CASE NOTES

Method of Electing Superior Court Judges Held Constitutional. - The method of electing superior court judges does not infringe upon republicans' rights to free speech and association in violation of the First Amendment. Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992), rehearing denied, 991 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 828, 114 S. Ct. 93, 126 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1993).

Chapter 50 of the General Statutes was extensively rewritten during the 1967 session of the General Assembly and is not a part of the Judicial Department Act of 1965, although in some respects they must be construed with reference to each other. Boston v. Freeman, 6 N.C. App. 736, 171 S.E.2d 206 (1969).

Cited in Kinney v. Goley, 4 N.C. App. 325, 167 S.E.2d 97 (1969); State v. Joseph, 92 N.C. App. 203, 374 S.E.2d 132 (1988); Cail v. Cerwin, 185 N.C. App. 176, 648 S.E.2d 510 (2007), review denied, 365 N.C. 75, 705 S.E.2d 743, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 50 (2011).

CASE NOTES

Cited in State v. Pennington, 327 N.C. 89, 393 S.E.2d 847 (1990).

CASE NOTES

Cited in Peoples v. Peoples, 8 N.C. App. 136, 174 S.E.2d 2 (1970); Smith v. Beaufort County Hosp. Ass'n, 141 N.C. App. 203, 540 S.E.2d 775 (2000), cert denied, 353 N.C. 381, 547 S.E.2d 435 (2001), aff'd, 354 N.C. 212, 552 S.E.2d 139 (2001); United States v. Allen, 446 F.3d 522 (4th Cir. 2006).

CASE NOTES

Cited in State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 163 S.E.2d 376 (1968); Fetherbay v. Sharpe Motor Lines, 8 N.C. App. 58, 173 S.E.2d 589 (1970); Adams-Millis Corp. v. Town of Kernersville, 281 N.C. 147, 187 S.E.2d 704 (1972); In re Annexation Ordinance, 300 N.C. 337, 266 S.E.2d 661 (1980); Early v. County of Durham, Dep't of Soc. Servs., 193 N.C. App. 334, 667 S.E.2d 512 (2008), review denied, 363 N.C. 372, 678 S.E.2d 237 (2009).

CASE NOTES

Cited in Thrift v. Food Lion, Inc., 111 N.C. App. 758, 433 S.E.2d 481 (1993).

§§ 7A-8, 7A-9: Reserved for future codification purposes.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

This section was not repealed or nullified by the enactment of Chapter 1A of the General Statutes prescribing the presently effective Rules of Civil Procedure. Wachovia Realty Invs. v. Housing, Inc., 292 N.C. 93, 232 S.E.2d 667 (1977).

There is no conflict between G.S. 15A-1444(e) and subsection (a) of this section. State v. Handy, 326 N.C. 532, 391 S.E.2d 159 (1990).

Construction with G.S. 150B-51 and G.S. 150B-52. - In an action arising from allegations of age discrimination, while the superior court properly applied both a de novo review and the whole-record test to the respective issues on appeal under G.S. 150B-51(b) when it reviewed the final decision of the State Personnel Commission (SPC), it erred when it improperly substituted its judgment for that of the SPC under the whole-record test. Thus, remand was ordered for the superior court to affirm the SPC's final agency decision. Trotter v. N.C. HHS, 189 N.C. App. 655, 659 S.E.2d 749 (2008).

Applicability. - Because G.S. 7A-27 governed appeals of right in ordinary civil actions, G.S. 7A-29(a), which applied generally to appeals from the North Carolina Industrial Commission and other administrative agencies, did not apply to estates' appeal arguing that the Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program was unconstitutional. In re Hughes, 245 N.C. App. 398, 785 S.E.2d 111 (2016).

Petition for Writ of Certiorari Granted. - Because the court of appeals did not state the procedure for review, the trial court did not enter an appealable order, and defendant did not seek entry of such an order by mandamus, defendant was not entitled to appeal as a matter of right; however, defendant petitioned for review by certiorari, and the court of appeals granted his petition for writ of certiorari in its discretion. State v. Watkins, 246 N.C. App. 725, 783 S.E.2d 279 (2016).

Defendant's written notice of appeal was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the appellate court to review the criminal judgment. However, because defendant's written notice of appeal was limited to the criminal judgment, defendant's written notice of appeal was therefore insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court to review the civil judgment against defendant for attorneys' fees, but the court issued a writ of certiorari to review the issues pertaining to the civil judgment for attorneys' fees. State v. Bowman, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Nov. 3, 2020).

Although defendant lost the statutory right to appeal a civil judgment against defendant imposing attorney's fees because defendant's notice of appeal was defective, the appellate court was satisfied that defendant was diligent in prosecuting the appeal by providing the written notice. Furthermore, because defendant's argument on the issue of attorney's fees was meritorious, the appellate court, in its discretion, allowed defendant's petition for writ of certiorari and issued a writ of certiorari to review the civil judgment of attorney's fees. State v. Corpening, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Feb. 18, 2021).

Standard of Review. - Pursuant to G.S. 7A-27, trial court properly applied a de novo standard of review in a land use appeal when it reversed a decision by a village and its board of adjustment, prohibiting a property owner from using his private property as a shooting range, as the land use ordinance in place at the time that he bought the property did not bar shooting ranges and he did not materially alter the prior non-conforming use. Land v. Vill. of Wesley Chapel, 206 N.C. App. 123, 697 S.E.2d 458 (2010).

An order is immediately appealable if the order affects a substantial right and the loss of that right will injure the party appealing if not corrected prior to final judgment. Travco Hotels, Inc. v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 102 N.C. App. 659, 403 S.E.2d 593, aff'd, 332 N.C. 288, 420 S.E.2d 426 (1992).

Reliance upon a substantial rights analysis as the basis for appellate review appears contrary to the plain and unambiguous language of the statutes governing criminal appeals. State v. Shoff, 118 N.C. App. 724, 456 S.E.2d 875 (1995), appeal dismissed, 340 N.C. 572, 460 S.E.2d 328 (1995), aff'd, 342 N.C. 638, 466 S.E.2d 277 (1996).

The right to appeal is available through two channels. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b) allows appeal if there has been a final judgment as to all of the claims and parties, or if the specific action of the trial court from which appeal is taken is final and the trial judge expressly determines that there is no just reason for delaying the appeal. The second channel to an appeal is by way of G.S. 1-277 or this section; an appeal will be permitted under these statutes if a substantial right would be affected by not allowing appeal before final judgment. Brown v. Brown, 77 N.C. App. 206, 334 S.E.2d 506, cert. denied, 315 N.C. 389, 338 S.E.2d 878 (1985).

Finality Requirement. - The statutes setting forth the appeals process do not include the same jurisdictional "finality" requirement as does the federal statute. Goldston v. AMC, 326 N.C. 723, 392 S.E.2d 735 (1990).

G.S. 1-277 and this section, considered together, provide that no appeal lies to an appellate court from an interlocutory judgment unless that ruling deprives the appellant of a substantial right which it would lose if the ruling were not reviewed before final judgment. State ex rel. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. IATSE Local 574, 114 N.C. App. 662, 442 S.E.2d 339 (1994).

There was no "substantial interest" exception present to permit appeal under G.S. 1-277 and this section of a court's order denying defendant's summary judgment. Cagle v. Teachy, 111 N.C. App. 244, 431 S.E.2d 801 (1993).

Appeals from other than final judgments are not absolutely barred by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b) and subsection (c) of this section. Estrada v. Jaques, 70 N.C. App. 627, 321 S.E.2d 240 (1984).

Appeal from order granting stay of declaratory action. - Because the issues in this insurance case affected a substantial right that could be lost absent immediate appeal, the appeal from the trial court's interlocutory order granting a stay of the declaratory action pending a final resolution of the underlying malpractice action was properly before the court. Cinoman v. Univ. of N.C. 234 N.C. App. 481, 764 S.E.2d 619 (2014).

For all practical purposes there is an unlimited right of appeal in North Carolina to the Appellate Division of the General Court of Justice from any final judgment of the superior court or the district court in civil and criminal cases. State v. Black, 7 N.C. App. 324, 172 S.E.2d 217 (1970).

The right to appeal must be exercised in accordance with the established rules of practice and procedure. State v. Black, 7 N.C. App. 324, 172 S.E.2d 217 (1970).

No Right to Appeal From Guilty Plea. - G.S. 7A-27(b) does not provide a route for appeals from guilty pleas. State v. Mungo, 213 N.C. App. 400, 713 S.E.2d 542 (2011).

Appellate court was unable to review whether a trial court abused its discretion by entering a special condition of probation that defendant could not have been employed in any type of law enforcement while on probation; there was no right of appeal under this section because defendant entered an Alford plea. State v. Sale, 232 N.C. App. 662, 754 S.E.2d 474 (2014).

Defendant's forfeiture appeal was dismissed because defendant (1) gave no timely appeal notice and (2) could not seek certiorari review for "failure to take timely action," as, inter alia, G.S. 7A-27(b) provided no guilty plea appeal. State v. Royster, 239 N.C. App. 196, 768 S.E.2d 196 (2015).

This statute should be strictly construed for the purpose of eliminating the unnecessary delay and expense of fragmented appeals and of presenting the whole case for determination in a single appeal from a final judgment. Buchanan v. Rose, 59 N.C. App. 351, 296 S.E.2d 508 (1982).

Particular Facts and Procedural Context Must Be Considered. - It is usually necessary to resolve the question of whether an appeal is premature in each case by considering the particular facts of that case and the procedural context in which the order from which appeal is sought was entered. Bernick v. Jurden, 306 N.C. 435, 293 S.E.2d 405 (1982).

No Appeal from Voluntary Election to Serve Sentence. - Where the trial court activated defendant's sentence upon his voluntary election to serve the sentence in lieu of the remainder of his probation and not "as a result of a finding of a violation of probation," defendant had no right to appeal from his activated sentence. State v. Ikard, 117 N.C. App. 460, 450 S.E.2d 927 (1994).

Request for additional sentencing credit. - Defendant's request for additional sentencing credit was not properly before the appellate court because the issue of additional sentencing credit was a matter for administrative action, as provided by G.S. 15-196.4, rather than a subject for appeal; the proper procedure to obtain additional credit was for defendant to initially have presented her claim to the trial court. State v. Cloer, 197 N.C. App. 716, 678 S.E.2d 399 (2009).

Because the trial court did not order a new trial, a property owner and owners' association were not entitled to an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order requiring other lot owners in a subdivision to be joined as necessary parties; the trial court's decree to rehear evidence was not an order for a new trial because a judgment had not been rendered in the case. Regency Lake Owners' Ass'n v. Regency Lake, LLC, 258 N.C. App. 636, 814 S.E.2d 121 (2018).

Right to Counsel. - G.S. 7A-450 et seq. has generally been construed to limit the right to appointed counsel in criminal cases to direct appeals taken as of right. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974).

Duty to Dismiss Appeal. - It is the duty of an appellate court to dismiss an appeal if there is no right to appeal. Pasour v. Pierce, 46 N.C. App. 636, 265 S.E.2d 652 (1980).

Where an appealing party has no right to appeal, an appellate court should on its own motion dismiss the appeal even though the question of appealability has not been raised by the parties themselves. Metcalf v. Palmer, 46 N.C. App. 622, 265 S.E.2d 484 (1980).

Court would address plaintiffs' appeal, which was not certified pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b), finding that plaintiffs have a substantial right to have the liability of all defendants determined in one proceeding. Camp v. Leonard, 133 N.C. App. 554, 515 S.E.2d 909 (1999).

Appeal from North Carolina Business Court. - Dismissal of an appeal was appropriate because the Court of Appeals of North Carolina lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, in that the appeal was from a final judgment of the North Carolina Business Court, but appeals from final judgments rendered in the North Carolina Business Court were statutorily mandated to be brought in the Supreme Court of North Carolina. Christenbury Eye Ctr., P.A. v. Medflow, Inc., 246 N.C. App. 237, 783 S.E.2d 264 (2016), review dismissed, as moot, writ granted, 793 S.E.2d 218, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 825 (2016).

North Carolina Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear appeal from the North Carolina Business Court because statutory amendments directing such appeals to the North Carolina Supreme Court became effective after the case was designated as a complex business case. USA Trouser, S.A. de C.V. v. Williams, 258 N.C. App. 192, 812 S.E.2d 373 (2018).

State's Appeal of Expunction Order. - Legislature did not give the State the right to appeal an expunction order in G.S. 15A-145.5 and did not amend G.S. 15A-1445 to include this right. It is not the Supreme Court's role to expand G.S. 15A-145.5 to include the right to appeal an expunction order, or to construe G.S. 7A-27 as governing procedure in a criminal matter not clearly brought under that statute's provisions authorizing appeals of right from the trial courts. State v. J.C., 372 N.C. 203, 827 S.E.2d 280 (2019).

Substantial evidence in the record supported an administrative law judge's findings and its dismissal of a day care's petition for a contested case hearing where the day care filed nothing in nearly six months following the filing of the petition, despite receiving several orders from the administrative law judge to file and serve prehearing statements and other responses to motions. Lincoln v. N.C. HHS, Nutrition Branch, 172 N.C. App. 567, 616 S.E.2d 622 (2005).

Right to Appeal Not Forfeited. - Decedent's nieces and nephews did not forfeit their right to appeal a consent judgment by not taking an immediate appeal of an interlocutory order granting motions to dismiss filed by a personal representative and entities because the nieces and nephews gave timely notice of appeal after entry of the final consent judgment; order dismissing the entities did not resolve all claims or all rights and liabilities of all parties and was not a final order under G.S. 1A-1-54(b). Stanford v. Paris, 364 N.C. 306, 698 S.E.2d 37 (Aug. 27, 2010).

Imposition of Satellite-Based Monitoring. - Defendant's appeal challenging imposition of satellite-based monitoring (SBM) was considered as a petition for writ of certiorari and addressed on the merits because, although defendant's oral notice of appeal was insufficient, at the time of his SBM hearing, defendant did not have any indication that notice of appeal pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) was improper. State v. Clayton, 206 N.C. App. 300, 697 S.E.2d 428 (2010).

Steps on Appeal. - While convictions that result in a judgment of death are automatically appealable to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, all other convictions are properly appealed to the Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-27 and N.C. R. App. P. 4(d), and while neither party filed a motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to defendant's non-capital conviction for burglary, when he appealed his conviction for murder and his death sentence, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, on its own initiative, and consistently with N.C. R. App. P. 2, considered defendant's assignments of error that concerned his burglary conviction under G.S. 14-51 because the issue also related to one of his arguments regarding an aggravating circumstance. State v. Elliott, 360 N.C. 400, 628 S.E.2d 735 (2006).

Substantial Right Not Affected. - Because the order appealed from did not affect substantial right under G.S. 7A-27, and there was no pending petition for a writ of certiorari, defendant's appeal from a trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss an order to show cause was subject to dismissal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. State v. Oakes, 240 N.C. App. 580, 771 S.E.2d 832 (2015).

Plaintiffs' statement of grounds for review was insufficient to establish that the challenged order affected a substantial right; they asserted in a single sentence that all claims involved the same facts and questions, without explaining how or why a jury's consideration of those facts in various state and federal claims could lead to irreconcilable results, plus plaintiffs also relied on a published case they said was controlling, but whether a ruling affected a substantial right had to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Doe v. City of Charlotte, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Aug. 18, 2020).

North Carolina Industrial Commission. - Because, pursuant to the Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program and the Tort Claims Act, the statute controlled estates' appeal, the North Carolina Industrial Commission had to be included when the statute referred to "court," "trial court," "district court," or "superior court." In re Hughes, 245 N.C. App. 398, 785 S.E.2d 111 (2016).

Oral Notice of Appeal. - Defendant's oral notice of appeal in open court was sufficient to invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction to review the criminal judgment entered against defendant. State v. Pratt, - N.C. App. - , 840 S.E.2d 875 (2020).

Applied in State v. Henry, 1 N.C. App. 409, 161 S.E.2d 622 (1968); State v. Lentz, 5 N.C. App. 177, 167 S.E.2d 887 (1969); Cline v. Cline, 6 N.C. App. 523, 170 S.E.2d 645 (1969); State v. Moore, 276 N.C. 142, 171 S.E.2d 453 (1970); State v. Tomblin, 276 N.C. 273, 171 S.E.2d 901 (1970); State v. Henderson, 276 N.C. 430, 173 S.E.2d 291 (1970); State v. Miller, 281 N.C. 70, 187 S.E.2d 729 (1972); State v. Cox, 281 N.C. 275, 188 S.E.2d 356 (1972); State v. Harris, 281 N.C. 542, 189 S.E.2d 249 (1972); State v. Lee, 282 N.C. 566, 193 S.E.2d 705 (1973); State v. Edwards, 282 N.C. 578, 193 S.E.2d 736 (1973); State v. Talbert, 282 N.C. 718, 194 S.E.2d 822 (1973); State v. Watkins, 283 N.C. 17, 194 S.E.2d 800 (1973); State v. Washington, 283 N.C. 175, 195 S.E.2d 534 (1973); State v. Davis, 284 N.C. 701, 202 S.E.2d 770 (1974); Spartan Leasing, Inc. v. Brown, 285 N.C. 689, 208 S.E.2d 649 (1974); State v. Little, 286 N.C. 185, 209 S.E.2d 749 (1974); State v. Ward, 286 N.C. 304, 210 S.E.2d 407 (1974); National Home Life Assurance Co. v. Ingram, 21 N.C. App. 591, 205 S.E.2d 313 (1974); State v. Lowery, 286 N.C. 698, 213 S.E.2d 255 (1975); State v. Smathers, 287 N.C. 226, 214 S.E.2d 112 (1975); State v. Buchanan, 287 N.C. 408, 215 S.E.2d 80 (1975); State v. Brunson, 287 N.C. 436, 215 S.E.2d 94 (1975); State v. Woodson, 287 N.C. 578, 215 S.E.2d 607 (1975); State v. King, 287 N.C. 645, 215 S.E.2d 540 (1975); State v. Bock, 288 N.C. 145, 217 S.E.2d 513 (1975); State v. Sanders, 288 N.C. 285, 218 S.E.2d 352 (1975); State v. McZorn, 288 N.C. 417, 219 S.E.2d 201 (1975); State v. Branch, 288 N.C. 514, 220 S.E.2d 495 (1975); State v. Miller, 288 N.C. 582, 220 S.E.2d 326 (1975); State v. Williams, 288 N.C. 680, 220 S.E.2d 558 (1975); State v. Hammonds, 290 N.C. 1, 224 S.E.2d 595 (1976); State v. Phifer, 290 N.C. 203, 225 S.E.2d 786 (1976); State v. McMorris, 290 N.C. 286, 225 S.E.2d 553 (1976); State v. Thompson, 290 N.C. 431, 226 S.E.2d 487 (1976); State v. Davis, 290 N.C. 511, 227 S.E.2d 97 (1976); State v. Hunter, 290 N.C. 556, 227 S.E.2d 535 (1976); State v. Cawthorne, 290 N.C. 639, 227 S.E.2d 528 (1976); State v. Harris, 290 N.C. 718, 228 S.E.2d 424 (1976); State v. Hicks, 290 N.C. 767, 228 S.E.2d 252 (1976); State v. Davis, 291 N.C. 1, 229 S.E.2d 285 (1976); State v. Monk, 291 N.C. 37, 229 S.E.2d 163 (1976); State v. Beaver, 291 N.C. 137, 229 S.E.2d 179 (1976); State v. Boykin, 291 N.C. 264, 229 S.E.2d 914 (1976); State v. Slade, 291 N.C. 275, 229 S.E.2d 921 (1976); State v. Cousin, 291 N.C. 413, 230 S.E.2d 518 (1976); State v. Miley, 291 N.C. 431, 230 S.E.2d 537 (1976); Bridges v. Bridges, 29 N.C. App. 209, 223 S.E.2d 845 (1976); State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 231 S.E.2d 833 (1977); State v. Britt, 291 N.C. 528, 231 S.E.2d 644 (1977); State v. Foddrell, 291 N.C. 546, 231 S.E.2d 618 (1977); State v. Locklear, 291 N.C. 598, 231 S.E.2d 256 (1977); State v. Jones, 291 N.C. 681, 231 S.E.2d 252 (1977); State v. Tilley, 292 N.C. 132,
232 S.E.2d 433 (1977); State v. Warren, 292 N.C. 235, 232 S.E.2d 419 (1977); State v. Stanfield, 292 N.C. 357, 233 S.E.2d 574 (1977); State v. Herndon, 292 N.C. 424, 233 S.E.2d 557 (1977); State v. Womble, 292 N.C. 455, 233 S.E.2d 534 (1977); State v. Jones, 292 N.C. 513, 234 S.E.2d 555 (1977); State v. Siler, 292 N.C. 543, 234 S.E.2d 733 (1977); State v. Willard, 292 N.C. 567, 234 S.E.2d 587 (1977); State v. Beeson, 292 N.C. 602, 234 S.E.2d 595 (1977); State v. Poole, 298 N.C. 254, 258 S.E.2d 339 (1979); State v. Reynolds, 298 N.C. 380, 259 S.E.2d 843 (1979); Whalehead Properties v. Coastland Corp., 299 N.C. 270, 261 S.E.2d 899 (1980); State ex rel. Child Day-Care Licensing Comm'n v. Fayetteville St. Christian School, 299 N.C. 351, 261 S.E.2d 908 (1980); State v. Ward, 300 N.C. 150, 266 S.E.2d 581 (1980); State v. Revelle, 301 N.C. 153, 270 S.E.2d 476 (1980); McGinnis v. McGinnis, 44 N.C. App. 381, 261 S.E.2d 491 (1980); State v. Cox, 303 N.C. 75, 277 S.E.2d 376 (1981); Green v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 603, 290 S.E.2d 593 (1982); State v. Corn, 307 N.C. 79, 296 S.E.2d 261 (1982); State v. Clark, 307 N.C. 120, 296 S.E.2d 296 (1982); State v. Sparks, 307 N.C. 71, 296 S.E.2d 451 (1982); State v. Woodruff, 307 N.C. 264, 297 S.E.2d 382 (1982); State v. Burns, 307 N.C. 224, 297 S.E.2d 384 (1982); State v. Reynolds, 307 N.C. 184, 297 S.E.2d 532 (1982); State v. Chamberlain, 307 N.C. 130, 297 S.E.2d 540 (1982); State v. Woods, 307 N.C. 213, 297 S.E.2d 574 (1982); State v. Taylor, 308 N.C. 185, 301 S.E.2d 358 (1983); State v. Ricks, 308 N.C. 522, 302 S.E.2d 770 (1983); State v. Webb, 309 N.C. 549, 308 S.E.2d 252 (1983); State v. Bates, 309 N.C. 528, 308 S.E.2d 258 (1983); State v. Lang, 309 N.C. 512, 308 S.E.2d 317 (1983); State v. Effler, 309 N.C. 742, 309 S.E.2d 203 (1983); Coastal Chem. Corp. v. Guardian Indus., Inc., 63 N.C. App. 176, 303 S.E.2d 642 (1983); In re Watson, 70 N.C. App. 120, 318 S.E.2d 544 (1984); State v. Moore, 311 N.C. 442, 319 S.E.2d 150 (1984); State v. Boyd, 311 N.C. 408, 319 S.E.2d 189 (1984); State v. Withers, 311 N.C. 699, 319 S.E.2d 211 (1984); State v. Joines, 312 N.C. 490, 322 S.E.2d 758 (1984); Johnson v. Brown, 71 N.C. App. 660, 323 S.E.2d 389 (1984); Abner Corp. v. City Roofing & Sheetmetal Co., 73 N.C. App. 470, 326 S.E.2d 632 (1985); State v. Price, 313 N.C. 297, 327 S.E.2d 863 (1985); State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 331 S.E.2d 652 (1985); State v. Grier, 314 N.C. 59, 331 S.E.2d 669 (1985); State v. Williams, 314 N.C. 337, 333 S.E.2d 708 (1985); State v. Spangler, 314 N.C. 374, 333 S.E.2d 722 (1985); State v. McNeely, 314 N.C. 451, 333 S.E.2d 738 (1985); State v. Freeman, 314 N.C. 432, 333 S.E.2d 743 (1985); LaFalce v. Wolcott, 76 N.C. App. 565, 334 S.E.2d 236 (1985); Rivenbark v. Southmark Corp., 77 N.C. App. 225, 334 S.E.2d 451 (1985); State v. Rowe, 81 N.C. App. 469, 344 S.E.2d 574 (1986); State v. Nations, 319 N.C. 318, 354 S.E.2d 510 (1987); State v. Nations, 319 N.C. 329, 354 S.E.2d 516 (1987); State v. Zuniga, 320 N.C. 233,
357 S.E.2d 898 (1987); State v. Brown, 320 N.C. 179, 358 S.E.2d 1 (1987); Kirkman v. Wilson, 86 N.C. App. 561, 358 S.E.2d 550 (1987); Automotive Restyling Concepts, Inc. v. Central Serv. Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 87 N.C. App. 173, 360 S.E.2d 141 (1987); Tay v. Flaherty, 90 N.C. App. 346, 368 S.E.2d 403 (1988); Wilson Heights Church of God v. Autry, 94 N.C. App. 111, 379 S.E.2d 691 (1988); Hooper v. C.M. Steel, Inc., 94 N.C. App. 567, 380 S.E.2d 593 (1989); Howard v. Parker, 95 N.C. App. 361, 382 S.E.2d 808 (1989); Vinson v. Wallace, 96 N.C. App. 372, 385 S.E.2d 810 (1989); Looney v. Wilson, 97 N.C. App. 304, 388 S.E.2d 142 (1990); Kimzay Winston-Salem, Inc. v. Jester, 103 N.C. App. 77, 404 S.E.2d 176 (1991); State v. McKinnon, 328 N.C. 668, 403 S.E.2d 474 (1991); Greer v. Parsons, 103 N.C. App. 463, 405 S.E.2d 921 (1991); Donnelly v. Guilford County, 107 N.C. App. 289, 419 S.E.2d 365 (1992); Bennish v. North Carolina Dance Theater, Inc., 108 N.C. App. 42, 422 S.E.2d 335 (1992); Bowden v. Latta, 337 N.C. 794, 448 S.E.2d 503 (1994); State v. Baity, 340 N.C. 65, 455 S.E.2d 621 (1995); State v. Davis, 340 N.C. 1, 455 S.E.2d 627, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 846, 116 S. Ct. 136, 133 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1995); State v. Johnson, 340 N.C. 32, 455 S.E.2d 644 (1995); State v. Larrimore, 340 N.C. 119, 456 S.E.2d 789 (1995); State v. Rush, 340 N.C. 174, 456 S.E.2d 819 (1995); Johnson v. Hudson, 122 N.C. App. 188, 468 S.E.2d 64 (1996); In re Browning, 124 N.C. App. 190, 476 S.E.2d 465 (1996); Vera v. Five Crow Promotions, Inc., 130 N.C. App. 645, 503 S.E.2d 692 (1998); Lang v. Lang, 132 N.C. App. 580, 512 S.E.2d 788 (1999); State v. Locklear, 349 N.C. 118, 505 S.E.2d 277 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1075, 119 S. Ct. 1475, 143 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1999); Anderson ex rel. Jerome v. Town of Andrews, 133 N.C. App. 185, 515 S.E.2d 55 (1999); Little v. Hamel, 134 N.C. App. 485, 517 S.E.2d 901 (1999); Eastover Ridge, L.L.C. v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 139 N.C. App. 360, 533 S.E.2d 827 (2000), cert. denied, 353 N.C. 262, 546 S.E.2d 93 (2000); State v. Hooks, 353 N.C. 629, 548 S.E.2d 501 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1155, 122 S. Ct. 1126, 151 L. Ed. 2d 1018 (2002); Moore v. N.C. Coop. Extension Serv., 146 N.C. App. 89, 552 S.E.2d 662 (2001), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 354 N.C. 574, 559 S.E.2d 180 (2001); State v. Holmes, 355 N.C. 719, 565 S.E.2d 154 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1010, 123 S. Ct. 478, 154 L. Ed. 2d 412 (2002); State v. Wiley, 355 N.C. 592, 565 S.E.2d 22 (2002); Boynton v. ESC Med. Sys., 152 N.C. App. 103, 566 S.E.2d 730 (2002); RPR & Assocs. v. Univ. of N. Carolina-Chapel Hill, 153 N.C. App. 342, 570 S.E.2d 510 (2002), cert. dismissed, 357 N.C. 166, 579 S.E.2d 882, cert. denied, 357 N.C. 166, 579 S.E.2d 882 (2003); State v. Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 604 S.E.2d 886 (2004); N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 599 S.E.2d 888 (2004); State v. Tirado, 358 N.C. 551, 599 S.E.2d 515 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 909, 125 S. Ct. 1600, 161 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2005); State v. Smith, 359 N.C. 199, 607 S.E.2d 607 (2005), cert. denied, -
U.S. - , 126 S. Ct. 109, 163 L. Ed. 2d 121 (2005); State v. Duke, 360 N.C. 110, 623 S.E.2d 11 (2005); State v. Augustine, 359 N.C. 709, 616 S.E.2d 515 (2005); State v. Cummings, 361 N.C. 438, 648 S.E.2d 788 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1319, 128 S. Ct. 1888, 170 L. Ed. 2d. 760 (2008); State v. Raines, 362 N.C. 1, 653 S.E.2d 126 (2007), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 129 S. Ct. 2857, 174 L. Ed. 2d 601 (2009); Carl v. State, 192 N.C. App. 544, 665 S.E.2d 787 (2008), review denied, cert. denied, review dismissed, as moot, 363 N.C. 123, 672 S.E.2d 683 (2009); Michael v. Huffman Oil Co., 190 N.C. App. 256, 661 S.E.2d 1 (2008), review denied, 363 N.C. 129, 673 S.E.2d 360 (2009); Early v. County of Durham, Dep't of Soc. Servs., 193 N.C. App. 334, 667 S.E.2d 512 (2008), review denied, 363 N.C. 372, 678 S.E.2d 237 (2009); Craig v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 678 S.E.2d 351 (June 18, 2009); In re W.B.M., 202 N.C. App. 606, 690 S.E.2d 41 (2010); Caldwell v. Smith, 203 N.C. App. 725, 692 S.E.2d 483 (2010); State v. Brewington, 204 N.C. App. 68, 693 S.E.2d 182 (2010), rev'd 367 N.C. 29, 743 S.E.2d 626, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 660 (2013); Mugno v. Mugno, 205 N.C. App. 273, 695 S.E.2d 495 (2010); Regions Bank v. Baxley Commer. Props., LLC, 206 N.C. App. 293, 697 S.E.2d 417 (2010); State v. Sanders, 208 N.C. App. 142, 701 S.E.2d 380 (2010); Hamilton v. Mortgage Info. Servs., 212 N.C. App. 73, 711 S.E.2d 185 (2011); State v. Williamson, 212 N.C. App. 393, 711 S.E.2d 765 (2011); State v. Phillips, 365 N.C. 103, 711 S.E.2d 122 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1541, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 1493, 182 L. Ed. 2d 176 (U.S. 2012); Fisk v. Murphy, 212 N.C. App. 667, 713 S.E.2d 100 (2011); Point Intrepid, LLC v. Farley, 215 N.C. App. 82, 714 S.E.2d 797 (2011); Johnson v. Antioch United Holy Church, Inc., 214 N.C. App. 507, 714 S.E.2d 806 (2011); Southern Seeding Serv. v. W.C. English, Inc., 217 N.C. App. 300, 719 S.E.2d 211 (2011); State v. Abbott, 217 N.C. App. 614, 720 S.E.2d 437 (2011); State v. Sistler, 218 N.C. App. 60, 720 S.E.2d 809 (2012), dismissed and review denied 365 N.C. 564, 724 S.E.2d 920, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 337 (N.C. 2012); State v. Adams, 218 N.C. App. 589, 721 S.E.2d 391 (2012); State v. Burrow, 218 N.C. App. 373, 721 S.E.2d 356 (2012); Estate of Livesay v. Livesay, 219 N.C. App. 183, 723 S.E.2d 772 (2012); IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 219 N.C. App. 36, 724 S.E.2d 588 (2012); Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 219 N.C. App. 227, 727 S.E.2d 550 (2012), review denied 366 N.C. 424, 736 S.E.2d 757, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 138 (2013); In re Foreclosure of a Lien by Five Oaks Rec. Ass'n, 219 N.C. App. 321, 724 S.E.2d 98 (2012); Williams v. Habul, 219 N.C. App. 281, 724 S.E.2d 104 (2012); State v. Conley, 220 N.C. App. 50, 724 S.E.2d 163 (2012); James v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Bd. of Educ., 221 N.C. App. 560, 728 S.E.2d 422, review denied, 734 S.E.2d 868, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 1095 (2012); Thorpe v. TJM Ocean Isle Partners LLC, 222 N.C. App. 262, 730 S.E.2d 268 (2012); Estate of Wooden v. Hillcrest Convalescent Ctr., Inc., 222 N.C. App. 396, 731 S.E.2d 500 (2012); MNC Holdings, LLC v. Town of Matthews, 223 N.C. App. 442, 735 S.E.2d 364 (2012); State v.
Randolph, 224 N.C. App. 521, 735 S.E.2d 845 (2012); Gregory v. Pearson, 224 N.C. App. 580, 736 S.E.2d 577 (2012); State v. Hoskins, 225 N.C. App. 177, 736 S.E.2d 631 (2013); McAdoo v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 225 N.C. App. 50, 736 S.E.2d 811 (2013); Hillsboro Partners, LLC v. City of Fayetteville, 226 N.C. App. 30, 738 S.E.2d 819, review denied, 367 N.C. 236, 748 S.E.2d 544, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 1031 (2013); Walters v. Cooper, 226 N.C. App. 166, 739 S.E.2d 185 (2013), aff'd 367 N.C. 117, 748 S.E.2d 144, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 1021 (2013); State v. Ward, 226 N.C. App. 386, 742 S.E.2d 550 (2013); In re Suttles Surveying, P.A., 227 N.C. App. 70, 742 S.E.2d 574, dismissed and review granted, 367 N.C. 252, 749 S.E.2d 840, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 1150 (2013); State v. Webb, 227 N.C. App. 205, 742 S.E.2d 284 (2013); Lendingtree v. Anderson, 228 N.C. App. 403, 747 S.E.2d 292 (2013); Riggings Homeowners, Inc. v. Coastal Res. Comm'n of N.C. 228 N.C. App. 630, 747 S.E.2d 301 (2013); Wellons v. White, 229 N.C. App. 164, 748 S.E.2d 709 (2013); In re Raynor, 229 N.C. App. 12, 748 S.E.2d 579 (2013); First Fed. Bank v. Aldridge, 230 N.C. App. 187, 749 S.E.2d 289 (2013); State v. Chukwu, 230 N.C. App. 553, 749 S.E.2d 910 (2013); JPmorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Browning, 230 N.C. App. 537, 750 S.E.2d 555 (2013); Halstead v. Plymale, 231 N.C. App. 253, 750 S.E.2d 894 (2013).

Templeton Props. LP v. Town of Boone, 234 N.C. App. 303, 759 S.E.2d 311 (2014); Shearl v. Town of Highlands, 236 N.C. App. 113, 762 S.E.2d 877 (2014); State v. Allah, 236 N.C. App. 120, 762 S.E.2d 524 (2014); State v. Ricks, 244 N.C. App. 742, 781 S.E.2d 637 (2016); State v. Jefferson, 252 N.C. App. 174, 798 S.E.2d 121 (2017), review denied, 804 S.E.2d 527, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 708 (N.C. 2017), cert. denied, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 1446 (U.S. 2018), cert. denied, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 1446, 200 L. Ed. 2d 318 (U.S. 2018) cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1169, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 1446, 200 L. Ed. 2d 318 (2018); State v. Johnson, 253 N.C. App. 337, 801 S.E.2d 123 (2017); Dung Thang Trang v. L J Wings, Inc., - N.C. App. - , 834 S.E.2d 679 (2019).

Cited in Gunter v. Anders, 114 N.C. App. 61, 441 S.E.2d 167 (1994), aff'd on rehearing, 115 N.C. App. 331, 444 S.E.2d 685 (1994), cert. denied, 339 N.C. 612, 454 S.E.2d 250, rehearing dismissed, 339 N.C. 738, 454 S.E.2d 651 (1995); State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 443 S.E.2d 14, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046, 115 S. Ct. 642, 130 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1994); State v. Jones, 336 N.C. 229, 443 S.E.2d 48, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1003, 115 S. Ct. 518, 130 L. Ed 2d 423 (1994), 339 N.C. 619, 454 S.E.2d 263 (1995). State v. Lipscomb, 274 N.C. 436, 163 S.E.2d 788 (1968); State v. Benton, 276 N.C. 641, 174 S.E.2d 793 (1970); State v. Hamby, 276 N.C. 674, 174 S.E.2d 385 (1970); State v. Blackwell, 276 N.C. 714, 174 S.E.2d 534 (1970); Shaw v. Stiles, 13 N.C. App. 173, 185 S.E.2d 268 (1971); Fishel v. Grifton United Methodist Church, 13 N.C. App. 238, 185 S.E.2d 322 (1971); State v. White, 286 N.C. 395, 211 S.E.2d 445 (1975); State v. McCall, 286 N.C. 472, 212 S.E.2d 132 (1975); State v. Carey, 288 N.C. 254, 218 S.E.2d 387 (1975); State v. Waddell, 289 N.C. 19, 220 S.E.2d 293 (1975); State v. Carter, 289 N.C. 35, 220 S.E.2d 313 (1975); State v. Killian, 25 N.C. App. 224, 212 S.E.2d 419 (1975); State v. Bush, 289 N.C. 159, 221 S.E.2d 333 (1976); State v. Harrill, 289 N.C. 186, 221 S.E.2d 325 (1976); State v. Lester, 289 N.C. 239, 221 S.E.2d 268 (1976); State v. Sellers, 289 N.C. 268, 221 S.E.2d 264 (1976); State v. Alford, 289 N.C. 372, 222 S.E.2d 222 (1976); State v. Norwood, 289 N.C. 424, 222 S.E.2d 253 (1976); State v. McCall, 289 N.C. 512, 223 S.E.2d 303 (1976); State v. Biggs, 289 N.C. 522, 223 S.E.2d 371 (1976); State v. Warren, 289 N.C. 551, 223 S.E.2d 317 (1976); State v. Perry, 293 N.C. 97, 235 S.E.2d 52 (1977); State v. White, 293 N.C. 91, 235 S.E.2d 55 (1977); State v. Bishop, 293 N.C. 84, 235 S.E.2d 214 (1977); State v. Cole, 293 N.C. 328, 237 S.E.2d 814 (1977); State v. Constance, 293 N.C. 581, 238 S.E.2d 294 (1977); State v. Cates, 293 N.C. 462, 238 S.E.2d 465 (1977); State v. Foster, 293 N.C. 674, 239 S.E.2d 449 (1977); State v. Garrison, 294 N.C. 270, 240 S.E.2d 377 (1978); State v. Lester, 294 N.C. 220, 240 S.E.2d 391 (1978); State v. Hill, 294 N.C. 320, 240 S.E.2d 794 (1978); State v. Smith, 294 N.C. 365, 241 S.E.2d 674 (1978); State v. Saults, 294 N.C. 722, 242 S.E.2d 801 (1978); State v. Barbour, 295 N.C. 66, 243 S.E.2d 380 (1978); State v. Medley, 295 N.C. 75, 243 S.E.2d 374 (1978); State v. Potter, 295 N.C. 126, 244 S.E.2d 397 (1978); State v. Freeman, 295 N.C. 210, 244 S.E.2d 680 (1978); State v. Connley, 295 N.C. 327, 245 S.E.2d 663 (1978); State v. Sanders, 295 N.C. 361, 245 S.E.2d 674 (1978); State v. Berry, 295 N.C. 534, 246 S.E.2d 758 (1978); State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 247 S.E.2d 905 (1978); State v. Mason, 295 N.C. 584, 248 S.E.2d 241 (1978); State v. Williams, 295 N.C. 655, 249 S.E.2d 709 (1978); State v. Haywood, 295 N.C. 709, 249 S.E.2d 429 (1978); State v. Jones,
296 N.C. 75, 248 S.E.2d 858 (1978); Digsby v. Gregory, 35 N.C. App. 59, 240 S.E.2d 491 (1978); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 36 N.C. App. 755, 245 S.E.2d 399 (1978); Williams v. Holland, 39 N.C. App. 141, 249 S.E.2d 821 (1978); State v. Wade, 296 N.C. 454, 251 S.E.2d 407 (1979); State v. Scott, 296 N.C. 519, 251 S.E.2d 414 (1979); State v. Henley, 296 N.C. 547, 251 S.E.2d 463 (1979); State v. Hunt, 297 N.C. 131, 254 S.E.2d 19 (1979); State v. Ford, 297 N.C. 144, 254 S.E.2d 14 (1979); State v. Stinson, 297 N.C. 168, 254 S.E.2d 23 (1979); State v. Sparks, 297 N.C. 314, 255 S.E.2d 373 (1979); State v. Barnes, 297 N.C. 442, 255 S.E.2d 386 (1979); State v. Davis, 297 N.C. 566, 256 S.E.2d 184 (1979); State v. Silhan, 297 N.C. 660, 256 S.E.2d 702 (1979); State v. Keller, 297 N.C. 674, 256 S.E.2d 710 (1979); State v. Colvin, 297 N.C. 691, 256 S.E.2d 689 (1979); State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 257 S.E.2d 597 (1979); State v. Spaulding, 298 N.C. 149, 257 S.E.2d 391 (1979); State v. Lyles, 298 N.C. 179, 257 S.E.2d 410 (1979); State v. Alford, 298 N.C. 465, 259 S.E.2d 242 (1979); State v. Perry, 298 N.C. 502, 259 S.E.2d 496 (1979); State v. Sanders, 298 N.C. 512, 259 S.E.2d 258 (1979); State v. Boykin, 298 N.C. 687, 259 S.E.2d 883 (1979); State v. Wetmore, 298 N.C. 743, 259 S.E.2d 870 (1979); In re Annexation Ordinance, 300 N.C. 337, 266 S.E.2d 661 (1980); Stahl-Rider, Inc. v. State, 48 N.C. App. 380, 269 S.E.2d 217 (1980); State v. Small, 301 N.C. 407, 272 S.E.2d 128 (1980); State v. Ashford, 301 N.C. 512, 272 S.E.2d 126 (1980); Nichols v. State Employees' Credit Union, 46 N.C. App. 294, 264 S.E.2d 793 (1980); State v. Martin, 303 N.C. 246, 278 S.E.2d 214 (1981); State v. Bass, 303 N.C. 267, 278 S.E.2d 209 (1981); State v. Freeman, 303 N.C. 299, 278 S.E.2d 207 (1981); Cunningham v. Brown, 51 N.C. App. 264, 276 S.E.2d 718 (1981); Bacon v. Leatherwood, 52 N.C. App. 587, 279 S.E.2d 86 (1981); State v. Misenheimer, 304 N.C. 108, 282 S.E.2d 791 (1981); State v. Silva, 304 N.C. 122, 282 S.E.2d 449 (1981); State v. Poplin, 304 N.C. 185, 282 S.E.2d 420 (1981); Green v. Duke Power Co., 50 N.C. App. 646, 274 S.E.2d 889 (1981); Briggs v. Mid-State Oil Co., 53 N.C. App. 203, 280 S.E.2d 501 (1981); Harris v. Jim Stacy Racing, Inc., 53 N.C. App. 597, 281 S.E.2d 455 (1981); State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 290 S.E.2d 574 (1982); State v. Howard, 305 N.C. 651, 290 S.E.2d 591 (1982); State v. Black, 305 N.C. 614, 290 S.E.2d 669 (1982); State v. Booker, 306 N.C. 302, 293 S.E.2d 78 (1982); State v. Schneider, 306 N.C. 351, 293 S.E.2d 157 (1982); State v. Breeden, 306 N.C. 533, 293 S.E.2d 788 (1982); State v. Weaver, 306 N.C. 629, 295 S.E.2d 375 (1982); State v. Meadows, 306 N.C. 683, 295 S.E.2d 394 (1982); State v. Powell, 306 N.C. 718, 295 S.E.2d 413 (1982); State v. Rankin, 306 N.C. 712, 295 S.E.2d 416 (1982); State v. Pratt, 306 N.C. 673, 295 S.E.2d 462 (1982); State v. Cabey, 307 N.C. 496, 299 S.E.2d 194 (1983); State v. Cheek, 307 N.C. 552,
299 S.E.2d 633 (1983); State v. Barnett, 307 N.C. 608, 300 S.E.2d 340 (1983); State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628, 300 S.E.2d 351 (1983); State v. Tysor, 307 N.C. 679, 300 S.E.2d 366 (1983); State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 300 S.E.2d 375 (1983); Terry's Floor Fashions, Inc. v. Murray, 61 N.C. App. 569, 300 S.E.2d 888 (1983); State v. Chatman, 308 N.C. 169, 301 S.E.2d 71 (1983); Schmitt v. Schmitt, 61 N.C. App. 750, 301 S.E.2d 741 (1983); Swindell v. Overton, 62 N.C. App. 160, 302 S.E.2d 841 (1983); State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 307 S.E.2d 339 (1983); American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 63 N.C. App. 38, 303 S.E.2d 649 (1983); State v. Rothwell, 308 N.C. 782, 303 S.E.2d 798 (1983); Porter v. Matthews Enters., Inc., 63 N.C. App. 140, 303 S.E.2d 828 (1983); Tastee Freez Cafeteria v. Watson, 64 N.C. App. 562, 307 S.E.2d 800 (1983); Johnston County v. McCormick, 65 N.C. App. 63, 308 S.E.2d 872 (1983); State v. Forney, 310 N.C. 126, 310 S.E.2d 20 (1984); Patterson v. DAC Corp., 66 N.C. App. 110, 310 S.E.2d 783 (1984); Duke Univ. v. Bryant-Durham Elec. Co., 66 N.C. App. 726, 311 S.E.2d 638 (1984); Wallace Butts Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Runge, 68 N.C. App. 196, 314 S.E.2d 293 (1984); State v. Wilson, 311 N.C. 117, 316 S.E.2d 46 (1984); State v. Toomer, 311 N.C. 183, 316 S.E.2d 66 (1984); State v. Maynard, 311 N.C. 1, 316 S.E.2d 197 (1984); State v. Taylor, 311 N.C. 266, 316 S.E.2d 225 (1984); State v. Maccia, 311 N.C. 222, 316 S.E.2d 241 (1984); State v. Michael, 311 N.C. 214, 316 S.E.2d 276 (1984); State v. Bell, 311 N.C. 131, 316 S.E.2d 611 (1984); State v. Jenkins, 311 N.C. 194, 317 S.E.2d 345 (1984); Elks v. Hannan, 68 N.C. App. 757, 315 S.E.2d 553 (1984); State v. Sanders, 312 N.C. 318, 321 S.E.2d 836 (1984); State v. Hamlet, 312 N.C. 162, 321 S.E.2d 837 (1984); State v. McDonald, 312 N.C. 264, 321 S.E.2d 849 (1984); State v. Brown, 312 N.C. 237, 321 S.E.2d 856 (1984); State v. Randolph, 312 N.C. 198, 321 S.E.2d 864 (1984); State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 322 S.E.2d 370 (1984); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); Smith v. Price, 74 N.C. App. 413, 328 S.E.2d 811 (1985); State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 330 S.E.2d 450 (1985); State v. Simpson, 314 N.C. 359, 334 S.E.2d 53 (1985); State v. Westmoreland, 314 N.C. 442, 334 S.E.2d 223 (1985); State v. Hayes, 314 N.C. 460, 334 S.E.2d 741 (1985); State v. Hardy, 78 N.C. App. 175, 336 S.E.2d 661 (1985); City of Winston-Salem v. Ferrell, 79 N.C. App. 103, 338 S.E.2d 794 (1986); State v. McClintick, 315 N.C. 649, 340 S.E.2d 41 (1986); State v. King, 316 N.C. 78, 340 S.E.2d 71 (1986); State v. Riddle, 316 N.C. 152, 340 S.E.2d 75 (1986); State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 340 S.E.2d 84 (1986); State v. McLaughlin, 316 N.C. 175, 340 S.E.2d 102 (1986); State v. Bullock, 316 N.C. 180, 340 S.E.2d 106 (1986); State v. Miller, 315 N.C. 773, 340 S.E.2d 290 (1986); State v. Ledford, 315 N.C. 599, 340 S.E.2d 309 (1986); State v. Martin, 315 N.C. 667, 340 S.E.2d 326 (1986); State v. Sidden, 315 N.C. 539, 340 S.E.2d 340 (1986); State v. DeLeonardo,
315 N.C. 762, 340 S.E.2d 350 (1986); State v. Riddick, 316 N.C. 127, 340 S.E.2d 422 (1986); State v. Mason, 315 N.C. 724, 340 S.E.2d 430 (1986); State v. Mize, 316 N.C. 48, 340 S.E.2d 439 (1986); State v. Torain, 316 N.C. 111, 340 S.E.2d 465 (1986); State v. Gladden, 315 N.C. 398, 340 S.E.2d 673 (1986); State v. Woods, 316 N.C. 344, 341 S.E.2d 545 (1986); State v. Moses, 316 N.C. 356, 341 S.E.2d 551 (1986); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986); State v. Moore, 316 N.C. 328, 341 S.E.2d 733 (1986); State v. Gordon, 316 N.C. 497, 342 S.E.2d 509 (1986); State v. Welch, 316 N.C. 578, 342 S.E.2d 789 (1986); State v. Massey, 316 N.C. 558, 342 S.E.2d 811 (1986); State v. Artis, 316 N.C. 507, 342 S.E.2d 847 (1986); State v. Gardner, 316 N.C. 605, 342 S.E.2d 872 (1986); State v. Henry, 318 N.C. 408, 348 S.E.2d 593 (1986); Little v. City of Locust, 83 N.C. App. 224, 349 S.E.2d 627 (1986); State v. Davis, 321 N.C. 52, 361 S.E.2d 724 (1987); State v. Strickland, 321 N.C. 31, 361 S.E.2d 882 (1987); State v. Childress, 321 N.C. 226, 362 S.E.2d 263 (1987); State v. McLaughlin, 321 N.C. 267, 362 S.E.2d 280 (1987); State v. Rael, 321 N.C. 528, 364 S.E.2d 125 (1988); State v. Mitchell, 321 N.C. 650, 365 S.E.2d 554 (1988); State v. Weathers, 322 N.C. 97, 366 S.E.2d 471 (1988); State v. Reid, 322 N.C. 309, 367 S.E.2d 672 (1988); State v. Weeks, 322 N.C. 152, 367 S.E.2d 895 (1988); Atkins v. Mitchell, 91 N.C. App. 730, 373 S.E.2d 152 (1988); State v. Hunt, 323 N.C. 407, 373 S.E.2d 400 (1988); State v. Ford, 323 N.C. 466, 373 S.E.2d 420 (1988); State v. Rose, 323 N.C. 455, 373 S.E.2d 426 (1988); State v. Stone, 323 N.C. 473, 373 S.E.2d 430 (1988); Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic v. Petrozza, 92 N.C. App. 21, 373 S.E.2d 449 (1988); State v. Deanes, 323 N.C. 508, 374 S.E.2d 249 (1988); State v. Shytle, 323 N.C. 684, 374 S.E.2d 573 (1989); State v. Tidwell, 323 N.C. 668, 374 S.E.2d 577 (1989); State v. Rogers, 323 N.C. 658, 374 S.E.2d 852 (1989); State v. Silvers, 323 N.C. 646, 374 S.E.2d 858 (1989); State v. Parks, 324 N.C. 94, 376 S.E.2d 4 (1989); State v. McSwain, 324 N.C. 241, 376 S.E.2d 453 (1989); State v. Ball, 324 N.C. 233, 377 S.E.2d 70 (1989); Cochran v. Cochran, 93 N.C. App. 574, 378 S.E.2d 580 (1989); State v. Bridges, 325 N.C. 529, 385 S.E.2d 337 (1989); State v. Coker, 325 N.C. 686, 386 S.E.2d 196 (1989); State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 386 S.E.2d 418 (1989); State v. Melvin, 326 N.C. 173, 388 S.E.2d 72 (1990), review dismissed, 792 S.E.2d 506, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 673 (2016); Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990); Kirkman v. Wilson, 98 N.C. App. 242, 390 S.E.2d 698 (1990); State v. Richardson, 328 N.C. 505, 402 S.E.2d 401 (1991); Telerent Leasing Corp. v. Barbee, 102 N.C. App. 129, 401 S.E.2d 122 (1991); State v. Terry, 329 N.C. 191, 404 S.E.2d 658 (1991); State v. Weddington, 329 N.C. 202, 404 S.E.2d 671 (1991); Peoples Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 103 N.C. App. 762,
407 S.E.2d 251 (1991); Plummer v. Kearney, 108 N.C. App. 310, 423 S.E.2d 526 (1992); 505 U.S. 1226, 112 S. Ct. 3045, 120 L. Ed. 2d 913 (1992); State v. Heatwole, 333 N.C. 156, 423 S.E.2d 735 (1992); State v. Pope, 333 N.C. 106, 423 S.E.2d 740 (1992); State v. Pope, 333 N.C. 116, 423 S.E.2d 746 (1992); State v. Williamson, 333 N.C. 128, 423 S.E.2d 766 (1992); State v. Bronson, 333 N.C. 67, 423 S.E.2d 772 (1992); Kaplan v. Prolife Action League, 111 N.C. App. 1, 431 S.E.2d 828 (1993); Milner Airco, Inc. v. Morris, 111 N.C. App. 866, 433 S.E.2d 811 (1993); T.H. Blake Contracting Co. v. Sorrells, 109 N.C. App. 119, 426 S.E.2d 85 (1993); In re Huang, 110 N.C. App. 683, 431 S.E.2d 541 (1993); McNeil v. Hicks, 111 N.C. App. 262, 431 S.E.2d 868 (1993); State v. Harvell, 334 N.C. 356, 432 S.E.2d 125 (1993); City of Winston-Salem v. Yarbrough, 117 N.C. App. 340, 451 S.E.2d 358 (1994), cert. denied, 340 N.C. 110 (1995), cert. denied, 340 N.C. 260, 456 S.E.2d 519 (1995); State v. Collins, 335 N.C. 729, 440 S.E.2d 559 (1994); State v. Barton, 335 N.C. 696, 441 S.E.2d 295 (1994); Adams v. Jones, 114 N.C. App. 256, 441 S.E.2d 699 (1994); State v. Howell, 335 N.C. 457, 439 S.E.2d 116 (1994); State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 439 S.E.2d 547 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 891, 115 S. Ct. 239, 130 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1994); State v. Patterson, 335 N.C. 437, 439 S.E.2d 578 (1994); State v. Mason, 336 N.C. 595, 444 S.E.2d 169 (1994); State v. Godwin, 336 N.C. 499, 444 S.E.2d 206 (1994); State v. McDougald, 336 N.C. 451, 444 S.E.2d 211 (1994); State v. Arrington, 336 N.C. 592, 444 S.E.2d 418 (1994); State v. McIntosh, 336 N.C. 517, 444 S.E.2d 438 (1994); State v. Morston, 336 N.C. 381, 445 S.E.2d 1 (1994); State v. Jones, 336 N.C. 490, 445 S.E.2d 23 (1994); State v. Lynch, 337 N.C. 415, 445 S.E.2d 581 (1994); State v. Carson, 337 N.C. 407, 445 S.E.2d 585 (1994); State v. Fisher, 336 N.C. 684, 445 S.E.2d 866 (1994); State v. Ingle, 336 N.C. 617, 445 S.E.2d 880 (1994); State v. Moseley, 336 N.C. 710, 445 S.E.2d 906 (1994); State v. Eason, 336 N.C. 730, 445 S.E.2d 917 (1994); State v. Dobson, 337 N.C. 464, 446 S.E.2d 14 (1994); State v. Jones, 337 N.C. 198, 446 S.E.2d 32 (1994); State v. Mason, 337 N.C. 165, 446 S.E.2d 58 (1994); State v. Alexander, 337 N.C. 182, 446 S.E.2d 83 (1994); State v. Johnson, 337 N.C. 212, 446 S.E.2d 92 (1994); State v. Skipper, 337 N.C. 1, 446 S.E.2d 252 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1134, 115 S. Ct. 953, 130 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1995), cert. dismissed, 342 N.C. 417, 465 S.E.2d 547 (1995); State v. Daniels, 337 N.C. 243, 446 S.E.2d 298 (1994); State v. Quick, 337 N.C. 359, 446 S.E.2d 535 (1994); State v. Bacon, 337 N.C. 66, 446 S.E.2d 542 (1994); State v. Taylor, 337 N.C. 597, 447 S.E.2d 360 (1994); State v. Terry, 337 N.C. 615, 447 S.E.2d 720 (1994); State v. Blankenship, 337 N.C. 543, 447 S.E.2d 727 (1994); State v. Shuford, 337 N.C. 641, 447 S.E.2d 742 (1994); State v. Elmore, 337 N.C. 789,
448 S.E.2d 501 (1994); State v. Gray, 337 N.C. 772, 448 S.E.2d 794 (1994); State v. Sidberry, 337 N.C. 779, 448 S.E.2d 798 (1994); State v. Reeves, 337 N.C. 700, 448 S.E.2d 802 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1114, 115 S. Ct. 1971, 131 L. Ed. 2d 860 (1995)

Alexander v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 116 N.C. App. 15, 446 S.E.2d 847 (1994); Epps v. Duke Univ., Inc., 116 N.C. App. 305, 447 S.E.2d 444 (1994); State v. Herring, 338 N.C. 271, 449 S.E.2d 183 (1994); State v. Jones, 339 N.C. 114, 451 S.E.2d 826 (1994); State v. Spruill, 338 N.C. 612, 452 S.E.2d 279 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 834, 116 S. Ct. 111, 133 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1995); State v. Alford, 339 N.C. 562, 453 S.E.2d 512 (1995); State v. Lovin, 339 N.C. 695, 454 S.E.2d 229 (1995); State v. Taylor, 340 N.C. 52, 455 S.E.2d 859 (1995); State v. Bowie, 340 N.C. 199, 456 S.E.2d 771 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 994, 116 S. Ct. 529, 133 L.E.2d 435 (1995); State v. Shoff, 118 N.C. App. 724, 456 S.E.2d 875 (1995), appeal dismissed, 340 N.C. 572, 460 S.E.2d 328 (1995), aff'd, 342 N.C. 638, 466 S.E.2d 277 (1996); State v. Worthy, 341 N.C. 707, 462 S.E.2d 482 (1995); State v. Butler, 341 N.C. 686, 462 S.E.2d 485 (1995); State v. Walls, 342 N.C. 1, 463 S.E.2d 738 (1995); State v. Pleasant, 342 N.C. 366, 464 S.E.2d 284 (1995); State v. Buckner, 342 N.C. 198, 464 S.E.2d 414 (1995); State v. Marr, 342 N.C. 607, 467 S.E.2d 236 (1996); State v. Straing, 342 N.C. 623, 466 S.E.2d 278 (1996); Willoughby v. Board of Trustees, 121 N.C. App. 444, 466 S.E.2d 285 (1996); State v. Jones, 342 N.C. 628, 467 S.E.2d 233 (1996); State v. Williams, 342 N.C. 869, 467 S.E.2d 392 (1996); State v. Brewton, 342 N.C. 875, 467 S.E.2d 395 (1996); State v. Ransome, 342 N.C. 847, 467 S.E.2d 404 (1996); State v. Murphy, 342 N.C. 813, 467 S.E.2d 428 (1996); State v. Chandler, 342 N.C. 742, 467 S.E.2d 636 (1996); State v. DeCastro, 342 N.C. 667, 467 S.E.2d 653 (1996); State v. Lyons, 343 N.C. 1, 468 S.E.2d 204 (1996); State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 471 S.E.2d 593 (1996); State v. Kilpatrick, 343 N.C. 466, 471 S.E.2d 624 (1996); State v. Burrus, 344 N.C. 79, 472 S.E.2d 867 (1996); State v. Fullwood, 343 N.C. 725, 472 S.E.2d 883 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1122, 117 S. Ct. 1260, 137 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1997); State v. Singletary, 344 N.C. 95, 472 S.E.2d 895 (1996); State v. Sharpe, 344 N.C. 190, 473 S.E.2d 3 (1996); State v. Bates, 343 N.C. 564, 473 S.E.2d 269 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 992, 136 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1997); State v. Heatwole, 344 N.C. 1, 473 S.E.2d 310 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1122, 117 S. Ct. 1259, 137 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1997); State v. Boyd, 343 N.C. 699, 473 S.E.2d 327 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1096, 117 S. Ct. 778, 136 L. Ed. 2d 722 (1997); State v. Taylor, 344 N.C. 31, 473 S.E.2d 596 (1996); State v. Cunningham, 344 N.C. 341, 474 S.E.2d 772 (1996); State v. Armstrong, 345 N.C. 161, 478 S.E.2d 194 (1996); State v. Thomas, 344 N.C. 639, 477 S.E.2d 450 (1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 824, 118 S. Ct. 84, 139 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997); State v. Stroud, 345 N.C. 106, 478 S.E.2d 476 (1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 826, 118 S. Ct. 86, 139 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1997), cert. dismissed
368 N.C. 424, 799 S.E.2d 145, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1200 (2015); State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 481 S.E.2d 25 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1997); State v. Prevatte, 346 N.C. 162, 484 S.E.2d 377 (1997); State v. Anderson, 346 N.C. 158, 484 S.E.2d 543 (1997); State v. Evans, 346 N.C. 221, 485 S.E.2d 271 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1057, 118 S. Ct. 712, 139 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1998); State v. McNeill, 346 N.C. 233, 485 S.E.2d 284 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1053, 118 S. Ct. 704, 139 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1998); State v. Bunning, 346 N.C. 253, 485 S.E.2d 290 (1997); Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 126 N.C. App. 409, 485 S.E.2d 333 (1997); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Simpson, 126 N.C. App. 393, 485 S.E.2d 337 (1997); State v. Prevatte, 346 N.C. 162, 484 S.E.2d 377 (1997); State v. Lewis, 346 N.C. 141, 484 S.E.2d 379 (1997); State v. Barnard, 346 N.C. 95, 484 S.E.2d 382 (1997); Barrett v. Hyldburg, 127 N.C. App. 95, 487 S.E.2d 803 (1997); Biggers v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 127 N.C. App. 199, 487 S.E.2d 829 (1997); State v. Pickens, 346 N.C. 628, 488 S.E.2d 162 (1997); State v. Allen, 346 N.C. 731, 488 S.E.2d 188 (1997); State v. Pierce, 346 N.C. 471, 488 S.E.2d 576 (1997); Town Ctr. Assocs. v. Y & C Corp., 127 N.C. App. 381, 489 S.E.2d 434 (1997); State v. Peterson, 347 N.C. 253, 491 S.E.2d 223 (1997); State v. Sidden, 347 N.C. 218, 491 S.E.2d 225 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1097, 118 S. Ct. 1583, 140 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1998); State v. Warren, 347 N.C. 309, 492 S.E.2d 609 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1109, 118 S. Ct. 1681, 140 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1998); Skipper v. French, 130 F.3d 603 (4th Cir. 1997); Rousselo v. Starling, 128 N.C. App. 439, 495 S.E.2d 725 (1998), appeal dismissed, 348 N.C. 74, 505 S.E.2d 876 (1998), review denied, 348 N.C. 74, 505 S.E.2d 876 (1998); Reunion Land Co. v. Village of Marvin, 129 N.C. App. 249, 497 S.E.2d 446 (1998); State v. Zuniga, 348 N.C. 214, 498 S.E.2d 611 (1998); DKH Corp. v. Rankin-Patterson Oil Co., 348 N.C. 583, 500 S.E.2d 666 (1998); State v. Hoffman, 349 N.C. 167, 505 S.E.2d 80 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1053, 119 S. Ct. 1362, 143 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1999); State v. Atkins, 349 N.C. 62, 505 S.E.2d 97 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1147, 119 S. Ct. 2025, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1036 (1999); State v. Guevara, 349 N.C. 243, 506 S.E.2d 711 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S. Ct. 1809, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1013 (1999); State v. LaPlanche, 349 N.C. 279, 507 S.E.2d 34 (1998); State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 509 S.E.2d 178 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 835, 120 S. Ct. 95, 145 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1999); State v. Bowman, 349 N.C. 459, 509 S.E.2d 428 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1040, 119 S. Ct. 2403, 144 L. Ed. 2d 802 (1999); State v. Murillo, 349 N.C. 573, 509 S.E.2d 752 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 838, 120 S. Ct. 103, 145 L. Ed. 2d 87, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 5310, 68 U.S.L.W. 3225 (1999); State v. Williams, 350 N.C. 1, 510 S.E.2d 626 (1999),
cert. denied 528 U.S. 880, 120 S. Ct. 193, 145 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1999); Hart v. F.N. Thompson Constr. Co., 132 N.C. App. 229, 511 S.E.2d 27 (1999); In re Wellnitz, 350 N.C. 109, 512 S.E.2d 720 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 941, 120 S. Ct. 351, 145 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1999); State v. Brown, 350 N.C. 193, 513 S.E.2d 57 (1999); In re Eldridge, 350 N.C. 152, 513 S.E.2d 296 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 973, 120 S. Ct. 417, 145 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1999); Wilson v. Watson, 136 N.C. App. 500, 524 S.E.2d 812 (2000); Lee v. Mutual Community Sav. Bank, 136 N.C. App. 808, 525 S.E.2d 854 (2000); State v. Blakeney, 352 N.C. 287, 531 S.E.2d 799 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1117, 121 S. Ct. 868, 148 L. Ed. 2d 780 (2001); State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 536 S.E.2d 1 (2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1167, 121 S. Ct. 1131, 148 L. Ed. 2d 997 (2001); RPR & Assocs. v. State, 139 N.C. App. 525, 534 S.E.2d 247 (2000), aff'd, 353 N.C. 543, 543 S.E.2d 480 (2001); State v. Thibodeaux, 352 N.C. 570, 532 S.E.2d 797 (2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1155, 121 S. Ct. 1106, 148 L. Ed. 2d 976 (2001); State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 533 S.E.2d 168 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 931, 121 S. Ct. 1379, 1380, 149 L. Ed. 2d 305 (2001), cert. dismissed, without prejudice, 805 S.E.2d 698, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 900 (2017), cert. granted, 370 N.C. 587, 809 S.E.2d 594, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 93 (2018); State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. 600, 536 S.E.2d 36 (2000), cert denied, 532 U.S. 997, 121 S. Ct. 1660, 149 L. Ed. 2d 641 (2001); Desmond v. City of Charlotte, 142 N.C. App. 590, 544 S.E.2d 269 (2001); Summey v. Barker, 142 N.C. App. 688, 544 S.E.2d 262 (2001); Thompson v. Town of Dallas, 142 N.C. App. 651, 543 S.E.2d 901 (2001); Rug Doctor, L.P. v. Prate, 143 N.C. App. 343, 545 S.E.2d 766 (2001); Triangle Bank v. Eatmon, 143 N.C. App. 521, 547 S.E.2d 92 (2001); Darroch v. Lea, 150 N.C. App. 156, 563 S.E.2d 219 (2002); Carter v. Lee, 283 F.3d 240 (4th. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 897, 123 S. Ct. 196, 154 L. Ed. 2d 166 (2002), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 617, 574 S.E.2d 468 (2002); State v. Leeper, 356 N.C. 55, 565 S.E.2d 1 (2002); Fairfield Mt. Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Doolittle, 149 N.C. App. 486, 560 S.E.2d 604 (2002); State v. al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. 150, 567 S.E.2d 120 (2002); Van Engen v. Que Scientific, Inc., 151 N.C. App. 683, 567 S.E.2d 179 (2002); State v. Murray, 154 N.C. App. 631, 572 S.E.2d 845 (2002), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 467, 586 S.E.2d 778 (2003); Daniels v. Lee, 316 F.3d 477 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 851, 124 S. Ct. 137, 157 L. Ed. 2d 93 (2003); Hunter-McDonald, Inc. v. Edison Foard, Inc., 157 N.C. App. 560, 579 S.E.2d 490 (2003), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 459, 585 S.E.2d 759 (2003); State v. Harless, 160 N.C. App. 78, 584 S.E.2d 339 (2003); State v. Nobles, 357 N.C. 433, 584 S.E.2d 765 (2003); State v. Carter, 357 N.C. 345, 584 S.E.2d 792 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 943, 124 S. Ct. 1670, 158 L. Ed. 2d 368 (2004); State v. Squires, 357 N.C. 529, 591 S.E.2d 837 (2003), cert. denied,
541 U.S. 1088, 124 S. Ct. 2818, 159 L. Ed. 2d 252 (2004); State v. Valentine, 357 N.C. 512, 591 S.E.2d 846 (2003); State v. Miller, 357 N.C. 583, 588 S.E.2d 857 (2003), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 124 S. Ct. 2914, 159 L. Ed. 2d 819 (2004); State v. Smith, 357 N.C. 604, 588 S.E.2d 453 (2003), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 124 S. Ct. 2915, 159 L. Ed. 2d 819 (2004); State v. Maske, 358 N.C. 40, 591 S.E.2d 521 (2004); State v. Roache, 358 N.C. 243, 595 S.E.2d 381 (2004); State v. Thompson, 359 N.C. 77, 604 S.E.2d 850 (2004); State v. Edgerson, 164 N.C. App. 712, 596 S.E.2d 351 (2004); State v. Boggess, 358 N.C. 676, 600 S.E.2d 453 (2004); State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 611 S.E.2d 794 (2005); State v. Brown, 170 N.C. App. 601, 613 S.E.2d 284 (2005), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 68, 621 S.E.2d 882 (2005); State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 617 S.E.2d 1 (2005); State v. Hurst, 360 N.C. 181, 624 S.E.2d 309 (2006), cert denied 364 N.C. 244 (2010); State v. Forte, 360 N.C. 427, 629 S.E.2d 137 (2006); Bobbitt v. N.C. State Univ., 179 N.C. App. 743, 635 S.E.2d 463 (2006), review denied, 361 N.C. 350, 645 S.E.2d 4, review denied, 361 N.C. 350, 645 S.E.2d 765, (2007); Bowling v. Margaret R. Pardee Mem'l Hosp., 179 N.C. App. 815, 635 S.E.2d 624 (2006), appeal dismissed, review denied, 361 N.C. 425, 648 S.E.2d 206 (2007); State v. Polke, 361 N.C. 65, 638 S.E.2d 189 (2006); Harris v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 180 N.C. App. 551, 638 S.E.2d 260 (2006); State v. Badgett, 361 N.C. 234, 644 S.E.2d 206 (2007); Strates Shows, Inc. v. Amusements of Am., Inc., 184 N.C. App. 455, 646 S.E.2d 418 (2007); State v. Goss, 361 N.C. 610, 651 S.E.2d 867 (2007), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 129 S. Ct. 59, 172 L. Ed. 2d 58 (2008); State v. Barden, 362 N.C. 277, 658 S.E.2d 654 (2008); State v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 193 N.C. App. 1, 666 S.E.2d 783 (2008), review denied, stay denied, 363 N.C. 136, 676 S.E.2d 54 (2009); State v. Taylor, 362 N.C. 514, 669 S.E.2d 239 (2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 851, 130 S. Ct. 129, 175 L. Ed. 2d 84 (2009); State v. Garcell, 363 N.C. 10, 678 S.E.2d 618 (2009); State v. Locklear, 363 N.C. 438, 681 S.E.2d 293 (Aug. 28, 2009); State v. Williams, 363 N.C. 689, 686 S.E.2d 493 (2009), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 149, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 6797, 178 L. Ed. 2d 90 (U.S. 2010); Lynn v. Lynn, 202 N.C. App. 423, 689 S.E.2d 198 (2010), review denied 705 S.E.2d 736, 2010 N.C. LEXIS 1029 (N.C. 2010); John Walter Kelly v. Regency Ctrs. Corp., 203 N.C. App. 339, 691 S.E.2d 92 (2010); State v. Brooks, 204 N.C. App. 193, 693 S.E.2d 204 (2010); Mugno v. Mugno, - N.C. App. - , 693 S.E.2d 276 (June 1, 2010); Bare v. Atwood, 204 N.C. App. 310, 693 S.E.2d 746 (2010); Bryson v. Haywood Reg'l Med. Ctr., 204 N.C. App. 532, 694 S.E.2d 416 (2010); Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 364 N.C. 195, 695 S.E.2d 442 (June 17, 2010); Bradley v. Bradley, 206 N.C. App. 249, 697 S.E.2d 422 (2010); State v. Kirby, 206 N.C. App. 446, 697 S.E.2d 496 (2010); Cummings v. Ortega, 206 N.C. App. 432, 697 S.E.2d 513 (2010); Thermal Design, Inc. v. M&M Builders, Inc., 207 N.C. App. 79, 698 S.E.2d 516 (2010); Bodine v. Harris Vill. Prop.
Owners Ass'n, 207 N.C. App. 52, 699 S.E.2d 129 (2010), review denied 365 N.C. 192, 707 S.E.2d 237, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 228 (2011); Ellison v. Alexander, 207 N.C. App. 401, 700 S.E.2d 102 (2010); Newcomb v. County of Carteret, 207 N.C. App. 527, 701 S.E.2d 325 (2010), review denied 365 N.C. 212, 710 S.E.2d 26, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 474 (N.C. 2011); State v. Waring, 364 N.C. 443, 701 S.E.2d 615 (2010); Johnson v. Johnson, 208 N.C. App. 118, 701 S.E.2d 722 (2010); Domingue v. Nehemiah II, Inc., 208 N.C. App. 429, 703 S.E.2d 462 (2010); McCrann v. N.C. HHS, 209 N.C. App. 241, 704 S.E.2d 899, review denied 365 N.C. 198, 710 S.E.2d 23, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 436 (2011); State v. Lawrence, 210 N.C. App. 73, 706 S.E.2d 822 (2011), rev'd 723 S.E.2d 326, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 265 (N.C. 2012); Peters v. Pennington, 210 N.C. App. 1, 707 S.E.2d 724 (2011); State v. Lane, 365 N.C. 7, 707 S.E.2d 210 (2011); State v. Towe, 210 N.C. App. 430, 707 S.E.2d 770 (2011), aff'd and modified 366 N.C. 56, 732 S.E.2d 564, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 420 (N.C. 2012); Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 210 N.C. App. 657, 709 S.E.2d 528 (2011); State v. Pell, 211 N.C. App. 376, 712 S.E.2d 189 (2011); Stratton v. Royal Bank of Can., 211 N.C. App. 78, 712 S.E.2d 221 (2011); State v. De La Sancha Cobos, 211 N.C. App. 536, 711 S.E.2d 464 (2011); Wilson v. City of Mebane Bd. of Adjustment, 212 N.C. App. 176, 710 S.E.2d 403 (2011), review denied, 724 S.E.2d 524, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 280 (2012); Meehan v. Am. Media Int'l, LLC, 214 N.C. App. 245, 712 S.E.2d 904 (2011); State v. White, 214 N.C. App. 471, 712 S.E.2d 921 (2011); State v. Stanley, 213 N.C. App. 545, 713 S.E.2d 196 (2011); Premier Plastic Surgery Ctr., PLLC v. Bd. of Adjustment for Matthews, 213 N.C. App. 364, 713 S.E.2d 511 (2011); Cobb v. Town of Blowing Rock, 213 N.C. App. 88, 713 S.E.2d 732 (2011), rev'd 722 S.E.2d 479, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 20 (N.C. 2012); State v. Boyd, 214 N.C. App. 294, 714 S.E.2d 466 (2011); Stephens v. Stephens, 213 N.C. App. 495, 715 S.E.2d 168 (2011); Parson v. Oasis Legal Fin., LLC, 214 N.C. App. 125, 715 S.E.2d 240 (2011); Cobb v. Pa. Life Ins. Co., 215 N.C. App. 268, 715 S.E.2d 541 (2011); Moore v. Proper, 215 N.C. App. 202, 715 S.E.2d 586 (2011), aff'd in part 366 N.C. 25, 726 S.E.2d 812, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 411 (N.C. 2012); Lovallo v. Sabato, 216 N.C. App. 281, 715 S.E.2d 909 (2011); Happ v. Creek Pointe Homeowner's Ass'n, 215 N.C. App. 96, 717 S.E.2d 401 (2011); In re Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 217 N.C. App. 199, 719 S.E.2d 171 (2011); State v. Crawley, 217 N.C. App. 509, 719 S.E.2d 632 (2011), review denied 365 N.C. 553, 722 S.E.2d 607, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 188 (N.C. 2012); In re Foreclosure of a Deed of Trust of Bass, 217 N.C. App. 244, 720 S.E.2d 18 (2011); State v. Foust, 220 N.C. App. 63, 724 S.E.2d 154 (2012); Smith v. City of Fayetteville, 220 N.C. App. 249, 725 S.E.2d 405 (2012); Mynhardt v. Elon Univ., 220 N.C. App. 368, 725 S.E.2d 632 (2012); Topp v. Big Rock Found., Inc., 221 N.C. App. 64, 726 S.E.2d 884 (2012), rev'd 366 N.C. 369, 736 S.E.2d 173, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 54 (2013)

Timothy L. Hardin v. York Mem'l Park, 221 N.C. App. 317, 730 S.E.2d 768 (2012); Kirkland's Stores, Inc. v. Cleveland Gastonia, LLC, 223 N.C. App. 119, 733 S.E.2d 885 (2012); Thorpe v. TJM Ocean Isle Partners LLC, 223 N.C. App. 201, 733 S.E.2d 185 (2012); State v. Grice, 223 N.C. App. 460, 735 S.E.2d 354 (2012); State v. Reid, 224 N.C. App. 181, 735 S.E.2d 389 (2012); S. Seeding Serv. v. W.C. English, 224 N.C. App. 90, 735 S.E.2d 829 (2012); State v. Claxton, 225 N.C. App. 150, 736 S.E.2d 603 (2013); State v. Wilkins, 225 N.C. App. 492, 737 S.E.2d 791 (2013); State v. Hatfield, 225 N.C. App. 765, 738 S.E.2d 236 (2013); Wind v. City of Gastonia, 226 N.C. App. 180, 738 S.E.2d 780, aff'd, 367 N.C. 184, 751 S.E.2d 611, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 1364 (2013); State v. Hunnicutt, 226 N.C. App. 348, 740 S.E.2d 906 (2013); Reeder v. Carter, 226 N.C. App. 270, 740 S.E.2d 913 (2013); Johnson v. Forsyth County, 227 N.C. App. 276, 743 S.E.2d 227 (2013); State v. Romero, 228 N.C. App. 348, 745 S.E.2d 364 (2013); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Integon Nat'l Ins. Co., 232 N.C. App. 44, 753 S.E.2d 388 (2014).

State v. Jamison, 234 N.C. App. 231, 758 S.E.2d 666 (2014); State v. Borders, 236 N.C. App. 149, 762 S.E.2d 490 (2014); Zurosky v. Shaffer, 236 N.C. App. 219, 763 S.E.2d 755 (2014); Rutherford Elec. Mbrshp. Corp. v. 130 of Chatham, LLC, 236 N.C. App. 87, 763 S.E.2d 296 (2014); Sandhill Amusements, Inc. v. Sheriff of Onslow County, 236 N.C. App. 340, 762 S.E.2d 666 (2014); State v. Harvell, 236 N.C. App. 404, 762 S.E.2d 659 (2014); Creech v. Ormond Oil & Gas Co. (In re Creech), 513 B.R. 482 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2014); State v. Robinson, 236 N.C. App. 446, 763 S.E.2d 178 (2014), modified 777 S.E.2d 755, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1058 (2015); Nanny's Korner Care Ctr. v. N.C. HHS - Div. of Child Dev., 234 N.C. App. 51, 758 S.E.2d 423 (2014); Green v. Kelischek, 234 N.C. App. 1, 759 S.E.2d 106 (2014); Town of Matthews v. Wright, 240 N.C. App. 584, 771 S.E.2d 328 (2015); Hart v. State, 368 N.C. 122, 774 S.E.2d 281 (2015).

Salzer v. King Kong Zoo, 242 N.C. App. 120, 773 S.E.2d 548 (2015); Arnesen v. Rivers Edge Golf Club & Plantation, Inc., 368 N.C. 440, 781 S.E.2d 1 (2015); Alston v. Hueske, 244 N.C. App. 546, 781 S.E.2d 305 (2016); State ex rel. McCrory v. Berger, 368 N.C. 633, 781 S.E.2d 248 (2016); In re Estate of Williams, 246 N.C. App. 76, 783 S.E.2d 253 (2016); State v. Johnson, 246 N.C. App. 132, 782 S.E.2d 549 (2016); Tanner v. Tanner, 248 N.C. App. 828, 789 S.E.2d 888 (2016); Seraj v. Duberman, 248 N.C. App. 589, 789 S.E.2d 551 (2016); Piazza v. Kirkbride, 246 N.C. App. 576, 785 S.E.2d 695 (2016).

Lueallen v. Lueallen, 249 N.C. App. 292, 790 S.E.2d 690 (2016); State v. Robinson, 249 N.C. App. 568, 791 S.E.2d 862 (2016); In re Timberlake, 250 N.C. App. 80, 792 S.E.2d 525 (2016); Flynn v. Schamens, 250 N.C. App. 337, 792 S.E.2d 833 (2016), appeal dismissed, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 72 (N.C. 2018) appeal dismissed, 809 S.E.2d 587, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 72 (2018); In re Estate of Phillips, 251 N.C. App. 99, 795 S.E.2d 273 (2016); Fisher v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 369 N.C. 202, 794 S.E.2d 699 (2016); Town of Boone v. State, 369 N.C. 126, 794 S.E.2d 710 (2016); Williams v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 251 N.C. App. 712, 795 S.E.2d 647 (2017), review denied, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 325 (2017); Tater Patch Estates Home Owner's Ass'n v. Sutton, 251 N.C. App. 686, 796 S.E.2d 84 (2017); Banks v. Hunter, 251 N.C. App. 528, 796 S.E.2d 361 (2017); Rittelmeyer v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 252 N.C. App. 340, 799 S.E.2d 378, review denied, 370 n.c. 67, 803 S.E.2d 385, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 606 (N.C. 2017); State v. Cox, 253 N.C. App. 306, 800 S.E.2d 692 (2017), review denied, 803 S.E.2d 153, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 579 (N.C. 2017); Hanna v. Wright, 253 N.C. App. 413, 800 S.E.2d 475 (2017); Innovative 55, LLC v. Robeson Cty., 253 N.C. App. 714, 801 S.E.2d 671 (2017); Kings Harbor Homeowners Ass'n v. Goldman, 253 N.C. App. 726, 800 S.E.2d 129 (2017); State v. Bass, 253 N.C. App. 754, 802 S.E.2d 477 (2017), rev'd on other grounds, 371 N.C. 535, 819 S.E.2d 322 (2018); State v. Hester, 254 N.C. App. 506, 803 S.E.2d 8 (2017); Friends of Crooked Creek, L.L.C. v. C.C. Partners, Inc., 254 N.C. App. 384, 802 S.E.2d 908 (2017), review denied, 805 S.E.2d 687, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 862 (N.C. 2017); Schwarz v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 254 N.C. App. 747, 802 S.E.2d 783 (2017); State v. Voltz, 255 N.C. App. 149, 804 S.E.2d 760 (2017); Morrell v. Hardin Creek, Inc., 255 N.C. App. 55, 803 S.E.2d 668 (2017), review denied, mot. granted, 805 S.E.2d 488, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 829 (N.C. 2017), aff'd and rev'd, in part, remanded, 821 S.E.2d 360, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 1032 (2018); State v. Yisrael, 255 N.C. App. 184, 804 S.E.2d 742 (2017), aff'd, 371 N.C. 108, 813 S.E.2d 217, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 327 (2018); Christenbury Eye Ctr., P.A. v. Medflow, Inc., 370 N.C. 1, 802 S.E.2d 888 (2017); Fid. Bank v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue, 370 N.C. 10, 803 S.E.2d 142 (2017); Hinson v. Hinson, - N.C. App. - , 836 S.E.2d 309 (2019); State v. Warden, - N.C. App. - , 836 S.E.2d 880 (2019); State v. Doss, - N.C. App. - , 836 S.E.2d 856 (2019); State ex rel. Regan v. WASCO, LLC, - N.C. App. - , 837 S.E.2d 565 (2020).

II. SENTENCE OF DEATH OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT.

Editor's Note. - Some of the notes below were decided under subsection (a) of this section prior to the amendment in 1995, which deleted reference to life imprisonment from the subsection.

The term "imprisonment for life" as it is used in this section means only a determinate life sentence and does not include an indeterminate sentence merely because the stated maximum is a life term. State v. Ferrell, 300 N.C. 157, 265 S.E.2d 210 (1980).

Death Sentence Affirmed. - Defendant's murder conviction and death sentence were affirmed as (1) there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to deny defendant's ex parte motion that a doctor be appointed as an expert on substance induced mood disorder; (2) the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion in limine seeking to exclude his prior conviction for malicious wounding; (3) there was no error in the trial court's refusal to peremptorily instruct the jury on the defendant's requested mitigating circumstances; (4) the evidence fully supported the aggravating circumstances found by the jury; (5) there was no indication the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and (6) the sentence of death was neither disproportionate nor excessive. Therefore, the defendant received a fair trial and capital sentencing proceeding, free from prejudicial error. State v. Brown, 357 N.C. 382, 584 S.E.2d 278 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1194, 124 S. Ct. 1447, 158 L. Ed. 2d 106 (2004).

Evidence supported the jury's findings that defendant acted with cruelty when he killed his wife with a shotgun while his stepson was sitting next to her, and then shot his stepson with the same shotgun shortly thereafter, and the state supreme court affirmed the trial court's judgments finding defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and imposing the death penalty for each conviction. State v. Jones, 358 N.C. 330, 595 S.E.2d 124 (2004).

In an appeal as of right with regard to the imposition of a sentence of death against a defendant following a jury trial, which resulted in his conviction for the first-degree murder of a police officer while in the performance of his duties, the defendant's conviction and sentence was upheld as the defendant failed to show any trial error with regard to the jury selection challenges he raised on appeal; the trial court did not commit prejudicial error when it denied a jury request to review certain exhibits as they were admitted solely for the purpose of illustrating an expert's testimony and the jury already had seen the exhibits in their entirety and there was some inadmissible material in the exhibits; the trial court did not err by denying his motion for a mistrial, made when law enforcement officers approached the jury box to purportedly block the victim's mother from seeing autopsy photographs, as the trial court acted promptly and effectively to regain control of the courtroom and the reviewing court would not second-guess the trial court to presume that the incident was fatally prejudicial; the evidence presented was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendant's use of the victim's gun was inseparable from the taking of it and the defendant's efforts to flee, thus, the trial court did not err by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon; and, the sentence of death was not disproportionate, excessive or influenced by passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor since the evidence showed that despite the kneeling victim's pleas for mercy, the defendant fatally shot him multiple times. State v. Maness, 363 N.C. 261, 677 S.E.2d 796 (2009).

Petitions to Review Judgments in Habeas Corpus Proceedings. - By analogy, subsection (a) of this section, G.S. 15-180.2 (now repealed) and N.C.R.A.P., Rule 21(b) are logically applicable to petitions for certiorari to review judgments in habeas corpus proceedings involving the restraint of prisoners under sentences of death or life imprisonment. State v. Niccum, 293 N.C. 276, 238 S.E.2d 141 (1977).

Appeal to Supreme Court Under G.S. 15A-979 When Charge Is Death or Life Imprisonment. - G.S. 15A-979 does not specify whether an appeal lies to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court. Subsection (a) of this section, however, stipulates that there is an appeal of right to the Supreme Court from a superior court judgment imposing a sentence of death or life imprisonment. When these two statutes are considered together, it is proper to appeal directly to the Supreme Court if the punishment for the charge(s) is either death or life imprisonment. State v. Silhan, 295 N.C. 636, 247 S.E.2d 902 (1978).

III. FINAL JUDGMENTS.

.

"Final Judgment" Defined. - A final judgment is one which disposes of the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be judicially determined between them in the trial court. Atkins v. Beasley, 53 N.C. App. 33, 279 S.E.2d 866 (1981).

A party may properly appeal only from a final order, which disposes of all the issues as to all parties, or an interlocutory order affecting a substantial right of the appellant. Buffington v. Buffington, 69 N.C. App. 483, 317 S.E.2d 97 (1984).

Order Authorizing Foreclosure is Final Judgment. - Trial court's order authorizing a foreclosure to proceed under G.S. 45-21.16(d) was a final judgment of the superior court, and, therefore, the court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear the mortgagor's appeal pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(b). In re Foreclosure by David A. Simpson, P.C., 211 N.C. App. 483, 711 S.E.2d 165 (2011).

Denial of Application for Certiorari Is Not Final Judgment. - A "judgment" of the superior court denying defendant's application to that court for a writ of certiorari to review the proceedings of the district court in a criminal case was not a final judgment within the meaning of subsection (b) of this section, and defendant was not authorized to appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right; defendant's only remedy was by petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals. State v. Flynt, 8 N.C. App. 323, 174 S.E.2d 120 (1970).

Appeal from Final Judgment. - As a trial court's memorandum of decision and judgment was a final judgment of the superior court, an appellate court exercised jurisdiction over plaintiff's appeal pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(b). Phelps Staffing, LLC v. S.C. Phelps, Inc., 217 N.C. App. 403, 720 S.E.2d 785 (2011).

When defendant's defective notice of appeal required dismissal of defendant's appeal of a criminal conviction, defendant was allowed to pursue a writ of certiorari because (1) defendant had a right to appeal the judgment, under G.S. 7A-27, and (2) the appellate court had the discretion to grant such a petition. State v. Rowe, 231 N.C. App. 462, 752 S.E.2d 223 (2013).

Appeal from Order of Superior Court Affirming Annexation Ordinance. - By this section initial appellate jurisdiction of an appeal from an order of the superior court affirming an annexation ordinance is given to the Court of Appeals, subject, however, to the provisions of G.S. 7A-31. Adams-Millis Corp. v. Town of Kernersville, 281 N.C. 147, 187 S.E.2d 704 (1972).

Appeal from Order Affirming Zoning Board's Decision. - Superior court fully resolved the merits of the parties' zoning dispute and remanded the matter only for the zoning board to schedule petitioner's compliance with her permit. Because the superior court's order affirming the board's stop work order left nothing more to be resolved in the superior court, the order was a final order for purposes of appeal. Thompson v. Town of White Lake, 252 N.C. App. 237, 797 S.E.2d 346 (2017).

Appeal from Decision of Board of Medical Examiners. - Court of Appeals is proper court to determine appeals taken from decisions of superior court in proceedings for judicial review of decisions of the Board of Medical Examiners under G.S. 7A-27(b); Court of Appeals erred in dismissing appeal under G.S. 90-14.11, since generally accepted rule is that where there is irreconcilable conflict between two statutes, later statute controls as the last expression of legislative intent, and therefore, later enacted statute, G.S. 7A-27(b), controlled in case. In re Guess, 324 N.C. 105, 376 S.E.2d 8 (1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1047, 111 S. Ct. 754, 112 L. Ed. 2d 774 (1991).

Appeal Where Question of Attorney's Fees is Reserved. - Once a trial court entered judgment awarding alimony to a wife, but reserving the question of attorney's fees, the judgment was final and appealable; the husband was not required to obtain certification for review pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 54. Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 742 S.E.2d 799 (2013).

The fact that plaintiff waived her right to appeal order granting summary judgment to one of three defendants in no way affected her statutory right to appeal from the final judgment, since although she could have appealed the entry of summary judgment as to that defendant, she was not required to do so. Ingle v. Allen, 71 N.C. App. 20, 321 S.E.2d 588 (1984), cert. denied, 313 N.C. 508, 329 S.E.2d 391 (1985).

Order Was Final Judgment Despite Reserving Issue for Jury. - Where the trial court in its "order and partial summary judgment" reserved for the jury the "issue as to whether defendant has waived any objection to, or is estopped to deny, the tenant's renewal of the lease," the order left no further action for the trial court to dispose of the case. Although the order reserved an issue for the jury, the trial court determined that it was irrelevant whether notice was received; therefore, there was no requirement for a trial on the issues of waiver or estoppel, and the order was effectively a final judgment and affected a substantial right. Janus Theatres of Burlington, Inc. v. Aragon, 104 N.C. App. 534, 410 S.E.2d 218 (1991).

Judgment Was Final Where Plaintiff Voluntarily Dismissed Remaining Claims. - Case was not dismissed because the employee's appeal was from a final judgment and was not interlocutory; the employee voluntarily dismissed the remaining claims as part of a settlement agreement. Tarrant v. Freeway Foods of Greensboro, Inc., 163 N.C. App. 504, 593 S.E.2d 808 (2004), cert. denied, 358 N.C. 739, 603 S.E.2d 126 (2004).

Summary Judgment Was Final Order Where Remaining Counterclaims Voluntarily Dismissed. - Trial court had jurisdiction over a contractor's appeal of a summary judgment for a subcontractor on a third party claim since the appeal was filed within 30 days of the owner's voluntary dismissal of the remaining counterclaims against the contractor, which made the previously interlocutory summary judgment a final order. Bost Constr. Co. v. Blondy, 229 N.C. App. 491, 750 S.E.2d 917 (2013), review denied 367 N.C. 292, 753 S.E.2d 780, 2014 N.C. LEXIS 45 (2014), review denied 755 S.E.2d 612, 2014 N.C. LEXIS 195 (N.C. 2014).

Appeal of Contempt Order Was Permissible. - Husband had a right to appeal those aspects of the contempt order that the husband alleged impermissibly modified child custody or exceeded the trial court's authority. Jackson v. Jackson, 192 N.C. App. 455, 665 S.E.2d 545 (2008).

The Court of Appeals of North Carolina had jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a satellite-based monitoring determination under G.S. 14-208.40B pursuant to G.S. 7A-27 because the order left nothing further to be judicially determined. State v. Singleton, 201 N.C. App. 620, 689 S.E.2d 562 (2010).

Postconviction DNA Testing. - When defendant's motion for postconviction DNA testing was denied, appeal was the proper avenue for seeking reversal because (1) defendant had a statutory right to appeal such an order, and (2) defendant preserved the issue for appellate review by appealing the denial of the motion. State v. Byers, 263 N.C. App. 231, 822 S.E.2d 746 (2018).

IV. INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS.

.

A. GENERALLY.

.

"Interlocutory Order" Defined. - An order is interlocutory if it does not determine the issues but directs some further proceeding preliminary to final decree. Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E.2d 338 (1978); Blackwelder v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 299 S.E.2d 777 (1983); Heavner v. Heavner, 73 N.C. App. 331, 326 S.E.2d 78, cert. denied, 313 N.C. 601, 330 S.E.2d 610 (1985).

Burden of Proof. - Because no order was certified as appropriate for immediate appeal, to establish appellate jurisdiction, the insured and insurer bore the burden of demonstrating how each order affected a substantial right and would work injury if not corrected before final judgment. Radiator Specialty Co. v. Arrowood Indem. Co., 253 N.C. App. 508, 800 S.E.2d 452 (2017).

Appeals of Right from Interlocutory Orders - G.S. 62-90(a) and (d) provide for appeals of final orders of the North Carolina Utilities Commission, G.S. 7A-29(a) and (b) provide for appeals of right from certain administrative agencies, and subsection (d) of this section provides for appeals of right from certain interlocutory orders of the superior or district courts. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Buck Island, Inc., 158 N.C. App. 536, 581 S.E.2d 122 (2003).

Where only the issue of damages remained, no final judgment had been made and no substantial right had been affected, the appellate court found the trial court's certification ineffective and saw no impediment to the trial court's sorting out the various claims and affirmative defenses intertwined with the damages issue. CBP Resources, Inc. v. Mountaire Farms of N.C. Inc., 134 N.C. App. 169, 517 S.E.2d 151 (1999).

Substantial Right Held Affected. - Trial court's order did not contain a certification under the rule, but the appeal was proper because plaintiff demonstrated a substantial right that would be lost absent an immediate appeal; a sufficient overlap existed between plaintiff's surviving claim for wrongful discharge and her First Amendment claim that was dismissed, such that there existed a possibility of inconsistent verdicts absent immediate appeal. Holland v. Harrison, 254 N.C. App. 636, 804 S.E.2d 205 (2017).

Appellate court had jurisdiction of an insurer's interlocutory appeal of an order finding the insurer provided primary liability coverage to an estate because this implicated a substantial right of the insurer that would be lost absent an immediate appeal, as the estate's decedent was not a named insured under the insurer's policy. Smith v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 261 N.C. App. 40, 819 S.E.2d 610 (2018).

Family asserted a substantial right to have the liability of all defendants be determined in one proceeding because the same factual issues applied to all claims against the property owner and the tenants, and two trials could bring about inconsistent verdicts relating to the family's damages. Curlee v. Johnson, - N.C. App. - , 842 S.E.2d 604 (2020).

Order requiring the North Carolina Department of Insurance to disclose subpoenaed documents affected a substantial right because if the Department was required to disclose the very documents that it alleged were protected from disclosure by statutory confidentiality provisions, then a substantial right was affected; the substantial right asserted by the Department would be lost if the trial court's order was not reviewed before entry of a final judgment. Powell v. Cartret, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (July 20, 2021).

When Interlocutory Order Is Appealable Generally. - Ordinarily, an appeal lies only from a final judgment, but an interlocutory order which will work injury if not corrected before final judgment is appealable. Wachovia Realty Invs. v. Housing, Inc., 292 N.C. 93, 232 S.E.2d 667 (1977); Atkins v. Beasley, 53 N.C. App. 33, 279 S.E.2d 866 (1981); Perry v. Aycock, 68 N.C. App. 705, 315 S.E.2d 791 (1984); Jenkins v. Wheeler, 69 N.C. App. 140, 316 S.E.2d 354, cert. denied, 311 N.C. 758, 321 S.E.2d 136 (1984); Stafford v. Stafford, 133 N.C. App. 163, 515 S.E.2d 43 (1999), aff'd, 351 N.C. 94, 520 S.E.2d 785 (1999).

Ordinarily, an appeal from an interlocutory order will be dismissed as fragmentary and premature unless the order affects some substantial right and will work injury to appellant if not corrected before appeal from final judgment. Wachovia Realty Invs. v. Housing, Inc., 292 N.C. 93, 232 S.E.2d 667 (1977); Godley Auction Co. v. Myers, 40 N.C. App. 570, 253 S.E.2d 362 (1979); Sims v. Ritter Constr., Inc., 62 N.C. App. 52, 302 S.E.2d 293 (1983); Adair v. Adair, 62 N.C. App. 493, 303 S.E.2d 190, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 319, 307 S.E.2d 162 (1983).

This section in effect provides that no appeal lies to an appellate court from an interlocutory order or ruling of the trial judge unless such ruling or order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he would lose if the ruling or order is not reviewed before final judgment. Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E.2d 338 (1978); Citicorp Person-to-Person Fin. Center, Inc. v. Stallings, 49 N.C. App. 187, 270 S.E.2d 567 (1980); A.E.P. Indus., Inc. v. McClure, 308 N.C. 393, 302 S.E.2d 754 (1983); Heavner v. Heavner, 73 N.C. App. 331, 326 S.E.2d 78, cert. denied, 313 N.C. 601, 330 S.E.2d 610 (1985); Thompson v. Newman, 74 N.C. App. 597, 328 S.E.2d 597 (1985).

An appeal does not lie from an interlocutory order unless such order affects some substantial right claimed by the appellant and will work an injury to him if not corrected before an appeal from the final judgment. Godley Auction Co. v. Myers, 40 N.C. App. 570, 253 S.E.2d 362 (1979); Ball v. Ball, 55 N.C. App. 98, 284 S.E.2d 555 (1981); Fraser v. Di Santi, 75 N.C. App. 654, 331 S.E.2d 217, cert. denied, 315 N.C. 183, 337 S.E.2d 856 (1985); Jenkins v. Maintenance, Inc., 76 N.C. App. 110, 332 S.E.2d 90 (1985); Brown v. Brown, 77 N.C. App. 206, 334 S.E.2d 506, cert. denied, 315 N.C. 389, 338 S.E.2d 878 (1985).

For a defendant to have a right of appeal from a mandatory preliminary injunction, substantial rights of the appellant must be adversely affected. Otherwise, an appeal from such an interlocutory order is subject to being dismissed. Dixon v. Dixon, 62 N.C. App. 744, 303 S.E.2d 606 (1983).

No appeal lies to an appellate court from an interlocutory order unless the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he would lose absent a review prior to final determination. Thus, the threshold question presented by a purported appeal from an order granting a preliminary injunction is whether the appellant has been deprived of any substantial right which might be lost should the order escape appellate review before final judgment. Robins & Weill, Inc. v. Mason, 70 N.C. App. 537, 320 S.E.2d 693, cert. denied, 312 N.C. 495, 322 S.E.2d 559 (1984).

For an interlocutory order to be immediately appealable under North Carolina law, it must: (1) affect a substantial right, and (2) work injury if not corrected before final judgment. Goldston v. AMC, 326 N.C. 723, 392 S.E.2d 735 (1990).

Trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims against aircraft manufacturer affected a substantial right to have determined in a single proceeding, i.e., whether plaintiffs were damaged by the actions of one, some or all defendants where their claims arise upon the same series of transactions, and the appeal from an interlocutory order was considered. Driver v. Burlington Aviation, Inc., 110 N.C. App. 519, 430 S.E.2d 476 (1993).

An interlocutory order not appealable under Rule 54(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure may nevertheless be appealed pursuant to G.S. 1-277 and subsection (d) of this section which permit an appeal of an interlocutory order which (1) affects a substantial right, or (2) in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which appeal might be taken, or (3) discontinues the action, or (4) grants or refuses a new trial. Dalton Moran Shook, Inc. v. Pitt Dev. Co., 113 N.C. App. 707, 440 S.E.2d 585 (1994).

An appeal of an interlocutory order or judgment is permitted if the trial court's decision deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review. North Carolina DOT v. Page, 119 N.C. App. 730, 460 S.E.2d 332 (1995).

There are two avenues by which an interlocutory judgment or order can be immediately appealed. First, if the order is final as to some but not all of the claims or parties and the trial court certifies there is no just reason to delay the appeal, and second, an interlocutory order can be immediately appealed under G.S. 1-277(a) and subdivision (d)(1) of this section if the trial court's decision deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review. Bartlett v. Jacobs, 124 N.C. App. 521, 477 S.E.2d 693 (1996).

There are two avenues by which a party may immediately appeal an interlocutory order of judgment. First, if the order or judgment is final as to some but not all of the claims or parties, and the trial court certifies the case for appeal pursuant to G.S. 1A-1-54(b) an immediate appeal may lie. Second, an appeal is permitted under subdivision (d)(1) of this section and G.S. 1-277 (a) if the trial court's decision deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review. Tinch v. Video Indus. Servs., Inc., 124 N.C. App. 391, 477 S.E.2d 193 (1996), rev'd on other grounds, 347 N.C. 380, 493 S.E.2d 426 (1997).

An interlocutory order can be immediately appealed under G.S. 1A-1-54(b) if the order is final as to some but not all of the claims, or an interlocutory order can be appealed under G.S. 1-277(a) and this subsection if the trial court's decision deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review. First Atl. Mgt. Corp. v. Dunlea Realty Co., 131 N.C. App. 242, 507 S.E.2d 56 (1998).

Trial court's order granting a partial new trial and its judgment fixing the issue of liability were interlocutory and they were not appealable under the exceptions allowed by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b), G.S. 1-277(a), or G.S. 7A-27(d), where the trial court did not certify either the order granting a partial new trial or the underlying judgment for immediate review, and where defendant failed to argue why the order and judgment appealed affected a substantial right. Loy v. Martin, 144 N.C. App. 414, 547 S.E.2d 843 (2001).

Where an interlocutory appeal affected a substantial right of one of the parties, such an appeal could be brought pursuant to G.S. 1-277 and 7A-27(d), and whether or not an appeal affected a substantial right had to be decided on a case by case basis. Ussery v. Taylor, 156 N.C. App. 684, 577 S.E.2d 159 (2003).

Arbitration Order in Particular. - An order denying arbitration, although interlocutory, is immediately appealable because it involves a substantial right which might be lost if appeal is delayed. Miller v. Two State Constr. Co., 118 N.C. App. 412, 455 S.E.2d 678 (1995).

Order denying a nursing facility's motion to compel arbitration in a negligence action by the executor of a deceased patient's estate affected a substantial right and was immediately appealable pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(d)(1). Westmoreland v. High Point Healthcare Inc., 218 N.C. App. 76, 721 S.E.2d 712 (2012).

Particular Facts and Procedural History Must Be Considered. - In determining which interlocutory orders are appealable and which are not, the Supreme Court must consider the particular facts of each case and the procedural history of the order from which an appeal is sought. Travco Hotels, Inc. v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 332 N.C. 288, 420 S.E.2d 426 (1992).

Under this section, whether a substantial right will be prejudiced by delaying an appeal must be determined on a case by case basis. Stafford v. Stafford, 133 N.C. App. 163, 515 S.E.2d 43 (1999), aff'd, 351 N.C. 94, 520 S.E.2d 785 (1999).

In deciding whether an appeal is interlocutory, G.S. 1-277 and this section require a two-part test: (1) does the trial court's order affect a substantial right; and (2) if so, will the loss of that right injure the party appealing if it is not corrected prior to final judgment. Travco Hotels, Inc. v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 102 N.C. App. 659, 403 S.E.2d 593, aff'd, 332 N.C. 288, 420 S.E.2d 426 (1992).

Separation of Property in Divorce Cases. - Because a partial summary judgment giving a wife two parcels of land, before the divorcing parties' property was equitably divided, was an interlocutory order, a husband was not required to file an appeal from the interlocutory order; no substantial right of either party was involved, and the partial summary judgment was appealable when the husband filed his appeal from the equitable distribution judgment. Davis v. Davis, 360 N.C. 518, 631 S.E.2d 114 (2006).

The Appellate Division Rules on Interlocutory Nature of Appeals. - The trial court's determination that there is no just reason to delay an appeal, while accorded great deference, cannot bind the appellate courts because ruling on the interlocutory nature of appeals is properly a matter for the appellate division, not the trial court. First Atl. Mgt. Corp. v. Dunlea Realty Co., 131 N.C. App. 242, 507 S.E.2d 56 (1998).

No Appeal from Interlocutory Order in Criminal Proceeding Absent Statutory Provision. - In light of the legislature's enactment of G.S. 15A-1444(d) and the decision in State v. Henry, 318 N.C. 408, 348 S.E.2d 593 (1986), G.S. 1-277, the statutory basis for the holding in State v. Childs, 265 N.C. 575, 144 S.E.2d 653 (1965) (per curiam) and dictum in State v. Bryant, 280 N.C. 407, 185 S.E.2d 854 (1972) is no longer relevant to the appeal of interlocutory orders in criminal proceedings; accordingly, the court of appeals declines to follow State v. Jones, 67 N.C. App. 413, 313 S.E.2d 264 (1984); State v. Montalbano, 73 N.C. App. 259, 326 S.E.2d 634, disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 608, 332 S.E.2d 182 (1985); and State v. Major, 84 N.C. App. 421, 352 S.E.2d 862 (1987) insofar as they might allow interlocutory appeals in criminal proceedings based on Childs, Bryant, or G.S. 1-277. State v. Joseph, 92 N.C. App. 303, 374 S.E.2d 132 (1988), cert. denied, 324 N.C. 115, 377 S.E.2d 241 (1989).

For discussion of apparent doctrinal inconsistency concerning the requirements for appealing interlocutory orders, which may produce irreconcilable results in cases which include counterclaims, see J & B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 1, 362 S.E.2d 812 (1987).

Fragmentary Appeals from Interlocutory Orders Not Permitted. - The appeal from a preliminary injunction restraining defendant bank from disposing of shares of corporate stock it held as executor under the will of a stockholder who died owning 88% of the capital stock of a North Carolina corporation was unauthorized and was dismissed since it was fragmentary; piecemeal appeals from interlocutory orders are not usually permitted in this State and the preliminary injunction appealed from in this case was such an order, as its effect was temporary rather than permanent. Shuping v. NCNB Nat'l Bank, 93 N.C. App. 338, 377 S.E.2d 802 (1989).

Standing to Appeal. - In an action brought by payee against makers to enforce acceleration clause in note, where third-party defendant bank not only had an opportunity to participate, but in fact did fully participate in the determination of third-party plaintiff's liability and was bound by the judgment in favor of plaintiff entered against defendants as third-party plaintiffs, bank qualified as an aggrieved party within the meaning of G.S. 1-271 and the bank had standing to appeal entry of summary judgment in favor of payee. Barker v. Agee, 326 N.C. 470, 389 S.E.2d 803 (1990).

The General Assembly did not restrict the right of appeal provided by G.S. 1-277 and subsection (d) of this section by engrafting G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b) requirements upon them. Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976).

G.S. 1-277 and this section prevent fragmentary, premature and unnecessary appeals by permitting the trial divisions to be done with a case fully and finally before it is presented to the appellate division. Blackwelder v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 299 S.E.2d 777 (1983).

The reason for the rules embodied in G.S. 1-277(a) and subdivision (d)(1) of this section is to prevent fragmentary, premature and unnecessary appeals by permitting the trial divisions to have done with a case fully and finally before it is presented to the appellate division. Appellate procedure is designed to eliminate the unnecessary delay and expense of repeated fragmentary appeals, and to present the whole case for determination in a single appeal from the final judgment. McKinney v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 64 N.C. App. 370, 307 S.E.2d 390 (1983).

Appellate court refused to review the neighbors' interlocutory appeal of the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment, where the neighbors failed to comply with N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(4) by failing to state in their brief the substantial right that would have been lost if the appeal was not heard, as was required under G.S. 1-277(a), 7A-27(d)(1). Munden v. Courser, 155 N.C. App. 217, 574 S.E.2d 110 (2002).

If appellant's rights would be fully and adequately protected by an exception to an interlocutory order that could then be assigned as error on appeal after final judgment, there is no right to an immediate appeal. Horne v. Nobility Homes, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 476, 363 S.E.2d 642 (1988); Howell v. Howell, 89 N.C. App. 115, 365 S.E.2d 181 (1988).

No Appeal from Interlocutory Order Where Substantial Right Not Affected. - An interlocutory order which does not affect a "substantial right" of one of the parties under G.S. 1-277 and subsection (d) of this section is not appealable, and the avoidance of a rehearing or trial is not considered to be such a "substantial right." Davis v. Mitchell, 46 N.C. App. 272, 265 S.E.2d 248 (1980).

No appeal lies from an interlocutory order unless it affects a substantial right and will result in injury if not reviewed before final judgment. Horne v. Nobility Homes, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 476, 363 S.E.2d 642 (1988); Howell v. Howell, 89 N.C. App. 115, 365 S.E.2d 181 (1988). But see, State v. Joseph, 92 N.C. App. 203, 374 S.E.2d 132 (1988), cert. denied, 324 N.C. 115, 377 S.E.2d 241 (1989), annotated above.

Court of appeals held that where a trial court dismissed a company's contract claims, but stayed the tort claims: (1) this was an interlocutory order; (2) there was no certification; and (3) the company failed to show a substantial right at stake on appeal. Mitsubishi Elec. & Elecs. USA, Inc. v. Duke Power Co., 155 N.C. App. 555, 573 S.E.2d 742 (2002).

Although defendant former employee argued that a preliminary injunction affected his substantial right and was immediately appealable under G.S. 7A-27(b)(3)(a), the preliminary injunction did not prevent defendant from working in plaintiff's industry, but merely limited defendant's activities by not allowing defendant to call on or service a narrowly defined group of customers; therefore, defendant's statement - that the preliminary injunction affected his ability to earn a living - failed to articulate a basis for appellate review. A&D Envtl. Servs. v. Miller, 243 N.C. App. 1, 776 S.E.2d 733 (2015).

Appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal by an underinsured motorist insurer because the trial court's order on cross-motions for summary judgment was an interlocutory order, as pending issues remained in the case, and the order did not contain a certification for appeal. Moreover, although the insurer was permitted, but was not required, to participate in the proceedings as an unnamed underinsured motorist carrier, the insurer failed to show a substantial right, which would have been lost absent immediate appellate review. Peterson v. Dillman, 245 N.C. App. 239, 782 S.E.2d 362 (2016).

Court of appeals did not review a father's appeal from an order denying his motions seeking post-award discovery because the father failed to demonstrate that he would be deprived of a substantial right without appellate review of the order before a final judgment had been entered. Stokes v. Crumpton, 246 N.C. App. 757, 784 S.E.2d 537 (2016).

Former employee was not entitled to appeal the Business Court's interlocutory order because she did not explain how she would be prejudiced and failed to show that the order affected a substantial right where she did not identify a specific "material right" that she would lose if the order were not reviewed before final judgment or explain how the order in question would "work injury" to her if not immediately reviewed, and merely asserting a preference for a forum other than the Business Court absent a specific, legal entitlement to an exclusion from designation was insufficient to support the former employee's contention that this matter was analogous to a venue change and was therefore immediately appealable. Hanesbrands Inc. v. Fowler, 369 N.C. 216, 794 S.E.2d 497 (2016).

Trial court's order setting aside a consent judgment was not immediately appealable because the order was interlocutory since it contemplated further proceedings at the trial level on the issue of just compensation, and the order did not affect a substantial right; the trial court did not certify the order setting aside the consent judgment for immediate appellate review. N.C. DOT v. Laxmi Hotels of Spring Lake, Inc., 259 N.C. App. 610, 817 S.E.2d 62 (2018).

Trial court's denial of employees' estoppel motion was interlocutory and not appealable, and the employees' appeal thereof was accordingly dismissed, because the employees failed to make the colorable assertion necessary to claim that the denial of their estoppel motion affected a substantial right; the employees nowhere asserted that the prior action upon which they based their estoppel motion reached final judgment on the merits. McCullers v. Lewis, 265 N.C. App. 216, 828 S.E.2d 524 (2019).

But Interlocutory Order May Be Appealed If It Affects a Substantial Right. - Orders which are technically interlocutory may properly be appealed, regardless of lack of certification under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b) if they affect a substantial right. Estrada v. Jaques, 70 N.C. App. 627, 321 S.E.2d 240 (1984).

Although it is the general rule that no appeal lies from an interlocutory order, G.S. 1-277 and subsection (d) of this section permit an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order which affects a substantial right. Fox v. Wilson, 85 N.C. App. 292, 354 S.E.2d 737 (1987).

Interlocutory order affects a substantial right so that it is appealable under G.S. 1-277(a) and subdivision (d)(1) of this section if the right affected is substantial and the right will be lost, prejudiced, or less than adequately protected if order is not reviewed before final judgment. T'ai Co. v. Market Square Ltd. Partnership, 92 N.C. App. 234, 373 S.E.2d 885 (1988).

Because university defendants' underlying interest in asserting sovereign immunity was substantial, the appellate court accepted jurisdiction of their interlocutory appeal pursuant to the authority conferred by G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d), although it disagreed with their comity argument. Atl. Coast Conf. v. Univ. of Md., 230 N.C. App. 429, 751 S.E.2d 612 (2013).

Appeal Is Permitted Where a Substantial Right Would Be Affected. - Where a trial court granted plaintiff summary judgment as to liability on a criminal conversation claim, and granted defendant summary judgment as to an alienation of affections claim, though no final judgment was entered as to the issue of damages for the criminal conversation claim, nor was certification granted under G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b) as to the alienation of affections claim, the appeal affected a substantial right that would be lost absent immediate review, because the elements of damages were so closely related that they did not support separate awards for each tort. McCutchen v. McCutchen, 170 N.C. App. 1, 612 S.E.2d 162 (2005).

Because a physician's assertions of statutory privilege related directly to the matters to be disclosed under a trial court's interlocutory discovery order, the challenged discovery order affected a substantial right and the physician's interlocutory appeal was properly before the appellate court under G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1). Armstrong v. Barnes, 171 N.C. App. 287, 614 S.E.2d 371 (2005), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 60, 621 S.E.2d 173 (2005).

North Carolina Court of Appeals accepted the appeal brought by third-party defendants, the North Carolina Division of Forest Resources and North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources (now a division of the North Carolina Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services), in a wrongful death suit, asserting negligence on the third-party defendants with regard to a forest fire obscuring the vision of travelers on a highway, which led to a multiple vehicle accident, killing a passenger, because the trial court's denial of the third-party defendants' motions to dismiss raised the issues of sovereign immunity and the public duty doctrine, which affected a substantial right sufficient to warrant immediate appellate review. Myers v. McGrady, 170 N.C. App. 501, 613 S.E.2d 334 (2005), rev'd and remanded, review improvidently allowed, 350 N.C. 460, 628 S.E.2d 761 (2006).

A substantial right is one which will clearly be lost or irremediably adversely affected if the order is not reviewable before final judgment. In other words, the right to immediate appeal is reserved for those cases in which the normal course of procedure is inadequate to protect the substantial right affected by the order sought to be appealed. Blackwelder v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 299 S.E.2d 777 (1983).

The "substantial right" test for appealability of interlocutory orders is more easily stated than applied. It is usually necessary to resolve the question in each case by considering the particular facts of that case and the procedural context in which the order from which appeal is sought was entered. Blackwelder v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 299 S.E.2d 777 (1983).

No hard and fast rules exist for determining which appeals affect a substantial right. Rather, such decisions usually require consideration of the facts of the particular case. Estrada v. Jaques, 70 N.C. App. 627, 321 S.E.2d 240 (1984).

Whether a substantial right is affected usually depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the procedural context of the orders appealed from. Estrada v. Jaques, 70 N.C. App. 627, 321 S.E.2d 240 (1984).

There has evolved a two-part test of the appealability of interlocutory orders under the "substantial right" exception provided in G.S. 1-277(a) and subdivision (d)(1) of this section. First, the right itself must be "substantial," and second, the enforcement of the substantial right must be lost, prejudiced or less than adequately protected by exception to entry of the interlocutory order. J & B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 1, 362 S.E.2d 812 (1987).

The appealability of interlocutory orders pursuant to the "substantial right" exception is determined by a two-step test. The right itself must be substantial and the deprivation of that substantial right must potentially work injury to plaintiff if not corrected before appeal from final judgment. Miller v. Swann Plantation Dev. Co., 101 N.C. App. 394, 399 S.E.2d 137 (1991).

Awards Pendente Lite. - Awards pendente lite are interlocutory decrees which necessarily do not affect a substantial right from which lies an immediate appeal pursuant to this section. Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991).

Facts and circumstances of each case and the procedural context of the orders appealed from are the determinative factors in deciding whether a "substantial right" is affected. Schneider v. Brunk, 72 N.C. App. 560, 324 S.E.2d 922 (1985).

Avoidance of a rehearing or trial is not a "substantial right" entitling a party to an immediate appeal. Blackwelder v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 299 S.E.2d 777 (1983).

Denial of a motion to dismiss is interlocutory because it simply allows an action to proceed and will not seriously impair any right of defendants that cannot be corrected upon appeal from final judgment, and the avoidance of a trial is not a "substantial right" that would make such an interlocutory order appealable under G.S. 1-277 or subsection (d) of this section. Howard v. Ocean Trail Convalescent Ctr., 68 N.C. App. 494, 315 S.E.2d 97 (1984).

Avoidance of a trial is not a substantial right entitling plaintiff to an immediate appeal. Horne v. Nobility Homes, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 476, 363 S.E.2d 642 (1988).

Court found that the only possible "injury" defendant would suffer if not permitted immediate appellate review was the necessity of proceeding to trial before the matter was reviewed by the appellate court, not the deprivation of a substantial right under this section. Anderson v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 134 N.C. App. 724, 518 S.E.2d 786 (1999).

The necessity of a second trial, standing alone, does not affect a substantial right. However, in certain cases the appellate courts have held that a plaintiff's right to have all his claims heard before the same jury affects a substantial right. Estrada v. Jaques, 70 N.C. App. 627, 321 S.E.2d 240 (1984).

A party has a "substantial right" to avoid separate trials of the same legal issues. Whitehurst v. Corey, 88 N.C. App. 746, 364 S.E.2d 728 (1988).

Right to avoid possibility of two trials on same issues can be a substantial right. Davidson v. Knauff Ins. Agency, Inc., 93 N.C. App. 20, 376 S.E.2d 488, cert. denied, 324 N.C. 577, 381 S.E.2d 772 (1989).

In a suit for malicious prosecution, in which defendant counterclaimed requesting a constructive trust, a factual issue of whether plaintiff forged defendant's name on a check was central to both actions; denial of appeal from summary judgment against defendant could have resulted in two juries in separate trials reaching different resolutions of this same issue if subsequent trial on the merits and appeal were successful. Consequently, the order dismissing defendant's counterclaim affected a substantial right and appeal was granted. Lamb v. Lamb, 92 N.C. App. 680, 375 S.E.2d 685 (1989).

The right to avoid the possibility of two trials on the same issues can be a substantial right that permits an appeal of an interlocutory order when there are issues of fact common to the claim appealed and remaining claims. Allen v. Sea Gate Ass'n, 119 N.C. App. 761, 460 S.E.2d 197 (1995).

Under circumstances in which a patient's suit alleged multiple, overlapping acts of medical malpractice resulting in harm, it was best that one jury hear the case to avoid inconsistent verdicts; accordingly, a summary judgment in favor of a radiologist affected a substantial right and the appeal from the summary judgment was considered, despite the fact that the summary judgment was granted as to one but not all of the defendants and the trial court did not certify that there was "no just reason for delay." Burgess v. Campbell, 182 N.C. App. 480, 642 S.E.2d 478 (2007).

But Avoiding Separate Trials of Different Issues Is Not a Substantial Right. - Simply having all claims determined in one proceeding is not a substantial right. A party has instead the substantial right to avoid two separate trials of the same "issues," but avoiding separate trials of different issues is not a substantial right. J & B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 1, 362 S.E.2d 812 (1987).

Appellate Court as Dispatcher of Appeals. - To the extent that judgments as to one or more but fewer than all parties are determined by the appellate courts of this State to affect a "substantial right" of one of the litigants under G.S. 1-277 and subsection (d) of this section, the procedure for trial court certification of such judgments as appealable established in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b) is bypassed and the appellate court is substituted as the true dispatcher of appeals. Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Myers, 46 N.C. App. 162, 265 S.E.2d 240 (1980).

Rule Against Allowing Appeal from Interlocutory Orders Strictly Construed. - Strict construction of the rule against allowing appeal from an interlocutory order of the trial court serves the purpose of eliminating the unnecessary delay and expense of fragmented appeals and of presenting the whole case for determination in a single appeal from a final judgment. Funderburk v. Justice, 25 N.C. App. 655, 214 S.E.2d 310 (1975).

Effect of Procedures for Staying Execution of Judgment. - The existence of procedures under G.S. 1-269, 1-289 and 1A-1, Rule 62, for staying execution on judgment does not prevent the entry of the judgment from affecting a substantial right of the judgment debtor. Wachovia Realty Invs. v. Housing, Inc., 292 N.C. 93, 232 S.E.2d 667 (1977).

No Appeal as Matter of Right from Interlocutory Orders in Criminal Cases. - This section makes no provision for an appeal as a matter of right from interlocutory orders in criminal cases. State v. Lance, 1 N.C. App. 620, 162 S.E.2d 154 (1968); State v. Smith, 4 N.C. App. 491, 4 N.C. App. 591, 166 S.E.2d 870 (1969); State v. Bryant, 12 N.C. App. 530, 183 S.E.2d 824 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 280 N.C. 407, 185 S.E.2d 854 (1972).

In a criminal case there is no provision in the statute for an appeal to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right from an interlocutory order entered therein. State v. Black, 7 N.C. App. 324, 172 S.E.2d 217 (1970); State v. Thompson, 56 N.C. App. 439, 289 S.E.2d 132 (1982).

Dismissal of Interlocutory Appeals. - The appellate division possesses sufficient authority to dispose of interlocutory appeals which do not affect a substantial right by dismissal. It has express authority to do so on motion of the parties if the appeal is frivolous or is taken solely for purposes of delay. Or it may exercise its general authority in response to motions filed under the general motions provision. Or the appellate division may dismiss upon its own motion as part of its general duty to apply the laws governing the right to appeal. Estrada v. Jaques, 70 N.C. App. 627, 321 S.E.2d 240 (1984).

In a workers' compensation proceeding, an appeal by an employer and its insurance carrier was dismissed as interlocutory where the North Carolina Industrial Commission specifically reserved the issue of the amount of the compensation award for the employee. Watts v. Hemlock Homes of the Highlands, Inc., 160 N.C. App. 81, 584 S.E.2d 97 (2003).

Because the trial court did not rule on the merits of an employee's claim for unemployment benefits, but found that the Employment Security Commission's order did not address all of the relevant issues raised by the record, and the findings were incomplete and failed to set out the sequence of events regarding the timing and notification of the employee's discharge, the order was clearly interlocutory; hence, without evidence that the employee's substantial rights were affected, or that any criteria for an immediate appeal was required, the employee's appeal was dismissed. Reeves v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 170 N.C. App. 610, 613 S.E.2d 350, review denied, 359 N.C. 853, 619 S.E.2d 511 (2005).

Filing of Motion to Dismiss. - Ruling on the interlocutory nature of appeals is properly a matter for the appellate division, not the trial court. Since this often requires consideration of the merits, motions to dismiss appeals on grounds of being interlocutory should properly be filed after the record on appeal is filed in the appellate court. Estrada v. Jaques, 70 N.C. App. 627, 321 S.E.2d 240 (1984).

Possibility of Two Trials. - The right to avoid the possibility of two trials on the same issues can be a substantial right so as to warrant an immediate appeal under G.S. 1-277 and subsection (d) of this section. Dalton Moran Shook, Inc. v. Pitt Dev. Co., 113 N.C. App. 707, 440 S.E.2d 585 (1994).

Where dismissal of appeal as interlocutory could result in two different trials on the same issues, creating the possibility of inconsistent verdicts, a substantial right was prejudiced; therefore, defendant's motion for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court was immediately appealable by plaintiff. Hartman v. Walkertown Shopping Ctr., Inc., 113 N.C. App. 632, 439 S.E.2d 787, cert. denied, 336 N.C. 780, 447 S.E.2d 422 (1994).

Where denial of Rule 60(b) motion was in the nature of an interlocutory order because plaintiff's voluntary dismissal resulted in there being no action pending, and defendants would not suffer the loss of a substantial right absent an appeal, in the court's discretion pursuant to Rules 2 and 21 the appeal was treated as a writ of certiorari. Troy v. Tucker, 126 N.C. App. 213, 484 S.E.2d 98 (1997).

Collateral Estoppel Did Not Bar Action. - Because no court had yet adjudicated the just compensation issue, the North Carolina Department of Transportation could not rely on collateral estoppel to immediately appeal the trial court's order setting aside a consent judgment; the consent judgment prevented the need for litigation, as it was designed to do. N.C. DOT v. Laxmi Hotels of Spring Lake, Inc., 259 N.C. App. 610, 817 S.E.2d 62 (2018).

B. PARTICULAR ORDERS.

.

Order Impacting Sovereign Immunity. - Denial of a city's summary judgment motion in a wrongful death action, an interlocutory order, was immediately appealable pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(d)(1) because the appeal raised an issue of sovereign immunity. Williams v. Scotland County, 167 N.C. App. 105, 604 S.E.2d 334 (2004), cert. denied, 359 N.C. 327, 611 S.E.2d 168 (2005).

Denial of an officer's and department's motion for summary judgment grounded on the defense of governmental immunity affected a substantial right and was immediately appealable; with respect to the balance of their arguments, however, the officer and the department showed no substantial right that would have been lost or irreparably prejudiced if the order was not reviewed before final judgment and those arguments were premature. Showalter v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 183 N.C. App. 132, 643 S.E.2d 649 (2007).

Although a trial court's denial of a county board of education's summary judgment motion was an interlocutory order that was generally not appealable at that point in the litigation, as the board was claiming sovereign immunity as a complete defense to an action by a student's mother after the student was denied placement at a school, the order was immediately appealable under G.S. 7A-27(d)(1). Craig v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 185 N.C. App. 651, 648 S.E.2d 923 (2007), cert. granted and review denied, 362 N.C. 234, 659 S.E.2d 439 (2008).

Court of appeals reviewed residents' interlocutory appeal of an order dismissing their complaint against a city pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) because the trial court's stated basis for the dismissal was that the doctrine of governmental immunity applied to the residents' allegations against the city, and the city had not waived its governmental immunity; those grounds were sufficient to warrant immediate appellate review. Williams v. Devere Constr. Co., 215 N.C. App. 135, 716 S.E.2d 21 (2011).

Because a sheriff and surety sought to have summary judgment entered in their favor on governmental immunity grounds, their appeal was properly before the court of appeals. White v. Cochran, 229 N.C. App. 183, 748 S.E.2d 334 (2013).

Town's appeal of two orders ruling on motions in a dispute with a county over wastewater disposal was dismissed because the orders were interlocutory, and the town did not show the orders affected substantial rights of governmental immunity, as governmental immunity did not apply to claims arising out of the proprietary operation of the town's sewer system. Union Cty. v. Town of Marshville, 255 N.C. App. 441, 804 S.E.2d 801 (2017).

Interlocutory Appeal of Preliminary Injunction Allowed. - Trial court's grant of a motion for a preliminary injunction, although an interlocutory order, was appealable under G.S. 1-277 and G.S. 7A-27 because the order required a North Carolina nonprofit association to give up the substantial right to do business as the exclusive provider of creditable bail bondsmen training and to receive remuneration for providing such education. Rockford-Cohen Group, LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Ins., 230 N.C. App. 317, 749 S.E.2d 469 (2013).

Preliminary Injunction Against Enforcement of a Statute. - When an agent of the State that is charged with enforcing statutes appeals rulings limiting the enforcement of those statutes, the right to enforce the statute is substantial, and the rulings are immediately appealable. Rockford-Cohen Group, LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Ins., 230 N.C. App. 317, 749 S.E.2d 469 (2013).

Grant of Preliminary Injunction. - Defendants' substantial right to control assets related to the mortgage sale is affected by the preliminary injunction and, thus, the court had jurisdiction to review the defendants' appeal from the preliminary injunction order. SED Holding, LLC v. 3 Star Props., LLC, 246 N.C. App. 632, 784 S.E.2d 627 (2016).

Court of appeals had no jurisdiction to consider an employee's interlocutory appeal of an order issuing a preliminary injunction because the employee failed to establish that the injunction affected a substantial right; the preliminary injunction did not prevent or destroy the employee's ability to earn a living or sustain a livelihood because he continued to have a realistic opportunity to use his skill and talents to generate new client relationships outside the employer's customer list. Sia Group, Inc. v. Patterson, 254 N.C. App. 85, 801 S.E.2d 707 (2017).

Appeal from Order Granting Motion to Enforce A Preliminary Injunction. - Appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a trial court's order granting a motion to enforce a previously imposed preliminary injunction because the former officers of a corporation failed to satisfy their burden of demonstrating the loss of a substantial right absent immediate appeal of the order. Bolier & Co., LLC v. Decca Furniture (USA), Inc., 250 N.C. App. 323, 792 S.E.2d 865 (2016), review denied, 369 N.C. 759, 799 S.E.2d 620, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 425 (2017).

Change of Venue. - While the trial court had sufficient information to rule on the timely motion, the trial court's discretionary determination was interlocutory and affected no substantial right of either party, and thus plaintiff's appeal was premature. Stokes v. Stokes, 371 N.C. 770, 821 S.E.2d 161 (2018).

Order granting a motion for a change of venue is interlocutory and not immediately appealable. Kennon v. Kennon, 72 N.C. App. 161, 323 S.E.2d 741 (1984).

Order Denying Motion for Change of Venue. - Defendant's purported appeal from an interlocutory order denying defendant's motion for a change of venue pursuant to G.S. 1-83(2) for the convenience of the witnesses and the ends of justice was dismissed as premature. Furches v. Moore, 48 N.C. App. 430, 269 S.E.2d 635 (1980).

In cases where a trial court's decision deprives an appellant of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review, an appellate court was allowed to review the appeal; motions for change of venue because the county designated was not proper affected a substantial right and were immediately appealable. Hawley v. Hobgood, 174 N.C. App. 606, 622 S.E.2d 117 (2005).

Appeal of the denial of a subcontractor's motions to consolidate actions and to change venue was proper because the right to venue established by statute is a substantial right, the denial of which is immediately appealable; further, a substantial right was affected when the same factual issues would be present in both trials and the possibility of inconsistent verdicts on those issues existed. Barrier Geotechnical Contrs., Inc. v. Radford Quarries of Boone, Inc., 184 N.C. App. 741, 646 S.E.2d 840 (2007).

When plaintiffs filed a negligence suit in Forsyth County, the trial court's order denying defendants' motion for change of venue, though interlocutory, affected a substantial right and was immediately appealable because Forsyth County was not proper; plaintiffs and defendants either resided in or were located in Alamance County. Jenkins v. Hearn Vascular Surgery, P.A., 217 N.C. App. 118, 719 S.E.2d 151 (2011).

Trial court's order denying defendants' motion for change of venue was interlocutory, as it was an order made during the pendency of the action, which did not dispose of the case; however, because defendants alleged the county indicated in the complaint was improper, the appellate court addressed the merits of defendants' appeal. TD Bank, N.A. v. Crown Leasing Partners, LLC, 224 N.C. App. 649, 737 S.E.2d 738 (2012).

Trial court's order denying defendants' motion for change of venue was interlocutory because it did not dispose of all issues of the case and was not a final disposition for any party, and thus the trial court's denial of the motion for change of venue affected a substantial right, and the merits were considered. Se. Caissons, LLC v. Choate Constr. Co., 247 N.C. App. 104, 784 S.E.2d 650 (2016).

Motion to Strike Jury Trial Request. - Trial court's denial of the city's motion to strike the officer's request for a jury trial was appealable as affecting a substantial right.

Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Preliminary Injunction. - The trial court abused its discretion in denying a seller's motion to set the preliminary injunction aside because the seller never received notice of the buyer's intention to seek a preliminary injunction; the lack of notice affected the seller's substantial rights, and the seller's purported attorney of record did not represent the seller in the instant action, thus making service on the attorney insufficient to provide notice to the seller. Perry v. Baxley Dev., Inc., 188 N.C. App. 158, 655 S.E.2d 460 (2008).

Order Regarding Interrogatories. - Trial court's order sustaining objections to, and granting a motion to strike, certain interrogatories, denying defendants' motion to compel answers to those interrogatories, and also denying defendants' motion to permit them to respond to plaintiff's request for admissions was interlocutory, and defendants' appeal was fragmentary and premature. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Olive, 42 N.C. App. 574, 257 S.E.2d 100 (1979).

In a wrongful death action, the defendant declined to answer certain interrogatories on the grounds of self-incrimination, but was ordered to do so by the court, and he appealed. Although this appeal was from an interlocutory order, it was nevertheless authorized, because if some of the interrogatories were incriminating and the defendant was compelled to answer them, his constitutional rights could have been lost beyond recall, and his appeal at the end of the trial would have been of no value. Shaw v. Williamson, 75 N.C. App. 604, 331 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 669, 335 S.E.2d 496 (1985).

Refusal to grant permissive intervention is an interlocutory order. Howell v. Howell, 89 N.C. App. 115, 365 S.E.2d 181 (1988).

Underinsured Motorist Carrier's Right to Appear as Unnamed Defendant. - An underinsured motorist carrier could appeal from an order denying its motion to appear unnamed in the liability phase of a trial against its insured, since the right of an underinsured motorist carrier to defend unnamed is substantial. Church v. Allstate Ins. Co., 143 N.C. App. 527, 547 S.E.2d 458 (2001).

Orders Regarding Insurance and the Duty to Defend. - Insured failed to establish how orders would irreparably affect its substantial right to defense in allegedly pending benzene claims, no order decided the ultimate duty to defend issue, and the insured failed to advance a sufficient argument for expanding the duty to defend substantial right exception, and its appeals were dismissed. Radiator Specialty Co. v. Arrowood Indem. Co., 253 N.C. App. 508, 800 S.E.2d 452 (2017).

Insurer could not establish that a certain order affected its substantial rights because it owed the insured no defense duty absent its consent; the insurer's ability but not duty to defend the insured did not implicate its substantial rights. Radiator Specialty Co. v. Arrowood Indem. Co., 253 N.C. App. 508, 800 S.E.2d 452 (2017).

Order Granting Motion to Amend. - An order of the trial court allowing a motion to amend a complaint is interlocutory and is not immediately appealable. Barber v. Woodmen of World Life Ins. Soc'y, 88 N.C. App. 666, 364 S.E.2d 715 (1988).

Class Action. - Because no substantial right was involved in a trial court's determination that the case met the prerequisites to utilizing a class action, the general rule disallowing interlocutory appeals of such orders applied. Frost v. Mazda Motor of Am., 353 N.C. 188, 540 S.E.2d 324 (2000).

Order Granting Intervention. - Although the rule is not absolute, ordinarily no appeal will lie from an order permitting intervention of parties unless the order adversely affects a substantial right which the appellant may lose if not granted an appeal before final judgment. The rule applies with equal vigor without regard to whether the trial court grants a motion to intervene as a matter of right pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 24(a) or as permissive intervention pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 24(b). Wood v. City of Fayetteville, 35 N.C. App. 738, 242 S.E.2d 640, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 264, 245 S.E.2d 781 (1978).

Order Denying Intervention. - An interlocutory order was immediately appealable, where substantial rights were affected by the trial court's denial of a motion by a physician and his employer to intervene in a declaratory judgment action brought by an infant patient's estate to determine which potential heirs would share in the proceeds, if any, of the underlying wrongful death action. Alford v. Davis, 131 N.C. App. 214, 505 S.E.2d 917 (1998).

Denial of Motion to Dismiss. - Ordinarily, there is no right of appeal from the refusal of a motion to dismiss. The refusal to dismiss the action generally will not seriously impair any right of defendant that cannot be corrected upon appeal from final judgment. Godley Auction Co. v. Myers, 40 N.C. App. 570, 253 S.E.2d 362 (1979).

An order denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim for punitive damages is not immediately appealable. Williams v. East Coast Sales, Inc., 50 N.C. App. 565, 274 S.E.2d 276 (1981).

Where defendant was ordered by the trial court through an interlocutory order to pay plaintiff's legal fees, and where defendant did not perfect his appeal from such judgment, defendant did not lose his right to attack the judgment, since the record indicated that the appeal was not taken because of an agreement between the parties' counsel to vacate the order in question. Stroupe v. Stroupe, 301 N.C. 656, 273 S.E.2d 434 (1981).

The order entered by the trial court denying the defendants' motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment was not a final determination of the defendants' rights, even though the trial court stated that "there is no just reason to delay the appeal," and did not affect the defendants' substantial rights. The appeal of the order, therefore, could not lie as of right. Fraser v. Di Santi, 75 N.C. App. 654, 331 S.E.2d 217, cert. denied, 315 N.C. 183, 337 S.E.2d 856 (1985).

The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss clearly represented an interlocutory order, which was not properly before the Court of Appeals. Southern Uniform Rentals, Inc. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 90 N.C. App. 738, 370 S.E.2d 76 (1988).

Where the trial court denied employer's motion to dismiss employee's breach of contract suit on the ground of a forum selection clause, finding that the clause was a product of unequal bargaining power, the motion to dismiss was immediately appealable. Cox v. Dine-A-Mate, Inc., 129 N.C. App. 773, 501 S.E.2d 353 (1998), cert. denied, 349 N.C. 355 (1998).

Order denying a taxpayer's motion to dismiss an administrative summons requesting documents was appealable because it was an intermediate order that involved the merits and affected the final judgment in that if the motion had been granted, the trial court would not have issued the order to comply with the summons. Even if the appeal was not from a final judgment, the appeal of a discovery order asserting a statutory or a common-law privilege affected a substantial right. In re Summons Issued to Ernst & Young, LLP, 191 N.C. App. 668, 663 S.E.2d 921 (2008), rev'd in part on other grounds, and remanded, 363 N.C. 612, 684 S.E.2d 151, 2009 N.C. LEXIS 897 (2009).

In plaintiffs' negligence action, a trial court's order denying defendants' motion to dismiss under G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) did not affect a substantial right and was not immediately appealable, even though the question presented in defendants' motion was in the interests of judicial economy and raised an issue of public importance, that being an alleged injury to a nonviable fetus, because defendants offered no evidence of any potential injury to either party if the issue was presented after a final judgment on the merits. Jenkins v. Hearn Vascular Surgery, P.A., 217 N.C. App. 118, 719 S.E.2d 151 (2011).

Court had jurisdiction to review defendants' appeal from the order denying their motion to dismiss because the issue pertained to a forum selection clause. SED Holding, LLC v. 3 Star Props., LLC, 246 N.C. App. 632, 784 S.E.2d 627 (2016).

Court of appeals addressed the interlocutory appeals from the denials of motions to dismiss filed by physicians employed by the Department of Public Safety because orders denying dispositive motions based on public official's immunity affected a substantial right and were immediately appealable; the physicians' appeals were interlocutory because the trial court's denial of their motions to dismiss did not dispose of the case. Leonard v. Bell, 254 N.C. App. 694, 803 S.E.2d 445 (2017).

Because employees failed to satisfy their burden as to all but their lack of personal jurisdiction argument, their appeal of the denial of their motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a clam upon which relief could be granted and estoppel motions was subject to dismissal; the statement of the grounds for appellate review only argued that the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction affected a substantial right. McCullers v. Lewis, 265 N.C. App. 216, 828 S.E.2d 524 (2019).

For purposes of appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory order, the investigatory counsel for an area authority under G.S.122C-3(1), G.S. 122C-116(a) failed to show that a trial court's order denying their motion to dismiss the CEO's defamation claims for absolute privilege deprived them of a substantial right where the allegedly defamatory statements were made in an out-of-court press conference shortly after the authority had filed suit against the CEO, and a press conference was neither an inherent nor critical component of a judicial proceeding. Topping v. Meyers, - N.C. App. - , 842 S.E.2d 95 (2020).

Same - Failure to State Claim. - The trial court's refusal to allow defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12 (b)(6) did not put an end to the action or seriously impair any substantial right of defendant that could not be corrected upon appeal from final judgment. Godley Auction Co. v. Myers, 40 N.C. App. 570, 253 S.E.2d 362 (1979).

Denial of a trustee's motion to dismiss trust beneficiaries' claim for relief affected a substantial right under G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1) because the motion to dismiss made a colorable assertion that the beneficiaries' claim was barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel due to a prior consent judgment between the parties. Turner v. Hammocks Beach Corp., 363 N.C. 555, 681 S.E.2d 770 (Aug. 28, 2009).

Same - Failure to Join Necessary Party. - No substantial right of the defendant was impaired by the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss for failure to join a necessary party pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(7). The trial court did not rule that other parties were not necessary to be joined. It ruled that the action should not be dismissed for that purpose. Defendant still had adequate opportunity in the trial court for a determination on the question of joinder of parties. Godley Auction Co. v. Myers, 40 N.C. App. 570, 253 S.E.2d 362 (1979).

Appeal from a trial court's order denying a motion to dismiss a complaint, under N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7), for failure to join a necessary party was premature because it was interlocutory in nature, under G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b), and because the appellants failed to show, pursuant to G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1), that a substantial right would have been affected absent immediate disposition of the matter. Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meeting St. Builders, LLC, 222 N.C. App. 647, 736 S.E.2d 197 (2012).

Same - Expiration of Statute of Limitations. - The denial of plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant railroad's counterclaim for being filed beyond the three-year statute of limitations did not affect a substantial right and therefore was not appealable. Thompson v. Norfolk & Southern Ry., 140 N.C. App. 115, 535 S.E.2d 397 (2000).

Order Reinstating Dismissed Charge. - Although defendant's appeal of a district court's order reversing the county court's dismissal of his driving while impaired charge was interlocutory in nature, as the order allegedly affected his substantial right to avoid double jeopardy, it was reviewable under G.S. 7A-27(d). State v. McKenzie, 225 N.C. App. 208, 736 S.E.2d 591 (2013), rev'd 367 N.C. 112, 750 S.E.2d 521, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 1019 (2013), rev'd 748 S.E.2d 145, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 1019 (2013).

Order Denying Relief from Default Judgment. - Appellate court had jurisdiction to consider a trial court's denial of a guarantor's G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) motion for relief from a default judgment because the denial affected a substantial right. Brown v. Cavit Scis., Inc., 230 N.C. App. 460, 749 S.E.2d 904 (2013).

Immunity as Basis for Summary Adjudication. - Denial of a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment is interlocutory and not immediately appealable. However, recent case law clearly establishes that if immunity is raised as a basis in the motion for summary adjudication, a substantial right is affected and the denial is immediately appealable. EEE-ZZZ Lay Drain Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 108 N.C. App. 24, 422 S.E.2d 338 (1992), overruled on other grounds, Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 489 S.E.2d 880 (1997).

Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of res judicata did not affect a substantial right entitling defendant to immediate appeal, where no possibility of inconsistent verdicts existed and no manifest injustice would result absent immediate appeal. Country Club of Johnston County, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 135 N.C. App. 159, 519 S.E.2d 540 (1999).

Same - Collateral Estoppel. - The denial of a motion for summary judgment based on the defense of collateral estoppel may affect a substantial right. McCallum v. North Carolina Coop. Extension Serv. of N.C. State Univ., 142 N.C. App. 48, 542 S.E.2d 227, cert. denied, 353 N.C. 452, 548 S.E.2d 527 (2001).

Following dismissal of their previous appeal, defendants filed an answer in which they specifically asserted collateral estoppel as a defense to plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims and moved for judgment on the pleadings based upon their collateral estoppel defense; defendants having made a colorable assertion that the claim is barred under collateral estoppel, the denial of their motion for judgment on the pleadings affected a substantial right and their interlocutory appeal was properly before the court. Fox v. Johnson, 243 N.C. App. 274, 777 S.E.2d 314 (2015), review denied, 781 S.E.2d 480, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 63 (2016).

Summary Judgment Based on Governmental Immunity. - Generally, denial of a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not immediately appealable; however, if the defense of governmental immunity is asserted as grounds for the summary judgment motion, the denial of the motion has been held to affect a substantial right, and the order is immediately appealable pursuant to G.S. 1-277(a) and subsection (d). Hallman v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 124 N.C. App. 435, 477 S.E.2d 179 (1996).

Order denying a motion to amend a complaint is interlocutory, for it does not determine the entire controversy and requires further action by the trial court. Mauney v. Morris, 73 N.C. App. 589, 327 S.E.2d 248, rev'd on other grounds, 316 N.C. 67, 340 S.E.2d 397 (1986).

Order Granting Motion to Amend and Denying Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. - An order granting a motion to amend and denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings is obviously not a final judgment but is interlocutory. Consequently, no appeal lies of right. Funderburk v. Justice, 25 N.C. App. 655, 214 S.E.2d 310 (1975).

Order Regarding Counterclaims. - The trial court's order for partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff employee suing for payment of a commission as to the defendant employer's four counterclaims - wrongful attachment, negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty - was interlocutory; no overlapping factual issues existed between the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's counterclaims, and the order appealed from did not deprive the defendant of a substantial right which would be jeopardized absent a review prior to a final determination on the merits. Murphy v. Coastal Physician Group, Inc., 139 N.C. App. 290, 533 S.E.2d 817 (2000).

Order Dismissing Counterclaims Except as Set-Offs. - In an action arising out of a contract between the parties whereby defendants agreed to construct a house on a piece of property owned by them and to convey the completed house and property to plaintiffs, the trial court's order dismissing defendants' counterclaims for overages, interest expenses, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and trespass but allowing defendants to assert these counterclaims as set-offs to plaintiff's claim was not a final judgment; however, the judgment in question affected a substantial right of defendants, their right to recover on their claims based on the contract, and the absence of an immediate appeal would work an injury to them, the possibility of being forced to undergo two full trials on the merits and to incur the expense of litigating twice, if not corrected before an appeal from a final judgment. Roberts v. Heffner, 51 N.C. App. 646, 277 S.E.2d 446 (1981).

Denial of motion to amend answer to allege compulsory counterclaim affects a substantial right and is immediately appealable. Hudspeth v. Bunzey, 35 N.C. App. 231, 241 S.E.2d 119, appeal dismissed, 294 N.C. 736, 244 S.E.2d 154 (1978).

Order allowing estates to amend their complaint in a medical malpractice suit was not immediately appealable where the issues of a hospital's claim that, without immediate review, it lost the right to avoid trial altogether by (1) raising the statute of limitations, (2) raising "estoppel by laches" as an affirmative defense, or (3) having the amended complaint dismissed for failure to comply with G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 9(j), were not brought before the trial court, and no substantial right was lost by the failure to allow immediate review; the estates were also entitled to sanctions against the hospital. Estate of Spell v. Ghanem, 175 N.C. App. 191, 622 S.E.2d 725 (2005).

Order Denying Motion to Permit Contact with Treating Physician. - A discovery order which prohibited the defendant hospital from contact with the defendant doctor other than through "the statutorily recognized methods of discovery enumerated in" G.S. 1A-1, Rule 26 was not immediately appealable because the order in no way precluded the hospital from "meeting with and discussing the case with" the doctor in the context of the multi-varied discovery methods detailed in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 26 and, therefore, did not affect a substantial right. Norris v. Sattler, 139 N.C. App. 409, 533 S.E.2d 483 (2000).

Contempt Order. - See Willis v. Duke Power Co., 291 N.C. 19, 229 S.E.2d 191 (1976).

Trial court had jurisdiction to find business owners in contempt after the owners appealed the underlying order because ordering compliance with an injunction the owners did not appeal did not affect the owners' substantial right. Plasman v. Decca Furniture (USA), Inc., 253 N.C. App. 484, 800 S.E.2d 761 (2017), cert. denied, 812 S.E.2d 849, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 342 (2018) cert. denied, 813 S.E.2d 245, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 400 (2018).

Possibility of Inconsistent Verdicts. - Plaintiffs' appeal is reviewable under the substantial right exception where a dismissal would raise the possibility of inconsistent verdicts in later proceedings. Hoots v. Pryor, 106 N.C. App. 397, 417 S.E.2d 269, cert. denied, 332 N.C. 344, 421 S.E.2d 148 (1992).

When a patient sued a pharmacy for negligence, breach of implied warranties, liability under G.S. 99B-6, and to pierce the pharmacy's corporate veil and hold its president liable, and the warranty claim and claim to pierce the corporate veil were dismissed, the patient did not show, in an interlocutory appeal of that dismissal, that she would lose a substantial right if she could not immediately appeal the dismissal. Rauch v. Urgent Care Pharm., Inc., 178 N.C. App. 510, 632 S.E.2d 211 (2006).

Summary judgment in a medical malpractice case for a physician, who was one party sued, could be appealed because the judgment affected a substantial right, since the same factual issues applied to each defendant, creating a risk of inconsistent verdicts. Hawkins v. Emergency Med. Physicians of Craven Cnty., PLLC, 240 N.C. App. 337, 770 S.E.2d 159 (2015).

Town's appeal of two interlocutory orders ruling on motions in a dispute with a county over wastewater disposal on grounds the order affected the town's substantial right to avoid inconsistent verdicts was dismissed because, when arguing that, if the town's appeal were successful, there could be a potential for inconsistent verdicts, the town did not explain how these inconsistent verdicts could become realities. Union Cty. v. Town of Marshville, 255 N.C. App. 441, 804 S.E.2d 801 (2017).

Order Granting Summary Judgment. - An order granting summary judgment denied plaintiff a jury trial on the issue of its claim against the bank and, in effect, determined the claim in favor of the bank. Thus the order affected a substantial right and was appealable under G.S. 1-277 and this section. Nasco Equip. Co. v. Mason, 291 N.C. 145, 229 S.E.2d 278 (1976).

In an action seeking to quiet title to property which plaintiffs, the original owners, alleged was secured by two of the three defendants by fraud or by mutual mistake and conveyed by general warranty deed to the other defendant, the current owner, summary judgment in favor of the current owner precluded plaintiffs from obtaining reformation of the deed and reconveyance of the property, thereby affecting a substantial right, and therefore the interlocutory order was appealable. Jenkins v. Maintenance, Inc., 76 N.C. App. 110, 332 S.E.2d 90 (1985).

In an action by a discharged employee seeking to recover accumulated vacation leave, a "substantial right" of the plaintiff was affected by the granting of summary judgment for the defendant, so that the order granting the motion for summary judgment was appealable, despite the defendant's pending counterclaim for wrongful conversion of company funds, and despite the absence of a determination by the trial judge under N.C.R.C.P., Rule 54(b), that "there was no just reason for delay." Narron v. Hardee's Food Sys., 75 N.C. App. 579, 331 S.E.2d 205, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 542, 335 S.E.2d 316 (1985).

Where summary judgment is allowed for fewer than all the defendants and the judgment does not contain a certification pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b), that there is "no just reason for delay," an appeal is premature unless the order allowing summary judgment affects a substantial right. Bernick v. Jurden, 306 N.C. 435, 293 S.E.2d 405 (1982).

Where the possibility of an inconsistent verdict in defendants' counterclaim trial could irreparably prejudice any subsequent trial of plaintiff's negligence and contract claims, the trial court's summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims affected a substantial right such that it was immediately appealable under subdivision (d)(1) of this section and G.S. 1-277(a). J & B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 1, 362 S.E.2d 812 (1987).

Where defendants' defense to plaintiff's promissory note claim, as well as their counterclaims, were both founded on proving plaintiff's breach of a fiduciary relationship with defendants, defendants' substantial right to avoid separate trials of the same issue would be prejudiced absent immediate review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claim. Whitehurst v. Corey, 88 N.C. App. 746, 364 S.E.2d 728 (1988).

Summary judgment on complaint was not appealable before counterclaim for attorneys' fees had been adjudicated by the trial court. There was no possibility of inconsistent results in complaint and counterclaim because an award for counterclaim could only have been granted if defendants were prevailing parties in the plaintiff 's action; therefore, as parties did not address any other substantial right which could have been affected, no substantial right was involved which would have been "lost, prejudiced, or less than adequately protected" if court did not review appeal before final judgment. T'ai Co. v. Market Square Ltd. Partnership, 92 N.C. App. 234, 373 S.E.2d 885 (1988).

Appeal from the grant of summary judgment for a psychiatric hospital in a medical malpractice action against the hospital and independent contractor physicians was premature, where the remaining defendants had separate and distinct contracts and each owed a different duty to the patient. Myers v. Barringer, 101 N.C. App. 168, 398 S.E.2d 615 (1990).

Since plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, on which defendant was granted summary judgment, involved the issue of defendant's negligence as well as the separate factual issues of the existence of severe emotional distress and foreseeability of injury, if at trial a jury determined defendant's conduct to have been negligent, then plaintiff would only have to prove severe emotional distress and foreseeability of injury at a second trial in the event of a proper successful appeal of the summary judgment. Since a second trial would not require plaintiff to retry the negligence issue, there were no overlapping issues to justify an immediate appeal of the interlocutory order. Jarrell v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Carolinas, Inc., 121 N.C. App. 198, 464 S.E.2d 720 (1995).

While an order granting summary judgment was interlocutory, it was appealable because the cause of action for criminal conversation, which was still before the trial court, was so connected with the claim for alienation of affections that only one issue of damages should be submitted to the jury, and thus, a substantial right was at stake to have the same jury hear the wife's two claims. McCutchen v. McCutchen, 360 N.C. 280, 624 S.E.2d 620 (2006).

When, in a personal injury case, a trial court granted summary judgment in favor of some of the parties sued, the judgment was appealable, under G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1), because it was alleged that the parties as to whom summary judgment was granted were joint tortfeasors with the remaining parties, so many of the same factual issues would apply to the claims against the parties awarded summary judgment and to the remaining parties, and separate trials could result in inconsistent judgments, so the alleged injured parties who brought suit asserted a substantial right to immediate review, and their appeals were properly before the appellate court. Walden v. Morgan, 179 N.C. App. 673, 635 S.E.2d 616 (2006).

As the trial court granted summary judgment only to a town, not the other defendants, and did not certify the court's order under N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b), and plaintiff did not voluntarily dismiss her claims against the other defendants or argue that her appeal affected a substantial right, she was not entitled to appeal the trial court's interlocutory order under G.S. 7A-27(b). Hyatt v. Town of Lake Lure, 191 N.C. App. 386, 663 S.E.2d 320 (2008).

Trial court's order denying a school principal's motion to dismiss pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and motion for summary judgment pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(c), was interlocutory because the order did not address and dispose of an office assistant's loss of consortium claim; the court of appeals exercised jurisdiction over the principal's appeal pursuant to G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1) because the trial court's order affected a substantial right. Trivette v. Yount, 217 N.C. App. 477, 720 S.E.2d 732 (2011), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 366 N.C. 303, 735 S.E.2d 306, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 1000 (2012).

In a coverage dispute, although a trial court's summary judgment order was interlocutory, the order was appealable because summary judgment on the issue of the insurer's duty to defend a claim against the insured affected a substantial right that could be lost absent immediate appeal; the underlying declaratory action concerned whether the insurer provided coverage for claims by passengers who were injured in a vehicle driven by the insured's 14-year-old son. Integon Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Villafranco, 228 N.C. App. 390, 745 S.E.2d 922 (2013).

Summary judgment order directing the judicial sale of an owner's home affected a substantial right subject to appellate review because if the appeal was not heard and the foreclosure moved forward, the wife could lose her home permanently prior to any appeal from final judgment. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Stocks, - N.C. App. - , 831 S.E.2d 378 (2019).

Appeal of Order of Summary Judgment. - Where dismissal of an appeal of a summary judgment could result in two different trials on the same issues, thereby creating the possibility of inconsistent verdicts, a substantial right is prejudiced and the summary judgment is immediately appealable. Taylor v. Brinkman, 108 N.C. App. 767, 425 S.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 333 N.C. 795, 431 S.E.2d 30 (1993).

The court denied the plaintiff - the administrator of the estates of his wife and two children, and guardian ad litem of a surviving injured child, who sued defendants/railroad company and engineering firm - the right to an immediate interlocutory appeal of a summary judgment on his contract claim where his tort claim survived the summary judgment and the trial court reserved the right to rule on matters of evidence which that judge considered competent, relevant and admissible on the remaining issues; the plaintiff failed to show that the court's separate treatment of the two claims would injure a substantial right where the evidence and the issues differed. Turner v. Norfolk S. Corp., 137 N.C. App. 138, 526 S.E.2d 666 (2000).

Under G.S. 1-277(a) and subsection (d) of this section, although an interlocutory order is ordinarily not immediately appealable, an interlocutory order may be immediately appealed if it affects a substantial right; the subcontractors' interlocutory appeal was supported by their assertion of a substantial right to have the case heard in a particular county and to have the liability of all of the defendants determined in one proceeding, which would have been lost without appellate review. Cencomp, Inc. v. Webcon, Inc., 157 N.C. App. 501, 579 S.E.2d 482 (2003).

Seller's appeal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the buyer was dismissed because the order did not affect a substantial right and the case presented no possibility of inconsistent verdicts where, while it was undisputed that the parties were identical and that they litigated a prior federal action, there was not a final judgment on the merits in the prior action on the current claim of breach of fiduciary duty, the current claim was not a material and relevant matter within the scope of the pleadings of the federal suit, and the buyer sought a remedy for a separate and distinct negligent act leading to a separate and distinct injury. Sanderford v. Duplin Land Dev., Inc., 248 N.C. App. 583, 789 S.E.2d 503 (2016), cert. denied, 794 S.E.2d 334, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 1075 (2016).

Although a trustee's appeal of an order denying summary judgment was interlocutory, appellate jurisdiction existed as the trustee's right to foreclose was authorized by the county assistant clerk, and thus, collateral estoppel was potentially applicable to the borrowers' claims for monetary damages stemming from a foreclosure. Gray v. Fannie Mae, 264 N.C. App. 642, 830 S.E.2d 652 (2019), review denied, 374 N.C. 265, 839 S.E.2d 853, 2020 N.C. LEXIS 342, review dismissed, 374 N.C. 265, 839 S.E.2d 854, 2020 N.C. LEXIS 343 (N.C. 2020).

Order Denying Summary Judgment. - Because there was a question of fact as to whether defendants followed the applicable standard of care, they were not entitled to qualified immunity under G.S. 122C-210.1 on plaintiff's wrongful death claims as a matter of law; accordingly, the denial of their motion for summary judgment did not deprive them of a substantial right, and their appeal was dismissed as interlocutory. Snyder v. Learning Servs. Corp., 187 N.C. App. 480, 653 S.E.2d 548 (2007).

Denial of husband's summary judgment motion opposing a wife's attempt to enforce a separation agreement amendment was immediately appealable because a ruling that the amendment was not void essentially struck the husband's defense and was, in substance, a demurrer affecting the husband's substantial right. Kelley v. Kelley, 252 N.C. App. 467, 798 S.E.2d 771 (2017).

Lender's appeal of an order denying its motion for summary judgment was properly before the court of appeals because absent immediate appeal, the lender would lose a substantial right; trial of the case could result in inconsistent judgments between the same parties involving the seizure of the same collateral. R.C. Koonts & Sons Masonry, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, - N.C. App. - , 830 S.E.2d 690 (2019).

Employer's appeal of a denial of its motion for summary judgment in a wrongful death suit was properly before the appellate court; the summary judgment motion argued that the employer was immune from the suit, and, although the appeal was interlocutory, appellate review was necessary on the grounds that the North Carolina's Workers' Compensation Act granted employers who complied with the Act immunity from suit, which would have been lost if the case was permitted to go to trial. This immunity from suit affected a substantial right. Edwards v. GE Lighting Sys., 193 N.C. App. 578, 668 S.E.2d 114 (2008).

Denial of a motion for summary judgment based on the defense of res judicata may affect a substantial right, making the order immediately appealable. Bockweg v. Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 428 S.E.2d 157 (1993).

Interlocutory appeal of the denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment in a constructive trust action was allowed; the basis of the motion for summary judgment was that res judicata barred the constructive trust action and in such a case, the failure to allow an appeal might affect a substantial right in that the possibility existed that without an immediate appeal, they would be required to twice defend against the same claim by plaintiffs. Tiber Holding Corp. v. DiLoreto, 170 N.C. App. 662, 613 S.E.2d 346 (2005), cert. denied, - N.C. - , 623 S.E.2d 263 (2005).

Summary Judgment on Issue of Liability. - Ordinarily, an order granting summary judgment on the issue of liability and reserving for trial the issue of damages is not immediately appealable. Smith v. Watson, 71 N.C. App. 351, 322 S.E.2d 588 (1984), cert. denied, 313 N.C. 509, 329 S.E.2d 394 (1985).

Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment. - The trial court's entry of summary judgment for a monetary sum against one of two defendants affected a "substantial right" of that defendant, and such judgment was therefore immediately appealable under G.S. 1-277 and this section, notwithstanding the absence of an express determination by the trial judge that there was "no just reason for delay" as required by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b). Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Myers, 46 N.C. App. 162, 265 S.E.2d 240 (1980).

Order allowing summary judgment as to fewer than all defendants held to affect a substantial right. Federal Land Bank v. Lieben, 86 N.C. App. 342, 357 S.E.2d 700 (1987).

An order of partial summary judgment dismissing a punitive damages claim was appealable, though interlocutory, since claims for compensatory and punitive damages depended upon the same evidence and plaintiff 's right to try them before the same jury and avoid the possible travesty of different juries rendering conflicting verdicts was a substantial one. Nance v. Robertson, 91 N.C. App. 121, 370 S.E.2d 283, cert. denied, 323 N.C. 477, 373 S.E.2d 865 (1988).

Where trial court's summary judgment determined fewer than all claims between parties, plaintiff could maintain interlocutory appeals from court's judgment, since trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's negligence, fraud and unfair trade practice claims against defendant insurance company and unfair trade claim against defendant insurance agency affected substantial right since there were factual issues common to claims dismissed by trial court and negligence claim which it did not dismiss. Davidson v. Knauff Ins. Agency, Inc., 93 N.C. App. 20, 376 S.E.2d 488, cert. denied, 324 N.C. 577, 381 S.E.2d 772 (1989).

Where plaintiff claimed that defendants, husband and wife, were negligent, and where summary judgment was granted in favor of wife, and where a possibility existed that inconsistent verdicts would be rendered in separate trials on the issue of husband and wife's joint and concurrent negligence if plaintiff 's appeal ultimately was successful, judgment was appealable because it affected a substantial right of plaintiff to have determined, in a single action, the question of whether plaintiff was injured by the acts of one, both, or neither of the defendants, especially since the claims against them arose from the same series of events. DeHaven v. Hoskins, 95 N.C. App. 397, 382 S.E.2d 856 (1989), cert. denied, 325 N.C. 705, 388 S.E.2d 452 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615, 507 S.E.2d 882 (1998).

The appellate court eliminated specifically the application of the doctrine of substantial rights to cases wherein partial summary judgment has been granted denying a claim for punitive damages. Moose v. Nissan of Statesville, Inc., 115 N.C. App. 423, 444 S.E.2d 694 (1994).

There were no factual issues common to the claims determined by summary judgments or the claims remaining, so that no substantial right was affected and plaintiff was not entitled to interlocutory appeal of summary judgments, since plaintiff did not present identical factual issues creating the possibility of two trials on the same issue. Jarrell v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Carolinas, Inc., 121 N.C. App. 198, 464 S.E.2d 720 (1995).

The trial court's partial grant of summary judgment on the issue of breach of contract was interlocutory with no immediate right of appeal because it did not affect substantial rights. Alexander Hamilton Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. J&H Marsh & McClennan, Inc., 142 N.C. App. 699, 543 S.E.2d 898 (2001).

Trial court's partial summary judgment order that two insurers were obligated to defend an insured in an underlying litigation was immediately appealable under G.S. 1-277 and 7A-27(d) and G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b) because the judgment affected a substantial right that might have been lost absent an immediate appeal. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buzz Off Insect Shield L.L.C., 190 N.C. App. 28, 664 S.E.2d 317 (2008), review denied 363 N.C. 802, 690 S.E.2d 694 (2010), rev'd in part 364 N.C. 1, 692 S.E.2d 605 (2010).

Plaintiffs argued the appeal was properly before the appellate court as an appeal from an interlocutory order affecting a substantial right, pursuant to G.S. 1-277 and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1); the trial court's grant of partial judgment to defendants was an interlocutory order because plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract remained pending and common to all claims - unjust enrichment, unfair and deceptive trade practices, common law fraud/breach of fiduciary duty, constructive trust, and punitive damages - was the factual issue of whether defendants caused plaintiffs' damages by falsely representing that a North Carolina limited liability corporation (LLC) validly existed as a LLC and by inducing plaintiffs to invest in the business. Because there were overlapping factual issues, inconsistent verdicts could result, thus, the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to defendants affected a substantial right, and plaintiffs' appeal was properly before the appellate court. James R. Carcano v. JBSS, LLC, 200 N.C. App. 162, 684 S.E.2d 41 (2009).

Insurer could not appeal from an interlocutory order granting summary judgment in favor of the insured as to the insurer's defense of champerty and maintenance because the insured's action was brought after its litigation with a homeowner had concluded and thus, a determination that the insurer did or did not owe a duty to defend the insured did not affect a substantial right because it would not change the resolution of the prior case. Paradigm Consultants, Ltd. v. Builders Mut. Ins. Co., 228 N.C. App. 314, 745 S.E.2d 69 (2013).

When the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) filed transportation corridor maps, under the Transportation Corridor Official Map Act, G.S. 136-44.50 to 136-44.54, and property owners' inverse condemnation claims were dismissed as not being ripe, the owners could pursue an interlocutory appeal because an order granting partial summary judgment on the issue of NCDOT's liability to pay just compensation for a claim for inverse condemnation was an immediately appealable interlocutory order affecting a substantial right. Kirby v. N.C. DOT, 239 N.C. App. 345, 769 S.E.2d 218, dismissed and review granted, 368 N.C. 279, 775 S.E.2d 829, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 704 (2015).

Series of partial summary judgment orders did not constitute a final judgment; notwithstanding a pending attorney's fees request, other non-collateral issues remained unresolved, including the issue of damages, and thus the orders were interlocutory. Radiator Specialty Co. v. Arrowood Indem. Co., 253 N.C. App. 508, 800 S.E.2d 452 (2017).

State officials could pursue an interlocutory appeal of a partial summary judgment because the ruling affected the officials' substantial right by barring the officials' enforcement of authorized statutory amendments to retired state employees' health insurance coverage, potentially affecting the state budget. Lake v. State Health Plan for Teachers & State Emples., 264 N.C. App. 174, 825 S.E.2d 645 (2019).

Same - Where Injunction Is Part of Order. - While ordinarily, the allowance of a motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, reserving for trial the issue of damages, will not be appealable, where a mandatory injunction was part of the order for partial summary judgment, it clearly affected a "substantial right" of the defendant and the allowance of the motion for partial summary judgment was appealable. English v. Holden Beach Realty Corp., 41 N.C. App. 1, 254 S.E.2d 223, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 609, 257 S.E.2d 217 (1979), overruled on other grounds, 319 N.C. 274, 354 S.E.2d 459 (1987).

Where defendants would immediately suffer the consequences of complying with mandatory injunction ordering that they remove anchors and boat slips constructed on plaintiff's submerged lands, this affected a substantial right of defendants, giving them the right to appeal from the interlocutory order granting summary judgment for plaintiffs except on the issue of damages. Steel Creek Dev. Corp. v. Smith, 300 N.C. 631, 268 S.E.2d 205 (1980).

North Carolina State Bar's interlocutory appeal from a superior court order enjoining the bar from proceeding in a disciplinary action against an attorney was not barred under G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1) because a substantive right, the right of the Bar to investigate and prosecute allegations of attorney misconduct, was involved. Gilbert v. N.C. State Bar, 363 N.C. 70, 678 S.E.2d 602 (2009).

Appeal of Order Denying Partial Summary Judgment. - Defendant's appeal of an order denying its motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages was interlocutory. Travco Hotels, Inc. v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 102 N.C. App. 659, 403 S.E.2d 593, aff'd, 332 N.C. 288, 420 S.E.2d 426 (1992).

When a landowner sued a developer and a land grader for, inter alia, negligence and trespass for conducting activities on a lot adjacent to the landowner's lot that allegedly caused flooding on the landowner's lot, a trial court's denial of the landowner's partial summary judgment motion on the issue of liability was not immediately appealable because the landowner did not show any substantial right that would be lost by a delay of his appeal from this denial. Williams v. Allen, 182 N.C. App. 121, 641 S.E.2d 391 (2007).

Appellate court lacked jurisdiction over a contractor's appeal of the trial court's partial summary judgment order rejecting some of its res judicata defenses because invocation of res judicata did not automatically entitle a party to an interlocutory appeal of an order rejecting that defense, the contractor did not include an explanation of how the challenged order would create a risk of inconsistent verdicts or otherwise affect a substantial right based on the particular facts of that case, and avoiding the time and expense of trial was not a substantial right justifying an immediate appeal. Denney v. Wardson Constr., LLC, 264 N.C. App. 15, 824 S.E.2d 436 (2019).

Order Requiring Jury Trial. - If an order denying a jury trial is appealable, an order requiring a jury trial should be appealable. If denial of a jury trial affects a substantial right, which would be lost absent review prior to final determination, the requirement that a case will be tried by a jury should have the same effect. Faircloth v. Beard, 320 N.C. 505, 358 S.E.2d 512 (1987), overruled in part, Jacobs v. City of Asheville, 137 N.C. App. 441, 528 S.E.2d 905 (2000).

Generally, the right to avoid a trial is not a substantial right; however, while avoidance of two trials on the same issues may be. This would require that a party show that the same factual issues would be present in both trials and that the possibility of inconsistent verdicts on those issues exists. Stafford v. Stafford, 133 N.C. App. 163, 515 S.E.2d 43 (1999), aff'd, 351 N.C. 94, 520 S.E.2d 785 (1999).

Appellate court could hear landowners' appeal of an order determining a boundary line because the order prejudiced the landowners' substantial rights by (1) effectively mooting the landowners' claims, and (2) denying the landowners' right to a jury trial on the factual issue of the boundary line's "on the ground" location. Ayscue v. Griffin, 263 N.C. App. 1, 823 S.E.2d 134 (2018).

Partial summary judgment holding that third-party defendant must indemnify defendant for any judgment on plaintiff's claim is interlocutory and not appealable under G.S. 1-277 or subsection (d) of this section, since the judgment will not work injury to third-party defendant if not corrected before appeal from a final judgment. Cook v. Export Leaf Tobacco Co., 47 N.C. App. 187, 266 S.E.2d 754 (1980).

Partial Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendant Who Is Only Secondarily Liable. - Plaintiffs had no right to an immediate appeal from summary judgment granted to defendant attorney where plaintiffs sought to recover against defendant attorney only if they were unable to recover against the other defendants on their primary claims. Blue Ridge Sportcycle Co. v. Schroader, 53 N.C. App. 354, 280 S.E.2d 799 (1981).

Interlocutory summary judgments in favor of third-party and fourth-party defendants in a negligence action were appealable as to the question of negligence, which presented common factual issues with the remaining claim of plaintiff against defendant, but not as to the issue of indemnity, which did not. Britt v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 97 N.C. App. 442, 388 S.E.2d 613 (1990).

Arbitration Order. - An order denying arbitration, although interlocutory, is immediately appealable because it involves a substantial right which might be lost if appeal is delayed. Prime S. Homes, Inc. v. Byrd, 102 N.C. App. 255, 401 S.E.2d 822 (1991); Hackett v. Bonta, 113 N.C. App. 89, 437 S.E.2d 687 (1993).

Where evidence showed that plaintiff knew that the terms of a dispute resolution agreement would apply to her should she continue her employment, and she did continue, sufficient consideration existed to support the agreement, plaintiff relinquished the right to pursue disputes in court, and the trial court's refusal to compel arbitration deprived defendants of a substantial right entitling them to immediate appeal. Howard v. Oakwood Homes Corp., 134 N.C. App. 116, 516 S.E.2d 879 (1999), cert. denied, 350 N.C. 832, 539 S.E.2d 288 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1155, 120 S. Ct. 1161, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1072 (2000).

Trial court's order denying a home inspector's motion to compel arbitration pursuant to a written agreement was immediately appealable, under G.S. 1-277 and G.S. 7A-27(d)(l), because it affected a substantial right of the home inspector. Edwards v. Taylor, 182 N.C. App. 722, 643 S.E.2d 51 (2007).

Appellate review of an interlocutory order concerning the right to arbitration was permitted under G.S. 7A-27(d)(1) because the order affected a substantial right, and review was permitted under G.S. 1-277(a) of any order involving a matter of law or legal inference which affected a substantial right. In re W. W. Jarvis & Sons, 194 N.C. App. 799, 671 S.E.2d 534 (2009).

Court acquired jurisdiction to hear defendants' appeal from the trial court's interlocutory order denying arbitration. Earl v. CGR Dev. Corp., 242 N.C. App. 20, 773 S.E.2d 551 (2015).

Court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the merits of a subsidiary's appeal of an order denying its motion to stay distributors' claims pending arbitration; the right to arbitrate a claim or issue is a substantial right if it was enforceable by or against an appellant who is a non-signatory to the agreement creating it. Neusoft Med. Sys., USA v. Neuisys, LLC, 242 N.C. App. 102, 774 S.E.2d 851 (2015), review denied 778 S.E.2d 433, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1177 (2015), dismissed and review denied 778 S.E.2d 432, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1178 (2015), review dismissed 778 S.E.2d 433, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1179 (2015), review denied 780 S.E.2d 555, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1180 (2015).

Court of appeals considered the merits of a manufacturer's appeal because the manufacturer met its burden to demonstrate that it had jurisdiction over its appeal of an order denying its right to arbitrate; the order affected the manufacturer's substantial right to arbitrate because the effect of the order was to require the manufacturer to proceed in defending distributor's claims against it in court rather than in arbitration. Neusoft Med. Sys., USA v. Neuisys, LLC, 242 N.C. App. 102, 774 S.E.2d 851 (2015), review denied 778 S.E.2d 433, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1177 (2015), dismissed and review denied 778 S.E.2d 432, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1178 (2015), review dismissed 778 S.E.2d 433, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1179 (2015), review denied 780 S.E.2d 555, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1180 (2015).

In an employment dispute, an appellate court had jurisdiction because an order enjoined certain claims from proceeding to arbitration, and a substantial right existed that could have been lost absent immediate appellate review. Epic Games, Inc. v. Murphy-Johnson, 247 N.C. App. 54, 785 S.E.2d 137 (2016).

Interlocutory order denying a town's motion to compel arbitration was immediately appealable because the order involved a substantial right which could be lost if an appeal were delayed. Town of Belville v. Urban Smart Growth, LLC, 252 N.C. App. 72, 796 S.E.2d 817 (2017), review denied, 803 S.E.2d 399, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 608 (N.C. 2017).

Order denying an elder care facility's motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings in a negligence and wrongful death action that was brought by the executrix of the decedent's estate was immediately appealable because it involved a substantial right, the right to arbitrate claims, which might have been lost if appeal was delayed. Gay v. Saber Healthcare Grp., L.L.C., - N.C. App. - , 842 S.E.2d 635 (2020).

Arbitration. - There is no immediate right of appeal from an order compelling arbitration. Bluffs, Inc. v. Wysocki, 68 N.C. App. 284, 314 S.E.2d 291 (1984).

Order compelling arbitration was interlocutory and did not affect a substantial right. North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. Duke Power Co., 95 N.C. App. 123, 381 S.E.2d 896, cert. denied, 325 N.C. 709, 388 S.E.2d 461 (1989).

An order compelling arbitration is interlocutory, does not affect a substantial right, and is not immediately appealable. Laws v. Horizon Hous., Inc., 137 N.C. App. 770, 529 S.E.2d 695 (2000).

Appellate court had jurisdiction to consider an appeal because the denial of a motion to compel arbitration, although interlocutory, was immediately appealable since it affected a substantial right. King v. Bryant, 225 N.C. App. 340, 737 S.E.2d 802 (2013).

Order Allowing Reinstatement of Lawsuits. - Defendant's appeal of an order granting plaintiffs' motions for reinstatement of their lawsuits for payment of materials provided on a county improvement project was interlocutory and not appealable, although a denial of review might force them "to continue the defense of th[e] action." Interior Distribs., Inc. v. Autry, 140 N.C. App. 541, 536 S.E.2d 853 (2000), cert denied, 353 N.C. 375, 547 S.E.2d 411 (2001).

Order Appointing Guardian Ad Litem. - For plaintiff to have been entitled to appeal of right from order granting defendant's motions for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, plaintiff was required to establish that it either (1) affected a substantial right, or (2) in effect determined the action and prevented a judgment from which appeal might be taken, or (3) discontinued the action, or (4) granted or refused a new trial. Culton v. Culton, 327 N.C. 624, 398 S.E.2d 323 (1990).

Order of partial summary judgment which included a mandatory injunction directing the defendant to remove a roadway affected a substantial right of the defendant and was thus immediately appealable pursuant to G.S. 1-277 and this section. Smith v. Watson, 71 N.C. App. 351, 322 S.E.2d 588 (1984), cert. denied, 313 N.C. 509, 329 S.E.2d 394 (1985).

The denial of summary judgment is interlocutory in nature and not appealable under G.S. 1-277 and this section, unless a substantial right of one of the parties would be affected if the appeal were not heard prior to final judgment. Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Myers, 46 N.C. App. 162, 265 S.E.2d 240 (1980).

An order setting aside without prejudice a summary judgment on the grounds of procedural irregularity, is interlocutory and not immediately appealable. Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E.2d 338 (1978).

Order Limiting Scope of Lis Pendens in Action to Quiet Title. - In an action to quiet title to property which defendants have incorporated into a residential subdivision, an order limiting the scope of lis pendens filed by plaintiffs only to the area of the subdivision which they claim was interlocutory and not immediately appealable. Whyburn v. Norwood, 37 N.C. App. 610, 246 S.E.2d 540 (1978).

Order Allowing Surveyor to Enter upon Land. - An interlocutory order by which defendants are simply ordered to allow a neutral third party, a surveyor, to enter upon their land for the purpose of completing an accurate survey of the property is not appealable. Ball v. Ball, 55 N.C. App. 98, 284 S.E.2d 555 (1981).

An order denying a motion to cancel a notice of lis pendens is not immediately appealable where the property owner fails to show that a substantial right of his has been impaired. Godley Auction Co. v. Myers, 40 N.C. App. 570, 253 S.E.2d 362 (1979).

An order requiring defendant husband to vacate premises which had been occupied by him and his wife as their home affected a substantial right and was appealable to the Court of Appeals, where the order was made after a hearing and before the case was tried. Musten v. Musten, 36 N.C. App. 618, 244 S.E.2d 699 (1978).

Eminent Domain. - Order concluding that the closure of a road was not a compensable taking was interlocutory because the order was not a final judgment in the proceeding; the jury still had to determine the amount of compensation a property owner was entitled to for the taking of its property by the North Carolina Department of Transportation. DOT v. BB&R, LLC, 242 N.C. App. 11, 775 S.E.2d 8 (2015).

Orders Regarding Condemnation Proceedings. - The trial court's denial of defendants' constitutional challenge and its conclusion that the defendants' four tracts formed a physically unified parcel affected by condemnation proceedings were interlocutory and did not affect any substantial rights, so the defendants were not required to appeal the trial court's orders immediately. DOT v. Rowe, 351 N.C. 172, 521 S.E.2d 707 (1999).

Conditional Use Permit. - Appellate court had jurisdiction to review a conditional use permit's denial after the applicant withdrew the application because (1) site owners had standing and continued to seek the permit, and (2) the denial was a reviewable final judgment. Dellinger v. Lincoln Cty., 266 N.C. App. 275, 832 S.E.2d 172 (2019).

Orders and awards pendente lite are interlocutory decrees which necessarily do not affect a substantial right from which an immediate appeal lies pursuant to subsection (d) of this section. Peeler v. Peeler, 7 N.C. App. 456, 172 S.E.2d 915 (1970) and other prior decisions recognizing a right of immediate appeal from orders and awards pendente lite are overruled. Thus, where husband in a divorce action appealed an order by the trial court for alimony pendente lite, child support pendente lite, and attorneys' fees pendente lite, the appeal was premature and therefore was dismissed. See Stephenson v. Stephenson, 55 N.C. App. 250, 285 S.E.2d 281 (1981).

[A]wards pendente lite are interlocutory decrees which necessarily do not affect a substantial right from which lies an immediate appeal pursuant to this section. Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991).

Order which clearly affected the right of plaintiff to receive support on behalf of minor children from defendant on a monthly basis as needed and in the amount which had been found reasonably necessary for the support and maintenance of the children involved a substantial right, and therefore the order in question was immediately appealable. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

Denial of Attorneys' Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice. - Order denying plaintiff's motion to reconsider order denying attorneys' motion for admission pro hac vice was an interlocutory order and was not immediately appealable; it did not come within the statutory appeals in G.S. 1-277(a) or subsection (d) of this section. Leonard v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 57 N.C. App. 553, 291 S.E.2d 828, cert. denied, 306 N.C. 558, 294 S.E.2d 371 (1982).

Preliminary Injunction Against Operation of Business. - Defendant could appeal trial court's issuance of a preliminary injunction enjoining defendant from operating a used car lot in violation of plaintiff town's zoning ordinance, where although defendant's appeal was from an interlocutory order, defendant would have been deprived of a substantial right, the right to operate his business, absent a review prior to determination on the merits. Town of Knightdale v. Vaughn, 95 N.C. App. 649, 383 S.E.2d 460 (1989).

Denial of Preliminary Injunction - Court of appeals found that deciding if operating video games in arcade was a substantial right was not necessary where a trial court's denial of a preliminary injunction did not strip the operators of a substantial right and the operators' appeal was interlocutory. Bessemer City Express, Inc. v. City of Kings Mt., 155 N.C. App. 637, 573 S.E.2d 712 (2002), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 61, 579 S.E.2d 384 (2003).

Trial court's order granting a preliminary injunction restraining the sale of real property was immediately appealable; the merits of the underlying special proceeding between an executor and a widow in which the executor's right to partition property and to sell the widow's interest therein were decided by the entry of the widow's default nearly 10 years before, and there could have been no final order confirming a sale of the widow's allotted portion of the farm until a sale, which the trial court's order enjoined, was accomplished. Revelle v. Chamblee, 168 N.C. App. 227, 606 S.E.2d 712 (2005).

Noncompetition Agreement. - Interlocutory holdings that an employer's voluntary dismissal was in bad faith and the employer's noncompetition agreement was invalid were reviewed because, based on judicial economy, it was appropriate to exercise discretion to treat the employer's appeal as a certiorari petition. Mkt. Am., Inc. v. Lee, 257 N.C. App. 98, 809 S.E.2d 32 (2017).

Preliminary Injunction Pursuant to Covenant Not to Compete. - Preliminary injunction entered by the trial court against defendant, pursuant to a covenant not to compete, was appealable prior to final determination on the merits, as it deprived defendant of a substantial right which he would lose absent review prior to a final determination. Masterclean of N.C. Inc. v. Guy, 82 N.C. App. 45, 345 S.E.2d 692 (1986).

In an action for injunctive relief and damages based on alleged breach of a covenant not to compete, defendant's appeal of trial court's preliminary injunction barring him from participating in any employment that competed with plaintiff's business in certain geographic locations would be dismissed as interlocutory, where there was no evidence in the record to show that defendant was presently working in any of those areas, as the injunction did not deprive defendant of any substantial right which he would lose absent a review prior to final determination. Automated Data Sys. v. Myers, 96 N.C. App. 624, 386 S.E.2d 432 (1989).

Where a former employer sued a former employee for violating a covenant not to compete, the employee was entitled to interlocutory review of the trial court's decision to issue a preliminary injunction which, inter alia, prohibited the employee from working for the employer's competitors in North Carolina or South Carolina, as the injunction adversely affected the employee's substantial right to earn a living and to practice the employee's livelihood. Precision Walls, Inc. v. Servie, 152 N.C. App. 630, 568 S.E.2d 267 (2002).

Preliminary Injunction Against Statute Granting Exclusive Right to Provide Services. - Court ruling granting plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction against Insurance Commissioner's enforcement of G.S. 58-71-71, which made defendant the exclusive provider of creditable bail bondsmen training, required defendant to "give up" this exclusive right and the ability to receive remuneration for providing such education, thereby affecting a substantial right. Rockford-Cohen Group, LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Ins., 230 N.C. App. 317, 749 S.E.2d 469 (2013).

When a party asserts a statutory privilege, such as that set out by G.S. 90-21.22(e) (right to non-disclosure of confidential information), which directly relates to the matter to be disclosed under an interlocutory discovery order, and the assertion is not otherwise frivolous or insubstantial, the challenged order affects a substantial right under G.S. 1-277(a) and subdivision (d)(1) of this section and is immediately reviewable; to the extent that cases like Kaplan v. Prolife Action League of Greensboro, 123 N.C. App. 677, 474 S.E.2d 408 (1996) differ, they are overruled. Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 522 S.E.2d 577 (1999).

Order Denying Discovery Privilege. - Dentist's motion to quash subpoenas of her patient records by the Board of Dental Examiners during its investigation of the dentist sought to protect the confidentiality of the records under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1320d et seq., and therefore was subject to immediate review under G.S. 1-277(a). However, because the records were sought by a health oversight agency and requested the patient records as part of its oversight activities, 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(d) was applicable and did not prohibit the disclosure of the patient records to the Board. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Woods, 202 N.C. App. 89, 688 S.E.2d 84 (2010).

Attorney-Client Privilege. - The trial court's orders requiring that the defendants-insurers produce material protected by the attorney-client privilege affected a substantial right and entitled them to a hearing on appeal. Evans v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 142 N.C. App. 18, 541 S.E.2d 782 (2001), cert. denied, 353 N.C. 371, 547 S.E.2d 810 (2001).

An order that denied a motion to invalidate appellee's request for a jury trial was interlocutory, and no appeal lay to an appellate court therefrom, as such order did not deprive the appellants of a substantial right. Faircloth v. Beard, 83 N.C. App. 235, 349 S.E.2d 609 (1986).

Where superior court's refusal to invalidate plaintiffs' demand for a jury trial in a stockholder's derivative action amounted to a ruling that plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial, denial of defendants' motion to invalidate the demand was appealable. Faircloth v. Beard, 320 N.C. 505, 358 S.E.2d 512 (1987), overruled in part, Jacobs v. City of Asheville, 137 N.C. App. 441, 528 S.E.2d 905 (2000).

Dismissal of Claim Against One Defendant. - Dismissal of Count II of plaintiff's amended complaint, resulting in dismissal of plaintiff's claim against defendant professional corporation, affected her substantial right to have determined in a single proceeding the issues of whether she had been damaged by the actions of one, some or all of the defendants, especially since her claims against all of them arose upon the same series of transactions. Therefore, her appeal therefrom was not premature. Fox v. Wilson, 85 N.C. App. 292, 354 S.E.2d 737 (1987).

Injured party's appeal from the trial court's judgment dismissing the injured party's claims against a church and a landowner was interlocutory because the trial court did not dismiss the injured party's claims against the landowner's son; however, the judgment was appealable under G.S. 1-277 and subsection (d) of this section because the injured party had a substantial right in having the case against all defendants tried by the same jury. Clontz v. St. Mark's Evangelical Lutheran Church, 157 N.C. App. 325, 578 S.E.2d 654, cert. denied, 357 N.C. 249, 582 S.E.2d 29 (2003).

The trial court's dismissal of all claims against defendant/insurer and some but not all claims against defendant-landlords affected a substantial right where plaintiff sought relief against them based on negligence, violation of the statutory duty of a landlord to repair premises, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and wrongful death, all arising from the single occurrence of a fire in a rental home and where she had the right to have all her claims adjudicated in a single proceeding. Prince v. Wright, 141 N.C. App. 262, 541 S.E.2d 191 (2000).

Discovery Orders. - Order from which defendant first appealed, which contained no enforcement sanctions, and only ordered defendant to answer questions by a certain date, was not properly appealable, and its attempted appeal was a nullity, notwithstanding the fact that the judge signed the appeal entries. Accordingly, such appeal did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to subsequently enter sanctions against defendant. Benfield v. Benfield, 89 N.C. App. 415, 366 S.E.2d 500 (1988).

Denial of the caveators' motion to compel the decedent's former attorney to answer deposition questions was an interlocutory order that was not appealable, because the order did not affect a substantial right pursuant to G.S. 1-277(a) and subdivision (d)(1) of this section; the caveators failed to demonstrate that the attorney, who was discharged prior to the drafting of the will at issue in the case, possessed relevant information concerning the decedent's health or relationship with the propounder of the will at the time the will was drafted. In re Will of Johnston, 157 N.C. App. 258, 578 S.E.2d 635 (2003).

When defendants contended that nursing home incident reports were protected by the peer review privilege, the trial court's interlocutory order compelling production of the reports affected a substantial right and thus was immediately appealable. Hayes v. Premier Living, Inc., 181 N.C. App. 747, 641 S.E.2d 316 (2007).

Interlocutory order was immediately appealable under G.S. 7A-27(d)(1) because the order affected a substantial right as the trial court's order compelled the production of a letter from a neuro-surgeon, who treated the decedent, to the chairperson of a hospital's surgical peer review committee and the letter might have been statutorily privileged from disclosure under G.S. 131E-95. Woods v. Moses Cone Health Sys., 198 N.C. App. 120, 678 S.E.2d 787 (2009), review denied, 363 N.C. 813, 693 S.E.2d 353, LEXIS 105 (2010).

When a homeowners' association sued a manufacturer for product liability under G.S. 99B-1 et seq., and a trial court ordered the association to return documents to the manufacturer that were inadvertently released to the association in discovery, the association could not immediately appeal the order under G.S. 1-277 or G.S. 7A-27(d)(1) on the theory that the order affected the association's substantial right, because: (1) the association did not identify a right that was affected or show how such a right would be jeopardized without immediate review; (2) unsupported opinions in a memo the association was ordered to return to the manufacturer did not affect a substantial right, as the memo did not show what the manufacturer's employees, outside testers and experts, knew about the product's adequacy and when the employees knew the information, and such prior knowledge was not critical to claims against the manufacturer; and (3), if such knowledge were critical, the memo did not contribute significantly to a determination of the issue. Harbour Point Homeowners' Ass'n v. DJF Enters., 206 N.C. App. 152, 697 S.E.2d 439 (2010).

County could not appeal an interlocutory order requiring a former manager to appear for a deposition because the county was not deprived of a substantial right nor did the county suffer injury warranting immediate review, as the order did not bar good-faith objections to the disclosure of privileged information at the deposition. Royal Oak Concerned Citizens Ass'n v. Brunswick County, 233 N.C. App. 145, 756 S.E.2d 833 (2014).

Expert witness could not appeal an order allowing the witness's deposition because (1) the order was interlocutory, (2) the witness did not allege a substantial right that would be jeopardized absent immediate appeal, and (3) the witness's that the witness's rights might be implicated if certain fact scenarios occurred in the future did not present a ripe controversy. In re Accutane Litig., 233 N.C. App. 319, 758 S.E.2d 13 (2014).

Property purchasers' appeal of an order compelling discovery was reviewed on appeal where they asserted that two e-mails the trial court had ordered disclosed were privileged under the work product doctrine. Maldjian v. Bloomquist, 245 N.C. App. 222, 782 S.E.2d 80 (2016).

Because the limited discovery requested by a plaintiff is highly material to a determination of the critical issue in his motion to vacate, the order denying discovery affects a substantial right justifying immediate appeal under G.S. 7A-27(b)(3)(a). Stokes v. Crumpton, 369 N.C. 713, 800 S.E.2d 41 (June 9, 2017).

Sanctions for Noncompliance with Discovery Order. - Where a party is adjudged to be in contempt for noncompliance with a discovery order or has been assessed with certain other sanctions, the order is immediately appealable, since it affects a substantial right under G.S. 1-277 and subdivision (d)(1) of this section. Benfield v. Benfield, 89 N.C. App. 415, 366 S.E.2d 500 (1988).

Order holding defendant in contempt of court for his failure to comply with discovery order was appealable and tested the validity both of the original discovery order and the contempt order. Benfield v. Benfield, 89 N.C. App. 415, 366 S.E.2d 500 (1988).

Denial of movant's motion to dismiss appeal was appropriate because the trial court ordered the nonmoving party on a motion to compel discovery to immediately pay attorneys fees as sanctions to the movant. Thus, the nonmoving party sufficiently established that the order for sanctions affected a substantial right and that interlocutory review was appropriate. Porters Neck Ltd., LLC v. Porters Neck Country Club, Inc., - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Mar. 4, 2021).

Order Setting Aside Judgment. - The avoidance of having to affirmatively prove claim was not a "substantial" right, where plaintiff was affected by inability to immediately appeal order setting aside judgment only to the extent that it would have to establish defendants' liability and the amount thereof by proper evidence, rather than by relying upon a purported confession of judgment. First Am. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Satterfield, 87 N.C. App. 160, 359 S.E.2d 812 (1987).

Order setting aside a default judgment is interlocutory, as it does not finally dispose of the case and requires further action by the trial court. Horne v. Nobility Homes, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 476, 363 S.E.2d 642 (1988).

Order Denying Motion for Stay. - The denial of defendant's motion for stay did not dispose of any of the claims or parties, the trial court did not certify the case for immediate appeal under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b), and defendants did not show that the trial court's decision deprived them of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review. Howerton v. Grace Hosp., 124 N.C. App. 199, 476 S.E.2d 440 (1996).

Order Requiring Posting of Bond. - Where brothers were equal shareholders in company, and company could no longer be conducted to the advantage of both of the shareholders, and where judge ordered the brothers to post a secured bond to ensure compliance with any judgment rendered, the appeal of the order by one of the brothers was interlocutory and would be dismissed; no substantial right of his was affected, since the amount of the bond reasonably approximated the value of the assets in his possession, and the bond would be cancelled if the opposing brother was unsuccessful in obtaining judgment in his favor. Stancil v. Stancil, 94 N.C. App. 760, 381 S.E.2d 720 (1989).

Order Increasing Attachment Bond Where No Findings Were Made. - Because the trial court was not required to make findings of fact in order to modify the plaintiffs' attachment bond on the motion of the defendant pursuant to G.S. 1-440.40(a), and where the plaintiffs failed to request such findings, they could not assert that the order had affected their substantial rights and they were not entitled to review. Collins v. Talley, 135 N.C. App. 758, 522 S.E.2d 794 (1999).

Order Removing Attorney. - Plaintiff had a substantial right to have attorney of her choice, properly admitted pro hac vice under G.S. 84-4.1, represent her in her lawsuit, and order removing him as counsel affected a substantial right of the plaintiff and was immediately appealable. Goldston v. AMC, 326 N.C. 723, 392 S.E.2d 735 (1990).

Appellate court had jurisdiction to hear a law firm's interlocutory appeal from an order disqualifying the firm's attorneys from representing the firm in a fee collection case while also testifying for the firm because the order affected a substantial right. Harris & Hilton, P.A. v. Rassette, 252 N.C. App. 280, 798 S.E.2d 154 (2017).

Denial of Motion to Disqualify Counsel. - An order granting disqualification of counsel seriously disrupts the progress of litigation while new counsel is obtained, but one refusing such relief merely allows the action to proceed and has no permanent effect of any kind. Travco Hotels, Inc. v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 332 N.C. 288, 420 S.E.2d 426 (1992).

Ruling striking attorney's charging lien was not a final order, since a charging lien is not available until there is a final judgment or decree to which the lien can attach, and no final judgment had yet been entered in the underlying divorce action. Howell v. Howell, 89 N.C. App. 115, 365 S.E.2d 181 (1988).

Where trial court's entry of summary judgment against plaintiff included an award of attorneys' fees, it affected a substantial right; consequently, the order was immediately appealable pursuant to G.S. 1-277(a) and subsection (d) of this section. K & K Dev. Corp. v. Columbia Banking Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 96 N.C. App. 474, 386 S.E.2d 226 (1989).

Denial of attorneys' fees under G.S. 50-16.4 was not a final order of the trial court, where at the time appellant's motion was filed there had been no determination that his client, defendant, was entitled to alimony pendente lite under G.S. 50-16.3, so that appellant was not yet entitled to attorneys' fees under G.S. 50-16.4, and as appellant could appeal the denial of his motion after final judgment, or could bring a separate lawsuit to collect fees, no substantial right of appellant was affected by the Court of Appeals' failure to entertain an interlocutory appeal on this issue. Howell v. Howell, 89 N.C. App. 115, 365 S.E.2d 181 (1988).

Alimony Award Held Interlocutory Because Motion for Attorney's Fees Still Unresolved. - Judgment awarding a wife permanent alimony was nonappealable because, inasmuch as the wife's claim for attorney's fees had not been disposed of by the trial court, the order was interlocutory, the order had not been certified by the trial court pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b), and the husband did not identify any substantial right that might have been lost without immediate appeal, as required by N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(4). Webb v. Webb, 196 N.C. App. 770, 677 S.E.2d 462 (2009).

Orders awarding child support, alimony, and attorneys' fees pendente lite are interlocutory decrees which necessarily do not affect a substantial right from which lies an immediate appeal pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(d). Berry v. Berry, 87 N.C. App. 624, 361 S.E.2d 771 (1987).

Child support order which was not expressly designated pendente lite by the court, but which was nevertheless a temporary one, entered provisionally pending a final determination to be made at a later date, was not subject to review by appeal. Berry v. Berry, 87 N.C. App. 624, 361 S.E.2d 771 (1987).

Appeal of Temporary Custody Order. - As a trial court awarded a former husband temporary custody of the parties' child and the former wife made no showing that the order adversely affected a substantial right which could not be protected by a timely appeal of the trial court's ultimate disposition of the entire controversy on the merits, review of the interlocutory order was not warranted under G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1). File v. File, 195 N.C. App. 562, 673 S.E.2d 405 (2009).

Termination of Temporary Alimony. - Appeal of an order terminating dependent spouse's right to receive temporary alimony was not premature, as the question of plaintiff's continued entitlement to the previously ordered alimony pendente lite until such time as her prayer for permanent alimony could be heard affected a "substantial right" of the dependent spouse. Brown v. Brown, 85 N.C. App. 602, 355 S.E.2d 525, cert. denied, 320 N.C. 511, 358 S.E.2d 516 (1987).

Equitable Distribution Order. - Permitting an immediate appeal from an interim equitable distribution order would be contrary to the policy of this state discouraging fragmentary appeals. Hunter v. Hunter, 126 N.C. App. 705, 486 S.E.2d 244 (1997).

Order Barring Defendant from Equitable Distribution. - Trial court's order denying defendant's motion to amend his answer in divorce action, which he filed following grant of absolute divorce to plaintiff, had the effect of forever barring defendant from asserting a claim for equitable distribution, and thus affected a substantial right; it was therefore appealable as a matter of right. Goodwin v. Zeydel, 96 N.C. App. 670, 387 S.E.2d 57 (1990).

Order Dismissing Equitable Distribution Claim. - Given the factual issues overlapping husband's company's contract claim retained by the court and wife's equitable distribution counterclaim which it dismissed, wife could appeal the dismissal of the equitable distribution counterclaim as a matter of right, since a substantial right would otherwise be affected. Small v. Small, 93 N.C. App. 614, 379 S.E.2d 273, cert. denied, 325 N.C. 273, 384 S.E.2d 519 (1989).

Order Granting Absolute Divorce While Reserving Equitable Distribution Issues. - While the trial court's determination of the parties' date of separation might have an effect on the unresolved issue of equitable distribution, the same factual issues would not be involved and no threat of inconsistent verdicts was involved, and thus, no substantial right of the husband was affected so as to entitle him to appeal the trial court's grant of an absolute divorce to the wife while reserving equitable distribution issues for a later hearing. Stafford v. Stafford, 133 N.C. App. 163, 515 S.E.2d 43 (1999), aff'd, 351 N.C. 94, 520 S.E.2d 785 (1999).

Ruling Disposing of a Plea in Bar. - Court's ruling on a separation/property settlement agreement did not dispose of plaintiff's claims for equitable distribution and alimony but only disposed of defendant's plea in bar to those claims: The court's ruling was thus interlocutory, and although the court's order stated that its ruling affected a substantial right and was a proper subject of immediate appeal, the court's order could not be certified as a final appealable order under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b). Garris v. Garris, 92 N.C. App. 467, 374 S.E.2d 638 (1988).

Appeal of Order Denying Motion to Disqualify Opponent's Counsel. - Where defendant maintained that because law firm representing plaintiff represented defendant in previous matters of a similar nature (but not involving plaintiff), that firm could not represent plaintiff in the present matter, it did have a substantial right to prevent prior counsel from using confidential information gleaned from a prior representation and utilizing it against the client in subsequent litigation, however, it cannot be found that the deprivation of this right would injure defendant if not corrected before a final judgment, and defendant's appeal of the trial court's order denying its motion to disqualify law firm was interlocutory. Travco Hotels, Inc. v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 102 N.C. App. 659, 403 S.E.2d 593, aff'd, 332 N.C. 288, 420 S.E.2d 426 (1992).

Appeal Regarding Waiver of Parental Consent. - No appeal of right lies to the Court of Appeals from an order of the superior court entered pursuant to G.S. 90-21.8(h); the exclusive appeal remedy is the appeal from the district court to the superior court. In re Doe, 126 N.C. App. 401, 485 S.E.2d 354 (1997).

Appeal of Order Denying Release of Escrow Funds. - The effect of an order denying the release of the funds held in escrow under G.S. 58-36-25 was temporary and not permanent where the Commissioner's order only determined that the funds are not to be released now, and did not purport to determine who is entitled to the money; for these reasons, an appeal of the order was interlocutory and was not immediately appealable under either G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b) or G.S. 1-277 or this section. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 102 N.C. App. 809, 403 S.E.2d 597 (1991).

Judgment That Leaves Issue of Damages Unresolved. - A judgment that determines only that there has in fact been a breach by defendant and leaves unresolved the issue of plaintiffs' damage is clearly an interlocutory order; an order determining only the issue of liability and leaving unresolved other issues such as that of damages cannot be held to affect a substantial right. Johnston v. Royal Indem. Co., 107 N.C. App. 624, 421 S.E.2d 170 (1992).

Issues in Bifurcated Trial Held Nonappealable. - In a case bifurcated pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 42(b) as to liability and damages, the denial of a motion for new trial as to the liability phase was interlocutory and nonappealable and there was no automatic right of appeal under either G.S. 1-277 or G.S. 7A-27(d) in the absence of a showing of a substantial right because the denial of defendants' motion for a new trial was only as to the liability phase of the trial. Land v. Land, 201 N.C. App. 672, 687 S.E.2d 511 (2010), review denied 2010 N.C. LEXIS 498 (2010).

Order of North Carolina Industrial Commission Modifying Deputy Commissioner's Order. - Appeal from the North Carolina Industrial Commission's order that a deputy commissioner's dismissal of a workers' compensation claim was to be deemed to be without prejudice was dismissed; the Commission's order was an interlocutory order, from which there was no general right to immediate review, and the denial of immediate review would not affect the employers' substantial rights. Ward v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 166 N.C. App. 726, 603 S.E.2d 896 (2004), cert. denied, 359 N.C. 326, 611 S.E.2d 853 (2005).

Orders Under Family Law Arbitration Act. - Husband had a right to appeal the trial court's order denying discovery under the substantial rights analysis of G.S. 7A-27(b)(3)(a), and that right to appeal could exist under G.S. 7A-27 even if the order was not appealable under the arbitration statute itself. Stokes v. Crumpton, 369 N.C. 713, 800 S.E.2d 41 (June 9, 2017).

Supreme Court of North Carolina agrees that a trial court's interlocutory order may be appealed if it affects a substantial right, pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(b)(3)(a), even if plaintiff has no right to appeal under the Family Law Arbitration Act. Stokes v. Crumpton, 369 N.C. 713, 800 S.E.2d 41 (June 9, 2017).

Interlocutory Appeal Allowed Where Order Affected Potential Inheritance. - Interlocutory order denying siblings' motion to intervene in a G.S. 49-14 paternity action was permitted to be considered under G.S. 1-277 and G.S. 7A-27(a) (as the order adversely affected a substantial right which they could lose - part of their inheritance from their deceased father's estate), but denial of the motion was affirmed. Stockton v. Estate of Thompson, 165 N.C. App. 899, 600 S.E.2d 13 (2004).

Interlocutory Appeal From Denial of Appointment of Receiver. - Shareholders were entitled to an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's denial of their motion for the appointment of a receiver because they established a substantial right to the preservation of what they alleged were their corporation's assets and opportunities under G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1), which right was substantially affected by the trial court's denial of the appointment of a receiver. Barnes v. Kochhar, 178 N.C. App. 489, 633 S.E.2d 474 (2006).

Trial court's denial of a motion to enforce a settlement did not resolve the underlying personal injury claim, and the order of denial was therefore interlocutory; since the trial court did not certify that there was no just reason to delay the appeal, and the denial did not affect a substantial right, there was no right to an immediate appeal since an appeal of the denial was still allowed once there was a final judgment. Milton v. Thompson, 170 N.C. App. 176, 611 S.E.2d 474 (2005).

Blanket General Objection Failed. - Blanket general objection based on the attorney/client privilege, the work product doctrine, or any other applicable privilege or doctrine did not satisfy G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 34 as blanket general objections purporting to assert attorney-client privilege or work product immunity to all of the opposing parties' discovery requests were inadequate to effect their intended purpose and did not establish a substantial right to an immediate appeal. K2 Asia Ventures v. Trota, 215 N.C. App. 443, 717 S.E.2d 1 (2011), review denied, 719 S.E.2d 37, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 1139 (2011).

I. IN GENERAL.

Legislative Intent. - In establishing the North Carolina Court of Appeals, defining its jurisdiction, and providing a system of appeals, the General Assembly followed the basic principle that there should be only one trial on the merits and one appeal on the law, as of right, in every case. Consequently, double appeals as of right - first to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court - are authorized only in the instances specified by this section. State v. Cumber, 280 N.C. 127, 185 S.E.2d 141 (1971).

Had the General Assembly intended to limit double appeals in criminal cases to the defendant only, it would have said so. State v. Campbell, 282 N.C. 125, 191 S.E.2d 752 (1972).

Scope of Review. - When the Supreme Court, after a decision of a cause by the Court of Appeals and pursuant to the petition of a party thereto as authorized by G.S. 7A-31, grants certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, only the decision of the Court of Appeals is before the Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court inquires into proceedings in the trial court solely to determine the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Its inquiry is restricted to rulings of the Court of Appeals which are assigned as error in the petition for certiorari and which are preserved by arguments or the citation of authorities with reference thereto in the brief filed by the petitioner in the Supreme Court, except in those instances in which the Supreme Court elects to exercise its general power of supervision of courts inferior to the Supreme Court. Supreme Court review of a decision by the Court of Appeals upon an appeal from it to the Supreme Court as a matter of right, pursuant to this section, is similarly limited. State v. Williams, 274 N.C. 328, 163 S.E.2d 353 (1968).

Because the dissent in a decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals of North Carolina did not address a particular issue, defendant's arguments on that issue were not properly before the Supreme Court of North Carolina. State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 658 S.E.2d 643 (2008).

Right to Counsel. - G.S. 7A-450 et seq. has generally been construed to limit the right to appointed counsel in criminal cases to direct appeals taken as of right. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974).

Applied in State v. Cavallaro, 274 N.C. 480, 164 S.E.2d 168 (1968); Southern Ry. v. City of Winston-Salem, 275 N.C. 465, 168 S.E.2d 396 (1969); State v. Horton, 275 N.C. 651, 170 S.E.2d 466 (1969); State v. Bumper, 275 N.C. 670, 170 S.E.2d 457 (1969); State v. Strickland, 276 N.C. 253, 173 S.E.2d 129 (1970); State v. Barrow, 276 N.C. 381, 172 S.E.2d 512 (1970); State v. McCloud, 276 N.C. 518, 173 S.E.2d 753 (1970); North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n v. Asheville School, Inc., 276 N.C. 556, 173 S.E.2d 909 (1970); Atkins v. Moye, 277 N.C. 179, 176 S.E.2d 789 (1970); State v. Green, 277 N.C. 188, 176 S.E.2d 756 (1970); Goldman v. Parkland of Dallas, Inc., 277 N.C. 223, 176 S.E.2d 784 (1970); State v. Gaiten, 277 N.C. 236, 176 S.E.2d 778 (1970); State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242, 176 S.E.2d 772 (1970); Marrone v. Long, 277 N.C. 246, 176 S.E.2d 762 (1970); State v. Fowler, 277 N.C. 305, 177 S.E.2d 385 (1970); State v. Jordan, 277 N.C. 341, 177 S.E.2d 289 (1970); State v. Hatcher, 277 N.C. 380, 177 S.E.2d 892 (1970); Williamson v. McNeill, 277 N.C. 447, 177 S.E.2d 859 (1970); Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971); In re Johnson, 277 N.C. 688, 178 S.E.2d 470 (1971); Southern Ry. v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 709, 178 S.E.2d 422 (1971); Keiger v. Winston-Salem Bd. of Adjustment, 278 N.C. 17, 178 S.E.2d 616 (1971); Blackwell v. Butts, 278 N.C. 615, 180 S.E.2d 835 (1971); State v. Lynch, 279 N.C. 1, 181 S.E.2d 561 (1971); Watkins v. Central Motor Lines, 279 N.C. 132, 181 S.E.2d 588 (1971); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 279 N.C. 240, 182 S.E.2d 571 (1971); Brewer v. Harris, 279 N.C. 288, 182 S.E.2d 345 (1971); State v. Harris, 279 N.C. 307, 182 S.E.2d 364 (1971); State v. Hunter, 279 N.C. 498, 183 S.E.2d 665 (1971); First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Carr, 279 N.C. 539, 184 S.E.2d 268 (1971); Pleasant v. Motors Ins. Co., 280 N.C. 100, 185 S.E.2d 164 (1971); State v. Jackson, 280 N.C. 122, 185 S.E.2d 202 (1971); State v. Speights, 280 N.C. 137, 185 S.E.2d 152 (1971); State v. McCluney, 280 N.C. 404, 185 S.E.2d 870 (1972); State v. Bryant, 280 N.C. 407, 185 S.E.2d 854 (1972); In re Tew, 280 N.C. 612, 187 S.E.2d 13 (1972); State v. Greenwood, 280 N.C. 651, 187 S.E.2d 8 (1972); Willis v. J.M. Davis Indus., Inc., 280 N.C. 709, 186 S.E.2d 913 (1972); State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. 1, 187 S.E.2d 706 (1972); Roberts v. William N. & Kate B. Reynolds Mem. Park, 281 N.C. 48, 187 S.E.2d 721 (1972); State v. Ford, 281 N.C. 62, 187 S.E.2d 741 (1972); State ex rel. Banking Comm'n v. Lexington State Bank, 281 N.C. 108, 187 S.E.2d 747 (1972); State v. Spencer, 281 N.C. 121, 187 S.E.2d 779 (1972); EAC Credit Corp. v. Wilson, 281 N.C. 140, 187 S.E.2d 752 (1972); Wright v. Wright, 281 N.C. 159, 188 S.E.2d 317 (1972); Investment Properties of Asheville, Inc. v. Allen, 281 N.C. 174, 188 S.E.2d 441 (1972); Investment Properties of Asheville, Inc. v. Norburn, 281 N.C. 191, 188 S.E.2d 342 (1972); Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 188 S.E.2d 350 (1972); State v. Accor, 281 N.C. 287, 188 S.E.2d 332 (1972); Stevenson v. City of Durham, 281 N.C. 300, 188 S.E.2d 281 (1972); Calloway v. Ford Motor Co., 281 N.C. 496,
189 S.E.2d 484 (1972); Ferguson v. Morgan, 282 N.C. 83, 191 S.E.2d 817 (1972); State v. Brown, 282 N.C. 117, 191 S.E.2d 659 (1972); State v. Killian, 282 N.C. 138, 191 S.E.2d 699 (1972); State v. Summrell, 282 N.C. 157, 192 S.E.2d 569 (1972); Marks v. Thompson, 282 N.C. 174, 192 S.E.2d 311 (1972); McNair v. Boyette, 282 N.C. 230, 192 S.E.2d 457 (1972); State v. Russell, 282 N.C. 240, 192 S.E.2d 294 (1972); Variety Theatres, Inc. v. Cleveland County, 282 N.C. 272, 192 S.E.2d 290 (1972); Braswell v. Purser, 282 N.C. 388, 193 S.E.2d 90 (1972); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. City of Durham, 16 N.C. App. 69, 190 S.E.2d 851 (1972); Hoots v. Calaway, 282 N.C. 477, 193 S.E.2d 709 (1973); State v. Dix, 282 N.C. 490, 193 S.E.2d 897 (1973); Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 194 S.E.2d 521 (1973); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. J.D. McCotter, Inc., 283 N.C. 104, 194 S.E.2d 859 (1973); State v. Cameron, 283 N.C. 191, 195 S.E.2d 481 (1973); State v. Streeter, 283 N.C. 203, 195 S.E.2d 502 (1973); State v. Fredell, 283 N.C. 242, 195 S.E.2d 300 (1973); Investment Properties of Asheville, Inc. v. Allen, 283 N.C. 277, 196 S.E.2d 262 (1973); Tennessee Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 283 N.C. 423, 196 S.E.2d 711 (1973); Anderson v. Butler, 284 N.C. 723, 202 S.E.2d 585 (1974); State v. Horn, 285 N.C. 82, 203 S.E.2d 36 (1974); State v. Heard, 285 N.C. 167, 203 S.E.2d 826 (1974); Sanders v. Wilkerson, 285 N.C. 215, 204 S.E.2d 17 (1974); State v. Castor, 285 N.C. 286, 204 S.E.2d 848 (1974); State v. Shore, 285 N.C. 328, 204 S.E.2d 682 (1974); State v. Austin, 285 N.C. 364, 204 S.E.2d 675 (1974); Smith v. Keator, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d 203 (1974); Robertson v. Stanley, 285 N.C. 561, 206 S.E.2d 190 (1974); State v. Luther, 285 N.C. 570, 206 S.E.2d 238 (1974); Spartan Leasing, Inc. v. Brown, 285 N.C. 689, 208 S.E.2d 649 (1974); Estate of Loftin v. Loftin, 285 N.C. 717, 208 S.E.2d 670 (1974); Little v. Rose, 285 N.C. 724, 208 S.E.2d 666 (1974); Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, 286 N.C. 24, 209 S.E.2d 795 (1974); Rhodes v. Hogg & Allen, 286 N.C. 40, 209 S.E.2d 794 (1974); State v. Crews, 286 N.C. 41, 209 S.E.2d 462 (1974); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Werner Indus., Inc., 286 N.C. 89, 209 S.E.2d 734 (1974); State v. Edwards, 286 N.C. 162, 209 S.E.2d 758 (1974); State v. Black, 286 N.C. 191, 209 S.E.2d 458 (1974); Heath v. Mosley, 286 N.C. 197, 209 S.E.2d 740 (1974); State v. Lindley, 286 N.C. 255, 210 S.E.2d 207 (1974); Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 213 S.E.2d 563 (1975); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 287 N.C. 192, 214 S.E.2d 98 (1975); State v. Brooks, 287 N.C. 392, 215 S.E.2d 111 (1975); Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 215 S.E.2d 102 (1975); State v. Jackson, 287 N.C. 470, 215 S.E.2d 123 (1975); State v. Pope, 287 N.C. 505, 215 S.E.2d 139 (1975); State v. Brown, 287 N.C. 523, 215 S.E.2d 150 (1975); Rape v. Lyerly, 287 N.C. 601, 215 S.E.2d 737 (1975); Tucker v. Tucker, 288 N.C. 81, 216 S.E.2d 1 (1975); Thompson v. Thompson, 288 N.C. 120, 215 S.E.2d 606 (1975); Sink v. Easter, 288 N.C. 183,
217 S.E.2d 532 (1975); State v. McCotter, 288 N.C. 227, 217 S.E.2d 525 (1975); Williams v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 288 N.C. 338, 218 S.E.2d 368 (1975); Canady v. Creech, 288 N.C. 354, 218 S.E.2d 383 (1975); Pruitt v. Williams, 288 N.C. 368, 218 S.E.2d 348 (1975); Caldwell v. Deese, 288 N.C. 375, 218 S.E.2d 379 (1975); Sauls v. Sauls, 288 N.C. 387, 218 S.E.2d 338 (1975); Adder v. Holman & Moody, Inc., 288 N.C. 484, 219 S.E.2d 190 (1975); State v. Scott, 289 N.C. 712, 224 S.E.2d 185 (1976); State v. Rhodes, 290 N.C. 16, 224 S.E.2d 631 (1976); Cogdill v. Scates, 290 N.C. 31, 224 S.E.2d 604 (1976); State v. Wright, 290 N.C. 45, 224 S.E.2d 624 (1976); State v. Atwood, 290 N.C. 266, 225 S.E.2d 543 (1976); Watkins v. City of Wilmington, 290 N.C. 276, 225 S.E.2d 577 (1976); Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347 (1976); Nantz v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 290 N.C. 473, 226 S.E.2d 340 (1976); Crumpton v. Crumpton, 290 N.C. 651, 227 S.E.2d 587 (1976); Brock v. North Carolina Property Tax Comm'n, 290 N.C. 731, 228 S.E.2d 254 (1976); State v. Finney, 290 N.C. 755, 228 S.E.2d 433 (1976); State v. Asbury, 291 N.C. 164, 229 S.E.2d 175 (1976); State v. Sauls, 291 N.C. 253, 230 S.E.2d 390 (1976); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 327, 230 S.E.2d 651 (1976); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 361, 230 S.E.2d 671 (1976); State v. Castor, 28 N.C. App. 336, 220 S.E.2d 819 (1976); Manganello v. Permastone, Inc., 291 N.C. 666, 231 S.E.2d 678 (1977); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 292 N.C. 1, 231 S.E.2d 867 (1977); State v. McKenzie, 292 N.C. 170, 232 S.E.2d 424 (1977); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 292 N.C. 244, 232 S.E.2d 414 (1977); State v. Thomas, 292 N.C. 251, 232 S.E.2d 411 (1977); State v. Best, 292 N.C. 294, 233 S.E.2d 544 (1977); State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 233 S.E.2d 895 (1977); Gallimore v. Marilyn's Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 233 S.E.2d 529 (1977); Thompson v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 292 N.C. 406, 233 S.E.2d 538 (1977); Falls Sales Co. v. Board of Transp., 292 N.C. 437, 233 S.E.2d 569 (1977); Farmer v. Chaney, 292 N.C. 451, 233 S.E.2d 582 (1977); State v. Gainey, 292 N.C. 627, 234 S.E.2d 610 (1977); Etheridge v. Peters, 301 N.C. 76, 269 S.E.2d 133 (1980); Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 301 N.C. 226, 271 S.E.2d 364 (1980); State v. Maher, 305 N.C. 544, 290 S.E.2d 694 (1982); State v. Barnes, 307 N.C. 104, 296 S.E.2d 291 (1982); Felton v. Hospital Guild, 307 N.C. 121, 296 S.E.2d 297 (1982); Beck v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 307 N.C. 267, 297 S.E.2d 397 (1982); State v. Tate, 307 N.C. 242, 297 S.E.2d 581 (1982); A.E.P. Indus., Inc. v. McClure, 308 N.C. 393, 302 S.E.2d 754 (1983); Heath v. Turner, 309 N.C. 483, 308 S.E.2d 244 (1983); State v. Green, 309 N.C. 623, 308 S.E.2d 326 (1983); State v. Massey, 309 N.C. 625, 308 S.E.2d 332 (1983); State v. Callicutt, 309 N.C. 626, 308 S.E.2d 333 (1983); Nash v. Conrad Indus., Inc., 309 N.C. 629, 308 S.E.2d 334 (1983); Huyck Corp. v. C.C. Mangum, Inc., 309 N.C. 788, 309 S.E.2d 183 (1983); North Carolina ex rel. Horne v. Chafin, 309 N.C. 813,
309 S.E.2d 239 (1983); Coats v. Jones, 309 N.C. 815, 309 S.E.2d 253 (1983); State v. Ysaguire, 309 N.C. 780, 309 S.E.2d 436 (1983); Speck v. North Carolina Dairy Found., Inc., 311 N.C. 679, 319 S.E.2d 139 (1984); In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 319 S.E.2d 227 (1984); Board of Trustees v. Unknown & Unascertained Heirs, 311 N.C. 644, 319 S.E.2d 239 (1984); State v. Riddle, 311 N.C. 734, 319 S.E.2d 250 (1984); State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 319 S.E.2d 254 (1984); State v. Holloway, 311 N.C. 573, 319 S.E.2d 261 (1984); State v. King, 311 N.C. 603, 320 S.E.2d 1 (1984); Betts v. Parrish, 312 N.C. 47, 320 S.E.2d 662 (1984); Sherrod v. Any Child or Children Hereafter Born to Sherrod, 312 N.C. 74, 320 S.E.2d 669 (1984); Williams v. Boylan-Pearce, Inc., 313 N.C. 321, 327 S.E.2d 870 (1985); In re Webb, 313 N.C. 322, 327 S.E.2d 879 (1985); State v. Warren, 313 N.C. 254, 328 S.E.2d 256 (1985); Pollock v. Reeves Bros., 313 N.C. 287, 328 S.E.2d 282 (1985); Thompson v. Thompson, 313 N.C. 313, 328 S.E.2d 288 (1985); State v. Majors, 314 N.C. 111, 331 S.E.2d 689 (1985); Fletcher v. Jones, 314 N.C. 389, 333 S.E.2d 731 (1985); Snider v. Hopkins, 314 N.C. 529, 334 S.E.2d 776 (1985); State v. Cameron, 314 N.C. 516, 335 S.E.2d 9 (1985); State v. Whitaker, 316 N.C. 515, 342 S.E.2d 514 (1986); State v. Stallings, 316 N.C. 535, 342 S.E.2d 519 (1986); Sharpe v. Park Newspapers of Lumberton, Inc., 317 N.C. 579, 347 S.E.2d 25 (1986); Weaver v. Swedish Imports Maintenance, Inc., 319 N.C. 243, 354 S.E.2d 477 (1987); Morrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 319 N.C. 298, 354 S.E.2d 495 (1987); Medlin v. Bass, 327 N.C. 587, 398 S.E.2d 460 (1990); State v. Everett, 328 N.C. 72, 399 S.E.2d 305 (1991); Hearne v. Sherman, 350 N.C. 612, 516 S.E.2d 864 (1999); Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 351 N.C. 458, 526 S.E.2d 652 (2000), appeal dismissed, 153 N.C. App. 378, 570 S.E.2d 136 (2002); Wise v. Harrington Grove Cmty. Ass'n, 357 N.C. 396, 584 S.E.2d 731 (2003); In re Estate of Lunsford, 160 N.C. App. 125, 585 S.E.2d 245 (2003); N.C. Forestry Ass'n v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 357 N.C. 640, 588 S.E.2d 880 (2003); State v. Alexander, 359 N.C. 824, 616 S.E.2d 914 (2005); Coley v. State, 360 N.C. 493, 631 S.E.2d 121 (2006); Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 361 N.C. 114, 638 S.E.2d 203 (2006); Holly Ridge Assocs., LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 361 N.C. 531, 648 S.E.2d 830 (2007); State v. Icard, 363 N.C. 303, 677 S.E.2d 822 (June 18, 2009); In re K.J.L., 363 N.C. 343, 677 S.E.2d 835 (June 18, 2009).

State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309, 644 S.E.2d 201 (2007); In re J.T.W., 361 N.C. 341, 643 S.E.2d 579 (2007); State v. Carpenter, 361 N.C. 382, 646 S.E.2d 105 (2007); State v. Boyce, 361 N.C. 670, 651 S.E.2d 879 (2007); State v. Everette, 361 N.C. 646, 652 S.E.2d 241 (2007); Tillman v. Commer. Credit Loans, Inc., 362 N.C. 93, 655 S.E.2d 362 (2008); Davis v. Harrah's Cherokee Casino, 362 N.C. 133, 655 S.E.2d 392 (2008); State v. Wilson, 362 N.C. 162, 655 S.E.2d 359 (2008); Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 657 S.E.2d 361 (2008); Schenkel & Shultz, Inc. v. Hermon F. Fox & Assocs., P.C., 362 N.C. 269, 658 S.E.2d 918 (2008); State v. Cook, 362 N.C. 285, 661 S.E.2d 874 (2008); Hassell v. Onslow County Bd. of Educ., 362 N.C. 299, 661 S.E.2d 709 (2008); Binney v. Banner Therapy Prods., 362 N.C. 310, 661 S.E.2d 717 (2008); Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp. Co., 192 N.C. App. 114, 665 S.E.2d 493 (2008); In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 669 S.E.2d 572 (2008); Andrews v. Haygood, 362 N.C. 599, 669 S.E.2d 310 (2008), cert. denied, - U.S. - 129 S. Ct. 2792 (2009); Falk v. Fannie Mae, 367 N.C. 594, 766 S.E.2d 271 (2014); In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275 (2017).

Cited in Harris v. Board of Comm'rs, 274 N.C. 343, 163 S.E.2d 387 (1968); Rigby v. Clayton, 274 N.C. 465, 164 S.E.2d 7 (1968); Redevelopment Comm'n v. Guilford County, 274 N.C. 585, 164 S.E.2d 476 (1968); State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 141, 166 S.E.2d 53 (1969); Vinson v. Chappell, 275 N.C. 234, 166 S.E.2d 686 (1969); State v. Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 167 S.E.2d 274 (1969); Hicks v. Hicks, 275 N.C. 370, 167 S.E.2d 761 (1969); Southern Ry. v. City of Winston-Salem, 275 N.C. 465, 168 S.E.2d 396 (1969); State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 173 S.E.2d 897 (1970); Surratt v. State, 276 N.C. 725, 174 S.E.2d 524 (1970); State v. Simmons, 278 N.C. 468, 180 S.E.2d 97 (1971); Dantzic v. State, 279 N.C. 212, 182 S.E.2d 563 (1971); Ross v. Perry, 281 N.C. 570, 189 S.E.2d 226 (1972); Younts v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 281 N.C. 582, 189 S.E.2d 137 (1972); Branch v. Branch, 282 N.C. 133, 191 S.E.2d 671 (1972); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Beatties Ford Util., Inc., 21 N.C. App. 213, 203 S.E.2d 649 (1974); Master Hatcheries, Inc. v. Coble, 286 N.C. 518, 212 S.E.2d 150 (1975); Setzer v. Annas, 286 N.C. 534, 212 S.E.2d 154 (1975); State v. Miller, 289 N.C. 1, 220 S.E.2d 572 (1975); Watson Seafood & Poultry Co. v. George W. Thomas, Inc., 289 N.C. 7, 220 S.E.2d 536 (1975); Clark v. Bodycombe, 289 N.C. 246, 221 S.E.2d 506 (1976); Pruitt v. Knight Publishing Co., 289 N.C. 254, 221 S.E.2d 355 (1976); Whitaker v. Earnhardt, 289 N.C. 260, 221 S.E.2d 316 (1976); Penland v. Green, 289 N.C. 281, 221 S.E.2d 365 (1976); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 289 N.C. 286, 221 S.E.2d 322 (1976); Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976); Kidd v. Early, 289 N.C. 343, 222 S.E.2d 392 (1976); State v. Greene, 289 N.C. 578, 223 S.E.2d 365 (1976); Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 289 N.C. 587, 223 S.E.2d 346 (1976); State v. McFadden, 292 N.C. 609, 234 S.E.2d 742 (1977); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 293 N.C. 365, 239 S.E.2d 48 (1977); State v. Boone, 293 N.C. 702, 239 S.E.2d 459 (1977); State v. Hewitt, 294 N.C. 316, 239 S.E.2d 833 (1978); State v. McKoy, 294 N.C. 134, 240 S.E.2d 383 (1978); State v. Lee, 294 N.C. 299, 240 S.E.2d 449 (1978); State v. Walters, 294 N.C. 311, 240 S.E.2d 628 (1978); Thompson v. Frank Ix & Sons, 294 N.C. 358, 240 S.E.2d 783 (1978); State v. Sanders, 294 N.C. 337, 240 S.E.2d 788 (1978); Frank H. Conner Co. v. Spanish Inns Charlotte, Ltd., 294 N.C. 661, 242 S.E.2d 785 (1978); In re Byers, 295 N.C. 256, 244 S.E.2d 665 (1978); Murphy v. Murphy, 295 N.C. 390, 245 S.E.2d 693 (1978); State v. Headen, 295 N.C. 437, 245 S.E.2d 706 (1978); State v. Ross, 295 N.C. 488, 246 S.E.2d 780 (1978); Daughtry v. Turnage, 295 N.C. 543, 246 S.E.2d 788 (1978); State v. Snead, 295 N.C. 615, 247 S.E.2d 893 (1978); State v. Alston, 295 N.C. 629, 247 S.E.2d 898 (1978); State v. Hodges, 296 N.C. 66, 249 S.E.2d 371 (1978); Currence v. Hardin, 296 N.C. 95, 249 S.E.2d 387 (1978); North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Evans, 296 N.C. 374, 250 S.E.2d 231 (1979); Rappaport v. Days Inn of Am., Inc., 296 N.C. 382, 250 S.E.2d 245 (1979); Moore v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 296 N.C. 467, 251 S.E.2d 419 (1979); Hensley v. Caswell Action Comm., Inc.,
296 N.C. 527, 251 S.E.2d 399 (1979); Arnold v. Sharpe, 296 N.C. 533, 251 S.E.2d 452 (1979); State v. Gunther, 296 N.C. 578, 251 S.E.2d 462 (1979); Beasley v. Beasley, 296 N.C. 580, 251 S.E.2d 433 (1979); Housing, Inc. v. Weaver, 296 N.C. 581, 251 S.E.2d 457 (1979); White v. White, 296 N.C. 661, 252 S.E.2d 698 (1979); State v. Thompson, 296 N.C. 703, 252 S.E.2d 776 (1979); Moore v. Moore, 297 N.C. 14, 252 S.E.2d 735 (1979); Gregory Poole Equip. Co. v. Coble, 297 N.C. 19, 252 S.E.2d 729 (1979); Henderson County v. Osteen, 297 N.C. 113, 254 S.E.2d 160 (1979); Wadsworth v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 297 N.C. 172, 253 S.E.2d 925 (1979); State v. Phifer, 297 N.C. 216, 254 S.E.2d 586 (1979); Moore v. Union Fid. Life Ins. Co., 297 N.C. 375, 255 S.E.2d 160 (1979); Wood v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 297 N.C. 636, 256 S.E.2d 692 (1979); State v. Haywood, 297 N.C. 686, 256 S.E.2d 715 (1979); Smith v. State, 298 N.C. 115, 257 S.E.2d 399 (1979); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Mebane Home Tel. Co., 298 N.C. 162, 257 S.E.2d 623 (1979); State v. Winfrey, 298 N.C. 260, 258 S.E.2d 346 (1979); Kinlaw v. Long Mfg. N.C. Inc., 298 N.C. 494, 259 S.E.2d 552 (1979); In re Vinson, 298 N.C. 640, 260 S.E.2d 591 (1979); Baumann v. Smith, 298 N.C. 778, 260 S.E.2d 626 (1979); State v. Benton, 299 N.C. 16, 260 S.E.2d 917 (1980); In re Purported Will of Andrews, 299 N.C. 52, 261 S.E.2d 198 (1980); Pearce v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 299 N.C. 64, 261 S.E.2d 176 (1980); State v. Dickens, 299 N.C. 76, 261 S.E.2d 183 (1980); State v. Jones, 299 N.C. 103, 261 S.E.2d 1 (1980); Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 261 S.E.2d 849 (1980); Tanglewood Land Co. v. Byrd, 299 N.C. 260, 261 S.E.2d 655 (1980); State ex rel. Child Day-Care Licensing Comm'n v. Fayetteville St. Christian School, 299 N.C. 351, 261 S.E.2d 908 (1980); National Mtg. Corp. v. American Title Ins. Co., 299 N.C. 369, 261 S.E.2d 844 (1980); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Edmisten, 299 N.C. 432, 263 S.E.2d 583 (1980); Thompson v. Soles, 299 N.C. 484, 263 S.E.2d 599 (1980); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. CF Indus., Inc., 299 N.C. 504, 263 S.E.2d 559 (1980); State v. Lynch, 301 N.C. 479, 272 S.E.2d 349 (1980); Kinnard v. Mecklenburg Fair, Ltd., 301 N.C. 522, 271 S.E.2d 909 (1980); Morris v. Morris, 301 N.C. 525, 272 S.E.2d 1 (1980); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Duke Power Co., 51 N.C. App. 698, 277 S.E.2d 444 (1981); Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981); Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981); In re McElwee, 304 N.C. 68, 283 S.E.2d 115 (1981); Rental Towel & Uniform Serv. v. Bynum Int'l, Inc., 304 N.C. 174, 282 S.E.2d 426 (1981); State v. Cooper, 304 N.C. 180, 282 S.E.2d 436 (1981); Worthington v. Bynum, 305 N.C. 478, 290 S.E.2d 599 (1982); In re Peal, 305 N.C. 640, 290 S.E.2d 664 (1982); Dealers Specialties, Inc. v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs., Inc., 305 N.C. 633, 291 S.E.2d 137 (1982); Love v. Moore, 305 N.C. 575, 291 S.E.2d 141 (1982); State v. Andrews, 306 N.C. 144, 291 S.E.2d 581 (1982); State v. LeDuc, 306 N.C. 62, 291 S.E.2d 607 (1982); State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 291 S.E.2d 618 (1982); State v. Brackett, 306 N.C. 138, 291
S.E.2d 660 (1982); Snipes v. Snipes, 306 N.C. 373, 293 S.E.2d 187 (1982); State v. Hannah, 306 N.C. 374, 293 S.E.2d 188 (1982); State v. Morrison, 306 N.C. 375, 293 S.E.2d 188 (1982); Taylor v. Cone Mills Corp., 306 N.C. 314, 293 S.E.2d 189 (1982); Hoyle v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., 306 N.C. 248, 293 S.E.2d 196 (1982); Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415 (1982); Cianfarra v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 306 N.C. 737, 295 S.E.2d 457 (1982); Rorie v. Holly Farms Poultry Co., 306 N.C. 706, 295 S.E.2d 458 (1982); Caviness v. Administrative Office of Courts, 306 N.C. 738, 295 S.E.2d 469 (1982); State v. Murphy, 306 N.C. 739, 295 S.E.2d 470 (1982); Page v. Tao, 306 N.C. 734, 295 S.E.2d 470 (1982); Allen v. Investors Heritage Life Ins. Co., 306 N.C. 732, 295 S.E.2d 471 (1982); State v. Allison, 307 N.C. 411, 298 S.E.2d 365 (1983); State v. Williams, 307 N.C. 452, 298 S.E.2d 372 (1983); North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Virginia Carolina Bldrs., 307 N.C. 563, 299 S.E.2d 629 (1983); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 307 N.C. 541, 299 S.E.2d 763 (1983); Department of Transp. v. Harkey, 308 N.C. 148, 301 S.E.2d 64 (1983); North Carolina Dep't of Cor. v. Gibson, 308 N.C. 131, 301 S.E.2d 78 (1983); State v. Wilhite, 308 N.C. 798, 303 S.E.2d 788 (1983); Gaston Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Harrison, 311 N.C. 230, 316 S.E.2d 59 (1984); Freeman v. SCM Corp., 311 N.C. 294, 316 S.E.2d 81 (1984); Northern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Lacy J. Miller Mach. Co., 311 N.C. 62, 316 S.E.2d 256 (1984); C.C. Walker Grading & Hauling, Inc. v. S.R.F. Mgt. Corp., 311 N.C. 170, 316 S.E.2d 298 (1984); American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters, 311 N.C. 311, 317 S.E.2d 351 (1984); State v. Simmons, 312 N.C. 78, 320 S.E.2d 405 (1984); State v. Bowen, 312 N.C. 79, 320 S.E.2d 405 (1984); State v. Dula, 312 N.C. 80, 320 S.E.2d 405 (1984); State v. Eason, 312 N.C. 320, 321 S.E.2d 881 (1984); State v. Jolley, 312 N.C. 296, 321 S.E.2d 883 (1984); Owensby v. Owensby, 312 N.C. 473, 322 S.E.2d 772 (1984); Jones v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 312 N.C. 725, 325 S.E.2d 237 (1985); Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985); Forbes Homes, Inc. v. Trimpi, 313 N.C. 168, 326 S.E.2d 30 (1985); Pembee Mfg. Corp. v. Cape Fear Constr. Co., 313 N.C. 488, 329 S.E.2d 350 (1985); O'Briant v. O'Briant, 313 N.C. 432, 329 S.E.2d 370 (1985); State v. Reilly, 313 N.C. 499, 329 S.E.2d 381 (1985); In re Truesdell, 313 N.C. 421, 329 S.E.2d 630 (1985); Miller v. Kite, 313 N.C. 474, 329 S.E.2d 663 (1985); State v. Lester, 313 N.C. 595, 330 S.E.2d 205 (1985); State v. Hunt, 313 N.C. 593, 330 S.E.2d 205 (1985); State v. Cooney, 313 N.C. 594, 330 S.E.2d 206 (1985); Square D Co. v. C.J. Kern Contractors, 314 N.C. 423, 334 S.E.2d 63 (1985); Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., 315 N.C. 500, 340 S.E.2d 295 (1986); State v. Hamlet, 316 N.C. 41, 340 S.E.2d 418 (1986); State v. Campbell, 316 N.C. 168, 340 S.E.2d 474 (1986); Colon v. Bailey, 316 N.C. 190, 340 S.E.2d 478 (1986); Jackson v. Housing Auth., 316 N.C. 259, 341 S.E.2d 523 (1986); State v. Miller, 316 N.C. 273, 341 S.E.2d 531 (1986); State v. Nelson, 316 N.C. 350, 341 S.E.2d 561 (1986); State v. Heath,
316 N.C. 337, 341 S.E.2d 565 (1986); State v. Richardson, 316 N.C. 594, 342 S.E.2d 823 (1986); State v. Denning, 316 N.C. 523, 342 S.E.2d 855 (1986); State v. Trexler, 316 N.C. 528, 342 S.E.2d 878 (1986); Lee ex rel. Schlosser v. Mowett Sales Co., 316 N.C. 489, 342 S.E.2d 882 (1986); Holley v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 318 N.C. 352, 348 S.E.2d 772 (1986); Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 348 S.E.2d 782 (1986); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U.S. 130, 107 S. Ct. 499, 93 L. Ed. 2d 449 (1986); Jackson County ex rel. Child Support Enforcement Agency ex rel. Jackson v. Swayney, 319 N.C. 52, 352 S.E.2d 413 (1987); Ratcliff v. County of Buncombe, 663 F. Supp. 1003 (W.D.N.C. 1987); State v. Kimbrell, 320 N.C. 762, 360 S.E.2d 691 (1987); Town of Emerald Isle ex rel. Smith v. State, 320 N.C. 640, 360 S.E.2d 756 (1987); Trenants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 320 N.C. 776, 360 S.E.2d 783 (1987); Long v. Morganton Dyeing & Finishing Co., 321 N.C. 82, 361 S.E.2d 575 (1987); Lockert v. Breedlove, 321 N.C. 66, 361 S.E.2d 581 (1987); Murrow v. Daniels, 321 N.C. 494, 364 S.E.2d 392 (1988); Youngblood v. North State Ford Truck Sales, 321 N.C. 380, 364 S.E.2d 433 (1988); Wilkes County Vocational Workshop, Inc. v. United Sleep Products., Inc., 321 N.C. 735, 365 S.E.2d 292 (1988); West v. King's Dep't Store, Inc., 321 N.C. 698, 365 S.E.2d 621 (1988); Williams v. Jones, 322 N.C. 42, 366 S.E.2d 433 (1988); Booe v. Shadrick, 322 N.C. 567, 369 S.E.2d 554 (1988); State v. Mayes, 323 N.C. 159, 371 S.E.2d 476 (1988); State v. Smith, 323 N.C. 439, 373 S.E.2d 435 (1988); In re Lynette H., 323 N.C. 598, 374 S.E.2d 272 (1988); McLean v. McLean, 323 N.C. 543, 374 S.E.2d 376 (1988); Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989); State ex rel. Rhodes v. Simpson, 325 N.C. 514, 385 S.E.2d 329 (1989); State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 693, 386 S.E.2d 187 (1989); State v. Pakulski, 326 N.C. 434, 390 S.E.2d 129 (1990); Hogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 326 N.C. 476, 390 S.E.2d 136 (1990); Thrash v. City of Asheville, 327 N.C. 251, 393 S.E.2d 842 (1990); Triangle Leasing Co. v. McMahon, 327 N.C. 224, 393 S.E.2d 854 (1990); McNeill v. Harnett County, 327 N.C. 552, 398 S.E.2d 475 (1990); Vancamp v. Burgner, 328 N.C. 495, 402 S.E.2d 375 (1991); Rogers v. T.J.X. Cos., 329 N.C. 226, 404 S.E.2d 664 (1991); State v. Monroe, 330 N.C. 433, 410 S.E.2d 913 (1991); In re Michael Weinman Assocs., 333 N.C. 221, 424 S.E.2d 385 (1993); Debnam v. North Carolina Dep't of Cor., 334 N.C. 380, 432 S.E.2d 324 (1993); Gardner v. Gardner, 334 N.C. 662, 435 S.E.2d 324 (1993); Richmond County v. North Carolina Low-Level Radioactive Waste Mgt. Auth., 335 N.C. 77, 436 S.E.2d 113 (1993); Baldwin v. GTE S., Inc., 335 N.C. 544, 439 S.E.2d 108 (1994); Mitchell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 335 N.C. 433, 439 S.E.2d 110 (1994); Jones v. Shoji, 336 N.C. 581, 444 S.E.2d 203 (1994); State v. Sneeden, 336 N.C. 482, 444 S.E.2d 218 (1994); Smith v. Smith, 336 N.C. 575, 444 S.E.2d 420 (1994); Petersen v. Rowe, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994); State v. Baymon, 336 N.C. 748, 446 S.E.2d 1 (1994); State v. Powell, 336 N.C. 762, 446 S.E.2d 26 (1994); State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 446 S.E.2d 67
(1994); State v. Webster, 337 N.C. 674, 447 S.E.2d 349 (1994); State v. Brinson, 337 N.C. 764, 448 S.E.2d 822 (1994); Holloway v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 339 N.C. 338, 452 S.E.2d 233 (1994); Bromhal v. Stott, 341 N.C. 702, 462 S.E.2d 219 (1995); Walton v. City of Raleigh, 342 N.C. 879, 467 S.E.2d 410 (1996); Democratic Party v. Guilford County Bd. of Elections, 342 N.C. 856, 467 S.E.2d 681 (1996); State v. Odum, 343 N.C. 116, 468 S.E.2d 245 (1996); Edward Valves, Inc. v. Wake County, 343 N.C. 426, 471 S.E.2d 342 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1112, 117 S. Ct. 952, 136 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1997); State ex rel. Tucker v. Frinzi, 344 N.C. 411, 474 S.E.2d 127 (1996); Roberts v. Madison County Realtors Ass'n, 344 N.C. 394, 474 S.E.2d 783 (1996); Richardson v. North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 345 N.C. 128, 478 S.E.2d 501 (1996); Moore v. City of Creedmoor, 345 N.C. 356, 481 S.E.2d 14 (1997); Cicogna v. Holder, 345 N.C. 488, 480 S.E.2d 636 (1997); State v. Davidson, 345 N.C. 496, 480 S.E.2d 701 (1997); State v. Adams, 345 N.C. 745, 483 S.E.2d 156 (1997); Messer v. Town of Chapel Hill, 346 N.C. 259, 485 S.E.2d 269 (1997); In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 485 S.E.2d 612 (1997); Onslow County v. Phillips, 346 N.C. 265, 485 S.E.2d 618 (1997); State v. Smith, 346 N.C. 794, 488 S.E.2d 210 (1997); State v. Beatty, 347 N.C. 555, 495 S.E.2d 367 (1998); Mullis v. Sechrest, 347 N.C. App. 548, 495 S.E.2d 721 (1998); Creech v. Melnik, 347 N.C. 520, 495 S.E.2d 907 (1998); In re Will of Lamparter, 348 N.C. 45, 497 S.E.2d 692 (1998); Martin v. Benson, 348 N.C. 684, 500 S.E.2d 664 (1998); Bring v. North Carolina State Bar, 348 N.C. 655, 501 S.E.2d 907 (1998); Bethania Town Lot Comm. v. City of Winston-Salem, 348 N.C. 664, 502 S.E.2d 360 (1998); Davis v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 349 N.C. 208, 505 S.E.2d 77 (1998); Peace v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 349 N.C. 315, 507 S.E.2d 272 (1998); State v. Thompson, 349 N.C. 483, 508 S.E.2d 277 (1998); Meads v. North Carolina Dep't of Agric., 349 N.C. 656, 509 S.E.2d 165 (1998); State v. Malette, 350 N.C. 52, 509 S.E.2d 776 (1999); Marcus Bros. Textiles v. Price Waterhouse, 350 N.C. 214, 513 S.E.2d 320 (1999); Beechridge Dev. Co. v. Dahners, 350 N.C. 583, 516 S.E.2d 592 (1999)

State v. Mackey, 352 N.C. 650, 535 S.E.2d 555 (2000); Martishius v. Carolco Studios, Inc., 355 N.C. 465, 562 S.E.2d 887 (2002); State v. Hearst, 356 N.C. 132, 567 S.E.2d 124 (2002); Augur v. Augur, 356 N.C. 582, 573 S.E.2d 125 (2002); Owenby v. Young, 357 N.C. 142, 579 S.E.2d 264 (2003); Dockery v. Hocutt, 357 N.C. 210, 581 S.E.2d 431 (2003); Rosero v. Blake, 357 N.C. 193, 581 S.E.2d 41 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177, 124 S. Ct. 1407, 158 L. Ed. 2d 78 (2004); Holley v. ACTS, Inc., 357 N.C. 228, 581 S.E.2d 750 (2003); Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471, 586 S.E.2d 250 (2003); Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 586 S.E.2d 247 (2003); Brewer v. Cabarrus Plastics, Inc., 160 N.C. App. 688, 586 S.E.2d 819 (2003); In re Stumbo, 357 N.C. 279, 582 S.E.2d 255 (2003); In re May, 357 N.C. 423, 584 S.E.2d 271 (2003); Lange v. Lange, 357 N.C. 645, 588 S.E.2d 877 (2003); State v. Hooper, 358 N.C. 122, 591 S.E.2d 514 (2004); Locust v. Pitt County Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 358 N.C. 113, 591 S.E.2d 543 (2004); Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 594 S.E.2d 1 (2004); Watkins v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 358 N.C. 190, 593 S.E.2d 764 (2004); Holcomb v. Colonial Assocs., L.L.C., 358 N.C. 501, 597 S.E.2d 710 (2004); State v. Weaver, 359 N.C. 246, 607 S.E.2d 599 (2005); In re Estate of Lunsford, 359 N.C. 382, 610 S.E.2d 366 (2005); In re T.E.F., 359 N.C. 570, 614 S.E.2d 296 (2005); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 359 N.C. 516, 614 S.E.2d 281 (2005); State v. Harris, 360 N.C. 145, 622 S.E.2d 615 (2005); Newberne v. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 359 N.C. 782, 618 S.E.2d 201 (2005); McCutchen v. McCutchen, 360 N.C. 280, 624 S.E.2d 620 (2006); State v. Lawrence, 360 N.C. 368, 627 S.E.2d 609 (2006); In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 636 S.E.2d 787 (2006); Patronelli v. Patronelli, 360 N.C. 628, 636 S.E.2d 559 (2006); Chambers v. Transit Mgmt., 360 N.C. 609, 636 S.E.2d 553 (2006); Misenheimer v. Burris, 360 N.C. 620, 637 S.E.2d 173 (2006); State v. Hammett, 361 N.C. 92, 637 S.E.2d 518 (2006); Frost v. Salter Path Fire & Rescue, 361 N.C. 181, 639 S.E.2d 429 (2007); Robins v. Town of Hillsborough, 361 N.C. 193, 639 S.E.2d 421 (2007); Bio-Medical Applications of N.C. Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 361 N.C. 229, 641 S.E.2d 303 (2007); Multiple Claimants v. N.C. HHS, Div. of Facility Servs., 361 N.C. 372, 646 S.E.2d 356 (2007); State v. Peterson, 361 N.C. 587, 652 S.E.2d 216 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1271, 128 S. Ct. 1682, 170 L. Ed. 2d. 377 (2008); State v. Stone, 362 N.C. 50, 653 S.E.2d 414 (2007); Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C. Inc., 362 N.C. 63, 653 S.E.2d 393 (2007); State v. Coltrane, 188 N.C. App. 498, 656 S.E.2d 322 (2008), review denied, 362 N.C. 476, 666 S.E.2d 760 (2008); State v. Mead, 362 N.C. 218, 657 S.E.2d 367 (2008); State v. Sparks, 362 N.C. 181, 657 S.E.2d 655 (2008); Shaw v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 362 N.C. 457, 665 S.E.2d 449 (2008); State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 665 S.E.2d 438 (2008); In re T.H.T., 362 N.C. 446, 665 S.E.2d 54 (2008); State v. Smith, 362 N.C. 583, 669 S.E.2d 299 (2008); State v. Maready, 362 N.C. 614,
669 S.E.2d 564 (2008); Richardson v. Maxim Healthcare/Allegis Group, 362 N.C. 657, 669 S.E.2d 582 (2008); State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 669 S.E.2d 290 (2008); State v. Miller, 363 N.C. 96, 678 S.E.2d 592 (2009); State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444 (June 18, 2009); Southeastern Jurisdictional Admin. Council v. Emerson, 363 N.C. 590, 683 S.E.2d 366 (2009); Scarborough v. Dillard's, Inc., 363 N.C. 715, 693 S.E.2d 640 (2009), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 2456, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3769, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1211 (U.S. 2011), cert. denied 563 U.S. 988, 131 S. Ct. 2456, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3769 (U.S. 2011); In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. 664, 686 S.E.2d 135 (2009), rev'd, remanded, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4557, 180 L. Ed. 2d 310 (U.S. 2011); Copper v. Denlinger, 363 N.C. 784, 688 S.E.2d 426 (2010); Bird v. Bird, 363 N.C. 774, 688 S.E.2d 420 (Jan. 29, 2010); State v. Jacobs, 363 N.C. 815, 689 S.E.2d 859 (2010); State v. Bunch, 363 N.C. 841, 689 S.E.2d 866 (Mar. 12, 2010); White v. Thompson, 364 N.C. 47, 691 S.E.2d 676 (2010); Brown v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. East, L.L.C., 364 N.C. 76, 692 S.E.2d 87 (Apr. 15, 2010); Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buzz Off Insect Shield, L.L.C., 364 N.C. 1, 692 S.E.2d 605 (2010); Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs. & Div. of Med. Assistance of the N.C. HHS, 364 N.C. 61, 692 S.E.2d 96 (Apr. 15, 2010); State v. Morton, 204 N.C. App. 578, 694 S.E.2d 432 (2010); Fussell v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 364 N.C. 222, 695 S.E.2d 437 (June 17, 2010); State Emples. Ass'n of N.C. Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of State Treasurer & Richard H. Moore, 364 N.C. 205, 695 S.E.2d 91 (2010); State v. Yencer, 206 N.C. App. 552, 696 S.E.2d 875 (2010); Kinlaw v. Harris, 364 N.C. 528, 702 S.E.2d 294 (2010); State v. Sargeant, 365 N.C. 58, 707 S.E.2d 192 (2011); Libertarian Party v. State, 365 N.C. 41, 707 S.E.2d 199 (2011); State v. Khuram Ashfaq Choudhry, 365 N.C. 215, 717 S.E.2d 348 (2011); State v. Mbacke, 365 N.C. 403, 721 S.E.2d 218 (2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 224, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 6828, 184 L. Ed. 2d 116 (U.S. 2012); Ray v. N.C. DOT, 366 N.C. 1, 727 S.E.2d 675 (2012); Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. Talford, 366 N.C. 43, 727 S.E.2d 866 (2012); State v. Williams, 366 N.C. 110, 726 S.E.2d 161 (2012); State v. King, 366 N.C. 68, 733 S.E.2d 535 (2012); State v. Salinas, 366 N.C. 119, 729 S.E.2d 63 (2012); Moore v. Proper, 366 N.C. 25, 726 S.E.2d 812 (2012); State v. Bradshaw, 366 N.C. 90, 728 S.E.2d 345 (2012); State v. Sweat, 366 N.C. 79, 727 S.E.2d 691 (2012); State v. Otto, 366 N.C. 134, 726 S.E.2d 824 (2012); In re Proposed Foreclosure of Claim of Lien Filed Against Johnson, 366 N.C. 252, 741 S.E.2d 308 (2012); Mussa v. Palmer-Mussa, 366 N.C. 185, 731 S.E.2d 404 (2012); Hest Techs., Inc. v. State Ex Rel. Perdue, 366 N.C. 289, 749 S.E.2d 429 (2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 99, 187 L. Ed. 2d 34, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 5319 (U.S. 2013); Trivette v. Yount, 366 N.C. 303, 735 S.E.2d 306 (2012); In re Ocean Isle Palms, LLC, 366 N.C. 351, 749 S.E.2d 439 (2013); State v. Khan, 366 N.C. 448, 738 S.E.2d 167 (2013); IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 366 N.C. 456, 738 S.E.2d 156 (2013); Green v. Freeman, 367 N.C. 136, 749 S.E.2d 262 (2013); State v. Jones, 367 N.C. 299, 758 S.E.2d 345 (2014); Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC, 367
N.C. 414, 760 S.E.2d 732 (2014); State v. Verkerk, 367 N.C. 483, 758 S.E.2d 387 (2014); State v. Sanders, 367 N.C. 716, 766 S.E.2d 331 (2014); Christie v. Hartley Constr., Inc., 367 N.C. 286, 753 S.E.2d 657 (Dec. 19, 2014); State v. Stubbs, 368 N.C. 40, 770 S.E.2d 74 (2015); Burley v. U.S. Foods, Inc., 368 N.C. 315, 776 S.E.2d 832 (2015); Morningstar Marinas/Eaton Ferry, LLC v. Warren Cnty., 368 N.C. 360, 777 S.E.2d 733 (2015); Beverage Sys. of the Carolinas, LLC v. Associated Bev. Repair, LLC, 368 N.C. 693, 784 S.E.2d 457 (2016); State v. Thomsen, 369 N.C. 22, 789 S.E.2d 639 (2016).

State v. Allman, 369 N.C. 292, 794 S.E.2d 301 (2016); In re Foreclosure of a Deed of Trust Executed by Lucks, 369 N.C. 222, 794 S.E.2d 501 (2016); City of Asheville v. State, 369 N.C. 80, 794 S.E.2d 759 (2016); State v. Todd, 369 N.C. 707, 799 S.E.2d 834 (2017); Harrison v. Gemma Power Sys., LLC, 369 N.C. 572, 799 S.E.2d 855 (2017); State v. Knight, 369 N.C. 640, 799 S.E.2d 603 (2017); Wray v. City of Greensboro, 370 N.C. 41, 802 S.E.2d 894 (2017); In re Estate of Skinner, 370 N.C. 126, 804 S.E.2d 449 (2017); State v. Campbell, 373 N.C. 216, 835 S.E.2d 844 (2019).

II. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.

The constitutional question must be real and substantial rather than superficial and frivolous. It must be a constitutional question which has not already been the subject of conclusive judicial determination. State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 163 S.E.2d 376 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1087, 89 S. Ct. 876, 21 L. Ed. 2d 780 (1969); Bundy v. Ayscue, 276 N.C. 81, 171 S.E.2d 1 (1969).

Dismissal Where Involvement of Substantial Constitutional Question Is Not Shown. - An appellant seeking a second review by the Supreme Court as a matter of right on the ground that a substantial constitutional question is involved must allege and show the involvement of such question or suffer dismissal. State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 163 S.E.2d 376 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1087, 89 S. Ct. 876, 21 L. Ed. 2d 780 (1969); Bundy v. Ayscue, 276 N.C. 81, 171 S.E.2d 1 (1969).

This section requires that an appellant must either allege and show the existence of a real and substantial constitutional question which has not already been the subject of conclusive judicial determination or suffer dismissal. Thompson v. Thompson, 288 N.C. 120, 215 S.E.2d 606 (1975).

Respondent's appeal based solely on the assertion that the district court's allowance of an amendment to a juvenile petition deprived him of a constitutional right was dismissed by the Supreme Court, ex mero motu, because it did not directly involve a substantial constitutional question within the meaning of this section. In re Jones, 279 N.C. 616, 184 S.E.2d 267 (1971).

Mouthing of Constitutional Phrases Will Not Avoid Dismissal. - Mere mouthing of constitutional phrases like "due process of law" and "equal protection of the law" will not avoid dismissal. State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 163 S.E.2d 376 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1087, 89 S. Ct. 876, 21 L. Ed. 2d 780 (1969); Bundy v. Ayscue, 276 N.C. 81, 171 S.E.2d 1 (1969).

Question Should Be Raised and Passed on in Trial Court. - Appellate courts will not ordinarily pass upon a constitutional question unless it affirmatively appears that such question was raised and passed upon in the trial court. State v. Mitchell, 276 N.C. 404, 172 S.E.2d 527 (1970); State v. Cumber, 280 N.C. 127, 185 S.E.2d 141 (1971).

And Preserved by Appropriate Objection, Assignment of Error and Argument in Brief. - The Supreme Court will not pass upon the merits of a litigant's contention that his constitutional right has been violated by a ruling or order of a lower court, unless, at the time the alleged violation of such right occurred or was threatened by a proposed procedure, ruling or offer of evidence, or at the earliest opportunity thereafter, the litigant made an appropriate objection, exception or motion and thereafter preserved the constitutional question at each level of appellate review by an appropriate assignment of error and by argument in his brief. State v. Mitchell, 276 N.C. 404, 172 S.E.2d 527 (1970).

Consideration of Other Matters. - Once involvement of a substantial constitutional question is established, the Supreme Court will retain the case and may, in its discretion, pass upon any or all assignments of error, constitutional or otherwise, allegedly committed by the Court of Appeals and properly presented for review. State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 163 S.E.2d 376 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1087, 89 S. Ct. 876, 21 L. Ed. 2d 780 (1969); Bundy v. Ayscue, 276 N.C. 81, 171 S.E.2d 1 (1969).

III. DISSENT.

.

Legislative Intent. - The General Assembly intended to insure a review by the Supreme Court of questions on which there was a division in the intermediate appellate court; no such review was intended for claims joined or consolidated in the lower appellate court and on which that court rendered unanimous decision. Hendrix v. Alsop, 278 N.C. 549, 180 S.E.2d 802 (1971); State v. Campbell, 282 N.C. 125, 191 S.E.2d 752 (1972); State v. Hageman, 307 N.C. 1, 296 S.E.2d 433 (1982); State v. Hooper, 318 N.C. 680, 351 S.E.2d 286 (1987).

Dissent Allows Appeal as a Matter of Right. - The aggrieved party, whether the State or the defendant, may appeal to the Supreme Court as of right from any decision of the Court of Appeals in which there is a dissent. State v. Campbell, 282 N.C. 125, 191 S.E.2d 752 (1972).

Supreme Court of North Carolina found that it could hear an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals of North Carolina that a defendant be resentenced because G.S. 7A-30(2) provided the state with an appeal of right as there was a dissent in the Court of Appeals. State v. Norris, 360 N.C. 507, 630 S.E.2d 915 (2006).

Concurring Opinions Labelled as Dissents. - Plaintiff had no right of appeal pursuant to subdivision (2) of this section, although two concurring opinions were labelled as dissents, where all three judges of the Court of Appeals agreed that the plaintiff's complaint and summonses should be dismissed, though for different reasons. Harris v. Maready, 311 N.C. 536, 319 S.E.2d 912 (1984).

Issues on Appeal Under Subdivision (2). - When an appeal is taken pursuant to subdivision (2) of this section, the only issues properly before the court are those on which the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals based his dissent. Clifford v. River Bend Plantation, Inc., 312 N.C. 460, 323 S.E.2d 23 (1984); State v. Hooper, 318 N.C. 680, 351 S.E.2d 286 (1987); Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 511 S.E.2d 298 (1999).

On appeal to the Supreme Court pursuant to subdivision (2) of this section by defendant from a decision of the Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, in which a majority of the panel found no error in defendant's convictions, where the dissenting judge disagreed only with the majority's treatment of the second question presented to that court, and where defendant did not petition the Supreme Court for discretionary review of the other questions, only the second question was properly before the Supreme Court for review, notwithstanding defendant's attempt to bring forward other questions in his brief. State v. Reilly, 313 N.C. 499, 329 S.E.2d 381 (1985), considering, however, the additional question of the sufficiency of the evidence in order to prevent manifest injustice.

Under subdivision (2) of this section, only the issue raised in the dissent is properly before the Supreme Court for review. N.C.R.A.P., Rule 16 defines the permissible scope of review in such cases. Blumenthal v. Lynch, 315 N.C. 571, 340 S.E.2d 358 (1986), addressing, nevertheless, additional issues which arise frequently in the administration of estates, and must often be determined by the Department of Revenue under the Court's residual power or authority under N.C.R.A.P., Rule 2.

Waiver of Failure to Serve Notice of Appeal. - Failure to serve the notice of appeal is a defect in the record analogous to failure to serve process. Therefore, a party upon whom service of notice of appeal is required may waive the failure of service by not raising the issue by motion or otherwise and by participating without objection in the appeal, and the Court of Appeals thus had jurisdiction and could consider the case on its merits. Hale v. Afro-American Arts Int'l, Inc., 335 N.C. 231, 436 S.E.2d 588 (1993).

CASE NOTES

This section confers judicial power in special proceedings upon the clerk. In re Locklear, 314 N.C. 412, 334 S.E.2d 46 (1985).

The legitimation procedure, which is identified in G.S. 49-10 as "a special proceeding in the superior court of the county in which the putative father resides," is within the jurisdictional purview of the clerk of superior court. In re Locklear, 314 N.C. 412, 334 S.E.2d 46 (1985).

Immunity. - Court clerk was immune from an action against the clerk for contempt for orders relative to a judicial sale of a decedent's real estate because the clerk was performing a judicial duty in accordance with a court orders; therefore, the clerk was entitled to judicial immunity pursuant to G.S. 7A-40. Bare v. Atwood, 204 N.C. App. 310, 693 S.E.2d 746 (2010).

Applied in Wyatt v. Wyatt, 69 N.C. App. 747, 318 S.E.2d 251 (1984).

Cited in Yale v. National Indem. Co., 602 F.2d 642 (4th Cir. 1979).

CASE NOTES

1987 Amendment Held Constitutional. - The provisions of Session Laws 1987, c. 509, which amended subsection (d) of this section, did not violate the North Carolina Constitution. State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473 (1989).

The provisions of Session Laws 1987, c. 509, which amended subsection (d) of this section, creating a one-time delay of elections and a one-time interim or hiatus between terms of office for certain superior court judgeships (causing the incumbents to hold over until the next elections were held and the succeeding terms of office began) served a public purpose and did not violate the Constitution of North Carolina. State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473 (1989).

By enacting Session Laws 1987, c. 509, the legislature eliminated staggered terms within multi-seat judicial districts by creating a one-time interim or hiatus between certain terms of office; as the Constitution anticipates such "hold over" situations by providing that elected judges remain in office "until their successors are elected and qualified," the act was not unconstitutional. State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473 (1989).

Constitutionality. - Redistricting plan for the superior courts in a county enacted pursuant to G.S. 7A-41 did not violate N.C. Const., Art. I, § 19, as the one person, one vote principle did not apply to judicial elections. Blankenship v. Bartlett, 184 N.C. App. 327, 646 S.E.2d 584 (2007), review granted, appeal dismissed, 668 S.E.2d 24 (N.C. 2008).

Court of appeals erred in reversing a trial court's judgment entered in favor of attorneys qualified to run for superior court judge and a voter in their action against the North Carolina State Board of Elections and the attorney general alleging that the 1993 amendment to G.S. 7A-41 unconstitutionally created an additional superior court judgeship in Wake County Superior Court District 10A because the Equal Protection Clause, N.C. Const. art. I, § 19, applied to the General Assembly's creation of an additional judgeship in District 10A, and the attorneys and voter demonstrated gross disparity in voting power between similarly situated residents of the county; residents of District 10A had a voting power roughly five times greater than residents of District 10C, four and a half times greater than residents of District 10B, and four times greater than residents of District 10D. Blankenship v. Bartlett, 363 N.C. 518, 681 S.E.2d 759 (2009).

Preclearance of Acts Pursuant to Voting Rights Act. - Where superior court judges were elected pursuant to Session Laws 1965, c. 262, Session Laws 1967, c. 997, Session Laws 1977, cc. 1119, 1130 and 1238, and Session Laws 1983, c. 1109, and such legislative acts had not been precleared by the Attorney General as required by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, the federal district court would enjoin such elections retroactively in those counties subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act; the fact that an election law deals with the election of members of the judiciary does not remove it from the ambit of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Haith v. Martin, 618 F. Supp. 410 (E.D.N.C. 1985), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S. Ct. 3268, 91 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1986).

Elections proposed to be held in Judicial Districts 3, 4, 8 and 12 would not offend provisions of federal court order of Sept. 24, 1985, and thus would not be enjoined, as such elections would not result in any retrogression in the voting right privileges of racial minorities in those districts, and the judgeships to be filled in those districts in 1986, all of which were created under law prior to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, have not become an integral part of the voting procedures established by the North Carolina statutes creating new judgeships in those districts. Haith v. Martin, 643 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.N.C. 1986).

New Judicial District Was Not Arbitrary and Capricious. - Creation of the Wake County Superior Court judicial district was not arbitrary and capricious where the General Assembly had consulted with the Administrative Office of the Courts and the new judgeship was based on heavy caseloads and maintaining minority districts. Blankenship v. Bartlett, 184 N.C. App. 327, 646 S.E.2d 584 (2007), review granted, appeal dismissed, 668 S.E.2d 24 (N.C. 2008).

Cited in Kelly v. Davenport, 7 N.C. App. 670, 173 S.E.2d 600 (1970); Austin v. Austin, 12 N.C. App. 286, 183 S.E.2d 420 (1971); Holshouser v. Scott, 335 F. Supp. 928 (M.D.N.C. 1971); State v. Braswell, 283 N.C. 332, 196 S.E.2d 185 (1973); Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992), rehearing denied, 991 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 828, 114 S. Ct. 93, 126 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1993); ITS Leasing, Inc. v. Ram Dog Enters., LLC, 206 N.C. App. 572, 696 S.E.2d 880 (2010).

CASE NOTES

Administrative Order Issued In Contravention of G.S. 15A-535. - District court was not obligated to follow an administrative order because there was no evidence that the senior resident superior court judge of the 24th Judicial District entered the administrative order in a manner consistent with G.S. 15A-535(a); there was no signature of the chief district court judge on the 24th District administrative order, and there was no evidence of a consultation with the chief district court judge or judges of all the district court districts in which were located any of the counties in the senior resident superior court judge's district. State v. Harrison, 217 N.C. App. 363, 719 S.E.2d 204 (2011).

Cited in Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 185 N.C. App. 566, 649 S.E.2d 410 (2007), cert. denied, 362 N.C. 360, 661 S.E.2d 735 (2008).

Opinions of Attorney General

Regarding requirements for becoming a Senior Resident Superior Court Judge, see opinion of Attorney General to Honorable Thomas Ross, Superior Court Judge, N.C. General Assembly, 1999 N.C.A.G. 14 (5/27/99).

CASE NOTES

Obligation to Provide "Suitable" Facilities. - In cities other than county seats where sessions of superior court are held, boards of commissioners are obligated by statute to provide "suitable" places for holding such sessions of court. In re Alamance County Ct. Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 405 S.E.2d 125 (1991).

Hearing Ordered to Probe Adequacy of Court Facilities. - A hearing ordered by a superior court judge to inquire into the adequacy of the Alamance County court facilities probes the scope of the court's inherent power to direct county commissioners to ameliorate such facilities and the proper means of effecting that end. Such power exists, but the order invoking it was procedurally and substantively flawed where the commissioners against whom the order was directed were not made parties to the action, the order was ex parte, and the order intruded on discretion that properly belonged to the commissioners. In re Alamance County Ct. Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 405 S.E.2d 125 (1991).

Cited in Blankenship v. Bartlett, 363 N.C. 518, 681 S.E.2d 759 (2009).

§ 7A-43: Reserved for future codification purposes.

§§ 7A-43.1 through 7A-43.3: Repealed by Session Laws 1967, c. 1049, s. 6.