CHAPTER 186 Licensing of Motor Vehicles, Operators and Trailers

General Provisions

186.005. Policy on regulation and registration of vehicles — License plates.

  1. It is declared to be the policy of this Commonwealth that all vehicles should be regulated, registered, and the laws pertaining thereto be administered by the Transportation Cabinet. Motor vehicles other than commercial vehicles should be registered, regulated, and controlled by the Transportation Cabinet and the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet.
  2. All motor vehicles registered under the provisions of KRS 186.050(1) shall be on an annual basis and evidenced by a license plate whose registration designation is a combination of letters of the alphabet and Arabic numerical digits. These registration plates shall be issued for use during a multiyear period and validated for continued use the following year, or years, by affixing an appropriate insignia of plastic or adhesive material bearing the date of the new year.
  3. Unless otherwise specified, all motor vehicles shall have registration plates issued for use during a multiyear period and validated for continued use the following year, by affixing an appropriate insignia of plastic or adhesive material bearing the date of the new year.
  4. The Transportation Cabinet may promulgate regulations and prepare the proper insignia and forms, which forms shall include information required by the Transportation Cabinet.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 62, § 2; 1966, ch. 255, § 168; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(9); 1974, ch. 226, § 1; 1976, ch. 94, § 1; 1976, ch. 133, § 3; 1978, ch. 239, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1994, ch. 132, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 2007, ch. 85, § 189, effective June 26, 2007; 2021 ch. 53, § 1, effective June 29, 2021.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Effect of Adoption of KRS Ch. 186A.

The adoption of KRS Chapter 186A in conjunction with the existing provisions of this chapter, had the effect of changing the law of Kentucky from an equitable title state to a certificate of title state for the purposes of determining ownership of a motor vehicle for liability insurance requirements. The general law of sales is no longer applicable to such a situation because of the statute. Potts v. Draper, 864 S.W.2d 896, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 117 ( Ky. 1993 ).

2.Evidence of Ownership.

Compliance with the motor vehicle licensing statute of this chapter is not dispositive of ownership since ownership is a factual issue. Dixon v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 602 S.W.2d 173, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 240 ( Ky. 1980 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The owner of a motor vehicle may properly procure a loan on it and execute a lien thereon and have the lien recorded on the previous year’s registration during the grace period after January 1. OAG 63-1088 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Whiteside, Amending the Uniform Commercial Code, Introduction: Updating the Code. 51 Ky. L.J. 3 (1962).

Notes, Vehicular Registration in Kentucky: A Remnant of the Horse and Buggy Age, 69 Ky. L.J. 124 (1980-81).

186.010. Definitions for chapter.

As used in this chapter, unless otherwise indicated:

  1. “Cabinet,” as used in KRS 186.400 to 186.640 , means the Transportation Cabinet; except as specifically designated, “cabinet,” as used in KRS 186.020 to 186.270 , means the Transportation Cabinet only with respect to motor vehicles, other than commercial vehicles; “cabinet,” as used in KRS 186.020 to 186.270 , means the Department of Vehicle Regulation when used with respect to commercial vehicles;
  2. “Highway” means every way or place of whatever nature when any part of it is open to the use of the public, as a matter of right, license, or privilege, for the purpose of vehicular traffic;
  3. “Manufacturer” means any person engaged in manufacturing motor vehicles who will, under normal conditions during the year, manufacture or assemble at least ten (10) new motor vehicles;
  4. “Motor vehicle” means in KRS 186.020 to 186.260 , all vehicles, as defined in paragraph (a) of subsection (8) of this section, which are propelled otherwise than by muscular power. As used in KRS 186.400 to 186.640 , it means all vehicles, as defined in paragraph (b) of subsection (8) of this section, which are self-propelled. “Motor vehicle” shall not include a moped as defined in this section, but for registration purposes shall include low-speed vehicles and military surplus vehicles as defined in this section and vehicles operating under KRS 189.283 ;
  5. “Moped” means either a motorized bicycle whose frame design may include one (1) or more horizontal crossbars supporting a fuel tank so long as it also has pedals, or a motorized bicycle with a step-through type frame which may or may not have pedals rated no more than two (2) brake horsepower, a cylinder capacity not exceeding fifty (50) cubic centimeters, an automatic transmission not requiring clutching or shifting by the operator after the drive system is engaged, and capable of a maximum speed of not more than thirty (30) miles per hour;
  6. “Operator” means any person in actual control of a motor vehicle upon a highway;
    1. “Owner” means a person who holds the legal title of a vehicle or a person who pursuant to a bona fide sale has received physical possession of the vehicle subject to any applicable security interest. (7) (a) “Owner” means a person who holds the legal title of a vehicle or a person who pursuant to a bona fide sale has received physical possession of the vehicle subject to any applicable security interest.
    2. A vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale or lease, with the vendee or lessee entitled to possession of the vehicle, upon performance of the contract terms, for a period of three hundred sixty-five (365) days or more and with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession vested in the conditional vendee or lessee, or if a mortgagor of a vehicle is entitled to possession, the conditional vendee or lessee or mortgagor shall be deemed the owner.
    3. A licensed motor vehicle dealer who transfers physical possession of a motor vehicle to a purchaser pursuant to a bona fide sale, and complies with the requirements of KRS 186A.220 , shall not be deemed the owner of that motor vehicle solely due to an assignment to his dealership or a certificate of title in the dealership’s name. Rather, under these circumstances, ownership shall transfer upon delivery of the vehicle to the purchaser, subject to any applicable security interest;
    1. “Vehicle,” as used in KRS 186.020 to 186.260 , includes all agencies for the transportation of persons or property over or upon the public highways of this Commonwealth and all vehicles passing over or upon said highways, except electric low-speed scooters, road rollers, road graders, farm tractors, vehicles on which power shovels are mounted, such other construction equipment customarily used only on the site of construction and which is not practical for the transportation of persons or property upon the highways, such vehicles as travel exclusively upon rails, and such vehicles as are propelled by electric power obtained from overhead wires while being operated within any municipality or where said vehicles do not travel more than five (5) miles beyond the city limit of any municipality. (8) (a) “Vehicle,” as used in KRS 186.020 to 186.260 , includes all agencies for the transportation of persons or property over or upon the public highways of this Commonwealth and all vehicles passing over or upon said highways, except electric low-speed scooters, road rollers, road graders, farm tractors, vehicles on which power shovels are mounted, such other construction equipment customarily used only on the site of construction and which is not practical for the transportation of persons or property upon the highways, such vehicles as travel exclusively upon rails, and such vehicles as are propelled by electric power obtained from overhead wires while being operated within any municipality or where said vehicles do not travel more than five (5) miles beyond the city limit of any municipality.
    2. As used in KRS 186.400 to 186.640 , “vehicle” means every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway, except electric low-speed scooters, devices moved by human and animal power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks, or which derives its power from overhead wires;
  7. KRS 186.020 to 186.270 apply to motor vehicle licenses. KRS 186.400 to 186.640 apply to operator’s licenses;
  8. “Dealer” means any person engaging in the business of buying or selling motor vehicles;
  9. “Commercial vehicles” means all motor vehicles that are required to be registered under the terms of KRS 186.050 , but not including vehicles primarily designed for carrying passengers and having provisions for not more than nine (9) passengers (including driver), motorcycles, sidecar attachments, pickup trucks and passenger vans which are not being used for commercial or business purposes, and motor vehicles registered under KRS 186.060 ;
  10. “Resident” means any person who has established Kentucky as his or her state of domicile. Proof of residency shall include but not be limited to a deed or property tax bill, utility agreement or utility bill, or rental housing agreement. The possession by an operator of a vehicle of a valid Kentucky operator’s license shall be prima-facie evidence that the operator is a resident of Kentucky;
  11. “Special status individual” means:
    1. “Asylee” means any person lawfully present in the United States who possesses an I-94 card issued by the United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, on which it states “asylum status granted indefinitely pursuant to Section 208 of the Immigration & Nationality Act”;
    2. “K-1 status” means the status of any person lawfully present in the United States who has been granted permission by the United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service to enter the United States for the purpose of marrying a United States citizen within ninety (90) days from the date of that entry;
    3. “Refugee” means any person lawfully present in the United States who possesses an I-94 card issued by the United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, on which it states “admitted as a refugee pursuant to Section 207 of the Immigration & Nationality Act”; and
    4. “Paroled in the Public Interest” means any person lawfully present in the United States who possesses an I-94 card issued by the United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, on which it states “paroled pursuant to Section 212 of the Immigration & Nationality Act for an indefinite period of time”;
  12. “Instruction permit” includes both motor vehicle instruction permits and motorcycle instruction permits;
  13. “Motorcycle” means any motor driven vehicle that has a maximum speed that exceeds fifty (50) miles per hour, has a seat or saddle for the use of the operator, and is designed to travel on not more than three (3) wheels in contact with the ground, including vehicles on which the operator and passengers ride in an enclosed cab. Only for purposes of registration, “motorcycle” shall include a motor scooter, an alternative-speed motorcycle, and an autocycle as defined in this section, but shall not include a tractor or a moped as defined in this section;
  14. “Low-speed vehicle” means a motor vehicle that:
    1. Is self-propelled using an electric motor, combustion-driven motor, or a combination thereof;
    2. Is four (4) wheeled; and
    3. Is designed to operate at a speed not to exceed twenty-five (25) miles per hour as certified by the manufacturer;
  15. “Alternative-speed motorcycle” means a motorcycle that:
    1. Is self-propelled using an electric motor;
    2. Is three (3) wheeled;
    3. Has a fully enclosed cab and includes at least one (1) door for entry;
    4. Is designed to operate at a speed not to exceed forty (40) miles per hour as certified by the manufacturer; and
    5. Is not an autocycle as defined in this section;
  16. “Multiple-vehicle driving range” means an enclosed area that is not part of a highway or otherwise open to the public on which a number of motor vehicles may be used simultaneously to provide driver training under the supervision of one (1) or more driver training instructors;
  17. “Autocycle” means any motor vehicle that:
    1. Is equipped with a seat that does not require the operator to straddle or sit astride it;
    2. Is designed to travel on three (3) wheels in contact with the ground;
    3. Is designed to operate at a speed that exceeds forty (40) miles per hour as certified by the manufacturer;
    4. Allows the operator and passenger to ride either side-by-side or in tandem in a seating area that may be enclosed with a removable or fixed top;
    5. Is equipped with a three (3) point safety belt system;
    6. May be equipped with a manufacturer-installed air bags or a roll cage;
    7. Is designed to be controlled with a steering wheel and pedals; and
    8. Is not an alternative-speed motorcycle as defined in this section;
  18. “Military surplus vehicle” means a multipurpose wheeled surplus military vehicle that:
    1. Is not operated using continuous tracks;
    2. Was originally manufactured for and sold directly to the Armed Forces of the United States; and
    3. Was originally manufactured under the federally mandated requirements set forth in 49 C.F.R. sec. 571.7;
  19. “Livestock” means cattle, sheep, swine, goats, horses, alpacas, llamas, buffaloes, and any other animals of the bovine, ovine, porcine, caprine, equine, or camelid species;
  20. “Identity document” means an instruction permit, operator’s license, or personal identification card issued under KRS 186.4102 , 186.412 , 186.412 1, 186.4122 , and 186.4123 or a commercial driver’s license issued under KRS Chapter 281A;
  21. “Travel ID,” as it refers to an identity document, means a document that complies with Pub. L. No. 109-13, Title II;
  22. “Motor scooter” means a low-speed motorcycle that is:
    1. Equipped with wheels greater than sixteen (16) inches in diameter;
    2. Equipped with an engine greater than fifty (50) cubic centimeters;
    3. Designed to operate at a speed not to exceed fifty (50) miles per hour;
    4. Equipped with brake horsepower of two (2) or greater; and
    5. Equipped with a step-through frame or a platform for the operator’s feet; and
  23. “Alternative technology,” as used in KRS 186.400 to 186.640 , means methods used by the cabinet to facilitate the issuance of operator’s licenses and personal identification cards outside of the normal in-person application at a cabinet office, including but not limited to a cabinet mobile unit or online services.

HISTORY: 2739g-1, 2739m-33: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 78, § 1; 1950, ch. 190, §§ 1, 2; 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 7, Art. X, § 10; 1962, ch. 62, § 1; 1966, ch. 139, § 2; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IX, § 20(2), (7), (9); 1978, ch. 349, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 194, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 431, § 7, effective January 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 287, § 1, effective January 1, 1989; 1994, ch. 51, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2001, ch. 43, § 2, effective June 21, 2001; 2002, ch. 264, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2009, ch. 103, § 1, effective June 25, 2009; 2012, ch. 16, § 2, effective July 12, 2012; 2017 ch. 55, § 3, effective June 29, 2017; 2017 ch. 69, § 1, effective June 29, 2017; 2017 ch. 129, § 8, effective June 29, 2017; 2017 ch. 184, § 2, effective June 29, 2017; 2017 ch. 100, § 35, effective January 1, 2019; 2019 ch. 22, § 1, effective June 27, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 26, effective March 27, 2020.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective January 1, 2019, see the following section also numbered KRS 186.010 .

Sections 207, 208 and 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act referenced herein are compiled at 8 USCS §§ 1157, 1158 and 1182, respectively.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/29/2017). This statute was amended by 2017 Ky. Acts chs. 55, 69, 129, and 184, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

Law entitled “An Act to regulate, license and govern the use of motor vehicles,” did not violate Ky. Const., § 51, because of provisions fixing license fee and providing for disposition thereof. Smith v. Commonwealth, 175 Ky. 286 , 194 S.W. 367, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 334 ( Ky. 1917 ).

Law providing for regulation and licensing of motor vehicles and their use was not invalid on theory that, although enacted under police power, it imposed license fee exceeding cost of registration and supervision of vehicles, where primary purpose of act was to regulate motor vehicles and where proceeds of tax, which was not unreasonable one, after expenses of registration and supervision, went to upkeep of highways. Smith v. Commonwealth, 175 Ky. 286 , 194 S.W. 367, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 334 ( Ky. 1917 ) (decided under prior law).

2.Construction.

Law providing for licensing of motor vehicles and operator showed legislative intention to embrace therein all statutory law intended to be enacted pertaining to subject of regulating use of motor vehicles, licenses for operating same and collection and disbursement of license taxes from that source. Lewis v. James, 191 Ky. 769 , 231 S.W. 526, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 392 ( Ky. 1921 ).

Motor registration license acts, with their attached fees, are strictly police regulations and not revenue taxing acts. Harco Corp. v. Martin, 271 Ky. 572 , 112 S.W.2d 693, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1937 ).

If a motor vehicle transaction is to a licensed dealer intending the vehicle for resale, then the dealer must only comply with Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186A.220(1) to (4) in order to qualify for the exemption in Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186.010(7). Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 565 S.W.3d 550, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 449 ( Ky. 2018 ).

3.Highways.

Notwithstanding definition of “highway” in this section and KRS 189.010 , words main traveled portion of the highway in KRS 189.450 (1) apply only to highways outside cities and not to city streets. Kimble v. Standard Oil Co., 235 Ky. 169 , 30 S.W.2d 890, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 324 ( Ky. 1930 ), limited, Evans v. Lorenz, 454 S.W.2d 691, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1969 ) (decision prior to amendment of KRS 189.450 ).

4.Motor Vehicles.

Airplanes not being within broad definition of “automobiles” and “motor vehicles,” there was no liability for death of insured because of wrecking of airplane under policy covering accidents from wrecking of automobiles or motor driven cars. Monroe's Adm'r v. Federal Union Life Ins. Co., 251 Ky. 570 , 65 S.W.2d 680, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 912 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Compliance with registration laws is not dispositive of ownership since the provisions of this chapter governing licensing of motor vehicles are police measures and regulatory in nature. McKenzie v. Oliver, 571 S.W.2d 102, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 586 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

Because a moped was a “motor vehicle” in accordance with common and approved usage, and because defendant did not show that the legislature intended the definition in KRS 186.010(4) to apply to KRS ch. 189A, defendant was properly found guilty of driving under the influence under KRS 189A.010(1). Adams v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.3d 209, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 263 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

5.Vehicle.

A bicycle is a “vehicle” and a public alley a “highway” within the definitions of this section and under KRS 189.330 the driver of a bicycle about to enter an alley must yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on it. Thomas v. Dahl, 293 Ky. 808 , 170 S.W.2d 337, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 706 ( Ky. 1943 ).

KRS 186.045 which requires liens to be noted on the registration only applies to “vehicles” as defined in this section, which definition does not include mobile homes. Vanover v. Bank of Alexandria, 644 S.W.2d 948, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 274 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

6.Owner.

A conditional vendee does not use an insured automobile with the consent or permission of the conditional vendor, and hence, is ordinarily not within the coverage of an omnibus clause of a liability insurance policy issued on the vehicle. Cowles v. Rogers, 762 S.W.2d 414, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 182 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988), overruled in part, Wheeler v. Rogers, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 64 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1992).

Where there was an oral conditional sales agreement between the parties and no evidence was adduced that upon performance of his duty to pay the balance of the purchase price, the uninsured buyer did not have a right to possess the vehicle for a period of 365 days or more, buyer was deemed to have been the owner of the vehicle for purposes of KRS 186A.215(1), therefore, buyer was not insured within the meaning of the omnibus clause in seller’s insurance policy because seller did not own the vehicle on the date of the collision. Cowles v. Rogers, 762 S.W.2d 414, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 182 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988), overruled in part, Wheeler v. Rogers, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 64 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1992).

The auto seller was the owner of the vehicle involved in an accident that had been bought by the purchaser days earlier. Although the purchaser had driven the vehicle off of the auto seller’s lot a few days earlier, the auto seller did not meet both requirements of transferring ownership of the vehicle without assigning a certificate of title, set forth in KRS 186A.220(5), because the auto seller did not obtain the purchaser’s consent to file the certificate of title and other documents on the purchaser’s behalf and did not verify that the purchaser had obtained insurance on the vehicle before relinquishing possession. Gainsco Cos. v. Gentry, 191 S.W.3d 633, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 68 ( Ky. 2006 ).

The definition of “owner” in KRS 186.010 is not the correct definition to apply to vehicle forfeiture under the controlled substances chapter. While KRS ch. 218A does not specifically define “owner,” KRS 218A.405(1)(b) and (5)(b) define “interest in property” and “trustee.” Defining “owner” as one who has an interest in property when title is being held by another appropriately prevents a drug dealer from titling vehicles or other property in someone else’s name in order to use the property in illegal activity and escape forfeiture. Commonwealth v. Coffey, 247 S.W.3d 908, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 65 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Under KRS 186A.215 , title to a pickup truck transferred upon the seller’s and insured’s completion of the transfer of title and odometer statement on the certificate of title and the delivery of the completed form to the insured; KRS 186A.215 (4) allowed them a 15-day grace period after completion of the paperwork to file the certificate of title with the clerk. Therefore, the insured was the “owner” of the truck as defined by KRS 186.010(7)(a) at the time of an accident, and the truck was a “covered vehicle” under his insurance policy, Franklin v. Safe Auto Ins. Co., 290 S.W.3d 69, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 58 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Since the auction dealer was not an operator of either vehicle, the estate’s claims were properly dismissed. Savage v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2021 Ky. App. LEXIS 8 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2021).

7.— Liability.

Alleged conditional sales agreement for the purchase of a vehicle was invalid and used car dealer was deemed to be owner of the vehicle and responsible for insurance coverage on the vehicle when it was involved in a collision where used car dealer, in an effort to facilitate potential repossession of the vehicle, did not transfer title of the vehicle to the buyers, where dealer renewed the registration in his own name when the vehicle’s license expired and did not advise the county clerk that he had “sold” the vehicle to the buyers, and where county clerk, in reliance on dealer’s omnibus policy, did not require proof of insurance. Rogers v. Wheeler, 864 S.W.2d 892, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 132 ( Ky. 1993 ).

Where an auto dealer had not assigned the title to a car sold to purchasers until after it was involved in an accident, the dealer’s insurer’s uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage was primary; the dealer had legal title and was the owner until it complied with the title assignment provisions of KRS 186A.220(5). Kelly v. McFarland, 243 F. Supp. 2d 715, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25018 (E.D. Ky. 2001 ).

In a case involving the repossession of a leased car, because KRS 186.010(7)(b) made the lessee of a vehicle the “owner” for insurance purposes, the lessees of the leased car were considered the owners of the leased car, and their insurance policy provided primary coverage for the accident that occurred when the car was repossessed. Std. Fire Ins. Co. v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 234 S.W.3d 377, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 316 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

8.Conditional Sale.

This section does not contemplate or authorize a conditional sale without transfer of title. The language used in the statute is intended to distinguish those leases which in reality are sales, or at the option of the leasee can be converted into a sale from a short term lease of less than 365 days with no right of purchase. Certainly conditional sales can be appropriate, but the vendor cannot disregard other statutes which are universal and compulsory in nature. Rogers v. Wheeler, 864 S.W.2d 892, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 132 ( Ky. 1993 ).

Authorization of a short-term conditional sale without transfer of title so long as the dealer insured the vehicle directly conflicts with KRS 186A.220(5). Rogers v. Wheeler, 864 S.W.2d 892, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 132 ( Ky. 1993 ).

A conditional sales contract is one where title is retained by the seller in order to secure payment by the purchaser. Once payment has been made in full, then the title is to be transferred to the purchaser pursuant to the terms of the agreement. Potts v. Draper, 864 S.W.2d 896, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 117 ( Ky. 1993 ).

Transaction was not a conditional sale since used car dealer was not holding title to the van until full performance of the contract terms by the buyers where dealer transferred title to buyers one week after accident occurred even though they never finished paying for the van; therefore, where title had been assigned to used car dealer and the transaction between used car dealer and buyer was not a conditional sale, and where insurer insured all motor vehicles owned by used car dealer, van was insured by used car dealer’s insurer on the day of the collision. Potts v. Draper, 864 S.W.2d 896, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 117 ( Ky. 1993 ).

Under the Uniform Commercial Code, KRS 355.1-203, an agreement between a trust and a debtor constituted a security interest rather than an unexpired lease, as the rental payments over the term of the agreement reflected a purchase price of the vehicles with interest; nor was the agreement an executory contract as defined by 11 U.S.C.S. 365, as the debtor had no continuing obligations under the agreement other than payment. Further, under the Motor Vehicle Registration Act, KRS 186.010(7)(b), a conditional lessee, such as the debtor, could be considered the owner for the purposes of registering the vehicle, which the undisputed evidence showed was done, rendering the trust’s reliance on KRS 186A.215 inapplicable. Magdovitz Family Trust v. KY USA Energy, Inc. (In re KY USA Energy, Inc.), 449 B.R. 745, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1993 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2011 ).

9.Certificate of Title.

Kentucky is a certificate of title state in which the titling statutes control ownership of a motor vehicle for liability insurance purposes in the absence of a valid conditional sale. Potts v. Draper, 864 S.W.2d 896, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 117 ( Ky. 1993 ).

KRS 186A.220(5) permits the customary practice of dealers in Kentucky of taking the applicable documents to the clerk’s office on behalf of the buyer, and so long as the seller and buyer complete the necessary paperwork at the time of the sale and then one of the parties promptly submits papers to the county clerk, title passes at the time of the sale for liability insurance purposes; thus, auto dealer following customary practice was relieved of all of its duties, including the responsibility to provide liability insurance prior to date of buyer’s accident. Stigall v. Fourth St. Auto Co., 922 S.W.2d 752, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 97 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

Where debtor purchased a pickup truck from a dealer but the dealer refused to deliver certificate of title after debtor filed Chapter 7 petition, plain language of Kentucky's registration and titling system provided that debtor was rightful owner of truck on petition date. Palmer v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc. (In re Lainhart), 566 B.R. 464, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 292 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2017 ).

10.Public Highway.

Word “any” preceding public highway indicated in law providing for regulation and licensing of motor vehicles and their use, any kind of public highway lawfully dedicated to public use, whether it was a state road, county road, street or alley. Forgy v. Rutledge, 167 Ky. 182 , 180 S.W. 90, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 826 ( Ky. 1915 ) (decided under prior law).

Cited:

Washington Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Burke, 258 S.W.2d 709, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 878 , 38 A.L.R.2d 861 ( Ky. 1953 ); Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vanover, 506 S.W.2d 517, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 758 ( Ky. 1974 ); Department of Revenue ex rel. Carpenter v. Pullman, Inc. (Trailmobile Div.), 560 S.W.2d 18, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 875 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); American Interinsurance Exchange v. Norton, 631 S.W.2d 851, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 207 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982); Nantz v. Lexington Lincoln Mercury Subaru, 947 S.W.2d 36, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 71 ( Ky. 1997 ); In re Skeans, — B.R. —, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 693 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2003 ); Revenue Cabinet v. O’Daniel, 153 S.W.3d 815, 2005 Ky. LEXIS 19 ( Ky. 2005 ); Best v. West Am. Ins. Co., 270 S.W.3d 398, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 300 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Opinions of Attorney General.

To determine whether a bank or finance company is a “dealer” needing a license and a dealer’s registration tag in disposing of automobiles on which there is a deficiency, the definition in KRS 139.110(1)(c) is used. OAG 62.954.

A peace officer has authority to stop the operator of a motor bike for the purpose of determining whether or not the operator has the required license where it appears the operator is under the age of 16. OAG 65-354 .

The operation of a motorcycle by a person under 16 along the shoulder of a highway in Kentucky is prohibited and constitutes the offense of operation of a motor vehicle without a permit. OAG 69-356 .

A minibike is a motor vehicle within the definition of this section. OAG 70-416 .

A section of a public park, not paved or laid out, in lanes and leading nowhere, designed for use by minibikes only but open to anyone with a minibike, would be a “highway,” requiring the operator to have an operator’s license. OAG 71-272 .

To use a minibike trail set up in a public park and constituting a “highway,” an operator’s license would be required even if the area were open only to members of a club. OAG 71-272 .

An enclosed pedal powered tricycle is not a motor vehicle within the current definition and neither the motor vehicle registration statutes nor the motor vehicle usage tax statutes are applicable to this tricycle. OAG 74-244 .

The “El Camino” and “Sprint” are pick-up trucks and should be registered as trucks. OAG 74-302 .

A motorcycle, trailbike or minibike is a motor vehicle as defined by the provisions of subsections (4) and (7) (now (8)) of this section and a person operating such a vehicle upon a street is required to have an operator’s license. OAG 74-796 .

While OAG 75-113 advised that it would be reasonable for the county clerk to refuse to transfer title to a vehicle titled in the names of “John and/or Mary Jones” unless both parties signed the authorization to transfer, it is equally reasonable for the clerk to act upon only one signature and where an automobile is owned by a father and his son, the son being in the military and unable to sign the authorization, and the clerk refuses to transfer the title upon the father’s signature only, the father’s proper course of action is either to obtain a power of attorney from the son or to institute legal action to determine the father’s right to transfer the title based upon his signature alone. OAG 75-448 .

Where the bill of sale of an automobile reads “John Doe and Mary Doe,” if both original owners are alive then both owners should sign the bill of transfer. OAG 76-371 .

Where the bill of sale of an automobile reads “John Doe or Mary Doe,” if John and Mary wish to sell either signature is sufficient; however, if John dies, then Mary takes the entire title by survivorship and if she wants to sell the car, her signature alone on the bill of sale is sufficient as a survivor with full title. OAG 76-371 .

Where the bill of sale for an automobile reads “John Doe and Mary Doe,” the owners are joint owners of an undivided one-half interest and if one spouse dies then the bill of sale of a subsequent transfer would require the signature of the living spouse and the owner of the other undivided one-half interest by heirship or by will and such latter interest should be supported by a proper county court order, affidavit of descent or will. OAG 76-371 .

Where the bill of sale of an automobile reads “John and Mary Doe” and John dies and a dispense order under KRS 395.455 is issued, and Mary does not wish to sell the car, Mary would not have to sign a bill of sale for her undivided one-half interest and the buyer would have to look to the court order issued under KRS 395.455 for the proper signatory in connection with the other undivided one-half interest, assuming that the estate owner is someone other than Mary. OAG 76-371 .

Where the bill of sale of an automobile reads “John and/or Mary Doe” the clerk has the option of deciding that “and/or” means “and” or “or” depending on the circumstances of each case and as bearing on the intent of the parties. OAG 76-372 .

A snowmobile is not a motor vehicle under the definition found in subsections (4), (7a) (now (8)(a)) and 7(b) (now (8)(b)) of this section, nor is it a motorcycle as defined by KRS 189.285(4). OAG 79-85 .

A golf cart is neither a motor vehicle as defined in this section nor a motorcycle as defined in KRS 189.285 ; a golf cart is an off-road vehicle which is covered by the provisions of KRS 189.860 , and therefor, a golf cart cannot be licensed to operate on a public highway or the shoulder of a highway. OAG 80-251 .

Because the definition of “vehicles” in this section specifically excludes farm tractors, they need not be licensed in order to be driven on Kentucky’s public highways. OAG 82-213 .

A moped cannot be licensed, and the maximum speed limit for mopeds is 30 miles per hour. OAG 84-176 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Lee, An Analysis of Kentucky’s New Exemption Law, B Property Exempt, 5 Motor Vehicles, 55 Ky. L.J. 618 (1967).

Note, Kentucky No-Fault: An Analysis and Interpretation, 65 Ky. L.J. 466 (1976-77).

Notes, Vehicular Registration in Kentucky: A Remnant of the Horse and Buggy Age, 69 Ky. L.J. 124 (1980-81).

186.014. Branch offices for issuance of licenses.

In any county, the county clerk and the circuit clerk may maintain branch offices in each legislative district for the purpose of issuing motor vehicle registration plates and drivers’ licenses. These offices may be located in volunteer fire department stations or in other buildings used for a public purpose.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 55, § 2.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since the legislature intended that legislative district should mean state representative district, this section permits the county clerk of Knott County to establish one branch office in the county for the purpose of issuing license plates during the vehicle license period, but would not empower him to take license plates into each voting precinct for that purpose. The one branch office could be located at the voting place in a precinct provided that the voting place is a building used for a public purpose. OAG 73-435 .

Except in the case of counties of less than 150,000 population containing a city of the second class, this section is the only authority under which a county court clerk may establish a branch office outside of the county seat. OAG 73-545 .

A branch office for the issuance of drivers’ licenses may not be located in a shopping center unless it is located in a building used for a public purpose as required by this section. OAG 75-346 .

The intent of this section was to provide that the county clerk or the circuit clerk may maintain two or more branch offices, as needed in each state representative district in the county, since the conjunctive word “and” may be construed in the disjunctive when necessary to effectuate the obvious intention of the legislature. OAG 82-43 (modifying OAG 73-435 ).

Population density and convenience to motor vehicle owners in licensing motor vehicles were at the forefront of legislative intent in enacting this section; accordingly, the county clerk, depending upon the need for same under the above contextual criteria, may maintain two or more branch offices in each legislative district. OAG 82-43 (modifying OAG 73-435 ).

This section narrowly relates to only the issuance of motor vehicle license plates, as concerns the county clerk, while subsection (1) of KRS 67.035 is designed to accommodate any other function of the county clerk in the county; accordingly, assuming that Pike County has a land area of more than 750 square miles, the fiscal court of Pike County may authorize the county clerk to maintain a branch office in any incorporated (other than in Pikeville) or unincorporated city of Pike County but only on a reasonable showing of the necessity for such branches. OAG 82-43 .

186.015. License plates and operators’ licenses for residents of Fort Knox. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 26, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

186.016. Cabinet may prescribe methods of record keeping.

Notwithstanding the provisions of this chapter, the cabinet may by regulation prescribe methods of record keeping and reporting by the county clerk to the cabinet.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 133, § 19; 1978, ch. 384, § 329, effective June 17, 1978.

186.018. Driving history records of operators — Fees.

  1. For purposes of maintaining driving history records of operators of motor vehicles of the Commonwealth, the files of the Transportation Cabinet shall be used to ascertain the driving history record of each person who is licensed to operate a motor vehicle within the Commonwealth. Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the Transportation Cabinet shall destroy, and shall not maintain, records of moving traffic convictions that are more than five (5) years old. Notwithstanding, for any licensee who now holds, who has applied for, or has ever held a Class A, B, or C license issued pursuant to KRS 281A.170 , the cabinet shall keep conviction records indefinitely.
  2. The Transportation Cabinet shall not release information on the driving history record of a person under the age of twenty-one (21) whose operator license has been suspended pursuant to KRS 189A.010(6). The cabinet shall destroy, and shall not maintain, the record of the suspension of a person’s operator’s license if the license was suspended pursuant to KRS 189A.010(6), within five (5) working days of the person’s operator’s license being reinstated. This subsection shall not apply to a person who holds, or is required to hold, a commercial driver’s license.
  3. The cabinet shall charge a fee of three dollars ($3) for any driving history record, ten cents ($0.10) of which shall be deposited in a special account within the road fund to be used exclusively by the Transportation Cabinet for the state driver education program as designated in KRS 186.535 .

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 434, § 3, effective June 17, 1978; 1990, ch. 455, § 28, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 274, § 9, effective April 7, 1992; 1996, ch. 198, § 11, effective October 1, 1996; 2000, ch. 467, § 20, effective October 1, 2000; 2005, ch. 165, § 2, effective June 20, 2005.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Use as Evidence.

While subsection (1) of former KRS 422.020 and CR 44.01 permit the use of properly certified copies of public records to serve as prima facie evidence of their contents, the information appearing in the Transportation Cabinet’s records was wholly inadequate to prove the defendants’ prior convictions for driving under the influence for enhancement purposes under KRS 189A.010 . Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 445, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1203 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986), limited, Osborne v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 484, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993), overruled, Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1996 ).

A certified copy of the “Driving History Record” maintained by the Transportation Cabinet, Division of Driver Licensing, may not be utilized as evidence of prior convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol at trial of a subsequent D.U.I. offense. Commonwealth v. Willis, 719 S.W.2d 440, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 327 ( Ky. 1986 ), overruled, Commonwealth v. Duncan, 939 S.W.2d 336, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 1997 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Acts 1978, chapter 434 as enrolled (without house amendment number 6) and signed by the presiding officers of both houses and which became law without the governor’s signature represents the law on the question as enacted at the 1978 general assembly. OAG 78-283 .

One may review the driving records of specific individuals where these records go beyond three years but less than the five-year time limit expressed by the General Assembly; however, this review excludes records of violations prohibited by KRS 187.310 . OAG 89-78 .

Motor Vehicle Licenses

186.020. Registration requirement — Application for registration — Application and other documents to be sent to Transportation Cabinet — Renewal by mail — Extension of renewal period for military personnel stationed outside United States.

  1. Before the owner of a motor vehicle, other than a motor vehicle engaged in the transportation of passengers for hire operating under a certificate of convenience and necessity, may operate it or permit its operation upon a highway, the owner shall apply for registration in accordance with administrative regulations promulgated by the cabinet, except that a person who purchases a motor vehicle, or brings a motor vehicle into the Commonwealth from another state shall make application for registration within fifteen (15) days. The bill of sale or assigned title must be in the motor vehicle during this fifteen (15) day period. If the owner of a motor vehicle is an individual and resides in the Commonwealth, the motor vehicle shall be registered with the county clerk of the county in which he resides. If the owner of a motor vehicle does not reside in the Commonwealth, the motor vehicle shall be registered with the county clerk of the county in which the motor vehicle is principally operated. If the owner of a motor vehicle is other than an individual and resides in the Commonwealth, the motor vehicle shall be registered with the county clerk of either county. The application when presented to the county clerk for registration shall be accompanied by:
    1. A bill of sale and a manufacturer’s certificate of origin if the application is for the registration of a new motor vehicle;
    2. The owner’s registration receipt, if the motor vehicle was last registered in this state;
    3. A bill of sale and the previous registration receipt, if last registered in another state where the law of that state does not require the owner of a motor vehicle to obtain a certificate of title or ownership;
    4. A certificate of title, if last registered in another state where the law of that state requires the owner of a motor vehicle to obtain a certificate of title or ownership;
    5. An affidavit from an officer of a local government saying that the motor vehicle has been abandoned and that the provisions of KRS 82.630 have been complied with, for local governments which elect to use the provisions of KRS 82.600 to 82.640 ; and
    6. The application from a person who has brought a motor vehicle into the Commonwealth from another state shall be accompanied by proof that the motor vehicle is insured in compliance with KRS 304.39-080 .
  2. After that, except as provided in subsection (6) of this section, the owner of any motor vehicle registered under KRS 186.050(1) or (2) shall register his motor vehicle on or before the date on which his certificate of registration expires. If, before operating the motor vehicle in this state, the owner registers it at some later date and pays the fee for the full year, he or she will be deemed to have complied with the law. Insofar as the owner is concerned, registration with the clerk shall be deemed to be registration with the cabinet.
  3. After that, the owner of any commercial vehicle registered under KRS 186.050(3) to (14) shall register the commercial vehicle on or before April 1 of each year. If, before operating a commercial vehicle in this state, the owner registers it at some later date and pays the required fee, he or she will be deemed to have complied with the law. Insofar as the owner is concerned, registration with the clerk shall be deemed to be registration with the cabinet, except the owner of any commercial motor vehicle to be registered pursuant to the International Registration Plan under KRS 186.050(13) shall register the commercial motor vehicles on or before the last day of the month of registration established pursuant to KRS 186.051(3).
  4. The application and documents presented therewith, including the sheriff’s certificate of inspection, shall be affixed to the Transportation Cabinet copy of the certificate of title or registration and sent to the Transportation Cabinet by the clerk.
  5. At least forty-five (45) days prior to the expiration of registration of any motor vehicle previously registered in the Commonwealth as provided by KRS 186A.035 , the owner of the vehicle shall be notified by mail on the same notice required by KRS 134.805(5) of the date of expiration. In addition, the department shall provide appropriate forms and information to permit renewal of motor vehicle registration to be completed by mail. Any registration renewal by mail shall require payment of an additional two dollar ($2) fee which shall be received by the county clerk. Nonreceipt of the notice herein shall not constitute a defense to any registration related offense.
    1. If an individual has been serving in the United States military stationed or assigned to a base or other location outside the boundaries of the United States, he or she shall renew the registration on the vehicle within thirty (30) days of his or her return if: (6) (a) If an individual has been serving in the United States military stationed or assigned to a base or other location outside the boundaries of the United States, he or she shall renew the registration on the vehicle within thirty (30) days of his or her return if:
      1. The motor vehicle has been stored on a military base during the time of deployment and has not been operated on the public highways during that time; and
      2. The vehicle’s registration expired during the individual’s absence.
    2. An individual who meets the criteria in paragraph (a) of this subsection shall not be convicted or cited for driving a vehicle with expired registration within thirty (30) days after the individual’s return to the Commonwealth if the individual can provide proof of meeting the eligibility criteria under paragraph (a) of this subsection.
    3. When an individual presents evidence of meeting the criteria under paragraph (a) of this subsection when applying to renew the registration on the motor vehicle, the county clerk shall, when applicable, treat the registration as a prorated renewal under KRS 186.051 , and charge the individual a registration fee only for the number of months of the registration year the vehicle will be used on the public highways.

History. 2739g-2a, 2739g-9: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 208, § 1; 1954, ch. 153, § 1; 1958, ch. 82, § 1; 1966, ch. 139, § 3; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(2); 1976, ch. 133, § 4; 1978, ch. 239, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 296, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 203, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 416, § 9, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 363, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 431, § 9, effective July 15, 1986; 1994, ch. 428, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 97, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 1996, ch. 341, § 4, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 153, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 565, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2006, ch. 252, Pt. XXVIII, § 14, effective April 25, 2006; 2009, ch. 10, § 65, effective January 1, 2010.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1.Application.

This section does not apply to common carrier of passengers by motorbus. Furste v. Dixie Traction Co., 286 Ky. 336 , 150 S.W.2d 913, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 265 ( Ky. 1941 ).

2.Registration.

Where amendment to law providing for registration of vehicles changed time of registration from “on or before the first day of January of each and every year” to “on or before the first day of March of each and every year” law did not change the registration year so as to make it begin on March 1 instead of January 1, but merely gave automobile owners a two-month grace period during which they might continue to operate an automobile registered for the previous year. Martin v. Louisville Motors, 276 Ky. 696 , 125 S.W.2d 241, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 584 ( Ky. 1939 ).

3.— Compliance.

Although this section respecting registration and transfer of motor vehicles did not expressly provide that sale by method different from that prescribed was void, it made sale without compliance a misdemeanor with penalty, and required compliance for registration. Boden v. Harter, 240 Ky. 138 , 41 S.W.2d 920, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 354 ( Ky. 1931 ).

4.— Noncompliance.

Noncompliance with statute regulating registration and sale of automobiles did not invalidate sale, statute being police measure, regulatory in character, and neither compliance nor noncompliance being conclusive as to ownership of car. Moore v. Wilson, 230 Ky. 49 , 18 S.W.2d 873, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 15 ( Ky. 1929 ).

5.— Evidence of Ownership.

Registration and transfer records in county clerk’s office made jury question as to ownership of attached automobile, but were not conclusive. Crook v. Blackburn, 254 Ky. 405 , 71 S.W.2d 986, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 17 ( Ky. 1932 ).

This section being a police measure, neither compliance nor noncompliance therewith is conclusive as to ownership; and one claiming ownership may show, except as against innocent third persons, that his seller was true owner although not holding under statutorily prescribed bill of sale. Higginbotham v. Higginbotham's Trustee in Bankruptcy, 253 Ky. 218 , 69 S.W.2d 329, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 632 ( Ky. 1934 ).

The fact that a truck was licensed in partnership’s name raises a presumption that it was owned by partnership. Vansant v. Holbrook's Adm'r, 285 Ky. 88 , 146 S.W.2d 337, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 595 ( Ky. 1940 ).

The mere fact that a vehicle is registered in the name of another is immaterial as to responsibility for damages since the statute providing for such regulation is a regulatory police measure and compliance or noncompliance with this section is not conclusive of ownership. Beardsley v. Broach, 310 S.W.2d 539, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 396 ( Ky. 1958 ).

The registration of an automobile is prima facie but not conclusive evidence of title in the party in whose name the car is registered and the same may be said in regard to the licensing of the car for operation on the public ways. Siler v. Williford, 350 S.W.2d 704, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 129 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Where a wife was injured while riding in a car driven by her husband, the bill of sale for the car was made to the wife, the conditional sales contract for the car was made by her, and the car was licensed in her name, the statements of the husband and wife that the car was owned by their son were not sufficient to overcome the presumption raised by the documents that she owned it. Siler v. Williford, 350 S.W.2d 704, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 129 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Compliance or noncompliance with the provisions of this section is not conclusive as to the ownership of a car. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 357 S.W.2d 548, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 25 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Where evidence did not show defendant was owner of the vehicle in question and ownership is a necessary element as to this section and KRS 186.170 then evidence did not sustain the charges of improper registration and plates. Toppass v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 587, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 133 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).

6.Bill of Sale.

In action upon notary’s bond, it was jury question whether his certification on bill of sale which owner had signed and delivered to sales agent, but had not acknowledged, was proximate cause of loss of automobile, when agent wrongfully obtained notary’s certification, procured transfer of automobile to himself and sold it to bona fide purchaser. Boden v. Harter, 240 Ky. 138 , 41 S.W.2d 920, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 354 ( Ky. 1931 ).

Notary’s deliberate and wrongful act in placing his certification upon bill of sale signed by owner and given to his sales agent but not sworn to, thus enabling agent to transfer automobile to his own name, sell it to bona fide purchaser, and convert proceeds, was violation of notary’s official duty and of his bond, for which he was liable. American Surety Co. v. Boden, 243 Ky. 805 , 50 S.W.2d 10, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 202 ( Ky. 1932 ).

7.Liability for Nonregistration.

Although owner of passenger motor truck operated for hire failed to register his machine and employed an unlicensed chauffeur, his failure to comply with statute would not bar recovery for injuries in rear-end collision, caused by defendant’s negligence, and not contributed to by plaintiff’s failure to meet statute. Moore v. Hart, 171 Ky. 725 , 188 S.W. 861, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 432 ( Ky. 1916 ) (decided under prior law).

Insurer was not liable under automobile policy against loss by fire, excluding liability while automobile was being operated by person prohibited by law from driving or while being driven contrary to law, if, at time of fire, driver was unlicensed, automobile had not been registered, and registration plates had not been issued to insured. Standard Auto Ins. Ass'n v. Neal, 199 Ky. 699 , 251 S.W. 966, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 916 ( Ky. 1923 ).

Failure to register truck by one who had paid for it but was not sure of having received bill of sale pursuant to KRS 186.200 did not preclude recovery for injuries received in operating it. Pickering v. Simpkins, 271 Ky. 288 , 111 S.W.2d 650, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 223 ( Ky. 1937 ).

Vendee must register himself as owner. Otherwise subsequent mortgagee of vendor without notice is not affected. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Collinsworth, 288 Ky. 398 , 156 S.W.2d 157, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 102 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Cited:

Green v. Moore, 281 Ky. 305 , 135 S.W.2d 682, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 33 ( Ky. 1939 ); Department of Revenue ex rel. Scent v. Williams, 351 S.W.2d 875, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 186 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

1.Registration.
2.— Noncompliance.

Unpublished decision: District court properly declined to dismiss based on qualified immunity a driver’s 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 claims against police officers in their individual capacities. Based on the driver’s allegations of racial profiling and disparate treatment during a traffic stop, the driver sufficiently plead a claim that the officers denied him equal protection of the laws; the district court’s finding that the officers had probable cause to stop the driver and issue him a citation for improper vehicle registration, KRS 186.020 , did not defeat the driver’s equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, as it did the illegal search and seizure claim under the Fourth Amendment. High v. Fuchs, 74 Fed. Appx. 499, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 17933 (6th Cir. Ky. 2003 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

No officer, agent or employe of the Commonwealth has authority to confiscate license plates issued by another state to a person who drives a car bearing those plates into Kentucky regardless of the fact that the person’s driver’s license was revoked by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. OAG 60-1055 .

If the registrant is a bona fide resident of the county wherein the vehicle is registered, the registration is valid for that year even though the registrant should become a resident of another county during that year. OAG 61-219 .

In an action brought against a person believed to be in violation of this section or KRS 186.210 , the burden of proof would be on the prosecuting attorney to show that the registrant was not a bona fide resident of the county of registration. OAG 61-219 .

Registrations are valid where a vendee purchases a vehicle from an individual vendor or dealer-vendor who registered the vehicle in a county other than the county of residence of the purchaser. OAG 61-219 .

Should the registrant be a bona fide resident of the county wherein the vehicle is registered at the time of registration, the registration of that vehicle is valid for that year of registration should the registrant become a resident of another county during that year. OAG 61-220 .

Should a resident of one county purchase a vehicle after January 1, wherein the purchased vehicle has already been registered in another county for that year by the individual vendor or dealer-vendor, the purchaser need not reregister the vehicle in his own county for that year. OAG 61-220 .

If a city has adopted the county assessments and due date, a receipt must be presented to the county clerk for the payment of city taxes due on a motor vehicle before such vehicle can be registered and licensed. OAG 61-827 .

The county clerk is required to keep the manufacturer’s certificate of origin and the previous registration certificate and cannot return them to the owner. OAG 63-955 .

The motor vehicle usage tax was due on the transfer of a car from father to son upon the son’s reaching the age of 21. OAG 68-326 .

A Kentucky resident could not borrow and operate for a period greater than five days a motor vehicle owned and licensed by a resident of Missouri if the Kentucky resident intended to remain in the state of Kentucky. OAG 73-678 .

There is presently no statutory or constitutional authority for the county clerk to impose the condition of showing a tax receipt before a registration is effected, as the registration provisions contain no such condition of tax prepayment and receipt. OAG 74-3 .

Where a sheriff sells an automobile under an execution, and the registration receipt is not available, the sheriff should give the purchaser a bill of sale indicating the authority by which he is conveying the vehicle and the clerk shall register the vehicle without requiring the surrender of the registration receipt. OAG 74-727 .

The “owner” of a motor vehicle is simply one holding legal title and the county clerk, in administering the transfer statute, is in a ministerial role and is not required to pass “judicially” on the title question and the bill of sale designation of owners as “John and/or Mary Jones” raises the presumption of joint holding of title and the clerk would be acting reasonably in requiring both signatures on a bill of sale in order to transfer the car under the circumstances. OAG 75-113 .

A motor vehicle purchased in another state or brought from another state into Kentucky may be operated in Kentucky for a five-day period without being registered either in the other state or in Kentucky. OAG 75-282 .

This section and 186.061 , when read together, make it mandatory for a volunteer fire protection district to register all of its motor vehicles, including fire trucks, owned exclusively by such district, and which are to operate on the public roads in Kentucky. OAG 76-454 .

An automobile dealer would violate this section by placing the wrong address of the purchaser on the bill of sale which would lead to registration and licensing that was false. OAG 76-653 .

Where a county court clerk is presented with a statement of origin to a motor vehicle or trailer properly assigned and with a lien in favor of some financial institution typed on the statement of origin but no security agreement is presented, if the application for registration is made as provided in this section and is accompanied by the applicable document or documents required by subsection (1) of this section the clerk is required to register the motor vehicle regardless of whether or not a security agreement is presented, for the proper filing of a security agreement under KRS 186.050 is a matter independent of the basic matter of registration of the motor vehicle. OAG 77-220 .

The proper filing of a security agreement under this section is a matter independent of the basic matter of registration of a motor vehicle under this section. OAG 77-220 .

Where a car was purchased from a private owner on December 31, 1977, but where the buyer did not take the registration certificate to the county clerk until January 7, 1978, only one transfer fee would be required to be paid. OAG 78-91 .

Because the definition of “vehicles” in KRS 186.010 specifically excludes farm tractors, they need not be licensed in order to be driven on Kentucky’s public highways. OAG 82-213 .

A motor vehicle may be legally sold to a minor of at least 16 years of age, as relates to the county clerk’s effecting a transfer and registration; thus where the vehicle owner of title is 17 years of age, there is no prohibition against the clerk’s transferring (if applicable) and registering such vehicle in the minor’s name. OAG 83-376 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

“Cabinet” defined, KRS 186.010(1).

Motor vehicle not to be registered unless equipped with:

Safety glass, KRS 189.120 .

Seat belt anchors, KRS 189.125 .

Motor vehicle use tax, KRS 138.450 to 138.470 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Garrison and Martin, History of Kentucky Commercial Motor Vehicle Transportation Tax Legislation, I, 33 Ky. L.J. 3 (1944).

Garrison and Martin, History of Kentucky Commercial Motor Vehicle Transportation Tax Legislation, II, 33 Ky. L.J. 3 (1944).

Coldiron, Statutory Interpretation — Department of Revenue v. McIlwain, 35 Ky. L.J. 352 (1947).

Kripke, Kentucky Modernizes the Law of Chattel Security, 48 Ky. L.J. 396 (1960).

Whiteside, Lewis, Kentucky’s Commercial Code — Some Initial Problems in Security, the Lincoln Bank Case, 50 Ky. L.J. 61 (1961).

Whiteside, Amending the Uniform Commercial Code, Introduction; Updating the Code, 51 Ky. L.J. 3 (1962).

Fitzgerald, Special Comment — The Crazy Quilt of Commercial Law: A Study in Legislative Patchwork, the Nature of the Latest Patch, 54 Ky. L.J. 85 (1965).

Note, Kentucky No-Fault: An Analysis and Interpretation, 65 Ky. L.J. 466 (1976-77).

Notes, Vehicular Registration in Kentucky: A Remnant of the Horse and Buggy Age, 69 Ky. L.J. 124 (1980-81).

186.021. Issuance of replacement plate, decal, registration certificate, or renewal for motor vehicle on which ad valorem taxes are delinquent or which is uninsured — Option of purchaser to pay delinquent taxes.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, a county clerk shall not issue a replacement plate, decal, or registration certificate as provided in KRS 186.180 , or a registration for renewal to any person who on January 1 of any year owned a motor vehicle on which state, county, city, urban-county government, school, or special taxing district ad valorem taxes are delinquent.
  2. Pursuant to KRS 134.810(4), the owner as defined in KRS 186.010(7)(a) and (c) on January 1 of any year shall be liable for taxes due on a motor vehicle. A person other than the owner of record who applies to a county clerk to transfer the registration of a motor vehicle may pay any delinquent ad valorem taxes due on the motor vehicle to facilitate the county clerk’s transferring registration of the motor vehicle. The person applying shall not be required to pay delinquent ad valorem taxes due on any other motor vehicle owned by the owner of record from which he is purchasing his motor vehicle as a condition of registration.
  3. A county clerk shall not issue a replacement plate, decal, or registration certificate as provided in KRS 186.180 , or a registration renewal for any motor vehicle that is not insured in compliance with KRS 304.39-080 . Each applicant for registration renewal shall present proof of compliance to the county clerk in a manner prescribed in administrative regulations issued by the Department of Insurance. On and after January 1, 2006, if the motor vehicle is a personal motor vehicle as defined in KRS 304.39-087 , proof of insurance shall be determined by the county clerk as provided in KRS 186A.042 .

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 264, § 14, effective January 1, 1984; 1984, ch. 54, § 8, effective January 1, 1985; 1984, ch. 129, § 1, effective January 1, 1985; 1984, ch. 391, § 7, effective January 1, 1985; 1988, ch. 113, § 7, effective December 31, 1988; 1994, ch. 20, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2002, ch. 316, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2004, ch. 130, § 6, effective July 13, 2004; 2010, ch. 24, § 233, effective July 15, 2010.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2002). The amendments made to subsection (2) of this statute in 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 316, sec. 1, “shall apply for tax assessments made on or after January 1, 2003.” 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 316, sec. 5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

The motorist’s right to equal protection of the laws secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was not violated because subsection (2) of this section requires each applicant for renewal of this commonwealth’s motor vehicle registration to present proof of tort liability insurance coverage in the amount prescribed by KRS 304.35-110 (now repealed), whereas those registering a motor vehicle for the first time are not required to present such proof. Commonwealth v. Fulkerson, 761 S.W.2d 631, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 161 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).

2.Applicability.

Where the versions of KRS 134.810(4) and 186.021(2) in effect at the timestated that the owner of record of a motor vehicle on January 1 of any year was liable for ad valorem taxes on the vehicle, owners who purchased their vehicles near the end of a calendar year but took advantage of a statutory grace period to delay registering the vehicles until after January 1 of the following year were not liable for the taxes for such year since they did not become owners of record until the vehicles were registered. Revenue Cabinet v. O'Daniel, 153 S.W.3d 815, 2005 Ky. LEXIS 19 ( Ky. 2005 ).

186.023. Title and registration cancelled upon notice of transfer from another jurisdiction.

The Transportation Cabinet shall cancel the registration and title of any motor vehicle registered or titled in Kentucky within thirty (30) days following receipt of notification from another jurisdiction that the Kentucky title issued for such motor vehicle has been surrendered.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 113, § 6, effective December 31, 1988.

186.025. Cabinet to furnish list of owners of registered vehicles to Department of Revenue.

Effective January 1, 1981, the Transportation Cabinet shall, by April 1 of each year, provide the Department of Revenue with a listing of all owners of motor vehicles registered in Kentucky on an anniversary basis under KRS 186.051 as of the preceding January 1. The listing shall be by counties and shall contain, in addition to the name of the owners, the owners’ addresses, and the make, model and year of all vehicles owned by the registrants. The county clerk shall continue to provide copies of motor vehicle registration certificates on all motor vehicles not registered under the provisions of KRS 186.051 .

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 233, § 3, effective June 17, 1978; 2005, ch. 85, § 605, effective June 20, 2005.

186.030. Form of application.

  1. The application form shall contain spaces for the names and post office addresses of the owner and of the lien holder as shown by chattel mortgage, or other instrument construed as such in this state, on file in the office of the county clerk in the county in which the motor vehicle is registered, and such other information as the cabinet may require. If the motor vehicle is a truck designed for the transportation of property, the application form shall contain space for the declared gross weight in pounds. The declared gross weight shall be the weight of the vehicle and the heaviest load that the vehicle will be used to carry at any time on the highways.
  2. The application, when completed, shall be presented to the county clerk and accompanied by the appropriate fee.

History. 2739g-2b: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 96; 1946, ch. 15, § 2; 1954, ch. 153, § 2; 1958, ch. 82, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Carrying Capacity of Trucks.

Where this section based license tax for trucks upon “carrying capacity,” and for many years licenses had been issued in accordance with manufacturers’ ratings, and during this period statute had been amended several times without changing basis for rating, there was contemporaneous construction of this section precluding state tax commission from ordering trucks to be rerated to actual carrying capacity. State Tax Com. v. Safety Transfer & Storage Co., 230 Ky. 225 , 18 S.W.2d 991, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 55 ( Ky. 1929 ) (decision prior to 1946 amendment).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although a statutory lien on the vehicle is created on behalf of a county clerk when a check to him for registration fees is dishonored, he may not make a note of such lien on the registration receipt. OAG 74-744 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Garrison and Martin, History of Kentucky Commercial Motor Vehicle Transportation Tax Legislation, I, 33 Ky. L.J. 3 (1944).

186.032. Voluntary inclusion of information that an owner, lesser, or operator of a motor vehicle is deaf or hard of hearing in Kentucky vehicle registration system database — Deaf or hard of hearing protection trust fund — Use of fund.

  1. At the time of initial application for registration or application for renewal, the owner or lessee of a motor vehicle may inform the county clerk that he or she, or someone who may be operating the vehicle, is deaf or hard of hearing and request that information be included in the Kentucky vehicle registration system database to assist law enforcement in identifying the operator of the vehicle as possibly being deaf or hard of hearing.
    1. The deaf or hard of hearing protection trust fund is created as a separate trust fund in the State Treasury. The trust fund shall consist of any proceeds from gifts, grants, contributions, appropriations, or other moneys made available for the purposes of the trust fund. (2) (a) The deaf or hard of hearing protection trust fund is created as a separate trust fund in the State Treasury. The trust fund shall consist of any proceeds from gifts, grants, contributions, appropriations, or other moneys made available for the purposes of the trust fund.
    2. The fund shall be administered by the Kentucky Commission on the Deaf or Hard of Hearing.
    3. Notwithstanding KRS 45.229 , trust fund amounts not expended at the close of a fiscal year shall not lapse but shall be carried forward to the next fiscal year.
    4. Any interest earnings of the trust fund shall become part of the trust fund and shall not lapse.
    5. Trust fund moneys deposited in this fund shall only be used to:
      1. Reimburse the Transportation Cabinet for the cost of including information that someone is deaf or hard of hearing in the Kentucky vehicle registration system database;
      2. Support other actions to protect the safety and welfare of persons who are deaf or hard of hearing; and
      3. Educate the public and the deaf and hard of hearing community on issues confronting the deaf and hard of hearing.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 57, § 1, effective June 29, 2017.

186.035. Payment of ad valorem tax as condition to registration. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 186, Art. 1, § 19) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 29, § 8.

186.040. Issuance of certificate of registration — Plates — Clerk’s fee — Donations to child care assistance account — Additional fees and distribution.

  1. Upon receiving the application and fee, the county clerk shall issue to the owner a certificate of registration containing the information required by subsection (2) of this section and a registration plate. If the cabinet finds that there is a shortage of materials suitable for making plates, or that a substantial saving will result, it may require by regulation with the approval of the Governor that previously issued plates continue to be used for a designated period. Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section and in KRS 186.162 , for services performed, the owner shall pay the county clerk the sum of six dollars ($6) for each registration, or if the registration exceeds a twelve (12) month period, the clerk shall receive a fee of nine dollars ($9).
  2. The certificate of registration shall contain the registration number, the name and post office address of the owner, and such other information as the cabinet may require.
  3. An owner who registers a vehicle under KRS 186.050 that has a declared gross vehicle weight with any towed unit of forty-four thousand and one (44,001) pounds or greater shall pay the county clerk thirty dollars ($30) for each registration. The clerk shall retain the thirty dollar ($30) fee for services performed under this subsection.
  4. Any person requesting a certificate of registration or renewal of registration of any type of motor vehicle shall have the opportunity to donate one dollar ($1) to the child care assistance account. The one dollar ($1) donation shall be added to the regular fee for vehicle registration. One donation may be made per issuance or renewal of vehicle registration. Donation to the child care assistance account shall be voluntary and may be refused by the applicant at the time of the issuance or renewal of any vehicle registration.
  5. The county clerk may retain five percent (5%) of fees collected for the child care assistance account under subsection (4) of this section. The remaining funds shall be deposited into a trust and agency account in the State Treasury to the credit of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services for the exclusive use as follows:
    1. Funds shall be made available to the agencies that administer child care subsidy funds; and
    2. Funds shall be used as determined by the cabinet for working families whose income exceeds the state income eligibility limits for child day care assistance.
  6. Except as provided in KRS 186.162 , in addition to the registration fee provided for county clerks in subsections (1) and (3) of this section, an additional three dollars ($3) per registration shall be collected by the county clerk at the time of registration. This additional fee shall be distributed as follows:
    1. One dollar ($1) shall be placed in an agency fund to provide additional funds exclusively for technological improvements or replacement of the AVIS system. The operation and maintenance of AVIS shall remain as currently provided for from the operational budget of the Transportation Cabinet and shall not be reduced below the 2005-2006 funding level;
    2. One dollar ($1) shall be placed in an agency trust fund to provide funds exclusively for technological improvements to the hardware and software in county clerk offices related to the collection and administration of road fund taxes. The Transportation Cabinet, in consultation with county clerks, shall allocate funds as necessary from this fund to be used for this exclusive purpose; and
    3. One dollar ($1) shall be placed in a trust fund to be maintained by the Transportation Cabinet to provide an unrestricted revenue supplement, for operations of the office related to the collection and administration of road fund taxes, to county clerk offices in counties containing a population of less than twenty thousand (20,000), as determined by the decennial census, and for no other purpose. Annually, by March 1, the Transportation Cabinet shall calculate the amount collected in the previous calendar year and distribute the entire fund proportionate to each county that qualifies under this paragraph based on population. This revenue shall be considered current year revenue when paid to the clerk and shall not be identified as excess fees from the previous year.

History. 2739g-10: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 78, §§ 4, 9; 1958, ch. 82, § 3; 1964, ch. 59, § 1; 1966, ch. 139, § 4; 1968, ch. 40, Part IV, § 1; 1982, ch. 375, § 3, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 37, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 118, § 102, effective July 1, 1987; 1994, ch. 428, § 3, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 544, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2003, ch. 124, § 41, effective July 1, 2003; 2005, ch. 99, § 144, effective June 20, 2005; 2006, ch. 255, § 7, effective January 1, 2007; 2021 ch. 92, § 2, effective June 29, 2021.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Compensation of County Clerk.

Prior to the 2003 amendment, for his services under this section, the county clerk was entitled only to the 50¢ fee (now $1.00), and not to any percentage or fee allowed by other statutes for services in connection with the issuance of licenses. Lewis v. James, 191 Ky. 769 , 231 S.W. 526, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 392 ( Ky. 1921 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The motor vehicle usage tax was due on the transfer of a car from father to son upon the son’s reaching the age of 21. OAG 68-326 .

The term “post-office address,” as used in subsection (2) of this section, means something more than a post office box number or general delivery. OAG 71-368 .

Although a statutory lien on the vehicle is created on behalf of a county clerk when a check to him for registration fees is dishonored, he may not make a note of such lien on the registration receipt. OAG 74-744 .

A registration for greater than 12 months constitutes a single registration; therefore, even when a registration year should exceed 12 calendar months, the clerk is not entitled to more than a $2.00 fee. OAG 83-76 .

A motor vehicle may be legally sold to a minor of at least 16 years of age, as relates to the county clerk’s effecting a transfer and registration; thus where the vehicle owner of title is 17 years of age, there is no prohibition against the clerk’s transferring (if applicable) and registering such vehicle in the minor’s name. OAG 83-376 .

Mopeds are required to have at least one but not more than two headlamps, and the fine for violating that requirement is $20 to $100. OAG 84-176 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

“Cabinet” defined, KRS 186.010(1).

Registration receipt to be kept in truck, KRS 189.260 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Vanlandingham, The Fee System in Kentucky Counties: The Fee System in Kentucky, 40 Ky. L.J. 275 (1952).

Lawson, Security Interests in Motor Vehicles: A Conflict in Kentucky Law, 66 Ky. L.J. 924 (1977-1978).

Notes, Vehicular Registration in Kentucky: A Remnant of the Horse and Buggy Age, 69 Ky. L.J. 124 (1980-81).

186.041. Special military-related license plates.

  1. Each initial and renewal application by a person who meets the criteria of paragraph (a) of this section and each initial application by a person who meets the criteria of paragraph (b), (c), or (d) of this section for a special military license plate shall be accompanied by proof as set forth in subsection (10) of this section that the person is associated with the United States Army, United States Navy, United States Air Force, United States Marine Corps, United States Coast Guard, United States Coast Guard Auxiliary, Kentucky National Guard, Merchant Marines with service between December 7, 1941, and August 15, 1945, or Civil Air Patrol in one (1) of the following ways:
    1. A member of the Armed Forces of the United States;
    2. A retired member;
    3. A member of the National Guard or Reserve component who has completed his or her term of service, or has retired with a minimum of twenty (20) years of service; or
    4. A veteran who received a discharge under honorable conditions, or the veteran’s surviving spouse, and:
      1. Performed one hundred eighty (180) days of active-duty service;
      2. Received an early release due to injuries or other medical condition, or at the convenience of the service;
      3. Received a hardship discharge;
      4. Was separated or retired due to a disability; or
      5. Was determined to have a service-connected disability incurred during the enlistment.
  2. The member, retired member, veteran, reservist, or his or her spouse who is eligible under subsection (9) of this section may purchase an unlimited number of special military-related license plates described in subsection (1) of this section, annually for vehicles they own or lease. A disabled veterans license plate shall expire on July 31.
  3. A recipient of the Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, or Air Force Cross shall be eligible for a Service Cross license plate upon submission of an application to the Kentucky Department of Veterans’ Affairs. The recipient shall be required to include with the initial application for a Service Cross license plate a copy of the general order that authorized the award and the recipient’s Department of Defense form number 214. The Department of Veterans’ Affairs shall verify the documentation submitted with the application for a Service Cross license plate, and if the individual applying for the plate is confirmed to be a recipient of the Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, or Air Force Cross, the Department of Veterans’ Affairs shall submit the applicant’s name to the Transportation Cabinet’s Division of Motor Vehicle Licensing not later than September 1 preceding the year that the Service Cross license plate is to be initially issued or renewed. When the Service Cross license plate is ready, the plate shall be sent to the county clerk in the county of the applicant’s residence. The Transportation Cabinet’s Division of Motor Vehicle Licensing shall inform each applicant in writing that the Service Cross license plate is ready and may be picked up at the county clerk’s office. The Transportation Cabinet shall prescribe the type of application form required by this subsection and shall supply the Department of Veterans’ Affairs with the application form required by this subsection.
  4. A person who is a former prisoner of the enemy during World War I, World War II, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War, or the spouse of a deceased former prisoner of war, shall be eligible for a former prisoner of war license plate by submitting written proof from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs or other appropriate federal agency stating the period of time the person or person’s spouse was a prisoner of war. If a former prisoner of war dies with a vehicle licensed as authorized under this section, the person’s surviving spouse may retain the license plate for use on the same vehicle or on another vehicle that complies with KRS 186.164(7).
  5. A person who is certified by the Kentucky chapter of the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association as being a survivor of the attack on Pearl Harbor shall be eligible for a Pearl Harbor license plate and shall be required to attach to the special military-related license plate application written evidence from the Kentucky chapter of the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association that the person:
    1. Was a member of the United States Armed Forces on December 7, 1941;
    2. Was on station on December 7, 1941, during the hours of 7:55 a.m. to 9:45 a.m., Hawaii time, at Pearl Harbor, the island of Oahu, or offshore at a distance not to exceed three (3) miles;
    3. Was discharged honorably from the United States Armed Forces; and
    4. Is certified by the Kentucky chapter of the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association.
  6. A person who is eligible to receive a Gold Star Mothers, Gold Star Fathers, or Gold Star Spouses license plate under KRS 186.164(15)(a) may receive up to two (2) Gold Star Mothers, Gold Star Fathers, or Gold Star Spouses license plates free of charge and may purchase additional license plates by paying the same fee as for special military-related plates issued under KRS 186.162(2)(d) annually for vehicles he or she owns or leases.
  7. The surviving spouse of a Purple Heart recipient, or a Kentucky National Guard member or a retired member, who possessed a vehicle licensed with the Purple Heart recipient special license plate or the Kentucky National Guard special license plate, may retain the license plate for use on the same vehicle or another vehicle that complies with KRS 186.164(7). The surviving spouse may renew the license plate indefinitely, provided the appropriate registration fee is paid annually.
  8. A person who is attending or who is a graduate of the United States Air Force Academy, the United States Military Academy, the United States Naval Academy, the United States Coast Guard Academy, or the United States Merchant Marine Academy shall be eligible for a special military service academy license plate. A special military service academy license plate under this subsection shall use the same plate template as the standard special military license plate under subsection (1) of this section, with stickers to identify the various service academies. The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to establish the proof required to demonstrate current attendance at or graduation from a service academy. An eligible applicant may receive up to two (2) special military service academy license plates.
    1. The legally married spouse of a member of the Armed Forces of the United States who meets the criteria for a special military license plate under subsection (1) of this section shall be eligible for a special military license plate. A special military license plate under this subsection shall use the same template as the standard special military license plate under subsection (1) of this section, with a sticker identifying the plate as that of a military spouse. (9) (a) The legally married spouse of a member of the Armed Forces of the United States who meets the criteria for a special military license plate under subsection (1) of this section shall be eligible for a special military license plate. A special military license plate under this subsection shall use the same template as the standard special military license plate under subsection (1) of this section, with a sticker identifying the plate as that of a military spouse.
    2. An applicant who is eligible for a special military license plate under this subsection shall present as proof of eligibility an original or copy of his or her marriage certificate establishing marriage to the member of the Armed Forces of the United States and an original or copy of one (1) of the following:
      1. His or her unexpired DD-1173 form; or
      2. Any identification document outlined in subsection (10) of this section issued to his or her spouse.
  9. Prior to receiving a special military-related plate requested under subsection (1) of this section, the applicant shall present as proof of eligibility, an original or copy of his or her:
    1. Unexpired Veteran Identification Card or Veteran Health Identification Card issued by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs;
    2. DD-2, DD-214, DD-256, DD-257, or NGB-22 form; or
    3. Unexpired Geneva Conventions Identification Card issued by the United States Department of Defense.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 191, § 1; 2017 ch. 137, § 1, effective June 28, 2017; 2020 ch. 42, § 1, effective July 15, 2020; 2021 ch. 92, § 5, effective June 29, 2021.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Before the special free license plates are issued by the department of revenue (now revenue cabinet), the department (now cabinet) may require proof that the claimant did, in fact, receive financial assistance from the veterans administration under 38 USCS § 1901 and that he is now being paid disability compensation by the veterans administration pursuant to 38 USCS, §§ 301-360. OAG 71-94 .

Evidence that the claimant is currently receiving disability compensation could take any reasonable form acceptable by the department of revenue (now revenue cabinet). OAG 71-94 .

Those disabled veterans who have been furnished financial assistance from the veterans administration should obtain the special free license plates. OAG 71-94 .

The issuance of a special automobile plate to a disabled veteran does not relieve him as the owner from payment of ad valorem property taxes on the vehicle. OAG 74-775 .

Since the benefit bestowed in this section is tied in exclusively with 38 USCS § 1901, the free certificate and license plates authorized by this section are confined to the one vehicle provided by the veterans’ administration and there is no statutory authority for selling the special “Handicapped Veteran” license plates. OAG 76-640 .

Although a National Guard member may only have a special license plate for one vehicle at a time, a guardsman must pay only a one time registration fee regardless of how long he keeps his vehicle or how often he changes vehicles and transfers the plate from one vehicle to the next. OAG 76-693 .

The prohibition on cities under former subsection (4) of this section from imposing any automobile license fee was restricted to one vehicle owned by a qualifying veteran; accordingly, any additional motor vehicle owned by the disabled veteran would require the veteran to pay the regular motor vehicle license fee levied by the city. OAG 81-194 .

Neither this section nor KRS 189.456 requires a city to provide specific handicapped parking facilities though there appears to be an implication to this effect under former KRS 189.456 (6) which authorizes handicapped persons qualifying to park in a designated handicapped parking place even when a parking limit is imposed, by allowing such vehicle to be parked for a period of two hours in excess of the legal parking period prescribed by the local authorities with certain exceptions mentioned therein. There is nothing under either statute prohibiting the charging of parking fees for handicapped parking spaces, the same as would be required for parking generally. OAG 82-116 .

Special license plates authorized by this section for national guardsmen cannot be issued for a vehicle owned by a guardsman and his wife jointly and can only be issued for a vehicle of the kind required to be licensed under the provisions of KRS 186.050 (1). OAG 77-108 .

186.042. Accessible parking registration plates and parking privileges for persons with certain disabilities — Application procedure — Issuance.

  1. For the purposes of this section, “persons with disabilities which limit or impair the ability to walk” means persons who:
    1. Cannot walk two hundred (200) feet or sixty-one (61) meters without stopping to rest;
    2. Cannot walk without the use of, or assistance from, a brace, cane, crutch, another person, prosthetic device, wheelchair, or other assistant device;
    3. Are restricted by lung disease to the extent that the person’s forced respiratory and expiratory volume for one (1) second, when measured by spirometry, is less than one (1) liter, or the arterial oxygen tension is less than sixty (60) mm/hg on room air at rest;
    4. Use portable oxygen;
    5. Have a cardiac condition to the extent that the person’s functional limitations are classified in severity as Class III or Class IV according to standards set by the American Heart Association; or
    6. Are severely limited in their ability to walk due to an arthritic, neurological, or orthopedic condition.
  2. On the application of any person with disabilities which limit or impair the ability to walk, who has lost the use of an arm or both arms, or who is blind, the Transportation Cabinet shall issue the person with a disability, the parent or guardian of a disabled minor, or the parent or guardian of a disabled adult, an accessible parking registration plate or renewal decal designating the vehicle licensed as being owned by or leased by a person with a disability or their parent or guardian. The license plate or renewal decal may be issued for a passenger car as set forth in KRS 186.050(1), for a motorcycle as set forth in KRS 186.050(2), or for a commercial vehicle as set forth in KRS 186.050(3)(a). The registration plates issued shall bear the international symbol of access adopted by Rehabilitation International in 1969, reading from left to right and shall be followed by numbers or letters the cabinet finds expedient. Except as provided in this subsection, the cabinet shall not issue the registration plates so designated to any person other than a person with a disability as described above. The fee for a disabled license plate shall be as established in KRS 186.162 .
  3. The application for a license plate for a person with a disability shall be made on a form prepared by the Transportation Cabinet. For every person seeking this accessible parking license plate, proof of the disability shall be required by:
    1. The county clerk issuing the license plate ascertaining that the applicant or the applicant’s minor or adult child is obviously disabled as described in this section; or
    2. A statement from a licensed physician, physician assistant, chiropractor, or advanced practice registered nurse that the applicant or the applicant’s minor or adult child is a person with disabilities which limit or impair the ability to walk, a person who has lost the use of an arm, or any person who is blind.
  4. When a motor vehicle bearing plates issued under this section is being operated by or for the benefit of the person with a disability, who is in the motor vehicle when the motor vehicle is being operated, the motor vehicle may be parked for a period of two (2) hours in excess of the legal parking period permitted by local authorities, except if local ordinances or police regulations prohibit parking on a highway for the purpose of creating a fire lane; if the ordinances or police regulations provide for the accommodation of heavy traffic during morning, afternoon, or evening hours; or if the motor vehicle is parked in such a manner as to clearly be a traffic hazard.
  5. Registration under this section shall expire July 31.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 239, § 3, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 203, § 4, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 268, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 150, § 3, effective July 15, 1988; 1992, ch. 60, § 2, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 405, § 36, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 416, § 4, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 428, § 5, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 15, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 133, § 6, effective June 20, 2005; 2008, ch. 33, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; 2010, ch. 85, § 31, effective July 15, 2010; 2018 ch. 63, § 3, effective July 14, 2018; 2021 ch. 69, § 1, effective June 29, 2021.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(7/15/94). This section was amended by 1994 Ky. Acts chs. 405, 416, and 428. Where these Acts are not in conflict, they have been codified together. Where a conflict exists between chs. 405 and 416, Acts ch. 416, which was enacted after Acts chapter 405 by the General Assembly, prevails under KRS 446.250 .

Opinions of Attorney General.

A motor vehicle bearing special registration plates should not be ticketed as long as it is parked no longer than two hours past the legal parking period and as long as the vehicle is being operated by the handicapped person or for such person. OAG 82-161 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Special handicapped parking permit, KRS 189.456 .

186.0422. Display of international symbol of access on accessible parking registration plate.

Any person eligible for an accessible parking registration plate under KRS 186.042 who has been issued, or is eligible for, a special license plate shall make application to the cabinet by September 1 of the preceding registration year that the special plate be made to display the international symbol of access adopted by Rehabilitation International in 1969. The fee for a plate issued under this section shall be the same as for the special plate that the person is eligible for. All privileges granted by KRS 186.042 shall apply to license plates issued under this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 288, § 1, effective July 15, 1998.

186.0425. Accessible parking registration plate for vehicle used to transport persons with a disability — Extension of legal parking period.

  1. On the application of any agency or organization which transports persons with a disability described in KRS 186.042 as part of the service provided by that agency or organization to the county clerk for an accessible parking registration plate for a vehicle used in the transportation of persons with a disability, the Transportation Cabinet shall issue the agency or organization an accessible parking registration plate or renewal decal designating the vehicle licensed as being owned or leased by an agency or organization which transports persons with a disability. The license plate or renewal decal may be issued for a passenger car as set forth in KRS 186.050(1) or for a commercial vehicle as set forth in KRS 186.050(3)(a). The registration plates issued shall bear the international symbol of access adopted by Rehabilitation International in 1969, reading from left to right, and shall be followed by the numbers or letters the cabinet finds expedient. The cabinet shall not charge any fee, other than the regular fee for annual registration, for the issuance of the registration plate or renewal decal.
  2. The application for a license plate for an agency or organization which transports persons with a disability shall be made on a form prepared by the Transportation Cabinet. For every agency or organization seeking an accessible parking license plate, the application shall contain at least the following:
    1. Name of the agency or organization requesting use of an accessible parking placard for a person with a disability;
    2. Number of vehicles being used in the transportation of persons with a disability; and
    3. A statement from the director of the agency or organization verifying the need for the parking placard.
  3. Upon the sale, transfer, or termination of lease of a vehicle licensed as authorized under this section, the owner or lessee shall remove the license plate and return it and the certificate of registration to the county clerk. The clerk shall issue a regular license plate and certificate of registration upon the payment of an eleven dollar fifty cent ($11.50) state fee and a three dollar ($3) clerk’s fee. When the accessible parking plate has been presented to the clerk, he shall reissue the plate free of charge by the Transportation Cabinet and upon payment of a two dollar ($2) clerk’s fee, for use on any other vehicle owned or leased by the same agency or organization who purchased the accessible parking plate for the current licensing period. The license plate and decal on the other vehicle shall be turned into the county clerk, who shall forward the license plate to Frankfort.
  4. When a motor vehicle bearing plates issued to an agency or organization which transports persons with a disability as prescribed in this section is being operated for the benefit of a person with a disability who is in the motor vehicle at the time it is being operated, the motor vehicle may be parked for a period of two (2) hours in excess of the legal parking period permitted by local authorities, except where local ordinances or police regulations prohibit parking on a highway for the purpose of creating a fire lane or where the ordinances or police regulations provide for the accommodation of heavy traffic during morning, afternoon, or evening hours or where the motor vehicle is parked in such a manner as to clearly be a traffic hazard.
  5. Registration under this section shall expire July 31.
  6. The cabinet may promulgate the administrative regulations necessary to further the purpose of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 60, § 3, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 405, § 37, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 416, § 5, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 428, § 6, effective July 15, 1994.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/94). This section was amended by 1994 Ky. Acts chs. 405, 416, and 428. Where these Acts are not in conflict, they have been codified together. Where a conflict exists between chs. 405 and 416, Acts ch. 416, which was enacted after Acts ch. 405 by the General Assembly, prevails under KRS 446.250 .

186.043. Special license plates for historic motor vehicles — Permanent registration.

  1. In enacting this section, it is the intention of the General Assembly to recognize the special value of historic vehicles to the Commonwealth, and also to recognize that historic vehicles, because of their limited use and easily identifiable characteristics, do not require the same degree of regulation as other vehicles.
  2. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, “historic vehicle” shall mean all motor vehicles twenty-five (25) years old or older, which are used primarily for exhibition in shows, parades, tours, and other special uses, but not for general transportation.
  3. Historic vehicles shall be registered and licensed by the Transportation Cabinet. The registration shall be in lieu of registration and license required by KRS 186.020 to 186.270 .
  4. Upon payment of the fee established in KRS 186.162 and an application in accordance with regulations issued by the Transportation Cabinet, the secretary of the Transportation Cabinet shall issue a certificate of registration and two (2) special license plates of a different color and design than the regular license plate, which, in the judgment of the secretary of the Transportation Cabinet, will best advertise, popularize, and promote the Commonwealth of Kentucky. These plates, besides the word “Kentucky” shall have the words, “Historic Motor Vehicle” inscribed in a conspicuous manner and carry no year date. These plates shall have a serial number beginning with the number “100” and continue in a consecutive numerical sequence.
  5. Historic vehicles may display an authentic Kentucky license plate, twenty-five (25) years or older, or a reproduction of such a plate, if the historic motor vehicle plate and the registration receipt are kept in the vehicle at all times.
  6. The registration license and license plates of historic motor vehicles shall be valid without renewal as long as the vehicle is in existence. If the historic motor vehicle is sold, the registration and license shall be assigned and transferred to the new owner on the records of the Transportation Cabinet upon receipt of an application in accordance with regulations issued by the cabinet and payment of a fee of three dollars ($3).

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 14, §§ 1 to 5, 7; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(9), (10); 1978, ch. 69, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 169, § 3, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 117, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 428, § 7, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 343, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 133, § 7, effective June 20, 2005.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The license plate for a historic vehicle must remain with the particular vehicle which is registered with the county clerk and for which the plate was purchased and cannot be transferred or changed to other historic vehicles that may be in the owner’s possession. OAG 69-540 .

When a historic vehicle is sold and transferred in Kentucky or to someone outside the state, the plate or tag must remain with the vehicle. OAG 69-540 .

186.0435. Display of vintage Kentucky license plates on historic vehicle.

Any motor vehicle that meets the age requirements of a “historic vehicle” as used in KRS 186.043(2) and is registered in accordance with KRS 186.050 may display an authentic Kentucky license plate, twenty-five (25) years or older, or a reproduction of such a plate, if the current motor vehicle plate and the registration receipt are kept in the vehicle at all times.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 135, § 1, effective June 26, 2007.

186.044. License plates for recipients of a Purple Heart medal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 178, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1994, ch. 428, § 8, effective July 15, 1994) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 453, § 3, effective July 14, 2000. For present law, see KRS 186.041 .

186.045. Discharge by payment in full — Termination statement and record of termination of security interest — Filing — Time — Fees — Notations showing security interest — Clerk not liable for accepting fraudulent termination statement.

  1. A perfected security interest in a motor vehicle that has been satisfied by payment in full shall be deemed to have been discharged if one (1) or both of the following events has occurred:
    1. The funds to pay in full and discharge the security interest have been provided to the secured party in the form of a cashier’s check, certified check, or wire transfer; or
    2. The debt has been paid to a secured party who is no longer in existence or has failed to file the necessary documents to discharge the lien.
  2. If payment in full has been made under subsection (1)(a) of this section, the discharge of the lien shall be made not later than ten (10) days from the receipt of the payment.
  3. When a security interest has been paid in full and a termination statement or discharge has not been filed, the debtor may petition the Circuit Court in the county of the debtor’s residence to order the discharge of the security interest. The debtor shall present written evidence to the Circuit Court that the security interest has been paid in full. If the evidence presented to the Circuit Court proves to the court’s satisfaction that the security interest has been paid in full, the court shall order the county clerk to note the termination on the title and to remove the lien from the Automated Vehicle Information System (AVIS). A copy of the court’s order shall immediately be sent to the county clerk in the county where the security interest was originally filed and the county clerk shall discharge the security interest and remove the lien information from AVIS in accordance with the provisions of this section.
  4. Whenever a security interest has been discharged, other than by proceedings under Part 6 of Article 9 of KRS Chapter 355 or similar proceedings, the secured party shall:
    1. Deliver an authenticated termination statement in the manner required by KRS 355.9-513 and 186A.195 to the county clerk of the county in which the title lien statement was submitted; or
    2. Have a county clerk from another county submit by fax or other form of electronic communication available and acceptable to both sender and recipient, and verified verbally or by electronically assigned identification as being from the sending clerk, and which is able to be copied to an electronic or paper file, on that county clerk’s letterhead, an authenticated termination statement in the manner required by KRS 186A.195 and 355.9-513 to the county clerk of the county in which the title lien statement was submitted. The county clerk, upon receipt of the authenticated termination statement in the manner prescribed under this paragraph, shall verify the legitimacy of the document. The secured party shall also deliver a copy of the termination statement to the debtor or the debtor’s transferee. For failure to file the termination statement within the allowable time, the secured party shall be subject to the penalty provided in KRS 186.990(1). Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, within five (5) days after the receipt of such documents, the county clerk shall note the filing in the index, in language prescribed by the cabinet, that the termination statement has been filed. Upon presentation of the owner’s title showing a security interest to the county clerk where the termination statement was submitted, and with the copy of the termination statement submitted by the secured party, the clerk shall discharge the security interest by noting on the title that the termination statement has been filed and place the seal of the county clerk thereon. The clerk shall return the owner’s title to the owner. The county clerk shall then file the termination statement in the place from which the title lien statement was removed. Termination statements shall be retained in the clerk’s files for a period of two (2) years subsequent to the date of filing a statement, at which time they may be destroyed. The fee for these services are included in the provisions of KRS 186A.190 .
  5. Upon presentation of an owner’s title showing a security interest to the county clerk of a county where the termination statement was not delivered, the county clerk shall access the automated system to determine whether a record of termination of the security interest has been entered into the automated system by the county clerk where the termination statement was delivered by the secured party as provided in KRS 186A.210 . If a record of termination has been entered into the automated system, the county clerk of the county where the termination statement was not delivered, shall note the discharge of the security interest on the certificate of title by noting that the termination statement has been delivered, the county where it was delivered, and placing the seal of the county clerk thereon and may rely on the automated system to do so. If a record of termination has not been entered into the automated system, the county clerk of the county other than where the termination statement was delivered shall not make any notation upon the certificate of title that the security interest has been discharged or that a termination statement has been delivered to the county where the title lien statement was submitted.
  6. Whenever any secured party repossesses a vehicle titled in Kentucky, for which a security interest is in existence at the time of repossession, and disposes of the vehicle pursuant to the provisions of KRS Chapter 355, the secured party shall present, within fifteen (15) days after such disposition, the vehicle’s license plate if the plate has not been retained by the previous owner, an affidavit in a form prescribed by the department, proof of notification of all interested parties pursuant to KRS 186A.190 and 355.9-611, and a termination statement or proof that a termination statement has been filed. The new owner shall pay to the county clerk all applicable fees for titling and transferring the vehicle into his or her name. Upon receipt of such documents, the county clerk who issued the lien shall then omit from the title he makes application for any information relating to the security interest under which the vehicle was repossessed or any security interest subordinate thereto. However, any security interest, as shown by such title which is superior to the one under which the vehicle was repossessed, shall be shown on the title issued by the clerk unless the prior secured party has discharged the security interest in the clerk’s office or proof of termination is submitted, if the prior security interest was discharged in another clerk’s office.
  7. Whenever any vehicle brought into Kentucky is required to be titled and the vehicle is then subject to a security interest in another state as shown by the out-of-state documents presented to the clerk, the county clerk is prohibited from processing the application for title on the vehicle unless the owner obtains from the secured party a financing statement or title lien statement and presents same to the clerk along with the fees required in KRS 186A.190 . The clerk shall note the out-of-state security interest on the certificate of title. This provision does not apply to vehicles required to be registered in Kentucky under forced registration provisions under KRS 186.145 .
  8. The fees provided for in this section are in addition to any state fee provided for by law.
  9. Any person violating any provision of this section or any person refusing to surrender a certificate of title registration and ownership or transfer certificate upon request of any person entitled thereto, is subject to the penalties provided in subsection (1) of KRS 186.990 .
  10. The county clerk is prohibited from noting any security interest on a certificate of title on any vehicle subject to the provisions of KRS Chapter 186A if a certificate of title therefor is presented to him which has all the spaces provided thereon for noting security interests fully exhausted. The owner is responsible for ensuring that a discharge is noted on the certificate of title for each security interest and then a duplicate title as provided for in KRS 186A.180 shall be obtained from the clerk by the owner of the vehicle.
  11. Security interests in vehicles sold to or owned by residents of other states shall be perfected in the state of the nonresident and repossession of the vehicle shall be taken pursuant to the laws of that state, unless:
    1. The vehicle is principally operated in Kentucky;
    2. The vehicle is properly titled in Kentucky under KRS Chapter 186A; and
    3. The security interest is authorized to be noted on the certificate of title by the county clerk under KRS Chapter 186A.
  12. A county clerk who accepts an authenticated termination statement and complies with the verification requirements of subsection (4)(b) of this section shall be held harmless from any liability arising from fraudulent termination statements.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 59, § 2; 1966, ch. 83, § 1; 1966, ch. 255, § 169; 1972, ch. 203, § 35; 1974, ch. 222, § 2; 1978, ch. 84, § 5, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 321, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1986, ch. 118, § 103, effective July 1, 1987; 1998, ch. 128, § 9, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 408, § 178, effective July 1, 2001; 2003, ch. 103, § 1, effective June 24, 2003; 2004, ch. 25, § 1, effective July 13, 2004; 2011, ch. 5, § 2, effective January 1, 2014; 2016 ch. 8, § 1, effective July 15, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/12/2012). The amendment of this statute in 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 5 was to be effective January 1, 2013, pursuant to Section 7 of that Act. However, in 2012 Ky. Acts ch. 12, sec. 1, 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 5, sec. 7, was repealed, and a new effective date of January 1, 2014, was established for the 2011 amendment of this statute, pursuant to 2012 Ky. Acts ch. 12, sec. 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Failure to Perfect Lien.

Where the county clerk failed to place the lien on the registration receipt as required by this section, such failure rendered the lien unenforceable as against a purchaser without notice. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hodge, 485 S.W.2d 894, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 145 ( Ky. 1972 ).

2.Mobile Homes.

Subdivision (2)(a) of this section (now subsection 5, pursuant to the 2003 amendment) which requires that liens be noted on the vehicle registration only applies to “vehicles” as defined in KRS 186.010 , which definition does not include mobile homes. Vanover v. Bank of Alexandria, 644 S.W.2d 948, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 274 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (decision prior to 1986 amendment).

Cited:

McKenzie v. Oliver, 571 S.W.2d 102, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 586 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A termination statement is filed by the procedure in KRS 355.9-404 but a partial release of a termination statement is filed pursuant to KRS 355.9-406. OAG 64-416 .

The clerk’s fee for filing a financing statement is $3.25 pursuant to this section and the clerk is not entitled to the $2.50 fee provided in KRS 64.010 (now repealed). OAG 64-416 .

As relates to the filing of a financing statement affecting a vehicle required to be registered, this section must govern. OAG 70-436 .

The filing officer cannot remove the chattel mortgage representing a financing statement on a motor vehicle registration certificate without the filing of a termination statement. OAG 70-655 .

The motor vehicle certificate is an exception to the general filing provisions under KRS 355.9-403, since a financing statement must be noted on the motor vehicle registration certificate. OAG 70-655 .

The computation of the ten-day period for filing security agreements under this section is computed by the formula set out in KRS 446.030 . OAG 71-393 .

Where the elapsed period between the date a security agreement was executed and the date it was presented to the clerk was more than ten days, the clerk was correct in refusing to file the security agreement or make a notation on the registration until the penalty of $2.00 was paid. OAG 71-393 .

Where an automobile is repossessed and sold by a first lienholder, the clerk has no duty to contact a second lienholder and request a release from him. OAG 71-490 .

In order for county court clerk to accept a financing statement covering cars and trucks in a security agreement, copies of the tax or registration receipts upon which to enter the financing statement must be included before the statement can be filed. OAG 72-41 .

There is no civil liability on the part of the county clerk where her deputy failed to place the unreleased lien on a motor vehicle registration and where the vehicle was subsequently transferred to a purchaser who had no actual notice of the lien or mortgage. OAG 72-84 .

Where a vehicle is repossessed the person repossessing such vehicle must file with the clerk a copy of revenue form 71A192 and based on this a transfer certificate should be issued transferring the vehicle from the person from whom it was repossessed to the purchaser of the vehicle. OAG 72-549 .

The time limit involving a late penalty must be computed from the day the security agreement is executed and, therefore, the security agreement must necessarily bear the execution date. OAG 72-843 .

A county clerk, in order to be protected in transferring a vehicle that is repossessed by a financing company from the borrower to a new purchaser, may refuse to make such transfer unless an affidavit is submitted in compliance with subsection (6) as it is incumbent upon the secured party who has repossessed the vehicle to file the financing statement with the clerk, and in the absence of such filing, transfer cannot be effected except by court action. OAG 73-295 .

Where no termination statement as provided by this section has been filed, an encumbered motor vehicle may be sold, without the consent, written or otherwise, from the holder of the security interest, so long as the security interest data is carefully preserved and carried forward in issuing the transfer of registration as provided by KRS 186.190(3). OAG 74-606 .

Although a statutory lien on the vehicle is created on behalf of a county clerk when a check to him for registration fees is dishonored, he may not make a note of such lien on the registration receipt. OAG 74-744 .

Failure to present both the owner’s copy of the registration or transfer receipt issued for the current registration and the financing statement within 10 days after the execution of the security agreement gives rise to a two dollar penalty to be paid by the secured party to the county clerk. OAG 75-144 .

Since a graphic review of the legislative history indicates that a uniform fee was intended for the filing of financing statement, regardless of whether a motor vehicle or some other item of personal property is involved, and in 1974 the fee under this section was inadvertently stated to be $4.00 instead of $4.75, the clerk’s fee for filing an original financing statement is uniformly $4.75. OAG 75-179 .

A county clerk may record a financing statement wherein a motor vehicle is listed as the collateral pledged without having in hand the certificate of title thereto from another state. OAG 75-355 .

A financing statement on a motor vehicle which is not used on the public highways may be filed by the county clerk without the registration receipt being produced but the clerk may require an affidavit that the vehicle serving as collateral is not required to be registered. OAG 75-355 .

Where a transferor transferred two tractors to the transferees who took title subject to the original obligations of the transferor under a security agreement, the county clerk was authorized to transfer the registration from the transferor to the original secured party upon repossession of the tractors, though disposition of the collateral by the secured party was of no concern to the county clerk. OAG 76-66 .

Because the general rule holds that a corporation usually remains a resident of the state of its incorporation and in the absence of a manifest legislative intent or reported case asserting a contrary exception to the general rule, a qualified foreign corporation is a nonresident under this section and accordingly the proper office to file a financing statement on the motor vehicles under subsection (1) of this section is with the county clerk of the county in which the vehicle is principally operated. OAG 76-569 .

An individual who is a resident of the state of Kentucky and owns a tractor trailer which is licensed in another state and is principally operated in Ohio and Indiana and such vehicle is not registered in Kentucky and will not be used on the highways of Kentucky and therefore is not required to be registered in Kentucky, the proper place of filing a security interest on such trailer would be in the office of the county court clerk in the county of debtor’s residence as provided in former KRS 355.9-401(1)(c) and an affidavit of the owner or secured party should be filed with the county court clerk indicating that the vehicle is not being used on the highways of Kentucky and thus does not require registration in Kentucky. OAG 77-48 .

There is no conflict between subsection (5) of this section (now subsection (9)) and KRS 355.9-404 for one involves a criminal offense for violation and the other involves a civil debt for violation. OAG 77-49 .

KRS 355.9-404 would have no effect on a criminal warrant obtained under subsection (5) of this section. OAG 77-49 .

Where a county court clerk is presented with a statement of origin to a motor vehicle or trailer properly assigned and with a lien in favor of some financial institution typed on the statement of origin but no security agreement is presented, if the application for registration is made as provided in KRS 186.020 and is accompanied by the applicable document or documents required by subsection (1) of KRS 186.020 the clerk is required to register the motor vehicle regardless of whether or not a security agreement is presented, for the proper filing of a security agreement under KRS 186.050 is a matter independent of the basic matter of registration of the motor vehicle. OAG 77-220 .

The proper filing of a security agreement under this section is a matter independent of the basic matter of registration of a motor vehicle under KRS 186.020 . OAG 77-220 .

Subsection (3) of this section (now subsection 6, pursuant to the 2003 amendment) originally charged an additional penalty fee for late compliance, but allowed the secured party to perfect his security interest in the motor vehicle, while the 1978 amendment to subsection (3) (now subsection 6) cut off the secured party’s ability to perfect his security interest under KRS Chapters 355 and 186 if the secured party does not comply within 15 days from the date the security agreement was executed; it therefore seems that subsection (3) (now subsection 6) as amended is at best a mistake which is not truly indicative of the legislative intent. OAG 78-423 .

The county clerk may not refuse to file a financing statement even though offered for filing more than 15 days after execution of the security agreement, since the power of the county clerk is purely administrative, not judicial. OAG 78-448 .

It would appear that in order for the transfer of a motor vehicle to be precluded, the information must actually appear on the certificate of registration of the motor vehicle and the fact that it may be on the computer files in the clerk’s office is not sufficient. OAG 79-31 .

KRS 186.230(9) must be read in connection with this section covering the time for filing financing statements affecting vehicles, fees and notations showing security interests. OAG 79-31 .

Since the clerk is not personally responsible for determining how the house trailer is being used, he may rely upon the secured party’s representation that it is or is not subject to registration, and may rely upon the secured party’s representation that a financing statement is all that is required, or if the secured party also presents a registration receipt, he may note the lien thereon. OAG 79-57 .

There are two means for perfecting a security interest in a house trailer: if the house trailer is being used in one place as a permanent dwelling, then filing a financing statement serves to perfect the security interest, but if the house trailer falls within the definition of KRS 186.650 , it is subject to registration and insofar as practicable a financing statement should be filed and registration receipt should be presented for notation of the lien thereon. OAG 79-57 .

For a seller-lienholder to have an enforceable lien against a vehicle, the lien must be noted on the motor vehicle registration receipt of record in the county clerk’s office. OAG 79-511 .

Where one company filed a financing statement in September of 1979, listing a mobile home, with an accompanying affidavit that the mobile home would not be used on public highways, and a second company filed a financing statement in October of 1979, listing the same mobile home, with an accompanying license registration receipt issued by the county clerk’s office on which the second company was listed as the first lienholder on the mobile home, the fact that at the time of the filing of the first company’s financing statement there was no certificate of registration for the mobile home in existence in no way militates against the principle that the proper filing of the financing statement perfected the lien; the county clerk is now required to note the first lien of the company that filed the September statement on the certificate of registration that came into existence later. OAG 80-103 .

A federal certificate of sale of seized property should be treated as having the same effect as a bill of sale of a motor vehicle and the county clerk should issue a certificate of registration to the purchaser if other statutory conditions are met; any unreleased liens should be noted on the new certificate of registration unless the clerk has proof presented to him that the liens are subordinate to the federal tax lien but no subordinate liens should be noted on the registration certificate. OAG 80-510 .

The county clerk is still entitled to a five percent commission out of each $2.00 penalty even though the 1980 amendment to this section did not refer to the commission; since the penalty is associated with a tax provided for under KRS 142.010 , each county clerk is entitled to the commission figured on the total of the tax and the attendant penalty. OAG 80-534 .

The General Assembly, by the 1980 amendment of subsection (3) (now subsection 6, pursuant to the 2003 amendment) of this section putting the $2.00 penalty provision back into the law, intended it to return the state of the law to the posture it was in prior to the 1978 amendment; that is, while the county clerk is to collect the lienholder penalty, the clerk is to remit this penalty to the department of revenue. OAG 80-534 .

The lienholder on a truck which belonged to a Kentucky resident debtor and was used, titled and subject to a security agreement in Indiana would not have to file the Indiana security agreement in Kentucky under the provisions of subsection (4) of KRS 355.9-103 even if the truck should be required to be licensed in Kentucky due to the operation of the truck there for more than five days, under the express language of subsection (2)(a) of this section. OAG 81-369 (decision prior to 1986 amendment of this section).

KRS 186A.190(3) (now (5)), former 186A.060 (14)(a), and this section prohibit the county clerk from listing more than two liens on the certificate of title in connection with the registration or titling of the vehicles; however, the information in KRS 186A.060 required to be filed in conjunction with the liens indicates the legislature intended that its restriction of two liens apply only to commercial liens and there is no such limit to the number of statutory liens such as liens for unpaid property taxes. There is no restriction against placing any type of indicator on the certificate of title that other liens exist. OAG 84-81 .

Since commercial liens are referred to in KRS 186A.190(3), former 186A.060(14), and this section, the clerk should place these on the certificate of title, if they exist, and then after any commercial liens are listed, the clerk should place the tax liens on the certificate, where space permits, or into the computer. OAG 84-81 .

Under the current registration-title law relating to motor vehicles, the General Assembly by this section and KRS 186A.060 , 186A.175 (now repealed) and 186A.190 has made provisions for showing not more than two liens on the certificate of title. OAG 84-301 .

The motor vehicle lien statement is meant to replace financing statements on those motor vehicles for which a certificate of title is required. OAG 87-39 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Mellen, Proposed Amendments to the Kentucky Uniform Commercial Code, Vol. 50, No. 1, Winter 1985-86 Ky. Bench & B. 17.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Fitzgerald, Special Comment — The Crazy Quilt of Commercial Law: A Study in Legislative Patchwork, Introduction to a Crazy Quilt, 54 Ky. L.J. 85 (1965).

Lawson, Security Interests in Motor Vehicles: A Conflict in Kentucky Law, 66 Ky. L.J. 924 (1977-1978).

Notes, Vehicular Registration in Kentucky: A Remnant of the Horse and Buggy Age, 69 Ky. L.J. 124 (1980-81).

186.047. Lapsed financing statement. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 173, § 1; 1978, ch. 384, § 330) was repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 118, § 108, effective July 1, 1987.

186.050. Registration fees — Voluntary donation for wildlife management and conservation activities and the agricultural program trust fund.

  1. The annual registration fee shall be eleven dollars fifty cents ($11.50) for:
    1. Motor vehicles, including pickup trucks and passenger vans; and
    2. Motor carrier vehicles, as defined in KRS 281.010 , primarily designed for carrying passengers or passengers for hire and having been designed or constructed to transport not more than fifteen (15) passengers, including the operator.
  2. Except as provided in KRS 186.041 and 186.162 , the annual registration fee for each motorcycle shall be nine dollars ($9).
    1. All motor vehicles having a declared gross weight of vehicle and any towed unit of ten thousand (10,000) pounds or less, except those mentioned in subsections (1) and (2) of this section, are classified as commercial vehicles and the annual registration fee, except as provided in subsections (4) to (14) of this section, shall be eleven dollars and fifty cents ($11.50). (3) (a) All motor vehicles having a declared gross weight of vehicle and any towed unit of ten thousand (10,000) pounds or less, except those mentioned in subsections (1) and (2) of this section, are classified as commercial vehicles and the annual registration fee, except as provided in subsections (4) to (14) of this section, shall be eleven dollars and fifty cents ($11.50).
    2. All motor vehicles, except those mentioned in subsections (1) and (2) of this section, and those engaged in hauling passengers for hire which are designed or constructed to transport more than fifteen (15) passengers including the operator, whose registration fee shall be one hundred dollars ($100), are classified as commercial vehicles and the annual registration fee, except as provided in subsections (3)(a) and (4) to (14) of this section, shall be as follows:
      1. Any farmer owning a truck having a gross weight of twenty-six thousand (26,000) pounds or less may have it registered as a farmer’s truck and obtain a license for eleven dollars and fifty cents ($11.50). The applicant’s signature upon the certificate of registration and ownership shall constitute a certificate that he is a farmer engaged in the production of crops, livestock, or dairy products, that he owns a truck of the gross weight of twenty-six thousand (26,000) pounds or less, and that during the next twelve (12) months the truck shall not be used in for-hire transportation and may be used in transporting persons, food, provender, feed, machinery, livestock, material, and supplies necessary for his farming operation, and the products grown on his farm. (4) (a) 1. Any farmer owning a truck having a gross weight of twenty-six thousand (26,000) pounds or less may have it registered as a farmer’s truck and obtain a license for eleven dollars and fifty cents ($11.50). The applicant’s signature upon the certificate of registration and ownership shall constitute a certificate that he is a farmer engaged in the production of crops, livestock, or dairy products, that he owns a truck of the gross weight of twenty-six thousand (26,000) pounds or less, and that during the next twelve (12) months the truck shall not be used in for-hire transportation and may be used in transporting persons, food, provender, feed, machinery, livestock, material, and supplies necessary for his farming operation, and the products grown on his farm.
      2. Any farmer owning a truck having a gross weight of twenty-six thousand one (26,001) pounds to thirty-eight thousand (38,000) pounds may have it registered as a farmer’s truck and obtain a license for eleven dollars and fifty cents ($11.50). The applicant’s signature upon the certificate of registration and ownership shall constitute a certificate that he is a farmer engaged in the production of crops, livestock, or dairy products, that he owns a truck of the gross weight between twenty-six thousand one (26,001) pounds and thirty-eight thousand (38,000) pounds, and that during the next twelve (12) months the truck shall not be used in for-hire transportation and may be used in transporting persons, food, provender, feed, machinery, livestock, material, and supplies necessary for his farming operation and the products grown on his farm.
    1. Any farmer owning a truck having a declared gross weight in excess of thirty-eight thousand (38,000) pounds shall not be required to pay the fee set out in subsection (3) of this section and, in lieu thereof, shall pay forty percent (40%) of the fee set out in subsection (3) of this section and shall be exempt from any fee charged under the provisions of KRS 281.752 . The applicant’s signature upon the registration receipt shall be considered to be a certification that he is a farmer engaged solely in the production of crops, livestock, or dairy products, and that during the current registration year the truck will be used only in transporting persons, food, provender, feed, and machinery used in operating his farm and the products grown on his farm.
    2. An initial applicant for, or an applicant renewing, his or her registration pursuant to this subsection, may at the time of application make a voluntary contribution to be deposited into the agricultural program trust fund established in KRS 246.247 . The recommended voluntary contribution shall be set at ten dollars ($10) and automatically added to the cost of registration or renewal unless the individual registering or renewing the vehicle opts out of contributing the recommended amount. The county clerk shall collect and forward the voluntary contribution to the cabinet for distribution to the Department of Agriculture.
  3. Any person owning a truck or bus used solely in transporting school children and school employees may have the truck or bus registered as a school bus and obtain a license for eleven dollars fifty cents ($11.50) by filing with the county clerk, in addition to other information required, an affidavit stating that the truck or bus is used solely in the transportation of school children and persons employed in the schools of the district, that he has caused to be printed on each side of the truck or bus and on the rear door the words “School Bus” in letters at least six (6) inches high, and of a conspicuous color, and the truck or bus will be used during the next twelve (12) months only for the purpose stated.
  4. Any church or religious organization owning a truck or bus used solely in transporting persons to and from a place of worship or for other religious work may have the truck or bus registered as a church bus and obtain a license for eleven dollars and fifty cents ($11.50) by filing with the county clerk, in addition to other information required, an affidavit stating that the truck or bus will be used only for the transporting of persons to and from a place of worship, or for other religious work, and that there has been printed on the truck or bus in large letters the words “Church Bus,” with the name of the church or religious organization owning and using the truck or bus, and that during the next twelve (12) months the truck or bus will be used only for the purpose stated.
  5. Any person owning a motor vehicle with a gross weight of fourteen thousand (14,000) pounds or less on which a wrecker crane or other equipment suitable for wrecker service has been permanently mounted may register the vehicle and obtain a license for eleven dollars fifty cents ($11.50) by filing with the county clerk, in addition to other information required, an affidavit that a wrecker crane or other equipment suitable for wrecker service has been permanently mounted on such vehicle and that during the next twelve (12) months the vehicle will be used only in wrecker service. If the gross weight of the vehicle exceeds fourteen thousand (14,000) pounds, the vehicle shall be registered in accordance with subsection (3) of this section. The gross weight of a vehicle used in wrecker service shall not include the weight of the vehicle being towed by the wrecker.
  6. Motor vehicles having a declared gross weight in excess of eighteen thousand (18,000) pounds, which when operated in this state are used exclusively for the transportation of property within the limits of the city named in the affidavit hereinafter required to be filed, or within ten (10) miles of the city limits of the city if it is a city with a population equal to or greater than three thousand (3,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, or within five (5) miles of its limits if it is a city with a population of less than three thousand (3,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, or anywhere within a county containing an urban-county government, shall not be required to pay the fee as set out in subsection (3) of this section, and in lieu thereof shall pay seventy-five percent (75%) of the fee set forth in subsection (3) of this section and shall be exempt from any fee charged under the provisions of KRS 281.752 . Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit any right of nonresidents to exemption from registration under any other provisions of the laws granting reciprocity to nonresidents. Operations outside of this state shall not be considered in determining whether or not the foregoing mileage limitations have been observed. When claiming the right to the reduced fee, the applicant’s signature on the certificate of registration and ownership shall constitute a certification or affidavit stating that the motor vehicle when used within this state is used only for the transportation of property within the city to be named in the affidavit and the area above set out and that the vehicle will not be used outside of a city and the area above set out during the current registration period.
  7. Motor vehicles having a declared gross weight in excess of eighteen thousand (18,000) pounds, which are used exclusively for the transportation of primary forest products from the harvest area to a mill or other processing facility, where such mill or processing facility is located at a point not more than fifty (50) air miles from the harvest area or which are used exclusively for the transportation of concrete blocks or ready-mixed concrete from the point at which such concrete blocks or ready-mixed concrete is produced to a construction site where such concrete blocks or ready-mixed concrete is to be used, where such construction site is located at a point not more than thirty (30) air miles from the point at which such concrete blocks or ready-mixed concrete is produced shall not be required to pay the fee as set out in subsection (3) of this section, and in lieu thereof, shall pay seventy-five percent (75%) of the fee set out in subsection (3) of this section and shall be exempt from any fee charged under the provisions of KRS 281.752 . The applicant’s signature upon the certificate of registration and ownership shall constitute a certification that the motor vehicle will not be used during the current registration period in any manner other than that for which the reduced fee is provided in this section.
  8. Any owner of a commercial vehicle registered for a declared gross weight in excess of eighteen thousand (18,000) pounds, intending to transfer same and desiring to take advantage of the refund provisions of KRS 186.056(2), may reregister such vehicle and obtain a “For Sale” certificate of registration and ownership for one dollar ($1). Title to a vehicle so registered may be transferred, but such registration shall not authorize the operation or use of the vehicle on any public highway. No refund may be made under the provisions of KRS 186.056(2) until such time as the title to such vehicle has been transferred to the purchaser thereof. Provided, however, that nothing herein shall be so construed as to prevent the seller of a commercial vehicle from transferring the registration of such vehicle to any purchaser thereof.
  9. The annual registration fee for self-propelled vehicles containing sleeping or eating facilities shall be twenty dollars ($20) and the multiyear license plate issued shall be designated “Recreational vehicle.” The foregoing shall not include any motor vehicle primarily designed for commercial or farm use having temporarily attached thereto any sleeping or eating facilities, or any commercial vehicle having sleeping facilities.
  10. The registration fee on any vehicle registered under this section shall be increased fifty percent (50%) when the vehicle is not equipped wholly with pneumatic tires.
    1. The Department of Vehicle Regulation is authorized to negotiate and execute an agreement or agreements for the purpose of developing and instituting proportional registration of motor vehicles engaged in interstate commerce, or in a combination of interstate and intrastate commerce, and operating into, through, or within the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The agreement or agreements may be made on a basis commensurate with, and determined by, the miles traveled on, and use made of, the highways of this Commonwealth as compared with the miles traveled on and use made of highways of other states, or upon any other equitable basis of proportional registration. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 186.020 , the cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations concerning the registration of motor vehicles under any agreement or agreements made under this section and shall provide for direct issuance by it of evidence of payment of any registration fee required under such agreement or agreements. Any proportional registration fee required to be collected under any proportional registration agreement or agreements shall be in accordance with the taxes established in this section. (13) (a) The Department of Vehicle Regulation is authorized to negotiate and execute an agreement or agreements for the purpose of developing and instituting proportional registration of motor vehicles engaged in interstate commerce, or in a combination of interstate and intrastate commerce, and operating into, through, or within the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The agreement or agreements may be made on a basis commensurate with, and determined by, the miles traveled on, and use made of, the highways of this Commonwealth as compared with the miles traveled on and use made of highways of other states, or upon any other equitable basis of proportional registration. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 186.020 , the cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations concerning the registration of motor vehicles under any agreement or agreements made under this section and shall provide for direct issuance by it of evidence of payment of any registration fee required under such agreement or agreements. Any proportional registration fee required to be collected under any proportional registration agreement or agreements shall be in accordance with the taxes established in this section.
    2. Any owner of a commercial vehicle who is required to title his motor vehicle under this section shall first title such vehicle with the county clerk pursuant to KRS 186.020 for a state fee of one dollar ($1). Title to such vehicle may be transferred; however title without proper registration shall not authorize the operation or use of the vehicle on any public highway. Any commercial vehicle properly titled in Kentucky may also be registered in Kentucky, and, upon payment of the required fees, the department may issue an apportioned registration plate to such commercial vehicle.
    3. Any commercial vehicle that is properly titled in a foreign jurisdiction, which vehicle is subject to apportioned registration, as provided in paragraph (a) of this subsection, may be registered in Kentucky, and, upon proof of proper title and payment of the required fees, the department may issue an apportioned registration plate to the commercial vehicle. The department shall promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with this section.
  11. Any person seeking to obtain a special license plate for an automobile that has been provided to him pursuant to an occupation shall meet both of the following requirements:
    1. The automobile shall be provided for the full-time exclusive use of the applicant; and
    2. The applicant shall obtain permission in writing from the vehicle owner or lessee on a form provided by the cabinet to use the vehicle and for the vehicle to bear the special license plate.
  12. An applicant for any motor vehicle registration issued pursuant to this section shall have the opportunity to make a donation of two dollars ($2) to promote a hunger relief program through specific wildlife management and conservation efforts by the Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources in accordance with KRS 150.015 . If an applicant elects to make a contribution under this subsection, the two dollar ($2) donation shall be added to the regular fee for any motor vehicle registration issued pursuant to this section. One (1) donation may be made per issuance of each registration. The fee shall be paid to the county clerk and shall be transmitted by the State Treasurer to the Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources to be used exclusively for the purpose of wildlife management and conservation activities in support of hunger relief. The county clerk may retain up to five percent (5%) of the fees collected under this subsection for administrative costs associated with the collection of this donation. Any donation requested under this subsection shall be voluntary and may be refused by the applicant at the time of issuance or renewal of a license plate.

Declared Gross Weight of Vehicle and Any Towed Unit Registration Fee 10,001-14,000 30.00 14,001-18,000 50.00 18,001-22,000 132.00 22,001-26,000 160.00 26,001-32,000 216.00 32,001-38,000 300.00 38,001-44,000 474.00 44,001-55,000 669.00 55,001-62,000 1,007.00 62,001-73,280 1,250.00 73,281-80,000 1,410.00

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HISTORY: 2739g-2c(2), 2739g-2d: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 78, § 7; 2015 ch. 19, § 38, effective June 24, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

Law imposing license tax upon owners of automobiles which also bore ad valorem tax, did not constitute double taxation in violation of Ky. Const., §§ 11, 171, 174 and U.S. Const., Amend. 14; nor did it create inequality of taxation, where tax was imposed upon all persons using motor vehicles on highways pursuant to reasonable classification. Smith v. Commonwealth, 175 Ky. 286 , 194 S.W. 367, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 334 ( Ky. 1917 ) (decided under prior law).

2.Fee for Regulatory Purposes.

Automobile license tax, being imposed under police power, could not be deemed occupational tax when required from private pleasure car owner. Atterbury v. Waldeck, 207 Ky. 818 , 270 S.W. 45, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 193 ( Ky. 1925 ).

The fee provided for in this section is solely for regulatory purposes under the police power, and is not “taxation” within the meaning of Ky. Const., § 170. Gray v. Methodist Episcopal Church, etc., 272 Ky. 646 , 114 S.W.2d 1141, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1938 ).

3.Weight Tax.

A vehicle registered under this section is exempt from weight tax imposed by KRS 281.810 (now repealed) as well as those owned by a nonresident and registered under the laws of another state when used or operated solely within the confines of a nonborder city as well as a border city area. Blackburn v. Maxwell Co., 305 S.W.2d 112, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 297 ( Ky. 1957 ).

4.Semitrailers.

Registration of semitrailer having load capacity exceeding 1,000 pounds, but attachment of which did not increase capacity of truck, is not required; statute does not provide for levy of tax on semitrailers. Commonwealth v. Wilborn, 250 Ky. 148 , 61 S.W.2d 1051, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 633 ( Ky. 1933 ) (decision prior to 1966 amendment).

5.Passenger Buses.

Prior to enactment of 1942 legislation, passenger buses were exempt from vehicle registration fees regardless of whether such buses operated under certificates of convenience and necessity, and buses operated wholly within city limits, not under such certificates, were not subject to registration fees. Reeves v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 291 Ky. 226 , 163 S.W.2d 482, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 211 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Licensing of buses by cities, and requirement that they pay seat tax, constituted sufficient governmental regulation as against contention that exemption from registration fees was a total exemption from state regulation not intended by legislature. Reeves v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 291 Ky. 226 , 163 S.W.2d 482, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 211 ( Ky. 1942 ).

6.Farmer’s Truck.

To register truck as “farmer’s truck” applicant must be engaged in production of crops, livestock or dairy products, but if so engaged on farm is not excluded by having other business wholly separate from farm. Fischer v. Grieb, 272 Ky. 166 , 113 S.W.2d 1139, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 93 ( Ky. 1938 ).

7.Percentage of Revenue for County Road Funds.

One-half (now 30 percent) of all revenue raised by subsections (3) to (8) (now (13)) of this section shall be evenly distributed among all the counties for the county road funds under KRS 47.020 and is not committed for payment of bonds issued to obtain funds to match federal funds. Dalton v. State Property & Bldgs. Com., 304 S.W.2d 342, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 276 ( Ky. 1957 ).

8.Refund of Registration Fees.

Registration fees illegally collected could be refunded by action under KRS 134.580 , without first appealing from the tax commission (now revenue cabinet) to the Franklin Circuit Court. Reeves v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 291 Ky. 226 , 163 S.W.2d 482, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 211 ( Ky. 1942 ).

9.Owner Liable for Violation.

Conviction of operating overweight farm truck in violation of this section against driver could not stand where it was shown that the vehicle was owned by another person since this section is aimed at the owner of the truck and no one else. Holbrook v. Commonwealth, 390 S.W.2d 643, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 357 ( Ky. 1965 ).

10.Miscellaneous.

Types of vehicles at issue in this action were F–Series Super Duty Trucks, which would be considered “pickup trucks” under the registration statute, and F–Series Super Duty Excursions, which would be classified as motor vehicles primarily designed for carrying passengers and having provisions for not more than nine passengers; thus, the vehicles at issue in this action could not be considered “commercial vehicles” under the statute. Corder v. Ford Motor Co., 297 F.R.D. 572, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6073 (W.D. Ky. 2014 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a tractor or motor vehicle was licensed under subsection (3) of this section, the fee would apply to the registering and licensing of the trailer. OAG 61-335 .

There is reciprocity between Ohio and Kentucky on trucks engaged in private business operations, and not as common or contract carriers, where the weight is 18,000 pounds or less. OAG 63-123 .

When a vehicle engaged in private business operations in both Kentucky and Ohio has a declared gross weight of 18,001 pounds or more, the provisions of KRS 186.055 apply and the vehicle must have a Kentucky weight tag regardless of whether it is licensed in Kentucky or in Ohio. OAG 63-123 .

Although the general assembly, after amending this section in 1973 by adding subsection (14), by an apparent oversight, did not amend KRS 47.020 to include this subsection it is clear that it is the legislative intent to share all the fees collected under the provisions of subsections (3) through (14) of this section with the counties, and, therefore, fees collected pursuant to subsection (14) of this section are required to be included with all fees distributable pursuant to KRS 47.020 . OAG 73-428 .

If the applicant is “a farmer engaged solely in the production of crops, live-stock or dairy products” and uses the truck for the transportation of logs cut from his farm then he has satisfied the requirement that the truck be used only in transporting “products grown on his farm” but if the party involved is using this truck to haul logs for hire or to haul logging equipment to other areas so that he might do custom work, then this is in violation of the certification required. OAG 73-710 .

The “El Camino” and “Sprint” are pick-up trucks and should be registered as trucks. OAG 74-302 .

Although a statutory lien on the vehicle is created on behalf of a county clerk when a check to him for registration fees is dishonored, he may not make a note of such lien on the registration receipt. OAG 74-744 .

Since logs are a primary forest product, trucks transporting them less than 50 miles from cutting to the mill are required to pay only the 40% reduced fee, but slabs are a forest by-product and trucks transporting them are not entitled to the reduced fee. OAG 75-560 .

Until such time as the court sees fit to expand its charitable definition to include motor vehicles owned by religious nonprofit cemetery organizations from the motor vehicle usage tax, such vehicles are subject to the tax. OAG 78-579 .

Subsection (9) of this section allows the transportation of coal from the mine to an unloading point within 50 air miles of the mine whether the unloading point is a railhead, tipple, plant, barge or any other location which is no more than 50 air miles from the mine where the coal was dug, in order to qualify for the 40% fee charge. OAG 80-443 .

When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the statute must be applied to those terms without resort to any construction or interpretation; as subsection (9) specifies that to receive a fee reduction, the operator of a motor vehicle having a declared gross weight in excess of eighteen thousand pounds must “exclusively” transport primary forest products, operators who transport other products are not entitled to the fee reduction. OAG 98-10 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Motor carriers, KRS ch. 281.

Motor vehicle use tax, KRS 138.450 to 138.470 .

Reciprocal exemptions from fees for nonresident motor carriers operating in interstate commerce, KRS 281.835 .

Money not to be drawn from Treasury unless appropriated — Annual publication of accounts — Certain revenues usable only for highway purposes, Ky. Const., § 230.

Truck license fees, disposition of, KRS 47.020 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Garrison and Martin, Kentucky Commercial Motor Vehicle Transportation Tax Legislation, 33 Ky. L.J. 1 (1944).

Vanlandingham, The Fee System in Kentucky Counties: The Fee System in Kentucky, 40 Ky. L.J. 275 (1952).

Notes, Economic, Social and Legal Aspects of Coal Transportation in Kentucky, 64 Ky. L.J. 601 (1975-76).

Notes, Vehicular Registration in Kentucky: A Remnant of the Horse and Buggy Age, 69 Ky. L.J. 124 (1980-81).

186.051. Year-round registration system — Cabinet may designate separate registration years — Staggered registration system for commercial motor vehicles.

  1. Notwithstanding the provisions of this chapter, the cabinet shall by January 1, 1978, establish a year-round system for the registration of vehicles under the provisions of KRS 186.050(1). The system shall be designed so as to distribute the work load as uniformly as practicable within the various offices of the county clerks, as well as the cabinet, on a year-round basis. In implementing a year-round registration system, the cabinet may establish separate and distinct registration years. Each registration year so designated shall begin on the first day of a calendar month and expire on the last day of the last calendar month in a registration period. Registration periods may be designated to include less than twelve (12) consecutive months and registration fees shall be computed at a rate of one-twelfth (1/12) of the appropriate annual registration fee per month in each registration period. The cabinet may establish a registration year of more than twelve (12) months except that registration fees for designated periods of more than twelve (12) months may be paid at the option of the owner. The cabinet may promulgate reasonable administrative regulations to carry out the orderly implementation and administration of the year-round registration system. Any transaction relating to registration or registration renewal which would cause an unexpired Kentucky motor vehicle license plate to be surrendered shall have that unexpired fee prorated or credited against any additional fee required by a subsequent registration.
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of this chapter, the cabinet shall by April 1, 1980, establish a year-round system for the registration of vehicles under the provisions of KRS 186.050(3)(a). The system shall be designed so as to distribute the work load as uniformly as practicable within the various offices of the county clerks, as well as the cabinet, on a year-round basis. In implementing a year-round registration system, the cabinet may establish separate and distinct registration years. Each registration year so designated shall begin on the first day of a calendar month and expire on the last day of the last calendar month in a registration period. Registration periods may be designated to include less than twelve (12) consecutive months and registration fees shall be computed at a rate of one-twelfth (1/12) of the appropriate annual registration fee per month in each registration period. The cabinet may establish a registration year of more than twelve (12) months except that registration fees for designated periods of more than twelve (12) months may be paid at the option of the owner. The cabinet may promulgate reasonable administrative regulations to carry out the orderly implementation and administration of the year-round registration system.
  3. The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations to establish a staggered registration system for those commercial motor vehicles registered pursuant to KRS 186.050(13).

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 133, § 25; 1978, ch. 239, § 5, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 331, effective June 17, 1978; 1988, ch. 241, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1998, ch. 153, § 2, effective July 15, 1998.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The terms registration year and registration period are synonymous; the registration year is, therefore, determined by the birth date of the owner. The legislative intent is that a registration period or year must commence on the birth month of the owner; therefore, when there is a new owner, a new registration period begins, based on the birth month of the new owner. OAG 83-47 .

The termination of a registration period is marked by the occurrence of either one of two contingencies whichever happens first: the birth month of the owner of the vehicle or the transfer of ownership of the vehicle; under this interpretation, the new owner is not entitled to be credited with the unexpired time of the previous owner’s registration. OAG 83-47 .

The Transportation Cabinet must assess registration fees on vehicle transfers in accordance with statutory requirements and may not credit the new owner with the unexpired time on the registration plate. OAG 83-47 .

A registration for greater than 12 months constitutes a single registration; therefore, even though a registration year should exceed 12 calendar months, the clerk is not entitled to more than a $2.00 fee. OAG 83-76 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Notes, Vehicular Registration in Kentucky: A Remnant of the Horse and Buggy Age, 69 Ky. L.J. 124 (1980-81).

186.052. License fee for driveaway operations — Tags. [Repealed]

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 139, § 22; 1988, ch. 49, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1996, ch. 174, § 4, effective July 15, 1996; repealed by 2015 ch. 19, § 45, effective June 24, 2015.

Compiler's Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 139, § 22; 1988, ch. 49, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1996, ch. 174, § 4, effective July 15, 1996) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 19, § 45, effective June 24, 2015.

186.053. License for dealer-demonstrator trucks or tractors — Fee — Tags.

  1. Every dealer in motor trucks or tractors to be used in combination with semitrailers who engages in the practice of transporting property for demonstration purposes shall pay to the Department of Vehicle Regulation an annual tax based on the gross weight of the motor vehicle so demonstrated an amount equal to one-half (1/2) the registration fee imposed by KRS 186.050(3). The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall issue a metal license plate designated “dealer demonstration.” The use of such tag shall be limited to demonstration purposes, and the tag may be transferred from one vehicle to another. The Department of Vehicle Regulation may adopt regulations governing the use and transfer of such license tags.
  2. Vehicles used for demonstration and displaying the tag issued hereunder shall not be required to display dealer tags which may be required under the provisions of KRS 186.070 .

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 139, § 23.

186.054. Taxicab license fees — City licenses. [Renumbered KRS 186.281.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 139, § 21(4) and (5)) was recompiled as KRS 186.281 (4) and (5).

186.055. Extra registration fees for trucks having gross weight in excess of 18,000 pounds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 15, § 4; 1950, ch. 63, § 58; 1954, ch. 188, § 13; 1956 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 5, § 2; 1958, ch. 70, § 25; 1960, ch. 254, § 1; 1962, ch. 62, § 5; 1964, ch. 95, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 139, § 33.

186.056. Refund of portion of extra weight fees when ownership and use of vehicle are changed; refund or credit when use permanently discontinued.

  1. Whenever the ownership of a vehicle which has been registered at a declared gross weight in excess of 18,000 pounds under KRS 186.050 is changed, a refund of that portion of the tax paid allocable to the remainder of the unexpired period for which the tax was paid may be refunded as provided for destroyed vehicles in KRS 186.120(1) and in accordance with regulations adopted hereunder.
  2. In the event a vehicle is registered in accordance with KRS 186.050(11), the seller may obtain a refund of the portion of the tax which he had theretofore paid allocable to the remaining complete quarters of the unexpired period for which the tax was paid in the same manner as provided for destroyed vehicles in KRS 186.120 , and in accordance with regulations adopted hereunder.
  3. In the event the use of a vehicle which has been registered according to the terms of any proportional registration agreement pursuant to the provisions of KRS 186.050(13), is permanently discontinued by the registrant, a refund of that portion of the tax which the registrant had heretofore paid to the department, allocable to the remaining complete months of the unexpired period for which the tax was paid may be made to the registrant or a credit of that portion of the tax paid allocable to the remainder of the unexpired period for which the tax was paid may be applied toward the registration of any other vehicle during the current registration period by the registrant. The department shall have the authority to promulgate regulations regarding such refunds or credits.

History. Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 57, § 3; 1966, ch. 139, § 6; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(2); 1974, ch. 90, § 1; 1990, ch. 113, § 1, effective April 1, 1991.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The refund provisions of this section would not apply in the case of a stolen vehicle. OAG 72-769 .

186.057. Additional fee for trucks used to haul coal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 373, § 6, effective July 13, 1984) was repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 498, § 8, effective April 1, 1987.

186.0571. Surtax exemption. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 373, § 11, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 174, § 19, effective July 1, 1986) was repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 498, § 8, effective April 1, 1987.

186.058. Special provision for coal trucks. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 254, § 4; 1962, ch. 96, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 139, § 33.

186.059. Operation of overweight commercial vehicle — Ineligibility for exemption — Department hearing — Appeal.

  1. Operation of a commercial vehicle at a gross weight in excess of the declared gross weight at which such vehicle is registered under subsection (8), (9), or (10) of KRS 186.050 , shall make any owner or operator, otherwise entitled to a reduced fee set out in those subsections ineligible for same for the entire license year.
  2. The department, upon receipt of information substantiated by affidavit, that any owner or operator is operating a motor vehicle in excess of the gross weight at which it is registered under subsection (8), (9), or (10) of KRS 186.050 , may issue notice to the owner or operator advising that he is ineligible for the reduced fee or, that the privilege is revoked for the current license year. Within thirty (30) days of the date of the issuance of the notice, any affected owner or operator may request a hearing to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 13B. Failure to request a hearing within thirty (30) days of the date of the issuance of the notice shall make the ruling absolute, and the owner or operator shall be liable for the payment of the fees applicable under KRS 186.050 (3) for the entire license year.
  3. If a hearing is requested in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, the owner or operator shall not be entitled to the reduced fee during the interim between the application for hearing and the department’s final order, unless he shall file with the department a bond in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500) per vehicle to be applied to the payment of any taxes which the department, as a result of the hearing, may determine are due the Commonwealth.
  4. The question for determination at any hearing held at the request of an owner or operator receiving a notice from the department shall be whether or not the owner or operator has operated a commercial vehicle in excess of the declared gross weight at which it is registered under subsection (8), (9), or (10) or KRS 186.050 . The burden of proof shall be upon the department to show such unlawful operation. Any final order of the department shall be subject to appeal to the Franklin Circuit Court in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B, and any bond posted with the department shall be held pending the judgment of the highest court to which the matter is appealed.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 96, § 3; 1966, ch. 139, § 7; 1996, ch. 318, § 69, effective July 15, 1996.

186.060. Motor vehicles leased or owned by governmental units or emergency and ambulance vehicles operated by nonprofit corporations organized by units of government — Use of official plates on motor vehicles leased by governmental entity.

  1. Applications for registration of motor vehicles leased or owned by a county, city, urban-county, or board of education, or emergency and ambulance vehicles operated by nonprofit corporations organized by units of government in the state or by the state or federal government shall be accompanied by a statement from the head of the department of the governmental unit that leases or owns the motor vehicle, certifying that the motor vehicle is leased or owned and operated by the governmental unit. The application and statement shall be forwarded by the county clerk to the cabinet, which shall give special authority to the clerk to register it. Upon receiving that authority, the clerk shall issue a registration receipt and the official number plate described in KRS 186.240(6), and report the registration to the head of the department authorizing the registration. For his services in issuing such certificate of registration and number plate and reporting the same, the county clerk shall be entitled to a fee of three dollars ($3) in each instance, to be paid by the department upon whose authorization such license was issued.
  2. After such registration of any vehicle leased or owned by a county, city, urban-county, or board of education, or emergency and ambulance vehicles operated by nonprofit corporations organized by units of government in the state, or by the state or federal government and after issuance of such number plate for such vehicle so leased or owned, no subsequent registration or renewal of same, and no subsequent renewal of a number plate of the vehicle shall be necessary so long as the vehicle is leased or owned by the governmental unit except in the case of loss or destruction of the license plate. In the event of loss or destruction, the number plate shall be replaced in the same manner as if no plate had ever been issued.
  3. When a motor vehicle leased or owned by a county, city, urban-county, or board of education, or emergency and ambulance vehicles operated by nonprofit corporations organized by units of government in the state, or by the state or federal government is transferred or sold to another governmental unit, a new license plate shall be issued for the vehicle in the same manner as provided for in subsection (1) of this section and shall have the same effect as given to such license plates in subsection (2) of this section.
  4. No person shall use on a motor vehicle, not leased or owned by a county, city, urban-county, board of education, or emergency and ambulance vehicles operated by nonprofit corporations organized by units of government in the state, or the state or federal government, any license plate that has been issued for use on a motor vehicle leased or owned by the governmental unit.
  5. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 186.020 and 186.050 , a governmental entity which leases a motor vehicle may have that vehicle equipped with an official plate under this section. Upon termination of the lease agreement, if ownership of the motor vehicle does not revert to an entity allowed to use an official plate under this section, the owner of the motor vehicle shall surrender the official plates and apply for registration under the provisions of KRS 186.050 .

History. 2739g-7: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 122; 1948, ch. 126, §§ 1, 2, 3; 1964, ch. 148, § 1; 1974, ch. 72, § 1; 1986, ch. 419, § 3, effective July 15, 1986; 1990, ch. 296, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 498, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 428, § 9, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 36, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 2013, ch. 33, § 1, effective June 25, 2013; 2021 ch. 53, § 3, effective June 29, 2021.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Georgetown v. Morrison, 362 S.W.2d 289, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 256 ( Ky. 1962 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A school board was without authority to authorize the use of its buses by a civic organization in the absence of a showing of some specific connection between the proposed trip and regular school functions. OAG 60-690 .

So long as motor vehicles are owned exclusively by a board of education they need not be re-registered after the initial registration and the license tags will be permanent. OAG 65-421 .

The LKLP Council, a private nonprofit corporation whose general objective is the social, individual, and economic growth of Leslie, Knott, Letcher and Perry Counties, is not a governmental agency as defined in this section and is not entitled to an official license tag. OAG 67-257 .

Community Action Lexington-Fayette County, Inc. (CALF) is not qualified to obtain state license plates for its vehicles. OAG 71-467 .

A city may not equip a motor vehicle with an official license if the vehicle is leased rather than purchased. OAG 73-6 .

A fire truck owned by a nonstock, nonprofit corporation for the purpose of offering fire protection, said corporation not having been created under KRS chapter 75 does not constitute a political subdivision or governmental unit and, as provided by this section, would not be entitled to a governmental license plate. OAG 73-145 .

A residential manpower center is not entitled to receive official license plates for automobiles acquired under a General Motors lending agreement and used in its driver’s education program as it is not a governmental unit and the automobiles are not owned and used exclusively by it. OAG 74-363 .

The driver education vehicles owned by an independent school district and operated exclusively for the conduct of a school program by a residential manpower center as an agency of the school district qualify for official license plates under this section. OAG 74-395 .

A governmental agency may not use official license plates on leased cars. OAG 74-456 .

KRS 186.060(4), as amended in 1996, allows federal, state, and local governmental units to use official license plates on vehicles leased or owned by them; prior opinions to the contrary are abrogated insofar as they rely on prior statutory language. OAG 12-001 , 2012 Ky. AG LEXIS 25.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

“Cabinet” defined, KRS 186.010(1).

Kentucky Law Journal.

Notes, Economic, Social and Legal Aspects of Coal Transportation in Kentucky, 64 Ky. L.J. 601 (1975-76).

Garrison and Martin, Kentucky Commercial Motor Vehicle Transportation Tax Legislation, 33 Ky. L.J. 3 (1944).

186.061. Motor vehicles owned by nonprofit volunteer fire department, volunteer fire prevention unit, or volunteer fire protection unit.

  1. Applications for registration of motor vehicles owned exclusively by any nonprofit volunteer fire department, volunteer fire prevention unit, or volunteer fire protection unit shall be accompanied by a statement from the chief or assistant chief of the volunteer fire department or unit that owns the motor vehicle, certifying that the motor vehicle is exclusively owned and operated by the volunteer fire department or unit. The application and statement shall be forwarded by the county clerk to the cabinet, which shall give special authority to the clerk to register it. Upon receiving that authority, the clerk shall issue a registration receipt and the official number plate described in KRS 186.240(6), and report the registration to the head of the cabinet authorizing the registration. For his services in issuing such certificate of registration and number plate and reporting the same, the county clerk shall be entitled to a fee of three dollars ($3) in each instance, to be paid by the volunteer fire department or unit.
  2. After registration of any vehicle owned exclusively by any nonprofit volunteer fire department, volunteer fire prevention unit, or volunteer fire protection unit and after issuance of a number plate for the vehicle so owned, no subsequent registration or renewal of same, and no subsequent renewal of a number plate of the vehicle shall be necessary so long as the vehicle is owned exclusively by the volunteer fire department or unit except in the case of loss or destruction of the license plate. In the event of loss or destruction, the number plate shall be replaced in the same manner as if no plate had ever been issued.
  3. When a motor vehicle owned exclusively by any nonprofit volunteer fire department, volunteer fire prevention unit, or volunteer fire protection unit is transferred or sold to another nonprofit volunteer fire department, volunteer fire prevention unit, or volunteer fire protection unit or another governmental unit a new license plate shall be issued for the vehicle in the same manner as provided for in subsection (1) of this section and shall have the same effect as given to such license plates in subsection (2) of this section.
  4. No person shall use on a motor vehicle, not exclusively owned by any nonprofit volunteer fire department, volunteer fire prevention unit, or volunteer fire protection unit, any license plate that has been issued for use on a motor vehicle owned by a volunteer fire department or unit.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 366, § 1; 1990, ch. 296, § 3, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 498, § 3, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 428, § 10, effective July 15, 1994; 2021 ch. 53, § 4, effective June 29, 2021.

Opinions of Attorney General.

KRS 186.020 and this section, when read together, make it mandatory for a volunteer fire protection district to register all of its motor vehicles, including fire trucks, owned exclusively by such district, and which are to operate on the public roads in Kentucky. OAG 76-454 .

186.065. State-owned vehicles — How marked — Exceptions.

  1. Every state-owned motor vehicle, except as provided in subsection (2), shall have an official license plate. Except as provided in subsections (2), (3), and (4) on one (1) door on each side of every state-owned vehicle shall be the great seal of the Commonwealth and the words “For Official Use Only.”
  2. The Department of Revenue, the Transportation Cabinet, the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, the Public Protection Cabinet, and the Attorney General may authorize registration under KRS 186.020 and be issued regular license plates for vehicles used for investigatory purposes. The Administrative Office of the Courts may authorize registration under KRS 186.020 and be issued regular license plates for vehicles used by justices and judges of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
  3. The Governor and the Lieutenant Governor may each use one (1) state-owned motor vehicle on which it shall not be necessary to have the state seal or the words “For Official Use Only.”
  4. The Justices and Judges of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals may each use state-owned motor vehicles on which it shall not be necessary to have the state seal or the words “For Official Use Only.”

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 23, §§ 1, 2, 3; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(7); 1990, ch. 28, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 2005, ch. 133, § 10, effective June 20, 2005; 2010, ch. 24, § 234, effective July 15, 2010.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Subsection (2) of this section providing regular licensing of state vehicles and nonmarking does not apply to the office of auditor of public accounts. OAG 76-374 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Motor vehicles, purchase for state use; license plates; markings; regulations, KRS 44.045 .

186.067. Publicly owned vehicles, how marked — Exceptions.

  1. All publicly owned vehicles shall be properly identified by an insignia on one (1) door on each side of every such vehicle.
  2. Such insignia shall not be less than twelve (12) inches in width and not less than twenty-one (21) inches in length, of a design so chosen by the legislative body of the state, county, or city in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
  3. The legislative body may designate a separate insignia for each division, department, agency, bureau or any other authority as may come under their jurisdiction within the state, county or city within the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
  4. Publicly owned vehicle, as used in this section, means any vehicle paid for with public funds and used by an elected or appointed official or employee of the state, county or city within the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
  5. Nothing in this section shall be construed to abrogate the provisions of KRS 44.045 and 186.065 .
  6. The legislative body of any county or city may exempt from the provisions of this section any vehicle used for investigatory purposes.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 186, § 1.

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section applies to vehicles belonging to school districts and the state board of education (now state board for elementary and secondary education) is the appropriate agency to designate the required insignia for vehicles belonging to school districts. OAG 72-295 .

A city council may enact an ordinance exempting certain vehicles used for investigation from being labeled. OAG 73-6 .

Although all publicly owned vehicles, whether owned by the state, county, city or school districts must be labeled as publicly owned, such vehicles used by a school district for investigatory purposes can be exempted from the labeling requirement by authorization of the city council or the fiscal court. OAG 73-122 .

186.068. Transit tag for transporting motor vehicle out of state — Administrative regulations — Exclusion of motor vehicle dealers and distributors.

  1. Individual sellers or owners of motor vehicles that would ordinarily be registered under KRS 186.050(3) may obtain a transit tag from the Transportation Cabinet in order to transport the motor vehicle out of state. The fee for each transit tag issued shall be five dollars ($5).
  2. A transit tag issued under this section shall be issued only for a motor vehicle which is ineligible for:
    1. Registration under KRS 186.050 ; or
    2. Temporary registration under KRS 186A.100 .
  3. The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to establish application forms and procedures for the issuance of transit tags. The application for a transit tag under this section shall be accompanied by proof of vehicle ownership and proof of insurance coverage in compliance with KRS 304.39-080 .
  4. A transit tag issued under this section shall be placed on a motor vehicle in the same manner as a regular license plate.
  5. Transit tags issued under this section shall expire fifteen (15) days from the date of issuance, and shall be designed in a manner that clearly identifies the expiration date on the face of the tag in a tamper-resistant manner.
  6. This section shall not apply to motor vehicle dealers or distributors licensed under KRS Chapter 190.

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 34, § 1, effective January 1, 2014.

186.070. Registration of manufacturers and dealers — Dealer’s plates and stickers — Names of drivers authorized to use dealer’s plates to be available to law enforcement agencies — Revocation of licenses — Appeal.

    1. Every manufacturer of, or dealer in, motor vehicles in this state shall register with each county clerk in which his or her principal office or place of business and branch office, sub-agent, or agency is located, and pay an annual registration fee of twenty-five dollars ($25) to each clerk. (1) (a) Every manufacturer of, or dealer in, motor vehicles in this state shall register with each county clerk in which his or her principal office or place of business and branch office, sub-agent, or agency is located, and pay an annual registration fee of twenty-five dollars ($25) to each clerk.
    2. Upon receipt of the twenty-five dollar ($25) fee, the clerk shall issue the manufacturer or dealer a certificate of registration and one (1) dealer plate. Every manufacturer or dealer registered under this section shall be furnished additional dealer’s plates upon the payment of fourteen dollars and fifty cents ($14.50) for each additional plate requested. Three dollars ($3) shall be retained by the clerk for each additional plate issued.
    3. A motor vehicle bearing dealer’s plates may be used on the highways only by the following people:
      1. A licensed dealer, bona fide salesman, or employee of the dealer;
      2. A manufacturer or dealer licensed pursuant to the laws of this state transporting a motor vehicle to his or her place of retail business from a manufacturer or wholesale dealer in motor vehicles; and
      3. A bona fide customer of a licensed dealer, or the customer’s employees when a motor vehicle is being demonstrated. This provision shall be limited to one (1) trip or demonstration to the same prospective customer.
    4. License plates issued under this section shall annually expire on December 31.
    5. As used in this section, “bona fide salesman or employee” means a licensed salesman, or an employee, who is actively engaged in and devotes a substantial part of his or her time to the conduct of the dealer business.
    6. A vehicle bearing a dealer plate, except when the vehicle is being transported to a dealer’s place of business from a manufacturer, shall have, in the case of a new motor vehicle, a “monroney” sticker attached to the vehicle, or, in the case of a used motor vehicle, a Federal Trade Commission buyer’s guide sticker attached to the vehicle.
    1. Each manufacturer and dealer when making application for dealer’s plates shall file a verified statement on at least a quarterly basis with the county clerk, giving the name, address, and Social Security number of each dealer, and each bona fide salesman or employee entitled to the use of the plates for demonstration purposes only. When any bona fide registered salesman or employee is no longer employed by the manufacturer or dealer, the manufacturer or dealer shall file an amended verified statement with the clerk stating that fact, and when any additional salesmen or employees are employed, an amended verified statement showing their names and addresses shall be filed with the clerk so that the records in the clerk’s office will at all times show the bona fide salesmen and employees actually in the service of the registered dealer or manufacturer; (2) (a) Each manufacturer and dealer when making application for dealer’s plates shall file a verified statement on at least a quarterly basis with the county clerk, giving the name, address, and Social Security number of each dealer, and each bona fide salesman or employee entitled to the use of the plates for demonstration purposes only. When any bona fide registered salesman or employee is no longer employed by the manufacturer or dealer, the manufacturer or dealer shall file an amended verified statement with the clerk stating that fact, and when any additional salesmen or employees are employed, an amended verified statement showing their names and addresses shall be filed with the clerk so that the records in the clerk’s office will at all times show the bona fide salesmen and employees actually in the service of the registered dealer or manufacturer;
    2. The names of each dealer and each bona fide salesman and employee shall be entered by the clerk into the AVIS where it will be readily available to law enforcement agencies. The information shall be entered by the clerk immediately after each quarterly filing of the verified statement by the dealer;
    3. Any person who is hired as a driver by a motor vehicle dealer for the limited, specific purpose of transporting a motor vehicle to or from that dealer’s place of business may, for that purpose only, operate a motor vehicle bearing a dealer plate. For the purpose of that operation, the dealer shall provide to that driver a permit, provided by the Transportation Cabinet. The permit shall be valid for five (5) days from the date of issuance. A fee shall not be charged for the permit.
  1. The license of any dealer or manufacturer may be revoked by the Transportation Cabinet for the violation of any of the provisions of this section. The manufacturer or dealer shall be given an opportunity to be heard in defense of the charge that he or she has violated any of the provisions of this section, and the Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations governing the revocation procedure. A manufacturer or dealer whose license is revoked may appeal the revocation to the Board of Tax Appeals pursuant to KRS 49.220 . The manufacturer or dealer whose license has been suspended shall be prohibited from engaging in the business of selling or buying motor vehicles. The license of any manufacturer or dealer shall be revoked for a period of one (1) year and his or her dealer’s plates canceled if he or she violates any of the provisions of this section during this suspension period or has been suspended by the cabinet more than twice for violations of this section. At the end of the revocation or suspension period, the manufacturer or dealer whose license has been revoked or suspended and dealer’s plates canceled may follow the provisions of this section and again be registered and secure dealer’s plates from the clerk.
  2. The Transportation Cabinet shall be responsible for the issuance and cancellation of the plates provided for in this section, and the motor vehicle commission shall be responsible for the enforcement of this section, except for the normal responsibilities of law enforcement agencies. The cabinet may promulgate administrative regulations pertaining to the administration of this section.

HISTORY: 2739g-6: amend. Acts 1950, ch. 190, § 3; 1960, ch. 186, Art. IV, § 10; 1962, ch. 62, § 6; 1964, ch. 141, § 31; 1968, ch. 40, pt. 4, § 3; 1970, ch. 173, § 1; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(9); 1976, ch. 133, § 6; 1986, ch. 431, § 10, effective July 15, 1986; 1994, ch. 84, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 428, § 11, effective July 15, 1994; 2017 ch. 74, § 91, effective June 29, 2017; 2021 ch. 185, § 81, effective June 29, 2021.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/94). This section was amended by 1994 Ky. Acts chs. 84 and 428. Where these Acts are not in conflict, they have been codified together. Where a conflict exists, Acts ch. 428, which was last enacted by the General Assembly, prevails under KRS 446.250 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Application.

KRS 382.675 does not require that motor vehicles in a dealer’s inventory be registered (licensed under the provisions of this chapter). Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 223 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Circuit court erred in affirming a decision of the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Commission, which concluded that a licensed motor vehicle dealer made improper use of a dealer license plate because a pickup truck was in use by a dealership employee for the necessary operation and in furtherance of the dealer's business; the vehicle originally displayed the required Federal Trade Commission buyer's guide sticker, it had been temporarily removed;, and it had been promptly restored to view. Bruce Walters Ford Lincoln Kia v. Ky. Motor, Vehicle, 527 S.W.3d 825, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 444 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

Statutes and administrative regulations pertaining to dealer plates permit unregistered vehicles to be operated on Kentucky's highways only by specified persons, for limited purposes, and, in some instances, for limited periods; when vehicles bearing dealer plates are operated by non-salesperson dealer employees, operation of the vehicles is limited to testing the mechanical operation of the vehicle, transport of the vehicle to or from the dealer's place of business. Bruce Walters Ford Lincoln Kia v. Ky. Motor, Vehicle, 527 S.W.3d 825, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 444 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

Where the vehicle's use is expanded to include furtherance of some other of the dealer's business, its operation is limited to the dealer's business hours; there is no restriction that a non-salesperson employee may use the vehicle only with the intent of offering or advertising the vehicle for sale to the public. Bruce Walters Ford Lincoln Kia v. Ky. Motor, Vehicle, 527 S.W.3d 825, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 444 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A used car dealer who operates a motor vehicle bearing dealer’s license to travel to other places to buy cars for resale and uses the car with dealer’s plates for towing is violating the statute. OAG 61-177 . Now see OAG 78-574 .

A used car dealer who operates a motor vehicle bearing dealer’s license to travel to other places to buy cars not for resale and uses the car with dealer’s plates for towing is violating the statute. OAG 61-177 . Now see OAG 78-574 .

To determine whether a bank or finance company is a “dealer” needing a license and a dealer’s registration tag in disposing of automobiles on which there is a deficiency the definition in former KRS 139.110(1)(c) (see now KRS 139.010 ) was used. OAG 62-954 .

Automobiles can only be operated on the highways by a dealer with dealer’s tags for demonstration purposes in connection with the sale of such motor vehicle or to transport a vehicle over the highway from a manufacturer or wholesaler to the retailer’s place of business. OAG 62-1152 . Now see OAG 78-574 .

Salesmen who use cars assigned to them as demonstrators are not permitted to operate such cars on dealer’s tags on the salesmen’s own business and pleasure. OAG 62-1152 . Now see OAG 78-574 .

The statute precludes the use of a vehicle by a dealer’s family with dealer plates attached. OAG 62-1152 . Now see OAG 78-574 .

Where a bank made a loan on a house trailer and recorded the financing statement but did not present a registration certificate for the lien to be recorded on, if a subsequent loan is made by another and the registration receipt is presented the first loan is classified as the first mortgage against the trailer. OAG 64-563 .

Where a bank made a loan on a house trailer and recorded the financing statement but did not present a registration certificate for the lien to be recorded on, if at a later date the registration receipt for the house trailer is presented for recording in that county the lien information should be recorded on such receipt. OAG 64-563 .

Motor carriers licensed pursuant to this section are subject to the tax imposed by KRS 138.660 . OAG 70-345 .

A dealer or his bona fide employe may use dealer’s plates on a vehicle which is being used for transporting and selling automobiles, but which is not being held for immediate resale. OAG 78-574 ; modifying OAG 61-177 .

A used car dealer or his duly authorized employe, who is properly registered and identified, may operate a vehicle bearing dealer’s plates to travel for the purpose of purchasing additional vehicles for resale or for the purpose of towing automobiles purchased back to his place of business. OAG 78-574 ; modifying OAG 61-177 .

A dealer may legally use a car bearing dealer’s plates, where the car is being used generally in connection with his business, for general family purposes since he or she, as a licensed dealer, may use such a vehicle at all times, but members of the dealer’s family could not legally drive the car since they are not within the category of those for whom general use of a car bearing dealer’s tags is permissible. OAG 78-574 ; modifying OAG 62-1152 .

A licensed dealer is not required to use cars bearing dealer’s plates only in the course of his business. OAG 78-574 ; modifying OAG 62-1152 .

Salespersons may use demonstrators assigned to them for their own business and pleasure. OAG 78-574 ; modifying OAG 62-1152 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Garrison and Martin, Kentucky Commercial Motor Vehicle Transportation Tax Legislation, 33 Ky. L.J. 3 (1944).

Whiteside, Lewis, Kentucky’s Commercial Code — Some Initial Problems in Security, The Lincoln Bank Case, 50 Ky. L.J. 61 (1961).

186.072. Commercial motor vehicle temporary registration placard — Application process — Uses — Record of use — Activation.

  1. For the purposes of this section, “motor truck” and “truck tractor” shall have the same meaning as established in KRS 189.010 .
  2. Any manufacturer, dealer, or distributor engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling, or customizing truck tractors or motor trucks may obtain a commercial motor vehicle temporary registration placard from the Department of Vehicle Regulation. The fee for each placard shall be one hundred dollars ($100) per placard and each applicant shall specify the number of placards to be issued. A company may make additional requests for temporary placards at any time it exhausts the placards supplied by the department.
  3. The commissioner shall prescribe the application form for the commercial vehicle temporary registration placard, require each applicant to submit proof of eligibility to receive the placard, and certify that the applicant has need of the placard in the ordinary course of business, and may request other information as part of the application process.
  4. The commercial vehicle temporary registration placard shall be placed on a truck tractor or motor truck in the same manner as a regular license plate. The temporary placard shall be issued if a permanent registration issued pursuant to KRS 186.050 or temporary registration issued pursuant to KRS 186A.100 cannot be obtained.
  5. The use of a commercial vehicle temporary placard shall be limited to the following activities:
    1. A demonstration of the truck tractor or motor truck to a prospective purchaser;
    2. The transportation of the truck tractor or motor truck to a facility engaged in the customizing of a motor vehicle for eventual use on the highway;
    3. The transportation of the truck tractor or motor truck to a trade show or other activity designed to promote the selling of the product; or
    4. The transportation of the truck tractor or motor truck by a purchaser to a location outside Kentucky, provided that the truck tractor or motor truck is not eligible to be registered in Kentucky.
  6. Each manufacturer, dealer, or distributor receiving the temporary placards shall maintain a record of use for each temporary placard to include the following:
    1. The make and model of each motor vehicle and the vehicle identification number or other identification number of each vehicle on which a placard is used;
    2. The date the placard was issued and the registration number of the placard;
    3. The address of the final destination and reason for movement of the truck tractor or motor truck receiving the temporary placard; and
    4. A record of insurance coverage or a binder for insurance coverage issued to the recipient of the temporary placard.
  7. A commercial vehicle temporary placard shall not be activated until it is placed upon the truck tractor or motor truck and used in a manner as authorized by subsection (5) of this section. The commercial vehicle temporary placard shall expire thirty (30) days after it is activated and placed in use on a truck tractor or motor truck and shall be designed in a manner that an expiration date shall be noted clearly on the face of the placard.

History. Enact. Acts 2008, ch. 176, § 1, effective July 15, 2008.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2008). 2000 While the lead-in language for this statute in 2008 Ky. Acts ch. 176, sec. 1 provided that “A NEW SECTION KRS 186 (sic) IS AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:” it is clear that a new statute was actually being created and the Reviser of Statutes has codified it as such to effectuate that intent.

186.073. Commercial trailer temporary registration placard — Application process — Uses — Record of use — Activation.

  1. For the purposes of this section, “semitrailer” and “trailer” shall have the same meaning as established in KRS 186.650 .
  2. Any manufacturer, dealer, or distributor engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling, or customizing commercial semitrailers or commercial trailers may obtain a commercial trailer temporary registration placard from the Department of Vehicle Regulation. The fee for each placard shall be five dollars ($5) per placard and each applicant shall specify the number of placards to be issued. A company may make additional requests for temporary placards at any time it exhausts the placards supplied by the department.
  3. The commissioner shall prescribe the application form for the commercial trailer temporary registration placard, require each applicant to submit proof of eligibility to receive the placard, and certify that the applicant has need of the placard in the ordinary course of business, and may request other information as part of the application process.
  4. The commercial trailer temporary registration placard shall be placed on a semitrailer or trailer in the same manner as a regular trailer license plate. The temporary placard shall be issued if a permanent registration issued pursuant to KRS 186.655 cannot be obtained.
  5. The use of a commercial trailer temporary registration placard shall be limited to the following activities:
    1. A demonstration of the semitrailer or trailer to a prospective purchaser;
    2. The transportation of the semitrailer or trailer to a facility engaged in the customizing of a motor vehicle for eventual use on the highway;
    3. The transportation of the semitrailer or trailer to a trade show or other activity designed to promote the selling of the product;
    4. The transportation of the semitrailer or trailer by a purchaser to a location outside Kentucky, provided that the semitrailer or trailer is not eligible to be registered in Kentucky; or
    5. Transportation of a trailer or semitrailer from the manufacturer to a place of business in Kentucky in order to obtain a permanent registration issued pursuant to KRS 186.655 .
  6. Each manufacturer, dealer, or distributor receiving the temporary placards shall maintain a record of use for each temporary placard to include the following:
    1. The make and model of each semitrailer or trailer and the vehicle identification number or other identification number of each vehicle on which a placard is used;
    2. The date the placard was issued and the registration number of the placard; and
    3. The address of the final destination and reason for movement of the semitrailer or trailer receiving the temporary placard.
  7. A commercial trailer temporary registration placard shall not be activated until it is placed upon the semitrailer or trailer and used in a manner as authorized by subsection (5) of this section. The commercial trailer temporary registration placard shall expire thirty (30) days after it is activated and placed in use on a semitrailer or trailer and shall be designed in a manner that an expiration date shall be noted clearly on the face of the placard.

History. Enact. Acts 2008, ch. 176, § 2, effective July 15, 2008.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2008). 2000 While the lead-in language for this statute in 2008 Ky. Acts ch. 176, sec. 1 provided that “A NEW SECTION KRS 186 (sic) IS AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:” it is clear that a new statute was actually being created and the Reviser of Statutes has codified it as such to effectuate that intent.

186.074. Temporary permits. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 186, Art. IV, § 13; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(9); 1974, ch. 100, § 1; 1978, ch. 434, § 8, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 276, § 1, effective July 15, 1980) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 69, effective July 15, 1982.

186.076. Revocation of license for failure to transfer registration. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 186, Art. IV, § 12; 1964, ch. 141, § 32; 1966, ch. 139, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 431, § 19, effective July 15, 1986.

186.080. “In-transit” license plates. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-6) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 190, § 4.

186.090. Driveaway licenses — Application — Fees. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-103; 2739g-104) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 63, § 57.

186.100. Towing vehicles — Financial liability — Equipment — Speed. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-104) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 63, § 57.

186.110. Interchangeable bodies — Fees.

  1. If a person owns a motor vehicle which has interchangeable bodies for same so that at one time the motor vehicle may be classed as a passenger automobile and at another time as a truck, has registered same as a passenger automobile, he shall, before using it as a truck, pay the registration fee required for trucks in KRS 186.050 . In such case the owner shall be allowed credit for the unearned portion of the passenger registration fee on the truck registration fee.
  2. A passenger automobile shall be construed to have been converted into a truck when the change is such as to enable same to be used as a commercial vehicle.

History. 2739g-3: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 78, §§ 3, 8.

186.115. Registration of vehicle assembled from parts of wrecked or salvaged motor vehicles.

When the owner of a motor vehicle which has been assembled from parts from wrecked or salvaged motor vehicles presents such a vehicle for registration, he or she shall submit an affidavit and any invoices showing the purchase of such parts to either the county clerk or the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet’s central office in Frankfort. The county clerk shall forward all applications received to the Transportation Cabinet. The cabinet will either authorize or prohibit the registration of the vehicle.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 133, § 18; 1978, ch. 384, § 332, effective June 17, 1978; 2013, ch. 35, § 1, effective June 25, 2013.

186.120. Refund of portion of fee when motor vehicle destroyed.

  1. If any motor vehicle other than a commercial vehicle upon which the license tax has been paid is destroyed by fire or accident, so that the vehicle is rendered entirely useless the owner shall be entitled to have refunded to him a part of the license fee paid by him proportionate to the registration period for which the license was granted.
  2. If any commercial vehicle upon which the license tax has been paid is destroyed by fire or accident so that the vehicle is rendered entirely useless the owner is entitled to have refunded to him that portion of the tax which he had theretofore paid allocable to the remaining complete quarters of the unexpired period for which the tax was paid.
  3. To obtain the refund, the owner whose motor vehicle has been destroyed shall apply to the Transportation Cabinet, submitting his affidavit and the affidavits of two (2) reputable persons, attesting to the fact that the vehicle has been destroyed, and the manner of destruction, and shall return the original license plates to the Transportation Cabinet. The Transportation Cabinet shall examine all applications and investigate the claims for refund, and if a claim is found to be correct, it shall approve it for payment, whereupon the Finance and Administration Cabinet shall draw a warrant upon the State Treasurer in favor of the owner of the destroyed vehicle, and charge the amount of it to the state road fund.

History. 2739g-2e, 2739g-2f: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 62, § 7; 1966, ch. 139, § 9; 1974, ch. 74, Art. II, § 9(1); 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(9); 1976, ch. 133, § 7.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Garrison and Martin, Kentucky Commercial Motor Vehicle Transportation Tax Legislation I, 33 Ky. L.J. 3 (1944).

186.130. Proportionate fees for commercial vehicle operated after registration year began.

If any person offers a commercial vehicle for registration after April 1 of any year by reason of not having operated such vehicle on the public highways after April 1 of that year, the registration fee shall be as many twelfths of the annual fee as there are unexpired months in the registration year.

History. 2739g-4: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 139, § 10; 1976, ch. 133, § 8; 1978, ch. 239, § 6, effective June 17, 1978; 1990, ch. 113, § 2, effective April 1, 1991; 1996, ch. 97, § 3, effective July 15, 1996.

186.140. Reciprocity for nonresidents.

Except as provided in KRS 281.835 and 281.836 , a nonresident owner, from a state not requiring registration of nonresidents temporarily in it, who has complied with the laws of the state of his residence relating to registration of motor vehicles, and who displays the requisite plates and holds the requisite receipt or certificate of registration as required by his resident state, shall be exempt from registration in this state for the same period of time as is granted to nonresident owners by the laws and regulations of his state. Registration in any other state shall not relieve any owner resident in this state from the penalties provided in KRS 186.990 .

History. 2739g-5: amend. Acts 1970, ch. 57, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

Exemption of law from registration and license taxes in state of nonresidents who had complied with similar domiciliary law containing reciprocity provisions, did not violate Constitution, notwithstanding a portion of the law provided that cities of certain classes could levy license taxes upon resident owners for city purposes. Newport v. Merkel Bros. Co., 156 Ky. 580 , 161 S.W. 549, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 478 ( Ky. 1913 ) (decided under prior law).

2.Construction.

This section embraces registration and licensing of, and granting of permits and certificates to, nonresident owners of motor vehicles, whether used privately or commercially. Reeves v. Deisenroth, 288 Ky. 724 , 157 S.W.2d 331, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 197 ( Ky. 1941 ).

This section is to be read into and with all other statutes regulating and licensing motor vehicles, giving consideration to the exemptions in each and the absence of reference to this section. Reeves v. Deisenroth, 288 Ky. 724 , 157 S.W.2d 331, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 197 ( Ky. 1941 ).

3.Application.

The exemption applies only to nonresidents temporarily operating in Kentucky. Reeves v. Deisenroth, 288 Ky. 724 , 157 S.W.2d 331, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 197 ( Ky. 1941 ).

4.Police Measure.

This section is a police measure, not a revenue measure. Reeves v. Deisenroth, 288 Ky. 724 , 157 S.W.2d 331, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 197 ( Ky. 1941 ).

5.Temporarily Within.

“Temporarily within” refers to occasional, casual, infrequent or transitory trips into Kentucky. Reeves v. Deisenroth, 288 Ky. 724 , 157 S.W.2d 331, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 197 ( Ky. 1941 ).

6.Reciprocity Agreements.

Reciprocity agreements do not have the force of law; they can merely state the law and its interpretation. Reeves v. Deisenroth, 288 Ky. 724 , 157 S.W.2d 331, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 197 ( Ky. 1941 ).

7.Service of Process.

Law providing for service of process on secretary of state and whose purpose was to relieve injured person of hardship of following nonresident motorist into other jurisdiction, applies to nonresident having Kentucky license, and not merely to nonresident temporarily within this state and operating under this section. Mann v. Humphrey's Adm'x, 257 Ky. 647 , 79 S.W.2d 17, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 85 ( Ky. 1935 ).

8.License Tax for Use of Streets.

Ordinance imposing license tax upon persons using vehicles on streets was invalid as to nonresident who had complied with domiciliary law which exempted from license tax in the state nonresidents who had complied with similar domiciliary law requiring licenses, registration, and numbering of vehicles. Newport v. Merkel Bros. Co., 156 Ky. 580 , 161 S.W. 549, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 478 ( Ky. 1913 ) (decided under prior law).

Opinions of Attorney General.

No officer, agent or employe of the Commonwealth has authority to confiscate license plates issued by another state to a person who drives a car bearing those plates into Kentucky regardless of the fact that the person’s driver’s license was revoked by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. OAG 60-1055 .

Workers who have established residence in Michigan and are maintaining it in that state even though they return to Kentucky temporarily are only visitors in Kentucky, and are not required to register their automobiles in this state for the period of time as is granted to nonresidents of the state of Michigan. OAG 72-226 .

A resident of another state who has complied with the motor vehicle registration laws of his state of residence may operate a motor vehicle on the highways of Kentucky while in the state attending school. OAG 74-672 .

There is no statute which requires the sheriff to have someone in his office at all times, when it is open, for the purpose of inspecting out-of-state cars for licensing in Kentucky. The providing of a deputy or deputies to enforce such licensing law is left to the sound discretion of the sheriff, considering the number of his deputies and the total statutory functions of his office. OAG 82-460 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Reciprocal exemptions for nonresident motor carriers operating in interstate commerce, KRS 281.835 .

Suspension for nonpayment of judgment — Exception, KRS 187.410 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Garrison and Martin, Tax Impediments to Interstate Motor Vehicle Transportation, 33 Ky. L.J. 213 (1945).

186.145. Registration of nonresident by use of copy of registration or title document.

Any motor vehicle properly registered and titled in another state belonging to a nonresident, which vehicle is required to be registered in this state by reason of lack of reciprocal agreement with the state in which it is registered, or by reason of not qualifying for reciprocity under an existing reciprocal agreement with the state in which it is registered, may be registered with the county clerk by presenting a photostat or certified copy of the registration receipt or certificate of title issued to the nonresident in his home state. The registration receipt issued by the county clerk shall be stamped across its face with a notation prescribed by the cabinet that will indicate the registration receipt so issued cannot be used in transferring legal title to the motor vehicle. However, under regulations prescribed by the cabinet, a registration receipt so issued may be transferred to a new owner if the foreign legal title and registration is transferred in that state to the new owner. Nothing contained in this section shall release the owner of the vehicle from any tax fees or other requirements imposed by law.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 62, § 3; 1968, ch. 40, Part IV, § 4.

186.150. Residents not to use license of other states.

  1. No resident operating a motor vehicle on the highways, shall secure or license the motor vehicle in any state other than Kentucky unless so licensed in conformity with a motor vehicle reciprocal arrangement or under the international registration plan.
  2. The use of a license of any state other than Kentucky by a resident of this state on his car driven over Kentucky highways shall be prima facie evidence of guilt.

History. 2739g-5a, 2739g-5b: amend. Acts 1986, ch. 431, § 11, effective July 15, 1986.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Reeves v. Deisenroth, 288 Ky. 724 , 157 S.W.2d 331, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 197 , 138 A.L.R. 1493 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A person who is or becomes a resident of Kentucky must immediately apply for his automobile license and his operator’s license in this state, since there is no grace period allowed by the statute. OAG 72-226 .

Where a man claimed domicile in Ohio, but listed his address as in Kentucky on a job application and loaned his car to relatives in Kentucky, he was not required to register the car in Kentucky, since it could only be registered in one state, the state of his domicile, and domicile is a matter of intent. OAG 78-317 .

A sheriff’s department may not use an out-of-state plate on unmarked squad cars since this section prohibits a Kentucky resident from registering his vehicle out-of-state and there is no exemption for a sheriff’s department. OAG 81-421 .

There is no statute which requires the sheriff to have someone in his office at all times, when it is open, for the purpose of inspecting out-of-state cars for licensing in Kentucky. The providing of a deputy or deputies to enforce such licensing law is left to the sound discretion of the sheriff, considering the number of his deputies and the total statutory functions of his office. OAG 82-460 .

186.160. Motor numbers essential to registration — Assignment of number.

No clerk shall receive an application for registration nor register a motor vehicle, unless the motor vehicle bears a motor number or a vehicle identification number. If there is no motor number or vehicle identification number, or if the number is not plainly legible, the owner shall apply through the clerk to the Transportation Cabinet for a motor number or vehicle identification number, and when that number is assigned to the owner’s motor vehicle the owner shall cause the number to be stamped on the motor with a steel die or in the space provided by manufacturer for vehicle identification number. That number shall thereafter be used by the owner in making registration or executing a bill of sale.

History. 2739g-8: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 153, § 4; 1962, ch. 62, § 8.

186.162. Special license plates for members or supporters of certain groups and organizations — Initial and renewal fees — Combination of special license plate with personalized license plate — Special license plates for motorcycles.

  1. As used in this section and in KRS 186.043 , 186.164 , 186.166 , 186.1722 , and 186.174 :
    1. “Special license plate” means a unique license plate issued under this chapter to a group or organization that readily identifies the operator of the motor vehicle or motorcycle bearing the plate as a member of a group or organization, or a supporter of the work, goals, or mission of a group or organization. The term shall not include regular license plates issued under KRS 186.240 ;
    2. “Street rod” means a modernized private passenger motor vehicle manufactured prior to the year 1949, or designed or manufactured to resemble a vehicle manufactured prior to 1949;
    3. “SF” means the portion of an initial or renewal fee to obtain a special license plate that is dedicated for use by the Transportation Cabinet;
    4. “CF” means the county clerk’s fee for issuing a motor vehicle registration as established under KRS 186.040(1). If a CF amount is charged for a license plate listed in this section, the applicant for that plate shall also pay the fees identified in KRS 186.040(6). If a CF amount is not charged, the applicant shall not be required to pay those fees; and
    5. “EF” means the portion of an initial or renewal fee to obtain a special license plate that is mandated by this chapter to be dedicated for use by a particular group or organization.
  2. The initial purchase fee and renewal fee for a special license plate created under this chapter shall be as established in this subsection and includes the name of group or organization and the total initial and renewal fee required for the plate. The amount in parentheses indicates how the total fee is required to be divided:
    1. Disabled veterans who receive assistance to purchase a vehicle from the United States Department of Veterans’ Affairs, veterans declared by the United States Department of Veterans’ Affairs to be one hundred percent (100%) service-connected disabled, and recipients of the Congressional Medal of Honor:
    2. Former prisoners of war and survivors of Pearl Harbor:
      1. Initial Fee: $23 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$5 EF to the veterans’ program trust fund established under ). KRS 40.460 2. Renewal Fee: $6 ($0 SF/$6 CF/$0 EF).
    3. Members of the Kentucky National Guard and recipients of the Purple Heart:
      1. Initial Fee: $23 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$5 EF to the veterans’ program trust fund established under ). KRS 40.460 2. Renewal Fee: $11 ($0 SF/$6 CF/$5 EF to the veterans’ program trust fund established under ). KRS 40.460
    4. Members of the Civil Air Patrol; active, retired, veteran, reserve, or auxiliary members of the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard; Merchant Marines who served between December 7, 1941, and August 15, 1945; recipients of the Silver Star Medal, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Air Medal, the Combat Action Badge, the Combat Infantry Badge, or the Bronze Star Medal; persons who wish to receive Gold Star Mothers, Gold Star Fathers, or Gold Star Spouses license plates beyond the two (2) exempted from fees under KRS 186.041(6); individuals eligible for a special military service academy license plate under KRS 186.041(8); and disabled veterans who have been declared to be between fifty percent (50%) and ninety-nine percent (99%) service-connected disabled by the United States Department of Veterans’ Affairs:
      1. Initial Fee: $23 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$5 EF to the veterans’ program trust fund established under ). KRS 40.460 2. Renewal Fee: $23 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$5 EF to the veterans’ program trust fund established under ). KRS 40.460
    5. Recipients of the Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, or Air Force Cross:
      1. Initial Fee: $6 ($0 SF/$6 CF/$0 EF). 2. Renewal Fee: $6 ($0 SF/$6 CF/$0 EF).
    6. Disabled license plates:
      1. Initial Fee: $18 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$0 EF). 2. Renewal Fee: $18 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$0 EF).
    7. Historic vehicles:
      1. Initial Fee for two plates: $56 ($50 SF/$6 CF/$0 EF). 2. Renewal Fee: Do not renew annually.
    8. Members of Congress:
      1. Initial Fee: $43 ($37 SF/$6 CF/$0 EF). 2. Renewal Fee: $23 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$5 EF to the veterans’ program trust fund established under ). KRS 40.460
    9. Firefighters:
      1. Initial Fee: $28 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to the Kentucky Firefighters Association). 2. Renewal Fee: $28 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to the Kentucky Firefighters Association).
    10. Emergency management:
      1. Initial Fee: $31 ($25 SF/$6 CF/$0 EF). 2. Renewal Fee: $18 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$0 EF).
    11. Fraternal Order of Police:
      1. Initial Fee: $41 ($25 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to the Kentucky FOP Death Benefit Fund). 2. Renewal Fee: $28 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to the Kentucky FOP Death Benefit Fund).
    12. Law Enforcement Memorial:
      1. Initial Fee: $41 ($25 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to the Kentucky Law Enforcement Memorial Foundation, Inc.). 2. Renewal Fee: $28 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to the Kentucky Law Enforcement Memorial Foundation, Inc.).
    13. Personalized plates:
      1. Initial Fee: $43 ($37 SF/$6 CF/$0 EF). 2. Renewal Fee: $43 ($37 SF/$6 CF/$0 EF).
    14. Street rods:
      1. Initial Fee: $43 ($37 SF/$6 CF/$0 EF). 2. Renewal Fee: $18 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$0 EF).
    15. Nature plates:
      1. Initial Fee: $28 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to Kentucky Heritage Land Conservation Fund established under ). KRS 146.570 2. Renewal Fee: $28 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to Kentucky Heritage Land Conservation Fund established under ). KRS 146.570
    16. Amateur radio:
      1. Initial Fee: $43 ($37 SF/$6 CF/$0 EF). 2. Renewal Fee: $18 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$0 EF).
    17. Kentucky General Assembly:
      1. Initial Fee: $43 ($37 SF/$6 CF/$0 EF). 2. Renewal Fee: $23 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$5 EF to the veterans’ program trust fund established under ). KRS 40.460
    18. Kentucky Court of Justice:
      1. Initial Fee: $43 ($37 SF/$6 CF/$0 EF). 2. Renewal Fee: $11 ($0 SF/$6 CF/$5 EF to the veterans’ program trust fund established under ). KRS 40.460
    19. Masons:
      1. Initial Fee: $41 ($25 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to the Masonic Homes of Kentucky). 2. Renewal Fee: $28 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to the Masonic Homes of Kentucky).
    20. Collegiate plates:
      1. Initial Fee: $53 ($37 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to the general scholarship fund of the university whose name will be borne on the plate). 2. Renewal Fee: $28 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to the general scholarship fund of the university whose name will be borne on the plate).
    21. Independent Colleges:
      1. Initial Fee: $41 ($25 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to the Association of Independent Kentucky Colleges and Universities for distribution to the general scholarship funds members). 2. Renewal Fee: $28 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to the Association of Independent Kentucky Colleges and Universities for distribution to the general scholarship funds members).
    22. Child Victims:
      1. Initial Fee: $41 ($25 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to the child victims’ trust fund established under ). KRS 41.400 2. Renewal Fee: $23 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$5 EF to the child victims’ trust fund established under ). KRS 41.400
    23. Kentucky Horse Council:
      1. Initial Fee: $41 ($25 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to the Kentucky Horse Council). 2. Renewal Fee: $23 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$5 EF to the Kentucky Horse Council).
    24. Ducks Unlimited:
      1. Initial Fee: $41 ($25 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to Kentucky Ducks Unlimited). 2. Renewal Fee: $28 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to Kentucky Ducks Unlimited).
    25. Spay neuter:
      1. Initial Fee: $28 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to the animal control and care fund established under ). KRS 258.119 2. Renewal Fee: $23 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$5 EF to the animal control and care fund established under ). KRS 258.119
    26. Gold Star Mothers, Gold Star Fathers, or Gold Star Spouses:
      1. Initial Fee: $0 ($0 SF/$0 CF/ $0 EF). 2. Renewal Fee: $0 ($0 SF/$0 CF/ $0 EF). 3. A person may receive a maximum of two (2) plates under this paragraph free of charge and may purchase additional plates for fees as established in subsection (2)(d) of this section.
    27. I Support Veterans:
      1. Initial Fee: $28 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to the Kentucky Department of Veterans’ Affairs). 2. Renewal Fee: $23 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$5 EF to the Kentucky Department of Veterans’ Affairs).
    28. Gold Star Siblings, Gold Star Sons, or Gold Star Daughters:
      1. Initial Fee: $28 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to the veterans’ program trust fund established under ). KRS 40.460 2. Renewal Fee: $23 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$5 EF to the veterans’ program trust fund established under ). KRS 40.460
    29. POW/MIA Awareness:
      1. Initial Fee: $41 ($25 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to the veterans’ program trust fund established under ). KRS 40.460 2. Renewal Fee: $28 ($12 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF to the veterans’ program trust fund established under ). KRS 40.460
    30. Special license plates established under KRS 186.164 :
      1. Initial Fee: $41 ($25 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF). 2. Renewal Fee: $41 ($25 SF/$6 CF/$10 EF).
  3. Any special license plate may be combined with a personalized license plate for a twenty-five dollar ($25) state fee in addition to all other fees for the particular special license plate established in this section and in KRS 186.164(3). The twenty-five dollar ($25) fee required under this subsection shall be divided between the cabinet and the county clerk of the county where the applicant is applying for the license plate with the cabinet receiving twenty dollars ($20) and the county clerk receiving five dollars ($5).
    1. A sponsoring organization of any special license plate issued under this section or any special license plate established under the provisions of KRS 186.164 may petition the cabinet for the production of that special license plate for motorcycles. (4) (a) A sponsoring organization of any special license plate issued under this section or any special license plate established under the provisions of KRS 186.164 may petition the cabinet for the production of that special license plate for motorcycles.
    2. Owners and lessees of motorcycles registered under KRS 186.050(2) may be eligible to receive special license plates approved by the cabinet under paragraph (a) of this subsection. Applicants for a special license plate for a motorcycle shall be required to pay the fee for a special plate as prescribed in this section or in KRS 186.164. The fee paid for the special plate for a motorcycle shall be in lieu of the registration fee required under KRS 186.050(2).

$0 ($0 SF/$0 CF/$0 EF). 2. Renewal Fee: $0 ($0 SF/$0 CF/$0 EF).

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History. Enact. Acts 2005, ch. 133, § 1, effective June 20, 2005; 2006, ch. 40, § 1, effective July 12, 2006; 2006, ch. 190, § 2, effective July 12, 2006; 2007, ch. 23, § 1, effective June 26, 2007; 2007, ch. 39, § 1, effective June 26, 2007; 2008, ch. 30, § 2, effective July 15, 2008; 2008, ch. 164, § 2, effective July 15, 2008; 2010, ch. 33, § 1, effective July 15, 2010; 2010, ch. 72, § 1, effective July 15, 2010; 2010, ch. 113, § 2, effective July 15, 2010; 2010, ch. 129, § 1, effective July 15, 2010; 2011, ch. 10, § 2, effective July 12, 2012 (see note); 2014, ch. 56, § 1, effective July 15, 2014; 2015 ch. 32, § 1, effective January 1, 2016; 2017 ch. 50, § 1, effective January 1, 2018; 2019 ch. 107, § 1, effective June 27, 2019; 2021 ch. 92, § 1, effective June 29, 2021.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(1/1/2015). This statute was amended by 2014 Ky. Acts chs. 56 and 91, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

(7/12/2012). The amendment to this statute in 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 10, sec. 2, takes effect on July 12, 2012. The effective date of that amendment was subject to a contingency, but the contingency was removed in 2012. Section 5 of 2012 Ky. Acts ch. 139, which is effective July 12, 2012, repeals 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 10, sec. 4, which established the contingency. Section 6 of 2012 Ky. Acts ch. 139 states, “KRS 186.162 and 186.1722 , as created or amended by 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 10, relating to an I Support Veterans special license plate, shall be effective on the normal effective date for the legislation enacted at the 2012 Regular Session of the General Assembly.” The normal effective date for that 2012 legislation is July 12, 2012.

(6/20/2005). Under the authority of KRS 7.136 (1)(h), during codification a manifest clerical or typographical error occurring in 2005 Ky. Acts ch. 133, § 1 (2)(c)2., has been corrected by changing “OSF” to “SF” to conform with definitions for that section found in § 1(1)(c) of that Act.

186.164. Collection and distribution of special license plate fees — Design, printing, and replacement — Application process — Voluntary contribution for designated group — Administrative regulations — Audit of special license plate funds.

  1. The SF portion of the fee required under KRS 186.162 shall include the fee to reflectorize all license plates under KRS 186.240 . All EF fees required under KRS 186.162 shall be collected at the time of an initial or renewal application by the county clerk who shall forward the EF fee to the cabinet. The cabinet shall remit EF fees to the group or organization identified in KRS 186.162 on a quarterly basis. The cabinet may retain any investment income earned from holding EF fees designated to be remitted under this subsection to offset administrative costs incurred by the cabinet in the administration of EF fees.
  2. A special license plate shall be the color and design selected by the group or organization identified in subsection (13) of this section, contingent upon the approval of the Transportation Cabinet. In addition to the design selected for a special license plate, the name “Kentucky,” an annual renewal decal, and any combination of letters or numerals required by the cabinet in the design shall also appear on the plate.
  3. An actual metal special license plate shall be issued on the same schedule as regular license plates are issued under KRS 186.240 . The cabinet shall have the discretion to extend the time period that will exist between the date a metal special license plate is issued and the date that regular plates are issued under KRS 186.240 . A renewal registration decal shall be issued all other years during the owner’s or lessee’s birth month, except as provided in KRS 186.041(2) and 186.042(5). A person seeking a special license plate for a vehicle provided as part of the person’s occupation shall conform to the requirements of KRS 186.050(14).
    1. If a special license plate issued under this chapter deteriorates to the point that the lettering, numbering, or images on the face of the plate are not legible, the plate shall be replaced free of charge, if the owner or lessee has not transferred the vehicle to which the plate was issued during the current licensing period. (4) (a) If a special license plate issued under this chapter deteriorates to the point that the lettering, numbering, or images on the face of the plate are not legible, the plate shall be replaced free of charge, if the owner or lessee has not transferred the vehicle to which the plate was issued during the current licensing period.
    2. If a special license plate issued under this chapter is lost, stolen, or damaged in an accident, the county clerk shall issue a new plate upon payment of a three dollar ($3) county clerk fee, if the owner or lessee has not transferred the vehicle to which the plate was issued during the current licensing period.
  4. Upon the sale, transfer, or termination of a lease of a vehicle with any special license plate issued under this chapter, the owner or lessee shall remove the special plate and return it and the certificate of registration to the county clerk. The county clerk shall reissue the owner or lessee a regular license plate and a certificate of registration upon payment of a three dollar ($3) county clerk fee. If the owner or lessee requests, the county clerk shall reissue the special plate upon payment of a three dollar ($3) county clerk fee for use on any other vehicle of the same classification and category owned, leased, or acquired by the person during the current licensing period. If the owner or lessee has the special plate reissued to a vehicle which has been previously registered in this state, the regular license plate that is being replaced shall be returned to the county clerk who shall forward the plate to the Transportation Cabinet.
  5. A special license plate may be issued to the owner or lessee of a motor vehicle that is required to be registered under KRS 186.050(1), (3)(a), or (4)(a), except a special license plate shall not be issued to a taxicab, limousine, or U-Drive-It registered and licensed under this chapter or KRS Chapter 281. A person applying for a special license plate shall apply in the office of the county clerk in the county of the person’s residence, except as provided in KRS 186.168(3). All special license plates issued under this chapter may be combined with a personalized license plate under the provisions of KRS 186.174 . The fee to combine a special license plate with a personalized license plate shall be as established in KRS 186.162(3).
  6. Within thirty (30) days of termination from election to, appointment to, or membership with any group or organization, an applicant to whom a special license plate was issued under this chapter shall return the special license plate to the county clerk of the county of his or her residence, unless the person is merely changing his or her status with the group or organization to retired.
  7. A group wanting to create a special license plate that is not authorized under this chapter on June 27, 2019, shall comply with the following conditions before being eligible to apply for a special license plate:
    1. The group shall be nonprofit and based, headquartered, or have a chapter in Kentucky;
    2. The group may be organized for, but shall not be restricted to, social, civic, or entertainment purposes;
    3. The message to be placed on the license plate, if created, shall not discriminate against any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and shall not be construed, as determined by the cabinet, as an attempt to victimize or intimidate any person due to the person’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
    4. The plate shall not represent a political party and shall not have been created primarily to promote a specific political belief;
    5. The plate shall not have as its primary purpose the promotion of any specific faith, religion, or antireligion;
    6. The plate shall not be the name of a special product or brand name, and shall not be construed, as determined by the cabinet, as promoting a product or brand name; and
    7. The plate’s lettering, logo, image, or message to be placed on the license plate, if created, shall not be obscene, as determined by the cabinet.
  8. If the cabinet denies to issue a group a special license plate based upon the conditions specified in subsection (8) of this section, the cabinet shall, immediately upon denying to issue a group a special license plate, notify in writing the chairperson of both the House and Senate standing committees on transportation of the denial and the reasons upon which the cabinet based the denial.
  9. If the cabinet approves a request for a special license plate, the cabinet shall begin designing and printing the plate after:
    1. The group collects a minimum of nine hundred (900) applications with each application being accompanied by a fee as set forth in KRS 186.162 . The applications and accompanying fee shall be submitted to the cabinet at one (1) time as a whole and shall not be submitted individually or intermittently; and
    2. The group submits to the cabinet the programming and production costs for the plate.
  10. A group that is approved for a special license plate shall maintain a minimum number of five hundred (500) registrations annually for the cabinet to continue production of the plate.
  11. An initial applicant for, or an applicant renewing, his or her registration for a special license plate shall, at the time of application, make a contribution that the county clerk shall forward to the cabinet as set forth in KRS 186.162 . The cabinet shall, on an annual basis, remit the contributions to the appropriate group identified to be used for the declared purpose stated under subsection (13) of this section. The cabinet may retain any investment income earned from holding contributions designated to be remitted under this subsection to offset administrative costs incurred by the cabinet in the administration of the contributions. Any group or organization that receives a mandatory EF fee under KRS 186.162 shall maintain the information required under subsection (13)(a) and (c) of this section with the Transportation Cabinet.
  12. The group shall, at the time the nine hundred (900) applications are submitted to the Transportation Cabinet, also submit a notarized affidavit to the cabinet attesting to:
    1. The name, address, and telephone number for the group or organization. If the group or organization does not have its headquarters in the Commonwealth, then the name, address, and telephone number for the group or organization’s Kentucky state chapter shall be required. The names of the officers of the group or organization shall also be required. If the entity receiving funds under subsection (12) of this section is not a state governmental agency, a program unit within a state governmental agency, or is a group or organization that does not have a statewide chapter, then a donation for use by the group or organization shall be prohibited;
    2. The amount of the monetary donation the group wants to receive when a person purchases the group or organization’s special license plate; and
    3. The purpose for which the donated funds will be used by the group or organization. Donated funds shall not be limited for use by members of the group or organization, and shall not be used for administrative or personnel costs of the group or organization.
  13. All funds received by a group or organization under subsection (12) of this section shall be deposited into an account separate from all other accounts the group or organization may have, and the account shall be audited yearly at the expense of the group or organization. The completed audit shall be forwarded to the Transportation Cabinet in Frankfort. One hundred percent (100%) of the funds received by a group or organization under subsection (12) of this section shall be used for the express purpose identified by the group in subsection (13) of this section. Any group or organization that receives a mandatory EF fee under KRS 186.162 shall comply with the provisions of this subsection.
  14. The secretary of the Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations under KRS Chapter 13A to establish additional rules to implement the issuance of special license plates issued under this chapter, including but not limited to:
    1. Documentation that will be required to accompany an application for a special license plate to provide proof of:
      1. Election to the United States Congress or the Kentucky GeneralAssembly;
      2. Election or appointment to the Kentucky Court of Justice;
      3. Membership in a Masonic Order, Fraternal Order of Police, or emergency management organization;
      4. Eligibility for membership in the Gold Star Mothers of America;
      5. Eligibility as a father for associate membership in the Gold Star Mothers of America;
      6. Eligibility for membership in the Gold Star Wives of America;
      7. Ownership of an amateur radio operator license;
      8. Receipt of the Silver Star Medal;
      9. Receipt of the Bronze Star Medal;
      10. Receipt of the Air Medal;
      11. Receipt of the Distinguished Flying Cross;
      12. Receipt of the Combat Action Badge;
      13. Receipt of the Combat Infantry Badge;
      14. Eligibility for a Gold Star Siblings license plate for a person whose sibling died while serving the country in the United States Armed Forces. For the purposes of this subparagraph, “sibling” means a sibling by blood, a sibling by half-blood, a sibling by adoption, or a stepsibling; or
      15. Eligibility for a Gold Star Sons or Gold Star Daughters license plate for a person whose parent or stepparent died while serving the country in the United States Armed Forces;
    2. The time schedule permissible for a group or organization to request a design change for the special license plate; and
    3. The procedures for review of proposed license plates and the standards by which proposed special license plates are approved or rejected in accordance with subsection (10) of this section.
  15. Any individual, group, or organization that fails to audit any funds received under this chapter, or that intentionally uses any funds received in any way other than attwsted to under subsection (13) of this section or for administrative or personnel costs in violation of subsection (13) of this section, shall be guilty of a Class D felony and upon conviction shall, in addition to being subject to criminal penalties, be assessed a mandatory five thousand dollar ($5,000) fine.

History. Enact. Acts 2005, ch. 133, § 2, effective June 20, 2005; 2006, ch. 40, § 2, effective July 12, 2006; 2006, ch. 200, § 1, effective July 12, 2006; 2007, ch. 40, § 1, effective June 26, 2007; 2008, ch. 30, § 3, effective July 15, 2008; 2010, ch. 33, § 3, effective July 15, 2010; 2010, ch. 40, § 1, effective July 15, 2010; 2010, ch. 72, § 2, effective July 15, 2010; 2010, ch. 113, § 3, effective July 15, 2010; 2015 ch. 19, § 39, effective June 24, 2015; 2015 ch. 32, § 2, effective January 1, 2016; 2017 ch. 50, § 2, effective January 1, 2018; 2018 ch. 148, § 2, effective July 14, 2018; 2019 ch. 107, § 2, effective June 27, 2019; 2021 ch. 92, § 3, effective June 29, 2021.

186.165. Exchange of one special license plate for another — Transfer of special license plate to another vehicle.

  1. As used in this section, “owner” means a person who has purchased or leased a motor vehicle that is registered under the provisions of KRS 186.050(1) or (3)(a).
  2. The provisions of this chapter relating to special license plates to the contrary notwithstanding, if a vehicle has been issued a special license plate and the owner of the vehicle wishes to surrender the plate and exchange it for a different special license plate, the owner may, at the time he or she renews the vehicle’s annual registration, exchange the special plate without being required to obtain a regular registration plate.
  3. An owner requesting to exchange a special license plate shall be required to surrender the special license plate issued to the vehicle and the appropriate certificate of registration to the county clerk of the county where the person lives. Upon payment of the fee established in subsection (4) of this section, the county clerk shall immediately exchange the special license plate and issue a new special license plate and certificate of registration without placing further requirements upon the owner.
  4. The fee to exchange a special license plate under this section shall be the fee charged under this chapter for the particular special license plate which is being requested.
  5. If a motor vehicle that has been issued a special license plate is sold prior to the expiration of the registration, the owner may, pursuant to KRS 186.190 , transfer the plate to another vehicle the owner has obtained.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 106, § 1, effective July 12, 2006; 2011, ch. 5, § 5, effective January 1, 2013.

186.166. Perpetual production of certain special license plates — Design of Purple Heart license plates.

  1. The Transportation Cabinet shall, unless directed otherwise by the General Assembly, perpetually produce the following special license plates: military license plates, U.S. Congressional license plates, firefighter license plates, emergency management license plates, Fraternal Order of Police license plates, Law Enforcement Memorial license plates, street rod license plates, nature license plates, amateur radio license plates, Kentucky General Assembly license plates, Kentucky Court of Justice license plates, Masonic Order license plates, collegiate license plates, independent college and university license plates, child victims’ trust fund license plates, Kentucky Horse Council license plates, Ducks Unlimited license plates, Gold Star Mothers, Fathers, and Spouses license plates, Gold Star Siblings, Sons, and Daughters license plates, Silver Star Medal license plates, Bronze Star Medal license plates, Air Medal license plates, Distinguished Flying Cross license plates, Combat Action Badge license plates, Combat Infantry Badge license plates, POW/MIA Awareness license plates, spay neuter license plates, service academy license plates, and I Support Veterans license plates.
  2. The design of the plates identified for perpetual production under this section may be revised upon request of a group or organization requesting a design revision under the provisions of KRS 186.164(15).
    1. The design of a Purple Heart license plate shall not include any representation of the word “Kentucky” that is a registered trademark or slogan which appears on a general issue license plate. (3) (a) The design of a Purple Heart license plate shall not include any representation of the word “Kentucky” that is a registered trademark or slogan which appears on a general issue license plate.
    2. The design of a Purple Heart license plate shall include a representation of the Purple Heart medal and the words “Combat Wounded.”

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2005, ch. 133, § 3, effective June 20, 2005; 2017 ch. 50, § 3, effective January 1, 2018; 2021 ch. 92, § 4, effective June 29, 2021.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(6/25/2013). 2013 Ky. Acts ch. 117, sec. 2, provides that the design specifications indicated in subsection (3)(b) of this statute “shall be included in the first regularly scheduled replating of the Purple Heart license plate after [June 25, 2013].”

(7/12/2012). The amendment to this statute in 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 10, sec. 3, takes effect on July 12, 2012. The effective date of that amendment was subject to a contingency, but the contingency was removed in 2012. Section 5 of 2012 Ky. Acts ch. 139, which is effective July 12, 2012, repeals 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 10, sec. 4, which established the contingency.

186.167. Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc. — Petition for voluntary contributions under KRS 186.164. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 2009, ch. 17, § 1, effective June 25, 2009; repealed by 2019 ch. 107, § 5, effective June 27, 2019.

186.168. Voluntary contributions to veterans’ program trust fund upon registering vehicle.

  1. Any person may, when initially registering or renewing any motor vehicle registration, make a voluntary contribution to the veterans’ program trust fund established under KRS 40.460(2)(b). Any monetary contribution shall be accepted, and there shall not be a minimum amount that may be contributed. The county clerk shall forward contributions made under this section in the same manner as funds are forwarded under KRS 186.164 .
  2. The cabinet shall provide each county clerk’s office with a poster to promote voluntary contributions to the veterans’ program trust fund that meets the following specifications:
    1. It shall be bright and colorful and at a minimum measure thirty-six (36) inches in width and thirty-six (36) inches in length;
    2. It shall state the purpose of the veterans’ program trust fund and the agency where the contributions are sent; and
    3. It shall list the specific ways in which money from the trust fund is used to assist veterans across the Commonwealth.
  3. The design of the poster shall be developed collectively by the cabinet and the Kentucky Department of Veterans’ Affairs. The poster may be redesigned periodically if the Kentucky Department of Veterans’ Affairs determines that a new design will increase contributions to the veterans’ program trust fund under this section.

History. Enact. Acts 2005, ch. 133, § 4, effective June 20, 2005.

186.170. Display of registration plates, insignia — Decals to cover corporation trademark — Registration years.

  1. Except as provided in this subsection and in KRS 186.045 , the owner shall have the receipt issued by the cabinet through the county clerk constantly in his possession, and shall display the registration plate conspicuously upon the rear of the motor vehicle, except that the registration plate upon a semitrailer-tractor shall be displayed upon the front of the tractor. The owner’s copy, or a reproduced copy thereof, of the registration receipt of every motor vehicle, except motorcycles, licensed under KRS 186.050 shall be kept in the vehicle at all times and shall be available for inspection. Plates shall be kept legible at all times and the rear plate shall be illuminated when being operated during the hours designated in KRS 189.030 . No rim, frame, or other covering around the plate shall in any way obscure or cover any lettering or decal on the plate; except that, any owner who objects to the display of a trademark of a private corporation which appears on the registration plate shall be entitled to receive a set of decals from the county clerk in his county of residence to cover the trademark of the private corporation. The owner may apply for the decal by presenting his certificate of registration either at the time of registration renewal or later. The county clerk shall charge a three dollar ($3) clerk’s fee for issuing the decal set if it is applied for a time other than at registration renewal. If the cabinet has prescribed that plates shall continue in use, it shall each year, in addition to the registration receipt, select and give to the owner as further evidence of registration some insignia which may conveniently be attached permanently and conspicuously to the motor vehicle during each registration year. It shall be the duty of the owner to attach the insignia in the prescribed manner and no person may operate a motor vehicle unless the insignia is affixed upon it. The cabinet shall have placed on the insignia either figures, letters, writing, marks, or a combination thereof, which indicate that the motor vehicle has been registered and which in conjunction with the records of the cabinet make identity of the registrant readily ascertainable.
  2. The registration year for commercial vehicles, trailers, semitrailers, mobile homes, and recreational vehicles shall be from April 1 to March 31.
  3. At the discretion of the vehicle owner, the title to a motor vehicle may be held in the system and subsequently printed and mailed to the owner at the owner’s request.

History. 2739g-11: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 78, §§ 5, 10; 1954, ch. 153, § 5; 1958, ch. 82, § 5; 1962, ch. 62, § 9; 1966, ch. 139, § 11; 1976, ch. 133, § 9; 1978, ch. 239, § 7, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 395, § 9, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 86, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 431, § 12, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 287, § 3, effective July 15, 1988; 1994, ch. 428, § 12, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 97, § 4, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 128, § 10, effective July 15, 1998.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1.Failure to Have Registration Receipt.

Officer had reasonable grounds for arresting occupants of automobile for their failure to have a registration certificate for the automobile in violation of this section. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 443 S.W.2d 20, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 139 ( Ky. 1968 ).

2.Improper License Plates.

Where defendant was the operator of the vehicle and the license plates were not the plates issued for the car he was driving, he was properly convicted of this section even though he was not shown to be the owner of the vehicle. Toppass v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 587, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 133 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).

3.Failure to Illuminate.

Police officers were entitled to summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity in a 42 USCS § 1983 suit alleging an illegal arrest in violation of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights because, although the officers initially began their pursuit because plaintiff did not have his license plate illuminated as required by KRS 186.170 and 186.990 , they arrested plaintiff for fleeing in violation of KRS 520.095 and 520.100 and there was no dispute as to the officers’ assertion that plaintiff failed to stop once they were in pursuit. Nelson v. Riddle, 217 Fed. Appx. 456, 2007 FED App. 0129N, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3592 (6th Cir. Ky. 2007 ).

4.Temporary Plates.

Legislature intended the statute to apply to both temporary and permanent license plates, and the conclusion that this is the correct interpretation is reinforced by the language an administrative regulation, which governs the issuance and physical appearance of temporary tags, uses the term “temporary registration plates,” which strongly suggests that the requirements of the statute are applicable to temporary tags. Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 488 S.W.3d 41, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 56 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).

Because the manner in which the temporary tag was displayed in the driver's car violated the legibility requirement of the statute, the officer's stop was justified, and the circuit court properly denied the motion to suppress. Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 488 S.W.3d 41, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 56 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).

Cited:

Commonwealth v. Erickson, 132 S.W.3d 884, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 38 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

1.Failure to Illuminate.

Unpublished decision: Officers had probable cause to stop defendant for failing to have illumination of a rear license plate at night as required by KRS 186.170(1), even though the vehicle had a temporary license tag taped to the window; while the statute contained no specific provision dealing with temporary license tags, such lack did not imply that temporary tags need not be illuminated at night, but rather supported the proposition that temporary tags were subject to the same illumination requirements as permanent plates. United States v. Foster, 65 Fed. Appx. 41, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 8654 (6th Cir. Ky. 2003 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

“Cabinet” defined, KRS 186.010(1).

Vehicles transporting persons or property for hire to display plates, KRS 281.720 .

Truck registration receipt to be kept in truck, KRS 189.260 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Garrison and Martin, Kentucky Commercial Motor Vehicle Transportation Tax Legislation I, 33 Ky. L.J. 3 (1944).

Lawson, Security Interests in Motor Vehicles: A Conflict in Kentucky Law, 666 Ky. L.J. 924 (1977-1978).

186.1701. Special license plate for former prisoner of war. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 301, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 89, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 150, § 4, effective July 15, 1988; 1992, ch. 320, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 428, § 13, effective July 15, 1994) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 453, § 3, effective July 14, 2000. For present law, see KRS 186.041 .

186.1702. Special license plate for survivors of the attack on Pearl Harbor. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 255, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1994, ch. 428, § 14, effective July 15, 1994) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 453, § 3, effective July 14, 2000. For present law, see KRS 186.041 .

186.171. Special license plates for members of Congress. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 203, § 1, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.172. Special license plates for firefighters.

  1. Upon application to the county clerk of the county of his residence, any current or retired member of a fire department, volunteer fire department, or fire protection district in the Commonwealth shall be issued a special firefighter license plate that shall bear the inscription “Firefighter,” a registration number, and an appropriate standardized insignia.
  2. Each initial or renewal application shall be accompanied by proof of current service or retirement as a firefighter as furnished by the fire chief, the mayor or trustee of a city, or the county judge/executive in appropriate rural areas, and the payment of the fees set forth in KRS 186.162 .
  3. The special firefighter license plate shall be administered in the same manner as other special license plates as prescribed in KRS 186.164 .

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 303, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 150, § 6, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 194, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 428, § 16, effective July 15, 1994; 2008, ch. 164, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; 2019 ch. 107, § 3, effective June 27, 2019.

186.1721. Special license plate for disaster and emergency services staff members. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 227, § 1, effective July 13, 1984) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.1722. I Support Veterans special license plate.

  1. Upon application to the county clerk of the county of his or her residence, the owner or lessee of a motor vehicle registered under KRS 186.050(1) or (3)(a) may obtain an I Support Veterans special license plate.
  2. Each initial or renewal application for an I Support Veterans special license plate shall be subject to payment of the fees set forth in KRS 186.162 and the distribution and auditing requirements set forth in KRS 186.164 .
  3. The EF portion of the fees collected under KRS 186.162 for an I Support Veterans special license plate shall be distributed to the Kentucky Department of Veterans’ Affairs and are hereby appropriated for purposes that support veterans. These funds shall be in addition to any other appropriations or resources available to the Kentucky Department of Veterans’ Affairs.
  4. The I Support Veterans special license plate shall be administered in the same manner as other special license plates as prescribed in KRS 186.162 .
  5. The printing of the I Support Veterans special license plate shall not be contingent on any minimum number of applications.

History. Enact. Acts 2011, ch. 10, § 1, effective July 12, 2012 (see note).

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/12/2012). This statute takes effect on July 12, 2012. Its effective date was subject to a contingency, but the contingency has been removed. Section 5 of 2012 Ky. Acts ch. 139, which is effective July 12, 2012, repeals 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 10, sec. 4, which established the contingency. Section 6 of 2012 Ky. Acts ch. 139 states, “KRS 186.162 and 186.1722 , as created or amended by 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 10, relating to an I Support Veterans special license plate, shall be effective on the normal effective date for the legislation enacted at the 2012 Regular Session of the General Assembly.” The normal effective date for that 2012 legislation is July 12, 2012.

186.1723. Special license plate for member of Fraternal Order of Police. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 413, § 1, effective July 13, 1990) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.1724. Special license plates for law enforcement memorial. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 347, § 1, effective July 14, 2000) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.1725. Special license plate for active or retired professional firefighters. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 200, § 1, effective July 15, 1996) was repealed by Acts 2003, ch. 74, § 3, effective June 24, 2003.

186.1726. Special license plate for Knights of Columbus. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 200, § 2, effective July 15, 1996) was repealed by Acts 2003, ch. 74, § 3, effective June 24, 2003.

186.1727. Application for special license plate for active or retired professional firefighters and Knights of Columbus — Fees — Disposition of funds received. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 200, § 3, effective July 15, 1996) was repealed by Acts 2003, ch. 74, § 3, effective June 24, 2003.

186.173. Special license plates for active or retired members of the National Guard. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 162, § 1; 1978, ch. 239, § 8, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 230, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 150, § 8, effective July 15, 1988; 1994, ch. 428, § 20, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 39, § 1, effective July 15, 1996) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 453, § 3, effective July 14, 2000. For present law, see KRS 186.041 .

186.1731. License plate for members of the Civil Air Patrol. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 457, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 150, § 9, effective July 15, 1988; 1994, ch. 428, § 19, effective July 15, 1994) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 453, § 3, effective July 14, 2000. For present law, see KRS 186.041 .

186.1732. Special license plate for active, reserve, retired, and veteran members of the United States Armed Forces. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 346, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1994, ch. 428, § 21, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 307, § 1, effective July 15, 1998) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 453, § 3, effective July 14, 2000. For present law, see KRS 186.041 .

186.1733. Special license plate for member or veteran of the Marine Corps League. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 73, § 1, effective July 15, 1996) was repealed by Acts 2003, ch. 74, § 3, effective June 24, 2003. For present law, see KRS 186.041 .

186.174. Personalized license plates.

  1. For purposes of this section, “personalized license plate” means a license plate issued with personal letters or numbers significant to the applicant and it also means a license plate that is issued under this section and has been combined with a special license plate.
  2. Any owner or lessee of a motor vehicle that is required to be registered under the provisions of KRS 186.050(1), (3)(a), or (4)(a), or any owner or lessee of a motorcycle required to be registered under the provisions of KRS 186.050(2) may obtain a personalized license plate by applying for a personalized license plate in the office of the county clerk and upon payment of the fee required in KRS 186.162 . A person initially applying for a personalized license plate shall submit the application and appropriate SF fee in person to the county clerk, but may submit the annual application to renew the personalized license plate and entire fee required in KRS 186.162 by mail to the county clerk.
  3. Personalized license plates shall expire on the last day of the birth month of the applicant.
  4. A personalized license plate shall be replaced on the same schedule as regular issue license plates unless it is damaged or unreadable. A county clerk shall immediately forward the application and the fee required in KRS 186.162 for a personalized license plate to the Transportation Cabinet. The initial fee for a personalized license plate that has been combined with special license plate shall be as established in KRS 186.162 (3).
    1. A personalized plate shall not be issued that would conflict with or duplicate the alphabetical-numerical system used for regular license plates or any other license plates issued in the Commonwealth, and shall not contain a combination of more than six (6) letters of the alphabet and Arabic numerals, including spaces. (5) (a) A personalized plate shall not be issued that would conflict with or duplicate the alphabetical-numerical system used for regular license plates or any other license plates issued in the Commonwealth, and shall not contain a combination of more than six (6) letters of the alphabet and Arabic numerals, including spaces.
    2. A personalized plate shall not be issued if the cabinet determines the request fails to comply with the following conditions:
      1. The message to be placed on the license plate, if created, shall not discriminate against any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and shall not be construed, as determined by the cabinet, as an attempt to victimize or intimidate any person due to the person’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
      2. The plate shall not represent a political party and shall not have been created primarily to promote a specific political belief;
      3. The plate shall not have as its primary purpose the promotion of any specific faith, religion, or antireligion;
      4. The plate shall not be the name of a special product or brand name, and shall not be construed, as determined by the cabinet, as promoting a product or brand name; and
      5. The plate’s lettering or message to be placed on the license plate, if created, shall not be obscene, as determined by the cabinet.
    3. The owner or lessee shall submit an application and fee to renew a personalized license plate pursuant to the provisions of this section. Once an applicant obtains a personalized plate, he or she will have first priority on that plate for each of the following years that he or she makes timely and proper application.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 153, § 3, effective January 1, 1977; 1978, ch. 239, § 9, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 335, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 203, § 5, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 143, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 150, § 10, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 241, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 296, § 4, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 498, § 4, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 428, § 22, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 200, § 4, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 543, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 347, § 2, effective July 15, 2002; 2005, ch. 133, § 8, effective June 20, 2005; 2018 ch. 148, § 1, effective July 14, 2018; 2019 ch. 107, § 4, effective June 27, 2019.

Opinions of Attorney General.

As used in this section, “constantly in his possession” means that the operator of the vehicle should have the registration receipt or a reproduced copy thereof either on his person or in the vehicle at all times. OAG 71-359 .

A personalized plate may be issued with a trade name or brand name on it, restricted only by the requirement of subsection (2) of this section that a plate can only contain a combination of letters and numbers totaling 6. OAG 76-376 .

The term “money order” as used in subsection (1) of this section includes both United States postal money orders and commercial money orders. OAG 76-376 .

Only a person who already owns the vehicle he intends to license may apply for a personalized license plate under subsection (1) of this section. OAG 76-376 .

186.175. Special plates for amateur radio station licensees — County clerk’s fees. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 119, §§ 1, 2) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

186.1751. Special license plate for “Street Rod” vehicle. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 200, § 1, effective July 13, 1990) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.176. Amateur radio licensees may attach plate showing call letters to license plate. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 59) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 123, § 2.

186.1761. Nature license plates. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 328, § 6, effective July 15, 1994) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.1765. Special agricultural license plates. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 256, § 1, effective July 14, 2000) was repealed by Acts 2003, ch. 74, § 3, effective June 24, 2003.

186.177. Special license plates bearing amateur radio call letters. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 123, § 1, effective June 16, 1972) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.1775. Special YMCA license plates. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 260, § 1, effective July 14, 2000) was repealed by Acts 2003, ch. 74, § 3, effective June 24, 2003.

186.178. Special license plates for General Assembly members. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 41, § 1) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.179. Special license plates for Justices or Judges of the Court of Justice. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 153, § 4, effective January 1, 1977) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.180. Duplicate receipts and plates — Clerk’s fees — Cancellation of registration and issuance of new plates upon loss of plate — Reporting of lost plates — Issuance of plates upon removal from one county to another — Reinstatement after revocation under KRS 186A.040 — Proof of insurance.

    1. If the owner loses his or her copy of a registration or transfer receipt, he or she may obtain a duplicate from the county clerk who issued the present owner’s copy of the receipt by presenting the clerk proof of insurance on the motor vehicle in compliance with KRS 304.39-080 , and by filing an affidavit, upon a form furnished by the cabinet. The owner shall pay to the clerk a fee of three dollars ($3), except proof of insurance shall not be required for duplicates applied for by motor vehicle dealers as defined in KRS 190.010 . (1) (a) If the owner loses his or her copy of a registration or transfer receipt, he or she may obtain a duplicate from the county clerk who issued the present owner’s copy of the receipt by presenting the clerk proof of insurance on the motor vehicle in compliance with KRS 304.39-080 , and by filing an affidavit, upon a form furnished by the cabinet. The owner shall pay to the clerk a fee of three dollars ($3), except proof of insurance shall not be required for duplicates applied for by motor vehicle dealers as defined in KRS 190.010 .
    2. When the owner’s copy of any registration or transfer receipt shows that the spaces provided thereon for noting and discharging security interests have been exhausted, the owner may apply to the county clerk who issued the receipt in order to obtain a duplicate thereof. The owner shall surrender his or her copy of the current receipt to the clerk and provide proof of insurance on the motor vehicle in compliance with KRS 304.39-080, before a duplicate may be issued. The owner shall pay the clerk a fee of three dollars ($3), except proof of insurance shall not be required for duplicates applied for by motor vehicle dealers as defined in KRS 190.010.
    3. Any security interest which has been discharged as shown by the records of the clerk or upon the owner’s copy of the current receipt shall be omitted from the duplicate receipt to be issued by the clerk.
  1. If the owner loses a registration plate, he or she shall surrender his or her registration receipt to the county clerk from whom it was obtained and file a written statement as to the loss of the plate. Upon presenting the clerk proof of insurance on the motor vehicle in compliance with KRS 304.39-080 , and upon the payment of the sum of three dollars ($3) for each plate and a fee of three dollars ($3) to the clerk for his or her services, the owner shall be issued another registration receipt and a plate or plates which shall bear a different number from that of the lost plate. The clerk shall retain the owner’s statement and a copy of the owner’s proof of insurance, and shall make a notation on the triplicate copy of the surrendered registration receipt stating the number of the registration receipt replacing it. The original copy of the surrendered receipt shall be forwarded to the cabinet. The cabinet shall forthwith cancel the registration corresponding to the number of the lost plate. The cancellation shall be reported by the cabinet to the commissioner of the Department of Kentucky State Police. Any person finding a lost registration plate shall deliver it to the Transportation Cabinet or to any county clerk for forwarding it to the cabinet.
  2. If the owner moves from one (1) county into another county of the Commonwealth, he or she may obtain a registration plate bearing the name of the county of residence. In order to obtain a new registration plate, the owner shall surrender his or her current registration receipt and current registration plate to the county clerk. Upon being provided with proof of insurance on the motor vehicle in compliance with KRS 304.39-080 , the clerk shall provide the owner with a new registration receipt and plate bearing the county name. The surrendered receipt and plate shall be forwarded to the Transportation Cabinet. The fee for this registration shall be five dollars ($5) of which the clerk shall be entitled to three dollars ($3) and the cabinet shall be entitled to two dollars ($2).
  3. If the owner’s registration is revoked as a result of the provisions set forth in KRS 186A.040 , the owner may have his or her registration reinstated by the county clerk who issued the present owner’s copy of the receipt by presenting the clerk proof of:
    1. Insurance on the motor vehicle in compliance with KRS 304.39-080 and by filing an affidavit upon a form furnished by the cabinet; or
    2. A valid compliance or exemption certificate in compliance with KRS 224.20-720 or issued under the authority of an air pollution control district under KRS 224.20-760 .
  4. The owner of a motor vehicle that has the vehicle’s registration revoked under KRS 186.290 shall pay to the clerk a fee of twenty dollars ($20), which shall be equally divided between the county clerk and the cabinet.
  5. On and after January 1, 2006, if the motor vehicle is a personal motor vehicle as defined in KRS 304.39-087 , proof of insurance required under this section shall be determined by the county clerk as provided in KRS 186A.042 .

History. 2739g-12: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 208, § 2; 1964, ch. 59, § 4; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(9); 1976, ch. 89, § 1; 1978, ch. 384, § 333, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 229, § 2; 1994, ch. 428, § 27, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 341, § 3, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 442, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 441, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2004, ch. 130, § 7, effective July 13, 2004; 2007, ch. 85, § 190, effective June 26, 2007.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 3 of Acts 1980, ch. 229 provided that the version of this section as amended by § 2 of Acts 1980, ch. 229 would become effective “the first year registration plates are issued”. Such plates were reissued in 1983.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a lien for towing or storing a motor vehicle is enforced by a nonjudicial sale, the affidavit described in KRS 186.200 would be sufficient to authorize the issuance of a duplicate current registration receipt. OAG 66-369 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Definition of “cabinet”, KRS 186.010(1).

Kentucky Law Journal.

Vanlandingham, The Fee System in Kentucky Counties, The Fee System in Kentucky, 40 Ky. L.J. 275 (1952).

186.181. Seizure of canceled plates by Department of Kentucky State Police.

The secretary of the Transportation Cabinet shall, upon receipt of a report from the Transportation Cabinet or the Department of Vehicle Regulation of a canceled motor vehicle registration plate, cause all members of the Department of Kentucky State Police and such peace officers as he or she may deem necessary, to be notified of the cancellation. It shall be the duty of all members of the Department of Kentucky State Police and of all peace officers to seize any registration plate bearing a canceled number and to report such seizure to the appropriate department.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 208, § 3; 1958, ch. 126, § 20; 1962, ch. 62, § 10; 2007, ch. 85, § 191, effective June 26, 2007.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Enforcement of motor vehicle laws; arrests; bail bonds, KRS 281.765 .

186.182. Special license plates for recipients of Congressional Medal of Honor. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 376, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 203, § 9, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 150, § 14, effective July 15, 1988; 1994, ch. 428, § 28, effective July 15, 1994) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 453, § 3, effective July 14, 2000. For present law, see KRS 186.041 .

186.1831. Special license plates for members of a Masonic order. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 404, § 1, effective July 14, 1992) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.1835. Special license plates for members of the Knights of Columbus. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 225, § 1, effective July 15, 1996) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.184. Special PTA license plate — PTA program fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 32, § 1, effective July 15, 2002) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.185. Collegiate license plate. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 290, § 1, effective July 15, 1988) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.186. Application for special license plates pursuant to KRS 186.186 to 186.1867 — Vehicles leased or provided pursuant to an occupation — Renewal, fees, administrative regulations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 366, § 1, effective July 15, 1996) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.1861. Special license plates for United States Veterans. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 366, § 2, effective July 15, 1996) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 453, § 3, effective July 14, 2000. For present law, see KRS 186.041 .

186.1862. Special license plates for nurses. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 366, § 3, effective July 15, 1996) was repealed by Acts 2003, ch. 74, § 3, effective June 24, 2003.

186.1863. Special license plates for United States Olympic Committee. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 366, § 4, effective July 15, 1996) was repealed by Acts 2003, ch. 74, § 3, effective June 24, 2003.

186.1864. Special license plates for youth soccer. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 366, § 5, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 48, § 16, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 565, § 5, effective July 15, 1998) was repealed by Acts 2003, ch. 74, § 3, effective June 24, 2003.

186.1865. Special Kentucky Tech license plates. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 366, § 6, effective July 15, 1996) was repealed by Acts 1997 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 151, effective May 30, 1997.

186.18651. Special license plates for independent college or university. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 335, § 1, effective July 14, 2000) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.1866. Special license plates for members or retired members of unions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 366, § 7, effective July 15, 1996) was repealed by Acts 2003, ch. 74, § 3, effective June 24, 2003.

186.1867. Special license plates for child victims’ trust fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 366, § 8, effective July 15, 1996) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.1868. Special Kentucky Horse Council license plate. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 543, § 1, effective July 15, 1998) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.18685. Special license plates for Ducks Unlimited. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 282, § 1, effective January 1, 2001) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.1869. Special license plates for members of National Wild Turkey Federation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 276, § 1, effective July 14, 2000) was repealed by Acts 2003, ch. 74, § 3, effective June 24, 2003.

186.187. Special spay neuter license plate. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 56, § 1, effective January 1, 2003) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.188. Special Louisville Zoo license plate. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 74, § 1, effective June 24, 2003) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.189. Special license plates for special groups or special purposes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 190, § 1, effective January 1, 1997) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 133, § 11, effective June 20, 2005.

186.190. Transfer of registration upon transfer of ownership — Permitted registration plate transfers — Clerk’s fee.

    1. Except as provided for in paragraph (e) of this subsection, when a motor vehicle that has been previously registered changes ownership, the registration plate shall not remain upon the motor vehicle, but shall be retained by the seller and may be transferred to another vehicle owned or leased by the seller in accordance with paragraph (b) or (c) of this subsection. (1) (a) Except as provided for in paragraph (e) of this subsection, when a motor vehicle that has been previously registered changes ownership, the registration plate shall not remain upon the motor vehicle, but shall be retained by the seller and may be transferred to another vehicle owned or leased by the seller in accordance with paragraph (b) or (c) of this subsection.
    2. An individual who sells a motor vehicle which has a valid registration plate may transfer that plate to another vehicle of the same classification at the time the individual transfers the vehicle. If the individual does not have a vehicle to transfer the plate to at the time the individual sells a vehicle, the individual may hold the registration plate for the period of registration. At any time during the period of registration, the individual shall notify the county clerk and transfer the plate to a vehicle of the same classification that he or she has obtained prior to operating that vehicle on a public highway. If the plate transfer occurs in the final month in which the existing registration is still valid, the individual shall be required to renew the registration on the newly acquired vehicle.
    3. An individual who trades in a motor vehicle with a valid registration plate during the purchase of a motor vehicle from a licensed motor vehicle dealer shall remove the plate from the vehicle offered in trade. A photocopy of the valid certificate of registration shall be included with the application for title and registration for the purchased vehicle, and the plate shall be retained by the purchaser. The dealer shall equip the purchased vehicle with a temporary tag in accordance with KRS 186A.100 before the buyer may operate it on the highway. When the buyer receives a valid certificate of registration from the county clerk, the buyer shall remove the temporary tag and affix the registration plate to the vehicle.
    4. All vehicle transfers and registration plate transfers shall be initiated within the fifteen (15) day period established under KRS 186.020 and 186A.070 .
    5. This subsection shall not apply to transfers between motor vehicle dealers licensed under KRS Chapter 190. A secured party who repossesses a vehicle shall comply with KRS 186.045(6).
  1. A person shall not purchase, sell, or trade any motor vehicle without delivering to the county clerk of the county in which the sale or trade is made the title, and a notarized affidavit if required and available under KRS 138.450 attesting to the total and actual consideration paid or to be paid for the motor vehicle. Except for transactions handled by a motor vehicle dealer licensed pursuant to KRS Chapter 190, the person who is purchasing the vehicle shall present proof of insurance in compliance with KRS 304.39-080 to the county clerk before the clerk transfers the registration on the vehicle. Proof of insurance shall be in the manner prescribed in administrative regulations promulgated by the Department of Insurance pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A. On and after January 1, 2006, if the motor vehicle is a personal motor vehicle as defined in KRS 304.39-087 , proof of insurance shall be determined by the county clerk as provided in KRS 186A.042 .
  2. Upon delivery of the title, and a notarized affidavit if required and available under KRS 138.450 attesting to the total and actual consideration paid or to be paid for the motor vehicle to the county clerk of the county in which the sale or trade was made, the seller shall pay to the county clerk a transfer fee of two dollars ($2), which shall be remitted to the Transportation Cabinet. If an affidavit is required, and available, the signatures on the affidavit shall be individually notarized before the county clerk shall issue to the purchaser a transfer of registration bearing the same data and information as contained on the original registration receipt, except the change in name and address. The seller shall pay to the county clerk a fee of six dollars ($6) for his services.
  3. If the owner junks or otherwise renders a motor vehicle unfit for future use, he shall deliver the registration plate and registration receipt to the county clerk of the county in which the motor vehicle is junked. The county clerk shall return the plate and motor vehicle registration receipt to the Transportation Cabinet. The owner shall pay to the county clerk one dollar ($1) for his services.
  4. A licensed motor vehicle dealer shall not be required to pay the transfer fee provided by this section, but shall be required to pay the county clerk’s fee provided by this section.
  5. The motor vehicle registration receipt issued by the clerk under this section shall contain information required by the Department of Vehicle Regulation.

History. 2739g-13: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 202; 1958, ch. 82, § 6; 1958, ch. 95; 1960, ch. 37, § 1; 1962, ch. 62, § 11; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(2), (9); 1974, ch. 222, § 3; 1976, ch. 133, § 10; 1978, ch. 239, § 13, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 296, § 4, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 36, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1994, ch. 428, § 31, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 504, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 128, § 11, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 600, § 6, effective April 14, 1998; 2004, ch. 130, § 8, effective July 13, 2004; 2006, ch. 255, § 9, effective January 1, 2007; 2010, ch. 24, § 235, effective July 15, 2010; 2011, ch. 5, § 1, effective January 1, 2013.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 11 of Acts 1998, ch. 600, stated: “The amendments contained in Sections 3 to 8 of this Act shall apply to motor vehicles sold after July 31, 1998.”

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/98.) This section was amended by 1998 Ky. Acts chs. 128 and 600. Where these Acts are not in conflict, they have been codified together. Where a conflict exists, Acts ch. 600, which was last enacted by the General Assembly, prevails under KRS 446.250 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.In General.

This section and KRS 186.200 are revenue measures designed to insure payment of the motor vehicle usage tax at the time of registration and are entirely distinct from the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code governing sales. Lexington Mack, Inc. v. Miller, 555 S.W.2d 249, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 500 ( Ky. 1977 ).

2.Registration Year.

An owner may not transfer title to an automobile after January 1 without reregistering the automobile for the new registration year. Martin v. Louisville Motors, 276 Ky. 696 , 125 S.W.2d 241, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 584 ( Ky. 1939 ).

3.Presumption of Ownership.

Fact truck was licensed in partnership name raises a presumption that it was owned by it. Vansant v. Holbrook's Adm'r, 285 Ky. 88 , 146 S.W.2d 337, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 595 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Where a wife was injured while riding in a car driven by her husband, the bill of sale for the car was made to the wife, the conditional sales contract for the car was made by her, and the car was licensed in her name, the statements of the husband and wife that the car was owned by their son were not sufficient to overcome the presumption raised by the documents that she owned it. Siler v. Williford, 350 S.W.2d 704, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 129 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Compliance or noncompliance with this section is not conclusive of title although persuasive. Siler v. Williford, 350 S.W.2d 704, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 129 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Where no transfer of registration appeared in the records, the defendant motel owners had probable cause to believe that the automobile, which was allegedly used in the commission of a crime, was the property of the plaintiff’s employer. Mink v. Stratton, 499 S.W.2d 291, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 278 ( Ky. 1973 ).

4.Transfer.
5.— Failure to Register.

Although law respecting registration and transfer of motor vehicle does not expressly provide that sale or transfer by method different from that prescribed is void, it makes sale without compliance a misdemeanor with penalty, and requires compliance for registration. Boden v. Harter, 240 Ky. 138 , 41 S.W.2d 920, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 354 ( Ky. 1931 ).

The failure to register a transfer of title does not void a sale under this section and KRS 186.200 . Campbell v. State Farm Ins. Co., 346 S.W.2d 775, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 338 ( Ky. 1961 ).

6.— Not on Open Bills of Sale.

Transfers of used cars on open bills of sale (bills with vendees’ names not filled in) violate this section. Armour v. Haskins, 275 S.W.2d 580, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 361 ( Ky. 1955 ).

7.Bill of Sale.
8.— Notary’s Certification.

Notary’s deliberate and wrongful act in placing his certification upon bill of sale signed by owner and given to his sales agent but not sworn to, thus enabling agent to transfer automobile to his own name, sell it to bona fide purchaser, and convert proceeds, was violation of notary’s official duty and of his bond, for which he was liable. American Surety Co. v. Boden, 243 Ky. 805 , 50 S.W.2d 10, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 202 ( Ky. 1932 ).

9.— Impeachment.

A bill of sale may be impeached by parol evidence “clearly showing” title in another and auction company paying dealer for automobiles which it then sold to a second dealer for $60 more had no title to the automobiles and could not sue second dealer’s mortgagee for conversion when second dealer’s check was returned for insufficient funds. Gateway Auto. Auction, Inc. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 398 S.W.2d 498, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 496 ( Ky. 1966 ).

Bill of sale for an automobile may be impeached by parol evidence “clearly showing” title in another. Gateway Auto. Auction, Inc. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 398 S.W.2d 498, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 496 ( Ky. 1966 ).

10.Registration after Non-judicial Sale.

Sale of vehicle under KRS 376.275 to satisfy lien for towing and storage after notice was given owners by registered mail was sufficient to authorize the purchaser to obtain a registration and license for the vehicle. Department of Revenue v. Derringer, 399 S.W.2d 482, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 467 ( Ky. 1966 ).

11.Notice of Encumbrances on Title.

Where registration receipt showed on its face that automobile was last licensed in the state of Indiana, purchaser who, in compliance with the statute, obtained the receipt, was put on notice as to any encumbrances on the title which an examination of the licensing record in Indiana would disclose. Eline v. Commercial Credit Corp., 307 Ky. 77 , 209 S.W.2d 846, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 695 ( Ky. 1948 ).

12.Failure of Consideration.

Where purchaser of an automobile has never received a bill of sale as described in KRS 186.200 or a receipt evidencing registration as provided in subsection (3) of this section, consideration for the contract has failed, for without a bill of sale conforming to KRS 186.200 the purchaser cannot obtain a license for the car and without the registration receipt he cannot obtain a license or legally operate the car upon the highway and if the purchaser has done all he reasonably can to obtain these papers and has been denied them, he has proven a failure of consideration and is entitled to rescind the contract or recover damages for its breach. Brooks v. Williams, 268 S.W.2d 650, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 922 ( Ky. 1954 ).

13.Conviction of Violation Admissible.

Evidence that defendant had been convicted of violating this section was admissible in action to recover an alleged breach of contract of sale of a used automobile. Harlow v. Dick, 245 S.W.2d 616, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 601 ( Ky. 1952 ).

Cited:

American Interinsurance Exchange v. Norton, 631 S.W.2d 851, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 207 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982); Red Bird Motors, Inc. v. Endsley, 657 S.W.2d 954, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 328 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); Rogers v. Wheeler, 864 S.W.2d 892, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 132 ( Ky. 1993 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county clerk cannot refuse to transfer an automobile for the sole reason that the registration receipt of said automobile shows that it is encumbered with a lien. OAG 61-453 .

On the transfer of a vehicle seized by the United States government and sold, the clerk cannot drop liens that were set out on the registration certificate without a filed statement by the government that it has cut off all security interests. OAG 61-974 .

Only the courts may make a valid transfer of title on a vehicle as a result of a sale for storage and towing charges where the owner is unavailable to make the transfer. OAG 62-1154 .

All authorization by the car owner for another to execute a sworn bill of sale to his car should designate an agent in writing in order to be conclusive as a matter of law. OAG 63-479 .

No one other than the car owner, his legally authorized agent, employe or representative, shall execute a bill of sale in the name of said owner without written authority as applies to other personal property. OAG 63-479 .

An ex parte order by a county judge would not authorize a county clerk to transfer the registration of a motor vehicle sold to satisfy a lien for storing and towing. OAG 63-573 .

When a termination statement has been filed of record on a chattel mortgage, but the lien has not been released on the back of the license receipt, the clerk cannot legally drop the lien information when a car is transferred to another person. OAG 63-1083 .

The owner of a motor vehicle may properly procure a loan on it and execute a lien thereon and have the lien recorded on the previous year’s registration during the grace period after January 1. OAG 63-1088 .

County clerks are under a duty to transfer registration of vehicles sold under federal tax liens free and clear of any subordinate liens which may be listed. OAG 64-22 .

When a historic vehicle is sold and transferred in Kentucky or to someone outside the state, the plate or tag must remain with the vehicle. OAG 69-540 .

The license plate for a historic vehicle must remain with the particular vehicle which is registered with the county clerk and for which the plate was purchased and cannot be transferred or changed to other historic vehicles that may be in the owner’s possession. OAG 69-540 .

Where no termination statement as provided by KRS 186.045(5) (now KRS 186.045(4)) has been filed, an encumbered motor vehicle may be sold, without the consent, written or otherwise from the holder of the security interest, so long as the security interest data is carefully preserved and carried forward in issuing the transfer of registration as provided by this section. OAG 74-606 .

Where a bill of sale designates the owners as “John and/or Mary Jones” it raises a presumption of joint ownership and the county clerk may reasonably require both signatures on the bill of sale in order to transfer title to a motor vehicle. OAG 75-113 .

Where the bill of sale designates the owners as “John or Mary Jones” the county court clerk may require the signature of either one of the named owners but not both. OAG 75-113 .

The county clerk must, where this section is complied with, effect the transfer of registration of the motor vehicle even though a lien or security interest is shown on the registration receipt, without any consent on the part of the holder of the security interest and the knowledge and bad conduct of the seller and his intent cannot be finally imputed to the clerk where the clerk has no knowledge of the intent of the seller to violate KRS 517.060 and refusal of the clerk to perform his statutory duty would be a violation of KRS 522.030 in the second degree. OAG 75-479 .

Where an automobile is junked and the registration plate and registration receipt are in the possession of the Department of Transportation (now transportation cabinet), the transferee must in order to get a transfer of registration under this section, obtain a bill of sale from the owner-transferor and the current registration receipt from the department of transportation (now transportation cabinet). OAG 81-69 .

Neither the motor vehicle owner nor the junk dealer at whose place of business a vehicle is junked have any ownership rights in the license plates whatsoever since the plate belongs to the Commonwealth of Kentucky; therefore, a junkyard dealer has no authority to allow an unauthorized person to use a plate. OAG 81-421 .

A transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle entails a transfer of registration. OAG 83-47 .

The Transportation Cabinet must assess registration fees on vehicle transfers in accordance with statutory requirements and may not credit the new owner with the unexpired time on the registration plate. OAG 83-47 .

Where an affidavit is filed with the county clerk stating that the affiant no longer has in his possession the title or plate to a motor vehicle, identified by license plate number, year, make, model number, vehicle identification number, and indicating the date of disposition of vehicle and title, and that the vehicle is junked or unfit for future use, the clerk may consider the described vehicle junked, under subsection (5) (now (4)) of this section and should not require plate or decal renewal. OAG 84-309 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Transfer or reregistration of suspended registration, KRS 187.580 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Vanlandingham, The Fee System in Kentucky Counties, The Fee System in Kentucky, 40 Ky. L.J. 275 (1952).

186.191. Revocation of document relating to motor vehicle due to illegal act. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 296, § 2, effective July 15, 1980) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 69, effective July 15, 1982.

186.1911. Replacement of vehicle identification number.

In any instance where a transfer of a motor vehicle shall be accompanied by a certificate of title or registration and such vehicle:

  1. Has had the vehicle identification number removed, or
  2. Has had the vehicle identification number altered, or
  3. Has had the vehicle identification number defaced, or
  4. Has had the vehicle identification number covered,

the owner thereof shall, before delivery of the vehicle to any other person obtain a replacement vehicle identification number from the manufacturer and affix it to the vehicle at the places specified by the Department of Vehicle Regulation or obtain a Kentucky identification number from the department and affix it to the vehicle at the places specified by the Department of Vehicle Regulation.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 296, § 3, effective July 15, 1980.

186.192. Evidence required of excise tax payment.

  1. The county clerk shall not transfer the registration of any motor vehicle or vehicle as defined in KRS 186.650 unless evidence is presented in such form as the Transportation Cabinet may prescribe that all excise taxes imposed on the sale, transfer or use of the motor vehicle or vehicles have been paid. In any case where the transferor or transferee is a dealer as defined in KRS 190.010 , no proof of payment of such taxes is required.
  2. Any clerk who violates this section shall be subject to the penalties prescribed in KRS 186.990(1).

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 186, Art. IV, § 11; 1962, ch. 62, § 12.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a sole proprietor sold his business, including motor vehicles, to another individual to operate as a sole proprietorship, the subject sale of motor vehicles was an “occasional sale,” as defined in subsection (1)(a) and (b) of former KRS 139.070 (see now KRS 139.010 ) and the seller was thus exempted from paying the use or excise tax pursuant to subsection (4) of KRS 139.470 ; accordingly, the county clerk could not refuse to transfer the registration of the motor vehicle pursuant to this section. OAG 81-233 .

186.193. Evidence required of ad valorem tax payment.

The county clerk shall not transfer the registration on any motor vehicle or trailer against which a tax lien has been filed until the taxes have been paid and the lien has been released.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 371, § 4, effective January 1, 1981.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A tax lien on an automobile, once perfected by the filing required under KRS 134.148(2) must be paid off by one who seeks to repossess and retransfer an automobile pursuant to a prior recorded security interest; the clerk is prohibited by this section and KRS 186.232 from transferring title until the lien is paid and released. OAG 83-477 .

KRS 186.232 and this section apply to all tax liens of every sort which have been filed. OAG 84-339 .

Neither KRS 186.232 nor this section support an arbitrary classification in violation of Ky. Const., §§ 2 and 59; these statutes apply equally to all vehicles and trailers which are to be operated on the highways of this state. OAG 84-339 .

It is not necessary for tax liens to be noted on the certificate of title or registration, except with respect to ad valorem tax liens as provided in KRS 134.148(4). OAG 84-339 .

The county clerk can require payment of all tax liens against a mobile home before transferring registration to its new owner if the liens have been properly filed. OAG 84-339 .

KRS 186.232 and this section do not affect the relationship between the purchaser and the seller of a mobile home; the tax lien is a matter of public record and obviously subject to negotiations between the parties at the time of the sale, transfer of title, and registration. The purchaser is free to accept or reject the offer; if the purchaser accepts the offer, the statutes do not prevent the purchaser from taking title to the mobile home; the statutes only prevent the purchaser from registering the mobile home until the tax lien has been paid. OAG 84-339 .

186.195. Recordation of lien information on registration receipt — Assignment or termination of lien. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 82, § 4; 1960, ch. 10, § 2; 1960, ch. 37, § 2; 1962, ch. 83, § 15) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 59, § 5.

186.200. Contents of bill of sale.

  1. The bill of sale provided for by KRS 186.190 shall contain the date, the purchaser’s name and post office address, seller’s name and post office address, and the information provided for in KRS 186.030 and shall be subscribed and sworn to before any officer authorized to administer an oath.
  2. No person for himself or his employee or agent or as an officer of any court, shall sell, trade, transfer or deliver any motor vehicle without at the same time making a bill of sale in quadruplicate and delivering the original and two (2) copies thereof to the county clerk. The county clerk shall retain one (1) copy of the bill of sale and shall deliver the original copy to the purchaser together with the registration receipt or transfer of registration, and attach the other copy to the Revenue Cabinet’s copy of the registration receipt of transfer of registration. No person shall sign a bill of sale until the purchaser’s name is shown thereon.

History. 2739g-14: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 82, § 7; 1962, ch. 62, § 13; 1976, ch. 133, § 11; 1978, ch. 239, § 14, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Compliance.
2.— Evidence of Title.

The provisions of this section are police measures and neither compliance nor noncompliance with their terms is conclusive of question of title, although persuasive. Siler v. Williford, 350 S.W.2d 704, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 129 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Where a wife was injured while riding in a car driven by her husband, the bill of sale for the car was made to the wife, the conditional sales contract for the car was made by her, and the car was licensed in her name, the statements of the husband and wife that the car was owned by their son were not sufficient to overcome the presumption raised by the documents that she owned it. Siler v. Williford, 350 S.W.2d 704, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 129 ( Ky. 1961 ).

3.— License Requirement.

Before a license can be obtained for a new automobile, the buyer must present to the county clerk his bill of sale, executed in accordance with this section. Bobbitt v. Cundiff, 296 Ky. 802 , 177 S.W.2d 596, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 170 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Without a bill of sale conforming to the requirements of this section and without the registration receipt an automobile buyer could not obtain a license or legally operate the automobile upon any highway. Harlow v. Dick, 245 S.W.2d 616, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 601 ( Ky. 1952 ).

4.Sale.

KRS 186.190 and this section are revenue measures designed to insure payment of the motor vehicle usage tax at the time of registration and are entirely distinct from the provisions of the uniform commercial code governing sales. Lexington Mack, Inc. v. Miller, 555 S.W.2d 249, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 500 ( Ky. 1977 ).

5.— Date.

An automobile purchased by an insured from a 20-year-old boy alleged to be the owner, although title was in his father’s name, started by the purchaser with his own keys and driven without the permission of either the boy or his father was not covered by the provisions of purchaser’s insurance policy as a replacement automobile or an additional automobile owned by the purchaser on the date of the accident where the father did not sign the title papers or deliver the keys to the automobile until the following day which was a day after the accident. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 345 F.2d 11, 1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 5576 (6th Cir. Ky. 1965 ).

While the bill of sale is not conclusive as to who is the actual owner, its execution and delivery, together with the surrender of the property therein described and the lodging of it for record is conclusive as to the date upon which the sale was consummated and is binding as to such date on the vendor and those claiming under him. Bobbitt v. Cundiff, 296 Ky. 802 , 177 S.W.2d 596, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 170 ( Ky. 1943 ).

6.— Not Void for Failure to Register Transfer.

The failure to register a transfer of title does not avoid a sale under this section and KRS 186.190 . Campbell v. State Farm Ins. Co., 346 S.W.2d 775, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 338 ( Ky. 1961 ).

7.— Conditional.

Where buyer of automobile gave note and used car in payment and received delivery pursuant to conditional sales contract retaining title in seller, seller’s alleged oral agreement to mail buyer legal transfer of automobile as required by this section would not prevent seller, upon buyer’s defaulting in payments, from recovering possession of automobile, since alleged oral agreement could not vary written contract. Geary-Gay Motor Co. v. Chasteen, 248 Ky. 283 , 58 S.W.2d 393, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 209 ( Ky. 1933 ).

8.— Non-judicial, Purchaser at.

Purchaser at a non-judicial sale for towing and storage under KRS 376.275 would be entitled to registration and license for the automobile upon his presentation to the county clerk of bill of sale in the prescribed form showing his status as a lienholder and upon presentation to the clerk of the original or a duplicate of the current registration receipt for the car. Department of Revenue v. Derringer, 399 S.W.2d 482, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 467 ( Ky. 1966 ).

9.Noncompliance.

A failure to comply with the law requiring the registration of an automobile does not preclude recovery for injuries received in its operation since such omission has no causal connection with accident. Pickering v. Simpkins, 271 Ky. 288 , 111 S.W.2d 650, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 223 ( Ky. 1937 ).

10.Bill of Sale.

Where purchaser of an automobile has never received a bill of sale as described in this section or a receipt evidencing registration as provided in this section, consideration for the contract has failed, for without a bill of sale conforming to this section the purchaser cannot obtain a license for the car and without the registration receipt he cannot obtain a license or legally operate the car upon the highway and if the purchaser has done all he reasonably can to obtain these papers and has been denied them, he has proven a failure of consideration and is entitled to rescind the contract or recover damages for its breach. Brooks v. Williams, 268 S.W.2d 650, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 922 ( Ky. 1954 ).

11.— Impeachment.

Bill of sale for an automobile may be impeached by parol evidence “clearly showing” title in another. Gateway Auto. Auction, Inc. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 398 S.W.2d 498, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 496 ( Ky. 1966 ).

12.— Signing Blank Bill.

Owner of automobile who signed blank bill of sale and delivered car and bill of sale to his sales agent, who wrongfully transferred automobile to bona fide purchaser and converted proceeds, could not recover it from such purchaser. Bailey v. Hoover, 233 Ky. 681 , 26 S.W.2d 522, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 619 ( Ky. 1930 ).

13.— Failure to Claim.

The failure of the purchaser to pick up the bill of sale until some nine days after the sale and delivery of the car would not charge the sellers with liability for the alleged negligent acts of a stranger to whom the purchaser had entrusted the car. Amburgey v. Potter, 477 S.W.2d 786, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 363 ( Ky. 1972 ).

Cited:

Red Bird Motors, Inc. v. Endsley, 657 S.W.2d 954, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 328 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); Rogers v. Wheeler, 864 S.W.2d 892, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 132 ( Ky. 1993 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county clerk cannot refuse to transfer an automobile for the sole reason that the registration receipt of said automobile shows that it is encumbered with a lien. OAG 61-453 .

All authorization by the car owner for another to execute a sworn bill of sale to his car should designate an agent in writing in order to be conclusive as a matter of law. OAG 63-479 .

No one other than the car owner, his legally authorized agent, employe or representative, shall execute a bill of sale in the name of said owner without written authority as applies to other personal property. OAG 63-479 .

Where a lien for towing or storing a motor vehicle is enforced by a nonjudicial sale, the affidavit described in this section would be sufficient to authorize the issuance of a duplicate current registration receipt. OAG 66-369 .

Where a lien for towing or storing a motor vehicle is enforced by a nonjudicial sale, to effect a transfer of registration the bill of sale or the affidavit described in this section and the original or duplicate of the current registration receipt should be presented. OAG 66-369 .

This section and KRS 186.076 (now repealed), 186.090 (repealed), and 190.040 require that a motor vehicle dealer secure a transfer to his own name of all used cars acquired by that dealer before the county clerk is required to issue a transfer of registration from that dealer to any subsequent transferee. OAG 75-593 .

For the purpose of determining ownership of a motor vehicle involved in an accident, title passed when the consideration was paid and the vehicle was delivered to and accepted by the buyer; thus the buyer would be the owner in determining tort liability, even though a transfer of registration had not been effected. OAG 77-776 .

It is permissible for a deputy clerk to notarize a bill of sale in either of the following forms: (1) . . . . . . . . . . , deputy clerk or (2) . . . . . . . . . . county clerk, by: . . . . . . . . . . (deputy clerk). OAG 78-602 .

In order to effect the valid transfer of a transfer of registration after a nonjudicial sale for the enforcement of the statutory lien under KRS 376.275 , the bill of sale or a properly executed affidavit containing the information required by this section, and the original or a duplicate of the current registration receipt for the motor vehicle should be presented to the county clerk. OAG 81-359 .

186.210. False statements in applications prohibited — Possession of plates and receipts.

  1. No person shall make any false statement in an application for registration, application for duplicate receipt or plate, bill of sale, registration receipt, motor number or vehicle identification number. No person shall use, display or keep registration plates or registration receipts that do not belong or have not been issued to him. This subsection shall not apply to a false statement in an initial or renewal application for a military license plate issued under KRS 186.041 .
  2. No person shall make any false statement in an initial or renewal application for a military license plate issued under KRS 186.041 or use, display, or keep military license plates that do not belong or have not been issued to him.
  3. The penalties established in KRS 186.990 for violations of this section shall be printed prominently on every form or blank used for these purposes and furnished by the cabinet.

History. 2739g-22: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 153, § 6; 1958, ch. 82, § 8; 1976, ch. 133, § 12; 1978, ch. 239, § 15, effective June 17, 1978; 2008, ch. 15, § 2, effective July 15, 2008.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Rogers v. Wheeler, 864 S.W.2d 892, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 132 ( Ky. 1993 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If the registrant is a bona fide resident of the county wherein the vehicle is registered, the registration is valid for that year even though the registrant should become a resident of another county during that year. OAG 61-219 .

In an action brought against a person believed to be in violation of KRS 186.020 or this section, the burden of proof would be on the prosecuting attorney to show that the registrant was not a bona fide resident of the county of registration. OAG 61-219 .

Registrations are valid where a vendee purchases a vehicle from an individual vendor or dealer-vendor who registered the vehicle in a county other than the county of residence of the purchaser. OAG 61-219 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

“Cabinet” defined, KRS 186.010(1).

186.220. Denial and revocation of registration for violation of laws. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-59, 2739g-60) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 190, § 5.

186.230. County clerk’s duties — Lien on vehicle, effect — Issuance of plate without collecting taxes and fees prohibited.

The county clerk shall see that KRS 186.005 to 186.260 in his county are enforced. In so doing, he shall:

  1. Take all applications as provided in KRS 186.005 to 186.260 ;
  2. Issue the receipts on blanks furnished by the cabinet;
  3. Collect the fees due the state;
  4. Distribute the registration plates furnished by the Transportation Cabinet and Department of Vehicle Regulation and keep a complete public record of all registrations for his county, in his office;
  5. Report and remit each Monday to the Transportation Cabinet all moneys collected during the previous week, together with a duplicate of all receipts issued by him during the same period. He shall make all checks payable to the State Treasurer. Unless the clerk forwards duplicates of all receipts issued by him during the reporting period with his report and remits the amount shown due by the report within seven (7) days after the report and remittance are due, he shall pay a penalty of one percent (1%) per month or fraction thereof on the amount of money shown to be due on the report. The cabinet may in its discretion grant a county clerk a reasonable extension of time to file his report and remit all moneys not to exceed ten (10) days for any one (1) report. The extension however must be requested prior to the end of the seven (7) day period and shall begin to run at the end of said period. All penalties collected under this provision shall be paid into the State Treasury as a part of the revenue collected under KRS 186.005 to 186.260 ;
  6. The clerk shall mail to the Transportation Cabinet one (1) duplicate of all receipts issued by him within two (2) weeks of the date of issuance. The Transportation Cabinet shall make the receipts pertaining to commercial vehicles available to the Department of Vehicle Regulation for use in assimilating data therefrom;
  7. Account to the Transportation Cabinet for all registration plates and receipt forms consigned to him, at such time or times as the Transportation Cabinet may direct, and give the appropriate cabinet timely notice of a probable deficiency of plates or other supplies;
  8. Any county clerk, who in collecting the taxes and fees due the state or county clerk, accepts in payment thereof a check which is not honored upon presentment, shall have a lien on the vehicle for the amount of such check. This lien shall be subordinate to any prior perfected lien, either contractual or statutory;
  9. No person shall be permitted to sell, trade or transfer ownership of a motor vehicle if evidence is presented to the county clerk that any lien exists on the motor vehicle; and
  10. The county clerk shall not issue to any manufacturer or dealer any registration plate other than a manufacturer’s or dealer’s plate, or registration plate which is under a dealer assignment pursuant to KRS 186A.230 , except when the dealer registers a motor vehicle under a U-Drive-It permit, without collecting designated registration fees and applicable taxes.

History. 2739g-62, 2739g-63: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 78, § 11; 1960, ch. 37, § 3; 1962, ch. 62, § 14; 1964, ch. 59, § 3; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(2), (7), (9); 1976, ch. 133, § 13; 1978, ch. 239, § 16, effective June 17, 1978; 1986, ch. 431, § 13, effective July 15, 1986.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Liability of Clerk.

County clerk was liable for failure to use proper care as bailee of public funds, where he collected license taxes aggregating $1,362 after banks had closed, placed them in locked iron safe in office in county courthouse, without watchman, from midnight to daytime, and during that period safe was burglarized. Commonwealth v. Polk, 256 Ky. 100 , 75 S.W.2d 761, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 361 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although a statutory lien on the vehicle is created on behalf of a county clerk when a check to him for registration fee is dishonored, he may not make a note of such lien on the registration receipt. OAG 74-744 .

There is no statutory provision for the recordation of a clerk’s lien on a vehicle registered in the clerk’s office by payment of a check which is later dishonored upon presentment for payment. OAG 74-780 .

Since this section provides no method for the enforcement of the lien that it creates in subsection (8), the clerk, where the check bounces, can either sue: (1) by way of ordinary action to collect the debt; or (2) by way of an equitable type action in circuit court to have the debt satisfied out of the vehicle to which the lien applies and the lien could only be binding on those affected persons having actual notice of the lien. OAG 77-104 .

Subsection (9) of this section must be read in connection with KRS 186.045 (2)(a), covering financing statement affecting vehicles filing time, fees and notations showing security interests. OAG 79-31 (opinion prior to 1986 amendment of KRS 186.045 ).

Because subsection (9) of this section does not provide any essential protection to the rights of creditors, but does not severely restrict the individual’s use and disposition of his property, it is an unconstitutional infringement upon the right to acquire and protect property and to be free from any unreasonable restraint upon the use of property in violation of Ky. Const., §§ 1 and 2. OAG 79-445 .

“Motor vehicle” within subsection (9) of this section encompasses all forms of mobile transportation which are subject to the registration requirements of KRS chapter 186. OAG 79-445 .

Subsection (9) of this section applies to any lien which is noted on the face of the registration receipt or certificate of title of the motor vehicle. OAG 79-445 .

Subsection (9) of this section does not promote any legitimate public interest. OAG 79-445 .

Subsection (9) of this section is unconstitutional because the classification set out therein is arbitrary in violation of Ky. Const., §§ 2 and 59. OAG 79-445 .

Subsection (9) of this section is unconstitutional, is void ab initio, and should not be enforced. OAG 79-445 .

The term “lien” in subsection (9) of this section applies to security interests as well as to statutory, common-law or other liens. OAG 79-445 .

Subsection (9) of this section, which prohibits the alienability or transfer of a motor vehicle while a lien is still on it, is clearly unconstitutional since it promotes no perceptible and clear legitimate public interest and has no reasonable relation to such police power objects as public safety, health, peace, good order or morals; thus, the statutory restraint is unreasonable and arbitrary under Ky. Const., § 2. OAG 81-160 .

Where the original purchaser of a mobile home purports to transfer any interest he has in the home to a third party through a “transfer of equity and assumption agreement” with the third party’s assumption of the remaining obligation due under the original security agreement covering the vehicle, the county clerk should accept the transfer and note the lien on the new registration certificate issued to the new owner, since subsection (9) of this section, which restricts alienability of vehicles while a lien exists, is clearly unconstitutional, and since KRS 355.9-311 permits the alienability of a secured transaction debtor’s rights. OAG 81-160 .

It is not necessary for tax liens to be noted on the certificate of title or registration except with respect to ad valorem tax liens as provided in KRS 134.148(4). OAG 84-339 .

The county clerk can require payment of all tax liens against a mobile home before transferring registration to its new owner if the liens have been properly filed. OAG 84-339 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Receipts of state moneys to be deposited in state treasury, KRS 41.070 .

Report and accounting of state funds by local officers, KRS ch. 46.

186.232. Registration not transferable until taxes paid, lien released, and proof of insurance and notarized affidavit presented.

  1. The county clerk shall not transfer the registration on any motor vehicle or trailer against which a tax lien has been filed until the taxes have been paid and the lien has been released.
  2. The county clerk shall not transfer the registration of any motor vehicle unless the transferee presents proof of insurance in compliance with KRS 304.39-080 and KRS 186.190 .
  3. If a notarized affidavit is required and available under KRS 138.450 , the county clerk shall not transfer the registration of a motor vehicle unless the notarized affidavit attesting to the total and actual consideration paid or to be paid for the motor vehicle is presented to the clerk at the time of the transfer. If a notarized affidavit is required but is not available, the county clerk shall contact the Department of Revenue to determine the “retail price” of the vehicle and any taxes due prior to transferring the vehicle.
  4. The county clerk shall not transfer title on a motor vehicle if there are delinquent ad valorem taxes on the motor vehicle.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 240, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1994, ch. 504, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 600, § 7, effective April 14, 1998; 2005, ch. 85, § 606, effective June 20, 2005; 2011, ch. 5, § 4, effective January 1, 2013.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 11 of Acts 1998, ch. 600, stated: “The amendments contained in Sections 3 to 8 of this Act shall apply to motor vehicles sold after July 31, 1998.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Kling v. Geary, 667 S.W.2d 379, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 216 ( Ky. 1984 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A tax lien on an automobile, once perfected by the filing required under KRS 134.148(2) must be paid off by one who seeks to repossess and retransfer an automobile pursuant to a prior recorded security interest; the clerk is prohibited by KRS 186.193 and this section from transferring title until the lien is paid and released. OAG 83-477 .

KRS 186.193 and this section apply to all tax liens of every sort which have been filed. OAG 84-339 .

Neither KRS 186.193 nor this section support an arbitrary classification in violation of Ky. Const., §§ 2 and 59; these statutes apply equally to all vehicles and trailers which are to be operated on the highways of this state. OAG 84-339 .

It is not necessary for tax liens to be noted on the certificate of title or registration except with respect to ad valorem tax liens as provided in KRS 134.148(4). OAG 84-339 .

The county clerk can require payment of all tax liens against a mobile home before transferring registration to its new owner if the liens have been properly filed. OAG 84-339 .

KRS 186.193 and this section do not affect the relationship between the purchaser and the seller of a mobile home; the tax lien is a matter of public record and obviously subject to negotiations between the parties at the time of the sale, transfer of title, and registration. The purchaser is free to accept or reject the offer; if the purchaser accepts the offer, the statutes do not prevent the purchaser from taking title to the mobile home; the statutes only prevent the purchaser from registering the mobile home until the tax lien has been paid. OAG 84-339 .

186.235. Inspection prior to registration. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 82, § 10; 1960, ch. 37, § 4; 1962, ch. 62, § 15; 1966, ch. 139, § 12; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(2); 1974, ch. 272, § 1; 1976, ch. 354, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 69, effective July 15, 1982.

186.240. Cabinet to furnish forms and plates — Records — Receipts — Reflectorized license plate program fund — Use of receipts — Accounting by clerk — Audit.

  1. It shall be the duty of the cabinet to carry out the provisions of KRS 186.005 to 186.260 , and:
    1. Provide to the clerk in each county access to all forms provided for in KRS 186.005 to 186.260 ;
    2. Keep a numerical record of all registration numbers issued in the state and also keep a record of motor or vehicle identification numbers required by KRS 186.160 ; and
    3. Furnish to each clerk, originally each year upon estimate, and thereafter upon requisition at all times, a sufficient supply of standard, noncommercial plates and the supplies necessary to provide evidence of registration for all classes of vehicles required to be registered.
    4. Prescribe a plate of practical form and size for police identification purposes that shall contain:
      1. The registration identifier;
      2. An indication that Kentucky is the issuing jurisdiction;
      3. For standard plates for noncommercial vehicles, the county in which the plate is issued;
      4. For plates for commercial vehicles, the year the license expires and words or information the Department of Vehicle Regulation may prescribe by administrative regulation, pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A; and
      5. At the discretion of the cabinet, a state slogan.
  2. License plates issued pursuant to this chapter shall conform to the provisions of subsection (1)(c) and (d) of this section.  The Transportation Cabinet shall provide for the issuance of reflectorized plates for all motor vehicles, and shall collect a fee, in addition to the fee set out in KRS Chapter 186 and KRS 281.631 , of fifty cents ($0.50). The fifty cents ($0.50) fee to reflectorize license plates shall be used by the cabinet as provided in subsection (3) of this section.
  3. The reflectorized license plate program fund is established in the state road fund and appropriated on a continual basis to the cabinet to administer the moneys as provided in this subsection. The fifty cents ($0.50) fee collected by the cabinet to reflectorize license plates shall be deposited into the program fund and used to issue reflectorized license plates. If at the end of a fiscal year, money remains in the program fund, it shall be retained in the fund and shall not revert to the state road fund. The interest and income earned on money in the program fund shall also be retained in the program fund to carry out the provisions of this subsection. The Transportation Cabinet shall issue reflectorized license plates under the provisions of this subsection on a schedule to be determined at the discretion of the cabinet.
  4. Except as directed under subsection (3) of this section, the Transportation Cabinet shall receive all moneys forwarded by the clerk in each county and turn it over to the State Treasurer for the benefit of the state road fund.
  5. The Transportation Cabinet shall require an accounting by the clerk in each county for any moneys received by him under the provisions of this chapter, after the deduction of his fees under this chapter, and for all receipts, forms, plates, and insignia consigned to him. The Auditor of Public Accounts, pursuant to KRS 43.071 , shall annually audit each county clerk concerning his responsibilities for the collection of various fees and taxes associated with motor vehicles. The secretary of the Transportation Cabinet, with the advice, consultation, and approval of the Auditor, shall develop and implement an inventory and accounting system which shall insure that the audits mandated in KRS 43.071 are performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. The Transportation Cabinet shall pay for the audits mandated by KRS 43.071.
  6. When applied for under KRS 186.060 or 186.061 , motor or vehicle numbers assigned shall be distinctive to show that they were designated by the cabinet.

History. 2739g-63: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 78, §§ 6, 11; 1946, ch. 208, § 5; 1948, ch. 126, § 4; 1950, ch. 190, § 6; 1954, ch. 153, § 7; 1962, ch. 62, § 16; 1966, ch. 139, § 13; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(2), (9); 1976, ch. 133, § 14; 1976, ch. 366, § 2; 1980, ch. 229, § 1, effective January 1, 1983; 1986, ch. 86, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 429, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1990, ch. 296, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 498, § 5, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 221, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 2000, ch. 180, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2005, ch. 50, § 1, effective June 20, 2005; 2015 ch. 19, § 40, effective June 24, 2015; 2021 ch. 53, § 2, effective June 29, 2021.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Fees of Clerk.

This section, requiring accounting by county clerk for money received “after deduction of his fees under this act (now chapter),” did not permit deduction of five percent (5%) commissions authorized by other laws, since fees deductible were those authorized by law, which did not provide for five percent (5%) commissions. Lewis v. James, 191 Ky. 769 , 231 S.W. 526, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 392 ( Ky. 1921 ).

County clerk is not entitled to five percent (5%) of motor vehicle license fees. Lewis v. James, 191 Ky. 769 , 231 S.W. 526, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 392 ( Ky. 1921 ).

Cited in:

Reeves v. Gerard, 255 S.W.2d 21, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 629 ( Ky. 1953 ), overruled, Maynard v. Commonwealth, 538 S.W.2d 38, 1976 Ky. LEXIS 60 ( Ky. 1976 ), overruled in part, Maynard v. Commonwealth, 538 S.W.2d 38, 1976 Ky. LEXIS 60 ( Ky. 1976 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

“Cabinet” defined, KRS 186.010(1).

Period for which records to be preserved, KRS 131.185 .

Receipts of state moneys to be deposited in state treasury, KRS 41.070 .

Money not to be drawn from Treasury unless appropriated — Annual publication of accounts — Certain revenues usable only for highway purposes, Ky. Const., § 230.

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See Transportation Cabinet Budget, 2021 Ky. Acts ch. 198, Section 1, Pt. II, A, 2, 001, (1) at 1511.

186.245. Posting of notice about 2006 increases in fees of county clerks.

Beginning January 1, 2007, every county clerk shall post a permanent notice that the fee increases contained in 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 255 were requested by the Kentucky County Clerks Association. The notice shall be printed in bold face type of sufficient point size to be read from a distance of at least three (3) feet. The notice shall be posted in a conspicuous place to ensure that every person who enters the county clerk’s office will readily see the notice.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 428, § 36, effective July 15, 1994; 2006, ch. 255, § 2, effective January 1, 2007.

186.250. Courts to notify department of convictions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-61) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 62, § 17.

186.260. Arrests and bail for violations.

KRS 281.765 shall apply in the case of arrests and bail for a violation of any of the provisions of KRS 186.020 to 186.260 .

History. 2739g-64.

186.270. City license taxes on trucks, tractors and trailers — Notice of new or increased tax.

Cities may, by ordinance, impose license taxes on motor trucks, truck-tractors, semitrailers and trailers and require that registration plates issued as evidence of the licenses be affixed to the vehicle in some conspicuous place as prescribed by ordinance. No new or increased license tax on motor trucks, truck-tractors, semitrailers and trailers shall be effective unless the owners thereof or licensees are mailed notice of the new tax at least ten (10) days prior to the effective date of the tax.

History. 2739g-92: amend. Acts 1964, ch. 119, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Application.

Under this section, a city of the fifth class may by ordinance tax and license firms operating trucks in the city whose trucks also operate outside the city and beyond the five mile limit mentioned in KRS 189.280 (2), since the purpose of KRS 189.280 is only to suspend statutory regulations as to weight and size within city and five mile limit where city chooses to regulate size and weight. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lancaster, 276 Ky. 585 , 124 S.W.2d 745, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1938 ).

2.Nonresidents.

Nonresident furniture dealers who at no time had attempted to solicit or obtain business as a regular matter in the city were not engaged in an occupation, trade or profession in the city and deliveries to 12 to 25 customers in the city during a year would not subject dealers to city license fee imposed under KRS 92.281 or this section since due to the bulky nature of the products sold delivery by the vendor is necessary and in accordance with the custom of the business as an incidental detail in the final consummation of the sale. H. H. Leet Furniture Co. v. Richmond, 357 S.W.2d 329, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 123 ( Ky. 1962 ).

3.License and Occupational Taxes Imposed.

Ordinance of city of Louisville imposing license tax upon every “owner or operator of a motor truck” upon the city streets was not invalid as double taxation when applied to persons engaged in the business of renting trucks on a “U-drive-it” basis, although such persons were also required to pay a license tax for the privilege of engaging in such business, the first tax being a regulatory measure. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc. v. Louisville, 294 Ky. 568 , 172 S.W.2d 207, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 489 ( Ky. 1943 ).

4.Basis.

A city having authority to levy a license tax on trucks using its streets may base the tax upon type, size, horsepower or number of trucks used. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lancaster, 276 Ky. 585 , 124 S.W.2d 745, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1938 ).

A city ordinance enacted under this section may license and tax trucks without regulating size or weight, and may apply to firms which own and operate trucks, but are not solely engaged in the business of trucking. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lancaster, 276 Ky. 585 , 124 S.W.2d 745, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1938 ).

A city ordinance licensing and taxing firms “doing business” in the city “by the operation of motor truck or trucks upon and over the streets of said city,” was not vague and uncertain, since the class of trucks intended to be licensed and taxed was designated with sufficient clearness. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lancaster, 276 Ky. 585 , 124 S.W.2d 745, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1938 ).

A city ordinance may tax each of the trucks owned by a single firm and operated by it over the city streets. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lancaster, 276 Ky. 585 , 124 S.W.2d 745, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1938 ).

An ordinance taxing trucks operating within a city, on the basis of load capacity, regardless of the number of miles actually traveled over the streets, is not discriminatory or confiscatory and does not violate the U. S. Const., 14th Amend.Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lancaster, 276 Ky. 585 , 124 S.W.2d 745, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1938 ).

5.Rate.

An ordinance of a city of the fifth class, which did not regulate trucks, but licensed and taxed them at a graduated rate based on load capacity, so that license fees represented approximately ten per cent of the city’s revenues, was valid as a police measure, and not a revenue measure, since such fees are not shown to be unreasonable in view of the damage done to streets by heavy trucks. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lancaster, 276 Ky. 585 , 124 S.W.2d 745, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1938 ).

6.Exemption of Common and Contract Carriers.

City may not require “permit” of operator of vehicle who has certificate or permit under motor carrier act. Pineville v. Meeks, 254 Ky. 167 , 71 S.W.2d 33, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Provision of law prohibiting cities from imposing license tax on vehicles operated under a certificate or permit created an implied exception to this section notwithstanding that both sections were passed at the same legislative session. Pineville v. Meeks, 254 Ky. 167 , 71 S.W.2d 33, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1934 ).

A city of the fifth class may, under its police power, impose a license tax on firms doing business in the city by operating trucks on its streets, other than common carriers or contract carriers. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lancaster, 276 Ky. 585 , 124 S.W.2d 745, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1938 ).

A city ordinance taxing all firms operating their own motor trucks on the city streets did not violate KRS ch. 281, since that statute regulated only common carriers and contract carriers. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lancaster, 276 Ky. 585 , 124 S.W.2d 745, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1938 ).

7.Reciprocity Applicable.

Reciprocity provision exempting nonresidents from Kentucky registration laws applied to city license taxes, and was not unconstitutional as so applied even though cities had power to impose tax on residents. Newport v. Merkel Bros. Co., 156 Ky. 580 , 161 S.W. 549, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 478 ( Ky. 1913 ) (decided under prior law).

8.Ad Valorem and License Taxes Not Double Taxation.

Although ad valorem tax was imposed on vehicles as to which license fee was also imposed, there was not double taxation, ad valorem tax being on the property, and license fee being on occupation of owner. Covington v. Woods, 98 Ky. 344 , 33 S.W. 84, 17 Ky. L. Rptr. 927 , 1895 Ky. LEXIS 61 ( Ky. 1895 ) (decided under prior law).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If trucks are not exempt under the provisions of KRS ch. 281 or opinions of the courts, they may be subject to a vehicle tax for the use of the city streets, under the city’s police power, if they are locally owned and are regularly garaged within the city. OAG 62-179 .

A city can impose both an occupational tax upon a business using a motor vehicle and a motor vehicle tax on the same motor vehicle subject to the limitations of KRS 189.280 and 281.830 . OAG 63-65 .

Trucks operating in interstate commerce which have complied with KRS 281.835 and, also, trucks of nonresidents which have complied with valid domiciliary laws requiring licensing, registering, and numbering of vehicles in their home state would not be subject to a city tax imposed under this section. OAG 63-911 .

The validity of the tax as levied on the vehicles of nonresidents depends upon the regularity of the use of the streets during the tax period. OAG 63-911 .

A city can levy a license tax on the motor vehicle owned by both residents or nonresidents for the use of the city streets. OAG 63-911 .

Where buses were operated pursuant to a certificate issued by the interstate commerce commission, they came within the provisions of KRS 281.830(2) and were exempt from taxation by a city. OAG 68-341 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Garrison and Martin, Kentucky Commercial Motor Vehicle Transportation Tax Legislation I, 33 Ky. L.J. 3 (1944).

186.275. Motor vehicle not to be registered without proof of payment of state and county taxes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 211, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

186.276. Seat tax on airport shuttle vehicles. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 139, § 20; 1990, ch. 198, § 3, effective July 13, 1990) was repealed by Acts 1998, ch. 565, § 7, effective July 15, 1998.

186.280. Motor vehicle not to be registered without proof of payment of city taxes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 211, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

186.281. Seat and other vehicle taxes. [Repealed]

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 139, § 21; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(2); 1978, ch. 232, § 14, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 151, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1990, ch. 198, § 4, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 448, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; repealed by 2015 ch. 19, § 45, effective June 24, 2015.

Compiler's Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 139, § 21; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(2); 1978, ch. 232, § 14, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 151, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1990, ch. 198, § 4, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 448, § 2, effective July 15, 1994) was repealed by Acts 2015, ch. 19, § 45, effective June 24, 2015).

186.285. Requirements of KRS 186.275 and 186.280 to be additional to other motor vehicle registration requirements. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 211, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

186.286. Apportionment of seat taxes. [Repealed]

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 139, § 24; 1984, ch. 151, § 3, effective July 13, 1984; repealed by 2015 ch. 19, § 45, effective June 24, 2015.

Compiler's Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 139, § 24; 1984, ch. 151, § 3, effective July 13, 1984) was repealed by Acts 2015, ch. 19, § 45, effective June 24, 2015).

186.290. Information on motor vehicle emissions test status and compliance.

  1. The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall provide and receive information on the emissions test status of vehicles registered in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall provide appropriate emissions test and compliance status to the Department of Information Systems for inclusion in the AVIS database.
  2. Upon notification to the Department of Vehicle Regulation from a county air pollution control district or the Energy and Environment Cabinet of expiration of a vehicle emissions compliance certificate, the Department of Vehicle Regulation shall immediately notify the person who owns the vehicle that unless evidence of compliance is received within thirty (30) days, the department shall revoke the registration of the motor vehicle until:
    1. The person presents an emissions certificate to the county clerk and pays the reinstatement fee required under KRS 186.180 ; or
    2. The person presents proof in the form of an affidavit stating, under penalty of perjury as set forth in KRS 523.030 , that failure to obtain a current emissions certificate is the result of the inoperable condition of the motor vehicle.
  3. The provisions of this section and KRS 186.180 , 186.990 , 224.20-760 , and 224.20-765 shall not prevent the Transportation Cabinet, a county air pollution district, or the Energy and Environment Cabinet from seeking the enforcement or operation of any other statute or ordinance that ensures the compliance of motor vehicles in the Commonwealth under KRS Chapter 186, KRS 224.20-710 to 224.20-765 , or KRS Chapter 77.
  4. The provisions of this section and KRS 186.180 , 186.990 , 224.20-760 , and 224.20-765 shall apply to vehicles that are registered in a county authorized under KRS 224.20-710 to 224.20-765 or KRS Chapter 77 to conduct vehicle emissions tests.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 441, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2010, ch. 24, § 236, effective July 15, 2010.

Operator’s License

186.400. Duties of Transportation Cabinet — Administration of laws.

  1. The administration of the provisions of KRS 186.400 to 186.640 shall be vested in the Transportation Cabinet. The Transportation Cabinet may prescribe regulations for the enforcement of KRS 186.400 to 186.640 . The Transportation Cabinet also shall enforce regulations governing the acts of motor vehicle operators under KRS 186.400 to 186.640 and require reports which it deems necessary.
  2. The cabinet shall provide or cause to be provided to appropriate persons or officials an adequate supply of forms for the administration of KRS 186.400 to 186.640 . The style of those forms and the method of their use shall be prescribed by the cabinet and shall be adequate to protect the safety interests of the state. The Transportation Cabinet shall prescribe the method of financial control.
    1. The Transportation Cabinet shall collect all moneys due the state under KRS 186.531 for operators’ licenses and personal identification cards issued, and shall deposit those moneys with the state treasurer. (3) (a) The Transportation Cabinet shall collect all moneys due the state under KRS 186.531 for operators’ licenses and personal identification cards issued, and shall deposit those moneys with the state treasurer.
    2. At least once each year the secretary of the Transportation Cabinet shall cause a reconciliation to be made between the record of receipts by the Transportation Cabinet and the receipt of applications by the Transportation Cabinet.

History. 2739m-55, 2739m-70: amend. Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 7, Art. X, § 11; 2020 ch. 51, § 1, effective March 27, 2020.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Regulations Prescribed.

The Department of Public Safety (now Transportation Cabinet) in adopting a point system providing for the suspension of a driver’s license after a driver has accumulated a certain number of points, acted within the scope of the power delegated to it under KRS 186.570 because the regulations neither enlarged nor restricted the application of the terms of the statute but merely declared an administrative policy within its express terms; the point system provides a fair and workable method of effectuating the provisions of KRS 186.570 . Sturgill v. Beard, 303 S.W.2d 908, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 275 ( Ky. 1957 ), overruled, Commonwealth, Dep't Public Safety v. Thomas, 467 S.W.2d 335, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 364 ( Ky. 1971 ).

KRS 186.570 is not unconstitutional in that the legislative functions have been delegated to an administrative body without providing any criteria or standards in the legislative act since the point system adopted by the department under its power to promulgate rules and regulations is constitutionally sound and the administration of the traffic rules can lawfully be delegated to administrative officials. Sturgill v. Beard, 303 S.W.2d 908, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 275 ( Ky. 1957 ), overruled, Commonwealth, Dep't Public Safety v. Thomas, 467 S.W.2d 335, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 364 ( Ky. 1971 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

An operator’s license issued to a minor should be canceled where the parent required to sign for the minor rescinds his request or renounces his assumption of liability but where evidence of the minor’s financial responsibility remains in the file. OAG 65-840 .

The operation of a motorcycle by a person under 16 along the shoulder of a highway in Kentucky is prohibited and constitutes the offense of operation of a motor vehicle without a permit. OAG 69-356 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Appeal from ruling of cabinet, KRS 186.580 .

Peace officers to enforce motor vehicle laws, KRS 281.765 .

186.401. Definitions of “driver’s license,” “operator’s license,” and “commercial driver’s license.”

As used in KRS 186.400 to 186.640 :

  1. Driver’s license means an operator’s license issued pursuant to KRS 186.4102 , 186.412 , and 186.412 1;
  2. “Operator’s license,” unless otherwise indicated, includes a motor vehicle operator’s license, a motorcycle operator’s license, and a combination motor vehicle-motorcycle license; and
  3. Commercial driver’s license means a license issued pursuant to KRS Chapter 281A.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 455, § 27, effective July 13, 1990; 2017 ch. 100, § 12, effective January 1, 2019.

186.402. Statement of legislative intent relating to young drivers.

It is the goal of the General Assembly to improve traffic safety and reduce traffic accident injuries and fatalities by controlling a young driver’s exposure and progressively moving the driver into more difficult driving experiences prior to full licensure.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 198, § 1, effective October 1, 1996.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 20 of Acts 1996, ch. 198 read: “Whereas in order to give local school districts the opportunity to decide if they want to add driver’s education to the district’s curriculum the provisions of this Act take effect on October 1, 1996.”

186.403. Voluntary travel ID instruction permits, operator’s licenses, commercial driver’s licenses, and personal identification cards — Application — Fees — Issuance — Administrative regulations.

  1. The Transportation Cabinet shall develop a system of issuing voluntary travel ID instruction permits, operator’s licenses, commercial driver’s licenses, and personal identification cards.
  2. The development of the system identified in subsection (1) of this section shall include but not be limited to the:
    1. Acquisition of equipment and information technology systems and services;
    2. Modification, conversion, or upgrade of the cabinet’s existing databases, equipment, and information technology systems;
    3. Establishment of electronic connectivity with any other state’s driver licensing department, federal agency, national or regional association, or business. Electronic connectivity under this paragraph shall be limited to the sharing of the minimum amount of information necessary to validate information supplied by an applicant, process the application, and produce and distribute the identity document. The Transportation Cabinet shall limit any access to the databases developed under this chapter in accordance with the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. sec. 2721 ;
    4. Creation of a new design for operator’s licenses, commercial driver’s licenses, instruction permits, and personal identification cards that will meet the minimum content, design, and security standards required under this section;
    5. Collection, management, and retention of personal information and identity documents; and
    6. Development and implementation of a comprehensive security plan to ensure the security and integrity of the department’s:
      1. Employees;
      2. Facilities;
      3. Storage systems;
      4. Production of operator’s licenses, commercial driver’s licenses, instruction permits, and personal identification cards; and
      5. Collection and retention of personal information and identity documents.
  3. On or after January 1, 2019:
    1. A person who applies for an initial Kentucky instruction permit, operator’s license, or personal identification card under KRS 412, 186.4121 , 186.4122 , or 186.4123 , including any person who establishes residency in the state, may apply for either a voluntary travel ID or a standard instruction permit, operator’s license, or personal identification card;
    2. A person who applies for the renewal of an instruction permit, operator’s license, or personal identification card under KRS 412, 186.4121 , 186.4122 , or 186.4123 may apply for either a voluntary travel ID or a standard instruction permit, operator’s license, or personal identification card; and
    3. A person who holds a voluntary travel ID operator’s license, and applies for and passes all necessary examinations for a commercial driver’s license under KRS Chapter 281A, shall receive a voluntary travel ID commercial driver’s license. This paragraph shall not apply to a person who is not a citizen or permanent resident of the United States.
  4. The fees for initial, renewal, duplicate, or corrected voluntary travel ID or standard operator’s licenses, instruction permits, or personal identification cards shall be as set forth under KRS 186.531 .
  5. A voluntary travel ID identity document issued by the cabinet may be used for all state purposes authorized for identity documents otherwise issued under KRS 186.400 to 186.640 and Chapter 281A.
  6. The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations under KRS Chapter 13A that set standards for the establishment of a voluntary travel ID identity document system, including but not limited to the components of the system identified in subsection (2) of this section.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 100, § 10, effective June 29, 2017.

186.405. Registration with United States Selective Service System — Duties of cabinet.

  1. Any United States male citizen or immigrant who is at least eighteen (18) years of age but less than twenty-six (26) years of age shall be registered for the United States Selective Service System when applying to the Transportation Cabinet for the issuance, renewal, or duplicate copy of:
    1. An operator’s license;
    2. A commercial driver’s license; or
    3. A personal identification card.
  2. This registration is in compliance with federal Selective Service System requirements.
  3. The Transportation Cabinet shall forward, in an electronic format, the necessary personal information required for registration of the applicants identified in this section to the Selective Service System via the American Association of Motor Vehicles Administrators Network. If an applicant declines registration, the Transportation Cabinet shall forward the necessary personal information to the Selective Service System with the notation that automatic registration was declined.
  4. The applicant’s submission of the application shall serve as an indication that the applicant has already registered with the Selective Service System, or that he is authorizing the Transportation Cabinet to forward the necessary information for registration to the Selective Service System.
  5. The Transportation Cabinet shall include the following statement on applications for licenses or identification cards described in this section: “By submitting this application, I am consenting to registration with the federal Selective Service System, if so required. If under eighteen (18) years of age, I understand that I will be registered as required by federal law when I attain eighteen (18) years of age.” In the event the applicant declines Selective Service registration, the cabinet may issue an operator’s license or personal identification card, but shall forward the necessary personal information to the Selective Service System.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 60, § 1, effective June 24, 2003; 2006, ch. 173, § 28, effective July 12, 2006.

186.410. Operators’ licenses — Requirements and issuance — Personal identification cards, validity — Driver training programs — Application for travel ID or standard document.

  1. Every person except those exempted by KRS 186.420 and 186.430 shall, before operating a motor vehicle, motorcycle, or moped upon a highway, secure an operator’s license as provided in this chapter.
  2. Except as provided in KRS 186.4121 , all original, renewal, and duplicate personal identification cards and licenses for the operation of motor vehicles, motorcycles, or mopeds shall be applied for with the Transportation Cabinet, or through alternative technology, and issued by the Transportation Cabinet. Subject to the provisions of KRS 186.4101 , applications for renewal licenses and personal identification cards shall be made every eight (8) years within the birth month of the applicant. A license shall not be issued until the application has been certified by the cabinet and the applicant has, if required under KRS 186.635 , successfully completed the examinations required under KRS 186.480 .
  3. All personal identification cards shall be issued under the provisions of KRS 186.4102 , 186.4122 , and 186.4123 .
  4. A person under the age of eighteen (18) years who applies for an instruction permit shall, at any time between the age of sixteen (16) and before the person’s eighteenth birthday, enroll in one (1) of the following driver training programs:
    1. A driver’s education course administered by a school district;
    2. A driver training school licensed pursuant to KRS Chapter 332 which offers a course meeting or exceeding the minimum standards established by the Transportation Cabinet; or
    3. State traffic school. The person may seek to enroll in state traffic school before the person’s eighteenth birthday. Persons enrolling in state traffic school pursuant to this paragraph shall not be required to pay a fee.
  5. Any applicant for any initial or renewal instruction permit, operator’s license, or personal identification card under KRS 186.400 to 186.640 may apply for either:
    1. A voluntary travel ID document; or
    2. A standard document that does not meet standards for federal identification purposes.

History. 2739m-34: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 79, § 1; 1946, ch. 127, § 1; 1948, ch. 208, §§ 1, 2, 3; 1958, ch. 60, § 1; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20 (7); 1978, ch. 349, § 3, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 434, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 389, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1994, ch. 267, § 3, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 198, § 3, effective October 1, 1996; 2000, ch. 535, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 264, § 3, effective July 15, 2002; 2006, ch. 173, § 29, effective July 12, 2006; 2017 ch. 100, § 1, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 2, effective March 27, 2020.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Evidence of Failure to Have License.

The practice of setting up a roadblock for motor vehicles for the purpose of requiring the driver to display an operator’s license is not an arrest or illegal restraint or search nor can it be regarded as exercising arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of free men which power is denied by Ky. Const., § 2; therefore evidence obtained entirely and solely by such procedure that driver did not have or display a driver’s license is admissible in prosecution for driving without a license. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 83 ( Ky. 1962 ).

2.Unlicensed Operator, Liability.

Although owner of passenger motor truck operated for hire failed to register his machine and employed an unlicensed chauffeur, his failure to comply with statute would not bar recovery for injuries in rearend collision, caused by defendant’s negligence, and not contributed to by plaintiff’s failure to meet statute. Moore v. Hart, 171 Ky. 725 , 188 S.W. 861, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 432 ( Ky. 1916 ) (decided under prior law).

Insurer was not liable under automobile policy against loss by fire, excluding liability while automobile was being operated by person prohibited by law from driving, or while being driven contrary to law, if at time of fire, driver was unlicensed, automobile had not been registered, and registration plates had not been issued to insured. Standard Auto Ins. Ass'n v. Neal, 199 Ky. 699 , 251 S.W. 966, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 916 ( Ky. 1923 ) (decided under prior law).

Where, under common-law principles, owner was not liable for negligence of employe who was not acting in course of employment, he would not be liable on ground that permitted car to be driven by “chauffeur” known to be unregistered, since employee was not, at time of accident, operating car for compensation and hence was not “chauffeur.” Winslow v. Everson, 221 Ky. 430 , 298 S.W. 1084 ( Ky. 1927 ) (decided under prior law).

In prosecution for manslaughter for striking man with automobile, evidence to show that accused did not have driver’s license which he was legally required to have and for not having which he could be fined and imprisoned, was inadmissible for he was not on trial for not having such license and its admission constituted reversible error especially where instruction was given thereon. Roberts v. Commonwealth, 264 Ky. 545 , 95 S.W.2d 23, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 361 ( Ky. 1936 ) (decided under prior law).

Cited:

Howard v. Hicks, 737 S.W.2d 711, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 582 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987); Commonwealth v. Mullins, 812 S.W.2d 164, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 37 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth ex rel. Logan Cty. Atty. v. Williams, 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 167 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2019).

Opinions of Attorney General.

An officer of the state police can require an accused traffic law violator to exhibit his operator’s license before the motorist is informed of the charge against him. OAG 61-317 .

A peace officer has authority to stop the operator of a motor bike for the purpose of determining whether or not the operator has the required license where it appears the operator is under the age of 16. OAG 65-354 .

Since a person under 16 cannot obtain a license to operate a motor vehicle, if a person sells a car to a person under 16 knowingly, then such seller could be prosecuted for causing the juvenile to be charged with a crime. OAG 67-360 .

Operation of a motor vehicle in disregard of valid restrictions on a motor vehicle operator’s license is operation without a license in violation of this section for which a person may be convicted and fined or imprisoned or both pursuant to KRS 186.990(3), and for which a peace office may issue a citation if the offense is committed in his presence. OAG 67-530 .

A city of the fourth class had no authority to adopt an ordinance providing for revocation of the motor vehicle operator’s license of a person who attempts to elude a police officer. OAG 68-148 .

A Kentucky operator’s license is not required to operate minibikes or motorcycles on private property but would be required under this section before operating them on a highway as defined in KRS 186.010 . OAG 73-437 .

Juvenile offenders sixteen years of age or older charged with operating a motorcycle without an operator’s license must, in view of KRS 208.020 (now repealed), be proceeded against as adult offenders and the juvenile court has no jurisdiction in such cases, but juvenile offenders under sixteen years of age must be proceeded against in juvenile court. OAG 75-563 .

Acts 1978, chapter 434 as enrolled (without house amendment number 6) and signed by the presiding officers of both houses and which became law without the Governor's signature represents the law on the question as enacted at the 1978 General Assembly. OAG 78-283 .

A person must comply with all the requirements of a regular operator’s license, including age, to obtain a moped operator’s license except the requirement of taking and passing the driving test. OAG 78-702 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Commercial driver’s licenses, KRS Chapter 281A.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Vanlandingham, The Fee System in Kentucky Counties, The Fee System in Kentucky, 40 Ky. L.J. 275 (1952).

186.4101. Renewal of license — Reconciliation of four-year and eight-year renewal periods.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, a license to operate a motor vehicle, motorcycle, or moped, or a personal identification card shall be renewed every eight (8) years prior to its expiration. Except as provided in KRS 186.410 , a person seeking to renew an operator’s license shall apply to the cabinet in accordance with KRS 186.412 and 186.4121 .
  2. An applicant for a renewal license, instruction permit, or identification card may choose to be issued a document that is valid for four (4) years. Fees for documents issued for a four (4) year period shall be adjusted in accordance with KRS 186.531 .
  3. The fee to renew an operator’s license or personal identification card shall be according to the schedule set forth in KRS 186.531 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 38, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1994, ch. 267, § 4, effective July 15, 1994; 2017 ch. 100, § 13, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 3, effective March 27, 2020.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A person who operates a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state must have either a valid Kentucky operator’s license or a valid operator’s permit from another state; failure to possess either of the above mentioned operator’s licenses means that the person is in violation of KRS 186.620(2) if he operates a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state. OAG 83-67 .

If a nonresident who has no Kentucky driver’s license, has had his license suspended or revoked by the issuing state, he then has no right to drive a motor vehicle upon the highways of Kentucky. OAG 83-67 .

A moped operator must be licensed or face a $12 to $500 fine and six months in jail. OAG 84-176 .

186.4102. Photograph required for operator’s license, instructional permit, or personal identification card — Identification number — Age and organ donor designations — Voluntary travel ID identity document — When photograph not required.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (9) of this section, the Transportation Cabinet shall issue operator’s licenses and personal identification cards bearing a photograph of the applicant and other information the cabinet may deem appropriate to qualified applicants under this chapter. When taking the photograph, the applicant shall be prohibited from wearing sunglasses, veils, scarves, or any other attire that obscures or creates shadows upon any features of the applicant’s face as determined by the cabinet. An applicant shall be required to remove eyewear that obstructs the iris or the pupil of the eyes and shall not take any action to obstruct a photograph of his or her facial features. The face shall be visible from the crown to the base of the chin and from ear to ear. Any person who refuses to remove attire prohibited by this subsection as directed by the person taking the application shall be prohibited from receiving an operator’s license or personal identification card.
  2. An operator’s license or personal identification card issued by the cabinet shall not contain the applicant’s Social Security number. The cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A that develop a numbering system that uses an identification system other than Social Security numbers. If an applicant submits adequate proof that he or she does not have a Social Security number, the Transportation Cabinet shall assign the applicant a unique identifying number.
  3. The license or personal identification card shall also designate by color coding and using the phrase “under 21” if the licensee or card holder is under the age of twenty-one (21); “CDL” if the license is issued pursuant to KRS Chapter 281A; or “under 21 CDL” if the licensee holds a commercial driver’s license issued pursuant to KRS Chapter 281A and is under the age of twenty-one (21).
  4. The cabinet shall provide on each operator’s license and personal identification card space for a notation that the holder of the license or personal identification card has expressed to the cabinet the person’s willingness to make an anatomical gift under KRS 311.1917 . If a person who has made a declaration under this subsection wishes to rescind that declaration, the person shall notify the Kentucky Circuit Court Clerks’ Trust for Life, which shall remove the notation from his or her records.
  5. An operator’s license issued pursuant to this chapter shall be designated a Class D license.
  6. A person shall not have more than one (1) operator’s license.
  7. Upon marriage, dissolution of marriage, or any other qualifying event, if a person seeks to change his or her name, the person shall make a name change with the Social Security Administration prior to applying for an operator’s license or a personal identification card and shall provide the cabinet with the person’s marriage license, divorce decree, or other documentation. The name issued on the identity document shall match the person’s first and last name as recorded with the Social Security Administration. Unless a person is eligible to renew his or her identity document at the time of the name change, the fee charged under this section shall be for a corrected identity document as set forth in KRS 186.531 .
  8. An identity document issued under this chapter shall contain a denotation that either:
    1. The identity document is a voluntary travel ID identity document that complies with the security standards set forth by Pub. L. No. 109-13, Title II, and may be used for identification for federal purposes; or
    2. The identity document shall not be used for federal identification purposes.
    1. The Transportation Cabinet may provide for the issuance of an instruction permit, operator’s license, or personal identification card without a photograph if there is good cause for the omission based in documented religious objections. The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to establish the criteria and requirements for obtaining an operator’s license, instruction permit, or personal identification card without a photograph. (9) (a) The Transportation Cabinet may provide for the issuance of an instruction permit, operator’s license, or personal identification card without a photograph if there is good cause for the omission based in documented religious objections. The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to establish the criteria and requirements for obtaining an operator’s license, instruction permit, or personal identification card without a photograph.
    2. An applicant for an initial instruction permit, operator’s license, or personal identification card without a photograph shall apply to the Transportation Cabinet in Frankfort or a Transportation Cabinet field office. The application shall be processed solely by the Transportation Cabinet in the same manner as in KRS 186.4121(5) and 186.4123(8).
    3. An operator’s license, instruction permit, or personal identification card issued without a photograph shall denote on its face that it shall not be accepted by any federal agency for identification or any other federal purpose.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 100, § 6, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 4, effective March 27, 2020.

186.411. Issuance of driver’s license to person with a seizure condition — Conditions — Notice and hearing — Option for determination of ability by medical review board.

  1. If a person with a seizure condition applies for an original, duplicate, modified, or renewal operator’s license, or applies for an instruction permit, he or she shall be required by the cabinet to present to the Division of Driver Licensing certification by a physician or advanced practice registered nurse that his or her condition is controlled by drugs, details of the drugs, dosages which the person takes, and that the person has been free of any seizures for ninety (90) days; his or her own statement that he or she has been free of any seizures for ninety (90) days before the date of the application, and that he or she is taking the medication prescribed by his physician or advanced practice registered nurse. The division shall upon receipt of the required documentation issue him a letter of authorization to present to the cabinet. The cabinet shall not issue an operator’s license to a person with a seizure condition who does not present the letter of authorization.
  2. Any person who has a seizure condition who cannot present the certification that his or her condition is controlled by drugs or a statement that he or she has been seizure-free for ninety (90) days shall be notified in writing by the cabinet that the person’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle is withdrawn and of his or her right to have an informal hearing on the matter of whether he or she is an unsafe driver as a result of having the seizure condition. The notice shall be mailed by first-class mail to the address of record of the person. The hearing shall be automatically waived if not requested within twenty (20) days after the cabinet mails notice. The hearing shall be scheduled as early as practical after receipt of the request at a time and place designated by the cabinet.
  3. A person whose seizure condition would impair his or her ability to operate a motor vehicle may present evidence of the condition to the Division of Driver Licensing’s medical review board as established under KRS 186.444 , including his or her own attested statement, physician’s or advanced practice registered nurse’s statement, and medical dosage details. If the board determines that the person’s seizure condition would not impair his or her ability to operate a motor vehicle, the division shall issue the letter of authorization required by subsection (1) of this section.
  4. A person whose seizure condition is of a nature that the seizure condition would not impair the ability to operate a motor vehicle may present evidence of this fact to the Division of Driver Licensing including the person’s own attested statement, physician’s or advanced practice registered nurse’s statement, and medicine dosage details. If the division determines that the person’s seizure condition does not impair the ability to operate a motor vehicle, the division shall issue the letter of authorization required by subsection (1) of this section.
  5. Any physician or advanced practice registered nurse shall not be subject to civil or criminal liability, absent a showing of bad faith, for providing any reports, records, examinations, opinions, or recommendations pursuant to this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 306, § 1; 1980, ch. 283, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1994, ch. 416, § 6, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 455, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 318, § 70, effective July 15, 1996; 2016 ch. 87, § 3, effective July 15, 2016; 2020 ch. 51, § 5, effective March 27, 2020.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/94). This section was amended by 1994 Ky. Acts chs. 416 and 455. Where these Acts are not in conflict, they have been codified together. Where a conflict exists, Acts ch. 416, which was last enacted by the General Assembly, prevails under KRS 446.250 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Cruse v. Commonwealth, 712 S.W.2d 356, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1122 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

186.412. Application of United States citizen or permanent resident for instruction permit or operator’s license — Information and documents required — Photograph — Scanning and retaining of application information — Temporary license or permit — Birth certificate — Oath.

  1. As used in this section, “applicant” means a person who is a citizen or permanent resident of the United States.
  2. An applicant shall apply for an instruction permit or operator’s license with the Transportation Cabinet, or through alternative technology. Except as provided in KRS 186.417 , the application form shall require the applicant’s:
    1. Full legal name and signature;
    2. Date of birth;
    3. Social Security number or a letter from the Social Security Administration declining to issue a Social Security number;
    4. Sex;
    5. Present Kentucky resident address, exclusive of a post office box address alone;
    6. Other information necessary to permit the application of United States citizens to also serve as an application for voter registration;
    7. A brief physical description of the applicant;
    8. Proof of the applicant’s Kentucky residency, including but not limited to a deed or property tax bill, utility agreement or utility bill, or rental housing agreement; and
    9. Other information the cabinet may require by administrative regulation promulgated under KRS Chapter 13A.
  3. In addition to the information identified in subsection (2) of this section, a permanent resident shall present one (1) of the following documents issued by the United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services:
    1. An I-551 card with a photograph of the applicant; or
    2. A form with the photograph of the applicant or a passport with a photograph of the applicant on which the United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, has stamped the following: “Processed for I-551. Temporary evidence of lawful admission for permanent residence. Valid until .... (Expiration Date). Employment authorized.”
  4. Upon application for an operator’s license under this section, the cabinet shall capture a photograph of the applicant in accordance with the requirements of KRS 186.4102(1).
    1. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, the cabinet shall electronically scan the documents required for application under this section and shall electronically retain the application, supporting documents, and the photograph of the applicant. Upon completion of any required examinations under KRS 186.480 , the cabinet shall present the applicant with a temporary operator’s license or instruction permit, which shall be valid for thirty (30) days until a permanent operator’s license or instruction permit is mailed to the applicant by the Transportation Cabinet. (5) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, the cabinet shall electronically scan the documents required for application under this section and shall electronically retain the application, supporting documents, and the photograph of the applicant. Upon completion of any required examinations under KRS 186.480 , the cabinet shall present the applicant with a temporary operator’s license or instruction permit, which shall be valid for thirty (30) days until a permanent operator’s license or instruction permit is mailed to the applicant by the Transportation Cabinet.
    2. The cabinet shall only electronically scan the birth certificate of an individual applying for a voluntary travel ID instruction permit or operator’s license. If the applicant is not seeking such a permit or license, the cabinet shall not electronically scan the applicant’s birth certificate.
    3. An applicant for an operator’s license or instruction permit shall not be required to surrender the applicant’s birth certificate for image capture, image storage, or image transmission to any entity, including the federal government, unless express consent is given by the applicant during the course of obtaining a voluntary travel ID license or permit.
  5. An applicant shall swear an oath to the cabinet as to the truthfulness of the statements contained in the form.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 60, § 2; 1968, ch. 63, § 3; 1970, ch. 22, § 1; 1970, ch. 103, § 1; 1974, ch. 15, § 1, effective January 1, 1975; 1974, ch. 124, § 1; 1978, ch. 349, § 4, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 434, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 236, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 243, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 389, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 402, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 142, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 165, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 455, § 29, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 86, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 393, § 9, effective January 1, 1995; 1994, ch. 481, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 185, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1996, ch. 198, § 5, effective October 1, 1996; 1998, ch. 52, § 1, effective March 16, 1998; 1998, ch. 192, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 535, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 96, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2002, ch. 261, § 1, effective January 1, 2003; 2002, ch. 264, § 4, effective January 1, 2003; 2005, ch. 55, § 1, effective June 20, 2005; 2006, ch. 65, § 4, effective July 12, 2006; 2007, ch. 85, § 192, effective June 26, 2007; 2008, ch. 2, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; 2009, ch. 46, § 2, effective June 25, 2009; 2010, ch. 98, § 1, effective July 15, 2010; 2010, ch. 161, § 32, effective July 15, 2010; 2011, ch. 59, § 5, effective June 8, 2011; 2011, ch. 79, § 2, effective June 8, 2011; 2012, ch. 11, § 1, effective July 12, 2012; 2013, ch. 110, § 1, effective June 25, 2013; 2015 ch. 126, § 2, effective June 24, 2015; 2018 ch. 74, § 2, effective April 2, 2018; repealed and reenacted, 2017, ch. 100, § 2, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 6, effective March 27, 2020.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(7/15/94). This section was amended by 1994 Ky. Acts chs. 86, 393, and 481. Where these acts are not in conflict, they have been codified together. Where Acts ch. 86 and 481 are in conflict, Acts ch. 481, which is the last enacted by the General Assembly, prevails under KRS 446.250 . 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 393 amending this section is effective January 1, 1995, according to OAG 94-42 .

Opinions of Attorney General.

The word “reside” as used in this section means mere physical presence so that a person physically residing in Camp Breckinridge is, for purposes of this section, a resident of Union County, Kentucky, and may obtain a driver’s license by application to the circuit court of that county, even though Kentucky has ceded exclusive jurisdiction over Camp Breckenridge to the United States. OAG 69-264 .

Since Hart County has no city of the second class, the circuit court clerk cannot legally authorize one of his deputies to sell motor vehicle operators’ licenses in some place other than the clerk’s office in the county seat. OAG 69-670 .

The department of public safety (now transportation cabinet) may require an applicant for a driver’s license to give a social security number if such applicant has a number. OAG 72-814 .

While a person seeking a driver’s license must apply in person to the Circuit Court clerk of the county in which he resides, a lawful deputy of the clerk can issue a license to the applicant in the applicant’s presence anywhere in the county in which his principal is circuit clerk as the deputy’s presence is the constructive presence of the circuit clerk, and there is no reference to the circuit clerk’s office as the exclusive site of issuance. OAG 73-311 .

Although there is no specific statutory requirement that a social security number appear on the operator’s application for a driver’s license, there is no legal argument against such a disclosure, and it could be included with “such other information as necessary” that would be of help in identifying the person seeking a license to operate a motor vehicle. OAG 73-490 .

Once the commission created by KRS 186.413 has decided on a process for the color photo processing of driver’s licenses, the commission need not be reconvened to pass on the renewal of or the letting of a new contract for such processing so long as the process chosen by the commission is complied with. OAG 75-562 .

Unless a married woman has procured a court order under KRS 401.010 changing her name to something other than her husband’s surname, the woman must take the name of her husband in order to get a valid Kentucky driver’s license. OAG 77-72 .

Acts 1978, chapter 434 as enrolled (without house amendment number 6) and signed by the presiding officers of both Houses and which became law without the Governor's signature represents the law on the question as enacted at the 1978 General Assembly. OAG 78-283 .

There is no Kentucky law or regulation requiring a person to prove his age for a drivers license in any way other than by his own sworn statement. OAG 80-145 .

The Circuit Court may lawfully require a person’s social security number in order for such person to obtain a driver’s license and such requirement does not violate the Federal Privacy Act. OAG 82-494 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Money not to be drawn from Treasury unless appropriated — Annual publication of accounts — Certain revenues usable only for highway purposes, § 230.

Receipts of state moneys to be deposited in state treasury, KRS 41.070 .

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Equal Protection of the Sexes in Kentucky: The Effect of the Hummeldorf Decision on a Woman’s Right to Choose Her Surname, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 475 (1982).

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Minors, § 30.17.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Personal Rights and Privileges Resulting from Marriage, § 12.3.

186.4121. Instruction permit or operator’s license application for non-United States citizen or permanent resident — Immigration status and personal identity documentation and verification — Renewal or duplicate license — Term of license.

  1. As used in this section, “applicant” means a person who is not a United States citizen and has not been granted status as a permanent resident of the United States.
  2. An applicant shall apply for an instruction permit or operator’s license to either the Transportation Cabinet in Frankfort or a Transportation Cabinet field office. An applicant under this section shall complete the application identified in KRS 186.412 , along with other documents required under this section. The cabinet shall keep an electronic copy of the documentation submitted with the application and shall capture a photograph of the applicant in accordance with KRS 186.4102(1).
  3. The application form under this section shall be accompanied by the applicant’s documentation issued by the United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, authorizing the person to be in the United States and, if applicable, the applicant’s international driving permit. The Transportation Cabinet shall verify the information submitted under this subsection through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program.
  4. The application form of a special status individual with a K-1 status shall be accompanied by an original or certified copy of the applicant’s completed marriage license signed by the official who presided over the marriage ceremony and two (2) witnesses. The application form of a special status individual with a K-1 status shall also include the applicant’s petition to enter the United States for the purpose of marriage that contains the name of the prospective spouse. If the name of the prospective spouse on the petition does not match the name of the spouse on the marriage license, the Transportation Cabinet shall not be required to issue an operator’s license.
    1. The Transportation Cabinet shall verify and validate the immigration status and personal identity of an applicant under this section through federal government systems and databases. (5) (a) The Transportation Cabinet shall verify and validate the immigration status and personal identity of an applicant under this section through federal government systems and databases.
    2. If an applicant’s identity and immigration status is validated, the cabinet shall capture a photograph of the applicant, and scan the required documents into the cabinet’s database.
    3. If the applicant successfully completes any examinations required under KRS 186.480 , or if an examination is not required, the Transportation Cabinet shall present the applicant with a temporary operator’s license or instruction permit, which shall be valid for thirty (30) days until a permanent operator’s license or instruction permit is mailed to the applicant.
    4. An applicant under this section shall only be issued a standard operator’s license or instruction permit.
    1. An applicant shall apply to renew an operator’s license, or obtain a duplicate operator’s license, at the Transportation Cabinet in Frankfort or a Transportation Cabinet field office. (6) (a) An applicant shall apply to renew an operator’s license, or obtain a duplicate operator’s license, at the Transportation Cabinet in Frankfort or a Transportation Cabinet field office.
    2. If an applicant has any type of change in his or her immigration status, the applicant shall apply to update the operator’s license with either the Transportation Cabinet in Frankfort or a Transportation Cabinet field office within ten (10) days.
  5. An applicant shall swear an oath to the Transportation Cabinet as to the truthfulness of the statements contained in the form.
    1. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, an initial or renewal operator’s license issued to an applicant who is not a special status individual shall be valid for a period equal to the length of time the applicant’s documentation from the United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, is valid, or eight (8) years, whichever time period is shorter. (8) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, an initial or renewal operator’s license issued to an applicant who is not a special status individual shall be valid for a period equal to the length of time the applicant’s documentation from the United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, is valid, or eight (8) years, whichever time period is shorter.
    2. An initial or renewal operator’s license shall be valid for a period of one (1) year if the applicant is not a special status individual and the person’s documentation issued by the United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, is issued for an indefinite period of time and does not have an expiration date. The fee shall be the same as for a regular operator’s license.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 100, § 3, effective January 1, 2019.

186.4122. Personal identification card application for United States citizen or permanent resident — Photograph — Scanning and retaining of application information — Proof of residency — Issuance of personal identification card and operator’s license or instruction permit — Term of identification card.

  1. As used in this section, “applicant” means a person who is a citizen or permanent resident of the United States.
  2. The Transportation Cabinet shall issue a personal identification card to an applicant who:
    1. Is a Kentucky resident;
    2. Applies in person to the cabinet or through alternative technology; and
    3. Complies with the provisions of this section.
  3. Upon application for a personal identification card under this section, the cabinet shall capture a photograph of the applicant in accordance with KRS 186.4102(1).
    1. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, the cabinet shall electronically scan the documents required for application under this section and shall electronically retain the application, supporting documents, and the photograph of the applicant. The cabinet shall present the applicant with a temporary personal identification card, which shall be valid for thirty (30) days until a permanent personal identification card is mailed to the applicant by the Transportation Cabinet. (4) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, the cabinet shall electronically scan the documents required for application under this section and shall electronically retain the application, supporting documents, and the photograph of the applicant. The cabinet shall present the applicant with a temporary personal identification card, which shall be valid for thirty (30) days until a permanent personal identification card is mailed to the applicant by the Transportation Cabinet.
    2. The cabinet shall only electronically scan the birth certificate of an individual applying for a voluntary travel ID personal identification card. If the applicant is not seeking such a document, the cabinet shall not electronically scan the applicant’s birth certificate.
    3. An applicant for a personal identification card shall not be required to surrender the applicant’s birth certificate for image capture, image storage, or image transmission to any entity, including the federal government, unless express consent is given by the applicant during the course of obtaining a voluntary travel ID personal identification card.
    1. An application for a personal identification card shall be accompanied by the same information as is required for an operator’s license under KRS 186.412 , except if an applicant does not have a fixed, permanent address, the applicant may use as proof of residency a signed letter from a homeless shelter, health care facility, or social service agency currently providing the applicant treatment or services and attesting that the applicant is a resident of Kentucky. An applicant who does not have a fixed, permanent address shall not be issued a voluntary travel ID personal identification card. (5) (a) An application for a personal identification card shall be accompanied by the same information as is required for an operator’s license under KRS 186.412 , except if an applicant does not have a fixed, permanent address, the applicant may use as proof of residency a signed letter from a homeless shelter, health care facility, or social service agency currently providing the applicant treatment or services and attesting that the applicant is a resident of Kentucky. An applicant who does not have a fixed, permanent address shall not be issued a voluntary travel ID personal identification card.
    2. It shall be permissible for the application form for a personal identification card to include as an applicant’s most current resident address a mailing address or an address provided on a voter registration card.
    3. If the applicant is not the legal owner or possessor of the address provided on the application form, the applicant shall swear that he or she has permission from the legal owner, authorized agent for the legal owner, or possessor to use the address for purposes of obtaining the personal identification card.
    1. Every applicant for a personal identification card under this section shall swear an oath to the cabinet as to the truthfulness of the statements contained on the application form. (6) (a) Every applicant for a personal identification card under this section shall swear an oath to the cabinet as to the truthfulness of the statements contained on the application form.
    2. A personal identification card may be suspended or revoked if the person who was issued the card presents false or misleading information to the cabinet when applying for the card.
  4. A personal identification card issued under this section shall be valid for a period of eight (8) years from the date of issuance, except that if the personal identification card is issued to a person who does not have a fixed, permanent address, then the personal identification card shall be valid for one (1) year from the date of issuance.
    1. An applicant may be issued a personal identification card if the applicant currently holds a valid Kentucky instruction permit or operator’s license, except that a person shall not hold more than one (1) license or personal identification card that is a voluntary travel ID identity document which indicates that it meets the requirements for federal identification under Pub. L. No. 109-13, Title II, as referenced in KRS 186.4102(8). (8) (a) An applicant may be issued a personal identification card if the applicant currently holds a valid Kentucky instruction permit or operator’s license, except that a person shall not hold more than one (1) license or personal identification card that is a voluntary travel ID identity document which indicates that it meets the requirements for federal identification under Pub. L. No. 109-13, Title II, as referenced in KRS 186.4102(8).
    2. If a person’s instruction permit or operator’s license has been suspended or revoked, the person may be issued a personal identification card. Subject to the limitations in paragraph (a) of this subsection, a personal identification card may be surrendered when the person applies to have his or her instruction permit or operator’s license reinstated.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 100, § 4, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 7, effective March 27, 2020.

186.4123. Personal identification card application for non-United States citizen or permanent resident — Photograph — Scanning of application documents — Proof of residency — Immigration documentation — Immigration status and personal identity verification — Term of identification card.

  1. As used in this section, “applicant” means a person who is not a United States citizen and has not been granted status as a permanent resident of the United States.
  2. The Transportation Cabinet shall issue a personal identification card to an applicant who:
    1. Is a Kentucky resident;
    2. Applies in person to either the Transportation Cabinet in Frankfort or a Transportation Cabinet field office; and
    3. Complies with the provisions of this section.
  3. Upon application for a personal identification card under this section, the cabinet shall capture a photograph of the applicant in accordance with KRS 186.4102(1).
  4. The cabinet shall electronically scan the documents required for application under this section, supporting documents, and the photograph of the applicant into the cabinet’s database.
    1. An application for a personal identification card shall be accompanied by the same information as is required for an operator’s license under KRS 186.412 , along with other documents required under this section, except if an applicant does not have a fixed, permanent address, the applicant may use as proof of residency a signed letter from a homeless shelter, health care facility, or social service agency currently providing the applicant treatment or services and attesting that the applicant is a resident of Kentucky. An applicant who does not have a fixed, permanent address shall not be issued a voluntary travel ID personal identification card. (5) (a) An application for a personal identification card shall be accompanied by the same information as is required for an operator’s license under KRS 186.412 , along with other documents required under this section, except if an applicant does not have a fixed, permanent address, the applicant may use as proof of residency a signed letter from a homeless shelter, health care facility, or social service agency currently providing the applicant treatment or services and attesting that the applicant is a resident of Kentucky. An applicant who does not have a fixed, permanent address shall not be issued a voluntary travel ID personal identification card.
    2. It shall be permissible for the application form for a personal identification card to include as an applicant’s most current resident address a mailing address or an address provided on a voter registration card.
    3. If the applicant is not the legal owner or possessor of the address provided on the application form, the applicant shall swear that he or she has permission from the legal owner, authorized agent for the legal owner, or possessor to use the address for purposes of obtaining the personal identification card.
  5. The application form under this section shall be accompanied by the applicant’s documentation issued by the United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, authorizing the applicant to be in the United States. The Transportation Cabinet shall verify the information submitted under this subsection through the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program.
  6. The application form of a special status individual with a K-1 status shall be accompanied by an original or certified copy of the applicant’s completed marriage license signed by the official who presided over the marriage ceremony and two (2) witnesses. The application form of a special status individual with a K-1 status shall also include the applicant’s petition to enter the United States for the purpose of marriage that contains the name of the prospective spouse. If the name of the prospective spouse on the petition does not match the name of the spouse on the marriage license, the Transportation Cabinet shall not be required to issue an operator’s license.
    1. The Transportation Cabinet shall verify and validate the immigration status and personal identity of an applicant under this section through federal government systems and databases. (8) (a) The Transportation Cabinet shall verify and validate the immigration status and personal identity of an applicant under this section through federal government systems and databases.
    2. If an applicant’s identity and immigration status is validated, the cabinet shall capture a photograph of the applicant, and scan the required documents into the cabinet’s database, and shall present the applicant with a temporary personal identification card, which shall be valid for thirty (30) days until a permanent personal identification card is mailed to the applicant.
    3. An applicant under this section shall only be issued a standard personal identification card.
    1. An applicant shall apply to renew a personal identification card, or obtain a duplicate personal identification card, at the Transportation Cabinet in Frankfort or a Transportation Cabinet field office. (9) (a) An applicant shall apply to renew a personal identification card, or obtain a duplicate personal identification card, at the Transportation Cabinet in Frankfort or a Transportation Cabinet field office.
    2. If a person has any type of change in his or her immigration status, the person shall apply to update with either the Transportation Cabinet in Frankfort or a Transportation Cabinet field office within ten (10) days.
    1. Every applicant for a personal identification card under this section shall swear an oath to the Transportation Cabinet as to the truthfulness of the statements contained on the application form. (10) (a) Every applicant for a personal identification card under this section shall swear an oath to the Transportation Cabinet as to the truthfulness of the statements contained on the application form.
    2. A personal identification card may be suspended or revoked if the person who was issued the card presents false or misleading information to the cabinet when applying for the card.
    1. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, an initial or renewal personal identification card issued to an applicant who is not a special status individual shall be valid for a period equal to the length of time the applicant’s documentation from the United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, is valid, or eight (8) years, whichever time period is shorter. (11) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, an initial or renewal personal identification card issued to an applicant who is not a special status individual shall be valid for a period equal to the length of time the applicant’s documentation from the United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, is valid, or eight (8) years, whichever time period is shorter.
    2. An initial or renewal personal identification card shall be valid for a period of one (1) year if:
      1. The applicant is not a special status individual and the applicant’s documentation issued by the United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, is issued for an indefinite period of time and does not have an expiration date. The fee shall be the same as for a regular personal identification card; or
      2. The personal identification card is issued to a person who does not have a fixed, permanent address.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 100, § 5, effective January 1, 2019.

186.4125. Documentation required for voluntary travel ID — Use of original hospital birth certificate as proof of applicant’s age — Application for exception to allow use of birth certificates.

  1. In order to apply for a voluntary travel ID identity document under KRS 186.403 , the applicant shall present the applicant’s certified birth certificate or a valid, unexpired, United States passport or Permanent Resident Card (Form I- 551).
  2. For the purposes of KRS 186.400 to 186.640 , an original hospital birth certificate signed by the attending physician shall be acceptable as certifying the birth date of an applicant for a standard instruction permit, operator’s license, or personal identification card.
  3. The Transportation Cabinet shall apply to the United States Department of Homeland Security for an exception to allow birth certificates described in subsection (2) of this section to be used to apply for a voluntary travel ID identity document under KRS 186.403 .

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 287, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2017 ch. 100, § 14, effective January 1, 2019.

186.413. Commission to determine color photo process to be used. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 124, § 3; 1978, ch. 155, § 41, effective June 17, 1978; 1996, ch. 185, § 2, effective July 15, 1996) was repealed by Acts 2002, ch. 264, § 10, effective July 15, 2002.

186.414. Duration of licenses — Renewal — Extension of licenses of servicemen. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 60, § 3; 1964, ch. 40, § 1; 1968, ch. 63, § 2; 1970, ch. 22, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 434, § 9, effective June 17, 1978. For present law see KRS 186.410 .

186.415. Application for operator’s license by military enlistee — Conditions.

  1. Notwithstanding KRS 186.450 , 186.452 , and 186.454 , a person who is under eighteen (18) years of age may apply for an operator’s license if the person has:
    1. Held an instruction permit for a minimum of one hundred eighty (180) days; and
    2. Enlisted in the United States Armed Forces or a state National Guard.
  2. An individual eligible to apply for an operator’s license under this section shall present proof of enlistment at the time of application.

History. Enact. Acts 2009, ch. 46, § 1, effective June 25, 2009.

186.416. Renewal of operator’s license by mail for military personnel and spouse and dependents stationed outside of Kentucky — Veteran’s designation on operator’s license or personal ID card.

  1. If a resident of the Commonwealth currently serving in the United States military is stationed or assigned to a base or other location outside the boundaries of the Commonwealth, the resident, or the resident’s spouse or dependents, may renew a Class D operator’s license issued under this section by mail. If the resident, or his or her spouse or dependents, was issued an “under 21” operator’s license, upon the date of the license holder’s twenty-first birthday, the “under 21” operator’s license may be renewed for an operator’s license that no longer contains the outdated reference to being “under 21.”
  2. A resident of the Commonwealth renewing an operator’s license by mail under subsection (1) of this section may have a personal designee apply to the cabinet on behalf of the resident to renew the resident’s operator’s license. An operator’s license being renewed by mail under subsection (1) of this section shall be issued a license bearing the applicant’s historical photo if there is a photo on file. If there is no photo on file, the license shall be issued without a photograph and shall show in the space provided for the photograph the legend “valid without photo and signature.”
      1. If a resident of the Commonwealth has been serving in the United States military stationed or assigned to a base or other location outside the boundaries of the Commonwealth and has allowed his or her operator’s license to expire, he or she shall, within ninety (90) days of returning to the Commonwealth, be permitted to renew his or her license without having to take a written test or road test. (3) (a) 1. If a resident of the Commonwealth has been serving in the United States military stationed or assigned to a base or other location outside the boundaries of the Commonwealth and has allowed his or her operator’s license to expire, he or she shall, within ninety (90) days of returning to the Commonwealth, be permitted to renew his or her license without having to take a written test or road test.
      2. The spouse or dependent of a person identified in subparagraph 1. of this paragraph shall be afforded the same consideration identified in that subparagraph regarding the renewal of an expired operator’s license.
    1. A person who meets the criteria in paragraph (a) of this subsection shall not be convicted or cited for driving on an expired license prior to license renewal during the ninety (90) days after the person’s return to the Commonwealth if the person can provide proof of his or her out-of-state service and dates of assignment.
    2. A person who meets the criteria in paragraph (a) of this subsection and who does not renew his or her license within ninety (90) days of returning to the Commonwealth shall be required to comply with the provisions of this chapter governing renewal of a license that has expired.
    3. If a resident of the Commonwealth has been issued an “under 21” or “under 21 CDL” operator’s license and the person is unable to renew the license on the date of his or her twenty-first birthday, the “under 21” or “under 21 CDL” operator’s license shall be valid for ninety (90) days beyond the date of the person’s twenty-first birthday.
    1. Any person who served in the active Armed Forces of the United States, including the Coast Guard, and any member of the National Guard or Reserve Component who completed the member’s term of service and was released, separated, discharged, or retired therefrom under either an honorable discharge or a general under honorable conditions discharge may, at the time of initial application or application for renewal or duplicate, request that an operator’s license or a personal identification card issued under this chapter bear the word “veteran” on the face or the back of the license or personal identification card. (4) (a) Any person who served in the active Armed Forces of the United States, including the Coast Guard, and any member of the National Guard or Reserve Component who completed the member’s term of service and was released, separated, discharged, or retired therefrom under either an honorable discharge or a general under honorable conditions discharge may, at the time of initial application or application for renewal or duplicate, request that an operator’s license or a personal identification card issued under this chapter bear the word “veteran” on the face or the back of the license or personal identification card.
    2. The designation shall be in a style and format considered appropriate by the Transportation Cabinet. Prior to obtaining a designation requested under this subsection, the applicant shall present to the cabinet as proof of eligibility, an original or copy of his or her:
      1. Unexpired Veteran Identification Card or Veteran Health Identification Card issued by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs;
      2. DD-2, DD-214, DD-256, DD-257, or NGB-22 form; or
      3. Unexpired Geneva Conventions Identification Card issued by the United States Department of Defense.

The cabinet shall not be liable for fraudulent or misread forms presented.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 100, § 9, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 8, effective March 27, 2020; 2020 ch. 42, § 2, effective July 15, 2020; 2021 ch. 65, § 2, effective June 29, 2021.

186.417. Issuance of operator’s license or personal identification card to released felon — Documentation required — Processing and issuance — Administrative regulations governing operator’s licenses for eligible current inmates.

  1. The Transportation Cabinet shall issue to any felony offender, if the felony offender is eligible, released from the Kentucky Department of Corrections or a Federal Bureau of Prisons facility located in Kentucky on home incarceration, parole, completed service of sentence, shock probation, or pardon, a personal identification card or, if the felony offender is eligible, an operator’s license. An offender who wishes to obtain a personal identification card or operator’s license shall provide proper documentation to comply with the provisions of this section.
  2. Proper documentation under subsection (1) of this section shall consist of:
    1. The offender’s certificate of birth;
    2. A copy of the offender’s resident record card and parole certificate or notice of discharge;
    3. A photograph of the offender, printed on plastic card or paper; and
    4. A release letter that shall contain the offender’s:
      1. Full legal name, subject to the information available to the Kentucky Department of Corrections or a Federal Bureau of Prisons facility located in Kentucky;
      2. Discharge/release date;
      3. Signature;
      4. Social Security number;
      5. Date of birth;
      6. Present Kentucky address where he or she resides; and
      7. Physical description.
  3. The Transportation Cabinet shall issue to any felony offender, if the felony offender is eligible, probated or conditionally discharged by the court and under the supervision of the Division of Probation and Parole or the United States Probation Office, a personal identification card or, if the felony offender is eligible, an operator’s license. An offender who wishes to obtain a personal identification card or operator’s license shall provide proper documentation to comply with the provisions of this section.
  4. Proper documentation under subsection (3) of this section shall consist of:
    1. The offender’s certificate of birth;
    2. The offender’s sentencing order;
    3. A photograph of the offender, printed on plastic card or paper; and
    4. A notarized release letter, signed by the supervising officer verifying the offender’s status on supervision, that shall contain the offender’s:
      1. Full legal name, subject to the information available to the Division of Probation and Parole or the United States Probation Office;
      2. Signature;
      3. Social Security number;
      4. Date of birth;
      5. Present Kentucky address where he or she resides; and
      6. Physical description.
  5. The offender shall present the documentation identified in subsection (2) or (4) of this section to the cabinet within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the release letter and shall be responsible for paying the fee for the personal identification card or operator’s license pursuant to KRS 186.531 .
  6. The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A to establish procedures for current inmates in state and federal prisons, who are deemed eligible by prison officials, to be issued operator’s licenses to engage in work release activities or reentry initiatives. The administrative regulations shall address, at a minimum:
    1. The information required for application, which shall include all information in paragraph (b) of this subsection which is germane to a current inmate. For purposes of this paragraph, the facility in which the inmate is housed shall be considered the inmate’s residence;
    2. Required documentation from the Department of Corrections or the Federal Bureau of Prisons that the inmate meets the security criteria to be eligible for work outside of the facility;
    3. Procedures for license issuance; and
    4. Restrictions on use of the license, including a requirement that the inmate shall surrender the license to prison officials when the inmate is not engaged in work outside the facility.
  7. The cabinet shall process applications for operator’s licenses and personal identification cards under this section in the same manner as in KRS 186.412 and 186.4122 .
  8. The Transportation Cabinet may enter into an agreement with the Kentucky Department of Corrections, the United States Probation Office, or the Federal Bureau of Prisons to use a mobile unit to begin the issuance process in this section.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 100, § 7, effective January 1, 2019; 2018 ch. 74, § 1, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 9, effective March 27, 2020.

186.418. Voluntary statewide child identification program — Travel ID child identification — Fee — Term of child identification card.

  1. The Transportation Cabinet shall implement a voluntary statewide child identification program. The program shall issue a photo personal identification card to a child two (2) to fifteen (15) years of age.
  2. A parent or guardian may apply for a child identification card under this section at the cabinet. Application for a child identification card shall be accompanied by a Social Security card and a birth certificate for the child or other proof of the child’s date of birth as provided under KRS 186.412 . The card shall not contain the child’s Social Security number.
    1. If the child’s parent or guardian wishes to obtain a travel ID child identification card, the cabinet shall scan the application and supporting documentation, capture a photograph of the child in accordance with the provisions of KRS 186.4102(1), and issue the child identification card by mail. (3) (a) If the child’s parent or guardian wishes to obtain a travel ID child identification card, the cabinet shall scan the application and supporting documentation, capture a photograph of the child in accordance with the provisions of KRS 186.4102(1), and issue the child identification card by mail.
    2. If the child’s parent or guardian does not wish to obtain a travel ID child identification card, the cabinet shall scan the application, capture a photograph of the child in accordance with the provisions of KRS 186.4102(1), and issue the child identification card by mail.
    3. A parent or guardian applying under this section shall not be required to surrender the child’s birth certificate for image capture, image storage, or image transmission to any entity, including the federal government, unless express consent is given by the parent or guardian during the course of obtaining a voluntary travel ID child identification card.
  3. A child identification card issued under this section shall contain the child’s name and the toll-free number of the Kentucky missing persons clearinghouse, Department of Kentucky State Police. The descriptive data and a photo image of the child shall be stored in the Kentucky driver’s license information system and may be retrieved and used by public agencies subject to the provisions of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. sec. 2721 , and may also be used by the Kentucky missing persons clearinghouse.
  4. The fee for a child identification card shall be six dollars ($6), which shall be deposited into the KYTC photo license account established in KRS 174.056 .
  5. A child identification card shall expire every four (4) years on the child’s birthday. Within the time period that the child identification card is valid, the card may be updated with a new photograph and information. The fee for an updated card shall be six dollars ($6), with the fee distributed in the same manner as the fee for an initial card as described in subsection (5) of this section.
  6. If a parent or guardian complies with the requirements of KRS 186.403 and 186.419 , the parent or guardian may request that the child identification card issued to a minor child under this section be a voluntary travel ID identity document under KRS 186.403 .
  7. A child identification card issued under this section shall contain a denotation that either:
    1. The child identification card is a voluntary travel ID identity document that complies with the security standards set forth by Pub. L. No. 109-13, Title II, and may be used for identification for federal purposes; or
    2. The identity document shall not be used for federal identification purposes.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 100, § 8, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 10, effective March 27, 2020.

186.419. Additional documentation required for voluntary travel ID permit, license, or identification card — Administrative regulations — Proof of physical address and citizenship or immigration status.

  1. In addition to the information required under KRS 186.412 , 186.412 1, 186.4122 , and 186.4123 , an applicant for a voluntary travel ID instruction permit, operator’s license, or personal identification card under KRS 186.403 shall present two (2) of the following documents upon application or renewal that show the name and physical residential address of the applicant:
    1. Utility bill that is less than one (1) year old;
    2. Current lease or rental agreement;
    3. Bank statement that is less than one (1) year old;
    4. Mortgage statement;
    5. Telephone bill that is less than one (1) year old;
    6. Current insurance policy;
    7. State or federal tax return that is less than one (1) year old;
    8. Pay slip or salary statement that is less than one (1) year old;
    9. Record from an educational institution in Kentucky which establishes enrollment;
    10. Kentucky voter registration card that is less than one (1) year old;
    11. Current property tax bill;
    12. Current vehicle registration;
    13. Current operator’s license, instruction permit, or personal identification card;
    14. Postmarked mail that is less than one (1) year old;
    15. Internal Revenue Service form W-2 from the most recent tax year available; or
    16. Internal Revenue Service form 1099 from the most recent tax year available.
  2. Any of the documents described in subsection (1) of this section that contains the name of the spouse of the applicant, together with a certified copy of the applicant’s marriage license or marriage certificate, shall be considered acceptable documentation of proof of residence under subsection (1) of this section.
  3. The Transportation Cabinet may promulgate administrative regulations under KRS Chapter 13A to identify additional documentation that would satisfy the proof of residence requirement under this section.
  4. A Kentucky post office box address is not sufficient proof of physical address for purposes of this section.
  5. The cabinet may require additional proof of physical address if the cabinet questions the validity or authenticity of the proof of physical address submitted by the applicant.
  6. In addition to the information required under KRS 186.412 , 186.412 1, 186.4122 , and 186.4123 , an applicant for a voluntary travel ID instruction permit, operator’s license, or personal identification card under KRS 186.403 shall present valid documentary evidence that the applicant:
    1. Is a citizen or national of the United States;
    2. Is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent or temporary residence in the United States;
    3. Has conditional permanent resident status in the United States;
    4. Has an approved application for asylum in the United States or has entered into the United States in refugee status;
    5. Has a valid, unexpired nonimmigrant visa or nonimmigrant visa status for entry into the United States;
    6. Has a pending application for asylum in the United States;
    7. Has a pending or approved application for temporary protected status in the United States;
    8. Has approved deferred action status; or
    9. Has a pending application for adjustment of status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States or conditional permanent resident status in the United States.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 100, § 11, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 11, effective March 27, 2020.

186.420. Exemption of operators of road or farm machinery and persons in Armed Forces.

  1. No person need obtain an operator’s license to operate a road roller, road machinery or any tractor or implement of husbandry temporarily drawn or propelled on the highways.
  2. Every person in the service of the Army, Navy or Marine Corps of the United States, when furnished with an operator’s permit from the United States, shall be exempt from an operator’s license when operating an official vehicle in the course of his service.

History. 2739m-35: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 74; 1948, ch. 208, § 4; 1950, ch. 176, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Washington Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Burke, 258 S.W.2d 709, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 878 , 38 A.L.R.2d 861 ( Ky. 1953 ); Georgetown v. Morrison, 362 S.W.2d 289, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 256 ( Ky. 1962 ).

186.430. Exemptions from Kentucky operator’s license requirement.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (2) or (6) of this section, a person over the age of sixteen (16) who is a United States citizen and who is not a resident of Kentucky may drive in Kentucky for a period of time not to exceed one (1) year from the date the person enters Kentucky if:
    1. The person possesses a valid license issued by the person’s home state;
    2. The person has the license in his or her immediate possession at all times when operating a vehicle on the highways; and
    3. The person’s home state accords similar privileges to licensed residents of Kentucky.
  2. A person who is a United States citizen but who is not a resident of Kentucky who is enrolled as a full-time or part-time student at a university, college, or technical college located in Kentucky may drive in Kentucky on a valid license issued by the person’s state of domicile, and shall not be required to obtain a Kentucky operator’s license under this chapter if the person has a student identification card from a university, college, or technical college located in Kentucky in his or her immediate possession at all times when driving in Kentucky.
  3. A person over the age of sixteen (16) who is not a United States citizen and who is legally visiting this country for less than one (1) year may drive in Kentucky on a valid domestic license issued by the person’s country of domicile and shall not be required to obtain a Kentucky driver’s license.
  4. A person over the age of sixteen (16) who is not a United States citizen, who has not been granted status as a permanent resident of the United States, but is a resident of Kentucky, shall be issued a Kentucky operator’s license if the person complies with the requirements of KRS 186.4121 . The cabinet may at any time refuse or discontinue the exemptions authorized in this section for any grounds and may deny, cancel, suspend, or revoke an instruction permit or operator’s license issued under this chapter.
  5. A person whose operator’s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle, motorcycle, or moped in this state has been denied, withdrawn, canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided in KRS 186.400 to 186.640 shall not operate a motor vehicle, motorcycle, or moped in this state under a license, permit, or registration certificate issued by any other jurisdiction during the period of denial, withdrawal, cancellation, suspension, or revocation.
  6. The following persons may drive in Kentucky on a valid operator’s license issued by the person’s state or United States territory of domicile and shall not be required to obtain a Kentucky operator’s license under this chapter if the person is:
    1. A member of the Armed Forces of the United States stationed in Kentucky who maintains a home of record for military purposes outside of Kentucky;
    2. The member’s spouse; or
    3. The member’s child or stepchild who is sixteen (16) years of age or older and a dependent or under guardianship of the member.

History. 2739m-36: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 127, § 2; 1996, ch. 198, § 6, effective October 1, 1996; 2002, ch. 264, § 5, effective July 15, 2002; 2017 ch. 100, § 15, effective January 1, 2019; 2021 ch. 65, § 1, effective June 29, 2021.

Opinions of Attorney General.

An individual whose privilege of operating a motor vehicle in Kentucky is under suspension is prohibited from operating a vehicle in Kentucky notwithstanding he may hold a driver’s license issued by another state. OAG 65-334 .

An Indiana resident, under a valid instruction permit from Indiana, may take driver’s education training at a Kentucky high school. OAG 74-739 .

A person who operates a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state must have either a valid Kentucky operator’s license or a valid operator’s permit from another state; failure to possess either of the above mentioned operator’s licenses means that the person is in violation of KRS 186.620(2) if he operates a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state. OAG 83-67 .

If a nonresident who has no Kentucky driver’s license, has had his license suspended or revoked by the issuing state, he then has no right to drive a motor vehicle upon the highways of Kentucky. OAG 83-67 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Suspension for nonpayment of judgment — Exception, KRS 187.410 .

186.435. Application for operator’s license by driver who becomes Kentucky resident — Verification of status in other jurisdiction — Procedures for permanent residents — Application of driver who becomes Kentucky resident.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, a licensed driver who becomes a Kentucky resident shall, within thirty (30) days of establishing residency, apply for a Kentucky operator’s license to the Transportation Cabinet.
  2. The Transportation Cabinet shall, before issuing a person a Kentucky operator’s license, verify through the National Drivers Register that the person applying for a Kentucky operator’s license does not currently have his or her operator’s license or driving privilege suspended or revoked in another licensing jurisdiction.
  3. A person who is not a United States citizen but who has been granted permanent resident status by the United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, and who is a Kentucky resident, shall follow the same procedures for applying for an original, renewal, transfer, or duplicate operator’s license as persons who are United States citizens.
  4. A licensed driver from another jurisdiction who:
    1. Is not a United States citizen;
    2. Has not been granted permanent resident status by the United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services;
    3. Becomes a Kentucky resident; and
    4. Wishes to operate a motor vehicle;

shall, within thirty (30) days of establishing residency, apply for a Kentucky operator’s license under the provisions of KRS 186.4121 .

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 264, § 2, effective July 15, 2002; 2017 ch. 100, § 16, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 12, effective March 27, 2020.

186.440. Persons ineligible for operator’s license — Reinstatement fee.

An operator’s license shall not be granted to:

  1. Any person who is not a resident of Kentucky;
  2. Any person under the age of sixteen (16);
  3. Any person under the age of eighteen (18) who holds a valid Kentucky instruction permit issued pursuant to KRS 186.450 , but who has not graduated from high school or who is not enrolled and successfully participating in school or who is not being schooled at home, except those persons who satisfy the District Court of appropriate venue pursuant to KRS 159.051 (3) that revocation of their license would create an undue hardship. Persons under the age of eighteen (18) shall present proof of complying with the requirements of KRS 159.051 ;
  4. Any person whose operator’s license has been suspended, during the period of suspension, subject to the limitations of KRS 186.442 ;
  5. Any person whose operator’s license has been revoked, nor to any nonresident whose privilege of exemption under KRS 186.430 has been refused or discontinued, until the expiration of the period for which the license was revoked, or for which the privilege was refused or discontinued;
  6. Any applicant adjudged incompetent by judicial decree;
  7. Any person who in the opinion of the Department of Kentucky State Police, after examination, is unable to exercise reasonable and ordinary control over a motor vehicle upon the highways;
  8. Any person who is unable to understand highway warnings or direction signs in the English language;
  9. Any person required by KRS 186.480 to take an examination who has not successfully passed the examination;
  10. Any person required by KRS Chapter 187 to deposit proof of financial responsibility, who has not deposited that proof;
  11. Any person who has not filed a correct and complete application attested to in the presence of a person authorized to administer oaths;
  12. Any person who cannot meet the requirements set forth in KRS 186.411(1) or (3); or
  13. Any person whose operator’s license has been suspended or revoked under the provisions of KRS Chapter 186, 187, or 189A who has not paid the reinstatement fee required under KRS 186.531 .

History. 2739m-37: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 78, § 1; 1966, ch. 255, § 170; 1974, ch. 306, § 2; 1978, ch. 92, § 8, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 88, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1986, ch. 123, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1990, ch. 63, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 234, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 267, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 416, § 7, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 455, § 3, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 341, § 10, effective July 15, 1996; 1996, ch. 198, § 4, effective October 1, 1996; 1998, ch. 442, § 5, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 264, § 6, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 189, § 2, effective June 24, 2003; 2007, ch. 85, § 193, effective June 26, 2007; 2017 ch. 100, § 24, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 13, effective March 27, 2020.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/94). This section was amended by 1994 Ky. Acts chs. 267, 416, and 455. Where these Acts are not in conflict, they have been codified together. Where a conflict exists, Acts ch. 416, which was last enacted by the General Assembly, prevails under KRS 446.250 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

This section does not violate equal protection of the law on the theory that it treats driver’s license applicants with suspended out-of-state licenses differently from driver’s license applicants with suspended Kentucky licenses; this section is rationally related to the two legitimate purposes of protecting the public from drivers whose licenses have been suspended for DUI offenses and of preventing “license shopping” by nonresidents with suspended out-of-state licenses. Commonwealth Transp. Cabinet v. Hobson, 870 S.W.2d 228, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 158 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

2.Nonresident.

This section compels denial of a Kentucky license to a nonresident during such time as his license remains revoked in the issuing state; the word “nonresident” refers to the status of the driver at the time of revocation and that an individual who moves to Kentucky cannot successfully avoid the provisions of the statute by the simple expedient of changing his residence. Commonwealth Transp. Cabinet v. Hobson, 870 S.W.2d 228, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 158 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

3.Clearance Letter Requirement.

Failure to produce a clearance letter from another state which showed that the license issued to driver by that state was no longer suspended was sufficient grounds for this state’s refusal to issue an operator’s license under the provisions of this section and 601 KAR 12:020, even though the requirement of a clearance letter was the only one of several license reinstatement conditions the driver had not met. Transportation Cabinet v. Feige, 889 S.W.2d 52, 1994 Ky. App. LEXIS 147 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994).

Cited:

Ingram’s Adm’r v. Advance Motor Co., 283 Ky. 87 , 140 S.W.2d 840, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 300 ( Ky. 1940 ); Estes v. Gibson, 257 S.W.2d 604, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 802 , 36 A.L.R.2d 729 ( Ky. 1953 ); Scott v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 273 S.W.2d 350, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1154 ( Ky. 1954 ); Cruse v. Commonwealth, 712 S.W.2d 356, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1122 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Commonwealth v. Mullins, 812 S.W.2d 164, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 37 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991), rehearing denied, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 160 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth v. Howard, 969 S.W.2d 700, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 95 ( Ky. 1998 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A peace officer has authority to stop the operator of a motor bike for the purpose of determining whether or not the operator has the required license where it appears the operator is under the age of 16. OAG 65-354 .

Since a person under 16 cannot obtain a license to operate a motor vehicle, if a person sells a car to a person under 16 knowingly, then such seller could be prosecuted for causing the juvenile to be charged with a crime. OAG 67-360 .

Operation of a motor vehicle in disregard of valid restrictions on a motor vehicle operator’s license is operation without a license in violation of KRS 186.410 for which a person may be convicted and fined or imprisoned or both pursuant to KRS 186.990(3), and for which a peace officer may issue a citation if the offense is committed in his presence. OAG 67-530 .

Juvenile offenders sixteen years of age or older charged with operating a motorcycle without an operator’s license must, in view of KRS 208.020 (now repealed), be proceeded against as adult offenders and the juvenile court has no jurisdiction in such cases, but juvenile offenders under sixteen years of age in such cases must be proceeded against in juvenile court. OAG 75-563 .

The lawful minimum age of a moped operator is 16. OAG 84-176 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Minors, § 30.17.

186.442. Suspension or revocation of license or driving privileges in another jurisdiction — Persons eligible for restricted license — Application and supporting documents — Issuance of license valid only in Kentucky — Removal of restrictions — Inapplicability to commercial driver’s license.

  1. The Transportation Cabinet shall, before issuing or renewing a Kentucky operator’s license, verify through the National Drivers Register that the person applying for an initial or renewal Kentucky operator’s license does not currently have his or her operator’s license or driving privilege suspended or revoked in another licensing jurisdiction.
  2. If the person’s operator’s license or driving privilege is currently suspended or revoked in another licensing jurisdiction for a traffic offense where the conviction for the offense is less than five (5) years old, the Transportation Cabinet shall not issue the person an initial or renewal Kentucky operator’s license until the person resolves the matter in the other licensing jurisdiction and complies with the provisions of this chapter.
  3. A person whose operator’s license has been suspended or revoked in another licensing jurisdiction, or the holder of a Kentucky operator’s license whose driving privileges have been suspended in another licensing jurisdiction, may be issued a Kentucky license, or may renew a Kentucky license if:
    1. The conviction causing the suspension or revocation is more than five (5) years old;
    2. The conviction is for a traffic offense other than a felony traffic offense or a habitual violator offense; and
    3. The person has been a resident of the Commonwealth for at least five (5) years prior to the date of application for issuance or renewal.
    1. A person applying for an operator’s license under subsection (3) of this section shall submit an application to the cabinet, who shall electronically scan the application and supporting documents, along with a photograph of the applicant captured in accordance with KRS 186.4102(1), into the cabinet database. (4) (a) A person applying for an operator’s license under subsection (3) of this section shall submit an application to the cabinet, who shall electronically scan the application and supporting documents, along with a photograph of the applicant captured in accordance with KRS 186.4102(1), into the cabinet database.
    2. The cabinet shall review the person’s documentation, including the person’s photograph, in the cabinet database. If the documentation is verified as accurate, and if the person successfully completes any examinations required under KRS 186.480 and pays the reinstatement fee required under KRS 186.531 , the cabinet shall present the applicant with a temporary operator’s license, which shall be valid for thirty (30) days, until a permanent operator’s license is mailed to the applicant by the Transportation Cabinet.
  4. A person issued a Kentucky operator’s license in accordance with subsection (3) of this section shall be issued an operator’s license marked “Valid in Kentucky Only” and shall sign a statement that the person understands that he or she may be subject to arrest and detention if stopped by a law enforcement officer in another state while operating a motor vehicle on this restricted license.
  5. If a person granted a license under subsection (3) of this section satisfies the requirements to have the suspension or revocation in another state lifted, the person shall apply to the cabinet to be issued a new license without the restrictions outlined in subsection (3) of this section.
  6. The provisions of subsection (3) of this section shall not apply to a commercial driver’s license.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 189, § 1, effective June 24, 2003; 2017 ch. 100, § 17, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 14, effective March 27, 2020.

186.444. Medical review board — Purpose — Members — Informal hearing — Authority of cabinet to promulgate administrative regulations — Prohibition against age-based licensing limitations — Appeal.

  1. The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations to establish a medical review board. The purpose of the medical review board shall be to receive cases relating to the ability of an applicant or holder of a motor vehicle operator’s license to drive due to physical or mental disability which may affect or limit a person’s ability to safely operate a motor vehicle.
  2. The secretary shall appoint any number of physicians licensed in the Commonwealth to the medical review board. Not less than three (3) members shall be present in order to conduct an informal hearing. Each member shall receive two hundred dollars ($200) per day for attending meetings of the board and shall be reimbursed for necessary expenses incurred in attending meetings.
  3. The cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations regarding the procedures of the medical review board in conducting informal hearings.
  4. The cabinet shall not promulgate administrative regulations for the purpose of creating tests or other criteria that might limit a person’s ability to obtain or retain an operator’s license because that person may be considered too old to drive.
  5. Any person aggrieved by a decision made as a result of an informal hearing conducted under authority of KRS 186.411 and this section may appeal, and upon appeal an administrative hearing shall be conducted in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 455, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 318, § 71, effective July 15, 1996; 2020 ch. 51, § 15, effective March 27, 2020.

186.445. License for child to operate motor vehicle of not more than five horsepower. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 198) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 60.

186.447. Motorcycle operator's license restriction — Three-wheeled motorcycles.

The Transportation Cabinet shall establish a restriction on motorcycle operator’s licenses which limits the operator to the operation of a three (3) wheeled motorcycle only.

HISTORY: 2021 ch. 188, § 1, effective June 29, 2021.

186.450. Instruction permits for motor vehicle and motorcycle — Application — Age requirements — Restrictions on driving with permit — Administrative regulations — Minors and adults who assume responsibility for them.

  1. A person who is at least sixteen (16) years of age may apply for an instruction permit to operate a motor vehicle. A person who possesses a valid intermediate motor vehicle operator’s license issued under KRS 186.452 or a person who is at least eighteen (18) years of age may apply for an instruction permit to operate a motorcycle. A holder of either a motor vehicle or motorcycle instruction permit may also operate a moped under that permit. A person applying for an instruction permit under this section shall make application to the Transportation Cabinet. A person applying for an instruction permit shall be required to comply with the following:
    1. If the person is under the age of eighteen (18), the instruction permit application shall be signed by the applicant’s parent or legal guardian. If the person does not have a living parent or does not have a legal guardian, the instruction permit application shall be signed by a person willing to assume responsibility for the applicant pursuant to KRS 186.590 ;
    2. If the person is under the age of eighteen (18) and in the custody of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, the instruction permit application shall be signed by:
      1. The applicant’s parent, legal guardian, grandparent, adult sibling, aunt, or uncle if the parental rights have not been terminated in accordance with KRS Chapter 625;
      2. The foster parent with whom the applicant resides;
      3. Another person who is at least age eighteen (18) and is willing to assume responsibility for the applicant pursuant to KRS 186.590 ; or
      4. The applicant, without another person, upon verification by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services in accordance with KRS 605.102 that shall include proof of financial responsibility in accordance with KRS 186.590(2); and
    3. All applicants for an instruction permit shall comply with the examinations required by KRS 186.480 .
  2. If an applicant successfully passes the examinations required by KRS 186.480 , the applicant shall be issued an instruction permit upon payment of the fee set forth in KRS 186.531 .
    1. An instruction permit to operate a motor vehicle shall be valid for three (3) years and may be renewed. An instruction permit to operate a motorcycle shall be valid for one (1) year and may be renewed one (1) time. (3) (a) An instruction permit to operate a motor vehicle shall be valid for three (3) years and may be renewed. An instruction permit to operate a motorcycle shall be valid for one (1) year and may be renewed one (1) time.
    2. Except as provided in KRS 186.415 , a person who has attained the age of sixteen (16) years and is under the age of eighteen (18) years shall have the instruction permit a minimum of one hundred eighty (180) days before applying for an intermediate license and shall have an intermediate license for a minimum of one hundred eighty (180) days before applying for an operator’s license.
    3. A person who was under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of application for an instruction permit and is eighteen (18) years of age or older shall have the instruction permit a minimum of one hundred eighty (180) days and complete a driver training program under KRS 186.410(4) before applying for an operator’s license.
    4. A person who is at least eighteen (18) years of age and is under the age of twenty-one (21) years at the time of application for an instruction permit shall have the instruction permit a minimum of one hundred eighty (180) days before applying for an operator’s license.
    5. A person who is at least twenty-one (21) years of age at the time of application for an instruction permit shall have the instruction permit a minimum of thirty (30) days before applying for an operator’s license.
    6. In accordance with KRS 176.5062(5), a person whose motorcycle instruction permit has expired may apply to the cabinet to receive a motorcycle operator’s license or endorsement if the person presents proof of successful completion of a motorcycle safety education course approved by the Transportation Cabinet under KRS 176.5061 to 176.5069 .
    1. A person shall have the instruction permit in his possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle, motorcycle, or moped upon the highway. (4) (a) A person shall have the instruction permit in his possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle, motorcycle, or moped upon the highway.
    2. When operating a motor vehicle, a motor vehicle instruction permit holder shall be accompanied by a person with a valid operator’s license who is at least twenty-one (21) years of age occupying the seat beside the operator at all times.
    3. The requirements of paragraph (b) of this subsection shall not apply to a motor vehicle instruction permit holder being supervised on a multiple-vehicle driving range by a driver training instructor affiliated with a driver training school licensed under KRS Chapter 332 or a public or nonpublic secondary school.
  3. A person with an instruction permit who is under the age of eighteen (18) shall not operate a motor vehicle, motorcycle, or moped between the hours of 12 midnight and 6 a.m. unless the person can demonstrate good cause for driving, including but not limited to emergencies, involvement in school-related activities, or involvement in work-related activities.
  4. Except when accompanied by a driver training instructor affiliated with a driver training school licensed under KRS Chapter 332 or a public or nonpublic secondary school, a person with an instruction permit who is under the age of eighteen (18) years shall not operate a motor vehicle at any time when accompanied by more than one (1) unrelated person who is under the age of twenty (20) years. A peace officer shall not stop or seize a person nor issue a uniform citation for a violation of this subsection if the officer has no other cause to stop or seize the person other than a violation of this subsection. This subsection shall not apply to any operator of a vehicle registered under the provisions of KRS 186.050(4) who is engaged in agricultural activities.
  5. A violation under subsection (4), (5), or (6) of this section, a conviction for a moving violation under KRS Chapter 189 for which points are assessed by the cabinet, or a conviction for a violation of KRS 189A.010(1) shall add an additional minimum of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the violation before a person who is under the age of eighteen (18) years may apply for an intermediate license to operate a motor vehicle, motorcycle, or moped.
  6. A person under the age of eighteen (18) who accumulates more than six (6) points against his driving privilege may have the driving privilege suspended pursuant to KRS Chapter 186 or probated by the court.
  7. The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations, in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A, to establish procedures for:
    1. Minors who reside with individuals in informal guardianship arrangements to have an adult who resides with them sign the minor’s application and assume responsibility in accordance with subsection (1) of this section;
    2. Individuals who have signed for responsibility under subsection (1) of this section to rescind that assumption of responsibility;
    3. Notifying minors when an adult has rescinded responsibility under subsection (1) of this section; and
    4. Allowing minors for whom an adult has rescinded responsibility under subsection (1) of this section, to obtain a new signature of an individual assuming responsibility without having to retake any examinations the minor has successfully passed.

History. 2739m-39: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 127, § 3; 1958, ch. 60, § 4; 1970, ch. 22, § 3; 1978, ch. 349, § 5, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 266, § 4, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 99, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 123, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1990, ch. 234, § 3, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 503, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 198, § 2, effective October 1, 1996; 1998, ch. 52, § 2, effective March 16, 1998; 2001, ch. 43, § 1, effective June 21, 2001; 2006, ch. 65, § 1, effective July 12, 2006; 2009, ch. 46, § 3, effective June 25, 2009; 2012, ch. 16, § 1, effective July 12, 2012; 2012, ch. 79, § 1, effective July 12, 2012; 2017 ch. 11, § 1, effective June 29, 2017; 2017 ch. 100, § 18, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 16, effective March 27, 2020; 2021 ch. 190, § 10, § 17, effective June 29, 2021.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(6/29/2021). This statute was amended by 2021 Ky. Acts ch. 190, secs. 10 and 17, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

(7/12/2006). 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 65, sec, 9, provides: “The amendments to Section 1 of this Act (this statute) shall apply to any person who obtains an original or renewal instruction permit pursuant to KRS 186.450 on or after October 1, 2006.”

Opinions of Attorney General.

It would seem that the intention of this section is not being fulfilled where the licensed driver is intoxicated at the time he is in the car with a driver operating with an instruction permit. OAG 72-238 .

An Indiana resident, under a valid instruction permit from Indiana, may take driver’s education training at a Kentucky high school. OAG 74-739 .

The requirements of Acts 1990, ch. 234 (KRS 159.051 , 186.470 and this section) that applicants for driving permits and operator’s licenses who are under the age of 18 and who have not graduated from high school provide proof that they are currently enrolled or have been enrolled in the prior semester of school may be implemented immediately if it is limited to requiring the applicants to provide this proof based only on whether the applicants have withdrawn from school; requiring the applicants to provide proof of enrollment based on whether the applicants have “dropped out” of school as defined in Section 1(1) of the Act (KRS 159.051 ) should not be implemented immediately, because such immediate implementation would cause the Act to be applied retroactively without statutory authorization. In addition, the Act’s requirement that these applicants provide proof that they are not or have not been found academically deficient should not be implemented immediately, because such immediate implementation would cause the Act to be applied retroactively without statutory authorization; those requirements of the Act which will not be implemented immediately should be implemented at any future date in which the “preceding semester” referred to in the Act will have occurred after July 13, 1990. OAG 90-54 .

186.452. Intermediate license to operate a motor vehicle.

  1. Except as provided in KRS 186.415 , a person who is under eighteen (18) years of age may apply for an intermediate license to operate a motor vehicle if the person has:
    1. Held an instruction permit a minimum of one hundred eighty (180) days without a violation under KRS 186.450(4), (5), or (6), a conviction for a violation of KRS 189.292 or 189.294 , a conviction for a moving violation under KRS Chapter 189 for which points are assessed by the cabinet, or a conviction for a violation of KRS 189A.010(1); and
    2. Presented a statement to the Department of Kentucky State Police signed by a parent or guardian of the applicant attesting that the applicant has completed at least sixty (60) hours of supervised driving experience, including at least ten (10) hours at night, while accompanied by a person who has attained the age of twenty-one (21) years and holds a valid operator’s license occupying the seat beside the applicant.
  2. If an applicant for an intermediate license successfully completes the examinations required under KRS 186.480 , the Department of Kentucky State Police shall affix an intermediate license sticker to the instruction permit and report the applicant’s new status to the Transportation Cabinet. The Transportation Cabinet shall update the information in its computer system to reflect that the applicant has been granted an intermediate license. An intermediate license shall be valid for two (2) years and may be renewed.
  3. A person shall have the intermediate license in his or her possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle.
  4. A person with an intermediate license who is under the age of eighteen (18) years shall not operate a motor vehicle, motorcycle, or moped between the hours of 12 midnight and 6 a.m. unless the person can demonstrate good cause for driving, including emergencies, involvement in school-related activities, or involvement in work-related activities.
  5. Except when accompanied by a driver training instructor affiliated with a driver training school licensed under KRS Chapter 332 or a public or nonpublic secondary school, a person with an intermediate license who is under the age of eighteen (18) years shall not operate a motor vehicle at any time when accompanied by more than one (1) unrelated person who is under the age of twenty (20) years. A peace officer shall not stop or seize a person nor issue a uniform citation for a violation of this subsection if the officer has no other cause to stop or seize the person other than a violation of this subsection. This subsection shall not apply to any operator of a vehicle registered under the provisions of KRS 186.050(4) who is engaged in agricultural activities.
  6. A violation under subsection (3), (4), or (5) of this section, a conviction for a moving violation under KRS Chapter 189 for which points are assessed by the cabinet, or a conviction for a violation of KRS 189A.010(1) shall add an additional minimum of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the violation before a person who is under the age of eighteen (18) years may apply for an operator’s license.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 65, § 2, effective July 12, 2006; 2007, ch. 85, § 194, effective June 26, 2007; 2009, ch. 46, § 4, effective June 25, 2009; 2010, ch. 110, § 5, effective July 15, 2010.

186.454. Intermediate license holder application process.

  1. Except as provided in KRS 186.415 , a person with an intermediate license who is under the age of eighteen (18) years may apply for an operator’s license to operate a motor vehicle if the person has:
    1. Held an intermediate license for a minimum of one hundred eighty (180) days without a conviction for a moving violation under KRS Chapter 189 for which points are assessed by the cabinet, a conviction for a violation of KRS 189.292 or 189.294 , a conviction for a violation of KRS 189A.010(1), or a conviction under KRS 186.452(3), (4), or (5); and
    2. Completed a driver training program under KRS 186.410(4).
  2. A person with an intermediate license who is eighteen (18) years of age or older may apply for an operator’s license to operate a motor vehicle if the person has completed a driver training program under KRS 186.410(4).

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 65, § 3, effective July 12, 2006; 2009, ch. 46, § 5, effective June 25, 2009; 2010, ch. 110, § 6, effective July 15, 2010.

186.455. Circuit clerk’s fees for preparing and acknowledging applications for driver’s instruction permit. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 139) was repealed by Acts 1958, ch. 60, § 10.

186.460. Application for operator’s license or instruction permit — Renewal of license. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739m-40, 2739m-52, 2739m-70: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 68, § 1; 1946, ch. 127, § 4; 1948, ch. 208, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1958, ch. 60, § 10.

186.470. Application of minor — Renewal of minor’s license or permit — Consent to release of academic information to cabinet — Cancellation.

    1. Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subsection, the application of any minor under the age of eighteen (18) for an operator’s license, motorcycle operator’s license, intermediate license, or any instruction permit shall not be granted unless the application is signed by a parent or legal guardian of the applicant. Regardless of which parent signs the application, both parents shall be responsible as provided in KRS 186.590 . (1) (a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subsection, the application of any minor under the age of eighteen (18) for an operator’s license, motorcycle operator’s license, intermediate license, or any instruction permit shall not be granted unless the application is signed by a parent or legal guardian of the applicant. Regardless of which parent signs the application, both parents shall be responsible as provided in KRS 186.590 .
    2. The application of a minor who is under the age of eighteen (18) and in the custody of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services shall be signed by:
      1. The applicant’s parent, legal guardian, grandparent, adult sibling, aunt, or uncle if the parental rights have not been terminated in accordance with KRS Chapter 625;
      2. The foster parent with whom the applicant resides;
      3. Another person who is at least age eighteen (18) and is willing to assume responsibility for the applicant pursuant to KRS 186.590; or
      4. The applicant, without another person, upon verification by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services in accordance with KRS 605.102 that shall include proof of financial responsibility in accordance with KRS 186.590(2).
    3. If the minor does not have a father, mother, or guardian, and has not applied under paragraph (b) of this subsection, an operator’s license, intermediate license, or instruction permit shall not be granted to the minor unless his or her application is signed by a person willing to assume the obligation imposed by KRS 186.590 upon a person signing the application of a minor.
    4. A signature shall not be required in the case of the renewal of a minor’s license but the signature on the original application shall continue to make the parent, guardian, or other person liable under the provisions of KRS 186.590 on all renewals of the minor’s license until he or she reaches the age of eighteen (18) unless the license, or any renewal thereof, is canceled as provided in subsection (3) of this section.
  1. The application shall include parental consent or the minor’s consent for the receipt and release of the information as set forth in KRS 159.051 regarding the attendance and academic requirements for a minor to acquire and keep an operator’s license, intermediate license, instructional permit, or privilege to operate a motor vehicle.
    1. A parent or a guardian of a minor applicant, or a person who signed for a minor applicant under subsection (1)(b) or (c) of this section, may file with the cabinet a verified written request that the license of the minor be canceled. A minor’s foster parent shall share a request made in accordance with this paragraph with the Cabinet for Health and Family Services. (3) (a) A parent or a guardian of a minor applicant, or a person who signed for a minor applicant under subsection (1)(b) or (c) of this section, may file with the cabinet a verified written request that the license of the minor be canceled. A minor’s foster parent shall share a request made in accordance with this paragraph with the Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
    2. A representative of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services may file with the cabinet a verified written request that the license of a minor child in the custody of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services be canceled.
    3. Upon the filing of a request under paragraph (a) or (b) of this subsection, the license of the minor shall be canceled and any person who signed the application shall be relieved as to subsequent acts of the minor from the liability imposed by subsection (1) of KRS 186.590 .
  2. Upon receipt of satisfactory evidence of the death of the person who signed the application of a minor for a license, the cabinet shall have the license canceled and no new license shall be issued to the minor until a new application, signed and verified, is made as required by this section.

HISTORY: 2739m-41: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 127, § 5; 1970, ch. 22, § 4; 1974, ch. 286, § 1; 1974, ch. 386, § 33; 1990, ch. 234, § 4, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 503, § 3, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 198, § 7, effective October 1, 1996; 2006, ch. 65, § 5, effective July 12, 2006; 2007, ch. 36, § 2, effective June 26, 2007; 2017 ch. 11, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

Where mother, who tendered her son’s driver’s license application, challenged constitutionality of requirement that male parent must sign the application, court found the statute to be reasonable in its classification preferring the father, citing both the overriding state interest as opposed to the minimal interest of the plaintiff and protection of a victim of the minor’s negligence from an insolvent defendant. Ogren v. Miller, 373 F. Supp. 980, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10961 (W.D. Ky. 1973 ). See Johnston v. Hodges, 372 F. Supp. 1015, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9341 (E.D. Ky. 1974 ).

This section, which contains a mandatory preference for a male parent over a female parent in sponsoring a minor for a driver’s license, is unconstitutional as it erects an arbitrary classification not justified by a compelling state interest. Johnston v. Hodges, 372 F. Supp. 1015, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9341 (E.D. Ky. 1974 ). See Ogren v. Miller, 373 F. Supp. 980, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10961 (W.D. Ky. 1973 ).

2.Liability of Signer for Minor’s License.

Where father signed application for operator’s license for a minor under this section, the one year statute of limitation for personal injuries (KRS 413.140 ) rather than the five year statute upon a liability created by statute (KRS 413.120 ) was applicable to an action for negligence imputed to the father under KRS 186.590 . Robinson v. Hardaway, 293 Ky. 627 , 169 S.W.2d 823, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 675 ( Ky. 1943 ).

In an action to recover damages for the death of a 12-year-old son who was not negligent while a passenger in an automobile driven by his 17-year-old brother whose application for operator’s license had been signed by the father in accordance with this section, the contributory negligence imputed to the father under KRS 186.590 applied only to the 17-year-old driver whose application he had signed and not to the passenger son so as to bar recovery for his death. Sizemore v. Bailey's Adm'r, 293 S.W.2d 165, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 55 ( Ky. 1956 ).

It was conceded that father who signed operator’s license of infant owner under this section was not liable under KRS 186.590 where minor son gave a 16-year-old girl and a 14-year-old girl permission to use his automobile and the 14-year-old who was a passenger while the 16-year-old girl was driving knew that this girl was an unlicensed and inexperienced driver. Cambron v. Bartlett, 333 S.W.2d 764, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 206 ( Ky. 1960 ).

The liability imposed by subsection (1) of KRS 186.590 on persons signing minors’ license applications may be extinguished by compliance with subsection (2) of that statute and where the trial judge specifically determined that this requirement had been satisfied as it had been shown that minor was covered by insurance and had the ability to respond in damages, trial court properly dismissed suit arising from minor’s negligent use of car as to minor’s father who had signed minor’s license application. Beardon v. Derry, 645 S.W.2d 356, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 276 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

Cited:

Finck v. Albers Super Markets, Inc., 136 F.2d 191, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 2994 (6th Cir. 1943); Estes v. Gibson, 257 S.W.2d 604, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 802 , 36 A.L.R.2d 729 ( Ky. 1953 ); Bryan v. Bear, 560 S.W.2d 827, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 886 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinions of Attorney General.

An operator’s license issued to a minor should be canceled where the parent required to sign for the minor rescinds his request or renounces his assumption of liability but where evidence of the minor’s financial responsibility remains in the file. OAG 65-840 .

A married minor is subject to the provisions of this section. OAG 68-515 .

Under subsection (1) of this section, the signature of a minor’s mother, who is her custodian and guardian by virtue of a divorce decree, is required even though the mother has not seen the child for over 13 years. OAG 69-182 .

A minor who has a living father or mother or legal guardian cannot get an operator’s license or a learner’s permit by having an adult sign his application who is neither his father, mother nor legal guardian. OAG 80-249 .

The custody of and responsibility for a divorced minor does not revert to the parents since the parents no longer have parental control, however, the emancipation by marriage of a minor does not remove the disabilities of infancy, thus a divorced minor who wishes to apply for an operator’s license will have to get some adult, other than the father or mother, to sign the application as provided in this section, if neither parent will sign. OAG 80-430 .

Where a minor under the age of 18 applied for a motor vehicle operator’s license, and the minor’s father was deceased, his mother had been adjudged mentally incompetent, and he had no legally appointed guardian, the minor’s older brother, who was an adult, could sign the application for the minor as long as the adult brother was willing to assume the responsibilities imposed by KRS 186.590 . OAG 84-220 .

The requirements of Acts 1990, ch. 234 (KRS 159.051 , 186.450 and this section) that applicants for driving permits and operator’s licenses who are under the age of 18 and who have not graduated from high school provide proof that they are currently enrolled or have been enrolled in the prior semester of school may be implemented immediately if it is limited to requiring the applicants to provide this proof based only on whether the applicants have withdrawn from school; requiring the applicants to provide proof of enrollment based on whether the applicants have “dropped out” of school as defined in Section 1(1) of the Act (KRS 159.051 ) should not be implemented immediately, because such immediate implementation would cause the Act to be applied retroactively without statutory authorization. In addition, the Act’s requirement that these applicants provide proof that they are not or have not been found academically deficient should not be implemented immediately, because such immediate implementation would cause the Act to be applied retroactively without statutory authorization; those requirements of the Act which will not be implemented immediately should be implemented at any future date in which the “preceding semester” referred to in the Act will have occurred after July 13, 1990. OAG 90-54 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Automobiles/No Fault/Uninsured Motorist, § 135.00.

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Automobiles, § 16.56.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Minors, § 30.17.

186.480. Examination of applicants by Department of Kentucky State Police — Exemptions. [Effective until July 1, 2024]

  1. The Department of Kentucky State Police shall examine every applicant for an operator’s license as identified in KRS 186.635 , except as otherwise provided in this section. The examination shall be held in the county where the applicant resides unless:
    1. The applicant is granted written permission by the Transportation Cabinet to take the examination in another county, and the Department of Kentucky State Police agree to arrange for the examination in the other county; or
    2. The applicant is tested using a bioptic telescopic device.
  2. The examination shall include a test of the applicant’s eyesight to ensure compliance with the visual acuity standards set forth in KRS 186.577 . The examination shall also include a test of the applicant’s ability to read and understand highway signs regulating, warning, and directing traffic, the applicant’s knowledge of traffic laws, and an actual demonstration of the applicant’s ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable control in the operation of a motor vehicle. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to an applicant who:
    1. At the time of application, holds a valid operator’s license from another state, provided that state affords a reciprocal exemption to a Kentucky resident; or
    2. Is a citizen of the Commonwealth who has been serving in the United States military and has allowed his or her operator’s license to expire.
  3. In addition to the requirements of subsection (2) of this section, an applicant for a motorcycle operator’s license shall be required to show his or her ability to operate a motorcycle. An applicant who successfully completes the skills portion of the test under this subsection on a:
    1. Three (3) wheeled motorcycle shall be issued a motorcycle operator’s license restricted to the operation of three (3) wheeled motorcycles under KRS 186.447 ; or
    2. Two (2) wheeled motorcycle shall be issued a motorcycle operator’s license without the restriction identified in KRS 186.447 , and may operate both two (2) and three (3) wheeled motorcycles.
  4. Any person whose intermediate license or operator’s license is denied, suspended, or revoked for cause shall apply for reinstatement at the termination of the period for which the license was denied, suspended, or revoked by submitting to the examination. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any person whose license was suspended for failure to meet the conditions described in KRS 186.411 when, within one (1) year of suspension, the driving privileges of such individuals are reinstated.
  5. An applicant shall not use an autocycle for any road skills testing administered under the provisions of this section.

History. 2739m-33, 2739m-67: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 208, § 6; 1968, ch. 63, § 8; 1970, ch. 22, § 5; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 36, § 6; 1986, ch. 122, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 123, § 3, effective July 15, 1986; 1994, ch. 86, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 396, § 5, effective January 1, 2001; 2002, ch. 264, § 9, effective July 15, 2002; 2006, ch. 65, § 6, effective July 12, 2006; 2007, ch. 85, § 195, effective June 26, 2007; 2017 ch. 69, § 3, effective June 29, 2017; 2017 ch. 100, § 37, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 17, effective March 27, 2020; 2021 ch. 188, § 2, effective June 29, 2021.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Experienced Driver.

An instruction that a 16-year-old operator was contributorily negligent on the sole basis that he was an inexperienced driver because he had obtained his license only a week or ten days prior to the accident was unwarranted where he had demonstrated his ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable control in the operation of a motor vehicle to the satisfaction of the state police who examined him before he received his operator’s license. Davidson v. Davern, 385 S.W.2d 44, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 110 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The driving test cannot be given to a person between the ages of 16 and 18 without the person producing a birth certificate. OAG 65-93 .

Operation of a motor vehicle in disregard of valid restrictions on a motor vehicle operator’s license is operation without a license in violation of KRS 186.410 for which a person may be convicted and fined or imprisoned or both pursuant to KRS 186.990(3), and for which a peace officer may issue a citation if the offense is committed in his presence. OAG 67-530 .

186.480. Examination of applicants by Department of Kentucky State Police — Vision test to be administered in compliance with KRS 186.577 — Exemptions for certain applicants — Road skills test required for motorcycle operator’s license. [Effective July 1, 2024]

  1. The Department of Kentucky State Police shall examine every applicant for an operator’s license as identified in KRS 186.635 , except as otherwise provided in this section. The examination shall be held in the county where the applicant resides unless:
    1. The applicant is granted written permission by the Transportation Cabinet to take the examination in another county; or
    2. The applicant is tested using a bioptic telescopic device.
  2. The examination shall include a test of the applicant’s eyesight to ensure compliance with the visual acuity and visual field standards set forth in KRS 186.577 . The vision testing outlined in this subsection shall be administered under the provisions established in KRS 186.577 at, or prior to, the time of application. The examination shall also include a test of the applicant’s ability to read and understand highway signs regulating, warning, and directing traffic, the applicant’s knowledge of traffic laws, and an actual demonstration of the applicant’s ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable control in the operation of a motor vehicle. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to an applicant who:
    1. At the time of application, holds a valid operator’s license from another state, provided that state affords a reciprocal exemption to a Kentucky resident; or
    2. Is a citizen of the Commonwealth who has been serving in the United States military and has allowed his or her operator’s license to expire.
  3. In addition to the requirements of subsection (2) of this section, an applicant for a motorcycle operator’s license shall be required to show his or her ability to operate a motorcycle. An applicant who successfully completes the skills portion of the test under this subsection on a:
    1. Three (3) wheeled motorcycle shall be issued a motorcycle operator’s license restricted to the operation of three (3) wheeled motorcycles under KRS 186.447 ; or
    2. Two (2) wheeled motorcycle shall be issued a motorcycle operator’s license without the restriction identified in KRS 186.447 , and may operate both two (2) and three (3) wheeled motorcycles.
  4. Any person whose intermediate license or operator’s license is denied, suspended, or revoked for cause shall apply for reinstatement at the termination of the period for which the license was denied, suspended, or revoked by submitting to the examination. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any person whose license was suspended for failure to meet the conditions described in KRS 186.411 when, within one (1) year of suspension, the driving privileges of such individuals are reinstated.
  5. An applicant shall not use an autocycle for any road skills testing administered under the provisions of this section.

HISTORY: 2739m-33, 2739m-67: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 208, § 6; 1968, ch. 63, § 8; 1970, ch. 22, § 5; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 36, § 6; 1986, ch. 122, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 123, § 3, effective July 15, 1986; 1994, ch. 86, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 396, § 5, effective January 1, 2001; 2002, ch. 264, § 9, effective July 15, 2002; 2006, ch. 65, § 6, effective July 12, 2006; 2007, ch. 85, § 195, effective June 26, 2007; 2017 ch. 69, § 3, effective June 29, 2017; 2017 ch. 100, § 37, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 17, effective March 27, 2020; 2021 ch. 188, § 2, effective June 29, 2021; 2021 ch. 126, § 2, effective July 1, 2024.

186.490. Duties of the circuit clerk — Issuing offices to close by June 30, 2020.

  1. The circuit clerk of each county shall continue to issue standard identity documents until the cabinet determines that a cabinet regional office can assume those duties. All circuit clerk issuing offices shall be closed by June 30, 2022.
  2. The circuit clerk of each county that operates an office that issues standard identity credentials shall:
    1. Comply with all rules and regulations issued by the cabinet under KRS 186.400 relating to his or her duties;
    2. Act for the cabinet for the purpose of issuing temporary operator’s licenses, instruction permits, and personal identification cards;
    3. Administer the oath required by KRS 186.412 and 186.4122 to the applicant without fee;
    4. Report and remit monthly to the state all moneys collected during the preceding month and remit a copy of all applications taken by him during the same period to the Transportation Cabinet. Upon failure of any clerk to report and remit therefor more than seven (7) days after the due date, he shall pay, in addition to the amount due, a penalty of ten percent (10%) of the amount due. Penalties collected under this section shall be paid into the State Treasury as a p art of the revenue collected under KRS 186.531 ; and
    5. Keep adequate records of all moneys collected and remitted to the state.

History. 2739m-42, 2739m-44, 2739m-70: amend. Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 7, Art. X, § 12; 1958, ch. 60, § 5; 1968, ch. 63, § 4; 1970, ch. 22, § 6; 1980, ch. 188, § 309, effective July 15, 1980; 1998, ch. 367, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2017 ch. 100, § 19, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 18, effective March 27, 2020.

186.495. Alphabetical index of operators’ licenses. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 79, § 2; 1968, ch. 63, § 5; 1970, ch. 22, § 7; 2007, ch. 85, § 196, effective June 26, 2007; repealed by 2017 ch. 100, § 39, effective January 1, 2019.

186.500. Content of license certificate. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739m-44, Acts 1944, ch. 68, § 2; 1948, ch. 208, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1958, ch. 60, § 10.

186.510. License to be in possession and to be shown on demand.

The licensee shall have his or her license in his or her immediate possession at all times when driving a motor vehicle and shall display it upon demand to the circuit clerk or examiner, a peace officer, a member of the Department of Kentucky State Police, or a field deputy or inspector of the Department of Vehicle Regulation or Transportation Cabinet or, pursuant to KRS 67A.075 or 83A.088 , a safety officer who is in the process of securing information to complete an accident report. It shall be a defense to any charge under this section if the person so charged produces in court an operator’s license, issued to him or her before his or her arrest and valid at the time of his or her arrest.

History. 2739m-46: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 127, § 6; 1966, ch. 255, § 171; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(2), (9); 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 174, effective January 2, 1978; 1994, ch. 110, § 3, effective July 15, 1994; 2007, ch. 85, § 197, effective June 26, 2007.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Roadblock for Display of License.

The practice of setting up a roadblock for motor vehicles for the purpose of requiring the driver to display an operator’s license is not an arrest or illegal restraint or search nor can it be regarded as exercising arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of free men which power is denied by Ky. Const., § 2, therefore evidence obtained entirely and solely by such procedure that driver did not have or display a driver’s license is admissible in prosecution for driving without a license. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 83 ( Ky. 1962 ).

2.Production of License.

The state police are empowered to demand, without other justification, the production of a valid driver’s license of any driver. United States v. Cupps, 503 F.2d 277, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 6754 (6th Cir. Ky. 1974 ).

3.Search after Production of License.

State police exceeded their authority when, after stopping accused’s automobile, requesting and receiving a valid driver’s license, they ordered the accused from the automobile and then found a firearm which was not in sight while accused was in the automobile since they had no probable cause to search the vehicle as they had no reason to believe that the accused had been or was involved in any criminal activity nor were they in fear for their safety. United States v. Cupps, 503 F.2d 277, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 6754 (6th Cir. Ky. 1974 ).

Cited:

Johnson v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.2d 550, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 385 ( Ky. 1956 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

An officer of the state police can require an accused traffic law violator to exhibit his operator’s license before the motorist is informed of the charge against him. OAG 61-317 .

An officer of the state police would exceed his authority if, when arresting a motorist for a traffic violation, he required the motorist to surrender his driver’s license and then required the motorist to drive to the courthouse without his license. OAG 61-317 .

An officer may stop a driver for the good faith purpose of examining his license and if the driver has no license, he may be charged with a violation of the statute. OAG 62-359 .

A peace officer has authority to stop the operator of a motor bike for the purpose of determining whether or not the operator has the required license where it appears the operator is under the age of 16. OAG 65-354 .

Operation of a motor vehicle in disregard of valid restrictions on a motor vehicle operator’s license is operation without a license in violation of KRS 186.410 for which a person may be convicted and fined or imprisoned or both pursuant to KRS 186.990(3), and for which a peace officer may issue a citation if the offense is committed in his presence. OAG 67-530 .

Since reckless driving, failure to have a driver’s license, speeding and crossing the yellow line (KRS 189.300 ) are four separate offenses, where a chase commences in a city and ends in the county with both city and county and/or state officials involved in apprehending the violator, double jeopardy would not prohibit the county from charging the accused with speeding and crossing the yellow line even though the city has already charged reckless driving and failure to have a driver’s license. OAG 74-612 .

A police officer may not take a person’s driver’s license from him and require the person to drive to the courthouse without a license; all that a police officer can do is to require a person to display his operator’s license, for only in the case where the driver’s license is counterfeit or is not the license of the person carrying it would it be contraband such as to justify an officer in taking it from the person. OAG 76-645 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Commercial driver’s licenses, KRS Chapter 281A.

186.520. Duplicate license.

  1. A person whose license has been legitimately lost or destroyed, shall apply to the Transportation Cabinet in order to make application for a duplicate license. The person shall furnish satisfactory proof by affidavit substantiating the loss or destruction when applying for a duplicate license.
  2. The fee for a duplicate license shall be according to the schedule set forth in KRS 186.531 .

History. 2739m-45: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 138; 1958, ch. 60, § 6; 1972, ch. 135, § 1; 1976, ch. 173, § 1; 1994, ch. 267, § 5, effective July 15, 1994; 2017 ch. 100, § 20, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 19, effective March 27, 2020.

186.530. Expiration of licenses — Renewal — Fee. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739m-47) was repealed by Acts 1948, ch. 208, § 8.

186.531. Fees for licenses, permits, and identification cards — Exceptions, when fee not to be assessed for personal identification cards — Voluntary donation to organ donor program — Acceptance of payment methods.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “AOC Fund” means the circuit court clerk salary account created in KRS 27A.052 ;
    2. “GF” means the general fund;
    3. “IP” means instruction permit;
    4. “License Fund” or “LF” means the KYTC photo license account created in KRS 174.056 ;
    5. “MC” means motorcycle;
    6. “MC Fund” or “MCF” means the motorcycle safety education program fund established in KRS 176.5065 ;
    7. “OL” means operator’s license; and
    8. “PIDC” means personal identification card.
  2. The fees imposed for voluntary travel ID operator’s licenses, instruction permits, and personal identification cards shall be as follows. The fees received shall be distributed as shown in the table. The fees shown, unless otherwise noted, are for an eight (8) year period:
  3. Except as provided in subsection (11) of this section, the fees imposed for standard operator’s licenses, instruction permits, and personal identification cards shall be as follows:
    1. If the identity document is issued through a circuit clerk’s office, the fees received shall be distributed as shown in the table. The fees shown, unless otherwise noted, are for an eight (8) year period:
    2. If the identity document is issued through a Transportation Cabinet office, the fees received shall be distributed as shown in the table. The fees shown, unless otherwise noted, are for an eight (8) year period:
  4. The fee for a second or subsequent duplicate personal identification card for a person who does not have a fixed, permanent address, as allowed under KRS 186.4122(5) and 186.4123(5), shall be the same as for a duplicate regular personal identification card.
  5. The fee for a four (4) year original or renewal license issued pursuant to KRS 186.4101 shall be fifty percent (50%) of the amount shown in subsections (2) and (3) of this section. The distribution of fees shown in subsections (2) and (3) of this section shall also be reduced by fifty percent (50%) for licenses that are issued for four (4) years.
  6. Any fee for any identity document applied for using alternative technology under KRS 186.410 and 186.4122 shall be distributed in the same manner as a document applied for in person with the cabinet.
    1. An applicant for an original or renewal operator’s license, permit, commercial driver’s license, motorcycle operator’s license, or personal identification card shall be requested by the cabinet to make a donation to promote an organ donor program. (7) (a) An applicant for an original or renewal operator’s license, permit, commercial driver’s license, motorcycle operator’s license, or personal identification card shall be requested by the cabinet to make a donation to promote an organ donor program.
    2. The donation under this subsection shall be added to the regular fee for an original or renewal motor vehicle operator’s license, permit, commercial driver’s license, motorcycle operator’s license, or personal identification card. One (1) donation may be made per issuance or renewal of a license or any combination thereof.
    3. The fee shall be paid to the cabinet and shall be forwarded by the cabinet on a monthly basis to the Kentucky Circuit Court Clerks’ Trust for Life, and such moneys are hereby appropriated to be used exclusively for the purpose of promoting an organ donor program. A donation under this subsection shall be voluntary and may be refused by the applicant at the time of issuance or renewal.
  7. In addition to the fees outlined in this section, the following individuals, upon application for an initial or renewal operator’s license, instruction permit, or personal identification card, shall pay an additional application fee of thirty dollars ($30), which shall be deposited in the photo license account:
    1. An applicant who is not a United States citizen or permanent resident and who applies under KRS 186.4121 or 186.4123 ; or
    2. An applicant who is applying for a instruction permit, operator’s license, or personal identification card without a photo under KRS 186.4102(9).
    1. Except for individuals exempted under paragraph (c) of this subsection, an applicant for relicensing after revocation or suspension shall pay a reinstatement fee of forty dollars ($40). (9) (a) Except for individuals exempted under paragraph (c) of this subsection, an applicant for relicensing after revocation or suspension shall pay a reinstatement fee of forty dollars ($40).
    2. The reinstatement fee under this subsection shall be distributed by the State Treasurer as follows:
      1. Thirty-five dollars ($35) shall be deposited into the photo license account; and
      2. Five dollars ($5) shall be deposited into a trust and agency fund to be used in defraying the costs and expenses of administering a driver improvement program for problem drivers.
    3. This subsection shall not apply to:
      1. Any person whose license was suspended for failure to meet the conditions set out in KRS 186.411 when, within one (1) year of suspension, the driving privileges of the individual are reinstated; or
      2. A student who has had his or her license revoked pursuant to KRS 159.051 .
  8. As payment for any fee identified in this section, the cabinet:
    1. Shall accept cash and personal checks; and
    2. May accept other methods of payment in accordance with KRS 45.345 .
  9. There shall be no fee assessed for the initial, renewal, or duplicate standard personal identification card to an individual, if the individual:
    1. Does not possess a valid operator’s license or a commercial driver’s license; and
    2. Is at least eighteen (18) years of age on or before the next regular election.

Card Type Fee LF GF MCF OL (initial/renewal) $48 $48 $0 $0 OL (Under 21) (Up to 4 years) $18 $18 $0 $0 Any OL, MC, or combination (duplicate/corrected) $15 $13.25 $1.75 $0 Motor vehicle IP (3 years) $18 $16 $2 $0 Motorcycle IP (1 year) $18 $13 $1 $4 Motorcycle OL (initial/renewal) $48 $38 $0 $10 Combination vehicle/MC OL (initial/renewal) $58 $48 $0 $10 PIDC (initial/renewal) $28 $25 $3 $0 PIDC (duplicate/corrected) $15 $13.50 $1.50 $0

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Card Fee Road License AOC GF MC Type Fund Fund Fund Fund OL (initial/renewal) $43 $28 $7 $8 $0 $0 OL (Under 21) (Up to 4 years) $15 $7.50 $4 $3.50 $0 $0 Any OL, MC OL or combination (duplicate /corrected) $15 $5.25 $4 $4 $1.75 $0 Motor vehicle IP (3 years) $15 $5 $4 $4 $2 $0 Motorcycle IP (1 year) $15 $5 $4 $1 $1 $4 Motorcycle OL (initial/renewal) $43 $17.50 $8 $7.50 $0 $10 Combination vehicle/MC OL (initial/renewal) $53 $25 $7 $11 $0 $10 PIDC (initial/renewal) $23 $8 $8 $4 $3 $0 PIDC (duplicate/corrected) $15 $6 $4 $3.50 $1.50 $0 PIDC (no fixed address) and KRS 186.4122(5) 186.4123(5) $10 $0 $5 $5 $0 $0

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Card Type Fee LF GF MCF OL(initial/renewal) $43 $43 $0 $0 OL (Under 21) (Up to 4 years) $15 $15 $0 $0 Any OL, MC, or combination (duplicate/corrected) $15 $13.25 $1.75 $0 Motor vehicle IP (3 years) $15 $13 $2 $0 Motorcycle IP (1 year) $15 $10 $1 $4 Motorcycle OL (initial/renewal) $43 $33 $0 $10 Combination vehicle/MC OL (initial/renewal) $53 $43 $0 $10 PIDC (initial/renewal) $23 $20 $3 $0 PIDC (duplicate/corrected) $15 $13.50 $1.50 $0 PIDC (no fixed address) under /186.4123(5) KRS 186.4122(5) $10 $10 $0 $0

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History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 60, § 8; 1968, ch. 63, § 6; 1968, ch. 169, § 1; 1970, ch. 22, § 8; 1974, ch. 124, § 2; 1976, ch. 244, § 1; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 21, § 20, effective January 2, 1978; 1980, ch. 38, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 188, § 239, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 389, § 3, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 99, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 142, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 165, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1992, ch. 274, § 12, effective April 7, 1992; 1992, ch. 277, § 8, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 267, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 367, § 3, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 96, § 2, effective July 15, 2002; 2005, ch. 55, § 2, effective June 20, 2005; 2005, ch. 122, § 10, effective July 1, 2005; 2005, ch. 173, Pt. XV, § 1, effective July 1, 2005; 2011, ch. 79, § 1, effective June 8, 2011; repealed and reenacted by 2017 ch. 100, § 21, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 20, effective March 27, 2020; 2020 ch. 89, § 32, effective July 15, 2020; 2021 ch. 190, § 11, effective June 29, 2021.

Opinions of Attorney General.

On January 2, 1978 and thereafter circuit clerks should turn operator’s license fees into the Executive Department for Finance and Administration (now Finance and Administration Cabinet), which Department (now Cabinet) will in turn credit such fees to the general fund in the State Treasury. OAG 77-100 .

186.5315. Posting of notice about 1994 increases in fees of circuit clerks. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 267, § 7, effective July 15, 1994; repealed by 2017 ch. 100, § 39, effective January 1, 2019.

186.535. Earmark of funds from operator’s license and motorcycle registration fees.

  1. From the portion of the fee for each eight (8) year original or renewal operator’s license which is assigned to the photo license account under KRS 186.531 , two dollars ($2) shall be credited to a special account within the road fund, and shall be used exclusively by the Transportation Cabinet for the purpose of expanding the state driver education program, and two dollars ($2) shall be paid to the fiscal court of the county where the driver’s license is issued to be used by the fiscal court for county road purposes. The distribution of fees under this subsection shall be reduced by fifty percent (50%) for licenses issued for a four (4) year term in accordance with KRS 186.4101 .
  2. From the fee for each annual registration of a motorcycle pursuant to KRS 186.050 , four dollars ($4) shall be credited to the motorcycle safety education program fund pursuant to KRS 176.5065 and shall be used exclusively for the purposes outlined in KRS 176.5061 to 176.5069 .

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 169, § 2; 1980, ch. 38, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1992, ch. 277, § 9, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 267, § 6, effective July 15, 1994; 2010, ch. 61, § 4, effective July 15, 2010; 2017 ch. 100, § 25, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 21, effective March 27, 2020; 2021 ch. 190, § 12, effective June 29, 2021.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The phrase, “shall be used exclusively,” removes the account from the application of the lapsing statute, KRS 45.230 (now repealed). OAG 69-424 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Appropriations, lapsing, KRS 45.229 .

186.540. Application for corrected license or identification card upon change of address or name — No charge for corrected identity document if street name or postal address changed or if document contains error.

  1. Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, when any person, after applying for or receiving an operator’s license or personal identification card, moves from the address named in the application or on the identity document issued to the person, or when the name of a identity document holder is changed, by marriage or otherwise, the person shall within ten (10) days after the change apply to the Transportation Cabinet for the issuance of a corrected license. The fee for a corrected license shall be as set forth in KRS 186.531 .
  2. If an identity document holder’s street name or postal address is changed and the person has not moved to a new residence, the person shall apply to the cabinet for a corrected identity document, which shall be issued free of charge.
  3. If a person receives an identity document that contains an error, the person shall apply to the cabinet for a corrected identity document, which shall be issued free of charge.

History. 2739m-68; 1994, ch. 393, § 10, effective January 1, 1995; 2006, ch. 235, § 1, effective July 12, 2006; 2017 ch. 100, § 26, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 22, effective March 27, 2020.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective January 1, 2019, see the following section, also numbered 186.540 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/94). In Attorney General Opinion 94-42, it was concluded that 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 393, which amended this statute “will take effect on January 1, 1995, the date the National Voter Registration Act will take effect with respect to Kentucky.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Notification Still Required.

Where Transportation Cabinet mailed a suspension notice to driver at his new address after initially mailing the notice to driver’s last address of record and receiving return of the notice, driver was not relieved of the requirement under this section to notify the Transportation Cabinet within 10 days of any change of address. Wright v. Transportation Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 412, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

186.550. Courts to report convictions and send licenses to cabinet — Exception for offenses committed under KRS Chapter 189A.

  1. Except for offenses committed under KRS Chapter 189A, the clerk of any court having jurisdiction over offenses committed under motor vehicle laws shall report upon a form furnished by the cabinet the conviction, pleas or forfeiture of bond arising under motor vehicle laws, to the cabinet within fifteen (15) days.
  2. The court shall take up the motor vehicle operator’s license certificate of a person convicted of any of the offenses for which mandatory revocation is provided by KRS 186.560 and have it immediately forwarded to the cabinet with the report covering the conviction.

History. 2739m-48: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 175, effective January 2, 1978; 2019 ch. 103, § 23, effective July 1, 2020.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.License.
2.— Revocation.

The license is not revoked by the court. The Department of Revenue (now Transportation Cabinet) revokes the license, not as a punishment to the offender, but in the interest of public safety. Commonwealth v. Burnett, 274 Ky. 231 , 118 S.W.2d 558, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 257 ( Ky. 1938 ). See Commonwealth v. Harris, 278 Ky. 218 , 128 S.W.2d 579, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 405 ( Ky. 1939 ).

3.Certified Copy of Judgment.

Instead of a certified copy of judgment of conviction of an operator for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, an offense requiring mandatory revocation of license under KRS 186.560 , the police judge sent an abstract of the judgment to the commissioner of revenue (now secretary of the Transportation Cabinet) and that was all that was necessary under this section. Phillips v. Reeves, 313 Ky. 284 , 231 S.W.2d 63, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 882 ( Ky. 1950 ).

4.Appeal.

Even though there was no specific statutory authorization for judicial review of revocation of driver’s license for mandatory cause, in case where license was revoked because of a conviction for drunken driving and complainant denied that such a conviction had taken place, Circuit Court had jurisdiction to review the administrative action and had power to suspend effectiveness of order revoking license until case was decided on the merits. Commonwealth Dep't Public Safety v. Richardson, 467 S.W.2d 602, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 393 ( Ky. 1971 ).

Driver who takes an appeal from a police court conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicants is entitled to a suspension of the order of mandatory revocation of his operator’s license, since the conviction is no longer effective, and Circuit Court has jurisdiction to stay the enforcement of the revocation. Commonwealth, Dep't Public Safety v. Cox, 467 S.W.2d 603, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 394 ( Ky. 1971 ).

Cited:

Garner v. Shouse, 292 Ky. 798 , 168 S.W.2d 42, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 747 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

An order is a conviction within the meaning of this section. OAG 66-23 .

An adjudication of guilt, whether upon a guilty plea or after trial, and an order placing a defendant on probation constitute a conviction for the purpose of assessing points under the point system. OAG 66-23 .

A supersedeas on appeal to Circuit Court from a city court conviction for driving under the influence does not require that the defendant’s operator’s license be delivered to the Circuit Court and the license must be forwarded to the Department of Public Safety (now Transportation Cabinet) pursuant to this section. OAG 70-550 .

The county judge trying the case must immediately, upon a conviction for driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, take up the defendant’s motor vehicle operator’s license and have it immediately forwarded to the Department of Public Safety (now the Transportation Cabinet) along with the report covering such conviction. OAG 72-141 .

A police court loses jurisdiction of a case arising under this section when the case is appealed to the Circuit Court, but until an appeal is filed the police court retains jurisdiction and the conviction is in effect. OAG 72-526 .

When an appeal from a conviction has been filed and the police judge receives the order from the Circuit Court to stay proceedings on the judgment, the operator’s certificate should be returned to the defendant. OAG 72-526 .

The period of suspension of a driver’s license of a person convicted of certain named offenses in KRS 186.560 runs from the date upon which the operator can no longer legally drive a vehicle either because he does not have his license certificate in his possession because it has been taken up by the court or because he has been notified by the Department of Transportation (now Transportation Cabinet) that his license has been suspended and he is ordered to surrender his license certificate to the Department (now Cabinet) and the Department (now Cabinet) may give the operator credit for the time that the trial court kept his license before mailing it to the Department (now Cabinet) unless it has been shown in a hearing that the operator continued to drive his vehicle on the highways during that period. OAG 77-31 .

The entrance of a guilty plea constitutes a conviction within the meaning of this section providing for the reporting by the court to the Department of Transportation (now Transportation Cabinet) of conviction under the motor vehicle laws. OAG 78-750 .

In “driving under the influence” convictions involving a nonresident motor vehicle operator, the Kentucky trial court has no authority to withdraw or revoke a nonresident’s privilege of operating a motor vehicle in Kentucky. The withdrawing or revoking of a nonresident’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Kentucky is the responsibility of the Transportation Cabinet, pursuant to KRS 186.560 , 186.565 (now repealed), 186.570 , 189A.070 , and 189A.080 . OAG 85-72 .

A Kentucky trial court has no authority to physically take possession of a nonresident operator’s license when he is convicted of driving under the influence. OAG 85-72 .

186.560. Mandatory revocation or denial of license — Causes — Period of revocation or denial — Prohibition against reductions of certain revocations or denials — Limited exception relating to enrollment in alcohol or substance abuse education or treatment programs.

  1. The cabinet shall forthwith revoke the license of any operator of a motor vehicle upon receiving record of his or her:
    1. Conviction of any of the following offenses:
      1. Murder or manslaughter resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle;
      2. Driving a vehicle which is not a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any other substance which may impair one’s driving ability;
      3. Perjury or the making of a false affidavit under KRS 186.400 to 186.640 or any law requiring the registration of motor vehicles or regulating their operation on highways;
      4. Any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used;
      5. Conviction or forfeiture of bail upon three (3) charges of reckless driving within the preceding twelve (12) months;
      6. Conviction of driving a motor vehicle involved in an accident and failing to stop and disclose his identity at the scene of the accident;
      7. Conviction of theft of a motor vehicle or any of its parts, including the conviction of any person under the age of eighteen (18) years;
      8. Failure to have in full force and effect the security required by Subtitle 39 of KRS Chapter 304 upon conviction of a second and each subsequent offense within any five (5) year period;
      9. Conviction for fraudulent use of a driver’s license or use of a fraudulent driver’s license to purchase or attempt to purchase alcoholic beverages, as defined in KRS 241.010 , in violation of KRS 244.085(4);
      10. Conviction of operating a motor vehicle, motorcycle, or moped without an operator’s license as required by KRS 186.410 ; and
      11. Conviction of fleeing or evading police in the second degree when the offense involved the operation of a motor vehicle; or
    2. Being found incompetent to stand trial under KRS Chapter 504.
  2. If the person convicted of any offense named in subsection (1) of this section or who is found incompetent to stand trial is not the holder of a license, the cabinet shall deny the person so convicted a license for the same period of time as though he had possessed a license which had been revoked. If through an inadvertence the defendant should be issued a license, the cabinet shall forthwith cancel it.
  3. The cabinet, upon receiving a record of the conviction of any person upon a charge of operating a motor vehicle while the license of that person is denied, or suspended, or revoked, or while his privilege to operate a motor vehicle is withdrawn, shall immediately extend the period of the first denial, suspension, revocation, or withdrawal for an additional like period.
  4. The revocation or denial of a license or the withdrawal of the privilege of operating a motor vehicle for a violation of subsection (1)(a)1. of this section shall be for a period of not less than five (5) years. Revocations or denials under this section shall not be subject to any lessening of penalties authorized under any other provision of this section or any other statute.
  5. Except as provided in subsections (3), (4), (8), and (9) of this section, in all other cases, the revocation or denial of a license or the withdrawal of the privilege of operating a motor vehicle under this section shall be for a period of six (6) months, except that if the same person has had one (1) previous conviction of any offense enumerated in subsection (1) of this section, regardless of whether the person’s license was revoked because of the previous conviction, the period of the revocation, denial, or withdrawal shall be one (1) year. If the person has had more than one (1) previous conviction of the offenses considered collectively as enumerated in subsection (1) of this section, regardless of whether the person’s license was revoked for any previous conviction, the period of revocation, denial, or withdrawal shall be for not less than two (2) years. If the cabinet, upon receipt of the written recommendation of the court in which any person has been convicted of violating KRS 189.520(1) or 244.085(4) as relates to instances in which a driver’s license or fraudulent driver’s license was the identification used or attempted to be used in the commission of the offense, who has had no previous conviction of said offense, the person’s operator’s license shall not be revoked, but the person’s operator’s license shall be restricted to any terms and conditions the secretary in his discretion may require, provided the person has enrolled in an alcohol or substance abuse education or treatment program as the cabinet shall require. If the person fails to satisfactorily complete the education or treatment program or violates the restrictions on his operator’s license, the cabinet shall immediately revoke his operator’s license for a period of six (6) months.
  6. In order to secure the reinstatement of a license to operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle restored following a period of suspension pursuant to KRS Chapter 189A, the person whose license is suspended shall comply with the fees and other procedures of the Transportation Cabinet with regard to the reinstatement of suspended licenses.
  7. The cabinet shall revoke the license of any operator of a motor vehicle upon receiving notification that the person is under age eighteen (18) and has dropped out of school or is academically deficient, as defined in KRS 159.051(1).
  8. A person under the age of eighteen (18) who is convicted of the offenses of subsections (1) or (3) of this section, except for subsection (1)(a)8. or 9. of this section, shall have his license revoked until he reaches the age of eighteen (18) or shall have his license revoked as provided in this section, whichever penalty will result in the longer period of revocation.
  9. A revocation or denial of a license or the withdrawal of the privilege of operating a motor vehicle under this section due to a person being found incompetent to stand trial shall extend until the person is found competent to stand trial or the criminal case is dismissed.

History. 2739m-49: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 127, § 7; 1966, ch. 17, § 1; 1974, ch. 217, § 1; 1980, ch. 103, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 129, § 3, effective January 1, 1985; 1984, ch. 165, § 15, effective July 13, 1985; 1986, ch. 376, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 434, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 443, § 3, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 222, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 234, § 5, effective July 13, 1990; 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 20, effective July 1, 1991; 1996, ch. 198, § 8, effective October 1, 1996; 2000, ch. 467, §§ 26, 29, effective October 1, 2000; 2006, ch. 235, § 2, effective July 12, 2006; 2013, ch. 16, § 1, effective June 25, 2013; 2017 ch. 62, § 117, effective June 29, 2017; 2019 ch. 103, § 24, effective July 1, 2020; 2020 ch. 97, § 3, effective July 15, 2020.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/25/2013). In codifying 2013 Ky. Acts ch. 16, sec. 1, (this statute), a reference in subsection (8) to “subsection (1)(a)8. or 8. of this section” has been changed to “subsection (1)(a)8. or 9. of this section.” The internal numbering of subsection (1) of this statute was modified by that Act, but the reference in subsection (8) of this statute was incorrectly modified to conform with that renumbering. The Reviser of Statutes has corrected this manifest clerical or typographical error in codification under the authority of KRS 7.136(1)(h).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Revocation.

The magistrate does not revoke the license for operating while intoxicated but merely recommends such revocation. Commonwealth v. Burnett, 274 Ky. 231 , 118 S.W.2d 558, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 257 ( Ky. 1938 ).

The revocation period under KRS 189A.070 is not governed by the conviction as a first, second, third, or subsequent violation of the section within a five-year period, but by the number of convictions sustained for driving under the influence under KRS 189A.010 within that period; whether those convictions are all pursuant to subdivision (2)(a) of KRS 189A.010 for first offense violations of KRS 189A.010 or whether they are successive convictions is of no consequence in the administration of KRS 189A.070 . Division of Driver Licensing, Dep't of Vehicle Regulation, Transp. Cabinet v. Bergmann, 740 S.W.2d 948, 1987 Ky. LEXIS 263 ( Ky. 1987 ).

A two (2) year license suspension was properly imposed on the defendant, notwithstanding that he had no previous convictions arising prior to the triggering event, where the defendant pleaded guilty to five (5) felony offenses and driving while intoxicated, all arising from the triggering event. Conley v. Kentucky, 75 F. Supp. 2d 687, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18724 (E.D. Ky. 1999 ).

2.— Forfeiture of Temporary Right.

Permission to operate an auto on the public highways is a temporary right granted by the state, and its use and enjoyment depends upon compliance with the conditions prescribed. Revocation of the operator’s license is merely forfeiture of a conditional temporary permit, and does not deprive the holder of any guaranteed civil right. Commonwealth v. Harris, 278 Ky. 218 , 128 S.W.2d 579, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 405 ( Ky. 1939 ).

3.Drunken Driving.

Revenue Department (Transportation Cabinet) must mandatorily suspend license of person convicted of drunken driving, upon being notified of the conviction, and the judgment is final. Commonwealth v. Harris, 278 Ky. 218 , 128 S.W.2d 579, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 405 ( Ky. 1939 ).

4.Proof of Financial Responsibility.

The action of the Department of Revenue (now Transportation Cabinet) in refusing the issuance of an automobile operator’s license was proper where driver’s operator’s license had been revoked for one year following his second conviction of operating an automobile on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and he refused to furnish the Department of Revenue (now Transportation Cabinet) with proof of his financial responsibility as required by KRS 187.450(1), (2) (now repealed). Commonwealth ex rel. Allphin v. Stumbo, 258 S.W.2d 910, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 892 ( Ky. 1953 ).

5.Out-of-State Convictions.

While the General Assembly might well have related the length of license suspension to the number of convictions of driving under the influence anywhere, it has explicitly chosen that the length of revocation be related to the number of violations of KRS 189A.010 . Sutton v. Transp. Cabinet, Commonwealth, 775 S.W.2d 933, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 42 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

6.Previous Convictions.

Multiple convictions on the same date do not constitute previous offenses pursuant to subsection (5) of this section. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 74 S.W.3d 750, 2001 Ky. App. LEXIS 55 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).

Cited:

Sturgill v. Beard, 303 S.W.2d 908, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 275 ( Ky. 1957 ), overruled, Commonwealth, Dep’t Public Safety v. Thomas, 467 S.W.2d 335, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 364 ( Ky. 1971 ), overruled in part, Commonwealth, Dep’t Public Safety v. Thomas, 467 S.W.2d 335, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 364 ( Ky. 1971 ); Commonwealth v. Steiber, 697 S.W.2d 135, 1985 Ky. LEXIS 259 ( Ky. 1985 ); Commonwealth Transp. Cabinet v. Hobson, 870 S.W.2d 228, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 158 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinions of Attorney General.

No officer, agent or employee of the Commonwealth has authority to confiscate license plates issued by another state to a person who drives a car bearing those plates into Kentucky regardless of the fact that the person’s driver’s license was revoked by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. OAG 60-1055 .

Where a person was convicted on the same day of two offenses of drunken driving the two suspensions should run concurrently. OAG 61-498 .

Where a person was convicted on the same day of two offenses of drunken driving and they were his first and second offenses, his license should be revoked for a total period of 12 months. OAG 61-498 .

Although running a red light alone cannot be considered an act of reckless driving, it may, together with other circumstances or acts, be considered as reckless driving or an element of it. OAG 63-833 .

An order is a conviction within the meaning of KRS 186.550 . OAG 66-23 .

An adjudication of guilt for a moving motor vehicle violation and an order placing a defendant on probation constitute a conviction for the purpose of assessing points under the point system and such an order is a conviction within the meaning of KRS 186.550 . OAG 66-23 .

An adjudication of guilt, whether upon a guilty plea or after trial, and an order placing a defendant on probation constitute a conviction for the purpose of assessing points under the point system. OAG 66-23 .

The county judge trying the case must immediately, upon a conviction for driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, take up the defendant’s motor vehicle operator’s license certificate and have it immediately forwarded to the Department of Public Safety (now Transportation Cabinet) along with the report covering such conviction as provided by KRS 186.550 . OAG 72-141 .

Where an operator is convicted of an offense requiring mandatory suspension of his driver’s license, if the operator appeals to the Circuit Court, obtains a stay of suspension of his license pending the decision in that court, and later his conviction is affirmed by the Circuit Court and no further stay is obtained, the period of suspension will start from the date which the court or the department takes up the operator’s license certificate. OAG 77-31 .

The period of suspension of a driver’s license of a person convicted of certain named offenses in this section runs from the date upon which the operator can no longer legally drive a vehicle either because he does not have his license certificate in his possession because it has been taken up by the court or because he has been notified by the Department of Transportation (now Transportation Cabinet) that his license has been suspended and he is ordered to surrender his license certificate to the Department (now Cabinet) and the Department (now Cabinet) may give the operator credit for the time that the trial court kept his license before mailing it to the Department (now Cabinet) unless it has been shown in a hearing that the operator continued to drive his vehicle on the highways during that period. OAG 77-31 .

A person who has refused to take a chemical test for intoxication cannot avoid the suspension of his driving privileges by attending driver education school without having been convicted of driving while intoxicated. OAG 77-190 .

If a driver commits several offenses requiring mandatory suspension, the periods of suspension shall be served consecutively. OAG 78-174 .

A plea of guilty constitutes a conviction for purposes of subsection (4) of this section. OAG 78-750 .

In “driving under the influence” convictions involving a nonresident motor vehicle operator, the Kentucky trial court has no authority to withdraw or revoke a nonresident’s privilege of operating a motor vehicle in Kentucky. The withdrawing or revoking of a nonresident’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Kentucky is the responsibility of the Transportation Cabinet, pursuant to this section and KRS 186.565 (now repealed), 186.570 , 189A.070 , and 189A.080 . OAG 85-72 .

A Kentucky trial court has no authority to physically take possession of a nonresident operator’s license when he is convicted of driving under the influence. OAG 85-72 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Suspension for nonpayment of judgment — Exception, KRS 187.410 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Johnston, Legislation — A Proposed Drunken Driving Statute, 36 Ky. L.J. 90 (1947).

186.565. Consent to test for alcohol in blood — Procedure upon refusal — Ruling — Judicial review — Exception — Application to court to enter driver’s education program. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 184, §§ 1 to 6; 1970, ch. 238, § 1; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(7), (8); 1976, ch. 29, § 1, effective March 5, 1976; 1978, ch. 157, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 103, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 114, § 33, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 165, § 16, effective July 13, 1984) was repealed by Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 31, effective July 1, 1991. For present law see KRS 189A.005 , 189A.103 , 189A.105 , 189A.107 , 189A.120 , 189A.200 and 189A.220 .

186.570. Denial or suspension of license — Informal hearing — Appeal — Surrender of certificate — Medical review board — Prohibition against raising insurance on basis of denial or suspension for child support arrearage.

  1. The cabinet or its agent designated in writing for that purpose may deny any person an operator’s license or may suspend the operator’s license of any person, or, in the case of a nonresident, withdraw the privilege of operating a motor vehicle in this state, subject to a hearing and with or without receiving a record of conviction of that person of a crime, if the cabinet has reason to believe that:
    1. That person has committed any offenses for the conviction of which mandatory revocation of a license is provided by KRS 186.560 .
    2. That person has, by reckless or unlawful operation of a motor vehicle, caused, or contributed to an accident resulting in death or injury or serious property damage.
    3. That person has a mental or physical disability that makes it unsafe for him to drive upon the highways. The Transportation Cabinet shall, by administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A, establish a medical review board to provide technical assistance in the review of the driving ability of these persons. The board shall consist of licensed medical and rehabilitation specialists.
    4. That person is an habitually reckless or negligent driver of a motor vehicle or has committed a serious violation of the motor vehicle laws.
    5. That person has been issued a license without making proper application for it, as provided in KRS 186.412 or 186.412 1 and administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A.
    6. That person has presented false or misleading information as to the person’s residency, citizenship, religious convictions, or immigration status.
    7. A person required by KRS 186.480 to take an examination has been issued a license without first having passed the examination.
    8. That person has been convicted of assault and battery resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle.
    9. That person has failed to appear pursuant to a citation or summons issued by a law enforcement officer of this Commonwealth or any other jurisdiction.
    10. That person has failed to appear pursuant to an order by the court to produce proof of security required by KRS 304.39-010 and a receipt showing that a premium for a minimum policy period of six (6) months has been paid.
    11. That person is a habitual violator of KRS 304.39-080 . For purposes of this section, a “habitual violator” shall mean any person who has operated a motor vehicle without security on the motor vehicle as required by Subtitle 39 of this chapter three (3) or more times within a five (5) year period, in violation of KRS 304.99-060 (2).
  2. The cabinet shall deny any person a license or shall suspend the license of an operator of a motor vehicle upon receiving written notification from the Cabinet for Health and Family Services that the person has a child support arrearage which equals or exceeds the cumulative amount which would be owed after six (6) months of nonpayment or failure, after receiving appropriate notice, to comply with a subpoena or warrant relating to paternity or child support proceedings, as provided by 42 U.S.C. secs. 651 et seq.; except that any child support arrearage which exists prior to January 1, 1994, shall not be included in the calculation to determine whether the license of an operator of a motor vehicle shall be denied or suspended. The denial or suspension shall continue until the arrearage has been eliminated, payments on the child support arrearage are being made in accordance with a court or administrative order, or the person complies with the subpoena or warrant relating to paternity or child support. Before the license may be reinstated, proof of elimination of the child support arrearage or proof of compliance with the subpoena or warrant relating to paternity or child support proceedings as provided by 42 U.S.C. sec. 666(a)(16) from the court where the action is pending or the Cabinet for Health and Family Services shall be received by the Transportation Cabinet as prescribed by administrative regulations promulgated by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services and the Transportation Cabinet.
  3. The cabinet or its agent designated in writing for that purpose shall deny any person an operator’s license or shall suspend the operator’s license of any person, or, in the case of a nonresident, withdraw the privilege of operating a motor vehicle in this state:
    1. Where the person has been declared ineligible to operate a motor vehicle under KRS 532.356 for the duration of the ineligibility, upon notification of the court’s judgment; or
    2. Upon receiving written notification from the Finance and Administration Cabinet, Department of Revenue, that the person is a delinquent taxpayer as provided in KRS 131.1817 . The denial or suspension shall continue until a written tax clearance has been received by the cabinet from the Finance and Administration Cabinet, Department of Revenue. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (4) of this section, a person whose license is denied or suspended under this paragraph shall have thirty (30) days from the date the cabinet mails the notice to request a hearing.
  4. The cabinet or its agent designated in writing for that purpose shall provide any person subject to the suspension, revocation, or withdrawal of their driving privileges, under provisions of this section, an informal hearing. Upon determining that the action is warranted, the cabinet shall notify the person in writing by mailing the notice to the person by first-class mail to the last known address of the person. The hearing shall be automatically waived if not requested within twenty (20) days after the cabinet mails the notice. The hearing shall be scheduled as early as practical within twenty (20) days after receipt of the request at a time and place designated by the cabinet. An aggrieved party may appeal a decision rendered as a result of an informal hearing, and upon appeal an administrative hearing shall be conducted in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B.
    1. The cabinet may suspend the operator’s license of any resident upon receiving notice of the conviction of that person in another state of an offense there which, if committed in this state, would be grounds for the suspension or revocation of an operator’s license. The cabinet shall not suspend an operator’s license under this paragraph if: (5) (a) The cabinet may suspend the operator’s license of any resident upon receiving notice of the conviction of that person in another state of an offense there which, if committed in this state, would be grounds for the suspension or revocation of an operator’s license. The cabinet shall not suspend an operator’s license under this paragraph if:
      1. The conviction causing the suspension or revocation is more than five (5) years old;
      2. The conviction is for a traffic offense other than a felony traffic offense or a habitual violator offense; and
      3. The license holder complies with the provisions of KRS 186.442 .
    2. If, at the time of application for an initial Kentucky operator’s license, a person’s license is suspended or revoked in another state for a conviction that is less than five (5) years old, the cabinet shall deny the person a license until the person resolves the matter in the other state and complies with the provisions of this chapter.
    3. The cabinet may, upon receiving a record of the conviction in this state of a nonresident driver of a motor vehicle of any offense under the motor vehicle laws, forward a notice of that person’s conviction to the proper officer in the state of which the convicted person is a resident.
    4. This subsection shall not apply to a commercial driver’s license.
  5. The Transportation Cabinet is forbidden from suspending or revoking an operator’s license or assessing points or any other form of penalty against the license holder for speeding violations or speeding convictions from other states. This subsection shall apply only to speeding violations. This section shall not apply to a person who holds or is required to hold a commercial driver’s license.
  6. Each operator’s license which has been canceled, suspended, or revoked shall be surrendered to and destroyed by the cabinet. At the end of the period of cancellation, suspension, or revocation, the license holder may reapply under KRS 186.412 or 186.4121 , after the licensee has complied with all requirements for the issuance or reinstatement of his or her driving privilege.
  7. Insurance companies issuing motor vehicle policies in the Commonwealth shall be prohibited from raising a policyholder’s rates solely because the policyholder’s driving privilege has been suspended or denied pursuant to subsection (2) of this section.

History. 2739m-50: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 127, § 8; 1968, ch. 152, § 121; 1972, ch. 92, § 1; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(7); 1978, ch. 287, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 1990, ch. 455, § 30, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 136, § 2, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 381, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 416, § 8, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 318, § 72, effective July 15, 1996; 1996, ch. 341, § 11, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 255, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 426, § 123, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 442, § 6, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 565, § 4, effective July 15, 1998; 2001, ch. 139, § 1, effective June 21, 2001; 2002, ch. 264, § 7, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 189, § 3, effective June 24, 2003; 2005, ch. 99, § 145, effective June 20, 2005; 2005, ch. 152, § 3, effective June 20, 2005; 2005, ch. 165, § 3, effective June 20, 2005; 2008, ch. 21, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; 2013, ch. 119, § 4, effective July 1, 2013; 2017 ch. 100, § 27, effective January 1, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until January 1, 2019, see the preceding section also numbered KRS 186.570 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/94). This section was amended by 1994 Ky. Acts chs. 381 and 416. Where these Acts are not in conflict, they have been codified together. Where a conflict exists, Acts ch. 416, which was last enacted by the General Assembly, prevails under KRS 446.250 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

This section is not unconstitutional in that the legislative functions have been delegated to an administrative body without providing any criteria or standards in the legislative act since the point system adopted by the department under its power to promulgate rules and regulations is constitutionally sound and the administration of the traffic rules can lawfully be delegated to administrative officials. Sturgill v. Beard, 303 S.W.2d 908, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 275 ( Ky. 1957 ), overruled, Commonwealth, Dep't Public Safety v. Thomas, 467 S.W.2d 335, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 364 ( Ky. 1971 ).

To the extent that this section prior to its 1978 amendment provided for denial or suspension of a driver’s license or a withdrawal of the operating privilege without the opportunity for a hearing, it was unconstitutional. Commonwealth, Dep't Public Safety v. Thomas, 467 S.W.2d 335, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 364 ( Ky. 1971 ).

2.Point System.

Department of Public Safety (now Transportation Cabinet) did not apply retroactively regulation providing for use of point system in determining when licensee’s license should be suspended where offenses for which he was convicted in 1954, 1955 and 1956 were not grounds for suspension when he was convicted of them in view of the fact that this section, enacted prior thereto authorized the Department (now Cabinet) to summarily suspend the license of any person if they have reason to believe he is a habitually reckless driver and defendant’s license was suspended under this section upon determination he was a habitually reckless driver and mere fact that point system was used in making this determination did not make application of the regulation retroactive. Sturgill v. Beard, 303 S.W.2d 908, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 275 ( Ky. 1957 ), overruled, Commonwealth, Dep't Public Safety v. Thomas, 467 S.W.2d 335, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 364 ( Ky. 1971 ).

The Department of Public Safety (now Transportation Cabinet) in adopting a point system providing for the suspension of a driver’s license after a driver has accumulated a certain number of points, acted within the scope of the power delegated to it under this section because the regulations neither enlarged nor restricted the application of the terms of the statute but merely declared an administrative policy within its express terms; the point system provides a fair and workable method of effectuating the provisions of this section. Sturgill v. Beard, 303 S.W.2d 908, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 275 ( Ky. 1957 ), overruled, Commonwealth, Dep't Public Safety v. Thomas, 467 S.W.2d 335, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 364 ( Ky. 1971 ).

Provision of this section that the Department of Public Safety (now Transportation Cabinet) “may” immediately suspend the license of a licensee did not restrict the department (now cabinet) from promulgating reasonable regulations giving advance notice of standards which will govern its determination of when a licensee is habitually reckless by adoption of a system providing for mandatory suspension when the licensee accumulates 12 penalty points for moving traffic violations under the point system. Sturgill v. Beard, 303 S.W.2d 908, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 275 ( Ky. 1957 ), overruled, Commonwealth, Dep’t Public Safety v. Thomas, 467 S.W.2d 335, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 364 ( Ky. 1971 ), overruled in part, Commonwealth, Dep’t Public Safety v. Thomas, 467 S.W.2d 335, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 364 ( Ky. 1971 ), overruled on other grounds, Commonwealth, Dep’t Public Safety v. Thomas, 467 S.W.2d 335, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 364 (Ky. 1971) (decision prior to 1978 amendment).

3.Evidentiary Hearing.

Where no hearing was afforded licensee by the Department of Public Safety (now Transportation Cabinet) prior to the revocation of license, and where licensee’s hearing on appeal of revocation in the quarterly court resulted in reversal of the revocation order, in the absence of an administrative hearing it must be assumed that the evidence supported the position of the Circuit Court. Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Safety v. Walker, 481 S.W.2d 681, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 270 ( Ky. 1972 ).

The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment requires that an administrative hearing be afforded a licensee before the Department of Public Safety (now Transportation Cabinet) may revoke his license pursuant to this section. Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Safety v. Walker, 481 S.W.2d 681, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 270 ( Ky. 1972 ).

An offender under KRS 186.560(1)(d) is not entitled to an administrative hearing under subsection (3) (now subsection (4)) of this section. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 74 S.W.3d 750, 2001 Ky. App. LEXIS 55 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).

4.Revocation.

The magistrate does not revoke the license for operating while intoxicated but merely recommends such revocation. Commonwealth v. Burnett, 274 Ky. 231 , 118 S.W.2d 558, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 257 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Cited:

Commonwealth v. Weinberg, 150 S.W.3d 75, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 319 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinions of Attorney General.

An operator’s license issued to a minor should be canceled where the parent required to sign for the minor rescinds his request or renounces his assumption of liability but where evidence of the minor’s financial responsibility remains in the file. OAG 65-840 .

An adjudication of guilt for a moving motor vehicle violation and an order placing a defendant on probation constitute a conviction for the purpose of assessing points under the point system and such an order is a conviction within the meaning of KRS 186.550 . OAG 66-23 .

An adjudication of guilt, whether upon a guilty plea or after trial, and an order placing a defendant on probation constitute a conviction for the purpose of assessing points under the point system. OAG 66-23 .

This section vests exclusive jurisdiction in the department of public safety (now transportation cabinet) over suspensions of driver licenses and no court of the state has jurisdiction to enter an order granting “special privileges” for a person whose license has been suspended. OAG 69-129 .

A conviction for speeding in any territory wherein the commonwealth has ceded jurisdiction to the federal government without a retention of police power or where congress has not receded to state jurisdiction the respective territory involved must be considered a conviction received in other states pursuant to subsection (2) of this section and cannot be used by the department of public safety (now transportation cabinet) to assess points and effect driver license suspensions. OAG 73-239 .

The department of transportation (now transportation cabinet) may withdraw the privilege of operating a motor vehicle in Kentucky, in the case of a nonresident with or without a hearing, and with or without receiving a record of conviction of that person of a crime, whenever the department (now cabinet) has reason to believe that such person has committed any offenses for the conviction of which mandatory revocation of license is provided by KRS 186.560 but Kentucky has no control over the license, as such, issued by a sister state. OAG 75-505 .

The legislative purpose in having Kentucky join the nonresident violator compact was to allow peace officers who cite a nonresident motorist for a traffic violation to issue a citation to the violator who is a resident of a member state with the assurance that the violator’s home state will enforce Kentucky’s citation. OAG 79-70 .

An initial appearance on a citation will not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1)(h) (now (1)(i)) of this section if the district judge continues the case on the docket with an order for the defendant to appear at a later definite date. OAG 79-358 .

A person who fails to appear in response to a citation on a misdemeanor charge which is not a traffic violation cannot have his driving privileges suspended by the department (now cabinet) because of such failure to appear. OAG 79-358 .

If the district judge does not continue a case on the docket, but simply defers payment of the fine, it will be necessary to use some other means to enforce the payment of the fine rather than suspension of the driver’s license. OAG 79-358 .

If a nonresident has a valid driver’s license from another state and thus has the privilege of driving on Kentucky’s highways, Kentucky cannot withdraw that privilege without affording him a due process hearing; however, if the driver’s out-of-state license has been suspended or revoked, there is no privilege to withdraw since the nonresident’s home state has already canceled or suspended his operator’s license and he has no right or privilege to drive on Kentucky’s highways. There is no need to hold a hearing pursuant to subsection (2) (now subsection (4)) of this section to withdraw driving privileges of a nonresident motorist, where the nonresident driver has no legal authority to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of this state. OAG 83-67 .

In “driving under the influence” convictions involving a nonresident motor vehicle operator, the Kentucky trial court has no authority to withdraw or revoke a nonresident’s privilege of operating a motor vehicle in Kentucky. The withdrawing or revoking of a nonresident’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Kentucky is the responsibility of the Transportation Cabinet, pursuant to this section and KRS 186.560 , 186.565 (now repealed), 189A.070 , and 189A.080 . OAG 85-72 .

A Kentucky trial court has no authority to physically take possession of a nonresident operator’s license when he is convicted of driving under the influence. OAG 85-72 .

A prosecutor may legally prove the existence of a mandatory revocation of operator’s license made pursuant to this section by first producing to this section by first producing a certified copy of a conviction for which mandatory revocation shall take place from the court which rendered the conviction; second, the prosecutor should produce a certified copy of the driving history record, obtained from the Transportation Cabinet, in order to prove that such a revocation did in fact take place. OAG 89-19 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Suspension of license, following accident, under financial responsibility law, KRS 187.410 .

186.572. Assessment of penalty points for speeding on limited access highway.

Conviction for any one (1) of the following moving hazardous violations on a limited access highway or a limited access highway of four (4) or more lanes in Kentucky on which the speed limit is sixty-five (65) mph or higher shall be cause for assessment of the penalty points indicated:

Speeding 10 mph or less over the limit 0 points.

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History. Enact. Acts 1987 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 36, § 7; 1988, ch. 177, § 4, effective July 15, 1988.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

An Overview of Kentucky’s New Court System, Vol. 41, No. 2, April 1977 Ky. Bench & B. 13.

186.574. State traffic school for new drivers and for traffic offenders — Fee — Procedures — County attorney-operated traffic safety program.

  1. The Transportation Cabinet shall establish a state traffic school for new drivers and for traffic offenders. The school shall be composed of uniform education and training elements designed to create a lasting influence on new drivers and a corrective influence on traffic offenders. District Courts may in lieu of assessing penalties for traffic offenses, other than for KRS 189A.010 , sentence offenders to state traffic school and no other.
  2. If a District Court stipulates in its judgment of conviction that a person attend state traffic school, the court shall indicate this in the space provided on the abstract of conviction filed with the Transportation Cabinet. Upon receipt of an abstract, the Transportation Cabinet, or its representative, shall schedule the person to attend state traffic school. Failure of the person to attend and satisfactorily complete state traffic school in compliance with the court order, may be punished as contempt of the sentencing court. The Transportation Cabinet shall not assess points against a person who satisfactorily completes state traffic school. However, if the person referred to state traffic school holds or is required to hold a commercial driver’s license, the underlying offense shall appear on the person’s driving history record.
  3. The Transportation Cabinet shall supervise, operate, and administer state traffic school, and shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A governing facilities, equipment, courses of instruction, instructors, and records of the program. In the event a person sentenced under subsection (1) of this section does not attend or satisfactorily complete state traffic school, the Transportation Cabinet may deny that person a license or suspend the license of that person until he reschedules attendance or completes state traffic school, at which time a denial or suspension shall be rescinded.
  4. Persons participating in the state traffic school as provided in this section shall pay a fee of fifteen dollars ($15) to defray the cost of operating the school, except that if enrollment in state traffic school is to satisfy the requirement of KRS 186.410(4)(c), a fee shall not be assessed. Any funds collected pursuant to KRS 186.535(1) that are dedicated to the photo license account for use in the state driver education program may be used for the purposes of state traffic school.
  5. The following procedures shall govern persons attending state traffic school pursuant to this section:
    1. A person convicted of any violation of traffic codes set forth in KRS Chapters 177, 186, or 189, and who is otherwise eligible, may in the sole discretion of the trial judge, be sentenced to attend state traffic school. Upon payment of the fee required by subsection (4) of this section, and upon successful completion of state traffic school, the sentence to state traffic school shall be the person’s penalty in lieu of any other penalty, except for the payment of court costs;
    2. Except as provided in KRS 189.990(28), a person shall not be eligible to attend state traffic school who has been cited for a violation of KRS Chapters 177, 186, or 189 that has a penalty of mandatory revocation or suspension of an offender’s driver’s license;
    3. Except as provided in KRS 189.990(28), a person shall not be eligible to attend state traffic school for any violation if, at the time of the violation, the person did not have a valid driver’s license or the person’s driver’s license was suspended or revoked by the cabinet;
    4. Except as provided in KRS 189.990(28), a person shall not be eligible to attend state traffic school more than once in any one (1) year period, unless the person wants to attend state traffic school to comply with the driver education requirements of KRS 186.410 ; and
    5. The cabinet shall notify the sentencing court regarding any person who was sentenced to attend state traffic school who was ineligible to attend state traffic school. A court notified by the cabinet pursuant to this paragraph shall return the person’s case to an active calendar for a hearing on the matter. The court shall issue a summons for the person to appear and the person shall demonstrate to the court why an alternative sentence should not be imposed.
    1. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, a county attorney may operate a traffic safety program for traffic offenders prior to the adjudication of the offense. (6) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, a county attorney may operate a traffic safety program for traffic offenders prior to the adjudication of the offense.
    2. Offenders alleged to have violated KRS 189A.010 or 304.39-080 , offenders holding a commercial driver’s license under KRS Chapter 281A, or offenders coming within the provisions of subsection (5)(b) or (c) of this section shall be excluded from participation in a county attorney-operated program.
    3. A county attorney that operates a traffic safety program:
      1. May charge a reasonable fee to program participants, which shall only be used for payment of county attorney office operating expenses; and
      2. Shall, by October 1 of each year, report to the Prosecutors Advisory Council the fee charged for the county attorney-operated traffic safety program and the total number of traffic offenders diverted into the county attorney-operated traffic safety program for the preceding fiscal year categorized by traffic offense.
    4. Each participant in a county attorney-operated traffic safety program shall, in addition to the fee payable to the county attorney, pay a twenty-five dollar ($25) fee to the court clerk, which shall be paid into a trust and agency account with the Administrative Office of the Courts and is to be used by the circuit clerks to hire additional deputy clerks and to enhance deputy clerk salaries.
    5. Each participant in a county attorney-operated traffic safety program shall, in addition to the fee payable to the county attorney and the fee required by paragraph (d) of this subsection, pay a thirty dollar ($30) fee to the county attorney in lieu of court costs. On a monthly basis, the county attorney shall forward the fees collected pursuant to this paragraph to the Finance and Administration Cabinet to be distributed as follows:
      1. Ten and eight-tenths percent (10.8%) to the spinal cord and head injury research trust fund created in KRS 211.504 ;
      2. Nine and one-tenth percent (9.1%) to the traumatic brain injury trust fund created in KRS 211.476 ;
      3. Five and eight-tenths percent (5.8%) to the special trust and agency account set forth in KRS 42.320(2)(f) for the Department of Public Advocacy;
      4. Five and seven-tenths percent (5.7%) to the crime victims compensation fund created in KRS 49.480 ;
      5. One and two-tenths percent (1.2%) to the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet to defray the costs of conducting record checks on prospective firearms purchasers pursuant to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act and for the collection, testing, and storing of DNA samples;
      6. Sixteen and eight-tenths percent (16.8%) to the county sheriff in the county from which the fee was received;
      7. Nine and one-tenth percent (9.1%) to the county treasurer in the county from which the fee was received to be used by the fiscal court for the purposes of defraying the costs of operation of the county jail and the transportation of prisoners;
      8. Thirty-three and two-tenths percent (33.2%) to local governments in accordance with the formula set forth in KRS 24A.176(5); and
      9. Eight and three-tenths percent (8.3%) to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services for the implementation and operation of a telephonic behavioral health jail triage system as provided in KRS 210.365 and 441.048 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 248, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 165, § 17, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 258, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 198, § 9, effective October 1, 1996; 1998, ch. 124, § 9, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 232, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 183, § 15, effective August 1, 2002; 2005, ch. 165, § 4, effective June 20, 2005; 2008, ch. 108, § 3, effective July 15, 2008; 2012, ch. 107, § 1, effective July 12, 2012; 2014, ch. 71, § 8, effective July 15, 2014; 2015 ch. 36, § 1, effective June 24, 2015; 2017 ch. 74, § 92, effective June 29, 2017; 2020 ch. 51, § 23, effective March 27, 2020.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

Writ of prohibition was inappropriate based on a judge’s lack of jurisdiction to sua sponte invalidate Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186.574(6) as district courts had subject-matter jurisdiction over traffic offenses, and the alleged errors implicated particular-case jurisdiction, which belonged to the erroneous action category of writs. Delahanty v. Commonwealth, 558 S.W.3d 489, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 146 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

Writ of prohibition based on erroneous action was properly granted where a judge’s order that Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186.574(6) was unconstitutional affected the county attorney’s ability to exercise statutory and prosecutorial authority, no actual litigant had raised the issue, the statute’s constitutionality was not essential to the motions before the judge, there was a lack of notice and due process to the county attorney, the Attorney General was not joined as required by Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 418.075(1), and the judge’s decision violated separation of powers. Delahanty v. Commonwealth, 558 S.W.3d 489, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 146 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinions of Attorney General.

There would be no constitutional or statutory restriction on a circuit court clerk serving as an instructor in one of the state’s driver improvement programs. OAG 80-548 .

186.575. Highway patrol to take up canceled, revoked or suspended licenses. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 127, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 7, Art. X, § 13.

186.576. Definitions for KRS 186.576 to 186.579.

As used in KRS 186.576 to 186.579 :

  1. “Applicant” means any person applying for an instruction permit or an operator’s license who must use a bioptic telescopic device in order to operate a motor vehicle;
  2. “Binocular vision” means visual acuity that is 20/200 or better in both eyes, with or without corrective lenses;
  3. “Bioptic telescopic device” means a two (2) focus optical system used to magnify distant objects by including a small telescope that is mounted in a spectacle lens in a manner to allow an unobstructed view of the horizontal visual field through a person’s normal distance corrective lens;
  4. “Certified driver training program” means a program that provides and coordinates comprehensive assessment and training of driving skills and responses that emphasizes the vision, hearing, psychological, perceptual, orientation, and mobility skills of an applicant and that is certified by the department;
  5. “Combined visual acuity” means visual acuity attained by using both eyes together where a person has binocular vision;
  6. “Corrective lenses” means eyeglasses, contact lenses, and intraocular lenses, but does not mean a bioptic telescopic device;
  7. “Daytime driving restriction” means operation of a motor vehicle is restricted to the period of time from between thirty (30) minutes after sunrise and thirty (30) minutes before sunset. Under this restriction, driving during adverse weather conditions that significantly reduce the visibility of the roadway, other traffic, and traffic control devices shall be prohibited;
  8. “Office” means the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation;
  9. “Monocular vision” means visual acuity that is 20/200 or better in only one (1) eye, with or without corrective lenses;
  10. “Restricted out-of-state driver” means a person who has been issued, by another state, a valid operator’s license with a restriction requiring the use of a bioptic telescopic device;
  11. “Vision specialist” means a licensed ophthalmologist or optometrist;
  12. “Visual acuity” means the measure of a person’s visual acuity based on the Snellen visual acuity scale; and
  13. “Visual field” means the area of physical space visible to the eye in a given fixed position.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 396, § 1, effective January 1, 2001; 2006, ch. 211, § 116, effective April 21, 2006; 2019 ch. 146, § 52, effective June 27, 2019.

186.577. Testing applicants for initial operator’s license or initial instruction permit — Restrictions or driving privileges based on visual acuity test — Certain drivers restricted to use of bioptic telescopic devices. [Effective until July 1, 2024]

  1. All persons applying for an initial operator’s license or an initial instruction permit shall submit to a test of visual acuity and visual field at the time of application.
  2. Persons whose visual acuity is 20/40 or better without corrective lenses shall not have a restriction placed on their driving privileges. Persons whose visual acuity is 20/40 or better with corrective lenses shall have their driving privileges restricted to mandate the use of the corrective lenses. If a person fails to meet a 20/40 visual acuity standard, the Department of Kentucky State Police shall refer the person to a vision specialist for examination.
  3. A person referred to a vision specialist by the Department of Kentucky State Police under subsection (2) of this section whose visual acuity is 20/60 or better shall be eligible to test for an instruction permit or operator’s license. If corrective lenses were prescribed by the vision specialist, the person’s driving privileges shall be restricted to mandate the use of the corrective lenses.
  4. Persons who meet the requirements of KRS 186.578 and are issued operator’s licenses under KRS 186.579 shall have their driving privileges restricted to the use of a bioptic telescopic device.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 396, § 2, effective January 1, 2001; 2007, ch. 85, § 198, effective June 26, 2007.

186.577. Testing applicants for initial operator’s license or initial instruction permit — Restrictions or driving privileges based on visual acuity test — Testing not required for license renewal — Certain drivers restricted to use of bioptic telescopic devices — Administrative regulations — Fees to cover costs of testing — Deposit of fees in photo license account. [Effective July 1, 2024]

    1. The following persons shall submit to a test of visual acuity and visual field at the time of application or renewal: (1) (a) The following persons shall submit to a test of visual acuity and visual field at the time of application or renewal:
      1. All persons applying for an initial or renewal operator’s license;
      2. All persons applying for an initial or renewal instruction permit; and
      3. Any person required to complete an examination under KRS 186.635 .
  1. Vision testing under this section shall be administered to any person:
    1. Applying for an initial operator’s license, an initial instruction permit, or reinstatement of a license when vision must be tested as required in KRS 186.480 :
      1. Prior to the time of application under subsection (5) of this section; or
      2. By Kentucky State Police at the time of application;
    2. Applying for operator’s license renewal or instruction permit renewal:
      1. Prior to the time of application under subsection (5) of this section; or
      2. By the Transportation Cabinet at the time of application; or
    3. Identified in Kentucky administrative regulations promulgated by the Transportation Cabinet or the Kentucky State Police as being required to undergo the exam required by KRS 186.480 .
    1. Persons whose visual acuity is 20/40 or better and who meet or exceed the visual field standard established by the Transportation Cabinet without corrective lenses shall not have a restriction placed on their driving privileges. (3) (a) Persons whose visual acuity is 20/40 or better and who meet or exceed the visual field standard established by the Transportation Cabinet without corrective lenses shall not have a restriction placed on their driving privileges.
    2. Persons whose visual acuity is 20/40 or better and who meet or exceed the visual field standard established by the Transportation Cabinet with corrective lenses shall have their driving privileges restricted to mandate the use of the corrective lenses.
    3. If a person fails to meet a 20/40 visual acuity standard or the visual field standard established by the cabinet, the person shall be referred to a vision specialist for examination.
  2. A person referred to a vision specialist under subsection (3) of this section whose visual acuity is 20/60 or better and who meets or exceeds the visual field standard established by the cabinet shall be eligible to test for an instruction permit or operator’s license, or shall be eligible for operator’s license renewal. If corrective lenses were prescribed by the vision specialist, the person’s driving privileges shall be restricted to mandate the use of the corrective lenses.
  3. Vision tests administered under subsection (2)(a) of this section shall be deemed to meet the testing provisions outlined in subsection (3) or (4) of this section, if the person submits a driver vision testing form that complies with the provisions of subsection (6) of this section and the form has been completed by:
    1. A vision specialist; or
    2. An osteopath, physician, or advanced practice registered nurse who is credentialed by the cabinet to perform vision testing under this section.
  4. All driver vision testing forms completed under subsection (5) of this section shall:
    1. Attest that the applicant meets or exceeds the visual acuity standard and visual field standard established by the cabinet;
    2. Only be valid if the vision specialist or the credentialed osteopath, credentialed physician, or credentialed advanced practice registered nurse signed and completed the vision testing form less than twelve (12) months prior to the date of application or renewal;
    3. State whether the driving privileges of the applicant shall be restricted to mandate the use of corrective lenses; and
    4. Clearly indicate that the vision testing under this section is a screening for minimum vision standards established in this section and is not a complete eye examination.
  5. Any person seeking application or permit under subsection (1) of this section shall attest that he or she has submitted to and passed the visual acuity and visual field tests required under this section.
  6. Any person renewing an operator’s license under KRS 186.416 shall be exempt from the vision testing requirements outlined in this section.
  7. Persons who meet the requirements of KRS 186.578 and are issued operator’s licenses under KRS 186.579 shall:
    1. Have their driving privileges restricted to the use of a bioptic telescopic device; and
    2. Be exempt from this section.
  8. The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to implement the provisions of this section, including but not limited to establishing visual field standards, the creation of a driver vision testing form, and establishing a credentialing process for osteopaths, physicians, and advanced practice registered nurses to conduct vision testing under this section.
  9. The Transportation Cabinet may promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to:
    1. Implement a system for electronic transmission of driver vision testing forms and accompanying documentation; and
    2. Assess a fee to an applicant to cover the administrative costs of performing on-site vision testing. Any funds received from this fee shall be deposited into the photo license account established in KRS 174.056 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 396, § 2, effective January 1, 2001; 2007, ch. 85, § 198, effective June 26, 2007; 2021 ch. 126, § 1, effective July 1, 2024.

186.578. Visual acuity requirements for certified driver training program — Testing of knowledge of motor vehicle laws — Out-of-state drivers establishing residence in Kentucky — Restriction on taking of operator’s license examination after three failings — Consequence of failure to pass examination.

  1. Applicants accepted to participate in a certified driver training program shall meet the following minimum vision requirements:
    1. A distance visual acuity of 20/200 or better, with corrective lenses, in the applicant’s better eye;
    2. A visual field of at least one hundred twenty (120) degrees horizontally and eighty (80) degrees vertically in the same eye as used in paragraph (a) of this subsection;
    3. A distance visual acuity of 20/60 or better using a bioptic telescopic device; and
    4. No ocular diagnosis or prognosis that indicates a likelihood that significant deterioration of visual acuity or visual field to levels below the minimum standards outlined in this subsection will occur.
  2. Upon acceptance into a certified driver training program, an applicant shall be given an examination to test his or her knowledge of the motor vehicle laws of the Commonwealth. This examination may be taken orally. Upon successful completion of this examination, the applicant shall be issued a temporary instruction permit, that shall be valid only when the applicant is accompanied by an employee of a certified driver training program. Temporary instruction permits issued under this section shall be valid for one (1) year from the date of issue.
  3. An applicant who successfully completes a certified driver training program shall be reexamined by a vision specialist upon completion of the program. The examination shall certify that the applicant continues to meet the visual acuity and visual field standards set forth in subsection (1) of this section.
  4. An applicant who successfully completes a certified driving training program and passes the visual reexamination required by subsection (3) of this section shall be eligible to take a comprehensive operator’s license examination administered by the Department of Kentucky State Police. The operator’s license examination shall include testing of the applicant’s driving skills over a route specifically designed to test the applicant’s competency using a bioptic telescopic device.
  5. An applicant who is a restricted out-of-state driver establishing residence in Kentucky shall be required to take and pass a temporary instruction permit examination before being eligible to take the operator’s license examination. An applicant who is a restricted out-of-state driver establishing residence in Kentucky shall not be required to complete a certified driver training program but shall be required to take and pass the visual examination outlined in subsection (3) of this section before taking the operator’s license examination.
  6. If an applicant or restricted out-of-state driver fails the operator’s license examination three (3) times, he or she shall not be eligible to retake the examination until successfully completing additional training from a certified driver training program and obtaining an affidavit from the program director or bioptic driving instructor recommending that the applicant or restricted out-of-state driver be allowed to retake the examination.
  7. The Office of Vocational Rehabilitation in the Education and Workforce Development Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A to set standards for a certified driver training program and to otherwise carry out the provisions of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 396, § 3, effective January 1, 2001; 2006, ch. 211, § 117, effective July 12, 2006; 2007, ch. 85, § 199, effective June 26, 2007; 2014, ch. 51, § 1, effective July 15, 2014; 2019 ch. 146, § 53, effective June 27, 2019.

186.579. Restricted operator’s license requiring daytime driving, use of bioptic telescopic device, and vehicle with left and right outside mirrors — Removal of restrictions — Renewal.

  1. The Transportation Cabinet shall issue, to an applicant who successfully passes the operator’s license examination outlined in KRS 186.578(4), an operator’s license with the following restrictions:
    1. Required use of a bioptic telescopic device;
    2. Restricted to daytime driving upon the recommendation of a vision specialist; and
    3. Restricted to vehicles with left and right outside mirrors.
  2. A restriction to daytime driving in accordance with subsection (1) of this section shall be removed if the licensed driver:
    1. Obtains a recommendation from a vision specialist;
    2. Successfully completes additional evaluation and training specifically designed for night driving from a certified driver training program; and
    3. Passes a comprehensive night driving examination.
  3. An operator’s license issued under KRS 186.578 and 186.579 shall be effective for one (1) year and shall expire on the last day of the birth month of the license holder. The license holder shall undergo a comprehensive visual examination by a vision specialist before a license can be renewed. If the vision specialist certifies that the conditions causing the visual impairment are stable, then the cabinet shall issue a renewal license. If the conditions causing the visual impairment are unstable or deteriorating, the license holder may be required to undergo additional testing as required by the department before a renewal license may be issued.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 396, § 4, effective January 1, 2001; 2014, ch. 51, § 2, effective July 15, 2014; 2017 ch. 100, § 28, effective January 1, 2019; 2020 ch. 51, § 24, effective March 27, 2020.

186.580. Appeals.

If any person is aggrieved by any final order of the cabinet relating to the denial, revocation, suspension, or cancellation of an operator’s license or motorcycle operator’s license other than orders of revocation or suspension when the facts render revocation or suspension mandatory, he may file a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court of the county in which he resides, or in the Franklin Circuit Court in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B.

History. 2739m-44, 2739m-70: amend. Acts 1968, ch. 63, § 7; 1970, ch. 22, § 9; 1970, ch. 74, § 1; 1996, ch. 318, § 73, effective July 15, 1996; 2020 ch. 51, § 25, effective March 27, 2020.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Construction.

The statutory scheme contemplates that the aggrieved party will first apply to the Department (now Cabinet) to obtain relief from its order and if this is unavailing or the Department (now Cabinet) fails to act within 15 days, he then has 15 more days within which to petition the quarterly court for relief. Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Safety v. McCuiston, 431 S.W.2d 724, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 375 ( Ky. 1968 ) (decision prior to 1970 amendment).

When an aggrieved party is in literal compliance with the statute and the administrative agency is afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard, judicial review of the administrative order is proper. Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Safety v. Bell, 453 S.W.2d 749, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 340 ( Ky. 1970 ).

2.Suspension of License.

Since the suspension of an operator’s license is not part of the penalty for speeding and the suspension proceeding is separate from the criminal processes culminating in a conviction, the action of the Department (now Cabinet) in suspending the license after the time to appeal from the police court’s conviction had expired was not arbitrary nor unreasonable nor a violation of due process. Commonwealth Dep't of Public Safety v. Palmisano, 444 S.W.2d 128, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 203 ( Ky. 1969 ).

District Court was a court of limited jurisdiction and was allowed to exercise original jurisdiction only as provided by the General Assembly; a District Court was without jurisdiction to review the denial of a driver’s license, or to order the Secretary of the Transportation Cabinet to issue or reinstate an administratively revoked license, and the Circuit Court’s order affirming the District Court’s order directing reinstatement of a driver’s license was reversed. Commonwealth Transp. Cabinet v. Mohney, 107 S.W.3d 907, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 140 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

3.Grievance.
4.— Civil Proceeding.

The grievance proceeding to rescind a suspension is civil in nature. Commonwealth Dep't of Public Safety v. Palmisano, 444 S.W.2d 128, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 203 ( Ky. 1969 ).

5.— Time for Presenting.

The aggrieved party is not limited with respect to the time when he may present his grievance to the Department (now Cabinet), and the 30-day appeal time would begin to run from the date he mails, or if he does not use the mail, when he files his grievance with the Department (now Cabinet). Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Safety v. McCuiston, 431 S.W.2d 724, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 375 ( Ky. 1968 ).

6.— Stating Grounds.

Advising the Department of Public Safety (now Transportation Cabinet) of the grievance and stating the grounds for it is a condition precedent to petitioning the quarterly court for relief. Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Safety v. McCuiston, 431 S.W.2d 724, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 375 ( Ky. 1968 ) (decision prior to 1970 amendment).

A proper notification to the Department (now Cabinet) of a grievance should conform to what the statute requires. Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Safety v. McCuiston, 431 S.W.2d 724, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 375 ( Ky. 1968 ).

7.Circuit Court.
8.— Time for Filing Action.

The 30 day appeal time begins to run when the Department (now Cabinet) is notified of the grievance. Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Safety v. McCuiston, 431 S.W.2d 724, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 375 ( Ky. 1968 ).

The prohibition against proceeding in less than 15 days is to give the Department of Public Safety (now Transportation Cabinet) time within which to pass upon the grievance. Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Safety v. McCuiston, 431 S.W.2d 724, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 375 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Retroactive effect would not be given to a decision changing the time computation for review so that it commences from the date the Department (now Cabinet) acts or must act on the grievance notice filed by the license holder. Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Safety v. Bell, 453 S.W.2d 749, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 340 ( Ky. 1970 ).

9.— Proceedings.

Where on testimony heard, the trial court accepted the proof offered by the defendant-appellee, and in substance found that the appellee was not exceeding the speed limit by 26 miles per hour and the evidence sustained the decision, the findings were not clearly erroneous. Commonwealth Dep't of Public Safety v. Palmisano, 444 S.W.2d 128, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 203 ( Ky. 1969 ).

10.Limited to Discretionary Suspension.

Under this section the quarterly court’s jurisdiction is limited to cases of discretionary suspensions of licenses. Commonwealth ex rel. Allphin v. Stumbo, 258 S.W.2d 910, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 892 ( Ky. 1953 ) (decision prior to 1970 amendment).

11.Nonappearance of Department.

Where the driver who was suspended filed a petition in quarterly court, a date for hearing was set, and the Department (now Cabinet) notified, the driver had complied with the procedure even though the Department (now Cabinet) chose not to appear. Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Safety v. Bell, 453 S.W.2d 749, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 340 ( Ky. 1970 ) (decision prior to 1970 amendment).

12.Stay of Ruling.

Administrative action suspending or revoking motorist’s operator’s license should be attended by a hearing with all due process, and judicial review of such action would be based on whether the action was arbitrary on the basis of the record. In case where license was suspended for six months without hearing, Circuit Court judgment suspending it for 45 days could not be questioned by the Department of Public Safety (now Transportation Cabinet), as its decision was given more validity than it deserved. Commonwealth, Dep't Public Safety v. Thomas, 467 S.W.2d 335, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 364 ( Ky. 1971 ).

13.Jurisdiction.

When defendant was convicted of driving while under the influence of alcohol, fourth offense, and had his driving privileges permanently revoked pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 322.28(2)(e), he was not entitled to a Kentucky driver’s license. A new or renewal license was not authorized under Kentucky law because of defendant’s convictions in Florida; KRS 186.580(2) vested jurisdiction in the Circuit Court. Commonwealth Transp. Cabinet v. Mohney, 107 S.W.3d 907, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 140 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

Cited:

Sturgill v. Beard, 303 S.W.2d 908, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 275 ( Ky. 1957 ), overruled, Commonwealth, Dep’t Public Safety v. Thomas, 467 S.W.2d 335, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 364 ( Ky. 1971 ), overruled in part, Commonwealth, Dep’t Public Safety v. Thomas, 467 S.W.2d 335, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 364 ( Ky. 1971 ).

186.590. Minor’s negligence imputed to person signing application or allowing him or her to drive.

  1. Any negligence of a minor under the age of eighteen (18) who has been licensed upon an application signed as provided by KRS 186.470 , when driving any motor vehicle upon a highway, shall be imputed to the person who signed the application, if required, of the minor for the license. That person shall be jointly and severally liable with the minor for any damages caused by the negligence.
  2. If a minor deposits or there is deposited in his or her behalf, a proof of financial responsibility in form and amounts required by KRS 304.39-110 , the person who signed the application shall not, while such proof is maintained, be subject to the liability imposed by subsection (1). If the minor is the owner of a motor vehicle, the proof of financial responsibility shall be with respect to the operation of that motor vehicle; if not an owner, then with respect to the operation of any motor vehicle.
  3. Every motor vehicle owner who causes or knowingly permits a minor under the age of eighteen (18) to drive the vehicle upon a highway, and any person who gives or furnishes a motor vehicle to the minor shall be jointly and severally liable with the minor for damage caused by the negligence of the minor in driving the vehicle.

HISTORY: 2739m-41, 2739m-53, 2739m-54; 2017 ch. 11, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Purpose.

The General Assembly was not attempting to give defendants an additional defense to an action for negligence brought against them, but intended to provide only an additional source for the recovery of damages when the minor driver was held responsible for them. Sizemore v. Bailey's Adm'r, 293 S.W.2d 165, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 55 ( Ky. 1956 ).

2.Application.

One who sells an automobile to a minor under 18 years of age is not liable for his negligence. If “owner” was construed to include “seller” this statute would be unconstitutional. Ingram's Adm'r v. Advance Motor Co., 283 Ky. 87 , 140 S.W.2d 840, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 300 ( Ky. 1940 ).

This statute applies to all persons placing minors in charge of motor vehicles, regardless of ownership, with the exception of one who sells a motor vehicle to a minor. Peters v. Frey, 429 S.W.2d 847, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 758 ( Ky. 1968 ).

3.Statute of Limitation.

An action against the parent of a minor, under this section, for personal injuries arising from negligent operation of an automobile by the minor, is an action for personal injuries governed by the one-year period of limitation fixed by KRS 413.140(1)(a), and not an action upon a liability created by statute for which a five-year period of limitation is fixed by KRS 413.120(2). The fact that a judgment has been obtained against the minor, and that the judgment may be conclusive against the parent on the questions of negligence and damages, makes no difference. Robinson v. Hardaway, 293 Ky. 627 , 169 S.W.2d 823, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 675 ( Ky. 1943 ).

4.Liability.

When father signed the son’s application for a driver’s license, pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, he became liable for the son’s negligent acts. Wolford v. Wolford, 662 S.W.2d 835, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 203 ( Ky. 1984 ).

5.— Of Father.

Father was responsible for injury caused by negligent driving of 13-year-old son operating car in violation of law prohibiting any person under 14 years old from driving on highway at any time or under any conditions. Stevens v. Potter, 209 Ky. 705 , 273 S.W. 470, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 584 ( Ky. 1925 ) (decided under prior law).

6.— Owner.

Where the owner permitted a minor to operate his automobile and the minor became involved in an accident, the owner’s furnishing of proof of financial responsibility did not relieve him of his imputed liability. Benton v. Parks' Adm'r, 272 S.W.2d 466, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1108 ( Ky. 1954 ).

Liability could not be imputed under this section to holder of paper title at time of accident as he was not, as a matter of law, owner of the car despite the fact the paper title was still in his name where he had sold the car some weeks before the accident and had merely held paper title until the balance of purchase price was paid. Campbell v. State Farm Ins. Co., 346 S.W.2d 775, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 338 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Where truck owners gave a nephew permission to borrow their truck and without their knowledge he permitted another nephew of the truck owners who was an unlicensed minor to drive the truck on the highway, the truck owners were not liable under this section for damages caused by negligent operation of the truck by the unlicensed minor nephew although in the past they had allowed him to drive the truck on their farm. Meadows v. Bailey, 350 S.W.2d 630, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 120 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Owner who allowed licensed minor under 18 years of age to drive her car with her knowledge and consent became jointly and severally liable with him because of this section for injuries to passenger in the car. Asher v. Russell, 377 S.W.2d 803, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 501 ( Ky. 1964 ).

No liability attaches to owner of automobile unless it is first established that vehicle was operated with her permission. Commonwealth Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Manis, 549 S.W.2d 303, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 657 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Insurance company is bound by determination in trial on issue of whether automobile was operated with owner’s permission where it participated in the trial. Commonwealth Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Manis, 549 S.W.2d 303, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 657 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Minor’s father could not be held liable for minor’s negligence on grounds of furnishing car to minor where trial court found that despite the fact that paper title to the car was in the father’s name, the mother was the actual owner of the car as the result of a divorce decree. Beardon v. Derry, 645 S.W.2d 356, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 276 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

7.— Permitting Minor to Drive on Highway.

Any person who gives or furnishes a motor vehicle (whether he be the owner or not) to a minor is jointly and severally liable with the minor for damages caused by the minor’s negligence in driving the vehicle and garageman who had 17-year-old employe deliver automobile to a customer was liable although garageman was not the owner of the vehicle. Falender v. Hankins, 296 Ky. 396 , 177 S.W.2d 382, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 553 ( Ky. 1944 ).

Subsection (3) not only provides that a motor vehicle owner who causes or knowingly permits a minor under the age of eighteen to drive a vehicle upon the highway, shall be jointly and severally liable with the minor for damage caused by the latter’s negligence in driving the vehicle; but, in addition thereto, renders any other person who gives or furnishes a motor vehicle (whether he be the owner or not) to the minor, jointly and severally liable with the minor for damages caused by the latter’s negligence in driving the vehicle. Falender v. Hankins, 296 Ky. 396 , 177 S.W.2d 382, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 553 ( Ky. 1944 ).

By making the person liable who enables a minor to operate a motor vehicle, an additional source for the recovery of damages is provided. Peters v. Frey, 429 S.W.2d 847, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 758 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Where the defendant was a corporate officer of a trucking company and in that capacity hired a minor as a truck driver, the defendant was not excused from responsibility by reason of his capacity as an officer or employe of the corporation or of nonownership of the vehicle. Peters v. Frey, 429 S.W.2d 847, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 758 ( Ky. 1968 ).

This section applies to all minors, emancipated and unemancipated, under the age of eighteen, and father’s liability arises under subsection (3), regardless of a claim of emancipation. State Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 32 S.W.3d 508, 2000 Ky. App. LEXIS 9 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000).

8.— Basis.

Father who permitted thirteen-year-old son to use car was not liable for injury to son’s friend, whom son permitted to drive and who left brakes off when putting car into garage, allowing it to roll back upon him when he tried to stop it, violation of statute not being proximate cause of injury. Phillips v. Scott, 254 Ky. 340 , 71 S.W.2d 662, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 83 ( Ky. 1934 ) (decided under prior law).

Although, if car had been operated at time of accident by owner’s son under 16 years of age, liability would attach to owner, Court of Appeals need not decide whether liability would attach on that ground where son permitted friend over 18 years old to operate car, since liability attached pursuant to family purpose doctrine. Wells v. Lockhart, 258 Ky. 698 , 81 S.W.2d 5, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 224 ( Ky. 1935 ) (decided under prior law).

Where there was no evidence that father had knowledge of or had caused his 15-year-old son to use his delivery truck at the time of accident, the son’s negligence could not be imputed to the father under this section and the “family purpose” doctrine could not be invoked because the delivery truck was not used for the pleasure or convenience of the family and no other use of it was shown except the one night-time joy ride during which the accident occurred. Cook v. Hall, 308 Ky. 500 , 214 S.W.2d 1017, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 971 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Finding by jury that boy driving without a driver’s license was not negligent when he hit cows crossing the highway while he was driving school children home in his brother’s car at his mother’s request precluded recovery against his mother under this section since her liability was based upon the negligent driving of her son and not upon her negligence in allowing him to drive. Lewis v. Devasher, 267 S.W.2d 938, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 878 ( Ky. 1954 ).

When 17-year-old daughter lost control of car owned by her father and struck car parked in a no-parking zone any negligence on part of driver in parking in no-parking zone had no proximate causal connection with accident and daughter’s negligence was imputable to her father under this section. Lawhorn v. Holloway, 346 S.W.2d 302, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 302 ( Ky. 1961 ).

9.— — Insurance.

Where insurance policy made father an insured for any covered auto and agreed to payment for all sums the father was required to pay because of the injury or damage and where father was liable, under subsection (1) of this section, for damages because of bodily injury caused by the son’s negligence when operating a car when not insured, then since the son was not insured the father was liable because of the statute and was, therefore, covered by the policy. Wolford v. Wolford, 662 S.W.2d 835, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 203 ( Ky. 1984 ).

Father of defendant who pled guilty to reckless driving, later himself pled guilty to failure to maintain insurance required by KRS 304.39-080 (5) which requires owners of motor vehicles operated in Kentucky to maintain certain levels of liability insurance; KRS 304.99-060 provides criminal penalties for failure to maintain such required insurance; however, the combination of this section and KRS 304.39-080 (5), et seq., did not render parents of reckless son liable for the tort of their son; the injuries involved were not injuries “ . . . . . by the debtor (parents) . . . . . ” as required by 11 USCS § 523(a)(6) and while the conduct of the parents was at least arguably malicious in allowing the insurance to lapse, the willful requirement of 11 USCS § 523 (a)(6) had not been met and the defendant/parents were entitled to a summary judgment on that issue. Beyersdoerfer v. Bex, 143 B.R. 835, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1306 (E.D. Ky. 1992 ).

10.Proof of Responsibility.

This section does not mandate that the person signing the license application file proof of responsibility even though that act relieves him or her of liability. Bryan v. Bear, 560 S.W.2d 827, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 886 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

11.Liability of Signer Extinguished.

The liability imposed by subsection (1) of this section on persons signing minors’ license applications may be extinguished by compliance with subsection (2) of this section, and where the trial judge specifically determined that this requirement had been satisfied as it had been shown that minor was covered by insurance and had the ability to respond in damages, the trial court properly dismissed suit arising from minor’s negligent use of car as to minor’s father who had signed minor’s license application. Beardon v. Derry, 645 S.W.2d 356, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 276 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

Cited:

Finck v. Albers Super Markets, Inc., 136 F.2d 191, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 2994 (6th Cir. 1943); Johnston v. Hodges, 372 F. Supp. 1015, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9341 (E.D. Ky. 1974 ); Estes v. Gibson, 257 S.W.2d 604, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 802 , 36 A.L.R.2d 729 ( Ky. 1953 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

An operator’s license issued to a minor should be canceled where the parent required to sign for the minor rescinds his request or renounces his assumption of liability but where evidence of the minor’s financial responsibility remains in the file. OAG 65-840 .

A minor may own a motor vehicle, thus a county clerk can legally transfer the registration of a motor vehicle to a minor. OAG 66-784 .

Where a minor under the age of 18 applied for a motor vehicle operator’s license, and the minor’s father was deceased, his mother had been adjudged mentally incompetent, and he had no legally appointed guardian, the minor’s older brother, who was an adult, could sign the application for the minor as long as the adult brother was willing to assume the responsibilities imposed by this section. OAG 84-220 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Oberst, Recent Developments in Torts: Decisions of the Court of Appeals at the 1956-57 Terms, Proof of Negligence, 46 Ky. L.J. 193 (1958).

Kentucky Law Survey, Ausness, Torts, 64 Ky. L.J. 201 (1975-76).

Kentucky Law Survey, Clay, Insurance, 73 Ky. L.J. 423 (1984-85).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Tapp and Tincher, Of Innocents and Offenders: A Survey of Children’s Law in Kentucky, 30 N. Ky. L. Rev. 131 (2003).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Complaint Asserting Vicarious Liability Pursuant to KRS 186.590(3), Form 135.16.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Answer Denying Vicarious Liability under KRS 186.590 , Alleging Use Not Permissive, Form 135.17.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Automobiles/No Fault/Uninsured Motorist, § 135.00.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context Parent and Child, § 256.00.

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Automobiles, § 16.56.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Minors, § 30.17.

186.600. Age limit for drivers of school buses and public passenger-carrying vehicles. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739m-38: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 60; 1948, ch. 208, § 9; 1950, ch. 176, § 4; 1960, ch. 123, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1990, ch. 455, § 39, effective July 13, 1990.

186.610. Prohibited uses of licenses — Fraud in application.

No person shall:

  1. Display or cause or permit to be displayed or have in his possession any operator’s license knowing it to be fictitious or to have been canceled, revoked, suspended or altered;
  2. Lend to, or knowingly permit the use of by, one not entitled to, any operator’s license issued to the person so lending or permitting the use of the license;
  3. Represent as one’s own any operator’s license not issued to the person displaying the license;
  4. Fail to surrender to the cabinet upon demand, any operator’s license which has been suspended, canceled or revoked;
  5. Use a false name or give a false address in any application for an operator’s license or any renewal or duplicate, or knowingly make a false statement or knowingly conceal a material fact or otherwise commit a fraud in any application.

History. 2739m-56.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A police officer who is presented with a driver’s license he or she determines to be suspended or revoked should seize such license, both as a statutorily prohibited item and as evidence in connection with violation of subdivision (1) of this section, and deal with it accordingly; furthermore, upon seizing a driver’s license, a police officer should not then permit the person whose license is seized to operate a vehicle upon the highway. OAG 87-3 .

Violation of subdivision (1) of this section is a misdemeanor for which a full custody arrest may be effected, or in the alternative, a citation may be issued, in accordance with subsection (1) of KRS 431.015 . OAG 87-3 .

186.620. Unlawful to drive or permit another to drive without license — Display of license on request of peace officer — Defense.

  1. No person shall authorize or knowingly permit a motor vehicle owned or controlled by him to be driven by any person who has no legal right to drive it or in violation of any of the provisions of KRS 186.400 to 186.640 .
  2. No person who has not applied for an operator’s license or whose operator’s license has been denied, canceled, suspended or revoked, or whose privilege to operate a motor vehicle has been withdrawn, shall operate any motor vehicle upon the highways while the license is denied, canceled, suspended, or revoked or his privilege to operate a motor vehicle is withdrawn, or the license has not been applied for.
  3. If the operator of a motor vehicle on a public highway is requested by a peace officer, authorized to arrest a person for a violation of subsection (2) of this section or KRS 189A.090 , to display his operator’s license and fails to display his operator’s license, that fact shall be admissible in court and shall be prima facie proof of violation of subsection (2) of this section or KRS 189A.090 .
  4. It shall be a defense to a charge under this section and KRS 189A.090 if the person charged presents to the court an operator’s license issued to him before the date of the charge and which was valid on the date of the charge.

History. 2739m-58, 2739m-59; 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 21, effective July 1, 1991.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1.Contributory Negligence.

Where 14-year-old girl who was injured while a passenger in a borrowed automobile knew the 16-year-old driver was an unlicensed and inexperienced driver when she permitted her to drive the borrowed automobile, she was guilty of contributory negligence by reason of this section, thus barring her recovery of damages. Cambron v. Bartlett, 333 S.W.2d 764, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 206 ( Ky. 1960 ).

2.Driving While License Suspended.

Where vehicle was driven after suspension of operator’s license at a dangerous rate of speed for about six miles and across a county line, the offenses of reckless driving and driving without a license were continuous and could not be prosecuted as separate offenses in one of the counties, after conviction in the other. Huff v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 831, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 219 ( Ky. 1966 ).

3.Evidence.

Certified copy of Transportation Cabinet’s driving history satisfies authentication requirement of KRE Rule 902 as a self-authenticating official record in driving on suspended license prosecution. Commonwealth v. Duncan, 939 S.W.2d 336, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 1997 ).

The use of certified copy of driver’s driving history from the Transportation Cabinet is sufficient evidence of suspension or revocation of operator’s license for the purpose of prosecution under KRS 186.620(2) and is consistent with KRS 186.018 . Commonwealth v. Duncan, 939 S.W.2d 336, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 1997 ).

Cited:

Banks v. Department of Education, 462 S.W.2d 428, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 552 ( Ky. 1971 ); Sizemore v. District Court, 50th Judicial Dist., 735 F.2d 204, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 21937 (6th Cir. 1984); Toppass v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 587, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 133 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

Analysis

1.Applicability.

Unpublished decision: Seller of an automobile did not breach the duty set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186.620(1) where the jury determined that he had delivered the necessary title documents to the purchasers, the purchasers became the owners on the day that those documents were delivered, and since the seller was no longer an owner, he was under no duty to prevent either of the purchasers from driving the automobile on the date of the accident. Burchett v. Burchett, 2016 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 894 (Ky. Ct. App. May 13, 2016), review denied, ordered not published, 2017 Ky. LEXIS 104 (Ky. Mar. 15, 2017).

2.Driving While License Suspended.

Unpublished decision: Where defendant dropped a baggie of crack cocaine in anticipation of a strip-search at a jail, suppression was not warranted, because, inter alia, the police did not need reasonable suspicion or probable cause of defendant’s commission of any other crime to take defendant into custody and search defendant incident to arrest since police could properly arrest defendant for driving on a suspended license. United States v. Warfield, 404 Fed. Appx. 994, 2011 FED App. 0002N, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 55 (6th Cir. Ky. 2011 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A minibike is a motor vehicle as the term is defined by KRS 186.010 and it is a violation of this section for the owner of such vehicle to authorize or knowingly permit the bike to be operated on the street by an unlicensed minor. OAG 70-416 .

A violation of this section is not a “moving violation” within KRS 208.020(1)(a) (now repealed) and the juvenile court would have exclusive jurisdiction of such persons between the ages of 16 and 18 years. OAG 73-705 .

This section would apply to the situation where a person authorized or knowingly permitted a motor vehicle owned or controlled by him to be driven by a person under 16 years of age. OAG 73-705 .

A person may be specifically charged as knowingly permitting an unlicensed driver to operate a motor vehicle owned or controlled by him, but if the unlicensed driver is under the age of sixteen years, the jurisdiction of the case remains exclusively in the county court. OAG 74-796 .

An adult who permits a juvenile to operate a motor vehicle without an operator’s license may be proceeded against directly under this section or under KRS 530.070 in juvenile court for having an unlawful transaction with a minor and it is not necessary that the juvenile has been proceeded against in juvenile court. OAG 75-563 .

If a juvenile owning or having charge of a motor vehicle allows another without an operator’s license to operate it the juvenile must be proceeded against in juvenile court since a violation of this section is not a moving motor vehicle violation under the exception in KRS 208.020 (now repealed). OAG 75-563 .

A person who operates a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state must have either a valid Kentucky operator’s license or a valid operator’s permit from another state; failure to possess either of the above mentioned operator’s licenses means that the person is in violation of subsection (2) of this section if he operates a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state. OAG 83-67 .

The offense of driving a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state by a person whose operator’s license has been denied, canceled, suspended or revoked, or whose privilege to operate a motor vehicle has been withdrawn, is a misdemeanor. OAG 83-67 .

If a nonresident who has no Kentucky driver’s license, has had his license suspended or revoked by the issuing state, he then has no right to drive a motor vehicle upon the highways of Kentucky. OAG 83-67 .

If a police officer has evidence or knowledge that a nonresident driver found to be in violation of this section has previously ignored a citation or summons issued by a law enforcement officer of this state or some other jurisdiction, that would probably constitute reasonable grounds to believe that the person would not appear to answer the charges in connection with the most recent incident, thus justifying the person’s arrest. OAG 83-67 .

Since subsection (1) of KRS 189A.090 only pertains to violations of KRS 189A.010 , the defendant must stand convicted of prior offenses in violation of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants during the period his license was suspended or revoked. Should a prosecutor note that the defendant has been previously convicted of operating a motor vehicle while his license was revoked or suspended based upon another statute, e.g. KRS 186.560 or 186.570 , the defendant should be prosecuted under the provisions of subsection (2) of this section and KRS 186.642(3) (now repealed), which provide enhancement penalties for other types of subsequent revocation and suspension violations. OAG 89-30 .

The district court is not required to specifically warn a defendant who pleads guilty to a first offense violation of this section, KRS 189A.010 or KRS 189A.090 of the possibility of enhancement of punishment, in the event he is found guilty of a subsequent violation of the statute. OAG 89-30 .

A person may be charged with a violation of KRS 189A.090 only if he operates a motor vehicle while his driver’s license is revoked or suspended for violation of KRS 189A.010 . If the driver fails to have his driver’s license reinstated after the period of suspension for driving under the influence has elapsed, he should be charged with operating a vehicle without a valid driver’s license, contrary to this section. OAG 90-38 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Automobiles/No Fault/Uninsured Motorist, § 135.00.

186.630. Renting a motor vehicle to another.

  1. No person shall rent a motor vehicle to any other person if the latter is not licensed, unless he is a nonresident whose home state or country does not require that an operator be licensed.
  2. No person shall rent a motor vehicle to another until he has inspected the operator’s license of the person to whom the vehicle is to be rented and compared and verified the signature on the license with the signature of that person written in his presence.
  3. Every person renting a motor vehicle to another shall keep a record of the registration number of the motor vehicle rented, the name and address of the person to whom the vehicle is rented, the number of his license and the date and place of issuance of his license. That record shall be open to inspection by any police officer or employee of the cabinet.

History. 2739m-66.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Renting car to drunk or drug addict prohibited, KRS 189.530 .

186.635. Persons required to complete examinations under KRS 186.480. [Effective January 1, 2019]

The following persons shall be required to successfully complete the examinations required under KRS 186.480 prior to being issued a Kentucky operator’s license:

  1. A person who has been issued a Kentucky instruction permit or intermediate license;
  2. A person who has applied for a Kentucky operator’s license under KRS 186.412 or 186.4121 ; and
  3. Other persons as identified in an administrative regulation promulgated by the Department of Kentucky State Police or the Transportation Cabinet under KRS Chapter 13A.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 264, § 8, effective July 15, 2002; 2006, ch. 65, § 7, effective July 12, 2006; 2007, ch. 85, § 200, effective June 26, 2007; Former § 186.6401 was renumbered to be § 186.635 , by 2017, ch. 100, § 29, effective January 1, 2019.

186.640. Driving without operator’s license is evidence of negligence in accident.

Any driver involved in any accident resulting in any damage whatever to person or to property who is ineligible to procure an operator’s license, or being eligible therefor has failed to procure a license, or whose license has been canceled, suspended or revoked prior to the time of the accident, shall be deemed prima facie negligent in causing or contributing to cause the accident.

History. 2739m-62.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Driving Without License.

It is not competent for the general assembly to make the mere failure to secure an operator’s license prima facie evidence of negligent driving, since such a violation of law has no evidentiary relation to or logical tendency to prove the fact of negligence. Tipton v. Estill Ice Co., 279 Ky. 793 , 132 S.W.2d 347, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 365 ( Ky. 1939 ).

In an action arising from a motor vehicle accident in a parking lot, the trial court properly precluded the plaintiff from introducing evidence that the defendant’s driver’s license had been suspended because of his failure to attend alcohol classes following a prior alcohol-related motorcycle accident in which he had sustained personal injuries, since the fact of consequence in the action was whether the manner in which the defendant operated his vehicle was a substantial factor in causing the accident and his status as a licensed or unlicensed driver did not tend to prove or disprove that fact. Rentschler v. Lewis, 33 S.W.3d 518, 2000 Ky. LEXIS 113 ( Ky. 2000 ).

2.Contributory Negligence.

Even if 16-year-old driving without a driver’s license had been found guilty of negligence by the jury, recovery of damages for death and injury to cows would have been barred by the contributory negligence of owner of the cows in allowing his 15-year-old son to drive 10 cows across the road without warning to motorists. Lewis v. Devasher, 267 S.W.2d 938, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 878 ( Ky. 1954 ).

Cited:

Toppass v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 587, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 133 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Vogeler, Is Section 2739m-62 of the Kentucky Statutes Constitutional?, 27 Ky. L.J. 318 (1939).

186.6401. Persons required to complete examinations under KRS 186.480. [Renumbered.]

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 264, § 8, effective July 15, 2002; 2006, ch. 65, § 7, effective July 12, 2006; 2007, ch. 85, § 200, effective June 26, 2007.

Compiler's Notes.

This section was renumbered as KRS 186.635 .

Habitual Violator

186.641. When abstract of driving record to be certified to county attorney.

On and after June 21, 1974, and when the records of the Transportation Cabinet disclose that any person has been convicted under the traffic laws of this state, or a valid municipal or county ordinance paralleling and substantially conforming to a like state law, of an offense occurring on or after June 21, 1974, which record of conviction, when taken with, and added to the previous convictions of such person of offenses occurring within five (5) years prior to the date of such offense, as contained in the files of the Transportation Cabinet, shall reveal that said person is an habitual violator, as hereinafter defined, the secretary of the Transportation Cabinet shall forthwith certify to the county attorney of the county in which such person resides according to the records of the cabinet, a full and complete abstract of the person’s driving record as shown in the files of the cabinet. The provisions of this section shall apply only to offenses and records of offenses committed after June 21, 1974. These provisions shall have no retroactive effect before June 21, 1974.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 374, § 1.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A driving under the influence (DUI) conviction entered prior to June 21, 1974 may be used to enhance the penalty for a subsequent DUI conviction pursuant to KRS 189.520(2) and KRS 189.990 (9)(a). OAG 84-175 (opinion prior to 1984 amendment of KRS 189.990 ).

186.642. “Habitual violator” defined. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 374, § 2, repealed and reenacted by Acts 1994, ch. 279, § 3, effective July 1, 1994) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 467, § 31, effective October 1, 2000.

186.643. Information to be filed by county attorney. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 374, § 3) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 467, § 31, effective October 1, 2000.

186.644. Hearing. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 374, § 4) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 467, § 31, effective October 1, 2000.

186.645. Findings of court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 374, § 5) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 467, § 31, effective October 1, 2000.

186.646. License not to be issued to habitual violator. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 374, § 6) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 467, § 31, effective October 1, 2000.

186.647. Restoration of license. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 374, § 7) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 467, § 31, effective October 1, 2000.

186.648. Appeal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 374, § 8) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 467, § 31, effective October 1, 2000.

186.649. Law not to affect existing laws or ordinances of political subdivisions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 374, § 9) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 467, § 31, effective October 1, 2000.

Registration of Trailers

186.650. Definitions for KRS 186.650 to 186.700.

As used in KRS 186.650 to 186.700 :

  1. A “trailer” means any vehicle designed for carrying persons or property and being drawn by a motor vehicle being so constructed that no part of its weight rests upon the towing vehicle.
  2. “Semitrailer” means any vehicle designed for carrying persons or property and for being drawn by a motor vehicle and is so constructed that some part of its weight and some part of its load rests upon or is carried by another vehicle, except that:
    1. “Semitrailer” shall not include any vehicle designed for carrying persons or property and being drawn by a motor vehicle registered according to the provisions of KRS 186.050(4)(a) and used by a farmer only for transporting persons, food, provender, feed, machinery, livestock, material and supplies necessary for his farming operation, and the products grown on his farm.
  3. “Manufactured home” means a structure, transportable in one (1) or more sections, which:
    1. Is eight (8) body feet or more in width and forty (40) body feet or more in length when in the traveling mode;
    2. Has three hundred twenty (320) or more square feet when erected on site;
    3. Is built on a permanent chassis;
    4. Is designed to be used as a dwelling, with or without a permanent foundation, when connected to the required utilities;
    5. Includes plumbing, heating, air-conditioning, and electrical systems; and
    6. May be used as a place of residence, business, profession, or trade by the owner, lessee or their assigns, and may consist of one (1) or more units that can be attached or joined together to comprise an integral unit or condominium structure.
  4. “Recreational vehicle” means a vehicular type unit primarily designed as temporary living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use, which either has its own motive power or is mounted on or drawn by another vehicle. The basic entities are: travel trailer, camping trailer, truck camper, and motor home;
    1. A travel trailer is a vehicular unit, mounted on wheels, designed to provide temporary living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use. It shall be a size and weight which shall not require special highway movement permits when drawn by a motorized vehicle. It shall have a living area of less than two hundred twenty (220) square feet, excluding built-in equipment (such as wardrobes, closets, cabinets, kitchen units, or fixtures) and bath and toilet rooms. The exterior area of a travel trailer shall be less than three hundred twenty (320) square feet.
    2. A camping trailer is a vehicular portable unit mounted on wheels and constructed with collapsible partial side walls which fold for towing by another vehicle and unfold at the camp site to provide temporary living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use.
    3. A truck camper is a portable unit constructed to provide temporary living quarters for recreational, travel, or camping use, consisting of a roof, floor, and sides, designed to be loaded onto and unloaded from the bed of a pick-up truck.
    4. A motor home is a vehicular unit designed to provide temporary living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use built on or permanently attached to, a self-propelled motor vehicle chassis or on a chassis cab or van which is an integral part of the completed vehicle.
  5. “Cabinet” means the Transportation Cabinet.

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 6, § 1; 1962, ch. 62, § 18; 1966, ch. 255, § 172; 1974, ch. 90, § 3; 1974, ch. 368, § 3; 1982, ch. 395, § 10, effective July 15, 1982; 1994, ch. 42, § 1, effective July 15, 1994.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Department of Revenue ex rel. Scent v. Williams, 351 S.W.2d 875, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 186 ( Ky. 1961 ); Department of Revenue ex rel. Carpenter v. Pullman, Inc. (Trailmobile Div.), 560 S.W.2d 18, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 875 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Vanover v. Bank of Alexandria, 644 S.W.2d 948, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 274 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); Hiers v. Bank One, 946 S.W.2d 196, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 167 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996); Westenhoefer v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Stagnoli), — B.R. —, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 238 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2007 ); Wright v. Miller, 629 S.W.3d 813, 2021 Ky. App. LEXIS 53 (Ky. Ct. App. 2021).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If farm equipment dealers are using their own trailers to haul farm equipment to and from farms, such trailers are exempt from the provisions of the trailer licensing statutes. OAG 61-741 .

Housetrailers which are included within the definition contained in this section must be registered as provided by KRS 186.655(1) with the county clerk before they can be towed upon the public highways of the commonwealth. OAG 63-677 .

A modular home is not a housetrailer under this section. OAG 75-249 .

A regulation, adopted by a city or county legislative body, which includes modular homes in the definition of “housetrailer” is invalid since it is at variance with the statutory definition of that term. OAG 75-249 .

186.655. Time of registration — Application — Affidavit — Sales tax.

  1. Before any owner or operator of a trailer, semitrailer, or recreational vehicle may operate upon the highways, the owner shall apply for registration to the county clerk of the county in which he resides or in which the vehicles are principally operated. The application shall be retained by the clerk and shall be accompanied by:
    1. A manufacturer’s certificate of origin, if the application is for the registration of a new trailer, semitrailer, or recreational vehicle;
    2. The owner’s registration receipt, if the trailer, semitrailer, or recreational vehicle was last registered in this state;
    3. A bill of sale and the previous registration receipt, if last registered in another state that does not require the owner of a trailer, semitrailer, or recreational vehicle to obtain a certificate of title or ownership;
    4. A certificate of title, if last registered in another state that requires the owner of a trailer, semitrailer, or recreational vehicle to obtain a certificate of title or ownership;
    5. An affidavit from the owner of a trailer, semitrailer, or recreational vehicle assembled or constructed for his personal use on the highways; or
    6. An affidavit from the owner of a trailer, semitrailer, or recreational vehicle where the bill of sale for the vehicle has been lost, destroyed, or stolen.
  2. The affidavit required in paragraph (e) of subsection (1) of this section shall contain the owner’s name, address, date, brief description, and a statement that the trailer was constructed by the owner for use on the highways and additional information the cabinet may require by administrative regulation promulgated pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A.
  3. The affidavit required in paragraph (f) of subsection (1) of this section shall contain the owner’s name, address, date, make, year made, serial or identification number, name of the person from whom purchased, date of purchase, a statement that the person making the affidavit is the sole owner, the circumstances under which the bill of sale was lost, destroyed, or stolen, and additional information the cabinet may require by administrative regulation promulgated pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A.
  4. After initial registration of his vehicles in this state, the owner shall register his trailer, semitrailer, or recreational vehicle on or before April 1 of each year. Registration with the clerk shall be deemed to be registration with the cabinet.

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 6, § 2; 1958, ch. 70, § 26; 1962, ch. 62, § 19; 1966, ch. 139, § 15; 1976, ch. 133, § 15; 1976, ch. 236, § 1; 1982, ch. 395, § 11, effective July 15, 1982; 1994, ch. 42, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 2005, ch. 85, § 607, effective June 20, 2005; 2006, ch. 252, Part XIV, § 3, effective January 1, 2007.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Vanover v. Bank of Alexandria, 644 S.W.2d 948, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 274 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Trailers used solely to lower gravesite vaults into the grave must be registered even though they are not used for transportation because they are within the legal definition of a trailer in design and capabilities. OAG 76-123 .

There is nothing in this section indicating that the term “other officers” includes the circuit clerk. OAG 76-357 .

Acts 1976, ch. 236 and ch. 133 as they relate to registration of motor vehicles, house trailers, mobile homes, or recreational vehicles and the collection of sales and use tax on such vehicles do not apply to the registration of motor boats, since the term “recreational vehicles” and the term “motor vehicle” do not embrace motor boats. OAG 76-357 .

The clerk does not have to search the record to determine whether there are any outstanding security interests on the house trailer if he subsequently issues a new certificate of title pursuant to subdivision (f) of this section, rather his only duty under the statute is to obtain an affidavit, and to that effect he may rely upon the statements therein; the duty of searching the title rests upon the subsequent lender or buyer. OAG 79-57 .

The clerk will not be liable for any losses incurred by the prior lender if its lien of record was not noted in the affidavit where he issues a new certificate of title pursuant to subdivision (f) of this section. OAG 79-57 .

Where one company filed a financing statement in September of 1979, listing a mobile home, with an accompanying affidavit that the mobile home would not be used on public highways, and a second company filed a financing statement in October of 1979, listing the same mobile home, with an accompanying license registration receipt issued by the county clerk’s office on which the second company was listed as the first lienholder on the mobile home, the fact that at the time of the filing of the first company’s financing statement there was no certificate of registration for the mobile home in existence in no way militates against the principle that the proper filing of the financing statement perfected the lien; the county clerk is now required to note the first lien of the company that filed the September statement on the certificate of registration that came into existence later. OAG 80-103 .

Whereas the General Assembly had not given the Transportation Cabinet the authority to extend the time for the registration of Kentucky trailers, the registration deadline remained April 1 as provided in subsection (4) of this section, and therefore, a commissioner of the Transportation Cabinet had no authority to extend the registration deadline for trailers to April 30. OAG 84-156 .

186.660. Trailer, semitrailer, mobile home or recreational vehicle last registered in another state.

A trailer, semitrailer, mobile home or recreational vehicle last registered in another state and purchased by a person for operation in this state shall be first registered in this state by and in the name of the purchaser and not in the name of the seller.

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 6, § 3, effective January 1, 1957; 1982, ch. 395, § 12, effective July 15, 1982.

186.665. Inability to register trailer, semitrailer, mobile home or recreational vehicle before April 1.

If an owner because of sickness or absence from the state is unable to renew the registration of his trailer, semitrailer, mobile home or recreational vehicle on or before April 1, he will be deemed to have complied with the law, if before operating the trailer, semitrailer, mobile home or recreational vehicle in this state he registers it at some later date and pays the fee for the full year, just as though he had renewed the registration on or before April 1. The owner shall file with the application an affidavit showing sickness or absence.

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 6, § 4; 1966, ch. 139, § 16; 1982, ch. 395, § 13, effective July 15, 1982.

186.670. Application blanks — Registration receipt and plate.

  1. The application blank shall contain blank spaces for, and the applicant shall fill in the owner’s name and post office address, make of the trailer, semitrailer, mobile home or recreational vehicle, and serial or identification number. Every application shall be accompanied by the appropriate fee.
  2. Upon filing application and paying the fee as provided by law, said owner shall be given a receipt containing the registration number and the information included in the application and one (1) plate for the registration year bearing said number.

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 6, §§ 5, 6, effective January 1, 1957; 1982, ch. 395, § 14, effective July 15, 1982.

186.675. Annual fees — Permanent registration and fee.

  1. The annual registration fee for trailers and semitrailers which are drawn by motor vehicles required to be licensed under KRS 186.050(1) shall be four dollars and fifty cents ($4.50). The annual registration fee for trailers and semitrailers which are drawn by motor vehicles required to be licensed under KRS 186.050(3) to (13) shall be nineteen dollars and fifty cents ($19.50).
  2. The provisions of KRS 186.650 to 186.700 shall not apply to privately owned and operated trailers used for the transportation of:
    1. Boats;
    2. Luggage;
    3. Personal effects;
    4. Farm products, farm supplies, or farm equipment;
    5. All-terrain vehicles as defined in KRS 189.010(24);
    6. Wildlife as defined in KRS 150.010(45) that the owner or operator of the trailer has obtained while hunting; and
    7. Firearms or other supplies used in conjunction with hunting wildlife.
  3. The registration fee for mobile homes and recreational vehicles shall be nine dollars and fifty cents ($9.50) except the registration fee for camping trailers, travel trailers, and truck campers shall be four dollars and fifty cents ($4.50). The clerk shall issue the registration plate furnished by the cabinet and shall be paid for this service the sum of one dollar ($1).
  4. Beginning April 1, 1993, at the request of the owner, trailers and semitrailers which are drawn by motor vehicles required to be licensed under KRS 186.050(3) to (13) may be permanently registered, except the registration shall expire when the trailer or semitrailer is sold or when it is otherwise permanently removed from service by the owner. The registration fee for the period shall be ninety-eight dollars ($98). The clerk shall issue the registration plate furnished by the cabinet and shall be paid for this service the sum of three dollars ($3).

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 6, § 7; 1958, ch. 70, § 27; 1966, ch. 139, § 17; 1978, ch. 84, § 6, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 25, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 395, § 15, effective July 15, 1982; 1992, ch. 14, § 1, effective April 1, 1993; 1994, ch. 428, § 32, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 460, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2017 ch. 129, § 9, effective June 29, 2017; 2019 ch. 115, § 11, effective June 27, 2019; 2019 ch. 167, § 5, effective June 27, 2019.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(7/15/2020). A reference to “KRS 150.010(45)” in subsection (2)(f) of this statute has been changed to “KRS 150.010(46)” to conform with renumbering of definitions in that statute during the codification of 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 115, sec. 2.

(6/27/2019). This statute was amended by 2019 Ky. Acts chs. 115 and 167, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

186.680. Registration fees for portion of year.

If a person becomes the owner of a trailer, semitrailer, or recreational vehicle after April 1 of any year, and for that reason registers for only part of a year, the registration fee shall be as many twelfths of the annual fee as there are unexpired months in the registration year.

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 6, § 8; 1966, ch. 139, § 18; 1982, ch. 395, § 16, effective July 15, 1982; 1994, ch. 42, § 3, effective July 15, 1994.

186.685. Registration plates — Design.

The cabinet shall prescribe a plate of practical form and size which shall contain only the registration number and the word “Trailer” and the abbreviation of the word “Kentucky”.

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 6, § 9, effective January 1, 1957.

186.690. Application of KRS 186.045 and 186.070 to 186.240.

KRS 186.045 and 186.070 to 186.240 shall apply to the registration of trailers, semitrailers, and recreational vehicles if practicable.

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 6, § 10; 1966, ch. 139, § 19; 1982, ch. 395, § 17, effective July 15, 1982; 1994, ch. 42, § 4, effective July 15, 1994.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a bank made a loan on a house trailer and recorded the financing statement but did not present a registration certificate for the lien to be recorded on, if at a later date the registration receipt for the house trailer is presented for recording in that county the lien information should be recorded on such receipt. OAG 64-563 .

Where a bank made a loan on a house trailer and recorded the financing statement but did not present a registration certificate for the lien to be recorded on, if a subsequent loan is made by another and the registration receipt is presented the first loan is classified as the first mortgage against the trailer. OAG 64-563 .

Since the clerk is not personally responsible for determining how the house trailer is being used, he may rely upon the secured party’s representation that it is or is not subject to registration, and may rely upon the secured party’s representation that a financing statement is all that is required, or if the secured party also presents a registration receipt, he may note the lien thereon. OAG 79-57 .

186.695. Exemptions.

  1. Trailers, semitrailers, and manufactured homes as defined in KRS 186.650 to 186.700 are expressly exempted from KRS 138.450 to 138.470 .
  2. Trailers and semitrailers in transit between a manufacturing plant and dealer’s place of business; between a manufacturing plant and user’s place of residence; or between a dealer’s place of business and user’s place of residence and farm equipment pulled or towed by a motor vehicle not required to be licensed under the provisions of KRS Chapter 186 shall be exempt from the provisions of KRS 186.650 to 186.700 .
  3. Recreational vehicles and manufactured homes in transit between a manufacturing plant and dealer’s place of business shall be exempt from the provisions of KRS 186.650 to 186.700 .
  4. Manufactured homes shall be exempt from the provisions of KRS 186.650 to 186.700 .

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 6, §§ 11, 11a; 1966, ch. 120, § 1; 1982, ch. 395, § 18, effective July 15, 1982; 1994, ch. 42, §§ 5, 8, effective July 15, 1994.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/94). This section was amended by 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 42, secs. 5 and 8 which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Department of Revenue ex rel. Carpenter v. Pullman, Inc. (Trailmobile Div.), 560 S.W.2d 18, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 875 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

186.700. Department of Vehicle Regulation to administer KRS 186.650 to 186.700 — Cooperation with Transportation Cabinet.

The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall administer the provisions of KRS 186.650 to 186.700 , except that the Transportation Cabinet shall require an accounting by the clerk for the moneys received by the clerk under the provisions of KRS 186.675 and for all receipts, forms, plates and insignia consigned to him, and the clerk shall forward these moneys to the Transportation Cabinet in accordance with the other provisions of this chapter. The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall include on the registration receipts such information as shall be required by the Transportation Cabinet.

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 6, § 12; 1962, ch. 62, § 20.

186.750. Definitions for KRS 186.750 and 186.752.

As used in this section and KRS 186.752 :

  1. “Bi-fuel system” means the power system of motor vehicles that are powered by gasoline and either CNG or LNG;
  2. “Cabinet” means the Transportation Cabinet;
  3. “Clean transportation fuel” means:
    1. Propane, CNG, LNG, bi-fuel systems, or electricity when they are used as motor vehicle fuel; or
    2. Other transportation fuels determined by the division to be comparable with respect to emissions;
  4. “Compressed natural gas” or “CNG” means pipeline quality natural gas that is compressed and provided for sale or use as a motor vehicle fuel;
  5. “Conversion” means:
    1. Repowering a motor vehicle or special mobile equipment by replacing its original gasoline or diesel powered engine with one capable of operating on clean transportation fuel; or
    2. Retrofitting a motor vehicle or special mobile equipment with parts that enable its original gasoline or diesel powered engine to operate on clean transportation fuel;
  6. “Division” means the Division for Air Quality within the Energy and Environment Cabinet;
  7. “Liquefied natural gas,” “liquid natural gas,” or “LNG” means pipeline-quality natural gas treated to remove water, hydrogen sulfide, carbon dioxide, and other components that will freeze and condensed into liquid form for sale or use as a motor vehicle fuel;
  8. “Liquefied petroleum gas,” “propane,” or “LPG” means a hydrocarbon mixture produced as a by-product of natural gas processing and petroleum refining and condensed into liquid form for sale or use as a motor fuel;
  9. “Motor vehicle” means a self-propelled device by which a person or property may be transported upon a public highway, except a device moved by human or animal power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks, or which derives its power from overhead wires; and
  10. “Special mobile equipment” means a motor vehicle or mobile equipment not designed or used primarily to transport people, including but not limited to construction or maintenance equipment.

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 116, § 1, effective June 25, 2013.

186.752. Safety inspection required for vehicles converted to the use of natural gas after January 1, 2013 — Certification to owner and cabinet — Administrative regulations — Directions to cabinet.

  1. The owner of a motor vehicle that has been converted after January 1, 2013, to operate on either CNG or LNG alone or in a bi-fuel system shall have the motor vehicle inspected to ascertain compliance with relevant federal safety standards covering the use of these fuels. The safety inspection shall occur:
    1. At the time of the conversion;
    2. Every three (3) years or thirty-six thousand (36,000) miles after the conversion, whichever occurs first; and
    3. Following any collision in which any vehicle involved is traveling at five (5) miles per hour or greater.
  2. The owner of a motor vehicle originally designed and manufactured to use compressed or liquid natural gas as a fuel shall have it inspected for safety following any collision in which any vehicle involved is traveling at five (5) miles per hour or greater.
  3. A person who performs the conversion of a motor vehicle to operate on either CNG or LNG alone or in a bi-fuel system shall certify to the owner of the motor vehicle and the cabinet that the conversion does not tamper with, circumvent, or otherwise affect any existing motor vehicle emissions or diagnostic systems, except as necessary to complete the conversion.
  4. The cabinet may promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to carry out the provisions of this section to:
    1. Qualify persons to perform safety inspections on converted motor vehicles;
    2. Modify or adopt for state use any federal safety standards, if necessary; and
    3. Identify motor vehicles that have been converted to operate on clean transportation fuels and ensure compliance with the safety, emissions, and efficiency requirements of this section and applicable administrative regulations.
  5. In promulgating administrative regulations, the cabinet shall consider:
    1. Directing that inspections use equipment which is widely available in the state; and
    2. Creating a regulatory framework that encourages the conversion and sale of motor vehicles that operate on CNG, LNG, or a bi-fuel system.

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 116, § 2, effective June 25, 2013.

Nonresident Violators’ Compact

186.860. Authorization to develop and join the Nonresident Violator Compact.

The secretary of the Transportation Cabinet, the commissioner of the Department of Vehicle Regulation, or a duly authorized agent, is hereby authorized and directed to negotiate with other states for the purpose of developing and joining the “Nonresident Violator Compact.” The department may promulgate regulations concerning the administration of such compact and shall prescribe the penalties and procedures for the required compliance.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 287, § 1, effective June 17, 1978.

186.865. Motorcycle registration requirements — Health insurance requirements. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 21, § 2, effective July 15, 1998) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 319, § 4 and Acts 2000, ch. 393, § 48, effective July 14, 2000.

186.870. Motorcycle safety education program — Standards — Administrative regulations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 277, § 1, effective July 14, 1992) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 122, § 11, effective July 1, 2005.

186.875. Motorcycle rider training courses — Exemption from motorcycle driver’s license skill test. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 277, § 2, effective July 14, 1992) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 122, § 11, effective July 1, 2005.

186.880. Instructors — Requirements for approval. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 277, § 3, effective July 14, 1992) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 122, § 11, effective July 1, 2005.

186.885. Powers of cabinet. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 277, § 4, effective July 14, 1992) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 122, § 11, effective July 1, 2005.

186.890. Motorcycle safety education program fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 277, § 5, effective July 14, 1992) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 122, § 11, effective July 1, 2005.

186.891. Revenues relating to motorcycle safety education program fund — Report. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 280, § 17, effective April 9, 2002) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 122, § 11, effective July 1, 2005.

186.892. Motorcycle Safety Education Advisory Commission — Purpose. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2001, ch. 53, § 1, effective June 21, 2001) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 122, § 11, effective July 1, 2005.

186.893. Membership — Officers — Meetings. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2001, ch. 53, § 2, effective June 21, 2001) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 122, § 11, effective July 1, 2005.

186.894. Responsibilities of commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2001, ch. 53, § 3, effective June 21, 2001) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 122, § 11, effective July 1, 2005.

186.895. Annual report to Governor and General Assembly. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 277, § 6, effective July 14, 1992) was repealed by Act 2005, ch. 122, § 11, effective July 1, 2005.

Penalties

186.990. Penalties.

  1. Any person who violates any of the provisions of KRS 186.020 , 186.030 , 186.040 , 186.045(4), 186.050 , 186.056 , 186.060 , 186.073 , 186.110 , 186.130 , 186.140 , 186.160 , 186.170 , 186.180(1) to (4)(a), 186.210(1), 186.230 , or KRS 186.655 to 186.680 shall be guilty of a violation.
  2. Any person who violates any of the provisions of KRS 138.465 , 186.072 , 186.190 ,186.200, or 186.210(2) shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
  3. A person who violates the provisions of KRS 186.450(4), (5), or (6) or 186.452(3), (4), or (5) shall be guilty of a violation. A person who violates any of the other provisions of KRS 186.400 to 186.640 shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
  4. Any clerk or judge failing to comply with KRS 186.550(1) shall be guilty of a violation.
  5. If it appears to the satisfaction of the trial court that any offender under KRS 186.400 to 186.640 has a driver’s license but in good faith failed to have it on his or her person or misplaced or lost it, the court may, in its discretion, dismiss the charges against the defendant without fine, imprisonment, or cost.
  6. Any person who steals a motor vehicle registration plate or renewal decal shall be guilty of a Class D felony. Displaying a canceled registration plate on a motor vehicle shall be prima facie evidence of guilt under this section.
  7. Any person who violates the provisions of KRS 186.1911 shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
  8. Any person who makes a false affidavit to secure a license plate under KRS 186.172 shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
  9. Any person who violates any provision of KRS 186.070 or 186.150 shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
  10. Any person who operates a vehicle bearing a dealer’s plate upon the highways of this Commonwealth with intent to evade the motor vehicle usage tax or registration fee shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor for the first offense and a Class D felony for each subsequent offense.
  11. Any person, other than a licensed dealer or manufacturer, who procures a dealer’s plate with intent to evade the motor vehicle usage tax or registration fee shall be guilty of a Class D felony.
  12. Any resident who unlawfully registers, titles, or licenses a motor vehicle in any state other than Kentucky with intent to evade the motor vehicle usage tax or the registration fee shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor if the amount of tax due is less than one hundred dollars ($100), or of a Class D felony if the amount of tax due is more than one hundred dollars ($100), and in addition shall be liable for all taxes so evaded with applicable interest and penalties.

History. 2739g-5c, 2739g-6, 2739g-7, 2739g-65, 2739g-103, 2739g-104, 2739m-36, 2739m-48, 2739m-59, 2739m-69: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 208, § 4; 1958, ch. 70, § 28; 1960, ch. 37, § 5; 1966, ch. 83, § 2; 1970, ch. 92, § 58; 1978, ch. 101, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1979 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 7, § 2, effective July 1, 1979; 1980, ch. 296, § 5, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 303, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 373, § 7(1) to (9), effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 118, § 104, effective July 1, 1987; 1986, ch. 431, § 14, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 498, § 6, effective April 1, 1987; 1992, ch. 463, § 20, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 198, § 17, effective October 1, 1996; 2000, ch. 441, § 3, effective July 14, 2000; 2003, ch. 103, § 5, effective June 24, 2003; 2006, ch. 65, § 8, effective July 12, 2006; 2008, ch. 15, § 3, effective July 15, 2008; 2008, ch. 176, § 3, effective July 15, 2008.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

7/15/2008). This section was amended by 2008 Ky. Acts chs. 15 and 176, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

(6/24/2003). 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 408, sec. 178, renumbered the former subsection (2) of KRS 186.045 as subsection (1), but that Act failed to include a conforming amendment to change the reference to that subsection in subsection (1) of this statute. Under KRS 7.136(1)(e), that change has now been made.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1.Evidence of Fine Admissible.

Evidence of conviction of violation of KRS 186.190 and fine under this section was admissible in action to recover on an alleged breach of contract of sale and of a claimed warranty of a used automobile. Harlow v. Dick, 245 S.W.2d 616, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 601 ( Ky. 1952 ).

2.Failure to Illuminate License Plates.

Police officers were entitled to summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity in a 42 USCS § 1983 suit alleging an illegal arrest in violation of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights because, although the officers initially began their pursuit because plaintiff did not have his license plate illuminated as required by KRS 186.170 and 186.990 , they arrested plaintiff for fleeing in violation of KRS 520.095 and 520.100 and there was no dispute as to the officers’ assertion that plaintiff failed to stop once they were in pursuit. Nelson v. Riddle, 217 Fed. Appx. 456, 2007 FED App. 0129N, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3592 (6th Cir. Ky. 2007 ).

3.Possessing Stolen Plates.

In investigating a stolen vehicle registration plate allegedly belonging to defendant’s mother, because exigent circumstances existed when law enforcement found an active methamphetamine lab in the trunk of the car which had the stolen license plate affixed to it, suppression of the lab was properly denied. Bishop v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W.3d 567, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 365 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

Cited:

Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W.2d 686, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 83 ( Ky. 1962 ); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 443 S.W.2d 20, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 139 ( Ky. 1968 ); McKenzie v. Oliver, 571 S.W.2d 102, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 586 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Boone v. Commonwealth, 2021 Ky. App. LEXIS 90 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2021).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

1.Search and Seizure.

Unpublished decision: Where defendant dropped a baggie of crack cocaine in anticipation of a strip-search at a jail, suppression was not warranted, because, inter alia, the police did not need reasonable suspicion or probable cause of defendant’s commission of any other crime to take defendant into custody and search defendant incident to arrest since police could properly arrest defendant for driving on a suspended license. United States v. Warfield, 404 Fed. Appx. 994, 2011 FED App. 0002N, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 55 (6th Cir. Ky. 2011 ).

2.Evidence.

Unpublished decision: Trial court did not err in denying a directed verdict to defendant on a charge of theft of a license plate. Although defendant provided an explanation of why he had the plate, the placement of the plate on his truck was prima facie evidence of his guilt and provided the jury with sufficient evidence from which to determine defendant’s guilt on the charge. Casey v. Commonwealth, 2012 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1054 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2012), review denied, ordered not published, 2013 Ky. LEXIS 495 (Ky. Aug. 21, 2013).

Opinions of Attorney General.

No officer, agent or employee of the Commonwealth has authority to confiscate license plates issued by another state to a person who drives a car bearing those plates into Kentucky regardless of the fact that the person’s driver’s license was revoked by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. OAG 60-1055 .

If the registrant is a bona fide resident of the county wherein the vehicle is registered, the registration is valid for that year even though the registrant should become a resident of another county during that year. OAG 61-219 .

In an action brought against a person believed to be in violation of KRS 186.020 or KRS 186.210 , the burden of proof would be on the prosecuting attorney to show that the registrant was not a bona fide resident of the county of registration. OAG 61-219 .

Registrations are valid where a vendee purchases a vehicle from an individual-vendor or dealer-vendor who registered the vehicle in a county other than the county of residence of the purchaser. OAG 61-219 .

Since a person under 16 cannot obtain a license to operate a motor vehicle, if a person sells a car to a person under 16 knowingly, then such seller could be prosecuted for causing the juvenile to be charged with a crime. OAG 67-360 .

Operation of a motor vehicle in disregard of valid restrictions on a motor vehicle operator’s license is operation without a license in violation of KRS 186.410 for which a person may be convicted and fined or imprisoned or both pursuant to this section, and for which a peace officer may issue a citation if the offense is committed in his presence. OAG 67-530 .

The fact that subsection (6) of this section includes the penalty in the same subsection as the violation does not violate Ky. Const., § 51. OAG 72-90 .

A moped operator must be licensed or face a $12 to $500 fine and six months in jail. OAG 84-176 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Fitzgerald, Special Comment — The Crazy Quilt of Commercial Law: A Study In Legislative Patchwork, The Nature of the Latest Patch, 54 Ky. L.J. 85 (1965).

186.991. Penalties.

Any person who violates, or causes, aids, or abets any violation of KRS 186.053 or of any order, rule, or regulation lawfully issued pursuant thereto, shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars ($25) nor more than two hundred dollars ($200) or imprisoned for not more than thirty (30) days, or both.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 139, § 32; 1978, ch. 101, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 1979 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 7, § 3, effective July 1, 1979; 2015 ch. 19, § 41, effective June 24, 2015.

186.992. Penalty. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 374, § 10) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 467, § 31, effective October 1, 2000.

CHAPTER 186A Automated Motor Vehicle Registration System

186A.010. Automated motor vehicle and trailer registration and titling — Transportation Cabinet to develop system.

  1. An automated motor vehicle and trailer registration and titling system shall be developed and implemented as expeditiously as practicable in all counties of the Commonwealth. The automated motor vehicle and trailer registration system shall be designed to enable Kentucky’s county clerks to produce motor vehicle and trailer certificates of registration in their offices, and certificates of title in Frankfort, by automated means utilizing telecommunication terminals and associated devices supplied by the Commonwealth, to inhibit registration and transfer of stolen motor vehicles or trailers, to improve the capability of detecting and recovering such vehicles, to ensure development of a common vehicle information database to improve efficiency in auditing motor vehicle usage tax, license fee collections, and in collecting personal property tax to provide information to the traffic record system, and to provide improved security interest protection to potential creditors throughout Kentucky while simultaneously reducing the number of forms that must be processed and stored each year in Kentucky.
  2. The Transportation Cabinet is hereby directed to, as expeditiously as practicable, develop an automated motor vehicle and trailer registration and titling system, having, as a minimum, the capabilities or functions described in this chapter, and to acquire and assure the installation of such equipment or services as are necessary to enable the system as described in this chapter to be operated in all counties of the Commonwealth.
  3. All departments of state government affected by the system are hereby directed to cooperate with the Transportation Cabinet for purposes of assuring orderly implementation of this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 133, § 22; 1982, ch. 164, § 1, effective July 15, 1982.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Owner of a Motor Vehicle.

Since the effective date of chapter 186A, the provisions of that statute, rather than the general law of sales, govern the issue of who owns a motor vehicle for purposes of insurance coverage. Cowles v. Rogers, 762 S.W.2d 414, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 182 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988), overruled in part, Wheeler v. Rogers, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 64 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1992).

2.Effect of Adoption of KRS Ch. 186A.

The adoption of this chapter in conjunction with the existing provisions of Chapter 186, had the effect of changing the law of Kentucky from an equitable title state to a certificate of title state for the purposes of determining ownership of a motor vehicle for liability insurance requirements. The general law of sales is no longer applicable to such a situation because of the statute. Potts v. Draper, 864 S.W.2d 896, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 117 ( Ky. 1993 ).

3.Certificate of Title.

Kentucky is a certificate of title state in which the titling statutes control ownership of a motor vehicle for liability insurance purposes in the absence of a valid conditional sale. Potts v. Draper, 864 S.W.2d 896, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 117 ( Ky. 1993 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If the Automated Vehicle Information System does not have the technical capabilities to store more than two liens and there is no other place to store the information, then obviously the clerk cannot store the additional lien and will be responsible to file them in some other form as well as filing it in the same manner as lis pendens are filed. OAG 84-81 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Survey of Law, Nowka, Commercial Law, 72 Ky. L.J. 337 (1983-84).

186A.015. Automated motorboat registration and titling — Agencies to implement system.

  1. Except as provided for in KRS 235.050 , the titling and registration of motorboats as defined in KRS 235.010 shall be administered through the automated motor vehicle and trailer registration and titling system developed and implemented under the provisions of KRS 186A.010 .
  2. The Transportation Cabinet, the Energy and Environment Cabinet, the Department of Revenue, and all other agencies of state government affected by the system are hereby directed to cooperate in the orderly implementation of this system.
  3. The Transportation Cabinet, as far as practicable, and not inconsistent with the provisions of KRS Chapter 235, shall promulgate administrative regulations requiring the procedures for boat titling and registration to be consistent with motor vehicle titling and registration. These administrative regulations may pertain but shall not be limited to the following:
    1. Conditions and characteristics of certificate of title forms;
    2. Comparison and identification of hull identification numbers;
    3. Application for title or registration;
    4. Processing of title applications;
    5. Form of certificate of title;
    6. Notation of security interests or title;
    7. Title lien statements;
    8. Transfer of boat ownership;
    9. Duplicate certificate of title or registration; and
    10. Salvage titles.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 163, § 3, effective January 1, 1990; 1990, ch. 391, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1998, ch. 289, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 85, § 608, effective June 20, 2005; 2010, ch. 24, § 237, effective July 15, 2010.

186A.020. Cabinet authorized to promulgate administrative regulations and institute programs.

The Transportation Cabinet shall have any and all necessary power and authority, subject to appropriate provision of the statutes, to promulgate administrative regulations and institute such programs as are reasonably necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 133, § 22; 1998, ch. 128, § 1, effective July 15, 1998.

186A.025. Responsibility and authority for administration and support of system.

    1. The Finance and Administration Cabinet shall have full responsibility and authority for day-to-day administration of the automated system described by this chapter; and (1) (a) The Finance and Administration Cabinet shall have full responsibility and authority for day-to-day administration of the automated system described by this chapter; and
    2. May request the assistance of any cabinet or department of state government in carrying out its responsibilities under this chapter.
  1. The Commonwealth Office of Technology shall assure, to the extent feasible, twenty-four (24) hour, year-round information support to the Department of Kentucky State Police, and to other law enforcement agencies state and nationwide, regarding vehicles registered and, when required, titled in this state.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 2000, ch. 506, § 21, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 536, § 21, effective July 14, 2000; 2005, ch. 85, § 609, effective June 20, 2005; 2007, ch. 85, § 201, effective June 26, 2007.

186A.030. Computation and collection of motor vehicle and trailer ad valorem taxes.

In order to improve collection of personal property (ad valorem) taxes associated with motor vehicles and trailers, the Department of Vehicle Regulation, in cooperation with the Department of Revenue, shall:

  1. Ensure that the automated system provided by this chapter is capable of properly assigning a value for each vehicle registered in a county, utilizing a value reference manual in machine readable form approved by the Department of Revenue, and a manually entered value for vehicles not shown in such “manual.”
  2. Promptly study the feasibility of computing personal property (ad valorem) taxes associated with motor vehicles or trailers, and producing tax bills or notices of taxes due in such regard, and if shown feasible to its satisfaction, implement such capability, or any part thereof, as expeditiously as practicable.
  3. Ensure that the automated system is capable of receiving the record of a lien for unpaid personal property (ad valorem) taxes associated with an owner of a motor vehicle or trailer. No motor vehicle dealer shall be responsible for the payment of a tax lien on a motor vehicle which is received as trade-in or otherwise obtained by the dealer.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 3, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 113, § 10, effective March 28, 1988; 2005, ch. 85, § 610, effective June 20, 2005.

186A.035. Motor vehicle registration by birth month of owner — Joint tenancy with right of survivorship for motor vehicle jointly owned by husband and wife — Clerk’s fee — Renewal of registration.

  1. All motor vehicles, including motorcycles, with a gross vehicular weight of six thousand (6,000) pounds or less, first registered, or for which the registration is renewed in this state on or after January 1, 1983, shall be placed in a system of year-round registration based upon the birth month of the owner, in order to distribute the work of registering motor vehicles as uniformly as practicable throughout the twelve (12) months of the year.
  2. If the owner of a motor vehicle is other than an individual, the month in which the owning entity came into being shall be used for purposes of this section. If a motor vehicle is jointly owned, the owners shall indicate to the county clerk the birth month of one (1) of them to be used for purposes of this section. In addition, if a motor vehicle is jointly owned by a husband and wife, the ownership shall exist as a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, unless the registration expressly states to the contrary and gives an alternative specific status. Upon the death of one (1) of the spouses, the jointly-owned vehicle shall transfer to the surviving spouse free from payment of any state-required transferral fees.
  3. The certificate of registration and license plate issued for a motor vehicle first registered, renewed, or titled in this state on or after January 1, 1983, shall be valid, unless revoked in accordance with KRS 186A.040 or canceled by the cabinet in accordance with KRS Chapter 186 or this chapter, upon payment of the required fee, for a period beginning on the first day of the month of the year in which registration is applied for, and expiring on the last day of the next birth month of the owner following the month during which registration is applied for. Upon the owner’s request, and after payment of the proper prorated fee, an owner may obtain a certificate of registration and license plate valid through the last day of his second birth month following the month and year in which he applied for a certificate of registration. Any transaction relating to registration or registration renewal which would cause an unexpired Kentucky motor vehicle license plate to be surrendered shall have that unexpired fee prorated or credited against any additional fee required by a subsequent registration.
  4. After a motor vehicle has been initially placed in the system of year-round registration, the owner shall renew the registration annually during the owner’s birth month, by making application to the county clerk and paying the fee required for twelve (12) consecutive months of registration, which shall take effect on the first day of the month succeeding the owner’s birth month and shall expire on the last day of the owner’s next birth month. The county clerk shall be entitled to a registration fee of two dollars ($2) for each registration, or if the registration exceeds a twelve (12) month period, the clerk shall receive a fee of three dollars ($3).
  5. At least forty-five (45) days prior to the expiration of the registration of any motor vehicle previously registered in the Commonwealth as provided by subsection (1) of this section, the owner of the vehicle shall be notified by mail on the same notice required by KRS 134.805(5) of the date of expiration. Nonreceipt of the notice required by this subsection shall not constitute a defense to any registration-related offense.
  6. Any owner who fails to renew the registration of a motor vehicle during the month in which the previous registration expired shall, if he applies for renewal of the registration in some later month, pay the same fees that would have been required if the registration had been renewed in the month which the previous registration expired.
  7. Fees which must be prorated in carrying out the intent of this section shall be prorated on the basis of twelfths of the annual registration fee. Any vehicle which is registered at any time during a month shall pay the fee required for that whole month plus any additional months of registration purchased consistent with the intent of the section.
  8. The county clerk shall ensure that the certificate of registration issued to an owner displays the month and year in which the registration period begins and the month and year of its expiration, and shall issue to the owner a decal or decals corresponding to the month and year of expiration shown in the certificate of registration which shall be placed upon the corresponding license plate by the owner in the manner required by administrative regulations of the Department of Vehicle Regulation.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 4, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 37, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 363, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 241, § 3, effective July 15, 1988; 1994, ch. 19, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 85, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 97, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 442, § 7, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 565, § 2, effective July 15, 1998.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/98). This section was amended by 1998 Ky. Acts chs. 442 and 565 which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The terms registration year and registration period are synonymous; the registration year is, therefore, determined by the birth date of the owner. The legislative intent is that a registration period or year must commence on the birth month of the owner; therefore, when there is a new owner, a new registration period begins, based on the birth month of the new owner. OAG 83-47 .

The termination of a registration period is marked by the occurrence of either one of two contingencies whichever happens first: the birth month of the owner of the vehicle or the transfer of ownership of the vehicle; under this interpretation, the new owner is not entitled to be credited with the unexpired time of the previous owner’s registration. OAG 83-47 .

186A.040. Motor vehicle insurance data included in system database — Notification of cancellation, nonrenewal of policy, or absence of vehicle identification number to insured and county attorney — Revocation of license — Certified records to county attorney — Information not subject to Kentucky Open Records Act.

  1. The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall provide and receive information on the insurance status of vehicles registered in the Commonwealth of Kentucky pursuant to KRS 304.39-087 and 304.39-085 . The department shall provide appropriate insurance information to the Commonwealth Office of Technology for inclusion in the AVIS database to assist in identifying uninsured motor vehicles.
    1. Upon notification to the Department of Vehicle Regulation from an insurance company of cancellation or nonrenewal of a policy pursuant to KRS 304.39-085 , or on and after January 1, 2006, if the vehicle identification number (VIN) of a personal motor vehicle does not appear in the database created by KRS 304.39-087 for two (2) consecutive reporting months, the department shall immediately make a determination as to the notification of the insured. Notification to the insured shall state that the insured’s policy is no longer valid and that the insured shall have thirty (30) days to show proof of insurance to the county clerk. The department shall further inform the insured that if evidence of insurance is not received within thirty (30) days the department shall revoke the registration of the motor vehicle until: (2) (a) Upon notification to the Department of Vehicle Regulation from an insurance company of cancellation or nonrenewal of a policy pursuant to KRS 304.39-085 , or on and after January 1, 2006, if the vehicle identification number (VIN) of a personal motor vehicle does not appear in the database created by KRS 304.39-087 for two (2) consecutive reporting months, the department shall immediately make a determination as to the notification of the insured. Notification to the insured shall state that the insured’s policy is no longer valid and that the insured shall have thirty (30) days to show proof of insurance to the county clerk. The department shall further inform the insured that if evidence of insurance is not received within thirty (30) days the department shall revoke the registration of the motor vehicle until:
      1. The person presents proof of insurance to the county clerk and pays the reinstatement fee required by KRS 186.180 ;
      2. The person presents proof in the form of an affidavit stating, under penalty of perjury as set forth in KRS 523.030 , that the failure to maintain motor vehicle insurance on the vehicle specified in the department’s notification is the result of the inoperable condition of the motor vehicle;
      3. The person presents proof in the form of an affidavit stating, under penalty of perjury as set forth in KRS 523.030 , that the failure to maintain motor vehicle insurance on the vehicle specified in the department’s notification is the result of the seasonal nature of the vehicle. The affidavit shall explain that when the vehicle is out of dormancy and when the seasonal use of the vehicle is resumed, the proper security will be obtained; or
      4. The person presents proof in the form of an affidavit stating, under penalty of perjury as set forth in KRS 523.030, that he or she requires a registered motor vehicle in order to carry out his or her employment and that the motor vehicle that he or she drives during the course of his or her employment meets the security requirement of Subtitle 39 of KRS Chapter 304. The person shall also declare in the affidavit that he or she will operate a motor vehicle only in the course of his or her employment. If a person has his or her motor vehicle registration revoked in accordance with this subsection three (3) times within any twelve (12) month period, the revocations shall constitute a violation of KRS 304.39-080 . The department shall notify the county attorney to begin prosecution for violation of subtitle 39 of KRS Chapter 304.
    2. The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall be responsible for notification to the appropriate county attorney that a motor vehicle is not properly insured, if the insured does not respond to notification set out by paragraph (a) of this subsection. The notice that the department gives to the county attorney in accordance with paragraph (a) of this subsection shall include a certified copy of the person’s driving record which shall include:
      1. The notice that the department received from an insurance company that a person’s motor vehicle insurance policy has been canceled or has not been renewed; and
      2. A dated notice that the department sent to the person requiring the person to present proof of insurance to the county clerk. Upon notification by the department, a county attorney shall immediately begin prosecution of the person who had his or her motor vehicle registration revoked three (3) times within any twelve (12) month period in accordance with paragraph (a) of this subsection.
    3. The certified copies sent by the department described in paragraph (b) of this subsection, shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of KRS 304.39-080 .
    4. If the insured provides proof of insurance to the clerk within the thirty (30) day notification period, the department shall ensure action is taken to denote a valid insurance policy is in force.
    1. In developing the mechanism to electronically transfer information pursuant to KRS 304.39-087 , the commissioner of the Department of Vehicle Regulation shall consult with the commissioner of the Department of Insurance and insurers of personal motor vehicles to adopt a standardized system of organizing, recording, and transferring the information so as to minimize insurer administrative expenses. The commissioner of vehicle regulation shall to the maximum extent possible utilize nationally recognized electronic data information systems such as those developed by the American National Standards Institute or the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators. (3) (a) In developing the mechanism to electronically transfer information pursuant to KRS 304.39-087 , the commissioner of the Department of Vehicle Regulation shall consult with the commissioner of the Department of Insurance and insurers of personal motor vehicles to adopt a standardized system of organizing, recording, and transferring the information so as to minimize insurer administrative expenses. The commissioner of vehicle regulation shall to the maximum extent possible utilize nationally recognized electronic data information systems such as those developed by the American National Standards Institute or the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators.
    2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, information obtained by the department pursuant to KRS 304.39-087 shall not be subject to the Kentucky Open Records Act, KRS 61.872 to 61.884 , and shall not be disclosed, used, sold, accessed, utilized in any manner, or released by the department to any person, corporation, or state and local agency, except in response to a specific individual request for the information authorized pursuant to the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. secs. 2721 et seq. The department shall institute measures to ensure that only authorized persons are permitted to access the information for the purposes specified by this section. Persons who knowingly release or disclose information from the database created by KRS 304.39-087 for a purpose other than those described as authorized by this section or to a person not entitled to receive it shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor for each release or disclosure.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 5, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 129, § 6, effective January 1, 1985; 1996, ch. 341, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 442, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 319, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 506, § 22, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 536, § 22, effective July 14, 2000; 2004, ch. 130, § 2, effective July 13, 2004; 2005, ch. 85, § 611, effective June 20, 2005; 2010, ch. 24, § 238, effective July 15, 2010.

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

1.Statute Not Violated.

Unpublished decision: Police officer had not violated KRS 186A.040 (b) in accessing the system as insurance status information was expressly excluded under 18 U.S.C.S. § 2725(3), and the officer was not a person from whom 18 U.S.C.S. § 2721(b)(1) intended such information to be withheld. Willoughby v. Commonwealth, 2014 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1055 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2014), review denied, ordered not published, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 519 (Ky. Oct. 15, 2014).

186A.042. Prohibition against licensing of personal motor vehicles without listing of vehicle identification numbers — Exceptions — Submission of paper or electronic proof of insurance card to county clerk.

  1. On and after January 1, 2006, a county clerk shall not process an application for, nor issue, a:
    1. Kentucky title and registration or renewal of registration;
    2. Replacement plate, decal, or registration certificate;
    3. Duplicate registration;
    4. Transfer of registration; or
    5. Temporary tag; for any personal motor vehicle as defined in KRS 304.39-087 (1) if AVIS does not list the vehicle identification number of the personal motor vehicle as an insured vehicle, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section.
  2. If AVIS does not list the vehicle identification number of the personal motor vehicle as an insured vehicle, the county clerk may process the application if:
    1. The applicant has an insurance card in paper or electronic format that indicates the required security is currently in full force on the personal motor vehicle if the paper or electronic proof of insurance card was effective no more than forty-five (45) days before the application is submitted to the county clerk; or
    2. The owner of the motor vehicle is serving in the Armed Forces outside of Kentucky, and the owner provides an affidavit by the provost marshal of the base where the owner is stationed stating that the motor vehicle is covered by security as required by Subtitle 39 of KRS Chapter 304.
  3. This section shall not apply to any transactions involving Kentucky motor vehicle dealers who are licensed as required by KRS 190.030 .
  4. For purposes of this section:
    1. An insurance card in an electronic format means the display of an image subject to immediate download or transmission from the applicant’s insurer or agent to the applicant on any portable electronic device, including a cellular phone or any other type of portable electronic device, but shall not include a photographic copy of a paper insurance card on a portable electronic device; and
    2. The county clerk may require the applicant to e-mail the electronic insurance card to the clerk, and the clerk may print a copy of the card for the clerk’s records.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 130, § 3, effective July 13, 2004; 2005, ch. 24, § 1, effective June 20, 2005; 2013, ch. 83, § 2, effective June 25, 2013.

186A.045. Video telecommunication equipment in all counties.

The Transportation Cabinet shall ensure that each county in the Commonwealth is equipped with at least one (1), or more than one (1), as workload dictates, video telecommunications terminal and associated devices, linked to a computer in Frankfort maintained by the Commonwealth, and capable of enabling the county clerks to produce certificates of registration in their offices, and certificates of title in Frankfort, in a manner consistent with this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 6, effective July 15, 1982.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Survey of Law, Nowka, Commercial Law, 72 Ky. L.J. 337 (1983-84).

186A.050. Conditions and characteristics of certificate of title and computer generated forms.

The certificate of title and computer generated forms required by this chapter shall be designed and printed to make difficult and to facilitate detection of counterfeit likenesses or fraudulent alteration of genuine documents. The bid specifications for the acquisition of the certificate of title blanks shall require, as a minimum:

  1. That bidders have a demonstrable reputation in the printing of currency or securities, and guarantee with an appropriate cash bond that, in addition to any other requirements, the document blanks to be supplied are printed in a secure printing facility, utilizing a combination of the printing process, unique printing plates, paper, and inks to produce high quality documents designed to:
    1. Be readily recognizable as genuine by a layman and by extra visual techniques;
    2. Make extremely difficult the manufacture of counterfeit likenesses by direct engraving, photographic, or color xerographic means;
    3. Visually reveal actual or attempted alteration or erasure by chemical or mechanical means.
  2. That bidders guarantee production of a specific number of uniquely numbered documents with guaranteed accounting for spoilage and a guaranteed list of document numbers supplied and those deleted.
  3. That the documents will be shipped to the Commonwealth by an agreed means to assure minimal risk of theft, loss, or destruction.
  4. That the plates utilized in printing of the blanks will not be utilized for the printing of certificate of title blanks by other than the bidder pursuant to a lawful contract with the Commonwealth.
  5. The department, by administrative regulation, may provide for the production of a certificate of title by electronic means.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 7, effective July 15, 1982; 1990, ch. 391, § 14, effective July 13, 1990; 1998, ch. 128, § 2, effective July 15, 1998.

186A.055. System to withhold title until vehicle identification number compared.

The Department of Vehicle Regulation, in cooperation with the Department of Kentucky State Police, shall ensure that the automated vehicle registration and titling system provided for by this chapter will be designed, equipped, and operated so that, under normal conditions, the system will withhold production of a certificate of title until the vehicle identification number of a vehicle for which a title is sought, and when present, its license number has been automatically compared against the Law Information Network Kentucky (LINK) and, unless it refuses to permit such an arrangement, the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) computerized listing of vehicles reported stolen, and a “no stolen report” or its equivalent is received.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 8, effective July 15, 1982; 2007, ch. 85, § 202, effective June 26, 2007.

186A.060. Department of Vehicle Regulation to develop forms — Reduction of paperwork required.

  1. The Department of Vehicle Regulation is directed to develop, in cooperation with county clerks, auto dealers, and the Department of Revenue, Department of Insurance, and Department of Kentucky State Police, the forms required to record all information pertinent to the initial registration, or titling and taxation, or transfer of registration or title of a vehicle.
  2. The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall make every effort to minimize and reduce the amount of paperwork required to apply for, or transfer, a vehicle title. When possible, the title document itself shall be used as the primary form used to effect a transfer of vehicle ownership. The title document shall contain space exclusively reserved for a minimum of two (2) dealer assignments.
  3. When no in-state title exists, forms shall be designed by the department that require only the appropriate and essential information to effect the application for title.
  4. The department shall constantly review the information needs of government agencies and other organizations with the goal of reducing or eliminating unnecessary documentation. Information being sought for application for title relevant to, but not limited to, vehicle identification, owner, buyer, usage tax, county clerk, or inspector shall be set forth by the cabinet in such a way as to promote flexibility in reaching this goal, except that an applicant for a motor vehicle title shall not be required to provide his or her Social Security number as part of the application process.
  5. The use of an electronic medium shall be employed so that forms can be printed by the automated system. Existing statutory language in this chapter and KRS Chapter 186 pertaining to application, signature, forms, or application transfer record may be construed to be electronic in nature at the discretion of the cabinet as provided for by administrative regulation.
  6. Any person who knowingly enters, or attests to the entry of, false or erroneous information in pursuit of a certificate of title shall be guilty of forgery in the second degree.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 9, effective July 15, 1982; 1994, ch. 405, § 38, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 35, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 128, § 3, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 85, § 612, effective June 20, 2005; 2007, ch. 85, § 203, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 24, § 239, effective July 15, 2010; 2012, ch. 113, § 1, effective January 1, 2014.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since commercial liens are referred to in KRS 186.045 , 186A.190(3), and former subdivision (14) of this section, the clerk should place these on the certificate of title, if they exist, and then after any commercial liens are listed, the clerk should place the tax liens on the certificate, where space permits, or into the computer. OAG 84-81 .

If the Automated Vehicle Information System does not have the technical capabilities to store more than two liens and there is no other place to store the information, then obviously the clerk cannot store the additional lien and will be responsible to file them in some other form as well as filing it in the same manner as lis pendens are filed. OAG 84-81 .

KRS 186.045 , 186A.190(3), and former subdivision (14)(a) of this section prohibit the county clerk from listing more than two liens on the certificate of title in connection with the registration or titling of the vehicles; however, the information in this section required to be filed in conjunction with the liens indicates the legislature intended that its restriction of two liens apply only to commercial liens and there is no such limit to the number of statutory liens such as liens for unpaid property taxes. There is no restriction against placing any type of indicator on the certificate of title that other liens exist. OAG 84-81 .

It is not legal for an automobile dealer to list his business address as the address of the owner of the vehicle on an application for title and registration, because the mailing address of the owner required by statute must be amenable to reasonable location of the person. OAG 84-131 .

Under the current registration-title law relating to motor vehicles, the General Assembly by this section and KRS 186.045 , 186A.175 (now repealed) and 186A.190 has made provisions for showing not more than two liens on the certificate of title. OAG 84-301 .

186A.065. Prerequisites for operation of motor vehicles or trailers.

Except as otherwise provided, before the owner of a motor vehicle or trailer may operate it or permit its operation upon the highways of this state, he shall obtain motor vehicle insurance as required by KRS 304.39-080 , a certificate of registration, and a license plate and apply for a certificate of title in his name.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 10, effective July 15, 1982; 1996, ch. 341, § 5, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Lien.

Where the lien of a creditor was noted on the Certificate of Origin and the Manufacturer’s Statement of Origin for tractor and trailer, respectively, and where no certificate of title was issued, the liens of the creditor were not perfected at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition and the trustee, as hypothetical judgment lien creditor pursuant to 11 USCS § 544(a)(1), must prevail. Westenhoefer v. Navistar Fin. Corp., 155 B.R. 7, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 754 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1993 ).

2.No Liability.

Since the auction dealer was never an owner of either the two vehicles, it could be liable for violations of either statute. Savage v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2021 Ky. App. LEXIS 8 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2021).

Since the auction dealer was not an operator of either vehicle, the estate’s claims were properly dismissed. Savage v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2021 Ky. App. LEXIS 8 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2021).

Cited:

Kling v. Geary, 667 S.W.2d 379, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 216 ( Ky. 1984 ); United States v. Oldfield, 859 F.2d 392, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 13307 (6th Cir. 1988).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A certificate of title for an automobile is not required by law to be recorded or lodged for record within the meaning of KRS 382.370 , and accordingly, a power of attorney to transfer ownership of an automobile is not required to be recorded or lodged for record within the meaning of that phrase in KRS 382.370 . OAG 93-82 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Survey of Law, Nowka, Commercial Law, 72 Ky. L.J. 337 (1983-84).

186A.070. Registration and title requirements for vehicles, manufactured homes, or trailers.

  1. Except as otherwise provided, the state resident owner of a vehicle as defined in KRS 186.010(8)(a), manufactured home as defined in KRS 186.650 , or trailer which will not be operated upon the highways of this state shall within fifteen (15) days apply for and obtain a certificate of title in his name. He shall not, however, be required to obtain a certificate of registration until the vehicle, manufactured home, or trailer is to be operated upon the highways of this state.
  2. On or after July 1, 2010, any state resident who purchases an all-terrain vehicle as defined in KRS 189.010 shall apply for and obtain a certificate of title in the purchaser’s name within fifteen (15) days of purchase. The owner of an all-terrain vehicle shall not be eligible to obtain a certificate of registration pursuant to KRS 186.020 .
  3. On or after July 1, 2010, any state resident who owns an all-terrain vehicle and creates a security interest on that vehicle shall be required to obtain a certificate of title within fifteen (15) days of the creation of the security interest. The perfection and discharge of the security interest shall be governed by KRS 186A.190 , 186A.193 , 186A.195 , 186A.200 , 186A.205 , 186A.210 , and 186A.215 . The owner of an all-terrain vehicle shall not be eligible to obtain a certificate of registration pursuant to KRS 186.020 .
  4. An all-terrain vehicle shall not be operated upon the roadways of this state, except in accordance with KRS 189.515 .

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 11, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 132, § 1, effective March 31, 1988; 1994, ch. 42, § 9, effective July 15, 1994; 2009, ch. 64, § 2, effective June 25, 2009.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.In General.

KRS 134.810(4), which requires that the purchaser shall become liable for the taxes on motor vehicles does not violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of U.S. Const., Amend. 14; these taxes are paid only if the purchaser desires to register the motor vehicle for use upon the highway. Nor is the exclusion of dealers of motor vehicles from payment of these tax liens objectionable since the dealer is a mere conduit by and through which title is passed from one owner to another and no one — dealer or individual — is required to obtain a certificate of registration until such time as the motor vehicle is to be operated upon the highways of the state. Kling v. Geary, 667 S.W.2d 379, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 216 ( Ky. 1984 ).

2.All-Terrain Vehicles.

Even though all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) were not specifically listed in KRS 186A.080 , as exempt from the title and registration requirements of KRS 186A.070 , in a bankruptcy case, a creditor’s lien on two (2) ATVs was perfected by the filing of a UCC financing statement, notwithstanding the creditor’s failure to note the liens on the certificates of title covering the ATVs; therefore, the trustee was not permitted to sell the ATVs unless it appeared that the sale price exceeded the amount of the indebtedness secured by the perfected lien in favor of the creditor. In re Skeans, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 693 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. June 19, 2003).

3.Manufactured Home.

Because the plain language of the mortgage contract did not grant the lender a lien on debtor’s manufactured home as personal property, the lender did not obtain a security interest in the manufactured home through the mortgage contract, and even if the lender had obtained a lien against the manufactured home by way of the mortgage contract, it was undisputed that the lender did not note the security interest on the certificate of title, and the filing of a lis pendens could not serve to perfect a security interest in a manufactured home; accordingly, before the state-court foreclosure judgment, the lender did not have a perfected lien on debtor’s manufactured home. Dickson v. Countrywide Home Loans (In re Dickson), 655 F.3d 585, 2011 FED App. 0242P, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17830 (6th Cir. 2011).

Chapter 7 Trustee avoided a lien on the debtors’ manufactured home under 11 U.S.C.S. § 544. The creditor did not perfect its lien in the home, which was certificate of title property under KRS 186A.070 subject to perfection under KRS 186A.190 , and the debtors did not convert the home from personal property to real estate as permitted by KRS 186A.297 ; in addition, KRS 355.9-334 did not apply to permit the perfection of the lien as a lien on a fixture because the Uniform Commercial code did not address perfection of a security interest in certificate of title property. Rogan v. Greentree Fin. Servicing Corp. (In re Nutgrass), 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 636 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2013).

Cited:

Hiers v. Bank One, 946 S.W.2d 196, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 167 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996); Wright v. Miller, 629 S.W.3d 813, 2021 Ky. App. LEXIS 53 (Ky. Ct. App. 2021).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A bank may title a repossessed car in its name and, if the car is not registered and not operated on the highways, the current year’s property tax will not be collected in the current year. OAG 84-135 .

Where an affidavit is filed with the county clerk stating that the affiant no longer has in his possession the title or plate to a motor vehicle, identified by license plate number, year, make, model number, vehicle identification number, and indicating the date of disposition of vehicle and title, and that the vehicle is junked or unfit for future use, the clerk may consider the described vehicle junked, under KRS 186.190(5) (now 196.190(4)) and should not require plate or decal renewal. OAG 84-309 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Ellerman & Linneman, A Survey of Kentucky Commercial Law., 31 N. Ky. L. Rev. 201 (2004).

186A.072. Titling of custom-built motorcycles.

  1. As used in KRS 186A.115 and this section, “custom-built motorcycle” means a motorcycle as defined in KRS 186.010(15) that has been built from one hundred percent (100%) new parts to the individual specifications of:
    1. The individual who built the motorcycle who will personally use the motorcycle;
    2. A specific known prospective owner of the motorcycle who is purchasing the motorcycle at retail; or
    3. A person engaged in the business of building and selling motorcycles who is building the motorcycle for purposes of retail sale to an unknown buyer.
  2. A person who has either personally custom-built a motorcycle or who has purchased a custom-built motorcycle shall be issued a first certificate of title after complying with the provisions of this subsection. The person shall, prior to applying for the certificate of title, apply to the Transportation Cabinet for a vehicle identification number under the provisions of KRS 186A.090 . When applying for a first certificate of title for a custom-built motorcycle, the person shall apply in the office of the county clerk of the county in which he or she resides and provide the clerk with the following:
    1. Written documentation authenticating that one hundred percent (100%) of the parts used to assemble the custom-built motorcycle are new parts purchased from either a wholesale or retail supplier that have never been used;
    2. Proof of insurance to comply with the provisions of KRS 304.39-080 ; and
    3. Other information that may be required by the Transportation Cabinet in an administrative regulation promulgated under KRS Chapter 13A. If the cabinet fails to promulgate an administrative regulation governing custom-built motorcycles, the only documentation a person applying for a first certificate of title for a custom-built motorcycle shall be required to present to the county clerk is the information required under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection.
  3. The Transportation Cabinet shall not classify a custom-built motorcycle as a salvage or rebuilt vehicle and shall not subject a custom-built motorcycle to the provisions of this chapter governing salvage or rebuilt vehicles.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 97, § 2, effective June 24, 2003.

186A.073. Titling of military surplus vehicle.

  1. As used in this section, “military surplus vehicle” has the same meaning as in KRS 186.010 .
  2. A person who has purchased a military surplus vehicle shall be issued a certificate of title after complying with the provisions of this section.
  3. An owner of a military surplus vehicle that does not have a vehicle identification number shall, prior to applying for a certificate of title, apply to the Transportation Cabinet for a vehicle identification number under KRS 186A.090 .
  4. When applying for a certificate of title for a military surplus vehicle, the owner shall apply in the office of the county clerk of the county in which he or she resides and provide the clerk with the following:
    1. Proof of insurance to comply with KRS 304.39-080 ;
    2. Proof that the military surplus vehicle has passed an inspection in accordance with KRS 186A.115 ; and
    3. Any other information that may be required by the Transportation Cabinet in an administrative regulation promulgated under KRS Chapter 13A.
  5. The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to implement this section.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 55, § 1, effective June 29, 2017.

186A.074. Titling of all-terrain vehicles.

  1. As used in this section, “all-terrain vehicle” has the same meaning as in KRS 189.010 .
  2. The titling of all-terrain vehicles shall be administered through the automated motor vehicle and trailer registration and titling system developed and implemented under KRS 186A.010 .
  3. The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A requiring the procedures for titling of all-terrain vehicles to be consistent as far as practicable with motor vehicle titling. These regulations may pertain but shall not be limited to the following:
    1. Conditions and characteristics of certificate of title forms;
    2. Comparison and identification of identification or serial numbers of all-terrain vehicles;
    3. Application for title;
    4. Processing of title applications;
    5. Form of certificate of title;
    6. Notation of security interests on title;
    7. Title lien statements;
    8. Transfer of all-terrain vehicle ownership; and
    9. Duplicate certificate of title.
  4. The Transportation Cabinet shall ensure that the automated motor vehicle and trailer registration and titling system is capable of receiving and discharging a lien associated with the owner of an all-terrain vehicle. An all-terrain vehicle dealer shall not be responsible for the payment of a lien on an all-terrain vehicle which is received as trade-in or otherwise obtained by the dealer.

History. Enact. Acts 2009, ch. 64, § 1, effective June 25, 2009.

186A.075. Motor vehicle titles — When to be effective — Governor may extend effective date by executive order. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 12, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1998, ch. 128, § 14, effective July 15, 1998.

186A.080. Motor vehicles exempt from title and registration requirements.

No Kentucky certificate of registration, license plate, or certificate of title need be applied for or obtained for:

  1. A vehicle owned by the United States unless it is registered in this state;
  2. A vehicle owned by a nonresident of this state, principally operated in another state, properly and currently registered and titled in another state;
  3. A vehicle regularly engaged in the interstate transportation of persons or property for which a currently effective lawful certificate of title has been issued in another state;
  4. A vehicle moved solely by animal power;
  5. An implement of husbandry;
  6. Special mobile equipment;
  7. A self-propelled wheelchair or invalid tricycle;
  8. A pole trailer;
  9. A motor vehicle engaged in the transportation of passengers for hire operating under a currently valid certificate of convenience and necessity;
  10. A moped; and
  11. An electric low-speed scooter as defined in KRS 189.010 .

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 13, effective July 15, 1982; 2019 ch. 22, § 2, effective June 27, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.All-terrain Vehicles.

Even though all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) were not specifically listed in KRS 186A.080 , as exempt from the title and registration requirements of KRS 186A.070 , in a bankruptcy case, a creditor’s lien on two (2) ATVs was perfected by the filing of a UCC financing statement, notwithstanding the creditor’s failure to note the liens on the certificates of title covering the ATVs; therefore, the trustee was not permitted to sell the ATVs unless it appeared that the sale price exceeded the amount of the indebtedness secured by the perfected lien in favor of the creditor. In re Skeans, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 693 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. June 19, 2003).

186A.085. Prerequisites to acceptance of application for title.

No county clerk shall accept an application for a certificate of registration or title, or license plate, unless the vehicle bears an apparently legitimate vehicle identification number, and if required, an apparently legitimate motor and frame number, as indicated by an owner’s application.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 14, effective July 15, 1982.

186A.090. Owner to secure proper vehicle identification number from department.

  1. The owner of a vehicle required to be titled or registered in this state which:
    1. Does not have a legitimate vehicle identification number as affixed by a manufacturer regularly engaged in the original manufacture of the type vehicle for which registration is sought, or in accordance with the law of this or another state; or
    2. Has been built from parts;

      shall, before making application for registration of the vehicle, apply to the Department of Vehicle Regulation for issuance of a vehicle identification number plate, which shall be affixed to the vehicle in the manner prescribed by administrative regulations of the Department of Vehicle Regulation.

  2. The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall establish, in cooperation with the Department of Kentucky State Police, regulations governing the form of application required by this section, and may require inspection of the vehicle before a vehicle identification number plate has been issued and after such plate has been affixed to the vehicle.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 15, effective July 15, 1982; 2007, ch. 85, § 204, effective June 26, 2007.

Opinions of Attorney General.

If the Automated Vehicle Information System does not have the technical capabilities to store more than two liens and there is no other place to store the information, then obviously the clerk cannot store the additional lien and will be responsible to file them in some other form as well as filing them in the same manner as lis pendens are filed. OAG 84-81 .

186A.095. Time for application for registration and title on vehicle imported into Commonwealth.

An owner of a vehicle for which a certificate of registration or title, and license plate must be obtained shall be allowed a fifteen (15) day grace period from the date on which he purchased a vehicle or brings a vehicle into the Commonwealth from another state, during which time the owner shall apply for and obtain motor vehicle insurance pursuant to KRS 304.39-080 , a certificate of registration or title, and a license plate in his name.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 16, effective July 15, 1982; 1996, ch. 341, § 2, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Application.

Where debtor purchased pickup truck from dealer but dealer refused to deliver certificate of title after debtor filed Chapter 7 petition, 15-day deadline did not apply because dealer elected to transfer title on debtor's behalf. Palmer v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc. (In re Lainhart), 566 B.R. 464, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 292 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2017 ).

Cited:

Revenue Cabinet v. O’Daniel, 153 S.W.3d 815, 2005 Ky. LEXIS 19 ( Ky. 2005 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Used car dealers who sell cars which have previously been registered in this state may not issue temporary tags for 15 days while permanent certificates of title and registration plates are obtained from the county clerk’s office. OAG 84-149 .

There is no provision for equipping a motor vehicle which has been previously registered in this state with a temporary tag; the only vehicle which qualifies for a temporary tag is one which has not previously been registered in this state. OAG 84-149 .

A certificate of title for an automobile is not required by law to be recorded or lodged for record within the meaning of KRS 382.370 , and accordingly, a power of attorney to transfer ownership of an automobile is not required to be recorded or lodged for record within the meaning of that phrase in KRS 382.370 . OAG 93-82 .

186A.097. Registration of imported motor vehicles — Transfer of title — Inspection of vehicle.

  1. No county clerk shall accept an initial application for a certificate of registration or title, or license plate, from an importer of a motor vehicle not manufactured for sale or distribution in the United States unless the importer of such a vehicle shall furnish to the county clerk of the county where the vehicle is sought to be titled or registered the following:
    1. A manufacturer’s certificate of origin in the English language issued by the actual vehicle manufacturer;
    2. The original documents constituting valid proof of ownership in the country in which the vehicle was originally purchased, together with a complete translation of the documents into the English language verified as to accuracy of the translation by affidavit of a competent translator; or
    3. In the case of a vehicle imported from a country that cancels the vehicle registration and title for export, the documents assigned to the vehicle after the registration and title have been canceled, together with a complete translation of the documents into the English language, verified as to accuracy of the translation by affidavit of the translator.
  2. Upon the initial transfer of a vehicle not manufactured for sale or distribution in the United States by an importer of a vehicle, or upon registration of such a vehicle by the importer for their own use, no county clerk shall accept an application for certificate of registration or title or license plate until the following information is provided:
    1. A bond release letter, with all attachments, issued by the United States Department of Transportation acknowledging receipt of a statement of compliance submitted by the importer of the vehicle and that the statement meets the safety requirements of 19 C.F.R. 12.80 (e);
    2. A bond release letter, with all attachments, issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency stating that the vehicle has been tested and shown to be in conformity with federal emission requirements;
    3. A receipt or certificate issued by the United States Department of Treasury showing that any and all gas guzzler taxes due on the vehicle under the provision of Public Law 95-618, Title II, Section 201(a), (26 U.S.C. Sec. 4064), have been fully paid; and
    4. True and accurate copies of all documents, photographs, reports and all other records submitted to and used in obtaining United States customs bond release authorization from the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the United States Department of Transportation, and on which the authorization to release the bond was based.
  3. Upon the initial transfer of a vehicle not manufactured for sale or distribution in the United States by an importer of a vehicle, or upon registration of such a vehicle by the importer for their own use, the applicant shall, before submitting his application to the county clerk, have the vehicle together with his application for title or registration and its supporting documents inspected by a certified inspector according to the provisions of the KRS 186A.115 . When requested to inspect a vehicle pursuant to this section, the certified inspector shall personally and physically inspect the vehicle, together with the application for title or registration, and its supporting documentation. He shall insure that the documents, photographs, reports and other records submitted to the United States Department of Transportation and the United States Environmental Protection Agency, upon which the decision to issue bond release authorization to the United States Customs Service was based, correspond with the vehicle he is physically inspecting, by matching such records with the following:
    1. The vehicle identification number;
    2. The engine serial number;
    3. The make and model of the vehicle; and
    4. Photographs of the vehicle (if submitted).
  4. In lieu of the foregoing requirements, the applicant shall furnish to the county clerk proof satisfactory that the vehicle for which registration or title is sought was manufactured in the United States, or that such was lawfully imported into the United States by an authorized distributor from the manufacturer of the motor vehicle.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 69, § 1, effective July 15, 1986.

186A.100. Application, procedure, and use for temporary motor vehicle registration.

  1. A motor vehicle dealer licensed under KRS 186.070 who sells a vehicle for use upon the highways of this state shall equip the vehicle with a temporary tag executed in the manner prescribed below, which shall be valid for thirty (30) days from the date the vehicle is delivered to the purchaser. The cost of the tag shall be two dollars ($2), of which the clerk shall retain one dollar ($1). A motor vehicle dealer licensed under KRS 186.070 shall apply to the county clerk of the county in which the dealer maintains his principal place of business for issuance of temporary tags. Application shall be made for such tags on forms supplied to the county clerk by the Transportation Cabinet. If the purchaser has not received his certificate of registration within thirty (30) days from the date of delivery, the purchaser may obtain another temporary tag from the dealer.
  2. The county clerk of any county who receives a proper application for issuance of temporary tags shall record the number of each tag issued upon the application of the dealer for such tags, or if a group of consecutively numbered temporary tags are issued to a dealer in connection with a single application, record the beginning and ending numbers of the group on the application.
  3. The clerk shall retain, for a period of two (2) years, one (1) copy of the dealer’s temporary tag application, and ensure that it reflects the numbers appearing on the tags issued with respect to such application.
  4. If the owner of a motor vehicle submits to the county clerk a properly completed application for Kentucky certificate of title and registration pursuant to KRS 186A.120 , any motor vehicle required to be registered and titled in Kentucky, that is not currently registered and titled in Kentucky, may be equipped with a temporary tag, which shall be valid for thirty (30) days from the date of issuance, issued by the county clerk for the purpose of operating the vehicle in Kentucky while assembling the necessary documents in order to title and register the vehicle in Kentucky. The Transportation Cabinet may establish administrative regulations governing this section.
  5. The county clerk may issue a temporary tag to the owner of a motor vehicle that is currently registered and titled in Kentucky. A temporary tag authorized by this subsection shall be used for emergency or unusual purposes as determined by the clerk for the purpose of maintaining the owner’s current registration. A temporary tag authorized by this subsection may only be issued by the county clerk and shall be valid for a period of between twenty-four (24) hours and seven (7) days, as determined is necessary by the clerk. A county clerk shall not issue a temporary tag authorized by this subsection unless the owner of the motor vehicle applying for the tag presents proof of motor vehicle insurance pursuant to KRS 304.39-080 . On and after January 1, 2006, if the motor vehicle is a personal motor vehicle as defined in KRS 304.39-087 , proof of insurance shall be determined by the county clerk as provided in KRS 186A.042 . A temporary tag issued pursuant to this subsection shall not be reissued by the county clerk for the same owner and same motor vehicle within one (1) year of issuance of a temporary tag.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 17, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 105, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 113, § 3, effective July 15, 1988; 1996, ch. 53, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 2004, ch. 130, § 9, effective July 13, 2004; 2007, ch. 27, § 1, effective June 26, 2007; 2011, ch. 5, § 3, effective January 1, 2013.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

Subsection (4) of this section was created in 1988 Acts Ch. 105, Section 1, to provide for the issuance of a fifteen-day temporary tag by the county clerk for out-of-state vehicles being registered in Kentucky. Although this conformed with the existing fifteen-day temporary tag issued by dealers pursuant to (1), subsection (1) was later amended by 1988 Acts Ch. 113, Section 3, to extend the temporary tag period to thirty days. Inadvertently, in the later enactment, (4) was not amended to conform. Pursuant to KRS 7.136 , the Reviser of Statutes has made a technical correction in order to make the subsections consistent.

186A.105. Information required for issuance of temporary registration.

  1. Motor vehicle dealers, their agents and county clerks, before equipping a vehicle with a temporary tag, shall print or stamp in waterproof ink, legibly, in the spaces provided on such tag:
    1. The month, day and year the vehicle was delivered to the purchaser;
    2. The month, day and year of expiration of the tag which shall be no more than thirty (30) days following the date of delivery of the vehicle to the purchaser;
    3. The purchaser’s or owner’s name;
    4. The year model, make and vehicle identification number of the vehicle sold; and
    5. Either the dealer’s name, city of principal place of business and the telephone number, including telephone area code, or the clerk’s name, county and telephone number, including area code.
  2. The dealer’s employee who executes the temporary tag shall place his signature in the space provided. A dealer who issues, or whose agents issue, temporary tags shall keep a log of each temporary tag obtained and each tag issued, showing all information entered by the dealer or dealer’s agent on forms supplied by the cabinet, and shall make such log available for inspection by any law enforcement officer upon request. The log shall be retained by the dealer for a period of at least two (2) years following the date of issuance of the last dated tags whose issuance is indicated on any individual temporary tag log sheet.
  3. The county clerk who executes the temporary tag shall place his signature in the space provided. A county clerk who issues temporary tags shall keep a log of each temporary tag obtained and each tag issued, showing all information entered by the county clerk on forms supplied by the cabinet, and shall make the log available for inspection by any law enforcement officer upon request. The log shall be retained by the county clerk for a period of at least two (2) years following the date of issuance of the last dated tags whose issuance is indicated on any individual temporary tag log sheet.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 18, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 105, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1998, ch. 565, § 3, effective July 15, 1998.

186A.110. Liability for improper issuance of temporary registration.

Both the dealer and the dealer’s salesman or agent shall be liable for separate penalties for issuance of a temporary tag prior to sale of the vehicle on which the tag is placed by the dealer, for placement of a tag on a vehicle other than one purchased by the purchaser shown on such tag, for failure to fully execute as provided in this section a temporary tag which is placed upon a vehicle, and for failure to maintain the records required by KRS 186A.105 .

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 19, effective July 15, 1982.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Used car dealers who sell cars which have previously been registered in this state may not issue temporary tags for 15 days while permanent certificates of title and registration plates are obtained from the county clerk’s office. OAG 84-149 .

There is no provision for equipping a motor vehicle which has been previously registered in this state with a temporary tag; the only vehicle which qualifies for a temporary tag is one which has not previously been registered in this state. OAG 84-149 .

186A.115. Inspection of motor vehicles and documents by certified inspector — Fee for certification of inspection — Reciprocity between counties — Modifications of military surplus vehicles — Administrative regulations — Exceptions — Inspection of historic vehicles.

    1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the owner of every vehicle brought into this state and required to be titled in this state shall, before submitting his or her application for title to the county clerk, have the vehicle together with his or her application for title and its supporting documents inspected by a certified inspector in the county in which the application for title is to be submitted to the county clerk. (1) (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the owner of every vehicle brought into this state and required to be titled in this state shall, before submitting his or her application for title to the county clerk, have the vehicle together with his or her application for title and its supporting documents inspected by a certified inspector in the county in which the application for title is to be submitted to the county clerk.
    2. An owner of a military surplus vehicle seeking title in this state shall, before submitting his or her application for title to the county clerk, have the vehicle together with his or her application for title and its supporting documents inspected by a certified inspector in the county in which the application for title is to be submitted to the county clerk.
  1. For inspections under this section:
    1. The certified inspector shall be certified through the Department of Vehicle Regulation following requirements set forth by the department by regulation and shall be designated by the county sheriff. The certified inspector will be held responsible for all certifications required pursuant to this chapter and will be liable for any and all penalties prescribed in this chapter, and shall be available during regular office hours at any and all offices and branches that issue applications for titles;
    2. There shall be a five dollar ($5) fee for this certification, payable to the sheriff’s office, upon completion of certification;
    3. There shall be an additional fee of ten dollars ($10) per trip when it becomes necessary for the certified inspector to travel to the site of the vehicle rather than bringing the vehicle to the sheriff’s inspection area; and
    4. An inspection conducted in one (1) county within the Commonwealth of Kentucky under this subsection, and the fees paid for that inspection under this subsection, shall be honored by the certified inspector, sheriff, and county clerk in all other counties within this state. A second inspection shall not be required and additional fees shall not be required.
  2. The Transportation Cabinet may require that modifications be made to a military surplus vehicle. Any modifications required by the cabinet under this section shall be made to the military surplus vehicle prior to its inspection.
  3. The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to implement the provisions of subsections (1)(b) and (3) of this section, including but not limited to vehicle modification requirements and the creation of a separate inspection form. The Transportation Cabinet shall note that military vehicles were originally manufactured under the federally mandated requirements set forth in 49 C.F.R. sec. 571.7 and shall only require these vehicles to meet applicable federal motor vehicle safety standards.
  4. The following vehicles are excluded from the requirement of inspection by a certified inspector prior to titling in this state:
    1. New motor vehicles sold by a dealer licensed in this state;
    2. Vehicles required to be registered in this state by reason of lack of a reciprocity agreement with another state and for which a nonnegotiable registration document is to be issued;
    3. Motor vehicles operated by a motor carrier under a nonnegotiable certificate or permit issued by the Department of Vehicle Regulation;
    4. Motor vehicles owned by servicemen or servicewomen who are residents of Kentucky stationed outside of Kentucky may be inspected by the post provost or similar officer of the camp, post, or station. The post provost or similar officer shall submit an affidavit stating the name of the owner, the identification or serial number, the make, body style, current license or title number, if any, and state in which currently registered or titled, if any, of the motor vehicle;
    5. Motor vehicles purchased in another state by persons who are residents of Kentucky but are temporarily residing out of state for at least thirty (30) days, but not longer than nine (9) months, may after the purchase of the vehicle be inspected by the state police, a local law enforcement agency, or the vehicle inspection program of another state. If an inspector in another state examines a vehicle under this paragraph, the purchaser may request the inspector to complete an affidavit stating the name of the owner, the vehicle identification number, the vehicle make and body style, the current state of registration, if any, and the current vehicle license or title number, if any. The Transportation Cabinet shall create an affidavit form containing at a minimum this information and shall post the form on the cabinet’s Internet Web site. A person using an inspector in another state under this paragraph shall comply with all requirements of that state’s inspection program, including payment of fees charged in that state. A person registering a motor vehicle for the first time in Kentucky under this paragraph shall transmit the application for registration, all supporting documentation, and payment for registration and usage tax to the county clerk of the county in which the person resides, and upon receipt of the appropriate documentation, the county clerk shall register the vehicle; and
    6. Motor vehicles no longer located in Kentucky but which require inspection in order to issue a corrected Kentucky title due to error in vehicle identification or serial number may be inspected by an inspector authorized to inspect vehicle identification or serial number by the laws of the state or foreign country where application for a new title has been submitted.
  5. When presented to a certified inspector for inspection or to a county clerk for processing, the owner’s application for a first certificate of registration or title in his or her name shall be accompanied by proof of insurance in compliance with KRS 304.39-080 and one (1) of the following documents as applicable:
    1. If the vehicle is a new vehicle not previously registered in this state, the properly assigned manufacturer’s statement of origin for the vehicle for which registration or title is sought;
    2. If the vehicle was last registered in this state, and is a vehicle for which a title is not required in this state, a certificate of registration, or if the vehicle is one for which a certificate of title is required in this state, a properly assigned certificate of title;
    3. If the vehicle was last previously titled in another state, a properly assigned certificate of title;
    4. If the application refers to a vehicle previously registered in another country, the documents of that country establishing ownership of the vehicle;
    5. If the application refers to a vehicle last previously registered in another country by a person on active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States, the county clerk may accept on behalf of the Department of Vehicle Regulation evidence of ownership provided the applicant by the United States Department of Defense; and
    6. Except as provided in KRS 186A.072(2)(c) governing custom-built motorcycles, if the application relates to a vehicle which has been specially constructed or reconstructed, that fact shall be stated in the application, and the application shall be accompanied by the documents specified by administrative regulations of the Department of Vehicle Regulation.
  6. When requested to inspect a vehicle pursuant to this section, the certified inspector shall personally and physically inspect the vehicle, when registration or title is sought in this state, on the following points:
    1. He or she shall ensure that the application is legible and properly executed to the extent required at the time of execution;
    2. He or she shall compare the vehicle identification number as appearing on both the vehicle identification number plate, and the federal safety standards label of the vehicle which is sought to be registered or titled, with the corresponding number inscribed on the application, and its supporting documentation, and ensure that the vehicle identification number appearing at each described location appears legitimate and that they are consistent with each other;
    3. He or she shall examine the primary odometer of the vehicle and legibly record the reading in the space provided in the inspection section of the application; and
    4. After exercising due diligence in inspecting the vehicle, the application, and its supporting documentation, and finding that they appear to be in order, the certified inspector shall execute the preprinted certificate of inspection according to its terms by printing in the spaces provided his or her first name, middle initial, and last name, and his or her title; the name of the county in which he serves; and the telephone number including the telephone area code of his or her agency, and sign in ink his or her signature in the space provided, and print the month, day, and year in which his or her inspection was made, certifying under penalty of forgery in the second degree the character, accuracy, and date of his or her inspection.
  7. The certified inspector shall refrain from executing the certificate of inspection if:
    1. He or she has not personally and physically inspected the vehicle in accordance with this section;
    2. He or she has reason to believe that the vehicle displays an unlawfully altered vehicle identification number;
    3. The application and any of its copies are illegible or otherwise improperly executed, or contain information reasonably believed to be inaccurate or fraudulent;
    4. The documentation required in support of any application is not present, or not consistent with the vehicle and the owner’s application or appears fraudulent; or
    5. He or she has probable cause to believe the vehicle is stolen.
    1. Inspections on motor vehicles that meet the definition of a “historic vehicle” under KRS 186.043(2) and are brought into this state shall be limited to verification of the vehicle identification number with supporting documentation for purposes of titling. (9) (a) Inspections on motor vehicles that meet the definition of a “historic vehicle” under KRS 186.043(2) and are brought into this state shall be limited to verification of the vehicle identification number with supporting documentation for purposes of titling.
    2. Inspections on motor vehicles that meet the definition of a classic motor vehicle project as set forth in KRS 186A.510 shall be limited to verification of the vehicle identification number with supporting documentation for purposes of issuing a classic motor vehicle project certificate of title under KRS 186A.535(1).

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 20, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 319, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1994, ch. 504, § 3, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 35, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 1996, ch. 248, § 4, effective July 15, 1996; 2002, ch. 298, § 3, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 97, § 1, effective June 24, 2003; 2007, ch. 135, § 2, effective June 26, 2007; 2008, ch. 157, § 3, effective July 15, 2008; 2017 ch. 55, § 2, effective June 29, 2017.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Failure to Obtain Inspection.

Where debtor purchased pickup truck from dealer but dealer refused to deliver certificate of title after debtor filed Chapter 7 petition, sale was not void based on debtor's prepetition failure to provide vehicle for required inspection and dealer did not provide any statutory authority that voided sale based on that omission and none was located. Palmer v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc. (In re Lainhart), 566 B.R. 464, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 292 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2017 ).

186A.120. Initial application for title and registration to be in county of residence of owner — Exceptions.

  1. Application for a first certificate of registration or title and plate, shall be made by the owner to the county clerk of the county in which he resides, except that, if a vehicle is purchased from a dealer other than in the county in which the purchaser for use resides, the purchaser, or the dealer on behalf of the purchaser, may make application for registration to the county clerk in either the county in which the purchaser resides, or in the county in which the dealer’s principal place of business is located.
    1. When purchaser of a vehicle upon which a lien is to be recorded is a resident of a county other than that of the dealer, the application for registration or title may be made to the county clerk in either county. The lien must be recorded in the county of the purchaser’s residence. (2) (a) When purchaser of a vehicle upon which a lien is to be recorded is a resident of a county other than that of the dealer, the application for registration or title may be made to the county clerk in either county. The lien must be recorded in the county of the purchaser’s residence.
    2. If vehicle application for registration or title is presented to the county clerk of dealer’s location rather than purchaser’s residence, the clerk shall process documents in a manner similar to that of any application, with the exception that the AVIS system shall be programmed in a manner that the title shall not be issued from Frankfort until the lien information has been entered by the county clerk of the purchaser’s residence.
    1. A new vehicle, when first registered or titled in this state, shall be registered or titled in the name of the first owner for use rather than in the name of a dealer who held the vehicle for sale. (3) (a) A new vehicle, when first registered or titled in this state, shall be registered or titled in the name of the first owner for use rather than in the name of a dealer who held the vehicle for sale.
    2. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a used vehicle not previously registered or titled in this state shall be registered or titled in the name of the first owner for use rather than in the name of a dealer who held the vehicle for resale.
  2. If the owner of a vehicle required to be registered or titled in this state does not reside in the Commonwealth, the vehicle shall be registered or titled with the county clerk of the county in which the vehicle is principally operated.
  3. If the owner of a vehicle is other than an individual and resides in the Commonwealth, the vehicle shall be registered or titled with the county clerk in either the county in which the owner resides or in the county in which the vehicle is principally operated.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 21, effective July 15, 1982.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

While subdivision (3)(b) of this section, 186A.220 and 186A.230 exempt dealers who hold vehicles for resale from payment of the ad valorem tax, this is not a “halving” of a classification, but is only a method of fixing the time and the person responsible for payment of the ad valorem tax on all motor vehicles — to-wit, the purchaser of the vehicle at the time the vehicle is registered for use upon the highway, and the tax is payable by all persons, including an individual or a dealer, who intend to operate the vehicle on the highways of the state; these sections, read in conjunction with KRS 134.810(4), do not violate Ky. Const., §§ 59(15) or 171. Kling v. Geary, 667 S.W.2d 379, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 216 ( Ky. 1984 ).

1.5Miscellaneous.

Bankruptcy court properly granted summary judgment to appellee bankruptcy trustee in his strong-arm proceeding against appellant to avoid a lien claimed by appellant against the debtor’s manufactured home under 11 U.S.C.S. § 544 because the lien was not properly perfected under KRS 186A.190 , 186A.195 as appellant had filed the required title lien statement in its county of residence rather than in the county where the debtor resided. KRS 186A.120(2)(a) also required the lien to be filed in the county where the debtor resided. Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin. v. Westenhoefer, 716 F.3d 957, 2013 FED App. 0150P, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 10620 (6th Cir. Ky. 2013 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

It is not legal for an automobile dealer to list his business address as the address of the owner of the vehicle on an application for title and registration, because the mailing address of the owner required by statute must be amenable to reasonable location of the person. OAG 84-131 .

186A.125. Application for title or registration — Department to provide forms — County clerk to process documents.

  1. Application for a first certificate of registration, or title, in the name of an owner shall be made on forms prescribed by the Department of Vehicle Regulation consistent with this chapter, which shall be available from any county clerk.
  2. Application forms shall be completed, except as to required signatures, by legibly printing in ink, or typing all required information.
  3. The application, when presented to the county clerk, shall contain all required information and be fully executed with all required supporting documentation and fees.
  4. The county clerk shall reject any application upon which the information provided is not legibly printed or typed, the required information is not supplied, not accompanied by required supporting documents, not properly executed with signatures when required, or when the clerk determines that the application is improper or that the applicant is not entitled to registration or title of the vehicle for which registration or title is sought, or in the absence of the required fees.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 22, effective July 15, 1982; 1998, ch. 128, § 4, effective July 15, 1998.

186A.130. Fee for title application.

There shall be paid for issuing and processing documents required by this chapter fees according to the following schedule:

  1. Each application for a certificate of title shall be nine dollars ($9), of which the county clerk shall retain six dollars ($6) and the Transportation Cabinet shall receive three dollars ($3).
  2. Each application for a replacement or corrected certificate of title shall be six dollars ($6), of which the county clerk shall retain four dollars ($4) and the Transportation Cabinet shall receive two dollars ($2). If a corrected certificate must be issued because of an error of the county clerk or the Department of Vehicle Regulation, there shall be no charge.
  3. Each application for a speed title shall be twenty-five dollars ($25), of which the county clerk shall retain five dollars ($5) and the Transportation Cabinet shall receive twenty dollars ($20).
    1. Each application for a certificate of title for an all-terrain vehicle shall be fifteen dollars ($15), of which the county clerk shall retain six dollars ($6) and the Transportation Cabinet shall receive nine dollars ($9). (4) (a) Each application for a certificate of title for an all-terrain vehicle shall be fifteen dollars ($15), of which the county clerk shall retain six dollars ($6) and the Transportation Cabinet shall receive nine dollars ($9).
    2. Each application for a replacement or corrected certificate of title for an all-terrain vehicle shall be ten dollars ($10), of which the county clerk shall retain four dollars ($4) and the Transportation Cabinet shall receive six dollars ($6). If a corrected certificate must be issued because of an error of the county clerk or the Department of Vehicle Regulation, there shall be no charge.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 23, effective July 15, 1982; 1994, ch. 428, § 34, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 35, § 3, effective July 15, 1996; 2006, ch. 255, § 11, effective January 1, 2007; 2009, ch. 64, § 3, effective June 25, 2009.

186A.135. Issuance of documents processed by system. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 24, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1998, ch. 128, § 14, effective July 15, 1998.

186A.140. Issuance of documents in county not equipped with operable automated system. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 25, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 118, § 96, effective July 1, 1987) was repealed by Acts 1998, ch. 128, § 14, effective July 15, 1998.

186A.145. Processing prohibited when property tax account delinquent — Exceptions — Responsibility for ad valorem taxes.

  1. Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, a county clerk shall not process an application for Kentucky title and registration from or to any Kentucky resident who has a delinquent motor vehicle ad valorem property tax account.
  2. This section shall not apply to transactions involving:
    1. Licensed Kentucky motor vehicle dealers;
    2. A person who is engaged in the business of storing or towing motor vehicles, applying for a new title under KRS 376.275(1)(c); or
    3. A secured party applying for a repossession title under KRS 186.045(6).
    1. For any vehicle obtained as the result of a claim on a motor vehicle insurance policy, an insurer and its agent shall not be responsible for the payment of any delinquent motor vehicle ad valorem property taxes owed by any previous owner, when: (3) (a) For any vehicle obtained as the result of a claim on a motor vehicle insurance policy, an insurer and its agent shall not be responsible for the payment of any delinquent motor vehicle ad valorem property taxes owed by any previous owner, when:
      1. Applying for a regular or salvage title; or
      2. Transferring ownership of the vehicle to another party.
    2. The owner of a motor vehicle that was transferred to an insurer or its agent under paragraph (a) of this subsection shall remain responsible for any delinquent motor vehicle ad valorem property taxes owed prior to the transfer.
  3. An insurer shall not be exempt from any motor vehicle ad valorem property taxes owed on any vehicle that it owns:
    1. As a part of its business operations; or
    2. On January 1, that was obtained as the result of a claim on a motor vehicle insurance policy.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 26, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 113, § 8, effective December 31, 1988; 1998, ch. 128, § 5, effective July 15, 1998; 2021 ch. 74, § 14, effective June 29, 2021.

186A.147. Prohibition against registration of personal motor vehicle owned by delinquent taxpayer — Written tax clearance — Informal hearing — Exception.

  1. A county clerk shall not process an application for, nor issue a:
    1. Kentucky registration or renewal of registration;
    2. Replacement plate, decal, or registration certificate;
    3. Duplicate registration;
    4. Transfer of registration; or
    5. Temporary tag; for any motor vehicle if AVIS lists the vehicle identification number of the motor vehicle as owned by a delinquent taxpayer as defined in KRS 131.1817 .
  2. The county clerk shall not process the applicable application or issue the applicable document until a written tax clearance has been received by the Department of Vehicle Regulation from the Finance and Administration Cabinet, Department of Revenue, as provided in KRS 131.1817 .
    1. A person who has been adversely affected by the refusal of a county clerk to process an application or issue a document under this section may request an informal hearing, to be conducted by the Transportation Cabinet or its agency designated in writing for that purpose. (3) (a) A person who has been adversely affected by the refusal of a county clerk to process an application or issue a document under this section may request an informal hearing, to be conducted by the Transportation Cabinet or its agency designated in writing for that purpose.
    2. The request for the informal hearing shall be writing and shall be filed with the Transportation Cabinet within thirty (30) days after the county clerk’s refusal to process an application or issue a document.
    3. The only matter to be considered at the hearing shall be whether there is a mistake in fact made by the Department of Revenue or the Department of Vehicle Regulation in the determination that the person is a delinquent taxpayer.
  3. This section shall not apply to any transactions involving Kentucky motor vehicle dealers who are licensed under KRS 190.030 .

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 119, § 5, effective July 1, 2013.

186A.150. Procedures for receiving application in event of outage of automated system. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 27, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1998, ch. 128, § 14, effective July 15, 1998.

186A.155. Duties of county clerk after system becomes operational. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 28, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1998, ch. 128, § 14, effective July 15, 1998.

186A.160. County clerk to distribute copies of certificate of registration. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 29, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1998, ch. 128, § 14, effective July 15, 1998.

186A.165. County clerk to prepare application transmittal record.

Not later than 3 p.m. on the next business day after an application for a first certificate of registration or title for a vehicle is received by him, the county clerk shall prepare on forms supplied by the Department of Vehicle Regulation, an application transmittal record.

  1. The clerk shall indicate thereon in the spaces provided, the name of his county, the date or time period the transmittal relates to and, in the order they are to be attached to the transmittal record, a notation for each application attached consisting of the applicant’s last name and initials or if the applicant is other than an individual, the name commonly used by the applicant and any other information required upon the form as indicated thereon.
  2. The clerk shall ensure that the original of all applications noted on the transmittal, together with the original of all required supporting documents are attached to the transmittal record in the order shown thereon, and shall thereafter sign and date the original of the transmittal record as of the date the transmittal is being forwarded to Frankfort.
  3. The county clerk shall place the original of each application record, with the original of each application shown thereon, and its required supporting documents, together with the acknowledgment of the transmittal record, in the envelope or other container provided by the Department of Vehicle Regulation and forward to the Division of Motor Vehicle Licensing in Frankfort.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 30, effective July 15, 1982.

186A.170. Duties of Department of Vehicle Regulation in processing title applications.

  1. The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall:
    1. Within five (5) working days following receipt by it of an application for a certificate of title in proper form, process the application and its supporting documents in the manner provided in this section, and unless it finds discrepancies with respect to it or its supporting documents, issue a certificate of title in the name of the owner and send it postpaid to such owner; and
    2. Within forty-eight (48) hours following electronic notification by a county clerk’s office of an application for a certificate of title, issue a speed title which shall be held for pickup or returned to the owner by mail. The clerk shall take the application for title and process the appropriate paperwork as provided for in this chapter. The department may provide, by administrative regulation, for exceptions to the speed title procedure.
  2. Upon receiving an application packet from a county clerk, the application receipt clerk of the Department of Vehicle Regulation shall:
    1. Cause the date and time of receipt to be stamped on both the department’s copy and the acknowledgment copy of the application transmittal record and accompanying documents;
    2. Cause at least duplicate sets of images to be made of each transmittal record application and supporting document by a means that will provide rapid, selective, automated retrieval of individual document images by appropriate indexing methods or keys; and
    3. Compare the application transmittal record with the documents accompanying it and, if all applications shown upon the record are accompanying the record, endorse the department’s copy of the transmittal record and the acknowledgment copy, and forward the acknowledgment copy to the clerk who issued it.
  3. In the event there is a discrepancy between the application transmittal record and the application attached to it, the Department of Vehicle Regulation shall note the discrepancy upon the department’s copy and the acknowledgment copy, and shall promptly contact the issuing clerk and resolve the discrepancy. After resolving the discrepancy, the department shall note the nature of the disposition of the discrepancy and endorse the respective copies and forward the acknowledgment copy with the discrepancy disposition noted thereon to the issuing clerk.
  4. After executing the acknowledgment of receipt of applications, the Department of Vehicle Regulation shall carry out the following action with respect to each application:
    1. Examine the owner’s application for legibility and proper execution, presence of required information, including required supporting documents, and the presence of required signatures. The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall ensure also that the required supporting documents are consistent in pertinent part with the information shown on the owner’s application;
    2. The documents supporting an owner’s application shall be examined as to authenticity and to determine if fraudulent alteration has occurred;
    3. Ensure that the vehicle identification number of the subject vehicle is apparently legitimate;
    4. Ensure that the vehicle identification number and any other appropriate information with respect to a vehicle for which a certificate of title has been applied for is compared against the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) computerized listings of vehicles reported stolen, unless NCIC is not operational and the department has official notification that it is not expected to be operational within four (4) working days following the day on which an application for a certificate of title is received by it; and
    5. Compare the computer-produced certificate of title for consistency with the owner’s application and supporting documents.
  5. When the title application has been completed, and the application examiner at each significant stage has indicated, by placing his unique symbol upon the application in the space provided thereon, that an application has passed the required examinations, the application shall be examined by a title examination certifier.
  6. The title application certifier shall ensure that each application has received the required examinations as indicated by the presence of each required examiner’s symbol. Upon satisfying himself that an application has passed the required examinations, the title examination certifier shall place his unique symbol together with the date upon the application.
  7. The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall withhold issuance of a title, until its questions are resolved to its satisfaction, when it finds material discrepancies or has information giving probable cause to believe:
    1. That an applicant is not the lawful owner of a vehicle for which he seeks a title;
    2. His application is not in order;
    3. The documentation supporting an application is insufficient or fraudulent;
    4. The vehicle has an illegitimate vehicle identification number;
    5. The vehicle is stolen; or
    6. That the computer-produced certificate of title is not consistent with the owner’s application.
  8. In the case of multiple owners, the Department of Vehicle Regulation shall require only two (2) primary owners’ names to be printed on the certificate of title. Upon submission of the title application, if more than two (2) owners are listed, the primary owners shall be determined by the title applicants. In such instances, the certificate of the title shall note that there are more than two (2) owners. The names of all title applicants shall be documented in AVIS.
  9. When the Department of Vehicle Regulation finds that a certificate of title should be issued for a vehicle, the endorsement of the commissioner of the Department of Vehicle Regulation shall be engrossed upon the certificate of title following a preprinted statement which shall read: I certify that the Department of Vehicle Regulation has exercised due diligence in examining an application for a certificate of title for the above-described vehicle, and to the best of our knowledge and belief, the applicant whose name appears above is the lawful owner of the apparently legitimate vehicle described herein. ___________________ (signature), commissioner, Department of Vehicle Regulation, Kentucky Transportation Cabinet.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 31, effective July 15, 1982; 1996, ch. 35, § 4, effective July 15, 1996; 2010, ch. 61, § 2, effective July 15, 2010; 2012, ch. 113, § 2, effective January 1, 2014; 2017 ch. 148, § 1, effective June 29, 2017.

186A.175. Form of certificate of title issued by department. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 32, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1998, ch. 128, § 14, effective July 15, 1998.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/98). Under KRS 446.260 , the repeal of this section in 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 128, sec. 14, prevails over its amendment in 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 128, sec. 6.

186A.180. Owner may obtain updated certificate of title.

An owner who has obtained a certificate of title pursuant to this chapter may apply for and obtain an updated certificate, but shall not be required to periodically renew a certificate of title that has been issued to him.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 33, effective July 15, 1982.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Survey of Law, Nowka, Commercial Law, 72 Ky. L.J. 337 (1983-84).

186A.185. Department to be custodian of documents.

The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall:

  1. Be the custodian of the original of each application for a certificate of title, and its supporting documents. It shall retain such records in accordance with a records retention and destruction schedule established pursuant to the archives and records statutes of this state.
  2. Furnish on a periodic basis not less than quarterly to other states, either the original, or a copy, or listings of all certificates of title received from them, to include title and document control numbers in addition to the vehicle description and owner information.
  3. Maintain active liaison with other states regarding vehicle titling and its auto-theft implications, and obtain from them on a regular basis, listings of documents reported missing or stolen or counterfeit.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 34, effective July 15, 1982.

186A.190. Security interest notation required on title document — Notarized designation of debtor’s county of residence provides reliance on and relief from liability — Requirements to perfect title on security interest — Continuation statements — Determination of debtor’s residence when debtor is other than a natural person — Discharge of security interest — Issuance of new ownership document to creditor in possession upon certain conditions — Fees.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (6) of this section and in KRS 355.9-311(4), the perfection of a security interest in any property for which has been issued a Kentucky certificate of title shall be by notation on the certificate of title which shall be deemed to have occurred when the provisions of subsection (3) of this section have been complied with. Discharge of a security interest shall be by notation on the certificate of title. Notation shall be made by the entry of information required by subsection (9) of this section into the Automated Vehicle Information System. The notation of the security interest on the certificate of title shall be in accordance with this chapter and shall remain effective from the date on which the security interest is noted on the certificate of title for a period of ten (10) years, or, in the case of a manufactured home, for a period of thirty (30) years, or until discharged under this chapter and KRS Chapter 186. The filing of a continuation statement within the six (6) months preceding the expiration of the initial period of a notation’s effectiveness extends the expiration date for five (5) additional years, commencing on the day the notation would have expired in the absence of the filing. Succeeding continuation statements may be filed in the same manner to continue the effectiveness of the initial notation.
  2. A motor vehicle dealer, a secured party or its representative, an assignee of a retail installment contract lender, or a county clerk shall rely on a county of residence designated by the debtor on any approved, notarized state form utilized in lien titling or the title transfer process signed by the debtor. Reliance on the foregoing by the motor vehicle dealer, secured parties, and county clerk shall relieve those persons from liability to any third party claiming failure to comply with this section.
  3. Except as provided in subsection (6) of this section, the notation of security interests relating to property required to be titled under this chapter in Kentucky through the county clerk shall be done in the office of the county clerk of the county in which the debtor resides as determined by subsections (2) and (4) of this section. The security interest shall be deemed to be noted on the certificate of title and perfected, or deemed perfected at the time the security interest attaches as provided in KRS 355.9-203, if in compliance with KRS 186A.195(5), when a title lien statement:
    1. Is received by the county clerk in the county in which residence of the debtor resides as determined under the provisions of this section together with the required fees, as designated by the debtor in the sworn statement;
    2. Describes the titled vehicle, or vehicle to be titled, by year, model, make, and vehicle identification number;
    3. Provides the name of the secured party, or a representative of the secured party, together with the additional information about the secured party required by subsection (9) of this section with reasonable particularity; and
    4. Includes the date and time-stamped entry of the notation of the security interest by the county clerk of the required information in the Automated Vehicle Information System (AVIS), or its successor title processing system maintained by the Division of Motor Vehicle Licensing of the Transportation Cabinet.
  4. Except as provided in subsection (6) of this section, if the debtor is other than a natural person, the following provisions govern the determination of the county of the debtor’s residence:
    1. A partnership shall be deemed a resident of the county in which its principal place of business in this state is located. If the debtor does not have a place of business in this state, then the debtor shall be deemed a nonresident for purposes of filing in this state;
    2. A limited partnership organized under KRS Chapter 362 or as defined in KRS 362.2-102(14) shall be deemed a resident of the county in which its principal place of business is located, as set forth in its certificate of limited partnership or most recent amendment thereto filed pursuant to KRS Chapter 362 or 362.2-202. If such office is not located in this state, the debtor shall be deemed a nonresident for purposes of filing in this state;
    3. A limited partnership not organized under the laws of this state and authorized to do business in this state shall be deemed a resident of the county in which the office of its process agent is located, as set forth in the designation or most recent amendment thereto filed with the Secretary of State of the Commonwealth of Kentucky;
    4. A corporation organized under KRS Chapter 271B, 273, or 274 or a limited liability company organized under KRS Chapter 275 shall be deemed a resident of the county in which its registered office is located, as set forth in its most recent corporate filing with the Secretary of State which officially designates its current registered office;
    5. A corporation not organized under the laws of this state, but authorized to transact or do business in this state under KRS Chapter 271B, 273, or 274, or a limited liability company not organized under the laws of this state, but authorized to transact business in this state under KRS Chapter 275, shall be deemed a resident of the county in which its registered office is located, as set forth in its most recent filing with the Secretary of State which officially designates its current registered office;
    6. A cooperative corporation or association organized under KRS Chapter 272 shall be deemed a resident of the county in which its principal business is transacted, as set forth in its articles of incorporation or most recent amendment thereto filed with the Secretary of State of the Commonwealth of Kentucky;
    7. A cooperative corporation organized under KRS Chapter 279 shall be deemed a resident of the county in which its principal office is located, as set forth in its articles of incorporation or most recent amendment thereto filed with the Secretary of State of the Commonwealth of Kentucky;
    8. A business trust organized under KRS Chapter 386 shall be deemed a resident of the county in which its principal place of business is located, as evidenced by the recordation of its declaration of trust in that county pursuant to KRS Chapter 386;
    9. A credit union organized under Subtitle 6 of KRS Chapter 286 shall be deemed a resident of the county in which its principal place of business is located, as set forth in its articles of incorporation or most recent amendment thereto filed with the Secretary of State of the Commonwealth of Kentucky; and
    10. Any other organization defined in KRS 355.1-201 shall be deemed a resident of the county in which its principal place of business in this state is located, except that any limited liability company, limited liability partnership, limited partnership, or corporation not organized under the laws of this state and not authorized to transact or do business in this state shall be deemed a nonresident for purposes of filing in this state. If the organization does not have a place of business in this state, then it shall be deemed a nonresident for purposes of filing in this state.

      If the debtor does not reside in the Commonwealth, the notation of the security interest shall be done in the office of the county clerk in which the property is principally situated or operated. Notwithstanding the existence of any filed financing statement under the provisions of KRS Chapter 355 relating to any property registered or titled in Kentucky, the sole means of perfecting and discharging a security interest in property for which a certificate of title is required by this chapter is by notation on the property’s certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter or in accordance with the provisions of KRS 186.045(3). In other respects the security interest is governed by the provisions of KRS Chapter 355.

  5. Except as provided in subsection (6) of this section, before ownership of property subject to a lien evidenced by notation on the certificate of title may be transferred, the transferor shall obtain the release of the prior liens in his name against the property being transferred. Once a security interest has been noted on the owner’s title, a subsequent title shall not be issued by any county clerk free of the notation unless the owner’s title is presented to the clerk and it has been noted thereon that the security interest has been discharged. If this requirement is met, information relating to any security interest shown on the title as having been discharged may be omitted from the title to be issued by the clerk. If information relating to the discharge of a security interest is presented to a clerk under the provisions of KRS 186.045(3), the clerk shall discharge the security interest and remove the lien information from AVIS.
  6. Notwithstanding subsections (1) to (5) of this section, a county clerk shall, following inspection of the vehicle by the sheriff, to determine that the vehicle has not been stolen, issue a new ownership document to a vehicle, clear of all prior liens, to a person after he or she provides to the county clerk an affidavit devised by the Transportation Cabinet and completed by the person. The ownership document presented as a result of this affidavit shall be in accordance with subsection (7) of this section. In the affidavit, the affiant shall attest that:
    1. The affiant or the agent of the affiant possesses the vehicle;
    2. Before he or she provided the notices required by paragraphs (c) and (d) of this subsection:
      1. A debt on the vehicle has been owed him or her for more than thirty (30) days;
      2. Within thirty (30) days of payment of damages by an insurance company and receipt by the current owner of the motor vehicle or lienholder of damages pursuant to a claim settlement which required transfer of the vehicle to the insurance company, the insurance company has been unable to obtain:
        1. A properly endorsed certificate of title on the vehicle from the current owner; and
        2. If applicable, any lien satisfactions; or
        1. The vehicle was voluntarily towed or transported pursuant to a request of the current owner or an insurance company that a motor vehicle dealer, licensed as a used motor vehicle dealer and motor vehicle auction dealer, take possession of and store the motor vehicle in the regular course of business; and 3. a. The vehicle was voluntarily towed or transported pursuant to a request of the current owner or an insurance company that a motor vehicle dealer, licensed as a used motor vehicle dealer and motor vehicle auction dealer, take possession of and store the motor vehicle in the regular course of business; and
        2. Within forty-five (45) days of taking possession of the motor vehicle, the motor vehicle dealer has not been paid storage fees by the current owner or lienholder and has not been provided both a properly endorsed certificate of title and if applicable, any lien satisfactions;
    3. More than thirty (30) days before presenting the affidavit to the county clerk, the affiant attempted to notify the owner of the vehicle and all known lienholders, including those noted on the title, by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by a nationally recognized courier service, of his or her name, address, and telephone number as well as his or her intention to obtain a new title or salvage title, as applicable, clear of all prior liens, unless the owner or a lienholder objects in writing;
    4. More than fourteen (14) days before presenting the affidavit to the county clerk, the affiant had published a legal notice stating his or her intention to obtain title to the vehicle. The legal notice appeared at least twice in a seven (7) day period in a newspaper with circulation in the county. The legal notice stated:
      1. The affiant’s name, address, and telephone number;
      2. The owner’s name;
      3. The names of all known lienholders, including those noted on the title;
      4. The vehicle’s make, model, and year; and
      5. The affiant’s intention to obtain title to the vehicle unless the owner or a lienholder objects in writing within fourteen (14) days after the last publication of the legal notice; and
    5. Neither the owner nor a lienholder has objected in writing to the affiant’s right to obtain title to the vehicle.
    1. If subsection (6) (b)1. of this section applies, the new ownership document shall be a title. (7) (a) If subsection (6) (b)1. of this section applies, the new ownership document shall be a title.
    2. If subsection (6) (b)2. or 3. of this section applies, the new ownership document shall be a salvage title if the vehicle meets the requirements for a salvage title as stated in KRS 186A.520(1)(a).
    3. If subsection (6) (b)2. or 3. of this section applies and the vehicle does not meet the requirements for a salvage title as stated in KRS 186A.520(1)(a), the new ownership document shall be a title.
  7. No more than two (2) active security interests may be noted upon a certificate of title.
  8. In noting a security interest upon a certificate of title, the county clerk shall ensure that the certificate of title bears the lienholder’s name, mailing address and zip code, the date the lien was noted, the notation number, and the county in which the security interest was noted. The clerk shall obtain the information required by this subsection for notation upon the certificate of title from the title lien statement described in KRS 186A.195 to be provided to the county clerk by the secured party.
  9. For all the costs incurred in the notation and discharge of a security interest on the certificate of title, the county clerk shall receive the fee prescribed by KRS 64.012 . The fee prescribed by this subsection shall be paid at the time of submittal of the title lien statement described in KRS 186A.195 .
  10. A copy of the application, certified by the county clerk, indicating the lien will be noted on the certificate of title shall be forwarded to the lienholder.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 35, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 118, § 97, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 132, § 2, effective March 31, 1988; 1990, ch. 478, § 4, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 297, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 2000, ch. 408, § 179, effective July 1, 2001; 2001, ch. 65, § 1, effective July 1, 2001; 2003, ch. 103, § 2, effective June 24, 2003; 2006, ch. 149, § 225, effective July 12, 2006; 2006, ch. 242, § 63, effective July 12, 2006; 2016 ch. 11, § 1, effective July 15, 2016; 2016 ch. 118, § 1, effective July 15, 2016; 2017 ch. 31, § 1, effective June 29, 2017; 2018 ch. 117, § 2, effective July 14, 2018; 2020 ch. 119, § 1, effective July 15, 2020.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(7/15/2016). This statute was amended by 2016 Ky. Acts chs. 11 and 118, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

(7/12/2006). 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 247 instructs the Reviser of Statutes to adjust KRS references throughout the statutes to conform with the 2006 renumbering of the Financial Services Code, KRS Chapter 286. Such an adjustment has been made in this statute.

Acts 1988, ch. 11, § 19, provides: “In order that city employees with a choice can make an informed decision on whether or not to join the county employees retirement system, Kentucky retirement systems shall conduct briefings for each affected pension system on the provisions of this Act. Each employee shall receive a written summary of the retirement benefits which the county employees retirement system offers, and each employee shall be given the opportunity to attend an oral presentation. All such presentations shall be completed by October 15, 1988, and each affected employee shall make his decision by November 1, 1988. Failure of an employee subject to the provisions of this Act to receive a written summary or to attend an oral briefing shall in no way invalidate any of the provisions of this Act.”

Compiler's Notes.

Section 190 of Acts 2000 ch. 408, effective July 1, 2001, read: “The amendment to KRS 186A.190(1) contained in Section 179 of 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 408 [this section] shall be retroactive in nature and apply to notations on certificates of titles already in existence on July 1, 2001. The effectiveness of those existing notations that would otherwise expire on July 1, 2001, or within the first six months following that date, is hereby extended until six months after July 1, 2001. For these notations, the filing of a continuation statement within the first six months following July 1, 2001 shall operate to extend the expiration date of the notation for seven (7) additional years from the date that the notation would have expired under KRS 186A.190(1), as amended in 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 408.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Merger of Title and Financing Statement.

When the certificate of title is issued, the financing statement is merged into the certificate and the certificate becomes the only document necessary to achieve perfection. Kentucky Finance Co. v. Spradlin, 717 S.W.2d 843, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1460 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

2.Release of Certificate of Title.

The public must be able to rely upon documents certified by the county clerk’s office and, in spite of the danger of forged releases, a release noted upon a certificate of title by a duly appointed deputy clerk is effective; therefore, since the certificate of title governs and the filing of a financing statement is unnecessary for perfection and priority, a secured creditor is not required to search the records. Kentucky Finance Co. v. Spradlin, 717 S.W.2d 843, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1460 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

3.Perfection or Discharge of Security Interest.

Since subsection (2) of this section and former KRS 355.9-302(3) clearly and unambiguously provide that, as to any property for which a certificate of title is required by KRS Chapter 186A, a security interest in that property may be perfected or discharged only by a notation in that vein on the certificate of title, fact that mobile home was affixed to real estate was of no merit and notation on the certificate of title served as the exclusive method for perfecting bank’s security interest therein and bank was entitled to possess the mobile home upon default of promissory note. Hiers v. Bank One, 946 S.W.2d 196, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 167 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

Where bankruptcy debtors had mobile homes on real properties secured by mortgages, the mobile homes were personal property under state law, and thus the mortgagee’s failure to perfect its liens by having the liens recorded on the mobile homes’ certificates of title as required by KRS 186A.190 permitted modification of the mortgagee’s security interests under 11 U.S.C.S. § 1322(b)(2). Sizemore v. Johnson (In re Sizemore), 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 627 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Apr. 20, 2006).

A bankruptcy trustee had the power under 11 USCS 544(a)(1) to avoid a loan company’s lien in two (2) joint debtors’ manufactured home in part because, as of the bankruptcy filing date, the company had not perfected its security interest in the home under KRS 186A.190 . The trustee had a superior lien interest in the debtors’ home. Westenhoefer v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Stagnoli), 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 238 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Jan. 19, 2007).

Since the final act necessary perfection is notation by the clerk of the lien on the certificate of title, and it is only when a security interest is actually noted on the title are other creditors foreclosed conclusively from obtaining a superior lien, regardless of the prior submission of the appropriate documents and fees by a enabling secured party, a contract creditor can acquire a superior interest until such time as the county clerk notes the enabling creditor’s lien on the title. Because the lender’s security interest was not perfected until more than 20 days after debtor received possession of the vehicle, the enabling loan exception was inapplicable. Brock v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. (In re Johnson), 380 B.R. 455, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4209 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007), aff'd, 611 F.3d 313, 2010 FED App. 0193P, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 13588 (6th Cir. 2010).

Bankruptcy trustee could avoid a bank’s lien asserted on the debtors’ vehicle because the debtors did not comply with the perfection requirements of KRS 186A.190 and KRS 186A.195 when the bank did not have the certificate of title and the title lien statement submitted to the county where the debtors resided for notation on the certificate of title. Schlarman v. Fifth Third Bank, Inc. (In re Sands), 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3064 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Sept. 16, 2008).

Final perfection of a vehicle lien did not occur until physical notation was made on the title pursuant to KRS 186A.190 . Johnson v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 313 S.W.3d 557, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 152 ( Ky. 2010 ).

Second mortgage holder had a priority security interest in a manufactured home because a lis pendens did not apply to personal property, the mere filing of a notice of lis pendens was insufficient to independently create a security interest, and it did not affect the priority of competing security interests. A first mortgage holder did not perfect a security interest in the home as personal property by placing a notation on a certificate of title, as required by KRS 186A.190 , and the manufactured home remained personal property due to a failure to comply with KRS 186A.297 . Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 309 S.W.3d 792, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 67 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).

Kentucky Supreme Court responded to a certified question that final perfection of a vehicle lien did not occur until physical notation was made on the title pursuant to KRS 186A.190 , and perfection was not accomplished as and when the required paperwork and fee were submitted to the clerk. Having received the Kentucky Supreme Court’s response to a certified question regarding when a vehicle lien became perfected under Kentucky law, the court upheld a bankruptcy appellate panel’s conclusion that perfection of the bank’s lien did not occur until the security interest was actually noted on the certificate of title; because perfection did not occur within 20 days after the debtor received possession of the truck, the enabling loan exception of 11 U.S.C.S. § 547(c)(3) did not protect the bank’s interest from avoidance as a preferential transfer. Brock v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. (In re Johnson), 611 F.3d 313, 2010 FED App. 0193P, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 13588 (6th Cir. 2010).

Chapter 13 creditor did not have a perfected lien in the debtor’s mobile home, as the creditor had not complied with KRS 186A.190(1) or KRS 186A.297(1). In re Scott, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 3943 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. Nov. 19, 2010).

Where the secured creditor’s lien against the debtors’ mobile home had not been perfected under KRS 186A.190(1), its secured interest was limited to the mortgage on the debtors’ real property, and the debtors’ payoff of the lien against the mobile home was avoidable as a preference under 11 U.S.C.S. § 547(b). Higgason v. CIT Group/Consumer Fin., Inc. (In re Lambdin), 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 4227 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Nov. 9, 2010).

Where a creditor failed to file its title lien statement with the county clerk where a Chapter 7 debtor resided as required by KRS 186A.190 , its lien on the debtor’s mobile home was not properly perfected at the time the debtor filed bankruptcy, and a trustee had a superior title to the debtor’s one-half interest in the mobile home under 11 U.S.C.S. § 544, and he was entitled to recover the value of the debtor’s one-half interest for the benefit of the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C.S. § 550. The court rejected the creditor’s argument that perfection occurred solely by the appearance of the notation of the lien on the face of the certificate of title, notwithstanding the county of filing, and the argument that once the title was issued, all prior acts, including any infirmities, merged into the title. Palmer v. Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin. (In re Walling), 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 4716 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Dec. 20, 2010).

Because the plain language of the mortgage contract did not grant the lender a lien on debtor’s manufactured home as personal property, the lender did not obtain a security interest in the manufactured home through the mortgage contract, and even if the lender had obtained a lien against the manufactured home by way of the mortgage contract, it was undisputed that the lender did not note the security interest on the certificate of title, and the filing of a lis pendens could not serve to perfect a security interest in a manufactured home; accordingly, before the state-court foreclosure judgment, the lender did not have a perfected lien on debtor’s manufactured home. Dickson v. Countrywide Home Loans (In re Dickson), 655 F.3d 585, 2011 FED App. 0242P, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17830 (6th Cir. 2011).

Creditor’s objection to a Chapter 13 plan on the grounds that the plan impermissibly sought to modify its claim under 11 U.S.C.S. § 1322(b)(2) was overruled because notwithstanding whether the debtors’ mobile home was permanently affixed to real property that secured the creditor’s interest, it could only be deemed an interest in real estate if it was converted to real property under KRS 186A.297 ; thus, because the mobile home had an active certificate of title and had not been converted, a security interest could only be perfected under KRS 186A.190(1) by notation on the certificate of title. The court rejected the creditor’s argument that because the priority scheme in KRS 355.9-334(5)(d) provided a mechanism for a mortgage to have priority over a security interest in a titled mobile home, that this meant the mobile home could be perfected other than by a notation on its title. In re Starks, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 268 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Jan. 24, 2011).

Creditor failed to provide evidence that its security interest was perfected by notation on the certificate of title of a Chapter 7 debtor’s mobile home prior to the filing of the debtor’s petition as required by KRS 186A.190(1) and failed to allege or prove that the mobile home was converted from personalty to realty under KRS 186A.297 . Even had the creditor provided sufficient evidence that its lien was noted on a certificate of title issued before the debtor’s petition was filed, it still could not overcome the fact that it filed the title lien statement in the wrong county under KRS 186A.190(2) and thus, because the creditor’s lien on the mobile home was not properly perfected at the time the debtor filed bankruptcy, the trustee had superior title to the mobile home pursuant to 11 U.S.C.S. § 544(a)(1) and was entitled to recover the value of the debtor’s interest in the mobile home for the benefit of the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C.S. § 550. Higgason v. Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc. (In re Pierce), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 3639 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Sept. 20, 2011), aff'd, 471 B.R. 876, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 2457 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2012).

Because strict compliance with KRS 186A.190 was required to perfect a creditor’s lien, the lien was unperfected under Kentucky law at the time the debtor filed bankruptcy, and the chapter 7 trustee could avoid the lien under 11 U.S.C.S. § 544(a)(1) and recover the value of the vehicle under 11 U.S.C.S. § 550. In re Godsey, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 113 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Jan. 11, 2012).

Bankruptcy court properly granted summary judgment to appellee bankruptcy trustee in his strong-arm proceeding against appellant to avoid a lien claimed by appellant against the debtor’s manufactured home under 11 U.S.C.S. § 544 because the lien was not properly perfected under KRS 186A.190 , 186A.195 as appellant had filed the required title lien statement in its county of residence rather than in the county where the debtor resided. KRS 186A.120(2)(a) also required the lien to be filed in the county where the debtor resided. Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin. v. Westenhoefer, 716 F.3d 957, 2013 FED App. 0150P, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 10620 (6th Cir. Ky. 2013 ).

Trustee could avoid a mortgage lender’s interest in debtor’s manufactured home because, under Kentucky law pertaining to perfection of its lien, the lender was required to either note its lien on the certificate of title to the mobile home, or to convert the manufactured home to real property under statute, which the lender failed to do. Higgason v. Cantrell (In re Cantrell), 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3708 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Sept. 5, 2013).

Credit union's mortgages on three acres of property were insufficient to concomitantly place a lien upon a manufactured home where a certificate of title existed on the manufactured home, as a result, the only available method to perfect a security interest was by notation on the certificate of title as provided by Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186A.190 , and nothing in the record showed that the credit union had either created, attached, or perfected a security interest in the home by notation. Bowling v. Appalachian Fed. Credit Union, 515 S.W.3d 686, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 25 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

Fact that original title was destroyed by Clerk's office did not equate to finding that creditor did not perfect its lien on July 30, 2013, or that lien was ever released; records showed otherwise and perfected lien of creditor carried forward to duplicate certificate of title. Johnson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc. (In re Bryant), 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 4942 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. Dec. 8, 2014).

4.Lien Undefeated.

Summary judgment was granted to a trustee because she could avoid a corporation’s mortgage lien on a mobile home as a hypothetical lien creditor pursuant to 11 USCS § 544(a)(1) since the trustee’s lien was prior and superior on the date of the filing of the debtors’ Chapter 7 petition where the corporation’s lien was not noted on the certificate of tile, as required by KRS 186A.070 , and 186A.190 , and thus it was unperfected as of the date of the filing of the petition. Coleman v. Altegra Credit Co. (In re Coleman), 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 967 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. July 21, 2004).

Trustee could not avoid a creditor’s lien on debtor’s manufactured home as a hypothetical lien creditor, as creditor properly perfected its security interest under Kentucky law. The requirement in the statute that creditor file a title lien statement in the county clerk’s office where debtor resided was unambiguous and fully supported by existing case law, and there was nothing in the statute that supported trustee’s position that creditor should have filed its lien in the county of debtor’s intended residence rather than the county where he resided when he purchased the manufactured home. Westenhoefer v. Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc. (In re Howard), 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 3967 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Dec. 14, 2018).

5.Conversion to Real Property.

Because the 2000 enactment of KRS 186A.297 allowed for a manufactured home to become part of the real estate by filing an affidavit of conversion and surrendering the certificate of title, the home would be deemed an improvement to the real estate upon which it was located and subsequently treated as real property, and therefore the manufactured home would apparently no longer be governed or subject to the certificate of title provision in KRS 186A.190 . PHH Mortg. Servs. v. Higgason, 345 B.R. 584, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48166 (E.D. Ky. 2006 ).

Creditor did not have authority to attempt recovery on the debtor’s mobile home because the creditor had not perfected a security interest in the mobile home by assuring that there was a notation on the certificate of title for the mobile home, and the debtor had not filed a certificate converting the mobile home to real estate, pursuant to KRS 186A.297 . Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. v. Flener (In re Boisseau), 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1354 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. June 4, 2009).

Chapter 7 Trustee avoided a lien on the debtors’ manufactured home under 11 U.S.C.S. § 544. The creditor did not perfect its lien in the home, which was certificate of title property under KRS 186A.070 subject to perfection under KRS 186A.190 , and the debtors did not convert the home from personal property to real estate as permitted by KRS 186A.297 ; in addition, KRS 355.9-334 did not apply to permit the perfection of the lien as a lien on a fixture because the Uniform Commercial code did not address perfection of a security interest in certificate of title property. Rogan v. Greentree Fin. Servicing Corp. (In re Nutgrass), 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 636 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2013).

Cited:

State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 792 S.W.2d 626, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 89 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since commercial liens are referred to in subsection (3) of this section, and former KRS 186A.060(14), and 186.045 , the clerk should place these on the certificate of title, if they exist, and then after any commercial liens are listed, the clerk should place the tax liens on the certificate, where space permits, or into the computer. OAG 84-81 .

Subsection (3) of this section and former KRS 186A.060 (14)(a), and 186.045 prohibit the county clerk from listing more than two (2) liens on the certificate of title in connection with the registration or titling of the vehicles; however, the information in KRS 186A.060 required to be filed in conjunction with the liens indicates the legislature intended that its restriction of two (2) liens apply only to commercial liens and there is no such limit to the number of statutory liens such as liens for unpaid property taxes. There is no restriction against placing any type of indicator or the certificate of title that other liens exist. OAG 84-81 .

Under the current registration-title law relating to motor vehicles, the General Assembly by KRS 186.045 , 186A.060 , 186A.175 (now repealed) and this section has made provisions for showing not more than two (2) liens on the certificate of title. OAG 84-301 .

The motor vehicle lien statement is meant to replace financing statements on those motor vehicles for which a certificate of title is required. OAG 87-39 .

The fee to be collected for the filing of an original security agreement containing an assignment is $10.50, pursuant to this section, if the security interest is to be noted upon a motor vehicle lien statement; however, if the secured interest is being filed upon property other than a motor vehicle, the fee, pursuant to KRS 64.012 , would be $6.00 for filing, $6.00 for an assignment, and $1.00 for termination, plus any miscellaneous fees established by other applicable statutes. OAG 87-52 .

There is a $1.00 fee for a partial release on an original security agreement filed prior to July 1, 1987; after that date, a partial termination would not be necessary, since there is not a situation in which part of a security interest in a motor vehicle would end, and instead a new motor vehicle lien notation should be made. OAG 87-52 .

Neither a camper trailer nor a fifth wheel trailer require the notation of security interests on the title because they are not motor vehicles. OAG 87-61 .

Where the lien on a pickup truck had already been perfected, this section did not prohibit the filing of a continuation statement on security interest in the truck. OAG 91-167 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Mellen, Proposed Amendments to the Kentucky Uniform Commercial Code, Vol. 50, No. 1, Winter 1985-86 Ky. Bench & B. 17.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Survey of Law, Nowka, Commercial Law, 72 Ky. L.J. 337 (1983-84).

Kentucky Law Survey, Weinberg, Graham and Stipanowich, Modernizing Kentucky’s Uniform Commercial Code, 73 Ky. L.J. 515 (1984-85).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Ellerman & Linneman, A Survey of Kentucky Commercial Law., 31 N. Ky. L. Rev. 201 (2004).

186A.191. Terminal rental adjustment clauses — Vehicle leases that are not sales or security interests.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a lease transaction does not create a sale or security interest in a motor vehicle or trailer merely because the lease contains a terminal rental adjustment clause that provides that the rental price is permitted or required to be adjusted up or down by reference to the amount of money realized upon the sale or other disposition of the motor vehicle or trailer.

History. Enact. Acts 2012, ch. 132, § 101, effective July 12, 2012.

186A.193. Title lien statement.

The title lien statement, provided for in KRS 186A.195 , shall be developed by January 1, 1987 by the Transportation Cabinet, in cooperation with county clerks, financial institutions and auto dealers. The Transportation Cabinet shall ensure that the title lien statement is in a similar form and contains the same information as that provided for in KRS 355.9-502(1) and, where applicable, include the year, make, and identification number of the titled property.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 118, § 95, effective January 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 132, § 3, effective March 31, 1988; 2000, ch. 408, § 180, effective July 1, 2001.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The motor vehicle lien statement is meant to replace financing statements on those motor vehicles for which a certificate of title is required. OAG 87-39 .

186A.195. Title lien statement defined — System to receive financing information — Perfection of security interest.

  1. As used in this chapter, a title lien statement is a document to be submitted by the secured party to the county clerk. Upon submission of the title lien statement, the county clerk shall use the information contained therein to note the security interest on the certificate of title, in accordance with KRS 186A.190(9). The county clerk may make title lien statements available to the general public. However, public availability of such statements is not necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property required to be registered or titled in accordance with this chapter.
  2. If a title lien statement and the required fees accompany the application for first title of any property in the name of an owner, the county clerk shall enter the information required by KRS 186A.190(9) into the automated system so as to produce a certificate of title in Frankfort bearing in addition to any other required information, the information designated by KRS 186A.190(9). The clerk shall thereby produce, in accordance with design of the automated system, a certificate of registration, if required.
  3. If a title lien statement and the required fees are not received at the time of application for first title of any property in the name of the owner due to the owner’s residency in another county, or if the form prescribed by KRS 186A.060 indicates a pending lien but the title lien statement does not accompany the application for title, the county clerk shall enter into the Automated Vehicle Information System (AVIS) the name and address of the lienholder and the county where the lien is to be noted or that a lien is pending. The clerk shall indicate a title is not to be issued until the lien has been noted and fees, according to KRS 186A.190 , paid in the county of the owner’s residence or in thirty (30) days. The county clerk shall then issue the registration. The county clerk in the county of the owner’s residence shall, after receiving the title lien statement and fees contained in KRS 186A.190 , enter into the Automated Vehicle Information System (AVIS) the date of lien notation and the notation number, thus enabling the system to produce the title in Frankfort.
  4. Should a certificate of title be issued after the thirty (30) day period has expired without the notation of a security interest thereon, or should there be no provision made for a lien to be noted in the county of residence of the debtor within thirty (30) days and the title issued within that time, the secured party shall request from the debtor, and the debtor shall submit to the secured party, the certificate of title. The secured party shall submit the certificate of title along with the title lien statement to the county clerk of the county of the debtor’s residence. The county clerk shall then enter the information required by KRS 186A.190(9) into the Automated Vehicle Information System (AVIS) and note on the certificate of title in the appropriate section the information described in that section. Following the notation of the appropriate information on the certificate of title, the county clerk shall return the title to the debtor.
  5. The security interest noted on the certificate of title shall be deemed perfected at the time the security interest attaches (KRS 355.9-203) if the secured party tenders the required fees and submits a properly completed title lien statement and application for first title or, in the case of property previously titled in the name of its debtor, the certificate of title to the appropriate county clerk within thirty (30) days of attachment. Otherwise, the security interest shall be deemed perfected at the time that such fees are tendered and such documents are submitted to the appropriate county clerk.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 36, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 118, § 98, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 132, § 4, effective March 31, 1988; 1996, ch. 297, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 2000, ch. 408, § 181, effective July 1, 2001; 2016 ch. 118, § 2, effective July 15, 2016; 2017 ch. 31, § 2, effective June 29, 2017; 2020 ch. 119, § 2, effective July 15, 2020.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Relation Back Period.

The lien on the debtors’ automobile constituted a preferential transfer pursuant to 11 USCS § 547, and the 20-day “relation back” period of § 547 prevails over the 10-day “relation back” period of this section. Westenhoefer v. PNC Bank (In re Smallwood), 204 B.R. 519, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 59 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1997 ).

There are no cases which address how the deemed perfection language in KRS 186A.195(5) interacts with the directive that the sole means of perfecting a security interest on a motor vehicle is by notation in KRS 186A.190 . However, it appears from the statutory scheme as a whole that KRS 186A.195(5) was designed to specify the timing of perfection for the purposes of determining priority among competing creditors. Brock v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. (In re Johnson), 380 B.R. 455, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4209 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2007), aff'd, 611 F.3d 313, 2010 FED App. 0193P, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 13588 (6th Cir. 2010).

2.Creditor’s Signature.

Chapter 13 debtors’ argument that a finance company’s secured claim in connection with the debtors’ purchase and financing of a vehicle was invalid because the creditor did not sign the title lien statement that was filed with the county clerk per KRS 186A.195 was rejected because the title lien statement was not the same as a security agreement; there was no requirement that the creditor sign it and KRS 355.9-102(g) did not apply to a title lien statement. In re Ford, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 867 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Mar. 21, 2007).

3.Perfection.

Bankruptcy trustee could avoid a bank’s lien asserted on the debtors’ vehicle because the debtors did not comply with the perfection requirements of KRS 186A.190 and KRS 186A.195 when the bank did not have the certificate of title and the title lien statement submitted to the county where the debtors resided for notation on the certificate of title. Schlarman v. Fifth Third Bank, Inc. (In re Sands), 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3064 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Sept. 16, 2008).

Bankruptcy court properly granted summary judgment to appellee bankruptcy trustee in his strong-arm proceeding against appellant to avoid a lien claimed by appellant against the debtor’s manufactured home under 11 U.S.C.S. § 544 because the lien was not properly perfected under KRS 186A.190 , 186A.195 as appellant had filed the required title lien statement in its county of residence rather than in the county where the debtor resided. KRS 186A.120(2)(a) also required the lien to be filed in the county where the debtor resided. Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin. v. Westenhoefer, 716 F.3d 957, 2013 FED App. 0150P, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 10620 (6th Cir. Ky. 2013 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The motor vehicle lien statement is meant to replace financing statements on those motor vehicles for which a certificate of title is required. OAG 87-39 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Survey of Law, Nowka, Commercial Law, 72 Ky. L.J. 337 (1983-84).

Kentucky Law Survey, Weinberg, Graham and Stepanovich, Modernizing Kentucky’s Uniform Commercial Code, 73 Ky. L.J. 515 (1984-85).

186A.196. Validity of existing lien. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 132, § 5, effective March 31, 1988; 1998, ch. 128, § 12, effective July 15, 1998) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 408, § 186, effective July 1, 2001.

186A.197. Issuance of certificate of title noting existing liens. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 132, § 6, effective March 31, 1988) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 408, § 186, effective July 1, 2001.

186A.200. Time period for presentation of title and title lien statement.

  1. With respect to a vehicle previously titled in the name of its debtor, the secured party shall, within thirty (30) days after execution of the security agreement, obtain the current certificate of title in the name of the debtor, with no more than one (1) prior lien indicated thereon, and present to the county clerk the certificate of title, which the secured party shall have the right to obtain from the debtor, together with the title lien statement and the required fees in KRS 186A.190 to the county clerk.
  2. For failure to present both the title and title lien statement within the time prescribed by subsection (1) of this section, the secured party shall pay a penalty of two dollars ($2) to the county clerk as a prerequisite for noting the security interest on the title.
  3. The county clerk shall enter the information required by KRS 186A.190(9) into the automated system.
  4. The county clerk shall record upon the title in the appropriate section the information designated by KRS 186A.190(9).

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 37, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 118, § 99, effective July 1, 1987; 1996, ch. 297, § 3, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 128, § 13, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 408, § 182, effective July 1, 2001; 2017 ch. 31, § 3, effective June 29, 2017; 2020 ch. 119, § 3, effective July 15, 2020.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The motor vehicle lien statement is meant to replace financing statements on those motor vehicles for which a certificate of title is required. OAG 87-39 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Weinberg, Graham and Stipanowich, Modernizing Kentucky’s Uniform Commercial Code, 73 Ky. L.J. 515 (1984-85).

186A.205. Clerk to enter lien assignment into system.

Whenever a security interest is assigned as provided by KRS 186.045(4), the county clerk of a county that is operating under automated procedures shall, in addition to carrying out his requirements stated therein, enter the record of lien assignment into the automated system in the manner directed by the Department of Vehicle Regulation.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 38, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 118, § 100, effective July 1, 1987; 2003, ch. 103, § 6, effective June 24, 2003.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/24/2003). Although the subsection relating to assignment of perfected security interests was deleted from KRS 186.045 by 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 408, sec. 178, that Act failed to include a conforming amendment either to change the reference to that subsection in this section or to repeal this section in its entirety.

186A.210. Clerk to release lien assignment.

  1. When a security interest has been discharged under the provisions of KRS 186.045(3), the county clerk shall discharge the security interest and remove the lien information from AVIS.
  2. When a security interest has been discharged as provided by KRS 186.045(4), the county clerk of a county that is operating under automated procedures shall, upon receiving a termination statement, within five (5) days enter the record of termination into the automated system. The automated system shall be programmed to allow a county clerk in a county where the termination statement was not received to access the automated system to determine the county and date that the record of termination was entered into the automated system. The clerk of the county where the termination statement was received shall then release the lien recorded upon the title in the manner directed by the Department of Vehicle Regulation, and take such other action with respect to a termination as is directed by the Department of Vehicle Regulation.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 39, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 118, § 101, effective July 1, 1987; 2003, ch. 103, § 3, effective June 24, 2003.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/24/2003). 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 408, sec. 178, renumbered the former subsection (2) of KRS 186.045 as subsection (1), but that Act failed to include a conforming amendment to change the reference to that subsection in former subsection (1) of this statute. Under KRS 7.136(1)(e), that change has now been made.

186A.215. Procedures for transfer of vehicle ownership.

  1. If an owner transfers his interest in a vehicle, he shall, at the time of the delivery of the vehicle, execute an assignment and warranty of title to the transferee in the space provided therefor on the certificate of title, except if the space provided therefor on the owner’s certificate of title fails to meet the Kentucky requirements for lawful conveyance of title or if the space provided therefor on the owner’s certificate of title fails to meet the requirements for the owner to execute an odometer disclosure statement as required by federal law in effect at the time transferor executes an assignment and warranty of title. Pursuant to the exceptions provided by this subsection and in other cases where applicable, the transferor shall execute an assignment and warranty of title to the transferee by executing the application as provided by the Department of Vehicle Regulation and available from the county clerk. The transferor shall cause the application with the certificate of title attached to be delivered to the transferee.
  2. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the transferee shall, promptly after delivery to him of the vehicle, execute the application for a new certificate of title and registration. If an application is required by subsection (1) of this section, the transferee shall execute the applicable portions provided to him by his transferor. Any unexpired registration shall remain valid upon transfer of said vehicle to the transferee.
  3. The application with its supporting documentation attached shall promptly be submitted to the county clerk as provided in KRS 186A.115 , together with the required fees.
  4. If it comes to the attention of a transferor that a transferee did not promptly submit the necessary document within fifteen (15) calendar days to the county clerk as required by law in order to complete the transfer transaction, a transferor shall submit to the county clerk, in his county of residence, an affidavit that he has transferred his interest in a specific vehicle, and the clerk shall enter appropriate data into the AVIS system which shall restrict any registration transaction from occurring on that vehicle until the transfer has been processed. The Transportation Cabinet may adopt administrative regulations governing this subsection. This subsection shall not apply to any transactions involving licensed Kentucky motor vehicle dealers.
  5. This section shall not apply to a vehicle which has had the title surrendered to a county clerk or a hulk vehicle. Hulk vehicle shall mean a vehicle or part thereof that is:
    1. In a rusted, wrecked, discarded, worn out, extensively damaged, dismantled, and mechanically inoperative condition; or
    2. Of an apparent value of less than two hundred dollars ($200).

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 40, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 36, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 98, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1996, ch. 35, § 5, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Owner of Motor Vehicle.

Where there was an oral conditional sales agreement between the parties and no evidence was adduced that upon performance of his duty to pay the balance of the purchase price, the uninsured buyer did not have a right to possess the vehicle for a period of 365 days or more, buyer was deemed to have been the owner of the vehicle for purposes of subsection (1) of this section, therefore, buyer was not insured within the meaning of the omnibus clause in seller’s insurance policy because seller did not own the vehicle on the date of the collision. Cowles v. Rogers, 762 S.W.2d 414, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 182 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988), overruled in part, Wheeler v. Rogers, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 64 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1992).

Since the effective date of chapter 186A, the provisions of that statute, rather than the general law of sales, govern the issue of who owns a motor vehicle for purposes of insurance coverage. Cowles v. Rogers, 762 S.W.2d 414, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 182 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988), overruled in part, Wheeler v. Rogers, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 64 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1992).

A conditional vendee does not use an insured automobile with the consent or permission of the conditional vendor, and hence, is ordinarily not within the coverage of an omnibus clause of a liability insurance policy issued on the vehicle. Cowles v. Rogers, 762 S.W.2d 414, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 182 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988), overruled in part, Wheeler v. Rogers, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 64 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1992).

The transferor of an automobile remained the owner of the automobile at the time of a collision where he had not completed or delivered necessary documentation required by statute. Omni Ins. Co. v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 999 S.W.2d 724, 1999 Ky. App. LEXIS 109 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999), overruled in part, Ky. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 326 S.W.3d 803, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 2010 ).

Seller was entitled to summary judgment in a driver’s action alleging negligent entrustment of a vehicle because the seller had transferred ownership of his car to a buyer at the time of the driver’s accident with the buyer, and the seller did not have knowledge of the buyer’s failure to file for a new title until after the accident; under KRS 186A.215(4), the Legislature does not establish an affirmative duty on a seller to insure that a buyer has complied with KRS 186A.215(3) by submitting the necessary documents to the county clerk’s office within 15 days of sale. Graham v. Rogers, 277 S.W.3d 251, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 135 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Under KRS 186A.215 , title to a pickup truck transferred upon the seller’s and insured’s completion of the transfer of title and odometer statement on the certificate of title and the delivery of the completed form to the insured; KRS 186A.215 (4) allowed them a 15-day grace period after completion of the paperwork to file the certificate of title with the clerk. Therefore, the insured was the “owner” of the truck as defined by KRS 186.010(7)(a) at the time of an accident, and the truck was a “covered vehicle” under his insurance policy, Franklin v. Safe Auto Ins. Co., 290 S.W.3d 69, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 58 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Under the Uniform Commercial Code, KRS 355.1-203, an agreement between a trust and a debtor constituted a security interest rather than an unexpired lease, as the rental payments over the term of the agreement reflected a purchase price of the vehicles with interest; nor was the agreement an executory contract as defined by 11 U.S.C.S. 365, as the debtor had no continuing obligations under the agreement other than payment. Further, under the Motor Vehicle Registration Act, KRS 186.010(7)(b), a conditional lessee, such as the debtor, could be considered the owner for the purposes of registering the vehicle, which the undisputed evidence showed was done, rendering the trust’s reliance on KRS 186A.215 inapplicable. Magdovitz Family Trust v. KY USA Energy, Inc. (In re KY USA Energy, Inc.), 449 B.R. 745, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1993 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2011 ).

2.Liability Insurance.
3.— Auto Dealer.

KRS 186A.220(5) permits the customary practice of dealers in Kentucky of taking the applicable documents to the clerk’s office on behalf of the buyer, and so long as the seller and buyer complete the necessary paperwork at the time of the sale and then one of the parties promptly submits papers to the county clerk and title passes at the time of the sale for liability insurance purposes; thus, auto dealer following customary practice was relieved of all of its duties, including the responsibility to provide liability insurance prior to date of buyer’s accident. Stigall v. Fourth St. Auto Co., 922 S.W.2d 752, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 97 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

Automobile dealership was deemed the owner of a truck for insurance purposes where, after relinquishing possession of the truck to the purchasing driver, the dealership waited 39 days to transfer title, during which time the driver was in an accident. Ellis v. Browning Pontiac-Chevrolet-GMC Truck-Geo, Inc., 125 S.W.3d 306, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 177 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

4.— Certificate of Title.

There is no duty on part of seller of motor vehicle to require titling of vehicle prior to relinquishing possession of it; therefore title passed from commercial car dealer to buyer to second buyer, an uninsured motorist, when each buyer received the properly assigned certificate of title, a properly executed vehicle transaction record and a registration receipt and thus second buyer who failed to file the documents with the county clerk’s office was liable for accident that occurred after first buyer gave second buyer the necessary title transfer documents. Nantz v. Lexington Lincoln Mercury Subaru, 947 S.W.2d 36, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 71 ( Ky. 1997 ).

Cited:

United States v. Oldfield, 859 F.2d 392, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 13307 (6th Cir. 1988); Kelly v. McFarland, 243 F. Supp. 2d 715, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25018 (E.D. Ky. 2001 ).

186A.220. Requirements for motor vehicle dealer upon receipt of vehicle.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, when any motor vehicle dealer licensed in this state buys or accepts such a vehicle in trade, which has been previously registered or titled for use in this or another state, and which he holds for resale, he shall not be required to obtain a certificate of title for it, but shall, within fifteen (15) days after acquiring such vehicle, notify the county clerk of the assignment of the motor vehicle to his dealership and pay the required transferor fee.
  2. Upon purchasing such a vehicle or accepting it in trade, the dealer shall obtain from his transferor, properly executed, all documents required by KRS 186A.215 , to include the odometer disclosure statement thereon, together with a properly assigned certificate of title.
  3. The dealer shall execute his application for assignment upon documents designated by the Department of Vehicle Regulation, to the county clerk of the county in which he maintains his principal place of business. Such clerk shall enter the assignment upon the automated system.
  4. The dealer shall retain the properly assigned certificate of title received from his transferor, and may make any reassignments thereon until the forms for dealer assignment on the certificate of title are exhausted. The Department of Vehicle Regulation may, if it deems it warranted, provide a special document to allow for additional dealer assignments without requiring system generated documents.
    1. When a dealer assigns the vehicle to a purchaser for use, he shall deliver the properly assigned certificate of title, and other documents if appropriate, to such purchaser, who shall make application for registration and a certificate of title thereon. (5) (a) When a dealer assigns the vehicle to a purchaser for use, he shall deliver the properly assigned certificate of title, and other documents if appropriate, to such purchaser, who shall make application for registration and a certificate of title thereon.
    2. The dealer may, with the consent of the purchaser, deliver the assigned certificate of title, and other appropriate documents of a new or used vehicle, directly to the county clerk, and on behalf of the purchaser, make application for registration and a certificate of title. In so doing, the dealer shall require from the purchaser proof of insurance as mandated by KRS 304.39-080 before delivering possession of the vehicle.
    3. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 186.020 , 186A.065 , 186A.095 , 186A.215 , and 186A.300 , if a dealer elects to deliver the title documents to the county clerk and has not received a clear certificate of title from a prior owner, the dealer shall retain the documents in his possession until the certificate of title is obtained.
    4. When a dealer assigns a vehicle to a purchaser for use under paragraph (a) of this subsection, the transfer and delivery of the vehicle is effective immediately upon the delivery of all necessary legal documents, or copies thereof, including proof of insurance as mandated by KRS 304.39-080 .
  5. The department may make available, upon proper application from a licensed motor vehicle dealer, electronic means by which the dealer can interface directly with AVIS and the department. If the department grants this access, all fees currently required for the issuance of a certificate of title shall continue to be charged and remitted to the appropriate parties as provided by statute.
  6. The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall assure that the automated system is capable of accepting instructions from the county clerk that a certificate of title shall not be produced under a dealer registration situation.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 41, effective July 1, 1982; 1988, ch. 98, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1994, ch. 51, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 35, § 6, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 128, § 7, effective July 15, 1998; 2016 ch. 90, § 1, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

While this section, KRS 186A.120(3)(b) and 186A.230 exempt dealers who hold vehicles for resale from payment of the ad valorem tax, this is not a “halving” of a classification, but is only a method of fixing the time and the person responsible for payment of the ad valorem tax on all motor vehicles — to-wit, the purchaser of the vehicle at the time the vehicle is registered for use upon the highway, and the tax is payable by all persons, including an individual or a dealer, who intend to operate the vehicle on the highways of the state; these sections, read in conjunction with KRS 134.810(4), do not violate Ky. Const., §§ 59(15) or 171. Kling v. Geary, 667 S.W.2d 379, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 216 ( Ky. 1984 ).

2.Vehicle Acquired for Resale.

Car purchased by dealership, to be transferred as gift to son of dealership’s owner, was still considered to be a vehicle acquired for resale, with regard to statutes on titling and registration of cars. Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co. v. Maddix, 842 S.W.2d 871, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 208 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

Vehicle dealer and the dealer’s insurer were entitled to summary judgment in a wrongful death suit arising from the use of a vehicle the dealer sold to another seller, despite the dealer possessing title, because the dealer was not the vehicle’s owner, as (1) the dealer substantially complied with the directory requirements of Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186A.220(1) through (4) at the time of the accident, and (2) the proof of insurance requirement in Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186A.220(5) was irrelevant in a dealer-to-dealer transaction, as a purchaser for use was different from a purchaser for resale, so the vehicle’s ultimate purchaser was the owner. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 565 S.W.3d 550, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 449 ( Ky. 2018 ).

When considering the requirements an automobile dealer must comply with to cut off potential liability for the use of a vehicle the dealer sells, a purchaser for use does not implicate transactions from dealer to dealer for the purpose of resale, and a purchaser for use is a consumer buyer, which does not include licensed motor vehicle dealers that are purchasing vehicles for the sole purpose of resale. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 565 S.W.3d 550, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 449 ( Ky. 2018 ).

“Purchaser for use” cannot be interpreted so expansively as to include the dealers who are purchasing or accepting traded vehicles for resale. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 565 S.W.3d 550, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 449 ( Ky. 2018 ).

If a motor vehicle transaction is to a licensed dealer intending the vehicle for resale, then the dealer must only comply with Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186A.220(1) to (4) in order to qualify for the exemption in Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186.010(7). Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 565 S.W.3d 550, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 449 ( Ky. 2018 ).

3.Vehicle Covered by Dealership’s Insurance.

Car driven by the son of the owner of car dealership was covered by the “garage policy” which insurer had issued to dealership since ownership of vehicles is governed by the titling and registration statutes, and where at the time of accident the dealership was still the owner of the car which had not yet been transferred to son. Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co. v. Maddix, 842 S.W.2d 871, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 208 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

4.Certificate of Title.
5.— Transfer.

Authorization of a short-term conditional sale without transfer of title so long as the dealer insured the vehicle directly conflicts with this section. Rogers v. Wheeler, 864 S.W.2d 892, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 132 ( Ky. 1993 ).

Subsection (5) of this section permits the customary practice of dealers in Kentucky of taking the applicable documents to the clerk’s office on behalf of the buyer, and so long as the seller and buyer complete the necessary paperwork at the time of the sale and then one of the parties promptly submits papers to the county clerk, title passes at the time of the sale for liability insurance purposes; thus, auto dealer following customary practice was relieved of all of its duties, including the responsibility to provide liability insurance prior to date of buyer’s accident. Stigall v. Fourth St. Auto Co., 922 S.W.2d 752, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 97 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

There is no duty on part of seller of motor vehicle to require titling of vehicle prior to relinquishing possession of it; therefore title passed from commercial car dealer to buyer to second buyer, an uninsured motorist, when each buyer received the properly assigned certificate of title, a properly executed vehicle transaction record and a registration receipt and thus second buyer who failed to file the documents with the county clerk’s office was liable for accident that occurred after first buyer gave second buyer the necessary title transfer documents. Nantz v. Lexington Lincoln Mercury Subaru, 947 S.W.2d 36, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 71 ( Ky. 1997 ).

Execution of an assignment of a certificate of title is the touchstone of transfer of title to a motor vehicle, and liability remains on the dealer until transfer is accomplished. Kelly v. McFarland, 243 F. Supp. 2d 715, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25018 (E.D. Ky. 2001 ).

Bankruptcy court did not commit clear error when it found that a creditor did not meet its burden of showing that debts a debtor owed the creditor were nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C.S. § 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), and (a)(6). The district court rejected the creditor’s claim that the debt was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4) because KRS 186A.220(5) created a trust for the creditor’s benefit that the debtor breached when a used car dealership he co-owned with his brother sold cars “out of trust,” in violation of an agreement the dealership entered with the creditor to obtain credit. Isaacs Cars, Inc. v. Woods, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55416 (W.D. Ky. June 4, 2010).

6.Necessity of Performing Requirements.

Because the statutory duties of this section of the motor vehicle code concerning transfer of title govern in this situation and were not performed by purchaser of the vehicle in question and the Uniform Commercial Code provisions of KRS 355.9-307(1) do not govern the determination of whether a sale had occurred in this situation, there was no sale completed by debtor to purchaser and debtor/seller of vehicle was justified in liquidating the vehicle to satisfy its security interest. SCT Motor Cars v. Automotive Fin. Corp. (In re Cunningham Used Cars), 182 B.R. 22, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 656 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1995 ).

The title retained by a motor vehicle dealer must be assigned, and hence fully executed, as a prerequisite to effectuating the transfer of title to the vehicle; in other words, the dealer’s duty to complete and sign the certificate of title assignment is paramount to his duty to actually deliver the completed paperwork to the county clerk’s office—the former duty cuts to the very heart of the contract, whereas the latter duty is akin to a mere ministerial function. Kelly v. McFarland, 243 F. Supp. 2d 715, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25018 (E.D. Ky. 2001 ).

7.Owner for Insurance Purposes.

When a car dealer sells a car, KRS 186A.220(5) creates an exception to the general statutory scheme that makes the title holder the owner of a vehicle for insurance purposes; however, a car dealer can only take advantage of the exception by first verifying that the buyer has a valid and current insurance policy that covers the purchased vehicle. Auto Acceptance Corp. v. T.I.G. Ins. Co., 89 S.W.3d 398, 2002 Ky. LEXIS 229 ( Ky. 2002 ).

Under KRS 186A.220(5), the buyer of a car who was involved in a car accident the day after the purchase was the owner of the vehicle for insurance purposes even though the buyer had not yet received the title papers for the vehicle because, in taking possession of the vehicle, the buyer showed the seller, a car dealer, proof of insurance coverage for the vehicle and agreed to allow the seller, who had not yet received a certificate of title from the prior owner, to forward the certificate of title and the necessary title transfer and registration papers directly to the county clerk on the buyer’s behalf. Auto Acceptance Corp. v. T.I.G. Ins. Co., 89 S.W.3d 398, 2002 Ky. LEXIS 229 ( Ky. 2002 ).

Where an auto dealer had not assigned the title to a car sold to purchasers until after it was involved in an accident, the dealer’s insurer’s uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage was primary; the dealer had legal title and was the owner until it complied with the title assignment provisions of KRS 186A.220(5). Kelly v. McFarland, 243 F. Supp. 2d 715, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25018 (E.D. Ky. 2001 ).

Automobile dealership was deemed the owner of a truck for insurance purposes where, after relinquishing possession of the truck to the purchasing driver, the dealership waited 39 days to transfer title, during which time the driver was in an accident. Ellis v. Browning Pontiac-Chevrolet-GMC Truck-Geo, Inc., 125 S.W.3d 306, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 177 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

Where a car dealer did not obtain a purchaser’s consent to file a certificate of title and other documents and did not verify that the purchaser had insurance as required by KRS 186A.220(5), the dealer was the “owner” of a vehicle for insurance purposes at the time of an accident; therefore, the trial court properly determined that a guardian was entitled to summary judgment. Gainsco Cos. v. Gentry, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 55 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2004), aff'd, 191 S.W.3d 633, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 68 ( Ky. 2006 ).

The auto seller was the owner of the vehicle involved in an accident that had been bought by the purchaser days earlier. Although the purchaser had driven the vehicle off of the auto seller’s lot a few days earlier, the auto seller did not meet both requirements of transferring ownership of the vehicle without assigning a certificate of title, set forth in KRS 186A.220(5), because the auto seller did not obtain the purchaser’s consent to file the certificate of title and other documents on the purchaser’s behalf and did not verify that the purchaser had obtained insurance on the vehicle before relinquishing possession. Gainsco Cos. v. Gentry, 191 S.W.3d 633, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 68 ( Ky. 2006 ).

Circuit court properly dismissed a second dealer as a party on the ground that a deceased passenger was barred from re-litigating the ownership of the vehicle the law-of-the-case doctrine because the buyer purchased the vehicle in a bona fide sale, the second dealer verified his insurance as statutorily required, and the Kentucky Supreme Court had previously determined that the buyer was the statutory owner of the vehicle even though title was still in the first dealer’s name. Armstrong v. Estate of Elmore, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 59 (Ky. Ct. App. May 15, 2020).

8.Proof of Insurance Required.

Trial court properly found that an automobile seller had not met its obligation to require from an automobile buyer proof of insurance before delivering possession of the vehicle where even though the seller may have known that the buyer had proof of insurance from past dealings, it was statutorily required to verify the buyer’s insurance in the instant case. Calhoun v. Provence, 395 S.W.3d 476, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 97 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012), overruled in part, Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 565 S.W.3d 550, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 449 ( Ky. 2018 ).

Insurer chose to deliver the title documents to the car dealer’s agent prior to delivering possession of the vehicle to the individual, and thus neither the insurer nor the auction dealer was subject to the insurance-verification requirement in the statute. Savage v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2021 Ky. App. LEXIS 8 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2021).

Insurance-verification requirement did not apply where the insurers transferred the titles to the car dealer prior to the auction dealer releasing possession of the vehicles to the individual. Savage v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2021 Ky. App. LEXIS 8 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2021).

9.Purchaser For Use.

For purposes of the statute, the Mexican used automobile dealer had to be considered a consumer and thus a purchaser for use. Savage v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2021 Ky. App. LEXIS 8 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2021).

186A.225. Forms used when transferring vehicle or trailer.

The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall establish appropriate forms and procedures to be utilized in connection with the transfer of a motor vehicle or trailer by operation of law.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 42, effective July 15, 1982.

186A.230. Assignment titles used by motor vehicle dealers.

  1. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as requiring that a trade-in vehicle received by a motor vehicle dealer licensed in this state must be titled by assignment in the dealer’s name substantially, simultaneously with the registration or titling of the vehicle toward which the trade-in vehicle was received.
  2. Licensed motor vehicle dealers shall be allowed to title by assignment a trade-in vehicle into their name if they possess an original or a copy of a title for the trade-in or in lieu thereof an affidavit. The affidavit shall contain the existing owner’s name, address, make, year, model, vehicle identification number, license plate number, decal number, title number, if available, and the dealer’s name, address and telephone number and any additional information required by the Transportation Cabinet.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 43, effective July 15, 1982.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

While KRS 186A.120(3)(b), 186A.220 and this section exempt dealers who hold vehicles for resale from payment of the ad valorem tax, this is not a “halving” of a classification, but is only a method of fixing the time and the person responsible for payment of the ad valorem tax on all motor vehicles — to-wit, the purchaser of the vehicle at the time the vehicle is registered for use upon the highway, and the tax is payable by all persons, including an individual or a dealer, who intend to operate the vehicle on the highways of the state; these sections, read in conjunction with KRS 134.810(4), do not violate Ky. Const., §§ 59(15) or 171. Kling v. Geary, 667 S.W.2d 379, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 216 ( Ky. 1984 ).

186A.235. Owner to notify clerk of residence or name change.

  1. Whenever any person after making application for or obtaining a certificate of registration or title for a vehicle, shall move from the address named in the application or shown upon a registration card or certificate of title, such person shall within fifteen (15) days thereafter notify the county clerk of the county in which he resides in writing of his old and new addresses as well as the current license number of all vehicles currently registered or titled in his name. The county clerk shall immediately enter such change into the automated system.
  2. Whenever the name of any person who has made application for or obtained a certificate of registration or title for a vehicle is thereafter changed by marriage or otherwise, such person shall within fifteen (15) days notify the county clerk of the county of residence of such former and new name. The county clerk shall immediately enter such change into the automated system.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 44, effective July 15, 1982.

186A.240. Cancellation of title erroneously issued.

  1. When any certificate of registration or certificate of title has been issued in error to a person not entitled to the certificate, or contains incorrect information or information has been omitted from the certificates, the Department of Vehicle Regulation shall notify in writing the person to whom the certificates have been issued or delivered and such person shall immediately return such certificate within forty-eight (48) hours, together with any other information necessary for the adjustment of the records related to it, to the county clerk of the county in which the title was originally applied for, or as otherwise directed by the Department of Vehicle Regulation.
  2. Upon receipt of the certificates and information requested, the county clerk and the Department of Vehicle Regulation shall coordinate the production of a corrected certificate of registration and certificate of title, and the cancellation of the erroneous documents by the Department of Vehicle Regulation, and ensure that corrected documents are sent to the appropriate party.
  3. Production of corrected documents shall be carried out under procedures similar to those applicable to production of an original certificate of title. The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall supply to the county clerk such forms as may be needed to assure documentation of corrective action in accordance with this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 45, effective July 15, 1982.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Applicability.

Provisions of KRS 186A.240 , which allowed for correction of an erroneously issued certificate of title, did not apply to a situation where a bank failed to obtain a properly perfected security interest on or before the filing of the debtors’ bankruptcy petition. Schlarman v. Fifth Third Bank, Inc. (In re Sands), 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 3064 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Sept. 16, 2008).

186A.245. Duplicate certificate of title — Fee.

  1. If a certificate of title is lost, stolen, mutilated, or destroyed or becomes illegible, the owner or legal representative of the owner named in the certificate shall promptly make application to the county clerk for and may obtain a duplicate, upon furnishing information satisfactory to the Department of Vehicle Regulation. The duplicate certificate of title shall contain appropriate words or symbols to indicate that it is a duplicate. Each application for a duplicate certificate of title shall be six dollars ($6), of which the county clerk shall retain four dollars ($4), and the Transportation Cabinet two dollars ($2). Each application for a duplicate certificate of title for an all-terrain vehicle shall be ten dollars ($10), of which the county clerk shall retain four dollars ($4) and the Transportation Cabinet shall receive six dollars ($6). It shall be mailed to the owner.
  2. The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall make provisions for production and issuance of a duplicate title if update of information is requested. The provisions shall be generally consistent with the procedures for production and issuance of a certificate of title in the first instance as provided in this chapter.
  3. A person recovering an original certificate of title for which a duplicate has been issued shall promptly surrender the original certificate to the Department of Vehicle Regulation.
  4. Application for documents provided for by this section shall be made to the county clerk upon forms provided to him by the Department of Vehicle Regulation.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 46, effective July 15, 1982; 1994, ch. 428, § 33, effective July 15, 1994; 2006, ch. 255, § 10, effective January 1, 2007; 2009, ch. 64, § 4, effective June 25, 2009.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited in:

Wright v. Miller, 629 S.W.3d 813, 2021 Ky. App. LEXIS 53 (Ky. Ct. App. 2021).

186A.250. Suspension or revocation of title — Conditions and methods for action.

  1. The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall suspend or revoke a certificate of title, after giving notice and providing a reasonable opportunity for the holder to be heard, when authorized by any other provision of law, or, if it finds:
    1. The certificate of title was fraudulently procured or erroneously issued; or
    2. The vehicle has been scrapped, dismantled, or destroyed. Suspension or revocation of a certificate of title does not, in itself, affect the validity of a security interest noted on it.
  2. When the Department of Vehicle Regulation suspends or revokes a certificate of title, the owner or person in possession of it shall, immediately upon receiving notice of the suspension or revocation, mail or deliver the certificate to the Department of Vehicle Regulation.
  3. The department shall promptly notify the Department of Kentucky State Police of the suspension or revocation of any certificate of title.
  4. Any peace officer shall seize and impound any certificate of title which has been suspended or revoked except when such document is in the custody of the Department of Vehicle Regulation or the Department of Kentucky State Police.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 47, effective July 15, 1982; 2007, ch. 85, § 205, effective June 26, 2007.

186A.255. Department of Vehicle Regulation to provide notice of fraudulent documents to State Police.

The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall promptly notify the Department of Kentucky State Police of the particulars of:

  1. Any attempted or actual registration or titling in this state of a stolen motor vehicle, or trailer, or motor vehicle or trailer whose true identity is in doubt, of which it becomes aware;
  2. Counterfeit, stolen, or altered ownership documents it receives; and
  3. Attempts to supply, or supplying to it, of false or fraudulent information in any application for a certificate of registration, certificate of title for a motor vehicle or trailer in this state.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 48, effective July 15, 1982; 2007, ch. 85, § 206, effective June 26, 2007.

186A.260. Tampering with automated system prohibited.

No person, including a county clerk and his employees, shall willfully utilize or tamper with a telecommunications terminal, or associated devices, linked to the automated vehicle registration and titling system and capable of entering data or electronic signals into, altering information stored within, or obtaining information or electronic signals from, the automated vehicle registration and titling system unless:

  1. He has current authorization from the commissioner of the Department of Vehicle Regulation to utilize the system;
  2. He has, previous to utilizing such terminal or associated devices in a given county, satisfactorily completed an orientation as given by the Department of Vehicle Regulation concerning the forms, procedures, and use of the system, as certified by the county clerk or county clerk-elect of the county in which his use of the system will take place; and
  3. He has been assigned, and has received, a unique personal identifying code or device from the Department of Vehicle Regulation.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 49, effective July 15, 1982.

186A.265. County clerk and employees to be trained and certified in system use.

  1. Each county clerk, or county clerk-elect, shall, before utilizing or permitting his employees to utilize the automated vehicle registration and titling system, ensure that he and his employees have satisfactorily completed an orientation course regarding the forms, procedures and use of the system as instructed by the Transportation Cabinet.
  2. The county clerk, or county clerk-elect, shall certify to the commissioner of the Department of Vehicle Regulation, those of his employees or prospective employees, who, together with himself, having satisfactorily completed the required orientation, will utilize the automated system under his direction.
  3. His certification shall be made by printing or typing upon a form supplied by the Department of Vehicle Regulation, the name of his county, and as to himself and each of his employees who will utilize the system, their last name, first name, and where available middle initial, their birth date, and Social Security account number, as to each person shown upon the certificate. The county clerk shall sign and date the certificate following a preprinted statement that shall read: I certify under penalty of forgery in the second degree that the persons whose names appear above have satisfactorily completed an orientation on use of the automated vehicle registration and titling system as provided by this chapter and that the information supplied is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. I will not willfully permit anyone other than those persons shown hereon, or on another certificate of this same type executed by me, and persons authorized in writing by the Department of Vehicle Regulation, to use telecommunications terminals linked to the automated system and under my control.
  4. Each county clerk shall promptly notify the Department of Vehicle Regulation on a form supplied by it, of the name of any employee whose authorization to utilize the automated system has been terminated by him or whose employment by such clerk has ceased.
  5. Every county clerk and each of his employees who is authorized to utilize the automated system shall promptly report to the Department of Vehicle Regulation any attempted, actual, or suspected misuse of the automated system of which they become aware.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 50, effective July 15, 1982.

186A.270. Commissioner may suspend authority to utilize automated system.

  1. Upon receiving notice that a person who has previously been authorized to utilize the automated system has willfully or negligently misused the automated vehicle registration and titling system, the commissioner of the Department of Vehicle Regulation may temporarily suspend such person’s authorization to utilize the system.
  2. Whenever he suspends or revokes any person’s authorization to utilize the automated vehicle registration and titling system, the commissioner of the Department of Vehicle Regulation shall give immediate notice of such revocation to the person whose authorization has been suspended or revoked and if such person is not the county clerk, then notice shall be given also to the county clerk of the county in which the person is employed.
  3. No person whose authorization to utilize the automated system has been suspended or revoked shall utilize such system following notice of such action until his authorization to utilize the system is restored by the commissioner of the Department of Vehicle Regulation.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 51, effective July 15, 1982.

186A.275. Entering false information to produce title document prohibited.

No county clerk or other person who is authorized to utilize the automated vehicle registration and titling system, shall knowingly enter into such system, information enabling the system to produce a certificate of title and registration, certificate of registration, or certificate of title, or enter the record of a lien or its release, unless he has in his official custody at the time he enters such information into the system, an application which he believes to be bona fide and in proper form, or if the information entry involves a lien, a proper financing or termination statement, which is consistent with the information he enters.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 52, effective July 15, 1982.

186A.280. Entering false information into automated system prohibited.

No county clerk or other person shall knowingly enter any information or record into a telecommunications terminal or other device connected to the automated vehicle registration and titling system, knowing that the information or record entered into such device is false, fraudulent, illegitimate, or contains erroneous information that:

  1. Creates, or enables the system to create, a certificate of title and registration, certificate of registration, or certificate of title, that is illegitimate or that contains information that is false, fraudulent or erroneous; or
  2. Results in the system storing information or a record that is false, fraudulent or contains erroneous information; or
  3. Fraudulently, illegitimately, or maliciously alters information or records stored within the system.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 53, effective July 15, 1982.

186A.285. Permission to connect automated system required — Exceptions — Notification of county attorney if vehicle is not properly insured.

  1. No person shall, without prior specific written approval of the commissioner of the Department of Vehicle Regulation and the executive director of the Commonwealth Office of Technology, connect with the automated vehicle registration and titling system, directly or indirectly, by wire, electronic, electromagnetic induction, systemic, or any other means, any device, system or apparatus capable of putting information or electronic signals into, or receiving information or electronic signals from, or blocking, diverting, or altering transmission of data or signals within, the automated vehicle registration and titling system, its components, and its communications network.
  2. This section does not apply to or prohibit connection of devices or systems to the automated vehicle registration and titling system by persons who are acting in accordance with a contract or agreement with the Commonwealth of Kentucky, which in addition to any other required approval, has been approved in writing by the commissioner of the Department of Vehicle Regulation and the executive director of the Commonwealth Office of Technology.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 54, effective July 15, 1982; 2000, ch. 506, § 23, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 536, § 23, effective July 14, 2000; 2005, ch. 85, § 613, effective June 20, 2005.

186A.287. Use of automated motor vehicle information system for titling and registration restricted to county clerks and Transportation Cabinet.

  1. The ability to use the automated motor vehicle information system to carry out the functions of titling and registration of motor vehicles shall be restricted to county clerks and the Transportation Cabinet.
  2. Any other access granted to the automated motor vehicle information system shall be for informational purposes only.

History. Enact. Acts 2011, ch. 5, § 6, effective January 1, 2013.

186A.290. County clerk may omit sending duplicate copies of title.

  1. Regardless of other provisions of the statutes, the county clerk may omit sending duplicates of each certificate of title and registration, or certificate of registration he issues, to the Transportation Cabinet and Department of Revenue, and the property valuation administrator, and may omit the production and filing of one of the copies formerly known as either county clerk’s alpha or his numeric copy, when it is determined by the agencies indicated that their need for “duplicates” of each certificate or “receipt” is obviated by the automated system.
  2. The Department of Vehicle Regulation and the Department of Revenue shall, as agreed between them, provide appropriate system support or computerized listings on magnetic tape or disc, printouts, or system access, to fulfill the information needs formerly requiring duplicates of each certificate or receipt.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 55, effective July 15, 1982; 2005, ch. 85, § 614, effective June 20, 2005.

186A.295. Owner to surrender title on destroyed vehicle or trailer.

    1. Any person or entity having a motor vehicle or trailer that has been destroyed, to the extent that its repair cannot be obtained through usual commercial repair services, at a cost less than its retail value as established from a value manual approved by the Department of Revenue, or from which two (2) or more parts which typically bear a vehicle identification number placed thereon by the manufacturer have been removed, or which he removes, shall surrender the certificate of title for such vehicle for which he has a certificate of title in his or another name, to the county clerk of the county in which such vehicle is located. The clerk shall immediately forward the surrendered title to Frankfort with instructions for canceling the title. (1) (a) Any person or entity having a motor vehicle or trailer that has been destroyed, to the extent that its repair cannot be obtained through usual commercial repair services, at a cost less than its retail value as established from a value manual approved by the Department of Revenue, or from which two (2) or more parts which typically bear a vehicle identification number placed thereon by the manufacturer have been removed, or which he removes, shall surrender the certificate of title for such vehicle for which he has a certificate of title in his or another name, to the county clerk of the county in which such vehicle is located. The clerk shall immediately forward the surrendered title to Frankfort with instructions for canceling the title.
    2. Any person or entity engaged in the sale of used motor vehicle or trailer parts, or the recycling or salvage of them, shall surrender the certificate of title for any vehicle in his possession, and for which he has a certificate of title, whether in his or another name, if such vehicle is destroyed within the meaning of paragraph (a) of this subsection, or from which two (2) or more parts which typically bear a vehicle identification number placed thereon by a manufacturer have been removed, or which he removes, to the county clerk of the county in which such vehicle is located. The clerk shall immediately forward the surrendered title to Frankfort with instructions for canceling the title.
    3. The surrender of the certificate of title pursuant to this section shall be made within ten (10) working days, next succeeding the day when such vehicle was received, destroyed, or next succeeding the day during which such second part was removed.
  1. Each county clerk shall receive without charge, a certificate surrendered in accordance with this section, cancel it, and remit it to the Department of Vehicle Regulation, and take any other action related to it, as required by the Department of Vehicle Regulation.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 56, effective July 15, 1982; 2005, ch. 85, § 615, effective June 20, 2005.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where an affidavit is filed with the county clerk stating that the affiant no longer has in his possession the title or plate to a motor vehicle, identified by license plate number, year, make, model number, vehicle identification number, and indicating the date of disposition of vehicle and title, and that the vehicle is junked or unfit for future use, the clerk may consider the described vehicle junked, under KRS 186.190(5) (now 186.190(4)) and should not require plate or decal renewal. OAG 84-309 .

186A.297. Filing of affidavit of conversion to real estate when manufactured home is permanently affixed to land — Surrender of certificate of title.

  1. When a manufactured home is or is to be permanently affixed to real estate, the owner may execute and file an affidavit of conversion to real estate with the county clerk of the county in which the real estate is located. The affidavit shall attest to the fact that the home has been or will be permanently affixed to the real estate and be accompanied by a surrender of the Kentucky certificate of title. The county clerk shall file the affidavit of conversion to real estate in the miscellaneous record book.
  2. A county clerk shall not accept a surrender of a Kentucky certificate of title which displays an unreleased lien unless it is accompanied by a release of the lien. When the county clerk files the affidavit of conversion to real estate, the county clerk shall furnish a copy to the property valuation administrator for inclusion in the real property tax rolls of the county. A filing of an affidavit of conversion to real estate and a surrender of a Kentucky certificate of title shall be deemed a conversion of the property as an improvement to the real estate upon which it is located.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 166, § 1, effective July 14, 2000.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Construction.

Because the 2000 enactment of KRS 186A.297 allowed for a manufactured home to become part of the real estate by filing an affidavit of conversion and surrendering the certificate of title, the home would be deemed an improvement to the real estate upon which it was located and subsequently treated as real property, and therefore the manufactured home would apparently no longer be governed or subject to the certificate of title provision in KRS 186A.190 . PHH Mortg. Servs. v. Higgason, 345 B.R. 584, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48166 (E.D. Ky. 2006 ).

State court in rem judgment and order of sale converting debtor’s manufactured home to an improvement to real property created a perfected security interest in the manufactured home; the state-court judgment “deemed” debtor’s manufactured home to be converted to real estate. Dickson v. Countrywide Home Loans (In re Dickson), 655 F.3d 585, 2011 FED App. 0242P, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17830 (6th Cir. 2011).

2.Applicability.

Bankruptcy trustee had the power under 11 USCS 544(a)(1) to avoid a loan company’s lien in joint debtors’ manufactured home in part because, as of the bankruptcy filing date, the company had not complied with KRS 186A.297 , which was necessary to convert the home to real estate. The company could not rely on KRS 355.9-502 to get around its failure to timely file the debtors’ affidavit of conversion because KRS 186A.297 provided the specific method by which a manufactured home could be converted to real estate upon its permanent affixation to land. Westenhoefer v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Stagnoli), 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 238 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Jan. 19, 2007).

Because KRS 186A.297 provides a specific method by which a manufactured home can be converted to real estate, upon its permanent affixation to land, the statute must be complied with in order for a conversion to take place. KRS 355.9-502 does not provide an alternate method by which an affixed manufactured home can be converted to real estate. Westenhoefer v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re Stagnoli), 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 238 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Jan. 19, 2007).

Creditor did not have authority to attempt recovery on the debtor’s mobile home because the creditor had not perfected a security interest in the mobile home by assuring that there was a notation on the certificate of title for the mobile home, and the debtor had not filed a certificate converting the mobile home to real estate, pursuant to KRS 186A.297 . Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc. v. Flener (In re Boisseau), 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1354 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. June 4, 2009).

Creditor’s objection to a Chapter 13 plan on the grounds that the plan impermissibly sought to modify its claim under 11 U.S.C.S. § 1322(b)(2) was overruled because notwithstanding whether the debtors’ mobile home was permanently affixed to real property that secured the creditor’s interest, it could only be deemed an interest in real estate if it was converted to real property under KRS 186A.297 ; thus, because the mobile home had an active certificate of title and had not been converted, a security interest could only be perfected under KRS 186A.190(1) by notation on the certificate of title. The court rejected the creditor’s argument that because the priority scheme in KRS 355.9-334(5)(d) provided a mechanism for a mortgage to have priority over a security interest in a titled mobile home, that this meant the mobile home could be perfected other than by a notation on its title. In re Starks, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 268 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Jan. 24, 2011).

Creditor failed to provide evidence that its security interest was perfected by notation on the certificate of title of a Chapter 7 debtor’s mobile home prior to the filing of the debtor’s petition as required by KRS 186A.190(1) and failed to allege or prove that the mobile home was converted from personalty to realty under KRS 186A.297 . Even had the creditor provided sufficient evidence that its lien was noted on a certificate of title issued before the debtor’s petition was filed, it still could not overcome the fact that it filed the title lien statement in the wrong county under KRS 186A.190(2) and thus, because the creditor’s lien on the mobile home was not properly perfected at the time the debtor filed bankruptcy, the trustee had superior title to the mobile home pursuant to 11 U.S.C.S. § 544(a)(1) and was entitled to recover the value of the debtor’s interest in the mobile home for the benefit of the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C.S. § 550. Higgason v. Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc. (In re Pierce), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 3639 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Sept. 20, 2011), aff'd, 471 B.R. 876, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 2457 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2012).

Trustee could avoid a mortgage lender’s interest in debtor’s manufactured home because, under Kentucky law pertaining to perfection of its lien, the lender was required to either note its lien on the certificate of title to the mobile home, or to convert the manufactured home to real property under statute, which the lender failed to do. Higgason v. Cantrell (In re Cantrell), 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3708 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Sept. 5, 2013).

Creditor's claim that debtors' Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan could not be confirmed under 11 U.S.C.S. § 1325 because they did not include the cost of delivering a new mobile home to their lot and setting it up was rejected because set-up and delivery costs could not be used as a means of increasing the replacement value of a manufactured home, particularly where a debtor intended to retain their home; the home was personal property under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 186A.297 , and the replacement value of the home did not include the costs of moving a new home to the debtors' lot because the home was already on their lot and they intended to keep the home and make payments they owed the creditor on the home under their plan. In re Neace, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 42 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Jan. 6, 2017).

Real property owner was not the owner of a manufactured home that was placed on a foundation on the owner’s property because the manufactured home did not lose its character as personal property when an active certificate of title existed that was held by the assignee of the title, the title history did not reflect any security interest against the manufactured home, and the real property owner admitted that the purchase contract for the real property did not include title to the manufactured home. Wright v. Miller, 629 S.W.3d 813, 2021 Ky. App. LEXIS 53 (Ky. Ct. App. 2021).

3.Effect of Noncompliance.

The creditor did not have a security interest in the mobile home because the creditor had not complied with KRS Chapter 186A by surrendering a certificate of title to the county clerk and filing an affidavit stating that the mobile home had been converted to real estate. Because the creditor’s loan was thus not secured by real property that consisted of the debtor’s personal residence, the exception to modification afforded under 11 USCS § 1322(b)(2) did not apply. In re Gearheart, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4281 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Dec. 14, 2007).

Second mortgage holder had a priority security interest in a manufactured home because a lis pendens did not apply to personal property, the mere filing of a notice of lis pendens was insufficient to independently create a security interest, and it did not affect the priority of competing security interests. A first mortgage holder did not perfect a security interest in the home as personal property by placing a notation on a certificate of title, as required by KRS 186A.190 , and the manufactured home remained personal property due to a failure to comply with KRS 186A.297 . Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 309 S.W.3d 792, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 67 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).

Chapter 13 creditor did not have a perfected lien in the debtor’s mobile home, as the creditor had not complied with KRS 186A.190(1) or KRS 186A.297(1). In re Scott, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 3943 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. Nov. 19, 2010).

Because the plain language of the mortgage contract did not grant the lender a lien on debtor’s manufactured home as personal property, the lender did not obtain a security interest in the manufactured home through the mortgage contract, and even if the lender had obtained a lien against the manufactured home by way of the mortgage contract, it was undisputed that the lender did not note the security interest on the certificate of title, and the filing of a lis pendens could not serve to perfect a security interest in a manufactured home; accordingly, before the state-court foreclosure judgment, the lender did not have a perfected lien on debtor’s manufactured home. Dickson v. Countrywide Home Loans (In re Dickson), 655 F.3d 585, 2011 FED App. 0242P, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17830 (6th Cir. 2011).

Chapter 7 Trustee avoided a lien on the debtors’ manufactured home under 11 U.S.C.S. § 544. The creditor did not perfect its lien in the home, which was certificate of title property under KRS 186A.070 subject to perfection under KRS 186A.190 , and the debtors did not convert the home from personal property to real estate as permitted by KRS 186A.297 ; in addition, KRS 355.9-334 did not apply to permit the perfection of the lien as a lien on a fixture because the Uniform Commercial code did not address perfection of a security interest in certificate of title property. Rogan v. Greentree Fin. Servicing Corp. (In re Nutgrass), 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 636 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2013).

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Ellerman & Linneman, A Survey of Kentucky Commercial Law., 31 N. Ky. L. Rev. 201 (2004).

186A.298. Filing of affidavit of severance from real estate for manufactured home previously converted to real estate.

  1. The owner of a manufactured home that has been converted to real estate in accordance with KRS 186A.297 may detach or sever the home from the real property only by filing an affidavit of severance with the clerk of the county in which the affidavit of conversion originally took place and in which the real estate is located. The affidavit of severance shall include the following information:
    1. The manufacturer and, if applicable, the model name of the manufactured home;
    2. The legal description of the real property on which the manufactured home is or was placed, with the source of title setting forth the book and page number of how the owner of the real estate acquired the property;
    3. The book and page number where the previous affidavit of conversion was filed of record;
    4. A Class B1 or B2 Seal as required under KRS 227.600 ;
    5. Certification of an attorney that, as of the date of the titling of the severance, there are no security interests or liens in the manufactured home that have not been released by the secured party and that the title to the real estate is marketable, free, and clear of liens, or certification of any holder of a security interest in the manufactured home of:
      1. The amount of any existing security interest; and
      2. The secured party’s consent to issuance of a title;
    6. The owner’s affidavit that the manufactured home has previously been or will be removed from the described real estate within thirty (30) days of the date of filing the affidavit of conversion, and that, before moving the manufactured home the owner will apply for and receive;
      1. A certificate of title as required under KRS 186A.070 ; and
      2. A manufactured home registration as required under KRS 186.675 ; and
    7. There shall be a limit of one (1) affidavit of severance issued to an owner on a property.
  2. When the county clerk files the affidavit of severance, the county clerk shall provide a copy to:
    1. The property valuation administrator for adjustment of the real property tax rolls of the county; and
    2. The Transportation Cabinet, Department of Vehicle Regulation.
  3. An owner who fails to file an affidavit of severance prior to removal of the manufactured home shall be liable for actual damages or five hundred dollars ($500), whichever is greater, payable to any first lien holder of record, or if no such lien holder exists, to be payable to the clerk of the county in which the affidavit of conversion first took place, upon notice to the clerk that the manufactured home was not removed within thirty (30) days of the date of filing of the affidavit of severance.
  4. The county clerk shall receive a fee of sixteen dollars ($16) for the service provided under this section.
  5. If the owner of the manufactured home provides inaccurate or fraudulent information to the county clerk, the clerk shall not be held liable in any subsequent action relating to the severance of the manufactured home from the real estate.
  6. For the purposes of this section, “owner” means the party who holds the legal title to the real estate where the manufactured home is located prior to being moved. It shall not include the party who is acquiring the manufactured home.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 98, § 1, effective June 29, 2017.

186A.300. Possession of blank, uncompleted or partially executed title and registration documents prohibited — Exceptions.

  1. No person, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section shall have in his possession any blank, uncompleted, or partially executed “certificate of title and registration,” “certificate of registration,” “certificate of title,” or other similarly styled form or document, whether genuine or counterfeit, of this or any other state or country, which is of a type that, when genuine and properly issued, evidences ownership of a vehicle under the laws of this or another state or country, and surrender of which is required in order to sell, transfer, register or title a motor vehicle or trailer in this state.
  2. A person who possesses forms or documents of the type described in subsection (1) of this section, is not in violation of this section if he:
    1. Is an employee of a manufacturer or printer of such forms or documents and possesses such forms or documents in the normal course of the business of design or manufacture of them in connection with bid invitation, bid, or contract with a governmental agency related to supplying such forms for governmental use.
    2. Is an employee of a shipper, or agency, under whose direction such forms are being shipped or delivered to a state or local agency charged with receiving, distributing or issuing such forms or documents, when they are in a container sealed under governmental direction.
    3. Is an employee of a state agency who possesses such forms or documents in the course of carrying out his official duties when his duties are to handle such forms or documents.
    4. Is a county clerk, or employee of a county clerk whose official work duties require the handling of such forms or documents, and he possesses them within the confines of the county clerk’s office or official storage space or immediately incidental to placing them in such places.
    5. Possesses such form or document and it is prominently and indelibly marked on its face either: specimen, or void, or sample.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 57, effective July 15, 1982.

186A.305. Alteration or removal of motor vehicle identification number prohibited.

  1. No person shall intentionally remove, deface, cover, destroy, alter, or obscure any vehicle identification number, or other distinguishing number, of a motor vehicle or trailer or any part thereof in this state, without written authorization from the Department of Kentucky State Police, nor shall any person place or stamp, in place of the original manufacturer’s serial, motor, or other number or mark upon a vehicle, any number except one assigned thereto by the Department of Vehicle Regulation under the provisions of KRS 186.1911 or authorized agency of another state.
  2. This section does not prohibit the restoration by an owner of the original vehicle identification number when the restoration is authorized by the Department of Kentucky State Police, nor prevent any manufacturer from placing in the ordinary course of business numbers or marks upon new motor vehicles or new parts thereof.
  3. This section shall not apply to a scrap processor who loads, unloads, crushes, flattens, destroys, grinds up, handles, shreds, or otherwise reduces a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part into metallic scrap for the purpose of recycling such metallic content.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 58, effective July 15, 1982; 2007, ch. 85, § 207, effective June 26, 2007.

186A.310. Selling or receiving of vehicle with identification number removed or altered prohibited.

  1. No person shall knowingly buy, sell, offer for sale, receive, or have in his possession, any titled motor vehicle or trailer or component part thereof, from which the original manufacturer’s vehicle identification number, or serial number, has been removed, defaced, altered, obscured or destroyed, unless such vehicle or component part has attached thereto an identification number assigned or approved by the Department of Vehicle Regulation under the provisions of KRS 186.1911 or authorized agency of another state in lieu of the manufacturer’s number.
  2. Whenever such vehicle or component part comes into the custody of a peace officer it shall be forfeited under the procedure established in KRS 500.090 . Nothing in this section shall, however, preclude the return of such vehicle or parts to the lawful owner thereof following presentation of satisfactory evidence of ownership and assignment of an identification number by the Department of Vehicle Regulation.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 59, effective July 15, 1982.

186A.315. Possession of manufacturer’s identification number plates prohibited — Exceptions.

  1. No person shall have in his possession a manufacturer’s vehicle identification number plate unless it is attached to the vehicle, or vehicle part, to which it was originally affixed by the manufacturer, nor shall any person have any facsimile of such a plate.
  2. This section shall not prohibit possession of legitimate plates by persons:
    1. Whose possession is incident to a contract to supply them to a manufacturer of new motor vehicles, or when such plates are in the possession of a manufacturer of new vehicles, or such manufacturer’s employee, who possesses them within the scope of his work when his work involved the manufacture or storage of such plates, for legitimate placement upon newly manufactured vehicles, legitimate affixing of such plates upon newly manufactured vehicles, or legitimate affixing of a replacement plate.
    2. Who possess such plate immediately incident to transferring it from being legitimately attached to a wrecked part or portion of a vehicle to a replacement part or portion for installation on, or installed on, the same vehicle on which the plate was originally placed by the manufacturer, when such possession and transfer is authorized in writing by the Department of Vehicle Regulation.
    3. Who are authorized in writing, by the commissioner of the Department of Vehicle Regulation under the provisions of KRS 186.1911 to possess such plates.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 60, effective July 15, 1982.

186A.320. Duties of peace officer in the event a stolen vehicle is located.

  1. When any peace officer has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle or trailer, or any component part of such vehicle is stolen, he shall impound such vehicle or part and notify its lawful owner, and when applicable, the agency to which the theft was reported, of the recovery of such vehicle or part and where it may be claimed.
  2. A vehicle or component part thereof which has been impounded pursuant to this section shall be released to its lawful owner when such owner presents satisfactory evidence of his ownership.
  3. A vehicle or component part thereof that has been impounded under this section, and which has not been claimed within ninety (90) days following notice of recovery to the owner, or if the owner cannot be located after a reasonable effort, within ninety (90) days following impoundment, is forfeited and shall be disposed of in accordance with procedures set forth in KRS 500.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 61, effective July 15, 1982.

186A.325. Trafficking in stolen vehicles or stolen vehicle parts.

  1. Any person or entity knowingly in possession or control of two (2) or more motor vehicles or trailers or their major component parts or assemblies such as, but not limited to, an engine, transmission, chassis, frame, front clip, rear clip:
    1. That are stolen; or
    2. Have had their identity obscured, removed or altered, except as an immediate result of the final destruction by crushing, flattening, grinding up, or shredding of a vehicle or vehicle part for purpose of recycling its metallic content; or
    3. Have stolen parts on them; or
    4. Are comprised of any combination of the above;

      shall be deemed to be trafficking in stolen vehicles or stolen vehicle parts.

  2. Trafficking in stolen vehicles or stolen vehicle parts is a Class D felony.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 62, effective July 15, 1982.

186A.330. Duties of law enforcement officer in the event of arrest for violation of trafficking in stolen vehicles or stolen parts.

  1. Upon the arrest of any person or entity for violation of KRS 186A.325 , the law enforcement officer may cause the seizure, pending disposition by the court as provided by subsection (2) of this section, of:
    1. All vehicles or vehicle parts, held in violation of KRS 186A.310(1) or 186A.325 ;
    2. All vehicles and other equipment used to transport property in violation of KRS 186A.325;
    3. All tools, equipment, and other materials, and all real and personal property used in furtherance of a violation of KRS 186A.325; and
    4. All money or other proceeds gained from the violation of KRS 186A.325.
  2. Upon the conviction of any person or entity for violation of KRS 186A.325 , all items seized in accordance with subsection (1) of this section may be forfeited to the state in a manner consistent with procedures for forfeiture set forth in KRS 500.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 63, effective July 15, 1982.

186A.335. Salvage titles — Conditions for issuance. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by Acts 1994, ch. 243, § 3 and renumbered by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 as KRS 186A.520 .

186A.340. Appeal of administrative action to court.

Any person aggrieved by any administrative action pursuant to this chapter or regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, may appeal such action to a court of competent jurisdiction.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 65, effective July 15, 1982.

186A.345. Definitions to be consistent with KRS 186.010.

Unless the context requires otherwise, terms used in this chapter shall be defined, where applicable, as provided by KRS 186.010 .

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 67, effective July 15, 1982.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Cowles v. Rogers, 762 S.W.2d 414, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 182 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988), overruled in part, Wheeler v. Rogers, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992); Nantz v. Lexington Lincoln Mercury Subaru, 947 S.W.2d 36, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 71 ( Ky. 1997 ).

186A.350. Fees credited to trust and agency account.

All fees to be credited to the state shall be deposited to a trust and agency account within the transportation fund to be used in defraying the cabinet’s costs and expenses of administering a vehicle titling program.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 68, effective July 15, 1982.

Damaged Motor Vehicles

186A.500. Legislative finding.

The General Assembly finds that purchasers when buying vehicles are entitled to know if the vehicle has sustained prior severe damage. The most feasible mechanism for conveying that information is a designation on the title that the vehicle has previously sustained severe damage or has been rebuilt after being declared “junk,” “salvage,” or “water damaged.”

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 243, § 1, effective July 15, 1994.

NOTES TO UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS

1.Disclosure.

Unpublished decision: Dealer has a duty to disclose cumulative repair work exceeding $1,000 of which it has direct knowledge, regardless of whether the repairs were actually billed to the dealer. Evans v. JNT, Inc., 2015 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 878 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2015), review denied, ordered not published, 2016 Ky. LEXIS 192 (Ky. Apr. 27, 2016).

186A.510. Definitions for KRS 186A.500 to 186A.550.

As used in KRS 186A.500 to 186A.550 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Brand” means a designation that is affixed as required by this chapter, or that has previously been affixed, to a motor vehicle title that establishes a portion of the history of the motor vehicle and that shall be fixed to all subsequently issued titles for that vehicle;
  2. “Classic motor vehicle project” means a motor vehicle that is:
    1. At least twenty-five (25) years old;
    2. Not in roadworthy condition; and
    3. Either currently in this state and not titled or being brought into this state with a regular title from another state that does not denote it as “salvage,” “junk,” “rebuilt,” or any similar designation;
  3. “Dealer” means a person or business as defined in KRS 190.010 who sells or offers for sale a motor vehicle;
  4. “Junk vehicle” means a vehicle which meets the description set forth in KRS 186A.295(1)(a);
  5. “Motor vehicle” means a motor vehicle as defined in KRS 186.010(8)(a) and (b);
  6. “Owner” means a person who holds the legal title of a vehicle or a person who pursuant to a bona fide sale has received physical possession of the vehicle subject to any applicable security interest;
  7. “Rebuilt vehicle” means a vehicle that has been repaired to a road worthy condition after having been registered as a salvage vehicle pursuant to KRS 186A.520 , or a similar salvage designation from another licensing jurisdiction;
  8. “Roadworthy condition” means a vehicle in a safe condition to operate on the highway and capable of transporting persons or property that complies fully with the provisions of KRS Chapter 189 pertaining to vehicle equipment; and
  9. “Water damage” means damage to a motor vehicle caused by submerging or partially submerging the vehicle in water to the extent that the vehicle was submerged or partially submerged at any water level above the dashboard of the vehicle, regardless of the actual dollar amount of the damage.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 243, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 67, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 2008, ch. 157, § 1, effective July 15, 2008.

186A.520. Salvage titles — Conditions for issuance — Operation of vehicle with salvage title.

  1. Except as provided in KRS 186A.555 , a salvage title shall be obtained by the owner of a motor vehicle that meets the following definition of a salvage vehicle:
    1. A vehicle which has been wrecked, destroyed, or damaged, to the extent that the total estimated or actual cost of parts and labor to rebuild or reconstruct the vehicle to its preaccident condition and for legal operation on the roads or highways, not including the cost of parts and labor to reinstall a deployed airbag system, exceeds seventy-five percent (75%) of the retail value of the vehicle, as set forth in a current edition of the National Automobile Dealer’s Association price guide.
    2. The value of repair parts for purposes of this definition shall be determined by using the current published retail cost of the parts equal in kind and quality to the parts to be replaced or the actual retail cost of the repair parts used in repair.
    3. The labor costs of repairs for purposes of this section shall be computed by using the hourly labor rate and time allocations which are reasonable and customary in the automobile repair industry in the community where the repairs are performed.
    4. Airbag reinstallation costs which are excluded from the seventy-five percent (75%) computation as set forth in paragraph (a) of this subsection shall be included by an insurer in the computation of the total physical damage estimate according to the terms and conditions of individual policies, provided that the total costs payable by an insurer do not exceed the total retail value of the vehicle.
  2. The owner or an authorized agent of a motor vehicle that meets the definition of a salvage vehicle as set forth in subsection (1) of this section shall, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of all necessary paperwork required by this chapter, submit an application to the county clerk, on a form prescribed by the Department of Vehicle Regulation, for a salvage title, accompanied by a properly endorsed certificate of title and any lien satisfactions, if any appear, as may be required.
  3. The county clerk shall retain a copy of each salvage title application received and shall forward the original and its supporting documents to the Department of Vehicle Regulation in a manner similar to that for handling of an application for a title.
  4. The county clerk shall rely on the information provided by the owner or authorized agent, including a county of residence designation, on:
    1. Any approved, notarized state form utilized in lien titling or the title transfer process signed by the owner or authorized agent; and
    2. Any document submitted during the transfer of a salvage vehicle from an owner to an insurer.

      Reliance on the foregoing by the county clerk shall relieve the office of the county clerk from liability to any third party claiming failure to comply with this section.

  5. The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall process the salvage title application in a manner similar to that used in processing a title application and the salvage title shall be delivered in a like manner of a title. Salvage titles shall be construed as proof of ownership of a vehicle in a state as to be unusable upon the highways of the Commonwealth. A vehicle shall not be issued a registration for highway use as long as a salvage title is in force.
  6. The only time a vehicle with a salvage title may be operated upon the highways of the Commonwealth is when it is in route to or from an inspection by the certified inspector prior to obtaining a certificate of title after having been rebuilt as per KRS 186.115 .
  7. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 369.103, when a salvage vehicle is transferred from an owner to an insurer, the following shall be exempted from the requirements of notarization, including exemption from the notarization of electronic signature requirements of KRS Chapter 423:
    1. The transfer of ownership on the certificate of title;
    2. Any power of attorney required in connection with the transfer of ownership to the insurer;
    3. Any required odometer disclosure statement;
    4. The application for a salvage certificate of title; and
    5. The transfer of ownership on the salvage certificate of title issued.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 64, effective July 15, 1982; 1994, ch. 243, § 3, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 230, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2003, ch. 97, § 3, effective June 24, 2003; 2009, ch. 54, § 1, effective October 1, 2009; 2020 ch. 49, § 1, effective July 15, 2020.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 186A.335 and was renumbered by the Reviser of Statutes effective July 15, 1994 pursuant to KRS 7.136 (1).

186A.525. Title for motor vehicle previously with branded title or salvage title.

If a motor vehicle had a brand previously affixed to its title or previously has been issued a salvage title in this or any other jurisdiction, the applicant for a title for that motor vehicle may, at the time of the application, notify the Transportation Cabinet of the prior existence of a brand on the motor vehicle’s title or of the previous salvage title for the motor vehicle. The notification to the Transportation Cabinet shall include the title number and the jurisdiction where the previous brand was issued. Upon verification, the Transportation Cabinet shall issue a title with the appropriate brand for the motor vehicle.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 67, § 2, effective July 15, 1996.

186A.530. Titles of rebuilt, water-damaged, and junk vehicles — Insurance claim settlements for salvage vehicles — Disclosure of title brand by owner or dealer — Voidability of sale without disclosure — Exemption — Administrative regulations.

  1. The owner of a motor vehicle that meets the definition of a salvage vehicle as set forth in KRS 186A.520(1) and has been issued a salvage certificate of title in Kentucky, or the equivalent thereof by another licensing jurisdiction, and has been rebuilt, may make application for a new certificate of title pursuant to KRS 186.115 . The Transportation Cabinet may promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A governing the form of application.
  2. Upon receipt of a salvage certificate of title issued pursuant to KRS 186A.520 , or similar title issued by another state if the title does not disqualify the vehicle from being titled for use on the highway in that state, and proof of passing the inspection required by KRS 186A.115 , the cabinet shall issue a new certificate of title with the words “rebuilt vehicle” printed on the face of the title. The brand shall be carried forward and printed in the appropriate section on the face of all titles issued thereafter for that motor vehicle.
  3. If ownership of a motor vehicle has been transferred to an insurance company through payment of damages, the insurance company making the payment of damages shall be deemed the owner of the vehicle.
  4. The owner of a water damaged vehicle shall make application to the cabinet for a salvage certificate of title as provided for in KRS 186A.520 . The owner of a vehicle with a brand from another jurisdiction identifying the vehicle as water damaged or other similar designation who is making application for a Kentucky title shall be issued a title with the words “water damaged” printed on the face of the title.
  5. A Kentucky salvage certificate of title may be issued from an out-of-state junking certificate or other ownership document bearing a designation of “junk,” “unrebuildable,” or other similar classification that disqualifies the vehicle from being titled for use on the highway in that state with the following provisions:
    1. The out-of-state junking certificate of title or other ownership certificate shall be an original, secure document.
    2. The applicant shall submit a minimum of two (2) photographs of the motor vehicle showing the damage to the motor vehicle. The photographs shall be included in the application for a salvage certificate of title.
    3. The applicant shall submit a minimum of two (2) estimates of damage verifying that the condition of the vehicle which has been issued the junking certificate constitutes less than seventy-five percent (75%) of the retail value of the vehicle, as set forth in a current edition of the National Auto Dealers’ Association N.A.D.A. price guide.
    4. A salvage title issued under this subsection shall be branded “SALVAGE.” The Transportation Cabinet shall use a unique method of identification to differentiate a salvage title issued under this subsection from other salvage titles.
    1. Upon receipt of a salvage certificate of title issued pursuant to subsection (5) of this section, or an out-of-state junking certificate or other ownership document bearing a designation of “junk,” “unrebuildable,” or other similar classification that disqualifies the vehicle from being titled for use on the highway in that state, and proof of passing the inspection required by KRS 186A.115 , the cabinet shall issue a new certificate of title with the words “REBUILT VEHICLE” printed on the face of the title. The Transportation Cabinet shall use a unique method of identification to differentiate a rebuilt brand issued under this paragraph from other rebuilt brands. The brand shall be carried forward and printed in the appropriate section on the face of all titles issued thereafter for that motor vehicle. (6) (a) Upon receipt of a salvage certificate of title issued pursuant to subsection (5) of this section, or an out-of-state junking certificate or other ownership document bearing a designation of “junk,” “unrebuildable,” or other similar classification that disqualifies the vehicle from being titled for use on the highway in that state, and proof of passing the inspection required by KRS 186A.115 , the cabinet shall issue a new certificate of title with the words “REBUILT VEHICLE” printed on the face of the title. The Transportation Cabinet shall use a unique method of identification to differentiate a rebuilt brand issued under this paragraph from other rebuilt brands. The brand shall be carried forward and printed in the appropriate section on the face of all titles issued thereafter for that motor vehicle.
    2. A person who obtains a rebuilt title under this subsection shall permanently affix a plate of metallic composition within the opening for the driver’s side door which states “REBUILT VEHICLE — May Not Be Eligible For Title In All States.”
    1. When an insurance company makes a claim settlement on a vehicle that has been stolen and recovered, if the vehicle meets the definition of a salvage vehicle as set forth in KRS 186A.520 , the company shall apply for a salvage certificate of title as provided for in KRS 186A.520 . Upon receipt of this information, the cabinet shall issue the company a certificate of title to replace a salvage certificate of title. The cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A regarding the forms and any additional information which insurance companies shall be required to obtain and submit when seeking a certificate of title to replace a salvage certificate of title. (7) (a) When an insurance company makes a claim settlement on a vehicle that has been stolen and recovered, if the vehicle meets the definition of a salvage vehicle as set forth in KRS 186A.520, the company shall apply for a salvage certificate of title as provided for in KRS 186A.520. Upon receipt of this information, the cabinet shall issue the company a certificate of title to replace a salvage certificate of title. The cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A regarding the forms and any additional information which insurance companies shall be required to obtain and submit when seeking a certificate of title to replace a salvage certificate of title.
    2. In claim settlements that do not involve transfer of the vehicle to the insurance company, an insurer shall not render payment on a damage claim for a vehicle whose damage meets or exceeds seventy-five percent (75%) of the value of the vehicle, until the insurer has received proof that the owner has surrendered the title or has applied for a salvage certificate of title as set forth in KRS 186A.520. The owner shall apply for a salvage certificate of title within three (3) working days of the agreed settlement. This subsection shall not apply to hail-damaged vehicles under KRS 186A.555 .
    3. An insurance company shall not refuse coverage to, and shall not reclassify coverage of, a vehicle that has been issued a rebuilt title pursuant to the provisions of this section.
  6. A motor vehicle owner or a motor vehicle dealer licensed in this state who offers for sale, trade, or transfer a motor vehicle which carries a title brand, as set forth in subsection (2) or (6) of this section, shall disclose the nature of the brand to any prospective buyer or transferee, prior to the sale, and according to the following:
    1. Dealer disclosure shall be located on a sticker placed on the vehicle. The sticker wording shall be printed in at least ten (10) point, bold face type, on a background of obviously different color, and shall include the following: “THIS IS A REBUILT VEHICLE.” This disclosure information shall not appear on vehicles that do not have a branded title. Dealer disclosure shall also be located on a buyer’s notification form to be approved by the Transportation Cabinet. The form shall inform the buyer that the vehicle is a rebuilt vehicle and may include any other information the cabinet deems necessary.
    2. Nondealer disclosure shall be made in accordance with the procedures provided for in KRS 186A.060 . The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall ensure that disclosure information appears near the beginning of the application for title and informs the buyer that the vehicle is a rebuilt vehicle.
  7. Failure of a dealer to procure the buyer’s acknowledgment signature on the buyer’s notification form or failure of any person other than a dealer to procure the buyer’s acknowledgment signature on the vehicle transaction record form shall render the sale voidable at the election of the buyer. The election to render the sale voidable shall be limited to forty-five (45) days after issuance of the title. This provision shall not bar any other remedies otherwise available to the purchaser.
  8. The notification provisions of this section shall not apply to motor vehicles more than ten (10) model years old.
  9. The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A, regarding the administration of the title branding procedure. The administrative regulations shall include the manner in which salvage titles and rebuilt brands on vehicles previously declared unrebuildable by another state are differentiated from other salvage titles and rebuilt brands. The administrative regulations may include designation of additional brands which provide significant information to the owner.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 243, § 4, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 35, § 7, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 128, § 8, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 230, § 3, effective July 14, 2000; 2005, ch. 22, § 1, effective June 20, 2005; 2015 ch. 95, § 2, effective June 24, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/96). The reference to KRS 186A.335 in subsection (2) of this statute has been changed to KRS 186A.520 to reflect a renumbering by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136(1).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.In General.

The statute does not relieve an owner/seller of a vehicle of his obligation to make a required disclosure where the buyer is a dealer who has the alternative option of not immediately applying for a transfer of the vehicle’s title; this section puts the entire onus on the owner/seller of the vehicle to make the disclosure, without exception. Preferred Auto. Sales v. Sisson, 44 S.W.3d 818, 2001 Ky. App. LEXIS 53 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001), modified, Commonwealth v. Ingram, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 121 (Ky. June 14, 2001).

186A.535. Title for classic motor vehicle project — Administrative regulations.

  1. The owner of a motor vehicle that meets the definition of a classic motor vehicle project may apply for a classic motor vehicle project certificate of title, which shall:
    1. Bear on the face of the title the words “CLASSIC MOTOR VEHICLE PROJECT—NOT FOR ROAD USE”; and
    2. Not bear the designation of “salvage,” “junk,” “rebuilt,” or any other similar brand.
  2. The owner of a motor vehicle that meets the definition of a classic motor vehicle project as set forth in KRS 186A.510 , has been issued a classic motor vehicle project certificate of title under subsection (1) of this section, and has been restored to roadworthy condition may make application for a new certificate of title pursuant to KRS 186A.115 . The Transportation Cabinet may promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A governing the form of application.
  3. Upon receipt of a classic motor vehicle project certificate of title issued pursuant to subsection (1) of this section and proof of passing the inspection required by KRS 186A.115 , the cabinet shall issue a new regular certificate of title with no special brand printed on the face of the title.
  4. The only time a vehicle with a classic motor vehicle project certificate of title may be operated upon the highways of the Commonwealth is when it is en route to or from an inspection by the certified inspector prior to obtaining a certificate of title after having been restored in accordance with KRS 186A.115 .
  5. The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A, regarding the administration of the classic motor vehicle project certificate of title procedures. The administrative regulations shall include the manner in which classic motor vehicle project titles are differentiated from salvage titles and rebuilt brands. The administrative regulations may include designation of additional brands which provide significant information to the owner.

History. Enact. Acts 2008, ch. 157, § 2, effective July 15, 2008.

186A.540. Written disclosure of damages to motor vehicle.

  1. An individual, or a dealer required to be licensed pursuant to KRS Chapter 190, shall disclose all damages to a motor vehicle:
    1. Of which the individual or the dealer has direct knowledge;
    2. Which result in repairs, for items other than wheels, tires, or glass, that exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000); and
    3. That occur while the motor vehicle is in the individual’s or the dealer’s possession and prior to delivery to a purchaser.
  2. Disclosure under this section shall be in writing and shall require the purchaser’s signature acknowledging the disclosure of damages.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 243, § 5, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 23, § 7, effective February 22, 2000; 2009, ch. 54, § 2, effective June 25, 2009; 2017 ch. 139, § 1, effective June 29, 2017.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Disclosure.

KRS 186A.540 imposes an affirmative duty on motor vehicle dealers to disclose repairs exceeding $1,000, and a truck buyer who bought the truck for commercial purposes was within the class intended to be protected by KRS 186A.540 . Thus, it was error to dismiss the buyer’s claim against a dealership on grounds he did not allege the truck’s damages occurred while in the dealership’s possession. Keeton v. Lexington Truck Sales, Inc., 275 S.W.3d 723, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 226 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

NOTES TO UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS

1.Disclosure.

Unpublished decision: “As is” clause in a vehicle purchase contract precluded claims for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of express and implied warranties; it did not preclude a claim for intentional misrepresentation or for violations of the statutory damage disclosure requirements and the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act. The buyer alleged that the seller induced him to buy without a pre-purchase inspection and that the “as is” clause was inserted into the contract after the money had been transferred. Evans v. JNT, Inc., 2015 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 878 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2015), review denied, ordered not published, 2016 Ky. LEXIS 192 (Ky. Apr. 27, 2016).

Unpublished decision: Dealer has a duty to disclose cumulative repair work exceeding $1,000 of which it has direct knowledge, regardless of whether the repairs were actually billed to the dealer. Evans v. JNT, Inc., 2015 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 878 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2015), review denied, ordered not published, 2016 Ky. LEXIS 192 (Ky. Apr. 27, 2016).

Unpublished decision: The statute requires disclosure of any motor vehicle repairs over $300 (now $1,000), whether they be mechanical, body, or otherwise. Smith v. GMC, 979 S.W.2d 127, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 99 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

186A.550. Authority for administrative regulations to conform to federal requirement of uniformity, if imposed.

Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 186A.510 , 186A.520 , and 186A.530 , if the United States Department of Transportation requires a uniform method for titling salvage and junk vehicles, the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations, pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A, to bring the provisions of KRS 186A.510 , 186A.520 , and 186A.530 into compliance with federal law.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 243, § 6, effective July 15, 1994.

186A.555. Titles of hail-damaged vehicles.

  1. The provisions of KRS 186A.500 to 186A.550 notwithstanding, the owner of a motor vehicle that has been damaged solely by hail shall have the regular title of the vehicle branded as follows “Hail Damage” if:
    1. The vehicle is in a condition that it can be legally operated on the highway;
    2. The total estimated or actual cost of parts and labor to rebuild or reconstruct the vehicle to its pre-hail condition exceeds seventy-five percent (75%) of the retail value of the vehicle, as set forth in a current edition of the National Automobile Dealer’s Association price guide; and
    3. The owner intends to retain ownership of the vehicle.
  2. A person seeking to have the title of a vehicle branded for hail damage under subsection (1) of this section shall present the sheriff with a statement from the person’s insurance company that the damage exceeds seventy-five percent (75%) of the retail value of the vehicle and is solely the result of hail damage, and shall have the vehicle inspected by the sheriff of the county in which the vehicle is registered. Upon completion of inspection of the vehicle, the sheriff shall indicate on the vehicle transaction record form if he or she has received a statement from the person’s insurance company that the damage to the vehicle is the result of hail damage and if the total estimated or actual cost of parts and labor to rebuild or reconstruct the vehicle to its pre-hail condition exceeds seventy-five percent (75%) of the retail value of the vehicle, as set forth in a current edition of the National Automobile Dealer’s Association price guide. The sheriff shall be paid a fee of five dollars ($5) to conduct an inspection under this subsection.
  3. Upon completion of the inspection required under subsection (2) of this section, a person shall take the vehicle transaction record form and the title to the vehicle to the office of the county clerk in the county in which the vehicle is registered. If the sheriff has certified on the vehicle transaction record form that the damage to the vehicle is the result of hail damage and if the total estimated or actual cost of parts and labor to rebuild or reconstruct the vehicle to its pre-hail condition exceeds seventy-five percent (75%) of the retail value of the vehicle, as set forth in a current edition of the National Automobile Dealer’s Association price guide, the title shall not be surrendered to the clerk, but the clerk shall stamp on the face of the title “Hail Damage”. The clerk shall also enter into the Automated Motor Vehicle Registration System (AVIS) the information that the title has been branded in the clerk’s office “Hail Damage”. The county clerk shall be paid a fee of three dollars ($3) to carry out the provisions of this subsection.
  4. A title branded “Hail Damage” under the provisions of subsection (3) of this section shall retain the brand for as long as the person holds title to the vehicle, and upon the sale or transfer of the vehicle, the new title issued shall continue to carry the brand “Hail Damage”.
  5. An insurance company shall not render payment on a vehicle damaged solely by hail in excess of seventy-five percent (75%) of the retail value of the vehicle until the title has been branded “Hail Damage”.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 230, § 1, effective July 14, 2000.

Penalties

186A.990. Penalties.

  1. Any person who knowingly gives false, fraudulent, or erroneous information in connection with an application for the registration, and when required, titling of a vehicle, or any application for assignment of a vehicle identification number, or replacement documents, or gives information in connection with his review of applications, or falsely certifies the truthfulness and accuracy of information supplied in connection with the registration and when required, titling of a vehicle, shall be guilty of forgery in the second degree.
  2. Any person who violates KRS 186A.260 or KRS 186A.275 to 186A.285 shall be guilty of a Class D felony.
  3. Any person who violates KRS 186A.300 to 186A.315 shall be guilty of a Class D felony.
  4. Any person who operates a motor vehicle or trailer upon the highways of this state without a temporary tag when one is required, or with one that is expired, improperly executed, or displayed on a vehicle other than the one (1) to which it was legitimately and lawfully issued, shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
  5. Any person who violates the disclosure provisions of KRS 186A.530(8) shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
  6. Any person who violates any provisions of this chapter, or regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, and for which a specific penalty is not prescribed by statute, shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
  7. Criminal remedies or sanctions provided in this chapter are in addition to, and not exclusive of, any other criminal remedies or sanctions provided elsewhere in the statutes.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 164, § 66, effective July 15, 1982; 1994, ch. 243, § 7, effective July 15, 1994; 2005, ch. 22, § 2, effective June 20, 2005.

CHAPTER 187 Financial Responsibility Law

187.010. Definitions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-1, 2739n-30, 2739n-31) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.020. Suspension and denial of licenses and registration for certain offenses. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-3, 2739n-4, 2739n-5) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.030. When operator or chauffeur need not give proof in own behalf. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-7) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.040. Operator’s license and registration certificate to be suspended upon failure to satisfy judgment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-8) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.050. Judgment to be satisfied and proof of ability to pay damages to be fired before future licensing or registration — Nonresidents. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-9) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.060. Payments sufficient to satisfy requirements. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-12) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.070. Restoration of licenses and certificates upon installment payment or judgment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-13) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.080. Courts to report convictions and orders. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-6, 2739n-11) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.090. Proof of ability to respond in damages — What is. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-4, 2739n-14) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.100. Certificate of insurer. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-15) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.110. Certificate of insurer of nonresident. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-16) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.120. Insurer to notify department of cancellation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-17) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.130. Bond as proof — Clerk to record. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-18) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.140. Money or securities as proof. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-19) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.150. Department may require further proof of ability to respond in damages. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-20) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.160. License, registration certificate and number plates to be returned to department. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-24) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.170. Period proof to be maintained — Cancellation of bond or insurance — Return of money or securities — Waiver of filing proof. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-25) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.180. Rights of a judgment creditor against bad money or securities deposited with the treasurer. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-21) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.190. Motor vehicle liability policy necessary — Express provisions — Operator’s policy. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-31, 2739n-32) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.200. Liability policies — Implied provisions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-32) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.210. Policies covering vehicles and not operators — Operators’ policy. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-30) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.220. Insurance required by other laws unaffected — May be used as proof. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-27) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.230. When insurer to issue certificate. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-33) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.240. Department to furnish operator’s record and record of ability to pay damages. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-22, 2739n-23) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.250. Transfer of registration to defeat purpose of this chapter prohibited. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-26) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.260. Forgery and operating without giving proof prohibited. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-28, 2739n-29) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.270. Department to make regulations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-34) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.280. Plaintiff’s rights under this chapter are supplemental. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739n-35) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

187.290. Definitions for chapter.

As used in this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Cabinet” means the Transportation Cabinet;
  2. “Highways” means every way or place of whatever nature when any part of it is open to the use of the public, as a matter of right, license, or privilege, for purpose of vehicular traffic;
  3. “Judgment” means any judgment which has become final by expiration without appeal of the time within which an appeal might have been perfected, or by final affirmation on appeal, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction of any state or of the United States, upon a cause of action arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle, for damages, including damages for care and loss of services, because of bodily injury to or death of any person, or for damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, or upon a cause of action on an agreement of settlement for such damages;
  4. “Motor vehicle” means every self-propelled vehicle which is designed for use upon a highway, including trailers designed for use with such vehicles (except traction engines, road rollers, farm tractors, tractor cranes, power shovels, mopeds, and well drillers) and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead wires but not operated upon rails;
  5. “Moped” means either a motorized bicycle whose frame design may include one (1) or more horizontal crossbars supporting a fuel tank so long as it also has pedals, or a motorized bicycle with a step-through type frame which may or may not have pedals rated no more than two (2) brake horsepower, a cylinder capacity not exceeding fifty (50) cubic centimeters, an automatic transmission not requiring clutching or shifting by the operator after the drive system is engaged, and capable of a maximum speed of not more than thirty (30) miles per hour;
  6. “License” means any operator’s license, temporary instruction permit, or temporary license issued under the laws of this state pertaining to the licensing of operators;
  7. “Nonresident” means every person who is not a resident of this state;
  8. “Nonresident’s operating privilege” means the privilege conferred upon a nonresident by the laws of this state pertaining to the operation by him of a motor vehicle, or the use of a motor vehicle owned by him, in this state;
  9. “Operator” means every person who is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle;
  10. “Owner” means a person who holds the legal title of a motor vehicle, or in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale or lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession vested in the conditional vendee or lessee or in the event a mortgagor of a vehicle is entitled to possession, then such conditional vendee or lessee or mortgagor shall be deemed the owner for the purposes of this chapter;
  11. “Proof of financial responsibility” means proof of ability to respond in damages for liability, on account of accidents occurring subsequent to the effective date of said proof, arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in amounts meeting the requirements of KRS 304.39-110 ;
  12. “Registration” means registration certificates and registration plates issued under the laws of this state pertaining to the registration of motor vehicles; and
  13. “State” means any state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any province of the Dominion of Canada.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 1; 1950, ch. 190, § 7; 1966, ch. 255, § 173; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(7); 1978, ch. 349, § 6, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 194, § 3, effective July 15, 1982; 2005, ch. 140, § 1, effective June 20, 2005; 2017 ch. 157, § 2, effective June 29, 2017.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Purpose.

The liability of the company under the policy could not be avoided under narrow technical definitions because the purpose of the law is fundamentally to provide compensation for innocent persons injured through faulty operation of motor vehicles. Allen v. Canal Ins. Co., 433 S.W.2d 352, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 272 ( Ky. 1968 ).

2.Application.

KRS 186.590(2) specifically applies only to the person who signs the minor’s application and not to the owner who permits the minor to drive, therefore the owner who permits the minor to drive is not relieved of liability under KRS 186.590(2) because he carries liability insurance constituting proof of financial responsibility. Benton v. Parks' Adm'r, 272 S.W.2d 466, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1108 ( Ky. 1954 ).

3.Revocation for Nonpayment of Judgments.

The Department of Public Safety’s (now Transportation Cabinet) acts of revocation for nonpayment of judgments are reviewable in court to ascertain whether they are unlawful or unreasonable. Commonwealth Dep't of Public Safety v. Robinson, 435 S.W.2d 447, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 204 ( Ky. 1968 ).

The Department of Public Safety’s (now Transportation Cabinet) acts of revocation for nonpayment of judgments are reviewable in court to ascertain whether they are unlawful or unreasonable. Commonwealth Dep't of Public Safety v. Robinson, 435 S.W.2d 447, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 204 ( Ky. 1968 ).

4.Owner.

The operator of a rent-a-car agency is the “owner” and the insurance is required only to cover him and anyone driving the vehicle with his consent. Thomas v. Mellen, 387 S.W.2d 578, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 469 ( Ky. 1965 ).

For the purposes of the Kentucky Financial Responsibility Law the owner of a motor vehicle having legal title to it is the person in whose name the vehicle is registered. Tharp v. Security Ins. Co., 405 S.W.2d 760, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 274 ( Ky. 1966 ).

Where the purchase price for an automobile was paid and the automobile was delivered and accepted by the buyer, and the entire transaction took place in Kentucky between residents thereof, even though a bill of sale had not been executed and title had not been transferred in the clerk’s office, the buyer was the “owner” and the coverage of the seller’s insurance would not extend to the buyer. Hicks v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 455 S.W.2d 52, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 241 ( Ky. 1970 ).

5.Proof of Financial Responsibility.

Where no evidence showed policy issued by insurer ever became a motor vehicle liability policy certified as “proof of financial responsibility,” KRS 187.490(6)(a) (now repealed) did not make insurer’s liability absolute. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sinclair, 96 F. Supp. 267, 1950 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1915 (D. Ky. 1950 ).

Where a motorist is insured by an automobile liability policy complying with the provisions of this section at the time of his first accident and proof of that insurance is properly supplied to the department of public safety (now transportation cabinet), he is not required to obtain the kind of policy required in KRS 187.490 (now repealed). Hurst v. West American Ins. Co., 514 S.W.2d 186, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 291 ( Ky. 1974 ).

Where representations were made by agent of insurance company to plaintiff that the policy met the provisions of the Financial Responsibility Law such representations gave plaintiff no basis for estoppel because the policy contained a household exclusion provision where policy was not required and such provision was not contrary to the provisions of this chapter. Hurst v. West American Ins. Co., 514 S.W.2d 186, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 291 ( Ky. 1974 ).

The language in subsection (10) (now (11)) “on account of accidents occurring subsequent to the effective date of said proof” must be interpreted to mean the effective date of the insurance policy and not the date some form may have been filed. Bryan v. Bear, 560 S.W.2d 827, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 886 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (decision prior to 1978 amendment).

6.Notice and Cooperation with Insurer.

Notice to insurance company by counsel of party injured by insured 23 months after accident did not meet policy requirements where policy required notice to be given “as soon as possible” and as insured did not cooperate and give insurer adequate notice insurer was not liable for judgment against insured. Hines v. Royal Indem. Co., 141 F. Supp. 234, 1956 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3259 (D. Ky. 1956 ), aff'd, 244 F.2d 959, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 3194 (6th Cir. Ky. 1957 ).

7.Exclusion by Employer of Employees.

The financial responsibility law does not prohibit an employer from excluding from his motor vehicle liability coverage, employees who suffer bodily injury while driving the employer’s vehicle within the scope of their employment. National Union Indem. Co. v. Miniard, 310 S.W.2d 793, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Cited:

Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vanover, 506 S.W.2d 517, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 758 ( Ky. 1974 ); Department of Revenue ex rel. Carpenter v. Pullman, Inc. (Trailmobile Div.), 560 S.W.2d 18, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 875 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The department of public safety (now transportation cabinet) has neither the duty nor the authority under KRS 187.410(1) to suspend the operating privileges of a person for failure to pay a fine and court costs upon conviction for violation of a motor vehicle law. OAG 64-673 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Bonds or insurance policies, KRS 281.655 .

Proof of financial responsibility by minors under age 18, KRS 186.590 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Cooper, Uninsured Motorist Coverage — Charting the Kentucky Course, 62 Ky. L.J. 467 (1973-74).

Note, Kentucky No-Fault: An Analysis and Interpretation, 65 Ky. L.J. 466 (1976-77).

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Minors, § 30.17.

187.300. Administration of chapter — Employment of personnel — Expenses — Action to vacate order or act of cabinet.

  1. The cabinet shall administer and enforce the provisions of this chapter and may make rules and regulations necessary for its administration.
  2. The cabinet may employ additional persons, in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 18A, and incur travel, rental and other current and capital expenses necessary to accomplish the purposes of this chapter.
  3. Any person aggrieved by an order or act of the cabinet under this chapter may, within twenty (20) days after notice thereof, bring an action against the cabinet in the Circuit Court of the county in which the accident or violation of law upon which the action of the cabinet was based occurred to vacate or set aside the order or action of the cabinet on the ground that it is unlawful or unreasonable. The answer of the cabinet shall be served and filed within twenty (20) days after service of the complaint. The action shall then be at issue and stand ready for trial upon ten (10) days’ notice to either party. The answer need not deny verbatim the allegations of the complaint, but a general denial thereof on behalf of the cabinet is sufficient. The filing of the action does not suspend the order or act of the cabinet unless a stay thereof is granted by the court pending final determination of the review. Injunctive relief may also be granted by the court in the manner and upon the terms provided by law.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 2; 1966, ch. 255, § 174.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Action.
2.— Aggrieved Party’s Time for Bringing.

Where the appellant’s statement of appeal was filed 22 days after notice to her that her driver’s license was suspended, the appeal was dismissed for not having been timely filed. Commonwealth Dep't of Public Safety, 441 S.W.2d 142, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 299 ( Ky. 1969 ).

3.— Place for Bringing.

In cases of mandatory suspensions or revocations of licenses the Circuit Court is the forum in which the aggrieved party must institute his action against the Department of Revenue (now Transportation Cabinet) for relief. Commonwealth ex rel. Allphin v. Stumbo, 258 S.W.2d 910, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 892 ( Ky. 1953 ).

4.— Acts for Which Filed.

The Department of Public Safety’s (now Transportation Cabinet’s) acts of revocation under KRS 187.410(1) for nonpayment of judgments are reviewable in court to ascertain whether they are unlawful or unreasonable. Commonwealth Dep't of Public Safety v. Robinson, 435 S.W.2d 447, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 204 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Cited:

Ballow v. Reeves, 238 S.W.2d 141, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 802 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The bureau of vehicle registration has no recourse but to continue to act upon foreign judgments in accordance with the provisions of KRS 187.410(1) and may not enact a regulation requiring that any foreign judgment submitted to it be first filed in a Kentucky court and certified unsatisfied prior to performing the statutory duties under KRS 187.410(1) since such a regulation would be an attempt to confer jurisdiction on a circuit court by administrative regulation in violation of Ky. Const., § 126 (repealed) which provides that only the General Assembly may confer or change the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. OAG 75-139 .

187.310. Certified abstract of operating record of motorist.

  1. The cabinet shall, upon request, furnish any person a certified abstract of the operating record of any person subject to the provisions of KRS 187.290 to 187.620 . The abstract shall designate the motor vehicles, if any, registered in the name of the person. If there is not a record of the person being convicted of violating any law relating to the operation of a motor vehicle, or of any injury or damage caused by the person, the department shall so certify on the abstract.
  2. The certified abstract shall not include information concerning any violation of the law, injury, or damage that occurred earlier than three (3) years prior to the request. The abstracts shall not be admissible as evidence in any action for damages or criminal proceedings arising out of a motor vehicle accident. The certified abstract shall not include accident reports filed with the Department of Kentucky State Police under KRS 189.635 , and shall not include suspension orders of a student who has had his or her operator’s license, permit, or privilege to operate a motor vehicle revoked or denied for being academically deficient pursuant to KRS 159.051 if the suspension has been lifted by the reinstatement of academic eligibility pursuant to KRS 159.051 . The cabinet shall not furnish to any person the accident report of a driver other than himself or herself. This section shall in no way preclude the right of any court of law, law enforcement officer, or attorney representing the individual affected from securing full and complete information concerning the record of that individual.
  3. Insurance companies issuing motor vehicle policies in the Commonwealth shall be prohibited from raising a policyholder’s rates solely because the policyholder has a dependent whose license has been revoked or denied for being academically deficient pursuant to KRS 159.051 .

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 3; 1978, ch. 83, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 50, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1994, ch. 34, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2007, ch. 85, § 208, effective June 26, 2007.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A person’s driving history will contain records of his traffic offenses and of his reported accidents and these records are subject to public inspection. OAG 77-191 .

One may review the driving records of specific individuals where these records go beyond three years but less than the five-year time limit expressed by the General Assembly; however, this review excludes records of violations prohibited by this section. OAG 89-78 .

187.320. Report of accident — Failure to report. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 4; 1952, ch. 151, § 1; 1966, ch. 255, § 175; 1972, ch. 64, § 1; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(7)) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 83, § 3, effective June 17, 1978 and 1978, ch. 434, § 9, effective June 17, 1978.

187.330. Security required following accident — Effect of failure to deposit — Bond or policy as security. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 5; 1954, ch. 152, § 1; 1962, ch. 164) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 385, § 35, effective July 1, 1975. For present law see no-fault insurance provisions of KRS 304.39-010 to 304.39-340 .

187.340. Exceptions to requirement of security or suspension. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 385, § 35, effective July 1, 1975. For present law see no-fault insurance provisions of KRS 304.39-010 to 304.39-340 .

187.350. Duration of suspension. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 385, § 35, effective July 1, 1975. For present law see no-fault insurance provisions of KRS 304.39-010 to 304.39-340 .

187.360. Unlicensed drivers of unregistered vehicles. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 385, § 35, effective July 1, 1975. For present law see no-fault insurance provisions of KRS 304.39-010 to 304.39-340 .

187.370. Form and amount of security — Reduction of amount. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 385, § 35, effective July 1, 1975. For present law see no-fault insurance provisions of KRS 304.39-010 to 304.39-340 .

187.380. Custody, application or return of security. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 385, § 35, effective July 1, 1975. For present law see no-fault insurance provisions of KRS 304.39-010 to 304.39-340 .

187.390. Matters not to be evidence in civil action for damages. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 385, § 35, effective July 1, 1975. For present law see no-fault insurance provisions of KRS 304.39-010 to 304.39-340 .

187.400. Courts to report on unpaid judgments and convictions.

  1. Whenever any person fails within sixty (60) days to satisfy any judgment, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court in which any such judgment is rendered within this state to forward to the cabinet immediately after the expiration of said sixty (60) days a certified copy of such judgment. If the defendant named in any certified copy of a judgment reported to the cabinet is a nonresident, the cabinet shall transmit a certified copy of the judgment to the official in charge of the issuance of licenses and registration certificates of the state of which the defendant is a resident.
  2. The clerk of the court in which any conviction for violation of a motor vehicle law is rendered, or in which a person charged with violation of a motor vehicle law has pleaded guilty or forfeited bail, shall forward immediately to the cabinet a certified copy of the judgment, order or record of other action of the court. This copy shall be prima facie evidence of the conviction, plea or other action stated.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 12; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 176, effective January 2, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Department of Public Safety (now Transportation Cabinet) has neither the duty nor the authority under KRS 187.410(1) to suspend the operating privileges of a person for failure to pay a fine and court costs upon conviction for violation of a motor vehicle law. OAG 64-673 .

187.410. Suspension for nonpayment of judgment — Exception.

  1. Upon the receipt of a certified copy of a judgment, the cabinet shall forthwith suspend (except as provided in KRS 187.440 ) the license and registration and the nonresident’s operating privilege of any person against whom such judgment was rendered.
  2. If the judgment creditor consents in writing, in such form as the cabinet may prescribe, that the judgment debtor be allowed license and registration or nonresident’s operating privilege, the same may be allowed by the cabinet, in its discretion, for six (6) months from the date of such consent and thereafter until such consent is revoked in writing, notwithstanding default in the payment of such judgment, or of any installments thereof prescribed in KRS 187.440 .

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 13; 1978, ch. 434, § 4, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

Plaintiffs’ constitutional attack of this section was found to be without merit. Black v. Gray, 410 F. Supp. 1242, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14129 (W.D. Ky. 1975 ).

2.Compliance with Requirements.

A motor vehicle operator’s license may not be revoked or suspended if the operator had insurance which complied with the requirements of this law, at the time the liability arose. Commonwealth Dep't of Public Safety v. Nelson, 435 S.W.2d 449, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 205 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Where the defendant had complied with the standards required, it was unlawful and unreasonable to revoke or suspend his license or registrations. Commonwealth Dep't of Public Safety v. Robinson, 435 S.W.2d 447, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 204 ( Ky. 1968 ).

3.Subsequent Insolvency of Insurance Carrier.

Where at the time of the accident the defendant’s insurance coverage was in excess of the coverage required by the financial responsibility law and her insurance carrier subsequently became insolvent, the defendant had complied with the law and a suspension or revocation of her operator’s license was unlawful and unreasonable. Commonwealth Dep't of Public Safety v. Nelson, 435 S.W.2d 449, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 205 ( Ky. 1968 ).

4.Revocation Reviewable in Court.

The Department of Public Safety’s (now Transportation Cabinet’s) acts of revocation for nonpayment of judgments are reviewable in court to ascertain whether they are unlawful or unreasonable. Commonwealth Dep't of Public Safety v. Robinson, 435 S.W.2d 447, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 204 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Department of Public Safety (now Transportation Cabinet) has neither the duty nor the authority under this section to suspend the operating privileges of a person for failure to pay a fine and court costs upon conviction for violation of a motor vehicle law. OAG 64-673 .

Under subsection (1) of this section, the Department (now Cabinet) must suspend both the operator’s license and the motor vehicle registrations of any person against whom a judgment for damages is rendered as a result of a motor vehicle accident, whether such person was the operator of the vehicle, the owner of the vehicle, or both. OAG 69-652 .

A judgment debtor may have his license restored if his creditor consents in writing and the other requirements of this section are met. OAG 72-417 .

Neither this section nor KRS 187.440 provide for the return of an operator’s license upon an order of satisfaction of judgment entered by the appropriate court. OAG 72-417 .

The Bureau (now Department) of Vehicle Regulation has no recourse but to continue to act upon foreign judgments in accordance with the provisions of this section and may not enact a regulation requiring that any foreign judgment submitted to it be first filed in a Kentucky court and certified unsatisfied prior to performing the statutory duties under this section since such a regulation would be an attempt to confer jurisdiction upon a circuit court by administrative regulation in violation of Ky. Const., § 126 (repealed) which provides that only the General Assembly may confer or change the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. OAG 75-139 .

Acts 1978, Chapter 434 as enrolled (without house amendment number 6) and signed by the presiding officers of both Houses and which became law without the Governor’s signature represents the law on the question as enacted at the 1978 General Assembly. OAG 78-283 .

187.420. Duration of suspension.

Such license, registration and nonresident’s operating privilege shall (except as provided in KRS 187.440 ) remain so suspended and shall not be renewed, nor shall any such license or registration be thereafter issued in the name of such person, including any such person not previously licensed, unless and until every such judgment is stayed, satisfied or discharged.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 14; 1978, ch. 434, § 5, effective June 17, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Department of Public Safety (now Transportation Cabinet) has neither the duty nor the authority under KRS 187.410(1) to suspend the operating privileges of a person for failure to pay a fine and court costs upon conviction for violation of a motor vehicle law. OAG 64-673 .

Given the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Perez v. Campbell (1971), 402 U.S. 637, 91 Sup. Ct. 1704, 29 L. Ed. 2d 233, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 127, which held that a state statute could not frustrate the purposes of the federal bankruptcy laws which include giving a debtor a new opportunity in life, the Department of Public Safety (now Transportation Cabinet) may not suspend a bankrupt judgment debtor’s driver’s license. OAG 72-755 .

Acts 1978, Chapter 434 as enrolled (without house amendment number 6) and signed by the presiding officers of both Houses and which became law without the Governor’s signature represents the law on the question as enacted at the 1978 General Assembly. OAG 78-283 .

187.430. What constitutes satisfaction of judgment.

Judgments in excess of the amounts specified in KRS 187.290 (11) shall, for the purpose of KRS 187.290 to 187.620 , be deemed satisfied when payments in the amount so specified have been credited thereon; provided, however, payments made in settlement of any claims because of bodily injury, death or property damage arising from a motor vehicle accident shall be credited in reduction of the respective amounts so specified.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 15.

187.440. Installment payment of judgment — Default.

  1. A judgment debtor upon due notice to the judgment creditor may apply to the court in which such judgment was rendered for the privilege of paying such judgment in installments and the court, in its discretion and without prejudice to any other legal remedies which the judgment creditor may have, may so order and fix the amounts and times of payment of the installments.
  2. The cabinet shall not suspend a license, registration or a nonresident’s operating privilege, and shall restore any license, registration or nonresident’s operating privilege suspended following nonpayment of a judgment, when the judgment debtor gives proof of financial responsibility and obtains such an order permitting the payment of such judgment in installments, and while the payment of any said installment is not in default.
  3. In the event the judgment debtor fails to pay any installment as specified by such order, then upon notice of such default, the cabinet shall forthwith suspend the license, registration or nonresident’s operating privilege of the judgment debtor until such judgment is satisfied as provided in KRS 187.290 to 187.620 .

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 16.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Black v. Gray, 410 F. Supp. 1242, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14129 (W.D. Ky. 1975 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Neither this section nor KRS 187.410 provide for the return of an operator’s license upon an order of satisfaction of judgment entered by the appropriate court. OAG 72-417 .

If consent of the judgment creditor is not obtained under KRS 187.410 , the judgment debtor may seek relief under this section. OAG 72-417 .

187.450. Proof of financial responsibility required upon certain convictions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 17; 1968, ch. 127, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 303, § 1.

187.460. Methods of giving proof. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 18) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 303, § 1.

187.470. Certificate of insurance proof. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 19) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 303, § 1.

187.480. Certificate of insurance from nonresident. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 20) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 303, § 1.

187.490. Motor vehicle liability policy — Definitions — Requirements — Coverage — Implied provisions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 21; 1966, ch. 255, § 176) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 434, § 9, effective June 17, 1978.

187.500. Notice of cancellation or termination of certified policy. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 22) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 434, § 9, effective June 17, 1978.

187.510. Other automobile insurance policies not affected. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 23) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 434, § 9, effective June 17, 1978.

187.520. Surety or real estate bond as proof — Lien — Action on. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 24) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 434, § 9, effective June 17, 1978.

187.530. Cash or securities required as proof. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 25; 1966, ch. 255, § 177) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 434, § 9, effective June 17, 1978.

187.540. Owner may give proof for operator. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 26) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 434, § 9, effective June 17, 1978.

187.550. Substitution of proof. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 27) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 434, § 9, effective June 17, 1978.

187.560. Department may require further proof. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 28) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 434, § 9, effective June 17, 1978.

187.570. Circumstances authorizing cancellation or termination of certified policy. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 29) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 434, § 9, effective June 17, 1978.

187.580. Transfer or reregistration of suspended registration.

If an owner’s registration has been suspended hereunder, such registration shall not be transferred nor the motor vehicle in respect of which such registration was issued registered in any other name until the cabinet is satisfied that such transfer of registration is proposed in good faith and not for the purpose or with the effect of defeating the purposes of KRS 187.290 to 187.620 . Nothing in this section shall be held to apply to or affect the registration of any motor vehicle sold by a person who, pursuant to the terms or conditions of any written instrument giving a right of repossession, has exercised such right and has repossessed such motor vehicle from a person whose registration has been suspended under the provisions of KRS 187.290 to 187.620 .

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 30.

187.590. Surrender of license and registration certificates.

Any person whose license or registration shall have been suspended as provided in KRS 187.290 to 187.620 , or whose policy of insurance or bond, when required under KRS 187.290 to 187.620 , shall have been canceled or terminated, or who shall neglect to furnish other proof upon request of the cabinet shall immediately return his license and registration to the cabinet. If any person shall fail to return to the cabinet the license or registration as provided herein, the cabinet shall forthwith direct any peace officer to secure possession thereof and return the same to the cabinet.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 31.

187.600. Self-insurance.

  1. Any person in whose name more than twenty-five (25) motor vehicles are registered may qualify as a self-insurer by obtaining a certificate of self-insurance issued by the cabinet as provided in subsection (2) of this section.
  2. The cabinet may, in its discretion, upon the application of such a person, issue a certificate of self-insurance when it is satisfied that the person is possessed and will continue to be possessed of ability to pay judgments obtained against the person.
  3. The cabinet may upon reasonable grounds cancel a certificate of self-insurance subject to the certificate holder being afforded the opportunity for a hearing to be conducted in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B. Failure to pay any judgment within thirty (30) days after the judgment becomes final constitutes a reasonable ground for the cancellation of a certificate of self-insurance.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 34; 1996, ch. 318, § 74, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Owner of Leased Automobiles.

The owner of leased automobiles is not engaged in the insurance business when he procures a certificate of self-insurance from the Department of Revenue (now Revenue Cabinet) in lieu of a liability insurance policy. Reeves v. Wright & Taylor, 310 Ky. 470 , 220 S.W.2d 1007, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 950 ( Ky. 1949 ).

2.U-Drive-It Business.

All persons engaged in the U-Drive-It business regardless of the number of motor vehicles owned and rented may apply for a certificate of self-insurance and are not limited to the procurement of an insurance policy as provided for in this section. Reeves v. Wright & Taylor, 310 Ky. 470 , 220 S.W.2d 1007, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 950 ( Ky. 1949 ).

187.610. Government-owned vehicles.

KRS 187.290 to 187.620 shall not apply with respect to any motor vehicle owned by the United States, this state or any political subdivision of this state or any municipality therein; nor with respect to any motor vehicle which is subject to the requirements of KRS Chapter 281.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 33; 1980, ch. 188, § 143, effective July 15, 1980.

187.620. Chapter is supplemental.

  1. KRS 187.290 to 187.620 shall in no respect be considered as a repeal of any other state motor vehicle laws but shall be construed as supplemental thereto.
  2. Nothing in KRS 187.290 to 187.620 shall be construed as preventing the plaintiff in any action at law from relying for relief upon the other processes provided by law.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, §§ 35, 37.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Motor vehicle liability insurance — Conditions, KRS 164.287 .

187.630. Date of application of chapter — Former statutes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, §§ 35(1), 36, 40) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 210, § 50.

187.640. Insurance covering operation of rented vehicles. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 51, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1956 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 70, § 20.

187.650. Insurance policy to show that public liability insurance not included.

Whenever an automobile dealer or bank or other lending institution which handles automobile loans procures a policy of insurance for the purchaser of an automobile, new or used, if such policy does not cover the insured as to public liability insurance, then such person or institution shall cause to be stamped or written on the face of the purchaser’s copy of such policy a statement that such policy does not cover bodily injury or property damage insurance.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 148, § 1, effective June 17, 1954.

187.990. Penalties.

  1. Any person whose license or registration or nonresident’s operating privilege has been suspended or revoked under KRS 187.290 to 187.620 and who, during such suspension or revocation drives any motor vehicle upon any highway or knowingly permits any motor vehicle owned by such person to be operated by another upon any highway, except as permitted under KRS 187.290 to 187.620 , shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or imprisoned not exceeding six (6) months, or both.
  2. Any person willfully failing to return license or registration as required in KRS 187.590 shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or imprisoned not to exceed thirty (30) days, or both.
  3. Any person who shall forge or, without authority, sign any evidence of proof of financial responsibility, or who files or offers for filing any such notice or evidence of proof knowing or having reason to believe that it is forged or signed without authority, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or imprisoned not more than one (1) year, or both.
  4. Any person who shall violate any provision of KRS 187.290 to 187.620 for which no penalty is otherwise provided shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or imprisoned not more than ninety (90) days, or both.
  5. Any person who shall violate the provisions of KRS 187.650 shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars ($100) or imprisoned not more than thirty (30) days, or both.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 32; 1954, ch. 148, § 2; amend. Acts 1962, ch. 210, § 26.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former section 187.990 (2739n-24, 2739n-28, 2739n-29) was repealed by Acts 1946, ch. 118, § 35.

Former subsec. (5) enacted in Acts 1954, ch. 148, § 2 was deleted by Acts 1962, ch. 210, § 26.

Former subsec. (6) was renumbered as subsec. (5) in Acts 1962, ch. 210, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Reeves v. Wright & Taylor, 310 Ky. 470 , 220 S.W.2d 1007, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 950 ( Ky. 1949 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Note, Kentucky No-Fault: An Analysis and Interpretation, 65 Ky. L.J. 466 (1976-77).

CHAPTER 188 Service of Process on Nonresident Motorists

188.010. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Motor vehicles” means all motor propelled vehicles, except electric and steam railways.
  2. “Public highway” means every street, road or highway in this state.

History. 12-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

This chapter providing for substituted service on nonresidents for accidents occurring on either public or private roads is constitutional as an exercise of police power. Stout v. Sutton, 434 S.W.2d 316, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 231 ( Ky. 1968 ).

2.Application.

Where it was unclear whether accident arose on a public highway and how the defendants were using the highway at the time of the accident, defendant’s motion to strike on ground that service upon nonresidents by delivery of service of summons to secretary of state was improper because accident did not arise out of use of public highway and should not be granted without clarification of the facts as to the nature of the highway and in what manner and under what circumstances it was being used by the defendant at the time of the accident. Thorpe v. W. L. Harper Co., 224 F. Supp. 222, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6421 (E.D. Ky. 1963 ).

3.Correct Address Mandatory.

It is mandatory under this chapter that plaintiff furnish the Secretary of State the defendant’s correct address. Hertz' You Drive It Yourself System, Inc. v. Castle, 317 S.W.2d 177, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 81 ( Ky. 1958 ).

4.Service Not Constructive Service.

The manner of service of process on nonresidents in automobile accident cases is authorized and justified on the proposition that nonresidents using the highways consent to the Constitution of the Secretary of State as their agent for the service of process and such service is not constructive service under CR 4.10 allowing constructively summoned nonresidents some grace in the presentation of their defense. Tankersley v. Gilkey, 414 S.W.2d 589, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 363 ( Ky. 1967 ).

5.Amending Pleadings to Correct Address.

Where summons was served according to KRS, Chapter 188 on the Secretary of State who sent a registered letter to the address given in the petition duly filed within the one year statutory period and the letter was returned marked “no such post office in the state named,” and was filed with the papers in the case and the address given in the petition was obtained from the state highway patrol and an amended petition setting out correct address was filed and upon summons being served on Secretary of State notification was duly made by registered letter, the facts failed to show that first summons was not filed in good faith and the one year statute of limitations was not a bar to the action. Hausman's Adm'r v. Poehlman, 314 Ky. 453 , 236 S.W.2d 259, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 674 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Cited:

Heath v. Commonwealth, 761 S.W.2d 630, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 160 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Moreland, Conflict of Laws — A Rationale of Jurisdiction — Service of Process, VII Service of Process, A. Service of Process in Suits Between Litigants Present Within the State, 2. Substituted Personal Service, 56 Ky. L.J. 629 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey: Cooper, Civil Procedure, 66 Ky. L.J. 531 (1977-1978).

188.020. Nonresident owner or operator of motor vehicle makes Secretary of State process agent.

Any nonresident operator or owner of any motor vehicle who accepts the privilege extended by the laws of this state to nonresidents to operate motor vehicles or have them operated within state shall, by such acceptance and by the operation of such motor vehicle within this state, make the Secretary of State the agent of himself or his personal representative for the service of process in any civil action instituted in the courts of this state against the operator or owner, or the personal representative of the operator or owner, arising out of or by reason of any accident or collision or damage occurring within this state in which the motor vehicle is involved.

History. 12-1: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 22, § 1; 1960, ch. 119, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

This Chapter providing for substituted service on nonresidents for accidents occurring on either public or private roads is constitutional as an exercise of police power. Stout v. Sutton, 434 S.W.2d 316, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 231 ( Ky. 1968 ).

2.Purpose.

Court may judicially notice that purpose of nonresident motorists law was to encourage greater care in operation of cars by nonresidents, and to give effective civil remedy against them comparable to that against residents. Kentucky use of Kern v. Maryland Casualty Co., 112 F.2d 352, 1940 U.S. App. LEXIS 4296 (6th Cir. Ky. 1940 ).

The obvious purpose of the amendment to this section to include the personal representative of the operator or owner was to make the personal representative subject to process the same as provided in respect to the operator of the motor vehicle. Parrott v. Whisler, 313 F.2d 245, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 6179 (6th Cir. Ky. 1963 ).

3.Construction.

Constructive service upon nonresident is in derogation of the common law, and the statute providing for it should be strictly construed and should not be extended by implication to include persons not clearly coming within its terms. Kentucky use of Kern v. Maryland Casualty Co., 112 F.2d 352, 1940 U.S. App. LEXIS 4296 (6th Cir. Ky. 1940 ).

This statute is only a process statute. Kenneay v. Lee, 272 Ky. 237 , 113 S.W.2d 1125, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 89 (Ky. Ct. App. 1938).

4.Application.

The fact that a nonresident motorist who comes into Kentucky can, consistent with the due process clause of the 14th amendment, be subjected to suit in the appropriate Kentucky state court has nothing whatever to do with his rights under 28 USCS § 1391(a) and service of process could not be made under this section by a nonresident against a nonresident in a federal court action for damages arising from an accident in Kentucky. Olberding v. Illinois C. R. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 74 S. Ct. 83, 98 L. Ed. 39, 1953 U.S. LEXIS 1549 (U.S. 1953).

Where nonresident owner authorized other nonresident to use automobile, and other nonresident permitted her nephew to take and operate it, and he had accident in Kentucky, other nonresident could not be served pursuant to this section, not being owner of car and car not being operated by her agent. Kentucky use of Kern v. Maryland Casualty Co., 112 F.2d 352, 1940 U.S. App. LEXIS 4296 (6th Cir. Ky. 1940 ).

Where the automobile collision occurred in Tennessee, and not on a highway in Kentucky, it is clear that the defendant cannot be brought before a court in this state by substituted or constructive process, and is, consequently, not properly before the court. Raleigh v. Dixie Ohio Express, 26 F.R.D. 624, 1960 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5395 (D. Ky. 1960 ).

This section which was to relieve injured person of hardship of following nonresident motorist into other jurisdiction, applies to nonresident having Kentucky license, and not merely to nonresident temporarily in state and operating under Reciprocity Law. Mann v. Humphrey's Adm'x, 257 Ky. 647 , 79 S.W.2d 17, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 85 ( Ky. 1935 ).

A plaintiff under this section need not be one whose right to sue is not statutory. It may be based on an implied contract and service can be had under this section upon the nonresident defendant in an action against him for contribution. Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Myers, 288 Ky. 337 , 156 S.W.2d 161, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 104 ( Ky. 1941 ).

This statute does not operate to domesticate both the plaintiff and the defendant in an action arising out of an automobile accident, and therefore does not authorize a foreign administrator to bring suit in Kentucky for the death of a nonresident decedent. Vassill's Adm'r v. Scarsella, 292 Ky. 153 , 166 S.W.2d 64, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 56 ( Ky. 1942 ).

The nonresident motorists law encompasses operation of motor vehicles anywhere within this state either on or off public highways. Stout v. Sutton, 434 S.W.2d 316, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 231 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Although the estate served its initial complaint on the Secretary of State’s office, such service was subject to Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 454.210(3)(c), under which an additional mailing to the nonresident defendant was required, implicating the provisions of the Hague Convention; thus, the estate was obligated to comply with the Hague Convention to effect complete service on the nonresident defendant, and since it did not, the trial court properly quashed the initial service of process on him. Savage v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2021 Ky. App. LEXIS 8 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2021).

5.Motor Vehicle.
6.— Airplane Not Included.

As used in this section the term “motor vehicle” does not include an airplane and this section does not authorize the service of process of nonresident representative of a deceased nonresident plane operator in a negligence case based on a plane crash in Kentucky. First Bank & Trust Co. v. Feuquay, 405 F.2d 990, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 9423 (6th Cir. Ky. 1969 ).

7.— Operation.

An accident which occurred during the unloading resulted from the operation of the truck. Stout v. Sutton, 434 S.W.2d 316, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 231 ( Ky. 1968 ).

A motor vehicle is definitely involved when an accident occurs during loading or unloading. Stout v. Sutton, 434 S.W.2d 316, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 231 ( Ky. 1968 ).

8.Service of Process.
9.— Designation of Agent for.

Use by nonresident of the highways of state is voluntary and valid designation by him of Secretary of State as his agent for service of process. Carby v. Greco, 31 F. Supp. 251, 1940 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3574 (D. Ky. 1940 ).

Under power to regulate use of highways by nonresidents, state may declare that such use be treated as equivalent to appointment of state official as agent to receive process in suits growing out of accidents in such use, provided statute contains provision making it reasonably probable that notice will be sent to person sued. Hirsch v. Warren, 253 Ky. 62 , 68 S.W.2d 767, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 602 ( Ky. 1934 ).

The Secretary of State is not a general representative of the defendant, but an agent for one limited purpose, service of process. Staples v. Southern Fire & Casualty Co., 289 S.W.2d 512, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 289 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956).

10.— Against Nonresident Personal Representative.

An action against a nonresident motorist, on whom process has been served pursuant to this section and KRS 188.030 , cannot be revived against his foreign personal representative. Riggs v. Schneider's Ex'r, 279 Ky. 361 , 130 S.W.2d 816, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 291 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decision prior to 1954 amendment).

This section providing for service of summons upon the Secretary of State as agent for a nonresident personal representative of a decedent motorist is valid within the due process clause of the Constitution. Williams v. Carter Bros. Co., 390 S.W.2d 873, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 371 ( Ky. 1965 ).

A suit may be maintained against a nonresident personal representative of a nonresident decedent and service of summons upon the Secretary of State against such personal representative is valid. Williams v. Carter Bros. Co., 390 S.W.2d 873, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 371 ( Ky. 1965 ).

11.— Nature of.

A defendant summoned by service on the Secretary of State is on a parity with a defendant actually summoned within the state. Riggs v. Schneider's Ex'r, 279 Ky. 361 , 130 S.W.2d 816, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 291 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Cited:

Lied Motor Car Co. v. Maxey, 208 F.2d 672, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 3087 (6th Cir. 1953); Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2603 (D. Iowa 1947); Strom v. Anderson, 114 F. Supp. 767, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4075 (D.N.Y. 1953); Imus v. Hemingway Bros. Interstate Trucking Co., 128 F. Supp. 278, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2316 (D. Conn. 1954); Sigler v. Youngblood Truck Lines, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 61, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3823 (D. Tenn. 1957); Goodman v. Columbia Steel & Shafting Co., 171 F. Supp. 718, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3645 (D. Pa. 1959); Brandt v. Olson, 179 F. Supp. 363, 1959 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2384 (N.D. Iowa 1959); Reed v. Charizio, 183 F. Supp. 52, 1960 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2890 (E.D. Va. 1960); Holbrook v. Cafiero, 18 F.R.D. 218, 1955 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4094 (D. Md. 1955).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Salmon, Constitutional Law — Equal Protection of the Laws — Venue Statutes Distinguishing Between Residents and Nonresidents, 26 Ky. L.J. 258 (1938).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Philipps, The Kentucky Long Arm Statute: How “Long” Is It?, 4 N. Ky. L. Rev. 65 (1977).

188.030. Service of summons and complaint in action against nonresident motorist.

The clerk of the court in which the action is brought shall issue a summons against the defendant named in the complaint and direct it to the sheriff of Franklin County. The sheriff shall execute the summons by delivering two (2) true copies to the Secretary of State and shall also deliver with each summons an attested copy of plaintiff’s complaint. The Secretary of State shall immediately mail a copy of the summons and complaint to the defendant at the address given in the complaint. The letter shall be posted by prepaid certified mail, return receipt requested, and shall bear the return address of the Secretary of State. The sheriff shall make the usual return to the court, and in addition the Secretary of State shall make a return to the court showing that the acts contemplated by this statute have been performed, and shall attach to his return the registry receipt, if any. Summons shall be deemed to be served on the return of the Secretary of State and the action shall proceed as provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure.

History. 12-2: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 64; 1972, ch. 307, § 1; 1974, ch. 315, § 25; 1980, ch. 114, § 34, effective July 15, 1980; 1988, ch. 185, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Accident in Kentucky Mandatory.

Where the automobile collision occurred in Tennessee, and not on a highway in Kentucky, it is clear that the defendant cannot be brought before a court in this state by substituted or constructive process and is, consequently, not properly before this court. Raleigh v. Dixie Ohio Express, 26 F.R.D. 624, 1960 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5395 (D. Ky. 1960 ).

2.Venue.

Nonresident motorists law authorizes commencement of action in county where accident occurred by substituted service of process, where both plaintiff and defendant are nonresidents and reside in some foreign state. Hoagland v. Dolan, 259 Ky. 1 , 81 S.W.2d 869, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 262 ( Ky. 1 935).

Action against nonresident for automobile collision could only be brought in county where collision occurred, under law requiring actions for injuries to persons or property to be brought in county where defendant resides or where injury is done. Kennedy v. Lee, 272 Ky. 237 , 113 S.W.2d 1125 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Service of summons should be quashed as to nonresident motorist served pursuant to this section, where action was instituted in Circuit Court of county other than one where injury was done and process was issued by clerk of that court. Kennedy v. Lee, 272 Ky. 237 , 113 S.W.2d 1125 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Where action against nonresident motorist was brought in county of plaintiff’s residence, instead of county where accident occurred, motion of defendant to quash process and to quash the return thereon sufficiently raised the question of venue, and justified dismissal of the action by the lower court, although basis for motion to quash was alleged irregularity in issuance and service of process. Turner v. Manos, 291 Ky. 431 , 164 S.W.2d 962, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 249 ( Ky. 1942 ).

3.Service.

The Secretary of State need not actually succeed in notifying nonresident defendant, provided all details of the statute have been complied with, assuming plaintiff has stated in petition the correct address of defendant and is not guilty of fraud or bad faith. Morris v. Argo-Collier Truck Line, 39 F. Supp. 602, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3000 (D. Ky. 1941 ).

This section requiring Secretary of State to write letter to defendant “at the address given in the petition” was not invalid as not making it reasonably probable that notice of suit would be communicated to defendant, in view of plaintiff’s duty and interest to give correct address. Hirsch v. Warren, 253 Ky. 62 , 68 S.W.2d 767, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 602 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Service of summons on nonresident motorist should not be quashed where defect suggested was that copy of petition served was not stated to be attested; presumption that officers did duty by serving attested copy not being overcome by failure of sheriff’s return and of Secretary of State’s letter to state that copy was attested. Fischer v. Eby, 272 Ky. 545 , 114 S.W.2d 763, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 156 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Where court’s jurisdiction over person of nonresident motorist, who was the defendant in a damage suit, depended upon substituted service of process, failure of plaintiff’s petition to set out either the present or the last known address of the defendant resulted in failure to comply sufficiently with the law authorizing substituted service, and a personal judgment by default, rendered against the defendant, was void. Odley v. Wilson, 309 Ky. 507 , 218 S.W.2d 17, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 733 ( Ky. 1949 ).

Where “Deliver to Addressee Only” was stamped on the envelope this went beyond the terms of this section and default judgment based on it could not stand. White v. Jayne, 313 Ky. 160 , 230 S.W.2d 429, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 811 ( Ky. 1950 ).

In an action arising out of a traffic accident where two addresses, one in-state and one out-of-state, are given in the state police officer’s report, a plaintiff who seeks to invoke the provisions of this section is required to direct summons to the local address as well as to the out-of-state address. Begley v. Kilburn, 545 S.W.2d 926, 1976 Ky. LEXIS 120 ( Ky. 1976 ).

4.— In Federal Court Action.

In action in U.S. District Court for Western District of Kentucky, summons issued by clerk of that court, sent to U.S. Marshal in Eastern District and served upon Secretary of State at Frankfort in Eastern District, was not duly served, since civil process of federal district courts does not run, and is not servable, outside district where issued. Carby v. Greco, 31 F. Supp. 251, 1940 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3574 (D. Ky. 1940 ).

5.Personal Judgment.

Use of highways of state being equivalent to appointment of Secretary of State as nonresident motorist’s agent to receive service of process in accident cases, where process is served pursuant to act, personal judgment is recoverable against nonresident motorist. Mann v. Humphrey's Adm'x, 257 Ky. 647 , 79 S.W.2d 17, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 85 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Cited:

Olberding v. Illinois C. R. Co., 201 F.2d 582, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 2334 (6th Cir. 1953), rev’d, 346 U.S. 338, 74 S. Ct. 83, 98 L. Ed. 39, 1953 U.S. LEXIS 1549 (1953); Lied Motor Car Co. v. Maxey, 208 F.2d 672, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 3087 (6th Cir. 1953); Imus v. Hemingway Bros. Interstate Trucking Co., 128 F. Supp. 278, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2316 (D. Conn. 1954); Weaver v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 6 Ohio Op. 2d 267, 160 F. Supp. 621, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2532 (D. Ohio 1958); Thorpe v. W. L. Harper Co., 224 F. Supp. 222, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6421 (E.D. Ky. 1963 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Venue of action, KRS 452.460 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Salmon, Constitutional Law — Equal Protection of the Laws — Venue Statutes Distinguishing Between Residents and Non-Residents, 26 Ky. L.J. 258 (1938).

Childs, An Evaluation of the Techniques of Acquiring Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents not Engaged in Business When a Single Commercial Transaction Has Been Breached. 38 Ky. L.J. 207 (1949).

Fortune, Venue of Civil Actions in Kentucky, 60 Ky. L.J. 497 (1971).

Kentucky Law Survey: Cooper, Civil Procedure, 66 Ky. L.J. 531 (1977-1978).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Service of Process (Long-Arm Statute or Rule), § 36.00.

188.040. Fee of Secretary of State — Records.

The sheriff serving the summons upon the Secretary of State shall pay to him, at the time of service, a fee of ten dollars ($10), which shall be taxed as costs in the action. The Secretary shall keep a record of each summons, including the day and hour of service upon him.

History. 12-3: amend. Acts 1986, ch. 204, § 1, effective July 15, 1986.

188.050. Continuances.

The court in which the action is pending may order such continuances as may be necessary to afford the defendant reasonable opportunity to appear and defend the action.

History. 12-4.

188.060. Other methods of serving process not affected.

This chapter extends the right of service of process upon nonresidents, and does not limit any other provisions for the service of process.

History. 12-5.

188.070. Application of process provisions to resident becoming nonresident.

The provisions of KRS 188.010 to 188.060 shall apply to any operator or owner of any motor vehicle who is a resident of this state at the time any accident or collision or damage occurs and who thereafter becomes a nonresident.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 22, § 2; 1960, ch. 119, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Johnson v. Smith, 551 S.W.2d 834, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 712 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

CHAPTER 189 Traffic Regulations — Vehicle Equipment and Storage

189.010. Definitions for chapter.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Department” means the Department of Highways;
  2. “Crosswalk” means:
    1. That part of a roadway at an intersection within the connections of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of the highway measured from the curbs or in the absence of curbs, from the edges of the traversable roadway; or
    2. Any portion of a roadway at an intersection or elsewhere distinctly indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or other markings on the surface;
  3. “Highway” means any public road, street, avenue, alley or boulevard, bridge, viaduct, or trestle and the approaches to them and includes private residential roads and parking lots covered by an agreement under KRS 61.362 , off-street parking facilities offered for public use, whether publicly or privately owned, except for-hire parking facilities listed in KRS 189.700 ;
  4. “Intersection” means:
    1. The area embraced within the prolongation or connection of the lateral curb lines, or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines of the roadways of two (2) highways which join one another, but do not necessarily continue, at approximately right angles, or the area within which vehicles traveling upon different highways joining at any other angle may come into conflict; or
    2. Where a highway includes two (2) roadways thirty (30) feet or more apart, then every crossing of each roadway of such divided highway by an intersecting highway shall be regarded as a separate intersection. If the intersecting highway also includes two (2) roadways thirty (30) feet or more apart, every crossing of two (2) roadways of the highways shall be regarded as a separate intersection. The junction of a private alley with a public street or highway shall not constitute an intersection;
  5. “Manufactured home” has the same meaning as defined in KRS 186.650 ;
  6. “Motor truck” means any motor-propelled vehicle designed for carrying freight or merchandise. It shall not include self-propelled vehicles designed primarily for passenger transportation but equipped with frames, racks, or bodies having a load capacity of not exceeding one thousand (1,000) pounds;
  7. “Operator” means the person in actual physical control of a vehicle;
  8. “Pedestrian” means any person afoot or in a wheelchair;
  9. “Right-of-way” means the right of one (1) vehicle or pedestrian to proceed in a lawful manner in preference to another vehicle or pedestrian approaching under such circumstances of direction, speed, and proximity as to give rise to danger of collision unless one grants precedence to the other;
  10. “Roadway” means that portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the berm or shoulder. If a highway includes two (2) or more separate roadways, the term “roadway” as used herein shall refer to any roadway separately but not to all such roadways collectively;
  11. “Safety zone” means the area or space officially set apart within a roadway for the exclusive use of pedestrians and which is protected or is so marked or indicated by adequate signs as to be plainly visible at all times while set apart as a safety zone;
  12. “Semitrailer” means a vehicle designed to be attached to, and having its front end supported by, a motor truck or truck tractor, intended for the carrying of freight or merchandise and having a load capacity of over one thousand (1,000) pounds;
  13. “Truck tractor” means any motor-propelled vehicle designed to draw and to support the front end of a semitrailer. The semitrailer and the truck tractor shall be considered to be one (1) unit;
  14. “Sharp curve” means a curve of not less than thirty (30) degrees;
  15. “State Police” includes any agency for the enforcement of the highway laws established pursuant to law;
  16. “Steep grade” means a grade exceeding seven percent (7%);
  17. “Trailer” means any vehicle designed to be drawn by a motor truck or truck-tractor, but supported wholly upon its own wheels, intended for the carriage of freight or merchandise and having a load capacity of over one thousand (1,000) pounds;
  18. “Unobstructed highway” means a straight, level, first-class road upon which no other vehicle is passing or attempting to pass and upon which no other vehicle or pedestrian is approaching in the opposite direction, closer than three hundred (300) yards;
    1. “Vehicle” includes: (19) (a) “Vehicle” includes:
      1. All agencies for the transportation of persons or property over or upon the public highways of the Commonwealth; and
      2. All vehicles passing over or upon the highways.
    2. “Motor vehicle” includes all vehicles, as defined in paragraph (a) of this subsection, except:
      1. Road rollers;
      2. Road graders;
      3. Farm tractors;
      4. Vehicles on which power shovels are mounted;
      5. Construction equipment customarily used only on the site of construction and which is not practical for the transportation of persons or property upon the highways;
      6. Vehicles that travel exclusively upon rails;
      7. Vehicles propelled by electric power obtained from overhead wires while being operated within any municipality or where the vehicles do not travel more than five (5) miles beyond the city limits of any municipality;
      8. Vehicles propelled by muscular power; and
      9. Electric low-speed scooters;
  19. “Reflectance” means the ratio of the amount of total light, expressed in a percentage, which is reflected outward by the product or material to the amount of total light falling on the product or material;
  20. “Sunscreening material” means a product or material, including film, glazing, and perforated sunscreening, which, when applied to the windshield or windows of a motor vehicle, reduces the effects of the sun with respect to light reflectance or transmittance;
  21. “Transmittance” means the ratio of the amount of total light, expressed in a percentage, which is allowed to pass through the product or material, including glazing, to the amount of total light falling on the product or material and the glazing;
  22. “Window” means any device designed for exterior viewing from a motor vehicle, except the windshield, any roof-mounted viewing device, and any viewing device having less than one hundred fifty (150) square inches in area;
  23. “All-terrain vehicle” means any motor vehicle used for recreational off-road use;
  24. “Nondivisible load,” as pertains to state highways that are not part of the national truck network established pursuant to 23 C.F.R. pt. 658, means a load or vehicle, that if separated into smaller loads or vehicles:
    1. Compromises the intended use of the vehicle, making it unable to perform the function for which it was intended;
    2. Destroys the value of the load or vehicle, making it unusable for its intended purpose; or
    3. Requires more than four (4) work hours to dismantle and reassemble using appropriate equipment;
  25. “Electric low-speed scooter” means a device that:
    1. Weighs less than one hundred (100) pounds;
    2. Is equipped with wheels;
    3. Is equipped with handlebars;
    4. Is equipped with a brake adequate enough to stop and park the device;
    5. Is designed to be stood or sat upon;
    6. Is propelled by an electric motor, human power, or both; and
    7. Is designed to operate at a maximum speed of twenty (20) miles per hour, on a paved level surface, with or without human propulsion; and
  26. “Highway work zone” means that lane or portion of a state-maintained highway open to vehicular traffic and the affected area adjacent to a lane, berm, or shoulder of a state-maintained highway upon which construction, reconstruction, resurfacing, maintenance, inspection, or other work of that nature is being conducted.

History. 2739g-1, 2739g-69gg, 2739g-80: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 78, §§ 1, 2; 1956 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 1; 1958, ch. 126, § 22; 1974, ch. 46, § 1; 1978, ch. 46, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1988, ch. 244, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 400, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 42, § 6, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 327, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 47, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 270, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 587, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2017 ch. 35, § 1, effective June 29, 2017; 2019 ch. 22, § 3, effective June 27, 2019; 2019 ch. 40, § 4, effective June 27, 2019.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(6/29/2021). Subsection (7)(a) of this statute was amended by Section 7 of 2021 Ky. Acts ch. 186. Section 9 of that Act provides that “Sec- tions 6 to 8 of this Act are part of a pilot program and shall sunset on July 1, 2024.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

It was not arbitrary or a violation of a driver’s equal protection right under a rational basis analysis for the Kentucky General Assembly to impose a different penalty upon third time offenders based upon their level of intoxication. Cornelison v. Commonwealth, 52 S.W.3d 570, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 133 ( Ky. 2001 ).

2.Highway.

This section is applicable to all public highways, including city streets. Ashland v. Ashland Supply Co., 225 Ky. 123 , 7 S.W.2d 833, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 710 ( Ky. 1928 ).

A public alley is a “highway.” Thomas v. Dahl, 293 Ky. 808 , 170 S.W.2d 337, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 706 ( Ky. 1943 ).

“Highway” includes street and KRS 189.570(6) (now (14)) requiring pedestrian to walk on the left side of the “highway” applies to streets within the limits of a city. Saddler v. Parham, 249 S.W.2d 945, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 1164 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952) (decision prior to 1978 amendment).

3.Operator.

There is no distinction between driving a car two feet and two miles and where car was moved only a few feet it was being operated and driven. Mullins v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 282 , 147 S.W.2d 704, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 376 ( Ky. 1941 ).

4.Semitrailer and Trailer.

A small four-wheeled farm wagon, when attached to and pulled by a private automobile, is not a “trailer” as defined in subsection (10) (now (17)) of this section, and thus may be operated on the highway without compliance with the licensing requirements of KRS 189.490 . Withers v. Marshall, 311 Ky. 659 , 225 S.W.2d 121, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 1226 ( Ky. 1949 ).

Gross receipts under sales and use tax law does not include the sale price of any motor vehicle including those defined under subsections (5) and (10) (now (12) and (17)) of this section which has never been registered in Kentucky. George v. Scent, 346 S.W.2d 784, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 341 ( Ky. 1961 ).

5.Sharp Curve.

There must have been conclusive or uncontradicted proof that curve was not less than 30 degrees before it can be said as a matter of law that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence because he had exceeded the prima facie unreasonable speed confined to a “sharp curve” and without such proof the rate of speed determinative of reasonableness and prudence was that declared for a “straightaway, unobstructed highway.” Patton v. Gannett, 296 Ky. 533 , 177 S.W.2d 888, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 580 ( Ky. 1944 ).

6.Grade.

When it is sought to fasten negligence on one because of improper driving on a steep grade, there should be proof that the grade in question exceeded 7 percent. National Linen Supply Co. v. Snowden, 288 Ky. 374 , 156 S.W.2d 186, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1941 ).

7.Vehicle.

Intersectional collision between streetcar and automobile was not governed by provision of motor vehicle law which excepted vehicles traveling exclusively on rails. It was governed by city ordinance. Louisville R. Co. v. Everett, 199 Ky. 33 , 250 S.W. 103, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 742 ( Ky. 1923 ).

A bicycle is a “vehicle.” Thomas v. Dahl, 293 Ky. 808 , 170 S.W.2d 337, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 706 ( Ky. 1943 ).

8.Farm Tractors.

It was the intention of KRS ch. 189 to exclude farm tractors from rigid requirements as to equipment but it did not intend that tractors could operate on public highways without regard to rules of safety including the duty to give proper signals. Davidson v. Moore, 340 S.W.2d 227, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 23 ( Ky. 1960 ).

The purpose of excluding farm tractors from the definition of vehicle in subsection (18) (now (19)) of this section was for the purpose of excluding farm tractors from the rigid requirements as to equipment but the exemption for that purpose did not intend that farm tractors could operate on public highways without regard to the rules of safety. Nemeth v. Commonwealth, 944 S.W.2d 871, 1997 Ky. App. LEXIS 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).

Where an insurance policy’s definition of “motor vehicle” did not include a farm tractor and the tractor did not meet the highway use specifications of KRS 189.010(19)(b)(3), the policy exclusion applied and the insurer was entitled to summary judgment. Ryan v. Pa. Life Ins. Co., 123 S.W.3d 142, 2003 Ky. LEXIS 253 ( Ky. 2003 ).

9.Arrest Without Warrant.

If an arrest is made without a warrant for violation of any provision of KRS ch. 189, the arresting officer may, instead of proceeding under CrC., § 46(1) (now RCr. 3.02), issue a citation requiring the defendant to appear before a magistrate of the county in which the offense occurred at a future time to be stated in the citation but in no event shall the citation state a time of appearance in excess of five days from the date of arrest (now “without unnecessary delay”). Duncan v. Brothers, 344 S.W.2d 398, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 228 ( Ky. 1961 ).

10.Public Golf Course.

The trial court erred as a matter of law in applying Kentucky’s Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA) to the circumstances attendant to the operation of a golf cart on a public course, and the one-year personal injury statute of limitations was applicable, not the two-year statute of limitations under MVRA. Kenton County Pub. Parks Corp. v. Modlin, 901 S.W.2d 876, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 70 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

Cited in:

Furste v. Dixie Traction Co., 286 Ky. 336 , 150 S.W.2d 913, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 265 ( Ky. 1941 ); Southern Oxygen Co. v. Martin, 291 Ky. 238 , 163 S.W.2d 459, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 202 ( Ky. 1942 ); Miles v. Southeastern Motor Truck Lines, Inc., 295 Ky. 156 , 173 S.W.2d 990, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 205 ( Ky. 1943 ); Sherrow v. Watts’ Adm’r, 312 Ky. 262 , 226 S.W.2d 929, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 613 ( Ky. 1950 ); Duncan v. Brothers, 344 S.W.2d 398, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 228 ( Ky. 1961 ); Hall v. Kolb, 374 S.W.2d 854, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 394 ( Ky. 1964 ); Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vanover, 506 S.W.2d 517, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 758 ( Ky. 1974 ); Department of Revenue ex rel. Carpenter v. Pullman, Inc. (Trailmobile Div.), 560 S.W.2d 18, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 875 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Heath v. Commonwealth, 761 S.W.2d 630, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 160 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov’t v. TDC Group, LLC, 283 S.W.3d 657, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 28 ( Ky. 2009 ); Dep't of Revenue, Fin. & Admin. Cabinet v. Shinin' B Trailer Sales, LLC, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 131 (Sept. 4, 2015).

Opinions of Attorney General.

There are no specific maximum length limits prescribed by statute for the “driveaway method” of transporting motor vehicle units. OAG 63-246 .

The term “highway” does not include a newly constructed road before it is open to the public. OAG 67-455 .

School parking lots come within the definition of an approach to the highway as set out in subdivision (2) (now (3)) of this section. OAG 71-207 .

The definition of “highway” in this section encompasses a filling station or the parking lot of a restaurant at a time the establishment is closed and this definition would apply to KRS 244.020 (repealed) prohibiting intoxication on any public or private road. OAG 74-703 .

The city police have authority to enforce traffic laws, issue citations and make arrests in the parking lots of apartment complexes, high schools, hospitals and churches providing off-street parking facilities for guests’ use. OAG 75-36 .

The clear legislative intent of this section, KRS 189.390 and 189.396 that peace officers shall enforce traffic laws in off-street parking facilities, including a speed limit of fifteen miles per hour, seems a reasonable exercise of the authority of the legislature to enact a law for the public good and until the sections are invalidated by a decision of the highest court of the state, all peace officers are legally obligated to enforce said sections. OAG 75-115 .

A practice of city police officers of entering off-street parking facilities provided by apartment buildings for use of their tenants and tenants’ invitees, for purposes of placing citations on vehicles not bearing city sticker representing compliance with the city ordinance imposing a tax and permit for use of city streets, is illegal because such off-street parking facilities are not off-street facilities offered for public use within the definition of “highways” in the statute. OAG 75-164 .

When a farm tractor is being operated as a passenger vehicle or as towing a trailer, transporting passengers or property, it is required to comply with the traffic laws which apply to motor vehicles. OAG 78-712 .

Where only a traffic citation has been issued and no complaint is filed and no summons or warrant is issued, then the district court would have no jurisdiction of the person of a nonresident motorist until and unless the accused delivers himself in person to the court in obedience to the citation, or unless he enters his appearance by other means. OAG 78-318 .

The definition of “trailer” in this section does not apply to wagons pulled by farm tractors but only to trailers pulled by trucks. OAG 82-213 .

The gross weight limit of 36,000 pounds, provided in KRS 189.221(4), applies to any truck, semitrailer truck or truck and trailer unit, operating upon any highway regardless of the nature of its cargo, including coal, timber or other natural resources; the truck weight limitation, which applies explicitly to “any highway,” would include county roads. OAG 85-40 .

If roadways within mobile home park are offered for public use so as to be considered “public” roads (although privately owned or maintained), or if such roadways constitute off-street parking facilities offered for public use, other than for hire, they would be within the definition of “highway” as used in subsection (3) of this section. Accordingly, law enforcement officers could properly issue citations for speeding violations (KRS 189.390 ), or reckless driving violations (KRS 189.290 ), occurring upon such roadways. OAG 92-36 .

If the roads or streets of a specific subdivision, although privately owned, are subject to public access, so as to be “public roads” within the meaning of subsection (3) of this section, applicable speed limit provisions of KRS 189.390 would apply to them, and could be enforced upon them by law enforcement officers; additionally, Fiscal Court could, in the exercise of its police power, and in view of specific provisions of KRS 189.390 and this section provide, by proper ordinance, for speed limits on privately owned subdivision streets generally which are used by the public. OAG 92-67 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Financial responsibility law, KRS ch. 187.

Highways department, KRS ch. 176.

Licensing of motor vehicles and operators, KRS ch. 186.

Lien on motor vehicles and contents for towing, recovery, storage, transporting, and other applicable charges — Attempt to notify registered owner — Inspection of vehicle and contents prior to release — Forfeiture and sale of contents — Limitation of storage or growing company’s liability, KRS 376.270 , 376.275 .

Motor carriers, KRS ch. 281.

Motor vehicle parking authorities, KRS 94.810 94.820 , 94.835 , 94.840 .

Nonresident motorists, service of process on, KRS ch. 188.

Powers and duties of commissioner and officers, KRS 16.060 .

Traffic rules for limited access highways, KRS 177.300 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Murray, Instructions in Regard to the Speed of Motor Trucks, A Study In Statutory Interpretation, 34 Ky. L.J. 85 (1946).

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Criminal), 5th Ed., Offenses Against Public Order, Safety and Morals, Part 1 Definitions, Offenses Involving Operation of Motor Vehicles, § 8.13.

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Criminal), 5th Ed., Offenses Against Public Order, Safety and Morals, Part 1 Definitions, Offenses Involving Operation of Motor Vehicles, § 8.13B.

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Automobiles, § 16.38.

189.011. Additional definitions — Application of light regulations.

  1. As used in this chapter, the following words and phrases shall have the meanings respectively ascribed to them:
    1. “Authorized emergency vehicle” shall mean any vehicle designated as such by KRS 189.910 .
    2. “Wrecker” shall mean a motor vehicle on which a wrecking crane and other equipment suitable for motor vehicle wrecker service has been permanently mounted.
  2. Provided, however, that the regulations in reference to lights shall not apply to common carrier motor vehicles whose equipment is regulated by the rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
  3. As used in this chapter, a driver’s license shall mean an operator’s license issued pursuant to KRS 186.4102 , 186.412 , and 186.412 1 and a commercial driver’s license means a license issued pursuant to KRS Chapter 281A.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 52, § 2; 1970, ch. 93, § 7; 1990, ch. 455, § 31, effective July 13, 1990; 2017 ch. 100, § 30, effective January 1, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Authorized Emergency Vehicle.

The exemption of an emergency vehicle from ordinary traffic regulations confers no absolute immunity upon the driver nor does it relieve the driver from the duty of having due regard for the safety of other people lawfully using a street or highway which duty is measured by the danger to be apprehended and notice and warning to persons required to yield the right of way is essential and a reasonable opportunity to yield or get out of the way is necessary before they become chargeable with the obligation to give preference to the emergency vehicle. Myers v. Able, 417 S.W.2d 235, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 251 ( Ky. 1967 ).

Cited:

Henderson v. Watson, 262 S.W.2d 811, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 1129 ( Ky. 1953 ); Gasparac v. Castle, 330 S.W.2d 111, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 184 ( Ky. 1959 ); Williams v. Chilton, 427 S.W.2d 586, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 687 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

No private vehicles other than those specifically enumerated in this section, KRS 189.040 and 189.080 may have sirens or flashing lights. OAG 66-456 .

The cruiser of a constable is a “police vehicle” and as such is an “authorized emergency vehicle” and may be equipped with emergency equipment, including a siren and flashing red light. OAG 67-496 .

Motor vehicles operated in the course of official duties by members of the federal bureau of investigation carrying out federal law enforcement functions are included within the terminology “police vehicle” and “police patrols.” OAG 67-521 .

189.012. Definitions for KRS 189.221 to 189.228. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 115, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

189.020. Equipment of vehicle not to be nuisance or menace.

Every vehicle when on a highway shall be so equipped as to make a minimum of noise, smoke or other nuisance, to protect the rights of other traffic, and to promote the public safety.

History. 2739g-23.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Rights of Other Traffic.

What equipment on a vehicle is necessary “to protect the rights of other traffic” is a question to be answered in terms of ordinary care under the circumstances of the particular case. Adkins v. Greyhound Corp., 357 S.W.2d 860, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 151 ( Ky. 1962 ).

2.Milk Truck.

This statute does not require a milk truck to be driven with its sliding doors closed. Bumpus v. Drinkard's Adm'x, 279 S.W.2d 4, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 497 ( Ky. 1955 ).

3.Cracked Windshield.

The cracks in defendant’s windshield were not a basis for a stop of his vehicle because the cracks were not a violation of KRS 189.110 , which concerns window tinting, nor were they severe enough to unreasonably impair his forward vision, so they were not a violation of KRS 189.020 , so a subsequent search to which defendant consented was invalid. Garcia v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 658, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 62 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

Applying the rule of ejusdem generis to KRS 189.020 , the term “other nuisance” is preceded by the particular designation of “noise” and “smoke”; therefore, “other nuisance” should be interpreted as including only those nuisances of a similar kind as noise and smoke. Thus, the term “other nuisance” does not encompass a cracked windshield. Garcia v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 658, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 62 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

Under the requirements of KRS 189.020 that a vehicle be equipped so as to protect the rights of other traffic, a cracked windshield must unreasonably impair the vision of a vehicle’s driver to constitute a violation of KRS 189.020 . Garcia v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 658, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 62 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

Mere hairline cracks of a vehicle’s windshield are not typically of sufficient severity to constitute a violation of KRS 189.020 . Garcia v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 658, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 62 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

NOTES TO UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS

1.Flat Tire.

Traffic stop was justified because driving in the left lane at full speed on two completely flat tires, with the rims striking the asphalt, is a factual scenario that does present a significant threat to public safety and to the safety of the driver, and suggests recklessness on the part of the driver; driving on a flat tire or tires may not always constitute a violation of the statute if a driver is proceeding slowly to a service station or to an area where it is safe to pull off the road. Foley v. Commonwealth, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 173 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2016, sub. op., 2016 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 898 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2016).

189.025. Permit required for installation of television set in motor vehicle. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 8, §§ 1, 2; 1958, ch. 126, § 24) was repealed by Acts 1988, ch. 48, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.

189.030. Time when lights must be on.

  1. Headlamps, when required on a vehicle, shall be illuminated:
    1. During the period from one-half (1/2) hour after sunset to one-half (1/2) hour before sunrise; and
    2. At such other times as atmospheric conditions render visibility as low as or lower than is ordinarily the case during that period.
  2. Provisions as to distances that lights must be visible refer to visibility under ordinary atmospheric conditions.

History. 2739g-23, 2739g-24: amend. Acts 2006, ch. 173, § 1, effective July 12, 2006.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Application.

This section does not apply to state highway within residential district of city. Cottrell v. Martin A. Ceder, Inc., 376 S.W.2d 536, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 457 ( Ky. 1964 ).

2.Time of Sunset.

Admission of improper evidence in form of telegram that was not signed by any authority that attempted to show what time the sun set on a particular day was not prejudicial where other evidence showed that it was dark at the time the accident occurred. McLellan v. Threlkeld, 279 Ky. 114 , 129 S.W.2d 977, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 223 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Where there was no proof as to time of sunset and the only evidence was that the accident occurred “about dusk” or “around dusky dark,” it was not proven that bus driver was negligent in not having his lights on. Howard v. Fowler, 306 Ky. 567 , 207 S.W.2d 559, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 1016 ( Ky. 1947 ).

3.Driving Without Lights.

Court knows judicially that 6:30 p. m. in February is within period when law requires lights on automobiles to be illuminated; and if accused was properly arrested without warrant for driving without lights, arresting officer could testify to seeing whiskey in car. Morris v. Commonwealth, 231 Ky. 838 , 22 S.W.2d 295, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 373 ( Ky. 1929 ).

Whether it was dark or light and whether road was straight were jury questions precluding peremptory instruction that failure to have light on wagon was proximate cause of rear-end collision with bus. Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Eckler, 248 Ky. 309 , 58 S.W.2d 582, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 222 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Where collision occurred between wagon and automobiles on late afternoon on which the sun set at 5:15 and was not dark until about an hour later instruction that driver of wagon was required to have a light on rear of wagon if it was nighttime or dark was erroneous. McCulloch's Adm'r v. Abell's Adm'r, 272 Ky. 756 , 115 S.W.2d 386, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 212 ( Ky. 1938 ).

4.Driving with Lights Dimmed.

Where evidence showed defendant driving at a speed unreasonable in a residential area, with lights dimmed so as to fail to reveal a church building at the end of a street at night, there was sufficient showing of negligence to instruct the jury to find for plaintiff, a guest in defendant’s car. Robinson v. Higgins, 295 Ky. 446 , 174 S.W.2d 687, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 252 ( Ky. 1943 ).

5.Unlighted Parked Vehicles.

It was negligence to have unlighted trucks parked in nighttime at side of country highway while unloading goods, causing collision with motorist properly driving on that side. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v. Union Transfer & Storage Co., 205 Ky. 651 , 266 S.W. 362, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 202 ( Ky. 1924 ).

Motor vehicle parked on highway at night was required to have lights the same as moving vehicles. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v. Union Transfer & Storage Co., 205 Ky. 651 , 266 S.W. 362, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 202 ( Ky. 1924 ).

A truck stopped on heavily traveled road at night without lights after it ran out of gas after traveling only 22 miles or so on a long journey, and when there was no defect in the lighting system, was a clear violation of this section and in an action for injuries to the driver of an automobile who ran into the rear of the truck the evidence of the truck driver’s negligence was sufficient to take to the jury. Kentucky Transport Corp. v. Simcox, 282 Ky. 50 , 137 S.W.2d 708, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 117 ( Ky. 1940 ).

6.Weather Conditions.

Where accident occurred on rainy and foggy night, and evidence was that defendant had “dimmed” his lights for better visibility, so that they cast their beams only 100 or 150 feet, an instruction that it was duty of defendant to have his automobile equipped with lights with sufficient power to distinguish objects for a distance of at least 350 feet was prejudicially erroneous, since jury should have been instructed to take into consideration the atmospheric conditions. Cheatham v. Chabal, 301 Ky. 616 , 192 S.W.2d 812, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 536 ( Ky. 1946 ).

There is a difference between a motorist’s duties as to lights under different weather conditions. Cheatham v. Chabal, 301 Ky. 616 , 192 S.W.2d 812, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 536 ( Ky. 1946 ).

Where, in action for damages resulting from automobile accident, there was conflicting evidence as to time of accident and atmospheric conditions, question as to whether driver was negligent in not having lights burning was properly submitted to jury. Keller v. Morehead, 247 S.W.2d 218, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 680 ( Ky. 1952 ).

7.Parking on City Streets.

City cannot be held liable for negligence of owner of automobile in parking it without lights, regardless of whether city had notice of such parking. Miller's Adm'r v. Pineville, 277 Ky. 390 , 126 S.W.2d 844, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 673 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Subsection (2) of this section is permissive, and where no ordinance has been enacted, question of negligence in parking without lights would be that of owner and not city. Miller's Adm'r v. Pineville, 277 Ky. 390 , 126 S.W.2d 844, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 673 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Cited:

Johnson v. Hunt, 122 F. Supp. 816, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3318 (D. Ky. 1954 ); Schoenbaechler v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 328 S.W.2d 514, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 115 ( Ky. 1959 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Even in the absence of a statute granting express exemption, a conservation officer may not be prosecuted criminally for a violation of subsection (1) of this section where the conduct of driving a short distance on a secondary highway without turning on the lights of his automobile was in the course of his official duties while attempting to apprehend suspected violators of the hunting laws and where due care was exercised for the safety of others. OAG 69-625 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Automobiles, § 16.11.

189.040. Front lights — Flashing lights.

  1. Every motor vehicle, other than a motorcycle or moped , shall be equipped with at least two (2) headlamps with at least one (1) on each side of the front of the motor vehicle, which headlamps shall comply with the requirements and limitations set forth in this section.
  2. Every motorcycle and moped shall be equipped with at least one (1) and not more than two (2) headlamps which shall comply with the requirements and limitations of this section.
  3. Except as hereinafter provided, the headlamps or the auxiliary driving lamps or the auxiliary passing lamp or combinations thereof on motor vehicles, other than a motorcycle or moped , shall be so arranged that the driver may control the selection between distribution of light projected to different elevations, subject to the following requirements and limitations:
    1. There shall be an uppermost distribution of light, or composite beam, so aimed and of such intensity as to reveal persons and vehicles at a distance of at least three hundred fifty (350) feet ahead for all conditions of loading;
    2. There shall be a lowermost distribution of light, or composite beam, so aimed and of sufficient intensity to reveal persons and vehicles at a distance of at least one hundred (100) feet ahead; and on a straight level road under any condition of loading none of the high-intensity portion of the beam shall be directed to strike the eyes of an approaching driver; and
    3. Every new motor vehicle, other than a motorcycle or moped , registered in this state after January 1, 1956, which has multiple-beam road-lighting equipment shall be equipped with a beam indicator, which shall be lighted whenever the uppermost distribution of light from the headlamps is in use, and shall not otherwise be lighted. Said indicator shall be so designed and located that when lighted it will be readily visible without glare to the driver of the vehicle so equipped.
  4. Whenever a motor vehicle is being operated on a roadway or shoulder adjacent thereto during the times specified in KRS 189.030 , the driver shall use a distribution of light or composite beam directed high enough and of sufficient intensity to reveal persons and vehicles at a safe distance in advance of the vehicle, subject to the requirements and limitations hereinafter set forth.
  5. Whenever a driver of a vehicle approaches an oncoming vehicle within five hundred (500) feet, the driver shall use a distribution of light or composite beam, so aimed that the glaring rays are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver. The lowermost distribution of light or composite beam specified in paragraph (b) of subsection (3) of this section shall be deemed to avoid glare at all times, regardless of road contour and loading.
  6. Whenever the driver of a vehicle follows another vehicle within three hundred (300) feet to the rear, except when engaged in the act of overtaking and passing, the driver shall use a distribution of light other than the uppermost distribution of light specified in paragraph (a) of subsection (3) of this section.
  7. Headlamps arranged to provide a single distribution of light not supplemented by auxiliary driving lights shall be permitted on motor vehicles manufactured and sold prior to May 30, 1939, in lieu of multiple-beam road-lighting equipment, if the single distribution of light complies with the following requirements and limitations:
    1. The headlamps shall be so aimed that when the vehicle is not loaded none of the high intensity portion of the light shall, at a distance of twenty-five (25) feet ahead, project higher than a level of five (5) inches below the level of the center of the light from which it comes, and in no case higher than forty-two (42) inches above the level on which the vehicle stands, at a distance of seventy-five (75) feet ahead;
    2. The intensity shall be sufficient to reveal persons and vehicles at a distance of at least two hundred (200) feet; and
    3. Whenever the operator of a motor vehicle approaches an oncoming vehicle within five hundred (500) feet, he shall use a distribution of light or composite beam so aimed that the glaring rays are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver. In no case shall the high intensity portion which is projected to the left of the prolongation of the extreme left side of the vehicle be aimed higher than the center of the lamp from which it comes at a distance of twenty-five (25) feet ahead, and in no case higher than a level of forty-two (42) inches above the level upon which the vehicle stands at a distance of seventy-five (75) feet ahead.
  8. Flashing lights are prohibited on all motor vehicles except as a means for indicating a right or left turn or for the purpose of warning the operators of other vehicles of the presence of a vehicular traffic hazard requiring the exercise of unusual care in approaching, overtaking or passing.
  9. The height of the headlamps, from the center of the lamp to level ground when the vehicle is unloaded, shall be between twenty-four (24) and fifty-four (54) inches.
  10. Headlamps required under this section shall only emit white light. Halogen headlamps may have a slight yellow or amber tint. Nonhalogen headlamps may emit a slight blue tint, if the headlamps were installed by the vehicle manufacturer as original equipment in the motor vehicle, motorcycle, or moped or the headlamps meet the requirements of subsection (11) of this section.
  11. A motor vehicle, motorcycle, or moped shall only be equipped with headlamps that meet United States Department of Transportation regulations.
  12. A motor vehicle, motorcycle, or moped shall not be retrofitted with a headlamp that appears to emit a solid color of light other than white.
  13. A motor vehicle, motorcycle, or moped shall not be retrofitted with a headlamp cover or film that changes the light emitted from the headlamp to a color other than white.
  14. Except as provided in subsection (10) of this section, except as provided in KRS 189.950 (3)(b), and except for vehicles exempted under the provisions of KRS 189.910 to 189.950 , when operating on a highway or upon the right-of-way of a highway, any:
    1. Visible front lights on a motor vehicle or any light that is affixed to the front of a motorcycle or moped, shall only be white or amber, unless installed as original equipment by the manufacturer; and
    2. Visible rear lights on a motor vehicle shall only be white, amber, or red, unless installed as original equipment by the manufacturer.
  15. Any violation of this section for the illumination of a solid blue light or solid blue lights shall be deemed to be a violation of KRS 189.950(3).

HISTORY: 2739g-24: amend. Acts 1950, ch. 52, § 1; 1954, ch. 248, § 1; 1960, ch. 54; 1964, ch. 65, § 1; 1966, ch. 18, § 3; 1966, ch. 50, § 2; 1966, ch. 73, § 1; 1966, ch. 227, § 1; 1970, ch. 93, § 8; 1974, ch. 101, § 2; 1978, ch. 349, § 7, effective June 17, 1978; 2006, ch. 173, § 2, effective July 12, 2006; 2017 ch. 79, § 2, effective June 29, 2017.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Construction.

Fact driver did not observe tractor trailer allegedly parked without lights or reflectors in driving lane until he was within about 15 feet of it and when driver was allegedly blinded by lights of a parked automobile did not necessarily indicate that his headlights did not meet the statutory requirement of this section or that he was not keeping a proper lookout since the statute does not require lights that will reveal objects 350 feet under all conditions and at all times and since many factors may intervene and render it impossible to observe an object until within a few feet of it. De Buyser v. Walden, 255 S.W.2d 616, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 669 ( Ky. 1953 ).

While the statute does not require lights which will reveal objects for 350 feet under all conditions and at all times, it does require such lights under normal atmospheric and road conditions. Mason v. Stengell, 441 S.W.2d 412, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 315 ( Ky. 1969 ).

2.Weather Conditions.

There is difference between a motorist’s duties as to lights under different weather conditions. Cheatham v. Chabal, 301 Ky. 616 , 192 S.W.2d 812, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 536 ( Ky. 1946 ).

3.Speed While on Low Beam.

The operator of a car, with his lights on low beam is required to drive at a rate of speed that will enable him to avoid collision with other vehicles on the highway, coming within the range of his lights 100 feet distant. Johnson v. Hunt, 122 F. Supp. 816, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3318 (D. Ky. 1954 ).

4.Driver Blinded by Lights.

A driver blinded by lights of an approaching vehicle may not assume that the road ahead of him is clear, nor must he proceed at his peril or necessarily stop, but a driver so blinded is under a duty to slacken his speed and have his car under such control in the circumstances as ordinary care and precaution suggest or require. Greyhound Corp. v. Hounshell, 351 S.W.2d 64, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 140 ( Ky. 1961 ).

5.Violation Proximate Cause.

It is the rule that, although one may be guilty of negligence per se as a consequence of the violation of a statutory provision, a party will not be entitled to recover for an injury unless the violation is the proximate cause and even if an assumption was made that this section was violated by the failure to have truck lights on bright it was not shown wherein the failure played any part as a causative factor in the accident. Mountain Petroleum Co. v. Howard, 351 S.W.2d 178, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 151 ( Ky. 1961 ).

6.Insufficiency of Lights as Negligence.

Failure of motorist to have lights of reasonable strength and brilliancy on his automobile would be negligence. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mahoney, 220 Ky. 30 , 294 S.W. 777, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 464 ( Ky. 1927 ), overruled in part, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Branson, 267 S.W.2d 945, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 885 ( Ky. 1954 ), but see, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Branson, 267 S.W.2d 945, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 885 ( Ky. 1954 ).

Motorist was negligent in striking man working after dark near disabled truck at side of country highway, where headlight did not enable motorist to see objects more than 50 feet distant, and he did not keep lookout or sound horn on approaching truck. Tate v. Hall, 247 Ky. 843 , 57 S.W.2d 986, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 454 ( Ky. 1933 ).

That lights were defective and dim would not impose liability on owner where driver saw car with which he collided as soon as it appeared in his line of vision. Rawlings v. Clay Motor Co., 287 Ky. 604 , 154 S.W.2d 711, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 596 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Where lights were dimmed and did not reveal clearly substantial object at least 350 feet ahead and driver ran into a church at the end of a street she was not excused from liability for injuries to a guest. Robinson v. Higgins, 295 Ky. 446 , 174 S.W.2d 687, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 252 ( Ky. 1943 ).

7.Evidence.

In view of evidence of service manager that lights of automobile which struck pedestrian in nighttime on country highway were apparently all right and motorist’s evidence that they were regulation and not defective, his estimate that he could see 30 feet or 75 or 100 feet should not overcome jury’s verdict in his favor. Page's Adm'r v. Scott, 245 Ky. 648 , 54 S.W.2d 23, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 652 ( Ky. 1932 ).

In nighttime railroad crossing collision case it was proper to submit issue whether automobile was equipped with lights sufficient under this section, where there was evidence, or natural inference therefrom, that it was not so equipped. Wallis v. Illinois C. R. Co., 247 Ky. 70 , 56 S.W.2d 715, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 357 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Since failure to see unlighted vehicle ahead may be due to deflected lights, to position of vehicle on highway, or other circumstances, failure to see it is not evidence of insufficient lights. Roederer's Adm'x v. Gray, 253 Ky. 669 , 69 S.W.2d 998, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 692 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Evidence that defendant before striking deceased who was sitting on the road attempted to avoid accident and afterwards summoned aid for deceased to support verdict finding that defendant was not negligent as to speed or insufficient headlights. Girtman's Adm'r v. Akins, 275 Ky. 2 , 120 S.W.2d 660, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 354 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Testimony by defendant that his lights would reveal an object 100 feet ahead and that they would meet statutory requirements though he did not know these requirements and that his battery and lights were in good condition was as a whole not sufficient to say that defendant’s lights were not up to statutory requirements. Moberly v. Flynn, 247 S.W.2d 211, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 675 ( Ky. 1952 ).

Where the defendant’s deposition, in which he admitted his car had been in a wreck the year before and had not been repaired, was admissible, the defendant could offer any evidence that his headlights were not affected by the wreck the year before or that he struck a barrel after striking the deceased to counteract any evidence or inference that his headlights were defective at the time of the present accident. Mason v. Stengell, 441 S.W.2d 412, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 315 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Where an accident occurred on a straight road on a clear night, the defendant’s evidence that he did not see deceased until he was within 60 to 70 feet warranted the inference that his lights did not meet the statutory requirement. Mason v. Stengell, 441 S.W.2d 412, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 315 ( Ky. 1969 ).

8.Jury Instructions.

In nighttime collision case between meeting cars where defendant contended that he was blinded by lights of plaintiff’s car, court should have given concrete instruction grouping facts on contributory negligence rather than general instruction thereon. Osborne v. Holtzclaw, 193 Ky. 803 , 237 S.W. 658, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 77 ( Ky. 1922 ).

Instruction that truck owner must equip truck with two headlights of sufficient power to clearly reveal bulk of truck and its bed at least specified distance ahead was erroneous as imposing duty not statutorily required. Gess v. Wilder, 237 Ky. 830 , 36 S.W.2d 617, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 692 ( Ky. 1931 ).

In head-on nighttime collision between truck and automobiles on country highway, instruction was not erroneous for failure to impose on motorist duty to have front lights, where truck driver testified he saw automobile approaching and its lights were burning. Allender Co. v. Browning's Adm'x, 242 Ky. 273 , 46 S.W.2d 116, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 266 ( Ky. 1932 ).

In action for striking pedestrian crossing street in nighttime, failure to instruct that headlight of truck should have sufficient power to reveal objects a specified distance ahead was not prejudicial error, where there was no evidence that lights, if insufficient, were proximate cause of accident. Whitehead's Adm'r v. Peter Knopf's Sons, 262 Ky. 493 , 90 S.W.2d 709, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 53 ( Ky. 1936 ).

Where there was no evidence lights were insufficient it was not prejudicial error for court to fail to instruct on this point in an action for damages to truck which collided with automobile either standing or backing at an angle across highway. Tucker v. Ragland-Potter Co., 285 Ky. 533 , 148 S.W.2d 691, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 422 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Where the jury found that the defendant was guilty of not having his car under control, the instructions of the court, which embodied elements of common sense but did not conform with this section was not prejudicial. Davenport v. Brewer, 265 S.W.2d 451, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 730 ( Ky. 1954 ).

Where witnesses testified that they saw headlights burning on the decedent’s car immediately before it ran into a disabled truck stopped on the road, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury as to headlights the decedent was required to have on his car. Smith v. Collins, 277 S.W.2d 38, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 460 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Testimony that driver first saw car parked at night 125 to 150 feet ahead amounts to admission that either his headlights were inadequate or he was derelict in his lookout duty and driver was not entitled to a sudden emergency instruction. Mullins v. Bullens, 383 S.W.2d 130, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 15 ( Ky. 1964 ).

9.— Uppermost Distribution of Light.

It was reversible error to instruct under this section requiring lights on motor vehicles to reveal objects 350 feet ahead, when the law applicable at the time of the accident required lights revealing objects 200 feet ahead. Layne v. Cottle, 286 Ky. 221 , 150 S.W.2d 684, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 248 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Where accident occurred on rainy and foggy night, and evidence was that defendant had “dimmed” his lights for better visibility, so that they cast their beams only 100 or 150 feet, an instruction that it was duty of defendant to have his automobile equipped with lights with sufficient power to distinguish objects for a distance of at least 350 feet was prejudicially erroneous, since jury should have been instructed to take into consideration the atmospheric conditions. Cheatham v. Chabal, 301 Ky. 616 , 192 S.W.2d 812, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 536 ( Ky. 1946 ).

Where no issue was raised by the evidence in respect to the sufficiency of the headlights, instructions to the jury failing to submit the question of the sufficiency of the lights on truck to disclose substantial objects at least 350 feet ahead as provided in this section was not erroneous. Wilson v. Dalton's Adm'r, 311 Ky. 285 , 223 S.W.2d 978, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 1116 ( Ky. 1949 ).

It is customary and safe practice for driver on lighted street to have his headlights dimmed and to dim lights prior to passing another automobile and instruction to jury that driver had duty to have front headlights of sufficient power to reveal substantial objects 350 feet ahead as required by statute was properly refused where driver had dimmed his lights prior to passing an automobile and his failure to do so would have been a statutory violation. Harris v. Morris, 259 S.W.2d 469, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 958 ( Ky. 1953 ).

There was no basis in instructions to the jury for mention of the 350-foot power under ordinary conditions because at the time of the accident driver had deflected his lights as required by subsection (5) of this section whereupon only a 100-foot reach was mandatory. Sparks v. Doe, 379 S.W.2d 252, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 235 ( Ky. 1964 ).

10.Questions for Jury.

Motorist was liable for striking pedestrian who was not seen in nighttime until moment of accident, where motorist’s own evidence showed that headlights were insufficient, and speed not exceeding statutory limit when passing on-coming car whose lights had blinded motorist made jury question whether speed was reasonable under circumstances. Marsee v. Hunt's Adm'x, 246 Ky. 503 , 55 S.W.2d 376, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 797 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Whether motorist saw or should have seen unlighted wagon in time to avoid rear-end collision was jury question, where he drove around slight curve at 25 miles per hour. Roederer's Adm'x v. Gray, 253 Ky. 669 , 69 S.W.2d 998, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 692 ( Ky. 1934 ).

11.Motorcycles.

Motorcycle driver who was injured in seeking to avoid allegedly unlighted pile of bricks in city street had duty to have motorcycle lighted and to keep lookout ahead for persons, vehicles and other things. Ashland v. Williams, 203 Ky. 300 , 262 S.W. 273, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 900 ( Ky. 1924 ).

Cited:

Harry Holder Motor Co. v. Davidson, 243 S.W.2d 926, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1188 ( Ky. 1951 ); Smith v. Collins, 277 S.W.2d 38, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 460 ( Ky. 1955 ); Farris v. Summerour, 296 S.W.2d 708, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 223 ( Ky. 1956 ); Veal v. Davis, 343 S.W.2d 593, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1960 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A coroner’s vehicle is not an “emergency vehicle” and it is not included among those types of vehicles which are authorized and required to utilize red or blue flashing, rotating or oscillating lights and sirens, bells or whistles; the coroner may not use such equipment on his vehicle even when he is proceeding to the scene of an accident. OAG 80-543 .

189.043. Flashing white or amber lights to warn of traffic hazard permitted.

Notwithstanding any other provisions against the use of flashing lights, any vehicle may be equipped with lamps which may be used for the purpose of warning the operators of other vehicles of the presence of a vehicular traffic hazard requiring the exercise of unusual care in approaching, overtaking or passing and when so equipped may display such warning in addition to any other warning signals required by law. The lamps used to display such warning to the front shall be mounted at the same level and as widely spaced laterally as practicable, and shall display simultaneously flashing white or amber lights, or any shade of color between white and amber. The lamps used to display such warning to the rear shall be mounted at the same level and as widely spaced laterally as practicable, and shall show simultaneously flashing amber or red lights, or any shade of color between amber and red. These warning lights shall be visible from a distance of not less than fifteen hundred (1,500) feet under normal atmospheric conditions at night.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 50, § 1.

189.045. Flashing lights prohibited near highway.

No person shall install or maintain a red, yellow, green or similarly colored flashing light within one hundred (100) feet of the right-of-way of a state maintained highway for any purposes other than safety, highway construction, or emergency purposes.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 148, § 5 (1).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A red flashing light placed in front of a business within 100 feet of a state maintained highway strictly as a burglar alarm, which is activated only by breaking into the premises and at all other times inactive, comes under the definition of emergency purposes. OAG 74-517 .

189.047. Blue flashing lights, officers only may use. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 18, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1970, ch. 93, § 12.

189.050. Rear, side, and clearance lights and lanterns.

  1. All motor vehicles shall display at the rear two (2) red lights visible when lighted for at least five hundred (500) feet, unless the motor vehicle was originally equipped with only one (1) such light.
  2. A person shall not operate any motor truck or semitrailer truck on any highway unless it is equipped with a red light that automatically indicates the application of brakes and is visible from the rear a distance of not less than five hundred (500) feet.
  3. No person shall operate on any highway a motor truck or semitrailer truck having a width of any part in excess of eighty-four (84) inches, unless it carries at least two (2) clearance lights to indicate the outside left limit of the motor truck or semitrailer truck, one (1) light colored white, to be attached to and be visible from the front of the motor truck or semitrailer truck, and two (2) lights colored red, to be attached to and be visible from the rear, in each case a distance of not less than five hundred (500) feet.
  4. When in operation on any highway, slow-moving or motorless vehicles, except bicycles and electric low-speed scooters, shall have at least one (1) light on the left side of the vehicle whether from the front or rear, showing white and of sufficient power to reveal clearly the outline of the left side of the vehicle and in such a manner that the outline may be observed clearly by approaching vehicles from a distance of at least five hundred (500) feet.
  5. When in operation between sunset and sunrise on any highway, motorless vehicles, except bicycles and electric low-speed scooters, shall have in operation:
    1. A four (4) way flasher system, with two (2) flashing yellow or amber lights visible from the front of the vehicle for a distance of at least five hundred (500) feet and two (2) flashing red lights visible from the rear of the vehicle for a distance of at least five hundred (500) feet; or
    2. Two (2) reflective lanterns, one (1) on either side of the rear of the vehicle, showing white to the front of the vehicle and red to the rear of the vehicle, with the lantern on the left side of the vehicle situated at least twelve (12) inches higher than the lantern on the right.

History. 2739g-24, 2739g-50, 2739g-89, 2739g-90: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 73, § 2; 1974, ch. 101, § 3; 2006, ch. 105, § 1, effective July 12, 2006; 2006, ch. 173, § 3, effective July 12, 2006; 2012, ch. 53, § 1, effective April 11, 2012; 2019 ch. 22, § 6, effective June 27, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Violation Proximate Cause of Accidents.

Truck driver was guilty of negligence proximately causing nighttime collision, where his truck without rear lights was standing on traveled portion of highway, and motorist, blinded by lights of oncoming car, did not see parked car until immediately before striking it. Commonwealth v. Daniel, 266 Ky. 285 , 98 S.W.2d 897, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 643 ( Ky. 1936 ).

Assuming automobile was being operated without a rear light in violation of this section, where motorist saw automobile 200 feet from the point of collision, failure to have rear light was not proximate cause of collision. Walling v. Flynn, 332 S.W.2d 638, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 167 ( Ky. 1960 ).

2.Vehicles Parked on City Streets.

Truck and trailer parked on city street was within statute requiring that automobiles should have red light on rear visible for specified distance. Robinson Transfer Co. v. Turner, 244 Ky. 181 , 50 S.W.2d 546, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 405 ( Ky. 1932 ), limited, Evans v. Lorenz, 454 S.W.2d 691, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1969 ).

3.Lights.
4.— Interior.

It is not duty of driver of bus having all lights required by law to have bus illuminated inside; inside illumination is for passengers and not for passing motorists. United Coach Corp. v. Finley, 243 Ky. 658 , 49 S.W.2d 544, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 165 ( Ky. 1932 ).

5.— Clearance.

It was assumed, without deciding, that, in the exercise of ordinary care in the operation of its truck at night upon the public highway, it was the duty of the federal government to place a clearance light upon the left edge of the truck bed and that failure to do so constituted negligence, notwithstanding the statutory exemption of government-owned trucks by KRS 189.280 . (However, such failure was not here the proximate cause of accident.) Price v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 676, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2463 (D. Ky. 1943 ).

6.Incapacitated Vehicles.

Heavily loaded truck whose rear wheel came off on highway was within exception against leaving vehicle standing on main traveled portion of highway, and was not liable for rear-end collision with automobile, where truck’s rear lights were left burning and flares were placed on highway while operators sought aid for repairs. Stevens' Adm'r v. Watt, 266 Ky. 608 , 99 S.W.2d 753, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 717 ( Ky. 1936 ).

Defendant was negligent when he stopped his truck without having his lights on on a heavily traveled road at night when his truck ran out of gas after having gone only 22 miles on a start of a long journey. Kentucky Transport Corp. v. Simcox, 282 Ky. 50 , 137 S.W.2d 708, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 117 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Flares to warn of a disabled vehicle stopped on a highway are required only when the lights of such vehicle are also disabled. Smith v. Collins, 277 S.W.2d 38, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 460 ( Ky. 1955 ).

The display of flares or similar signals is required if either the vehicle or the lighting equipment is disabled. Duncan v. Wiseman Baking Co., 357 S.W.2d 694, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 27 ( Ky. 1961 ).

7.Jury Instructions.

In rear-end collision case between disabled truck parked on country highway and automobile, it was not error to refuse instruction to effect that if truck displayed red light verdict should be for defendant trucker, where that point was covered in substance by instructions given. R. B. Tyler Co. v. Curd, 240 Ky. 253 , 42 S.W.2d 298, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 379 ( Ky. 1931 ).

In case involving collision between truck and automobile at night in narrow underpass, failure of court to instruct as to duty of truck to carry clearance lights was not prejudicial, where jury found truck driver negligent on several grounds but denied recovery to automobile driver on ground of contributory negligence. Foley's Adm'r v. Witt, 294 Ky. 498 , 172 S.W.2d 81, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 485 ( Ky. 1943 ).

8.Question for Jury.

Whether motorist was negligent in striking rear end of wagon was jury question, where he drove around curve in nighttime at 25 miles per hour and wagon carried no red light, and due to curve, lights of automobile were deflected until moment of collision. Roederer's Adm'x v. Gray, 253 Ky. 669 , 69 S.W.2d 998, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 692 ( Ky. 1934 ).

It was an issue for the jury to decide whether a motorist was contributorily negligent when he failed to slow down from a speed of 35 to 40 miles per hour when meeting oncoming vehicles with blinding headlights and thereafter collided with an unlighted truck parked ahead of the motorist with its left wheels on the highway. McLellan v. Threlkeld, 279 Ky. 114 , 129 S.W.2d 977, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 223 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Issues of fact, whether bus did or did not stop suddenly and whether the stop signal required by this section was so obscured by mud as to render it ineffective in particular case was for the jury. Garrison v. Dixie Traction Co., 313 Ky. 565 , 232 S.W.2d 997, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 914 ( Ky. 1950 ).

9.Evidence.

In rear-end collision case question is whether lights were burning at time and place of accident, and evidence whether they were burning at certain prior times should be excluded. Robinson Transfer Co. v. Turner, 244 Ky. 181 , 50 S.W.2d 546, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 405 ( Ky. 1932 ), limited, Evans v. Lorenz, 454 S.W.2d 691, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Cited:

McCulloch’s Adm’r v. Abell’s Adm’r, 272 Ky. 756 , 115 S.W.2d 386, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 212 ( Ky. 1938 ); Keller v. Morehead, 247 S.W.2d 218, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 680 ( Ky. 1952 ); Branch v. Whitaker, 294 S.W.2d 948, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 154 ( Ky. 1956 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Subsection (2) of this section does not apply to a taxicab. OAG 61-128 .

A violation of this section is a “moving motor vehicle offense” within the meaning of KRS 208.020 (now repealed) and a misdemeanor, so that, the prosecution of a person 16 years of age or older for a violation of this section is excepted from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court by the provisions of KRS 208.020 (1)(a) (now repealed). OAG 70-404 .

189.055. Brake lights.

A person shall not operate any vehicle required by law to be licensed upon a highway unless it is equipped with a mechanical signal device which would indicate an intention to stop or suddenly decrease speed by illuminating at least two (2) red lights on the rear of the vehicle, which are visible from the rear a distance of not less than five hundred (500) feet, unless the vehicle was originally manufactured with only one (1) such red light on the rear of the vehicle.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 9, § 1; 2006, ch. 173, § 4, effective July 12, 2006.

189.060. Lights on vehicles in tow and projections — Motor vehicle used as towing unit.

  1. Each vehicle towed by a towline shall display the lights required on vehicles of the class to which it belongs.
  2. Each vehicle being hauled by another and connected to it in a manner that will keep them uniformly spaced shall carry at least one (1) light on the left side in such a manner as to show an amber light to the front and a red light to the rear visible at least one thousand (1,000) feet away.
  3. When any part of a load projects more than four (4) feet beyond a vehicle, two (2) red flags by day and two (2) red lights during the period provided in KRS 189.030 must be placed upon the extremity of the projection marking the width of the overhang.
  4. Any motor vehicle used as a towing unit where two (2) lamps displaying red lights are not obscured by the towed unit or its load may be equipped with two (2) lamps displaying red lights on the towed unit, the towing unit, or both.

History. 2739g-29 to 2739g-31: amend. Acts 2006, ch. 72, § 1, effective July 12, 2006; 2006, ch. 173, § 5, effective July 12, 2006.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/12/2006). This section was amended by 2006 Ky. Acts chs. 72 and 173, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been compiled together.

189.070. Motor vehicles to carry and use required flares or similar signals.

  1. A person shall not operate any commercial motor vehicle upon a highway outside of a business or residence district at any time from one-half (1/2) hour before sunset to one-half (1/2) hour before sunrise unless that vehicle carries the number and type of flares, electric lanterns, or other signals which the Department of Vehicle Regulation shall by regulation require.
  2. Whenever any commercial motor vehicle and its lighting equipment are disabled during a period when lighted lamps must be illuminated on vehicles and the vehicle cannot immediately be removed from the main traveled portion of a highway outside of a business or residence district, the person in charge of the vehicle shall cause to be placed upon the highway such flares, lanterns, and other signals as the Department of Vehicle Regulation shall by regulation require, and such flares, lanterns, or other signals shall be utilized as required by the regulations.

History. 2739g-69d: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 91, § 1; 2006, ch. 173, § 6, effective July 12, 2006.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Application.

This section relates to emergency signals which must be available on the vehicle, not those in use. Harry Holder Motor Co. v. Davidson, 243 S.W.2d 926, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1188 ( Ky. 1951 ).

2.Placing of Flares.

The display of flares or similar signals is required if either the vehicle or the lighting equipment is disabled. Duncan v. Wiseman Baking Co., 357 S.W.2d 694, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 27 ( Ky. 1961 ).

When flares or similar signals are required to be displayed, they should be placed with reasonable promptness. Duncan v. Wiseman Baking Co., 357 S.W.2d 694, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 27 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Defendant’s negligence in parking his stalled truck on a highway at night and his failure to place flares or other devices upon the highway as required by this section was the proximate cause of the collision. Armes v. Armes, 424 S.W.2d 137, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 18 ( Ky. 1967 ).

3.Parking Without Lights.

Evidence that truck was parked partly on pavement, on wrong side of road and without lights, was sufficient to take case to jury, notwithstanding some evidence of contributory negligence on part of driver of car that struck truck. Midland Baking Co. v. Kitchen, 293 Ky. 160 , 168 S.W.2d 372, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 8 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Cited:

Floyd v. Gray, 657 S.W.2d 936, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 273 ( Ky. 1983 ).

189.080. Horns and other sound devices.

Every motor vehicle, when in use on a highway, shall be equipped with a horn or other device capable of making an abrupt sound sufficiently loud to be heard from a distance of at least two hundred (200) feet under all ordinary traffic conditions. Every person operating an automobile or bicycle shall sound the horn or sound device whenever necessary as a warning of the approach of such vehicle to pedestrians or other vehicles, but shall not sound the horn or sound device unnecessarily. A bell may be used on a bicycle.

History. 2739g-28: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 167; 1970, ch. 93, § 9; 1974, ch. 101, § 4; 2006, ch. 173, § 7, effective July 12, 2006.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Application.

This section applies in cities as well as in the country. Wener v. Pope, 209 Ky. 553 , 273 S.W. 92, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 542 ( Ky. 1925 ).

2.Horns.
3.— Necessity for Sounding.

Statute does not require sounding of horn unless it is necessary. Lieberman v. McLaughlin, 233 Ky. 763 , 26 S.W.2d 753, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 647 ( Ky. 1930 ). See White Swan Laundry v. Boyd, 212 Ky. 747 , 279 S.W. 345, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 229 ( Ky. 1926 ); Malcolm v. Nunn, 226 Ky. 275 , 10 S.W.2d 817, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 59 ( Ky. 1928 ); Golubic v. Rasnick, 239 Ky. 355 , 39 S.W.2d 513, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 782 ( Ky. 1931 ).

Driver may be proceeding with utmost care, yet occasion may arise where he must sound horn to fully perform duty. Best's Adm'r v. Adams, 234 Ky. 702 , 28 S.W.2d 484, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 201 ( Ky. 1930 ).

Giving of signal by driver of on-coming truck to warn approaching motorist of its approach was unnecessary where motorist knew of its approach. Trevillian v. Boswell, 241 Ky. 237 , 43 S.W.2d 715, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 63 ( Ky. 1931 ).

Where defendant driver started braking as soon as he saw a pedestrian in the road ahead and did not sound his horn until he was ten to 20 feet behind her, he did not violate the requirement of this section that he sound a horn to warn pedestrians of his approach where necessary. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Stubblefield, 353 S.W.2d 371, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 14 ( Ky. 1962 ).

Where according to plaintiff’s evidence she was struck while on a traffic divider between traffic lanes and according to the defendant the pedestrian was struck as she was running across a traffic lane toward the divider, the motorist was not required, under either version, to sound her horn. Pearce v. Rawlings, 373 S.W.2d 426, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 160 ( Ky. 1963 ).

Since the only duty under KRS 189.340 with regard to sounding the horn is the duty under this section to sound a warning whenever necessary to warn others, court instruction that it was plaintiff’s duty to sound horn before passing “if you believe same was necessary” was not erroneous. Barrett v. Stephany, 510 S.W.2d 524, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 552 ( Ky. 1974 ).

4.— — Curve.

It was bus driver’s duty when approaching curve which obstructed view to hold bus under control, sound horn, and keep lookout for other vehicles. Big Sandy Bus Line Co. v. Williams, 246 Ky. 758 , 56 S.W.2d 346, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1933 ).

5.— — Private Driveways.

Driver on highway has no duty to sound horn when approaching intersection with private driveway. Thomas v. Dahl, 293 Ky. 808 , 170 S.W.2d 337, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 706 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Where operator of vehicle entering highway from private driveway looked and saw defendant’s truck approaching on highway, but thought he had time to cross in front, failure of defendant to sound horn violated no duty owed by defendant, and instruction as to duty to sound horn was erroneous. Thomas v. Dahl, 293 Ky. 808 , 170 S.W.2d 337, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 706 ( Ky. 1943 ).

6.— — Backing.

Where defendant truck driver was backing out into highway and approaching a curve, he should have sounded his horn in order to give some warning that he was blocking the highway at a very dangerous point. Nolan v. Nally, 342 S.W.2d 400, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 384 ( Ky. 1961 ).

7.— — Intersections.

This section does not mean drivers shall always sound horn on approaching intersection, but necessity for signals depends upon circumstances. Newbold v. Brotzge, 209 Ky. 218 , 272 S.W. 755, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 467 ( Ky. 1925 ).

In intersectional collision duty to sound horn should not be imposed upon motorist approaching intersection, where driver on boulevard saw him when about 150 feet away. Elliott's Guardian v. Bernauer, 248 Ky. 423 , 58 S.W.2d 632, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 244 ( Ky. 1933 ). See Tharp v. Elbert Coal & Teaming Co., 226 Ky. 421 , 11 S.W.2d 93, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 106 ( Ky. 1928 ).

8.— — Oncoming Automobiles.

Motorist who failed to sound horn was not contributorily negligent, where collision of meeting cars was caused by fact that driver of oncoming car, blinded by sun, drove down middle of highway and struck motorist who had moved far over to right side. Stevens v. Potter, 209 Ky. 705 , 273 S.W. 470, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 584 ( Ky. 1925 ).

Where lights on oncoming automobile while overtaking and passing bus were visible to approaching truck driver, it was unnecessary for motorist to sound horn for his benefit as required in overtaking vehicles. C. L. & L. Motor Express v. Lyons, 245 Ky. 611 , 53 S.W.2d 978, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 639 ( Ky. 1932 ).

9.— — Children.

Where thirteen-year-old boy engaged in romp with other boy walking along country highway, and when running from him with head averted was struck by slow-moving truck, question whether driver sounded warning signal was for jury on conflicting evidence. Collett's Guardian v. Standard Oil Co., 186 Ky. 142 , 216 S.W. 356, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1919 ) (decided under prior law).

Whether warning signal was sounded by truck approaching children in highway was jury question where some witnesses stated affirmatively that signal was given and others stated negatively that they did not hear signal. Collett's Guardian v. Standard Oil Co., 186 Ky. 142 , 216 S.W. 356, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1919 ) (decided under prior law).

It was truck driver’s duty as matter of law to give warning of truck’s approach, where he saw small child and her little brother playing in street with dog and they started across street. United Casket Co. v. Reeves, 206 Ky. 581 , 267 S.W. 1108, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 1003 ( Ky. 1925 ).

10.— — Pedestrians.

Signal of traffic officer authorizing movement of vehicles across intersection did not relieve motorist of duty of sounding horn, slowing speed or exercising reasonable care for pedestrians on opposite foot crossing; and motorist’s failure to observe duties after seeing crowd of pedestrians at crossing was negligent. Melville v. Rollwage, 171 Ky. 607 , 188 S.W. 638, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 390 ( Ky. 1916 ) ( Ky. 1916 ) (decided under prior law).

If pedestrian in place of safety saw automobile approaching, its driver did not need to sound warning signal. Bruce's Adm'x v. Callahan, 185 Ky. 1 , 213 S.W. 557, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 228 ( Ky. 1 919 ) (decided under prior law).

If pedestrian crossing street observed automobile passing along opposite side of street he should use ordinary care to avoid collision with it, but unless pedestrian knows of approach of car, driver should sound warning signal, control car, and stop if necessary to insure safety. Bruce's Adm'x v. Callahan, 185 Ky. 1 , 213 S.W. 557, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 228 ( Ky. 1 919 ) (decided under prior law).

It is motorist’s duty to sound horn only if necessary to warn of car’s approach to pedestrian or others using the street and in apparent danger therefrom. Wener v. Pope, 209 Ky. 553 , 273 S.W. 92, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 542 ( Ky. 1925 ).

It was truck driver’s duty as matter of law to give warning of truck’s approach to pedestrian whom he saw crossing city street intersection in nighttime in front of truck, despite contention that he stopped truck, that pedestrian returned to curb and as he started again pedestrian turned and stepped in front of truck. Hart Dry Cleaning Co. v. Grizzel, 218 Ky. 111 , 290 S.W. 1057, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 101 ( Ky. 1927 ).

Motorist on public street, where pedestrians may be expected, must keep reasonable lookout, operate car at reasonable speed, keep it under reasonable control, and give reasonable warning of its approach, if warning is necessary under circumstances. Wilder v. Cadle, 227 Ky. 486 , 13 S.W.2d 497, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 900 ( Ky. 1929 ); Kinsella v. Meyer's Adm'r, 267 Ky. 508 , 102 S.W.2d 974, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 341 ( Ky. 1937 ).

If pedestrian walking along side of highway saw approaching, overtaking automobile, it was unnecessary to give warning signal. Hawpe v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 27 , 27 S.W.2d 394, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 108 ( Ky. 1930 ).

Motorist was not guilty of voluntary manslaughter by recklessly driving overtaking automobile against pedestrian where there was evidence that he saw pedestrian when 1,000 feet away, that she looked toward car and then walked along side of highway, but, as he reached her, turned and walked in front of car, notwithstanding he gave no warning signal. Hawpe v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 27 , 27 S.W.2d 394, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 108 ( Ky. 1930 ).

While driver need not anticipate that pedestrian seen in place of safety will move into danger zone until his movements indicate that fact, yet instances arise where driver should give warning to pedestrian on or near highway who is apparently oblivious to car’s approach. Trainor's Adm'r v. Keller, 257 Ky. 840 , 79 S.W.2d 232, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 99 ( Ky. 1935 ).

In nighttime collision between truck and pedestrian, sounding of horn by driver going about 25 miles per hour when 300 yards from pedestrian to warn another pedestrian and not again until within 15 to 25 feet was insufficient, since it did not afford pedestrian opportunity to escape. Gilbert's Adm'r v. Allen, 264 Ky. 202 , 94 S.W.2d 341, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 291 ( Ky. 1936 ).

Notwithstanding truck driver going not over 20 miles per hour in city street did not sound horn, there was no liability for striking adult pedestrian, who was placing cans at edge of sidewalk and who, without indicating intention to go into street, left sidewalk and stepped into side of truck. Schulze Baking Co. v. Daniel's Adm'r, 271 Ky. 717 , 112 S.W.2d 1011, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 260 ( Ky. 1937 ).

11.— Instructions to Jury.

In action for striking pedestrian crossing country highway, instructions should have defined driver’s duty to signal approach of truck, where, although there was evidence that driver did not see pedestrian until instant of collision, there was also evidence that he could have seen him when 55 feet away. Nunnelley's Adm'r v. Muth, 195 Ky. 352 , 242 S.W. 622, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 339 ( Ky. 1922 ).

To conform to statute existing at time of accident court’s instruction as to giving warning should have been, to give, when necessary, timely warning of the approach of his automobile to such place by sounding the horn. Caines v. Wheeler, 207 Ky. 237 , 268 S.W. 1098, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 63 ( Ky. 1925 ).

Where evidence disclosed either that pedestrian crossing intersection and aware that traffic was moving across her path walked into side of car or that car skidded against her when brakes were suddenly applied, instruction respecting driver’s duty to sound horn was not required. Lieberman v. McLaughlin, 233 Ky. 763 , 26 S.W.2d 753, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 647 ( Ky. 1930 ).

Where bus driver knew of intersecting lane which was hidden from view by rising land and of danger which might exist there, instruction should be given requiring driver to give warning of bus’ approach if warning was necessary under circumstances. Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Hopkins' Adm'r, 238 Ky. 136 , 37 S.W.2d 1, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 197 ( Ky. 1931 ).

In action involving collision between automobile and small girl crossing highway, where necessity of warning of car’s approach would be jury question, instruction on duty to sound horn should incorporate idea “when necessary.” Gretton v. Duncan, 238 Ky. 554 , 38 S.W.2d 448, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 282 ( Ky. 1931 ).

Where motorist struck small boy who allegedly was rolling hoop and came from behind passing car and motorist gave no warning of car’s approach, case should go to jury on proper instructions where reasonable inference from evidence indicated that motorist violated some of duties respecting operation of car. Porter v. Music, 252 Ky. 582 , 67 S.W.2d 958, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 822 ( Ky. 1934 ).

In action involving collision between automobile and pedestrian crossing city street not at intersection, instruction requiring pedestrian to keep lookout for vehicles was erroneous; jury may or may not believe that ordinary care requires, under circumstances, pedestrian to look and listen. Trainor's Adm'r v. Keller, 257 Ky. 840 , 79 S.W.2d 232, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 99 ( Ky. 1935 ).

In action involving intersectional collision resulting in injury to pedestrian, it was error to instruct on duty to sound horn, where each driver knew of other’s presence and pedestrian had reached place of apparent safety. Field v. Collins, 263 Ky. 474 , 92 S.W.2d 793, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 207 ( Ky. 1936 ).

In action involving nighttime collision between truck and pedestrian, instruction as to sounding horn was erroneous, where it suggested that any sounding of horn would be sufficient warning regardless of whether it was timely or reasonable warning. Gilbert's Adm'r v. Allen, 264 Ky. 202 , 94 S.W.2d 341, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 291 ( Ky. 1936 ).

Instruction that driver should sound his horn “whenever necessary” instead of “if necessary” was not error, and was proper although not qualified by stating that duty existed if operator saw or could have seen boy on street. Kelly v. Marshall's Adm'r, 274 Ky. 666 , 120 S.W.2d 142, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 319 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Since under the statute a motorist is not required to sound his horn as warning of his approach except when necessary and the words “when necessary” should be embodied in an instruction defining the duties of the motorist in that particular. McElrath v. Barnett, 274 Ky. 771 , 120 S.W.2d 216, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 327 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Where evidence showed that auto entered blind intersection without heeding stop sign, and drove directly in front of truck, and that driver of auto saw truck as soon as she entered intersection, failure of court to instruct on duty of truck driver to sound horn was not error. Barr v. Searcy, 280 Ky. 535 , 133 S.W.2d 714, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 149 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Where driver testified he sounded horn three times, prior to striking boy, an instruction to jury failing to leave question of necessity of sounding horn to them was not prejudicial error even if erroneous. Lundy v. Brown's Adm'x, 305 Ky. 721 , 205 S.W.2d 498, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 913 ( Ky. 1947 ).

Where automobile being driven by owner’s employe at approximately 50 or 60 miles an hour struck a six-year-old boy crossing street in small village an instruction permitting recovery upon belief by jury that driver failed to exercise ordinary care in its operation, to keep it under reasonable control, to drive it at a reasonable speed or to give timely notice of the approach of the car by sounding the horn was not improper. Lever Bros. Co. v. Stapleton, 313 Ky. 837 , 233 S.W.2d 1002, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 996 ( Ky. 1950 ).

Instruction omitting duty of truck driver to sound horn was proper where there was absence of evidence indicating presence or possible presence of child behind truck. Hettich's Adm'r v. Mellwood Dairy, Inc., 278 S.W.2d 717, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 486 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Failure to give instruction on driver’s statutory duty to sound horn if necessary to give pedestrian notice of automobile was not error in absence of request. Wheat's Adm'r v. Gray, 309 Ky. 593 , 218 S.W.2d 400, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 765 ( Ky. 1949 ).

Where driver was aware of approaching vehicle and had time to stop it was improper to give instruction imposing unqualified duty on driver of approaching vehicle to sound horn. Shewmaker v. Richeson, 344 S.W.2d 802, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 247 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Instruction that truck driver had duty to sound his horn could properly be given only under last clear chance theory which was inapplicable where approaching automobile was in wrong lane and collision occurred about 3.26 seconds after automobile came into view and truck pulled to right as far as possible in an attempt to avoid the collision. Sellers v. Cayce Mill Supply Co., 349 S.W.2d 677, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Where striking of child by motorist was not due to any failure by motorist to give warning court properly refused instruction on duty of motorist to sound horn. Pearce v. Rawlings, 373 S.W.2d 426, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 160 ( Ky. 1963 ).

12.— Questions for Jury.

Driver should sound horn, not on all occasions, but only when circumstances require it; it was jury question whether he should have sounded it on making left turn at intersection on dark, rainy night when windshield wiper was not working well and when pedestrians were protected by red light. Jefferson's Adm'x v. Baker, 232 Ky. 98 , 22 S.W.2d 448, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 399 ( Ky. 1929 ).

As regards necessity of sounding horn, circumstances may be such as to require sounding as a matter of law, or so equivocal as to make it jury question. Lieberman v. McLaughlin, 233 Ky. 763 , 26 S.W.2d 753, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 647 ( Ky. 1930 ). See Stevens v. Potter, 209 Ky. 705 , 273 S.W. 470, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 584 ( Ky. 1925 ).

Although motorist did not see pedestrian who suddenly came from between parked cars and passed in front of motorist before he was struck, presence of parked cars and soft drink stand made it question for jury whether motorist should have sounded horn. Best's Adm'r v. Adams, 234 Ky. 702 , 28 S.W.2d 484, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 201 ( Ky. 1930 ).

Statute does not require driver to sound horn whenever automobile is moved, but only whenever necessary as warning of its approach; question of necessity is ordinarily for jury. Fork Ridge Bus Line v. Matthews, 248 Ky. 419 , 58 S.W.2d 615, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 235 ( Ky. 1933 ). See United Casket Co. v. Reeves, 206 Ky. 581 , 267 S.W. 1108, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 1003 ( Ky. 1925 ).

It was jury question whether motorist who, after passing intersection, saw man standing motionless either at curb or between parked cars, should have sounded horn to warn of car’s approach. Trainor's Adm'r v. Keller, 257 Ky. 840 , 79 S.W.2d 232, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 99 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Where group of children were on path at side of highway and one of them crossed street ahead of on-coming car and another followed and was struck by automobile, whether driver should have sounded horn and point at which it should have been sounded were jury questions. McCray v. Earls, 267 Ky. 89 , 101 S.W.2d 192, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 756 ( Ky. 1936 ).

In collision between pedestrian crossing city intersection in nighttime and automobile traveling at reasonable speed, where driver could have seen pedestrian, duty of sounding horn was not obviated by fact that he did not see her; whether he should have seen her and given warning was for jury. Pryor's Adm'r v. Otter, 268 Ky. 602 , 105 S.W.2d 564, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 488 ( Ky. 1937 ).

It is the sole province of the jury to determine whether operator should have sounded horn or given other signal required by statute. Kelly v. Marshall's Adm'r, 274 Ky. 666 , 120 S.W.2d 142, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 319 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Where bus driver, on coming over rise 500 feet from point where car was parked, sounded his horn and slowed his speed to about 25 miles per hour, but did not sound horn again until he was within 15 or 20 feet of parked car, second sounding of horn was not sufficient to warn person who was standing beside parked car, and it was a jury question as to whether bus driver used proper diligence in approaching the parked car. Short Way Lines, Inc. v. Sutton's Adm'r, 291 Ky. 541 , 164 S.W.2d 809, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 239 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Since the duty to sound a horn depends upon the necessity of the occasion, which is ordinarily a question for the jury, the absence of evidence as to whether the horn was sounded or not sounded or the necessity thereof under the circumstances did not authorize a peremptory instruction upon the ground of contributory negligence. Patton v. Gannett, 296 Ky. 533 , 177 S.W.2d 888, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 580 ( Ky. 1944 ).

Ordinarily the question of necessity for sounding horn is for the jury. Chappell v. Doepel, 301 Ky. 622 , 192 S.W.2d 809, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 535 ( Ky. 1946 ).

It is ordinarily a question for trier of facts to consider whether horn was sounded at proper time under the circumstances. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Stubblefield, 353 S.W.2d 371, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 14 ( Ky. 1962 ).

13.Authorized Emergency Vehicles.

The driver of bus was required to grant the right of way to emergency car if the siren was sounded and he heard or by the exercise of ordinary care could have heard it. Fayette County v. Hill, 304 Ky. 621 , 201 S.W.2d 886, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 688 ( Ky. 1947 ) (decision prior to 1970 amendment).

Where plaintiff was struck by defendant’s fire truck in an intersection through which the automatic traffic signal showed her to have the right of way, she had one witness who testified that the fire truck was not sounding a siren or other audible warning, and she introduced other witnesses who testified that they did not hear any warning from the truck, the issue was properly submitted to the jury although the defendant introduced several witnesses who testified that the siren was working properly immediately prior to the collision. Fayette County v. Veach, 294 S.W.2d 541, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1956 ) (decision prior to 1970 amendment).

Determination by jury that fire truck siren was sounded only weakly and intermittently, if at all, would constitute reasonable excuse for motorist’s refusal to yield right of way. Fayette County v. Veach, 294 S.W.2d 541, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1956 ) (decision prior to 1970 amendment).

When an emergency vehicle driver has the preferred right of way, he must be exceptionally alert when he intends to run a red traffic light at a busy street intersection and must take care commensurate with the serious consequences that might follow his failure to do so; he should remember that other drivers have the right to assume that the red light signal will be obeyed by him unless duly and timely warned to the contrary. Page v. Dodds, 433 S.W.2d 656, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 287 ( Ky. 1968 ) (decision prior to 1970 amendment).

Notice and warning to persons required to yield the right of way is essential, and a reasonable opportunity to yield or get out of the way is necessary before they become chargeable with the obligation to give preference to the emergency vehicle. Page v. Dodds, 433 S.W.2d 656, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 287 ( Ky. 1968 ) (decision prior to 1970 amendment).

Where a police cruiser intended not only to run a red light, but to use an extraordinary path in reaching the intersection, it might reasonably be considered that a warning which merely signified that an emergency vehicle was approaching was not adequate to give notice of the extraordinary course the vehicle would pursue. Page v. Dodds, 433 S.W.2d 656, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 287 ( Ky. 1968 ) (decision prior to 1970 amendment).

14.Motorcycles and Bicycles.

While operators of motorcycles and bicycles have the same duty to sound their horns in passing another vehicle as is required of operators of automobiles and other motor vehicles, defendant was under no duty to sound his horn for the benefit of persons whom he knew had recently crested a hill and was under no duty to anticipate that bicyclist would stop or slow down to a walk after cresting the hill. Benningfield v. Dixon, 482 S.W.2d 760, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 201 ( Ky. 1972 ).

Cited:

Fayette County v. Hill, 304 Ky. 621 , 201 S.W.2d 886, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 688 ( Ky. 1947 ); Veal v. Davis, 343 S.W.2d 593, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1960 ); Louisville v. Chapman, 413 S.W.2d 74, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 380 ( Ky. 1967 ); Marshall v. Merrifield, 474 S.W.2d 99, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 91 ( Ky. 1971 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Automobiles, § 16.02.

189.090. Brakes.

  1. No owner shall knowingly operate or permit to be operated on a highway a motor vehicle upon which the brakes are defective.
  2. Every motor vehicle, other than a motorcycle, when operated upon a highway shall be equipped with brakes adequate to control the movement of and to stop and hold the vehicle. There shall be two (2) separate means of applying the brakes, each of which means shall be effective to apply the brakes to at least two (2) wheels. If the two (2) separate means are connected in any way, they shall be so constructed that failure of any one (1) part of the operating mechanism shall not leave the motor vehicle without brakes on at least two (2) wheels.
    1. Except for commercial motor vehicles with a declared gross vehicle weight of more the ten thousand (10,000) pounds, the service brakes upon any motor vehicle or combination of vehicles shall be adequate to stop the vehicle when traveling twenty (20) miles per hour within a distance of forty (40) feet when upon dry asphalt or concrete pavement surface free from loose material where the grade does not exceed one percent (1%). (3) (a) Except for commercial motor vehicles with a declared gross vehicle weight of more the ten thousand (10,000) pounds, the service brakes upon any motor vehicle or combination of vehicles shall be adequate to stop the vehicle when traveling twenty (20) miles per hour within a distance of forty (40) feet when upon dry asphalt or concrete pavement surface free from loose material where the grade does not exceed one percent (1%).
    2. Under the conditions described in subsection (3)(a), the hand brake shall be adequate to stop the vehicle within a distance of fifty-five (55) feet and the hand brake shall be adequate to hold the vehicle stationary on any grade upon which it is operated.
    3. Under the conditions described in subsection (3)(a), the service brakes upon a motor vehicle equipped with two (2)-wheel brakes only shall be adequate to stop the vehicle within a distance of forty (40) feet and the hand brake adequate to stop the vehicle within a distance of fifty-five (55) feet.
    4. All braking distances specified in this section shall apply whether or not the vehicles are loaded to the maximum capacity permitted by law.
    5. All brakes shall be maintained in good working order and shall be so adjusted as to operate with equal effect with respect to the wheels on opposite sides of the vehicle.
  3. A person shall not operate any commercial motor vehicle with a declared gross weight of over ten thousand (10,000) pounds on any highway in this state unless it is equipped with efficient brakes that meet the federal motor carrier safety standards in 49 C.F.R. pt. 393 and may be operated by the operator of the vehicle.

History. 2739g-26, 2739g-88: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 173, § 2; 2006, ch. 173, § 8, effective July 12, 2006.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Duty of Driver.

Duty of taxicab driver when pedestrian unexpectedly stepped from curb in front of car was to use all means at hand by application of brakes and manipulation of car to avoid injury when peril was discovered. Finnegan v. Floyd Garage & Auto Livery Co., 214 Ky. 416 , 283 S.W. 402, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 351 ( Ky. 1926 ).

2.Brakes.
3.— Condition not Insured.

Operator of automobile is not an insurer of the mechanical perfection of his brakes under all conditions. Veal v. Davis, 343 S.W.2d 593, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1960 ).

4.— Failure to Apply.

That brakes were defective would not impose liability on owner where driver did not apply them before collision; driver’s fear of their defective condition and consequent refusal to apply them being too remote to impose liability. Rawlings v. Clay Motor Co., 287 Ky. 604 , 154 S.W.2d 711, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 596 ( Ky. 1941 ).

5.— Defective, Knowledge of.

Collision between bus and cattle being driven along highway caused by failure of brakes to function was not excusable as “unavoidable accident” where driver had previous knowledge of their defective condition. Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Sphar, 226 Ky. 30 , 10 S.W.2d 482, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 28 ( Ky. 1928 ).

Instruction to find for plaintiff if jury believed that defendant knew of defective brakes on his truck and with such knowledge operated the truck on the occasion in question with such defective brakes, “if any,” although subject to criticism because it could be construed as assuming that the brakes were defective, was not prejudicial, in view of use of words “if any” and in view of testimony of driver of truck that brakes were defective. McFarland v. Bruening, 299 Ky. 267 , 185 S.W.2d 247, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 404 ( Ky. 1945 ).

The fact that truck owner knew that brakes were defective did not render him liable, under this section, for injuries to occupant of truck sustained in an accident which occurred when truck was being operated by employe of truck owner, where employe had driven truck beyond turn-off to owner’s farm and was continuing on main highway on business of his own and was not engaged on owner’s business at time of accident, and owner did not know, or have reason to know, he would operate truck, with defective brakes, at place where accident occurred. Hensley v. Golden, 302 Ky. 856 , 196 S.W.2d 739, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 774 ( Ky. 1946 ).

Truck driver was negligent where he drove truck after garagemen had warned him brakes were faulty and when his brakes failed he ran off highway into a building. Jewell v. Dell, 284 S.W.2d 92, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 19 ( Ky. 1955 ).

6.— Evidence as to Condition.

Testimony by person who repaired brakes on truck that they were defective should have been excluded in absence of proof identifying truck repaired with truck which struck pedestrian. Golubic v. Rasnick, 239 Ky. 355 , 39 S.W.2d 513, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 782 ( Ky. 1931 ).

Where motorist relied on last clear chance doctrine to impose liability on truck driver, who struck him after he had negligently gone into pathway of truck, evidence that brakes were defective and collision might otherwise have been prevented was properly excluded since truck driver was required only to exercise ordinary care with means then available to avoid injury. Braden's Adm'x v. Liston, 258 Ky. 44 , 79 S.W.2d 241, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 574 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Where pedestrian was struck while crossing highway negligently, a new trial could not be granted on newly discovered evidence of faulty brakes since evidence at former trial disclosed no brakes could have stopped vehicle in time to avoid the accident. O. L. Cain's Adm'r v. Holder, 302 S.W.2d 839, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 219 ( Ky. 1957 ).

7.Jury Instructions.

Where jury could have concluded that plaintiff might have avoided collision in attempting to pass another auto if he had applied his brakes, court should have instructed under this section as to duty of plaintiff not to operate his auto with defective brakes. Whitney v. Penick, 281 Ky. 474 , 136 S.W.2d 570, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Where lack of brakes on trailer had no causal connection with collision the denial by court of instruction on this was not error. Keller v. Morehead, 247 S.W.2d 218, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 680 ( Ky. 1952 ).

In case involving automobile collision due to brake failure, the issue of whether defendant had exercised ordinary care in regard to inspection and maintenance of the brakes should have been submitted under proper instruction. Swope v. Fallen, 413 S.W.2d 82, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 384 ( Ky. 1967 ).

An instruction defining “ordinary care” sufficiently advised the jury of the driver’s duties with respect to checking and maintaining the braking system. Wagoner v. Roberson, 450 S.W.2d 270, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 442 ( Ky. 1970 ).

The necessity or propriety of giving an instruction concerning the six separate duties under this section must be determined by the particular facts involved. Wagoner v. Roberson, 450 S.W.2d 270, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 442 ( Ky. 1970 ).

8.Jury Question.

The question of whether a car’s brakes were adequate was a question for the jury. Willis v. Sherman, 464 S.W.2d 816, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 104 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Cited:

Beardsley v. Broach, 310 S.W.2d 539, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 396 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Automobiles, §§ 16.46, 16.47, 16.48.

189.095. Brake linings, sale when not of approved type prohibited.

  1. On and after January 1, 1967, it shall be unlawful to sell, or to display for sale, any brake lining unless of a type which has been submitted to the secretary of the Transportation Cabinet for approval and for which a certificate of approval has been issued by the secretary and is then in effect; provided, however, that no owner of a motor vehicle shall be required to replace brake linings which were installed before June 16, 1966 solely because such linings have not been approved in accordance with the provisions of this section.
  2. The secretary shall, in order to insure safe operation of motor vehicles, prescribe uniform specifications as to the stopping ability, pedal force, lining integrity, stability, fade and recovery characteristic requirements of brake linings and shall determine whether any brake lining submitted complies with such rules and uniform standards; provided, however, that in order to promote uniformity between the states and thereby avoid increased costs to the people of this state, due to the necessity of complying with diverse requirements in the distribution and sale of brake linings, the secretary is hereby authorized to adopt and maintain the standards and specifications which are adopted by the several states pursuant to the procedures of the Vehicle Equipment Safety Compact, or those of the Society of Automotive Engineers, whichever in the discretion of the secretary will better protect the safety of the people of this state.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 113, §§ 1, 2.

189.100. Steering device not to be defective.

No owner shall knowingly operate or permit to be operated on a highway a motor vehicle upon which the steering device is defective.

History. 2739g-27.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Applicability.

Since the auction dealer was never an owner of either the two vehicles, it could be liable for violations of either statute. Savage v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2021 Ky. App. LEXIS 8 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2021).

189.110. Unobstructed windshields — Display of American flag — Windshield wipers.

  1. A windshield in a fixed and upright position, that is equipped with safety glazing as required by federal safety-glazing material standards, is required on every motor vehicle which is operated on the public highways, roads, and streets, except on a motorcycle or implement of husbandry.
  2. A person shall not operate a motor vehicle on a public highway, road, or street with any sign, sunscreening material, product, or covering attached to, or located in or upon the windshield, except the following:
    1. A certificate or other paper required to be displayed by law;
    2. Sunscreening material along a strip at the top of the windshield, if the material is transparent and does not encroach upon the driver’s direct forward viewing area as defined in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards No. 205 as the AS/1 portion of the windshield.
  3. A person shall not operate a motor vehicle required to be registered in the Commonwealth, on a public highway, road, or street on which vehicle the side wings and side windows on either side forward of or adjacent to the operator’s seat are composed of, covered by, or treated with any sunscreening material or other product or covering which has the effect of making the window nontransparent or which would alter the window’s color, increase its reflectivity, or reduce its light transmittance, except as expressly permitted by this section. A sunscreening material may be applied to the windows if, when tested on one-eighth (1/8) inch clear glass, the material has a total solar reflectance of visible light of not more than twenty-five percent (25%) as measured on the nonfilm side and a light transmittance of at least thirty-five percent (35%) in the visible light range.
  4. A person shall not operate a motor vehicle required to be registered in the Commonwealth, on a public highway, road, or street on which vehicle any windows behind the driver are composed of, covered by, or treated with any sunscreening material, or other product or material which has the effect of making the window nontransparent or which would alter the window’s color, increase its reflectivity, or reduce its light transmittance, except as specified below:
    1. Sunscreen material consisting of film which, when tested on one-eighth (1/8) inch clear glass, has a total solar reflectance of visible light of not more than thirty-five percent (35%) as measured on the nonfilm side and a light transmittance of at least eighteen percent (18%) in the visible light range; however, sunscreen material which, when tested on one-eighth (1/8) inch clear glass, has a total solar reflectance of visible light of not more than thirty-five percent (35%) as measured on the nonfilm side and a light transmittance of at least eight percent (8%) in the visible light range may be used on multipurpose passenger vehicles;
    2. Perforated sunscreening material which, when tested in conjunction with existing glazing or film material, has a total reflectance of visible light of not more than thirty-five percent (35%) and a light transmittance of no less than thirty percent (30%). For those products or materials having different levels of reflectance, the highest reflectance from the product or material will be measured by dividing the area into sixteen (16) equal sections and averaging the overall reflectance. The measured reflectance of any of those sections may not exceed fifty percent (50%).
  5. A person shall not operate a motor vehicle required to be registered in the Commonwealth, upon a public highway, road, or street, on which vehicle the rear window is composed of, covered by, or treated with any material which has the effect of making the window nontransparent, unless the vehicle is equipped with side mirrors on both sides.
  6. Each installer or seller of sunscreening material shall provide a pressure-sensitive, self-destructive, nonremovable, vinyl-type film label to the purchaser stating that the material complies with the provisions of KRS 189.010(20) to (23) and subsections (1) to (5) of this section. Each installer shall affix the required label to the inside left door jamb of the motor vehicle. In addition, the label shall state the trade name of the material and the installer’s or seller’s business name. Labeling is not required for factory glazing which complies with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 205.
  7. Every percentage measurement required by subsections (3) and (4) of this section is subject to a tolerance of plus or minus three percent (3%).
  8. A person shall not install window tinting materials on a vehicle that fails to meet the minimum standards for light transmission pursuant to subsections (3) and (4) of this section. Tinted material that fails to meet the minimum standards for light transmission pursuant to subsections (3) and (4) of this section shall be removed immediately.
  9. A person who applies sunscreening materials in violation of this section shall be guilty upon conviction of a Class B misdemeanor.
  10. Nothing in this section shall prevent the display of a representation of the American flag on the rear window of any motor vehicle, including any vehicle owned by a local or state government, provided that the representation does not exceed a size of five (5) inches by eight (8) inches and is placed in a lower corner of the rear window.
  11. The windshield on every motor vehicle shall be equipped with a device for cleaning rain, snow or other moisture from the windshield. The device shall be so constructed as to be controlled by the operator of the vehicle.
  12. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the use of any window which is composed of, covered by, or treated with any material or component in a manner approved by federal statute or regulation if the window was a component part of a vehicle at the time of the vehicle manufacture, or the replacement of any window by a covering which meets these requirements.

History. 2739g-69c: amend. Acts 1970, ch. 283, § 1; 1988, ch. 244, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1994, ch. 42, § 11, effective July 15, 1994.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Applicability.

The cracks in defendant’s windshield were not a basis for a stop of his vehicle because the cracks were not a violation of KRS 189.110 , which concerns window tinting, nor were they severe enough to unreasonably impair his forward vision, so they were not a violation of KRS 189.020 , so a subsequent search to which defendant consented was invalid. Garcia v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 658, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 62 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

Circuit court properly imposed a $100 fine for excessive window tinting and allowed a deferred payment of that fine because the fine was not subject to waiver inasmuch as both the offense and the fine were defined outside of the penal code. Fultz v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.3d 385, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 214 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

2.Windshield Cracks.

Since KRS 189.110 provides requirements for window sunscreening and tinting, and also sets forth mandatory safety glazing of glass and windshield wiper requirements, but it does not set forth any express or implied proscriptions against cracks in a vehicle’s windshield, a cracked windshield does not constitute a violation of its provisions. Garcia v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 658, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 62 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

Cited:

Veal v. Davis, 343 S.W.2d 593, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1960 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although KRS 189.645 (now repealed) referred to “windshield wipers” in the plural, the obvious intent of subsection (3) (now (11)) of this section was to require sufficient equipment for clearing the windshield so that a motorist will have proper visibility for safe driving, and clearing only half of the windshield would not fulfill that intent, but if a vehicle comes from the manufacturer equipped with a one-blade windshield wiper device, it would meet the inspection requirements if that one-blade device were working properly. OAG 73-178 .

A university could, under KRS 164.975 , promulgate a regulation requiring a university parking sticker to be placed on an automobile windshield, without violating the motor vehicle laws, since subsection (1) (now(2)) of this section makes an exception as to windshield obstructions for “a paper required to be so displayed by law.” OAG 82-19 .

189.120. Safety glass required in motor vehicles.

  1. No person shall sell any new motor vehicle in this state nor shall any new motor vehicle be registered in this state unless the vehicle is equipped with safety glass wherever glass is used in the windshield, doors or windows.
  2. As used in this section, “safety glass” means any product composed of glass, so manufactured, fabricated, or treated as substantially to prevent shattering and flying of the glass when struck or broken, or such other or similar product as may be approved by the Department of Vehicle Regulation.
  3. The Department of Vehicle Regulation shall compile and publish a list of types of glass by name approved by the department as meeting the requirements of this section, and shall cause a copy of the list to be furnished to each county clerk. No motor vehicle which is subject to the provisions of this section shall be registered unless it is equipped with an approved type of safety glass as required by this section, and the Department of Vehicle Regulation may prescribe and enforce such regulations as are necessary to effectuate this section. If the rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission differ the common carriers may elect to apply the rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

History. 2739g-28a, 2739g-28b: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 171, § 1; 1956, ch. 136; 1958, ch. 126, § 24; 1978, ch. 384, § 334, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Veal v. Davis, 343 S.W.2d 593, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1960 ).

189.125. Requirements of use of seat belts, child restraint systems, and child booster seats — Exceptions.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, “motor vehicle” as used in this section means every vehicle designed to carry fifteen (15) or fewer passengers and used for the transportation of persons, but the term does not include:
    1. Motorcycles;
    2. Motor-driven cycles; or
    3. Farm trucks registered for agricultural use only and having a gross weight of one (1) ton or more.
  2. A person shall not sell any new motor vehicle in this state nor shall any person make application for registering a new motor vehicle in this state unless the front or forward seat or seats have adequate anchors or attachments secured to the floor and/or sides to the rear of the seat or seats to which seat belts may be secured.
    1. Any driver of a motor vehicle, when transporting a child of forty (40) inches in height or less in a motor vehicle operated on the roadways, streets, and highways of this state, shall have the child properly secured in a child restraint system of a type meeting federal motor vehicle safety standards. (3) (a) Any driver of a motor vehicle, when transporting a child of forty (40) inches in height or less in a motor vehicle operated on the roadways, streets, and highways of this state, shall have the child properly secured in a child restraint system of a type meeting federal motor vehicle safety standards.
    2. Any driver of a motor vehicle, when transporting a child under the age of eight (8) years who is between forty (40) inches and fifty-seven (57) inches in height in a motor vehicle operated on the roadways, streets, and highways of this state, shall have the child properly secured in a child booster seat. A child of any age who is greater than fifty-seven (57) inches in height shall not be required to be secured in a child booster seat under this section.
  3. As used in this section:
    1. “Child restraint system” means any device manufactured to transport children in a motor vehicle which conforms to all applicable federal motor vehicle safety standards; and
    2. “Child booster seat” means a child passenger restraint system that meets the standards set forth in 49 C.F.R. Part 571 that is designed to elevate a child to properly sit in a federally approved lap-and-shoulder belt system.
  4. Failure to use a child passenger restraint system or a child booster seat shall not be considered as contributory negligence, nor shall such failure to use a passenger restraint system or booster seat be admissible as evidence in the trial of any civil action. Failure of any person to wear a seat belt shall not constitute negligence per se.
  5. A person shall not operate a motor vehicle manufactured after 1981 on the public roadways of this state unless the driver and all passengers are wearing a properly adjusted and fastened seat belt, unless the passenger is a child who is secured as required in subsection (3) of this section. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to:
    1. A person who has in his possession at the time of the conduct in question a written statement from a physician, advanced practice registered nurse, or licensed chiropractor that he is unable, for medical or physical reasons, to wear a seat belt; or
    2. A letter carrier of the United States postal service while engaged in the performance of his duties.
  6. A conviction for a violation of subsection (6) of this section shall not be transmitted by the court to the Transportation Cabinet. The Transportation Cabinet shall not include a conviction for a violation of subsection (6) of this section as part of any person’s driving history record.
  7. The provisions of subsection (6) of this section shall supersede any existing local ordinance involving the use of seat belts. No ordinance contrary to subsection (6) of this section may be enacted by any unit of local government.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 76, § 1; 1982, ch. 158, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 232, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1994, ch. 39, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2006, ch. 180, § 9, effective July 12, 2006; 2008, ch. 108, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; 2012, ch. 130, § 1, effective July 12, 2012; 2015 ch. 91, § 1, effective June 24, 2015; 2016 ch. 87, § 4, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Construction.

This section’s silence on the legal duty to utilize a seat belt restraint cannot be construed as a legislative expression of public policy for or against the use of a seat belt restraint. Wemyss v. Coleman, 729 S.W.2d 174, 1987 Ky. LEXIS 210 ( Ky. 1987 ).

2.Common Carriers.

There is no statutory duty for common carriers to provide seat belts. Montgomery v. Midkiff, 770 S.W.2d 689, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

3.Warrantless Stop of Vehicle.

A law enforcement officer may stop a vehicle based solely upon a failure to secure a child of less than 40 inches in height in accordance with the statute. Commonwealth v. Fox, 48 S.W.3d 24, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 2001 ).

Defendant’s motion to dismiss should have been granted after defendant was charged with driving under the influence and driving without a seatbelt because the basis for defendant’s arrest was premised upon a highway checkpoint and the checkpoint did not comport with state police guidelines. There were no media announcements about the check point, a state trooper was not designated to be in charge of the checkpoint, the checkpoint was closed after defendant was arrested, and the state police could not put forth a constitutionally permissible purpose for its decision to conduct the vehicle checkpoint. Monin v. Commonwealth, 209 S.W.3d 471, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 186 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

4.Roadblocks.

Defendant’s motion to suppress a driving under the influence arrest was properly denied since a roadblock, which was set up to check for seatbelt law compliance and to check for general motor vehicle safety, and which was the sole reason for stopping defendant’s vehicle, was not prohibited by KRS 189.125(7)’ s restriction against police officer’s stopping vehicles or citing drivers based solely on violations of the KRS 189.125(6) mandate that drivers wear seatbelts. Dunlap v. Commonwealth, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 107 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2006).

5.Actions in Tort.

Truck driver and his employer were not entitled to a summary judgment as to the alleged failure of the driver of the other accident vehicle to wear a seat belt because there were disputed issues of material fact for a jury to consider as to whether the other driver failed to wear a seat belt in violation of KRS 189.125(6) and whether such failure was a substantial factor in his injuries. Norton v. Canadian Am. Tank Lines, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2184 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 12, 2009).

6.Jury Instructions.

Although a trial court properly qualified a civil engineer as an expert witness, the trial court failed to allow testimony of the amount of money that the expert witness was being paid to testify and erroneously instructed a jury on a passenger’s duty to wear a seat belt (contrary to KRS 189.125(6)); because the error was not harmless under CR 61.01, the matter had to be remanded for a new trial. Tetrick v. Frashure, 119 S.W.3d 89, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 243 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Note, The Seat Belt Defense in Kentucky: Wemyss v. Coleman, 15 N. Ky. L. Rev. 657 (1988).

189.126. Roadblocks for sole purpose of checking for seat belt violations prohibited.

All law enforcement agencies in this state shall be prohibited from erecting roadblocks for the sole purpose of checking for violations of KRS 189.125 .

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 180, § 12, effective July 12, 2006.

189.130. Mirrors.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, every motor vehicle shall be equipped with the following mirrors so located and adjusted as to reflect to the driver a view of the highway to the rear of the vehicle:
    1. One (1) mirror mounted on the left side of the vehicle; and
    2. One (1) mirror mounted either inside the vehicle approximately in the center or on the right side of the vehicle.
  2. No person shall, by himself or through his agent or servant, operate a motor vehicle upon the highways without the equipment required by subsection (1). Each day of operation without the equipment shall constitute a separate offense.
  3. No person shall sell, barter, or otherwise dispose of any motor vehicle described in subsection (1) unless it is equipped with a mirror as provided in that subsection.
  4. A motorcycle shall be required only to have the mirror identified a paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section.

History. 2739a-69a, 2739i-1 to 2739i-3: amend. Acts 2006, ch. 173, § 9, effective July 12, 2006.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Implied Duty for Lookout.

A duty to maintain a lookout to the rear is implied by this section. Hainline v. Hukill, 383 S.W.2d 353, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 35 ( Ky. 1964 ).

2.Jury Instructions.

An instruction defining the statutory duty with reference to having vehicle equipped with a rearview mirror and following the requirements of this section was not erroneous. Stockdale v. Eads, 263 S.W.2d 133, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 1153 ( Ky. 1953 ).

Instructions were not so prejudicial as to require a reversal where court used term “lookout” rather than “ordinary care” to learn of the presence of a closely following vehicle. The usual method of performing this duty is by the use of the rearview mirror with which automobiles are to be equipped under this section. Hainline v. Hukill, 383 S.W.2d 353, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 35 ( Ky. 1964 ).

189.140. Mufflers — Noise regulation.

  1. Every motor vehicle with an internal-combustion, steam or air motor shall be equipped with a suitable and efficient muffler. No person while on a highway shall operate a motor vehicle with the muffler cut out or removed. No cutout shall be so arranged or connected as to permit its operation or control by the driver of any motor vehicle while in position for driving.
  2. No person shall modify the exhaust system of a motor vehicle or an off highway vehicle in a manner which will amplify or increase the noise emitted by the motor of such vehicle above that emitted by the muffler originally installed on the vehicle. The original muffler shall comply with all of the noise requirements of KRS Chapter 224 and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto. No person shall operate a motor vehicle with an exhaust system so modified.

History. 2739g-25: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 332, § 1.

189.150. Escaping contents — Shifting or spilling loads.

  1. No vehicle shall be operated upon any highway unless it is so constructed as to prevent its contents from escaping.
  2. No vehicle shall be operated upon any public highway for a distance of over one (1) mile whose load is susceptible to shifting or spillage unless said load is covered with a device suitable for prevention of spillage.

History. 2739g-49: amend. Acts 1982, ch. 203, § 14, effective July 15, 1982.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Hancock v. Terry Elkhorn Mining Co., 503 S.W.2d 710, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 42 ( Ky. 1973 ); Commonwealth v. Mountain Truckers Asso., 683 S.W.2d 260, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 636 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Coal trucks operated carrying loads of coal which is piled two or more feet above the sides of the truck would be in violation of this section. OAG 70-522 .

Where a citizen observes overweight coal truck violations occurring in his presence, he should appear before a magistrate, county judge (now county judge/executive), police judge, or Circuit Judge for the purpose of swearing out a complaint charging violation of the pertinent statutory provisions. Although a citizen generally may not be qualified to determine the weight of a vehicle by mere observation, nevertheless he is capable of determining whether the truck is constructed so as to contain properly its contents (as required by this section) or whether the operator of the truck is guilty of littering the highways (thus offending KRS 433.753 ). OAG 70-522 .

A county ordinance requiring motor vehicles, trailers, and semitrailers operating upon county public roads and carrying cargo to be covered effectively to prevent cargo in such vehicles from spilling upon the highways is enforceable on county roads as it is not in conflict with either this section or KRS 189.231 and is also enforceable on state highways located within the county and the ordinance passed under the authority of the home rule statute (KRS 67.083 ) does not constitute an abdication of the state’s right to use its own police power to enforce the law. OAG 75-468 .

Despite the fact that a person has been convicted six times in the past four years of violating this section by littering the highway by transporting chicken waste in a truck which leaked its contents on the highway, there is no statute providing for the abatement of such a nuisance by injunction and the facts do not constitute a common-law nuisance; however, the repeated offender could be convicted, if he offends in the same way again, under KRS 512.070 for criminal littering, a class B misdemeanor, and could be fined up to $250 or sentenced to 90 days in jail, or both. OAG 80-163 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Ausness, Torts, 63 Ky. L.J. 753 (1974-1975).

189.160. Vehicles transporting explosives to be marked — Fire extinguishers.

Whenever a vehicle is used to transport an explosive, it shall be marked on each side and the rear with the word “Explosives” in letters no less than eight (8) inches high, or there shall be displayed on the rear of the vehicle a red flag not less than twenty-four (24) inches square marked with the word “Danger” in white letters six (6) inches high. The vehicle shall be equipped with not less than two (2) fire extinguishers, filled and ready for immediate use, and placed at a convenient point on the vehicle.

History. 2739g-69e.

189.170. Trucks hauling stock to display owner’s name. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-53a) was repealed by Acts 1988, ch. 72, § 3, effective July 15, 1988.

189.180. Height, width and length of trucks and semitrailer trucks. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-83 to 2739g-85: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 5, §§ 2, 5, 8; 1950, ch. 176, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 115, par. 1.

189.190. Chains and lugs on wheels — Thickness of solid rubber tires.

  1. No person shall use on a highway not covered with ice, a vehicle with a chained wheel, unless the wheel rests upon an ice shoe at least six (6) inches wide.
  2. Where chains are used on rubber-tired vehicles, the cross chains shall be not more than three-fourths (3/4) of an inch in thickness or diameter, and shall be spaced not more than ten (10) inches apart, around the circumference of the tires.
  3. Any machinery, utensils or implements used solely for agricultural, farming or manufacturing purposes may be operated on the highways under present equipment except as is provided in subsection (4).
  4. No tractor, traction engine, hauling engine or other similar power vehicle having any projections on the face of the tires or rims of the wheels in contact with the pavement shall be operated on any highway, the top surface of which is either composed of or treated with bituminous materials or concrete except that the driving wheels may be fitted with flat lugs extending diagonally across the entire width of the tire or rim. Those lugs shall be not less than one (1) inch in width at the bearing surface in contact with the pavement, but those lugs shall be so spaced that not less than two (2) lugs on each driving wheel shall be in contact with the highway surface at all times. The front or nondriving wheels may be fitted with flat steering rings, if those rings are at least two (2) inches in width and not more than one and one-half (1-1/2) inches in height, but there shall be no bolt head, rivet heads or other projections beyond the face of the tire or rim. The narrow angle iron lugs used for plowing or on soft ground shall not be permitted, nor shall any tractor or other vehicles of the caterpillar or track laying type having such projections on the faces of the shoes or treads of the track in contact with the roadway be permitted unless fitted with the flat lugs, in a way that will prevent any injury to the highway by either the narrow angle lugs or the projections on any tractor or other vehicle named in this section.
  5. No solid rubber or rubber compounded tire on any vehicle, other than a vehicle being actually used in the construction or maintenance of a highway, shall be less than one (1) inch thick, measured from the steel flange of the rim. Any person violating this subsection shall be civilly liable for any damage done to any state or county highway. The county attorney of the county in which the damage is done shall institute actions necessary to reimburse the state or county for the damage suffered.

History. 2739g-33, 4345, 4346a-1, 4346a-2, 4346a-5.

189.200. Maximum weight on iron and solid tires.

No person shall operate on a highway a vehicle that has greater weight on any tire per inch of width of the tire which is in contact with the surface of the highway, than four hundred (400) pounds, for iron or steel tires, or six hundred (600) pounds, for solid rubber or rubber compounded tires.

History. 2739g-33.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Limitation.
2.— Total Weight not Fixed.

This section, which measures loads haulable in vehicles on public highways by permitting weights dependent upon tire widths, does not fix limit to total weight. Ashland v. Ashland Supply Co., 225 Ky. 123 , 7 S.W.2d 833, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 710 ( Ky. 1928 ).

3.— By City Ordinance.

Ordinance of second-class city forbidding commercial vehicles and loads exceeding ten tons upon city streets without permit was valid, not being unreasonable or violative of this section, and since loads to be hauled on city streets should be subject to local control. Ashland v. Ashland Supply Co., 225 Ky. 123 , 7 S.W.2d 833, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 710 ( Ky. 1928 ).

Cited:

Whitney v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 65, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3654 (D. Ky. 1941 ), aff’d, 314 U.S. 574, 62 S. Ct. 117, 86 L. Ed. 465, 1941 U.S. LEXIS 262 (1941).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Registration fee increased 50 per cent for truck not having pneumatic tires, KRS 186.050 .

189.205. Regrooved or recut tires prohibited — Exceptions.

  1. No person shall knowingly operate on any highway any vehicle on which any tire has been regrooved or recut or offer such tire for sale or exchange.
  2. This section shall not apply to regrooved or recut vehicle tires which are designed and constructed in such a manner that regrooving and recutting is an acceptable and safe practice nor does this subsection apply to regrooving and recutting done in a tire recapping process.
  3. No provision of this section shall apply or be construed to apply to any commercial vehicle operated under safety regulations or requirements of the Kentucky department of vehicle regulation or of the interstate commerce commission.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 142, § 1.

189.210. Maximum weight permitted on highway.

  1. No person shall operate on a highway any vehicle, object or contrivance, other than a motor truck or semitrailer truck, which weighs more than fifteen (15) tons, including the weight of the vehicle, object or contrivance and load, except as provided by subsection (2). This shall not apply to vehicles run upon tracks or fire apparatus belonging to any municipal or volunteer fire department or used by such a department in the discharge of its functions.
  2. The county judge/executive or the county road engineer of any county upon an application in writing by the owner or person having charge of, may grant permission for the movement of vehicles, objects or structures limited by subsection (1), over the highways within that county and located outside of a city. The permission shall be in writing and the county judge/executive or the county road engineer may grant it subject to such conditions and restrictions as in his judgment are necessary for the preservation and protection of the highways. The city engineer or mayor of any city may in like manner grant permission as to the highways within the city.

History. 4345a-1, 4345a-2.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The county is not legally authorized to accept a bond for the day-to-day use of a county road by trucks weighing substantially in excess of the legal limits, and any such use constitutes a violation of law and may be cited to the district court. OAG 78-726 .

A county judge/executive is not authorized by this section to grant permission for trucks or semitrailers to exceed the weight limit on county roads imposed by subsection (4) of KRS 189.221 on trucks, semitrailer trucks or tractor trailer units, since the express language of this section excepts motor trucks or semitrailer trucks from its operation, and since a contrary interpretation would subvert the clear intent of KRS 189.221 , which section must be considered in pari materia with this section. OAG 81-397 .

189.212. Authority of fiscal court to issue special permits for certain haulers.

  1. As used in this section, “materials” shall mean cargo, whether divisible or nondivisible, that a motor vehicle transports in the usual and ordinary course of business and shall specifically include, but not be limited to, agricultural products, minerals, or natural resources transported by a motor vehicle.
  2. A fiscal court may issue special permits to the owners, operators, or lessees of motor vehicles for the purpose of hauling materials whose gross weight or dimensions, including vehicle and load, exceeds the limits prescribed by KRS 189.210 but that do not exceed the maximum weight limits established in KRS 189.222 . A permit shall be issued for specified materials only and shall designate the portions of the fiscal court-owned road over which the vehicle may operate under the permit. The permit shall be issued for a stated period of time not to exceed one (1) year and shall be upon the terms and conditions as the fiscal court may, in its discretion, require. The fiscal court shall require, as a condition to issuing the permit, that the applicant pay a reasonable fee to be fixed by the fiscal court and enter into a cooperative agreement under the provisions of KRS 189.230 . The operation of any motor vehicle in accordance with the terms of the permit shall not constitute a violation of this chapter, if the operator has a valid permit, or a copy of a valid permit, in his or her possession.
  3. The fiscal court shall not issue a permit under this section for a vehicle whose dimensions, including vehicle and load, exceed the maximum dimension limits established in KRS 189.222 .
  4. A person shall not operate a motor vehicle in violation of the terms and conditions of any permit issued by the fiscal court under this section.
  5. A fiscal court may:
    1. Exercise general supervision for administering and enforcing the provisions of this section.
    2. Adopt ordinances regulating the issuance of a permit, including but not limited to matters concerning the duration of permits and weight limits for various types of vehicles, materials, and highways.
    3. Adopt rules and regulations governing the amount, terms, and conditions of a bond and the sufficiency of the surety of any bond required by this section.
    4. Issue, continue in effect, revoke, modify, or deny a permit issued under this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 484, § 2, effective July 15, 1998.

189.214. Recreational vehicles — Access to public highways — Definitions.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Appurtenances” means the following devices that do not extend beyond the maximum vehicle width as established in subsection (2) of this section by more than six (6) inches on either side of a recreational vehicle:
      1. Hand holds for entry or egress;
      2. Load-induced tire bulge;
      3. Rearview mirrors;
      4. Splash and spray suppressant devices;
      5. Turn signal lamps; and
      6. Shade awnings and their mounting hardware;
    2. “Recreational vehicle” has the meaning set forth in KRS 186.650(4); and
    3. “Width exclusion safety devices” means the following devices that do not extend beyond the maximum vehicle width as established in subsection (2) of this section by more than three (3) inches on either side of a recreational vehicle:
      1. Corner caps;
      2. Lift pads;
      3. Rear or side door hinges and protective hardware;
      4. Rain gutters;
      5. Side marker lamps;
      6. Tarps and tarp hardware; and
      7. Wall variations from a true flat.
  2. A recreational vehicle that is one hundred two (102) inches in width and is registered under KRS 186.050 , 186.655 , or an equivalent statute from another state shall have access to any public state-maintained highway in Kentucky and the vehicle’s appurtenances and width exclusion safety devices shall not exceed the limits defined in this section. A recreational vehicle shall not exceed established weight limits on Kentucky highways without first obtaining an overweight permit issued under this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 96, § 1, effective June 24, 2003; 2005, ch. 34, § 1, effective June 20, 2005.

189.220. Maximum weight of truck or semitrailer truck. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-82: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 5, §§ 1, 4, 7; 1950, ch. 176, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 115, par. 1.

189.221. Basic height, width, length, and weight limits for trucks, trailers, manufactured homes, or vehicles — Exception.

A person shall not operate on any highway, except those highways designated by the secretary of transportation under the provisions of KRS 189.222 , or those locally maintained highways under the provisions of KRS 189.222 (11) or KRS 189.230(4), any of the following trucks, trailers, manufactured homes, or vehicles:

  1. Any motor truck, semitrailer, trailer, manufactured home, or vehicle which exceeds eleven and one-half (11-1/2) feet in height or ninety-six (96) inches in width, including any part of the body or load;
  2. Any motor truck, except a semitrailer truck, which exceeds twenty-six and one half (26-1/2) feet in length, including any part of the body or load;
  3. Any semitrailer truck which exceeds thirty (30) feet in length, including any part of the body or load;
  4. Any truck, semitrailer truck, or truck and trailer unit which exceeds 36,000 pounds gross weight, including the load;
  5. Any truck, semitrailer truck, or tractor-trailer unit which exceeds a gross weight equal to the sum of six hundred (600) pounds per inch of the combined width of the tires upon which the vehicle may be propelled, but no more than thirty-six thousand (36,000) pounds.
  6. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, any truck hauling building materials under KRS 189.2226 , or to a road construction project on a highway rated less than the maximum weight provided above, may haul up to eighty thousand (80,000) pounds gross weight, including the load, without a permit.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 115, § 2; 1962, ch. 91, § 2; 1982, ch. 395, § 19, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 330, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 132, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 42, § 12, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 484, § 3, effective July 15, 1998; 2003, ch. 124, §§ 35, 38, effective June 24, 2003; 2009, ch. 34, § 2, effective June 25, 2009.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

The provision of limiting gross weight of trucks or semitrailer trucks was not violative of either the United States or Kentucky Constitutions. Whitney v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 65, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3654 (D. Ky.), aff'd, 314 U.S. 574, 62 S. Ct. 117, 86 L. Ed. 465, 1941 U.S. LEXIS 262 (U.S. 1941).

Even if laws regulating height, width and length of trucks or semitrailer trucks did not give right of appeal from highway commission and county judges (now county judges/executive), aggrieved party would not be without remedy in view of general powers of courts of equity to protect against arbitrary action and preserve due process of law. Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Com., 247 Ky. 144 , 56 S.W.2d 691, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 863 ( Ky. 1932 ) (decided under prior law).

Laws regulating height, width and length of trucks or semitrailer trucks were not unconstitutional in prescribing maximum limits upon length and width of trucks, being within police power of state although applied also to operation of trucks by nonresidents or in interstate commerce on public roads whether maintained by a state or by a county. Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Com., 247 Ky. 144 , 56 S.W.2d 691, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 863 ( Ky. 1932 ) (decided under prior law).

Fact that limitations laws as to weight, dimensions and speed placed on motor trucks did not apply to passenger buses did not render such laws discriminatory and invalid. Whitney v. Fife, 270 Ky. 434 , 109 S.W.2d 832, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 87 ( Ky. 1937 ) (decided under prior law).

2.Proximate Cause of Accident.

Former similar section was for the benefit of the roads; hence state only could complain of a violation of statute, unless it was shown that a violation thereof was proximate cause of accident. Magness' Adm'x v. Hutchinson, 274 Ky. 226 , 117 S.W.2d 1041, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 220 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

Refusal to submit issue as to overwidth of truck to jury was proper where there was no evidence that such overwidth was a proximate cause of collision. Marmor v. Marmor, 409 S.W.2d 526, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1966 ).

In an accident where the plaintiff’s brakes failed and he struck the defendant’s stopped truck from the rear, the fact that the defendant’s truck was wider than the statutory maximum was not the proximate cause of the accident. Howard v. Fields, 433 S.W.2d 629, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 279 ( Ky. 1968 ).

3.Operation of Wide Vehicles.

One driving a motor vehicle having a greater width than the ordinary passenger car, even though within the width permitted by statute, was required to take that fact into consideration as he endeavored to exercise ordinary care in its operation. Commercial Carriers, Inc. v. Small, 277 Ky. 189 , 126 S.W.2d 143, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 638 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

Cited:

Webb v. Commonwealth, 258 S.W.2d 452, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 827 ( Ky. 1953 ); Kentucky Power Co. v. Thompson, 335 S.W.2d 915, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 294 ( Ky. 1960 ); Hancock v. Terry Elkhorn Mining Co., 503 S.W.2d 710, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 42 ( Ky. 1973 ).

NOTES TO UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS

1.Negligence.

Unpublished decision: Negligence case filed by an estate was subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction by the Kentucky Board of Claims because the fact that the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Transportation Cabinet, Department of Highways owed a general duty to the public to enforce size and weight restrictions of vehicles upon particular roadways did not establish that it owed any direct duty to a decedent to prevent, by way of more vigorous enforcement of those regulations, a fatal accident. Commonwealth v. Collins, 2015 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 879 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2015), aff'd, 516 S.W.3d 320, 2017 Ky. LEXIS 203 ( Ky. 2017 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The venue provisions of KRS 281.795 apply to KRS 281.790 injunctions by DMT against overweight coal truck violations pursuant to this section and KRS 189.222(1). OAG 70-522 .

A city cannot by ordinance restrict the gross vehicle weight of dump type trucks to 5,000 pounds. OAG 71-435 .

Under this section a city may bring an action against overweight or overlong trucks operating on city streets where such streets are not state highways or state maintained even though the trucks have been granted permits from the state to exceed the prescribed weight and length limitations. OAG 72-247 .

Although the maximum weight limit of this section applies to all county roads which are not part of a state-maintained system, the county judge may prescribe lower load limits under conditions outlined in KRS 189.230 . OAG 76-271 .

A county, through fiscal court, can sue to enjoin repeated violations of the truck weight statute resulting in damages or obstruction to county roads. OAG 79-393 .

A county judge/executive is not authorized by KRS 189.210 to grant permission for trucks or semitrailers to exceed the weight limit on county roads imposed by subsection (4) of this section on trucks, semitrailer trucks or tractor trailer units, since the express language of KRS 189.210 excepts motor trucks or semitrailer trucks from its operation, and since a contrary interpretation would subvert the clear intent of this section, which section must be considered in pari materia with KRS 189.210. OAG 81-397 .

The central legislative purpose of this section was to provide the state with a rule to prevent the wear and hazards due to excessive size of vehicles and weight of load. OAG 81-397 .

There is no requirement that farm tractors and wagons comply with the overwidth or overlength requirements of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, or any other regulation as set forth by the Department of Transportation (now Transportation Cabinet). OAG 82-213 .

In the absence of statute, a fiscal court has no authority, by ordinance or otherwise, to require heavy truck haulers to execute a bond guaranteeing against damage to county roads. OAG 84-21 .

Where a vehicle is properly equipped and operated under applicable statutes and has proper load weights, generally the vehicle operator or owner is not answerable in damages to a county in contributing to the wear and deterioration of county roads; the right of action only accrues where road repairs are necessitated because of a wrongful, negligent or unreasonable use of the public way. OAG 84-21 .

A fiscal court can sue to enjoin repeated violations of the truck weight statute resulting in damages or obstruction to county roads. OAG 84-68 .

A fiscal court has no authority to establish a system of permits whereby trucks would be permitted to haul commodities in excess of statutory weight limits over county roads upon the posting of a bond for any damages which they might cause to such roads. Such a permit system would be in direct conflict with the legislative program envisioned in this section and KRS 189.230 . OAG 84-68 .

The gross weight limit of 36,000 pounds, provided in subsection (4) of this section, applies to any truck, semitrailer truck or truck and trailer unit, operating upon any highway regardless of the nature of its cargo, including coal, timber or other natural resources; the truck weight limitation, which applies explicitly to “any highway,” would include county roads. OAG 85-40 .

The fiscal court, in determining whether to make an appropriation for purchase of scales to weigh trucks for use by the sheriff’s office, could weigh such need against funds available, reasonable enforcement priorities, availability of outside resources, and other considerations; a fiscal court is under a strict duty to ensure that essential obligations are provided for before making appropriations for those things that, while allowable, are not compulsory or indispensable. OAG 92-61 .

While a writ of mandamus might lie to direct the sheriff to enforce statutory provisions within his purview, such remedy probably will not compel the exercise of such duty in a particular way, e.g., to require a sheriff to acquire scales for enforcement of vehicle weight provisions. OAG 92-61 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Notes, Economic, Social and Legal Aspects of Coal Transportation in Kentucky, 64 Ky. L.J. 601 (1975-76).

189.222. Increased height, length, and weight limits on designated highways — Exceptions — Cabinet may promulgate administrative regulations to implement 23 C.F.R. Part 658 — Restriction of cabinet’s enforcement powers on locally maintained roads.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the secretary of the Transportation Cabinet in respect to highways which are a part of the state- maintained system, by official order, may increase on designated highways or portions thereof, the maximum height, length, and gross weight prescribed in KRS 189.221 , if in the opinion of the secretary, the increased height, length, and weight designated by him are justified by the strength, safety, and durability of the designated highways, and the highways do not appear susceptible to unreasonable and unusual damage by reason of the increases and the secretary may establish reasonable classification of state maintained roads and fix a different maximum for each classification. Any increase in the height, length, or width of any motor truck or tractor semitrailer combinations or any other vehicle combinations including any part of the body or load or designation of highways to be used by the vehicles, shall not, in any way, exceed the federal law or regulations thereunder or jeopardize the allotment or qualification for federal aid funds of the Commonwealth of Kentucky or exceed the following dimensions and weights:
      1. Height, for vehicles transporting motor vehicles, fourteen (14) feet; and (a) 1. Height, for vehicles transporting motor vehicles, fourteen (14) feet; and
      2. Height, for all other vehicles, thirteen and one-half (13-1/2) feet;
    1. Length, semitrailers, fifty-three (53) feet; trailers, twenty-eight (28) feet; motor trucks, forty-five (45) feet, not to exceed two (2) trailers per truck tractor;
    2. Weight, twenty thousand (20,000) pounds per single axle, with axles less than forty-two (42) inches apart to be considered as a single axle; thirty-four thousand (34,000) pounds on two (2) axles in tandem arrangement which are spaced forty-two (42) inches or more apart and less than ninety-six (96) inches apart; forty-eight thousand (48,000) pounds on three (3) axles which are spaced forty-two (42) inches or more apart and less than one hundred twenty (120) inches apart. No single axle in any arrangement shall exceed twenty thousand (20,000) pounds or seven hundred (700) pounds per inch of the aggregate width of all the tires on a single axle, whichever is less. The total gross weight of the vehicle and load shall not exceed eighty thousand (80,000) pounds;
    3. Except on the interstate highway system, a tolerance of not more than five percent (5%) per axle load shall be permitted before a carrier is deemed to have violated paragraph (c) of this subsection. The gross weight shall not exceed eighty thousand (80,000) pounds;
    4. Except as provided for in paragraph (f) of this subsection, truck tractor, semitrailer and trailer combinations, and other vehicle combinations may be operated only on the interstate system and on those parts of the federal aid highway system and the state-maintained system which have been designated by the secretary of the Transportation Cabinet by official order as safely allowing same;
    5. A vehicle or combination of vehicles that is one hundred two (102) inches wide or less and has a gross weight of not more than eighty thousand (80,000) pounds may be driven on any state highway, for a distance of up to fifteen (15) miles from an interstate or parkway exit.
  2. In addition to the provisions of KRS 189.2226 , vehicles with a gross weight of up to eighty thousand (80,000) pounds may travel on any state highway in the Commonwealth without obtaining a special permit, if the weight does not exceed any limits mandated by federal law or regulation, any posted bridge weight limit, or the weight limits for the size and type of vehicle established under paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section, and if the vehicle is transporting any of the following:
    1. Meats or agricultural crop products originating from a farm to first market;
    2. Livestock or poultry from their point of origin to first market. As used in this paragraph and in paragraph (d) of this subsection, “livestock” means cattle, sheep, swine, goats, horses, alpacas, llamas, buffaloes, or any other animals of the bovine, ovine, porcine, caprine, equine, or camelid species;
    3. Primary forest products, including, but not limited to, sawdust, wood chips, bark, slabs, or logs originating from their points of origin to first market; or
    4. Supplies, materials, or equipment necessary to carry out a farming operation engaged in the production of agricultural crop products, meats, livestock, or poultry.
  3. The following vehicles registered under KRS 186.050 may exceed the gross weight provisions set forth in subsection (1)(c) of this section by a weight tolerance of ten percent (10%), except on the interstate highway system:
    1. Vehicles that are engaged exclusively in the transportation of items listed in subsection (2)(a), (b), and (c) of this section; and
    2. Vehicles that are engaged exclusively in the transportation of feed for livestock or poultry.
  4. Vehicles exclusively engaged in the transportation of motor vehicles, unmanufactured tobacco, or unmanufactured tobacco products may, on those highways which are a part of the state-maintained system and which have been designated by the secretary of the Transportation Cabinet by official order as safely allowing same, attain the maximum lengths as provided by subsection (1)(b) of this section, excluding the usual and ordinary bumper overhang of the transported vehicles.
  5. Vehicles engaged exclusively in the transportation of farm or primary forestry products and registered under KRS 186.050(4) or 186.050(9) and vehicles engaged exclusively in the transportation of ready-mixed concrete shall be excluded from the axle weight provisions, except on interstate highways, and subject only to total gross weight provisions.
  6. Vehicles registered pursuant to KRS 186.050(3)(b) and engaged in the transportation of primary forest products, including, but not limited to, vehicles transporting sawdust, wood chips, bark, slabs, or logs, may exceed the axle, or gross weight provisions as set forth in accordance with subsection (1)(c) of this section by a weight tolerance of ten percent (10%), except on the interstate highway system.
  7. Vehicles designed for and engaged exclusively in the collection and hauling of refuse and registered under KRS 186.050(3)(b) shall be excluded from the axle weight provisions, except when in operation on the federal interstate system, and subject only to total gross weight provisions.
  8. The secretary of the Transportation Cabinet may by order increase the weight and height limits prescribed by this chapter for motor vehicles while being operated exclusively on roads or highways being constructed, reconstructed, or repaired under contract with the Transportation Cabinet by the contractor or subcontractor, agent, or employee thereof.
  9. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the secretary of the Transportation Cabinet shall not authorize the operation of any vehicle or combination of vehicles, upon any part of the federal aid highway system or state parkway system, which exceeds the following dimensions and weights:
    1. Width, one hundred two (102) inches, including any part of the body or load;
    2. Weight, twenty thousand (20,000) pounds per single axle, with axles less than forty-two (42) inches apart to be considered as a single axle; thirty-four thousand (34,000) pounds on two (2) axles in tandem arrangement which are spaced forty-two (42) inches or more apart and less than ninety-six (96) inches apart; forty-eight thousand (48,000) pounds on three (3) axles which are spaced forty-two (42) inches or more apart and less than one hundred twenty (120) inches apart. The total gross weight of the vehicle and load shall not exceed eighty thousand (80,000) pounds. If any federal law or laws or regulations thereunder are hereafter enacted authorizing weights and dimensions in excess of those set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection, the secretary of the Transportation Cabinet may by official order increase the maximum weights and dimensions but the increased weights and dimensions shall not exceed those set out in this section.
  10. Except on the interstate highway system, vehicles engaged exclusively in the transportation of crushed stone, fill dirt and rock, soil, bulk sand, coal, phosphate muck, asphalt, concrete, solid waste, tankage or animal residues, livestock, feed for livestock or poultry, and agricultural products shall be permitted a tolerance of ten percent (10%) of the axle weight provisions before a carrier is deemed to have violated paragraph (1)(c) of this section.
  11. The Transportation Cabinet may promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A, relating to the implementation of 23 C.F.R. Part 658 as it relates to state-maintained or locally maintained roads. The enforcement of the provisions of KRS 189.221 and this section on locally maintained roads shall not be the responsibility of the law enforcement officers of the Transportation Cabinet, unless the head of the corresponding local government unit has requested, in writing, enforcement assistance from the Transportation Cabinet.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 115, § 3; 1956 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 2; 1958, ch. 70, § 29; 1960, ch. 254, § 2; 1962, ch. 108; 1964, ch. 95, § 3; 1966, ch. 261; 1972, ch. 150, § 1; 1974, ch. 368, § 1; 1980, ch. 39, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 85, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 393, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1990, ch. 71, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 179, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 132, § 2, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 111, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2003, ch. 30, § 1, effective June 24, 2003; 2003, ch. 124, § 36, effective June 24, 2003; 2009, ch. 34, § 1, effective June 25, 2009; 2017 ch. 8, § 1, effective June 29, 2017; 2017 ch. 129, § 10, effective June 29, 2017; 2017 ch. 146, § 3, effective June 29, 2017; 2018 ch. 175, § 2, effective July 14, 2018.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Fines.
2.— Violator Owing Not Debtor.

Person brought before county court on a criminal charge of violating this section and who pleaded guilty and was fined $500 under KRS 189.990 and placed in jail on failure to pay the fine could not be released on surrender of his estate for benefit of creditors under Ky. Const., § 18 for he was not a “debtor” to the Commonwealth within the meaning of Ky. Const., § 18. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 240 S.W.2d 587, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 982 ( Ky. 1951 ).

3.— Not Deductible for Federal Income Tax.

Payment of fines for violation of state maximum weight laws are not “necessary” to the operation of business as violations could be avoided by correctional procedures, or even assuming with all due care and without willful intent they could not be avoided, to allow the resulting fines as deductions for federal income tax purposes would severely and directly frustrate state policy. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38, 78 S. Ct. 511, 2 L. Ed. 2d 568, 1958 U.S. LEXIS 1887 (U.S. 1958).

Cited:

Hancock v. Terry Elkhorn Mining Co., 503 S.W.2d 710, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 42 ( Ky. 1973 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

So long as the vehicles are evenly or uniformly spaced, it would be permissible to haul or tow as many as two, but no more, by the driveaway method. OAG 63-246 .

There are no specific maximum length limits prescribed by statute for the “driveaway method” of transporting motor vehicle units. OAG 63-246 .

Under subsection (1)(c) of this section, the maximum legal weight, including vehicle and load, which can be carried on a truck having three rear axles spaced 51 inches apart is 50,000 pounds, of which not more than 18,000 pounds can be carried on the front axle or any single axle in the tandem arrangement, and not more than 32,000 pounds can be carried on the three axles making up the single rear tandem. OAG 67-23 .

Under the existing statutes and regulations there is no limit as to the number of vehicles which may be involved in a saddle-mount tow except that the length of the hook up shall be within the statutory limits. OAG 80-528 .

Where the legislature specifically excluded from the axle weight provisions vehicles engaged exclusively in the transportation of farm products only, the Kentucky State Police cannot enforce axle weight provisions against such vehicles because of subsection (3) of this section, despite the fact that the Federal Highway Administration indicated that the exclusion contained in subsection (3) would jeopardize federal aid funds, in that the failure to enforce axle weight limits on federal aid roads in the state without regard to the use or licensing of the vehicle would violate federal law, since the will and intent of the legislature must control and since the legislative intent is explicitly and unambiguously expressed in the exemption for farm vehicles. OAG 81-250 .

In connection with truck axles the language of subdivision (7)(b) (now (9)(b)) of this section refers to a “tridem axle” and since the Interstate Highway System is a part of the “federal aid highway system” referred to in subsection (7) (now (9)) of this section it follows that the maximum allowable weight for tridem axles used on the Interstate Highway System in Kentucky is 48,000 pounds. OAG 91-106 .

Kentucky law, including its regulations, is clear that “tolerances” are not applicable in connection with truck weights on the Interstate Highway System in Kentucky. OAG 91-106 .

The language of subdivision (1)(d) of this section expressly provides that “tolerances” that might effectively increase statutory maximum weights for trucks are not applicable on the Interstate Highway System in Kentucky. OAG 91-106 .

Any vehicle, properly registered under KRS 186.050(3)(b), transporting primary forest products may receive the ten percent weight tolerance; the vehicle need not be used exclusively for the purpose of transporting forest products. OAG 98-10 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Ausness, Torts, 63 Ky. L.J. 753 (1974-1975).

Notes, Economic, Social and Legal Aspects of Coal Transportation in Kentucky, 64 Ky. L.J. 601 (1975-76).

189.2224. Authority to join interstate compact for overdimensional permits.

The secretary of the Transportation Cabinet, or his or her designee, is hereby authorized to join and negotiate with other states a compact for overdimensional permits. If the secretary joins a compact pursuant to this section, the cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A governing the administration and enforcement of a compact on overdimensional permits.

HISTORY: 2015 ch. 19, § 42, effective June 24, 2015.

189.2225. Operation of certain overdimensional motor vehicles authorized in some counties — Operation of certain overdimensional motor vehicles transporting agricultural commodities or materials authorized on all public roads.

  1. In a county that does not have at least ten (10) miles of existing highway designated by the Transportation Cabinet for operation of motor vehicles that have a width of one hundred two (102) inches, a motor vehicle that does not exceed the length requirements set forth in KRS 189.222(1)(b) or a width of one hundred two (102) inches may be operated on the state-maintained highway segments in that county with lane widths of ten (10) or more feet if those highway segments are designated by the Transportation Cabinet as capable of accommodating an eighty thousand (80,000) pound gross weight limit. The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate an administrative regulation pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A that lists the counties and highway segments that meet the criteria of this subsection.
  2. Vehicles authorized to operate on state-maintained roads pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall be authorized to do so only until the Transportation Cabinet promulgates an administrative regulation pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A that designates more than ten (10) miles of highway in a county as capable of accommodating motor vehicles with these dimensions.
  3. A motor vehicle or combination motor vehicle transporting agricultural commodities from a farm or transporting materials needed in the production of agricultural commodities to a farm that does not exceed the length requirements set forth in KRS 189.222(1)(b) or a width of one hundred two (102) inches shall be allowed to operate on any public road in Kentucky.
  4. The provisions of this section shall not authorize the weight limitation of any highway or bridge to be exceeded.
  5. The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to establish reasonable safety criteria for the operation of motor vehicles pursuant to this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 162, § 1, effective July 15, 1996.

189.2226. Definitions — Vehicles hauling building materials.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Bill of lading” means a document evidencing the purchase of, or delivery order for, building materials issued by a person engaged in a business that sold or leased the building materials;
    2. “Building materials” means equipment or materials associated with new home construction, home remodeling, or home maintenance, including but not limited to:
      1. Agriculture products;
      2. Asphalt;
      3. Concrete;
      4. Crushed stone;
      5. Excavation equipment;
      6. Fill dirt and rock;
      7. Glass;
      8. Landscaping materials;
      9. Lumber or other wood products;
      10. Minerals;
      11. Roofing materials; and
      12. Steel products;
    3. “Home” means:
      1. A site where a single or multi-family housing unit is being initially constructed; and
      2. A site where construction of a single or multi-family housing unit is complete and persons inhabit the housing unit; and
    4. “State road” means a state or federal highway but does not mean an interstate or county road.
  2. Other statutes to the contrary in this chapter notwithstanding, any vehicle hauling building materials to a home shall be allowed, subject to the provisions of this section, to travel on any state road without a permit and without being subject to a fine, if the weight of the vehicle is within the limits of the registration issued to the vehicle and within the axle limits for the vehicle, even if the vehicle’s gross weight or length, including vehicle and load, exceed the limits prescribed by this chapter or in other aspects fail to comply with this chapter.
  3. A vehicle hauling building materials under this section shall be allowed to travel the most direct route, in the opinion of the operator, to the vehicle’s point of destination, provided any road traveled as the most direct route shall not be further than fifteen (15) miles from a state road that is classified to carry the registered weight of the vehicle. If a vehicle is traveling a road classified by the cabinet as a single “A” highway, the vehicle or its load cannot exceed ninety-six (96) inches in width. If a vehicle or its load exceed ninety-six (96) inches in width, the operator shall be required to obtain the appropriate overdimensional permit required by this chapter to travel the proposed route. The operator of a vehicle hauling building materials under this section shall have in his or her possession a bill of lading.
  4. All vehicles hauling building materials under this section shall be prohibited from exceeding the established width and posted bridge weight limits for any route the vehicle travels. A vehicle that exceeds the width or bridge limits for its posted routes shall be required to obtain the appropriate overdimensional or overweight permit required by this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 124, § 34, effective June 24, 2003.

189.223. Measuring or weighing of vehicle by peace officer — Unloading of excess weight.

Any peace officer having reason to believe that the height, length, width or weight of any motor truck, semitrailer truck, or trailer, is in excess of the maximum limits prescribed by KRS 189.221 and subsection (1) of 189.222 or permitted by any special permit issued under KRS 189.270 and in the possession of the operator, may measure it or weigh it either by portable or stationary scales, and may require it to be driven to the nearest scales, if such scales are within a distance of five (5) miles from the point at which the vehicle is first directed to stop. If the officer shall determine that the operation of the motor truck, semitrailer, or trailer, was unlawful, he shall require the operator of said motor truck, semitrailer truck, or trailer to unload such portion of the load as may be necessary to decrease the gross weight of the vehicle to the maximum gross weight permitted under the terms of KRS 189.221 and subsection (1) of 189.222 or of KRS 189.270 , or he may, at the election of the operator, permit the operator to move the vehicle with its load to the nearest city or nearest court having jurisdiction, at which place the excess load shall be unloaded. The excess load shall be unloaded at the sole risk of the owner. The refusal of the operator to permit his motor truck, semitrailer truck, or trailer to be measured or weighed, or to proceed to a scales, or to unload the excess load, shall constitute a violation of KRS 189.221 to 189.228 .

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 115, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Weighing of Vehicle.

Highway patrolman, in requiring driver of truck to allow truck to be weighed to determine whether law providing for maximum weight of trucks was being violated, did not commit an illegal search and seizure within the meaning of Ky. Const., § 10; nor did he compel driver to give evidence against himself in violation of Ky. Const., § 11, where driver, though not expressly consenting, voluntarily complied with the patrolman’s direction. Commonwealth v. Abell, 275 Ky. 802 , 122 S.W.2d 757, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 498 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Notes, Economic, Social and Legal Aspects of Coal Transportation in Kentucky, 64 Ky. L.J. 601 (1975-76).

189.224. Permitting unlawful operation of a motor vehicle prohibited.

It is unlawful for the owner, or any other person, employing or otherwise directing the operator of any vehicle, to require or knowingly to permit the operation of such vehicle upon a highway in any manner contrary to law.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 115, § 5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Banks v. Department of Education, 462 S.W.2d 428, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 552 ( Ky. 1971 ).

189.225. Designation of National Emergency Highways, for purpose of weight and length limits. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 5, §§ 3, 6) was repealed by both Acts 1950, ch. 176, § 1, and Acts 1950, ch. 115, par. 1.

189.226. Violations of KRS 189.221 to 189.228, what constitutes.

Every person who commits, attempts to commit, conspires to commit, or aids or abets in the commission of, any act declared by KRS 189.221 to 189.228 to be a crime, whether individually or in connection with one or more other persons or as a principal, agent, or accessory, shall be guilty of such offense, and every person who falsely, fraudulently, forcibly, or willfully induces, causes, coerces, requires, permits, assists, or directs another to violate any provision of KRS 189.221 to 189.228 is likewise guilty of such offense.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 115, § 6.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Notes, Economic, Social and Legal Aspects of Coal Transportation in Kentucky, 64 Ky. L.J. 601 (1975-76).

189.227. Enforcement of KRS 189.221 to 189.228 and other statutes relating to motor vehicles — Department of Kentucky State Police powers — Commercial motor vehicle inspectors.

  1. The Department of Highways may take such actions, and may promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A, as are necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of KRS 189.221 to 189.228 , including but not limited to the erection, establishment, and maintenance of permanent or portable scales.
  2. The Department of Kentucky State Police is authorized to employ commercial motor vehicle inspectors and such other employees as may be necessary to operate any scales erected or established, and commercial motor vehicle inspectors employed under this section shall have the authority of peace officers for the purpose of enforcing KRS 189.221 to 189.228 , and other statutes relating to motor vehicles, and for no other purpose. A previous period of residence within the county of service shall not be required of any peace officer appointed under this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 115, § 7; 2010, ch. 93, § 1, effective July 15, 2010.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Notes, Economic, Social and Legal Aspects of Coal Transportation in Kentucky, 64 Ky. L.J. 601 (1975-76).

189.228. Evidence of ownership — Each violation constitutes separate offense.

For the purposes of KRS 189.221 to 189.228 , proof of the registration of any vehicle in the name of any person shall be prima facie evidence of ownership of said vehicle by the person in whose name it is registered, and each violation by an owner, whether or not with the same vehicle, shall constitute a separate offense by that owner.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 115, § 8.

189.230. Reduction of load and speed limits — Fiscal court to require cooperative agreement of persons applying for permit under KRS 189.212.

  1. Except as provided in KRS 189.221 (6), 189.222 , and 189.222 6, the department, in respect to state and federal highways, and county judges/executive in respect to county highways, may prescribe, by notice as provided in subsection (3) of this section, load and speed limits lower than the limits prescribed in KRS 189.221 and subsection (4) of KRS 189.390 , respectively, if in their judgment any highway may, by reason of its design, deterioration, rain, or other natural causes, be damaged or destroyed by motor trucks or semitrailer trucks, if their gross weight or speed exceeds certain limits. The department or fiscal court may, by like notice, regulate or prohibit the operation of motor trucks or semitrailer trucks on state highways or county roads for limited periods of specified days, or parts of days, if their load and speed exceed those limits, if in their judgment, the regulation or prohibition is necessary, by reason of traffic density or intensive use by the traveling public, to provide for the public safety and convenience on the highway.
  2. The department, in respect to bridges on the extended weight coal haul system defined in KRS 177.9771 , may prescribe, by notice, as provided in subsection (3) of this section, gross weight limits lower than the limits prescribed in KRS 177.9771 , when in its judgment any bridge on the extended weight coal haul road system may, by reason of its design or deterioration, be damaged or destroyed to the point of catastrophic failure by motor vehicles, if their gross weight exceeds certain limits. For the purposes of KRS 177.9771, all bridges shall conform with KRS 177.9771(4)(a) to (d).
  3. The notice or the substance of it shall be posted at conspicuous places at the termini of and at all intermediate crossroads and road junctions with the section of the highway to which the notice applies. After a notice has been posted, a person shall not operate any motor truck or semitrailer truck contrary to its provisions.
  4. A fiscal court shall require all persons applying for a permit issued under KRS 189.212 to enter into a cooperative agreement with the fiscal court. The cooperative agreement shall provide for an equitable apportionment of the incremental costs for design, maintenance, construction, or reconstruction of those roads and bridges on which the person will be operating under the permit issued under KRS 189.212 . A fiscal court may require as part of a cooperative agreement for the person to give the fiscal court a bond to ensure payment of the equitable costs associated with the permit issued under KRS 189.212. All funds collected under this subsection shall be expended on those roads covered by the cooperative agreement.
  5. A fiscal court shall not be relieved of expending its normal routine maintenance on all roads covered by cooperative agreements under the provisions of this section.
  6. A person who entered a cooperative agreement with a fiscal court under the provisions of subsection (4) of this section may terminate the agreement by submitting written notice to the fiscal court. If a person terminates a cooperative agreement with a fiscal court, the permit issued under KRS 189.212 shall immediately be revoked by the fiscal court.

History. 2739g-91: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 126, § 23; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(1); 1978, ch. 384, § 335, effective June 17, 1978; 1986, ch. 498, § 5, effective April 1, 1987; 1992, ch. 143, § 3, effective July 14, 1992; 1998, ch. 484, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2003, ch. 124, § 37, effective June 24, 2003.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

The provisions of this section do not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, and are not invalid as being too indefinite or as conferring arbitrary power without right to appeal. Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Com., 247 Ky. 144 , 56 S.W.2d 691, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 863 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Provisions vesting commissioner of motor vehicles (now Department of Highways) and county judges (now county judges/executive) with discretionary powers respecting load and speed of trucks and semitrailers did not violate U.S. Const., amend. 14 or Ky. Const., §§ 59 and 60. Whitney v. Fife, 270 Ky. 434 , 109 S.W.2d 832, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 87 ( Ky. 1937 ).

2.Excess Weight.

Violation by defendant of a statute forbidding operation of a vehicle over the posted limit on a bridge was not negligence per se where there was no evidence that defendant’s truck caused or contributed to the collapse of the bridge. Commonwealth v. Ragland Potter Co., 305 S.W.2d 915, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 344 ( Ky. 1957 ).

Where Department of Highways posted a conspicuous notice on a bridge of the maximum weight which it would support and an individual drove upon the bridge a truck of a weight vastly in excess of that posted he was guilty of negligence and the state would be entitled to recover the cost of the bridge if it collapsed as a result of such negligence. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Compton, 387 S.W.2d 314, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 541 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).

Cited:

Keck v. Manning, 313 Ky. 433 , 231 S.W.2d 604, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 897 ( Ky. 1950 ); Hancock v. Terry Elkhorn Mining Co., 503 S.W.2d 710, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 42 ( Ky. 1973 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The county court and judge (now county judge/executive), and not the fiscal court, has power to set weight limits and other restrictions for motor vehicles. OAG 64-14 .

The fine applicable to a violation of an order entered pursuant to this section is found in KRS 189.990(2)(b) (now (2)(c)), and the fact that the county judge (now judge/executive) in entering that order may have referred to subsection (2)(a) is of no significance. OAG 66-380 .

Fines imposed for violation of a county court order under this section are to be paid over to the commonwealth. OAG 66-380 .

Where heavy coal trucks are operating on state highways through a city of the fourth class and causing serious damage to the sewer lines located under the pavement, the commissioner of highways (now secretary of transportation) has the responsibility for regulating traffic on streets accepted as part of the state highway system and may set new limits himself or relinquish jurisdiction to the city for the performance of this function. OAG 74-257 .

Under the authority of KRS 67.080 and 67.083 the fiscal court has the authority to establish by proper order speed limits on county roads lower than those prescribed in KRS 189.390 and 189.391 (repealed) where such lower limits are necessary to the public health, safety, welfare and convenience, except in the special situation involving trucks under this section where the county judge may lower speed limits. OAG 75-74 .

Since it was the legislative intent to restrict county court authority to weight limit decreases any court action providing for a weight limit increase would be in conflict with this section and therefore illegal. OAG 75-183 .

Although the maximum weight limit of KRS 189.221 applies to all county roads which are not part of a state-maintained system, the county judge (now county judge/executive) may prescribe lower load limits under conditions outlined in this section. OAG 76-271 .

Liens noted on the face of the registration receipt, which must be presented to the county clerk pursuant to KRS 186.190 in order to effect a transfer, would constitute “evidence presented to the county clerk,” and if the county clerk is presented with such evidence, then he must refuse to complete the transfer, but this is the only duty imposed on the county clerk by this section. OAG 78-461 .

Since the language of this section refers to any lien, the plain wording of the statute makes it clear that the legislature intended that all liens which may be placed upon a motor vehicle are to fall within the purview of this section, but this does not mean that it is incumbent upon the county clerks to search their records to ascertain the existence of any liens. OAG 78-461 .

A county, through fiscal court, can sue to enjoin repeated violations of the truck weight statute resulting in damages or obstruction to county roads. OAG 79-393 .

There is no express statutory authority for a fiscal court’s enacting an ordinance covering an overweight truck situation and providing that using haulers post a bond. OAG 79-393 .

In the absence of statute, a fiscal court has no authority, by ordinance or otherwise, to require heavy truck haulers to execute a bond guaranteeing against damage to county roads. OAG 84-21 .

A fiscal court can sue to enjoin repeated violations of the truck weight statute resulting in damages or obstruction to county roads. OAG 84-68 .

A fiscal court has no authority to establish a system of permits whereby trucks would be permitted to haul commodities in excess of statutory weight limits over county roads upon the posting of a bond for any damages which they might cause to such roads. Such a permit system would be in direct conflict with the legislative program envisioned in this section and KRS 189.221 . OAG 84-68 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Notes, Economic, Social and Legal Aspects of Coal Transportation in Kentucky, 64 Ky. L.J. 601 (1975-76).

189.2301. Axle weight exemption for vehicles on state-maintained AAA highways.

The provisions of this chapter to the contrary notwithstanding, a vehicle that has a valid registration of a declared gross vehicle weight, including any towed unit, of eighty thousand (80,000) pounds or less shall be exempt from any axle weight provisions when operating on any state-maintained highway that is classified as a “AAA” highway, if the vehicle is hauling seventy-nine thousand nine hundred ninety-nine (79,999) pounds or less. A person operating a vehicle under the provisions of this section shall have written documentation verifying the weight of the load being hauled is seventy-nine thousand nine hundred ninety-nine (79,999) pounds or less. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any vehicle operating on the interstate highway system or any vehicle operating on any highway where the vehicle would exceed any posted bridge weight limit.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 157, § 1, effective June 24, 2003; 2017 ch. 174, § 4, effective April 10, 2017.

189.231. State maintained highways — Restriction and regulation of traffic.

  1. The secretary of transportation may install and maintain traffic control devices upon state-maintained highways in such manner as is reasonably necessary to promote the safety and convenience of the traveling public.
  2. The driver of any vehicle shall obey the instructions of any official traffic control device applicable thereto unless otherwise directed by a traffic or police officer, subject to the exceptions granted the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle.
  3. The secretary of transportation may restrict or regulate traffic upon state-maintained highways in such a manner as is reasonably necessary to promote the safety of the traveling public.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 206, § 1; 1966, ch. 255, § 178; 1988, ch. 347, § 1, effective April 10, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Stop Sign.

The fact that stop sign is located at a railroad crossing rather than a highway intersection does not impair its efficacy as a warning device and wherever a stop sign is located no reasonably prudent motorist may justifiably ignore it and where he stops at a stop sign and his view is obstructed he is under a duty to proceed with caution. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Fisher, 357 S.W.2d 683, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 136 ( Ky. 1962 ).

Cited:

United States v. Sturgill, 563 F.2d 307, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 11273 (6th Cir. 1977); Commonwealth v. Curry, 607 S.W.3d 618, 2020 Ky. LEXIS 293 ( Ky. 2020 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Bureau (now Department) of Highways may require the closing or changing of entrances to business sites if public safety so requires, and the cost of such changes would be upon the property owner. OAG 73-654 .

Under the police power of the state, the Bureau (now Department) of Highways may prescribe the location and type of entrances made upon the highways by abutting owners of business sites who must obtain permits from the Bureau (now Department). OAG 73-654 .

A county ordinance requiring motor vehicles, trailers, and semitrailers operating upon county public roads and carrying cargo to be covered effectively to prevent it from spilling upon the highways is enforceable on county roads as it is not in conflict with either this section or KRS 189.150 and is also enforceable on state highways located within the county and the ordinance passed under the authority of the home rule statute (KRS 67.083 ) does not constitute an abdication of the state’s right to use its own police power to enforce the law. OAG 75-468 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Criminal), 5th Ed., Offenses Against Public Order, Safety and Morals, Part. 4. Offenses Relating to Firearms and Destructive Devices, § 8.72.

189.232. Definition of “highway work zone.” [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 37, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; repealed by 2019 ch. 40, § 6, effective June 27, 2019.

189.2325. Posting of signs advising motorists of increased traffic penalties in state highway work zones.

The secretary of the Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A governing the posting of signs advising motorists that penalties are increased for traffic violations occurring on state-maintained streets or state-maintained highways in a highway work zone. The administrative regulations promulgated by the cabinet shall include guidelines to determine which areas are appropriate to the posting of these signs. The guidelines may include, but are not limited to, the following:

  1. The duration of the work on the highway;
  2. The proximity of workers to moving traffic;
  3. The existence of any unusual or hazardous conditions;
  4. The volume of traffic on the highway; and
  5. Other appropriate factors as determined by the secretary.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 37, § 2, effective July 15, 1996.

189.2327. Doubling of fines in highway work zone — Highway work zone safety fund.

  1. Subject to the requirements of subsection (2) of this section, if a violation of KRS 189.290 to 189.580 or 189.910 to 189.960 occurred in a highway work zone, the fine established under KRS 189.394 , 189.990 , or 189.993 shall be doubled.
  2. In order for a fine to be doubled under this section, the highway work zone must have:
    1. Signs displayed informing drivers of the existence of a highway work zone and that fines are doubled in it; and
    2. At least one (1) bona fide worker present.
  3. All fines collected for violations in a highway work zone under subsection (1) of this section shall be deposited into a separate trust and agency account within the Transportation Cabinet known as the “highway work zone safety fund.” The highway work zone safety fund shall be used exclusively by the Transportation Cabinet to hire or pay for enhanced law enforcement of traffic laws within highway work zones.

HISTORY: 2019 ch. 40, § 1, effective June 27, 2019.

189.2329. Prohibited conduct with respect to temporary traffic control devices in highway work zones — Penalty — Disposition of restitution payments.

  1. A person shall not intentionally destroy, remove, injure, or deface a temporary traffic control device erected for the purpose of enhancing traffic safety or worker safety in a highway work zone. A temporary traffic control device shall include but not be limited to a cone, tubular marker, delineator, warning light, drum, barricade, sign, sign truck, arrow board, or other device specified in an approved traffic control plan or by an administrative regulation promulgated by the cabinet pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A.
  2. A person who violates the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction, in addition to any other penalty established by statute, be sentenced to pay one hundred dollars ($100) for each temporary traffic control device that the person destroyed, removed, injured, or defaced, and the person shall make restitution to the owner of the temporary traffic control device.
  3. Restitution payments to owners of temporary traffic control devices required to be made under subsection (2) of this section shall be paid directly to the owner of the device as specified by written order of the court. The court shall not direct that the payments be made through the circuit clerk.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 37, § 5, effective July 15, 1996; 2002, ch. 183, § 16, effective August 1, 2002; 2019 ch. 40, § 2, effective June 27, 2019.

189.233. Regulation of traffic on state highways.

The secretary of transportation may, by official order, assume the responsibility for regulating traffic and parking on streets accepted as a part of the state highway system, and may contract with the city or a joint city-county agency for the performance of this function.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 35, § 1.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city of the fourth class does not have the authority under KRS 86.110(11) (now repealed) to impose weight limits on a state highway if the commissioner of highways (now secretary of transportation) has assumed responsibility under this section for regulating traffic on the state maintained highways running through the city. OAG 74-357 .

Charitable solicitors who are soliciting funds at a main intersection within a city limits are in the same class as peddlers and hawkers as far as the authority of a city to regulate the use of its streets is concerned, but unless a city has adopted an ordinance either prohibiting or regulating these street solicitors, specific permission for the soliciting is not required. OAG 76-177 .

The city may regulate traffic on a city street, even though that street is part of a state highway, maintained by the state, unless the state highway commissioner (now secretary of transportation) has by official order assumed the responsibility of the regulation of traffic on that street pursuant to this section and in the absence of the above-mentioned order, the city, pursuant to its control of the city streets, may regulate parking, install parking meters and enforce parking violations through the enactment of reasonable ordinances, including the towing away of vehicles. OAG 78-259 .

189.235. Increase of height, weight and length limits for trucks and semitrailer trucks on certain designated highways — Maximum limits. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 15, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 115, par. 1.

189.240. Weighing — Unloading part of load. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-95) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 115, par. 1.

189.250. Scales for weighing motor vehicles. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-98) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 115, par. 1.

189.260. Display of plates by commercial vehicles — Registration to be kept in truck.

Every motor vehicle licensed under KRS 186.050(3) through (14) shall display all plates issued by the county clerk. Except as provided in KRS 186.045 , the registration receipt shall be kept in the truck at all times and shall be available for inspection.

History. 2739g-32: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 15, § 5; 1958, ch. 82, § 9; 1964, ch. 95, § 4; 1966, ch. 139, § 25; 1966, ch. 255, § 179; 1976, ch. 133, § 16.

189.265. Motor buses — Height, length and weight limits on designated highways.

  1. “Motor bus” shall mean any motor vehicle designed primarily for the transportation of passengers and having a seating capacity in excess of nine (9) passengers including the driver, provided, however, that transit authorities created pursuant to KRS Chapter 96A are exempt from the provisions of this section.
  2. No person shall operate on any highway, except such highways as may be designated by the secretary of the Transportation Cabinet pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, any motor bus which exceeds, including any part of the body or load, eleven (11) feet six (6) inches in height, forty (40) feet in length, twenty (20) tons in gross weight, or ninety-six (96) inches in width, exclusive of any required safety equipment.
  3. The secretary of the Transportation Cabinet, in respect to highways which are a part of the state-maintained system, by official order may increase the maximum height of a motor bus to twelve (12) feet six (6) inches and the maximum width of a motor bus to 102 inches, exclusive of any required safety equipment and tire bulge due to loads, if in the opinion of the secretary the increased height and width designated by him is justified by the width of such highways, provided, however, that any such increase in the width of motor buses or designation of highways to be used by them shall not, in any way, exceed the federal law or regulations thereunder or jeopardize the allotment or qualification for federal aid funds of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 139, § 1; 1980, ch. 324, § 7, effective July 15, 1980.

189.269. Prohibition on new overweight or overdimensional permits — Exception.

After June 27, 2019, no new overweight or overdimensional permit, or any new overweight or overdimensional tolerance, for motor carriers shall be granted under this chapter, except that the overweight permit established in KRS 177.985 and 177.986 may be extended until June 30, 2033.

HISTORY: 2019 ch. 126, § 4, effective June 27, 2019.

189.270. Special permits to exceed limits.

  1. The department may issue permits for the operation of motor vehicles, manufactured homes, recreational vehicles, boats, or any other vehicle transporting a nondivisible load, whose gross weight including load, height, width, or length exceeds the limits prescribed by this chapter or which in other respects fail to comply with the requirements of this chapter. Permits may be issued by the department for stated periods, special purposes, and unusual conditions, and upon terms in the interest of public safety and the preservation of the highways as the department may require.
  2. Except as provided in subsection (8) of this section, the department may, at the request of an applicant, issue a single-trip permit regardless of the type of vehicle or equipment being transported that exceeds the weight or dimension limits established by this chapter if the load being transported is a nondivisible load. A single-trip permit shall cost sixty dollars ($60) for each overweight or overdimensional permit requested.
    1. Except as provided in subsection (8) of this section, the department may, at the request of an applicant, issue an annual permit regardless of the type of vehicle or equipment being transported that exceeds the weight or dimension limits established by this chapter if the load being transported is a nondivisible load. (3) (a) Except as provided in subsection (8) of this section, the department may, at the request of an applicant, issue an annual permit regardless of the type of vehicle or equipment being transported that exceeds the weight or dimension limits established by this chapter if the load being transported is a nondivisible load.
    2. The vehicle operating under a permit issued under this subsection shall not exceed sixteen (16) feet in width exclusive of usual and ordinary overhang, one hundred twenty (120) feet in length including a towing vehicle and trailer combination, thirteen (13) feet six (6) inches in height, or one hundred sixty thousand (160,000) pounds.
    3. Except as provided in subsections (4), (7), and (8) of this section, an annual permit for loads less than or equal to fourteen (14) feet in width shall cost two hundred fifty dollars ($250). An annual permit for loads exceeding fourteen (14) feet in width shall cost five hundred dollars ($500).
  3. An annual permit to transport farm equipment less than fourteen (14) feet in width shall cost eighty dollars ($80). An annual permit to transport farm equipment that exceeds fourteen (14) feet in width from a dealership to a farm, from a farm to a dealership, or from a dealership to a dealership shall cost one hundred fifty dollars ($150).
  4. Permits issued under this section shall be for nondivisible loads and shall be valid statewide; however, the department may, as a condition of issuing an annual or single-trip permit, limit the overweight or overdimensional vehicle to specified routes, exclude certain highways, or even cancel an applicant’s permit if an unreasonable risk of accident or an unreasonable impedance of the flow of traffic would result from the presence of the overweight or overdimensional vehicle. A person who applies for, and accepts, a permit issued under this section is acknowledging that the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet is not guaranteeing safe passage of vehicles by issuing the permit. A person who applies for, and accepts, a permit issued under this section agrees to measure all clearances of highway structures, both laterally and vertically, prior to passage of the person’s vehicles along the routes specified in the permit. A person who applies for, and accepts, a permit issued under this section is classified as a bare licensee whose duty is to assume sole risk involved in using Kentucky’s highways without warranty of accuracy.
  5. Subject to the limitations of subsection (12) of this section, the department shall promulgate administrative regulations under KRS Chapter 13A to establish requirements for escort vehicles, safety markings, and other safety restrictions governing the operation of an overweight or overdimensional vehicle. The department shall provide each applicant for an annual or single-trip permit issued under this section a copy of all restrictions associated with the overweight or overdimensional permit at no charge to the applicant. The department shall be prohibited from raising the permit fee established in subsections (2) and (3) of this section by levying additional fees for an overweight or overdimensional permit through the administrative regulation process.
    1. Notwithstanding KRS 189.269 , the department may, at the request of an applicant who is a transporter of manufactured housing, issue an annual permit that exceeds the weight or dimension limits established by this chapter if the load being transported is a nondivisible load. (7) (a) Notwithstanding KRS 189.269 , the department may, at the request of an applicant who is a transporter of manufactured housing, issue an annual permit that exceeds the weight or dimension limits established by this chapter if the load being transported is a nondivisible load.
    2. The vehicle operated shall not exceed sixteen (16) feet in width exclusive of usual and ordinary overhang, one hundred twenty (120) feet in length including a towing vehicle and trailer combination, fifteen (15) feet in height, or one hundred sixty thousand (160,000) pounds.
    3. The cost for an annual permit issued under this subsection shall be:
      1. One thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) for loads greater than fourteen (14) feet in width or greater than thirteen (13) feet six (6) inches in height; and
      2. Five hundred dollars ($500) for loads less than or equal to fourteen (14) feet in width and less than or equal to thirteen (13) feet six (6) inches in height.
    4. The holder of a permit issued under this subsection shall, when transporting a manufactured home:
      1. Abide by all escort requirements, safety markings, and other safety restrictions governing overweight and overdimensional vehicles; and
      2. Equip each truck operating under a permit with global positioning system technology that keeps a record of locations traveled. The travel records of trucks operating under a permit shall be open to inspection by the Transportation Cabinet.
    5. Any person with a permit under this subsection who operates a vehicle greater than thirteen (13) feet six (6) inches in height while operating in a restricted area designated by the Transportation Cabinet shall be fined one thousand dollars ($1,000).
  6. The cabinet shall not issue an annual permit under this section if the person applying for the permit is eligible for an annual permit issued under KRS 189.2716 or 189.2717 .
  7. The department may require the applicant to give bond, with approved surety, to indemnify the state or counties against damage to highways or bridges resulting from use by the applicant. The operation of vehicles in accordance with the terms of the permit issued under this section shall not constitute a violation of this chapter if the operator has the permit, or an authenticated copy of it, in his possession.
  8. Any person transporting a parade float which exceeds the dimensional limits on a highway over which it is transported shall be required to obtain a permit as required in subsection (2) of this section. If the float is being used in conjunction with a parade to be held within the boundaries of the Commonwealth, a fee shall not be assessed by the department to issue the permit.
  9. A person shall not operate any vehicle in violation of the terms of the permit issued under this section.
    1. The cabinet shall not promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to this section that restrict the time or days of the week when a permit holder may operate on the highway, except that travel may be limited from 6 a.m. to 9 a.m. and 3 p.m. to 6 p.m. Monday through Friday. In addition to the restrictions established in this paragraph, any manufactured home being transported by permit issued under this section shall not travel on any highway after daylight hours Monday through Saturday, or at any time on Sunday. (12) (a) The cabinet shall not promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to this section that restrict the time or days of the week when a permit holder may operate on the highway, except that travel may be limited from 6 a.m. to 9 a.m. and 3 p.m. to 6 p.m. Monday through Friday. In addition to the restrictions established in this paragraph, any manufactured home being transported by permit issued under this section shall not travel on any highway after daylight hours Monday through Saturday, or at any time on Sunday.
    2. The cabinet shall allow a permit holder who has obtained a permit to transport equipment to a work site to return to the permit holder’s place of business immediately after work is completed at the job site, subject to the limitations of paragraph (a) of this subsection.
    3. The cabinet shall not promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to this section setting forth escort vehicle requirements for overdimensional farm implements or vehicles towing overdimensional farm implements that are more stringent than the following:
      1. For a single vehicle and load in excess of twelve (12) feet in width being operated on a two (2) lane highway, no more than one (1) lead vehicle shall be required;
      2. For a single vehicle and load in excess of twelve (12) feet in width being operated on a four (4) lane highway, no more than one (1) trail vehicle shall be required;
      3. For a single vehicle and load in excess of eighty-five (85) feet in length being operated on a two (2) lane highway, no more than one (1) lead vehicle shall be required;
      4. For more than one (1) vehicle and load in excess of twelve (12) feet in width or eighty-five (85) feet in length being operated as a convoy on a two (2) lane highway, no more than one (1) lead vehicle shall be required;
      5. A lead escort vehicle on a two (2) lane highway under this paragraph may also serve as a tow vehicle;
      6. Any distance for lead or trail escort vehicles shall contain provisions allowing for a variance from that distance due to safety or road conditions; and
      7. A vehicle or its escort shall be required to bear a sign declaring that the vehicle is oversized or be required to use lights, flashers, or flags, but a vehicle or its escort shall not be required to do both.

History. 2739g-92: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 118, § 1(c); 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(1); 1976, ch. 173, § 3; 1982, ch. 265, § 3, effective April 1, 1982; 1982, ch. 395, § 20, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 150, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 126, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 175, § 11, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 245, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 77, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 197, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 269, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 292, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 22, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1992, ch. 283, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1992, ch. 400, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 42, § 7, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 356, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 306, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2003, ch. 30, § 2, effective June 24, 2003; 2005, ch. 166, § 1, effective June 20, 2005; 2011, ch. 88, § 4, effective March 16, 2011; 2012, ch. 114, § 2, effective April 11, 2012; 2016 ch. 63, § 2, effective July 15, 2016; 2020 ch. 19, § 1, effective July 15, 2020.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(6/29/2017). 2017 Ky. Acts Ch. 146, sec. 11 repealed KRS 189.2715 , which was cited in KRS 189.270 (7). However, no conforming amendment of KRS 189.270 was included in 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 146 to remove the reference to the repealed section. The Reviser of Statutes has made this conforming change under the authority of KRS 7.136 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

Provision of this section empowering Highway Commission (now Department of Highways) to permit excess loads and lengths was not too general and vague as to vest arbitrary power in commission (now department), where statute required it to promulgate rules for such transportation applicable to all alike. Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Com., 247 Ky. 144 , 56 S.W.2d 691, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 863 ( Ky. 1932 ).

2.Failure to Obtain Permits.

Where trailer was 21 inches wider than statutory limit and a special permit had not been obtained under this section, the operation of the trailer was not such wanton disregard for the lives or safety of others as to warrant infliction of punitive damages in action for collision of auto with trailer. Keller v. Morehead, 247 S.W.2d 218, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 680 ( Ky. 1952 ).

3.Special Permits.

Where special permits to exceed the weight limitations of vehicles on state highways were issued for the day-to-day operation of a mining business rather than for emergency purposes, the Highway Department (now Department of Highways) had exceeded its authority. Hancock v. Terry Elkhorn Mining Co., 503 S.W.2d 710, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 42 ( Ky. 1973 ).

4.Excessiveness.

This section’s 1988 amendment which imposed a weight-axle-overdimensional permit fee upon motor carriers, was a license fee rather than a tax, and as such could not be excessive in relation to the cost of administering the overweight and/or overdimensional permit program. Commonwealth v. Thomas Heavy Hauling, 889 S.W.2d 807, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 140 ( Ky. 1994 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Ausness, Torts, 63 Ky. L.J. 753 (1974-1975).

Notes, Economic, Social and Legal Aspects of Coal Transportation in Kentucky, 64 Ky. L.J. 601 (1975-76).

189.271. Special permits for hauling industrial materials — Renewals — Overweight and overdimensional vehicles.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of laws, the Transportation Cabinet may issue special permits to the owners, operators, or lessees of motor vehicles for the purpose of hauling industrial materials whose gross weight or dimensions, including vehicle and load, exceeds the limits prescribed by this chapter or which in other respects fail to comply with the requirements of this chapter. A separate permit shall be required for each vehicle. Such permits shall be issued for specified materials only and shall designate the portions of the state primary road system over which such vehicle may operate pursuant to the permit. Such permit shall be issued for a stated period of time determined by the applicant not to exceed three (3) years, and an existing permit may be renewed pending an inspection by the cabinet of the routes listed on the permit. Permits under this section shall be upon such terms and conditions as the cabinet may, in its discretion, require in the public interest.
  2. The cabinet may establish a system by which a current permit holder can be granted a new permit specifying different routes or materials without having to complete a new application or pay a separate application fee.
  3. The cabinet shall require, as a condition to the issuance of the permit, that the applicant pay a reasonable fee, to be fixed by the cabinet, and shall require that an applicant convicted under provisions of KRS 189.990(2)(a) two (2) or more times within a five (5) year period give bond, with approved surety, in an amount not to exceed six thousand dollars ($6,000) for each vehicle to indemnify the Commonwealth of Kentucky against damage to highways or bridges resulting from the operation of any motor vehicle under the authorization of such permit. A bond acquired under this subsection may be carried forward to another permit if the cabinet has not gone against the bond.
  4. The operation of any motor vehicle in accordance with the terms of any such permit shall not constitute a violation of this chapter, if the operator has the permit, or a copy of it, authenticated as the cabinet may require, in his possession.
  5. The cabinet shall not issue a permit under this section for a vehicle whose gross weight, including vehicle and load, exceeds the maximum gross weight as provided in KRS 189.222 .
  6. The cabinet shall not issue a permit under this section for a vehicle whose dimensions, including vehicle and load, exceed the maximum dimension as provided in KRS 189.222 .
  7. A person shall not operate a motor vehicle in violation of the terms and conditions of any permit issued by the cabinet pursuant to this section.
  8. As used in this section, industrial materials shall mean all cargo, whether divisible or indivisible, which a motor vehicle transports in the usual and ordinary course of business and shall specifically include, but not be limited to, agricultural products, minerals, or natural resources transported by a motor vehicle.
  9. The cabinet may:
    1. Exercise general supervision of the administering and enforcement of this section.
    2. Promulgate administrative regulations, subject to the limitations of this section, with respect to the issuance of a permit, including, but not limited to, administrative regulations concerning the duration of permits and weight limits for various types of vehicles, materials, and highways.
    3. Promulgate administrative regulations with respect to the amount, terms and conditions of the bond and the sufficiency of the surety of such bond required by this section. The cabinet shall allow applicants not required to post a surety bond under subsection (3) of this section to self-insure to meet the bonding requirements of this section.
    4. Issue, continue in effect, revoke, modify, or deny, under such conditions as the cabinet may prescribe, permits provided for under this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 258, § 4; 1978, ch. 232, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1994, ch. 132, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 481, § 1, effective July 14, 2000.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since the General Assembly did not intend to confer general authority to require a bond for the privilege of operating vehicles within statutory limits, any attempt by a county to require a bond of persons operating within statutory limits as well as for holders of special permits is in conflict with and beyond the scope of the home rule statute (KRS 67.083 ). OAG 75-183 .

189.2713. Annual and single-trip permits for transporting loads of metal commodities weighing between 80,001 and 120,000 pounds — Administrative regulations.

  1. As used in this section, “metal commodities” means output products from metal-producing industries that are transported in their most basic and original form from a mill or storage facility to market for processing. “Metal commodities” does not include manufactured parts being transported from a manufacturer or supplier to another customer.
  2. The department shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A governing the issuance of annual and single-trip permits for the operation of motor vehicles transporting metal commodities with a minimum gross weight of eighty thousand and one (80,001) pounds and a maximum gross weight of one hundred twenty thousand (120,000) pounds in divisible or nondivisible loads to or from a facility manufacturing metal commodities in this state or a facility used for storage of metal commodities.
  3. A motor carrier transporting metal commodities in divisible or nondivisible loads to or from a facility manufacturing metal commodities in this state or a facility used for storage of metal commodities, may apply for an annual or single-trip overweight permit pursuant to subsection (2) of this section. A permit issued under this section shall be specific to a single truck and shall be valid twenty-four (24) hours a day.
    1. The cost of an annual permit issued under this section shall be one thousand two hundred fifty dollars ($1,250). (4) (a) The cost of an annual permit issued under this section shall be one thousand two hundred fifty dollars ($1,250).
    2. The cost of a single-trip permit issued under this section shall be one hundred dollars ($100).
  4. Permits issued under this section shall contain a Web site hyperlink or any other method to provide the motor carrier with routes that are approved by the department.
  5. Upon renewal of any annual permit issued under this section, the permit holder shall report to the cabinet the number of trips made and the total miles driven under the permit during the previous year.
  6. Administrative regulations promulgated by the department under this section may require motor carriers to meet specific Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) safety ratings and FMCSA safety measurement system scores before issuance of a permit under this section.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 146, § 1, effective June 29, 2017; 2019 ch. 126, § 3, effective June 27, 2019.

189.2714. Annual overweight permit for transporting steel products or materials to or from a manufacturing or storage facility — Administrative regulations. [Repealed]

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 146, § 2, effective July 1, 2020; Repealed 2019, ch. 126, § 6, effective June 27, 2019.

189.2715. Annual overweight permit for transporting steel products or materials — Weight and mileage limitations. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 94, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 2012, ch. 112, § 1, effective July 12, 2012; Repealed, Acts 2017, ch. 146, § 11, effective June 29, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 94, § 1, effective July 14, 1992) was repealed by Acts 2017, ch. 146, § 11, effective June 29, 2017.

189.2716. Annual overdimensional permit for transporting steel products to a Kentucky riverport — Width and mileage limitations.

  1. As used in this section, “riverport” means a riverport facility established by a riverport authority under KRS 65.520 .
  2. In order to promote economic development and retain jobs within this state, subject to KRS 189.222 , the department shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A governing the issue of annual permits for the operation of motor vehicles that are transporting steel products in divisible or nondivisible loads on state highways from a facility manufacturing products in this state to a riverport within this state, and whose dimensions exceed the limits for vehicle width prescribed by this chapter.
  3. The maximum width dimension for an overdimensional permit issued in accordance with this section shall be ten (10) feet.
  4. A motor carrier transporting steel products in divisible or nondivisible loads from a facility manufacturing steel products in this state may apply for an annual overdimensional permit pursuant to subsection (2) of this section. An application for a permit shall identify the route to be used. The permit shall be valid twenty-four (24) hours a day, but shall be limited to movements of steel products within the state of not more than seven (7) road miles from the manufacturing facility. The cost of the annual permit shall be two hundred fifty dollars ($250).

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 63, § 1, effective July 15, 2016.

189.2717. Annual overweight permit for transporting nondivisible loads over specified routes — Axle-weight limitation.

  1. Subject to the provisions of KRS 189.222 , the department may promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A governing the issuance of annual permits for the operation of motor vehicles transporting nondivisible loads in this Commonwealth whose gross weight exceeds the limits prescribed by this chapter. The gross weight of a motor vehicle operating pursuant to this section shall not exceed one hundred twenty thousand (120,000) pounds. The movement of the overweight motor vehicle shall be limited to a specific route set forth on the annual permit.
  2. The following axle weights shall not be exceeded in the loading of a nondivisible load:
    1. Single axle with axles less than forty-two (42) inches apart and being the steering axle with one (1) wheel on each side of the axle to be considered a single axle shall not be more than fifteen thousand (15,000) pounds;
    2. Two (2) axles in tandem arrangement which are spaced forty-two (42) inches or more apart and less than ninety-six (96) inches apart shall not be more than forty thousand (40,000) pounds;
    3. Three (3) axles in tridem arrangement which are spaced forty-two (42) or more inches apart and less than one hundred twenty (120) inches apart shall not be more than sixty-five thousand (65,000) pounds; and
    4. Dual wheel axle with one (1) axle with two (2) wheels on each side of the axle to be considered a dual wheel axle shall not be more than twenty thousand (20,000) pounds each.
  3. Each motor vehicle operating pursuant to this section shall comply with the safety provisions set forth in the administrative regulations promulgated by the department pursuant to this section.
  4. The fee for the annual permit for each motor vehicle pursuant to this section shall be five hundred dollars ($500).
  5. The department may refuse to issue a permit for a requested route because of the inadequacies of the roadway or a structure on that route.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 52, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 306, § 2, effective July 15, 1998.

189.2718. Administrative regulations regarding issuance of annual certificates for transporting feed for livestock or poultry to a farm or other facility housing livestock or poultry.

  1. The department may promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A governing the issuance of annual certificates for the operation of motor vehicles exclusively engaged in transporting feed for livestock or poultry to a farm or other facility housing livestock or poultry.
  2. A motor carrier exclusively engaged in transporting feed for livestock or poultry in divisible or nondivisible loads may apply for an annual certificate pursuant to subsection (1) of this section. A certificate issued under this section shall be:
    1. Specific to a single truck;
    2. Valid twenty-four (24) hours a day; and
    3. Kept in the vehicle during all times of operation.
  3. The cost of an annual certificate issued under this section shall be one hundred fifty dollars ($150), paid to the cabinet.
  4. Administrative regulations promulgated by the department under this section may require motor carriers to meet specific Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) safety ratings and FMCSA safety measurement system scores before issuance of a certificate under this section.

HISTORY: 2018 ch. 175, § 1, effective July 14, 2018.

189.272. Venue and jurisdiction — Overweight vehicle cases.

The District Court where the offense occurred shall have venue and jurisdiction with the courts of this Commonwealth of all prosecutions for violations of the weight provisions of KRS 189.221 , 189.222 , 189.226 , 189.230 , 189.270 and 189.271 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 258, § 3.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Notes, Economic, Social and Legal Aspects of Coal Transportation in Kentucky, 64 Ky. L.J. 601 (1975-76).

189.273. Permit for transportation of soil conservation and other specialized equipment — Escort vehicles. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 68, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1992, ch. 400, § 2, effective July 14, 1992) was repealed by Acts 1998, ch. 306, § 3, effective July 15, 1998.

189.274. Special permits for moving specialized equipment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 332, § 1, effective July 13, 1984) was repealed by Acts 1998, ch. 306, § 3, effective July 15, 1998.

189.275. Housetrailers, dimensions — Permit required, when. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 148, § 3(1); 1962, ch. 181; 1966, ch. 139, § 26) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 173, § 6.

189.276. Issuance of resource recovery road hauling permit — Terms and conditions — Fee. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 203, § 12(1) to (4)) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 373, § 12, effective July 13, 1984.

189.277. Forms for use of permit — Review by department of revenue. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 203, § 13) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 373, § 12, effective July 13, 1984.

189.280. Trucks and trailers owned by governmental units — Regulation of trucks and trailers by cities.

  1. KRS 189.221 to 189.230 and 189.280 shall not apply to motor trucks, semitrailer trucks, or trailers owned by the United States, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or any agency of them, any county or city.
  2. If any motor truck, semitrailer truck, or trailer is lawfully licensed by a city pursuant to KRS 186.270 , then KRS 189.221 and subsection (1) of 189.222 shall not apply thereto, within the limits of the city issuing the license, or within fifteen (15) miles of the limits of the city, if it is a city with a population equal to or greater than three thousand (3,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, or within five (5) miles of its limits if it is a city with a population of less than three thousand (3,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, except on such state-maintained highways or portions thereof, including connecting-link streets, as may be designated by the commissioner of highways, and on such county highways as may be designated by the county judge/executive; provided, however, that in no case shall any vehicle exceed the weight and size limitations established by the city ordinance when those limitations are less stringent than those provided in the aforementioned sections of the statutes. For the purposes of this subsection vehicles exempt from the imposition of a city license tax by reason of subsection (2) of KRS 281.830 shall be entitled to the same exemptions as those so licensed.
  3. Cities may, by ordinance, provide maximum limits with respect to the weight, height, width and length of motor trucks, semitrailer trucks, and trailers, within their respective boundaries, not less, however, than the maximum limits prescribed in KRS 189.221 and subsection (1) of 189.222 , and may authorize the operation of trailers.

History. 2739g-92: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 118, 1(a)(b); 1952, ch. 177; 1966, ch. 255, § 180; 2006, ch. 173, § 30, effective July 12, 2006; 2014, ch. 92, § 267, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

Exemption of governmental owned trucks is based on distinctive reason and does not violate Ky. Const., §§ 59 and 60. Whitney v. Fife, 270 Ky. 434 , 109 S.W.2d 832, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 87 ( Ky. 1937 ).

2.Purpose.

Under KRS 186.270 , a city of the fifth class may by ordinance tax and license firms operating trucks in the city whose trucks also operate outside the city and beyond the five-mile limit mentioned in subsection (2) of this section, since the purpose of this section is only to suspend the statutory regulations as to weight and size within city and five-mile limit where city chooses to regulate size and weight. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lancaster, 276 Ky. 585 , 124 S.W.2d 745, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1938 ).

3.Exemptions.

It was assumed, without deciding, that, in the exercise of ordinary care in the operation of its truck at night upon the public highway, it was the duty of the federal government to place a clearance light upon the left edge of the truck bed, as contemplated by KRS 189.050 , and that failure to do so constituted negligence, notwithstanding the statutory exemption of government-owned trucks by this section. (However, such failure was not here the proximate cause of accident.) Price v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 676, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2463 (D. Ky. 1943 ).

4.Regulation by Cities.

A city ordinance enacted under KRS 186.270 may license and tax trucks without regulating size and weight. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lancaster, 276 Ky. 585 , 124 S.W.2d 745, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city can impose both an occupational tax upon a business using a motor vehicle and a motor vehicle tax on the same motor vehicle subject to the limitations of this section and 281.830 . OAG 63-65 .

A city would have ample authority to limit the size of vehicles hauling mobile homes on city streets and to require rerouting of such vehicles. OAG 72-313 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Fees and taxes under this chapter are in addition to others — Limitations on fees and taxes imposed by cities and counties, KRS 281.830 .

189.281. Local government pilot program for off-highway vehicles. [Effective until July 1, 2024]

After June 29, 2021 and until July 1, 2024:

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Local government” means a city, county, charter county government, urban-county government, consolidated local government, or unified local government that is located within the boundaries of a regional authority, or the Kentucky Mountain Regional Recreation Authority established under KRS 148.0222 , acting on behalf of a local government that is part of the authority;
    2. “Off-highway vehicle” or “OHV” means a motorized vehicle that:
      1. Is designed to be primarily used for recreational purposes;
      2. Has a maximum speed that is greater than thirty-five (35) miles per hour;
      3. Is equipped with the following:
        1. Four (4) to six (6) highway or nonhighway tires;
        2. A steering wheel or steering mechanism;
        3. Brakes;
        4. Headlamps;
        5. Tail lamps;
        6. Brake lights;
        7. One (1) red reflex reflector on each side as far to the rear as practicable and one (1) red reflex reflector on the rear;
        8. A working muffler;
        9. A parking brake;
        10. A spark arrestor; and
        11. For multi-passenger vehicles, an exterior mirror mounted on the driver’s side of the vehicle, either an interior mirror or an exterior mirror mounted on the passenger’s side of the vehicle, and for each designated seating position, a seatbelt assembly that conforms to the federal motor vehicle safety standard provided in 49 C.F.R. sec. 571.209; and
    3. “Regional authority” means:
      1. The Kentucky Mountain Regional Recreation Authority established in KRS 148.0222 ; and
      2. Any other authority established in Kentucky Revised Statutes, prior to June 29, 2021, that oversees lands in two (2) or more contiguous counties, on which there is a system of recreational trails, including streams, rivers, and other waterways, and appurtenant facilities, including trailhead centers, parking areas, camping facilities, picnic areas, recreational areas, historic or cultural interpretive sites, and other facilities in Kentucky and designated by the regional authority.
    1. The legislative body of a local government that is currently or formerly located within the boundaries of a regional authority, or which currently operates a public OHV trail system, may establish a pilot program, by ordinance, to authorize and regulate the operation of an OHV on any public roadway or any section of city or county roadway for which it bears responsibility. (2) (a) The legislative body of a local government that is currently or formerly located within the boundaries of a regional authority, or which currently operates a public OHV trail system, may establish a pilot program, by ordinance, to authorize and regulate the operation of an OHV on any public roadway or any section of city or county roadway for which it bears responsibility.
    2. Prior to enacting an OHV ordinance under paragraph (a) of this subsection, the legislative body of a local government shall notify the public of its plans to allow OHV use on roadways under its jurisdiction. Public notice under this paragraph shall:
      1. Notify the public of the time, subject, and location of the public meeting and shall be posted in both a local newspaper, if any, and a newspaper of general circulation in the county;
      2. Include a list and map of all roadways and connecting trails that the local government intends to designate for OHV use; and
      3. Be placed on the Web site of the local government.
    3. A local government may petition the Transportation Cabinet to include, in an OHV ordinance adopted under paragraph (a) of this subsection, state-maintained roadways or sections of state-maintained roadways located within the local government’s jurisdictional boundaries. The local government shall submit the following to the Transportation Cabinet for approval:
      1. The minutes from the public meeting or meetings held prior to adoption of an OHV ordinance under this subsection;
      2. A list and map of all roadways and connecting trails that the local government intends to designate for OHV use;
      3. An enforcement plan to ensure that all OHVs operating on roadways under this section meet all of the requirements established under this section, including verification of required insurance coverage;
      4. A plan to notify the public and OHV users of the operation of OHVs on state and local roadways within the boundaries of the local government;
      5. A safety plan for OHV roadway use; and
      6. Any other requirements established by the Transportation Cabinet under subsection (16) of this section.
    4. The Transportation Cabinet shall, within ninety (90) days of receipt of a petition and all information required in paragraph (c) of this subsection, respond to the local government with approval or denial of the request submitted.
    5. Any OHV ordinance adopted under this section shall be adopted at a public meeting.
  2. A fully controlled access highway shall not be designated for OHV use under this section.
  3. A local government that has enacted an OHV ordinance under this section shall notify the Transportation Cabinet of any collision involving an OHV that occurred on any roadway approved for OHV use under this section.
  4. A person may operate an OHV on a public roadway pursuant to subsection (2) of this section if the:
    1. Operator is eighteen (18) years of age or older;
    2. Operator has a valid operator’s license in his or her possession;
    3. OHV is insured by the owner or operator, for the payment of tort liabilities in the same form and amounts as set forth in KRS 304.39-110 for motorcycles;
    4. Proof of insurance is inside the OHV at all times of operation on a public roadway; and
    5. OHV is equipped with all safety equipment required under this section.
  5. Any person operating an OHV on a public roadway under this section shall be subject to the same traffic regulations of this chapter as a motor vehicle, including KRS 189.520 prohibiting the operation of a vehicle that is not a motor vehicle, while under the influence of intoxicants or substances which may impair driving.
  6. A person shall not operate an OHV under this section on any public roadway:
    1. Between one (1) hour after sunset and one (1) hour before sunrise, unless the person can demonstrate cause for driving, including but not limited to emergencies; or
    2. While carrying passengers on a trailer or any other towed unit.
  7. Any passenger of an OHV that is under the age of sixteen (16) shall be required to wear a helmet that meets the national standards prescribed by the United States Department of Transportation.
  8. An operator and any passengers shall wear eye protection when operating or riding an OHV that is not equipped with a windshield.
    1. The Transportation Cabinet shall be responsible for the cost, placement, and maintenance of signage denoting state highways that have been authorized for OHV use under this section. (10) (a) The Transportation Cabinet shall be responsible for the cost, placement, and maintenance of signage denoting state highways that have been authorized for OHV use under this section.
    2. The local government shall be responsible for the cost, placement, and maintenance of signage denoting local roadways that have been designated for OHV use under this section.
    3. The local government shall be responsible for monthly inspection of state and local OHV signage.
  9. An OHV operating on a public roadway designated by a local government under subsection (2) of this section is not considered to be a motor vehicle and shall be exempt from:
    1. Vehicle registration requirements of KRS 186.050 ; and
    2. Emissions compliance certificates pursuant to KRS 224.20-720 .
  10. A local government may adopt more stringent local ordinances governing OHV safety equipment and operation than specified in this section.
  11. If deemed in the interest of public safety, the Transportation Cabinet may:
    1. Prohibit the operation of an OHV on any public roadway designated under subsection (2) of this section that crosses a state-maintained roadway; or
    2. Rescind approval given under subsection (2)(d) of this section.
  12. This section shall not apply to:
    1. An OHV operated on any private or public recreational trail or area;
    2. An OHV operating under the exemptions for highway use under KRS 189.515 ; or
    3. A publicly owned and operated OHV used for wildlife management, law enforcement, emergency services, or other governmental purposes.
  13. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted or construed to require an insurance company to provide OHV insurance coverage.
  14. The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to implement this section, including but not limited to:
    1. Prescribing of any forms or applications needed;
    2. Establishing criteria for OHV ordinances;
    3. Establishing OHV enforcement requirements;
    4. Establishing criteria for rescinding approval pursuant to subsection (13) of this section;
    5. Establishing OHV safety requirements;
    6. Establishing OHV safety equipment verification protocol; and
    7. Establishing OHV safety plan requirements.

HISTORY: 2021 ch. 186, § 6, effective June 29, 2021.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(6/29/2021). This statute was created by Sec- tion 6 of 2021 Ky. Acts ch. 186. Section 9 of that Act provides that “Sections 6 to 8 of this Act are part of a pilot program and shall sunset on July 1, 2024.”

189.282. Operation of low-speed vehicle on highway.

  1. As used in this section, “low-speed vehicle” shall have the same meaning as in KRS 186.010 .
  2. A person may operate a low-speed vehicle on a highway if:
    1. The vehicle meets the federal motor vehicle safety standards for low-speed vehicles set forth in 49 C.F.R. sec. 571.500;
    2. The vehicle displays a seventeen (17) character vehicle identification number that meets the requirements set forth in 49 C.F.R. 565;
    3. The posted speed limit of the highway is thirty-five (35) miles per hour or less;
    4. The operator of the low-speed vehicle does not cross a roadway at an at-grade intersection where the roadway being crossed has a posted speed limit of more than thirty-five (35) miles per hour unless the intersection is equipped with an electronic traffic signal;
    5. The operator has a valid operator’s license in his or her possession; and
    6. The low-speed vehicle has not been modified to increase its speed above its original standard manufactured limit.
  3. A low-speed vehicle operating on a highway shall be insured in compliance with KRS 304.39-080 by the owner or operator, and the proof of insurance shall be inside the vehicle at all times of operation on a highway.
  4. A low-speed vehicle operating on a highway is considered to be a motor vehicle as defined in KRS 186.010 and shall be titled in accordance with KRS Chapter 186A and registered as a motor vehicle in accordance with KRS 186.050(3)(a).
  5. An operator of a low-speed vehicle operating on a highway shall comply with the traffic regulations of KRS Chapter 189 and shall be subject to the provisions of KRS Chapter 189A.

History. Enact. Acts 2009, ch. 103, § 2, effective June 25, 2009.

189.283. Regulation of commercial parcel delivery made by means of low-speed vehicle, golf cart, or utility vehicle — Administrative regulations.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Commercial delivery personnel” means employees of a licensed commercial delivery service;
    2. “Golf cart” has the same meaning as in KRS 189.286 ;
    3. “Local government” has the same meaning as in KRS 189.286 ;
    4. “Low-speed vehicle” has the same meaning as in KRS 186.010 ;
    5. “Residential area” means areas zoned primarily or exclusively for single-family or multifamily residential use; and
    6. “Utility vehicle” means a vehicle designed and manufactured for general maintenance, security, and landscaping purposes, but does not include any vehicle designed or used primarily for the transportation of persons or property on a street or highway, a golf cart, or an all-terrain vehicle as defined in KRS 189.010 .
  2. Commercial delivery personnel may operate low-speed vehicles, golf carts, or utility vehicles solely for the purpose of delivering express envelopes and packages if:
    1. The operator has a valid operator’s license in his or her possession;
    2. The vehicles are solely operated in residential areas and on public roadways with a posted speed limit of thirty-five (35) miles per hour or less;
    3. At any point after a required notice of intent to operate is provided to the local government pursuant to subsection (8) of this section, the local government having jurisdiction over the public roadways described in paragraph (b) of this subsection has not enacted an ordinance prohibiting commercial delivery personnel from operating on those roadways;
    4. The size of the combined length and girth packages does not exceed one hundred thirty (130) inches and the weight of the packages does not exceed one hundred fifty (150) pounds; and
    5. The vehicles are being operated between:
      1. Sunrise and sunset; or
      2. A time period specified by local ordinance under the provisions of subsection (6) of this section.
  3. Vehicles operating under subsection (2) of this section shall:
    1. Be titled in accordance with KRS Chapter 186A;
    2. Be registered as a motor vehicle in accordance with KRS 186.050(3)(a);
    3. Be insured in compliance with KRS 281.655 ;
    4. Meet the federal motor vehicle safety standards for low-speed vehicles set forth in 49 C.F.R. sec. 571.500;
    5. Be marked in a conspicuous manner with the name of the delivery service;
    6. Bear an identifying sticker or tag issued by the cabinet. The sticker or tag shall carry a unique ID; and
    7. Comply with vehicle standards established by administrative regulations promulgated under subsection (9) of this section.
  4. Commercial delivery personnel may pull a trailer from vehicles operated under this section if the trailer is registered in accordance with KRS 186.675(4).
  5. Commercial delivery personnel operating a vehicle on a public roadway under this section shall be subject to the traffic regulations in this chapter.
  6. The governing body of a local government may, by local ordinance, regulate a vehicle operating under this section on any public roadway under its jurisdiction by specifying:
    1. Each roadway that is prohibited for use by vehicles operating under this section; and
    2. The time period during which vehicles under this section may operate.
  7. A local ordinance adopted under this section shall not assess fees or set forth vehicle equipment requirements.
  8. At least sixty (60) days prior to commencing the operation of low-speed vehicles, golf carts, or utility vehicles under this section, a commercial delivery service shall provide notice to a local government of its intent to operate on roadways under the local government’s jurisdiction. Notification under this subsection shall not be required for local governments that have adopted an ordinance under KRS 189.286 .
  9. The Transportation Cabinet may promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to establish requirements and to set forth standards for vehicles used by commercial delivery personnel operating under this section, including but not limited to issuance of an identification sticker or tag.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 184, § 1, effective June 29, 2017.

189.284. Operation of alternative-speed motorcycle on highway.

  1. As used in this section, “alternative-speed motorcycle” shall have the same meaning as in KRS 186.010 .
  2. A person may operate an alternative-speed motorcycle on a highway if:
    1. The motorcycle bears a sticker, affixed by the manufacturer or dealer, on the left side of the rear window that indicates the vehicle’s maximum speed rating;
    2. The motorcycle is equipped with:
      1. Headlights, front and rear turn signal lights, taillights, and brake lights;
      2. Three (3) red reflectors, two (2) of which must be placed on each side as far to the rear of the vehicle as practicable, and one (1) of which must be placed on the rear of the vehicle;
      3. An exterior mirror mounted on the driver’s side of the vehicle and either an exterior mirror mounted on the passenger’s side of the vehicle or an interior mirror;
      4. A parking brake;
      5. A windshield that conforms to the federal motor vehicle safety standard provided in 49 C.F.R. 571.205;
      6. A seatbelt assembly that conforms to the federal motor vehicle safety standard provided in 49 C.F.R. 571.209; and
      7. A roll bar, roll cage, or crushproof body design;
    3. The posted speed limit of the highway is thirty-five (35) miles per hour or less;
    4. The operator of the alternative-speed vehicle does not cross a roadway at an at-grade intersection where the roadway being crossed has a posted speed limit of more than thirty-five (35) miles per hour unless the intersection is equipped with an electronic traffic signal;
    5. The operator has a valid motorcycle operator’s license in his or her possession; and
    6. The alternative-speed motorcycle has not been modified to increase its speed above its original standard manufactured limit.
  3. An alternative-speed motorcycle operating on a highway shall be insured in compliance with KRS 304.39-080 by the owner or operator, and the proof of insurance shall be inside the vehicle at all times of operation on a highway.
  4. An alternative-speed motorcycle operating on a highway is considered to be a motorcycle as defined in KRS 186.010 and shall be titled in accordance with KRS Chapter 186A and registered as a motorcycle in accordance with KRS 186.050(2).
  5. An operator of an alternative-speed motorcycle shall be exempt from the protective headgear requirements of KRS 189.285 .
  6. Except as provided in this section, an operator of an alternative-speed motorcycle operating on a highway shall comply with the traffic regulations of KRS Chapter 189 and shall be subject to the provisions of KRS Chapter 189A.

History. Enact. Acts 2009, ch. 103, § 3, effective June 25, 2009.

189.285. Regulations for operating and riding on motorcycles — Headgear requirements — Definitions of motorcycle and moped.

  1. A person shall not operate a motorcycle on a highway:
    1. Except when that person is in possession of a valid motorcycle operator’s license; and
    2. Unless that person uses an approved eye-protective device, in the manner prescribed by the secretary of the Transportation Cabinet, at all times such vehicle is in motion; and
    3. Unless the motorcycle is equipped with a rear-view mirror as required under KRS 189.130 .
  2. A person shall not operate or ride as a passenger on a motorcycle:
    1. Except on a seat permanently attached to that vehicle and specifically designed to carry the operator or passenger in a safe manner; and
    2. Except when using a footrest permanently attached to that vehicle and specifically designed to carry that person in a safe manner.
  3. The following persons shall be required to wear protective headgear, in the manner prescribed by the secretary of the Transportation Cabinet, at all times the motorcycles they are riding are in motion on a public highway:
    1. A person under the age of twenty-one (21) years who is operating a motorcycle or who is a passenger on a motorcycle or in a sidecar attachment;
    2. A person who possesses a motorcycle instruction permit and who is operating a motorcycle; and
    3. A person who has held a valid motorcycle operator’s license, or combination motor vehicle-motorcycle operator’s license, for less than one (1) year and who is operating a motorcycle.
  4. A motorcycle operator authorized to drive a motorcycle on an instruction permit shall not be authorized to carry passengers.
  5. The secretary of the Transportation Cabinet shall by regulation fix minimum standards for approved protective headgear and for approved eye-protective devices, and prescribe the manner in which they shall be used. The secretary shall maintain and cause to be published a list of approved protective headgear and of approved eye-protective devices. The secretary may prescribe by regulation minimum standards for other protective devices and require the use of those devices.
  6. As used in this chapter:
    1. “Motorcycle” means any motor-driven vehicle having a seat or saddle for the use of the operator and designed to travel on not more than three (3) wheels in contact with the ground, but excluding tractors and vehicles on which the operator and passengers ride in an enclosed cab and excluding a moped as defined in this subsection; and
    2. “Moped” means either a motorized bicycle whose frame design may include one (1) or more horizontal crossbars supporting a fuel tank so long as it also has pedals, or a motorized bicycle with a step-through type frame which may or may not have pedals rated no more than two (2) brake horsepower, a cylinder capacity not exceeding fifty (50) cubic centimeters, an automatic transmission not requiring clutching or shifting by the operator after the drive system is engaged, and capable of a maximum speed of not more than thirty (30) miles per hour.

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 63, § 1; 1972, ch. 203, § 36; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(10); 1976, ch. 173, § 6; 1978, ch. 349, § 8, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 434, § 6, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 194, § 4, effective July 15, 1982; 1998, ch. 21, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 319, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 393, § 47, effective July 14, 2000; 2001, ch. 43, § 3, effective June 21, 2001; 2006, ch. 173, § 10, effective July 12, 2006.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

The National Highway Safety Act has no bearing on the constitutionality of this section. Commonwealth v. Coffman, 453 S.W.2d 759, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 345 ( Ky. 1970 ).

This section requiring motorcycle riders to wear helmets is not invalid as unreasonable class legislation. Commonwealth v. Coffman, 453 S.W.2d 759, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 345 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A person under the age of 16 is forbidden by law to operate a motorcycle anywhere in the state, including both highways and private property. OAG 77-277 .

Acts 1978, Chapter 434 as enrolled (without House amendment number 6) and signed by the presiding officers of both houses and which became law without the Governor’s signature represents the law on the question as enacted at the 1978 General Assembly. OAG 78-283 .

A snowmobile is not a motor vehicle under the definition found in KRS 186.010(4), (7)(a) (now (8)(a)) and (7)(b) (now (8)(b)), nor is it a motorcycle as defined by subsection (4) (now (6)(a)) of this section. OAG 79-85 .

A golf cart is neither a motor vehicle as defined in KRS 186.010 nor a motorcycle as defined in this section; a golf cart is an off-road vehicle which is covered by the provisions of KRS 189.860 , and therefor, a golf cart cannot be licensed to operate on a public highway or the shoulder of a highway. OAG 80-251 .

The operator of a moped need not wear a protective helmet. OAG 84-176 .

189.2851. Operation, titling, registration, and insuring of motor scooters — Headgear requirements.

  1. As used in this section, “motor scooter” has the same meaning as in KRS 186.010 .
  2. A person may operate a motor scooter on a highway if the operator has a valid motorcycle operator’s license or motorcycle instructional permit in his or her possession.
  3. A motor scooter operating on a highway is considered to be a motorcycle as defined in KRS 186.010 and shall be titled in accordance with KRS Chapter 186A and registered as a motorcycle in accordance with KRS 186.050(2).
  4. A motor scooter operating on a highway shall be insured in compliance with KRS 304.39-110 by the owner or operator, and the proof of insurance shall be in possession of the operator at all times of operation on a highway.
  5. A person operating a motor scooter on a highway shall comply with the traffic regulations of this chapter, meet the same equipment standards as those for motorcycles in this chapter, and shall be subject to the provisions of KRS Chapter 189A.
  6. A person operating a motor scooter shall be subject to the protective headgear requirements of KRS 189.285 .

HISTORY: 2019 ch. 22, § 5, effective June 27, 2019.

189.286. Local government may permit operation of golf cart on public roadway — Ordinance — Qualifications for operation — Exemption from title, registration, and emissions compliance requirements — Preemption by Transportation Cabinet.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Golf cart” means any self-propelled vehicle that:
      1. Is designed for the transportation of players or maintaining equipment on a golf course, while engaged in the playing of golf, supervising the play of golf, or maintaining the condition of the grounds on a golf course;
      2. Has a minimum of four (4) wheels;
      3. Is designed to operate at a speed of not more than thirty-five (35) miles per hour;
      4. Is designed to carry not more than six (6) persons, including the driver;
      5. Has a maximum gross vehicle weight of two thousand five hundred (2,500) pounds;
      6. Has a maximum rated payload capacity of one thousand two hundred (1,200) pounds; and
      7. Is equipped with the following:
        1. Headlamps;
        2. Tail lamps;
        3. Stop lamps;
        4. Front and rear turn signals;
        5. One (1) red reflex reflector on each side as far to the rear as practicable, and one (1) red reflex reflector on the rear;
        6. An exterior mirror mounted on the driver’s side of the vehicle and either an exterior mirror mounted on the passenger’s side of the vehicle or an interior mirror;
        7. A parking brake;
        8. For each designated seating position, a seatbelt assembly that conforms to the federal motor vehicle safety standard provided in 49 C.F.R. sec. 571.209; and
        9. A horn that meets the requirements of KRS 189.080 ; and
    2. “Local government” means a city, county, charter county government, urban-county government, consolidated local government, unified local government, or special district.
  2. The governing body of a local government may authorize and regulate the operation of a golf cart on any public roadway under its jurisdiction if the local government adopts an ordinance specifying each roadway that is open for golf cart use.
  3. An ordinance created under subsection (2) of this section shall require that a golf cart operated on a designated public roadway:
    1. Be issued a permit for the golf cart by the local government;
    2. Display a sticker or permit that identifies that the golf cart is allowed to be operated on specific roadways within the local government; and
    3. Be inspected by a certified inspector designated by the county sheriff and certified through the Department of Vehicle Regulation to ensure that the golf cart complies with the requirements of this section. The inspection fee under this paragraph shall not exceed five dollars ($5) with an additional fee not to exceed ten dollars ($10) per trip charged if it becomes necessary for the certified inspector to travel to the site of the golf cart rather than having the golf cart brought to the sheriff’s inspection area.
  4. A person may operate a golf cart on a public roadway pursuant to subsection (2) of this section if:
    1. The posted speed limit of the designated public roadway is thirty-five (35) miles per hour or less;
    2. The operator of the golf cart does not cross a roadway at an intersection where the roadway being crossed has a posted speed limit of more than thirty-five (35) miles per hour;
    3. The operator has a valid operator’s license in his or her possession; and
    4. The golf cart displays a slow-moving vehicle emblem in compliance with KRS 189.820 .
  5. A golf cart operating on a public roadway under subsection (2) of this section shall be insured in compliance with KRS 304.39-080 by the owner or operator, and the proof of insurance shall be inside the golf cart at all times of operation on a public roadway.
  6. Any person operating a golf cart on a public roadway under the provisions of this section shall be subject to the traffic regulations of KRS Chapter 189.
  7. A golf cart operating on a public roadway designated by a local government under subsection (2) of this section is not considered to be motor a vehicle and is exempt from:
    1. Title requirements of KRS 186.020 ;
    2. Vehicle registration requirements of KRS 186.050 ; and
    3. Emissions compliance certificates pursuant to KRS 224.20-720 .
  8. A local government may adopt more stringent local ordinances governing golf cart safety equipment and operation than specified in this section.
  9. The Transportation Cabinet may prohibit the operation of a golf cart on a public roadway designated under subsection (2) of this section that crosses a state-maintained highway under its jurisdiction if it determines that such prohibition is necessary in the interest of public safety.
  10. The provisions of this section shall not apply to a golf cart that is not used on a public roadway except to cross a roadway while following a golf cart path on a golf course.

History. Enact. Acts 2008, ch. 106, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; 2010, ch. 53, § 1, effective July 15, 2010; 2019 ch. 13, § 1, effective June 27, 2019; 2020 ch. 34, § 1, effective July 15, 2020.

189.287. Bicycle safety regulations and standards.

The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to set forth standards for bicycle equipment and the safe operation of a bicycle. The regulations shall include requirements for lights, reflectors, and audible warning devices. Bicycles and riders which comply with the regulations promulgated under this section are exempt from municipal and other local government regulations concerning safety equipment but not method of operation. In promulgating the administrative regulations, the Transportation Cabinet shall permit use of lightweight modern technological substitutes for lights, reflectors, and bells. The purpose of this section is to encourage bicycling and bicycle touring in this state by enabling bicycle riders to make use of modern technology to make their presence known to other users of the road. The Transportation Cabinet may consult with organizations of bicycle riders to aid it in the search for bicycle safety equipment and rules convenient for long distance bicycle riders.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 101, § 1; 2006, ch. 105, § 2, effective July 12, 2006; 2006, ch. 173, § 11, effective July 12, 2006.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/12/2006). This section was amended by 2006 Ky. Acts chs. 105 and 173, which are in conflict. Under KRS 446.250 , Acts ch. 173, which was last enacted by the General Assembly, prevails.

189.288. Operation, insuring, titling, and registration of autocycles — Exemption from headgear requirements.

  1. As used in this section, “autocycle” has the same meaning as in KRS 186.010 .
    1. A person may operate an autocycle on a highway if the operator has a valid operator’s license in his or her possession. (2) (a) A person may operate an autocycle on a highway if the operator has a valid operator’s license in his or her possession.
    2. An operator of an autocycle shall not be required to obtain a motorcycle license or endorsement.
  2. An autocycle operating on a highway shall be insured in compliance with KRS 304.39-110 by the owner or operator, and the proof of insurance shall be inside the vehicle at all times of operation on a highway.
  3. An autocycle operating on a highway is considered to be a motorcycle as defined in KRS 186.010 and shall be titled in accordance with KRS Chapter 186A and registered as a motorcycle in accordance with KRS 186.050(2).
  4. A person operating an autocycle on a highway shall comply with the traffic regulations of KRS Chapter 189 and shall be subject to the provisions of KRS Chapter 189A.
  5. An operator of an autocycle shall be exempt from the protective headgear requirements of KRS 189.285 .

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 69, § 2, effective June 29, 2017.

189.289. Operation of electric low-speed scooter on highway, bicycle lane, or bicycle path.

  1. A person sixteen (16) years of age or older, may operate an electric low-speed scooter on a highway, bicycle lane, or bicycle path.
  2. A person operating an electric low-speed scooter under this section shall be subject to traffic regulations outlined in this chapter, and the provisions of KRS 189.520 .
  3. An electric low-speed scooter shall be equipped with and shall have illuminated, at least one (1) headlamp and at least one (1) rear red light when:
    1. Operated during the period from one-half (1/2) hour after sunset to one-half (1/2) hour before sunrise; or
    2. At such other times as atmospheric conditions render visibility as low as or lower than is ordinarily the case during that period.
  4. An electric low-speed scooter may be parked on a sidewalk in a manner that does not impede the reasonable movement of pedestrian or any other traffic.
  5. An operator of an electric low-speed scooter and any company or entity that provides electric low-speed scooters for rental, shall comply with all local government ordinances.
  6. The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to establish safe operating standards for electric low-speed scooters. Administrative regulations established under this section shall not include any equipment or helmet use requirements.

HISTORY: 2019 ch. 22, § 4, effective June 27, 2019.

189.290. Operator of vehicle to drive carefully.

  1. The operator of any vehicle upon a highway shall operate the vehicle in a careful manner, with regard for the safety and convenience of pedestrians and other vehicles upon the highway.
  2. No person shall willfully operate any vehicle on any highway in such a manner as to injure the highway.

History. 2739g-33, 2739g-35.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Construction.

As to respective rights and duties as between a pedestrian and the operator of a motor vehicle in the highway the common-law principles of ordinary care and this section are supplemented by KRS 189.570 . Frank v. Silvers, 414 S.W.2d 887, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 367 ( Ky. 1967 ).

Under the statute a motorist is required to operate his vehicle in a careful manner at all times. Lockridge v. Mercer, 438 S.W.2d 486, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 151 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Since the auction dealer was not an operator of either vehicle, the estate’s claims were properly dismissed. Savage v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2021 Ky. App. LEXIS 8 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2021).

2.Ordinary Care.

KRS 189.390 did not affect basic rule that each driver must exercise reasonable and ordinary care and that failure to do so constitutes some evidence of negligence. Meriweather's Adm'x v. Pickering, 273 Ky. 367 , 116 S.W.2d 670, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 643 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior version of KRS 189.390 ).

One driving a motor vehicle having a greater width than the ordinary passenger car, even though within the width permitted by statute, must take that fact into consideration as he endeavors to exercise ordinary care in its operation. Commercial Carriers, Inc. v. Small, 277 Ky. 189 , 126 S.W.2d 143, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 638 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Pedestrians and operators of motor cars have equal rights in the use of the highway, and each must recognize the right of the other and exercise reasonable care to avoid injuring others and being injured himself; but “ordinary care” as applied to the operator of a motor vehicle, is of higher degree than “ordinary care” as applied to pedestrians. Igo v. Smith, 282 Ky. 336 , 138 S.W.2d 497, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 173 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Driver of large tractor-trailer had the right to take as much of the road as he deemed necessary to make turn into driveway but he was bound to exercise reasonable and ordinary care commensurate with the risk of danger to the traveling public which attended the course he took and without violating this section or KRS 189.330 , 189.340 and 189.380 . Crawford Transport Co. v. Wireman, 280 S.W.2d 163, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1955 ).

3.Negligence Per Se.

Where a driver traveling on an interstate highway realized he had missed his exit, pulled to the emergency lane, began backing his automobile, backed onto the highway and was hit from behind by an approaching automobile, he was negligent as a matter of law. Ferguson v. Stevenson, 427 S.W.2d 822, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 698 ( Ky. 1968 ).

4.Contributory Negligence.

Where a motorist approaching a tractor and combine coming from the opposite direction, saw that the tractor and combine extended into his lane, applied his brakes, steered to his right so that his right wheels left the pavement, lost control attempting to return to the pavement, and collided with defendant’s tractor, both parties were negligent and neither was entitled to recover. United States v. Richmond, 113 F. Supp. 213, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2546 (D. Ky. 1953 ).

The violation of the terms of a statute or ordinance with reference to the operation of automobiles is negligence per se; and if, but for such negligence on plaintiff’s part, there would have been no injury, plaintiff is barred by contributory negligence. Home Laundry Co. v. Cook, 277 Ky. 8 , 125 S.W.2d 763, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 609 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Evidence that 9-year-old boy ran across intersection directly into the path of defendant’s approaching car, with the red light against him, was ample for defendant on ground of contributory negligence. Dixon v. Stringer, 277 Ky. 347 , 126 S.W.2d 448, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 651 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Question of plaintiff’s contributory negligence on account of speed and failing to avoid defendant’s car by driving around it on balance of road and shoulder was properly submitted to jury. Saxton v. Tucker, 280 Ky. 777 , 134 S.W.2d 590, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1939 ).

It is not contributory negligence as a matter of law for one in full possession of his faculties to ride on the running board of a motor vehicle, but an intoxicated person who so rides is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. If the driver does not know of the intoxicated condition, the passenger may not recover for injuries, but if the driver knows of the condition he must, under the last clear chance doctrine, exercise ordinary care to prevent injury to the passenger, having in mind his intoxicated condition, and in some cases ordinary care would require that the vehicle not be operated at all with the passenger on the running board. Prather's Adm'r v. Allen, 291 Ky. 353 , 164 S.W.2d 402, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 225 ( Ky. 1942 ).

A driver who obeyed stop sign at street intersection and looked both ways before entering the intersection was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law when he was struck by a taxi after entering the intersection since he had the right to assume the taxi driver who was on the main or preferred highway would obey speed law and exercise ordinary care to avoid collision. Danville Cab Co. v. Hendren, 304 Ky. 528 , 201 S.W.2d 561, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 669 ( Ky. 1947 ).

Where plaintiff stood in the street in front of his car and poured anti-freeze into his car’s radiator and defendant who was parked in front of plaintiff’s car without warning backed his car against plaintiff thereby injuring him, plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Clem v. Ball, 237 S.W.2d 839, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 777 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Rider of horse on highway who used a spur in attempt to control horse frightened by truck causing horse to whirl and jam its head into truck window was contributorily negligent. Alpha Constr. Co. v. Branham, 337 S.W.2d 790, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 369 ( Ky. 1960 ).

5.Last Clear Chance.

Where there was evidence that pedestrian ran or walked as much as 20 to 34 feet in full view of driver of car, contributory negligence instruction should have been followed by an instruction of last clear chance. Dixon v. Stringer, 277 Ky. 347 , 126 S.W.2d 448, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 651 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Where driver of truck parked at curb on city street backed up truck three or four feet and struck child standing in street behind truck, it was prejudicial error to give a “last clear chance” instruction, since the circumstances made the “last clear change” doctrine inapplicable. Thomas v. Boklage, 293 Ky. 804 , 170 S.W.2d 348, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 710 ( Ky. 1943 ).

6.Violation of Law by Plaintiff.

Where the evidence established that the defendant’s driver turned to left across highway without maintaining a proper lookout or proper signal, and at a time when plaintiff’s oncoming car was but 80 feet away, the proximate cause of the collision with the approaching car was the negligence of the defendant’s driver, notwithstanding plaintiff’s possible violation of the federal speed limit. Davis v. Kunkle, 302 Ky. 258 , 194 S.W.2d 513, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 653 ( Ky. 1946 ).

7.Unexpected Crisis.

Driver of auto is not required to anticipate that an auto will suddenly come out from behind another approaching vehicle right in his path and continue straight toward him. Lyons v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 282 Ky. 106 , 137 S.W.2d 1107, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 137 ( Ky. 1940 ).

One without fault, confronted with an unexpected crisis, is not called upon to exercise the same ordered judgment as under ordinary circumstances. Lyons v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 282 Ky. 106 , 137 S.W.2d 1107, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 137 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Operator of automobile who was proceeding at a reasonable speed on his own side of the highway and keeping a reasonable lookout was not liable for injuries caused by striking person sitting near the road when he turned off the road to avoid a collision with truck which was approaching on wrong side of road. Moreland's Adm'r v. Stone, 292 Ky. 521 , 166 S.W.2d 998, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 121 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Driver of vehicle is not liable for acts, otherwise negligent, committed instinctively in the face of imminent peril not of his own creation. Moreland's Adm'r v. Stone, 292 Ky. 521 , 166 S.W.2d 998, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 121 ( Ky. 1942 ).

8.Sudden Appearance Doctrine Repudiated.

The “sudden appearance” doctrine is repudiated, and the giving of a “sudden appearance” instruction is reversible error, the instruction being condemned because it relieves the driver of responsibility if he exercises ordinary care after pedestrian appears in his path, even though antecedent negligence of driver caused him to get into position where he could not avoid striking pedestrian after discovering him. Voluntary action on the part of a pedestrian by which he gets into the path of a moving car may be covered by a contributory negligence instruction. Dixon v. Stringer, 277 Ky. 347 , 126 S.W.2d 448, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 651 ( Ky. 1939 ).

9.Continuous Violations.

Where vehicle was driven at a dangerous rate of speed for about six miles and across a county line, the offenses of reckless driving and driving without a license were continuous and could not be prosecuted as separate offenses in one of the counties after conviction in the other. Huff v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 831, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 219 ( Ky. 1966 ).

10.Narrow Bridge.

When two vehicles moving in opposite directions are approaching a bridge or passage too narrow for the vehicles to pass, it is the duty of each operator to exercise ordinary care to prevent collision and in so doing to avoid the contingency of being on the bridge or in the passage at the same time. Short v. Robinson, 280 Ky. 707 , 134 S.W.2d 594, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 195 ( Ky. 1939 ).

11.School Bus Driver.

School bus driver owes other motorists duty of operating his bus in a careful manner with respect to their safety under this section. Greyhound Corp. v. White, 323 S.W.2d 578, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Where a school bus driver stopped in his left lane a few feet behind a commercial bus which was stopped partially in the right lane and he could easily have pulled completely off of the road, the question of whether the school bus driver was negligent should have been submitted to the jury and, were it not for the requirement that all motorists stop before passing a school bus and the possibility that the school bus driver, therefore, reasonably thought that any motorist behind him would be prepared to stop when he did, there should have been a directed verdict against the school bus driver in favor of a passenger in a car which hit both buses from behind on the slick road. Greyhound Corp. v. White, 323 S.W.2d 578, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Where a commercial bus stopped partially in the right traffic lane of a road in order to repair a flat tire, a school bus traveling in the same direction then stopped in the left lane a few feet behind it, and a car also traveling in the same direction then hit both buses in an attempt to stop on the slick road, the parking of the school bus so as to materially obstruct the road was so unusual and extraordinary that the commercial bus driver could not have foreseen it and, therefore, the parking of the school bus was an intervening cause of the accident so as to relieve the commercial bus driver of liability even if his stopping was negligent. Greyhound Corp. v. White, 323 S.W.2d 578, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1958 ).

12.Passing Another Vehicle.

Fact that bus ran off road and turned over while attempting to pass a truck creates a situation from which an inference of negligence may be drawn by the jury, particularly where there was evidence that bus was traveling 40 miles per hour. V. T. C. Lines v. Taylor, 281 Ky. 83 , 134 S.W.2d 991, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 14 ( Ky. 1939 ).

13.Rear-end Collision.

Driver of auto may not place his auto so close behind a moving vehicle, in congested traffic, that he cannot stop in time to avoid a collision if the preceding vehicle should suddenly stop. Lyons v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 282 Ky. 106 , 137 S.W.2d 1107, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 137 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Driver of truck did not violate this section in slowing or stopping where another truck was off the highway with lights burning and man was standing by it waving a flashlight nor was he negligent to extent of being liable for death of passenger in following truck which struck his truck. Clardy v. Robinson, 284 S.W.2d 651, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 29 ( Ky. 1955 ).

14.Voluntary Manslaughter.

Drunkenness of motorist, coupled with failure to maintain a lookout, sustained verdict of voluntary manslaughter. Newcomb v. Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 362 , 124 S.W.2d 486, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 532 ( Ky. 1939 ).

One who operates an auto in such a manner as is likely to injure other persons using the highway, and recklessly, wantonly and with gross carelessness strikes and kills another, is guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Carnes v. Commonwealth, 278 Ky. 771 , 129 S.W.2d 543, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 493 ( Ky. 1939 ).

15.Involuntary Manslaughter.

Evidence did not sustain conviction of involuntary manslaughter, where accused was not driving in unlawful, reckless or dangerous manner, and deceased pedestrian ran in front of his car. Carnes v. Commonwealth, 278 Ky. 771 , 129 S.W.2d 543, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 493 ( Ky. 1939 ).

16.Reckless Driving.

The trial court did not err in not dismissing the defendant’s prosecution under subsection (1) of KRS 189A.010 in that he had already pled guilty to a charge of reckless driving resulting from the same occurrences because reckless driving is not a lesser included offense of driving under the influence. Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 445, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1203 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986), limited, Osborne v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 484, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993), overruled, Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1996 ).

17.Search and Seizure.

Where driver pleaded guilty to violation of this section and paid a fine and stated to state trooper her erratic driving was due to a load of furniture in the trunk, it was reasonable for trooper to search her trunk which was loaded with non-tax-paid whiskey as an incident to the lawful arrest for the traffic violation committed in the trooper’s presence and there was no evidence the search was exploratory to secure evidence to support some future arrest. United States v. Stokely, 311 F.2d 593, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 6476 (6th Cir. Ky. 1963 ).

18.Evidence.

Where motorist struck infant pedestrian who was crossing street, and evidence was conflicting as to whether infant ran from behind streetcar, verdict for plaintiff was upheld. Whitehead v. Stith, 279 Ky. 556 , 131 S.W.2d 455, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 307 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Although negligence will not be presumed, it may be inferred from circumstances which show that the accident would not have occurred in the usual and ordinary course, if the driver had been exercising ordinary care, and in such a case the burden to introduce evidence on the issue of negligence is shifted from the plaintiff to the defendant. Stark's Adm'x v. Herndon's Adm'r, 292 Ky. 469 , 166 S.W.2d 828, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 91 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Evidence sustained verdict for defendant where defendant was driving along a relatively straight highway at night at 40 to 45 miles per hour and he testified he had not seen decedent until immediately prior to striking him. Hughes's Adm'x v. Shouse, 245 S.W.2d 940, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 611 ( Ky. 1952 ).

19.— As to Conduct Prior to Accident.

Where defendant charged with murder as result of operation of automobile in reckless and wanton manner maintained that he was seized with a fit at time of accident, evidence as to his manner of driving ten to 20 minutes before the accident was admissible as bearing on his condition of mind at that time. Nichols v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 165 , 163 S.W.2d 480, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 210 ( Ky. 1942 ).

20.Questions for Jury.

Question of whether motorist, in the exercise of ordinary care under this section, should have seen pedestrian crossing street during evening, and should have given warning, was for the jury. Pryor's Adm'r v. Otter, 268 Ky. 602 , 105 S.W.2d 564, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 488 ( Ky. 1937 ).

Whether motorist was negligent in failing to slacken speed, when meeting other vehicles whose lights blinded him, so that he did not see truck parked on road ahead of him, was a jury question. McLellan v. Threlkeld, 279 Ky. 114 , 129 S.W.2d 977, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 223 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Where seven-year-old child ran into street and was struck by defendant’s car, and evidence was conflicting as to whether defendant was keeping a proper lookout and could have stopped car after seeing child, question of negligence was for the jury. Nickell v. Stewart, 291 Ky. 4 , 163 S.W.2d 39, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 175 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Where there was evidence that deceased was standing in center of road, near parked car, at time bus came over hill some 500 feet away, but did not see bus because he was looking at dog in field and did not hear it because he was deaf, there was a jury question as to whether bus driver was negligent in not seeing deceased and in not using means at hand to avoid striking him, under last clear chance doctrine. Short Way Lines, Inc. v. Sutton's Adm'r, 291 Ky. 541 , 164 S.W.2d 809, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 239 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Where defendant, who was driving north in middle lane of four-lane highway, maintained that plaintiff pedestrian ran directly in front of his car from behind south-bound truck, but undisputed evidence was that plaintiff was struck at extreme east edge of pavement, questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury. Smith v. Goodwin, 292 Ky. 37 , 165 S.W.2d 976, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Where bus struck child who ran across road at a point in a small country village, negligence of bus driver was for the jury, in view of testimony of passenger in bus that he saw child when bus was 150 feet away, while bus driver testified that he did not see child until he was within 25 or 30 feet of her, justifying inference that driver was not keeping a proper lookout, and in view of evidence that bus traveled 137 feet after brakes were applied, indicating excessive speed. Kentucky Virginia Stages, Inc. v. Tackett's Adm'r, 294 Ky. 189 , 171 S.W.2d 4, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 389 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Where defendant, driving west on highway, started to turn across road into filling station in front of plaintiff’s car, which was going east, but changed his mind and turned back to own side of road because of proximity of plaintiff’s car, and collision resulted because plaintiff turned to left in effort to avoid defendant’s car, questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury, in view of testimony and physical evidence that plaintiff was driving at high rate of speed and did not reduce his speed although he saw defendant preparing to turn when defendant was some 400 feet away. Raidt v. Blount, 294 Ky. 172 , 171 S.W.2d 233, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 409 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Where the driver of a truck was driving at speeds varying from 30 to 40 miles per hour and the roads were slick and icy and the truck skidded when the brakes were applied upon coming upon a car stopped on the highway, there was no act or failure to act on the part of the truck driver which made him negligent as a matter of law, and the question of negligence was for a jury to determine. Williams v. Chilton, 427 S.W.2d 586, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 687 ( Ky. 1968 ), overruled in part, Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 261 ( Ky. 1984 ).

21.Jury Instructions.

Instructions should have qualified the contributory negligence instruction by adding a last clear chance instruction and should have modified instruction as to liability of defendant if he was driving at a rate of speed in excess of statutory limit by proximate cause, contributory negligence and unreasonable and proper driving provisions. Nowak v. Joseph, 275 Ky. 470 , 121 S.W.2d 939, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 443 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Failure to define “negligence” in instructions was not prejudicial where instructions were otherwise sufficient. Home Laundry Co. v. Cook, 277 Ky. 8 , 125 S.W.2d 763, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 609 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Proper instructions should be given on ordinary and proximate cause and instructions should not authorize jury to find for plaintiff both for permanent impairment of his power to earn money and for the loss of time for the same period thereby authorizing a duplication for the period of lost time. McLellan v. Threlkeld, 279 Ky. 114 , 129 S.W.2d 977, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 223 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Instruction using language of this section was not objectionable. Buck v. Kleinschmidt, 279 Ky. 569 , 131 S.W.2d 714, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 324 ( Ky. 1939 ).

A proper negligence instruction was “and if the driver of the defendant’s car failed in the performance of any one or more of said duties, and that by reason of said failure, if any there was, the car of defendant collided with the car in which plaintiff was riding and thereby plaintiff received the injuries complained of, the law is for the plaintiff and you should so find.” Buck v. Kleinschmidt, 279 Ky. 569 , 131 S.W.2d 714, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 324 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Proper instructions as to duty of driver of vehicle traveling behind another vehicle were “it was the duty of the truck driver to have the truck under reasonable control and operate it in a careful manner with due regard for the safety of his truck and the safety of other traffic on the highway, and, in traveling behind defendant’s car on the highway, to keep such distance between it and his truck as was reasonable in the circumstances in the exercise of ordinary care to avoid collision with it, having due regard for the traffic and conditions existing on the highway; to keep a reasonable lookout and exercise ordinary care to avoid collision with the car in front of him and for the safety of his truck; if the jury believe from the evidence that the truck driver failed to observe one or more of these duties and that such failure on his part caused the damage to the truck and cargo or contributed to causing same to such an extent that, but for such failure on his part, such damage would not have occurred, you should find for the defendants.” Fahrenholtz v. Loomis, 280 Ky. 9 , 132 S.W.2d 307, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 49 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Instruction that plaintiff should use ordinary care in operating his auto to avoid colliding with other vehicles, to drive at a reasonable rate of speed, to keep it under reasonable control, to keep a lookout ahead, and before passing auto ahead to give notice of his intention to do so by sounding his horn and not to pass to the righthand side of the highway until he had cleared the other auto, was proper. Whitney v. Penick, 281 Ky. 474 , 136 S.W.2d 570, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Evidence that bus was proceeding at very slow rate of speed in meeting truck, and that auto behind truck suddenly pulled out directly in path of bus, causing bus driver to bring bus to a sudden stop, resulting in injury to passenger, justified peremptory instruction for defendant bus owner in action by passenger. Lyons v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 282 Ky. 106 , 137 S.W.2d 1107, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 137 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Where general instruction predicated liability on defendant’s failure to observe her duties, and required finding for defendant unless the jury so believed, it was not error for court to fail to extend the converse to a second instruction submitting the defense of sudden appearance. Nickell v. Stewart, 291 Ky. 4 , 163 S.W.2d 39, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 175 ( Ky. 1942 ).

In a case involving an accident resulting from a blowout, where there was no evidence that tire was defective, other than evidence that it was a second-hand tire, instruction relieving defendant from liability if jury found that there was a defect in the tire unknown to defendant was erroneous, there being no evidence to support it. Murphy v. Harmon, 291 Ky. 504 , 165 S.W.2d 11, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 262 ( Ky. 1942 ).

An instruction that the plaintiff driver should have his motor vehicle under reasonable control and should keep a reasonable lookout ahead, although irrelevant because negligence claim was predicated on violation of other statutory duties, was not error. Lockridge v. Mercer, 438 S.W.2d 486, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 151 ( Ky. 1968 ).

22.— Contributory Negligence.

Where there was evidence that 9-year-old plaintiff walked or ran as much as 20 to 34 feet in full view of driver, if driver had been looking, before being struck a contributory negligence instruction should be followed by an instruction on last clear chance. Dixon v. Stringer, 277 Ky. 347 , 126 S.W.2d 448, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 651 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Instructions as to contributory negligence of passengers in riding with driver who was suffering from physical and mental fatigue were properly refused where there was no evidence that driver was tired or sleepy and no evidence of careless or improper driving at any time before the accident. Southern Oxygen Co. v. Martin, 291 Ky. 238 , 163 S.W.2d 459, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 202 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Where evidence was that defendant bus driver approached parked car at speed of at least 25 miles an hour, and there was conflicting testimony as to whether passenger in car was standing in the center of the road or beside the car close to the edge of the road, it was proper to instruct the jury to determine whether the rate of speed was reasonable and whether the bus driver had the bus under reasonable control. Short Way Lines, Inc. v. Sutton's Adm'r, 291 Ky. 541 , 164 S.W.2d 809, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 239 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Where evidence was that injured pedestrian was deaf, instruction that it was his duty to exercise that degree of care usually exercised by ordinary prudent persons “under circumstances and conditions established in this case” was sufficient, without specific reference to deafness. Short Way Lines, Inc. v. Sutton's Adm'r, 291 Ky. 541 , 164 S.W.2d 809, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 239 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Cited in:

W. M. Abbott Transfer Co. v. Kruse, 272 Ky. 479 , 114 S.W.2d 731, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 147 ( Ky. 1938 ); Siler v. Commonwealth, 280 Ky. 830 , 134 S.W.2d 945, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 219 ( Ky. 1939 ); McCoy v. Carter, 323 S.W.2d 210, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 323 ( Ky. 1959 ); Commonwealth v. Robey, 337 S.W.2d 34, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 361 ( Ky. 1960 ); Hainline v. Hukill, 383 S.W.2d 353, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 35 ( Ky. 1964 ); Carruba v. Speno, 418 S.W.2d 398, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 210 ( Ky. 1967 ); Peterman v. Darby, 419 S.W.2d 747, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 185 ( Ky. 1967 ); Omer v. Brandenburg, 481 S.W.2d 285, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 246 ( Ky. 1972 ); Dier v. City of Prestonsburg, 480 F. Supp. 2d 929, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26644 (E.D. Ky. 2007 ); Bays v. Summitt Trucking, LLC, 691 F. Supp. 2d 725, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16975 (W.D. Ky. 2010 ); Carr v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.3d 364, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 177 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although running a red light alone cannot be considered an act of reckless driving, it may, together with other circumstances or acts, be considered as reckless driving or an element of it. OAG 63-833 .

A prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicating beverages in violation of KRS 189.520 would not, on grounds of double jeopardy, bar a prosecution for reckless driving in violation of this section, even though the actions constituting the violations were committed simultaneously. OAG 70-288 .

Although a school district could not set speed requirements on its parking lots lower than those allowed by state law, driving at an unreasonable speed under the circumstances or driving in an improper manner, even in the absence of a lower posted speed limit or a lower statutory limit, could form the basis for a traffic violation under this section. OAG 71-207 .

There is no statutory distinction between the terms “improper driving of a motor vehicle” and “reckless driving,” and both fall within the prohibitions of this section. OAG 73-501 .

A prosecution of reckless driving under this section would not bar a later prosecution of reckless homicide under KRS 507.050 arising out of the same conduct. OAG 78-301 .

Persons operating farm tractors on the highway may be held to the standard of this section. OAG 78-712 .

Since there is no statutory distinction between reckless driving and careless driving, as long as the ambiguity in the point system continues to exist, only the lesser penalty of three points may be assessed under this section. OAG 78-771 .

There are only two types of offenses as far as the law of arrest is concerned, felonies and misdemeanors, and a peace officer may make an arrest at his discretion for a misdemeanor or violation committed in his presence. OAG 80-143 (withdrawing OAG 79-395 ).

If roadways within mobile home park are offered for public use so as to be considered “public” roads (although privately owned or maintained), or if such roadways constitute off-street parking facilities offered for public use, other than for hire, they would be within the definition of “highway” as used in KRS 189.010(3). Accordingly, law enforcement officers could properly issue citations for speeding violations or reckless driving violations occurring upon such roadways. OAG 92-36 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Mann, Legislation — A Proposed Dangerous Driving Statute for Kentucky, 36 Ky. L.J. 82 (1947).

Kentucky Law Survey, Fortune, Criminal Rules, 70 Ky. L.J. 395 (1981-82).

Note: Cell Phones Pose a Distraction to Drivers but Legislative Ban Is Not the Answer, 98 Ky. L.J. 177 (2009/2010).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Police Officer’s Answer to Claim of Unlawful Arrest, Form 121.02.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Automobiles/No Fault/Uninsured Motorist, § 135.00.

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Assault and Battery, § 28.12.

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Automobiles, §§ 16.02, 16.04, 16.05, 16.14 — 16.19, 16.21, 16.22, 16.27, 16.34 — 16.38, 16.40, 16.44 — 16.49.

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Criminal), 5th Ed., Offenses Against Public Order, Safety and Morals, Part. 4 Offenses Relating to Firearms and Destructive Devices, § 8.69.

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Railroads, § 25.01.

189.292. Use of personal communication device prohibited while operating motor vehicle in motion on traveled portion of roadway — Exclusions — Administrative regulations.

  1. As used in this section, “personal communication device” means a device capable of two (2) way audio or text communication that emits an audible signal, vibrates, displays a message, or otherwise summons or delivers communication to the possessor, including but not limited to a paging device and a cellular telephone.
  2. Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, no person shall, while operating a motor vehicle that is in motion on the traveled portion of a roadway, write, send, or read text-based communication using a personal communication device to manually communicate with any person using text-based communication, including but not limited to communications referred to as a text message, instant message, or electronic mail.
  3. Subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to:
    1. The use of a global positioning system feature of a personal communication device;
    2. The use of a global positioning or navigation system that is physically or electronically integrated into the motor vehicle;
    3. The reading, selecting, or entering of a telephone number or name in a personal communication device for the purpose of making a phone call;
    4. An operator of an emergency or public safety vehicle, when the use of a personal communication device is an essential function of the operator’s official duties; or
    5. The operator of a motor vehicle who writes a text message on a personal communication device to:
      1. Report illegal activity;
      2. Summon medical help;
      3. Summon a law enforcement or public safety agency; or
      4. Prevent injury to a person or property.
  4. The secretary of the Transportation Cabinet may promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to implement the provisions of this section, including but not limited to updates or advances in the automotive and information technology industries.

History. Enact. Acts 2010, ch. 110, § 2, effective July 15, 2010; 2011, ch. 59, § 3, effective June 8, 2011.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Cell Phones Pose a Distraction to Drivers but Legislative Ban Is Not the Answer, 98 Ky. L.J. 177 (2009/2010).

189.294. Use of personal communication device by minor prohibited while operating motor vehicle, motorcycle, or moped in motion on traveled portion of roadway — Exclusions — Administrative regulations.

  1. As used in this section, “personal communication device” shall have the same meaning as defined in KRS 189.292 .
  2. Any person under the age of eighteen (18) who has been issued an instruction permit, intermediate license, or operator’s license shall not operate a motor vehicle, motorcycle, or moped that is in motion on the traveled portion of a roadway while using a personal communication device, except to summon medical help or a law enforcement or public safety agency in an emergency situation.
  3. Use of a personal communication device does not include a stand-alone global positioning system, a global positioning or navigation system that is physically or electronically integrated into the motor vehicle, or an in-vehicle security, diagnostics, and communications system, but does include manually entering information into the global positioning system feature of a personal communication device.
  4. This section shall not apply to the use of a citizens band radio or an amateur radio by a motor vehicle operator.
  5. The secretary of the Transportation Cabinet may promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to implement the provisions of this section, including but not limited to updates or advances in the automotive and information technology industries.

History. Enact. Acts 2010, ch. 110, § 3, effective July 15, 2010; 2011, ch. 59, § 4, effective June 8, 2011.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Cell Phones Pose a Distraction to Drivers but Legislative Ban Is Not the Answer, 98 Ky. L.J. 177 (2009/2010).

189.300. Vehicles to keep to right — Exceptions.

  1. The operator of any vehicle when upon a highway shall travel upon the right side of the highway whenever possible, and unless the left side of the highway is clear of all other traffic or obstructions for a sufficient distance ahead to permit the overtaking and passing of another vehicle to be completed without interfering with the operation of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction or any vehicle being overtaken. The overtaking vehicle shall return to the proper traffic lane as soon as practicable and, if the passing vehicle enters the oncoming traffic lane, before coming within two hundred (200) feet of any approaching vehicle.
  2. The operator of any vehicle moving slowly upon a highway shall keep his vehicle as closely as practicable to the right-hand boundary of the highway, allowing more swiftly moving vehicles reasonably free passage to the left, unless signage or markings indicate otherwise.

HISTORY: 2739g-35, 2739g-45: amend. Acts 2006, ch. 173, § 12, effective July 12, 2006; 2018 ch. 38, § 1, effective July 14, 2018.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Construction.

Traveler is not required under this section at all times and under all conditions to remain on right-hand side of road. Fullenwider v. Brawner, 224 Ky. 274 , 6 S.W.2d 264, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 592 ( Ky. 1928 ).

Statute seems to require that driver should stay on right-hand side of road whenever possible and must stay there if there is traffic or obstruction on left side within 150 feet, or if he cannot see that way is clear for that distance. H. M. Williams Motor Co. v. Howard, 251 Ky. 557 , 65 S.W.2d 688, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 917 ( Ky. 1933 ).

This section requires that driver should keep to the right-hand side of the road whenever possible, but must do so if there is any traffic or other obstruction within 150 feet or if he cannot see the way clearly ahead for at least that distance. McFarland v. Bruening, 299 Ky. 267 , 185 S.W.2d 247, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 404 ( Ky. 1945 ).

2.Application.

This section applies to view of driver rather than to one standing on side of highway. Schultz v. Smith's Adm'r, 314 Ky. 198 , 234 S.W.2d 676, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 1053 ( Ky. 1950 ).

3.Negligence Per Se.

Automobile driver had right to assume, in the absence of knowledge to the contrary, that, when he observed the headlights of truck, it was on the right side of the highway, since it is a duty to drive on that side, and the presumption would be indulged that truck driver was performing his duty and since truck driver was on the wrong side of the highway he was guilty of negligence so as to render him liable for consequences of collision unless automobile driver was contributorily negligent. Padgett v. Brangan, 228 Ky. 440 , 15 S.W.2d 277, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 569 ( Ky. 1929 ).

Negligence of driver making occasional use of left side of highway seems to refer to respective rights of drivers passing each other as affected by their relative positions on highway, and negligence of one driving on left is not conclusively shown regardless of traffic conditions. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Sapp's Adm'r, 249 Ky. 406 , 60 S.W.2d 976, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 537 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Proof that operator of an automobile was traveling on the wrong side of the highway creates a prima facie case of negligence, where it results in injury to other users of the highway on their right side of the road. Stark's Adm'x v. Herndon's Adm'r, 292 Ky. 469 , 166 S.W.2d 828, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 91 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Plaintiff was not negligent as a matter of law in violation of this section where her jeep was struck in the rear while she was making a left turn at an intersection for this section was not intended to forbid a car on a two-lane highway from turning off to the left. Wooten v. Compton, 322 S.W.2d 473, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1959 ).

Where driver intentionally drove his automobile at a speed that was excessive in view of the topography of the highway and in so doing committed a misdemeanor in failing to operate his vehicle in a careful manner in violation of KRS 189.290 and 189.990 and perhaps in violation of this section by failing to keep to the right he was negligent per se but without any evidence of how excessive it was or what other conditions led up to it, it did not necessarily forecast a sufficient likelihood or probability of accident and injury to support a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. Agee v. Hammons, 335 S.W.2d 732, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 279 ( Ky. 1960 ).

Where a driver traveling on an interstate highway realized he had missed his exit, pulled to the emergency lane, began backing his automobile, backed onto the highway and was hit from behind by an approaching automobile, he was negligent as a matter of law. Ferguson v. Stevenson, 427 S.W.2d 822, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 698 ( Ky. 1968 ).

When a collision occurs on the defendant’s left side of the road, there is a prima facie case of negligence and the obligation to go forward and to explain the reason for being on the wrong side of the road passes to the defendant. Webb Transfer Lines, Inc. v. Taylor, 439 S.W.2d 88, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 142 ( Ky. 1968 ).

4.Proximate Cause.

Mere driving or presence of motor vehicle on wrong side of highway is insufficient to impose liability unless it is shown that it was proximate cause of accident. Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Bryant, 260 Ky. 452 , 86 S.W.2d 88, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 482 ( Ky. 1935 ). See Colyer v. Hudson, 261 Ky. 84 , 87 S.W.2d 92, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 595 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Fact that truck and auto did not collide would not prevent negligence of truck driver, in being on wrong side of road, from being proximate cause of accident. Hogge v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 277 Ky. 460 , 126 S.W.2d 877, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 682 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Where the evidence established that the defendant’s driver turned to left across highway without maintaining a proper lookout or proper signal, and at a time when plaintiff’s oncoming car was but 80 feet away, the proximate cause of the collision with the approaching car was the negligence of the defendant’s driver, notwithstanding plaintiff’s possible violation of the federal speed limit. Davis v. Kunkle, 302 Ky. 258 , 194 S.W.2d 513, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 653 ( Ky. 1946 ).

Where taxicab was passing a bicycle traveling in the same direction as they went through an intersection and another motorist operated her automobile into the intersection and into the left side of the taxicab in violation of posted stop signs causing the cab to strike the bicycle throwing the rider off and killing him, the trial court did not err in refusing to give instructions as to the duties of the operator of a vehicle in overtaking and passing another vehicle, because it is doubtful whether these rules apply to bicycles and, even if they do, the passing by the taxicab was not the proximate cause of the rider’s death. Tinsley's Adm'r v. Slate, 251 S.W.2d 883, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 952 ( Ky. 1952 ).

5.Contributory Negligence.

Operation of tractor-combine with left wheel across center line was negligent and in violation of this section but operation of automobile at an excessive speed was contributorily negligent and the combined negligence produced the collision so neither driver was entitled to recover. United States v. Richmond, 113 F. Supp. 213, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2546 (D. Ky. 1953 ).

Motorist who failed to sound horn was not contributorily negligent, where collision of meeting cars was caused by fact that driver of oncoming car, blinded by sun, drove down middle of highway and struck motorist who had moved far over to right side. Stevens v. Potter, 209 Ky. 705 , 273 S.W. 470, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 584 ( Ky. 1925 ).

In action involving collision between bus and cattle being driven on highway, since usual contributory negligence instruction covering duty of person driving cattle was not objected to or more concrete instruction asked, Court of Appeals need not determine whether “keeping to the right” applied to cattle being driven on highway. Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Sphar, 226 Ky. 30 , 10 S.W.2d 482, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 28 ( Ky. 1928 ).

Where evidence showed that at time of nighttime collision between truck and oncoming automobile truck was on left side of road and turned to right immediately before collision, oncoming motorist was not contributorily negligent as matter of law in not stopping or turning off road where evidence did not conclusively show that he was exceeding 30 miles per hour; motorist has right to assume that approaching automobile will be on right side of highway or will turn to right. Huber & Huber v. Noe's Adm'x, 252 Ky. 779 , 68 S.W.2d 406, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 859 ( Ky. 1934 ).

If motorist rounding curve in nighttime drove on left side of highway, did not have car under reasonable control or keep lookout, and thereby contributed to collision with turntable placed on left side of highway by contractor, he could not recover against contractor. W. F. Robinson & Son v. Jones, 254 Ky. 637 , 72 S.W.2d 16, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 122 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Instruction that plaintiff could not recover if he was contributorily negligent, but not defining the duties of the plaintiff in the operation of his car so that the jury could determine in what respects he was negligent, was erroneous. Pedigo v. Osborne, 279 Ky. 85 , 129 S.W.2d 996, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 229 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Where a motorist passed a truck without having clear vision for 150 feet ahead the driver of a truck approaching from the opposite direction had a duty to use ordinary care to discover the peril of the motorist and to use such means as he had in order to avoid the collision. Pedigo v. Osborne, 279 Ky. 85 , 129 S.W.2d 996, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 229 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Where evidence was conflicting it could not be said as a matter of law that automobile driver who pulled onto highway and was struck by a truck had violated this section and was contributorily negligent but it was a question for the jury. Gauze v. Horn, 253 S.W.2d 606, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 1108 ( Ky. 1952 ).

6.Sudden Emergency.

If motorist rounding curve in nighttime saw oncoming car turn to its left side of highway and believed in exercise of reasonable judgment that it was necessary to turn to left to avoid collision, and in doing so struck insufficiently lighted turntable on left side of highway, he could recover against contractor who placed turntable there. W. F. Robinson & Son v. Jones, 254 Ky. 637 , 72 S.W.2d 16, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 122 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Where driver is placed in an emergency through the act of another, he is not held to strict exercise of ordinary care, but may take the course that seems best to him. Hogge v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 277 Ky. 460 , 126 S.W.2d 877, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 682 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Driver of truck, confronted by sudden emergency when children coasting on sleds on highway came around a curve directly in his path, was not negligent in turning to left in trying to avoid them, although that may not have been the wisest course. Pennington's Adm'r v. Pure Milk Co., 279 Ky. 235 , 130 S.W.2d 24, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 247 ( Ky. 1939 ).

If there were no explanatory circumstances in evidence, the fact that the defendant was on the wrong side of the road would be enough to take the case to the jury by virtue of this section but where all the evidence was substantially consistent and showed conclusively that the driver acted in the face of a sudden emergency the fact that he was on the wrong side was not sufficient unless there was in evidence further circumstances from which the jury might deduce that he acted negligently since in such a case there was simply no showing of negligence. Agee v. Hammons, 335 S.W.2d 732, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 279 ( Ky. 1960 ).

A directed verdict was proper where defendant swerved to the left to avoid a truck that had just backed out of a driveway into the highway in front of him and the defendant in doing so collided head on with plaintiff’s car on the latter’s side of the road. Agee v. Hammons, 335 S.W.2d 732, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 279 ( Ky. 1960 ).

7.Skidding.

Although skidding is not ordinarily evidence of negligence, yet burden is upon driver on wrong side of road to excuse violation of law of road. Hunt v. Whitlock's Adm'r, 259 Ky. 286 , 82 S.W.2d 364, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 311 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Driver’s failure to keep to right side of centerline of highway is excused where without his fault, car skids across it; but where skidding results from his negligence as by driving from 60 to 75 miles per hour on allegedly slippery highway, he cannot be exonerated on “unavoidable accident” theory. Hunt v. Whitlock's Adm'r, 259 Ky. 286 , 82 S.W.2d 364, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 311 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Jury was entitled to believe positive testimony of eyewitnesses that auto accident was caused by defendant being on wrong side of road, although photographs of autos indicated that plaintiff might have skidded into defendant, where photographs did not show that accident could not have happened in the manner testified to. D. G. Hayes Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Fortney's Adm'r, 277 Ky. 441 , 126 S.W.2d 864, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 678 ( Ky. 1939 ).

8.Guests.

Guest in automobile was not precluded from recovery against utility company, notwithstanding driver proceeded on left side of country highway and struck pole at or close to gravel shoulder of road. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Sapp's Adm'r, 249 Ky. 406 , 60 S.W.2d 976, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 537 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Contributory negligence of driver of automobile could not be imputed to bar recovery by injured guest against truck driver whose negligence in driving to left of highway was proximate cause of collision. Williams v. Farmer's Adm'x, 273 Ky. 131 , 115 S.W.2d 589, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 592 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Where car in which plaintiff was a passenger and car of defendant were approaching each other from opposite directions, and plaintiff’s car suddenly swerved over onto left side of highway, whereupon defendant turned his car to the left to avoid a collision, it was proper to instruct the jury that defendant was not liable if he was confronted with an emergency and exercised a reasonable judgment in turning to the left, and it was not necessary to instruct jury as to defendant’s duty to drive on the right side of the highway. Edmiston v. Robinson, 293 Ky. 273 , 168 S.W.2d 740, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 590 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Where accident was due to host’s being on wrong side of road, due to momentary diversion of his attention from the highway, and there was no evidence that host had been driving on wrong side of road for any length of time during trip, there was no basis for submitting to jury question of guest’s negligence in failing to protest against manner of driving. Edmiston v. Robinson, 293 Ky. 273 , 168 S.W.2d 740, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 590 ( Ky. 1943 ).

9.Voluntary Manslaughter.

Accused was guilty of voluntary manslaughter by reckless driving, where, after drinking whiskey, he drove car with defective steering gear, following zigzagging course on highway and, when overtaking and passing another vehicle at 30 miles per hour on curving upgrade which obstructed view, collided with oncoming car, killing occupant thereof. Largent v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 598 , 97 S.W.2d 538, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 543 ( Ky. 1936 ).

10.Evidence.

In collision between automobile and oncoming truck which was being driven on left side of country highway where automobile turned to left and truck to right immediately before collision, evidence sustained verdict against truck owner. E. L. Martin & Co. v. Hurt's Adm'r, 250 Ky. 235 , 62 S.W.2d 465, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 664 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Where evidence showed that front wheels of defendant’s car were across center line of highway, but rear wheels were on defendant’s right side of highway, such evidence was strong support of defendant’s testimony that plaintiff’s car struck defendant’s car on left side of highway and bumpers caught, pulling front of defendant’s car across the center line. Hollis v. Bourne, 292 Ky. 578 , 167 S.W.2d 50, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 126 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Where the defendant, before beginning to pass a slowing truck, failed to look in his rearview mirror to see that the southbound lane was clear of other traffic, both fore and aft, thus forcing a car off the road that had already begun to pass him, regardless of whether that driver had sounded his horn, the evidence was sufficient to justify a finding that the defendant was negligent. Campbell v. Markham, 426 S.W.2d 431, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 644 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Where there was testimony that the defendant was on the wrong side of the road when the collision occurred, and there were no natural or physical facts which so conflicted with the testimony as to make it incredible, there was sufficient evidence of probative value to support the verdict of the defendant’s negligence. Webb Transfer Lines, Inc. v. Taylor, 439 S.W.2d 88, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 142 ( Ky. 1968 ).

11.— Physical.

Location of glass falling to road from collision of vehicles, though not very reliable evidence as to location of vehicles at time of collision, may be considered by the jury. Bowling Green-Hopkinsville Bus Co. v. Montgomery, 278 Ky. 837 , 129 S.W.2d 535, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 492 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Testimony of witnesses as to marks on highway observed the day following the accident was admissible where marks were scars or gashes in the surface of a permanent character. Southern Oxygen Co. v. Martin, 291 Ky. 238 , 163 S.W.2d 459, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 202 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Where physical facts, consisting of broken guard rails on defendant’s side of road, position of plaintiff’s car across center line after accident, and marks on highway, coupled with testimony of disinterested witnesses, clearly indicated that plaintiff’s car was on wrong side of road at time of collision, directed verdict should have been given for defendant, notwithstanding testimony of plaintiff’s witnesses that defendant was on wrong side of road. Silver Fleet Motor Express v. Wilson, 291 Ky. 515 , 165 S.W.2d 51, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 276 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Where occupants of both cars were killed and there were no eyewitnesses to collision, evidence that a short time before the accident one driver was in Frankfort and other driver was in Georgetown, and that collision occurred on south side of road between those cities, which was right side for driver headed towards Georgetown, as indicated by position of cars after accident and location of tracks, broken glass and spilled oil and gasoline, was sufficient to support conclusion that driver who had been in Georgetown was driving on the wrong side of the road at the time of the collision. Stark's Adm'x v. Herndon's Adm'r, 292 Ky. 469 , 166 S.W.2d 828, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 91 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Where under this section truck had no right to be in center of the road and had truck been on its right side instead of the center of the road plaintiff would not have collided with the front end of it, or if it had there would have been no negligence on truck driver’s part, driver could not escape liability by showing that physical facts contradicted plaintiff as to the point of contact when the same physical facts showed his truck was in the ruts in the center of the road at the time of the collision. Williams v. Kirtley, 263 S.W.2d 119, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 1245 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953).

12.Question for Jury.

Negligence of truck driver allegedly turning truck abruptly to left in path of oncoming motorist was jury question, where motorist, in overtaking and passing to left of bus, drove on streetcar tracks partly to left of center of street. C. L. & L. Motor Express v. Lyons, 245 Ky. 611 , 53 S.W.2d 978, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 639 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Evidence was sufficient to take case to jury in collision between meeting vehicles, where it was evident that one was on wrong side of road and there was conflicting evidence as to which was at fault. Bowling Green-Hopkinsville Bus Co. v. Montgomery, 278 Ky. 837 , 129 S.W.2d 535, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 492 ( Ky. 1939 ).

In view of conflicting evidence as to speed of motor bus and its distance from oncoming automobile when latter started to skid, it was jury question whether bus driver by exercise of ordinary care discovered or could have discovered motorist’s perilous position in time to avoid collision. Cincinnati N. & C. R. Co. v. Renaker, 287 Ky. 388 , 153 S.W.2d 906, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 554 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Where testimony as to manner in which accident occurred was conflicting, question of negligence was for the jury, notwithstanding that position of vehicles after the accident and marks upon the highway indicated probability that plaintiff was driving on wrong side of road, since position of vehicles and marks on highway did not preclude possibility that defendant was on wrong side. Southern Oxygen Co. v. Martin, 291 Ky. 238 , 163 S.W.2d 459, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 202 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Where defendant, driving west on highway, started to turn across road into filling station in front of plaintiff’s car, which was going east, but changed his mind and turned back to own side of road because of proximity of plaintiff’s car, and collision resulted because plaintiff turned to left in effort to avoid defendant’s car, questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury, in view of testimony and physical evidence that plaintiff was driving at high rate of speed and did not reduce his speed although he saw defendant preparing to turn when defendant was some 400 feet away. Raidt v. Blount, 294 Ky. 172 , 171 S.W.2d 233, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 409 ( Ky. 1943 ).

If driver making a left turn had started across the highway when the automobile with which he collided was still 180 feet to his north as he testified, he did not violate this section per se and the question of contributory negligence was for the jury but assuming he failed to signal a left turn in violation of statute the question of proximate cause was for the jury so trial court did not err in allowing a jury to pass on the questions of negligence and proximate cause. Adams v. Feck, 303 S.W.2d 287, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 247 ( Ky. 1957 ).

Where a collision occurs on the defendant’s left side of the road, if the explanation is so clear and convincing and all the circumstances and fair inferences that could be drawn from them show that the reason for being on the wrong side of the road was completely unrelated to any negligence of the defendant, then the defendant is entitled to win by directed verdict, but, if the reasons, circumstances or the inferences are not that clear then the jury must determine the question. Webb Transfer Lines, Inc. v. Taylor, 439 S.W.2d 88, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 142 ( Ky. 1968 ).

13.Jury Instructions.

In action involving collision between speeding automobile which swerved to left and car coming out of driveway on right and moving to left side of highway, it was not prejudicial error to omit from instruction requiring driving on right side, provision “unless the left side is clear of traffic for distance of 150 feet,” where evidence was that when motorist entered zone of 150 feet left side of highway was or immediately would be obstructed by other car; instruction given being more favorable to motorist swerving to left. H. M. Williams Motor Co. v. Howard, 251 Ky. 557 , 65 S.W.2d 688, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 917 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Instructions that imposed on truck driver both statutory duty of keeping on right side of highway and common-law duty of exercising ordinary care to avoid injury were erroneous, where only common-law duty to exercise ordinary care for his own safety and the safety of others using the highway was imposed on driver of other automobile by instructions. Williams v. Coleman's Adm'x, 273 Ky. 122 , 115 S.W.2d 584, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 591 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Where there was evidence that defendant’s truck was on wrong side of road, causing plaintiff to lose control of his auto in driving on shoulder to avoid defendant, it was error to give peremptory instruction for defendant. Hogge v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 277 Ky. 460 , 126 S.W.2d 877, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 682 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Instruction as to duty of operator to drive on right side of highway was proper, where there was evidence that left side was obstructed by a cow, a man on foot, and three men on mules. Hughes v. Bates' Adm'r, 278 Ky. 592 , 129 S.W.2d 138, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 472 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Instruction using language of this section was not objectionable. Buck v. Kleinschmidt, 279 Ky. 569 , 131 S.W.2d 714, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 324 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Instruction hereunder need not be qualified because of emergency brought on by defendant himself. Bybee Bros., Inc. v. Imes, 288 Ky. 1 , 155 S.W.2d 492, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 55 ( Ky. 1 941 ).

Instruction that it was duty of truck driver to keep to right side of road was not erroneous, although evidence was that driver had turned to left to avoid collision, where there was other evidence that truck was on wrong side of road when approaching scene of collision and jury could not have been misled. Thomas v. Dahl, 293 Ky. 808 , 170 S.W.2d 337, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 706 ( Ky. 1943 ).

In an action against driver and owner of taxicab for death of 13-year-old bicyclist there was no basis for an instruction under this section where there was no evidence that taxicab, which was thrown by automobile that had failed to stop at a stop sign against the bicyclist, was at any time driven to the left of the center of the street. Tinsley's Adm'r v. Slate, 251 S.W.2d 883, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 952 ( Ky. 1952 ).

Where instructions were requested that among defendant’s duties was duty to keep a lookout ahead for other cars and a duty to keep to the right side of the road without passing to the left side unless it was clear of other traffic and presented a clear vision for a distance of at least 150 feet it was based on this section and not KRS 189.340 (3). Brock v. Pillion, 277 S.W.2d 27, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 457 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Instruction that defendant was on the left side of the road and therefore ignored this section which allows left turns across a highway only if the highway is clear of traffic for 150 feet ahead was based on plaintiff’s theories as to the cause of the accident and under the evidence it was proper to submit her theories to the jury for consideration. McCoy v. Carter, 323 S.W.2d 210, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 323 ( Ky. 1959 ).

In a personal injury action where the driver claimed a sudden emergency forced him to cross into the left-hand lane of highway and over an embankment, the jury instructions on driving on the right-hand side of the highway properly included the words “when possible”. Mudd v. Mudd, 710 S.W.2d 236, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1142 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

14.— Meeting Vehicles.

Instruction that meeting vehicles must each travel on the right side of the highway unless the left side was clear of all other traffic or obstructions and presented a clear vision for a distance of at least 150 feet ahead, although not necessary because both parties clearly had clear vision for more than 150 feet, was not harmful. Commercial Carriers, Inc. v. Small, 277 Ky. 189 , 126 S.W.2d 143, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 638 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Instruction to find for defendant bus company unless jury believed that its driver failed to exercise ordinary care to avoid collision with oncoming automobile after he discovered, or by exercising ordinary care could have discovered, other’s peril, was not objectionable as leaving too much to jury’s speculation as to when peril began. Cincinnati N. & C. R. Co. v. Renaker, 287 Ky. 388 , 153 S.W.2d 906, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 554 ( Ky. 1941 ).

In a case involving a collision between cars proceeding in opposite directions on the same street, an instruction under subsection (1) of this section was proper and sufficient, and it was not necessary to give instruction under subsection (2) of KRS 189.310 . Hollis v. Bourne, 292 Ky. 578 , 167 S.W.2d 50, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 126 ( Ky. 1942 ).

In case involving collision between northbound truck and southbound automobile, where truck driver had turned into left lane because of inability to stop when a preceding automobile stopped on the highway in his lane, instruction that it was duty of both plaintiff and defendant “to bear to the right and keep to the right side of the road when meeting a vehicle coming in the opposite direction” was proper, as against contention of defendant that instruction should have been in language of this section, or should have been qualified by the words “whenever possible.” McFarland v. Bruening, 299 Ky. 267 , 185 S.W.2d 247, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 404 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Where, in case involving collision between meeting vehicles, the court gave a contributory negligence instruction and a sudden emergency instruction, it was not error to fail to give instruction that if both drivers were negligent and their concurrent negligence caused the accident neither could recover damages. McFarland v. Bruening, 299 Ky. 267 , 185 S.W.2d 247, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 404 ( Ky. 1945 ).

15.— Passing.

In action involving collision occurring when driver attempted to pass car ahead, instruction on duties under this section and KRS 189.310 was proper where evidence warranted it, and it did not give undue prominence to fact in issue. Sheetinger v. Dawson, 236 Ky. 571 , 33 S.W.2d 609, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 792 ( Ky. 1930 ).

As there was no vehicle approaching from the opposite direction and as there was no obstruction upon the highway, the court properly refused to give defendant’s proffered instruction that defendant should not have attempted to pass truck until the left side of the highway was clear of all traffic or obstruction for 150 feet as is provided in this section. Whitney v. Penick, 281 Ky. 474 , 136 S.W.2d 570, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Where there was uncontradicted evidence driver at time of accident was guilty of violation of KRS 189.340 , attempting to pass on the left in a “no passing” zone, but the circuit court refused to instruct the jury on this legal duty although request was made and instruction submitted and instead an instruction to the jury was made under this section it was erroneous as it injected a false issue into the case which undoubtedly had a misleading effect upon the minds of the jury by assuming no greater duty was imposed on driver in driving his car in a “no passing” zone than in operating it upon a straightaway. Rogers v. Abbott, 240 S.W.2d 840, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1024 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Under this section and KRS 189.380 a driver is not authorized by law to travel in other than its own lane without showing that he was passing or forced out and instruction that “It was his (Sensen, the truck driver’s) duty not to pull to the left of the highway after James H. Devore in driving his car had started to pass until said Devore had passed, if you believe he did so attempt to pass.” was not erroneous. Carnation Co. v. Devore, 252 S.W.2d 860, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 1026 ( Ky. 1952 ).

In personal injury action instructions were not in error which set out that although there was not a “No Passing” zone, truck was running entirely too close to jeep for safety in violation of this section, was attempting to pass another car without blowing its horn after receiving a signal that the car was about to turn to the left and was failing to exercise the general duty of ordinary care and the specific duties of lookout, reasonable control and speed. Wooten v. Compton, 322 S.W.2d 473, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1959 ).

16.— Pedestrian.

Where evidence showed that immediately before striking pedestrian crossing highway motorist was approaching another car, instruction on duty to drive on right side of highway whenever possible should add “and unless left side of such highway is clear of all other traffic or obstruction and presents a clear vision of at least 150 feet ahead.” Gretton v. Duncan, 238 Ky. 554 , 38 S.W.2d 448, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 282 ( Ky. 1931 ).

In civil action for damages, where there was a conflict in the evidence as to whether motorist or pedestrian was on wrong side of road, instruction following the language of this section was not erroneous, although not qualified by statement that motorist could drive to left to avoid pedestrian who suddenly stepped into his path, where motorist did not request the qualifying statement. Davidson v. Ratliffe, 277 Ky. 371 , 126 S.W.2d 827, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 667 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Where cars were parked on each side of and extending into street and driver did not have a clear and unobstructed vision of the left side for 150 feet, an instruction that driver who struck a pedestrian had a right to drive on the left of center of the street if the left side was clear of all traffic or obstruction for a distance of 150 feet was properly refused. Ward v. Music, 257 S.W.2d 516, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 772 ( Ky. 1953 ).

In an action brought by the administrator of the estate of the deceased against a policeman who was driving a police car at the time it struck pedestrian causing his death, an instruction which stated that it was the defendant’s duty to drive on the right or the west side of the street but failed to add other language of this section, which concerns the right of a driver to drive on the left if the highway is unobstructed and presents a clear vision for 150 feet ahead, was not prejudicial, since if the jury found that defendant was driving on the left-hand side of the road when it struck the pedestrian, it would be apparent that the street could not be free of obstruction, as the pedestrian himself would qualify as such. Miracle v. Flannery's Adm'r, 259 S.W.2d 689, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 968 ( Ky. 1953 ).

17.— Intersection.

In intersectional collision case it was unnecessary, after instructing on right of way at intersections, to tell jury that driver must keep to right side of street unless he had clear vision ahead for 150 feet where there were no vehicles ahead for that distance; fact that another truck was approaching on intersecting avenue did not require such instruction. W. M. Abbott Transfer Co. v. Kruse, 272 Ky. 479 , 114 S.W.2d 731, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 147 ( Ky. 1938 ).

In intersectional collision case between trucks, causing injury to driver of wagon also crossing intersection, failure to instruct that it was duty of truck driver overtaking wagon not to attempt to pass it at intersection in violation of city ordinance was not prejudicially erroneous where jury had been told that if other truck approaching on intersecting avenue had right of way, truck driver should drive to right of center of intersection and not to left thereof. W. M. Abbott Transfer Co. v. Kruse, 272 Ky. 479 , 114 S.W.2d 731, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 147 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Cited:

Siler v. Commonwealth, 280 Ky. 830 , 134 S.W.2d 945, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 219 ( Ky. 1939 ); Crawford Transport Co. v. Wireman, 280 S.W.2d 163, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1955 ); Alpha Constr. Co. v. Branham, 337 S.W.2d 790, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 369 ( Ky. 1960 ); Stunson v. Easley, 469 S.W.2d 58, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 287 ( Ky. 1971 ).

NOTES TO UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS

1.Negligence Per Se.

Unpublished decision: Given the uncontroverted testimony that defendant driver lost control of his trailer, that it slid into oncoming traffic causing an accident and the resultant injuries, and that in so doing he violated his duties under KRS 189.300(1) and common law to stay in his lane and safely operate his vehicle, plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict in her negligence action, and the trial court erred in failing to so rule. Carroll v. Wright, 2013 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 997 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2013), aff'd, 452 S.W.3d 127, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 495 ( Ky. 2014 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since reckless driving, failure to have a driver’s license, speeding and crossing the yellow line are four separate offenses, where a chase commences in a city and ends in the county with both city and county and/or state officials involved in apprehending the violator, double jeopardy would not prohibit the county from charging the accused with speeding and crossing the yellow line even though the city has already charged him with reckless driving and failure to have a driver’s license. OAG 74-612 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Vehicles on limited access highways to drive in proper lane, KRS 177.300 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Mann, Legislation — A Proposed Dangerous Driving Statute for Kentucky, 36 Ky. L.J. 82 (1947).

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Automobiles, §§ 16.12, 16.44.

189.310. Vehicles meeting other vehicles and animals.

  1. Two (2) vehicles passing or about to pass each other in opposite directions shall have the right-of-way, and no other vehicle to the rear of those two (2) vehicles shall pass or attempt to pass either of those vehicles.
  2. Vehicles proceeding from opposite directions shall pass each other from the right, each giving to the other one-half (1/2) of the highway as nearly as possible.
  3. Every person operating a vehicle on a highway and approaching any animal being ridden or driven, shall exercise every reasonable precaution to prevent frightening the animal and to insure the safety of the person riding or driving it.

History. 2739g-36, 2739g-39, 2739g-44: amend. Acts 2006, ch. 173, § 13, effective July 12, 2006.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Application.

It is exceedingly doubtful whether this statute was intended to apply to an automobile passing a bicycle or to apply to any vehicle passing another on a wide street where the passing could be accomplished without crossing over into the left lane of traffic. Tinsley's Adm'r v. Slate, 251 S.W.2d 883, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 952 ( Ky. 1952 ).

2.Duty to Keep Right.

Driver of truck meeting automobile should comply with subsection (2) of this section respecting driving to right of center and conceding half of highway to other vehicle. Trevillian v. Boswell, 241 Ky. 237 , 43 S.W.2d 715, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 63 ( Ky. 1931 ).

3.Violation Prima Facie Negligence.

Trucker was liable for nighttime head-on collision with automobile where truck was driven to left of center of highway, about 25 feet wide, and automobile was traveling on its right side; speed of automobile being immaterial. Thronton v. Phillips, 262 Ky. 346 , 90 S.W.2d 347, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 31 ( Ky. 1936 ).

In collision between oncoming motorcycle on right side of curving country highway and automobile on left side thereof, evidence of violation of statute by driver of automobile made prima facie case of negligent driving, requiring him to excuse wrongful driving. Abell v. Whitehead, 266 Ky. 764 , 99 S.W.2d 770, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 724 ( Ky. 1936 ).

4.Sudden Emergency.

Driver of auto is not required to anticipate that an auto will suddenly come out from behind another approaching vehicle right in his path and continue straight toward him. Lyons v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 282 Ky. 106 , 137 S.W.2d 1107, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 137 ( Ky. 1940 ).

5.Proximate Cause.

Where taxicab was passing a bicycle traveling in the same direction as they went through an intersection and another motorist operated her automobile into the intersection and into the left side of the taxicab in violation of posted stop signs causing the cab to strike the bicycle throwing the rider off and killing him, the trial court did not err in refusing to give instructions as to the duties of the operator of a vehicle in overtaking and passing another vehicle, because it is doubtful whether these rules apply to bicycles and, even if they do, the passing by the taxicab was not the proximate cause of the rider’s death. Tinsley's Adm'r v. Slate, 251 S.W.2d 883, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 952 ( Ky. 1952 ).

In an accident where the plaintiff’s brakes failed and he struck the defendant’s stopped truck from the rear, conceding but not deciding that this section was violated, the fact that the defendant’s truck was too wide to afford half the highway to oncoming traffic was not the proximate cause of the accident. Howard v. Fields, 433 S.W.2d 629, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 279 ( Ky. 1968 ).

6.Evidence.

Evidence even though it was mostly circumstantial sustained verdict for $35,000 in wrongful death resulting from sideswipe collision of meeting vehicles where truck driver had been cited by state trooper for involuntary manslaughter and violation of this section and pleaded guilty and paid a $22 fine for violation of this section. Carpenter v. Galloway, 344 S.W.2d 795, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 245 ( Ky. 1961 ).

7.Contributory Negligence.

Motorist was not guilty of contributory negligence where, on dark, foggy night he approached truck at 25 miles per hour, believing until time of collision that truck, which was parked on wrong side of country highway, was moving. Padgett v. Brangan, 228 Ky. 440 , 15 S.W.2d 277, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 569 ( Ky. 1929 ).

Oncoming motorist who had seen that bus had started to overtake and pass a truck, but had desisted and was pulling in behind truck, but who, although blinded by lights of oncoming truck and exceeding speed limit, proceeded to pass truck without slackening speed and struck darkened rear end of bus still protruding on left side of highway, was guilty of contributory negligence. United Coach Corp. v. Finley, 243 Ky. 658 , 49 S.W.2d 544, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 165 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Where truck driver was negligent in driving on the left side of the highway, guest riding in automobile which collided with truck could recover from truck owners for injuries since the truck driver’s negligence was the proximate cause of the collision and although the automobile driver may have been contributorily negligent this could not be imputed to his guest. Williams v. Farmer's Adm'x, 273 Ky. 131 , 115 S.W.2d 589, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 592 ( Ky. 1938 ).

8.Last Clear Chance.

Instruction on last clear chance that if driver of truck, hit by defendant who was on wrong side of road attempting to pass another truck traveling in the same direction, had sufficient space at the right so that he could have prevented the accident then he should have done so, but failing to submit issue of discovery of defendant’s peril, was erroneous. Pedigo v. Osborne, 279 Ky. 85 , 129 S.W.2d 996, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 229 ( Ky. 1939 ).

A motorist may assume in the absence of something to put him on notice to the contrary that another he is meeting will conform to the law, and may act upon that assumption in determining his own manner of using the road, but if by due care he discovers the other motorist in the wrong and cannot or will not yield, he must take precaution to avoid the collision under the “last clear chance” doctrine. Short v. Robinson, 280 Ky. 707 , 134 S.W.2d 594, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 195 ( Ky. 1939 ).

9.Question for Jury.

Where there were no eyewitnesses to collision and physical evidence indicated that operator of automobile was driving on wrong side of highway in violation of this section the question of negligence should have been submitted to the jury since proof that operator of an automobile is traveling on the wrong side of the highway created a prima facie case of negligent driving where it results in injury to other users of the highway when on the right side of the road and it becomes the duty of the defendant if he would avoid the effect of such prima facie showing to explain and excuse the fact that his automobile was on the wrong side of the road. Stark's Adm'x v. Herndon's Adm'r, 292 Ky. 469 , 166 S.W.2d 828, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 91 ( Ky. 1942 ).

10.Instructions.

In action involving collision occurring when driver attempted to pass car ahead, instruction on duties under KRS 189.300 and this section, was proper, where evidence warranted it and it did not give undue prominence to fact in issue. Sheetinger v. Dawson, 236 Ky. 571 , 33 S.W.2d 609, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 792 ( Ky. 1930 ).

In action governed by this section instruction that certain rate of speed was prima facie evidence of negligence, thus indicating that presumption of law was against defendant, was improper. Summerville v. Waller, 262 Ky. 343 , 90 S.W.2d 65, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 788 ( Ky. 1935 ).

It was reversible error where instructions imposed duties of this section and the common-law duty of ordinary care to avoid injuring persons on the highway on truck driver while imposing only the common-law duty to exercise ordinary care for his own safety and the safety of his automobile on driver of automobile. Williams v. Coleman's Adm'x, 273 Ky. 122 , 115 S.W.2d 584, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 591 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Evidence that bus was proceeding at very slow rate of speed in meeting truck, and that auto behind truck suddenly pulled out directly in path of bus, causing bus driver to bring bus to a sudden stop, resulting in injury to passenger, justified peremptory instruction for defendant bus owner in action by passenger. Lyons v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 282 Ky. 106 , 137 S.W.2d 1107, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 137 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Since this section does not fix any rate of speed to be observed in meeting other vehicles, it was prejudicial error to instruct the jury on a rate of speed provided in an earlier statute. Gorman v. Berry, 289 Ky. 88 , 158 S.W.2d 155, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 511 ( Ky. 1942 ).

In a case involving a collision between cars proceeding in opposite directions on the same street, an instruction under subsection (1) of KRS 189.300 was proper and sufficient, and it was not necessary to give instruction under subsection (2) of this section. Hollis v. Bourne, 292 Ky. 578 , 167 S.W.2d 50, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 126 ( Ky. 1942 ).

11.Parking on Wrong Side of Highway.

Truck driver was guilty of negligence where he parked truck on wrong side of country highway with headlights burning, and, because of fog and darkness, oncoming motorist could not locate on which side of highway it was and believed it was moving. Padgett v. Brangan, 228 Ky. 440 , 15 S.W.2d 277, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 569 ( Ky. 1929 ).

12.Meeting on Bridge or Underpass.

Where bridge is wide enough for two vehicles to pass in safety, the one reaching the bridge first has no special right of way over the other. Commercial Carriers, Inc. v. Small, 277 Ky. 189 , 126 S.W.2d 143, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 638 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Evidence of negligence in collision of autos on bridge was sufficient to take case to jury. Buck v. Kleinschmidt, 279 Ky. 569 , 131 S.W.2d 714, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 324 ( Ky. 1939 ).

When two vehicles moving in opposite directions are approaching a bridge or passage too narrow for the vehicles to pass, it is the duty of each operator to exercise ordinary care to prevent collision and in so doing to avoid the contingency of being on the bridge or in the passage at the same time. Short v. Robinson, 280 Ky. 707 , 134 S.W.2d 594, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 195 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Where, regardless of estimates and the exercise of reasonable judgment by either driver, one of them as a matter of fact has practically or actually driven on a narrow bridge before the other, it becomes the duty of the latter to stop until the former has crossed over and cleared the way. Short v. Robinson, 280 Ky. 707 , 134 S.W.2d 594, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 195 ( Ky. 1939 ).

In case involving collision between passenger car and truck in narrow underpass, where there was conflicting evidence as to speed and as to which vehicle entered underpass first, questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury. Foley's Adm'r v. Witt, 294 Ky. 498 , 172 S.W.2d 81, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 485 ( Ky. 1943 ).

13.— One-way Bridge.

In determining which of two vehicles approaching a one-way bridge has the right-of-way, the determining factor is which vehicle proceeding within the law as to speed could be reasonably expected, in the exercise of reasonable care, to reach the bridge first. Short v. Robinson, 280 Ky. 707 , 134 S.W.2d 594, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 195 ( Ky. 1939 ).

In approaching a one-way bridge, the driver of the motor vehicle who would probably first reach and enter it by proceeding at a reasonable rate of speed, and exercising ordinary care considering the situation before him, has the right-of-way; it is the duty of the driver not having the right-of-way not to enter the bridge but to drive his car to the right of the middle of the road and wait for the other car to clear the bridge; and it is the duty of the driver of the car having the right-of-way immediately on leaving the bridge to drive to his right-hand side of the middle of the road. Short v. Robinson, 280 Ky. 707 , 134 S.W.2d 594, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 195 ( Ky. 1939 ).

A one-way bridge or underpass is one through which vehicles of lawful width cannot pass with a reasonable margin of safety while being operated at a lawful speed. Foley's Adm'r v. Witt, 294 Ky. 498 , 172 S.W.2d 81, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 485 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Where vehicles are approaching a one-way bridge from opposite directions, that vehicle has the right-of-way which would probably first reach or enter the bridge by proceeding at a reasonable rate of speed. Rice v. Franklin Title & Trust Co., 299 Ky. 142 , 184 S.W.2d 896, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 391 ( Ky. 1945 ).

14.— One-way Underpass.

Driver approaching narrow underpass is required to anticipate that approaching vehicle may be truck whose lawful width is such as to prevent vehicles passing in safety. Foley's Adm'r v. Witt, 294 Ky. 498 , 172 S.W.2d 81, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 485 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Fact that truck which collided with automobile at night in narrow underpass did not have clearance lights did not excuse driver of automobile of duty to anticipate that approaching vehicle might be of such width as to prevent safe passage, and to reduce his speed accordingly. Foley's Adm'r v. Witt, 294 Ky. 498 , 172 S.W.2d 81, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 485 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Narrowing of paved surface and ending of white center line at approach to underpass was notice that it was a one-way underpass. Foley's Adm'r v. Witt, 294 Ky. 498 , 172 S.W.2d 81, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 485 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Underpass which was wide enough to permit passenger vehicles to pass in safety, but not wide enough to permit passenger vehicle and truck to pass, was as a matter of law a one-way underpass. Foley's Adm'r v. Witt, 294 Ky. 498 , 172 S.W.2d 81, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 485 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Where highway passed through one-way underpass, it was not negligence for driver of vehicle to be in center of road, rather than on right side. Foley's Adm'r v. Witt, 294 Ky. 498 , 172 S.W.2d 81, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 485 ( Ky. 1943 ).

15.Vehicle Approaching Animals.

Evidence that motorist approaching horse and buggy on city street did not stop car but turned it and attempted to pass between restive horse and sidewalk justified jury’s verdict against him. Webb v. Moore, 136 Ky. 708 , 125 S.W. 152, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 534 ( Ky. 1910 ) (decided under prior law).

Motorist was prima facie negligent where he rapidly overtook horse and buggy, did not sound horn or do anything except swerve car around buggy, and evidence was that horse showed signs of fright while motorist was several rods in rear, and subsequently ran away. National Casket Co. v. Powar, 137 Ky. 156 , 125 S.W. 279, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 554 ( Ky. 1910 ) (decided under prior law).

Motorist was not liable for injuries to buggy driver, where on approaching horse and buggy he discovered that horse was frightened and stopped automobile at side of highway, but driver attempted to force unmanageable horse past automobile, overturning buggy, although evidence as to whether motor was shut off was conflicting. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Yeiser, 141 Ky. 15 , 131 S.W. 1049, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 393 ( Ky. 1910 ) (decided under prior law).

If motorist saw that horse which he was approaching was frightened while being ridden in narrow roadway, and did not stop as statutorily required, but drove by without even slackening speed, his action would be wanton and justify punitive damages. Searcy v. Golden, 172 Ky. 42 , 188 S.W. 1098, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 168 ( Ky. 1916 ) (decided under prior law).

In absence of statute defining duties of pedestrians or horseback riders, such travelers are governed by common law, requiring ordinary care for own safety. Fullenwider v. Brawner, 224 Ky. 274 , 6 S.W.2d 264, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 592 ( Ky. 1928 ).

Subsection (3) of this section deals with precautions exercisable by drivers to prevent frightening animals being ridden or driven on highway, and not with duties to prevent collisions with them. Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Sphar, 226 Ky. 30 , 10 S.W.2d 482, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 28 ( Ky. 1928 ).

The purpose of subsection (3) of this section is to prevent frightening animals, and it includes animals on the unpaved as well as the paved portions of the highway. Hughes v. Bates' Adm'r, 278 Ky. 592 , 129 S.W.2d 138, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 472 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Where there was evidence that accident, in which truck struck cow and went off road, killing man standing on shoulder, was caused by fact that cow was frightened by truck, instruction as to duties under subsection (3) of this section was proper. Hughes v. Bates' Adm'r, 278 Ky. 592 , 129 S.W.2d 138, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 472 ( Ky. 1939 ).

When truck, passing span of mules, harnessed to a mower, made no unusual noise, speed was not excessive and animals did not become frightened until it was too late to stop truck, this section was not violated. Blackburn v. Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co., 243 S.W.2d 995, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1192 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Driver of vehicle had a special duty of care under this section in approaching a traveler on muleback. Robinson v. Lunsford, 330 S.W.2d 423, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 198 ( Ky. 1959 ).

In an action for personal injuries by rider of horse, truck driver into whose truck window horse stuck his head was entitled to directed verdict where rider gave no warning that he was in difficulty, continued his course of travel and used his spurs on the horse constituting the proximate cause of the accident. Alpha Constr. Co. v. Branham, 337 S.W.2d 790, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 369 ( Ky. 1960 ).

Cited:

Kennedy Transfer Co. v. Greenfield’s Adm’x, 248 Ky. 708 , 59 S.W.2d 978, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 304 ( Ky. 1933 ); Nehi Bottling Co. v. Flannery, 264 Ky. 68 , 94 S.W.2d 297, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 272 (1936); Siler v. Commonwealth, 280 Ky. 830 , 134 S.W.2d 945, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 219 ( Ky. 1939 ); National Linen Supply Co. v. Snowden, 288 Ky. 374 , 156 S.W.2d 186, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Murray, Instructions in Regard to the Speed of Motor Trucks, A Study In Statutory Interpretation. 34 Ky. L.J. 85 (1946).

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Automobiles, §§ 16.12, 16.40.

189.320. Ambulances, patrols, and fire apparatus to have right of way. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-38, 2896a-15) was repealed by Acts 1970, ch. 93, § 12.

189.330. Turning and right-of-way at intersections.

  1. When two (2) vehicles approach or enter an intersection from different roadways at approximately the same time, the operator of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the right.
  2. The right-of-way rule declared in subsection (1) is modified at highways and through intersections and as otherwise stated in this chapter.
  3. Preferential right-of-way may be indicated by stop signs or yield signs. The state highway commissioner, with reference to state highways, and local authorities, with reference to other highways under their jurisdiction, may designate any intersection as a stop intersection or as a yield intersection and erect stop signs or yield signs at one (1) or more entrances to such intersections.
  4. Except when directed to proceed by a police officer, every operator of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line but, if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the operator has view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it. After having stopped, the operator shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time when such operator is moving across or within the intersection or junction of roadways.
  5. The operator of a vehicle approaching a yield sign shall, in obedience to such sign, slow down to a speed reasonable for the existing conditions and, if required for safety to stop, shall stop at a clearly marked stop line but, if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the operator has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it. After slowing and stopping, the operator shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time such operator is moving across or within the intersection or junction of roadways; provided, however, that if such an operator is involved in a collision with a vehicle in the intersection or junction of roadways after driving past a yield sign without stopping, such collision shall be deemed prima facie evidence of his failure to yield right-of-way.
  6. The operator of a vehicle intending to turn shall do so as follows:
    1. Right turns — both the approach for a right turn and a right turn shall be made as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway;
    2. Left turns — the operator of a vehicle intending to turn left shall approach the turn in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the direction of travel of such vehicle. Whenever practicable, the left turn shall be made to the left of the center of the intersection and so as to leave the intersection or other location in the extreme right-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the same direction as such vehicle on the roadway being entered.
  7. The Transportation Cabinet and local authorities in their respective jurisdictions may cause official traffic control devices to be placed and thereby require and direct that a different course from that specified in this section be traveled by turning vehicles and, when such devices are so placed, no operator shall turn a vehicle other than as directed and required by such devices.
  8. The operator of any vehicle shall not turn such vehicle so as to proceed in the opposite direction unless such movement can be made in safety without interfering with other traffic.
  9. The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left within an intersection or into an alley, private road, or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard.
  10. The operator of a vehicle about to enter or cross a roadway from any place other than another roadway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on the roadway to be entered or crossed.
  11. On highways with a center lane restricted for left turns off the highway by vehicles proceeding in both directions:
    1. A left turn shall not be made from any other lane; and
    2. A vehicle shall not be driven in a center lane as described in this subsection except when preparing for or making a left turn off the highway or merging onto the highway after making a left turn from a side road or other entrance.

History. 2739g-37, 2739g-42: amend. Acts 1960, ch. 148, § 2; 1978, ch. 46, § 3, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 188, § 144, effective July 15, 1980; 2006, ch. 173, § 14, effective July 12, 2006.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Application.

This section requiring motor vehicles to remain stopped until the intersection is clear applies only to other vehicles and has no application to pedestrian traffic. Brown v. Wilson, 401 S.W.2d 77, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 406 ( Ky. 1966 ).

The duties required of a driver entering a street or roadway from private property do not apply where the motor vehicle is being operated entirely on private property at the time of an accident, but the driver is charged with the common-law duty of exercising ordinary care in the operation of the automobile. Johnson v. Haddix, 522 S.W.2d 859, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 144 ( Ky. 1975 ).

2.Vehicle.

A bicycle is a “vehicle” within the meaning of this section. Thomas v. Dahl, 293 Ky. 808 , 170 S.W.2d 337, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 706 ( Ky. 1943 ).

3.Highway.

A public alley is a “highway” within the meaning of this section. Thomas v. Dahl, 293 Ky. 808 , 170 S.W.2d 337, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 706 ( Ky. 1943 ).

4.Intersections.

A “T” connection of two highways is an “intersection.” Smith v. Goodwin, 292 Ky. 37 , 165 S.W.2d 976, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 1942 ). See Rice v. Franklin Title & Trust Co., 299 Ky. 142 , 184 S.W.2d 896, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 391 ( Ky. 1945 ).

5.— Turns.

Driver of army bus who made a slow left turn in front of approaching motor scooter in violation of subsection (1) (now (6)(b)) of this section was proximate cause of accident and passenger and operator of the motor scooter were not contributorily negligent although the operator was not experienced in riding a motor scooter. Miles v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 728, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3860 (W.D. Ky. 1962 ).

This section was applicable where colliding cars had been meeting each other, but one started to turn around in intersection and at time of collision was moving at right angles to other car. White Swan Laundry v. Boyd, 212 Ky. 747 , 279 S.W. 345, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 229 ( Ky. 1926 ).

Subsection (2) (now (1)) of this section was applicable where cars approached intersection from opposite directions and one of them made left turn in intersection before other car reached intersection. Coleman v. Nelson, 224 Ky. 460 , 6 S.W.2d 454, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 603 ( Ky. 1928 ).

Where side street enters street circling monument at angle, instruction in language of statute as to left turn is proper, since statute prevails over city ordinance requiring driver to circle monument. Tharp v. Elbert Coal & Teaming Co., 226 Ky. 421 , 11 S.W.2d 93, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 106 ( Ky. 1928 ).

Instruction that it was the duty of the driver of automobile in turning into street to pass immediately to the left of the center point of the intersection and as close as possible thereto was in accordance with subsection (1) (now (6)(b)) of this section and was not inconsistent with instruction that it was the duty of the driver of the automobile to turn into the street on the east side of the centerline of that street, to move his car at a reasonable rate of speed and to have it under reasonable control. Durbin v. Banks, 314 Ky. 192 , 234 S.W.2d 681, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 1055 ( Ky. 1950 ).

Where cars approach an intersection from opposite directions and the one which reaches the intersection first intends to make a left turn, the right-of-way of the car turning and the duty of the other car to yield the right-of-way are secondary to the duty of the turning car to signal his intent to turn. Zogg v. O'Bryan, 314 Ky. 821 , 237 S.W.2d 511, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 757 ( Ky. 1951 ).

The operator of a motor vehicle is not an insurer of the safety of young children although he owes them a great or high degree of care and truck driver who slowed or stopped his truck in the intersection to permit vehicle to pass then slowly turned left of the center of the intersection as required by this section and proceeded slowly around the corner was not negligent in striking an eight-year-old boy with his left rear wheel. Woodard's Adm'r v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 264 S.W.2d 861, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 696 ( Ky. 1954 ).

This section clearly contemplates that a driver of an automobile may turn left in front of approaching traffic so long as it is not negligently done. Pillsbury-Ballard, Div. of Pillsbury Mills, Inc. v. Scott, 283 S.W.2d 387, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 316 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Where a portion of the city ordinance on left-hand turns conformed to the statutes on left-hand turns, it was not prejudicial to have read that part of the ordinance to the jury, nor to have had an instruction partially based on the ordinance. Habich v. Humbert, 446 S.W.2d 567, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 127 ( Ky. 1969 ).

6.— Entering Private Driveways.

Where defendant, driving west on highway, started to turn across road into filling station in front of plaintiff’s car, which was going east, but changed his mind and turned back to own side of road because of proximity of plaintiff’s car, and collision resulted because plaintiff turned to left in effort to avoid defendant’s car, questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury, in view of testimony and physical evidence that plaintiff was driving at high rate of speed and did not reduce his speed although he saw defendant preparing to turn when defendant was some 400 feet away. Raidt v. Blount, 294 Ky. 172 , 171 S.W.2d 233, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 409 ( Ky. 1943 ).

This section and the last clear chance doctrine had no application where plaintiff angled across highway at a very slow speed and drove in left lane 70 feet before making a right turn into his driveway colliding with an approaching automobile just as he started to make his turn. Ratliff v. Mayo, 290 S.W.2d 479, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 323 ( Ky. 1956 ).

7.— Traffic Lights.

Where several witnesses for plaintiff testified that traffic light was green in his favor when he entered the intersection, the natural deduction from this testimony was that the light was red on intersecting street, and such testimony was therefore sufficient to justify submitting to jury question as to whether defendant had entered intersection against red light. Bryan v. Battoe, 290 Ky. 47 , 160 S.W.2d 369, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 355 ( Ky. 1942 ), overruled, Brockie v. Shadwick, 396 S.W.2d 63, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 98 ( Ky. 1965 ).

8.— Unmarked.

It was jury question whether driver at intersection having no “stop” signs had his car under reasonable control considering fact that he was allegedly going at 20 to 25 miles per hour in closely built up business portion, and view was partially obstructed by embankment and weeds. Tate v. Shaver, 287 Ky. 29 , 152 S.W.2d 259, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 494 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Where two cars reached an unmarked intersection at the same time and the driver of the car approaching the intersection from the right stated that she thought the vehicle on the left was far enough away to allow her to proceed across the intersection safely and there was conflicting evidence as to speed of car approaching on the left, the question of negligence and contributory negligence was properly submitted to the jury although driver approaching from the right was cited for failure to yield. Head v. Russell, 307 S.W.2d 557, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 92 ( Ky. 1957 ).

Vehicle traveling on street which zig-zagged to the left at intersection had right of way over vehicle traveling on the other street if the vehicle on the zig-zagging street got there first and intersection was not marked on either street. Pritchett v. Herber, 398 S.W.2d 473, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 44 ( Ky. 1965 ).

9.Yielding Right-of-way.

The duty to yield the right-of-way that subsection (7) (now (10)) of this section imposes on a driver about to enter or cross a highway from a private road or driveway is not absolute, since the failure to so yield does not absolve the favored driver of his duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid a collision. Bailey v. Barnett, 470 S.W.2d 331, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 273 ( Ky. 1971 ).

10.— Vehicle Approaching from Right.

Subsection (1) of this section means that driver approaching from left shall yield right-of-way to vehicle approaching from right unless latter is further from point of intersection, but that this requirement shall not be observed by driver approaching from left if he is on highway, boulevard, or street of superior class. Mann v. Woodward, 217 Ky. 491 , 290 S.W. 333, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 103 ( Ky. 1926 ) (decision prior to amendment of 1978).

Where automobile ahead entered intersection before car which had been trailing it and was attempting to pass it, automobile ahead had right-of-way under this section, which applies even though paths of automobiles are not at right angles to each other. Cook v. Gillespie, 259 Ky. 281 , 82 S.W.2d 347, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 307 ( Ky. 1935 ).

11.— — Paths.

Truck which approached on right of other truck had right-of-way unless other truck was closer to point of intersection of paths of verging trucks, in which event it was duty of truck on right to yield. Fall City Ice & Beverage Co. v. Scanlan Coal Co., 208 Ky. 820 , 271 S.W. 1097, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 401 ( Ky. 1925 ).

Even if taxicab driver had right-of-way at intersection, he was required to keep lookout and could not continue across oblivious of other traffic, and would not be exonerated as matter of law in intersectional collision if he turned head to talk to passenger. B-Line Cab Co. v. Lake, 270 Ky. 763 , 110 S.W.2d 1083, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 164 ( Ky. 1937 ).

Whether word “paths” in this section refers to streets on which vehicles are approaching intersection, or refers to point where paths of two vehicles would intersect, need not be decided where instruction offered by appellant was in practically same words as instruction given by court on that issue, telling jury to find for appellant if other car was farther from point of intersection of their paths than was appellant’s car. Tate v. Shaver, 287 Ky. 29 , 152 S.W.2d 259, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 494 ( Ky. 1941 ).

12.— — First to Reach Intersection.

Collision occurred as the direct and proximate result of the failure of automobile driver to yield right-of-way at intersection which was not controlled by traffic officers or signals until after truck had entered and passed the intersection sufficiently to leave the east driving lane clear, all in violation of subsection (2) (now (1)) of this section. Fries v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 396, 1948 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2841 (D. Ky.), aff'd, 170 F.2d 726, 1948 U.S. App. LEXIS 3226 (6th Cir. Ky. 1948 ).

Although car was approaching from right, other car had right-of-way because it reached intersection first. Schneider v. Rolf, 211 Ky. 669 , 278 S.W. 100, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 942 ( Ky. 1925 ).

In collision between bus and automobile, where automobile was at intersection when bus was 50 feet away, automobile had right-of-way, whether approaching from right or left or whatever its position on street. Big Sandy Bus Line Co. v. Williams, 246 Ky. 758 , 56 S.W.2d 346, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1933 ).

In collision between autos at intersection, question of negligence was for the jury under conflicting evidence as to which entered intersection first, and as to whether traffic light was working. Sandmann v. Sheehan, 279 Ky. 614 , 131 S.W.2d 484, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 314 ( Ky. 1939 ).

13.— — Instructions.

Instruction on duties of drivers as to lookout, control, and signals should have added duty to “yield right-of-way at intersections of their paths to vehicle approaching from the right, unless such vehicle approaching from the right is further from the point of intersection of their paths than such first named vehicle.” Kentucky Livery Co. v. Meyers, 196 Ky. 822 , 245 S.W. 882, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 602 ( Ky. 1922 ).

Court should have instructed that it was duty of car approaching intersection to yield right-of-way to car approaching from its right if it was equidistant from point of intersection of their paths since street on which car on left was traveling not being boulevard or designated by ordinance as equal in importance to boulevard. Newbold v. Brotzge, 209 Ky. 218 , 272 S.W. 755, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 467 ( Ky. 1925 ).

“Sudden appearance” instruction was properly refused, where bus driver approaching intersection saw automobile ahead when 50 feet away and when automobile was closer to the intersection and on bus driver’s right, thus permitting stopping if required, if bus was under control. Big Sandy Bus Line Co. v. Williams, 246 Ky. 758 , 56 S.W.2d 346, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Where evidence as to which driver reached intersection first was conflicting, instruction should have been given on that phase of case. Field v. Collins, 263 Ky. 474 , 92 S.W.2d 793, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 207 ( Ky. 1936 ).

In action for intersectional collision between taxicab and speeding automobile, part of instruction leaving to jury question whether taxicab entered intersection first was erroneous, where all evidence was that taxicab entered intersection first, and therefore had right-of-way as matter of law. B-Line Cab Co. v. Lake, 270 Ky. 763 , 110 S.W.2d 1083, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 164 ( Ky. 1937 ).

In action for damages resulting from collision of car and truck where truck traveling in southbound right lane collided with car traveling in southbound left lane that was attempting to pass truck, trial court correctly refused to give instruction under subsection (2) (now (1)) of this section to the effect that car should have yielded right-of-way to truck which was approaching from the right since the accident did not occur in an intersection. Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Ross, 273 S.W.2d 554, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1174 ( Ky. 1954 ).

In a death action arising out of a collision, an instruction which required a vehicle to yield the right-of-way “at the intersection of its path with the path of another vehicle approaching from the right unless the vehicle approaching from the right is farther from the point of the intersection of the paths of the two automobiles than such first named vehicle,” instead of an instruction requiring a vehicle to yield the right-of-way at an intersection to another vehicle approaching from the right unless the vehicle approaching from the right is farther from the intersection, was sufficient since the former instruction is in the language of subsection (2) (now (1)) of this section. Bumpus v. Drinkard's Adm'x, 279 S.W.2d 4, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 497 ( Ky. 1955 ).

The court properly instructed the jury that under this section it was the plaintiff’s duty to yield the right-of-way to the defendant (since she was approaching from the right) unless the jury should believe that the defendant’s car was farther from the point of the intersection of the respective paths of the cars than was the plaintiff’s car, and that in such an event it was the defendant’s duty to yield the right-of-way through the intersection. Farris v. Summerour, 296 S.W.2d 708, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 223 ( Ky. 1956 ).

Where turn to the left was necessarily subsequent to the determination of which of two vehicles had the right-of-way at the intersection jury would have to make that determination under an instruction based on subsection (2) (now (1)) of this section and it was error for court to give instruction under subsection (1) (now (6)(b)) of this section (to the effect that automobile driver entering through street had the duty to see to it that he had sufficient space and time before entering the intersection to bear to the left in order to proceed eastwardly) apparently assuming that the proper law to apply was the provision giving the right-of-way to the vehicle proceeding in a straight line and not the first at the intersection when the first at the intersection was going to make a left turn. Pritchett v. Herber, 398 S.W.2d 473, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 44 ( Ky. 1965 ).

14.— Signs.

Where the evidence was conflicting it could not be said as a matter of law that violation of subsection (6) of this section or of KRS 189.300(2) or 189.440 constituted contributory negligence. Gauze v. Horn, 253 S.W.2d 606, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 1108 ( Ky. 1952 ).

15.Highway of Lesser Class.

In intersectional collision in city, automobile on intercounty seat highway had right-of-way if colliding vehicles were equidistant from intersection. Sharp v. Rawls, 234 Ky. 438 , 28 S.W.2d 493, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 206 ( Ky. 1930 ).

Instruction was not prejudicially erroneous where it required north bound motorist on intersecting street not to proceed if there was danger to eastbound traffic on boulevard and did not confine it to plaintiffs’ car alone, and made duty absolute instead of confining it to exercise of ordinary care. Elliott's Guardian v. Bernauer, 248 Ky. 423 , 58 S.W.2d 632, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 244 ( Ky. 1933 ).

The application of subsection (4) (now (5)) of this section providing that a vehicle shall not be driven onto a through highway from an inferior highway when another car is approaching so closely on the through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard depends on the facts of the case and is a question for the jury when the evidence is not clear-cut. Duvall v. Cole, 288 S.W.2d 663, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 276 ( Ky. 1956 ).

Until defined or designated as a superior thoroughfare in the manner authorized by statute, one road has no legal preference over another and this section does not apply. Hall v. Kolb, 374 S.W.2d 854, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 394 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Subsection (4) (now (5)) of this section concerning yielding of right-of-way at an intersection had no application where the paths of the cars would not have crossed if they had been properly driven since one car should have been in the east lane and the other car should have been in the west lane as it had entered the highway and already turned south. Miller v. Quaife, 391 S.W.2d 682, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 315 ( Ky. 1965 ).

Since the right of the vehicle on the superior highway was a qualified right, testimony by the driver and passenger of the vehicle approaching from the inferior highway that the vehicle on the superior highway had no headlights burning was sufficient to present an issue for the jury. Clark v. Johnston, 492 S.W.2d 447, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 522 ( Ky. 1973 ).

16.— Through or Preferential Highway.

If truck came to stop at intersection with through highway it was invitation to approaching cars to proceed and sudden starting again and colliding with approaching automobile would be negligence. Lindig v. Breen, 268 Ky. 153 , 103 S.W.2d 941, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 423 ( Ky. 1937 ).

Where plaintiff’s motorcycle traveling on main street collided with defendant’s auto entering main street from side street, plaintiff’s evidence that collision occurred across center line of main street was not contrary to universally recognized physical laws, notwithstanding testimony of several witnesses that defendant’s car did not enter main street and that collision occurred at entrance to side street, where oil marks on main street supported plaintiff’s testimony, two witnesses testified that car was pushed back on side street after collision, and car could have been forced back by impact. Saxton v. Tucker, 280 Ky. 777 , 134 S.W.2d 590, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Motorist on preferred street had right of way over motorist on intersecting street if he first reached the intersection, or was so near it that by the exercise of ordinary care he could not stop or slow his vehicle so as to avoid other vehicle. Saxton v. Tucker, 280 Ky. 777 , 134 S.W.2d 590, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1939 ).

The purpose of former subsections requiring stopping before entering a highway of a higher class and at entrances to a through highway, is to promote safety at intersections and not to lay down or to set out the precise point within inches for stopping at every intersection but to leave a question of fact for the jury as to whether or not the judgment in that matter was reasonably exercised. Gartrell v. Harris' Coadm'xs, 300 Ky. 82 , 187 S.W.2d 1019, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 823 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Anyone entering an intersection has a right to assume that any approaching vehicle is being operated at a reasonable rate of speed. Gartrell v. Harris' Coadm'xs, 300 Ky. 82 , 187 S.W.2d 1019, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 823 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Regulations giving drivers approaching an intersection on a favored highway the right-of-way over those approaching on a secondary road do not confer an absolute and unqualified right to proceed but only a relative preference. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Tungent's Adm'r, 313 Ky. 1 , 229 S.W.2d 985, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 784 ( Ky. 1 950).

In a city business section, where vehicles are traveling at relatively low speeds, and where traffic customs are such as to allow a ready movement of cross-traffic, reasonable minds might differ as to what constitutes a reasonable time margin for passing through an intersection and may be a question for the jury. Frozen Food Marketers v. Feisstreitzer, 335 S.W.2d 896, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 286 ( Ky. 1960 ).

17.— Duty to Stop and Yield.

Driver of automobile on state highway of a narrow, lower grade surface and less traveled nature, and on which there was an arterial stop sign at its intersection with a U.S. highway of a higher class and constituting a main artery of traffic, was required to stop before entering the intersection. Barr v. Searcy, 280 Ky. 535 , 133 S.W.2d 714, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 149 ( Ky. 1939 ).

A motorist must come to a complete stop before entering a preferred street from a side street, even though the side street does not cross the preferred street, and even though the motorist intends to make a right turn into the preferred street. Saxton v. Tucker, 280 Ky. 777 , 134 S.W.2d 590, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1939 ).

The driver on the subordinate street is required to yield the right-of-way when the positions of the vehicles are such that a reasonably careful man might be in doubt as to which should go first; he cannot take chances or make close calculations. Thomas v. Dahl, 293 Ky. 808 , 170 S.W.2d 337, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 706 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Person driving car on main highway had right to assume, in the absence of something to put him on notice to the contrary, that driver on intersecting side highway would conform to law by stopping car before entering the highway and driver on main highway had a right to act on the assumption in determining his manner of using the highway. Mullen v. Coleman, 297 Ky. 351 , 179 S.W.2d 600, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 700 ( Ky. 1944 ).

Where gravel road made connection with main highway at a point where main highway made a right angle turn, so that person going north on main highway could continue north on gravel road, but in so doing would have to cross left lane of main highway, a motorist desiring to enter the gravel road would have the same duty to come to a stop before crossing in front of approaching traffic so close as to constitute an immediate hazard as he would have if he were entering the main highway from the gravel road. Rice v. Franklin Title & Trust Co., 299 Ky. 142 , 184 S.W.2d 896, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 391 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Driver was required to yield right-of-way if at the time another car entered the intersection his car was a sufficient distance from the intersection for the other car to cross the intersection with reasonable safety. Gartrell v. Harris' Coadm'xs, 300 Ky. 82 , 187 S.W.2d 1019, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 823 ( Ky. 1945 ).

The stop is to be made before entering the intersection, and the driver shall not proceed into the intersection until he can do so with safety, but the point of stopping is to be at a place where the view is sufficiently clear to permit observation of approaching traffic. Gartrell v. Harris' Coadm'xs, 300 Ky. 82 , 187 S.W.2d 1019, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 823 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Under this section it was automobile driver’s duty to bring car to a stop when he reached intersection and yield the right-of-way if approaching truck was so near the intersection as to constitute an immediate hazard and where instead of bringing his automobile to a complete stop he shifted into low gear and proceeded into the intersection he was contributorily negligent and could not recover from the truck driver for personal injuries occurring from collision. Huber & Huber Motor Express, Inc. v. Croley, 303 Ky. 101 , 196 S.W.2d 965, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 791 ( Ky. 1946 ).

Where truck driver without stopping drove onto highway from an intersecting road at a time when an automobile was approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard he violated subsections (4) (now (5)) and (5) (now (4)) of this section by failing to stop and yield right-of-way and was solely responsible for collision as motorist was entitled to assume the truck driver would not enter the highway until he was reasonably sure it was clear of traffic. Yates v. Kurtz, 314 Ky. 867 , 238 S.W.2d 669, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 819 ( Ky. 1951 ). See Riggs v. Miller, 396 S.W.2d 69, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 101 ( Ky. 1965 ).

A driver entering a main highway from a secondary road is not only required to stop before entering but also to yield the right-of-way to a car approaching on the main highway which is close enough to present an immediate hazard. Vaughn v. Jones, 257 S.W.2d 583, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 792 ( Ky. 1953 ). See Couch v. Hensley, 305 S.W.2d 765, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 336 ( Ky. 1957 ).

It is beyond question that an approaching vehicle less than four seconds traveling time away from an intersection constitutes an “immediate hazard” and should be recognized as such by anyone who has observed its speed and proximity. Central Petroleum Co. v. Wright, 290 S.W.2d 465, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 316 ( Ky. 1956 ).

Under subsection (3) of this section, a driver has a duty to stop at an intersection when entering a main thoroughfare from a road that dead-ends at the thoroughfare even though the stop sign at the intersection had been knocked down. Reidling v. Wickes Lumber & Bldg. Supply Co., 471 S.W.2d 319, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 240 ( Ky. 1971 ).

Where the physical evidence indicated that the right front of the defendant’s vehicle struck the left front, or left side, of the plaintiff’s vehicle, it was evident that both vehicles entered the intersection “at approximately the same time” and the defendant, who was on the left, was under a statutory duty to yield the right-of-way to the plaintiff. Walton v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 655 S.W.2d 11, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 293 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).

18.— Proceeding After Stop.

Where the plaintiff sustained injuries when the taxicab driven by him was struck at an intersection by a government vehicle operated by a member of the armed forces, and the evidence showed that the plaintiff had stopped his taxicab in obedience to a boulevard stop sign and was proceeding across the intersection at a low rate of speed, but the government vehicle was operated at an excessive rate of speed and in a negligent manner, the plaintiff was entitled to recovery, and the government was precluded from recovery on its counterclaim. Taylor v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 920, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2685 (D. Ky. 1953 ).

Motorist stopping before entering preferred street from side street should not proceed until it is reasonably safe for him to do so. Saxton v. Tucker, 280 Ky. 777 , 134 S.W.2d 590, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1939 ).

19.— Relative not Absolute Preference.

The driver of the vehicle having the right-of-way at an intersection does not have the absolute and unqualified right to go ahead; the right-of-way is a relative preference. The preferred driver has the right to assume that the vehicle on the intersecting highway will yield to him, but he nevertheless has the duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid collision with other vehicles, and he cannot ignore their presence or possible presence. The duty to yield the right-of-way may depend upon whether the driver traveling at a lawful rate of speed is so close to the intersection that a prudent person under the circumstances would not have reasonable ground to believe he might safely enter the highway. Thomas v. Dahl, 293 Ky. 808 , 170 S.W.2d 337, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 706 ( Ky. 1943 ).

In action by administrator of estate of 13-year-old girl for her death from injuries received while a passenger on a bicycle operated by a 15-year-old boy when bicycle was struck by an automobile at an intersection, instructions should have followed subsections (4) (now (5)) and (5) (now (4)) of this section and should not have been so unqualified and favorable to driver of automobile that they would tend to create in the minds of the jury the impression that the automobile had unrestricted right-of-way in intersection. Harris v. Morris, 259 S.W.2d 469, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 958 ( Ky. 1953 ).

Tractor-trailer operator on through highway had right to assume that automobile driver entering from inferior road would yield right-of-way but assumption vanished when tractor-trailer operator observed (or in the exercise of ordinary care should have observed) that automobile driver failed to yield. Metcalfe v. Hopper, 400 S.W.2d 531, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 444 ( Ky. 1966 ).

20.— Negligence as Matter of Law.

Where vehicle entered through highway intersection when car thereon was so close as to constitute an immediate hazard, the driver was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. Tooke v. Adkins, 418 S.W.2d 220, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 201 ( Ky. 1967 ).

Where a driver traveling on an interstate highway realized he had missed his exit, pulled to the emergency lane, began backing his automobile, backed onto the highway and was hit from behind by an approaching automobile, he was negligent as a matter of law. Ferguson v. Stevenson, 427 S.W.2d 822, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 698 ( Ky. 1968 ).

21.— Proximate Cause.

When the approaching car on arterial highway is in view for an unlimited distance, the speed of the approaching car cannot be considered to be a causative factor where motorist enters the arterial highway from a secondary road in spite of the fact it is reasonably observable that the approaching car will be in the intersection at the same time the motorist enters the intersection from the secondary road. Chambliss v. Lewis, 382 S.W.2d 207, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 339 ( Ky. 1964 ).

The failure of motorcyclist to yield right-of-way to automobile traveling on preferential street, if the proximate cause of the accident, constitutes such negligence as will bar recovery. Grooms v. Puckett, 406 S.W.2d 309, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 196 ( Ky. 1966 ).

22.— Contributory Negligence.

Where motorist on lesser road approaching through highway had a clear and unobstructed view of the highway, the fact that he stopped at intersection and looked both ways before proceeding into highway did not relieve him of contributory negligence in collision with truck which was clearly visible while approaching intersection. Creal v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 249, 1949 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2638 (D. Ky. 1949 ).

The failure of driver on secondary street to obey the stop sign or yield to car which was then so close as to constitute an immediate hazard in violation of subsection (4) (now (5)) of this section was contributorily negligent as a matter of law and the last clear chance doctrine was not applicable where motorist on preferential highway did not see the automobile that had entered from secondary street until the instant of collision. Seamon v. Bolton, 351 S.W.2d 51, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 133 ( Ky. 1961 ).

23.— Instructions.

Where plaintiff failed to stop when entering a main highway and then proceeded across the highway after observing defendants’ car approaching at a rapid rate of speed such contributory negligence warranted a peremptory instruction in favor of defendants. Mullen v. Coleman, 297 Ky. 351 , 179 S.W.2d 600, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 700 ( Ky. 1944 ).

Where signed statement of plaintiff regarding the direction he intended to take on road was contradicted by his testimony showing that point of accident was not intersection, trial court properly refused to give plaintiff’s instruction that if the jury believed from the evidence that plaintiff was nearer to the intersection of the path of plaintiff’s and defendant’s vehicles, then it was defendant’s duty to yield right-of-way since there was no evidence on which to base the instruction. Rice v. Franklin Title & Trust Co., 299 Ky. 142 , 184 S.W.2d 896, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 391 ( Ky. 1945 ).

An instruction that it was the duty of driver as she approached intersection with through highway to bring her automobile to a dead stop before entering and not to proceed into the through highway until she could do so with reasonable safety to traffic on the through highway was sufficient without specifying the exact point of stoppage. Gartrell v. Harris' Coadm'xs, 300 Ky. 82 , 187 S.W.2d 1019, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 823 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Instructions should have directed jury to determine whether plaintiff’s car actually was stalled in intersection and, if so, whether it was stalled long enough to afford car on preferential highway time and opportunity, considering traffic conditions, to have avoided the collision and instruction on last clear chance did not clearly state these factors. Gross v. Hubbard, 314 S.W.2d 548, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 307 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Where the jury was instructed that the deceased had a duty to yield the right-of-way to traffic on the preferred street including the automobile being operated by the defendant, “which traffic was then in the intersection or so near to it as to constitute an immediate hazard, and not to enter the intersection unless and until she could do so with reasonable safety,” the instruction did not give the defendant an absolute right-of-way, but complied with the statute. Shields v. Goins, 426 S.W.2d 139, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 517 ( Ky. 1967 ).

Where the defendant was traveling on a through highway and the plaintiff had to stop, it was error to give an instruction conditioning the defendant’s right-of-way upon his being so near the intersection when the plaintiff entered it that in the exercise of ordinary care on his part he could not stop or slow down so as not to collide with the plaintiff’s car. Killman v. Taylor, 453 S.W.2d 574, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 321 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Where the site of an accident between a backing automobile and a truck was on private property, the only duty required of truck driver was to exercise such care for his own safety and the safety of others as an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances, and it was improper for the court to instruct the jury on specific statutory duty to give timely warning of truck’s approach by sounding its horn. Johnson v. Haddix, 522 S.W.2d 859, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 144 ( Ky. 1975 ).

There is nothing in this section that requires a motorist who is moving from an inferior highway or street into a superior one to exercise the “highest degree of care” and the giving of an instruction to that effect was prejudicial error. Crumpler v. Winkler, 564 S.W.2d 536, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 925 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

24.Stop Signs.

Where there was no evidence of stop signs except on one of the streets, duties of drivers were different and should have been set forth in separate instructions. Field v. Collins, 263 Ky. 474 , 92 S.W.2d 793, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 207 ( Ky. 1936 ).

Instruction which merely submitted question of presence of stop sign in first-class city and gave legal effect of its presence was not erroneous. Lindig v. Breen, 268 Ky. 153 , 103 S.W.2d 941, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 423 ( Ky. 1937 ).

Where there was no duty on the part of the city to maintain a stop signal at the intersection of an arterial highway and another street it is not liable for injuries to drivers for its failure to maintain such stop signal. Martin v. Winchester, 278 Ky. 200 , 128 S.W.2d 543, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 391 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Automobile driver had the right under subsection (5) (now (4)) of this section, after obeying the stop sign, and seeing nothing in or so near to the intersection as to appear hazardous, to proceed and he also had the right to assume that the driver of taxi would obey the law as to speed, would have his taxi under control, and would use ordinary care to avoid a collision, even though the taxi was on a preferred street. Danville Cab Co. v. Hendren, 304 Ky. 528 , 201 S.W.2d 561, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 669 ( Ky. 1947 ).

Motorist was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law under subsection (5) (now (4)) of this section when he drove onto a main highway from a side street where there was a stop sign without stopping when a heavily loaded truck, signalling a right turn into the highway, was approaching the intersection at about 40 miles per hour although the truck drove straight ahead instead of turning right. Romans v. Duke, 313 Ky. 157 , 230 S.W.2d 439, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 815 ( Ky. 1950 ).

Where driver failed to stop at stop sign and entered highway in path of approaching car which she mistakenly believed was 500 to 600 feet away, her failure to stop and mistaken belief were cause of resulting accident and court should have given peremptory instruction for counter-claimant. Yates v. Kurtz, 314 Ky. 867 , 238 S.W.2d 669, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 819 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Where the defendant did not see the plaintiff’s vehicle, but drove his automobile into an intersection when the plaintiff’s vehicle was so close as to constitute an immediate hazard, the defendant was guilty of contributory negligence which precluded his recovery on a counterclaim, since he was required by law to see what he should have seen by looking. Roberts v. Rogers, 265 S.W.2d 448, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 728 ( Ky. 1954 ).

Motorist’s contributory negligence was proximate cause of accident where in violation of subsection (5) (now (4)) of this section he failed to stop and yield right-of-way to truck traveling on arterial highway when the truck was so near intersection as to constitute an immediate hazard and the fact his automobile was found in second gear tended to corroborate evidence of his failure to stop and yield right-of-way. Manning v. Claxon's Ex'x, 283 S.W.2d 704, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 319 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Where avenue had been properly designated a preferential highway by city ordinance the intersection was a regulated one even though the stop sign was small and had been placed in a hedge off the sidewalk and was very difficult to see. Blanton v. Metz, 357 S.W.2d 306, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 113 ( Ky. 1962 ).

Where the evidence indicated that defendant stopped her car at a stop sign, saw a pickup truck turning right into lane closest to her and pulled into the intersection as the truck was turning thereby striking a motorcycle obscured from her vision by the turning truck, and killing the motorcyclist, it was proper for the court to direct a verdict against the defendant pursuant to this section. Charlton v. Jacobs, 619 S.W.2d 498, 1981 Ky. App. LEXIS 265 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).

A superior street or thoroughfare does not lose its superior status by reason of a stop or yield sign being misplaced or obscured on an inferior, intersecting street; the policy underlying such a rule is that a motorist proceeding along a through street or highway protected by stop signs is entitled to assume that the driver of the vehicle on an intersecting street will obey the law and stop or yield the right-of-way. Walton v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 655 S.W.2d 11, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 293 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).

Where stop sign at intersection was missing at time of collision between vehicles which entered intersection at approximately the same time, trial court should have instructed jury under subsection (3) of this section, since the superior street did not lose such status by virtue of the stop sign on the inferior street being misplaced. Walton v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 655 S.W.2d 11, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 293 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).

25.Entering from Private Road or Driveway.

The preferred driver has the right to assume, although not with implicit impunity, that the other driver about to enter his path of of travel from a private driveway will yield to him; yet there remains the duty at all times to exercise reasonable care to avoid collision with other vehicles, and he cannot ignore their presence or possible presence. Thomas v. Dahl, 293 Ky. 808 , 170 S.W.2d 337, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 706 ( Ky. 1943 ). See Siler v. Williford, 350 S.W.2d 704, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 129 ( Ky. 1961 ).

The operator of a motor scooter who re-entered the highway from a service station was under a duty to look for approaching vehicles and not to proceed upon the highway if he saw one coming, unless he could do so in safety, and while he was not required to exercise an infallible judgment he was required to use such care as a reasonably cautious and prudent person would exercise under the circumstances. Brumbach v. Day, 260 S.W.2d 939, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 988 ( Ky. 1953 ).

A motorist about to enter a public way from a private drive has an absolute duty to yield the right-of-way to vehicles traveling on the public way until his entry can be made, in the exercise of ordinary care, without danger of a collision. Siler v. Williford, 350 S.W.2d 704, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 129 ( Ky. 1961 ).

The statement in the opening remarks of plaintiff’s counsel that the decedent driver was struck by an approaching vehicle after he emerged from a private entrance onto a through thoroughfare was not an admission of contributory negligence as a matter of law such as would justify the granting of a directed verdict following the opening statement. Baker v. Case Plumbing Mfg. Co., 423 S.W.2d 258, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 480 ( Ky. 1968 ).

The statute does not impose an absolute duty to yield. Baker v. Case Plumbing Mfg. Co., 423 S.W.2d 258, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 480 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Where there was testimony that the defendant was on the wrong side of the road when the collision occurred, and there were no natural or physical facts which so conflicted with the testimony as to make it incredible, there was sufficient evidence of probative value to support the verdict of the defendant’s negligence. Webb Transfer Lines, Inc. v. Taylor, 439 S.W.2d 88, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 142 ( Ky. 1968 ).

26.— Questions for Jury.

Where driver of truck on public alley collided with boy on bicycle entering alley from private driveway, and there was evidence that truck was traveling at excessive rate of speed and on wrong side, and that boy did not keep a proper lookout, questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury. Thomas v. Dahl, 293 Ky. 808 , 170 S.W.2d 337, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 706 ( Ky. 1943 ).

The matter of who had the right-of-way was relative notwithstanding the literal language of subsection (7) (now (10)) of this section and the question of negligence was for the jury, however, on second appeal the “law of the case” precluded reconsideration of the claimed error that the section was mandatory in requiring driver to yield right-of-way. Siler v. Williford, 375 S.W.2d 262, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 400 ( Ky. 1964 ).

There was no basis for a directed verdict and case was properly submitted to a jury where the testimony was conflicting as to whether automobile was pulling from the berm onto the highway in violation of subsection (7) (now (10)) of this section or was sitting still waiting to pull onto the highway and the physical fact that the cars collided or came to rest on the berm of the highway was not sufficient to require a directed verdict in view of all of the testimony in the case and on submission to the jury the jury had the right to believe that the automobile was pulling onto the highway since this version was supported by substantive probable evidence. Gullion v. Ewry, 384 S.W.2d 315, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 91 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Where in the opening statement plaintiff’s counsel stated that defendant’s vehicle had swerved into the wrong lane at the time of the collision, although such action may not have been negligence in view of the emergency, it could constitute an issue concerning defendant driver’s negligence in failing to continue in his proper lane sufficient to make the granting of a directed verdict after the opening statement improper. Baker v. Case Plumbing Mfg. Co., 423 S.W.2d 258, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 480 ( Ky. 1968 ).

27.— Instructions.

An instruction making it the unqualified duty of the driver entering a highway from a private driveway to yield the right-of-way was erroneous. Thomas v. Dahl, 293 Ky. 808 , 170 S.W.2d 337, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 706 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Instruction that it was the further duty of driver as he approached road to yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on the highway and not to proceed from private driveway into the road until he could do so with reasonable safety to traffic on the highway was in keeping with subsection (6) (now (10)) of this section and where evidence was conflicting question of whether accident was result of motorist entering highway from driveway or of high rate of speed of vehicle approaching on highway was question for jury. McCoy v. Clark, 309 Ky. 841 , 219 S.W.2d 50, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 824 ( Ky. 1949 ).

Where instruction offered and one given by the court imposed practically the same duties on the driver with the exception that the offered instruction required defendant’s driver to come to a dead stop before entering the highway this difference was immaterial because all testimony showed defendant’s driver made a complete stop before emerging from the private driveway onto the highway and plaintiff could not complain of the instruction. Moore v. Decker, 312 Ky. 80 , 226 S.W.2d 519, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 587 ( Ky. 1950 ).

The duty to yield right-of-way under subsection (7) (now (10)) of this section implies the duty to look and see what is obvious unless there is some excuse for not seeing it and where driver pulling onto highway and both of her passengers looked but no automobile was visible the court was correct in submitting the question to the jury with instructions including a contributory negligence instruction and the jury was justified in believing that had the lights of the car approaching on the highway been on, the driver pulling onto the highway and her passengers would have seen it. Robinson v. Cull, 416 S.W.2d 346, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 265 ( Ky. 1967 ).

In a collision case between motorist and motorcyclist where the act creating the peril occurred almost simultaneously with the happening of the collision, the last clear chance doctrine was not applicable because neither party could fairly be said to have a last clear chance to avert the consequences, and thus the refusal of the trial court to instruct on the last clear chance doctrine was not error. Smith v. Wright, 512 S.W.2d 943, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 418 ( Ky. 1974 ).

Cited:

Pryor’s Adm’r v. Otter, 268 Ky. 602 , 105 S.W.2d 564, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 488 ( Ky. 1937 ); Black v. Bishop, 306 Ky. 524 , 207 S.W.2d 22, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 1008 (1947); Clay v. Sammons, 239 S.W.2d 927, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 906 ( Ky. 1951 ); B-Line Cab Co. v. Hampton, 247 S.W.2d 34, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 664 ( Ky. 1952 ); Commonwealth v. Bentley, 259 S.W.2d 441, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 946 ( Ky. 1953 ); Cody v. Nortof, 267 S.W.2d 403, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 838 ( Ky. 1954 ); Crawford Transport Co. v. Wireman, 280 S.W.2d 163, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Restrictions as to turning or entering on limited access highway, KRS 177.300 .

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Criminal), 5th Ed., Offenses Against Public Order, Safety and Morals, Part 4 Offenses Relating to Firearms and Destructive Devices, § 8.71.

189.335. Authority to install yield right-of-way signs.

When it is determined, upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation at an intersection, that vehicle stop signs are more restrictive than necessary for the safe and efficient control of that intersection’s vehicular movements, yield right-of-way signs may be installed by the Department of Highways on one or more of the intersection approaches for the purpose of assigning right-of-way. The driver of a vehicle, in obedience to a yield right-of-way sign shall yield right-of-way to vehicles not so obligated to yield or stop which are within the intersection or approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard; but such driver, having so yielded, may proceed at such time as a safe interval occurs.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 148, § 1, effective June 16, 1960.

189.336. Installation of flasher lights near schools — Speed limits.

  1. Fiscal courts, with respect to school zones situated in unincorporated areas, may authorize by resolution installation at county expense of school flasher lights and other traffic control devices on highways in school zones as they deem reasonable and necessary.
  2. Cities, with respect to school zones within their incorporated areas, may authorize by ordinance installation at city expense of school flasher lights and other traffic control devices on highways in school zones as they deem reasonable and necessary.
  3. The speed limit on all highways where school flasher lights are in operation shall be determined by the governmental unit having control of the highway where a school flasher light is in operation. Flasher lights shall be placed one-eighth (1/8) of a mile on each side of the principal school building where practical. The governmental unit having control of the highway where the lights are in operation shall erect signs notifying motorists of the speed limit.
  4. “Highways” as used in this section shall mean any public road or street maintained by a city, county or the state.
  5. Any traffic control devices erected by any governmental unit shall conform to standards and specifications authorized by KRS 189.337 .

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 49, § 1; 1974, ch. 27, § 1; 1978, ch. 227, § 1, effective June 17, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Fiscal courts, and cities by ordinance, may authorize the installation of traffic devices that conform to the standards and specifications of KRS 189.337 on highways in school zones as they deem reasonable and necessary with or without authorization from the bureau (now department) of highways, except where federal aid highways are involved, since any traffic control devices placed thereon must be approved by the bureau (now department) of highways as required by 23 USCS, § 109(d). OAG 74-774 .

A board of education in making reasonable rules for the control and management of the schools may establish student safety patrols for street traffic instructional purposes inside the limits of school property but may not make or enforce traffic regulations on roads or driveways within or outside the limits of school property. OAG 75-614 .

A city ordinance making school crossing guards, who are sworn peace officers with authority to issue citations and place and remove traffic control devices, employes of the school board rather than the city is invalid under KRS 94.360 (now repealed), giving a city exclusive control over its streets, this section, giving a city exclusive authority to place traffic control devices, and Ky. Const., § 184 requiring school board funds be used only for the purpose of education. OAG 79-107 .

The city has authority to employ school crossing guards to regulate traffic, while the local school board does not; due to the city’s exclusive control over its streets, no other governmental entity has similar control. OAG 92-6 .

The city school board does not have the authority to regulate traffic, as the city has exclusive control over traffic and traffic control devices. OAG 92-6 .

There is no statutory authority allowing the city to abdicate its responsibility and jurisdiction over existing city streets and in fact, subsection (2) of this section expressly authorizes a city, by ordinance, to install, at city expense, school flasher lights in school zones, as necessary. OAG 92-6 .

189.337. Traffic control signs, uniform standards to be prescribed — Sign to conform — Prohibited activities.

  1. As used in this chapter, “official traffic control devices” shall mean all signs, signals, markings, and devices placed or erected by authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating, warning, or dividing traffic.
  2. The Department of Highways shall promulgate and adopt a manual of standards and specifications for a uniform system of official traffic control devices for use upon all roads and streets open to public travel. The manual and its future revisions and supplements shall be applicable to all roads and streets under the control of the Department of Highways or any county or incorporated city.
  3. All traffic control devices installed on any road or street after the adoption of the manual shall conform to the provisions thereof. Satisfactory operating traffic devices in use on the date of the adoption of the manual may continue to be used; however, if such devices are replaced or revised, they must be replaced or revised in conformance with the provisions of the manual.
  4. No person shall place, maintain, or display on or in the view of any highway any authorized sign, signal, marking, or device which resembles, purports to be, or is an imitation of an official traffic control device or signal.
  5. A person shall not attempt to or in fact alter, twist, deface, injure, knock down, or interfere with the effective operation of any official traffic control device or signal, or any part thereof.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 46, §§ 1 to 3; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(1); 1978, ch. 46, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 2006, ch. 173, § 15, effective July 12, 2006.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Watkins v. Reed, 557 F. Supp. 278, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19485 (E.D. Ky. 1983 ), aff’d, 734 F.2d 17, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 14355 (6th Cir. Ky. 1984 ); Commonwealth v. Curry, 607 S.W.3d 618, 2020 Ky. LEXIS 293 ( Ky. 2020 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since subsection (3) of this section states that all traffic control devices must conform to the provisions of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, the legislature obviously intended that no traffic control device be installed which does not conform to Manual specifications and that no device be installed where there are no specifications set forth in the Manual to which it could conform; therefore, since the Manual makes no reference to speed bumps there is no statutory or regulatory authority for their placement or installation. OAG 81-90

189.338. Limitation of colored lights used in traffic-control signals — Rules for vehicular and pedestrian traffic controlled by traffic-control signals — Affirmative defense for motorcyclists.

Whenever traffic is controlled by traffic-control signals exhibiting different colored lights or colored lighted arrows, successively one at a time or in combination, only the colors green, red, and yellow shall be used, except for special pedestrian signals carrying a word legend or symbolic message, and said lights shall indicate and apply to drivers of vehicles and pedestrians as follows:

  1. Green indication.
    1. Vehicular traffic facing a circular green signal may proceed straight through or turn right or left unless a sign at such place prohibits either such turn. But vehicular traffic, including vehicles turning right or left, shall yield the right-of-way to other vehicles and to pedestrians lawfully within the intersection or an adjacent crosswalk at the time such signal is exhibited.
    2. Vehicular traffic facing a green arrow signal, shown alone or in combination with another indication, may cautiously enter the intersection only to make the movement indicated by such arrow, or such other movement as is permitted by other indications shown at the same time. Such vehicular traffic shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk and to other traffic lawfully using the intersection.
    3. Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-control signal, pedestrians facing any green signal, except when the sole green signal is a turn arrow, may proceed across the roadway within any marked or unmarked crosswalk.
    4. Vehicular traffic that entered an intersection on a circular green or yellow indication is allowed to complete a left turn during the red indication.
  2. Steady yellow indication.
    1. Vehicular traffic facing a steady yellow signal is thereby warned that the related green movement is being terminated or that a red indication will be exhibited immediately thereafter when vehicular traffic shall not enter the intersection.
    2. Pedestrians facing a steady yellow signal, unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-control signal, are thereby advised that there is insufficient time to cross the roadway before a red indication is shown, and no pedestrian shall then start to cross the roadway.
  3. Steady red indication.
    1. Vehicular traffic facing a circular red signal alone shall stop at a clearly marked stop line but, if none, then before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, if none, then before entering the intersection and shall remain standing until a green indication is shown, except as follows:
      1. The driver of a vehicle which is stopped as required by this paragraph with the intention of making a right turn, may make such right turn, after stopping, unless an official sign has been erected prohibiting such movement, but shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians and other traffic lawfully proceeding through the intersection;
      2. The driver of a vehicle which is stopped as required by this paragraph whose vehicle is in the left lane of a one-way highway with the intention of making a left turn onto the left lane of another one-way highway with the flow of traffic, may make such left turn, after stopping, unless an official sign has been erected prohibiting such movement, but shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians and other traffic lawfully proceeding through the intersection; and
      3. In instances where there are two (2) right or left turn lanes, an allowable turn under this paragraph may be made from either lane unless a regulatory sign specifically prohibits it.
    2. Cities and counties may, by ordinance, and the department of highways may, by regulation, prohibit any such right or left turn against a steady red signal at any intersection, which prohibition shall be effective when an official sign prohibiting such movement is erected at the intersection.
    3. Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-control signal, pedestrians facing a steady red signal alone shall not enter the roadway.
  4. In the event an official traffic-control signal is erected and maintained at a place other than an intersection, the provisions of this section shall be applicable except as to those provisions which by their nature can have no application. Any stop required shall be made at a sign or marking on the pavement indicating where the stop shall be made, but in the absence of any such sign or marking the stop shall be made at the signal.
  5. Whenever an illuminated flashing red or yellow light is used in a traffic signal or with a traffic sign it shall require obedience by vehicular traffic as follows:
    1. Flashing red (stop signal) — When a red lens is illuminated with rapid intermittent flashes, operators of vehicles shall stop at a clearly marked stop line but, if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where the operator has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering it, and the right to proceed shall be subject to the rules applicable after making a stop at a stop sign; and
    2. Flashing yellow (caution signal) — When a yellow lens is illuminated with rapid intermittent flashes, operators of vehicles may proceed through the intersection or past such signal only with caution.
  6. Any person operating a motorcycle who violates subsection (3) of this section by entering or crossing an intersection controlled by a traffic control signal against a steady red light shall have an affirmative defense to that charge if the person establishes all of the following conditions:
    1. The motorcycle was brought to a complete stop;
    2. The traffic control signal continued to show a steady red light for one hundred twenty (120) seconds or the traffic control signal at the intersection has completed two (2) lighting cycles;
    3. The traffic control signal was apparently malfunctioning or, if programmed or engineered to change to a green light only after detecting the approach of a motor vehicle, the signal apparently failed to detect the arrival of a motorcycle; and
    4. No motor vehicle or person was approaching on the street or highway to be crossed or entered, or any approaching person or vehicle was so far away from the intersection that it did not constitute an immediate hazard.
  7. The affirmative defense outlined in subsection (6) of this section shall only apply to a violation for entering or crossing an intersection controlled by a traffic signal against a steady red light and shall not provide a defense to any other civil or criminal action.
  8. In the event a motorcyclist exercises the affirmative defense provisions set forth in subsection (6) of this section, the Transportation Cabinet or its employees are specifically immune from any and all civil liability arising from any such claim, lawsuit, or dispute. Any claim, lawsuit, or dispute against the Transportation Cabinet as a result of the affirmative defense set forth in subsection (6) of this section, shall be brought using the provisions outlined in KRS Chapter 44.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 201, § 1; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(1); 1978, ch. 46, § 4, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 156, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 2006, ch. 173, § 16, effective July 12, 2006; 2015 ch. 116, § 1, effective June 24, 2015.

Opinions of Attorney General.

While subsection (4) of this section does not authorize the use of mid-block stop signs, it does permit the use of mid-block traffic-control signals exhibiting different colored lights, or colored lighted arrows, successively one at a time or in combination. OAG 78-799 .

189.340. Overtaking vehicles, bicycles, or electric low — eed scooters — Traffic lanes — Following vehicles — Exemption for commercial motor vehicle platoon trailing vehicle.

  1. Vehicles overtaking other vehicles proceeding in the same direction shall pass to the left of them and shall not again drive to the right until reasonably clear of those vehicles. Vehicles overtaking streetcars may pass either to the right or left when so directed by a police officer, when on a one (1) way street or where the location of the tracks prevents compliance with this section, with regard for other traffic.
    1. Vehicles overtaking a bicycle or electric low-speed scooter proceeding in the same direction shall: (2) (a) Vehicles overtaking a bicycle or electric low-speed scooter proceeding in the same direction shall:
      1. If there is more than one (1) lane for traffic proceeding in the same direction, move the vehicle to the immediate left, if the lane is available and moving in the lane is reasonably safe; or
      2. If there is only one (1) lane for traffic proceeding in the same direction, pass to the left of the bicycle or electric low-speed scooter at a distance of not less than three (3) feet between any portion of the vehicle and the bicycle or electric low-speed scooter and maintain that distance until safely past the overtaken bicycle or electric low-speed scooter. If space on the roadway is not available to have a minimum distance of three (3) feet between the vehicle and the bicycle or electric low-speed scooter, then the driver of the passing vehicle shall use reasonable caution in passing the bicyclist or electric low-speed scooter operator.
    2. The driver of a motor vehicle may drive to the left of the center of a roadway, including when a no-passing zone is marked in accordance with subsection (6) of this section, to pass a person operating a bicycle or electric low-speed scooter only if the roadway to the left of the center is unobstructed for a sufficient distance to permit the driver to pass the person operating the bicycle or electric low-speed scooter safely and avoid interference with oncoming traffic. This paragraph does not authorize driving on the left side of the center of the roadway when otherwise prohibited under state law.
    3. The operator of a bicycle or electric low-speed scooter shall not ride more than two (2) abreast on a single highway lane unless operating on any part of the roadway marked exclusively for bicycle use. Persons riding two (2) abreast shall not impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic.
  2. The operator of a vehicle may overtake and pass upon the right of another vehicle only under the following conditions:
    1. When the vehicle overtaken is making or about to make a left turn;
    2. Upon a roadway with unobstructed pavement of sufficient width for two (2) or more lines of vehicles moving lawfully in the direction being traveled by the overtaking vehicle.
  3. The operator of a vehicle may overtake and pass another vehicle upon the right only under conditions permitting such movements in safety. Such movement shall not be made by driving off the roadway unless passing vehicle comes to a complete stop and such movement may be made safely.
  4. No vehicle shall be driven to the left side of the center of the roadway in overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless the left side is clearly visible and free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit overtaking and passing to be completely made without interfering with the safe operation of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction or any vehicle overtaken. In every event, the overtaking vehicle must return to the right-hand side of the roadway before coming within two hundred (200) feet of any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction.
  5. The commissioner of highways is hereby authorized to determine those portions of any highway where overtaking and passing or driving to the left of the roadway would be especially hazardous and may by appropriate signs or markings on the roadway indicate the beginning and end of such zones, and when such signs or markings are in place and clearly visible to an ordinarily observant person, every driver of a vehicle shall obey the directions thereof, except as provided for in subsection (2)(b) of this section.
  6. Whenever any roadway has been divided into three (3) clearly marked lanes for travel, the following additional rules shall apply:
    1. A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as may be practical entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety;
    2. A vehicle shall not be driven in the center lane except when overtaking and passing another vehicle where the roadway is clearly visible and the center lane is clear of traffic within a safe distance, or in preparation for a left turn or where a center lane is at the time allocated exclusively to traffic moving in the direction in which the vehicle is proceeding and is signposted to give notice of the allocation; and
    3. Official signs may be erected directing slow-moving traffic to use a designated lane or allocating specified lanes to traffic moving in the same direction and operators of vehicles shall obey the directions of such signs.
  7. A vehicle shall not be driven in the left lane of any limited access highway of four (4) lanes or more with a posted speed limit of at least sixty-five (65) miles per hour, except in overtaking a slower vehicle, yielding to traffic coming onto such a highway, or when traffic conditions exist which would prohibit safe use of the right or center lanes.
    1. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subsection, the operator of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for the speed of the vehicle and the traffic upon and condition of the highway. (9) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subsection, the operator of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for the speed of the vehicle and the traffic upon and condition of the highway.
    2. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subsection, the operator of any motor truck, semitrailer truck, bus, or heavy construction equipment unit, when traveling upon a highway outside of a business or residential district, shall not follow within two hundred fifty (250) feet of another such vehicle or equipment unit. This subsection shall not prevent overtaking and passing, nor shall it apply to any lane specially designated for use of motor trucks or semitrailer trucks, buses or heavy construction equipment units.
    3. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection shall not apply to a trailing commercial motor vehicle involved in a platoon as defined in KRS 281.010 , but shall apply to the commercial motor vehicle leading a platoon.

HISTORY: 2739g-40: amend. Acts 1950, ch. 51; 1952, ch. 206, § 2; 1962, ch. 288, § 1; 1964, ch. 65, § 2; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(4); 1978, ch. 46, § 5, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 27, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 245, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 2006, ch. 173, § 17, effective July 12, 2006; 2007, ch. 43, § 2, effective June 26, 2007; 2018 ch. 33, § 3, effective July 14, 2018; 2018 ch. 38, § 2, effective July 14, 2018; 2019 ch. 22, § 7, effective June 27, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Purpose.

Purpose of this statute was to aid traffic in passing trucks on the highway proceeding in the same direction as the traffic desiring to pass. Greathouse v. Mitchell, 249 S.W.2d 738, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 851 ( Ky. 1952 ).

A purpose of this section is that a reasonable margin of safety be allowed in case of an emergency requiring the front vehicle to stop, reduce its speed or change its course. Propane Transport Co. v. Edelen, 400 S.W.2d 697, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 452 ( Ky. 1966 ).

2.Application.

This section does not apply to the passing of a parked vehicle which had been proceeding in the same direction as the vehicle passing it but had come to a stop. Schultz v. Smith's Adm'r, 314 Ky. 198 , 234 S.W.2d 676, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 1053 ( Ky. 1950 ).

This section had no bearing on proximate cause of a collision where vehicle was not in process of passing but was parked on right hand side of road. Harry Holder Motor Co. v. Davidson, 243 S.W.2d 926, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1188 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Where taxicab was passing a bicycle traveling in the same direction as they went through an intersection and another motorist operated her automobile into the intersection and into the left side of the taxicab in violation of posted stop signs causing the cab to strike the bicycle throwing the rider off and killing him, the trial court did not err in refusing to give instructions as to the duties of the operator of a vehicle in overtaking and passing another vehicle, because it is doubtful whether these rules apply to bicycles and, even if they do, the passing by the taxicab was not the proximate cause of the rider’s death. Tinsley's Adm'r v. Slate, 251 S.W.2d 883, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 952 ( Ky. 1952 ).

This section does not apply where other vehicle being passed was parked on the other side of the road and headed in the opposite direction. Jordon v. Clough, 313 S.W.2d 581, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 271 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Violation of subsection 7(b) (now (8)(b)) of this section has no causal connection with an accident involving a collision of the violating vehicle with a vehicle approaching from the opposite direction. Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. Eagle Express Co., 346 S.W.2d 30, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 287 ( Ky. 1961 ).

3.Violation As Negligence Per Se.

Violation of this section was negligence per se, but such negligence did not permit recovery as matter of law unless it was the direct and proximate cause of the accident. Blackburn v. Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co., 243 S.W.2d 995, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1192 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Violation of this section, though negligence per se, did not preclude recovery for personal injuries where negligence had no connection with the accident. Greathouse v. Mitchell, 249 S.W.2d 738, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 851 ( Ky. 1952 ).

In motorcyclist’s action for damages due to injuries he suffered when struck while attempting a right-hand turn, the motorist who claimed a privilege to pass to the right by custom and usage was negligent as a matter of law for passing to the right on a graveled shoulder. Blakeman v. Joyce, 511 S.W.2d 112, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 428 ( Ky. 1974 ).

4.Passing.

Accused was guilty of voluntary manslaughter by reckless driving, where, after drinking whiskey, he drove car with defective steering gear, following zigzagging course on highway, and, when overtaking and passing another vehicle at 30 miles per hour on curving up-grade which obstructed view, collided with oncoming car, killing occupant thereof. Largent v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 598 , 97 S.W.2d 538, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 543 ( Ky. 1936 ) (decision prior to 1962 amendment).

Evidence that bus was proceeding at very slow rate of speed in meeting truck, and that auto behind truck suddenly pulled out directly in path of bus, causing bus driver to bring bus to a sudden stop, resulting in injury to passenger, justified peremptory instruction for defendant bus owner in action by passenger. Lyons v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 282 Ky. 106 , 137 S.W.2d 1107, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 137 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Driver of auto is not required to anticipate that an auto will suddenly come out from behind another approaching vehicle right in his path and continue straight toward him. Lyons v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 282 Ky. 106 , 137 S.W.2d 1107, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 137 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Where plaintiff, in attempting to pass defendant’s truck, blew horn, and truck pulled to the right side of the road, but when plaintiff was passing, the truck swerved to the left, striking plaintiff’s truck and forcing it from road, question of plaintiff’s contributory negligence, arising from fact that plaintiff, in following truck for some distance, had observed that the truck was tilted to the left and was weaving back and forth, two automobiles ahead of plaintiff had difficulty in passing the truck, and plaintiff had made one unsuccessful attempt to pass, was for the jury. Dixie-Ohio Express Co. v. Webb, 299 Ky. 201 , 184 S.W.2d 361, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 1034 ( Ky. 1944 ).

Where truck driver was attempting to pass defendant’s automobile within 100 feet of an intersection when defendant signalled her intent to turn left about 15 to 20 feet before reaching the intersection, the truck driver sounded his horn and attempted to return to the right hand lane, thus losing control of the truck causing it to crash into a building, and the defendant continued straight through the intersection, the negligence of the truck driver was the primary cause of the accident. Sanders Trucking Co. v. King, 313 Ky. 29 , 230 S.W.2d 87, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 801 ( Ky. 1950 ) (decision prior to 1962 amendment).

Where one motorist attempted to pass another within 100 feet of an intersection, the other attempted a left turn at the intersection, and they collided, both were guilty of negligence contributing to the accident and neither should recover. Garnett v. Hicks, 333 S.W.2d 509, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 193 ( Ky. 1960 ), overruled, Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Ricks, 376 S.W.2d 299, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 443 ( Ky. 1964 ), overruled in part, Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Ricks, 376 S.W.2d 299, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 443 ( Ky. 1964 ), overruled on other grounds, Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Ricks, 376 S.W.2d 299, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 443 (Ky. 1964) (decision prior to 1962 amendment).

5.— On Left.

“Last clear chance” doctrine was inapplicable where motorist sought to pass bus on its left in nighttime and oncoming truck allegedly veered suddenly across its path, since vehicles were approaching on parallel courses with equal opportunity to see ahead and avoid collision. C. L. & L. Motor Express v. Lyons, 245 Ky. 611 , 53 S.W.2d 978, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 639 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Motorist had no right to overtake and pass bus on its left while oncoming truck was passing, if in doing so motorist drove on streetcar tracks partly to left of center of street, even if approaching truck was still farther to left. C. L. & L. Motor Express v. Lyons, 245 Ky. 611 , 53 S.W.2d 978, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 639 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Question of contributory negligence should not have been submitted to jury where driver collided with truck while attempting to pass truck within 100 feet of the intersection at same time truck was attempting to make left turn into side road since except for the negligence of driver accident would not have happened. Garnett v. Hicks, 333 S.W.2d 509, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 193 ( Ky. 1960 ), overruled, Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Ricks, 376 S.W.2d 299, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 443 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Where automobile was following truck and both were being driven in the same direction on a two lane road and at the same time that automobile attempted to pass truck, truck attempted to make a left turn at an intersection and the vehicles collided on the left side of the highway, such accident would not have occurred except for automobile driver’s violation of the statute and such dereliction could not be excused by showing that there were no markings to indicate an intersection or no passing zone. Garnett v. Hicks, 333 S.W.2d 509, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 193 ( Ky. 1960 ), overruled, Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Ricks, 376 S.W.2d 299, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 443 ( Ky. 1964 ), overruled in part, Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Ricks, 376 S.W.2d 299, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 443 ( Ky. 1964 ), overruled on other grounds, Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Ricks, 376 S.W.2d 299, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 443 (Ky. 1964) (decision prior to 1962 amendment).

While this section requires the overtaking vehicle to pass to the left of the vehicle being overtaken it does not necessarily mean that the overtaking vehicle must at any and all events be entirely across the centerline while in the act of passing. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Warfield, 386 S.W.2d 453, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 505 ( Ky. 1965 ).

6.— On Right.

Driver of following vehicle, who disregards rule of road and attempts to pass car ahead on right, must exercise great care, even if car ahead has moved to left preparatory to turning right into driveway, and cannot be exonerated if he seeks to pass without sounding horn. Wright v. Clausen, 253 Ky. 498 , 69 S.W.2d 1062, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 712 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Verdict for motorcyclist on issue of contributory negligence was supported by evidence that motorcyclist gave hand signal to turn to the right and was then struck by motorist who attempted to pass to right onto shoulder. Blakeman v. Joyce, 511 S.W.2d 112, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 428 ( Ky. 1974 ).

The absolute duty to sound an automobile horn “whenever necessary,” imposed by KRS 189.080 , does not apply to the passing permitted by subsection (2) of this section and an instruction on contributory negligence was not justified where a plaintiff motorist, at the time of the accident, did not sound his horn before passing on the right. Barrett v. Stephany, 510 S.W.2d 524, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 552 ( Ky. 1974 ).

The argument that subdivision (2)(b) of this section, permitting passing on the right in a certain situation, applies only to four-lane highways is refuted by the express language of this section. Pedigo v. Carey, 650 S.W.2d 256, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 246 ( Ky. 1983 ).

Passing on the right on a three-lane section of the highway designed to facilitate the movement of traffic up the grade of the highway was not contributory negligence as a matter of law, and was permitted under subdivision (2)(b) of this section. Pedigo v. Carey, 650 S.W.2d 256, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 246 ( Ky. 1983 ).

7.— Instructions.

In action involving collision when overtaking and passing, instruction upon driver’s duties at steep grade was unnecessary where evidence was that collision occurred on road which was level or had slight grade. Wright v. Clausen, 263 Ky. 298 , 92 S.W.2d 93, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 801 ( Ky. 1935 ) (decision prior to 1962 amendment).

Court should not instruct jury that driver attempting to pass another vehicle must exercise highest degree of care in passing, or that he should not attempt to pass until he could do so in safety to himself and the occupants of his vehicle, or that he should not attempt to pass other vehicle if it was attempting to pass a third vehicle. Whitney v. Penick, 281 Ky. 474 , 136 S.W.2d 570, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 1940 ).

In an action involving a collision of motor vehicles which occurred after the defendant had passed another vehicle and resumed his proper lane, an instruction setting forth the requirements of this section for passing another vehicle prejudiced the defendant, because his passing the uninvolved car was not a causative factor in the collision. Elliott v. Drury's Adm'x, 304 Ky. 93 , 200 S.W.2d 141, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 599 ( Ky. 1947 ), overruled, Rankin v. Green, 346 S.W.2d 477, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 7 ( Ky. 1960 ).

Where evidence indicated appellee was guilty of violation of this section, refusal of circuit court to instruct the jury on legal duty under this section was reversible error. Rogers v. Abbott, 240 S.W.2d 840, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1024 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Where the defendant contended that he was not attempting to pass in a no passing zone and the plaintiff contended he was, instructions should have been given on both theories, and the instruction of the defendant’s duties should have included his duty not to pass unless in response to a sudden emergency. Grimes v. Kulmer, 454 S.W.2d 685, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 283 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Where the suit involved an accident in a location where passing was prohibited, it was unnecessary to instruct on any other possible violations of duty committed when passing. Grimes v. Kulmer, 454 S.W.2d 685, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 283 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Where two drivers were litigating as to their comparative responsibility arising out of an automobile accident in which the following vehicle attempted to pass the lead vehicle and the lead vehicle attempted a left turn as the following vehicle was practically alongside the lead vehicle, this section requires that the jury be instructed as to the duties imposed by subsection (1) of this section on a driver who desires to make a left turn. Dever v. Goranflo, 473 S.W.2d 131, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1971 ).

Since the only duty under this section with regard to sounding the horn is the duty under KRS 189.080 to sound a warning whenever necessary to warn others, court instruction that it was plaintiff’s duty to sound horn before passing “if you believe same was necessary” was not erroneous. Barrett v. Stephany, 510 S.W.2d 524, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 552 ( Ky. 1974 ).

8.Sounding Horn.

The failure of a motorist to sound his horn before attempting to pass another vehicle is not contributory negligence unless such failure is the proximate cause of the accident. Hinton v. Dixie Ohio Exp. Co., 188 F.2d 121, 1951 U.S. App. LEXIS 2975 (6th Cir. Ky. 1951 ).

When lights of oncoming automobile while overtaking and passing bus were visible to approaching truck driver, it was unnecessary for motorist to sound horn for his benefit, as required in overtaking vehicles. C. L. & L. Motor Express v. Lyons, 245 Ky. 611 , 53 S.W.2d 978, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 639 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Before overtaking and passing vehicle ahead, driver of trailing car should see that he can do so safely and should give statutory signals. Cook v. Gillespie, 259 Ky. 281 , 82 S.W.2d 347, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 307 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Where leading car turned to left of highway and slowed down, and following truck, without sounding horn attempted to pass to its right and collision occurred when leading car cut to right to enter driveway, jury could believe that negligence of driver of leading car was proximate cause of accident notwithstanding truck driver’s failure to sound horn. Wright v. Clausen, 263 Ky. 298 , 92 S.W.2d 93, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 801 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Court properly instructed jury that plaintiff should use ordinary care in operating his wrecker to avoid colliding with other vehicles, to drive at a reasonable rate of speed, to keep it under reasonable control, to keep a lookout ahead, and before passing truck to give notice of his intention to do so by sounding his horn and not to pass to the right-hand side of the highway until he had cleared the truck. Whitney v. Penick, 281 Ky. 474 , 136 S.W.2d 570, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 1940 ).

When passing a car traveling in the opposite direction or parked on the other half of the road, it is not necessary to sound the horn. Jordon v. Clough, 313 S.W.2d 581, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 271 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Whether a jury issue is presented by so-called “negligence” testimony must depend on the facts of the particular case, including the degree of preponderance of the positive evidence, the likelihood that the witness or witnesses giving the negative evidence would have heard and noticed the horn if it had been sounded, and the interest or disinterest of the respective witnesses. Collett v. Taylor, 383 S.W.2d 692, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 59 ( Ky. 1964 ).

If a witness (whether interested or disinterested) was in a position in which it is likely that he would have heard and noticed a warning signal, and he did not hear it, there is a reasonable basis for the jury to infer that the signal was not given, particularly when the witnesses testifying that it was given are interested and evidence is sufficient to support a finding that it was not sounded and where the failure to sound was defendant’s he is not entitled to a directed verdict. Collett v. Taylor, 383 S.W.2d 692, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 59 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Where proper contributory negligence instruction was given, the failure to sound a horn at the time of passing a turning truck could be found by the jury not to be the proximate cause of the injury and consequently not to bar recovery. Jewell v. Oglesby, 402 S.W.2d 439, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 368 ( Ky. 1966 ).

While operators of motorcycles and bicycles have the same duty to sound their horns in passing another vehicle as is required of operators of automobiles and other motor vehicles, defendant was under no duty to sound his horn for the benefit of persons whom he knew had recently crested a hill and was under no duty to anticipate that bicyclist would stop or slow down to a walk after cresting the hill. Benningfield v. Dixon, 482 S.W.2d 760, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 201 ( Ky. 1972 ).

9.Left Turn.

Where a motorist turned left in front of another motorist trying to pass him from the rear resulting in a collision, the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the passing motorist could fulfill his duty under this section by notice other than sounding his horn such as by signalling with his lights, but this was not reversible error, because the evidence, that the turning motorist’s failure to signal for the required distance before turning was the proximate cause of the accident, was sufficient to sustain the verdict for the passing motorist. Victory Cab Co. v. Watson, 238 S.W.2d 1004, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 831 ( Ky. 1951 ).

The provision of this section prohibiting driving on the left side of the road when approaching the crest of a hill does not apply where the vehicle in question is making a left turn. Tupts v. Judy, 272 S.W.2d 335, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1091 ( Ky. 1954 ) (decision prior to 1962 amendment).

Where defendant attempted a left turn across two lanes of the one-way street, was struck by plaintiff’s car traveling in one of those lanes, and there was evidence that the plaintiff was speeding and that he failed to see the defendant’s turn signal, the jury’s finding that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence was sustained. Simons v. Allen, 309 S.W.2d 775, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 366 ( Ky. 1958 ).

The overtaking vehicle, confronted with a left-turning car ahead, may not proceed as if the left turn and the passing process will be synchronized with the precision of a well-trained drill team. Townsend v. Stamper, 398 S.W.2d 45, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 37 ( Ky. 1965 ).

10.— Into Driveway.

In collision between overtaking and passing automobile and car turning left into driveway, verdict for overtaking driver was sustained by evidence that leading car bore to right as if to permit following automobile to pass and then cut suddenly to left. Challinor v. Axton, 246 Ky. 76 , 54 S.W.2d 600, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 703 ( Ky. 1932 ).

In suit for personal injuries where defendant motorist coming over crest of hill struck defendant making a left turn into his private driveway, and then struck following automobile of plaintiffs, an instruction declaring motorist making left turn guilty of negligence as a matter of law, because he crossed yellow barrier line at crest of hill and failed to heed highway warning sign, was erroneous and in effect a peremptory instruction. Wilburn v. Simons, 302 Ky. 752 , 196 S.W.2d 356, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 744 ( Ky. 1946 ).

This section was not designed to prohibit a person from making a left turn into a driveway and the mere fact of doing so does not constitute negligence. Tupts v. Judy, 272 S.W.2d 335, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1091 ( Ky. 1954 ).

11.Sudden Emergency.

“Sudden emergency” instruction was proper where witness had testified that two cars, one attempting to pass the other, were bearing down upon third car traveling toward them and that the two cars were approximately four or five car lengths away. Van Hoose v. Bryant, 389 S.W.2d 457, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 534 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).

12.Driving Left of Center Line.

Where defendant testified that he traveled 42 feet on left side of highway before making left turn into driveway, it was for the jury to decide whether he had exercised care and executed turn at a reasonably safe angle. Wilburn v. Simons, 302 Ky. 752 , 196 S.W.2d 356, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 744 ( Ky. 1946 ).

Motorist was guilty of negligence as a matter of law in passing highway trucks in violation of subsection (3) (now (4)) of this section but last clear chance doctrine was clearly applicable and a submission should have been made to the jury with proper instructions. Lexington Roller Mills v. Thornberry, 314 Ky. 111 , 234 S.W.2d 491, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 1036 ( Ky. 1950 ).

It is doubtful if evidence authorized an instruction under subsection (3) (now (4)) of this section relating to negligence in passing where neither the car passed nor the oncoming car was involved in the accident but automobile driven by defendant in which plaintiff was guest turned over after passing. Brock v. Pillion, 277 S.W.2d 27, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 457 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Where the defendant passed a car when the plaintiff was approaching so closely from the opposite direction that a sudden emergency was created, the plaintiff was not negligent although he skidded into the defendant’s lane after applying his brakes in an attempt to avoid the emergency. Weichhand v. Garlinger, 447 S.W.2d 606, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 90 ( Ky. 1969 ).

13.Markings by Commissioner of Highways.

Commissioner of highways is authorized under this section to provide markings to indicate that there is an intersection or that motorist is in a no passing zone, but his failure to do so will not relieve motorist of his duty under this section. Garnett v. Hicks, 333 S.W.2d 509, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 193 ( Ky. 1960 ), overruled, Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Ricks, 376 S.W.2d 299, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 443 ( Ky. 1964 ).

14.Roadway of Three or More Lanes.

Where defendant, who was driving north in middle lane of four-lane highway, maintained that plaintiff pedestrian ran directly in front of his car from behind southbound truck, but undisputed evidence was that plaintiff was struck at extreme east edge of pavement, questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury. Smith v. Goodwin, 292 Ky. 37 , 165 S.W.2d 976, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 1942 ).

15.— Middle or Passing Lane.

Where driver of truck collided with approaching truck in its proper lane of traffic, question of whether he violated subsection (5)(a),(b) (now (6)(a),(b)) of this section by not staying within middle or passing lane once he had pulled out into it until he could move out of it into any other lane with reasonable safety was question for the jury. Rucker v. Clark, 239 S.W.2d 80, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 849 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Where all of the proof indicated that the middle or passing lane of a highway was free from all traffic when a motorist entered it and he was rightfully and legally in such middle lane according to all of the proof, the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the motorist could not drive in the middle lane except when overtaking and passing another vehicle where the middle lane was clearly visible and free of traffic within a safe distance. Rucker v. Clark, 239 S.W.2d 80, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 849 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Where driver was in the middle or passing lane, he had a duty to remain there until he could move out of it to another lane with reasonable safety. Rucker v. Clark, 239 S.W.2d 80, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 849 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Instructions covering the usual duties of driving and an instruction that the plaintiff was not to overtake and pass the defendant’s vehicle in the center lane unless the roadway was clearly visible and the center lane was clear to traffic within a safe distance were in accord with the statute. Habich v. Humbert, 446 S.W.2d 567, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 127 ( Ky. 1969 ).

16.— Left-hand Turns.

Where a portion of the city ordinance on left-hand turns conformed to the statutes on left-hand turns, it was not prejudicial to have read that part of the ordinance to the jury, nor to have had an instruction partially based on the ordinance. Habich v. Humbert, 446 S.W.2d 567, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 127 ( Ky. 1969 ).

17.Following Vehicle Too Closely.

Driver of auto may not place his auto so close behind a moving vehicle, in congested traffic, that he cannot stop in time to avoid a collision if the preceding vehicle should suddenly stop. Lyons v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 282 Ky. 106 , 137 S.W.2d 1107, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 137 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Tractor-trailer unit following within 40 feet of a pick-up truck going up hill was negligently operated. Propane Transport Co. v. Edelen, 400 S.W.2d 697, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 452 ( Ky. 1966 ).

Where court gave jury the usual instruction defining the duties of each driver to use ordinary care, to keep a proper lookout and to have car under reasonable control it was not error to fail to give an instruction under subsection (6)(a) (now (8)(a)) of this section since the duty was substantially embodied in the other instructions. Ford v. Robinson, 428 S.W.2d 772, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 725 ( Ky. 1968 ).

18.Bridge.

Where bridge is wide enough for two vehicles to pass in safety, the one reaching the bridge first has no special right of way over the other. Commercial Carriers, Inc. v. Small, 277 Ky. 189 , 126 S.W.2d 143, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 638 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decision prior to 1962 amendment).

Violation of the prohibition against driving on the left side of the road within 100 feet of a bridge does not impose liability where such driving has no causal connection to the accident. Ross v. Jones, 316 S.W.2d 845, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 60 ( Ky. 1958 ) (decision prior to the 1962 amendment).

19.Underpass.

In case involving collision between passenger car and truck in narrow underpass, where there was conflicting evidence as to speed and as to which vehicle entered underpass first, questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury. Foley's Adm'r v. Witt, 294 Ky. 498 , 172 S.W.2d 81, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 485 ( Ky. 1943 ) (decision prior to 1962 amendment).

Underpass which was wide enough to permit passenger vehicles to pass in safety, but not wide enough to permit passenger vehicle and truck to pass, was as a matter of law a one-way underpass. Foley's Adm'r v. Witt, 294 Ky. 498 , 172 S.W.2d 81, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 485 ( Ky. 1943 ) (decision prior to 1962 amendment).

A one-way bridge or underpass is one through which vehicles of lawful width cannot pass with a reasonable margin of safety while being operated at a lawful speed. Foley's Adm'r v. Witt, 294 Ky. 498 , 172 S.W.2d 81, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 485 ( Ky. 1943 ) (decision prior to 1962 amendment).

Where highway passed through one-way underpass, it was not negligence for driver of vehicle to be in center of road rather than on right side. Foley's Adm'r v. Witt, 294 Ky. 498 , 172 S.W.2d 81, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 485 ( Ky. 1943 ) (decision prior to 1962 amendment).

Fact that truck which collided with automobile at night in narrow underpass did not have clearance lights did not excuse driver of automobile of duty to anticipate that approaching vehicle might be of such width as to prevent safe passage, and to reduce his speed accordingly. Foley's Adm'r v. Witt, 294 Ky. 498 , 172 S.W.2d 81, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 485 ( Ky. 1943 ) (decision prior to 1962 amendment).

Narrowing of paved surface and ending of white center line at approach to underpass was notice that it was a one-way underpass. Foley's Adm'r v. Witt, 294 Ky. 498 , 172 S.W.2d 81, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 485 ( Ky. 1943 ) (decision prior to 1962 amendment).

Driver approaching narrow underpass is required to anticipate that approaching vehicle may be truck whose lawful width is such as to prevent vehicles passing in safety. Foley's Adm'r v. Witt, 294 Ky. 498 , 172 S.W.2d 81, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 485 ( Ky. 1943 ) (decision prior to 1962 amendment).

20.Business or Residential District.

In a rear-end collision suit brought by the driver of a tractor-trailer truck against the driver of another tractor-trailer truck, the requirements of subdivision (7)(b) (now (8)(b)) of this section were inapplicable, inasmuch as the trial court took judicial notice of the fact that the location of the accident was in a business or residential district. Chandler v. Edgar W. Long, Inc., 623 F.2d 1139, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 16718 (6th Cir. Ky. 1980 ).

Cited:

Mitchell v. United States, 396 F.2d 650, 1968 U.S. App. LEXIS 6370 (6th Cir. 1968); Asher v. Fox, 134 F. Supp. 27, 1955 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2694 (E.D. Ky. 1955 ); Bilbrey v. Louisville R. Co., 301 Ky. 860 , 192 S.W.2d 177, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 488 ( Ky. 1946 ); Keck v. Manning, 313 Ky. 433 , 231 S.W.2d 604, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 897 ( Ky. 1950 ); Clark v. Finch’s Adm’x, 254 S.W.2d 934, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 1237 ( Ky. 1953 ); Tupts v. Judy, 272 S.W.2d 335, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1091 ( Ky. 1954 ); Crawford Transport Co. v. Wireman, 280 S.W.2d 163, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1955 ); Tennessee Products & Chemical Corp. v. Miller, 282 S.W.2d 52, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 220 (Ky. 1955); V. T. C. Lines, Inc. v. Chappell’s Dairy, Inc., 298 S.W.2d 683, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 381 ( Ky. 1957 ); McCoy v. Carter, 323 S.W.2d 210, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 323 ( Ky. 1959 ); Freeland v. Todd, 379 S.W.2d 723, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 253 ( Ky. 1964 ); West v. Luchesi, 509 S.W.2d 251, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 554 ( Ky. 1974 ); Commonwealth Transp. Cabinet Dep’t of Highways v. Arrow Truck Lines & Transport Indem. Co., 713 S.W.2d 1, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1173 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A school bus may not stop to receive or discharge passengers in a no passing area as defined in this section. OAG 64-23 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

State and federal highways, KRS ch. 177.

Vehicles on limited access highway to stay in proper lane, KRS 177.300 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tribell, Plaintiff’s Violation of a Statute as Affecting Recovery for Negligence — “Proximate Cause,” 41 Ky. L.J. 317 (1953).

Ausness, Torts, 63 Ky. L.J. 753 (1974-1975).

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Automobiles, §§ 16.11, 16.14 — 16.19.

189.345. Prohibitions against driving on left side of roadway.

  1. No vehicle shall be driven on the left side of the roadway under the following conditions:
    1. When approaching or upon the crest of a grade or a curve in the highway where the operator’s view is obstructed within such distance as to create a hazard in the event another vehicle might approach from the opposite direction;
    2. When approaching within one hundred (100) feet of or traversing any intersection or railroad grade crossing;
    3. When the view is obstructed upon approaching within one hundred (100) feet of any bridge, viaduct or tunnel.
  2. The foregoing limitations shall not apply upon a one (1) way roadway, nor when an obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to the left of the center of the highway; provided, any person so doing shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portion of the highway within such distance as to constitute an immediate hazard, nor to the operator of a vehicle turning left into or from an alley, private road or driveway.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 46, § 7, effective June 17, 1978.

189.350. Assistance in passing or overtaking.

  1. The operator of a vehicle about to be overtaken and passed shall give way to the right in favor of the overtaking vehicle if the overtaking vehicle is a motor vehicle.
  2. In all cases of meeting, passing, or overtaking of vehicles such assistance shall be given by the operator and occupants of each vehicle, respectively, to the other as the circumstances reasonably demand, in order to obtain clearance and avoid accidents.

History. 2739g-41, 2739g-43; 1994, ch. 203, § 1, effective July 15, 1994.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Centerline not Absolute Criterion.

Even if it be assumed that automobile was partially to right of centerline that would not have been negligence per se under KRS 189.340(1) since subsection (1) of this section requires the operator of the vehicle being overtaken to “give way to the right” insofar as he is reasonably able to do so and subsection (2) of this section exacts from the operators and occupants of both vehicles the duty of such reciprocal assistance “as the circumstances reasonably demand” and to make the center line of the highway an absolute criterion would destroy the effect of these provisions. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Warfield, 386 S.W.2d 453, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 505 ( Ky. 1965 ).

2.Cooperation of Driver.

The requirement that driver about to be overtaken must give way and cooperate as the circumstances reasonably demand are literally predicated upon receipt of the audible signal required by KRS 189.340(1), but presumably they would apply also if in some other manner the driver being overtaken is or should be aware of the move to pass. Collett v. Taylor, 383 S.W.2d 692, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 59 ( Ky. 1964 ).

The driver of the vehicle being passed may not ignore the passing car and where truck driver increased his speed from 29 or 30 miles an hour to 50 and automobile attempting to pass the truck collided with an approaching automobile the truck driver was negligent in violating this section and was the proximate cause of the accident. Carruba v. Speno, 418 S.W.2d 398, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 210 ( Ky. 1967 ).

3.Negligence.

Where the defendant, before beginning to pass a slowing truck, failed to look in his rearview mirror to see that the southbound lane was clear of other traffic, both before and after, thus forcing a car off the road that had already begun to pass him, regardless of whether that driver had sounded his horn, the evidence was sufficient to justify a finding that the defendant was negligent. Campbell v. Markham, 426 S.W.2d 431, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 644 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Cited:

Tennessee Products & Chemical Corp. v. Miller, 282 S.W.2d 52, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 220 ( Ky. 1955 ); Rowe v. Gibson, 309 S.W.2d 173, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 149 ( Ky. 1957 ); McCoy v. Carter, 323 S.W.2d 210, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 323 ( Ky. 1959 ); Salyer v. Booher, 419 S.W.2d 533, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 152 ( Ky. 1967 ); Barrett v. Stephany, 510 S.W.2d 524, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 552 ( Ky. 1974 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Murray, Instructions In Regard to the Speed of Motor Trucks, A Study In Statutory Interpretation, 34 Ky. L.J. 85 (1946).

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Automobiles, §§ 16.14 — 16.19.

189.360. Passing cars receiving or discharging passengers.

  1. Whenever a car traveling upon rails placed in the center or approximate center of a highway is stopped for the purpose of receiving or discharging passengers, every operator of a vehicle approaching the car from the rear and proceeding in the same direction shall bring his vehicle to a full stop and shall not start up or attempt to pass until the car has finished receiving or discharging passengers.
  2. Where safety isles of reasonable size are established, leaving space between the track and the curb or edge of the highway sufficient for the passage of traffic, overtaking vehicles shall pass between the isle and the curb or edge of the highway, without observing subsection (1).

History. 2739g-46.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Application.

This section which applied primarily to motor vehicles, was inapplicable where streetcar passenger when vestibule door was opened while car was moving stepped out into side of passing truck; his contributory negligence precluded recovery against streetcar company. Twaddell's Adm'r v. South C. & C. S. R. Co., 201 Ky. 97 , 255 S.W. 1027, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 222 ( Ky. 1923 ).

Subsection (1) of this section did not apply where pedestrian alighted from streetcar on tracks, which were not in paved portion of city street but were adjacent thereto, and walked half way across street into path of automobile proceeding in same direction as streetcar. Trout's Adm'r v. Ohio V. E. R. Co., 241 Ky. 144 , 43 S.W.2d 507, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 29 ( Ky. 1931 ).

2.Assault and Battery.

Conviction of assault and battery by unlawfully running taxicab against conductor of standing streetcar was sustained by evidence of excessive speed when passing and failure to give signal of purpose to pass. Pierce v. Commonwealth, 214 Ky. 454 , 283 S.W. 418, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 357 ( Ky. 1926 ).

189.370. Passing stopped school or church bus prohibited — Application to properly marked vehicles — Rebuttable presumption as to identity of violator.

  1. If any school or church bus used in the transportation of children is stopped upon a highway for the purpose of receiving or discharging passengers, with the stop arm and signal lights activated, the operator of a vehicle approaching from any direction shall bring his vehicle to a stop and shall not proceed until the bus has completed receiving or discharging passengers and has been put into motion. The stop requirement provided for in this section shall not apply to vehicles approaching a stopped bus from the opposite direction upon a highway of four (4) or more lanes.
  2. Subsection (1) of this section shall be applicable only when the bus displays the markings and equipment required by Kentucky minimum specifications for school buses.
  3. If any vehicle is witnessed to be in violation of subsection (1) of this section and the identity of the operator is not otherwise apparent, it shall be a rebuttable presumption that the person in whose name the vehicle is registered or leased was the operator of the vehicle at the time of the alleged violation and is subject to the penalties as provided for in KRS 189.990(5).

History. 2739g-46a, 2739g-69l: amend. Acts 1950, ch. 96, § 1; 1960, ch. 123, § 2; 1964, ch. 65, § 3; 1986, ch. 443, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 262, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Purpose.

The Constitution, statute and case law of this state reflect a policy of special protection of minors from injury. Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 235 ( Ky. 1968 ).

2.Bus Driver.
3.— Duty.

School bus driver owes other motorists duty of operating his bus in a careful manner with respect to their safety under KRS 189.290 . Greyhound Corp. v. White, 323 S.W.2d 578, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1958 ).

4.— Negligence.

Where a school bus driver stopped in his left lane a few feet behind a commercial bus which was stopped partially in the right lane and the school bus driver could easily have pulled completely off of the road, the question of whether the school bus driver was negligent should have been submitted to the jury and were it not for the requirement that all motorists stop before passing a school bus and the possibility that the school bus driver, therefore, reasonably thought that any motorist behind him would be prepared to stop when he did, there should have been a directed verdict against the school bus driver in favor of a passenger in a car which hit both buses from behind on slick road. Greyhound Corp. v. White, 323 S.W.2d 578, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1958 ).

5.Negligence of Motorist.

Where a motorist was following a school bus on a slick road, the school bus pulled into the left lane revealing a commercial bus stopped partially in the right lane, the school bus then stopped in the left lane a few feet behind the commercial bus to pick up children, and the motorist slid into both buses, the issue of the motorist’s negligence should have been submitted to the jury in an action by passengers in his automobile. Greyhound Corp. v. White, 323 S.W.2d 578, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1958 ).

6.Involuntary Manslaughter.

Driver who failed to bring his automobile to a complete stop as he approached school bus which had stopped on highway for the purpose of discharging passengers and who passed bus while it was discharging passengers was guilty of involuntary manslaughter when he struck and killed child who had alighted from the bus. Commonwealth v. Mullins, 296 Ky. 190 , 176 S.W.2d 403, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 137 ( Ky. 1943 ).

7.“In use.”

Where truck passed school bus on the left and struck the child, child’s death arose out of the “use” of the school bus, and insurer of the school bus had a duty to defend; until the child had reached the other side of the street safely the school bus had not stopped operating as a school bus in relation to the child. Hartford Ins. Cos. of Am. v. Kentucky Sch. Bds. Ins. Trust, 17 S.W.3d 525, 1999 Ky. App. LEXIS 124 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).

Cited:

Lowe v. Commonwelath, 298 Ky. 7 , 181 S.W.2d 409, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 816 ( Ky. 1944 ); Mackey v. Spradlin, 397 S.W.2d 33, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 52 ( Ky. 1965 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Regardless of whether a bus was marked “school bus” or “church bus” when it was being used to carry children to a church function, a motorist passing such a bus while the bus was stopped for receiving or disembarking passengers, whether or not the bus was “upon a highway,” would be in violation of subsection (1) of this section. OAG 60-1237 .

The provisions of subsection (1) of this section were intended primarily to apply to the passing of a bus which was loading or unloading passengers on the highway. OAG 60-1237 .

Painted stripes between opposite traffic lanes would not fall within the definition of a mountable median. OAG 65-120 .

When a school bus driver has seen a vehicle pass a stopped school bus loading or unloading children, has noted the license number of the vehicle, and has ascertained the name of the registered owner, he has sufficient information to justify making a complaint before a judge against the registered owner and the complaint should not be dismissed without a trial, but unless the prosecution has obtained additional evidence, either direct or circumstantial, identifying the driver of the vehicle at the time of the violation, the court would be justified in dismissing the case without requiring the defendant to make any defense. OAG 79-263 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Murray, Instructions In Regard to the Speed of Motor Trucks, A Study In Statutory Interpretation, 34 Ky. L.J. 85 (1946).

189.375. School or church bus signaling device — Use — Stopping regulated.

No school or church bus shall be licensed or operated for the transportation of school children unless it is equipped with bus alternating flashing signal lamps and a stop arm folding sign. The bus body shall be equipped with a system of four (4) red signal lamps, two (2) on the front and two (2) on the rear of the bus, and four (4) amber signal lamps. Each amber signal lamp shall be located near each red signal lamp, at the same level, but closer to the vertical centerline of the bus. The bus body shall be equipped with a stop arm folding sign on the driver’s side with letters at least six (6) inches in height displaying the word “stop” on both sides. Prior to stopping the school bus for the purpose of receiving or discharging school children, the driver shall activate the amber flashing signal lamps. Once the bus comes to a complete stop, the driver shall extend the stop arm and activate the red flashing signal lights prior to opening the door so it shall be plainly visible to traffic approaching from both directions that the bus is in the process of receiving or discharging passengers. No driver shall stop a school or church bus for receiving or discharging passengers in a no passing zone which does not afford reasonable visibility to approaching motor vehicles from both directions unless a “School Bus Stop Ahead” sign has been installed a reasonable distance before that spot in the roadway. No driver shall stop a school or church bus for the purpose of receiving passengers from or discharging passengers to the opposite side of the road on a highway of four (4) or more lanes; provided, that this provision does not prohibit the discharging of passengers at a marked pedestrian crossing.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 41; 1958, ch. 110, § 1; 1964, ch. 65, § 4; 1986, ch. 443, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 262, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 2006, ch. 173, § 18, effective July 12, 2006.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Bus Driver’s Standard of Care.

A school bus driver is required to exercise the highest degree of care for a child’s safety until the child is on the side of the street where his home is located and is out of danger of injury from passing traffic. Croghan v. Hart County Board of Education, 549 S.W.2d 306, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 658 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Where child was allowed to disembark from school bus on side of highway opposite his home and bus driver failed to use flashing signals or operate stop sign, bus driver and county school board were negligent as a matter of law. Croghan v. Hart County Board of Education, 549 S.W.2d 306, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 658 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A school bus may not stop to receive or discharge passengers in a no passing area as defined in KRS 189.340(4) (now KRS 189.340(5)). OAG 64-23 .

189.377. Yielding right-of-way to solid waste collection service vehicle.

  1. As used in this section, “solid waste collection service vehicle” means a vehicle used by a solid waste collection service provider registered with a county pursuant to KRS 224.43-315 (2).
  2. Upon approaching and passing a stationary solid waste collection service vehicle that is giving a visual signal by alternately displaying flashing yellow, red, white, or amber lights, the operator of the approaching motor vehicle shall yield the right-of- way to the solid waste collection service vehicle or any collection service employees by:
    1. Reducing to, and maintaining, a safe speed for weather, road conditions, and vehicular or pedestrian traffic; and
    2. Proceeding with due care and caution.
  3. This section may be cited as the Slow Down to Get Around Law.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 21, § 1, effective June 29, 2017.

189.378. Funeral processions.

  1. “Funeral procession,” as used in this section, means two (2) or more vehicles accompanying the body of a deceased person when each vehicle has its headlights on or is displaying a pennant attached in such a manner as to be clearly visible to approaching traffic.
  2. A vehicle in a funeral procession has the right-of-way at an intersection and may proceed through the intersection if the procession is led by an escort vehicle displaying flashing yellow, red, or blue lights, except:
    1. When the right-of-way is required by an emergency vehicle as defined by KRS 189.910 ;
    2. When vehicles in the procession are directed otherwise by a police or safety officer; or
    3. When the vehicle is a train or locomotive.
  3. Before assuming the right-of-way, a person who drives a vehicle in a funeral procession shall exercise due caution with regard to crossing traffic.
  4. A person who drives a vehicle that is not part of a funeral procession shall not drive the vehicle between the vehicles of the funeral procession or otherwise interfere with the progress of the procession, except when:
    1. The person is authorized to do so by a police or safety officer; or
    2. The vehicle is an emergency vehicle as defined by KRS 189.910 .
  5. A person who drives a vehicle that is not a part of a funeral procession shall not illuminate the vehicle headlights or engage in any other act for the purpose of securing the right-of-way granted to funeral processions.
  6. The escort vehicle, hearse, or other vehicles in a procession may be equipped with flashing amber lights for the purpose of notifying the general public of the procession and gaining the right-of-way at intersections, or signaling the end of a procession.
  7. Persons authorized to use flashing lights as defined in KRS 189.920 may use them while accompanying a funeral procession to warn traffic that a procession is approaching or that it is in progress.
  8. When a funeral procession is in progress, a person driving a vehicle not in the procession shall not pass or overtake any vehicle in the procession unless:
    1. The person is directed to do so by a police or safety officer;
    2. The procession is on a street, road, or highway outside the corporate limits of a city, town, or urban-county; or
    3. The procession is on an interstate highway or a state parkway.
  9. Any person who violates this section shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 251, § 1, effective July 15, 1996.

189.380. Signals.

  1. A person shall not turn a vehicle or move right or left upon a roadway until the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided.
  2. A signal indicating the intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the motor vehicle before the turn.
  3. A bus driver shall not stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal to traffic following the bus.
  4. All signals required for a motor vehicle shall be given by signal lamps or mechanical signal devices.
  5. A signal required for a vehicle that is not a motor vehicle may be given by either hand signals, signal lamps, or mechanical signal devices. The signal shall be given intermittently for the last fifty (50) feet traveled by the vehicle before the turn.
  6. Hand signals shall be executed in the following manner when operating a vehicle that is not a motor vehicle:
    1. The hand and arm shall be extended horizontally from the left side of the vehicle to indicate a left turn;
    2. The left arm shall be extended horizontally with the hand and arm extended upward from the elbow or the right arm and hand shall be extended horizontally to indicate a right turn;
    3. Either arm shall be extended horizontally with the hand and arm extended downward from the elbow to indicate a stop or decrease in speed.

History. 2739g-50, 2739g-69p: amend. Acts 1950, ch. 54; 1954, ch. 142, § 1; 1960, ch. 123, § 3; 1978, ch. 46, § 6, effective June 17, 1978; 1988, ch. 262, § 3, effective July 15, 1988; 1994, ch. 203, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 327, § 2, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Purpose.

Signal required of operator of turning vehicle is not only for protection of vehicles in rear, but also of all vehicles whose movements may reasonably be affected by change in direction. Lindig v. Breen, 268 Ky. 153 , 103 S.W.2d 941, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 423 ( Ky. 1937 ).

A turn signal can have but one legally-recognized meaning for a vehicle in motion, and that is a turn. Campbell v. Markham, 426 S.W.2d 431, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 644 ( Ky. 1968 ).

2.Duties of Driver.

While a vehicle proceeding in a straight course should be given priority, the plaintiff, as he approached the highway junction intending to follow a straight course, had a duty to keep his automobile under reasonable control, to drive at a reasonable speed, to maintain a lookout for other automobiles and signals and to exercise ordinary care to avoid a collision with a vehicle turning at the junction. Moskowitz v. Peariso, 458 F.2d 240, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 10221 (6th Cir. Ky. 1972 ).

A motorist following another motorist at a distance of about 25 feet at a speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour had a reasonable right to assume that the preceding motorist would, in the event the latter decided to stop or turn, observe his duty under this section to properly indicate his intention. Berry v. Jorris, 303 Ky. 799 , 199 S.W.2d 616, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 562 ( Ky. 1947 ).

Subsection (1) of this section imposes a double duty on a driver who wants to change the direction of his vehicle. He must first ascertain that his movement can be made with reasonable safety and then he must give a signal to drivers of other vehicles of his intention to change direction. Kentucky Bus Lines, Inc. v. Wilson, 258 S.W.2d 486, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 843 ( Ky. 1953 ).

Once a driver had signaled a left turn and then changed his mind and swerved back on to his right side of the road and stopped or slowed almost to a stop, it was necessary that he make known his change of intention in compliance with this section. McCoy v. Carter, 323 S.W.2d 210, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 323 ( Ky. 1959 ).

An instruction that the plaintiff driver should have his motor vehicle under reasonable control and should keep a reasonable lookout ahead, although irrelevant because negligence claim was predicated on violation of other statutory duties, was not error. Lockridge v. Mercer, 438 S.W.2d 486, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 151 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Drivers are under a duty not to turn their vehicles from a direct course upon the highway by changing lanes until such movement can be made with reasonable safety. Yellow Cab Co. v. Crume, 552 S.W.2d 662, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 727 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Drivers have a duty to maintain a lookout ahead and to the rear in attempting to change from the left to the right lane of traffic and it is up to the jury to determine whether a driver was acting in a reasonably prudent manner when he looked in his rearview mirror rather than looking out ahead immediately before a collision. Yellow Cab Co. v. Crume, 552 S.W.2d 662, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 727 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

3.— Turns.

Instruction imposing on truck driver duty to give signals in any and all events regardless of whether movement of car might reasonably affect operation of another, imposed greater burden upon truck driver than statute required. Lehr v. Fenton Dry Cleaning & Dyeing Co., 258 Ky. 663 , 80 S.W.2d 831, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 220 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Operator contemplating turn or change of course must look, and if he sees anyone to whom to give signal, he must do so; but he need not give signal if contemplated turn or change of course will not affect anyone. Cook v. Gillespie, 259 Ky. 281 , 82 S.W.2d 347, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 307 ( Ky. 1935 ).

This section places a duty upon a driver about to change the course of his vehicle to see that there is sufficient space for the turn to be made in safety and to give a proper signal if it appears that the movement of another vehicle may reasonably be affected. Stockdale v. Eads, 314 Ky. 384 , 235 S.W.2d 998, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 661 ( Ky. 1951 ).

The driver of a vehicle is under no duty to give a signal under this section if no vehicle is in sight which might reasonably be affected by the change in direction. Stockdale v. Eads, 314 Ky. 384 , 235 S.W.2d 998, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 661 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Where cars approach an intersection from opposite directions and the one which reaches the intersection first intends to make a left turn, the right of way of the car turning and the duty of the other car to yield the right-of-way are secondary to the duty of the turning car to signal his intent to turn. Zogg v. O'Bryan, 314 Ky. 821 , 237 S.W.2d 511, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 757 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Signals required under this statute need not be given unless the movement of another vehicle might reasonably be affected by the failure to do so and if an approaching vehicle is not in sight when a turn to the right or left on a highway is made, the flashing of the turn indicator would be a futile gesture. Adams v. Feck, 303 S.W.2d 287, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 247 ( Ky. 1957 ).

This section requires a driver to ascertain whether a turn can be made with reasonable safety and to give a proper signal for distance of 100 feet before turning. Riley v. Thomas, 310 S.W.2d 49, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 370 ( Ky. 1958 ).

An implicit requirement in this section is that the operator keep a lookout ahead in order to ascertain if he can make his turn with reasonable safety. Jackson v. Shipley, 312 S.W.2d 627, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 237 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Where instruction as to duties under subsections (1) and (2) of this section was given with respect to driver of lead car it was not error to refuse to give the same instruction as to driver of following car since the requirement to signal before changing lanes has no application to the following car. Ford v. Robinson, 428 S.W.2d 772, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 725 ( Ky. 1968 ).

The statute imposes a continuing duty on a motorist, after giving his signal, to observe traffic conditions both fore and aft up to the time of actual turning. Lockridge v. Mercer, 438 S.W.2d 486, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 151 ( Ky. 1968 ).

4.— — Left Turn.

Arm signal for left-hand turn is for benefit of other vehicles and does not apply where automobile making left turn struck pedestrian. Jefferson's Adm'x v. Baker, 232 Ky. 98 , 22 S.W.2d 448, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 399 ( Ky. 1929 ).

Driver of automobile was not liable for making left turn into side road without having sufficient space therefor, where uncontradicted evidence was that there was sufficient space and evidence indicated that collision occurred because driver of trailing car disregarded signal given by driver of leading car and sought to pass to his left. White v. McClintock-Field Co., 242 Ky. 688 , 47 S.W.2d 527, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 346 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Motorist was entitled to make left turn across highway when other car was approaching, and could assume that other car was not being driven at speed greater than was reasonable and proper. Rutherford v. Smith, 284 Ky. 592 , 145 S.W.2d 533, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 548 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Evidence that plaintiff was driving at more than 40 miles per hour in a congested area justified finding by jury that he was contributorily negligent in collision with approaching automobile which turned to the left across the road in front of plaintiff’s car. Hilsenrad v. Bowling, 292 Ky. 368 , 166 S.W.2d 847, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 96 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Where a driver approaching an intersection through which he had the right-of-way saw a bus about 80 feet from the intersection coming toward the intersection from the opposite direction and also having the right-of-way, thought the bus was going to stop at the intersection, and made a left turn in the intersection colliding with the bus which was about in the middle of the intersection at the time of impact, the driver was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Louisville Transit Co. v. Gipe, 277 S.W.2d 52, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 464 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Where one motorist attempted to pass another within 100 feet of an intersection, the other attempted a left turn at the intersection, and they collided, both were guilty of negligence contributing to the accident and neither should recover. Garnett v. Hicks, 333 S.W.2d 509, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 193 ( Ky. 1960 ), overruled, Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Ricks, 376 S.W.2d 299, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 443 ( Ky. 1964 ).

When there is nothing to prevent a left turning driver from observing the imminent approach of a vehicle which is traveling in a straight course, the left turning driver is negligent as a matter of law when a collision results. Covington v. Friend Tractor & Motor Co., 547 S.W.2d 771, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 634 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

The driver of an automobile seeking to make a left turn across the projected path of oncoming traffic must yield the right-of-way unless and until it appears to him in the exercise of ordinary care that the left turn can be made in reasonable safety. Covington v. Friend Tractor & Motor Co., 547 S.W.2d 771, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 634 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

5.— — — Failure to Signal.

Driver who signaled intention only 50 feet before making left turn across highway was guilty of negligence per se. Rutherford v. Smith, 284 Ky. 592 , 145 S.W.2d 533, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 548 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Whether motorist making left turn to enter intersecting street was guilty of negligence proximately causing collision was jury question, where evidence showed that he was going about 12 miles per hour and extended arm when about 50 feet before making turn and that oncoming car was going about 70 miles an hour and struck rear of his automobile. Rutherford v. Smith, 284 Ky. 592 , 145 S.W.2d 533, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 548 ( Ky. 1940 ).

In action against motorist for alleged negligence in making left turn across highway, in which motorist filed counterclaim, favorable verdict on counterclaim showed that his negligence in not giving signal at proper distance before making turn was not proximate cause of collision. Rutherford v. Smith, 284 Ky. 592 , 145 S.W.2d 533, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 548 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Contributory negligence of driver of automobile following other car barred recovery as matter of law, where driver was going at 35 to 50 miles per hour when following other car which was slowing down to turn into side street, and where, without slackening speed, he attempted to pass it, and collided with oncoming truck, despite some evidence that motorist in other car did not give signal of intention to turn. Peden's Adm'r v. Reynolds, 287 Ky. 641 , 154 S.W.2d 708, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 595 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Where the evidence established that the defendant’s driver turned to left across highway without maintaining a proper lookout or proper signal, and at a time when plaintiff’s oncoming car was but 80 feet away, the proximate cause of the collision with the approaching car was the negligence of the defendant’s driver, notwithstanding plaintiff’s possible violation of the federal speed limit. Davis v. Kunkle, 302 Ky. 258 , 194 S.W.2d 513, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 653 ( Ky. 1946 ).

In an action for personal injuries, where motorist coming over crest of hill struck defendant’s automobile making a left turn across highway into private driveway, and subsequently struck plaintiff’s automobile following defendant, conflicting evidence as to whether defendant gave proper signal for making turn and whether his failure, if any, to give signal was the proximate cause of the collision, was for the jury. Wilburn v. Simons, 302 Ky. 752 , 196 S.W.2d 356, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 744 ( Ky. 1946 ).

Where a motorist turned left in front of another motorist trying to pass him from the rear, resulting in a collision, the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the passing motorist could fulfill his duty under KRS 189.340 by notice other than sounding his horn, such as by signaling with his lights. However, this was not reversible error, because the evidence that the turning motorist’s failure to signal for the required distance before turning was the proximate cause of the accident and was sufficient to sustain the verdict for the passing motorist. Victory Cab Co. v. Watson, 238 S.W.2d 1004, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 831 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Instruction that if defendant manifested an intention to make a left turn by getting over on the left side of the road and then abandoned making such a movement and returned wholly to his right side, he was obligated under this section to give the statutory signal before turning back to the right, and, also, not to stop his vehicle abruptly immediately in front of another vehicle was not error. McCoy v. Carter, 323 S.W.2d 210, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 323 ( Ky. 1959 ).

In an action for personal injuries and property damage by automobile driver and her passenger, defendant truck driver was entitled to a directed verdict where the automobile driver had stopped on the right-hand side of the road directly opposite a private driveway and then turned left across the highway directly in front of the truck approaching from the opposite direction since the truck driver had the right to assume that the automobile driver would give a signal if she was going to turn left and would not violate this section by turning until she could do so with reasonable safety. Hollar v. Harrison, 323 S.W.2d 219, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 324 ( Ky. 1959 ).

Question of contributory negligence in observing presence of motorist and giving left turn signal was for jury where plaintiff truck driver was making left turn into junk yard and motorist who was attempting to pass truck collided with it. Collett v. Taylor, 383 S.W.2d 692, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 59 ( Ky. 1964 ).

6.— — — Reasonable Safety.

Although he has signaled his intention to make a left turn, a motorist may make such a turn only when it may be done in reasonable safety, thus where a motorist so signaled then turned in front of a truck which hit his car and then ran into a building damaging both vehicles, the building, and injuring an occupant of the building and the only negligence alleged against the truck driver was his failure to steer around the motorist, the trial court erred in not directing the verdict in favor of the truck driver and owner as against the motorist and other injured parties. Smith v. Sizemore, 300 S.W.2d 225, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 442 ( Ky. 1957 ).

Where driver testified he first observed approaching car when it came over a rise 1,000 feet away and that it then looked to him to be going at a “pretty fast rate of speed” he must have known he could not venture a left turn with reasonable safety. Wandling v. Wandling, 357 S.W.2d 857, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 150 ( Ky. 1962 ).

In action based on collision between car passing another which was making left turn, instruction requiring that operator refrain from turning vehicle until turn could be made with reasonable safety, should be given. Salyer v. Booher, 419 S.W.2d 533, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 152 ( Ky. 1967 ).

The plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law in turning across the defendant’s lane of traffic when the defendant was so close that the turn could not be made with reasonable safety. Hall v. King, 432 S.W.2d 394, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 324 ( Ky. 1968 ).

The defendant driver was negligent where he began a left turn, stopped because a car following him started to pass him and then completed the turn although he knew a car was approaching him when he first began the turn. Gentry v. Peak, 436 S.W.2d 785, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 488 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Where testimony of witnesses indicated that left-turning motorist’s view of oncoming vehicle was obstructed by other vehicles in left-hand lane of oncoming traffic and that oncoming automobile was in that left-hand lane until it neared the intersection at which time it moved to the right-hand lane, left-turning motorist did not breach her duty to see that her turn could be made with reasonable safety. Compton v. Johnson, 522 S.W.2d 448, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 135 ( Ky. 1975 ).

Although subsection (1) of this section enjoins a driver from turning a vehicle to the right or left “until such movement can be made with reasonable safety,” this duty is not absolute in the sense that any collision itself proves conclusively that the turn could not be made with reasonable safety. Mason v. Keltner, 854 S.W.2d 780, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 199 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

7.— — Right Turn.

Holding out right arm from jeep 25 feet before right turn could not be considered to have complied with this section and to have been sufficient to have given overtaking vehicle clear chance to avoid collision with turning vehicle. Riley v. Thomas, 310 S.W.2d 49, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 370 ( Ky. 1958 ).

8.— — U-turn.

Under subsection (2) of this section motorist before making U-turn should see that movement could be made in safety and, if it appeared that operation of other car might reasonably be affected, should give plainly visible signals by use of arm or of electrical or mechanical device. Marsee v. Bates, 235 Ky. 60 , 29 S.W.2d 632, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1930 ).

9.— — Control of Vehicle.

The jury could determine from the evidence, although certain portions of it were in conflict, that plaintiff acted as an ordinarily prudent man in the operation of his vehicle in the face of the extraordinary hazard with which he was confronted when he drove into a curve and was suddenly confronted by an automobile stopped for highway construction. Adams Constr. Corp. v. Short, 324 S.W.2d 118, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 352 ( Ky. 1959 ) (decided under prior law).

10.— — Reasonable Space.

Before turning his automobile driver must see that there is sufficient space to make such turn in safety, and, if jury believes that operation of another vehicle would reasonably be affected, he must give visible signal of intention to turn by extending arm. Mendel v. Dorman, 202 Ky. 29 , 258 S.W. 936, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 659 ( Ky. 1924 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

11.Duties of Other Drivers.

In rear-end collision, where leading automobile started to pass car ahead but desisted and sought to regain position, following bus driver was not exculpated as matter of law, since, even if motorist checked speed, and did not signal before turning back, bus driver was required to operate carefully, including regulation of speed. Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Saunders, 229 Ky. 284 , 17 S.W.2d 233, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 758 ( Ky. 1929 ).

Where statute imposes duties upon operators to give signals relative to turning, stopping, or changing course, the operators of trailing or approaching vehicles must heed such signals. Wright v. Clausen, 253 Ky. 498 , 69 S.W.2d 1062, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 712 ( Ky. 1934 ). See Cook v. Gillespie, 259 Ky. 281 , 82 S.W.2d 347, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 307 ( Ky. 1935 ).

A driver is under no duty to foresee that the driver directly ahead may suddenly slow down or stop without first giving the statutory signal, but he must use ordinary care to avoid striking the automobile ahead. Vinson v. Kissinger's Adm'r, 274 Ky. 606 , 119 S.W.2d 628, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 296 ( Ky. 1938 ).

12.Traveling in Own Lane.

Under this section and KRS 189.300 a driver is not authorized by law to travel in other than his own lane without showing that he was passing or forced out and instruction that “It was his (Sensen, the truck driver’s) duty not to pull to the left of the highway after James H. Devore in driving his car had started to pass until said Devore had passed, if you believe he did so attempt to pass” was not erroneous. Carnation Co. v. Devore, 252 S.W.2d 860, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 1026 ( Ky. 1952 ).

An instruction authorizing plaintiff’s recovery, if the plaintiff, who turned into the left lane to pass a tractor and was hit from behind by defendant, had been driving in the left lane for a sufficient distance for the defendant in the exercise of ordinary care to avoid him, properly presented the question of whether the plaintiff had made his move to the left lane with reasonable safety. Weaver v. Caudill, 375 S.W.2d 712, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 432 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Even if this section was intended to cover deviations of direction in one’s own lane of traffic, an instruction given under subsections (1) and (2) of this section requiring a minor bicycle rider “to exercise ordinary care not to turn his bicycle from a direct course upon the highway unless and until such movement could be made with reasonable safety and not to turn his bicycle to the left if any other vehicle could be affected by such movement without giving a signal to turn left by extending his hand and arm horizontally for at least the last 100 feet traveled by his bicycle before turning” was prejudicial where the bicycle rider admittedly was in his own lane of traffic, close to the shoulder of the road and had no statutory warning of the approach of automobile when accident happened. Lareau v. Trader, 403 S.W.2d 265, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 7 ( Ky. 1965 ).

13.Pedestrians.

Where a plaintiff pedestrian was struck by defendant’s motor vehicle as it made a left turn while he was crossing the street in compliance with the automatic traffic signal, a verdict should have been directed for the plaintiff. Railway Express Agency v. Bailey, 310 Ky. 781 , 220 S.W.2d 997, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 946 ( Ky. 1949 ).

Where pedestrian was not guilty of any negligence nor was accident unavoidable he was entitled to a directed verdict except as to damages and on appeal, court could not consider lower court’s instructions concerning hand signals and sounding horn. Railway Express Agency v. Bailey, 310 Ky. 781 , 220 S.W.2d 997, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 946 ( Ky. 1949 ).

Operator of motor vehicle was not required to sound his horn before making a left turn where no pedestrian would be affected. Victory Cab Co. v. Watson, 238 S.W.2d 1004, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 831 ( Ky. 1951 ).

14.Failure to Signal.

Failure of driver to signal continuously for the last 100 feet before turning to the left across the highway was negligence, but where there was evidence that approaching car with which she collided was 600 feet away when she started the turn, and that the approaching car was traveling at an excessive rate of speed, the question whether her negligence was the proximate cause of the collision was for the jury. Hilsenrad v. Bowling, 292 Ky. 368 , 166 S.W.2d 847, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 96 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Technical negligence of defendant driver in failing to comply with the requirement of this section of giving left-turn signal a full 100 feet before reaching intersection was not the proximate cause of truck jackknifing into front of store. Sanders Trucking Co. v. King, 313 Ky. 29 , 230 S.W.2d 87, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 801 ( Ky. 1950 ).

Where truck driver was attempting to pass defendant’s automobile within 100 feet of an intersection when defendant signalled her intent to turn left about 15 to 20 feet before reaching the intersection, the truck driver sounded his horn and attempted to return to the right-hand lane, thus losing control of the truck causing it to crash into a building, and the defendant continued straight through the intersection, the negligence of the truck driver was the primary cause of the accident. Sanders Trucking Co. v. King, 313 Ky. 29 , 230 S.W.2d 87, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 801 ( Ky. 1950 ).

Circuit court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of marijuana and cocaine seized during a traffic stop, because a police officer had probable cause for the traffic stop based upon defendant’s failure to signal a lane change in violation of KRS 189.380 . Commonwealth v. Fowler, 409 S.W.3d 355, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 187 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

15.Stopping.

Stopping automobile without first ascertaining whether movement of other vehicles, including following truck, would reasonably be affected would be negligence, precluding recovery unless driver of following truck, who owed duty of lookout, saw or should have seen the peril to car ahead in time to avoid injuring it by exercising ordinary care. Jellico Grocery Co. v. Biggs, 252 Ky. 827 , 68 S.W.2d 429, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 870 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Where defendant brought her car to abrupt stop on highway, at point where there had been a wreck and a car overturned on the edge of the highway, without any signal of her intention to do so and plaintiff’s truck being unable to go to the left of defendant’s car as another vehicle was approaching from the opposite direction was forced in order to avoid a collision to run off the right side of the road thereby overturning the truck facts did not show emergency requiring defendant to stop suddenly without giving signal. Fahrenholtz v. Loomis, 280 Ky. 9 , 132 S.W.2d 307, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 49 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Where plaintiff’s claim was that defendant backed his truck into plaintiff’s auto after stopping on hill, trial court had no duty to instruct jury as to defendant’s duty to signal his intention to stop, since failure to signal could not have been cause of collision. Vale v. Illinois Pipe Line Co., 281 Ky. 1 , 134 S.W.2d 940, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 2 ( Ky. 1 939 ).

In action for injuries arising out of a motor vehicular accident allegedly caused by the defendant operating his car from the berm of a highway into the path of the plaintiff’s car causing the plaintiff to lose control, the trial court erred in directing the verdict against the defendant where he testified that he was 700 feet in front of the plaintiff’s car when he pulled onto the traveled portion of the highway and the driver of the plaintiff’s car admitted seeing defendant’s car by the road and that she knew that he would drive back onto the road after he picked up a passenger. Hargis v. Noel, 310 Ky. 542 , 221 S.W.2d 94, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 969 ( Ky. 1949 ).

Where there was conflict in the evidence as to whether a “stop” signal was flashed on the rear of defendant’s car as it was brought to a stop, an instruction requiring defendant to stop for bus could not have been prejudicial to plaintiff. Davis v. McFarland, 265 S.W.2d 66, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 718 ( Ky. 1954 ).

Taillights activated by the sudden application of brakes are not an appropriate warning of the intention to stop suddenly for the sole purpose of aiding a pedestrian. Hainline v. Hukill, 383 S.W.2d 353, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 35 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Where motorist on approaching heavily traveled expressway stopped, then moved forward a short distance before stopping again, he was not required to give a hand signal, and operator of vehicle colliding with rearend of auto when so stopped was negligent. Massingille v. Meridith, 408 S.W.2d 209, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 92 ( Ky. 1966 ).

16.Decreasing Speed.

In sudden emergencies, acts which might violate normal duties are not always negligent acts and where automobile made a sudden right turn without a signal and car behind it slowed down and pulled into passing lane to avoid striking it and car behind second car suddenly slowed without giving a signal as required by subsection (3) of this section and was struck in the rear by a tractor-trailer the truck driver was not negligent as a matter of law and the question of whether there was causative negligence should have been submitted to the jury. Lucas v. Davis, 409 S.W.2d 297, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 54 ( Ky. 1966 ).

17.Methods of Signalling.

Fines paid by truck operator for failing to have truck equipped with turn signals were deductible from gross income as ordinary and necessary business expense where statute was later construed as not requiring the mechanical device if truck driver gave a hand signal since the allowance would not frustrate any clearly defined public policy. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 818, 1955 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2659 (M.D. Tenn. 1955), aff'd, 241 F.2d 459, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 4296 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1957).

Signals required by this section may be given either by hand or by automatic signals, thus the trial court erred in giving an instruction that a hand signal was required without also stating that an automatic light signal was sufficient. Ellis v. McCubbins, 312 Ky. 837 , 229 S.W.2d 992, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 787 ( Ky. 1950 ).

The signal to turn or stop required by this section may be given by either hand and arm or by an electrical device; both are not required. Anderson v. Shields, 314 Ky. 228 , 234 S.W.2d 739, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 1064 ( Ky. 1950 ).

18.Instructions.

In head-on collision case where evidence whether accident happened on curve was conflicting, instruction following words of statute and imposing duty on driver to give warning if he was approaching a curve or obstruction to view of distance ahead of at least 150 feet was proper. Berryman v. Worthington, 240 Ky. 756 , 43 S.W.2d 5, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 490 ( Ky. 1931 ) (decided under prior law).

If defendant wished instruction upon statute requiring certain signals before turning if movement of other vehicles would reasonably be affected, he should have requested it, in view of plaintiff’s evidence that no car was in sight when turn was made. Sweazy v. King, 248 Ky. 432 , 58 S.W.2d 659, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 255 ( Ky. 1933 ).

In action involving overtaking and passing cars instruction on turning signals by leading car was erroneous, where it assumed that leading car had commenced to turn, but did not submit issue that turn had not started when collision occurred. Perkins v. Stevenson, 268 Ky. 692 , 105 S.W.2d 832, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 518 ( Ky. 1937 ).

Where the instruction qualified the statutory designation of acceptable signals by the phrase “other than the stop lights on the rear of an automobile which are normally activated by pressure upon the brake pedal,” such qualification was too restrictive and not proper. Sorg v. Purvis, 487 S.W.2d 943, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 97 ( Ky. 1972 ).

The words, “unless and until” in subsection (1) of this section should be phrased in the instructions as “unless and until it appeared to him in the exercise of ordinary care that such movement could be made with reasonable safety”. Compton v. Johnson, 522 S.W.2d 448, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 135 ( Ky. 1975 ).

In action brought by passenger in oncoming vehicle against left-turning motorist for injuries sustained in automobile accident, instruction to the jury that left-turning motorist’s duty was not to make the turn if it reasonably appeared that the movement might affect the movement of the oncoming vehicle was not erroneous. Compton v. Johnson, 522 S.W.2d 448, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 135 ( Ky. 1975 ).

19.Standard of Care.

Whether a change of course can be executed by the motorist with reasonable safety is to be judged by the standard of ordinary care. Compton v. Johnson, 522 S.W.2d 448, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 135 ( Ky. 1975 ).

Cited:

Miles v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 728, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3860 (W.D. Ky. 1962 ); Crawford Transport Co. v. Wireman, 280 S.W.2d 163, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1955 ); Davidson v. Moore, 340 S.W.2d 227, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 23 ( Ky. 1960 ); Smather v. May, 379 S.W.2d 230, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 223 ( Ky. 1964 ); Brown v. Todd, 425 S.W.2d 737, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 433 ( Ky. 1968 ); Grimes v. Kulmer, 454 S.W.2d 685, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 283 ( Ky. 1970 ); Stunson v. Easley, 469 S.W.2d 58, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 287 ( Ky. 1971 ); West v. Luchesi, 509 S.W.2d 251, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 554 ( Ky. 1974 ); Charlton v. Jacobs, 619 S.W.2d 498, 1981 Ky. App. LEXIS 265 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city could install “traffic bumps” on residential streets as a traffic measure so long as they do not constitute a nuisance or a traffic hazard. OAG 60-69 .

189.390. Speed — Secretary authorized to increase speed limit in certain areas by official order — Parking.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context requires otherwise:
    1. “Business district” means the territory contiguous to and including a highway if, within six hundred (600) feet along the highway, there are buildings in use for business or industrial purposes that occupy three hundred (300) feet of frontage on one (1) side or three hundred (300) feet collectively on both sides of the highway;
    2. “Residential district” means the territory contiguous to and including a highway not comprising a business district if the property on the highway for a distance of three hundred (300) feet or more is improved with residences or residences and buildings in use for business; and
    3. “State highway” means a highway or street maintained by the Kentucky Department of Highways.
  2. An operator of a vehicle upon a highway shall not drive at a greater speed than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for the traffic and for the condition and use of the highway.
  3. The speed limit for motor vehicles on state highways shall be as follows, unless conditions exist that require lower speed for compliance with subsection (2) of this section, or the secretary of the Transportation Cabinet establishes a different speed limit in accordance with subsection (4) of this section:
    1. Sixty-five (65) miles per hour on interstate highways and parkways;
    2. Fifty-five (55) miles per hour on all other state highways; and
    3. Thirty-five (35) miles per hour in a business or residential district.
    1. If the secretary of transportation determines, upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation, that any speed limit is greater or less than is reasonable or safe under the conditions found to exist at any intersection, or upon any part of a state highway, the secretary of transportation may establish by official order a reasonable and safe speed limit at the location. The secretary shall not increase any speed limit established by subsection (3) of this section in excess of sixty-five (65) miles per hour, except that, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (3)(a) of this section, the secretary may increase the speed limit on any of the following segments of highway to seventy (70) miles per hour: (4) (a) If the secretary of transportation determines, upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation, that any speed limit is greater or less than is reasonable or safe under the conditions found to exist at any intersection, or upon any part of a state highway, the secretary of transportation may establish by official order a reasonable and safe speed limit at the location. The secretary shall not increase any speed limit established by subsection (3) of this section in excess of sixty-five (65) miles per hour, except that, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (3)(a) of this section, the secretary may increase the speed limit on any of the following segments of highway to seventy (70) miles per hour:
      1. Interstate 24 (entire length);
      2. Interstate 64 from Interstate 264 to the West Virginia state line;
      3. Interstate 65 from Interstate 264 to the Tennessee state line;
      4. Interstate 69 (entire length);
      5. Interstate 71 from Interstate 264 to Interstate 275;
      6. Interstate 75 from the Tennessee state line to Interstate 275;
      7. Interstate 165 (entire length);
      8. The Audubon Parkway (entire length);
      9. The Julian M. Carroll Purchase Parkway (entire length);
      10. The Bert T. Combs Mountain Parkway (entire length);
      11. The Bert T. Combs Mountain Parkway Extension (entire length);
      12. The Edward T. Breathitt Pennyrile Parkway (entire length);
      13. The Wendell H. Ford Western Kentucky Parkway (entire length);
      14. The Louie B. Nunn Cumberland Expressway (entire length);
      15. The Martha Layne Collins Bluegrass Parkway (entire length); and
      16. The William H. Natcher Parkway (entire length).
    2. In a highway work zone, the Transportation Cabinet may temporarily reduce established speed limits without an engineering or traffic investigation. A speed limit established under this paragraph shall become effective when and where posted. The Transportation Cabinet shall post signs notifying the traveling public of the temporary highway work zone maximum speed limit. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prevent the Transportation Cabinet from using moveable or portable speed limit signs in highway work zones.
    1. A city or a county may by ordinance establish speed limits within its own jurisdiction, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection. (5) (a) A city or a county may by ordinance establish speed limits within its own jurisdiction, except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection.
    2. The alteration of speed limits on state highways within a city or a county shall not be effective until the alteration has been approved by the secretary of transportation. The secretary shall not approve any alteration that could increase any speed limit established by subsection (3)(b) or (c) of this section in excess of fifty-five (55) miles per hour.
    3. If a county determines, upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation and study, that it is unsafe to park motor vehicles on or along any highway, other than a state highway, within the unincorporated areas of the county, or that in any business district the congestion of traffic justifies a reasonable limitation on the length of time any one (1) motor vehicle is permitted to park in such district so as to reduce the congestion, the fiscal court may by ordinance establish “no parking” areas on the highway, or limit the length of time any motor vehicle may be parked in any business district.
  4. The speed limit for motor vehicles in an off-street parking facility offered for public use, whether publicly or privately owned, shall be fifteen (15) miles per hour.
  5. A person shall not drive a motor vehicle at a speed that will impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law.
  6. In every charge for a violation of any speed limit specified in this section, the warrant or citation shall specify the speed at which the defendant is alleged to have driven, and the lawful speed limit applicable at the location where the violation is charged to have occurred.

History. 2739g-43, 2739g-51, 2739g-86: amend. Acts 1950, ch. 97, § 1; 1954, ch. 143, § 1; 1962, ch. 150; 1964, ch. 13, § 1; 1966, ch. 18, § 4; 1970, ch. 93, § 10; 1974, ch. 46, § 2; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(10); 1978, ch. 230, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1988, ch. 177, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1992, ch. 143, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 37, § 4, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 130, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 43, § 1, effective June 26, 2007; 2012, ch. 25, § 1, effective July 12, 2012; 2019 ch. 168, § 1, effective June 27, 2019; 2021 ch. 186, § 3, effective June 29, 2021.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

This section was also amended in the reviser’s bill, Acts 1978, ch. 384, sec. 336, however, Acts 1978, ch. 230, HB 211, sec. 1 prevailed. See KRS 7.136(3).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Prior to the 1950 amendment speed in excess of the statutory limitation was prima facie evidence of unreasonable and improper driving and all the following annotations should be read with this in mind.

1.Constitutionality.

Law fixing speed limit of trucks at less than that of automobiles was not discriminatory and unconstitutional, there being reasonable basis for classification. Fenton Dry Cleaning & Dyeing Co. v. Hamilton, 226 Ky. 580 , 11 S.W.2d 409, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 129 ( Ky. 1928 ).

The regulation of speed of motortrucks and semitrailers by this section was not unconstitutional. Whitney v. Fife, 270 Ky. 434 , 109 S.W.2d 832, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 87 ( Ky. 1937 ).

Subsections 189.390(3)-(5), which define the maximum reasonable speed on specific sections of road and outline the procedure under which those limits might be altered, provide citizens with fair notice of the conduct they proscribe and do not encourage arbitrary enforcement. Commonwealth v. Curry, 607 S.W.3d 618, 2020 Ky. LEXIS 293 ( Ky. 2020 ).

Subsections 189.390(3)-(5), which define the maximum reasonable speed on specific sections of road and outline the procedure under which those limits might be altered, pass constitutional muster regardless of whether the court engages in as-applied or facial review. Commonwealth v. Curry, 607 S.W.3d 618, 2020 Ky. LEXIS 293 ( Ky. 2020 ).

2.Construction.

This section did not affect the basic rule that each driver must exercise ordinary care. Meriweather's Adm'x v. Pickering, 273 Ky. 367 , 116 S.W.2d 670, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 643 ( Ky. 1938 ).

The word “city” does not include counties. Fayette County v. Hill, 304 Ky. 621 , 201 S.W.2d 886, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 688 ( Ky. 1947 ).

This section cannot be construed to mean that under certain favorable conditions the speed limit may be exceeded without violating the statute. Bumpus v. Drinkard's Adm'x, 279 S.W.2d 4, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 497 ( Ky. 1955 ).

3.Reasonable Speed.

The operator of a car, with its lights on low beam, is required to drive at a rate of speed that would enable him to avoid a collision with other vehicles on the highway, coming within the range of his lights 100 feet distance. Johnson v. Hunt, 122 F. Supp. 816, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3318 (D. Ky. 1954 ).

This section does not give carte blanche to any rate of speed; but it prescribes that rate shall be reasonable having regard to traffic and use of highway, and that speed exceeding stated rate on highways outside of closely built-up sections of city shall throw burden of showing its reasonableness on driver. Kappa v. Brewer, 207 Ky. 61 , 268 S.W. 831, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 15 ( Ky. 1925 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

This statute does not fix any speed limit other than to make it unlawful to drive at speed greater than is reasonable having regard to traffic conditions, but it does provide that speed exceeding stated rate in residential section of city shall be prima facie evidence of improper driving, thus imposing upon one driving at excessive speed, burden of proving that such speed did not produce the injury. Wight v. Rose, 209 Ky. 803 , 273 S.W. 472, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 605 ( Ky. 1925 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

Under provisions of law forbidding speed greater than reasonable and proper in view of traffic conditions and providing that speed on highway outside closely built up business section of city in excess of certain speed should be prima facie evidence of unreasonable and improper driving, motorist, on meeting horseback rider near hillcrest, did not have absolute right to travel at such speed. Fullenwider v. Brawner, 224 Ky. 274 , 6 S.W.2d 264, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 592 ( Ky. 1928 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

Law providing that speed in excess of 45 miles per hour in area outside of closely built up business section of city was prima facie evidence of unreasonable and improper driving did not authorize as reasonable and proper any rate of speed less than maximum mentioned therein, but what constitutes reasonable rate is for jury from circumstances shown. Summers v. Spivey's Adm'r, 241 Ky. 213 , 43 S.W.2d 666, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 43 ( Ky. 1931 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

Motorist was liable for striking pedestrian who was not seen in nighttime until moment of accident, where motorist’s own evidence showed that headlights were insufficient and speed not exceeding statutory limit when passing oncoming car whose lights had blinded motorist made jury question whether speed was reasonable under circumstances. Marsee v. Hunt's Adm'x, 246 Ky. 503 , 55 S.W.2d 376, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 797 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Truck driver who, when going about 25 miles per hour, was blinded by lights of oncoming car but drove blindly ahead at somewhat slackened speed could not claim that he was keeping proper lookout ahead when he struck pedestrian. Gilbert's Adm'r v. Allen, 264 Ky. 202 , 94 S.W.2d 341, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 291 ( Ky. 1936 ).

This section requires that a driver of an automobile must keep his vehicle under reasonable control and drive at a speed that is reasonable and proper given the traffic conditions at the time. Mattingly v. Meuter, 275 Ky. 294 , 121 S.W.2d 676, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1938 ).

It was jury question whether driver at intersection having no “stop” signs had his car under reasonable control considering fact that he was allegedly going at 20 to 25 miles per hour in closely built up business portion, and view was partially obstructed by embankment and weeds. Tate v. Shaver, 287 Ky. 29 , 152 S.W.2d 259, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 494 ( Ky. 1941 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

Provision of this section that speed exceeding 20 miles per hour through closely built-up business portion shall be prima facie evidence of unreasonable speed does not change or affect basic rule that every operator must drive at reasonable speed, having due regard for existing traffic conditions. Tate v. Shaver, 287 Ky. 29 , 152 S.W.2d 259, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 494 ( Ky. 1941 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

In case involving collision between meeting cars, admission of testimony of occupants of defendant’s car that plaintiff was traveling at “terrific speed,” “was going at a tremendous rate of speed,” and “was going very fast” was not prejudicial, where there was physical evidence of excessive speed, witnesses were in a position to judge the speed, and court in effect told jury to give little weight to such testimony. Raidt v. Blount, 294 Ky. 172 , 171 S.W.2d 233, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 409 ( Ky. 1943 ).

The evidence of speed as well as that of all attendant circumstances must be considered in determining whether or not the driver of an automobile has exercised reasonable care as to speed and in having his vehicle under control. Hewitt's Adm'r v. Central Truckaway System, 302 Ky. 459 , 194 S.W.2d 999, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 701 ( Ky. 1946 ).

An instruction that a motorist had a duty not to exceed the statutory speed limit unless the jury found that a greater speed was not unreasonable was erroneous in that it approved a speed in excess of the statutory maximum. Zettler v. Hughes, 283 S.W.2d 849, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 337 ( Ky. 1955 ).

This section authorizes the operator of a motor vehicle to operate at such a slow speed as to block or impede the movement of traffic if it “is necessary for safe operation.” Clardy v. Robinson, 284 S.W.2d 651, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 29 ( Ky. 1955 ).

There is a duty under this section, without regard to fixed limits, not to drive at a greater speed than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for the condition and use of the highway. Potts v. Krey, 362 S.W.2d 726, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 262 ( Ky. 1962 ).

Evidence did not establish plaintiff was speeding where his testimony he was operating his car at a speed of between 50 and 55 miles per hour stood uncontradicted and the rate of travel was within the lawful limit allowed on the highway which was a through highway at the time and place of the accident and where there was undisputed testimony of an impartial witness that in his opinion plaintiff was not speeding. Riggs v. Miller, 396 S.W.2d 69, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 101 ( Ky. 1965 ).

4.— Residential District.

The trial court could decide for itself on a basis of adequate evidence whether the locale in question was a “closely built-up business portion” or a “residence portion” and determination that a locale where there were six driving lanes and business places were interspersed with residential places and vacant lots was more of a “residence portion” than a “closely built up business portion” was not error. Berry v. Jorris, 303 Ky. 799 , 199 S.W.2d 616, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 562 ( Ky. 1947 ).

The question of whether an area was or was not a “residential district” was a question of law for the court and not a question of fact for the jury. Bowling Green-Hopkinsville Bus Co. v. Adams, 261 S.W.2d 14, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 995 ( Ky. 1953 ).

Where there was a store, a dwelling, and a garage within more than 350 feet on one side of the road and there were six dwellings on the other side spread over a greater distance, this was, as a matter of law, not a residential district. Mayer v. Dickerson, 321 S.W.2d 56, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 266 ( Ky. 1959 ).

Whether or not the scene of an accident was a residential district was a question of law and submission of it to the jury was erroneous. Mayer v. Dickerson, 321 S.W.2d 56, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 266 ( Ky. 1959 ); Roberts v. Taylor, 339 S.W.2d 653, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 484 ( Ky. 1960 ).

Where the frontage on one side of a road was two thirds residential and business for a distance of 150 feet on either side of the point of an accident, it was a residential district. Roberts v. Taylor, 339 S.W.2d 653, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 484 ( Ky. 1960 ).

Both sides of a road do not have to be occupied with residences and business structures in close proximity for the area to be a residential district, one side is sufficient. Roberts v. Taylor, 339 S.W.2d 653, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 484 ( Ky. 1960 ).

5.— Business District.

The determination of what is a business district, within the meaning of this section, is a question of law for the court to decide. Wright v. Kinslow, 264 S.W.2d 673, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 689 ( Ky. 1954 ).

6.— Statutory Limitations.

Traffic ordinance of first-class city making lower rate of speed in going around curves or corners prima facie evidence of negligence than was prescribed by comprehensive statute dealing with entire subject of what rate of speed would constitute prima facie evidence of unreasonable driving, conflicted with statute and was invalid. Mendel v. Dorman, 202 Ky. 29 , 258 S.W. 936, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 659 ( Ky. 1924 ).

This section authorizes municipalities to fix speed limits within their boundaries when conditions so warrant. Murphy v. Lake Louisvilla, 303 S.W.2d 307, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 257 ( Ky. 1957 ).

Although signs limiting speed to 40 miles per hour because of workmen on the highway were not official speed limits, the violation of which is negligence per se, the evidence of the signs was admissible on the charge of reckless conduct as bearing on the question of the existence of warnings of the amount of caution necessary to safely negotiate the work area. Smith v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.2d 835, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 27 ( Ky. 1967 ).

If it is prima facie evidence of unreasonable speed to show that passenger automobile was exceeding certain speed limit in closely built-up portion of city, burden shifts to driver to show that such speed was not improper considering traffic and use of highway. Saunders Ex'rs v. Armour & Co., 220 Ky. 719 , 295 S.W. 1014, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 606 ( Ky. 1927 ).

Effect of provision establishing certain speed limit was to cast upon driver exceeding stipulated rate, duty of overcoming presumption and of showing that speed was reasonable under circumstances. Utilities Appliance Co. v. Toon's Adm'r, 241 Ky. 823 , 45 S.W.2d 478, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 9 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Operation of motor vehicle in excess of stipulated rate in residential portion of city is prima facie evidence of negligence. Kelly v. Marshall's Adm'r, 274 Ky. 666 , 120 S.W.2d 142, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 319 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

Motorist’s own testimony fixing his speed at 30 to 40 miles per hour while going over crest of hill at point of collision, made a prima facie case of negligence against him in view of this section’s 25 mile per hour speed limit on steep grades. Wilburn v. Simons, 302 Ky. 752 , 196 S.W.2d 356, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 744 ( Ky. 1946 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

Where defendant conceded he was going at a speed of between 30 and 32 miles per hour in city of Louisville, his admission was prima facie evidence of improper driving. Reed v. Hostetler, 245 S.W.2d 953, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 616 ( Ky. 1952 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

7.— Proximate Cause.

Provision that speed exceeding 45 miles per hour shall be prima facie evidence of unreasonable and improper driving does not create presumption of negligence as to accidents unrelated to traffic, and hence was inapplicable to injury to occupant when he opened door of car going 50 miles per hour. Newton v. Wetherby's Adm'x, 287 Ky. 400 , 153 S.W.2d 947, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 567 ( Ky. 1941 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

It is error to inject the question of speed into a case where it is apparent that the proximate cause of the accident was the presence on the wrong side of the highway of one of the cars involved in the accident since excessive speed does not lend to liability unless it was the proximate cause of the injury or as a matter of defense a contributory cause and in a head-on collision if vehicle was on its proper side of the road its speed even though it may have exceeded the legal rate in violation of this section could have played no part in causing the accident. Fentress v. Hardin's Adm'r, 273 S.W.2d 575, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1188 ( Ky. 1954 ).

8.— Jury Question.

Whether motorist was negligent in failing to slacken speed, when meeting other vehicles whose lights blinded him, so that he did not see truck parked on road ahead of him, was a jury question. McLellan v. Threlkeld, 279 Ky. 114 , 129 S.W.2d 977, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 223 ( Ky. 1939 ).

In an action involving a wrongful death caused by an intersectional collision of motor vehicles in which the defendant admitted that he was driving at 25 to 30 miles per hour and the speed limit was 25 miles per hour in a residential district such as the one in which the accident occurred and there was other evidence indicating the defendant’s speed was in excess of such limitation, the question of whether the defendant’s speed constituted negligence was properly submitted to the jury. Gartrell v. Harris' Coadm'xs, 300 Ky. 82 , 187 S.W.2d 1019, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 823 ( Ky. 1945 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

Testimony of witness that motorist was traveling at “a terrific speed” was competent and sufficient for the jury on question of negligence, where witness had been driving automobiles for more than 25 years. Wilburn v. Simons, 302 Ky. 752 , 196 S.W.2d 356, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 744 ( Ky. 1946 ).

Where plaintiff’s automobile collided head-on with defendant’s which was traveling in the opposite direction in the plaintiff’s lane and skid marks and the testimony of the defendant and of a disinterested witness indicated that the plaintiff was traveling at a speed substantially faster than the maximum allowable under this section for the type of district in which the accident occurred, the defendant was entitled to have the issues of whether the plaintiff was speeding and, if so, whether his speed contributed to the accident submitted to the jury and to have his counterclaim submitted on the theory of last clear chance. Richerson v. Butterworth, 261 S.W.2d 294, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 1002 ( Ky. 1953 ).

In a rear-end collision suit brought by the driver of one tractor-trailer truck against the driver of another tractor-trailer truck, it was a question of fact for the jury to determine the speed and location of defendant’s truck at the time of the accident and, if his speed were in excess of the statutory provision, whether it was the proximate cause of the accident. Chandler v. Edgar W. Long, Inc., 623 F.2d 1139, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 16718 (6th Cir. Ky. 1980 ).

9.— Evidence Before and After Accident.

Admission of testimony as to speed of defendant’s car at a point 1,800 feet from the scene of accident was not error, where witness was in car following defendant and testified that speed continued up to half a block from the scene. Home Laundry Co. v. Cook, 277 Ky. 8 , 125 S.W.2d 763, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 609 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Admission of evidence of defendant’s speed following accident is error. Layne v. Cottle, 286 Ky. 221 , 150 S.W.2d 684, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 248 ( Ky. 1941 ).

10.— Contributory Negligence.

Where there was ample room for automobile to pass a tractor and combine being operated with left rear wheel of the tractor across the center line on its driver’s left of the highway in violation of KRS 189.300 without colliding with it if the automobile had not been driving at an excessive rate of speed of about 60 miles per hour in the rain on a wet slippery pavement in violation of this section, both drivers were negligent and their combined negligence was the proximate cause of the collision and neither was entitled to recover damages. United States v. Richmond, 113 F. Supp. 213, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2546 (D. Ky. 1953 ).

Motorist, who struck rear of disabled truck parked in nighttime on highway allegedly without lights, was not negligent as matter of law, where he was traveling at about 35 miles per hour on straight country road with slight grade, was blinded by lights of oncoming car, slowed down, and struck truck about 100 feet distant. R. B. Tyler Co. v. Curd, 240 Ky. 253 , 42 S.W.2d 298, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 379 ( Ky. 1931 ).

Evidence that plaintiff was driving at more than 40 miles per hour in a congested area justified finding by jury that he was contributorily negligent in collision with approaching automobile which turned to the left across the road in front of plaintiff’s car. Hilsenrad v. Bowling, 292 Ky. 368 , 166 S.W.2d 847, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 96 ( Ky. 1942 ).

In an action for the wrongful death of a pedestrian struck by defendant’s automobile, where the defendant testified that she was traveling at the maximum speed allowable under this section and the evidence showed that her automobile traveled in excess of 300 feet after hitting the decedent, the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant and should have submitted the question to the jury of whether the defendant was negligent by virtue of her speed. Strode v. Campbell, 311 Ky. 525 , 224 S.W.2d 673, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 1180 ( Ky. 1949 ).

A driver blinded by lights of an approaching vehicle may not assume that the road ahead of him is clear, nor must he proceed at his peril or necessarily stop, but he is under a duty to slacken his speed and have his car under such control in the circumstances as ordinary care and precaution suggest or require and where approaching bus driver negligently failed to dim lights evidence automobile driver was traveling at high speed confirmed by triple somersault of the car after the impact and its coming to rest 200 feet away after it scraped along the side of the bus was sufficient to establish contributory negligence as a matter of law and the court should have directed a verdict. Harris v. Luster, 259 S.W.2d 489, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 965 ( Ky. 1953 ).

11.Duty to Arrest Speeder.

It is the duty of an officer of the law to arrest, or cause to be arrested, any person operating an automobile at a speed greater than the legal limit, and, where an officer makes an investigation and causes no arrest, the natural presumption is that, in his opinion, no arrest was justified and no violation has been committed. Denny v. Rudy, 275 Ky. 467 , 121 S.W.2d 951, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 446 ( Ky. 1938 ).

12.Jurisdiction for Violation.

The county court had jurisdiction of a citation for violation under this section and the question of whether the charge was under the proper section therefor became an issue to be determined by the judge of the county court even though the arrest was on an interstate highway and the charge was for violation of the 60 mile per hour speed limit. Gabbard v. Rose, 359 F.2d 182, 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 6426 (6th Cir. Ky. 1966 ).

13.Steep Grade.

When it is sought to fasten negligence on one because of improper driving on a steep grade, there should be proof that the grade in question exceeded 7 per cent as defined in subsection (9) (now (15)) of KRS 189.010 . National Linen Supply Co. v. Snowden, 288 Ky. 374 , 156 S.W.2d 186, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1941 ).

14.Pedestrian.

Motorist was not liable for injury to small boy who ran into side of automobile which stopped within one length, even if automobile was traveling over statutory speed limit for closely built-up business portion of city, and presumption of negligence arose from exceeding statutory rate of speed; proximate cause of injury being act of running into automobile, and not its speed. Knecht v. Buckshorn, 233 Ky. 329 , 25 S.W.2d 727, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 549 ( Ky. 1930 ).

Evidence of truck driver’s negligence supported verdict for death of three-year-old child crossing highway, where driver had view ahead, knew that children were often at that place, and there was evidence that he was exceeding speed stipulated as reasonable under circumstances. Brown McClain Transfer Co. v. Major's Adm'r, 251 Ky. 741 , 65 S.W.2d 992, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 945 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Where bus struck child who ran across road at a point in a small country village, negligence of bus driver was for the jury, in view of testimony of passenger in bus that he saw child when bus was 150 feet away, while bus driver testified that he did not see child until he was within 25 or 30 feet of her, justifying inference that driver was not keeping a proper lookout, and in view of evidence that bus traveled 137 feet after brakes were applied, indicating excessive speed. Kentucky Virginia Stages, Inc. v. Tackett's Adm'r, 294 Ky. 189 , 171 S.W.2d 4, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 389 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Evidence of three witnesses that automobile was being driven at 50 or 60 miles an hour when it came into a congested area where children had recently alighted from a school bus, the terrific impact upon the child it struck and killed and the undenied skidding after the brakes were applied all indicated an excessive speed and was sufficient to take the case to the jury. Lever Bros. Co. v. Stapleton, 313 Ky. 837 , 233 S.W.2d 1002, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 996 ( Ky. 1950 ).

15.Skidding.

The length of skid marks made by truck, together with the estimate of its speed by disinterested witnesses, established negligent operation which resulted in the collision. Creal v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 249, 1949 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2638 (D. Ky. 1949 ).

Although mere fact of skidding does not prove negligence to justify application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine, skidding is circumstance on general issue of negligence or on specific allegation of negligence through excessive speed, and may justify finding of negligence. O'Neil & Hearne v. Bray's Adm'x, 262 Ky. 377 , 90 S.W.2d 353, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 33 ( Ky. 1936 ).

16.Passengers’ Actions.

Whether passenger was contributorily negligent in failing to protest as to speed was a question of fact for the jury. Sanderson v. Finley, 276 Ky. 1 , 122 S.W.2d 999, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 523 ( Ky. 1 938 ).

In an action by passenger for personal injuries against driver of car making a left turn the rate of speed at which passenger’s driver was traveling was a question for the jury where he testified he was driving 70 miles an hour in a 50 mile an hour maximum zone and the car ahead of him avoided hitting the car making the left turn and passenger’s driver struck the car making the left turn in the rear. Daniels v. Tackett, 416 S.W.2d 749, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 288 ( Ky. 1967 ).

17.Common Carrier.

It was the duty of the driver of taxicab, a common carrier for hire, to exercise the highest degree of care in the operation of the taxicab so as not to come into collision with other vehicles using the street at that time and place and this duty included the duty to have the taxicab under reasonable control, to operate it at a rate of speed that was reasonable and proper, and to keep a lookout ahead for other vehicles in front of him or so near thereto as to be in danger of collision. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Smallwood, 311 Ky. 405 , 224 S.W.2d 450, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 1159 ( Ky. 1949 ).

18.Trucks and Semitrailers.

In head-on nighttime collision between truck and automobile on country highway, court properly submitted question whether truck was being driven at reasonable speed with regard to traffic and use of highway, where truck was of two and three-quarter tons capacity and there was evidence that it was traveling over the statutory speed limit for such trucks. Allender Co. v. Browning's Adm'x, 242 Ky. 273 , 46 S.W.2d 116, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 266 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Where motorist relied on last clear chance doctrine to impose liability on truck driver who struck him after he had negligently gone into pathway of truck, evidence that truck was exceeding statutory limit when motorist started across its pathway was properly excluded, being matter of driver’s antecedent negligence. Braden's Adm'x v. Liston, 258 Ky. 44 , 79 S.W.2d 241, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 574 ( Ky. 1934 ).

In grade crossing collision, speed of truck even if exceeding statutory limit or more than was proper having regard to traffic and use of highway, did not exonerate railroad from liability as matter of law, but was merely circumstance to be considered with other evidence on contributory negligence of driver. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ratliff's Adm'r, 260 Ky. 380 , 85 S.W.2d 1006, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 478 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Speed of truck, even if traveling 40 miles per hour, was permissible under provision that trucks under 5,000 pounds traveling outside the city could operate at speed up to 40 miles per hour, there being no evidence that loaded truck weighed over 5,000 pounds or that accident occurred in city. Tate v. Collins, 266 Ky. 322 , 98 S.W.2d 938, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 659 ( Ky. 1936 ).

Driver of heavily loaded truck going 35 miles per hour in violation of law that provided for speed of not to exceed 25 miles per hour on highway around sharp curve, and swinging over to wrong side of highway, was liable for head-on collision with other truck going 15 miles per hour on proper side of road, although neither driver saw other truck until 50 feet away. Pickering v. Simpkins, 271 Ky. 288 , 111 S.W.2d 650, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 223 ( Ky. 1937 ).

The act of slowly driving a truck through a left turn from a highway into a private drive was not violative of the prohibition of this section against driving a vehicle so slowly as to impede traffic except where necessary for the safe operation of the vehicle, because the slow speed was necessary to the safe operation of the truck. Tupts v. Judy, 272 S.W.2d 335, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1091 ( Ky. 1954 ).

19.Instructions.

Instructions on speed must conform to the statute in force at the time of the accident. National Linen Supply Co. v. Snowden, 288 Ky. 374 , 156 S.W.2d 186, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Where accident resulted from blowout of tire, and there was evidence that car was being driven in excess of 45 miles per hour at the time, an instruction requiring jury to find for defendant if they believed that accident resulted from defect in tire unknown to defendant was erroneous, since it excused defendant from liability regardless of the rate of speed at which he was driving, it being common knowledge that the rate of speed affects the course a motor vehicle may take after a blowout. Murphy v. Harmon, 291 Ky. 504 , 165 S.W.2d 11, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 262 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Where there is no evidence in a negligence action that the vehicle involved was traveling at a speed in excess of that allowed in this section the court properly refused to give a separate instruction on speed. Miles v. Southeastern Motor Truck Lines, Inc., 295 Ky. 156 , 173 S.W.2d 990, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 205 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Where truck and automobile were involved in head-on collision, trial court in damage action should not have given instruction on speed of truck where speed was not proximate cause of collision. Brown v. Crumpton, 252 S.W.2d 670, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 1009 ( Ky. 1952 ).

Where the only direct evidence of speed was plaintiff ’s own testimony that he was traveling within the speed limit and there was no circumstantial evidence of substance to indicate a greater speed, an instruction on the point was unnecessary and technically improper but the enumeration of a driver’s basic duties in a single instruction does not emphasize any one of them over the others and does not so invite speculation that prejudice could be found in the inclusion of a duty just because it is technically irrelevant and from a practical standpoint, it would seem that when there had been no evidence of excessive speed there would be a greater likelihood of benefit than prejudice to the driver through the jury’s being advised of the speed limit. Sparks v. Doe, 379 S.W.2d 252, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 235 ( Ky. 1964 ).

This section authorized jury instructions in a vehicular personal injury action stating that the plaintiff had a duty not to drive her car so slowly as to block or impede the normal movement of other traffic, and that if she was aware that the defendant’s truck was passing her car she should have assisted it to obtain clearance; the instructions were justified by the defendant’s testimony that he first saw the plaintiff’s car “rocking back and forth” in front of him and by the plaintiff’s testimony that she was aware the defendant was trying to pass her. The section applies to all public roadways, including interstate highways. Burns v. Level, 957 S.W.2d 218, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 109 ( Ky. 1997 ).

20.— Reasonable Speed.

Instruction that it was driver’s duty to run at such speed in no event exceeding 20 miles per hour as was reasonable considering traffic and use of street, was not prejudicially erroneous, where there was no evidence that he was exceeding 20 miles per hour; instruction was more favorable to driver than one following words of statute. American Dye Works v. Baker, 210 Ky. 508 , 276 S.W. 133, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 717 ( Ky. 1925 ).

Instruction that it was driver’s duty to run truck at such speed not exceeding statutory limit as jury believed to be reasonable considering traffic and use of intersection was not erroneous, where driver’s defense was that his speed was lower than legal rate. Hornek Bros. v. Strubel, 212 Ky. 631 , 279 S.W. 1087, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 210 ( Ky. 1926 ).

Where court gave instruction substantially as requested by pedestrian that driver should operate at reasonable rate of speed under traffic conditions, pedestrian could not complain that court should have instructed that driver should not have exceeded statutory speed limitation. Saunders Ex'rs v. Armour & Co., 220 Ky. 719 , 295 S.W. 1014, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 606 ( Ky. 1927 ).

Where appellee failed to ask for instruction as to violation of legal speed limit, court’s instruction that it was duty of driver to drive at rate of speed no greater than was reasonable and proper, considering the traffic at the time and place, such instruction being favorable to appellant, was not error. Home Laundry Co. v. Cook, 277 Ky. 8 , 125 S.W.2d 763, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 609 ( Ky. 1939 ).

An instruction which omitted “having regard for the traffic and the use of the highway” did not constitute prejudicial error where no unusual or extraordinary traffic conditions were shown. Willett v. Bradas & Gheens, Inc., 283 Ky. 525 , 142 S.W.2d 139, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 372 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Where evidence was that defendant bus driver approached parked car at speed of at least 25 miles an hour, and there was conflicting testimony as to whether passenger was standing in the center of the road or beside the car close to the edge of the road, it was proper to instruct the jury to determine whether the rate of speed was reasonable and whether the bus driver had the bus under reasonable control. Short Way Lines, Inc. v. Sutton's Adm'r, 291 Ky. 541 , 164 S.W.2d 809, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 239 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Where evidence showed defendant driving at a speed unreasonable in a residential area, with lights dimmed so as to fail to reveal a church building at the end of a street at night, there was sufficient showing of negligence to instruct the jury to find for plaintiff, a guest in defendant’s car. Robinson v. Higgins, 295 Ky. 446 , 174 S.W.2d 687, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 252 ( Ky. 1943 ).

21.— — Statutory Limit.

Where evidence is adduced that automobile was driven at rate made prima facie evidence of improper driving, and instruction incorporating that idea is offered, that point should be covered in instruction given, even if requested instruction is not correct in form. Wight v. Rose, 209 Ky. 803 , 273 S.W. 472, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 605 ( Ky. 1925 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

Requested instruction that if plaintiff’s car was exceeding statutory limitation for speed in residential district it was prima facie evidence of improper driving was properly refused in absence of allegation and proof that collision occurred in residential district. Sharp v. Rawls, 234 Ky. 438 , 28 S.W.2d 493, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 206 ( Ky. 1930 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

Instruction making it absolute duty of driver not to exceed specified speed was not objectionable as against requested instruction that speed exceeding specified rate was prima facie evidence of improper driving. Mann's Ex'r v. Leyman Motor Co., 234 Ky. 639 , 28 S.W.2d 956, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 236 ( Ky. 1930 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

Instruction that driving in excess of 20 miles an hour was per se negligence instead of prima facie negligence, was erroneous; on retrial suggested instruction should be given. Utilities Appliance Co. v. Toon's Adm'r, 241 Ky. 823 , 45 S.W.2d 478, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 9 ( Ky. 1932 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

Instruction that defendant driver should not exceed statutory limit was not prejudicially erroneous to plaintiff, its peremptory effect going beyond interpretation of statute by Court of Appeals. Challinor v. Axton, 246 Ky. 76 , 54 S.W.2d 600, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 703 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Instruction on speed, “in no event to operate said automobile in excess of 20 miles an hour,” was erroneous, since it told jury that such speed was conclusively negligent, instead of prima facie evidence of negligence. Diamond Taxicab Co. v. McDaniel, 258 Ky. 478 , 80 S.W.2d 562, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 192 ( Ky. 1935 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

Instruction assuming as matter of law that speed was limited by statute regulating speed in closely built-up portion of city was not erroneous, where testimony and photographs were conclusive of fact. West Kentucky Transp. Co. v. Dezern, 259 Ky. 470 , 82 S.W.2d 486, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 330 ( Ky. 1935 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

Since speed of car allegedly striking defect in city street causing driver to lose control was in issue and since definite speeds have been fixed as raising presumption of negligence, instruction should be given including statutory criterion of prima facie negligence. Catlettsburg v. Sutherland's Adm'r, 261 Ky. 535 , 88 S.W.2d 19, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 682 ( Ky. 1935 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

Instruction making motorist absolutely liable if he exceeded statutory speed limits was erroneous, statute making excessive speed prima facie evidence of improper driving. Lang v. Cooper, 262 Ky. 407 , 90 S.W.2d 382, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 41 ( Ky. 1936 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

Pedestrian could not complain of failure to give instruction that speed exceeding 15 miles per hour in closely built-up portion of city was prima facie evidence of improper driving, where instruction given that driver must regulate speed not to exceed 20 miles per hour was more favorable to pedestrian. Gilbert's Adm'r v. Allen, 264 Ky. 202 , 94 S.W.2d 341, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 291 ( Ky. 1936 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

Instruction that operation of taxi, in business and residence portion of busy street, at a greater speed than 15 or 20 miles an hour would be negligence, was not error. Kelly v. Marshall's Adm'r, 274 Ky. 666 , 120 S.W.2d 142, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 319 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

It was prejudicial error to instruct on a maximum speed of 40 miles an hour outside of closely built-up sections of city, where later change in law permitted speed of 45 miles an hour. Gorman v. Berry, 289 Ky. 88 , 158 S.W.2d 155, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 511 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

Where there is definite and specific evidence of a speed in excess of statutory limit, it is proper for trial court to instruct that such speed is prima facie evidence of unreasonable and improper driving. White v. Saunders, 289 Ky. 268 , 158 S.W.2d 393, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 520 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

Where there was evidence that plaintiff’s car was traveling 45 or 50 miles per hour, failure to instruct that speed in excess of 45 is prima facie negligent was reversible error. Southern Oxygen Co. v. Martin, 291 Ky. 238 , 163 S.W.2d 459, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 202 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

An instruction which in part stated it was the driver’s duty not to drive his car at a speed in excess of that specified in this section was proper. Stephens v. Glass, 296 Ky. 90 , 176 S.W.2d 139, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 110 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Where the evidence indicated that a motorist was driving at a speed between the maximum for a closely built-up business district and the maximum for a residential district in an area of mixed business and residential buildings, the court properly refused to give the jury a definite speed limit instruction in a case involving the motorist’s alleged negligence. Berry v. Jorris, 303 Ky. 799 , 199 S.W.2d 616, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 562 ( Ky. 1947 ).

22.— — Curves and Grades.

Prior to 1950 amendment this section contained a provision that where highway passed around any sharp curve, speed in excess of certain rate was prima facie evidence of unreasonable and improper driving and the following annotations should be read with this in mind.

Instruction erroneously omitted driver’s duty to hold car under control and sound horn, and should have told jury that speed exceeding 20 miles per hour around sharp curve was prima facie evidence of improper driving. Comer v. Yancy, 251 Ky. 461 , 65 S.W.2d 459 ( Ky. 1933 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

Where there was evidence that collision occurred on steep grade and that overtaking truck was exceeding statutory speed limit, court, at plaintiff’s request, should give instruction under this section. Wright v. Clausen, 253 Ky. 498 , 69 S.W.2d 1062, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 712 ( Ky. 1934 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

Instruction as to law relating to speed on sharp curve was properly refused where there was no evidence that curve involved was a sharp curve as defined in KRS 189.010 . Southern Oxygen Co. v. Martin, 291 Ky. 238 , 163 S.W.2d 459, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 202 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

23.— — Trucks.

Instruction which placed absolute liability upon truck driver even if speed of 40 to 45 miles per hour was not, under circumstances, unreasonable, was prejudicially erroneous, since statute makes excessive speed simply prima facie evidence of improper driving. Electric Bakeries v. Stacy's Adm'r, 264 Ky. 431 , 94 S.W.2d 977, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 326 ( Ky. 1936 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

24.— Proximate Cause.

Omission of instruction that speed exceeding statutory limit was prima facie evidence of improper driving was not reversible error, where pedestrian collided with side of automobile making speed immaterial, since it was not proximate cause of injury. Lieberman v. McLaughlin, 233 Ky. 763 , 26 S.W.2d 753, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 647 ( Ky. 1930 ) (decision prior to 1950 amendment).

25.Parking.

This section does not authorize a county to permit parking on the main traveled portion of a highway. Evans v. Lorenz, 454 S.W.2d 691, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Cited:

Kennedy Transfer Co. v. Greenfield’s Adm’x, 248 Ky. 708 , 59 S.W.2d 978, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 304 ( Ky. 1933 ); Hughes v. Bates’ Adm’r, 278 Ky. 592 , 129 S.W.2d 138, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 472 ( Ky. 1939 ); Kentucky Transport Co. v. Campbell, 299 Ky. 555 , 186 S.W.2d 409, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 474 ( Ky. 1945 ); Barnes v. Commonwealth, 305 Ky. 481 , 204 S.W.2d 801, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 845 ( Ky. 1947 ); Sherrow v. Watts’ Adm’r, 312 Ky. 262 , 226 S.W.2d 929, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 613 ( Ky. 1950 ); Louisville v. Chapman, 413 S.W.2d 74, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 380 ( Ky. 1967 ); Williams v. Chilton, 427 S.W.2d 586, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 687 ( Ky. 1968 ); Gravatt v. B. F. Saul Real Estate Inv. Trust, 601 S.W.2d 287, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 228 ( Ky. 1980 ); Louisville v. Maresz, 835 S.W.2d 889, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 166 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Creation and enforcement of traffic regulations with respect to speed limits on or near school property is not within the authority of a board of education. OAG 72-251 .

If the limitation is reasonable, a city may pursuant to subsection (4)(a) (now (5)(a)) of this section fix a speed limit of not exceeding fifteen miles per hour for all “dead-end” streets in the city. OAG 74-397 .

Since reckless driving, failure to have a driver’s license, speeding and crossing the yellow line (KRS 189.300 ) are four separate offenses, where a chase commences in a city and ends in the county with both city and county and/or state officials involved in apprehending the violator, double jeopardy would not prohibit the county from charging the accused with speeding and crossing the yellow line even though the city has already charged him with reckless driving and failure to have a driver’s license. OAG 74-612 .

Under the authority of KRS 67.080 and 67.083 the fiscal court has the authority to establish by proper order speed limits on county roads lower than those prescribed in this section and KRS 189.391 (now repealed) where such lower limits are necessary to the public health, safety, welfare and convenience, except in the special case involving trucks under KRS 189.230 where the county judge (now county judge/executive) may lower speed limits. OAG 75-74 .

The clear legislative intent of this section, KRS 189.010 , and 189.396 that peace officers shall enforce traffic laws in off-street parking facilities, including a speed limit of fifteen miles an hour, seems a reasonable exercise of the authority of the legislature to enact a law for the public good and until the sections are invalidated by a decision of the highest court of the state, all peace officers are legally obligated to enforce said sections. OAG 75-115 .

A board of education in making reasonable rules for the control and management of the schools may establish student safety patrols for street traffic instructional purposes inside the limits of school property but may not make or enforce traffic regulations on roads or driveways within or outside the limits of school property. OAG 75-614 .

The provisions of this section were designed to enable political subdivisions in the urban areas of Kentucky to deal effectively with the increasing problems involving traffic control and the related problem of parking in business districts and parking along those highways and streets entangled in the congestion of traffic. OAG 78-328 .

Neither speeding, this section, nor reckless driving, KRS 189.290 , is a misdemeanor. OAG 79-395 .

If roadways within mobile home park are offered for public use so as to be considered “public” roads (although privately owned or maintained), or if such roadways constitute off-street parking facilities offered for public use, other than for hire, they would be within the definition of “highway” as used in § 189.010(3). Accordingly, law enforcement officers could properly issue citations for speeding violations or reckless driving violations occurring upon such roadways. OAG 92-36 .

If the roads or streets of a specific subdivision, although privately owned, are subject to pbulic access, so as to be “public roads” within the meaning of KRS 189.010 (3), applicable speed limit provisions of this section would apply to them, and could be enforced upon them by law enforcement officers; additionally, Fiscal Court could, in the exercise of its police power, and in view of specific provisions of KRS 189.390 and 189.010 provide, by proper ordinance, for speed limits on privately owned subdivision streets generally which are used by the public. OAG 92-67 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Reducing speed limits, KRS 189.230 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Combs, Torts — Effect of a Breach of a Safety Statute — Proximate Cause. 34 Ky. L.J. 78 (1945).

Murray, Instructions in Regard to the Speed of Motor Trucks, A Study in Statutory Interpretation. 34 Ky. L.J. 85 (1946).

Mann, Legislation — A Proposed Dangerous Driving Statute for Kentucky, 36 Ky. L.J. 82 (1947).

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Automobiles, §§ 16.02, 16.05, 16.19 — 16.22, 16.25 16.27, 16.30, 16.34 — 16.40, 16.44 — 16.47, 16.52.

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Criminal), 5th Ed., Offenses Against Public Order, Safety and Morals, Part. 4 Offenses Relating to Firearms and Destructive Devices, §§ 8.70A, 8.70B.

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Railroads, § 25.01.

189.391. Reduction of speed limits. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 9, § 1, effective March 1, 1974; 1976, ch. 284, § 1; 1978, ch. 384, § 337, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 313, § 1, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1988, ch. 177, § 5, effective July 15, 1988.

189.392. Emergency vehicles excepted.

KRS 189.390 shall not apply to emergency vehicles while being operated under the provisions of KRS 189.910 to 189.950 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 9, § 2, effective March 1, 1974; 1988, ch. 177, § 3, effective July 15, 1988.

189.393. Complying with traffic officer’s signal.

No operator of a vehicle, after having received a visual or audible signal from an officer directing traffic shall knowingly or wantonly disregard the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of the traffic officer or other vehicles or pedestrians.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 128, § 1; 1998, ch. 606, § 160, effective July 15, 1998.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Dier v. City of Prestonsburg, 480 F. Supp. 2d 929, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26644 (E.D. Ky. 2007 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Fortune, Criminal Rules, 70 Ky. L.J. 395 (1981-82).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Police Officer’s Answer to Claim of Unlawful Arrest, Form 121.02.

189.394. Fines for speeding — Doubling of fines in school areas with flashing lights.

  1. The fines for speeding in violation of KRS 189.390 shall be:
  2. For speeding in excess of the speeds shown on the specific fine schedule the fine shall be not less than sixty dollars ($60) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100).
  3. For any violation shown on the chart for which a specific fine is prescribed, the defendant may elect to pay the fine and court costs to the circuit clerk before the date of his trial or to be tried in the normal manner. Payment of the fine and court costs to the clerk shall be considered as a plea of guilty for all purposes.
  4. If the offense charged shows a speed in excess of the speeds shown on the specific fine schedule the defendant shall appear for trial and may not pay the fine to the clerk before the trial date.
  5. If the offense occurred in an area near a school where flasher lights have been installed and are flashing, and a speed limit has been set pursuant to KRS 189.336 , the fine established by subsection (1) or (2) of this section shall be doubled.

Mph. Over Limit Prima Facie or Maximum Speed Fine 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 1 16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56 61 66 71 $1 2 17 22 27 32 37 42 47 52 57 62 67 72 2 3 18 23 28 33 38 43 48 53 58 63 68 73 3 4 19 24 29 34 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 4 5 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 5 6 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56 61 66 71 76 16 7 22 27 32 37 42 47 52 57 62 67 72 77 17 8 23 28 33 38 43 48 53 58 63 68 73 78 18 9 24 29 34 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 79 19 10 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 20 11 26 31 36 41 46 51 56 61 66 71 76 81 22 12 27 32 37 42 47 52 57 62 67 72 77 82 24 13 28 33 38 43 48 53 58 63 68 73 78 83 26 14 29 34 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 79 84 28 15 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 30 16 31 36 41 46 51 56 61 66 71 76 81 32 17 32 37 42 47 52 57 62 67 72 77 82 34 18 33 38 43 48 53 58 63 68 73 78 83 36 19 34 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 79 84 38 20 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 40 21 36 41 46 51 56 61 66 71 43 22 37 42 47 52 57 62 67 72 46 23 38 43 48 53 58 63 68 73 49 24 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 52 25 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 55

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History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 36, § 1, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 101, § 3, effective June 17, 1978; 1979 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 7, § 4, effective July 1, 1979; 1988, ch. 177, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1994, ch. 403, § 3, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 37, § 3, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 124, § 7, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 183, § 17, effective August 1, 2002; 2004, ch. 98, § 1, effective July 13, 2004; 2011, ch. 59, § 2, effective June 8, 2011; 2019 ch. 40, § 3, effective June 27, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited in:

Commonwealth v. Curry, 607 S.W.3d 618, 2020 Ky. LEXIS 293 ( Ky. 2020 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

An Overview of Kentucky’s New Court System, Vol. 41, No. 2, April 1977 Ky. Bench & B. 15.

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Criminal), 5th Ed., Offenses Against Public Order, Safety and Morals, Part 4 Offenses Relating to Firearms and Destructive Devices, §§ 8.70A, 8.70B.

189.395. Speed on turnpikes and limited access highways. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1960, ch. 148, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 13, § 2.

189.396. Enforcement of traffic regulations on off-street parking facilities offered for public use.

All law enforcement officials shall enforce the traffic regulations contained in KRS Chapter 189 on off-street parking facilities offered for public use, except for-hire parking facilities listed in KRS 189.700 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 46, § 3.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The clear legislative intent of KRS 189.010 , 189.390 , and this section that peace officers shall enforce traffic laws in off-street parking facilities, including a speed limit of fifteen miles an hour, seems a reasonable exercise in the authority of the legislature to enact a law for the public good and until the sections are invalidated by a decision of the highest court of the state, all peace officers are legally obligated to enforce said sections. OAG 75-115 .

189.400. Turning around on curve or grade.

No vehicle shall be turned around upon any curve, or upon the approach to, or near the crest of a grade, unless it can be seen for a distance of five hundred (500) feet by the driver of any other vehicle approaching from either direction.

History. 2739g-69n.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Right to Turn on Curve or Grade.

This section by implication confirms the right of a driver of a motor vehicle to make a turn from one side of the highway to the other when his effort to do so “can be seen for a distance of 500 feet by the driver of any other vehicle approaching from either direction.” Dixie Ice Cream Co. v. Ravenna Grocery Co., 306 Ky. 182 , 206 S.W.2d 824, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 977 ( Ky. 1947 ).

2.Violation Negligence Per Se.

It is negligence per se to turn a vehicle around on a highway near the crest of a grade unless it can be seen for 500 feet by driver approaching from either direction but this section contemplates normal conditions and when collision results from a supervening, abnormal circumstance such as brake failure by oncoming truck the violation is not the proximate cause of the collision. Wilborn v. Sneed, 415 S.W.2d 858, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 345 ( Ky. 1967 ).

3.Visibility Distance.

Question of contributory negligence was for jury and instruction objected to was not improper in view of positive testimony of the officers who measured the visibility distance at the curve where accident occurred and which made this section applicable. Arnett v. Hensley, 273 S.W.2d 816, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1203 ( Ky. 1954 ).

189.410. Approaching curve or obstruction. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-47) was repealed by Acts 1994, ch. 203, § 3, effective July 15, 1994.

189.420. Driving on mountain highways.

The operator of a motor vehicle traveling through defiles or on mountain highways shall hold his motor vehicle under control and keep as near the right-hand edge of the highway as reasonably possible. Upon approaching any curve where the view is obstructed within a distance of two hundred feet (200´) along the highway, he shall give audible warning with the horn of his motor vehicle.

History. 2739g-69h.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Sounding Horn.

Where defendant truck driver was backing out into highway where highway approached a curve, he should have sounded his horn in order to give some warning that he was blocking the highway at a very dangerous point. Nolan v. Nally, 342 S.W.2d 400, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 384 ( Ky. 1961 ).

2.Contributory Negligence.

Where physical facts, consisting of broken guard rails on defendant’s side of road, position of plaintiff’s car across centerline after accident, and marks on highway, coupled with testimony of disinterested witnesses, clearly indicated that plaintiff’s car was on wrong side of road at time of collision, plaintiff was contributorily negligent and directed verdict should have been given for defendant, notwithstanding testimony of plaintiff’s witnesses that defendant was on wrong side of road. Silver Fleet Motor Express v. Wilson, 291 Ky. 515 , 165 S.W.2d 51, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 276 ( Ky. 1942 ).

3.Instructions.

Instruction under this section as to duty to sound horn was properly refused where there was no evidence that curve obstructed view. Southern Oxygen Co. v. Martin, 291 Ky. 238 , 163 S.W.2d 459, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 202 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Murray, Instructions In Regard to the Speed of Motor Trucks, A Study In Statutory Interpretation. 34 Ky. L.J. 85 (1946).

189.430. Coasting prohibited — Unattended vehicle.

  1. The driver of a motor vehicle when traveling upon a down grade shall not coast with the gears of the vehicle in neutral.
  2. The driver of a commercial motor vehicle when traveling upon a down grade shall not coast with the clutch disengaged.
  3. No person operating or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition and removing the key, nor allow it to stand upon any perceptible grade without effectively setting the brake and turning the front wheels to the curb or side of the highway.

History. 2739g-69i.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Application.

This section does not apply to private driveways. Estridge v. Estridge, 333 S.W.2d 758, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 203 ( Ky. 1960 ).

KRS 189.430(3) was not applicable to a private driveway; summary judgment for a truck owner in a claim brought by an injured person who was struck by the truck while it was being driven by a thief who stole the truck from the owner’s driveway was affirmed Bruck v. Thompson, 131 S.W.3d 764, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 76 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Police officer was not exempt from the requirements of KRS 189.430 that required all motor vehicle operators to stop the engine and take the keys to the ignition when exiting the vehicle. Fact that the officer was investigating an accident scene did not exempt him from this duty imposed on all drivers. Pile v. City of Brandenburg, 215 S.W.3d 36, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 322 ( Ky. 2006 ).

2.Locking Ignition and Removing Key.

Where automobile was parked in an unguarded public parking lot and left unattended and unlocked with the key in the ignition in violation of this section and a city ordinance and it was stolen by some unknown person shortly thereafter who caused personal injuries to others approximately two miles from the place of the theft, the owner was not liable for the personal injuries as his negligence was not the proximate cause of the injuries. Frank v. Ralston, 248 F.2d 541, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 3827 (6th Cir. Ky. 1957 ).

3.Setting Brake.

Plaintiff ’s proof that he was struck and injured by defendant’s runaway automobile shortly after defendant parked it on hill established a clear case for application of the “res ipsa loquitur” doctrine and defendant’s testimony that he effectively set the brake and turned wheels to curb was insufficient to overcome presumption of negligence on his part, and a directed verdict in favor of defendant was error. Lewis v. Wolk, 312 Ky. 536 , 228 S.W.2d 432, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 692 ( Ky. 1950 ).

Under subsection (3) of this section the mere setting of the brake when parking on a hill does not constitute statutory compliance, the brake must be “effectively” set. Lewis v. Wolk, 312 Ky. 536 , 228 S.W.2d 432, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 692 ( Ky. 1950 ).

NOTES TO UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS

1.Locking Ignition and Removing Key.

Unpublished decision: Statute did not impose a duty upon a car salesman to remove the ignition key from the unattended vehicle parked in his apartment parking lot because the statute did not apply to a private driveway; an apartment complex parking lot is owned by the property owner and, depending on the lease agreement, permitted to be used by the residents and guests, and thus, it is analogous to a private driveway and is not a public way used by motorists to travel from one point to another. Fentress v. Martin Cadillac, Inc., 2015 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 873 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2015), review denied, ordered not published, 2016 Ky. LEXIS 163 (Ky. Mar. 9, 2016).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In the absence of a city ordinance a police officer is not authorized to remove a car found with the keys in the ignition switch. OAG 79-559 .

The purpose of this section is to prevent theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle and the protection or safety of the public. OAG 79-559 .

When an officer finds a vehicle with the keys in the ignition switch in violation of this section it is sufficient for the officer to leave a citation in the car for the violation and to take the keys from the car to the police station. OAG 79-559 .

189.440. Starting a parked vehicle.

No person shall start a vehicle that is stopped or parked unless and until the movement can be made with reasonable safety.

History. 2739g-69o.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Application.

This section is applicable where a motorist drives his car from the side of the road out across the near lane and in front of an automobile proceeding in the far lane of the highway. Clay v. Sammons, 239 S.W.2d 927, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 906 ( Ky. 1951 ).

2.Backing.

Where driver of truck parked at curb on city street backed up truck three or four feet and struck child standing in street behind truck, it was prejudicial error to give a “last clear chance” instruction, since the circumstances made the “last clear chance” doctrine inapplicable. Thomas v. Boklage, 293 Ky. 804 , 170 S.W.2d 348, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 710 ( Ky. 1943 ).

If driver of vehicle parked at curb knows, or should have discovered by exercise of ordinary care, that pedestrian is standing in street behind vehicle, it is negligent for him to back vehicle without warning. Thomas v. Boklage, 293 Ky. 804 , 170 S.W.2d 348, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 710 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Whether driver of parked vehicle was negligent in not discovering presence of pedestrian behind vehicle was for the jury. Thomas v. Boklage, 293 Ky. 804 , 170 S.W.2d 348, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 710 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Where a driver traveling on an interstate highway realized he had missed his exit, pulled to the emergency lane, began backing his automobile, backed onto the highway and was hit from behind by an approaching automobile, he was negligent as a matter of law. Ferguson v. Stevenson, 427 S.W.2d 822, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 698 ( Ky. 1968 ).

3.Pulling onto Highway.

In action for injuries arising out of a motor vehicular accident allegedly caused by the defendant operating his car from the berm of a highway into the path of the plaintiff’s car causing the plaintiff to lose control, the trial court erred in directing the verdict against the defendant, where he testified that he was 700 feet in front of the plaintiff’s car when he pulled onto the traveled portion of the highway and the driver of the plaintiff’s car admitted seeing defendant’s car by the road and that she knew that he would drive back onto the road after he picked up a passenger. Hargis v. Noel, 310 Ky. 542 , 221 S.W.2d 94, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 969 ( Ky. 1949 ).

4.Contributory Negligence.

Where plaintiff stood in the street in front of his car and poured anti-freeze in his car’s radiator and defendant who was parked in front of plaintiff’s car without warning backed his car against plaintiff thereby injuring him, plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Clem v. Ball, 237 S.W.2d 839, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 777 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Question of contributory negligence of plaintiff who moved his car from a parked position and was struck by truck approaching from the west as he was attempting to move into the right or eastbound lane at an angle was for the jury. Gauze v. Horn, 253 S.W.2d 606, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 1108 ( Ky. 1952 ).

Plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law in the operation of her husband’s car where she had an unobstructed view for 1,600 feet toward the west, looked up and down the street before driving the car from a parked position and then drove diagonally across the street and was struck in the right rear fender after traveling about 100 feet since her lookout duty was not confined to the time and place she started out. Lewis v. Walters, 341 S.W.2d 67, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 65 ( Ky. 1960 ).

189.450. Stopping, standing, parking, or repairing vehicle on roadway or shoulders of highway.

  1. No person shall stop a vehicle, leave it standing, or cause it to stop or to be left standing upon any portion of the roadway; provided, however, that this section shall not be construed to prevent parking in front of a private residence off the roadway or street in a city or suburban area where such parking is otherwise permitted, as long as the vehicle so parked does not impede the flow of traffic. This subsection shall not apply to:
    1. A vehicle that has been disabled on the right-of-way of such a highway in such a manner and to such extent that it is impossible to avoid the occupation of the shoulder of a state-maintained highway or impracticable to remove it from the shoulder of the highway until repairs have been made or sufficient help obtained for its removal. In no event shall a disabled vehicle remain on the shoulder of a state-maintained highway for twenty-four (24) hours or more;
    2. Motor vehicles when required to stop in obedience to the provisions of any section of the Kentucky Revised Statutes or any traffic ordinance, regulation, or sign or the command of any peace officer;
    3. Vehicles operating as common carriers of passengers for hire and school buses taking passengers on such vehicle or discharging passengers therefrom; provided, that no such vehicle shall stop for such purposes at a place on the highway which does not afford reasonable visibility to approaching motor vehicles from both directions;
    4. Vehicles which are stopped for a period of not more than fifteen (15) minutes at a time for the purpose of collecting and transporting solid waste as defined in KRS 224.1-010 (30) (a), and which are operated by a:
      1. Collection service registered in accordance with KRS 224.43-315 ; or
      2. Person or organization actively participating in the Adopt-a-Highway Program; or
    5. Any vehicle required to stop by reason of an obstruction to its progress.
  2. When any police officer finds a vehicle standing upon such a highway in violation of this section, he may move or cause to be moved the vehicle or require the operator or other person in charge of the vehicle to move it. The police officer may cause the vehicle to be removed by ordering any person engaged in the business of storing or towing motor vehicles to remove the vehicle to a site chosen by such person. Ownership of the vehicle shall be determined by the police officer’s enforcement agency through the vehicle’s license plates, serial number, or other means of determining ownership. As soon as practicable, the police officer’s enforcement agency shall notify the owner by mail that the vehicle was illegally upon public property; the name and address of the storage facility where the vehicle is located; that removal of the vehicle from the storage facility will involve payment of towing and storage charges; and that the vehicle may be sold pursuant to the provisions of KRS 376.275 if not claimed within sixty (60) days. No notification shall be required if ownership cannot be determined. In the event of a sale pursuant to KRS 376.275 , the state shall receive any proceeds after the satisfaction of all liens placed on the vehicle.
  3. No vehicle shall be parked, stopped, or allowed to stand on the shoulders of any toll road, interstate highway, or other fully controlled access highway, including ramps thereto, nor shall any vehicle registered at a gross weight of over forty-four thousand (44,000) pounds be parked, stopped, or allowed to stand on the shoulders of any state-maintained highway, except that, in the case of emergency or in response to a peace officer’s signal, vehicles shall be permitted to stop on the shoulders to the right of the traveled way with all wheels and projecting parts of the vehicles, including the load, completely clear of the traveled way. Parking of any vehicle which is disabled on the shoulders of a toll road, interstate highway, other fully controlled access highway, including ramps thereto, or any state-maintained highway not mentioned in this section for twenty-four (24) hours continuously is prohibited and vehicles violating this provision may be towed away at the cost of the owner.
  4. When any police officer finds a vehicle unattended upon any bridge or causeway or in a tunnel where the vehicle constitutes an obstruction to traffic, the officer may provide for the removal of the vehicle to the nearest garage or other place of safety as provided in subsection (2) of this section.
  5. No person shall stop or park a vehicle except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the directions of a police officer or traffic control device, in the following places:
    1. On a sidewalk;
    2. In front of sidewalk ramps provided for persons with disabilities;
    3. In front of a public or private driveway;
    4. Within an intersection or on a crosswalk;
    5. At any place where official signs prohibit stopping or parking;
    6. Within thirty (30) feet upon the approach to any flashing beacon, stop sign, or traffic control signal located at the side of a roadway;
    7. On any controlled access highway;
    8. Within a highway tunnel;
    9. Within fifteen (15) feet of a fire hydrant; or
    10. In an area between the roadways of a divided highway.
  6. No person shall move a vehicle not lawfully under his control into any such prohibited area.
  7. The restrictions in subsection (5)(e) of this section shall not apply to sheriffs and their deputies or police officers when operating properly identified vehicles during performance of their official duties.

HISTORY: 2739g-48: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 206, § 3; 1954, ch. 235; 1962, ch. 288, § 2; 1964, ch. 25, § 1; 1970, ch. 93, § 11; 1974, ch. 405, § 1; 1980, ch. 163, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 318, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 322, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 80, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1994, ch. 405, § 39, effective July 15, 1994; 2006, ch. 173, § 19, effective July 12, 2006; 2016 ch. 19, § 1, effective July 15, 2016; 2017 ch. 117, § 21, effective June 29, 2017.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Purpose.

Although this section related to stopping of motor vehicles to make repairs or for passengers, its purpose was to prevent a person from leaving a motor vehicle standing on a main traveled portion of a public highway. Bradley v. Clarke, 219 Ky. 438 , 293 S.W. 1082, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 391 ( Ky. 1927 ).

Apparently this section relates to the stopping of a motor vehicle for the purpose of making repairs or taking on or discharging passengers, but the purpose of the statute undoubtedly was to prevent any person from stopping a motor vehicle and leaving it standing on a main traveled portion of any public highway. Hendricks v. Garst, 314 Ky. 49 , 234 S.W.2d 160, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 1009 ( Ky. 1950 ).

Purpose of this section was to prevent any person from stopping a motor vehicle and leaving it standing on main traveled portion of a highway and one who parks his car in such a position has burden of showing that he is within the exceptions stated in the statute. Bosshammer v. Lawton, 237 S.W.2d 520, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 759 ( Ky. 1951 ).

The purpose of this section is to prevent the highway from being obstructed by stationary vehicles, and one leaving a vehicle standing on the highway has the burden of showing that he comes within one of the exceptions enumerated therein. Banner Transfer Co. v. Morse, 274 S.W.2d 380, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1226 ( Ky. 1954 ).

2.Construction.

Subsection (1) of this section is not limited by subsection (4) (now (5)). The latter subsection is aimed primarily at stopping or parking off the main traveled portion of a highway. Jack Cole Co. v. Hoff, 274 S.W.2d 658, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1236 ( Ky. 1954 ).

3.Application.

This section does not apply to state highway within residential district of city. Cottrell v. Martin A. Ceder, Inc., 376 S.W.2d 536, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 457 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Although this section does not apply to city streets, the exemption does not extend to counties even though they contain suburban areas. Evans v. Lorenz, 454 S.W.2d 691, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1969 ).

This section is applicable to suburban streets in unincorporated areas. Wheeler v. Creekmore, 469 S.W.2d 559, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 304 ( Ky. 1971 ).

Police officer was not exempt pursuant to KRS 189.450(7) from the requirements of KRS 189.430 that required all motor vehicle operators to stop the engine and take the keys to the ignition when exiting the vehicle. Fact that the officer was investigating an accident scene did not exempt him from this duty imposed on all drivers. Pile v. City of Brandenburg, 215 S.W.3d 36, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 322 ( Ky. 2006 ).

State statute prohibiting parking on a roadway under KRS 189.450 prevailed over a municipal ordinance pursuant to KRS 82.082 because the ordinance conflicted with the state provision. Norton v. Canadian Am. Tank Lines, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2184 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 12, 2009).

4.Stopping on Highway.

While stopping a vehicle on the main traveled portion of a highway is negligence per se, it does not create liability unless such stopping was a proximate cause of the injury. Michael v. United States, 338 F.2d 219, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 3861 (6th Cir. Ky. 1964 ).

Truck driver forced to stop truck on highway in order to make switch to auxiliary gasoline tank was not negligent in stopping on right-hand side of highway which, though having a slight upgrade, was straight at that point. Freeman v. W. T. Sistrunk & Co., 312 Ky. 438 , 227 S.W.2d 979, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 665 ( Ky. 1950 ), overruled in part, Mitchell v. Doolittle, 429 S.W.2d 862, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 765 ( Ky. 1968 ), but see, Mitchell v. Doolittle, 429 S.W.2d 862, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 765 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Where plaintiff was driving 30 to 35 miles per hour at night in heavy fog and struck defendant’s automobile which was stopped in the plaintiff’s lane with the lights burning, the trial court erred in directing the verdict for the plaintiff and should have submitted the question to the jury on the question of proximate cause. Burnett v. Yurt, 247 S.W.2d 227, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 683 ( Ky. 1952 ).

Questions of whether the taillights of car rammed in the rear were on and of contributory negligence of motorist hitting the car in the rear were for the jury where the evidence was conflicting and the driver of the car hit in the rear denied he was stopped on the highway in violation of this section and that his taillights were not on but testified he was traveling very slowly hunting a place to stop for he had noticed a car in the ditch along his right side of the highway. Richardson v. Baker, 251 S.W.2d 858, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 939 ( Ky. 1952 ).

Where a vehicle operator stopped his car on the traveled portion of the highway because the hood flew up and obstructed his vision and he remained on highway for 15 minutes or longer when the evidence showed that the car could have been driven off the traveled portion of the road with a minimum of care, he was negligent as a matter of law. Mullins v. Bullens, 383 S.W.2d 130, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 15 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Where highway employe stopped highway truck on traveled portion of the highway and failed to put out signs and by reason thereof an injury was occasioned to a traveler on the highway, the highway employe was liable for negligence. Dixie Transport Co. v. Reed, 386 S.W.2d 735, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 177 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Where the plaintiff struck a state police car that had slowed in the driving lane to signal to an approaching wrecker to direct him to a disabled vehicle, the wrecker did not come under the exceptions to the prohibition against stopping on a highway because the wrecker was not “at the scene of” an accident. Williams v. Chilton, 427 S.W.2d 586, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 687 ( Ky. 1968 ), overruled in part, Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 261 ( Ky. 1984 ) (decision prior to 1970 amendment).

Owner of taxi was not liable for injuries to motorist and his car where driver of taxi without owner’s knowledge or consent and outside the scope of his duties stopped the taxi in violation of this section to assist the motorist from a ditch and in so doing partially blocked the highway and another automobile struck motorist’s automobile and even if it had been in the scope of taxi driver’s duties the motorist was grossly negligent where he was present and did not himself place signals warning other travelers of the danger. Brock v. Bennett, 304 Ky. 338 , 200 S.W.2d 745, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 635 ( Ky. 1947 ).

A motorist is absolved from his duty not to voluntarily stop on the main traveled portion of the road if his car becomes disabled and it becomes impossible or impracticable not to occupy that portion of the highway. Floyd v. Gray, 657 S.W.2d 936, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 273 ( Ky. 1983 ), limited, Hardin v. Action Graphics, Inc., 57 S.W.3d 844, 2001 Ky. App. LEXIS 7 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).

Because a truck driver violated KRS 189.450 by parking with his truck extended into a roadway as defined under KRS 189.010 , he was negligent as a matter of law under KRS 446.070 and his employer was vicariously liable for plaintiff’s injuries resulting from that negligence. Norton v. Canadian Am. Tank Lines, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2184 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 12, 2009).

5.— Last Clear Chance.

Open violation of this section and KRS 189.030 and 189.040 in bringing unlighted automobile to rest on left side of center of highway obstructing the entire portion of the right traffic lane would have precluded any recovery plaintiff ’s estate might otherwise have been entitled to on account of defendant’s negligent operation of car with vision restricted by use of lights on low beam driving at a maximum lawful rate of speed at nighttime on a highway known to be heavily traveled except for the last clear chance doctrine but where it was undisputed that no approaching traffic was observed and that no traffic was closely following, defendant could have passed from right traffic lane to the left and avoided the collision. Johnson v. Hunt, 122 F. Supp. 816, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3318 (D. Ky. 1954 ).

Where a driver stopped on the main traveled portion of a highway so that she could back up onto the shoulder of the road and was struck by a following driver after two cars had gone by her in the passing lane, her stopping in violation of this section was a direct and proximate cause of the accident as a matter of law, with the result that she could recover against the following driver only under the last clear chance doctrine while the following driver could recover on his counterclaim if he was not contributorily negligent. Woosley v. Smith, 471 S.W.2d 737, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 262 ( Ky. 1971 ).

6.— Command of Police Officer.

Where a state police officer signaled for an approaching wrecker to slow down so the officer could direct the wrecker to a disabled vehicle, the signal given by the officer was a command within the meaning of the statute but such a signal did not relieve the driver of the wrecker from exercising ordinary care. Williams v. Chilton, 427 S.W.2d 586, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 687 ( Ky. 1968 ), overruled in part, Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 261 ( Ky. 1984 ).

7.Parking.

No liability should be imposed upon truck owners who parked their trucks near curb on city street, in absence of ordinance controlling subject or of evidence of negligent parking. Kimble v. Standard Oil Co., 235 Ky. 169 , 30 S.W.2d 890, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 324 ( Ky. 1930 ), limited, Evans v. Lorenz, 454 S.W.2d 691, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1969 ).

One transporting seven-year-old boy for hire from school to home who stopped on opposite side of city street from home, thus requiring boy to cross street, was negligent as to selecting place to discharge boy, since driver could have stopped on left side next to home. Taylor v. Patterson's Adm'r, 272 Ky. 415 , 114 S.W.2d 488, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 131 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Where bus driver, on coming over rise 500 feet from the point where car was parked, sounded his horn and slowed his speed to about 25 miles per hour, but did not sound his horn again until he was within 15 or 20 feet of parked car, second sounding of horn was not sufficient to warn person who was standing beside parked car, and it was a jury question as to whether bus driver used proper diligence in approaching the parked car. Short Way Lines, Inc. v. Sutton's Adm'r, 291 Ky. 541 , 164 S.W.2d 809, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 239 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Evidence that truck was parked partly on pavement, on wrong side of road and without lights, was sufficient to take case to jury, notwithstanding some evidence of contributory negligence on part of driver of car that struck truck. Midland Baking Co. v. Kitchen, 293 Ky. 160 , 168 S.W.2d 372, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 8 ( Ky. 1942 ).

When a motorist collided with rear of defendant’s wrecker which was parked without flares on traveled portion of highway on rainy, foggy night in front of a private driveway and less than 150 feet from brow of a hill in violation of this section and the motorist saw lights on rear of wrecker before accident occurred, question of proximate cause of collision should have been submitted to jury. Carpenter v. Page Bros. Motor Co., 242 S.W.2d 993, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1094 ( Ky. 1951 ) (decision prior to 1970 amendment).

Where wrecker was parked on straight level stretch of highway and no brow of a hill or other obstruction interfered with driver’s view, instruction on this section presented false issue unrelated to facts of the case. Harry Holder Motor Co. v. Davidson, 243 S.W.2d 926, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1188 ( Ky. 1951 ) (decision prior to 1970 amendment).

A sixth-class city may by ordinance properly prohibit parking in front of a bus station from 15 minutes before a bus is due until it leaves, may require the bus company to post signs showing the times at which buses arrive, and allow a bus to protrude into an intersection when parked where the bus company is required to have someone at the intersection to direct traffic when a bus is so protruding. Gibson v. Hardinsburg, 247 S.W.2d 31, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 662 ( Ky. 1952 ).

Under this section in the absence of a city ordinance or lawful police regulation, authorized by ordinance prohibiting parking, a person may lawfully park in a proper manner on a city street in the daytime. Duff v. Lykins, 306 S.W.2d 252, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1957 ), limited, Evans v. Lorenz, 454 S.W.2d 691, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1969 ).

In litigation growing out of collision of two trucks allegedly caused by parking of a third truck on the highway on a curve in ice and snow in violation of this section, which was admitted, and questions of negligence, contributory negligence and unavoidable accident under the circumstances were submitted to the jury and not complained of by motorist violating the section, court on appeal concluded the proof supported the jury’s finding and award. Peck v. Hickman, 321 S.W.2d 395, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 277 ( Ky. 1959 ).

Where the driver of defendant’s truck stopped the truck partially in the eastbound lane of a two-lane road and another agent of the defendant parked a car in the middle of the road beside the truck so that the car lights blinded approaching eastbound drivers, the parking of the car was negligent as a matter of law. Duncan v. Wiseman Baking Co., 357 S.W.2d 694, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 27 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Although party was clearly negligent in having his auto parked partly on traveled portion of highway, contributory negligence of one colliding with it would prevent recovery. Russell v. Prater, 419 S.W.2d 764, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 193 ( Ky. 1967 ).

8.— Near Highway.

One who in nighttime was working on his automobile which was not standing on paved, traveled portion of county highway and had lights burning was not contributorily negligent as matter of law when struck by rapidly moving truck. Glasgow Ice Cream Co. v. Fults' Adm'r, 268 Ky. 447 , 105 S.W.2d 135, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 472 ( Ky. 1937 ).

Presence of parked car on side of road is notice or warning to other vehicle operators that someone might be about the car and in a place of danger. Short Way Lines, Inc. v. Sutton's Adm'r, 291 Ky. 541 , 164 S.W.2d 809, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 239 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Where a highway divided to form a “v,” the middle of which was customarily used as a parking area although not officially so marked, and the traveled portions of the highway were well defined on either side of this middle area, the parking of a bus in this middle area well off of the traveled portions of the highway was not negligent. Howard v. Fowler, 306 Ky. 567 , 207 S.W.2d 559, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 1016 ( Ky. 1947 ).

If a motorist lawfully may park a vehicle at a particular place in the daytime he reasonably assumes he may leave it there after dark as a parked vehicle. Duff v. Lykins, 306 S.W.2d 252, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1957 ), limited, Evans v. Lorenz, 454 S.W.2d 691, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Where the plaintiff had parked his truck one half on the highway and one half on the grass, he had violated this section even though the county had not designated the area as a “no parking area.” Evans v. Lorenz, 454 S.W.2d 691, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Where the plaintiff parked her car in the left-hand lane of a highway and was hit head-on by an approaching car, her actions were a probable cause of the accident. Wheeler v. Creekmore, 469 S.W.2d 559, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 304 ( Ky. 1971 ).

Where trucker parked his truck on shoulder of road in violation of subsection (3) of this section and driver of car who fell asleep at wheel of his car ran into the truck, since evidence was uncontradicted that truck driver’s parking on the shoulder created a situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which trucker was not responsible, jury was free to conclude that car driver’s own negligence was so overwhelming as to negate trucker’s negligence. Tennyson v. Brower, 823 F. Supp. 421, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8612 (E.D. Ky. 1993 ).

9.— At Curb.

Operator of “curb service” gasoline service station was not liable for injuries sustained by customer whose auto, parked at curb to receive gasoline, was struck by another auto. Gates v. Kuchle, 281 Ky. 13 , 134 S.W.2d 1002, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 19 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Operator of “curb service” gasoline station had no control over street and was not a guarantor of the safety of the street; his operation of station was not an obstruction of the street and he had no duty to warn customer of dangers of parking at curb to receive gasoline, since dangers were equally apparent to customer. Gates v. Kuchle, 281 Ky. 13 , 134 S.W.2d 1002, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 19 ( Ky. 1939 ).

If parking at curb to receive gasoline from “curb service” gasoline station was a violation of this section, the negligence arising therefrom could not form the basis of liability on the part of the operator of the station. Gates v. Kuchle, 281 Ky. 13 , 134 S.W.2d 1002, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 19 ( Ky. 1939 ).

10.— Wrong Side of Highway.

Truck driver was guilty of negligence where he parked truck on wrong side of country highway with headlights burning and because of fog and darkness oncoming motorist could not locate side of highway on which it was located and believed it was moving. Padgett v. Brangan, 228 Ky. 440 , 15 S.W.2d 277, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 569 ( Ky. 1929 ).

11.— Driveway.

A property owner may not park on a public street so as to block his own drive. Allsmiller v. Johnson, 309 Ky. 695 , 218 S.W.2d 28, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 738 ( Ky. 1949 ).

12.Backing in Emergency Lane.

Where a driver traveling on an interstate highway realized he had missed his exit, pulled to the emergency lane, began backing his automobile, backed onto the highway and was hit from behind by an approaching automobile, he was negligent as a matter of law. Ferguson v. Stevenson, 427 S.W.2d 822, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 698 ( Ky. 1968 ).

13.Ordinary Care.

A mere compliance with the statute or ordinance does not absolve a motorist from negligence if he has failed to exercise ordinary care. O'Donley v. Shelby, 262 S.W.2d 362, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 1085 ( Ky. 1953 ).

14.Passengers.

One who merely accompanied owner of truck, but had nothing to do with its operation and who alighted when it broke down to assist in repairing it, had status of pedestrian, required to use due care for own safety but not responsible for violation, if any, of this section. Tate v. Hall, 247 Ky. 843 , 57 S.W.2d 986, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 454 ( Ky. 1933 ).

15.Disabled Vehicles.

This section does not apply where traveling automobile becomes disabled on highway making it impossible to avoid occupying part of road or impracticable to remove car therefrom while being repaired. Tate v. Hall, 247 Ky. 843 , 57 S.W.2d 986, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 454 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Heavily loaded truck whose rear wheel came off on highway was within exception against leaving vehicle standing on main traveled portion of highway, and was not liable for rear-end collision with automobile, where truck’s rear lights were left burning and flares were placed on highway while operator sought aid for repairs. Stevens' Adm'r v. Watt, 266 Ky. 608 , 99 S.W.2d 753, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 717 ( Ky. 1936 ).

Where car had already gotten out of ditch and was moving under its own power at time of collision, there was no reason for instruction relating to disabled cars. Tucker v. Ragland-Potter Co., 285 Ky. 533 , 148 S.W.2d 691, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 422 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Under this section it is not negligence to leave a car temporarily upon the main traveled portion of the highway if it is disabled. American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Patterson, 243 S.W.2d 472, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1127 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Where automobile overturned on right side of main traveled portion of highway and driver and passengers went to nearby house, action of driver of automobile in leaving the automobile on the highway was not such negligence as to make her responsible for damages resulting when bus crashed into automobile and caused automobile to strike bystanders. American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Patterson, 243 S.W.2d 472, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1127 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Where a motorist struck a vehicle stopped in the other lane of a two-lane highway for repairs while he was temporarily blinded by the lights of another vehicle, the question of which motorist’s negligence was the proximate cause of the collision was properly submitted to the jury. Ashton v. Roop, 244 S.W.2d 727, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1231 ( Ky. 1951 ).

A disabled vehicle must be removed from the highway unless it is impracticable to do so. Banner Transfer Co. v. Morse, 274 S.W.2d 380, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1226 ( Ky. 1954 ).

This section does not prevent a vehicle which is disabled from stopping on the main traveled portion of a highway. Smith v. Collins, 277 S.W.2d 38, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 460 ( Ky. 1955 ).

If stopping a motor vehicle on the highway is necessary for the safe operation of the vehicle (or in compliance with law) it is not prohibited. Clardy v. Robinson, 284 S.W.2d 651, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 29 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Where a disabled truck had been stopped partially on a road at least 15 minutes and two men had had time to set out a flare 100 feet in front of the truck and start connecting jumper cables, the failure to place a warning flare behind the truck was negligence as a matter of law. Duncan v. Wiseman Baking Co., 357 S.W.2d 694, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 27 ( Ky. 1961 ).

A disabled vehicle must be removed from the highway unless it is impractical to do so and whether failure to remove vehicle constituted negligence was jury question under evidence. Service Lines, Inc. v. Mitchell, 419 S.W.2d 525, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 150 ( Ky. 1967 ).

16.— Repairing Flat.

This section does not allow a motorist to leave his car on a road when it has only minor damage and is movable, but, where the decedent had stopped his car partially on a road in order to repair a flat tire, it was for the jury to determine whether the decedent was negligent in stopping his car on the road. Sears v. Frost's Adm'r, 279 S.W.2d 776, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 539 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Violation of this section in leaving car parked on highway did not constitute a breach of any duty owed to garage employee who was killed by passing automobile while changing a tire on the automobile and even if it should be considered that a violation of this section was negligence as to the garage employe the violation did not constitute a proximate cause of the accident since the garage employee, knowing the danger involved in changing a tire on a heavily traveled highway, assumed the risk. Lanzner v. Wentworth, 315 S.W.2d 622, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 330 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Where a bus had a flat tire and the driver stopped it after pulling off the road as far as possible to the right, partially on the road, but there was a graveled strip along the left side of the road that was wide enough for the bus to occupy without protruding onto the road, the bus driver testified that the bus could not practically be stopped on that graveled strip, and another person familiar with the operation of buses testified that the bus could have easily been stopped on such strip, the question of the bus driver’s negligence should have been submitted to the jury, if it had been relevant. Greyhound Corp. v. White, 323 S.W.2d 578, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Where a commercial bus stopped partially in the right traffic lane of a road in order to repair a flat tire, a school bus traveling in the same direction was then stopped in the left lane a few feet behind it, and a car also traveling in the same direction then hit both buses in an attempt to stop on the slick road, the parking of the school bus so as to materially obstruct the road was so unusual and extraordinary that the commercial bus driver could not have foreseen it and therefore the parking of the school bus was an intervening cause of the accident so as to relieve the commercial bus driver of liability even if his stopping was negligent. Greyhound Corp. v. White, 323 S.W.2d 578, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1958 ).

The pure assumption of risk doctrine under which a plaintiff is barred even though he acted reasonably should no longer be recognized or applied because reasonableness of conduct should be the basic consideration of all negligence cases and whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent in failing to observe the standard of care of the ordinarily prudent man or the statutory standard of care is a question for the jury but a man who stopped to change a tire on a woman’s automobile illegally parked under this section and who was injured when the car was struck in the rear by a passing motorist did not himself violate the section and is not chargeable with statutory negligence and he could be found guilty of common-law negligence only if he failed to act as an ordinarily prudent man, which was a question for the jury. Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 71 ( Ky. 1967 ).

17.Emergency Vehicle.

The legislature intended the term “emergency vehicle” to include ambulances, fire trucks and similar vehicles which ordinarily are equipped with flashing lights and other warning devices. Jack Cole Co. v. Hoff, 274 S.W.2d 658, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1236 ( Ky. 1954 ) (decision prior to 1970 amendment).

The legislature did not intend the term “emergency vehicle” to apply to the ordinary motorist who stops to assist a fellow motorist in distress. Jack Cole Co. v. Hoff, 274 S.W.2d 658, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1236 ( Ky. 1954 ) (decision prior to 1970 amendment).

Where the plaintiff struck a state police car that had slowed in the driving lane to signal an approaching wrecker to direct him to a disabled vehicle, the police car’s statutory exemption from the prohibition against stopping on a highway did not relieve the officer from exercising ordinary care. Williams v. Chilton, 427 S.W.2d 586, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 687 ( Ky. 1968 ), overruled in part, Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 261 ( Ky. 1984 ) (decision prior to 1970 amendment).

Where the plaintiff struck a state police car that had slowed in the driving lane to signal to an approaching wrecker to direct him to a disabled vehicle, the exceptions apply to the state police officer because a “police vehicle” is an emergency vehicle “at all times.” Williams v. Chilton, 427 S.W.2d 586, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 687 ( Ky. 1968 ), overruled in part, Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 261 ( Ky. 1984 ) (decision prior to 1970 amendment).

18.Instructions.

Where owner of a pharmacy noticed one of his employes waiting at a bus stop and stopped on a four-lane highway to pick her up and take her to work and his automobile was struck in the rear by a truck and there was a conflict in the evidence as to signals, how far the stopped automobile was on the highway and whether there was another automobile present and the circuit judge gave instruction that it was the duty of the owner of the pharmacy not to stop or leave his automobile standing upon the main traveled portion of the highway and upon the request of the jury for clarification refused to clarify the instruction on the ground that it followed a statute and was stated in understandable words and no objection was made to his refusal, the objection was not properly preserved for appeal. Jackson v. Louisville Asphalt Co., 308 S.W.2d 790, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 139 ( Ky. 1957 ).

It is not the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury that violation of this section is negligence as a matter of law but the plaintiff should have presented the question to the trial court by a motion to direct the jury to find a verdict in favor of plaintiff on the liability of defendant for damages thus leaving the amount of damages to be determined by the jury if the motion was sustained and after an adverse ruling and verdict the plaintiff should have presented the question again by a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in absence of proper motions the trial court had no duty to make such rulings and the verdict could not be attacked on appeal as being contrary to the law and evidence. Thacker's Adm'r v. Salyers, 290 S.W.2d 830, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 348 ( Ky. 1956 ).

The trial court did not err in giving an instruction that the plaintiff had a duty not to stop her car and leave it standing on the main portion of the highway. Wheeler v. Creekmore, 469 S.W.2d 559, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 304 ( Ky. 1971 ).

Whether the plaintiff stopped her car in the left-hand lane and was hit head-on by an approaching car, the plaintiff was entitled to a last clear chance instruction conditioned on whether the jury did or did not believe her lights were on so that her plight could be readily seen by the defendant. Wheeler v. Creekmore, 469 S.W.2d 559, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 304 ( Ky. 1971 ).

Cited:

Peden’s Adm’r v. Reynolds, 287 Ky. 641 , 154 S.W.2d 708, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 595 ( Ky. 1941 ); Turpin v. Scrivner, 297 Ky. 365 , 178 S.W.2d 971, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 671 (1944); Howard v. Fowler, 306 Ky. 567 , 207 S.W.2d 559, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 1016 ( Ky. 1947 ); Allsmiller v. Johnson, 309 Ky. 695 , 218 S.W.2d 28, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 738 ( Ky. 1949 ); Ashton v. Roop, 244 S.W.2d 727, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1231 ( Ky. 1951 ); Burnett v. Yurt, 247 S.W.2d 227, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 683 ( Ky. 1952 ); Gibson v. Hardinsburg, 247 S.W.2d 31, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 662 ( Ky. 1952 ); Williams v. Commonwealth, 261 S.W.2d 807, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 1059 , 43 A.L.R.2d 490 ( Ky. 1953 ); Smith v. Collins, 277 S.W.2d 38, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 460 ( Ky. 1955 ); Sears v. Frost’s Adm’r, 279 S.W.2d 776, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 539 ( Ky. 1955 ); Branch v. Whitaker, 294 S.W.2d 948, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 154 ( Ky. 1956 ); Greyhound Corp. v. White, 323 S.W.2d 578, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1958 ); Duncan v. Wiseman Baking Co., 357 S.W.2d 694, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 27 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A school bus may not stop to receive or discharge passengers in a no passing area as defined in KRS 189.340(4) (now KRS 189.340(5)). OAG 64-23 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Glass dropped from damaged vehicle on highway to be removed by person removing vehicle, KRS 189.754 .

State and federal highways, KRS ch. 177.

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Automobiles, §§ 16.30, 16.32 — 16.37.

189.455. Parking privileges for handicapped — Special registration plates — Issuance — Violations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 94, §§ 1-4; 1970, ch. 92, § 59; 1970, ch. 117, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 239, § 17, effective June 17, 1978. For present law, see KRS 186.042 .

189.456. Accessible parking placard for person with a disability — Duplicate placard — Fees — Proof of disability — Application by parent or guardian — Organizations transporting disabled individuals — Display — Administrative regulations.

  1. On the application of any person who has a severe visual, audio, or physical impairment, including partial paralysis, lower limb amputation, chronic heart condition, emphysema, arthritis, rheumatism, or other debilitating condition which limits or impairs one’s personal mobility or ability to walk, the county clerk in the county of the person’s residence shall issue the person with a disability an accessible parking placard. In addition, any agency or organization which transports persons with a disability as a part of the service provided by that agency or organization shall receive an accessible parking placard upon application to the county clerk for each vehicle used in the transportation of persons with a disability. The accessible parking placard issued shall be a two (2) sided hanger style placard and shall on each side bear the international symbol of access adopted by Rehabilitation International in 1969. One (1) side of the placard shall bear the date of expiration of the placard, a seal or other identification of the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet, and shall contain the accessible parking placard identification number and other information the Transportation Cabinet may by regulation require. The international symbol of access shall be at least three (3) inches in height, be centered on the placard and in a white color on a blue shield. Any information contained on the placard shall be written in indelible ink or inscribed in other permanent fashion so as to prevent tampering with or the changing of information contained on the placard.
  2. The county clerk shall issue an applicant one (1) accessible parking placard at no cost. Except as outlined in subsection (7) of this section, an applicant may obtain one (1) duplicate placard. A fee of ten dollars ($10) shall be assessed for an initial or renewal duplicate placard, of which eight dollars ($8) shall be forwarded to the road fund and two dollars ($2) shall be retained by the clerk. The placard shall be valid for a period of six (6) years and may be renewed an unlimited number of times. A placard shall expire in the applicant’s birth month and may be renewed up to twelve (12) months prior to its expiration date. Upon renewal, a receipt and decal shall be issued that both contain the placard number, placard expiration date, and other information required by the Transportation Cabinet. The decal shall be affixed to the existing placard. Placards shall be printed at cabinet expense. The county clerk of each county shall keep a record of applications filed and placards issued. Placards issued under this section shall be issued in the name of the applicant and shall not be tied to the applicant’s motor vehicle or a motor vehicle used to transport the applicant.
  3. For every person seeking an initial accessible parking placard or renewal of a placard issued prior to July 14, 2018, proof of the disability shall be required by:
    1. Evidence that the individual has a license plate for a person with a disability as provided by KRS 186.041 or 186.042 ;
    2. The county clerk issuing the permit ascertaining that the applicant meets the criteria established by the Transportation Cabinet for determining that the applicant is disabled; or
    3. A statement from a licensed physician, physician assistant, chiropractor, or advanced practice registered nurse that the applicant is a person whose mobility, flexibility, coordination, respiration, or perceptiveness is significantly reduced by a permanent disability to that person’s arms, legs, lungs, heart, ears, or eyes. The statement shall be on a form prescribed by the Transportation Cabinet and shall not be dated more than sixty (60) days prior to the date of application.
    1. A parent or guardian of a disabled minor may apply for a placard on behalf of the disabled person by submitting the form identified in subsection (3) of this section. (4) (a) A parent or guardian of a disabled minor may apply for a placard on behalf of the disabled person by submitting the form identified in subsection (3) of this section.
    2. A parent or guardian of a disabled adult may apply for a placard on behalf of the disabled person by submitting the form identified in subsection (3) of this section and a power of attorney or proof of guardianship for the disabled person.
  4. The Transportation Cabinet may allow the county clerk to issue an accessible disabled placard to an organization transporting disabled individuals. For every agency or organization seeking an accessible parking placard for a person with a disability, application for the placard shall include:
    1. Name of the agency or organization requesting use of an accessible parking placard;
    2. Number of vehicles being used in the transportation of persons with a disability; and
    3. A statement from the director of the agency or organization verifying the need for the parking placard.
  5. The accessible parking placard shall, when the vehicle is parked in a parking space identified as accessible to a person with a disability, be displayed so that the expiration date may be viewed from the front of the vehicle by hanging the placard from the front windshield rear view mirror. When there is no rear view mirror, the placard shall be displayed on the dashboard so that the expiration date may be viewed.
  6. A person who has been issued a license plate for a person with a disability under the provisions of KRS 186.041 or 186.042 shall only be issued one (1) parking placard under this section at no cost and shall not be issued a duplicate placard.
  7. A person with a disability who has been issued a parking placard pursuant to this section may make application for a replacement placard by swearing in an affidavit that the original placard has been lost, stolen, or destroyed. The replacement parking placard shall be issued at a fee of ten dollars ($10), of which eight dollars ($8) shall be forwarded to the road fund and two dollars ($2) shall be retained by the clerk. If a damaged placard is returned to the clerk, a replacement shall be issued at no cost.
  8. The Transportation Cabinet may promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to implement or administer this section, including but not limited to the designing of required forms, establishing placard issuance criteria for county clerks, and establishing criteria for placard issuance for organizations.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 305, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1986, ch. 68, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 359, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 82, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 60, § 4, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 405, § 40, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 416, § 9, effective July 15, 1994; 2004, ch. 131, § 1, effective July 13, 2004; 2006, ch. 255, § 4, effective January 1, 2007; 2008, ch. 33, § 2, effective July 15, 2008; 2014, ch. 76, § 1, effective July 15, 2014; 2018 ch. 63, § 1, effective July 14, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/94). This section was amended by 1994 Ky. Acts chs. 405 and 416. Where these Acts are not in conflict, they have been codified together. Where a conflict exists, Acts ch. 416, which was last enacted by the General Assembly, prevails under KRS 446.250 .

Opinions of Attorney General.

Neither KRS 186.041 nor this section requires a city to provide specific handicapped parking facilities though there appears to be an implication to this effect under former subsection (6) of this section which authorizes handicapped persons qualifying to park in a designated handicapped parking place even when a parking limit is imposed by allowing such vehicle to be parked for a period of two hours in excess of the legal parking period prescribed by the local authorities with certain exceptions mentioned therein. There is nothing under either statute prohibiting the charging of parking fees for handicapped parking spaces, the same as would be required for parking generally. OAG 82-116 .

A doctor of chiropractic is not considered a “licensed physician” for the purpose of certifying the disability of an applicant for a handicapped parking permit; only a doctor of medicine or doctor of osteopathy duly licensed pursuant to KRS Ch. 311 is competent to certify the existence of a handicap pursuant to subsection (3)(c) of this section. OAG 82-130 .

A deaf mute cannot be considered handicapped within those statutes permitting special parking spaces and permits for persons having handicaps. OAG 84-110 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Special registration plates and parking privileges for handicapped, KRS 186.042 .

189.458. Temporary accessible parking placard for person with a disability — Replacement — Fee — Proof of disability — Display — Administrative regulations.

  1. Upon application of any person who has a severe temporary visual, audio, or physical impairment, including partial paralysis, heart condition, emphysema, arthritis, rheumatism, or other debilitating condition which limits or impairs one’s personal mobility or ability to walk as defined in KRS 186.042 , the county clerk in the county of the person’s residence shall issue the person with a disability a temporary accessible parking placard.
  2. The accessible parking placard issued shall be a two (2) sided hanger style placard and shall on each side bear the international symbol of access adopted by Rehabilitation International in 1969. One (1) side of the placard shall bear the date of expiration of the placard, a seal or other identification of the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet, and shall contain the accessible parking placard identification number and other information the Transportation Cabinet may by administrative regulation require. The international symbol of access shall be at least three (3) inches in height, be centered on the placard and in a white color on a red shield.
    1. A temporary accessible parking placard shall be issued at no charge by the county clerk, and the placard shall be valid for a period of not more than three (3) months. (3) (a) A temporary accessible parking placard shall be issued at no charge by the county clerk, and the placard shall be valid for a period of not more than three (3) months.
    2. A person with a disability who has been issued a temporary parking placard pursuant to this section may make application for a replacement placard by swearing in an affidavit that the original placard has been lost, stolen, or destroyed. A replacement parking placard shall be issued at a fee of ten dollars ($10), of which eight dollars ($8) shall be forwarded to the road fund and two dollars ($2) shall be retained by the clerk. Replacement placards issued under this paragraph shall retain the same expiration date as the initial temporary placard. If a damaged placard is returned to the clerk, a replacement shall be issued at no cost.
  3. The application shall be made on a form prepared by the Transportation Cabinet. The placards shall be printed at cabinet expense. The county clerk of each county shall keep a record of applications filed and placards issued. Placards issued under this section shall be issued in the name of the applicant and shall not be tied to the applicant’s motor vehicle or a motor vehicle used to transport the applicant.
  4. For every person seeking a temporary accessible parking placard, proof of the disability shall be required by:
    1. The county clerk ascertaining that the applicant meets the criteria established by the Transportation Cabinet for placard issuance; or
    2. A statement from a licensed physician, physician assistant, physical therapist, occupational therapist, chiropractor, or advanced practice registered nurse that the applicant is a person whose mobility, flexibility, coordination, respiration, or perceptiveness is significantly reduced by a temporary disability to that person’s arms, legs, lungs, heart, ears, or eyes. The statement shall be submitted on a form prescribed by the cabinet and shall not be dated more than sixty (60) days prior to the date of application.
  5. The temporary accessible parking placard, when the vehicle is parked in a parking space designated as accessible to and for the use of a person with a disability, shall be displayed so that the expiration date may be viewed from the front of the vehicle by hanging it from the front windshield rear view mirror. When there is no rear view mirror, the placard shall be displayed on the dashboard so that the expiration date may be viewed.
  6. The Transportation Cabinet may promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to implement or administer this section, including but not limited to the designing of required forms and establishing placard issuance criteria for county clerks.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 60, § 5, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 405, § 41, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 416, § 10, effective July 15, 1994; 2004, ch. 131, § 2, effective July 13, 2004; 2006, ch. 255, § 5, effective January 1, 2007; 2014, ch. 76, § 2, effective July 15, 2014; 2018 ch. 63, § 2, effective July 14, 2018.

189.459. Parking limits for vehicles with plates or placards for persons with a disability — Prohibitions.

  1. When a motor vehicle which is being operated by or for the benefit of the person with a disability who is in the motor vehicle at the time it is being operated is displaying an auto registration plate as provided in KRS 186.041 or 186.042 or 186.0425 , an out-of-state or out-of-country registration plate for a person with a disability bearing the international symbol of access, a parking placard issued by any United States Department of Veterans Affairs hospital, or an accessible parking placard issued to a person with a disability as prescribed in KRS 189.456 or 189.458 or by another state or foreign country when the accessible parking placard meets the basic requirements of KRS 189.456 or 189.458 , the vehicle may be parked in a parking place designated as accessible to and for the use of a person with a disability.
  2. When parked where a parking limit is imposed, the vehicle may be parked for a period of two (2) hours in excess of the legal parking period permitted by local authorities, except where local ordinances or police regulations prohibit parking on a highway for the purpose of creating a fire lane or where the ordinances or police regulations provide for the accommodation of heavy traffic during morning, afternoon, or evening hours or where the motor vehicle is parked in such a manner as to clearly be a traffic hazard. No person shall park in a parking area designated as accessible to and for the use of a person with a disability in a motor vehicle not displaying either an auto registration plate as provided in KRS 186.041 , 186.042 , 186.042 5, or an out-of-state registration plate designated for the use of a person with a disability on the rear of the vehicle unless he displays on the dashboard of his motor vehicle an accessible parking placard issued to a person with a disability. No person shall park a vehicle displaying an accessible parking placard in a parking area designated as accessible to and for the use of a person with a disability when the person with a disability is not in the motor vehicle.
  3. No person shall make, issue, possess, or knowingly use any imitation, counterfeit, or transferable placard or license plate for a person with a disability.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 60, § 6, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 405, § 42, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 416, § 11, effective July 15, 1994; 2017 ch. 42, § 11, effective June 29, 2017.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/94). This section was amended by 1994 Ky. Acts chs. 405 and 416. Where these Acts are not in conflict they have been codified together. Where a conflict exists, Acts ch. 416, which was last enacted by the General Assembly, prevails under KRS 446.250 .

189.4595. Exemption from local motor vehicle licenses and fees for disabled veterans or Congressional Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, or Air Force Cross recipients — Extension of legal parking period.

  1. Any other provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, a city, county, town, or other political subdivision of this state shall not require any license or fee from a disabled veteran, recipient of the Congressional Medal of Honor, or recipient of the Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, or Air Force Cross who has been issued a special military-related license plate under KRS 186.041 , for the privilege of operating a motor vehicle upon any street or alley.
  2. When a motor vehicle bearing a special military-related license plate for disabled veterans, recipients of the Congressional Medal of Honor, or recipients of the Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross, or Air Force Cross is being operated by or for the benefit of the person, the motor vehicle may be parked for a period of two (2) hours in excess of the legal parking period permitted by local authorities unless a local ordinance or police regulation:
    1. Prohibits parking on a highway for the purpose of creating a fire lane:
    2. Provides for the accommodation of heavy traffic during morning, afternoon, or evening hours; or
    3. Prohibits parking a motor vehicle in a manner as to clearly be a traffic hazard.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 453, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2001, ch. 45, § 2, effective June 21, 2001.

189.460. Following or obstructing fire apparatus prohibited. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-69j, 2739g-69k) was repealed by Acts 1970, ch. 93, § 12.

189.470. Obstruction to operator’s view or control.

  1. No person shall operate a vehicle when it is so loaded, or when there are in the front seat such number of persons, exceeding three (3), as to obstruct the view of the operator to the front or sides of the vehicle or as to interfere with the operator’s control over the vehicle.
  2. No passenger in a vehicle or street car shall ride in such a position as to interfere with the operator’s view ahead or to the sides, or to interfere with his control over the vehicle or street car.

History. 2739g-69g.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Contributory Negligence of Guest.

The failure of guest in automobile to exercise ordinary care may consist of overloading or overcrowding in violation of this section, continuing to ride in an automobile without protest against the driver’s recklessness or negligence, or knowingly riding with a reckless, inexperienced or intoxicated driver, and where driver asked guest about the condition of the southbound traffic to which he replied that it looked O. K. and driver without making the boulevard stop proceeded across the intersection and his car was struck on the right side by another car who had an equal opportunity to avoid the accident, the last clear chance doctrine did not apply and the contributory negligence of the guest precluded recovery from either the driver of the automobile in which he was riding or the driver of the other car involved in the collision. Donnell v. Pruitt, 265 S.W.2d 784, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 752 ( Ky. 1954 ).

Contributory negligence of guest in riding in front seat of an automobile with three other persons depends on interference with driver’s control over the automobile and the obstruction of the driver’s view and is a question for the jury. Coy v. Hoover, 272 S.W.2d 449, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1098 ( Ky. 1954 ).

2.Instructions.

Presence of three persons in front seat did not justify instruction on contributory negligence where there was no evidence that this fact contributed to the accident. Southern Oxygen Co. v. Martin, 291 Ky. 238 , 163 S.W.2d 459, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 202 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Where two trucks collided as one attempted to pass the other and the wife and four children of the driver of the truck being passed were riding with him in the cab, the trial court erred in omitting an instruction concerning the prohibition of more than three people riding in the front seat of a vehicle so as to interfere with the driver’s control of the vehicle. Clark v. Finch's Adm'x, 254 S.W.2d 934, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 1237 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953).

The mere presence of more than three persons in the front seat of a motor vehicle which is involved in a collision is, in itself, insufficient to support an instruction under this section. Schweitzer v. Good, 380 S.W.2d 809, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 317 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Overcrowding of passenger vehicles; maximum width, KRS 281.735 .

189.480. Towed vehicles.

No vehicle shall haul with a towline more than one (1) other vehicle. The towline shall not be over fifteen (15) feet in length, and a white cloth or flag shall be fastened to the towline at or near the center of the line, during both day and night so as to make it plainly discernible. No vehicle shall at one (1) time haul more than two (2) vehicles connected in such a manner as to keep them uniformly spaced. Any vehicle being towed under the provisions of this chapter shall have the brake lights required under KRS 189.050 .

History. 2739g-29, 2739g-30; 2006, ch. 173, § 20, effective July 12, 2006.

Opinions of Attorney General.

So long as the vehicles are evenly or uniformly spaced, it would be permissible to haul or tow as many as two, but no more, by the driveaway method. OAG 63-246 .

This section does not forbid a triple saddlemount driveaway operation. OAG 70-547 .

This section has no application as to towing vehicles by the saddle-mount method and applies only to two types of towing: (1) the tow line method, and (2) the tow bar method which provides for a tow uniformly spaced. OAG 80-528 .

189.490. Trailer operation restricted. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-81) was repealed by Acts 2006, ch. 173, § 34, effective July 12, 2006.

189.500. Logs or stones not to be dragged on highways.

No person shall draw upon a highway any logs or stones with the ends dragged on the ground, so as to injure the highway.

History. 4345.

189.505. Motor vehicle races on highways prohibited.

No person shall engage upon any street or highway in motor vehicle racing, drag racing, or any other form of competition involving motor vehicles.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 67, § 1, effective June 19, 1958.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The term “highway” does not include a newly constructed road before it is open to the public. OAG 67-455 .

189.510. Horse race on highway prohibited.

No person shall ride a horse, nor shall the owner of a horse consent to the racing of his horse, in a horse race on a highway.

History. 4348.

189.515. Restrictions on operation of all-terrain vehicles. [Effective until July 1, 2024]

  1. As used in this section, “federal all-terrain vehicle standards” means the all-terrain vehicle standards set forth by the American National Standards Institute/Specialty Vehicle Institute of America and incorporated by reference in 16 C.F.R. sec. 1420.3, to the extent those standards are applicable.
  2. Except for vehicles authorized to operate on a public highway as of July 15, 1998, and except as provided in subsection (7) of this section, a person shall not operate an all-terrain vehicle upon any public highway or roadway or upon the right-of-way of any public highway or roadway.
  3. A person shall not operate an all-terrain vehicle on private property without the consent of the landowner, tenant, or individual responsible for the property.
  4. A person shall not operate an all-terrain vehicle on public property unless the governmental agency responsible for the property has approved the use of all-terrain vehicles.
  5. Except for vehicles authorized to operate on a public highway, a person sixteen (16) years of age or older operating an all-terrain vehicle on public property shall wear approved protective headgear, in the manner prescribed by the secretary of the Transportation Cabinet, at all times that the vehicle is in motion. The approved headgear requirement shall not apply when the operator of any all-terrain vehicle is engaged in:
    1. Farm or agriculture related activities;
    2. Mining or mining exploration activities;
    3. Logging activities;
    4. Any other business, commercial, or industrial activity;
    5. Use of that vehicle on private property; or
    6. The crossing of a public roadway with a posted speed limit of fifty-five (55) miles per hour or less. The crossing of a public roadway outlined in this paragraph shall be in compliance with subsection (7)(a) of this section.
    1. A parent or legal guardian of a minor who is under the age of six (6) shall not knowingly allow that person to operate an all-terrain vehicle. (6) (a) A parent or legal guardian of a minor who is under the age of six (6) shall not knowingly allow that person to operate an all-terrain vehicle.
    2. A person under the age of sixteen (16) years shall not operate an all-terrain vehicle except under direct parental supervision.
    3. A person under the age of sixteen (16) years, when operating or riding as a passenger on an all-terrain vehicle, shall wear approved protective headgear, in the manner prescribed by the secretary of the Transportation Cabinet, at all times that the vehicle is in motion.
    4. A parent or guardian of a minor who is under the age of sixteen (16), or who does not possess an instruction permit, an intermediate license, or an operator’s license, shall not knowingly allow that person to carry a passenger while operating an all-terrain vehicle.
    5. A parent or guardian of a minor under the age of sixteen (16) shall not knowingly allow that person to operate an all-terrain vehicle in violation of the age restriction warning label affixed by the manufacturer as required by the federal all-terrain vehicle standards.
    1. Except for off-highway vehicles described in KRS 189.281 , a person may operate an all-terrain vehicle on any two (2) lane public highway in order to cross the highway. In crossing the highway under this paragraph, the operator shall cross the highway at as close to a ninety (90) degree angle as is practical and safe, and shall not travel on the highway for more than two-tenths (2/10) of a mile. (7) (a) Except for off-highway vehicles described in KRS 189.281 , a person may operate an all-terrain vehicle on any two (2) lane public highway in order to cross the highway. In crossing the highway under this paragraph, the operator shall cross the highway at as close to a ninety (90) degree angle as is practical and safe, and shall not travel on the highway for more than two-tenths (2/10) of a mile.
    2. A person may operate an all-terrain vehicle on any two (2) lane public highway, if the operator is engaged in farm or agricultural related activities, construction, road maintenance, or snow removal.
    3. The Transportation Cabinet may designate, and a city or county government may designate, those public highways, segments of public highways, and adjoining rights-of-way of public highways under its jurisdiction where all-terrain vehicles that are prohibited may be operated.
    4. A person operating an all-terrain vehicle on a public highway under this subsection shall possess a valid operator’s license.
    5. A person operating an all-terrain vehicle on a public highway under this subsection shall comply with all applicable traffic regulations.
    6. A person shall not operate an all-terrain vehicle under this subsection unless the all-terrain vehicle has at least one (1) headlight and two (2) taillights, which shall be illuminated at all times the vehicle is in operation.
    7. A person operating an all-terrain vehicle under this subsection shall restrict the operation to daylight hours, except when engaged in snow removal or emergency road maintenance.
    8. It shall be unlawful for a person to remove from an all-terrain vehicle the manufacturer age restriction warning label required by the federal all-terrain vehicle standards.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 400, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1998, ch. 47, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 460, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2006, ch. 180, § 8, effective July 12, 2006; 2014, ch. 86, § 1, effective July 15, 2014; 2018 ch. 64, § 1, effective July 14, 2018; 2021 ch. 186, § 7, effective June 29, 2021.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(6/29/2021). Subsection (7)(a) of this statute was amended by Section 7 of 2021 Ky. Acts ch. 186. Section 9 of that Act provides that “Sec- tions 6 to 8 of this Act are part of a pilot program and shall sunset on July 1, 2024.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1.Whether ATV Qualifies as Motor Vehicle.

Insurer was entitled to summary judgment in its action against an insured for a declaration that the insurer did not owe basic reparations benefits or uninsured motorist benefits to the insured for injuries sustained by the insured when he was struck by an all terrain vehicle (ATV) because basic reparations benefits and uninsured motorist benefits were only available under KRS 304.39-030 (1) for injuries sustained as a result of a motor vehicle as defined by statute and an ATV did not qualify as a “motor vehicle” under KRS 304.39-020 (7) because it did not transport persons or property on the public highways and was actually forbidden to do so by KRS 189.515 . Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v. Burke, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27228 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 29, 2002), aff'd, 91 Fed. Appx. 415, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3635 (6th Cir. Ky. 2004 ).

2.Tort Actions.

An administratrix was entitled to damages resulting from the decedent’s riding of an All-Terrain Vehicle on a public highway obstructed by an indiscernible cable; the fact that the decedent was using an ATV to unlawfully travel a public road under KRS 189.515(1) did not render the Transportation Cabinet free of fault for its negligence, but rather the decedent’s negligence was a factor which the circuit court properly considered in apportioning the liability between the parties under KRS 411.182 . Commonwealth v. Guffey, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 150 (Ky. Ct. App. May 19, 2006), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 244 S.W.3d 79, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 2 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Department of Highways owed a duty to decedent, the operator of an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) who was riding his ATV upon a public highway; decedent was a member of the traveling public, even though he was in violation of KRS 189.515(1), and the damages resulting from decedent riding his ATV upon that portion of a public roadway, which had been obstructed by a cable stretched across it, were certainly foreseeable. Commonwealth v. Guffey, 244 S.W.3d 79, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 2 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Cited:

In re Skeans, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 693 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. June 19, 2003).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

1.Insurance Coverage.

Unpublished decision: When an insurer sought a declaration that it was not obligated to pay basic reparations benefits or uninsured motorist benefits to its insured, it was entitled to summary judgment because the insured was injured by an all terrain vehicle, which was not a motor vehicle under the policy or under KRS 304.39-020 (7), as its operation on public highways was prohibited by KRS 189.515 , and a limited exception to that prohibition in KRS 189.515 (6)(b) did not require a different result, as other statutes recognized the presence of non-motor vehicles on the public highways, and any injuries caused by the trailer the all terrain vehicle was pulling were not covered because a covered trailer had to be designed to be towed on a public road by a vehicle. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v. Burke, 91 Fed. Appx. 415, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3635 (6th Cir. Ky. 2004 ).

189.517. Mini-truck — Definition — Criteria for operation — Permitted and prohibited uses.

  1. As used in this section, “mini-truck” means a lightweight Japanese kei class utility vehicle.
  2. Except as provided in subsection (5) of this section, a person shall not operate a mini-truck upon any public highway or roadway or upon the right-of-way of any public highway or roadway.
  3. A person shall not operate a mini-truck on private property without the consent of the landowner, tenant, or individual responsible for the property.
  4. A person shall not operate a mini-truck on public property unless the governmental agency responsible for the property has approved the use of mini-trucks.
    1. A person may operate a mini-truck on any two (2) lane public highway in order to cross the highway. In crossing the highway under this paragraph, the operator shall cross the highway at as close to a ninety (90) degree angle as is practical and safe, and shall not travel on the highway for more than two-tenths (2/10) of a mile. (5) (a) A person may operate a mini-truck on any two (2) lane public highway in order to cross the highway. In crossing the highway under this paragraph, the operator shall cross the highway at as close to a ninety (90) degree angle as is practical and safe, and shall not travel on the highway for more than two-tenths (2/10) of a mile.
    2. A person may operate a mini-truck on any two (2) lane public highway if the operator is engaged in farm or agricultural-related activities, construction, road maintenance, or snow removal.
    3. The Transportation Cabinet may designate, and a city or county government may designate, those public highways, segments of public highways, and adjoining rights-of-way of public highways under its jurisdiction where mini-trucks that are prohibited may be operated.
    4. A person operating a mini-truck on a public highway under this subsection shall possess a valid operator’s license.
    5. A person operating a mini-truck on a public highway under this subsection shall comply with all applicable traffic regulations.
    6. A person shall not operate a mini-truck under this subsection unless the mini-truck has at least two (2) headlights and two (2) taillights, which shall be illuminated at all times the mini-truck is in operation.
    7. A person operating a mini-truck under this subsection shall restrict the operation to daylight hours, except when engaged in snow removal or emergency road maintenance.

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 61, § 1, effective June 25, 2013.

189.520. Operating vehicle not a motor vehicle while under influence of intoxicants or substance which may impair driving ability prohibited — Presumptions concerning intoxication.

  1. No person under the influence of intoxicating beverages or any substance which may impair one’s driving ability shall operate a vehicle that is not a motor vehicle anywhere in this state.
  2. No peace officer or State Police officer shall fail to enforce rigidly this section.
  3. In any criminal prosecution for a violation of subsection (1) of this section, wherein the defendant is charged with having operated a vehicle which is not a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating beverages, the alcohol concentration, as defined in KRS 189A.005 , in the defendant’s blood as determined at the time of making an analysis of his blood, urine, or breath, shall give rise to the following presumptions:
    1. If there was an alcohol concentration of less than 0.05, it shall be presumed that the defendant was not under the influence of alcohol;
    2. If there was an alcohol concentration of 0.05 or greater but less than 0.08, such fact shall not constitute a presumption that the defendant either was or was not under the influence of alcohol, but such fact may be considered, together with other competent evidence, in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant; and
    3. If there was an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, it shall be presumed that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol.
  4. The provisions of subsection (3) of this section shall not be construed as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question of whether the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating beverages.

History. 2739g-34, 2739g-34a, 2739g-34b: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 209; 1954, ch. 74; 1958, ch. 126, § 24; 1968, ch. 184, § 7; 1984, ch. 165, § 18, effective July 13, 1984; 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 19, effective July 1, 1991; 2000, ch. 467, § 12, effective October 1, 2000.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

This statute is not an unconstitutional creation of a presumption of guilt. Marcum v. Commonwealth, 483 S.W.2d 122, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 172 ( Ky. 1972 ), overruled in part, Commonwealth v. Roberts, 122 S.W.3d 524, 2003 Ky. LEXIS 255 ( Ky. 2003 ).

2.Reasonable Suspicion.

Defendant’s turning away from a sobriety checkpoint, coupled with the deputy sheriff’s experience in similar instances, the time of day, and the nature of the roadway onto which the defendant turned constituted specific, reasonable, and articulable facts which allowed the police officer to draw an inference sufficient to form a reasonable suspicion that the defendant might have been engaged in criminal activity. Steinbeck v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 912, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 128 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

3.Testing.
4.— Blood Test.

Where accused refused to take a blood test which is the only “sobriety” test available in this state, her request for a “sobriety test” could not be granted. Sharp v. Commonwealth, 414 S.W.2d 902, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 372 ( Ky. 1967 ).

Where the defendant contended that the question of whether he consented to the blood test should have been submitted to the jury but he made no such suggestion during the trial and made no motion for a new trial, the point was not reviewable on appeal. Washburn v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 859, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 295 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Where following an automobile accident the defendant was treated at the hospital for injuries and the investigating officer had no suspicion that the defendant had been drinking until he smelled a faint odor of alcohol while the defendant was being treated, there was not sufficient cause to warrant taking a blood test without consent. Washburn v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 859, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 295 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Where following an accident the sheriff went to the defendant’s hospital room and asked for consent to have a blood sample taken and the defendant agreed and the doctor testified the defendant, although in pain, was lucid and capable of giving a competent consent, the consent was valid although the defendant later claimed he could not remember giving the consent. Washburn v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 859, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 295 ( Ky. 1968 ).

The accused does not have to have previously been informed of his right to refuse or of his right to counsel in order for a consent to have a blood sample taken to be valid. Washburn v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 859, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 295 ( Ky. 1968 ).

The provision for the manner of taking the blood test was intended for the safety and protection of the person being subjected to the test and does not apply to a dead body. Woosley v. Central Uniform Rental, 463 S.W.2d 345, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 591 ( Ky. 1971 ).

5.— Breathalyzer Test.

The district court did not err in permitting the jury to hear testimony on defendant’s refusal to take a breathalyzer test; this did not violate defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination or right to due process. Commonwealth v. Hager, 702 S.W.2d 431, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 225 ( Ky. 1986 ).

6.— Additional Chemical Test.

Where a motorist, who was arrested and charged with the offense of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, refused to submit to a breathalyzer test, the provision for an additional chemical test administered by a physician was not applicable. Newman v. Hacker, 530 S.W.2d 376, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 53 ( Ky. 1975 ).

7.— Medical Technicians.

Both phlebotomists and paramedics are “qualified” to work within their respective medical fields and can easily be classified as “medical technicians” as set forth in this section. Speers v. Commonwealth, 828 S.W.2d 638, 1992 Ky. LEXIS 59 ( Ky. 1992 ).

8.Indictment.

Indictment for operating motor vehicle on public highway while intoxicated was sufficient, where it followed language of statute which states every fact necessary to constitute offense. Commonwealth v. Black, 230 Ky. 677 , 20 S.W.2d 741, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 169 ( Ky. 1929 ).

9.Right to Counsel.

A motorist arrested and charged with the offense of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor had no right to have counsel present at the time a breathalyzer test was administered. Newman v. Hacker, 530 S.W.2d 376, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 53 ( Ky. 1975 ).

10.Jury Trial.

Right to demand a jury trial for violation of this section must be taken as waived unless demanded. Garner v. Shouse, 292 Ky. 798 , 168 S.W.2d 42, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 747 ( Ky. 1943 ).

11.Evidence.

Where the test showed a blood-alcohol level of 0.25 immediately after the accident, there was ample evidence of probative value on which the board could and did find the employee was intoxicated at the time of his death. Banks v. Department of Education, 462 S.W.2d 428, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 552 ( Ky. 1971 ).

The presumptions embodied in subsection (4) (now (3)) of this section are legislative substitutes for expert testimony devised for prosecutorial convenience in narrowly limited situations; they are not rules of law given by the court to the jury, but rather evidence which may be read without judicial comment, upon proper motion, in connection with the testimony concerning blood-alcohol content and as such they are the only presumptions of fact, essential to establish a crime, of which the trial court is permitted to inform the jury. Wells v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85, 1978 Ky. LEXIS 314 ( Ky. 1978 ).

The trial court erred in permitting the introduction into evidence of the results of a blood/alcohol test performed shortly after the defendant’s arrest, where the commonwealth failed to demonstrate both that the blood sample had been obtained by a person authorized to do so pursuant to former subsection (6) of this section and that it had properly maintained the integrity of the chain of custody of the subject blood sample. Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 445, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1203 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986), limited, Osborne v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 484, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993), overruled, Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1996 ).

In telling the jury that the provisions of subsections (3) and (4) of this section read aloud during the presentation of the commonwealth’s evidence were to be considered “as evidence in the case,” and in refraining from any comment on the weight or effect of such evidence, the County District Court was doing exactly what Kentucky’s highest court had said should be done in misdemeanor DUI cases in Marcum v. Commonwealth, 483 S.W.2d 122, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 172 ( Ky. 1972 ).Morgan v. Shirley, 958 F.2d 662, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1209 (6th Cir. Ky. 1992 ).

12.Presumption of Intoxication.

Statutory provision that blood alcohol content of .10% by weight raises presumption that individual was under the influence of intoxicating beverages applies only to criminal prosecutions for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants. Wilson v. Wizor, 544 S.W.2d 231, 1976 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1976 ).

It was well within the province of the jury to conclude that a 19-year-old man who weighed 195 pounds and who was presumptively under the influence of intoxicating beverages at 12:46 a.m. on Saturday was likewise under the influence when he drove his vehicle off the road at 11:15 p.m. on Friday; there can be no doubt at all of the existence of a rational connection between the established fact of a 0.14 blood alcohol concentration “at the time of making an analysis,” and the presumed fact of being under the influence of alcohol at that time. Morgan v. Shirley, 958 F.2d 662, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1209 (6th Cir. Ky. 1992 ).

The statutory presumption of subdivision (3)(c) of this section that if there was an alcohol concentration of 0.10 (now .08) percent or greater, then the defendant was under the influence of alcohol, only applies in misdemeanor prosecutions for driving under the influence of intoxicating beverages. Commonwealth v. Runion, 873 S.W.2d 583, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 168 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

13.Instructions.

The statutory presumption of drunkenness from the percentage by weight of alcohol in the blood is the only presumption of fact, essential to establish guilt of a crime, of which a state court is permitted to inform the jury; however, the presumption is confined to prosecutions for the offense of operating a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating beverages. Overstreet v. Commonwealth, 522 S.W.2d 178, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 126 ( Ky. 1975 ).

In prosecution for first-degree involuntary manslaughter, arising out of an automobile collision, it was error for the trial court to read subsection (4) (now (3)) and former subsection (5) of this section to the jury, since the presumption of intoxication provided for by this statute is confined to prosecutions for a misdemeanor, but the error was not prejudicial in view of ample evidence as to defendant’s drunkenness. Overstreet v. Commonwealth, 522 S.W.2d 178, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 126 ( Ky. 1975 ).

It was error to instruct the jury in a murder prosecution involving a death caused by an allegedly intoxicated driver, on the statutory presumption that applies only to Driving Under the Influence (D.U.I.) cases, however, it was harmless error; the so-called legislative substitute should not have been utilized, but it was merely cumulative of other highly persuasive expert testimony to the same effect, so the harmless error rule applied. Walden v. Commonwealth, 805 S.W.2d 102, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 3 ( Ky. 1991 ), overruled, Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 82 ( Ky. 1997 ).

Where the only jury instruction referring specifically to subsections (3) and (4) of this section was the instruction to consider the subsections “as evidence in the case,” there was no reason to suppose that the jurors failed to understand that they, not the legislature, were the sole judges of the weight of that evidence; it is true that this piece of evidence was couched in mandatory language — it “shall” be presumed — but the mandate given the jury by the court was to treat the presumption as a matter of evidence and the section showed, moreover, that the presumption was intended to be rebuttable; otherwise, there would have been no reason to authorize “the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question of whether the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating beverages.” Morgan v. Shirley, 958 F.2d 662, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1209 (6th Cir. Ky. 1992 ).

Instruction was improper which equated “under the influence” with mere consumption, instructed on impairment as a separate element, and instructed that the Commonwealth must prove influence but not impaired ability. Bridges v. Commonwealth, 845 S.W.2d 541, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 3 ( Ky. 1993 ).

14.Manslaughter.

A motorist who struck and killed a pedestrian, while violating statute against drunken driving, was guilty of manslaughter, where drunkenness was obvious cause of failure to maintain a lookout. Newcomb v. Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 362 , 124 S.W.2d 486, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 532 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Generally a person, who while driving an automobile in violation of this section, kills another is guilty of manslaughter. Newcomb v. Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 362 , 124 S.W.2d 486, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 532 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Evidence sustained conviction of operating motor vehicle in such reckless manner as to cause death of another where, despite conflicting evidence as to speed and drinking, several commonwealth witnesses testified that driver was drunk or drinking and that whiskey was found in his car. Dunn v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 622 , 154 S.W.2d 707, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 594 ( Ky. 1941 ).

15.Revocation of License.

Revocation of license is merely recommended by magistrate and is not a penalty for violation of this section, in addition to $500 fine or imprisonment not to exceed 12 months provided by KRS 189.990 , which would remove the jurisdiction from magistrate’s court. Commonwealth v. Burnett, 274 Ky. 231 , 118 S.W.2d 558, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 257 ( Ky. 1938 ); Commonwealth v. Harris, 278 Ky. 218 , 128 S.W.2d 579, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 405 ( Ky. 1939 ).

16.Penalty Enhancement.

Using a conviction for driving under the influence obtained under subsection (2) of this section prior to the enactment of KRS 189A.010 to enhance the penalty for driving under the influence upon conviction of a second offense, pursuant to KRS 189A.010 , does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Commonwealth v. Ball, 691 S.W.2d 207, 1985 Ky. LEXIS 231 ( Ky. 1985 ).

17.Civil Action Against Offender.

In action against truck owner, whose driver struck small child in street, driver’s intoxication may be considered on question of negligence, but KRS 446.070 , providing for recovery for violation of statute, in connection with this section, against drunken driving, does not authorize recovery thereunder against anybody but offenders. Bray-Robinson Clothing Co. v. Higgins, 210 Ky. 432 , 276 S.W. 129, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 697 ( Ky. 1925 ).

18.— Defenses.

A person who enters an auto as a guest with knowledge that the driver is intoxicated assumes the risk incident to the driver’s condition. Mahin's Adm'r v. McClellan, 279 Ky. 595 , 131 S.W.2d 478, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 312 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Whether driver was intoxicated and whether guest had knowledge of that fact held for jury under conflicting evidence. Mahin's Adm'r v. McClellan, 279 Ky. 595 , 131 S.W.2d 478, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 312 ( Ky. 1939 ).

A person who voluntarily enters an auto driven by one he knows to be drunk is guilty of contributory negligence. Whitney v. Penick, 281 Ky. 474 , 136 S.W.2d 570, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Court should have instructed the jury that plaintiff’s were guilty of contributory negligence if they entered defendant’s wrecker after they knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have known, he was under the influence of intoxicants to such an extent that his driving was affected, and thereby his condition caused or contributed to the accident. Whitney v. Penick, 281 Ky. 474 , 136 S.W.2d 570, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Cited:

Siler v. Commonwealth, 280 Ky. 830 , 134 S.W.2d 945, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 2 19 ( Ky. 1939 ); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 77 S. Ct. 408, 1 L. Ed. 2d 448, 1957 U.S. LEXIS 1255 (1957); Mullins v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 282 , 147 S.W.2d 704, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 376 ( Ky. 1941 ); Burnett v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.2d 654, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 1955 ); Brown v. Hoblitzell, 307 S.W.2d 739, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 2 ( Ky. 1957 ); Commonwealth v. Robey, 337 S.W.2d 34, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 361 ( Ky. 1960 ); Marcum v. Commonwealth, 390 S.W.2d 884, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 374 ( Ky. 1965 ); North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 96 S. Ct. 2709, 49 L. Ed. 2d 534, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 76 (1976); Hollin v. Commonwealth, 481 S.W.2d 269, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 240 ( Ky. 1972 ); Britt v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 496, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 396 ( Ky. 1974 ); Commonwealth, Dep’t of Public Safety v. Tuemler, 526 S.W.2d 305, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 97 ( Ky. 1975 ); Jewell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 807, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 412 ( Ky. 1977 ); Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 560 S.W.2d 539, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 568 ( Ky. 1977 ); Pack v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 594, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 281 ( Ky. 1980 ); Sizemore v. District Court, 50th Judicial Dist., 735 F.2d 204, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 21937 (6th Cir. 1984); Marks v. Commonwealth, 698 S.W.2d 533, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 638 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); Heath v. Commonwealth, 761 S.W.2d 630, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 160 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); Dick v. Scroggy, 882 F.2d 192, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 12120 (6th Cir. 1989); Commonwealth v. Mullins, 812 S.W.2d 164, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 37 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991); Nemeth v. Commonwealth, 944 S.W.2d 871, 1997 Ky. App. LEXIS 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In a prosecution for violation of subsection (2) (now (1)) of this section, a defense counsel’s comment to the jury that if convicted the defendant would lose his license was improper conduct and should not be permitted by the court. OAG 65-466 .

If the defendant elects to have his own physician administer a test of his choosing, the defendant is responsible for the costs of the test. OAG 69-23 .

The defendant cannot be required to pay the costs of the particular test designated by the law enforcement agency. OAG 69-23 .

Where the defendant remained silent, the failure of an officer to offer a chemical test would not be grounds for dismissal of the drunken driving charge. OAG 69-23 .

If an officer had reasonable grounds to arrest and was acting in good faith, the arrested person should not be released solely because the test places the content at under 0.05 percent. OAG 69-449 .

If an intoxicated person enters the driver’s seat of an automobile parked at the curb of a public street and starts the automobile, there is sufficient ground for prosecution under this section. OAG 70-254 .

A prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicating beverages under subsection (2) (now (1)) of this section would not, on grounds of double jeopardy, bar a prosecution for reckless driving in violation of KRS 189.290 , even though the actions constituting the violations were committed simultaneously. OAG 70-288 .

A previous conviction of driving while under the influence of alcoholic beverages should be shown ordinarily by presentation of the original court record by the court clerk. OAG 70-696 .

Where the judge of the police court is his own clerk and the defendant will not stipulate the authenticity of a previous conviction noted in the judgment book, it could be established by the police judge with some other witness reading the previous conviction to the jury. OAG 70-696 .

If the officers have probable cause for an arrest for violation of this section based upon the physical symptoms exhibited by the accused, the offender can be required to submit to a blood sample drawn by a physician in a simple, medically acceptable manner in a hospital environment. OAG 73-243 .

Licensed embalmer may remove blood from body, upon request of law enforcement officers for purpose of determining intoxication prior to death, without being subject to civil damages. OAG 73-470 .

It is unlawful to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating beverages or drugs on private property, which would include parking lots, driveways, drive-in theaters, and other such private facilities. OAG 73-491 .

If a 17-year-old is driving while intoxicated, he can be treated as an adult and detained at the jail, although it would be better practice to place him in a room or ward separate from adult offenders. OAG 73-705 .

If an automobile by reason of being jacked up is clearly inoperable and cannot be put into motion, a person sitting in the driver’s seat behind the wheel with the motor running cannot properly be convicted for operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants. OAG 74-667 .

A drunk person sitting behind the wheel of a parked motor vehicle in a filling station or the parking lot of a restaurant, at a time when the establishment is closed, is operating a motor vehicle while under the influence. OAG 74-703 .

Where a law enforcement agency pursuant to KRS 186.565 (now repealed) has designated a blood, breath, urine or saliva test to be administered to one reasonably suspected of driving while intoxicated but an arresting officer fails to administer the test due to the unavailability, failure or inoperative conditions of the equipment used therefor, the defendant may still be convicted if the court or jury is convinced of his intoxication from other facts including lane weaving, slurred speech, reeking of alcohol, lack of coordination, stumbling or inability to walk a straight line or touch the nose with the index finger. OAG 75-269 .

A prosecution of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor is not a bar to a prosecution of homicide arising out of the same incident. OAG 78-301 .

A law enforcement agency is required to provide for the testing, by a physician of his own choosing, of one accused of driving while under the influence of intoxicants where a chemical test was conducted by the state. OAG 78-599 .

When a request is made for an independent examination, provision should be made for a physician of the accused’s choosing to come to the place of detention to conduct the test, or arrangements made for transporting the accused to a doctor, and if the accused has no preference as to the doctor conducting the independent examination, it would appear reasonable that he be transported to the nearest medical facility for such testing. OAG 78-599 . (Opinion prior to 1991 amendment)

This section does not provide for a bifurcated trial on a second or succeeding charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants. OAG 82-76 .

Any arresting officer can request a blood alcohol test and it is not only the requests of the Kentucky State Police which must be honored; requests of city and county law enforcement officers must also be honored. The suspect has the right to have his own test administered by his own physician in addition to the one conducted at the request of the arresting officer; it is only when a motorist refuses to submit to a test requested by a police officer that he has no right to have tests administered by a physician of his own choosing. OAG 82-537 .

While police officers of a sixth class city have a statutory obligation to rigidly enforce the provisions of this section, they can only enforce this statute or any other statute within their jurisdictional area of authority; generally, the jurisdiction of such police officers to arrest for offenses against the state is limited to the city limits of their particular city. However, where sixth class cities are operating under an interlocal agreement, the jurisdiction is extended to include the city limits of all of the cities which are parties to the agreement; also under the appropriate circumstances the jurisdiction of a sixth class city police officer could be expanded by the utilization of the concept of hot pursuit under KRS 431.045 . OAG 82-599 .

A police officer cannot stop a driver suspected of being under the influence of alcohol, pursuant to this section, and take that individual to the police station for a breathalyzer test before arresting the individual and charging him or her with that offense, because KRS 186.565(1) (now repealed) clearly requires an arrest before the state can imply consent to a chemical test on the part of the driver. OAG 83-154 .

Former subsection (6) of this section was unequivocal and unambiguous: no person may be compelled to submit to a chemical test for the detection of alcohol in his blood. This section would be applicable to the taking of chemical tests for use as evidence in a prosecution for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating beverages; if this section is applicable, then consent to the taking of the test is required. Where this section is not applicable, then under Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 1966 U.S. LEXIS 1129 (1968), consent is required under the federal constitution unless there exists reasonable cause for belief that the suspect is intoxicated. OAG 83-395 . (Opinion prior to 1991 amendment)

A reading of this section reveals that evidence of a breathalyzer or other chemical tests is not a necessary element of a prosecution for drunk driving; subsection (4) (now (3)) merely provides that if a blood-alcohol test is administered, the amount of alcohol found in the person’s blood shall give rise to certain presumptions. Thus, it is obvious that a prosecution can be maintained without the results of a breathalyzer test. OAG 84-124 .

A driving under the influence (DUI) conviction entered prior to June 21, 1974 may be used to enhance the penalty for a subsequent DUI conviction pursuant to KRS 189.990 (9)(a) (deleted by amendment) and subsection (2) (now (1)) of this section. OAG 84-175 (opinion prior to 1984 amendment of KRS 189.990 ).

Subsection (2) (now (1)) of this section and KRS 189.990(9) must be construed by the express or literal language contained therein; accordingly, any previous conviction under subsection (2) (now (1)) of this section may be used for enhancement purposes under KRS 189.990(9). If proof of previous convictions cannot be obtained from the Transportation Cabinet due to a destruction of records which are over five years old or have occurred prior to June 21, 1974, proof by any other means is acceptable so long as introduction of such proof complies with the rules on evidence. OAG 84-175 .

A peace officer does not need a search warrant to obtain a blood sample, and all hospital employes and personnel, including physicians, should obey an order of such officer to take a blood sample from a patient in the hospital for the purpose of chemical analysis, whether or not the patient gives his or her consent to do so; such hospital personnel are immune from civil or criminal liability under KRS 503.040 . OAG 84-379 .

Drivers of vehicles other than motor vehicles who refuse to take a breathalyzer test, and who have had no previous convictions under this section, instead of having their licenses revoked may apply to a district court of competent jurisdiction for permission to enter a driver’s education program. OAG 88-41 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Public intoxication, Penal Code, KRS 525.100 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Mann, Legislation — A Proposed Dangerous Driving Statute for Kentucky, 36 Ky. L.J. 82 (1947).

Reed, Use of Chemical Tests As Evidence of Intoxication, 43 Ky. L.J. 85 (1954).

Richardson, Scientific Evidence in the Law, 44 Ky. L.J. 277 (1956).

Administrative Law — Kentucky’s “Implied Consent” Statute — Revocation of Motor Vehicle Operator’s License for Refusal to Take Blood Alcohol Test, 59 Ky. L.J. 536 (1970).

Comments, Long Overdue-Process: California And The Lay Judge, 63 Ky. L.J. 490 (1974-1975).

Kentucky Law Survey, Campbell, Criminal Procedure, 64 Ky. L.J. 325 (1975-76).

Kentucky Law Survey, Fortune, Criminal Rules, 70 Ky. L.J. 395 (1981-82).

Kentucky Law Survey, Fortune and Welling, Criminal Procedure, 72 Ky. L.J. 381 (1983-84).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Breath Alcohol Analysis: Can It Withstand Modern Scientific Scrutiny?, 5 N. Ky. L. Rev. 207 (1978).

Comments, Criminal Law — Murder by Auto, Kentucky’s Hard Line Stance Against Drunken Drivers, 5 N. Ky. L. Rev. 279 (1978).

Rankin and Muehlenkamp, 1993 Kentucky Criminal Law Update, 21 N. Ky. L. Rev. 311 (1994).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Complaint Against Master for Injuries by Servant in Driving Automobile, Form 282.07.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Police Officer’s Answer to Claim of Unlawful Arrest, Form 121.02.

189.530. Providing motor vehicle to person intoxicated or under influence of substance which may impair driving ability — Possession of open alcoholic beverage container in a motor vehicle prohibited — Exceptions — Definitions — Election of offenses to prosecute.

  1. No person shall provide a motor vehicle to another to operate upon a highway, knowing that the other person is in an intoxicated condition, or under the influence of any substance which may impair one’s driving ability.
  2. A person is guilty of possession of an open alcoholic beverage container in a motor vehicle, when he or she has in his or her possession an open alcoholic beverage container in the passenger area of a motor vehicle located on a public highway or on the right-of-way of a public highway. However, nothing in this section shall prohibit the possession of an open alcoholic beverage container by an individual who is strictly a passenger and not the driver, in the passenger area of a motor vehicle maintained or used primarily for the transportation of persons for compensation, such as buses, taxis, and limousines, or in a recreational vehicle, motor home, or motor coach.
  3. For purposes of this section, “alcoholic beverage” means:
    1. Beer, ale, porter, stout, and other similar fermented beverages including sake or similar products of any name or description containing one-half of one percent (0.5%) or more of alcohol by volume, brewed or produced from malt, wholly or in part, or from any substitute therefor;
    2. Wine of not less than one-half of one percent (0.5%) of alcohol by volume; or
    3. Distilled spirits which is that substance known as ethyl alcohol, ethanol, or spirits of wine in any form including all dilutions and mixtures thereof from whatever source or by whatever process produced.
  4. For the purposes of this section, “open alcoholic beverage container” means any bottle, can, or other receptacle that contains any amount of alcoholic beverage, and:
    1. Is open or has a broken seal; or
    2. The contents of which are partially removed.
  5. For the purposes of this section, “passenger area” means the area designed to seat the driver and the passengers while the motor vehicle is in operation and any area that is readily accessible to the driver or a passenger while in their seating positions, including the glove compartment. Passenger area does not include possession of an open alcoholic beverage container in a locked glove compartment, or behind the last upright seat or in an area not normally occupied by the driver or a passenger in a motor vehicle that is not equipped with a trunk.
  6. For the purpose of this section, “public highway” or “right-of-way of a public highway” means the entire width between and immediately adjacent to the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.
  7. No person shall, as a result of a single course of conduct, be tried for or convicted of a violation of this section and a violation of KRS 222.202 or 525.100 . The attorney for the Commonwealth shall elect under which statute to proceed. A conviction, decision not to prosecute, or dismissal of charges under any of these statutes shall operate as a bar to prosecution under any other of these statutes for offenses arising out of the same course of conduct.

History. 1376r-2: amend. Acts 1984, ch. 165, § 19, effective July 13, 1984; 2000, ch. 467, § 18, effective October 1, 2000.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Renting motor vehicle to unlicensed persons prohibited, KRS 186.630 .

189.540. Regulations for school buses — Operator required to have commercial driver’s license with school bus endorsement.

  1. The Kentucky Board of Education shall promulgate administrative regulations to govern the design and operation of all Kentucky school buses and to govern the operation of district-owned passenger vehicles transporting students under KRS 156.153(2). The board shall, with the advice and aid of the Department of Kentucky State Police and the Transportation Cabinet, enforce the administrative regulations governing the operation of all school buses whether owned by a school district or privately contracted and all district-owned passenger vehicles transporting students under KRS 156.153(2). The regulations covering the operation shall by reference be made a part of any contract with a school district. Every school district and private contractor referred to under this subsection shall be subject to those regulations.
  2. Any employee of any school district who violates any of the administrative regulations in any contract executed on behalf of a school district shall be subject to removal from office. Any person operating a school bus under contract with a school district who fails to comply with any of the administrative regulations shall be guilty of breach of contract and the contract shall be canceled after proper notice and a hearing by the responsible officers of such school district.
  3. Any person who operates a school bus shall be required to possess a commercial driver’s license issued pursuant to KRS 281A.170 with a school bus endorsement as described in KRS 281A.175 .

History. 2739g-69m: corrected, Acts. 1958, ch. 126, § 24; 1988, ch. 262, § 4, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 455, § 32, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 476, § 609, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 216, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 1996, ch. 362, § 6, effective July 15, 1996; 2004, ch. 22, § 2, effective July 13, 2004; 2005, ch. 165, § 9, effective June 20, 2005; 2007, ch. 85, § 209, effective June 26, 2007.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/13/90). The Act amending this section prevails over the repeal and reenactment in House Bill 940, Acts Ch. 476, pursuant to Section 653(1) of Acts Ch. 476.

(6/17/78). This section was amended by 1978 Ky. Acts chs. 83 and 434, part of which are in conflict and cannot be compiled together. Effect has been given to all provisions except for the conflicting provision in subsection (3), in which the later amendment by 1978 Ky. Acts ch. 434, sec. 7, prevails.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Authority to Regulate.

Where language of KRS 156.160 and this section was clear and unambiguous and authorized the Department of Transportation to regulate the operation of school buses, which necessarily included those persons operating the buses, there was no room for construction of the statutes and they must be accepted as they were written. Cornette v. Commonwealth, 899 S.W.2d 502, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 108 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

Statutory grant of authority under KRS 156.160 and this section to Department of Transportation to adopt regulations to govern the design and operation of school buses was not unconstitutional special legislation because it applied only to public and not to private or parochial school bus drivers; the statutes apply equally to a class and further a legitimate state interest in safe transportation of public school children. Cornette v. Commonwealth, 899 S.W.2d 502, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 108 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

It was not the case that KRS Chapter 281A set forth a comprehensive scheme of regulating the same matter which was being regulated by an administrative agency, in violation of KRS 13A.120 , as the administrative regulation was more detailed, comprehensive and pertinent regarding school bus drivers than was the statute, which dealt with commercial driver’s licenses. Cornette v. Commonwealth, 899 S.W.2d 502, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 108 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

189.550. Vehicles used for transporting children to stop at railroad crossings.

Operators of all buses and motor vehicles used for transporting children shall stop their vehicles before crossing any railroad when tracks are at the same level of the roadway. The stop shall be made not less than fifteen (15) feet nor more than fifty (50) feet from the nearest track over which the highway crosses, except where the crossing is protected by gates or a flagman employed by the railroad. After making the stop, the operator shall open the service door and carefully look in each direction and listen for approaching trains or other on-track equipment before proceeding. If visibility is impaired at the required distance for stopping under this section, the operator may allow the vehicle to slowly roll forward for the purpose of gaining the visibility necessary to safely cross the railroad tracks.

HISTORY: 1376r-10: amend. Acts. 1960, ch. 123, § 4; 1988, ch. 262, § 5, effective July 15, 1988; 2003, ch. 147, § 1, effective March 18, 2003; 2018 ch. 101, § 1, effective July 14, 2018.

189.560. Railroad crossings — Duties of motor vehicle operators and commercial drivers — Railroad’s liability for death or injury.

  1. The operator of a vehicle shall stop and remain standing at a railroad grade crossing when any of the following conditions exist:
    1. A visible electric or mechanical signal device warns of the immediate approach of a railroad train or other on-track equipment;
    2. A crossing gate is lowered warning of the immediate approach or passage of a railroad train or other on-track equipment;
    3. An approaching train or other on-track equipment is visible and in hazardous proximity; or
    4. A human flagman signals the approach or passage of a train or other on-track equipment.
  2. In addition to subsection (1) of this section, a person who holds or is required to hold a CDL as defined in KRS 281A.010 and is driving a commercial motor vehicle shall:
    1. Slow down and check that the railroad tracks are clear of an approaching train;
    2. Stop and remain standing at a railroad grade crossing if the railroad tracks are not clear;
    3. Maintain sufficient space to drive completely through the railroad grade crossing without stopping; and
    4. Negotiate a railroad grade crossing only with sufficient undercarriage clearance.
  3. Whenever the tracks of any railroad or interurban railway over which trains or cars are regularly operated cross a state maintained highway at grade, the cabinet may designate that crossing as “unsafe,” and no operator of any vehicle shall cross the crossing without first bringing his vehicle to a full stop no closer than a marked stop line or fifteen (15) feet, nor more than thirty (30) feet, from the nearest rail of the tracks.
  4. At crossings designated “unsafe,” the cabinet shall place and maintain on each side of the tracks on the right side of the highway, at the marked stopping position, or, if the stopping position is not marked, on the pavement not more than twenty-five (25) feet in advance of the track, an octagonal shape sign of a type and size currently approved for use by the cabinet bearing the word “Stop” in white letters not less than ten (10) inches in height.
  5. The cabinet shall install the signs described in subsection (3) of this section, within sixty (60) days after the crossing is designated unsafe.
  6. Subsections (3) to (5) of this section shall not apply to grade crossings at which have been constructed and maintained gates, electric warning signals, or other automatic audible signals, or which are protected by watchmen.
  7. The failure to observe subsections (3) to (6) of this section shall not change the liability of any railroad or interurban railway in the trial of any civil case against the railroad or interurban railway for death or injuries, to person or property.
  8. If subsection (7) of this section is declared unconstitutional, then subsections (3) to (8) of this section shall be ineffective.

HISTORY: 2739g-69w, 4353b-1 to 4353b-5: amend. Acts 1964, ch. 65, § 5; 1970, ch. 86, § 1; 1992, ch. 229, § 3, effective July 14, 1992; 2006, ch. 173, § 21, effective July 12, 2006; 2013, ch. 21, § 2, effective June 25, 2013; 2018 ch. 101, § 2, effective July 14, 2018.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Purpose.

Purpose of signals and warnings as to railroad crossings is to warn of approach of trains, and railroad has no duty to warn motorists that train is standing on crossing. Sympson v. Southern R. Co., 279 Ky. 619 , 131 S.W.2d 481, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 313 ( Ky. 1939 ).

2.Duty of Motorist Approaching.

Motorist approaching crossing has duty only to use such care as would usually be expected of an ordinary prudent person in driving his car, and to learn of the approach of the train and keep out of its way. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Pittman, 292 Ky. 331 , 166 S.W.2d 443, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 83 ( Ky. 1942 ).

3.Failure of Electric Signals.

The fact that electric crossing signals are not working does not relieve the motorist of the duty to exercise ordinary care for his safety, but it does diminish the quantum of care considered as ordinary. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Pittman, 292 Ky. 331 , 166 S.W.2d 443, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 83 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Refusal of court to instruct that if plaintiff relied exclusively on failure of electric signals to work without using ordinary care for his own safety then he was guilty of contributory negligence, was not error, since it is for jury to determine whether motorist, in proceeding across crossing where signals were not working, was using ordinary care under the circumstances in relying on the failure of the signals. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Pittman, 292 Ky. 331 , 166 S.W.2d 443, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 83 ( Ky. 1942 ).

4.Liability of Railroad Company.

Subsections (2) to (6) of this section making it unlawful for driver to cross without stop grade crossing designated as unsafe and marked “Stop — Kentucky Law,” did not change railroad’s liability in civil actions, and showed that driver offending act should not be penalized by barring recovery because contributorily negligent; “Stop, Look and Listen” doctrine was not modified by act. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Crockett's Adm'x, 232 Ky. 726 , 24 S.W.2d 580, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 69 ( Ky. 1930 ) (decision prior to 1964 amendment).

Where train approaching crossing was in a cut for some distance, and motorist on highway could not see train until reaching a point on the highway only 75 to 80 feet from the crossing, and then only when the engine was within 40 or 50 feet of the crossing, and there was evidence that whistle and bell were not sounded until train was within 300 feet of the crossing and that wigwag signal was not working, motorist approaching crossing at 35 miles per hour was not negligent as a matter of law in failing to reduce speed or in failing to observe approach of train until too late to avoid being struck. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Pittman, 292 Ky. 331 , 166 S.W.2d 443, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 83 ( Ky. 1942 ).

An exception to this rule exists where there has been a custom of the railroad to maintain a light, signal or flagman at the crossing, and the custom is certain, definite, uniform, and known to travelers on the highway. Whether such custom existed is usually a jury question. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Maxwell, 292 Ky. 660 , 167 S.W.2d 841, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 726 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Where only evidence as to custom of railroad to maintain a flagman and lights at a crossing was that such was the practice during switching operations, the evidence was not sufficient to establish liability of railroad where a full train was standing on the crossing and no switching was being done. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Maxwell, 292 Ky. 660 , 167 S.W.2d 841, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 726 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Applicability of the “ultra-hazardous-crossing” exception to defendant railroad’s minimal liability for a collision at a crossing on a private drive was an issue for the jury. The presence of a crossbuck sign did not absolve the railroad of its duty to warn where the crossing was deemed ultra-hazardous, and plaintiff deputy presented evidence that his sight line to the right of the crossing and the train’s approach was obscured by foliage. Dugle v. Norfolk Southern Ry., 683 F.3d 263, 2012 FED App. 0192P, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12631 (6th Cir. Ky. 2012 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Bell or whistle to be sounded by locomotive near highway crossings, KRS 277.190 .

Passenger vehicles required to stop at railroad crossings, KRS 281.745 .

Signal boards, erection of, similar to those used by railroads and interurbans at crossings, prohibited, KRS 277.160 .

Signal boards to be placed by railroad companies at crossings, KRS 277.160 .

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Railroads, § 335.00.

189.561. Investigation of certain public grade crossings not equipped with gates — Results — Costs.

  1. The cabinet shall investigate any public grade crossing not equipped with gates, with an average daily traffic of four thousand (4,000) or more, at which two (2) or more accidents involving a train and a vehicle traversing the crossing of a railroad and a highway have occurred in a consecutive five (5) year period, beginning January 1, 1986. The cabinet shall not consider nonfatal accidents caused by mechanical failure of the motor vehicle; accidents in which the operator of the highway motor vehicle was in violation of the provisions of KRS Chapter 189A; or other nonwarning signal related cause as set forth by the cabinet in an administrative regulation. If the cabinet installed active warning devices under its normal crossing safety improvement program since January 1, 1986, the five (5) year period for the determination of accidents shall begin at the time of this installation. The cabinet shall request written comments from the affected local government prior to reaching a decision on a particular crossing. After receiving a report from the affected local government supporting the installation of gates, the cabinet, utilizing matching funds available from the Federal Highway Administration’s rail/highway grade crossing safety program, shall program the installation of gates at the crossing. Locations which do not receive a favorable report from the affected local government shall be reconsidered at the time of the next update of the five (5) year accident period.
  2. The cost of installing gates shall be the responsibility of the cabinet and railroad in accordance with KRS 277.065 and shall not be charged to any unit of local government.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 229, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 195, § 1, effective July 15, 1994.

189.562. Duty of railroad company when warning device incorrectly remains activated.

If a warning device at a grade crossing is activated, for a period of thirty (30) minutes or more, in the absence of an approaching train, due to track maintenance or train movements in the vicinity, and the railroad company responsible is unable to disengage the warning device, then the company shall position a flagman at the affected intersection.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 229, § 2, effective July 14, 1992.

189.565. Operator of motor vehicle used in transporting inflammable liquids or explosives to stop vehicle at railroad crossings — Exceptions.

The operator of any motor vehicle used in the transportation of inflammable liquids or explosives shall stop such motor vehicle before crossing at grade the main track of any railroad or interurban electric railway, except where the crossing is a guarded crossing protected by gates or a flag controlled crossing or operated by an employee of the railroad or interurban company. The stop shall be made no closer than a marked stop line or fifteen (15) feet, nor more than thirty (30) feet, from the nearest track to be crossed. After making the stop, the operator shall look carefully in each direction and shall not start his vehicle until he has ascertained that no cars, trains, or other on-track equipment are approaching in either direction.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 35, § 1, effective May 18, 1956; 2006, ch. 173, § Section 22, effective July 12, 2006; 2018 ch. 101, § 3, effective July 14, 2018.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Marks v. Commonwealth, 698 S.W.2d 533, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 638 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

189.570. Pedestrians.

  1. Pedestrians shall obey the instruction of any official traffic control devices specifically applicable to them, unless otherwise directed by a police officer or other officially designated persons.
  2. Pedestrians shall be subject to traffic and pedestrian control signals as provided in KRS 189.231 and 189.338 .
  3. At all other places, pedestrians shall be accorded the privileges and shall be subject to the restrictions stated in this chapter.
  4. When traffic control signals are not in place or in operation the operator of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way, slowing down or stopping if need be to so yield, to a pedestrian crossing the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling, or when the pedestrian is approaching so closely from the opposite half of the roadway as to be in danger.
  5. Whenever any vehicle is stopped at a marked crosswalk or at any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, to permit a pedestrian to cross the roadway, the operator of any other vehicle approaching from the rear shall not overtake and pass the stopped vehicle.
    1. Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway. (6) (a) Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway.
    2. Any pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point where a pedestrian tunnel or overhead pedestrian crossing has been provided shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway.
    3. Between adjacent intersections within the city limits of every city at which traffic control signals are in operation, pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked crosswalk.
    4. Notwithstanding other provisions of this subsection or the provisions of any local ordinance, every operator of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian and shall give warning by sounding the horn when necessary and shall exercise proper precaution upon observing a child or an obviously confused or incapacitated person upon a roadway.
  6. No vehicle shall at any time be driven through or within a safety zone.
  7. The operator of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to any pedestrian on a sidewalk.
  8. No pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.
  9. No pedestrian shall cross a roadway intersection diagonally unless authorized by official traffic control devices; and, when authorized to cross diagonally, pedestrians shall cross only in accordance with the official traffic control devices pertaining to such crossing movements.
  10. Pedestrians shall move, whenever practicable, upon the right half of crosswalks.
  11. Where a sidewalk is provided and its use is practicable, it shall be unlawful for any pedestrian to walk along and upon an adjacent roadway.
  12. Where a sidewalk is not available, any pedestrian walking along and upon a highway shall walk only on a shoulder, as far as practicable from the edge of the roadway.
  13. Where neither a sidewalk nor a shoulder is available, any pedestrian walking on or along a highway shall walk as near as practicable to an outside edge of the roadway, and, if on a two-way roadway shall walk only on the left side of the roadway.
  14. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, any pedestrian upon a roadway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway.
  15. A pedestrian who is under the influence of alcohol or any kind of drug to a degree which renders himself a hazard shall not walk or be upon a highway except on a sidewalk.
  16. No pedestrian shall enter or remain upon any bridge or approach thereto beyond the bridge signal, gate, or barrier, after a bridge operation signal indication has been given.
  17. No pedestrian shall pass through, around, over, or under any crossing gate or barrier at a railroad grade crossing or bridge while such gate or barrier is closed or is being opened or closed.
  18. No person shall stand in a roadway for the purpose of soliciting a ride.
  19. No person shall stand on a roadway for the purpose of soliciting employment or business from the occupant of any vehicle.
  20. No person shall stand on a highway for the purpose of soliciting contributions unless such soliciting is designated by the presence of a traffic control device or warning signal or an emergency vehicle or public safety vehicle as defined in KRS 189.910 making use of the flashing, rotating or oscillating red, blue, or yellow lights on such devices or vehicles.
  21. No person shall stand on or in proximity to a street or highway for the purpose of soliciting the watching or guarding of any vehicle while parked or about to be parked on a street or highway.
  22. Upon the immediate approach of an emergency vehicle equipped with, and operating, one (1) or more flashing, rotating, or oscillating red or blue lights, visible under normal conditions from a distance of 500 feet to the front of such vehicle, and the operator of which is giving audible signal by siren, exhaust whistle, or bell, every pedestrian shall yield the right-of-way to the emergency vehicle.
  23. This section shall not relieve the operator of an emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway nor from the duty to exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian.

History. 2739g-69q to 2739g-69v: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 46, § 8, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Purpose.

Purpose of this section was not to make it easier for the motorist to avoid the pedestrian but that the pedestrian may observe approaching vehicles and step out of their path if it appears they may not turn out of their path to avoid him. Saddler v. Parham, 249 S.W.2d 945, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 1164 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952).

2.Construction.

This section means that the duty of pedestrians to yield the right-of-way does not relieve motorists of the duty to exercise due care to avoid injuring pedestrians who cross streets at places other than those specified by this section. Myers & Clark Co. v. Layne, 312 S.W.2d 463, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 228 ( Ky. 1958 ).

This section does not relieve a motorist of his common-law duty of exercising due care to avoid striking pedestrians walking along the right side of the highway. Chism v. Lampach, 352 S.W.2d 191, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1961 ).

No absolute right-of-way obtains in favor of the pedestrian or motorist. Russell v. Lawless, 458 S.W.2d 176, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 168 ( Ky. 1970 ).

3.Application.

The provisions of this section do not include a situation where the pedestrian is within a marked crosswalk where traffic signals are in operation. Eichstadt v. Underwood, 337 S.W.2d 684, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 366 ( Ky. 1960 ).

This section does not apply to a plant’s private driveway leading to the public highway. McKinney v. Ballard, 352 S.W.2d 200, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 199 ( Ky. 1961 ).

4.Intersections.

Signal of traffic officer authorizing movement of vehicles across intersection, did not relieve motorist of duty of sounding horn, slowing speed, or exercising reasonable care for pedestrians on opposite foot crossing; and motorist’s failure to observe duties after seeing crowd of pedestrians at crossing was negligence. Melville v. Rollwage, 171 Ky. 607 , 188 S.W. 638, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 390 ( Ky. 1916 ) ( Ky. 1916 ) (decided under prior law).

In action involving collision between automobile and pedestrian crossing city intersection in nighttime it was jury question whether automobile proceeding against red light struck pedestrian, or pedestrian proceeding against red light walked into traffic properly moving across his path. Peak v. Arnett, 233 Ky. 756 , 26 S.W.2d 1035, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 653 ( Ky. 1930 ) (decided under prior law).

Even if traffic officer had permitted pedestrian to proceed across intersection, she was obliged to exercise care for own safety, especially where she knew that traffic was moving across her path. Lieberman v. McLaughlin, 233 Ky. 763 , 26 S.W.2d 753, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 647 ( Ky. 1930 ) (decided under prior law).

Old man who was struck by automobile while attempting to cross city street at intersection when red light was against him was contributorily negligent as matter of law. Kinsella v. Meyer's Adm'r, 267 Ky. 508 , 102 S.W.2d 974, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 341 ( Ky. 1937 ) (decided under prior law).

A “T” connection of two highways is an “intersection.” Smith v. Goodwin, 292 Ky. 37 , 165 S.W.2d 976, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 1942 ).

“Intersection” within the meaning of traffic statutes and regulations is a term used to describe the meeting of one street with another at an angle, although one of the streets may stop at and not cross the other street but the intersection must be formed by recognized public ways as distinguished from private ways. McKinney v. Ballard, 352 S.W.2d 200, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 199 ( Ky. 1961 ).

This section involves the regulation of pedestrian traffic at intersections and an unmarked crossing from a plant across a four-lane highway controlled by a flashing yellow light erected by the state highway department was not an intersection and pedestrian who entered the unmarked crossing and was struck by an automobile was contributorily negligent since flashing yellow light gave traffic on the highway the right-of-way. McKinney v. Ballard, 352 S.W.2d 200, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 199 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Since there is at every intersection not having a marked crosswalk an unmarked crosswalk, then this crosswalk should consist of that portion of the roadway at the intersection a pedestrian would be required to travel in crossing from curb to curb for a reasonable width to allow pedestrian travel. French v. Mozzali, 433 S.W.2d 122, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 260 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Where a pedestrian was struck while crossing the street at an intersection where there was no marked crosswalk, the pedestrian was not violating the statute as a matter of law. Meredith v. Crumpton, 434 S.W.2d 648, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 242 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Motorists can be reasonably expected to anticipate the presence of pedestrians at intersections. Meredith v. Crumpton, 434 S.W.2d 648, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 242 ( Ky. 1968 ).

The pedestrian, although having the right-of-way, must exercise ordinary care for his own protection both in keeping a lookout for oncoming vehicles and in getting on across the street and out of danger. French v. Mozzali, 433 S.W.2d 122, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 260 ( Ky. 1968 ).

5.— Crosswalk.

Where evidence was conflicting as to whether pedestrian who stepped into street from between two parked cars was struck at crossing or in middle of block, verdict would not be disturbed. Wilkins v. Hopkins, 278 Ky. 280 , 128 S.W.2d 772, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 437 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Subsection (2) (now (4)) of this section, requiring motorist to yield right-of-way to pedestrian, does not give pedestrian an absolute right of passage nor does it justify him in proceeding in disregard of rights of motorists or of his own safety. Whittaker v. Thornberry, 306 Ky. 830 , 209 S.W.2d 498, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 666 ( Ky. 1948 ), overruled, Buckler v. Commonwealth, 541 S.W.2d 935, 1976 Ky. LEXIS 29 ( Ky. 1976 ), overruled in part, Rabovsky v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 6, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 28 ( Ky. 1998 ).

Pedestrian may not unreasonably ignore an approaching car or intrude himself in the midst of traffic. He does not have exclusive control of the intersection. Whittaker v. Thornberry, 306 Ky. 830 , 209 S.W.2d 498, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 666 ( Ky. 1948 ), overruled, Buckler v. Commonwealth, 541 S.W.2d 935, 1976 Ky. LEXIS 29 ( Ky. 1976 ), overruled in part, Rabovsky v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 6, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 28 ( Ky. 1998 ).

The customary observance of due care justifies the preferential right of the pedestrian to cross the street and the observance of a duty by the driver of an automobile to yield the right-of-way to the pedestrian until he reaches the opposite side. Herbold v. Ford Motor Co., 310 Ky. 697 , 221 S.W.2d 646, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 997 ( Ky. 1949 ).

In personal injury action by pedestrian struck by automobile it was prejudicial error for trial court to refuse to admit discovery deposition stating that driver, after stopping for stop sign and looking for vehicular traffic, had started forward at precisely the same instant that pedestrian stepped off the curb where pedestrian contended that motorist was negligent by failing to ascertain her whereabouts before starting his car forward and that he should have yielded the right-of-way to her under subsection (2) (now (4)) of this section. White v. Crawford, 346 S.W.2d 308, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 306 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Where the defendant’s evidence would support an inference that the pedestrian had not entered the crosswalk when the defendant began to negotiate his turn, the jury could find that the defendant was justified in believing the pedestrian did not intend to cross the street. Russell v. Lawless, 458 S.W.2d 176, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 168 ( Ky. 1970 ).

The Kentucky Alcoholic Beverage Control Board did not abuse its discretion in granting a retail drink license to a business by interpreting former KRS 241.075 as meaning that the required measurement under the statute must be via the shortest route of ordinary pedestrian travel that was both lawful and safe. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't v. TDC Group, LLC, 283 S.W.3d 657, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 28 ( Ky. 2009 ).

6.— — Marked.

Pedestrian had right-of-way under this section if crossing in crosswalk and was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law where she allegedly continued to cross even though she saw oncoming taxi half a block away and left crosswalk to avoid accident. B-Line Cab Co. v. Hampton, 247 S.W.2d 34, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 664 ( Ky. 1952 ).

If pedestrian was in the crosswalk failure of driver to yield right-of-way could constitute a negligent act and where driver turned left in congested traffic after waiting for vehicular and pedestrian traffic to clear and struck a pedestrian who had walked behind an automobile partially straddling the crosswalk question of negligence was for the jury. Likens Drug Co. v. Bosley, 343 S.W.2d 841, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 448 ( Ky. 1961 ).

If pedestrian was in a marked crosswalk at time of collision, she had right-of-way. Fenwick v. Daugherty, 418 S.W.2d 243, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 207 ( Ky. 1967 ).

To constitute a “marked” crosswalk, the crosswalk must be clearly identifiable on the street by distinct and adequate markings. White v. McAllister, 443 S.W.2d 541, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 246 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Where the plaintiff’s evidence showed that at one time there had been a marked crossing but the painted lines had been allowed to wear away everywhere but on the curb of a six-lane street, the evidence with regard to the existence of a marked crosswalk lacked probative value, and a directed verdict for the defendant was proper. White v. McAllister, 443 S.W.2d 541, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 246 ( Ky. 1969 ).

7.— — Unmarked.

Where a city ordinance defined unmarked crosswalks at intersections as being that part of the roadway included in the extension of the sidewalk across any intersection, a pedestrian walking straight across a street perpendicular to it near a point where the street was intersected on one side by another at a 74 degree angle so that she was outside of that portion of the roadway included in the extension of the sidewalk of the intersecting street when she was struck by defendant’s vehicle was not in a crosswalk at the time she was struck. Severance v. Sohan, 347 S.W.2d 498, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 352 ( Ky. 1961 ).

An unmarked crosswalk is an extension of the sidewalk lying across the roadway in a line between the two curb corners, and may be, under certain circumstances, held to encompass a width reasonably necessary for pedestrian travel. Cassinelli v. Begley, 433 S.W.2d 651, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 286 ( Ky. 1968 ).

8.— — Right Side.

Question of contributory negligence was for the jury where right half of crosswalk was blocked as pedestrian entered the street and she was compelled to start her trip on the left side of the crosswalk, for it could not be said as a matter of law she was negligent in failing to return to the right side since there was serious doubt this provision created a duty to those operating motor vehicles but seemed to be designed to promote convenience of other pedestrians. Likens Drug Co. v. Bosley, 343 S.W.2d 841, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 448 ( Ky. 1961 ).

9.Roads and Highways.
10.— Crossing.

Where defendant, who was driving north in middle lane of four-lane highway, maintained that plaintiff pedestrian ran directly in front of his car from behind southbound truck, but undisputed evidence was that plaintiff was struck at extreme east edge of pavement, questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury. Smith v. Goodwin, 292 Ky. 37 , 165 S.W.2d 976, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Although highway which pedestrian was crossing consisted of two national highways that were leading arterials, defendant motorist was not entitled to instruction that pedestrian was required to exercise increased precaution under such circumstances, in absence of evidence that there was heavy vehicular traffic on the highway at the time of the accident. Smith v. Goodwin, 292 Ky. 37 , 165 S.W.2d 976, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 1942 ).

A pedestrian is not required to yield the right-of-way to a motor vehicle except when he crosses the highway at a point other than an intersection or marked crosswalk which is available for his use in crossing. A pedestrian crossing the road in the country or in a village where there is no intersection or marked crosswalk is not required to yield the right-of-way to motor vehicles. Kentucky Virginia Stages, Inc. v. Tackett's Adm'r, 294 Ky. 189 , 171 S.W.2d 4, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 389 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Where a pedestrian crossed the west half of a straight road and walked into the side of a truck traveling in east lane, the pedestrian was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Leslie-Four Coal Co. v. Brock, 343 S.W.2d 820, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 439 ( Ky. 1961 ).

11.— Walking on Side.

Subsection (6) (now (14)) of this section refers only to pedestrians who are walking on or along the highway and has no application to stationary pedestrians and it was designed not for protection of the motorist but in order that the pedestrian could see cars approaching and keep out of the way as a matter of ordinary care and a refusal of an instruction seeking to apply this subsection to a motorist who was struck by a truck while standing behind his automobile preparatory to changing a tire was not error. Sears v. Frost's Adm'r, 279 S.W.2d 776, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 539 ( Ky. 1955 ).

This section permits a motorist to assume that pedestrians will not be walking on or along the right side of the highway. Chism v. Lampach, 352 S.W.2d 191, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Where pedestrian was walking on the left side of the street and was struck from his rear by a paving truck which was being operated in reverse on its wrong side of the street, in connection with the paving of the street, a question for the jury as to the liability of the trucking concern was presented. Barker v. Danville Constr. Co., 389 S.W.2d 931, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 404 ( Ky. 1965 ).

A pedestrian is walking along the highway within the meaning of the statute when he walks along the shoulder or berm of the hard-surfaced portion in the area into which the bodies of wide vehicles extend and on which other vehicles may be expected to travel either by reason of being forced off the hard surface by another vehicle, or by inadvertence while dozing, or looking off, or for any other reason. French v. Mozzali, 433 S.W.2d 122, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 260 ( Ky. 1968 ).

12.— Contributory Negligence.

Where a pedestrian while walking upon the right shoulder of the highway at night was struck from behind by an automobile, the pedestrian was guilty of contributory negligence and precluded from recovery for the injuries sustained when struck by an automobile traveling in the same direction as the pedestrian. Brown v. Wilson, 209 F.2d 151, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 3142 (6th Cir. Ky. 1953 ).

Where pedestrian walking eastwardly in center of four-lane highway, which had grass plot dividing east and west lanes, was struck by rearview mirror of truck going westwardly when truck was in inside lane passing another vehicle, questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury under conflicting evidence as to whether pedestrian was walking on grass plot or on concrete. Brown v. Gibbs, 294 Ky. 423 , 172 S.W.2d 62, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 479 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Plaintiff’s violation of this section by walking on righthand lane of highway was contributory negligence as a matter of law under the evidence. Saddler v. Parham, 249 S.W.2d 945, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 1164 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952).

Pedestrians were not contributorily negligent as a matter of law in that they violated subsections (6) (now (14)) and (7) (now (19)) of this section requiring pedestrians to walk on the left side of the highway and forbidding the standing in a roadway to solicit a ride respectively where the evidence established there was a very narrow space between the blacktop and the ditch. State Contracting & Stone Co. v. Fulkerson, 288 S.W.2d 43, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 239 ( Ky. 1956 ).

Pedestrian who crossed highway within an unmarked crosswalk after looking and seeing headlights coming toward him and ascertaining that he believed he could cross safely was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law, in failing to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. Ellis v. Quinker, 674 S.W.2d 34, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 498 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

13.Duties of Pedestrians.

Pedestrian who, in crossing street, sees automobile approaching and obviously going to pass him, close to him, and despite this knowledge attempts to cross its path, must look and see where automobile is before attempting crossing; failure to do so is contributory negligence as matter of law. Myers v. Cassity, 209 Ky. 315 , 272 S.W. 718, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 488 ( Ky. 1925 ) (decided under prior law).

Pedestrian struck by car who deliberately hurried in front of it, believing there was time to beat it across street, was guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law. Cumberland Grocery Co. v. Hewlett, 231 Ky. 702 , 22 S.W.2d 97, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 343 ( Ky. 1929 ) (decided under prior law).

Age, experience and discretion of adults are not elements in their ordinary care as is case with children, but adults should exercise such care as is usually exercised by ordinarily prudent persons in same or similar circumstances. Fork Ridge Bus Line v. Matthews, 248 Ky. 419 , 58 S.W.2d 615, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 235 ( Ky. 1933 ) (decided under prior law).

14.Jaywalking.

If it is more dangerous to cross a street between intersections than at the intersection, a person so crossing the street should exercise such increased care, in proportion to the increased danger, as a person of ordinarily care and prudence would ordinarily exercise under like circumstances. Ross v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 202 Ky. 828 , 261 S.W. 590, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 817 ( Ky. 1924 ) (decided under prior law). See Cundiff v. Nave, 240 Ky. 47 , 39 S.W.2d 471, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 336 ( Ky. 1931 ); Baldwin v. Hosley, 328 S.W.2d 426, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1959 ).

In pedestrian’s action for injuries when hit by motorist while pedestrian was crossing street in daylight in the middle of the block evidence justified submission of cause to jury with instructions on duties of pedestrian and operator, speed, lookout, warning, contributory negligence and “last clear chance.” Nowak v. Joseph, 275 Ky. 470 , 121 S.W.2d 939, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 443 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

If alleged facts that pedestrian was crossing street at point other than in crosswalk were true, pedestrian had duty to yield right-of-way to oncoming taxi. B-Line Cab Co. v. Hampton, 247 S.W.2d 34, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 664 ( Ky. 1952 ).

The literally expressed absolute duty of every pedestrian crossing a street between intersections to yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway has been modified by judicial construction to be only relative to the proximity of an approaching vehicle. Baldwin v. Hosley, 328 S.W.2d 426, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1959 ).

The fact that an unmarked area near the middle of a block is frequently used as a crosswalk does not make it a crosswalk. Clark v. Smitson, 346 S.W.2d 780, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 340 ( Ky. 1961 ).

If a pedestrian crosses a city street at a place other than an intersection or marked crosswalk, subsection (4)(a) (now (6)(a)) of this section charges him with the duty to yield the right-of-way to motor vehicles. Music v. Waddle, 380 S.W.2d 203, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 279 ( Ky. 1964 ).

The necessity of a pedestrian keeping a reasonable lookout for his own safety, where crossing a city street at other than an intersection or marked crosswalk, cannot end at the curb but must continue until he clears the street, because for a pedestrian this section has declared the street a danger area as a matter of law. Music v. Waddle, 380 S.W.2d 203, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 279 ( Ky. 1964 ).

The statute governs the rights of the parties when the pedestrian is crossing at a point other than a crosswalk area. Meredith v. Crumpton, 434 S.W.2d 648, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 242 ( Ky. 1968 ).

15.— Duties of Motorists.

Subsection (4)(a) (now (6)(a)) of this section which states that a pedestrian shall yield the right-of-way to vehicles except at a marked crosswalk or at any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection does not relieve drivers of the duty to exercise due care to avoid striking pedestrians who cross streets at other than places sanctioned by statute. Miracle v. Flannery's Adm'r, 259 S.W.2d 689, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 968 ( Ky. 1953 ).

While this section provides that a pedestrian crossing a roadway, shall yield the right-of-way to vehicles at all places other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, it does not relieve motorists of the duty to exercise due care to avoid injuring pedestrians who cross streets at places other than those sanctioned by the statute. Shuffitt v. Martin, 268 S.W.2d 928, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 930 ( Ky. 1954 ).

16.— Contributory Negligence.

The literally expressed absolute duty of pedestrian crossing other than at a marked crosswalk or intersection to yield the right-of-way has been modified by judicial construction to be only relative to the proximity of an approaching vehicle and the question of pedestrian’s contributory negligence is for the jury. McFall v. Tooke, 308 F.2d 617, 1962 U.S. App. LEXIS 3978 (6th Cir. Ky. 1962 ).

Where circumstances were such that, had plaintiff looked, he could not possibly have missed seeing defendant’s approaching car before he stepped from curb intending to cross street in middle of block, and thus failed to yield right-of-way as required by subsection (4)(a) (now (6)(a)) of this section, plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Tarter v. Wigginton's Adm'x, 310 Ky. 393 , 220 S.W.2d 829, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 912 ( Ky. 1949 ).

Where a pedestrian stuck his head into a traffic lane from behind a stopped truck to see if any traffic was coming and was struck in the head by a rear-view mirror on a passing car, the pedestrian was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Travis v. Embry, 257 S.W.2d 64, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 768 ( Ky. 1953 ).

Where the plaintiff pedestrian made a judicial admission that he looked both right and left, saw cars coming from his right, waited for those cars to pass, looked to his right again, stepped into the street in middle of the block without looking to his left, and was struck by defendant’s automobile, the trial court properly sustained defendant’s motion for judgment n. o. v. Schoenbaechler v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 328 S.W.2d 514, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 115 ( Ky. 1959 ).

Where the defendant’s vehicle struck the plaintiff in the middle of a street and the evidence established that the plaintiff did not look for approaching cars before or during his attempted crossing, the trial court erred in not directing the verdict against the pedestrian, although there was evidence from which the jury could have found that the defendant was driving 10 to 15 miles per hour over the speed limit, was straddling the centerline of the street, and was not keeping a proper lookout. Clark v. Smitson, 346 S.W.2d 780, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 340 ( Ky. 1961 ).

In addition to common-law duty to exercise ordinary care to protect herself, pedestrian was under statutory duty to surrender the right-of-way to a motor vehicle when she was crossing the road at a point other than at a marked crosswalk or intersection and failure to do so was contributory negligence barring recovery in absence of last clear chance which was not proven. Couch v. Holland, 385 S.W.2d 204, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 150 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Pedestrian struck by vehicle while crossing street at place other than crosswalk was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Satterly v. Stiles, 409 S.W.2d 820, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 76 ( Ky. 1966 ).

Where the evidence clearly established that the decedent was well out of an unmarked crosswalk at the time he was struck by the defendant’s automobile, the decedent was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Cassinelli v. Begley, 433 S.W.2d 651, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 286 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Where the plaintiff crossed the street in the middle of the block at a place not designated as a pedestrian crossing point and he continued across the road after observing the oncoming car, he was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Dickerson v. Martin, 450 S.W.2d 520, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 452 ( Ky. 1970 ).

17.Motorists’ Liability.

Driver need not anticipate that pedestrian seen in place of safety will leave that place and get into danger zone until some movement on his part reasonably indicates that fact. Peak v. Arnett, 233 Ky. 756 , 26 S.W.2d 1035, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 653 ( Ky. 1930 ) (decided under prior law). See Smith v. Dunning, 275 Ky. 733 , 122 S.W.2d 781, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 505 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Where pedestrian leaves place of safety and appears in path of automobile so suddenly that motorist could not have avoided accident had automobile been running at reasonable speed, motorist is not liable, although he saw pedestrian in place of safety and did not signal nor slacken speed. Smith v. Dunning, 275 Ky. 733 , 122 S.W.2d 781, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 505 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

18.Children.

Thirteen-year-old boy did not fail as matter of law to exercise degree of care required by one of his age under similar circumstances thus contributing to his own injury, where he engaged in romp with other boy on country highway and in running from him with head averted was struck by approaching, slow moving truck from which he heard no warning signal. Collett's Guardian v. Standard Oil Co., 186 Ky. 142 , 216 S.W. 356, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1919 ) (decided under prior law).

In action for collision between truck and three-year-old child who had been playing on sidewalk and suddenly ran into street and was struck by bumper, it was jury question in view of driver’s statement that he did not see child, whether he was keeping lookout and whether he saw or could have seen child in time to avoid collision. Fenton Dry Cleaning & Dyeing Co. v. Hamilton, 226 Ky. 580 , 11 S.W.2d 409, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 129 ( Ky. 1928 ) (decided under prior law).

In collision between truck and six-year-old child who allegedly ran from yard into path of truck, driver would not be liable if child suddenly appeared in front of him or so near that danger should not have been anticipated, and if, while running at reasonable speed, he could not, using ordinary care, have prevented the collision with means at his command. Golubic v. Rasnick, 239 Ky. 355 , 39 S.W.2d 513, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 782 ( Ky. 1931 ) (decided under prior law).

Driver who sees children in or near street should take steps for their protection, even if they are not in path of car, if in exercise of ordinary care he should anticipate that they would get in its path. Golubic v. Rasnick, 239 Ky. 355 , 39 S.W.2d 513, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 782 ( Ky. 1931 ) (decided under prior law).

Verdict that truck driver was liable for striking eleven-year-old girl who was crossing street nearly opposite safety zone and was struck when near middle of street, by bumper of rapidly moving truck, was not flagrantly against weight of evidence as against contention that she walked into side of truck. West Kentucky Transp. Co. v. Dezern, 259 Ky. 470 , 82 S.W.2d 486, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 330 ( Ky. 1935 ) (decided under prior law).

Where seven-year-old child ran into street and was struck by defendant’s car, and evidence was conflicting as to whether defendant was keeping a proper lookout and could have stopped car after seeing child, question of negligence was for the jury. Nickell v. Stewart, 291 Ky. 4 , 163 S.W.2d 39, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 175 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Where there was no evidence that child who attempted to cross road in front of bus saw bus coming, bus driver was not entitled to an instruction as to duty of child not to leave a place of safety. Kentucky Virginia Stages, Inc. v. Tackett's Adm'r, 294 Ky. 189 , 171 S.W.2d 4, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 389 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Where bus struck child who ran across road at a point in a small country village, negligence of bus driver was for the jury, in view of testimony of passenger in bus that he saw child when bus was 150 feet away, while bus driver testified that he did not see child until he was within 25 or 30 feet of her, justifying inference that driver was not keeping a proper lookout, and in view of evidence that bus traveled 137 feet after brakes were applied, indicating excessive speed. Kentucky Virginia Stages, Inc. v. Tackett's Adm'r, 294 Ky. 189 , 171 S.W.2d 4, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 389 ( Ky. 1943 ).

In an action to recover for injuries to a child, who was struck by defendant’s motor vehicle, it was proper to treat the point at which the child was struck as being within a crosswalk, although there were no curbs or markings, because it was at an intersection and was a place where pedestrians would naturally cross the street. Ratterman v. Cleveland, 309 Ky. 435 , 217 S.W.2d 978, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 728 ( Ky. 1949 ).

The motorist had no duty to yield to the child in an unmarked crosswalk until the motorist discovered, or by the exercise of ordinary care should have discovered, that the child was in or was about to enter the unmarked crosswalk. Conley v. Rice, 444 S.W.2d 898, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 233 ( Ky. 1969 ).

19.— Contributory Negligence.

Evidence that nine-year-old plaintiff ran across intersection directly into the path of defendant’s approaching car, with the red light against plaintiff, justified verdict for defendant on ground of contributory negligence. Dixon v. Stringer, 277 Ky. 347 , 126 S.W.2d 448, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 651 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Where evidence was that child ran into road directly in front of defendant’s car, from behind a bus which was stopped on the highway, and all witnesses but one testified that defendant’s speed did not exceed 25 miles an hour, verdict for defendant was sustained by great preponderance of the evidence. Burton v. Spurlock's Adm'r, 294 Ky. 336 , 171 S.W.2d 1012, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 459 ( Ky. 1943 ).

In crossing road in country village, it was duty of child to use the degree of care for her own safety that an ordinarily prudent child of her age would use in like and similar circumstances. Kentucky Virginia Stages, Inc. v. Tackett's Adm'r, 294 Ky. 189 , 171 S.W.2d 4, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 389 ( Ky. 1943 ).

“Sudden emergency” doctrine was not applicable to case where child ran across road in front of bus and was struck by bus, such case being controlled by ordinary principles of contributory negligence. Kentucky Virginia Stages, Inc. v. Tackett's Adm'r, 294 Ky. 189 , 171 S.W.2d 4, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 389 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Where child ran across road in front of bus in a country village, and there was conflicting evidence as to lookout and as to distance of bus at time she started across, question of her contributory negligence was for the jury. Kentucky Virginia Stages, Inc. v. Tackett's Adm'r, 294 Ky. 189 , 171 S.W.2d 4, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 389 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Where the mother of a seven-year-old child who was struck by a truck as he crossed a street in the middle of a block in front of his home instructed her children to so cross the street to the sidewalk on the opposite side rather than to walk to the next intersection before crossing which would have required the children to walk where there was no sidewalk with their backs to oncoming traffic in the nearest lane, it was for the jury to determine whether such instruction constituted negligence. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Friend's Adm'x, 270 S.W.2d 946, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1029 ( Ky. 1954 ).

The violation of a statutory duty as contributory negligence of a child is to be treated the same as in common-law jurisprudence and the rules as to presumptions of incapacity should be applied and it was error to give an instruction on contributory negligence of an eight-year-old child in absence of evidence that might be regarded as overcoming presumption that child was not accountable for its negligence. Baldwin v. Hosley, 328 S.W.2d 426, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1959 ).

20.Confused Persons.

The requirement that motorists exercise proper caution upon observing a confused person on the road was not violated where the motorist’s first indication that a pedestrian was confused was when she stepped in front of his truck and he immediately swerved his truck in an attempt to miss her when she did so. Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Stubblefield, 353 S.W.2d 371, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 14 ( Ky. 1962 ).

21.Deafness.

Where there was evidence that deceased was standing in center of road, near parked car, at time bus came over hill some 500 feet away, but did not see bus because he was looking at dog in field, and did not hear it because he was deaf, there was a jury question as to whether bus driver was negligent in not seeing deceased and in not using means at hand to avoid striking him, under “last clear chance” doctrine. Short Way Lines, Inc. v. Sutton's Adm'r, 291 Ky. 541 , 164 S.W.2d 809, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 239 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Where evidence was that injured pedestrian was deaf, instruction that it was his duty to exercise that degree of care usually exercised by ordinarily prudent persons “under circumstances and conditions established in this case” was sufficient, without specific reference to deafness. Short Way Lines, Inc. v. Sutton's Adm'r, 291 Ky. 541 , 164 S.W.2d 809, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 239 ( Ky. 1942 ).

22.Sounding Horn.

The sounding of a horn can serve no effective purpose to warn a pedestrian unless there is sufficient time available after the warning to enable the pedestrian to take advantage of it. Hopper v. Reed, 320 F.2d 433, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 4497 (6th Cir. Ky. 1963 ).

Where automobile driver, by exercise of ordinary care, could have seen pedestrian in position of danger, his duty to give warning by sounding the horn was not obviated by the fact that he did not see the pedestrian. Heskamp v. Bradshaw's Adm'r, 294 Ky. 618 , 172 S.W.2d 447, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1943 ).

In an action by a pedestrian against the motorist who struck her, where the motorist testified that he saw her in the middle of the street, that she stopped there, that he thought she saw his car and was waiting on him, and that she stepped in front of his car after he was too close to stop, the question of whether it was necessary for the motorist to sound his horn was properly submitted to the jury. Halbert v. Lange, 313 Ky. 648 , 233 S.W.2d 278, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 952 ( Ky. 1950 ).

Where a motorist was traveling at least 45 miles per hour and a pedestrian appeared 60 feet in front of him, the sounding of his horn would have been a futile gesture and was, therefore, not required. Jordon v. Clough, 313 S.W.2d 581, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 271 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Where according to plaintiff’s evidence she was struck while on a traffic divider between traffic lanes and according to the defendant the pedestrian was struck as she was running across a traffic lane toward the divider, the motorist was not required, under either version, to sound her horn. Pearce v. Rawlings, 373 S.W.2d 426, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 160 ( Ky. 1963 ).

23.Sudden Appearance.

In action involving collision between truck and pedestrian on city street, instruction suggesting that driver would be precluded from “sudden appearance defense” if he were driving at excessive speed, although the collision would have been unavoidable even if he had been going at permissible speed, was prejudicially erroneous. Hornek Bros. v. Strubel, 212 Ky. 631 , 279 S.W. 1087, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 210 ( Ky. 1926 ) (decided under prior law).

In action for collision between overtaking bus and pedestrian walking near side of city street and allegedly turning suddenly diagonally across street and striking side of bus, bus owner was entitled to sudden appearance instruction. Fork Ridge Bus Line v. Matthews, 248 Ky. 419 , 58 S.W.2d 615, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 235 ( Ky. 1933 ) (decided under prior law).

Motorist is exonerated if pedestrian appeared so suddenly in front of him that, if he had been running at reasonable speed, he could not, with ordinary care and with means at his command, have prevented collision. Gretton v. Duncan, 238 Ky. 554 , 38 S.W.2d 448, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 282 ( Ky. 1931 ) (decided under prior law).

The “sudden appearance” doctrine is repudiated, and the giving of a “sudden appearance” instruction is reversible error; the instruction is condemned because it relieves the driver of responsibility if he exercises ordinary care after pedestrian appears in his path, even though antecedent negligence of driver caused him to get into a position where he could not avoid striking pedestrian after discovering him. Voluntary action on the part of a pedestrian by which he gets into the path of a moving car may be covered by a contributory negligence instruction. Dixon v. Stringer, 277 Ky. 347 , 126 S.W.2d 448, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 651 ( Ky. 1939 ).

“Sudden appearance” instruction was not warranted where passenger in automobile was the one who first saw child running across street, and driver on being warned sought to turn aside, but struck child. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Hazelip, 284 Ky. 333 , 144 S.W.2d 798, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 492 ( Ky. 1940 ). See Dixon v. Stringer, 277 Ky. 347 , 126 S.W.2d 448, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 651 ( Ky. 1939 ), which abolished “sudden appearance” doctrine.

Motorist is not entitled to a “sudden appearance” instruction in a case involving injury to a pedestrian unless the pedestrian is an infant not chargeable with contributory negligence, or unless contributory negligence has not been pleaded, or unless it is shown that the pedestrian slipped, fell or was propelled into the path of the car involuntarily. Kentucky Virginia Stages, Inc. v. Tackett's Adm'r, 294 Ky. 189 , 171 S.W.2d 4, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 389 ( Ky. 1943 ).

24.Instructions.

Where motorist, whose view was obstructed by car in front of him which had pulled over toward the center before making a right-hand turn, proceeded without stopping or making proper observation and struck pedestrian who was unquestionably crossing a street at an intersection and whom he first observed about five feet from him an instruction requiring pedestrian to exercise ordinary care for his own safety was sufficient. Hillman v. Hall, 311 Ky. 790 , 225 S.W.2d 667, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 1249 ( Ky. 1949 ).

There is a pedestrian crosswalk at every intersection of public roads or highways at the place where pedestrians customarily cross, and in action against motorist for striking pedestrian at unmarked crosswalk an appropriate instruction was required. Frank v. Silvers, 414 S.W.2d 887, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 367 ( Ky. 1967 ).

Where it would have been impossible for the jury to find that the pedestrian could not have seen the approaching police car, court committed no error in refusing to give an instruction that the pedestrian’s duty to yield was predicated upon his having a reasonable opportunity to do so. Wright v. Louisville, 477 S.W.2d 146, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 58 ( Ky. 1971 ).

25.— Duties of Pedestrian.

Instruction, that if it is more dangerous to cross street between intersections than at intersection, pedestrian must exercise increased care in proportion to the increased danger, was not erroneous. Ramsey v. Sharpley, 294 Ky. 286 , 171 S.W.2d 427, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 428 ( Ky. 1943 ), overruled, Music v. Waddle, 380 S.W.2d 203, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 279 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Failure to give instruction requested by defense on duty of plaintiff to keep a lookout and exercise due care when crossing the roadway at a point other than the regularly designated crosswalk was reversible error where such instruction was authorized by the evidence. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Byrnes, 296 Ky. 560 , 178 S.W.2d 4, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 589 ( Ky. 1944 ).

In case where pedestrian, who was attempting to cross street at intersection, was struck by bus after he had taken only a few steps into the street, it was error for the court not to give instructions as to specific duties of pedestrian with respect to right of way. Also, defendant bus operator was entitled to instruction covering its claim that pedestrian left place of safety on curb and stepped in front of bus. Whittaker v. Thornberry, 306 Ky. 830 , 209 S.W.2d 498, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 666 ( Ky. 1948 ), overruled, Buckler v. Commonwealth, 541 S.W.2d 935, 1976 Ky. LEXIS 29 ( Ky. 1976 ), overruled in part, Rabovsky v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 6, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 28 ( Ky. 1998 ).

26.— Yielding Right-of-way.

Defendant motorist could not complain of failure of court to instruct as to duty of pedestrian to yield right-of-way under subsection (4)(a) (now (6)(a)) of this section, where defendant did not offer such instruction. Ramsey v. Sharpley, 294 Ky. 286 , 171 S.W.2d 427, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 428 ( Ky. 1943 ), overruled, Music v. Waddle, 380 S.W.2d 203, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 279 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Instruction that it was duty of motorist to yield the right-of-way to pedestrian if the pedestrian was crossing the street in the crosswalk, whether marked or unmarked, at the intersection and if necessary in order to yield the right-of-way to slow down or stop and to exercise proper precaution upon observing the pedestrian upon the roadway, the first clause of which was predicated on subsection (2) (now (4)) and the second clause of which was predicated on subsection (4)(d) (now (6)(d)) of this section, was not error although the intersection formed a “Y” and there was no sidewalk or curbing and no lines marking the crosswalk. Ratterman v. Cleveland, 309 Ky. 435 , 217 S.W.2d 978, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 728 ( Ky. 1949 ).

Instruction that if pedestrian did not use the crosswalk but crossed between the intersections then he should yield the right-of-way and the failure to give last clear chance instruction was not error where evidence was conflicting as to whether pedestrian crossed at a regular crosswalk. Wilson v. Molter, 314 Ky. 676 , 236 S.W.2d 921, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 722 ( Ky. 1951 ).

In an action by a pedestrian against a motorist who struck him, the trial court’s instruction that if the pedestrian was crossing the street within a regular crosswalk it was the duty of the motorist to yield the right-of-way and if he was crossing at a point other than a regular crosswalk, it was his duty to yield to the motorist was proper. Wilson v. Molter, 314 Ky. 676 , 236 S.W.2d 921, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 722 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Where a pedestrian was injured while crossing through a street at a “T” intersection at a point which was directly opposite a sidewalk, and since it was customary for pedestrians to cross the street at such point, she was in an unmarked crosswalk within the meaning of this section and the court’s instruction should have placed the duty upon the motorist to yield the right-of-way. Ellis v. Glenn, 269 S.W.2d 234, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 973 ( Ky. 1954 ).

27.— — Walking on Left Side.

In an action for the wrongful death of a pedestrian an instruction stating that it was the duty of the decedent to walk on the left side of the road in the direction he was traveling was proper. Straughan's Adm'r v. Fendley, 301 Ky. 209 , 191 S.W.2d 391, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 728 ( Ky. 1945 ).

In suit by pedestrian to recover for personal injuries sustained when he was struck by automobile while walking along right side of highway, the court erred in failing to instruct specifically as to duty of pedestrian, under this statute, to walk on left side of highway. Mere instruction that pedestrian put himself in peril if he walked on the paved portion of the highway was not sufficient. Applegate v. Johnson, 306 Ky. 358 , 208 S.W.2d 77, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 572 ( Ky. 1948 ).

28.— Last Clear Chance.

Although pedestrian may have been negligent in crossing city street in nighttime not at intersection, he may recover if, after peril is discovered or by exercise of ordinary care should be discovered, the driver by ordinary care could avoid injuring him. Ross v. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co., 202 Ky. 828 , 261 S.W. 590, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 817 ( Ky. 1924 ) (decided under prior law). See Baldwin v. Hosley, 328 S.W.2d 426, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1959 ).

In collision between pedestrian crossing city intersection in nighttime and automobile making left turn, instruction on “last clear chance” was properly refused, where there was no evidence that driver saw pedestrian a sufficient time before accident to have enabled him, with means at command, to avoid injury. Blackman v. Streicher, 205 Ky. 773 , 266 S.W. 633, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 226 ( Ky. 1924 ) (decided under prior law).

In case involving striking of pedestrian crossing country highway where “last clear chance” doctrine was applicable, but case was not submitted on that theory, it should be retried notwithstanding pedestrian, who was guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law, received verdict, and case should be submitted on question of last clear chance. Myers v. Cassity, 209 Ky. 315 , 272 S.W. 718, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 488 ( Ky. 1925 ) (decided under prior law).

“Last clear chance” doctrine was applicable where pedestrian negligently hurried across street in front of approaching car, but driver saw her when she was 60 to 90 feet away; and it was jury question whether driver exercised ordinary care to avoid injury, after he saw, or in exercise of ordinary care should have seen, her peril. Cumberland Grocery Co. v. Hewlett, 231 Ky. 702 , 22 S.W.2d 97, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 343 ( Ky. 1929 ) (decided under prior law).

“Last clear chance” doctrine was inapplicable to collision between automobile and pedestrian crossing city intersection in nighttime where evidence did not indicate that pedestrian was in peril until he stepped from place of safety and accident happened immediately. Peak v. Arnett, 233 Ky. 756 , 26 S.W.2d 1035, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 653 ( Ky. 1930 ) (decided under prior law).

“Last clear chance” doctrine could not be applied where pedestrian in crossing street not at intersection passed between cars running in almost solid line and as she emerged through line was struck by automobile which, in exercise of any kind of care, could not have avoided her. Runge v. Haller, 236 Ky. 423 , 33 S.W.2d 317, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 767 ( Ky. 1930 ) (decided under prior law).

“Last clear chance” doctrine was applicable where pedestrian crossing city intersection when struck by automobile was contributorily negligent in walking against red light, but where street light was bright; question whether driver exercised ordinary care to avoid injury after he discovered, or in exercise of ordinary care could have discovered pedestrian’s peril, was jury question. Kinsella v. Meyer's Adm'r, 267 Ky. 508 , 102 S.W.2d 974, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 341 ( Ky. 1937 ) (decided under prior law).

It is only where the plaintiff is physically unable to escape from his peril that the defendant is held responsible under the last clear chance doctrine on the ground that he should have discovered the peril but where both parties are merely inattentive and the plaintiff has an equal opportunity to avoid the accident by some act on his part up to the moment of its occurrence then the doctrine does not apply and where plaintiff could have avoided the accident by a slight turn of the head and a hurried step he was not in a position of inextricable peril and it was error to instruct the jury on last clear chance. McFall v. Tooke, 308 F.2d 617, 1962 U.S. App. LEXIS 3978 (6th Cir. Ky. 1962 ).

Where there was evidence that pedestrian ran or walked as much as 20 to 34 feet in full view of driver, “last clear chance” instruction should have been given. Dixon v. Stringer, 277 Ky. 347 , 126 S.W.2d 448, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 651 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Though a pedestrian may be negligent in crossing a street, still he may recover if after his peril is discovered, or by ordinary care should have been discovered, the driver of the automobile could, by ordinary care, avoid injuring him, and a contributory negligence instruction should be so qualified. Heskamp v. Bradshaw's Adm'r, 294 Ky. 618 , 172 S.W.2d 447, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Where there was evidence that automobile driver had ample opportunity to discover pedestrian and avert accident, even though pedestrian was crossing street at point other than crosswalk, a “last clear chance” instruction was proper. Heskamp v. Bradshaw's Adm'r, 294 Ky. 618 , 172 S.W.2d 447, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Pedestrian was entitled to have the jury instructed on the doctrine of “last clear chance” where he was struck by an automobile while in an unmarked crosswalk. Shea v. Bruner, 426 S.W.2d 482, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 519 ( Ky. 1967 ).

Where the plaintiff was struck by a car while he was walking on the wrong side of the road after getting off a bus, the presence of a city bus at the intersection, its observation by the defendant, the close proximity of the plaintiff to the crosswalk, the street light nearby, and the fact that the plaintiff was wearing a light colored overcoat were facts sufficient to submit the case to the jury on a last clear chance instruction. French v. Mozzali, 433 S.W.2d 122, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 260 ( Ky. 1968 ).

29.Questions for Jury.

Where pedestrian, crossing street in easterly direction on unmarked crosswalk at intersection, was struck by automobile going north, and evidence was that pedestrian had traveled 32 feet across intersection before being hit, and automobile had traveled 150 feet since time pedestrian started across street, but driver did not see pedestrian until car was in middle of intersection, questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for jury. Heskamp v. Bradshaw's Adm'r, 294 Ky. 618 , 172 S.W.2d 447, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Where an automobile partially blocked the near side of a crosswalk at a busy intersection and a pedestrian walked behind it and was struck as she stepped from behind it by defendant’s vehicle making a left turn, the questions of the defendant’s negligence and of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence were properly submitted to the jury, whether or not the pedestrian was in the crosswalk at the time of being struck. Likens Drug Co. v. Bosley, 343 S.W.2d 841, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 448 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Considering the special hazards normally existing at intersections and the purpose of the statute which gives the pedestrian a right-of-way, it was a jury question as to whether the pedestrian was in an unmarked crosswalk, or so close thereto that his rights were superior to those of the defendant driver. Meredith v. Crumpton, 434 S.W.2d 648, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 242 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Where a driver struck a pedestrian, the trial court should have submitted to the jury the issues of negligence on the part of the driver and contributory negligence on the part of the pedestrian. Russell v. Lawless, 458 S.W.2d 176, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 168 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Whether pedestrian acted as a reasonably prudent person in estimating the distance, speed, and time of both himself and the automobile, and then attempting to cross in front of it was a jury question and the jury could reasonably believe that if pedestrian had made the proper evaluation on distance, speed, and time, there would have been no need for him to take another look as he crossed the road. Ellis v. Quinker, 674 S.W.2d 34, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 498 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

30.Soliciting Contributions.
31.— Distributing Literature Prohibited.

This section is content neutral on its face. Because the statute prohibits all parties from distributing literature in the roadways, and because it permits all parties to solicit contributions in the roadways if the precaution prescribed by subsection (21) of this section are undertaken, the statute applies evenhandedly to all those who wish to distribute written material or solicit funds. Ater v. Armstrong, 961 F.2d 1224, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 7357 (6th Cir. Ky.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 985, 113 S. Ct. 493, 121 L. Ed. 2d 431, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 7215 (U.S. 1992).

Cited:

Lehman v. Patterson, 298 Ky. 360 , 182 S.W.2d 897, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 898 ( Ky. 1944 ); Straughan’s Adm’r v. Fendley, 301 Ky. 209 , 191 S.W.2d 391, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 728 ( Ky. 1945 ); Remmers’ Ex’r v. Mayhugh, 303 Ky. 366 , 197 S.W.2d 450, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 842 ( Ky. 1946 ); Ratterman v. Cleveland, 309 Ky. 435 , 217 S.W.2d 978, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 728 ( Ky. 1949 ); Halbert v. Lange, 313 Ky. 648 , 233 S.W.2d 278, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 952 ( Ky. 1950 ); Wilson v. Molter, 314 Ky. 676 , 236 S.W.2d 921, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 722 ( Ky. 1951 ); Travis v. Embry, 257 S.W.2d 64, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 768 ( Ky. 1953 ); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Friend’s Adm’x, 270 S.W.2d 946, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1029 ( Ky. 1954 ); Senters v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.2d 786, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 376 ( Ky. 1955 ); Johnson v. Morris’ Adm’x, 282 S.W.2d 835, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1955 ); State Contracting & Stone Co. v. Fulkerson, 288 S.W.2d 43, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 239 ( Ky. 1956 ); Jordon v. Clough, 313 S.W.2d 581, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 271 ( Ky. 1958 ); Ross v. Jones, 316 S.W.2d 845, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 60 ( Ky. 1958 ); Leslie-Four Coal Co. v. Brock, 343 S.W.2d 820, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 439 ( Ky. 1961 ); Likens Drug Co. v. Bosley, 343 S.W.2d 841, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 448 ( Ky. 1961 ); Clark v. Smitson, 346 S.W.2d 780, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 340 (Ky. 1961); Severance v. Sohan, 347 S.W.2d 498, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 352 (Ky. 1961); Siler v. Williford, 350 S.W.2d 704, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 129 (Ky. 1961); Commonwealth, Dep’t of Highways v. Stubblefield, 353 S.W.2d 371, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 14 ( Ky. 1962 ); Pearce v. Rawlings, 373 S.W.2d 426, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 160 ( Ky. 1963 ); Seymour v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 508 S.W.2d 572, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 615 ( Ky. 1974 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Automobiles, §§ 16.02 — 16.06.

189.575. Yielding right-of-way to blind pedestrian.

The operator of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to any blind pedestrian carrying a clearly visible white cane or accompanied by an assistance dog.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 48, §§ 1 to 3; 1978, ch. 46, § 9, effective June 17, 1978; 2002, ch. 94, § 1, effective July 15, 2002.

189.580. Duty in case of accident — Movement of vehicle from roadway after accident — Removal of vehicles obstructing roadway — Exemptions — Costs of removal recoverable.

    1. The operator of any vehicle, whose vehicle, vehicle load, or vehicle equipment which is involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or resulting only in damage to a vehicle or other property which is driven or attended by any person, shall immediately stop and ascertain the extent of the injury or damage and render reasonable assistance, including the carrying, or making of arrangements for the carrying, of such person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary, or if such carrying is requested by the injured person. The operator or person having or assuming authority of the operator, or ownership of the vehicle, shall give the occupant of the vehicle, or person struck, if requested, the registration number of the vehicle, if any, and also the names and addresses of the owner, the occupants, and operator. The total names need not exceed five (5) in number. (1) (a) The operator of any vehicle, whose vehicle, vehicle load, or vehicle equipment which is involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or resulting only in damage to a vehicle or other property which is driven or attended by any person, shall immediately stop and ascertain the extent of the injury or damage and render reasonable assistance, including the carrying, or making of arrangements for the carrying, of such person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary, or if such carrying is requested by the injured person. The operator or person having or assuming authority of the operator, or ownership of the vehicle, shall give the occupant of the vehicle, or person struck, if requested, the registration number of the vehicle, if any, and also the names and addresses of the owner, the occupants, and operator. The total names need not exceed five (5) in number.
    2. If an accident that occurs on an interstate highway or parkway or any on-ramp or off-ramp thereto does not involve death, known or visible injury, or the transportation of hazardous material, the operator shall move the vehicle off the roadway to a place as close to the accident scene as practicable without obstructing traffic as soon as the vehicle can be moved without the risk of further injury or damage. The operator or person having or assuming authority of the operator, or ownership of the vehicle, shall give any other person involved in the accident, if requested, the registration number of the vehicle, if any, and also the names and addresses of the owner, the occupants, and the operator of his or her vehicle, and insurance information for the vehicle.
  1. The operator of any vehicle which collides with or is involved in an accident with any vehicle or other property which is unattended resulting in any damage to such other vehicle or property shall immediately stop as close to the accident scene as possible without obstructing traffic and shall then and there either locate and notify the operator or owner of such vehicle or other property of his or her name, address, and the registration number of the vehicle he or she is driving or shall attach securely in a conspicuous place in or on such vehicle or other property a written notice giving his or her name, address, and the registration number of the vehicle he or she is driving, or shall file a report with the local police department.
  2. If the operator of a vehicle is unable to move a vehicle off the roadway under the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of this section, the operator or owner may permit any person who possesses a valid operator’s license or proper class of commercial driver’s license to move the vehicle as provided in this section.
  3. Except as provided for in subsection (5) of this section, a peace officer or safety officer may remove or cause to be removed from the roadway of an interstate highway or parkway or any on-ramp or off-ramp thereto, without consent of the owner or operator, any vehicle, cargo, or other property which is obstructing the roadway, creating or aggravating an emergency situation, or otherwise endangering public safety. Any vehicle, cargo, or other property obstructing the roadway of an interstate highway or parkway shall be removed by the most expeditious means available to clear the obstruction, giving due regard to the protection of the property removed.
    1. In accidents that involve fatalities or known or visible injuries, the removal provisions of subsection (4) of this section shall apply only after all medical assistance, fire supervision, and site investigation have been completed. (5) (a) In accidents that involve fatalities or known or visible injuries, the removal provisions of subsection (4) of this section shall apply only after all medical assistance, fire supervision, and site investigation have been completed.
    2. The removal provisions of subsection (4) of this section shall not apply if an accident involves, or is believed to involve, a release of hazardous materials.
    1. The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident on a highway in this state which results in a fatality or a known or visible injury to a person or damage to a vehicle which renders the vehicle inoperable shall immediately notify a public safety answering point, law enforcement agency, or law enforcement officer having jurisdiction, if the operator is physically capable of doing so and has in his or her possession a functioning communications device with which to do so. (6) (a) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident on a highway in this state which results in a fatality or a known or visible injury to a person or damage to a vehicle which renders the vehicle inoperable shall immediately notify a public safety answering point, law enforcement agency, or law enforcement officer having jurisdiction, if the operator is physically capable of doing so and has in his or her possession a functioning communications device with which to do so.
    2. In the event an operator fails to notify or is incapable of notifying a public safety answering point, law enforcement agency, or law enforcement officer having jurisdiction, the responsibility for reporting the accident within a reasonable amount of time shall rest with the owner of the vehicle or any occupant of the vehicle at the time of the accident, if the owner or occupant is physically capable of doing so, has in his or her possession a functioning communications device with which to do so, and, in the case of the owner, knows of the motor vehicle accident. A law enforcement officer having jurisdiction shall investigate the accident and file a written report of the accident with the officer’s agency.
  4. The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident on a highway in this state resulting in injury to or death of any person or in which total property damage of five hundred dollars ($500) or more is sustained, and in which an investigation is not conducted by a law enforcement officer, shall file a written report of the accident with the Department of Kentucky State Police within ten (10) days of the occurrence of the accident upon forms provided by the department.
  5. Any agency, including the Commonwealth, that removes property from the roadway may intervene in any civil action arising from the accident to recover any costs expended. An owner of real property shall not be liable for the costs of removal under this section of trees, fences, structures, or other debris which fall into the roadway as a result of fire, severe weather, or other casualty.

History. 2739g-53, 2739g-69x, 2739g-69y: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 151, § 2; 1958, ch. 126, § 24; 1972, ch. 64, § 2; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(10); 1976, ch. 133, § 23; 1978, ch. 83, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 434, § 7, effective June 17, 1978; 1990, ch. 94, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 2006, ch. 109, § 1, effective July 12, 2006; 2006, ch. 110, § 1, effective July 12, 2006; 2007, ch. 85, § 210, effective June 26, 2007.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(6/17/78). This section was amended by 1978 Ky. Acts chs. 83 and 434, part of which are in conflict and cannot be compiled together. Effect has been given to all provisions except for the conflicting provision in subsection (3), in which the later amendment by 1978 Ky. Acts ch. 434, sec. 7, prevails.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Construction.

Subsection (1) of this section does not change rule of law for determining whether master is liable for torts of servant. Guy W. Smith & Sons v. Dawson, 206 Ky. 107 , 266 S.W. 926, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 282 ( Ky. 1924 ).

2.Duty to Render Aid.

Only duty of operator is to do what an ordinarily prudent person would have done under similar circumstances to render aid to injured person. Bowling Green-Hopkinsville Bus Co. v. Montgomery, 278 Ky. 837 , 129 S.W.2d 535, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 492 ( Ky. 1939 ).

3.Leaving Scene of Accident.

It was undisputed that another driver intentionally collided with defendant's vehicle. As this was not an accident, the Commonwealth could not prove an essential element of the crime of leaving the scene of an accident, and a directed verdict should have been granted. Gill v. Commonwealth, 465 S.W.3d 35, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 95 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).

4.— Evidence of Guilt.

The defendant’s flight from the scene of a fatal automobile accident, and his subsequent attempts at concealment or suppression of evidence, proved at most that he believed he was at fault, which was just as consistent with ordinary negligence or recklessness as it is with “wanton” conduct. Fugate v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 675, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 169 ( Ky. 1969 ), overruled, Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 303 ( Ky. 1983 ).

On an indictment for voluntary manslaughter in the first degree and leaving the scene of an accident, without any evidence of the extent, if any, to which driver’s intoxication impaired his capacity to understand and tell the truth, and without any evidence of coercion other than the simple fact that he was drunk and in police custody and had been advised that the occupier of the car had told the police what had happened, the trial court having no alternative, did not err in admitting the inculpatory statement. Britt v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 496, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 396 ( Ky. 1974 ).

5.— Separate Crime.

The act of leaving the scene of the accident without stopping to render aid, though it may have amounted to gross and wanton misconduct in itself, was a separate crime from the manslaughter charged as a result of the original striking. Fugate v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 675, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 169 ( Ky. 1969 ), overruled, Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 303 ( Ky. 1983 ).

6.Notice.

The statutory requirement for notice required by this section with any other efforts on part of hit-and-run victim’s administratrix to make the necessary discovery as to who was responsible for negligently producing his death. St. Clair v. Bardstown Transfer Line, Inc., 310 Ky. 776 , 221 S.W.2d 679, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 1274 ( Ky. 1949 ).

7.Conviction.

Conviction of violating this section was proper under evidence that accused motorist drove at excessive speed in nighttime, struck another car stopped at roadside and injured man standing near it, but did not stop although urged to do so. Tipton v. Commonwealth, 207 Ky. 685 , 269 S.W. 1007, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 167 ( Ky. 1925 ).

8.Punishment.

Punishment for violation of this section could not be increased by making out charge of “voluntary manslaughter” because of failure to stop and render aid and resultant death of injured person. Commonwealth v. Nevius, 249 S.W.2d 717, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 840 ( Ky. 1952 ).

9.Instructions.

Where certain duties are imposed on a motorist by statute it is proper to instruct on those duties in the language of the statute. Fahrenholtz v. Loomis, 280 Ky. 9 , 132 S.W.2d 307, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 49 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Instruction requiring jury to find that motorist did “wilfully and unlawfully fail to stop and ascertain the extent of injury and make her identity known and render assistance” in coupling together the factors of stopping, ascertaining the extent of the injury, making known the identity, and rendering assistance necessarily required a belief by the jury that the defendant knew there was someone with an extent of injury to be ascertained, to whom her identity should be made known, and to whom should be rendered assistance and was not erroneous. Smith v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.2d 835, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 27 ( Ky. 1967 ).

10.Finding of Error.

Where there was no objection to an improper question on cross-examination, nor a motion to admonish the jury, there was no basis for a finding of error. Britt v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 496, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 396 ( Ky. 1974 ).

11.Fine.

The maximum fine provided for the offense of failing to render aid and assistance after an accident in violation of subsection (1) of this section is $2,000.00 rather than the $500.00 maximum set for a class A misdemeanor. Commonwealth v. Schindler, 685 S.W.2d 544, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 298 ( Ky. 1984 ).

Cited in:

Harralson v. Monger, 206 S.W.3d 336, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 291 ( Ky. 2006 ); Bays v. Summitt Trucking, LLC, 691 F. Supp. 2d 725, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16975 (W.D. Ky. 2010 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Juvenile offenders sixteen years of age or older charged under this section must, in view of KRS 208.020 (now repealed), be proceeded against as adult offenders and the juvenile court has no jurisdiction in such cases, but juvenile offenders under sixteen years of age must be proceeded against in juvenile court. OAG 75-563 .

Where a written accident report is provided by a law enforcement agency to the bureau of the state police which forwards a copy of that report to the department of transportation (now transportation cabinet), the practical purpose of accident reporting would be accomplished and the motor vehicle operator’s report would not have to be filed. OAG 77-56 .

Acts 1978, chapter 434 as enrolled (without house amendment number 6) and signed by the presiding officers of both houses and which became law without the governor’s signature, represents the law on the question as enacted at the 1978 general assembly. OAG 78-283 .

KRS 532.005 , effective June 19, 1976, eliminated the exception set out in KRS 534.040(2) for offenses defined outside the code, thereby limiting the fine for a violation of subsection (1) of this section to a maximum of $500. OAG 78-457 .

Due to the absence of any exemptions, ambulance crews which are involved in an accident while responding to an emergency call must comply with the requirements of this section and of KRS 189.635 , if applicable, before proceeding to the scene of the emergency. OAG 80-187 .

In the event that an emergency medical service vehicle which is transporting a patient to a hospital on an emergency basis is involved in an accident, where the ambulance crew has determined that no one else who was involved in the accident has been injured in any way, it would not be violating this section in leaving the scene of the accident without first giving the information on vehicle registration and ownership to the driver of the other vehicle. OAG 80-187 .

When a peace officer spots a vehicle a short distance from the scene of an accident which he suspects as having been involved in the accident, he is justified in making an arrest for leaving the scene, for the reason that the driver is guilty of a continuing violation of this section and is still involved in leaving the scene at the time of the arrest, so that this misdemeanor is in fact being committed in the officer’s presence at the time of the arrest. It is not required that the officer witness the vehicle leaving the accident scene itself in order for the officer to make an arrest. OAG 82-301 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Sheriffs and deputies to investigate accidents, KRS 70.150 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Fortune, Criminal Rules, 70 Ky. L.J. 395 (1981-82).

Notes, Statutes Establishing a Duty to Report Crimes or Render Assistance to Strangers: Making Apathy Criminal, 72 Ky. L.J. 827 (1983-84).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Police Officer’s Answer to Claim of Unlawful Arrest, Form 121.02.

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Criminal), 5th Ed., Offenses Against Public Order, Safety and Morals, Part 4 Offenses Relating to Firearms and Destructive Devices, §§ 8.73A, 8.73B.

189.590. Coroners to report deaths.

Every coroner or other official performing a coroner’s functions shall, on or before the tenth day of each month, report in writing to the State Police the death of any person occurring within his county during the preceding calendar month as the result of an accident involving a motor vehicle, and the circumstances of the accident.

History. 2739g-69aa: corrected, Acts 1958, ch. 126, § 24.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Oberst, Recent Developments in Torts; Decisions of the Court of Appeals at the 1956-57 Terms, Contributory Negligence, 46 Ky. L.J. 193 (1958).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Answer Denying Vicarious Liability under KRS 189.590 , Alleging Use Not Permissive, Form 135.17.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Bailment, § 133.00.

189.600. State police to supply accident report forms. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-69z: amended Acts 1958, ch. 126, § 24) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 194, § 4, effective January 1, 1977.

189.610. Accident reports confidential. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-69bb: amended Acts 1958, ch. 126, § 24) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 194, § 4, effective January 1, 1977.

189.620. State police to tabulate reports and publish statistics. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-69cc: amended Acts 1958, ch. 126, § 24) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 194, § 4, effective January 1, 1977.

189.630. City may require accident reports. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-69dd: corrected, Acts 1958, ch. 126, § 24; 1976, ch. 194, § 3, effective January 1, 1977) was repealed by Acts 2006, ch. 173, § 34, effective July 12, 2006.

189.635. Vehicle accident reports by operators, law enforcement officers, and agencies — News-gathering organizations — Contracts with outside entities to provide vehicle’s accident history and electronic access to reports — Administrative regulations — Insurers of train engineers.

  1. The Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, Department of Kentucky State Police, shall be responsible for maintaining a reporting system for all vehicle accidents which occur within the Commonwealth. Such accident reports shall be utilized for such purposes as will improve the traffic safety program in the Commonwealth involving the collection, processing, storing, and dissemination of such data and the establishment of procedures by administrative regulations to ensure that uniform definitions, classifications, and other federal requirements are in compliance.
  2. Any person operating a vehicle on the highways of this state who is involved in an accident resulting in fatal or nonfatal personal injury to any person or damage to the vehicle rendering the vehicle inoperable shall be required to immediately notify a law enforcement officer having jurisdiction. In the event the operator fails to notify or is incapable of notifying a law enforcement officer having jurisdiction, such responsibility shall rest with the owner of the vehicle or any occupant of the vehicle at the time of the accident. A law enforcement officer having jurisdiction shall investigate the accident and file a written report of the accident with his or her law enforcement agency.
  3. Every law enforcement agency whose officers investigate a vehicle accident of which a report must be made as required in this chapter shall file a report of the accident with the Department of Kentucky State Police within ten (10) days after investigation of the accident upon forms supplied by the department.
  4. Any person operating a vehicle on the highways of this state who is involved in an accident resulting in any property damage exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) in which an investigation is not conducted by a law enforcement officer shall file a written report of the accident with the Department of Kentucky State Police within ten (10) days of occurrence of the accident upon forms provided by the department.
    1. All accident reports filed with the Department of Kentucky State Police in compliance with subsection (4) of this section shall not be considered open records under KRS 61.870 to 61.884 and shall remain confidential, except that the department may: (5) (a) All accident reports filed with the Department of Kentucky State Police in compliance with subsection (4) of this section shall not be considered open records under KRS 61.870 to 61.884 and shall remain confidential, except that the department may:
      1. Disclose the identity of a person involved in an accident when his or her identity is not otherwise known or when he or she denies his or her presence at an accident; and
      2. Make the reports available:
        1. To the persons named in paragraph (c) of this subsection; and
        2. In accordance with subsection (8) of this section.
    2. All other accident reports required by this section, and the information contained in the reports, shall be confidential and exempt from public disclosure under KRS 61.870 to 61.884, except when:
      1. Produced pursuant to a properly executed subpoena or court order; or
      2. Disclosed as provided in this section.
    3. Accident reports shall be made available to:
      1. The parties to the accident;
      2. The parents or guardians of a minor who is party to the accident;
      3. Insurers or their written designee for insurance business purposes of any party who is the subject of the report;
      4. The attorneys of the parties to the accident;
      5. Any party to litigation who files with the department a request for the report and includes a copy of the first page of a District or Circuit Court clerk-stamped complaint naming all parties; and
      6. The Department of Workplace Standards in the Labor Cabinet if the accident report is pertinent to an occupational safety and health investigation.
    1. Except as provided for in paragraph (b) of this subsection, the department shall not release accident reports for a commercial purpose. (6) (a) Except as provided for in paragraph (b) of this subsection, the department shall not release accident reports for a commercial purpose.
    2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the department may, as a matter of public safety, contract with an outside entity and release unredacted vehicle damage data extracted from accident reports to the entity if the data is used solely for the purpose of providing the public a means of determining a vehicle’s accident history. The department may further contract with a third party to provide electronic access to reports for persons and entities who are entitled to the reports under subsection (5) of this section.
  5. The department shall promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A to set out a fee schedule for accident reports made available pursuant to subsections (5) and (8) of this section. These fees shall be in addition to those charged to the public for records produced under KRS Chapter 61.
    1. The report shall be made available to a news-gathering organization, solely for the purpose of publishing or broadcasting the news. The news-gathering organization shall not use or distribute the report, or knowingly allow its use or distribution, for a commercial purpose other than the news-gathering organization’s publication or broadcasting of the information in the report. (8) (a) The report shall be made available to a news-gathering organization, solely for the purpose of publishing or broadcasting the news. The news-gathering organization shall not use or distribute the report, or knowingly allow its use or distribution, for a commercial purpose other than the news-gathering organization’s publication or broadcasting of the information in the report.
    2. For the purposes of this subsection:
      1. “News-gathering organization” includes:
        1. A newspaper or periodical if it:
          1. Is published at least fifty (50) of fifty-two (52) weeks during a calendar year;
          2. Contains at least twenty-five percent (25%) news content in each issue or no more than seventy-five percent (75%) advertising content in any issue in the calendar year; and
          3. Contains news of general interest to its readers that can include news stories, editorials, sports, weddings, births, and death notices;
        2. A television or radio station with a valid broadcast license issued by the Federal Communications Commission;
        3. A news organization that broadcasts over a multichannel video programming service as defined in KRS 136.602 ;
        4. A Web site published by or affiliated with any entity described in subdivision a., b., or c. of this subparagraph;
        5. An online-only newspaper or magazine that publishes news or opinion of interest to a general audience and is not affiliated with any entity described in subparagraph 2. of this paragraph; and
        6. Any other entity that publishes news content by any means to the general public or to members of a particular profession or occupational group; and
      2. “News-gathering organization” does not include any product or publication with the primary purpose of distributing advertising or of publishing names and other personal identifying information concerning parties to motor vehicle accidents which may be used to solicit for services covered under Subtitle 39 of KRS Chapter 304.
    3. A news-gathering organization shall not be held to have used or knowingly allowed the use of the report for a commercial purpose merely because of its publication or broadcast.
    4. A request under this subsection shall be completed using a form promulgated by the department through administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A. The form under this paragraph shall include:
      1. The name and address of the requestor and the news-gathering organization the requestor represents;
      2. A statement that the requestor is a news-gathering organization under this subsection and identifying the specific subdivision of paragraph (b)1. of this subsection under which the requester qualifies;
      3. A statement that the request is in compliance with the criteria contained in this section; and
      4. A declaration of the requestor as to the accuracy and truthfulness of the information provided in the request.
      1. The department shall redact all personal information from a report prior to making it available to a news-gathering organization as defined under paragraph (b)1.f. of this subsection. (e) 1. The department shall redact all personal information from a report prior to making it available to a news-gathering organization as defined under paragraph (b)1.f. of this subsection.
      2. Reports may be provided to news-gathering organizations as defined under paragraph (b)1.a. to e. of this subsection without redaction.
      3. For the purposes of this paragraph, “personal information” means:
        1. The address, driver’s license number, phone number, date of birth, and any other contact information contained in the report for each person listed on the report; and
        2. The vehicle identification numbers (VINs) for each vehicle listed on the report.
  6. The motor vehicle insurers of any train engineer or other train crew member involved in an accident on a railroad while functioning in their professional capacity shall be prohibited from obtaining a copy of any accident report filed on the accident under this section without written consent from the individual the company insures. Insurance companies issuing motor vehicle policies in the Commonwealth shall be prohibited from raising a policyholder’s rates solely because the policyholder, in his or her professional capacity, is a train engineer or other train crew member involved in an accident on a railroad.
  7. For reporting and statistical purposes, motor scooters and autocycles as defined in KRS 186.010 shall be listed as a distinct category and shall not be considered to be a motor vehicle or a motorcycle for reports issued under this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 335, § 1; 1976, ch. 194, § 1, effective January 1, 1977; 1990, ch. 94, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 478, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 497, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2007, ch. 85, § 211, effective June 26, 2007; 2008, ch. 160, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; 2019 ch. 22, § 9, effective June 27, 2019; 2019 ch. 143, § 3, effective June 27, 2019.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(6/27/2019). This statute was amended by 2019 Ky. Acts chs. 22 and 143, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

(7/15/2008). The numbering of the subsections in this section has been altered by the Reviser of Statutes from the numbering in 2008 Ky. Acts ch. 160, sec. 1, under the authority of KRS 7.136 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

KRS 189.635 , keeping state police accident reports confidential with a few exceptions was upheld as constitutional as applied to a group of attorneys and chiropractors because it did not offend their First Amendment rights and because it rationally furthered a legitimate state interest, namely protecting the privacy of accident victims, it satisfied the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. Amelkin v. McClure, 330 F.3d 822, 2003 FED App. 0168P, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10832 (6th Cir. Ky.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1050, 124 S. Ct. 827, 157 L. Ed. 2d 699, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8627 (U.S. 2003).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a written accident report is provided by a law enforcement agency to the Bureau (now Department) of the State Police which forwards a copy of that report to the department of transportation, the practical purpose of accident reporting would be accomplished and the motor vehicle operator’s report would not have to be filed. OAG 77-56 .

Due to the absence of any exemptions, ambulance crews which are involved in an accident while responding to an emergency call must comply with the requirements of KRS 189.580 and of this section, if applicable, before proceeding to the scene of the emergency. OAG 80-187 .

Any member of the public may inspect an accident report made by a police officer concerning a fatal one-car accident, including the results of a blood alcohol test conducted on the deceased, since there is no provision in the Open Records Law exempting such a report. OAG 80-210 .

Uniform police traffic accident reports prepared by law enforcement officers pursuant to this section are not confidential and are open records under the Open Records Law. OAG 89-76 .

City police division did not have to respond to newspaper’s request to obtain copies of all traffic accident reports within the jurisdiction on a weekly basis. Although traffic accident reports prepared by law enforcement officers pursuant to this section are not confidential and are open records, the right to inspect public records attaches only after those records have been “prepared, owned, used, in the possession of or retained by a public agency.” No such right attaches for records which have not yet come into existence. The Open Records Act governs access to existing public records, not to prospective requests. City can require newspaper to submit a new application each time copies of records are requested and city need only honor requests for existing records. 97-ORD-18.

The police department may rely on KRS 189.635(5) as the basis for denying any request for accident reports not submitted by the parties to the accident, the parents or guardians of a minor who is party to the accident, the insurers of any party who is the subject of the report, the attorneys of the parties, and news gathering organizations “solely for the purpose of publishing or broadcasting the news.” This specific confidentiality provision overrides the general rule of openness mandated by the Open Records Act. OAG 01-ORD-127.

The Division of Police improperly relied on KRS 61.878(1)(a) in partially denying news-gathering requesters access to those portions of accident reports containing information of a personal nature. Because KRS 189.635(6) places no restriction on the information in the accident reports that must be disclosed to news-gathering organizations, limiting only the use to which the information may be put, these organizations are entitled to the same right of access as the parties identified in KRS 189.635(5). OAG 02-ORD-19.

KRS 189.635(5), in tandem with KRS 61.878(1)(l), requires that a public agency deny a request for copies of accident reports not submitted by parties to the accident, the parents or guardians of a minor who is party to the accident, the insurers of any party who is the subject of the report, the attorneys of the parties, and news gathering organizations “solely for the purpose of publishing or broadcasting the news.” This specific confidentiality provision overrides the general rule of openness mandated by the Open Records Act. OAG 02-ORD-155.

Since the Covington Police Department is required to prepare and file an accident report under KRS 189.635 , that statute applies to it and its accident reports are exempt from disclosure, unless a requester falls within one of the classes entitled to a copy of the report. OAG 02-ORD-155.

Request for an accident report involving a city truck was proper under the Open Records Act; however, the requested record was excluded from public inspection by operation of KRS 189.635(5). OAG 06-ORD-024.

The confidentiality provision in KRS 189.635(5) admits of only the specifically enumerated exceptions found in its concluding sentence and in KRS 189.635(6). It does not permit disclosure of the accident report if the vehicle involved in the accident is a city vehicle being driven by a city employee. Nor does it permit disclosure based on the requester’s goals and intended use. OAG 2006-ORD-024.

189.636. Accident or traffic violation involving uninsured motor vehicle.

If, in the investigation of any motor vehicle accident or traffic violation it appears that any vehicle involved therein is uninsured, the law enforcement officer making the investigation shall issue a citation to the owner of the vehicle requiring such owner to appear in a court of proper jurisdiction for violation of KRS 304.39-110 .

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 36, § 8; 1978, ch. 384, § 53, effective June 17, 1978.

189.640. Enforcement of highway and motor vehicle laws. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-64a, 2739g-69ff, 2739g-97, 4618-99) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 185, § 2.

189.641. Definitions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 115, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 102, § 6, effective June 17, 1978.

189.643. Unsafe motor vehicle may not be operated. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 115, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 102, § 6, effective June 17, 1978.

189.645. Annual inspection — Time for repairs — Registration suspended, when — Foreign inspections. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 115, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 102, § 6, effective June 17, 1978.

189.647. Certificate of inspection, when issued — Fee — Display. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 115, § 5(2) to (4)) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 102, § 6, effective June 17, 1978.

189.650. Arrests and bail for violation of motor vehicle laws. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-96) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 185, § 2.

189.651. Counterfeiting certificates — Possession unlawful — Permit not transferable — Display. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 115, §§ 5(1), 7) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 102, § 6, effective June 17, 1978.

189.653. Official inspection station permits, application — Annual fee — Inspection of stations — Fees in revolving fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 115, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 102, § 6, effective June 17, 1978.

189.655. False advertising as official inspection station — Who may issue certificates. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 115, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 102, § 6, effective June 17, 1978.

189.657. Extension of time for inspections — Rules and regulations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 115, §§ 13, 14) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 102, § 6, effective June 17, 1978.

189.659. Permits for commercial vehicle operators — Vehicles exempted. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 115, §§ 10, 11; 1970, ch. 57, § 4; 1976, ch. 173, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 102, § 6, effective June 17, 1978.

189.660. Right of action unabridged. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2739g-52) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 102, § 6, effective June 17, 1978.

189.670. Public policy as to trucks declared.

It is hereby declared to be the public policy of this state that heavy motor trucks, alone or in combination with other vehicles, increase the cost of highway construction and maintenance, interfere with and limit the use of highways for normal traffic thereon, and endanger the safety and lives of the traveling public, and that the regulations embodied in this chapter with respect to motor trucks, semitrailer trucks and semitrailers are necessary to achieve economy in highway costs, and to permit the highways to be used freely and safely by the traveling public.

History. 2739g-101.

189.700. Declaration of policy concerning parking lots and automobile storage garages.

It is declared that the operation of automobile parking lots or automobile storage garages, wherein automobiles are parked or stored for hire, is a business impressed with the public interest. It is further declared that any contract purporting to limit the liability of the operator of such a lot or garage, for loss of or damage to an automobile parked for hire, or its contents, except liability for damage by the elements or by physical forces beyond the control of the operator and his employees, is against public policy.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 154, § 1, effective June 17, 1954.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Automobile parking lots and storage garages where automobiles are parked or stored for hire are exempted from the provisions of KRS 189.010 and a peace officer could not cite a person for a moving violation or an equipment violation which occurred within such facilities but an officer would nevertheless have the authority to pursue a violator into such facilities for a violation which occurred outside. OAG 75-36 .

189.705. Posting of notice of hours facility is open — Attendant required — Exceptions.

Every parking lot or storage garage, wherein automobiles are stored or kept for hire, shall post clearly the hours during which said parking facility is open for business. It shall be the duty of every such operator of a parking lot or garage to keep an attendant on duty during the posted hours of operation of such parking facility, unless the entrance to said parking lot or garage is controlled by a mechanically operated gate, door or other entrance device which is operated by the customer or unless the parking lot is operated on an honor system which requires no attendant, or by a system of meters at each individual stall. This section shall not apply to operators who lease a specific space to a customer for a period of a month or longer at a time.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 154, § 2, effective June 17, 1954.

189.710. Liability of parking lot or storage garage operator.

Every operator of an automobile parking lot or storage garage who takes possession of the customer’s automobile and requires keys to be left with the automobile or the employees of such parking lot or garage, shall be liable as bailee for hire and shall be obligated to safely keep and return such automobiles so parked or stored and shall be liable for any loss or damage to such automobiles except such as is caused by persons or forces beyond the control of the operator and his employees. The liability shall expressly include liability for theft, and for damage resulting from collision of any type on the lot or in the garage where the event is in the control of or should be in the control of the operator and his employees.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 154, § 3, effective June 17, 1954.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Peltier and Coleman, Commercial Law, 67 Ky. L.J. 523 (1978-79).

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Bailments, § 34.01.

189.715. Checking of personal articles other than automobile equipment — Posting of notice.

The customer may contract to check personal articles, not properly the equipment of an automobile, by obtaining an additional check for such articles. All parking lots and garages which park or store automobiles for hire and assume to act as bailees for said automobile shall post a sign of not less than twenty-four (24) inches by thirty-six (36) inches having bold lettering bearing the inscription “Responsible for Contents Only if Checked Separately.” The sign shall be placed in a conspicuous place at or near the entrance of the parking lot or storage garage, at or near the eye level of a motorist seated in an automobile, and shall be well-lighted at all times while the parking facility is opened for business.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 154, § 4, effective June 17, 1954.

189.720. Contracts limiting liability are void.

Any contract which purports to limit in any way the common law liability of the parking operator or his liability under KRS 189.700 to 189.720 shall be totally void and of no effect.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 154, § 5, effective June 17, 1954.

189.725. Removal of vehicles by owner of private parking lot — Signs.

  1. Any owner or attendant of a privately owned parking lot may have a towing company remove from the lot any unauthorized parked vehicle. A towing company engaged to remove such vehicle shall have a lien on the vehicle in accordance with KRS 376.275 .
  2. Every operator of a parking lot covered by subsection (1) of this section shall post signs stating thereon that the parking lot is privately owned and unauthorized vehicles will be towed away at the owner’s expense.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 96, §§ 1, 2; 2021 ch. 74, § 13, effective June 29, 2021.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Only the owner or attendant of a privately owned lot has the authority to order the removal of an unauthorized vehicle; this section neither gives carte blanche authority to a towing service to remove vehicles at its discretion nor does the statute give the owner or attendant the authority to delegate this discretion to a third party. OAG 83-296 .

189.730. Vehicles required to be inspected or repaired when — Operation prohibited when — Duty of owner. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 125, § 1; 1958, ch. 126, § 24; 1962, ch. 91, § 3; 1966, ch. 115, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 102, § 6, effective June 17, 1978.

189.740. Issuance of form falsely certifying that repairs have been made prohibited. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 125, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 115, § 12.

189.750. Abandonment of motor vehicle on highway property — Removal — Disposition. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 301; 1966, ch. 239, § 162) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 105, § 4.

189.751. Abandonment of vehicle on county road or city street — Penalty — Removal — Disposition.

  1. Any person who leaves a vehicle upon a county road or city street under circumstances indicating an abandonment, shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars ($25) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100), or imprisoned for not less than ten (10) days nor more than thirty (30) days. A vehicle left upon a county road or city street for three (3) consecutive days shall be presumed to be abandoned.
  2. The public authority having jurisdiction over a particular county road or city street shall cause a vehicle that is presumed to be abandoned under subsection (1) of this section and that is fit for future use to be removed by some person engaged in the business of storing or towing motor vehicles and the provisions of KRS 376.275 shall apply in disposing of the vehicle. Any money obtained in disposing of a vehicle that is in excess of any liens shall be paid by the seller to the owner and if the owner cannot be located, the excess money shall escheat to the state pursuant to the provisions of KRS Chapter 393. A vehicle shall be registered or transferred in the county where the sale is conducted upon an affidavit by the seller that the provisions of KRS 376.275 have been met. The affidavit shall contain information as prescribed by the transportation cabinet.
  3. If a vehicle that is presumed abandoned under subsection (1) of this section is, in the opinion of the public authority, unfit for future use, the public authority may dispose of it immediately in a manner as it deems appropriate.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 105, §§ 1 to 3; 1972, ch. 299, § 3; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(9); 1998, ch. 179, § 1, effective July 15, 1998.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Police officers are advised to obtain a warrant against a property owner before going on his property to remove a junked vehicle which he has allowed to remain on his property in violation of a local ordinance, even though the vehicle can be readily observed without going upon the private property. OAG 71-192 .

A city has no legal interest in an abandoned vehicle other than to have it removed and stored, or disposed of where it is found to be unfit for future use pursuant to subsection (3) of this section; of course, the city can purchase the vehicle at a sale pursuant to KRS 376.275 . OAG 78-254 .

189.752. Definitions for KRS 189.753.

  1. “State highway” means any public road maintained by the State Department of Highways.
  2. “Motor vehicle” means any vehicle propelled by an internal combustion engine capable of transporting persons or property. Motor vehicle shall not mean “moped” as defined in KRS 189.285 .
  3. “Abandoned vehicle” means any motor vehicle that is left upon the right-of-way of a state highway for three (3) days, whether or not it is fit for future use.
  4. “Owner” means the last registered owner.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 299, § 1; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(1); 1978, ch. 349, § 9, effective June 17, 1978; 1986, ch. 322, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1998, ch. 179, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2006, ch. 173, § 23, effective April 5, 2006.

189.753. Abandonment of motor vehicle on state highway — Presumption — Notification — Removal.

  1. Any motor vehicle left upon the right-of-way of a state highway for three (3) consecutive days shall be presumed an abandoned vehicle.
  2. The Department of Kentucky State Police shall locate abandoned vehicles on the right-of-way of state highways. Upon determination that a vehicle is abandoned, and notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 189.450 , the Department of Kentucky State Police may order any person engaged in the business of storing or towing motor vehicles to remove the abandoned vehicle to a site chosen by the person. The department shall determine, if possible, the ownership of the vehicle through the abandoned vehicle’s license plates, serial number, or other methods of determining ownership. As soon as practicable, the owner shall be notified by mail, whether he or she is a Kentucky resident or a resident of another state, that the abandoned vehicle was illegally upon public property; the name and the address where the storage facility is located; that removal of the vehicle from the storage facility will involve payment of towing and storage charges; and that the vehicle may be sold pursuant to provisions of KRS 376.275 if not claimed within sixty (60) days. A notification shall not be required if ownership cannot be determined. In the event of such sale, the state shall receive any proceeds after the satisfaction of all liens placed on the vehicle.
  3. The commissioner of the Department of Kentucky State Police shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to carry out the provisions of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 299, § 2; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(1), (7); 1986, ch. 322, § 3, effective July 15, 1986; 1998, ch. 179, § 3, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 85, § 212, effective June 26, 2007.

189.754. Removal of injurious substance from highway.

Any person removing a wrecked or damaged vehicle from a highway shall remove any glass or other injurious substance dropped upon the highway from such vehicle.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 49, § 5, effective July 15, 1980.

Vehicle Equipment Safety Compact

189.760. Vehicle safety compact adopted. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact Acts 1964, ch. 101, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 230, § 1, effective July 15, 1982.

189.763. Declaration of need for and objectives of compact. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact Acts 1964, ch. 101, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 230, § 1, effective July 15, 1982.

189.767. Governor as executive head of state. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact Acts 1964, ch. 101, § 12) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 230, § 1, effective July 15, 1982.

189.770. Rules and regulations adopted under compact to supersede statutes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact Acts 1964, ch. 101, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 230, § 1, effective July 15, 1982.

189.773. Rules and regulations to be approved by legislature. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact Acts 1964, ch. 101, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 230, § 1, effective July 15, 1982.

189.777. Commissioner of public safety to be vehicle equipment safety commissioner. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact Acts 1964, ch. 101, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 230, § 1, effective July 15, 1982.

189.780. Agreements to place commission employes under retirement system. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact Acts 1964, ch. 101, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 230, § 1, effective July 15, 1982.

189.783. State agencies to cooperate with vehicle equipment safety commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact Acts 1964, ch. 101, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 230, § 1, effective July 15, 1982.

189.787. Document filed with secretary of state. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact Acts 1964, ch. 101, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 230, § 1, effective July 15, 1982.

189.790. Budgets to department of finance — Inspection of accounts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact Acts 1964, ch. 101, §§ 9, 10) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 230, § 1, effective July 15, 1982.

189.793. Penalties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact Acts 1964, ch. 101, § 11; 1966, ch. 255, § 181) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 230, § 1, effective July 15, 1982.

Slow-Moving Vehicle Emblem

189.810. Definitions.

  1. “Slow-moving vehicle” includes farm machinery, including animal-drawn vehicles, highway construction and maintenance vehicles, and any other type of vehicle, except bicycles and electric low-speed scooters, capable of a rate of speed no greater than twenty-five (25) miles per hour.
  2. “Slow-moving vehicle emblem” consists of a fluorescent yellow-orange triangle with a dark red reflective border, as specified in American Society of Agricultural Engineers R276 or Society of Automotive Engineers J943 standards, or consisting of reasonably similar reflective qualities as specified in said standards.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 45, § 1; 1974, ch. 101, § 5; 2019 ch. 22, § 8, effective June 27, 2019.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Automobiles, §§ 16.38, 16.41.

189.820. Slow-moving vehicle emblem or reflective tape required — Display — Regulations for mounting emblem or reflective tape.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, all slow-moving vehicles sold, leased, or rented in, or for use within, the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall have affixed to them as standard equipment a slow-moving vehicle emblem.
  2. Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, the slow-moving vehicle emblem shall be displayed as herein provided on all slow-moving vehicles operated day or night upon the public roads within the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
  3. The slow-moving vehicle emblem shall be mounted as near the center of the rear of the slow-moving vehicle as is practicable, and the lower edge of the emblem shall be mounted at least three feet (3) or more above the road surface, and shall be maintained in a clean, reflective condition.
  4. As an alternative to the slow-moving vehicle emblem, one (1)-inch-wide white or silver reflective tape may be used on motorless slow-moving vehicles as follows:
    1. The rear of the vehicle shall be covered with a minimum of one hundred (100) square inches of the reflective tape;
    2. The reflective tape on the rear of the vehicle shall, at a minimum, outline the entire rear of the vehicle;
    3. Each side of the vehicle shall be covered with a minimum of thirty-six (36) square inches of reflective tape; and
    4. The highest point of the left front of the vehicle shall be covered with a minimum of twenty-four (24) square inches of reflective tape.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 45, § 2; 2012, ch. 53, § 2, effective April 11, 2012.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

Drivers who refused to display a slow-moving vehicle emblem on horse-and-buggy vehicles for religious reasons could be ticketed and fined under KRS 189.820 without violating their right to the free exercise of religion under Ky. Const. §§ 1, 5. Under the rational basis standard of review, which was appropriate because KRS 189.820 is a public safety statute that generally applies to all slow-moving vehicles and does not prohibit any religious practice, there was ample rational basis for a statute regulating slow-moving vehicles for safety reasons. Gingerich v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.3d 835, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 175 ( Ky. 2012 ).

NOTES TO UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

Unpublished decision: KRS 189.820 does not infringe upon the right to exercise religion by restricting religious worship rituals or enforcing compulsory conduct to which a person is conscientiously opposed; driving an automobile is not a fundamental constitutional right, but a legitimately regulated privilege, like the use of public roads, and the use of a vehicle and the public roads are not acts of religious worship. KRS 189.820 is a neutral law of general applicability, and does not invoke strict scrutiny analysis; the Commonwealth’s objective of ensuring public safety through the most effective means possible by use of an emblem to alert to a slow-moving vehicle overshadowed any encumbrances on religious practices. KRS 189.820 would have passed constitutional muster if a strict scrutiny analysis was applied; an argument that a bicycle exemption created a showing of legislative belief that slow-moving vehicle emblems did not promote roadway safety was rejected, and an argument that reflective tape was a less restrictive alternative was also rejected. Gingerich v. Commonwealth, 2011 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 963 (Ky. Ct. App. June 3, 2011), aff'd, 382 S.W.3d 835, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 175 ( Ky. 2012 ).

2.Selective Enforcement.

Unpublished decision: In a prosecution under KRS 189.820 , a claim of selective enforcement was not shown because the testimony of a witness relating to non-Amish slow-moving vehicles was discounted by the trial court, a non-Amish vehicle that did not receive a citation for failing to have a slow-moving vehicle emblem was not akin to a dark buggy, and, even though there were few prosecutions for these violations outside of the county at issue, there was no information relating to the distribution of a particular Amish community outside of this county. Gingerich v. Commonwealth, 2011 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 963 (Ky. Ct. App. June 3, 2011), aff'd, 382 S.W.3d 835, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 175 ( Ky. 2012 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Automobiles, §§ 16.38, 16.41.

189.830. Use of emblem or reflective tape restricted — Exemption from requirement.

  1. The slow-moving vehicle emblem shall be restricted to the uses specified herein and the use on any other type of vehicle or on other objects is prohibited.
  2. The slow-moving vehicle emblem shall not be required on trailers or other drawn vehicles which do not obstruct the slow-moving vehicle emblem required on the towing vehicle.
  3. Highway construction or maintenance vehicles and public utility vehicles shall not require slow-moving vehicle emblems when being guarded by flagmen or flares.
  4. The use of slow-moving vehicle emblems or alternative reflective tape, as required under KRS 189.820 , shall be in addition to any other reflective or lighting devices required by law.
  5. The slow-moving vehicle emblem shall not be used on a bicycle.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 45, § 3; 1974, ch. 101, § 6; 2012, ch. 53, § 3, effective April 11, 2012.

189.860. Off-road vehicles.

  1. “Off-road vehicle” means a motor vehicle capable of cross-country travel, without the benefit of a road or trail. It does not include a farm vehicle, a vehicle used for military or law enforcement purposes, a vehicle used in construction, mining, or other industrial-related purposes, aircraft, or any other vehicle registered under state law.
  2. No person shall operate an off-road vehicle on any private or public property without the consent of the landowner, tenant, or governmental agency responsible for the property.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 345, § 1(1), (2).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If an off-road vehicle is operated on a public highway it is no longer an “off-road” vehicle and both the vehicle and the operator of the vehicle must be licensed pursuant to the terms and provisions of KRS chapter 186. OAG 77-258 .

While a city could not prohibit the use of an off-road vehicle on private property when permission has been granted by the landowner, the city could regulate such use if the object of the regulations is to promote public order, health, safety and protection of the lives and property of persons. OAG 77-258 .

A snowmobile is not permitted to operate on a public highway in Kentucky. OAG 79-85 .

A golf cart is neither a motor vehicle as defined in KRS 186.010 nor a motorcycle as defined in KRS 189.285 ; a golf cart is an off-road vehicle which is covered by the provisions of this section and therefor, a golf cart cannot be licensed to operate on a public highway or the shoulder of a highway. OAG 80-251 .

A city cannot by ordinance permit the use of golf carts on public roads or streets because the legislature has preempted the field of law governing motor vehicles. OAG 80-358 .

Emergency Vehicles

189.910. Definitions for KRS 189.920 to 189.950.

  1. As used in KRS 189.920 to 189.950 , “emergency vehicle” means any vehicle used for emergency purposes by:
    1. The Department of Kentucky State Police;
    2. A public police department;
    3. The Department of Corrections;
    4. A sheriff’s office;
    5. A rescue squad;
    6. An emergency management agency if it is a publicly owned vehicle;
    7. An ambulance service, mobile integrated healthcare program, or medical first response provider licensed by the Kentucky Board of Emergency Medical Services, for any vehicle used to respond to emergencies or to transport a patient with a critical medical condition;
    8. Any vehicle commandeered by a police officer;
    9. Any vehicle with the emergency lights required under KRS 189.920 used by a paid or volunteer fireman or paid or volunteer ambulance personnel, or a paid or local emergency management director while responding to an emergency or to a location where an emergency vehicle is on emergency call;
    10. An elected coroner granted permission to equip a publicly or privately owned motor vehicle with lights and siren pursuant to KRS 189.920;
    11. A deputy coroner granted permission to equip a publicly or privately owned motor vehicle with lights and siren pursuant to KRS 189.920; or
    12. A conservation officer of the Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources.
  2. As used in KRS 189.920 to 189.950 , “public safety vehicle” means public utility repair vehicle; wreckers; state, county, or municipal service vehicles and equipment; highway equipment which performs work that requires stopping and standing or moving at slow speeds within the traveled portions of highways; and vehicles which are escorting wide-load or slow-moving trailers or trucks.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 93, § 1; 1986, ch. 220, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 419, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 211, § 16, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 233, § 9, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 226, § 106, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 426, § 124, effective July 15, 1998; 2006, ch. 173, § 24, effective July 12, 2006; 2011, ch. 17, § 1, effective June 8, 2011; 2011, ch. 99, § 1, effective June 8, 2011; 2019 ch. 100, § 23, effective June 27, 2019; 2019 ch. 115, § 10, effective June 27, 2019.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(6/27/2019). This statute was amended by 2019 Ky. Acts chs. 100 and 115, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

(6/8/2011). This section was amended by 2011 Ky. Acts chs. 17 and 99, which are in conflict. Under KRS 446.250 , Acts ch. 99, which was last enacted by the General Assembly, prevails.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Emergency Vehicles.

Where duly elected and qualified constables used their own vehicles equipped with an oscillating blue light in the performance of their official duties, such vehicles were not “emergency vehicles” as defined in subsection (1) of this section and therefore, they may not use blue flashing, blue revolving or blue oscillating lights as part of their motor vehicle equipment. Commonwealth v. Bradley, 516 S.W.2d 644, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1974 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Private vehicles owned by members of an organization known as REACT are not emergency vehicles within the definition of this section and are prohibited by KRS 189.050 from being equipped with flashing red lights. OAG 70-368 .

A privately owned switching tractor used to tow trailers across city streets at a speed of 5-10 m.p.h. is a public safety vehicle within the meaning of this section. OAG 70-375 .

A police vehicle also has the special exemptions when responding to accidents, fires, explosions, and plane crashes, to first aid requests, and to any other emergency. OAG 70-486 .

KRS 189.910 to 189.950 are not unconstitutional as stripping the constable of his powers as a constitutional officer because it does not allow him to use flashing blue lights on automobiles. OAG 70-608 .

Privately owned vehicles used in assessing property taxes are not public safety vehicles within the meaning of KRS 189.910 to 189.950 . OAG 71-200 .

A funeral home employe cannot display a colored flashing light on his private automobile for use when he is called from his home to pick up an ambulance to make an emergency run because under KRS 189.910 to 189.990 only publicly owned or government operated emergency equipment may be equipped with flashing lights while moving on the highway. OAG 72-94 .

There is no conflict between this section or section 189.920 with respect to the provisions of KRS 150.095 regarding conservation officers. OAG 72-695 .

An ambulance is nonetheless an emergency vehicle when it is operated with a silent siren for the benefit of a patient which it is transporting but an ambulance driver should exercise greater caution in proceeding through an intersection with a silent siren. OAG 74-623 .

When an ambulance transporting a heart patient proceeds with a silent siren for the benefit of the patient, due care should dictate that speed of travel will have to be sacrificed especially when crossing an intersection. OAG 74-623 .

It would be unlawful for a county police unit formed as part of a civil defense unit organized under the authority of the county judge or an auxiliary police force created by the fiscal court as provided by KRS 70.545 (repealed) to put blue signal lights on privately owned vehicles. OAG 74-634 .

Considering the definition of “emergency vehicle” given in subsection (1) of this section, if the vehicle is used by the sheriff or his lawful deputies in the performance of his official duties and for law enforcement emergency purposes, it should be equipped with the blue lights required by subsection (2) of KRS 189.920 regardless of whether the vehicle is owned by the county, the sheriff, a deputy, or some other person or corporation; the term “lawful deputies” means those deputies filling regular deputy positions as authorized by orders of the fiscal court under KRS 64.530 and who work for the sheriff on a full work week basis for a reasonable compensation set by the fiscal court; therefore, full time, paid deputies can drive their own vehicles if authorized by the sheriff in performing their official duties of law enforcement and such vehicles should have blue lights. OAG 76-574 .

Since there is no reference to a constable’s vehicle or to the duties of a constable in KRS 189.910 to 189.950 , a constable’s vehicle is neither an “emergency vehicle” nor a “public safety vehicle” and may not be equipped with flashing, revolving or oscillating lights of any color or with a siren. OAG 78-207 .

A vehicle used by a constable in performing his official duties does not come within the “emergency vehicles” authorized to contain flashing, oscillating blue lights, and thus a constable is not authorized to have such lights on his official vehicle. OAG 79-177 .

Within the meaning of subsection (1) of this section, “commandeer” means to seize forcefully or arbitrarily. OAG 79-262 .

Only those vehicles specifically mentioned in KRS 189.910 to 189.950 shall be equipped with blue flashing, rotating or oscillating lights and since there is no mention of jailers and their vehicles, such vehicles cannot legally be equipped with such blue lights. OAG 80-231 .

A coroner’s vehicle is not an “emergency vehicle” and it is not included among those types of vehicles which are authorized and required to utilize red or blue flashing, rotating or oscillating lights and sirens, bells or whistles; the coroner may not use such equipment on his vehicle even when he is proceeding to the scene of an accident. OAG 80-543 .

There is nothing in subsection (2) of this section that would enable a coroner’s vehicle to be considered a public safety vehicle. OAG 80-543 .

The vehicles of constables are not “emergency vehicles”, as defined in subsection (1) of this section; accordingly, the fiscal court cannot pass an ordinance to authorize duly elected constables to place blue lights and sirens upon their cars to be used in the performance of their statutory duties. OAG 82-47 .

While KRS 67.083(3)(u) provides that the fiscal court may pass ordinances relating to “provision of police and fire protection,” the subject matter of an ordinance authorizing constables to use blue lights and sirens on their official vehicles has been preempted by the General Assembly in the enactment of this section and KRS 189.920 . OAG 82-47 .

189.920. Flashing lights and sirens.

  1. All fire department, rescue squad, or publicly owned emergency management agency emergency vehicles and all ambulances shall be equipped with one (1) or more flashing, rotating, or oscillating red lights, visible under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the front of the vehicle, and a siren, whistle, or bell, capable of emitting a sound audible under normal conditions from a distance of not less than five hundred (500) feet. This equipment shall be in addition to any other equipment required by the motor vehicle laws.
  2. All state, county, or municipal police vehicles and all sheriffs’ vehicles used as emergency vehicles shall be equipped with one (1) or more flashing, rotating, or oscillating blue lights, visible under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the front of the vehicle, and a siren, whistle, or bell, capable of emitting a sound audible under normal conditions from a distance of not less than five hundred (500) feet. This equipment shall be in addition to any other equipment required by the motor vehicle laws.
  3. By ordinance, the governing body of any city or county may direct that the police or sheriffs’ vehicles in that jurisdiction be equipped with a combination of red and blue flashing, rotating, or oscillating lights.
  4. All public safety vehicles shall be equipped with one (1) or more flashing, rotating, or oscillating yellow lights, visible under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the front of the vehicle. Yellow flashing, rotating, or oscillating lights may also be used by vehicles operated by mail carriers while on duty, funeral escort vehicles, and church buses.
  5. All Department of Corrections vehicles used as emergency vehicles shall be equipped with one (1) or more flashing, rotating, or oscillating blue lights, visible under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the front of the vehicle. The Department of Corrections vehicles shall not be equipped with or use a siren, whistle, or bell. The equipment prescribed by this subsection shall be in addition to any other equipment required by motor vehicle laws.
    1. If authorized by the legislative body of a county, urban-county, charter county, consolidated local government, or unified local government: (6) (a) If authorized by the legislative body of a county, urban-county, charter county, consolidated local government, or unified local government:
      1. All publicly owned county jail and regional jail vehicles used as emergency vehicles may be quipped with one (1) or more flashing, rotating, or oscillating blue lights, visible under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the front of the vehicle; and
      2. An elected jailer or the chief administrator of a county or regional jail not managed by an elected jailer may equip (1) personally owned vehicle with one (1) or more flashing, rotating, or oscillating blue lights, visible under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the front of the vehicle.
    2. Publicly owned county jail or regional jail vehicles shall not be equipped with or use a siren, whistle, or bell.
    3. The equipment prescribed by this subsection shall be in addition to any other equipment required by the motor vehicle laws.
  6. Red flashing lights may be used by school buses.
  7. No emergency vehicle, public safety vehicle, or any other vehicle covered by KRS 189.910 to 189.950 shall use any light of any other color than those specified by KRS 189.910 to 189.950 . Sirens, whistles, and bells may not be used by vehicles other than those specified by KRS 189.910 to 189.950, except that any vehicle may be equipped with a theft alarm signal device which is so arranged that it cannot be used by the driver as an ordinary warning signal.
  8. Vehicles used as command posts at incidents may be equipped with and use when on scene, a green rotating, oscillating, or flashing light. This light shall be in addition to the lights and sirens required in this section.
  9. A personal vehicle used by a paid or volunteer firefighter, ambulance personnel, or emergency services director who is responding to an emergency shall display the lights required in subsection (1) of this section.
  10. An elected coroner may equip a publicly or privately owned motor vehicle, or both, with flashing, rotating, or oscillating red and blue lights and a siren meeting the requirements of this section solely for the purpose of responding to a report of the death of a human being subject to the following terms and conditions:
    1. The coroner makes a written request to the legislative body of the county, urban-county, charter county, consolidated local government, or unified local government in which the coroner was elected to equip a publicly or privately owned motor vehicle, or both, with flashing, rotating, or oscillating red and blue lights and a siren meeting the requirements of this section, and that request is approved by the legislative body by ordinance or by court order;
    2. The coroner may use the lights and siren only while responding to the scene of the report of a death of a human being and shall not, KRS 189.940 to the contrary notwithstanding, exceed the posted speed limit; and
    3. The permission granted pursuant to this section shall expire upon the coroner leaving office or the legislative body revoking the authorization.
  11. A deputy coroner certified pursuant to KRS Chapter 72 may equip a publicly owned or privately owned motor vehicle, or both, with flashing, rotating, or oscillating red and blue lights and a siren meeting the requirements of this section solely for the purpose of responding to a report of the death of a human being, subject to the following terms and conditions:
    1. The deputy coroner has made a written request to the coroner to equip a publicly owned or privately owned vehicle with flashing, rotating, or oscillating red and blue lights meeting the requirements of this section and the coroner has approved the request in writing;
    2. The coroner makes a written request to the legislative body of the county, urban-county, charter county, consolidated local government, or unified local government in which the coroner is elected to permit the deputy coroner to equip a publicly owned motor vehicle or privately owned motor vehicle, or both, and that request has been approved by the legislative body by ordinance or by court order;
    3. The deputy coroner may use the lights and siren only while responding to the scene of the report of the death of a human being and shall not, KRS 189.940 to the contrary notwithstanding, exceed the posted speed limit; and
    4. The permission granted pursuant to this section shall expire upon the coroner leaving office or the legislative body revoking the authorization.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 93, § 2; 1984, ch. 55, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 419, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 211, § 17, effective July 14, 1992; 1998, ch. 226, § 107, effective July 15, 1998; 2006, ch. 173, § 25, effective July 12, 2006; 2011, ch. 17, § 2, effective June 8, 2011; 2011, ch. 99, § 2, effective June 8, 2011.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/8/2011). This section was amended by 2011 Ky. Acts chs. 17 and 99, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 516 S.W.2d 644, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1974 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Subsection (2) of this section does not authorize the use of blue lights on the vehicles of constables. OAG 70-333 .

KRS 189.910 and subsection (2) of this section relating to emergency lights on police and sheriff’s vehicles are quite specific in that they do not authorize the use of blue lights on private vehicles of auxiliary police. OAG 70-509 .

This section does not prohibit the use of combination red and clear lights. OAG 70-512 .

Local Special Police, Inc. may not use emergency flashing lights of any color. OAG 70-562 .

The civil defense agency has the authority to use red emergency lights on publicly owned civil defense emergency vehicles, but not on such vehicles which are privately owned. OAG 70-703 .

Privately owned vehicles used in assessing property for taxation are not authorized to use flashing yellow lights. OAG 71-200 .

A private citizen could not display on his private automobile an emergency red, yellow or blue flashing light for use when he is called from his home to pick up an ambulance at the funeral home to make an emergency run. OAG 72-94 .

A constable is not permitted to place a siren on his privately owned vehicle. OAG 72-617 .

While county police vehicles in a broad sense might be considered as including the vehicles of constables, in the context of this section in which the vehicles of sheriffs are separately considered, it is clear that the term county police vehicles is used in the narrow sense of county police department vehicles, and not in the broad sense as including constables’ vehicles so that blue lights may not be used on vehicles of constables. OAG 73-834 .

It would be unlawful for a county police unit formed as part of a civil defense unit organized under the authority of the county judge (now county judge/executive) or an auxiliary police force created by the fiscal court as provided by KRS 70.545 (repealed) to put blue signal lights on privately owned vehicles. OAG 74-634 .

An “adviser to the jailer” who is not actually appointed to fill a deputy jailer position under KRS 64.345 may not equip his vehicle with or use a flashing, rotating or oscillating blue light since he is neither a deputy jailer nor a peace officer but only a civilian employe of the police department. OAG 76-81 .

Considering the definition of “emergency vehicle” given in KRS 189.910(1), if the vehicle is used by the sheriff or his lawful deputies in the performance of his official duties and for law enforcement emergency purposes, it should be equipped with the blue lights required by subsection (2) of this section regardless of whether the vehicle is owned by the county, the sheriff, a deputy, or some other person or corporation; the term “lawful deputies” means those deputies filling regular deputy positions as authorized by orders of the fiscal court under KRS 64.530 and who work for the sheriff on a full work week basis for a reasonable compensation set by the fiscal court; therefore, full time, paid deputies can drive their own vehicles if authorized by the sheriff in performing their official duties of law enforcement and such vehicles should have blue lights. OAG 76-574 .

Since there is no reference to a constable’s vehicle or to the duties of a constable in KRS 189.910 to 189.950 , a constable’s vehicle is neither an “emergency vehicle” nor a “public safety vehicle” and may not be equipped with flashing, revolving or oscillating lights of any color or with a siren. OAG 78-207 .

This section cannot be construed to authorize the use of a combination of red and blue lights on emergency vehicles, nor can it be construed to allow such a combination as an increased measure for visibility purposes in addition to the required color. OAG 78-470 .

A vehicle used by a constable in performing his official duties does not come within the “emergency vehicles” authorized to contain flashing, oscillating blue lights, and thus a constable is not authorized to have such lights on his official vehicle. OAG 79-177 .

A coroner’s vehicle is not an “emergency vehicle” and it is not included among those types of vehicles which are authorized and required to utilize red or blue flashing, rotating or oscillating lights and sirens, bells or whistles; the coroner may not use such equipment on his vehicle even when he is proceeding to the scene of an accident. OAG 80-543 .

The vehicles of constables are not “emergency vehicles,” as defined in KRS 189.910(1); accordingly, the fiscal court cannot pass an ordinance to authorize duly elected constables to place blue lights and sirens upon their cars to be used in the performance of their statutory duties. OAG 82-47 .

While KRS 67.083(3)(u) provides that the fiscal court may pass ordinances relating to “provision of police and fire protection,” the subject matter of an ordinance authorizing constables to use blue lights and sirens on their official vehicles has been preempted by the General Assembly in the enactment of KRS 189.910 and this section. OAG 82-47 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Automobiles, §§ 16.51 — 16.53.

189.930. Right-of-way to emergency vehicles — Blocking or following emergency vehicles — Driving over unprotected hoses of fire department.

  1. Upon the approach of an emergency vehicle equipped with, and operating, one (1) or more flashing, rotating, or oscillating red or blue lights, visible under normal conditions from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the front of such vehicle; or the driver is given audible signal by siren, exhaust whistle, or bell, the driver of every other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way, immediately drive to a position parallel to, and as close as possible to, the edge or curb of the highway clear of any intersection, and stop and remain in such position until the emergency vehicle has passed, except when otherwise directed by a police officer or firefighter.
  2. Upon the approach of any emergency vehicle, operated in conformity with the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, the operator of every vehicle shall immediately stop clear of any intersection and shall keep such position until the emergency vehicle has passed, unless directed otherwise by a police officer or firefighter.
  3. No operator of any vehicle, unless he is on official business, shall follow any emergency vehicle being operated in conformity with the provisions of subsection (1) of this section closer than five hundred (500) feet, nor shall he drive into, or park the vehicle into, or park the vehicle within, the block where the vehicle has stopped in answer to an emergency call or alarm unless he is directed otherwise by a police officer or firefighter.
  4. No vehicle, train, or other equipment shall be driven over any unprotected hose of a fire department when the hose is laid down on any street, private driveway, or track for use at any fire or fire alarm unless the fire department official in command consents that the hose be driven over.
  5. Upon approaching a stationary emergency vehicle or public safety vehicle, when the emergency vehicle or public safety vehicle is giving a signal by displaying alternately flashing yellow, red, red and white, red and blue, or blue lights, a person who drives an approaching vehicle shall, while proceeding with due caution:
    1. Yield the right-of-way by moving to a lane not adjacent to that of the authorized emergency vehicle, if:
      1. The person is driving on a highway having at least four (4) lanes with not fewer than two (2) lanes proceeding in the same direction as the approaching vehicle; and
      2. If it is possible to make the lane change with due regard to safety and traffic conditions; or
    2. Reduce the speed of the vehicle, maintaining a safe speed to road conditions, if changing lanes would be impossible or unsafe.
  6. This section does not operate to relieve the person who drives an emergency vehicle from the duty to operate the vehicle with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 93, § 3; 1980, ch. 371, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 2000, ch. 215, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2003, ch. 63, § 1, effective June 24, 2003.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Ability to See Trooper’s Lights.

There was no error in failing to instruct the jury as to motorist’s duty to yield right-of-way to an approaching emergency vehicle where there was no testimony from which the jury could infer that motorist could possibly have seen trooper’s blue lights from a distance of 500 feet or at any distance to take evasive action or otherwise yield. Speck v. Bowling, 892 S.W.2d 309, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

2.Sounding Siren.

Evidence was sufficient for jury as to whether siren on fire truck was sounded and if it was whether it was sounded intermittently or weakly. Fayette County v. Veach, 294 S.W.2d 541, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1956 ) (decided under prior law).

3.Non-verbal Direction to Stop.

Trial court did not err when it failed to grant directed verdict motions for first-degree wanton endangerment and first-degree fleeing or evading because a sergeant testified that he was 100% certain defendant was the driver of the pickup truck, and defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined the sergeant; the deputy’s police cruiser blocking a single-lane road with its emergency lights on was a visible, non-verbal direction to approaching drivers, including defendant, to stop their vehicles, but defendant accelerated, and the deputy was forced to drive his cruiser out of the way and into a ditch to avoid a head-on collision; and defendant’s actions created a substantial risk of serious physical injury or death. Eversole v. Commonwealth, 600 S.W.3d 209, 2020 Ky. LEXIS 121 ( Ky. 2020 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although subsection (1) of this section does not specify to which side of the street a driver should go, it is to be expected that he will normally go to to the right side as far as possible and stop; therefore, an emergency vehicle will usually pass on the left even if it means going into an oncoming lane and even if the right lane is open. OAG 79-649 .

Because there is no statute authorizing a constable to equip a vehicle with a fixed or stationary blue light, and no statutory command that a motorist stop or yield the right-of-way to a vehicle using a fixed or stationary blue light, and because of public policy considerations, a constable may not lawfully equip a vehicle with a fixed or stationary blue light. OAG 91-162 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Automobiles, §§ 16.52, 16.53.

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., General Principles, § 13.11.

189.940. Exemptions from traffic regulations.

  1. Except as provided in KRS 189.920 , the speed limitations set forth in the Kentucky Revised Statutes do not apply to emergency vehicles:
    1. When responding to emergency calls; or
    2. To police vehicles when in pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law; or
    3. To ambulances when transporting a patient to medical care facilities; and
    4. The driver thereof is giving the warning required by subsection (5)(a) and (b) of this section. No portion of this subsection shall be construed to relieve the driver of the duty to operate the vehicle with due regard for the safety of all persons using the street or highway.
  2. The driver of an emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call, or of a police vehicle in pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or of an ambulance transporting a patient to a medical care facility and giving the warning required by subsection (5) of this section, upon approaching any red light or stop signal or any stop sign shall slow down as necessary for safety to traffic, but may proceed past such red or stop light or stop sign with due regard for the safety of persons using the street or highway.
  3. The driver of an emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call, or of a police vehicle in pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or of an ambulance transporting a patient to a medical care facility and giving warning required by subsection (5) of this section, may drive on the left side of any highway or in the opposite direction of a one-way street provided the normal lanes of traffic are blocked and he does so with due regard for the safety of all persons using the street or highway.
  4. The driver of an emergency or public safety vehicle may stop or park his vehicle upon any street or highway without regard to the provisions of KRS 189.390 and 189.450 , provided that, during the time the vehicle is parked at the scene of an emergency, at least one (1) warning light is in operation at all times.
  5. The driver of an emergency vehicle desiring the use of any option granted by subsections (1) through (3) of this section shall give warning in the following manner:
    1. By illuminating the vehicle’s warning lights continuously during the period of the emergency; and
    2. By continuous sounding of the vehicle’s siren, bell, or exhaust whistle; unless
    3. The vehicle is an ambulance and the driver is of the opinion that sounding of the siren, bell, or exhaust whistle would be detrimental to the victim’s health. In the event the driver of an ambulance elects not to use the siren, bell, or exhaust whistle he shall not proceed past red lights or drive in the opposite direction on a one-way street or in oncoming lanes of traffic unless no other vehicles are within five hundred (500) feet of the front of the ambulance. The driver shall not extinguish the warning lights during the period of the emergency.
  6. No driver or operator of any emergency or public safety or other vehicle shall use the warning lights or siren, bell, or exhaust whistle of his vehicle for any purposes or under any circumstances other than those permitted by KRS 189.910 to 189.950 .
  7. KRS 189.910 to 189.950 does not relieve the driver of any emergency or public safety vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons and property upon the highway.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 93, § 4; 1974, ch. 308, § 36; 1980, ch. 371, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 2011, ch. 99, § 3, effective June 8, 2011.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Generally.

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 189.940 does not abrogate the Chambers per se no proximate cause rule. That statute was enacted to alert drivers of an emergency vehicle to prevent a collision with the police vehicle itself and, while the legislature could have added language specifically abrogating the Chambers rule, it did not. Gonzalez v. Johnson, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 113 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2018), rev'd, 581 S.W.3d 529, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 206 ( Ky. 2019 ).

2.Police.
3.— Stopping on Highway.

Officer’s conduct in suddenly stopping his car in the left lane of an interstate highway would be negligent per se. The evidence and argument presented, however, seemed to have been aimed at showing that, since he was a police officer, he had a valid excuse for disregarding the applicable statute. Officer had the right to argue that he should be exonerated because, as a police officer, he had the right to disregard traffic regulations. But having allowed into evidence officer’s reasons for stopping, the trial court was obligated to set out officer’s duties and the conditions in the jury instruction’s under which his disregard of the law could be excused. Louisville v. Maresz, 835 S.W.2d 889, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 166 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

4.—— Stopping Engine.

Police officer was not exempt from the requirements of KRS 189.430 that required all motor vehicle operators to stop the engine and take the keys when exiting the vehicle. Fact that the officer was investigating an accident scene did not exempt him from this duty imposed on all drivers. Pile v. City of Brandenburg, 215 S.W.3d 36, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 322 ( Ky. 2006 ).

5.Exemptions.

Statute regulating the speed of motor vehicles did not apply to city fire and police vehicles. Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 594 ( Ky. 1952 ), overruled in part, Gonzalez v. Johnson, 581 S.W.3d 529, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 206 ( Ky. 2019 ) (decided under prior law).

6.— Conditional.

The provision exempting an emergency vehicle from ordinary traffic regulations conferred no absolute immunity upon the driver, for it was based on the prescribed conditions nor did the preferential status relieve the driver from the duty of having due regard for the safety of other people lawfully using a street or highway and the duty was measured by the danger to be apprehended. Myers v. Able, 417 S.W.2d 235, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 251 ( Ky. 1967 ) (decided under prior law).

The provision exempting an emergency vehicle from ordinary traffic regulations conferred no absolute immunity upon the driver, for it was based on the prescribed conditions. Gasparac v. Castle, 330 S.W.2d 111, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 184 ( Ky. 1959 ). See Page v. Dodds, 433 S.W.2d 656, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 287 ( Ky. 1968 ) (decided under prior law).

There had to be strict observance of the conditions which exempted an emergency vehicle. Myers v. Able, 417 S.W.2d 235, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 251 ( Ky. 1967 ) (decided under prior law). See Page v. Dodds, 433 S.W.2d 656, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 287 ( Ky. 1968 ).

7.Response to Emergency Call.

Where defendant’s police car was admittedly exceeding the speed limit at the time of the collision complained of and there was no evidence that it was responding to an emergency, the trial court erred in adding to the instruction as to the defendant’s duty not to exceed the speed limit the exception for a situation where he was responding to an emergency. Siler v. Williford, 350 S.W.2d 704, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 129 ( Ky. 1961 ) (decided under prior law).

8.Notice and Warning.

Notice and warning to persons required to yield the right-of-way was essential, and a reasonable opportunity to yield or get out of the way was necessary before they were chargeable with the obligation to give preference to the emergency vehicle. Myers v. Able, 417 S.W.2d 235, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 251 ( Ky. 1967 ) (decided under prior law). See Page v. Dodds, 433 S.W.2d 656, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 287 ( Ky. 1968 ).

9.Proceeding through Red Light.

Soldier driving Army ambulance was negligent where he entered street intersection at over 40 miles an hour against a red traffic signal and did not see approaching auto until after collision and United States was liable for damages. Potts v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 833, 1948 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2575 (D. Ky. 1948 ) (decided under prior law).

Where plaintiff was struck by defendant’s fire truck in an intersection through which the automatic traffic signal showed her to have the right-of-way, and she had one witness who testified that the fire truck was not sounding a siren or other audible warning and she introduced other witnesses who testified that they did not hear any warning from the truck, the issue was properly submitted to the jury although the defendant introduced several witnesses who testified that the siren was working properly immediately prior to the collision. Fayette County v. Veach, 294 S.W.2d 541, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1956 ) (decided under prior law).

Where a motorist was struck by an ambulance in an intersection through which he had the right-of-way and there was evidence that the ambulance was traveling at a speed up to 60 miles per hour, that its siren was not audible immediately prior to the collision, and that the motorist could not see its approach because parked cars and buildings obscured his view, the trial court properly submitted the questions of the ambulance driver’s and the motorist’s negligence to the jury. Gasparac v. Castle, 330 S.W.2d 111, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 184 ( Ky. 1959 ) (decided under prior law).

In an action against the city based on the alleged negligence of the operator of a police cruiser in going through a red light, an instruction requiring the operator of the police car to “observe traffic regulations governing the flow of traffic at that time and place,” was erroneous since it did not inform the jury that the operator of the police cruiser had a right to run a red light by exercising due regard to the safety of the public. Louisville v. Chapman, 413 S.W.2d 74, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 380 ( Ky. 1967 ) (decided under prior law).

Law that provided that ambulances, fire apparatus and patrols had right-of-way and law exempting emergency vehicles from speed limitations gave emergency vehicles the right to disregard traffic regulations at intersections when due regard for the safety of the public was observed and instruction was faulty where it told jury driver had duty to operate the fire truck with due regard to the safety of the public but did not instruct jury that driver had a right to run the red light by exercising due regard for the safety of the public. Myers v. Able, 417 S.W.2d 235, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 251 ( Ky. 1967 ) (decided under prior law).

A fire truck had a right to run a red light by exercising due regard for the safety of the public. Myers v. Able, 417 S.W.2d 235, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 251 ( Ky. 1967 ) (decided under prior law).

Where the defendant was driving through an intersection when she had the green light and struck a police cruiser traveling in a storage lane and going through the intersection on a red light with its siren and lights operating, the defendant was not required to yield the right-of-way or to anticipate that the police cruiser would run the red light unless the warning was adequate for a person in her position. Page v. Dodds, 433 S.W.2d 656, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 287 ( Ky. 1968 ) (decided under prior law).

Where a police cruiser intended not only to run a red light, but to use an extraordinary path in reaching the intersection, it could reasonably be considered that a warning which merely signified that an emergency vehicle was approaching was not adequate to give notice of the extraordinary course the vehicle would pursue. Page v. Dodds, 433 S.W.2d 656, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 287 ( Ky. 1968 ) (decided under prior law).

When a driver of police cruiser had the preferred right-of-way, he was required to be exceptionally alert when he intended to run a red traffic light at a busy intersection and to take care commensurate with the serious consequences that might follow his failure to do so; and he should have remembered that other drivers had the right to assume that the red light signal would be obeyed by him unless duly and timely warned to the contrary. Page v. Dodds, 433 S.W.2d 656, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 287 ( Ky. 1968 ) (decided under prior law).

10.Due Regard for Safety.

Ambulance not owned by municipality and being operated beyond city limits was not exonerated from charge that driving it at 40 miles an hour on slippery road and skidding into automobile parked at roadside was negligent under circumstances. O'Neil & Hearne v. Bray's Adm'x, 262 Ky. 377 , 90 S.W.2d 353, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 33 ( Ky. 1936 ) (decided under prior law).

This provision did not permit an emergency vehicle to be operated at an excessive rate of speed with impunity. Henderson v. Watson, 262 S.W.2d 811, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 1129 ( Ky. 1953 ) (decided under prior law).

The preferential status did not relieve the driver from the duty of having due regard for the safety of other people lawfully using a street or highway, and the duty was measured by the danger to be apprehended. Page v. Dodds, 433 S.W.2d 656, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 287 ( Ky. 1968 ) (decided under prior law).

Supreme Court of Kentucky overruled Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589 ( Ky. 1952 ) insofar as it held there was a per se no proximate cause rule where there was no contact with the pursuing vehicle, but injury or damage occurred, due to an allegedly negligent pursuit, and found that the factual allegations in the case at issue were sufficient to create a disputed issue of material fact as to whether a deputy sheriff negligently conducted his pursuit of a suspect because the duty of care owed to the public at large by pursuing officers was that of due regard. Gonzalez v. Johnson, 581 S.W.3d 529, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 206 ( Ky. 2019 ).

Cited in:

Smith v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 884 F. Supp. 1086, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6370 (E.D. Ky. 1995 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although an ambulance operating with a silent siren is an emergency vehicle the driver when so operating should observe all traffic signals in the same manner as the driver of a nonemergency vehicle. OAG 74-724 .

A privately owned vehicle of a volunteer fireman, not equipped with the proper lights and audible devices, is not an “emergency vehicle” and is not exempt from traffic regulations so that the driver of such a vehicle, proceeding to the fire station in response to an alarm, must observe all traffic laws in the same manner required by other drivers. OAG 78-85 .

While the operator of an emergency vehicle should travel the wrong way on a one-way street only when the circumstances make it necessary to do so, each case has to be judged on its particular circumstances; and if the operator believes that the street is blocked as far as being able to travel the direction allowed and has his lights flashing and his siren sounding, he would be justified in proceeding the wrong way on the one-way street though caution would dictate that he should travel at a slow speed and give oncoming traffic ample opportunity to get out of his path. OAG 79-173 .

An emergency vehicle may use any avenue available to it under the circumstances, even to traveling on the shoulder, sidewalk or median, but in such unusual maneuvers a driver should use special caution in proceeding and should use his lights and audible alarms. OAG 79-649 .

If all traffic is at a standstill and the left lane in the direction of the emergency vehicle is blocked but the right lane is open, the emergency vehicle may pass on the right with due care. OAG 79-649 .

The legislative intent is that an emergency vehicle may disregard traffic laws and regulations as long as it does so with due regard for the safety of all persons using the street or highway. OAG 79-649 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., Automobiles, §§ 16.51 — 16.53.

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Civil), 5th Ed., General Principles, § 13.11.

189.945. Prohibition against use of mobile infrared electronic transmitter — Exceptions — Penalties.

  1. As used in this section, “MIRET” means a mobile infrared electronic transmitter or similar device that emits an infrared beam or electronic signal and may be used to change the lighting cycle of a traffic control signal.
  2. A person shall not use a MIRET to change the lighting cycle of a traffic control signal, unless the person is an occupant of an emergency vehicle as defined by KRS 189.910 that is responding to or engaged in an emergency situation, or is an authorized employee, contractor, consultant, or vendor of the government agency responsible for the installation, maintenance, and testing of the traffic control signal or emergency vehicle preemption system, operating in the course and scope of his or her employment.
  3. Except as provided for in subsection (4) of this section, any person who violates subsection (2) of this section shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500).
    1. If a person is involved in a motor vehicle collision which involves physical injury as defined by KRS 500.080 while in violation of subsection (2) of this section, the person shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. (4) (a) If a person is involved in a motor vehicle collision which involves physical injury as defined by KRS 500.080 while in violation of subsection (2) of this section, the person shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
    2. If a person is involved in a motor vehicle collision which involves serious physical injury as defined by KRS 500.080 while in violation of subsection (2) of this section, the person shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.

History. Enact. Acts 2005, ch. 28, § 1, effective June 20, 2005.

189.950. Prohibitions — Exceptions.

  1. No motor vehicle, except those designated under KRS 189.910 to 189.950 as emergency vehicles, shall be equipped with, nor shall any person use upon a vehicle, any siren, whistle, or bell. Any vehicle may be equipped with a theft alarm signal device which shall be so arranged that it cannot be used as an ordinary warning signal.
  2. No motor vehicle, except those designated under KRS 189.910 to 189.950 as emergency vehicles, shall be equipped with, nor shall any person use upon a vehicle any red or blue flashing, revolving, or oscillating light or place a red light on the front thereof. This subsection shall not apply to the use of red flashing lights on school buses or to stop lights or turn signals at the rear of any motor vehicle.
  3. Except as otherwise provided for in this section, a person shall not illuminate a blue light that is affixed to a motor vehicle while operating the motor vehicle on a highway. This subsection shall not apply to:
    1. Any light on a motorcycle that is not affixed to the front of the motorcycle; or
    2. Nonhalogen headlamps that have a slight blue tint and meet United States Department of Transportation regulations.
  4. No motor vehicle, except those designated under KRS 189.910 to 189.950 as public safety vehicles, shall be equipped with, nor shall any person use upon any vehicle any yellow flashing, revolving, or oscillating light. This subsection shall not apply to the use of yellow lights for turn signals; or to emergency flasher lights for use when warning the operators of other vehicles of the presence of a vehicular traffic requiring the exercise of unusual care in approaching, overtaking, or passing; or to vehicles operated by mail carriers while on duty; funeral escort vehicles and church buses.
  5. Any person who is a regular or voluntary member of any fire department furnishing fire protection for a political subdivision of the state or any person who is a regular or voluntary member of a rescue squad may equip his vehicle with red flashing, rotating, or oscillating lights and a siren, bell, or exhaust whistle if he has first been given permission, in writing, to do so by the chief of the fire department or rescue squad. He may use such lights and equipment only while proceeding to the scene of a fire or other emergency or to a location where another emergency vehicle is on emergency call in the performance of his official duties as a member of a fire department or rescue squad.
  6. Any constable may, upon approval of the fiscal court in the county of jurisdiction, equip vehicles used by said officer as emergency vehicles with one (1) or more flashing, rotating or oscillating blue lights, visible under normal atmospheric condition from a distance of five hundred (500) feet to the front of such vehicle, and a siren, whistle or bell, capable of emitting a sound audible under normal conditions from a distance of not less than five hundred (500) feet. This equipment shall be in addition to any other equipment required by the motor vehicle laws. Any constable authorized by the fiscal court to utilize blue lights and a siren pursuant to this section shall maintain at least the insurance described by KRS 304.39-110 .
  7. Any person who is a paid or voluntary member of any ambulance service furnishing emergency medical services for a political subdivision of the state may equip his vehicle with red flashing, rotating, or oscillating lights and a siren, bell, or exhaust whistle if he has first been given permission, in writing, to do so by the chief or director of the ambulance service. He may use such lights and equipment only while proceeding to the scene of an emergency, a medical facility, or to a location where another emergency vehicle is on emergency call in the performance of his official duties as a member of the ambulance service.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 93, § 5; 1984, ch. 19, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 220, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 437, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 2017 ch. 79, § 1, effective June 29, 2017.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Emergency Vehicles.

The personal vehicle of a constable, though used in the performance of his official duties, is not an “emergency vehicle” as defined by KRS 189.910 to 189.950 and therefore, the constable may not equip the vehicle with a flashing, rotating or oscillating blue light. Commonwealth v. Bradley, 516 S.W.2d 644, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1974 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section prohibits equipping vehicles owned by members of an organization known as REACT with flashing red lights since such vehicles are not emergency vehicles as defined by KRS 189.910 . OAG 70-368 .

Under this section and KRS 432.570 , the fiscal court does not have the authority to permit county auxiliary policemen to equip their cars with either flashing blue lights or police radios. OAG 75-500 .

A volunteer fireman from Indiana with a blue flashing light on his car does not violate Kentucky law while driving in Kentucky as long as he does not turn the light on. OAG 76-30 .

An “adviser to the jailer” who is not actually appointed to fill a deputy jailer position under KRS 64.345 may not equip his vehicle with or use a flashing, rotating or oscillating blue light since he is neither a deputy jailer or a peace officer but only a civilian employe of the police department. OAG 76-81 .

A member of a volunteer fire department who equips his private vehicle with signals for use in emergency situations must use both visible and audible signals so that the vehicle will be seen and heard. OAG 76-165 .

A privately owned vehicle of a volunteer fireman, not equipped with the proper lights and audible devices, is not an “emergency vehicle” and is not exempt from traffic regulations so that the driver of such a vehicle, proceeding to the fire station in response to an alarm, must observe all traffic laws in the same manner required by other drivers. OAG 78-85 .

Only those vehicles specifically mentioned in KRS 189.910 to 189.950 shall be equipped with blue flashing, rotating or oscillating lights and since there is no mention of jailers and their vehicles, such vehicles cannot legally be equipped with such blue lights. OAG 80-231 .

A coroner’s vehicle is not an “emergency vehicle” and it is not included among those types of vehicles which are authorized and required to utilize red or blue flashing, rotating or oscillating lights and sirens, bells or whistles; the coroner may not use such equipment on his vehicle even when he is proceeding to the scene of an accident. OAG 80-543 .

While a fireman whose chief has authorized him, in writing, to equip his vehicle with flashing red lights and a siren pursuant to subsection (4) of this section may utilize those devices while proceeding to the scene of a fire or other emergency in the performance of his official duties as a member of the fire department, he may not utilize his flashing red lights and siren while departing from the scene of a fire or other emergency; accordingly, if it was determined that an accident victim needed to be rushed to a hospital and could not be transported under normal driving conditions, then an ambulance or other authorized emergency vehicle should have been called to the scene, because the fireman did not have the authority to utilize his flashing red lights and siren to depart from the scene and transport the accident victim to the hospital. OAG 81-236 .

Where a fire chief has exercised his discretionary authority pursuant to this section and permitted, in writing, members of his fire department to equip their personal vehicles with flashing red lights and sirens for use while proceeding to the scene of a fire or other emergency, that permission to so act terminates when he ceases to be fire chief. Permission must be obtained in writing from the successor as fire chief if the members of the fire department are to continue to use flashing red lights and sirens on their private vehicles. OAG 82-126 .

Pursuant to subsection (5) of this section, any constable in Kentucky may use blue lights on his official emergency vehicle, provided such use is formally approved by the fiscal court of his county, except in an urban county government, where the constable’s use of blue lights must be approved by the urban county council. OAG 84-241 .

For a fiscal court to be liable for the wrongful conduct of a constable, the wrongdoing by the constable must be directly attributable to the use of the blue lights or siren and the fiscal court must have acted negligently in approving the use of blue lights under subsection (5) of this section. OAG 86-67 .

A fiscal court can terminate its discretionary approval under subsection (5) of this section at a later date. OAG 86-87 .

A hearing is not necessary to terminate the privilege previously granted to a constable under subsection (5) of this section. OAG 86-67 .

A constable may not lawfully equip a vehicle with a fixed or stationary blue light for use in attempting to cause motorists to stop or yield the right-of-way. OAG 91-162 .

Because there is no statute authorizing a constable to equip a vehicle with a fixed or stationary blue light, and no statutory command that a motorist stop or yield the right-of-way to a vehicle using a fixed or stationary blue light, and because of public policy considerations, a constable may not lawfully equip a vehicle with a fixed or stationary blue light. OAG 91-162 .

Public Safety Vehicles

189.960. Right-of-way to public safety vehicle or to pedestrian engaged in work on highway.

  1. The operator of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to any public safety vehicle, as defined in KRS 189.910(2), or any pedestrian actually engaged in work upon a highway or within any highway construction or maintenance area indicated by official traffic control devices.
  2. The operator of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to any public safety vehicle obviously and actually engaged in work upon a highway whenever such vehicle displays flashing lights meeting the requirements of KRS 189.920(4).

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 46, § 10, effective June 17, 1978; 2011, ch. 59, § 1, effective June 8, 2011.

Penalties

189.990. Penalties. [Effective until July 1, 2024]

  1. Any person who violates any of the provisions of KRS 189.020 to 189.040 , subsection (1) or (4) of KRS 189.050 , KRS 189.060 to 189.080 , subsections (1) to (3) of KRS 189.090 , KRS 189.100 , 189.110 , 189.130 to 189.160 , subsections (2) to (4) of KRS 189.190 , KRS 189.200 , 189.285 , 189.290 , 189.300 to 189.360 , KRS 189.380 , KRS 189.400 to 189.430 , KRS 189.450 to 189.458 , KRS 189.4595 to 189.480 , subsection (1) of KRS 189.520 , KRS 189.540 , KRS 189.570 to 189.590 , except subsection (1)(b) or (6)(b) of KRS 189.580 , KRS 189.345 , subsection (6) of KRS 189.456 , and 189.960 shall be fined not less than twenty dollars ($20) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100) for each offense. Any person who violates subsection (1)(a) of KRS 189.580 shall be fined not less than twenty dollars ($20) nor more than two thousand dollars ($2,000) or imprisoned in the county jail for not more than one (1) year, or both, unless the accident involved death or serious physical injury and the person knew or should have known of the death or serious physical injury, in which case the person shall be guilty of a Class D felony. Any person who violates paragraph (c) of subsection (5) of KRS 189.390 shall be fined not less than eleven dollars ($11) nor more than thirty dollars ($30). Neither court costs nor fees shall be taxed against any person violating paragraph (c) of subsection (5) of KRS 189.390 .
    1. Any person who violates the weight provisions of KRS 189.212 , 189.221 , 189.222 , 189.226 , 189.230 , 189.270 , or 189.271 3 shall be fined two cents ($0.02) per pound for each pound of excess load when the excess is five thousand (5,000) pounds or less. When the excess exceeds five thousand (5,000) pounds the fine shall be two cents ($0.02) per pound for each pound of excess load, but the fine levied shall not be less than one hundred dollars ($100) and shall not be more than five hundred dollars ($500). (2) (a) Any person who violates the weight provisions of KRS 189.212 , 189.221 , 189.222 , 189.226 , 189.230 , 189.270 , or 189.271 3 shall be fined two cents ($0.02) per pound for each pound of excess load when the excess is five thousand (5,000) pounds or less. When the excess exceeds five thousand (5,000) pounds the fine shall be two cents ($0.02) per pound for each pound of excess load, but the fine levied shall not be less than one hundred dollars ($100) and shall not be more than five hundred dollars ($500).
    2. Any person who violates the provisions of KRS 189.271 and is operating on a route designated on the permit shall be fined one hundred dollars ($100); otherwise, the penalties in paragraph (a) of this subsection shall apply.
    3. Any person who violates any provision of subsection (2) or (3) of KRS 189.050 , subsection (4) of KRS 189.090 , KRS 189.221 to 189.230, 189.270, 189.2713 , 189.280 , or the dimension provisions of KRS 189.212, for which another penalty is not specifically provided shall be fined not less than ten dollars ($10) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500).
      1. Any person who violates the provisions of KRS 177.985 while operating on a route designated in KRS 177.986 shall be fined one hundred dollars ($100). (d) 1. Any person who violates the provisions of KRS 177.985 while operating on a route designated in KRS 177.986 shall be fined one hundred dollars ($100).
      2. Any person who operates a vehicle with a permit under KRS 177.985 in excess of eighty thousand (80,000) pounds while operating on a route not designated in KRS 177.986 shall be fined one thousand dollars ($1,000).
    4. Nothing in this subsection or in KRS 189.221 to 189.228 shall be deemed to prejudice or affect the authority of the Department of Vehicle Regulation to suspend or revoke certificates of common carriers, permits of contract carriers, or drivers’ or chauffeurs’ licenses, for any violation of KRS 189.221 to 189.228 or any other act applicable to motor vehicles, as provided by law.
    1. Any person who violates subsection (1) of KRS 189.190 shall be fined not more than fifteen dollars ($15). (3) (a) Any person who violates subsection (1) of KRS 189.190 shall be fined not more than fifteen dollars ($15).
    2. Any person who violates subsection (5) of KRS 189.190 shall be fined not less than thirty-five dollars ($35) nor more than two hundred dollars ($200).
    1. Any person who violates subsection (1) of KRS 189.210 shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars ($25) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100). (4) (a) Any person who violates subsection (1) of KRS 189.210 shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars ($25) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100).
    2. Any peace officer who fails, when properly informed, to enforce KRS 189.210 shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars ($25) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100).
    3. All fines collected under this subsection, after payment of commissions to officers entitled thereto, shall go to the county road fund if the offense is committed in the county, or to the city street fund if committed in the city.
  2. Any person who violates KRS 189.370 shall for the first offense be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than two hundred dollars ($200) or imprisoned not less than thirty (30) days nor more than sixty (60) days, or both. For each subsequent offense occurring within three (3) years, the person shall be fined not less than three hundred dollars ($300) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) or imprisoned not less than sixty (60) days nor more than six (6) months, or both. The minimum fine for this violation shall not be subject to suspension. A minimum of six (6) points shall be assessed against the driving record of any person convicted.
  3. Any person who violates KRS 189.500 shall be fined not more than fifteen dollars ($15) in excess of the cost of the repair of the road.
  4. Any person who violates KRS 189.510 or KRS 189.515 shall be fined not less than twenty dollars ($20) nor more than fifty dollars ($50).
  5. Any peace officer who violates subsection (2) of KRS 189.520 shall be fined not less than thirty-five dollars ($35) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100).
    1. Any person who violates KRS 189.530(1) shall be fined not less than thirty-five dollars ($35) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100), or imprisoned not less than thirty (30) days nor more than twelve (12) months, or both. (9) (a) Any person who violates KRS 189.530(1) shall be fined not less than thirty-five dollars ($35) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100), or imprisoned not less than thirty (30) days nor more than twelve (12) months, or both.
    2. Any person who violates KRS 189.530(2) shall be fined not less than thirty-five dollars ($35) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100).
  6. Any person who violates any of the provisions of KRS 189.550 shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
  7. Any person who violates subsection (3) of KRS 189.560 shall be fined not less than thirty dollars ($30) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100) for each offense.
  8. The fines imposed by paragraph (a) of subsection (3) and subsections (6) and (7) of this section shall, in the case of a public highway, be paid into the county road fund, and, in the case of a privately owned road or bridge, be paid to the owner. These fines shall not bar an action for damages for breach of contract.
  9. Any person who violates any of the provisions of KRS 189.120 shall be fined not less than twenty dollars ($20) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100) for each offense.
  10. Any person who violates any provision of KRS 189.575 shall be fined not less than twenty dollars ($20) nor more than twenty-five dollars ($25).
  11. Any person who violates subsection (2) of KRS 189.231 shall be fined not less than twenty dollars ($20) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100) for each offense.
  12. Any person who violates restrictions or regulations established by the secretary of transportation pursuant to subsection (3) of KRS 189.231 shall, upon first offense, be fined one hundred dollars ($100) and, upon subsequent convictions, be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) or imprisoned for thirty (30) days, or both.
    1. Any person who violates any of the provisions of KRS 189.565 shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. (17) (a) Any person who violates any of the provisions of KRS 189.565 shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
    2. In addition to the penalties prescribed in paragraph (a) of this subsection, in case of violation by any person in whose name the vehicle used in the transportation of inflammable liquids or explosives is licensed, the person shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500). Each violation shall constitute a separate offense.
  13. Any person who abandons a vehicle upon the right-of-way of a state highway for three (3) consecutive days shall be fined not less than thirty-five dollars ($35) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100), or imprisoned for not less than ten (10) days nor more than thirty (30) days.
  14. Every person violating KRS 189.393 shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor, unless the offense is being committed by a defendant fleeing the commission of a felony offense which the defendant was also charged with violating and was subsequently convicted of that felony, in which case it is a Class A misdemeanor.
  15. Any law enforcement agency which fails or refuses to forward the reports required by KRS 189.635 shall be subject to the penalties prescribed in KRS 17.157 .
  16. A person who operates a bicycle in violation of the administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to KRS 189.287 shall be fined not less than ten dollars ($10) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100).
  17. Any person who violates KRS 189.860 shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or imprisoned for not more than six (6) months, or both.
  18. Any person who violates KRS 189.754 shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars ($25) nor more than three hundred dollars ($300).
  19. Any person who violates the provisions of KRS 189.125(3)(a) shall be fined fifty dollars ($50). This fine shall be subject to prepayment. A fine imposed under this subsection shall not be subject to court costs pursuant to KRS 24A.175 , additional court costs pursuant to KRS 24A.176 , the fee imposed pursuant to KRS 24A.176 5, or any other additional fees or costs.
  20. Any person who violates the provisions of KRS 189.125 (3)(b) shall not be issued a uniform citation, but shall instead receive a courtesy warning up until July 1, 2009. For a violation on or after July 1, 2009, the person shall be fined thirty dollars ($30). This fine shall be subject to prepayment. A fine imposed under this subsection shall not be subject to court costs pursuant to KRS 24A.175 , additional court costs pursuant to KRS 24A.176 , a fee imposed pursuant to KRS 24A.1765 , or any other additional fees or costs. A person who has not been previously charged with a violation of KRS 189.125 (3)(b) may elect to acquire a booster seat meeting the requirements of KRS 189.125. Upon presentation of sufficient proof of the acquisition, the charge shall be dismissed and no fees or costs shall be imposed.
  21. Any person who violates the provisions of KRS 189.125(6) shall be fined an amount not to exceed twenty-five dollars ($25). This fine shall be subject to prepayment. A fine imposed under this subsection shall not be subject to court costs pursuant to KRS 24A.175 , additional court costs pursuant to KRS 24A.176 , the fee imposed pursuant to KRS 24A.176 5, or any other additional fees or costs.
  22. Fines levied pursuant to this chapter shall be assessed in the manner required by KRS 534.020 , in amounts consistent with this chapter. Nonpayment of fines shall be governed by KRS 534.020 and 534.060 .
  23. A licensed driver under the age of eighteen (18) charged with a moving violation pursuant to this chapter as the driver of a motor vehicle may be referred, prior to trial, by the court to a diversionary program. The diversionary program under this subsection shall consist of one (1) or both of the following:
    1. Execution of a diversion agreement which prohibits the driver from operating a vehicle for a period not to exceed forty-five (45) days and which allows the court to retain the driver’s operator’s license during this period; and
    2. Attendance at a driver improvement clinic established pursuant to KRS 186.574 . If the person completes the terms of this diversionary program satisfactorily the violation shall be dismissed.
  24. A person who violates the provisions of subsection (2) or (3) of KRS 189.459 shall be fined two hundred fifty dollars ($250). The fines and costs for a violation of subsection (2) or (3) of KRS 189.459 shall be collected and disposed of in accordance with KRS 24A.180 . Once deposited into the State Treasury, ninety percent (90%) of the fine collected under this subsection shall immediately be forwarded to the personal care assistance program under KRS 205.900 to 205.920 . Ten percent (10%) of the fine collected under this subsection shall annually be returned to the county where the violation occurred and distributed equally to all law enforcement agencies within the county.
  25. Any person who violates KRS 189.292 or 189.294 shall be fined twenty-five dollars ($25) for the first offense and fifty dollars ($50) for each subsequent offense.
  26. Any person who violates KRS 189.281(5) or (7)(b) shall be subject to a fine of two hundred fifty dollars ($250). This fine shall be subject to prepayment. A fine imposed under this subsection shall not be subject to court costs pursuant to KRS 24A.175 , additional costs pursuant to KRS 24A.176 , the fee imposed pursuant to KRS 24A.176 5, or any other additional fees or costs.

History. 1376r-2, 1376r-10, 2739g-34a, 2739g-34b, 2739g-46a, 2739-53b, 2739g-65, 2739g-69ee, 2739g-93, 2739i-2, 2896a-15, 4345, 4345a-6, 4346, 4346a-5, 4348, 4353b-4: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 96; 1948, ch. 171, § 2; 1950, ch. 48, § 4; 1950, ch. 96, § 2; 1950, ch. 97, §§ 2, 3; 1950, ch. 115, § 9; 1952, ch. 206, § 1; 1956, ch. 23, § 1, 1956, ch. 35, § 2; 1956, ch. 125, § 3; 1970, ch. 92, § 60; 1972, ch. 128, § 2; 1972, ch. 203, § 38; 1972, ch. 299, § 2(4); 1974, ch. 101, § 7; 1974, ch. 217, § 2; 1974, ch. 258 § 5; 1974, ch. 335, § 2; 1974, ch. 345, § 1(3); 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 36, § 2, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 46, § 11, effective June 17, 1978, ch. 101, § 4, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 54, effective June 17, 1978; 1979 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 7 § 5, effective July 1, 1979; 1980, ch. 49, § 5, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 305, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 165, § 20(1) to (24), effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 72, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 232, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 262, § 6, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 293, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 347, § 2, effective April 10, 1988; 1990, ch. 400, § 3, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 143, § 4, effective July 14, 1992; 1992, ch. 229, § 4, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 39, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 21, § 3, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 124, § 6, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 179, § 4, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 484, § 4, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 606, § 69, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 319, § 3, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 449, § 1, effective April 21, 2000; 2000, ch. 467, § 25, effective October 1, 2000; 2000, ch. 481, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 512, § 6, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 183, § 18, effective August 1, 2002; 2004, ch. 131, § 3, effective July 13, 2004; 2006, ch. 109, § 2, effective July 12, 2006; 2006, ch. 110, § 2, effective July 12, 2006; 2006, ch. 173, § 32, effective July 12, 2006; 2006, ch. 180, § 10, effective July 12, 2006; 2008, ch. 108, § 2, effective July 15, 2008; 2008, ch. 141, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; 2010, ch. 110, § 4, effective July 15, 2010; 2013, ch. 21, § 4, effective June 25, 2013; 2017 ch. 146, § 4, effective June 29, 2017; 2017 ch. 158, § 9, effective June 29, 2017; 2018 ch. 63, § 4, effective July 14, 2018; 2019 ch. 126, § 5, effective June 27, 2019; 2021 ch. 186, § 8, effective June 29, 2021.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former subsections (19) and (20) (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 125, § 3) were repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 115, § 12 and former subsection (21) (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 142, § 2) was repealed by implication by Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 123.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(6/29/2021). This statute was created by Sec- tion 6 of 2021 Ky. Acts ch. 186. Section 9 of that Act provides that “Sections 6 to 8 of this Act are part of a pilot program and shall sunset on July 1, 2024.”

(7/12/2006). Because of typographical error, in 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 173, sec. 32, which amended KRS 189.990 , an erroneous reference to a nonexistent KRS section, KRS 189.599, appears in subsection (1). The correct citation is KRS 189.590 . Under the authority of KRS 7.136(1), the Reviser of Statutes has inserted the correct citation.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Reduction of Maximum Fine.

A city ordinance fixing maximum fine of $50 for exceeding speed limit of 15 miles per hour is not consistent with statute and therefore repugnant to Ky. Const., § 168 where KRS 189.390 authorizes municipalities to fix speed limits within their boundaries when conditions warrant but the penalty provided for violation of KRS 189.390 is set forth in this section as a fine of not less than $10 or more than $100. Murphy v. Lake Louisvilla, 303 S.W.2d 307, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 257 ( Ky. 1957 ).

2.Permitting Prisoner to Obtain Attorney.

Two hour delay by arresting officer and jailer in permitting motorist arrested for driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated to call her attorney was not unreasonable or prejudicial where the delay was due to her conduct. Sharp v. Commonwealth, 414 S.W.2d 902, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 372 ( Ky. 1967 ).

3.Leaving Scene of Accident.

The defendant’s flight from the scene of a fatal automobile accident, and his subsequent attempts at concealment or suppression of evidence, proved at most that he believed he was at fault, which was just as consistent with ordinary negligence or recklessness as it is with “wanton” conduct. Fugate v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 675, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 169 ( Ky. 1969 ), overruled, Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 303 ( Ky. 1983 ).

The act of leaving the scene of the accident without stopping to render aid, though it may have amounted to gross and wanton misconduct in itself, was a separate crime from the manslaughter charged as a result of the original striking. Fugate v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 675, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 169 ( Ky. 1969 ), overruled, Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 303 ( Ky. 1983 ).

4.Failure to Render Aid.

The maximum fine provided for the offense of failing to render aid and assistance after an accident in violation of KRS 189.580(1) is $2,000.00 rather than the $500.00 maximum set for a class A misdemeanor. Commonwealth v. Schindler, 685 S.W.2d 544, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 298 ( Ky. 1984 ).

5.Voluntary Manslaughter.

Where driver intentionally drove his automobile at a speed that was excessive in view of the topography of the highway and in so doing committed a misdemeanor in failing to operate his vehicle in a careful manner in violation of KRS 189.290 and this section and perhaps in violation of KRS 189.300 by failing to keep to the right he was negligent per se but without any evidence of how excessive it was or what other conditions led up to it, it did not necessarily forecast a sufficient likelihood or probability of accident and injury to support a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. Agee v. Hammons, 335 S.W.2d 732, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 279 ( Ky. 1960 ).

6.Revocation of Operator’s License.

The revocation of operator’s license for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated in violation of KRS 189.580 is not by the magistrate but merely recommended by him and is not a punishment in addition to the fine and confinement provided by this section which would deprive the magistrate of jurisdiction. Commonwealth v. Burnett, 274 Ky. 231 , 118 S.W.2d 558, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 257 ( Ky. 1938 ).

7.Fine Not Debt.

Person brought before county court on a criminal charge of violating KRS 189.222 and who pleaded guilty and was fined $500 under this section and placed in jail on failure to pay the fine could not be released on surrender of his estate for benefit of creditors under Ky. Const., § 18 for he was not a “debtor” to the Commonwealth within the meaning of Ky. Const., § 18. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 240 S.W.2d 587, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 982 ( Ky. 1951 ).

8.Indictment.

Wilful and wanton failure of motorist injuring person to stop and render assistance does not constitute voluntary manslaughter even though the person dies as a result and an indictment charging voluntary manslaughter for wilful and wanton failure to stop and render assistance violates the criminal code by combining two offenses in one indictment, one a charge of voluntary manslaughter under KRS 435.020 (now repealed) carrying a penalty of confinement in penitentiary for not less than 2 or more than 21 years and the other a violation of KRS 189.580 carrying the penalty provided in subsection (1) of this section. Commonwealth v. Nevius, 249 S.W.2d 717, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 840 ( Ky. 1952 ).

9.Evidence.

Where automobile driver violated KRS 189.330 and this section by failing to stop at caution light for which officers were authorized to make an arrest and after the arrest the driver disclosed he had illegal whiskey in the automobile, the evidence of finding the liquor in the car was competent in charge of transporting intoxicating liquor for purpose of sale in local option territory and the trial court committed error in directing a verdict of acquittal. Commonwealth v. Bentley, 259 S.W.2d 441, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 946 ( Ky. 1953 ).

10.Appeal.

Where offense is a misdemeanor punishable by fine only under this section the Commonwealth may appeal and upon reversal have a new trial, notwithstanding the former judgment of acquittal. Commonwealth v. Abell, 275 Ky. 802 , 122 S.W.2d 757, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 498 ( Ky. 1938 ).

11.Imposition of Fine.

Circuit court properly imposed a $100 fine for excessive window tinting and allowed a deferred payment of that fine because the fine was not subject to waiver inasmuch as both the offense and the fine were defined outside of the penal code. Fultz v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.3d 385, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 214 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

Cited:

Pinkleton v. Lueke, 265 Ky. 84 , 95 S.W.2d 1103, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 435 ( Ky. 1936 ); Newcomb v. Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 362 , 124 S.W.2d 486, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 532 ( Ky. 1939 ); National Linen Supply Co. v. Snowden, 288 Ky. 374 , 156 S.W.2d 186, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1941 ); Garner v. Shouse, 292 Ky. 798 , 168 S.W.2d 42, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 747 ( Ky. 1943 ); Hovious v. Riley, 403 S.W.2d 17, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 313 ( Ky. 1966 ), overruled, Commonwealth v. Hager, 702 S.W.2d 431, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 225 ( Ky. 1986 ), overruled in part, Commonwealth v. Hager, 702 S.W.2d 431, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 225 ( Ky. 1986 ); Smith v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.2d 835, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 27 ( Ky. 1967 ); North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 96 S. Ct. 2709, 49 L. Ed. 2d 534, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 76 (1976); Luna v. Commonwealth, 571 S.W.2d 88, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 929 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Sizemore v. District Court, 50th Judicial Dist., 735 F.2d 204, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 21937 (6th Cir. 1984).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If an arrest is made by a local peace officer for a violation under KRS 189.221 , 189.222 or 189.270 , the fines recovered as well as the taxes levied must all be sent by the collecting court directly within 30 days after they are imposed and collected. OAG 62-815 .

If an arrest for a violation of KRS 189.221 , 189.222 or 189.270 is made by a state trooper, state highway agent or department of motor transportation (now transportation cabinet) agent, the fines and taxes are treated as any other fines and are sent to the circuit court clerk who reports and forwards them to the state treasury. OAG 62-815 .

The fine applicable to a violation of an order entered pursuant to KRS 189.230 is found in subsection (2)(b) (now (2)(c)) of this section, and the fact that the county judge (now county judge/executive) in entering that order may have referred to subsection (2)(a) is of no significance. OAG 66-380 .

All fines collected under violations of KRS 189.210 and as mentioned in subsection (5)(a), (b) and (c) (now (4)(a), (b) and (c)) of this section, after payment of commissions to officers entitled thereto, mandatorily go to the county road fund if the offense is committed in the county. OAG 72-204 .

Under subsection (5) (now (4)) of this section, 15% of fines collected in the quarterly court for violations of KRS 189.210 will go to the county road fund which is the amount available after payment of the requisite percentages of the fines to the commonwealth’s attorney, the county attorney, and the circuit clerk. OAG 72-237 .

To the extent that a fiscal court cannot agree not to enforce hauling and weight restrictions governing the use of public roads, a contract whereby a coal company would pay a fee to the county, based on the tonnage hauled, to compensate for future expected damages to county roads would be impermissible. OAG 76-170 .

As between legislation of broad and general nature on one hand and legislation dealing minutely with specific matter on the other hand, the specific will prevail over the general, and, accordingly, the specific prohibition of this section against imposing of costs in parking violations prevails over the generality of KRS 24A.175 , which purports to require payment of costs in all criminal prosecutions upon conviction. OAG 78-328 .

Where two statutes enacted at the same session are destructively repugnant, the law last enacted must be regarded as the final expression of the legislative will and permitted to prevail; since amended subsection (1) of this section and KRS 24A.175 are destructively repugnant, this section, as the last enacted, prevails. OAG 78-328 .

KRS 346.185 , which imposes an additional cost of ten dollars for all offenses for which imprisonment may be imposed, only applies to traffic offenses for which a term of imprisonment may be imposed for a violation. OAG 82-332 .

A driving under the influence (DUI) conviction entered prior to June 21, 1974 may be used to enhance the penalty for a subsequent DUI conviction pursuant to KRS 189.520(2) and subdivision (9)(a) (deleted by 1984 amendment) of this section. OAG 84-175 .

KRS 189.520(2) and subsection (9) (now subsection (8)) of this section must be construed by the express or literal language contained therein; accordingly, any previous conviction under KRS 189.520(2) may be used for enhancement purposes under subsection (9) (now subsection (8)) of this section. If proof of previous convictions cannot be obtained from the Transportation Cabinet due to a destruction of records which are over five years old or have occurred prior to June 21, 1974, proof by any other means is acceptable so long as introduction of such proof complies with the rules on evidence. OAG 84-175 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Mann, Legislation — A Proposed Dangerous Driving Statute for Kentucky, 36 Ky. L.J. 82 (1947).

Comments, Long Overdue-Process: California And The Lay Judge, 63 Ky. L.J. 490 (1974-1975).

Notes, Economic, Social and Legal Aspects of Coal Transportation in Kentucky, 64 Ky. L.J. 601 (1975-76).

Kentucky Law Survey, Fortune, Criminal Rules, 70 Ky. L.J. 395 (1981-82).

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Criminal), 5th Ed., Offenses Against Public Order, Safety and Morals, Part 4 Offenses Relating to Firearms and Destructive Devices, §§ 8.67, 8.68 — 8.73B.

189.991. Penalty. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 110, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 168.

189.992. Penalty. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 67, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 168.

189.993. Penalties.

  1. Any person who violates KRS 189.045 shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000).
  2. Any person convicted of violating any of the provisions of KRS 189.095 shall be fined sixty dollars ($60) and costs of prosecution.
  3. Any person who violates any provision of KRS 189.205 shall be fined not less than twenty dollars ($20) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100).
  4. Any person who violates any provision of KRS 189.375 shall be fined not less than twenty dollars ($20) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100).
  5. Any person who violates KRS 189.505 shall be fined not less than sixty dollars ($60) nor more than two hundred dollars ($200) or be imprisoned for not more than thirty (30) days, or both.
  6. Any person found violating any provision of KRS 189.820 or 189.830 is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not less than twenty dollars ($20) nor more than thirty-five dollars ($35).
  7. Any person who violates KRS 189.920 shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or imprisoned in the county jail for not more than thirty (30) days, or both. In the case of a private vehicle not authorized to use emergency lights under KRS 189.920 , all lighting and other equipment used in violation of KRS 189.910 to 189.950 shall be confiscated and forfeited to the county in which the offense occurred.
  8. Any person who violates KRS 189.930 shall be fined not less than sixty dollars ($60) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), or be imprisoned in the county jail for not more than thirty (30) days, or both.
  9. Any person who violates KRS 189.940 shall be fined not less than sixty dollars ($60) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or be imprisoned in the county jail for not more than six (6) months, or both. In the case of a private vehicle, except as outlined in subsection (11) of this section, all lighting and other equipment used in violation of KRS 189.910 to 189.950 shall be confiscated and forfeited to the county in which the offense occurred.
  10. If a member of a regular or volunteer fire department, ambulance service, or rescue squad violates any provisions of subsection (6) of KRS 189.940 , he shall, in addition to any other penalty provided under KRS 189.990 or this section, be immediately dismissed from his membership or employment with the fire department, ambulance service, or rescue squad and shall be disqualified from being employed by or being a member of any fire department, ambulance service, or rescue squad in the Commonwealth for a period of three (3) years. Upon conviction of a second offense he shall be permanently barred from employment or membership in any fire department, ambulance service, rescue squad, police department, or sheriff’s office in the Commonwealth, nor shall he be permitted to operate any public safety vehicle as defined in KRS 189.910 .
    1. Any person who violates KRS 189.950 (3)shall be fined one hundred dollars ($100) for the first offense, two hundred dollars ($200) for the second offense, and one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each subsequent offense. (11) (a) Any person who violates KRS 189.950 (3)shall be fined one hundred dollars ($100) for the first offense, two hundred dollars ($200) for the second offense, and one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each subsequent offense.
    2. Except as provided in paragraph (a) of this subsection, any person who violates KRS 189.950 shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or be imprisoned in the county jail for not more than thirty (30) days, or both. In the case of a privately owned vehicle, all lighting and other equipment used or installed in violation of KRS 189.910 to 189.950 shall be confiscated and forfeited to the county in which the offense occurred.
  11. Any person who violates any provision of this chapter for which no penalty is otherwise provided shall, upon conviction, be fined not less than twenty dollars ($20) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100) for each offense, except that no penalty shall be assessed for a violation of KRS 189.580(1)(b) or (6)(b).
  12. No producer or processor of natural resources shall allow the transporting of natural resources over the highways of the Commonwealth in excess of the weight limits without possessing a resource recovery road hauling permit. Violation for hauling in excess of prescribed limits without possession of a permit or transporting natural resources over prescribed limits of the resource recovery road hauling permit shall be not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each violation and shall be deposited in the resource recovery road fund.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 18, § 2; 1966, ch. 113, § 3; 1968, ch. 152, § 123; 1970, ch. 45, § 4; 1970, ch. 92, § 61; 1970, ch. 93, § 6; 1970, ch. 117, § 1; 1972, ch. 203, § 39; 1978, ch. 101, § 5, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 102, § 5, effective June 17, 1978; 1979 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 7, § 6, effective July 1, 1979; 1982, ch. 203, § 12(5), effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 220, § 3, effective July 15, 1986; 2006, ch. 109, § 3, effective July 12, 2006; 2006, ch. 110, § 3, effective July 12, 2006; 2006, ch. 173, § 33, effective July 12, 2006; 2017 ch. 79, § 3, effective June 29, 2017.

Opinions of Attorney General.

KRS 346.185 , which imposes an additional cost of ten dollars for all offenses for which imprisonment may be imposed, only applies to traffic offenses for which a term of imprisonment may be imposed for a violation. OAG 82-332 .

189.994. Penalty for unspecified violations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 163, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 168.

189.995. Penalties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 115, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 168.

189.999. Prepayment of fines subject to certain conditions.

  1. All offenses under this chapter classified as violations shall be prepayable, except for:
    1. Any offense that could result in license suspension or revocation by the court or the Transportation Cabinet;
    2. Any offense relating to KRS 189.393 , 189.520 , or 189.580 ;
    3. When the defendant is speeding more than twenty-five (25) miles per hour over the posted speed limit under KRS 189.394 ;
    4. An offense where evidence of the offense or of commission of another offense is seized by the officer and the citation is so marked and a court date set;
    5. The offense is cited with another offense that is not prepayable;
    6. When the defendant is under the age of eighteen (18); or
    7. An arrest is made under KRS 431.015 .
  2. In the event that a prepayable offense is cited with another offense that is not prepayable, a court appearance shall be required on all of the offenses as required by KRS 431.452 .

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 512, § 5, effective July 14, 2000; 2014, ch. 81, § 1, effective July 15, 2014; 2019 ch. 40, § 5, effective June 27, 2019.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2014). 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 81, sec. 3 provided that the amendments made to this statute in Section 1 of that Act shall be known as the “Denzel Steward Act of 2014.”

CHAPTER 189A Driving Under the Influence

189A.005. Definitions for chapter.

As used in this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Alcohol concentration” means either grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath;
  2. “Cabinet” means the Transportation Cabinet;
  3. “Ignition interlock device” or “device” means a device, certified by the Transportation Cabinet for use in this Commonwealth under KRS 189A.350 , that:
    1. Connects a motor vehicle ignition system or motorcycle ignition system to a breath alcohol analyzer and prevents a motor vehicle ignition or motorcycle ignition from starting, and from continuing to operate, if a driver’s breath alcohol concentration exceeds 0.02, as measured by the device; and
    2. Has a fully functional camera that is equipped to record the date, time, and photo of all persons providing breath samples to the device;
  4. Ignition interlock certificate of installation means a certificate providing that the installed ignition interlock device has been installed and is certified for use in the Commonwealth under KRS 189A.350 ;
  5. “Ignition interlock device provider” or “provider” means any person or company certified by the Transportation Cabinet to engage in the business of manufacturing, selling, leasing, servicing, or monitoring ignition interlock devices within the Commonwealth;
  6. “Ignition interlock license” means a motor vehicle or motorcycle operator’s license issued or granted by the laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky that, except for those with an employer exemption under KRS 189A.340 , permits a person to drive only motor vehicles or motorcycles equipped with a functioning ignition interlock device;
  7. “License” means any driver’s or operator’s license or any other license or permit to operate a motor vehicle issued under or granted by the laws of this state including:
    1. Any temporary license or instruction permit;
    2. The privilege of any person to obtain a valid license or instruction permit, or to drive a motor vehicle whether or not the person holds a valid license; and
    3. Any nonresident’s operating privilege as defined in KRS Chapter 186 or 189;
  8. “Limited access highway” has the same meaning as “limited access facility” does in KRS 177.220 ;
  9. “Refusal” means declining to submit to any test or tests pursuant to KRS 189A.103 . Declining may be either by word or by the act of refusal. If the breath testing instrument for any reason shows an insufficient breath sample and the alcohol concentration cannot be measured by the breath testing instrument, the law enforcement officer shall then request the defendant to take a blood or urine test in lieu of the breath test. If the defendant then declines either by word or by the act of refusal, he shall then be deemed to have refused if the refusal occurs at the site at which any alcohol concentration or substance test is to be administered; and
  10. When age is a factor, it shall mean age at the time of the commission of the offense.

History. Enact. Acts 1991 (lst Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 1, effective July 1, 1991; 2000, ch. 467, § 1, effective October 1, 2000; 2002, ch. 171, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2015 ch. 124, § 1, effective June 24, 2015; 2019 ch. 103, § 1, effective July 1, 2020.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Refusal.

Where the arresting officer’s testimony sufficiently showed that he made a proper request of the driver to submit to a blood test and the driver’s testimony strongly indicated that he had understood what the officer had asked of him, the findings of the commissioner that the driver had refused the test were neither arbitrary nor capricious. Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Safety v. Cheek, 451 S.W.2d 394, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 384 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Where there was no positive unequivocal “request,” within the meaning of the word, that the motorist should submit to a blood alcohol test, his driver’s license would not be revoked because of mere refusal to submit to the test without such request. Timberlake v. Commonwealth Dep't of Public Safety, 464 S.W.2d 283, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 489 ( Ky. 1971 ).

Driver who requested a blood test when he was stopped for allegedly driving under the influence of alcohol, but refused to sign a consent form at the hospital and so did not have the test, should not have had his license revoked, as he did not refuse to have a blood test when requested by an officer to have one. Commonwealth Dep't Public Safety v. Carpenter, 467 S.W.2d 338, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 365 ( Ky. 1971 ).

Although defendant orally agreed to take the chemical breath test after his arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating beverages, the officer’s testimony that defendant, after knowing of the effect of eating on the administration of the test, deliberately ate a candy mint and defendant’s statement, “God damn your old test,” was sufficient evidence that defendant had refused to take the test. Newman v. Smith, 481 S.W.2d 679, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1972 ).

Evidence of extreme intoxication was not such a condition as to render a person incapable of responding to a definite and positive request to submit to the test unless the person was in a complete drunken stupor or passed out, and in order to comply with former law concerning consent to take a blood alcohol test there must have been a positive and specific request addressed to the licensee to take the test, and, in addition, there must have been a refusal either express or implied by the licensee. Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Safety v. Hayden, 484 S.W.2d 97, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 147 ( Ky. 1972 ); Commonwealth Dep't of Public Safety v. Hanson, 484 S.W.2d 865, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 161 ( Ky. 1972 ).

Where the defendant, as soon as he was apprehended, embarked upon a deliberate program of eating, drinking and smoking designed to frustrate an accurate chemical test, such a course was tantamount to an absolute refusal to submit to the test, regardless of an oral statement to the contrary. Moseley v. Commonwealth, 492 S.W.2d 204, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 511 ( Ky. 1973 ).

Where a motorist, who was arrested on a charge of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, was not told by the arresting officer that if he failed to take a breathalyzer test he would automatically lose his driver’s license but was warned that the chances were that he would, the motorist was adequately warned of the consequences of his refusal to take the test. Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Safety v. Tuemler, 526 S.W.2d 305, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 97 ( Ky. 1975 ).

Where the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was in physical control of his automobile while under the influence of intoxicating beverages and there was sufficient evidence in the record that defendant refused to take the breathalyzer test after repeated requests and warnings that his refusal could result in revocation of his license, the warnings sufficiently apprised defendant of the effect of his refusal in accordance with former law regarding consent to test for alcohol in the blood and an order suspending defendant’s license for six months was proper. Elkin v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Vehicle Regulation, 646 S.W.2d 45, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 281 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).

When defendant twice refused to submit to a breathalyzer and was informed of the consequences of such action pursuant to this section, law enforcement officers are not required to administer the breathalyzer at a later time after defendant changes her mind and agrees to submit to the test. Cummins v. Lentz, 813 S.W.2d 822, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 70 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).

2.— Intervening Events.

The bare chance that intervening events may have affected the accuracy of the blood alcohol test, without any claim that any such thing happened, was no legal excuse for refusing the test approximately an hour and a half after the accident. Commonwealth Dep't of Public Safety v. Brent, 452 S.W.2d 819, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 372 ( Ky. 1970 ).

3.Alcohol Concentration.

The failure of the statute to mention urine does not affect the admissibility of urine sample evidence to prove guilt of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Love v. Commonwealth, 55 S.W.3d 816, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 28 ( Ky. 2001 ).

The failure of the statute to mention blood serum does not affect the admissibility of blood alcohol evidence based on blood serum to prove guilt of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Love v. Commonwealth, 55 S.W.3d 816, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 28 ( Ky. 2001 ).

189A.010. Operating motor vehicle with alcohol concentration of or above 0.08, or of or above 0.02 for persons under age twenty-one, or while under the influence of alcohol, a controlled substance, or other substance which impairs driving ability prohibited — Admissibility of alcohol concentration or controlled substance test results — Presumptions — Penalties — Aggravating circumstances.

  1. A person shall not operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle anywhere in this state:
    1. Having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more as measured by a scientifically reliable test or tests of a sample of the person’s breath or blood taken within two (2) hours of cessation of operation or physical control of a motor vehicle;
    2. While under the influence of alcohol;
    3. While under the influence of any other substance or combination of substances which impairs one’s driving ability;
    4. While the presence of a controlled substance listed in subsection (12) of this section is detected in the blood, as measured by a scientifically reliable test, or tests, taken within two (2) hours of cessation of operation or physical control of a motor vehicle;
    5. While under the combined influence of alcohol and any other substance which impairs one’s driving ability; or
    6. Having an alcohol concentration of 0.02 or more as measured by a scientifically reliable test or tests of a sample of the person’s breath or blood taken within two (2) hours of cessation of operation or physical control of a motor vehicle, if the person is under the age of twenty-one (21).
  2. With the exception of the results of the tests administered pursuant to KRS 189A.103(7):
    1. If the sample of the person’s blood or breath that is used to determine the alcohol concentration thereof was obtained more than two (2) hours after cessation of operation or physical control of a motor vehicle, the results of the test or tests shall be inadmissible as evidence in a prosecution under subsection (1)(a) or (f) of this section. The results of the test or tests, however, may be admissible in a prosecution under subsection (1)(b) or (e) of this section; or
    2. If the sample of the person’s blood that is used to determine the presence of a controlled substance was obtained more than two (2) hours after cessation of operation or physical control of a motor vehicle, the results of the test or tests shall be inadmissible as evidence in a prosecution under subsection (1)(d) of this section. The results of the test or tests, however, may be admissible in a prosecution under subsection (1)(c) or (e) of this section.
  3. In any prosecution for a violation of subsection (1)(b) or (e) of this section in which the defendant is charged with having operated or been in physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, the alcohol concentration in the defendant’s blood as determined at the time of making analysis of his blood or breath shall give rise to the following presumptions:
    1. If there was an alcohol concentration of less than 0.04 based upon the definition of alcohol concentration in KRS 189A.005 , it shall be presumed that the defendant was not under the influence of alcohol; and
    2. If there was an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or greater but less than 0.08 based upon the definition of alcohol concentration in KRS 189A.005 , that fact shall not constitute a presumption that the defendant either was or was not under the influence of alcohol, but that fact may be considered, together with other competent evidence, in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the questions of whether the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or other substances, in any prosecution for a violation of subsection (1)(b) or (e) of this section.
    1. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, the fact that any person charged with violation of subsection (1) of this section is legally entitled to use any substance, including alcohol, shall not constitute a defense against any charge of violation of subsection (1) of this section. (4) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, the fact that any person charged with violation of subsection (1) of this section is legally entitled to use any substance, including alcohol, shall not constitute a defense against any charge of violation of subsection (1) of this section.
    2. A laboratory test or tests for a controlled substance shall be inadmissible as evidence in a prosecution under subsection (1)(d) of this section upon a finding by the court that the defendant consumed the substance under a valid prescription from a practitioner, as defined in KRS 218A.010 , acting in the course of his or her professional practice. However, a laboratory test for a controlled substance may be admissible as evidence in a prosecution under subsection (1)(c) or (e) of this section.
  4. Any person who violates the provisions of paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of subsection (1) of this section shall:
    1. For the first offense within a ten (10) year period, be fined not less than two hundred dollars ($200) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), or be imprisoned in the county jail for not less than forty-eight (48) hours nor more than thirty (30) days, or both. Following sentencing, the defendant may apply to the judge for permission to enter a community labor program for not less than forty-eight (48) hours nor more than thirty (30) days in lieu of fine or imprisonment, or both. If any of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (11) of this section are present while the person was operating or in physical control of a motor vehicle, the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment shall be four (4) days, which term shall not be suspended, probated, conditionally discharged, or subject to any other form of early release;
    2. For the second offense within a ten (10) year period, be fined not less than three hundred fifty dollars ($350) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) and shall be imprisoned in the county jail for not less than seven (7) days nor more than six (6) months and, in addition to fine and imprisonment, may be sentenced to community labor for not less than ten (10) days nor more than six (6) months. If any of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (11) of this section are present, the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment shall be fourteen (14) days, which term shall not be suspended, probated, conditionally discharged, or subject to any other form of early release;
    3. For a third offense within a ten (10) year period, be fined not less than five hundred dollars ($500) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) and shall be imprisoned in the county jail for not less than thirty (30) days nor more than twelve (12) months and may, in addition to fine and imprisonment, be sentenced to community labor for not less than thirty (30) days nor more than twelve (12) months. If any of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (11) of this section are present, the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment shall be sixty (60) days, which term shall not be suspended, probated, conditionally discharged, or subject to any other form of early release;
    4. For a fourth or subsequent offense within a ten (10) year period, be guilty of a Class D felony. If any of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (11) of this section are present, the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment shall be two hundred forty (240) days, which term shall not be suspended, probated, conditionally discharged, or subject to any other form of release; and
    5. For purposes of this subsection, prior offenses shall include all convictions in this state, and any other state or jurisdiction, for operating or being in control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or other substances that impair one’s driving ability, or any combination of alcohol and such substances, or while having an unlawful alcohol concentration, or driving while intoxicated, but shall not include convictions for violating subsection (1)(f) of this section. A court shall receive as proof of a prior conviction a copy of that conviction, certified by the court ordering the conviction.
  5. Any person who violates the provisions of subsection (1)(f) of this section shall be fined no less than one hundred dollars ($100) and no more than five hundred dollars ($500), or sentenced to twenty (20) hours of community service in lieu of a fine. A person subject to the penalties of this subsection shall not be subject to the penalties established in subsection (5) of this section or any other penalty established pursuant to KRS Chapter 189A, except those established in KRS 189A.040(1) and KRS 189A.070 .
  6. If the person is under the age of twenty-one (21) and there was an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or greater based on the definition of alcohol concentration in KRS 189A.005 , the person shall be subject to the penalties established pursuant to subsection (5) of this section.
  7. For a second or third offense within a ten (10) year period, the minimum sentence of imprisonment or community labor shall not be suspended, probated, or subject to conditional discharge or other form of early release. For a fourth or subsequent offense under this section, the minimum term of imprisonment shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and this term shall not be suspended, probated, or subject to conditional discharge or other form of early release. For a second or subsequent offense, at least forty-eight (48) hours of the mandatory sentence shall be served consecutively.
  8. When sentencing persons under subsection (5)(a) of this section, at least one (1) of the penalties shall be assessed and that penalty shall not be suspended, probated, or subject to conditional discharge or other form of early release.
  9. In determining the ten (10) year period under this section, the period shall be measured from the dates on which the offenses occurred for which the judgments of conviction were entered.
  10. For purposes of this section, aggravating circumstances are any one (1) or more of the following:
    1. Operating a motor vehicle in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour above the speed limit;
    2. Operating a motor vehicle in the wrong direction on a limited access highway;
    3. Operating a motor vehicle that causes an accident resulting in death or serious physical injury as defined in KRS 500.080 ;
    4. Operating a motor vehicle while the alcohol concentration in the operator’s blood or breath is 0.15 or more as measured by a test or tests of a sample of the operator’s blood or breath taken within two (2) hours of cessation of operation of the motor vehicle;
    5. Refusing to submit to any test or tests of one’s blood, breath, or urine requested by an officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person was operating or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of subsection (1) of this section, except it shall not be considered an aggravating circumstance for a first offense under subsection (5)(a) of this section; and
    6. Operating a motor vehicle that is transporting a passenger under the age of twelve (12) years old.
  11. The substances applicable to a prosecution under subsection (1)(d) of this section are:
    1. Any Schedule I controlled substance except marijuana;
    2. Alprazolam;
    3. Amphetamine;
    4. Buprenorphine;
    5. Butalbital;
    6. Carisoprodol;
    7. Cocaine;
    8. Diazepam;
    9. Hydrocodone;
    10. Meprobamate;
    11. Methadone;
    12. Methamphetamine;
    13. Oxycodone;
    14. Promethazine;
    15. Propoxyphene; and
    16. Zolpidem.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 165, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 2, effective July 1, 1991; 1996, ch. 198, § 10, effective October 10, 1996; 1998, ch. 124, § 8, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 606, § 171, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 467, § 2, effective October 1, 2000; 2002, ch. 183, § 19, effective August 1, 2002; 2010, ch. 149, § 17, effective July 15, 2010; 2016 ch. 85, § 1, effective April 9, 2016; 2019 ch. 103, § 2, effective July 1, 2020.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(4/9/2016). 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 85, sec. 10 provided that that Act shall be known as the Brianna Taylor Act. This statute was amended in Section 1 of that Act.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

Subsection (1) of this section is not unconstitutional because it fails to define “substance,” as this section clearly states that if you consume alcohol or any other substance that impairs your driving ability, then you have an obligation to cease driving. Cruse v. Commonwealth, 712 S.W.2d 356, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1122 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Subsection (3) (see now (8) and (9)) of this section, which directs that the minimum sentences for repeat offenders established in the earlier portions of that statute, shall not be subject to suspension, probation, or any other form of conditional release or early discharge, is not a violation of Ky. Const., §§ 27 and 28. Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 445, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1203 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986), limited, Osborne v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 484, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993), overruled, Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1996 ).

The prohibition of this section of operating or being in physical control of a vehicle anywhere in the state while under the influence of alcohol or other substance does not constitute an unreasonable restriction upon the conduct of an individual wherein it violates his constitutional right with regard to privacy and the right to do as he pleases on his own property, for it is not unbridled government decision making, as it is not a law restricting individual freedom without any relation to a valid public interest. Lynch v. Commonwealth, 902 S.W.2d 813, 1995 Ky. LEXIS 55 ( Ky. 1995 ).

This section, KRS 189A.103 , and KRS 189A.105 do not violate the separation of powers doctrine, because they do not involve any “ultimate power” of the judiciary, but simply impose conditions on the issuance of warrants. Combs v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 161, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 33 ( Ky. 1998 ), limited, Commonwealth v. Lopez, 3 S.W.3d 351, 1999 Ky. LEXIS 136 ( Ky. 1999 ).

“Zero tolerance” provisions pertaining to underage drinking and driving are rationally related to a legitimate state purpose and are based on a valid distinction; therefore, such provisions are valid under the equal protection clauses of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions and do not constitute special legislation in violation of Ky. Const., § 59. Commonwealth v. Howard, 969 S.W.2d 700, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 95 ( Ky. 1998 ).

Subsection (4) (now (5)), which operates as a recidivist provision in that it designates an enhanced penalty for each subsequent DUI offense committed within a five-year period, is sufficiently definite that it can be understood by ordinary persons and, therefore, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague, notwithstanding the argument that subdivision (4)(c) (now (5)(c)) is incompatible with KRS 189A.105 , which requires a person to be informed of the repercussion of refusing to submit to a blood alcohol test. Barker v. Commonwealth, 32 S.W.3d 515, 2000 Ky. App. LEXIS 111 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000).

Subdivision (4)(c) (now (5)(c)) is not arbitrary and does not offend Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution; the defendant failed to establish that those with a blood alcohol level of 0.18 are not seriously impaired or that they do not impose a greater threat to themselves and others than less intoxicated drivers of motor vehicles. Cornelison v. Commonwealth, 2000 Ky. App. LEXIS 73 (Ky. Ct. App. July 7, 2000), aff'd, 52 S.W.3d 570, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 133 ( Ky. 2001 ).

Subdivision (4)(c) (now (5)(c)) did not subject the defendant to cruel and unusual punishment where he was arrested and convicted for driving under the influence of alcohol on three different occasions within a 10 month period and, for his third conviction, he was sentenced to a one year imprisonment, of which he was required to serve 120 days. Cornelison v. Commonwealth, 2000 Ky. App. LEXIS 73 (Ky. Ct. App. July 7, 2000), aff'd, 52 S.W.3d 570, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 133 ( Ky. 2001 ).

Subdivision (4)(c) (now (5)(c)) did not violate the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution where the statute as amended effective July 15, 1998, was in effect one day prior to his second DUI offense and several months prior to his third offense. Cornelison v. Commonwealth, 2000 Ky. App. LEXIS 73 (Ky. Ct. App. July 7, 2000), aff'd, 52 S.W.3d 570, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 133 ( Ky. 2001 ).

Subdivision (4)(c) (now (5)(c)) does not violate the right to equal protection, notwithstanding that it provides for the treatment of some third time offenders as felons and the treatment of others as misdemeanants. Cornelison v. Commonwealth, 2000 Ky. App. LEXIS 73 (Ky. Ct. App. July 7, 2000), aff'd, 52 S.W.3d 570, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 133 ( Ky. 2001 ).

Defendant did not have standing to argue that KRS 189A.010(2), which applied to test results taken over two (2) hours after cessation of operation or physical control of a motor vehicle, was constitutional. Because her own test result was within the two-hour time period, the section was not relevant or applicable to her case, and she therefore could not have suffered any injury or harm from it. Veltrop v. Commonwealth, 269 S.W.3d 15, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 244 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

This section does not violate the requirement of equal protection of the laws due to a provision concerning those who have a prescription for the substance found in their system while operating a motor vehicle, as the classes of individuals were not similarly situated and the statute did not provide a blanket of immunity for those with a prescription. Epperson v. Commonwealth, 437 S.W.3d 157, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 74 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014).

2.Construction.

The words employed in this statute are to be given their ordinary meaning; the language of the statute is both unambiguous and plain and is to be given effect as written. Lynch v. Commonwealth, 902 S.W.2d 813, 1995 Ky. LEXIS 55 ( Ky. 1995 ).

A statute of the type of this section is not just a road regulation, but a prohibition against an intoxicated person’s driving an automobile, which may be an act dangerous to the public and the driver wherever it may occur, consequently the individual’s right to privacy must yield to the demands of public and personal safety. Lynch v. Commonwealth, 902 S.W.2d 813, 1995 Ky. LEXIS 55 ( Ky. 1995 ).

In electing to proceed to trial pursuant to KRS 281A.210 in prosecuting a truck driver, the Commonwealth bound itself to invoke the penalty provision contained in that chapter and did not have the option to impose penalties listed in this section. Beatus v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 167, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 26 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

A defendant cannot rebut a breathalyzer reading of .10 or higher by attempting to prove that the defendant was not actually impaired at the time. Commonwealth v. Mattingly, 98 S.W.3d 865, 2002 Ky. App. LEXIS 2351 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).

To give effect to the entire statute in KRS 189A.010 , prohibiting driving under the influence, to not make any part of it a nullity, and to not create an absurdity in its application, KRS 189A.010 (1)(e) did not require all persons under the age of 21 to be charged and convicted solely under KRS 189A.010(1)(e), and a person under the age of 21 with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more could be convicted under KRS 189A.010(1)(a), but the Commonwealth of Kentucky was required to give notice to defendants as to the subsections of KRS 189A.010 that it intended to prove. Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 136 S.W.3d 442, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 140 ( Ky. 2004 ).

3.Relationship to Other Laws.

Plan administrator was entitled to judgment in a beneficiary’s action under 29 USCS § 1132(a)(1)(B) challenging the denial of the beneficiary’s claim for accidental death benefits; the use of KRS 189A.010 to determine the meaning of “legally intoxicated” as to the decedent who fell down steps was a rational interpretation of the plan, and the toxicology evidence supported the decision. Loan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 588 F. Supp. 2d 770, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98249 (E.D. Ky. 2008 ), vacated, 370 Fed. Appx. 592, 2010 FED App. 0171N, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5708 (6th Cir. Ky. 2010 ).

Where a bottle rocket struck a child's eye at the insureds' house, the criminal-act exclusion in their homeowners' insurance policy did not exclude coverage, because the language of the exclusion was ambiguous when applied to possessing and igniting fireworks without a license, and under Kentucky's reasonable expectations doctrine, the insureds would have reasonably expected to be covered for injuries resulting from their possession of the bottle rockets since they were far from the core criminal offenses that an insured would believe to be within the exclusion. Auto Club Property-Casualty Ins. Co. v. B.T., 596 Fed. Appx. 409, 2015 FED App. 0034N, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 670 (6th Cir. Ky. 2015 ).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of first-degree fleeing or evading police following his conditional guilty plea because the fact that defendant had not been previously convicted of DUI was of no consequence since the fleeing and eluding statute only required factual proof that defendant was driving under the influence while fleeing or evading police; it did not require the Commonwealth to actually convict defendant of it. Fogle v. Commonwealth, 600 S.W.3d 736, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 22 (Ky. Ct. App. 2020).

4.Essential Elements.

Other than the date, time and location of the occurrence, there are but two essential elements: 1) operation of a motor vehicle; 2) while under the influence of alcohol. Hayden v. Commonwealth, 766 S.W.2d 956, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

While sometimes actual impaired driving is what calls the officer’s attention to a particular vehicle and justifies the initial stop, that justification can also come from minor violations which may or may not demonstrate impaired driving; consequently, although evidence of impaired driving and/or impaired driving ability is often present in a DUI trial, neither is an essential element of the offense. Hayden v. Commonwealth, 766 S.W.2d 956, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

Supreme Court ruled subsection (4)(d) (now (5)(d)) of this section did not establish a fourth or subsequent offense of driving under the influence which included prior DUI convictions as an element, rather the elements required for violation of this section were the operation or physical control of a motor vehicle coupled with one or more of the levels of impairment outlined in subsection (1). Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1996 ).

KRS 189A.010(1)(a) creates a criminal offense for operating a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of .10 (now .08) or above, regardless of available evidence that the accused is not under the influence of alcohol. Commonwealth v. Mattingly, 98 S.W.3d 865, 2002 Ky. App. LEXIS 2351 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).

There are only two elements necessary to prove driving under the influence (DUI) per se, and the controlling issue on the second element is whether a defendant has a blood or breath alcohol content of .10 (now .08) or higher; KRS 189A.010 also sets out rebuttable presumptions regarding blood and breath alcohol readings in prosecutions under KRS 189A.010 (1)(b) or (d). Commonwealth v. Mattingly, 98 S.W.3d 865, 2002 Ky. App. LEXIS 2351 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).

Defendant was on notice of the subsections of the driving under the influence statute, KRS 189A.010 , under which defendant was being prosecuted, as the facts of the case ruled out defendant’s prosecution under any subsection other than KRS 189A.010 (1)(a), (b); defendant was over age 21, defendant was charged with driving under the influence, defendant had a blood alcohol reading of 0.88, the citation described defendant’s driving and defendant’s performance on field sobriety tests, and the citation stated that blood and urine samples were not taken. Smith v. Commonwealth, 164 S.W.3d 508, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 279 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

If the Commonwealth did not provide defendant with notice of the subsections under which KRS 189A.010(1) it intended to proceed, any error was harmless under RCr 9.24; any omission did not prejudice defendant’s opportunity to prepare a meaningful defense, and no likely possibility existed that defendant’s defense or the result of the trial would have been any different had the Commonwealth more specifically informed defendant under which subsections it was proceeding. Smith v. Commonwealth, 164 S.W.3d 508, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 279 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

5.Motor Vehicle.

A farm tractor is a motor vehicle under this section which would subject its driver to penalties for operating same while under the influence of intoxicants. Heath v. Commonwealth, 761 S.W.2d 630, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 160 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).

Since motor vehicle is not defined in KRS Chapter 189A the term will be construed by the court in accordance with its common and approved usage; therefore, since a farm tractor is a vehicle, has a motor, and is frequently operated on public roads and highways, a farm tractor is a motor vehicle as that term is used in KRS Chapter 189A and the driver of a farm tractor can be prosecuted for DUI under such chapter. Nemeth v. Commonwealth, 944 S.W.2d 871, 1997 Ky. App. LEXIS 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).

Because a moped was a “motor vehicle” in accordance with common and approved usage, and because defendant did not show that the legislature intended the definition in KRS 186.010(4) to apply to KRS ch. 189A, defendant was properly found guilty of driving under the influence under KRS 189A.010(1). Adams v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.3d 209, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 263 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

6.Operation of Motor Vehicle.

In order to be operating a motor vehicle for purposes of subsection (1) of this section, a person has to be in actual physical control of the vehicle, and the factors to be used in determining whether one is exercising that degree of control include: (1) Whether or not the person in the driver’s seat is asleep or awake; (2) whether or not the vehicle’s engine is running; (3) the location of the vehicle and any circumstances showing how the vehicle arrived there; and (4) the intent of the person behind the wheel. Harris v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 846, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1077 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Wells v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 847, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1075 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Where it was undisputed that the defendant was not intoxicated when he first arrived at the restaurant and that, during the two hours he was there, the truck did not move, the truck’s motor was not running at the time of his arrest, although the key was in the ignition and turned to “on,” and the defendant was asleep and difficult for the police to awaken, the defendant was not “operating” his truck for purposes of subsection (1) of this section. Harris v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 846, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1077 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Where the defendant’s van was in a parking lot in a parking space, the engine was running, but the transmission was in neutral and the parking brake was engaged, and the defendant was asleep when he was found, the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence of operation by the defendant to sustain a conviction under subsection (1) of this section. Wells v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 847, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1075 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

7.Substances.

One can be convicted of violating subsection (1) of this section by being under the influence of alcohol or by being under the influence of other substances which have the propensity to impair driving ability, or under the influence of substances which do not ordinarily have such propensities but because of the amount ingested have in fact impaired driving ability. Hayden v. Commonwealth, 766 S.W.2d 956, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

8.Term “Anywhere In This State”.

The meaning of the statutory term “anywhere in this state” as used in subsection (1) of this section appears most clear from the language of the statute and, as a whole, is to be construed in accord with the intent designed by the legislature, which was to extend the prohibition against driving while intoxicated beyond the public highways so as to include the entire state. Lynch v. Commonwealth, 902 S.W.2d 813, 1995 Ky. LEXIS 55 ( Ky. 1995 ).

9.Reasonable Suspicion.

Defendant’s turning away from a sobriety checkpoint, coupled with the deputy sheriff’s experience in similar instances, the time of day, and the nature of the roadway onto which the defendant turned constituted specific, reasonable, and articulable facts which allowed the police officer to draw an inference sufficient to form a reasonable suspicion that the defendant might have been engaged in criminal activity. Steinbeck v. Commonwealth, 862 S.W.2d 912, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 128 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

Based on a citizen’s complaint regarding plaintiff’s erratic and dangerous driving, and his own observations of defendant during a high-speed pursuit, the police officer determined that defendant was speeding and fleeing a police officer. The officer had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for driving under the influence. Dier v. City of Prestonsburg, 480 F. Supp. 2d 929, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26644 (E.D. Ky. 2007 ).

10.Vehicle Checkpoint.

Defendant’s motion to dismiss should have been granted after defendant was charged with driving under the influence and driving without a seatbelt because the basis for defendant’s arrest was premised upon a highway checkpoint and the checkpoint did not comport with state police guidelines. There were no media announcements about the check point, a state trooper was not designated to be in charge of the checkpoint, the checkpoint was closed after defendant was arrested, and the state police could not put forth a constitutionally permissible purpose for its decision to conduct the vehicle checkpoint. Monin v. Commonwealth, 209 S.W.3d 471, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 186 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

11.Field Sobriety Procedures.

In a prosecution for driving under the influence, while a state trooper should not have used the terms “test” and “fail” in describing defendant’s performance of two (2) standard field sobriety procedures, allowing that usage was not reversible error. Hardin v. Commonwealth, 2007 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 36 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2007).

When testifying about standard field sobriety procedures, a police officer must be limited to describing the procedure administered and the observations of how the defendant performed it, without resort to terms such as “test,” “standardized clues,” “pass,” or “fail,” unless the government first has established a foundation that satisfies KRE 702 and the Daubert/Kumho Tire factors regarding the reliability and validity of the scientific or technical underpinnings of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration assertions that there are a stated number of clues that support an opinion that the suspect has “failed” the test. Hardin v. Commonwealth, 2007 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 36 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2007).

As the one-leg stand and walk-and-turn procedures are standard field sobriety procedures which are not grounded in scientific terms, any testimony regarding these types of procedures is within a layperson’s common understanding. Therefore, under KRE 701, a law enforcement officer may testify as to his observations of a defendant when performing these procedures. Hardin v. Commonwealth, 2007 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 36 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2007).

12.Blood Alcohol Test.

The trial court erred in permitting the introduction into evidence of the results of a blood/alcohol test performed shortly after the defendant’s arrest, where the commonwealth failed to demonstrate both that the blood sample had been obtained by a person authorized to do so pursuant to former subsection (6) of KRS 189.520 and that it had properly maintained the integrity of the chain of custody of the subject blood sample. Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 445, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1203 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986), limited, Osborne v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 484, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993), overruled, Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1996 ).

Intoxilyzer 5000 reading of .100 was sufficient probative evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person has an “alcohol concentration in his blood or breath of 0.10 or more” as required by subdivision (1)(a) of this section despite the intoxilyzer’s margin of error of plus/minus .005. King v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 902, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 175 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

An intoxilyzer result is admissible in a prosecution under subdivision (1)(a) and/or (e) where the calibration unit and the subject testing component are shown to be in proper working order on the testing date, despite the fact that the calibration component showed out of tolerance readings on other dates. Commonwealth v. Davis, 25 S.W.3d 106, 2000 Ky. LEXIS 92 ( Ky. 2000 ), overruled in part, Commonwealth v. Carman, 455 S.W.3d 916, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 2015 ).

It was not error to permit the introduction into evidence of the result of a blood alcohol test taken four (4) hours after an accident where hospital staff closely monitored the defendant from the moment he entered the emergency room, he had no opportunity to ingest additional alcoholic beverages so as to skew the test results, and, the delay benefited the defendant by providing more time for his body to oxidize the alcohol in his system. Love v. Commonwealth, 55 S.W.3d 816, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 28 ( Ky. 2001 ).

As defendant was entitled to present any evidence, which tended to impugn the results of a breath and blood alcohol concentration test regarding a driving under the influence offense, including evidence of defendant’s performance on field sobriety tests, the trial court properly set aside the lower court’s holding excluding the evidence of defendant’s performance on the field sobriety tests. Commonwealth v. Mattingly, 98 S.W.3d 865, 2002 Ky. App. LEXIS 2351 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).

Where defendant was accused of driving under the influence under KRS 189A.010(1), the case was dismissed as defendant was denied the right under KRS 189A.103(7) to obtain an independent blood test; where defendant had the $150 for the blood test in defendant’s purse, but defendant, upon the officer’s instruction, left defendant’s purse in defendant’s car before going to the police station, the officer should have granted defendant’s request to arrange for the $150 to be brought to defendant, whose roommate had picked up defendant’s car. Commonwealth v. Long, 118 S.W.3d 178, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 244 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

Defendant’s conviction for DUI in violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a) was affirmed because the result of the BAC test was properly admitted by the trial court when the officer administering the test testified about his experience and about the test results, which met the sequential requirements of 500 KAR 8:030, § 1(2). The calibration check conducted by the officer met the requirement of an alcohol simulator analysis check. Lewis v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W.3d 875, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 1 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

13.Breath Alcohol Test.

Circuit court properly denied the a writ of prohibition seeking to prohibit the district court from suppressing the results of defendant’s breathalyzer test in the DUI case under KRS 189A.010(1)(b) because, although the Commonwealth had no adequate remedy by appeal and would suffer great and irreparable injury, the evidence showed that defendant did not intend to operate a motor vehicle while intoxicated but, rather, that he had returned to his vehicle after an evening of merry-making, entered his vehicle, and started it to warm himself while he sobered. Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 40 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2013), review denied, ordered not published, 2013 Ky. LEXIS 694 (Ky. Dec. 11, 2013).

District court did not err in granting defendant's motion to suppress breathalyzer test results where the vehicle was legally parked on the side of the road, nothing suggested that it was parked after having been driven by an intoxicated driver, substantial evidence supported the finding that defendant was merely using the vehicle for its seat from which she could comfortably smoke and text, and thus, the arrest was not justified by probable cause. Commonwealth v. Crosby, 518 S.W.3d 153, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 57 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

14.Breathalyzer Source Code.

Where defendant, charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol having an alcohol concentration of 0.18 or more in violation of KRS 189A.010 , sought the computer source code for the breathalyzer from its manufacturer, compliance with the subpoena would not be unreasonable or oppressive under RCr 7.02. The evidence was relevant under KRE 401 because a flaw could affect the accuracy of the reading relied upon by the Commonwealth, and the code could be produced at minimal expense and effort. House v. Commonwealth, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 19 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2008, sub. op., 2008 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1220 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2008).

15.Amendment of Complaint.

Order allowing the Commonwealth to amend to reduce a fourth-offense operating a motor vehicle under the influence (DUI) charge to a second-offense DUI in order to avoid impermissible double enhancements was error because defendant had refused to submit to an alcohol concentration test, and, thus, such a motion to amend was prohibited by KRS 189A.120(1); clearly, by moving to amend, the Commonwealth had improperly agreed to the amendment. Nothing in KRS 189A.120(1) led to the conclusion that the Commonwealth was only prohibited from concurring in a defense motion to amend while remaining free to seek such an amendment on its own. Jones v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 522, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 65 ( Ky. 2009 ).

16.Manslaughter.

While driving under the influence of intoxicants would almost always be wanton, for manslaughter in the second degree under subsection (1) of KRS 507.040 the state need not prove the element of intoxication needed to support the driving under the influence charge; thus, the crimes are separate and distinct. Keller v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 5, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1459 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

17.Jury Trial.

Because the maximum penalties for first-offense driving under the influence (DUI) are limited to a $500 fine or a 30-day term of imprisonment under KRS 189A.010(5)(a), first-offense DUI is a petty offense for which there is no common law or constitutional right to a jury trial when a defendant is not prosecuted by indictment or information under Ky. Const. § 11. Commonwealth v. Green, 194 S.W.3d 277, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 171 ( Ky. 2006 ).

Although defendant had no common law or constitutional right to a jury trial in his prosecution for first-offense DUI because first-offense DUI is a petty offense and he was not prosecuted by indictment or information under Ky. Const. § 11, the requirements of RCr 9.26(1), including the requirement for the consent of the Commonwealth of Kentucky to a bench trial, were triggered when his case was originally scheduled for jury trial; because the Commonwealth did not consent, the district court erred in granting defendant’s motion for a bench trial, and the Commonwealth was entitled to a writ of prohibition to prevent the bench trial from proceeding. Commonwealth v. Green, 194 S.W.3d 277, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 171 ( Ky. 2006 ).

18.Bifurcated Trial.

Since there is no constitutional right to a bifurcated trial under the U.S. Constitution and since Kentucky has not created a statutory right to a bifurcated trial for a subsequent misdemeanor offense under this section, trial court properly denied petitioner’s motion for a bifurcated trial on the subsequent DUI offense. Hatfield v. Daugherty, 837 F. Supp. 852, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16221 (E.D. Ky. 1993 ), aff'd, 25 F.3d 1048, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 20982 (6th Cir. Ky. 1994 ).

19.Lay Opinion.

In a prosecution for driving under the influence, pursuant to KRE 701, a state trooper was properly allowed to give his lay opinion that defendant was intoxicated based on defendant’s performance of field sobriety procedures, his slurred speech and blood-shot eyes, and the odor of alcohol on his person. Hardin v. Commonwealth, 2007 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 36 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2007).

20.Sufficiency of Evidence.

Where the defendant had consumed less than one beer prior to being stopped by the constable, he had a .18 on the breathalyzer, the defendant escaped after his initial stop and was arrested 30 minutes later at his home, he claimed that he drank 6 to 8 beers at home after he escaped, but his brother testified that the defendant had not been at home all day, the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find the defendant guilty. Commonwealth v. Bivins, 740 S.W.2d 954, 1987 Ky. LEXIS 274 ( Ky. 1987 ).

Machines do not replace the observations and conclusions of an experienced officer who stops an offender for illegal operation of a vehicle; therefore, the attempts to discredit the technology may do just that, but a conviction may stand upon the testimony of the police without resort to various devices. Allen v. Commonwealth, 817 S.W.2d 458, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 125 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).

It was well within the province of the jury to conclude that a 19 year old man who weighed 195 pounds and who was presumptively under the influence of intoxicating beverages at 12:46 a.m. on Saturday was likewise under the influence when he drove his vehicle off the road at 11:15 p.m. on Friday; there can be no doubt at all of the existence of a rational connection between the established fact of a 0.14 blood alcohol concentration “at the time of making an analysis” and the presumed fact of being under the influence of alcohol at that time. Morgan v. Shirley, 958 F.2d 662, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1209 (6th Cir. Ky. 1992 ).

Officer’s observations and the results of a field sobriety test sufficed to establish that defendant’s ability to drive was impaired despite the absence of erratic driving; coupled with the evidence of marijuana in defendant’s urine, this was sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict convicting defendant of a violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(c). Kidd v. Commonwealth, 146 S.W.3d 400, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 284 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s driving under the influence conviction because defendant admitted to the officer that she was taking three prescription medications, one of which contained a warning regarding driving while on that medication. The officer also testified as to his observations of defendant’s behavior, including the results of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test showing intoxication. Leatherman v. Commonwealth, 357 S.W.3d 518, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 843, 133 S. Ct. 153, 184 L. Ed. 2d 76, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 7371 (U.S. 2012).

Defendant’s convictions for murder, DUI, first-degree wanton endangerment, and first-degree criminal mischief were supported by the evidence; before the collision, which killed a child, defendant admitted that defendant had consumed around six beers and was under the influence of alcohol. Baumia v. Commonwealth, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 191 (Ky. Nov. 21, 2012), sub. op., 402 S.W.3d 530, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 503 ( Ky. 2012 ), modified, op. withdrawn, sub. op., 402 S.W.3d 530, 2013 Ky. LEXIS 247 ( Ky. 2013 ).

21.— Destruction of Evidence.

Unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law; therefore, where prosecutor had no objection to defendant making independent tests of defendant’s blood sample, and only after the request was made did either party discover the sample had been destroyed pursuant to established lab policy, it was immaterial that the evidence might have assisted defendant. Allen v. Commonwealth, 817 S.W.2d 458, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 125 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).

22.— Improper Evidence.

While it was error for the medical examiner to testify concerning the statutory presumption that a blood alcohol reading in excess of 0.10 (now .08) was considered under the influence, the court did not err in failing to declare a mistrial after he so testified where the court not only admonished the jury to disregard the doctor’s testimony immediately following the miscue, but there was ample evidence offered from other sources to indicate that defendant was indeed intoxicated at the time of the collision. Cormney v. Commonwealth, 943 S.W.2d 629, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 180 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

23.Double Jeopardy.

In this case, in light of Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 109 L. Ed. 2d 548, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 2698 (1990), which held that convictions for both driving while intoxicated and for vehicular homicide based on driving while intoxicated violated the double jeopardy clause, there was no error in refusing to accept defendant’s guilty plea, where defendant was well aware of the holding in Grady and intended to use it to bar a subsequent conviction of manslaughter. Cobb v. Commonwealth, 821 S.W.2d 817, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

Conviction for DUI and wanton murder in the same trial violates the double jeopardy principle in the Ky. Const., § 13, and its statutory counterpart, KRS 505.020 . Under Kentucky law, in such circumstances the DUI may be submitted to the jury as an alternative to the more serious offense, available in the event the jury does not convict of the greater offense, but not as a subject for additional punishment. Bush v. Commonwealth, 839 S.W.2d 550, 1992 Ky. LEXIS 146 ( Ky. 1992 ).

Defendant’s sentences for both driving under the influence (DUI), KRS 189A.010(1)(a), and operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended for DUI, KRS 189A.090(1), did not violate his double jeopardy rights under KRS 505.020(2)(a), since being under the influence was not an element of each offense. As each offense required the proof of different elements, sentencing on both convictions was not double jeopardy. Lay v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 18, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 163 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

No double jeopardy violation occurred for convicting defendant for DUI and driving with a suspended license while DUI. Jones v. Commonwealth, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 293 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006), rev’d, 279 S.W.3d 522, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 65 ( Ky. 2009 ) (on other grounds).

24.— Lesser Included Offense.

Even if the crime of drunk driving contained in this section is a lesser included offense to murder, as set forth in KRS 507.020 , and had the trial court accepted the defendant’s guilty plea to the drunk driving charge, the commonwealth would not have been barred by the double jeopardy clause to prosecute the defendant on the greater offense of murder where the defendant did not request separate trials. Keller v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 5, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1459 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the defense of intoxication because public intoxication under KRS 222.202 was not a lesser included offense of DUI since each offense required proof of at least one element that the one did not; public intoxication required intoxication to the degree that defendant or others might be endangered while DUI required operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of 0.08. Hudson v. Commonwealth, 202 S.W.3d 17, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 142 ( Ky. 2006 ).

25.— Not Lesser Included Offense.

The trial court did not err in not dismissing the defendant’s prosecution under subsection (1) of this section in that he had already pled guilty to a charge of reckless driving resulting from the same occurrences because reckless driving is not a lesser included offense of driving under the influence. Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 445, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1203 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986), limited, Osborne v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 484, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993), overruled, Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1996 ).

26.Jury Instructions.

The jury is only to decide the ultimate issue and to assess penalties thereon; therefore, the jury should not be instructed or be allowed to speculate on whether the defendant’s license shall be revoked upon conviction. Commonwealth v. Steiber, 697 S.W.2d 135, 1985 Ky. LEXIS 259 ( Ky. 1985 ).

In telling the jury that the provisions of KRS 189.520(3) and (4) read aloud during the presentation of the commonwealth’s evidence were to be considered “as evidence in the case,” and in refraining from any comment on the weight or effect of such evidence, the County District Court was doing exactly what Kentucky’s highest court had said should be done in misdemeanor DUI cases in Marcum v. Commonwealth, 483 S.W.2d 122, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 172 ( Ky. 1972 ).Morgan v. Shirley, 958 F.2d 662, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1209 (6th Cir. Ky. 1992 ).

Where the only jury instruction referring specifically to KRS 189.520(3) and (4) was the instruction to consider the subsections “as evidence in the case,” there was no reason to suppose that the jurors failed to understand that they, not the legislature, were the sole judges of the weight of that evidence; it is true that this piece of evidence was couched in mandatory language — it “shall” be presumed — but the mandate given the jury by the court was to treat the presumption as a matter of evidence and the section showed, moreover, that the presumption was intended to be rebuttable; otherwise, there would have been no reason to authorize “the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question of whether the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating beverages.” Morgan v. Shirley, 958 F.2d 662, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1209 (6th Cir. Ky. 1992 ).

Instruction was improper which equated “under the influence” with mere consumption, instructed on impairment as a separate element, and instructed that the Commonwealth must prove influence but not impaired ability. Bridges v. Commonwealth, 845 S.W.2d 541, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 3 ( Ky. 1993 ).

The jury instruction on second offense DUI was improper where it permitted the jury to fix a penalty for second offense DUI and did not require the jury to make the necessary finding that defendant had previously been convicted of DUI. Osborne v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 484, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

A single jury instruction allowing a DUI conviction under alternative theories of criminal liability contained in subsection (1) is not improper, even though no separate findings are made as to each of the means of commission of the offense, so long as evidence is presented from which the jury could reasonably believe that both of the theories were violated. Evans v. Commonwealth, 45 S.W.3d 445, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 8 ( Ky. 2001 ).

Two (2) elements of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), having a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more and operating or being in control of vehicle, needed to coincide; a trial court’s instruction, which required the jury to find that defendant had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more when he was operating or in physical control of a vehicle, was proper. Lopez v. Commonwealth, 173 S.W.3d 905, 2005 Ky. LEXIS 327 ( Ky. 2005 ).

27.Revocation.

The revocation period under KRS 189A.070 is not governed by the conviction as a first, second, third, or subsequent violation of the statute within a five-year period, but by the number of convictions sustained for driving under the influence under this section within that period; whether those convictions are all pursuant to subdivision (2)(a) (now (5)(a)) of this section for first offense violations of this section or whether they are successive convictions is of no consequence in the administration of KRS 189A.070 . Division of Driver Licensing, Dep't of Vehicle Regulation, Transp. Cabinet v. Bergmann, 740 S.W.2d 948, 1987 Ky. LEXIS 263 ( Ky. 1987 ).

28.Enhancement of Penalty.

One who has been convicted of engaging in the prohibited conduct of operating a motor vehicle anywhere in this state while under the influence of alcohol in violation of subsection (1) of this section, and who has the status at the time of such conviction of having been previously convicted within five years of such conviction of driving under the influence, is a previous offender and is subject to the enhancement provisions of subdivisions (2)(a), (b), and (c) (now (5)(a), (b), and (c)). Commonwealth v. Ball, 691 S.W.2d 207, 1985 Ky. LEXIS 231 ( Ky. 1985 ).

Where, when the defendant was arrested, such arrest was his second offense, however, when convicted for that offense it was his third conviction since subsequent to such arrest he was convicted of another offense, the defendant was properly convicted for a third offense of operating a vehicle under the influence of intoxicants. Royalty v. Commonwealth, 749 S.W.2d 700, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 74 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988), limited, Osborne v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 484, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

State was not collaterally estopped from prosecuting defendant as a third offender under this section because his second previous offense was prosecuted and disposed of as a first offense. Estis v. Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 317, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

Using defendants’ previous convictions for driving under the influence to enhance the penalty upon conviction under the new per se subsection of this section, was not a violation of the prohibitions against ex post facto laws of the Ky. Const., § 19, because the defendants received enhanced sentences for their crimes committed after the new subsection took effect, thus they were punished as the law provided at the time when their present offenses were committed. Botkin v. Commonwealth, 890 S.W.2d 292, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 141 ( Ky. 1994 ).

The concurrent running of driving under influence (DUI) sentences is irrelevant in determining the number of convictions under subdivisions (4)(d) and (e) (now (5)(d) and (e)) of this section; so long as a defendant has actually been convicted of DUI on three prior occasions within five years, he can be convicted of DUI fourth offense. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 905 S.W.2d 871, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 167 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995), abrogated in part, Ballinger v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.3d 349, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1611 ( Ky. 2015 ).

In prosecution for defendant’s fourth offense of driving under the influence (DUI), use of DUI convictions which occurred before this section was enacted was not an ex post facto application of the law, as noted in Botkin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 890 S.W.2d 292, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 141 .O'Bryan v. Commonwealth, 920 S.W.2d 529, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 37 ( Ky. 1996 ).

In misdemeanor driving under the influence (DUI) trials, evidence of previous DUI convictions shall not be introduced until a guilty verdict is rendered on the underlying charge, which shall be achieved by requiring district courts to bifurcate misdemeanor DUI trials in order to fulfill the legislative mandate of enhanced penalties for repeat DUI offenders. Dedic v. Commonwealth, 920 S.W.2d 878, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1996 ).

First-time offender’s sentence could not be enhanced due to his refusal to submit to testing of his blood, breath, or urine, because the clear language of KRS 189A.010(5)(a) provided the aggravating factors in subsection (11) only applied to first-time offenders when they occurred while the offender was operating a motor vehicle, and a refusal to submit to testing could not logically occur under that circumstance. Commonwealth v. Gaitherwright, 70 S.W.3d 411, 2002 Ky. LEXIS 47 ( Ky. 2002 ).

Where the only prior convictions for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants (DUI), KRS 189A.010 , and operating a motor vehicle while license is revoked or suspended for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OSI/DUI), KRS 189A.090 , that were used to obtain a persisent felony offender (PFO) enhancement of defendant’s present convictions were not the convictions used to enhance defendant’s present DUI and DUI/OSL convictions to Class D felonies, they were properly used for PFO enhancement under KRS 532.080(6)(b). Parson v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 775, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 2004 ).

Since a fourth conviction for driving under the influence was considered to be a felony offense punishable by imprisonment of one to five years under KRS 189A.010(5)(d) and KRS 532.020(1)(a), and since driving while under the influence of intoxicants presented a serious potential risk that the driver would cause physical injury to another person, under the sentencing system established by the guidelines, defendant’s fourth conviction within a five-year period for driving under the influence should be considered a “crime of violence” that subjected defendant to sentencing as a career offender. United States v. Veach, 455 F.3d 628, 2006 FED App. 0266P, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 19283 (6th Cir. Ky. 2006 ).

Circuit court properly denied defendant's petition for a writ of mandamus because she could challenge the judge's application of Senate Bill 56 (2016)should she be convicted on her current DUI charge, having her driver's license suspended did not constitute an injury of ruinous or grievous nature necessitating issuance of a writ, a recent Kentucky Supreme Court opinion confirmed that the judge acted appropriately in applying the 10-year look-back period to a DUI charge, and any reference to prior five-year look-back period during defendant's bargain process did not immunize her from the 2016 changes and could not be relied upon to avoid application of the new look-back period. Phillips v. Delahanty, 544 S.W.3d 652, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 90 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

29.— Retroactive Effect.

This section does not create a new offense for which there can be no retroactive effect prior to July 13, 1984. Commonwealth v. Ball, 691 S.W.2d 207, 1985 Ky. LEXIS 231 ( Ky. 1985 ).

In prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol, the trial court did not err in allowing the use of the defendants’ previous convictions for driving under the influence entered prior to July 13, 1984, the effective date of this chapter, as grounds for enhancement of the penalties accorded them and such use was not an ex post facto application of laws. Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 445, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1203 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986), limited, Osborne v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 484, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993), overruled, Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1996 ).

A person whose Class D felony sentence is reduced under section 532.070(2) does not become a misdemeanant by virtue of the reduction but remains a felon, consequently, defendant who was indicted on her fourth offense of driving under the influence and operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license, was not eligible for a probated sentence conditioned on home incarceration. Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 920 S.W.2d 531, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 67 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

30.— Prior Convictions.

While subsection (1) of former KRS 422.020 and CR 44.01 permitted the use of properly certified copies of public records to serve as prima facie evidence of their contents, the information appearing in the Transportation Cabinet’s records were wholly inadequate to prove the defendants’ prior convictions for driving under the influence for enhancement purposes under this section. Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 445, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1203 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986), limited, Osborne v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 484, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993), overruled, Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1996 ).

The trial court erred in allowing the use of prior convictions for driving under the influence as a basis for the enhancement of the sentences under this section, where the defendants properly instigated the operation of proceedings to question the validity of the prior convictions by timely filing of the required pre-trial motions, thereby obligating the commonwealth to prove those prior judgments through their introduction before the court, and the commonwealth completely failed in its efforts to this effect. Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 445, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1203 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986), limited, Osborne v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 484, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993), overruled, Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1996 ).

The trial court properly allowed the admission of evidence regarding the defendants’ prior drunken driving convictions before the jury had reached a verdict as to their guilt, where proof of defendants’ prior convictions was essential to the determination of guilt on the primary charge or the fixing of an appropriate punishment. Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 445, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1203 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986), limited, Osborne v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 484, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993), overruled, Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1996 ).

A certified copy of the “Driving History Record” maintained by the Transportation Cabinet, Division of Driver Licensing, may not be utilized as evidence of prior convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol at trial of a subsequent D.U.I. offense. Commonwealth v. Willis, 719 S.W.2d 440, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 327 ( Ky. 1986 ), overruled, Commonwealth v. Duncan, 939 S.W.2d 336, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 1997 ).

Once a guilty verdict is reached in driving under the influence case, the circuit court has the authority to conduct a penalty phase, pursuant to section 532.055 , in which the prior convictions may be introduced and the appropriate sentence determined, following proper instructions to the jury. Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1996 ).

Under the reasoning of Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 38 (1996), evidence of defendant’s prior convictions for driving under the influence (DUI) were properly excluded during the prosecution’s case-in-chief in case involving defendant’s fourth offense of DUI. O'Bryan v. Commonwealth, 920 S.W.2d 529, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 37 ( Ky. 1996 ).

Commonwealth was not required to prove ‘essential element’ of ‘second offense’ driving under the influence (DUI) in light of holding in Commonwealth v. Ramsey, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 526, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 38 (1996) that prior DUI convictions are not elements of additional crimes but rather are penalty guidelines. Dedic v. Commonwealth, 920 S.W.2d 878, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1996 ).

Defendant’s prior convictions for driving under the influence (DUI) were not elements necessary to determine guilt under section 189A.010 (4)(d) (now (5)(d)), as subsection (1) of the section contains the elements of the crime of DUI; further, the prior convictions did not fall within the exceptions outlined by KRE 404(b); as such, due to their prejudicial effect, the court ruled the prior DUI convictions could not be introduced during the prosecution’s case in chief for a violation of section 189A.010 (1). Overruling Ratliff v. Commonwealth, Ky. App. 719 S.W.2d 445, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1203 (1986), Asher v. Commonwealth, Ky. App. 763 S.W.2d 153, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 201 (1988), Hall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 817 S.W.2d 228, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 153 (1991) as they relate to interpretation of KRS 189A.010. Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1996 ).

Where, when the defendant was arrested, such arrest was his second offense, however, when convicted for that offense it was his third conviction since subsequent to such arrest he was convicted of another offense, the defendant was properly convicted for a third offense of operating a vehicle under the influence of intoxicants. Royalty v. Commonwealth, 749 S.W.2d 700, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 74 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988), limited, Osborne v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 484, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

Nothing in KRS 189A.010(1)(a), prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle by a person with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or greater, and allowing enhanced penalties for repeat offenders, under KRS 189A.010(5), limited its application to persons at least 21 years old, despite the existence of KRS 189.010(1)(e), prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle by a person under 21 with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.02 or greater, which did not allow for enhanced penalties, so a person under 21 could be prosecuted under KRS 189.010(1)(a) for driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 or greater and could be subject to enhanced penalties for repeat offenses, but the Commonwealth had to provide notice of the subsection it was proceeding under. Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 136 S.W.3d 442, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 140 ( Ky. 2004 ).

Punishment for a driving under the influence conviction under KKRS 189A.010(1)(e) was contained in KRS 189A.010(6), yet KRS 189A.010(7), which was limited to persons under the age of 21, directed punishment for an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more under KRS 189A.010(5), and this directive revealed no intent of the legislature that persons under the age of 21 with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more be immunized from the severe penalties of KRS 189.010(5). Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 136 S.W.3d 442, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 140 ( Ky. 2004 ).

While KRS 189A.010(5), providing enhanced penalties for repeat driving under the influence convictions, did not recognize a conviction of a person under 21 under KRS 189A.010(1)(e) as punishable under that subsection, KRS 189A.010(7) directed punishment of persons under 21 with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or greater pursuant to KRS 189A.010(5), so it followed that the legislature intended for persons under the age of 21 who were convicted under KRS 189A.010(1)(a) to be punished under KRS 189A.010(5) as was prescribed in KRS 189A.010(7). Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 136 S.W.3d 442, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 140 ( Ky. 2004 ).

Persons under the age of 21 could be punished for having a lower alcohol concentration than persons who were of age, but suffer less severe punishment for such violations, but there was no indication that the general assembly intended that persons under 21 be subject only to the lesser penalties of KRS 189A.010(1)(e), and persons under the age of 21 who violated KRS 189A.010(1)(a) would be subject to the penalties prescribed in KRS 189A.010(5). Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 136 S.W.3d 442, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 140 ( Ky. 2004 ).

Pursuant to KRS 189A.010(5)(e), because defendant’s second arrest for DUI could not be used to enhance the penalties for his conviction on an earlier DUI charge, when he had not been convicted of the first offense before the second offense occurred, the trial court properly vacated his guilty plea to the second DUI offense. Commonwealth v. Beard, 275 S.W.3d 205, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 91 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008), overruled in part, Ballinger v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.3d 349, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1611 ( Ky. 2015 ).

Trial court’s order suppressing use of defendant’s 2000 conviction for enhancement purposes was reversed and remanded where, under KRS §§ 189A.010 or 532.080 , having failed to attack his 2000 conviction in 2001, prior to pleading guilty to DUI, second offense, defendant could not launch such an attack now. Commonwealth v. Lamberson, 304 S.W.3d 72, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 8 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).

Defendant could be prosecuted for a driving under the influence (DUI) fourth offense, when two prior convictions were not entered when defendant committed defendant's current crime, because, under the applicable two-pronged approach, (1) the prior convictions occurred within five years before the current crime, and (2) convictions for the prior crimes were entered before the current conviction, as impaired drivers were subject to both criminal sanctions under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 189A.010(5) and license suspensions under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 189A.070(1), the number of convictions of record at the time of a new conviction determined a suspension's length, and Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 189A.070(1)(e) said “offense” had the same meaning for both purposes. Ballinger v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.3d 349, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1611 ( Ky. 2015 ).

When determining whether a prior conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) may be used to enhance an offender's penalty, there is a two-part inquiry under which the first question is whether the alleged predicate offense was committed within the five-year period preceding the commission of the current offense, and the second question is whether the conviction for that prior offense was entered prior to the defendant's conviction for the current offense by either guilty plea or verdict. Ballinger v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.3d 349, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1611 ( Ky. 2015 ).

When defendant plead guilty on one day to separate driving under the influence offenses, the offenses were treated separately for purposes of determining whether defendant was subject to an enhanced prosecution because the number of prior crimes controlled. Ballinger v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.3d 349, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1611 ( Ky. 2015 ).

31.— — Constitutionality.

Using a conviction for driving under the influence obtained under KRS 189.520(2) prior to the enactment of this section to enhance the penalty for driving under the influence upon conviction of a second offense, pursuant to this section, does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Commonwealth v. Ball, 691 S.W.2d 207, 1985 Ky. LEXIS 231 ( Ky. 1985 ).

32.— Out-of-State Convictions.

A driving under the influence conviction obtained in another state within the previous five years is not admissible as evidence to enhance a subsequent DUI conviction in Kentucky. Suttle v. Commonwealth, 774 S.W.2d 454, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 40 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (decided under prior law).

Whereas KRS 532.080 , the general recidivist statute, is all-inclusive with respect to prior felony convictions and specifically includes foreign convictions, and this section is silent with respect to driving under the influence convictions from a sister state, as such, the enhancement of DUI punishment can only be had by the use of prior DUI convictions obtained in Kentucky. Suttle v. Commonwealth, 774 S.W.2d 454, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 40 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (decided under prior law).

While the General Assembly might well have related the length of license suspension to the number of convictions of driving under the influence anywhere, it has explicitly chosen that the length of revocation be related to the number of violations of this section. Sutton v. Transp. Cabinet, Commonwealth, 775 S.W.2d 933, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 42 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (decided under prior law).

Cited in:

Newton v. Commonwealth, 760 S.W.2d 100, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 129 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); Toppass v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 587, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 133 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990); Commonwealth, Transp. Cabinet v. Tarter, 802 S.W.2d 944, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 141 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 806 S.W.2d 643, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1991 ); Commonwealth Transp. Cabinet v. Hobson, 870 S.W.2d 228, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 158 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993); Hourigan v. Commonwealth, 883 S.W.2d 497, 1994 Ky. App. LEXIS 116 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994); Skeans v. Commonwealth, 912 S.W.2d 455, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 2 17 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995); Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peppers (In re Peppers), 213 B.R. 956, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1876 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1996 ); Hourigan v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 860, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 11 ( Ky. 1998 ); Pulliam v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 84 S.W.3d 455, 2002 Ky. LEXIS 178 ( Ky. 2002 ); Cook v. Commonwealth, 129 S.W.3d 351, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 76 ( Ky. 2004 ); Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Claypoole, 198 S.W.3d 589, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 185 ( Ky. 2006 ); Peters v. Commonwealth, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 2 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010); Commonwealth ex rel. Logan Cty. Atty. v. Williams, 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 167 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2019).

NOTES TO UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS

1.Blood Alcohol Test.

Unpublished decision: Any error in admitting defendant’s refusal of a blood test was harmless, under RCr P. 9.24, because (1) defendant admitted consuming alcohol and driving, and (2) defendant’s recorded interaction with an officer and subsequent sobriety testing showed defendant was intoxicated, so allowing driving under the influence to be presumed based on defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood test was cumulative. Guinn v. Commonwealth, 2014 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1051 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2014), review denied, ordered not published, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1966 (Ky. Oct. 21, 2015).

2.Enhancement of Penalty.
3. — Prior Convictions.

Unpublished decision: For purposes of a penalty enhancement under KRS 189A.010(5)(e), the determining factor as to whether conviction of a subsequent offense is proper is the existence of a credible record showing conviction of a prior offense; it is the timing of the convictions that control, not the timing of the arrests. Therefore, a trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion to amend a driving under the influence (DUI) 4th offense to a DUI 2nd under KRS 189A.010(5)(e) because, at the time of defendant’s fourth arrest, he had one prior DUI conviction and two pending DUI charges; he pled guilty to the two pending cases prior to his indictment for DUI 4th. Commonwealth v. Ballinger, 2012 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1048 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2012), aff'd, 459 S.W.3d 349, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1611 ( Ky. 2015 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In “driving under the influence” convictions involving a nonresident motor vehicle operator, the Kentucky trial court has no authority to withdraw or revoke a nonresident’s privilege of operating a motor vehicle in Kentucky. The withdrawing or revoking of a nonresident’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Kentucky is the responsibility of the Transportation Cabinet, pursuant to KRS 186.560 , 186.565 (now repealed), 186.570 , 189A.070 , and 189A.080 . OAG 85-72 .

A Kentucky trial court has no authority to physically take possession of a nonresident operator’s license when he is convicted of driving under the influence. OAG 85-72 .

The District Court is not required to specifically warn a defendant who pleads guilty to a first offense violation of this section, KRS 186.620 , or KRS 189A.090 of the possibility of enhancement of punishment, in the event he is found guilty of a subsequent violation of the statute. OAG 89-30 .

Since subsection (1) (now (2)) of KRS 189A.090 only pertains to violations of this section, the defendant must stand convicted of prior offenses in violation of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants during the period his license was suspended or revoked. Should a prosecutor note that the defendant has been previously convicted of operating a motor vehicle while his license was revoked or suspended based upon another statute, e.g. KRS 186.560 or 186.570 , the defendant should be prosecuted under the provisions of KRS 186.620(2) and KRS 186.642(3) (now repealed), which provide enhancement penalties for other types of subsequent revocation and suspension violations. OAG 89-30 .

A person may be charged with a violation of KRS 189A.090 only if he operates a motor vehicle while his driver’s license is revoked or suspended for violation of this section. If the driver fails to have his driver’s license reinstated after the period of suspension for driving under the influence has elapsed, he should be charged with operating a vehicle without a valid driver’s license, contrary to KRS 186.620 . OAG 90-38 .

Home incarceration may be lawfully imposed by a trial court as a penalty for a first, second, or third violation of this section, unless the defendant has been convicted of a violent felony offense within the previous five years, as defined by KRS 532.200(3); a person convicted of a fourth or subsequent violation of this section is not eligible for home incarceration, since the statutes do not permit a court to sentence a felon to home incarceration. OAG 94-49 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Foellger, “Toughening” The Juvenile Code: Did We Or Didn’t We?, Vol. 60, No. 3, Summer 1996, Ky. Bench & Bar 43.

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Rankin and Muehlenkamp, 1993 Kentucky Criminal Law Update, 21 N. Ky. L. Rev. 311 (1994).

Burk and Bartley, Kentucky Criminal Law Survey: Driving Under the Influence, 30 N. Ky. L. Rev. 108 (2003).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Police Officer’s Answer to Claim of Unlawful Arrest, Form 121.02.

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Criminal), 5th Ed., Offenses Against Public Order, Safety and Morals, Part 4 Offenses Relating to Firearms and Destructive Devices, §§ 8.64A — 8.64F.

189A.015. Offenses committed prior to July 13, 1984. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 355, § 1, effective July 15, 1986) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 467, § 31, effective October 1, 2000.

189A.020. Community labor program — Terms and conditions.

All community labor shall be under the supervision of the court and subject to the following:

    1. No period of labor shall be less than four (4) hours to qualify for satisfaction of a sentence; (1) (a) No period of labor shall be less than four (4) hours to qualify for satisfaction of a sentence;
    2. A “day” shall mean eight (8) hours of labor;
    3. A “month” shall mean twenty (20) days of labor;
    4. Periods of labor four (4) hours or longer may be cumulated to meet the requirements under this section;
  1. Labor shall be done for public agencies, nonprofit corporations or eleemosynary institutions only;
  2. Any agency for whom a person works shall agree to supervise such person and report to the court:
    1. The hours worked,
    2. The quality of the work,
    3. The nature of the work;
  3. An agency may refuse to accept persons under this program or to accept any particular person or persons sent by the court;
  4. The court shall maintain a list of agencies willing to accept and supervise persons sentenced under this program;
  5. The court may contract, at no cost to the state or participant, with any public agency or nonprofit corporation or eleemosynary institution for the supervision of persons in the program;
  6. No work performed under this program shall be deemed employment for any purpose nor shall the person performing such work be considered an employee;
  7. Failure to complete the community labor ordered by the court, to perform diligently at that labor, or to pay the fee required shall constitute contempt of court and the court shall, in addition to any other remedy for contempt, reinstitute all penalties which were previously imposed but suspended or delayed pending completion of the community labor.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 165, § 2, effective July 13, 1984.

189A.030. Terms of imprisonment for first and second offenders.

  1. Terms of imprisonment for first and second offenders under KRS 189A.010 shall, at the order of the court, be served on weekends or such other times as may preserve the employment or education of the offender, provided that no individual period of incarceration shall be less than twenty-four (24) hours.
  2. Children shall be detained pursuant to the applicable provisions of KRS Chapters 600 to 645.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 165, § 3, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 423, § 186, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 140, effective April 10, 1988.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, § 32.14.

189A.040. Alcohol or substance abuse treatment and education programs — Sentencing offenders to programs — Regulation of programs — Medicaid-eligible defendants — Appeals of decisions regarding licensure of education and treatment facilities and programs.

  1. In addition to any other penalty prescribed by KRS 189A.010(5)(a) or (6), the court shall sentence the person to attend an alcohol or substance abuse education or treatment program subject to the following terms and conditions for a first offender or a person convicted under KRS 189A.010(1)(f):
    1. The treatment or education shall be for a period of ninety (90) days and the program shall provide an assessment of the defendant’s alcohol or other substance abuse problems, which shall be performed at the start of the program;
    2. Each defendant shall pay the cost of the education or treatment program up to his ability to pay but no more than the actual cost of the treatment;
    3. Upon written report to the court by the administrator of the program that the defendant has completed the program recommended by the administrator based upon the assessment of the defendant, the defendant shall be released prior to the expiration of the ninety (90) day period; and
    4. Failure to complete the education or treatment program or to pay the amount specified by the court for education or treatment shall constitute contempt, and the court shall, in addition to any other remedy for contempt, reinstitute all penalties which were previously imposed but suspended or delayed pending completion of the education or treatment program.
  2. In addition to any other penalty prescribed by KRS 189A.010(5)(b), the court shall sentence the person to an alcohol or substance abuse treatment program subject to the following terms and conditions for a second offender:
    1. The sentence shall be for a period of one (1) year and the program shall provide an assessment of the defendant’s alcohol or other substance abuse problems, which shall be performed at the start of the program;
    2. Each defendant shall pay the cost of the treatment program up to his ability to pay but no more than the actual cost of the treatment;
    3. Upon written report to the court by the administrator of the program that the defendant has completed the program recommended by the administrator based upon the assessment of the defendant, the defendant may be released prior to the expiration of the one (1) year period; and
    4. Failure to complete the treatment program or to pay the amount specified by the court for treatment shall constitute contempt of court and the court shall, in addition to any other remedy for contempt, reinstitute all penalties which were previously imposed but suspended or delayed pending the completion of the treatment program.
  3. In addition to any other penalty prescribed by KRS 189A.010(5)(c) or (d), the court shall sentence the person to an alcohol or substance abuse treatment program subject to the following terms and conditions for a third or subsequent offender:
    1. The sentence shall be for a period of one (1) year and the program shall provide an assessment of the defendant’s alcohol or other substance abuse problems, which shall be performed at the start of the program. The program may be an inpatient or residential-type program;
    2. Each defendant shall pay the cost of the treatment program up to his ability to pay but no more than the actual cost of the program;
    3. A defendant, upon written recommendation to the court by the administrator of the program, may be released from the inpatient or residential program prior to the expiration of one (1) year but shall be retained in the program on an outpatient basis for the remainder of the year period; and
    4. Failure to complete the treatment program or to pay the amount specified by the court for treatment shall constitute contempt of court, and the court shall, in addition to any other remedy for contempt, reinstitute all penalties which were previously imposed but suspended or delayed pending completion of the treatment program.
  4. Costs of treatment or education programs which are paid from the service fee established by KRS 189A.050 , or from state or federal funds, or any combination thereof, shall be deducted from the amount which the defendant must pay.
  5. For defendants who are Medicaid-eligible, alcohol or substance abuse treatment under this section shall be authorized by the Department for Medicaid Services and its contractors as Medicaid-eligible services and shall be subject to the same medical necessity criteria and reimbursement methodology as for all other covered behavioral health services.
  6. For the purposes of this section, “treatment” means service in an alcohol or substance abuse education or treatment program or facility licensed, regulated, and monitored by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services for services as required under this section.
  7. The Cabinet for Health and Family Services shall promulgate administrative regulations for the licensure of education and treatment facilities and programs for offenders receiving education or treatment under this section. The criteria developed by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services shall include:
    1. Manner of assessment;
    2. Appropriate education and treatment plans; and
    3. Referrals to other treatment providers.
  8. The participating facilities and programs shall be required to abide by these standards and shall report completion to the Transportation Cabinet. Upon request, the facility or program shall report to the courts regarding the progress of offenders being treated pursuant to this section.
  9. Administrative decisions regarding the licensure of education and treatment facilities and programs may be appealed, and upon appeal an administrative hearing shall be conducted in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 165, § 4, effective July 13, 1984; 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 3, effective July 1, 1991; 1996, ch. 318, § 75, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 426, § 125, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 467, § 3, effective October 1, 2000; 2005, ch. 99, § 146, effective June 20, 2005; 2010, ch. 149, § 18, effective July 15, 2010; 2019 ch. 103, § 3, effective July 1, 2020.

189A.045. Enrollment in alcohol or substance abuse education or treatment programs — Attendance — Reporting and effect of failure to attend — Reporting of completion of program.

    1. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, when a court requires a defendant to enroll in an alcohol or substance abuse education or treatment program pursuant to this chapter, it shall require the defendant to accomplish the enrollment within ten (10) days of the entry of judgment of conviction. (1) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, when a court requires a defendant to enroll in an alcohol or substance abuse education or treatment program pursuant to this chapter, it shall require the defendant to accomplish the enrollment within ten (10) days of the entry of judgment of conviction.
    2. A defendant may choose to enroll in an alcohol or substance abuse education or treatment program prior to conviction. If a defendant chooses to enroll prior to conviction, the alcohol or substance abuse education or treatment completed prior to conviction shall count towards the period of alcohol or substance abuse education or treatment required pursuant to KRS 189A.040 .
  1. When a defendant enrolls in the program, the administrator of the program or his authorized representative shall transmit to the court a certificate of enrollment within five (5) working days of the enrollment.
  2. If the court does not receive a certificate of enrollment from the administrator of a program to which the defendant has been assigned within twenty (20) days of the entry of judgment of conviction, the court shall hold a hearing requiring the defendant to show cause why he did not enroll.
  3. If a defendant enrolled in an alcohol or substance abuse education or treatment program drops out of the program or does not maintain satisfactory attendance at the program, the administrator of the program or his authorized representative shall transmit to the court a notice describing the defendant’s failure to attend.
  4. Upon receipt of a notice of failure to attend a required alcohol or substance abuse education or treatment program, the court shall hold a hearing requiring the defendant to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court and be subject to the reinstatement of any penalties which may have been withheld pending completion of treatment.
  5. When a defendant completes the required alcohol or substance abuse education or treatment program, the administrator of the program shall notify the court and the Transportation Cabinet of the defendant’s completion of the program.

History. Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 4, effective July 1, 1991; 2019 ch. 103, § 4, effective July 1, 2020.

189A.050. Service fee — Amount — Payment — Remedies for nonpayment — Use of revenue from fees collected.

  1. All persons convicted of violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) shall be sentenced to pay a service fee of four hundred twenty-five dollars ($425), which shall be in addition to all other penalties authorized by law.
  2. The fee shall be imposed in all cases but shall be subject to the provisions of KRS 534.020 and KRS 534.060 .
  3. The first fifty dollars ($50) of each service fee imposed by this section shall be paid into the general fund, the second fifty dollars ($50) of each service fee imposed by this section shall be paid to the ignition interlock administration fund established in KRS 189A.380 , and the remainder of the revenue collected from the service fee imposed by this section shall be utilized as follows:
    1. Twelve percent (12%) shall be transferred to the Department of Kentucky State Police forensic laboratory for the acquisition, maintenance, testing, and calibration of alcohol concentration testing instruments and the training of laboratory personnel to perform these tasks;
    2. Twenty percent (20%) shall be allocated to the Department of Public Advocacy;
    3. One percent (1%) shall be transferred to the Prosecutor’s Advisory Council for training of prosecutors for the prosecution of persons charged with violations of this chapter and for obtaining expert witnesses in cases involving the prosecution of persons charged with violations of this chapter or any other offense in which driving under the influence is a factor in the commission of the offense charged;
    4. Sixteen percent (16%) shall be transferred as follows:
      1. Fifty percent (50%) shall be credited to the traumatic brain injury trust fund established under KRS 211.476 ; and
      2. Fifty percent (50%) shall be credited to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Department for Behavioral Health, Developmental and Intellectual Disabilities, for the purposes of providing direct services to individuals with brain injuries that may include long-term supportive services and training and consultation to professionals working with individuals with brain injuries. As funding becomes available under this subparagraph, the cabinet may promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to implement the services permitted by this subparagraph;
    5. Any amount specified by a specific statute shall be transferred as provided in that statute;
    6. Forty-six percent (46%) shall be transferred to be utilized to fund enforcement of this chapter and for the support of jails, recordkeeping, treatment, and educational programs authorized by this chapter and by the Department of Public Advocacy; and
    7. The remainder shall be transferred to the general fund.
  4. The amounts specified in subsection (3)(a), (b), (c), and (d) of this section shall be placed in trust and agency accounts that shall not lapse.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 165, § 5, effective July 13, 1984; 1994, ch. 395, § 3, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 467, § 4, effective October 1, 2000; 2004, ch. 137, § 1, effective July 13, 2004; 2005, ch. 99, § 147, effective June 20, 2005; 2007, ch. 85, § 213, effective June 26, 2007; 2008, ch. 158, § 6, effective July 1, 2008; 2010, ch. 149, § 19, effective July 15, 2010; 2012, ch. 146, § 16, effective July 12, 2012; 2012, ch. 158, § 11, effective July 12, 2012; 2017 ch. 158, § 10, effective June 29, 2017; 2017 ch. 167, § 12, effective June 29, 2017; 2020 ch. 91, § 36, effective April 15, 2020.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/12/2012). This statute was amended by 2012 Ky. Acts chs. 146 and 158, which are in conflict. Under KRS 446.250 , Acts. ch. 146, which was last enacted by the General Assembly, prevails.

(6/26/2007). 2007 Ky. Acts ch. 85, relating to the creation and organization of the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, instructs the Reviser of Statutes to correct statutory references to agencies and officers whose names have been changed in that Act. Such a correction has been made in this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Avoidance of Service Fee.

The mandatory service fee imposed by this section constitutes an additional “fine” or “penalty”; therefore, it is not part of the court costs and subject to be avoided under the provisions of KRS 453.190 . Beane v. Commonwealth, 736 S.W.2d 317, 1987 Ky. LEXIS 226 ( Ky. 1987 ), overruled, Commonwealth v. Moore, 545 S.W.3d 848, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 2018 ).

Defendant’s motion to satisfy a driving under the influence service fee with jail credit was properly denied because the Kentucky Supreme Court had held the fee was not a fine or a cost, so the credit did not apply. Cole v. Commonwealth, 578 S.W.3d 353, 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 52 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019).

Cited:

Doyle v. Judicial Retirement & Removal Comm’n, 885 S.W.2d 917, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 86 ( Ky. 1994 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The service fee described in subsections (1) and (3) of this section is constitutional, since it in no way violates Ky. Const., § 51; the 1984 Act (Chapter 165) enacting this section has only one subject, “An Act relating to crimes and punishments”; the service fee is not an appropriation, as envisioned in Ky. Const., § 230 and KRS 41.110 , and there is no intent expressed in this section that such fees are to go into the state treasury prior to disbursement. OAG 84-327 .

Subsection (3) of this section, by its literal terms, suggests that deposits of the service fees by the court clerks in the state treasury system was not intended. OAG 84-327 .

Considering that the Finance and Transportation Cabinets and the Administrative Office of the Courts, as well as state and local law-enforcement officers, may have some entitlement to share in the distribution of the service fee collected under this section, the actual scheme of allocating and distributing such fees deposited in a special bank account may be equitably and functionally determined through the coordinated regulatory action of the Finance and Transportation Cabinets and the Administrative Office of the Courts; in structuring an equitable, but workable scheme of distribution, they should also be guided by what is deemed to be reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of the act. OAG 84-327 .

The court clerks are authorized to deposit the service fees collected under subsection (1) of this section in special or nontreasury bank accounts, subject to withdrawal or disbursement policies established by the regulatory action, on a coordinated basis, of the Finance and Transportation Cabinets and the Administrative Office of the Courts. OAG 84-327 .

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2021 Ky. Acts ch. 169, Pt. I, H, 4, (2) at 1100.

189A.060. Pretrial suspension of operator’s license. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 165, § 6, effective July 13, 1984) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 467, § 31, effective October 1, 2000.

189A.070. License revocations — Time periods — Completion of alcohol or substance treatment or education program required before reinstatement.

      1. Unless the person is under eighteen (18) years of age, in addition to the penalties specified in KRS 189A.010 , the Transportation Cabinet shall suspend a person’s license to operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle upon conviction of KRS 189A.010 (1). (1) (a) 1. Unless the person is under eighteen (18) years of age, in addition to the penalties specified in KRS 189A.010, the Transportation Cabinet shall suspend a person’s license to operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle upon conviction of KRS 189A.010(1).
      2. Upon conviction of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e), the Transportation Cabinet shall suspend a person’s license to operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle as follows:
        1. For the first offense within a ten (10) year period:
          1. For a person who is issued an ignition interlock license under KRS 189A.340 and who meets the ninety (90) consecutive day requirement within the first four (4) months of the issuance of the ignition interlock license, four (4) months;
          2. For a person who is issued an ignition interlock license under KRS 189A.340 but does not meet the ninety (90) consecutive day requirement within the first four (4) months of the issuance of the ignition interlock license, until the person meets the ninety (90) consecutive day requirement or six (6) months, whichever is shorter; or
          3. For all others, six (6) months;
        2. For the second offense within a ten (10) year period:
          1. For a person who is issued an ignition interlock license under KRS 189A.340 and who meets the one hundred twenty (120) consecutive day requirement within the first twelve (12) months of the issuance of the ignition interlock license, twelve (12) months;
          2. For a person who is issued an ignition interlock license under KRS 189A.340 but does not meet the one hundred twenty (120) consecutive day requirement within the first twelve (12) months of the issuance of the ignition interlock license, until the person meets the one hundred twenty (120) consecutive day requirement or eighteen (18) months, whichever is shorter; or
          3. For all others, eighteen (18) months;
        3. For a third offense within a ten (10) year period:
          1. For a person who is issued an ignition interlock license under KRS 189A.340 and who meets the one hundred twenty (120) consecutive day requirement within the first eighteen (18) months of the issuance of the ignition interlock license, eighteen (18) months;
          2. For a person who is issued an ignition interlock license under KRS 189A.340 but does not meet the one hundred twenty (120) consecutive day requirement within the first eighteen (18) months of the issuance of the ignition interlock license, until the person meets the one hundred twenty (120) consecutive day requirement or thirty-six (36) months, whichever is shorter; or
          3. For all others, thirty-six (36) months;
        4. For a fourth or subsequent offense within a ten (10) year period:
          1. For a person who is issued an ignition interlock license under KRS 189A.340 and who meets the one hundred twenty (120) consecutive day requirement within the first thirty (30) months of the issuance of the ignition interlock license, thirty (30) months;
          2. For a person who is issued an ignition interlock license under KRS 189A.340 but does not meet the one hundred twenty (120) consecutive day requirement within the first thirty (30) months of the issuance of the ignition interlock license, until the person meets the one hundred twenty (120) consecutive day requirement or sixty (60) months, whichever is shorter; or
          3. For all others, sixty (60) months;
        5. If the conviction records transmitted to the Transportation Cabinet pursuant to subsection (3) of this section show that a person was convicted of a:
          1. First offense of KRS 189A.010, the person’s license shall be suspended as provided in subdivision a. of this subparagraph;
          2. Second offense of KRS 189A.010, the person’s license shall be suspended as provided in subdivision b. of this subparagraph;
          3. Third offense of KRS 189A.010, the person’s license shall be suspended as provided in subdivision c. of this subparagraph; and
          4. Fourth or subsequent offense of KRS 189A.010, the person’s license shall be suspended as provided in subdivision d. of this subparagraph; and
        6. The license suspension shall be deemed effective on the date of entry of the court’s order or judgement for a conviction of KRS 189A.010.
      3. Upon conviction of KRS 189A.010(1)(f), the Transportation Cabinet shall suspend a person’s license to operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle as follows:
        1. For a person who is issued an ignition interlock license under KRS 189A.340 and who meets the ninety (90) consecutive day requirement within the first four (4) months of the issuance of the ignition interlock license, four (4) months;
        2. For a person who is issued an ignition interlock license under KRS 189A.340 but does not meet the ninety (90) consecutive day requirement within the first four (4) months of the issuance of the ignition interlock license, until the person meets the ninety (90) consecutive day requirement or six (6) months, whichever is shorter; or
        3. For all others, six (6) months.
      4. For purposes of this paragraph, “ninety (90) consecutive day requirement” and “one hundred twenty (120) consecutive day requirement” mean the requirements established in KRS 189A.340(4)(b)2.
    1. For a person under the age of eighteen (18), in addition to the penalties specified in KRS 189A.010, the Transportation Cabinet shall suspend the person’s license to operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle upon conviction of KRS 189A.010(1). The person shall have his or her license suspended until he or she reaches the age of eighteen (18) or as provided in paragraph (a) of this subsection, whichever penalty will result in the longer period of suspension.
  1. In addition to the period of license suspension set forth in subsection (1) of this section, no person shall be eligible for reinstatement of his or her full privilege to operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle until he or she has completed the alcohol or substance abuse education or treatment program ordered pursuant to KRS 189A.040 .
  2. Upon conviction of KRS 189A.010(1):
    1. A person shall surrender his or her license to operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle to the court. Should the person fail to surrender his or her license to the court, the court shall issue an order directing the sheriff or any other peace officer to seize the license forthwith and deliver it to the court. The court shall then forward the license to the Transportation Cabinet. This paragraph shall not apply to a person who has previously surrendered his or her license pursuant to KRS 189A.200 ; and
    2. The court shall immediately transmit the conviction records and other appropriate information to the Transportation Cabinet. A court shall not waive or stay this procedure.
  3. In determining the ten (10) year period under this section, the period shall be measured from the dates on which the offenses occurred for which the judgments of conviction were entered.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 165, § 7, effective July 13, 1984; 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 5, effective July 1, 1991; 1996, ch. 198, § 12, effective October 1, 1996; 2000, ch. 467, § 5, effective October 1, 2000; 2002, ch. 171, § 2, effective July 15, 2002; 2010, ch. 149, § 20, effective July 15, 2010; 2015 ch. 124, § 2, effective June 24, 2015; 2016 ch. 85, § 2, effective April 9, 2016; repealed and reenacted by 2019 ch. 103, § 5, effective March 26, 2019.

189A.080. Surrender and forwarding of suspended or revoked licenses. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 165, § 8, effective July 13, 1984; 2000, ch. 467, § 6, effective October 1, 2000; repealed by 2019 ch. 103, § 25, effective July 1, 2020.

189A.085. Surrender and impoundment of motor vehicle license plates — Hardship exception for affected individuals other than offender.

  1. Unless a person has been issued an ignition interlock license under KRS 189A.340 or a hardship license under KRS 189A.410 , a person who has been convicted of an offense under KRS 189A.010 shall have the license plate or plates on all of the motor vehicles or motorcycles owned by him or her, either solely or jointly, impounded by the court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the following procedures:
    1. At the final sentencing hearing, or within forty-five (45) days thereafter, the person shall physically surrender any and all license plate or plates currently in force on any motor vehicle or motorcycle owned either individually or jointly by him or her to the court. The order of the court suspending the license plate or plates shall not exceed the time for the suspension of the operator’s license as specified in KRS 189A.070 .
    2. The clerk of the court shall retain any surrendered plate or plates and transmit all surrendered plate or plates to the Transportation Cabinet in the manner set forth by the Transportation Cabinet in administrative regulations promulgated by the Transportation Cabinet.
  2. Upon application, the court may grant hardship exceptions to family members or other individuals affected by the surrender of any license plate or plates of any motor vehicle or motorcycle owned by the offender. Hardship exceptions may be granted by the court to the offender’s family members or other affected individuals only if the family members or other affected individuals prove to the court’s satisfaction that their inability to utilize the surrendered motor vehicles or motorcycles would pose an undue hardship upon the family members or other affected individuals. Upon the court’s granting of hardship exceptions, the clerk or the Transportation Cabinet as appropriate, shall return to the family members or other affected individuals the license plate or plates of the motor vehicles or motorcycles of the offender for their utilization. The offender shall not be permitted to operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle for which the license plate has been suspended or for which a hardship exception has been granted, unless the offender has been issued an ignition interlock license under KRS 189A.340 or a hardship license under KRS 189A.410 .
  3. If the license plate of a jointly owned vehicle is impounded, this vehicle may be transferred to a joint owner of the vehicle who was not the violator.
  4. If the license plate of a motor vehicle is impounded, the vehicle may be transferred.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 467, § 19, effective October 1, 2000; 2010, ch. 149, § 21, effective July 15, 2010; 2015 ch. 124, § 3, effective June 24, 2015; 2019 ch. 103, § 6, effective July 1, 2020.

189A.090. Operating motor vehicle while license is suspended for driving under the influence prohibited — Operating motor vehicle without ignition interlock license or hardship license prohibited — Penalties.

  1. No person shall operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle or motorcycle while his or her license is suspended under this chapter, unless the person has a valid:
    1. Ignition interlock license in the person’s possession and:
      1. The motor vehicle or motorcycle is equipped with a functioning ignition interlock device; or
      2. The person is operating or in physical control of an employer’s motor vehicle or motorcycle in accordance with KRS 189A.340(6); or
    2. Hardship license in the person’s possession.
  2. In addition to the period of license suspension imposed by KRS 189A.070 , any person who violates subsection (1) of this section shall:
    1. For a first offense within a ten (10) year period, be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor and have his or her license suspended by the Transportation Cabinet for six (6) months, unless at the time of the offense the person was also operating or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e), in which event the person shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and have his or her license suspended by the Transportation Cabinet for a period of one (1) year;
    2. For a second offense within a ten (10) year period, be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and have his or her license suspended by the Transportation Cabinet for one (1) year, unless at the time of the offense the person was also operating or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e), in which event the person shall be guilty of a Class D felony and have his or her license suspended by the Transportation Cabinet for a period of two (2) years; and
    3. For a third or subsequent offense within a ten (10) year period, be guilty of a Class D felony and have his or her license suspended by the Transportation Cabinet for two (2) years, unless at the time of the offense the person was also operating or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e), in which event the person shall be guilty of a Class D felony and have his or her license suspended by the Transportation Cabinet for a period of five (5) years.
  3. Any person who violates subsection (1) of this section may apply for an ignition interlock license for the remainder of the original period of suspension under KRS 189A.070 and for the entire period of the new suspension if the person is and remains otherwise eligible for such license pursuant to KRS 189A.340 .
  4. The ten (10) year period under this section shall be measured in the same manner as in KRS 189A.070 .

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 165, § 9, effective July 13, 1984; 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 22, effective July 1, 1991; 2000, ch. 467, § 7, effective October 1, 2000; 2002, ch. 171, § 3, effective July 15, 2002; 2010, ch. 149, § 22, effective July 15, 2010; 2015 ch. 124, § 4, effective June 24, 2015; 2016 ch. 85, § 3, effective April 9, 2016; 2019 ch. 103, § 7, effective July 1, 2020.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(4/9/2016). 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 85, sec. 10 provided that that Act shall be known as the Brianna Taylor Act. This statute was amended in Section 3 of that Act.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1.Purpose.

The legislative intent of this section is to raise the seriousness of the offense as well as the punishment based on the number of times a defendant has committed the offense of operating a vehicle while his license is suspended or revoked. Estis v. Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 317, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

2.Nature of Prior Offense.

Where defendant previously pled guilty to the felony offense of operating on a suspended license, he had judicially admitted the underlying requisites. Consequently, the circuit court unquestionably had jurisdiction to try him, as this was a subsequent offense under Subdivision (2)(c). Toppass v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 587, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 133 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).

This section does not require that a defendant first be convicted of a Class A misdemeanor for the second such offense before he can be convicted of a Class D felony; he need only be shown to have been previously convicted of two or more violations of subsection (1) of this section; therefore, defendant who was convicted twice under this section, each time for a first offense, could be convicted as a third offender, a Class D felony, when his two previous convictions were both first offenses. Estis v. Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 317, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

3.Evidence.

Trial court did not err in permitting the driving history record from the Department of Transportation to be used to prove prior revoked or suspended licenses in lieu of prior judgments of convictions or duly authenticated copies thereof. Toppass v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 587, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 133 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).

4.Enhancement of Sentence.

Although defendant was indicted for his fourth DUI offense on the same date he was also charged in a separate indictment for being a persistent felony offender (PFO), based on his prior felony conviction for operating a motor vehicle (OMV) while his license was suspended or revoked by his third DUI offense, the prior DUI convictions are separate convictions from the OMV on a revoked license charge; thus it was not double enhancement for court to allow the OMV for revoked license charge to enhance the fourth DUI charge for PFO purposes. Corman v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 122, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 82 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

It is permissible that some prior offenses are used to elevate the charged offense to a felony, while another prior offense is used for persistent felony offender (PFO) enhancement. Newcomb v. Commonwealth, 964 S.W.2d 228, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 15 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

Unlike the DUI statute, this section does not include a time limitation on the use of prior OSL convictions to enhance subsequent convictions, and the trial court erred when it added the requirement that in order to use a prior conviction for enhancement purposes under this section, the conviction must have occurred within a five-year period. Commonwealth v. Garnett, 8 S.W.3d 573, 1999 Ky. App. LEXIS 35 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).

Where the only prior convictions for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants (DUI), KRS 189A.010 , and operating a motor vehicle while license is revoked or suspended for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (OSI/DUI), KRS 189A.090 , that were used to obtain a persisent felony offender (PFO) enhancement of defendant’s present convictions were not the convictions used to enhance defendant’s present DUI and DUI/OSL convictions to Class D felonies, they were properly used for PFO enhancement under KRS 532.080(6)(b). Parson v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 775, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 2004 ).

Court of Appeals erred in vacating defendant's third conviction for operating a motor vehicle on a DUI-suspended driver's license under the statutory enhancement provision because defendant failed to properly preserve his argument that he was completely denied counsel in his underlying convictions. Commonwealth v. Fugate, 527 S.W.3d 43, 2017 Ky. LEXIS 373 ( Ky. 2017 ).

5.Double Jeopardy.

Defendant’s sentences for both driving under the influence (DUI), KRS 189A.010(1)(a), and operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended for DUI, KRS 189A.090(1), did not violate his double jeopardy rights under KRS 505.020(2)(a), since being under the influence was not an element of each offense. As each offense required the proof of different elements, sentencing on both convictions was not double jeopardy. Lay v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 18, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 163 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

No double jeopardy violation occurred for convicting defendant for DUI and driving with a suspended license while DUI. Jones v. Commonwealth, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 293 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006), rev’d, 279 S.W.3d 522, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 65 ( Ky. 2009 ) (on other grounds).

6.Construction.

Defendant's motion to dismiss was properly granted where the specific and unambiguous language used in Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 189A.090(1) was meant to prevent a person from operating a motor vehicle in any location, be it a public highway or private property, while his or her license was revoked or suspended under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 189A, and defendant had been operating a vehicle on his mother's private property. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 530 S.W.3d 925, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 545 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

Cited:

Anderson v. Commonwealth, 905 S.W.2d 871, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 167 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995); Commonwealth v. Duncan, 939 S.W.2d 336, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 1997 ); Jones v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 522, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 65 ( Ky. 2009 ).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

1.Nature of Prior Offense.

Unpublished decision: Department of transportation employee testified that, in consecutive suspensions, a suspension for driving under suspension came after a suspension for driving under the influence (DUI), and that defendant’s KRS 189A.070(1)(b) 12-month DUI suspension expired on November 17, 2001, and that only his KRS 189A.090 (suspension for driving while suspended) remained. The trial court erred in determining that defendant’s license was revoked or suspended for DUI under KRS 189A.070(1)(b) at the time of his arrest, because, according to the undisputed testimony of the employee, defendant’s license was no longer revoked or suspended for DUI at the time of the June 14, 2002 incident—even though he had not yet completed a driver’s school and had not had a new license issued to him. Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 145 S.W.3d 419, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 260 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Unpublished decision: KRS 189A.090(1) sets forth the offense of operating a motor vehicle on a license suspended or revoked due to driving under the influence (DUI). Section 189A.090(1) provides that a person convicted of a first offense under the statute is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor and his license is revoked for six months, unless he was also violating the DUI statute ( KRS 189A.010 ) at the time, in which case he is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and his license is revoked for one year, KRS 189A.090(2)(a). Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 145 S.W.3d 419, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 260 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section (conviction for driving while license is suspended or revoked and doubling the period of revocation), KRS 189A.060 (now repealed), KRS 189A.070 (license revocations), and KRS 189A.080 (surrender of suspended or revoked licenses) are written in terms of resident defendants who hold motor vehicle operators’ licenses issued in Kentucky. OAG 85-72 .

In “driving under the influence” convictions involving a nonresident motor vehicle operator, the Kentucky trial court has no authority to withdraw or revoke a nonresident’s privilege of operating a motor vehicle in Kentucky. The withdrawing or revoking of a nonresident’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Kentucky is the responsibility of the Transportation Cabinet, pursuant to KRS 186.560 , 186.565 (now repealed), 186.570 , 189A.070 , and 189A.080 . OAG 85-72 .

A Kentucky trial court has no authority to physically take possession of a nonresident operator’s license when he is convicted of driving under the influence. OAG 85-72 .

The district court is not required to specifically warn a defendant who pleads guilty to a first offense violation of this section, KRS 186.620 , or KRS 189A.010 of the possibility of enhancement of punishment, in the event he is found guilty of a subsequent violation of the statute. OAG 89-30 .

Since subsection (1) of this section only pertains to violations of KRS 189A.010 , the defendant must stand convicted of prior offenses in violation of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants during the period his license was suspended or revoked. Should a prosecutor note that the defendant has been previously convicted of operating a motor vehicle while his license was revoked or suspended based upon another statute, e.g. KRS 186.560 or 186.570 , the defendant should be prosecuted under the provisions of KRS 186.620(2) and KRS 186.642(3) (now repealed), which provide enhancement penalties for other types of subsequent revocation and suspension violations. OAG 89-30 .

A person may be charged with a violation of this section only if he operates a motor vehicle while his driver’s license is revoked or suspended for violation of KRS 189A.010 . If the driver fails to have his driver’s license reinstated after the period of suspension for driving under the influence has elapsed, he should be charged with operating a vehicle without a valid driver’s license, contrary to KRS 186.620 . OAG 90-38 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Kentucky Instructions To Juries (Criminal), 5th Ed., Offenses Against Public Order, Safety and Morals, Part 4 Offenses Relating to Firearms and Destructive Devices, §§ 8.65A — 8.65E.

189A.100. Administration of preliminary breath tests — Visual recording of vehicle pursuits, traffic stops, and field sobriety tests — Conditions of recording — Use and destruction of recordings.

  1. Law enforcement agencies may administer preliminary breath tests using devices or equipment which will ensure an accurate determination of blood alcohol content. Such tests may be administered in the field to a person suspected of violation of KRS 189A.010 before the person is arrested. This test may be administered in addition to any other blood alcohol level test authorized by law. A person’s refusal to take a preliminary breath test shall not be used against him in a court of law or in any administrative proceeding.
    1. Law enforcement agencies may record on film or videotape or by other visual and audible means: (2) (a) Law enforcement agencies may record on film or videotape or by other visual and audible means:
      1. The pursuit of a violator or suspected violator;
      2. The traffic stop; or
        1. Field sobriety tests administered at the scene or such tests at a police station, jail, or other suitable facility; or 3. a. Field sobriety tests administered at the scene or such tests at a police station, jail, or other suitable facility; or
        2. The refusal of a violator or suspected violator to submit to tests under KRS 189A.103 ; for a suspected violation of KRS 189A.010 .
    2. Recordings made under paragraph (a) of this subsection shall be subject to the following conditions:
      1. The testing is recorded in its entirety (except for blood alcohol analysis testing);
      2. The entire recording of the field sobriety tests or refusal and the entire recording of the pursuit and traffic stop is shown in court unless the defendant waives the showing of any portions not offered by the prosecution;
      3. The entire recording is available to be shown by the defense at trial if the defendant so desires regardless of whether it was introduced by the Commonwealth;
      4. The defendant or his counsel is afforded an opportunity to view the entire recording a reasonable time before the trial in order to prepare an adequate defense;
      5. Recordings shall be used for official purposes only, which shall include:
        1. Viewing in court;
        2. Viewing by the prosecution and defense in preparation for a trial; and
        3. Viewing for purposes of administrative reviews and official administrative proceedings. Recordings shall otherwise be considered as confidential records;
      6. The videotape or film taken in accordance with this section shall, upon order of the sentencing court, be destroyed after the later of the following:
        1. Fourteen (14) months, if there is no appeal of any criminal or traffic case filed as a result of the videotape or film, or if the videotape or film does not record the actual happening of an accident involving a motor vehicle;
        2. Fourteen (14) months after a decision has been made not to prosecute any case upon which an arrest has been made or a citation issued as a result of the videotape or film, if the videotape does not record the actual happening of an accident involving a motor vehicle;
        3. Twenty-six (26) months, if there is no appeal of any criminal or traffic case filed as a result of the videotape or film, if the videotape or film records the actual happening of an accident involving a motor vehicle;
        4. After all appeals have been exhausted arising from any criminal or traffic case filed as a result of the videotape;
        5. At the conclusion of any civil case arising from events depicted on the videotape or film; or
        6. At the conclusion of the exhaustion of all appeals arising from any law enforcement agency administrative proceedings arising from events depicted on the videotape or film; and
      7. Public officials or employees utilizing or showing recordings other than as permitted in this chapter or permitting others to do so shall be guilty of official misconduct in the first degree.
  2. When a peace officer makes a videotape or film recording of any transaction covered by subsection (2) of this section and a citation is issued or an arrest is made, the peace officer shall note on the uniform citation that a videotape has been made of the transaction.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 165, § 10, effective July 13, 1984; 2000, ch. 467, § 24, effective October 1, 2000; 2019 ch. 103, § 8, effective July 1, 2020.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Alco Sensor III.

Use of the Alco Sensor III to administer a preliminary breath test was acceptable because there was an abundance of evidence in the lower court record demonstrating that the device is most reliable. Allen v. Commonwealth, 817 S.W.2d 458, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 125 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).

2.Custody at Time of Breath Sample.

Where defendant was involved in a two car accident resulting in the death of the driver, defendant was asked a few questions, asked to be placed in the back seat of a police car, and voluntarily gave a breath sample, the court found that defendant was not in custody at the time the breath sample was given. Allen v. Commonwealth, 817 S.W.2d 458, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 125 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).

3.Sufficiency of Evidence.

Machines do not replace the observations and conclusions of an experienced officer who stops the offender for illegal operation of a vehicle; therefore, the attempts to discredit the technology may do just that, but a conviction may stand upon the testimony of the police without resort to various devices. Allen v. Commonwealth, 817 S.W.2d 458, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 125 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).

4.Immunity.

Circuit court did not err by concluding that the police chief was not protected by qualified official immunity and that the city could be held vicariously liable for his actions because the language of the statute expressly prohibited the release of the disputed dashcam video and that its unambiguous provisions did not require the exercise of any discretion, judgment, or personal deliberation. The chief was not making a bad guess in a gray area; instead, his duty was absolute, certain, and imperative because he could not, in good faith, have failed to abide by the statute’s provisions. City of Hodgenville v. Sanders, 633 S.W.3d 802, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 135 (Ky. Ct. App. 2020).

Cited:

Hoppenjans v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 290, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 240 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Kentucky State Police properly denied defendant’s request for a videotape made at the time of her arrest for alcohol intoxication where the videotape contained footage of defendant’s companion, who was charged with DUI, and where the State Police did not have the option of segregating that portion of the tape showing defendant at the time of her arrest. OAG 93-ORD-133.

189A.103. Consent to tests for alcohol concentration or substance which may impair driving ability — Test procedures — Who may administer — Personal testing.

The following provisions shall apply to any person who operates or is in physical control of a motor vehicle or a vehicle that is not a motor vehicle in this Commonwealth:

  1. He or she has given his or her consent to one (1) or more tests of his or her blood, breath, and urine, or combination thereof, for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration or presence of a substance which may impair one’s driving ability, if an officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of KRS 189A.010(1) or 189.520(1) has occurred;
  2. Any person who is dead, unconscious, or otherwise in a condition rendering him or her incapable of refusal is deemed not to have withdrawn the consent provided in subsection (1) of this section, and the test may be given;
  3. The breath, blood, and urine tests administered pursuant to this section shall be administered at the direction of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person has committed a violation of KRS 189A.010(1) or 189.520(1).
    1. Tests of the person’s breath, blood, or urine, to be valid pursuant to this section, shall have been performed according to the administrative regulations promulgated by the secretary of the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, and shall have been performed, as to breath tests, only after a peace officer has had the person under personal observation at the location of the test for a minimum of twenty (20) minutes.
    2. All breath tests shall be administered by a peace officer holding a certificate as an operator of a breath analysis instrument, issued by the secretary of the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet or his or her designee;
  4. A breath test shall consist of a test which is performed in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions for the use of the instrument. The secretary of the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet shall keep available for public inspection copies of these manufacturer’s instructions for all models of breath testing devices in use by the Commonwealth of Kentucky;
  5. When the preliminary breath test, breath test, or other evidence gives the peace officer reasonable grounds to believe there is impairment by a substance which is not subject to testing by a breath test, then blood or urine tests, or both, may be required in addition to a breath test, or in lieu of a breath test;
  6. Only a physician, registered nurse, phlebotomist, medical technician, or medical technologist not otherwise prohibited by law can withdraw any blood of any person submitting to a test under this section; and
  7. After the person has submitted to all alcohol concentration tests and substance tests requested by the officer, the person tested shall be permitted to have a person listed in subsection (6) of this section of his or her own choosing administer a test or tests in addition to any tests administered at the direction of the peace officer. Tests conducted under this section shall be conducted within a reasonable length of time. Provided, however, the nonavailability of the person chosen to administer a test or tests in addition to those administered at the direction of the peace officer within a reasonable time shall not be grounds for rendering inadmissible as evidence the results of the test or tests administered at the direction of the peace officer.

History. Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 6, effective July 1, 1991; 2000, ch. 467, § 8, effective October 1, 2000; 2007, ch. 85, § 214, effective June 26, 2007.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

This section, KRS 189A.010 , and KRS 189A.105 do not violate the separation of powers doctrine, because they do not involve any “ultimate power” of the judiciary, but simply impose conditions on the issuance of warrants. Combs v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 161, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 33 ( Ky. 1998 ), limited, Commonwealth v. Lopez, 3 S.W.3d 351, 1999 Ky. LEXIS 136 ( Ky. 1999 ).

Implied consent law permitted the police to take a blood test of a driver who was unconscious; however, the warrantless testing was permissible only if the police had probable cause to believe that the unconscious driver had been driving while under the influence of alcohol. If the police lacked probable cause and only took the blood test because the accident in which the driver was involved resulted in fatalities, then the testing violated the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. Helton v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 555, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 186 ( Ky. 2009 ).

2.Applicability.

Former law regarding procedure to consent to test for alcohol in the blood did not apply to defendant who was not under arrest or in police custody at the time of the taking of the blood sample. Cook v. Commonwealth, 826 S.W.2d 329, 1992 Ky. LEXIS 43 ( Ky. 1992 ) (decided under prior law).

3.Implied Consent.

The implied consent law in subsection one of former KRS 186.565 (now repealed) specifically stated that operators of motor vehicles are deemed to have given consent to a breathalyzer test. The entire purpose of the implied consent law was to control the number of persons driving motor vehicles while intoxicated. There is no statute that implies the operator of a nonmotor vehicle must submit to a breathalyzer test; therefore, subsection (7) would have been meaningless unless it also applied to motor vehicles. Commonwealth, Transp. Cabinet v. Tarter, 802 S.W.2d 944, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 141 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (decided under prior law).

The provisions of this section are based on the public policy determined by the legislature that an individual driving on the highways of Kentucky has given implied consent to the performance of blood, breath and/or urine tests in the event that the individual is suspected of driving a vehicle under the influence. Beach v. Commonwealth, 927 S.W.2d 826, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 60 ( Ky. 1996 ).

By virtue of this section, one who operates a motor vehicle consents to a test of his blood, breath or urine for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration. The phrase “no person shall be compelled” in KRS 189A.105 could not rationally have been intended to contradict the consent provisions of this section. A more reasonable interpretation of the language used is that one who refuses will not be physically forced to submit to a chemical test. It does not mean that such person has a lawful right to refuse such testing. Commonwealth v. Wirth, 936 S.W.2d 78, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 90 ( Ky. 1996 ).

4.— Blood Test.

Trial court improperly concluded that defendant did not give express consent to blood alcohol testing. The Commonwealth offered sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proving voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Brown, 560 S.W.3d 873, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 143 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

Subsections (1) and (5) of this section do not require that a police officer must first offer a DUI suspect a breath test before asking him or her to submit to a blood test; trial judge properly refused to suppress results of blood test. Beach v. Commonwealth, 927 S.W.2d 826, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 60 ( Ky. 1996 ).

Where a defendant expressly consents to a blood alcohol test in compliance with the statute, blood alcohol evidence is admissible in a DUI case not involving physical injury or death. Commonwealth v. Lopez, 3 S.W.3d 351, 1999 Ky. LEXIS 136 ( Ky. 1999 ), overruled in part, Commonwealth v. Carman, 455 S.W.3d 916, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 2015 ).

It is reasonable to interpret the purposes of the statute and regulations concerning the credentials of the individual drawing blood as giving a presumption of regularity; it is presumed that those individuals mentioned in the statute and regulations will perform the procedures properly, but they are not the only persons in the world who can draw blood accurately. Matthews v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 361, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 24 ( Ky. 2001 ).

Court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss a driving under the influence charge because, while defendant was certainly free to express an opinion as to his testing preference, the police officer had statutory authority to determine which of the three tests to utilize, and, even if defendant asserted a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, which he did not, he lacked the requisite standing where an actual blood test was never performed due to his refusal to consent. Commonwealth v. Duncan, 483 S.W.3d 353, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1614 ( Ky. 2015 ), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2542, 195 L. Ed. 2d 868, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 4267 (U.S. 2016).

5.Body Searches.

The plain language of this section and KRS 189A.105 prohibit compelled body searches of a DUI suspect following a refusal to take a blood test, unless death or physical injury are involved. Combs v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 161, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 33 ( Ky. 1998 ), limited, Commonwealth v. Lopez, 3 S.W.3d 351, 1999 Ky. LEXIS 136 ( Ky. 1999 ).

6.Probable Cause.

Evidence that defendant was driving his car on the wrong side of a yellow line, that he illegally entered an exit, was speeding, was unable to walk a straight line, that his eyes were red and he smelled of alcoholic beverages was sufficient to support the commissioner’s ruling that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was operating his motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating beverages and such ruling could not be overturned by the trial court on judicial review as arbitrary and capricious. Newman v. Smith, 481 S.W.2d 679, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1972 ) (decided under prior law).

An arresting officer would have had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was in actual control of his automobile when he was found nearly “passed out” behind the steering wheel of his automobile which was stopped at a street intersection with the motor running and, although the traffic light had changed several times prior to the arrest, had not moved for some time. Newman v. Stinson, 489 S.W.2d 826, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1972 ) (decided under prior law).

7.Presence of Counsel.

A motorist arrested and charged with the offense of driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor has no right to consult counsel prior to deciding whether to take a breathalyzer test or to have counsel present when the breathalyzer test is given. Elkin v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Vehicle Regulation, 646 S.W.2d 45, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 281 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (decided under prior law).

Driver did not have a right to consult with an attorney before taking a breathalyzer test nor did he have a right to have his attorney present while taking a breathalyzer test. Commonwealth Transp. Cabinet Dep't of Vehicle Regulation v. Cornell, 796 S.W.2d 591, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 132 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (decided under prior law).

8.Law Enforcement Officer.

A corrections employee was a “sworn public peace officer” and was therefore qualified as a “law enforcement officer” for the purposes of this section, even though he was not a police officer. Schneider v. Commonwealth, Transp. Cabinet, Dep’t of Vehicle Regulation, 788 S.W.2d 747, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 12 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990), rehearing denied, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 164 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (decided under prior law).

9.Arrest.

The statutory requirement in former KRS 186.565 of an arrest was necessary only where the DUI suspect refused by words or conduct to submit to a blood alcohol test in order for his refusal to trigger the administrative revocation of his privilege to operate a motor vehicle. Speers v. Commonwealth, 828 S.W.2d 638, 1992 Ky. LEXIS 59 ( Ky. 1992 ) (decided under prior law).

10.Chemical Test.

“Infrared” equipment was a “chemical” test within the meaning of former law regarding consent to test for alcohol in the blood; the “infrared” equipment is no more nor less than a recognized scientific examination and process to test the chemical make-up of alcohol in the blood system. McConnell v. Commonwealth, 655 S.W.2d 43, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 339 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983), overruled, Appalachian Racing, LLC v. Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc., 423 S.W.3d 726, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 88 ( Ky. 2014 ) (decided under prior law).

11.Test Procedures.

In requiring that a breath test be performed in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions, KRS 189A.103(4) effectuates no change to the rule that a breath test should be administered according to standard operating procedures in order for the results to be admitted at trial. Commonwealth v. Roberts, 122 S.W.3d 524, 2003 Ky. LEXIS 255 ( Ky. 2003 ).

As an intoxilyzer was in proper working order, and the foundation requirements for admission of the test results were satisfied, the arresting officer’s failure to check the simulator’s hoses for warmth and to determine whether its paddle was properly turned went to the weight of the evidence, rather than to its admissibility; therefore, the district court judge erred in suppressing the results. Billingsley v. Commonwealth, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 162 (Ky. Ct. App. June 4, 2004, sub. op., 2004 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 929 (Ky. Ct. App. June 4, 2004).

In a case involving operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of or above 0.08, a motion to suppress was properly denied where it was based on the argument that a deputy jailer turned on the breathalyzer machine; a trooper who was certified was the one that performed the test. O'Daniel v. Commonwealth, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 15 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2017, sub. op., 2017 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 829 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2017).

12.Twenty-minute Rule.

With regard to the requirement for admissibility at trial of a breath test that a defendant not be permitted to take food or drink within 15 minutes before taking the test, KRS 189A.103(3)(a) changes the standard concerning the 15-minute time frame and specifies that a peace officer must personally observe a defendant for 20 minutes. Commonwealth v. Roberts, 122 S.W.3d 524, 2003 Ky. LEXIS 255 ( Ky. 2003 ).

Admission of the Intoxilyzer test results was not erroneous despite inconsistencies in the officer’s testimony as to whether the officer observed defendant for 20 minutes prior to administering the test, because the trial court was in the best position to resolve the inconsistencies in the officer’s testimony and its determination was not clearly erroneous. Greene v. Commonwealth, 244 S.W.3d 128, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 4 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

13.Sufficient Compliance.

Although former law concerning consent to blood alcohol test did not prescribe any particular volume of air which must have been breathed into the breathalyzer equipment to constitute compliance, the fact that defendant exhaled into the machine one time and no reading was obtained, in the absence of a showing of the impossibility of compliance or the likelihood of harm resulting therefrom, was not sufficient compliance. Newman v. Stinson, 489 S.W.2d 826, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1972 ) (decided under prior law).

Where the arresting officer filed a false affidavit averring that motorist had refused to take the breathalyzer test when in fact he had submitted to the test, where the department of transportation (now transportation cabinet) failed to inform motorist of his right to a post-revocation hearing, and where arresting officer failed to appear at the scheduled trial on the drunken driving charge, the revocation of motorist’s driving license was patently invalid. Slone v. Kentucky Dep't of Transp., 513 F.2d 1189, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15342 (6th Cir. Ky. 1975 ) (decided under prior law).

14.Independent Test.

An accused does not have the right to an independent blood or urine test until after he or she has submitted to a valid first official test. Commonwealth v. Minix, 3 S.W.3d 721, 1999 Ky. LEXIS 119 ( Ky. 1999 ).

The defendant waived his right to an independent blood or urine test where (1) he submitted to two (2) unsuccessful attempts to obtain results from a preliminary breath test, and (2) once he was arrested and transported to the detention center, he chose not to comply with an officer’s request to a test using the Intoxilyzer 5000 machine. Commonwealth v. Minix, 3 S.W.3d 721, 1999 Ky. LEXIS 119 ( Ky. 1999 ).

Where defendant was accused of driving under the influence under KRS 189A.010(1), the case was dismissed as defendant was denied the right under KRS 189A.103(7) to obtain an independent blood test; where defendant had the $150 for the blood test in defendant’s purse, but defendant, upon the officer’s instruction, left defendant’s purse in defendant’s car before going to the police station, the officer should have granted defendant’s request to arrange for the $150 to be brought to defendant, whose roommate had picked up defendant’s car. Commonwealth v. Long, 118 S.W.3d 178, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 244 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

When a court determines whether a defendant has been denied the right to an independent blood test pursuant to KRS 189A.103(7), the court is to consider the totality of the circumstances, including, but not limited to: (1) availability of or access to funds or resources to pay for the requested test; (2) a protracted delay in the giving of the test if the officer complies with the defendant’s requests; (3) availability of police time and other resources; (4) location of requested facilities, e.g., the hospital to which the defendant wants to be taken is nearby but in a different jurisdiction; and (5) opportunity and ability of accused to make arrangements personally for the testing. Commonwealth v. Long, 118 S.W.3d 178, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 244 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

In accordance with the majority rule, suppression of the State’s alcohol test is a sufficient sanction to be applied when the police fall short of the requirements pertaining to a request for independent testing; Commonwealth v. Long, 118 S.W.3d 178, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 244 ( Ky. 2003 ), does not dictate otherwise. Commonwealth v. Filben, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 229 (Ky. Ct. App. July 21, 2006, sub. op., 2006 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 186 (Ky. Ct. App. July 21, 2006), review denied, ordered not published, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 317 (Ky. Dec. 13, 2006).

Where a police officer failed to use reasonable efforts to facilitate defendant’s statutory entitlement to an independent alcohol concentration test by transporting defendant to a nearby hospital that the officer knew conducted private testing after a first hospital refused to conduct a private test, the trial court erred in dismissing the charge; the appropriate sanction was the suppression of the breathalyzer test, and the Commonwealth could proceed with the prosecution with other evidence. Commonwealth v. Filben, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 229 (Ky. Ct. App. July 21, 2006, sub. op., 2006 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 186 (Ky. Ct. App. July 21, 2006), review denied, ordered not published, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 317 (Ky. Dec. 13, 2006).

Denial of defendant's motion to suppress the results of defendant's initial blood test was appropriate because when defendant requested that an independent test be performed at a different hospital, the deputy sheriff who arrested defendant made sufficient efforts to facilitate such a test at a different hospital in another town, but was unable to facilitate such a test because of the low staffing level for the sheriff's department on that night. Hardin v. Commonwealth, 491 S.W.3d 514, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 37 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).

Defendant was not entitled to suppression of a blood test due to an officer's failure to advise of the right to an independent test because defendant did not submit to all tests the officer requested, including a breath test, so defendant was not entitled to request an independent test, as Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 189A.105(2)(a)(3) was clear in that a person's right to request an independent blood test arose only after he or she submitted to all tests an officer requests, and the fact that defendant agreed to submit to a more invasive blood test was irrelevant. Gooch v. Commonwealth, 496 S.W.3d 492, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 124 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).

15.Refusal to Sign Hospital Release.

Appellee’s refusal to sign a form releasing a hospital from civil liability in connection with taking a blood specimen pursuant to the implied consent law did not amount to a refusal to submit to the test for purposes of former KRS 186.565 . Transportation Cabinet v. Driver, 828 S.W.2d 666, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 77 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (decided under prior law).

16.Deceased Person.

The General Assembly did not intend to condition the taking of a blood sample from a deceased person upon his having been placed under arrest before death. Woosley v. Central Uniform Rental, 463 S.W.2d 345, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 591 ( Ky. 1971 ) (decided under prior law).

17.Observation.

In a case involving operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of or above 0.08, a motion to suppress was properly denied because there was no violation of this statute; it was not always practical to observe a defendant in the room in which the breath test was to be administered, the observation in this case satisfied the intent and purpose of the statute, and the requirements for admissibility set forth in Commonwealth v. Roberts, 122 S.W.3d 524 ( Ky. 2003 ), were met. O'Daniel v. Commonwealth, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 15 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2017, sub. op., 2017 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 829 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2017).

NOTES TO UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS

1.Implied Consent.
2.— Blood Test.

Unpublished decision: Under the implied consent law, the circuit court erred by holding an arresting officer had the option as to which test may be given in a DUI case—a blood test or a breathalyzer. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream did not present a per se exigency that justified an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in drunk-driving cases. Duncan v. Commonwealth, 2013 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 995 (Ky. Ct. App. July 19, 2013), rev'd, 483 S.W.3d 353, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1614 ( Ky. 2015 ).

Unpublished decision: Any error in admitting defendant’s refusal of a blood test was harmless, under RCr P. 9.24, because (1) defendant admitted consuming alcohol and driving, and (2) defendant’s recorded interaction with an officer and subsequent sobriety testing showed defendant was intoxicated, so allowing driving under the influence to be presumed based on defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood test was cumulative. Guinn v. Commonwealth, 2014 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1051 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2014), review denied, ordered not published, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1966 (Ky. Oct. 21, 2015).

Cited:

Combs v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 161, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 33 ( Ky. 1998 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since this section clearly contemplates that a suspected driver must first submit to an alcohol test requested by the officer prior to obtaining a test from a physician of his own choosing a person arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicants who refuses to submit to the alcohol test requested by a police officer is not allowed to have his own test administered by a physician of his own choosing. OAG 92-158 .

189A.104. Alcohol or substance testing subject to refusal or enhancement of penalties under KRS Chapter 189A.

  1. The only alcohol or substance testing that is subject to refusal or enhancement of penalties provided for in this chapter is:
    1. Breath analysis testing by a machine installed, tested, and maintained by the Commonwealth for that specific purpose at a police station or detention facility;
    2. Blood or urine testing at the request of the officer at a police station, detention facility, or medical facility; or
    3. Combination of tests required in paragraphs (a) or (b) of this subsection.
  2. The results of any breath analysis by an instrument other than one specified in subsection (1) of this section shall be inadmissible in court.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 467, § 30, effective October 1, 2000.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

Because defendant did not refuse to submit to one of the tests found in KRS 189A.104(2), nor was defendant subject to any enhancement of penalties, the statute and its prohibition regarding the admissibility of preliminary breath test results did not apply; therefore, the question of its constitutionality was a moot issue. Stump v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.3d 213, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 7 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009), overruled in part, Crouch v. Commonwealth, 323 S.W.3d 668, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 161 ( Ky. 2010 ).

2.Improper Exclusion of Evidence.

Although KRS 189A.104 ’s bar on the admission of portable breathalyzer test (PBT) results in driving under the influence (DUI) cases did not bar defendant from seeking to admit that result as part of a defense in a non-DUI prosecution, the exclusion of the PBT evidence was harmless error under RCr P. 9.24. Elery v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.3d 78, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 87 ( Ky. 2012 ).

Cited:

Greene v. Commonwealth, 244 S.W.3d 128, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 4 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008); Hoppenjans v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 290, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 240 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

189A.105. Effect of refusal to submit to tests — Information required to be provided when tests requested — Court-ordered testing — Right to consult attorney before submitting to tests — Personal testing option.

  1. A person’s refusal to submit to tests under KRS 189A.103 shall result in suspension of his or her driving privilege as provided in this chapter.
    1. At the time a breath, blood, or urine test is requested, the person shall be informed: (2) (a) At the time a breath, blood, or urine test is requested, the person shall be informed:
      1. That, if the person refuses to submit to such tests:
        1. The fact of this refusal may be used against him or her in court as evidence of violating KRS 189A.010 and will result in suspension of his or her driver’s license by the court at the time of arraignment; and
        2. Is subsequently convicted of violating KRS 189A.010 (1):
          1. For a second or third time within a ten (10) year period, he or she will be subject to a mandatory minimum jail sentence which is twice as long as the mandatory minimum jail sentence imposed if he or she submits to the tests; and
          2. His or her license will be suspended by the Transportation Cabinet;
      2. That, if a test is taken:
        1. The results of the test may be used against the person in court as evidence of violating KRS 189A.010(1); and
        2. The person has the right to have a test or tests of his or her blood performed by a person of his or her choosing described in KRS 189A.103 within a reasonable time of his or her arrest at the expense of the person arrested; and
      3. That although his or her license will be suspended, he or she may be eligible immediately for an ignition interlock license allowing him or her to drive during the period of suspension and, if he or she is convicted, he or she will receive a credit toward any other ignition interlock requirement arising from this arrest.
    2. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction from issuing a search warrant or other court order requiring a blood or urine test, or a combination thereof, of a defendant charged with a violation of KRS 189A.010, or other statutory violation arising from the incident, when a person is killed or suffers physical injury, as defined in KRS 500.080 , as a result of the incident in which the defendant has been charged. However, if the incident involves a motor vehicle accident in which there was a fatality, the investigating peace officer shall seek such a search warrant for blood, breath, or urine testing unless the testing has already been done by consent. If testing done pursuant to a warrant reveals the presence of alcohol or any other substance that impaired the driving ability of a person who is charged and convicted of a violation of KRS 189A.010(1), the sentencing court shall require, in addition to any other sentencing provision, that the defendant make restitution to the state for the cost of the testing.
  2. During the period immediately preceding the administration of any test, the person shall be afforded an opportunity of at least ten (10) minutes but not more than fifteen (15) minutes to attempt to contact and communicate with an attorney and shall be informed of this right. Inability to communicate with an attorney during this period shall not be deemed to relieve the person of his obligation to submit to the tests and the penalties specified by KRS 189A.010 and 189A.107 shall remain applicable to the person upon refusal. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to create a right to have an attorney present during the administration of the tests, but the person’s attorney may be present if the attorney can physically appear at the location where the test is to be administered within the time period established in this section.
  3. Immediately following the administration of the final test requested by the officer, the person shall again be informed of his or her right to have a test or tests of his or her blood performed by a person of his or her choosing described in KRS 189A.103 within a reasonable time of his or her arrest at the expense of the person arrested. He or she shall then be asked “Do you want such a test?” The officer shall make reasonable efforts to provide transportation to the tests.

History. Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 7, effective July 1, 1991; 2000, ch. 467, § 9, effective October 1, 2000; 2006, ch. 116, § 2, effective July 12, 2006; 2010, ch. 149, § 23, effective July 15, 2010; 2015 ch. 124, § 5, effective June 24, 2015; 2019 ch. 103, § 9, effective July 1, 2020.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Right to Refuse Test.

By virtue of KRS 189A.103 , one who operates a motor vehicle consents to a test of his blood, breath or urine for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration. The phrase “no person shall be compelled” in this section could not rationally have been intended to contradict the consent provisions of KRS 189A.103 . A more reasonable interpretation of the language used is that one who refuses will not be physically forced to submit to a chemical test. It does not mean that such person has a lawful right to refuse such testing. Commonwealth v. Wirth, 936 S.W.2d 78, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 90 ( Ky. 1996 ).

The plain language of this section and KRS 189A.103 prohibit compelled body searches of a DUI suspect following a refusal to take a blood test, unless death or physical injury are involved. Combs v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 161, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 33 ( Ky. 1998 ), limited, Commonwealth v. Lopez, 3 S.W.3d 351, 1999 Ky. LEXIS 136 ( Ky. 1999 ).

Implied consent warning contained in KRS 189A.105 , although inaccurate in this case, was not so defective as to prejudice a suspected drunk driver’s decision-making process since there was no constitutional right to refuse to submit to a test to determine blood alcohol concentration. Commonwealth v. Hernandez-Gonzalez, 72 S.W.3d 914, 2002 Ky. LEXIS 14 ( Ky. 2002 ), modified, 2002 Ky. LEXIS 85 (Ky. May 16, 2002).

Where defendant failed to produce any evidence that defendant did not understand defendant’s rights as read in English, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence. Bautista v. Commonwealth, 2003 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 79 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2003).

Trial court properly held that the Commonwealth could not penalize defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood test as provided in this section because that result was not allowed under Birchfield. Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 628 S.W.3d 18, 2021 Ky. LEXIS 131 ( Ky. 2021 ).

Trial court properly held that defendant’s refusal to consent to a blood test could not be used against him under this section as evidence of his guilt of driving under the influence because Birchfield established that a DUI defendant had a constitutional right to withhold consent to a blood test. Under Deno, use of defendant’s now-constitutionally-recognized right to refuse a blood test as evidence of guilt of DUI was improper. Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 628 S.W.3d 18, 2021 Ky. LEXIS 131 ( Ky. 2021 ).

2.Search Warrant.

Subsection (2)(b) directs all executive branch employees, including police, not to seek a search warrant where injury or death does not result from a drunk driving offense. Combs v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 161, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 33 ( Ky. 1998 ), limited, Commonwealth v. Lopez, 3 S.W.3d 351, 1999 Ky. LEXIS 136 ( Ky. 1999 ).

Where there is death or physical injury and the offender has been charged with a qualifying offense, if there is a refusal to take the test, KRS 189A.105 applies and a search warrant may be obtained; however, where there is death or physical injury but no charge has yet been brought, KRS 189A.105 (2)(b) does not apply and traditional search and seizure principles control. Commonwealth v. Morriss, 70 S.W.3d 419, 2002 Ky. LEXIS 46 ( Ky. 2002 ).

The trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress blood and urine tests; defendant refused to take a blood test and there was a death and physical injury involved, and he was not yet charged when the test was sought, and therefore KRS 189A.105 did not apply, but rather traditional search and seizure rules applied. Commonwealth v. Morriss, 70 S.W.3d 419, 2002 Ky. LEXIS 46 ( Ky. 2002 ).

In a defendant’s trial for murder resulting from a fatality wherein defendant was accused of driving under the influence of liquor, the refusal of the trial court to suppress defendant’s blood alcohol test results was not in error, despite the arresting officer erroneously informing defendant that he was prohibited from contacting an attorney until and unless he agreed to take the test, where a search warrant was properly obtained and served upon defendant pursuant to KRS 189A.105(2)(b) as a result of defendant being charged with a qualifying offense that had resulted in death, which caused the issue of erroneously having been denied the opportunity to contact counsel to become moot as the issuance of the warrant rendered such wrongful refusal harmless; defendant also made no incriminating statements at the hospital. Cook v. Commonwealth, 129 S.W.3d 351, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 76 ( Ky. 2004 ).

Implied consent law permitted the police to take a blood test of a driver who was unconscious without obtaining a warrant; however, the warrantless testing was permissible only if the police had probable cause to believe that the unconscious driver had been driving while under the influence of alcohol. If the police lacked probable cause and only took the blood test because the accident in which the driver was involved resulted in fatalities, then the testing violated the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. Helton v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 555, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 186 ( Ky. 2009 ).

Affidavit and resulting court order were not defective due to the officer’s citation of subsection (3)(b), which was not in the statute, instead of subsection (2)(b) because it was not a substantial deficiency because the officer included language taken directly from the correct statute, and therefore his reference to subsection (3)(b) was nothing more than a simple typographical error. Whitlow v. Commonwealth, 575 S.W.3d 663, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 205 ( Ky. 2019 ).

3.Evidence of Refusal.

Though an arresting officer’s violation of KRS 189A.105(3) in refusing defendant’s request to contact an attorney before taking a blood alcohol level test rendered defendant’s refusal involuntary, the trial court’s error in admitting defendant’s refusal as evidence of his intoxication was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in a case of first impression in Kentucky where the evidence of defendant’s intoxication at the time of a collision that caused the death of a pregnant woman was overwhelming as defendant had admitted to the arresting officer that he had been drinking all day, he smelled of alcohol, was unsteady on his feet, and slurred his speech, the videotape of the field sobriety tests permitted the jurors to observe defendant’s intoxicated condition for themselves, and the result of the trial finding defendant guilty of wanton murder would not have been any different had the evidence of defendant’s refusal to take the test been excluded. Cook v. Commonwealth, 129 S.W.3d 351, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 76 ( Ky. 2004 ).

Defendant refused to submit to a breath test; such a refusal was admissible pursuant to KRS 189A.105(2)(a)(1). Hoppenjans v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 290, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 240 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

4.Blood Sample for Medical Treatment.

Commonwealth was entitled to a patient’s blood test results from a hospital for purposes of prosecuting a driving under the influence case against the patient where the patient had consented to a blood sample for purposes of medical treatment; nothing in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C.S. § 201 et seq., or regulations under that Act required a balancing test. Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 205 S.W.3d 230, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 97 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

5.Right to Contact Attorney.

Since the “right” described by KRS 189A.105(3) was very circumscribed, as it was merely the right to an opportunity to attempt to contact and communicate with an attorney, and the statute specifically avoided creating a right to have counsel present, KRS 189A.105(3) and RCr 2.14 were not violated. Litteral v. Commonwealth, 282 S.W.3d 331, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 388 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Officer’s actions in dialing telephone numbers for attorneys provided by defendant before administering an Intoxilyzer test, instead of allowing defendant to dial the telephone himself, was not improper because KRS 189A.105(3) did not require law enforcement to allow defendants to dial the telephone; the officer testified that he would have allowed defendant to listen to the telephone as it was ringing, if defendant had asked, and defendant provided no contrary evidence. It was proper for the local telephone book to be provided to defendant, as there were attorneys’ telephone numbers listed, but the officer did not need to provide any further means for defendant to obtain an attorney’s telephone number. Bhattacharya v. Commonwealth, 292 S.W.3d 901, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 123 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Defendant’s motion to suppress the results of a breathalyzer test due to an alleged violation of KRS 189A.105(3) was improperly denied, as defendant’s right to contact and communicate with defendant’s attorney was frustrated by the state action of frustrating defendant’s ability to use defendant’s cell phone that contained the attorney’s number. Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 362 S.W.3d 341, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 107 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

In a DUI case, the circuit court did not err by suppressing defendant’s breath test results because his statutory right to contact an attorney under KRS 189A.105(3) was denied when the police refused to allow him to contact his daughter to obtain his attorney’s telephone number. Commonwealth v. Bedway, 2012 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1043 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2012), rev'd, 466 S.W.3d 468, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1741 ( Ky. 2015 ).

With respect to access to legal counsel during breath testing under KRS 189A.105(3), the legislature has bestowed the right to at least attempt to seek the advice of counsel. Ignoring the mandates of the informed consent statute without fear of suppression would render the statute meaningless and incentivize law enforcement practices that do not conform to the legislature’s mandate. Commonwealth v. Bedway, 2012 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1043 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2012), rev'd, 466 S.W.3d 468, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1741 ( Ky. 2015 ).

Law enforcement must make a reasonable effort to accommodate a suspect in his attempt to contact an attorney under KRS 189A.105(3) before submitting to a breath test, which can include permitting him to obtain contact information through a third party; under the totality of the circumstances, a trial court must determine whether this right is reasonably facilitated. Factors to include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) time of day; (2) whether the suspect is attempting to obtain the numbers of a specific attorney whom he knows personally, or knows by reputation; (3) whether the suspect affirmatively states that a third party has an attorney phone number not available in the phonebook; and (4) whether the request is timely. Commonwealth v. Bedway, 2012 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1043 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2012), rev'd, 466 S.W.3d 468, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1741 ( Ky. 2015 ).

Pursuant to this section, defendant should have been permitted to reasonably effectuate his right to attempt to contact an attorney prior to submitted to the breathalyzer test and his request for his cell phone to call his daughter and obtain the number of an attorney she had used before was reasonable and should have been accommodated. Commonwealth v. Bedway, 466 S.W.3d 468, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1741 ( Ky. 2015 ).

Court did not err in failing to provide defendant with a reasonable opportunity to contact his attorney because the court found that defendant had not communicated to the officer that he wanted to contact his wife for the purpose of obtaining an attorney’s telephone number; the statute did not provide a defendant an attempt to contact a non-attorney. Longwell v. Commonwealth, 2021 Ky. App. LEXIS 106 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2021).

6.Petition for Reduction of Revocation Denied.

An individual arrested for DUI who refuses to take a breathalyzer test may petition the court to reduce the mandatory revocation period for his license. Commonwealth, Transp. Cabinet v. Tarter, 802 S.W.2d 944, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 141 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (decided under prior law) (Contrary to OAG 88-41 ).

7.Request.

The request of a police officer for a motorist who has been arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol to submit to test of blood, breath, urine or saliva should have been phrased as to call for a response which, if negative, was a refusal instead of a mere declination. Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Safety v. Powers, 453 S.W.2d 260, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 298 ( Ky. 1970 ) (decided under prior law).

The word “request” in former law regarding consent to test for alcohol in the blood while operating a vehicle in Kentucky meant to demand rather than to offer. Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Safety v. Powers, 453 S.W.2d 260, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 298 ( Ky. 1970 ) (decided under prior law).

Where the words used by the officers were calculated to convey to the arrested driver the thought that to take the test was a privilege being offered him rather than a waiver of protection on the giving of evidence against his interests, there was no “request” within the meaning of former law regarding consent to test for alcohol in blood of motorist. Commonwealth, Dep't of Public Safety v. Powers, 453 S.W.2d 260, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 298 ( Ky. 1970 ) (decided under prior law).

Where police officers request a driver to submit to a blood alcohol test and warn him that his license will be suspended if he refuses the test, they have complied with type of request required by former law regarding consent to test for alcohol in blood by motorist. Craig v. Commonwealth Dep't of Public Safety, 471 S.W.2d 11, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 222 ( Ky. 1971 ) (decided under prior law).

Suppression of a blood alcohol concentration result collected from defendant, a Spanish-speaking person suspected of drunk driving, was not required because the arresting officer’s reading of the implied consent warning to defendant in English satisfied Kentucky’s implied consent law. Furthermore, when given the option, defendant weighed whether to contact an attorney, ultimately choosing not to do so. Commonwealth ex rel. Logan Cty. Atty. v. Williams, 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 167 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2019), rev'd, 630 S.W.3d 714, 2021 Ky. LEXIS 367 ( Ky. 2021 ).

8.Procedure.

A sworn report by the arresting officer was mandatory to begin the license revocation process pursuant to former law that provided for revocation of driver’s license for refusing consent to test alcohol in blood. While the swearing need not be the formal procedure used in courts to swear in witnesses, there should have been a positive statement by the officer that the report contains the truth and was sufficient so long as the affiant appeared before the notary and signed the document or acknowledged the signature in the presence of a notary while being aware that the affidavit was to be accepted and processed as a sworn document. Therefore, where the officer had failed to sign the affidavit in the presence of a notary the Transportation Cabinet had no authority to hold a hearing or issue a final order on defendant’s license revocation. Commonwealth, Transp. Cabinet, Dep't of Vehicle Regulation v. Williams, 833 S.W.2d 385, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 144 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (decided under prior law).

Defendant’s combative and belligerent conduct on the date of her arrest for driving under the influence did not amount to a refusal to submit to an intoxilyzer examination because the reading of the implied consent warning was mandatory under KRS 189A.105(2)(a); the officers did not do so even though defendant was not required to listen to the warning. Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 308 S.W.3d 720, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 63 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).

Circuit court properly reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress the results of an intoxilyzer test because the excessive cost of the blood test charged by a medical school deprived defendant of the opportunity to challenge the results in a meaningful fashion and hindered his fundamental right to due process to develop and present any exculpatory evidence in his own defense where the Legislature afforded him—in mandatory language—the right to the test. Commonwealth v. Riker, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 450 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2017), rev'd, 573 S.W.3d 622, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 530 ( Ky. 2018 ).

Trial court improperly concluded that defendant did not give express consent to blood alcohol testing. The Commonwealth offered sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proving voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Brown, 560 S.W.3d 873, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 143 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

Police officer satisfied his duties under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 189A.105(4) where he informed defendant of his right to have an independent blood test performed, specifically asked whether defendant wanted the test, and made reasonable efforts to provide transportation, and although the cost of the test was concerning, defendant failed to identify any additional assistance by the officer that could have resulted in defendant obtaining the test. Commonwealth v. Riker, 573 S.W.3d 622, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 530 ( Ky. 2018 ).

Circuit court erred in granting defendant’s motion to suppress her blood test following her arrest for DUI as involuntary because the information to be given and the warnings about the consequences of refusing or submitting to a test were statutorily provided, which included the doubling of mandatory minimum sentences for refusing consent, and defendant validly offered her consent after being read the implied consent warnings. Commonwealth v. Combs, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 121 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2020), vacated, 2021 Ky. LEXIS 284 (Ky. Aug. 26, 2021).

Cited:

Combs v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 161, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 33 ( Ky. 1998 ); Barker v. Commonwealth, 32 S.W.3d 515, 2000 Ky. App. LEXIS 111 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000).

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Burk and Bartley, Kentucky Criminal Law Survey: Driving Under the Influence, 30 N. Ky. L. Rev. 108 (2003).

189A.107. License suspension for refusal to take alcohol or substance tests — Hearing on alleged refusal — Time period for suspension — Notice to Transportation Cabinet.

  1. A person who refuses to submit to an alcohol concentration or substance test requested by an officer having reasonable grounds to believe that the person violated KRS 189A.010(1) shall have his or her driver’s license suspended during the pendency of the action as provided in KRS 189A.200 .
    1. In the event a defendant is not convicted of a violation of KRS 189A.010(1) in a case in which it is alleged that he or she refused to take an alcohol concentration or substance test, upon motion of the attorney for the Commonwealth, the court shall conduct a hearing, without a jury, to determine by clear and convincing evidence if the person actually refused the testing. However, the hearing shall not be required if the court has made a previous determination of the issue at a hearing held under KRS 189A.200 and 189A.220 . (2) (a) In the event a defendant is not convicted of a violation of KRS 189A.010(1) in a case in which it is alleged that he or she refused to take an alcohol concentration or substance test, upon motion of the attorney for the Commonwealth, the court shall conduct a hearing, without a jury, to determine by clear and convincing evidence if the person actually refused the testing. However, the hearing shall not be required if the court has made a previous determination of the issue at a hearing held under KRS 189A.200 and 189A.220 .
    2. If the court finds that the person did refuse to submit to the testing, the court shall suspend the person’s driver’s license for the period of time the license would have been suspended upon conviction as set forth in KRS 189A.070(1), except that the court may authorize the person to apply to the Transportation Cabinet for issuance of an ignition interlock license under KRS 189A.340 for the period of the suspension.
    3. When the court orders the suspension of a person’s license pursuant to this subsection, the person shall surrender the license in the same manner prescribed by KRS 189A.200(4). In addition, notice of the suspension shall be immediately transmitted to the Transportation Cabinet.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 16, effective July 1, 1991; 2000, ch. 467, § 10, effective October 1, 2000; 2015 ch. 124, § 6, effective June 24, 2015; 2019 ch. 103, § 10, effective July 1, 2020.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Challenge of Law.

Expiration of the six month suspension term did not bar motorist’s challenge to constitutionality of implied consent statute since the requisite injury resulting from the putatively illegal action was the denial of due process by revocation of motorist’s driver’s license prior to administrative hearing. Slone v. Kentucky Dep't of Transp., 379 F. Supp. 652, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7493 (E.D. Ky. 1974 ), aff'd, 513 F.2d 1189, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15342 (6th Cir. Ky. 1975 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A prosecutor may properly agree to the ninety day suspension versus a six months suspension for refusal to take a breathalyzer test when a defendant pleads guilty to a drunk driving charge, if the guilty plea is entered before the trial judge determines that defendant refused to submit to a blood alcohol test. OAG 92-158 .

189A.110. Minimum detention in custody when blood alcohol reading exceeds .15 percent.

Any person who is arrested for a violation of KRS 189A.010 and who, upon blood alcohol testing, shows a blood alcohol reading above .15 percent shall be detained in custody at least four (4) hours following his arrest.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 165, § 11, effective July 13, 1984.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A blood alcohol reading need not be .16 percent in order to trigger this section; a blood alcohol reading of any amount over .15 percent will bring this section into play in order to detain a person in custody for DUI at least four hours following his arrest. OAG 94-19 .

189A.120. Prosecutor’s duties with regard to amendment of charges — Amendment of blood alcohol concentration — Record of charges and amendments.

  1. When an alcohol concentration for a person twenty-one (21) years of age or older in a prosecution for violation of KRS 189A.010 is 0.08 or above, is 0.02 or above for a person under the age of twenty-one (21), or when the defendant, regardless of age, has refused to take an alcohol concentration or substance test, a prosecuting attorney shall not agree to the amendment of the charge to a lesser offense and shall oppose the amendment of the charge at trial, unless all prosecution witnesses are, and it is expected they will continue to be, unavailable for trial.
  2. A prosecuting attorney shall not amend a blood alcohol concentration, and he or she shall oppose the amendment of the percentage, unless uncontroverted scientific evidence is presented that the test results were in error. In those cases, the prosecutor shall state his or her reasons for agreeing with the amendment, and the scientific data upon which the amendment was made shall be made a part of the record in this case.
  3. The record of charges and disposition thereof, including reasons for amending the charges, shall be transmitted by the court to the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet for inclusion in the centralized criminal history record information system under KRS 17.150 .

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 165, § 12, effective July 13, 1984; 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 17, effective July 1, 1991; 1996, ch. 198, § 13, effective October 1, 1996; 2000, ch. 467, § 11, effective October 1, 2000; 2007, ch. 85, § 215, effective June 26, 2007.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Amendment Prohibited.

Order allowing the Commonwealth to amend to reduce a fourth-offense operating a motor vehicle under the influence (DUI) charge to a second-offense DUI in order to avoid impermissible double enhancements was error because defendant had refused to submit to an alcohol concentration test, and, thus, such a motion to amend was prohibited by KRS 189A.120(1); clearly, by moving to amend, the Commonwealth had improperly agreed to the amendment. Nothing in KRS 189A.120(1) led to the conclusion that the Commonwealth was only prohibited from concurring in a defense motion to amend while remaining free to seek such an amendment on its own. Jones v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 522, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 65 ( Ky. 2009 ).

189A.130. Assessment of fines — Response to nonpayment.

Fines levied pursuant to this chapter shall be assessed in the manner required by KRS 534. 020 (but in amounts consistent with this chapter) and the response to nonpayment of fines shall be governed by KRS 534.020 and 534.060 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 165, § 20(24), effective July 13, 1984; 2017 ch. 158, § 11, effective June 29, 2017.

189A.200. Pretrial suspension of license of person charged with driving under the influence for refusing to take test, for being a repeat offender, and for causing accident resulting in death or serious physical injury to another person — Hearing — Length of suspension — When application for ignition interlock license required.

  1. The court shall at the arraignment or as soon as such relevant information becomes available suspend the motor vehicle operator’s license and motorcycle operator’s license and driving privileges of any person charged with a violation of KRS 189A.010(1) who:
    1. Has refused to take an alcohol concentration or substance test as reflected on the uniform citation form;
    2. Has been convicted of one (1) or more prior offenses as described in KRS 189A.010(5)(e) or has had his or her operator’s license suspended on one (1) or more occasions for refusing to take an alcohol concentration or substance test, in the ten (10) year period immediately preceding his or her arrest; or
    3. Was involved in an accident that resulted in death or serious physical injury as defined in KRS 500.080 to a person other than the defendant.
  2. Persons whose licenses have been suspended pursuant to this section may file a motion for judicial review of the suspension, and the court shall conduct the review in accordance with this chapter within thirty (30) days after the filing of the motion. The court shall, at the time of the suspension, advise the defendant of his rights to the review.
  3. When the court orders the suspension of a license pursuant to:
    1. Subsection (1)(a) of this section, the court may, in addition to any other conditions the court may order, require that the person apply to the Transportation Cabinet for issuance of an ignition interlock license under KRS 189A.340 for the period of the suspension;
    2. Subsection (1)(b) or (c) of this section, the court shall, in addition to any other conditions the court may order, require that the person apply to the Transportation Cabinet for issuance of an ignition interlock license under KRS 189A.340 for the period of suspension; and
    3. Subsection (1) of this section and the person is required to apply for an ignition interlock license pursuant to paragraph (a) or (b) of this subsection, the person shall present the completed ignition interlock license application to the court
  4. When the court orders the suspension of a license pursuant to this section, the defendant shall immediately surrender his or her license to operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle to the court. Should the defendant fail to surrender his or her license to the court, the court shall issue an order directing the sheriff or any other peace officer to seize the license forthwith and deliver it to the court. If the license is currently under suspension, the provisions of this subsection shall not apply.
  5. The Circuit Court Clerk shall forthwith transmit to the Transportation Cabinet:
    1. Any license surrendered pursuant to this section; and
    2. If the court ordered a person to apply for an ignition interlock device under subsection (3) of this section, notification of the order.
  6. Licenses suspended under this section shall remain suspended until:
    1. The person is acquitted;
    2. All pending or current charges relating to a violation of KRS 189A.010 have been dismissed; or
    3. The person is convicted and the Transportation Cabinet has suspended his or her license pursuant to KRS 189A.070 ; but in no event for a period longer than the license suspension period applicable to the person under KRS 189A.070 or 189A.107 .
  7. Any person whose operator’s license has been suspended pursuant to this section shall be given credit for all pretrial suspension time against the period of suspension imposed under KRS 189A.070 .

History. Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 9, effective July 1, 1991; 1996, ch. 198, § 14, effective October 1, 1996; 2000, ch. 467, § 13, effective October 1, 2000; 2015 ch. 124, § 7, effective June 24, 2015; 2016 ch. 85, § 4, effective April 9, 2016; 2019 ch. 103, § 11, effective July 1, 2020.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(4/9/2016). 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 85, sec. 10 provided that that Act shall be known as the Brianna Taylor Act. This statute was amended in Section 4 of that Act.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Constitutionality.

Suspension of appellants’ driver’s licenses, prior to their trials for DUI, did not constitute criminal punishment, per se, and consequently the double jeopardy clause did not apply to their subsequent trials. Hourigan v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 860, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 11 ( Ky. 1998 ).

2.Hearing.

Where motorist was unjustly accused by arresting officer’s affidavit of declining the test, the failure to accord him a pre-revocation hearing unconstitutionally denied motorist an opportunity to demonstrate compliance with the implied consent statute. Slone v. Kentucky Dep’t of Transp., 379 F. Supp. 652, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7493 (E.D. Ky. 1974 ), aff’d, 513 F.2d 1189, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15342 (6th Cir. 1975), aff’d, Slone v. Kentucky Dep’t of Transp., 513 F.2d 1189, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15342 (6th Cir. 1975) (decided under prior law).

A driver’s license is an entitlement protected by the fourteenth amendment guarantee of a pre-termination hearing and the state’s interest in highway safety does not justify its failure to offer a hearing prior to revocation of such license. Slone v. Kentucky Dep’t of Transp., 379 F. Supp. 652, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7493 (E.D. Ky. 1974 ), aff’d, 513 F.2d 1189, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15342 (6th Cir. 1975), aff’d, Slone v. Kentucky Dep’t of Transp., 513 F.2d 1189, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15342 (6th Cir. 1975) (decided under prior law).

A trial-type hearing to determine the adjudicative facts, necessary to decide the issue of whether to revoke a license is required by due process; the requisite elements of such a hearing include an actual hearing, the taking and weighing of evidence, a finding of fact based upon an evaluation of the evidence, and conclusions of law supported by substantial evidence, and cross-examination of witnesses is required as part of the taking and weighing of evidence element. Wyatt v. Transportation Cabinet, 796 S.W.2d 872, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 146 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (decided under prior law).

3.Testimony.

It was not constitutionally necessary to have the breathalyzer operator testify at a revocation hearing where a different officer arrested defendant; although having the operator testify would be the better procedure, it is not necessary since defendant could cross-examine the arresting officer who was present at all relevant times and could testify as to the facts of the refusal, even if he was unable to quote them verbatim. Wyatt v. Transportation Cabinet, 796 S.W.2d 872, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 146 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (decided under prior law).

4.Circuit Court Ruling.

The circuit court erred in reversing a Transportation Cabinet’s decision to suspend a driver’s license due to the cabinet’s failure to file a copy of the secretary’s ruling; neither party was truly prejudiced by the failure to file the ruling, as both sides had access to the report. Commonwealth Transp. Cabinet Dep't of Vehicle Regulation v. Cornell, 796 S.W.2d 591, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 132 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (decided under prior law).

5.Revocation of Driver's License.

A state does not have complete discretion regarding revocation of driver’s licenses, but must afford drivers procedural due process. Wyatt v. Transportation Cabinet, 796 S.W.2d 872, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 146 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (decided under prior law).

The revocation of a driver’s license of driver who refuses breathalyzer test is not a criminal proceeding, and as a result, the totality of rights of a criminal defendant are not necessarily available to such an individual. Wyatt v. Transportation Cabinet, 796 S.W.2d 872, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 146 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (decided under prior law).

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Wintersheimer, State Constitutional Law Survey, 21 N. Ky. L. Rev. 257 (1994).

Rankin and Muehlenkamp, 1993 Kentucky Criminal Law Update, 21 N. Ky. L. Rev. 311 (1994).

189A.210. Duty of court clerk to obtain defendant’s driving history record upon arrest for driving while impaired.

When a defendant is arrested upon a charge of violating KRS 189A.010(1), the court clerk shall obtain forthwith the information from the defendant’s driving history record and make it a part of the record of the case.

History. Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 23, effective July 1, 1991.

189A.220. Judicial review of pretrial license suspension for test refusal.

In any judicial review of a pretrial suspension imposed for refusal to take an alcohol concentration or substance test under KRS 189A.200(1)(a), if the court determines, by the preponderance of the evidence, that:

  1. The person was charged and arrested by a peace officer with violation of KRS 189A.010(1);
  2. The officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of KRS 189A.010(1);
  3. The person was advised of the implied consent law pursuant to KRS 189A.105 ;
  4. The peace officer requested the person to take the test or tests pursuant to KRS 189A.103 ; and
  5. The person refused to take a test requested by a peace officer pursuant to KRS 189A.103 ;

then the court shall continue the suspension of the person’s operator’s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle during the pendency of the proceedings, but in no event for a period longer than the license suspension period applicable to the person under KRS 189A.070 and 189A.107 .

History. Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 10, effective July 1, 1991; 2000, ch. 467, § 14, effective October 1, 2000; 2019 ch. 103, § 12, effective July 1, 2020.

189A.230. Judicial review of pretrial license suspension for person under twenty-one. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 11, effective July 1, 1991) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 198, § 19, effective October 1, 1996.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/96). Under 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 198, sec. 20, the repeal of this statute by Section 19 of that Act becomes effective October 1, 1996.

189A.240. Judicial review of pretrial license suspension for repeat offender.

In any judicial review of a pretrial suspension imposed under KRS 189A.200(1)(b), if the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that:

  1. The person was charged and arrested by a peace officer with a violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e);
  2. The peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e);
  3. There is probable cause to believe that the person committed the violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) as charged; and
  4. The person has been convicted of one (1) or more prior offenses as described in KRS 189A.010(5)(e) or has had his or her motor vehicle operator’s license suspended on one (1) or more occasions for refusing to take an alcohol concentration or substance test, in the ten (10) year period immediately preceding his or her arrest;

then the court shall continue to suspend the person’s operator’s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle, but in no event for a period longer than the license suspension period applicable to the person under KRS 189A.070 and 189A.107 . The provisions of this section shall not be construed as limiting the person’s ability to challenge any prior convictions or license suspensions or refusals.

History. Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 12, effective July 1, 1991; 1996, ch. 198, § 15, effective October 1, 1996; 2000, ch. 467, § 21, effective October 1, 2000; 2010, ch. 149, § 24, effective July 15, 2010; 2015 ch. 124, § 13, effective June 24, 2015; 2016 ch. 85, § 5, effective April 9, 2016; 2019 ch. 103, § 13, effective July 1, 2020.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(4/9/2016). 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 85, sec. 10 provided that that Act shall be known as the Brianna Taylor Act. This statute was amended in Section 5 of that Act.

189A.250. Judicial review of pretrial suspension for causing an accident resulting in death or serious physical injury to another person.

In any judicial review of a pretrial suspension imposed under KRS 189A.200(1)(c), if the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that:

  1. The person was charged and arrested by a peace officer with violation of KRS 189A.010 ;
  2. The officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of KRS 189A.010 ;
  3. There is probable cause to believe that the person committed the violation of KRS 189A.010(1) as charged; and
  4. There is probable cause to believe that the person was involved in an accident that resulted in death or serious physical injury as defined in KRS 500.080 to a person other than the defendant;

then the court shall continue the suspension of the person’s operator’s license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle during the pendency of the proceedings, but in no event for a period longer than the license suspension period applicable to the person under KRS 189A.070 and 189A.107 .

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 467, § 15, effective October 1, 2000; 2015 ch. 124, § 14, effective June 24, 2015; 2019 ch. 103, § 14, effective July 1, 2020.

189A.300. Provision of alcohol test instruments to counties.

The Commonwealth shall provide at least one (1) breath alcohol analysis and simulating unit for each county, paid for by state funds received pursuant to the service fee levied in KRS 189A.050 . All units shall be approved by the secretary of the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet or his or her designee.

History. Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 8, effective July 1, 1991; 2007, ch. 85, § 216, effective June 26, 2007.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.In general.

In prosecution for driving under the influence it was not necessary that the Secretary of the Justice Cabinet approve the individual model of the unit used to administer defendant’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC) test, pursuant to this section, specific language of the statute requires the Secretary or his designee to approve all units; thus it was sufficient that the type of unit used to administer defendant’s test had been approved by the Secretary and a lab technician for the Commonwealth testified that he had inspected the instrument just 12 days prior to defendant’s arrest. Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 949 S.W.2d 621, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 176 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

189A.310. Attacking admissibility of prior convictions to enhance penalties — Procedure — Standard.

  1. A court may, upon application of the defendant or attorney for the Commonwealth or upon its own motion, and if the facts of the case so indicate, order that a prior conviction not meeting applicable case law regarding admissibility of a prior conviction cannot be used to enhance criminal penalties including license suspensions or revocations, or for other purposes for which such a conviction might be used.
  2. The Transportation Cabinet shall give full faith and credit to any court decision meeting the requirements of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 14, effective July 1, 1991; 2000, ch. 467, § 16, effective October 1, 2000.

189A.320. Court reporting of convictions and license revocations to Transportation Cabinet. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 15, effective July 1, 1991; repealed by 2019 ch. 103, § 25, effective July 1, 2020.

189A.330. Reporting by clerk of cases pending more than ninety days — Actions by Attorney General and Chief Justice.

  1. The clerk of the court in which hearings for violation of KRS 189A.010 are heard shall report to the Administrative Office of the Courts on or within five (5) working days of January 1, April 1, July 1, and October 1 of each year the cases involving violations of KRS 189A.010 which have not resulted in a final ruling by the court within one hundred eighty (180) days of the date upon which the person was charged with a violation of KRS 189A.010.
  2. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall forward a copy of the lists of these cases to the Chief Justice and the Office of the Attorney General.
  3. Upon a determination that there is sufficient cause, the Office of the Attorney General may appoint a special prosecutor or prosecutors to assist in the disposition of these cases within a reasonable time period.
  4. The Chief Justice may take actions deemed necessary and reasonable to facilitate the resolution of these cases within a reasonable time period.

History. Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 18, effective July 1, 1991; 2016 ch. 85, § 6, effective April 9, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(4/9/2016). 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 85, sec. 10 provided that that Act shall be known as the Brianna Taylor Act. This statute was amended in Section 6 of that Act.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Wiederstein, Firm Hearing and Trial Dates: A Partial Answer to Reducing Delay in the Courts, Vol. 70, No. 3, May 2006, Ky. Bench & Bar 18.

Ignition Interlock Licenses and Devices

189A.340. Ignition interlock licenses — Provider fees.

    1. If a person’s license is suspended pursuant to this chapter and the initial suspension was for a violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), (b), (e), or (f), the sole license the person shall be eligible for is an ignition interlock license pursuant to this section. (1) (a) If a person’s license is suspended pursuant to this chapter and the initial suspension was for a violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), (b), (e), or (f), the sole license the person shall be eligible for is an ignition interlock license pursuant to this section.
    2. If a person’s license is suspended pursuant to this chapter and the initial suspension was for a violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(c) or (d), the person shall be eligible for an ignition interlock license pursuant to this section and may be eligible for a hardship license pursuant to KRS 189A.410 .
    1. A person may apply for an ignition interlock license anytime, including after receiving the notices under KRS 189A.105 or after his or her license has been suspended pursuant to this chapter. (2) (a) A person may apply for an ignition interlock license anytime, including after receiving the notices under KRS 189A.105 or after his or her license has been suspended pursuant to this chapter.
    2. If at the time the person applies for an ignition interlock license, the person’s license has been suspended pursuant to this chapter, the person shall be authorized to drive to:
      1. An ignition interlock device provider to have a functioning ignition interlock device installed in his or her motor vehicle or motorcycle; and
      2. The Transportation Cabinet to obtain an ignition interlock license; This paragraph shall only apply within fourteen (14) days of the date printed on the ignition interlock approval letter issued by the Transportation Cabinet and if the person has the ignition interlock approval letter in the motor vehicle or motorcycle.
  1. Before the Transportation Cabinet shall issue an ignition interlock license, the person shall:
    1. Submit an application for an ignition interlock license;
    2. Provide proof of motor vehicle insurance;
    3. Provide an ignition interlock certificate of installation issued by an ignition interlock device provider; and
    4. Provide any other information required by administrative regulations promulgated by the Transportation Cabinet under KRS 189A.350 .
  2. An ignition interlock license shall restrict the person to operating only a motor vehicle or motorcycle equipped with a functioning ignition interlock device, unless the person qualifies for an employer exemption under subsection (6) of this section. This restriction shall remain in place for:
    1. If a person’s license was suspended pretrial pursuant to KRS 189A.200 , the required suspension period under KRS 189A.200 (6);
    2. If a person’s license was suspended pursuant to KRS 189A.070 or 189A.107 :
      1. The required suspension period under KRS 189A.070 (1); and
        1. If the maximum suspension period under KRS 189A.070(1)(a) has not yet been met, until the Transportation Cabinet has received a declaration from the person’s ignition interlock device provider, in a form provided or approved by the cabinet, certifying that none of the violations outlined in subdivision b. of this subparagraph has occurred: 2. a. If the maximum suspension period under KRS 189A.070(1)(a) has not yet been met, until the Transportation Cabinet has received a declaration from the person’s ignition interlock device provider, in a form provided or approved by the cabinet, certifying that none of the violations outlined in subdivision b. of this subparagraph has occurred:
          1. For a first offense within a ten (10) year period of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) or for any offense of KRS 189A.010(1)(f), in the ninety (90) consecutive days; and
          2. For all subsequent offenses within a ten (10) year period of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e), one hundred twenty (120) consecutive days; prior to the date of releasing the ignition interlock device restriction.
        2. If any of the following occur, it shall be a violation of the ninety (90) or one hundred twenty (120) consecutive day requirement:
          1. Failure to take any random breath alcohol concentration test unless a review of the digital image confirms that the motor vehicle or motorcycle was not occupied by a driver at the time of the missed test;
          2. Failure to pass any random retest with a breath alcohol concentration of 0.02 or lower unless a subsequent test performed within ten (10) minutes registers a breath alcohol concentration lower than 0.02, and the digital image confirms the same person provided both samples;
          3. Failure of the person, or his or her designee, to appear at the ignition interlock device provider when required for maintenance, repair, calibration, monitoring, inspection, or replacement of the device;
          4. Failure of the person to pay fees established pursuant to subsection (7) of this section;
          5. Tampering with an installed ignition interlock device with the intent of rendering it defective; or
          6. Altering, concealing, hiding, or attempting to alter, conceal, or hide, the person’s identity from the ignition interlock device’s camera while providing a breath sample;
    3. If a person’s license was suspended pursuant to KRS 189A.090 , for the required suspension period under KRS 189A.090 (2); or
    4. If a person’s license suspension was extended pursuant to KRS 189A.345 , the required suspension period under KRS 189A.345 (1).
    1. The time period a person: (5) (a) The time period a person:
      1. Holds a valid ignition interlock license pursuant to this section; or
      2. Receives alcohol or substance abuse treatment in an inpatient residential facility;

        shall apply on a day-for-day basis toward satisfying the suspension periods detailed in subsection (4) of this section.

    2. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subsection, the Transportation Cabinet shall give the person a day-for-day credit for any time period the person:
      1. Held a valid ignition interlock license; or
      2. Received alcohol or substance abuse treatment in an inpatient residential facility.
    3. A person shall not receive day-for-day credit for days the person utilized the employer exemption in accordance with subsection (6) of this section and drove an employer’s motor vehicle or motorcycle not equipped with a functioning ignition interlock device.
    1. A person with an ignition interlock license may operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle not equipped with a functioning ignition interlock device if: (6) (a) A person with an ignition interlock license may operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle not equipped with a functioning ignition interlock device if:
      1. The person is required to operate an employer’s motor vehicle or motorcycle in the course and scope of employment; and
      2. The business entity that owns the motor vehicle or motorcycle is not owned or controlled by the person.
    2. To qualify for the employer exemption, the person shall provide the Transportation Cabinet with a sworn statement from his or her employer stating that the person and business entity meet the requirements of paragraph (a) of this subsection.
    1. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subsection, an ignition interlock device provider may charge the following fees: (7) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subsection, an ignition interlock device provider may charge the following fees:
      1. An installation fee for an alternative fuel vehicle or a vehicle with a push button starter not to exceed one hundred thirty dollars ($130), an installation fee for all other vehicles not to exceed one hundred dollars ($100);
      2. A monthly fee not to exceed one hundred dollars ($100);
      3. A removal fee not to exceed thirty dollars ($30);
      4. A reset fee not to exceed fifty dollars ($50); or
      5. A missed appointment fee not to exceed thirty-five dollars ($35).
    2. A person who is issued an ignition interlock license shall pay fees as established in his or her lease agreement with the ignition interlock device provider for any ignition interlock device installed in his or her motor vehicle or motorcycle. However, the fees shall never be more than allowed under paragraph (a) of this subsection and are subject to paragraph (c) of this subsection.
    3. Any person who has an income:
      1. At or below two hundred percent (200%) but above one hundred fifty percent (150%) of the federal poverty guidelines, shall pay only seventy-five percent (75%) of fees established pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection;
      2. At or below one hundred fifty percent (150%) but above one hundred percent (100%) of the federal poverty guidelines, shall pay only fifty percent (50%) of fees established pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection; or
      3. At or below one hundred percent (100%) of the federal poverty guidelines, shall pay only twenty-five percent (25%) of fees established pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection; As used in this paragraph, “federal poverty guidelines” has the same meaning as in KRS 205.5621 . The Transportation Cabinet shall determine the person’s income and where that income places the person on the federal poverty guidelines.
    4. Neither the Commonwealth, the Transportation Cabinet, nor any unit of state or local government shall be responsible for payment of any costs associated with an ignition interlock device.
  3. For a person issued an ignition interlock license under this section who is residing outside of Kentucky, the Transportation Cabinet may accept an ignition interlock certificate of installation from an ignition interlock device provider authorized to do business in the state where the person resides if the ignition interlock device meets the requirements of that state.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 467, § 27, effective October 1, 2000; 2002, ch. 171, § 4, effective July 15, 2002; 2015 ch. 124, § 8, effective June 24, 2015; 2016 ch. 85, § 7, effective April 9, 2016; repealed and reenacted by 2019 ch. 103, § 15, effective July 1, 2020; 2020 ch. 51, § 27, effective July 1, 2020.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(4/9/2016). 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 85, sec. 10 provided that that Act shall be known as the Brianna Taylor Act. This statute was amended in Section 7 of that Act.

(6/24/2015). During codification, the Reviser of Statutes has changed the numbering of subsection (1) of this statute from the way it appeared in 2015 Ky. Acts ch. 124, sec. 8. None of the text of the subsection was changed.

(6/24/2015). During codification, the Reviser of Statutes has corrected a manifest clerical or typographical error in subsection (1) of this statute from the way it appeared in 2015 Ky. Acts ch. 24, sec. 8 by changing a citation to “ KRS 189A.010 (a), (b), (e), or (f)” to read “ KRS 189A.010 (1)(a), (b), (e), or (f).” None of the text of the subsection was changed.

189A.345. Prohibition against use of vehicle other than for purpose authorized by ignition interlock license — Penalties for unlawful acts relating to ignition interlock licenses and devices.

    1. No person who is issued an ignition interlock license under KRS 189A.340 shall operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle without a functioning ignition interlock device or at any time, place, or for any purpose other than authorized under KRS 189A.340 . (1) (a) No person who is issued an ignition interlock license under KRS 189A.340 shall operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle without a functioning ignition interlock device or at any time, place, or for any purpose other than authorized under KRS 189A.340.
    2. Any person who violates the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor, and shall have his or her license suspended by the Transportation Cabinet for the initial period of suspension under KRS 189A.070 for an additional six (6) months.
    1. No person who is issued an ignition interlock license under KRS 189A.340 shall request, permit, or allow another person to: (2) (a) No person who is issued an ignition interlock license under KRS 189A.340 shall request, permit, or allow another person to:
      1. Start a motor vehicle or motorcycle equipped with an ignition interlock device; or
      2. Take a subsequent breath alcohol concentration test; for the purpose of providing an operable motor vehicle or motorcycle for that person subject to the ignition interlock license to drive in violation of KRS 189A.340.
    2. Any person who violates paragraph (a) of this subsection shall:
      1. For a first offense, be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor; and
      2. For a second or subsequent offense, be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
    1. No person shall start a motor vehicle or motorcycle equipped with an ignition interlock device for the purpose of providing an operable motor vehicle or motorcycle to a person subject to the prohibition established in KRS 189A.340 . (3) (a) No person shall start a motor vehicle or motorcycle equipped with an ignition interlock device for the purpose of providing an operable motor vehicle or motorcycle to a person subject to the prohibition established in KRS 189A.340 .
    2. Any person who violates paragraph (a) of this subsection shall:
      1. For a first offense, be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor; and
      2. For a second or subsequent offense, be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
    1. No person shall: (4) (a) No person shall:
      1. Knowingly install a defective ignition interlock device on a motor vehicle or motorcycle;
      2. Tamper with an installed ignition interlock device with the intent of rendering it defective; or
      3. Alter, conceal, hide, or attempt to alter, conceal, or hide, the person’s identity from the ignition interlock device’s camera while providing a breath sample.
    2. Any person who violates paragraph (a) of this subsection shall:
      1. For a first offense, be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor; and
      2. For a second or subsequent offense, be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and be prohibited from installing ignition interlock devices or directing others in the installation of ignition interlock devices.
    1. No person shall direct another person to install a defective ignition interlock device on a motor vehicle or motorcycle when the person giving the direction knows that the ignition interlock device is defective. (5) (a) No person shall direct another person to install a defective ignition interlock device on a motor vehicle or motorcycle when the person giving the direction knows that the ignition interlock device is defective.
    2. Any person who violates paragraph (a) of this subsection shall:
      1. For a first offense, be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor; and
      2. For a second or subsequent offense, be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and be prohibited from directing others in the installation of ignition interlock devices or installing ignition interlock devices.
    1. No person shall knowingly assist a person who is issued an ignition interlock license in making a false statement in order to qualify for the employer exemption under KRS 189A.340(6). (6) (a) No person shall knowingly assist a person who is issued an ignition interlock license in making a false statement in order to qualify for the employer exemption under KRS 189A.340(6).
    2. Any person who violates paragraph (a) of this subsection, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and shall have his or her motor vehicle or motorcycle operator’s license suspended by the Transportation Cabinet for six (6) months.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 467, § 28, effective October 1, 2000; 2002, ch. 171, § 5, effective July 15, 2002; 2006, ch. 173, § 31, effective July 12, 2006; 2014, ch. 71, § 9, effective July 15, 2014; 2015 ch. 124, § 9, effective June 24, 2015; 2019 ch. 103, § 16, effective July 1, 2020.

189A.350. Administrative regulations promulgated by Transportation Cabinet for ignition interlock licenses devices, and providers — Certification of devices and device providers — Provider contract provisions — Transportation Cabinet’s power to require ignition interlock device providers to pay certain fees — Fees collected to be paid to ignition interlock administration fund.

    1. The Transportation Cabinet shall: (1) (a) The Transportation Cabinet shall:
      1. Issue ignition interlock license application forms and other forms necessary for the implementation of ignition interlock licenses;
      2. Create a uniform ignition interlock certificate of installation to be provided to a defendant by an ignition interlock provider upon installation of an ignition interlock device;
      3. Create an ignition interlock license. The ignition interlock license may be a regular driver’s or operator’s license with an ignition interlock restriction printed on the license;
      4. Require a person issued an ignition interlock license to maintain motor vehicle insurance for the duration of his or her ignition interlock license;
      5. Certify ignition interlock devices approved for use in the Commonwealth;
      6. Publish and periodically update on the Transportation Cabinet Web site a list of contact information, including a link to the Web site of each certified ignition interlock device provider, with the entity appearing first on the list changing on a statistically random basis each time a unique visitor visits the list of the approved ignition interlock installers and the approved servicing and monitoring entities;
      7. Monitor the ignition interlock device service locations of providers and create a random or designated selection process to require a provider to provide ignition interlock device services in any area of the Commonwealth which the Transportation Cabinet determines is underserved by providers; and
      8. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, promulgate administrative regulations to carry out the provisions of this section.
    2. The Transportation Cabinet shall not create any ignition interlock license or device violations in administrative regulations. The sole ignition interlock license or device violations are established in this chapter.
  1. No model of ignition interlock device shall be certified for use in the Commonwealth unless it meets or exceeds standards promulgated by the Transportation Cabinet pursuant to this section.
  2. In bidding for a contract with the Transportation Cabinet to provide ignition interlock devices and servicing or monitoring or both, the ignition interlock device provider shall take into account that some defendants will not be able to pay the full amount of the fees established pursuant to KRS 189A.340(7)(a).
  3. Any contract between the cabinet and an ignition interlock device provider shall include the following:
    1. A requirement that the provider accept reduced payments as a full payment for all purposes from persons determined to be at or below two hundred percent (200%) of the federal poverty guidelines by the Transportation Cabinet as provided by KRS 189A.340(7)(c);
    2. A requirement that no unit of state or local government and no public officer or employee shall be liable for the cost of purchasing or installing the ignition interlock device or associated costs;
    3. A requirement that the provider agree to a price for the cost of leasing or purchasing an ignition interlock device and any associated servicing or monitoring fees during the duration of the contract. This price shall not be increased but may be reduced during the duration of the contract;
    4. Requirements and standards for the servicing, inspection, and monitoring of the ignition interlock device;
    5. Provisions for training for service center technicians and clients;
    6. A requirement that the provider electronically transmit reports on driving activity within seven (7) days of servicing an ignition interlock device to the Transportation Cabinet, prosecuting attorney, and defendant;
    7. Requirements for a transition plan for the ignition interlock device provider before the provider leaves the state to ensure that continuous monitoring is achieved and to provide a minimum forty-five (45) day notice to the cabinet of any material change to the design of the ignition interlock device, or any changes to the provider’s installation, servicing, or monitoring capabilities;
    8. A requirement that, before beginning work, the ignition interlock device provider have and maintain insurance as approved by the cabinet, including provider’s public liability and property damage insurance, in an amount determined by the cabinet, that covers the cost of defects or problems with product design, materials, workmanship during manufacture, calibration, installation, device removal, or any use thereof;
    9. A provision requiring that an ignition interlock provider agree to hold harmless and indemnify any unit of state or local government, public officer, or employee from all claims, demands, and actions, as a result of damage or injury to persons or property which may arise, directly or indirectly, out of any action or omission by the ignition interlock provider relating to the installation, service, repair, use, or removal of an ignition interlock device;
    10. A requirement that a warning label to be affixed to each ignition interlock device upon installation. The label shall contain a warning that any person who tampers with, circumvents, or otherwise misuse the device commits a violation of law under KRS 189A.345 ;
    11. A requirement that a provider will remove an ignition interlock device without cost, if the device is found to be defective;
    12. A requirement that a provider have at least one (1) ignition interlock device service location in each Transportation Cabinet highway district; and
    13. A requirement that a provider accept assignments to provide ignition interlock device services in areas of the Commonwealth which the Transportation Cabinet determines are underserved by providers in accordance with subsection (1) of this section.
    1. The Transportation Cabinet may require ignition interlock device providers to pay the following fees: (5) (a) The Transportation Cabinet may require ignition interlock device providers to pay the following fees:
      1. An application fee not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500);
      2. An annual renewal fee not to exceed two hundred dollars ($200);
      3. An annual service inspection fee not to exceed one hundred dollars ($100); or
      4. A revisit fee for a failed inspection not to exceed one hundred fifty dollars ($150).
    2. Any fees collected pursuant to this subsection shall be paid to the ignition interlock administration fund established in KRS 189A.380 .

HISTORY: Former § KRS § 189A.500 was renumbered to be § 189A.350 , by 2019, ch. 103, § 17, effective July 1, 2020; 2020 ch. 91, § 37, effective July 1, 2020.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 189A.500 and was renumbered as this section effective July 1, 2020.

189A.360. Nonrefundable application fee for ignition interlock license. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 26, effective July 1, 1991; Former § 189A.420 was renumbered to be § 189A.360 , by 2019, ch. 103, § 18, effective July 1, 2020; repealed by 2020 ch. 91, § 75, effective April 15, 2020.

189A.370. Administrative appeals process for ignition interlock license.

    1. In every instance where the Transportation Cabinet takes action which affects: (1) (a) In every instance where the Transportation Cabinet takes action which affects:
      1. A person’s eligibility for an ignition interlock license;
      2. The calculation of a person’s ninety (90) or one hundred twenty (120) consecutive days;
      3. The calculation of a person’s day-for-day credit;
      4. A person’s eligibility for an employer exemption; or
      5. The calculation of a person’s income and where that income places the person on the federal poverty guidelines; under KRS 189A.340 , that action shall include a letter that notifies the person of the action, informs the person of the basis of the action, and informs the person of his or her right to request an informal hearing within twenty (20) days of receiving the notice.
    2. The informal hearing shall be scheduled as early as practical within twenty (20) days after receipt of the request at a time and place designated by the cabinet.
    3. The informal hearing shall be conducted by a hearing officer designated by the commissioner and shall adhere to the requirements of KRS 13B.090 . At the hearing, the complainant shall be given a statement of why the cabinet took the action, and both the cabinet and the complainant shall have the right to be advised by an attorney with the burden of proof resting with the complainant. After the hearing, the hearing officer shall prepare a written report of the hearing with a recommended decision to the commissioner. The final decision shall be made by the commissioner. As used in this paragraph, “commissioner” means the commissioner of the cabinet’s Office of Vehicle Regulation.
  1. An aggrieved party may file a request for reconsideration of the commissioner’s final decision with the cabinet’s Office of Legal Services within twenty (20) days after receipt of the informal hearing decision. The Office of Legal Services shall issue a decision within twenty (20) days after receipt of the request.
  2. An aggrieved party may appeal the Office of Legal Services’ decision within twenty (20) days after receipt of the decision, and upon appeal an administrative hearing shall be conducted in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B.

HISTORY: 2019 ch. 103, § 19, effective July 1, 2020.

189A.380. Ignition interlock administration fund.

  1. The ignition interlock administration fund is created as a restricted fund. The restricted fund shall consist of funds deposited pursuant to KRS 189A.050 and 189A.350 . The Transportation Cabinet shall administer the fund.
  2. The funds deposited pursuant to:
    1. KRS 189A.050 shall be appropriated to the Department of Vehicle Regulation; and
    2. KRS 189A.350 shall be appropriated to the Office of Highway Safety; for administrative costs associated with ignition interlock pursuant to this chapter.
  3. Notwithstanding KRS 45.229 , any moneys remaining in the fund at the close of the fiscal year shall not lapse but shall be carried forward into the succeeding fiscal year to be used for the purposes set forth in subsection (2) of this section.
  4. Any interest earned on moneys in the fund shall become a part of the fund and shall not lapse.

HISTORY: 2020 ch. 91, § 38, effective April 15, 2020.

Hardship Licenses

189A.400. Sentencing court jurisdiction over issuance of ignition interlock and hardship licenses — Commonwealth’s or county attorney’s review of application and right to object.

  1. The sentencing court shall have jurisdiction over the issuance of hardship licenses.
  2. The Commonwealth’s or county attorney shall review applications submitted to the sentencing court and may object to the issuance of hardship licenses.

History. Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 24, effective July 1, 1991; 2015 ch. 124, § 10, effective June 24, 2015; 2019 ch. 103, § 20, effective July 1, 2020.

189A.410. Hardship license — Prohibition against issuance when alcohol or substance test refused.

  1. At any time during the suspension periods enumerated in:
    1. KRS 189A.070 for violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(c) or (d); or
    2. KRS 189A.090 relating to a violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(c) or (d); the court may grant the person hardship driving privileges for the balance of the suspension period imposed by the Transportation Cabinet, if the court finds reasonable cause to believe that revocation would hinder the person’s ability to continue his or her employment; continue attending school or an educational institution; obtain necessary medical care; attend driver improvement, alcohol, or substance abuse education programs; or attend court-ordered counseling or other programs.
  2. Before granting hardship driving privileges, the court shall order the person to:
    1. Provide the court with proof of motor vehicle insurance;
    2. If necessary, provide the court with a written, sworn statement from his or her employer, on a form provided by the cabinet, detailing his or her job, hours of employment, and the necessity for the person to use the employer’s motor vehicle either in his or her work at the direction of the employer during working hours, or in travel to and from work if the license is sought for employment purposes; and
    3. If the person is self-employed, to provide the information required in paragraph (b) of this subsection together with a sworn statement as to its truth;
    4. Provide the court with a written, sworn statement from the school or educational institution which he attends, of his or her class schedule, courses being undertaken, and the necessity for the person to use a motor vehicle in his travel to and from school or other educational institution if the license is sought for educational purposes. Licenses for educational purposes shall not include participation in sports, social, extracurricular, fraternal, or other noneducational activities;
    5. Provide the court with a written, sworn statement from a physician, or other medical professional licensed but not certified under the laws of Kentucky, attesting to the person’s normal hours of treatment, and the necessity to use a motor vehicle to travel to and from the treatment if the license is sought for medical purposes;
    6. Provide the court with a written, sworn statement from the director of any alcohol or substance abuse education or treatment program as to the hours in which the person is expected to participate in the program, the nature of the program, and the necessity for the person to use a motor vehicle to travel to and from the program if the license is sought for alcohol or substance abuse education or treatment purposes;
    7. Provide the court with a copy of any court order relating to treatment, participation in driver improvement programs, or other terms and conditions ordered by the court relating to the person which require him or her to use a motor vehicle in traveling to and from the court-ordered program. The judge shall include in the order the necessity for the use of the motor vehicle; and
    8. Provide to the court any information as may be required by administrative regulation of the Transportation Cabinet.
  3. The court shall not issue a hardship license to a person who has refused to take an alcohol concentration or substance test or tests offered by a law enforcement officer.

History. Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 25, effective July 1, 1991; 1996, ch. 198, § 16, effective October 1, 1996; 2000, ch. 467, § 17, effective October 1, 2000; 2002, ch. 171, § 6, effective July 15, 2002; 2015 ch. 124, § 16, effective June 24, 2015; 2016 ch. 85, § 8, effective April 9, 2016; 2019 ch. 103, § 21, effective July 1, 2020.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(4/9/2016). 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 85, sec. 10 provided that that Act shall be known as the Brianna Taylor Act. This statute was amended in Section 8 of that Act.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Authority to Issue.

District courts have jurisdiction to issue hardship licenses pursuant to this section only to true first offenders. Butler v. Groce, 880 S.W.2d 547, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 55 ( Ky. 1994 ).

189A.420. Renumbered as KRS 189A.360, effective July 1, 2020. [Renumbered]

History. Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 26, effective July 1, 1991; 2015 ch. 124, § 11, effective June 24, 2015; renumbered to KRS § 189A.360 by 2019 ch. 103, § 18, effective July 1, 2020.

Compiler's Notes.

This section was renumbered as KRS 189A.360 effective July 1, 2020.

189A.430. Permit card and window decal for hardship driving privileges — Requirement to carry permit — Penalty for failure to display decal. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 27, effective July 1, 1991; repealed by 2019 ch. 103, § 25, effective July 1, 2020.

189A.440. Prohibition against use of vehicle other than for purpose authorized by hardship license — Penalty — Penalty for false application statement.

  1. No person who is issued a hardship license shall operate a motor vehicle at any time, place, or for any purpose other than those authorized upon the face of the hardship license issued under KRS 189A.410 .
  2. Any defendant who violates the provisions of subsection (1) of this section is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor, and shall have his or her license suspended by the Transportation Cabinet for the initial period of suspension under KRS 189A.070 for an additional six (6) months.
  3. Any defendant or any other person who knowingly assists the defendant in making a false application statement is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and shall have his or her motor vehicle or motorcycle operator’s license suspended by the Transportation Cabinet for six (6) months.

History. Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 28, effective July 1, 1991; 2015 ch. 124, § 12, effective June 24, 2015; 2019 ch. 103, § 22, effective July 1, 2020.

189A.450. Service fee for hardship driving privileges. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 29, effective July 1, 1991; repealed by 2019 ch. 103, § 25, effective July 1, 2020.

189A.460. Transportation Cabinet’s responsibility as to administrative regulations and forms relating to hardship licenses.

The Transportation Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations and shall issue hardship license application forms and other forms necessary for the implementation of KRS 189A.400 to 189A.460 .

History. Enact. Acts 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 15, § 30, effective July 1, 1991.

189A.500. Ignition interlock devices and licenses — Certification of devices and device providers — Provider contract provisions. [Renumbered]

HISTORY: 2015 ch. 124, § 15, effective June 24, 2015; renumbered to KRS § 189A.350 by 2019 ch. 103, § 17, effective July 1, 2020.

Compiler's Notes

This section was renumbered as KRS 189A.350 effective July 1, 2020.

CHAPTER 190 Motor Vehicle Sales

190.010. Definitions for chapter.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Manufacturer” means any person, partnership, firm, association, corporation, or trust, resident or nonresident, who manufactures or assembles new motor vehicles, or imports for distribution through distributors of new motor vehicles, or any partnership, firm, association, joint venture, corporation, or trust, resident or nonresident, which is controlled by the manufacturer. Additionally, the term “manufacturer” shall include the following terms:
    1. “Distributor” which means any person, firm, association, corporation, or trust, resident or nonresident, who in whole or in part offers for sale, sells, or distributes any new motor vehicle to new motor vehicle dealers, or who maintains factory representatives, or who controls any person, firm, association, corporation, or trust, resident or nonresident, who in whole or in part offers for sale, sells, or distributes any new motor vehicle to new motor vehicle dealers;
    2. “Factory branch” which means a branch office maintained by a manufacturer for the purpose of selling, or offering for sale, new motor vehicles to a distributor, wholesaler, or new motor vehicle dealer, or for directing or supervising, in whole or in part, factory or distributor representatives, and shall further include any sales promotion organization, whether the same be a person, firm, or corporation, which is engaged in promoting the sale of new motor vehicles in this state of a particular brand or make to new motor vehicle dealers;
    3. “Factory representative” which means a representative employed by a manufacturer, distributor, or factory branch for the purpose of making or promoting for the sale of his, its, or their new motor vehicles, or for supervising or contracting with his, its, or their dealers, or prospective dealers;
    4. “Distributor branch” which means a branch office similarly maintained by a distributor or wholesaler for the same purposes; and
    5. “Distributor representative” which means a representative similarly employed by a distributor, distributor branch, or wholesaler;
  2. “Motor vehicle dealer” means any person not excluded by subsection (3) of this section, engaged in the business of selling, offering to sell, soliciting, or advertising the same, of new or used motor vehicles, or possessing motor vehicles for the purpose of resale, either on his own account, or on behalf of another, either as his primary business or incidental thereto;
  3. The term “motor vehicle dealer” shall not include:
    1. Receivers, trustees, administrators, executors, guardians, or other persons appointed by or acting under the judgment or order of any court, and any bank, trust company, or lending institution that is subject to state or federal regulation, with regard to its disposition of repossessed motor vehicles;
    2. Public officers while performing their official duties; or
    3. Employees of persons enumerated in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection, when engaged in the specific performance of their duties as employees;
  4. “New motor vehicle dealer” means a vehicle dealer who holds a valid sales and service agreement, franchise, or contract, granted by the manufacturer, distributor, or wholesaler for the sale of the manufacturer’s new motor vehicles;
  5. “New motor vehicle dealership facility” means an established place of business which is being used or will be used primarily for the purpose of selling, buying, displaying, repairing, and servicing motor vehicles;
  6. “Used motor vehicle dealer” means any person engaged in the business of selling at retail, displaying, offering for sale, or dealing in used motor vehicles or autocycles as defined in KRS 186.010 , but shall not mean any person engaged in the business of dismantling, salvaging, or rebuilding motor vehicles by means of using used parts, or any public officer performing his official duties;
  7. “Motor vehicle leasing dealer” means any person engaged in the business of regularly making available, offering to make available, or arranging for another person to use a motor vehicle pursuant to a bailment, lease, or other contractual arrangement under which a charge is made for its use at a periodic rate for at least a monthly term, and title to the motor vehicle is in a person other than the user, but shall not mean a manufacturer or its affiliate leasing to its employees or to dealers;
  8. “Restricted motor vehicle dealer” means a motor vehicle dealer who exclusively sells, offers to sell, solicits, or advertises specialized motor vehicles including, but not limited to, funeral coaches, emergency vehicles, and an automotive recycling dealer engaged in the business of dismantling, salvaging, or recycling salvage motor vehicles for the purpose of harvesting used parts, components, assemblies, and recyclable materials for resale, reuse, or reclamation;
  9. “Motorcycle dealer” means a motor vehicle dealer who exclusively sells, offers to sell, solicits, or advertises motorcycles, including alternative-speed motorcycles as defined in KRS 186.010 and autocycles as defined in KRS 186.010 . Motorcycles shall not include mopeds as defined in this section;
  10. “Motor vehicle salesperson” means any person who is employed as a salesperson by a motor vehicle dealer to sell motor vehicles, or who is employed as an auctioneer by a motor vehicle auction dealer to sell motor vehicles at auction;
  11. “Motor vehicle auction dealer” means any person primarily engaged in the business of offering, negotiating, or attempting to negotiate a sale, purchase, or exchange of a motor vehicle through auction;
  12. “Motor vehicle” means every vehicle intended primarily for use and operation on the public highways that is self-propelled including low-speed motor vehicles as defined in KRS 186.010 , but shall not include any recreational vehicle or farm tractors and other machines and tools used in the production, harvesting, and care of farm products;
  13. “New motor vehicle” means a vehicle that is in the possession of the manufacturer, distributor, or wholesaler, or has been sold to the holders of a valid sales and service agreement, franchise, or contract, granted by the manufacturer, distributor, or wholesaler for the sale of the make of new vehicle, which is new, and on which the original title has not been issued from the franchised dealer;
  14. “Moped” means a motorized bicycle with pedals whose frame design may include one (1) or more horizontal crossbars supporting a fuel tank, or a motorized bicycle with pedals and with a step through type frame rated no more than two (2) brake horsepower, a cylinder capacity not exceeding fifty (50) cubic centimeters, an automatic transmission not requiring clutching or shifting by the operator after the drive system is engaged, and capable of a maximum speed of not more than thirty (30) miles per hour;
  15. “Commission” means the Motor Vehicle Commission;
  16. “Commissioner” means the commissioner of the department;
  17. “Department” means the Department of Vehicle Regulation;
  18. “Licensor” means the commission;
  19. “Established place of business” means a permanent, enclosed commercial building located within this state, easily accessible and open to the public at all reasonable times, and at which the business of a vehicle dealer, including the display and repair of vehicles, may be lawfully carried on in accordance with the terms of all applicable building codes, zoning, and other land use regulatory ordinances;
  20. “Person” means a person, partnership, firm, corporation, association, trust, estate, or other legal entity;
  21. “Franchise” means the agreement or contract between any new motor vehicle manufacturer, written or otherwise, and any new motor vehicle dealer that purports to fix the legal rights and liabilities of the parties to an agreement or contract, and pursuant to which the dealer purchases and resells the franchise product;
  22. “Good faith” means honesty in fact, and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade, as is defined and interpreted in KRS 355.2-103(1)(b);
  23. “Designated family member” means the spouse, child, grandchild, parent, brother, or sister of a dealer who, in the case of a deceased dealer, is entitled to inherit the dealer’s ownership interest in the dealership under the terms of the dealer’s will; or who has otherwise been designated in writing by a deceased dealer to succeed him in the motor vehicle dealership; or who, under the laws of intestate succession of this state is entitled to inherit the interest; or who, in the case of an incapacitated dealer, has been appointed by a court as the legal representative of the dealer’s property. The term includes the appointed and qualified personal representative and testamentary trustee of a deceased dealer;
  24. “Fraud” means a misrepresentation in any manner, whether intentionally false or due to gross negligence, of a material fact; a promise or representation not made in good faith; or an intentional failure to disclose material fact;
  25. “Sale” means the issuance, transfer, agreement for transfer, exchange, lease, pledge, hypothecation, mortgage in any form, whether by transfer in trust or otherwise, of any motor vehicle or interest in it, or of any franchise related to it, as well as any option, subscription, other contract, or solicitation looking to a sale, offer to attempt to sell in any form, whether spoken or written. A gift or delivery of any motor vehicle or franchise with respect thereto, with or as a bonus on account of the sale of anything, shall be deemed a sale of the motor vehicle or franchise;
  26. “Automotive mobility dealer” means any motor vehicle dealer who:
    1. Exclusively engages in the business of selling, offering to sell, or soliciting or advertising the sale of adapted vehicles;
    2. Possesses adapted vehicles exclusively for the purpose of resale, either on his or her own account or on behalf of another, as his or her primary business or incidental thereto; or
    3. Engages in the business of selling, installing, or servicing; offering to sell, install, or service; or soliciting or advertising the sale, installation, or servicing of equipment or modifications specifically designed to facilitate use or operation of a motor vehicle by an aging or disabled person;
  27. “Adapted vehicle” means a new or used motor vehicle especially designed or modified for use by an aging or disabled person;
  28. “Mobility equipment” means equipment specifically designed to facilitate the use of a motor vehicle by an aging or disabled person;
  29. “Nonprofit motor vehicle dealer” means a nonprofit organization exempt from taxation under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code that purchases motor vehicles that it may offer for purchase to clients and other individuals who meet the definition of client as defined in this section and who are referred to the organization by public or private social service agencies;
  30. “Client” means a person who has an open case file with a nonprofit organization or governmental agency and who meets the standards for disability or disadvantaging condition as established in administrative regulations promulgated by the commission pursuant to KRS 190.032(4);
  31. “Recreational vehicle” means a vehicle that:
    1. Is primarily designed as temporary living quarters for noncommercial recreation or camping use;
    2. Has its own motive power or is towed by another vehicle;
    3. Is regulated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration as a vehicle; and
    4. Does not require a special highway use permit; and
  32. “New recreational vehicle dealer” means a new recreational vehicle dealer as defined in KRS 190A.010 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 161, § 1; 2017 ch. 69, § 4, effective June 29, 2017.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Salesman.

Individual who sold pick-up truck was not a motor vehicle salesperson under this section and was not subject to its provisions. Greene v. Waddell, 657 S.W.2d 589, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 321 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

2.Vehicle Acquired for Resale.

Car purchased by dealership, to be transferred as gift to son of dealership’s owner, was still considered to be a vehicle acquired for resale, with regard to statutes on titling and registration of cars. Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co. v. Maddix, 842 S.W.2d 871, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 208 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

Cited:

American Motors Sales Corp. v. Runke, 708 F.2d 202, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 28110 (6th Cir. 1983); Blair v. General Motors Corp., 838 F. Supp. 1196, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17728 (W.D. Ky. 1993 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

To determine whether a bank or finance company is a “dealer” needing a license and a dealer’s registration tag in disposing of automobiles on which there is a deficiency the definition in KRS 139.110(1)(c) (now repealed) is used. OAG 62-954 .

Motor vehicle dealers in states other than Kentucky are eligible to respond to invitations to bid on new motor vehicles and subsequently sell the vehicles to Kentucky upon proper award, even though they are not licensed as dealers under this section, since the statutes under KRS Chapter 190, and the Model Procurement Code, KRS Chapter 45A, are not in pari materia and do not have to be construed together. OAG 81-89 . ( OAG 78-464 withdrawn.)

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Contracts, formality and assignability, KRS ch. 371.

Interest and usury, KRS ch. 360.

Lien on motor vehicles and contents for towing, recovery, storage, transporting, and other applicable charges — Attempt to notify registered owner — Inspection of vehicle and contents prior to release — Forfeiture and sale of contents — Limitation of storage or growing company’s liability, KRS 376.270 , 376.275 .

Seat belt anchors required in new passenger vehicles, KRS 189.125 .

190.015. Public policy declared.

The Legislature finds and declares that the distribution and sale of vehicles within this state vitally affects the general economy of the state and the public interest and the public welfare, and that in order to promote the public interest and public welfare, and in the exercise of its police power, it is necessary to regulate and license vehicle manufacturers, distributors or wholesalers, brokers and auctioneers, and factory or distributor representatives, and to regulate and license dealers of vehicles doing business in this state, in order to prevent frauds, impositions, and other abuses upon its citizens, and to protect and preserve the investments and properties of the citizens of this state.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 175, § 6; 1982, ch. 373, § 2, effective July 15, 1982.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Legislative Intent.

The General Assembly did not intend to enact this section for the protection of out-of-state dealerships. BMW Stores, Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of America, Inc., 860 F.2d 212, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 14522 (6th Cir. Ky. 1988 ).

2.Invalid Regulation.

A regulation by the Motor Vehicle Commission which restricted off-site sales of motor vehicles was properly ruled to be invalid for lack of any legitimate purpose and was further held to contain several key provisions which were individually unconstitutional. Motor Vehicle Com. v. Hertz Corp., 767 S.W.2d 1, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 39 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

190.020. Commission to issue licenses and supervise licensees.

The commission shall, under administrative regulations promulgated by it, issue the licenses provided for by KRS 190.010 to 190.080 and shall have supervision over the licensees thereunder in respect to all the provisions of KRS 190.010 to 190.080 .

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 161, § 2; 1966, ch. 175, § 2; 1982, ch. 374, § 5, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 357, § 2, effective July 13, 1984.

190.030. License requirement — Application for license — Time within which license to be granted or refused — Licenses to be displayed — Administrative regulations establishing fees — Temporary sale or display — Bond — Reports by motor vehicle dealer and new recreational dealer.

    1. A motor vehicle dealer, new, used, or auction motor vehicle dealer, nonprofit motor vehicle dealer, motor vehicle leasing dealer, restricted motor vehicle dealer, motorcycle dealer, broker, wholesaler, automotive recycling dealer, new recreational vehicle dealer, a salesperson of motor vehicles, or a salesperson of new recreational vehicles shall not engage in business in this state at any location without a license issued for that location as provided in KRS 190.010 to 190.080 . (1) (a) A motor vehicle dealer, new, used, or auction motor vehicle dealer, nonprofit motor vehicle dealer, motor vehicle leasing dealer, restricted motor vehicle dealer, motorcycle dealer, broker, wholesaler, automotive recycling dealer, new recreational vehicle dealer, a salesperson of motor vehicles, or a salesperson of new recreational vehicles shall not engage in business in this state at any location without a license issued for that location as provided in KRS 190.010 to 190.080 .
    2. If a person licensed as a motor vehicle dealer or new recreational vehicle dealer acts as a motor vehicle salesperson or a new recreational vehicle salesperson, that person shall secure a motor vehicle salesperson’s license or a new recreational vehicle salesperson’s license in addition to a license for a motor vehicle dealer or for a new recreational vehicle dealer.
    3. In addition to the authority granted under subsection (6) of this section, the motor vehicle commission may promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A to establish licenses and appropriate fees for other licensee activities.
  1. A manufacturer of motor vehicles, recreational vehicles, factory branch, distributor, distributor branch, or wholesaler shall not engage in business in this state without a license as provided in KRS 190.010 to 190.080 .
  2. A factory representative or distributor representative shall not engage in business in this state without a license as provided in KRS 190.010 to 190.080 .
  3. Application for license shall be made to the licensor, at a time, in a form, and containing information the licensor shall require and shall be accompanied by the required fee. The licensor may require, as part of the application process, information relating to the applicant’s solvency, financial standing, or other pertinent matter commensurate with the safeguarding of the public interest in the locality in which the applicant proposes to engage in business. The information may be considered by the licensor in determining the fitness of the applicant to engage in business as set forth in this section.
  4. All licenses shall be granted or refused within thirty (30) days after submission of a complete application and shall expire, unless revoked or suspended, on December 31 of the calendar year for which they are granted. If a complaint of unfair cancellation of dealer franchise is in the process of being heard, a replacement application for the franchise shall not be considered until a decision is rendered by the commission.
    1. The commission shall promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A to establish annual license fees, not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500), for: (6) (a) The commission shall promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A to establish annual license fees, not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500), for:
      1. New motor vehicle dealers;
      2. Used motor vehicle dealers;
      3. Motor vehicle leasing dealers;
      4. Restricted motor vehicle dealers;
      5. Motorcycle dealers;
      6. Motor vehicle manufacturers and factory branches;
      7. Distributors, motor vehicle auction dealers, and wholesalers;
      8. Factory representatives and distributor branch representatives;
      9. Automotive mobility dealers;
      10. Nonprofit motor vehicle dealers;
      11. Recreational vehicle manufacturers and distributors; and
      12. New recreational vehicle dealers.
    2. The commission shall promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A to establish annual license fees, not to exceed fifty dollars ($50), for motor vehicle salespersons and new recreational vehicle salespersons.
    3. The license fee imposed on motor vehicle salespersons and new recreational vehicle salespersons shall be paid by the licensed dealer for every salesperson the dealer employs.
    4. A license fee shall not be imposed on nonprofit motor vehicle dealer salespersons.
    1. The licenses of dealers, manufacturers, factory branches, distributors, and distributor branches shall specify the location of the office or branch and shall be conspicuously displayed there. If the location is changed, the licensor shall endorse the change of location on the license. A licensee shall not be charged a fee for changing locations. A change of location shall require a new application. (7) (a) The licenses of dealers, manufacturers, factory branches, distributors, and distributor branches shall specify the location of the office or branch and shall be conspicuously displayed there. If the location is changed, the licensor shall endorse the change of location on the license. A licensee shall not be charged a fee for changing locations. A change of location shall require a new application.
      1. A motor vehicle dealer who is not a new motor vehicle dealer may conduct a temporary sale or display in the county where the dealer is licensed to conduct business. (b) 1. A motor vehicle dealer who is not a new motor vehicle dealer may conduct a temporary sale or display in the county where the dealer is licensed to conduct business.
      2. A new motor vehicle dealer may conduct a temporary sale or display in the dealer’s market as defined in KRS 190.047(6).
      3. A recreational vehicle dealer may conduct a temporary sale or display in the county where the dealer is licensed to conduct business or in any other county where there is no licensed recreational vehicle dealer.
    2. A temporary sale or display may be conducted under this subsection if the temporary sale or display is permitted under an enabling ordinance enacted by the city, county, urban-county, or consolidated local government within whose boundaries the temporary sale or display is to be conducted. A temporary sale or display shall be advertised as temporary in nature and shall consist of a representative sampling of the inventory of each participating licensee.
    3. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to a nonprofit motor vehicle dealer.
  5. Every salesperson, factory representative, or distributor representative shall carry his license when engaged in business, and display it upon request. The license shall name his employer; and in case of a change of employer, the salesperson shall immediately mail his license to the licensor who shall endorse the change on the license without charge.
  6. If the licensor has reasonable cause to doubt the financial responsibility or the compliance by the applicant or licensee with the provisions of this statute, the licensor may require the applicant or licensee to furnish and maintain a bond in a form, amount and with sureties up to one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), conditioned upon the applicant or licensee complying with the provisions of the statutes applicable to the licensee. The bonds shall be executed in the name of the State of Kentucky for the benefit of any aggrieved parties, but the penalty of the bond shall not be invoked except after a court adjudication. The commission may promulgate administrative regulations to permit the applicant to submit evidence, in lieu of posting bond, that reliable financial arrangements, deposits, or commitments exist providing assurance, substantially equivalent to that afforded by a bond complying with this subsection, for payment on conditions and indemnity set forth in this subsection. The bonding requirements of this subsection shall not apply to manufacturers, factory branches, and their agents.
  7. Application for dealer’s license shall be submitted to the commission and contain information the commission may require. A motor vehicle dealer, unless licensed under KRS 190.010 to 190.080 , shall not be permitted to register, receive, or use any motor vehicle registration plates.
  8. Every motor vehicle dealer or new recreational vehicle dealer licensed in accordance with the provisions of this section shall make reports to the licensor at intervals and show information the licensor may require.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 161, § 3; 1966, ch. 175, § 3; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(2); 1978, ch. 313, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 373, § 3, effective July 15, 19821982, ch. 374, § 6, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 357, § 3, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 452, § 2, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 186, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 216, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2003, ch. 13, § 1, effective June 24, 2003; 2007, ch. 125, § 3, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 43, § 3, effective July 15, 2010; 2014, ch. 83, § 1, effective July 15, 2014; 2014, ch. 27, § 16, effective January 1, 2015; 2021 ch. 156, § 15, effective March 29, 2021; 2021 ch. 190, § 14, effective June 29, 2021.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(6/29/2021). This statute was amended by 2021 Ky. Acts chs. 156 and 190. Where these Acts are not in conflict, they have been codified together. Where a conflict exists, Acts ch. 190, which was last enacted by the General Assembly, prevails under KRS 446.250 .

Opinions of Attorney General.

The department of motor transportation (now department of vehicle regulation) can rely upon the advice given to the commissioner by the advisory committee as such advice would constitute good cause for issuing or revoking salesmen’s licenses. OAG 64-862 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Registration of dealers and salesmen with county clerk; fees; dealer’s plates, KRS 186.070 .

190.031. Automotive mobility dealers — License and regulation requirements.

  1. Any person, prior to engaging or continuing in the business of an automotive mobility dealer after June 26, 2007, shall obtain an automotive mobility dealer license from the commission.
    1. An automotive mobility dealer shall be licensed and regulated by the commission under the provisions of this chapter. (2) (a) An automotive mobility dealer shall be licensed and regulated by the commission under the provisions of this chapter.
    2. The commission shall, by administrative regulations promulgated under KRS Chapter 13A, establish requirements for initial application for and renewal of a license to be an automotive mobility dealer. The commission’s regulations establishing requirements for automotive mobility dealers shall include provisions for automotive mobility dealers to meet reasonable and appropriate quality assurance requirements. These requirements may include:
      1. Appropriate training by automotive mobility dealers regarding adapted vehicle usage;
      2. Driver evaluation by automotive mobility dealers; and
      3. A requirement that automotive mobility dealers obtain and maintain insurance in an amount to be established by the commission.

        The commission shall have the power to promulgate any other regulations that are necessary to implement this section.

    3. The commission shall immediately suspend the license of an automotive mobility dealer if it determines that the dealer has sold or modified a vehicle that does not comply with this section or any administrative regulations promulgated thereunder. A dealer whose license is suspended under this paragraph shall be permitted to appeal the suspension in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B.
  2. A licensed automotive mobility dealer shall have the right to display, inventory, advertise, and offer for sale any adapted vehicle.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 125, § 2, effective June 26, 2007.

190.032. Nonprofit motor vehicle dealers — License and regulation requirements.

  1. A nonprofit organization, prior to engaging in the business of a nonprofit motor vehicle dealer, shall obtain a nonprofit motor vehicle dealer license from the commission.
  2. A nonprofit motor vehicle dealer and persons who act as salespersons for a nonprofit motor vehicle dealer shall be licensed and regulated by the commission under the provisions of this chapter, except that a nonprofit motor vehicle dealer shall not be required to:
    1. Comply with KRS 190.030(7); or
    2. Comply with KRS 190.035 .
  3. A nonprofit motor vehicle dealer may sell vehicles only to:
    1. A person who is a client of the nonprofit organization;
    2. A person referred by other nonprofit organizations or governmental agencies who meets the definition of client as defined in KRS 190.010 ; or
    3. A licensed motor vehicle dealer or automotive recycling dealer.
  4. The commission shall promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A to establish requirements for initial application for and renewal of a license to be a nonprofit motor vehicle dealer and standards for disability and disadvantaging condition. In addition, the commission may promulgate additional administrative regulations that are necessary to implement this section.

History. Enact. Acts 2010, ch. 43, § 1, effective July 15, 2010.

190.033. Insurance or bond required of licensees — Exemption.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, a motor vehicle dealer’s license, new recreational vehicle dealer’s license, motor vehicle auction dealer’s license, or wholesaler’s license shall not be issued or renewed unless the applicant or holder of the license shall have on file with the commission an approved indemnifying bond or insurance policy issued by a surety company or insurance carrier authorized to transact business within the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The term of the bond or policy shall be continuous and shall remain in full force until canceled under proper notice. All bonds or policies shall be issued in the name of the holder or applicant for the dealer’s license or wholesaler’s license. The bond or policy for all dealers except automotive recycling dealers shall provide public liability and property damage coverage for the operation of any vehicle owned or being offered for sale by the dealer or wholesaler when being operated by the owner or seller, his agents, servants, employees, prospective customers, or other persons. In circumstances where a customer’s or other person’s vehicle is out of use because of breakdown, repair, or servicing and a motor vehicle is loaned, with or without consideration, the coverage mandated by this section shall be in excess of, and be deemed secondary to, the collision, bodily injury, and property damage liability coverage under a customer’s or other person’s own coverage for that person’s own negligence; otherwise the coverage mandated by this section shall be primary.
  2. The amount of insurance shall be two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) for bodily injury or death of any one (1) person; five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) for bodily injury or death in any one (1) accident; and two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) property damage. The bond or policy for automotive recycling dealers shall provide commercial general liability coverage in the amount of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) for bodily injury or death of any one (1) person; five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) for bodily injury or death in any one (1) accident; and two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) property damage.
  3. A bond or insurance policy shall not be canceled unless fifteen (15) days’ notice by the bondsman or insurance carrier has been given in writing to the commission. Upon the cancellation of any bond or insurance policy required, the right to engage in the business of a motor vehicle dealer or wholesaler shall immediately abate. If the bond or insurance policy is reinstated within thirty (30) days from the date of cancellation, the rights granted by the license shall again be in force and effect; otherwise, the license shall become void.
  4. A dealer that has a certificate of authority from the Department of Insurance demonstrating proof of self-insurance is exempt from this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 175, § 13; 1982, ch. 373, § 4, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 65, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1992, ch. 452, § 3, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 111, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 2002, ch. 83, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 83, § 2, effective July 15, 2014; 2014, ch. 27, § 17, effective January 1, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1/1/2015). This statute was amended by 2014 Ky. Acts chs. 27 and 83, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Purpose.

The purpose of this section is to protect members of the public and when that protection is provided the purpose of the statute is satisfied. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Register, 583 S.W.2d 705, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 436 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), overruled in part, Ky. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 326 S.W.3d 803, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 2010 ).

2.Liability.

An automobile dealer’s compulsory liability policy which insured vehicles owned or being offered for sale by the dealer did not insure a vehicle owned by a customer where the vehicle was being operated by another customer at the time of the accident. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Baldwin, 514 F.2d 111, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15048 (6th Cir. Ky. 1975 ).

Where two insurance companies are contesting primary liability, and one policy contains a non-standard escape clause while the other contains an excess clause, the escape clause prevails over the excess clause. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Haddix, 927 S.W.2d 843, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 131 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

Basic liability limits of this section applied in personal injury suit brought by passengers against driver and dealership which owned vehicle, and not the lower basic liability limits of KRS 304.39-110 ; for although dealership was not attempting to sell the substitute vehicle to driver, KRS 190.033 applies to vehicles “owned or being offered for sale” and dealership was “motor vehicle dealer” under the statute. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Haddix, 927 S.W.2d 843, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 131 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

In a case arising out of a single car accident in which a passenger was injured, although the passenger argued that a car dealership that employed the driver violated KRS 190.033 when it failed to provide liability coverage on a demonstrator vehicle it furnished to the driver, this argument was rejected. The fact that the dealership’s insurer was insolvent did not make the dealership liable. Easterling v. Man-O-War Auto., Inc., 223 S.W.3d 852, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 111 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

3.Action to Recover Damages.

An “escape” clause precluding recovery of damages where there was other insurance sufficient to pay the damages up to the amount of the applicable financial responsibility limit did not violate any public policy set forth in this section where it was asserted in a dispute between two insurers. Royal-Globe Ins. Cos. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 560 S.W.2d 22, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 877 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977), overruled in part, Ky. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 326 S.W.3d 803, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 2010 ).

Where driver of car provided by automobile dealer was involved in accident and sought to invoke coverage by automobile dealer’s insurer, dealer’s insurer could not invoke nonstandard escape clause which denied coverage to one using dealer’s car with permission but covered by his own automobile liability insurance, since upholding such an escape clause would violate public policy reflected in this section; however, insurer was only obligated to provide the $10,000 minimum coverage set forth in this section rather than primary coverage under the $1,000,000 umbrella policy purchased by the automobile dealer. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Veljkovic, 613 S.W.2d 426, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 427 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Trial court properly granted a driver’s insurer’s summary judgment motion in a car dealer’s insurer’s subrogation action as the dealer’s insurer’s policy did not provide the minimum amount of property damage coverage for motor vehicle dealers as required by KRS 190.033 ; the lack of minimum coverage did not result from the operation of an escape clause, an excess coverage clause, or an other insurance clause. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 149 S.W.3d 437, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 158 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Trial court erred in applying KRS 304.39-080 (5) to a car dealer’s insurer’s subrogation claim against a driver’s insurer as KRS 190.033 specifically applies to motor vehicle dealers, and the statutory minimums set forth in KRS 190.033 are higher than those set forth in KRS 304.39-110 (1). Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 149 S.W.3d 437, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 158 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

4.Public Policy.

Where third party complaint was not between two insurers, but rather between insurer and other parties to the litigation, an escape clause denying coverage to driver of automobile on loan from dealer because she had her own automobile liability coverage could not be invoked by dealer’s insurer since such a clause violated the public policy reflected in this section. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Veljkovic, 613 S.W.2d 426, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 427 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

5.Owner.

Alleged conditional sales agreement for the purchase of a vehicle was invalid and used car dealer was deemed to be owner of the vehicle and responsible for insurance coverage on the vehicle when it was involved in a collision where used car dealer, in an effort to facilitate potential repossession of the vehicle, did not transfer title of the vehicle to the buyers, where dealer renewed the registration in his own name when the vehicle’s license expired and did not advise the county clerk that he had “sold” the vehicle to the buyers, and where county clerk, in reliance on dealer’s omnibus policy, did not require proof of insurance. Rogers v. Wheeler, 864 S.W.2d 892, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 132 ( Ky. 1993 ).

Transaction was not a conditional sale since used car dealer was not holding title to the van until full performance of the contract terms by the buyers where dealer transferred title to buyers one week after accident occurred even though they never finished paying for the van; where title had been assigned to used car dealer and the transaction between used car dealer and buyer was not a conditional sale, and where insurer insured all motor vehicles owned by used car dealer, van was insured by used car dealer’s insurer on the day of the collision. Potts v. Draper, 864 S.W.2d 896, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 117 ( Ky. 1993 ).

6.Duty to Defend.

In personal injury suit brought by passengers against driver and dealership which owned vehicle, driver’s own insurer had the primary duty to defend and indemnify the driver. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Haddix, 927 S.W.2d 843, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 131 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Underwood, Insurance, 70 Ky. L.J. 255 (1981-82).

190.035. Established place of business and sufficient space required for licensure by commission as motor vehicle dealer or new recreational vehicle dealer — Exemption.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, a license shall not be issued by the commission for the purposes described in KRS 190.030(1) and to motor vehicle dealers or new recreational vehicle dealers, either as dealer or salesman, unless the applicant for the license has an established place of business as defined in KRS 190.010 or, for recreational vehicles as defined in KRS 190A.010 , and as provided by regulation of the commission consistent with the activity of the license applied for. A licensee may conduct more than one (1) business in a building otherwise meeting the requirements of this chapter providing he has suitable space and adequate facilities therein to properly conduct the business of a motor vehicle dealer. The lot requirement of this section may be waived if the dealer has sufficient space within a building to properly show and display the motor vehicles or new recreational vehicles being sold by him. The dealer shall display a sign easily visible from the street identifying his business.
  2. The provisions of this section shall not apply to a nonprofit motor vehicle dealer.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 129; 1966, ch. 175, § 4; 1982, ch. 373, § 5, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 357, § 4, effective July 13, 1984; 2010, ch. 43, § 4, effective July 15, 2010; 2014, ch. 27, § 18, effective January 1, 2015.

Opinions of Attorney General.

There is nothing in this section which requires that the name of a motor vehicle dealer indicate the nature of his business. OAG 78-387 .

190.037. Temporary permits.

Where application for any license provided for herein has been made, a temporary permit may be granted to the applicant to engage in the business for which the license is sought. The temporary permit shall be valid until such time as the application is approved or denied, but in no event for a period longer than ninety (90) days. KRS 190.040(3) shall not apply to a temporary permit.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 175, § 17.

190.038. Manufacturer to provide information on service or repairs of its motor vehicles.

  1. Any manufacturer of motor vehicles licensed in accordance with KRS 190.030 shall provide to any person upon request and at reasonable cost, any schematic, manual or any other technical documentation needed to service or repair motor vehicles manufactured by the manufacturer of a year model not to exceed ten (10) years prior to the current year model.
  2. Failure to comply with the provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall be grounds for suspension or revocation of a manufacturer’s license in accordance with KRS 190.040 .

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 183, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.

190.040. Grounds for denial, suspension, or revocation of license — Notice of denial of application for license — Hearings — Inspection of licensee’s records — Appeals from order of commission.

  1. A license may be denied, suspended, or revoked on the following grounds:
    1. Proof of financial or moral unfitness of applicant;
    2. Material misstatement in application for license;
    3. Filing a materially false or fraudulent tax return as certified by the Department of Revenue;
    4. Willful failure to comply with any provision of this chapter or any administrative regulation promulgated under this chapter;
    5. Willfully defrauding any retail buyer to the buyer’s damage;
    6. Willful failure to perform any written agreement with any buyer;
    7. Failure or refusal to furnish and keep in force any bond required;
    8. Having made a fraudulent sale, transaction, or repossession;
    9. False or misleading advertising;
    10. Fraudulent misrepresentation, circumvention, or concealment through subterfuge or device of any of the material particulars or the nature of them required to be stated or furnished to the retail buyer;
    11. Employment of fraudulent devices, methods, or practices in connection with compliance with the requirements under the statutes of this state with respect to the retaking of goods under retail installment contracts and the redemption and resale of goods;
    12. Having violated any law relating to the sale, distribution, or financing of motor vehicles or new recreational vehicles;
    13. Being a manufacturer of motor vehicles or recreational vehicles, factory branch, distributor, field representative, officer, agent, or any representative of the motor vehicle manufacturer, recreational vehicle manufacturer, or factory branch, who has induced, coerced, or attempted to induce or coerce any automobile dealer or new recreational vehicle dealer to accept delivery of any motor vehicle, new recreational vehicle, vehicles, parts, accessories, or any other commodities that shall not have been ordered by the dealer;
    14. Being a manufacturer of motor vehicles or recreational vehicles, factory branch, distributor, field representative, officer, agent, or any representative of a motor vehicle manufacturer or factory branch, who has attempted to induce or coerce, or has induced or coerced, any dealer to enter into any agreement with a manufacturer, factory branch, or representative, or to do any other act unfair to the dealer, by threatening to cancel any franchise existing between a manufacturer, factory branch, or representative and the dealer;
    15. Being a manufacturer, factory branch, distributor, field representative, officer, agent, or any representative of a motor vehicle manufacturer or factory branch, who has unfairly, without due regard to the equities of the dealer and without just provocation, canceled the franchise of any motor vehicle dealer. The nonrenewal of a franchise or selling agreement without just provocation or cause shall be deemed an evasion of this section and shall constitute an unfair cancellation;
    16. Being a manufacturer, factory branch, distributor, field representative, officer, agent, or any representative of a motor vehicle manufacturer, recreational vehicle manufacturer, or factory branch, or wholesaler who makes, attempts to make, or aids or abets the making of a sale of a motor vehicle or a new recreational vehicle to a person other than a licensed motor vehicle dealer or new recreational vehicle dealer. This section shall not prevent any manufacturer from offering discounts or rebates on any motor vehicle or new recreational vehicle to any of its employees; or
    17. Being a dealer who advertises for sale a new motor vehicle or new recreational vehicle unless he is a dealer operating under a franchise with a licensed manufacturer, factory branch, or distributor authorizing the sale of the new motor vehicle or the new recreational vehicle being advertised.
  2. The licensor may deny the application for a license within thirty (30) days after receipt thereof by written notice to the applicant, stating the grounds for denial. Upon request by the applicant whose license has been denied, the licensor shall set the time and place of hearing a review of denial, to be conducted in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B.
  3. A license shall not be suspended or revoked except after a hearing conducted in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B.
  4. The commission may inspect the pertinent books, letters, records, and contracts of a licensee.
  5. If a licensee is a firm or corporation, it shall be sufficient cause for the denial, suspension, or revocation of a license that any officer, director, or trustee of the firm or corporation, or any member in case of a partnership, has been guilty of any act or omission which would be cause for refusing, suspending, or revoking a license to the party as an individual. Each licensee shall be responsible for the acts of any or all of his salesmen while acting as his agent, if the licensee approved of or had knowledge of the acts and after approval or knowledge retained the benefit, proceeds, profits, or advantages accruing from the acts.
  6. Any licensee or other person in interest who is dissatisfied with a final order of the commission may appeal to the Franklin Circuit Court and to the Court of Appeals in the manner provided by KRS Chapter 13B.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 161, § 4; 1966, ch. 175, § 5; 1972, ch. 211, § 2; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(2); 1982, ch. 374, § 7, effective July 15, 1982; 1992, ch. 452, § 4, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 111, § 3, effective July 15, 1996; 1996, ch. 318, § 76, effective July 15, 1996; 2000, ch. 23, § 2, effective February 22, 2000; 2000, ch. 216, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2005, ch. 85, § 616, effective June 20, 2005; 2014, ch. 27, § 19, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Conflict With Federal Law.

Subdivisions (1)(m) and (1)(n) of this section, which in part prohibit distributors from “inducing” certain actions by automobile dealers, conflict with the provision of the federal Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act, 15 USCS § 1221(e), which expressly authorizes “persuasion” by a distributor, as the dictionary meaning of “induce” is synonymous with “persuasion”; in light of this conflict, the federal district court properly held that the bureau (now department) of vehicle regulation was prohibited by the Supremacy Clause from enforcing subdivisions (1)(m) and (1)(n) to the extent that those provisions purported to forbid “inducement” by an automobile distributor. American Motors Sales Corp. v. Runke, 708 F.2d 202, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 28110 (6th Cir. Ky. 1983 ).

2.Enjoining Administrative Proceedings.

The federal Anti-Injunction Act (28 USCS § 2283), by its terms only prohibits federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings, and therefore it did not prohibit a federal district court from enjoining a state administrative agency from enforcing the provisions of this section in an administrative proceeding. American Motors Sales Corp. v. Runke, 708 F.2d 202, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 28110 (6th Cir. Ky. 1983 ).

Cited:

Craig & Bishop, Inc. v. Piles, 247 S.W.3d 897, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 61 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Department of Motor Transportation (now Department of Vehicle Regulation) can rely upon the advice given to the commissioner by the advisory committee as such advise would constitute good cause for issuing or revoking salesmen’s licenses. OAG 64-862 .

A program which provides an incentive bonus payment to salesmen of licensed or franchised dealers, does not violate this section as long as the merchandise sold by the salesmen is purchased from the licensed dealer-employer and delivered to customer by the dealer-employer of the salesmen. OAG 75-329 .

In view of KRS 186.076 (now repealed), 186.090 (now repealed), 186.200 and this section, a motor vehicle dealer must secure a transfer of all used cars acquired by that dealer to his own name before the county clerk is required to issue a transfer of registration from that dealer to a subsequent transferee. OAG 75-593 .

A bid under KRS 45A.080 is not an advertisement within the meaning of subsection (1)(q) of this section. OAG 79-255 .

A Governor’s pardon or other type of rehabilitative action or law is not conclusive proof of rehabilitation of a convicted felon and does not automatically qualify that person for a motor vehicle dealer’s license since it is for the licensing authority to decide whether the applicant has been rehabilitated. OAG 80-388 .

If the Bureau of Vehicle Regulation (now Department) issues a license to a dealer or salesman knowing him to be a former felon and he later commits other crimes in the area of the activities for which the Bureau (now Department) licensed him, the Bureau (now Department) has no liability since the members of a licensing board are immune from civil liability for the quasi-judicial decisions within the scope of their authority without regard for bad faith, malice or other evil motives. OAG 80-388 .

The Bureau of Vehicle Regulation (now Department) has the discretion to weigh all factors in an individual’s background, including felonies, before deciding to grant or deny a motor vehicle dealer’s license. OAG 80-388 .

The conviction of a felony requires a licensing board to deny a motor vehicle dealer’s license unless it determines that the applicant has been successfully rehabilitated and the applicant has the burden of demonstrating to the licensing authority that he has been rehabilitated. OAG 80-388 .

The implication of KRS Chapter 335B is that a licensing authority should look beyond the mere record of a felony conviction and should not arbitrarily refuse all former felons, although the chapter does not expressly order the authority to consider former felons the better policy is to review each case on its merits and not to have a policy of arbitrary rejection. OAG 80-388 .

190.041. Law not applicable to manufacturers or distributors — Exception. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 175, § 21; 1972, ch. 75, § 4; 1980, ch. 296, § 6, effective July 15, 1980) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 373, § 15, effective July 15, 1982 and by Acts 1982, ch. 374, § 14, effective July 15, 1982.

190.042. Succession to ownership of a new motor vehicle dealership of a deceased or incapacitated owner.

  1. Any owner of a new motor vehicle dealership may appoint by will, or any other written instrument, a designated family member to succeed in the ownership interest of the said owner in the new motor vehicle dealership.
  2. Unless there exists good cause for refusal to honor succession on the part of the manufacturer or distributor, any designated family member of a deceased or incapacitated owner of a new motor vehicle dealership may succeed to the ownership of the new motor vehicle dealership under the existing franchise provided that:
    1. The designated family member gives the manufacturer or distributor written notice of his or her intention to succeed to the ownership of the new motor vehicle dealership within ninety (90) days of the owner’s death or incapacity; and
    2. The designated family member agrees to be bound by all the terms and conditions of the franchise.
  3. The manufacturer or distributor may request, and the designated family member shall provide, promptly upon said request, personal and financial data that is reasonably necessary to determine whether the succession should be honored.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 373, § 10, effective July 15, 1982.

190.043. Refusal of manufacturer or distributor to honor succession.

  1. If a manufacturer or distributor believes that good cause exists for refusing to honor the succession to the ownership of a new motor vehicle dealership by a family member of a deceased or incapacitated owner of a new motor vehicle dealership under the existing franchise agreement, the manufacturer or distributor may, not more than sixty (60) days following the receipt of:
    1. Notice of the designated family member’s intent to succeed to the ownership of the new motor vehicle dealership; or
    2. Any personal or financial data which it has requested;

      serve upon the designated family member and the commission, notice of its refusal to honor the succession and its intent to discontinue the existing franchise with the dealer no sooner than ninety (90) days from the date such notice is served.

  2. The notice provided in subsection (1) of this section must state the specific grounds for the refusal to honor the succession and of its intent to discontinue the existing franchise with the new motor vehicle dealer no sooner than ninety (90) days from the date such notice is served.
  3. If notice of refusal and discontinuance as provided in subsection (1) of this section is not timely served upon the family member, the franchise shall continue in effect subject to termination only as otherwise permitted by KRS 190.045 .
  4. In determining whether good cause for the refusal to honor the succession exists, the manufacturer, distributor, factory branch, or importer has the burden of proving before the commission that the successor is a person who is not of good moral character or does not meet the franchisor’s existing and reasonable standards, and considering the volume of sales and service of the new motor vehicle dealership, the uniformly applied business experience standards in the market area.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 373, § 11, effective July 15, 1982; 1996, ch. 111, § 4, effective July 15, 1996.

190.045. Cancellation, termination, refusal to renew franchise — Notice — Duty of manufacturer.

  1. Notwithstanding the terms, provisions, or conditions of any franchise or notwithstanding the terms or provisions of any waiver, a manufacturer shall not cancel, terminate, or fail to renew any franchise with a licensed new motor vehicle dealer unless the manufacturer has:
    1. Satisfied the notice requirement of subsection (4) of this section;
    2. Has good cause for cancellation, termination, or nonrenewal;
    3. Has acted in good faith as defined in KRS 190.010(22); and
    4. Has established the requirements of this subsection in proceedings before the licensor if the action is protested by the new motor vehicle dealer within fifteen (15) days after receiving notice of the cancellation, termination, or nonrenewal.

      When a protest is filed, the licensor shall inform the manufacturer, distributor, factory branch, or factory representative that a timely protest has been filed and that the manufacturer, distributor, factory branch, or factory representative shall not cancel, terminate, or fail to renew any franchise with the licensed new motor vehicle dealer until the licensor has held a hearing and the licensor has determined that the manufacturer has met its burden under this section.

  2. Notwithstanding the terms, provisions, or conditions of any franchise or the terms or provisions of any waiver, good cause shall exist for the purposes of a termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal when:
    1. There is a failure by the new motor vehicle dealer to comply with a provision of the franchise which provision is both reasonable and of material significance to the franchise relationship, provided that the dealer has been notified in writing of the failure within one hundred eighty (180) days after the manufacturer first acquired knowledge of the failure.
    2. If the failure by the new motor vehicle dealer, defined in paragraph (a) of this subsection, relates to the performance of the new motor vehicle dealer in sales or service, then good cause shall be defined as the failure of the new motor vehicle dealer to comply with reasonable performance criteria established by the manufacturer, if the new motor vehicle dealer was apprised by the manufacturer in writing of a failure, and
      1. The notification stated that notice was provided of failure of performance pursuant to this section;
      2. The new motor vehicle dealer was afforded a reasonable opportunity, for a period of not less than six (6) months, to comply with the criteria; and
      3. The new motor vehicle dealer did not demonstrate substantial progress toward compliance with the manufacturer’s performance criteria during the designated period.
  3. The manufacturer shall have the burden of proof under this section.
  4. Notwithstanding the terms, provisions, or conditions of any franchise prior to the termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal of any franchise, the manufacturer shall furnish notification of a termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal to the new motor vehicle dealer as follows:
    1. In the manner described in subsection (2)(b) of this section; and
    2. In not less than ninety (90) days prior to the effective date of the termination, cancellation or nonrenewal; or
    3. In not less than fifteen (15) days prior to the effective date of a termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal with respect to any of the following:
      1. Insolvency of the new motor vehicle dealer, or filing of any petition by or against the new motor vehicle dealer under any bankruptcy or receivership law;
      2. Failure of the new motor vehicle dealer to conduct its customary sales and service operations during its customary business hours for seven (7) consecutive business days, except for acts of God or circumstances beyond the direct control of the new motor vehicle dealer;
      3. Fraudulent misrepresentation by the new motor vehicle dealer to the manufacturer or distributor which is material to the franchise;
      4. Conviction of the new motor vehicle dealer, or any owner or operator thereof, of any felony which is punishable by imprisonment; or
      5. Revocation of any license which the new motor vehicle dealer is required to have to operate a dealership;
    4. In not less than one hundred eighty (180) days prior to the effective date of a termination or cancellation where the manufacturer or distributor is discontinuing the sale of the product line.
  5. Notification under this section shall be in writing by certified mail or personally delivered to the new motor vehicle dealer; and shall contain:
    1. A statement of intent to terminate, cancel, or not to renew the franchise; and
    2. A statement of the reasons for the termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal; and
    3. The date on which the termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal takes effect.
  6. Upon the termination, nonrenewal, or cancellation of any franchise, pursuant to this section, the new motor vehicle dealer shall be allowed fair and reasonable compensation by the manufacturer for the:
    1. New current model year motor vehicle inventory which has been acquired from the manufacturer, and which has not been damaged or altered while in the dealer’s possession;
    2. Supplies and parts which have been acquired from the manufacturer;
    3. Equipment and furnishings provided the new motor vehicle dealer purchased from the manufacturer or its approved sources; and
    4. Special tools.

      Fair and reasonable compensation shall be paid by the manufacturer within ninety (90) days of the effective date of termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal, provided the new motor vehicle dealer has clear title to the inventory and other items and is in a position to convey that title to the manufacturer.

  7. In the event of a termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal under this section, and the new motor vehicle dealer is leasing the dealership facilities from a lessor other than the manufacturer, or owns the dealership facilities, the manufacturer shall pay a reasonable rent to the dealer in accordance with and subject to subsection (8) of this section.
    1. Reasonable rental value shall be paid only to the extent the dealership premises are recognized in the franchise and only if they are: (8) (a) Reasonable rental value shall be paid only to the extent the dealership premises are recognized in the franchise and only if they are:
      1. Used solely for performance in accordance with the franchise; and
      2. Not substantially in excess of those facilities recommended by the manufacturer.
    2. If the facilities are owned by the dealer, the manufacturer will either:
      1. Locate a purchaser who will offer to purchase the dealership facilities at a reasonable price; or
      2. Locate a lessee who will offer to lease the premises for a reasonable term at a reasonable rent; or
      3. Failing the foregoing, lease the dealership facilities at a reasonable rental value for one (1) year.
    3. If the facilities are leased by the dealer, the manufacturer will either:
      1. Locate a tenant or tenants satisfactory to the lessor, who will sublet or assume the balance of the lease; or
      2. Arrange with the lessor for the cancellation of the lease without penalty to the dealer; or
      3. Failing the foregoing, lease the dealership facilities at a reasonable rent for one (1) year.
    4. The manufacturer shall not be obligated to provide assistance under this section if the dealer:
      1. Fails to accept a bona fide offer from a prospective purchaser, sublessee or assignee; or
      2. Refuses to execute a settlement agreement with the lessor if the agreement would be without cost to the dealer; or
      3. Fails to make a written request for assistance under this section within one (1) month of the termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal.
    5. If, in an action for damages under this section, the manufacturer or distributor fails to prove either that the manufacturer or distributor has acted in good faith or that there was good cause for the franchise termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal, then the manufacturer or distributor may terminate, cancel, or fail to renew the franchise upon payment to the new motor vehicle dealer of an amount equal to the value of the dealership as an ongoing business location.
  8. Notice of termination to a dealer shall entitle the dealer to continue the franchise and the dealer may attempt to sell the franchise until all of the dealer’s appeal rights have been exhausted.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 75, § 1; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(2); 1982, ch. 373, § 6, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 357, § 5, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 111, § 5, effective July 15, 1996; 2000, ch. 23, § 3, effective February 22, 2000.

190.0451. New motor vehicle dealer license — Prohibition against licensing new dealer after prior dealer’s franchise has been revoked — Exceptions — Ten year duration of prohibition.

  1. Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, if a dealer licensed under this chapter has its franchise revoked by the manufacturer on or after January 1, 2009, for grounds other than those provided in KRS Chapter 190, the commission shall not grant a new motor vehicle dealer license establishing a new motor vehicle dealership, or relocating an existing new motor vehicle dealership, within a ten (10) mile radius of a location at which a former licensed new motor vehicle dealer for the same line make of new motor vehicles had its franchise revoked.
  2. If the manufacturer can show proof that the franchise was offered to the original franchisee at substantially similar terms as offered to other potential buyers, and the original franchisee refused the offer, then the prohibition in subsection (1) of this section shall not apply and the commission may grant a new motor vehicle dealer license within the ten (10) mile radius described in subsection (1) of this section.
  3. The prohibition against granting a new motor vehicle dealer license outlined in subsection (1) of this section shall remain in effect for ten (10) years from the date of revocation of the original franchise by the manufacturer.

History. Enact. Acts 2010, ch. 84, § 1, effective July 15, 2010.

190.046. Compensation to dealer for work performed under warranty — “Reasonable compensation” — Submission, determination, and payment of dealer’s claims — Compensation to dealer for sponsored sales or service promotion events — Audits — Fraud.

  1. Notwithstanding the terms of any franchise agreement, each motor vehicle manufacturer or distributor, doing business within this Commonwealth, shall assume all responsibility for and shall defend, indemnify, and hold harmless its motor vehicle dealers against any loss, damages, and expenses, including legal costs, arising out of complaints, claims, recall repairs or modifications or factory authorized or directed repairs, or lawsuits resulting from warranty defects, which shall include structural or production defects; defects in the assembly; or design of motor vehicles, parts, accessories; or other functions beyond the control of the dealer, including without limitation, the selection of parts or components for the vehicle. Each manufacturer or distributor shall pay reasonable compensation to any authorized dealer who performs work to repair defects, or to repair any damage to the manufacturer’s or distributor’s product sustained while the product is in transit to the dealer, when the carrier or the means of transportation is designated by the manufacturer or distributor. Each manufacturer or distributor shall provide to its dealers with each model year a schedule of time allowances for the performance of warranty repair work and services, which shall include time allowances for the diagnosis and performance of warranty work and service time, and shall be reasonable and adequate for the work to be performed.
  2. In the determination of what constitutes “reasonable compensation” under this section, the principal factor to be considered shall be the amount of money that the dealer is charging its other customers for the same type service or repair work. Other factors may be considered, including the compensation being paid by other manufacturers or distributors to their dealers for work; and the prevailing amount of money being paid or charged by the dealers in the city or community in which the authorized dealer is doing business. “Reasonable compensation” shall include diagnosing the defect; repair service; labor; parts and administrative and clerical costs. The compensation of a dealer shall not be less than the amount charged by the dealer for like services and parts, which minimum compensation for parts shall be dealer cost plus thirty percent (30%) gross profit, to retail customers for nonwarranty service and repairs, or less than the amounts indicated for work on the schedule of warranty compensation required to be filed by the manufacturer with the commission as a part of the manufacturer’s license application by KRS 190.030 . A manufacturer or distributor shall not require unreasonable proof to establish “reasonable compensation.”
    1. A manufacturer or distributor shall not require a dealer to submit a claim authorized under this section sooner than thirty (30) days after the dealer completes the preparation, delivery, or warranty service authorizing the claim for preparation, delivery, or warranty service. (3) (a) A manufacturer or distributor shall not require a dealer to submit a claim authorized under this section sooner than thirty (30) days after the dealer completes the preparation, delivery, or warranty service authorizing the claim for preparation, delivery, or warranty service.
    2. All claims made by a dealer under this section shall be paid within thirty (30) days after their approval.
    3. All claims shall be either approved or disapproved by the manufacturer or distributor within thirty (30) days after their receipt on a completed form supplied or approved by the manufacturer or distributor.
    4. Any claims not specifically disapproved in writing within thirty (30) days after the receipt of the form shall be considered to be approved and payment shall be made within thirty (30) days thereafter.
    5. A dealer shall not be required to maintain defective parts for more than thirty (30) days after payment of a claim.
    6. Any dispute between the dealer and the manufacturer or distributor shall be subject to the provisions of KRS 190.057 .
  3. A manufacturer or distributor shall compensate the dealer for manufacturer-sponsored or distributor-sponsored sales or service promotion events, including but not limited to rebates, programs, or activities in accordance with established written guidelines for such events, programs, or activities, which the manufacturer or distributor shall provide to each dealer.
    1. A manufacturer or distributor shall not require a dealer to submit a claim authorized under subsection (4) of this section sooner than thirty (30) days after the dealer becomes eligible to submit the claim. (5) (a) A manufacturer or distributor shall not require a dealer to submit a claim authorized under subsection (4) of this section sooner than thirty (30) days after the dealer becomes eligible to submit the claim.
    2. All claims made by a dealer pursuant to subsection (4) of this section for promotion events, including but not limited to rebates, programs, or activities, shall be paid within thirty (30) days after their approval.
    3. All claims shall be either approved or disapproved by the manufacturer or distributor within thirty (30) days after their receipt on a completed form supplied or approved by the manufacturer or distributor.
    4. Any claim not specifically disapproved in writing within thirty (30) days after the receipt of this form shall be considered to be approved and payment shall be made within thirty (30) days.
  4. If a dealer submits any claim under this section to a manufacturer or distributor that is incomplete, inaccurate, or lacking any information usually required by the manufacturer or distributor, or if incomplete, inaccurate, or missing information is discovered during an audit, then the manufacturer or distributor shall promptly notify the dealer, and the time limit to submit the claim shall be extended for a reasonable length of time, not less than five (5) business days following notice by the manufacturer or distributor to the dealer, for the dealer to provide the complete, accurate, or lacking information to the manufacturer or distributor. A dealer’s failure to comply with the specific requirements of the manufacturer or distributor for processing a claim may not constitute grounds for denial of the claim or reduction of the amount of compensation paid to the dealer if the dealer presents reasonable documentation or other evidence to substantiate the claim.
    1. A manufacturer or distributor may only audit warranty, sales, or incentive claims for a period of twelve (12) months following payment, or the end of a program which does not exceed one (1) year in length, whichever is later, subject to all of the provisions of this section. (7) (a) A manufacturer or distributor may only audit warranty, sales, or incentive claims for a period of twelve (12) months following payment, or the end of a program which does not exceed one (1) year in length, whichever is later, subject to all of the provisions of this section.
    2. A manufacturer or distributor shall not require documentation for warranty, sales, or incentive claims more than twelve (12) months after the claim was paid or the end of a program which does not exceed one (1) year in length, whichever is later.
    3. Prior to requiring any charge-back, reimbursement, or credit against a future transaction arising out of an audit, the manufacturer or distributor shall submit written notice to the dealer along with a copy of its audit and the detailed reason for each intended charge-back, reimbursement, or credit.
    4. The limitations of this subsection do not apply if the manufacturer or distributor can prove fraud on a claim.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 75, § 2; 1974, ch. 107, § 1; 1978, ch. 182, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 373, § 7, effective July 15, 1982; 1992, ch. 452, § 5, effective July 14, 1992; 2000, ch. 23, § 4, effective February 22, 2000; 2011, ch. 3, § 1, effective June 8, 2011.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A manufacturer is prohibited from requiring that a franchise dealer submit to an arbitration panel the question of whether the dealer must pay for all or part of the cost of repairing or replacing a defective new motor vehicle. OAG 87-69 .

190.0461. Recall of vehicle — Duty of manufacturer or distributor.

In the event a manufacturer or distributor recalls any of its products, the manufacturer or distributor must include within the written notice thereof to vehicle owners and dealers the expected date by which necessary parts and equipment will be available for the correction of the defects necessitating the recall.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 182, § 3, effective June 17, 1978.

190.0462. Manufacturer’s schedule of compensation to be paid to dealers for warranty service and repairs.

Included within the application for a license to engage in business within this state as a manufacturer of motor vehicles must be a schedule specifying the compensation to be paid the manufacturer’s dealers for parts, work and service in connection with warranty service and repairs which shall include compensation for diagnostic work, as well as repair service and labor.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 182, § 4, effective June 17, 1978.

190.047. Transfer of motor vehicle sales franchise — Proposal to establish additional dealership or to relocate existing dealership.

  1. Unless a franchise specifically states to the contrary, no franchise or any interest in a franchise may be sold, transferred, or assigned without the approval of the manufacturer or distributor.
  2. A dealer desiring to sell, transfer, or assign all or any portion of his franchise shall submit a written proposal of the sale, transfer, or assignment to the manufacturer or distributor, and approval of the proposal shall not be arbitrarily or unreasonably withheld.
  3. The refusal of the manufacturer or the distributor to approve a proposed sale, transfer, or assignment shall be subject to review by the licensor, if a written application for review is filed with the licensor, with notice to the manufacturer or distributor, within thirty (30) days of the date of the refusal. The refusal shall not be final until the licensor, after a hearing has been held in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 13B, has determined that the approval was not arbitrarily or unreasonably withheld.
  4. The burden of proof shall be on the dealer to show that the approval of the sale, transfer, or assignment of any interest in the franchise was arbitrarily or unreasonably withheld. Factors to be considered in determining whether the manufacturer or distributor acted arbitrarily or unreasonably shall include whether the basic financial and facility requirements of the franchise will be met by the proposed transfer, sale, or assignment and that the proposed purchaser, transferee, or assignee is capable of operating, managing, and supervising the operation of the business in question.
  5. Failure of the manufacturer or distributor to abide by the final order of the licensor or to continue the franchise in effect pending the final determination of the issue by the licensor shall be cause for the licensor to refuse to issue a subsequent license in the same county or franchise area to an applicant who will be selling the same motor vehicles as the former dealer for the same manufacturer or distributor.
  6. If a manufacturer, distributor, factory branch, or factory representative seeks to:
    1. Enter into a franchise establishing an additional new motor vehicle dealership facility;
    2. Establish an additional new motor vehicle dealership facility under an existing franchise; or
    3. Relocate an existing new motor vehicle dealership facility, within or into a relevant market area where the same line make is then represented,

      the manufacturer, distributor, factory branch, or factory representative shall, in writing, first notify the licensor, and each new motor vehicle dealer in the line make in the relevant market area, of the intention to establish an additional new motor vehicle dealership facility, or to establish an additional new motor vehicle dealership facility under an existing franchise, or to relocate an existing new motor vehicle dealership facility within or into that market area. The relevant market area shall be a radius of ten (10) miles around an existing new motor vehicle dealership facility. Within fifteen (15) days of receiving the notice, or within fifteen (15) days after the end of any appeal procedure provided by the manufacturer, distributor, factory branch, or factory representative, any new motor vehicle dealership may file with the licensor a protest to the establishment or relocation of the new motor vehicle dealership facility. When a protest is filed, the licensor shall inform the manufacturer, distributor, factory branch, or factory representative that a timely protest has been filed and that the manufacturer, distributor, factory branch, or factory representative shall not establish or relocate the proposed new motor vehicle dealership facility until the licensor has held a hearing in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B, if the licensor has determined that there is good cause for permitting the new motor vehicle dealership facility. For the purposes of this section, the reopening in a relevant market area of a new motor vehicle dealership that has not been in operation for two (2) years or more shall be deemed the establishment of an additional new motor vehicle dealership facility.

  7. In determining whether good cause has been established for entering into an additional franchise for the same line make, or establishing an additional new motor vehicle dealership facility under an existing franchise, or relocating an existing new motor vehicle dealership facility within or into a relevant market area where the same line make is then represented, the licensor shall take into consideration the existing circumstances, including, but not limited to:
    1. Permanency of the investment;
    2. Whether the new motor vehicle dealer of the same line make in that relevant market area is providing adequate competition and convenient consumer care for the motor vehicles of the line make in the market area, which shall include the adequacy of motor vehicle sales and service facilities, equipment, supply of vehicle parts, and qualified service personnel; and
    3. Growth, or decline in population and new car registrations in the relevant market areas.

      In the case of the establishment of an additional new motor vehicle dealership facility under an existing franchise, good cause shall not be found if the additional facility fails to offer a range of service, including, but not limited to sales, service, parts, and financing.

  8. Any parties to a hearing by the licensor concerning the establishing or relocating of a new motor vehicle dealership shall have a right of judicial review of the final order in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B.
  9. The provisions of this section shall apply to the personal representative, executor, or administrator of the estate of an individual who had an interest in a franchise, or to the guardian or conservator of an individual who has been declared mentally disabled and who has that interest for one (1) year following appointment.
  10. The provisions of this section do not apply to:
    1. The relocation of an existing dealership within that dealer’s area of responsibility contained in its franchise agreement, provided the relocation is not within five (5) miles of a new motor vehicle dealer of the same line make; or
    2. The relocation of an existing new motor vehicle dealership facility to a site that is further away from an existing dealership of the same line make.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 75, § 3; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(2); 1982, ch. 141, § 64, effective July 1, 1982; 1982, ch. 373, § 8, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 357, § 6, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 111, § 6, effective July 15, 1996; 1996, ch. 318, § 77, effective July 15, 1996.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by § 69 of Acts 1980, ch. 396, which would have taken effect July 1, 1982; however, Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 146, effective July 1, 1982, repealed Acts 1980, ch. 396. Section 9 of Acts 1982, ch. 373, purported to amend this section as amended by ch. 396, but the repeal of ch. 396 by Acts 1982, ch. 141 prevails over such purported amendment.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/96). This section was amended by 1996 Ky. Acts chs. 111 and 318 which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Application.

The limitations imposed by subsection (6) of this section do not apply when the existing dealership is within 10 miles of the proposed dealership, but is located in another state. BMW Stores, Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of America, Inc., 860 F.2d 212, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 14522 (6th Cir. Ky. 1988 ).

2.Legislative Intent.

The General Assembly did not intend to enact this section for the protection of out-of-state dealerships. BMW Stores, Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of America, Inc., 860 F.2d 212, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 14522 (6th Cir. Ky. 1988 ).

3.Sale of Franchise.

The purpose of the Kentucky Automobile Dealer Act is to protect the dealer’s interest; if manufacturer does not approve the sale of a franchise and if franchise dealer does not initiate a review of such disapproval, a third party purchaser has no standing to do so. Blair v. General Motors Corp., 838 F. Supp. 1196, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17728 (W.D. Ky. 1993 ).

Without any facts of bad faith or arbitrary conduct relevant to the transfer evaluation process, the dealership had not stated a claim for breach of contract and violation of Kentucky Motor Vehicle Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 190.010 et seq., for unreasonably withheld consent. Epps Chevrolet Co. v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 3d 692, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38949 (E.D. Ky. 2015 ).

4.Third Parties.

Nothing in the statutory language of the Kentucky Automobile Dealer Act indicates that the legislature intended to protect or otherwise provide an administrative remedy for third parties not having a contractual relationship with the manufacturer. Blair v. General Motors Corp., 838 F. Supp. 1196, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17728 (W.D. Ky. 1993 ).

190.049. Controversies as to transportation costs and damages of new motor vehicles. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 107, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 182, § 5, effective June 17, 1978.

190.0491. “Delivery” defined — Dealer’s duties concerning vehicle damaged in transit — Reversion of ownership — Certification to consumer — Failure of manufacturer to indemnify dealer.

  1. “Delivery” of a motor vehicle to a dealer by a manufacturer or distributor for the purposes of this section shall be accomplished by the:
    1. Tender of the motor vehicle and any documents necessary to enable the dealer to obtain title and possession of the motor vehicle at the dealer’s place of business or designated place of delivery, and
    2. The giving of notice of the tender of the motor vehicle and documents to the dealer.
  2. Whenever a motor vehicle is damaged while in transit when the carrier or the means of transportation is designated by the manufacturer or distributor, or whenever a motor vehicle is otherwise damaged prior to delivery to the dealer, the dealer must:
    1. Notify the manufacturer or distributor of the damage within three (3) working days of the occurrence of the delivery of the motor vehicle as defined in subsection (1) of this section; and
    2. Request from the manufacturer or distributor authorization to repair the damages sustained or to replace the parts or accessories damaged.

      Notification of damage by the dealer must be by certified mail, with a notice of delivery requested to be returned to the dealer, and shall be presumed to have occurred upon deposit of the notice with the United States Postal Service.

  3. In the event the manufacturer or distributor refuses or fails to authorize repair or replacement of the damage within three (3) working days of notification of damage by the dealer, ownership of the motor vehicle shall revert to the manufacturer or distributor, and the dealer shall incur no obligations, financial or otherwise, for the damage to the motor vehicle. In determining when the notification of the damage by the dealer to the manufacturer or distributor occurs, the date the notice is received by the manufacturer or distributor by the United States Postal Service indicated on the notice of delivery returned to the dealer shall be controlling.
  4. In computing the lapse of three (3) working days under this section, the day of the occurrence of delivery of the motor vehicle to the dealer by the manufacturer or distributor, as defined in subsection (1) of this section, or the day of notification of the damage to the manufacturer or distributor by the dealer, as described in subsection (3) of this section, shall not be included, but the last working day of the period so computed shall be included.
  5. Prior to the sale of any motor vehicle damaged prior to delivery to the dealer as described in subsection (2) of this section, excluding damage to glass, tires, and bumpers when replaced by identical manufacturer’s original equipment and any damage not exceeding six percent (6%) of the sticker price of the vehicle, the occurrence and extent of the damage must be disclosed by the dealer to the consumer, and upon repair of the damage sustained, or replacement of the parts or accessories damaged, the manufacturer and/or dealer, must certify to the consumer that the motor vehicle has been repaired or remanufactured to the manufacturer’s standards; if the dealer makes the certification he shall be indemnified by the manufacturer. Upon this certification, liability for any concealed damages then remaining with the motor vehicle shall lie with the manufacturer.
  6. Whenever a motor vehicle is damaged resulting in repairs, for items other than wheels, tires, or glass, that exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000) after delivery to the dealer by the manufacturer or distributor, as defined in subsection (1) of this section, but before sale by the dealer to the consumer, the occurrence and extent of the damage must be disclosed by the dealer to the consumer prior to a sale, and upon repair of the damage sustained, or replacement of parts or accessories damaged, the dealer must certify to the consumer that this motor vehicle has been repaired or remanufactured according to the manufacturer’s standards. Upon this certification, liability for any concealed damages then remaining with the motor vehicle shall lie with the dealer.
  7. Notwithstanding the terms of any franchise agreement, it shall be a violation of this section for any new motor vehicle manufacturer to fail to indemnify and hold harmless its franchised dealers against any judgment or settlement agreed to in writing by the manufacturer for damages, including, but not limited to, court costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees of the new motor vehicle dealer, arising out of complaints, claims, or lawsuits including, but not limited to, strict liability, negligence, misrepresentation, warranty (express or implied), or rescission of the sale as is defined in KRS 355.2-608, to the extent that the judgment or settlement agreed to in writing by the manufacturer relates to the alleged defective or negligent manufacture, assembly, or design of new motor vehicles, parts, or accessories or other functions by the manufacturer, beyond the control of the dealer.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 182, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 114, § 35, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 373, § 12, effective July 15, 1982; 1996, ch. 111, § 8, effective July 15, 1996; 2000, ch. 23, § 5, effective Feburary 22, 2000; 2017 ch. 139, § 2, effective June 29, 2017.

190.050. Local and general advisory committees, appointment of — Duties.

The licensor may appoint annually one (1) or more local advisory committees and one (1) general advisory committee, each consisting of not more than nine (9) members. The committees upon request of the licensor may advise and assist the licensor in the administration of this section. The members of said committees shall receive no compensation for their services or expenses.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 161, § 5, effective May 18, 1956.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The department of motor transportation (now department of vehicle regulation) can rely upon the advice given to the commissioner by the advisory committee as such advice would constitute good cause for issuing or revoking salesmen’s licenses. OAG 64-862 .

190.053. Citation of suspected violators.

If a licensee is found to be violating any of the provisions of this chapter, or any administrative regulation promulgated by the commission pursuant thereto, or is found to be permitting any of its salesmen to violate any of the provisions of this chapter, or any administrative regulation promulgated by the commission pursuant thereto, the commission may, upon complaint or upon its own motion, issue its order to a licensee notifying it to appear before the commission at a fixed time and place, at which time and place the commission shall have a hearing conducted in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B. If the commission is satisfied, after a hearing, that the licensee has violated or refused to observe any of the provisions of this chapter, or any order or administrative regulation of the commission, or has permitted any of its salesmen to violate any of the provisions of this chapter or any order or administrative regulation promulgated by the commission pursuant thereto, the commission may suspend or revoke the license of the licensee. The renewal by the commission of any license shall not be construed to be a waiver or condonement of any violation which occurred prior to renewal and shall not prevent subsequent proceedings against the licensee for the violation.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 175, § 16; 1982, ch. 374, § 8, effective July 15, 1982; 1992, ch. 452, § 6, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 318, § 78, effective July 15, 1996.

190.057. Hearings — Amendment of final order.

  1. Hearings under this chapter shall be conducted in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B.
  2. A final order may be withdrawn, set aside, or amended, if action is taken between the date of the rendition of the final order and the expiration of the time for appeal or until an appeal has been taken.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 175, §§ 14, 15; 1982, ch. 374, § 9, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 357, § 7, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 452, § 7, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 111, § 7, effective July 15, 1996; 1996, ch. 318, § 79, effective July 15, 1996.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/96). This section was amended by 1996 Ky. Acts chs. 111 and 318 which are in conflict. Under KRS 446.250 , Acts ch. 318, which was last enacted by the General Assembly, prevails.

190.058. Motor Vehicle Commission — Membership — Powers — Duties.

  1. The Motor Vehicle Commission is hereby created as an agency of the Commonwealth to carry out the functions and duties conferred upon it by this section.
  2. The commission shall consist of twelve (12) members, eleven (11) of whom shall be appointed by the Governor, and the twelfth shall be the commissioner of the Department of Vehicle Regulation. The appointed members shall be:
    1. One (1) representative of an automobile manufacturer;
    2. One (1) representative of automobile wholesalers;
    3. One (1) representative of consumers who shall have no direct financial interest in the industry;
    4. Four (4) new motor vehicle dealers, but no more than two (2) shall represent the same automobile manufacturer as a franchise dealer; and
    5. Four (4) used motor vehicle dealers.
  3. In addition to the requirements of membership on the commission in subsection (2), the following requirements shall apply to the composition of the commission:
    1. No more than seven (7) members shall be from the same political party; and
    2. From the eight (8) members specified in subsection (2)(d) and (e), seven (7) shall be from separate Supreme Court districts.
  4. Each member shall serve for a term of three (3) years. The staggered terms of membership dating from the gubernatorial appointments of July 15, 1982, shall remain in effect.
    1. Members of the commission shall qualify by taking the constitutional oath of office which shall, with the certificate of appointment, be evidence of the authority of the member to act. (5) (a) Members of the commission shall qualify by taking the constitutional oath of office which shall, with the certificate of appointment, be evidence of the authority of the member to act.
    2. Each member of the commission shall be entitled to two hundred dollars ($200) per day for each day actually engaged in the duties of the office, including time spent in necessary travel to and from meetings and otherwise, together with all travel and other necessary expenses incurred while performing official duties.
  5. The commission shall hold a regular annual meeting in September of each year and elect a chairman and vice chairman to serve for the ensuing year. The commission shall have regular meetings as the majority of the members specifies and special meetings at the request of any five (5) members. Reasonable notice of all meetings shall be given as commission administrative regulations prescribe.
  6. A member of the commission shall not participate in the deliberations of the commission and shall not vote on any matter before the commission in which the member has a financial interest or is an interested party. A member shall voluntarily disqualify himself or herself from deliberating or voting upon matters that affect the member but shall not be required to disqualify from matters of general interest affecting the member, the member’s employer, or a business unit in which the member has a financial interest as a member of a class of persons to be affected by an administrative regulation or order of the commission.
  7. A majority of the commissioners, excluding any disqualified commissioner, shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of any business, for the performance of any duty, or for the exercise of any power of the commission. A vacancy in the commission, whether due to disqualification or otherwise, shall not impair the right of the remaining commissioners to exercise all the powers of the commission.
  8. The commission shall employ an executive director who shall be the chief administrative officer of the commission. He shall maintain all minutes of the commission proceedings and shall be custodian of the files and records of the commission. The executive director shall employ the staff authorized by the commission. The commission may, by interagency contract, utilize assistance of any state agency.
  9. The commission shall deposit all moneys received by it from license fees paid under this law with the State Treasurer, who shall keep them in a separate fund to be known as the “Motor Vehicle Commission Fund.” The commission may use this fund for salaries, wages, per diem, professional and consulting fees, grants, loans, contracts, travel expenses, equipment, office rent and expenses, and other necessary expenses incurred in carrying out its duties under this section as provided by legislative appropriation. Notwithstanding KRS 45.229 , at the close of each biennium, the unexpended balance remaining in the motor vehicle commission fund shall not lapse but shall be carried forward to the next biennium.
  10. The commission shall administer the provisions of this section, establish the qualifications of manufacturers and dealers, and ensure that the distribution and sale of new motor vehicles are conducted as provided in this chapter and under the commission’s administrative regulations.
  11. The commission may issue orders and make determinations necessary to carry out the provisions of KRS 190.010 to 190.080 . The orders shall set forth the findings on which the order is based, and the reason for the particular action taken. All orders shall be signed by the chairman or vice chairman and attested by the executive director.
  12. The commission may hold hearings that shall be conducted in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B. A member of the commission shall not participate in the deliberations of the commission and shall not vote on any matter if the member has been disqualified on any of the grounds under KRS 13B.040 .
  13. The commission may cause legal proceedings to be instituted to enforce the provisions of this section and its administrative regulations, orders, and decisions. If it appears from any investigation of a possible violation of any other law or administrative regulation that a violation of the provisions of KRS 190.010 to 190.080 may have occurred, the matter shall be referred to the commission to determine whether proceedings under KRS 190.010 to 190.080 are appropriate. The commission may make contracts and execute instruments necessary or convenient to the exercise of its power or performance of its duties.
  14. The availability of administrative procedures under this section shall not preclude the utilization of other remedies for violation of the provisions of this chapter which are available to the affected parties, including actions for injunctive relief.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 374, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 357, § 8, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 235, § 5, effective July 14, 1992; 1992, ch. 452, § 8, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 318, § 80, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 263, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2014, ch. 83, § 3, effective July 15, 2014.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 9 of Acts 1992, ch. 235, read:

“The terms of current members on the boards, commissions, and councils treated by statutes amended by this Act shall continue in force. When a vacancy occurs for a member appointed to be the representatives of one of the former seven congressional districts, whether by resignation, death, expiration of term, or otherwise, the vacancy shall be filled as follows:

  1. A vacancy from the former First Congressional District shall be filled by an appointee from the current First Supreme Court District.
  2. A vacancy from the former Second Congressional District shall be filled by an appointee from the current Second Supreme Court District.
  3. A vacancy from the former Third Congressional District shall be filled by an appointee from the current Fourth Supreme Court District.
  4. A vacancy from the former Fourth Congressional District shall be filled by an appointee from the current Sixth Supreme Court District.
  5. A vacancy from the former Fifth Congressional District shall be filled by an appointee from the current Third Supreme Court District.
  6. A vacancy from the former Sixth Congressional District shall be filled by an appointee from the current Fifth Supreme Court District.
  7. A vacancy from the former Seventh Congressional District shall be filled by an appointee from the current Seventh Supreme Court District.”

190.059. Appeal from final order of commission.

The final order of the commission granting or refusing to grant an application for a license, or to suspend or revoke a license may be appealed by an aggrieved party to the Circuit Court of Franklin County in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of the court to grant such relief as the circumstances may require. If the issues involved were first presented to the commission by a complaint filed with the commission, the complainant may appeal from the decision of the commission in the same manner as prescribed above.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 374, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 1996, ch. 318, § 81, effective July 15, 1996.

190.060. Licensor to determine the place within state where trials or hearings are held — Other powers — Report of examiner — Rules and regulations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 161, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 175, § 20.

190.061. Motor vehicle dealers board — Members — Qualifications, terms — Meetings — Quorum. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 175, §§ 7-9; 1972, ch. 211, § 3; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(3); 1976, ch. 195, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 374, § 14, effective July 15, 1982.

190.062. Action for damages — Power of commission — Applicability of chapter and KRS Chapter 190A — Written demand for mediation required before civil action involving recreational vehicle franchise issues may be brought.

  1. Notwithstanding the terms, provisions, or conditions of any agreement or franchise, or the terms or provisions of any waiver, any person who is injured in his business or property by a violation of this section or any person so injured because he refuses to accede to a proposal for an arrangement which, if consummated, would be in violation of this section, may bring a civil action in the Franklin Circuit Court to enjoin further violations, to recover the actual damages sustained by him, together with costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.
  2. The commission may order, deny, suspend, or revoke the license of any new motor vehicle dealer, new recreational vehicle dealer, manufacturer, distributor, factory branch, or factory representative for failing to comply with any provisions of KRS 190.010 to 190.080 or KRS Chapter 190A, as such provisions apply, respectively, to new motor vehicle dealers, new recreational vehicle dealers, manufacturers, distributors, factory branches, or factory representatives; or in lieu thereof, or in addition thereto, may assess monetary penalties of a civil nature not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each violation.
  3. The provisions of KRS 190.010 to 190.080 and KRS Chapter 190A, as such provisions apply, respectively, to new motor vehicle dealers, new recreational vehicle dealers, manufacturers, distributors, factor branches, or factory representatives, shall apply to all persons required to be licensed under the terms herein, and to dealerships and contracts between new motor vehicle dealers, new recreational vehicle dealers, and manufacturers, distributors, factory branches, or factory representatives at the time of its passage, and to all such future new motor vehicle dealerships and contracts.
    1. In addition to the provisions of this section, before a civil action involving recreational vehicle franchise issues is brought, the party bringing suit for an alleged violation of this chapter shall serve a written demand for mediation on the offending party. The demand for mediation shall include a brief statement of the dispute and the relief sought by the party making the demand. The party making the demand shall serve the demand by certified mail to one (1) of the following addresses: (4) (a) In addition to the provisions of this section, before a civil action involving recreational vehicle franchise issues is brought, the party bringing suit for an alleged violation of this chapter shall serve a written demand for mediation on the offending party. The demand for mediation shall include a brief statement of the dispute and the relief sought by the party making the demand. The party making the demand shall serve the demand by certified mail to one (1) of the following addresses:
      1. In an action between a new recreational vehicle dealer and a manufacturer, the address stated in the dealer agreement between the parties;
      2. In an action between a new recreational vehicle dealer and a warrantor that is not a manufacturer, the address stated in any agreement between the parties; or
      3. In an action between two (2) new recreational vehicle dealers, the address of the offending dealer in the records of the commission.
    2. Within twenty (20) days after a demand for mediation is served under this subsection, the parties shall mutually select an independent mediator who is approved by the commission and meet with that mediator for the purpose of attempting to resolve the dispute at a location in this state selected by the mediator. The mediator may extend the date of the meeting for good cause shown by either party or if the parties agree to the extension.
    3. The service of a demand for mediation under this subsection tolls the time for the filing of any complaint, petition, protest, or other action under this chapter until representatives of both parties have met with the mediator selected pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subsection for the purpose of attempting to resolve the dispute. If a complaint, petition, protest, or other action is filed before that meeting, the court shall enter an order suspending the proceeding or action until the mediation meeting has occurred and may, if all the parties to the proceeding or action stipulate in writing that they wish to continue to mediate under this subsection, enter an order suspending the proceeding or action for as long a period as the court considers appropriate.
    4. Each of the parties to the mediation under this subsection is responsible for its own attorney fees. The parties shall equally divide the cost of the mediator.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 374, § 3, effective July 15, 1982; 2014, ch. 27, § 20, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.In General.

The statute requires that anyone proceeding under this chapter must bring the civil action in Franklin Circuit Court. GMC v. Book Chevrolet, 979 S.W.2d 918, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 149 ( Ky. 1998 ).

190.063. Records, public — Continuation of licenses.

All records of the commission, including those maintained by the department for its account, shall be public records. All persons holding any license which is authorized by this chapter, as of June 16, 1966, shall have the right to continue to hold, maintain, and renew such license after June 16, 1966, subject only to the suspension or revocation thereof pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 175, § 11; 1982, ch. 374, § 10, effective July 15, 1982.

190.067. Department of Vehicle Regulation’s authority to perform commission’s duties upon failure or inability to perform.

If the commission fails to perform or is unable to perform any of its official duties within the time prescribed in this chapter, the department may perform these duties.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 175, § 10; 1982, ch. 374, § 11, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 357, § 9, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 452, § 9, effective July 14, 1992; 1998, ch. 263, § 2, effective July 15, 1998.

190.070. Prohibited practices on the part of a manufacturer, distributor, factory branch, or factory representative.

  1. It shall be a violation of this section for any manufacturer, distributor, factory branch, or factory representative licensed under this chapter to require any new motor vehicle dealer in the Commonwealth:
    1. To order or accept delivery of any motor vehicle, part or accessory thereof, appliances, equipment, or any other product not required by law, which shall not have been voluntarily ordered by the new motor vehicle dealer; except that this section is not intended to modify or supersede any terms or provisions of the franchise requiring new motor vehicle dealers to market a representative line of those motor vehicles which the manufacturer or distributor is publicly advertising.
    2. To order or accept delivery of any new motor vehicle with special features, appliances, accessories, or equipment not included in the list price of the motor vehicle, as publicly advertised by the manufacturer or distributor.
    3. To order for any person any parts, accessories, equipment, machinery tools, appliance, or any commodity whatsoever not required in connection with a recall campaign.
    4. To participate monetarily in an advertising campaign or contest, any promotional materials, training materials, showroom or other display decorations, or materials, at the expense of the dealer, without the consent of the dealer.
    5. To enter into any agreement with the manufacturer, distributor, factory branch, or factory representative, or to do any other act prejudicial to the new motor vehicle dealer by threatening to cancel a franchise or any contractual agreement existing between the dealer and the manufacturer, distributor, factory branch, or factory representative. Notice in good faith to any dealer of the dealer’s violation of any terms or provisions of the dealer’s franchise, or contractual agreement shall not constitute a violation of this law.
    6. To change the capital structure of the dealership, or the means by or through which the dealer finances the operation of the dealership, provided that the dealership at all times meets any reasonable capital standards agreed to by the dealer, excluding any entity engaged primarily in providing financing or insurance on motor vehicles.
    7. To refrain from participation in the management or investment in, or the acquisition of any other line of new motor vehicle or related products; provided, however, that this section does not apply unless the new motor vehicle dealer maintains a reasonable line of credit for each make or line of new motor vehicles, and that the new motor vehicle dealer remains in substantial compliance with the terms and conditions of the franchise and with any reasonable facility requirements of the manufacturer, and no change is made in the principal management of the new motor vehicle dealership.
    8. To change location of the dealership, or to, during the course of the agreement, make any substantial alterations to the dealership premises, when to do so, would be unreasonable in light of the current economic, political, and social considerations.
    9. To prospectively assent to a release, assignment, novation, waiver, or estoppel which would relieve any person from liability to be imposed by this law, or to require any controversy between a dealer and a manufacturer, distributor, or representative, to be referred to any person other than the duly constituted courts of the Commonwealth or the United States of America, or to the commissioner, if the referral would be binding upon the dealer.
    10. To establish or maintain exclusive facilities, personnel, display space, or signage for a new motor vehicle make or line.
    11. To expand facilities without making available a sufficient supply of new motor vehicles to support the expansion in light of the market and economic conditions.
  2. It shall be a violation of this section for any manufacturer, distributor, factory branch, or factory representative:
    1. To delay, refuse, or fail to deliver motor vehicles, or vehicle parts or accessories in reasonable quantities relative to the new motor vehicle dealer’s facilities and sales potential in the new motor vehicle dealer’s relevant market area, and within a reasonable time, but in any case no more than sixty (60) days, after receipt of an order from a dealer having a franchise for the retail sale of any new vehicle sold or distributed by the manufacturer or distributor, any new vehicle, parts, or accessories to new vehicles as are covered by the franchise, if the vehicle, parts, or accessories are publicly advertised as being available for delivery or actually being delivered. The delivery to another dealer of a motor vehicle of the same model and similarly equipped as the vehicle ordered by a motor vehicle dealer who has not received delivery thereof, but who had placed his written order for the vehicle prior to the order of the dealer receiving the vehicle, shall be prima facie evidence of a delayed delivery of, or refusal to deliver, a new motor vehicle to a motor vehicle dealer within sixty (60) days, without cause. This section is not violated, however, if the failure is caused by acts or causes beyond the control of the manufacturer, distributor, factory branch, or factory representative.
    2. To refuse to disclose to any new motor vehicle dealer, handling the same line make, the manner and mode of distribution of that line make within the relevant market areas.
    3. To prevent or attempt to prevent a dealer from receiving fair and reasonable compensation for the value of the franchised business. There shall not be a transfer or assignment of the dealer’s franchise without the consent of the manufacturer or distributor, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
    4. To obtain money, goods, service, or any other benefit from any other person with whom the dealer does business, on account of, or in relation to, the transaction between the dealer and the other person, other than for compensation for services rendered, unless the benefit is promptly accounted for, and transmitted to, the dealer, excluding any entity engaged primarily in providing financing or insurance on motor vehicles.
    5. To increase prices of motor vehicles which the dealer had ordered for private retail customers prior to the dealer’s receipt of the written official price increase notification, a sales contract signed by a private retail consumer shall constitute evidence of each order, provided that the vehicle is in fact delivered to the customer. In the event of manufacturer price reductions, the amount of a reduction received by a dealer shall be passed on to the private retail consumer by the dealer, if the retail price was negotiated on the basis of the previous higher price to the dealer. Price reductions shall apply to all vehicles in the dealer’s inventory which were subject to the price reduction. Price differences applicable to new model or series motor vehicles at the time of the introduction of new models or series shall not be considered a price increase or price decrease. Price changes caused by the following shall not be subject to the provisions of this section:
      1. The addition to a motor vehicle of required or optional equipment pursuant to state or federal law;
      2. Revaluation of the United States dollar, in the case of foreign-make vehicles or components; or
      3. Increased transportation charges due to an increase in the rate charged by common carrier or transporter.
    6. To offer any refunds or other types of inducements to any person for the purchase of new motor vehicles of a certain line make to be sold to the state or any political subdivision thereof, without making the same offer, upon written request, to all other dealers in the same line make within the relevant market area.
    7. To release to any outside party, except under subpoena, any administrative, judicial or arbitration proceedings, or any business, financial, or personal information which may be, from time to time, provided by the dealer to the manufacturer, without the express written consent of the dealer.
    8. To deny any dealer the right of free association with any other dealer for any lawful purpose.
    9. To establish or maintain a relationship, on the part of a manufacturer, distributor, factory branch, or factory representative, where the voting rights exceed a simple majority.
    10. To own, operate, or control any motor vehicle dealership in the Commonwealth; however, this subsection shall not prohibit:
      1. The operation by any manufacturer of a dealership for a temporary period, not to exceed one (1) year, during the transition from one (1) owner to another;
      2. The ownership or control of a dealership by a manufacturer while the dealership is being sold under a bona fide contract or purchase option to the operator of the dealership; or
      3. The ownership, operation, or control of a dealership by a manufacturer if the licensor determines after a hearing at the request of any party, that there is not a dealer who is independent of the manufacturer available in the community or trade area to own and operate the franchise in a manner consistent with the public interest.
    11. To compete without good faith with a new motor vehicle dealer in the same line make, operating under an agreement or franchise from the aforementioned manufacturer, distributor, factory branch, or factory representative in the relevant market area. A manufacturer, distributor, factory branch, or factory representative shall not, however, be deemed to be competing when operating a dealership, either temporarily for a reasonable period, not to exceed one (1) year, or in a bona fide retail operation which is for sale to any qualified independent person at a fair and reasonable price, or in a bona fide relationship in which an independent person has made a significant investment, subject to loss in the dealership, and can reasonably expect to acquire full ownership of such dealership on reasonable terms and conditions.
    12. To unfairly discriminate among its new motor vehicle dealers with respect to warranty reimbursement or authority granted its new motor vehicle dealers to make warranty adjustment with retail customers.
    13. To fail to give consent to the sale, transfer, or exchange of the franchise to a qualified buyer capable of being licensed as a new motor vehicle dealer in this state; provided that consent may be withheld when in light of other circumstances, granting the consent would be unreasonable.
    14. To fail to be licensed as provided in this chapter, and to maintain a bond in an amount as determined by this chapter.
  3. It shall be unlawful for a manufacturer, either directly or indirectly, or in combination with or through any subsidiary or affiliated entity, to discriminate in favor of one (1) dealer against another dealer holding a franchise for the same line make of motor vehicle by furnishing to only one (1) dealer any of the following:
    1. Any vehicle, part, or other product that is not available to each dealer at the same price, including discounts, rebates, incentives, or other payments or allowances affecting the net price of the product;
    2. Any vehicle, part, or other product that is not made available to each dealer in quantities proportionate to the demand for the vehicle, part, or other product;
    3. Any vehicle, part, or other product that is not made available to each dealer on comparable delivery terms, including time of delivery after placement of an order;
    4. Any promotional or advertising payment or allowance that is not made available to each dealer on proportionally equal terms;
    5. Any opportunity to purchase or lease from the manufacturer the dealer’s facility that is not made available to each dealer on terms proportionate to the respective values of its facilities;
    6. Any personnel training that is not made available to each dealer on proportionally equal terms;
    7. Any inventory or other financing that is not made available to each dealer on proportionally equal terms, except that a manufacturer, subsidiary, or affiliated entity shall not be obligated to make available financing to a dealer who does not meet reasonable credit standards uniformly applied by the manufacturer, subsidiary, or affiliated entity;
    8. Any opportunity to perform work for which the dealer is entitled to be compensated under this chapter that is not made available to each dealer under uniformly applied standards;
    9. Any opportunity to sell products or services distributed by the manufacturer for resale in connection with the line make of the motor vehicle covered by the franchise that is not made available to each dealer on proportionally equal terms;
    10. Any opportunity to establish an additional sales, service, or parts outlet that is not made available to each dealer in whose relevant market area the sales, service, or parts outlet will be located;
    11. Any information concerning the manufacturer’s products, prices or other terms of sale, or promotional programs that is not contemporaneously furnished to the dealer;
    12. Any improvement to, or payment to the dealer for an improvement to, the dealer’s facilities that is not made available to each dealer on proportionally equal terms;
    13. Any opportunity to sell or assign retail installment contracts or consumer leases to the manufacturer or the manufacturer’s sales finance company subsidiary that is not made available to each dealer on proportionally equal terms, except that a manufacturer or sales finance company shall not be obligated to purchase any retail installment contract or consumer lease that does not meet reasonable credit terms uniformly applied by the manufacturer or sales finance company subsidiary;
    14. Any product assistance, service, or facility in connection with the franchise that is not made available to each dealer on proportionally equal terms; or
    15. Any payment for any service or facility in connection with the franchise that is not made available to each dealer on proportionally equal terms.
  4. It shall not be a defense to an alleged violation of subsection (3) of this section, that an item or opportunity was offered to a dealer if the offer was conditioned upon the dealer meeting one (1) or more requirements that are not reasonable and necessary to fulfill the dealer’s obligations under the franchise. The manufacturer shall have the burden of proving that any requirement upon which an offer was conditioned was reasonable and necessary to fulfill the dealer’s obligations under the franchise when the offer was made. A requirement shall not be found to be reasonable and necessary to fulfill the dealer’s obligations under the franchise if the manufacturer cannot prove that it was within the control of each dealer to meet the requirement imposed on the dealer as a condition of the offer.
  5. A dealer who alleges a good faith belief that the dealer has been, or is being, discriminated against in violation of subsection (3) of this section, may demand in writing that the manufacturer furnish the dealer with pertinent information reasonably necessary for the dealer to determine if discrimination exists. If the manufacturer fails to furnish the dealer with the information demanded within thirty (30) days of the manufacturer’s receipt of the dealer’s written demand, the manufacturer shall have, in any subsequent legal proceeding, the burden of proving that the alleged violation has not occurred.
  6. Any dealer who is discriminated against by a manufacturer in violation of subsection (3) of this section shall recover three (3) times an amount equal to the value of what the dealer would have received if the manufacturer had complied with subsection (3) of this section upon furnishing any item or opportunity to another dealer.
  7. A change in ownership of a manufacturer or distributor that contemplates a continuation of that line make in the state shall not directly or indirectly, through actions of any parent of the manufacturer or distributor, subsidiary of the manufacturer or distributor, or common entity cause a termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal of a dealer agreement by a present or previous manufacturer or distributor of an existing agreement unless the manufacturer or distributor offers the new vehicle dealer an agreement substantially similar to that offered to other dealers of the same line make.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 161, § 7, effective May 18, 1956; 1982, ch. 373, § 13, effective July 15, 1982; 2000, ch. 23, § 6, effective February 22, 2000; 2008, ch. 17, § 1, effective July 15, 2008.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A manufacturer is prohibited from requiring that a franchise dealer submit to an arbitration panel the question of whether the dealer must pay for all or part of the cost of repairing or replacing a defective new motor vehicle. OAG 87-69 .

190.071. Prohibited practices on part of new motor vehicle dealer.

  1. It shall be a violation of this section for any new motor vehicle dealer:
    1. To require the purchaser of a motor vehicle as a condition of sale and delivery, to also purchase special features, appliances, accessories, or equipment not desired or requested by the purchaser, unless the features, appliances, accessories, or equipment are the type which are ordinarily installed on the vehicle by the manufacturer or distributor when the vehicle is received or acquired by the dealer.
    2. To advertise, display, represent, or sell as a new or unused motor vehicle any vehicle which has been operated for demonstration purposes, or which is otherwise a used motor vehicle.
    3. To sell or offer for sale as a new or unused motor vehicle any motor vehicle for which he cannot secure for the purchaser the new car warranty that may be extended by the manufacturer of the vehicle to purchasers of one (1) of its new vehicles, unless the fact that the vehicle being sold without a manufacturer’s warranty is communicated to the purchaser, and disclosed prominently in writing.
    4. To fail to have an established place of business which is used, or will be used, primarily for the purpose of selling, buying, displaying, repairing, or servicing motor vehicles.
    5. To use false or fraudulent representations in connection with the operation of the new motor vehicle dealership.
    6. To fail to reasonably supervise his agents, salesmen, or employees.
    7. To transfer a new motor vehicle with a manufacturer’s statement of origin to a motor vehicle dealer who does not have either a valid service agreement or franchise from the particular line, make, manufacturer, distributor, factory branch, or factory representative.
  2. Any motor vehicle dealer who fails to comply with this section or the provisions of KRS Chapter 186 or 186A, and any motor vehicle dealer other than a wholesale auto dealer who is found by the commission to have acquired a used motor vehicle for cash, trade-in, or in any other manner and fails to have the registration transferred to him prior to the time the vehicle is sold or otherwise transferred to another person shall be subject to suspension, fine, or revocation of his motor vehicle dealer’s license.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 373, § 14, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 357, § 10, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 452, § 10, effective July 14, 1992.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Disclosure.

Subsection (1)(e) of this section imposes an affirmative duty upon new motor vehicle dealers to disclose material facts to customers while in the course of conducting business and the failure to so inform the customers may constitute fraud. Smith v. GMC, 979 S.W.2d 127, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 99 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

190.073. Regulations.

The commission shall promulgate appropriate and reasonable regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 175, § 18; 1982, ch. 374, § 12, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 357, § 11, effective July 13, 1984.

190.075. Restraint of violations.

At the instance of the commission, the department or of any person having any interest in the subject matter, the courts of this state may enjoin any person from violating any of the provisions of this chapter, or any order, rule, regulation or requirement of the commission. The Franklin Circuit Court shall hold concurrent venue with the courts of this Commonwealth of all civil and injunctive actions instituted by the commission for the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter, or the orders, rules, regulations or requirements properly promulgated under this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 175, § 12; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(2); 1982, ch. 374, § 13, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 357, § 12, effective July 13, 1984.

190.080. Previous consumer-owner information provided upon request.

  1. As used in this section, “previous consumer-owner” shall mean the last owner of the vehicle who could reasonably be expected to have operated the used car for personal, family, household, or business purposes, but shall not mean an owner who possessed the vehicle primarily for resale purposes.
  2. It shall be unlawful for any motor vehicle dealer or motor vehicle salesperson to refuse to furnish, upon request of a prospective purchaser, the name, address, and telephone number, if known or available, of the previous consumer-owner of any used car offered for sale.
  3. It shall be unlawful for any person to transfer a motor vehicle in order to avoid compliance with this section.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 161, § 8; 1976, ch. 335, § 1; 2015 ch. 95, § 1, effective June 24, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

American Motors Sales Corp. v. Runke, 708 F.2d 202, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 28110 (6th Cir. 1983).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Comments, Precomplaint Investigations Under the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act: Validity and Scope of the Civil Investigation Demand, 65 Ky. L.J. 169 (1976-77).

190.085. Civic event license plate.

  1. A vehicle which has been donated or loaned by a licensed motor vehicle dealer for use in a civic event may be operated during preparation for and during the civic event with a civic event license plate.
  2. Application for approval of the use of a civic event license plate shall be made to the Department of Vehicle Regulation on forms prescribed and furnished by the department at least sixty (60) days prior to the event. The licensed motor vehicle dealer in his application shall provide the name of the event for which the motor vehicles will be used, date and duration of the event, the number of vehicles to be loaned or donated and other information required by the Department of Vehicle Regulation. The application shall be accompanied by five dollars ($5) for each civic event license plate applied for. The commissioner of the Department of Vehicle Regulation shall approve or deny the use of the license plate within thirty (30) days after receiving the application and inform the dealer as to his decision.
  3. At least ten (10) days prior to the date approved for the use of civic event license plate, the motor vehicle dealer shall provide to the department the vehicle identification number for each vehicle which is anticipated to be lent or donated to the civic event.
  4. Any motor vehicle bearing a civic event license plate authorized by subsection (1) of this section shall be restricted to use in providing services for events for which approval is granted. The services may include, but not be limited to, parades, transportation of visitors or dignitaries to and from event activities, use by event personnel or event volunteers and any other activity for which a vehicle may be required in the furtherance of the civic event.
  5. The use of the civic event license plate shall be limited to the time set forth in the approved application. A copy of the approved application shall be carried in the vehicle at all times. When the civic event license plate expires, the dealer shall remove the plate and return it to the Department of Vehicle Regulation. The vehicle shall then be registered in a manner required by KRS Chapter 186. A misuse of civic event license plates shall be deemed a violation of the motor vehicle dealer’s license.
  6. The Department of Vehicle Regulation may promulgate administrative regulations to implement this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 300, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.

Installment Sales Contract

190.090. Definitions for KRS 190.090 to 190.140.

As used in KRS 190.090 to 190.140 , unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires:

  1. “Person” means an individual, partnership, corporation, association, and any other group however organized;
  2. “Retail installment sale” means any sale for other than agricultural, business, or commercial use evidenced by a retail installment contract wherein retail buyer agrees to buy and retail seller agrees to sell a motor vehicle at a time sale price payable in two (2) or more installments. The cash sale price of the motor vehicle, the amount, if any, included for insurance and other benefits, official fees and the finance charge, shall together constitute the time sale price;
  3. “Retail installment contract” means any agreement, entered into in this state, evidencing a retail installment sale of a motor vehicle, other than for the purpose of resale, pursuant to which title to, or a lien upon the motor vehicle is retained by the retail seller as security for the retail buyer’s obligation. This term includes a mortgage, conditional sale contract or any contract for the bailment or leasing of a motor vehicle by which the bailee or lessee contracts to pay as compensation for its use a sum substantially equivalent to the time sale price of the motor vehicle and by which it is agreed that the bailee or lessee is bound to become, or has the option of becoming for no additional consideration or for nominal additional consideration, the owner of such motor vehicle;
  4. “Motor vehicle” means any device in, upon, or by which any person or property is, or may be transported or drawn upon a highway. The term does not include self-propelled wheelchairs and invalid tricycles, tractors, power shovels, road machinery, implements of husbandry and other agricultural machinery, or other machinery not designed primarily for highway transportation but which may incidentally transport persons or property on a highway, or devices which move upon or are guided by a track or travel through the air. A moped as defined in KRS 190.010 and a recreational vehicle shall be subject to the same requirements as a motor vehicle under this section;
  5. “Retail seller” or “seller” means a person who sells or agrees to sell a motor vehicle under a retail installment contract to a retail buyer;
  6. “Retail buyer” or “buyer” means a person who buys or agrees to buy a motor vehicle from a retail seller not for the purpose of resale and who executes a retail installment contract in connection therewith;
  7. “Sales finance company” means a person engaged in the business of creating and holding or purchasing or acquiring retail installment contracts from a retail seller. The term includes a bank, trust company, private banker, industrial bank, investment company or national bank, if so engaged;
  8. “Cash sale price” means, for purposes of KRS 190.090 to 190.140 only, and not for purposes of KRS 138.455 to 138.470 , the price at which the seller would in good faith sell to the buyer, and the buyer would in good faith buy from the seller, the motor vehicle which is the subject matter of the retail installment contract, if such sale were a sale for cash, instead of a retail installment sale. The cash sale price may include:
    1. Any taxes, registration fees, certificate of title fees, and, if any, license fees;
    2. Charges for delivery, servicing, repairing, or improving the motor vehicle, including accessories and their installation;
    3. Charges for a service contract, mechanical breakdown insurance, a maintenance agreement, a vehicle protection product, and any other goods or services related to the sale that the buyer agrees to purchase from the seller; and
    4. Any processing fee;
  9. “Official fees” means the fees prescribed by law for filing, recording, or otherwise perfecting and releasing or satisfying a retained title or a lien created by a retail installment contract;
  10. “Finance charge” means that part of the time sale price by which it exceeds the aggregate of the cash sale price, the amount, if any, included for insurance and other benefits and official fees included in the retail installment sale;
  11. “Maintenance agreement” means a contract of limited duration that provides for scheduled maintenance and parts related to such maintenance. A maintenance agreement shall not be considered a contract of, or for, insurance;
  12. “Service contract” has the same meaning as in KRS 304.5-070 (1)(p);
  13. “Truth in Lending Act” means Title I of Pub. L. No. 90-321, codified at 15 U.S.C. secs. 1601 to 1667f, as may be amended from time to time;
  14. “United States Rule” means that in partial payments on a debt, each payment is applied first to the finance charge and any remainder reduces the principal. Under this rule, accrued but unpaid finance charges cannot be added to the principal and interest cannot be compounded;
  15. “Vehicle protection product” means a vehicle protection device, system, or service that is installed on or applied to a vehicle that is designed to deter the theft of the vehicle, and includes a written warranty that provides that if the product fails to deter the theft of the vehicle, the warranty holder shall be paid specified incidental costs by the warrantor as a result of the failure of the device, system, or service to perform pursuant to the terms of the warranty. Vehicle protection products include but are not limited to window etch products and body part marking products. A vehicle protection product shall not be considered a contract of, or for, insurance; and
  16. Words in the singular include the plural and vice versa.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 105, § 1, effective July 1, 1956; 1978, ch. 349, § 11, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 391, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 2012, ch. 96, § 1, effective July 12, 2012; 2016 ch. 57, § 2, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Retail Installment Contract.

In a contract case, there was no error in a default judgment that limited post-judgment interest on a retail installment contract to 12 percent per annum because a purchaser did not agree to the accrual of interest at any rate, much less at a rate in excess of the statutory rate; the purchaser agreed only to buy a vehicle at a price determined by adding the cost of the vehicle if she had paid cash and the time price differential. Moreover, the court could not deviate from the 12 percent rate because the claim here was for liquidated damages. Serv. Fin. Co. v. Ware, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 47 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2015), op. withdrawn, sub. op., 473 S.W.3d 98, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 110 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Retail installment sales of mobile homes would not fall within the ambit of KRS chapter 190 which sets out the provisions for installment contract sales for motor vehicles whose cash sale price is $5,000 or less, because mobile homes do not fall within the category of motor vehicles as defined in subsection (4) of this section, and are therefore covered by the provisions of KRS 371.210 et seq. OAG 80-51 .

Since mobile homes fall within the broad definition of motor vehicles in subsection (4) of this section and do not fall within any of the exemptions listed in subsection (4) of this section, if the cash price of a mobile home is $5,000 or less, the mobile home may be financed under the provisions of KRS 190.090 to 190.140 ; but see OAG 80-51 . OAG 80-111 .

Where the cash sale price of a stationary mobile home is $5,000 or less, the provisions of the motor vehicle retail instalment sales act, KRS 190.090 to 190.140 apply; where the cash price of stationary mobile homes exceeds $5,000, the provisions of the Instalment Sales Contracts Act, KRS 371.210 to 371.330 , apply but see OAG 80-51 . OAG 80-111 .

KRS 360.150 excludes manufactured home financing transactions which provide for a fixed rate of interest payable in substantially equal successive installments over a fixed term; these financing transactions fall under the statutory requirements of the Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act because they would fall under the broad definition of “motor vehicle” as contained in subsection (4) of this section. Since there is no longer a ceiling on the cash price sale of such transactions, the Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act would be applicable in all manufactured home financing transactions where there was a fixed rate of interest. OAG 84-353 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Contracts, formality and assignability, KRS ch. 371.

Interest and usury, KRS ch. 360.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kripke, Kentucky Modernizes the Law of Chattel Security, 48 Ky. L.J. 396 (1960).

Whiteside, Uniform Commercial Code — Major Changes in Sales Law, Introduction, 49 Ky. L.J. 165 (1960).

Whiteside, Lewis, Kentucky’s Commercial Code — Some Initial Problems in Security, Assignment of Security Interest in Motor Vehicles, 50 Ky. L.J. 61 (1961).

Stengel, Should States Adopt the Uniform Consumer Credit Code?, 60 Ky. L.J. 8 (1971).

Kentucky Law Survey, Weinberg, Commercial Law and Consumer Credit, 65 Ky. L.J. 370 (1976-77).

190.100. Installment contract.

    1. Every retail installment contract shall: (1) (a) Every retail installment contract shall:
      1. Be in writing in at least eight (8) point type;
      2. Contain all the agreements of the parties;
      3. Be signed by the retail buyer; and
      4. Require a copy thereof to be furnished to the retail buyer at the time of the execution of the contract.
    2. A retail installment contract need not appear on a single page and a contract that includes a provision incorporating agreements that appear after the buyer’s signature, including without limitation, terms, and conditions on the back or on subsequent pages, shall be deemed in compliance with KRS 446.060(1).
    3. No provisions for confession of judgment, power of attorney therefor, or wage assignment contained in any retail installment contract shall be valid or enforceable.
    4. The holder of a retail installment contract may collect a delinquency and collection charge on each installment in arrears for a period not less than ten (10) days in an amount not in excess of five percent (5%) of each installment or fifteen dollars ($15), whichever is greater. In addition to such delinquency and collection charge, the retail installment contract may provide for the payment of reasonable attorneys’ fees where such contract is referred to an attorney not a salaried employee of the holder of the contract for collection, plus the court costs.
    5. Unless notice has been given to the retail buyer of actual or intended assignment of a retail installment contract, payment thereunder or tender thereof made by the retail buyer to the last known holder of such contract shall be binding upon all subsequent holders or assignees.
    6. Upon written request from the retail buyer, the holder of the retail installment contract shall give or forward to the retail buyer a written statement of the total amount unpaid under such contract. A retail buyer shall be given a written receipt for any payment when made in cash.
  1. The retail installment contract shall contain the following:
    1. The cash sale price of the motor vehicle which is the subject matter of the retail installment sale;
    2. The amount of the retail buyer’s down payment, whether made in money or goods, or partly in money or partly in goods;
    3. The difference between paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection;
      1. Amount, if any, included for insurance and other benefits; and (d) 1. Amount, if any, included for insurance and other benefits; and
      2. Types of coverage and benefits;
    4. Official fees as defined in KRS 190.090 ;
    5. Any amounts eligible for inclusion in the cash sale price as defined in KRS 190.090 that the seller elects to separately itemize; and
    6. Principal balance, which is the sum of paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) of this subsection.
  2. A retail installment contract is deemed in compliance with subsection (2) of this section if it satisfies the requirements of the Truth in Lending Act that would apply to a retail installment contract within the Truth in Lending Act’s scope, regardless of whether the Truth in Lending Act would apply to the retail installment sale at issue.
  3. The amount, if any, included for insurance, shall not exceed the premiums chargeable in accordance with applicable rate filings made with the commissioner of insurance. Every retail seller or sales finance company, if insurance on the motor vehicle is included in a retail installment contract shall within thirty (30) days after execution of the retail installment contract send or cause to be sent to the retail buyer a policy or policies or certificate of insurance, which insurance shall be written by a company authorized to do business in this state, clearly setting forth the amount of the premium, the kind or kinds of insurance and the scope of the coverage and all the terms, exceptions, limitations, restrictions and conditions of the contract or contracts of the insurance. The buyer of a motor vehicle under a retail installment contract shall have the privilege of purchasing such insurance from an agent or broker of his own selection and of selecting an insurance company acceptable to the seller; provided, however, that the inclusion of the insurance premium in the retail installment contract when the buyer selects the agent, broker or company, shall be optional with the seller. If any such policy is canceled, the unearned insurance premium refund received by the holder of the contract shall be credited to the final maturing installments of the retail installment contract. For purposes of this subsection, single interest insurance insuring the retail seller or sales finance company shall not be considered insurance on the motor vehicle. Neither a copy of the policy nor a certificate of insurance of this type of insurance shall be sent to the retail buyer.
  4. Any sales finance company hereunder may purchase or acquire from any retail seller any retail installment contract on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon between them. No filing of the assignment, no notice to the retail buyer of the assignment, and no requirement that the retail seller shall be deprived of dominion over the payments thereunder or the goods covered thereby if repossessed by the retail seller shall be necessary to the validity of a written assignment of a retail installment contract as against creditors, subsequent purchasers, pledgees, mortgagees, and lien claimants of the retail seller.
  5. An acknowledgment in the body of the retail installment contract by the retail buyer of the delivery of a copy thereof shall be conclusive proof of delivery in any action or proceeding by or against any assignee of a retail installment contract.
    1. A “debt cancellation agreement” is a written provision in a retail installment contract, or separate addendum thereto, which provides for cancellation of all or part of an obligation of the buyer or obligor upon the occurrence of a specified event. (7) (a) A “debt cancellation agreement” is a written provision in a retail installment contract, or separate addendum thereto, which provides for cancellation of all or part of an obligation of the buyer or obligor upon the occurrence of a specified event.
    2. In accordance with subsection (2)(d) of this section, a debt cancellation agreement shall be itemized by type on the retail installment contract and considered an “other benefit” for which the seller, sales finance company, or other holder may charge the buyer or obligor.
    3. A debt cancellation agreement shall not be considered a contract of, or for, insurance.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 105, § 2, effective July 1, 1956; 1984, ch. 391, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 384, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 2008, ch. 68, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; 2010, ch. 24, § 240, effective July 15, 2010; 2012, ch. 96, § 2, effective July 12, 2012.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Attorney Fees.

Under subsection (1)(d) of this section, payment of attorney fees not exceeding 15 percent of the amount due, provided for in retail installment contracts, includes, for the purpose of computing the amount of attorney fees, the entire amount of the judgment including prejudgment interest. Capitol Cadillac Olds, Inc. v. Roberts, 813 S.W.2d 287, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 133 ( Ky. 1991 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Whiteside, Lewis, Kentucky’s Commercial Code — Some Initial Problems in Security, Assignment of Security Interest in Motor Vehicles, 50 Ky. L.J. 61 (1961).

190.110. Finance charges — Rates — Computations.

  1. The finance charge allowed by this subsection may be precomputed by using an add-on method. If the finance charge in a retail installment sale is precomputed it shall not exceed the following rates:

    Class 1. Any new or used motor vehicle designated by the manufacturer by a year model not earlier than the year in which the sale is made -- eleven dollars ($11) per one hundred dollars ($100) of principal balance, as determined pursuant to KRS 190.100(2), per year of the contract.

    Class 2. Any new motor vehicle not in class 1 and any used motor vehicle designated by the manufacturer by a year model of one (1) or two (2) years prior to the year in which the sale is made — thirteen dollars ($13) per one hundred dollars ($100) of principal balance, as determined pursuant to KRS 190.100(2), per year of the contract.

    Class 3. All other motor vehicles not in class 1 or 2 — fifteen dollars ($15) per one hundred dollars ($100) of principal balance, as determined pursuant to KRS 190.100(2), per year of the contract.

  2. If the finance charge applicable to a retail installment sale is precomputed and the retail installment contract provides for successive monthly payments, substantially equal in amount, the maximum finance charge computed pursuant to subsection (1) of this section for a partial year occurring at the beginning of a contract with a term of less than one (1) year or at the end of a contract with a remaining term greater than a year shall be prorated at the annual maximum amount of finance charge computed under subsection (1) of this section, based on the number of months in the partial year.
  3. If the finance charge applicable to a retail installment sale is precomputed and the retail installment contract provides for unequal or irregular installment payments, the maximum finance rate of the finance charge shall be at the effective rate provided in subsection (1) of this section, having due regard for the schedule of payment.
  4. Alternatively, the seller may, at his option, compute the finance charge in a retail installment sale on a simple interest basis, taking into account the actual number of days between payments under the contract using a fixed or variable rate not to exceed the effective rate of finance charge permitted under subsection (1) of this section.
  5. For the purposes of subsections (3) and (4) of this section, the effective rate of the finance charge permitted by subsection (1) of this section shall be the rate computed in accordance with the actuarial method or the United States Rule method for a retail installment contract that provides for:
    1. The total finance charge permitted under subsections (1) and (2) of this section;
    2. Successive monthly payments substantially equal in amount; and
    3. The purchase of a vehicle of the same vehicle class over the same term as the unequal or irregular installment payment contract subject to subsection (3) of this section or the simple interest basis contract subject to subsection (4) of this section. In computing the effective rate, the seller may make any assumptions and use any method that the Truth in Lending Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder would permit in computing the annual percentage rate.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 105, § 3, effective July 1, 1956; 1980, ch. 321, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 391, § 3, effective July 13, 1984; 2012, ch. 96, § 3, effective July 12, 2012.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Interest.

In a contract case, there was no error in a default judgment that limited post-judgment interest on a retail installment contract to 12 percent per annum because a purchaser did not agree to the accrual of interest at any rate, much less at a rate in excess of the statutory rate; the purchaser agreed only to buy a vehicle at a price determined by adding the cost of the vehicle if she had paid cash and the time price differential. Moreover, the court could not deviate from the 12 percent rate because the claim here was for liquidated damages. Serv. Fin. Co. v. Ware, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 47 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2015), op. withdrawn, sub. op., 473 S.W.3d 98, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 110 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).

Trial court properly limited post-judgment interest on a retail installment contract to 12% per annum because (1) the contract sued on was a retail installment agreement in which a buyer agreed to pay a finance charge but did not agree to the accrual of interest at any rate, much less a rate in excess of that stated in Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 360.040, and (2) a time price differential was expressed as a finance charge calculated under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 190.110 , and the seller did not compute the finance charge on a simple interest basis, under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 190.110 (4). Serv. Fin. Co. v. Ware, 473 S.W.3d 98, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 110 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).

Cited:

Rexing v. Doug Evans Auto Sales, Inc., 703 S.W.2d 491, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1027 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

190.120. Payment in full before maturity.

  1. If the finance charge applicable to the retail installment contract has been determined by a precomputed method, the retail buyer may pay in full at any time before the stated maturity date and upon such prepayment in full the retail buyer shall receive a refund of a portion of the finance charge not less than the refund computed in accordance with the Rule of 78’s. An acquisition cost of twenty-five dollars ($25) shall be deducted from the finance charge before computation of the refund. Where the refund is less than one dollar ($1) no refund need be made and acceleration of the balance by the seller, caused by the default of the buyer or otherwise, shall not affect the date of computation. Any balance remaining unpaid as of the stated maturity date shall then be subject to accumulation of additional finance charges at the rate specified in the contract.
  2. If the finance charge applicable to the retail installment contract has or will be determined by a simple interest method, the retail buyer may pay in full at any time before the stated maturity date without penalty, except that the holder may collect and receive a minimum finance charge of twenty-five dollars ($25) in any event.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 105, § 4, effective July 1, 1956; 1984, ch. 391, § 4, effective July 13, 1984; 2012, ch. 96, § 4, effective July 12, 2012.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Rexing v. Doug Evans Auto Sales, Inc., 703 S.W.2d 491, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1027 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinions of Attorney General.

For indirect loans or purchases of installment paper under KRS 371.260(2), 371.270(2) and this section, the statutes expressly permit deduction of the $10 or $25 acquisition cost before computing the rebate. The proportion or ratio is established “after” the acquisition cost is deducted. OAG 82-260 .

190.124. Statute of limitations on action for breach of retail installment contract.

  1. The holder of a retail installment contract shall commence an action against the retail buyer to recover monetary damages or other relief for breach of the retail installment contract within the earlier of the following:
    1. Four (4) years after the maturity date of the retail installment contract;
    2. If the motor vehicle has been repossessed, voluntarily or involuntarily, four (4) years after the date the motor vehicle was sold or otherwise disposed of by the repossessing retail seller, sales finance company, or other owner of the retail installment contract; or
    3. If the maturity date is accelerated by reason of default, regardless of whether the motor vehicle has been repossessed, within four (4) years of the accelerated maturity date.
  2. The provisions of this section shall control over any contrary provision of KRS Chapter 413.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 242, § 62, effective July 12, 2006.

190.130. Extension, deferral or renewal — When — Service fee — Additional charge.

The holder of a retail installment contract may, upon agreement with the retail buyer, extend the scheduled due date, defer the scheduled payment of all or part of any installment payment or payments, or renew the balance of such contract. In any such case the holder may restate the amount of the installments and the time schedule therefor, and collect as a refinance charge for such extension, deferment or renewal, a flat service fee not to exceed five dollars ($5) and an additional finance charge computed at the same rate and by the same method as originally set out in the retail installment contract computed from the date of such extension, deferment or renewal.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 105, § 5, effective July 1, 1956; 1984, ch. 391, § 5, effective July 13, 1984.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Riley v. West Kentucky Production Credit Asso., 603 S.W.2d 916, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 347 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Mapother, Attorneys’ Fees Recoverable in Kentucky Litigation, Vol. 44, No. 4, October 1980, Ky. Bench & Bar 28.

190.140. Citation of KRS 190.090 to 190.140.

KRS 190.090 to 190.140 may be cited as “The Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act.”

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 105, § 8, effective July 1, 1956.

Mobile Home Sales

190.180. Definition of terms in KRS 190.180 to 190.250. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 120, § 2; 1968, ch. 152, § 24) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 76, § 15, effective June 21, 1974. For present law see KRS 367.710 to 367.775.

190.190. License required for mobile home dealers and manufacturers — Application fees — Bond — Report. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 120, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 76, § 15, effective June 21, 1974. For present law see KRS 367.710 to 367.775.

190.200. Licenses issuance. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 120, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 76, § 15, effective June 21, 1974. For present law see KRS 367.710 to 367.775.

190.210. Denial, suspension, revocation of license, grounds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 120, § 6(1), (7)) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 76, § 15, effective June 21, 1974. For present law see KRS 367.710 to 367.775.

190.220. Procedure on denial, suspension or revocation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 120, § 6(2) to (5)) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 76, § 15, effective June 21, 1974. For present law see KRS 367.710 to 367.775.

190.230. Powers of commissioner, hearing — Subpoenas — Witness fees. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 120, § 6(6), 7) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 76, § 15, effective June 21, 1974. For present law see KRS 367.710 to 367.775.

190.240. Kentucky mobile home dealers license board — Members — Terms — Functions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 120, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 76, § 15, effective June 21, 1974. For present law see KRS 367.710 to 367.775.

190.250. Rules and regulations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 120, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 76, § 15, effective June 21, 1974. For present law see KRS 367.710 to 367.775.

Tampering with Odometer

190.260. Definitions for KRS 190.270 to 190.320.

As used in KRS 190.270 to 190.320 :

  1. “Odometer” means an instrument for measuring and recording the actual distance a motor vehicle or motor home as defined in KRS 190A.010 travels while in operation; but shall not include any auxiliary odometer designed to be reset by the operator of the motor vehicle for the purpose of recording mileage on trips;
  2. “Repair and replacement” means to restore to a sound working condition by replacing the odometer or any part thereof or by correcting what is inoperative; and
  3. “Transfer” means to change ownership by purchase, gift, or any other means.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 246, § 1; 2014, ch. 27, § 22, effective January 1, 2015.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Comments, Precomplaint Investigations Under the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act: Validity and Scope of the Civil Investigation Demand, 65 Ky. L.J. 169 (1976-77).

190.270. Unlawful acts — Suspension and revocation schedule for violations.

  1. It is unlawful for any person to advertise for sale, to sell, to use, or to install or to have installed, any device which causes an odometer to register any mileage other than the true mileage driven. For purposes of this section, the true mileage driven is that mileage the vehicle has been driven as registered by the odometer within the manufacturer’s designed tolerance.
  2. It is unlawful for any person or his agent to disconnect, reset, or alter the odometer of any motor vehicle or motor home with the intent to change the number of miles indicated thereon.
  3. It is unlawful for any person with the intent to defraud to operate a motor vehicle or motor home on any street or highway knowing that the odometer of such vehicle is disconnected or nonfunctional.
  4. The commission shall deny, suspend or revoke the license of any person who violates or causes, aids or abets any violation of this section which denial, suspension or revocation may be in addition to, and not exclusive of, any other penalties provided for elsewhere in this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 246, §§ 2, 3, 4; 1982, ch. 315, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 357, § 13, effective July 13, 1984; 2014, ch. 27, § 23, effective January 1, 2015.

190.280. Conspiracy to violate provisions of KRS 190.260 to 190.320.

No person shall conspire with any other person to violate the provisions of KRS 190.260 to 190.320 .

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 246, § 5.

190.290. Service, repair or replacement of odometer.

Nothing in KRS 190.260 to 190.320 shall prevent the service, repair, or replacement of an odometer, provided the mileage indicated thereon remains the same before the service, repair, or replacement. Where the odometer is incapable of registering the same mileage as before such service, repair, or replacement, the odometer shall be adjusted to read zero and a notice in writing shall be attached to the left door frame of the vehicle by the owner or his agent specifying the mileage prior to repair or replacement of the odometer and the date on which it was repaired or replaced. Any removal or alteration of such notice so affixed shall be unlawful.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 246, § 6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Bruestle v. S & M Motors, 914 S.W.2d 353, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 9 , 59 A.L.R.5th 881 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

190.300. Disclosure of mileage upon transfer of motor vehicle or motor home.

  1. Any transferor must give a written disclosure to the transferee in connection with the transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle or motor home:
    1. Disclosing the cumulative mileage registered on the odometer.
    2. Disclosure that the actual mileage is unknown, if the odometer reading is known to the transferor to be different from the number of miles the vehicle has actually traveled.
  2. It shall be a violation of this section for any transferor to knowingly give a false statement to a transferee in making any disclosure required by this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 246, § 7; 2014, ch. 27, § 24, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Webster v. Allstate Ins. Co., 689 F. Supp. 689, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16342 (W.D. Ky. 1986 ).

190.310. Liability for violation of KRS 190.270 to 190.320 with intent to defraud.

  1. Any person who, with intent to defraud, violates any requirement imposed under KRS 190.270 to 190.320 shall be liable to the transferee in an amount equal to the sum of:
    1. Three (3) times the amount of actual damages sustained or fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500), whichever is the greater; and
    2. In the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court.
  2. An action to enforce any liability created under subsection (1) of this section, may be brought in a Circuit Court of a county in which the purchaser of the motor vehicle resides.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 246, § 8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1.Recoverable Costs.

Trial court properly rejected an auto buyer’s assertion that he could recover the costs for extra copies of deposition transcripts and other copying expenses under KRS 190.310 because that statute provided for a broader class of cost recoveries than CR 54.04(2). The award of “the costs of the action” in KRS 190.310 was not broader in scope than the award of costs under the procedural rule or under KRS 453.040(1)(a). Wilson v. Lawhorn Ford Sales, Inc., 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 172 (Ky. Ct. App. June 9, 2006).

Cited:

Bruestle v. S & M Motors, 914 S.W.2d 353, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 9 , 59 A.L.R.5th 881 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

190.320. Forms.

Compliance with KRS 190.300 shall be effected by use of forms prescribed by 15 U.S.C. secs. 1981 et seq.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 246, § 9.

Compiler’s Notes.

15 U.S.C.S. Section 1981 et seq. has been repealed. Provisions regarding mileage disclosure requirements upon transfer of vehicles are now found at 49 USCS §§ 32701 et seq.

Penalties

190.990. Penalties.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (5) of this section, any person who violates or causes, aids, or abets any violation of any provision of KRS 190.010 to 190.080 and KRS Chapter 190A, as such provisions apply, respectively, to new motor vehicle dealers, new recreational vehicle dealers, manufacturers, distributors, factory branches, or factory representatives, or any order, rule or regulation lawfully issued pursuant to authority granted by KRS 190.010 to 190.080 shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars ($25) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), or imprisoned for not more than thirty (30) days, or both. Any person who violates paragraphs (l), (m) or (n) of subsection (1) of KRS 190.040 may also be subject to a suspension or revocation sentence of not more than a year effective only in the territory formerly served by the unfairly canceled dealer, except that in a metropolitan area serviced by several dealers handling the same motor vehicle or recreational vehicle, the suspension or revocation order shall not be applicable to the remaining dealers.
  2. Any person who willfully and intentionally violates any provision of KRS 190.090 to 190.140 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500).
  3. A willful violation of KRS 190.100 or 190.110 by any person shall bar his recovery of any finance charge, delinquency, or collection charge on the retail installment contract involved.
  4. Any person who willfully violates KRS 190.270 to 190.320 shall be subject to a penalty of five thousand dollars ($5,000) per violation, which may be recovered on behalf of the Commonwealth by the Attorney General.
  5. Any person who willfully and fraudulently gives a false statement as to the total and actual consideration paid for a motor vehicle under KRS 138.450 shall be guilty of a Class D felony and shall be fined not less than two thousand dollars ($2,000) per offense.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 105, § 6; 1956, ch. 161, § 9; 1968, ch. 152, § 125; 1976, ch. 246, § 10; 1984, ch. 357, § 14, effective July 13, 1984; 1998, ch. 600, § 8, effective April 14, 1998; 2014, ch. 27, § 25, effective January 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 11 of Acts 1998, ch. 600, stated: “The amendments contained in Sections 3 to 8 of this Act shall apply to motor vehicles sold after July 31, 1998.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

American Motors Sales Corp. v. Runke, 708 F.2d 202, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 28110 (6th Cir. 1983).

190.991. Penalty.

Any person who violates any of the provisions of KRS 186.695 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500) or be imprisoned for a term not to exceed six (6) months, or both.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 120, § 9; 1974, ch. 76, § 14.

CHAPTER 190A Recreational Vehicle Sales

190A.010. Definitions for chapter.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Area of sales responsibility,” in relation to new recreational vehicle dealers, means a geographical area agreed to by a new recreational vehicle dealer and the manufacturer in a dealer agreement in which the dealer has the exclusive right to display or sell the new recreational vehicles of a manufacturer of a particular line-make to the public;
  2. “Dealer agreement” means a written agreement or contract entered into between a new recreational vehicle manufacturer and a new recreational vehicle dealer that fixes the rights and responsibilities of the parties and pursuant to which the dealer has the exclusive right to sell specific line-makes and models of the manufacturer’s new recreational vehicles;
  3. “Established place of business” shall not include tents, temporary stands, lots, or other temporary quarters but shall include the following:
    1. A paved or gravel lot for customer parking and for the showing and storage of recreational vehicles;
    2. An indoor office with public areas sufficient to conduct sales transactions with customers;
    3. Restroom facilities available to the public; and
    4. A service and parts area, separated from the public areas, equipped with tools, equipment, and replacement parts necessary for reasonably expected warranty and service needs;
  4. “Factory campaign” means an effort by a new recreational vehicle warrantor to contact recreational vehicle owners or recreational vehicle dealers in order to address an issue concerning a recreational vehicle problem, defective part, or equipment;
  5. “Family member” means a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, sibling, niece, or nephew, or the spouse thereof;
  6. “Fifth-wheel trailer” means a recreational vehicle designed to be towed by a motorized vehicle by means of a towing mechanism that is mounted above or forward of the tow vehicle’s rear axle;
  7. “Folding camping trailer” means a recreational vehicle constructed with partially collapsible side walls that fold for travel and unfold and extend in the set-up mode, which is designed to be towed by a motorized vehicle;
  8. “Line-make” means a specific series of recreational vehicle products that:
    1. Are identified by a common series trade name or trademark;
    2. Are targeted to a particular market segment based on the decor, features, equipment, size, weight, and price range;
    3. Have dimensions and interior floor plans that distinguish the recreational vehicles from recreational vehicles that have substantially the same decor, features, equipment, weight, and price;
    4. Belong to a single, distinct classification of recreational vehicle product type that has a substantial degree of commonality in the construction of the chassis, frame, and body; and
    5. Are authorized for sale by the dealer in the dealer agreement;
  9. “Manufacturer” means any person, partnership, firm, association, corporation, or trust, resident or nonresident, who manufactures or assembles new recreational vehicles, or imports for distribution through distributors of new recreational vehicles, or any partnership, firm, association, joint venture, corporation, or trust, resident or nonresident, which is controlled by the manufacturer. Additionally, the term “manufacturer” shall include the following terms:
    1. “Distributor” means any person, firm, association, corporation, or trust, resident or nonresident, who in whole or in part offers for sale, sells, or distributes any new recreational vehicle to new recreational vehicle dealers, or who maintains factory representatives, or who controls any person, firm, association, corporation, or trust, resident or nonresident, or who in whole or in part offers for sale, sells, or distributes any new recreational vehicle to new recreational vehicle dealers;
    2. “Factory branch” means a branch office maintained by a manufacturer for the purpose of selling, or offering for sale, new recreational vehicles to a distributor, wholesaler, or new recreational vehicle dealer, or for directing or supervising, in whole or in part, factory representatives, and shall further include any sales promotion organization, whether it is a person, firm, or corporation, which is engaged in promoting the sale of new recreational vehicles in this state of a particular line-make to new recreational vehicle dealers; and
    3. “Factory representative” means a representative employed by a manufacturer, distributor, or factory branch for the purpose of making or promoting the sale of new recreational vehicles, or for supervising or contracting with dealers or prospective dealers;
  10. “Motor home” means a recreational vehicle built on a self-propelled motor vehicle chassis that must contain at least four (4) of the following permanently installed independent life support systems:
    1. A cooking facility with an onboard fuel source;
    2. A potable water supply system that includes at least a sink, a faucet, and a water tank with an exterior service supply connection;
    3. A toilet with exterior evacuation;
    4. A gas or electric refrigerator;
    5. A heating or air conditioning system with an onboard power or fuel source separate from the vehicle engine; or
    6. A 110-125 volt electric power supply;
  11. “New recreational vehicle” means a recreational vehicle that is in the possession of the manufacturer, distributor, or wholesaler, or has been sold to the holder of a valid dealer agreement, granted by the manufacturer, or distributor for the sale of the line-make of new recreational vehicle, and on which the original title has not been issued from the franchised dealer;
  12. “New recreational vehicle dealer” means a recreational vehicle dealer who holds a valid dealer agreement, sales and service agreement, franchise, or contract granted by the manufacturer for the sale of the manufacturer’s new recreational vehicles;
  13. “Proprietary part” means a recreational vehicle part manufactured by or for a recreational vehicle manufacturer and sold exclusively by a recreational vehicle manufacturer;
  14. “Recreational vehicle” means a vehicle that:
    1. Is primarily designed as temporary living quarters for noncommercial recreation or camping use;
    2. Has its own motive power or is towed by another vehicle;
    3. Is regulated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration as a vehicle; and
    4. Does not require a special highway use permit;

      The term “recreational vehicle” includes motor homes, travel trailers, fifth-wheel trailers, and folding camping trailers;

  15. “Recreational vehicle salesperson” means any person who, for gain or compensation of any kind, either directly or indirectly, regularly or occasionally, by any form of agreement or arrangement, sells or negotiates for the sale of any new recreational vehicle for any new recreational vehicle dealer to any one (1) or more third parties;
  16. “Supplier” means any person, firm, corporation, or business entity that engages in the manufacturing of recreational vehicle parts, accessories, or components;
  17. “Transient customer” means a person who is temporarily traveling through the area of sales responsibility of a recreational vehicle dealer;
  18. “Travel trailer” means a recreational vehicle designed to be towed by a motorized vehicle; and
  19. “Warrantor” means any person, firm, corporation, or business entity, including any manufacturer or supplier, which provides a written warranty to the consumer in connection with a new recreational vehicle or parts, accessories, or components thereof. The term does not include a person that provides a service contract, mechanical or other insurance, or an extended warranty sold for separate consideration by a dealer or other person not controlled by a warrantor.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 27, § 1, effective January 1, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1/1/2015). 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 27, sec. 26, provides that that Act, which established KRS Chapter 190A and amended various sections of KRS Chapter 190, may be cited as the Recreational Vehicle Dealer Franchise Act of 2014.

(1/1/2015). 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 27, sec. 27, provides that that Act, which established KRS Chapter 190A and amended various sections of KRS Chapter 190, applies to any recreational vehicle manufacturer-dealer agreement entered into on or after the effective date of that Act, which is January 1, 2015.

(1/1/2015). The internal numbering of this statute has been modified by the Reviser of Statutes from the way it appeared in 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 27, sec. 1, under the authority of KRS 7.136(1). The words in the text were not changed.

190A.020. Motor Vehicle Commission’s licensure and supervision of recreational vehicle dealers and manufacturers — Additional statutory requirements for new recreational vehicle dealers.

  1. The Motor Vehicle Commission shall, under administrative regulations promulgated by it, issue the licenses provided for by KRS 190.010 to 190.080 to recreational vehicle dealers and manufacturers and shall have supervision over licensees in respect to this chapter and all the provisions of KRS 190.010 to 190.080 that are applicable to recreational vehicle manufacturers and dealers.
  2. New recreational vehicle dealers shall also be subject to the provisions of KRS 190.090 to 190.140 and 190.270 to 190.320 .

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 27, § 2, effective January 1, 2015.

190A.030. Conditions applicable to area of sales responsibility of a new recreational vehicle dealer included in an agreement between a new recreational vehicle manufacturer and a dealer — Prohibition against sales activity outside of designated area — Exception.

  1. The following conditions shall apply to the area of sales responsibility of a new recreational vehicle dealer included in a dealer agreement between a new recreational vehicle manufacturer and a dealer:
    1. A manufacturer or distributor shall not sell a recreational vehicle in this state to or through a dealer without first having entered into a written dealer agreement with a dealer which has been signed by both parties;
    2. The new recreational vehicle manufacturer shall designate in the dealer agreement the area of sales responsibility in which the dealer has the exclusive right to display or sell the manufacturer’s new recreational vehicles of a line-make included in the dealer agreement;
    3. The manufacturer shall not contract with another dealer for the sale of the same line-make included in the designated area for the duration of the agreement; and
    4. The area of sales responsibility shall not be reviewed or changed without the consent of both parties until one (1) year after the execution of the dealer agreement.
  2. A new recreational vehicle dealer shall not conduct sales activity or display for sale recreational vehicles outside of its designated area of sales responsibility except as provided in KRS 190A.030(7) and the laws of this state.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 27, § 3, effective January 1, 2015.

190A.040. Recreational vehicle manufacturer may terminate or not renew a new recreational vehicle dealer’s agreement with good cause — Determination of good cause — Notice of termination or nonrenewal of dealer agreement.

  1. A recreational vehicle manufacturer, directly or through any officer, agent, or employee, may terminate or not renew a new recreational vehicle dealer’s agreement with good cause.
  2. A recreational vehicle manufacturer has the burden of showing good cause when terminating or not renewing a dealer agreement for cause. For the purpose of determining whether there is good cause for the proposed action, any of the following factors may be considered:
    1. The extent of the penetration of the dealer in the area of sales responsibility;
    2. The extent and quality of the service of the dealer under recreational vehicle warranties;
    3. The nature and extent of the investment of the dealer in the business of the dealer;
    4. The adequacy of the service facilities, equipment, parts, supplies, and personnel of the dealer;
    5. The effect of the proposed action on the community;
    6. Whether the dealer fails to follow agreed-upon procedures or standards related to the overall operation of the dealership; and
    7. The performance by the dealer under the terms of the dealer agreement.
    1. Except as provided in paragraph (d) or (e) of this subsection, the manufacturer shall provide written notice at least ninety (90) days before the effective date of the termination or nonrenewal of the dealer agreement in the event the dealer is being terminated for good cause. (3) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (d) or (e) of this subsection, the manufacturer shall provide written notice at least ninety (90) days before the effective date of the termination or nonrenewal of the dealer agreement in the event the dealer is being terminated for good cause.
    2. The notice shall state all of the reasons for the termination or nonrenewal of the dealer agreement.
    3. The notice shall state that if the dealer provides to the manufacturer within thirty (30) days after the dealer receives the original notice a written notification of the intent of the dealer to cure all claimed deficiencies, the dealer shall have ninety (90) days from the receipt of the original notice to correct the claimed deficiencies. If all of the deficiencies are corrected within the ninety (90) day time period, the notice shall be deemed void and the manufacturer shall not terminate or not renew the dealer agreement because of the claimed deficiencies stated in the notice. If the dealer does not provide a notification of intent to cure deficiencies within the thirty (30) day time period, the termination or nonrenewal of the dealer agreement shall take effect thirty (30) days from the dealer’s receipt of the original notice.
    4. A manufacturer may reduce the notice period of this subsection from ninety (90) days to thirty (30) days if the grounds for termination or nonrenewal of the dealer agreement by the manufacturer are any of the following factors:
      1. A conviction of a felony or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony by a dealer or an owner of a dealership of a crime that was committed during the time frame of the current dealer agreement; provided there is full disclosure, in writing, of any felony conviction or plea of guilty or nolo contendere to any such felony crime that occurred within ten (10) years of entering into such dealer agreement;
      2. The abandonment or closing of the business operations of the dealer for ten (10) consecutive business days without contacting the manufacturer prior to the closing unless the closing is due to an act of God, strike, labor difficulty, or other cause over which the dealer has no control;
      3. A misrepresentation to the manufacturer by the dealer that materially affects the business relationship between the dealer and the manufacturer;
      4. A suspension or revocation of the dealer’s license, or refusal to renew the dealer’s license, by the Motor Vehicle Commission; or
      5. A material violation of this chapter which is not cured within thirty (30) days after the written notice by the manufacturer.
    5. A manufacturer shall not be required to provide notice or an opportunity to correct deficiencies under this subsection if the grounds for termination or nonrenewal of the dealer agreement by the manufacturer include one (1) of the following:
      1. The dealer becomes insolvent;
      2. The dealer is bankrupt; or
      3. The dealer makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 27, § 4, effective January 1, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1/1/2015). Under the authority of KRS 7.136(1), the Reviser of Statutes has restructured subsection (3) of this statute and changed references therein to correspond. No substantive change has been made.

190A.050. New recreational vehicle dealer may terminate a dealer agreement with recreational vehicle manufacturer with or without good cause — Conditions applicable to termination — Burden of showing good cause — Notice — Clear title required for inventory to be repurchased by manufacturer.

  1. A new recreational vehicle dealer may terminate a dealer agreement with a recreational vehicle manufacturer with or without good cause. If the dealer terminates or does not renew the dealer agreement with good cause, the manufacturer shall comply with the provisions of subsection (5) of this section. If the dealer terminates or does not renew the dealer agreement without good cause, the provisions of subsection (5) of this section shall not apply. A dealer that terminates a dealer agreement for good cause shall provide the manufacturer with written notice at least ninety (90) days prior to the effective date of the termination of the dealer agreement.
  2. All of the following conditions shall apply to a termination of a dealer agreement under this section for good cause:
    1. The notice described in subsection (1) of this section shall state all reasons for the proposed termination; and
    2. The notice described in subsection (1) of this section shall state that if the manufacturer provides to the dealer within thirty (30) days after the manufacturer receives the notice of termination a written notification of intent to cure all claimed deficiencies, the manufacturer shall have ninety (90) days after the manufacturer’s receipt of the original notice to correct the deficiencies. If all of the deficiencies are corrected within the ninety (90) day period, the notice shall be deemed void and the dealer shall not terminate the dealer agreement because of the claimed deficiencies stated in the notice. If the manufacturer does not provide a notification of intent to cure deficiencies within thirty (30) days of receiving the original notice, the termination shall take effect thirty (30) days from the manufacturer’s receipt of the original notice.
  3. The dealer has the burden of showing good cause. Any of the following factors shall be considered good cause for the proposed termination of a dealer agreement by a dealer:
    1. A conviction of a felony or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony by a manufacturer of a crime that was committed during the time frame of the current dealer agreement; provided there is full disclosure, in writing, of any felony conviction or plea of guilty or nolo contendere to any such felony crime that occurred within ten (10) years of entering into the dealer agreement;
    2. Abandonment or permanent closing of the business operations of the manufacturer for ten (10) consecutive business days without contacting the dealer prior to the closing, unless the closing is due to an act of God, strike, labor difficulty, or other cause over which the manufacturer has no control;
    3. A misrepresentation to the dealer by the manufacturer that materially affects the business relationship between the dealer and manufacturer;
    4. A material violation of any of the provisions of this chapter by the manufacturer;
    5. A material breach of the dealer agreement by the manufacturer; or
    6. The manufacturer becomes insolvent, is bankrupt, or makes an assignment for the benefit of the creditors.
  4. A dealer is not required to provide notice or an opportunity to correct deficiencies under this section if the grounds for termination or nonrenewal of the dealer agreement by the dealer includes one (1) of the following:
    1. The manufacturer becomes insolvent;
    2. The manufacturer is bankrupt; or
    3. The manufacturer makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors.
  5. If the manufacturer fails to provide the notice of intent to cure or fails to cure any claimed deficiencies pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the manufacturer shall, at the election of the dealer and within forty-five (45) days after termination or nonrenewal, repurchase as follows:
    1. All new, untitled recreational vehicles that were acquired from the manufacturer within the twelve (12) months prior to the effective date of the notice of termination of the dealer agreement that have not been used, except for demonstration purposes, and that have not been altered or damaged, may be repurchased at one hundred percent (100%) of the net invoice cost of the recreational vehicles, including transportation, less applicable rebates and discounts to the dealer. In the event any of the vehicles repurchased pursuant to this paragraph are damaged, but do not trigger a consumer disclosure requirement, the amount due the dealer shall be reduced by the cost to repair the vehicle. Damage prior to delivery to the dealer that is disclosed at the time of delivery shall not disqualify repurchase of that vehicle under this section;
    2. All current and undamaged accessories and proprietary parts sold to the dealer for resale by the manufacturer or distributor within the twelve (12) months prior to the effective date of the termination of the dealer agreement that are accompanied by the original invoice may be repurchased at one hundred five percent (105%) of the original net price paid to the manufacturer to compensate the dealer for handling, packing, and shipping the accessories and parts; and
    3. Any properly functioning diagnostic equipment, special tools, current signage, and other equipment and machinery at one hundred percent (100%) of the dealer’s net cost plus freight, destination, delivery, and distribution charges and sales taxes, if any, shall be repurchased if it was purchased by the dealer upon the manufacturer’s request within five (5) years before termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal, and it can no longer be used in the normal course of the dealers’ ongoing business. The manufacturer or distributor shall pay the dealer within thirty (30) days after receipt of the returned items.
  6. The dealer shall show clear title to vehicle inventory and promptly return or arrange for the return of all the items the manufacturer is required to repurchase under subsection (5) of this section at the expense of the manufacturer.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 27, § 5, effective January 1, 2015.

190A.060. New recreational vehicle dealer not prohibited from selling remaining in-stock recreational vehicles after termination or nonrenewal of dealer agreement.

The Motor Vehicle Commission shall not prohibit a new recreational vehicle dealer from selling the remaining in-stock recreational vehicles of a line-make subject to a dealer agreement after that dealer agreement has been terminated or not renewed pursuant to KRS 190A.040 or 190A.050 . If recreational vehicles of a line-make that was subject to a terminated dealer agreement are not repurchased or required to be repurchased by the manufacturer, the dealer may continue to sell all recreational vehicles that were subject to the terminated dealer agreement and were in the dealer’s inventory on the effective date of the termination until those recreational vehicles are no longer in the dealer’s inventory.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 27, § 6, effective January 1, 2015.

190A.070. Conditions applicable to proposed sale of business assets, stock transfer, or other transaction that will result in a change of ownership of a new recreational vehicle dealer except in cases of death, incapacity, or retirement of designated principal of dealer — Conditions applicable to those cases.

  1. All of the following conditions shall apply to a proposed sale of the business assets, transfer of stock, or other transaction that will result in a change of ownership of a new recreational vehicle dealer, except a transaction described in subsection (2) of this section:
    1. The dealer shall provide written notice to the manufacturer at least ninety (90) days prior to the proposed closing of the transaction;
    2. If the dealer is not in breach of the dealer agreement or in violation of the provisions of this chapter at the time the dealer provides the notice described in paragraph (a) of this subsection, the manufacturer shall not object to the proposed transaction, unless:
      1. The prospective transferee was previously a party to a dealer agreement with the manufacturer that the manufacturer terminated;
      2. In the proceeding ten (10) years, the prospective transferee was convicted of a felony crime or any crime of fraud, deceit, or moral turpitude;
      3. The prospective transferee does not have an application for a recreational vehicle dealer license pending with the Motor Vehicle Commission or a tentative dealer agreement with a recreational vehicle manufacturer to conduct business as a dealer in this state relative to the sale or transfer of the dealership;
      4. The prospective transferee does not have an active line of credit sufficient to purchase recreational vehicles from the manufacturer according to the terms of the dealer agreement; or
      5. In the preceding ten (10) years, the prospective transferee was bankrupt or insolvent, made a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, or a receiver, trustee, or conservator was appointed to take possession of the business or property of the prospective transferee;
    3. If the manufacturer objects to the proposed transaction, the manufacturer shall give written notice of its objection, including the reasons for the objection, to the dealer within thirty (30) days after receiving the notice described in paragraph (a) of this subsection. If the manufacturer does not give notice of an objection within the thirty (30) day time period, the proposed transaction shall be considered approved by the manufacturer; and
    4. For purposes of paragraph (c) of this subsection, the manufacturer has the burden of demonstrating why the manufacturer objects to the proposed transaction.
  2. All of the following conditions apply concerning the death, incapacity, or retirement of the designated principal of a dealer:
    1. A dealer agreement shall include a designated principal of the dealer. A dealer agreement may identify a family member as the successor to the principal in the event of the death, incapacity, or retirement of the designated principal or include a succession plan of the dealer. A dealer may at any time change a designation or succession plan by providing written notice to the manufacturer;
    2. The manufacturer shall not prevent or refuse to honor the succession to a dealership by a family member of the deceased, incapacitated, or retired designated principal of that dealer unless the manufacturer previously provided written notice to the dealer of any objections to the succession plan of the dealer within thirty (30) days after receiving the succession plan of the dealer or any modification of the succession plan of the dealer;
    3. Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this subsection, unless the dealer is in breach of the dealer agreement, a manufacturer shall not object to the succession to a dealership by a family member of the deceased, incapacitated, or retired designated principal, unless:
      1. In the preceding ten (10) years, the successor was convicted of a felony crime or any crime of fraud, deceit, or moral turpitude;
      2. In the preceding ten (10) years, the successor was bankrupt, insolvent, or made an assignment for the benefit of creditors;
      3. The successor was previously a party to a dealer agreement with the manufacturer that the manufacturer terminated for a breach of a dealer agreement;
      4. The successor does not have an active line of credit sufficient to purchase recreational vehicles from the manufacturer according to the terms of the dealer agreement; or
      5. The successor does not have an application for a recreational vehicle dealer license pending before the Motor Vehicle Commission or a tentative dealer agreement with a recreational vehicle manufacturer to conduct business as a dealer in this state;
    4. The manufacturer has the burden of proof regarding any objection to the succession to a dealership by a family member of the deceased, incapacitated, or retired designated principal; and
    5. The consent of the manufacturer shall be required for the succession to a dealership by a family member of the deceased, incapacitated, or retired designated principal if the succession involves a relocation of the business or an alteration of the terms and conditions of the dealer agreement.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 27, § 7, effective January 1, 2015.

190A.080. Obligations of warrantor of products sold by new recreational vehicle dealer — Audits of dealer records — Warranty claims submission — Storage of defective warranty parts — Notification of warrantor if dealer is unable to perform warranty repair — Approval or disapproval of warranty claim.

  1. A warrantor has all the following obligations to each new recreational vehicle dealer engaged in the sale of products that are covered by a warranty from that warrantor:
    1. To specify in writing to the dealer the obligations of the dealer, if any, for preparation, delivery, and warranty service on its products;
    2. To compensate the dealer for warranty service required of the dealer by the warrantor;
    3. To provide the dealer with a schedule of compensation the warrantor will pay for warranty work and service, and the time allowances of the warrantor for the performance of that work and service. All of the following conditions apply to the schedule of compensation required under this paragraph:
      1. Time allowances for the diagnosis and performance of warranty labor shall be reasonable for the work to be performed;
      2. In the determination of what constitutes reasonable compensation under this section, the principal factors to be considered are the actual wage rates paid by the dealer, and the actual retail labor rate charged by dealers in the community in which the dealer is doing business; and
      3. The compensation of a dealer for warranty labor may not be less than the lowest retail labor rates actually charged by the dealer for like nonwarranty labor, as long as those rates are reasonable;
    4. To reimburse the dealer for any warranty part, accessory, or complete component at actual wholesale cost plus a minimum thirty percent (30%) handling charge up to a maximum of one hundred fifty dollars ($150) and the cost, if any, of freight to return such parts, components, or accessories to the warrantor; and
    5. To deny dealer claims for warranty compensation only for cause, including but not limited to performance of nonwarranty repairs, material noncompliance with the published policies and procedures of the warrantor, lack of material documentation of claims, fraud, or misrepresentation.
  2. A warrantor may conduct audits of the records of a dealer that sells its warranted products on a reasonable basis.
  3. A dealer shall submit warranty claims to a warrantor within forty-five (45) days after completing all warranty work on a warranted product.
  4. A dealer is not obligated to store defective warranty parts for more than thirty (30) days from the time the warranty work is paid by the warrantor, if the defective parts, components, or accessories are not immediately returned to the warrantor.
  5. A dealer shall immediately notify the warrantor in writing if the dealer is unable to perform any warranty repair within ten (10) days of receipt of a written complaint from a consumer.
  6. A warrantor shall approve or disapprove a warranty claim on a warranted product in writing within thirty (30) days after the date the dealer submits the claim, if the claim is submitted in the manner and in the form prescribed by the warrantor. If a claim that is properly submitted is not specifically disapproved in writing by a warrantor within the thirty (30) day time period, the claim shall be considered approved by the warrantor, and the warrantor shall pay the amount of the claim to the dealer within sixty (60) days after the dealer submitted the claim.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 27, § 8, effective January 1, 2015.

190A.090. Warrantor’s prohibited actions.

  1. As used in this section and KRS 190A.080 :
    1. “Products” means new recreational vehicles or parts, accessories, or components of new recreational vehicles; and
    2. “Warranted products” means products subject to a written warranty to the consumer from a specific warrantor.
  2. A warrantor shall not do any of the following:
    1. Fail to perform all of its warranty obligations with respect to a warranted product;
    2. In any written notice of a factory campaign to recreational vehicle owners and dealers, fail to include the expected date by which necessary parts and equipment, including tires and chassis or chassis parts, if required, will be available to the dealer to perform the factory campaign work. The warrantor shall provide sufficient parts to the dealer to perform the factory campaign work. If the number of parts provided to the dealer pursuant to this paragraph exceeds the requirements of the dealer to perform the factory campaign work, the dealer may return unused, undamaged parts to the warrantor for credit after completion of the factory campaign;
    3. Subject to the provisions of KRS 190A.080 , fail to compensate a dealer for authorized repairs of warranted products damaged during the manufacturing process or damaged while in transit to the dealer if the warrantor selected the carrier;
    4. Fail to compensate a dealer for authorized warranty service under this section in accordance with the applicable schedule of compensation provided to the dealer pursuant to KRS 190A.080 if the warranty service is performed in a timely and competent manner;
    5. Intentionally misrepresent in any way to a purchaser of a warranted product that any warranty concerning the manufacture, performance, or design of the warranted product is made by the dealer either as a warrantor or co-warrantor; or
    6. Require a dealer to make warranties to customers in any manner related to the manufacture of a warranted product.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 27, § 9, effective January 1, 2015.

190A.100. Recreational vehicle dealer’s prohibited actions.

A recreational vehicle dealer shall not do any of the following:

  1. Fail to perform any warranty service work authorized by a warrantor in a reasonably competent and timely manner if a transient customer requests service work on a recreational vehicle of a line-make that the dealer is authorized to display and sell;
  2. Make a fraudulent warranty claim to a warrantor;
  3. Misrepresent the terms of any warranty;
  4. Fail to perform any pre-delivery inspection functions as specified by the warrantor in a competent and timely manner;
  5. Fail to accurately document the time spent completing each repair, the total number of repair attempts conducted on a single recreational vehicle, and the number of repair attempts for the same repair conducted on a single recreational vehicle;
  6. Fail to notify the warrantor within ten (10) days subsequent to the second repair attempt on a defect which impairs the use, value, or safety of a recreational vehicle; or
  7. Fail to maintain written records, including a customer’s signature, regarding the amount of time a recreational vehicle is stored for the consumer’s convenience during a repair.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 27, § 10, effective January 1, 2015.

190A.110. Activities in violation of chapter.

Notwithstanding the terms of any manufacturer-dealer agreement, it is a violation of this chapter for:

  1. A warrantor to fail to indemnify and hold harmless its new recreational vehicle dealer against any losses or damages to the extent that the losses or damages are caused by the negligence or willful misconduct of the warrantor. A new recreational vehicle dealer may not be denied indemnification for failing to discover, disclose, or remedy a defect in the design or manufacturing of a new recreational vehicle. A new recreational vehicle dealer may be denied indemnification if the new recreational vehicle dealer fails to remedy a known and announced defect in accordance with the written instructions of a warrantor for whom the new recreational vehicle dealer is obligated to perform warranty service. A new recreational vehicle dealer shall provide to a warrantor a copy of any pending lawsuit in which allegations are made that are covered by the provisions of this subsection within ten (10) days after receiving such suit. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, this subsection shall continue to apply even after the new recreational vehicle is titled; or
  2. A new recreational vehicle dealer to fail to indemnify and hold harmless its warrantor against any losses or damages to the extent that the losses or damages are caused by the negligence or willful misconduct of the new recreational vehicle dealer. A warrantor shall provide to a new recreational vehicle dealer a copy of any pending lawsuit or similar proceeding in which allegations are made that come within the provisions of this subsection within ten (10) days after receiving such suit. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, this subsection shall continue to apply even after the new recreational vehicle is titled.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 27, § 11, effective January 1, 2015.

190A.120. Conditions applicable to new recreational vehicle damaged prior to delivery to dealer or in transit to dealer — Inspection and rejection of recreational vehicles that are damaged or have unreasonable odometer mileage.

  1. All of the following conditions apply if a new recreational vehicle is damaged before it is shipped to a dealer, or is damaged in transit to the dealer and the manufacturer selected the carrier or means of transportation:
    1. The dealer shall notify the manufacturer of the damage within the time period specified in the dealer agreement and do one (1) of the following:
      1. In the notice, request authorization from the manufacturer to replace the components, parts, and accessories damaged, or otherwise correct the damage; or
      2. Reject the recreational vehicle within the time period specified in the dealer agreement;
    2. If the manufacturer refuses or fails to authorize repair of the damage within ten (10) days after receiving notice under paragraph (a) of this subsection or if the dealer rejects the recreational vehicle because of the damage within the time period specified in the dealer agreement, ownership of the recreational vehicle reverts to the manufacturer; and
    3. The dealer shall exercise due care in the custody of the damaged recreational vehicle; provided, the dealer shall have no financial or other obligation with respect to that recreational vehicle.
  2. A dealer agreement shall include a time period for inspection and rejection of damaged recreational vehicles under subsection (1) of this section that is not less than two (2) business days after the physical delivery of the recreational vehicles to the dealer.
  3. If the number of miles on the odometer of the recreational vehicle is more than the sum of the distance between the dealer and the factory of the manufacturer or point of distribution plus one hundred (100) miles, the dealer may consider the number of miles on the odometer unreasonable for purposes of this subsection. If a dealer determines that a new recreational vehicle has an unreasonable number of miles on the odometer at the time the recreational vehicle is delivered to the dealer, the dealer may reject the recreational vehicle and the ownership of the recreational vehicle shall revert to the manufacturer.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 27, § 12, effective January 1, 2015.

190A.130. Coercion of recreational vehicle dealer by manufacturer prohibited.

  1. As used in this section, the term “coerce” includes but is not limited to:
    1. Threatening to terminate or not renew a dealer agreement without good cause; and
    2. Threatening to withhold line-makes or other product lines the dealer is entitled to display and sell under the dealer agreement or delay delivery of recreational vehicles as an inducement to amend the dealer agreement.
  2. A recreational vehicle manufacturer shall not coerce or attempt to coerce a dealer to purchase a product or service that the dealer did not order.
  3. A recreational vehicle manufacturer shall not coerce a dealer to enter into any agreement with the manufacturer.
  4. A recreational vehicle manufacturer shall not coerce or attempt to coerce a dealer to enter into an agreement with the manufacturer or any other person that requires the dealer to submit any disputes by the dealer to binding arbitration or otherwise waive the rights or responsibilities of the dealer under the provisions of this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 27, § 13, effective January 1, 2015.

190A.140. Penalty for violation of chapter.

Any person who violates or causes, aids, or abets any violation of any provision of this chapter shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars ($25) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), or imprisoned for not more than thirty (30) days, or both.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 27, § 14, effective January 1, 2015.