§ 7A-1. Short title.

This Chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Judicial Department Act of 1965."

History

(1965, c. 310, s. 1.)

Legal Periodicals. - For comment, "Examining the Evolution of Legal Precedent Through Citation Network Analysis," see 96 N.C.L. Rev. 227 (2017).

For article, "23RD Annual Institute for Law & Economic Policy Symposium: Secrecy: A2J2K: Access to Justice, Access to Knowledge, and Economic Inequalities in Open Courts and Arbitrations," see 96 N.C.L. Rev. 605 (2018).

For comment, "Revival of Roosevelt: Analyzing Expansion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Light of the Resurgence of State ‘Court-Packing' Plans,” see 96 N.C.L. Rev. 1126 (2018).

§ 7A-2. Purpose of Chapter.

This Chapter is intended to implement Article IV of the Constitution of North Carolina and promote the just and prompt disposition of litigation by:

1. Providing a new chapter in the General Statutes into which, at a time not later than January 1, 1971, when the General Court of Justice is fully operational in all counties of the State, all statutes concerning the organization, jurisdiction and administration of each division of the General Court of Justice may be placed;
2. Amending certain laws with respect to the superior court division to conform them to the laws set forth in this Chapter, to the end that each trial division may be a harmonious part of the General Court of Justice;
3. Creating the district court division of the General Court of Justice, and the Administrative Office of the Courts;
4. Establishing in accordance with a fixed schedule the various district courts of the district court division;
5. Providing for the organization, jurisdiction and procedures necessary for the operation of the district court division;
6. Providing for the financial support of the judicial department, and for uniform costs and fees in the trial divisions of the General Court of Justice;
7. Providing for an orderly transition from the present system of courts to a uniform system completely operational in all counties of the State not later than January 1, 1971;
8. Repealing certain laws inconsistent with the foregoing purposes; and
9. Effectuating other purposes incidental and supplemental to the foregoing enumerated purposes.

History

(1965, c. 310, s. 1.)

§ 7A-3. Judicial power; transition provisions.

Except for the judicial power vested in the court for the trial of impeachments, and except for such judicial power as may from time to time be vested by the General Assembly in administrative agencies, the judicial power of the State is vested exclusively in the General Court of Justice. Provided, that all existing courts of the State inferior to the superior courts, including justice of the peace courts and mayor's courts, shall continue to exist and to exercise the judicial powers vested in them by law until specifically abolished by law, or until the establishment within the county of their situs of a district court, or until January 1, 1971, whichever event shall first occur. Judgments of inferior courts which cease to exist under the provisions of this section continue in force and effect as though the issuing court continued to exist, and the General Court of Justice is hereby vested with jurisdiction to enforce such judgments.

History

(1965, c. 310, s. 1.)

§ 7A-4. Composition and organization.

The General Court of Justice constitutes a unified judicial system for purposes of jurisdiction, operation and administration, and consists of an appellate division, a superior court division, and a district court division.

History

(1965, c. 310, s. 1.)

CASE NOTES

Resignation of District Judge Created Legal and Actual Vacancy. - Where a district court judge resigned upon the discovery of his legal infirmity, his resignation from office created an actual vacancy in that position. Hence, upon the resignation, there was no one legally entitled to hold office by virtue of an election, nor under G.S. 128-7 was there an incumbent with the legal right to continue in office until a successor was elected or appointed. The judge, therefore, created a legal as well as an actual vacancy in office under N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 19. People ex rel. Duncan v. Beach, 294 N.C. 713, 242 S.E.2d 796 (1978).

Cited in Martin v. State, 330 N.C. 412, 410 S.E.2d 474 (1991).

§ 7A-5. Organization.

The appellate division of the General Court of Justice consists of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.

History

(1965, c. 310, s. 1; 1967, c. 108, s. 1.)

Editor's Note. - As enacted in 1965, this article was designated "Article 1A. Appellate Division Organization and Terms," and consisted of former G.S. 7A-5, which read, "The appellate division of the General Court of Justice consists of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. (Chapter 7, subchapter I, articles 1-6, of the General Statutes, is applicable.)" The former section derived from c. 310, s. 1, Session Laws 1965.

§ 7A-6. Appellate division reporters; reports.

1. The Supreme Court shall appoint one or more reporters for the appellate division, to serve at its pleasure. It shall be the duty of the reporters to prepare for publication the opinions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The salary of the reporters shall be fixed by the Administrative Officer of the Courts, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
2. The Administrative Officer of the Courts shall contract for the printing of the reports of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, and for the advance sheets of each court. He shall select a printer for the reports and prescribe such contract terms as will insure issuance of the reports as soon as practicable after a sufficient number of opinions are filed. He shall make such contract after consultation with the Department of Administration and comparison of prices for similar work in other states to such an extent as may be practicable. He shall also sell the reports and advance sheets of the appellate division, to the general public, at a price not less than cost nor more than cost plus ten percent (10%), to be fixed by him in his discretion. Proceeds of such sales shall be remitted to the State treasury.
3. In addition to and as an alternative to the provisions for the publication and sale of the appellate division reports of subsection (a) and subsection (b) of this section, the Supreme Court may designate a commercial law publisher's reports and advance sheets of the opinions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as the Official Reports of the Appellate Division, or the Administrative Officer of the Courts, with the approval of the Supreme Court, may contract with a commercial law publisher or publishers to act as printer and vendor of the reports and advance sheets of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals upon such terms as the Supreme Court deems advisable after consultation with the Department of Administration.
4. Repealed by Session Laws 2018-40, s. 1, effective June 22, 2018.

History

(1967, c. 108, s. 1; c. 691, s. 57; 1969, c. 1190, s. 1; 1971, c. 377, s. 2; 1975, c. 879, s. 46; 1977, c. 721, s. 1; 1987, c. 404; 2018-40, s. 1.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2018-40, s. 1, effective June 22, 2018, repealed subsection (c).

§ 7A-7. Law clerks; secretaries and stenographers.

1. Each justice and judge of the appellate division is entitled to the services of not more than two research assistants, who must be graduates of an accredited law school. The salaries of research assistants shall be set by the Administrative Officer of the Courts, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
2. The Administrative Officer of the Courts shall determine the number and salaries of all secretaries and stenographers in the appellate division.

History

(1967, c. 108, s. 1; 1985, c. 698, s. 8(a).)

CASE NOTES

Quorum Necessary for Court to Transact Business. - In a challenge brought by a class of over 222,000 individuals, the members of the court disclosed the information pertaining to members of their families who either were or might be members of plaintiff class; and those justices were disqualified from participating in the consideration and decision of the case unless their participation was consented to in writing by the parties and their counsel. Because a minimum of four justices was necessary to constitute a quorum to transact the business of the court, the parties to that proceeding would be denied an opportunity to be heard for lack of a quorum in the absence of further action by the parties or the court. Lake v. State Health Plan for Teachers & State Emples., - N.C. - , - S.E.2d - (Jan. 26, 2021).

Cited in Bradshaw v. Administrative Office of Courts, 83 N.C. App. 237, 349 S.E.2d 621 (1986); State v. Smith, 359 N.C. 199, 607 S.E.2d 607 (2005), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 126 S. Ct. 109, 163 L. Ed. 2d 121 (2005); HCW Ret. & Fin. Servs., LLC v. HCW Emple. Ben. Servs., LLC, 367 N.C. 104, 747 S.E.2d 236 (2013); State v. Jones, 367 N.C. 299, 758 S.E.2d 345 (2014); State v. Ross, 369 N.C. 393, 794 S.E.2d 289 (2016); City of Asheville v. State, 369 N.C. 80, 794 S.E.2d 759 (2016); Wray v. City of Greensboro, 370 N.C. 41, 802 S.E.2d 894 (2017); State v. Hammonds, 370 N.C. 158, 804 S.E.2d 438 (2017).

Opinions of Attorney General

Length of Service of Supreme Court Justice. - Upon taking office as an Associate Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court, a justice was entitled to have his service as Director and Assistant Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts to be taken into account in calculating his service for longevity purposes, but his service as assistant district attorney could not be taken into account. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Thomas W. Ross, Director, The Administrative Office of the Courts, 1999 N.C. AG LEXIS 28 (9/28/99).

CASE NOTES

Adoption of Rule Regarding Limitation of Proceedings Did Not Affect Action Already Pending. - Given the unique constitutional and statutory responsibilities of the Supreme Court of North Carolina to promulgate rules of appellate procedure, as well as rules and standards of conduct for the judiciary, the Supreme Court of North Carolina did not exceed its authority in adopting N.C. Code Jud. Conduct Limitation of Proceedings; however, where a judicial disciplinary action was already pending when N.C. Code Jud. Conduct Limitation of Proceedings came into effect, the action was not barred. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Brown), 358 N.C. 711, 599 S.E.2d 502 (2004).

CASE NOTES

Amendment Held Unconstitutional. - Amendment to G.S. 7A-16 effected by Session Laws 2000-67, s. 15.5, which expanded the size of the state Court of Appeals from 12 judges to 15 and which allowed the newly appointed judges to serve until the year 2005 before being required to face a retention election, was unconstitutional to the extent that it conflicted with the provisions of N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 19, requiring a judge appointed to a judicial vacancy to stand for election at the next general election; remaining portions of the amendment by Session Laws 2000-67 were constitutional and could properly be severed from the unconstitutional clause. Pope v. Easley, 354 N.C. 544, 556 S.E.2d 265 (2001).

In enacting the provisions in Session Laws 2000-67, G.S. 15.5, making the creation of the new judgeships effective upon gubernatorial appointment and allowing the appointees to serve for nearly four years before facing election, the General Assembly devised a statutory framework that does not comport with the limitation in N.C. Const. art. IV, § 19, requiring that judicial appointees hold their places only until the next election for members of the General Assembly; section 15.5.(a) operated to create a vacancy at the Court of Appeals, thereby requiring an election to fill the vacancy in the 2002 election cycle. Pope v. Easley, 354 N.C. 544, 556 S.E.2d 265 (2001).

The addition of three new Court of Appeals judgeships by Session Laws 2000-67 was constitutionally permissible and severable from the unconstitutional provision of that act. Pope v. Easley, 354 N.C. 544, 556 S.E.2d 265 (2001).

Cited in State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 163 S.E.2d 376 (1968); Adams-Millis Corp. v. Town of Kernersville, 281 N.C. 147, 187 S.E.2d 704 (1972); In re Annexation Ordinance, 300 N.C. 337, 266 S.E.2d 661 (1980); Bradshaw v. Administrative Office of Courts, 83 N.C. App. 237, 349 S.E.2d 621 (1986).

§ 7A-17: Repealed by Session Laws 1969, c. 1190, s. 57.

CASE NOTES

Section Unconstitutional. - Even if the General Assembly did not intend to repeal this section by ratification of the 1971 revision of N.C. Const., Art. IV, this section is unconstitutional. Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976).

This section was rendered null and void when the electorate approved revised N.C. Const., Art. IV, which deleted the provision granting the Supreme Court original jurisdiction of claims against the State. Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976).

Legislative Intent to Repeal. - It was the intent of the General Assembly that upon the ratification of the 1971 revision of N.C. Const., Art. IV, this section be repealed, since the jurisdiction which this section purports to give to the Supreme Court exceeded that granted to it in the 1971 revision of N.C. Const., Art. IV. Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976).

No Execution to Enforce Judgment Available from Supreme Court. - In the event a plaintiff is successful in establishing a claim for breach of contract against the State, he cannot obtain execution from the Supreme Court to enforce the judgment. Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976).

CASE NOTES

Jurisdiction of Court of Appeals. - Court of Appeals of North Carolina had jurisdiction to consider a claimant's constitutional challenge to an act of the North Carolina General Assembly on appeal from a final decision and order of the North Carolina Industrial Commission because the claimant's constitutional challenge was not required to be heard by a three-judge panel of the Superior Court of Wake County, North Carolina. In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275 (2017).

Appeals in Civil Causes Distinguished from Appeals in Criminal Causes. - The constitutional and statutory structure of the General Court of Justice provides that, generally, appeals from the district court in civil causes go to the Court of Appeals, while appeals in criminal causes must first go to the superior court. State v. Killian, 25 N.C. App. 224, 212 S.E.2d 419 (1975).

Supreme Court Has Authority to Give Relief for Error of Law. - Supreme Court has authority to review the record on appeal and to give appropriate relief for an error of law committed by the trial court. State v. Lampkins, 286 N.C. 497, 212 S.E.2d 106 (1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909, 96 S. Ct. 3220, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1216 (1976).

But No Authority to Grant Relief from Criminal Trial Free from Error of Law. - Supreme Court has no authority to grant relief to a defendant convicted of a criminal offense in a trial free from an error of law for the reason that it disagrees with the jury concerning the credibility of a witness for the State. State v. Lampkins, 286 N.C. 497, 212 S.E.2d 106 (1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909, 96 S. Ct. 3220, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1216 (1976).

Supreme Court must accept as conclusive the verdict of the jury so far as the credibility of witnesses is concerned. State v. Lampkins, 286 N.C. 497, 212 S.E.2d 106 (1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909, 96 S. Ct. 3220, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1216 (1976).

Objections and Exceptions Necessary to Preserve Legal Questions on Appeal. - Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on appeal is limited to questions of law or legal inference, which ordinarily must be presented by objections duly entered and exceptions duly taken to the rulings of the lower court. State v. Hedrick, 289 N.C. 232, 221 S.E.2d 350 (1976).

When Findings of Trial Court Are Conclusive on Appeal. - Where evidence properly in the record fully supports the findings of fact which the trial court made, and the record itself does not disclose that these findings were based on information obtained by the trial judge in a manner violative of plaintiff's rights, the trial court's findings are conclusive on appeal. Horton v. Horton, 12 N.C. App. 526, 183 S.E.2d 794, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 727, 184 S.E.2d 884 (1971).

It is not the function of the Court of Appeals to make findings of fact. Horton v. Horton, 12 N.C. App. 526, 183 S.E.2d 794, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 727, 184 S.E.2d 884 (1971).

The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to entertain a motion for summary judgment made for the first time on appeal. Britt v. Allen, 12 N.C. App. 399, 183 S.E.2d 303 (1971).

Court of Appeals Without Jurisdiction. - Court of appeals was without jurisdiction to consider estates' appeal, arguing that the Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program was unconstitutional, because, pursuant to the Compensation Program and the Tort Claims Act, the North Carolina Industrial Commission was constituted a court for resolution of the matters; the appropriate procedure was for the Commission to transfer the action to the Superior Court of Wake County for resolution by a three-judge panel. In re Hughes, 245 N.C. App. 398, 785 S.E.2d 111 (2016).

Cited in State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 163 S.E.2d 376 (1968); State v. Morris, 41 N.C. App. 164, 254 S.E.2d 241 (1979).

CASE NOTES

• I. General Consideration.
• II. Sentence of Death or Life Imprisonment.
• III. Final Judgments.
• IV. Interlocutory Orders.
  • A. Generally.
  • B. Particular Orders.

CASE NOTES

New Trial Based upon Newly Discovered Evidence. - The State has the right to immediately appeal a superior court order granting a criminal defendant a new trial pursuant to G.S. 15A-1415(b)(6), on the ground of newly discovered evidence. State v. Monroe, 330 N.C. 433, 410 S.E.2d 913 (1991).

Exhaustion Requirement in Federal Habeas Corpus. - The fact that the respondent in an appeal from the order of a United States magistrate dismissing a claim for habeas corpus relief incorrectly pleaded that the appellant had exhausted his state court remedies and was entitled to adjudication on the merits was neither conclusive nor a waiver of the exhaustion requirement by the State. Strader v. Allsbrook, 656 F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1981).

Jurisdiction of North Carolina Supreme Court. - Statute could not have restricted the Supreme Court of North Carolina's constitutional authority under N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 12(1) to exercise jurisdiction to review upon appeal any decision of the courts below, and as such, the Supreme Court of North Carolina did not hesitate to exercise its rarely used general supervisory authority when necessary to promote the expeditious administration of justice, and did so to consider questions that were not properly presented according to its rules; this exercise of supervisory authority was particularly appropriate when prompt and definitive resolution of an issue was necessary to ensure the uniform administration of North Carolina's criminal statutes. State v. Ellis, 361 N.C. 200, 639 S.E.2d 425 (2007).

In a case in which a pro se inmate filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254 petition as untimely, he unsuccessfully argued that his second certiorari petition to the North Carolina State Supreme Court also should be included in his one-year calculations. His certiorari petition was not a properly filed petition as contemplated under 28 U.S.C.S. § 2244(d)(2), and it was incapable of tolling his one-year limitations period because the North Carolina Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain that petition; pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 21(e), only the North Carolina Court of Appeals has authority to review the denial of a MAR in a non-capital case, and pursuant to G.S. 7A-28(a), decisions of the North Carolina Court of Appeals upon review of motions for appropriate relief listed in G.S. 15A-1415(b) were final and not subject to further review in the North Carolina Supreme Court by appeal, motion, verification, writ or otherwise. Blankenship v. Mitchell, - F. Supp. 2d - (W.D.N.C. Sept. 23, 2009).

Cited in McLendon v. Woodard, 719 F. Supp. 441 (W.D.N.C. 1989); Harb v. Keller, - F. Supp. 2d - (M.D.N.C. Sept. 28, 2010); State v. Todd, 369 N.C. 707, 799 S.E.2d 834 (2017).

CASE NOTES

Applicability. - Because G.S. 7A-27 governed appeals of right in ordinary civil actions, G.S. 7A-29(a), which applied generally to appeals from the North Carolina Industrial Commission and other administrative agencies, did not apply to estates' appeal arguing that the Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program was unconstitutional. In re Hughes, 245 N.C. App. 398, 785 S.E.2d 111 (2016).

Appeals of Right from Certain Administrative Agencies - G.S. 62-90(a) and (d) provide for appeals of final orders of the North Carolina Utilities Commission; subsections (a) and (b) of this section provide for appeals of right from certain administrative agencies, and G.S. 7A-27(d) provides for appeals of right from certain interlocutory orders of the superior or district courts. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Buck Island, Inc., 158 N.C. App. 536, 581 S.E.2d 122 (2003).

North Carolina DHHS, Division of Facility Services, Certificate of Need Section's issuance of a No Review letter to a hospice that sought to open a branch office in another service area was the issuance of an exemption for purposes of G.S. 131E-188(a); accordingly, G.S. 131E-188(b) conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals of North Carolina to hear an appeal from a challenge to the letter. Hospice at Greensboro, Inc. v. N.C. HHS Div. of Facility Servs., 185 N.C. App. 1, 647 S.E.2d 651 (2007).

Right of Appeal Expressly Granted. - The right of appeal from any final order or decision of the Utilities Commission is expressly granted by this section. Morgan v. Duke Power Co., 22 N.C. App. 497, 206 S.E.2d 507, appeal dismissed, 285 N.C. 759, 209 S.E.2d 282 (1974).

No appeal lies from an interlocutory order of the Industrial Commission. There is a right of appeal only from a final order. Vaughn v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 37 N.C. App. 86, 245 S.E.2d 892, aff'd, 296 N.C. 683, 252 S.E.2d 792 (1978); Lynch v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 41 N.C. App. 127, 254 S.E.2d 236, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 298, 259 S.E.2d 914 (1979).

Only from a final order or decision of the Industrial Commission is there an appeal of right to the Court of Appeals. Ledford v. Asheville Hous. Auth., 125 N.C. App. 597, 482 S.E.2d 544 (1997).

Appeal of Decisions Under G.S. 143-166.4. - The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to review an appeal of a decision by the North Carolina Industrial Commission made pursuant to G.S. 143-166.4. In re Vandiford, 56 N.C. App. 224, 287 S.E.2d 912 (1982).

Appeal By State Bar of North Carolina - Court of Appeals of North Carolina lacked jurisdiction to hear the State Bar of North Carolina's appeal of a grant of summary judgment to an attorney in a disciplinary proceeding because G.S. 84-28(h) provided no appeal from a final order that did not impose discipline and in the instant case no discipline had been imposed. N.C. State Bar v. Rudisill, 159 N.C. App. 704, 583 S.E.2d 413 (2003).

An order of the hearing commission of the State Bar denying defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is interlocutory; therefore, defendant cannot appeal therefrom as a matter of right. North Carolina State Bar v. DuMont, 298 N.C. 564, 259 S.E.2d 280 (1979).

Superior court properly dismissed a university employee's petition for review of an administrative law judge's affirmation of the termination of his employment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because an adequate procedure for judicial review by direct appeal to the Court of Appeals was provided by two other statutes. Swauger v. Univ. of N.C. 259 N.C. App. 727, 817 S.E.2d 434 (2018).

Interlocutory Appeal Dismissed - Water and sewer processing facilities part-owner's appeal of interlocutory orders of the North Carolina Utilities Commission holding that the part-owner was a public utility under G.S. 62-3(23)a.2 and was subject to the Commission's jurisdiction was dismissed as the absence of any exceptions to G.S. 62-90 or this section, allowing review of interlocutory orders of the Commission, required the appellate court to conclude that it had no jurisdiction to consider appeals of interlocutory orders of the Commission; further, the appellate court did not have authority under G.S. 7A-32(c) to review the part-owner's issues as there was no final order of the Commission. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Buck Island, Inc., 158 N.C. App. 536, 581 S.E.2d 122 (2003).

Applied in Morgan v. VEPCO, 22 N.C. App. 300, 206 S.E.2d 338 (1974); Fisher v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours, 54 N.C. App. 176, 282 S.E.2d 543 (1981); Perkins v. Broughton Hosp., 71 N.C. App. 275, 321 S.E.2d 495 (1984); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. North Carolina Textile Mfrs. Ass'n, 313 N.C. 215, 328 S.E.2d 264 (1985); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Thornburg, 314 N.C. 509, 334 S.E.2d 772 (1985); Hardin v. Venture Constr. Co., 107 N.C. App. 758, 421 S.E.2d 601 (1992); Martin v. Piedmont Asphalt & Paving Co., 113 N.C. App. 121, 437 S.E.2d 696 (1993); In re Appeal of Blue Ridge Hous. of Bakersville LLC, 226 N.C. App. 42, 738 S.E.2d 802, dismissed and review granted, 367 N.C. 216, 747 S.E.2d 526, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 723 (2013); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper, 367 N.C. 644, 766 S.E.2d 827 (2014); Fields v. H&E Equip. Servs., LLC, 240 N.C. App. 483, 771 S.E.2d 791 (2015); Patillo v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 251 N.C. App. 228, 794 S.E.2d 906 (2016).

Cited in State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. General Tel. Co., 17 N.C. App. 727, 195 S.E.2d 311 (1973); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 1, 287 S.E.2d 786 (1982); Citicorp v. Currie, 75 N.C. App. 312, 330 S.E.2d 635 (1985); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Thornburg, 317 N.C. 26, 342 S.E.2d 28 (1986); In re Wake Kidney Clinic, 85 N.C. App. 639, 355 S.E.2d 788 (1987); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Thornburg, 325 N.C. 463, 385 S.E.2d 451 (1989); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Thornburg, 325 N.C. 484, 385 S.E.2d 463 (1989); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Water Serv., Inc., 335 N.C. 493, 439 S.E.2d 127 (1994); Martin v. Piedmont Asphalt & Paving, 337 N.C. 785, 448 S.E.2d 380 (1994); Phillips v. N.C. State Univ., 206 N.C. App. 258, 697 S.E.2d 433 (2010); E. Carolina Internal Med., P.A. v. N.C. HHS, 211 N.C. App. 397, 710 S.E.2d 245 (2011); In re Parkdale Mills & Parkdale Am., 225 N.C. App. 713, 741 S.E.2d 416 (2013); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper, 366 N.C. 484, 739 S.E.2d 541 (2013); N.C. State Bar v. Simmons, 233 N.C. App. 669, 757 S.E.2d 357 (2014); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper, 367 N.C. 444, 761 S.E.2d 640 (2014); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper, 367 N.C. 741, 767 S.E.2d 305 (Jan. 23, 2015); Cumberland Cnty. Hosp. Sys. v. North Carolina HHS, 242 N.C. App. 524, 776 S.E.2d 329 (2015); In re Michelin North Am., Inc., 246 N.C. App. 482, 783 S.E.2d 775 (2016), mot. dismissed, as moot, 792 S.E.2d 512, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 707 (2016); review dismissed, as moot, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 704 (N.C. 2016); review dismissed, as moot, 792 S.E.2d 790, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 704 (2016); review denied, 792 S.E.2d 519, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 702 (2016); Harris v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 252 N.C. App. 94, 798 S.E.2d 127, aff'd, 370 N.C. 386, 808 S.E.2d 142, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 1020 (2017); In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275 (2017); In re Cube Yadkin Generation, LLC v. Duke Energy Progress, LLC, - N.C. App. - , 837 S.E.2d 144 (2019).

CASE NOTES

• I. In General.
• II. Constitutional Questions.
• III. Dissent.

CASE NOTES

Scope of Review. - When the Supreme Court, after a decision of a cause by the Court of Appeals and pursuant to the petition of a party thereto as authorized by this section, grants certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, only the decision of the Court of Appeals is before the Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court inquires into proceedings in the trial court solely to determine the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Its inquiry is restricted to rulings of the Court of Appeals which are assigned as error in the petition for certiorari and which are preserved by arguments or the citation of authorities with reference thereto in the brief filed by the petitioner in the Supreme Court, except in those instances in which the Supreme Court elects to exercise its general power of supervision of courts inferior to the Supreme Court. Supreme Court review of a decision by the Court of Appeals upon an appeal from it to the Supreme Court as a matter of right, pursuant to G.S. 7A-30, is similarly limited. State v. Williams, 274 N.C. 328, 163 S.E.2d 353 (1968); Peaseley v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., 282 N.C. 585, 194 S.E.2d 133 (1973); State v. Miller, 282 N.C. 633, 194 S.E.2d 353 (1973).

The Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals for errors of law allegedly committed by it and properly brought forward for review. State v. Parrish, 275 N.C. 69, 165 S.E.2d 230 (1969); State v. Miller, 282 N.C. 633, 194 S.E.2d 353 (1973).

The Supreme Court may review the entire proceedings and consider any errors which have occurred during the course of the litigation, provided that the parties have taken the proper steps to preserve the questions for appellate review. Spartan Leasing, Inc. v. Brown, 285 N.C. 689, 208 S.E.2d 649 (1974).

When the Supreme Court grants certiorari pursuant to this section, review is ordinarily restricted to the rulings of the Court of Appeals which are assigned as error in the petition for certiorari and brought forward in petitioner's brief. State v. Muse, 280 N.C. 31, 185 S.E.2d 214 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 974, 92 S. Ct. 2409, 32 L. Ed. 2d 674, rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 898, 93 S. Ct. 99, 34 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1972); Peaseley v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., 282 N.C. 585, 194 S.E.2d 133 (1973).

Jurisdiction Proper. - Statute could not have restricted the Supreme Court of North Carolina's constitutional authority under N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 12(1) to exercise jurisdiction to review upon appeal any decision of the courts below, and as such, the Supreme Court of North Carolina did not hesitate to exercise its rarely used general supervisory authority when necessary to promote the expeditious administration of justice, and did so to consider questions that were not properly presented according to its rules; this exercise of supervisory authority was particularly appropriate when prompt and definitive resolution of an issue was necessary to ensure the uniform administration of North Carolina's criminal statutes. State v. Ellis, 361 N.C. 200, 639 S.E.2d 425 (2007).

Departure from General Rule. - In a criminal case in which the State petitioned for certiorari and the Court of Appeals ruled on only one of defendant's assignments of error in granting a new trial, the Supreme Court elected to depart from the general rule that review under this section is ordinarily restricted to the rulings of the Court of Appeals which are assigned as error, and to consider the remaining assignments of error not considered by the Court of Appeals. State v. Muse, 280 N.C. 31, 185 S.E.2d 214 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 974, 92 S. Ct. 2409, 32 L. Ed. 2d 674, rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 898, 93 S. Ct. 99, 34 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1972).

Improvidently Allowed. - Discretionary review, pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, of three protective orders was improvidently allowed; under N.C. R. App. P. 15(b), a husband's petition for review of those orders was not timely filed. Davis v. Davis, 360 N.C. 518, 631 S.E.2d 114 (2006).

Under this section the Supreme Court is to review only those cases of substantial general or legal importance or in which review is necessary to preserve the integrity of precedent established by the Supreme Court. Peaseley v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., 282 N.C. 585, 194 S.E.2d 133 (1973).

Constitutional Questions. - The Supreme Court will not ordinarily pass upon a constitutional question unless it affirmatively appears that such question was timely raised and passed upon in the trial court if it could have been, or in the Court of Appeals if the question arose after trial. State v. Parrish, 275 N.C. 69, 165 S.E.2d 230 (1969).

Workers' Compensation. - North Carolina Industrial Commission did not err in failing to prove a 10 percent late penalty because the employer's payment was not untimely; the time for appeal expired fifteen days after the mandate issued, the time to file for a petition for discretionary review ended and the employer avoided the penalty by making payment fourteen days after payment became due. Silva v. Lowes Home Improvement, 239 N.C. App. 175, 768 S.E.2d 180 (2015).

"Appeal by application" such as a petition for discretionary review would be considered an appeal pursuant to subsection (e); because G.S. 7A-31 provides for discretionary review from the Industrial Commission and states that this review is an "appeal," "appeal" under G.S. 97-18(e) includes the period during which a party may seek discretionary review by the supreme court of an opinion from the court of appeals. Silva v. Lowes Home Improvement, 239 N.C. App. 175, 768 S.E.2d 180 (2015).

The failure of plaintiff to petition for a writ of certiorari to review the interlocutory decree of the Court of Appeals does not preclude the Supreme Court from granting certiorari after final judgment and thereupon considering and rectifying any errors which occurred at any stage of the proceedings. Spartan Leasing, Inc. v. Brown, 285 N.C. 689, 208 S.E.2d 649 (1974).

The denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case and such denial does not mean that the Supreme Court has determined that the decision of the Court of Appeals is correct. Denial may simply mean that in the opinion of the Supreme Court the case does not require further review under the provisions of this section. Peaseley v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., 282 N.C. 585, 194 S.E.2d 133 (1973).

G.S. 7A-451 Does Not Give Indigent Right to Counsel. - An indigent is entitled to have a lawyer at his trial, and for direct review of that trial, but G.S. 7A-451 is not intended to cover the discretionary power of the North Carolina Supreme Court to grant a writ of certiorari under this section. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974).

And Equal Protection Clause Does Not Require Free Counsel for Discretionary Appeals. - The equal protection clause does not require North Carolina to provide free counsel for indigent defendants seeking to take discretionary appeals to the North Carolina Supreme Court or to file petitions for certiorari to that court. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974).

The duty of the State is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974).

A defendant is not denied meaningful access to the North Carolina Supreme Court simply because the State does not appoint counsel to aid him in seeking discretionary review in that court. At that stage he will have a transcript or other record of trial proceedings, a brief on his behalf in the Court of Appeals setting forth his claims of error, and often an opinion by the Court of Appeals disposing of his case. These materials, supplemented by whatever submission respondent may make pro se, would appear to provide the Supreme Court with an adequate basis on which to base its decision to grant or deny review. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974).

Equally Divided Court. - Where one member of the Supreme Court does not participate in the consideration or decision of a case, and the remaining six justices are equally divided as to whether the decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed or reversed, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed without becoming a precedent. Greenhill v. Crabtree, 301 N.C. 520, 271 S.E.2d 908 (1980); Wayfaring Home, Inc. v. Ward, 301 N.C. 518, 272 S.E.2d 121 (1980).

Exhaustion Requirement in Federal Habeas Corpus. - The fact that the respondent in an appeal from the order of a United States magistrate dismissing a claim for habeas corpus relief incorrectly pleaded that the appellant had exhausted his state court remedies and was entitled to adjudication on the merits was neither conclusive nor a waiver of the exhaustion requirement by the State. Strader v. Allsbrook, 656 F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1981).

Substantially Similar Rules and Procedures. - The rules and procedures of the North Carolina Supreme Court regarding writs of certiorari are substantially similar to those of the United States Supreme Court. Felton v. Barnett, 912 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1032, 111 S. Ct. 693, 112 L. Ed. 2d 683, 502 U.S. 1007, 112 S. Ct. 644, 116 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1991).

Discretionary Review Granted. - Supreme Court took discretionary review of three issues in a criminal appeal of a rape conviction that was affirmed by the Court of Appeals; finding error in two of those issues regarding admission of hearsay evidence that affected whether the defendant committed first or second degree rape, the court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. State v. Finney, 358 N.C. 79, 591 S.E.2d 863 (2004).

Applied in State v. Horton, 275 N.C. 651, 170 S.E.2d 466 (1969); State v. McBane, 276 N.C. 60, 170 S.E.2d 913 (1969); State v. Jennings, 276 N.C. 157, 171 S.E.2d 447 (1970); Whitley v. Redden, 276 N.C. 263, 171 S.E.2d 894 (1970); Hoyle v. City of Charlotte, 276 N.C. 292, 172 S.E.2d 1 (1970); King v. Baldwin, 276 N.C. 316, 172 S.E.2d 12 (1970); Smith v. Mercer, 276 N.C. 329, 172 S.E.2d 489 (1970); State v. Riera, 276 N.C. 361, 172 S.E.2d 535 (1970); Morse v. Curtis, 276 N.C. 371, 172 S.E.2d 495 (1970); State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Bank of Statesville, 276 N.C. 576, 174 S.E.2d 551 (1970); Martin v. North Carolina Hous. Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 175 S.E.2d 665 (1970); Home Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. McDonald, 277 N.C. 275, 177 S.E.2d 291 (1970); Whitney Stores, Inc. v. Clark, 277 N.C. 322, 177 S.E.2d 418 (1970); Mansour v. Rabil, 277 N.C. 364, 177 S.E.2d 849 (1970); State v. McVay, 277 N.C. 410, 177 S.E.2d 874 (1970); In re Ellis, 277 N.C. 419, 178 S.E.2d 77 (1970); State v. Harris, 277 N.C. 435, 177 S.E.2d 865 (1970); State Keg, Inc. v. State Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 277 N.C. 450, 177 S.E.2d 861 (1970); Styers v. Phillips, 277 N.C. 460, 178 S.E.2d 583 (1971); State v. Crump, 277 N.C. 573, 178 S.E.2d 366 (1971); Stegall v. Housing Auth., 278 N.C. 95, 178 S.E.2d 824 (1971); State v. Brooks, 279 N.C. 45, 181 S.E.2d 553 (1971); Strickland v. Powell, 279 N.C. 183, 181 S.E.2d 464 (1971); Joyner v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 226, 182 S.E.2d 553 (1971); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Morgan, 279 N.C. 265, 182 S.E.2d 356 (1971); Mutual Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Lanier, 279 N.C. 299, 182 S.E.2d 368 (1971); Cogdill v. North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n, 279 N.C. 313, 182 S.E.2d 373 (1971); Dr. T.C. Smith Co. v. North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n, 279 N.C. 328, 182 S.E.2d 383 (1971); State v. Allred, 279 N.C. 398, 183 S.E.2d 553 (1971); State v. Moore, 279 N.C. 455, 183 S.E.2d 546 (1971); State v. Fields, 279 N.C. 460, 183 S.E.2d 666 (1971); State v. Battle, 279 N.C. 484, 183 S.E.2d 641 (1971); State v. Allen, 279 N.C. 492, 183 S.E.2d 659 (1971); State v. Roberts, 279 N.C. 500, 183 S.E.2d 647 (1971); State v. Smith, 279 N.C. 505, 183 S.E.2d 649 (1971); State v. Collins, 279 N.C. 508, 183 S.E.2d 549 (1971); State v. Carnes, 279 N.C. 549, 184 S.E.2d 235 (1971); State v. Gladden, 279 N.C. 566, 184 S.E.2d 249 (1971); Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 184 S.E.2d 239 (1971); State v. Richardson, 279 N.C. 621, 185 S.E.2d 102 (1971); State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 663, 185 S.E.2d 174 (1971); State v. Stimpson, 279 N.C. 716, 185 S.E.2d 168 (1971); State v. Rummage, 280 N.C. 51, 185 S.E.2d 221 (1971); State v. Jones, 280 N.C. 60, 184 S.E.2d 862 (1971); State v. Hudson, 280 N.C. 74, 185 S.E.2d 189 (1971); Sutton v. Figgatt, 280 N.C. 89, 185 S.E.2d 97 (1971); Wiggins v. Bunch, 280 N.C. 106, 184 S.E.2d 879 (1971); State v. Burleson, 280 N.C. 112, 184 S.E.2d 869 (1971); Forrester v. Garrett, 280 N.C. 117, 184 S.E.2d 858 (1971); State v. Williams, 280 N.C. 132, 184 S.E.2d 875 (1971); State v. Tart, 280 N.C. 172, 184 S.E.2d 842 (1971); State v. Allison,
280 N.C. 175, 184 S.E.2d 857 (1971); State v. Thompson, 280 N.C. 202, 185 S.E.2d 666 (1972); State v. Jones, 280 N.C. 322, 185 S.E.2d 858 (1972); State v. Gainey, 280 N.C. 366, 185 S.E.2d 874 (1972); State v. Holden, 280 N.C. 426, 185 S.E.2d 889 (1972); State v. Ballard, 280 N.C. 479, 186 S.E.2d 372 (1972); Smith v. County of Mecklenburg, 280 N.C. 497, 187 S.E.2d 67 (1972); State v. Jackson, 280 N.C. 563, 187 S.E.2d 27 (1972); Hall v. Wake County Bd. of Elections, 280 N.C. 600, 187 S.E.2d 52 (1972); Adams-Millis Corp. v. Town of Kernersville, 281 N.C. 147, 187 S.E.2d 704 (1972); City of Kings Mountain v. Cline, 281 N.C. 269, 188 S.E.2d 284 (1972); In re Strong Tire Serv., Inc., 281 N.C. 293, 188 S.E.2d 306 (1972); State v. McIntyre, 281 N.C. 304, 188 S.E.2d 304 (1972); Allgood v. Town of Tarboro, 281 N.C. 430, 189 S.E.2d 255 (1972); North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n v. Farm Equip. Co., 281 N.C. 459, 189 S.E.2d 272 (1972); State v. Johnson, 282 N.C. 1, 191 S.E.2d 641 (1972); Lutz v. Gaston County Board of Educ., 282 N.C. 208, 192 S.E.2d 463 (1972); Albemarle Elec. Membership Corp. v. Alexander, 282 N.C. 402, 192 S.E.2d 811 (1972); State v. Lee, 282 N.C. 566, 193 S.E.2d 705 (1973); State v. Underwood, 283 N.C. 154, 195 S.E.2d 489 (1973); State v. Beach, 283 N.C. 261, 196 S.E.2d 214 (1973); State v. Sawyer, 283 N.C. 289, 196 S.E.2d 250 (1973); City of Kings Mountain v. Goforth, 283 N.C. 316, 196 S.E.2d 231 (1973); Baxter v. Jones, 283 N.C. 327, 196 S.E.2d 193 (1973); State v. Braswell, 283 N.C. 332, 196 S.E.2d 185 (1973); State v. Black, 283 N.C. 344, 196 S.E.2d 225 (1973); State v. Allen, 283 N.C. 354, 196 S.E.2d 256 (1973); Rayfield v. Clark, 283 N.C. 362, 196 S.E.2d 197 (1973); Smoky Mt. Enters., Inc. v. Rose, 283 N.C. 373, 196 S.E.2d 189 (1973); State v. Glover, 283 N.C. 379, 196 S.E.2d 207 (1973); State v. Bumgarner, 283 N.C. 388, 196 S.E.2d 210 (1973); State v. Moses, 283 N.C. 390, 196 S.E.2d 211 (1973); State v. Mitchell, 283 N.C. 462, 196 S.E.2d 736 (1973); State v. Williams, 283 N.C. 550, 196 S.E.2d 756 (1973); State v. Eubanks, 283 N.C. 556, 196 S.E.2d 706 (1973); In re Hanes Dye & Finishing Co., 285 N.C. 598, 207 S.E.2d 729 (1974); Greene v. City of Winston-Salem, 287 N.C. 66, 213 S.E.2d 231 (1975); United Tel. Co. v. Universal Plastics, Inc., 287 N.C. 232, 214 S.E.2d 49 (1975); State v. Hunt, 287 N.C. 360, 215 S.E.2d 40 (1975); Dean v. Carolina Coach Co., 287 N.C. 515, 215 S.E.2d 89 (1975); State v. Wortham, 287 N.C. 541, 215 S.E.2d 131 (1975); State v. Woodson, 287 N.C. 578, 215 S.E.2d 607 (1975); Pritchett v. Clapp, 288 N.C. 329, 218 S.E.2d 406 (1975); State v. McZorn, 288 N.C. 417, 219 S.E.2d 201 (1975); State v. Branch, 288 N.C. 514, 220 S.E.2d 495 (1975); Taylor v. Johnston, 289 N.C. 690, 224 S.E.2d 567 (1976); State v. Scott, 289 N.C. 712, 224 S.E.2d 185 (1976); Cedar Creek Enters., Inc. v. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 290 N.C. 450, 226 S.E.2d 336 (1976); Shore v. Edmisten, 290 N.C. 628, 227 S.E.2d 553 (1976); Nasco Equip. Co. v. Mason, 291 N.C. 145, 229 S.E.2d 278 (1976); State v. Fair, 291 N.C. 171, 229 S.E.2d 189
(1976); State v. Boykin, 291 N.C. 264, 229 S.E.2d 914 (1976); State v. Smith, 291 N.C. 438, 230 S.E.2d 644 (1976); State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 231 S.E.2d 833 (1977); In re Arthur, 291 N.C. 640, 231 S.E.2d 614 (1977); Whitten v. Bob King's AMC/Jeep, Inc., 292 N.C. 84, 231 S.E.2d 891 (1977); State v. Tilley, 292 N.C. 132, 232 S.E.2d 433 (1977); State ex rel. Dorothea Dix Hosp. v. Davis, 292 N.C. 147, 232 S.E.2d 698 (1977); State v. Siler, 292 N.C. 543, 234 S.E.2d 733 (1977); State v. Willard, 292 N.C. 567, 234 S.E.2d 587 (1977); State v. McFadden, 292 N.C. 609, 234 S.E.2d 742 (1977); State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 265 S.E.2d 164 (1980); State v. Ward, 300 N.C. 150, 266 S.E.2d 581 (1980); In re Rogers, 300 N.C. 747, 268 S.E.2d 221 (1980); Goodman Toyota, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 301 N.C. 84, 277 S.E.2d 690 (1980); State v. Cox, 303 N.C. 75, 277 S.E.2d 376 (1981); State v. Maher, 305 N.C. 544, 290 S.E.2d 694 (1982); Long v. City of Charlotte, 306 N.C. 187, 293 S.E.2d 101 (1982); In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 293 S.E.2d 127 (1982); Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 306 N.C. 324, 293 S.E.2d 182 (1982); State v. Ricks, 308 N.C. 522, 302 S.E.2d 770 (1983); Pugh v. Davenport, 309 N.C. 628, 308 S.E.2d 292 (1983); Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 309 N.C. 695, 309 S.E.2d 193 (1983); State v. Ysaguire, 309 N.C. 780, 309 S.E.2d 436 (1983); Barrington v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 65 N.C. App. 602, 309 S.E.2d 539 (1983); State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 319 S.E.2d 177 (1984); Mazza v. Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 311 N.C. 621, 319 S.E.2d 217 (1984); State v. McLeod, 312 N.C. 76, 320 S.E.2d 687 (1984); Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677 (1985); State v. Weldon, 314 N.C. 401, 333 S.E.2d 701 (1985); Akzona, Inc. v. Southern Ry., 314 N.C. 488, 334 S.E.2d 759 (1985); State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175, 337 S.E.2d 504 (1985); Cavenaugh v. Cavenaugh, 317 N.C. 652, 347 S.E.2d 19 (1986); Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. First of Ga. Ins. Co., 340 N.C. 88, 455 S.E.2d 655 (1995); McKinney v. Richitelli, 357 N.C. 483, 586 S.E.2d 258 (2003); Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 597 S.E.2d 674 (2004); James v. Bartlett, 359 N.C. 260, 607 S.E.2d 638 (2005); Jonesboro United Methodist Church v. Mullins-Sherman Architects, L.L.P., 359 N.C. 593, 614 S.E.2d 268 (2005); State v. Beck, 359 N.C. 611, 614 S.E.2d 274 (2005); In re R.T.W., 359 N.C. 539, 614 S.E.2d 489 (2005); State v. Cobb, 361 N.C. 414, 646 S.E.2d 365 (2007); State v. Holmes, 361 N.C. 410, 646 S.E.2d 353 (2007); State v. Cupid, 361 N.C. 417, 646 S.E.2d 348 (2007); State v. Denny, 361 N.C. 662, 652 S.E.2d 212 (2007); Carolina Bldg. Servs.' Windows & Doors, Inc. v. Boardwalk, LLC, 362 N.C. 262, 658 S.E.2d 924 (2008); Mangum v. Raleigh Bd. of Adjustment, 362 N.C. 640, 669 S.E.2d 279 (2008); Gilbert v. N.C. State Bar, 363 N.C. 70, 678 S.E.2d 602 (2009); Crocker v. Roethling, 363 N.C. 140, 675 S.E.2d 625 (2009); State v. Rollins, 363 N.C. 232, 675 S.E.2d 334 (2009); State v. Oates, 366 N.C. 264, 732 S.E.2d 571 (2012); State v. Heien, 366 N.C. 271, 737 S.E.2d 351 (2012); White v. Trew, 366 N.C. 360,
736 S.E.2d 166 (2013); Hammond v. Saini, 367 N.C. 607, 766 S.E.2d 590 (2014); State v. Miller, 367 N.C. 702, 766 S.E.2d 289 (2014); Falk v. Fannie Mae, 367 N.C. 594, 766 S.E.2d 271 (2014); State v. Young, 368 N.C. 188, 775 S.E.2d 291 (2015); LexisNexis Risk Data Mgmt. v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 368 N.C. 180, 775 S.E.2d 651 (2015); State v. Bartlett, 368 N.C. 309, 776 S.E.2d 672 (2015); State v. Ellis, 368 N.C. 342, 776 S.E.2d 675 (2015); State v. Saldierna, 369 N.C. 401, 794 S.E.2d 474 (2016); State v. Johnson, 370 N.C. 32, 803 S.E.2d 137 (2017).

Cited in In re Delk, 336 N.C. 543, 444 S.E.2d 198; Empire Power Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 337 N.C. 569, 447 S.E.2d 768, rehearing denied, 338 N.C. 314, 451 S.E.2d 634 (1994). Carolina Beach Fishing Pier v. Town of Carolina Beach, 274 N.C. 362, 163 S.E.2d 363 (1968); Sykes v. Clayton, 274 N.C. 398, 163 S.E.2d 775 (1968); Duke Power Co. v. Clayton, 274 N.C. 505, 164 S.E.2d 289 (1968); S.S. Kresge Co. v. Tomlinson, 275 N.C. 1, 165 S.E.2d 236 (1969); Hughes v. North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n, 275 N.C. 121, 165 S.E.2d 321 (1969); Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Clayton, 275 N.C. 215, 166 S.E.2d 671 (1969); State v. Core Banks Club Properties, 275 N.C. 328, 167 S.E.2d 385 (1969); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hayes, 276 N.C. 620, 174 S.E.2d 511 (1970); Kale v. Forrest, 278 N.C. 1, 178 S.E.2d 622 (1971); State v. Winford, 278 N.C. 67, 178 S.E.2d 777 (1971); Kelly v. International Harvester Co., 278 N.C. 153, 179 S.E.2d 396 (1971); State v. Woods, 278 N.C. 210, 179 S.E.2d 358 (1971); Ervin v. Clayton, 278 N.C. 219, 179 S.E.2d 353 (1971); In re North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 278 N.C. 302, 180 S.E.2d 155 (1971); City of Statesville v. Bowles, 278 N.C. 497, 180 S.E.2d 111 (1971); Hendrix v. Alsop, 278 N.C. 549, 180 S.E.2d 802 (1971); In re City of New Bern, 278 N.C. 641, 180 S.E.2d 851 (1971); State v. Parker, 279 N.C. 168, 181 S.E.2d 432 (1971); Glusman v. Trustees of Univ. of N.C. 281 N.C. 629, 190 S.E.2d 213 (1972); City of Charlotte v. McNeely, 281 N.C. 684, 190 S.E.2d 179 (1972); Keiger v. Winston-Salem Bd. of Adjustment, 281 N.C. 715, 190 S.E.2d 175 (1972); Plemmer v. Matthewson, 281 N.C. 722, 190 S.E.2d 204 (1972); State v. Joyner, 286 N.C. 366, 211 S.E.2d 320 (1975); State v. Carey, 288 N.C. 254, 218 S.E.2d 387 (1975); State v. Norwood, 289 N.C. 424, 222 S.E.2d 253 (1976); State v. Dietz, 289 N.C. 488, 223 S.E.2d 357 (1976); Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 289 N.C. 587, 223 S.E.2d 346 (1976); In re Thomas, 290 N.C. 410, 226 S.E.2d 371 (1976); State v. Cole, 293 N.C. 328, 237 S.E.2d 814 (1977); State v. Wills, 293 N.C. 546, 240 S.E.2d 328 (1977); Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E.2d 338 (1978); People ex rel. Duncan v. Beach, 294 N.C. 713, 242 S.E.2d 796 (1978); State v. Joyner, 295 N.C. 55, 243 S.E.2d 367 (1978); State v. Abernathy, 295 N.C. 147, 244 S.E.2d 373 (1978); State v. Johnson, 295 N.C. 227, 244 S.E.2d 391 (1978); State v. Sanders, 295 N.C. 361, 245 S.E.2d 674 (1978); State v. Curmon, 295 N.C. 453, 245 S.E.2d 503 (1978); Board of Transp. v. Brown, 296 N.C. 250, 249 S.E.2d 803 (1978); State ex rel. Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 250 S.E.2d 603 (1979); Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 251 S.E.2d 843 (1979); Martin v. Bonclarken Ass'y, 296 N.C. 540, 251 S.E.2d 403 (1979); Wood v. Wood, 297 N.C. 1, 252 S.E.2d 799 (1979); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Wolfe, 297 N.C. 36, 252 S.E.2d 809 (1979); State v. McCombs, 297 N.C. 151, 253 S.E.2d 906 (1979); Blackwood v. Cates, 297 N.C. 163, 254 S.E.2d 7 (1979); Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206, 254 S.E.2d 762 (1979); Cline v. Cline, 297 N.C. 336, 255 S.E.2d 399 (1979); State v. Joyner, 297 N.C. 349, 255 S.E.2d 390 (1979); State v. Barnes, 297 N.C. 442,
255 S.E.2d 386 (1979); Booker v. Duke Medical Ctr., 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979); State v. Lyles, 298 N.C. 179, 257 S.E.2d 410 (1979); State v. Hardy, 298 N.C. 191, 257 S.E.2d 426 (1979); Seders v. Powell, 298 N.C. 453, 259 S.E.2d 544 (1979); Campbell v. First Baptist Church, 298 N.C. 476, 259 S.E.2d 558 (1979); State v. Sanders, 298 N.C. 512, 259 S.E.2d 258 (1979); Harrington v. Collins, 298 N.C. App. 535, 259 S.E.2d 275 (1979); Rent-A-Car Co. v. Lynch, 298 N.C. 559, 259 S.E.2d 564 (1979); North Carolina State Bar v. DuMont, 298 N.C. 564, 259 S.E.2d 280 (1979); State v. Boykin, 298 N.C. 687, 259 S.E.2d 883 (1979); Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 260 S.E.2d 611 (1979); State v. Jones, 299 N.C. 103, 261 S.E.2d 1 (1980); State v. Bumgarner, 299 N.C. 113, 261 S.E.2d 105 (1980); State v. Ray, 299 N.C. 151, 261 S.E.2d 789 (1980); Woodhouse v. Board of Comm'rs, 299 N.C. 211, 261 S.E.2d 882 (1980); State v. Cronin, 299 N.C. 229, 262 S.E.2d 277 (1980); State ex rel. Child Day-Care Licensing Comm'n v. Fayetteville St. Christian School, 299 N.C. 351, 261 S.E.2d 908 (1980); Ragland v. Moore, 299 N.C. 360, 261 S.E.2d 666 (1980); Heritage Village Church & Missionary Fellowship, Inc. v. State, 299 N.C. 399, 263 S.E.2d 726 (1980); MacDonald v. University of N.C. 299 N.C. 457, 263 S.E.2d 578 (1980); Hudson v. Hudson, 299 N.C. 465, 263 S.E.2d 719 (1980); Davis v. McRee, 299 N.C. 498, 263 S.E.2d 604 (1980); Kavanau Real Estate Trust v. Debnam, 299 N.C. 510, 263 S.E.2d 595 (1980); State v. Williams, 299 N.C. 529, 263 S.E.2d 571 (1980); In re Annexation Ordinance, 300 N.C. 337, 266 S.E.2d 661 (1980); Weber v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 301 N.C. 83, 282 S.E.2d 228 (1980); State v. Ward, 301 N.C. 469, 272 S.E.2d 84 (1980); Tarkington v. Tarkington, 301 N.C. 502, 272 S.E.2d 99 (1980); State v. Lang, 301 N.C. 508, 272 S.E.2d 123 (1980); State v. Bass, 303 N.C. 267, 278 S.E.2d 209 (1981); Cromer v. Cromer, 303 N.C. 307, 278 S.E.2d 518 (1981); Chateau X, Inc. v. State ex rel. Andrews, 302 N.C. 321, 275 S.E.2d 443 (1981); North Carolina Sav. & Loan League v. North Carolina Credit Union Comm'n, 302 N.C. 458, 276 S.E.2d 404 (1981); Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., 303 N.C. 573, 281 S.E.2d 24 (1981); State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 282 S.E.2d 439 (1981); Hill v. Pinelawn Mem. Park, 304 N.C. 159, 282 S.E.2d 779 (1981); Zarn, Inc. v. Southern Ry., 304 N.C. 189, 282 S.E.2d 421 (1981); Green v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 603, 290 S.E.2d 593 (1982); Adcock v. Perry, 305 N.C. 625, 290 S.E.2d 608 (1982); State v. Jones, 305 N.C. 520, 290 S.E.2d 675 (1982); Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 290 S.E.2d 682 (1982); Deese v. Southern Lawn & Tree Expert Co., 306 N.C. 275, 293 S.E.2d 140 (1982); State v. McGraw, 306 N.C. 372, 293 S.E.2d 161 (1982); Godley v. County of Pitt, 306 N.C. 357, 293 S.E.2d 167 (1982); State v. Walden, 306 N.C. 466, 293 S.E.2d 780 (1982); In re Foreclosure of Deed of Trust Executed by Bonder, 306 N.C. 451, 293 S.E.2d 798 (1982); Hoffman v. Ryder Truck Lines, 306 N.C. 502, 293 S.E.2d 807 (1982); State v. Lombardo, 306 N.C. 594, 295 S.E.2d 399 (1982); State v. Pratt, 306 N.C. 673, 295 S.E.2d 462 (1982); Appeal of Willett,
306 N.C. 617, 295 S.E.2d 469 (1982); State v. Whitaker, 307 N.C. 115, 296 S.E.2d 273 (1982); In re Denial of Approval to Issue Hous. Bonds, 307 N.C. 52, 296 S.E.2d 281 (1982); Purdy v. Brown, 307 N.C. 93, 296 S.E.2d 459 (1982); State v. Woods, 307 N.C. 213, 297 S.E.2d 574 (1982); Henderson v. Henderson, 307 N.C. 401, 298 S.E.2d 345 (1983); State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 307 S.E.2d 339 (1983); State v. Toomer, 311 N.C. 183, 316 S.E.2d 66 (1984); Allen v. Duvall, 311 N.C. 245, 316 S.E.2d 267 (1984); Faulkner v. New Bern-Craven County Bd. of Educ., 311 N.C. 42, 316 S.E.2d 281 (1984); Middlesex Constr. Corp. v. State ex rel. State Art Museum Bldg. Comm'n, 312 N.C. 793, 325 S.E.2d 223 (1985); Arney v. Arney, 313 N.C. 173, 326 S.E.2d 31 (1985); Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985); Adams v. Nelsen, 313 N.C. 442, 329 S.E.2d 322 (1985); Bryant v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 313 N.C. 362, 329 S.E.2d 333 (1985); North Carolina Dep't of Cor. v. Hill, 313 N.C. 481, 329 S.E.2d 377 (1985); Gaston County Indus. Facilities & Pollution Control Fin. Auth. v. Hope, 314 N.C. 112, 331 S.E.2d 122 (1985); In re Locklear, 314 N.C. 412, 334 S.E.2d 46 (1985); State v. Swimm, 316 N.C. 24, 340 S.E.2d 65 (1986); State v. Miller, 315 N.C. 773, 340 S.E.2d 290 (1986); Leonard v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 316 N.C. 84, 340 S.E.2d 338 (1986); City of Winston-Salem v. Cooper, 315 N.C. 702, 340 S.E.2d 366 (1986); State v. Moore, 315 N.C. 738, 340 S.E.2d 401 (1986); State v. Riddick, 316 N.C. 127, 340 S.E.2d 422 (1986); Henry v. Edmisten, 315 N.C. 474, 340 S.E.2d 720 (1986); Beasley v. National Sav. Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 372, 341 S.E.2d 338 (1986); State v. Parker, 316 N.C. 295, 341 S.E.2d 555 (1986); Peoples v. Cone Mills Corp., 316 N.C. 426, 342 S.E.2d 798 (1986); Servomation Corp. v. Hickory Constr. Co., 316 N.C. 543, 342 S.E.2d 853 (1986); Marks v. Marks, 316 N.C. 447, 342 S.E.2d 859 (1986); Maffei v. Alert Cable TV of N.C. Inc., 316 N.C. 615, 342 S.E.2d 867 (1986); Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 348 S.E.2d 782 (1986); Daniels v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 320 N.C. 669, 360 S.E.2d 772 (1987); Lawson v. Lawson, 321 N.C. 274, 362 S.E.2d 269 (1987); Abernathy v. Consolidated Freightways, Corp., 321 N.C. 236, 362 S.E.2d 559 (1987); Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co. v. McLeod, 321 N.C. 426, 364 S.E.2d 399 (1988); Josey v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 322 N.C. 295, 367 S.E.2d 675 (1988); State ex rel. Rohrer v. Credle, 322 N.C. 522, 369 S.E.2d 825 (1988); Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N.C. 611, 370 S.E.2d 579 (1988); State v. Hayes, 323 N.C. 306, 372 S.E.2d 704 (1988); State v. Hunt, 323 N.C. 407, 373 S.E.2d 400 (1988); State v. Alston, 323 N.C. 614, 374 S.E.2d 247 (1988); Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 323 N.C. 559, 374 S.E.2d 385 (1988); Turlington v. McLeod, 323 N.C. 591, 374 S.E.2d 394 (1988); Lea Co. v. North Carolina Bd. of Transp., 323 N.C. 697, 374 S.E.2d 866 (1989); State ex rel. Rhodes v. Simpson, 325 N.C. 514, 385 S.E.2d 329 (1989); State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473 (1989); Kiser v. Kiser, 325 N.C. 502, 385 S.E.2d 487 (1989); North Carolina State Bar v. Randolph, 325 N.C. 699, 386 S.E.2d 185 (1989);
Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 388 S.E.2d 134 (1990); State v. Wise, 326 N.C. 476, 390 S.E.2d 142 (1990); McNeill v. Harnett County, 327 N.C. 552, 398 S.E.2d 475 (1990); State v. Nobles, 329 N.C. 239, 404 S.E.2d 668 (1991); State v. Rainey, 331 N.C. 259, 415 S.E.2d 337 (1992); Holloway v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 333 N.C. 94, 423 S.E.2d 752 (1992); Wireways, Inc. v. Mitek Indus., Inc., 333 N.C. 253, 424 S.E.2d 384 (1993); Brantley v. Starling, 336 N.C. 567, 444 S.E.2d 170 (1994); State v. Farris, 336 N.C. 552, 444 S.E.2d 182 (1994); Forsyth Mem. Hosp. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 336 N.C. 438, 444 S.E.2d 423 (1994); DOT v. Overton, 336 N.C. 598, 444 S.E.2d 448 (1994); State v. McCarroll, 336 N.C. 559, 445 S.E.2d 18 (1994); Hales v. North Carolina Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 337 N.C. 329, 445 S.E.2d 590 (1994); Nissan Div. of Nissan Motor Corp. in United States v. Fred Anderson Nissan, 337 N.C. 424, 445 S.E.2d 600 (1994); In re Ward, 337 N.C. 443, 446 S.E.2d 40 (1994); State v. Horn, 337 N.C. 449, 446 S.E.2d 52 (1994); Hickman ex rel. Womble v. McKoin, 337 N.C. 460, 446 S.E.2d 80 (1994); Moss v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 337 N.C. 315, 446 S.E.2d 799 (1994); Ragan v. Hill, 337 N.C. 667, 447 S.E.2d 371 (1994); Brown v. O'Toole, 337 N.C. 686, 447 S.E.2d 381 (1994); Hargett v. Holland, 337 N.C. 651, 447 S.E.2d 784 (1994); Bowden v. Latta, 337 N.C. 794, 448 S.E.2d 503 (1994); Best v. Duke Univ., 337 N.C. 742, 448 S.E.2d 506 (1994); State v. Hauser, 342 N.C. 382, 464 S.E.2d 443 (1995); State v. Marr, 342 N.C. 607, 467 S.E.2d 236 (1996); Associated Mechanical Contractors v. Payne, 342 N.C. 825, 467 S.E.2d 398 (1996); Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 467 S.E.2d 615 (1996); Crowell Constructors, Inc. v. State, 342 N.C. 838, 467 S.E.2d 675 (1996); State v. Dellinger, 343 N.C. 93, 468 S.E.2d 218 (1996); Edward Valves, Inc. v. Wake County, 343 N.C. 426, 471 S.E.2d 342 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1112, 117 S. Ct. 952, 136 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1997); Collins v. North Carolina Parole Comm'n, 344 N.C. 179, 473 S.E.2d 1 (1996); State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 146, 478 S.E.2d 188 (1996); Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1997); Tise v. Yates Constr. Co., 345 N.C. 456, 480 S.E.2d 677 (1997); State v. Rogers, 346 N.C. 262, 485 S.E.2d 619 (1997); State v. Smith, 346 N.C. 794, 488 S.E.2d 210 (1997); Leahy v. North Carolina Bd. of Nursing, 346 N.C. 775, 488 S.E.2d 245 (1997); Krauss v. Wayne County Dep't of Social Servs., 347 N.C. 371, 493 S.E.2d 428 (1997); Whitfield v. Gilchrist, 348 N.C. 39, 497 S.E.2d 412 (1998); State v. Pearson, 348 N.C. 272, 498 S.E.2d 599 (1998); Poole v. Copland, Inc., 348 N.C. 260, 498 S.E.2d 602 (1998); City of Charlotte v. Cook, 348 N.C. 222, 498 S.E.2d 605 (1998); Elliott v. North Carolina Psychology Bd., 348 N.C. 230, 498 S.E.2d 616 (1998); Farmah v. Farmah, 348 N.C. 586, 500 S.E.2d 662 (1998); Briley v. Farabow, 348 N.C. 537, 501 S.E.2d 649 (1998); Bethania Town Lot Comm. v. City of Winston-Salem, 348 N.C. 664, 502 S.E.2d 360 (1998); State v. Helms, 348 N.C. 578, 504 S.E.2d 293 (1998); State v. Ruff, 349 N.C. 213, 505 S.E.2d 579 (1998); State v. Malette, 350 N.C. 52,
509 S.E.2d 776 (1999); Frye Regional Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Hunt, 350 N.C. 39, 510 S.E.2d 159 (1999); State v. Hayes, 350 N.C. 79, 511 S.E.2d 302 (1999); Parish v. Hill, 350 N.C. 231, 513 S.E.2d 547 (1999); Bailey v. North Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 353 N.C. 142, 540 S.E.2d 313 (2000); Craig v. County of Chatham, 356 N.C. 40, 565 S.E.2d 172 (2002); Morris Communs. Corp. v. City of Asheville, 356 N.C. 103, 565 S.E.2d 70 (2002); State v. Hearst, 356 N.C. 132, 567 S.E.2d 124 (2002); Deadwood, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue, 356 N.C. 407, 572 S.E.2d 103 (2002); N.C. State Bar v. Talford, 356 N.C. 626, 576 S.E.2d 305 (2003); Owenby v. Young, 357 N.C. 142, 579 S.E.2d 264 (2003); Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 357 N.C. 170, 581 S.E.2d 415 (2003); Whitaker v. Town of Scotland Neck, 357 N.C. 552, 597 S.E.2d 665 (2003); In re Investigation of the Death of Miller, 357 N.C. 316, 584 S.E.2d 772 (2003); Whitacre P'ship v. BioSignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 591 S.E.2d 870 (2004); N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 599 S.E.2d 888 (2004); Register v. White, 358 N.C. 691, 599 S.E.2d 549 (2004); State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554, 614 S.E.2d 479 (2005); State v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 359 N.C. 763, 618 S.E.2d 219 (2005); State v. Jones, 359 N.C. 832, 616 S.E.2d 496 (2005); State v. Blackwell, 359 N.C. 814, 618 S.E.2d 213 (2005); In re Anderson, 360 N.C. 271, 624 S.E.2d 626 (2006); Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 628 S.E.2d 1 (2006); In re J.S.L., 177 N.C. App. 151, 628 S.E.2d 387 (2006); In re A.K., 360 N.C. 449, 628 S.E.2d 753 (2006); Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners Ass'n, 360 N.C. 547, 633 S.E.2d 78 (2006); State v. McKinney, 361 N.C. 53, 637 S.E.2d 868 (2006); DOT v. M.M. Fowler, Inc., 361 N.C. 1, 637 S.E.2d 885 (2006); State v. Hinton, 361 N.C. 207, 639 S.E.2d 437 (2007); State v. Lasiter, 361 N.C. 299, 643 S.E.2d 909 (2007); State v. Agnew, 361 N.C. 333, 643 S.E.2d 581 (2007); State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 648 S.E.2d 819 (2007); Gore v. Myrtle/Mueller, 362 N.C. 27, 653 S.E.2d 400 (2007); State v. Gillespie, 362 N.C. 150, 655 S.E.2d 355 (2008); State v. Whaley, 362 N.C. 156, 655 S.E.2d 388 (2008); Wake Cares, Inc. v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 190 N.C. App. 1, 660 S.E.2d 217 (2008), aff'd, 363 N.C. 165, 675 S.E.2d 345 (2009)

State v. Facyson, 367 N.C. 454, 758 S.E.2d 359 (2014); DocRx, Inc. v. EMI Servs. of N.C. 367 N.C. 371, 758 S.E.2d 390 (2014); State v. Murchison, 367 N.C. 461, 758 S.E.2d 356 (2014); King v. Town of Chapel Hill, 367 N.C. 400, 758 S.E.2d 364 (2014); In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. 386, 758 S.E.2d 374 (2014); State v. Pennell, 367 N.C. 466, 758 S.E.2d 383 (2014); Bynum v. Wilson County, 367 N.C. 355, 758 S.E.2d 643 (2014); State v. Verkerk, 367 N.C. 483, 758 S.E.2d 387 (2014); Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. Gray, 369 N.C. 1, 789 S.E.2d 445 (2016); E. Carolina Reg'l Hous. Auth. v. Lofton, 369 N.C. 8, 789 S.E.2d 449 (2016); Quality Built Homes, Inc. v. Town of Carthage, 369 N.C. 15, 789 S.E.2d 454 (2016).

Brown v. Ellis, 363 N.C. 360, 678 S.E.2d 222 (June 18, 2009); In re Summons Issued to Ernst & Young, LLP, 363 N.C. 612, 684 S.E.2d 151 (2009); Baxter v. Danny Nicholson, Inc., 363 N.C. 829, 690 S.E.2d 265 (2010); N.C. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Bd. of Trs. of Guilford Tech. Cmty. College, 364 N.C. 102, 691 S.E.2d 694 (2010); In re D.S., 364 N.C. 184, 694 S.E.2d 758 (2010); Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 364 N.C. 195, 695 S.E.2d 442 (June 17, 2010); In re D.L.H., 364 N.C. 214, 694 S.E.2d 753 (June 17, 2010); State v. Tanner, 364 N.C. 229, 695 S.E.2d 97 (June 17, 2010); Sisk v. Transylvania Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 364 N.C. 172, 695 S.E.2d 429 (June 17, 2010); In re J.A.G., 206 N.C. App. 318, 696 S.E.2d 809 (2010); State v. Ray, 364 N.C. 272, 697 S.E.2d 319 (Aug. 27, 2010); N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sadler, 365 N.C. 178, 711 S.E.2d 114 (2011); Underwood v. Underwood, 365 N.C. 235, 717 S.E.2d 361 (2011); Conner v. N.C. Council of State, 365 N.C. 242, 716 S.E.2d 836 (2011); Cummings v. Ortega, 365 N.C. 262, 716 S.E.2d 235 (2011); State v. Nabors, 365 N.C. 306, 718 S.E.2d 623 (2011); Stark v. Ford Motor Co., 365 N.C. 468, 723 S.E.2d 753 (2012); State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 723 S.E.2d 326 (2012); In re P.D.R., 365 N.C. 533, 723 S.E.2d 335 (2012); State v. Lewis, 365 N.C. 488, 724 S.E.2d 492 (2012); State v. Beckelheimer, 366 N.C. 127, 726 S.E.2d 156 (2012); State v. Moore, 366 N.C. 100, 726 S.E.2d 168 (2012); State v. Towe, 366 N.C. 56, 732 S.E.2d 564 (2012); Lanvale Props., LLC v. County of Cabarrus, 366 N.C. 142, 731 S.E.2d 800 (2012); Estate of Williams v. Pasquotank County Parks & Rec. Dep't, 366 N.C. 195, 732 S.E.2d 137 (2012); High Rock Lake Partners, LLC v. N.C. DOT, 366 N.C. 315, 735 S.E.2d 300 (2012); In re Foreclosure of a Deed of Trust Executed by Bass, 366 N.C. 464, 738 S.E.2d 173 (2013); State v. Griffin, 366 N.C. 473, 749 S.E.2d 444 (2013); State v. Carter, 366 N.C. 496, 739 S.E.2d 548 (2013); State v. Brent, 367 N.C. 73, 743 S.E.2d 152 (2013); State v. Craven, 367 N.C. 51, 744 S.E.2d 458 (2013); State v. Williams, 367 N.C. 64, 744 S.E.2d 125 (2013); State v. Ortiz-Zape, 367 N.C. 1, 743 S.E.2d 156 (2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 2660, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 3730, 189 L. Ed. 2d 208 (U.S. 2014); Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 367 N.C. 81, 747 S.E.2d 220 (2013); HCW Ret. & Fin. Servs., LLC v. HCW Emple. Ben. Servs., LLC, 367 N.C. 104, 747 S.E.2d 236 (2013).

State v. Stokes, 367 N.C. 474, 756 S.E.2d 32 (2014); Beroth Oil Co. v. N.C. DOT, 367 N.C. 333, 757 S.E.2d 466 (2014);.

Lunsford v. Mills, 367 N.C. 618, 766 S.E.2d 297 (2014); State v. Banks, 367 N.C. 652, 766 S.E.2d 334 (2014); Ward v. Carmona, 368 N.C. 35, 770 S.E.2d 70 (2015); Hart v. State, 368 N.C. 122, 774 S.E.2d 281 (2015); State v. Triplett, 368 N.C. 172, 775 S.E.2d 805 (2015); In re R.R.N., 368 N.C. 167, 775 S.E.2d 656 (2015); State v. McKinney, 368 N.C. 161, 775 S.E.2d 821 (2015); Lassiter v. N.C. Baptist Hosps., Inc., 368 N.C. 367, 778 S.E.2d 68 (2015); Wetherington v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 368 N.C. 583, 780 S.E.2d 543 (2015); State v. Winkler, 368 N.C. 572, 780 S.E.2d 824 (2015); High Point Bank & Trust Co. v. Highmark Props., LLC, 368 N.C. 301, 776 S.E.2d 838 (2015); Needham v. Price, 368 N.C. 563, 780 S.E.2d 549 (2015); Arnesen v. Rivers Edge Golf Club & Plantation, Inc., 368 N.C. 440, 781 S.E.2d 1 (2015); State v. Williams, 368 N.C. 620, 781 S.E.2d 268 (2016); Young v. Bailey, 368 N.C. 665, 781 S.E.2d 277 (2016); Irving v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 368 N.C. 609, 781 S.E.2d 282 (2016); State v. Crockett, 368 N.C. 717, 782 S.E.2d 878 (2016); State v. Barnett, 368 N.C. 710, 782 S.E.2d 885 (2016); In re N.T., 368 N.C. 705, 782 S.E.2d 502 (2016); State v. Spivey, 368 N.C. 739, 782 S.E.2d 872 (2016); State v. Miller, 368 N.C. 729, 783 S.E.2d 194 (2016); State v. Snead, 368 N.C. 811, 783 S.E.2d 733 (2016); State v. Ross, 369 N.C. 393, 794 S.E.2d 289 (2016); State v. Moir, 369 N.C. 370, 794 S.E.2d 685 (2016); Turner v. Thomas, 369 N.C. 419, 794 S.E.2d 439 (2016); Fisher v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 369 N.C. 202, 794 S.E.2d 699 (2016); State v. Floyd, 369 N.C. 329, 794 S.E.2d 460 (2016); State v. Dalton, 369 N.C. 311, 794 S.E.2d 485 (2016); State v. Juarez, 369 N.C. 351, 794 S.E.2d 293 (2016); State v. Barnett, 369 N.C. 298, 794 S.E.2d 306 (2016); City of Asheville v. State, 369 N.C. 80, 794 S.E.2d 759 (2016); King v. Bryant, 369 N.C. 451, 795 S.E.2d 340 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 314, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6038, 199 L. Ed. 2d 233 (U.S. 2017); State v. Walston, 369 N.C. 547, 798 S.E.2d 741 (2017); United Cmty. Bank (Ga.) v. Wolfe, 369 N.C. 555, 799 S.E.2d 269 (2017); State v. Godwin, 369 N.C. 605, 800 S.E.2d 47 (2017); State v. Miller, 369 N.C. 658, 800 S.E.2d 400 (2017); State v. Holloman, 369 N.C. 615, 799 S.E.2d 824 (2017); State v. Romano, 369 N.C. 678, 800 S.E.2d 644 (2017); State v. Campbell, 369 N.C. 599, 799 S.E.2d 600 (2017); United States Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Pinkney, 369 N.C. 723, 800 S.E.2d 412 (2017); State v. McKiver, 369 N.C. 652, 799 S.E.2d 851 (2017); State v. Jones, 369 N.C. 631, 800 S.E.2d 54 (2017); State v. Baker, 369 N.C. 586, 799 S.E.2d 816 (2017); Wilkes v. City of Greenville, 369 N.C. 730, 799 S.E.2d 838 (2017); Fid. Bank v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue, 370 N.C. 10, 803 S.E.2d 142 (2017);.

DOT v. Adams Outdoor Adver. of Charlotte Ltd. P'ship, 370 N.C. 101, 804 S.E.2d 486 (2017); Catawba Cty. v. Loggins, 370 N.C. 83, 804 S.E.2d 474 (2017); State v. Campbell, 373 N.C. 216, 835 S.E.2d 844 (2019).

CASE NOTES

Jurisdiction. - Appellate court had jurisdiction to grant defendant petition for a writ of certiorari where G.S. 7A-32(c) gave the court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its own jurisdiction, and thus, N.C. R. App. P. 21 could not take that jurisdiction away. State v. Posner, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Apr. 20, 2021).

The Court of Appeals is authorized to treat an appeal as a petition for a writ of certiorari in order to clarify its position. Jerson v. Jerson, 68 N.C. App. 738, 315 S.E.2d 522 (1984).

Appellate court could exercise its discretion to treat pro se defendant's appeal as a petition for certiorari and grant the writ to address the merits of defendant's appeal for speeding and failure to produce a driver's license where defendant failed to include in the record on appeal a copy of the district court judgment establishing the derivative jurisdiction of the superior court. State v. Phillips, 149 N.C. App. 310, 560 S.E.2d 852, appeal dismissed, 355 N.C. 499, 564 S.E.2d 230 (2002).

Because the court of appeals did not state the procedure for review, the trial court did not enter an appealable order, and defendant did not seek entry of such an order by mandamus, defendant was not entitled to appeal as a matter of right; however, defendant petitioned for review by certiorari, and the court of appeals granted his petition for writ of certiorari in its discretion. State v. Watkins, 246 N.C. App. 725, 783 S.E.2d 279 (2016).

Court of appeals elected to treat defendant's appeal as a petition for certiorari because, while the district court's judgment and the notice of appeal to the superior court therefrom were not included in the record on appeal, a district court proceeding was in fact alluded to in the record; the district court's order indicated that defendant was found guilty of driving while impaired (DWI), although the DWI judgment was not attached or included in the record; and the State did not dispute that the superior court had jurisdiction. State v. McNeil, 262 N.C. App. 497, 822 S.E.2d 317 (2018), review dismissed, State v. Myers-McNeil, 372 N.C. 718, 831 S.E.2d 88, 2019 N.C. LEXIS 827 (2019), cert. dismissed, 372 N.C. 718, 831 S.E.2d 91, 2019 N.C. LEXIS 831 (2019), cert. denied, 206 L. Ed. 2d 827, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 2267 (U.S. 2020).

Appeal Treated As Petition for Certiorari. - Defendant's notice was deficient and defendant failed to properly preserve the right to appeal because, although defendant timely filed written notice of appeal, the notice attempted to appeal the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence instead of the judgment underlying defendant's convictions. Nonetheless, the appellate court treated defendant's appeal as a petition for certiorari and granted the writ to address the merits of the appeal. State v. Horton, 264 N.C. App. 711, 826 S.E.2d 770 (2019).

Although defendant did not follow the correct procedure for appealing the entry of a civil judgment ordering defendant to pay attorney's fees, the appellate court granted defendant's petition for writ of certiorari, and thereby obtained jurisdiction to consider the merits of defendant's appeal even if defendant's right to appeal the judgment was lost by failure to take timely action. State v. Mangum, - N.C. App. - , 840 S.E.2d 862 (2020).

Appeal Dismissed But Arguments Reviewed. - Record on appeal lacked copies of the juvenile petitions purportedly filed and, thus, the record failed to demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter; because the record was silent with regard to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, the respondents' appeal was dismissed, but pursuant to the court's discretionary authority, the court elected to review their arguments on appeal by writ of certiorari. In re J.C.M.J.C., - N.C. App. - , 834 S.E.2d 670 (2019).

Guilty Plea. - Defendant's appeal asserting a guilty plea was not the product of an informed choice when a plea agreement's terms were contradictory was dismissed because (1) defendant had no statutory right to appeal the issue, (2) the issue was not listed in N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1) as one eligible for review pursuant to a writ of certiorari, nor (3) was it appropriate to invoke N.C. R. App. P. 2 to suspend the requirements of N.C. R. App. P. 21, as defendant showed no "exceptional circumstances," since defendant received a sentence consistent with defendant's guilty plea, acknowledgement of an aggravating factor, and understanding the sentence rested within the trial court's discretion. State v. Biddix, 244 N.C. App. 482, 780 S.E.2d 863 (2015).

Appellate court could grant defendant review by a writ of certiorari after pleading guilty because, while defendant's appeal raised no issue for which an appeal of right was afforded, (1) N.C. Const. art. IV, § 12(2) let the General Assembly prescribe the court's jurisdiction, (2) G.S. 7A-32(c) gave the court broad powers to control trial court proceedings, (3) G.S. 15A-1444(e) had no limiting language, and (4) N.C. R. App. P. 21 could not limit defendant's statutory right to seek the writ. State v. Jones, 253 N.C. App. 789, 802 S.E.2d 518 (2017).

Although the State cannot appeal from a verdict of not guilty, it may seek a writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to set aside action taken in excess of its authority. State v. Surles, 55 N.C. App. 179, 284 S.E.2d 738 (1981), cert. denied, 305 N.C. 307, 290 S.E.2d 707 (1982).

The State's attempted appeal of a district court's action in setting aside guilty verdicts in a misdemeanor case entered by it five months previously and entering verdicts of not guilty would be treated as a petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to subsection (c) of this section and N.C.R.A.P., Rule 22. State v. Surles, 55 N.C. App. 179, 284 S.E.2d 738 (1981), cert. denied, 305 N.C. 307, 290 S.E.2d 707 (1982).

Writ of Certiorari Lawfully Issued. - Court of appeals lawfully issued a writ of certiorari after a trial court granted its own motion for appropriate relief because there was a conspicuous absence of any mention in G.S. 15A-1422 of either G.S. 15A-1420(d) or sua sponte motions; the absence of limiting language regarding review of sua sponte motions meant the jurisdiction prescribed by G.S. 7A-32(c) remained unchanged, and the court of appeals had subject matter jurisdiction to issue the writ. State v. Thomsen, 369 N.C. 22, 789 S.E.2d 639 (2016).

Jurisdiction When State Appeals. - Appeal of the motion for appropriate relief would have fallen under the statute section by writ of certiorari; given that the state constitution authorizes the General Assembly to define the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to supervise and control trial court proceedings, and there no limiting language regarding which party may appeal a ruling on a motion for appropriate relief, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear an appeal by the State of a motion for appropriate relief when the defendant won relief, and while the appellate rule might appear to limit the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, the rules cannot take away jurisdiction given by the General Assembly. State v. Stubbs, 368 N.C. 40, 770 S.E.2d 74 (2015).

Appeal by Trustees of Charitable Trust. - Although an appeal by the trustees of a charitable trust was subject to dismissal on the ground that there were no parties aggrieved by the order of the superior court modifying the trust, the Court of Appeals nonetheless could consider the appeal, in the exercise of its supervisory power, where the order would affect the interests of a substantial number of public and private hospitals in the State, as well as thousands of persons who would be hospitalized as charity patients. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Morgan, 9 N.C. App. 460, 176 S.E.2d 860 (1970).

Adequate Foundation Requires Physical Evidence to Show Abuse. - Writ of certiorari was granted because an inmate was not entitled to relief under G.S. 15A-1415(b)(7), as there had been no significant change in law regarding expert opinion evidence since defendant's convictions; cases simply applied the existing law on expert opinion evidence, which was that before expert testimony may have been admitted under G.S. 8C-1-702, an adequate foundation had to be laid, and for expert testimony presenting a definitive diagnosis of sexual abuse, an adequate foundation required supporting physical evidence of the abuse. State v. Chandler, 364 N.C. 313, 697 S.E.2d 327 (Aug. 27, 2010).

Exercise of Discretionary Duties by Public Official. - Neither mandamus nor a mandatory injunction may be issued to control the manner of a public official's exercise of a discretionary duty. White v. Pate, 58 N.C. App. 402, 293 S.E.2d 601 (1982), modified, 308 N.C. 759, 304 S.E.2d 199 (1983).

Review of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings. - Under N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 12 and this section, the courts of the appellate division have power to review judicial disciplinary proceedings whether the attorney or the State has prevailed in the trial court. In re Palmer, 296 N.C. 638, 252 S.E.2d 784 (1979).

Review of Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings. - Court of Appeals of North Carolina lacked jurisdiction to hear the State Bar of North Carolina's appeal of a grant of summary judgment to an attorney in a disciplinary proceeding because G.S. 84-28(h) provided no appeal from a final order that did not impose discipline, and in the instant case no discipline had been imposed; further, certiorari was inappropriate because the case did not fall within the rubric of N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1) and the court declined to suspend the requirement of Rule 21(a)(1) using N.C. R. App. P. 2. N.C. State Bar v. Rudisill, 159 N.C. App. 704, 583 S.E.2d 413 (2003).

State Must Seek Review of Disciplinary Proceedings by Writ of Certiorari. - The State may seek review by the appellate division of proceedings disciplining attorneys under the judicial method. However, the State may not appeal in such cases as a matter of right, but must seek appellate review by petition for writ of certiorari. In re Palmer, 296 N.C. 638, 252 S.E.2d 784 (1979).

Relief Where Issue Not Presented in Brief. - Plaintiff 's failure to present and argue in its brief to the Court of Appeals the propriety of the trial court's judgment as to attorneys' fees precluded plaintiff from obtaining relief on this point in the Court of Appeals as a matter of right; however, the Court of Appeals, in the exercise of its general supervisory powers under subsection (c) of this section or pursuant to N.C.R.A.P., Rule 2, could consider on its own initiative the question of the attorneys' fees award and give relief as a matter of appellate grace. Stillwell Enters., Inc. v. Interstate Equip. Co., 300 N.C. 286, 266 S.E.2d 812 (1980).

Or When Counsel Fails to Follow Statutory Procedures. - Even though counsel employed by defendant failed to follow the statutory procedure for appealing to the Court of Appeals, because of the important issues raised by the appeal, defendant's petition for writ of certiorari, pursuant to G.S. 7A-32(c), and pursuant to N.C.R.A.P., Rule 21, was allowed. State v. Hamrick, 110 N.C. App. 60, 428 S.E.2d 830, appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 334 N.C. 436, 433 S.E.2d 181 (1993).

Writ Issued Despite Plaintiffs' Failure to Petition for One. - Court exercised its discretion to issue a writ of certiorari in this case, ignoring plaintiffs' failure to petition for one, as there were wide-reaching issues of justice and liberty at stake and plaintiffs' issues on appeal were meritorious; specifically, the lawsuit alleged serious misconduct and abuse of power by the government in violation of both the U.S. Constitution and the state's common law. Doe v. City of Charlotte, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Aug. 18, 2020).

The authority of a superior court to grant a writ of certiorari pursuant to Gen. Rules Prac., Rule 19 in appropriate cases is analogous to the Court of Appeals' power to issue a writ of certiorari pursuant to G.S. 7A-32(c). State v. Hamrick, 110 N.C. App. 60, 428 S.E.2d 830, appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 334 N.C. 436, 433 S.E.2d 181 (1993).

Motion to dismiss an interlocutory appeal of the denial of healthcare providers' motion to dismiss an administrator's wrongful death complaint was denied because the healthcare providers' petition for a writ of certiorari was granted. Reid v. Cole, 187 N.C. App. 261, 652 S.E.2d 718 (2007).

Denial of Class Certification Review Appropriate. - Although a trial court's denial of class certification was an interlocutory order, appellate review was justified where the number of tobacco support price program members exceeded 800,000, and thus, the case's subject matter implicated a public interest to large degree and supervisory authority was appropriate under G.S. 7A-32(b)(2015). Fisher v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 369 N.C. 202, 794 S.E.2d 699 (2016).

Appellate Court Should Have Exercised Jurisdiction. - While the Court of Appeals correctly acknowledged that it had jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari, it mistakenly concluded that the absence of a specific "procedural process" in the Rules of Appellate Procedure left the court without authority to invoke that jurisdiction. State v. Ledbetter, 371 N.C. 192, 814 S.E.2d 39 (2018), appeal dismissed, 261 N.C. App. 71, 819 S.E.2d 591, 2018 N.C. App. LEXIS (2018).

No Final Order to Review. - Where the only orders which had been were orders entered by a claims examiner and by a deputy commissioner, no final order or award had been entered by the Industrial Commission itself, and thus, the Commission had taken no action for the Court of Appeals to review, and the issuance of a writ of certiorari was improper. Martin v. Piedmont Asphalt & Paving, 337 N.C. 785, 448 S.E.2d 380 (1994).

Water and sewer processing facilities part-owner's appeal of interlocutory orders of the North Carolina Utilities Commission holding that the part-owner was a public utility under G.S. 62-3(23)a.2 and was subject to the Commission's jurisdiction was dismissed as the absence of any exceptions to G.S. 62-90 or G.S. 7A-29, allowing review of interlocutory orders of the Commission, required the appellate court to conclude that it had no jurisdiction to consider appeals of interlocutory orders of the Commission; further, the appellate court did not have authority under subsection (c) of this section to review the part-owner's issues as there was no final order of the Commission. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Buck Island, Inc., 158 N.C. App. 536, 581 S.E.2d 122 (2003).

Sentence Reduction. - When defendant was granted relief, under G.S. 15A-1415, from 50-year sentences, an appellate court could grant the State's certiorari petition, under G.S. 7A-32(c), because, under G.S. 15A-1422(c)(3), the appeal time had expired and no appeal was pending, and granting the petition was necessary to "supervise and control" the trial court. State v. Wilkerson, 232 N.C. App. 482, 753 S.E.2d 829 (2014).

Applied in City of Charlotte v. McNeely, 281 N.C. 684, 190 S.E.2d 179 (1972); Stanback v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 215 S.E.2d 30 (1975); State v. Strickland, 290 N.C. 169, 225 S.E.2d 531 (1976); In re Thomas, 290 N.C. 410, 226 S.E.2d 371 (1976); Crumpton v. Crumpton, 290 N.C. 651, 227 S.E.2d 587 (1976); Ziglar v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 53 N.C. App. 147, 280 S.E.2d 510 (1981); Department of Social Servs. v. Johnson, 70 N.C. App. 383, 320 S.E.2d 301 (1984); Coleman v. Interstate Cas. Ins. Co., 84 N.C. App. 268, 352 S.E.2d 249 (1987); State v. Dudley, 319 N.C. 656, 356 S.E.2d 361 (1987); State v. Freeman, 319 N.C. 609, 356 S.E.2d 765 (1987); Mack v. Moore, 91 N.C. App. 478, 372 S.E.2d 314 (1988); Garris v. Garris, 92 N.C. App. 467, 374 S.E.2d 638 (1988); Phelps v. Phelps, 337 N.C. 344, 446 S.E.2d 17, rehearing denied, 337 N.C. 807, 449 S.E.2d 750 (1994); In re Robinson, 120 N.C. App. 874, 464 S.E.2d 86 (1995); Concrete Mach. Co. v. City of Hickory, 134 N.C. App. 91, 517 S.E.2d 155 (1999); Frost v. Mazda Motor of Am., 353 N.C. 188, 540 S.E.2d 324 (2000); Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 157 N.C. App. 596, 580 S.E.2d 46, cert. denied, 357 N.C. 507, 587 S.E.2d 674 (2003); Newcomb v. County of Carteret, 207 N.C. App. 527, 701 S.E.2d 325 (2010), review denied 365 N.C. 212, 710 S.E.2d 26, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 474 (N.C. 2011).

Cited in State v. Flynt, 8 N.C. App. 323, 174 S.E.2d 120 (1970); North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau v. Ingram, 29 N.C. App. 338, 224 S.E.2d 229 (1976); Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E.2d 338 (1978); Craver v. Craver, 298 N.C. 231, 258 S.E.2d 357 (1979); Bailey v. Gooding, 301 N.C. 205, 270 S.E.2d 431 (1980); Industrotech Constructors, Inc. v. Duke Univ., 67 N.C. App. 741, 314 S.E.2d 272 (1984); Elks v. Hannan, 68 N.C. App. 757, 315 S.E.2d 553 (1984); Nobles v. First Carolina Communications, Inc., 108 N.C. App. 127, 423 S.E.2d 312 (1992); Martin v. Piedmont Asphalt & Paving Co., 113 N.C. App. 121, 437 S.E.2d 696 (1993); State v. Gary, 348 N.C. 510, 501 S.E.2d 57 (1998); State v. Lee, 348 N.C. 474, 501 S.E.2d 334 (1998); Stem v. Richardson, 350 N.C. 76, 511 S.E.2d 1 (1999); State v. Goode, 350 N.C. 247, 512 S.E.2d 414 (1999); Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A. v. Smith, 139 N.C. App. 1, 532 S.E.2d 815 (2000); In re Voight, 138 N.C. App. 542, 530 S.E.2d 76 (2000); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol. v. Durham Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 141 N.C. App. 569, 541 S.E.2d 157 (2000), cert. denied, 353 N.C. 370, 547 S.E.2d 433 (2001); Gibson v. Mena, 144 N.C. App. 125, 548 S.E.2d 745 (2001); State v. Featherson, 145 N.C. App. 134, 548 S.E.2d 828 (2001); In re Braithwaite, 150 N.C. App. 434, 562 S.E.2d 897 (2002), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 162, 568 S.E.2d 187 (2002); In re Will of McCauley, 356 N.C. 91, 565 S.E.2d 88 (2002); Staton v. Russell, 151 N.C. App. 1, 565 S.E.2d 103 (2002); State v. Wilson, 151 N.C. App. 219, 565 S.E.2d 223 (2002), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 313, 571 S.E.2d 215 (2002); Powell v. Bulluck, 155 N.C. App. 613, 573 S.E.2d 699 (2002); State v. Hunt, 357 N.C. 257, 582 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 539 U.S. 985, 124 S. Ct. 44, 156 L. Ed. 2d 702 (2003); State v. Frogge, 359 N.C. 228, 607 S.E.2d 627 (2005); State v. Weaver, 359 N.C. 246, 607 S.E.2d 599 (2005); State v. Seward, 362 N.C. 210, 657 S.E.2d 356 (2008); In re T.H.T., 362 N.C. 446, 665 S.E.2d 54 (2008); State v. Ward, 364 N.C. 157, 694 S.E.2d 729 (June 17, 2010); Jones v. Keller, 364 N.C. 249, 698 S.E.2d 49 (2010); In re M.I.W., 365 N.C. 374, 722 S.E.2d 469 (2012); State v. Whitehead, 365 N.C. 444, 722 S.E.2d 492 (2012); State v. Bowden, 367 N.C. 680, 766 S.E.2d 320 (2014), cert. denied 2015 U.S. LEXIS 7702 (U.S. 2015); State v. Davis, 368 N.C. 794, 785 S.E.2d 312 (2016); State v. Perry, 369 N.C. 390, 794 S.E.2d 280 (2016); State v. Young, 369 N.C. 118, 794 S.E.2d 274 (2016); Christenbury Eye Ctr., P.A. v. Medflow, Inc., 370 N.C. 1, 802 S.E.2d 888 (2017); Kornegay Family Farms LLC v. Cross Creek Seed, Inc., 370 N.C. 23, 803 S.E.2d 377 (2017);.

State v. Doss, - N.C. App. - , 836 S.E.2d 856 (2019).

CASE NOTES

Adoption of Procedural Rule Did Not Affect Action Already Pending. - Given the unique constitutional and statutory responsibilities of the Supreme Court of North Carolina to promulgate rules of appellate procedure, as well as rules and standards of conduct for the judiciary, the Supreme Court of North Carolina did not exceed its authority in adopting N.C. Code Jud. Conduct, Limitation of Proceedings; however, where a judicial disciplinary action was already pending when N.C. Code Jud. Conduct, Limitation of Proceedings came into effect, the action was not barred. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Brown), 358 N.C. 711, 599 S.E.2d 502 (2004).

Applied in State v. Bennett, 59 N.C. App. 418, 297 S.E.2d 138 (1982).

Cited in State v. Garnett, 4 N.C. App. 367, 167 S.E.2d 63 (1969); State v. Monroe, 330 N.C. 433, 410 S.E.2d 913 (1991).

CASE NOTES

Provision of Rule of Practice Must Give Way to Statute. - Subsection (b) of G.S. 15A-1231 clearly contemplates that a defendant be required to request an instruction conference as a prerequisite for assigning error to the trial court's failure to conduct one. Under this section, the provision of Gen. Rules Prac., Rule 21 which requires the trial judge to conduct a jury instruction conference conflicts with subsection (b) of G.S. 15A-1231 and must give way to the provisions of the statute. State v. Morris, 60 N.C. App. 750, 300 S.E.2d 46 (1983).

Unsealing Search Warrants. - Superior court did not err in unsealing certain search warrants and corresponding documents because the search warrants at issue were unsealed in accordance with procedures set forth in an administrative order of the resident superior court judge, pursuant to G.S. 7A-34 and N.C. Gen. R. Prac. Super. & Dist. Ct. 2(d), and the State failed to make a timely motion to extend the period for which the documents were sealed. In re Zahra Clare Baker Investigation, 220 N.C. App. 108, 727 S.E.2d 316 (2012).

Applied in Hamm v. Texaco, Inc., 17 N.C. App. 451, 194 S.E.2d 560 (1973); State v. Bennett, 308 N.C. 530, 302 S.E.2d 786 (1983); Young v. Young, 133 N.C. App. 332, 515 S.E.2d 478 (1999); In re J.S., 182 N.C. App. 79, 641 S.E.2d 395 (2007); State v. Seward, 362 N.C. 210, 657 S.E.2d 356 (2008); Plomaritis v. Plomaritis, 222 N.C. App. 94, 730 S.E.2d 784 (2012).

Cited in Lee v. Rowland, 11 N.C. App. 27, 180 S.E.2d 445 (1971); Terrell v. H. & N. Chevrolet Co., 11 N.C. App. 310, 181 S.E.2d 124 (1971); Duke v. Meisky, 12 N.C. App. 329, 183 S.E.2d 292 (1971); State v. Andrews, 12 N.C. App. 421, 184 S.E.2d 69 (1971); Lattimore v. Powell, 15 N.C. App. 522, 190 S.E.2d 288 (1972); Finley v. Finley, 15 N.C. App. 681, 190 S.E.2d 660 (1972); Neff v. Queen City Coach Co., 16 N.C. App. 466, 192 S.E.2d 587 (1972); Williams v. Hartis, 18 N.C. App. 89, 195 S.E.2d 806 (1973); State v. House, 295 N.C. 189, 244 S.E.2d 654 (1978); Wood v. Wood, 297 N.C. 1, 252 S.E.2d 799 (1979); Clarke v. Clarke, 47 N.C. App. 249, 267 S.E.2d 361 (1980); State v. McCaskill, 47 N.C. App. 289, 267 S.E.2d 331 (1980); Hensgen v. Hensgen, 53 N.C. App. 331, 280 S.E.2d 766 (1981); Lee v. Jenkins, 57 N.C. App. 522, 291 S.E.2d 797 (1982); Four Seasons Homeowners Ass'n v. Sellers, 62 N.C. App. 205, 302 S.E.2d 848 (1983); Butler Serv. Co. v. Butler Serv. Group, Inc., 66 N.C. App. 132, 310 S.E.2d 406 (1984); Simmons v. Tuttle, 70 N.C. App. 101, 318 S.E.2d 847 (1984); Daniels v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 320 N.C. 669, 360 S.E.2d 772 (1987); Provident Fin. Co. v. Locklear, 89 N.C. App. 535, 366 S.E.2d 599 (1988); State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 389 S.E.2d 48 (1990); State v. Hudson, 331 N.C. 122, 415 S.E.2d 732 (1992); State v. Rorie, 348 N.C. 266, 500 S.E.2d 77 (1998); Smith v. Young Moving & Storage, Inc., 141 N.C. App. 469, 540 S.E.2d 383 (2000), aff'd, 353 N.C. 521, 546 S.E.2d 87 (2001); In re T.M., 187 N.C. App. 694, 654 S.E.2d 502 (2007).

CASE NOTES

Failure to Attend - Unlike G.S. 7A-38.1, authorizing mediated settlement conferences in superior court civil actions, this section does not require the attendance of the parties, their attorneys and other persons or entities with authority, by law or by contract, to settle the parties' claims, nor does the court-ordered arbitration statute require sanctions as does the mediated settlement conference statute; thus, there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's sanction based on the fact that defendant motorist appeared at the arbitration only through his counsel. Bledsole v. Johnson, 357 N.C. 133, 579 S.E.2d 379 (2003).

Cited in Mohamad v. Simmons, 139 N.C. App. 610, 534 S.E.2d 616 (2000); Johnson v. Brewington, 150 N.C. App. 425, 562 S.E.2d 919 (2002); Bledsole v. Johnson, 150 N.C. App. 619, 564 S.E.2d 902 (2002), cert. granted, 356 N.C. 297, 570 S.E.2d 498 (2002); Brock & Scott Holdings, Inc. v. West, 198 N.C. App. 357, 679 S.E.2d 507 (2009), review granted, 363 N.C. 800, 690 S.E.2d 531, 2010 N.C. LEXIS 37 (2010); Clark v. Bichsel, 239 N.C. App. 13, 767 S.E.2d 145 (2015).

§ 7A-38: Repealed by Session Laws 1995, c. 500, s. 3.

CASE NOTES

Sanctions for Failure to Attend. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking defendant's answer and entering default where corporate defendant had no good cause for failing to have officer mediation settlement conference and was not excused, less severe sanctions were considered rejected as inappropriate, and the sanctions entered were specifically authorized by former Rule 37(b)(2)c (repealed by 1993 Session Laws, c. 553, s. 1). Triad Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Clement Bros. Co., 113 N.C. App. 405, 438 S.E.2d 485 (1994).

Unlike this section, authorizing mediated settlement conferences in superior court civil actions, G.S. 7A-37.1 does not require the attendance of the parties, their attorneys and other persons or entities with authority, by law or by contract, to settle the parties' claims, nor does the court-ordered arbitration statute require sanctions as does the mediated settlement conference statute; thus, there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's sanction based on the fact that defendant motorist appeared at the arbitration only through his counsel. Bledsole v. Johnson, 357 N.C. 133, 579 S.E.2d 379 (2003).

Because a homeowner's children and friends were not excused from attending a court-ordered mediation, they could be sanctioned unless they showed good cause for their absences when a mediator's report specifically identified the friends as parties absent without permission, and the mediator did not specify that the children's absence was authorized; even assuming that the report could be read as indicating the mediator's express permission for the absences, the mediator lacked authority to grant such permission under Rule 4(A)(2) of the Rules for Statewide Mediated Settlement Conferences and G.S. 7A-38.1(f). Perry v. GRP Fin. Servs. Corp., 196 N.C. App. 41, 674 S.E.2d 780 (2009).

Trial court erred in failing to make any findings related to the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees sought and awarded for the failure of a homeowner's children and friends to attend court-ordered mediation because it made no findings of fact at all other than to reiterate the amount of attorneys' fees sought by each party, and on remand, the trial court had to make further findings of fact regarding the amount of any sanction ultimately awarded; there is no reason to distinguish an award of sanctions under G.S. 7A-38.1 and Rule 5 of the Rules for Statewide Mediated Settlement Conferences from sanctions awarded under N.C. R. Civ. P. 11 and 37, and G.S. 6-21.1, all of which require a finding of reasonableness. Perry v. GRP Fin. Servs. Corp., 196 N.C. App. 41, 674 S.E.2d 780 (2009).

Trial court erred in imposing sanctions upon a homeowner's children and friends for their absence at court-ordered mediation because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact on the issue of whether the children and friends showed good cause for their absence; the friends submitted affidavits explaining the reason for their physical absence, but the trial court never explained why it decided that those reasons did not amount to "good cause." Perry v. GRP Fin. Servs. Corp., 196 N.C. App. 41, 674 S.E.2d 780 (2009).

Sanction Not Authorized for Violation of Agreement. - Trial court was without authority under G.S. 7A-38.1(g), or its inherent authority, to sanction the parents for violating the terms of the settlement agreement because the parents complied with the Mediation Rules in creating a settlement agreement but subsequently violated the terms of the agreement. Estate of Barber v. Guilford County Sheriff's Dep't, 161 N.C. App. 658, 589 S.E.2d 433 (2003).

Mediator May Be Compelled for Evidence of Agreement. - A mediator is both competent and compellable to testify or produce evidence on whether the parties reached a settlement agreement, where a judge is making that determination. Few v. Hammack Enters., Inc., 132 N.C. App. 291, 511 S.E.2d 665 (1999).

Mediation Settlement Outcomes Admissible. - Admission of the outcome of a mediation settlement conference is not prohibited where a judge is making a determination of whether an agreement was reached and the terms of the agreement. Few v. Hammack Enters., Inc., 132 N.C. App. 291, 511 S.E.2d 665 (1999).

Admission of Confidential Mediation Information. - When, in a builder's suit against a homeowner to enforce a lien, the homeowner was granted summary judgment, the homeowner was not awarded appellate attorneys' fees because no transcripts or evidence allowed the appellate court to decipher how statutorily confidential mediation information was admitted into evidence, or what other evidence the trial court considered. R & L Constr. of Mt. Airy, LLC v. Diaz, 240 N.C. App. 194, 770 S.E.2d 698 (2015).

A party who claims that a settlement agreement is invalid and unenforceable should have to overcome the strong presumption expressed in this section that a settlement agreement reached by the parties through court-ordered mediation under the guidance of a mediator is a valid contract. Chappell v. Roth, 141 N.C. App. 502, 539 S.E.2d 666 (2000).

Conversation Not Part of Negotiations. - The trial judge properly determined that admitted portions of an answering machine message and a subsequent conversation between the plaintiff mother of a boy injured on an amusement ride and the deceased defendant ride operator in which he admitted the possibility that he had not fastened the boy properly were not part of settlement negotiations; there was no mention of an intent to compromise or negotiate in the admitted portions of the conversation and the testimony was an admission of fact during a telephone conversation initiated by a party to the dispute. Breedlove v. Aerotrim, U.S.A., Inc., 142 N.C. App. 447, 543 S.E.2d 213 (2001).

Breach. - Record supported the trial court's judgment that a general contractor made three of six payments it was required to make under a settlement agreement on time, that a subcontractor that was entitled to receive those payments breached the settlement agreement by refusing to authorize release of a letter of credit, and that the general contractor was relieved of its obligation to make the remaining payments because of the subcontractor's breach. McClure Lumber Co. v. Helmsman Constr., Inc., 160 N.C. App. 190, 585 S.E.2d 234 (2003).

Summary Judgment Proper Upon Reaching Settlement Agreement. - Where the parties to a real estate commission dispute reached a settlement agreement at mediation, but the brokerage did not sign the written settlement agreement, and never moved the trial court to enforce the settlement agreement, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment dismissing the case rather than entering an order enforcing the agreement. Cohen Schatz Assocs. v. Perry, 169 N.C. App. 834, 611 S.E.2d 229 (2005).

Failure of One Party to Sign Settlement Agreement. - Plaintiff was not entitled to enforcement of the memorandum of settlement as a matter of law because defendant failed to sign the memorandum of settlement, making it unenforceable against him under the statute of frauds. Mitchell v. Boswell, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Nov. 3, 2020).

Dismissal Upon Failure to Agree on Mediator Was Error. - Both G.S. 7A-38.1(h) and Rules of the North Carolina Supreme Court Implementing Statewide Mediated Settlement Conferences in Superior Court Civil Actions 2C contemplated that if the parties to a lawsuit failed to agree on a settlement conference mediator or that plaintiff failed to report this to the senior resident superior court judge, that the judge was to have appointed a mediator; trial court's dismissal of an action after the parties failed to agree on mediator was error. Gailey v. Triangle Billiards & Blues Club, Inc., 179 N.C. App. 848, 635 S.E.2d 482 (2006), review denied, 361 N.C. 426, 648 S.E.2d 212 (2007).

Costs of Mediation Recoverable. - In a medical malpractice case, trial court erred in denying motion seeking to recover mediation costs because mediation was ordered in all civil actions, and the cost was recoverable under G.S. 7A-305(d)(7). Miller v. Forsyth Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 173 N.C. App. 385, 618 S.E.2d 838 (2005).

Negligent Misrepresentation Claim Not Stated. - Plaintiff's claim for negligent misrepresentation failed to state a claim where plaintiff alleged that she justifiably relied, to her detriment, on information prepared by defendant in a mediated settlement conference under G.S. 7A-38.1, and suffered pecuniary loss from the defendant's action of supplying false information as defendant's counsel allegedly misrepresented her authority to settle the case since plaintiff did not allege that her position in the federal litigation was prejudiced by the lack of a settlement or that the memorandum of settlement was used against her; a failure to settle a case was not compensable as a pecuniary loss. Howard v. County of Durham, 227 N.C. App. 46, 748 S.E.2d 1, review denied 367 N.C. 238, 748 S.E.2d 321, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 1000 (2013).

Applied in Lord v. Customized Consulting Specialty, Inc., 164 N.C. App. 730, 596 S.E.2d 891 (2004); SPX Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 210 N.C. App. 562, 709 S.E.2d 441 (2011).

Cited in Powell v. Bulluck, 155 N.C. App. 613, 573 S.E.2d 699 (2002).

CASE NOTES

Satisfaction of Requirements - Plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for requesting and participating in pre-litigation mediation as required by G.S. 7A-38.3 and N.C.R. Super. Ct. Mediated Settlement Conf. Rule 4; the pleadings alleged that they participated in pre-litigation mediation, and the mediator's report did not list any party as being absent. Powell v. Bulluck, 155 N.C. App. 613, 573 S.E.2d 699 (2002).

CASE NOTES

Failure to Comply. - Trial court erred in determining that two documents were subject to disclosure under State's Public Records Act and in ordering them to be produced under seal to an applicant because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the challenged order inasmuch as the applicant conceded that he did not initiate mediation within 30 days of the town's filing of a responsive pleading. Tillett v. Town of Kill Devil Hills, 257 N.C. App. 223, 809 S.E.2d 145 (2017).

CASE NOTES

Cited in Gentry v. Uniform Judicial Retirement Sys., 378 F. Supp. 1 (M.D.N.C. 1974).

§ 7A-40. Composition; judicial powers of clerk.

The Superior Court Division of the General Court of Justice consists of the several superior courts of the State. The clerk of superior court in the exercise of the judicial power conferred upon him as ex officio judge of probate, and in the exercise of other judicial powers conferred upon him by law in respect of special proceedings and the administration of guardianships and trusts, is a judicial officer of the Superior Court Division, and not a separate court.

History

(1965, c. 310, s. 1; 1967, c. 691, s. 1; 1969, c. 1190, s. 4; 1971, c. 377, s. 4.)

Editor's Note. - This section was originally G.S. 7A-39.1. It was transferred and renumbered G.S. 7A-42 by Session Laws 1967, c. 691, s. 1, effective July 1, 1967. It was again transferred, and renumbered G.S. 7A-40, by Session Laws 1969, c. 1190, s. 4, effective July 1, 1969.

§ 7A-41. Superior court divisions and districts; judges.

1. The counties of the State are organized into judicial divisions and superior court districts, and each superior court district has the counties, and the number of regular resident superior court judges set forth in the following table, and for districts of less than a whole county, as set out in subsection (b) of this section:
2. For superior court districts of less than a whole county, or with part of one county with part of another, the composition of the district and the number of judges is as follows:
   1. District 5A: New Hanover County: VTD CF01, VTD CF02, VTD CF03, VTD H01, VTD W25, VTD W27; Pender County. It has one judge.
   2. District 5B: New Hanover County: VTD H02, VTD H03, VTD H04, VTD H05, VTD H06, VTD H07, VTD H08, VTD H09, VTD M02, VTD M05, VTD W13, VTD W18, VTD W24, VTD W28, VTD WB. It has one judge.
   3. District 5C: New Hanover County: VTD FP01, VTD FP02, VTD FP03, VTD FP04, VTD FP05, VTD M03, VTD M04, VTD W03, VTD W08, VTD W12, VTD W15, VTD W16, VTD W17, VTD W21, VTD W26, VTD W29, VTD W30, VTD W31. It has one judge.
   4. District 7B: Edgecombe County: VTD: 1101: Block(s) 0650213001035; VTD: 1201, VTD: 1202, VTD: 1203, VTD: 1204, VTD: 1205: Block(s) 0650203001005, 0650203001006, 0650203001007, 0650203001008, 0650203001009, 0650203001010, 0650203001011, 0650203001012, 0650203001013, 0650203001014, 0650203001015, 0650203001016, 0650203001017, 0650204001000, 0650204001001, 0650204001002, 0650204001003, 0650204001004, 0650204001005, 0650204001006, 0650204001007, 0650204001008, 0650204001009, 0650204001010, 0650204001011, 0650204001012, 0650204001013, 0650204001014, 0650204001015, 0650204001016, 0650204001017, 0650204001018, 0650204001019, 0650204001020, 0650204001021, 0650204001022, 0650204001023, 0650204001024, 0650204001025, 0650204001026, 0650204001027, 0650204001028, 0650204001029, 0650204001030, 0650204001031, 0650204001032, 0650204001033, 0650204001034, 0650204001035, 0650204001036, 0650204001037, 0650204001038, 0650204001039, 0650204001040, 0650204001041, 0650204001042, 0650204001043, 0650204001044, 0650204001045, 0650204001046, 0650204001047, 0650204001048, 0650204001049, 0650204002000, 0650204002001, 0650204002002, 0650204002003, 0650204002004, 0650204002005, 0650204002006, 0650204002007, 0650204002008, 0650204002009, 0650204002010, 0650204002011, 0650204002012, 0650204002013, 0650204002014, 0650204002015, 0650204002016, 0650204002017, 0650204002018, 0650204002019, 0650204002020, 0650204002021, 0650204002022, 0650204002023, 0650204002024, 0650204002025; VTD: 1301: 0650214002017; VTD: 1401; Wilson County: VTD: PRBL: Block(s) 1950009001045, 1950009001046; VTD: PRGA: 1950007001065, 1950007001066, 1950007001067, 1950012001000, 1950012001001, 1950012001002, 1950012001003, 1950012001012, 1950012001013, 1950012001014, 1950012001015, 1950012001016, 1950012001017, 1950012001018, 1950012001019, 1950012001020, 1950012001021, 1950012001022, 1950012001023, 1950012001025, 1950012001026, 1950012001031, 1950012001032, 1950012001033, 1950012001034, 1950012001035, 1950012001036, 1950012001038, 1950012002000, 1950012002001, 1950012002002, 1950012002003, 1950012002004, 1950012002005, 1950012002006, 1950012002007, 1950012002008, 1950012002009, 1950012002010, 1950012002011, 1950012002012, 1950012002013, 1950012002014, 1950012002016, 1950012003000, 1950012003001, 1950012003002, 1950012003003, 1950012003004, 1950012003005, 1950012003006, 1950012003007, 1950012003008, 1950012003009, 1950012003010, 1950012003011, 1950012003012, 1950012003013, 1950012003014, 1950012003015, 1950012003016, 1950012003017, 1950012003018, 1950012003019, 1950012003020, 1950012003021; VTD: PRSA: 1950011001025, 1950011001028, 1950011001030, 1950011002000; VTD: PRST: 1950008022045, 1950008022047, 1950008022055, 1950008022059, 1950008022060, 1950008022061, 1950008022063, 1950008023031, 1950008023032, 1950008023033, 1950008023034, 1950008023035, 1950008023039; VTD: PRTO: 1950012001004, 1950012001005, 1950012001006, 1950012001007, 1950012001008, 1950012001009, 1950012001010, 1950012001011, 1950012001024, 1950013001000, 1950013001001, 1950013001002, 1950013001003, 1950013001004, 1950013001005, 1950013001006, 1950013001007, 1950013001008, 1950013001009, 1950013001010, 1950013001011, 1950013001012, 1950013001013, 1950013001014, 1950013001015, 1950013001016, 1950013001017, 1950013001018, 1950013001019, 1950013001020, 1950013001021, 1950013001022, 1950013001023, 1950013001024, 1950013001025, 1950013001026, 1950013001027, 1950013001028, 1950013001029, 1950013001030, 1950013001031, 1950013001032, 1950013001033, 1950013001034, 1950013001035, 1950013001036, 1950013001037, 1950013001038, 1950013001039, 1950013001040, 1950013001041, 1950013001042, 1950013001043, 1950013001044, 1950013001045, 1950013002000, 1950013002001, 1950013002002, 1950013002003, 1950013002004, 1950013002005, 1950013002006, 1950013002007, 1950013002008, 1950013002009, 1950013002010, 1950013002011, 1950013002012, 1950013002013, 1950013002014, 1950013002015, 1950013002016, 1950013002017, 1950013002018, 1950013002019, 1950013002020, 1950013002021, 1950013002022, 1950013002023, 1950013002024, 1950013002025, 1950013002026, 1950013002027, 1950013002028, 1950013002029, 1950013002030, 1950013002031, 1950013002032, 1950013002033, 1950013002034, 1950013002035, 1950013002036, 1950013002037, 1950013002038, 1950013002039, 1950013002040, 1950013002041, 1950013002042, 1950013002043, 1950013002044, 1950013002045, 1950013002046, 1950013002047, 1950013002048, 1950013002049, 1950013002050, 1950013002051, 1950013002052, 1950013002053, 1950013002054, 1950013002055, 1950013002056, 1950013002057, 1950013002058, 1950013002059, 1950013002060, 1950013002061, 1950013002062, 1950013002063, 1950013002064, 1950013002065, 1950013002066, 1950013002067, 1950013002068, 1950013002069, 1950013002070, 1950013002074, 1950013002075, 1950013002078, 1950013002079, 1950013002080, 1950013002081, 1950013002082, 1950013002083, 1950013002084, 1950013002087, 1950013002088; VTD: PRWA, VTD: PRWB: Block(s) 1950002001000, 1950002001001, 1950002001002, 1950002001003, 1950002001004, 1950002001005, 1950002001006, 1950002001007, 1950002001008, 1950002001009, 1950002001010, 1950002001011, 1950002001012, 1950002001013, 1950002001014, 1950002001015, 1950002001016, 1950002001017, 1950002001018, 1950002001019, 1950002001020, 1950002001021, 1950002001022, 1950002001023, 1950002001024, 1950002001025, 1950002001026, 1950002001027, 1950002001028, 1950002001029, 1950002001030, 1950002001031, 1950002001032, 1950002001033, 1950002001034, 1950002001035, 1950002001036, 1950002001037, 1950002001038, 1950002001039, 1950002001040, 1950002001041, 1950002001042, 1950002001043, 1950002001044, 1950002001045, 1950002001046, 1950002001052, 1950002001053, 1950002001054, 1950002001055, 1950002001056, 1950002001057, 1950002001058, 1950002001059, 1950002001060, 1950002001062, 1950002001063, 1950002001064, 1950002001065, 1950003002000, 1950003002001, 1950003002002, 1950003002003, 1950003002004, 1950003002005, 1950003002006, 1950003002013, 1950003002017, 1950003002018, 1950003002019, 1950003002020, 1950003002021, 1950003002022, 1950003002023, 1950003002025, 1950003002026, 1950003002027, 1950003002028, 1950003002029, 1950003002030, 1950003002031, 1950003002032, 1950003002033, 1950003002034, 1950003002035, 1950003002036, 1950003002037, 1950003002038, 1950003002039, 1950008011000, 1950008011001, 1950008012000, 1950008012001, 1950008012002, 1950008012003; VTD: PRWC: 1950001003004, 1950001003005, 1950001003006, 1950001003007, 1950001003008, 1950001003015, 1950001003020, 1950001003021, 1950001004005, 1950001004006, 1950001004007, 1950001004008, 1950001004009, 1950001004017, 1950001004019, 1950001004021, 1950001004022, 1950001004023, 1950001004024, 1950001004025, 1950001004026; VTD: PRWE: 1950001002003, 1950001002004, 1950001002005, 1950001002024, 1950001002025; VTD: PRWH, VTD: PRWN, VTD: PRWQ, VTD: PRWR. It has one judge.
   5. District 7C: Edgecombe County: VTD: 0101, VTD: 0102, VTD: 0103, VTD: 0104, VTD: 0201, VTD: 0301, VTD: 0401, VTD: 0501, VTD: 0601, VTD: 0701, VTD: 0801, VTD: 0901, VTD: 1001, VTD: 1101: Block(s) 0650213001009, 0650213001034, 0650213002000, 0650213002001, 0650213002002, 0650213002003, 0650213002004, 0650213002005, 0650213002006, 0650213002007, 0650213002008, 0650213002009, 0650213002010, 0650213002011, 0650213002012, 0650213002013, 0650213002014, 0650213002015, 0650213002016, 0650213002017, 0650213002018, 0650213002019, 0650213002022, 0650213002025, 0650213002026, 0650213002027, 0650213002028, 0650213002029, 0650213002035, 0650213002036, 0650213002037, 0650213002038, 0650213002039, 0650213002040, 0650213002041, 0650213002042, 0650213002043, 0650213002044, 0650213002045, 0650213002046, 0650213002048, 0650213002049, 0650213002050, 0650213002051, 0650213002052, 0650213002053, 0650213002054, 0650213002055, 0650213002056, 0650213002057, 0650213002058, 0650213002059, 0650213002060, 0650213002061, 0650213002062, 0650213002063, 0650213002064, 0650213002065, 0650213002066, 0650213002067, 0650213002068, 0650213002069, 0650213002070, 0650213002071, 0650213002072, 0650213002073, 0650213002074, 0650213002075, 0650213002076, 0650213002077, 0650213002078, 0650213002079, 0650213002080, 0650213002081, 0650213002082, 0650213002087, 0650213002088; VTD: 1205: 0650206001083, 0650206001084, 0650206001085, 0650206001086, 0650206001087, 0650206001089, 0650206001090, 0650206001091, 0650206001092; VTD: 1301: 0650214002000, 0650214002001, 0650214002002, 0650214002003, 0650214002004, 0650214002005, 0650214002006, 0650214002007, 0650214002008, 0650214002009, 0650214002010, 0650214002011, 0650214002012, 0650214002013, 0650214002014, 0650214002015, 0650214002016, 0650214002018, 0650214002019, 0650214002020, 0650214002021, 0650214002022, 0650214002023, 0650214002025, 0650214002026, 0650214002027, 0650214002028, 0650214002029, 0650214002030, 0650214002031, 0650214002032, 0650214002033, 0650214002034, 0650214002035, 0650214002036, 0650214002037, 0650214002038, 0650214002039, 0650214002040, 0650214002041, 0650214002042, 0650214002043; Wilson County: VTD: PRBL: Block(s) 1950009001000, 1950009001001, 1950009001002, 1950009001003, 1950009001004, 1950009001005, 1950009001006, 1950009001007, 1950009001008, 1950009001009, 1950009001010, 1950009001011, 1950009001012, 1950009001013, 1950009001014, 1950009001015, 1950009001016, 1950009001017, 1950009001018, 1950009001019, 1950009001020, 1950009001021, 1950009001022, 1950009001023, 1950009001024, 1950009001025, 1950009001026, 1950009001027, 1950009001028, 1950009001029, 1950009001030, 1950009001031, 1950009001032, 1950009001033, 1950009001034, 1950009001035, 1950009001036, 1950009001037, 1950009001038, 1950009001039, 1950009001040, 1950009001041, 1950009001042, 1950009001043, 1950009001044, 1950009001047, 1950009001048, 1950009001049, 1950009001050, 1950009001051, 1950009001052, 1950009001053, 1950009001054, 1950009001055, 1950009001056, 1950009001057, 1950009001058, 1950009001059, 1950009001060, 1950009001061, 1950009001062, 1950009001063, 1950009001064, 1950009001065, 1950009001066, 1950009001067, 1950009001068, 1950009001069, 1950009001070, 1950009001071, 1950009001072, 1950009001073, 1950009001074, 1950009001075, 1950009002000, 1950009002001, 1950009002002, 1950009002003, 1950009002004, 1950009002005, 1950009002006, 1950009002007, 1950009002008, 1950009002009, 1950009002010, 1950009002011, 1950009002012, 1950009002013, 1950009002014, 1950009002015, 1950009002016, 1950009002017, 1950009002018, 1950009002019, 1950009002020, 1950009002021, 1950009002022, 1950009002023, 1950009002024, 1950009002025, 1950009002026, 1950009002027, 1950009002028, 1950009002029, 1950009002030, 1950009002031, 1950009002032, 1950009002033, 1950009002034, 1950009002035, 1950009002036, 1950009002037, 1950009002038, 1950009002039, 1950009002040, 1950009002041, 1950009002042, 1950009002043, 1950009002044, 1950009002045, 1950009002046, 1950009002047, 1950009002048, 1950009002049, 1950009002050, 1950009002051, 1950009002052, 1950009002053, 1950009002054, 1950009003000, 1950009003001, 1950009003002, 1950009003003, 1950009003004, 1950009003006, 1950009003007, 1950009003008, 1950009003009, 1950009003010, 1950009003011, 1950009003013, 1950009003014, 1950009003015, 1950009003016, 1950009003017, 1950009003018, 1950009003019, 1950009003020, 1950009003021, 1950009003022, 1950009003023, 1950009003024, 1950009003025, 1950009003026, 1950009003027, 1950009003028, 1950009003029, 1950009003030, 1950009003031, 1950009003032, 1950009003033, 1950009003034, 1950009003035, 1950009003036, 1950009003037, 1950009003038, 1950009003039, 1950009003040, 1950009003041, 1950010001023, 1950017001000, 1950017001001, 1950017001002, 1950017002021, 1950017002022, 1950017003004, 1950017003005, 1950017003006, 1950017003007, 1950017003008, 1950017003009, 1950017003010, 1950017003035, 1950017003036; VTD: PRCR, VTD: PRGA: Block(s) 1950012002015; VTD: PROL, VTD: PRSA: Block(s) 1950011001000, 1950011001001, 1950011001002, 1950011001003, 1950011001004, 1950011001005, 1950011001006, 1950011001007, 1950011001008, 1950011001009, 1950011001010, 1950011001011, 1950011001012, 1950011001013, 1950011001014, 1950011001015, 1950011001016, 1950011001017, 1950011001018, 1950011001019, 1950011001020, 1950011001021, 1950011001022, 1950011001023, 1950011001024, 1950011001026, 1950011001027, 1950011001029, 1950011001031, 1950011001032, 1950011001033, 1950011001034, 1950011001035, 1950011001036, 1950011001037, 1950011001038, 1950011001039, 1950011001040, 1950011001041, 1950011001042, 1950011001043, 1950011001044, 1950011001045, 1950011001046, 1950011001047, 1950011001048, 1950011001049, 1950011001050, 1950011002001, 1950011002002, 1950011002003, 1950011002004, 1950011002005, 1950011002006, 1950011002007, 1950011002008, 1950011002009, 1950011002010, 1950011002011, 1950011002012, 1950011002013, 1950011002014, 1950011002015, 1950011002016, 1950011002017, 1950011002018, 1950011002019, 1950011002020, 1950011002021, 1950011002022, 1950011002023, 1950011002024, 1950011002025, 1950011002026, 1950011002027, 1950011002028, 1950011002029, 1950011002030, 1950011002031, 1950011002032, 1950011002033, 1950011002034, 1950011002035;
   6. Superior Court District 10A consists of Wake County Precincts: VTD: 01-01, VTD: 01-02, VTD: 01-06, VTD: 01-07, VTD: 01-14, VTD: 01-16, VTD: 01-23, VTD: 01-29, VTD: 01-31, VTD: 01-32, VTD: 01-33, VTD: 01-41, VTD: 01-48, VTD: 01-49, VTD: 04-01, VTD: 04-02, VTD: 04-03, VTD: 04-04, VTD: 04-06, VTD: 04-07, VTD: 04-10, VTD: 04-11, VTD: 04-12, VTD: 04-13, VTD: 04-14, VTD: 04-15, VTD: 04-16, VTD: 04-19, VTD: 04-20, VTD: 04-21, VTD: 11-02, VTD: 18-01, VTD: 18-04, VTD: 18-06, VTD: 18-08. It has one judge.
   7. Superior Court District 10B consists of Wake County Precincts: VTD: 01-12, VTD: 01-13, VTD: 01-18, VTD: 01-19, VTD: 01-20, VTD: 01-21, VTD: 01-22, VTD: 01-25, VTD: 01-26, VTD: 01-27, VTD: 01-34, VTD: 01-35, VTD: 01-38, VTD: 01-40, VTD: 01-46, VTD: 01-50, VTD: 13-01: Block(s) 1830527043000, 1830527043023, 1830527043024, 1830540081000, 1830540081001, 1830540081002, 1830540081003, 1830540081004, 1830540081005, 1830540081006, 1830540081007, 1830540081008, 1830540081009, 1830540081010, 1830540081011, 1830540081012, 1830540081013, 1830540081014, 1830540081015, 1830540082000, 1830540082001, 1830540082002, 1830540082003, 1830540082004, 1830540082005, 1830540082006, 1830540082007, 1830540082008, 1830540082009, 1830540082010, 1830540082011, 1830540082012, 1830540082013, 1830540082014, 1830540082015, 1830540082016, 1830540083000, 1830540083001, 1830540083002, 1830540083003, 1830540083004, 1830540083005, 1830540083006, 1830540083007, 1830540083008, 1830540083009, 1830540084000, 1830540084001, 1830540084002, 1830540181012, 1830540181013, 1830540181014, 1830540181015, 1830540181016, 1830540181017, 1830540181018, 1830540181027, 1830540181033, 1830540181034, 1830541041022, 1830541041023, 1830541041024, 1830541041025, 1830541041026, 1830541041028, 1830541041030, 1830541041031, 1830541041032, 1830541041033, 1830541041039, 1830541041040, 1830541041041, 1830541041042, 1830541041043, 1830541041044, 1830541041045, 1830541041046, 1830541041047, 1830541041048, 1830541041049, 1830541041050, 1830541042000, 1830541042002, 1830541042010, 1830541042023, 1830541042024, 1830541042025, 1830541042026, 1830541042027, 1830541042029, 1830541042030, 1830541043014, 1830541043015, 1830541043016, 1830541043017, 1830541043018, 1830541043019, 1830541043045; VTD: 13-05, VTD: 13-07, VTD: 16-02, VTD: 16-03, VTD: 16-06, VTD: 16-08, VTD: 17-06, VTD: 17-07, VTD: 17-08, VTD: 17-09, VTD: 17-10, VTD: 17-11. It has one judge.
   8. Superior Court District 10C consists of Wake County Precincts: VTD: 02-01, VTD: 02-02, VTD: 02-03, VTD: 02-04, VTD: 02-05, VTD: 02-06, VTD: 07-02, VTD: 07-06, VTD: 07-07, VTD: 07-11, VTD: 07-12, VTD: 08-02, VTD: 08-03, VTD: 08-04, VTD: 08-05, VTD: 08-06, VTD: 08-07, VTD: 08-08, VTD: 08-09, VTD: 08-10, VTD: 08-11, VTD: 13-10, VTD: 13-11, VTD: 14-01, VTD: 14-02, VTD: 19-03, VTD: 19-04, VTD: 19-05, VTD: 19-06, VTD: 19-07, VTD: 19-09, VTD: 19-10, VTD: 19-11, VTD: 19-12. It has one judge.
   9. Superior Court District 10D consists of Wake County Precincts: VTD: 01-03, VTD: 01-04, VTD: 01-05, VTD: 01-09, VTD: 01-10, VTD: 01-11, VTD: 01-15, VTD: 01-17, VTD: 01-30, VTD: 01-36, VTD: 01-37, VTD: 01-39, VTD: 01-43, VTD: 01-45, VTD: 01-51, VTD: 04-05, VTD: 04-08, VTD: 04-09, VTD: 04-17, VTD: 04-18, VTD: 05-01, VTD: 05-03, VTD: 05-04, VTD: 05-05, VTD: 05-06, VTD: 07-01, VTD: 07-03, VTD: 07-04, VTD: 07-05, VTD: 07-09, VTD: 07-10, VTD: 07-13, VTD: 11-01, VTD: 20-02, VTD: 20-04, VTD: 20-10. It has one judge.
   10. Superior Court District 10E consists of Wake County Precincts: VTD: 01-28, VTD: 01-42, VTD: 01-44, VTD: 01-47, VTD: 09-01, VTD: 09-02, VTD: 09-03, VTD: 10-01, VTD: 10-02, VTD: 10-03, VTD: 10-04, VTD: 13-01: Block(s) 1830541041000, 1830541041001, 1830541041002, 1830541041003, 1830541041004, 1830541041005, 1830541041006, 1830541041007, 1830541041008, 1830541041009, 1830541041010, 1830541041011, 1830541041012, 1830541041013, 1830541041014, 1830541041015, 1830541041016, 1830541041017, 1830541041018, 1830541041019, 1830541041020, 1830541041021, 1830541042028; VTD: 13-02, VTD: 13-06, VTD: 13-08, VTD: 13-09, VTD: 15-01, VTD: 15-03, VTD: 15-04, VTD: 16-01, VTD: 16-04, VTD: 16-05, VTD: 16-07, VTD: 16-09, VTD: 17-01, VTD: 17-02, VTD: 17-03, VTD: 17-04, VTD: 17-05, VTD: 19-16, VTD: 19-17. It has one judge.
   11. Superior Court District 10F consists of Wake County Precincts: VTD: 03-00, VTD: 06-01, VTD: 06-04, VTD: 06-05, VTD: 06-06, VTD: 06-07, VTD: 12-01, VTD: 12-02, VTD: 12-04, VTD: 12-05, VTD: 12-06, VTD: 12-07, VTD: 12-08, VTD: 12-09, VTD: 15-02, VTD: 18-02, VTD: 18-03, VTD: 18-05, VTD: 18-07, VTD: 20-01, VTD: 20-03, VTD: 20-05, VTD: 20-06, VTD: 20-08, VTD: 20-09, VTD: 20-11, VTD: 20-12. It has one judge.
   12. District 12A: Cumberland County: VTD: AH49, VTD: CC18: Block(s) 0510007011012, 0510007011013, 0510007011014, 0510007011015, 0510007011016, 0510007011021, 0510007011034, 0510007011035, 0510007013011, 0510007013012, 0510007013013, 0510007013014, 0510007013015, 0510007013016, 0510007013017, 0510007013018, 0510007013019, 0510007013020, 0510007013021, 0510007013022, 0510007013023, 0510007013024, 0510007013025, 0510007013026, 0510007013027, 0510007013028, 0510007013029, 0510007013030, 0510007013031, 0510007013032, 0510007022007, 0510007022008; VTD: CC24: 0510020011058, 0510020021002, 0510033022004; VTD: CC25, VTD: CC27, VTD: CC29, VTD: CC31, VTD: CC32, VTD: CC33, VTD: CC34, VTD: CU02, VTD: G10: Block(s) 0510016011001, 0510016011002, 0510016011004, 0510016011005, 0510016011006, 0510016011007, 0510016011009, 0510016011010, 0510016011011, 0510016011012, 0510016011013, 0510016011014, 0510016011015, 0510016011016, 0510016011017, 0510016011018, 0510016011019, 0510016011020, 0510016011021, 0510016011022, 0510016011023, 0510016011024, 0510016011025, 0510016011026, 0510016011027, 0510016011032, 0510016011041, 0510016012041, 0510031021000, 0510031021001, 0510031021002, 0510031021003, 0510031021004, 0510031021005, 0510031021006, 0510031021007, 0510031021008, 0510031021009, 0510031021010, 0510031021011, 0510031021012, 0510031021013, 0510031021014, 0510031021015, 0510031021016, 0510031021017, 0510031021018, 0510031021019, 0510031021020, 0510031021021, 0510031021022, 0510031021023, 0510031021024, 0510031021025, 0510031021026, 0510031021027, 0510031021028, 0510031021029, 0510031021030, 0510031021031, 0510031021032, 0510031021033, 0510031021034, 0510031021035, 0510031021036, 0510031021037, 0510031021038, 0510031021039, 0510031021040, 0510031021041, 0510031021042, 0510031021043, 0510031021044, 0510031021045, 0510031021046, 0510031021047, 0510031021048, 0510031021049, 0510031021050, 0510031021051, 0510031021052, 0510031021053, 0510031021054, 0510031021055, 0510031021056, 0510031021057, 0510031021058, 0510031021059, 0510031021060, 0510031021061, 0510031021062, 0510031031001, 0510031031002, 0510031031003, 0510031031004, 0510031031005, 0510031031006, 0510031031007, 0510031031008, 0510031031009, 0510031031010, 0510031031016, 0510031032004, 0510031032005, 0510031032006, 0510031032007, 0510031032008, 0510031032009, 0510031032010, 0510031032011, 0510031032012, 0510031032013, 0510031032014, 0510031032015, 0510031032017, 0510031032018, 0510031032019, 0510031032020, 0510031032021, 0510031032023, 0510031032024, 0510031032026, 0510031032027, 0510031032028, 0510031032029, 0510031032034, 0510031032036, 0510031032041, 0510031032042, 0510031032043, 0510031032044, 0510031032046, 0510031032047, 0510031032048, 0510031032049, 0510031032052, 0510031032053, 0510031032054, 0510031033000, 0510031033001, 0510031033009, 0510031033010, 0510031033011, 0510031033013, 0510031033015, 0510031033016, 0510031033030, 0510031033036, 0510032012000, 0510032012001, 0510032012002, 0510032012003, 0510032012004, 0510032012005, 0510032012006, 0510032012007, 0510032012008, 0510032012009, 0510032012010, 0510032012011, 0510032012012, 0510032012013, 0510032012014, 0510032012015, 0510032012016, 0510032012017, 0510032012018, 0510032012019, 0510032012020, 0510032012021, 0510032012022, 0510032012023, 0510032012024, 0510032012025, 0510032012026, 0510032012027, 0510032012028, 0510032012029, 0510032013000, 0510032013001, 0510032013002, 0510032013003, 0510032013004, 0510032013005, 0510032013006, 0510032013007, 0510032013008, 0510032013009, 0510032013010, 0510032013011, 0510032013012, 0510032013013, 0510032013014, 0510032013015, 0510032013016, 0510032013017, 0510032013018, 0510032013019, 0510032013020, 0510032013021, 0510032013022, 0510032013023, 0510032013024, 0510032013025, 0510032013026, 0510032013027, 0510032013028, 0510032013029, 0510032013030, 0510032013031, 0510032013032, 0510032013033, 0510032013034, 0510032013035, 0510032013036, 0510032013037, 0510032013038, 0510032013039, 0510032013040, 0510032013041, 0510032013042, 0510032013043, 0510032013044, 0510032013045, 0510032013046, 0510032014026, 0510032014027, 0510032014028, 0510032014029, 0510032014030, 0510032014031, 0510032014032, 0510032014033, 0510032014034, 0510032014040, 0510032014041, 0510032014042, 0510032014045, 0510032014046, 0510032014047, 0510032014048, 0510032014049, 0510032014050, 0510032014051, 0510032014057; VTD: G5, VTD: G8: Block(s) 0510016011003, 0510016011008, 0510017001035, 0510017003011, 0510017003013, 0510017003014, 0510017004022, 0510017004023, 0510017004024, 0510017004025, 0510017004026, 0510017004027, 0510017004028, 0510017004029, 0510017004030, 0510017004031, 0510017004032, 0510017004033, 0510017004034, 0510017004035, 0510017004036, 0510017004037, 0510017004038, 0510017004039, 0510017004040, 0510017004041, 0510017004042, 0510017004043, 0510017004046, 0510017004047, 0510017004048, 0510019011000, 0510019011001, 0510019011002, 0510019011003, 0510019011004, 0510019011005, 0510019011008, 0510019011009, 0510019011010, 0510019011011, 0510019011012, 0510019011013, 0510019011014, 0510019011015, 0510019011016, 0510019011017, 0510019011018, 0510019011020, 0510019011021, 0510019011022, 0510019011023, 0510019011024, 0510019011025, 0510019011026, 0510019011028, 0510019011029, 0510019011030, 0510019011031, 0510019011032, 0510019011033, 0510019011034, 0510019011035, 0510019011036, 0510019011037, 0510019011038, 0510019011039, 0510019011041, 0510019011042, 0510019022014, 0510019022015, 0510019022018, 0510019022022, 0510019022023, 0510019022024, 0510019022025, 0510019022026, 0510019022027, 0510019022028, 0510019022029, 0510019022030, 0510019022031, 0510019022032, 0510019022033, 0510019022034, 0510019022035, 0510019022036, 0510019022037, 0510019022038, 0510019022039, 0510019022040, 0510019022041, 0510019022044, 0510019022045, 0510019022046, 0510019031003, 0510019031004, 0510019031005, 0510019031006, 0510019031007, 0510019031008, 0510019031009, 0510019031010, 0510019031011, 0510019031012, 0510019031015, 0510019031016, 0510019031017, 0510019031018, 0510032014000, 0510032014001, 0510032014002, 0510032014003, 0510032014004, 0510032014005, 0510032014006, 0510032014007, 0510032014008, 0510032014009, 0510032014010, 0510032014011, 0510032014012, 0510032014013, 0510032014014, 0510032014015, 0510032014016, 0510032014017, 0510032014018, 0510032014019, 0510032014020, 0510032014021, 0510032014022, 0510032014023, 0510032014024, 0510032014025, 0510032014035, 0510032014036, 0510032014037, 0510032014038, 0510032014039, 0510032014043, 0510032014044, 0510032014055, 0510032014056, 0510032033016, 0510032033017, 0510032033019, 0510032033020, 0510032033021, 0510032033022, 0510032033023, 0510032044002, 0510032044003, 0510032044004, 0510032044005, 0510032044006, 0510032044007, 0510032044008, 0510032044009, 0510032044010, 0510032044011, 0510032044012, 0510032044013, 0510032044014, 0510032044015, 0510032044016, 0510032044017, 0510032045003, 0510032045004, 0510032045005, 0510032045006, 0510032045007, 0510032045008, 0510032045009, 0510032045011, 0510032045013, 0510032045014, 0510032045015, 0510032045016, 0510032045017, 0510032045018, 0510032045019, 0510032045020, 0510032045021, 0510032045022, 0510032045023, 0510032045024, 0510032045025, 0510032045026, 0510032045027; VTD: MB62: 0510033104011, 0510033111015; VTD: MR02. It has one judge.
   13. District 12B: Cumberland County: VTD: CC01, VTD: CC03, VTD: CC05, VTD: CC13: Block(s) 0510008001000, 0510008001002, 0510008001003, 0510008001004, 0510008001018, 0510008001019, 0510010001001, 0510010001002, 0510010001003, 0510010001004, 0510010001005, 0510010001006, 0510010001007, 0510010002000, 0510010002001, 0510010002002, 0510010002003, 0510010002010, 0510010002014, 0510010002015, 0510010002016, 0510010002017, 0510010002018, 0510010002019, 0510010002020, 0510010002021, 0510010002022, 0510010002023, 0510010002024, 0510010002025, 0510010002026, 0510010002027, 0510010002028, 0510010002029, 0510010002030, 0510010002031, 0510010002032, 0510010002033, 0510010002034, 0510011003017, 0510011003018, 0510011003019, 0510011003020, 0510011003021, 0510011003022, 0510011003023, 0510011003024, 0510011003025, 0510011003026; VTD: CC15: 0510006003000, 0510006003001, 0510006003002, 0510006003003, 0510006003004, 0510006003005, 0510006003006, 0510006003007, 0510006003008, 0510006003013, 0510006005000, 0510006005001, 0510006005002, 0510006005003, 0510006005004, 0510006005005, 0510006005006, 0510006005007, 0510006005008, 0510006005009, 0510006005010, 0510006005011, 0510006005012, 0510006005013, 0510006005014, 0510006005015, 0510006005016, 0510006005018, 0510006005019, 0510006005020, 0510006005021, 0510006005022, 0510006005023, 0510038003033, 0510038003034, 0510038003060, 0510038003061; VTD: CC16, VTD: CC17, VTD: CC19, VTD: CL57, VTD: G11: Block(s) 0510025041000, 0510033132008; 0510034011000, 0510034011001, 0510034011002, 0510034011003, 0510034011004, 0510034011005, 0510034011006, 0510034011007, 0510034011008, 0510034011009, 0510034011010, 0510034011011, 0510034011012, 0510034011013, 0510034011014, 0510034011015, 0510034011016, 0510034011017, 0510034011018, 0510034011019, 0510034011020, 0510034011021, 0510034011022, 0510034011023, 0510034011024, 0510034011025, 0510034011026, 0510034011027, 0510034011028, 0510034011029, 0510034011030, 0510034011031, 0510034011032, 0510034011033, 0510034011034, 0510034011035, 0510034011036, 0510034011037, 0510034011038, 0510034011039, 0510034011040, 0510034011041, 0510034011042, 0510034011043, 0510034012000, 0510034012001, 0510034012002, 0510034012003, 0510034012004, 0510034012005, 0510034012006, 0510034012007, 0510034012008, 0510034012009, 0510034012010, 0510034012011, 0510034012012, 0510034012013, 0510034012014, 0510034012015, 0510034012016, 0510034012017, 0510034012018, 0510034012019, 0510034012020, 0510034012021, 0510034012022, 0510034012023, 0510034012024, 0510034012025, 0510034012026, 0510034012027, 0510034012028, 0510034012029, 0510034012030, 0510034012031, 0510034012032, 0510034012033, 0510034012034, 0510034012035, 0510034012036, 0510034012037, 0510034012038, 0510034012039, 0510034012040, 0510034012041, 0510034012042, 0510034012043, 0510034012044, 0510034012045, 0510034012046, 0510034012047, 0510034012048, 0510034012049, 0510034012050, 0510034012051, 0510034012052, 0510034012053, 0510034012054, 0510034012055, 0510034012056, 0510034012057, 0510034012058, 0510034012059, 0510034012060, 0510034012061, 0510034012062, 0510034012063, 0510034012064, 0510034012065, 0510034012066, 0510034012067, 0510034012068, 0510034012069, 0510034021000, 0510034021001, 0510034021002, 0510034021003, 0510034021004, 0510034021005, 0510034021006, 0510034021007, 0510034021008, 0510034021009, 0510034021010, 0510034021011, 0510034021012, 0510034021013, 0510034021014, 0510034021015, 0510034021016, 0510034021017, 0510034021018, 0510034021019, 0510034021020, 0510034021021, 0510034021022, 0510034021023, 0510034021024, 0510034021025, 0510034021026, 0510034021027, 0510034021028, 0510034021029, 0510034021030, 0510034021031, 0510034022000, 0510034022001, 0510034022002, 0510034022003, 0510034031000, 0510034031001, 0510034031002, 0510034031003, 0510034031004, 0510034031005, 0510034031006, 0510034031007, 0510034031008, 0510034031009, 0510034031010, 0510034031011, 0510034031012, 0510034031013, 0510034032000, 0510034032001, 0510034032002, 0510034032003, 0510034032004, 0510034032005, 0510034032006, 0510034032007, 0510034032008, 0510034032009, 0510034032010, 0510034032011, 0510034032012, 0510034032013, 0510034032014, 0510034032015, 0510034041000, 0510034041001, 0510034041002, 0510034041003, 0510034041004, 0510034041005, 0510034041006, 0510034041007, 0510034041008, 0510034041009, 0510034042000, 0510034042001, 0510034042002, 0510034042003, 0510034042004, 0510034042005, 0510034042006, 0510034042007, 0510034042008, 0510034042009, 0510034042010, 0510034042011, 0510034042012, 0510034042013, 0510034042014, 0510034042015, 0510034042016, 0510034042017, 0510034042018, 0510034042019, 0510034051000, 0510034051001, 0510034051002, 0510034051003, 0510034051004, 0510034051005, 0510034051006, 0510034051007, 0510034051008, 0510034051009, 0510034051010, 0510034051011, 0510034051012, 0510034051013, 0510034051014, 0510034051015, 0510034051016, 0510034051017, 0510034051018, 0510034051019, 0510034051020, 0510034051021, 0510034051022, 0510034051023, 0510034051024, 0510034051025, 0510034051026, 0510034051027, 0510034051028, 0510034051029, 0510034051030, 0510034051031, 0510034051032, 0510034061000, 0510034061001, 0510034061002, 0510034061003, 0510034061004, 0510034061005, 0510034061006, 0510034061007, 0510034061008, 0510034061009, 0510034061010, 0510034061011, 0510034061012, 0510034061013, 0510034061014, 0510034061015, 0510034061016, 0510034061017, 0510034061018, 0510034061019, 0510034061020, 0510034061021, 0510034061022, 0510034061023, 0510034061024, 0510034061025, 0510034061026, 0510034061027, 0510034061028, 0510034061029, 0510034061030, 0510034061031, 0510034061032, 0510034061033, 0510034061034, 0510034061035, 0510034061036, 0510034061037, 0510034061038, 0510034061039, 0510034061040, 0510034061041, 0510034061042, 0510034061043, 0510034061044, 0510034061045, 0510034061046, 0510034061047, 0510034061048, 0510034061049, 0510034061050, 0510034061051, 0510034061052, 0510034061053, 0510034061054, 0510034061055, 0510034061056, 0510034061057, 0510034061058, 0510034061059, 0510034061060, 0510034061061, 0510034061062, 0510034061063, 0510034061064, 0510034061065, 0510034061066, 0510034061067, 0510034061068, 0510034061069, 0510034061070, 0510034061071, 0510034061072, 0510034061073, 0510034061074, 0510034061075, 0510034061076, 0510034061077, 0510034061078, 0510034061079, 0510034061080, 0510034061081, 0510034061082, 0510034061083, 0510034061084, 0510034061085, 0510034061086, 0510034061087, 0510034061088, 0510034061089, 0510034061090, 0510034061091, 0510034061092, 0510034061093, 0510034061094, 0510034061095, 0510034061096, 0510034061097, 0510034061098, 0510034061099, 0510034061100, 0510034061101, 0510034061102, 0510034061103, 0510034061104, 0510034061105, 0510034061106, 0510034061107, 0510034061108, 0510034061109, 0510034071000, 0510034071001, 0510034071002, 0510034071003, 0510034071004, 0510034071005, 0510034071006, 0510034071007, 0510034071008, 0510034071009, 0510034071010, 0510034071011, 0510034071012, 0510034071013, 0510034071014, 0510034071015, 0510034071016, 0510034071017, 0510034071018, 0510034072000, 0510034072001, 0510034072002, 0510034072003, 0510034072004, 0510034072005, 0510034072006, 0510034072007, 0510034072008, 0510034072009, 0510034072010, 0510034072011,
   14. District 12C: Cumberland County: VTD: AL51, VTD: CC04, VTD: CC06, VTD: CC07, VTD: CC08, VTD: CC10, VTD: CC12, VTD: CC13: Block(s) 0510009004000, 0510009004020; VTD: CC14, VTD: CC15: Block(s) 0510006001000, 0510006001001, 0510006001002, 0510006001003, 0510006001004, 0510006001005, 0510006001006, 0510006001007, 0510006001008, 0510006001009, 0510006001010, 0510006001011, 0510006001012, 0510006001013, 0510006001014, 0510006001015, 0510006001016, 0510006002000, 0510006002001, 0510006002002, 0510006002003, 0510006002004, 0510006002005, 0510006002006, 0510006002007, 0510006002008, 0510006002009, 0510018001000, 0510018001001, 0510018001002, 0510018001003, 0510018001004, 0510018001005, 0510018001006, 0510018001007, 0510018001008, 0510018001009, 0510018002000, 0510018002001, 0510018002002, 0510038003035; VTD: CC18: 0510007022006, 0510007022010, 0510007022011, 0510007022013, 0510007022014, 0510007022015, 0510007022016, 0510007022017, 0510007022018, 0510007022019, 0510007022020, 0510007022021, 0510007022022, 0510007022023, 0510007022024, 0510007022025, 0510007022026, 0510038003030, 0510038003031, 0510038003032, 0510038003055; VTD: CC21, VTD: CC24: Block(s) 0510020011006, 0510020011007, 0510020011008, 0510020011010, 0510020011011, 0510020011012, 0510020011013, 0510020011014, 0510020011015, 0510020011016, 0510020011025, 0510020011026, 0510020011030, 0510020011031, 0510020011032, 0510020011033, 0510020011034, 0510020011035, 0510020011036, 0510020011037, 0510020011038, 0510020011039, 0510020011040, 0510020011041, 0510020011042, 0510020011043, 0510020011044, 0510020011045, 0510020011046, 0510020011047, 0510020011048, 0510020011049, 0510020011050, 0510020011051, 0510020011052, 0510020011053, 0510020011055, 0510020011056, 0510020012000, 0510020012001, 0510020012002, 0510020012003, 0510020012006, 0510020012007, 0510020012008, 0510020012009, 0510020012010, 0510020012011, 0510020012012, 0510020012013, 0510020012014, 0510020012015, 0510020012016, 0510020012017, 0510020012018, 0510020012019, 0510020012021, 0510020012022, 0510020012023, 0510020012024, 0510020021001; VTD: CC26, VTD: EO61-1, VTD: EO61-2, VTD: G1, VTD: G10: Block(s) 0510031031000, 0510031031011, 0510031031012, 0510031031013, 0510031031014, 0510031031015, 0510031031017, 0510031031018, 0510031031019, 0510031031020, 0510031031021, 0510031031022, 0510031032000, 0510031032001, 0510031032002, 0510031032003, 0510031032016, 0510031032022, 0510031032025, 0510031032030, 0510031032031, 0510031032032, 0510031032033, 0510031032035, 0510031032037, 0510031032038, 0510031032039, 0510031032040, 0510031032045, 0510031032050, 0510031032051; VTD: G11: 0510036001000, 0510036001001, 0510036001002, 0510036001003, 0510036001004, 0510036001005, 0510036001006, 0510036001007, 0510036001008, 0510036001009, 0510036001010, 0510036001012, 0510036001013, 0510036001014, 0510036001015, 0510036001016, 0510036001017, 0510036001019, 0510036001021, 0510036001022, 0510036001039, 0510036001040, 0510036001041, 0510036001042, 0510036003000, 0510036003001, 0510036003002, 0510036003003, 0510036003004, 0510036003005, 0510036003006, 0510036003007, 0510036003008, 0510036003009, 0510036003010, 0510036003011, 0510036003012, 0510036003014, 0510036003015, 0510036003016, 0510036003017, 0510036003018, 0510036003019, 0510036003020, 0510036003021, 0510036003022, 0510036003023, 0510036003024, 0510036003025, 0510036003026, 0510036003027, 0510036003028, 0510036003029, 0510036003030, 0510036003031, 0510036003032, 0510036003033, 0510036003035, 0510036003037, 0510036003038, 0510036003039, 0510036003040, 0510036003041, 0510036003042, 0510036003043, 0510036003044, 0510036003045, 0510036003046, 0510036003047, 0510036003048, 0510036003049, 0510036003050, 0510036003051, 0510036004000, 0510036004001, 0510036004048, 0510037001007, 0510037001008, 0510037001009, 0519801001000, 0519801001001, 0519801001002, 0519801001003, 0519801001004, 0519801001007, 0519801001008, 0519801001010, 0519801001011, 0519801001012, 0519801001013, 0519801001014, 0519801001015, 0519801001016; VTD: G2: 0510012004001, 0510012004002, 0510012004003, 0510012004004, 0510012004021, 0510012004022, 0510012004023, 0510012004024, 0510012004025, 0510012004026, 0510012004027, 0510012004028, 0510024011000, 0510024011001, 0510024011002, 0510024011003, 0510024011004, 0510024011005, 0510024011006, 0510024011007, 0510024011008, 0510024011009, 0510024011010, 0510024011011, 0510024011013, 0510024011014, 0510024011015, 0510024011016, 0510024011017, 0510024011018, 0510024011019, 0510024011022, 0510024011024, 0510024011025, 0510024011026, 0510024011027, 0510024011028, 0510024011029, 0510024011030, 0510024011034, 0510024011035, 0510024011036, 0510024011038, 0510024011041, 0510024011042, 0510024011043, 0510024012004, 0510024012007, 0510024012025, 0510024021000, 0510024021005, 0510024022000, 0510024022001, 0510024022004, 0510024022007, 0510025011000, 0510025011001, 0510025011002, 0510025011003, 0510025011004, 0510025011005, 0510025011006, 0510025011007, 0510025011008, 0510025011009, 0510025011010, 0510025011011, 0510025011012, 0510025011013, 0510025011014, 0510025011015, 0510025011016, 0510025011017, 0510025011018, 0510025011019, 0510025011020, 0510025011021, 0510025011022, 0510025011023, 0510025012000, 0510025012001, 0510025012002, 0510025012003, 0510025012004, 0510025012005, 0510025012006, 0510025012007, 0510025012008, 0510025012009, 0510025012010, 0510025012011, 0510025012012, 0510025012013, 0510025012014, 0510025013000, 0510025013001, 0510025013002, 0510025013003, 0510025013004, 0510025013005, 0510025013006, 0510025013007, 0510025013008, 0510025013014, 0510025013015, 0510025013016, 0510025013017, 0510025013020, 0510025013023, 0510025013031, 0510025013033, 0510025013037, 0510025013038, 0510025013039, 0510025013040, 0510025013053, 0510025013054, 0510025013055, 0510025013056, 0510025013057, 0510025013058, 0510025013059, 0510025013060, 0510025013061, 0510025013062, 0510025013066, 0510025013067, 0510025013069, 0510025013070, 0510025013077, 0510025013078, 0510025013079, 0510025013080, 0510025013081, 0510025021000, 0510025021001, 0510025021002, 0510025021003, 0510025021004, 0510025021005, 0510025021006, 0510025021007, 0510025021008, 0510025021009, 0510025021010, 0510025021011, 0510025021012, 0510025021013, 0510025021014, 0510025021015, 0510025021016, 0510025021017, 0510025021018, 0510025021019, 0510025021020, 0510025021021, 0510025021022, 0510025021023, 0510025021024, 0510025021025, 0510025021026, 0510025021027, 0510025021028, 0510025021029, 0510025021030, 0510025021031, 0510025021032, 0510025021033, 0510025021034, 0510025021035, 0510025021036, 0510025021037, 0510025021038, 0510025021039, 0510025021040, 0510025021041, 0510025021042, 0510025021043, 0510025021044, 0510025021045, 0510025021046, 0510025021047, 0510025021048, 0510025021049, 0510025021050, 0510025021051, 0510025021052, 0510025021053, 0510025021054, 0510025021055, 0510025021056, 0510025021057, 0510025021058, 0510025021059, 0510025021060, 0510025021061, 0510025021062, 0510025021063, 0510025021064, 0510025021065, 0510025021066, 0510025021067, 0510025022000, 0510025022001, 0510025022002, 0510025022003, 0510025022004, 0510025022005, 0510025022006, 0510025022007, 0510025022008, 0510025022009, 0510025022010, 0510025022011, 0510025022012, 0510025022013,
   15. District 14A: Durham County: VTD: 09, VTD: 12, VTD: 13, VTD: 14, VTD: 15, VTD: 18, VTD: 31: Block(s) 0630010013033, 0630018024009; VTD: 34, VTD: 35: Block(s) 0630020211023, 0630020212002, 0630020212003, 0630020212004, 0630020212005, 0630020212006, 0630020212007, 0630020212008, 0630020212009, 0630020212010, 0630020212013, 0630020212015, 0630020212016, 0630020212018, 0630020212020, 0630020212021, 0630020272052; VTD: 40, VTD: 41, VTD: 42, VTD: 48, VTD: 53-1, VTD: 54, VTD: 55. It has one judge.
   16. District 14B: Durham County: VTD: 01, VTD: 02, VTD: 03, VTD: 04, VTD: 05, VTD: 06, VTD: 07, VTD: 08, VTD: 10, VTD: 16, VTD: 17, VTD: 19, VTD: 20, VTD: 21, VTD: 22, VTD: 23, VTD: 24, VTD: 25, VTD: 26, VTD: 27, VTD: 28, VTD: 29, VTD: 30-1, VTD: 30-2, VTD: 31: Block(s) 0630010013034, 0630010013038, 0630010013039, 0630010013040, 0630010013043, 0630018071037, 0630018071038, 0630018091000, 0630018091001, 0630018091002, 0630018091003, 0630018091004, 0630018091005, 0630018091006, 0630018091007, 0630018091008, 0630018091009, 0630018091010, 0630018091011, 0630018091012, 0630018091013, 0630018091014, 0630018091015, 0630018091016, 0630018091017, 0630018091018, 0630018091019, 0630018091020, 0630018091021, 0630018091022, 0630018091023, 0630018091024, 0630018091025, 0630018091026, 0630018091027, 0630018091028, 0630018091029, 0630018091030, 0630018091031, 0630018091032, 0630018091033, 0630018091034, 0630018091035, 0630018091036, 0630018091037, 0630018091038, 0630018091041, 0630018091042, 0630018091043, 0630018091044, 0630018091045, 0630018091046, 0630018091062, 0630018091063, 0630018091064, 0630018091065, 0630018091066, 0630018091067, 0630018091071, 0630018091072, 0630018091073, 0630018091074, 0630018091077, 0630018091079, 0630018091080, 0630018092000, 0630018092001, 0630018092002, 0630018092003, 0630018092004, 0630018092005, 0630018092006, 0630018092007, 0630018092008, 0630018092009, 0630018092010, 0630018092011, 0630018092012, 0630018092013, 0630018092014, 0630018092015, 0630018092016, 0630018092017, 0630018092018, 0630018092019, 0630018092020, 0630018092021, 0630018092022, 0630018092023, 0630018092024, 0630018092027, 0630018092028, 0630018092029, 0630018092030, 0630018092031, 0630018092032, 0630018092033, 0630020271000, 0630020271001, 0630020271002, 0630020271003, 0630020271004, 0630020271005, 0630020271006, 0630020271007, 0630020271008, 0630020271009, 0630020271010, 0630020271011, 0630020271012, 0630020271013, 0630020271014, 0630020271015, 0630020271016, 0630020271017, 0630020271018, 0630020271019, 0630020271020, 0630020271021, 0630020271022, 0630020271023, 0630020271024, 0630020271025, 0630020271054, 0630020271055, 0630020271063, 0630020271064, 0630020271065, 0630020271067, 0630020271070, 0630020271071, 0639801001012, 0639801001013; VTD: 32, VTD: 33, VTD: 35: Block(s) 0630020131000, 0630020131001, 0630020131002, 0630020131003, 0630020131004, 0630020131005, 0630020131006, 0630020131007, 0630020131008, 0630020131009, 0630020131010, 0630020131011, 0630020131012, 0630020131013, 0630020131014, 0630020132000, 0630020132001, 0630020132002, 0630020132003, 0630020132004, 0630020132005, 0630020132006, 0630020132007, 0630020132008, 0630020132009, 0630020132010, 0630020132011, 0630020132012, 0630020132013, 0630020132014, 0630020132015, 0630020133000, 0630020133001, 0630020133002, 0630020133003, 0630020133004, 0630020133005, 0630020133006, 0630020133007, 0630020133008, 0630020133009, 0630020133010, 0630020133011, 0630020133012, 0630020133013, 0630020133014, 0630020133015, 0630020133016, 0630020133017, 0630020133018, 0630020133019, 0630020202000, 0630020202001, 0630020202002, 0630020202003, 0630020202004, 0630020202005, 0630020202006, 0630020202007, 0630020202008, 0630020202009, 0630020202010, 0630020202011, 0630020202012, 0630020202013, 0630020202014, 0630020202015, 0630020202016, 0630020202017, 0630020202018, 0630020202019, 0630020202020, 0630020202021, 0630020202022, 0630020202023, 0630020202024, 0630020202025, 0630020202026, 0630020202027, 0630020202028, 0630020202029, 0630020202030, 0630020202031, 0630020202032, 0630020202033, 0630020202034, 0630020202035, 0630020202036, 0630020202037, 0630020202038, 0630020202039, 0630020202040, 0630020202041, 0630020202042, 0630020202043, 0630020202044, 0630020202045, 0630020202046, 0630020202047, 0630020202048, 0630020202049, 0630020202050, 0630020202051, 0630020202052, 0630020202053, 0630020202054, 0630020202055, 0630020202056, 0630020202057, 0630020202058, 0630020211021, 0630020211022, 0630020211024, 0630020211049, 0630020211050, 0630020212011, 0630020212014, 0630020212017, 0630020212019, 0630020272070, 0630020272071, 0630020272072, 0630020272073, 0630020272074, 0630020272075; VTD: 36, VTD: 37, VTD: 38, VTD: 39, VTD: 43, VTD: 44, VTD: 45, VTD: 46, VTD: 47, VTD: 50, VTD: 51, VTD: 52, VTD: 53-2. It has three judges.
   17. District 18A: Guilford County: VTD: FEN1, VTD: FEN2, VTD: G04, VTD: G05, VTD: G06, VTD: G46, VTD: G52, VTD: G67, VTD: G68, VTD: G69, VTD: G70, VTD: G71, VTD: G72, VTD: G73, VTD: G74, VTD: G75, VTD: NCLAY1, VTD: NCLAY2, VTD: PG1, VTD: PG2, VTD: SCLAY. It has one judge.
   18. District 18B: Guilford County: VTD: H01, VTD: H02, VTD: H03, VTD: H04, VTD: H05, VTD: H06, VTD: H07, VTD: H08, VTD: H09, VTD: H10, VTD: H11, VTD: H12, VTD: H13, VTD: H14, VTD: H15, VTD: H16, VTD: H17, VTD: H18, VTD: H19A, VTD: H19B, VTD: H20A, VTD: H20B, VTD: H21, VTD: H22, VTD: H23, VTD: H24, VTD: H25, VTD: H26, VTD: H27, VTD: HP, VTD: JAM1, VTD: JAM5, VTD: NDRI, VTD: SDRI. It has one judge.
   19. District 18C: Guilford County: VTD: CG1, VTD: CG2, VTD: CG3A, VTD: CG3B, VTD: FR1, VTD: FR2, VTD: FR3, VTD: FR4, VTD: FR5, VTD: G17, VTD: G30, VTD: G31, VTD: G32, VTD: G33, VTD: G34, VTD: G36, VTD: G37, VTD: G38, VTD: G39, VTD: G40A1, VTD: G40A2, VTD: G40B, VTD: G41, VTD: G42, VTD: G43, VTD: G64, VTD: G65, VTD: G66, VTD: JAM2, VTD: JAM3, VTD: JAM4, VTD: MON3, VTD: NCGR1, VTD: NCGR2, VTD: OR1, VTD: OR2, VTD: SF1, VTD: SF2, VTD: SF3, VTD: SF4, VTD: STOK. It has one judge.
   20. District 18D: Guilford County: VTD: G01, VTD: G11, VTD: G12, VTD: G13, VTD: G14, VTD: G15, VTD: G16, VTD: G19, VTD: G35, VTD: G44, VTD: G45, VTD: G47, VTD: G48, VTD: G49, VTD: G50, VTD: G51, VTD: G53, VTD: G54, VTD: G55, VTD: G56, VTD: G57, VTD: G58, VTD: G59, VTD: G60, VTD: G61, VTD: G62, VTD: G63, VTD: SUM1, VTD: SUM2, VTD: SUM3, VTD: SUM4. It has one judge.
   21. District 18E: Guilford County: VTD: G02, VTD: G03, VTD: G07, VTD: G08, VTD: G09, VTD: G10, VTD: G18, VTD: G20, VTD: G21, VTD: G22, VTD: G23, VTD: G24, VTD: G25, VTD: G26, VTD: G27, VTD: G28, VTD: G29, VTD: GIB, VTD: GR, VTD: JEF1, VTD: JEF2, VTD: JEF3, VTD: JEF4, VTD: MON1, VTD: MON2, VTD: NMAD, VTD: NWASH, VTD: RC1, VTD: RC2, VTD: SMAD, VTD: SWASH. It has one judge.
   22. District 21A: Forsyth County: VTD: 051, VTD: 052, VTD: 053, VTD: 054, VTD: 055, VTD: 071, VTD: 072, VTD: 073, VTD: 074, VTD: 075, VTD: 091, VTD: 092, VTD: 122, VTD: 123, VTD: 131, VTD: 132, VTD: 133, VTD: 701, VTD: 702, VTD: 703, VTD: 704, VTD: 705, VTD: 706, VTD: 707, VTD: 708, VTD: 709, VTD: 806, VTD: 807, VTD: 808. It has one judge.
   23. District 21B: Forsyth County: VTD: 042, VTD: 043, VTD: 501, VTD: 502, VTD: 503, VTD: 504, VTD: 505, VTD: 506, VTD: 507, VTD: 601, VTD: 602, VTD: 603, VTD: 604, VTD: 605, VTD: 606, VTD: 607, VTD: 901, VTD: 902, VTD: 903, VTD: 904, VTD: 905, VTD: 907. It has one judge.
   24. District 21C: Forsyth County: VTD: 011, VTD: 012, VTD: 013, VTD: 014, VTD: 015, VTD: 021, VTD: 031, VTD: 032, VTD: 033, VTD: 034, VTD: 061, VTD: 062, VTD: 063, VTD: 064, VTD: 065, VTD: 066, VTD: 067, VTD: 068, VTD: 101, VTD: 111, VTD: 112, VTD: 801, VTD: 802, VTD: 803, VTD: 804, VTD: 805, VTD: 809, VTD: 906, VTD: 908, VTD: 909. It has one judge.
   25. District 21D: Forsyth County: VTD: 081, VTD: 082, VTD: 083, VTD: 201, VTD: 203, VTD: 204, VTD: 205, VTD: 206, VTD: 207, VTD: 301, VTD: 302, VTD: 303, VTD: 304, VTD: 305, VTD: 306, VTD: 401, VTD: 402, VTD: 403, VTD: 404, VTD: 405. It has one judge.
   26. District 26A: Mecklenburg County: VTD 001, VTD 008, VTD 018, VTD 019, VTD 032, VTD 035, VTD 036, VTD 047, VTD 048, VTD 057, VTD 067, VTD 069, VTD 071, VTD 074, VTD 091, VTD 096, VTD 103, VTD 106, VTD 113, VTD 119, VTD 136, VTD 215, VTD 216, VTD 217, VTD 218, VTD 219, VTD 220, VTD 221, VTD 233, VTD 234, VTD 236. It has one judge.
   27. District 26B: Mecklenburg County: VTD 070, VTD 072, VTD 073, VTD 075, VTD 076, VTD 086, VTD 087, VTD 088, VTD 090, VTD 092, VTD 093, VTD 100, VTD 101, VTD 110, VTD 111, VTD 112, VTD 114, VTD 118, VTD 121, VTD 131, VTD 137, VTD 139.1, VTD 140, VTD 144, VTD 226, VTD 227, VTD 232. It has one judge.
   28. District 26C: Mecklenburg County: VTD 127, VTD 133, VTD 134, VTD 142, VTD 143, VTD 150, VTD 151, VTD 202, VTD 206, VTD 207, VTD 208, VTD 209, VTD 223.1, VTD 224, VTD 240, VTD 241, VTD 242. It has one judge.
   29. District 26D: Mecklenburg County: VTD 037, VTD 038, VTD 049, VTD 050, VTD 051, VTD 058, VTD 059, VTD 077, VTD 097, VTD 098, VTD 120, VTD 122, VTD 129, VTD 138, VTD 147, VTD 148, VTD 225, VTD 228, VTD 229, VTD 230, VTD 231, VTD 243. It has one judge.
   30. District 26E: Mecklenburg County: VTD 002, VTD 005, VTD 007, VTD 009, VTD 010, VTD 012, VTD 013, VTD 014, VTD 016, VTD 017, VTD 020, VTD 021, VTD 022, VTD 023, VTD 024, VTD 025, VTD 029, VTD 031, VTD 039, VTD 040, VTD 041, VTD 046, VTD 052, VTD 053, VTD 078.1, VTD 079, VTD 080, VTD 081, VTD 109, VTD 200. It has one judge.
   31. District 26F: Mecklenburg County: VTD 011, VTD 015, VTD 026, VTD 027, VTD 028, VTD 030, VTD 042, VTD 044, VTD 054, VTD 055, VTD 056, VTD 082, VTD 089, VTD 128, VTD 135, VTD 210, VTD 211, VTD 213, VTD 214, VTD 222, VTD 238.1. It has one judge.
   32. District 26G: Mecklenburg County: VTD 003, VTD 004, VTD 043, VTD 060, VTD 061, VTD 104, VTD 105, VTD 107.1, VTD 123, VTD 126, VTD 132, VTD 141, VTD 145, VTD 146, VTD 149, VTD 204.1, VTD 212, VTD 237, VTD 239. It has one judge.
   33. District 26H: Mecklenburg County: VTD 006, VTD 033, VTD 034, VTD 045, VTD 062, VTD 063, VTD 064, VTD 065, VTD 066, VTD 068, VTD 083, VTD 084, VTD 085, VTD 094, VTD 095, VTD 099, VTD 102, VTD 108, VTD 115, VTD 116, VTD 117, VTD 124, VTD 125, VTD 130, VTD 201, VTD 203, VTD 205, VTD 235. It has one judge.
3. The qualified voters of District 4 shall elect all judges established for District 4 in subsection (a) of this section, but only persons who reside in Onslow County may be candidates for one of the judgeships and only persons who reside in Duplin, Jones, or Sampson County may be candidates for the remaining judgeship.
4. In subsection (b) above, the names and boundaries of voting tabulation districts, tracts, block groups, and blocks specified in this section are as shown on the 2010 Census Redistricting TIGER/Line Shapefiles.
5. If any voting tabulation district boundary is changed, that change shall not change the boundary of a judicial district, which shall remain the same as it is depicted by the 2010 Census Redistricting TIGER/Line Shapefiles.
6. The Legislative Services Officer shall certify a true copy of the block assignment file associated with any mapping software used to generate the language in subsection (b) of this section. The certified true copy of the block assignment file shall be delivered by the Legislative Services Officer to the Principal Clerk of the Senate and the Principal Clerk of the House of Representatives. If any area within North Carolina is not assigned to a specific district by subsection (b) of this section, the certified true copy of the block assignment file delivered to the Principal Clerk of the Senate and the Principal Clerk of the House of Representatives shall control.
7. The several judges, their terms of office, and their assignments to districts are as follows:
   1. In the first superior court district, J. Herbert Small and Thomas S. Watts serve terms expiring December 31, 1994.
   2. In the second superior court district, William C. Griffin serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
   3. In the third-A superior court district, David E. Reid serves a term expiring on December 31, 1992.
   4. In the third-B superior court district, Herbert O. Phillips, III, serves a term expiring on December 31, 1994.
   5. In the fourth-A superior court district, Henry L. Stevens, III, serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
   6. In the fourth-B superior court district, James R. Strickland serves a term expiring December 31, 1992.
   7. In the fifth superior court district, no election shall be held in 1992 for the full term of the seat now occupied by Bradford Tillery, and the holder of that seat shall serve until a successor is elected in 1994 and qualifies. The succeeding term begins January 1, 1995. In the fifth superior court district, Napoleon B. Barefoot serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
   8. In the sixth-A superior court district, Richard B. Allsbrook serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
   9. In the sixth-B superior court district, a judge shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
   10. In the seventh-A superior court district, Charles B. Winberry, serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
   11. In the seventh-B superior court district, a judge shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
   12. In the seventh-C superior court district, Franklin R. Brown serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
   13. In the eighth-A superior court district, James D. Llewellyn serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
   14. In the eighth-B superior court district, Paul M. Wright serves a term expiring December 31, 1992.
   15. In the ninth superior court district, Robert H. Hobgood and Henry W. Hight, Jr., serve terms expiring December 31, 1994.
   16. In the tenth-A superior court district, a judge shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
   17. In the tenth-B superior court district, Robert L. Farmer serves a term expiring December 31, 1992. In the tenth-B superior court district, no election shall be held in 1990 for the full term of the seat now occupied by Henry V. Barnette, Jr., and the holder of that seat shall serve until a successor is elected in 1992 and qualifies. The succeeding term begins January 1, 1993.
   18. In the tenth-C superior court district, Edwin S. Preston, serves a term expiring December 31, 1990. In the tenth-D superior court district, Donald Stephens serves a term expiring December 31, 1988.
   19. In the eleventh superior court district, Wiley F. Bowen serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
   20. In the twelfth-A superior court district, D.B. Herring, Jr., serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
   21. In the twelfth-B superior court district, a judge shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
   22. In the twelfth-C superior court district, no election shall be held in 1992 for the full term of the seat now occupied by Coy E. Brewer, Jr., and the holder of that seat shall serve until a successor is elected in 1994 and qualifies. The succeeding term begins January 1, 1995. In the twelfth-C superior court district, E. Lynn Johnson serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
   23. In the thirteenth superior court district, Giles R. Clark serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
   24. In the fourteenth-A superior court district, a judge shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
   25. In the fourteenth-B superior court district, no election shall be held in 1992 for the full term of the seat now occupied by Anthony M. Brannon, and the holder of that seat shall serve until a successor is elected in 1994 and qualifies. The succeeding term begins July 1, 1995.
   26. In the fourteenth-B superior court district, no election shall be held in 1990 for the full term of the seat now occupied by Thomas H. Lee, and the holder of that seat shall serve until a successor is elected in 1994 and qualifies. The succeeding term begins January 1, 1995. In the fourteenth-B superior court district, J. Milton Read, Jr., serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
   27. In the fifteenth-A superior court district, J.B. Allen, Jr., serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
   28. In the fifteenth-B superior court district, F. Gordon Battle serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
   29. In the sixteenth-A superior court district, B. Craig Ellis serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
   30. In the sixteenth-B superior court district, a judge shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989. In the sixteenth-B judicial [superior court] district, a judge shall be appointed by the Governor to serve until the results of the 1990 general election are certified. A person shall be elected in the 1990 general election to serve the remainder of the term expiring December 31, 1996.
   31. In the seventeenth-A superior court district, Melzer A. Morgan, Jr., serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
   32. In the seventeenth-B superior court district, James M. Long serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
   33. In the eighteenth-A superior court district, a judge shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
   34. In the eighteenth-B superior court district, Edward K. Washington's term expired December 31, 1986, but he is holding over because of a court order enjoining an election from being held in 1986. A successor shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
   35. In the eighteenth-C superior court district, W. Douglas Albright serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
   36. In the eighteenth-D superior court district, Thomas W. Ross's term expired December 31, 1986, but he is holding over because of a court order enjoining an election from being held in 1986. A successor shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
   37. In the eighteenth-E superior court district, Joseph John's term expired December 31, 1986, but he is holding over because of a court order enjoining an election from being held in 1986. A successor shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
   38. In the nineteenth-A superior court district, James C. Davis serves a term expiring December 31, 1992.
   39. In the nineteenth-B1 superior court district, Russell G. Walker, Jr., serves a term expiring December 31, 1990. No election shall be held in 1998 for the full term of the seat now occupied by Russell G. Walker, Jr., and the holder of that seat shall serve until a successor is elected in 2000 and qualifies. The succeeding term shall begin January 1, 2001. The superior court judgeship held on June 12, 1996, in Superior Court District 20A by a resident of Moore County (James M. Webb) is allocated to Superior Court District 19B2. The term of that judge expires December 31, 2000. The judge's successor shall be elected in the 2000 general election.
   40. In the nineteenth-C superior court district, Thomas W. Seay, Jr., serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
   41. In the twentieth-A superior court district, F. Fetzer Mills serves a term expiring December 31, 1992.
   42. In the twentieth-B superior court district, William H. Helms serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
   43. In the twenty-first-A superior court district, William Z. Wood serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
   44. In the twenty-first-B superior court district, Judson D. DeRamus, Jr., serves a term expiring December 31, 1988.
   45. In the twenty-first-C superior court district, William H. Freeman serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
   46. In the twenty-first-D superior court district, a judge shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
   47. In the twenty-second superior court district, no election shall be held in 1992 for the full term of the seat now occupied by Preston Cornelius, and the holder of that seat shall serve until a successor is elected in 1994 and qualifies. The succeeding term shall begin January 1, 1995. In the twenty-second superior court district, Robert A. Collier serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
   48. In the twenty-third superior court district, Julius A. Rousseau, Jr., serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
   49. In the twenty-fourth superior court district, Charles C. Lamm, Jr., serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
   50. In the twenty-fifth-A superior court district, Claude S. Sitton serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
   51. In the twenty-fifth-B superior court district, Forrest A. Ferrell serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
   52. In the twenty-sixth-A superior court district, no election shall be held in 1994 for the full term of the seat now occupied by W. Terry Sherrill, and the holder of that seat shall serve until a successor is elected in 1996 and qualifies. The succeeding term shall begin January 1, 1997. In the twenty-sixth-A superior court district, a judge shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
   53. In the twenty-sixth-B superior court district, Frank W. Snepp, Jr., and Kenneth A. Griffin serve terms expiring December 31, 1990.
   54. In the twenty-sixth-C superior court district, no election shall be held in 1992 for the full term of the seat now occupied by Chase Boone Saunders, and the holder of that seat shall serve until a successor is elected in 1994 and qualifies. The succeeding term shall begin January 1, 1995. In the twenty-sixth-C superior court district, Robert M. Burroughs serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
   55. In the twenty-seventh-A superior court district, no election shall be held in 1988 for the full term of the seat now occupied by Robert E. Gaines, and the holder of that seat shall serve until a successor is elected in 1990 and qualifies. The succeeding term begins January 1, 1991. In the twenty-seventh-A superior court district, Robert W. Kirby serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
   56. In the twenty-seventh-B superior court district, John M. Gardner serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
   57. In the twenty-eighth superior court district, Robert D. Lewis and C. Walter Allen serve terms expiring December 31, 1990.
   58. In the twenty-ninth superior court district, Hollis M. Owens, Jr., serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
   59. In the thirtieth-A superior court district, James U. Downs serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
   60. In the thirtieth-B superior court district, Janet M. Hyatt serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.

--------------------------------------------------------------- ------------ --------------------------------------------------------------- ------------ Superior Judicial Court No. of Resident Division District Counties Judges --------------------------------------------------------------- ------------ First 1 Camden, Chowan, 2 Currituck, Dare, Gates, Pasquotank, Perquimans First 2 Beaufort, Hyde, 1 Martin, Tyrrell, Washington First 3A Pitt 2 Second 3B Carteret, Craven, 3 Pamlico Second 4 Duplin, Jones, 2 Onslow, Sampson Second 5A (part of New Hanover, 1 Pender see subsection (b)) 5B (part of New Hanover, 1 see subsection (b)) 5C (part of New Hanover, 1 see subsection (b)) First 6A Halifax 1 First 6B Bertie, Hertford, 1 Northampton First 7A Nash 1 First 7B (part of Wilson, 1 part of Edgecombe, see subsection (b)) First 7C (part of Wilson, 1 part of Edgecombe, see subsection (b)) Second 8A Lenoir and Greene 1 Second 8B Wayne 1 First 9 Franklin, Granville, 2 Person, Vance, Warren Third 10A (part of Wake, 1 see subsection (b)) Third 10B (part of Wake, 1 see subsection (b)) Third 10C (part of Wake, 1 see subsection (b)) Third 10D (part of Wake, 1 see subsection (b)) Third 10E (part of Wake, 1 see subsection (b)) Third 10F (part of Wake, 1 see subsection (b)) Third 11A Harnett, 1 Lee Third 11B Johnston 1 Third 12A (part of Cumberland, 1 see subsection (b)) Third 12B (part of Cumberland, 1 see subsection (b)) Third 12C (part of Cumberland, 2 see subsection (b)) Second 13A Bladen, Columbus 1 Second 13B Brunswick 1 First 14A (part of Durham, 1 see subsection (b)) First 14B (part of Durham, 3 see subsection (b)) Third 15A Alamance 2 Fourth 15B Orange, Chatham 2 Third 16A Anson, Richmond, 2 Scotland Second 16B Robeson 2 Fourth 17A Caswell, Rockingham 2 Fourth 17B Stokes, Surry 1 Fourth 18A (part of Guilford, 1 see subsection (b)) Fourth 18B (part of Guilford, 1 see subsection (b)) Fourth 18C (part of Guilford, 1 see subsection (b)) Fourth 18D (part of Guilford, 1 see subsection (b)) Fourth 18E (part of Guilford, 1 see subsection (b)) Fourth 19A Cabarrus 1 Third 19B Randolph 2 Fourth 19C Rowan 1 Third 19D Hoke, Moore 2 Third 20A Montgomery, Stanly 2 Third 20B Union 2 Fourth 21A (part of Forsyth, 1 see subsection (b)) Fourth 21B (part of Forsyth, 1 see subsection (b)) Fourth 21C (part of Forsyth, 1 see subsection (b)) Fourth 21D (part of Forsyth, 1 see subsection (b)) Fourth 22A Alexander, Iredell 2 Fourth 22B Davidson, Davie 2 Fourth 23 Alleghany, Ashe, 1 Wilkes, Yadkin Fifth 24 Avery, Madison, 2 Mitchell, Watauga, Yancey Fifth 25A Burke, Caldwell 2 Fifth 25B Catawba 2 Fifth 26A (part of Mecklenburg, 1 see subsection (b)) Fifth 26B (part of Mecklenburg, 1 see subsection (b)) Fifth 26C (part of Mecklenburg, 1 see subsection (b)) 26D (part of Mecklenburg, 1 see subsection (b)) 26E (part of Mecklenburg, 1 see subsection (b)) 26F (part of Mecklenburg, 1 see subsection (b)) 26G (part of Mecklenburg, 1 see subsection (b)) 26H (part of Mecklenburg, 1 see subsection (b)) Fifth 27A Gaston 2 Fifth 27B Cleveland, Lincoln 2 Fifth 28 Buncombe 2 Fifth 29A McDowell, 1 Rutherford Fifth 29B Henderson, Polk, 1 Transylvania Fifth 30A Cherokee, Clay, 1 Graham, Macon, Swain Fifth 30B Haywood, Jackson 1.

VTD: PRSP, VTD: PRST: Block(s) 1950008022062, 1950008022064, 1950008022065, 1950008023036, 1950008023037, 1950008023038, 1950009003005, 1950010001000, 1950010001001, 1950010001002, 1950010001003, 1950010001004, 1950010001005, 1950010001006, 1950010001007, 1950010001008, 1950010001009, 1950010001010, 1950010001011, 1950010001012, 1950010001013, 1950010001014, 1950010001015, 1950010001016, 1950010001017, 1950010001018, 1950010001019, 1950010001020, 1950010001021, 1950010001022, 1950010001024, 1950010001025, 1950010001026, 1950010001027, 1950010001028, 1950010001029, 1950010001030, 1950010001031, 1950010001032, 1950010001033, 1950010001034, 1950010001035, 1950010001036, 1950010001037, 1950010001038, 1950010001039, 1950010001040, 1950010001041, 1950010001042, 1950010001043, 1950010001044, 1950010001045, 1950010001046, 1950010001047, 1950010001048, 1950010001049, 1950010001050, 1950010001051, 1950010001052, 1950010001053, 1950010001054, 1950010001055, 1950010001056, 1950010001057, 1950010001058, 1950010001059, 1950010001060, 1950010001061, 1950010001062, 1950010001063, 1950010001064, 1950010001065, 1950010001066, 1950010001067, 1950010001068, 1950010001069, 1950010001070, 1950010001071, 1950010001072, 1950010001073, 1950010001074, 1950010001075, 1950010001076, 1950010001077, 1950010001078; VTD: PRTA, VTD: PRTO: Block(s) 1950013003000, 1950013003001, 1950013003002, 1950013003003, 1950013003004, 1950013003005, 1950013003006, 1950013003007, 1950013003008, 1950013003009, 1950013003010, 1950013003011, 1950013003012, 1950013003013, 1950013003014, 1950013003015, 1950013003016, 1950013003017, 1950013003018, 1950013003019, 1950013003020, 1950013004000, 1950013004001, 1950013004002, 1950013004003, 1950013004004, 1950013004005, 1950013004006, 1950013004007, 1950013004008, 1950013004009, 1950013004010, 1950013004011, 1950013004012, 1950013004013, 1950013004014, 1950013004015, 1950013004016, 1950013004017, 1950013004018, 1950013004019, 1950013004020, 1950013004021, 1950013004022, 1950013004023, 1950013004024, 1950013004025, 1950013004026, 1950013004027, 1950013004028, 1950013004029, 1950013004030, 1950013004031, 1950013004032, 1950013004033, 1950013004034, 1950013004035, 1950013004036, 1950013004037, 1950013004038, 1950013004039, 1950013004040, 1950013004041, 1950013004042, 1950013004043, 1950013004044, 1950013004045, 1950013004046, 1950013004047, 1950013004048, 1950013004049, 1950013004050, 1950013004051, 1950013004052, 1950013004053, 1950013004054, 1950013004055; VTD: PRWB: 1950002001047, 1950002001048, 1950002001049, 1950002001050, 1950002001051, 1950002001061; VTD: PRWC: 1950004002000, 1950004002001, 1950004002010, 1950004002011, 1950004002012, 1950004003000, 1950004003001, 1950004003002, 1950004003003, 1950004003004, 1950004003005, 1950004003006, 1950004003007, 1950004003008, 1950004003009, 1950004003010, 1950004003011, 1950004003012, 1950004003013, 1950004003014, 1950004003015, 1950004003016, 1950004003017, 1950004003018, 1950004003019, 1950004003020, 1950004003021, 1950004003022, 1950004003023, 1950004003024, 1950004003025; VTD: PRWD, VTD: PRWE: Block(s) 1950001001000, 1950001001001, 1950001001002, 1950001001003, 1950001001010, 1950001001011, 1950001001013, 1950001001014, 1950001001015, 1950001002000, 1950001002001, 1950001002002, 1950001002011, 1950001002012, 1950001002013, 1950006002000, 1950006002001, 1950006002004, 1950006002005, 1950006002006, 1950006002007, 1950006002008, 1950006002009, 1950006002010, 1950006002011, 1950006002012, 1950006002013, 1950006002014, 1950006002015, 1950006002016, 1950006003000, 1950006003001, 1950006003002, 1950006003003, 1950006003004, 1950006003005, 1950006003006, 1950006003007, 1950006003008, 1950006003009, 1950006003010, 1950006003011, 1950006003012, 1950006003013, 1950006003014, 1950006003015, 1950006003016, 1950006003017, 1950006003018, 1950006003019, 1950006003020, 1950006005019, 1950006005020, 1950006005021, 1950006005022, 1950006005023, 1950006005075, 1950013003021, 1950013003022; VTD: PRWI, VTD: PRWJ, VTD: PRWK, VTD: PRWL, VTD: PRWM, VTD: PRWP. It has one judge.

0510034081000, 0510034081001, 0510034081002, 0510034081003, 0510034081004, 0510034081005, 0510034081006, 0510034081007, 0510034081008, 0510034081009, 0510034081010, 0510034081011, 0510034081012, 0510034081013, 0510034081014, 0510034081015, 0510034081016, 0510034081017, 0510034081018, 0510034081019, 0510034081020, 0510034081021, 0510034081022, 0510034081023, 0510034081024, 0510034081025, 0510034081026, 0510034081027, 0510034081028, 0510034081029, 0510034081030, 0510034081031, 0510034081032, 0510034081033, 0510034081034, 0510034081035, 0510034081036, 0510034081037, 0510034081038, 0510034081039, 0510034081040, 0510034081041, 0510034081042, 0510034081043, 0510034081044, 0510034081045, 0510034081046, 0510034082000, 0510034082001, 0510034082002, 0510034082003, 0510034082004, 0510034082005, 0510034082006, 0510034082007, 0510034082008, 0510034082009, 0510034082010, 0510034082011, 0510034082012, 0510034082013, 0510034082014, 0510034082015, 0510034082016, 0510034082017, 0510034082018, 0510034082019, 0510034082020, 0510034082021, 0510034082022, 0510034082023, 0510034082024, 0510034082025, 0510034082026, 0510034082027, 0510034082028, 0510034082029, 0510034082030, 0510034082031, 0510034082032, 0510034082033, 0510034082034, 0510034082035, 0510034082036, 0510034082037, 0510034082038, 0510034082039, 0510034082040, 0510034082041, 0510034082042, 0510034082043, 0510034082044, 0510034082045, 0510034082046, 0510034082047, 0510034082048, 0510034082049, 0510034082050, 0510034082051, 0510034082052, 0510034082053, 0510034082054, 0510034082055, 0510034082056, 0510034082057, 0510034082058, 0510034082059, 0510034082060, 0510034082061, 0510034082062, 0510034082063, 0510034082064, 0510034082065, 0510034082066, 0510034082067, 0510034082068, 0510034082069, 0510034082070, 0510034082071, 0510034082072, 0510034082073, 0510034082074, 0510035001000, 0510035001001, 0510035001002, 0510035001003, 0510035001004, 0510035001005, 0510035001006, 0510035001007, 0510035001008, 0510035001009, 0510035001010, 0510035001011, 0510035001012, 0510035001013, 0510035001014, 0510035001015, 0510035001016, 0510035001017, 0510035001018, 0510035001019, 0510035001020, 0510035001021, 0510035001022, 0510035001023, 0510035001024, 0510035001025, 0510035001026, 0510035001027, 0510035001028, 0510035001029, 0510035001030, 0510035002000, 0510035002001, 0510035002002, 0510035002003, 0510035002004, 0510035002005, 0510035002006, 0510035002007, 0510035002008, 0510035002009, 0510035002010, 0510035002011, 0510035002012, 0510035002013, 0510035002014, 0510035002015, 0510035002016, 0510035002017, 0510035002018, 0510035002019, 0510035002020, 0510035002021, 0510035002022, 0510035002023, 0510035002024, 0510035002025, 0510035002026, 0510035002027, 0510035002028, 0510035002029, 0510035003000, 0510035003001, 0510035003002, 0510035003003, 0510035003004, 0510035003005, 0510035003006, 0510035003007, 0510035003008, 0510035003009, 0510035003010, 0510035003011, 0510035003012, 0510035003013, 0510035003014, 0510035003015, 0510035003016, 0510035003017, 0510035003018, 0510035003019, 0510035003020, 0510035003021, 0510035003022, 0510035003023, 0510035003024, 0510035003025, 0510035003026, 0510035003027, 0510035003028, 0510035003029, 0510035003030, 0510035003031, 0510035003032, 0510035003033, 0510035003034, 0510035003035, 0510035003036, 0510035003037, 0510035004000, 0510035004001, 0510035004002, 0510035004003, 0510035004004, 0510035004005, 0510035004006, 0510035004007, 0510035004008, 0510035004009, 0510035004010, 0510035004011, 0510035004012, 0510035004013, 0510035004014, 0510035004015, 0510035004016, 0510035004017, 0510035004018, 0510035004019, 0510035004020, 0510035004021, 0510035004022, 0510035004023, 0510035004024, 0510035004025, 0510035004026, 0510035004027, 0510035004028, 0510035004029, 0510036001011, 0510036001018, 0510036001020, 0510036001023, 0510036001024, 0510036001025, 0510036001026, 0510036001027, 0510036001028, 0510036001029, 0510036001030, 0510036001031, 0510036001032, 0510036001033, 0510036001034, 0510036001035, 0510036001036, 0510036001037, 0510036001038, 0510036001043, 0510036001044, 0510036001045, 0510036001046, 0510036001047, 0510036001048, 0510036001049, 0510036001050, 0510036001051, 0510036001052, 0510036001053, 0510036001054, 0510036001055, 0510036001056, 0510036001057, 0510036001058, 0510036001059, 0510036001060, 0510036002000, 0510036002001, 0510036002002, 0510036002003, 0510036002004, 0510036002005, 0510036002006, 0510036002007, 0510036002008, 0510036002009, 0510036002010, 0510036002011, 0510036002012, 0510036003013, 0510036003034, 0510036003036, 0510036004002, 0510036004003, 0510036004004, 0510036004005, 0510036004006, 0510036004007, 0510036004008, 0510036004009, 0510036004010, 0510036004011, 0510036004012, 0510036004013, 0510036004014, 0510036004015, 0510036004016, 0510036004017, 0510036004018, 0510036004019, 0510036004020, 0510036004021, 0510036004022, 0510036004023, 0510036004024, 0510036004025, 0510036004026, 0510036004027, 0510036004028, 0510036004029, 0510036004030, 0510036004031, 0510036004032, 0510036004033, 0510036004034, 0510036004035, 0510036004036, 0510036004037, 0510036004038, 0510036004039, 0510036004040, 0510036004041, 0510036004042, 0510036004043, 0510036004044, 0510036004045, 0510036004046, 0510036004047, 510036004049, 0510036004050, 0510036004051, 0510036004052, 0510036004053, 0510036004054, 0510036004055, 0510036004056, 0510036004057, 0510036004058, 0510036004059, 0510037001003, 0510037001023, 0510037001024, 0519801001005, 0519801001006, 0519801001009, 0519801001017, 0519801001018, 0519801001019, 0519801001020, 0519801001021, 0519801001022, 0519801001023, 0519801001024, 0519801001025, 0519801001026, 0519801001027, 0519801001028, 0519801001029, 0519801001030, 0519801001031, 0519801001032, 0519801001033, 0519801001034, 0519801001035, 0519801001036, 0519801001037, 0519801001038, 0519801001039, 0519801001040, 0519801001041, 0519801001042, 0519801001043, 0519801001044, 0519801001045, 0519801001046, 0519801001047, 0519801001048, 0519801001049, 0519801001051, 0519801001052, 0519801001053, 0519801001054, 0519801001055, 0519801001056, 0519801001057, 0519801001058, 0519801001059, 0519801001060, 0519801001061, 0519801001062, 0519801001063, 0519801001064, 0519801001065, 0519801001066, 0519801001067, 0519801001068, 0519802001000, 0519802001001, 0519802001002, 0519802001003, 0519802001004, 0519802001005, 0519802001006, 0519802001007, 0519802001008, 0519802001009, 0519802001010, 0519802001011, 0519802001012, 0519802001013, 0519802001014, 0519802001015, 0519802001016, 0519802001017, 0519802001018, 0519802001019, 0519802001020, 0519802001021, 0519802001022, 0519802001023, 0519802001024, 0519802001025, 0519802001026, 0519802001028, 0519802001029, 0519802001030, 0519802001031, 0519802001032, 0519802001033, 0519802001034, 0519802001035, 0519802001036, 0519802001037, 0519802001038, 0519802001039, 0519802001040, 0519802001041, 0519802001042, 0519802001043, 0519802001044, 0519802001045;

VTD: G2: 0510012001000, 0510012001001, 0510012001002, 0510012001003, 0510012001004, 0510012001005, 0510012001006, 0510012001007, 0510012001008, 0510012001009, 0510012001010, 0510024022002, 0510024022003, 0510024022005, 0510024022006, 0510024023000, 0510024023001, 0510024023002, 0510024023003, 0510024023004, 0510024023005, 0510024023006, 0510024023007, 0510024023008, 0510024023009, 0510024023011, 0510024023012, 0510024023013, 0510025013009, 0510025013010, 0510025013011, 0510025013012, 0510025013013, 0510025013018, 0510025013019, 0510025013021, 0510025013022, 0510025013024, 0510025013025, 0510025013026, 0510025013027, 0510025013028, 0510025013029, 0510025013030, 0510025013032, 0510025013034, 0510025013035, 0510025013036, 0510025013041, 0510025013042, 0510025013043, 0510025013044, 0510025013045, 0510025013046, 0510025013047, 0510025013048, 0510025013049, 0510025013050, 0510025013051, 0510025013052, 0510025013063, 0510025013064, 0510025013065, 0510025013068, 0510025013071, 0510025013072, 0510025013073, 0510025013074, 0510025013075, 0510025013076; VTD: LR63, VTD: MB62: Block(s) 0510033071009, 0510033071010, 0510033072000, 0510033072001, 0510033072002, 0510033072003, 0510033072004, 0510033072005, 0510033072006, 0510033072007, 0510033072008, 0510033072029, 0510033141000, 0510033141001, 0510033141002, 0510033141003, 0510033141004, 0510033141005, 0510033141006, 0510033141007, 0510033141008, 0510033141009, 0510033141010, 0510033141011, 0510033141012, 0510033141013, 0510033141014, 0510033141015, 0510033141016, 0510033141017, 0510033141018, 0510033141019, 0510033141020, 0510033141021, 0510033141022, 0510033141023, 0510033141024, 0510033141025, 0510033143000, 0510033143001, 0510033143002, 0510033143003, 0510033143009, 0510033143010, 0510033143011, 0510033143012, 0510033143013, 0510033143014. It has one judge.

0510025022014, 0510025022015, 0510025022016, 0510025022017, 0510025022018, 0510025022019, 0510025022020, 0510025022021, 0510025022022, 0510025022023, 0510025022024, 0510025022025, 0510025022026, 0510025022027, 0510025022028, 0510025022029, 0510025022030, 0510025022031, 0510025022032, 0510025022033, 0510025022034, 0510025022035, 0510025022036, 0510025022037, 0510025022038, 0510025022039, 0510025022040, 0510025022041, 0510025022042, 0510025022043, 0510025022044, 0510025022045, 0510025022046, 0510025022047, 0510025022048, 0510025022049, 0510025022050, 0510025022051, 0510025022052, 0510025022053, 0510025022054, 0510025022055, 0510025022056, 0510025022057, 0510025022058, 0510025022059, 0510025022060, 0510025022061, 0510025022062, 0510025022063, 0510025022064, 0510025022065, 0510025022066, 0510025022067, 0510025022068, 0510025022069, 0510025022070, 0510025022071, 0510025022072, 0510025022073, 0510025022074, 0510025022075, 0510025022076, 0510025022077, 0510025022078, 0510025022079, 0510025022080, 0510025022081, 0510025022082, 0510025022083, 0510025022084, 0510025023000, 0510025023001, 0510025023002, 0510025023003, 0510025023004, 0510025023005, 0510025023006, 0510025023007, 0510025023008, 0510025023009, 0510025023010, 0510025023011, 0510025023012, 0510025023013, 0510025023014, 0510025023015, 0510025023016, 0510025023017, 0510025023018, 0510025023019, 0510025023020, 0510025023021, 0510025023022, 0510025023023, 0510025023024, 0510025023025, 0510025023026, 0510025023027, 0510025023028, 0510025023029, 0510025023030, 0510025023031, 0510025023032, 0510025023033, 0510025023034, 0510025023035, 0510025023036, 0510025031000, 0510025031001, 0510025031002, 0510025031003, 0510025031004, 0510025031005, 0510025031006, 0510025031007, 0510025031008, 0510025031009, 0510025031010, 0510025031011, 0510025031012, 0510025031013, 0510025031014, 0510025031015, 0510025031016, 0510025031017, 0510025031018, 0510025031019, 0510025031020, 0510025031021, 0510025031022, 0510025031023, 0510025031024, 0510025031025, 0510025032000, 0510025032001, 0510025032002, 0510025032003, 0510025032004, 0510025032005, 0510025032006, 0510025032007, 0510025032008, 0510025032009, 0510025033000, 0510025033001, 0510025033002, 0510025033003, 0510025033004, 0510025033005, 0510025033006, 0510025033007, 0510025033008, 0510025033009, 0510025033010, 0510025033011, 0510025033012, 0510025033013, 0510025033014, 0510025033015, 0510025033016, 0510025033017, 0510025033018, 0510025033019, 0510025033020, 0510025033021, 0510025033022, 0510025033023, 0510025033024, 0510025033025, 0510025033026, 0510025033027, 0510025033028, 0510025033029, 0510025033030, 0510025033031, 0510025033032, 0510025033033, 0510025033034, 0510025033035, 0510025041001, 0510025041002, 0510025041003, 0510025041004, 0510025041005, 0510025041006, 0510025041007, 0510025041008, 0510025041009, 0510025041010, 0510025041011, 0510025041012, 0510025041013, 0510025041014, 0510025041015, 0510025041016, 0510025041017, 0510025041018, 0510025041019, 0510025041020, 0510025041021, 0510025041022, 0510025041023, 0510025041024, 0510025041025, 0510025041026, 0510025041027, 0510025041028, 0510025041029, 0510025041030, 0510025042000, 0510025042001, 0510025042002, 0510025042003, 0510025042004, 0510025042005, 0510025042006, 0510025042007, 0510025042008, 0510025042009, 0510025042010, 0510025042011, 0510025042012, 0510025042013, 0510025042014, 0510025042015, 0510025042016, 0510025042017, 0510025042018, 0510025042019, 0510025042020, 0510025042021, 0510025042022, 0510025042023, 0510025042024, 0510025042025, 0510025042026, 0510025042027, 0510025042028, 0510025042029, 0510025042030, 0510025042031, 0510025042032, 0510025042033, 0510025042034, 0510025042035, 0510025042036, 0510025042037, 0510025042038, 0510025042039, 0510025042040, 0510025042041, 0510025042042, 0510025042043, 0510025042044, 0510025042045, 0510025042046, 0510025042047, 0510025043000, 0510025043001, 0510025043002, 0510025043003, 0510025043004, 0510025043005, 0510025043006, 0510025043007, 0510025043008, 0510025043009, 0510025043010, 0510025043011, 0510025043012, 0510025043013, 0510025043014, 0510025043015, 0510025043016, 0510025043017, 0510025043018, 0510025043019, 0510025043020, 0510025043021, 0510025043022, 0510025043023, 0510025043024, 0510025043025, 0510025043026, 0510025043027, 0510025043028, 0510025043029, 0510025043030, 0510025043031, 0510025043032, 0510025043033, 0510025043034, 0510025043035, 0510025043036, 0510025043037, 0510025043038, 0510026002016, 0510037001001, 0510037001002, 0510037001004, 0510037001005, 0510037001006, 0510037001010, 0510037001011, 0510037001012, 0510037001013, 0510037001014, 0510037001015, 0510037001016, 0510037001017, 0510037001018, 0510037001019, 0510037001020, 0510037001021, 0510037001022, 0510037001025, 0510037001026, 0510037003088, 0510037003089, 0510037003090, 0510037003098, 0510037003099, 0510037003100, 0510037003101, 0510037003103, 0510037003104, 0510037003105, 0510037003106, 0510037003107, 0510037003110, 0510037003111, 0510037003112, 0510037003113, 0510037003114, 0519802001027;

VTD: G3, VTD: G4, VTD: G6, VTD: G7, VTD: G8: Block(s) 0510016011000, 0510016011028, 0510016011029, 0510016011030, 0510016011031, 0510016011033, 0510016011034, 0510016011035, 0510016011036, 0510016011037, 0510016011038, 0510016011039, 0510016011040, 0510016011042, 0510016012003, 0510016012004, 0510016012005, 0510016012006, 0510016012007, 0510016012008, 0510016012009, 0510016012012, 0510016012013, 0510016012014, 0510016012016, 0510016012017, 0510016012018, 0510016012019, 0510016012020, 0510016012021, 0510016012022, 0510016012023, 0510016012024, 0510016012025, 0510016012026, 0510016012027, 0510016012028, 0510016012029, 0510016012030, 0510016012032, 0510016012033, 0510016012034, 0510016012035, 0510016012036, 0510016012037, 0510016012038, 0510016012039, 0510016012040, 0510016012042, 0510016012043, 0510016012044, 0510016012045, 0510016012046, 0510016012047, 0510016012048, 0510016012049, 0510016012050, 0510016012051, 0510016012052, 0510016012053, 0510016032017, 0510016032018, 0510016032019, 0510016032020, 0510016032022, 0510016032023, 0510016032028, 0510016032029, 0510016032030, 0510016032031, 0510016032032, 0510016032044, 0510019011006, 0510019011007, 0510019011019, 0510019011027, 0510019011040, 0510019031013, 0510019031014, 0510031033002, 0510031033003, 0510031033004, 0510031033005, 0510031033006, 0510031041002, 0510031041003, 0510031041004, 0510031041005, 0510031041006, 0510031041007, 0510031041008, 0510031041009, 0510031041010, 0510031041011, 0510031041012, 0510031041013, 0510031041014, 0510031041015, 0510031042011, 0510032014052, 0510032014053, 0510032014054; VTD: G9, VTD: LI65, VTD: SH77. It has two judges.

History

(1969, c. 1171, ss. 1-3; c. 1190, s. 4; 1971, c. 377, s. 5; c. 997; 1973, c. 47, s. 2; c. 646; c. 855, s. 1; 1975, c. 529; c. 956, ss. 1, 2; 1975, 2nd Sess., c. 983, s. 114; 1977, c. 1119, ss. 1, 3, 4; c. 1130, ss. 1, 2; 1977, 2nd Sess., c. 1238, s. 1; c. 1243, s. 4; 1979, c. 838, s. 119; c. 1072, s. 1; 1979, 2nd Sess., c. 1221, s. 1; 1981, c. 964, ss. 1, 2; 1981 (Reg. Sess., 1982), c. 1282, s. 71.2; 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1109, ss. 4, 4.1; 1985, c. 698, s. 11(a); 1987, c. 509, s. 1; c. 549, s. 6.6; c. 738, s. 124; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 1; c. 1056, ss. 14, 15; 1989, c. 795, s. 22(a); 1991, c. 746, s. 1; 1993, c. 321, ss. 200.4(a), 200.5(a), (d); 1995, c. 51, s. 1; c. 509, s. 3; 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 589, s. 1(a), (c); 1998-212, s. 16.16A(a); 1998-217, s. 67.3(c); 1999-237, ss. 17.12(b), 17.19(a)-(d), 17.20(a)-(c); 1999-396, s. 1; 2000-67, s. 15.6(a); 2000-140, s. 36; 2001-333, ss. 1, 2; 2001-424, s. 22.4(b); 2001-507, ss. 3, 4; 2003-284, ss. 13.14(a), 13.14(b); 2004-124, s. 14.6(b); 2004-127, s. 2(a); 2005-276, ss. 14.2(a), 14.2(e1); 2006-96, s. 2; 2007-323, s. 14.25(a); 2011-203, ss. 1-3; 2011-417, s. 1; 2012-182, s. 2(a), (b); 2013-360, s. 18B.22(a); 2017-57, s. 18B.9(a); 2018-5, s. 18B.5(a); 2018-14, s. 1(a); 2018-121, ss. 1(a), 10.)

Preclearance Under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. - Information on receipt of preclearance was published in the Register. Please refer to the North Carolina Register (website at http://www.oah.state.nc.us/rules/register) or the Administrative Office of the Courts (website at http://www.nccourts.org) as described in Chapter 120, Article 6A, G.S. 120-30.9A et seq.

Session Laws 1993, c. 321, s. 200.4, which amended subsection (a), was effective November 1, 1993, or 15 days after the date upon which s. 200.4(a) and (b) were approved under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever was later. Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated February 14, 1994.

Session Laws 1993, c. 321, s. 200.5(a), which amended this section, was effective November 1, 1993, or the date upon which s. 200.5(a) and (b) were approved under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever was later. Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated February 14, 1994.

Session Laws 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 589, s. 5 provides that c. 589, s. 1, which amended this section, becomes effective January 4, 1997, or the date upon which that section is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later. Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated December 16, 1996.

Session Laws 2000-67, s. 15.6(c), provides that subsection (a) of the section becomes effective December 15, 2000, as to any district in which no county is subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Act) and, as to any district in which any county is subject to section 5 of the Act, subsection (a) becomes effective December 15, 2000, or 15 days after the date upon which that subsection is approved under section 5 of the Act, whichever is later. Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated October 26, 2000.

Session Laws 2001-333, s. 3, provides: "As to a district in a county not subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, this act is effective when it becomes law. As to a district in a county subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, this act becomes effective when the district is precleared pursuant to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended." Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated December 20, 2001.

Session Laws 2001-424, s. 22.4(d), provides that the amendment to this section by s. 22.4(b) is effective October 1, 2001, except that the elimination of the vacant judgeship in Superior Court District 4B becomes effective the later of October 1, 2001, or the date upon which it is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Session Laws 2004-124, s. 14.6(d) provides: "As to District 15B, subsection (b) of this section becomes effective December 1, 2004. As to District 3B, subsection (b) of this section becomes effective December 1, 2004, or 15 days after the date upon which that subsection is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later." As of October 19, 2004, preclearance under the Voting Rights Act was still pending.

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 14.2(a), which amended subsection (a), was effective December 1, 2005, or the date upon which subsection (a) is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later. Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated January 5, 2006.

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 14.2(e1), which also amended subsection (a), is effective January 1, 2011, or the date on which subsection (a) is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later. Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated January 5, 2006.

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 14.2(q), provides in part: "With respect to the realignment of Superior Court Districts 20A and 20B, subsections (a) through (e) of this section become effective December 1, 2005, or the date upon which subsection (a) of this section is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later. With respect to the addition of a judge in Superior Court District 20B, subsections (e1) and (e2) of this section become effective January 1, 2011, or the date upon which subsection (e1) of this section is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later. With respect to the division of Superior Court District 29, subsections (a) through (e) of this section become effective December 1, 2005."

Session Laws 2006-96, s. 5, provides, in part: "Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the act become effective October 1, 2006, or the date upon which Section 2 of this act is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later." Preclearance was received by letter dated December 21, 2006.

Session Laws 2006-96, s. 3, provides: "The superior court judgeship established for District 13A by Section 2 of this act shall be filled by the judge currently serving District 13 who resides in Bladen or Columbus County, who shall serve until the expiration of that judge's current term."

Appointment of Superior Court Judge by Governor. - Session Laws 2007-323, s. 14.25(b)-(d), provides: "(b) The two superior court judgeships established for District 22A by subsection (a) of this section shall be filled by the two judges currently serving District 22 who reside in Alexander and Iredell Counties. The term of one of those judges expires December 31, 2008, and a successor shall be elected in the 2008 election. The term of the other judges expires December 31, 2010, and a successor shall be elected in the 2010 election.

"(c) One of the superior court judgeships established for District 22B by subsection (a) of this section shall be filled by the judge currently serving District 22 who resides in Davidson County. That judge's term expires December 31, 2014, and a successor shall be elected in the 2014 election.

"(d) The additional judgeship established for District 22B by subsection (a) of this section shall be filled by election in the 2008 election for an eight-year term expiring December 31, 2016. That judge's successor shall be elected in the 2016 election."

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 18B.22(c), provides: "The two superior court judgeships established for Superior Court District 16A by subsection (a) of this section shall be filled by the superior court judge currently serving Superior Court District 16A who resides in Scotland County and by the superior court judge currently serving Superior Court District 20A who resides in Richmond County. The terms of those judges expire December 31, 2016, and successors shall be elected in the 2016 general election for eight-year terms commencing January 1, 2017."

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 18B.22(e), provides: "The superior court judgeship established for Superior Court District 20A by subsection (a) of this section shall be filled by the superior court judge currently serving Superior Court District 20A who resides in Stanly County. The term of that judge expires December 31, 2016, and a successor shall be elected in the 2016 general election for an eight-year term commencing January 1, 2017."

Elections for Judicial Offices 2018. - Session Laws 2017-214, s. 4(a), eliminated party primary elections for candidates for Justice of the Supreme Court, Judges of the Court of Appeals, superior court judges, and district court judges, for the November 6, 2018, general election, and s. 4(b)-(k) of that act provides for notices of candidacy, requirements, a timeline, filing fees, and method of determining the winner of each race. For full text of Session Laws 2017-214, s. 4(a)-(k), see note at G.S. 163A-970.

Session Laws 2018-3, s. 2(a)-(d), as amended by Session Laws 2018-130, ss. 2, 3, provides: "The General Assembly finds that both chambers of the General Assembly have carefully examined judicial redistricting and the forms of judicial selection with multiple committees considering various proposals of selection and new judicial district maps. The General Assembly finds that, to allow for more time to thoughtfully consider these changes, the General Assembly enacted S.L. 2017-214, the Electoral Freedom Act of 2017, which, among other items, provided for a one-time cancellation of partisan primaries for the offices of district court judge, superior court judge, judges of the Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court justices for the 2018 election cycle. The General Assembly finds that all elections for judges in 2018 were to be treated uniformly under S.L. 2017-214, the Electoral Freedom Act of 2017, while those changes were considered.

"The General Assembly notes that election to these offices will be held under a plurality election system, with candidates running under a political party label on the ballot, without having gone through a party primary. The General Assembly finds that ballot language above the sections of election ballots regarding these impacted offices setting forth that the listed party affiliation is only the self-identified party of a candidate at the time of filing will aid voters' understanding of the 2018 judicial races.

"(b) For the 2018 general election, the State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement shall, notwithstanding G.S. 163A-1114(b)(2), list the following judicial offices at the end of all partisan offices listed on the general election ballot:

"(1) Justices of the Supreme Court.

"(2) Judges of the Court of Appeals.

"(3) Judges of the superior courts.

"(4) Judges of the district courts.

"(c) Notwithstanding G.S. 163A-1112, immediately prior to the placement of the judicial offices listed in subsection (b) of this section on the ballot, the following information shall be printed:

"No primaries for judicial office were held in 2018. The information listed by each of the following candidates' names indicates only the candidates' party affiliation or unaffiliated status on their voter registration at the time they filed to run for office.

"(d) Except as provided in this section, ballot order for the judicial offices listed in subsection (b) of this section shall be as provided in Section 4(j) of S.L. 2017-214."

Sessions Laws 2018-121, s. 6, provides: "Other than the filing period, the election for the office of judge for Superior Court District 19D and District Court District 20A shall be held in accordance with Section 4 of S.L. 2017-214, as amended. Candidates seeking the office of judge for Superior Court District 19D or District Court District 20A shall file their notice of candidacy with the State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement no earlier than 12:00 noon on July 9, 2018, and no later than 12:00 noon on July 13, 2018."

Editor's Note. - The reference to superior court districts has been inserted in brackets in the second sentence of subdivision (d)(30) at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes in view of Session Laws 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 1.

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 1.2, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2005'."

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 46.3, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2005-2007 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2005-2007 fiscal biennium."

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 46.5 is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2007-323, s. 1.2, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2007'."

Session Laws 2007-323, s. 32.3, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2007-2009 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2007-2009 fiscal biennium."

Session Laws 2007-323, s. 32.5 is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2011-203, ss. 1 through 3, which, in the table in subsection (a), for superior court districts 10A and 10B, decreased the number of resident judges from 2 to 1 and added the entries for superior court districts 10E and 10F; rewrote subdivisions (b)(3) through (b)(6), and added subdivisions (b)(6a) and (6b); and rewrote subdivision (c)(2a), was applicable to the 2012 election.

Session Laws 2011-417, s. 1, which amended subdivision (b)(4) to assign additional areas inadvertently left unassigned by Session Laws 2011-203, was applicable to the 2012 election.

Session Laws 2012-182, ss. 2(a) and 2(b), effective July 12, 2012, which, in subsection (b), rewrote the provisions for all of the Superior Court Districts except Superior Court Districts 10A, 10B, 10C, 10D, 10E, 10F, to use the voting tabulation districts, tracts, block groups, and blocks shown on the 2010 Census Redistricting TIGER/Line Shapefiles, renumbered the subdivisions, placing them in order by Superior Court number, rewrote subsection (c) to coincide with the changes to the superior court districts made by subsection (b), and added subsections (c1) and (c2), is applicable to elections held on or after January 1, 2013. Session Laws 2012-182, s. 2(c), further provides: "This section shall not prevent any judge elected or appointed in 2012 or before from serving the remainder of the term to which that judge was elected or appointed."

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 18B.22(q), makes the amendments to the table in subsection (a) of this section by Session Laws 2013-360, s. 18B.22(a), effective January 1, 2015, except that those provisions of this section requiring election in the 2014 general election are effective to provide for those elections when they become law [July 1, 2013].

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2013.'"

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 38.2, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2013-2015 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2013-2015 fiscal biennium."

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 38.5 is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 18B.9(b), provides: "In order to implement the changes in subsection (a) of this section, the superior court judgeship serving District 9A shall be allocated to Judicial District 17A of the superior court of the General Court of Justice effective January 1, 2019."

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 18B.9(j), provides: "This section is effective when it becomes law [June 28, 2017], and elections conducted in 2018 shall be conducted in accordance with the districts as modified by this section."

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2017.'"

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 39.4, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2017-2019 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2017-2019 fiscal biennium."

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 39.6, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 18B.5(b), provides: "In order to implement the changes in subsection (a) of this section, the following applies:

"(1) In order to implement the changes in subsection (a) of this section, the superior court judgeship serving District 17A that was allocated to Judicial District 9A of the superior court of the General Court of Justice pursuant to Section 18B.9(b) of S.L. 2017-57 shall be reallocated to Judicial District 19B of the superior court of the General Court of Justice effective January 1, 2019.

"(2) The reduction in judgeships in Judicial District 17B of the superior court of the General Court of Justice applies to the judgeship with a term that expires on December 31, 2018."

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 18B.5(c), made the amendment of subsection (a) of this section by Session Laws 2018-5, s. 18B.5(a), effective January 1, 2019, and further provided that "elections conducted in 2018 shall be conducted in accordance with the districts as modified by this section."

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2018.'"

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 39.4, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2018]2019 fiscal year, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2018]2019 fiscal year."

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 39.7, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2018-14, s. 1(b), (c), as amended by Session Laws 2018-121, s. 9, provides: "(b) The judge in District 26A, as established by this act, shall take office on January 1, 2021, with an election in 2020 to be held accordingly.

"(c) In order to implement the superior court districts as enacted by this section, in 2018 and every eight years thereafter, elections shall be conducted for Districts 5B, 26C, 26E, 26F, and 26H; in 2020 and every eight years thereafter, elections shall be conducted for District 26A; and in 2022 and every eight years thereafter, elections shall be conducted for Districts 26B, 26D, and 26G; and in 2024 and every eight years thereafter, elections shall be conducted for Districts 5A and 5C."

Session Laws 2018-14, s. 4, made the amendment of this section by Session Laws 2018-14, s. 1(a), which rewrote subsection (a), rewrote subdivisions (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(26), (b)(27), and (b)(28), and added subdivisions (b)(29) through (b)(33), effective January 1, 2019, and further provided that "elections in 2018 and thereafter shall be held accordingly." See editor's note for Session Laws 2018-121, s. 10, for repeal of the assignment of judicial divisions in subsection (a) made by 2018-14, s. 1(a).

Session Laws 2018-121, s. 1(b)-(d), provides: "(b) The additional judge in District 19D, as established by this section, shall take office on January 1, 2019, with an election in 2018 to be held accordingly.

"(c) The additional judge in District 20A, as established by this section, shall take office on January 1, 2021, with an election in 2020 to be held accordingly.

"(d) Except as provided in this section, this section becomes effective January 1, 2019, and elections in 2018 shall be held accordingly."

Session Laws 2018-121, s. 10, provides: "If Senate Bill 757, 2018 Regular Session, becomes law, the assignment of judicial divisions in G.S. 7A-41(a), as enacted by that act, shall be repealed." Senate Bill 757 is Session Laws 2018-14. The amendments to the assignment of judicial divisions in subsection (a) made by Session Laws 2018-14, s. 1(a), have been treated as repealed and have not been given effect.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-203, ss. 1 through 3, effective January 1, 2013, and applicable to the 2012 election, in the table in subsection (a), for superior court districts 10A and 10B, decreased the number of resident judges from 2 to 1 and added the entries for superior court districts 10E and 10F; rewrote subdivisions (b)(3) through (b)(6), and added subdivisions (b)(6a) and (6b); and rewrote subdivision (c)(2a), which formerly read: "For Wake County, the precincts area as they were adopted by the Wake County Board of Elections and in effect as of January 1, 2001."

Session Laws 2011-417, s. 1, effective January 1, 2013, and applicable to the 2012 election, amended subdivision (b)(4) to assign additional areas inadvertently left unassigned by Session Laws 2011-203.

Session Laws 2012-182, ss. 2(a) and 2(b), effective July 12, 2012, and applicable to elections held on or after January 1, 2013, in subsection (b), rewrote the provisions for all of the Superior Court Districts except Superior Court Districts 10A, 10B, 10C, 10D, 10E, 10F, to use the voting tabulation districts, tracts, block groups, and blocks shown on the 2010 Census Redistricting TIGER/Line Shapefiles; and renumbered the subdivisions, placing them in order by Superior Court number. Session Laws 2012-182, s. 2(b), rewrote subsection (c) were updated to coincide with the changes to the superior court districts made by subsection (b); and added subsections (c1) and (c2). For applicability, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 18B.22(a), effective January 1, 2015, in the table in subsection (a), added "Anson, Richmond" following "16A," and substituted "2" for "1" preceding "Fourth 16B," "Fourth" for "Fifth" preceding "19D," and "Stanly" and "1" for "Anson, Richmond, Stanley" and "2" respectively, following "20A." For effective date, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 18B.9.(a), in the table of subsection (a), inserted "Person" in Superior Court District 9, deleted Superior Court District 9A concerning Person and Caswell Counties, and, in Superior Court District 17A, added "Caswell" and substituted "3" for "2". For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 18B.5(a), in the table in subsection (a), for superior court district 17A, decreased the number of resident judges from 3 to 2, for superior court district 17B, decreased the number of resident judges from 2 to 1, and, for superior court district 19B, increased the number of resident judges from 1 to 2. For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2018-14, s. 1(a), effective January 1, 2019, in the table of subsection (a), in District 5A, deleted "part of" preceding "Pender"; in District 5B, added "Second" and deleted "part of Pender" preceding "see subsection" in District 5C, added "Second" added Districts 26D, 26E, 26F, 26G, and 26H; rewrote subdivisions (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(26), (b)(27), and (b)(28); and added subdivisions (b)(29) through (b)(33). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2018-121, s. 1(a), rewrote subsection (a); and added subsection (b1). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Legal Periodicals. - For article on plea bargaining statutes and practices in North Carolina, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 477 (1981).

§ 7A-41.1. District and set of districts defined; senior resident superior court judges and their authority.

1. In this section and in any other law which refers to this section:
   1. "District" means any superior court district established by G.S. 7A-41 which consists exclusively of one or more entire counties;
   2. "Set of districts" means any set of two or more superior court districts established under G.S. 7A-41, none of which consists exclusively of one or more entire counties, but both or all of which include territory from the same county or counties and together comprise all of the territory of that county or those counties;
   3. "Regular resident superior court judge of the district or set of districts" means a regular superior court judge who is a resident judge of any of the superior court districts established under G.S. 7A-41 which comprise or are included in a district or set of districts as defined herein.
2. There shall be one and only one senior resident superior court judge for each district or set of districts as defined in subsection (a) of this section, who shall be:
   1. Where there is only one regular resident superior court judge for the district, that judge; and
   2. Where there are two or more regular resident superior court judges for the district or set of districts, the judge who, from among all the regular resident superior court judges of the district or set of districts, has the most continuous service as a regular resident superior court judge; provided if two or more judges are of equal seniority, the oldest of those judges shall be the senior regular resident superior court judge.
   3. Where there is a set of districts, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall designate one of the judges as senior resident superior court judge to serve in that capacity at the pleasure of the Chief Justice, if that set of districts are wholly contained in one county that is specified in law as the sole proper venue for certain actions.
3. Senior resident superior court judges and regular resident superior court judges possess equal judicial jurisdiction, power, authority and status, but all duties placed by the Constitution or statutes on the resident judge of a superior court district, including the appointment to and removal from office, which are not related to a case, controversy or judicial proceeding and which do not involve the exercise of judicial power, shall be discharged, throughout a district as defined in subsection (a) of this section or throughout all of the districts comprising a set of districts so defined, for each county in that district or set of districts, by the senior resident superior court judge for that district or set of districts. That senior resident superior court judge alone among the superior court judges of that district or set of districts shall receive the salary and benefits of a senior resident superior court judge.
4. A senior resident superior court judge for a district or set of districts as defined in subsection (a) of this section with two or more regular resident superior court judges, by notice in writing to the Administrative Officer of the Courts, may decline to exercise the authority vested in him by this section, in which event such authority shall be exercised by the regular resident superior court judge who, among the other regular resident superior court judges of the district or set of districts, is next senior in point of service or age, respectively.
5. In the event a senior resident superior court judge for a district or set of districts with one or more regular resident superior court judges is unable, due to mental or physical incapacity, to exercise the authority vested in him by the statute, and the Chief Justice, in his discretion, has determined that such incapacity exists, the Chief Justice shall appoint an acting senior regular resident superior court judge from the other regular resident judges of the district or set of districts, to exercise, temporarily, the authority of the senior regular resident judge. Such appointee shall serve at the pleasure of the Chief Justice and until his temporary appointment is vacated by appropriate order.

History

(1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 2; 2010-105, s. 1; 2012-194, s. 63.5.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2009-451, s 15.13(b), provides: "In its March 1, 2010, report, the Office of Indigent Defense Services shall provide a progress report on the pilot program for alternative scheduling authorized by Section 14.1 of S.L. 2008-107. In its March 1, 2011, report, the Office of Indigent Defense Services shall provide a final report on that pilot program."

Session Laws 2010-105, s. 2, provides, in part, that "each senior resident superior court judge seated on [October 1, 2010] in a multi-judge district shall continue to serve as senior resident superior court judge until that judge vacates the seat."

Session Laws 2012-194, s. 72, made the amendments to this section by Session Laws 2012-194, s. 63.5, applicable to vacancies occurring on or after July 17, 2012.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2010-105, s. 1, effective October 1, 2010, rewrote subdivision (b)(2), which formerly read: "Where there are two or more regular resident superior court judges for the district or set of districts, the judge who, from among all the regular resident superior court judges of the district or set of districts, has the most continuous service as a regular resident superior court judge; provided if two or more judges are of equal seniority, the oldest of those judges shall be the senior regular resident superior court judge."

Session Laws 2012-194, s. 63.5, effective July 17, 2012, rewrote subdivision (b)(2); and added subdivision (b)(3). For applicability, see editor's note.

§ 7A-41.2. Nomination and election of regular superior court judges.

Candidates for the office of regular superior court judge shall be both nominated and elected by the qualified voters of the superior court district for which the election is sought.

History

(1996, 2nd Ex. Sess., c. 9, s. 1.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1996, Second Extra Session, c. 9, s. 23, provides: "Part 1 of this act becomes effective only if Parts 1 and 2 of this act are both effective under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965." Preclearance was received by letter dated October 1, 1996.

Session Laws 1996, Second Extra Session, c. 9, s. 24, makes this section effective upon ratification, and applicable beginning with the 1996 elections, except that Sections 1 and 2 of that act shall be applied to the 1994 general election and the results of that election validated and confirmed under those sections. The Act was ratified August 2, 1996. Preclearance was received by letter dated October 1, 1996.

§ 7A-42. Sessions of superior court in cities other than county seats.

1. Sessions of the superior court shall be held in each city in the State which is not a county seat and which has a population of 35,000 or more, according to the 1960 federal census.
2. In addition to the sessions of superior court authorized by subsection (a) of this section, sessions of superior court in the following counties may be held in the additional seats of court listed by order of the Senior Resident Superior Court Judge after consultation with the Chief District Court Judge:
3. For the purpose of segregating the cases to be tried in any city referred to in subsection (a), and to designate the place of trial, the clerk of superior court in any county having one or more such cities shall set up a criminal docket and a civil docket, which dockets shall indicate the cases and proceedings to be tried in each such city in his county. Such dockets shall bear the name of the city in which such sessions of court are to be held, followed by the word "Division." Summons in actions to be tried in any such city shall clearly designate the place of trial.
4. For the purpose of determining the proper place of trial of any action or proceeding, whether civil or criminal, the county in which any city described in subsection (a) is located shall be divided into divisions, and the territory embraced in the division in which each such city is located shall consist of the township in which such city lies and all contiguous townships within such county, such division of the superior court to be known by the name of such city followed by the word "Division." All other townships of any such county shall constitute a division of the superior court to be known by the name of the county seat followed by the word "Division." All laws, rules, and regulations now or hereafter in force and effect in determining the proper venue as between the superior courts of the several counties of the State shall apply for the purpose of determining the proper place of trial as between such divisions within such county and as between each of such divisions and any other county of the superior court in North Carolina.
5. The clerk of superior court of any county with an additional seat of superior court may, but shall not be required to, hear matters in any place other than at his office at the county seat.
6. The grand jury for the several divisions of court of any county in which a city described in subsection (a) is located shall be drawn from the whole county, and may hold hearings and meetings at either the county seat or elsewhere within the county as it may elect, or as it may be directed by the judge holding any session of superior court within such county; provided, however, that in arranging the sessions of the court for the trial of criminal cases for any county in which any such city is located a session of one week or more shall be held at the county seat preceding any session of one week or more to be held in any such city, so as to facilitate the work of the grand jury, and so as to confine its meetings to the county seat as fully as may be practicable. All petit jurors for all sessions of court in the several divisions of such county shall be drawn, as now or hereafter provided by law, from the whole of the county in which any such city is located for all sessions of courts in the several divisions of such county.
7. Special sessions of court for the trial of either civil or criminal cases in any city described in subsection (a) may be arranged as by law now or hereafter provided for special sessions of the superior court.
8. All court records of all such divisions of the superior court of any such county shall be kept in the office of the clerk of the superior court at the county seat, but they may be temporarily removed under the direction and supervision of the clerk to any such division or divisions. No judgment or order rendered at any session held in any such city shall become a lien upon or otherwise affect the title to any real estate within such county until it has been docketed in the office of the clerk of the superior court at the county seat as now or may hereafter be provided by law; provided, that nothing herein shall affect the provisions of G.S. 1-233 and the equities therein provided for shall be preserved as to all judgments and orders rendered at any session of the superior court in any such city.
9. It shall be the duty of the board of county commissioners of the county in which any such city is located to provide a suitable place for holding such sessions of court, and to provide for the payment of the extra expense, if any, of the sheriff and his deputies in attending the sessions of court of any such division, and the expense of keeping, housing and feeding prisoners while awaiting trial.
10. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, when exigent circumstances exist, sessions of superior court may be conducted at a location outside a county seat by order of the Senior Resident Superior Court Judge of a county, with the prior approval of the location and the facilities by the Administrative Office of the Courts and after consultation with the Clerk of Superior Court and county officials of the county. An order entered under this subsection shall be filed in the office of the Clerk of Superior Court in the county and posted at the courthouse within the county seat and notice shall be posted in other conspicuous locations. The order shall be limited to such session or sessions as are approved by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Additional County Seats of Court Davidson Thomasville Iredell Mooresville

The courtrooms and related judicial facilities for these sessions of superior court may be provided by the municipality, and in such cases the facilities fee collected for the State by the clerk of superior court shall be remitted to the municipality to assist in meeting the expense of providing those facilities.

History

(1943, c. 121; 1969, c. 1190, s. 48; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 2.1; 1997-304, s. 4.)

Editor's Note. - This section was formerly G.S. 7-70.2. It was revised and transferred to its present position by Session Laws 1969, c. 1190, s. 48.

§ 7A-44. Salary and expenses of superior court judge.

1. A judge of the superior court, regular or special, shall receive the annual salary set forth in the Current Operations Appropriations Act, and in addition shall be paid the same travel allowance as State employees generally by G.S. 138-6(a), provided that no travel allowance be paid for travel within his county of residence. The Administrative Officer of the Courts may also reimburse superior court judges, in addition to the above funds for travel, for travel and subsistence expenses incurred for professional education.
2. In lieu of merit and other increment raises paid to regular State employees, a judge of the superior court, regular or special, shall receive as longevity pay an annual amount equal to four and eight-tenths percent (4.8%) of the annual salary set forth in the Current Operations Appropriations Act payable monthly after five years of service, nine and six-tenths percent (9.6%) after 10 years of service, fourteen and four-tenths percent (14.4%) after 15 years of service, nineteen and two-tenths percent (19.2%) after 20 years of service, and twenty-four percent (24%) after 25 years of service. "Service" means service as a justice or judge of the General Court of Justice, as a member of the Utilities Commission, as an administrative law judge, or as director or assistant director of the Administrative Office of the Courts. Service shall also mean service as a district attorney or as a clerk of superior court.

History

(Code, ss. 918, 3734; 1891, c. 193; 1901, c. 167; 1905, c. 208; Rev., s. 2765; 1907, c. 988; 1909, c. 85; 1911, c. 82; 1919, c. 51; C.S., s. 3884; 1921, c. 25, s. 3; 1925, c. 227; 1927, c. 69, s. 2; 1949, c. 157, s. 1; 1953, c. 1080, s. 1; 1957, c. 1416; 1961, c. 957, s. 2; 1963, c. 839, s. 2; 1965, c. 921, s. 2; 1967, c. 691, s. 40; 1969, c. 1190, s. 36; 1973, c. 1474; 1975, 2nd Sess., c. 983, s. 13; 1977, c. 802, s. 41.1; 1979, 2nd Sess., c. 1137, s. 28; 1981, c. 964, s. 18; 1983, c. 761, s. 244; 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1034, s. 165; c. 1109, ss. 2.2, 11, 13.1; 1985, c. 698, s. 10(a); 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1086, s. 30(b); c. 1100, s. 15(c); 2007-323, s. 28.18A(c); 2009-451, s. 15.10; 2009-575, s. 13; 2017-57, s. 35.4(f).)

Cross References. - As to salaries of judges, see N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 20.

Editor's Note. - This section was formerly G.S. 7-42. It was revised and transferred to its present position by Session Laws 1969, c. 1190, s. 36.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2007-322, s. 28.18A(c), effective July 1, 2007, in the first sentence of subsection (b), deleted "and" preceding "nineteen" and added "and twenty-four percent (24%) after 25 years of service" at the end.

Session Laws 2009-451, s. 15.10, effective July 1, 2009, in subsection (a), deleted the former second sentence, which read: "In addition, a judge of the superior court shall be allowed seven thousand dollars ($7,000) per year, payable monthly, in lieu of necessary subsistence expenses while attending court or transacting official business at a place other than in the county of his residence and in lieu of other professional expenses incurred in the discharge of his official duties." and substituted "funds for travel" for "funds for travel and subsistence" in the last sentence.

Session Laws 2009-575, s. 13, effective July 1, 2009, substituted "G.S. 138-6(a)" for "G.S. 138-6(a)(1) and (2)" in the first sentence of subsection (a).

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 35.4(f), effective July 1, 2017, in subsection (b), added "as an administrative law judge" at the end of the second-to-last sentence; and made a stylistic change.

§ 7A-44.1. Secretarial and clerical help.

1. Each senior resident superior court judge may appoint a judicial secretary to serve at his pleasure and under his direction the secretarial and clerical needs of the superior court judges of the district or set of districts as defined by G.S. 7A-41.1(a) for which he is the senior resident superior court judge. The appointment may be full- or part-time and the compensation and allowances of such secretary shall be fixed by the senior regular resident superior court judge, within limits determined by the Administrative Office of the Courts, and paid by the State.
2. Each senior resident superior court judge may apply to the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts to enter into contracts with local governments for the provision by the State of services of judicial secretaries pursuant to G.S. 153A-212.1 or G.S. 160A-289.1.
3. The Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts may provide assistance requested pursuant to subsection (b) of this section only upon a showing by the senior resident superior court judge, supported by facts, that the overwhelming public interest warrants the use of additional resources for the speedy disposition of cases involving drug offenses, domestic violence, or other offenses involving a threat to public safety.
4. The terms of any contract entered into with local governments pursuant to subsection (b) of this section shall be fixed by the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts in each case.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to obligate the General Assembly to make any appropriation to implement the provisions of this section or to obligate the Administrative Office of the Courts to provide the administrative costs of establishing or maintaining the positions or services provided for under this section. Further, nothing in this section shall be construed to obligate the Administrative Office of the Courts to maintain positions or services initially provided for under this section.

History

(1975, c. 956, s. 3; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 3; 2000-67, s. 15.4(a).)

Editor's Note. - Additional secretarial positions were created by Session Laws 1981, c. 964, s. 5.

§ 7A-45: Repealed by Session Laws 1987, c. 509, s. 7, effective January 1, 1989.

§ 7A-45.1. Special judges.

1. Effective November 1, 1993, the Governor may appoint two special superior court judges to serve terms expiring September 30, 2000.  Effective October 1, 2000, one of those positions is abolished.  Successors to the special superior court judge appointed pursuant to this subsection shall be appointed to a five-year term. A special judge takes the same oath of office and is subject to the same requirements and disabilities as are or may be prescribed by law for regular judges of the superior court, save the requirement of residence in a particular district.
2. Effective October 1, 1995, the Governor may appoint two special superior court judges to serve terms expiring September 30, 2000. Successors to the special superior court judges appointed pursuant to this subsection shall be appointed to five-year terms. A special judge takes the same oath of office and is subject to the same requirements and disabilities as are or may be prescribed by law for regular judges of the superior court, save the requirement of residence in a particular district.
3. Effective December 15, 1996, the Governor may appoint four special superior court judges to serve terms expiring five years from the date that each judge takes office. Successors to the special superior court judges appointed pursuant to this subsection shall be appointed to five-year terms. A special judge takes the same oath of office and is subject to the same requirements and disabilities as are or may be prescribed by law for regular judges of the superior court, save the requirement of residence in a particular district.
4. Effective December 15, 1998, the Governor may appoint a special superior court judge to serve a term expiring five years from the date that judge takes office. Successors to the special superior court judge appointed pursuant to this subsection shall be appointed to five-year terms. A special judge takes the same oath of office and is subject to the same requirements and disabilities as are or may be prescribed by law for regular judges of the superior court, save the requirement of residence in a particular district.
5. Effective October 1, 1999, the Governor may appoint four special superior court judges to serve terms expiring five years from the date that each judge takes office. Successors to the special superior court judges appointed pursuant to this subsection shall be appointed to five-year terms. A special judge takes the same oath of office and is subject to the same requirements and disabilities as are or may be prescribed by law for regular judges of the superior court, save the requirement of residence in a particular district.
6. Effective October 1, 2001, the Governor may appoint a special superior court judge to serve a term expiring five years from the date that judge takes office. Successors to the special superior court judge appointed pursuant to this subsection shall be appointed to five-year terms. A special judge takes the same oath of office and is subject to the same requirements and disabilities as are or may be prescribed by law for regular judges of the superior court, save the requirement of residence in a particular district.
7. Effective December 1, 2004, the Governor may appoint a special superior court judge to serve a term expiring five years from the date that each judge takes office. Successors to the special superior court judge appointed pursuant to this subsection shall be appointed to five-year terms. A special judge takes the same oath of office and is subject to the same requirements and disabilities as are or may be prescribed by law for regular judges of the superior court, save the requirement of residence in a particular district.
8. Effective January 1, 2008, the Governor may appoint two special superior court judges to serve terms expiring five years from the date that each judge takes office. Successors to the special superior court judges appointed pursuant to this subsection shall be appointed to five-year terms. A special judge takes the same oath of office and is subject to the same requirements and disabilities as are or may be prescribed by law for regular judges of the superior court, save the requirement of residence in a particular district.
9. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the four special superior court judgeships held as of April 1, 2014, by judges whose terms expire on April 29, 2015, October 20, 2015, and December 31, 2017, and the two special superior court judgeships held as of April 1, 2015, by judges whose terms expire January 26, 2016, are abolished when any of the following first occurs:
   1. Retirement of the incumbent judge.
   2. Resignation of the incumbent judge.
   3. Removal from office of the incumbent judge.
   4. Death of the incumbent judge.
   5. Expiration of the term of the incumbent judge.
10. Effective upon the retirement, resignation, removal from office, death, or expiration of the term of the special superior court judge held as of April 1, 2014, by the judge whose term expires on April 29, 2015, a new special superior court judgeship shall be created and filled through the procedure for nomination and confirmation provided for in subsection (a10) of this section.
11. A special judge is subject to removal from office for the same causes and in the same manner as a regular judge of the superior court, and a vacancy occurring in the office of special judge is filled by the Governor by appointment for the unexpired term.
12. A special judge, in any court in which he is duly appointed to hold, has the same power and authority in all matters that a regular judge holding the same court would have. A special judge, duly assigned to hold the court of a particular county, has during the session of court in that county, in open court and in chambers, the same power and authority of a regular judge in all matters arising in the district or set of districts as defined in G.S. 7A-41.1(a) in which that county is located, that could properly be heard or determined by a regular judge holding the same session of court.
13. A special judge is authorized to settle cases on appeal and to make all proper orders in regard thereto after the time for which he was commissioned has expired.

Prior to submitting a nominee for the judgeship created under this subsection to the General Assembly for confirmation, the Governor shall consult with the Chief Justice to ensure that the person nominated to fill this judgeship has the requisite expertise and experience to be designated by the Chief Justice as a business court judge under G.S. 7A-45.3, and the Chief Justice is requested to designate this judge as a business court judge.

(a10) Except for the judgeships abolished pursuant to subsection (a8) of this section, upon the retirement, resignation, removal from office, death, or expiration of the term of any special superior court judge on or after September 1, 2014, each judgeship shall be filled for a full five-year term beginning upon the judge's taking office according to the following procedure prescribed by the General Assembly pursuant to Article IV, Section 9(1) of the North Carolina Constitution. As each judgeship becomes vacant or the term expires, the Governor shall submit the name of a nominee for that judgeship to the General Assembly for confirmation by ratified joint resolution. Upon each such confirmation, the Governor shall appoint the confirmed nominee to that judgeship.

However, upon the failure of the Governor to submit the name of a nominee within 90 days of the occurrence of the vacancy or within 90 days of the expiration of the judge's term, as applicable, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives jointly shall submit the name of a nominee to the General Assembly. The appointment shall then be made by enactment of a bill. The bill shall state the name of the person being appointed, the office to which the appointment is being made, and the county of residence of the appointee.

The Governor may withdraw any nomination prior to it failing on any reading, and in case of such withdrawal the Governor shall submit a different nomination within 45 days of withdrawal. If a nomination shall fail any reading, the Governor shall submit a different nomination within 45 days of such failure. In either case of failure to submit a new nomination within 45 days, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall submit the name of a nominee to the General Assembly under the procedure provided in the preceding paragraph.

No person shall occupy a special superior court judgeship authorized under this subsection in any capacity, or have any right to, claim upon, or powers of those judgeships, unless that person's nomination has been confirmed by the General Assembly by joint resolution or appointed through the enactment of a bill upon the failure of the Governor to submit a nominee. Until confirmed by the General Assembly and appointed by the Governor, or appointed by the General Assembly upon the failure of the Governor to appoint a nominee, and qualified by taking the oath of office, a nominee is neither a de jure nor a de facto officer.

(a11) The Chief Justice is requested, pursuant to the authority under G.S. 7A-45.3 to designate business court judges, to maintain at least five business court judgeships from among the special superior court judgeships authorized under this section.

History

(1987, c. 738, s. 123(a); 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 5; 1993, c. 321, s. 200.5(g); 1995, c. 507, s. 21.1(f); 1996, 2nd Ex. Sess., c. 18, s. 22.6(a); 1998-212, s. 16.22(a), (b); 1999-237, s. 17.12(a); 2000-67, s. 15.8(a); 2001-424, s. 22.4(a); 2004-124, s. 14.6(a); 2007-323, s. 14.24; 2014-100, s. 18B.6; 2015-241, s. 18A.19.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994), c. 769, s. 24.7, as amended by Session Laws 1996, Second Extra Session, c. 18, s. 22.6(b), and Session Laws 2000-67, s. 15.8(b), provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 7A-45, G.S. 7A-45.1, Section 7 of Chapter 509 of the 1987 Session Laws, or any other provision of law, if any special superior court judge who is holding office on the effective date of this act first took office as an appointed or elected regular or special superior court judge in the calendar year 1986, the term of that judge is extended through December 31, 2000."

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2007-323, s. 14.24, effective July 1, 2007, added subsection (a7).

Session Laws 2014-100, s. 18B.6, effective July 1, 2014, added subsections (a8) through (a10).

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 18A.19, effective July 1, 2015, added "and the two special superior court judgeships held as of April 1, 2015, by judges whose terms expire January 26, 2016," in subsection (a8); deleted the last sentence in subsection (a9), which read "Effective upon the retirement, resignation, removal from office, death, or expiration of the term of the special superior court judge held as of April 1, 2014, by the judge whose term expires on October 20, 2015, a new special superior court judgeship shall be created and filled through the procedure for nomination and confirmation provided for in subsection (a10) of this section" and made minor stylistic changes; and added subsection (a11).

§ 7A-45.2. Emergency special judges of the superior court; qualifications, appointment, removal, and authority.

1. Any justice or judge of the appellate division of the General Court of Justice who:
   1. Retires under the provisions of the Consolidated Judicial Retirement Act, Article 4 of Chapter 135 of the General Statutes, or who is eligible to receive a retirement allowance under that act;
   2. Has not reached the mandatory retirement age specified in G.S. 7A-4.20;
   3. Has served at least five years as a superior court judge or five years as a justice or judge of the appellate division of the General Court of Justice, or any combination thereof, whether or not eligible to serve as an emergency justice or judge of the appellate division of the General Court of Justice; and
   4. Whose judicial service ended within the preceding 10 years;
2. Any emergency special superior court judge appointed as provided in this section shall:
   1. Have the same powers and duties, when duly assigned to hold court, as provided for an emergency superior court judge by G.S. 7A-48;
   2. Be subject to assignment in the same manner as provided for an emergency superior court judge by G.S. 7A-46 and G.S. 7A-52(a);
   3. Receive the same compensation, expenses, and allowances, when assigned to hold court, as an emergency superior court judge as provided by G.S. 7A-52(b);
   4. Be subject to the provisions and requirements of the Canons of Judicial Conduct; and
   5. Not engage in the practice of law during any period for which the emergency special superior court judgeship is commissioned. However, this subdivision shall not be construed to prohibit an emergency special superior court judge appointed pursuant to this section from serving as a referee, arbitrator, or mediator, during service as an emergency special superior court judge when the service does not conflict with or interfere with the emergency special superior court judge's judicial service in emergency status.
3. Upon reaching mandatory retirement age for superior court judges as set forth in G.S. 7A-4.20, any emergency special superior court judge appointed pursuant to this section, whose commission has expired, may be recalled as a recalled emergency special superior court judge to preside over any regular or special session of the superior court under the following circumstances:
   1. The judge shall consent to the recall;
   2. The Chief Justice may order the recall;
   3. Prior to ordering recall, the Chief Justice shall be satisfied that the recalled judge is capable of efficiently and promptly discharging the duties of the office to which recalled;
   4. Jurisdiction of a recalled emergency special superior court judge is as set forth in G.S. 7A-48;
   5. Orders of recall and assignment shall be in writing and entered upon the minutes of the court to which assigned; and
   6. Compensation, expenses, and allowances of recalled emergency special superior court judges are the same as for recalled emergency superior court judges under G.S. 7A-52(b).
   7. The emergency special superior court judge is listed as active on the list described in G.S. 7A-52(a).
4. Any former justice or judge of the appellate division of the General Court of Justice who otherwise meets the requirements of subsection (a) of this section to be appointed an emergency special superior court judge but has already reached the mandatory retirement age for superior court judges set forth in G.S. 7A-4.20 on retirement may, in lieu of serving as an emergency judge of the court from which he retired, apply to the Governor to be appointed as an emergency special superior court judge as provided in this section. If the Governor issues a commission to the applicant, the retired justice or judge is subject to recall as an emergency special superior court judge as provided in subsection (c) of this section.
5. No justice or judge appointed as an emergency special superior court judge or subject to recall as provided in this section shall, during the period so appointed or subject to recall, contemporaneously serve as an emergency justice or judge of the appellate division of the General Court of Justice.

may apply to the Governor for appointment as an emergency special superior court judge in the same manner as is provided for application as an emergency superior court judge in G.S. 7A-53. If the Governor is satisfied that the applicant meets the requirements of this section and is physically and mentally able to perform the duties of a superior court judge, the Governor shall issue a commission appointing the applicant as an emergency special superior court judge until the applicant reaches the mandatory retirement age for superior court judges specified in G.S. 7A-4.20.

History

(1993, c. 321, s. 199; 2017-57, s. 18B.11(a).)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2017-57, s. 18B.11(d), provides: "The Administrative Office of the Courts shall report annually to the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee on Justice and Public Safety by August 1 on the preceding fiscal year's activities. The report shall include:

"(1) An updated list of all active superior court and district court emergency judges.

"(2) A list of all cases where an emergency court judge was assigned, including what districts the cases were located in and the reason for the assignment.

"(3) A list of all expenses broken down by the daily fee for emergency judges, travel for service to assignment, and travel for continuing judicial education.

"(4) A list of on-bench time for all emergency judges."

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2017.'"

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 39.4, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2017-2019 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2017-2019 fiscal biennium."

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 39.6, is a severability clause.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2017-57, s. 18B.11(a), effective June 28, 2017, substituted "G.S. 7A-46 and G.S. 7A-52(a);" for "G.S. 7A-46;" in subdivision (b)(2); and added subdivision (c)(7).

§ 7A-45.3. Superior court judges designated for complex business cases.

The Chief Justice may exercise the authority under rules of practice prescribed pursuant to G.S. 7A-34 to designate one or more of the special superior court judges authorized by G.S. 7A-45.1 to hear and decide complex business cases as prescribed by the rules of practice. Any judge so designated shall be known as a Business Court Judge and shall preside in the Business Court. If there is more than one business court judge, including any judge serving as a senior business court judge pursuant to G.S. 7A-52(a1) or upon recall pursuant to G.S. 7A-57, the Chief Justice may designate one of them as the Chief Business Court Judge. If there is no designation by the Chief Justice, the judge with the longest term of service on the court shall serve as Chief Business Court Judge until the Chief Justice makes an appointment to the position. The presiding Business Court Judge shall issue a written opinion in connection with any order granting or denying a motion under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12, 56, 59, or 60, or any order finally disposing of a complex business case, other than an order effecting a settlement agreement or jury verdict.

History

(2005-425, s. 1.1; 2014-102, s. 2; 2016-91, s. 1.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2005-425, s. 4, made this section effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to fees assessed or collected on or after that date.

Session Laws 2014-100, s. 18B.1(d), repealed Session Laws 2009-451, s. 15.4, formerly noted under this section, which contained a reporting requirement as to North Carolina Business Court activities.

Session Laws 2014-100, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as 'The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2014."'

Session Laws 2014-100, s. 38.4, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2014-2015 fiscal year, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2014-2015 fiscal year."

Session Laws 2014-100, s. 38.7, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2017-122, s. 1, provides: "In order to make North Carolina a leading jurisdiction for the resolution of business, commercial, financial, and other legal disputes, the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, in consultation with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, shall submit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore a report recommending whether and how to establish an arbitration program within the North Carolina Business Court, including how parties may make themselves subject to the jurisdiction of said program, required qualifications and trainings for arbitrators, and requirements for persons who may represent parties in arbitration proceedings before the Business Court. Such recommendations may include suggestions on the form of appeal for both binding and nonbinding arbitrations in cases arbitrated under such a proposal. The Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts or through the North Carolina Dispute Resolution Commission may also include recommendations for establishing a mediation program operated by the Business Court, including suggestions as to how parties may make themselves subject to the jurisdiction of said program, required qualifications for mediators, and for persons who may represent parties in mediation proceedings."

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2014-102, s. 2, effective August 6, 2014, added the last sentence.

Session Laws 2016-91, s. 1, effective July 11, 2016, inserted "including any judge serving as a senior business court judge pursuant to G.S. 7A-52(a1) or upon recall pursuant to G.S. 7A-57" in the third sentence and substituted "Chief Business Court Judge" for "Senior Business Court Judge" wherever it appeared in the section.

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "A Plea to North Carolina: Bring Fairness to the Assessment of Civil Battery Liability for Defendants with Cognitive Disabilities," see 39 Campbell L. Rev. 241 (2017).

§ 7A-45.4. Designation of complex business cases.

1. Any party may designate as a mandatory complex business case an action that involves a material issue related to any of the following:
   1. Disputes involving the law governing corporations, except charitable and religious organizations qualified under G.S. 55A-1-40(4) on the grounds of religious purpose, partnerships, and limited liability companies, including disputes arising under Chapters 55, 55A, 55B, 57D, and 59 of the General Statutes.
   2. Disputes involving securities, including disputes arising under Chapter 78A of the General Statutes.
   3. Disputes involving antitrust law, including disputes arising under Chapter 75 of the General Statutes that do not arise solely under G.S. 75-1.1 or Article 2 of Chapter 75 of the General Statutes.
   4. Disputes involving trademark law, including disputes arising under Chapter 80 of the General Statutes.
   5. Disputes involving the ownership, use, licensing, lease, installation, or performance of intellectual property, including computer software, software applications, information technology and systems, data and data security, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology products, and bioscience technologies.
   6. , (7) Repealed by Session Laws 2014-102, s. 3, effective October 1, 2014.
      1. At least one plaintiff and at least one defendant is a corporation, partnership, or limited liability company, including any entity authorized to transact business in North Carolina under Chapter 55, 55A, 55B, 57D, or 59 of the General Statutes.
      2. The complaint asserts a claim for breach of contract or seeks a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations under a contract.
      3. The amount in controversy computed in accordance with G.S. 7A-243 is at least one million dollars ($1,000,000).
      4. All parties consent to the designation.
2. The following actions shall be designated as mandatory complex business cases:
   1. An action involving a material issue related to tax law that has been the subject of a contested tax case for which judicial review is requested under G.S. 105-241.16, or a civil action under G.S. 105-241.17 containing a constitutional challenge to a tax statute, shall be designated as a mandatory complex business case by the petitioner or plaintiff.
   2. An action described in subdivision (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), or (8) of subsection (a) of this section in which the amount in controversy computed in accordance with G.S. 7A-243 is at least five million dollars ($5,000,000) shall be designated as a mandatory complex business case by the party whose pleading caused the amount in controversy to equal or exceed five million dollars ($5,000,000).
   3. Repealed by Session Laws 2015-119, s. 6, effective June 29, 2015, and applicable to any action filed on or after that date.
   4. An action in which a general receiver is sought to be appointed pursuant to G.S. 1-507.24 for a debtor that is not an individual business debtor as defined in G.S. 1-507.20 and has assets having a fair market value of not less than five million dollars ($5,000,000), if the party making the designation is either (i) the debtor or (ii) one or more creditors or creditors' duly authorized representatives that assert a claim or claims against the debtor exceeding, in the aggregate, twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) that in each case is not contingent as to liability and is not the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount. Any creditor or creditor's duly authorized representative that is not a party to the action may join in the notice of designation with the same effect as if such joining creditor or creditor's representative were a party.
3. A party designating an action as a mandatory complex business case shall file a Notice of Designation in the Superior Court in which the action has been filed, shall contemporaneously serve the notice on each opposing party or counsel and on the Special Superior Court Judge for Complex Business Cases who is then the Chief Business Court Judge, and shall contemporaneously send a copy of the notice by e-mail to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for approval of the designation of the action as a mandatory complex business case. The Notice of Designation shall, in good faith and based on information reasonably available, succinctly state the basis of the designation and include a certificate by or on behalf of the designating party that the civil action meets the criteria for designation as a mandatory complex business case pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this section.
4. The Notice of Designation shall be filed:
   1. By the plaintiff, the third-party plaintiff, or the petitioner for judicial review contemporaneously with the filing of the complaint, third-party complaint, or the petition for judicial review in the action.
   2. By any intervenor when the intervenor files a motion for permission to intervene in the action.
   3. By any defendant or any other party within 30 days of receipt of service of the pleading seeking relief from the defendant or party.
   4. By any party whose pleading caused the amount in controversy computed in accordance with G.S. 7A-243 to equal or exceed five million dollars ($5,000,000) contemporaneously with the filing of that pleading.
   5. In the case of an action described in subdivision (4) of subsection (b) of this section, by the debtor, any person with a lien on receivership property, or any creditor of the debtor.
5. Within 30 days after service of the Notice of Designation, any other party may, in good faith, file and serve an opposition to the designation of the action as a mandatory complex business case. The opposition to the designation of the action shall assert all grounds on which the party opposing designation objects to the designation, and any grounds not asserted shall be deemed conclusively waived. Within 30 days after the entry of an order staying a pending action pursuant to subsection (g) of this section, any party opposing the stay shall file an objection with the Business Court asserting all grounds on which the party objects to the case proceeding in the Business Court, and any grounds not asserted shall be deemed conclusively waived. Based on the opposition or on its own motion, the Business Court Judge shall rule by written order on the opposition or objection and determine whether the action should be designated as a mandatory complex business case. If a party disagrees with the decision, the party may appeal in accordance with G.S. 7A-27(a).
6. Once a designation is filed under subsection (d) of this section, and after preliminary approval by the Chief Justice, a case shall be designated and administered a complex business case. All proceedings in the action shall be before the Business Court Judge to whom it has been assigned unless and until an order has been entered under subsection (e) of this section ordering that the case not be designated a mandatory complex business case or the Chief Justice revokes approval. If complex business case status is revoked or denied, the action shall be treated as any other civil action, unless it is designated as an exceptional civil case or a discretionary complex business case pursuant to Rule 2.1 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts.
7. If an action required to be designated as a mandatory complex business case pursuant to subsection (b) of this section is not so designated, the Superior Court in which the action has been filed shall, by order entered sua sponte, stay the action until it has been designated as a mandatory complex business case by the party required to do so in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
8. Nothing in this section is intended to permit actions for personal injury grounded in tort to be designated as mandatory complex business cases or to confer, enlarge, or diminish the subject matter jurisdiction of any court.

(8) Disputes involving trade secrets, including disputes arising under Article 24 of Chapter 66 of the General Statutes.

(9) Contract disputes in which all of the following conditions are met:

History

(2005-425, s. 2; 2007-491, s. 4; 2014-102, s. 3; 2015-119, s. 6; 2016-91, s. 2; 2020-75, s. 3(a).)

Cross References. - As to determination and treatment of oil and gas exploration trade secrets and confidential information, and the disclosure thereof to emergency personnel when necessary to address emergency situations, see G.S. 113-391.1.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2014-102, s. 9, made the rewriting of this section by Session Laws 2014-102, s. 3, effective October 1, 2014, and applicable to actions commenced or petitions filed on or after that date.

Session Laws 2014-102, s. 8(a)-(i), provides for the creation of a Subcommittee on Business Court Modernization within the Joint legislative Economic Development and Global Engagement Oversight Committee, to study the implementation of Session Laws 2014-102 and its efforts to modernize complex business cases and legislative improvements to the operations and management of the General Court of Justice. The Subcommittee terminates upon the convening of the 2015 General Assembly or upon the filing of its final report, whichever occurs first.

Session Laws 2015-119, s. 8, made the repeal of subdivision (b)(3) of this section by Session Laws 2015-119, s. 6, applicable to any action filed on or after June 29, 2015.

Session Laws 2020-75, s. 4, made subdivisions (b)(4) and (d)(5) of this section, as added by Session Laws 2020-75, s. 3(a), effective January 1, 2021, and applicable to receiverships commenced on or after that date.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2007-491, s. 4, effective January 1, 2008, added subdivision (a)(7); inserted "or a petition for judicial review under G.S. 105-241.16" in the first sentence of subsection (b); and in subdivision (d)(1), substituted "plaintiff, the third-party plaintiff, or the petitioner for judicial review" for "plaintiff or third-party plaintiff" and "complaint, third-party complaint, or the petition for judicial review" for "complaint or third-party complaint."

Session Laws 2014-102, s. 3, rewrote the section. For effective date and applicability, see Editor's note.

Session Laws 2015-119, s. 6, effective June 29, 2015, deleted subdivision (b)(3), which read "An action involving regulation of pole attachments brought pursuant to G.S. 62-350 shall be designated as a mandatory complex business case by the plaintiff." For applicability, see Editor's note.

Session Laws 2016-91, s. 2, effective July 11, 2016, substituted "Chief Business Court Judge" for "senior Business Court Judge" preceding "and shall contemporaneously send a copy" in subsection (c).

Session Laws 2020-75, s. 3(a), added subdivisions (b)(4) and (d)(5). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "Holding Out for a Change: Why North Carolina Should Permit Holder Claims," see 92 N.C. L. Rev. 988 (2014).

§ 7A-45.5: Repealed by Session Laws 2017-57, s. 18B.4(a), effective June 28, 2017.

History

(2014-100, s. 18B.1(e); repealed by Session Laws 2017-57, s. 18B.4(a), effective June 28, 2017.)

Editor's Note. - Former G.S. 7A-45.5 pertained to annual report on Business Court activities.

§ 7A-46. Special sessions.

Whenever it appears to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court that there is need for a special session of superior court in any county, he may order a special session in that county, and order any regular, special, or emergency judge to hold such session. The Chief Justice shall notify the clerk of the superior court of the county, who shall initiate action under Chapter 9 of the General Statutes to provide a jury for the special session, if a jury is required.

Special sessions have all the jurisdiction and powers that regular sessions have.

History

(R.C., c. 31, s. 22; 1868-9, c. 273; 1876-7, c. 44; Code, ss. 914, 915, 916; Rev., ss. 1512, 1513, 1516; C.S., ss. 1450, 1452, 1455; Ex. Sess. 1924, c. 100; 1951, c. 491, ss. 1, 3; 1959, c. 360; 1969, c. 1190, s. 46.)

Editor's Note. - This section combines former G.S. 7-78, 7-80 and 7-83. The former sections were revised, combined and transferred to their present position by Session Laws 1969, c. 1190, s. 46.

Legal Periodicals. - For article on plea bargaining statutes and practices in North Carolina, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 477 (1981).

§ 7A-47. Powers of regular judges holding courts by assignment or exchange.

A regular superior court judge, duly assigned to hold the courts of a county, or holding such courts by exchange, shall have the same powers in the district or set of districts as defined in G.S. 7A-41.1(a) in which that county is located, in open court and in chambers as the resident judge or any judge regularly assigned to hold the courts of the district or set of districts as defined in G.S. 7A-41.1(a) has, and his jurisdiction in chambers shall extend until the session is adjourned or the session expires by operation of law, whichever is later.

History

(1951, c. 740; 1969, c. 1190, s. 42; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 6.)

Editor's Note. - This section was formerly G.S. 7-61.1. It was revised and transferred to its present position by Session Laws 1969, c. 1190, s. 42.

§ 7A-47.1. Jurisdiction in vacation or in session.

In any case in which the superior court in vacation has jurisdiction, and all the parties unite in the proceedings, they may apply for relief to the superior court in vacation, or during a session of court, at their election. Any regular resident superior court judge of the district or set of districts as defined in G.S. 7A-41.1(a) and any special superior court judge residing in the district or set of districts and the judge regularly presiding over the courts of the district or set of districts have concurrent jurisdiction throughout the district or set of districts in all matters and proceedings in which the superior court has jurisdiction out of session; provided, that in all matters and proceedings not requiring a jury or in which a jury is waived, any regular resident superior court judge of the district or set of districts and any special superior court judge residing in the district or set of districts shall have concurrent jurisdiction throughout the district or set of districts with the judge holding the courts of the district or set of districts and any such regular or special superior court judge, in the exercise of such concurrent jurisdiction, may hear and pass upon such matters and proceedings in vacation, out of session or during a session of court.

History

(1871-2, c. 3; Code, c. 10, s. 230; Rev., s. 1501; C.S., s. 1438; 1939, c. 69; 1945, c. 142; 1951, c. 78, s. 2; 1969, c. 1190, s. 47; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 7.)

Editor's Note. - This section was formerly G.S. 7-65. It was revised and transferred to its present position by Session Laws 1969, c. 1190, s. 47.

Legal Periodicals. - For survey of 1977 law on civil procedure, see 56 N.C.L. Rev. 874 (1978).

§ 7A-47.2: Repealed by Session Laws 1987 (Regular Session, 1988), c. 1037, s. 8.

Editor's Note. - The repealed section was enacted by Session Laws 1987, c. 509, s. 2, effective January 1, 1989, and repealed by Session Laws 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 8, also effective January 1, 1989. Thus, it never went into effect.

§ 7A-47.3. Rotation and assignment; sessions.

1. To effect the intent of Article IV, Section 11 of the North Carolina Constitution, each regular resident superior court judge may, upon each rotation, be assigned to hold the courts either of one of the districts or of one of the sets of districts in that judge's judicial division.
2. All sessions of superior court shall be for an entire county, whether that county comprises or is located in a district or in a set of districts and at each session all matters and proceedings arising anywhere in the county shall be heard.
3. In making assignment of the judges of the superior court, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall strive to allow each regular resident superior court judge to be assigned to the district or set of districts from which that regular resident superior court judge was elected or appointed no less than one-half of the calendar year.
4. For purposes of this section, "district or set of districts" shall have the same meaning as in G.S. 7A-41.1(a).
5. The senior resident superior court judge, in consultation with the parties to the case, shall designate a specific resident judge or a specific judge assigned to hold court in the district to preside over all proceedings in a case subject to G.S. 90-21.11(2).

History

(1987, c. 509, s. 3; 738, s. 124; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 9; 2018-121, s. 5; 2021-47, s. 1(b).)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2018-121, s. 5, effective June 28, 2018, deleted "as defined in G.S. 7A-41.1(a)" preceding "in that judge's judicial division" near the end of subsection (a); and added subsections (c) and (d).

Session Laws 2021-47, s. 1(b), effective October 1, 2021, added subsection (e).

§ 7A-48. Jurisdiction of emergency judges.

Emergency superior court judges have the same power and authority in all matters whatsoever, in the courts which they are assigned to hold, that regular judges holding the same courts would have. An emergency judge duly assigned to hold the courts of a county or district or set of districts as defined in G.S. 7A-41.1(a) has the same powers in that county and district or set of districts in open court and in chambers as a resident judge of the district or set of districts or any judge regularly assigned to hold the courts of the district or set of districts would have, but his jurisdiction in chambers extends only until the session is adjourned or the session expires by operation of law, whichever is later.

History

(Ex. Sess. 1921, c. 94, s. 1; C.S., s. 1435(b); 1925, c. 8; 1941, c. 52, s. 2; 1951, c. 88; 1969, c. 1190, s. 39; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 10.)

Editor's Note. - This section was formerly G.S. 7-52. It was revised and transferred to its present position by Session Laws 1969, c. 1190, s. 39.

§ 7A-49. Orders returnable to another judge; notice.

When any special or emergency judge makes any matter returnable before him, and thereafter he is called upon by the Chief Justice to hold court elsewhere, he shall order the matter heard before some other judge, setting forth in the order the time and place where it is to be heard, and he shall send copies of the order to the attorneys representing the parties in such matter.

History

(Ex. Sess. 1921, c. 94, s. 2; C.S., s. 1435(c); 1951, c. 491, s. 1; 1969, c. 1190, s. 40.)

Editor's Note. - This section was formerly G.S. 7-53. It was revised and transferred to its present position by Session Laws 1969, c. 1190, s. 40.

§ 7A-49.1. Disposition of motions when judge disqualified.

Whenever a judge before whom a motion is made, either in open court or in chambers, disqualifies himself from determining it, he may in his discretion refer the motion for disposition to a regular resident superior court judge of, or any judge regularly holding the courts of, the district or set of districts as defined in G.S. 7A-41.1(a) in which the county in which the cause arose is located, or of any adjoining district or set of districts, who shall have full power and authority to hear and determine the motion in the same manner as if he were the presiding judge of a session of superior court for that county.

History

(1939, c. 48; 1961, c. 50; 1969, c. 1190, s. 43; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 11.)

Editor's Note. - This section was formerly G.S. 7-62. It was revised and transferred to its present position by Session Laws 1969, c. 1190, s. 43.

§ 7A-49.2. Civil business at criminal sessions; criminal business at civil sessions.

1. At criminal sessions of court, motions in civil actions may be heard upon due notice, and trials in civil actions may be heard by consent of parties. Motions for confirmation or rejection of referees' reports may also be heard upon 10 days' notice and judgment may be entered on such reports. The court may also enter consent orders and consent judgments, and try uncontested civil actions.
2. For sessions of court designated for the trial of civil cases only, no grand juries shall be drawn and no criminal process shall be made returnable to any civil session.

History

(1901, c. 28; Rev., ss. 1507, 1508; 1913, c. 196; Ex. Sess. 1913, c. 23; 1915, cc. 68, 240; 1917, c. 13; C.S., ss. 1444, 1445; 1931, c. 394; 1947, c. 25; 1969, c. 1190, s. 44; 1973, c. 503, s. 1.)

Editor's Note. - This section combines former G.S. 7-72 and 7-73. The former sections were revised, combined and transferred to their present position by Session Laws 1969, c. 1190, s. 44.

§ 7A-49.4. Superior court criminal case docketing.

1. Criminal Docketing. - Criminal cases in superior court shall be calendared by the district attorney at administrative settings according to a criminal case docketing plan developed by the district attorney for each superior court district in consultation with the superior court judges residing in that district and after opportunity for comment by members of the local bar. Each criminal case docketing plan shall, at a minimum, comply with the provisions of this section, but may contain additional provisions not inconsistent with this section.
2. Administrative Settings. - An administrative setting shall be calendared for each felony within 60 days of indictment or service of notice of indictment if required by law, or at the next regularly scheduled session of superior court if later than 60 days from indictment or service if required. At an administrative setting:
   1. The court shall determine the status of the defendant's representation by counsel;
   2. After hearing from the parties, the court shall set deadlines for the delivery of discovery, arraignment if necessary, and filing of motions;
   3. If the district attorney has made a determination regarding a plea arrangement, the district attorney shall inform the defendant as to whether a plea arrangement will be offered and the terms of any proposed plea arrangement, and the court may conduct a plea conference if supported by the interest of justice;
   4. The court may hear pending pretrial motions, set such motions for hearing on a date certain, or defer ruling on motions until the trial of the case; and
   5. The court may schedule more than one administrative setting if requested by the parties or if it is found to be necessary to promote the fair administration of justice in a timely manner.
3. Definite Trial Date. - When a case has not otherwise been scheduled for trial within 120 days of indictment or of service of notice of indictment if required by law, then upon motion by the defendant at any time thereafter, the senior resident superior court judge, or a superior court judge designated by the senior resident superior court judge, may hold a hearing for the purpose of establishing a trial date for the defendant.
4. Venue for Administrative Settings. - Venue for administrative settings may be in any county within the district when necessary to comply with the terms of the criminal case docketing plan. The presence of the defendant is only required for administrative settings held in the county where the case originated.
5. Setting and Publishing of Trial Calendar. - No less than 10 working days before cases are calendared for trial, the district attorney shall publish the trial calendar. The trial calendar shall schedule the cases in the order in which the district attorney anticipates they will be called for trial and should not contain cases that the district attorney does not reasonably expect to be called for trial. In counties in which multiple sessions of court are being held, the district attorney may publish a trial calendar for each session of court.
6. Order of Trial. - The district attorney, after calling the calendar and determining cases for pleas and other disposition, shall announce to the court the order in which the district attorney intends to call for trial the cases remaining on the calendar. Deviations from the announced order require approval by the presiding judge if the defendant whose case is called for trial objects; but the defendant may not object if all the cases scheduled to be heard before the defendant's case have been disposed of or delayed with the approval of the presiding judge or by consent of the State and the defendant. A case may be continued from the trial calendar only by consent of the State and the defendant or upon order of the presiding judge or resident superior court judge for good cause shown. The district attorney, after consultation with the parties, shall schedule a new trial date for cases not reached during that session of court.
7. Nothing in this section shall be construed to deprive any victim of the rights granted under Article I, Section 37 of the North Carolina Constitution and Article 46 of Chapter 15A of the General Statutes.
8. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the authority of the court in the call of cases calendared for trial.

Whenever practical, administrative settings shall be held by a superior court judge residing within the district, but may otherwise be held by any superior court judge.

If the parties have not otherwise agreed upon a trial date, then upon the conclusion of the final administrative setting, the district attorney shall announce a proposed trial date. The court shall set that date as the tentative trial date unless, after providing the parties an opportunity to be heard, the court determines that the interests of justice require the setting of a different date. In that event, the district attorney shall set another tentative trial date during the final administrative setting. The trial shall occur no sooner than 30 days after the final administrative setting, except by agreement of the State and the defendant.

Nothing in this section precludes the disposition of a criminal case by plea, deferred prosecution, or dismissal prior to an administrative setting.

History

(1999-428, s. 1.)

Legal Periodicals. - For brief comment on section, see 27 N.C.L. Rev. 451 (1949).

For article on plea bargaining statutes and practices in North Carolina, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 477 (1981).

§ 7A-49.6. Proceedings conducted by audio and video transmission.

1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, judicial officials may conduct proceedings of all types using an audio and video transmission in which the parties, the presiding official, and any other participants can see and hear each other. Judicial officials conducting proceedings by audio and video transmission under this section must safeguard the constitutional rights of those persons involved in the proceeding and preserve the integrity of the judicial process.
2. Each party to a proceeding involving audio and video transmission must be able to communicate fully and confidentially with his or her attorney if the party is represented by an attorney.
3. In a civil proceeding involving a jury, the court may allow a witness to testify by audio and video transmission only upon finding in the record that good cause exists for doing so under the circumstances.
4. A party may object to conducting a civil proceeding by audio and video transmission. If the presiding official finds that the party has demonstrated good cause for the objection, the proceeding must not be held by audio and video transmission. If there is no objection, or if there is an objection and good cause is not shown, the presiding official may conduct the proceeding by audio and video transmission.
5. Except as otherwise permitted by law, when the right to confront witnesses or be present is implicated in criminal or juvenile delinquency proceedings, the court may not proceed by audio and video transmission unless the court has obtained a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the defendant's or juvenile respondent's rights.
6. Proceedings conducted by audio and video transmission shall be held in a manner that complies with any applicable federal and State laws governing the confidentiality and security of confidential information.
7. If the proceeding is one that is open to the public, then the presiding official must facilitate access to the proceeding by the public and the media as nearly as practicable to the access that would be available were the proceeding conducted in person.
8. If the proceeding is required by law to be recorded, then the audio and video transmission must be recorded in accordance with G.S. 7A-95, G.S. 7A-198, and other laws, as applicable.
9. This section is not intended to limit the court's authority to receive remote testimony pursuant to statutes that otherwise permit it, including G.S. 15A-1225.1, 15A-1225.2, 15A-1225.3, 20-139.1, 8C-1, Rule 616, 50A-111, and 52C-3-315(f).
10. All proceedings under this section shall be conducted using videoconferencing applications approved by the Administrative Office of the Courts.
11. As used herein, the term "judicial official" has the same meaning as in G.S. 15A-101(5).

History

(2021-47, s. 9(a).)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2021-47, s. 9(b), made this section, as added by Session Laws 2021-47, s. 9(a), effective June 18, 2021, and applicable to proceedings occurring on or after that date.

§ 7A-49.5. Statewide electronic filing in courts.

1. The General Assembly finds that the electronic filing of pleadings and other documents required to be filed with the courts may be a more economical, efficient, and satisfactory procedure to handle the volumes of paperwork routinely filed with, handled by, and disseminated by the courts of this State, and therefore authorizes the use of electronic filing in the courts of this State.
2. The Supreme Court may adopt rules governing this process and associated costs and may supervise its implementation and operation through the Administrative Office of the Courts. The rules adopted under this section shall address the waiver of electronic fees for indigents.
3. The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules authorizing electronic filing and electronic signatures in the General Court of Justice. The rules shall require registration to participate in electronic filing and provide security procedures that include a mandatory submission of a form of identification to electronically file pro se.
4. The Administrative Office of the Courts may contract with a vendor to provide electronic filing in the courts.
5. Any funds received by the Administrative Office of the Courts from the vendor selected pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, other than applicable statutory court costs, as a result of electronic filing, shall be deposited in the Court Information Technology Fund in accordance with G.S. 7A-343.2.

History

(2006-187, s. 2(c); 2007-323, s. 14.17(c); 2012-142, s. 16.5(f); 2019-243, s. 3(a).)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2006-187, s. 13, provides in part: "Section 2 of this act is effective when it becomes law [August 3, 2006] and applies to all matters filed with the courts on or after the date that the Supreme Court adopts rules for electronic filing as authorized by that section."

Session Laws 2019-243, s. 3(b), provides: "No later than March 1, 2020, the Administrative Office of the Courts shall report the rules promulgated pursuant to G.S. 7A-49.5(b1) to the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee on Justice and Public Safety."

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2012-142, s. 16.5(f), effective July 2, 2012, and expiring June 30, 2013, inserted "and Facilities" near the end of subsection (d).

Session Laws 2019-243, s. 3(a), effective November 6, 2019, added subsection (b1).

CASE NOTES

Cited in Sharp v. Sharp, 124 N.C. App. 357, 477 S.E.2d 258 (1996).

CASE NOTES

The proper role of the district attorney or privately employed counsel in the prosecution of one charged with a criminal offense is the conviction of the guilty, the acquittal of the innocent and the punishment of the guilty, appropriate to the circumstances, in the interest of the future protection of society. In the discharge of his duties the prosecuting attorney is not required to be, and should not be, neutral. He is not the judge, but the advocate of the State's interest in the matter at hand. State v. Best, 280 N.C. 413, 186 S.E.2d 1 (1972).

Responsibility to Prosecute Vested in District Attorneys. - The clear mandate of N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 18 is that the responsibility and authority to prosecute all criminal actions in the superior courts is vested solely in the several district attorneys of the State. State v. Camacho, 329 N.C. 589, 406 S.E.2d 868 (1991).

Delegation of Prosecutorial Function. - The elected district attorney may, in his or her discretion and where otherwise permitted by law, delegate the prosecutorial function to others. State v. Camacho, 329 N.C. 589, 406 S.E.2d 868 (1991).

Prosecution by Special Prosecution Division. - G.S. 114-11.6 authorizes the several elected district attorneys of the State to permit the Special Prosecution Division of the Office of the Attorney General to prosecute individual criminal cases in their prosecutorial districts. State v. Camacho, 329 N.C. 589, 406 S.E.2d 868 (1991).

When Requested by District Attorneys. - When G.S. 114-11.6 is read in pari materia with N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 18, it is apparent that our Constitution and statutes give the district attorneys of the State the exclusive discretion and authority to determine whether to request, and thus permit, the prosecution of any individual case by the Special Prosecution Division. State v. Camacho, 329 N.C. 589, 406 S.E.2d 868 (1991).

This section makes the office of district attorney a full-time job. State v. Best, 280 N.C. 413, 186 S.E.2d 1 (1972).

But this Article did not change the role of the district attorney in a criminal case to that of an impartial officer of the court. State v. Best, 280 N.C. 413, 186 S.E.2d 1 (1972).

This Article Does Not Prohibit Practice of Employing Private Counsel to Assist District Attorney. - This Article does not prohibit the practice of employing private counsel to assist the district attorney in a criminal case. State v. Best, 280 N.C. 413, 186 S.E.2d 1 (1972).

However, the district attorney should not relinquish the duties of his office to privately employed counsel, but should remain in charge of and responsible for the prosecution of criminal actions, and except for the most compelling reasons, the trial judge should not permit the district attorney to abdicate his duties. State v. Page, 22 N.C. App. 435, 206 S.E.2d 771, appeal dismissed, 285 N.C. 763, 209 S.E.2d 287 (1974).

Allowing Special Counsel Is Within Discretion of Trial Court. - It is within the discretion of the trial court to allow special counsel to aid the prosecuting attorney in the prosecution of a case. State v. Best, 280 N.C. 413, 186 S.E.2d 1 (1972).

The discretion vested in the trial judge to permit private counsel to appear with the district attorney has existed in our courts from their incipiency. State v. Page, 22 N.C. App. 435, 206 S.E.2d 771, appeal dismissed, 285 N.C. 763, 209 S.E.2d 287 (1974).

Selectivity Required in Preparation of Trial Calendar. - It is the district attorney's statutory duty to prepare the trial docket and prosecute criminal actions in the name of the State. In order to properly perform this duty, he must exercise selectivity in preparing the trial calendar. State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941, 100 S. Ct. 2165, 64 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1980).

Holding Delinquency Hearing in Absence of District Attorney. - A contention by a juvenile who was represented by counsel that the trial court erred in proceeding with a delinquency hearing in the absence of the district attorney in that the court was cast in the role of a prosecutor was held without merit where the record showed that someone other than the judge examined witnesses of both the petitioner and the juvenile, and that the questions asked by the court were fair and demonstrated no bias. In re Potts, 14 N.C. App. 387, 188 S.E.2d 643, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 622, 190 S.E.2d 471 (1972).

Disqualification of Prosecutor for Conflict of Interests. - A prosecutor may not be disqualified from prosecuting a criminal action in this State unless and until the trial court determines that an actual conflict of interests exists. In this context, an "actual conflict of interests" is demonstrated where a district attorney or a member of his or her staff has previously represented the defendant with regard to the charges to be prosecuted and, as a result of that former attorney-client relationship, the prosecution has obtained confidential information which may be used to the defendant's detriment at trial. Any order of disqualification ordinarily should be directed only to individual prosecutors who have been exposed to such information. State v. Camacho, 329 N.C. 589, 406 S.E.2d 868 (1991).

Order to Withdraw Held Improper. - The trial court exceeded its authority by ordering that in order to avoid the possibility or impression of any conflict of interest, the district attorney and his entire staff must withdraw from a capital case and have no further participation either directly or indirectly with regard to the case. State v. Camacho, 329 N.C. 589, 406 S.E.2d 868 (1991).

Constitutional Application. - Where there were allegations the district attorney placed a large number of cases on the printed trial calendar knowing that all cases would not be called, thereby providing defendants virtually no notice of which cases were going to be called for trial, the allegations were sufficient to state a claim that the statutes were being applied in an unconstitutional manner in the Fourteenth Prosecutorial District. Simeon v. Hardin, 339 N.C. 358, 451 S.E.2d 858 (1994).

Public Nuisance Actions. - The State Constitution and G.S. 7A-61, 147-89 and 19-2.1 do not prohibit a district attorney from employing private counsel to assist in public nuisance actions. Whitfield v. Gilchrist, 126 N.C. App. 241, 485 S.E.2d 61 (1997), rev'd on other grounds, 348 N.C. 39, 497 S.E.2d 412 (1998).

Applied in State v. Mitchell, 298 N.C. 549, 259 S.E.2d 254 (1979); State v. Martin, 195 N.C. App. 43, 671 S.E.2d 53 (2009).

Cited in State v. Rimmer, 25 N.C. App. 637, 214 S.E.2d 225 (1975); State ex rel. Jacobs v. Sherard, 36 N.C. App. 60, 243 S.E.2d 184 (1978); State v. Jones, 63 N.C. App. 411, 305 S.E.2d 221 (1983); Robeson Defense Comm. v. Britt, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990); In re Spivey, 345 N.C. 404, 480 S.E.2d 693 (1997); State v. Summers, 351 N.C. 620, 528 S.E.2d 17 (2000).

CASE NOTES

The trial court exceeded its authority and invaded the province of an independent constitutional officer when it ordered the district attorney to request that the Attorney General prosecute defendant in a capital case. State v. Camacho, 329 N.C. 589, 406 S.E.2d 868 (1991).

CASE NOTES

Duties of Assistant District Attorneys. - The legislative intent and the statutory provisions contemplate that an assistant district attorney is fully authorized to carry out such duties of the district attorney as the district attorney may assign to him. State v. Rimmer, 25 N.C. App. 637, 214 S.E.2d 225, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 250, 217 S.E.2d 674 (1975).

Cited in State v. Best, 280 N.C. 413, 186 S.E.2d 1 (1972).

CASE NOTES

Compensation. - The district attorney has no power to provide for compensation of an attorney appointed under this statute. Whitfield v. Gilchrist, 348 N.C. 39, 497 S.E.2d 412 (1998).

Temporary Assistance When Docket Overcrowded. - Subdivision (2) sets out the mandatory procedure for a district attorney to follow to appoint private counsel to provide temporary assistance when criminal dockets are overcrowded. Whitfield v. Gilchrist, 348 N.C. 39, 497 S.E.2d 412 (1998).

Cited in State v. Best, 280 N.C. 413, 186 S.E.2d 1 (1972).

Opinions of Attorney General

Office of temporary district attorney is full-time public office as of January 1, 1971. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. John C.W. Gardner, 41 N.C.A.G. 192 (1970).

CASE NOTES

Constitutionality. - This section does not violate the Constitution of North Carolina; thus, the superior court had jurisdiction to remove district attorney. In re Spivey, 345 N.C. 404, 480 S.E.2d 693 (1997).

This section was not unconstitutionally vague since the state's highest court had rejected a vagueness challenge to G.S. 7A-376, which contained similar language. In re Cline, 230 N.C. App. 11, 749 S.E.2d 91 (2013), review denied 367 N.C. 293, 753 S.E.2d 781, 2014 N.C. LEXIS 51 (2014), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 132, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 6681, 190 L. Ed. 2d 100 (U.S. 2014).

Purpose. - This section aims to create a procedure for the removal of district attorneys by the superior court. In re Spivey, 345 N.C. 404, 480 S.E.2d 693 (1997).

Authority of General Assembly. - The General Assembly has the authority under the State Constitution to provide by statute for a method of removal of an individual holding the constitutional office of district attorney, although the Constitution does not itself specify any method whatsoever for removal of an individual from that office. In re Spivey, 345 N.C. 404, 480 S.E.2d 693 (1997).

Neither Article IV, Section 18 nor any other provision of the Constitution of North Carolina prohibits the General Assembly from enacting a statutory method for the removal of district attorneys from office, so long as district attorneys whose removal from office is sought are accorded due process of law. In re Spivey, 345 N.C. 404, 480 S.E.2d 693 (1997).

Discovery Not Available. - District attorney (DA) did not have a right to discovery in a proceeding under this statute since the proceeding was not a civil or criminal proceeding and G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 26 and G.S. 15A-902 and G.S. 15A-903 did not apply; the DA was not denied the right to a fair hearing by the denial of discovery since the admissible evidence was limited to the DA's statements in written court filings and in open court, and the applicable cases were limited to those cited in the citizen's affidavit. In re Cline, 230 N.C. App. 11, 749 S.E.2d 91 (2013), review denied 367 N.C. 293, 753 S.E.2d 781, 2014 N.C. LEXIS 51 (2014), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 132, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 6681, 190 L. Ed. 2d 100 (U.S. 2014).

Absolute Immunity Under Defamation Law Did Not Apply. - District attorney was not entitled to absolute immunity under defamation law for the false, malicious, direct attack on a judge since the proceeding did not seek civil damages, but was a suit to remove the DA from office, to which absolute immunity did not extend. In re Cline, 230 N.C. App. 11, 749 S.E.2d 91 (2013), review denied 367 N.C. 293, 753 S.E.2d 781, 2014 N.C. LEXIS 51 (2014), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 132, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 6681, 190 L. Ed. 2d 100 (U.S. 2014).

Use of Racial Epithets Is Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice Which Brings the Office into Disrepute. - There could be no question that the use of racial epithets against a member of the public by a district attorney in an apparent attempt to provoke an affray in public was conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the office into disrepute. In re Spivey, 345 N.C. 404, 480 S.E.2d 693 (1997).

District attorney's abusive verbal attack on African-American man which gave rise to the inquiry removing him from office was not protected speech under the First Amendment. Instead, when taken in context, his repeated references to victim as a "nigger"presented a classic case of the use of "fighting words" tending to incite an immediate breach of the peace which are not protected by either the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of North Carolina. In re Spivey, 345 N.C. 404, 480 S.E.2d 693 (1997).

Request for Second Continuance Properly Denied. - Trial court properly refused to grant a district attorney (DA) a second continuance in a proceeding under this statute because the statute's deadline for holding a hearing was mandatory; the trial court properly postponed the hearing for a week, restricted the scope of the hearing to statements made by the DA, and did not require the DA to present evidence for four days after the start of the hearing. In re Cline, 230 N.C. App. 11, 749 S.E.2d 91 (2013), review denied 367 N.C. 293, 753 S.E.2d 781, 2014 N.C. LEXIS 51 (2014), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 132, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 6681, 190 L. Ed. 2d 100 (U.S. 2014).

Applied in In re Hudson, 165 N.C. App. 894, 600 S.E.2d 25 (2004), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 359 N.C. 189, 607 S.E.2d 271 (2004).

CASE NOTES

Cited in Caudill v. Dellinger, 129 N.C. App. 649, 501 S.E.2d 99, cert. denied, 349 N.C. 353, 517 S.E.2d 888 (1998), aff'd, 350 N.C. 89, 511 S.E.2d 304 (1999).

Opinions of Attorney General

Oath of Office. - Administrative and investigatorial assistants to the district attorney appointed pursuant to this section and G.S. 7A-69 are not required to take an oath of office as public officials, unless the district attorney assigns such duties the performance of which would involve the exercise of sovereign authority of the State. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Herbert F. Pierce, Fifteen-A Prosecutorial District, 50 N.C.A.G. 79 (1981).

CASE NOTES

Discharge. - Since an investigatorial assistant's public statements criticizing the district attorney's discretionary decisions and the disruption of his office's working relationship with law enforcement agencies were sufficient reasons, standing alone, to terminate the investigatorial assistant's at will employment, the district attorney's decision to terminate him rested within his lawful and discretionary scope of authority; because the investigatorial assistant's termination was not injurious to the public or against the public good, there was no evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact to support a claim for wrongful discharge against the district attorney. Hines v. Yates, 171 N.C. App. 150, 614 S.E.2d 385 (2005).

CASE NOTES

Applied in State v. Rogers, 275 N.C. 411, 168 S.E.2d 345 (1969).

Cited in North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451 (M.D.N.C. 1976); State v. Wray, 35 N.C. App. 682, 242 S.E.2d 635 (1978).

CASE NOTES

Presumption of Adjournment. - Where the record recited that a regular term of a superior court was opened and held Wednesday, instead of on Monday, of the week fixed by the statutes, it was presumed that the sheriff had duly opened the court and adjourned it from day to day as provided in this section. State v. Weaver, 104 N.C. 758, 10 S.E. 486 (1889).

All Matters Carried Over. - This section by operation of law carries all matters over to the next term, in the same plight and condition. State v. Horton, 123 N.C. 695, 31 S.E. 218 (1898).

Newly Elected Judge. - Where a newly elected judge, as successor to one who was to have held the spring term of a court, ordered the sheriff to adjourn the court from day to day, not exceeding four days, to enable him to take the oath of office and preside, and the sheriff qualified and held the court, his acts were valid either as those of an officer de jure or as those of an officer de facto, and an exception to the validity of a trial of an action on that ground was untenable. State v. Harden, 177 N.C. 580, 98 S.E. 782 (1919).

Duty of Defendant to Attend Special Term. - A defendant bound over to answer a criminal charge at a regular term of the superior court, which term is not held in consequence of the absence of the judge, is required to attend an intervening special term subsequently appointed and held. State v. Horton, 123 N.C. 695, 31 S.E. 218 (1898).

Cited in State v. McGimsey, 80 N.C. 377 (1879).

CASE NOTES

• I. General Consideration.
• II. Scope of Argument.
  • A. In General.
  • B. Punishment.
  • C. Appeals, Paroles, etc.
• III. Length of Argument.
• IV. Number of Arguments.
• V. Capital Cases.
• VI. Objection.
  • A. In General.
  • B. Time for Objection.
• VII. Opening and Closing Arguments.

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - The cases cited in the following annotation were decided under former statutory provisions.

Commissioners' Duty. - A failure on the part of the clerk to give bond must be ascertained by the commissioners before the judge is authorized to declare a vacancy. And in accepting or rejecting the bond tendered, the court cannot interfere in the exercise of their discretion. Buckman v. Commissioners of Beaufort, 80 N.C. 121 (1879).

Conflicting Claimants for Vacant Office. - Where there are conflicting claimants for a vacant office, a court must act upon the prima facie evidence of right and admit the one possessing it, leaving the other to pursue the proper legal remedy for the recovery of possession. Clark v. Carpenter, 81 N.C. 309 (1879).

Term of Appointee. - When there is a vacancy and the judge appoints one to fill that vacancy, such appointee holds office only until the next election at which members of the General Assembly are chosen. Rodwell v. Rowland, 137 N.C. 617, 50 S.E. 319 (1905).

CASE NOTES

Cited in Ridge Community Investors, Inc. v. Berry, 32 N.C. App. 642, 234 S.E.2d 6 (1977); Ridge Community Investors, Inc. v. Berry, 293 N.C. 688, 239 S.E.2d 566 (1977); Carter v. Marion, 183 N.C. App. 449, 645 S.E.2d 129 (2007), review denied, appeal dismissed, 362 N.C. 175, 658 S.E.2d 271 (2008).

CASE NOTES

Legislature May Take Away or Modify Powers of Clerks. - The powers and duties of clerks enumerated in this section are given and fixed by legislative enactment, and there is no constitutional barrier to the legislature's taking away, adding to, or modifying them, or authorizing them to be exercised and performed by another. In re Barker, 210 N.C. 617, 188 S.E. 205 (1936).

The clerk of the superior court is a court of very limited jurisdiction. Russ v. Woodard, 232 N.C. 36, 59 S.E.2d 351 (1950).

Such court has only such jurisdiction as is given by statute. It has no common-law or equitable jurisdiction. McCauley v. McCauley, 122 N.C. 288, 30 S.E. 344 (1898).

Powers of Clerk Within His Jurisdiction. - Within his jurisdiction the clerk of the superior court has the same power as courts of general jurisdiction to open, vacate, modify, set aside or enter as of a former time, decrees or orders of his court, and to fix time for hearings. Russ v. Woodard, 232 N.C. 36, 59 S.E.2d 351 (1950).

The clerk has the jurisdiction to correct a mistake in a partition proceeding. Wahab v. Smith, 82 N.C. 229 (1880); Little v. Duncan, 149 N.C. 84, 62 S.E. 770 (1908).

Power to Set Aside Sale. - In a proceeding to subject real estate to sale for assets, after a report of the sale is returned and confirmed, the clerk has the right to set aside the sale and order a resale by showing proper cause. Lovinier v. Pearce, 70 N.C. 167 (1874).

Correction of Omissions. - The power of a court upon a proper showing to correct its records and supply an inadvertent omission cannot be doubted. Philbrick v. Young, 255 N.C. 737, 122 S.E.2d 725 (1961).

Clerk May Correct Orders Entered Erroneously. - The broad grant of power to the clerk in this section includes the power to correct orders entered erroneously, whenever the clerk's attention is directed to the error by motion or by other means. In re Estate of English, 83 N.C. App. 359, 350 S.E.2d 379 (1986), cert. denied, 319 N.C. 403, 354 S.E.2d 711 (1987).

The clerk of the superior court is authorized to correct, nunc pro tunc, orders entered on erroneous misapprehension of the facts. In re Watson, 70 N.C. App. 120, 318 S.E.2d 544 (1984), cert. denied, 313 N.C. 330, 327 S.E.2d 900 (1985).

Removal of Administrators. - The clerk has the power, for good and sufficient cause, to remove an administrator, or for like cause, as necessarily equivalent, to permit him to resign his trust. Murrill v. Sandlin, 86 N.C. 54 (1882); Tulburt v. Hollar, 102 N.C. 406, 9 S.E. 430 (1889).

Appointment and Replacement of Trustees - Action filed by a trust beneficiary and a settlor's siblings, pursuant to G.S. 36A-125.4, seeking an order modifying a trust, was really an action seeking replacement of the trustee for exercising discretion in managing the trust and the trial court's judgment dismissing the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was upheld. In re Testamentary Trust of Charnock, 158 N.C. App. 35, 579 S.E.2d 887 (2003), aff'd, 358 N.C. 523, 597 S.E.2d 706 (2004).

Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem. - Where the clerk, upon his own motion, sought to have the administratrix of the estate removed, and the minor heirs clearly had a vested interest and the right of appeal from the clerk's determination, the clerk took the appropriate and proper step of appointing a guardian ad litem to protect their interests and the clerk could compel the payment of the necessary expenses from the estate to which the heirs would potentially benefit, including the costs of the guardian ad litem's attorneys' fees, to the estate. In re Estate of Sturman, 93 N.C. App. 473, 378 S.E.2d 204 (1989).

Examination of Accounts. - The jurisdiction for auditing accounts of executors, administrators, etc., conferred upon the clerk is an ex parte jurisdiction of examining the accounts and vouchers of such persons, allowing them commissions, etc., as formerly practiced, and does not conclude legatees, etc., or affect suits inter partes upon the same matters. Heilig v. Foard, 64 N.C. 710 (1870).

Clerk Had Jurisdiction to Deny Accounting. - The clerk had jurisdiction to grant or deny plaintiffs' Motion to Compel an Accounting, because this section grants the clerk of superior court jurisdiction to audit the accounts of fiduciaries, as required by law, and by implication, to deny a request to audit such accounts as well. Wilson v. Watson, 136 N.C. App. 500, 524 S.E.2d 812 (2000).

Probate of Wills. - This section confers upon the clerk of the superior court exclusive and original jurisdiction of proceedings for the probate of wills. Brissie v. Craig, 232 N.C. 701, 62 S.E.2d 330 (1950); Morris v. Morris, 245 N.C. 30, 95 S.E.2d 110 (1956).

The clerk had authority to rehear a petition to reopen an estate and to reverse her prior order that the estate be reopened. In re Estate of English, 83 N.C. App. 359, 350 S.E.2d 379 (1986), cert. denied, 319 N.C. 403, 354 S.E.2d 711 (1987).

Acts of Heirs Would Not Affect Clerk's Determination. - The clerk of court was not bound, in making a discretionary determination of whether "proper cause" existed for reopening an estate, by any estoppel theory based upon acts of the heirs. In re Estate of English, 83 N.C. App. 359, 350 S.E.2d 379 (1986), cert. denied, 319 N.C. 403, 354 S.E.2d 711 (1987).

Refusal to Reopen Estate Upheld. - In light of the public policy in favor of the expedited administration of estates, as evidenced by the six-month statute of limitations and other provisions of Chapter 28A, petitioner, who alleged that the deceased had promised to devise a life estate to her, had a heavy burden of justifying her failure to bring her suit within the six-month period provided for that purpose, or at the very least, within the greater than two-year period that the estate actually remained open. There was no error in the clerk's determination that this burden was not met. In re Estate of English, 83 N.C. App. 359, 350 S.E.2d 379 (1986), cert. denied, 319 N.C. 403, 354 S.E.2d 711 (1987).

The purpose of the subpoena duces tecum is to require the production of specific items patently material to the inquiry. Therefore, it must specify with as much precision as fair and feasible the particular items desired. State v. Newell, 82 N.C. App. 707, 348 S.E.2d 158 (1986).

Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum. - It is the long-established practice of clerks of court to issue subpoenas duces tecum as a matter of course upon the oral request of counsel. The issuance of the subpoena is treated merely as a ministerial act which initiates proceedings to have the documents or other items described in the subpoena brought before the court. At the trial, the court will pass upon the competency of the evidence unless the subpoena has been quashed prior thereto. Vaughan v. Broadfoot, 267 N.C. 691, 149 S.E.2d 37 (1966).

Customary Use of Subpoena Duces Tecum. - Attorneys have customarily used the subpoena duces tecum only for the purpose for which it was intended, i.e., to require the production of a specific document or items patently material to the inquiry, or as a notice to produce the original of a document. Vaughan v. Broadfoot, 267 N.C. 691, 149 S.E.2d 37 (1966).

Discovery is not a proper purpose for a subpoena duces tecum. State v. Newell, 82 N.C. App. 707, 348 S.E.2d 158 (1986).

What Documents Are Subject to Subpoena Duces Tecum. - Documents not subject to the criminal discovery statute, G.S. 15A-903, may still be subject to a subpoena duces tecum. State v. Newell, 82 N.C. App. 707, 348 S.E.2d 158 (1986).

A motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and is not subject to review absent a showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Newell, 82 N.C. App. 707, 348 S.E.2d 158 (1986).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in quashing subpoena duces tecum which called for all files and records of children's home relating to the victim and another witness in a prosecution for taking indecent liberties with a child. State v. Newell, 82 N.C. App. 707, 348 S.E.2d 158 (1986).

A reasonable fee for legal advice and assistance in the management of a trust estate is allowable as a necessary expense of the trust estate. Tripp v. Tripp, 17 N.C. App. 64, 193 S.E.2d 366 (1972).

Partial Payment Allocated to Principal First. - When payment is made on a debt which has accumulated interest but the payment is not high enough to satisfy the principal and interest, in order to encourage debtors to pay the entire amount due and in the interest of fairness, when payments are made on a judgment debt, the clerk should first allocate the payment to the interest due, and the remainder of the payment should be allocated to the principal. Morley v. Morley, 102 N.C. App. 713, 403 S.E.2d 574 (1991).

Appeals. - In appeals from the clerk, in that class of cases of which he has jurisdiction in his capacity as clerk, as given under this section, it is not necessary that he should prepare and transmit to the judge any statement of the case on appeal. Ex parte Spencer, 95 N.C. 271 (1886).

Applied in Braddy v. Pfaff, 210 N.C. 248, 186 S.E. 340 (1936); In re Will of Wood, 240 N.C. 134, 81 S.E.2d 127 (1954); Potts v. Howser, 267 N.C. 484, 148 S.E.2d 836 (1966); Little v. Bennington, 109 N.C. App. 482, 427 S.E.2d 887.

Cited in Edwards v. McLawhorn, 218 N.C. 543, 11 S.E.2d 562 (1940); Morehead v. Wall, 224 N.C. App. 588, 736 S.E.2d 798 (2012).

CASE NOTES

The proper practice, in a proceeding against an administrator who at the time was elected clerk, seems to be to make the summons returnable before him, and then transfer the whole proceeding before the district judge, who will make the necessary orders in the premises. Wilson v. Abrams, 70 N.C. 324 (1874).

Disqualification of Interested Clerk. - The clerk is disqualified, both by common-law rules and by this section, to act in any cause wherein he is interested. Gregory v. Ellis, 82 N.C. 225 (1880); White v. Connelly, 105 N.C. 65, 11 S.E. 177 (1890); Scranton & N.C. Land & Lumber Co. v. Jennett, 128 N.C. 3, 37 S.E. 954 (1901).

And where he is personally interested in the commissions to be allowed the executors, the clerk is excluded from jurisdiction. Barlow v. Norfleet, 72 N.C. 535 (1875).

The probate of a deed by a clerk interested therein is a nullity. Scranton & N.C. Land & Lumber Co. v. Jennett, 128 N.C. 3, 37 S.E. 954 (1901).

And when the probate of a deed is a nullity because the clerk was disqualified to act the defect is not cured by the approval of the final decree, under which it is made, by the judge of the superior court. Scranton & N.C. Land & Lumber Co. v. Jennett, 128 N.C. 3, 37 S.E. 954 (1901).

The act of "admitting to probate" is a judicial act, and a clerk is prohibited from acting on a deed or deed of trust in which he is grantor or grantee. White v. Connelly, 105 N.C. 65, 11 S.E. 177 (1890); Freeman v. Person, 106 N.C. 251, 10 S.E. 1037 (1890); Piland v. Taylor, 113 N.C. 1, 18 S.E. 70 (1893); Norman v. Ausbon, 193 N.C. 791, 138 S.E. 162 (1927).

Performance of Ministerial Acts. - The issuing of a warrant in attachment, or an order for seizure of property in claim and delivery, are ministerial acts, and can be performed by a deputy, or even by the clerk, in a case to which he is a party. Evans v. Etheridge, 96 N.C. 42, 1 S.E. 633 (1887); White v. Connelly, 105 N.C. 65, 11 S.E. 177 (1890).

Issuance of Process. - It has been the practice in this State for clerks to issue process either for or against themselves. Evans v. Etheridge, 96 N.C. 42, 1 S.E. 633 (1887).

A clerk cannot take proof of a deed of which he is the subscribing witness, because he cannot administer an oath to himself. Trenwith v. Smallwood, 111 N.C. 132, 15 S.E. 1030 (1892).

Relationship of Clerk to Party. - A clerk is prohibited from acting as such in relation to any estate or proceeding if he is so related to any person having, or claiming to have, such interest that he would by reason of such relationship be disqualified as a juror. Scranton & N.C. Land & Lumber Co. v. Jennett, 128 N.C. 3, 37 S.E. 954 (1901).

But probate and private examination taken before an officer are not invalid simply because the clerk is related to the parties. McAllister v. Purcell, 124 N.C. 262, 32 S.E. 715 (1899).

Trial Court's Removal of Trustee Proper. - Where beneficiaries' filings only requested an order removing the trustee of trusts, the trial court did not err by exercising jurisdiction or entering orders regarding the trustee's removal after the clerk recused himself from the case; the trial court provided the parties with due process, and its conclusions removing the trustee were supported by its findings of fact. In re Estate of Newton, 173 N.C. App. 530, 619 S.E.2d 571 (2005), cert. denied, - N.C. - , 625 S.E.2d 786 (2005).

Written Waiver of Clerk's Disqualification. - The waiver must be in writing and made when the opposing parties are present and capable of objecting. White v. Connelly, 105 N.C. 65, 11 S.E. 177 (1890).

Cited in In re Estate of Smith, 226 N.C. 169, 37 S.E.2d 127 (1946); In re Alessandrini, 239 N.C. App. 313, 769 S.E.2d 214 (2015).

CASE NOTES

Necessity of Order and Demand on Predecessor. - A person duly elected clerk of the superior court by the people needs no order from any person or authority to demand from his predecessor the property of all kinds belonging to the office, nor is it necessary for a retiring superior court clerk to be ordered to pay over to his successor, whether elected or appointed, the funds, etc., of the officer. But where the judge places some person temporarily in charge of the office until the regular appointment is made, it is then necessary for the new clerk to have an order from the judge directing the person temporarily in charge to deliver the possession of his office to such clerk. Peebles v. Boone, 116 N.C. 57, 21 S.E. 187 (1895).

Ground for Right of Action. - The right of clerk of a superior court to bring an action against his predecessor on the latter's official bond to recover the records, money, etc., in his hands does not rest on any injury done to the plaintiff, but on the ground that the law requires that each successive clerk shall receive from his predecessor all the records, money and property of his office. Peebles v. Boone, 116 N.C. 57, 21 S.E. 187 (1895).

Two Distinct Remedies Provided. - Our statutes provide two separate and distinct remedies - one in behalf of the injured individual for a specific fund to which he is entitled or on account of a particular wrong committed against him by the clerk, as provided for in G.S. 58-76-5, and one in behalf of the clerk against his predecessor in office to recover possession of records, books, papers, and money in the hands of the outgoing clerk by virtue or under color of his office, as provided for in this section. State ex rel. Underwood v. Watson, 223 N.C. 437, 27 S.E.2d 144 (1943); State ex rel. Underwood v. Watson, 224 N.C. 502, 31 S.E.2d 465 (1944).

Successor's Remedy. - When an outgoing clerk fails to deliver the property of his office, as herein provided, the successor's remedy is by attachment and suit for the penalty. O'Leary v. Harrison, 51 N.C. 338 (1859).

Affirmative Allegations Improperly Stricken. - In an action by the clerk of the superior court against his predecessor in office for possession of records, books and funds under this section, where defendant denied the allegations of the complaint that plaintiff was duly appointed clerk to fill a vacancy caused by the removal of defendant and qualified as such, and also made further affirmative allegations to like effect, there was error in allowing a motion to strike such affirmative allegations. State ex rel. Underwood v. Watson, 223 N.C. 437, 27 S.E.2d 144 (1943).

When Liability Ceases. - When a former clerk delivers to his successors all the proceeds, etc., of his office, his official duties, powers, and liabilities cease. Gregory v. Morisey, 79 N.C. 559 (1878).

CASE NOTES

Cited in Carter v. Marion, 183 N.C. App. 449, 645 S.E.2d 129 (2007), review denied, appeal dismissed, 362 N.C. 175, 658 S.E.2d 271 (2008).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Most of the cases cited in the following annotation were decided under former statutory provisions.

Construction. - While the Public Records Act applies generally to state government records, G.S. 7A-109 is specifically limited to court records; G.S. 7A-109(d), addressing "remote electronic access" to court records, is a more specific statute that overrides applicability of the Public Records Act. LexisNexis Risk Data Mgmt. v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 368 N.C. 180, 775 S.E.2d 651 (2015).

While subsection (a) applies to court records in general, later-added subsection (d) focuses narrowly on court records maintained in electronic form; accordingly, the General Assembly intended that the non-exclusive contracts authorized in subsection (d) be the sole means of remote electronic access to the Automated Criminal/Infraction System. LexisNexis Risk Data Mgmt. v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 368 N.C. 180, 775 S.E.2d 651 (2015).

Access to the public information maintained in the Automated Criminal/Infraction System remains fully available by obtaining the physical records from the appropriate clerk of court, through the "green screen" terminal maintained in the local courthouse, or by means of a contract with the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts for remote access. LexisNexis Risk Data Mgmt. v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 368 N.C. 180, 775 S.E.2d 651 (2015).

Section Held Inapplicable to Prevent Introduction of Parole Evidence. - In an action to remove the executor of an estate, this section would not apply to prevent defendant from introducing parole evidence to prove that the court clerk gave oral approval of executor's actions and authorized commissions to be paid executor. Matthews v. Watkins, 91 N.C. App. 640, 373 S.E.2d 133 (1988), aff'd, 324 N.C. 541, 379 S.E.2d 857 (1989).

Purpose of Recordkeeping. - The clerk's proceedings are summary in their nature, and should always be put in such shape as to present all that he does in the course of a proceeding, including his orders and judgments, intelligently, and so that the same may be distinctly seen and understood. To this end, the clerk is required to keep certain permanent records of proceedings before him. Edwards v. Cobb, 95 N.C. 4 (1886).

Judgment Docket Serves as Notice. - The law prescribes what shall be recorded on the judgment docket, and everybody has notice that he may find there whatever ought to be there recorded, if indeed it exists. He is not required to look elsewhere for such matters. But he is required and bound to take notice in proper connections of what is there. The law charges him with such notice. Holman v. Miller, 103 N.C. 118, 9 S.E. 429 (1889); Dewey v. Sugg, 109 N.C. 328, 13 S.E. 923 (1891).

Documents filed as exhibits attached to plaintiff's complaint entered the public domain for purposes of the Public Records Act, G.S. 132-1, and public's right to inspect court records under this section, and became "public records" once the complaint was filed with the clerk of the court, although these exhibits would otherwise have been shielded by G.S.131E-95(b) of the Hospital Licensure Act. Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 350 N.C. 449, 515 S.E.2d 675 (1999).

Open Court Records. - Separation agreement that required sealed court files and closed hearings on disputes over the separation to protect privacy for personal and financial affairs of the children violated the public policies of open judicial proceedings in N.C. Const., Art. I, § 18 and open court records in the State's Public Records Act, G.S. 132-1. France v. France, 209 N.C. App. 406, 705 S.E.2d 399 (2011).

Civil Issue Docket. - Not only issues of fact joined upon the pleadings, but also all other matters for hearing before the judge at a regular term of the court are to be put upon the civil issue docket. Brown v. Rhinehart, 112 N.C. 772, 16 S.E. 840 (1893). See Brittain v. Mull, 91 N.C. 498 (1884); Walton v. Pearson, 101 N.C. 428, 7 S.E. 566 (1888).

Minute Docket. - The minute docket is intended to and should contain a record of all the proceedings of the court, and such other entries as the judge may direct to be therein made. Walton v. Pearson, 101 N.C. 428, 7 S.E. 566 (1888); Guilford v. Board of Comm'rs, 120 N.C. 23, 27 S.E. 94 (1897).

When Minute Docket Prevails. - While in the absence of entries on the minute docket those made on the civil issue docket should not be disregarded, yet where there is a conflict between them, nothing else appearing, those on the former must prevail. Walton v. Pearson, 101 N.C. 428, 7 S.E. 566 (1888).

Record of Fiats. - Clerks are required to record in general order books copies of all fiats made by them. Perry v. Bragg, 111 N.C. 159, 16 S.E. 10 (1892).

Record of Appointments. - The record of appointments is admissible as evidence to show a guardian's appointment. Topping v. Windley, 99 N.C. 4, 5 S.E. 14 (1888).

Sufficient Notice of Lien. - A notice of a lien filed on the lien docket should go into details sufficiently so as to give reasonable notice to all persons of the character of the claim and the property upon which the lien is attached. Fulp & Linville v. Kernersville Light & Power Co., 157 N.C. 157, 72 S.E. 867 (1911). See Cook v. Cobb, 101 N.C. 68, 7 S.E. 700 (1888); Cameron v. Consolidated Lumber Co., 118 N.C. 266, 24 S.E. 7 (1896).

Former G.S. 2-42 did not require cross-indexing of liens filed in the clerk's office and was not to be confused with the requirements for registering liens, deeds, etc., in the office of the register of deeds as provided by G.S. 161-22, which does require cross-indexing. Saunders v. Woodhouse, 243 N.C. 608, 91 S.E.2d 701 (1956).

A lien for material and labor was properly filed where the clerk after delivery attached it in its original form to specified page in a book labeled "Lien Docket," where the book without question was the book intended as the lien docket contemplated by former G.S. 2-42, though the book was also used for the filing of liens for old age assistance, since former G.S. 108-30.1 provided that such liens should be filed in the regular lien docket. Saunders v. Woodhouse, 243 N.C. 608, 91 S.E.2d 701 (1956).

The failure of the clerk to comply with the statute by neglecting to record all or a part of the proceeding does not render the proceeding void. Any interested party may, by motion, require the proceeding to be recorded, and when a part of the papers has been lost without being recorded, the proceeding does not, because of that fact, lose its vitality or cease to give the protection which the complete record would afford. State Trust Co. v. Toms, 244 N.C. 645, 94 S.E.2d 806 (1956).

The defendant county clerk was not required to comply with G.S. 1-116, 1-117, and 7A-109(b)(6) where the plaintiff was not entitled to have her notice of lis pendens cross-indexed by him on the public record. George v. Administrative Office of the Courts, 142 N.C. App. 479, 542 S.E.2d 699 (2001).

Treasurer's Report as Evidence. - The record of the county treasurer's report is competent evidence against the sureties upon the official bond of such officer, and is prima facie evidence of the correctness of statements therein made. Davenport v. McKee, 98 N.C. 500, 4 S.E. 545 (1887).

Recording of Verified Report Purports Verity. - Plaintiff, purchaser of the real property at execution sale of a judgment against the devisee, offered in evidence, as proof of payment and that title had vested in the devisee, a special report, duly verified, filed by the executrix, stating that the devisee had paid the estate the amount stipulated by the will. This special, verified report of the executrix was a document authorized and required to be recorded, was relevant to the issue, and was competent in evidence, its recording purporting verity, and objection to its admission on the ground of hearsay in that it contained a declaration of a person not a party to the action was untenable, the recorded, verified report being more than a mere declaration by the executrix. Braddy v. Pfaff, 210 N.C. 248, 186 S.E. 340 (1936).

Request of Copy of Database. - Trial court erred in concluding that requiring the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) to provide a copy of the Automated Criminal/Infraction System (ACIS) database upon request would negate the provisions of subsection (d) because a company was not seeking remote electronic access to ACIS but requested a copy of the entire database; subsection (d) is expressly permissive, rather than mandatory. LexisNexis Risk Data Mgmt. v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 232 N.C. App. 427, 754 S.E.2d 223 (2014).

Court of appeals erred by concluding that the Public Records Act provided the legal basis for granting corporations' request for a copy of the Automated Criminal/Infraction System database and that G.S. 7A-109 was inapposite to an analysis of access to such records because G.S. 7A-109 controlled the request for the records. LexisNexis Risk Data Mgmt. v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 368 N.C. 180, 775 S.E.2d 651 (2015).

Cited in State ex rel. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Willis Barber & Beauty Shop, 219 N.C. 709, 15 S.E.2d 4 (1941); Shaver v. Shaver, 248 N.C. 113, 102 S.E.2d 791 (1958); McMillan v. Robeson County, 262 N.C. 413, 137 S.E.2d 105 (1964); Wolfe v. Hewes, 41 N.C. App. 88, 254 S.E.2d 204 (1979); In re Alamance County Ct. Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 405 S.E.2d 125 (1991); WSOC Television, Inc. v. State ex rel. Att'y Gen., 107 N.C. App. 448, 420 S.E.2d 682 (1992); State v. Mead, 362 N.C. 218, 657 S.E.2d 367 (2008); Da Da Mai v. Carolina Holdings, Inc., 205 N.C. App. 659, 696 S.E.2d 769 (2010), dismissed and review denied 705 S.E.2d 377, 2010 N.C. LEXIS 1055 (2010).

CASE NOTES

As to the authority of the clerk to receive payment and satisfy a judgment rendered in favor of an infant, see Teele v. Kerr, 261 N.C. 148, 134 S.E.2d 126 (1964).

Cited in McMillan v. Robeson County, 262 N.C. 413, 137 S.E.2d 105 (1964).

CASE NOTES

Cited in State ex rel. Page v. Sawyer, 223 N.C. 102, 25 S.E.2d 443 (1943); In re Estate of Nixon, 2 N.C. App. 422, 163 S.E.2d 274 (1968); In re Castillian Apts., Inc., 281 N.C. 709, 190 S.E.2d 161 (1972).

§ 7A-130. Creation of district court division and district court districts; seats of court.

1. The district court division of the General Court of Justice is hereby created. It consists of various district courts organized in territorial districts. The numbers and boundaries of the districts are as provided by G.S. 7A-133. The district court shall sit in the county seat of each county, and at such additional places in each county as the General Assembly may authorize, except that sessions of court are not required at an additional seat of court unless the chief district judge and the Administrative Officer of the Courts concur in a finding that the facilities are adequate.
2. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, when exigent circumstances exist within a judicial district, sessions of district court may be conducted at a location outside a county seat by order of the chief district court judge of a county, with the prior approval of the location and facilities by the Administrative Officer of the Courts and after consultation with the clerk of superior court and county officials of the county. An order entered under this subsection shall be filed in the office of the clerk of superior court in the county and posted at the courthouse within the county seat and notice shall be posted in other conspicuous locations.

History

(1965, c. 310, s. 1; 1987, c. 509, s. 14; c. 738, s. 124; 2018-138, s. 2.12(b).)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2018-138, s. 2.12(b), effective December 3, 2018, added the designation for subsection (a), and added subsection (b).

§ 7A-131. Establishment of district courts.

District courts are established, within districts, in accordance with the following schedule:

1. On the first Monday in December, 1966, the first, the twelfth, the fourteenth, the sixteenth, the twenty-fifth, and the thirtieth districts;
2. On the first Monday in December, 1968, the second, the third, the fourth, the fifth, the sixth, the seventh, the eighth, the ninth, the tenth, the eleventh, the thirteenth, the fifteenth, the eighteenth, the twentieth, the twenty-first, the twenty-fourth, the twenty-sixth, the twenty-seventh, and the twenty-ninth districts;
3. On the first Monday in December, 1970, the seventeenth, the nineteenth, the twenty-second, the twenty-third, and the twenty-eighth districts.

History

(1965, c. 310, s. 1.)

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "Some Aspects of the Criminal Court Process in North Carolina," see 49 N.C.L. Rev. 469 (1971).

§ 7A-132. Judges, district attorneys, full-time assistant district attorneys and magistrates for district court districts.

Each district court district shall have one or more judges and one district attorney. Each county within each district shall have at least one magistrate.

For each district the General Assembly shall prescribe the numbers of district judges, and the numbers of full-time assistant district attorneys. For each county within each district the General Assembly shall prescribe a minimum number of magistrates.

History

(1965, c. 310, s. 1; 1967, c. 1049, s. 5; 1973, c. 47, s. 2; 2006-187, s. 7(b).)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2006-187, s. 7(b), effective July 1, 2006, deleted "and a maximum" preceding "number of magistrates" at the end of the second paragraph.

§ 7A-133. Numbers of judges by districts; numbers of magistrates and additional seats of court, by counties.

1. Each district court district shall have the numbers of judges as set forth in the following table:
2. For district court districts of less than a whole county, or with part or all of one county with part of another, the composition of the district is as follows:
   1. District Court District 9 consists of Person, Franklin and Granville Counties and the remainder of Vance County not in District Court District 9B.
   2. District Court District 9B consists of Warren County and VTD EH1, VTD MIDD, VTD NH1, VTD NH2, VTD TWNS, VTD WMSB of Vance County.
   3. District Court District 20C consists of the remainder of Union County not in District Court District 20B.
   4. District Court District 20B consists of Precinct 01: Tract 204.01: Block Group 2: Block 2040, Block 2057, Block 2058, Block 2060, Block 2061, Block 2062, Block 2064, Block 2065; Tract 204.02: Block Group 2: Block 2001, Block 2002, Block 2003, Block 2004, Block 2005, Block 2006, Block 2007, Block 2008, Block 2009, Block 2010, Block 2011, Block 2012, Block 2013, Block 2014, Block 2015, Block 2016, Block 2017, Block 2018, Block 2023, Block 2024, Block 2025, Block 2026, Block 2027, Block 2028, Block 2029, Block 2030, Block 2031, Block 2032, Block 2033, Block 2034; Block Group 3: Block 3000, Block 3003, Block 3004, Block 3005, Block 3006, Block 3007, Block 3008, Block 3009, Block 3010, Block 3011, Block 3012, Block 3013, Block 3014, Block 3015, Block 3016, Block 3017, Block 3018, Block 3019, Block 3020, Block 3021, Block 3022, Block 3023, Block 3024, Block 3025, Block 3026, Block 3027, Block 3028, Block 3029, Block 3030, Block 3031, Block 3032, Block 3033, Block 3034, Block 3035, Block 3036, Block 3037, Block 3038, Block 3039, Block 3040, Block 3041, Block 3042, Block 3043, Block 3044, Block 3045, Block 3046, Block 3047; Block Group 4: Block 4035, Block 4054, Block 4055; Precinct 02: Tract 205: Block Group 1: Block 1000, Block 1001, Block 1002, Block 1003, Block 1004, Block 1005, Block 1006, Block 1007, Block 1009, Block 1010, Block 1011, Block 1012, Block 1013, Block 1014, Block 1015, Block 1016, Block 1017, Block 1018, Block 1019, Block 1020, Block 1021, Block 1022, Block 1023, Block 1037, Block 1038; Block Group 2: Block 2081, Block 2082, Block 2092, Block 2099, Block 2100, Block 2101, Block 2102; Tract 206: Block Group 3: Block 3036, Block 3038, Block 3039, Block 3040, Block 3048; Block Group 4: Block 4053; Precinct 03, Precinct 04, Precinct 06: Tract 202.02: Block Group 1: Block 1012, Block 1013, Block 1014, Block 1015, Block 1017, Block 1018, Block 1021, Block 1022, Block 1023; Tract 204.01: Block Group 2: Block 2000, Block 2001, Block 2002, Block 2003, Block 2004, Block 2005, Block 2033, Block 2034, Block 2035, Block 2036, Block 2041, Block 2042, Block 2043, Block 2044, Block 2045, Block 2056, Block 2063, Block 2999; Precinct 08, Precinct 09, Precinct 10, Precinct 13, Precinct 23: Tract 206: Block Group 4: Block 4051; Precinct 25: Tract 206: Block Group 4: Block 4036; Precinct 34, Precinct 36, Precinct 43 of Union County.
   5. District 10A: Wake County: VTD 01-42, VTD 01-47, VTD 02-01, VTD 02-02, VTD 02-03, VTD 02-04, VTD 02-05, VTD 02-06, VTD 07-02, VTD 07-06, VTD 07-07, VTD 08-04, VTD 08-05, VTD 08-07, VTD 09-01, VTD 09-03, VTD 10-01, VTD 13-10, VTD 13-11, VTD 14-01, VTD 14-02, VTD 19-03, VTD 19-04, VTD 19-05, VTD 19-06, VTD 19-07, VTD 19-09, VTD 19-10, VTD 19-11, VTD 19-12.
   6. District 10B: Wake County: VTD 09-02, VTD 10-02, VTD 10-03, VTD 10-04, VTD 13-01, VTD 13-07, VTD 13-08, VTD 13-09, VTD 16-08, VTD 17-02, VTD 17-03, VTD 17-04, VTD 17-06, VTD 17-07, VTD 17-08, VTD 17-09, VTD 17-11, VTD 19-16, VTD 19-17.
   7. District 10C: Wake County: VTD 01-04, VTD 01-09, VTD 01-10, VTD 01-12, VTD 01-13, VTD 01-14, VTD 01-15, VTD 01-17, VTD 01-18, VTD 01-28, VTD 01-30, VTD 01-34, VTD 01-36, VTD 01-37, VTD 01-38, VTD 01-39, VTD 01-43, VTD 01-44, VTD 01-45, VTD 01-46, VTD 01-51, VTD 07-03, VTD 07-04, VTD 07-05, VTD 07-09, VTD 07-11, VTD 07-12, VTD 07-13, VTD 08-02, VTD 08-06, VTD 08-09, VTD 13-02, VTD 13-05, VTD 13-06, VTD 17-01, VTD 17-05, VTD 17-10.
   8. District 10D: Wake County: VTD 01-01, VTD 01-02, VTD 01-03, VTD 01-05, VTD 01-06, VTD 01-07, VTD 01-11, VTD 01-16, VTD 01-29, VTD 01-33, VTD 01-49, VTD 04-01, VTD 04-02, VTD 04-03, VTD 04-04, VTD 04-05, VTD 04-06, VTD 04-07, VTD 04-08, VTD 04-09, VTD 04-10, VTD 04-11, VTD 04-12, VTD 04-14, VTD 04-15, VTD 04-16, VTD 04-17, VTD 04-18, VTD 04-20, VTD 04-21, VTD 05-05, VTD 06-05, VTD 06-07, VTD 07-01, VTD 07-10, VTD 08-03, VTD 08-08, VTD 08-10, VTD 08-11, VTD 11-01, VTD 11-02, VTD 12-01, VTD 12-02, VTD 12-04, VTD 12-05, VTD 12-06, VTD 12-07, VTD 12-09, VTD 15-01, VTD 15-02, VTD 15-03, VTD 15-04, VTD 16-01, VTD 16-05, VTD 16-09, VTD 18-02, VTD 18-03, VTD 18-05, VTD 20-03, VTD 20-05, VTD 20-09.
   9. District 10E: Wake County: VTD 01-19, VTD 01-20, VTD 01-21, VTD 01-22, VTD 01-23, VTD 01-25, VTD 01-26, VTD 01-27, VTD 01-31, VTD 01-32, VTD 01-35, VTD 01-40, VTD 01-41, VTD 01-48, VTD 01-50, VTD 16-02, VTD 16-03, VTD 16-04, VTD 16-06, VTD 16-07, VTD 18-01, VTD 18-04, VTD 18-06, VTD 18-07, VTD 18-08.
   10. District 10F: Wake County: VTD 03-00, VTD 04-13, VTD 04-19, VTD 05-01, VTD 05-03, VTD 05-04, VTD 05-06, VTD 06-01, VTD 06-04, VTD 06-06, VTD 12-08, VTD 20-01, VTD 20-02, VTD 20-04, VTD 20-06, VTD 20-08, VTD 20-10, VTD 20-11, VTD 20-12.
   11. through (18) Repealed by Session Laws 2020-84, s. 2(a), effective January 1, 2021.
3. The qualified voters of District Court District 11 shall elect all eight judges established for the District in subsection (a) of this section, but only persons who reside in Johnston County may be candidates for five of the judgeships, only persons who reside in Harnett County may be candidates for two of the judgeships, and only persons who reside in Lee County may be candidates for the remaining judgeship.
4. The qualified voters of District Court District 13 shall elect all six judges established for the District in subsection (a) of this section, but only persons who reside in Bladen County may be candidates for one of those judgeships, only persons who reside in Columbus County may be candidates for two of those judgeships, and only persons who reside in Brunswick County may be candidates for three of those judgeships. These district court judgeships shall be numbered and assigned for residency purposes as follows:
   1. Seat number one, established for residents of Brunswick County by this section, shall be the seat currently held by Judge Barefoot.
   2. Seat number two, established for residents of Brunswick County by this section, shall be the seat currently held by Judge Fairley.
   3. Seat number three, established for residents of Brunswick County by this section, shall be the seat currently held by Judge Warren.
   4. Seat number four, established for residents of Columbus County by this section, shall be the seat currently held by Judge Jolly.
   5. Seat number five, established for residents of Columbus County by this section, shall be the seat currently held by Judge Tyler.
   6. Seat number six, established for residents of Bladen County by this section, shall be the seat currently held by Judge Ussery.
5. The qualified voters of District Court District 22A shall elect all five judges established for the District in subsection (a) of this section, but only persons who reside in Alexander County may be candidates for two of the judgeships, and only persons who reside in Iredell County may be candidates for three of the judgeships.
6. The qualified voters of District Court District 22B shall elect all six judges established for the District in subsection (a) of this section, but only persons who reside in Davie County may be candidates for two of the judgeships, and only persons who reside in Davidson County may be candidates for four of the judgeships.
7. (Effective January 1, 2021, with elections in 2020 to be held accordingly) The qualified voters of District 16A shall elect all judges established for District 16A in subsection (a) of this section, but only persons who reside in Anson County may be candidates for one of the judgeships, only persons who reside in Scotland County may be candidates for one of the judgeships, and only persons who reside in Richmond County may be candidates for the remaining judgeships. In order to implement this section the following shall apply in order to transition from at large seats to residency requirements:
   1. In 2020, and every four years thereafter, the district court judgeship requiring a resident of Anson County shall be elected, and a district court judgeship requiring a resident of Richmond County shall be elected.
   2. In 2022, and every four years thereafter, the district court judgeship requiring a resident of Scotland County shall be elected, and a district court judgeship requiring a resident of Richmond County shall be elected.
8. (Effective January 1, 2021, with elections in 2020 to be held accordingly) The qualified voters of District 20A shall elect all judges established for District 20A in subsection (a) of this section, but only persons who reside in Montgomery County may be candidates for one of the judgeships, and only persons who reside in Montgomery or Stanly County may be candidates for the remaining judgeships.
9. Subject to the provisions of this subsection, the qualified voters of District 25 shall elect all judges established for District 25 in subsection (a) of this section, but only persons who reside in Catawba County may be candidates for five of the judgeships, and only persons who reside in Burke or Caldwell County may be candidates for the remaining judgeships. In order to implement this section the following shall apply in order to transition from at large seats to residency requirements:
   1. Transition of seats; regular elections. - For any district court judgeship that is held by a resident of Burke or Caldwell Counties on July 1, 2018, at the next general election after July 1, 2018, that district court judgeship shall be filled only by a person who is a resident of Burke or Caldwell Counties. Until such time as three district court judgeships transition under subdivision (2) of this subsection, for any district court judgeship that is held by a resident of Catawba County on July 1, 2018, that district court judgeship shall, at the next general election after July 1, 2018, be filled only by a person who is a resident of Burke, Caldwell, or Catawba County.
   2. Transition of seats; vacancies. - Upon each of the first three district court judgeship vacancies occurring in District Court District 25 after July 1, 2018, due to death, resignation, removal, or retirement of a person who is a resident of Catawba County holding a judgeship on July 1, 2018, that vacancy shall be filled according to law for the remainder of the unfilled term. At the next general election held for that district court judgeship, only persons who reside in Burke or Caldwell County may be candidates for that district court judgeship. Any primary associated with that general election for that district court judgeship after the completion of the term shall also be held accordingly, in accordance with this subsection.
   3. Notification to State Board. - Upon each of the first three district court judgeship vacancies occurring after July 1, 2018, in District Court District 25 due to the death, resignation, removal, or retirement of a person who is a resident of Catawba County holding a judgeship on July 1, 2018, the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts shall provide written notice of the vacancy to the State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement. During the filing period for that district court judgeship at the next general election held for that district court judgeship, the State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement shall ensure that only persons who reside in Burke or Caldwell County may file as candidates for that district court judgeship in accordance [with] this subsection.
   4. Final transition. - If a total of three district court judgeships have not transferred under subdivision (2) of this subsection to be eligible to be held by only persons who are residents of Burke or Caldwell Counties by January 1, 2030, a sufficient number of district court judgeships to total three district court judgeships shall be transferred to be held by only persons who are residents of Burke or Caldwell Counties on January 1, 2031, and the 2030 elections shall be held accordingly.
10. Each county shall have the numbers of magistrates and additional seats of district court, as set forth in the following table:

------------------ ------------------ District Judges County 1 5 Camden Chowan Currituck Dare Gates Pasquotank Perquimans 2 4 Martin Beaufort Tyrrell Hyde Washington 3A 6 Pitt 3B 6 Craven Pamlico Carteret 4 9 Sampson Duplin Jones Onslow 5 9 New Hanover Pender 6 4 Northampton Bertie Hertford Halifax 7 7 Nash Edgecombe Wilson 8 6 Wayne Greene Lenoir 9 5 Granville (part of Vance see subsection (b)) Franklin Person 9B 2 Warren (part of Vance see subsection (b)) 10A 3 (part of Wake see subsection (b)) 10B 3 (part of Wake see subsection (b)) 10C 3 (part of Wake see subsection (b)) 10D 5 (part of Wake see subsection (b)) 10E 3 (part of Wake see subsection (b)) 10F 3 (part of Wake see subsection (b)) 11 11 Harnett Johnston Lee 12 10 Cumberland 13 6 Bladen Brunswick Columbus 14 7 Durham 15A 4 Alamance 15B 5 Orange Chatham 16A 4 Scotland Anson Richmond 16B 6 Robeson 17A 4 Caswell Rockingham 17B 4 Stokes Surry 18 14 Guilford 19A 6 Cabarrus 19B 5 Randolph 19C 5 Rowan 19D 4 Hoke, Moore 20A 3 Montgomery, Stanly 20B 1 (part of Union see subsection (b)) 20C 2 (part of Union see subsection (b)) 20D 2 Union 21 11 Forsyth 22A 6 Alexander Iredell 22B 6 Davidson Davie 23 4 Alleghany Ashe Wilkes Yadkin 24 4 Avery Madison Mitchell Watauga Yancey 25 10 Burke Caldwell Catawba 26 21 Mecklenburg 27A 7 Gaston 27B 6 Cleveland Lincoln 28 7 Buncombe 29A 4 McDowell Rutherford 29B 4 Henderson Polk Transylvania 30 6 Cherokee Clay Graham Haywood Jackson Macon Swain.

The names and boundaries of voting tabulation districts specified for Wake County, and Vance County in this section are as shown on the 2010 Census Redistricting TIGER/Line Shapefiles. Precinct boundaries for Union County are those shown on the Legislative Services Office's redistricting computer database on January 1, 2005; and for other counties are those reported by the United States Bureau of the Census under Public Law 94-171 for the 1990 Census in the IVTD Version of the TIGER files.

Additional Magistrates Seats of County Min. Court Camden 3 Chowan 3 Currituck 3 Dare 4 Gates 2 Pasquotank 4 Perquimans 3 Martin 3 Beaufort 4 Tyrrell 3 Hyde 3.5 Washington 3 Pitt 10.5 Farmville Ayden Craven 8 Havelock Pamlico 3 Carteret 6 Sampson 5 Duplin 4 Jones 2 Onslow 11 New Hanover 11 Pender 3.8 Halifax 7 Roanoke Rapids, Scotland Neck Northampton 3 Bertie 3 Hertford 3 Nash 9 Rocky Mount Edgecombe 7 Rocky Mount Wilson 7 Wayne 9 Mount Olive Greene 3 Lenoir 7 La Grange Granville 5 Vance 6 Warren 3 Franklin 4 Person 4 Caswell 3 Wake 18.5 Apex, Wendell, Fuquay- Varina, Wake Forest Harnett 8 Dunn Johnston 10 Benson, Clayton, Selma Lee 5 Cumberland 19 Bladen 3 Brunswick 8 Columbus 5 Tabor City Durham 13 Alamance 12 Burlington Orange 7 Chapel Hill Chatham 4 Siler City Scotland 5 Hoke 3 Robeson 12 Fairmont, Maxton, Pembroke, Red Springs, Rowland, St. Pauls Rockingham 7 Reidsville, Eden, Madison Stokes 3 Surry 6 Mt. Airy Guilford 24.4 High Point Cabarrus 9 Kannapolis Montgomery 3 Randolph 9 Liberty Rowan 9 Stanly 5 Union 7 Anson 3 Richmond 5 Hamlet Moore 5 Southern Pines Forsyth 15 Kernersville Alexander 3 Davidson 8 Thomasville Davie 3 Iredell 9 Mooresville Alleghany 2 Ashe 3 Wilkes 6 Yadkin 3 Avery 3 Madison 3 Mitchell 3 Watauga 4 Yancey 3 Burke 5.6 Caldwell 6 Catawba 10 Hickory Mecklenburg 26.50 Gaston 17 Cleveland 7 Lincoln 5 Buncombe 15 Henderson 6.5 McDowell 3 Polk 3 Rutherford 6 Transylvania 3 Cherokee 3 Clay 2 Graham 2 Haywood 5 Canton Jackson 3 Macon 3 Swain 3

History

(1965, c. 310, s. 1; 1967, c. 691, s. 8; 1969, c. 1190, s. 10; c. 1254; 1971, c. 377, s. 7; cc. 727, 840, 841, 842, 843, 865, 866, 898; 1973, cc. 132, 373, 483; c. 838, s. 1; c. 1376; 1975, c. 956, ss. 8, 10; 1977, cc. 121, 122; c. 678, s. 2; c. 947, s. 1; c. 1130, ss. 4, 5; 1977, 2nd Sess., c. 1238, s. 3; c. 1243, ss. 3, 6; 1979, c. 465; c. 838, ss. 117, 118; c. 1072, ss. 2, 3; 1979, 2nd Sess., c. 1221, s. 2; 1981, c. 964, s. 4; 1983, c. 881, s. 5; 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1109, s. 5; 1985, c. 698, ss. 7(a), 12; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1014, s. 222; 1987, c. 738, ss. 126(a), 130(a); 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1056, s. 4; c. 1075; c. 1100, s. 17.2(a); 1989, c. 795, s. 23(a), (d), (h); 1991, c. 742, ss. 11, 12(a); 1993, c. 321, ss. 200.4(e), 200.6(a), (d); 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994), c. 769, s. 24.9; 1995, c. 507, s. 21.1(c); 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 589, s. 2(a); 1996, 2nd Ex. Sess., c. 18, ss. 22.4, 22.7(a); 1997-443, ss. 18.12(a), 18.13; 1998-212, ss. 16.11, 16.16(a); 1998-217, s. 67.3(a); 1999-237, ss. 17.4, 17.6(a); 2000-67, ss. 15.2, 15.3(a); 2001-400, s. 1; 2001-424, ss. 22.16, 22.17(a); 2003-284, s. 13.8; 2004-124, ss. 14.1(a), 14.6(e); 2005-276, s. 14.2(f), (f1); 2005-345, s. 27(a), (b); 2006-66, ss. 14.4(a), 14.5; 2006-96, s. 1; 2006-187, s. 7(a); 2006-221, s. 14(a); 2006-264, s. 93(a); 2007-323, ss. 14.13(a), (d), 14.25(e), (f); 2007-484, s. 25(a), 36; 2008-107, s. 14.13(a); 2009-341, s. 1; 2012-194, s. 1(c), (d); 2013-360, s. 18B.22(f); 2016-94, s. 19B.3(a); 2017-57, s. 18B.9(c); 2018-14, s. 2(a); 2018-121, s. 2(a); 2019-229, s. 2(a); 2020-84, s. 2(a).)

Reduction in Minimum Magistrate Positions. - Section 15.14 of Session Laws 2010-31, as added by Session Laws 2010-123, s. 6.4, effective July 1, 2010, provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law relating to the number of positions in the Judicial Department, during the 2009-2011 biennium, the Administrative Office of the Courts may reduce positions in the Judicial Department to comply with budget reductions taken by action of the General Assembly for that Department. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall report to the Joint Legislative Commission on Governmental Operations, to the Fiscal Research Division of the General Assembly, and to the Revisor of Statutes, on any reductions taken that affect statutory staffing numbers in Chapter 7A of the General Statutes."

John Smith, Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, reported to the Revisor of Statutes et al. by memorandum dated June 30, 2011, that the minimum number of magistrates per county has been modified as shown in the following chart (the minimum number of magistrates for counties not listed in the chart remains as set out in the section above).

County FTE Currently Listed in Statute Minimum Magistrate Positions effective 7/01/2011 Minimum Magistrate Positions effective 1/1/2013 --------------------------------------------------------------- ------------- Alexander 4 4 3 Anson 5 4 3 Ashe 4 3 3 Avery 4 4 3 Beaufort 5.05 5 4 Bertie 5 3 3 Bladen 5 4 3 Brunswick 9 9 8 Burke 6.75 5.6 5.6 Caldwell 7 6 6 Carteret 9 7 6 Caswell 4 3 3 Chatham 6 4 4 Cherokee 4 4 3 Cleveland 8 7 7 Columbus 9.5 7.5 5 Craven 10 8 8 Currituck 4 4 3 Dare 6 6 4 Davidson 10 8 8 Davie 4 3 3 Duplin 8 4 4 Franklin 7 7 4 Granville 7 6.75 5 Greene 4 4 3 Halifax 12 7 7 Harnett 10 8 8 Haywood 6.75 6 5 Hertford 6 5 3 Hoke 5 3 3 Jackson 5 4 3 Johnston 11 10 10 Lee 5.5 5 5 Lincoln 6 6 5 Macon 3.5 3.5 3 Madison 4 4 3 Martin 4 4 3 McDowell 4.5 4 3 Mitchell 4 4 3 Montgomery 5 4 3 Moore 6.5 5 5 Northampton 5.25 5.25 3 Orange 9 7 7 Pasquotank 5 4 4 Pender 4.8 3.8 3.8 Polk 4 4 3 Randolph 10 9 9 Richmond 6 5 5 Robeson 15 13 12 Rockingham 9 7 7 Rutherford 7 6 6 Sampson 7 6 5 Stanly 6 5 5 Stokes 5 5 3 Surry 9 9 6 Swain 3.75 3 3 Transylvania 4 4 3 Warren 3.5 3.5 3 Washington 4 3 3 Watauga 5 4 4 Yadkin 4 3 3

Preclearance Under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. - Information on receipt of preclearance was published in the North Carolina Register.

Session Laws 1995, c. 507, s. 21.1(h), provides in part that c. 507, s. 21.1(c) and (d) become effective January 1, 1996, or 15 days after the date upon which those subsections are approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later. Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated November 8, 1995.

Session Laws 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 589, s. 5, provides that c. 589, s. 2 becomes effective January 1, 1997, or the date upon which that section is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later. Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated December 16, 1996.

Session Laws 1996, Second Extra Session, c. 18, s. 22.7(c), provides that the amendment by Session Laws 1996, Second Extra Session, c. 18, s. 22.7, becomes effective December 15, 1996, as to any district court district where no county is subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. As to any district court district where any county is subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the amendment becomes effective December 15, 1996, or 15 days after the date upon which it is approved under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later. Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated November 25, 1996.

Session Laws 1997-443, s. 18.12(a), which amended subsection (a), provides in s. 18.12(c): "Subsection (a) of this section becomes effective December 1, 1997, as to any district where no county is subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. As to any district where any county is subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, subsection (a) of this section becomes effective December 1, 1997, or 15 days after the date upon which that subsection is approved under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act." Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated December 8, 1997.

Session Laws 1998-212, s. 16.16(c), provides that subsection (a) of that section becomes effective December 15, 1998, as to any district where no county is subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and, as to any district where any county is subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, subsection (a) becomes effective December 15, 1998, or 15 days after the date upon which the subsection is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice.

Session Laws 1999-237, s. 17.6(c), provides that subsection (a) of this section becomes effective January 1, 2000, as to any district in which no county is subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. As to any district in which any county is subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, subsection (a) becomes effective January 1, 2000, or 15 days after the date upon which that subsection is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later. Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated September 27, 1999.

Session Laws 2000-67, s. 15.3(c), made subsection (a) of this section effective December 15, 2000, as to any district in which no county is subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Act) and, as to any district in which any county is subject to section 5 of the Act, December 15, 2000, or 15 days after the date upon which that subsection is approved under section 5 of the Act, whichever is later. Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated October 26, 2000.

Session Laws 2001-400, s. 5, provided that c. 400 becomes effective July 1, 2002, or the date upon which c. 400 is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later. Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated June 21, 2002.

Session Laws 2001-424, s. 22.17(c), provides: "This section becomes effective January 1, 2002, except that the elimination of the vacant judgeship in District Court District 17A is effective the later of January 1, 2002, or the date upon which it is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965."

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 14.2(q), provides, in part: "With respect to the division of District Court District 20, subsections (f) through (k) of this section become effective December 1, 2005, or the date upon which subsection (f) of this section is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later. With respect to the division of District Court District 29, subsections (f) through (k) of this section become effective December 1, 2005." Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated January 5, 2006.

Session Laws 2006-66, s. 14.4(c), provides: "This section becomes effective January 15, 2007, as to any district court district not subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. As to any district court district subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it becomes effective January 15, 2007, or the date upon which the additional judge added for that district by subsection (a) of this section is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later."

Session Laws 2006-96, s. 5, provides in part: "Section 1 of this act, which added subsection (b2), becomes effective October 1, 2006, or the date upon which Section 1 of this act is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later." Preclearance was received by letter dated December 21, 2006.

Session Laws 2007-323, s. 14.13(b), provides: "The Governor shall appoint the additional district court judges authorized by subsection (a) of this section. Those judges' successors shall be elected in the 2008 general election for four-year terms commencing January 1, 2009."

Session Laws 2007-323, s. 14.13(c), provides: "As to Districts 11, 12, and 18, subsection (a) of this section becomes effective January 1, 2008, or 15 days after preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later. All other portions of subsection (a) and subsection (b) of this section become effective January 1, 2008."

Session Laws 2008-107, s. 14.13(c), provides: "As to District 11, subsection (a) of this section becomes effective January 15, 2009, or 15 days after preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later. The remainder of this section becomes effective January 15, 2009." Preclearance was received December 4, 2008.

Session Laws 2009-341, s. 2, provides that the amendment by section 1 of the act becomes effective on the date upon which it is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Preclearance was received January 7, 2010.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1995, c. 507, s. 21.1(g), provides that notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person who has previously served as a magistrate is eligible to be appointed as a magistrate.

Session Laws 1995, c. 507, s. 28.9, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 1995-97 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 1995-97 biennium."

Session Laws 2006-66, s. 1.2, provides: "This act shall be known as 'The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2006'."

Session Laws 2006-66, s. 28.3, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2006-2007 fiscal year, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2006-2007 fiscal year."

Session Laws 2006-66, s. 28.6 is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2006-264, s. 93(b), provides: "(b) This section becomes effective December 1, 2005, or the date upon which Section 14.2(f) of S.L. 2005-276 is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later."

Session Laws 2006-264, s. 93(c), repealed Session Laws 2006-264, s. 93, if House Bill 198, 2005 Regular Session, became law, which it did not. Session Laws 2007-484, s. 36, repealed Session Laws 2006-264, s. 93(c).

Session Laws 2007-323, s. 1.2, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2007'."

Session Laws 2007-323, s. 32.3, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2007-2009 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2007-2009 fiscal biennium."

Session Laws 2007-323, s. 32.5 is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2008-107, s. 1.2, provides: "This act shall be known as 'The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2008'."

Session Laws 2008-107, s. 30.3, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2008-2009 fiscal year, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2008-2009 fiscal year."

Session Laws 2008-107, s. 30.5 is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2012-194, s. 1(a), provides: "The intent of this section is to codify the permanent reductions to the minimum number of magistrates in various counties and the number of full-time assistant district attorneys in certain prosecutorial districts that have been made by the Administrative Office of the Courts pursuant to Section 15.14 of S.L. 2010-31, as added by Section 6.4 of S.L. 2010-123, to the end that the General Statutes reflect the actual authorized numbers of magistrates and assistant district attorneys."

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 18B.22(g), provides: "The four district judgeships established for District Court District 6 by subsection (f) of this section shall be filled by:

"(1) The three district court judges currently serving District Court District 6A who reside in Halifax County whose terms expire December 31, 2016. Successors shall be elected in the 2016 general election for four-year terms commencing January 1, 2017.

"(2) The district court judge currently serving District Court District 6B who resides in Northampton County whose term expires December 31, 2016. A successor shall be elected in the 2016 general election for a four-year term commencing January 1, 2017."

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 18B.22(h), provides: "The six district court judgeships established for District Court District 16A by subsection (f) of this section shall be filled by:

"(1) The district court judge currently serving District Court District 16A who resides in Scotland County whose term expires December 31, 2016.

"(2) The district court judge currently serving District Court District 20A who resides in Richmond County whose term expires December 31, 2016.

"(3) The district court judge currently serving District Court District 20A who resides in Anson County whose term expires December 31, 2016.

"(4) Election of three judges in the 2014 general election for four-year terms commencing January 1, 2015."

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 18B.22(i), provides: "The additional district court judgeship authorized for District Court District 21 by subsection (f) of this section shall be filled by election of a district court judge in the 2014 general election for a four-year term commencing January 1, 2015."

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 18B.22(j), provides: "The two district court judgeships established for District Court District 20A by subsection (f) of this section shall be filled by election of two district court judges in the 2014 general election for four-year terms commencing January 1, 2015."

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 18B.22(q), makes the amendments to this section by Session Laws 2013-360, s. 18B.22(f), effective January 1, 2015, except that those provisions of this section requiring election in the 2014 general election are effective to provide for those elections when they become law [July 1, 2013].

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2013.'"

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 38.2, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2013-2015 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2013-2015 fiscal biennium."

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 38.5 is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 18B.9(d), as amended by Session Laws 2017-197, s. 5.5, provides: "In order to implement the changes in subsection (c) of this section [which amended the table in subsection (a)], the following shall apply:

"(1) The district court judgeship with a term expiring December 31, 2020, currently serving District 9A shall be allocated to Judicial District 9 and the judgeship with a term expiring December 31, 2018, currently serving District 9A shall be allocated to Judicial District 17A of the General Court of Justice effective January 1, 2019.

"(2) A vacancy occurring in the district court judgeship with a term expiring December 31, 2018 currently serving District 9A before January 1, 2019, shall be filled by appointment for a term to end December 31, 2018. A vacancy occurring in the district court judgeship with a term expiring December 31, 2020, currently serving District 9A before January 1, 2019, shall be filled by appointment for a term to end December 31, 2020."

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 18B.12, provides: "Notwithstanding the minimum staffing number in G.S. 7A-133(c), the clerk of superior court in a county, with the written or e-mailed consent of the chief district court judge, may hire one deputy or assistant clerk in lieu of one of the magistrate positions allocated to that county. To provide accessibility for law enforcement and citizens, the clerk of superior court's office will provide some of the services traditionally provided by the magistrates' office during some or all of the regular courthouse hours. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall report on the results of the pilot project by October 1, 2018, to the chairs of the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee on Justice and Public Safety. The report shall include the counties participating, a summary of the magisterial tasks assumed by clerks, the estimated cost savings, and recommendations for future expansion."

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2017.'"

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 39.4, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2017-2019 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2017-2019 fiscal biennium."

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 39.6, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2018-14, s. 4, made the amendment of this section by Session Laws 2018-14, s. 2(a), effective January 1, 2019, and further provided that "elections in 2018 and thereafter shall be held accordingly."

Session Laws 2018-14, s. 2(b), as amended by Session Laws 2019-229, s. 2(b), and as amended by Session Laws 2020-84, s. 2(b), provides: "In order to implement the district court districts as enacted by this section, the following shall apply:

"(1) Judges in the following districts, as set out in this section, shall take office on January 1, 2019, with elections in 2018, and every four years thereafter, to be held accordingly:

"a. District 10A - one judge.

"b. District 10B - one judge.

"c. District 10D - three judges.

"d. District 10E - two judges.

"e. District 10F - one judge.

"f. through j. Repealed by Session Laws 2020-84, 2(b), effective January 1, 2021.

"(2) Judges in the following districts, as set out in this section, shall take office on January 1, 2021, with elections in 2020, and every four years thereafter, to be held accordingly:

"a. District 10A - two judges.

"b. District 10B - two judges.

"c. District 10C - three judges.

"d. District 10D - two judges.

"e. District 10E - one judge.

"f. District 10F - two judges.

"g. through m. Repealed by Session Laws 2020-84, 2(b), effective January 1, 2021."

Session Laws 2018-121, s. 2(b)-(d), provides: "(b) The additional judge in District Court District 20A, as established by this section, shall take office on January 1, 2019, with an election in 2018 to be held accordingly. In implementing G.S. 7A-133(b6), as enacted by this section, State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement shall ensure that only residents of Montgomery County may be candidates for the additional judge in District Court District 20A in the 2018 election, and every four years thereafter.

"(c) G.S. 7A-133(b5) and G.S. 7A-133(b6), as enacted by this section, become effective January 1, 2021, with elections in 2020 to be held accordingly.

"(d) Except as otherwise provided, G.S. 7A-133, as enacted by this section, becomes effective January 1, 2019."

Session Laws 2019-229, s. 2(c), made the amendment of subsection (a) of this section by Session Laws 2019-229, s. 2(a), effective January 1, 2021, and further provided that "elections conducted in 2020 shall be conducted in accordance with the judgeships created in subsection (a) of this section."

Session Laws 2020-84, s. 2(c), made the amendment to this section by Session Laws 2020-84, s. 2(a), effective January 1, 2021, and applicable to elections conducted on or after that date, and further provided: "All elections in 2020 shall be conducted in accordance with the Consent Order as it was filed on November 27, 2019, in Alexander v. North Carolina State Board of Elections, 19 CVS 011321, Wake County."

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2006-264, s. 93(a), effective December 1, 2005, or the date upon which Section 14.2(f) of S.L. 2005-276 is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later, in subdivision (b)(3), substituted "District 20C" for "District 20B", and "District 20B" for "District 20C"; and in subdivision (b)(4), substituted "District 20B" for "District 20C". S.L. 2005-276, s. 14.2(f) became effective January 5, 2006.

Session Laws 2007-323, s. 14.13(a), effective January 1, 2008, in subsection (a), substituted "17" for "16" in District 10, substituted "10" for "9" in District 21, and substituted "19" for "18" in District 26; and effective January 1, 2008, or 15 days after preclearance under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, whichever is later, substituted "10" for "9" in Districts 11 and 12, and substituted "14" for "13" in District 18.

Session Laws 2007-323, s. 14.13(d), effective January 15, 2009, in subsection (a), substituted "9" for "8" in District 5, substituted "18" for "17" in District 10, and substituted "20" for "19" in District 26.

Session Laws 2007-323, s. 14.25(e), effective January 1, 2009, in subsection (a), substituted Districts 22A and 22B for District 22, which had 9 judges total.

Session Laws 2007-323, s. 14.25(f), effective January 1, 2009, but applicable to the 2008 election as provided in the terms of this section, added subsections (b3) and (b4).

Session Laws 2007-484, s. 25(a), effective August 30, 2007, added "20D" and the corresponding number of judges and county to the list of district court districts in subsection (a).

Session Laws 2008-107, s. 14.13(a), effective January 15, 2009, in subsection (a), substituted "19" for "18" in District 10, substituted "11" for "10" in District 11, and substituted "21" for "20" in District 26. See note under "Preclearance Under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act" for contingency regarding the amendment to District 11.

Session Laws 2009-341, s. 1, rewrote subsection (b2). See note regarding Voting Rights Act preclearance for effective date.

Session Laws 2012-194, s. 1(c), effective July 17, 2012, in subsection (c), substituted "4" for "5" in Pasquotank County, substituted "5" for "5.05" in Beaufort County, substituted "3" for "4" in Washington County, substituted "8" for "10" in Craven County, substituted "7" for "9" in Carteret County, substituted "6" for "7" in Sampson County, substituted "4" for "8" in Duplin County, substituted "3.8" for "4.8" in Pender County, substituted "7" for "12" in Halifax County, substituted "3" for "5" in Bertie County, substituted "5" for "6" in Hertford County, substituted "6.75" for "7" in Granville County, substituted "3" for "4" in Caswell County, substituted "8" for "10" in Johnston County, substituted "5" for "5.5" in Lee County, substituted "4" for "5" in Bladen County, substituted "7.5" for "9.5" in Columbus County, substituted "7" for "9" in Orange County, substituted "4" for "6" in Chatham County, substituted "3" for "5" in Hoke County, substituted "13" for "15" in Robeson County, substituted "7" for "9" in Rockingham County, substituted "4" for "5" in Montgomery County, substituted "9" for "10" in Randolph County, substituted "5" for "6" in Stanly County, substituted "4" for "5" in Anson County, substituted "5" for "6" in Richmond County, substituted "5" for "6.5" in Moore County, substituted "8" for "10" in Davidson County, substituted "3" for "4" in Davie County, substituted "3" for "4" in Ashe County, substituted "3" for "4" in Yadkin County, substituted "4" for "5" in Watauga County, substituted "5.6" for "6.75" in Burke County, substituted "6" for "7" in Caldwell County, substituted "7" for "8" in Cleveland County, substituted "4" for "4.5" in McDowell County, substituted "6" for "7" in Rutherford County, substituted "6" for "6.75" in Haywood County, substituted "4" for "5" in Jackson County, and substituted "3" for "3.75" in Swain County.

Session Laws 2012-194, s. 1(c), as amended by Session Laws 2012-194, s. 1(d), effective January 1, 2013, in subsection (c), substituted "3" for "4" in Currituck County, substituted "4" for "6" in Dare County, substituted "3" for "4" in Martin County, substituted "4" for "5" in Beaufort County, substituted "6" for "7" in Carteret County, substituted "5" for "6" in Sampson County, substituted "3" for "5.25" in Northampton County, substituted "3" for "5" in Hertford County, substituted "3" for "4" in Greene County, substituted "5" for "6.75" in Granville County, substituted "3" for "3.5" in Warren County, substituted "4" for "7" in Franklin County, substituted "3" for "4" in Bladen County, substituted "8" for "9" in Brunswick County, substituted "5" for "7.5" in Columbus County, substituted "12" for "13" in Robeson County, substituted "3" for "5" in Stokes County, substituted "6" for "9" in Surry County, substituted "3" for "4" in Montgomery County, substituted "3" for "4" in Anson County, substituted "3" for "4" in Alexander County, substituted "3" for "4" in Avery County, substituted "3" for "4" in Madison County, substituted "3" for "4" in Mitchell County, substituted "5" for "6" in Lincoln County, substituted "3" for "4" in McDowell County, substituted "3" for "4" in Polk County, substituted "3" for "4" in Transylvania County, substituted "3" for "4" in Cherokee County, substituted "5" for "6" in Haywood County, substituted "3" for "4" in Jackson County, and substituted "3" for "3.5" in Macon County.

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 18B.22(f), effective January 1, 2015, in the table of subsection (a), deleted "6A," "3," and "Halifax" following "5," "9," and "New Hanover Pender" and "Anson Richmond" preceding "20B," and substituted "6" and "4" for "6B" and "3" respectively, "6" for "3" following "16A," "2" for "4" following "20A," and "11" for "10" following "21." For effective date, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 19B.3, effective December 1, 2016, in the table of subsection (a), substituted "5" for "4" in District "19A" and "6" for "5" in District "27B."

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 18B.9(c), in the table of subsection (a), in District 9, substituted 5 for 4 and added Person, deleted District 9A, and, in District 17A, substituted 4 for 3 and added Caswell; substituted "VTD EH1, VTD MIDD, VTD NH1, VTD NH2, VTD TWNS, VTD WMSB" for "East Henderson I, North Henderson I, North Henderson II, Middleburg, Townsville, and Williamsboro Precincts" in subdivision (b)(2); and rewrote the undesignated last paragraph in subsection (b), which read: "Precinct boundaries as used in this section for Vance County are those shown on maps on file with the Legislative Services Office on May 1, 1991, for Union County, are those shown on the Legislative Services Office's redistricting computer database on January 1, 2005; and for other counties are those reported by the United States Bureau of the Census under Public Law 94-171 for the 1990 Census in the IVTD Version of the TIGER files." For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2018-14, s. 2(a), in the table of subsection (a), deleted District 10, which read: "10 19 Wake"; added Districts 10A through 10F; deleted District 26, which read: "26 21 Mecklenburg"; added Districts 26A through 26H; and added subdivisions (b)(5) through (b)(18). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2018-121, s. 2(a), in the table of subsection (a), reduced the number of judges in District 16A from 6 to 4 and removed Hoke County from that District, reduced the number of judges in District 19B from 7 to 5 and removed Montgomery and Moore Counties from that District, added District 19D, and increased the number of judges in District 20A from 2 to 3 and added Montgomery County to that District; and added subsections (b5), (b6), and (b7). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2019-229, s. 2(a), in subsection (a), substituted "6" for "5" preceding "Pitt"; substituted "9" for "8" preceding "Sampson"; substituted "5" for "6" following "10D"; substituted "6" for "5" preceding "Robeson"; substituted "6" for "5" preceding "Cabarrus"; substituted "2" for "1" preceding "Union"; substituted "6" for "5" preceding "Alexander"; substituted "10" for "9" preceding "Burke"; and substituted "4" for "3" preceding "McDowell." For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2020-84, s. 2(a), in the table in subsection (a), added the entry for District 26 and deleted the entries for Districts 26A through 26H; and deleted subdivisions (b)(11) through (b)(18). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

CASE NOTES

Preclearance of Acts Pursuant to Voting Rights Act. - Where superior court judges were elected pursuant to Session Laws 1965, c. 262, Session Laws 1967, c. 997, Session Laws 1977, cc. 1119, 1130 and 1238, and Session Laws 1983, c. 1109, and such legislative acts had not been precleared by the Attorney General as required by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, the federal district court would enjoin such elections retroactively in those counties subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act; the fact that an election law deals with the election of members of the judiciary does not remove it from the ambit of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Haith v. Martin, 618 F. Supp. 410 (E.D.N.C. 1985), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S. Ct. 3268, 91 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1986).

§ 7A-134: Repealed by Session Laws 1973, c. 1339, s. 2.

§ 7A-135. Transfer of pending cases when present inferior courts replaced by district courts.

On the date that the district court is established in any county, cases pending in the inferior court or courts of that county shall be transferred to the appropriate division of the General Court of Justice, and all records of these courts shall be transferred to the office of clerk of superior court in that county pursuant to rule of Supreme Court.

History

(1965, c. 310, s. 1.)