Subchapter 14. Drug Treatment Courts.
Subchapter 15. Conference of Clerks of Superior Court.
SUBCHAPTER I. GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE.
ARTICLE 1. Judicial Power and Organization.
Sec.
§ 7A-1. Short title.
This Chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Judicial Department Act of 1965."
History
(1965, c. 310, s. 1.)
Legal Periodicals. - For comment, "Examining the Evolution of Legal Precedent Through Citation Network Analysis," see 96 N.C.L. Rev. 227 (2017).
For article, "23RD Annual Institute for Law & Economic Policy Symposium: Secrecy: A2J2K: Access to Justice, Access to Knowledge, and Economic Inequalities in Open Courts and Arbitrations," see 96 N.C.L. Rev. 605 (2018).
For comment, "Revival of Roosevelt: Analyzing Expansion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Light of the Resurgence of State ‘Court-Packing' Plans,” see 96 N.C.L. Rev. 1126 (2018).
CASE NOTES
Method of Electing Superior Court Judges Held Constitutional. - The method of electing superior court judges does not infringe upon republicans' rights to free speech and association in violation of the First Amendment. Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992), rehearing denied, 991 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 828, 114 S. Ct. 93, 126 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1993).
Chapter 50 of the General Statutes was extensively rewritten during the 1967 session of the General Assembly and is not a part of the Judicial
Department Act of 1965, although in some respects they must be construed with reference to each other. Boston v. Freeman, 6 N.C. App. 736, 171 S.E.2d 206 (1969).
Cited in Kinney v. Goley, 4 N.C. App. 325, 167 S.E.2d 97 (1969); State v. Joseph, 92 N.C. App. 203, 374 S.E.2d 132 (1988); Cail v. Cerwin, 185 N.C. App. 176, 648 S.E.2d 510 (2007), review denied, 365 N.C. 75, 705 S.E.2d 743, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 50 (2011).
§ 7A-2. Purpose of Chapter.
This Chapter is intended to implement Article IV of the Constitution of North Carolina and promote the just and prompt disposition of litigation by:
- Providing a new chapter in the General Statutes into which, at a time not later than January 1, 1971, when the General Court of Justice is fully operational in all counties of the State, all statutes concerning the organization, jurisdiction and administration of each division of the General Court of Justice may be placed;
- Amending certain laws with respect to the superior court division to conform them to the laws set forth in this Chapter, to the end that each trial division may be a harmonious part of the General Court of Justice;
- Creating the district court division of the General Court of Justice, and the Administrative Office of the Courts;
- Establishing in accordance with a fixed schedule the various district courts of the district court division;
- Providing for the organization, jurisdiction and procedures necessary for the operation of the district court division;
- Providing for the financial support of the judicial department, and for uniform costs and fees in the trial divisions of the General Court of Justice;
- Providing for an orderly transition from the present system of courts to a uniform system completely operational in all counties of the State not later than January 1, 1971;
- Repealing certain laws inconsistent with the foregoing purposes; and
- Effectuating other purposes incidental and supplemental to the foregoing enumerated purposes.
History
(1965, c. 310, s. 1.)
CASE NOTES
Cited in State v. Pennington, 327 N.C. 89, 393 S.E.2d 847 (1990).
§ 7A-3. Judicial power; transition provisions.
Except for the judicial power vested in the court for the trial of impeachments, and except for such judicial power as may from time to time be vested by the General Assembly in administrative agencies, the judicial power of the State is vested exclusively in the General Court of Justice. Provided, that all existing courts of the State inferior to the superior courts, including justice of the peace courts and mayor's courts, shall continue to exist and to exercise the judicial powers vested in them by law until specifically abolished by law, or until the establishment within the county of their situs of a district court, or until January 1, 1971, whichever event shall first occur. Judgments of inferior courts which cease to exist under the provisions of this section continue in force and effect as though the issuing court continued to exist, and the General Court of Justice is hereby vested with jurisdiction to enforce such judgments.
History
(1965, c. 310, s. 1.)
§ 7A-4. Composition and organization.
The General Court of Justice constitutes a unified judicial system for purposes of jurisdiction, operation and administration, and consists of an appellate division, a superior court division, and a district court division.
History
(1965, c. 310, s. 1.)
CASE NOTES
Cited in Peoples v. Peoples, 8 N.C. App. 136, 174 S.E.2d 2 (1970); Smith v. Beaufort County Hosp. Ass'n, 141 N.C. App. 203, 540 S.E.2d 775 (2000), cert denied,
353 N.C. 381, 547 S.E.2d 435 (2001), aff'd, 354 N.C. 212, 552 S.E.2d 139 (2001); United States v. Allen, 446 F.3d 522 (4th Cir. 2006).
ARTICLE 1A. Retention Elections.
Sec.
§ 7A-4.1. Retention elections.
- A Justice of the Supreme Court who was elected to that office by vote of the voters who desires to continue in office shall be subject to approval by the qualified voters of the whole State in a retention election at the general election immediately preceding the expiration of the elected term. Approval shall be by a majority of votes cast on the issue of the justice's retention in accordance with this Article.
- If a Justice of the Supreme Court was appointed to fill a vacancy to that office, then the next election for that office shall be by ballot as provided by Article 25 of Chapter 163 of the General Statutes. Following that election, the justice shall be eligible for retention election as provided for in this Article.
- A justice seeking retention shall indicate the desire to continue in office by filing a notice to that effect with the State Board of Elections no later than 12:00 noon on the first business day of July in the year prior to the general election immediately preceding the expiration of the elected term. The notice shall be on a form provided by the State Board of Elections. Notice may be withdrawn at any time prior to December 15 of that year. If no retention notice is filed, or if it is filed and timely withdrawn, then an election shall be held the next year to elect a successor in accordance with Article 25 of Chapter 163 of the General Statutes.
- At the time of filing the notice under this Article, the justice shall pay to the State Board of Elections a filing fee for the office the candidate seeks in the amount of one percent (1%) of the annual salary of the office sought.
- Except as provided for in this Article, retention elections shall be conducted and canvassed in accordance with rules of the State Board of Elections in the same general manner as general elections under Chapter 163 of the General Statutes. The State Board of Elections shall certify the results.
- The question on the ballot shall be substantially in the following form, as appropriate:
- If a person who has filed a notice of intent for a retention election dies or is removed from office prior to the time that the ballots are printed, the retention election is cancelled and the vacancy shall be filled as provided by law. If a person who has filed a notice calling a retention election dies or is removed from office after the ballots are printed, the State Board of Elections may cancel the retention election if it determines that the ballots can be reprinted without significant expense. If the ballots cannot be reprinted, then the results of the retention election shall be ineffective.
Justices of the Supreme Court.
"[ ] FOR [ ] AGAINST
The retention of [name of Justice] on the North Carolina Supreme Court for a new term of eight years."
History
(2015-66, s. 1; 2017-6, s. 3; 2018-146, ss. 3.1(a), (b), 6.1.)
Re-recodification; Technical and Conforming Changes. - Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3, provides, in part: "The Revisor of Statutes shall recodify Chapter 138A of the General Statutes, Chapter 120C of the General Statutes, as well as Chapter 163 of the General Statutes, as amended by this act, into a new Chapter 163A of the General Statutes to be entitled 'Elections and Ethics Enforcement Act,' as enacted by Section 4 of this act. The Revisor may also recodify into the new Chapter 163A of the General Statutes other existing statutory laws relating to elections and ethics enforcement that are located elsewhere in the General Statutes as the Revisor deems appropriate." The Revisor was further authorized to make additional technical and conforming changes to catchlines, internal citations, and other references throughout the General Statutes to effectuate this recodification. Pursuant to this authority, the Revisor of Statutes, in subsection (d), substituted "Chapter 163A" for "Chapter 163"; and, throughout subsections (c) through (g), substituted "Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement" for "State Board of Elections."
Session Laws 2018-146, ss. 3.1(a), (b), 6.1 repealed Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3, and authorized the Revisor of Statutes to re-recodify Chapter 163A into Chapters 163, 138A, and 120C and to revert the changes made by the Revisor pursuant to Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3. Pursuant to this authority, the Revisor of Statutes reverted the changes to references in this section.
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2015-66, s. 9, made this article effective June 11, 2015.
Article 25 of Chapter 163, referred to in subsections (b) and (c), was repealed by Session Laws 2017-3, s. 13, effective with respect to primaries held
on or after 2018. For present provisions pertaining to nominations and elections, generally, see Articles 10 through 19 of Chapter 163.
§ 7A-4.2. Retention approval; failure to retain.
- If the voters vote to approve the retention in office, the justice shall be retained for a new eight-year term.
- If the voters fail to approve the retention in office, the office shall be deemed vacant at the end of the term of office, and the vacancy shall be filled as provided by law.
History
(2015-66, s. 1.)
§§ 7A-4.3 through 7A-4.19: Reserved for future codification purposes.
ARTICLE 1B. Age Limits for Service as Justice or Judge.
Sec.
§ 7A-4.20. Age limit for service as justice or judge: exception.
No justice or judge of the General Court of Justice may continue in office beyond the last day of the month in which he attains his seventy-second birthday, but justices and judges so retired may be recalled for periods of temporary service as provided in Subchapters II and III of this chapter.
History
(1971, c. 508, s. 1; c. 1194; 1973, c. 248; 1977, c. 736, s. 5; 1981, c. 455, s. 1; 1991 (Reg. Sess., 1992), c. 873, s. 1.)
CASE NOTES
Resignation of District Judge Created Legal and Actual Vacancy. - Where a district court judge resigned upon the discovery of his legal infirmity, his resignation from office created an actual vacancy in that position. Hence, upon the resignation, there
was no one legally entitled to hold office by virtue of an election, nor under G.S. 128-7 was there an incumbent with the legal right to continue in office until a successor was elected or appointed. The judge, therefore, created
a legal as well as an actual vacancy in office under N.C. Const., Art. IV,
§
19. People ex rel. Duncan v. Beach, 294 N.C. 713, 242 S.E.2d 796 (1978).
Cited in Martin v. State, 330 N.C. 412, 410 S.E.2d 474 (1991).
§ 7A-4.21. Validation of official actions of district court judges of twenty-fifth judicial district performed after mandatory retirement age.
No official action performed by any judge of the twenty-fifth judicial district of the district court division of the General Court of Justice shall be declared to be invalid by reason of the fact that the judge was beyond the mandatory retirement age set out in G.S. 7A-4.20 at the time of his performing any such act; provided this section shall only apply to those official actions performed prior to May 1, 1977.
History
(1977, c. 389.)
SUBCHAPTER II. APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE.
ARTICLE 2. Appellate Division Organization.
Sec.
§ 7A-5. Organization.
The appellate division of the General Court of Justice consists of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
History
(1965, c. 310, s. 1; 1967, c. 108, s. 1.)
Editor's Note. - As enacted in 1965, this article was designated "Article 1A. Appellate Division Organization and Terms," and consisted of former G.S. 7A-5, which read, "The appellate division of the General Court of Justice consists of the Supreme Court
of North Carolina. (Chapter 7, subchapter I, articles 1-6, of the General Statutes, is applicable.)" The former section derived from c. 310, s. 1, Session Laws 1965.
CASE NOTES
Cited in State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 163 S.E.2d 376 (1968); Fetherbay v. Sharpe Motor Lines, 8 N.C. App. 58, 173 S.E.2d 589 (1970); Adams-Millis Corp. v. Town of
Kernersville, 281 N.C. 147, 187 S.E.2d 704 (1972); In re Annexation Ordinance, 300 N.C. 337, 266 S.E.2d 661 (1980); Early v. County of Durham, Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
193 N.C. App. 334, 667 S.E.2d 512 (2008), review denied, 363 N.C. 372, 678 S.E.2d 237 (2009).
§ 7A-6. Appellate division reporters; reports.
- The Supreme Court shall appoint one or more reporters for the appellate division, to serve at its pleasure. It shall be the duty of the reporters to prepare for publication the opinions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The salary of the reporters shall be fixed by the Administrative Officer of the Courts, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
- The Administrative Officer of the Courts shall contract for the printing of the reports of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, and for the advance sheets of each court. He shall select a printer for the reports and prescribe such contract terms as will insure issuance of the reports as soon as practicable after a sufficient number of opinions are filed. He shall make such contract after consultation with the Department of Administration and comparison of prices for similar work in other states to such an extent as may be practicable. He shall also sell the reports and advance sheets of the appellate division, to the general public, at a price not less than cost nor more than cost plus ten percent (10%), to be fixed by him in his discretion. Proceeds of such sales shall be remitted to the State treasury.
- In addition to and as an alternative to the provisions for the publication and sale of the appellate division reports of subsection (a) and subsection (b) of this section, the Supreme Court may designate a commercial law publisher's reports and advance sheets of the opinions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as the Official Reports of the Appellate Division, or the Administrative Officer of the Courts, with the approval of the Supreme Court, may contract with a commercial law publisher or publishers to act as printer and vendor of the reports and advance sheets of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals upon such terms as the Supreme Court deems advisable after consultation with the Department of Administration.
- Repealed by Session Laws 2018-40, s. 1, effective June 22, 2018.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1; c. 691, s. 57; 1969, c. 1190, s. 1; 1971, c. 377, s. 2; 1975, c. 879, s. 46; 1977, c. 721, s. 1; 1987, c. 404; 2018-40, s. 1.)
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2018-40, s. 1, effective June 22, 2018, repealed subsection (c).
§ 7A-7. Law clerks; secretaries and stenographers.
- Each justice and judge of the appellate division is entitled to the services of not more than two research assistants, who must be graduates of an accredited law school. The salaries of research assistants shall be set by the Administrative Officer of the Courts, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
- The Administrative Officer of the Courts shall determine the number and salaries of all secretaries and stenographers in the appellate division.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1; 1985, c. 698, s. 8(a).)
CASE NOTES
Cited in Thrift v. Food Lion, Inc., 111 N.C. App. 758, 433 S.E.2d 481 (1993).
§§ 7A-8, 7A-9: Reserved for future codification purposes.
ARTICLE 3. The Supreme Court.
Sec.
§ 7A-10. Organization; compensation of justices.
- The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and six associate justices, elected by the qualified voters of the State for terms of eight years. Such election shall be under Article 25 of Chapter 163 of the General Statutes or Article 1A of this Chapter. Before entering upon the duties of the office, each justice shall take an oath of office. Four justices shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of the business of the court. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, sessions of the court shall be held in the city of Raleigh, and scheduled by rule of court so as to discharge expeditiously the court's business. The court may by rule hold sessions not more than twice annually in the Old Chowan County Courthouse (1767) in the Town of Edenton, which is a State-owned court facility that is designated as a National Historic Landmark by the United States Department of the Interior. The court may by rule hold sessions not more than twice annually in the City of Morganton; unless a more suitable site is identified by the court, the court shall meet in the Old Burke County Courthouse, the location of summer sessions of the Supreme Court from 1847-1862.
- The Chief Justice and each of the associate justices shall receive the annual salary provided in Current Operations Appropriations Act. Each justice is entitled to reimbursement for travel and subsistence expenses at the rate allowed State employees generally.
- In addition to the reimbursement for travel and subsistence expenses authorized by subsection (b) of this section, and notwithstanding G.S. 138-6, each justice whose permanent residence is at least 50 miles from the City of Raleigh shall also be reimbursed for the mileage the justice travels each week to the City of Raleigh from the justice's home for business of the court. The reimbursement authorized by this subsection shall be calculated for each justice by multiplying the actual round-trip mileage from that justice's home to the City of Raleigh by a rate-per-mile established by the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, but not to exceed the business standard mileage rate set by the Internal Revenue Service.
- In lieu of merit and other increment raises paid to regular State employees, the Chief Justice and each of the Associate Justices shall receive as longevity pay an annual amount equal to four and eight-tenths percent (4.8%) of the annual salary set forth in the Current Operations Appropriations Act payable monthly after five years of service, nine and six-tenths percent (9.6%) after 10 years of service, fourteen and four-tenths percent (14.4%) after 15 years of service, nineteen and two-tenths percent (19.2%) after 20 years of service, and twenty-four percent (24%) after 25 years of service. "Service" means service as a justice or judge of the General Court of Justice, as a member of the Utilities Commission, or as an administrative law judge. Service shall also mean service as a district attorney or as a clerk of superior court.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1; 1983, c. 761, s. 242; 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1034, s. 165; c. 1109, ss. 11, 13.1; 1985, c. 698, s. 10(a); 1997-56, s. 1; 2007-323, ss. 14.21(a), 28.18A(a); 2015-66, s. 2; 2015-89, s. 1; 2017-57, s. 35.4(d).)
Elections for Judicial Offices 2018. - Session Laws 2017-214, s. 4(a), eliminated party primary elections for candidates for Justice of the Supreme Court, Judges of the Court of Appeals, superior court judges, and district court judges, for the November 6, 2018, general election, and s. 4(b)-(k) of that act provides for notices of candidacy, requirements, a timeline, filing fees, and method of determining the winner of each race. For full text of Session Laws 2017-214, s. 4(a)-(k), see note at G.S. 163A-970.
Session Laws 2018-3, s. 2(a)-(d), as amended by Session Laws 2018-130, ss. 2, 3, provides: "The General Assembly finds that both chambers of the General Assembly have carefully examined judicial redistricting and the forms of judicial selection with multiple committees considering various proposals of selection and new judicial district maps. The General Assembly finds that, to allow for more time to thoughtfully consider these changes, the General Assembly enacted S.L. 2017-214, the Electoral Freedom Act of 2017, which, among other items, provided for a one-time cancellation of partisan primaries for the offices of district court judge, superior court judge, judges of the Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court justices for the 2018 election cycle. The General Assembly finds that all elections for judges in 2018 were to be treated uniformly under S.L. 2017-214, the Electoral Freedom Act of 2017, while those changes were considered.
"The General Assembly notes that election to these offices will be held under a plurality election system, with candidates running under a political party label on the ballot, without having gone through a party primary. The General Assembly finds that ballot language above the sections of election ballots regarding these impacted offices setting forth that the listed party affiliation is only the self-identified party of a candidate at the time of filing will aid voters' understanding of the 2018 judicial races.
"(b) For the 2018 general election, the State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement shall, notwithstanding G.S. 163A-1114(b)(2), list the following judicial offices at the end of all partisan offices listed on the general election ballot:
"(1) Justices of the Supreme Court.
"(2) Judges of the Court of Appeals.
"(3) Judges of the superior courts.
"(4) Judges of the district courts.
"(c) Notwithstanding G.S. 163A-1112, immediately prior to the placement of the judicial offices listed in subsection (b) of this section on the ballot, the following information shall be printed:
"No primaries for judicial office were held in 2018. The information listed by each of the following candidates' names indicates only the candidates' party affiliation or unaffiliated status on their voter registration at the time they filed to run for office.
"(d) Except as provided in this section, ballot order for the judicial offices listed in subsection (b) of this section shall be as provided in Section 4(j) of S.L. 2017-214."
Session Laws 2007-323, s. 1.2, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2007'."
Editor's Note. - Article 25 of Chapter 163, referred to in subsection (a), was repealed by Session Laws 2017-3, s. 13, effective with respect to primaries held on or after 2018. For present provisions pertaining to nominations and elections, generally, see Articles 10 to 19 of Chapter 163.
Session Laws 2017-57, s. 18B.8, provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 7A-10(a), in honor of the court's bicentennial celebration, the court may, by rule, hold sessions in any location across the State. This section only applies to the calendar years 2018 through 2020."
Session Laws 2017-57, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2017.'"
Session Laws 2017-57, s. 39.4, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2017-2019 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2017-2019 fiscal biennium."
Session Laws 2017-57, s. 39.6, is a severability clause.
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2007-323, ss. 14.21(a) and 28.18A(a), effective July 1, 2007, added subsection (b1) and in the first sentence of subsection (c), deleted "and" preceding "nineteen" and added "and twenty-four percent (24%) after 25 years of service" at the end.
Session Laws 2015-66, s. 2, effective June 11, 2015, in subsection (a), added the second sentence, and substituted "the office" for "his office" in the third sentence.
Session Laws 2015-89, s. 1, effective June 19, 2015, added the last sentence in subsection (a).
Session Laws 2017-57, s. 35.4.(d), effective July 1, 2017, added "or as an administrative law judge" at the end of the second to last sentence in subsection (c); and made a stylistic change.
Legal Periodicals. - For article, "Called to Duty: Justice William J. Gaston," see 94 N.C.L. Rev. 2051 (2016).
For article, "Hitting the 'Bullseye' in Supreme Court Coverage: News Quality in the Courts," see 9 Elon L. Rev. 489 (2017).
For comment, "Revival of Roosevelt: Analyzing Expansion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Light of the Resurgence of State 'Court-Packing' Plans," see 96 N.C.L. Rev. 1126 (2018).
CASE NOTES
Quorum Necessary for Court to Transact Business. - In a challenge brought by a class of over 222,000 individuals, the members of the court disclosed the information pertaining to members of their families who either were or might be members of plaintiff class; and those justices were disqualified from participating in the consideration and decision of the case unless their participation was consented to in writing by the parties and their counsel. Because a minimum of four justices was necessary to constitute a quorum to transact the business of the court, the parties to that proceeding would be denied an opportunity to be heard for lack of a quorum in the absence of further action by the parties or the court. Lake v. State Health Plan for Teachers & State Emples., - N.C. - , - S.E.2d - (Jan. 26, 2021).
Cited in Bradshaw v. Administrative Office of Courts, 83 N.C. App. 237, 349 S.E.2d 621 (1986); State v. Smith, 359 N.C. 199, 607 S.E.2d 607 (2005), cert. denied, - U.S.
- , 126 S. Ct. 109, 163 L. Ed. 2d 121 (2005); HCW Ret. & Fin. Servs., LLC v. HCW Emple. Ben. Servs., LLC, 367 N.C. 104, 747 S.E.2d 236 (2013); State v. Jones, 367 N.C. 299,
758 S.E.2d 345 (2014); State v. Ross, 369 N.C. 393, 794 S.E.2d 289 (2016); City of Asheville v. State, 369 N.C. 80, 794 S.E.2d 759 (2016); Wray v. City of Greensboro,
370 N.C. 41, 802 S.E.2d 894 (2017); State v. Hammonds, 370 N.C. 158, 804 S.E.2d 438 (2017).
Opinions of Attorney General
Length of Service of Supreme Court Justice. - Upon taking office as an Associate Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court, a justice was entitled to have his service as Director and Assistant Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts to be taken into account in calculating his service for longevity purposes, but his service as assistant district attorney could not be taken into account. See opinion of Attorney General to The Honorable Thomas W. Ross, Director, The Administrative Office of the Courts, 1999 N.C. AG LEXIS 28 (9/28/99).
§ 7A-10.1. Authority to prescribe standards of judicial conduct.
The Supreme Court is authorized, by rule, to prescribe standards of judicial conduct for the guidance of all justices and judges of the General Court of Justice.
History
(1973, c. 89.)
Legal Periodicals. - For article, "The Discipline and Removal of Judges in North Carolina," see 4 Campbell L. Rev. 1 (1981).
CASE NOTES
Adoption of Rule Regarding Limitation of Proceedings Did Not Affect Action Already Pending. - Given the unique constitutional and statutory responsibilities of the Supreme Court of North Carolina to promulgate rules of appellate procedure, as well as
rules and standards of conduct for the judiciary, the Supreme Court of North Carolina did not exceed its authority in adopting N.C. Code Jud. Conduct Limitation of Proceedings; however, where a judicial disciplinary action was
already pending when N.C. Code Jud. Conduct Limitation of Proceedings came into effect, the action was not barred. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Brown), 358 N.C. 711, 599
S.E.2d 502 (2004).
§ 7A-11. Clerk of the Supreme Court; salary; bond; fees; oath.
The clerk of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the Supreme Court to serve at its pleasure. The annual salary of the clerk shall be fixed by the Administrative Officer of the Courts, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. The clerk may appoint
assistants in the number and at the salaries fixed by the Administrative Officer of the Courts. The clerk shall perform such duties as the Supreme Court may assign, and shall be bonded to the State, for faithful performance of duty,
in the same manner as the clerk of the superior court, and in such amount as the Administrative Officer of the Courts shall determine. The clerk shall adopt a seal of office, to be approved by the Supreme Court. A fee bill for services
rendered by the clerk shall be fixed by rules of the Supreme Court, and all such fees shall be remitted to the State treasury. Charges to litigants for the reproduction of appellate records and briefs shall be fixed by rule of the
Supreme Court and remitted to the Appellate Courts Printing and Computer Operations Fund established in G.S. 7A-343.3. The operations of the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be subject to the oversight of the State Auditor pursuant
to Article 5A of Chapter 147 of the General Statutes. Before entering upon the duties of his office, the clerk shall take the oath
of office prescribed by law.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1; 1969, c. 1190, s. 2; 1973, c. 750; 1983, c. 913, s. 3; 2002-126, s. 2.2(j); 2019-243, s. 19(a).)
Cross References. - As to remission of moneys collected through charges to litigants for the reproduction of appellate records and briefs under G.S. 7A-11 and G.S. 7A-20(b) to the State Treasurer to be held in the Appellate Courts Printing and Computer Operations Fund, see G.S. 7A-343.3.
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2019-243, s. 19(a), effective November 6, 2019, substituted "The clerk" for "He" at the beginning of the fifth sentence.
§ 7A-12. Supreme Court marshal.
The Supreme Court may appoint a marshal to serve at its pleasure, and to perform such duties as it may assign. The marshal shall have the criminal and civil powers of a sheriff, and any additional powers necessary to execute the orders of the appellate division in any county of the State. His salary shall be fixed by the Administrative Officer, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. The marshal may appoint such assistants, and at such salaries, as may be authorized by the Administrative Officer of the Courts. The Supreme Court, in its discretion, may appoint the Supreme Court librarian, or some other suitable employee of the court, to serve in the additional capacity of marshal.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1.)
§ 7A-13. Supreme Court library; functions; librarian; library committee; seal of office.
- The Supreme Court shall appoint a librarian of the Supreme Court library, to serve at the pleasure of the court. The annual salary of the librarian shall be fixed by the Administrative Officer of the Courts, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. The librarian may appoint assistants in numbers and at salaries to be fixed by the Administrative Officer of the Courts.
- The primary function of the Supreme Court library is to serve the appellate division of the General Court of Justice, but it may render service to the trial divisions of the General Court of Justice, to State agencies, and to the general public, under such regulations as the librarian, subject to the approval of the library committee, may promulgate.
- The library shall be maintained in the city of Raleigh, except that if the Court of Appeals sits regularly in locations other than the city of Raleigh, branch libraries may be established at such locations for the use of the Court of Appeals.
- The librarian shall promulgate rules and regulations for the use of the library, subject to the approval of a library committee, to be composed of two justices of the Supreme Court appointed by the Chief Justice, and one judge of the Court of Appeals appointed by the Chief Judge.
- The librarian may adopt a seal of office.
- The librarian may operate a copying service by means of which he may furnish certified or uncertified copies of all or portions of any document, paper, book, or other writing in the library that legally may be copied. When a certificate is made under his hand and attested by his official seal, it shall be received as prima facie evidence of the correctness of the matter therein contained, and as such shall receive full faith and credit. The fees for copies shall be approved by the library committee, and the fees so collected shall be administered in the same manner as the charges to litigants for the reproduction of appellate records and briefs.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1.)
§ 7A-14. Reprints of Supreme Court Reports.
The Supreme Court is authorized to have such of the Reports of the Supreme Court of the State of North Carolina as are not on hand for sale, republished and numbered consecutively, retaining the present numbers and names of the reporters and by means of star pages in the margin retaining the original numbering of the pages. The Supreme Court is authorized to have such Reports reprinted without any alteration from the original edition thereof, except as may be directed by the Supreme Court. The contract for such reprinting and republishing shall be made by the Administrative Office of the Courts in the manner prescribed in G.S. 7A-6. Such republication shall thus continue until the State shall have for sale all of such Reports; and hereafter when the editions of any number or volume of the Supreme Court Reports shall be exhausted, it shall be the duty of the Supreme Court to have the same reprinted under the provisions of this section and G.S. 7A-6. In reprinting the Reports that have already been annotated, the annotations and the additional indexes therein shall be retained.
History
(Code, s. 3634; 1885, c. 309; 1889, c. 473, ss. 1-4, 6; Rev., s. 5361; 1907, c. 503; 1917, cc. 201, 292; C.S., s. 7671; 1923, c. 176; 1929, c. 39, s. 2; 1975, c. 328.)
Editor's Note. - This section was formerly G.S. 147-52. It was revised and transferred to its present position by Session Laws 1975,
c. 328.
§ 7A-15: Reserved for future codification purposes.
ARTICLE 4. Court of Appeals.
Sec.
§ 7A-16. Creation and organization.
The Court of Appeals is created effective January 1, 1967. It shall consist initially of six judges, elected by the qualified voters of the State for terms of eight years. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall designate one of the judges as Chief Judge, to serve in such capacity at the pleasure of the Chief Justice. Before entering upon the duties of his office, a judge of the Court of Appeals shall take the oath of office prescribed for a judge of the General Court of Justice.
The Governor on or after July 1, 1967, shall make temporary appointments to the six initial judgeships. The appointees shall serve until January 1, 1969. Their successors shall be elected at the general election for members of the General Assembly in November, 1968, and shall take office on January 1, 1969, to serve for the remainder of the unexpired term which began on January 1, 1967.
Upon the appointment of at least five judges, and the designation of a Chief Judge, the court is authorized to convene, organize, and promulgate, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, such supplementary rules as it deems necessary and appropriate for the discharge of the judicial business lawfully assigned to it.
Effective January 1, 1969, the number of judges is increased to nine, and the Governor, on or after March 1, 1969, shall make temporary appointments to the additional judgeships thus created. The appointees shall serve until January 1, 1971. Their successors shall be elected at the general election for members of the General Assembly in November, 1970, and shall take office on January 1, 1971, to serve for the remainder of the unexpired term which began on January 1, 1969.
Effective January 1, 1977, the number of judges is increased to 12; and the Governor, on or after July 1, 1977, shall make temporary appointments to the additional judgeships thus created. The appointees shall serve until January 1, 1979. Their successors shall be elected at the general election for members of the General Assembly in November, 1978, and shall take office on January 1, 1979, to serve the remainder of the unexpired term which began on January 1, 1977.
On or after December 15, 2000, the Governor shall appoint three additional judges to increase the number of judges to 15.
The Court of Appeals shall sit in panels of three judges each and may also sit en banc to hear or rehear any cause upon a vote of the majority of the judges of the court. The Chief Judge insofar as practicable shall assign the members to panels in such fashion that each member sits a substantially equal number of times with each other member, shall preside when a member of a panel, and shall designate the presiding judge of the other panel or panels.
Except as may be provided in G.S. 7A-32, three judges shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of the business of the court when sitting in panels of three judges, and a majority of the then sitting judges on the Court of Appeals shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of the business of the court when sitting en banc.
In the event the Chief Judge is unable, on account of absence or temporary incapacity, to perform the duties placed upon him as Chief Judge, the Chief Justice shall appoint an acting Chief Judge from the other judges of the Court, to temporarily discharge the duties of Chief Judge.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1; 1969, c. 1190, s. 3; 1973, c. 301; 1977, c. 1047; 2000-67, s. 15.5(a); 2004-203, s. 16; 2016-125, 4th Ex. Sess., s. 22(a); 2017-7, s. 1; 2019-2, s. 1.)
Elections for Judicial Offices 2018. - Session Laws 2017-214, s. 4(a), eliminated party primary elections for candidates for Justice of the Supreme Court, Judges of the Court of Appeals, superior court judges, and district court judges, for the November 6, 2018, general election, and s. 4(b)-(k) of that act provides for notices of candidacy, requirements, a timeline, filing fees, and method of determining the winner of each race. For full text of Session Laws 2017-214, s. 4(a)-(k), see note at G.S. 163A-970.
Session Laws 2018-3, s. 2(a)-(d), as amended by Session Laws 2018-130, ss. 2, 3, provides: "The General Assembly finds that both chambers of the General Assembly have carefully examined judicial redistricting and the forms of judicial selection with multiple committees considering various proposals of selection and new judicial district maps. The General Assembly finds that, to allow for more time to thoughtfully consider these changes, the General Assembly enacted S.L. 2017-214, the Electoral Freedom Act of 2017, which, among other items, provided for a one-time cancellation of partisan primaries for the offices of district court judge, superior court judge, judges of the Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court justices for the 2018 election cycle. The General Assembly finds that all elections for judges in 2018 were to be treated uniformly under S.L. 2017-214, the Electoral Freedom Act of 2017, while those changes were considered.
"The General Assembly notes that election to these offices will be held under a plurality election system, with candidates running under a political party label on the ballot, without having gone through a party primary. The General Assembly finds that ballot language above the sections of election ballots regarding these impacted offices setting forth that the listed party affiliation is only the self-identified party of a candidate at the time of filing will aid voters' understanding of the 2018 judicial races.
"(b) For the 2018 general election, the State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement shall, notwithstanding G.S. 163A-1114(b)(2), list the following judicial offices at the end of all partisan offices listed on the general election ballot:
"(1) Justices of the Supreme Court.
"(2) Judges of the Court of Appeals.
"(3) Judges of the superior courts.
"(4) Judges of the district courts.
"(c) Notwithstanding G.S. 163A-1112, immediately prior to the placement of the judicial offices listed in subsection (b) of this section on the ballot, the following information shall be printed:
"No primaries for judicial office were held in 2018. The information listed by each of the following candidates' names indicates only the candidates' party affiliation or unaffiliated status on their voter registration at the time they filed to run for office.
"(d) Except as provided in this section, ballot order for the judicial offices listed in subsection (b) of this section shall be as provided in Section 4(j) of S.L. 2017-214."
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2016-125, s. 25, 4th Ex Sess., provides: "If any provision of this act or its application is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this act that can be given effect without the invalid provisions or application, and to this end, the provisions of this act are severable."
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2016-125, 4th Ex. Sess., s. 22(a), effective December 16, 2016, rewrote the seventh and eighth paragraphs.
Session Laws 2017-7, s. 1, effective April 26, 2017, added the seventh paragraph.
Session Laws 2019-2, s. 1, effective February 27, 2019, deleted the seventh paragraph, which read: "On or after January 1, 2017, whenever the seat of an incumbent judge becomes vacant prior to the expiration of the judge's term due to the death, resignation, retirement, impeachment, or removal pursuant to G.S. 7A-374.2(8) of the incumbent judge, that seat is abolished until the total number of Court of Appeals seats is decreased to 12."
Legal Periodicals. - For article, "The North Carolina Court of Appeals - An Outline of Appellate Procedure," see 46 N.C.L. Rev. 705 (1968).
For article, "Why the North Carolina Court of Appeals Should Have a Procedure for Sitting En Banc," see 75 N.C.L. Rev. 1981 (1997).
CASE NOTES
Amendment Held Unconstitutional. - Amendment to G.S. 7A-16 effected by Session Laws 2000-67, s. 15.5, which expanded the size of the state Court of Appeals from 12 judges to 15 and which allowed the newly appointed judges to serve until the year 2005 before being required to face a retention election, was unconstitutional to the extent that it conflicted with the provisions of N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 19, requiring a judge appointed to a judicial vacancy to stand for election at the next general election; remaining portions of the amendment by Session Laws 2000-67 were constitutional and could properly be severed from the unconstitutional clause. Pope v. Easley, 354 N.C. 544, 556 S.E.2d 265 (2001).
In enacting the provisions in Session Laws 2000-67, G.S. 15.5, making the creation of the new judgeships effective upon gubernatorial appointment and allowing the appointees to serve for nearly four years before facing election, the General Assembly devised a statutory framework that does not comport with the limitation in N.C. Const. art. IV, § 19, requiring that judicial appointees hold their places only until the next election for members of the General Assembly; section 15.5.(a) operated to create a vacancy at the Court of Appeals, thereby requiring an election to fill the vacancy in the 2002 election cycle. Pope v. Easley, 354 N.C. 544, 556 S.E.2d 265 (2001).
The addition of three new Court of Appeals judgeships by Session Laws 2000-67 was constitutionally permissible and severable from the unconstitutional provision of that act. Pope v. Easley, 354 N.C. 544,
556 S.E.2d 265 (2001).
Cited in State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 163 S.E.2d 376 (1968); Adams-Millis Corp. v. Town of Kernersville, 281 N.C. 147, 187 S.E.2d 704 (1972); In re Annexation Ordinance,
300 N.C. 337, 266 S.E.2d 661 (1980); Bradshaw v. Administrative Office of Courts, 83 N.C. App. 237, 349 S.E.2d 621 (1986).
§ 7A-17: Repealed by Session Laws 1969, c. 1190, s. 57.
§ 7A-18. Compensation of judges.
- The Chief Judge and each associate judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive the annual salary provided in the Current Operations Appropriations Act. Each judge is entitled to reimbursement for travel and subsistence expenses at the rate allowed State employees generally.
- In addition to the reimbursement for travel and subsistence expenses authorized by subsection (a) of this section, and notwithstanding G.S. 138-6, each judge whose permanent residence is at least 50 miles from the City of Raleigh shall also be reimbursed for the mileage the judge travels each week to the City of Raleigh from the judge's home for business of the court. The reimbursement authorized by this subsection shall be calculated for each judge by multiplying the actual round-trip mileage from that judge's home to the City of Raleigh by a rate-per-mile established by the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, but not to exceed the business standard mileage rate set by the Internal Revenue Service.
- In lieu of merit and other increment raises paid to regular State employees, a judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as longevity pay an annual amount equal to four and eight-tenths percent (4.8%) of the annual salary set forth in the Current Operations Appropriations Act payable monthly after five years of service, nine and six-tenths percent (9.6%) after 10 years of service, fourteen and four-tenths percent (14.4%) after 15 years of service, nineteen and two-tenths percent (19.2%) after 20 years of service, and twenty-four percent (24%) after 25 years of service. "Service" means service as a justice or judge of the General Court of Justice, as a member of the Utilities Commission, as an administrative law judge, or as the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts. Service shall also mean service as a district attorney or as a clerk of superior court.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1; 1983, c. 761, s. 243; 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1034, s. 165; c. 1109, ss. 11, 13.1; 1985, c. 698, s. 10(a); 2007-323, ss. 14.21(b), 28.18A(b); 2015-241, s. 30.3(e); 2017-57, s. 35.4(e).)
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2007-323, ss. 14.21(b) and 28.18A(b), effective July 1, 2007, added subsection (a1); in the first sentence of subsection (b), deleted "and" preceding "nineteen" and added "and twenty-four percent (24%) after 25 years of service" at the end.
Session Laws 2015-241, s. 30.3(e), effective July 1, 2015, added "or as the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts" at the end of the next-to-last sentence in subsection (b).
Session Laws 2017-57, s. 35.4(e), effective July 1, 2017, inserted "as an administrative law judge" in the next to the last sentence of subsection (b).
§ 7A-19. Seats and sessions of court.
- The Court of Appeals shall sit in Raleigh, and at such other locations within the State as the Supreme Court may designate.
- The Department of Administration shall provide adequate quarters for the Court of Appeals.
- The Chief Judge shall schedule sessions of the court as required to discharge expeditiously the court's business.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1.)
§ 7A-20. Clerk; oath; bond; salary; assistants; fees.
- The Court of Appeals shall appoint a clerk to serve at its pleasure. Before entering upon the clerk's duties, the clerk shall take the oath of office prescribed for the clerk of the Supreme Court, conformed to the office of clerk of the Court of Appeals, and shall be bonded, in the same manner as the clerk of superior court, in an amount prescribed by the Administrative Officer of the Courts, payable to the State, for the faithful performance of the clerk's duties. The salary of the clerk shall be fixed by the Administrative Officer of the Courts, subject to the approval of the Court of Appeals. The number and salaries of the clerk's assistants, and their bonds, if required, shall be fixed by the Administrative Officer of the Courts. The clerk shall adopt a seal of office, to be approved by the Court of Appeals.
- Subject to approval of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals shall promulgate from time to time a fee bill for services rendered by the clerk, and such fees shall be remitted to the State Treasurer. Charges to litigants for the reproduction of appellate records and briefs shall be fixed by rule of the Supreme Court and remitted to the Appellate Courts Printing and Computer Operations Fund established in G.S. 7A-343.3. The operations of the Court of Appeals shall be subject to the oversight of the State Auditor pursuant to Article 5A of Chapter 147 of the General Statutes.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1; 1983, c. 913, s. 4; 2002-126, s. 2.2(k); 2019-243, s. 19(b).)
Cross References. - As to remission of moneys collected through charges to litigants for the reproduction of appellate records and briefs under G.S. 7A-11 and G.S. 7A-20(b) to the State Treasurer to be held in the Appellate Courts Printing and Computer Operations Fund, see G.S. 7A-343.3.
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2019-243, s. 19(b), effective November 6, 2019, substituted "the clerk's" for "his" throughout subsection (a).
§ 7A-21. Marshal; powers; salary.
The Court of Appeals may appoint a marshal to serve at its pleasure and to perform such duties as it may assign. The marshal shall have the criminal and civil powers of a sheriff and any additional powers necessary to execute the orders of the appellate division in any county of the State. His salary shall be fixed by the Administrative Officer, subject to the approval of the Court of Appeals.
History
(1981, c. 485.)
§§ 7A-22 through 7A-24: Reserved for future codification purposes.
ARTICLE 5. Jurisdiction.
Sec.
§ 7A-25. Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to hear claims against the State, but its decisions shall be merely recommendatory; no process in the nature of execution shall issue thereon; the decisions shall be reported to the next session of the General Assembly for its action. The court shall by rule prescribe the procedures to be followed in the proper exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by this section.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1.)
CASE NOTES
Section Unconstitutional. - Even if the General Assembly did not intend to repeal this section by ratification of the 1971 revision of N.C. Const., Art. IV, this section is unconstitutional. Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303,
222 S.E.2d 412 (1976).
This section was rendered null and void when the electorate approved revised N.C. Const., Art. IV, which deleted the provision granting the Supreme Court original jurisdiction of claims against the State. Smith v. State,
289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976).
Legislative Intent to Repeal. - It was the intent of the General Assembly that upon the ratification of the 1971 revision of N.C. Const., Art. IV, this section be repealed, since the jurisdiction which this section purports to give to the Supreme Court
exceeded that granted to it in the 1971 revision of N.C. Const., Art. IV. Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976).
No Execution to Enforce Judgment Available from Supreme Court. - In the event a plaintiff is successful in establishing a claim for breach of contract against the State, he cannot obtain execution from the Supreme Court to enforce the judgment. Smith
v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976).
§ 7A-26. Appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals respectively have jurisdiction to review upon appeal decisions of the several courts of the General Court of Justice and of administrative agencies, upon matters of law or legal inference, in accordance with the system of appeals provided in this Article.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1.)
Legal Periodicals. - For article, "A Powerless Judiciary? The North Carolina Courts' Perceptions of Review of Administrative Action," see 12 N.C. Cent. L.J. 21 (1980).
For article, "Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge / Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion," see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 993 (1986).
CASE NOTES
Jurisdiction of Court of Appeals. - Court of Appeals of North Carolina had jurisdiction to consider a claimant's constitutional challenge to an act of the North Carolina General Assembly on appeal from a final decision and order of the North Carolina
Industrial Commission because the claimant's constitutional challenge was not required to be heard by a three-judge panel of the Superior Court of Wake County, North Carolina. In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490,
797 S.E.2d 275 (2017).
Appeals in Civil Causes Distinguished from Appeals in Criminal Causes. - The constitutional and statutory structure of the General Court of Justice provides that, generally, appeals from the district court in civil causes go to the Court of Appeals, while
appeals in criminal causes must first go to the superior court. State v. Killian, 25 N.C. App. 224, 212 S.E.2d 419 (1975).
Supreme Court Has Authority to Give Relief for Error of Law. - Supreme Court has authority to review the record on appeal and to give appropriate relief for an error of law committed by the trial court. State v. Lampkins,
286 N.C. 497, 212 S.E.2d 106 (1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909, 96 S. Ct. 3220, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1216 (1976).
But No Authority to Grant Relief from Criminal Trial Free from Error of Law. - Supreme Court has no authority to grant relief to a defendant convicted of a criminal offense in a trial free from an error of law for the reason that it disagrees with the
jury concerning the credibility of a witness for the State. State v. Lampkins, 286 N.C. 497, 212 S.E.2d 106 (1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909, 96 S. Ct. 3220, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1216
(1976).
Supreme Court must accept as conclusive the verdict of the jury so far as the credibility of witnesses is concerned. State v. Lampkins, 286 N.C. 497, 212 S.E.2d 106 (1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909,
96 S. Ct. 3220, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1216 (1976).
Objections and Exceptions Necessary to Preserve Legal Questions on Appeal. - Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on appeal is limited to questions of law or legal inference, which ordinarily must be presented by objections duly entered and exceptions duly
taken to the rulings of the lower court. State v. Hedrick, 289 N.C. 232, 221 S.E.2d 350 (1976).
When Findings of Trial Court Are Conclusive on Appeal. - Where evidence properly in the record fully supports the findings of fact which the trial court made, and the record itself does not disclose that these findings were based on information obtained
by the trial judge in a manner violative of plaintiff's rights, the trial court's findings are conclusive on appeal. Horton v. Horton, 12 N.C. App. 526, 183 S.E.2d 794, cert.
denied, 279 N.C. 727, 184 S.E.2d 884 (1971).
It is not the function of the Court of Appeals to make findings of fact. Horton v. Horton, 12 N.C. App. 526, 183 S.E.2d 794, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 727, 184 S.E.2d 884 (1971).
The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to entertain a motion for summary judgment made for the first time on appeal. Britt v. Allen, 12 N.C. App. 399, 183 S.E.2d 303 (1971).
Court of Appeals Without Jurisdiction. - Court of appeals was without jurisdiction to consider estates' appeal, arguing that the Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program was unconstitutional, because, pursuant to the Compensation
Program and the Tort Claims Act, the North Carolina Industrial Commission was constituted a court for resolution of the matters; the appropriate procedure was for the Commission to transfer the action to the Superior Court of Wake
County for resolution by a three-judge panel. In re Hughes, 245 N.C. App. 398, 785 S.E.2d 111 (2016).
Cited in State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 163 S.E.2d 376 (1968); State v. Morris, 41 N.C. App. 164, 254 S.E.2d 241 (1979).
§ 7A-27. Appeals of right from the courts of the trial divisions.
-
Appeal lies of right directly to the Supreme Court in any of the following cases:
- All cases in which the defendant is convicted of murder in the first degree and the judgment of the superior court includes a sentence of death.
- From any final judgment in a case designated as a mandatory complex business case pursuant to G.S. 7A-45.4 or designated as a discretionary complex business case pursuant to Rule 2.1 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts.
-
From any interlocutory order of a Business Court Judge that does any of the following:
- Affects a substantial right.
- In effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken.
- Discontinues the action.
- Grants or refuses a new trial.
- Any trial court's decision regarding class action certification under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 23.
- Repealed by Session Laws 2021-18, s. 1, effective July 1, 2021, and applicable to appeals filed on or after that date.
- Repealed by Session Laws 2016-125, s. 22(b), 4th Ex. Sess., effective December 1, 2016.
-
Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, appeal lies of right directly to the Court of Appeals in any of the following cases:
- From any final judgment of a superior court, other than one based on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, including any final judgment entered upon review of a decision of an administrative agency, except for a final judgment entered upon review of a court martial under G.S. 127A-62.
- From any final judgment of a district court in a civil action.
-
From any interlocutory order or judgment of a superior court or district court in a civil action or proceeding that does any of the following:
- Affects a substantial right.
- In effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken.
- Discontinues the action.
- Grants or refuses a new trial.
- Determines a claim prosecuted under G.S. 50-19.1.
- Grants temporary injunctive relief restraining the State or a political subdivision of the State from enforcing the operation or execution of an act of the General Assembly. This sub-subdivision only applies where the State or a political subdivision of the State is a party in the civil action.
- From any other order or judgment of the superior court from which an appeal is authorized by statute.
- through (e) Repealed by Session Laws 2013-411, s. 1, effective August 23, 2013.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1; 1971, c. 377, s. 3; 1973, c. 704; 1977, c. 711, s. 4; 1987, c. 679; 1995, c. 204, s. 1; 2010-193, s. 17; 2013-411, s. 1; 2014-100, s. 18B.16(e); 2014-102, s. 1; 2015-264, s. 1(b); 2016-125, 4th Ex. Sess., s. 22(b); 2017-7, s. 2; 2021-18, s. 1.)
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2010-193, s. 23 provides: "Prosecutions for offenses committed before the effective date of this act are not abated or affected by this act, and the statutes that would be applicable but for this act remain applicable to those prosecutions."
Session Laws 2014-100, s. 18B.16(f) made subsection (a1) and subdivision (b)(3)f of this section, as added by Session Laws 2014-100, s. 18B.16(e), effective August 7, 2014, and applicable to any claim filed on or after that date or asserted in an amended pleading on or after that date that asserts that an act of the General Assembly is either facially invalid or invalid as applied to a set of factual circumstances on the basis that the act violates the North Carolina Constitution or federal law.
Session Laws 2014-100, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as 'The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2014.'"
Session Laws 2014-100, s. 38.7, is a severability clause.
Session Laws 2014-102, s. 9, made the amendment to this section by Session Laws 2014-102, s. 1, effective October 1, 2014, and applicable to actions designated as mandatory complex business cases on or after that date.
Session Laws 2015-264, s. 91.7, is a severability clause.
Session Laws 2016-125, 4th Ex Sess., s. 25, is a severability clause.
Session Laws 2017-7, s. 5, made subdivision (a)(5) of this section, as added by Session Laws 2017-7, s. 2, effective January 1, 2019, and applicable to appeals filed on or after that date. Subdivision (a)(4) of this section, as added by Session Laws 2017-7, s. 2, was effective April 26, 2017.
Session Laws 2021-18, s. 5, made the repeal of subdivision (a)(5) by Session Laws 2021-18, s. 1, effective July 1, 2021, and applicable to appeals filed on or after that date.
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2010-193, s. 17, effective December 1, 2010, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, inserted "except for a final judgment entered upon review of a court-martial under G.S. 127A-62", in subsection (b).
Session Laws 2013-411, s. 1, effective August 23, 2013, rewrote subsection (b); and repealed former subsections (c) through (e).
Session Laws 2014-100, s. 18B.16(e), effective July 1, 2014, added subsection (a1) and subdivision (b)(3)f. See Editor's note for effective date and applicability.
Session Laws 2014-102, s. 1, rewrote subsection (a); and substituted "that" for "which" in the introductory paragraph of (b)(3). See Editor's note for effective date and applicability.
Session Laws 2015-264, s. 1.(b), effective October 1, 2015, inserted "Except as provided in subsection (a) or (a1) of this section" at the beginning of subsection (b); and in subdivision (b)(1), deleted "the one described in subsection (a) of this section, or" preceding "one based on a plea"; and made minor stylistic changes.
Session Laws 2016-125, 4th Ex. Sess., s. 22(b), effective December 16, 2016, deleted former subsection (a1), related to facial challenges to certain criminal and civil judgments; and in subsection (b), deleted "or (a1)" following "subsection (a)" in the introductory language, and in subdivision (b)(3)f., deleted "as applied against a party in a civil action" from the end of the first sentence, and deleted the former last sentence, which read: "This sub-subdivision does not apply to facial challenges to an act's validity heard by a three-judge panel pursuant to G.S. 1-267.1."
Session Laws 2017-7, s. 2, added subdivisions (a)(4) and (a)(5). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.
Session Laws 2021-18, s. 1, deleted subdivision (a)(5). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.
Legal Periodicals. - For survey of 1977 law on civil procedure, see 56 N.C.L. Rev. 874 (1978).
For survey of 1978 law on civil procedure, see 57 N.C.L. Rev. 891 (1979).
For survey of 1979 law on civil procedure, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1261 (1980).
For comment on capital sentencing statute, see 16 Wake Forest L. Rev. 765 (1980).
For survey of 1980 law on civil procedure, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1062 (1981).
For survey of 1981 law on civil procedure, see 60 N.C.L. Rev. 1214 (1982).
For comment discussing interlocutory appeals in North Carolina in light of Stephenson v. Stephenson, 55 N.C. App. 250, 285 S.E.2d 281 (1981), see 18 Wake Forest L. Rev. 857 (1982).
For 1984 survey, "Double Jeopardy and Substantial Rights in North Carolina Appeals," see 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1061 (1985).
For article, "The Substantial Right Doctrine and Interlocutory Appeals," see 17 Campbell L. Rev. 71 (1995).
For article, "Functus Officio: Authority of the Trial Court after Notice of Appeal," see 81 N.C.L. Rev. 2331 (2003).
For recent development: " 'Deference Does Not by Definition Preclude Relief': The Impact of Miller-El v. Dretke on Batson Review in North Carolina Capital Appeals," see 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1328 (2006).
For comment, "Finality and Clarity Regarding Pending Claims for Attorney's Fees: Duncan and the Superfluous 54(b) Certification," see 36 Campbell L. Rev. 339 (2014).
For comment, "Revival of Roosevelt: Analyzing Expansion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Light of the Resurgence of State 'Court-Packing' Plans," see 96 N.C.L. Rev. 1126 (2018).
CASE NOTES
- I. General Consideration.
- II. Sentence of Death or Life Imprisonment.
- III. Final Judgments.
- IV. Interlocutory Orders.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
This section was not repealed or nullified by the enactment of
Chapter 1A of the General Statutes prescribing the presently effective Rules of Civil Procedure. Wachovia Realty Invs. v. Housing, Inc.,
292 N.C. 93, 232 S.E.2d 667 (1977).
There is no conflict between G.S. 15A-1444(e) and subsection (a) of this section. State v. Handy, 326 N.C. 532, 391 S.E.2d 159 (1990).
Construction with G.S. 150B-51 and G.S. 150B-52. - In an action arising from allegations of age discrimination, while the superior court properly applied both a de novo review and the whole-record test to the respective issues on appeal under G.S. 150B-51(b)
when it reviewed the final decision of the State Personnel Commission (SPC), it erred when it improperly substituted its judgment for that of the SPC under the whole-record test. Thus, remand was ordered for the superior court
to affirm the SPC's final agency decision. Trotter v. N.C. HHS, 189 N.C. App. 655, 659 S.E.2d 749 (2008).
Applicability. - Because G.S. 7A-27 governed appeals of right in ordinary civil actions, G.S. 7A-29(a), which applied generally to appeals from the North Carolina Industrial Commission and other administrative agencies, did not apply to estates' appeal
arguing that the Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program was unconstitutional. In re Hughes, 245 N.C. App. 398, 785 S.E.2d 111 (2016).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari Granted. - Because the court of appeals did not state the procedure for review, the trial court did not enter an appealable order, and defendant did not seek entry of such an order by mandamus, defendant was not entitled to appeal as a matter of right; however, defendant petitioned for review by certiorari, and the court of appeals granted his petition for writ of certiorari in its discretion. State v. Watkins, 246 N.C. App. 725, 783 S.E.2d 279 (2016).
Defendant's written notice of appeal was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the appellate court to review the criminal judgment. However, because defendant's written notice of appeal was limited to the criminal judgment, defendant's written notice of appeal was therefore insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court to review the civil judgment against defendant for attorneys' fees, but the court issued a writ of certiorari to review the issues pertaining to the civil judgment for attorneys' fees. State v. Bowman, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Nov. 3, 2020).
Although defendant lost the statutory right to appeal a civil judgment against defendant imposing attorney's fees because defendant's notice of appeal was defective, the appellate court was satisfied that defendant was diligent in prosecuting the appeal by providing the written notice. Furthermore, because defendant's argument on the issue of attorney's fees was meritorious, the appellate court, in its discretion, allowed defendant's petition for writ of certiorari and issued a writ of certiorari to review the civil judgment of attorney's fees. State v. Corpening, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Feb. 18, 2021).
Standard of Review. - Pursuant to G.S. 7A-27, trial court properly applied a de novo standard of review in a land use appeal when it reversed a decision by a village and its board of adjustment, prohibiting a property owner from using his private property
as a shooting range, as the land use ordinance in place at the time that he bought the property did not bar shooting ranges and he did not materially alter the prior non-conforming use. Land v. Vill. of Wesley Chapel,
206 N.C. App. 123, 697 S.E.2d 458 (2010).
An order is immediately appealable if the order affects a substantial right and the loss of that right will injure the party appealing if not corrected prior to final judgment. Travco Hotels, Inc. v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co.,
102 N.C. App. 659, 403 S.E.2d 593, aff'd, 332 N.C. 288, 420 S.E.2d 426 (1992).
Reliance upon a substantial rights analysis as the basis for appellate review appears contrary to the plain and unambiguous language of the statutes governing criminal appeals. State v. Shoff, 118 N.C. App. 724, 456 S.E.2d 875 (1995), appeal dismissed, 340 N.C. 572, 460 S.E.2d 328 (1995), aff'd, 342 N.C. 638, 466 S.E.2d 277 (1996).
The right to appeal is available through two channels. G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b) allows appeal if there has been a final judgment as to all of the claims and parties, or if the specific action of the trial court from which appeal is taken is final and the
trial judge expressly determines that there is no just reason for delaying the appeal. The second channel to an appeal is by way of G.S. 1-277 or this section; an appeal will be permitted under these statutes if a substantial
right would be affected by not allowing appeal before final judgment. Brown v. Brown, 77 N.C. App. 206, 334 S.E.2d 506, cert. denied, 315 N.C. 389,
338 S.E.2d 878 (1985).
Finality Requirement. - The statutes setting forth the appeals process do not include the same jurisdictional "finality" requirement as does the federal statute. Goldston v. AMC, 326 N.C. 723, 392 S.E.2d 735 (1990).
G.S. 1-277 and this section, considered together, provide that no appeal lies to an appellate court from an interlocutory judgment unless that ruling deprives the appellant of a substantial right which it would lose if the ruling were not reviewed before
final judgment. State ex rel. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. IATSE Local 574, 114 N.C. App. 662, 442 S.E.2d 339 (1994).
There was no "substantial interest" exception present to permit appeal under G.S. 1-277 and this section of a court's order denying defendant's summary judgment. Cagle v. Teachy, 111 N.C. App. 244,
431 S.E.2d 801 (1993).
Appeals from other than final judgments are not absolutely barred by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b) and subsection (c) of this section. Estrada v. Jaques, 70 N.C. App. 627, 321 S.E.2d 240 (1984).
Appeal from order granting stay of declaratory action. - Because the issues in this insurance case affected a substantial right that could be lost absent immediate appeal, the appeal from the trial court's interlocutory order granting a stay of the declaratory
action pending a final resolution of the underlying malpractice action was properly before the court. Cinoman v. Univ. of N.C. 234 N.C. App. 481, 764 S.E.2d 619 (2014).
For all practical purposes there is an unlimited right of appeal in North Carolina to the Appellate Division of the General Court of Justice from any final judgment of the superior court or the district court in civil and criminal cases. State v. Black,
7 N.C. App. 324, 172 S.E.2d 217 (1970).
The right to appeal must be exercised in accordance with the established rules of practice and procedure. State v. Black, 7 N.C. App. 324, 172 S.E.2d 217 (1970).
No Right to Appeal From Guilty Plea. - G.S. 7A-27(b) does not provide a route for appeals from guilty pleas. State v. Mungo, 213 N.C. App. 400, 713 S.E.2d 542 (2011).
Appellate court was unable to review whether a trial court abused its discretion by entering a special condition of probation that defendant could not have been employed in any type of law enforcement while on probation; there was no right of appeal under this section because defendant entered an Alford plea. State v. Sale, 232 N.C. App. 662, 754 S.E.2d 474 (2014).
Defendant's forfeiture appeal was dismissed because defendant (1) gave no timely appeal notice and (2) could not seek certiorari review for "failure to take timely action," as, inter alia, G.S. 7A-27(b) provided no guilty plea appeal. State v. Royster,
239 N.C. App. 196, 768 S.E.2d 196 (2015).
This statute should be strictly construed for the purpose of eliminating the unnecessary delay and expense of fragmented appeals and of presenting the whole case for determination in a single appeal from a final judgment. Buchanan v. Rose,
59 N.C. App. 351, 296 S.E.2d 508 (1982).
Particular Facts and Procedural Context Must Be Considered. - It is usually necessary to resolve the question of whether an appeal is premature in each case by considering the particular facts of that case and the procedural context in which the order
from which appeal is sought was entered. Bernick v. Jurden, 306 N.C. 435, 293 S.E.2d 405 (1982).
No Appeal from Voluntary Election to Serve Sentence. - Where the trial court activated defendant's sentence upon his voluntary election to serve the sentence in lieu of the remainder of his probation and not "as a result of a finding of a violation of
probation," defendant had no right to appeal from his activated sentence. State v. Ikard, 117 N.C. App. 460, 450 S.E.2d 927 (1994).
Request for additional sentencing credit. - Defendant's request for additional sentencing credit was not properly before the appellate court because the issue of additional sentencing credit was a matter for administrative action, as provided by G.S.
15-196.4, rather than a subject for appeal; the proper procedure to obtain additional credit was for defendant to initially have presented her claim to the trial court. State v. Cloer, 197 N.C. App. 716, 678 S.E.2d 399 (2009).
Because the trial court did not order a new trial, a property owner and owners' association were not entitled to an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order requiring other lot owners in a subdivision to be joined as necessary parties; the trial
court's decree to rehear evidence was not an order for a new trial because a judgment had not been rendered in the case. Regency Lake Owners' Ass'n v. Regency Lake, LLC, 258 N.C. App. 636, 814 S.E.2d 121 (2018).
Right to Counsel. - G.S. 7A-450 et seq. has generally been construed to limit the right to appointed counsel in criminal cases to direct appeals taken as of right. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974).
Duty to Dismiss Appeal. - It is the duty of an appellate court to dismiss an appeal if there is no right to appeal. Pasour v. Pierce, 46 N.C. App. 636, 265 S.E.2d 652 (1980).
Where an appealing party has no right to appeal, an appellate court should on its own motion dismiss the appeal even though the question of appealability has not been raised by the parties themselves. Metcalf v. Palmer,
46 N.C. App. 622, 265 S.E.2d 484 (1980).
Court would address plaintiffs' appeal, which was not certified pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b), finding that plaintiffs have a substantial right to have the liability of all defendants determined in one proceeding. Camp v. Leonard,
133 N.C. App. 554, 515 S.E.2d 909 (1999).
Appeal from North Carolina Business Court. - Dismissal of an appeal was appropriate because the Court of Appeals of North Carolina lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, in that the appeal was from a final judgment of the North Carolina Business Court, but appeals from final judgments rendered in the North Carolina Business Court were statutorily mandated to be brought in the Supreme Court of North Carolina. Christenbury Eye Ctr., P.A. v. Medflow, Inc., 246 N.C. App. 237, 783 S.E.2d 264 (2016), review dismissed, as moot, writ granted, 793 S.E.2d 218, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 825 (2016).
North Carolina Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear appeal from the North Carolina Business Court because statutory amendments directing such appeals to the North Carolina Supreme Court became effective after the case was designated as a complex
business case. USA Trouser, S.A. de C.V. v. Williams, 258 N.C. App. 192, 812 S.E.2d 373 (2018).
State's Appeal of Expunction Order. - Legislature did not give the State the right to appeal an expunction order in G.S. 15A-145.5 and did not amend G.S. 15A-1445 to include this right. It is not the Supreme Court's role to expand G.S. 15A-145.5 to include
the right to appeal an expunction order, or to construe G.S. 7A-27 as governing procedure in a criminal matter not clearly brought under that statute's provisions authorizing appeals of right from the trial courts. State v.
J.C., 372 N.C. 203, 827 S.E.2d 280 (2019).
Substantial evidence in the record supported an administrative law judge's findings and its dismissal of a day care's petition for a contested case hearing where the day care filed nothing in nearly six months following the filing of the petition, despite
receiving several orders from the administrative law judge to file and serve prehearing statements and other responses to motions. Lincoln v. N.C. HHS, Nutrition Branch, 172 N.C. App. 567, 616 S.E.2d 622 (2005).
Right to Appeal Not Forfeited. - Decedent's nieces and nephews did not forfeit their right to appeal a consent judgment by not taking an immediate appeal of an interlocutory order granting motions to dismiss filed by a personal representative and entities
because the nieces and nephews gave timely notice of appeal after entry of the final consent judgment; order dismissing the entities did not resolve all claims or all rights and liabilities of all parties and was not a final
order under G.S. 1A-1-54(b). Stanford v. Paris, 364 N.C. 306, 698 S.E.2d 37 (Aug. 27, 2010).
Imposition of Satellite-Based Monitoring. - Defendant's appeal challenging imposition of satellite-based monitoring (SBM) was considered as a petition for writ of certiorari and addressed on the merits because, although defendant's oral notice of appeal
was insufficient, at the time of his SBM hearing, defendant did not have any indication that notice of appeal pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) was improper. State v. Clayton, 206 N.C. App. 300, 697 S.E.2d 428 (2010).
Steps on Appeal. - While convictions that result in a judgment of death are automatically appealable to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, all other convictions are properly appealed to the Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-27 and N.C. R. App. P.
4(d), and while neither party filed a motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to defendant's non-capital conviction for burglary, when he appealed his conviction for murder and his death sentence, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, on its own initiative, and consistently with N.C. R. App. P. 2, considered defendant's assignments of error that concerned his burglary conviction under G.S. 14-51 because the issue also related to one of his arguments
regarding an aggravating circumstance. State v. Elliott, 360 N.C. 400, 628 S.E.2d 735 (2006).
Substantial Right Not Affected. - Because the order appealed from did not affect substantial right under G.S. 7A-27, and there was no pending petition for a writ of certiorari, defendant's appeal from a trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss an order to show cause was subject to dismissal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. State v. Oakes, 240 N.C. App. 580, 771 S.E.2d 832 (2015).
Plaintiffs' statement of grounds for review was insufficient to establish that the challenged order affected a substantial right; they asserted in a single sentence that all claims involved the same facts and questions, without explaining how or why a jury's consideration of those facts in various state and federal claims could lead to irreconcilable results, plus plaintiffs also relied on a published case they said was controlling, but whether a ruling affected a substantial right had to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Doe v. City of Charlotte, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Aug. 18, 2020).
North Carolina Industrial Commission. - Because, pursuant to the Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program and the Tort Claims Act, the statute controlled estates' appeal, the North Carolina Industrial Commission had to be included
when the statute referred to "court," "trial court," "district court," or "superior court." In re Hughes, 245 N.C. App. 398, 785 S.E.2d 111 (2016).
Oral Notice of Appeal. - Defendant's oral notice of appeal in open court was sufficient to invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction to review the criminal judgment entered against defendant. State v. Pratt, - N.C. App. - , 840 S.E.2d 875 (2020).
Applied in State v. Henry, 1 N.C. App. 409, 161 S.E.2d 622 (1968); State v. Lentz, 5 N.C. App. 177, 167 S.E.2d 887 (1969); Cline v. Cline, 6 N.C. App. 523, 170 S.E.2d 645 (1969); State v. Moore, 276 N.C. 142, 171 S.E.2d 453 (1970); State v. Tomblin, 276 N.C. 273, 171 S.E.2d 901 (1970); State v. Henderson, 276 N.C. 430,
173 S.E.2d 291 (1970); State v. Miller, 281 N.C. 70, 187 S.E.2d 729 (1972); State v. Cox, 281 N.C. 275, 188 S.E.2d 356 (1972); State v. Harris, 281 N.C. 542,
189 S.E.2d 249 (1972); State v. Lee, 282 N.C. 566, 193 S.E.2d 705 (1973); State v. Edwards, 282 N.C. 578, 193 S.E.2d 736 (1973); State v. Talbert, 282 N.C. 718,
194 S.E.2d 822 (1973); State v. Watkins, 283 N.C. 17, 194 S.E.2d 800 (1973); State v. Washington, 283 N.C. 175, 195 S.E.2d 534 (1973); State
v. Davis, 284 N.C. 701, 202 S.E.2d 770 (1974); Spartan Leasing, Inc. v. Brown, 285 N.C. 689, 208 S.E.2d 649 (1974); State v. Little, 286 N.C. 185,
209 S.E.2d 749 (1974); State v. Ward, 286 N.C. 304, 210 S.E.2d 407 (1974); National Home Life Assurance Co. v. Ingram, 21 N.C. App. 591,
205 S.E.2d 313 (1974); State v. Lowery, 286 N.C. 698, 213 S.E.2d 255 (1975); State v. Smathers, 287 N.C. 226, 214 S.E.2d 112 (1975); State v. Buchanan, 287 N.C. 408,
215 S.E.2d 80 (1975); State v. Brunson, 287 N.C. 436, 215 S.E.2d 94 (1975); State v. Woodson, 287 N.C. 578, 215 S.E.2d 607 (1975); State v. King, 287 N.C. 645,
215 S.E.2d 540 (1975); State v. Bock, 288 N.C. 145, 217 S.E.2d 513 (1975); State v. Sanders, 288 N.C. 285, 218 S.E.2d 352 (1975); State v. McZorn, 288 N.C. 417,
219 S.E.2d 201 (1975); State v. Branch, 288 N.C. 514, 220 S.E.2d 495 (1975); State v. Miller, 288 N.C. 582, 220 S.E.2d 326 (1975); State v. Williams, 288 N.C. 680,
220 S.E.2d 558 (1975); State v. Hammonds, 290 N.C. 1, 224 S.E.2d 595 (1976); State v. Phifer, 290 N.C. 203, 225 S.E.2d 786 (1976); State v. McMorris, 290 N.C. 286,
225 S.E.2d 553 (1976); State v. Thompson, 290 N.C. 431, 226 S.E.2d 487 (1976); State v. Davis, 290 N.C. 511, 227 S.E.2d 97 (1976); State v. Hunter, 290 N.C. 556,
227 S.E.2d 535 (1976); State v. Cawthorne, 290 N.C. 639, 227 S.E.2d 528 (1976); State v. Harris, 290 N.C. 718, 228 S.E.2d 424 (1976); State v. Hicks, 290 N.C. 767,
228 S.E.2d 252 (1976); State v. Davis, 291 N.C. 1, 229 S.E.2d 285 (1976); State v. Monk, 291 N.C. 37, 229 S.E.2d 163 (1976); State v. Beaver, 291 N.C. 137,
229 S.E.2d 179 (1976); State v. Boykin, 291 N.C. 264, 229 S.E.2d 914 (1976); State v. Slade, 291 N.C. 275, 229 S.E.2d 921 (1976); State v. Cousin, 291 N.C. 413,
230 S.E.2d 518 (1976); State v. Miley, 291 N.C. 431, 230 S.E.2d 537 (1976); Bridges v. Bridges, 29 N.C. App. 209, 223 S.E.2d 845 (1976); State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480,
231 S.E.2d 833 (1977); State v. Britt, 291 N.C. 528, 231 S.E.2d 644 (1977); State v. Foddrell, 291 N.C. 546, 231 S.E.2d 618 (1977); State v. Locklear, 291 N.C. 598,
231 S.E.2d 256 (1977); State v. Jones, 291 N.C. 681, 231 S.E.2d 252 (1977); State v. Tilley, 292 N.C. 132,
232 S.E.2d 433 (1977); State v. Warren, 292 N.C. 235, 232 S.E.2d 419 (1977); State v. Stanfield, 292 N.C. 357, 233 S.E.2d 574 (1977); State v. Herndon,
292 N.C. 424, 233 S.E.2d 557 (1977); State v. Womble, 292 N.C. 455, 233 S.E.2d 534 (1977); State v. Jones, 292 N.C. 513, 234 S.E.2d 555
(1977); State v. Siler,
292 N.C. 543, 234 S.E.2d 733 (1977); State v. Willard, 292 N.C. 567, 234 S.E.2d 587 (1977); State v. Beeson, 292 N.C. 602, 234 S.E.2d 595
(1977); State v. Poole, 298 N.C. 254, 258 S.E.2d 339 (1979); State v. Reynolds, 298 N.C. 380, 259 S.E.2d 843 (1979); Whalehead Properties v. Coastland Corp.,
299 N.C. 270, 261 S.E.2d 899 (1980); State ex rel. Child Day-Care Licensing Comm'n v. Fayetteville St. Christian School, 299 N.C. 351, 261 S.E.2d 908 (1980); State v.
Ward, 300 N.C. 150, 266 S.E.2d 581 (1980); State v. Revelle, 301 N.C. 153, 270 S.E.2d 476 (1980); McGinnis v. McGinnis, 44 N.C. App. 381,
261 S.E.2d 491 (1980); State v. Cox, 303 N.C. 75, 277 S.E.2d 376 (1981); Green v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 603, 290 S.E.2d 593 (1982); State v. Corn,
307 N.C. 79, 296 S.E.2d 261 (1982); State v. Clark, 307 N.C. 120, 296 S.E.2d 296 (1982); State v. Sparks, 307 N.C. 71, 296 S.E.2d 451 (1982);
State v. Woodruff,
307 N.C. 264, 297 S.E.2d 382 (1982); State v. Burns, 307 N.C. 224, 297 S.E.2d 384 (1982); State v. Reynolds, 307 N.C. 184, 297 S.E.2d 532
(1982); State v. Chamberlain, 307 N.C. 130, 297 S.E.2d 540 (1982); State v. Woods, 307 N.C. 213, 297 S.E.2d 574 (1982); State v. Taylor, 308 N.C. 185,
301 S.E.2d 358 (1983); State v. Ricks, 308 N.C. 522, 302 S.E.2d 770 (1983); State v. Webb, 309 N.C. 549, 308 S.E.2d 252 (1983); State v. Bates, 309 N.C. 528,
308 S.E.2d 258 (1983); State v. Lang, 309 N.C. 512, 308 S.E.2d 317 (1983); State v. Effler, 309 N.C. 742, 309 S.E.2d 203 (1983); Coastal Chem. Corp. v. Guardian Indus.,
Inc., 63 N.C. App. 176, 303 S.E.2d 642 (1983); In re Watson, 70 N.C. App. 120, 318 S.E.2d 544 (1984); State v. Moore, 311 N.C. 442, 319
S.E.2d 150 (1984); State v. Boyd, 311 N.C. 408, 319 S.E.2d 189 (1984); State v. Withers, 311 N.C. 699, 319 S.E.2d 211 (1984); State v. Joines, 312 N.C. 490,
322 S.E.2d 758 (1984); Johnson v. Brown, 71 N.C. App. 660, 323 S.E.2d 389 (1984); Abner Corp. v. City Roofing & Sheetmetal Co., 73 N.C. App. 470, 326 S.E.2d 632
(1985); State v. Price, 313 N.C. 297, 327 S.E.2d 863 (1985); State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 331 S.E.2d 652 (1985); State v. Grier, 314 N.C. 59,
331 S.E.2d 669 (1985); State v. Williams, 314 N.C. 337, 333 S.E.2d 708 (1985); State v. Spangler, 314 N.C. 374, 333 S.E.2d 722 (1985); State v. McNeely,
314 N.C. 451, 333 S.E.2d 738 (1985); State v. Freeman, 314 N.C. 432, 333 S.E.2d 743 (1985); LaFalce v. Wolcott, 76 N.C. App.
565, 334 S.E.2d 236 (1985); Rivenbark v. Southmark Corp., 77 N.C. App. 225, 334 S.E.2d 451 (1985); State v. Rowe, 81 N.C. App. 469, 344 S.E.2d 574 (1986); State v. Nations,
319 N.C. 318, 354 S.E.2d 510 (1987); State v. Nations, 319 N.C. 329, 354 S.E.2d 516 (1987); State v. Zuniga, 320 N.C. 233,
357 S.E.2d 898 (1987); State v. Brown, 320 N.C. 179, 358 S.E.2d 1 (1987); Kirkman v. Wilson, 86 N.C. App. 561, 358 S.E.2d 550 (1987); Automotive Restyling Concepts,
Inc. v. Central Serv. Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 87 N.C. App. 173, 360 S.E.2d 141 (1987); Tay v. Flaherty, 90 N.C. App. 346, 368 S.E.2d 403 (1988); Wilson Heights Church
of God v. Autry, 94 N.C. App. 111, 379 S.E.2d 691 (1988); Hooper v. C.M. Steel, Inc., 94 N.C. App. 567, 380 S.E.2d 593 (1989); Howard v. Parker, 95 N.C. App.
361, 382 S.E.2d 808 (1989); Vinson v. Wallace, 96 N.C. App. 372, 385 S.E.2d 810 (1989); Looney v. Wilson,
97 N.C. App. 304, 388 S.E.2d 142 (1990); Kimzay Winston-Salem, Inc. v. Jester, 103 N.C. App. 77, 404 S.E.2d 176 (1991); State v. McKinnon, 328 N.C. 668,
403 S.E.2d 474 (1991); Greer v. Parsons, 103 N.C. App. 463, 405 S.E.2d 921 (1991); Donnelly v. Guilford County, 107 N.C. App. 289, 419 S.E.2d 365 (1992); Bennish v.
North Carolina Dance Theater, Inc., 108 N.C. App. 42, 422 S.E.2d 335 (1992); Bowden v. Latta, 337 N.C. 794, 448 S.E.2d 503 (1994); State v. Baity,
340 N.C. 65, 455 S.E.2d 621 (1995); State v. Davis, 340 N.C. 1, 455 S.E.2d 627, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 846, 116 S. Ct. 136, 133 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1995); State v. Johnson,
340 N.C. 32, 455 S.E.2d 644 (1995); State v. Larrimore, 340 N.C. 119, 456 S.E.2d 789 (1995); State v. Rush, 340 N.C. 174, 456 S.E.2d 819
(1995); Johnson v. Hudson, 122 N.C. App. 188, 468 S.E.2d 64 (1996); In re Browning, 124 N.C. App. 190, 476 S.E.2d 465 (1996); Vera v. Five Crow Promotions, Inc.,
130 N.C. App. 645, 503 S.E.2d 692 (1998); Lang v. Lang, 132 N.C. App. 580, 512 S.E.2d 788 (1999); State v. Locklear, 349 N.C. 118, 505 S.E.2d
277 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1075, 119 S. Ct. 1475, 143 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1999); Anderson ex rel. Jerome v. Town of Andrews, 133 N.C. App. 185, 515 S.E.2d 55 (1999); Little v. Hamel, 134 N.C. App. 485, 517 S.E.2d 901 (1999); Eastover Ridge, L.L.C. v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 139 N.C. App. 360, 533 S.E.2d 827 (2000), cert. denied, 353 N.C. 262, 546 S.E.2d 93
(2000); State v. Hooks, 353 N.C. 629, 548 S.E.2d 501 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1155, 122 S. Ct. 1126, 151 L. Ed. 2d 1018 (2002); Moore v. N.C. Coop. Extension Serv., 146 N.C. App. 89, 552 S.E.2d 662 (2001), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 354 N.C. 574, 559 S.E.2d 180 (2001); State v. Holmes, 355 N.C. 719, 565 S.E.2d 154 (2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 1010, 123 S. Ct. 478, 154 L. Ed. 2d 412 (2002); State v. Wiley, 355 N.C. 592, 565 S.E.2d 22 (2002); Boynton v. ESC Med. Sys., 152 N.C. App. 103, 566 S.E.2d 730
(2002); RPR & Assocs. v. Univ. of N. Carolina-Chapel Hill, 153 N.C. App. 342, 570 S.E.2d 510 (2002), cert. dismissed, 357 N.C. 166, 579 S.E.2d 882, cert. denied,
357 N.C. 166, 579 S.E.2d 882 (2003); State v. Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 604 S.E.2d 886 (2004); N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649,
599 S.E.2d 888 (2004); State v. Tirado, 358 N.C. 551, 599 S.E.2d 515 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 909, 125 S. Ct. 1600, 161 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2005); State v. Smith, 359 N.C. 199,
607 S.E.2d 607 (2005), cert. denied, -
U.S. - , 126 S. Ct. 109, 163 L. Ed. 2d 121 (2005); State v. Duke, 360 N.C. 110, 623 S.E.2d 11 (2005); State v. Augustine, 359 N.C. 709, 616 S.E.2d 515 (2005);
State v. Cummings, 361 N.C. 438, 648 S.E.2d 788 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1319, 128 S. Ct. 1888, 170 L. Ed. 2d. 760 (2008); State v. Raines, 362 N.C. 1, 653 S.E.2d
126 (2007), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 129 S. Ct. 2857, 174 L. Ed. 2d 601 (2009); Carl v. State, 192 N.C. App. 544, 665 S.E.2d 787 (2008), review denied, cert. denied, review dismissed, as moot,
363 N.C. 123, 672 S.E.2d 683 (2009); Michael v. Huffman Oil Co., 190 N.C. App. 256, 661 S.E.2d 1 (2008), review denied, 363 N.C. 129, 673 S.E.2d 360 (2009); Early
v. County of Durham, Dep't of Soc. Servs., 193 N.C. App. 334, 667 S.E.2d 512 (2008), review denied, 363 N.C. 372, 678 S.E.2d 237 (2009); Craig v. New Hanover County
Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 678 S.E.2d 351 (June 18, 2009); In re W.B.M., 202 N.C. App. 606, 690 S.E.2d 41 (2010); Caldwell v. Smith,
203 N.C. App. 725, 692 S.E.2d 483 (2010); State v. Brewington, 204 N.C. App. 68, 693 S.E.2d 182 (2010), rev'd 367 N.C. 29, 743 S.E.2d
626, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 660 (2013); Mugno v. Mugno, 205 N.C. App. 273, 695 S.E.2d 495 (2010); Regions Bank v. Baxley Commer. Props., LLC, 206 N.C. App. 293, 697 S.E.2d
417 (2010); State v. Sanders, 208 N.C. App. 142, 701 S.E.2d 380 (2010); Hamilton v. Mortgage Info. Servs., 212 N.C. App. 73, 711 S.E.2d 185 (2011); State v. Williamson,
212 N.C. App. 393, 711 S.E.2d 765 (2011); State v. Phillips, 365 N.C. 103, 711 S.E.2d 122 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1541, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 1493, 182 L. Ed.
2d 176 (U.S. 2012); Fisk v. Murphy, 212 N.C. App. 667, 713 S.E.2d 100 (2011); Point Intrepid, LLC v. Farley, 215 N.C. App. 82, 714 S.E.2d 797 (2011); Johnson v. Antioch United Holy Church, Inc.,
214 N.C. App. 507, 714 S.E.2d 806 (2011); Southern Seeding Serv. v. W.C. English, Inc., 217 N.C. App. 300, 719 S.E.2d 211 (2011); State v. Abbott, 217 N.C. App. 614, 720 S.E.2d 437 (2011); State v. Sistler, 218 N.C. App. 60, 720 S.E.2d 809 (2012), dismissed and review denied 365 N.C. 564, 724 S.E.2d 920, 2012 N.C. LEXIS
337 (N.C. 2012); State v. Adams, 218 N.C. App. 589, 721 S.E.2d 391 (2012); State v. Burrow, 218 N.C. App. 373, 721 S.E.2d 356 (2012); Estate of Livesay v. Livesay, 219 N.C. App. 183, 723 S.E.2d 772 (2012); IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 219 N.C. App. 36, 724 S.E.2d 588 (2012); Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 219 N.C. App. 227, 727 S.E.2d 550 (2012), review denied 366 N.C. 424,
736 S.E.2d 757, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 138 (2013); In re Foreclosure of a Lien by Five Oaks Rec. Ass'n, 219 N.C. App. 321, 724 S.E.2d 98 (2012); Williams v. Habul, 219 N.C. App. 281, 724 S.E.2d 104 (2012); State v. Conley,
220 N.C. App. 50, 724 S.E.2d 163 (2012); James v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Bd. of Educ., 221 N.C. App. 560, 728 S.E.2d 422, review denied, 734 S.E.2d 868, 2012
N.C. LEXIS 1095 (2012); Thorpe v. TJM Ocean Isle Partners LLC, 222 N.C. App. 262, 730 S.E.2d 268 (2012); Estate of Wooden v. Hillcrest Convalescent Ctr., Inc., 222 N.C. App. 396, 731 S.E.2d 500 (2012); MNC Holdings, LLC v. Town of Matthews, 223 N.C. App. 442, 735 S.E.2d 364 (2012); State v.
Randolph, 224 N.C. App. 521, 735 S.E.2d 845 (2012); Gregory v. Pearson, 224 N.C. App. 580, 736 S.E.2d 577 (2012); State v. Hoskins, 225 N.C. App. 177, 736 S.E.2d 631 (2013); McAdoo v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 225 N.C. App. 50, 736 S.E.2d 811 (2013); Hillsboro Partners, LLC v. City of Fayetteville, 226 N.C. App. 30, 738 S.E.2d 819, review denied, 367 N.C. 236, 748 S.E.2d 544, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 1031 (2013); Walters v. Cooper, 226 N.C. App. 166, 739 S.E.2d 185 (2013), aff'd
367 N.C. 117, 748 S.E.2d 144, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 1021 (2013); State v. Ward, 226 N.C. App. 386, 742 S.E.2d 550 (2013); In re Suttles Surveying, P.A., 227 N.C. App. 70, 742 S.E.2d 574, dismissed and review granted, 367 N.C. 252, 749 S.E.2d 840, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 1150 (2013); State v. Webb, 227 N.C. App. 205, 742 S.E.2d 284 (2013);
Lendingtree v. Anderson, 228 N.C. App. 403, 747 S.E.2d 292 (2013); Riggings Homeowners, Inc. v. Coastal Res. Comm'n of N.C. 228 N.C. App. 630, 747 S.E.2d 301 (2013);
Wellons v. White, 229 N.C. App. 164, 748 S.E.2d 709 (2013); In re Raynor, 229 N.C. App. 12, 748 S.E.2d 579 (2013); First Fed. Bank v. Aldridge,
230 N.C. App. 187, 749 S.E.2d 289 (2013); State v. Chukwu, 230 N.C. App. 553, 749 S.E.2d 910 (2013); JPmorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Browning, 230 N.C. App. 537, 750
S.E.2d 555 (2013); Halstead v. Plymale, 231 N.C. App. 253, 750 S.E.2d 894 (2013).
Templeton Props. LP v. Town of Boone, 234 N.C. App. 303, 759 S.E.2d 311 (2014); Shearl v. Town of Highlands, 236 N.C. App. 113, 762 S.E.2d 877 (2014); State v. Allah,
236 N.C. App. 120, 762 S.E.2d 524 (2014); State v. Ricks, 244 N.C. App. 742, 781 S.E.2d 637 (2016); State v. Jefferson, 252 N.C. App. 174,
798 S.E.2d 121 (2017), review denied, 804 S.E.2d 527, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 708 (N.C. 2017), cert. denied, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 1446 (U.S. 2018), cert. denied, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 1446, 200 L. Ed. 2d 318 (U.S. 2018) cert. denied, 138 S. Ct.
1169, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 1446, 200 L. Ed. 2d 318 (2018); State v. Johnson, 253 N.C. App. 337, 801 S.E.2d 123 (2017); Dung Thang Trang v. L J Wings, Inc., - N.C. App. - , 834 S.E.2d 679 (2019).
Cited in Gunter v. Anders, 114 N.C. App. 61, 441 S.E.2d 167 (1994), aff'd on rehearing, 115 N.C. App. 331, 444 S.E.2d 685 (1994), cert. denied, 339 N.C. 612,
454 S.E.2d 250, rehearing dismissed, 339 N.C. 738, 454 S.E.2d 651 (1995); State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 443 S.E.2d 14, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046, 115 S. Ct. 642, 130
L. Ed. 2d 547 (1994); State v. Jones, 336 N.C. 229, 443 S.E.2d 48, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1003, 115 S. Ct. 518, 130 L. Ed 2d 423 (1994), 339 N.C. 619, 454 S.E.2d 263
(1995). State v. Lipscomb, 274 N.C. 436, 163 S.E.2d 788 (1968); State v. Benton, 276 N.C. 641, 174 S.E.2d 793 (1970); State v. Hamby, 276 N.C. 674,
174 S.E.2d 385 (1970); State v. Blackwell, 276 N.C. 714, 174 S.E.2d 534 (1970); Shaw v. Stiles, 13 N.C. App. 173, 185 S.E.2d 268 (1971); Fishel v. Grifton United Methodist
Church, 13 N.C. App. 238, 185 S.E.2d 322 (1971); State v. White, 286 N.C. 395, 211 S.E.2d 445 (1975); State v. McCall, 286 N.C. 472, 212
S.E.2d 132 (1975); State v. Carey, 288 N.C. 254, 218 S.E.2d 387 (1975); State v. Waddell, 289 N.C. 19, 220 S.E.2d 293 (1975); State v. Carter, 289 N.C. 35,
220 S.E.2d 313 (1975); State v. Killian, 25 N.C. App. 224, 212 S.E.2d 419 (1975); State v. Bush, 289 N.C. 159, 221 S.E.2d 333 (1976); State v. Harrill, 289 N.C. 186,
221 S.E.2d 325 (1976); State v. Lester, 289 N.C. 239, 221 S.E.2d 268 (1976); State v. Sellers, 289 N.C. 268, 221 S.E.2d 264 (1976); State v. Alford, 289 N.C. 372,
222 S.E.2d 222 (1976); State v. Norwood, 289 N.C. 424, 222 S.E.2d 253 (1976); State v. McCall, 289 N.C. 512, 223 S.E.2d 303 (1976); State v. Biggs, 289 N.C. 522,
223 S.E.2d 371 (1976); State v. Warren, 289 N.C. 551, 223 S.E.2d 317 (1976); State v. Perry, 293 N.C. 97, 235 S.E.2d 52 (1977); State v. White, 293 N.C. 91,
235 S.E.2d 55 (1977); State v. Bishop, 293 N.C. 84, 235 S.E.2d 214 (1977); State v. Cole, 293 N.C. 328, 237 S.E.2d 814 (1977); State v. Constance, 293 N.C. 581,
238 S.E.2d 294 (1977); State v. Cates, 293 N.C. 462, 238 S.E.2d 465 (1977); State v. Foster, 293 N.C. 674, 239 S.E.2d 449 (1977); State v. Garrison, 294 N.C. 270,
240 S.E.2d 377 (1978); State v. Lester, 294 N.C. 220, 240 S.E.2d 391 (1978); State v. Hill, 294 N.C. 320, 240 S.E.2d 794 (1978); State v. Smith, 294 N.C. 365,
241 S.E.2d 674 (1978); State v. Saults, 294 N.C. 722, 242 S.E.2d 801 (1978); State v. Barbour, 295 N.C. 66, 243 S.E.2d 380 (1978); State v. Medley, 295 N.C. 75,
243 S.E.2d 374 (1978); State v. Potter, 295 N.C. 126, 244 S.E.2d 397 (1978); State v. Freeman, 295 N.C. 210, 244 S.E.2d 680 (1978); State v. Connley, 295 N.C. 327,
245 S.E.2d 663 (1978); State v. Sanders, 295 N.C. 361, 245 S.E.2d 674 (1978); State v. Berry, 295 N.C. 534, 246 S.E.2d 758 (1978); State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559,
247 S.E.2d 905 (1978); State v. Mason, 295 N.C. 584, 248 S.E.2d 241 (1978); State v. Williams, 295 N.C. 655, 249 S.E.2d 709 (1978); State v. Haywood, 295 N.C. 709,
249 S.E.2d 429 (1978); State v. Jones,
296 N.C. 75, 248 S.E.2d 858 (1978); Digsby v. Gregory, 35 N.C. App. 59, 240 S.E.2d 491 (1978); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 36 N.C. App. 755, 245
S.E.2d 399 (1978); Williams v. Holland, 39 N.C. App. 141, 249 S.E.2d 821 (1978); State v. Wade, 296 N.C. 454, 251 S.E.2d 407 (1979); State v. Scott, 296 N.C. 519,
251 S.E.2d 414 (1979); State v. Henley, 296 N.C. 547, 251 S.E.2d 463 (1979); State v. Hunt, 297 N.C. 131, 254 S.E.2d 19 (1979); State v. Ford, 297 N.C. 144,
254 S.E.2d 14 (1979); State v. Stinson, 297 N.C. 168, 254 S.E.2d 23 (1979); State v. Sparks, 297 N.C. 314, 255 S.E.2d 373 (1979); State v. Barnes, 297 N.C. 442,
255 S.E.2d 386 (1979); State v. Davis, 297 N.C. 566, 256 S.E.2d 184 (1979); State v. Silhan, 297 N.C. 660, 256 S.E.2d 702 (1979); State v. Keller, 297 N.C. 674,
256 S.E.2d 710 (1979); State v. Colvin, 297 N.C. 691, 256 S.E.2d 689 (1979); State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 257 S.E.2d 597 (1979); State v. Spaulding, 298 N.C. 149,
257 S.E.2d 391 (1979); State v. Lyles, 298 N.C. 179, 257 S.E.2d 410 (1979); State v. Alford, 298 N.C. 465, 259 S.E.2d 242 (1979); State v. Perry, 298 N.C. 502,
259 S.E.2d 496 (1979); State v. Sanders, 298 N.C. 512, 259 S.E.2d 258 (1979); State v. Boykin, 298 N.C. 687, 259 S.E.2d 883 (1979); State v. Wetmore, 298 N.C. 743,
259 S.E.2d 870 (1979); In re Annexation Ordinance, 300 N.C. 337, 266 S.E.2d 661 (1980); Stahl-Rider, Inc. v. State, 48 N.C. App. 380, 269 S.E.2d 217 (1980); State v.
Small, 301 N.C. 407, 272 S.E.2d 128 (1980); State v. Ashford, 301 N.C. 512, 272 S.E.2d 126 (1980); Nichols v. State Employees' Credit Union, 46 N.C. App. 294, 264 S.E.2d 793 (1980); State v. Martin, 303 N.C. 246, 278 S.E.2d 214 (1981); State v. Bass, 303 N.C. 267, 278 S.E.2d 209 (1981); State v. Freeman, 303 N.C. 299,
278 S.E.2d 207 (1981); Cunningham v. Brown, 51 N.C. App. 264, 276 S.E.2d 718 (1981); Bacon v. Leatherwood, 52 N.C. App. 587, 279 S.E.2d 86 (1981); State v. Misenheimer,
304 N.C. 108, 282 S.E.2d 791 (1981); State v. Silva, 304 N.C. 122, 282 S.E.2d 449 (1981); State v. Poplin, 304 N.C. 185, 282 S.E.2d 420
(1981); Green v. Duke Power Co., 50 N.C. App. 646, 274 S.E.2d 889 (1981); Briggs v. Mid-State Oil Co., 53 N.C. App. 203, 280 S.E.2d 501 (1981); Harris v. Jim Stacy Racing,
Inc., 53 N.C. App. 597, 281 S.E.2d 455 (1981); State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 290 S.E.2d 574 (1982); State v. Howard, 305 N.C. 651, 290 S.E.2d
591 (1982); State v. Black, 305 N.C. 614, 290 S.E.2d 669 (1982); State v. Booker, 306 N.C. 302, 293 S.E.2d 78 (1982); State v. Schneider, 306 N.C. 351,
293 S.E.2d 157 (1982); State v. Breeden, 306 N.C. 533, 293 S.E.2d 788 (1982); State v. Weaver, 306 N.C. 629, 295 S.E.2d 375 (1982); State v. Meadows, 306 N.C. 683,
295 S.E.2d 394 (1982); State v. Powell, 306 N.C. 718, 295 S.E.2d 413 (1982); State v. Rankin, 306 N.C. 712, 295 S.E.2d 416 (1982); State v. Pratt, 306 N.C. 673,
295 S.E.2d 462 (1982); State v. Cabey, 307 N.C. 496, 299 S.E.2d 194 (1983); State v. Cheek, 307 N.C. 552,
299 S.E.2d 633 (1983); State v. Barnett, 307 N.C. 608, 300 S.E.2d 340 (1983); State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628, 300 S.E.2d 351 (1983); State v. Tysor, 307 N.C. 679,
300 S.E.2d 366 (1983); State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 300 S.E.2d 375 (1983); Terry's Floor Fashions, Inc. v. Murray, 61 N.C. App. 569, 300 S.E.2d 888 (1983); State v.
Chatman, 308 N.C. 169, 301 S.E.2d 71 (1983); Schmitt v. Schmitt, 61 N.C. App. 750, 301 S.E.2d 741 (1983); Swindell v. Overton, 62 N.C. App. 160, 302 S.E.2d 841 (1983); State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 307 S.E.2d 339 (1983); American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 63 N.C. App. 38, 303 S.E.2d 649 (1983); State v.
Rothwell, 308 N.C. 782, 303 S.E.2d 798 (1983); Porter v. Matthews Enters., Inc., 63 N.C. App. 140, 303 S.E.2d 828 (1983); Tastee Freez Cafeteria v. Watson, 64 N.C. App. 562, 307 S.E.2d 800 (1983); Johnston County v. McCormick, 65 N.C. App. 63, 308 S.E.2d 872 (1983); State v. Forney, 310 N.C. 126, 310 S.E.2d 20 (1984); Patterson v. DAC
Corp., 66 N.C. App. 110, 310 S.E.2d 783 (1984); Duke Univ. v. Bryant-Durham Elec. Co., 66 N.C. App. 726, 311 S.E.2d 638 (1984); Wallace Butts Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Runge,
68 N.C. App. 196, 314 S.E.2d 293 (1984); State v. Wilson, 311 N.C. 117, 316 S.E.2d 46 (1984); State v. Toomer, 311 N.C. 183, 316 S.E.2d
66 (1984); State v. Maynard, 311 N.C. 1, 316 S.E.2d 197 (1984); State v. Taylor, 311 N.C. 266, 316 S.E.2d 225 (1984); State v. Maccia, 311 N.C. 222, 316 S.E.2d 241 (1984);
State v. Michael, 311 N.C. 214, 316 S.E.2d 276 (1984); State v. Bell, 311 N.C. 131, 316 S.E.2d 611 (1984); State v. Jenkins, 311 N.C. 194,
317 S.E.2d 345 (1984); Elks v. Hannan, 68 N.C. App. 757, 315 S.E.2d 553 (1984); State v. Sanders, 312 N.C. 318, 321 S.E.2d 836 (1984); State v. Hamlet, 312 N.C. 162,
321 S.E.2d 837 (1984); State v. McDonald, 312 N.C. 264, 321 S.E.2d 849 (1984); State v. Brown, 312 N.C. 237, 321 S.E.2d 856 (1984); State v. Randolph, 312 N.C. 198,
321 S.E.2d 864 (1984); State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 322 S.E.2d 370 (1984); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); Smith v. Price, 74 N.C. App. 413, 328 S.E.2d 811 (1985); State v. Wilson, 313 N.C. 516, 330 S.E.2d 450 (1985); State v. Simpson, 314 N.C. 359, 334 S.E.2d 53 (1985); State v. Westmoreland,
314 N.C. 442, 334 S.E.2d 223 (1985); State v. Hayes, 314 N.C. 460, 334 S.E.2d 741 (1985); State v. Hardy, 78 N.C. App. 175, 336 S.E.2d 661
(1985); City of Winston-Salem v. Ferrell, 79 N.C. App. 103, 338 S.E.2d 794 (1986); State v. McClintick, 315 N.C. 649, 340 S.E.2d 41 (1986); State v. King, 316 N.C. 78,
340 S.E.2d 71 (1986); State v. Riddle, 316 N.C. 152, 340 S.E.2d 75 (1986); State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 340 S.E.2d 84 (1986); State v. McLaughlin, 316 N.C. 175,
340 S.E.2d 102 (1986); State v. Bullock, 316 N.C. 180, 340 S.E.2d 106 (1986); State v. Miller, 315 N.C. 773, 340 S.E.2d 290 (1986); State v. Ledford, 315 N.C. 599,
340 S.E.2d 309 (1986); State v. Martin, 315 N.C. 667, 340 S.E.2d 326 (1986); State v. Sidden, 315 N.C. 539, 340 S.E.2d 340 (1986); State v. DeLeonardo,
315 N.C. 762, 340 S.E.2d 350 (1986); State v. Riddick, 316 N.C. 127, 340 S.E.2d 422 (1986); State v. Mason, 315 N.C. 724, 340 S.E.2d 430
(1986); State v. Mize, 316 N.C. 48, 340 S.E.2d 439 (1986); State v. Torain, 316 N.C. 111, 340 S.E.2d 465 (1986); State v. Gladden, 315 N.C. 398,
340 S.E.2d 673 (1986); State v. Woods, 316 N.C. 344, 341 S.E.2d 545 (1986); State v. Moses, 316 N.C. 356, 341 S.E.2d 551 (1986); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203,
341 S.E.2d 713 (1986); State v. Moore, 316 N.C. 328, 341 S.E.2d 733 (1986); State v. Gordon, 316 N.C. 497, 342 S.E.2d 509 (1986); State v. Welch, 316 N.C. 578,
342 S.E.2d 789 (1986); State v. Massey, 316 N.C. 558, 342 S.E.2d 811 (1986); State v. Artis, 316 N.C. 507, 342 S.E.2d 847 (1986); State v. Gardner, 316 N.C. 605,
342 S.E.2d 872 (1986); State v. Henry, 318 N.C. 408, 348 S.E.2d 593 (1986); Little v. City of Locust, 83 N.C. App. 224, 349 S.E.2d 627 (1986); State v. Davis,
321 N.C. 52, 361 S.E.2d 724 (1987); State v. Strickland, 321 N.C. 31, 361 S.E.2d 882 (1987); State v. Childress, 321 N.C. 226, 362 S.E.2d
263 (1987); State v. McLaughlin, 321 N.C. 267, 362 S.E.2d 280 (1987); State v. Rael, 321 N.C. 528, 364 S.E.2d 125 (1988); State v. Mitchell,
321 N.C. 650, 365 S.E.2d 554 (1988); State v. Weathers, 322 N.C. 97, 366 S.E.2d 471 (1988); State v. Reid, 322 N.C. 309, 367 S.E.2d 672
(1988); State v. Weeks, 322 N.C. 152, 367 S.E.2d 895 (1988); Atkins v. Mitchell, 91 N.C. App. 730, 373 S.E.2d 152 (1988); State v. Hunt, 323 N.C. 407,
373 S.E.2d 400 (1988); State v. Ford, 323 N.C. 466, 373 S.E.2d 420 (1988); State v. Rose, 323 N.C. 455, 373 S.E.2d 426 (1988); State v. Stone, 323 N.C. 473,
373 S.E.2d 430 (1988); Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic v. Petrozza, 92 N.C. App. 21, 373 S.E.2d 449 (1988); State v. Deanes, 323 N.C. 508, 374 S.E.2d 249 (1988); State
v. Shytle, 323 N.C. 684, 374 S.E.2d 573 (1989); State v. Tidwell, 323 N.C. 668, 374 S.E.2d 577 (1989); State v. Rogers, 323 N.C. 658, 374
S.E.2d 852 (1989); State v. Silvers, 323 N.C. 646, 374 S.E.2d 858 (1989); State v. Parks, 324 N.C. 94, 376 S.E.2d 4 (1989); State v. McSwain, 324 N.C. 241,
376 S.E.2d 453 (1989); State v. Ball, 324 N.C. 233, 377 S.E.2d 70 (1989); Cochran v. Cochran, 93 N.C. App. 574, 378 S.E.2d 580 (1989); State v. Bridges,
325 N.C. 529, 385 S.E.2d 337 (1989); State v. Coker, 325 N.C. 686, 386 S.E.2d 196 (1989); State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 386 S.E.2d 418 (1989);
State v. Melvin, 326 N.C. 173, 388 S.E.2d 72 (1990), review dismissed, 792 S.E.2d 506, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 673 (2016); Crist v. Moffatt, 326 N.C. 326, 389 S.E.2d 41 (1990);
Kirkman v. Wilson, 98 N.C. App. 242, 390 S.E.2d 698 (1990); State v. Richardson, 328 N.C. 505, 402 S.E.2d 401 (1991); Telerent Leasing Corp. v. Barbee, 102 N.C. App. 129, 401 S.E.2d 122 (1991); State v. Terry, 329 N.C. 191, 404 S.E.2d 658 (1991); State v. Weddington, 329 N.C. 202, 404 S.E.2d 671 (1991); Peoples Sav. & Loan Assoc.
v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 103 N.C. App. 762,
407 S.E.2d 251 (1991); Plummer v. Kearney, 108 N.C. App. 310, 423 S.E.2d 526 (1992); 505 U.S. 1226, 112 S. Ct. 3045, 120 L. Ed. 2d 913 (1992); State v. Heatwole, 333 N.C. 156,
423 S.E.2d 735 (1992); State v. Pope, 333 N.C. 106, 423 S.E.2d 740 (1992); State v. Pope, 333 N.C. 116, 423 S.E.2d 746 (1992); State v. Williamson,
333 N.C. 128, 423 S.E.2d 766 (1992); State v. Bronson, 333 N.C. 67, 423 S.E.2d 772 (1992); Kaplan v. Prolife Action League, 111 N.C. App. 1, 431 S.E.2d 828 (1993); Milner Airco, Inc. v. Morris, 111 N.C. App. 866, 433 S.E.2d 811 (1993); T.H. Blake Contracting Co. v. Sorrells, 109 N.C. App. 119, 426 S.E.2d
85 (1993); In re Huang, 110 N.C. App. 683, 431 S.E.2d 541 (1993); McNeil v. Hicks, 111 N.C. App. 262, 431 S.E.2d 868 (1993); State v. Harvell, 334 N.C. 356, 432 S.E.2d
125 (1993); City of Winston-Salem v. Yarbrough, 117 N.C. App. 340, 451 S.E.2d 358 (1994), cert. denied, 340 N.C. 110 (1995), cert. denied,
340 N.C. 260, 456 S.E.2d 519 (1995); State v. Collins, 335 N.C. 729, 440 S.E.2d 559 (1994); State v. Barton, 335 N.C. 696, 441 S.E.2d 295
(1994); Adams v. Jones, 114 N.C. App. 256, 441 S.E.2d 699 (1994); State v. Howell, 335 N.C. 457, 439 S.E.2d 116 (1994); State v. Lee,
335 N.C. 244, 439 S.E.2d 547 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 891, 115 S. Ct. 239, 130 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1994); State v. Patterson, 335 N.C. 437, 439 S.E.2d 578 (1994); State
v. Mason, 336 N.C. 595, 444 S.E.2d 169 (1994); State v. Godwin, 336 N.C. 499, 444 S.E.2d 206 (1994); State v. McDougald, 336 N.C. 451, 444
S.E.2d 211 (1994); State v. Arrington, 336 N.C. 592, 444 S.E.2d 418 (1994); State v. McIntosh, 336 N.C. 517, 444 S.E.2d 438 (1994); State v. Morston,
336 N.C. 381, 445 S.E.2d 1 (1994); State v. Jones, 336 N.C. 490, 445 S.E.2d 23 (1994); State v. Lynch, 337 N.C. 415, 445 S.E.2d 581 (1994);
State v. Carson, 337 N.C. 407, 445 S.E.2d 585 (1994); State v. Fisher, 336 N.C. 684, 445 S.E.2d 866 (1994); State v. Ingle,
336 N.C. 617, 445 S.E.2d 880 (1994); State v. Moseley, 336 N.C. 710, 445 S.E.2d 906 (1994); State v. Eason, 336 N.C. 730, 445 S.E.2d 917
(1994); State v. Dobson, 337 N.C. 464, 446 S.E.2d 14 (1994); State v. Jones, 337 N.C. 198, 446 S.E.2d 32 (1994); State v. Mason, 337 N.C. 165,
446 S.E.2d 58 (1994); State v. Alexander, 337 N.C. 182, 446 S.E.2d 83 (1994); State v. Johnson, 337 N.C. 212, 446 S.E.2d 92 (1994); State v. Skipper, 337 N.C. 1, 446
S.E.2d 252 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1134, 115 S. Ct. 953, 130 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1995), cert. dismissed, 342 N.C. 417, 465 S.E.2d 547 (1995); State v. Daniels,
337 N.C. 243, 446 S.E.2d 298 (1994); State v. Quick, 337 N.C. 359, 446 S.E.2d 535 (1994); State v. Bacon, 337 N.C. 66, 446 S.E.2d 542 (1994);
State v. Taylor, 337 N.C. 597, 447 S.E.2d 360 (1994); State v. Terry, 337 N.C. 615, 447 S.E.2d 720 (1994); State v. Blankenship,
337 N.C. 543, 447 S.E.2d 727 (1994); State v. Shuford, 337 N.C. 641, 447 S.E.2d 742 (1994); State v. Elmore, 337 N.C. 789,
448 S.E.2d 501 (1994); State v. Gray, 337 N.C. 772, 448 S.E.2d 794 (1994); State v. Sidberry, 337 N.C. 779, 448 S.E.2d 798 (1994); State v. Reeves, 337 N.C. 700,
448 S.E.2d 802 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1114, 115 S. Ct. 1971, 131 L. Ed. 2d 860 (1995)
Alexander v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 116 N.C. App. 15, 446 S.E.2d 847 (1994); Epps v. Duke Univ., Inc., 116 N.C. App. 305, 447 S.E.2d 444 (1994); State
v. Herring, 338 N.C. 271, 449 S.E.2d 183 (1994); State v. Jones, 339 N.C. 114, 451 S.E.2d 826 (1994); State v. Spruill, 338 N.C. 612, 452
S.E.2d 279 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 834, 116 S. Ct. 111, 133 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1995); State v. Alford, 339 N.C. 562, 453 S.E.2d 512 (1995); State v. Lovin, 339 N.C. 695,
454 S.E.2d 229 (1995); State v. Taylor, 340 N.C. 52, 455 S.E.2d 859 (1995); State v. Bowie, 340 N.C. 199, 456 S.E.2d 771 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 994, 116 S. Ct.
529, 133 L.E.2d 435 (1995); State v. Shoff, 118 N.C. App. 724, 456 S.E.2d 875 (1995), appeal dismissed, 340 N.C. 572, 460 S.E.2d 328 (1995), aff'd, 342 N.C. 638,
466 S.E.2d 277 (1996); State v. Worthy, 341 N.C. 707, 462 S.E.2d 482 (1995); State v. Butler, 341 N.C. 686, 462 S.E.2d 485 (1995); State v. Walls, 342 N.C. 1,
463 S.E.2d 738 (1995); State v. Pleasant, 342 N.C. 366, 464 S.E.2d 284 (1995); State v. Buckner, 342 N.C. 198, 464 S.E.2d 414 (1995); State
v. Marr, 342 N.C. 607, 467 S.E.2d 236 (1996); State v. Straing, 342 N.C. 623, 466 S.E.2d 278 (1996); Willoughby v. Board of Trustees, 121 N.C. App. 444, 466 S.E.2d 285 (1996); State v. Jones, 342 N.C. 628, 467 S.E.2d 233 (1996); State v. Williams, 342 N.C. 869, 467 S.E.2d 392 (1996); State v. Brewton, 342 N.C. 875,
467 S.E.2d 395 (1996); State v. Ransome, 342 N.C. 847, 467 S.E.2d 404 (1996); State v. Murphy, 342 N.C. 813, 467 S.E.2d 428 (1996); State v. Chandler, 342 N.C. 742,
467 S.E.2d 636 (1996); State v. DeCastro, 342 N.C. 667, 467 S.E.2d 653 (1996); State v. Lyons, 343 N.C. 1, 468 S.E.2d 204 (1996); State v. White, 343 N.C. 378,
471 S.E.2d 593 (1996); State v. Kilpatrick, 343 N.C. 466, 471 S.E.2d 624 (1996); State v. Burrus, 344 N.C. 79, 472 S.E.2d 867 (1996); State v. Fullwood, 343 N.C. 725,
472 S.E.2d 883 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1122, 117 S. Ct. 1260, 137 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1997); State v. Singletary, 344 N.C. 95, 472 S.E.2d 895 (1996); State v. Sharpe, 344 N.C. 190,
473 S.E.2d 3 (1996); State v. Bates, 343 N.C. 564, 473 S.E.2d 269 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1131, 117 S. Ct. 992, 136 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1997); State v. Heatwole, 344 N.C. 1,
473 S.E.2d 310 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1122, 117 S. Ct. 1259, 137 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1997); State v. Boyd, 343 N.C. 699, 473 S.E.2d 327 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1096, 117 S. Ct. 778, 136
L. Ed. 2d 722 (1997); State v. Taylor, 344 N.C. 31, 473 S.E.2d 596 (1996); State v. Cunningham, 344 N.C. 341, 474 S.E.2d 772 (1996); State v. Armstrong, 345 N.C. 161,
478 S.E.2d 194 (1996); State v. Thomas, 344 N.C. 639, 477 S.E.2d 450 (1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 824, 118 S. Ct. 84, 139 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997); State v. Stroud, 345 N.C. 106,
478 S.E.2d 476 (1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 826, 118 S. Ct. 86, 139 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1997), cert. dismissed
368 N.C. 424, 799 S.E.2d 145, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1200 (2015); State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 481 S.E.2d 25 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837, 118 S. Ct. 111, 139 L. Ed.
2d 64 (1997); State v. Prevatte, 346 N.C. 162, 484 S.E.2d 377 (1997); State v. Anderson, 346 N.C. 158, 484 S.E.2d 543 (1997); State v. Evans, 346 N.C. 221,
485 S.E.2d 271 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1057, 118 S. Ct. 712, 139 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1998); State v. McNeill, 346 N.C. 233, 485 S.E.2d 284 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1053, 118 S. Ct. 704,
139 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1998); State v. Bunning, 346 N.C. 253, 485 S.E.2d 290 (1997); Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 126 N.C. App. 409, 485 S.E.2d 333 (1997); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Simpson, 126 N.C. App. 393, 485 S.E.2d 337 (1997); State v. Prevatte, 346 N.C. 162, 484 S.E.2d 377 (1997); State
v. Lewis, 346 N.C. 141, 484 S.E.2d 379 (1997); State v. Barnard, 346 N.C. 95, 484 S.E.2d 382 (1997); Barrett v. Hyldburg, 127 N.C. App. 95, 487 S.E.2d 803 (1997); Biggers v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 127 N.C. App. 199, 487 S.E.2d 829 (1997); State v. Pickens, 346 N.C. 628, 488 S.E.2d 162 (1997);
State v. Allen, 346 N.C. 731, 488 S.E.2d 188 (1997); State v. Pierce, 346 N.C. 471, 488 S.E.2d 576 (1997); Town Ctr. Assocs. v. Y & C Corp., 127 N.C. App. 381, 489
S.E.2d 434 (1997); State v. Peterson, 347 N.C. 253, 491 S.E.2d 223 (1997); State v. Sidden, 347 N.C. 218, 491 S.E.2d 225 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1097, 118 S.
Ct. 1583, 140 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1998); State v. Warren, 347 N.C. 309, 492 S.E.2d 609 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1109, 118 S. Ct. 1681, 140 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1998); Skipper v. French, 130 F.3d 603
(4th Cir. 1997); Rousselo v. Starling, 128 N.C. App. 439, 495 S.E.2d 725 (1998), appeal dismissed, 348 N.C. 74, 505 S.E.2d 876 (1998), review denied, 348 N.C. 74,
505 S.E.2d 876 (1998); Reunion Land Co. v. Village of Marvin, 129 N.C. App. 249, 497 S.E.2d 446 (1998); State v. Zuniga, 348 N.C. 214, 498 S.E.2d 611 (1998); DKH Corp.
v. Rankin-Patterson Oil Co., 348 N.C. 583, 500 S.E.2d 666 (1998); State v. Hoffman, 349 N.C. 167, 505 S.E.2d 80 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1053, 119 S. Ct. 1362,
143 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1999); State v. Atkins, 349 N.C. 62, 505 S.E.2d 97 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1147, 119 S. Ct. 2025, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1036 (1999); State v. Guevara, 349 N.C. 243,
506 S.E.2d 711 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 119 S. Ct. 1809, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1013 (1999); State v. LaPlanche, 349 N.C. 279, 507 S.E.2d 34 (1998); State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428,
509 S.E.2d 178 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 835, 120 S. Ct. 95, 145 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1999); State v. Bowman, 349 N.C. 459, 509 S.E.2d 428 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1040, 119 S. Ct. 2403, 144
L. Ed. 2d 802 (1999); State v. Murillo, 349 N.C. 573, 509 S.E.2d 752 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 838, 120 S. Ct. 103, 145 L. Ed. 2d 87, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 5310, 68 U.S.L.W. 3225 (1999); State v.
Williams, 350 N.C. 1, 510 S.E.2d 626 (1999),
cert. denied 528 U.S. 880, 120 S. Ct. 193, 145 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1999); Hart v. F.N. Thompson Constr. Co., 132 N.C. App. 229, 511 S.E.2d 27 (1999); In re Wellnitz, 350 N.C. 109,
512 S.E.2d 720 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 941, 120 S. Ct. 351, 145 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1999); State v. Brown, 350 N.C. 193, 513 S.E.2d 57 (1999); In re Eldridge, 350 N.C. 152,
513 S.E.2d 296 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 973, 120 S. Ct. 417, 145 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1999); Wilson v. Watson, 136 N.C. App. 500, 524 S.E.2d 812 (2000); Lee v. Mutual Community Sav. Bank,
136 N.C. App. 808, 525 S.E.2d 854 (2000); State v. Blakeney, 352 N.C. 287, 531 S.E.2d 799 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1117, 121 S. Ct. 868, 148 L. Ed. 2d 780 (2001);
State v. Steen,
352 N.C. 227, 536 S.E.2d 1 (2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1167, 121 S. Ct. 1131, 148 L. Ed. 2d 997 (2001); RPR & Assocs. v. State, 139 N.C. App. 525, 534 S.E.2d 247
(2000), aff'd,
353 N.C. 543, 543 S.E.2d 480 (2001); State v. Thibodeaux, 352 N.C. 570, 532 S.E.2d 797 (2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1155, 121 S. Ct. 1106, 148 L. Ed. 2d 976 (2001);
State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 533 S.E.2d 168 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 931, 121 S. Ct. 1379, 1380, 149 L. Ed. 2d 305 (2001), cert. dismissed, without prejudice, 805 S.E.2d 698, 2017 N.C.
LEXIS 900 (2017), cert. granted, 370 N.C. 587, 809 S.E.2d 594, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 93 (2018); State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. 600, 536 S.E.2d 36 (2000), cert denied, 532 U.S.
997, 121 S. Ct. 1660, 149 L. Ed. 2d 641 (2001); Desmond v. City of Charlotte, 142 N.C. App. 590, 544 S.E.2d 269 (2001); Summey v. Barker, 142 N.C. App. 688, 544 S.E.2d
262 (2001); Thompson v. Town of Dallas, 142 N.C. App. 651, 543 S.E.2d 901 (2001); Rug Doctor, L.P. v. Prate, 143 N.C. App. 343, 545 S.E.2d 766 (2001); Triangle Bank v. Eatmon,
143 N.C. App. 521, 547 S.E.2d 92 (2001); Darroch v. Lea, 150 N.C. App. 156, 563 S.E.2d 219 (2002); Carter v. Lee, 283 F.3d 240 (4th. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
897, 123 S. Ct. 196, 154 L. Ed. 2d 166 (2002), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 617, 574 S.E.2d 468 (2002); State v. Leeper, 356 N.C. 55, 565 S.E.2d 1 (2002); Fairfield Mt. Prop.
Owners Ass'n v. Doolittle, 149 N.C. App. 486, 560 S.E.2d 604 (2002); State v. al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. 150, 567 S.E.2d 120 (2002); Van Engen v. Que Scientific, Inc.,
151 N.C. App. 683, 567 S.E.2d 179 (2002); State v. Murray, 154 N.C. App. 631, 572 S.E.2d 845 (2002), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 467, 586 S.E.2d
778 (2003); Daniels v. Lee, 316 F.3d 477 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 851, 124 S. Ct. 137, 157 L. Ed. 2d 93 (2003); Hunter-McDonald, Inc. v. Edison Foard, Inc., 157 N.C. App. 560, 579
S.E.2d 490 (2003), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 459, 585 S.E.2d 759 (2003); State v. Harless, 160 N.C. App. 78, 584 S.E.2d 339 (2003); State v. Nobles,
357 N.C. 433, 584 S.E.2d 765 (2003); State v. Carter, 357 N.C. 345, 584 S.E.2d 792 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 943, 124 S. Ct. 1670, 158 L. Ed. 2d 368 (2004); State
v. Squires,
357 N.C. 529, 591 S.E.2d 837 (2003), cert. denied,
541 U.S. 1088, 124 S. Ct. 2818, 159 L. Ed. 2d 252 (2004); State v. Valentine, 357 N.C. 512, 591 S.E.2d 846 (2003); State v. Miller, 357 N.C. 583, 588 S.E.2d 857
(2003), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 124 S. Ct. 2914, 159 L. Ed. 2d 819 (2004); State v. Smith, 357 N.C. 604, 588 S.E.2d 453 (2003), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 124 S. Ct. 2915, 159 L. Ed. 2d 819 (2004);
State v. Maske, 358 N.C. 40, 591 S.E.2d 521 (2004); State v. Roache, 358 N.C. 243, 595 S.E.2d 381 (2004); State v. Thompson,
359 N.C. 77, 604 S.E.2d 850 (2004); State v. Edgerson, 164 N.C. App. 712, 596 S.E.2d 351 (2004); State v. Boggess, 358 N.C. 676, 600 S.E.2d
453 (2004); State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 611 S.E.2d 794 (2005); State v. Brown, 170 N.C. App. 601, 613 S.E.2d 284 (2005), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 68,
621 S.E.2d 882 (2005); State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 617 S.E.2d 1 (2005); State v. Hurst, 360 N.C. 181, 624 S.E.2d 309 (2006), cert denied 364 N.C. 244 (2010); State v. Forte, 360 N.C. 427, 629 S.E.2d 137 (2006); Bobbitt v. N.C. State Univ., 179 N.C. App. 743, 635 S.E.2d 463 (2006), review denied,
361 N.C. 350, 645 S.E.2d 4, review denied, 361 N.C. 350, 645 S.E.2d 765, (2007); Bowling v. Margaret R. Pardee Mem'l Hosp., 179 N.C. App. 815, 635 S.E.2d 624 (2006), appeal dismissed, review denied, 361 N.C. 425, 648 S.E.2d 206 (2007); State v. Polke, 361 N.C. 65, 638 S.E.2d 189 (2006); Harris v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp., 180 N.C. App. 551, 638 S.E.2d 260 (2006); State v. Badgett, 361 N.C. 234, 644 S.E.2d 206 (2007); Strates Shows, Inc. v. Amusements of Am., Inc., 184 N.C. App. 455, 646 S.E.2d 418 (2007); State v. Goss, 361 N.C. 610, 651 S.E.2d 867 (2007), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 129 S. Ct. 59, 172 L. Ed. 2d 58 (2008); State v. Barden, 362 N.C. 277,
658 S.E.2d 654 (2008); State v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 193 N.C. App. 1, 666 S.E.2d 783 (2008), review denied, stay denied, 363 N.C. 136, 676 S.E.2d 54 (2009); State
v. Taylor, 362 N.C. 514, 669 S.E.2d 239 (2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 851, 130 S. Ct. 129, 175 L. Ed. 2d 84 (2009); State v. Garcell, 363 N.C. 10, 678 S.E.2d 618 (2009);
State v. Locklear, 363 N.C. 438, 681 S.E.2d 293 (Aug. 28, 2009); State v. Williams, 363 N.C. 689, 686 S.E.2d 493 (2009), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 149, 2010 U.S. LEXIS
6797, 178 L. Ed. 2d 90 (U.S. 2010); Lynn v. Lynn, 202 N.C. App. 423, 689 S.E.2d 198 (2010), review denied 705 S.E.2d 736, 2010 N.C. LEXIS 1029 (N.C. 2010); John Walter Kelly v. Regency Ctrs. Corp.,
203 N.C. App. 339, 691 S.E.2d 92 (2010); State v. Brooks, 204 N.C. App. 193, 693 S.E.2d 204 (2010); Mugno v. Mugno, - N.C. App. - , 693 S.E.2d 276 (June 1, 2010); Bare
v. Atwood, 204 N.C. App. 310, 693 S.E.2d 746 (2010); Bryson v. Haywood Reg'l Med. Ctr., 204 N.C. App. 532, 694 S.E.2d 416 (2010); Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va.,
364 N.C. 195, 695 S.E.2d 442 (June 17, 2010); Bradley v. Bradley, 206 N.C. App. 249, 697 S.E.2d 422 (2010); State v. Kirby, 206 N.C. App. 446, 697 S.E.2d 496 (2010); Cummings v. Ortega, 206 N.C. App. 432, 697 S.E.2d 513 (2010); Thermal Design, Inc. v. M&M Builders, Inc., 207 N.C. App. 79, 698 S.E.2d 516 (2010); Bodine v. Harris
Vill. Prop.
Owners Ass'n, 207 N.C. App. 52, 699 S.E.2d 129 (2010), review denied 365 N.C. 192, 707 S.E.2d 237, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 228 (2011); Ellison v. Alexander, 207 N.C.
App. 401, 700 S.E.2d 102 (2010); Newcomb v. County of Carteret, 207 N.C. App. 527, 701 S.E.2d 325 (2010), review denied 365 N.C. 212, 710 S.E.2d 26, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 474 (N.C. 2011); State v. Waring,
364 N.C. 443, 701 S.E.2d 615 (2010); Johnson v. Johnson, 208 N.C. App. 118, 701 S.E.2d 722 (2010); Domingue v. Nehemiah II, Inc., 208 N.C. App. 429, 703 S.E.2d 462 (2010); McCrann v. N.C. HHS, 209 N.C. App. 241, 704 S.E.2d 899, review denied 365 N.C. 198, 710 S.E.2d 23, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 436 (2011); State v. Lawrence,
210 N.C. App. 73, 706 S.E.2d 822 (2011), rev'd 723 S.E.2d 326, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 265 (N.C. 2012); Peters v. Pennington,
210 N.C. App. 1, 707 S.E.2d 724 (2011); State v. Lane, 365 N.C. 7, 707 S.E.2d 210 (2011); State v. Towe, 210 N.C. App. 430, 707 S.E.2d 770 (2011), aff'd and modified
366 N.C. 56, 732 S.E.2d 564, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 420 (N.C. 2012); Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 210 N.C. App. 657, 709 S.E.2d 528 (2011); State v. Pell,
211 N.C. App. 376, 712 S.E.2d 189 (2011); Stratton v. Royal Bank of Can., 211 N.C. App. 78, 712 S.E.2d 221 (2011); State v. De La Sancha Cobos, 211 N.C. App. 536, 711
S.E.2d 464 (2011); Wilson v. City of Mebane Bd. of Adjustment, 212 N.C. App. 176, 710 S.E.2d 403 (2011), review denied, 724 S.E.2d 524, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 280 (2012); Meehan v. Am. Media Int'l, LLC,
214 N.C. App. 245, 712 S.E.2d 904 (2011); State v. White, 214 N.C. App. 471, 712 S.E.2d 921 (2011); State v. Stanley, 213 N.C. App. 545,
713 S.E.2d 196 (2011); Premier Plastic Surgery Ctr., PLLC v. Bd. of Adjustment for Matthews, 213 N.C. App. 364, 713 S.E.2d 511 (2011); Cobb v. Town of Blowing Rock, 213 N.C. App. 88, 713 S.E.2d
732 (2011), rev'd 722 S.E.2d 479, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 20 (N.C. 2012); State v. Boyd, 214 N.C. App. 294, 714 S.E.2d 466 (2011); Stephens v. Stephens, 213 N.C. App. 495, 715 S.E.2d 168 (2011); Parson v. Oasis Legal Fin., LLC, 214
N.C. App. 125, 715 S.E.2d 240 (2011); Cobb v. Pa. Life Ins. Co., 215 N.C. App. 268, 715 S.E.2d 541 (2011); Moore v. Proper, 215 N.C. App. 202, 715 S.E.2d 586 (2011),
aff'd in part 366 N.C. 25, 726 S.E.2d 812, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 411 (N.C. 2012); Lovallo v. Sabato, 216 N.C. App. 281, 715 S.E.2d 909 (2011); Happ v. Creek Pointe Homeowner's
Ass'n, 215 N.C. App. 96, 717 S.E.2d 401 (2011); In re Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 217 N.C. App. 199, 719 S.E.2d 171 (2011); State v. Crawley, 217 N.C. App. 509, 719 S.E.2d
632 (2011), review denied 365 N.C. 553, 722 S.E.2d 607, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 188 (N.C. 2012); In re Foreclosure of a Deed of Trust of Bass, 217 N.C. App. 244, 720 S.E.2d 18 (2011); State v. Foust,
220 N.C. App. 63, 724 S.E.2d 154 (2012); Smith v. City of Fayetteville, 220 N.C. App. 249, 725 S.E.2d 405 (2012); Mynhardt v. Elon Univ., 220 N.C. App. 368, 725 S.E.2d 632 (2012); Topp v.
Big Rock Found., Inc., 221 N.C. App. 64, 726 S.E.2d 884 (2012), rev'd 366 N.C. 369, 736 S.E.2d 173, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 54 (2013)
Timothy L. Hardin v. York Mem'l Park, 221 N.C. App. 317, 730 S.E.2d 768 (2012); Kirkland's Stores, Inc. v. Cleveland Gastonia, LLC, 223 N.C. App. 119, 733 S.E.2d 885 (2012); Thorpe v. TJM Ocean Isle Partners LLC, 223 N.C. App. 201, 733 S.E.2d 185 (2012); State v. Grice, 223 N.C. App. 460, 735 S.E.2d 354 (2012); State v. Reid, 224 N.C. App. 181, 735 S.E.2d 389 (2012); S. Seeding Serv. v. W.C. English, 224 N.C. App. 90, 735 S.E.2d 829 (2012); State v. Claxton, 225 N.C. App. 150, 736 S.E.2d 603 (2013); State v. Wilkins, 225 N.C. App. 492, 737 S.E.2d 791 (2013); State v. Hatfield, 225 N.C. App. 765, 738 S.E.2d 236 (2013); Wind v. City of Gastonia, 226 N.C. App. 180, 738 S.E.2d 780, aff'd, 367 N.C. 184, 751 S.E.2d 611, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 1364 (2013); State v. Hunnicutt, 226 N.C. App. 348, 740 S.E.2d 906 (2013); Reeder v. Carter, 226 N.C. App. 270, 740 S.E.2d 913 (2013); Johnson v. Forsyth County, 227 N.C. App. 276, 743 S.E.2d 227 (2013); State v. Romero, 228 N.C. App. 348, 745 S.E.2d 364 (2013); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Integon Nat'l Ins. Co., 232 N.C. App. 44, 753 S.E.2d 388 (2014).
State v. Jamison, 234 N.C. App. 231, 758 S.E.2d 666 (2014); State v. Borders, 236 N.C. App. 149, 762 S.E.2d 490 (2014); Zurosky v. Shaffer, 236 N.C. App. 219, 763 S.E.2d 755 (2014); Rutherford Elec. Mbrshp. Corp. v. 130 of Chatham, LLC, 236 N.C. App. 87, 763 S.E.2d 296 (2014); Sandhill Amusements, Inc. v. Sheriff of Onslow County, 236 N.C. App. 340, 762 S.E.2d 666 (2014); State v. Harvell, 236 N.C. App. 404, 762 S.E.2d 659 (2014); Creech v. Ormond Oil & Gas Co. (In re Creech), 513 B.R. 482 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2014); State v. Robinson, 236 N.C. App. 446, 763 S.E.2d 178 (2014), modified 777 S.E.2d 755, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1058 (2015); Nanny's Korner Care Ctr. v. N.C. HHS - Div. of Child Dev., 234 N.C. App. 51, 758 S.E.2d 423 (2014); Green v. Kelischek, 234 N.C. App. 1, 759 S.E.2d 106 (2014); Town of Matthews v. Wright, 240 N.C. App. 584, 771 S.E.2d 328 (2015); Hart v. State, 368 N.C. 122, 774 S.E.2d 281 (2015).
Salzer v. King Kong Zoo, 242 N.C. App. 120, 773 S.E.2d 548 (2015); Arnesen v. Rivers Edge Golf Club & Plantation, Inc., 368 N.C. 440, 781 S.E.2d 1 (2015); Alston v. Hueske, 244 N.C. App. 546, 781 S.E.2d 305 (2016); State ex rel. McCrory v. Berger, 368 N.C. 633, 781 S.E.2d 248 (2016); In re Estate of Williams, 246 N.C. App. 76, 783 S.E.2d 253 (2016); State v. Johnson, 246 N.C. App. 132, 782 S.E.2d 549 (2016); Tanner v. Tanner, 248 N.C. App. 828, 789 S.E.2d 888 (2016); Seraj v. Duberman, 248 N.C. App. 589, 789 S.E.2d 551 (2016); Piazza v. Kirkbride, 246 N.C. App. 576, 785 S.E.2d 695 (2016).
Lueallen v. Lueallen, 249 N.C. App. 292, 790 S.E.2d 690 (2016); State v. Robinson, 249 N.C. App. 568, 791 S.E.2d 862 (2016); In re Timberlake, 250 N.C. App. 80, 792 S.E.2d 525 (2016); Flynn v. Schamens, 250 N.C. App. 337, 792 S.E.2d 833 (2016), appeal dismissed, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 72 (N.C. 2018) appeal dismissed, 809 S.E.2d 587, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 72 (2018);
In re Estate of Phillips, 251 N.C. App. 99, 795 S.E.2d 273 (2016); Fisher v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 369 N.C. 202, 794 S.E.2d 699 (2016); Town
of Boone v. State, 369 N.C. 126, 794 S.E.2d 710 (2016); Williams v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 251 N.C. App. 712, 795 S.E.2d 647 (2017), review denied, 2017 N.C. LEXIS
325 (2017); Tater Patch Estates Home Owner's Ass'n v. Sutton, 251 N.C. App. 686, 796 S.E.2d 84 (2017); Banks v. Hunter, 251 N.C. App. 528, 796 S.E.2d 361 (2017); Rittelmeyer v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 252 N.C. App. 340, 799 S.E.2d 378, review denied, 370 n.c. 67, 803 S.E.2d 385, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 606 (N.C. 2017); State v. Cox, 253 N.C. App. 306, 800 S.E.2d 692 (2017), review denied, 803 S.E.2d 153, 2017 N.C.
LEXIS 579 (N.C. 2017); Hanna v. Wright, 253 N.C. App. 413, 800 S.E.2d 475 (2017); Innovative 55, LLC v. Robeson Cty., 253 N.C. App. 714, 801 S.E.2d 671 (2017); Kings Harbor Homeowners Ass'n v. Goldman,
253 N.C. App. 726, 800 S.E.2d 129 (2017); State v. Bass, 253 N.C. App. 754, 802 S.E.2d 477 (2017), rev'd on other grounds, 371 N.C. 535, 819 S.E.2d 322 (2018); State v. Hester, 254 N.C. App. 506, 803 S.E.2d 8 (2017); Friends of Crooked Creek, L.L.C. v. C.C. Partners, Inc., 254 N.C. App. 384, 802 S.E.2d 908 (2017), review denied, 805 S.E.2d 687, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 862 (N.C. 2017); Schwarz
v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 254 N.C. App. 747, 802 S.E.2d 783 (2017); State v. Voltz, 255 N.C. App. 149, 804 S.E.2d 760 (2017); Morrell v. Hardin Creek, Inc., 255 N.C. App. 55, 803 S.E.2d 668 (2017), review denied, mot. granted, 805 S.E.2d 488, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 829 (N.C. 2017), aff'd and rev'd, in part, remanded, 821 S.E.2d 360, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 1032 (2018); State v. Yisrael, 255 N.C. App. 184,
804 S.E.2d 742 (2017), aff'd, 371 N.C. 108, 813 S.E.2d 217, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 327 (2018); Christenbury Eye Ctr., P.A. v. Medflow, Inc., 370 N.C. 1, 802 S.E.2d 888 (2017);
Fid. Bank v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue, 370 N.C. 10, 803 S.E.2d 142 (2017); Hinson v. Hinson, - N.C. App. - , 836 S.E.2d 309 (2019); State v. Warden, - N.C. App. - , 836 S.E.2d 880 (2019); State v.
Doss, - N.C. App. - , 836 S.E.2d 856 (2019); State ex rel. Regan v. WASCO, LLC, - N.C. App. - , 837 S.E.2d 565 (2020).
II. SENTENCE OF DEATH OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT.
Editor's Note. - Some of the notes below were decided under subsection (a) of this section prior to the amendment in 1995, which deleted reference to life imprisonment from the subsection.
The term "imprisonment for life" as it is used in this section means only a determinate life sentence and does not include an indeterminate sentence merely because the stated maximum is a life term. State v. Ferrell,
300 N.C. 157, 265 S.E.2d 210 (1980).
Death Sentence Affirmed. - Defendant's murder conviction and death sentence were affirmed as (1) there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to deny defendant's ex parte motion that a doctor be appointed as an expert on substance induced mood disorder; (2) the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion in limine seeking to exclude his prior conviction for malicious wounding; (3) there was no error in the trial court's refusal to peremptorily instruct the jury on the defendant's requested mitigating circumstances; (4) the evidence fully supported the aggravating circumstances found by the jury; (5) there was no indication the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and (6) the sentence of death was neither disproportionate nor excessive. Therefore, the defendant received a fair trial and capital sentencing proceeding, free from prejudicial error. State v. Brown, 357 N.C. 382, 584 S.E.2d 278 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1194, 124 S. Ct. 1447, 158 L. Ed. 2d 106 (2004).
Evidence supported the jury's findings that defendant acted with cruelty when he killed his wife with a shotgun while his stepson was sitting next to her, and then shot his stepson with the same shotgun shortly thereafter, and the state supreme court affirmed the trial court's judgments finding defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and imposing the death penalty for each conviction. State v. Jones, 358 N.C. 330, 595 S.E.2d 124 (2004).
In an appeal as of right with regard to the imposition of a sentence of death against a defendant following a jury trial, which resulted in his conviction for the first-degree murder of a police officer while in the performance of his duties, the defendant's
conviction and sentence was upheld as the defendant failed to show any trial error with regard to the jury selection challenges he raised on appeal; the trial court did not commit prejudicial error when it denied a jury request
to review certain exhibits as they were admitted solely for the purpose of illustrating an expert's testimony and the jury already had seen the exhibits in their entirety and there was some inadmissible material in the exhibits;
the trial court did not err by denying his motion for a mistrial, made when law enforcement officers approached the jury box to purportedly block the victim's mother from seeing autopsy photographs, as the trial court acted
promptly and effectively to regain control of the courtroom and the reviewing court would not second-guess the trial court to presume that the incident was fatally prejudicial; the evidence presented was sufficient for the
jury to find that the defendant's use of the victim's gun was inseparable from the taking of it and the defendant's efforts to flee, thus, the trial court did not err by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of robbery with
a dangerous weapon; and, the sentence of death was not disproportionate, excessive or influenced by passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor since the evidence showed that despite the kneeling victim's pleas for mercy,
the defendant fatally shot him multiple times. State v. Maness, 363 N.C. 261, 677 S.E.2d 796 (2009).
Petitions to Review Judgments in Habeas Corpus Proceedings. - By analogy, subsection (a) of this section, G.S. 15-180.2 (now repealed) and N.C.R.A.P., Rule 21(b) are logically applicable to petitions for certiorari to review judgments in habeas corpus
proceedings involving the restraint of prisoners under sentences of death or life imprisonment. State v. Niccum, 293 N.C. 276, 238 S.E.2d 141 (1977).
Appeal to Supreme Court Under G.S. 15A-979 When Charge Is Death or Life Imprisonment. - G.S. 15A-979 does not specify whether an appeal lies to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court. Subsection (a) of this section, however, stipulates that there
is an appeal of right to the Supreme Court from a superior court judgment imposing a sentence of death or life imprisonment. When these two statutes are considered together, it is proper to appeal directly to the Supreme Court
if the punishment for the charge(s) is either death or life imprisonment. State v. Silhan, 295 N.C. 636, 247 S.E.2d 902 (1978).
III. FINAL JUDGMENTS.
.
"Final Judgment" Defined. - A final judgment is one which disposes of the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be judicially determined between them in the trial court. Atkins v. Beasley, 53 N.C. App. 33, 279 S.E.2d 866 (1981).
A party may properly appeal only from a final order, which disposes of all the issues as to all parties, or an interlocutory order affecting a substantial right of the appellant. Buffington v. Buffington, 69 N.C. App. 483, 317 S.E.2d 97 (1984).
Order Authorizing Foreclosure is Final Judgment. - Trial court's order authorizing a foreclosure to proceed under G.S. 45-21.16(d) was a final judgment of the superior court, and, therefore, the court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear the mortgagor's appeal pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(b). In re Foreclosure by David A. Simpson, P.C., 211 N.C. App. 483, 711 S.E.2d 165 (2011).
Denial of Application for Certiorari Is Not Final Judgment. - A "judgment" of the superior court denying defendant's application to that court for a writ of certiorari to review the proceedings of the district court in a criminal case was not a final
judgment within the meaning of subsection (b) of this section, and defendant was not authorized to appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right; defendant's only remedy was by petition for certiorari to the
Court of Appeals. State v. Flynt, 8 N.C. App. 323, 174 S.E.2d 120 (1970).
Appeal from Final Judgment. - As a trial court's memorandum of decision and judgment was a final judgment of the superior court, an appellate court exercised jurisdiction over plaintiff's appeal pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(b). Phelps Staffing, LLC v. S.C. Phelps, Inc., 217 N.C. App. 403, 720 S.E.2d 785 (2011).
When defendant's defective notice of appeal required dismissal of defendant's appeal of a criminal conviction, defendant was allowed to pursue a writ of certiorari because (1) defendant had a right to appeal the judgment, under G.S. 7A-27, and (2) the
appellate court had the discretion to grant such a petition. State v. Rowe, 231 N.C. App. 462, 752 S.E.2d 223 (2013).
Appeal from Order of Superior Court Affirming Annexation Ordinance. - By this section initial appellate jurisdiction of an appeal from an order of the superior court affirming an annexation ordinance is given to the Court of Appeals, subject, however,
to the provisions of G.S. 7A-31. Adams-Millis Corp. v. Town of Kernersville, 281 N.C. 147, 187 S.E.2d 704 (1972).
Appeal from Order Affirming Zoning Board's Decision. - Superior court fully resolved the merits of the parties' zoning dispute and remanded the matter only for the zoning board to schedule petitioner's compliance with her permit. Because the superior
court's order affirming the board's stop work order left nothing more to be resolved in the superior court, the order was a final order for purposes of appeal. Thompson v. Town of White Lake,
252 N.C. App. 237, 797 S.E.2d 346 (2017).
Appeal from Decision of Board of Medical Examiners. - Court of Appeals is proper court to determine appeals taken from decisions of superior court in proceedings for judicial review of decisions of the Board of Medical Examiners under G.S. 7A-27(b); Court
of Appeals erred in dismissing appeal under G.S. 90-14.11, since generally accepted rule is that where there is irreconcilable conflict between two statutes, later statute controls as the last expression of legislative intent,
and therefore, later enacted statute, G.S. 7A-27(b), controlled in case. In re Guess, 324 N.C. 105, 376 S.E.2d 8 (1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1047, 111 S. Ct. 754,
112 L. Ed. 2d 774 (1991).
Appeal Where Question of Attorney's Fees is Reserved. - Once a trial court entered judgment awarding alimony to a wife, but reserving the question of attorney's fees, the judgment was final and appealable; the husband was not required to obtain certification
for review pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 54. Duncan v. Duncan, 366 N.C. 544, 742 S.E.2d 799 (2013).
The fact that plaintiff waived her right to appeal order granting summary judgment to one of three defendants in no way affected her statutory right to appeal from the final judgment, since although she could have appealed the entry of summary judgment
as to that defendant, she was not required to do so. Ingle v. Allen, 71 N.C. App. 20, 321 S.E.2d 588 (1984), cert. denied, 313 N.C. 508,
329 S.E.2d 391 (1985).
Order Was Final Judgment Despite Reserving Issue for Jury. - Where the trial court in its "order and partial summary judgment" reserved for the jury the "issue as to whether defendant has waived any objection to, or is estopped to deny, the tenant's renewal
of the lease," the order left no further action for the trial court to dispose of the case. Although the order reserved an issue for the jury, the trial court determined that it was irrelevant whether notice was received; therefore,
there was no requirement for a trial on the issues of waiver or estoppel, and the order was effectively a final judgment and affected a substantial right. Janus Theatres of Burlington, Inc. v. Aragon,
104 N.C. App. 534, 410 S.E.2d 218 (1991).
Judgment Was Final Where Plaintiff Voluntarily Dismissed Remaining Claims. - Case was not dismissed because the employee's appeal was from a final judgment and was not interlocutory; the employee voluntarily dismissed the remaining claims as part of a
settlement agreement. Tarrant v. Freeway Foods of Greensboro, Inc., 163 N.C. App. 504, 593 S.E.2d 808 (2004), cert. denied, 358 N.C. 739,
603 S.E.2d 126 (2004).
Summary Judgment Was Final Order Where Remaining Counterclaims Voluntarily Dismissed. - Trial court had jurisdiction over a contractor's appeal of a summary judgment for a subcontractor on a third party claim since the appeal was filed within 30 days
of the owner's voluntary dismissal of the remaining counterclaims against the contractor, which made the previously interlocutory summary judgment a final order. Bost Constr. Co. v. Blondy,
229 N.C. App. 491, 750 S.E.2d 917 (2013), review denied 367 N.C. 292, 753 S.E.2d 780, 2014 N.C. LEXIS 45 (2014), review denied 755 S.E.2d 612, 2014 N.C. LEXIS 195 (N.C.
2014).
Appeal of Contempt Order Was Permissible. - Husband had a right to appeal those aspects of the contempt order that the husband alleged impermissibly modified child custody or exceeded the trial court's authority. Jackson v. Jackson, 192 N.C. App. 455, 665 S.E.2d 545 (2008).
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina had jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a satellite-based monitoring determination under G.S. 14-208.40B pursuant to G.S. 7A-27 because the order left nothing further to be judicially determined. State v. Singleton,
201 N.C. App. 620, 689 S.E.2d 562 (2010).
Postconviction DNA Testing. - When defendant's motion for postconviction DNA testing was denied, appeal was the proper avenue for seeking reversal because (1) defendant had a statutory right to appeal such an order, and (2) defendant preserved the issue
for appellate review by appealing the denial of the motion. State v. Byers, 263 N.C. App. 231, 822 S.E.2d 746 (2018).
IV. INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS.
.
A. GENERALLY.
.
"Interlocutory Order" Defined. - An order is interlocutory if it does not determine the issues but directs some further proceeding preliminary to final decree. Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200,
240 S.E.2d 338 (1978); Blackwelder v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 299 S.E.2d 777 (1983); Heavner v. Heavner, 73 N.C. App. 331, 326 S.E.2d 78, cert.
denied, 313 N.C. 601, 330 S.E.2d 610 (1985).
Burden of Proof. - Because no order was certified as appropriate for immediate appeal, to establish appellate jurisdiction, the insured and insurer bore the burden of demonstrating how each order affected a substantial right and would work injury if not
corrected before final judgment. Radiator Specialty Co. v. Arrowood Indem. Co., 253 N.C. App. 508, 800 S.E.2d 452 (2017).
Appeals of Right from Interlocutory Orders - G.S. 62-90(a) and (d) provide for appeals of final orders of the North Carolina Utilities Commission, G.S. 7A-29(a) and (b) provide for appeals of right from certain administrative agencies, and subsection
(d) of this section provides for appeals of right from certain interlocutory orders of the superior or district courts. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Buck Island, Inc., 158 N.C. App. 536, 581 S.E.2d 122 (2003).
Where only the issue of damages remained, no final judgment had been made and no substantial right had been affected, the appellate court found the trial court's certification ineffective and saw no impediment to the trial court's sorting out the various
claims and affirmative defenses intertwined with the damages issue. CBP Resources, Inc. v. Mountaire Farms of N.C. Inc., 134 N.C. App. 169, 517 S.E.2d 151 (1999).
Substantial Right Held Affected. - Trial court's order did not contain a certification under the rule, but the appeal was proper because plaintiff demonstrated a substantial right that would be lost absent an immediate appeal; a sufficient overlap existed between plaintiff's surviving claim for wrongful discharge and her First Amendment claim that was dismissed, such that there existed a possibility of inconsistent verdicts absent immediate appeal. Holland v. Harrison, 254 N.C. App. 636, 804 S.E.2d 205 (2017).
Appellate court had jurisdiction of an insurer's interlocutory appeal of an order finding the insurer provided primary liability coverage to an estate because this implicated a substantial right of the insurer that would be lost absent an immediate appeal, as the estate's decedent was not a named insured under the insurer's policy. Smith v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 261 N.C. App. 40, 819 S.E.2d 610 (2018).
Family asserted a substantial right to have the liability of all defendants be determined in one proceeding because the same factual issues applied to all claims against the property owner and the tenants, and two trials could bring about inconsistent verdicts relating to the family's damages. Curlee v. Johnson, - N.C. App. - , 842 S.E.2d 604 (2020).
Order requiring the North Carolina Department of Insurance to disclose subpoenaed documents affected a substantial right because if the Department was required to disclose the very documents that it alleged were protected from disclosure by statutory confidentiality provisions, then a substantial right was affected; the substantial right asserted by the Department would be lost if the trial court's order was not reviewed before entry of a final judgment. Powell v. Cartret, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (July 20, 2021).
When Interlocutory Order Is Appealable Generally. - Ordinarily, an appeal lies only from a final judgment, but an interlocutory order which will work injury if not corrected before final judgment is appealable. Wachovia Realty Invs. v. Housing, Inc., 292 N.C. 93, 232 S.E.2d 667 (1977); Atkins v. Beasley, 53 N.C. App. 33, 279 S.E.2d 866 (1981); Perry v. Aycock, 68 N.C. App. 705, 315 S.E.2d 791 (1984); Jenkins v. Wheeler, 69 N.C. App. 140, 316 S.E.2d 354, cert. denied, 311 N.C. 758, 321 S.E.2d 136 (1984); Stafford v. Stafford, 133 N.C. App. 163, 515 S.E.2d 43 (1999), aff'd, 351 N.C. 94, 520 S.E.2d 785 (1999).
Ordinarily, an appeal from an interlocutory order will be dismissed as fragmentary and premature unless the order affects some substantial right and will work injury to appellant if not corrected before appeal from final judgment. Wachovia Realty Invs. v. Housing, Inc., 292 N.C. 93, 232 S.E.2d 667 (1977); Godley Auction Co. v. Myers, 40 N.C. App. 570, 253 S.E.2d 362 (1979); Sims v. Ritter Constr., Inc., 62 N.C. App. 52, 302 S.E.2d 293 (1983); Adair v. Adair, 62 N.C. App. 493, 303 S.E.2d 190, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 319, 307 S.E.2d 162 (1983).
This section in effect provides that no appeal lies to an appellate court from an interlocutory order or ruling of the trial judge unless such ruling or order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he would lose if the ruling or order is not reviewed before final judgment. Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E.2d 338 (1978); Citicorp Person-to-Person Fin. Center, Inc. v. Stallings, 49 N.C. App. 187, 270 S.E.2d 567 (1980); A.E.P. Indus., Inc. v. McClure, 308 N.C. 393, 302 S.E.2d 754 (1983); Heavner v. Heavner, 73 N.C. App. 331, 326 S.E.2d 78, cert. denied, 313 N.C. 601, 330 S.E.2d 610 (1985); Thompson v. Newman, 74 N.C. App. 597, 328 S.E.2d 597 (1985).
An appeal does not lie from an interlocutory order unless such order affects some substantial right claimed by the appellant and will work an injury to him if not corrected before an appeal from the final judgment. Godley Auction Co. v. Myers, 40 N.C. App. 570, 253 S.E.2d 362 (1979); Ball v. Ball, 55 N.C. App. 98, 284 S.E.2d 555 (1981); Fraser v. Di Santi, 75 N.C. App. 654, 331 S.E.2d 217, cert. denied, 315 N.C. 183, 337 S.E.2d 856 (1985); Jenkins v. Maintenance, Inc., 76 N.C. App. 110, 332 S.E.2d 90 (1985); Brown v. Brown, 77 N.C. App. 206, 334 S.E.2d 506, cert. denied, 315 N.C. 389, 338 S.E.2d 878 (1985).
For a defendant to have a right of appeal from a mandatory preliminary injunction, substantial rights of the appellant must be adversely affected. Otherwise, an appeal from such an interlocutory order is subject to being dismissed. Dixon v. Dixon, 62 N.C. App. 744, 303 S.E.2d 606 (1983).
No appeal lies to an appellate court from an interlocutory order unless the order deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he would lose absent a review prior to final determination. Thus, the threshold question presented by a purported appeal from an order granting a preliminary injunction is whether the appellant has been deprived of any substantial right which might be lost should the order escape appellate review before final judgment. Robins & Weill, Inc. v. Mason, 70 N.C. App. 537, 320 S.E.2d 693, cert. denied, 312 N.C. 495, 322 S.E.2d 559 (1984).
For an interlocutory order to be immediately appealable under North Carolina law, it must: (1) affect a substantial right, and (2) work injury if not corrected before final judgment. Goldston v. AMC, 326 N.C. 723, 392 S.E.2d 735 (1990).
Trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims against aircraft manufacturer affected a substantial right to have determined in a single proceeding, i.e., whether plaintiffs were damaged by the actions of one, some or all defendants where their claims arise upon the same series of transactions, and the appeal from an interlocutory order was considered. Driver v. Burlington Aviation, Inc., 110 N.C. App. 519, 430 S.E.2d 476 (1993).
An interlocutory order not appealable under Rule 54(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure may nevertheless be appealed pursuant to G.S. 1-277 and subsection (d) of this section which permit an appeal of an interlocutory order which (1) affects a substantial right, or (2) in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which appeal might be taken, or (3) discontinues the action, or (4) grants or refuses a new trial. Dalton Moran Shook, Inc. v. Pitt Dev. Co., 113 N.C. App. 707, 440 S.E.2d 585 (1994).
An appeal of an interlocutory order or judgment is permitted if the trial court's decision deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review. North Carolina DOT v. Page, 119 N.C. App. 730, 460 S.E.2d 332 (1995).
There are two avenues by which an interlocutory judgment or order can be immediately appealed. First, if the order is final as to some but not all of the claims or parties and the trial court certifies there is no just reason to delay the appeal, and second, an interlocutory order can be immediately appealed under G.S. 1-277(a) and subdivision (d)(1) of this section if the trial court's decision deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review. Bartlett v. Jacobs, 124 N.C. App. 521, 477 S.E.2d 693 (1996).
There are two avenues by which a party may immediately appeal an interlocutory order of judgment. First, if the order or judgment is final as to some but not all of the claims or parties, and the trial court certifies the case for appeal pursuant to G.S. 1A-1-54(b) an immediate appeal may lie. Second, an appeal is permitted under subdivision (d)(1) of this section and G.S. 1-277 (a) if the trial court's decision deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review. Tinch v. Video Indus. Servs., Inc., 124 N.C. App. 391, 477 S.E.2d 193 (1996), rev'd on other grounds, 347 N.C. 380, 493 S.E.2d 426 (1997).
An interlocutory order can be immediately appealed under G.S. 1A-1-54(b) if the order is final as to some but not all of the claims, or an interlocutory order can be appealed under G.S. 1-277(a) and this subsection if the trial court's decision deprives the appellant of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review. First Atl. Mgt. Corp. v. Dunlea Realty Co., 131 N.C. App. 242, 507 S.E.2d 56 (1998).
Trial court's order granting a partial new trial and its judgment fixing the issue of liability were interlocutory and they were not appealable under the exceptions allowed by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b), G.S. 1-277(a), or G.S. 7A-27(d), where the trial court did not certify either the order granting a partial new trial or the underlying judgment for immediate review, and where defendant failed to argue why the order and judgment appealed affected a substantial right. Loy v. Martin, 144 N.C. App. 414, 547 S.E.2d 843 (2001).
Where an interlocutory appeal affected a substantial right of one of the parties, such an appeal could be brought pursuant to G.S. 1-277 and 7A-27(d), and whether or not an appeal affected a substantial right had to be decided on a case by case basis.
Ussery v. Taylor, 156 N.C. App. 684, 577 S.E.2d 159 (2003).
Arbitration Order in Particular. - An order denying arbitration, although interlocutory, is immediately appealable because it involves a substantial right which might be lost if appeal is delayed. Miller v. Two State Constr. Co., 118 N.C. App. 412, 455 S.E.2d 678 (1995).
Order denying a nursing facility's motion to compel arbitration in a negligence action by the executor of a deceased patient's estate affected a substantial right and was immediately appealable pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(d)(1). Westmoreland v. High Point
Healthcare Inc., 218 N.C. App. 76, 721 S.E.2d 712 (2012).
Particular Facts and Procedural History Must Be Considered. - In determining which interlocutory orders are appealable and which are not, the Supreme Court must consider the particular facts of each case and the procedural history of the order from which an appeal is sought. Travco Hotels, Inc. v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 332 N.C. 288, 420 S.E.2d 426 (1992).
Under this section, whether a substantial right will be prejudiced by delaying an appeal must be determined on a case by case basis. Stafford v. Stafford, 133 N.C. App. 163, 515 S.E.2d 43 (1999),
aff'd, 351 N.C. 94, 520 S.E.2d 785 (1999).
In deciding whether an appeal is interlocutory, G.S. 1-277 and this section require a two-part test: (1) does the trial court's order affect a substantial right; and (2) if so, will the loss of that right injure the party appealing if it is not corrected
prior to final judgment. Travco Hotels, Inc. v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 102 N.C. App. 659, 403 S.E.2d 593, aff'd, 332 N.C. 288, 420 S.E.2d
426 (1992).
Separation of Property in Divorce Cases. - Because a partial summary judgment giving a wife two parcels of land, before the divorcing parties' property was equitably divided, was an interlocutory order, a husband was not required to file an appeal from
the interlocutory order; no substantial right of either party was involved, and the partial summary judgment was appealable when the husband filed his appeal from the equitable distribution judgment. Davis v. Davis,
360 N.C. 518, 631 S.E.2d 114 (2006).
The Appellate Division Rules on Interlocutory Nature of Appeals. - The trial court's determination that there is no just reason to delay an appeal, while accorded great deference, cannot bind the appellate courts because ruling on the interlocutory nature
of appeals is properly a matter for the appellate division, not the trial court. First Atl. Mgt. Corp. v. Dunlea Realty Co., 131 N.C. App. 242, 507 S.E.2d 56 (1998).
No Appeal from Interlocutory Order in Criminal Proceeding Absent Statutory Provision. - In light of the legislature's enactment of G.S. 15A-1444(d) and the decision in State v. Henry, 318 N.C. 408,
348 S.E.2d 593 (1986), G.S. 1-277, the statutory basis for the holding in State v. Childs, 265 N.C. 575, 144 S.E.2d 653 (1965) (per curiam) and dictum in State v. Bryant, 280 N.C. 407,
185 S.E.2d 854 (1972) is no longer relevant to the appeal of interlocutory orders in criminal proceedings; accordingly, the court of appeals declines to follow State v. Jones, 67 N.C. App. 413,
313 S.E.2d 264 (1984); State v. Montalbano, 73 N.C. App. 259, 326 S.E.2d 634, disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 608, 332 S.E.2d 182 (1985); and State v. Major, 84 N.C. App. 421, 352 S.E.2d 862 (1987) insofar as they might allow interlocutory appeals in criminal proceedings based on Childs, Bryant, or G.S. 1-277. State v. Joseph, 92 N.C. App. 303, 374 S.E.2d 132 (1988),
cert. denied, 324 N.C. 115, 377 S.E.2d 241 (1989).
For discussion of apparent doctrinal inconsistency concerning the requirements for appealing interlocutory orders, which may produce irreconcilable results in cases which include counterclaims, see J & B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, Inc.,
88 N.C. App. 1, 362 S.E.2d 812 (1987).
Fragmentary Appeals from Interlocutory Orders Not Permitted. - The appeal from a preliminary injunction restraining defendant bank from disposing of shares of corporate stock it held as executor under the will of a stockholder who died owning 88% of the
capital stock of a North Carolina corporation was unauthorized and was dismissed since it was fragmentary; piecemeal appeals from interlocutory orders are not usually permitted in this State and the preliminary injunction appealed
from in this case was such an order, as its effect was temporary rather than permanent. Shuping v. NCNB Nat'l Bank, 93 N.C. App. 338, 377 S.E.2d 802 (1989).
Standing to Appeal. - In an action brought by payee against makers to enforce acceleration clause in note, where third-party defendant bank not only had an opportunity to participate, but in fact did fully participate in the determination of third-party
plaintiff's liability and was bound by the judgment in favor of plaintiff entered against defendants as third-party plaintiffs, bank qualified as an aggrieved party within the meaning of G.S. 1-271 and the bank had standing
to appeal entry of summary judgment in favor of payee. Barker v. Agee, 326 N.C. 470, 389 S.E.2d 803 (1990).
The General Assembly did not restrict the right of appeal provided by G.S. 1-277 and subsection (d) of this section by engrafting G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b) requirements upon them. Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, Inc.,
290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976).
G.S. 1-277 and this section prevent fragmentary, premature and unnecessary appeals by permitting the trial divisions to be done with a case fully and finally before it is presented to the appellate division. Blackwelder v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 299 S.E.2d 777 (1983).
The reason for the rules embodied in G.S. 1-277(a) and subdivision (d)(1) of this section is to prevent fragmentary, premature and unnecessary appeals by permitting the trial divisions to have done with a case fully and finally before it is presented to the appellate division. Appellate procedure is designed to eliminate the unnecessary delay and expense of repeated fragmentary appeals, and to present the whole case for determination in a single appeal from the final judgment. McKinney v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 64 N.C. App. 370, 307 S.E.2d 390 (1983).
Appellate court refused to review the neighbors' interlocutory appeal of the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment, where the neighbors failed to comply with N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(4) by failing to state in their brief the substantial right that
would have been lost if the appeal was not heard, as was required under G.S. 1-277(a), 7A-27(d)(1). Munden v. Courser, 155 N.C. App. 217, 574 S.E.2d 110 (2002).
If appellant's rights would be fully and adequately protected by an exception to an interlocutory order that could then be assigned as error on appeal after final judgment, there is no right to an immediate appeal. Horne v. Nobility Homes, Inc.,
88 N.C. App. 476, 363 S.E.2d 642 (1988); Howell v. Howell, 89 N.C. App. 115, 365 S.E.2d 181 (1988).
No Appeal from Interlocutory Order Where Substantial Right Not Affected. - An interlocutory order which does not affect a "substantial right" of one of the parties under G.S. 1-277 and subsection (d) of this section is not appealable, and the avoidance of a rehearing or trial is not considered to be such a "substantial right." Davis v. Mitchell, 46 N.C. App. 272, 265 S.E.2d 248 (1980).
No appeal lies from an interlocutory order unless it affects a substantial right and will result in injury if not reviewed before final judgment. Horne v. Nobility Homes, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 476, 363 S.E.2d 642 (1988); Howell v. Howell, 89 N.C. App. 115, 365 S.E.2d 181 (1988). But see, State v. Joseph, 92 N.C. App. 203, 374 S.E.2d 132 (1988), cert. denied, 324 N.C. 115, 377 S.E.2d 241 (1989), annotated above.
Court of appeals held that where a trial court dismissed a company's contract claims, but stayed the tort claims: (1) this was an interlocutory order; (2) there was no certification; and (3) the company failed to show a substantial right at stake on appeal. Mitsubishi Elec. & Elecs. USA, Inc. v. Duke Power Co., 155 N.C. App. 555, 573 S.E.2d 742 (2002).
Although defendant former employee argued that a preliminary injunction affected his substantial right and was immediately appealable under G.S. 7A-27(b)(3)(a), the preliminary injunction did not prevent defendant from working in plaintiff's industry, but merely limited defendant's activities by not allowing defendant to call on or service a narrowly defined group of customers; therefore, defendant's statement - that the preliminary injunction affected his ability to earn a living - failed to articulate a basis for appellate review. A&D Envtl. Servs. v. Miller, 243 N.C. App. 1, 776 S.E.2d 733 (2015).
Appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal by an underinsured motorist insurer because the trial court's order on cross-motions for summary judgment was an interlocutory order, as pending issues remained in the case, and the order did not contain a certification for appeal. Moreover, although the insurer was permitted, but was not required, to participate in the proceedings as an unnamed underinsured motorist carrier, the insurer failed to show a substantial right, which would have been lost absent immediate appellate review. Peterson v. Dillman, 245 N.C. App. 239, 782 S.E.2d 362 (2016).
Court of appeals did not review a father's appeal from an order denying his motions seeking post-award discovery because the father failed to demonstrate that he would be deprived of a substantial right without appellate review of the order before a final judgment had been entered. Stokes v. Crumpton, 246 N.C. App. 757, 784 S.E.2d 537 (2016).
Former employee was not entitled to appeal the Business Court's interlocutory order because she did not explain how she would be prejudiced and failed to show that the order affected a substantial right where she did not identify a specific "material right" that she would lose if the order were not reviewed before final judgment or explain how the order in question would "work injury" to her if not immediately reviewed, and merely asserting a preference for a forum other than the Business Court absent a specific, legal entitlement to an exclusion from designation was insufficient to support the former employee's contention that this matter was analogous to a venue change and was therefore immediately appealable. Hanesbrands Inc. v. Fowler, 369 N.C. 216, 794 S.E.2d 497 (2016).
Trial court's order setting aside a consent judgment was not immediately appealable because the order was interlocutory since it contemplated further proceedings at the trial level on the issue of just compensation, and the order did not affect a substantial right; the trial court did not certify the order setting aside the consent judgment for immediate appellate review. N.C. DOT v. Laxmi Hotels of Spring Lake, Inc., 259 N.C. App. 610, 817 S.E.2d 62 (2018).
Trial court's denial of employees' estoppel motion was interlocutory and not appealable, and the employees' appeal thereof was accordingly dismissed, because the employees failed to make the colorable assertion necessary to claim that the denial of their
estoppel motion affected a substantial right; the employees nowhere asserted that the prior action upon which they based their estoppel motion reached final judgment on the merits. McCullers v. Lewis,
265 N.C. App. 216, 828 S.E.2d 524 (2019).
But Interlocutory Order May Be Appealed If It Affects a Substantial Right. - Orders which are technically interlocutory may properly be appealed, regardless of lack of certification under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b) if they affect a substantial right. Estrada v. Jaques, 70 N.C. App. 627, 321 S.E.2d 240 (1984).
Although it is the general rule that no appeal lies from an interlocutory order, G.S. 1-277 and subsection (d) of this section permit an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order which affects a substantial right. Fox v. Wilson, 85 N.C. App. 292, 354 S.E.2d 737 (1987).
Interlocutory order affects a substantial right so that it is appealable under G.S. 1-277(a) and subdivision (d)(1) of this section if the right affected is substantial and the right will be lost, prejudiced, or less than adequately protected if order is not reviewed before final judgment. T'ai Co. v. Market Square Ltd. Partnership, 92 N.C. App. 234, 373 S.E.2d 885 (1988).
Because university defendants' underlying interest in asserting sovereign immunity was substantial, the appellate court accepted jurisdiction of their interlocutory appeal pursuant to the authority conferred by G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d), although
it disagreed with their comity argument. Atl. Coast Conf. v. Univ. of Md., 230 N.C. App. 429, 751 S.E.2d 612 (2013).
Appeal Is Permitted Where a Substantial Right Would Be Affected. - Where a trial court granted plaintiff summary judgment as to liability on a criminal conversation claim, and granted defendant summary judgment as to an alienation of affections claim, though no final judgment was entered as to the issue of damages for the criminal conversation claim, nor was certification granted under G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b) as to the alienation of affections claim, the appeal affected a substantial right that would be lost absent immediate review, because the elements of damages were so closely related that they did not support separate awards for each tort. McCutchen v. McCutchen, 170 N.C. App. 1, 612 S.E.2d 162 (2005).
Because a physician's assertions of statutory privilege related directly to the matters to be disclosed under a trial court's interlocutory discovery order, the challenged discovery order affected a substantial right and the physician's interlocutory appeal was properly before the appellate court under G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1). Armstrong v. Barnes, 171 N.C. App. 287, 614 S.E.2d 371 (2005), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 60, 621 S.E.2d 173 (2005).
North Carolina Court of Appeals accepted the appeal brought by third-party defendants, the North Carolina Division of Forest Resources and North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources (now a division of the North Carolina Department
of Agriculture and Consumer Services), in a wrongful death suit, asserting negligence on the third-party defendants with regard to a forest fire obscuring the vision of travelers on a highway, which led to a multiple vehicle
accident, killing a passenger, because the trial court's denial of the third-party defendants' motions to dismiss raised the issues of sovereign immunity and the public duty doctrine, which affected a substantial right sufficient
to warrant immediate appellate review. Myers v. McGrady, 170 N.C. App. 501, 613 S.E.2d 334 (2005), rev'd and remanded, review improvidently allowed, 350 N.C. 460,
628 S.E.2d 761 (2006).
A substantial right is one which will clearly be lost or irremediably adversely affected if the order is not reviewable before final judgment. In other words, the right to immediate appeal is reserved for those cases in which the normal course of procedure
is inadequate to protect the substantial right affected by the order sought to be appealed. Blackwelder v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 299 S.E.2d
777 (1983).
The "substantial right" test for appealability of interlocutory orders is more easily stated than applied. It is usually necessary to resolve the question in each case by considering the particular facts of that case and the procedural context in which the order from which appeal is sought was entered. Blackwelder v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 299 S.E.2d 777 (1983).
No hard and fast rules exist for determining which appeals affect a substantial right. Rather, such decisions usually require consideration of the facts of the particular case. Estrada v. Jaques, 70 N.C. App. 627, 321 S.E.2d 240 (1984).
Whether a substantial right is affected usually depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the procedural context of the orders appealed from. Estrada v. Jaques, 70 N.C. App. 627, 321 S.E.2d 240 (1984).
There has evolved a two-part test of the appealability of interlocutory orders under the "substantial right" exception provided in G.S. 1-277(a) and subdivision (d)(1) of this section. First, the right itself must be "substantial," and second, the enforcement of the substantial right must be lost, prejudiced or less than adequately protected by exception to entry of the interlocutory order. J & B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 1, 362 S.E.2d 812 (1987).
The appealability of interlocutory orders pursuant to the "substantial right" exception is determined by a two-step test. The right itself must be substantial and the deprivation of that substantial right must potentially work injury to plaintiff if not
corrected before appeal from final judgment. Miller v. Swann Plantation Dev. Co., 101 N.C. App. 394, 399 S.E.2d 137 (1991).
Awards Pendente Lite. - Awards pendente lite are interlocutory decrees which necessarily do not affect a substantial right from which lies an immediate appeal pursuant to this section. Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991).
Facts and circumstances of each case and the procedural context of the orders appealed from are the determinative factors in deciding whether a "substantial right" is affected. Schneider v. Brunk, 72 N.C. App. 560, 324 S.E.2d 922 (1985).
Avoidance of a rehearing or trial is not a "substantial right" entitling a party to an immediate appeal. Blackwelder v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 299 S.E.2d 777 (1983).
Denial of a motion to dismiss is interlocutory because it simply allows an action to proceed and will not seriously impair any right of defendants that cannot be corrected upon appeal from final judgment, and the avoidance of a trial is not a "substantial right" that would make such an interlocutory order appealable under G.S. 1-277 or subsection (d) of this section. Howard v. Ocean Trail Convalescent Ctr., 68 N.C. App. 494, 315 S.E.2d 97 (1984).
Avoidance of a trial is not a substantial right entitling plaintiff to an immediate appeal. Horne v. Nobility Homes, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 476, 363 S.E.2d 642 (1988).
Court found that the only possible "injury" defendant would suffer if not permitted immediate appellate review was the necessity of proceeding to trial before the matter was reviewed by the appellate court, not the deprivation of a substantial right under
this section. Anderson v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 134 N.C. App. 724, 518 S.E.2d 786 (1999).
The necessity of a second trial, standing alone, does not affect a substantial right. However, in certain cases the appellate courts have held that a plaintiff's right to have all his claims heard before the same jury affects a substantial right. Estrada
v. Jaques, 70 N.C. App. 627, 321 S.E.2d 240 (1984).
A party has a "substantial right" to avoid separate trials of the same legal issues. Whitehurst v. Corey, 88 N.C. App. 746, 364 S.E.2d 728 (1988).
Right to avoid possibility of two trials on same issues can be a substantial right. Davidson v. Knauff Ins. Agency, Inc., 93 N.C. App. 20, 376 S.E.2d 488, cert. denied, 324 N.C. 577, 381 S.E.2d 772 (1989).
In a suit for malicious prosecution, in which defendant counterclaimed requesting a constructive trust, a factual issue of whether plaintiff forged defendant's name on a check was central to both actions; denial of appeal from summary judgment against defendant could have resulted in two juries in separate trials reaching different resolutions of this same issue if subsequent trial on the merits and appeal were successful. Consequently, the order dismissing defendant's counterclaim affected a substantial right and appeal was granted. Lamb v. Lamb, 92 N.C. App. 680, 375 S.E.2d 685 (1989).
The right to avoid the possibility of two trials on the same issues can be a substantial right that permits an appeal of an interlocutory order when there are issues of fact common to the claim appealed and remaining claims. Allen v. Sea Gate Ass'n, 119 N.C. App. 761, 460 S.E.2d 197 (1995).
Under circumstances in which a patient's suit alleged multiple, overlapping acts of medical malpractice resulting in harm, it was best that one jury hear the case to avoid inconsistent verdicts; accordingly, a summary judgment in favor of a radiologist
affected a substantial right and the appeal from the summary judgment was considered, despite the fact that the summary judgment was granted as to one but not all of the defendants and the trial court did not certify that there
was "no just reason for delay." Burgess v. Campbell, 182 N.C. App. 480, 642 S.E.2d 478 (2007).
But Avoiding Separate Trials of Different Issues Is Not a Substantial Right. - Simply having all claims determined in one proceeding is not a substantial right. A party has instead the substantial right to avoid two separate trials of the same "issues,"
but avoiding separate trials of different issues is not a substantial right. J & B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 1, 362 S.E.2d 812 (1987).
Appellate Court as Dispatcher of Appeals. - To the extent that judgments as to one or more but fewer than all parties are determined by the appellate courts of this State to affect a "substantial right" of one of the litigants under G.S. 1-277 and subsection
(d) of this section, the procedure for trial court certification of such judgments as appealable established in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b) is bypassed and the appellate court is substituted as the true dispatcher of appeals. Equitable
Leasing Corp. v. Myers, 46 N.C. App. 162, 265 S.E.2d 240 (1980).
Rule Against Allowing Appeal from Interlocutory Orders Strictly Construed. - Strict construction of the rule against allowing appeal from an interlocutory order of the trial court serves the purpose of eliminating the unnecessary delay and expense of
fragmented appeals and of presenting the whole case for determination in a single appeal from a final judgment. Funderburk v. Justice, 25 N.C. App. 655, 214 S.E.2d 310
(1975).
Effect of Procedures for Staying Execution of Judgment. - The existence of procedures under G.S. 1-269, 1-289 and 1A-1, Rule 62, for staying execution on judgment does not prevent the entry of the judgment from affecting a substantial right of the judgment
debtor. Wachovia Realty Invs. v. Housing, Inc., 292 N.C. 93, 232 S.E.2d 667 (1977).
No Appeal as Matter of Right from Interlocutory Orders in Criminal Cases. - This section makes no provision for an appeal as a matter of right from interlocutory orders in criminal cases. State v. Lance, 1 N.C. App. 620, 162 S.E.2d 154 (1968); State v. Smith, 4 N.C. App. 491, 4 N.C. App. 591, 166 S.E.2d 870 (1969); State v. Bryant, 12 N.C. App. 530, 183 S.E.2d 824 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 280 N.C. 407, 185 S.E.2d 854 (1972).
In a criminal case there is no provision in the statute for an appeal to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right from an interlocutory order entered therein. State v. Black, 7 N.C. App. 324, 172
S.E.2d 217 (1970); State v. Thompson, 56 N.C. App. 439, 289 S.E.2d 132 (1982).
Dismissal of Interlocutory Appeals. - The appellate division possesses sufficient authority to dispose of interlocutory appeals which do not affect a substantial right by dismissal. It has express authority to do so on motion of the parties if the appeal is frivolous or is taken solely for purposes of delay. Or it may exercise its general authority in response to motions filed under the general motions provision. Or the appellate division may dismiss upon its own motion as part of its general duty to apply the laws governing the right to appeal. Estrada v. Jaques, 70 N.C. App. 627, 321 S.E.2d 240 (1984).
In a workers' compensation proceeding, an appeal by an employer and its insurance carrier was dismissed as interlocutory where the North Carolina Industrial Commission specifically reserved the issue of the amount of the compensation award for the employee. Watts v. Hemlock Homes of the Highlands, Inc., 160 N.C. App. 81, 584 S.E.2d 97 (2003).
Because the trial court did not rule on the merits of an employee's claim for unemployment benefits, but found that the Employment Security Commission's order did not address all of the relevant issues raised by the record, and the findings were incomplete
and failed to set out the sequence of events regarding the timing and notification of the employee's discharge, the order was clearly interlocutory; hence, without evidence that the employee's substantial rights were affected,
or that any criteria for an immediate appeal was required, the employee's appeal was dismissed. Reeves v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 170 N.C. App. 610, 613 S.E.2d 350, review
denied, 359 N.C. 853, 619 S.E.2d 511 (2005).
Filing of Motion to Dismiss. - Ruling on the interlocutory nature of appeals is properly a matter for the appellate division, not the trial court. Since this often requires consideration of the merits, motions to dismiss appeals on grounds of being interlocutory
should properly be filed after the record on appeal is filed in the appellate court. Estrada v. Jaques, 70 N.C. App. 627, 321 S.E.2d 240 (1984).
Possibility of Two Trials. - The right to avoid the possibility of two trials on the same issues can be a substantial right so as to warrant an immediate appeal under G.S. 1-277 and subsection (d) of this section. Dalton Moran Shook, Inc. v. Pitt Dev. Co., 113 N.C. App. 707, 440 S.E.2d 585 (1994).
Where dismissal of appeal as interlocutory could result in two different trials on the same issues, creating the possibility of inconsistent verdicts, a substantial right was prejudiced; therefore, defendant's motion for summary judgment which was granted
by the trial court was immediately appealable by plaintiff. Hartman v. Walkertown Shopping Ctr., Inc., 113 N.C. App. 632, 439 S.E.2d 787, cert. denied, 336 N.C. 780,
447 S.E.2d 422 (1994).
Where denial of Rule 60(b) motion was in the nature of an interlocutory order because plaintiff's voluntary dismissal resulted in there being no action pending, and defendants would not suffer the loss of a substantial right absent an appeal, in the court's
discretion pursuant to Rules 2 and 21 the appeal was treated as a writ of certiorari. Troy v. Tucker, 126 N.C. App. 213, 484 S.E.2d 98 (1997).
Collateral Estoppel Did Not Bar Action. - Because no court had yet adjudicated the just compensation issue, the North Carolina Department of Transportation could not rely on collateral estoppel to immediately appeal the trial court's order setting aside
a consent judgment; the consent judgment prevented the need for litigation, as it was designed to do. N.C. DOT v. Laxmi Hotels of Spring Lake, Inc., 259 N.C. App. 610,
817 S.E.2d 62 (2018).
B. PARTICULAR ORDERS.
.
Order Impacting Sovereign Immunity. - Denial of a city's summary judgment motion in a wrongful death action, an interlocutory order, was immediately appealable pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(d)(1) because the appeal raised an issue of sovereign immunity. Williams v. Scotland County, 167 N.C. App. 105, 604 S.E.2d 334 (2004), cert. denied, 359 N.C. 327, 611 S.E.2d 168 (2005).
Denial of an officer's and department's motion for summary judgment grounded on the defense of governmental immunity affected a substantial right and was immediately appealable; with respect to the balance of their arguments, however, the officer and the department showed no substantial right that would have been lost or irreparably prejudiced if the order was not reviewed before final judgment and those arguments were premature. Showalter v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 183 N.C. App. 132, 643 S.E.2d 649 (2007).
Although a trial court's denial of a county board of education's summary judgment motion was an interlocutory order that was generally not appealable at that point in the litigation, as the board was claiming sovereign immunity as a complete defense to an action by a student's mother after the student was denied placement at a school, the order was immediately appealable under G.S. 7A-27(d)(1). Craig v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 185 N.C. App. 651, 648 S.E.2d 923 (2007), cert. granted and review denied, 362 N.C. 234, 659 S.E.2d 439 (2008).
Court of appeals reviewed residents' interlocutory appeal of an order dismissing their complaint against a city pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) because the trial court's stated basis for the dismissal was that the doctrine of governmental immunity applied to the residents' allegations against the city, and the city had not waived its governmental immunity; those grounds were sufficient to warrant immediate appellate review. Williams v. Devere Constr. Co., 215 N.C. App. 135, 716 S.E.2d 21 (2011).
Because a sheriff and surety sought to have summary judgment entered in their favor on governmental immunity grounds, their appeal was properly before the court of appeals. White v. Cochran, 229 N.C. App. 183, 748 S.E.2d 334 (2013).
Town's appeal of two orders ruling on motions in a dispute with a county over wastewater disposal was dismissed because the orders were interlocutory, and the town did not show the orders affected substantial rights of governmental immunity, as governmental
immunity did not apply to claims arising out of the proprietary operation of the town's sewer system. Union Cty. v. Town of Marshville, 255 N.C. App. 441, 804 S.E.2d
801 (2017).
Interlocutory Appeal of Preliminary Injunction Allowed. - Trial court's grant of a motion for a preliminary injunction, although an interlocutory order, was appealable under G.S. 1-277 and G.S. 7A-27 because the order required a North Carolina nonprofit
association to give up the substantial right to do business as the exclusive provider of creditable bail bondsmen training and to receive remuneration for providing such education. Rockford-Cohen Group, LLC v. N.C. Dep't of
Ins., 230 N.C. App. 317, 749 S.E.2d 469 (2013).
Preliminary Injunction Against Enforcement of a Statute. - When an agent of the State that is charged with enforcing statutes appeals rulings limiting the enforcement of those statutes, the right to enforce the statute is substantial, and the rulings
are immediately appealable. Rockford-Cohen Group, LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Ins., 230 N.C. App. 317, 749 S.E.2d 469 (2013).
Grant of Preliminary Injunction. - Defendants' substantial right to control assets related to the mortgage sale is affected by the preliminary injunction and, thus, the court had jurisdiction to review the defendants' appeal from the preliminary injunction order. SED Holding, LLC v. 3 Star Props., LLC, 246 N.C. App. 632, 784 S.E.2d 627 (2016).
Court of appeals had no jurisdiction to consider an employee's interlocutory appeal of an order issuing a preliminary injunction because the employee failed to establish that the injunction affected a substantial right; the preliminary injunction did
not prevent or destroy the employee's ability to earn a living or sustain a livelihood because he continued to have a realistic opportunity to use his skill and talents to generate new client relationships outside the employer's
customer list. Sia Group, Inc. v. Patterson, 254 N.C. App. 85, 801 S.E.2d 707 (2017).
Appeal from Order Granting Motion to Enforce A Preliminary Injunction. - Appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a trial court's order granting a motion to enforce a previously imposed preliminary injunction because the former officers
of a corporation failed to satisfy their burden of demonstrating the loss of a substantial right absent immediate appeal of the order. Bolier & Co., LLC v. Decca Furniture (USA), Inc.,
250 N.C. App. 323, 792 S.E.2d 865 (2016), review denied, 369 N.C. 759, 799 S.E.2d 620, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 425 (2017).
Change of Venue. - While the trial court had sufficient information to rule on the timely motion, the trial court's discretionary determination was interlocutory and affected no substantial right of either party, and thus plaintiff's appeal was premature.
Stokes v. Stokes, 371 N.C. 770, 821 S.E.2d 161 (2018).
Order granting a motion for a change of venue is interlocutory and not immediately appealable. Kennon v. Kennon, 72 N.C. App. 161, 323 S.E.2d 741 (1984).
Order Denying Motion for Change of Venue. - Defendant's purported appeal from an interlocutory order denying defendant's motion for a change of venue pursuant to G.S. 1-83(2) for the convenience of the witnesses and the ends of justice was dismissed as premature. Furches v. Moore, 48 N.C. App. 430, 269 S.E.2d 635 (1980).
In cases where a trial court's decision deprives an appellant of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review, an appellate court was allowed to review the appeal; motions for change of venue because the county designated was not proper affected a substantial right and were immediately appealable. Hawley v. Hobgood, 174 N.C. App. 606, 622 S.E.2d 117 (2005).
Appeal of the denial of a subcontractor's motions to consolidate actions and to change venue was proper because the right to venue established by statute is a substantial right, the denial of which is immediately appealable; further, a substantial right was affected when the same factual issues would be present in both trials and the possibility of inconsistent verdicts on those issues existed. Barrier Geotechnical Contrs., Inc. v. Radford Quarries of Boone, Inc., 184 N.C. App. 741, 646 S.E.2d 840 (2007).
When plaintiffs filed a negligence suit in Forsyth County, the trial court's order denying defendants' motion for change of venue, though interlocutory, affected a substantial right and was immediately appealable because Forsyth County was not proper; plaintiffs and defendants either resided in or were located in Alamance County. Jenkins v. Hearn Vascular Surgery, P.A., 217 N.C. App. 118, 719 S.E.2d 151 (2011).
Trial court's order denying defendants' motion for change of venue was interlocutory, as it was an order made during the pendency of the action, which did not dispose of the case; however, because defendants alleged the county indicated in the complaint was improper, the appellate court addressed the merits of defendants' appeal. TD Bank, N.A. v. Crown Leasing Partners, LLC, 224 N.C. App. 649, 737 S.E.2d 738 (2012).
Trial court's order denying defendants' motion for change of venue was interlocutory because it did not dispose of all issues of the case and was not a final disposition for any party, and thus the trial court's denial of the motion for change of venue
affected a substantial right, and the merits were considered. Se. Caissons, LLC v. Choate Constr. Co., 247 N.C. App. 104, 784 S.E.2d 650 (2016).
Motion to Strike Jury Trial Request. - Trial court's denial of the city's motion to strike the officer's request for a jury trial was appealable as affecting a substantial right.
Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Preliminary Injunction. - The trial court abused its discretion in denying a seller's motion to set the preliminary injunction aside because the seller never received notice of the buyer's intention to seek a preliminary
injunction; the lack of notice affected the seller's substantial rights, and the seller's purported attorney of record did not represent the seller in the instant action, thus making service on the attorney insufficient to
provide notice to the seller. Perry v. Baxley Dev., Inc., 188 N.C. App. 158, 655 S.E.2d 460 (2008).
Order Regarding Interrogatories. - Trial court's order sustaining objections to, and granting a motion to strike, certain interrogatories, denying defendants' motion to compel answers to those interrogatories, and also denying defendants' motion to permit them to respond to plaintiff's request for admissions was interlocutory, and defendants' appeal was fragmentary and premature. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Olive, 42 N.C. App. 574, 257 S.E.2d 100 (1979).
In a wrongful death action, the defendant declined to answer certain interrogatories on the grounds of self-incrimination, but was ordered to do so by the court, and he appealed. Although this appeal was from an interlocutory order, it was nevertheless
authorized, because if some of the interrogatories were incriminating and the defendant was compelled to answer them, his constitutional rights could have been lost beyond recall, and his appeal at the end of the trial would
have been of no value. Shaw v. Williamson, 75 N.C. App. 604, 331 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 669, 335 S.E.2d 496 (1985).
Refusal to grant permissive intervention is an interlocutory order. Howell v. Howell, 89 N.C. App. 115, 365 S.E.2d 181 (1988).
Underinsured Motorist Carrier's Right to Appear as Unnamed Defendant. - An underinsured motorist carrier could appeal from an order denying its motion to appear unnamed in the liability phase of a trial against its insured, since the right of an underinsured
motorist carrier to defend unnamed is substantial. Church v. Allstate Ins. Co., 143 N.C. App. 527, 547 S.E.2d 458 (2001).
Orders Regarding Insurance and the Duty to Defend. - Insured failed to establish how orders would irreparably affect its substantial right to defense in allegedly pending benzene claims, no order decided the ultimate duty to defend issue, and the insured failed to advance a sufficient argument for expanding the duty to defend substantial right exception, and its appeals were dismissed. Radiator Specialty Co. v. Arrowood Indem. Co., 253 N.C. App. 508, 800 S.E.2d 452 (2017).
Insurer could not establish that a certain order affected its substantial rights because it owed the insured no defense duty absent its consent; the insurer's ability but not duty to defend the insured did not implicate its substantial rights. Radiator
Specialty Co. v. Arrowood Indem. Co., 253 N.C. App. 508, 800 S.E.2d 452 (2017).
Order Granting Motion to Amend. - An order of the trial court allowing a motion to amend a complaint is interlocutory and is not immediately appealable. Barber v. Woodmen of World Life Ins. Soc'y, 88 N.C. App. 666, 364 S.E.2d 715 (1988).
Class Action. - Because no substantial right was involved in a trial court's determination that the case met the prerequisites to utilizing a class action, the general rule disallowing interlocutory appeals of such orders applied. Frost v. Mazda Motor
of Am., 353 N.C. 188, 540 S.E.2d 324 (2000).
Order Granting Intervention. - Although the rule is not absolute, ordinarily no appeal will lie from an order permitting intervention of parties unless the order adversely affects a substantial right which the appellant may lose if not granted an appeal
before final judgment. The rule applies with equal vigor without regard to whether the trial court grants a motion to intervene as a matter of right pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 24(a) or as permissive intervention pursuant to
G.S. 1A-1, Rule 24(b). Wood v. City of Fayetteville, 35 N.C. App. 738, 242 S.E.2d 640, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 264, 245 S.E.2d 781 (1978).
Order Denying Intervention. - An interlocutory order was immediately appealable, where substantial rights were affected by the trial court's denial of a motion by a physician and his employer to intervene in a declaratory judgment action brought by an
infant patient's estate to determine which potential heirs would share in the proceeds, if any, of the underlying wrongful death action. Alford v. Davis, 131 N.C. App. 214, 505 S.E.2d 917 (1998).
Denial of Motion to Dismiss. - Ordinarily, there is no right of appeal from the refusal of a motion to dismiss. The refusal to dismiss the action generally will not seriously impair any right of defendant that cannot be corrected upon appeal from final judgment. Godley Auction Co. v. Myers, 40 N.C. App. 570, 253 S.E.2d 362 (1979).
An order denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim for punitive damages is not immediately appealable. Williams v. East Coast Sales, Inc., 50 N.C. App. 565, 274 S.E.2d 276 (1981).
Where defendant was ordered by the trial court through an interlocutory order to pay plaintiff's legal fees, and where defendant did not perfect his appeal from such judgment, defendant did not lose his right to attack the judgment, since the record indicated that the appeal was not taken because of an agreement between the parties' counsel to vacate the order in question. Stroupe v. Stroupe, 301 N.C. 656, 273 S.E.2d 434 (1981).
The order entered by the trial court denying the defendants' motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment was not a final determination of the defendants' rights, even though the trial court stated that "there is no just reason to delay the appeal," and did not affect the defendants' substantial rights. The appeal of the order, therefore, could not lie as of right. Fraser v. Di Santi, 75 N.C. App. 654, 331 S.E.2d 217, cert. denied, 315 N.C. 183, 337 S.E.2d 856 (1985).
The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss clearly represented an interlocutory order, which was not properly before the Court of Appeals. Southern Uniform Rentals, Inc. v. Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 90 N.C. App. 738, 370 S.E.2d 76 (1988).
Where the trial court denied employer's motion to dismiss employee's breach of contract suit on the ground of a forum selection clause, finding that the clause was a product of unequal bargaining power, the motion to dismiss was immediately appealable. Cox v. Dine-A-Mate, Inc., 129 N.C. App. 773, 501 S.E.2d 353 (1998), cert. denied, 349 N.C. 355 (1998).
Order denying a taxpayer's motion to dismiss an administrative summons requesting documents was appealable because it was an intermediate order that involved the merits and affected the final judgment in that if the motion had been granted, the trial court would not have issued the order to comply with the summons. Even if the appeal was not from a final judgment, the appeal of a discovery order asserting a statutory or a common-law privilege affected a substantial right. In re Summons Issued to Ernst & Young, LLP, 191 N.C. App. 668, 663 S.E.2d 921 (2008), rev'd in part on other grounds, and remanded, 363 N.C. 612, 684 S.E.2d 151, 2009 N.C. LEXIS 897 (2009).
In plaintiffs' negligence action, a trial court's order denying defendants' motion to dismiss under G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) did not affect a substantial right and was not immediately appealable, even though the question presented in defendants' motion was in the interests of judicial economy and raised an issue of public importance, that being an alleged injury to a nonviable fetus, because defendants offered no evidence of any potential injury to either party if the issue was presented after a final judgment on the merits. Jenkins v. Hearn Vascular Surgery, P.A., 217 N.C. App. 118, 719 S.E.2d 151 (2011).
Court had jurisdiction to review defendants' appeal from the order denying their motion to dismiss because the issue pertained to a forum selection clause. SED Holding, LLC v. 3 Star Props., LLC, 246 N.C. App. 632, 784 S.E.2d 627 (2016).
Court of appeals addressed the interlocutory appeals from the denials of motions to dismiss filed by physicians employed by the Department of Public Safety because orders denying dispositive motions based on public official's immunity affected a substantial right and were immediately appealable; the physicians' appeals were interlocutory because the trial court's denial of their motions to dismiss did not dispose of the case. Leonard v. Bell, 254 N.C. App. 694, 803 S.E.2d 445 (2017).
Because employees failed to satisfy their burden as to all but their lack of personal jurisdiction argument, their appeal of the denial of their motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a clam upon which relief could be granted and estoppel motions was subject to dismissal; the statement of the grounds for appellate review only argued that the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction affected a substantial right. McCullers v. Lewis, 265 N.C. App. 216, 828 S.E.2d 524 (2019).
For purposes of appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory order, the investigatory counsel for an area authority under G.S.122C-3(1), G.S. 122C-116(a) failed to show that a trial court's order denying their motion to dismiss the CEO's defamation claims for absolute privilege deprived them of a substantial right where the allegedly defamatory statements were made in an out-of-court press conference shortly after the authority had filed suit against the CEO, and a press conference was neither an inherent nor critical component of a judicial proceeding. Topping v. Meyers, - N.C. App. - , 842 S.E.2d 95 (2020).
Same - Failure to State Claim. - The trial court's refusal to allow defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12 (b)(6) did not put an end to the action or seriously impair any substantial right of defendant that could not be corrected upon appeal from final judgment. Godley Auction Co. v. Myers, 40 N.C. App. 570, 253 S.E.2d 362 (1979).
Denial of a trustee's motion to dismiss trust beneficiaries' claim for relief affected a substantial right under G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1) because the motion to dismiss made a colorable assertion that the beneficiaries' claim was barred under
the doctrine of collateral estoppel due to a prior consent judgment between the parties. Turner v. Hammocks Beach Corp., 363 N.C. 555, 681 S.E.2d 770 (Aug. 28, 2009).
Same - Failure to Join Necessary Party. - No substantial right of the defendant was impaired by the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss for failure to join a necessary party pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(7). The trial court did not rule that other parties were not necessary to be joined. It ruled that the action should not be dismissed for that purpose. Defendant still had adequate opportunity in the trial court for a determination on the question of joinder of parties. Godley Auction Co. v. Myers, 40 N.C. App. 570, 253 S.E.2d 362 (1979).
Appeal from a trial court's order denying a motion to dismiss a complaint, under N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7), for failure to join a necessary party was premature because it was interlocutory in nature, under G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b), and because
the appellants failed to show, pursuant to G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1), that a substantial right would have been affected absent immediate disposition of the matter. Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meeting St. Builders, LLC,
222 N.C. App. 647, 736 S.E.2d 197 (2012).
Same - Expiration of Statute of Limitations. - The denial of plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant railroad's counterclaim for being filed beyond the three-year statute of limitations did not affect a substantial right and therefore was not appealable.
Thompson v. Norfolk & Southern Ry., 140 N.C. App. 115, 535 S.E.2d 397 (2000).
Order Reinstating Dismissed Charge. - Although defendant's appeal of a district court's order reversing the county court's dismissal of his driving while impaired charge was interlocutory in nature, as the order allegedly affected his substantial right
to avoid double jeopardy, it was reviewable under G.S. 7A-27(d). State v. McKenzie, 225 N.C. App. 208, 736 S.E.2d 591 (2013), rev'd 367 N.C. 112,
750 S.E.2d 521, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 1019 (2013), rev'd 748 S.E.2d 145, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 1019 (2013).
Order Denying Relief from Default Judgment. - Appellate court had jurisdiction to consider a trial court's denial of a guarantor's G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) motion for relief from a default judgment because the denial affected a substantial
right. Brown v. Cavit Scis., Inc., 230 N.C. App. 460, 749 S.E.2d 904 (2013).
Immunity as Basis for Summary Adjudication. - Denial of a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment is interlocutory and not immediately appealable. However, recent case law clearly establishes that if immunity is raised as a basis in the motion for summary
adjudication, a substantial right is affected and the denial is immediately appealable. EEE-ZZZ Lay Drain Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 108 N.C. App. 24, 422 S.E.2d 338 (1992), overruled on other grounds, Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 489 S.E.2d 880 (1997).
Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of res judicata did not affect a substantial right entitling defendant to immediate appeal, where no possibility of inconsistent verdicts existed and no manifest injustice would result absent immediate
appeal. Country Club of Johnston County, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 135 N.C. App. 159, 519 S.E.2d 540 (1999).
Same - Collateral Estoppel. - The denial of a motion for summary judgment based on the defense of collateral estoppel may affect a substantial right. McCallum v. North Carolina Coop. Extension Serv. of N.C. State Univ., 142 N.C. App. 48, 542 S.E.2d 227, cert. denied, 353 N.C. 452, 548 S.E.2d 527 (2001).
Following dismissal of their previous appeal, defendants filed an answer in which they specifically asserted collateral estoppel as a defense to plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims and moved for judgment on the pleadings based upon their collateral
estoppel defense; defendants having made a colorable assertion that the claim is barred under collateral estoppel, the denial of their motion for judgment on the pleadings affected a substantial right and their interlocutory
appeal was properly before the court. Fox v. Johnson, 243 N.C. App. 274, 777 S.E.2d 314 (2015), review denied, 781 S.E.2d 480, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 63 (2016).
Summary Judgment Based on Governmental Immunity. - Generally, denial of a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not immediately appealable; however, if the defense of governmental immunity is asserted as grounds for the summary judgment motion,
the denial of the motion has been held to affect a substantial right, and the order is immediately appealable pursuant to G.S. 1-277(a) and subsection (d). Hallman v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
124 N.C. App. 435, 477 S.E.2d 179 (1996).
Order denying a motion to amend a complaint is interlocutory, for it does not determine the entire controversy and requires further action by the trial court. Mauney v. Morris, 73 N.C. App. 589,
327 S.E.2d 248, rev'd on other grounds, 316 N.C. 67, 340 S.E.2d 397 (1986).
Order Granting Motion to Amend and Denying Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. - An order granting a motion to amend and denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings is obviously not a final judgment but is interlocutory. Consequently, no appeal lies
of right. Funderburk v. Justice, 25 N.C. App. 655, 214 S.E.2d 310 (1975).
Order Regarding Counterclaims. - The trial court's order for partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff employee suing for payment of a commission as to the defendant employer's four counterclaims - wrongful attachment, negligence, breach of contract,
and breach of fiduciary duty - was interlocutory; no overlapping factual issues existed between the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's counterclaims, and the order appealed from did not deprive the defendant of a substantial
right which would be jeopardized absent a review prior to a final determination on the merits. Murphy v. Coastal Physician Group, Inc., 139 N.C. App. 290, 533 S.E.2d
817 (2000).
Order Dismissing Counterclaims Except as Set-Offs. - In an action arising out of a contract between the parties whereby defendants agreed to construct a house on a piece of property owned by them and to convey the completed house and property to plaintiffs,
the trial court's order dismissing defendants' counterclaims for overages, interest expenses, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and trespass but allowing defendants to assert these counterclaims as set-offs to plaintiff's
claim was not a final judgment; however, the judgment in question affected a substantial right of defendants, their right to recover on their claims based on the contract, and the absence of an immediate appeal would work an
injury to them, the possibility of being forced to undergo two full trials on the merits and to incur the expense of litigating twice, if not corrected before an appeal from a final judgment. Roberts v. Heffner,
51 N.C. App. 646, 277 S.E.2d 446 (1981).
Denial of motion to amend answer to allege compulsory counterclaim affects a substantial right and is immediately appealable. Hudspeth v. Bunzey, 35 N.C. App. 231, 241 S.E.2d 119, appeal dismissed,
294 N.C. 736, 244 S.E.2d 154 (1978).
Order allowing estates to amend their complaint in a medical malpractice suit was not immediately appealable where the issues of a hospital's claim that, without immediate review, it lost the right to avoid trial altogether by (1) raising the statute
of limitations, (2) raising "estoppel by laches" as an affirmative defense, or (3) having the amended complaint dismissed for failure to comply with G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 9(j), were not brought before the trial court,
and no substantial right was lost by the failure to allow immediate review; the estates were also entitled to sanctions against the hospital. Estate of Spell v. Ghanem, 175 N.C. App. 191, 622 S.E.2d 725 (2005).
Order Denying Motion to Permit Contact with Treating Physician. - A discovery order which prohibited the defendant hospital from contact with the defendant doctor other than through "the statutorily recognized methods of discovery enumerated in" G.S.
1A-1, Rule 26 was not immediately appealable because the order in no way precluded the hospital from "meeting with and discussing the case with" the doctor in the context of the multi-varied discovery methods detailed in G.S.
1A-1, Rule 26 and, therefore, did not affect a substantial right. Norris v. Sattler, 139 N.C. App. 409, 533 S.E.2d 483 (2000).
Contempt Order. - See Willis v. Duke Power Co., 291 N.C. 19, 229 S.E.2d 191 (1976).
Trial court had jurisdiction to find business owners in contempt after the owners appealed the underlying order because ordering compliance with an injunction the owners did not appeal did not affect the owners' substantial right. Plasman v. Decca Furniture
(USA), Inc., 253 N.C. App. 484, 800 S.E.2d 761 (2017), cert. denied, 812 S.E.2d 849, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 342 (2018) cert. denied, 813 S.E.2d 245, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 400 (2018).
Possibility of Inconsistent Verdicts. - Plaintiffs' appeal is reviewable under the substantial right exception where a dismissal would raise the possibility of inconsistent verdicts in later proceedings. Hoots v. Pryor, 106 N.C. App. 397, 417 S.E.2d 269, cert. denied, 332 N.C. 344, 421 S.E.2d 148 (1992).
When a patient sued a pharmacy for negligence, breach of implied warranties, liability under G.S. 99B-6, and to pierce the pharmacy's corporate veil and hold its president liable, and the warranty claim and claim to pierce the corporate veil were dismissed, the patient did not show, in an interlocutory appeal of that dismissal, that she would lose a substantial right if she could not immediately appeal the dismissal. Rauch v. Urgent Care Pharm., Inc., 178 N.C. App. 510, 632 S.E.2d 211 (2006).
Summary judgment in a medical malpractice case for a physician, who was one party sued, could be appealed because the judgment affected a substantial right, since the same factual issues applied to each defendant, creating a risk of inconsistent verdicts. Hawkins v. Emergency Med. Physicians of Craven Cnty., PLLC, 240 N.C. App. 337, 770 S.E.2d 159 (2015).
Town's appeal of two interlocutory orders ruling on motions in a dispute with a county over wastewater disposal on grounds the order affected the town's substantial right to avoid inconsistent verdicts was dismissed because, when arguing that, if the
town's appeal were successful, there could be a potential for inconsistent verdicts, the town did not explain how these inconsistent verdicts could become realities. Union Cty. v. Town of Marshville,
255 N.C. App. 441, 804 S.E.2d 801 (2017).
Order Granting Summary Judgment. - An order granting summary judgment denied plaintiff a jury trial on the issue of its claim against the bank and, in effect, determined the claim in favor of the bank. Thus the order affected a substantial right and was appealable under G.S. 1-277 and this section. Nasco Equip. Co. v. Mason, 291 N.C. 145, 229 S.E.2d 278 (1976).
In an action seeking to quiet title to property which plaintiffs, the original owners, alleged was secured by two of the three defendants by fraud or by mutual mistake and conveyed by general warranty deed to the other defendant, the current owner, summary judgment in favor of the current owner precluded plaintiffs from obtaining reformation of the deed and reconveyance of the property, thereby affecting a substantial right, and therefore the interlocutory order was appealable. Jenkins v. Maintenance, Inc., 76 N.C. App. 110, 332 S.E.2d 90 (1985).
In an action by a discharged employee seeking to recover accumulated vacation leave, a "substantial right" of the plaintiff was affected by the granting of summary judgment for the defendant, so that the order granting the motion for summary judgment was appealable, despite the defendant's pending counterclaim for wrongful conversion of company funds, and despite the absence of a determination by the trial judge under N.C.R.C.P., Rule 54(b), that "there was no just reason for delay." Narron v. Hardee's Food Sys., 75 N.C. App. 579, 331 S.E.2d 205, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 542, 335 S.E.2d 316 (1985).
Where summary judgment is allowed for fewer than all the defendants and the judgment does not contain a certification pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b), that there is "no just reason for delay," an appeal is premature unless the order allowing summary judgment affects a substantial right. Bernick v. Jurden, 306 N.C. 435, 293 S.E.2d 405 (1982).
Where the possibility of an inconsistent verdict in defendants' counterclaim trial could irreparably prejudice any subsequent trial of plaintiff's negligence and contract claims, the trial court's summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims affected a substantial right such that it was immediately appealable under subdivision (d)(1) of this section and G.S. 1-277(a). J & B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 1, 362 S.E.2d 812 (1987).
Where defendants' defense to plaintiff's promissory note claim, as well as their counterclaims, were both founded on proving plaintiff's breach of a fiduciary relationship with defendants, defendants' substantial right to avoid separate trials of the same issue would be prejudiced absent immediate review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claim. Whitehurst v. Corey, 88 N.C. App. 746, 364 S.E.2d 728 (1988).
Summary judgment on complaint was not appealable before counterclaim for attorneys' fees had been adjudicated by the trial court. There was no possibility of inconsistent results in complaint and counterclaim because an award for counterclaim could only have been granted if defendants were prevailing parties in the plaintiff 's action; therefore, as parties did not address any other substantial right which could have been affected, no substantial right was involved which would have been "lost, prejudiced, or less than adequately protected" if court did not review appeal before final judgment. T'ai Co. v. Market Square Ltd. Partnership, 92 N.C. App. 234, 373 S.E.2d 885 (1988).
Appeal from the grant of summary judgment for a psychiatric hospital in a medical malpractice action against the hospital and independent contractor physicians was premature, where the remaining defendants had separate and distinct contracts and each owed a different duty to the patient. Myers v. Barringer, 101 N.C. App. 168, 398 S.E.2d 615 (1990).
Since plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, on which defendant was granted summary judgment, involved the issue of defendant's negligence as well as the separate factual issues of the existence of severe emotional distress and foreseeability of injury, if at trial a jury determined defendant's conduct to have been negligent, then plaintiff would only have to prove severe emotional distress and foreseeability of injury at a second trial in the event of a proper successful appeal of the summary judgment. Since a second trial would not require plaintiff to retry the negligence issue, there were no overlapping issues to justify an immediate appeal of the interlocutory order. Jarrell v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Carolinas, Inc., 121 N.C. App. 198, 464 S.E.2d 720 (1995).
While an order granting summary judgment was interlocutory, it was appealable because the cause of action for criminal conversation, which was still before the trial court, was so connected with the claim for alienation of affections that only one issue of damages should be submitted to the jury, and thus, a substantial right was at stake to have the same jury hear the wife's two claims. McCutchen v. McCutchen, 360 N.C. 280, 624 S.E.2d 620 (2006).
When, in a personal injury case, a trial court granted summary judgment in favor of some of the parties sued, the judgment was appealable, under G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1), because it was alleged that the parties as to whom summary judgment was granted were joint tortfeasors with the remaining parties, so many of the same factual issues would apply to the claims against the parties awarded summary judgment and to the remaining parties, and separate trials could result in inconsistent judgments, so the alleged injured parties who brought suit asserted a substantial right to immediate review, and their appeals were properly before the appellate court. Walden v. Morgan, 179 N.C. App. 673, 635 S.E.2d 616 (2006).
As the trial court granted summary judgment only to a town, not the other defendants, and did not certify the court's order under N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b), and plaintiff did not voluntarily dismiss her claims against the other defendants or argue that her appeal affected a substantial right, she was not entitled to appeal the trial court's interlocutory order under G.S. 7A-27(b). Hyatt v. Town of Lake Lure, 191 N.C. App. 386, 663 S.E.2d 320 (2008).
Trial court's order denying a school principal's motion to dismiss pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and motion for summary judgment pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(c), was interlocutory because the order did not address and dispose of an office assistant's loss of consortium claim; the court of appeals exercised jurisdiction over the principal's appeal pursuant to G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1) because the trial court's order affected a substantial right. Trivette v. Yount, 217 N.C. App. 477, 720 S.E.2d 732 (2011), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 366 N.C. 303, 735 S.E.2d 306, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 1000 (2012).
In a coverage dispute, although a trial court's summary judgment order was interlocutory, the order was appealable because summary judgment on the issue of the insurer's duty to defend a claim against the insured affected a substantial right that could be lost absent immediate appeal; the underlying declaratory action concerned whether the insurer provided coverage for claims by passengers who were injured in a vehicle driven by the insured's 14-year-old son. Integon Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Villafranco, 228 N.C. App. 390, 745 S.E.2d 922 (2013).
Summary judgment order directing the judicial sale of an owner's home affected a substantial right subject to appellate review because if the appeal was not heard and the foreclosure moved forward, the wife could lose her home permanently prior to any appeal from final judgment. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Stocks, - N.C. App. - , 831 S.E.2d 378 (2019).
Appeal of Order of Summary Judgment. - Where dismissal of an appeal of a summary judgment could result in two different trials on the same issues, thereby creating the possibility of inconsistent verdicts, a substantial right is prejudiced and the summary judgment is immediately appealable. Taylor v. Brinkman, 108 N.C. App. 767, 425 S.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 333 N.C. 795, 431 S.E.2d 30 (1993).
The court denied the plaintiff - the administrator of the estates of his wife and two children, and guardian ad litem of a surviving injured child, who sued defendants/railroad company and engineering firm - the right to an immediate interlocutory appeal of a summary judgment on his contract claim where his tort claim survived the summary judgment and the trial court reserved the right to rule on matters of evidence which that judge considered competent, relevant and admissible on the remaining issues; the plaintiff failed to show that the court's separate treatment of the two claims would injure a substantial right where the evidence and the issues differed. Turner v. Norfolk S. Corp., 137 N.C. App. 138, 526 S.E.2d 666 (2000).
Under G.S. 1-277(a) and subsection (d) of this section, although an interlocutory order is ordinarily not immediately appealable, an interlocutory order may be immediately appealed if it affects a substantial right; the subcontractors' interlocutory appeal was supported by their assertion of a substantial right to have the case heard in a particular county and to have the liability of all of the defendants determined in one proceeding, which would have been lost without appellate review. Cencomp, Inc. v. Webcon, Inc., 157 N.C. App. 501, 579 S.E.2d 482 (2003).
Seller's appeal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the buyer was dismissed because the order did not affect a substantial right and the case presented no possibility of inconsistent verdicts where, while it was undisputed that the parties were identical and that they litigated a prior federal action, there was not a final judgment on the merits in the prior action on the current claim of breach of fiduciary duty, the current claim was not a material and relevant matter within the scope of the pleadings of the federal suit, and the buyer sought a remedy for a separate and distinct negligent act leading to a separate and distinct injury. Sanderford v. Duplin Land Dev., Inc., 248 N.C. App. 583, 789 S.E.2d 503 (2016), cert. denied, 794 S.E.2d 334, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 1075 (2016).
Although a trustee's appeal of an order denying summary judgment was interlocutory, appellate jurisdiction existed as the trustee's right to foreclose was authorized by the county assistant clerk, and thus, collateral estoppel was potentially applicable
to the borrowers' claims for monetary damages stemming from a foreclosure. Gray v. Fannie Mae, 264 N.C. App. 642, 830 S.E.2d 652 (2019), review denied, 374 N.C. 265,
839 S.E.2d 853, 2020 N.C. LEXIS 342, review dismissed, 374 N.C. 265, 839 S.E.2d 854, 2020 N.C. LEXIS 343 (N.C. 2020).
Order Denying Summary Judgment. - Because there was a question of fact as to whether defendants followed the applicable standard of care, they were not entitled to qualified immunity under G.S. 122C-210.1 on plaintiff's wrongful death claims as a matter of law; accordingly, the denial of their motion for summary judgment did not deprive them of a substantial right, and their appeal was dismissed as interlocutory. Snyder v. Learning Servs. Corp., 187 N.C. App. 480, 653 S.E.2d 548 (2007).
Denial of husband's summary judgment motion opposing a wife's attempt to enforce a separation agreement amendment was immediately appealable because a ruling that the amendment was not void essentially struck the husband's defense and was, in substance, a demurrer affecting the husband's substantial right. Kelley v. Kelley, 252 N.C. App. 467, 798 S.E.2d 771 (2017).
Lender's appeal of an order denying its motion for summary judgment was properly before the court of appeals because absent immediate appeal, the lender would lose a substantial right; trial of the case could result in inconsistent judgments between the same parties involving the seizure of the same collateral. R.C. Koonts & Sons Masonry, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, - N.C. App. - , 830 S.E.2d 690 (2019).
Employer's appeal of a denial of its motion for summary judgment in a wrongful death suit was properly before the appellate court; the summary judgment motion argued that the employer was immune from the suit, and, although the appeal was interlocutory,
appellate review was necessary on the grounds that the North Carolina's Workers' Compensation Act granted employers who complied with the Act immunity from suit, which would have been lost if the case was permitted to go to
trial. This immunity from suit affected a substantial right. Edwards v. GE Lighting Sys., 193 N.C. App. 578, 668 S.E.2d 114 (2008).
Denial of a motion for summary judgment based on the defense of res judicata may affect a substantial right, making the order immediately appealable. Bockweg v. Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 428 S.E.2d 157 (1993).
Interlocutory appeal of the denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment in a constructive trust action was allowed; the basis of the motion for summary judgment was that res judicata barred the constructive trust action and in such a case, the failure
to allow an appeal might affect a substantial right in that the possibility existed that without an immediate appeal, they would be required to twice defend against the same claim by plaintiffs. Tiber Holding Corp. v. DiLoreto,
170 N.C. App. 662, 613 S.E.2d 346 (2005), cert. denied, - N.C. - , 623 S.E.2d 263 (2005).
Summary Judgment on Issue of Liability. - Ordinarily, an order granting summary judgment on the issue of liability and reserving for trial the issue of damages is not immediately appealable. Smith v. Watson, 71 N.C. App. 351, 322 S.E.2d 588 (1984), cert. denied, 313 N.C. 509, 329 S.E.2d 394 (1985).
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment. - The trial court's entry of summary judgment for a monetary sum against one of two defendants affected a "substantial right" of that defendant, and such judgment was therefore immediately appealable under G.S. 1-277 and this section, notwithstanding the absence of an express determination by the trial judge that there was "no just reason for delay" as required by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b). Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Myers, 46 N.C. App. 162, 265 S.E.2d 240 (1980).
Order allowing summary judgment as to fewer than all defendants held to affect a substantial right. Federal Land Bank v. Lieben, 86 N.C. App. 342, 357 S.E.2d 700 (1987).
An order of partial summary judgment dismissing a punitive damages claim was appealable, though interlocutory, since claims for compensatory and punitive damages depended upon the same evidence and plaintiff 's right to try them before the same jury and avoid the possible travesty of different juries rendering conflicting verdicts was a substantial one. Nance v. Robertson, 91 N.C. App. 121, 370 S.E.2d 283, cert. denied, 323 N.C. 477, 373 S.E.2d 865 (1988).
Where trial court's summary judgment determined fewer than all claims between parties, plaintiff could maintain interlocutory appeals from court's judgment, since trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's negligence, fraud and unfair trade practice claims against defendant insurance company and unfair trade claim against defendant insurance agency affected substantial right since there were factual issues common to claims dismissed by trial court and negligence claim which it did not dismiss. Davidson v. Knauff Ins. Agency, Inc., 93 N.C. App. 20, 376 S.E.2d 488, cert. denied, 324 N.C. 577, 381 S.E.2d 772 (1989).
Where plaintiff claimed that defendants, husband and wife, were negligent, and where summary judgment was granted in favor of wife, and where a possibility existed that inconsistent verdicts would be rendered in separate trials on the issue of husband and wife's joint and concurrent negligence if plaintiff 's appeal ultimately was successful, judgment was appealable because it affected a substantial right of plaintiff to have determined, in a single action, the question of whether plaintiff was injured by the acts of one, both, or neither of the defendants, especially since the claims against them arose from the same series of events. DeHaven v. Hoskins, 95 N.C. App. 397, 382 S.E.2d 856 (1989), cert. denied, 325 N.C. 705, 388 S.E.2d 452 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615, 507 S.E.2d 882 (1998).
The appellate court eliminated specifically the application of the doctrine of substantial rights to cases wherein partial summary judgment has been granted denying a claim for punitive damages. Moose v. Nissan of Statesville, Inc., 115 N.C. App. 423, 444 S.E.2d 694 (1994).
There were no factual issues common to the claims determined by summary judgments or the claims remaining, so that no substantial right was affected and plaintiff was not entitled to interlocutory appeal of summary judgments, since plaintiff did not present identical factual issues creating the possibility of two trials on the same issue. Jarrell v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Carolinas, Inc., 121 N.C. App. 198, 464 S.E.2d 720 (1995).
The trial court's partial grant of summary judgment on the issue of breach of contract was interlocutory with no immediate right of appeal because it did not affect substantial rights. Alexander Hamilton Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. J&H Marsh & McClennan, Inc., 142 N.C. App. 699, 543 S.E.2d 898 (2001).
Trial court's partial summary judgment order that two insurers were obligated to defend an insured in an underlying litigation was immediately appealable under G.S. 1-277 and 7A-27(d) and G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b) because the judgment affected a substantial right that might have been lost absent an immediate appeal. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buzz Off Insect Shield L.L.C., 190 N.C. App. 28, 664 S.E.2d 317 (2008), review denied 363 N.C. 802, 690 S.E.2d 694 (2010), rev'd in part 364 N.C. 1, 692 S.E.2d 605 (2010).
Plaintiffs argued the appeal was properly before the appellate court as an appeal from an interlocutory order affecting a substantial right, pursuant to G.S. 1-277 and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1); the trial court's grant of partial judgment to defendants was an interlocutory order because plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract remained pending and common to all claims - unjust enrichment, unfair and deceptive trade practices, common law fraud/breach of fiduciary duty, constructive trust, and punitive damages - was the factual issue of whether defendants caused plaintiffs' damages by falsely representing that a North Carolina limited liability corporation (LLC) validly existed as a LLC and by inducing plaintiffs to invest in the business. Because there were overlapping factual issues, inconsistent verdicts could result, thus, the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to defendants affected a substantial right, and plaintiffs' appeal was properly before the appellate court. James R. Carcano v. JBSS, LLC, 200 N.C. App. 162, 684 S.E.2d 41 (2009).
Insurer could not appeal from an interlocutory order granting summary judgment in favor of the insured as to the insurer's defense of champerty and maintenance because the insured's action was brought after its litigation with a homeowner had concluded and thus, a determination that the insurer did or did not owe a duty to defend the insured did not affect a substantial right because it would not change the resolution of the prior case. Paradigm Consultants, Ltd. v. Builders Mut. Ins. Co., 228 N.C. App. 314, 745 S.E.2d 69 (2013).
When the North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT) filed transportation corridor maps, under the Transportation Corridor Official Map Act, G.S. 136-44.50 to 136-44.54, and property owners' inverse condemnation claims were dismissed as not being ripe, the owners could pursue an interlocutory appeal because an order granting partial summary judgment on the issue of NCDOT's liability to pay just compensation for a claim for inverse condemnation was an immediately appealable interlocutory order affecting a substantial right. Kirby v. N.C. DOT, 239 N.C. App. 345, 769 S.E.2d 218, dismissed and review granted, 368 N.C. 279, 775 S.E.2d 829, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 704 (2015).
Series of partial summary judgment orders did not constitute a final judgment; notwithstanding a pending attorney's fees request, other non-collateral issues remained unresolved, including the issue of damages, and thus the orders were interlocutory. Radiator Specialty Co. v. Arrowood Indem. Co., 253 N.C. App. 508, 800 S.E.2d 452 (2017).
State officials could pursue an interlocutory appeal of a partial summary judgment because the ruling affected the officials' substantial right by barring the officials' enforcement of authorized statutory amendments to retired state employees' health
insurance coverage, potentially affecting the state budget. Lake v. State Health Plan for Teachers & State Emples., 264 N.C. App. 174, 825 S.E.2d 645 (2019).
Same - Where Injunction Is Part of Order. - While ordinarily, the allowance of a motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, reserving for trial the issue of damages, will not be appealable, where a mandatory injunction was part of the order for partial summary judgment, it clearly affected a "substantial right" of the defendant and the allowance of the motion for partial summary judgment was appealable. English v. Holden Beach Realty Corp., 41 N.C. App. 1, 254 S.E.2d 223, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 609, 257 S.E.2d 217 (1979), overruled on other grounds, 319 N.C. 274, 354 S.E.2d 459 (1987).
Where defendants would immediately suffer the consequences of complying with mandatory injunction ordering that they remove anchors and boat slips constructed on plaintiff's submerged lands, this affected a substantial right of defendants, giving them the right to appeal from the interlocutory order granting summary judgment for plaintiffs except on the issue of damages. Steel Creek Dev. Corp. v. Smith, 300 N.C. 631, 268 S.E.2d 205 (1980).
North Carolina State Bar's interlocutory appeal from a superior court order enjoining the bar from proceeding in a disciplinary action against an attorney was not barred under G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1) because a substantive right, the right of
the Bar to investigate and prosecute allegations of attorney misconduct, was involved. Gilbert v. N.C. State Bar, 363 N.C. 70, 678 S.E.2d 602 (2009).
Appeal of Order Denying Partial Summary Judgment. - Defendant's appeal of an order denying its motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages was interlocutory. Travco Hotels, Inc. v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 102 N.C. App. 659, 403 S.E.2d 593, aff'd, 332 N.C. 288, 420 S.E.2d 426 (1992).
When a landowner sued a developer and a land grader for, inter alia, negligence and trespass for conducting activities on a lot adjacent to the landowner's lot that allegedly caused flooding on the landowner's lot, a trial court's denial of the landowner's partial summary judgment motion on the issue of liability was not immediately appealable because the landowner did not show any substantial right that would be lost by a delay of his appeal from this denial. Williams v. Allen, 182 N.C. App. 121, 641 S.E.2d 391 (2007).
Appellate court lacked jurisdiction over a contractor's appeal of the trial court's partial summary judgment order rejecting some of its res judicata defenses because invocation of res judicata did not automatically entitle a party to an interlocutory
appeal of an order rejecting that defense, the contractor did not include an explanation of how the challenged order would create a risk of inconsistent verdicts or otherwise affect a substantial right based on the particular
facts of that case, and avoiding the time and expense of trial was not a substantial right justifying an immediate appeal. Denney v. Wardson Constr., LLC, 264 N.C. App. 15, 824 S.E.2d 436 (2019).
Order Requiring Jury Trial. - If an order denying a jury trial is appealable, an order requiring a jury trial should be appealable. If denial of a jury trial affects a substantial right, which would be lost absent review prior to final determination, the requirement that a case will be tried by a jury should have the same effect. Faircloth v. Beard, 320 N.C. 505, 358 S.E.2d 512 (1987), overruled in part, Jacobs v. City of Asheville, 137 N.C. App. 441, 528 S.E.2d 905 (2000).
Generally, the right to avoid a trial is not a substantial right; however, while avoidance of two trials on the same issues may be. This would require that a party show that the same factual issues would be present in both trials and that the possibility of inconsistent verdicts on those issues exists. Stafford v. Stafford, 133 N.C. App. 163, 515 S.E.2d 43 (1999), aff'd, 351 N.C. 94, 520 S.E.2d 785 (1999).
Appellate court could hear landowners' appeal of an order determining a boundary line because the order prejudiced the landowners' substantial rights by (1) effectively mooting the landowners' claims, and (2) denying the landowners' right to a jury trial
on the factual issue of the boundary line's "on the ground" location. Ayscue v. Griffin, 263 N.C. App. 1, 823 S.E.2d 134 (2018).
Partial summary judgment holding that third-party defendant must indemnify defendant for any judgment on plaintiff's claim is interlocutory and not appealable under G.S. 1-277 or subsection (d) of this section, since the judgment will not work injury
to third-party defendant if not corrected before appeal from a final judgment. Cook v. Export Leaf Tobacco Co., 47 N.C. App. 187, 266 S.E.2d 754 (1980).
Partial Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendant Who Is Only Secondarily Liable. - Plaintiffs had no right to an immediate appeal from summary judgment granted to defendant attorney where plaintiffs sought to recover against defendant attorney only if they
were unable to recover against the other defendants on their primary claims. Blue Ridge Sportcycle Co. v. Schroader, 53 N.C. App. 354, 280 S.E.2d 799 (1981).
Interlocutory summary judgments in favor of third-party and fourth-party defendants in a negligence action were appealable as to the question of negligence, which presented common factual issues with the remaining claim of plaintiff against defendant,
but not as to the issue of indemnity, which did not. Britt v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 97 N.C. App. 442, 388 S.E.2d 613 (1990).
Arbitration Order. - An order denying arbitration, although interlocutory, is immediately appealable because it involves a substantial right which might be lost if appeal is delayed. Prime S. Homes, Inc. v. Byrd, 102 N.C. App. 255, 401 S.E.2d 822 (1991); Hackett v. Bonta, 113 N.C. App. 89, 437 S.E.2d 687 (1993).
Where evidence showed that plaintiff knew that the terms of a dispute resolution agreement would apply to her should she continue her employment, and she did continue, sufficient consideration existed to support the agreement, plaintiff relinquished the right to pursue disputes in court, and the trial court's refusal to compel arbitration deprived defendants of a substantial right entitling them to immediate appeal. Howard v. Oakwood Homes Corp., 134 N.C. App. 116, 516 S.E.2d 879 (1999), cert. denied, 350 N.C. 832, 539 S.E.2d 288 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1155, 120 S. Ct. 1161, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1072 (2000).
Trial court's order denying a home inspector's motion to compel arbitration pursuant to a written agreement was immediately appealable, under G.S. 1-277 and G.S. 7A-27(d)(l), because it affected a substantial right of the home inspector. Edwards v. Taylor, 182 N.C. App. 722, 643 S.E.2d 51 (2007).
Appellate review of an interlocutory order concerning the right to arbitration was permitted under G.S. 7A-27(d)(1) because the order affected a substantial right, and review was permitted under G.S. 1-277(a) of any order involving a matter of law or legal inference which affected a substantial right. In re W. W. Jarvis & Sons, 194 N.C. App. 799, 671 S.E.2d 534 (2009).
Court acquired jurisdiction to hear defendants' appeal from the trial court's interlocutory order denying arbitration. Earl v. CGR Dev. Corp., 242 N.C. App. 20, 773 S.E.2d 551 (2015).
Court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the merits of a subsidiary's appeal of an order denying its motion to stay distributors' claims pending arbitration; the right to arbitrate a claim or issue is a substantial right if it was enforceable by or against an appellant who is a non-signatory to the agreement creating it. Neusoft Med. Sys., USA v. Neuisys, LLC, 242 N.C. App. 102, 774 S.E.2d 851 (2015), review denied 778 S.E.2d 433, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1177 (2015), dismissed and review denied 778 S.E.2d 432, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1178 (2015), review dismissed 778 S.E.2d 433, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1179 (2015), review denied 780 S.E.2d 555, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1180 (2015).
Court of appeals considered the merits of a manufacturer's appeal because the manufacturer met its burden to demonstrate that it had jurisdiction over its appeal of an order denying its right to arbitrate; the order affected the manufacturer's substantial right to arbitrate because the effect of the order was to require the manufacturer to proceed in defending distributor's claims against it in court rather than in arbitration. Neusoft Med. Sys., USA v. Neuisys, LLC, 242 N.C. App. 102, 774 S.E.2d 851 (2015), review denied 778 S.E.2d 433, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1177 (2015), dismissed and review denied 778 S.E.2d 432, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1178 (2015), review dismissed 778 S.E.2d 433, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1179 (2015), review denied 780 S.E.2d 555, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1180 (2015).
In an employment dispute, an appellate court had jurisdiction because an order enjoined certain claims from proceeding to arbitration, and a substantial right existed that could have been lost absent immediate appellate review. Epic Games, Inc. v. Murphy-Johnson, 247 N.C. App. 54, 785 S.E.2d 137 (2016).
Interlocutory order denying a town's motion to compel arbitration was immediately appealable because the order involved a substantial right which could be lost if an appeal were delayed. Town of Belville v. Urban Smart Growth, LLC, 252 N.C. App. 72, 796 S.E.2d 817 (2017), review denied, 803 S.E.2d 399, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 608 (N.C. 2017).
Order denying an elder care facility's motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings in a negligence and wrongful death action that was brought by the executrix of the decedent's estate was immediately appealable because it involved a substantial right, the right to arbitrate claims, which might have been lost if appeal was delayed. Gay v. Saber Healthcare Grp., L.L.C., - N.C. App. - , 842 S.E.2d 635 (2020).
Arbitration. - There is no immediate right of appeal from an order compelling arbitration. Bluffs, Inc. v. Wysocki, 68 N.C. App. 284, 314 S.E.2d 291 (1984).
Order compelling arbitration was interlocutory and did not affect a substantial right. North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. Duke Power Co., 95 N.C. App. 123, 381 S.E.2d 896, cert. denied, 325 N.C. 709, 388 S.E.2d 461 (1989).
An order compelling arbitration is interlocutory, does not affect a substantial right, and is not immediately appealable. Laws v. Horizon Hous., Inc., 137 N.C. App. 770, 529 S.E.2d 695 (2000).
Appellate court had jurisdiction to consider an appeal because the denial of a motion to compel arbitration, although interlocutory, was immediately appealable since it affected a substantial right. King v. Bryant, 225 N.C. App. 340, 737 S.E.2d 802 (2013).
Order Allowing Reinstatement of Lawsuits. - Defendant's appeal of an order granting plaintiffs' motions for reinstatement of their lawsuits for payment of materials provided on a county improvement project was interlocutory and not appealable, although
a denial of review might force them "to continue the defense of th[e] action." Interior Distribs., Inc. v. Autry, 140 N.C. App. 541, 536 S.E.2d 853 (2000), cert denied,
353 N.C. 375, 547 S.E.2d 411 (2001).
Order Appointing Guardian Ad Litem. - For plaintiff to have been entitled to appeal of right from order granting defendant's motions for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, plaintiff was required to establish that it either (1) affected a substantial
right, or (2) in effect determined the action and prevented a judgment from which appeal might be taken, or (3) discontinued the action, or (4) granted or refused a new trial. Culton v. Culton,
327 N.C. 624, 398 S.E.2d 323 (1990).
Order of partial summary judgment which included a mandatory injunction directing the defendant to remove a roadway affected a substantial right of the defendant and was thus immediately appealable pursuant to G.S. 1-277 and this section. Smith v. Watson,
71 N.C. App. 351, 322 S.E.2d 588 (1984), cert. denied, 313 N.C. 509, 329 S.E.2d 394 (1985).
The denial of summary judgment is interlocutory in nature and not appealable under G.S. 1-277 and this section, unless a substantial right of one of the parties would be affected if the appeal were not heard prior to final judgment. Equitable Leasing
Corp. v. Myers, 46 N.C. App. 162, 265 S.E.2d 240 (1980).
An order setting aside without prejudice a summary judgment on the grounds of procedural irregularity, is interlocutory and not immediately appealable. Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200,
240 S.E.2d 338 (1978).
Order Limiting Scope of Lis Pendens in Action to Quiet Title. - In an action to quiet title to property which defendants have incorporated into a residential subdivision, an order limiting the scope of lis pendens filed by plaintiffs only to the area
of the subdivision which they claim was interlocutory and not immediately appealable. Whyburn v. Norwood, 37 N.C. App. 610, 246 S.E.2d 540 (1978).
Order Allowing Surveyor to Enter upon Land. - An interlocutory order by which defendants are simply ordered to allow a neutral third party, a surveyor, to enter upon their land for the purpose of completing an accurate survey of the property is not appealable.
Ball v. Ball, 55 N.C. App. 98, 284 S.E.2d 555 (1981).
An order denying a motion to cancel a notice of lis pendens is not immediately appealable where the property owner fails to show that a substantial right of his has been impaired. Godley Auction Co. v. Myers, 40 N.C. App. 570, 253 S.E.2d 362 (1979).
An order requiring defendant husband to vacate premises which had been occupied by him and his wife as their home affected a substantial right and was appealable to the Court of Appeals, where the order was made after a hearing and before the case was
tried. Musten v. Musten, 36 N.C. App. 618, 244 S.E.2d 699 (1978).
Eminent Domain. - Order concluding that the closure of a road was not a compensable taking was interlocutory because the order was not a final judgment in the proceeding; the jury still had to determine the amount of compensation a property owner was
entitled to for the taking of its property by the North Carolina Department of Transportation. DOT v. BB&R, LLC, 242 N.C. App. 11, 775 S.E.2d 8 (2015).
Orders Regarding Condemnation Proceedings. - The trial court's denial of defendants' constitutional challenge and its conclusion that the defendants' four tracts formed a physically unified parcel affected by condemnation proceedings were interlocutory
and did not affect any substantial rights, so the defendants were not required to appeal the trial court's orders immediately. DOT v. Rowe, 351 N.C. 172, 521 S.E.2d 707
(1999).
Conditional Use Permit. - Appellate court had jurisdiction to review a conditional use permit's denial after the applicant withdrew the application because (1) site owners had standing and continued to seek the permit, and (2) the denial was a reviewable
final judgment. Dellinger v. Lincoln Cty., 266 N.C. App. 275, 832 S.E.2d 172 (2019).
Orders and awards pendente lite are interlocutory decrees which necessarily do not affect a substantial right from which an immediate appeal lies pursuant to subsection (d) of this section. Peeler v. Peeler, 7 N.C. App. 456, 172 S.E.2d 915 (1970) and other prior decisions recognizing a right of immediate appeal from orders and awards pendente lite are overruled. Thus, where husband in a divorce action appealed an order by the trial court for alimony pendente lite, child support pendente lite, and attorneys' fees pendente lite, the appeal was premature and therefore was dismissed. See Stephenson v. Stephenson, 55 N.C. App. 250, 285 S.E.2d 281 (1981).
[A]wards pendente lite are interlocutory decrees which necessarily do not affect a substantial right from which lies an immediate appeal pursuant to this section. Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991).
Order which clearly affected the right of plaintiff to receive support on behalf of minor children from defendant on a monthly basis as needed and in the amount which had been found reasonably necessary for the support and maintenance of the children
involved a substantial right, and therefore the order in question was immediately appealable. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).
Denial of Attorneys' Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice. - Order denying plaintiff's motion to reconsider order denying attorneys' motion for admission pro hac vice was an interlocutory order and was not immediately appealable; it did not come within the
statutory appeals in G.S. 1-277(a) or subsection (d) of this section. Leonard v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 57 N.C. App. 553, 291 S.E.2d 828, cert. denied, 306 N.C. 558,
294 S.E.2d 371 (1982).
Preliminary Injunction Against Operation of Business. - Defendant could appeal trial court's issuance of a preliminary injunction enjoining defendant from operating a used car lot in violation of plaintiff town's zoning ordinance, where although defendant's
appeal was from an interlocutory order, defendant would have been deprived of a substantial right, the right to operate his business, absent a review prior to determination on the merits. Town of Knightdale v. Vaughn,
95 N.C. App. 649, 383 S.E.2d 460 (1989).
Denial of Preliminary Injunction - Court of appeals found that deciding if operating video games in arcade was a substantial right was not necessary where a trial court's denial of a preliminary injunction did not strip the operators of a substantial
right and the operators' appeal was interlocutory. Bessemer City Express, Inc. v. City of Kings Mt., 155 N.C. App. 637, 573 S.E.2d 712 (2002), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 61,
579 S.E.2d 384 (2003).
Trial court's order granting a preliminary injunction restraining the sale of real property was immediately appealable; the merits of the underlying special proceeding between an executor and a widow in which the executor's right to partition property
and to sell the widow's interest therein were decided by the entry of the widow's default nearly 10 years before, and there could have been no final order confirming a sale of the widow's allotted portion of the farm until
a sale, which the trial court's order enjoined, was accomplished. Revelle v. Chamblee, 168 N.C. App. 227, 606 S.E.2d 712 (2005).
Noncompetition Agreement. - Interlocutory holdings that an employer's voluntary dismissal was in bad faith and the employer's noncompetition agreement was invalid were reviewed because, based on judicial economy, it was appropriate to exercise discretion
to treat the employer's appeal as a certiorari petition. Mkt. Am., Inc. v. Lee, 257 N.C. App. 98, 809 S.E.2d 32 (2017).
Preliminary Injunction Pursuant to Covenant Not to Compete. - Preliminary injunction entered by the trial court against defendant, pursuant to a covenant not to compete, was appealable prior to final determination on the merits, as it deprived defendant of a substantial right which he would lose absent review prior to a final determination. Masterclean of N.C. Inc. v. Guy, 82 N.C. App. 45, 345 S.E.2d 692 (1986).
In an action for injunctive relief and damages based on alleged breach of a covenant not to compete, defendant's appeal of trial court's preliminary injunction barring him from participating in any employment that competed with plaintiff's business in certain geographic locations would be dismissed as interlocutory, where there was no evidence in the record to show that defendant was presently working in any of those areas, as the injunction did not deprive defendant of any substantial right which he would lose absent a review prior to final determination. Automated Data Sys. v. Myers, 96 N.C. App. 624, 386 S.E.2d 432 (1989).
Where a former employer sued a former employee for violating a covenant not to compete, the employee was entitled to interlocutory review of the trial court's decision to issue a preliminary injunction which, inter alia, prohibited the employee from working
for the employer's competitors in North Carolina or South Carolina, as the injunction adversely affected the employee's substantial right to earn a living and to practice the employee's livelihood. Precision Walls, Inc. v.
Servie, 152 N.C. App. 630, 568 S.E.2d 267 (2002).
Preliminary Injunction Against Statute Granting Exclusive Right to Provide Services. - Court ruling granting plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction against Insurance Commissioner's enforcement of G.S. 58-71-71, which made defendant the exclusive
provider of creditable bail bondsmen training, required defendant to "give up" this exclusive right and the ability to receive remuneration for providing such education, thereby affecting a substantial right. Rockford-Cohen
Group, LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Ins., 230 N.C. App. 317, 749 S.E.2d 469 (2013).
When a party asserts a statutory privilege, such as that set out by G.S. 90-21.22(e) (right to non-disclosure of confidential information), which directly relates to the matter to be disclosed under an interlocutory discovery order, and the assertion
is not otherwise frivolous or insubstantial, the challenged order affects a substantial right under G.S. 1-277(a) and subdivision (d)(1) of this section and is immediately reviewable; to the extent that cases like Kaplan v.
Prolife Action League of Greensboro, 123 N.C. App. 677, 474 S.E.2d 408 (1996) differ, they are overruled. Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159,
522 S.E.2d 577 (1999).
Order Denying Discovery Privilege. - Dentist's motion to quash subpoenas of her patient records by the Board of Dental Examiners during its investigation of the dentist sought to protect the confidentiality of the records under the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C.S.
§
1320d et seq., and therefore was subject to immediate review under G.S. 1-277(a). However, because the records were sought by a health oversight agency and requested the patient records as part of its oversight activities,
45 C.F.R.
§
164.512(d) was applicable and did not prohibit the disclosure of the patient records to the Board. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Woods, 202 N.C. App. 89, 688 S.E.2d 84 (2010).
Attorney-Client Privilege. - The trial court's orders requiring that the defendants-insurers produce material protected by the attorney-client privilege affected a substantial right and entitled them to a hearing on appeal. Evans v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass'n, 142 N.C. App. 18, 541 S.E.2d 782 (2001), cert. denied, 353 N.C. 371, 547 S.E.2d 810 (2001).
An order that denied a motion to invalidate appellee's request for a jury trial was interlocutory, and no appeal lay to an appellate court therefrom, as such order did not deprive the appellants of a substantial right. Faircloth v. Beard, 83 N.C. App. 235, 349 S.E.2d 609 (1986).
Where superior court's refusal to invalidate plaintiffs' demand for a jury trial in a stockholder's derivative action amounted to a ruling that plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial, denial of defendants' motion to invalidate the demand was appealable.
Faircloth v. Beard, 320 N.C. 505, 358 S.E.2d 512 (1987), overruled in part, Jacobs v. City of Asheville, 137 N.C. App. 441, 528 S.E.2d 905
(2000).
Dismissal of Claim Against One Defendant. - Dismissal of Count II of plaintiff's amended complaint, resulting in dismissal of plaintiff's claim against defendant professional corporation, affected her substantial right to have determined in a single proceeding the issues of whether she had been damaged by the actions of one, some or all of the defendants, especially since her claims against all of them arose upon the same series of transactions. Therefore, her appeal therefrom was not premature. Fox v. Wilson, 85 N.C. App. 292, 354 S.E.2d 737 (1987).
Injured party's appeal from the trial court's judgment dismissing the injured party's claims against a church and a landowner was interlocutory because the trial court did not dismiss the injured party's claims against the landowner's son; however, the
judgment was appealable under G.S. 1-277 and subsection (d) of this section because the injured party had a substantial right in having the case against all defendants tried by the same jury. Clontz v. St. Mark's Evangelical
Lutheran Church, 157 N.C. App. 325, 578 S.E.2d 654, cert. denied, 357 N.C. 249, 582 S.E.2d 29 (2003).
The trial court's dismissal of all claims against defendant/insurer and some but not all claims against defendant-landlords affected a substantial right where plaintiff sought relief against them based on negligence, violation of the statutory duty of
a landlord to repair premises, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and wrongful death, all arising from the single occurrence of a fire in a rental home and where she had the right to have all her claims adjudicated in a
single proceeding. Prince v. Wright, 141 N.C. App. 262, 541 S.E.2d 191 (2000).
Discovery Orders. - Order from which defendant first appealed, which contained no enforcement sanctions, and only ordered defendant to answer questions by a certain date, was not properly appealable, and its attempted appeal was a nullity, notwithstanding the fact that the judge signed the appeal entries. Accordingly, such appeal did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to subsequently enter sanctions against defendant. Benfield v. Benfield, 89 N.C. App. 415, 366 S.E.2d 500 (1988).
Denial of the caveators' motion to compel the decedent's former attorney to answer deposition questions was an interlocutory order that was not appealable, because the order did not affect a substantial right pursuant to G.S. 1-277(a) and subdivision (d)(1) of this section; the caveators failed to demonstrate that the attorney, who was discharged prior to the drafting of the will at issue in the case, possessed relevant information concerning the decedent's health or relationship with the propounder of the will at the time the will was drafted. In re Will of Johnston, 157 N.C. App. 258, 578 S.E.2d 635 (2003).
When defendants contended that nursing home incident reports were protected by the peer review privilege, the trial court's interlocutory order compelling production of the reports affected a substantial right and thus was immediately appealable. Hayes v. Premier Living, Inc., 181 N.C. App. 747, 641 S.E.2d 316 (2007).
Interlocutory order was immediately appealable under G.S. 7A-27(d)(1) because the order affected a substantial right as the trial court's order compelled the production of a letter from a neuro-surgeon, who treated the decedent, to the chairperson of a hospital's surgical peer review committee and the letter might have been statutorily privileged from disclosure under G.S. 131E-95. Woods v. Moses Cone Health Sys., 198 N.C. App. 120, 678 S.E.2d 787 (2009), review denied, 363 N.C. 813, 693 S.E.2d 353, LEXIS 105 (2010).
When a homeowners' association sued a manufacturer for product liability under G.S. 99B-1 et seq., and a trial court ordered the association to return documents to the manufacturer that were inadvertently released to the association in discovery, the association could not immediately appeal the order under G.S. 1-277 or G.S. 7A-27(d)(1) on the theory that the order affected the association's substantial right, because: (1) the association did not identify a right that was affected or show how such a right would be jeopardized without immediate review; (2) unsupported opinions in a memo the association was ordered to return to the manufacturer did not affect a substantial right, as the memo did not show what the manufacturer's employees, outside testers and experts, knew about the product's adequacy and when the employees knew the information, and such prior knowledge was not critical to claims against the manufacturer; and (3), if such knowledge were critical, the memo did not contribute significantly to a determination of the issue. Harbour Point Homeowners' Ass'n v. DJF Enters., 206 N.C. App. 152, 697 S.E.2d 439 (2010).
County could not appeal an interlocutory order requiring a former manager to appear for a deposition because the county was not deprived of a substantial right nor did the county suffer injury warranting immediate review, as the order did not bar good-faith objections to the disclosure of privileged information at the deposition. Royal Oak Concerned Citizens Ass'n v. Brunswick County, 233 N.C. App. 145, 756 S.E.2d 833 (2014).
Expert witness could not appeal an order allowing the witness's deposition because (1) the order was interlocutory, (2) the witness did not allege a substantial right that would be jeopardized absent immediate appeal, and (3) the witness's that the witness's rights might be implicated if certain fact scenarios occurred in the future did not present a ripe controversy. In re Accutane Litig., 233 N.C. App. 319, 758 S.E.2d 13 (2014).
Property purchasers' appeal of an order compelling discovery was reviewed on appeal where they asserted that two e-mails the trial court had ordered disclosed were privileged under the work product doctrine. Maldjian v. Bloomquist, 245 N.C. App. 222, 782 S.E.2d 80 (2016).
Because the limited discovery requested by a plaintiff is highly material to a determination of the critical issue in his motion to vacate, the order denying discovery affects a substantial right justifying immediate appeal under G.S. 7A-27(b)(3)(a).
Stokes v. Crumpton, 369 N.C. 713, 800 S.E.2d 41 (June 9, 2017).
Sanctions for Noncompliance with Discovery Order. - Where a party is adjudged to be in contempt for noncompliance with a discovery order or has been assessed with certain other sanctions, the order is immediately appealable, since it affects a substantial right under G.S. 1-277 and subdivision (d)(1) of this section. Benfield v. Benfield, 89 N.C. App. 415, 366 S.E.2d 500 (1988).
Order holding defendant in contempt of court for his failure to comply with discovery order was appealable and tested the validity both of the original discovery order and the contempt order. Benfield v. Benfield, 89 N.C. App. 415, 366 S.E.2d 500 (1988).
Denial of movant's motion to dismiss appeal was appropriate because the trial court ordered the nonmoving party on a motion to compel discovery to immediately pay attorneys fees as sanctions to the movant. Thus, the nonmoving party sufficiently established that the order for sanctions affected a substantial right and that interlocutory review was appropriate. Porters Neck Ltd., LLC v. Porters Neck Country Club, Inc., - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Mar. 4, 2021).
Order Setting Aside Judgment. - The avoidance of having to affirmatively prove claim was not a "substantial" right, where plaintiff was affected by inability to immediately appeal order setting aside judgment only to the extent that it would have to establish
defendants' liability and the amount thereof by proper evidence, rather than by relying upon a purported confession of judgment. First Am. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Satterfield, 87 N.C. App. 160, 359 S.E.2d 812 (1987).
Order setting aside a default judgment is interlocutory, as it does not finally dispose of the case and requires further action by the trial court. Horne v. Nobility Homes, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 476,
363 S.E.2d 642 (1988).
Order Denying Motion for Stay. - The denial of defendant's motion for stay did not dispose of any of the claims or parties, the trial court did not certify the case for immediate appeal under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b), and defendants did not show that the
trial court's decision deprived them of a substantial right which would be lost absent immediate review. Howerton v. Grace Hosp., 124 N.C. App. 199, 476 S.E.2d 440 (1996).
Order Requiring Posting of Bond. - Where brothers were equal shareholders in company, and company could no longer be conducted to the advantage of both of the shareholders, and where judge ordered the brothers to post a secured bond to ensure compliance
with any judgment rendered, the appeal of the order by one of the brothers was interlocutory and would be dismissed; no substantial right of his was affected, since the amount of the bond reasonably approximated the value of
the assets in his possession, and the bond would be cancelled if the opposing brother was unsuccessful in obtaining judgment in his favor. Stancil v. Stancil, 94 N.C. App. 760, 381 S.E.2d 720 (1989).
Order Increasing Attachment Bond Where No Findings Were Made. - Because the trial court was not required to make findings of fact in order to modify the plaintiffs' attachment bond on the motion of the defendant pursuant to G.S. 1-440.40(a), and where
the plaintiffs failed to request such findings, they could not assert that the order had affected their substantial rights and they were not entitled to review. Collins v. Talley, 135 N.C. App. 758, 522 S.E.2d 794 (1999).
Order Removing Attorney. - Plaintiff had a substantial right to have attorney of her choice, properly admitted pro hac vice under G.S. 84-4.1, represent her in her lawsuit, and order removing him as counsel affected a substantial right of the plaintiff and was immediately appealable. Goldston v. AMC, 326 N.C. 723, 392 S.E.2d 735 (1990).
Appellate court had jurisdiction to hear a law firm's interlocutory appeal from an order disqualifying the firm's attorneys from representing the firm in a fee collection case while also testifying for the firm because the order affected a substantial
right. Harris & Hilton, P.A. v. Rassette, 252 N.C. App. 280, 798 S.E.2d 154 (2017).
Denial of Motion to Disqualify Counsel. - An order granting disqualification of counsel seriously disrupts the progress of litigation while new counsel is obtained, but one refusing such relief merely allows the action to proceed and has no permanent
effect of any kind. Travco Hotels, Inc. v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 332 N.C. 288, 420 S.E.2d 426 (1992).
Ruling striking attorney's charging lien was not a final order, since a charging lien is not available until there is a final judgment or decree to which the lien can attach, and no final judgment had yet been entered in the underlying divorce action.
Howell v. Howell, 89 N.C. App. 115, 365 S.E.2d 181 (1988).
Where trial court's entry of summary judgment against plaintiff included an award of attorneys' fees, it affected a substantial right; consequently, the order was immediately appealable pursuant to G.S. 1-277(a) and subsection (d) of this section. K &
K Dev. Corp. v. Columbia Banking Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 96 N.C. App. 474, 386 S.E.2d 226 (1989).
Denial of attorneys' fees under G.S. 50-16.4 was not a final order of the trial court, where at the time appellant's motion was filed there had been no determination that his client, defendant, was entitled to alimony pendente lite under G.S. 50-16.3,
so that appellant was not yet entitled to attorneys' fees under G.S. 50-16.4, and as appellant could appeal the denial of his motion after final judgment, or could bring a separate lawsuit to collect fees, no substantial right
of appellant was affected by the Court of Appeals' failure to entertain an interlocutory appeal on this issue. Howell v. Howell, 89 N.C. App. 115, 365 S.E.2d 181 (1988).
Alimony Award Held Interlocutory Because Motion for Attorney's Fees Still Unresolved. - Judgment awarding a wife permanent alimony was nonappealable because, inasmuch as the wife's claim for attorney's fees had not been disposed of by the trial court,
the order was interlocutory, the order had not been certified by the trial court pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b), and the husband did not identify any substantial right that might have been lost without immediate
appeal, as required by N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(4). Webb v. Webb, 196 N.C. App. 770, 677 S.E.2d 462 (2009).
Orders awarding child support, alimony, and attorneys' fees pendente lite are interlocutory decrees which necessarily do not affect a substantial right from which lies an immediate appeal pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(d). Berry v. Berry,
87 N.C. App. 624, 361 S.E.2d 771 (1987).
Child support order which was not expressly designated pendente lite by the court, but which was nevertheless a temporary one, entered provisionally pending a final determination to be made at a later date, was not subject to review by appeal. Berry v.
Berry, 87 N.C. App. 624, 361 S.E.2d 771 (1987).
Appeal of Temporary Custody Order. - As a trial court awarded a former husband temporary custody of the parties' child and the former wife made no showing that the order adversely affected a substantial right which could not be protected by a timely appeal
of the trial court's ultimate disposition of the entire controversy on the merits, review of the interlocutory order was not warranted under G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1). File v. File,
195 N.C. App. 562, 673 S.E.2d 405 (2009).
Termination of Temporary Alimony. - Appeal of an order terminating dependent spouse's right to receive temporary alimony was not premature, as the question of plaintiff's continued entitlement to the previously ordered alimony pendente lite until such
time as her prayer for permanent alimony could be heard affected a "substantial right" of the dependent spouse. Brown v. Brown, 85 N.C. App. 602, 355 S.E.2d 525, cert.
denied, 320 N.C. 511, 358 S.E.2d 516 (1987).
Equitable Distribution Order. - Permitting an immediate appeal from an interim equitable distribution order would be contrary to the policy of this state discouraging fragmentary appeals. Hunter v. Hunter, 126 N.C. App. 705, 486 S.E.2d 244 (1997).
Order Barring Defendant from Equitable Distribution. - Trial court's order denying defendant's motion to amend his answer in divorce action, which he filed following grant of absolute divorce to plaintiff, had the effect of forever barring defendant from
asserting a claim for equitable distribution, and thus affected a substantial right; it was therefore appealable as a matter of right. Goodwin v. Zeydel, 96 N.C. App. 670, 387 S.E.2d 57 (1990).
Order Dismissing Equitable Distribution Claim. - Given the factual issues overlapping husband's company's contract claim retained by the court and wife's equitable distribution counterclaim which it dismissed, wife could appeal the dismissal of the equitable
distribution counterclaim as a matter of right, since a substantial right would otherwise be affected. Small v. Small, 93 N.C. App. 614, 379 S.E.2d 273, cert. denied,
325 N.C. 273, 384 S.E.2d 519 (1989).
Order Granting Absolute Divorce While Reserving Equitable Distribution Issues. - While the trial court's determination of the parties' date of separation might have an effect on the unresolved issue of equitable distribution, the same factual issues would
not be involved and no threat of inconsistent verdicts was involved, and thus, no substantial right of the husband was affected so as to entitle him to appeal the trial court's grant of an absolute divorce to the wife while
reserving equitable distribution issues for a later hearing. Stafford v. Stafford, 133 N.C. App. 163, 515 S.E.2d 43 (1999), aff'd, 351 N.C. 94,
520 S.E.2d 785 (1999).
Ruling Disposing of a Plea in Bar. - Court's ruling on a separation/property settlement agreement did not dispose of plaintiff's claims for equitable distribution and alimony but only disposed of defendant's plea in bar to those claims: The court's ruling
was thus interlocutory, and although the court's order stated that its ruling affected a substantial right and was a proper subject of immediate appeal, the court's order could not be certified as a final appealable order under
G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b). Garris v. Garris, 92 N.C. App. 467, 374 S.E.2d 638 (1988).
Appeal of Order Denying Motion to Disqualify Opponent's Counsel. - Where defendant maintained that because law firm representing plaintiff represented defendant in previous matters of a similar nature (but not involving plaintiff), that firm could not
represent plaintiff in the present matter, it did have a substantial right to prevent prior counsel from using confidential information gleaned from a prior representation and utilizing it against the client in subsequent litigation,
however, it cannot be found that the deprivation of this right would injure defendant if not corrected before a final judgment, and defendant's appeal of the trial court's order denying its motion to disqualify law firm was
interlocutory. Travco Hotels, Inc. v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 102 N.C. App. 659, 403 S.E.2d 593, aff'd, 332 N.C. 288, 420 S.E.2d 426 (1992).
Appeal Regarding Waiver of Parental Consent. - No appeal of right lies to the Court of Appeals from an order of the superior court entered pursuant to G.S. 90-21.8(h); the exclusive appeal remedy is the appeal from the district court to the superior court.
In re Doe, 126 N.C. App. 401, 485 S.E.2d 354 (1997).
Appeal of Order Denying Release of Escrow Funds. - The effect of an order denying the release of the funds held in escrow under G.S. 58-36-25 was temporary and not permanent where the Commissioner's order only determined that the funds are not to be released
now, and did not purport to determine who is entitled to the money; for these reasons, an appeal of the order was interlocutory and was not immediately appealable under either G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b) or G.S. 1-277 or this section.
State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 102 N.C. App. 809, 403 S.E.2d 597 (1991).
Judgment That Leaves Issue of Damages Unresolved. - A judgment that determines only that there has in fact been a breach by defendant and leaves unresolved the issue of plaintiffs' damage is clearly an interlocutory order; an order determining only the
issue of liability and leaving unresolved other issues such as that of damages cannot be held to affect a substantial right. Johnston v. Royal Indem. Co., 107 N.C. App. 624, 421 S.E.2d 170 (1992).
Issues in Bifurcated Trial Held Nonappealable. - In a case bifurcated pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 42(b) as to liability and damages, the denial of a motion for new trial as to the liability phase was interlocutory and nonappealable and there was no automatic
right of appeal under either G.S. 1-277 or G.S. 7A-27(d) in the absence of a showing of a substantial right because the denial of defendants' motion for a new trial was only as to the liability phase of the trial. Land v. Land,
201 N.C. App. 672, 687 S.E.2d 511 (2010), review denied 2010 N.C. LEXIS 498 (2010).
Order of North Carolina Industrial Commission Modifying Deputy Commissioner's Order. - Appeal from the North Carolina Industrial Commission's order that a deputy commissioner's dismissal of a workers' compensation claim was to be deemed to be without
prejudice was dismissed; the Commission's order was an interlocutory order, from which there was no general right to immediate review, and the denial of immediate review would not affect the employers' substantial rights. Ward
v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 166 N.C. App. 726, 603 S.E.2d 896 (2004), cert. denied, 359 N.C. 326, 611 S.E.2d 853 (2005).
Orders Under Family Law Arbitration Act. - Husband had a right to appeal the trial court's order denying discovery under the substantial rights analysis of G.S. 7A-27(b)(3)(a), and that right to appeal could exist under G.S. 7A-27 even if the order was not appealable under the arbitration statute itself. Stokes v. Crumpton, 369 N.C. 713, 800 S.E.2d 41 (June 9, 2017).
Supreme Court of North Carolina agrees that a trial court's interlocutory order may be appealed if it affects a substantial right, pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(b)(3)(a), even if plaintiff has no right to appeal under the Family Law Arbitration Act. Stokes v.
Crumpton, 369 N.C. 713, 800 S.E.2d 41 (June 9, 2017).
Interlocutory Appeal Allowed Where Order Affected Potential Inheritance. - Interlocutory order denying siblings' motion to intervene in a G.S. 49-14 paternity action was permitted to be considered under G.S. 1-277 and G.S. 7A-27(a) (as the order adversely
affected a substantial right which they could lose - part of their inheritance from their deceased father's estate), but denial of the motion was affirmed. Stockton v. Estate of Thompson, 165 N.C. App. 899, 600 S.E.2d 13 (2004).
Interlocutory Appeal From Denial of Appointment of Receiver. - Shareholders were entitled to an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's denial of their motion for the appointment of a receiver because they established a substantial right to the preservation
of what they alleged were their corporation's assets and opportunities under G.S. 1-277(a) and G.S. 7A-27(d)(1), which right was substantially affected by the trial court's denial of the appointment of a receiver. Barnes v.
Kochhar, 178 N.C. App. 489, 633 S.E.2d 474 (2006).
Trial court's denial of a motion to enforce a settlement did not resolve the underlying personal injury claim, and the order of denial was therefore interlocutory; since the trial court did not certify that there was no just reason to delay the appeal,
and the denial did not affect a substantial right, there was no right to an immediate appeal since an appeal of the denial was still allowed once there was a final judgment. Milton v. Thompson,
170 N.C. App. 176, 611 S.E.2d 474 (2005).
Blanket General Objection Failed. - Blanket general objection based on the attorney/client privilege, the work product doctrine, or any other applicable privilege or doctrine did not satisfy G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 34 as blanket general objections
purporting to assert attorney-client privilege or work product immunity to all of the opposing parties' discovery requests were inadequate to effect their intended purpose and did not establish a substantial right to an immediate
appeal. K2 Asia Ventures v. Trota, 215 N.C. App. 443, 717 S.E.2d 1 (2011), review denied, 719 S.E.2d 37, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 1139 (2011).
§ 7A-28. Decisions of Court of Appeals on post-trial motions for appropriate relief, valuation of exempt property, or courts-martial are final.
- Decisions of the Court of Appeals upon review of motions for appropriate relief listed in G.S. 15A-1415(b) are final and not subject to further review in the Supreme Court by appeal, motion, certification, writ, or otherwise.
- Decisions of the Court of Appeals upon review of valuation of exempt property under G.S. 1C are final and not subject to further review in the Supreme Court by appeal, motion, certification, writ, or otherwise.
- Decisions of the Court of Appeals upon review of courts-martial under G.S. 127A-62 are final and not subject to further review in the Supreme Court by appeal, motion, certification, writ, or otherwise.
History
(1981, c. 470, s. 1; 1981 (Reg. Sess., 1982), c. 1224, s. 16.; 2010-193, s. 18.)
Editor's Note. - The original G.S. 7A-28, which was substantially similar to this section, was enacted by Session Laws 1967, c. 108, s. 1, and repealed by Session Laws 1977, c. 711, s. 33.
Session Laws 2010-193, s. 23 provides: "Prosecutions for offenses committed before the effective date of this act are not abated or affected by this act, and the statutes that would be applicable but for this act remain applicable to those prosecutions."
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2010-193, s. 18, effective December 1, 2010, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, in the section catchline, substituted "motions for appropriate relief, valuation of exempt property, or courts-martial are final" for "motions for appropriate relief final or valuation of exempt property"; and added subsection (c).
CASE NOTES
New Trial Based upon Newly Discovered Evidence. - The State has the right to immediately appeal a superior court order granting a criminal defendant a new trial pursuant to G.S. 15A-1415(b)(6), on the ground of newly discovered evidence. State v. Monroe,
330 N.C. 433, 410 S.E.2d 913 (1991).
Exhaustion Requirement in Federal Habeas Corpus. - The fact that the respondent in an appeal from the order of a United States magistrate dismissing a claim for habeas corpus relief incorrectly pleaded that the appellant had exhausted his state court remedies and was entitled to adjudication on the merits was neither conclusive nor a waiver of the exhaustion requirement by the State. Strader v. Allsbrook, 656 F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1981).
Jurisdiction of North Carolina Supreme Court. - Statute could not have restricted the Supreme Court of North Carolina's constitutional authority under N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 12(1) to exercise jurisdiction to review upon appeal any decision of the courts below, and as such, the Supreme Court of North Carolina did not hesitate to exercise its rarely used general supervisory authority when necessary to promote the expeditious administration of justice, and did so to consider questions that were not properly presented according to its rules; this exercise of supervisory authority was particularly appropriate when prompt and definitive resolution of an issue was necessary to ensure the uniform administration of North Carolina's criminal statutes. State v. Ellis, 361 N.C. 200, 639 S.E.2d 425 (2007).
In a case in which a pro se inmate filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254 petition as untimely, he unsuccessfully argued that his second certiorari petition to the North Carolina State Supreme Court also should be included in his one-year calculations. His certiorari petition was not a properly filed petition as contemplated under 28 U.S.C.S. § 2244(d)(2), and it was incapable of tolling his one-year limitations period because the North Carolina Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain that petition; pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 21(e), only the North Carolina Court of Appeals has authority to review the denial of a MAR in a non-capital case, and pursuant to G.S. 7A-28(a), decisions of the North Carolina Court of Appeals upon review of motions for appropriate relief listed in G.S. 15A-1415(b) were final and not subject to further review in the North Carolina Supreme Court by appeal, motion, verification, writ or otherwise. Blankenship v. Mitchell, - F. Supp. 2d - (W.D.N.C. Sept. 23, 2009).
Cited in McLendon v. Woodard, 719 F. Supp. 441 (W.D.N.C. 1989); Harb v. Keller, - F. Supp. 2d - (M.D.N.C. Sept. 28, 2010); State v. Todd, 369 N.C. 707, 799 S.E.2d 834 (2017).
§ 7A-29. Appeals of right from certain administrative agencies.
- From any final order or decision of the North Carolina Utilities Commission not governed by subsection (b) of this section, the Department of Health and Human Services under G.S. 131E-188(b), the North Carolina Industrial Commission, the North Carolina State Bar under G.S. 84-28, the Property Tax Commission under G.S. 105-290 and G.S. 105-342, the Commissioner of Insurance under G.S. 58-2-80, the State Board of Elections under G.S. 163-127.6, the Office of Administrative Hearings under G.S. 126-34.02, or the Secretary of Environmental Quality under G.S. 104E-6.2 or G.S. 130A-293, appeal as of right lies directly to the Court of Appeals.
- From any final order or decision of the Utilities Commission in a general rate case, appeal as of right lies directly to the Supreme Court.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1; 1971, c. 703, s. 5; 1975, c. 582, s. 12; 1979, c. 584, s. 1; 1981, c. 704, s. 28; 1983, c. 526, s. 1; c. 761, s. 188; 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1000, s. 2; c. 1087, s. 2; c. 1113, s. 2; 1985, c. 462, s. 3; 1987, c. 850, s. 2; 1991, c. 546, s. 2; c. 679, s. 2; 1993, c. 501, s. 2; 1995, c. 115, s. 1; c. 504, s. 2; c. 509, s. 2; 1997-443, ss. 11A.118(a), 11A.119(a); 2003-63, s. 1; 2006-155, s. 1.1; 2013-382, s. 6.4; 2015-241, s. 14.30(v); 2017-6, s. 3; 2018-146, ss. 3.1(a), (b), 6.1.)
Cross References. - As to jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review, when authorized by law, direct appeals from a final order or decision of the North Carolina Utilities Commission, see N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 12(1).
As to scope of judicial review of orders of the Property Tax Commission, see G.S. 105-345 et seq.
Re-recodification; Technical and Conforming Changes. - Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3, provides, in part: "The Revisor of Statutes shall recodify Chapter 138A of the General Statutes, Chapter 120C of the General Statutes, as well as Chapter 163 of the General Statutes, as amended by this act, into a new Chapter 163A of the General Statutes to be entitled 'Elections and Ethics Enforcement Act,' as enacted by Section 4 of this act. The Revisor may also recodify into the new Chapter 163A of the General Statutes other existing statutory laws relating to elections and ethics enforcement that are located elsewhere in the General Statutes as the Revisor deems appropriate." The Revisor was further authorized to make additional technical and conforming changes to catchlines, internal citations, and other references throughout the General Statutes to effectuate this recodification. Pursuant to this authority, the Revisor of Statutes substituted "Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement" for "State Board of Elections" and "G.S. 163A-1030" for "G.S. 163-127.6" in subsection (a).
Session Laws 2018-146, ss. 3.1(a), (b), and 6.1 repealed Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3, and authorized the Revisor of Statutes to re-recodify Chapter 163A into Chapters 163, 138A, and 120C and to revert the changes made by the Revisor pursuant to Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3. Pursuant to this authority, the Revisor of Statutes reverted the changes to references in subsection (a).
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1087, s. 7, made ss. 1 through 5 of the act, s. 2 of which amended this section, effective on the earlier of: (1) The date on which registration becomes effective in one of the states listed in G.S. 54B-48.2(16) which authorizes regional acquisitions of savings and loan associations and savings and loan holding companies on a reciprocal basis and which applies to savings and loan associations and savings and loan holding companies in North Carolina; or (2) July 1, 1986. Sections 1 through 5 of the act became effective July 1, 1985, when the legislation became effective in Virginia.
Session Laws 2013-382, s. 6.5, made the amendment to subsection (a) by Session Laws 2013-382, s. 6.4, applicable to grievances filed on or after August 21, 2013.
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2013-382, s. 6.4, effective August 21, 2013, inserted "the Office of Administrative Hearings under G.S. 126-34.02" in subsection (a). For applicability, see editor's note.
Session Laws 2015-241, s. 14.30(v), effective July 1, 2015, substituted "Secretary of Environmental Quality" for "Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources" in subsection (a).
Legal Periodicals. - For survey of 1979 administrative law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1185 (1980).
For survey of 1979 tax law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1548 (1980).
For survey of 1982 law on administrative law, see 61 N.C.L. Rev. 961 (1983).
CASE NOTES
Applicability. - Because G.S. 7A-27 governed appeals of right in ordinary civil actions, G.S. 7A-29(a), which applied generally to appeals from the North Carolina Industrial Commission and other administrative agencies, did not apply to estates' appeal
arguing that the Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program was unconstitutional. In re Hughes, 245 N.C. App. 398, 785 S.E.2d 111 (2016).
Appeals of Right from Certain Administrative Agencies - G.S. 62-90(a) and (d) provide for appeals of final orders of the North Carolina Utilities Commission; subsections (a) and (b) of this section provide for appeals of right from certain administrative agencies, and G.S. 7A-27(d) provides for appeals of right from certain interlocutory orders of the superior or district courts. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Buck Island, Inc., 158 N.C. App. 536, 581 S.E.2d 122 (2003).
North Carolina DHHS, Division of Facility Services, Certificate of Need Section's issuance of a No Review letter to a hospice that sought to open a branch office in another service area was the issuance of an exemption for purposes of G.S. 131E-188(a);
accordingly, G.S. 131E-188(b) conferred jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals of North Carolina to hear an appeal from a challenge to the letter. Hospice at Greensboro, Inc. v. N.C. HHS Div. of Facility Servs.,
185 N.C. App. 1, 647 S.E.2d 651 (2007).
Right of Appeal Expressly Granted. - The right of appeal from any final order or decision of the Utilities Commission is expressly granted by this section. Morgan v. Duke Power Co., 22 N.C. App. 497,
206 S.E.2d 507, appeal dismissed, 285 N.C. 759, 209 S.E.2d 282 (1974).
No appeal lies from an interlocutory order of the Industrial Commission. There is a right of appeal only from a final order. Vaughn v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 37 N.C. App. 86, 245 S.E.2d 892, aff'd, 296 N.C. 683, 252 S.E.2d 792 (1978); Lynch v. M.B. Kahn Constr. Co., 41 N.C. App. 127, 254 S.E.2d 236, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 298, 259 S.E.2d 914 (1979).
Only from a final order or decision of the Industrial Commission is there an appeal of right to the Court of Appeals. Ledford v. Asheville Hous. Auth., 125 N.C. App. 597, 482 S.E.2d 544 (1997).
Appeal of Decisions Under G.S. 143-166.4. - The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to review an appeal of a decision by the North Carolina Industrial Commission made pursuant to G.S. 143-166.4. In re Vandiford, 56 N.C. App. 224, 287 S.E.2d 912 (1982).
Appeal By State Bar of North Carolina - Court of Appeals of North Carolina lacked jurisdiction to hear the State Bar of North Carolina's appeal of a grant of summary judgment to an attorney in a disciplinary proceeding because G.S. 84-28(h) provided no
appeal from a final order that did not impose discipline and in the instant case no discipline had been imposed. N.C. State Bar v. Rudisill, 159 N.C. App. 704, 583 S.E.2d 413
(2003).
An order of the hearing commission of the State Bar denying defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is interlocutory; therefore, defendant cannot appeal therefrom as a matter of right. North Carolina State Bar v. DuMont,
298 N.C. 564, 259 S.E.2d 280 (1979).
Superior court properly dismissed a university employee's petition for review of an administrative law judge's affirmation of the termination of his employment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because an adequate procedure for judicial review by
direct appeal to the Court of Appeals was provided by two other statutes. Swauger v. Univ. of N.C. 259 N.C. App. 727, 817 S.E.2d 434 (2018).
Interlocutory Appeal Dismissed - Water and sewer processing facilities part-owner's appeal of interlocutory orders of the North Carolina Utilities Commission holding that the part-owner was a public utility under G.S. 62-3(23)a.2 and was subject to the
Commission's jurisdiction was dismissed as the absence of any exceptions to G.S. 62-90 or this section, allowing review of interlocutory orders of the Commission, required the appellate court to conclude that it had no jurisdiction
to consider appeals of interlocutory orders of the Commission; further, the appellate court did not have authority under G.S. 7A-32(c) to review the part-owner's issues as there was no final order of the Commission. State ex rel.
Utils. Comm'n v. Buck Island, Inc., 158 N.C. App. 536, 581 S.E.2d 122 (2003).
Applied in Morgan v. VEPCO, 22 N.C. App. 300, 206 S.E.2d 338 (1974); Fisher v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours, 54 N.C. App. 176, 282 S.E.2d 543 (1981); Perkins v. Broughton Hosp.,
71 N.C. App. 275, 321 S.E.2d 495 (1984); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. North Carolina Textile Mfrs. Ass'n, 313 N.C. 215, 328 S.E.2d 264 (1985); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n
v. Thornburg, 314 N.C. 509, 334 S.E.2d 772 (1985); Hardin v. Venture Constr. Co., 107 N.C. App. 758, 421 S.E.2d 601 (1992); Martin v. Piedmont Asphalt & Paving Co.,
113 N.C. App. 121, 437 S.E.2d 696 (1993); In re Appeal of Blue Ridge Hous. of Bakersville LLC, 226 N.C. App. 42, 738 S.E.2d 802, dismissed and review granted, 367 N.C. 216,
747 S.E.2d 526, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 723 (2013); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper, 367 N.C. 644, 766 S.E.2d 827 (2014); Fields v. H&E Equip. Servs., LLC, 240 N.C. App. 483, 771 S.E.2d 791 (2015); Patillo v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 251 N.C. App. 228, 794 S.E.2d 906 (2016).
Cited in State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. General Tel. Co., 17 N.C. App. 727, 195 S.E.2d 311 (1973); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 1, 287 S.E.2d
786 (1982); Citicorp v. Currie, 75 N.C. App. 312, 330 S.E.2d 635 (1985); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Thornburg, 317 N.C. 26, 342 S.E.2d 28 (1986); In re Wake Kidney Clinic,
85 N.C. App. 639, 355 S.E.2d 788 (1987); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Thornburg, 325 N.C. 463, 385 S.E.2d 451 (1989); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Thornburg, 325 N.C. 484,
385 S.E.2d 463 (1989); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Water Serv., Inc., 335 N.C. 493, 439 S.E.2d 127 (1994); Martin v. Piedmont Asphalt & Paving, 337 N.C. 785,
448 S.E.2d 380 (1994); Phillips v. N.C. State Univ., 206 N.C. App. 258, 697 S.E.2d 433 (2010); E. Carolina Internal Med., P.A. v. N.C. HHS, 211 N.C. App. 397, 710 S.E.2d
245 (2011); In re Parkdale Mills & Parkdale Am., 225 N.C. App. 713, 741 S.E.2d 416 (2013); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper, 366 N.C. 484, 739 S.E.2d 541 (2013);
N.C. State Bar v. Simmons, 233 N.C. App. 669, 757 S.E.2d 357 (2014); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Cooper, 367 N.C. 444, 761 S.E.2d 640 (2014); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n
v. Cooper, 367 N.C. 741, 767 S.E.2d 305 (Jan. 23, 2015); Cumberland Cnty. Hosp. Sys. v. North Carolina HHS, 242 N.C. App. 524, 776 S.E.2d 329 (2015); In re Michelin North
Am., Inc., 246 N.C. App. 482, 783 S.E.2d 775 (2016), mot. dismissed, as moot, 792 S.E.2d 512, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 707 (2016); review dismissed, as moot, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 704 (N.C. 2016); review dismissed,
as moot, 792 S.E.2d 790, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 704 (2016); review denied, 792 S.E.2d 519, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 702 (2016); Harris v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 252 N.C. App. 94, 798 S.E.2d 127, aff'd, 370 N.C. 386,
808 S.E.2d 142, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 1020 (2017); In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275 (2017); In re Cube Yadkin Generation, LLC v. Duke Energy Progress, LLC, - N.C. App. - , 837 S.E.2d 144 (2019).
§ 7A-30. Appeals of right from certain decisions of the Court of Appeals.
Except as provided in G.S. 7A-28, an appeal lies of right to the Supreme Court from any decision of the Court of Appeals rendered in a case:
- Which directly involves a substantial question arising under the Constitution of the United States or of this State, or
- In which there is a dissent when the Court of Appeals is sitting in a panel of three judges. An appeal of right pursuant to this subdivision is not effective until after the Court of Appeals sitting en banc has rendered a decision in the case, if the Court of Appeals hears the case en banc, or until after the time for filing a motion for rehearing of the cause by the Court of Appeals has expired or the Court of Appeals has denied the motion for rehearing.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1; 1983, c. 526, s. 2; 2016-125, 4th Ex. Sess., s. 22(c).)
Cross References. - As to jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review, when authorized by law, direct appeals from a final order or decision of the North Carolina Utils. Commission, see N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 12(1).
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2016-125, 4th Ex Sess., s. 25, is a severability clause.
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2016-125, 4th Ex. Sess., s. 22(c), effective December 12, 2016, added the language following "dissent" in subdivision (2).
Legal Periodicals. - For statistical analysis of all of the opinions of the North Carolina Supreme Court for the year 1977, see 15 Wake Forest L. Rev. 39 (1979).
For article, "The Discipline and Removal of Judges in North Carolina," see 4 Campbell L. Rev. 1 (1981).
For 1984 survey of appellate procedure, "Appellate Rule 16(b) and New Requirements for Appeals of Right," see 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1074 (1985).
For comment, "The Burial of an Impartial Judicial System: The Lifting of Restrictions on Judicial Candidate Speech in North Carolina," see 33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 413 (1998).
For a brief discussion of the scope of review under this section, see 22 Campbell L. Rev. 253 (2000).
For recent development: " 'Deference Does Not by Definition Preclude Relief': The Impact of Miller-El v. Dretke on Batson Review in North Carolina Capital Appeals," see 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1328 (2006).
For article, "Simple Justice: In re J.D.B. and Custodial Interrogations," see 89 N.C.L. Rev. 685 (2011).
For article, "What Exactly Is a 'Substantial Constitutional Question' for Purposes of Appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court?," see 33 Campbell L. Rev. 211 (2011).
CASE NOTES
I. IN GENERAL.
Legislative Intent. - In establishing the North Carolina Court of Appeals, defining its jurisdiction, and providing a system of appeals, the General Assembly followed the basic principle that there should be only one trial on the merits and one appeal
on the law, as of right, in every case. Consequently, double appeals as of right - first to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court - are authorized only in the instances specified by this section. State v. Cumber,
280 N.C. 127, 185 S.E.2d 141 (1971).
Had the General Assembly intended to limit double appeals in criminal cases to the defendant only, it would have said so. State v. Campbell, 282 N.C. 125, 191 S.E.2d 752 (1972).
Scope of Review. - When the Supreme Court, after a decision of a cause by the Court of Appeals and pursuant to the petition of a party thereto as authorized by G.S. 7A-31, grants certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, only the decision of the Court of Appeals is before the Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court inquires into proceedings in the trial court solely to determine the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Its inquiry is restricted to rulings of the Court of Appeals which are assigned as error in the petition for certiorari and which are preserved by arguments or the citation of authorities with reference thereto in the brief filed by the petitioner in the Supreme Court, except in those instances in which the Supreme Court elects to exercise its general power of supervision of courts inferior to the Supreme Court. Supreme Court review of a decision by the Court of Appeals upon an appeal from it to the Supreme Court as a matter of right, pursuant to this section, is similarly limited. State v. Williams, 274 N.C. 328, 163 S.E.2d 353 (1968).
Because the dissent in a decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals of North Carolina did not address a particular issue, defendant's arguments on that issue were not properly before the Supreme Court of North Carolina. State v. Barnard,
362 N.C. 244, 658 S.E.2d 643 (2008).
Right to Counsel. - G.S. 7A-450 et seq. has generally been construed to limit the right to appointed counsel in criminal cases to direct appeals taken as of right. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974).
Applied in State v. Cavallaro, 274 N.C. 480, 164 S.E.2d 168 (1968); Southern Ry. v. City of Winston-Salem, 275 N.C. 465, 168 S.E.2d 396 (1969); State v. Horton,
275 N.C. 651, 170 S.E.2d 466 (1969); State v. Bumper, 275 N.C. 670, 170 S.E.2d 457 (1969); State v. Strickland, 276 N.C. 253, 173 S.E.2d
129 (1970); State v. Barrow, 276 N.C. 381, 172 S.E.2d 512 (1970); State v. McCloud, 276 N.C. 518, 173 S.E.2d 753 (1970); North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n v. Asheville
School, Inc.,
276 N.C. 556, 173 S.E.2d 909 (1970); Atkins v. Moye, 277 N.C. 179, 176 S.E.2d 789 (1970); State v. Green, 277 N.C. 188, 176 S.E.2d 756 (1970);
Goldman v. Parkland of Dallas, Inc., 277 N.C. 223, 176 S.E.2d 784 (1970); State v. Gaiten, 277 N.C. 236, 176 S.E.2d 778 (1970); State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242,
176 S.E.2d 772 (1970); Marrone v. Long, 277 N.C. 246, 176 S.E.2d 762 (1970); State v. Fowler, 277 N.C. 305, 177 S.E.2d 385 (1970); State v. Jordan, 277 N.C. 341,
177 S.E.2d 289 (1970); State v. Hatcher, 277 N.C. 380, 177 S.E.2d 892 (1970); Williamson v. McNeill, 277 N.C. 447, 177 S.E.2d 859 (1970); Allred v. City of Raleigh,
277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971); In re Johnson, 277 N.C. 688, 178 S.E.2d 470 (1971); Southern Ry. v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 709,
178 S.E.2d 422 (1971); Keiger v. Winston-Salem Bd. of Adjustment, 278 N.C. 17, 178 S.E.2d 616 (1971); Blackwell v. Butts, 278 N.C. 615, 180 S.E.2d 835 (1971); State
v. Lynch, 279 N.C. 1, 181 S.E.2d 561 (1971); Watkins v. Central Motor Lines, 279 N.C. 132, 181 S.E.2d 588 (1971); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
279 N.C. 240, 182 S.E.2d 571 (1971); Brewer v. Harris, 279 N.C. 288, 182 S.E.2d 345 (1971); State v. Harris, 279 N.C. 307, 182 S.E.2d 364
(1971); State v. Hunter, 279 N.C. 498, 183 S.E.2d 665 (1971); First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Carr, 279 N.C. 539, 184 S.E.2d 268 (1971); Pleasant v. Motors Ins.
Co., 280 N.C. 100, 185 S.E.2d 164 (1971); State v. Jackson, 280 N.C. 122, 185 S.E.2d 202 (1971); State v. Speights, 280 N.C. 137, 185 S.E.2d
152 (1971); State v. McCluney, 280 N.C. 404, 185 S.E.2d 870 (1972); State v. Bryant, 280 N.C. 407, 185 S.E.2d 854 (1972); In re Tew, 280 N.C. 612,
187 S.E.2d 13 (1972); State v. Greenwood, 280 N.C. 651, 187 S.E.2d 8 (1972); Willis v. J.M. Davis Indus., Inc., 280 N.C. 709, 186 S.E.2d 913 (1972); State v. Harvey,
281 N.C. 1, 187 S.E.2d 706 (1972); Roberts v. William N. & Kate B. Reynolds Mem. Park, 281 N.C. 48, 187 S.E.2d 721 (1972); State v. Ford, 281 N.C. 62,
187 S.E.2d 741 (1972); State ex rel. Banking Comm'n v. Lexington State Bank, 281 N.C. 108, 187 S.E.2d 747 (1972); State v. Spencer, 281 N.C. 121,
187 S.E.2d 779 (1972); EAC Credit Corp. v. Wilson, 281 N.C. 140, 187 S.E.2d 752 (1972); Wright v. Wright, 281 N.C. 159, 188 S.E.2d 317 (1972); Investment Properties
of Asheville, Inc. v. Allen, 281 N.C. 174, 188 S.E.2d 441 (1972); Investment Properties of Asheville, Inc. v. Norburn, 281 N.C. 191, 188 S.E.2d 342 (1972); Robbins v.
Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 188 S.E.2d 350 (1972); State v. Accor, 281 N.C. 287, 188 S.E.2d 332 (1972); Stevenson v. City of Durham, 281 N.C. 300,
188 S.E.2d 281 (1972); Calloway v. Ford Motor Co., 281 N.C. 496,
189 S.E.2d 484 (1972); Ferguson v. Morgan, 282 N.C. 83, 191 S.E.2d 817 (1972); State v. Brown, 282 N.C. 117, 191 S.E.2d 659 (1972); State v. Killian,
282 N.C. 138, 191 S.E.2d 699 (1972); State v. Summrell, 282 N.C. 157, 192 S.E.2d 569 (1972); Marks v. Thompson, 282 N.C. 174, 192 S.E.2d
311 (1972); McNair v. Boyette, 282 N.C. 230, 192 S.E.2d 457 (1972); State v. Russell, 282 N.C. 240, 192 S.E.2d 294 (1972); Variety Theatres, Inc. v. Cleveland County,
282 N.C. 272, 192 S.E.2d 290 (1972); Braswell v. Purser, 282 N.C. 388, 193 S.E.2d 90 (1972); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. City of Durham, 16 N.C. App. 69, 190 S.E.2d 851 (1972); Hoots v. Calaway, 282 N.C. 477, 193 S.E.2d 709 (1973); State v. Dix, 282 N.C. 490, 193 S.E.2d 897 (1973); Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co.,
282 N.C. 643, 194 S.E.2d 521 (1973); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. J.D. McCotter, Inc., 283 N.C. 104, 194 S.E.2d 859 (1973); State v. Cameron, 283 N.C. 191,
195 S.E.2d 481 (1973); State v. Streeter, 283 N.C. 203, 195 S.E.2d 502 (1973); State v. Fredell, 283 N.C. 242, 195 S.E.2d 300 (1973); Investment Properties of Asheville,
Inc. v. Allen, 283 N.C. 277, 196 S.E.2d 262 (1973); Tennessee Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 283 N.C. 423, 196 S.E.2d 711 (1973); Anderson v. Butler,
284 N.C. 723, 202 S.E.2d 585 (1974); State v. Horn, 285 N.C. 82, 203 S.E.2d 36 (1974); State v. Heard, 285 N.C. 167, 203 S.E.2d 826 (1974);
Sanders v. Wilkerson,
285 N.C. 215, 204 S.E.2d 17 (1974); State v. Castor, 285 N.C. 286, 204 S.E.2d 848 (1974); State v. Shore,
285 N.C. 328, 204 S.E.2d 682 (1974); State v. Austin, 285 N.C. 364, 204 S.E.2d 675 (1974); Smith v. Keator, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d 203
(1974); Robertson v. Stanley, 285 N.C. 561, 206 S.E.2d 190 (1974); State v. Luther, 285 N.C. 570, 206 S.E.2d 238 (1974); Spartan Leasing, Inc. v. Brown,
285 N.C. 689, 208 S.E.2d 649 (1974); Estate of Loftin v. Loftin, 285 N.C. 717, 208 S.E.2d 670 (1974); Little v. Rose, 285 N.C. 724, 208
S.E.2d 666 (1974); Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, 286 N.C. 24, 209 S.E.2d 795 (1974); Rhodes v. Hogg & Allen, 286 N.C. 40, 209 S.E.2d 794 (1974); State v. Crews,
286 N.C. 41, 209 S.E.2d 462 (1974); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Werner Indus., Inc., 286 N.C. 89, 209 S.E.2d 734 (1974); State v. Edwards, 286 N.C. 162,
209 S.E.2d 758 (1974); State v. Black, 286 N.C. 191, 209 S.E.2d 458 (1974); Heath v. Mosley, 286 N.C. 197, 209 S.E.2d 740 (1974); State v. Lindley, 286 N.C. 255,
210 S.E.2d 207 (1974); Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 213 S.E.2d 563 (1975); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 287 N.C. 192,
214 S.E.2d 98 (1975); State v. Brooks, 287 N.C. 392, 215 S.E.2d 111 (1975); Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 215 S.E.2d 102 (1975); State v. Jackson,
287 N.C. 470, 215 S.E.2d 123 (1975); State v. Pope, 287 N.C. 505, 215 S.E.2d 139 (1975); State v. Brown, 287 N.C. 523, 215 S.E.2d 150 (1975);
Rape v. Lyerly, 287 N.C. 601, 215 S.E.2d 737 (1975); Tucker v. Tucker, 288 N.C. 81, 216 S.E.2d 1 (1975); Thompson v. Thompson, 288 N.C. 120,
215 S.E.2d 606 (1975); Sink v. Easter, 288 N.C. 183,
217 S.E.2d 532 (1975); State v. McCotter, 288 N.C. 227, 217 S.E.2d 525 (1975); Williams v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 288 N.C. 338, 218 S.E.2d 368 (1975); Canady v.
Creech, 288 N.C. 354, 218 S.E.2d 383 (1975); Pruitt v. Williams, 288 N.C. 368, 218 S.E.2d 348 (1975); Caldwell v. Deese, 288 N.C. 375, 218
S.E.2d 379 (1975); Sauls v. Sauls, 288 N.C. 387, 218 S.E.2d 338 (1975); Adder v. Holman & Moody, Inc., 288 N.C. 484, 219 S.E.2d 190 (1975); State v. Scott,
289 N.C. 712, 224 S.E.2d 185 (1976); State v. Rhodes, 290 N.C. 16, 224 S.E.2d 631 (1976); Cogdill v. Scates, 290 N.C. 31, 224 S.E.2d 604 (1976); State v. Wright,
290 N.C. 45, 224 S.E.2d 624 (1976); State v. Atwood, 290 N.C. 266, 225 S.E.2d 543 (1976); Watkins v. City of Wilmington,
290 N.C. 276, 225 S.E.2d 577 (1976); Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347 (1976); Nantz v. Employment Sec. Comm'n,
290 N.C. 473, 226 S.E.2d 340 (1976); Crumpton v. Crumpton, 290 N.C. 651, 227 S.E.2d 587 (1976); Brock v. North Carolina Property Tax Comm'n, 290 N.C. 731,
228 S.E.2d 254 (1976); State v. Finney, 290 N.C. 755, 228 S.E.2d 433 (1976); State v. Asbury, 291 N.C. 164, 229 S.E.2d 175 (1976); State v. Sauls,
291 N.C. 253, 230 S.E.2d 390 (1976); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 327, 230 S.E.2d 651 (1976); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Edmisten,
291 N.C. 361, 230 S.E.2d 671 (1976); State v. Castor, 28 N.C. App. 336, 220 S.E.2d 819 (1976); Manganello v. Permastone, Inc., 291 N.C. 666,
231 S.E.2d 678 (1977); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 292 N.C. 1, 231 S.E.2d 867 (1977); State v. McKenzie, 292 N.C. 170,
232 S.E.2d 424 (1977); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 292 N.C. 244, 232 S.E.2d 414 (1977); State v. Thomas, 292 N.C. 251, 232 S.E.2d 411 (1977); State v. Best,
292 N.C. 294, 233 S.E.2d 544 (1977); State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 233 S.E.2d 895 (1977); Gallimore v. Marilyn's Shoes,
292 N.C. 399, 233 S.E.2d 529 (1977); Thompson v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 292 N.C. 406, 233 S.E.2d 538 (1977); Falls Sales Co. v. Board of Transp., 292 N.C. 437,
233 S.E.2d 569 (1977); Farmer v. Chaney, 292 N.C. 451, 233 S.E.2d 582 (1977); State v. Gainey, 292 N.C. 627, 234 S.E.2d 610 (1977); Etheridge v. Peters,
301 N.C. 76, 269 S.E.2d 133 (1980); Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 301 N.C. 226, 271 S.E.2d 364 (1980); State v. Maher, 305 N.C. 544,
290 S.E.2d 694 (1982); State v. Barnes, 307 N.C. 104, 296 S.E.2d 291 (1982); Felton v. Hospital Guild, 307 N.C. 121, 296 S.E.2d 297 (1982); Beck v. Carolina Power
& Light Co., 307 N.C. 267, 297 S.E.2d 397 (1982); State v. Tate, 307 N.C. 242, 297 S.E.2d 581 (1982); A.E.P. Indus., Inc. v. McClure,
308 N.C. 393, 302 S.E.2d 754 (1983); Heath v. Turner, 309 N.C. 483, 308 S.E.2d 244 (1983); State v. Green,
309 N.C. 623, 308 S.E.2d 326 (1983); State v. Massey, 309 N.C. 625, 308 S.E.2d 332 (1983); State v. Callicutt, 309 N.C. 626, 308 S.E.2d
333 (1983); Nash v. Conrad Indus., Inc., 309 N.C. 629, 308 S.E.2d 334 (1983); Huyck Corp. v. C.C. Mangum, Inc., 309 N.C. 788, 309 S.E.2d 183 (1983); North Carolina
ex rel. Horne v. Chafin, 309 N.C. 813,
309 S.E.2d 239 (1983); Coats v. Jones, 309 N.C. 815, 309 S.E.2d 253 (1983); State v. Ysaguire, 309 N.C. 780, 309 S.E.2d 436 (1983); Speck v. North Carolina
Dairy Found., Inc., 311 N.C. 679, 319 S.E.2d 139 (1984); In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 319 S.E.2d 227 (1984); Board of Trustees v. Unknown & Unascertained Heirs,
311 N.C. 644, 319 S.E.2d 239 (1984); State v. Riddle, 311 N.C. 734, 319 S.E.2d 250 (1984); State v. Arrington,
311 N.C. 633, 319 S.E.2d 254 (1984); State v. Holloway, 311 N.C. 573, 319 S.E.2d 261 (1984); State v. King, 311 N.C. 603, 320 S.E.2d
1 (1984); Betts v. Parrish, 312 N.C. 47, 320 S.E.2d 662 (1984); Sherrod v. Any Child or Children Hereafter Born to Sherrod, 312 N.C. 74, 320 S.E.2d 669 (1984); Williams
v. Boylan-Pearce, Inc., 313 N.C. 321, 327 S.E.2d 870 (1985); In re Webb, 313 N.C. 322, 327 S.E.2d 879 (1985); State v. Warren, 313 N.C. 254,
328 S.E.2d 256 (1985); Pollock v. Reeves Bros., 313 N.C. 287, 328 S.E.2d 282 (1985); Thompson v. Thompson,
313 N.C. 313, 328 S.E.2d 288 (1985); State v. Majors, 314 N.C. 111, 331 S.E.2d 689 (1985); Fletcher v. Jones, 314 N.C. 389, 333 S.E.2d
731 (1985); Snider v. Hopkins, 314 N.C. 529, 334 S.E.2d 776 (1985); State v. Cameron, 314 N.C. 516, 335 S.E.2d 9 (1985); State v. Whitaker,
316 N.C. 515, 342 S.E.2d 514 (1986); State v. Stallings, 316 N.C. 535, 342 S.E.2d 519 (1986); Sharpe v. Park Newspapers of Lumberton, Inc.,
317 N.C. 579, 347 S.E.2d 25 (1986); Weaver v. Swedish Imports Maintenance, Inc., 319 N.C. 243, 354 S.E.2d 477 (1987); Morrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
319 N.C. 298, 354 S.E.2d 495 (1987); Medlin v. Bass, 327 N.C. 587, 398 S.E.2d 460 (1990); State v. Everett, 328 N.C. 72, 399 S.E.2d 305 (1991); Hearne v.
Sherman, 350 N.C. 612, 516 S.E.2d 864 (1999); Lovelace v. City of Shelby, 351 N.C. 458, 526 S.E.2d 652 (2000), appeal dismissed, 153 N.C. App. 378, 570 S.E.2d 136 (2002); Wise v. Harrington Grove Cmty. Ass'n, 357 N.C. 396, 584 S.E.2d 731 (2003); In re Estate of Lunsford,
160 N.C. App. 125, 585 S.E.2d 245 (2003); N.C. Forestry Ass'n v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 357 N.C. 640, 588 S.E.2d 880 (2003); State v. Alexander,
359 N.C. 824, 616 S.E.2d 914 (2005); Coley v. State, 360 N.C. 493, 631 S.E.2d 121 (2006); Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 361 N.C. 114,
638 S.E.2d 203 (2006); Holly Ridge Assocs., LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 361 N.C. 531, 648 S.E.2d 830 (2007); State v. Icard, 363 N.C. 303,
677 S.E.2d 822 (June 18, 2009); In re K.J.L., 363 N.C. 343, 677 S.E.2d 835 (June 18, 2009).
State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309, 644 S.E.2d 201 (2007); In re J.T.W., 361 N.C. 341, 643 S.E.2d 579 (2007); State v. Carpenter, 361 N.C. 382,
646 S.E.2d 105 (2007); State v. Boyce, 361 N.C. 670, 651 S.E.2d 879 (2007); State v. Everette, 361 N.C. 646, 652 S.E.2d 241 (2007); Tillman v. Commer. Credit Loans,
Inc., 362 N.C. 93, 655 S.E.2d 362 (2008); Davis v. Harrah's Cherokee Casino, 362 N.C. 133, 655 S.E.2d 392 (2008); State v. Wilson, 362 N.C. 162,
655 S.E.2d 359 (2008); Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp. Co., 362 N.C. 191, 657 S.E.2d 361 (2008); Schenkel & Shultz, Inc. v. Hermon F. Fox & Assocs., P.C., 362 N.C. 269,
658 S.E.2d 918 (2008); State v. Cook, 362 N.C. 285, 661 S.E.2d 874 (2008); Hassell v. Onslow County Bd. of Educ., 362 N.C. 299, 661 S.E.2d 709 (2008); Binney v. Banner
Therapy Prods., 362 N.C. 310, 661 S.E.2d 717 (2008); Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp. Co., 192 N.C. App. 114, 665 S.E.2d 493 (2008); In re Will
of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 669 S.E.2d 572 (2008); Andrews v. Haygood, 362 N.C. 599, 669 S.E.2d 310 (2008), cert. denied, - U.S. - 129 S. Ct. 2792 (2009); Falk v. Fannie
Mae, 367 N.C. 594, 766 S.E.2d 271 (2014); In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275 (2017).
Cited in Harris v. Board of Comm'rs, 274 N.C. 343, 163 S.E.2d 387 (1968); Rigby v. Clayton, 274 N.C. 465, 164 S.E.2d 7 (1968); Redevelopment Comm'n v. Guilford County,
274 N.C. 585, 164 S.E.2d 476 (1968); State v. Moore, 275 N.C. 141, 166 S.E.2d 53 (1969); Vinson v. Chappell, 275 N.C. 234, 166 S.E.2d 686
(1969); State v. Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 167 S.E.2d 274 (1969); Hicks v. Hicks, 275 N.C. 370, 167 S.E.2d 761 (1969); Southern Ry. v. City of Winston-Salem, 275 N.C. 465,
168 S.E.2d 396 (1969); State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 173 S.E.2d 897 (1970); Surratt v. State, 276 N.C. 725, 174 S.E.2d 524 (1970); State v. Simmons, 278 N.C. 468,
180 S.E.2d 97 (1971); Dantzic v. State, 279 N.C. 212, 182 S.E.2d 563 (1971); Ross v. Perry, 281 N.C. 570, 189 S.E.2d 226 (1972); Younts v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 281 N.C. 582, 189 S.E.2d 137 (1972); Branch v. Branch, 282 N.C. 133, 191 S.E.2d 671 (1972); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Beatties Ford Util., Inc., 21 N.C. App. 213, 203 S.E.2d 649 (1974); Master Hatcheries, Inc. v. Coble, 286 N.C. 518, 212 S.E.2d 150 (1975); Setzer v. Annas, 286 N.C. 534, 212 S.E.2d 154 (1975); State v. Miller,
289 N.C. 1, 220 S.E.2d 572 (1975); Watson Seafood & Poultry Co. v. George W. Thomas, Inc., 289 N.C. 7, 220 S.E.2d 536 (1975); Clark v. Bodycombe, 289 N.C. 246,
221 S.E.2d 506 (1976); Pruitt v. Knight Publishing Co., 289 N.C. 254, 221 S.E.2d 355 (1976); Whitaker v. Earnhardt, 289 N.C. 260, 221 S.E.2d 316 (1976); Penland v. Green,
289 N.C. 281, 221 S.E.2d 365 (1976); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 289 N.C. 286, 221 S.E.2d 322 (1976); Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303,
222 S.E.2d 412 (1976); Kidd v. Early, 289 N.C. 343, 222 S.E.2d 392 (1976); State v. Greene, 289 N.C. 578, 223 S.E.2d 365 (1976); Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v.
Strick Corp., 289 N.C. 587, 223 S.E.2d 346 (1976); State v. McFadden, 292 N.C. 609, 234 S.E.2d 742 (1977); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate
Admin. Office, 293 N.C. 365, 239 S.E.2d 48 (1977); State v. Boone, 293 N.C. 702, 239 S.E.2d 459 (1977); State v. Hewitt, 294 N.C. 316, 239
S.E.2d 833 (1978); State v. McKoy, 294 N.C. 134, 240 S.E.2d 383 (1978); State v. Lee, 294 N.C. 299, 240 S.E.2d 449 (1978); State v. Walters, 294 N.C. 311,
240 S.E.2d 628 (1978); Thompson v. Frank Ix & Sons, 294 N.C. 358, 240 S.E.2d 783 (1978); State v. Sanders, 294 N.C. 337, 240 S.E.2d 788 (1978); Frank H. Conner Co.
v. Spanish Inns Charlotte, Ltd., 294 N.C. 661, 242 S.E.2d 785 (1978); In re Byers, 295 N.C. 256, 244 S.E.2d 665 (1978); Murphy v. Murphy, 295 N.C. 390,
245 S.E.2d 693 (1978); State v. Headen, 295 N.C. 437, 245 S.E.2d 706 (1978); State v. Ross, 295 N.C. 488, 246 S.E.2d 780 (1978); Daughtry v. Turnage, 295 N.C. 543,
246 S.E.2d 788 (1978); State v. Snead, 295 N.C. 615, 247 S.E.2d 893 (1978); State v. Alston, 295 N.C. 629, 247 S.E.2d 898 (1978); State v. Hodges, 296 N.C. 66,
249 S.E.2d 371 (1978); Currence v. Hardin, 296 N.C. 95, 249 S.E.2d 387 (1978); North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Evans, 296 N.C. 374, 250 S.E.2d 231 (1979); Rappaport v.
Days Inn of Am., Inc., 296 N.C. 382, 250 S.E.2d 245 (1979); Moore v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 296 N.C. 467, 251 S.E.2d 419 (1979); Hensley v. Caswell Action Comm., Inc.,
296 N.C. 527, 251 S.E.2d 399 (1979); Arnold v. Sharpe, 296 N.C. 533, 251 S.E.2d 452 (1979); State v. Gunther, 296 N.C. 578, 251 S.E.2d 462
(1979); Beasley v. Beasley, 296 N.C. 580, 251 S.E.2d 433 (1979); Housing, Inc. v. Weaver, 296 N.C. 581, 251 S.E.2d 457 (1979); White v. White, 296 N.C. 661,
252 S.E.2d 698 (1979); State v. Thompson, 296 N.C. 703, 252 S.E.2d 776 (1979); Moore v. Moore, 297 N.C. 14, 252 S.E.2d 735 (1979); Gregory Poole Equip. Co. v. Coble,
297 N.C. 19, 252 S.E.2d 729 (1979); Henderson County v. Osteen, 297 N.C. 113, 254 S.E.2d 160 (1979); Wadsworth v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 297 N.C. 172,
253 S.E.2d 925 (1979); State v. Phifer, 297 N.C. 216, 254 S.E.2d 586 (1979); Moore v. Union Fid. Life Ins. Co., 297 N.C. 375, 255 S.E.2d 160 (1979); Wood v. J.P. Stevens
& Co., 297 N.C. 636, 256 S.E.2d 692 (1979); State v. Haywood, 297 N.C. 686, 256 S.E.2d 715 (1979); Smith v. State, 298 N.C. 115, 257
S.E.2d 399 (1979); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Mebane Home Tel. Co., 298 N.C. 162, 257 S.E.2d 623 (1979); State v. Winfrey, 298 N.C. 260, 258 S.E.2d 346 (1979); Kinlaw
v. Long Mfg. N.C. Inc., 298 N.C. 494, 259 S.E.2d 552 (1979); In re Vinson, 298 N.C. 640, 260 S.E.2d 591 (1979); Baumann v. Smith, 298 N.C. 778,
260 S.E.2d 626 (1979); State v. Benton, 299 N.C. 16, 260 S.E.2d 917 (1980); In re Purported Will of Andrews, 299 N.C. 52, 261 S.E.2d 198 (1980); Pearce v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 299 N.C. 64, 261 S.E.2d 176 (1980); State v. Dickens, 299 N.C. 76, 261 S.E.2d 183 (1980); State v. Jones, 299 N.C. 103,
261 S.E.2d 1 (1980); Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 261 S.E.2d 849 (1980); Tanglewood Land Co. v. Byrd, 299 N.C. 260, 261 S.E.2d 655 (1980); State ex rel. Child
Day-Care Licensing Comm'n v. Fayetteville St. Christian School, 299 N.C. 351, 261 S.E.2d 908 (1980); National Mtg. Corp. v. American Title Ins. Co., 299 N.C. 369, 261
S.E.2d 844 (1980); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Edmisten, 299 N.C. 432, 263 S.E.2d 583 (1980); Thompson v. Soles, 299 N.C. 484, 263 S.E.2d 599 (1980); State ex rel.
Utils. Comm'n v. CF Indus., Inc., 299 N.C. 504, 263 S.E.2d 559 (1980); State v. Lynch, 301 N.C. 479, 272 S.E.2d 349 (1980); Kinnard v. Mecklenburg Fair, Ltd.,
301 N.C. 522, 271 S.E.2d 909 (1980); Morris v. Morris, 301 N.C. 525, 272 S.E.2d 1 (1980); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Duke Power Co., 51 N.C. App. 698, 277 S.E.2d 444 (1981); Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981); Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981); In re McElwee,
304 N.C. 68, 283 S.E.2d 115 (1981); Rental Towel & Uniform Serv. v. Bynum Int'l, Inc., 304 N.C. 174, 282 S.E.2d 426 (1981); State v.
Cooper, 304 N.C. 180, 282 S.E.2d 436 (1981); Worthington v. Bynum, 305 N.C. 478, 290 S.E.2d 599 (1982); In re Peal, 305 N.C. 640, 290 S.E.2d
664 (1982); Dealers Specialties, Inc. v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs., Inc., 305 N.C. 633, 291 S.E.2d 137 (1982); Love v. Moore, 305 N.C. 575, 291 S.E.2d 141 (1982); State
v. Andrews, 306 N.C. 144, 291 S.E.2d 581 (1982); State v. LeDuc, 306 N.C. 62, 291 S.E.2d 607 (1982); State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 291 S.E.2d
618 (1982); State v. Brackett, 306 N.C. 138, 291
S.E.2d 660 (1982); Snipes v. Snipes, 306 N.C. 373, 293 S.E.2d 187 (1982); State v. Hannah, 306 N.C. 374, 293 S.E.2d 188 (1982); State v. Morrison, 306 N.C. 375,
293 S.E.2d 188 (1982); Taylor v. Cone Mills Corp., 306 N.C. 314, 293 S.E.2d 189 (1982); Hoyle v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., 306 N.C. 248, 293 S.E.2d 196 (1982);
Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415 (1982); Cianfarra v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 306 N.C. 737, 295 S.E.2d 457 (1982); Rorie v. Holly
Farms Poultry Co., 306 N.C. 706, 295 S.E.2d 458 (1982); Caviness v. Administrative Office of Courts, 306 N.C. 738, 295 S.E.2d 469 (1982); State v. Murphy,
306 N.C. 739, 295 S.E.2d 470 (1982); Page v. Tao, 306 N.C. 734, 295 S.E.2d 470 (1982); Allen v. Investors Heritage Life Ins. Co., 306 N.C. 732,
295 S.E.2d 471 (1982); State v. Allison, 307 N.C. 411, 298 S.E.2d 365 (1983); State v. Williams, 307 N.C. 452, 298 S.E.2d 372 (1983); North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Virginia
Carolina Bldrs., 307 N.C. 563, 299 S.E.2d 629 (1983); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 307 N.C. 541, 299 S.E.2d 763 (1983); Department
of Transp. v. Harkey, 308 N.C. 148, 301 S.E.2d 64 (1983); North Carolina Dep't of Cor. v. Gibson, 308 N.C. 131, 301 S.E.2d 78 (1983); State v. Wilhite,
308 N.C. 798, 303 S.E.2d 788 (1983); Gaston Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Harrison, 311 N.C. 230, 316 S.E.2d 59 (1984); Freeman v. SCM Corp., 311 N.C. 294,
316 S.E.2d 81 (1984); Northern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Lacy J. Miller Mach. Co., 311 N.C. 62, 316 S.E.2d 256 (1984); C.C. Walker Grading & Hauling, Inc. v. S.R.F. Mgt. Corp., 311 N.C. 170,
316 S.E.2d 298 (1984); American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters, 311 N.C. 311, 317 S.E.2d 351 (1984); State v. Simmons, 312 N.C. 78, 320 S.E.2d 405 (1984); State v. Bowen,
312 N.C. 79, 320 S.E.2d 405 (1984); State v. Dula, 312 N.C. 80, 320 S.E.2d 405 (1984); State v. Eason, 312 N.C. 320, 321 S.E.2d 881 (1984);
State v. Jolley, 312 N.C. 296, 321 S.E.2d 883 (1984); Owensby v. Owensby, 312 N.C. 473, 322 S.E.2d 772 (1984); Jones v. All Am. Life Ins. Co.,
312 N.C. 725, 325 S.E.2d 237 (1985); Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985); Forbes Homes, Inc. v. Trimpi, 313 N.C. 168,
326 S.E.2d 30 (1985); Pembee Mfg. Corp. v. Cape Fear Constr. Co., 313 N.C. 488, 329 S.E.2d 350 (1985); O'Briant v. O'Briant, 313 N.C. 432, 329 S.E.2d 370 (1985); State
v. Reilly,
313 N.C. 499, 329 S.E.2d 381 (1985); In re Truesdell, 313 N.C. 421, 329 S.E.2d 630 (1985); Miller v. Kite, 313 N.C. 474, 329 S.E.2d 663
(1985); State v. Lester, 313 N.C. 595, 330 S.E.2d 205 (1985); State v. Hunt, 313 N.C. 593, 330 S.E.2d 205 (1985); State v. Cooney, 313 N.C. 594,
330 S.E.2d 206 (1985); Square D Co. v. C.J. Kern Contractors, 314 N.C. 423, 334 S.E.2d 63 (1985); Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., 315 N.C. 500, 340 S.E.2d 295 (1986);
State v. Hamlet, 316 N.C. 41, 340 S.E.2d 418 (1986); State v. Campbell, 316 N.C. 168, 340 S.E.2d 474 (1986); Colon v. Bailey, 316 N.C. 190,
340 S.E.2d 478 (1986); Jackson v. Housing Auth., 316 N.C. 259, 341 S.E.2d 523 (1986); State v. Miller, 316 N.C. 273, 341 S.E.2d 531 (1986); State v. Nelson,
316 N.C. 350, 341 S.E.2d 561 (1986); State v. Heath,
316 N.C. 337, 341 S.E.2d 565 (1986); State v. Richardson, 316 N.C. 594, 342 S.E.2d 823 (1986); State v. Denning, 316 N.C. 523, 342 S.E.2d
855 (1986); State v. Trexler, 316 N.C. 528, 342 S.E.2d 878 (1986); Lee ex rel. Schlosser v. Mowett Sales Co., 316 N.C. 489, 342 S.E.2d 882 (1986); Holley v. Burroughs
Wellcome Co., 318 N.C. 352, 348 S.E.2d 772 (1986); Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 348 S.E.2d 782 (1986); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham
County, 479 U.S. 130, 107 S. Ct. 499, 93 L. Ed. 2d 449 (1986); Jackson County ex rel. Child Support Enforcement Agency ex rel. Jackson v. Swayney, 319 N.C. 52, 352 S.E.2d 413 (1987); Ratcliff v.
County of Buncombe, 663 F. Supp. 1003 (W.D.N.C. 1987); State v. Kimbrell, 320 N.C. 762, 360 S.E.2d 691 (1987); Town of Emerald Isle ex rel. Smith v. State,
320 N.C. 640, 360 S.E.2d 756 (1987); Trenants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 320 N.C. 776, 360 S.E.2d 783 (1987); Long v. Morganton Dyeing & Finishing Co.,
321 N.C. 82, 361 S.E.2d 575 (1987); Lockert v. Breedlove, 321 N.C. 66, 361 S.E.2d 581 (1987); Murrow v. Daniels, 321 N.C. 494, 364 S.E.2d
392 (1988); Youngblood v. North State Ford Truck Sales, 321 N.C. 380, 364 S.E.2d 433 (1988); Wilkes County Vocational Workshop, Inc. v. United Sleep Products., Inc., 321 N.C. 735,
365 S.E.2d 292 (1988); West v. King's Dep't Store, Inc., 321 N.C. 698, 365 S.E.2d 621 (1988); Williams v. Jones, 322 N.C. 42, 366 S.E.2d 433 (1988); Booe v. Shadrick,
322 N.C. 567, 369 S.E.2d 554 (1988); State v. Mayes, 323 N.C. 159, 371 S.E.2d 476 (1988); State v. Smith, 323 N.C. 439, 373 S.E.2d 435 (1988);
In re Lynette H., 323 N.C. 598, 374 S.E.2d 272 (1988); McLean v. McLean, 323 N.C. 543, 374 S.E.2d 376 (1988); Turner v. Duke Univ.,
325 N.C. 152, 381 S.E.2d 706 (1989); State ex rel. Rhodes v. Simpson, 325 N.C. 514, 385 S.E.2d 329 (1989); State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 693,
386 S.E.2d 187 (1989); State v. Pakulski, 326 N.C. 434, 390 S.E.2d 129 (1990); Hogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 326 N.C. 476, 390 S.E.2d 136 (1990); Thrash v. City of Asheville,
327 N.C. 251, 393 S.E.2d 842 (1990); Triangle Leasing Co. v. McMahon, 327 N.C. 224, 393 S.E.2d 854 (1990); McNeill v. Harnett County, 327 N.C. 552,
398 S.E.2d 475 (1990); Vancamp v. Burgner, 328 N.C. 495, 402 S.E.2d 375 (1991); Rogers v. T.J.X. Cos., 329 N.C. 226, 404 S.E.2d 664 (1991); State v. Monroe,
330 N.C. 433, 410 S.E.2d 913 (1991); In re Michael Weinman Assocs., 333 N.C. 221, 424 S.E.2d 385 (1993); Debnam v. North Carolina Dep't of Cor., 334 N.C. 380,
432 S.E.2d 324 (1993); Gardner v. Gardner, 334 N.C. 662, 435 S.E.2d 324 (1993); Richmond County v. North Carolina Low-Level Radioactive Waste Mgt. Auth., 335 N.C. 77,
436 S.E.2d 113 (1993); Baldwin v. GTE S., Inc., 335 N.C. 544, 439 S.E.2d 108 (1994); Mitchell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 335 N.C. 433, 439 S.E.2d 110 (1994); Jones
v. Shoji, 336 N.C. 581, 444 S.E.2d 203 (1994); State v. Sneeden, 336 N.C. 482, 444 S.E.2d 218 (1994); Smith v. Smith, 336 N.C. 575, 444
S.E.2d 420 (1994); Petersen v. Rowe, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994); State v. Baymon, 336 N.C. 748, 446 S.E.2d 1 (1994); State v. Powell,
336 N.C. 762, 446 S.E.2d 26 (1994); State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 446 S.E.2d 67
(1994); State v. Webster, 337 N.C. 674, 447 S.E.2d 349 (1994); State v. Brinson, 337 N.C. 764, 448 S.E.2d 822 (1994); Holloway v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.,
339 N.C. 338, 452 S.E.2d 233 (1994); Bromhal v. Stott, 341 N.C. 702, 462 S.E.2d 219 (1995); Walton v. City of Raleigh, 342 N.C. 879, 467
S.E.2d 410 (1996); Democratic Party v. Guilford County Bd. of Elections, 342 N.C. 856, 467 S.E.2d 681 (1996); State v. Odum, 343 N.C. 116, 468 S.E.2d 245 (1996); Edward
Valves, Inc. v. Wake County, 343 N.C. 426, 471 S.E.2d 342 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1112, 117 S. Ct. 952, 136 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1997); State ex rel. Tucker v. Frinzi, 344 N.C. 411,
474 S.E.2d 127 (1996); Roberts v. Madison County Realtors Ass'n, 344 N.C. 394, 474 S.E.2d 783 (1996); Richardson v. North Carolina Dep't of Correction, 345 N.C. 128,
478 S.E.2d 501 (1996); Moore v. City of Creedmoor, 345 N.C. 356, 481 S.E.2d 14 (1997); Cicogna v. Holder, 345 N.C. 488, 480 S.E.2d 636 (1997); State v. Davidson,
345 N.C. 496, 480 S.E.2d 701 (1997); State v. Adams, 345 N.C. 745, 483 S.E.2d 156 (1997); Messer v. Town of Chapel Hill, 346 N.C. 259, 485
S.E.2d 269 (1997); In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 485 S.E.2d 612 (1997); Onslow County v. Phillips, 346 N.C. 265, 485 S.E.2d 618 (1997); State v. Smith, 346 N.C. 794,
488 S.E.2d 210 (1997); State v. Beatty, 347 N.C. 555, 495 S.E.2d 367 (1998); Mullis v. Sechrest,
347 N.C. App. 548, 495 S.E.2d 721 (1998); Creech v. Melnik, 347 N.C. 520, 495 S.E.2d 907 (1998); In re Will of Lamparter, 348 N.C. 45, 497
S.E.2d 692 (1998); Martin v. Benson, 348 N.C. 684, 500 S.E.2d 664 (1998); Bring v. North Carolina State Bar, 348 N.C. 655, 501 S.E.2d 907 (1998); Bethania Town Lot Comm.
v. City of Winston-Salem, 348 N.C. 664, 502 S.E.2d 360 (1998); Davis v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 349 N.C. 208, 505 S.E.2d 77 (1998); Peace v. Employment
Sec. Comm'n, 349 N.C. 315, 507 S.E.2d 272 (1998); State v. Thompson, 349 N.C. 483, 508 S.E.2d 277 (1998); Meads v. North Carolina Dep't of Agric.,
349 N.C. 656, 509 S.E.2d 165 (1998); State v. Malette, 350 N.C. 52, 509 S.E.2d 776 (1999); Marcus Bros. Textiles v. Price Waterhouse, 350 N.C. 214,
513 S.E.2d 320 (1999); Beechridge Dev. Co. v. Dahners, 350 N.C. 583, 516 S.E.2d 592 (1999)
State v. Mackey, 352 N.C. 650, 535 S.E.2d 555 (2000); Martishius v. Carolco Studios, Inc., 355 N.C. 465, 562 S.E.2d 887 (2002); State v. Hearst, 356 N.C. 132,
567 S.E.2d 124 (2002); Augur v. Augur, 356 N.C. 582, 573 S.E.2d 125 (2002); Owenby v. Young, 357 N.C. 142, 579 S.E.2d 264 (2003); Dockery v. Hocutt, 357 N.C. 210,
581 S.E.2d 431 (2003); Rosero v. Blake, 357 N.C. 193, 581 S.E.2d 41 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177, 124 S. Ct. 1407, 158 L. Ed. 2d 78 (2004); Holley v. ACTS, Inc., 357 N.C. 228,
581 S.E.2d 750 (2003); Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471, 586 S.E.2d 250 (2003); Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 586 S.E.2d 247 (2003); Brewer v. Cabarrus Plastics, Inc.,
160 N.C. App. 688, 586 S.E.2d 819 (2003); In re Stumbo, 357 N.C. 279, 582 S.E.2d 255 (2003); In re May, 357 N.C. 423, 584 S.E.2d 271 (2003);
Lange v. Lange, 357 N.C. 645, 588 S.E.2d 877 (2003); State v. Hooper, 358 N.C. 122, 591 S.E.2d 514 (2004); Locust v. Pitt County Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 358 N.C. 113,
591 S.E.2d 543 (2004); Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 594 S.E.2d 1 (2004); Watkins v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 358 N.C. 190, 593 S.E.2d 764 (2004); Holcomb
v. Colonial Assocs., L.L.C., 358 N.C. 501, 597 S.E.2d 710 (2004); State v. Weaver, 359 N.C. 246, 607 S.E.2d 599 (2005); In re Estate of Lunsford, 359 N.C. 382,
610 S.E.2d 366 (2005); In re T.E.F., 359 N.C. 570, 614 S.E.2d 296 (2005); State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 359 N.C. 516, 614 S.E.2d 281
(2005); State v. Harris, 360 N.C. 145, 622 S.E.2d 615 (2005); Newberne v. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 359 N.C. 782, 618 S.E.2d 201 (2005); McCutchen v.
McCutchen, 360 N.C. 280, 624 S.E.2d 620 (2006); State v. Lawrence, 360 N.C. 368, 627 S.E.2d 609 (2006); In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 636
S.E.2d 787 (2006); Patronelli v. Patronelli, 360 N.C. 628, 636 S.E.2d 559 (2006); Chambers v. Transit Mgmt., 360 N.C. 609, 636 S.E.2d 553 (2006); Misenheimer v. Burris,
360 N.C. 620, 637 S.E.2d 173 (2006); State v. Hammett, 361 N.C. 92, 637 S.E.2d 518 (2006); Frost v. Salter Path Fire & Rescue, 361 N.C. 181,
639 S.E.2d 429 (2007); Robins v. Town of Hillsborough, 361 N.C. 193, 639 S.E.2d 421 (2007); Bio-Medical Applications of N.C. Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 361 N.C. 229, 641 S.E.2d
303 (2007); Multiple Claimants v. N.C. HHS, Div. of Facility Servs., 361 N.C. 372, 646 S.E.2d 356 (2007); State v. Peterson, 361 N.C. 587, 652 S.E.2d 216 (2007), cert.
denied, 552 U.S. 1271, 128 S. Ct. 1682, 170 L. Ed. 2d. 377 (2008); State v. Stone, 362 N.C. 50, 653 S.E.2d 414 (2007); Walker v. Fleetwood Homes of N.C. Inc., 362 N.C. 63,
653 S.E.2d 393 (2007); State v. Coltrane, 188 N.C. App. 498, 656 S.E.2d 322 (2008), review denied, 362 N.C. 476, 666 S.E.2d 760 (2008); State v. Mead, 362 N.C. 218,
657 S.E.2d 367 (2008); State v. Sparks, 362 N.C. 181, 657 S.E.2d 655 (2008); Shaw v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 362 N.C. 457, 665 S.E.2d 449 (2008); State v. Styles,
362 N.C. 412, 665 S.E.2d 438 (2008); In re T.H.T., 362 N.C. 446, 665 S.E.2d 54 (2008); State v. Smith, 362 N.C. 583, 669 S.E.2d 299 (2008);
State v. Maready,
362 N.C. 614,
669 S.E.2d 564 (2008); Richardson v. Maxim Healthcare/Allegis Group, 362 N.C. 657, 669 S.E.2d 582 (2008); State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 669 S.E.2d 290 (2008);
State v. Miller, 363 N.C. 96, 678 S.E.2d 592 (2009); State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 677 S.E.2d 444 (June 18, 2009); Southeastern Jurisdictional Admin. Council v. Emerson,
363 N.C. 590, 683 S.E.2d 366 (2009); Scarborough v. Dillard's, Inc., 363 N.C. 715, 693 S.E.2d 640 (2009), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 2456, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3769, 179 L.
Ed. 2d 1211 (U.S. 2011), cert. denied 563 U.S. 988, 131 S. Ct. 2456, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3769 (U.S. 2011); In re J.D.B., 363 N.C. 664, 686 S.E.2d 135 (2009), rev'd, remanded, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2011 U.S.
LEXIS 4557, 180 L. Ed. 2d 310 (U.S. 2011); Copper v. Denlinger, 363 N.C. 784, 688 S.E.2d 426 (2010); Bird v. Bird, 363 N.C. 774, 688 S.E.2d 420 (Jan. 29, 2010); State
v. Jacobs, 363 N.C. 815, 689 S.E.2d 859 (2010); State v. Bunch, 363 N.C. 841, 689 S.E.2d 866 (Mar. 12, 2010); White v. Thompson, 364 N.C. 47,
691 S.E.2d 676 (2010); Brown v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. East, L.L.C., 364 N.C. 76, 692 S.E.2d 87 (Apr. 15, 2010); Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buzz Off Insect Shield, L.L.C., 364 N.C. 1,
692 S.E.2d 605 (2010); Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs. & Div. of Med. Assistance of the N.C. HHS, 364 N.C. 61, 692 S.E.2d 96 (Apr. 15, 2010); State v. Morton, 204 N.C. App. 578, 694 S.E.2d 432 (2010); Fussell v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 364 N.C. 222, 695 S.E.2d 437 (June 17, 2010); State Emples. Ass'n of N.C. Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of State Treasurer & Richard
H. Moore, 364 N.C. 205, 695 S.E.2d 91 (2010); State v. Yencer, 206 N.C. App. 552, 696 S.E.2d 875 (2010); Kinlaw v. Harris, 364 N.C. 528,
702 S.E.2d 294 (2010); State v. Sargeant, 365 N.C. 58, 707 S.E.2d 192 (2011); Libertarian Party v. State, 365 N.C. 41, 707 S.E.2d 199 (2011); State v. Khuram Ashfaq
Choudhry, 365 N.C. 215, 717 S.E.2d 348 (2011); State v. Mbacke, 365 N.C. 403, 721 S.E.2d 218 (2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 224, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 6828, 184 L. Ed. 2d
116 (U.S. 2012); Ray v. N.C. DOT, 366 N.C. 1, 727 S.E.2d 675 (2012); Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. Talford, 366 N.C. 43, 727 S.E.2d 866 (2012); State v. Williams,
366 N.C. 110, 726 S.E.2d 161 (2012); State v. King, 366 N.C. 68, 733 S.E.2d 535 (2012); State v. Salinas, 366 N.C. 119,
729 S.E.2d 63 (2012); Moore v. Proper, 366 N.C. 25, 726 S.E.2d 812 (2012); State v. Bradshaw, 366 N.C. 90, 728 S.E.2d 345 (2012); State v. Sweat, 366 N.C. 79,
727 S.E.2d 691 (2012); State v. Otto, 366 N.C. 134, 726 S.E.2d 824 (2012); In re Proposed Foreclosure of Claim of Lien Filed Against Johnson, 366 N.C. 252, 741 S.E.2d
308 (2012); Mussa v. Palmer-Mussa, 366 N.C. 185, 731 S.E.2d 404 (2012); Hest Techs., Inc. v. State Ex Rel. Perdue, 366 N.C. 289, 749 S.E.2d 429 (2012), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 99, 187 L. Ed. 2d 34, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 5319 (U.S. 2013); Trivette v. Yount, 366 N.C. 303, 735 S.E.2d 306 (2012); In re Ocean Isle Palms, LLC, 366 N.C. 351,
749 S.E.2d 439 (2013); State v. Khan, 366 N.C. 448, 738 S.E.2d 167 (2013); IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 366 N.C. 456, 738 S.E.2d 156 (2013); Green v. Freeman,
367 N.C. 136, 749 S.E.2d 262 (2013); State v. Jones, 367 N.C. 299, 758 S.E.2d 345 (2014); Medlin v. Weaver Cooke Constr., LLC, 367
N.C. 414, 760 S.E.2d 732 (2014); State v. Verkerk, 367 N.C. 483, 758 S.E.2d 387 (2014); State v. Sanders, 367 N.C. 716, 766 S.E.2d 331 (2014); Christie v. Hartley
Constr., Inc., 367 N.C. 286, 753 S.E.2d 657 (Dec. 19, 2014); State v. Stubbs, 368 N.C. 40, 770 S.E.2d 74 (2015); Burley v. U.S. Foods, Inc., 368 N.C. 315,
776 S.E.2d 832 (2015); Morningstar Marinas/Eaton Ferry, LLC v. Warren Cnty., 368 N.C. 360, 777 S.E.2d 733 (2015); Beverage Sys. of the Carolinas, LLC v. Associated Bev. Repair, LLC, 368 N.C. 693,
784 S.E.2d 457 (2016); State v. Thomsen, 369 N.C. 22, 789 S.E.2d 639 (2016).
State v. Allman, 369 N.C. 292, 794 S.E.2d 301 (2016); In re Foreclosure of a Deed of Trust Executed by Lucks, 369 N.C. 222, 794 S.E.2d 501 (2016); City of Asheville
v. State, 369 N.C. 80, 794 S.E.2d 759 (2016); State v. Todd, 369 N.C. 707, 799 S.E.2d 834 (2017); Harrison v. Gemma Power Sys., LLC, 369 N.C. 572,
799 S.E.2d 855 (2017); State v. Knight, 369 N.C. 640, 799 S.E.2d 603 (2017); Wray v. City of Greensboro, 370 N.C. 41, 802 S.E.2d 894 (2017); In re Estate of Skinner,
370 N.C. 126, 804 S.E.2d 449 (2017); State v. Campbell, 373 N.C. 216, 835 S.E.2d 844 (2019).
II. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
The constitutional question must be real and substantial rather than superficial and frivolous. It must be a constitutional question which has not already been the subject of conclusive judicial determination. State v. Colson,
274 N.C. 295, 163 S.E.2d 376 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1087, 89 S. Ct. 876, 21 L. Ed. 2d 780 (1969); Bundy v. Ayscue, 276 N.C. 81, 171 S.E.2d 1 (1969).
Dismissal Where Involvement of Substantial Constitutional Question Is Not Shown. - An appellant seeking a second review by the Supreme Court as a matter of right on the ground that a substantial constitutional question is involved must allege and show the involvement of such question or suffer dismissal. State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 163 S.E.2d 376 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1087, 89 S. Ct. 876, 21 L. Ed. 2d 780 (1969); Bundy v. Ayscue, 276 N.C. 81, 171 S.E.2d 1 (1969).
This section requires that an appellant must either allege and show the existence of a real and substantial constitutional question which has not already been the subject of conclusive judicial determination or suffer dismissal. Thompson v. Thompson, 288 N.C. 120, 215 S.E.2d 606 (1975).
Respondent's appeal based solely on the assertion that the district court's allowance of an amendment to a juvenile petition deprived him of a constitutional right was dismissed by the Supreme Court, ex mero motu, because it did not directly involve a
substantial constitutional question within the meaning of this section. In re Jones, 279 N.C. 616, 184 S.E.2d 267 (1971).
Mouthing of Constitutional Phrases Will Not Avoid Dismissal. - Mere mouthing of constitutional phrases like "due process of law" and "equal protection of the law" will not avoid dismissal. State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295,
163 S.E.2d 376 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1087, 89 S. Ct. 876, 21 L. Ed. 2d 780 (1969); Bundy v. Ayscue, 276 N.C. 81, 171 S.E.2d 1 (1969).
Question Should Be Raised and Passed on in Trial Court. - Appellate courts will not ordinarily pass upon a constitutional question unless it affirmatively appears that such question was raised and passed upon in the trial court. State v. Mitchell,
276 N.C. 404, 172 S.E.2d 527 (1970); State v. Cumber, 280 N.C. 127, 185 S.E.2d 141 (1971).
And Preserved by Appropriate Objection, Assignment of Error and Argument in Brief. - The Supreme Court will not pass upon the merits of a litigant's contention that his constitutional right has been violated by a ruling or order of a lower court, unless,
at the time the alleged violation of such right occurred or was threatened by a proposed procedure, ruling or offer of evidence, or at the earliest opportunity thereafter, the litigant made an appropriate objection, exception
or motion and thereafter preserved the constitutional question at each level of appellate review by an appropriate assignment of error and by argument in his brief. State v. Mitchell, 276 N.C. 404,
172 S.E.2d 527 (1970).
Consideration of Other Matters. - Once involvement of a substantial constitutional question is established, the Supreme Court will retain the case and may, in its discretion, pass upon any or all assignments of error, constitutional or otherwise, allegedly
committed by the Court of Appeals and properly presented for review. State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 163 S.E.2d 376 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1087, 89 S. Ct. 876,
21 L. Ed. 2d 780 (1969); Bundy v. Ayscue, 276 N.C. 81, 171 S.E.2d 1 (1969).
III. DISSENT.
.
Legislative Intent. - The General Assembly intended to insure a review by the Supreme Court of questions on which there was a division in the intermediate appellate court; no such review was intended for claims joined or consolidated in the lower appellate
court and on which that court rendered unanimous decision. Hendrix v. Alsop, 278 N.C. 549, 180 S.E.2d 802 (1971); State v. Campbell, 282 N.C. 125,
191 S.E.2d 752 (1972); State v. Hageman, 307 N.C. 1, 296 S.E.2d 433 (1982); State v. Hooper, 318 N.C. 680, 351 S.E.2d 286 (1987).
Dissent Allows Appeal as a Matter of Right. - The aggrieved party, whether the State or the defendant, may appeal to the Supreme Court as of right from any decision of the Court of Appeals in which there is a dissent. State v. Campbell, 282 N.C. 125, 191 S.E.2d 752 (1972).
Supreme Court of North Carolina found that it could hear an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals of North Carolina that a defendant be resentenced because G.S. 7A-30(2) provided the state with an appeal of right as there was a dissent in the
Court of Appeals. State v. Norris, 360 N.C. 507, 630 S.E.2d 915 (2006).
Concurring Opinions Labelled as Dissents. - Plaintiff had no right of appeal pursuant to subdivision (2) of this section, although two concurring opinions were labelled as dissents, where all three judges of the Court of Appeals agreed that the plaintiff's
complaint and summonses should be dismissed, though for different reasons. Harris v. Maready, 311 N.C. 536, 319 S.E.2d 912 (1984).
Issues on Appeal Under Subdivision (2). - When an appeal is taken pursuant to subdivision (2) of this section, the only issues properly before the court are those on which the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals based his dissent. Clifford v. River Bend Plantation, Inc., 312 N.C. 460, 323 S.E.2d 23 (1984); State v. Hooper, 318 N.C. 680, 351 S.E.2d 286 (1987); Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 511 S.E.2d 298 (1999).
On appeal to the Supreme Court pursuant to subdivision (2) of this section by defendant from a decision of the Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, in which a majority of the panel found no error in defendant's convictions, where the dissenting judge disagreed only with the majority's treatment of the second question presented to that court, and where defendant did not petition the Supreme Court for discretionary review of the other questions, only the second question was properly before the Supreme Court for review, notwithstanding defendant's attempt to bring forward other questions in his brief. State v. Reilly, 313 N.C. 499, 329 S.E.2d 381 (1985), considering, however, the additional question of the sufficiency of the evidence in order to prevent manifest injustice.
Under subdivision (2) of this section, only the issue raised in the dissent is properly before the Supreme Court for review. N.C.R.A.P., Rule 16 defines the permissible scope of review in such cases. Blumenthal v. Lynch,
315 N.C. 571, 340 S.E.2d 358 (1986), addressing, nevertheless, additional issues which arise frequently in the administration of estates, and must often be determined by the Department of Revenue
under the Court's residual power or authority under N.C.R.A.P., Rule 2.
Waiver of Failure to Serve Notice of Appeal. - Failure to serve the notice of appeal is a defect in the record analogous to failure to serve process. Therefore, a party upon whom service of notice of appeal is required may waive the failure of service
by not raising the issue by motion or otherwise and by participating without objection in the appeal, and the Court of Appeals thus had jurisdiction and could consider the case on its merits. Hale v. Afro-American Arts Int'l,
Inc., 335 N.C. 231, 436 S.E.2d 588 (1993).
§ 7A-31. Discretionary review by the Supreme Court.
- In any cause in which appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals, including any cause heard while the Court of Appeals was sitting en banc, except a cause appealed from the North Carolina Industrial Commission, the North Carolina State Bar pursuant to G.S. 84-28, the Property Tax Commission pursuant to G.S. 105-345, the Board of State Contract Appeals pursuant to G.S. 143-135.9, the Commissioner of Insurance pursuant to G.S. 58-2-80 or G.S. 58-65-131(c), a court-martial pursuant to G.S. 127A-62, a motion for appropriate relief, or valuation of exempt property pursuant to G.S. 7A-28, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, on motion of any party to the cause or on its own motion, certify the cause for review by the Supreme Court, either before or after it has been determined by the Court of Appeals. A cause appealed to the Court of Appeals from any of the administrative bodies listed in the preceding sentence may be certified in similar fashion, but only after determination of the cause in the Court of Appeals. The effect of such certification is to transfer the cause from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court for review by the Supreme Court. If the cause is certified for transfer to the Supreme Court before its determination in the Court of Appeals, review is not had in the Court of Appeals but the cause is forthwith transferred for review in the first instance by the Supreme Court. If the cause is certified for transfer to the Supreme Court after its determination by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals.
-
In causes subject to certification under subsection (a) of this section, certification may be made by the Supreme Court before determination of the cause by the Court of Appeals when in the opinion of the Supreme Court any of the following apply:
- The subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest.
- The cause involves legal principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the State.
- Delay in final adjudication is likely to result from failure to certify and thereby cause substantial harm.
- The work load of the courts of the appellate division is such that the expeditious administration of justice requires certification.
- The subject matter of the appeal is important in overseeing the jurisdiction and integrity of the court system.
-
In causes subject to certification under subsection (a) of this section, certification may be made by the Supreme Court after determination of the cause by the Court of Appeals when in the opinion of the Supreme Court any of the following apply:
- The subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest.
- The cause involves legal principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the State.
- The decision of the Court of Appeals appears likely to be in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court.
- The procedure for certification by the Supreme Court on its own motion, or upon petition of a party, shall be prescribed by rule of the Supreme Court.
Except in courts-martial and motions within the purview of G.S. 7A-28, the State may move for certification for review of any criminal cause, but only after determination of the cause by the Court of Appeals.
Interlocutory determinations by the Court of Appeals, including orders remanding the cause for a new trial or for other proceedings, shall be certified for review by the Supreme Court only upon a determination by the Supreme Court that failure to certify would cause a delay in final adjudication which would probably result in substantial harm.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1; 1969, c. 1044; 1975, c. 555; 1977, c. 711, s. 5; 1981, c. 470, s. 2; 1981 (Reg. Sess., 1982), c. 1224, s. 17; c. 1253, s. 1; 1983, c. 526, s. 3; c. 761, s. 189; 2010-193, s. 19; 2016-125, 4th Ex. Sess., s. 22(d); 2017-7, s. 3.)
Cross References. - As to jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review, when authorized by law, direct appeals from a final order or decision of the North Carolina Utilities Commission, see N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 12(1).
Editor's Note. - The reference to G.S. 143-135.9 in subsection (a) of this section appears to be in error. G.S. 143-135.10 et seq., which were repealed by Session Laws 1987, c. 847, s. 5, related to the former Board of State Contract Appeals.
Session Laws 2010-193, s. 23 provides: "Prosecutions for offenses committed before the effective date of this act are not abated or affected by this act, and the statutes that would be applicable but for this act remain applicable to those prosecutions."
Session Laws 2016-125, 4th Ex Sess., s. 25, is a severability clause.
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2010-193, s. 19, effective December 1, 2010, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date, in the first paragraph in subsection (a), in the first sentence, substituted "the Commissioner of Insurance pursuant to G.S. 58-2-80, a court-martial pursuant to G.S. 127A-62, a motion for appropriate relief, or valuation" for "or the Commissioner of Insurance pursuant to G.S. 58-2-80, or a motion for appropriate relief or valuation," and in the last paragraph, inserted "courts-martial and."
Session Laws 2016-125, 4th Ex. Sess., s. 22(d), effective December 16, 2016, in the first sentence of subsection (a), inserted "including any cause heard while the Court of Appeals was sitting en banc" and "or G.S. 58-65-131(c)".
Session Laws 2017-7, s. 3, effective April 26, 2017, substituted "Supreme Court any of the following apply:" for "Supreme Court" in subsection (b); substituted "public interest" for "public interest, or" in subdivision (b)(1); substituted "of the State" for "of the State, or" in subdivision (b)(2); substituted "substantial harm" for "substantial harm, or" in subdivision (b)(3); added subdivision (b)(5); substituted "Supreme Court any of the following apply:" for "Supreme Court:" in subsection (c); substituted "public interest" for "public interest, or" in subdivision (c)(1); and substituted "jurisprudence of the State" for "jurisprudence of the State, or" in subdivision (c)(2).
Legal Periodicals. - For note discussing the right to counsel on discretionary appeal, see 53 N.C.L. Rev. 560 (1974).
For 1984 survey of appellate procedure, "Appellate Rule 16(b) and New Requirements for Appeals of Rights," see 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1074 (1985).
For recent development: " 'Deference Does Not by Definition Preclude Relief': The Impact of Miller-El v. Dretke on Batson Review in North Carolina Capital Appeals," see 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1328 (2006).
For article, "No Brothers Allowed: How Expanding a Juvenile's Miranda Rights Backfired on a North Carolina Sheriff's Department," 89 N.C.L. Rev. 1A (2011).
For article, "What Exactly Is a 'Substantial Constitutional Question' for Purposes of Appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court?," see 33 Campbell L. Rev. 211 (2011).
CASE NOTES
Scope of Review. - When the Supreme Court, after a decision of a cause by the Court of Appeals and pursuant to the petition of a party thereto as authorized by this section, grants certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, only the decision of the Court of Appeals is before the Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court inquires into proceedings in the trial court solely to determine the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Its inquiry is restricted to rulings of the Court of Appeals which are assigned as error in the petition for certiorari and which are preserved by arguments or the citation of authorities with reference thereto in the brief filed by the petitioner in the Supreme Court, except in those instances in which the Supreme Court elects to exercise its general power of supervision of courts inferior to the Supreme Court. Supreme Court review of a decision by the Court of Appeals upon an appeal from it to the Supreme Court as a matter of right, pursuant to G.S. 7A-30, is similarly limited. State v. Williams, 274 N.C. 328, 163 S.E.2d 353 (1968); Peaseley v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., 282 N.C. 585, 194 S.E.2d 133 (1973); State v. Miller, 282 N.C. 633, 194 S.E.2d 353 (1973).
The Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals for errors of law allegedly committed by it and properly brought forward for review. State v. Parrish, 275 N.C. 69, 165 S.E.2d 230 (1969); State v. Miller, 282 N.C. 633, 194 S.E.2d 353 (1973).
The Supreme Court may review the entire proceedings and consider any errors which have occurred during the course of the litigation, provided that the parties have taken the proper steps to preserve the questions for appellate review. Spartan Leasing, Inc. v. Brown, 285 N.C. 689, 208 S.E.2d 649 (1974).
When the Supreme Court grants certiorari pursuant to this section, review is ordinarily restricted to the rulings of the Court of Appeals which are assigned as error in the petition for certiorari and brought forward in petitioner's brief. State v. Muse,
280 N.C. 31, 185 S.E.2d 214 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 974, 92 S. Ct. 2409, 32 L. Ed. 2d 674, rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 898, 93 S. Ct. 99, 34 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1972); Peaseley v. Virginia Iron, Coal
& Coke Co., 282 N.C. 585, 194 S.E.2d 133 (1973).
Jurisdiction Proper. - Statute could not have restricted the Supreme Court of North Carolina's constitutional authority under N.C. Const., Art. IV,
§
12(1) to exercise jurisdiction to review upon appeal any decision of the courts below, and as such, the Supreme Court of North Carolina did not hesitate to exercise its rarely used general supervisory authority when
necessary to promote the expeditious administration of justice, and did so to consider questions that were not properly presented according to its rules; this exercise of supervisory authority was particularly appropriate when
prompt and definitive resolution of an issue was necessary to ensure the uniform administration of North Carolina's criminal statutes. State v. Ellis, 361 N.C. 200, 639 S.E.2d 425 (2007).
Departure from General Rule. - In a criminal case in which the State petitioned for certiorari and the Court of Appeals ruled on only one of defendant's assignments of error in granting a new trial, the Supreme Court elected to depart from the general
rule that review under this section is ordinarily restricted to the rulings of the Court of Appeals which are assigned as error, and to consider the remaining assignments of error not considered by the Court of Appeals. State v.
Muse, 280 N.C. 31, 185 S.E.2d 214 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 974, 92 S. Ct. 2409, 32 L. Ed. 2d 674, rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 898, 93 S. Ct. 99, 34 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1972).
Improvidently Allowed. - Discretionary review, pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, of three protective orders was improvidently allowed; under N.C. R. App. P. 15(b), a husband's petition for review of those orders was not timely filed. Davis v. Davis,
360 N.C. 518, 631 S.E.2d 114 (2006).
Under this section the Supreme Court is to review only those cases of substantial general or legal importance or in which review is necessary to preserve the integrity of precedent established by the Supreme Court. Peaseley v. Virginia Iron, Coal &
Coke Co., 282 N.C. 585, 194 S.E.2d 133 (1973).
Constitutional Questions. - The Supreme Court will not ordinarily pass upon a constitutional question unless it affirmatively appears that such question was timely raised and passed upon in the trial court if it could have been, or in the Court of Appeals
if the question arose after trial. State v. Parrish, 275 N.C. 69, 165 S.E.2d 230 (1969).
Workers' Compensation. - North Carolina Industrial Commission did not err in failing to prove a 10 percent late penalty because the employer's payment was not untimely; the time for appeal expired fifteen days after the mandate issued, the time to file for a petition for discretionary review ended and the employer avoided the penalty by making payment fourteen days after payment became due. Silva v. Lowes Home Improvement, 239 N.C. App. 175, 768 S.E.2d 180 (2015).
"Appeal by application" such as a petition for discretionary review would be considered an appeal pursuant to subsection (e); because G.S. 7A-31 provides for discretionary review from the Industrial Commission and states that this review is an "appeal,"
"appeal" under G.S. 97-18(e) includes the period during which a party may seek discretionary review by the supreme court of an opinion from the court of appeals. Silva v. Lowes Home Improvement, 239 N.C. App. 175, 768 S.E.2d 180 (2015).
The failure of plaintiff to petition for a writ of certiorari to review the interlocutory decree of the Court of Appeals does not preclude the Supreme Court from granting certiorari after final judgment and thereupon considering and rectifying any errors
which occurred at any stage of the proceedings. Spartan Leasing, Inc. v. Brown, 285 N.C. 689, 208 S.E.2d 649 (1974).
The denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case and such denial does not mean that the Supreme Court has determined that the decision of the Court of Appeals is correct. Denial may simply mean that in the
opinion of the Supreme Court the case does not require further review under the provisions of this section. Peaseley v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., 282 N.C. 585, 194
S.E.2d 133 (1973).
G.S. 7A-451 Does Not Give Indigent Right to Counsel. - An indigent is entitled to have a lawyer at his trial, and for direct review of that trial, but G.S. 7A-451 is not intended to cover the discretionary power of the North Carolina Supreme Court to grant a writ of certiorari under this section. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974).
And Equal Protection Clause Does Not Require Free Counsel for Discretionary Appeals. - The equal protection clause does not require North Carolina to provide free counsel for indigent defendants seeking to take discretionary appeals to the North Carolina Supreme Court or to file petitions for certiorari to that court. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974).
The duty of the State is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974).
A defendant is not denied meaningful access to the North Carolina Supreme Court simply because the State does not appoint counsel to aid him in seeking discretionary review in that court. At that stage he will have a transcript or other record of trial proceedings, a brief on his behalf in the Court of Appeals setting forth his claims of error, and often an opinion by the Court of Appeals disposing of his case. These materials, supplemented by whatever submission respondent may make pro se, would appear to provide the Supreme Court with an adequate basis on which to base its decision to grant or deny review. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974).
Equally Divided Court. - Where one member of the Supreme Court does not participate in the consideration or decision of a case, and the remaining six justices are equally divided as to whether the decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed or
reversed, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed without becoming a precedent. Greenhill v. Crabtree, 301 N.C. 520, 271 S.E.2d 908 (1980); Wayfaring Home, Inc. v. Ward,
301 N.C. 518, 272 S.E.2d 121 (1980).
Exhaustion Requirement in Federal Habeas Corpus. - The fact that the respondent in an appeal from the order of a United States magistrate dismissing a claim for habeas corpus relief incorrectly pleaded that the appellant had exhausted his state court remedies and was entitled to adjudication on the merits was neither conclusive nor a waiver of the exhaustion requirement by the State. Strader v. Allsbrook, 656 F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1981).
Substantially Similar Rules and Procedures. - The rules and procedures of the North Carolina Supreme Court regarding writs of certiorari are substantially similar to those of the United States Supreme Court. Felton v. Barnett, 912 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1032, 111 S. Ct. 693, 112 L. Ed. 2d 683, 502 U.S. 1007, 112 S. Ct. 644, 116 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1991).
Discretionary Review Granted. - Supreme Court took discretionary review of three issues in a criminal appeal of a rape conviction that was affirmed by the Court of Appeals; finding error in two of those issues regarding admission of hearsay evidence that
affected whether the defendant committed first or second degree rape, the court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. State v. Finney, 358 N.C. 79, 591 S.E.2d
863 (2004).
Applied in State v. Horton, 275 N.C. 651, 170 S.E.2d 466 (1969); State v. McBane, 276 N.C. 60, 170 S.E.2d 913 (1969); State v. Jennings, 276 N.C. 157,
171 S.E.2d 447 (1970); Whitley v. Redden, 276 N.C. 263, 171 S.E.2d 894 (1970); Hoyle v. City of Charlotte, 276 N.C. 292, 172 S.E.2d 1 (1970); King v. Baldwin, 276 N.C. 316,
172 S.E.2d 12 (1970); Smith v. Mercer, 276 N.C. 329, 172 S.E.2d 489 (1970); State v. Riera, 276 N.C. 361, 172 S.E.2d 535 (1970); Morse v. Curtis, 276 N.C. 371,
172 S.E.2d 495 (1970); State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Bank of Statesville, 276 N.C. 576, 174 S.E.2d 551 (1970); Martin v. North Carolina Hous. Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 175 S.E.2d
665 (1970); Home Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. McDonald, 277 N.C. 275, 177 S.E.2d 291 (1970); Whitney Stores, Inc. v. Clark, 277 N.C. 322, 177 S.E.2d 418 (1970); Mansour v. Rabil,
277 N.C. 364, 177 S.E.2d 849 (1970); State v. McVay, 277 N.C. 410, 177 S.E.2d 874 (1970); In re Ellis, 277 N.C. 419, 178 S.E.2d 77 (1970); State
v. Harris, 277 N.C. 435, 177 S.E.2d 865 (1970); State Keg, Inc. v. State Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 277 N.C. 450, 177 S.E.2d 861 (1970); Styers v. Phillips, 277 N.C. 460,
178 S.E.2d 583 (1971); State v. Crump, 277 N.C. 573, 178 S.E.2d 366 (1971); Stegall v. Housing Auth., 278 N.C. 95, 178 S.E.2d 824 (1971); State v. Brooks, 279 N.C. 45,
181 S.E.2d 553 (1971); Strickland v. Powell, 279 N.C. 183, 181 S.E.2d 464 (1971); Joyner v. Garrett, 279 N.C. 226, 182 S.E.2d 553 (1971); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
Morgan, 279 N.C. 265, 182 S.E.2d 356 (1971); Mutual Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Lanier, 279 N.C. 299, 182 S.E.2d 368 (1971); Cogdill v. North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n,
279 N.C. 313, 182 S.E.2d 373 (1971); Dr. T.C. Smith Co. v. North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n, 279 N.C. 328, 182 S.E.2d 383 (1971); State v. Allred, 279 N.C. 398,
183 S.E.2d 553 (1971); State v. Moore, 279 N.C. 455, 183 S.E.2d 546 (1971); State v. Fields, 279 N.C. 460, 183 S.E.2d 666 (1971); State v. Battle,
279 N.C. 484, 183 S.E.2d 641 (1971); State v. Allen, 279 N.C. 492, 183 S.E.2d 659 (1971); State v. Roberts, 279 N.C. 500, 183 S.E.2d 647 (1971);
State v. Smith, 279 N.C. 505, 183 S.E.2d 649 (1971); State v. Collins, 279 N.C. 508, 183 S.E.2d 549 (1971); State v. Carnes, 279 N.C. 549, 184
S.E.2d 235 (1971); State v. Gladden, 279 N.C. 566, 184 S.E.2d 249 (1971); Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 184 S.E.2d 239 (1971); State v. Richardson,
279 N.C. 621, 185 S.E.2d 102 (1971); State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 663, 185 S.E.2d 174 (1971); State v. Stimpson, 279 N.C. 716, 185 S.E.2d 168
(1971); State v. Rummage, 280 N.C. 51, 185 S.E.2d 221 (1971); State v. Jones, 280 N.C. 60, 184 S.E.2d 862 (1971); State v. Hudson, 280 N.C. 74,
185 S.E.2d 189 (1971); Sutton v. Figgatt, 280 N.C. 89, 185 S.E.2d 97 (1971); Wiggins v. Bunch, 280 N.C. 106, 184 S.E.2d 879 (1971); State v. Burleson, 280 N.C. 112,
184 S.E.2d 869 (1971); Forrester v. Garrett, 280 N.C. 117, 184 S.E.2d 858 (1971); State v. Williams, 280 N.C. 132, 184 S.E.2d 875 (1971); State v. Tart, 280 N.C. 172,
184 S.E.2d 842 (1971); State v. Allison,
280 N.C. 175, 184 S.E.2d 857 (1971); State v. Thompson, 280 N.C. 202, 185 S.E.2d 666 (1972); State v. Jones, 280 N.C. 322, 185 S.E.2d 858 (1972);
State v. Gainey, 280 N.C. 366, 185 S.E.2d 874 (1972); State v. Holden, 280 N.C. 426, 185 S.E.2d 889 (1972); State v. Ballard, 280 N.C. 479,
186 S.E.2d 372 (1972); Smith v. County of Mecklenburg, 280 N.C. 497, 187 S.E.2d 67 (1972); State v. Jackson, 280 N.C. 563, 187 S.E.2d 27 (1972); Hall v. Wake County Bd.
of Elections, 280 N.C. 600, 187 S.E.2d 52 (1972); Adams-Millis Corp. v. Town of Kernersville, 281 N.C. 147, 187 S.E.2d 704 (1972); City of Kings
Mountain v. Cline, 281 N.C. 269, 188 S.E.2d 284 (1972); In re Strong Tire Serv., Inc., 281 N.C. 293, 188 S.E.2d 306 (1972); State v. McIntyre, 281 N.C. 304,
188 S.E.2d 304 (1972); Allgood v. Town of Tarboro, 281 N.C. 430, 189 S.E.2d 255 (1972); North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n v. Farm Equip. Co., 281 N.C. 459, 189 S.E.2d 272
(1972); State v. Johnson, 282 N.C. 1, 191 S.E.2d 641 (1972); Lutz v. Gaston County Board of Educ., 282 N.C. 208, 192 S.E.2d 463 (1972); Albemarle Elec. Membership Corp.
v. Alexander, 282 N.C. 402, 192 S.E.2d 811 (1972); State v. Lee, 282 N.C. 566, 193 S.E.2d 705 (1973); State v. Underwood, 283 N.C. 154, 195
S.E.2d 489 (1973); State v. Beach, 283 N.C. 261, 196 S.E.2d 214 (1973); State v. Sawyer, 283 N.C. 289, 196 S.E.2d 250 (1973); City of Kings Mountain v. Goforth,
283 N.C. 316, 196 S.E.2d 231 (1973); Baxter v. Jones, 283 N.C. 327, 196 S.E.2d 193 (1973); State v. Braswell, 283 N.C. 332, 196 S.E.2d 185 (1973);
State v. Black, 283 N.C. 344, 196 S.E.2d 225 (1973); State v. Allen, 283 N.C. 354, 196 S.E.2d 256 (1973); Rayfield v. Clark, 283 N.C. 362, 196
S.E.2d 197 (1973); Smoky Mt. Enters., Inc. v. Rose, 283 N.C. 373, 196 S.E.2d 189 (1973); State v. Glover, 283 N.C. 379, 196 S.E.2d 207 (1973); State v. Bumgarner,
283 N.C. 388, 196 S.E.2d 210 (1973); State v. Moses, 283 N.C. 390, 196 S.E.2d 211 (1973); State v. Mitchell, 283 N.C. 462, 196 S.E.2d 736 (1973);
State v. Williams, 283 N.C. 550, 196 S.E.2d 756 (1973); State v. Eubanks, 283 N.C. 556, 196 S.E.2d 706 (1973); In re Hanes Dye & Finishing Co., 285 N.C. 598,
207 S.E.2d 729 (1974); Greene v. City of Winston-Salem, 287 N.C. 66, 213 S.E.2d 231 (1975); United Tel. Co. v. Universal Plastics, Inc., 287 N.C. 232, 214 S.E.2d 49 (1975);
State v. Hunt, 287 N.C. 360, 215 S.E.2d 40 (1975); Dean v. Carolina Coach Co., 287 N.C. 515, 215 S.E.2d 89 (1975); State v. Wortham, 287 N.C. 541,
215 S.E.2d 131 (1975); State v. Woodson, 287 N.C. 578, 215 S.E.2d 607 (1975); Pritchett v. Clapp, 288 N.C. 329, 218 S.E.2d 406 (1975); State v. McZorn, 288 N.C. 417,
219 S.E.2d 201 (1975); State v. Branch, 288 N.C. 514, 220 S.E.2d 495 (1975); Taylor v. Johnston, 289 N.C. 690, 224 S.E.2d 567 (1976); State v. Scott, 289 N.C. 712,
224 S.E.2d 185 (1976); Cedar Creek Enters., Inc. v. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 290 N.C. 450, 226 S.E.2d 336 (1976); Shore v. Edmisten, 290 N.C. 628, 227 S.E.2d 553 (1976);
Nasco Equip. Co. v. Mason, 291 N.C. 145, 229 S.E.2d 278 (1976); State v. Fair, 291 N.C. 171, 229 S.E.2d 189
(1976); State v. Boykin, 291 N.C. 264, 229 S.E.2d 914 (1976); State v. Smith, 291 N.C. 438, 230 S.E.2d 644 (1976); State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480,
231 S.E.2d 833 (1977); In re Arthur, 291 N.C. 640, 231 S.E.2d 614 (1977); Whitten v. Bob King's AMC/Jeep, Inc., 292 N.C. 84, 231 S.E.2d 891 (1977); State v. Tilley,
292 N.C. 132, 232 S.E.2d 433 (1977); State ex rel. Dorothea Dix Hosp. v. Davis, 292 N.C. 147, 232 S.E.2d 698 (1977); State v. Siler, 292 N.C. 543,
234 S.E.2d 733 (1977); State v. Willard, 292 N.C. 567, 234 S.E.2d 587 (1977); State v. McFadden, 292 N.C. 609, 234 S.E.2d 742 (1977); State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71,
265 S.E.2d 164 (1980); State v. Ward, 300 N.C. 150, 266 S.E.2d 581 (1980); In re Rogers, 300 N.C. 747, 268 S.E.2d 221 (1980); Goodman Toyota, Inc. v. City of Raleigh,
301 N.C. 84, 277 S.E.2d 690 (1980); State v. Cox, 303 N.C. 75, 277 S.E.2d 376 (1981); State v. Maher, 305 N.C. 544, 290 S.E.2d 694 (1982); Long
v. City of Charlotte, 306 N.C. 187, 293 S.E.2d 101 (1982); In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 293 S.E.2d 127 (1982); Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 306 N.C. 324,
293 S.E.2d 182 (1982); State v. Ricks, 308 N.C. 522, 302 S.E.2d 770 (1983); Pugh v. Davenport, 309 N.C. 628, 308 S.E.2d 292 (1983); Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc.,
309 N.C. 695, 309 S.E.2d 193 (1983); State v. Ysaguire, 309 N.C. 780, 309 S.E.2d 436 (1983); Barrington v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 65 N.C. App. 602, 309 S.E.2d 539 (1983); State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 319 S.E.2d 177 (1984); Mazza v. Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 311 N.C. 621, 319 S.E.2d 217 (1984); State v. McLeod,
312 N.C. 76, 320 S.E.2d 687 (1984); Winston Realty Co. v. G.H.G., Inc., 314 N.C. 90, 331 S.E.2d 677 (1985); State v. Weldon, 314 N.C. 401, 333
S.E.2d 701 (1985); Akzona, Inc. v. Southern Ry., 314 N.C. 488, 334 S.E.2d 759 (1985); State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175, 337 S.E.2d 504 (1985); Cavenaugh v. Cavenaugh,
317 N.C. 652, 347 S.E.2d 19 (1986); Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. First of Ga. Ins. Co., 340 N.C. 88, 455 S.E.2d 655 (1995); McKinney v. Richitelli, 357 N.C. 483,
586 S.E.2d 258 (2003); Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 597 S.E.2d 674 (2004); James v. Bartlett, 359 N.C. 260, 607 S.E.2d 638 (2005); Jonesboro United Methodist
Church v. Mullins-Sherman Architects, L.L.P., 359 N.C. 593, 614 S.E.2d 268 (2005); State v. Beck, 359 N.C. 611, 614 S.E.2d 274 (2005); In re R.T.W., 359 N.C. 539,
614 S.E.2d 489 (2005); State v. Cobb, 361 N.C. 414, 646 S.E.2d 365 (2007); State v. Holmes, 361 N.C. 410, 646 S.E.2d 353 (2007); State v. Cupid, 361 N.C. 417,
646 S.E.2d 348 (2007); State v. Denny, 361 N.C. 662, 652 S.E.2d 212 (2007); Carolina Bldg. Servs.' Windows & Doors, Inc. v. Boardwalk, LLC, 362 N.C. 262, 658 S.E.2d
924 (2008); Mangum v. Raleigh Bd. of Adjustment, 362 N.C. 640, 669 S.E.2d 279 (2008); Gilbert v. N.C. State Bar, 363 N.C. 70, 678 S.E.2d 602 (2009); Crocker v. Roethling,
363 N.C. 140, 675 S.E.2d 625 (2009); State v. Rollins, 363 N.C. 232, 675 S.E.2d 334 (2009); State v. Oates, 366 N.C. 264, 732 S.E.2d 571 (2012);
State v. Heien, 366 N.C. 271, 737 S.E.2d 351 (2012); White v. Trew, 366 N.C. 360,
736 S.E.2d 166 (2013); Hammond v. Saini, 367 N.C. 607, 766 S.E.2d 590 (2014); State v. Miller, 367 N.C. 702, 766 S.E.2d 289 (2014); Falk v. Fannie Mae,
367 N.C. 594, 766 S.E.2d 271 (2014); State v. Young, 368 N.C. 188, 775 S.E.2d 291 (2015); LexisNexis Risk Data Mgmt. v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 368 N.C. 180,
775 S.E.2d 651 (2015); State v. Bartlett, 368 N.C. 309, 776 S.E.2d 672 (2015); State v. Ellis, 368 N.C. 342, 776 S.E.2d 675 (2015); State v. Saldierna,
369 N.C. 401, 794 S.E.2d 474 (2016); State v. Johnson, 370 N.C. 32, 803 S.E.2d 137 (2017).
Cited in In re Delk, 336 N.C. 543, 444 S.E.2d 198; Empire Power Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 337 N.C. 569, 447 S.E.2d 768, rehearing
denied, 338 N.C. 314, 451 S.E.2d 634 (1994). Carolina Beach Fishing Pier v. Town of Carolina Beach, 274 N.C. 362, 163 S.E.2d 363 (1968); Sykes v. Clayton, 274 N.C. 398,
163 S.E.2d 775 (1968); Duke Power Co. v. Clayton, 274 N.C. 505, 164 S.E.2d 289 (1968); S.S. Kresge Co. v. Tomlinson, 275 N.C. 1, 165 S.E.2d 236 (1969); Hughes v. North Carolina
State Hwy. Comm'n, 275 N.C. 121, 165 S.E.2d 321 (1969); Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Clayton, 275 N.C. 215, 166 S.E.2d 671 (1969); State v. Core
Banks Club Properties, 275 N.C. 328, 167 S.E.2d 385 (1969); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hayes, 276 N.C. 620, 174 S.E.2d 511 (1970); Kale v. Forrest, 278 N.C. 1,
178 S.E.2d 622 (1971); State v. Winford, 278 N.C. 67, 178 S.E.2d 777 (1971); Kelly v. International Harvester Co., 278 N.C. 153, 179 S.E.2d
396 (1971); State v. Woods, 278 N.C. 210, 179 S.E.2d 358 (1971); Ervin v. Clayton, 278 N.C. 219, 179 S.E.2d 353 (1971); In re North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office,
278 N.C. 302, 180 S.E.2d 155 (1971); City of Statesville v. Bowles, 278 N.C. 497, 180 S.E.2d 111 (1971); Hendrix v. Alsop, 278 N.C. 549, 180
S.E.2d 802 (1971); In re City of New Bern, 278 N.C. 641, 180 S.E.2d 851 (1971); State v. Parker, 279 N.C. 168, 181 S.E.2d 432 (1971); Glusman v. Trustees of Univ. of N.C.
281 N.C. 629, 190 S.E.2d 213 (1972); City of Charlotte v. McNeely, 281 N.C. 684, 190 S.E.2d 179 (1972); Keiger v. Winston-Salem Bd. of Adjustment, 281 N.C. 715,
190 S.E.2d 175 (1972); Plemmer v. Matthewson, 281 N.C. 722, 190 S.E.2d 204 (1972); State v. Joyner, 286 N.C. 366, 211 S.E.2d 320 (1975); State v. Carey, 288 N.C. 254,
218 S.E.2d 387 (1975); State v. Norwood, 289 N.C. 424, 222 S.E.2d 253 (1976); State v. Dietz, 289 N.C. 488, 223 S.E.2d 357 (1976); Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick
Corp., 289 N.C. 587, 223 S.E.2d 346 (1976); In re Thomas, 290 N.C. 410, 226 S.E.2d 371 (1976); State v. Cole, 293 N.C. 328, 237 S.E.2d 814 (1977);
State v. Wills, 293 N.C. 546, 240 S.E.2d 328 (1977); Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E.2d 338 (1978); People ex rel. Duncan v. Beach,
294 N.C. 713, 242 S.E.2d 796 (1978); State v. Joyner, 295 N.C. 55, 243 S.E.2d 367 (1978); State v. Abernathy, 295 N.C. 147, 244 S.E.2d 373 (1978);
State v. Johnson, 295 N.C. 227, 244 S.E.2d 391 (1978); State v. Sanders, 295 N.C. 361, 245 S.E.2d 674 (1978); State v. Curmon, 295 N.C. 453,
245 S.E.2d 503 (1978); Board of Transp. v. Brown, 296 N.C. 250, 249 S.E.2d 803 (1978); State ex rel. Andrews v. Chateau X, Inc., 296 N.C. 251, 250 S.E.2d 603 (1979); Lloyd
v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 251 S.E.2d 843 (1979); Martin v. Bonclarken Ass'y, 296 N.C. 540, 251 S.E.2d 403 (1979); Wood v. Wood, 297 N.C. 1, 252
S.E.2d 799 (1979); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Wolfe, 297 N.C. 36, 252 S.E.2d 809 (1979); State v. McCombs, 297 N.C. 151, 253 S.E.2d 906 (1979); Blackwood
v. Cates, 297 N.C. 163, 254 S.E.2d 7 (1979); Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206, 254 S.E.2d 762 (1979); Cline v. Cline, 297 N.C. 336, 255 S.E.2d
399 (1979); State v. Joyner, 297 N.C. 349, 255 S.E.2d 390 (1979); State v. Barnes, 297 N.C. 442,
255 S.E.2d 386 (1979); Booker v. Duke Medical Ctr., 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979); State v. Lyles, 298 N.C. 179, 257 S.E.2d 410 (1979); State v. Hardy,
298 N.C. 191, 257 S.E.2d 426 (1979); Seders v. Powell, 298 N.C. 453, 259 S.E.2d 544 (1979); Campbell v. First Baptist Church, 298 N.C. 476,
259 S.E.2d 558 (1979); State v. Sanders, 298 N.C. 512, 259 S.E.2d 258 (1979); Harrington v. Collins, 298 N.C. App. 535, 259 S.E.2d 275 (1979); Rent-A-Car Co. v. Lynch,
298 N.C. 559, 259 S.E.2d 564 (1979); North Carolina State Bar v. DuMont, 298 N.C. 564, 259 S.E.2d 280 (1979); State v. Boykin, 298 N.C. 687,
259 S.E.2d 883 (1979); Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 260 S.E.2d 611 (1979); State v. Jones, 299 N.C. 103, 261 S.E.2d 1 (1980); State v. Bumgarner, 299 N.C. 113,
261 S.E.2d 105 (1980); State v. Ray, 299 N.C. 151, 261 S.E.2d 789 (1980); Woodhouse v. Board of Comm'rs, 299 N.C. 211, 261 S.E.2d 882 (1980); State v. Cronin,
299 N.C. 229, 262 S.E.2d 277 (1980); State ex rel. Child Day-Care Licensing Comm'n v. Fayetteville St. Christian School, 299 N.C. 351, 261 S.E.2d 908 (1980); Ragland v.
Moore, 299 N.C. 360, 261 S.E.2d 666 (1980); Heritage Village Church & Missionary Fellowship, Inc. v. State, 299 N.C. 399, 263 S.E.2d 726 (1980); MacDonald v. University
of N.C. 299 N.C. 457, 263 S.E.2d 578 (1980); Hudson v. Hudson, 299 N.C. 465, 263 S.E.2d 719 (1980); Davis v. McRee, 299 N.C. 498, 263 S.E.2d
604 (1980); Kavanau Real Estate Trust v. Debnam,
299 N.C. 510, 263 S.E.2d 595 (1980); State v. Williams, 299 N.C. 529, 263 S.E.2d 571 (1980); In re Annexation Ordinance, 300 N.C. 337, 266 S.E.2d
661 (1980); Weber v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 301 N.C. 83, 282 S.E.2d 228 (1980); State v. Ward, 301 N.C. 469, 272 S.E.2d 84 (1980); Tarkington v. Tarkington,
301 N.C. 502, 272 S.E.2d 99 (1980); State v. Lang, 301 N.C. 508, 272 S.E.2d 123 (1980); State v. Bass, 303 N.C. 267, 278 S.E.2d 209 (1981);
Cromer v. Cromer,
303 N.C. 307, 278 S.E.2d 518 (1981); Chateau X, Inc. v. State ex rel. Andrews, 302 N.C. 321, 275 S.E.2d 443 (1981); North Carolina Sav. & Loan League v. North Carolina
Credit Union Comm'n,
302 N.C. 458, 276 S.E.2d 404 (1981); Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., 303 N.C. 573, 281 S.E.2d 24 (1981); State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 282 S.E.2d
439 (1981); Hill v. Pinelawn Mem. Park, 304 N.C. 159, 282 S.E.2d 779 (1981); Zarn, Inc. v. Southern Ry., 304 N.C. 189, 282 S.E.2d 421 (1981); Green v. Duke Power Co.,
305 N.C. 603, 290 S.E.2d 593 (1982); Adcock v. Perry, 305 N.C. 625, 290 S.E.2d 608 (1982); State v. Jones,
305 N.C. 520, 290 S.E.2d 675 (1982); Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 290 S.E.2d 682 (1982); Deese v. Southern Lawn & Tree Expert Co., 306 N.C. 275,
293 S.E.2d 140 (1982); State v. McGraw, 306 N.C. 372, 293 S.E.2d 161 (1982); Godley v. County of Pitt, 306 N.C. 357, 293 S.E.2d 167 (1982); State v. Walden,
306 N.C. 466, 293 S.E.2d 780 (1982); In re Foreclosure of Deed of Trust Executed by Bonder, 306 N.C. 451, 293 S.E.2d 798 (1982); Hoffman v. Ryder Truck Lines,
306 N.C. 502, 293 S.E.2d 807 (1982); State v. Lombardo, 306 N.C. 594, 295 S.E.2d 399 (1982); State v. Pratt, 306 N.C. 673, 295 S.E.2d 462
(1982); Appeal of Willett,
306 N.C. 617, 295 S.E.2d 469 (1982); State v. Whitaker, 307 N.C. 115, 296 S.E.2d 273 (1982); In re Denial of Approval to Issue Hous. Bonds, 307 N.C. 52,
296 S.E.2d 281 (1982); Purdy v. Brown, 307 N.C. 93, 296 S.E.2d 459 (1982); State v. Woods, 307 N.C. 213, 297 S.E.2d 574 (1982); Henderson v. Henderson,
307 N.C. 401, 298 S.E.2d 345 (1983); State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 307 S.E.2d 339 (1983); State v. Toomer, 311 N.C. 183, 316 S.E.2d 66
(1984); Allen v. Duvall, 311 N.C. 245, 316 S.E.2d 267 (1984); Faulkner v. New Bern-Craven County Bd. of Educ., 311 N.C. 42, 316 S.E.2d 281 (1984); Middlesex Constr.
Corp. v. State ex rel. State Art Museum Bldg. Comm'n, 312 N.C. 793, 325 S.E.2d 223 (1985); Arney v. Arney, 313 N.C. 173, 326 S.E.2d 31 (1985); Plott v. Plott,
313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985); Adams v. Nelsen, 313 N.C. 442, 329 S.E.2d 322 (1985); Bryant v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 313 N.C. 362,
329 S.E.2d 333 (1985); North Carolina Dep't of Cor. v. Hill, 313 N.C. 481, 329 S.E.2d 377 (1985); Gaston County Indus. Facilities & Pollution Control Fin. Auth. v. Hope, 314 N.C. 112,
331 S.E.2d 122 (1985); In re Locklear, 314 N.C. 412, 334 S.E.2d 46 (1985); State v. Swimm, 316 N.C. 24, 340 S.E.2d 65 (1986); State v. Miller, 315 N.C. 773,
340 S.E.2d 290 (1986); Leonard v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 316 N.C. 84, 340 S.E.2d 338 (1986); City of Winston-Salem v. Cooper, 315 N.C. 702, 340 S.E.2d 366 (1986);
State v. Moore, 315 N.C. 738, 340 S.E.2d 401 (1986); State v. Riddick, 316 N.C. 127, 340 S.E.2d 422 (1986); Henry v. Edmisten, 315 N.C. 474,
340 S.E.2d 720 (1986); Beasley v. National Sav. Life Ins. Co., 316 N.C. 372, 341 S.E.2d 338 (1986); State v. Parker, 316 N.C. 295, 341 S.E.2d 555 (1986); Peoples v.
Cone Mills Corp., 316 N.C. 426, 342 S.E.2d 798 (1986); Servomation Corp. v. Hickory Constr. Co., 316 N.C. 543, 342 S.E.2d 853 (1986); Marks v. Marks, 316 N.C. 447,
342 S.E.2d 859 (1986); Maffei v. Alert Cable TV of N.C. Inc., 316 N.C. 615, 342 S.E.2d 867 (1986); Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 348 S.E.2d
782 (1986); Daniels v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 320 N.C. 669, 360 S.E.2d 772 (1987); Lawson v. Lawson, 321 N.C. 274, 362 S.E.2d 269 (1987); Abernathy v. Consolidated
Freightways, Corp., 321 N.C. 236, 362 S.E.2d 559 (1987); Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co. v. McLeod, 321 N.C. 426, 364 S.E.2d 399 (1988); Josey v. Employment Sec. Comm'n,
322 N.C. 295, 367 S.E.2d 675 (1988); State ex rel. Rohrer v. Credle, 322 N.C. 522, 369 S.E.2d 825 (1988); Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N.C. 611,
370 S.E.2d 579 (1988); State v. Hayes, 323 N.C. 306, 372 S.E.2d 704 (1988); State v. Hunt, 323 N.C. 407, 373 S.E.2d 400 (1988); State v. Alston, 323 N.C. 614,
374 S.E.2d 247 (1988); Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 323 N.C. 559, 374 S.E.2d 385 (1988); Turlington v. McLeod, 323 N.C. 591, 374 S.E.2d 394 (1988);
Lea Co. v. North Carolina Bd. of Transp., 323 N.C. 697, 374 S.E.2d 866 (1989); State ex rel. Rhodes v. Simpson, 325 N.C. 514, 385 S.E.2d 329 (1989); State ex rel. Martin
v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473 (1989); Kiser v. Kiser,
325 N.C. 502, 385 S.E.2d 487 (1989); North Carolina State Bar v. Randolph, 325 N.C. 699, 386 S.E.2d 185 (1989);
Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 388 S.E.2d 134 (1990); State v. Wise, 326 N.C. 476, 390 S.E.2d 142 (1990); McNeill v. Harnett County,
327 N.C. 552, 398 S.E.2d 475 (1990); State v. Nobles, 329 N.C. 239, 404 S.E.2d 668 (1991); State v. Rainey, 331 N.C. 259, 415 S.E.2d 337
(1992); Holloway v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 333 N.C. 94, 423 S.E.2d 752 (1992); Wireways, Inc. v. Mitek Indus., Inc., 333 N.C. 253, 424 S.E.2d 384 (1993); Brantley
v. Starling, 336 N.C. 567, 444 S.E.2d 170 (1994); State v. Farris, 336 N.C. 552, 444 S.E.2d 182 (1994); Forsyth Mem. Hosp. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc.,
336 N.C. 438, 444 S.E.2d 423 (1994); DOT v. Overton, 336 N.C. 598, 444 S.E.2d 448 (1994); State v. McCarroll,
336 N.C. 559, 445 S.E.2d 18 (1994); Hales v. North Carolina Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 337 N.C. 329, 445 S.E.2d 590 (1994); Nissan Div. of Nissan Motor Corp. in United States
v. Fred Anderson Nissan, 337 N.C. 424, 445 S.E.2d 600 (1994); In re Ward, 337 N.C. 443, 446 S.E.2d 40 (1994); State v. Horn, 337 N.C. 449,
446 S.E.2d 52 (1994); Hickman ex rel. Womble v. McKoin, 337 N.C. 460, 446 S.E.2d 80 (1994); Moss v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 337 N.C. 315, 446 S.E.2d 799 (1994); Ragan
v. Hill, 337 N.C. 667, 447 S.E.2d 371 (1994); Brown v. O'Toole, 337 N.C. 686, 447 S.E.2d 381 (1994); Hargett v. Holland, 337 N.C. 651, 447
S.E.2d 784 (1994); Bowden v. Latta, 337 N.C. 794, 448 S.E.2d 503 (1994); Best v. Duke Univ., 337 N.C. 742, 448 S.E.2d 506 (1994); State v. Hauser,
342 N.C. 382, 464 S.E.2d 443 (1995); State v. Marr, 342 N.C. 607, 467 S.E.2d 236 (1996); Associated Mechanical Contractors v. Payne, 342 N.C. 825,
467 S.E.2d 398 (1996); Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 467 S.E.2d 615 (1996); Crowell Constructors, Inc. v. State, 342 N.C. 838, 467 S.E.2d 675 (1996);
State v. Dellinger, 343 N.C. 93, 468 S.E.2d 218 (1996); Edward Valves, Inc. v. Wake County, 343 N.C. 426, 471 S.E.2d 342 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1112, 117 S.
Ct. 952, 136 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1997); Collins v. North Carolina Parole Comm'n, 344 N.C. 179, 473 S.E.2d 1 (1996); State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 146, 478 S.E.2d 188 (1996);
Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1997); Tise v. Yates Constr. Co., 345 N.C. 456, 480 S.E.2d 677 (1997); State v. Rogers, 346 N.C. 262, 485 S.E.2d 619 (1997);
State v. Smith, 346 N.C. 794, 488 S.E.2d 210 (1997); Leahy v. North Carolina Bd. of Nursing, 346 N.C. 775, 488 S.E.2d 245 (1997); Krauss v. Wayne County Dep't of Social
Servs., 347 N.C. 371, 493 S.E.2d 428 (1997); Whitfield v. Gilchrist, 348 N.C. 39, 497 S.E.2d 412 (1998); State v. Pearson, 348 N.C. 272,
498 S.E.2d 599 (1998); Poole v. Copland, Inc., 348 N.C. 260, 498 S.E.2d 602 (1998); City of Charlotte v. Cook, 348 N.C. 222, 498 S.E.2d 605 (1998); Elliott v. North
Carolina Psychology Bd., 348 N.C. 230, 498 S.E.2d 616 (1998); Farmah v. Farmah, 348 N.C. 586, 500 S.E.2d 662 (1998); Briley v. Farabow, 348 N.C. 537,
501 S.E.2d 649 (1998); Bethania Town Lot Comm. v. City of Winston-Salem, 348 N.C. 664, 502 S.E.2d 360 (1998); State v. Helms, 348 N.C. 578, 504 S.E.2d 293 (1998); State
v. Ruff, 349 N.C. 213, 505 S.E.2d 579 (1998); State v. Malette, 350 N.C. 52,
509 S.E.2d 776 (1999); Frye Regional Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Hunt, 350 N.C. 39, 510 S.E.2d 159 (1999); State v. Hayes, 350 N.C. 79, 511 S.E.2d 302 (1999); Parish
v. Hill, 350 N.C. 231, 513 S.E.2d 547 (1999); Bailey v. North Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 353 N.C. 142, 540 S.E.2d 313 (2000); Craig v. County of Chatham, 356 N.C. 40,
565 S.E.2d 172 (2002); Morris Communs. Corp. v. City of Asheville, 356 N.C. 103, 565 S.E.2d 70 (2002); State v. Hearst,
356 N.C. 132, 567 S.E.2d 124 (2002); Deadwood, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue, 356 N.C. 407, 572 S.E.2d 103 (2002); N.C. State Bar v. Talford,
356 N.C. 626, 576 S.E.2d 305 (2003); Owenby v. Young, 357 N.C. 142, 579 S.E.2d 264 (2003); Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield,
357 N.C. 170, 581 S.E.2d 415 (2003); Whitaker v. Town of Scotland Neck, 357 N.C. 552, 597 S.E.2d 665 (2003); In re Investigation of the Death of Miller,
357 N.C. 316, 584 S.E.2d 772 (2003); Whitacre P'ship v. BioSignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 591 S.E.2d 870 (2004); N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll,
358 N.C. 649, 599 S.E.2d 888 (2004); Register v. White, 358 N.C. 691, 599 S.E.2d 549 (2004); State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554, 614 S.E.2d 479
(2005); State v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 359 N.C. 763, 618 S.E.2d 219 (2005); State v. Jones, 359 N.C. 832, 616 S.E.2d 496 (2005); State v. Blackwell, 359 N.C. 814,
618 S.E.2d 213 (2005); In re Anderson, 360 N.C. 271, 624 S.E.2d 626 (2006); Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 628 S.E.2d 1 (2006); In re J.S.L.,
177 N.C. App. 151, 628 S.E.2d 387 (2006); In re A.K., 360 N.C. 449, 628 S.E.2d 753 (2006); Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners Ass'n, 360 N.C. 547,
633 S.E.2d 78 (2006); State v. McKinney, 361 N.C. 53, 637 S.E.2d 868 (2006); DOT v. M.M. Fowler, Inc., 361 N.C. 1, 637 S.E.2d 885 (2006); State v. Hinton, 361 N.C. 207,
639 S.E.2d 437 (2007); State v. Lasiter, 361 N.C. 299, 643 S.E.2d 909 (2007); State v. Agnew,
361 N.C. 333, 643 S.E.2d 581 (2007); State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 648 S.E.2d 819 (2007); Gore v. Myrtle/Mueller, 362 N.C. 27, 653 S.E.2d
400 (2007); State v. Gillespie, 362 N.C. 150, 655 S.E.2d 355 (2008); State v. Whaley, 362 N.C. 156, 655 S.E.2d 388 (2008); Wake Cares, Inc. v. Wake County Bd. of Educ.,
190 N.C. App. 1, 660 S.E.2d 217 (2008), aff'd, 363 N.C. 165, 675 S.E.2d 345 (2009)
State v. Facyson, 367 N.C. 454, 758 S.E.2d 359 (2014); DocRx, Inc. v. EMI Servs. of N.C. 367 N.C. 371, 758 S.E.2d 390 (2014); State v. Murchison, 367 N.C. 461, 758 S.E.2d 356 (2014); King v. Town of Chapel Hill, 367 N.C. 400, 758 S.E.2d 364 (2014); In re Adoption of S.D.W., 367 N.C. 386, 758 S.E.2d 374 (2014); State v. Pennell, 367 N.C. 466, 758 S.E.2d 383 (2014); Bynum v. Wilson County, 367 N.C. 355, 758 S.E.2d 643 (2014); State v. Verkerk, 367 N.C. 483, 758 S.E.2d 387 (2014); Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. Gray, 369 N.C. 1, 789 S.E.2d 445 (2016); E. Carolina Reg'l Hous. Auth. v. Lofton, 369 N.C. 8, 789 S.E.2d 449 (2016); Quality Built Homes, Inc. v. Town of Carthage, 369 N.C. 15, 789 S.E.2d 454 (2016).
Brown v. Ellis, 363 N.C. 360, 678 S.E.2d 222 (June 18, 2009); In re Summons Issued to Ernst & Young, LLP, 363 N.C. 612, 684 S.E.2d 151 (2009); Baxter v. Danny Nicholson, Inc., 363 N.C. 829, 690 S.E.2d 265 (2010); N.C. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Bd. of Trs. of Guilford Tech. Cmty. College, 364 N.C. 102, 691 S.E.2d 694 (2010); In re D.S., 364 N.C. 184, 694 S.E.2d 758 (2010); Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 364 N.C. 195, 695 S.E.2d 442 (June 17, 2010); In re D.L.H., 364 N.C. 214, 694 S.E.2d 753 (June 17, 2010); State v. Tanner, 364 N.C. 229, 695 S.E.2d 97 (June 17, 2010); Sisk v. Transylvania Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 364 N.C. 172, 695 S.E.2d 429 (June 17, 2010); In re J.A.G., 206 N.C. App. 318, 696 S.E.2d 809 (2010); State v. Ray, 364 N.C. 272, 697 S.E.2d 319 (Aug. 27, 2010); N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sadler, 365 N.C. 178, 711 S.E.2d 114 (2011); Underwood v. Underwood, 365 N.C. 235, 717 S.E.2d 361 (2011); Conner v. N.C. Council of State, 365 N.C. 242, 716 S.E.2d 836 (2011); Cummings v. Ortega, 365 N.C. 262, 716 S.E.2d 235 (2011); State v. Nabors, 365 N.C. 306, 718 S.E.2d 623 (2011); Stark v. Ford Motor Co., 365 N.C. 468, 723 S.E.2d 753 (2012); State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 723 S.E.2d 326 (2012); In re P.D.R., 365 N.C. 533, 723 S.E.2d 335 (2012); State v. Lewis, 365 N.C. 488, 724 S.E.2d 492 (2012); State v. Beckelheimer, 366 N.C. 127, 726 S.E.2d 156 (2012); State v. Moore, 366 N.C. 100, 726 S.E.2d 168 (2012); State v. Towe, 366 N.C. 56, 732 S.E.2d 564 (2012); Lanvale Props., LLC v. County of Cabarrus, 366 N.C. 142, 731 S.E.2d 800 (2012); Estate of Williams v. Pasquotank County Parks & Rec. Dep't, 366 N.C. 195, 732 S.E.2d 137 (2012); High Rock Lake Partners, LLC v. N.C. DOT, 366 N.C. 315, 735 S.E.2d 300 (2012); In re Foreclosure of a Deed of Trust Executed by Bass, 366 N.C. 464, 738 S.E.2d 173 (2013); State v. Griffin, 366 N.C. 473, 749 S.E.2d 444 (2013); State v. Carter, 366 N.C. 496, 739 S.E.2d 548 (2013); State v. Brent, 367 N.C. 73, 743 S.E.2d 152 (2013); State v. Craven, 367 N.C. 51, 744 S.E.2d 458 (2013); State v. Williams, 367 N.C. 64, 744 S.E.2d 125 (2013); State v. Ortiz-Zape, 367 N.C. 1, 743 S.E.2d 156 (2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 2660, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 3730, 189 L. Ed. 2d 208 (U.S. 2014); Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 367 N.C. 81, 747 S.E.2d 220 (2013); HCW Ret. & Fin. Servs., LLC v. HCW Emple. Ben. Servs., LLC, 367 N.C. 104, 747 S.E.2d 236 (2013).
State v. Stokes, 367 N.C. 474, 756 S.E.2d 32 (2014); Beroth Oil Co. v. N.C. DOT, 367 N.C. 333, 757 S.E.2d 466 (2014);.
Lunsford v. Mills, 367 N.C. 618, 766 S.E.2d 297 (2014); State v. Banks, 367 N.C. 652, 766 S.E.2d 334 (2014); Ward v. Carmona, 368 N.C. 35, 770 S.E.2d 70 (2015); Hart v. State, 368 N.C. 122, 774 S.E.2d 281 (2015); State v. Triplett, 368 N.C. 172, 775 S.E.2d 805 (2015); In re R.R.N., 368 N.C. 167, 775 S.E.2d 656 (2015); State v. McKinney, 368 N.C. 161, 775 S.E.2d 821 (2015); Lassiter v. N.C. Baptist Hosps., Inc., 368 N.C. 367, 778 S.E.2d 68 (2015); Wetherington v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 368 N.C. 583, 780 S.E.2d 543 (2015); State v. Winkler, 368 N.C. 572, 780 S.E.2d 824 (2015); High Point Bank & Trust Co. v. Highmark Props., LLC, 368 N.C. 301, 776 S.E.2d 838 (2015); Needham v. Price, 368 N.C. 563, 780 S.E.2d 549 (2015); Arnesen v. Rivers Edge Golf Club & Plantation, Inc., 368 N.C. 440, 781 S.E.2d 1 (2015); State v. Williams, 368 N.C. 620, 781 S.E.2d 268 (2016); Young v. Bailey, 368 N.C. 665, 781 S.E.2d 277 (2016); Irving v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 368 N.C. 609, 781 S.E.2d 282 (2016); State v. Crockett, 368 N.C. 717, 782 S.E.2d 878 (2016); State v. Barnett, 368 N.C. 710, 782 S.E.2d 885 (2016); In re N.T., 368 N.C. 705, 782 S.E.2d 502 (2016); State v. Spivey, 368 N.C. 739, 782 S.E.2d 872 (2016); State v. Miller, 368 N.C. 729, 783 S.E.2d 194 (2016); State v. Snead, 368 N.C. 811, 783 S.E.2d 733 (2016); State v. Ross, 369 N.C. 393, 794 S.E.2d 289 (2016); State v. Moir, 369 N.C. 370, 794 S.E.2d 685 (2016); Turner v. Thomas, 369 N.C. 419, 794 S.E.2d 439 (2016); Fisher v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 369 N.C. 202, 794 S.E.2d 699 (2016); State v. Floyd, 369 N.C. 329, 794 S.E.2d 460 (2016); State v. Dalton, 369 N.C. 311, 794 S.E.2d 485 (2016); State v. Juarez, 369 N.C. 351, 794 S.E.2d 293 (2016); State v. Barnett, 369 N.C. 298, 794 S.E.2d 306 (2016); City of Asheville v. State, 369 N.C. 80, 794 S.E.2d 759 (2016); King v. Bryant, 369 N.C. 451, 795 S.E.2d 340 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 314, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6038, 199 L. Ed. 2d 233 (U.S. 2017); State v. Walston, 369 N.C. 547, 798 S.E.2d 741 (2017); United Cmty. Bank (Ga.) v. Wolfe, 369 N.C. 555, 799 S.E.2d 269 (2017); State v. Godwin, 369 N.C. 605, 800 S.E.2d 47 (2017); State v. Miller, 369 N.C. 658, 800 S.E.2d 400 (2017); State v. Holloman, 369 N.C. 615, 799 S.E.2d 824 (2017); State v. Romano, 369 N.C. 678, 800 S.E.2d 644 (2017); State v. Campbell, 369 N.C. 599, 799 S.E.2d 600 (2017); United States Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Pinkney, 369 N.C. 723, 800 S.E.2d 412 (2017); State v. McKiver, 369 N.C. 652, 799 S.E.2d 851 (2017); State v. Jones, 369 N.C. 631, 800 S.E.2d 54 (2017); State v. Baker, 369 N.C. 586, 799 S.E.2d 816 (2017); Wilkes v. City of Greenville, 369 N.C. 730, 799 S.E.2d 838 (2017); Fid. Bank v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue, 370 N.C. 10, 803 S.E.2d 142 (2017);.
DOT v. Adams Outdoor Adver. of Charlotte Ltd. P'ship, 370 N.C. 101, 804 S.E.2d 486 (2017); Catawba Cty. v. Loggins, 370 N.C. 83, 804 S.E.2d 474 (2017); State v. Campbell,
373 N.C. 216, 835 S.E.2d 844 (2019).
§ 7A-31.1. Discretionary Review by the Court of Appeals.
- In the case of a court-martial in which appeal is taken to the Wake County Superior Court under G.S. 127A-62, the Court of Appeals may, in its discretion, on motion of any party to the cause or on its own motion, certify the cause for review by the Court of Appeals after it has been reviewed by the Wake County Superior Court. The effect of such certification is to transfer the cause from the Wake County Superior Court to the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals reviews the decision by the Wake County Superior Court.
-
In causes subject to certification under subsection (a) of this section, certification may be made by the Court of Appeals after determination of the cause by the Wake County Superior Court when in the opinion of the Court of Appeals:
- The subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest, or
- The cause involves legal principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the State, or
- The decision of the Wake County Superior Court appears likely to be in conflict with a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.
- Any rules for practice and procedure for review of courts-martial that may be required shall be prescribed pursuant to G.S. 7A-33.
Interlocutory determinations by the Wake County Superior Court, including orders remanding the cause for a new trial or for other proceedings, shall be certified for review by the Court of Appeals only upon a determination by the Court of Appeals that failure to certify would cause a delay in final adjudication which would probably result in substantial harm.
History
(2010-193, s. 20.)
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2010-193, s. 23 provides: "Prosecutions for offenses committed before the effective date of this act are not abated or affected by this act, and the statutes that would be applicable but for this act remain applicable to those prosecutions."
Session Laws 2010-193, s. 24, makes this section effective December 1, 2010, and applicable to offenses committed on or after that date.
§ 7A-32. Power of Supreme Court and Court of Appeals to issue remedial writs.
- The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction, exercisable by any one of the justices or judges of the respective courts, to issue the writ of habeas corpus upon the application of any person described in G.S. 17-3, according to the practice and procedure provided therefor in chapter 17 of the General Statutes, and to rule of the Supreme Court.
- The Supreme Court has jurisdiction, exercisable by one justice or by such number of justices as the court may by rule provide, to issue the prerogative writs, including mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and supersedeas, in aid of its own jurisdiction or in exercise of its general power to supervise and control the proceedings of any of the other courts of the General Court of Justice. The practice and procedure shall be as provided by statute or rule of the Supreme Court, or, in the absence of statute or rule, according to the practice and procedure of the common law.
- The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, exercisable by one judge or by such number of judges as the Supreme Court may by rule provide, to issue the prerogative writs, including mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and supersedeas, in aid of its own jurisdiction, or to supervise and control the proceedings of any of the trial courts of the General Court of Justice, and of the Utilities Commission and the Industrial Commission. The practice and procedure shall be as provided by statute or rule of the Supreme Court, or, in the absence of statute or rule, according to the practice and procedure of the common law.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1.)
Legal Periodicals. - For 1984 survey, "Double Jeopardy and Substantial Rights in North Carolina Appeals," see 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1061 (1985).
For 1984 survey of appellate procedure, "Appellate Rule 16(b) and New Requirements for Appeals of Right," see 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1074 (1985).
CASE NOTES
Jurisdiction. - Appellate court had jurisdiction to grant defendant petition for a writ of certiorari where G.S. 7A-32(c) gave the court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its own jurisdiction, and thus, N.C. R. App. P. 21 could not take that jurisdiction away. State v. Posner, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Apr. 20, 2021).
The Court of Appeals is authorized to treat an appeal as a petition for a writ of certiorari in order to clarify its position. Jerson v. Jerson, 68 N.C. App. 738, 315 S.E.2d 522 (1984).
Appellate court could exercise its discretion to treat pro se defendant's appeal as a petition for certiorari and grant the writ to address the merits of defendant's appeal for speeding and failure to produce a driver's license where defendant failed to include in the record on appeal a copy of the district court judgment establishing the derivative jurisdiction of the superior court. State v. Phillips, 149 N.C. App. 310, 560 S.E.2d 852, appeal dismissed, 355 N.C. 499, 564 S.E.2d 230 (2002).
Because the court of appeals did not state the procedure for review, the trial court did not enter an appealable order, and defendant did not seek entry of such an order by mandamus, defendant was not entitled to appeal as a matter of right; however, defendant petitioned for review by certiorari, and the court of appeals granted his petition for writ of certiorari in its discretion. State v. Watkins, 246 N.C. App. 725, 783 S.E.2d 279 (2016).
Court of appeals elected to treat defendant's appeal as a petition for certiorari because, while the district court's judgment and the notice of appeal to the superior court therefrom were not included in the record on appeal, a district court proceeding
was in fact alluded to in the record; the district court's order indicated that defendant was found guilty of driving while impaired (DWI), although the DWI judgment was not attached or included in the record; and the State did
not dispute that the superior court had jurisdiction. State v. McNeil, 262 N.C. App. 497, 822 S.E.2d 317 (2018), review dismissed, State v. Myers-McNeil, 372 N.C. 718,
831 S.E.2d 88, 2019 N.C. LEXIS 827 (2019), cert. dismissed, 372 N.C. 718, 831 S.E.2d 91, 2019 N.C. LEXIS 831 (2019), cert. denied, 206 L. Ed. 2d 827, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 2267 (U.S. 2020).
Appeal Treated As Petition for Certiorari. - Defendant's notice was deficient and defendant failed to properly preserve the right to appeal because, although defendant timely filed written notice of appeal, the notice attempted to appeal the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence instead of the judgment underlying defendant's convictions. Nonetheless, the appellate court treated defendant's appeal as a petition for certiorari and granted the writ to address the merits of the appeal. State v. Horton, 264 N.C. App. 711, 826 S.E.2d 770 (2019).
Although defendant did not follow the correct procedure for appealing the entry of a civil judgment ordering defendant to pay attorney's fees, the appellate court granted defendant's petition for writ of certiorari, and thereby obtained jurisdiction to consider the merits of defendant's appeal even if defendant's right to appeal the judgment was lost by failure to take timely action. State v. Mangum, - N.C. App. - , 840 S.E.2d 862 (2020).
Appeal Dismissed But Arguments Reviewed. - Record on appeal lacked copies of the juvenile petitions purportedly filed and, thus, the record failed to demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter; because the record was silent with regard to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, the respondents' appeal was dismissed, but pursuant to the court's discretionary authority, the court elected to review their arguments on appeal by writ of certiorari. In re J.C.M.J.C., - N.C. App. - , 834 S.E.2d 670 (2019).
Guilty Plea. - Defendant's appeal asserting a guilty plea was not the product of an informed choice when a plea agreement's terms were contradictory was dismissed because (1) defendant had no statutory right to appeal the issue, (2) the issue was not listed in N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1) as one eligible for review pursuant to a writ of certiorari, nor (3) was it appropriate to invoke N.C. R. App. P. 2 to suspend the requirements of N.C. R. App. P. 21, as defendant showed no "exceptional circumstances," since defendant received a sentence consistent with defendant's guilty plea, acknowledgement of an aggravating factor, and understanding the sentence rested within the trial court's discretion. State v. Biddix, 244 N.C. App. 482, 780 S.E.2d 863 (2015).
Appellate court could grant defendant review by a writ of certiorari after pleading guilty because, while defendant's appeal raised no issue for which an appeal of right was afforded, (1) N.C. Const. art. IV,
§
12(2) let the General Assembly prescribe the court's jurisdiction, (2) G.S. 7A-32(c) gave the court broad powers to control trial court proceedings, (3) G.S. 15A-1444(e) had no limiting language, and (4) N.C. R. App.
P. 21 could not limit defendant's statutory right to seek the writ. State v. Jones, 253 N.C. App. 789, 802 S.E.2d 518 (2017).
Although the State cannot appeal from a verdict of not guilty, it may seek a writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to set aside action taken in excess of its authority. State v. Surles, 55 N.C. App. 179, 284 S.E.2d 738 (1981), cert. denied, 305 N.C. 307, 290 S.E.2d 707 (1982).
The State's attempted appeal of a district court's action in setting aside guilty verdicts in a misdemeanor case entered by it five months previously and entering verdicts of not guilty would be treated as a petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to
subsection (c) of this section and N.C.R.A.P., Rule 22. State v. Surles, 55 N.C. App. 179, 284 S.E.2d 738 (1981), cert. denied, 305 N.C. 307, 290
S.E.2d 707 (1982).
Writ of Certiorari Lawfully Issued. - Court of appeals lawfully issued a writ of certiorari after a trial court granted its own motion for appropriate relief because there was a conspicuous absence of any mention in G.S. 15A-1422 of either G.S. 15A-1420(d)
or sua sponte motions; the absence of limiting language regarding review of sua sponte motions meant the jurisdiction prescribed by G.S. 7A-32(c) remained unchanged, and the court of appeals had subject matter jurisdiction to issue
the writ. State v. Thomsen, 369 N.C. 22, 789 S.E.2d 639 (2016).
Jurisdiction When State Appeals. - Appeal of the motion for appropriate relief would have fallen under the statute section by writ of certiorari; given that the state constitution authorizes the General Assembly to define the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals to supervise and control trial court proceedings, and there no limiting language regarding which party may appeal a ruling on a motion for appropriate relief, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear an appeal by
the State of a motion for appropriate relief when the defendant won relief, and while the appellate rule might appear to limit the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, the rules cannot take away jurisdiction given by the General
Assembly. State v. Stubbs, 368 N.C. 40, 770 S.E.2d 74 (2015).
Appeal by Trustees of Charitable Trust. - Although an appeal by the trustees of a charitable trust was subject to dismissal on the ground that there were no parties aggrieved by the order of the superior court modifying the trust, the Court of Appeals
nonetheless could consider the appeal, in the exercise of its supervisory power, where the order would affect the interests of a substantial number of public and private hospitals in the State, as well as thousands of persons who
would be hospitalized as charity patients. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Morgan, 9 N.C. App. 460, 176 S.E.2d 860 (1970).
Adequate Foundation Requires Physical Evidence to Show Abuse. - Writ of certiorari was granted because an inmate was not entitled to relief under G.S. 15A-1415(b)(7), as there had been no significant change in law regarding expert opinion evidence since
defendant's convictions; cases simply applied the existing law on expert opinion evidence, which was that before expert testimony may have been admitted under G.S. 8C-1-702, an adequate foundation had to be laid, and for expert
testimony presenting a definitive diagnosis of sexual abuse, an adequate foundation required supporting physical evidence of the abuse. State v. Chandler, 364 N.C. 313, 697 S.E.2d
327 (Aug. 27, 2010).
Exercise of Discretionary Duties by Public Official. - Neither mandamus nor a mandatory injunction may be issued to control the manner of a public official's exercise of a discretionary duty. White v. Pate, 58 N.C. App. 402, 293 S.E.2d 601 (1982), modified, 308 N.C. 759, 304 S.E.2d 199 (1983).
Review of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings. - Under N.C. Const., Art. IV,
§
12 and this section, the courts of the appellate division have power to review judicial disciplinary proceedings whether the attorney or the State has prevailed in the trial court. In re Palmer, 296 N.C. 638,
252 S.E.2d 784 (1979).
Review of Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings. - Court of Appeals of North Carolina lacked jurisdiction to hear the State Bar of North Carolina's appeal of a grant of summary judgment to an attorney in a disciplinary proceeding because G.S. 84-28(h) provided
no appeal from a final order that did not impose discipline, and in the instant case no discipline had been imposed; further, certiorari was inappropriate because the case did not fall within the rubric of N.C. R. App. P. 21(a)(1)
and the court declined to suspend the requirement of Rule 21(a)(1) using N.C. R. App. P. 2. N.C. State Bar v. Rudisill, 159 N.C. App. 704, 583 S.E.2d 413 (2003).
State Must Seek Review of Disciplinary Proceedings by Writ of Certiorari. - The State may seek review by the appellate division of proceedings disciplining attorneys under the judicial method. However, the State may not appeal in such cases as a matter
of right, but must seek appellate review by petition for writ of certiorari. In re Palmer, 296 N.C. 638, 252 S.E.2d 784 (1979).
Relief Where Issue Not Presented in Brief. - Plaintiff 's failure to present and argue in its brief to the Court of Appeals the propriety of the trial court's judgment as to attorneys' fees precluded plaintiff from obtaining relief on this point in the
Court of Appeals as a matter of right; however, the Court of Appeals, in the exercise of its general supervisory powers under subsection (c) of this section or pursuant to N.C.R.A.P., Rule 2, could consider on its own initiative
the question of the attorneys' fees award and give relief as a matter of appellate grace. Stillwell Enters., Inc. v. Interstate Equip. Co., 300 N.C. 286, 266 S.E.2d 812 (1980).
Or When Counsel Fails to Follow Statutory Procedures. - Even though counsel employed by defendant failed to follow the statutory procedure for appealing to the Court of Appeals, because of the important issues raised by the appeal, defendant's petition
for writ of certiorari, pursuant to G.S. 7A-32(c), and pursuant to N.C.R.A.P., Rule 21, was allowed. State v. Hamrick, 110 N.C. App. 60, 428 S.E.2d 830, appeal dismissed, cert.
denied, 334 N.C. 436, 433 S.E.2d 181 (1993).
Writ Issued Despite Plaintiffs' Failure to Petition for One. - Court exercised its discretion to issue a writ of certiorari in this case, ignoring plaintiffs' failure to petition for one, as there were wide-reaching issues of justice and liberty at stake and plaintiffs' issues on appeal were meritorious; specifically, the lawsuit alleged serious misconduct and abuse of power by the government in violation of both the U.S. Constitution and the state's common law. Doe v. City of Charlotte, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Aug. 18, 2020).
The authority of a superior court to grant a writ of certiorari pursuant to Gen. Rules Prac., Rule 19 in appropriate cases is analogous to the Court of Appeals' power to issue a writ of certiorari pursuant to G.S. 7A-32(c). State v. Hamrick, 110 N.C. App. 60, 428 S.E.2d 830, appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 334 N.C. 436, 433 S.E.2d 181 (1993).
Motion to dismiss an interlocutory appeal of the denial of healthcare providers' motion to dismiss an administrator's wrongful death complaint was denied because the healthcare providers' petition for a writ of certiorari was granted. Reid v. Cole,
187 N.C. App. 261, 652 S.E.2d 718 (2007).
Denial of Class Certification Review Appropriate. - Although a trial court's denial of class certification was an interlocutory order, appellate review was justified where the number of tobacco support price program members exceeded 800,000, and thus,
the case's subject matter implicated a public interest to large degree and supervisory authority was appropriate under G.S. 7A-32(b)(2015). Fisher v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 369 N.C. 202,
794 S.E.2d 699 (2016).
Appellate Court Should Have Exercised Jurisdiction. - While the Court of Appeals correctly acknowledged that it had jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari, it mistakenly concluded that the absence of a specific "procedural process" in the Rules
of Appellate Procedure left the court without authority to invoke that jurisdiction. State v. Ledbetter, 371 N.C. 192, 814 S.E.2d 39 (2018), appeal dismissed, 261 N.C. App. 71, 819 S.E.2d 591, 2018 N.C. App. LEXIS (2018).
No Final Order to Review. - Where the only orders which had been were orders entered by a claims examiner and by a deputy commissioner, no final order or award had been entered by the Industrial Commission itself, and thus, the Commission had taken no action for the Court of Appeals to review, and the issuance of a writ of certiorari was improper. Martin v. Piedmont Asphalt & Paving, 337 N.C. 785, 448 S.E.2d 380 (1994).
Water and sewer processing facilities part-owner's appeal of interlocutory orders of the North Carolina Utilities Commission holding that the part-owner was a public utility under G.S. 62-3(23)a.2 and was subject to the Commission's jurisdiction was dismissed
as the absence of any exceptions to G.S. 62-90 or G.S. 7A-29, allowing review of interlocutory orders of the Commission, required the appellate court to conclude that it had no jurisdiction to consider appeals of interlocutory
orders of the Commission; further, the appellate court did not have authority under subsection (c) of this section to review the part-owner's issues as there was no final order of the Commission. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v.
Buck Island, Inc., 158 N.C. App. 536, 581 S.E.2d 122 (2003).
Sentence Reduction. - When defendant was granted relief, under G.S. 15A-1415, from 50-year sentences, an appellate court could grant the State's certiorari petition, under G.S. 7A-32(c), because, under G.S. 15A-1422(c)(3), the appeal time had expired
and no appeal was pending, and granting the petition was necessary to "supervise and control" the trial court. State v. Wilkerson, 232 N.C. App. 482, 753 S.E.2d 829 (2014).
Applied in City of Charlotte v. McNeely, 281 N.C. 684, 190 S.E.2d 179 (1972); Stanback v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 215 S.E.2d 30 (1975); State v. Strickland, 290 N.C. 169,
225 S.E.2d 531 (1976); In re Thomas, 290 N.C. 410, 226 S.E.2d 371 (1976); Crumpton v. Crumpton, 290 N.C. 651, 227 S.E.2d 587 (1976); Ziglar v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours &
Co., 53 N.C. App. 147, 280 S.E.2d 510 (1981); Department of Social Servs. v. Johnson, 70 N.C. App. 383, 320 S.E.2d 301 (1984); Coleman v. Interstate Cas. Ins. Co.,
84 N.C. App. 268, 352 S.E.2d 249 (1987); State v. Dudley, 319 N.C. 656, 356 S.E.2d 361 (1987); State v. Freeman, 319 N.C. 609, 356 S.E.2d 765
(1987); Mack v. Moore,
91 N.C. App. 478, 372 S.E.2d 314 (1988); Garris v. Garris, 92 N.C. App. 467, 374 S.E.2d 638 (1988); Phelps v. Phelps, 337 N.C. 344, 446 S.E.2d
17, rehearing denied, 337 N.C. 807, 449 S.E.2d 750 (1994); In re Robinson, 120 N.C. App. 874, 464 S.E.2d 86 (1995); Concrete Mach. Co. v. City of Hickory,
134 N.C. App. 91, 517 S.E.2d 155 (1999); Frost v. Mazda Motor of Am., 353 N.C. 188, 540 S.E.2d 324 (2000); Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 157 N.C. App. 596, 580 S.E.2d 46, cert. denied, 357 N.C. 507, 587 S.E.2d 674 (2003); Newcomb v. County of Carteret, 207 N.C. App. 527, 701 S.E.2d 325 (2010), review denied
365 N.C. 212, 710 S.E.2d 26, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 474 (N.C. 2011).
Cited in State v. Flynt, 8 N.C. App. 323, 174 S.E.2d 120 (1970); North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau v. Ingram, 29 N.C. App. 338, 224 S.E.2d 229 (1976); Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E.2d 338 (1978); Craver v. Craver, 298 N.C. 231, 258 S.E.2d 357 (1979); Bailey v. Gooding, 301 N.C. 205, 270 S.E.2d 431 (1980); Industrotech Constructors, Inc. v. Duke Univ., 67 N.C. App. 741, 314 S.E.2d 272 (1984); Elks v. Hannan, 68 N.C. App. 757, 315 S.E.2d 553 (1984); Nobles v. First Carolina Communications, Inc., 108 N.C. App. 127, 423 S.E.2d 312 (1992); Martin v. Piedmont Asphalt & Paving Co., 113 N.C. App. 121, 437 S.E.2d 696 (1993); State v. Gary, 348 N.C. 510, 501 S.E.2d 57 (1998); State v. Lee, 348 N.C. 474, 501 S.E.2d 334 (1998); Stem v. Richardson, 350 N.C. 76, 511 S.E.2d 1 (1999); State v. Goode, 350 N.C. 247, 512 S.E.2d 414 (1999); Robinson, Bradshaw & Hinson, P.A. v. Smith, 139 N.C. App. 1, 532 S.E.2d 815 (2000); In re Voight, 138 N.C. App. 542, 530 S.E.2d 76 (2000); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol. v. Durham Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 141 N.C. App. 569, 541 S.E.2d 157 (2000), cert. denied, 353 N.C. 370, 547 S.E.2d 433 (2001); Gibson v. Mena, 144 N.C. App. 125, 548 S.E.2d 745 (2001); State v. Featherson, 145 N.C. App. 134, 548 S.E.2d 828 (2001); In re Braithwaite, 150 N.C. App. 434, 562 S.E.2d 897 (2002), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 162, 568 S.E.2d 187 (2002); In re Will of McCauley, 356 N.C. 91, 565 S.E.2d 88 (2002); Staton v. Russell, 151 N.C. App. 1, 565 S.E.2d 103 (2002); State v. Wilson, 151 N.C. App. 219, 565 S.E.2d 223 (2002), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 313, 571 S.E.2d 215 (2002); Powell v. Bulluck, 155 N.C. App. 613, 573 S.E.2d 699 (2002); State v. Hunt, 357 N.C. 257, 582 S.E.2d 593, cert. denied, 539 U.S. 985, 124 S. Ct. 44, 156 L. Ed. 2d 702 (2003); State v. Frogge, 359 N.C. 228, 607 S.E.2d 627 (2005); State v. Weaver, 359 N.C. 246, 607 S.E.2d 599 (2005); State v. Seward, 362 N.C. 210, 657 S.E.2d 356 (2008); In re T.H.T., 362 N.C. 446, 665 S.E.2d 54 (2008); State v. Ward, 364 N.C. 157, 694 S.E.2d 729 (June 17, 2010); Jones v. Keller, 364 N.C. 249, 698 S.E.2d 49 (2010); In re M.I.W., 365 N.C. 374, 722 S.E.2d 469 (2012); State v. Whitehead, 365 N.C. 444, 722 S.E.2d 492 (2012); State v. Bowden, 367 N.C. 680, 766 S.E.2d 320 (2014), cert. denied 2015 U.S. LEXIS 7702 (U.S. 2015); State v. Davis, 368 N.C. 794, 785 S.E.2d 312 (2016); State v. Perry, 369 N.C. 390, 794 S.E.2d 280 (2016); State v. Young, 369 N.C. 118, 794 S.E.2d 274 (2016); Christenbury Eye Ctr., P.A. v. Medflow, Inc., 370 N.C. 1, 802 S.E.2d 888 (2017); Kornegay Family Farms LLC v. Cross Creek Seed, Inc., 370 N.C. 23, 803 S.E.2d 377 (2017);.
State v. Doss, - N.C. App. - , 836 S.E.2d 856 (2019).
§ 7A-33. Supreme Court to prescribe appellate division rules of practice and procedure.
The Supreme Court shall prescribe rules of practice and procedure designed to procure the expeditious and inexpensive disposition of all litigation in the appellate division.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1.)
Cross References. - For the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, see the Annotated Rules of North Carolina.
Legal Periodicals. - For recent development, "The Supreme Court of North Carolina's Rulemaking Authority and the Struggle for Power: State v. Tutt," see 84 N.C. L. Rev. 2100 (2006).
CASE NOTES
Adoption of Procedural Rule Did Not Affect Action Already Pending. - Given the unique constitutional and statutory responsibilities of the Supreme Court of North Carolina to promulgate rules of appellate procedure, as well as rules and standards of conduct
for the judiciary, the Supreme Court of North Carolina did not exceed its authority in adopting N.C. Code Jud. Conduct, Limitation of Proceedings; however, where a judicial disciplinary action was already pending when N.C. Code
Jud. Conduct, Limitation of Proceedings came into effect, the action was not barred. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Brown), 358 N.C. 711, 599 S.E.2d 502 (2004).
Applied in State v. Bennett, 59 N.C. App. 418, 297 S.E.2d 138 (1982).
Cited in State v. Garnett, 4 N.C. App. 367, 167 S.E.2d 63 (1969); State v. Monroe, 330 N.C. 433, 410 S.E.2d 913 (1991).
§ 7A-34. Rules of practice and procedure in trial courts.
The Supreme Court is hereby authorized to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for the superior and district courts supplementary to, and not inconsistent with, acts of the General Assembly.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1.)
Legal Periodicals. - For article, "The 1980 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Proposals for North Carolina Practice," see 16 Wake Forest L. Rev. 915 (1980).
For article, "Rummaging Through a Wilderness of Verbiage: The Charge Conference, Jury Argument and Instructions," see 8 Campbell L. Rev. 269 (1986).
CASE NOTES
Provision of Rule of Practice Must Give Way to Statute. - Subsection (b) of G.S. 15A-1231 clearly contemplates that a defendant be required to request an instruction conference as a prerequisite for assigning error to the trial court's failure to conduct
one. Under this section, the provision of Gen. Rules Prac., Rule 21 which requires the trial judge to conduct a jury instruction conference conflicts with subsection (b) of G.S. 15A-1231 and must give way to the provisions of the
statute. State v. Morris, 60 N.C. App. 750, 300 S.E.2d 46 (1983).
Unsealing Search Warrants. - Superior court did not err in unsealing certain search warrants and corresponding documents because the search warrants at issue were unsealed in accordance with procedures set forth in an administrative order of the resident
superior court judge, pursuant to G.S. 7A-34 and N.C. Gen. R. Prac. Super. & Dist. Ct. 2(d), and the State failed to make a timely motion to extend the period for which the documents were sealed. In re Zahra Clare Baker Investigation,
220 N.C. App. 108, 727 S.E.2d 316 (2012).
Applied in Hamm v. Texaco, Inc., 17 N.C. App. 451, 194 S.E.2d 560 (1973); State v. Bennett, 308 N.C. 530, 302 S.E.2d 786 (1983); Young v. Young, 133 N.C. App. 332, 515 S.E.2d 478 (1999); In re J.S., 182 N.C. App. 79, 641 S.E.2d 395 (2007); State v. Seward, 362 N.C. 210, 657 S.E.2d 356 (2008); Plomaritis v. Plomaritis, 222 N.C. App. 94, 730 S.E.2d 784 (2012).
Cited in Lee v. Rowland, 11 N.C. App. 27, 180 S.E.2d 445 (1971); Terrell v. H. & N. Chevrolet Co., 11 N.C. App. 310, 181 S.E.2d 124 (1971); Duke v. Meisky, 12 N.C. App. 329, 183 S.E.2d 292 (1971); State v. Andrews, 12 N.C. App. 421, 184 S.E.2d 69 (1971); Lattimore v. Powell, 15 N.C. App. 522, 190 S.E.2d 288 (1972); Finley v. Finley,
15 N.C. App. 681, 190 S.E.2d 660 (1972); Neff v. Queen City Coach Co., 16 N.C. App. 466, 192 S.E.2d 587 (1972); Williams v. Hartis, 18 N.C. App. 89, 195 S.E.2d 806 (1973); State v. House, 295 N.C. 189, 244 S.E.2d 654 (1978); Wood v. Wood, 297 N.C. 1, 252 S.E.2d 799 (1979); Clarke v. Clarke, 47 N.C. App. 249, 267 S.E.2d 361 (1980); State v. McCaskill, 47 N.C. App. 289, 267 S.E.2d 331 (1980); Hensgen v. Hensgen, 53 N.C. App. 331, 280 S.E.2d 766 (1981); Lee v. Jenkins,
57 N.C. App. 522, 291 S.E.2d 797 (1982); Four Seasons Homeowners Ass'n v. Sellers, 62 N.C. App. 205, 302 S.E.2d 848 (1983); Butler Serv. Co. v. Butler Serv. Group, Inc.,
66 N.C. App. 132, 310 S.E.2d 406 (1984); Simmons v. Tuttle, 70 N.C. App. 101, 318 S.E.2d 847 (1984); Daniels v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 320 N.C. 669,
360 S.E.2d 772 (1987); Provident Fin. Co. v. Locklear, 89 N.C. App. 535, 366 S.E.2d 599 (1988); State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 389 S.E.2d 48 (1990); State v. Hudson,
331 N.C. 122, 415 S.E.2d 732 (1992); State v. Rorie, 348 N.C. 266, 500 S.E.2d 77 (1998); Smith v. Young Moving & Storage, Inc., 141 N.C. App. 469, 540 S.E.2d 383 (2000), aff'd, 353 N.C. 521, 546 S.E.2d 87 (2001); In re T.M., 187 N.C. App. 694, 654 S.E.2d 502 (2007).
§ 7A-34.1: Repealed by Session Laws 2011-145, s. 31.23(f), effective July 1, 2011.
History
(2001-388, s. 2.)
§ 7A-35: Repealed by Session Laws 1971, c. 377, s. 32.
§ 7A-36: Repealed by Session Laws 1969, c. 1190, s. 57.
§ 7A-37: Repealed by Session Laws 1993, c. 553.
§ 7A-37.1. Statewide court-ordered, nonbinding arbitration in certain civil actions.
- The General Assembly finds that court-ordered, nonbinding arbitration may be a more economical, efficient and satisfactory procedure to resolve certain civil actions than by traditional civil litigation and therefore authorizes court-ordered nonbinding arbitration as an alternative civil procedure, subject to these provisions.
- The Supreme Court of North Carolina may adopt rules governing this procedure and may supervise its implementation and operation through the Administrative Office of the Courts. These rules shall ensure that no party is deprived of the right to jury trial and that any party dissatisfied with an arbitration award may have trial de novo.
- Except as otherwise provided in rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of North Carolina pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, this procedure shall be employed in all civil actions in district court, unless all parties to the action waive arbitration under this section.
- Except as provided in subsection (c2) of this section, in cases referred to nonbinding arbitration as provided in this section, a fee of one hundred dollars ($100.00) shall be assessed per arbitration, to be divided equally among the parties, to cover the cost of providing arbitrators. Fees assessed under this section shall be paid to the clerk of superior court in the county where the case was filed and remitted by the clerk to the State Treasurer.
- In appeals in small claims actions under Article 19 of Chapter 7A of the General Statutes, if (i) the arbitrator finds in favor of the appellee, (ii) the arbitrator's decision is appealed for trial de novo under G.S. 7A-229, and (iii) the arbitrator's decision is affirmed on appeal, then the court shall consider the fact that the arbitrator's decision was affirmed as a significant factor in favor of assessing all court costs and attorneys' fees associated with the case in both the original action and the two appeals, including the arbitration fee assessed under subsection (c1) of this section, against the appellant.
- This procedure may be implemented in a judicial district, in selected counties within a district, or in any court within a district, if the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, and the cognizant Senior Resident Superior Court Judge or the Chief District Court Judge of any court selected for this procedure, determine that use of this procedure may assist in the administration of justice toward achieving objectives stated in subsection (a) of this section in a judicial district, county, or court. The Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, acting upon the recommendation of the cognizant Senior Resident Superior Court Judge or Chief District Court Judge of any court selected for this procedure, may terminate this procedure in any judicial district, county, or court upon a determination that its use has not accomplished objectives stated in subsection (a) of this section.
- Arbitrators in this procedure shall have the same immunity as judges from civil liability for their official conduct.
History
(1989, c. 301, s. 1; 2002-126, s. 14.3(a); 2003-284, s. 36A.1; 2013-159, s. 3; 2013-225, s. 1.)
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1989, c. 301, s. 1, provided: "Nothing herein contained shall be construed to obligate the General Assembly to appropriate funds to implement the provisions of this act."
Session Laws 2013-159, s. 6, made the amendment to this section by Session Laws 2013-159, s. 3, applicable to actions filed on or after August 1, 2013.
Session Laws 2013-225, s. 8, made the amendment to subsection (c) by Session Laws 2013-225, s. 1, applicable to actions filed on or after August 1, 2013.
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2013-159, s. 3, effective August 1, 2013, rewrote subsection (c), which formerly read "This procedure may be employed in civil actions where claims do not exceed fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), except that it shall not be employed in actions in which the sole claim is an action on an account, including appeals from magistrates on such actions"; substituted "Except as provided in subsection (c2) of this section, in" for "In" in subsection (c1); and added subsection (c2). For applicability, see editor's note.
Session Laws 2013-225, s. 1, effective August 1, 2013, substituted "in district court" for "where claims do not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000)" in subsection (c). For applicability, see editor's note.
Legal Periodicals. - For note, "No-Frills Justice: North Carolina Experiments with Court-Ordered Arbitration," see 66 N.C.L. Rev. 395 (1988).
For article, "Court-Ordered Arbitration in North Carolina: Selected Issues of Practice and Procedure," see 21 Campbell L. Rev. 191 (1999).
For article, "Clause Construction: A Glimpse Into Judicial and Arbitral Decision-Making," see 68 Duke L.J. 1324 (2019).
CASE NOTES
Failure to Attend - Unlike G.S. 7A-38.1, authorizing mediated settlement conferences in superior court civil actions, this section does not require the attendance of the parties, their attorneys and other persons or entities with authority, by law or
by contract, to settle the parties' claims, nor does the court-ordered arbitration statute require sanctions as does the mediated settlement conference statute; thus, there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's
sanction based on the fact that defendant motorist appeared at the arbitration only through his counsel. Bledsole v. Johnson, 357 N.C. 133, 579 S.E.2d 379 (2003).
Cited in Mohamad v. Simmons, 139 N.C. App. 610, 534 S.E.2d 616 (2000); Johnson v. Brewington, 150 N.C. App. 425, 562 S.E.2d 919 (2002); Bledsole v. Johnson, 150 N.C. App. 619, 564 S.E.2d 902 (2002), cert. granted, 356 N.C. 297, 570 S.E.2d 498 (2002); Brock & Scott Holdings, Inc. v. West, 198 N.C. App. 357, 679 S.E.2d 507 (2009), review
granted, 363 N.C. 800, 690 S.E.2d 531, 2010 N.C. LEXIS 37 (2010); Clark v. Bichsel, 239 N.C. App. 13, 767 S.E.2d 145 (2015).
§ 7A-38: Repealed by Session Laws 1995, c. 500, s. 3.
§ 7A-38.1. Mediated settlement conferences in superior court civil actions.
- Purpose. - The General Assembly finds that a system of court-ordered mediated settlement conferences should be established to facilitate the settlement of superior court civil actions and to make civil litigation more economical, efficient, and satisfactory to litigants and the State. Therefore, this section is enacted to require parties to superior court civil actions and their representatives to attend a pretrial, mediated settlement conference conducted pursuant to this section and pursuant to rules of the Supreme Court adopted to implement this section.
-
Definitions. - As used in this section:
- "Mediated settlement conference" means a pretrial, court-ordered conference of the parties to a civil action and their representatives conducted by a mediator.
- "Mediation" means an informal process conducted by a mediator with the objective of helping parties voluntarily settle their dispute.
- "Mediator" means a neutral person who acts to encourage and facilitate a resolution of a pending civil action. A mediator does not make an award or render a judgment as to the merits of the action.
- Rules of procedure. - The Supreme Court may adopt rules to implement this section.
- Statewide implementation. - Mediated settlement conferences authorized by this section shall be implemented in all judicial districts as soon as practicable, as determined by the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts.
- Cases selected for mediated settlement conferences. - The senior resident superior court judge of any participating district may order a mediated settlement conference for any superior court civil action pending in the district. The senior resident superior court judge may by local rule order all cases, not otherwise exempted by the Supreme Court rule, to mediated settlement conference.
- Attendance of parties. - The parties to a superior court civil action in which a mediated settlement conference is ordered, their attorneys and other persons or entities with authority, by law or by contract, to settle the parties' claims shall attend the mediated settlement conference unless excused by rules of the Supreme Court or by order of the senior resident superior court judge. Nothing in this section shall require any party or other participant in the conference to make a settlement offer or demand which it deems is contrary to its best interests.
- Sanctions. - Any person required to attend a mediated settlement conference or other settlement procedure under this section who, without good cause, fails to attend or fails to pay any or all of the mediator's or other neutral's fee in compliance with this section and the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court to implement this section is subject to the contempt powers of the court and monetary sanctions imposed by a resident or presiding superior court judge. The monetary sanctions may include the payment of fines, attorneys' fees, mediator and neutral fees, and the expenses and loss of earnings incurred by persons attending the procedure. A party seeking sanctions against another party or person shall do so in a written motion stating the grounds for the motion and the relief sought. The motion shall be served upon all parties and upon any person against whom the sanctions are being sought. The court may initiate sanction proceedings upon its own motion by the entry of a show cause order. If the court imposes sanctions, it shall do so, after notice and a hearing, in a written order, making findings of fact and conclusions of law. An order imposing sanctions shall be reviewable upon appeal where the entire record as submitted shall be reviewed to determine whether the order is supported by substantial evidence.
- Selection of mediator. - The parties to a superior court civil action in which a mediated settlement conference is to be held pursuant to this section shall have the right to designate a mediator. Upon failure of the parties to designate a mediator within the time established by the rules of the Supreme Court, a mediator shall be appointed by the senior resident superior court judge.
- Promotion of other settlement procedures. - Nothing in this section is intended to preclude the use of other dispute resolution methods within the superior court. Parties to a superior court civil action are encouraged to select other available dispute resolution methods. The senior resident superior court judge, at the request of and with the consent of the parties, may order the parties to attend and participate in any other settlement procedure authorized by rules of the Supreme Court or by the local superior court rules, in lieu of attending a mediated settlement conference. Neutral third parties acting pursuant to this section shall be selected and compensated in accordance with such rules or pursuant to agreement of the parties. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the parties from participating in, or the court from ordering, other dispute resolution procedures, including arbitration to the extent authorized under State or federal law.
- Immunity. - Mediator and other neutrals acting pursuant to this section shall have judicial immunity in the same manner and to the same extent as a judge of the General Court of Justice, except that mediators and other neutrals may be disciplined in accordance with enforcement procedures adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to G.S. 7A-38.2.
- Costs of mediated settlement conference. - Costs of mediated settlement conferences shall be borne by the parties. Unless otherwise ordered by the court or agreed to by the parties, the mediator's fees shall be paid in equal shares by the parties. For purposes of this section, multiple parties shall be considered one party when they are represented by the same counsel. The rules adopted by the Supreme Court implementing this section shall set out a method whereby parties found by the court to be unable to pay the costs of the mediated settlement conference are afforded an opportunity to participate without cost. The rules adopted by the Supreme Court shall set the fees to be paid a mediator appointed by a judge upon the failure of the parties to designate a mediator.
-
Inadmissibility of negotiations. - Evidence of statements made and conduct occurring in a mediated settlement conference or other settlement proceeding conducted under this section, whether attributable to a party, the mediator, other neutral, or a neutral
observer present at the settlement proceeding, shall not be subject to discovery and shall be inadmissible in any proceeding in the action or other civil actions on the same claim, except:
- In proceedings for sanctions under this section;
- In proceedings to enforce or rescind a settlement of the action;
- In disciplinary hearings before the State Bar or the Dispute Resolution Commission; or
- In proceedings to enforce laws concerning juvenile or elder abuse.
- Right to jury trial. - Nothing in this section or the rules adopted by the Supreme Court implementing this section shall restrict the right to jury trial.
As used in this section, the term "neutral observer" includes persons seeking mediator certification, persons studying dispute resolution processes, and persons acting as interpreters.
No settlement agreement to resolve any or all issues reached at the proceeding conducted under this subsection or during its recesses shall be enforceable unless it has been reduced to writing and signed by the parties against whom enforcement is sought or signed by their designees. No evidence otherwise discoverable shall be inadmissible merely because it is presented or discussed in a mediated settlement conference or other settlement proceeding.
No mediator, other neutral, or neutral observer present at a settlement proceeding shall be compelled to testify or produce evidence concerning statements made and conduct occurring in anticipation of, during, or as a follow-up to a mediated settlement conference or other settlement proceeding pursuant to this section in any civil proceeding for any purpose, including proceedings to enforce or rescind a settlement of the action, except to attest to the signing of any agreements, and except proceedings for sanctions under this section, disciplinary hearings before the State Bar or the Dispute Resolution Commission, and proceedings to enforce laws concerning juvenile or elder abuse.
History
(1995, c. 500, s. 1; 1999-354, s. 5; 2005-167, s. 1; 2008-194, s. 8(a); 2015-57, s. 1; 2017-158, s. 26.7(a); 2021-47, s. 12(a).)
Cross References. - As to court ordered, mediated settlement conferences in superior court civil actions, see Rule 1, Rules for Mediated Settlement Conferences and Other Settlement Procedures in Superior Court Civil Actions, in the Annotated Rules of North Carolina.
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2015-57, s. 6, made the amendment to subsection ( l ) of this section by Session Laws 2015-57, s. 1, applicable to agreements entered into on or after July 1, 2015.
Session Laws 2017-122, s. 1, and Session Laws 2017-158, s. 26.6, provide: "In order to make North Carolina a leading jurisdiction for the resolution of business, commercial, financial, and other legal disputes, the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, in consultation with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, shall submit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate a report recommending whether and how to establish an arbitration program within the North Carolina Business Court, including how parties may make themselves subject to the jurisdiction of said program, required qualifications and trainings for arbitrators, and requirements for persons who may represent parties in arbitration proceedings before the Business Court. Such recommendations may include suggestions on the form of appeal for both binding and nonbinding arbitrations in cases arbitrated under such a proposal. The Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts or through the North Carolina Dispute Resolution Commission may also include recommendations for establishing a mediation program operated by the Business Court, including suggestions as to how parties may make themselves subject to the jurisdiction of said program, required qualifications for mediators, and for persons who may represent parties in mediation proceedings."
Session Laws 2021-47, s. 12(c), made the addition of "sought or signed by their designees" to the end of the first sentence of the next-to-last paragraph of subsection ( l ) of this section by Session Laws 2021-47, s. 12(a), effective June 18, 2021, and applicable to settlement agreements reached on or after that date.
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2008-194, s. 8(a), effective January 1, 2009, rewrote subsection (g).
Session Laws 2015-57, s. 1, effective July 1, 2015, added "against whom enforcement is sought" at the end of the first sentence in the second paragraph following subdivision ( l )(4). For applicability, see editor's note.
Session Laws 2017-158, s. 26.7(a), effective July 21, 2017, rewrote subdivision ( l )(3) which read: "In disciplinary proceedings before the State Bar or any agency established to enforce standards of conduct for mediators or other neutrals; or"; and substituted "the Dispute Resolution Commission," for "any agency established to enforce standards of conduct for mediators or other neutrals," in the last sentence of subdivision ( l )(4).
Session Laws 2021-47, s. 12(a), added "sought or signed by their designees" to the end of the first sentence of the next-to-last paragraph of subsection ( l ). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.
Legal Periodicals. - For comment, "An End to Settlement on the Courthouse Steps? Mediated Settlement Conferences in North Carolina Superior Courts," see 71 N.C.L. Rev. 1857 (1993).
For comment, "Good Faith Mediation: Improving Efficiency, Cost, and Satisfaction in North Carolina's Pre-Trial Process," 18 Campbell L. Rev. 281 (1996).
For article, "Court-Ordered Arbitration in North Carolina: Selected Issues of Practice and Procedure," see 21 Campbell L. Rev. 191 (1999).
For note, "A Mediation Nightmare?: The Effect of the North Carolina Supreme Court's Decision in Chappell v. Roth on the Enforceability and Integrity of Mediated Settlement Agreements," see 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 643 (2002).
For comment, "Do I Have to Say More? When Mediation Confidentiality Clashes with the Duty to Report," see 34 Campbell L. Rev. 205 (2011).
For article, "The 'Right to Commit Nuisance' in North Carolina: A Historical Analysis of the Right-to-Farm Act," see 94 N.C.L. Rev. 2097 (2016).
For article, "Inn Fein Amhain: Taking Collaborative Law Beyond Divorce," see 52 Wake Forest L. Rev. 139 (2017).
CASE NOTES
Sanctions for Failure to Attend. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking defendant's answer and entering default where corporate defendant had no good cause for failing to have officer mediation settlement conference and was not excused, less severe sanctions were considered rejected as inappropriate, and the sanctions entered were specifically authorized by former Rule 37(b)(2)c (repealed by 1993 Session Laws, c. 553, s. 1). Triad Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Clement Bros. Co., 113 N.C. App. 405, 438 S.E.2d 485 (1994).
Unlike this section, authorizing mediated settlement conferences in superior court civil actions, G.S. 7A-37.1 does not require the attendance of the parties, their attorneys and other persons or entities with authority, by law or by contract, to settle the parties' claims, nor does the court-ordered arbitration statute require sanctions as does the mediated settlement conference statute; thus, there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's sanction based on the fact that defendant motorist appeared at the arbitration only through his counsel. Bledsole v. Johnson, 357 N.C. 133, 579 S.E.2d 379 (2003).
Because a homeowner's children and friends were not excused from attending a court-ordered mediation, they could be sanctioned unless they showed good cause for their absences when a mediator's report specifically identified the friends as parties absent without permission, and the mediator did not specify that the children's absence was authorized; even assuming that the report could be read as indicating the mediator's express permission for the absences, the mediator lacked authority to grant such permission under Rule 4(A)(2) of the Rules for Statewide Mediated Settlement Conferences and G.S. 7A-38.1(f). Perry v. GRP Fin. Servs. Corp., 196 N.C. App. 41, 674 S.E.2d 780 (2009).
Trial court erred in failing to make any findings related to the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees sought and awarded for the failure of a homeowner's children and friends to attend court-ordered mediation because it made no findings of fact at all other than to reiterate the amount of attorneys' fees sought by each party, and on remand, the trial court had to make further findings of fact regarding the amount of any sanction ultimately awarded; there is no reason to distinguish an award of sanctions under G.S. 7A-38.1 and Rule 5 of the Rules for Statewide Mediated Settlement Conferences from sanctions awarded under N.C. R. Civ. P. 11 and 37, and G.S. 6-21.1, all of which require a finding of reasonableness. Perry v. GRP Fin. Servs. Corp., 196 N.C. App. 41, 674 S.E.2d 780 (2009).
Trial court erred in imposing sanctions upon a homeowner's children and friends for their absence at court-ordered mediation because the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact on the issue of whether the children and friends showed good
cause for their absence; the friends submitted affidavits explaining the reason for their physical absence, but the trial court never explained why it decided that those reasons did not amount to "good cause." Perry v. GRP Fin.
Servs. Corp., 196 N.C. App. 41, 674 S.E.2d 780 (2009).
Sanction Not Authorized for Violation of Agreement. - Trial court was without authority under G.S. 7A-38.1(g), or its inherent authority, to sanction the parents for violating the terms of the settlement agreement because the parents complied with the
Mediation Rules in creating a settlement agreement but subsequently violated the terms of the agreement. Estate of Barber v. Guilford County Sheriff's Dep't, 161 N.C. App. 658,
589 S.E.2d 433 (2003).
Mediator May Be Compelled for Evidence of Agreement. - A mediator is both competent and compellable to testify or produce evidence on whether the parties reached a settlement agreement, where a judge is making that determination. Few v. Hammack Enters.,
Inc., 132 N.C. App. 291, 511 S.E.2d 665 (1999).
Mediation Settlement Outcomes Admissible. - Admission of the outcome of a mediation settlement conference is not prohibited where a judge is making a determination of whether an agreement was reached and the terms of the agreement. Few v. Hammack Enters.,
Inc., 132 N.C. App. 291, 511 S.E.2d 665 (1999).
Admission of Confidential Mediation Information. - When, in a builder's suit against a homeowner to enforce a lien, the homeowner was granted summary judgment, the homeowner was not awarded appellate attorneys' fees because no transcripts or evidence
allowed the appellate court to decipher how statutorily confidential mediation information was admitted into evidence, or what other evidence the trial court considered. R & L Constr. of Mt. Airy, LLC v. Diaz,
240 N.C. App. 194, 770 S.E.2d 698 (2015).
A party who claims that a settlement agreement is invalid and unenforceable should have to overcome the strong presumption expressed in this section that a settlement agreement reached by the parties through court-ordered mediation under the guidance
of a mediator is a valid contract. Chappell v. Roth, 141 N.C. App. 502, 539 S.E.2d 666 (2000).
Conversation Not Part of Negotiations. - The trial judge properly determined that admitted portions of an answering machine message and a subsequent conversation between the plaintiff mother of a boy injured on an amusement ride and the deceased defendant
ride operator in which he admitted the possibility that he had not fastened the boy properly were not part of settlement negotiations; there was no mention of an intent to compromise or negotiate in the admitted portions of the
conversation and the testimony was an admission of fact during a telephone conversation initiated by a party to the dispute. Breedlove v. Aerotrim, U.S.A., Inc., 142 N.C. App. 447, 543 S.E.2d 213 (2001).
Breach. - Record supported the trial court's judgment that a general contractor made three of six payments it was required to make under a settlement agreement on time, that a subcontractor that was entitled to receive those payments breached the settlement
agreement by refusing to authorize release of a letter of credit, and that the general contractor was relieved of its obligation to make the remaining payments because of the subcontractor's breach. McClure Lumber Co. v. Helmsman
Constr., Inc., 160 N.C. App. 190, 585 S.E.2d 234 (2003).
Summary Judgment Proper Upon Reaching Settlement Agreement. - Where the parties to a real estate commission dispute reached a settlement agreement at mediation, but the brokerage did not sign the written settlement agreement, and never moved the trial
court to enforce the settlement agreement, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment dismissing the case rather than entering an order enforcing the agreement. Cohen Schatz Assocs. v. Perry,
169 N.C. App. 834, 611 S.E.2d 229 (2005).
Failure of One Party to Sign Settlement Agreement. - Plaintiff was not entitled to enforcement of the memorandum of settlement as a matter of law because defendant failed to sign the memorandum of settlement, making it unenforceable against him under the statute of frauds. Mitchell v. Boswell, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Nov. 3, 2020).
Dismissal Upon Failure to Agree on Mediator Was Error. - Both G.S. 7A-38.1(h) and Rules of the North Carolina Supreme Court Implementing Statewide Mediated Settlement Conferences in Superior Court Civil Actions 2C contemplated that if the parties to a
lawsuit failed to agree on a settlement conference mediator or that plaintiff failed to report this to the senior resident superior court judge, that the judge was to have appointed a mediator; trial court's dismissal of an action
after the parties failed to agree on mediator was error. Gailey v. Triangle Billiards & Blues Club, Inc., 179 N.C. App. 848, 635 S.E.2d 482 (2006), review denied, 361 N.C. 426,
648 S.E.2d 212 (2007).
Costs of Mediation Recoverable. - In a medical malpractice case, trial court erred in denying motion seeking to recover mediation costs because mediation was ordered in all civil actions, and the cost was recoverable under G.S. 7A-305(d)(7). Miller v.
Forsyth Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 173 N.C. App. 385, 618 S.E.2d 838 (2005).
Negligent Misrepresentation Claim Not Stated. - Plaintiff's claim for negligent misrepresentation failed to state a claim where plaintiff alleged that she justifiably relied, to her detriment, on information prepared by defendant in a mediated settlement
conference under G.S. 7A-38.1, and suffered pecuniary loss from the defendant's action of supplying false information as defendant's counsel allegedly misrepresented her authority to settle the case since plaintiff did not allege
that her position in the federal litigation was prejudiced by the lack of a settlement or that the memorandum of settlement was used against her; a failure to settle a case was not compensable as a pecuniary loss. Howard v. County
of Durham, 227 N.C. App. 46, 748 S.E.2d 1, review denied 367 N.C. 238, 748 S.E.2d 321, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 1000 (2013).
Applied in Lord v. Customized Consulting Specialty, Inc., 164 N.C. App. 730, 596 S.E.2d 891 (2004); SPX Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 210 N.C. App. 562, 709 S.E.2d 441
(2011).
Cited in Powell v. Bulluck, 155 N.C. App. 613, 573 S.E.2d 699 (2002).
§ 7A-38.2. Regulation of mediators and other neutrals.
- The Supreme Court may adopt standards of conduct for mediators and other neutrals who are certified or otherwise qualified pursuant to G.S. 7A-38.1, 7A-38.3, 7A-38.3B, 7A-38.3D, 7A-38.3E, and 7A-38.4A, or who participate in proceedings conducted pursuant to those sections. The standards may also regulate mediator and other neutral training programs. The Supreme Court may adopt procedures for the enforcement of those standards.
- The administration of the certification and qualification of mediators and other neutrals, and mediator and other neutral training programs shall be conducted through the Dispute Resolution Commission, established under the Judicial Department. The Supreme Court shall adopt rules and regulations governing the operation of the Commission. The Commission shall exercise all of its duties independently of the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, except that the Commission shall consult with the Director regarding personnel and budgeting matters.
- The Dispute Resolution Commission shall consist of 18 members: five judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, at least two of whom shall be active superior court judges, and at least two of whom shall be active district court judges; one clerk of superior court appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; two mediators certified to conduct superior court mediated settlement conferences and two mediators certified to conduct equitable distribution mediated settlement conferences appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; one certified district criminal court mediator who is a representative of a community mediation center appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; a district attorney appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; a court management staff member appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; two practicing attorneys who are not certified as mediators appointed by the President of the North Carolina State Bar, one of whom shall be a family law specialist; and three citizens knowledgeable about mediation, one of whom shall be appointed by the Governor, one by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Speaker of the House of Representatives in accordance with G.S. 120-121, and one by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the President Pro Tempore of the Senate in accordance with G.S. 120-121. Commission members shall serve three-year terms and shall be ineligible to serve more than two consecutive terms. Members appointed to fill unexpired terms shall be eligible to serve two consecutive terms upon the expiration of the unexpired term. The Chief Justice shall designate one of the members to serve as chair for a two-year term. Members of the Commission shall be compensated pursuant to G.S. 138-5.
- An administrative fee, not to exceed two hundred dollars ($200.00) per certification, may be charged by the Dispute Resolution Commission to applicants for certification and annual renewal of certification for mediators and mediation training programs operating under this Article. The fees collected shall be deposited in a Dispute Resolution Fund. The Fund shall be established within the Judicial Department as a nonreverting, interest-bearing special revenue account. Accordingly, interest and other investment income earned by the Fund shall be credited to it. All moneys collected through the fees authorized and assessed under this statute shall be remitted to the Fund. Moneys in the Fund shall be used to support the operations of the Commission and used at the direction of the Commission.
- The chair of the Commission may employ an executive director and other staff as necessary to assist the Commission in carrying out its duties. The chair may also employ special counsel or call upon the Attorney General to furnish counsel to assist the Commission in conducting hearings pursuant to its certification or qualification and regulatory responsibilities. Special counsel or counsel furnished by the Attorney General may present the evidence in support of a denial or revocation of certification or qualification or a complaint against a mediator, other neutral, training program, or trainers or staff affiliated with a program. Special counsel or counsel furnished by the Attorney General may also represent the Commission when its final determinations are the subject of an appeal.
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In connection with any investigation or hearing conducted pursuant to an application for certification or qualification of any mediator, other neutral, or training program, or conducted pursuant to any disciplinary matter, the chair of the Dispute Resolution
Commission or the chair's designee, may do any of the following:
- Administer oaths and affirmations.
- Sign and issue subpoenas in the name of the Dispute Resolution Commission or direct its executive director to issue such subpoenas on its behalf requiring attendance and the giving of testimony by witnesses and the production of books, papers, and other documentary evidence.
- Apply to the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, for any order necessary to enforce the powers conferred in this section, including an order for injunctive relief pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 65, when a certified mediator's conduct necessitates prompt action.
- Assess and collect an administrative fee from any person who appeals an adverse determination to the full Commission for a hearing and fails to attend the hearing without good cause as determined by the chair of the Commission. The fee assessed shall be the lesser of the Commission's actual expenses for the hearing or two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500). The fees collected shall be deposited in the Dispute Resolution Fund established pursuant to subsection (d) of this section.
- The General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, may enforce subpoenas issued in the name of the Dispute Resolution Commission and requiring attendance and the giving of testimony by witnesses and the production of books, papers, and other documentary evidence.
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The Commission shall keep confidential all information in its files pertaining to the initial and renewal applications for certification of mediators, the qualification of other neutrals, and the initial and renewal applications for certification or qualification
of training programs for mediators or other neutrals, except that in the case of an initial or renewal application for certification in the District Criminal Court Mediation Program, Commission staff shall notify the Executive
Director of the Mediation Network of North Carolina, Inc., and the Executive Director of the community mediation center that is sponsoring the application of any matter regarding the qualifications, character, conduct, or fitness
to practice of the applicant. The Commission shall also keep confidential the identity of those persons requesting informal guidance or the issuance of formal advisory opinions from the Commission or its staff.
- A preliminary investigation is completed.
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A determination is made that probable cause exists to believe that the words or actions of the mediator, neutral, trainer, or other training program personnel:
- Violate standards for the conduct of mediators or other neutrals;
- Violate other standards of professional conduct to which the mediator, neutral, trainer, or other training program personnel is subject;
- Violate program rules or applicable governing law; or
- Consist of conduct or actions that are inconsistent with good moral character or reflect a lack of fitness to serve as a mediator, other neutral, trainer, or other training program personnel.
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One of the following events has occurred:
- The respondent does not appeal the determination before the time permitted for an appeal has expired.
- Upon a timely filed appeal, the Commission holds a hearing and issues a decision affirming the determination.
- All appeals from denials of initial applications for mediator certification and initial applications for mediator training program certification shall be held in private, unless the applicant requests a public hearing. Appeals from a denial of a mediator or mediator training program application for certification renewal or reinstatement that relate to moral character, conduct, or fitness to practice shall be open to the public, except that for good cause shown, the presiding officer may exclude from the hearing room all persons except the parties, counsel, and those engaged in the hearing. All other appeals from denials of a mediator training program's application for certification renewal shall be held in private, unless the applicant requests a public hearing.
- Appeals from the Commission's initial determination after review and investigation of a complaint that probable cause exists to believe that the conduct of a mediator, neutral, trainer, or other training program personnel violated a provision set out in subdivision (2) of subsection (h) of this section shall be open to the public, except that for good cause shown, the presiding officer may exclude from the hearing room all persons except the parties, counsel, and those engaged in the hearing. No hearing shall be closed to the public over the objection of the mediator, neutral, trainer, or training program personnel that is the subject of the complaint.
- Appeals of final determinations by the Commission to deny certification or renewal of certification, to revoke certification, or to discipline a mediator, trainer, or other training program personnel shall be filed in the General Court of Justice, Wake County Superior Court Division. Notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days of the date of the Commission's decision.
- The Commission may issue a cease and desist letter to any individual who falsely represents himself or herself to the public as certified or as eligible to be certified pursuant to this section, or who uses any words, letters, titles, signs, cards, Web site postings, or advertisements that expressly or implicitly convey such misrepresentation to the public. If the individual continues to make such false representations after receipt of the cease and desist letter, the Commission, through its Chair, may petition the Superior Court of Wake County for an injunction restraining the individual's conduct and for any other relief that the court deems appropriate.
- Members of the Commission and its employees are immune from civil suit for all conduct undertaken in the course of their official duties.
Vacancies shall be filled for unexpired terms and full terms in the same manner as incumbents were appointed. Appointing authorities may receive and consider suggestions and recommendations of persons for appointment from the Dispute Resolution Commission, the Family Law, Litigation, and Dispute Resolution Sections of the North Carolina Bar Association, the North Carolina Association of Professional Family Mediators, the North Carolina Conference of Clerks of Superior Court, the North Carolina Conference of Court Administrators, the Mediation Network of North Carolina, the Dispute Resolution Committee of the Supreme Court, the Conference of Chief District Court Judges, the Conference of Superior Court Judges, the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, and the Child Custody Mediation Advisory Committee of the Administrative Office of the Courts.
All information in the Commission's disciplinary files pertaining to a complaint regarding the moral character, conduct, or fitness to practice of a mediator, other neutral, trainer, or other training program personnel shall remain confidential, unless the subject of the complaint requests otherwise, until such time as all of the following conditions are met:
Upon a finding of probable cause under this subsection against a mediator arising out of a mediated settlement conference, Commission staff shall provide notice of the finding of probable cause to any mediation program or agency under whose auspices the mediated settlement conference was conducted. Commission shall also make reasonable efforts to notify any such agency or program of any public sanction imposed by the Commission pursuant to Supreme Court rules governing the operation of the Commission against a certified mediator who serves as a mediator for any such agency or program. Commission staff and members of the Grievance and Disciplinary Committee of the Commission may share information with other committee chairs or committees of the Commission when relevant to a review of any matter before such other committee.
The Commission may publish names, contact information, and biographical information for mediators, neutrals, and training programs that have been certified or qualified.
History
(1995, c. 500, s. 1; 1998-212, s. 16.19(b), (c); 2005-167, ss. 2, 4; 2007-387, ss. 2, 3; 2010-169, s. 21(b); 2011-145, s. 15.5; 2011-411, s. 5; 2017-158, s. 26.8; 2019-243, s. 2(a); 2021-47, s. 4(a).)
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2019-243, s. 2(b), made the amendment to subsection (f) of this section by Session Laws 2019-243, s. 2(a), effective December 1, 2019, and applicable to hearings held on or after that date.
Session Laws 2021-47, s. 4(b), made the substitution of "18 members" for "17 members" and the insertion of "a court management staff member appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court" in the first sentence of the first paragraph of subsection (c), and the addition of subsection (m), by Session Laws 2021-47, s. 4(a), effective June 18, 2021, and applicable to conduct occurring on or after that date.
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2007-387, ss. 2 and 3, effective August 19, 2007, in subsection (a), substituted "may" for "is authorized to" following "The Supreme Court", deleted "G.S." preceding "7A-38.3B," and inserted "7A-38.3D" thereafter; in subsection (c), substituted "16 members" for "15 members" and inserted "one certified district criminal court mediator who is a representative of a community mediation center appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court" in the first sentence. For applicability provision, see Editor's note.
Session Laws 2010-169, s. 21(b), effective October 1, 2010, and applicable to actions filed on or after that date, inserted "7A-38.3E" in the first sentence of subsection (a).
Session Laws 2011-145, s. 15.5, effective July 1, 2011, added the last sentence in subsection (d).
Session Laws 2011-411, s. 5, effective September 15, 2011, added the last sentence in subsection (d).
Session Laws 2017-158, s. 26.8, effective July 21, 2017, rewrote the section.
Session Laws 2019-243, s. 2(a), in the introductory language of subsection (f), substituted "the chair's" for "his/her" and inserted "do any of the following"; substituted "director" for "secretary" in subdivision (f)(2); added subdivision (f)(4); and made stylistic changes. For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.
Session Laws 2021-47, s. 4(a), in the first sentence of the first paragraph of subsection (c), substituted "18 members" for "17 members" near the beginning, and inserted "a court management staff member appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court" near the middle; and added subsection (m). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.
§ 7A-38.3. Prelitigation mediation of farm nuisance disputes.
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Definitions. - As used in this section:
- "Farm nuisance dispute" means a claim that the farming activity of a farm resident constitutes a nuisance.
- "Farm resident" means a person holding an interest in fee, under a real estate contract, or under a lease, in land used for farming activity when that person manages the operations on the land.
- "Farming activity" means the cultivation of farmland for the production of crops, fruits, vegetables, ornamental and flowering plants, and the utilization of farmland for the production of dairy, livestock, poultry, and all other forms of agricultural products having a domestic or foreign market.
- "Mediator" means a neutral person who acts to encourage and facilitate a resolution of a farm nuisance dispute.
- "Nuisance" means an action that is injurious to health, indecent, offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property.
- "Party" means any person having a dispute with a farm resident.
- "Person" means a natural person, or any corporation, trust, or limited partnership as defined in G.S. 59-102.
- Voluntary Mediation. - The parties to a farm nuisance dispute may agree at any time to mediation of the dispute under the provisions of this section.
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Mandatory Mediation. - Prior to bringing a civil action involving a farm nuisance dispute, a farm resident or any other party shall initiate mediation pursuant to this section. If a farm resident or any other party brings an action involving a farm nuisance
dispute, this action shall, upon the motion of any party prior to trial, be dismissed without prejudice by the court unless any one or more of the following apply:
- The dispute involves a claim that has been brought as a class action.
- The nonmoving party has satisfied the requirements of this section and such is indicated in a mediator's certification issued under subsection (g) of this section.
- The court finds that a mediator improperly failed to issue a certification indicating that the nonmoving party satisfied the requirements of this section.
- The court finds good cause for a failure to attempt mediation. Good cause includes, but is not limited to, a determination that the time delay required for mediation would likely result in irreparable harm or that injunctive relief is otherwise warranted.
- Initiation of Mediation. - Prelitigation mediation of a farm nuisance dispute shall be initiated by filing a request for mediation with the clerk of superior court in a county in which the action may be brought. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall prescribe a request for mediation form. The party filing the request for mediation also shall mail a copy of the request by certified mail, return receipt requested, to each party to the dispute. The clerk shall provide each party with a list of mediators certified by the Dispute Resolution Commission. If the parties agree in writing to the selection of a mediator from that list, the clerk shall appoint that mediator selected by the parties. If the parties do not agree on the selection of a mediator, the party filing the request for mediation shall bring the matter to the attention of the clerk, and a mediator shall be appointed by the senior resident superior court judge. The clerk shall notify the mediator and the parties of the appointment of the mediator.
- Mediation Procedure. - Except as otherwise expressly provided in this section, mediation under this section shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions for mediated settlement of civil cases in G.S. 7A-38.1 and G.S. 7A-38.2 and rules and standards adopted pursuant to those sections. The Supreme Court may adopt additional rules and standards to implement this section, including an exemption from the provisions of G.S. 7A-38.1 for cases in which mediation was attempted under this section.
- Waiver of Mediation. - The parties to the dispute may waive the mediation required by this section by informing the mediator of their waiver in writing. No costs shall be assessed to any party if all parties waive mediation prior to the occurrence of an initial mediation meeting.
- Certification That Mediation Concluded. - Immediately upon a waiver of mediation under subsection (f) of this section or upon the conclusion of mediation, the mediator shall prepare a certification stating the date on which the mediation was concluded and the general results of the mediation, including, as applicable, that the parties waived the mediation, that an agreement was reached, that mediation was attempted but an agreement was not reached, or that one or more parties, to be specified in the certification, failed or refused without good cause to attend one or more mediation meetings or otherwise participate in the mediation. The mediator shall file the original of the certification with the clerk and provide a copy to each party. Each party to the mediation has satisfied the requirements of this section upon the filing of the certification, except any party specified in the certification as having failed or refused to attend one or more mediation meetings or otherwise participate. The sanctions in G.S. 7A-38.1(g) do not apply to prelitigation mediation conducted under this section.
- Time Periods Tolled. - Any applicable statutes of limitations relating to a farm nuisance dispute shall be tolled upon the filing of a request for mediation under this section, until 30 days after the date on which the mediation is concluded as set forth in the mediator's certification, or if the mediator fails to set forth such date, until 30 days after the filing of the certification under subsection (g) of this section. The filing of a request for prelitigation mediation under subsection (d) of this section does not constitute the commencement or the bringing of an action involving a farm nuisance dispute.
History
(1995, c. 500, s. 1; 2013-314, s. 2.)
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2013-314, s. 3, made the amendment to subsection (h) by Session Laws 2013-314, s. 2, applicable to actions commenced or brought on or after July 18, 2013.
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2013-314, s. 2, effective July 18, 2013, in subsection (h), in the first sentence, deleted "Time periods relating to the filing of a claim or the taking of other action with respect to a farm nuisance dispute, including" preceding "Any applicable," and inserted "relating to a farm nuisance dispute"; and added the last sentence.
Legal Periodicals. - For comment, "Good Faith Mediation: Improving Efficiency, Cost, and Satisfaction in North Carolina's Pre-Trial Process," 18 Campbell L. Rev. 281 (1996).
For article, "The 'Right to Commit Nuisance' in North Carolina: A Historical Analysis of the Right-to-Farm Act," see 94 N.C.L. Rev. 2097 (2016).
CASE NOTES
Satisfaction of Requirements - Plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for requesting and participating in pre-litigation mediation as required by G.S. 7A-38.3 and N.C.R. Super. Ct. Mediated Settlement Conf. Rule 4; the pleadings alleged that they participated
in pre-litigation mediation, and the mediator's report did not list any party as being absent. Powell v. Bulluck, 155 N.C. App. 613, 573 S.E.2d 699 (2002).
§ 7A-38.3A. Prelitigation mediation of insurance claims.
- Initiation of Mediation. - Prelitigation mediation of an insurance claim may be initiated by an insurer that has provided the policy limits in accordance with G.S. 58-3-33 by filing a request for mediation with the clerk of superior court in a county in which the action may be brought. The insurer also shall mail a copy of the request by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the person who requested the information under G.S. 58-3-33.
- Costs of Mediation. - Costs of mediation, including the mediator's fees, shall be borne by the insurer and claimant equally. When an attorney represents a party to the mediation, that party shall pay his or her attorneys' fees.
- Mediation Procedure. - Except as otherwise expressly provided in this section, mediation under this section shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions for mediated settlement of civil cases in G.S. 7A-38.1 and G.S. 7A-38.2, and rules and standards adopted pursuant to those sections. The Supreme Court may adopt additional rules and standards to implement this section, including an exemption from the provisions of G.S. 7A-38.1 for cases in which mediation was attempted under this section.
- Certification That Mediation Concluded. - Upon the conclusion of mediation, the mediator shall prepare a certification stating the date on which the mediation was concluded and the general results of the mediation, including, as applicable, that an agreement was reached, that mediation was attempted but an agreement was not reached, or that one or more parties, to be specified in the certification, failed or refused without good cause to attend one or more mediation meetings or otherwise participate in the mediation. The mediator shall file the original of the certification with the clerk and provide a copy to each party. Each party to the mediation has satisfied the requirements of this section upon the filing of the certification, except any party specified in the certification as having failed or refused to attend one or more mediation meetings or otherwise participate. The sanctions in G.S. 7A-38.1(g) do not apply to prelitigation mediation conducted under this section.
- Time Periods Tolled. - Time periods relating to the filing of a claim or the taking of other action with respect to an insurance claim, including any applicable statutes of limitations, shall be tolled upon the filing of a request for mediation under this section, until 30 days after the date on which the mediation is concluded as set forth in the mediator's certification or, if the mediator fails to set forth such date, until 30 days after the filing of the certification under subsection (d) of this section.
- Medical Malpractice Claims Excluded. - This section does not apply to claims seeking recovery for medical malpractice.
History
(2003-307, s. 2.)
§ 7A-38.3B. Mediation in matters within the jurisdiction of the clerk of superior court.
- Purpose. - The General Assembly finds that the clerk of superior court in the General Court of Justice should have the discretion and authority to order that mediation be conducted in matters within the clerk's jurisdiction in order to facilitate a more economical, efficient, and satisfactory resolution of those matters.
- Enabling Authority. - The clerk of superior court may order that mediation be conducted in any matter in which the clerk has exclusive or original jurisdiction, except for matters under Chapters 45 and 48 of the General Statutes and except in matters in which the jurisdiction of the clerk is ancillary. The Supreme Court may adopt rules to implement this section. Such mediations shall be conducted pursuant to this section and the Supreme Court rules as adopted.
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Attendance. - In those matters ordered to mediation pursuant to this section, the following persons or entities, along with their attorneys, may be ordered by the clerk to attend the mediation:
- Named parties.
- Interested persons, meaning persons or entities who have a right, interest, or claim in the matter; heirs or devisees in matters under Chapter 28A of the General Statutes, next of kin under Chapter 35A of the General Statutes, and other persons or entities as the clerk deems necessary for the adjudication of the matter. The meaning of "interested person" may vary according to the issues involved in the matter.
- Nonparty participants, meaning any other person or entity identified by the clerk as possessing useful information about the matter and whose attendance would be beneficial to the mediation.
- Fiduciaries, meaning persons or entities who serve as fiduciaries, as that term is defined by G.S. 36A-22.1, of named parties, interested persons, or nonparty participants.
- Selection of Mediator. - Persons ordered to mediation pursuant to this section have the right to designate a mediator in accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court implementing this section. Upon failure of those persons to agree upon a designation within the time established by rules of the Supreme Court, a mediator certified by the Dispute Resolution Commission pursuant to those rules shall be appointed by the clerk.
- Immunity. - Mediators acting pursuant to this section shall have judicial immunity in the same manner and to the same extent as a judge of the General Court of Justice, except that mediators may be disciplined in accordance with procedures adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to G.S. 7A-38.2.
- Costs of Mediation. - Costs of mediation under this section shall be borne by the named parties, interested persons, and fiduciaries ordered to attend the mediation. The rules adopted by the Supreme Court implementing this section shall set out the manner in which costs shall be paid and a method by which an opportunity to participate without cost shall be afforded to persons found by the clerk to be unable to pay their share of the costs of mediation. Costs may only be assessed against the estate of a decedent, the estate of an adjudicated or alleged incompetent, a trust corpus, or against a fiduciary upon the entry of a written order making specific findings of fact justifying the taxing of costs.
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Inadmissibility of Negotiations. - Evidence of statements made or conduct occurring during a mediation conducted pursuant to this section, whether attributable to any participant, mediator, expert, or neutral observer, shall not be subject to discovery
and shall be inadmissible in any proceeding in the matter or other civil actions on the same claim, except in:
- Proceedings for sanctions pursuant to this section;
- Proceedings to enforce or rescind a written and signed settlement agreement;
- Incompetency, guardianship, or estate proceedings in which a mediated agreement is presented to the clerk;
- Disciplinary hearings before the State Bar or the Dispute Resolution Commission; or
- Proceedings for abuse, neglect, or dependency of a juvenile, or for abuse, neglect, or exploitation of an adult, for which there is a duty to report under G.S. 7B-301 and Article 6 of Chapter 108A of the General Statutes, respectively.
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Testimony. - No mediator or neutral observer shall be compelled to testify or produce evidence concerning statements made and conduct occurring in anticipation of, during, or as a follow-up to the mediation in any civil proceeding for any purpose, including
proceedings to enforce or rescind a settlement of the matter except to attest to the signing of any agreements reached in mediation, and except in:
- Proceedings for sanctions pursuant to this section;
- Disciplinary hearings before the State Bar or the Dispute Resolution Commission; or
- Proceedings for abuse, neglect, or dependency of a juvenile, or for abuse, neglect, or exploitation of an adult, for which there is a duty to report under G.S. 7B-301 and Article 6 of Chapter 108A of the General Statutes, respectively.
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Agreements. - In matters before the clerk in which agreements are reached in a mediation conducted pursuant to this section, or during one of its recesses, those agreements shall be treated as follows:
- Where as a matter of law, a matter may be resolved by agreement of the parties, a settlement is enforceable only if it has been reduced to writing and signed by the parties against whom enforcement is sought or signed by their designees.
- In all other matters before the clerk, including guardianship and estate matters, all agreements shall be delivered to the clerk for consideration in deciding the matter.
- Sanctions. - Any person ordered to attend a mediation conducted pursuant to this section and rules of the Supreme Court who, without good cause, fails to attend the mediation or fails to pay any or all of the mediator's fee in compliance with this section and the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court to implement this section, is subject to the contempt powers of the clerk and monetary sanctions. The monetary sanctions may include the payment of fines, attorneys' fees, mediator fees, and the expenses and loss of earnings incurred by persons attending the mediation. If the clerk imposes sanctions, the clerk shall do so, after notice and a hearing, in a written order, making findings of fact and conclusions of law. An order imposing sanctions is reviewable by the superior court in accordance with G.S. 1-301.2 and G.S. 1-301.3, as applicable, and thereafter by the appellate courts in accordance with G.S. 7A-38.1(g).
- Authority to Supplement Procedural Details. - The clerk of superior court shall make all those orders just and necessary to safeguard the interests of all persons and may supplement all necessary procedural details not inconsistent with rules adopted by the Supreme Court implementing this section.
Any person or entity ordered to attend a mediation shall be notified of its date, time, and location and shall attend unless excused by rules of the Supreme Court or by order of the clerk. No one attending the mediation shall be required to make a settlement offer or demand that it deems contrary to its best interests.
No evidence otherwise discoverable shall be inadmissible merely because it is presented or discussed in mediation.
As used in this section, the term "neutral observer" includes persons seeking mediator certification, persons studying dispute resolution processes, and persons acting as interpreters.
History
(2005-67, s. 1; 2008-194, s. 8(b); 2015-57, s. 2; 2017-158, s. 26.7(c); 2021-47, s. 12(b).)
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2005-67, s. 5, made this section effective May 26, 2005, and applicable to all matters pending before a clerk of superior court on, or filed with the clerk after, the date the Supreme Court adopts rules implementing this act. The Rules Implementing Mediation in Matters Before the Clerk of Superior Court were adopted by the Supreme Court of North Carolina on January 26, 2006.
Session Laws 2015-57, s. 6, made the amendment to subsection (i) of this section by Session Laws 2015-57, s. 2, applicable to agreements entered into on or after July 1, 2015.
Session Laws 2021-47, s. 12(c), made the addition of "sought or signed by their designees" to the end of subdivision (i)(1) of this section by Session Laws 2021-47, s. 12(b), effective June 18, 2021, and applicable to settlement agreements reached on or after that date.
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2008-194, s. 8(b), effective January 1, 2009, rewrote subsection (j).
Session Laws 2015-57, s. 2, effective July 1, 2015, added "against whom enforcement is sought" at the end of subdivision (i)(1). For applicability, see editor's note.
Session Laws 2017-158, s. 26.7(c), effective July 21, 2017, in subdivisions (g)(4) and (h)(2), substituted "hearings" for "proceedings", deleted "North Carolina" preceding "State Bar", and substituted "the Dispute Resolution Commission" for "any agency established to enforce standards of conduct for mediators or other neutrals."
Session Laws 2021-47, s. 12(a), added "sought or signed by their designees" to the end of subdivision (i)(1). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.
§ 7A-38.3C: Repealed by Session Laws 2007-419, s. 4, effective August 21, 2007.
Cross References. - As to authority for electric suppliers to enter into agreements and for Utilities Commission to resolve disputes, see G.S. 160A-331.2.
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2007-419, s. 4, provides in part: "Any disputes submitted to the Public Staff of the North Carolina Utilities Commission pursuant to G.S. 7A-38.3C(i) are transferred to the North Carolina Utilities Commission to be considered by the Commission pursuant to G.S. 160A-331.2(c), as enacted by this act, and the Commission shall exercise its jurisdiction upon payment of the filing fee required by that subsection by the petitioner."
§ 7A-38.3D. Mediation in matters within the jurisdiction of the district criminal courts.
- Purpose. - The General Assembly finds that it is in the public interest to promote high standards for persons who mediate matters in district criminal court. To that end, a program of certification for these mediators shall be established in judicial districts designated by the Dispute Resolution Commission and the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts and in which the chief district court judge, the district attorney, and the community mediation center agree to participate. This section does not supersede G.S. 7A-38.5.
- Enabling Authority. - In each district, the court may encourage mediation for any criminal district court action pending in the district, and the district attorney may delay prosecution of those actions so that the mediation may take place.
- Program Administration. - A community mediation center established under G.S. 7A-38.5 and located in a district designated under subsection (a) of this section shall assist the court in administering a program providing mediation services in district criminal court cases. A community mediation center may assist in the screening and scheduling of cases for mediation and provide certified volunteer or staff mediators to conduct district criminal court mediations.
- Rules of Procedure. - The Supreme Court shall adopt rules to implement this section. Each mediation shall be conducted pursuant to this section and the Supreme Court Rules as adopted.
- Mediator Authority. - In the mediator's discretion, any person whose presence and participation may assist in resolving the dispute or addressing any issues underlying the mediation may be permitted to attend and participate. The mediator shall have discretion to exclude any individual who seeks to attend the mediation but whose participation the mediator deems would be counterproductive. Lawyers for the participants may attend and participate in the mediation.
- Mediator Qualification. - The Supreme Court shall establish requirements for the certification or qualification of mediators serving under this section. The Court shall also establish requirements for the qualification of training programs and trainers, including community mediation center staff, that train these mediators. The Court shall also adopt rules regulating the conduct of these mediators and trainers.
- Oversight and Evaluation. - The Supreme Court may require community mediation centers and their volunteer or staff mediators to collect and report caseload statistics, referral sources, fees collected, and any other information deemed essential for program oversight and evaluation purposes.
- Immunity. - A mediator under this section has judicial immunity in the same manner and to the same extent as a judge of the General Court of Justice, except that a mediator may be disciplined in accordance with procedures adopted by the Supreme Court. A community mediation center and its staff involved in supplying volunteer or staff mediators or other personnel to schedule cases or perform other duties under this section are immune from suit in any civil action, except in any case of willful or wanton misconduct.
- Confidentiality. - Any memorandum, work note, or product of the mediator and any case file maintained by a community mediation center acting under this section and any mediator certification application are confidential.
- Inadmissibility of Negotiations. - Evidence of any statement made and conduct occurring during a mediation under this section shall not be subject to discovery and shall be inadmissible in any proceeding in the action from which the mediation arises. Any participant in a mediation conducted under this section, including the mediator, may report to law enforcement personnel any statement made or conduct occurring during the mediation process that threatens or threatened the safety of any person or property. A mediator has discretion to warn a person whose safety or property has been threatened. No evidence otherwise discoverable is inadmissible for the reason it is presented or discussed in a mediated settlement conference or other settlement proceeding under this section.
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Testimony. - No mediator or neutral observer present at the mediation shall be compelled to testify or produce evidence concerning statements made and conduct occurring in or related to a mediation conducted under this section in any proceeding in the
same action for any purpose, except in:
- Proceedings for abuse, neglect, or dependency of a juvenile, or for abuse, neglect, or exploitation of an adult, for which there is a duty to report under G.S. 7B-301 and Article 6 of Chapter 108A of the General Statutes, respectively.
- Disciplinary hearings before the State Bar or the Dispute Resolution Commission.
- Proceedings in which the mediator acts as a witness pursuant to subsection (j) of this section.
- Trials of a felony, during which a presiding judge may compel the disclosure of any evidence arising out of the mediation, excluding a statement made by the defendant in the action under mediation, if it is to be introduced in the trial or disposition of the felony and the judge determines that the introduction of the evidence is necessary to the proper administration of justice and the evidence cannot be obtained from any other source.
- Written Agreements. - Any agreement reached in mediation is enforceable only if it has been reduced to writing and signed by the parties against whom enforcement is sought. A non-attorney mediator may assist parties in reducing the agreement to writing.
- Dispute Resolution Fee. - A dispute resolution fee shall be assessed and paid to the clerk in advance of mediation as set forth in G.S. 7A-38.7. By agreement, all or any portion of the fee may be paid by a person other than the defendant.
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Definitions. - As used in this section, the following definitions apply:
- Court. - A district court judge, a district attorney, or the designee of a district court judge or district attorney.
- Neutral observer. - Includes any person seeking mediator certification, any person studying any dispute resolution process, and any person acting as an interpreter.
History
(2007-387, s. 1; 2012-194, s. 63.3(b); 2015-57, s. 3; 2016-107, s. 7; 2017-158, s. 26.7(d).)
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2007-387, s. 4, provides: "The Supreme Court shall adopt rules under G.S. 7A-38.3D(d), as enacted in Section 1 of this act, and shall establish requirements for the certification or qualification under G.S. 7A-38.3D(f), as enacted by Section 1 of this act, no later than January 1, 2008." The Rules Implementing Mediation in Matters Pending in District Criminal Court were adopted by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, effective November 8, 2007.
Session Laws 2007-387, s. 5, provides: "This act is effective when it becomes law [August 19, 2007] and applies to mediations conducted on and after the date the Supreme Court adopts rules and requirements for the certification or qualification under Section 4 of this act."
Session Laws 2015-57, s. 6, made the amendment to subsection ( l ) of this section by Session Laws 2015-57, s. 3, applicable to agreements entered into on or after July 1, 2015.
Session Laws 2016-107, s. 10, made the amendment to subsection (m) of this section by Session Laws 2016-107, s. 7, applicable to criminal cases referred to mediation on or after October 1, 2016.
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2012-194, s. 63.3(b), effective December 1, 2012, deleted the former last sentence in subsection (m), which read: "The judge may in the judge's discretion waive the fee for good cause shown." For applicability, see editor's note.
Session Laws 2015-57, s. 3, effective July 1, 2015, in the first sentence of subsection ( l ), substituted "mediation is enforceable only if it has been" for "mediation shall be" and added "against whom enforcement is sought" at the end. For applicability, see editor's note.
Session Laws 2016-107, s. 7, effective October 1, 2016, in subsection (m), substituted "Dispute Resolution" for "Dismissal" and "A dispute resolution fee shall be assessed and paid to the clerk in advance of mediation as set forth in G.S. 7A-38.7" for "Where an agreement has been reached in mediation and the case will be dismissed, the defendant shall pay to the clerk the dismissal fee of court set forth in G.S. 7A-38.7." See editor's note for applicability.
Session Laws 2017-158, s. 26.7(d), effective July 21, 2017, in subdivision (k)(2), substituted "hearings" for "proceedings", deleted "North Carolina" preceding "State Bar", and substituted "the Dispute Resolution Commission" for "any agency established to enforce standards of conduct for mediators."
§ 7A-38.3E. Mediation of public records disputes.
- Voluntary Mediation. - The parties to a public records dispute under Chapter 132 of the General Statutes may agree at any time prior to filing a civil action under Chapter 132 of the General Statutes to mediation of the dispute under the provisions of this section. Mediation of a public records dispute shall be initiated by filing a request for mediation with the clerk of superior court in a county in which the action may be brought.
- Mandatory Mediation. - Subsequent to filing a civil action under Chapter 132 of the General Statutes, a person shall initiate mediation pursuant to this section. Such mediation shall be initiated no later than 30 days from the filing of responsive pleadings with the clerk in the county where the action is filed.
- Initiation of Mediation. - The Administrative Office of the Courts shall prescribe a request for mediation form. The party filing the request for mediation shall mail a copy of the request by certified mail, return receipt requested, to each party to the dispute. The clerk shall provide each party with a list of mediators certified by the Dispute Resolution Commission. If the parties agree in writing to the selection of a mediator from that list, the clerk shall appoint that mediator selected by the parties. If the parties do not agree on the selection of a mediator, the party filing the request for mediation shall bring the matter to the attention of the clerk, and a mediator shall be appointed by the senior resident superior court judge. The clerk shall notify the mediator and the parties of the appointment of the mediator.
- Mediation Procedure. - Except as otherwise expressly provided in this section, mediation under this section shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions for mediated settlement of civil cases in G.S. 7A-38.1 and G.S. 7A-38.2 and rules and standards adopted pursuant to those sections. The Supreme Court may adopt additional rules and standards to implement this section, including an exemption from the provisions of G.S. 7A-38.1 for cases in which mediation was attempted under this section.
- Waiver of Mediation. - The parties to the dispute may waive the mediation required by this section by informing the mediator of the parties' waiver in writing. No costs shall be assessed to any party if all parties waive mediation prior to the occurrence of an initial mediation meeting.
- Certification That Mediation Concluded. - Immediately upon a waiver of mediation under subsection (e) of this section or upon the conclusion of mediation, the mediator shall prepare a certification stating the date on which the mediation was concluded and the general results of the mediation, including, as applicable, that the parties waived the mediation, that an agreement was reached, that mediation was attempted but an agreement was not reached, or that one or more parties, to be specified in the certification, failed or refused without good cause to attend one or more mediation meetings or otherwise participate in the mediation. The mediator shall file the original of the certification with the clerk and provide a copy to each party.
- Time Periods Tolled. - Time periods relating to the filing of a claim or the taking of other action with respect to a public records dispute, including any applicable statutes of limitations, shall be tolled upon the filing of a request for mediation under this section, until 30 days after the date on which the mediation is concluded as set forth in the mediator's certification, or if the mediator fails to set forth such date, until 30 days after the filing of the certification under subsection (f) of this section.
- [Other Remedies Not Affected.] -. Nothing in this section shall prevent a party seeking production of public records from seeking injunctive or other relief, including production of public records prior to any scheduled mediation.
History
(2010-169, s. 21(a).)
Editor's Note. - The bracketed catchline in subsection (h) was inserted at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.
Session Laws 2010-169, s. 21(d), made this section effective October 1, 2010, and applicable to actions filed on or after that date.
CASE NOTES
Failure to Comply. - Trial court erred in determining that two documents were subject to disclosure under State's Public Records Act and in ordering them to be produced under seal to an applicant because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to enter the challenged order inasmuch as the applicant conceded that he did not initiate mediation within 30 days of the town's filing of a responsive pleading. Tillett v. Town of Kill Devil Hills,
257 N.C. App. 223, 809 S.E.2d 145 (2017).
§ 7A-38.3F. Prelitigation mediation of condominium and homeowners association disputes.
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Definitions. - The following definitions apply in this section:
- Association. - An association of unit or lot owners organized as allowed under North Carolina law, including G.S. 47C-3-101 and G.S. 47F-3-101.
- Dispute. - Any matter relating to real estate under the jurisdiction of an association about which the member and association cannot agree. The term "dispute" does not include matters expressly exempted in subsection (b) of this section.
- Executive board. - The body, regardless of name, designated in the declaration to act on behalf of an association.
- Mediator. - A neutral person who acts to encourage and facilitate a resolution of a dispute between an association and a member.
- Member. - A person who is a member of an association of unit or lot owners organized as allowed under North Carolina law, including G.S. 47C-3-101 and G.S. 47F-3-101.
- Party or parties. - An association or member who is involved in a dispute, as that term is defined in subdivision (2) of this subsection.
- Voluntary Prelitigation Mediation. - Prior to filing a civil action, the parties to a dispute arising under Chapter 47C of the General Statutes (North Carolina Condominium Act), Chapter 47F of the General Statutes (North Carolina Planned Community Act), or an association's declaration, bylaws, or rules and regulations are encouraged to initiate mediation pursuant to this section. However, disputes related solely to a member's failure to timely pay an association assessment or any fines or fees associated with the levying or collection of an association assessment are not covered under this section.
- Initiation of Mediation. - Either an association or a member may contact the North Carolina Dispute Resolution Commission or the Mediation Network of North Carolina for the name of a mediator or community mediation center. Upon contacting a mediator, either the association or member may supply to the mediator the physical address of the other party, or the party's representative, and the party's telephone number and e-mail address, if known. The mediator shall contact the party, or the party's representative, to notify him or her of the request to mediate. If the parties agree to mediate, they shall request in writing that the mediator schedule the mediation. The mediator shall then notify the parties in writing of the date, time, and location of the mediation, which shall be scheduled not later than 25 days after the mediator receives the written request from the parties.
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Mediation Procedure. - The following procedures shall apply to mediation under this section:
- Attendance. - The mediator shall determine who may attend mediation. The mediator may require the executive board or a large group of members to designate one or more persons to serve as their representatives in the mediation.
- All parties are expected to attend mediation. The mediator may allow a party to participate in mediation by telephone or other electronic means if the mediator determines that the party has a compelling reason to do so.
- If the parties cannot reach a final agreement in mediation because to do so would require the approval of the full executive board or the approval of a majority or some other percentage of the members of the association, the mediator may recess the mediation meeting to allow the executive board or members to review and vote on the agreement.
- Decline Mediation. - Either party to a dispute may decline mediation under this section. If either party declines mediation after mediation has been initiated under subsection (c) of this section but mediation has not been held, the party declining mediation shall inform the mediator and the other party in writing of his or her decision to decline mediation. No costs shall be assessed to any party if either party declines mediation prior to the occurrence of an initial mediation meeting.
- Costs of Mediation. - The costs of mediation, including the mediator's fees, shall be shared equally by the parties unless otherwise agreed to by the parties. Fees shall be due and payable at the end of each mediation meeting. When an attorney represents a party to the mediation, that party shall pay his or her attorneys' fees.
- Certification That Mediation Concluded. - Upon the conclusion of mediation, the mediator shall prepare a certification stating the date on which the mediation was concluded and a statement that an agreement was reached or that mediation was attempted but an agreement was not reached. If both parties participate in mediation and a cause of action involving the dispute mediated is later filed, either party may file the certificate with the clerk of court, and the parties shall not be required to mediate again under any provision of law.
- Inadmissibility of Evidence. - Evidence of statements made and conduct occurring during mediation under this section shall not be subject to discovery and shall be inadmissible in any proceeding in a civil action arising from the dispute which was the subject of that mediation; except proceedings to enforce or rescind a settlement agreement reached at that mediation, disciplinary proceedings before the State Bar or Dispute Resolution Commission, or proceedings to enforce laws concerning juvenile or elder abuse. No evidence otherwise discoverable shall be inadmissible merely because it is presented or discussed in a mediation under this section.
- Time Periods Tolled. - Time periods relating to the filing of a civil action, including any applicable statutes of limitations or statutes of repose, with respect to a dispute described in subsection (a) of this section, shall be tolled upon the initiation of mediation under this section until 30 days after the date on which the mediation is concluded as set forth in the mediator's certification. For purposes of this section, "initiation of mediation" shall be defined as the date upon which both parties have signed the written request to schedule the mediation.
- Association Duty to Notify. - Each association shall, in writing, notify the members of the association each year that they may initiate mediation under this section to try to resolve a dispute with the association. The association shall publish the notice required in this subsection on the association's Web site; but if the association does not have a Web site, the association shall publish the notice at the same time and in the same manner as the names and addresses of all officers and board members of the association are published as provided in G.S. 47C-3-103 and G.S. 47F-3-103.
No mediator shall be compelled to testify or produce evidence concerning statements made and conduct occurring in anticipation of, during, or as a follow-up to a mediation pursuant to this section in any civil proceeding for any purpose, including proceedings to enforce or rescind the settlement agreement; except in disciplinary hearings before the State Bar or Dispute Resolution Commission and proceedings to enforce laws concerning juvenile or elder abuse, and except in proceedings to enforce or rescind an agreement reached in a mediation under this section, but only to attest to the signing of the agreement.
History
(2013-127, s. 1.)
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2013-127, s. 2, made this section effective July 1, 2013, and applicable to all homeowners and condominium association disputes not specifically exempted by this act that occur on or after July 1, 2013.
§ 7A-38.4: Repealed by Session Laws 2001-320, s. 1, effective October 1, 2001.
Cross References. - As to settlement procedures in district court actions, see G.S. 7A-38.4A.
§ 7A-38.4A. Settlement procedures in district court actions.
- The General Assembly finds that a system of settlement events should be established to facilitate the settlement of district court actions involving equitable distribution, alimony, or support and to make that litigation more economical, efficient, and satisfactory to the parties, their representatives, and the State. District courts should be able to require parties to those actions and their representatives to attend a pretrial mediated settlement conference or other settlement procedure conducted under this section and rules adopted by the Supreme Court to implement this section.
- The definitions in G.S. 7A-38.1(b)(2) and (b)(3) apply in this section.
- Any chief district court judge in a judicial district may order a mediated settlement conference or another settlement procedure, as provided under subsection (g) of this section, for any action pending in that district involving issues of equitable distribution, alimony, child or post separation support, or claims arising out of contracts between the parties under G.S. 52-10, G.S. 52-10.1, or Chapter 52B of the General Statutes. The chief district court judge may adopt local rules that order settlement procedures in all of the foregoing actions and designate other district court judges or administrative personnel to issue orders implementing those settlement procedures. However, local rules adopted by a chief district court judge shall not be inconsistent with any rules adopted by the Supreme Court.
- The parties to a district court action where a mediated settlement conference or other settlement procedure is ordered, their attorneys, and other persons or entities with authority, by law or contract, to settle a party's claim, shall attend the mediated settlement conference or other settlement procedure, unless the rules ordering the settlement procedure provide otherwise. No party or other participant in a mediated settlement conference or other settlement procedure is required to make a settlement offer or demand that the party or participant deems contrary to that party's or participant's best interests. Parties who have been victims of domestic violence may be excused from physically attending or participating in a mediated settlement conference or other settlement procedure.
- Any person required to attend a mediated settlement conference or other settlement procedure under this section who, without good cause fails to attend or fails to pay any or all of the mediator or other neutral's fee in compliance with this section is subject to the contempt powers of the court and monetary sanctions imposed by a district court judge. A party seeking sanctions against another party or person shall do so in a written motion stating the grounds for the motion and the relief sought. The motion shall be served upon all parties and upon any person against whom sanctions are being sought. The court may initiate sanction proceedings upon its own motion by the entry of a show cause order. If the court imposes sanctions, it shall do so, after notice and hearing, in a written order making findings of fact and conclusions of law. An order imposing sanctions is reviewable upon appeal, and the entire record shall be reviewed to determine whether the order is supported by substantial evidence.
- The parties to a district court action in which a mediated settlement conference is to be held under this section shall have the right to designate a mediator. Upon failure of the parties to designate within the time established by the rules adopted by the Supreme Court, a mediator shall be appointed by a district court judge.
- A chief district court judge or that judge's designee, at the request of a party and with the consent of all parties, may order the parties to attend and participate in any other settlement procedure authorized by rules adopted by the Supreme Court or adopted by local district court rules, in lieu of attending a mediated settlement conference. Neutrals acting under this section shall be selected and compensated in accordance with rules adopted by the Supreme Court. Nothing herein shall prohibit the parties from participating in other dispute resolution procedures, including arbitration, to the extent authorized under State or federal law. Nothing herein shall prohibit the parties from participating in mediation at a community mediation center operating under G.S. 7A-38.5.
- Mediators and other neutrals acting under this section shall have judicial immunity in the same manner and to the same extent as a judge of the General Court of Justice, except that mediators and other neutrals may be disciplined in accordance with enforcement procedures adopted by the Supreme Court under G.S. 7A-38.2.
- Costs of mediated settlement conferences and other settlement procedures shall be borne by the parties. Unless otherwise ordered by the court or agreed to by the parties, the mediator's fees shall be paid in equal shares by the parties. The rules adopted by the Supreme Court shall set out a method whereby a party found by the court to be unable to pay the costs of settlement procedures is afforded an opportunity to participate without cost to that party and without expenditure of State funds.
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Evidence of statements made and conduct occurring in a mediated settlement conference or other settlement proceeding conducted under this section, whether attributable to a party, the mediator, other neutral, or a neutral observer present at the settlement
proceeding, shall not be subject to discovery and shall be inadmissible in any proceeding in the action or other civil actions on the same claim, except:
- In proceedings for sanctions under this section;
- In proceedings to enforce or rescind a settlement of the action;
- In disciplinary proceedings before the State Bar or the Dispute Resolution Commission; or
- In proceedings to enforce laws concerning juvenile or elder abuse.
- The Supreme Court may adopt standards for the certification and conduct of mediators and other neutrals who participate in settlement procedures conducted under this section. The standards may also regulate mediator training programs. The Supreme Court may adopt procedures for the enforcement of those standards. The administration of mediator certification, regulation of mediator conduct, and decertification shall be conducted through the Dispute Resolution Commission.
- An administrative fee not to exceed two hundred dollars ($200.00) may be charged by the Administrative Office of the Courts to applicants for certification and annual renewal of certification for mediators and mediator training programs operating under this section. The fees collected may be used by the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts to establish and maintain the operations of the Commission and its staff. The administrative fee shall be set by the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts in consultation with the Dispute Resolution Commission.
- The Administrative Office of the Courts, in consultation with the Dispute Resolution Commission, may require the chief district court judge of any district to report statistical data about settlement procedures conducted under this section for administrative purposes.
- Nothing in this section or in rules adopted by the Supreme Court implementing this section shall restrict a party's right to a trial by jury.
- The Supreme Court may adopt rules to implement this section.
As used in this subsection, the term "neutral observer" includes persons seeking mediator certification, persons studying dispute resolution processes, and persons acting as interpreters.
No settlement agreement to resolve any or all issues reached at the proceeding conducted under this section or during its recesses shall be enforceable unless it has been reduced to writing and signed by the parties against whom enforcement is sought and in all other respects complies with the requirements of Chapter 50 of the General Statutes. No evidence otherwise discoverable shall be inadmissible merely because it is presented or discussed in a settlement proceeding.
No mediator, other neutral, or neutral observer present at a settlement proceeding under this section, shall be compelled to testify or produce evidence concerning statements made and conduct occurring in anticipation of, during, or as a follow-up to a mediated settlement conference or other settlement proceeding pursuant to this section in any civil proceeding for any purpose, including proceedings to enforce or rescind a settlement of the action, except to attest to the signing of any agreements, and except proceedings for sanctions under this section, disciplinary hearings before the State Bar or the Dispute Resolution Commission, and proceedings to enforce laws concerning juvenile or elder abuse.
History
(1997-229, s. 1; 1998-212, s. 16.19(a); 1999-354, s. 6; 2000-140, s. 1; 2001-320, s. 2; 2001-487, s. 39; 2005-167, s. 3; 2008-194, s. 8(c); 2015-57, s. 4; 2017-158, s. 26.7(b).)
Editor's Note. - This section was enacted by Session Laws 2001-320, which repealed G.S. 7A-38.4, pertaining to a similar subject matter. The historical citation to repealed G.S. 7A-38.4 has been placed under this section at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.
Session Laws 2015-57, s. 6, made the amendment to subsection (j) of this section by Session Laws 2015-57, s. 4, applicable to agreements entered into on or after July 1, 2015.
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2008-194, s. 8(c), effective January 1, 2009, rewrote subsection (e).
Session Laws 2015-57, s. 4, effective July 1, 2015, inserted "against whom enforcement is sought" in the first sentence of the second paragraph following subdivision (j)(4). For applicability, see editor's note.
Session Laws 2017-158, s. 26.7(b), effective July 21, 2017, substituted "the Dispute Resolution Commission;" for "any agency established to enforce standards of conduct for mediators or other neutrals;" in subdivision (j)(3); and substituted "the Dispute Resolution Commission," for "any agency established to enforce standards of conduct for mediators or other neutrals," in the last sentence of the ending undesignated paragraph of subsection (j).
Legal Periodicals. - For article, "The Best Interests of the Child: Article & Empirical Study: it's the Conflict, Stupid: An Empirical Study of Factors that Inhibit Successful Medication in High-Conflict Custody Cases," see 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 505 (2008).
§ 7A-38.5. Community mediation centers.
- The General Assembly finds that it is in the public interest to encourage the establishment of community mediation centers, also known as dispute settlement centers or dispute resolution centers, to support the work of these centers in facilitating communication, understanding, reconciliation, and settlement of conflicts in communities, courts, and schools, and to promote the widest possible use of these centers by the courts and law enforcement officials across the State. A center may establish and charge fees for its services other than for criminal court mediations. Fees for criminal court mediation are set forth in G.S. 7A-38.7, and centers and mediators shall not charge any other fees in such cases.
- Community mediation centers, functioning as or within nonprofit organizations and local governmental entities, may receive referrals from courts, law enforcement agencies, and other public entities for the purpose of facilitating communication, understanding, reconciliation, and settlement of conflicts.
- Each chief district court judge and district attorney shall encourage mediation for any criminal district court action pending in the district when the judge and district attorney determine that mediation is an appropriate alternative.
- Each chief district court judge shall encourage mediation for any civil district court action pending in the district when the judge determines that mediation is an appropriate alternative.
- Except as provided in this subsection and subsection (f) of this section, each chief district court judge and district attorney shall refer any misdemeanor criminal action in district court that is generated by a citizen-initiated arrest warrant or criminal summons to the local mediation center for resolution, except for (i) any case involving domestic violence; (ii) any case in which the judge or the district attorney determine that mediation would be inappropriate; or (iii) any case being tried in a county in which mediation services are not available. The mediation center shall have 45 days to resolve each case and report back to the court with a resolution. The district attorney shall delay prosecution in order for the mediation to occur. If the case is not resolved through mediation within 45 days of referral, or if any party declines to enter into mediation, the court may proceed with the case as a criminal action. For purposes of this section, the term "citizen-initiated arrest warrant or criminal summons" means a warrant or summons issued pursuant to G.S. 15A-303 or G.S. 15A-304 by a magistrate or other judicial official based upon information supplied through the oath or affirmation of a private citizen.
- Any prosecutorial district may opt out of the mandatory mediation under subsection (e) of this section if the district attorney files a statement with the chief district court judge declaring that subsection shall not apply within the prosecutorial district.
- Nothing in this section is intended to prohibit or delay the appointment or engagement of an attorney for a defendant in a criminal case.
History
(1999-354, s. 1; 2011-145, s. 31.24(b); 2012-194, s. 63.3(a); 2016-107, s. 8.)
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2012-194, s. 63.3(c), made subsections (e) and (f), as added by Session Laws 2012-194, s. 63.3(a), applicable to offenses committed on or after December 1, 2012.
Session Laws 2016-107, s. 10, made the amendment to subsections (a) and (e) and the addition of subsection (g) of this section by Session Laws 2016-107, s. 8, applicable to criminal cases referred to mediation on or after October 1, 2016.
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-145, s. 31.24(b), effective July 1, 2011, added the last sentence in subsection (a).
Session Laws 2012-194, s. 63.3(a), effective December 1, 2012, added subsections (e) and (f). For applicability, see editor's note.
Session Laws 2016-107, s. 8, effective October 1, 2016, in subsection (a), inserted "other than for criminal court mediations" in the next to last sentence and added the last sentence; in subsection (e), inserted "or criminal summons" in the first sentence, substituted "45 days" for "30 days" in the second and fourth sentences, inserted "or if any party declines to enter into mediation" in the fourth sentence, and inserted "or criminal summons," "or summons" and "G.S. 15A-303 or" in the last sentence; and added subsection (g). See editor's note for applicability.
Legal Periodicals. - For case note, "Nunn v. Allen, Living Separate and Apart in North Carolina, Separation Agreements, Sex, the Meaning of Unmarried, and Liability of Third Parties," 25 N.C. Cent. L.J. 242 (2003).
§ 7A-38.6: Repealed by Session Laws 2014-100, s. 18B.1(g), effective July 1, 2014.
History
(2001-424, s. 22.2; 2003-284, s. 13.15(c); 2006-66, s. 14.12; 2006-203, s. 10; 2009-570, s. 28; 2011-145, s. 31.24(c); repealed by 2014-100, s. 18B.1(g), effective July 1, 2014.)
Editor's Note. - Former G.S. 7A-38.6 pertained to reporting requirements for community mediation centers and the Mediation Network of North Carolina.
Session Laws 2014-100, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as 'The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2014.'"
Session Laws 2014-100, s. 38.7, is a severability clause.
§ 7A-38.7. Dispute resolution fee for cases referred to mediation.
- In each criminal case filed in the General Court of Justice that is referred to a community mediation center, a dispute resolution fee shall be assessed in the sum of sixty dollars ($60.00) per mediation of that criminal case, in accordance with subsection (c) of this section, to support the services provided by the community mediation centers and the Mediation Network of North Carolina. Prior to mediation, the court shall cause the mediation participants to be informed that the dispute resolution fee shall be paid as part of any mediation of a criminal case. The fee shall be paid to the clerk in advance of the mediation. Fees assessed under this section shall be paid to the clerk of superior court in the county where the case was filed and remitted by the clerk to the Mediation Network of North Carolina. The Mediation Network may retain up to three dollars ($3.00) of this amount as an allowance for its administrative expenses. The Mediation Network must remit the remainder of this amount to the community mediation center that mediated the case. The court may waive or reduce a fee assessed under this section only upon entry of a written order, supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law, determining there is just cause to grant the waiver or reduction.
- Before providing the district attorney with a dismissal form, the community mediation center shall require proof that the defendant has paid the dispute resolution fee as required by subsection (a) of this section and shall attach the receipt to the dismissal form.
- All related criminal charges per defendant that are subject to mediation shall be treated as a single criminal case for the purpose of calculating the sixty-dollar ($60.00) dispute resolution fee. In advance of the mediation, the participants, including all complainants, defendants, and other parties to the mediation, shall discuss whether the dispute resolution fee shall be allocated between them. If the participants do not reach agreement on an allocation of the dispute resolution fee, then the fee shall be the responsibility of the defendant, unless the court waives or reduces the fee upon entry of a written order, supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law, determining there is just cause to waive or reduce the fee. In connection with any mediation subject to this section, no mediator or any other community mediation center volunteer or employee shall receive any payment directly from any participant in the mediation, regardless of whether the payment is a dispute resolution fee, cost of court, restitution, or any other fee required by law or court order. No mediator or community mediation center shall charge or collect any fees for mediating criminal cases other than the dispute resolution fee assessed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section.
History
(2002-126, s. 29A.11(a); 2003-284, s. 13.13; 2011-145, s. 31.24(d); 2012-142, s. 16.6(a); 2016-107, s. 9.)
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2012-142, s. 16.6(c), made the amendments to this section by Session Laws 2012-142, s. 16.6(a), applicable to fees waived on or after July 1, 2012.
Session Laws 2012-142, s. 1.2, provides: "This act shall be known as 'The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2012.'"
Session Laws 2012-142, s. 27.7 is a severability clause.
Session Laws 2016-107, s. 10, made the amendment to this section by Session Laws 2016-107, s. 9, applicable to criminal cases referred to mediation on or after October 1, 2016.
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-145, s. 31.24(d), effective July 1, 2011, in subsection (a), in the first sentence, substituted "to support the services provided by the community mediation centers and the Mediation Network of North Carolina" for "for the support of the General Court of Justice," in the second sentence, substituted "Mediation Network of North Carolina" for "State Treasurer," and added the last two sentences.
Session Laws 2012-142, s. 16.6(a), effective July 1, 2012, added the last sentence to subsection (a). For applicability, see editor's note.
Session Laws 2016-107, s. 9, effective October 1, 2016, in section heading, substituted "referred to" for "resolved in"; in subsection (a), substituted "referred" for "resolved through referral" and inserted "of that criminal case, in accordance with subsection (c) of this section" in first sentence, and added the second and third sentences; and added subsection (c). See editor's note for applicability.
§ 7A-39. Cancellation of court sessions and closing court offices; extension of statutes of limitations and other emergency orders in catastrophic conditions.
- Cancellation of Court Sessions, Closing Court Offices. - In response to adverse weather or other emergency situations, including catastrophic conditions, any session of any court of the General Court of Justice may be cancelled, postponed, or altered by judicial officials, and court offices may be closed by judicial branch hiring authorities, pursuant to uniform statewide guidelines prescribed by the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts. As used in this section, "catastrophic conditions" means any set of circumstances that makes it impossible or extremely hazardous for judicial officials, employees, parties, witnesses, or other persons with business before the courts to reach a courthouse, or that creates a significant risk of physical harm to persons in a courthouse, or that would otherwise convince a reasonable person to avoid traveling to or being in a courthouse.
-
Authority of Chief Justice. - When the Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court determines and declares that catastrophic conditions exist or have existed in one or more counties of the State, the Chief Justice may by order entered pursuant to
this subsection:
- Extend, to a date certain no fewer than 10 days after the effective date of the order, the time or period of limitation within which pleadings, motions, notices, and other documents and papers may be timely filed and other acts may be timely done in civil actions, criminal actions, estates, and special proceedings in each county named in the order. The Chief Justice may enter an order under this subsection during the catastrophic conditions or at any time after such conditions have ceased to exist. The order shall be in writing and shall become effective for each affected county upon the date set forth in the order, and if no date is set forth in the order, then upon the date the order is signed by the Chief Justice.
- Issue any emergency directives that, notwithstanding any other provision of law, are necessary to ensure the continuing operation of essential trial or appellate court functions, including the designation or assignment of judicial officials who may be authorized to act in the general or specific matters stated in the emergency order, and the designation of the county or counties and specific locations within the State where such matters may be heard, conducted, or otherwise transacted. The Chief Justice may enter such emergency orders under this subsection in response to existing or impending catastrophic conditions or their consequences. An emergency order under this subsection shall expire the sooner of the date stated in the order, or 30 days from issuance of the order, but the order may be extended in whole or in part by the Chief Justice for additional 30-day periods if the Chief Justice determines that the directives remain necessary.
- In Chambers Jurisdiction Not Affected. - Nothing in this section prohibits a judge or other judicial officer from exercising, during adverse weather or other emergency situations, including catastrophic conditions, any in chambers or ex parte jurisdiction conferred by law upon that judge or judicial officer, as provided by law. The effectiveness of any such exercise shall not be affected by a determination by the Chief Justice that catastrophic conditions existed at the time it was exercised.
- Nothing in this section shall be construed to abrogate or diminish the inherent judicial powers of the Chief Justice or the Judicial Branch.
History
(2000-166, s. 1; 2006-187, s. 6; 2009-516, s. 11.)
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2006-187, s. 6, effective August 3, 2006, in the section heading, substituted "Cancellation" for "Adverse weather cancellation"; in subsection (a), deleted "comparable" preceding "emergency situations"; in subsection (b), substituted "Justice" for "Justice to Extend Statutes of Limitations" in the subheading, and added "or period of limitation"; in subdivision (b)(1), deleted "including conditions that may result from hurricane, tornado, flood, snowstorm, ice storm, other severe natural disaster, fire, or riot" from the end; and in subdivision (b)(2), substituted "the date set forth in the order, and if no date is set forth in the order, then upon the date the order is signed by the Chief Justice" for "being filed in the office of the clerk of superior court of that county."
Session Laws 2009-516, s. 11, effective August 26, 2009, in the section heading, inserted "and other emergency orders"; in subsection (a), inserted "including catastrophic conditions" in the first sentence, and added the last sentence; in subsection (b), designated the previously existing provisions as subsection (b) and subdivision (b)(1), and made a related punctuation change; in the introductory language of subsection (b), deleted "extend" from the end; in subdivision (b)(1), added "Extend" at the beginning, deleted "(1) Catastrophic conditions defined. - As used in this subsection, 'catastrophic conditions' means any set of circumstances that make it impossible or extremely hazardous for judicial officials, employees, parties, witnesses, or other persons with business before the courts to reach a courthouse, or that create a significant risk of physical harm to persons in a courthouse, or that would otherwise convince a reasonable person to avoid travelling to or being in the courthouse. (2) Entry of order. - " following the first sentence, and, substituted "during the catastrophic conditions or at any time after such" for "at any time after catastrophic" in the second sentence; added subdivision (b)(2); in subsection (c), inserted "including catastrophic conditions" in the first sentence, and added subsection (d).
ARTICLE 6. Retirement of Justices and Judges of the Appellate Division; Retirement Compensation; Recall to Emergency Service; Disability Retirement.
Sec.
§ 7A-39.1. Justice, emergency justice, judge and emergency judge defined.
- As herein used "justice of the Supreme Court" includes the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and "judge of the Court of Appeals" includes the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, unless the context clearly indicates a contrary intent.
- As used herein, "emergency justice", "emergency judge", or "emergency recall judge" means any justice of the Supreme Court or any judge of the Court of Appeals, respectively, who has retired subject to recall for temporary service.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1; 1985, c. 698, s. 16(a); 1995, c. 108, s. 2.)
CASE NOTES
Cited in Gentry v. Uniform Judicial Retirement Sys., 378 F. Supp. 1 (M.D.N.C. 1974).
§ 7A-39.2. Age and service requirements for retirement of justices of the Supreme Court and judges of the Court of Appeals.
- Any justice of the Supreme Court or judge of the Court of Appeals who has attained the age of 65 years, and who has served for a total of 15 years, whether consecutive or not, on the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or the superior court, or as Administrative Officer of the Courts, or in any combination of these offices, may retire from his present office and receive for life compensation equal to two thirds of the total annual compensation, including longevity, but excluding any payments in the nature of reimbursement for expenses, from time to time received by the occupant or occupants of the office from which he retired.
- Any justice of the Supreme Court or judge of the Court of Appeals who has attained the age of 65 years, and who has served as justice or judge, or both, in the Appellate Division for 12 consecutive years may retire and receive for life compensation equal to two thirds of the total annual compensation, including longevity, but excluding any payments in the nature of reimbursement for expenses, from time to time received by the occupant or occupants of the office from which he retired.
- Any justice or judge of the Appellate Division, who has served for a total of 24 years, whether continuously or not, as justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of Appeals, judge of the superior court, or Administrative Officer of the Courts, or in any combination of these offices, may retire, regardless of age, and receive for life compensation equal to two thirds of the total annual compensation, including longevity, but excluding any payments in the nature of reimbursement for expenses, from time to time received by the occupant or occupants of the office from which he retired. In determining eligibility for retirement under this subsection, time served as a district solicitor of the superior court prior to January 1, 1971, may be included, provided the person has served at least eight years as a justice, judge, or Administrative Officer of the Courts, or in any combination of these offices.
- For purposes of this section, the "occupant or occupants of the office from which" the retired judge retired will be deemed to be a judge or justice of the Appellate Division holding the same office and with the same service as the retired judge had immediately prior to retirement.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1; 1971, c. 508, s. 2; 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1109, ss. 13.6-13.9.)
Legal Periodicals. - For note entitled, "Gregory v. Ashcroft: The Plain Statement Rule and Judicial Supervision of Federal-State Relations," see 70 N.C.L. Rev. 1563 (1992).
§ 7A-39.3. Retired justices and judges may become emergency justices and judges subject to recall to active service; compensation for emergency justices and judges on recall.
- Justices of the Supreme Court and judges of the Court of Appeals who have not reached the mandatory retirement age specified in G.S. 7A-4.20, but who have retired under the provisions of G.S. 7A-39.2, or under the Uniform Judicial Retirement Act after having completed 12 years of creditable service, may apply as provided in G.S. 7A-39.6 to become emergency justices or judges and upon being commissioned as an emergency justice or emergency judge shall be subject to temporary recall to active service in place of a justice or judge who is temporarily incapacitated as provided in G.S. 7A-39.5.
- In addition to the compensation or retirement allowance he would otherwise be entitled to receive by law, each emergency justice or emergency judge recalled for temporary active service shall be paid by the State his actual expenses, plus three hundred dollars ($300.00) for each day of active service rendered upon recall. No recalled retired or emergency justice or judge shall receive from the State total annual compensation for judicial services in excess of that received by an active justice or judge of the bench to which the justice or judge is being recalled.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1; 1973, c. 640, s. 3; 1977, c. 736, s. 1; 1979, c. 884, s. 1; 1981, c. 455, s. 3; c. 859, s. 46; 1981 (Reg. Sess., 1982), c. 1253, s. 2; 1983, c. 784; 1985, c. 698, ss. 9(a), 16(b); 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1086, s. 31(a); 2002-159, s. 25.)
Cross References. - For the Consolidated Judicial Retirement Act, see G.S. 135-50 et seq.
§ 7A-39.4. Retirement creates vacancy.
The retirement of any justice of the Supreme Court or any judge of the Court of Appeals under the provisions of this Article shall create a vacancy in his office to be filled as provided by law.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1.)
§ 7A-39.5. Recall of emergency justice or emergency judge upon temporary incapacity of a justice or judge.
- Upon the request of any justice of the Supreme Court who has been advised in writing by a reputable and competent physician that he is temporarily incapable of performing efficiently and promptly all the duties of his office, the Chief Justice may recall any emergency justice who, in his opinion, is competent to perform the duties of an associate justice, to serve temporarily in the place of the justice in whose behalf he is recalled; provided, that when the incapacity of a justice of the Supreme Court is such that he cannot request the recall of an emergency justice to serve in his place, an order of recall may be issued by the Chief Justice upon satisfactory medical proof of the facts upon which the order of recall must be based. Orders of recall shall be in writing and entered upon the minutes of the court.
- Upon the request of any judge of the Court of Appeals who has been advised in writing by a reputable and competent physician that he is temporarily incapable of performing efficiently and promptly all the duties of his office, the Chief Judge may recall any emergency judge who, in his opinion, is competent to perform the duties of a judge of the Court of Appeals, to serve temporarily in the place of the judge in whose behalf he is recalled; provided, that when the incapacity of a judge of the Court of Appeals is such that he cannot request the recall of an emergency judge to serve in his place, an order of recall may be issued by the Chief Judge upon satisfactory medical proof of the facts upon which the order of recall must be based. If the Chief Judge does not recall an emergency judge to serve in the place of the temporarily incapacitated judge, the Chief Justice may recall an emergency justice who, in his opinion, is competent to perform the duties of a judge of the Court of Appeals, to serve temporarily in the place of the judge in whose behalf he is recalled. In no case, however, may more than one emergency justice or emergency judge serve on one panel of the Court of Appeals at any given time. Orders of recall shall be in writing and entered upon the minutes of the court.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1; 1985, c. 698, s. 16(c).)
§ 7A-39.6. Application to the Governor; commission as emergency justice or emergency judge.
No retired justice of the Supreme Court or retired judge of the Court of Appeals may become an emergency justice or emergency judge except upon his written application to the Governor certifying his desire and ability to serve as an emergency justice or emergency judge. If the Governor is satisfied that the applicant qualifies under G.S. 7A-39.3(a) to become an emergency justice or emergency judge and that he is physically and mentally able to perform the official duties of an emergency justice or emergency judge, he shall issue to such applicant a commission as an emergency justice or emergency judge of the court from which he retired. The commission shall be effective upon the date of its issue and shall terminate when the judge to whom it is issued reaches the maximum age for judicial service under G.S. 7A-4.20(a).
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1; 1977, c. 736, s. 2; 1979, c. 884, s. 2.)
§ 7A-39.7. Jurisdiction and authority of emergency justices and emergency judges.
An emergency justice or emergency judge shall not have or possess any jurisdiction or authority to hear arguments or participate in the consideration and decision of any cause or perform any other duty or function of a justice of the Supreme Court or judge of the Court of Appeals, respectively, except while serving under an order of recall and in respect to appeals, motions, and other matters heard, considered, and decided by the court during the period of his temporary service under such order; and the justice of the Supreme Court or judge of the Court of Appeals in whose behalf an emergency justice or emergency judge is recalled to active service shall be disqualified to participate in the consideration and decision of any question presented to the court by appeal, motion or otherwise in which any emergency justice or emergency judge recalled in his behalf participated.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1.)
§ 7A-39.8. Court authorized to adopt rules.
The Supreme Court shall prescribe rules respecting the filing of opinions prepared by an emergency justice or an emergency judge after his period of temporary service has expired, and any other matter deemed necessary and consistent with the provisions of this Article.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1.)
§ 7A-39.9. Chief Justice and Chief Judge may recall and terminate recall of justices and judges; procedure when Chief Justice or Chief Judge incapacitated.
- Decisions of the Chief Justice and the Chief Judge regarding recall of emergency justices and emergency judges, when not in conflict with the provisions of this Article, are final.
- The Chief Justice or Chief Judge, may, at any time, in his discretion, cancel any order of recall issued by him or fix the termination date thereof.
- Whenever the Chief Justice is the justice in whose behalf an emergency justice is recalled to temporary service, the powers vested in him as Chief Justice by this article shall be exercised by the associate justice senior in point of time served on the Supreme Court. Whenever the Chief Judge is the judge in whose behalf an emergency judge or justice is recalled to temporary service the powers vested in him as Chief Judge by this article shall be exercised by the associate judge senior in point of time served on the Court of Appeals. If two or more judges have served the same length of time on the Court of Appeals, the eldest shall be deemed the senior judge.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1; 1985, c. 698, s. 16(d), (e).)
§ 7A-39.10. Article applicable to previously retired justices.
All provisions of this Article shall apply to every justice of the Supreme Court who has heretofore retired and is receiving compensation as an emergency justice.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1.)
§ 7A-39.11. Retirement on account of total and permanent disability.
Every justice of the Supreme Court or judge of the Court of Appeals who has served for eight years or more on the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or the superior court, or as Administrative Officer of the Courts, or in any combination of these offices, and who while in active service becomes totally and permanently disabled so as to be unable to perform efficiently the duties of his office, and who retires by reason of such disability, shall receive for life compensation equal to two thirds of the annual salary from time to time received by the occupant or occupants of the office from which he retired. In determining whether a judge is eligible for retirement under this section, time served as district solicitor of the superior court prior to January 1, 1971, may be included. Whenever any justice or judge claims retirement benefits under this section on account of total and permanent disability, the Governor and Council of State, acting together, shall, after notice and an opportunity to be heard is given the applicant, by a majority vote of said body, make findings of fact from the evidence offered. Such findings of fact shall be reduced to writing and entered upon the minutes of the Council of State. The findings so made shall be conclusive as to such matters and determine the right of the applicant to retirement benefits under this section. Justices and judges retired under the provisions of this section are not subject to recall as emergency justices or judges.
History
(1967, c. 108, s. 1.)
§ 7A-39.12. Applicability of §§ 7A-39.2 and 7A-39.11
The provisions of G.S. 7A-39.2 and 7A-39.11 shall apply only to justices and judges who entered into office prior to January 1, 1974. The extent of such application is specified in Chapter 135,
Article 4 (Uniform Judicial Retirement Act).
History
(1973, c. 640, s. 5.)
§ 7A-39.13. Recall of active and emergency justices and judges who have reached mandatory retirement age.
Justices and judges retired because they have reached the mandatory retirement age, and emergency justices and judges whose commissions have expired because they have reached the mandatory retirement age, may be temporarily recalled to active service under the following circumstances:
- The justice or judge must consent to the recall.
- The Chief Justice may recall retired justices to serve on the Supreme Court or on the Court of Appeals, and the Chief Judge may recall retired judges of the Court of Appeals to serve on that court.
- The period of recall shall not exceed six months, but it may be renewed for an additional six months if the emergency for which the recall was ordered continues.
- Prior to recall, the Chief Justice or the Chief Judge, as the case may be, shall satisfy himself that the justice or judge being recalled is capable of efficiently and promptly performing the duties of the office to which recalled.
- Recall is authorized only to replace an active justice or judge who is temporarily incapacitated.
- Jurisdiction and authority of a recalled justice or judge is as specified in G.S. 7A-39.7.
- The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, as the case may be, shall prescribe rules respecting the filing of opinions prepared by a retired justice or judge after his period of temporary service has expired, and respecting any other matter deemed necessary and consistent with this section.
- Compensation of recalled retired justices and judges is the same as for recalled emergency justices and judges under G.S. 7A-39.3(b).
- Recall shall be evidenced by a commission signed by the Chief Justice or Chief Judge, as the case may be.
History
(1981, c. 455, s. 2; 1985, c. 698, s. 16(f).)
§ 7A-39.14. Recall by Chief Justice of retired or emergency justices or judges for temporary vacancy.
-
In addition to the authority granted to the Chief Justice under G.S. 7A-39.5 to recall emergency justices and under G.S. 7A-39.13 to recall retired justices, the Chief Justice may recall not more than one retired or emergency justice or retired emergency
judge of the Court of Appeals, including an emergency justice or judge whose commission has expired because he has reached the mandatory retirement age, in the following circumstances:
- If a vacancy exists on the Supreme Court, he may recall an emergency or retired justice to serve on that court until the vacancy is filled in accordance with law.
- If a vacancy exists on the Court of Appeals, he may recall an emergency or retired justice of the Supreme Court or judge of the Court of Appeals to serve on the Court of Appeals until the vacancy is filled in accordance with law.
- With the concurrence of a majority of the Supreme Court, he may recall an emergency or retired justice to serve on the Supreme Court in place of a sitting justice who, as determined by the Chief Justice, is temporarily unable to perform all of the duties of his office.
- With the concurrence of a majority of the Supreme Court, he may recall an emergency or retired justice of the Supreme Court or judge of the Court of Appeals to serve on the Court of Appeals in place of a sitting judge who, as determined by the Chief Justice, is temporarily unable to perform all of the duties of his office.
- No judge or justice may be recalled unless he consents to the recall. Orders of recall issued pursuant to this section must be in writing and entered on the minutes of the court. In addition, if the judge or justice is recalled pursuant to subdivision (a)(3) or (a)(4), the order shall contain a finding by the Chief Justice setting out, in detail, the reason for the recall.
-
A judge or justice recalled pursuant to subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this section:
- Has the same authority and jurisdiction granted to emergency justices and judges under G.S. 7A-39.7;
- Is subject to rules adopted pursuant to G.S. 7A-39.8 regarding filing of opinions and other matters; and
- Is compensated as are other retired or emergency justices or judges recalled for service pursuant to G.S. 7A-39.5 or G.S. 7A-39.13.
-
A judge or justice recalled pursuant to subdivision (a)(3) or (a)(4) of this section:
- Has the same authority and jurisdiction granted to emergency justices and judges under G.S. 7A-39.7;
- Is subject to rules adopted pursuant to G.S. 7A-39.8 regarding filing of opinions and other matters;
- May, after the return of the judge or justice in whose place he was sitting, complete the duties assigned to him before the return of that judge or justice; and
- Is compensated as are other retired or emergency justices or judges recalled for service pursuant to G.S. 7A-39.5 or G.S. 7A-39.13.
- A retired or emergency justice or judge may serve on the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals pursuant to subdivision (a)(3) or (a)(4) only if he is recalled to serve temporarily in place of a sitting justice or judge who is not temporarily incapacitated under circumstances that would permit temporary service of the retired or emergency justice or judge pursuant to G.S. 7A-39.5 or G.S. 7A-39.13. This section does not authorize more than seven justices to serve on the Supreme Court at any given time, nor does it authorize more than 15 justices and judges to serve on the Court of Appeals at any given time. In no case may more than one emergency justice or emergency judge serve on one panel of the Court of Appeals at any given time.
- Repealed by Session Laws 1989, c. 795, s. 27.1.
History
(1985, c. 698, s. 15(a), (b); 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 851, s. 3; c. 1014, s. 225; 1987, c. 703, s. 5; c. 738, ss. 131(a), (b); 1989, c. 795, s. 27.1; 2009-570, s. 1.)
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2009-570, s. 1, effective August 28, 2009, substituted "15 justices" for "12 justices" in the second sentence of subsection (e).
§ 7A-39.15. Emergency recall judges of the Court of Appeals.
-
A retired justice or judge of the Appellate Division of the General Court of Justice is eligible to be appointed as an emergency recall judge of the Court of Appeals under the following circumstances:
- The justice or judge has retired under the provisions of the Consolidated Judicial Retirement Act, Article 4 of Chapter 135 of the General Statutes, or is eligible to receive a retirement allowance under that act;
- The justice or judge has not reached the mandatory retirement age specified in G.S. 7A-4.20;
- The justice or judge has served a total of at least five years as a judge or justice of the General Court of Justice, provided that at least six months was served in the Appellate Division, whether or not otherwise eligible to serve as an emergency justice or judge of the Appellate Division of the General Court of Justice;
- The judicial service of the justice or judge ended within the preceding 15 years; and
- The justice or judge has applied to the Governor for appointment as an emergency recall judge of the Court of Appeals in the same manner as is provided for application in G.S. 7A-53. If the Governor is satisfied that the applicant meets the requirements of this section and is physically and mentally able to perform the duties of a judge of the Court of Appeals, the Governor shall issue a commission appointing the applicant as an emergency recall judge of the Court of Appeals until the applicant reaches the mandatory retirement age for judges of the Court of Appeals specified in G.S. 7A-4.20.
- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals may recall and assign one or more emergency recall judges of the Court of Appeals, not to exceed three at any one time, provided funds are available, if the Chief Judge determines that one or more emergency recall judges of the Court of Appeals are necessary to discharge the court's business expeditiously.
-
Any emergency recall judge of the Court of Appeals appointed as provided in this section shall be subject to recall in the following manner:
- The judge shall consent to the recall;
- The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals may order the recall;
- Prior to ordering recall, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals shall be satisfied that the recalled judge is capable of efficiently and promptly discharging the duties of the office to which recalled;
- Orders of recall and assignment shall be in writing, evidenced by a commission signed by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, and entered upon the minutes of the permanent records of the Court of Appeals;
- Compensation, expenses, and allowances of emergency recall judges of the Court of Appeals are the same as for recalled emergency superior court judges under G.S. 7A-52(b);
- Emergency recall judges assigned under those provisions shall have the same powers and duties, when duly assigned to hold court, as provided for by law for judges of the Court of Appeals;
- Emergency recall judges of the Court of Appeals are subject to assignment in the same manner as provided for by G.S. 7A-16 and G.S. 7A-19;
- Emergency recall judges of the Court of Appeals shall be subject to rules adopted pursuant to G.S. 7A-39.8 regarding the filing of opinions and other matters;
- Emergency recall judges of the Court of Appeals shall be subject to the provisions and requirements of the Canons of Judicial Conduct during the term of assignment; and
- An emergency recall judge of the Court of Appeals shall not engage in the practice of law during any period for which the emergency recall Court of Appeals judgeship is commissioned. However, this subdivision shall not be construed to prohibit an emergency recall judge of the Court of Appeals appointed pursuant to this section from serving as a referee, arbitrator, or mediator during service as an emergency recall judge of the Court of Appeals so long as the service does not conflict with or interfere with the judge's service as an emergency recall judge of the Court of Appeals.
- A justice or judge commissioned as an emergency recall judge of the Court of Appeals is also eligible to receive a commission as an emergency special superior court judge. However, no justice or judge who has been recalled as provided in this section shall, during the period so recalled and assigned, contemporaneously serve as an emergency special superior court judge or emergency justice of the General Court of Justice.
Any former justice or judge of the Appellate Division of the General Court of Justice who otherwise meets the requirements of this section to be appointed an emergency recall judge of the Court of Appeals, but who has already reached the mandatory retirement age for judges of the Court of Appeals set forth in G.S. 7A-4.20, may apply to the Governor to be appointed as an emergency recall judge of the Court of Appeals as provided in this section. If the Governor issues a commission to the applicant, the retired justice or judge is subject to recall as an emergency recall judge of the Court of Appeals as provided in this section.
History
(1995, c. 108, s. 1.)
SUBCHAPTER III. SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION OF THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE.
ARTICLE 7. Organization.
Sec.
§ 7A-40. Composition; judicial powers of clerk.
The Superior Court Division of the General Court of Justice consists of the several superior courts of the State. The clerk of superior court in the exercise of the judicial power conferred upon him as ex officio judge of probate, and in the exercise of other judicial powers conferred upon him by law in respect of special proceedings and the administration of guardianships and trusts, is a judicial officer of the Superior Court Division, and not a separate court.
History
(1965, c. 310, s. 1; 1967, c. 691, s. 1; 1969, c. 1190, s. 4; 1971, c. 377, s. 4.)
Editor's Note. - This section was originally G.S. 7A-39.1. It was transferred and renumbered G.S. 7A-42 by Session Laws 1967, c. 691, s. 1, effective July 1, 1967. It was again transferred, and renumbered G.S. 7A-40, by Session Laws 1969, c. 1190, s. 4, effective July 1, 1969.
CASE NOTES
This section confers judicial power in special proceedings upon the clerk. In re Locklear, 314 N.C. 412, 334 S.E.2d 46 (1985).
The legitimation procedure, which is identified in G.S. 49-10 as "a special proceeding in the superior court of the county in which the putative father resides," is within the jurisdictional purview of the clerk of superior court. In re Locklear,
314 N.C. 412, 334 S.E.2d 46 (1985).
Immunity. - Court clerk was immune from an action against the clerk for contempt for orders relative to a judicial sale of a decedent's real estate because the clerk was performing a judicial duty in accordance with a court orders; therefore, the clerk
was entitled to judicial immunity pursuant to G.S. 7A-40. Bare v. Atwood, 204 N.C. App. 310, 693 S.E.2d 746 (2010).
Applied in Wyatt v. Wyatt, 69 N.C. App. 747, 318 S.E.2d 251 (1984).
Cited in Yale v. National Indem. Co., 602 F.2d 642 (4th Cir. 1979).
§ 7A-41. Superior court divisions and districts; judges.
- The counties of the State are organized into judicial divisions and superior court districts, and each superior court district has the counties, and the number of regular resident superior court judges set forth in the following table, and for districts of less than a whole county, as set out in subsection (b) of this section:
-
For superior court districts of less than a whole county, or with part of one county with part of another, the composition of the district and the number of judges is as follows:
- District 5A: New Hanover County: VTD CF01, VTD CF02, VTD CF03, VTD H01, VTD W25, VTD W27; Pender County. It has one judge.
- District 5B: New Hanover County: VTD H02, VTD H03, VTD H04, VTD H05, VTD H06, VTD H07, VTD H08, VTD H09, VTD M02, VTD M05, VTD W13, VTD W18, VTD W24, VTD W28, VTD WB. It has one judge.
- District 5C: New Hanover County: VTD FP01, VTD FP02, VTD FP03, VTD FP04, VTD FP05, VTD M03, VTD M04, VTD W03, VTD W08, VTD W12, VTD W15, VTD W16, VTD W17, VTD W21, VTD W26, VTD W29, VTD W30, VTD W31. It has one judge.
- District 7B: Edgecombe County: VTD: 1101: Block(s) 0650213001035; VTD: 1201, VTD: 1202, VTD: 1203, VTD: 1204, VTD: 1205: Block(s) 0650203001005, 0650203001006, 0650203001007, 0650203001008, 0650203001009, 0650203001010, 0650203001011, 0650203001012, 0650203001013, 0650203001014, 0650203001015, 0650203001016, 0650203001017, 0650204001000, 0650204001001, 0650204001002, 0650204001003, 0650204001004, 0650204001005, 0650204001006, 0650204001007, 0650204001008, 0650204001009, 0650204001010, 0650204001011, 0650204001012, 0650204001013, 0650204001014, 0650204001015, 0650204001016, 0650204001017, 0650204001018, 0650204001019, 0650204001020, 0650204001021, 0650204001022, 0650204001023, 0650204001024, 0650204001025, 0650204001026, 0650204001027, 0650204001028, 0650204001029, 0650204001030, 0650204001031, 0650204001032, 0650204001033, 0650204001034, 0650204001035, 0650204001036, 0650204001037, 0650204001038, 0650204001039, 0650204001040, 0650204001041, 0650204001042, 0650204001043, 0650204001044, 0650204001045, 0650204001046, 0650204001047, 0650204001048, 0650204001049, 0650204002000, 0650204002001, 0650204002002, 0650204002003, 0650204002004, 0650204002005, 0650204002006, 0650204002007, 0650204002008, 0650204002009, 0650204002010, 0650204002011, 0650204002012, 0650204002013, 0650204002014, 0650204002015, 0650204002016, 0650204002017, 0650204002018, 0650204002019, 0650204002020, 0650204002021, 0650204002022, 0650204002023, 0650204002024, 0650204002025; VTD: 1301: 0650214002017; VTD: 1401; Wilson County: VTD: PRBL: Block(s) 1950009001045, 1950009001046; VTD: PRGA: 1950007001065, 1950007001066, 1950007001067, 1950012001000, 1950012001001, 1950012001002, 1950012001003, 1950012001012, 1950012001013, 1950012001014, 1950012001015, 1950012001016, 1950012001017, 1950012001018, 1950012001019, 1950012001020, 1950012001021, 1950012001022, 1950012001023, 1950012001025, 1950012001026, 1950012001031, 1950012001032, 1950012001033, 1950012001034, 1950012001035, 1950012001036, 1950012001038, 1950012002000, 1950012002001, 1950012002002, 1950012002003, 1950012002004, 1950012002005, 1950012002006, 1950012002007, 1950012002008, 1950012002009, 1950012002010, 1950012002011, 1950012002012, 1950012002013, 1950012002014, 1950012002016, 1950012003000, 1950012003001, 1950012003002, 1950012003003, 1950012003004, 1950012003005, 1950012003006, 1950012003007, 1950012003008, 1950012003009, 1950012003010, 1950012003011, 1950012003012, 1950012003013, 1950012003014, 1950012003015, 1950012003016, 1950012003017, 1950012003018, 1950012003019, 1950012003020, 1950012003021; VTD: PRSA: 1950011001025, 1950011001028, 1950011001030, 1950011002000; VTD: PRST: 1950008022045, 1950008022047, 1950008022055, 1950008022059, 1950008022060, 1950008022061, 1950008022063, 1950008023031, 1950008023032, 1950008023033, 1950008023034, 1950008023035, 1950008023039; VTD: PRTO: 1950012001004, 1950012001005, 1950012001006, 1950012001007, 1950012001008, 1950012001009, 1950012001010, 1950012001011, 1950012001024, 1950013001000, 1950013001001, 1950013001002, 1950013001003, 1950013001004, 1950013001005, 1950013001006, 1950013001007, 1950013001008, 1950013001009, 1950013001010, 1950013001011, 1950013001012, 1950013001013, 1950013001014, 1950013001015, 1950013001016, 1950013001017, 1950013001018, 1950013001019, 1950013001020, 1950013001021, 1950013001022, 1950013001023, 1950013001024, 1950013001025, 1950013001026, 1950013001027, 1950013001028, 1950013001029, 1950013001030, 1950013001031, 1950013001032, 1950013001033, 1950013001034, 1950013001035, 1950013001036, 1950013001037, 1950013001038, 1950013001039, 1950013001040, 1950013001041, 1950013001042, 1950013001043, 1950013001044, 1950013001045, 1950013002000, 1950013002001, 1950013002002, 1950013002003, 1950013002004, 1950013002005, 1950013002006, 1950013002007, 1950013002008, 1950013002009, 1950013002010, 1950013002011, 1950013002012, 1950013002013, 1950013002014, 1950013002015, 1950013002016, 1950013002017, 1950013002018, 1950013002019, 1950013002020, 1950013002021, 1950013002022, 1950013002023, 1950013002024, 1950013002025, 1950013002026, 1950013002027, 1950013002028, 1950013002029, 1950013002030, 1950013002031, 1950013002032, 1950013002033, 1950013002034, 1950013002035, 1950013002036, 1950013002037, 1950013002038, 1950013002039, 1950013002040, 1950013002041, 1950013002042, 1950013002043, 1950013002044, 1950013002045, 1950013002046, 1950013002047, 1950013002048, 1950013002049, 1950013002050, 1950013002051, 1950013002052, 1950013002053, 1950013002054, 1950013002055, 1950013002056, 1950013002057, 1950013002058, 1950013002059, 1950013002060, 1950013002061, 1950013002062, 1950013002063, 1950013002064, 1950013002065, 1950013002066, 1950013002067, 1950013002068, 1950013002069, 1950013002070, 1950013002074, 1950013002075, 1950013002078, 1950013002079, 1950013002080, 1950013002081, 1950013002082, 1950013002083, 1950013002084, 1950013002087, 1950013002088; VTD: PRWA, VTD: PRWB: Block(s) 1950002001000, 1950002001001, 1950002001002, 1950002001003, 1950002001004, 1950002001005, 1950002001006, 1950002001007, 1950002001008, 1950002001009, 1950002001010, 1950002001011, 1950002001012, 1950002001013, 1950002001014, 1950002001015, 1950002001016, 1950002001017, 1950002001018, 1950002001019, 1950002001020, 1950002001021, 1950002001022, 1950002001023, 1950002001024, 1950002001025, 1950002001026, 1950002001027, 1950002001028, 1950002001029, 1950002001030, 1950002001031, 1950002001032, 1950002001033, 1950002001034, 1950002001035, 1950002001036, 1950002001037, 1950002001038, 1950002001039, 1950002001040, 1950002001041, 1950002001042, 1950002001043, 1950002001044, 1950002001045, 1950002001046, 1950002001052, 1950002001053, 1950002001054, 1950002001055, 1950002001056, 1950002001057, 1950002001058, 1950002001059, 1950002001060, 1950002001062, 1950002001063, 1950002001064, 1950002001065, 1950003002000, 1950003002001, 1950003002002, 1950003002003, 1950003002004, 1950003002005, 1950003002006, 1950003002013, 1950003002017, 1950003002018, 1950003002019, 1950003002020, 1950003002021, 1950003002022, 1950003002023, 1950003002025, 1950003002026, 1950003002027, 1950003002028, 1950003002029, 1950003002030, 1950003002031, 1950003002032, 1950003002033, 1950003002034, 1950003002035, 1950003002036, 1950003002037, 1950003002038, 1950003002039, 1950008011000, 1950008011001, 1950008012000, 1950008012001, 1950008012002, 1950008012003; VTD: PRWC: 1950001003004, 1950001003005, 1950001003006, 1950001003007, 1950001003008, 1950001003015, 1950001003020, 1950001003021, 1950001004005, 1950001004006, 1950001004007, 1950001004008, 1950001004009, 1950001004017, 1950001004019, 1950001004021, 1950001004022, 1950001004023, 1950001004024, 1950001004025, 1950001004026; VTD: PRWE: 1950001002003, 1950001002004, 1950001002005, 1950001002024, 1950001002025; VTD: PRWH, VTD: PRWN, VTD: PRWQ, VTD: PRWR. It has one judge.
- District 7C: Edgecombe County: VTD: 0101, VTD: 0102, VTD: 0103, VTD: 0104, VTD: 0201, VTD: 0301, VTD: 0401, VTD: 0501, VTD: 0601, VTD: 0701, VTD: 0801, VTD: 0901, VTD: 1001, VTD: 1101: Block(s) 0650213001009, 0650213001034, 0650213002000, 0650213002001, 0650213002002, 0650213002003, 0650213002004, 0650213002005, 0650213002006, 0650213002007, 0650213002008, 0650213002009, 0650213002010, 0650213002011, 0650213002012, 0650213002013, 0650213002014, 0650213002015, 0650213002016, 0650213002017, 0650213002018, 0650213002019, 0650213002022, 0650213002025, 0650213002026, 0650213002027, 0650213002028, 0650213002029, 0650213002035, 0650213002036, 0650213002037, 0650213002038, 0650213002039, 0650213002040, 0650213002041, 0650213002042, 0650213002043, 0650213002044, 0650213002045, 0650213002046, 0650213002048, 0650213002049, 0650213002050, 0650213002051, 0650213002052, 0650213002053, 0650213002054, 0650213002055, 0650213002056, 0650213002057, 0650213002058, 0650213002059, 0650213002060, 0650213002061, 0650213002062, 0650213002063, 0650213002064, 0650213002065, 0650213002066, 0650213002067, 0650213002068, 0650213002069, 0650213002070, 0650213002071, 0650213002072, 0650213002073, 0650213002074, 0650213002075, 0650213002076, 0650213002077, 0650213002078, 0650213002079, 0650213002080, 0650213002081, 0650213002082, 0650213002087, 0650213002088; VTD: 1205: 0650206001083, 0650206001084, 0650206001085, 0650206001086, 0650206001087, 0650206001089, 0650206001090, 0650206001091, 0650206001092; VTD: 1301: 0650214002000, 0650214002001, 0650214002002, 0650214002003, 0650214002004, 0650214002005, 0650214002006, 0650214002007, 0650214002008, 0650214002009, 0650214002010, 0650214002011, 0650214002012, 0650214002013, 0650214002014, 0650214002015, 0650214002016, 0650214002018, 0650214002019, 0650214002020, 0650214002021, 0650214002022, 0650214002023, 0650214002025, 0650214002026, 0650214002027, 0650214002028, 0650214002029, 0650214002030, 0650214002031, 0650214002032, 0650214002033, 0650214002034, 0650214002035, 0650214002036, 0650214002037, 0650214002038, 0650214002039, 0650214002040, 0650214002041, 0650214002042, 0650214002043; Wilson County: VTD: PRBL: Block(s) 1950009001000, 1950009001001, 1950009001002, 1950009001003, 1950009001004, 1950009001005, 1950009001006, 1950009001007, 1950009001008, 1950009001009, 1950009001010, 1950009001011, 1950009001012, 1950009001013, 1950009001014, 1950009001015, 1950009001016, 1950009001017, 1950009001018, 1950009001019, 1950009001020, 1950009001021, 1950009001022, 1950009001023, 1950009001024, 1950009001025, 1950009001026, 1950009001027, 1950009001028, 1950009001029, 1950009001030, 1950009001031, 1950009001032, 1950009001033, 1950009001034, 1950009001035, 1950009001036, 1950009001037, 1950009001038, 1950009001039, 1950009001040, 1950009001041, 1950009001042, 1950009001043, 1950009001044, 1950009001047, 1950009001048, 1950009001049, 1950009001050, 1950009001051, 1950009001052, 1950009001053, 1950009001054, 1950009001055, 1950009001056, 1950009001057, 1950009001058, 1950009001059, 1950009001060, 1950009001061, 1950009001062, 1950009001063, 1950009001064, 1950009001065, 1950009001066, 1950009001067, 1950009001068, 1950009001069, 1950009001070, 1950009001071, 1950009001072, 1950009001073, 1950009001074, 1950009001075, 1950009002000, 1950009002001, 1950009002002, 1950009002003, 1950009002004, 1950009002005, 1950009002006, 1950009002007, 1950009002008, 1950009002009, 1950009002010, 1950009002011, 1950009002012, 1950009002013, 1950009002014, 1950009002015, 1950009002016, 1950009002017, 1950009002018, 1950009002019, 1950009002020, 1950009002021, 1950009002022, 1950009002023, 1950009002024, 1950009002025, 1950009002026, 1950009002027, 1950009002028, 1950009002029, 1950009002030, 1950009002031, 1950009002032, 1950009002033, 1950009002034, 1950009002035, 1950009002036, 1950009002037, 1950009002038, 1950009002039, 1950009002040, 1950009002041, 1950009002042, 1950009002043, 1950009002044, 1950009002045, 1950009002046, 1950009002047, 1950009002048, 1950009002049, 1950009002050, 1950009002051, 1950009002052, 1950009002053, 1950009002054, 1950009003000, 1950009003001, 1950009003002, 1950009003003, 1950009003004, 1950009003006, 1950009003007, 1950009003008, 1950009003009, 1950009003010, 1950009003011, 1950009003013, 1950009003014, 1950009003015, 1950009003016, 1950009003017, 1950009003018, 1950009003019, 1950009003020, 1950009003021, 1950009003022, 1950009003023, 1950009003024, 1950009003025, 1950009003026, 1950009003027, 1950009003028, 1950009003029, 1950009003030, 1950009003031, 1950009003032, 1950009003033, 1950009003034, 1950009003035, 1950009003036, 1950009003037, 1950009003038, 1950009003039, 1950009003040, 1950009003041, 1950010001023, 1950017001000, 1950017001001, 1950017001002, 1950017002021, 1950017002022, 1950017003004, 1950017003005, 1950017003006, 1950017003007, 1950017003008, 1950017003009, 1950017003010, 1950017003035, 1950017003036; VTD: PRCR, VTD: PRGA: Block(s) 1950012002015; VTD: PROL, VTD: PRSA: Block(s) 1950011001000, 1950011001001, 1950011001002, 1950011001003, 1950011001004, 1950011001005, 1950011001006, 1950011001007, 1950011001008, 1950011001009, 1950011001010, 1950011001011, 1950011001012, 1950011001013, 1950011001014, 1950011001015, 1950011001016, 1950011001017, 1950011001018, 1950011001019, 1950011001020, 1950011001021, 1950011001022, 1950011001023, 1950011001024, 1950011001026, 1950011001027, 1950011001029, 1950011001031, 1950011001032, 1950011001033, 1950011001034, 1950011001035, 1950011001036, 1950011001037, 1950011001038, 1950011001039, 1950011001040, 1950011001041, 1950011001042, 1950011001043, 1950011001044, 1950011001045, 1950011001046, 1950011001047, 1950011001048, 1950011001049, 1950011001050, 1950011002001, 1950011002002, 1950011002003, 1950011002004, 1950011002005, 1950011002006, 1950011002007, 1950011002008, 1950011002009, 1950011002010, 1950011002011, 1950011002012, 1950011002013, 1950011002014, 1950011002015, 1950011002016, 1950011002017, 1950011002018, 1950011002019, 1950011002020, 1950011002021, 1950011002022, 1950011002023, 1950011002024, 1950011002025, 1950011002026, 1950011002027, 1950011002028, 1950011002029, 1950011002030, 1950011002031, 1950011002032, 1950011002033, 1950011002034, 1950011002035;
- Superior Court District 10A consists of Wake County Precincts: VTD: 01-01, VTD: 01-02, VTD: 01-06, VTD: 01-07, VTD: 01-14, VTD: 01-16, VTD: 01-23, VTD: 01-29, VTD: 01-31, VTD: 01-32, VTD: 01-33, VTD: 01-41, VTD: 01-48, VTD: 01-49, VTD: 04-01, VTD: 04-02, VTD: 04-03, VTD: 04-04, VTD: 04-06, VTD: 04-07, VTD: 04-10, VTD: 04-11, VTD: 04-12, VTD: 04-13, VTD: 04-14, VTD: 04-15, VTD: 04-16, VTD: 04-19, VTD: 04-20, VTD: 04-21, VTD: 11-02, VTD: 18-01, VTD: 18-04, VTD: 18-06, VTD: 18-08. It has one judge.
- Superior Court District 10B consists of Wake County Precincts: VTD: 01-12, VTD: 01-13, VTD: 01-18, VTD: 01-19, VTD: 01-20, VTD: 01-21, VTD: 01-22, VTD: 01-25, VTD: 01-26, VTD: 01-27, VTD: 01-34, VTD: 01-35, VTD: 01-38, VTD: 01-40, VTD: 01-46, VTD: 01-50, VTD: 13-01: Block(s) 1830527043000, 1830527043023, 1830527043024, 1830540081000, 1830540081001, 1830540081002, 1830540081003, 1830540081004, 1830540081005, 1830540081006, 1830540081007, 1830540081008, 1830540081009, 1830540081010, 1830540081011, 1830540081012, 1830540081013, 1830540081014, 1830540081015, 1830540082000, 1830540082001, 1830540082002, 1830540082003, 1830540082004, 1830540082005, 1830540082006, 1830540082007, 1830540082008, 1830540082009, 1830540082010, 1830540082011, 1830540082012, 1830540082013, 1830540082014, 1830540082015, 1830540082016, 1830540083000, 1830540083001, 1830540083002, 1830540083003, 1830540083004, 1830540083005, 1830540083006, 1830540083007, 1830540083008, 1830540083009, 1830540084000, 1830540084001, 1830540084002, 1830540181012, 1830540181013, 1830540181014, 1830540181015, 1830540181016, 1830540181017, 1830540181018, 1830540181027, 1830540181033, 1830540181034, 1830541041022, 1830541041023, 1830541041024, 1830541041025, 1830541041026, 1830541041028, 1830541041030, 1830541041031, 1830541041032, 1830541041033, 1830541041039, 1830541041040, 1830541041041, 1830541041042, 1830541041043, 1830541041044, 1830541041045, 1830541041046, 1830541041047, 1830541041048, 1830541041049, 1830541041050, 1830541042000, 1830541042002, 1830541042010, 1830541042023, 1830541042024, 1830541042025, 1830541042026, 1830541042027, 1830541042029, 1830541042030, 1830541043014, 1830541043015, 1830541043016, 1830541043017, 1830541043018, 1830541043019, 1830541043045; VTD: 13-05, VTD: 13-07, VTD: 16-02, VTD: 16-03, VTD: 16-06, VTD: 16-08, VTD: 17-06, VTD: 17-07, VTD: 17-08, VTD: 17-09, VTD: 17-10, VTD: 17-11. It has one judge.
- Superior Court District 10C consists of Wake County Precincts: VTD: 02-01, VTD: 02-02, VTD: 02-03, VTD: 02-04, VTD: 02-05, VTD: 02-06, VTD: 07-02, VTD: 07-06, VTD: 07-07, VTD: 07-11, VTD: 07-12, VTD: 08-02, VTD: 08-03, VTD: 08-04, VTD: 08-05, VTD: 08-06, VTD: 08-07, VTD: 08-08, VTD: 08-09, VTD: 08-10, VTD: 08-11, VTD: 13-10, VTD: 13-11, VTD: 14-01, VTD: 14-02, VTD: 19-03, VTD: 19-04, VTD: 19-05, VTD: 19-06, VTD: 19-07, VTD: 19-09, VTD: 19-10, VTD: 19-11, VTD: 19-12. It has one judge.
- Superior Court District 10D consists of Wake County Precincts: VTD: 01-03, VTD: 01-04, VTD: 01-05, VTD: 01-09, VTD: 01-10, VTD: 01-11, VTD: 01-15, VTD: 01-17, VTD: 01-30, VTD: 01-36, VTD: 01-37, VTD: 01-39, VTD: 01-43, VTD: 01-45, VTD: 01-51, VTD: 04-05, VTD: 04-08, VTD: 04-09, VTD: 04-17, VTD: 04-18, VTD: 05-01, VTD: 05-03, VTD: 05-04, VTD: 05-05, VTD: 05-06, VTD: 07-01, VTD: 07-03, VTD: 07-04, VTD: 07-05, VTD: 07-09, VTD: 07-10, VTD: 07-13, VTD: 11-01, VTD: 20-02, VTD: 20-04, VTD: 20-10. It has one judge.
- Superior Court District 10E consists of Wake County Precincts: VTD: 01-28, VTD: 01-42, VTD: 01-44, VTD: 01-47, VTD: 09-01, VTD: 09-02, VTD: 09-03, VTD: 10-01, VTD: 10-02, VTD: 10-03, VTD: 10-04, VTD: 13-01: Block(s) 1830541041000, 1830541041001, 1830541041002, 1830541041003, 1830541041004, 1830541041005, 1830541041006, 1830541041007, 1830541041008, 1830541041009, 1830541041010, 1830541041011, 1830541041012, 1830541041013, 1830541041014, 1830541041015, 1830541041016, 1830541041017, 1830541041018, 1830541041019, 1830541041020, 1830541041021, 1830541042028; VTD: 13-02, VTD: 13-06, VTD: 13-08, VTD: 13-09, VTD: 15-01, VTD: 15-03, VTD: 15-04, VTD: 16-01, VTD: 16-04, VTD: 16-05, VTD: 16-07, VTD: 16-09, VTD: 17-01, VTD: 17-02, VTD: 17-03, VTD: 17-04, VTD: 17-05, VTD: 19-16, VTD: 19-17. It has one judge.
- Superior Court District 10F consists of Wake County Precincts: VTD: 03-00, VTD: 06-01, VTD: 06-04, VTD: 06-05, VTD: 06-06, VTD: 06-07, VTD: 12-01, VTD: 12-02, VTD: 12-04, VTD: 12-05, VTD: 12-06, VTD: 12-07, VTD: 12-08, VTD: 12-09, VTD: 15-02, VTD: 18-02, VTD: 18-03, VTD: 18-05, VTD: 18-07, VTD: 20-01, VTD: 20-03, VTD: 20-05, VTD: 20-06, VTD: 20-08, VTD: 20-09, VTD: 20-11, VTD: 20-12. It has one judge.
- District 12A: Cumberland County: VTD: AH49, VTD: CC18: Block(s) 0510007011012, 0510007011013, 0510007011014, 0510007011015, 0510007011016, 0510007011021, 0510007011034, 0510007011035, 0510007013011, 0510007013012, 0510007013013, 0510007013014, 0510007013015, 0510007013016, 0510007013017, 0510007013018, 0510007013019, 0510007013020, 0510007013021, 0510007013022, 0510007013023, 0510007013024, 0510007013025, 0510007013026, 0510007013027, 0510007013028, 0510007013029, 0510007013030, 0510007013031, 0510007013032, 0510007022007, 0510007022008; VTD: CC24: 0510020011058, 0510020021002, 0510033022004; VTD: CC25, VTD: CC27, VTD: CC29, VTD: CC31, VTD: CC32, VTD: CC33, VTD: CC34, VTD: CU02, VTD: G10: Block(s) 0510016011001, 0510016011002, 0510016011004, 0510016011005, 0510016011006, 0510016011007, 0510016011009, 0510016011010, 0510016011011, 0510016011012, 0510016011013, 0510016011014, 0510016011015, 0510016011016, 0510016011017, 0510016011018, 0510016011019, 0510016011020, 0510016011021, 0510016011022, 0510016011023, 0510016011024, 0510016011025, 0510016011026, 0510016011027, 0510016011032, 0510016011041, 0510016012041, 0510031021000, 0510031021001, 0510031021002, 0510031021003, 0510031021004, 0510031021005, 0510031021006, 0510031021007, 0510031021008, 0510031021009, 0510031021010, 0510031021011, 0510031021012, 0510031021013, 0510031021014, 0510031021015, 0510031021016, 0510031021017, 0510031021018, 0510031021019, 0510031021020, 0510031021021, 0510031021022, 0510031021023, 0510031021024, 0510031021025, 0510031021026, 0510031021027, 0510031021028, 0510031021029, 0510031021030, 0510031021031, 0510031021032, 0510031021033, 0510031021034, 0510031021035, 0510031021036, 0510031021037, 0510031021038, 0510031021039, 0510031021040, 0510031021041, 0510031021042, 0510031021043, 0510031021044, 0510031021045, 0510031021046, 0510031021047, 0510031021048, 0510031021049, 0510031021050, 0510031021051, 0510031021052, 0510031021053, 0510031021054, 0510031021055, 0510031021056, 0510031021057, 0510031021058, 0510031021059, 0510031021060, 0510031021061, 0510031021062, 0510031031001, 0510031031002, 0510031031003, 0510031031004, 0510031031005, 0510031031006, 0510031031007, 0510031031008, 0510031031009, 0510031031010, 0510031031016, 0510031032004, 0510031032005, 0510031032006, 0510031032007, 0510031032008, 0510031032009, 0510031032010, 0510031032011, 0510031032012, 0510031032013, 0510031032014, 0510031032015, 0510031032017, 0510031032018, 0510031032019, 0510031032020, 0510031032021, 0510031032023, 0510031032024, 0510031032026, 0510031032027, 0510031032028, 0510031032029, 0510031032034, 0510031032036, 0510031032041, 0510031032042, 0510031032043, 0510031032044, 0510031032046, 0510031032047, 0510031032048, 0510031032049, 0510031032052, 0510031032053, 0510031032054, 0510031033000, 0510031033001, 0510031033009, 0510031033010, 0510031033011, 0510031033013, 0510031033015, 0510031033016, 0510031033030, 0510031033036, 0510032012000, 0510032012001, 0510032012002, 0510032012003, 0510032012004, 0510032012005, 0510032012006, 0510032012007, 0510032012008, 0510032012009, 0510032012010, 0510032012011, 0510032012012, 0510032012013, 0510032012014, 0510032012015, 0510032012016, 0510032012017, 0510032012018, 0510032012019, 0510032012020, 0510032012021, 0510032012022, 0510032012023, 0510032012024, 0510032012025, 0510032012026, 0510032012027, 0510032012028, 0510032012029, 0510032013000, 0510032013001, 0510032013002, 0510032013003, 0510032013004, 0510032013005, 0510032013006, 0510032013007, 0510032013008, 0510032013009, 0510032013010, 0510032013011, 0510032013012, 0510032013013, 0510032013014, 0510032013015, 0510032013016, 0510032013017, 0510032013018, 0510032013019, 0510032013020, 0510032013021, 0510032013022, 0510032013023, 0510032013024, 0510032013025, 0510032013026, 0510032013027, 0510032013028, 0510032013029, 0510032013030, 0510032013031, 0510032013032, 0510032013033, 0510032013034, 0510032013035, 0510032013036, 0510032013037, 0510032013038, 0510032013039, 0510032013040, 0510032013041, 0510032013042, 0510032013043, 0510032013044, 0510032013045, 0510032013046, 0510032014026, 0510032014027, 0510032014028, 0510032014029, 0510032014030, 0510032014031, 0510032014032, 0510032014033, 0510032014034, 0510032014040, 0510032014041, 0510032014042, 0510032014045, 0510032014046, 0510032014047, 0510032014048, 0510032014049, 0510032014050, 0510032014051, 0510032014057; VTD: G5, VTD: G8: Block(s) 0510016011003, 0510016011008, 0510017001035, 0510017003011, 0510017003013, 0510017003014, 0510017004022, 0510017004023, 0510017004024, 0510017004025, 0510017004026, 0510017004027, 0510017004028, 0510017004029, 0510017004030, 0510017004031, 0510017004032, 0510017004033, 0510017004034, 0510017004035, 0510017004036, 0510017004037, 0510017004038, 0510017004039, 0510017004040, 0510017004041, 0510017004042, 0510017004043, 0510017004046, 0510017004047, 0510017004048, 0510019011000, 0510019011001, 0510019011002, 0510019011003, 0510019011004, 0510019011005, 0510019011008, 0510019011009, 0510019011010, 0510019011011, 0510019011012, 0510019011013, 0510019011014, 0510019011015, 0510019011016, 0510019011017, 0510019011018, 0510019011020, 0510019011021, 0510019011022, 0510019011023, 0510019011024, 0510019011025, 0510019011026, 0510019011028, 0510019011029, 0510019011030, 0510019011031, 0510019011032, 0510019011033, 0510019011034, 0510019011035, 0510019011036, 0510019011037, 0510019011038, 0510019011039, 0510019011041, 0510019011042, 0510019022014, 0510019022015, 0510019022018, 0510019022022, 0510019022023, 0510019022024, 0510019022025, 0510019022026, 0510019022027, 0510019022028, 0510019022029, 0510019022030, 0510019022031, 0510019022032, 0510019022033, 0510019022034, 0510019022035, 0510019022036, 0510019022037, 0510019022038, 0510019022039, 0510019022040, 0510019022041, 0510019022044, 0510019022045, 0510019022046, 0510019031003, 0510019031004, 0510019031005, 0510019031006, 0510019031007, 0510019031008, 0510019031009, 0510019031010, 0510019031011, 0510019031012, 0510019031015, 0510019031016, 0510019031017, 0510019031018, 0510032014000, 0510032014001, 0510032014002, 0510032014003, 0510032014004, 0510032014005, 0510032014006, 0510032014007, 0510032014008, 0510032014009, 0510032014010, 0510032014011, 0510032014012, 0510032014013, 0510032014014, 0510032014015, 0510032014016, 0510032014017, 0510032014018, 0510032014019, 0510032014020, 0510032014021, 0510032014022, 0510032014023, 0510032014024, 0510032014025, 0510032014035, 0510032014036, 0510032014037, 0510032014038, 0510032014039, 0510032014043, 0510032014044, 0510032014055, 0510032014056, 0510032033016, 0510032033017, 0510032033019, 0510032033020, 0510032033021, 0510032033022, 0510032033023, 0510032044002, 0510032044003, 0510032044004, 0510032044005, 0510032044006, 0510032044007, 0510032044008, 0510032044009, 0510032044010, 0510032044011, 0510032044012, 0510032044013, 0510032044014, 0510032044015, 0510032044016, 0510032044017, 0510032045003, 0510032045004, 0510032045005, 0510032045006, 0510032045007, 0510032045008, 0510032045009, 0510032045011, 0510032045013, 0510032045014, 0510032045015, 0510032045016, 0510032045017, 0510032045018, 0510032045019, 0510032045020, 0510032045021, 0510032045022, 0510032045023, 0510032045024, 0510032045025, 0510032045026, 0510032045027; VTD: MB62: 0510033104011, 0510033111015; VTD: MR02. It has one judge.
- District 12B: Cumberland County: VTD: CC01, VTD: CC03, VTD: CC05, VTD: CC13: Block(s) 0510008001000, 0510008001002, 0510008001003, 0510008001004, 0510008001018, 0510008001019, 0510010001001, 0510010001002, 0510010001003, 0510010001004, 0510010001005, 0510010001006, 0510010001007, 0510010002000, 0510010002001, 0510010002002, 0510010002003, 0510010002010, 0510010002014, 0510010002015, 0510010002016, 0510010002017, 0510010002018, 0510010002019, 0510010002020, 0510010002021, 0510010002022, 0510010002023, 0510010002024, 0510010002025, 0510010002026, 0510010002027, 0510010002028, 0510010002029, 0510010002030, 0510010002031, 0510010002032, 0510010002033, 0510010002034, 0510011003017, 0510011003018, 0510011003019, 0510011003020, 0510011003021, 0510011003022, 0510011003023, 0510011003024, 0510011003025, 0510011003026; VTD: CC15: 0510006003000, 0510006003001, 0510006003002, 0510006003003, 0510006003004, 0510006003005, 0510006003006, 0510006003007, 0510006003008, 0510006003013, 0510006005000, 0510006005001, 0510006005002, 0510006005003, 0510006005004, 0510006005005, 0510006005006, 0510006005007, 0510006005008, 0510006005009, 0510006005010, 0510006005011, 0510006005012, 0510006005013, 0510006005014, 0510006005015, 0510006005016, 0510006005018, 0510006005019, 0510006005020, 0510006005021, 0510006005022, 0510006005023, 0510038003033, 0510038003034, 0510038003060, 0510038003061; VTD: CC16, VTD: CC17, VTD: CC19, VTD: CL57, VTD: G11: Block(s) 0510025041000, 0510033132008; 0510034011000, 0510034011001, 0510034011002, 0510034011003, 0510034011004, 0510034011005, 0510034011006, 0510034011007, 0510034011008, 0510034011009, 0510034011010, 0510034011011, 0510034011012, 0510034011013, 0510034011014, 0510034011015, 0510034011016, 0510034011017, 0510034011018, 0510034011019, 0510034011020, 0510034011021, 0510034011022, 0510034011023, 0510034011024, 0510034011025, 0510034011026, 0510034011027, 0510034011028, 0510034011029, 0510034011030, 0510034011031, 0510034011032, 0510034011033, 0510034011034, 0510034011035, 0510034011036, 0510034011037, 0510034011038, 0510034011039, 0510034011040, 0510034011041, 0510034011042, 0510034011043, 0510034012000, 0510034012001, 0510034012002, 0510034012003, 0510034012004, 0510034012005, 0510034012006, 0510034012007, 0510034012008, 0510034012009, 0510034012010, 0510034012011, 0510034012012, 0510034012013, 0510034012014, 0510034012015, 0510034012016, 0510034012017, 0510034012018, 0510034012019, 0510034012020, 0510034012021, 0510034012022, 0510034012023, 0510034012024, 0510034012025, 0510034012026, 0510034012027, 0510034012028, 0510034012029, 0510034012030, 0510034012031, 0510034012032, 0510034012033, 0510034012034, 0510034012035, 0510034012036, 0510034012037, 0510034012038, 0510034012039, 0510034012040, 0510034012041, 0510034012042, 0510034012043, 0510034012044, 0510034012045, 0510034012046, 0510034012047, 0510034012048, 0510034012049, 0510034012050, 0510034012051, 0510034012052, 0510034012053, 0510034012054, 0510034012055, 0510034012056, 0510034012057, 0510034012058, 0510034012059, 0510034012060, 0510034012061, 0510034012062, 0510034012063, 0510034012064, 0510034012065, 0510034012066, 0510034012067, 0510034012068, 0510034012069, 0510034021000, 0510034021001, 0510034021002, 0510034021003, 0510034021004, 0510034021005, 0510034021006, 0510034021007, 0510034021008, 0510034021009, 0510034021010, 0510034021011, 0510034021012, 0510034021013, 0510034021014, 0510034021015, 0510034021016, 0510034021017, 0510034021018, 0510034021019, 0510034021020, 0510034021021, 0510034021022, 0510034021023, 0510034021024, 0510034021025, 0510034021026, 0510034021027, 0510034021028, 0510034021029, 0510034021030, 0510034021031, 0510034022000, 0510034022001, 0510034022002, 0510034022003, 0510034031000, 0510034031001, 0510034031002, 0510034031003, 0510034031004, 0510034031005, 0510034031006, 0510034031007, 0510034031008, 0510034031009, 0510034031010, 0510034031011, 0510034031012, 0510034031013, 0510034032000, 0510034032001, 0510034032002, 0510034032003, 0510034032004, 0510034032005, 0510034032006, 0510034032007, 0510034032008, 0510034032009, 0510034032010, 0510034032011, 0510034032012, 0510034032013, 0510034032014, 0510034032015, 0510034041000, 0510034041001, 0510034041002, 0510034041003, 0510034041004, 0510034041005, 0510034041006, 0510034041007, 0510034041008, 0510034041009, 0510034042000, 0510034042001, 0510034042002, 0510034042003, 0510034042004, 0510034042005, 0510034042006, 0510034042007, 0510034042008, 0510034042009, 0510034042010, 0510034042011, 0510034042012, 0510034042013, 0510034042014, 0510034042015, 0510034042016, 0510034042017, 0510034042018, 0510034042019, 0510034051000, 0510034051001, 0510034051002, 0510034051003, 0510034051004, 0510034051005, 0510034051006, 0510034051007, 0510034051008, 0510034051009, 0510034051010, 0510034051011, 0510034051012, 0510034051013, 0510034051014, 0510034051015, 0510034051016, 0510034051017, 0510034051018, 0510034051019, 0510034051020, 0510034051021, 0510034051022, 0510034051023, 0510034051024, 0510034051025, 0510034051026, 0510034051027, 0510034051028, 0510034051029, 0510034051030, 0510034051031, 0510034051032, 0510034061000, 0510034061001, 0510034061002, 0510034061003, 0510034061004, 0510034061005, 0510034061006, 0510034061007, 0510034061008, 0510034061009, 0510034061010, 0510034061011, 0510034061012, 0510034061013, 0510034061014, 0510034061015, 0510034061016, 0510034061017, 0510034061018, 0510034061019, 0510034061020, 0510034061021, 0510034061022, 0510034061023, 0510034061024, 0510034061025, 0510034061026, 0510034061027, 0510034061028, 0510034061029, 0510034061030, 0510034061031, 0510034061032, 0510034061033, 0510034061034, 0510034061035, 0510034061036, 0510034061037, 0510034061038, 0510034061039, 0510034061040, 0510034061041, 0510034061042, 0510034061043, 0510034061044, 0510034061045, 0510034061046, 0510034061047, 0510034061048, 0510034061049, 0510034061050, 0510034061051, 0510034061052, 0510034061053, 0510034061054, 0510034061055, 0510034061056, 0510034061057, 0510034061058, 0510034061059, 0510034061060, 0510034061061, 0510034061062, 0510034061063, 0510034061064, 0510034061065, 0510034061066, 0510034061067, 0510034061068, 0510034061069, 0510034061070, 0510034061071, 0510034061072, 0510034061073, 0510034061074, 0510034061075, 0510034061076, 0510034061077, 0510034061078, 0510034061079, 0510034061080, 0510034061081, 0510034061082, 0510034061083, 0510034061084, 0510034061085, 0510034061086, 0510034061087, 0510034061088, 0510034061089, 0510034061090, 0510034061091, 0510034061092, 0510034061093, 0510034061094, 0510034061095, 0510034061096, 0510034061097, 0510034061098, 0510034061099, 0510034061100, 0510034061101, 0510034061102, 0510034061103, 0510034061104, 0510034061105, 0510034061106, 0510034061107, 0510034061108, 0510034061109, 0510034071000, 0510034071001, 0510034071002, 0510034071003, 0510034071004, 0510034071005, 0510034071006, 0510034071007, 0510034071008, 0510034071009, 0510034071010, 0510034071011, 0510034071012, 0510034071013, 0510034071014, 0510034071015, 0510034071016, 0510034071017, 0510034071018, 0510034072000, 0510034072001, 0510034072002, 0510034072003, 0510034072004, 0510034072005, 0510034072006, 0510034072007, 0510034072008, 0510034072009, 0510034072010, 0510034072011,
- District 12C: Cumberland County: VTD: AL51, VTD: CC04, VTD: CC06, VTD: CC07, VTD: CC08, VTD: CC10, VTD: CC12, VTD: CC13: Block(s) 0510009004000, 0510009004020; VTD: CC14, VTD: CC15: Block(s) 0510006001000, 0510006001001, 0510006001002, 0510006001003, 0510006001004, 0510006001005, 0510006001006, 0510006001007, 0510006001008, 0510006001009, 0510006001010, 0510006001011, 0510006001012, 0510006001013, 0510006001014, 0510006001015, 0510006001016, 0510006002000, 0510006002001, 0510006002002, 0510006002003, 0510006002004, 0510006002005, 0510006002006, 0510006002007, 0510006002008, 0510006002009, 0510018001000, 0510018001001, 0510018001002, 0510018001003, 0510018001004, 0510018001005, 0510018001006, 0510018001007, 0510018001008, 0510018001009, 0510018002000, 0510018002001, 0510018002002, 0510038003035; VTD: CC18: 0510007022006, 0510007022010, 0510007022011, 0510007022013, 0510007022014, 0510007022015, 0510007022016, 0510007022017, 0510007022018, 0510007022019, 0510007022020, 0510007022021, 0510007022022, 0510007022023, 0510007022024, 0510007022025, 0510007022026, 0510038003030, 0510038003031, 0510038003032, 0510038003055; VTD: CC21, VTD: CC24: Block(s) 0510020011006, 0510020011007, 0510020011008, 0510020011010, 0510020011011, 0510020011012, 0510020011013, 0510020011014, 0510020011015, 0510020011016, 0510020011025, 0510020011026, 0510020011030, 0510020011031, 0510020011032, 0510020011033, 0510020011034, 0510020011035, 0510020011036, 0510020011037, 0510020011038, 0510020011039, 0510020011040, 0510020011041, 0510020011042, 0510020011043, 0510020011044, 0510020011045, 0510020011046, 0510020011047, 0510020011048, 0510020011049, 0510020011050, 0510020011051, 0510020011052, 0510020011053, 0510020011055, 0510020011056, 0510020012000, 0510020012001, 0510020012002, 0510020012003, 0510020012006, 0510020012007, 0510020012008, 0510020012009, 0510020012010, 0510020012011, 0510020012012, 0510020012013, 0510020012014, 0510020012015, 0510020012016, 0510020012017, 0510020012018, 0510020012019, 0510020012021, 0510020012022, 0510020012023, 0510020012024, 0510020021001; VTD: CC26, VTD: EO61-1, VTD: EO61-2, VTD: G1, VTD: G10: Block(s) 0510031031000, 0510031031011, 0510031031012, 0510031031013, 0510031031014, 0510031031015, 0510031031017, 0510031031018, 0510031031019, 0510031031020, 0510031031021, 0510031031022, 0510031032000, 0510031032001, 0510031032002, 0510031032003, 0510031032016, 0510031032022, 0510031032025, 0510031032030, 0510031032031, 0510031032032, 0510031032033, 0510031032035, 0510031032037, 0510031032038, 0510031032039, 0510031032040, 0510031032045, 0510031032050, 0510031032051; VTD: G11: 0510036001000, 0510036001001, 0510036001002, 0510036001003, 0510036001004, 0510036001005, 0510036001006, 0510036001007, 0510036001008, 0510036001009, 0510036001010, 0510036001012, 0510036001013, 0510036001014, 0510036001015, 0510036001016, 0510036001017, 0510036001019, 0510036001021, 0510036001022, 0510036001039, 0510036001040, 0510036001041, 0510036001042, 0510036003000, 0510036003001, 0510036003002, 0510036003003, 0510036003004, 0510036003005, 0510036003006, 0510036003007, 0510036003008, 0510036003009, 0510036003010, 0510036003011, 0510036003012, 0510036003014, 0510036003015, 0510036003016, 0510036003017, 0510036003018, 0510036003019, 0510036003020, 0510036003021, 0510036003022, 0510036003023, 0510036003024, 0510036003025, 0510036003026, 0510036003027, 0510036003028, 0510036003029, 0510036003030, 0510036003031, 0510036003032, 0510036003033, 0510036003035, 0510036003037, 0510036003038, 0510036003039, 0510036003040, 0510036003041, 0510036003042, 0510036003043, 0510036003044, 0510036003045, 0510036003046, 0510036003047, 0510036003048, 0510036003049, 0510036003050, 0510036003051, 0510036004000, 0510036004001, 0510036004048, 0510037001007, 0510037001008, 0510037001009, 0519801001000, 0519801001001, 0519801001002, 0519801001003, 0519801001004, 0519801001007, 0519801001008, 0519801001010, 0519801001011, 0519801001012, 0519801001013, 0519801001014, 0519801001015, 0519801001016; VTD: G2: 0510012004001, 0510012004002, 0510012004003, 0510012004004, 0510012004021, 0510012004022, 0510012004023, 0510012004024, 0510012004025, 0510012004026, 0510012004027, 0510012004028, 0510024011000, 0510024011001, 0510024011002, 0510024011003, 0510024011004, 0510024011005, 0510024011006, 0510024011007, 0510024011008, 0510024011009, 0510024011010, 0510024011011, 0510024011013, 0510024011014, 0510024011015, 0510024011016, 0510024011017, 0510024011018, 0510024011019, 0510024011022, 0510024011024, 0510024011025, 0510024011026, 0510024011027, 0510024011028, 0510024011029, 0510024011030, 0510024011034, 0510024011035, 0510024011036, 0510024011038, 0510024011041, 0510024011042, 0510024011043, 0510024012004, 0510024012007, 0510024012025, 0510024021000, 0510024021005, 0510024022000, 0510024022001, 0510024022004, 0510024022007, 0510025011000, 0510025011001, 0510025011002, 0510025011003, 0510025011004, 0510025011005, 0510025011006, 0510025011007, 0510025011008, 0510025011009, 0510025011010, 0510025011011, 0510025011012, 0510025011013, 0510025011014, 0510025011015, 0510025011016, 0510025011017, 0510025011018, 0510025011019, 0510025011020, 0510025011021, 0510025011022, 0510025011023, 0510025012000, 0510025012001, 0510025012002, 0510025012003, 0510025012004, 0510025012005, 0510025012006, 0510025012007, 0510025012008, 0510025012009, 0510025012010, 0510025012011, 0510025012012, 0510025012013, 0510025012014, 0510025013000, 0510025013001, 0510025013002, 0510025013003, 0510025013004, 0510025013005, 0510025013006, 0510025013007, 0510025013008, 0510025013014, 0510025013015, 0510025013016, 0510025013017, 0510025013020, 0510025013023, 0510025013031, 0510025013033, 0510025013037, 0510025013038, 0510025013039, 0510025013040, 0510025013053, 0510025013054, 0510025013055, 0510025013056, 0510025013057, 0510025013058, 0510025013059, 0510025013060, 0510025013061, 0510025013062, 0510025013066, 0510025013067, 0510025013069, 0510025013070, 0510025013077, 0510025013078, 0510025013079, 0510025013080, 0510025013081, 0510025021000, 0510025021001, 0510025021002, 0510025021003, 0510025021004, 0510025021005, 0510025021006, 0510025021007, 0510025021008, 0510025021009, 0510025021010, 0510025021011, 0510025021012, 0510025021013, 0510025021014, 0510025021015, 0510025021016, 0510025021017, 0510025021018, 0510025021019, 0510025021020, 0510025021021, 0510025021022, 0510025021023, 0510025021024, 0510025021025, 0510025021026, 0510025021027, 0510025021028, 0510025021029, 0510025021030, 0510025021031, 0510025021032, 0510025021033, 0510025021034, 0510025021035, 0510025021036, 0510025021037, 0510025021038, 0510025021039, 0510025021040, 0510025021041, 0510025021042, 0510025021043, 0510025021044, 0510025021045, 0510025021046, 0510025021047, 0510025021048, 0510025021049, 0510025021050, 0510025021051, 0510025021052, 0510025021053, 0510025021054, 0510025021055, 0510025021056, 0510025021057, 0510025021058, 0510025021059, 0510025021060, 0510025021061, 0510025021062, 0510025021063, 0510025021064, 0510025021065, 0510025021066, 0510025021067, 0510025022000, 0510025022001, 0510025022002, 0510025022003, 0510025022004, 0510025022005, 0510025022006, 0510025022007, 0510025022008, 0510025022009, 0510025022010, 0510025022011, 0510025022012, 0510025022013,
- District 14A: Durham County: VTD: 09, VTD: 12, VTD: 13, VTD: 14, VTD: 15, VTD: 18, VTD: 31: Block(s) 0630010013033, 0630018024009; VTD: 34, VTD: 35: Block(s) 0630020211023, 0630020212002, 0630020212003, 0630020212004, 0630020212005, 0630020212006, 0630020212007, 0630020212008, 0630020212009, 0630020212010, 0630020212013, 0630020212015, 0630020212016, 0630020212018, 0630020212020, 0630020212021, 0630020272052; VTD: 40, VTD: 41, VTD: 42, VTD: 48, VTD: 53-1, VTD: 54, VTD: 55. It has one judge.
- District 14B: Durham County: VTD: 01, VTD: 02, VTD: 03, VTD: 04, VTD: 05, VTD: 06, VTD: 07, VTD: 08, VTD: 10, VTD: 16, VTD: 17, VTD: 19, VTD: 20, VTD: 21, VTD: 22, VTD: 23, VTD: 24, VTD: 25, VTD: 26, VTD: 27, VTD: 28, VTD: 29, VTD: 30-1, VTD: 30-2, VTD: 31: Block(s) 0630010013034, 0630010013038, 0630010013039, 0630010013040, 0630010013043, 0630018071037, 0630018071038, 0630018091000, 0630018091001, 0630018091002, 0630018091003, 0630018091004, 0630018091005, 0630018091006, 0630018091007, 0630018091008, 0630018091009, 0630018091010, 0630018091011, 0630018091012, 0630018091013, 0630018091014, 0630018091015, 0630018091016, 0630018091017, 0630018091018, 0630018091019, 0630018091020, 0630018091021, 0630018091022, 0630018091023, 0630018091024, 0630018091025, 0630018091026, 0630018091027, 0630018091028, 0630018091029, 0630018091030, 0630018091031, 0630018091032, 0630018091033, 0630018091034, 0630018091035, 0630018091036, 0630018091037, 0630018091038, 0630018091041, 0630018091042, 0630018091043, 0630018091044, 0630018091045, 0630018091046, 0630018091062, 0630018091063, 0630018091064, 0630018091065, 0630018091066, 0630018091067, 0630018091071, 0630018091072, 0630018091073, 0630018091074, 0630018091077, 0630018091079, 0630018091080, 0630018092000, 0630018092001, 0630018092002, 0630018092003, 0630018092004, 0630018092005, 0630018092006, 0630018092007, 0630018092008, 0630018092009, 0630018092010, 0630018092011, 0630018092012, 0630018092013, 0630018092014, 0630018092015, 0630018092016, 0630018092017, 0630018092018, 0630018092019, 0630018092020, 0630018092021, 0630018092022, 0630018092023, 0630018092024, 0630018092027, 0630018092028, 0630018092029, 0630018092030, 0630018092031, 0630018092032, 0630018092033, 0630020271000, 0630020271001, 0630020271002, 0630020271003, 0630020271004, 0630020271005, 0630020271006, 0630020271007, 0630020271008, 0630020271009, 0630020271010, 0630020271011, 0630020271012, 0630020271013, 0630020271014, 0630020271015, 0630020271016, 0630020271017, 0630020271018, 0630020271019, 0630020271020, 0630020271021, 0630020271022, 0630020271023, 0630020271024, 0630020271025, 0630020271054, 0630020271055, 0630020271063, 0630020271064, 0630020271065, 0630020271067, 0630020271070, 0630020271071, 0639801001012, 0639801001013; VTD: 32, VTD: 33, VTD: 35: Block(s) 0630020131000, 0630020131001, 0630020131002, 0630020131003, 0630020131004, 0630020131005, 0630020131006, 0630020131007, 0630020131008, 0630020131009, 0630020131010, 0630020131011, 0630020131012, 0630020131013, 0630020131014, 0630020132000, 0630020132001, 0630020132002, 0630020132003, 0630020132004, 0630020132005, 0630020132006, 0630020132007, 0630020132008, 0630020132009, 0630020132010, 0630020132011, 0630020132012, 0630020132013, 0630020132014, 0630020132015, 0630020133000, 0630020133001, 0630020133002, 0630020133003, 0630020133004, 0630020133005, 0630020133006, 0630020133007, 0630020133008, 0630020133009, 0630020133010, 0630020133011, 0630020133012, 0630020133013, 0630020133014, 0630020133015, 0630020133016, 0630020133017, 0630020133018, 0630020133019, 0630020202000, 0630020202001, 0630020202002, 0630020202003, 0630020202004, 0630020202005, 0630020202006, 0630020202007, 0630020202008, 0630020202009, 0630020202010, 0630020202011, 0630020202012, 0630020202013, 0630020202014, 0630020202015, 0630020202016, 0630020202017, 0630020202018, 0630020202019, 0630020202020, 0630020202021, 0630020202022, 0630020202023, 0630020202024, 0630020202025, 0630020202026, 0630020202027, 0630020202028, 0630020202029, 0630020202030, 0630020202031, 0630020202032, 0630020202033, 0630020202034, 0630020202035, 0630020202036, 0630020202037, 0630020202038, 0630020202039, 0630020202040, 0630020202041, 0630020202042, 0630020202043, 0630020202044, 0630020202045, 0630020202046, 0630020202047, 0630020202048, 0630020202049, 0630020202050, 0630020202051, 0630020202052, 0630020202053, 0630020202054, 0630020202055, 0630020202056, 0630020202057, 0630020202058, 0630020211021, 0630020211022, 0630020211024, 0630020211049, 0630020211050, 0630020212011, 0630020212014, 0630020212017, 0630020212019, 0630020272070, 0630020272071, 0630020272072, 0630020272073, 0630020272074, 0630020272075; VTD: 36, VTD: 37, VTD: 38, VTD: 39, VTD: 43, VTD: 44, VTD: 45, VTD: 46, VTD: 47, VTD: 50, VTD: 51, VTD: 52, VTD: 53-2. It has three judges.
- District 18A: Guilford County: VTD: FEN1, VTD: FEN2, VTD: G04, VTD: G05, VTD: G06, VTD: G46, VTD: G52, VTD: G67, VTD: G68, VTD: G69, VTD: G70, VTD: G71, VTD: G72, VTD: G73, VTD: G74, VTD: G75, VTD: NCLAY1, VTD: NCLAY2, VTD: PG1, VTD: PG2, VTD: SCLAY. It has one judge.
- District 18B: Guilford County: VTD: H01, VTD: H02, VTD: H03, VTD: H04, VTD: H05, VTD: H06, VTD: H07, VTD: H08, VTD: H09, VTD: H10, VTD: H11, VTD: H12, VTD: H13, VTD: H14, VTD: H15, VTD: H16, VTD: H17, VTD: H18, VTD: H19A, VTD: H19B, VTD: H20A, VTD: H20B, VTD: H21, VTD: H22, VTD: H23, VTD: H24, VTD: H25, VTD: H26, VTD: H27, VTD: HP, VTD: JAM1, VTD: JAM5, VTD: NDRI, VTD: SDRI. It has one judge.
- District 18C: Guilford County: VTD: CG1, VTD: CG2, VTD: CG3A, VTD: CG3B, VTD: FR1, VTD: FR2, VTD: FR3, VTD: FR4, VTD: FR5, VTD: G17, VTD: G30, VTD: G31, VTD: G32, VTD: G33, VTD: G34, VTD: G36, VTD: G37, VTD: G38, VTD: G39, VTD: G40A1, VTD: G40A2, VTD: G40B, VTD: G41, VTD: G42, VTD: G43, VTD: G64, VTD: G65, VTD: G66, VTD: JAM2, VTD: JAM3, VTD: JAM4, VTD: MON3, VTD: NCGR1, VTD: NCGR2, VTD: OR1, VTD: OR2, VTD: SF1, VTD: SF2, VTD: SF3, VTD: SF4, VTD: STOK. It has one judge.
- District 18D: Guilford County: VTD: G01, VTD: G11, VTD: G12, VTD: G13, VTD: G14, VTD: G15, VTD: G16, VTD: G19, VTD: G35, VTD: G44, VTD: G45, VTD: G47, VTD: G48, VTD: G49, VTD: G50, VTD: G51, VTD: G53, VTD: G54, VTD: G55, VTD: G56, VTD: G57, VTD: G58, VTD: G59, VTD: G60, VTD: G61, VTD: G62, VTD: G63, VTD: SUM1, VTD: SUM2, VTD: SUM3, VTD: SUM4. It has one judge.
- District 18E: Guilford County: VTD: G02, VTD: G03, VTD: G07, VTD: G08, VTD: G09, VTD: G10, VTD: G18, VTD: G20, VTD: G21, VTD: G22, VTD: G23, VTD: G24, VTD: G25, VTD: G26, VTD: G27, VTD: G28, VTD: G29, VTD: GIB, VTD: GR, VTD: JEF1, VTD: JEF2, VTD: JEF3, VTD: JEF4, VTD: MON1, VTD: MON2, VTD: NMAD, VTD: NWASH, VTD: RC1, VTD: RC2, VTD: SMAD, VTD: SWASH. It has one judge.
- District 21A: Forsyth County: VTD: 051, VTD: 052, VTD: 053, VTD: 054, VTD: 055, VTD: 071, VTD: 072, VTD: 073, VTD: 074, VTD: 075, VTD: 091, VTD: 092, VTD: 122, VTD: 123, VTD: 131, VTD: 132, VTD: 133, VTD: 701, VTD: 702, VTD: 703, VTD: 704, VTD: 705, VTD: 706, VTD: 707, VTD: 708, VTD: 709, VTD: 806, VTD: 807, VTD: 808. It has one judge.
- District 21B: Forsyth County: VTD: 042, VTD: 043, VTD: 501, VTD: 502, VTD: 503, VTD: 504, VTD: 505, VTD: 506, VTD: 507, VTD: 601, VTD: 602, VTD: 603, VTD: 604, VTD: 605, VTD: 606, VTD: 607, VTD: 901, VTD: 902, VTD: 903, VTD: 904, VTD: 905, VTD: 907. It has one judge.
- District 21C: Forsyth County: VTD: 011, VTD: 012, VTD: 013, VTD: 014, VTD: 015, VTD: 021, VTD: 031, VTD: 032, VTD: 033, VTD: 034, VTD: 061, VTD: 062, VTD: 063, VTD: 064, VTD: 065, VTD: 066, VTD: 067, VTD: 068, VTD: 101, VTD: 111, VTD: 112, VTD: 801, VTD: 802, VTD: 803, VTD: 804, VTD: 805, VTD: 809, VTD: 906, VTD: 908, VTD: 909. It has one judge.
- District 21D: Forsyth County: VTD: 081, VTD: 082, VTD: 083, VTD: 201, VTD: 203, VTD: 204, VTD: 205, VTD: 206, VTD: 207, VTD: 301, VTD: 302, VTD: 303, VTD: 304, VTD: 305, VTD: 306, VTD: 401, VTD: 402, VTD: 403, VTD: 404, VTD: 405. It has one judge.
- District 26A: Mecklenburg County: VTD 001, VTD 008, VTD 018, VTD 019, VTD 032, VTD 035, VTD 036, VTD 047, VTD 048, VTD 057, VTD 067, VTD 069, VTD 071, VTD 074, VTD 091, VTD 096, VTD 103, VTD 106, VTD 113, VTD 119, VTD 136, VTD 215, VTD 216, VTD 217, VTD 218, VTD 219, VTD 220, VTD 221, VTD 233, VTD 234, VTD 236. It has one judge.
- District 26B: Mecklenburg County: VTD 070, VTD 072, VTD 073, VTD 075, VTD 076, VTD 086, VTD 087, VTD 088, VTD 090, VTD 092, VTD 093, VTD 100, VTD 101, VTD 110, VTD 111, VTD 112, VTD 114, VTD 118, VTD 121, VTD 131, VTD 137, VTD 139.1, VTD 140, VTD 144, VTD 226, VTD 227, VTD 232. It has one judge.
- District 26C: Mecklenburg County: VTD 127, VTD 133, VTD 134, VTD 142, VTD 143, VTD 150, VTD 151, VTD 202, VTD 206, VTD 207, VTD 208, VTD 209, VTD 223.1, VTD 224, VTD 240, VTD 241, VTD 242. It has one judge.
- District 26D: Mecklenburg County: VTD 037, VTD 038, VTD 049, VTD 050, VTD 051, VTD 058, VTD 059, VTD 077, VTD 097, VTD 098, VTD 120, VTD 122, VTD 129, VTD 138, VTD 147, VTD 148, VTD 225, VTD 228, VTD 229, VTD 230, VTD 231, VTD 243. It has one judge.
- District 26E: Mecklenburg County: VTD 002, VTD 005, VTD 007, VTD 009, VTD 010, VTD 012, VTD 013, VTD 014, VTD 016, VTD 017, VTD 020, VTD 021, VTD 022, VTD 023, VTD 024, VTD 025, VTD 029, VTD 031, VTD 039, VTD 040, VTD 041, VTD 046, VTD 052, VTD 053, VTD 078.1, VTD 079, VTD 080, VTD 081, VTD 109, VTD 200. It has one judge.
- District 26F: Mecklenburg County: VTD 011, VTD 015, VTD 026, VTD 027, VTD 028, VTD 030, VTD 042, VTD 044, VTD 054, VTD 055, VTD 056, VTD 082, VTD 089, VTD 128, VTD 135, VTD 210, VTD 211, VTD 213, VTD 214, VTD 222, VTD 238.1. It has one judge.
- District 26G: Mecklenburg County: VTD 003, VTD 004, VTD 043, VTD 060, VTD 061, VTD 104, VTD 105, VTD 107.1, VTD 123, VTD 126, VTD 132, VTD 141, VTD 145, VTD 146, VTD 149, VTD 204.1, VTD 212, VTD 237, VTD 239. It has one judge.
- District 26H: Mecklenburg County: VTD 006, VTD 033, VTD 034, VTD 045, VTD 062, VTD 063, VTD 064, VTD 065, VTD 066, VTD 068, VTD 083, VTD 084, VTD 085, VTD 094, VTD 095, VTD 099, VTD 102, VTD 108, VTD 115, VTD 116, VTD 117, VTD 124, VTD 125, VTD 130, VTD 201, VTD 203, VTD 205, VTD 235. It has one judge.
- The qualified voters of District 4 shall elect all judges established for District 4 in subsection (a) of this section, but only persons who reside in Onslow County may be candidates for one of the judgeships and only persons who reside in Duplin, Jones, or Sampson County may be candidates for the remaining judgeship.
- In subsection (b) above, the names and boundaries of voting tabulation districts, tracts, block groups, and blocks specified in this section are as shown on the 2010 Census Redistricting TIGER/Line Shapefiles.
- If any voting tabulation district boundary is changed, that change shall not change the boundary of a judicial district, which shall remain the same as it is depicted by the 2010 Census Redistricting TIGER/Line Shapefiles.
- The Legislative Services Officer shall certify a true copy of the block assignment file associated with any mapping software used to generate the language in subsection (b) of this section. The certified true copy of the block assignment file shall be delivered by the Legislative Services Officer to the Principal Clerk of the Senate and the Principal Clerk of the House of Representatives. If any area within North Carolina is not assigned to a specific district by subsection (b) of this section, the certified true copy of the block assignment file delivered to the Principal Clerk of the Senate and the Principal Clerk of the House of Representatives shall control.
-
The several judges, their terms of office, and their assignments to districts are as follows:
- In the first superior court district, J. Herbert Small and Thomas S. Watts serve terms expiring December 31, 1994.
- In the second superior court district, William C. Griffin serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
- In the third-A superior court district, David E. Reid serves a term expiring on December 31, 1992.
- In the third-B superior court district, Herbert O. Phillips, III, serves a term expiring on December 31, 1994.
- In the fourth-A superior court district, Henry L. Stevens, III, serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
- In the fourth-B superior court district, James R. Strickland serves a term expiring December 31, 1992.
- In the fifth superior court district, no election shall be held in 1992 for the full term of the seat now occupied by Bradford Tillery, and the holder of that seat shall serve until a successor is elected in 1994 and qualifies. The succeeding term begins January 1, 1995. In the fifth superior court district, Napoleon B. Barefoot serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
- In the sixth-A superior court district, Richard B. Allsbrook serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
- In the sixth-B superior court district, a judge shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
- In the seventh-A superior court district, Charles B. Winberry, serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
- In the seventh-B superior court district, a judge shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
- In the seventh-C superior court district, Franklin R. Brown serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
- In the eighth-A superior court district, James D. Llewellyn serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
- In the eighth-B superior court district, Paul M. Wright serves a term expiring December 31, 1992.
- In the ninth superior court district, Robert H. Hobgood and Henry W. Hight, Jr., serve terms expiring December 31, 1994.
- In the tenth-A superior court district, a judge shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
- In the tenth-B superior court district, Robert L. Farmer serves a term expiring December 31, 1992. In the tenth-B superior court district, no election shall be held in 1990 for the full term of the seat now occupied by Henry V. Barnette, Jr., and the holder of that seat shall serve until a successor is elected in 1992 and qualifies. The succeeding term begins January 1, 1993.
- In the tenth-C superior court district, Edwin S. Preston, serves a term expiring December 31, 1990. In the tenth-D superior court district, Donald Stephens serves a term expiring December 31, 1988.
- In the eleventh superior court district, Wiley F. Bowen serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
- In the twelfth-A superior court district, D.B. Herring, Jr., serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
- In the twelfth-B superior court district, a judge shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
- In the twelfth-C superior court district, no election shall be held in 1992 for the full term of the seat now occupied by Coy E. Brewer, Jr., and the holder of that seat shall serve until a successor is elected in 1994 and qualifies. The succeeding term begins January 1, 1995. In the twelfth-C superior court district, E. Lynn Johnson serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
- In the thirteenth superior court district, Giles R. Clark serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
- In the fourteenth-A superior court district, a judge shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
- In the fourteenth-B superior court district, no election shall be held in 1992 for the full term of the seat now occupied by Anthony M. Brannon, and the holder of that seat shall serve until a successor is elected in 1994 and qualifies. The succeeding term begins July 1, 1995.
- In the fourteenth-B superior court district, no election shall be held in 1990 for the full term of the seat now occupied by Thomas H. Lee, and the holder of that seat shall serve until a successor is elected in 1994 and qualifies. The succeeding term begins January 1, 1995. In the fourteenth-B superior court district, J. Milton Read, Jr., serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
- In the fifteenth-A superior court district, J.B. Allen, Jr., serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
- In the fifteenth-B superior court district, F. Gordon Battle serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
- In the sixteenth-A superior court district, B. Craig Ellis serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
- In the sixteenth-B superior court district, a judge shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989. In the sixteenth-B judicial [superior court] district, a judge shall be appointed by the Governor to serve until the results of the 1990 general election are certified. A person shall be elected in the 1990 general election to serve the remainder of the term expiring December 31, 1996.
- In the seventeenth-A superior court district, Melzer A. Morgan, Jr., serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
- In the seventeenth-B superior court district, James M. Long serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
- In the eighteenth-A superior court district, a judge shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
- In the eighteenth-B superior court district, Edward K. Washington's term expired December 31, 1986, but he is holding over because of a court order enjoining an election from being held in 1986. A successor shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
- In the eighteenth-C superior court district, W. Douglas Albright serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
- In the eighteenth-D superior court district, Thomas W. Ross's term expired December 31, 1986, but he is holding over because of a court order enjoining an election from being held in 1986. A successor shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
- In the eighteenth-E superior court district, Joseph John's term expired December 31, 1986, but he is holding over because of a court order enjoining an election from being held in 1986. A successor shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
- In the nineteenth-A superior court district, James C. Davis serves a term expiring December 31, 1992.
- In the nineteenth-B1 superior court district, Russell G. Walker, Jr., serves a term expiring December 31, 1990. No election shall be held in 1998 for the full term of the seat now occupied by Russell G. Walker, Jr., and the holder of that seat shall serve until a successor is elected in 2000 and qualifies. The succeeding term shall begin January 1, 2001. The superior court judgeship held on June 12, 1996, in Superior Court District 20A by a resident of Moore County (James M. Webb) is allocated to Superior Court District 19B2. The term of that judge expires December 31, 2000. The judge's successor shall be elected in the 2000 general election.
- In the nineteenth-C superior court district, Thomas W. Seay, Jr., serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
- In the twentieth-A superior court district, F. Fetzer Mills serves a term expiring December 31, 1992.
- In the twentieth-B superior court district, William H. Helms serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
- In the twenty-first-A superior court district, William Z. Wood serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
- In the twenty-first-B superior court district, Judson D. DeRamus, Jr., serves a term expiring December 31, 1988.
- In the twenty-first-C superior court district, William H. Freeman serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
- In the twenty-first-D superior court district, a judge shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
- In the twenty-second superior court district, no election shall be held in 1992 for the full term of the seat now occupied by Preston Cornelius, and the holder of that seat shall serve until a successor is elected in 1994 and qualifies. The succeeding term shall begin January 1, 1995. In the twenty-second superior court district, Robert A. Collier serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
- In the twenty-third superior court district, Julius A. Rousseau, Jr., serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
- In the twenty-fourth superior court district, Charles C. Lamm, Jr., serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
- In the twenty-fifth-A superior court district, Claude S. Sitton serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
- In the twenty-fifth-B superior court district, Forrest A. Ferrell serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
- In the twenty-sixth-A superior court district, no election shall be held in 1994 for the full term of the seat now occupied by W. Terry Sherrill, and the holder of that seat shall serve until a successor is elected in 1996 and qualifies. The succeeding term shall begin January 1, 1997. In the twenty-sixth-A superior court district, a judge shall be elected in 1988 to serve an eight-year term beginning January 1, 1989.
- In the twenty-sixth-B superior court district, Frank W. Snepp, Jr., and Kenneth A. Griffin serve terms expiring December 31, 1990.
- In the twenty-sixth-C superior court district, no election shall be held in 1992 for the full term of the seat now occupied by Chase Boone Saunders, and the holder of that seat shall serve until a successor is elected in 1994 and qualifies. The succeeding term shall begin January 1, 1995. In the twenty-sixth-C superior court district, Robert M. Burroughs serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
- In the twenty-seventh-A superior court district, no election shall be held in 1988 for the full term of the seat now occupied by Robert E. Gaines, and the holder of that seat shall serve until a successor is elected in 1990 and qualifies. The succeeding term begins January 1, 1991. In the twenty-seventh-A superior court district, Robert W. Kirby serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
- In the twenty-seventh-B superior court district, John M. Gardner serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
- In the twenty-eighth superior court district, Robert D. Lewis and C. Walter Allen serve terms expiring December 31, 1990.
- In the twenty-ninth superior court district, Hollis M. Owens, Jr., serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
- In the thirtieth-A superior court district, James U. Downs serves a term expiring December 31, 1990.
- In the thirtieth-B superior court district, Janet M. Hyatt serves a term expiring December 31, 1994.
--------------------------------------------------------------- ------------ --------------------------------------------------------------- ------------ Superior Judicial Court No. of Resident Division District Counties Judges --------------------------------------------------------------- ------------ First 1 Camden, Chowan, 2 Currituck, Dare, Gates, Pasquotank, Perquimans First 2 Beaufort, Hyde, 1 Martin, Tyrrell, Washington First 3A Pitt 2 Second 3B Carteret, Craven, 3 Pamlico Second 4 Duplin, Jones, 2 Onslow, Sampson Second 5A (part of New Hanover, 1 Pender see subsection (b)) 5B (part of New Hanover, 1 see subsection (b)) 5C (part of New Hanover, 1 see subsection (b)) First 6A Halifax 1 First 6B Bertie, Hertford, 1 Northampton First 7A Nash 1 First 7B (part of Wilson, 1 part of Edgecombe, see subsection (b)) First 7C (part of Wilson, 1 part of Edgecombe, see subsection (b)) Second 8A Lenoir and Greene 1 Second 8B Wayne 1 First 9 Franklin, Granville, 2 Person, Vance, Warren Third 10A (part of Wake, 1 see subsection (b)) Third 10B (part of Wake, 1 see subsection (b)) Third 10C (part of Wake, 1 see subsection (b)) Third 10D (part of Wake, 1 see subsection (b)) Third 10E (part of Wake, 1 see subsection (b)) Third 10F (part of Wake, 1 see subsection (b)) Third 11A Harnett, 1 Lee Third 11B Johnston 1 Third 12A (part of Cumberland, 1 see subsection (b)) Third 12B (part of Cumberland, 1 see subsection (b)) Third 12C (part of Cumberland, 2 see subsection (b)) Second 13A Bladen, Columbus 1 Second 13B Brunswick 1 First 14A (part of Durham, 1 see subsection (b)) First 14B (part of Durham, 3 see subsection (b)) Third 15A Alamance 2 Fourth 15B Orange, Chatham 2 Third 16A Anson, Richmond, 2 Scotland Second 16B Robeson 2 Fourth 17A Caswell, Rockingham 2 Fourth 17B Stokes, Surry 1 Fourth 18A (part of Guilford, 1 see subsection (b)) Fourth 18B (part of Guilford, 1 see subsection (b)) Fourth 18C (part of Guilford, 1 see subsection (b)) Fourth 18D (part of Guilford, 1 see subsection (b)) Fourth 18E (part of Guilford, 1 see subsection (b)) Fourth 19A Cabarrus 1 Third 19B Randolph 2 Fourth 19C Rowan 1 Third 19D Hoke, Moore 2 Third 20A Montgomery, Stanly 2 Third 20B Union 2 Fourth 21A (part of Forsyth, 1 see subsection (b)) Fourth 21B (part of Forsyth, 1 see subsection (b)) Fourth 21C (part of Forsyth, 1 see subsection (b)) Fourth 21D (part of Forsyth, 1 see subsection (b)) Fourth 22A Alexander, Iredell 2 Fourth 22B Davidson, Davie 2 Fourth 23 Alleghany, Ashe, 1 Wilkes, Yadkin Fifth 24 Avery, Madison, 2 Mitchell, Watauga, Yancey Fifth 25A Burke, Caldwell 2 Fifth 25B Catawba 2 Fifth 26A (part of Mecklenburg, 1 see subsection (b)) Fifth 26B (part of Mecklenburg, 1 see subsection (b)) Fifth 26C (part of Mecklenburg, 1 see subsection (b)) 26D (part of Mecklenburg, 1 see subsection (b)) 26E (part of Mecklenburg, 1 see subsection (b)) 26F (part of Mecklenburg, 1 see subsection (b)) 26G (part of Mecklenburg, 1 see subsection (b)) 26H (part of Mecklenburg, 1 see subsection (b)) Fifth 27A Gaston 2 Fifth 27B Cleveland, Lincoln 2 Fifth 28 Buncombe 2 Fifth 29A McDowell, 1 Rutherford Fifth 29B Henderson, Polk, 1 Transylvania Fifth 30A Cherokee, Clay, 1 Graham, Macon, Swain Fifth 30B Haywood, Jackson 1.
VTD: PRSP, VTD: PRST: Block(s) 1950008022062, 1950008022064, 1950008022065, 1950008023036, 1950008023037, 1950008023038, 1950009003005, 1950010001000, 1950010001001, 1950010001002, 1950010001003, 1950010001004, 1950010001005, 1950010001006, 1950010001007, 1950010001008, 1950010001009, 1950010001010, 1950010001011, 1950010001012, 1950010001013, 1950010001014, 1950010001015, 1950010001016, 1950010001017, 1950010001018, 1950010001019, 1950010001020, 1950010001021, 1950010001022, 1950010001024, 1950010001025, 1950010001026, 1950010001027, 1950010001028, 1950010001029, 1950010001030, 1950010001031, 1950010001032, 1950010001033, 1950010001034, 1950010001035, 1950010001036, 1950010001037, 1950010001038, 1950010001039, 1950010001040, 1950010001041, 1950010001042, 1950010001043, 1950010001044, 1950010001045, 1950010001046, 1950010001047, 1950010001048, 1950010001049, 1950010001050, 1950010001051, 1950010001052, 1950010001053, 1950010001054, 1950010001055, 1950010001056, 1950010001057, 1950010001058, 1950010001059, 1950010001060, 1950010001061, 1950010001062, 1950010001063, 1950010001064, 1950010001065, 1950010001066, 1950010001067, 1950010001068, 1950010001069, 1950010001070, 1950010001071, 1950010001072, 1950010001073, 1950010001074, 1950010001075, 1950010001076, 1950010001077, 1950010001078; VTD: PRTA, VTD: PRTO: Block(s) 1950013003000, 1950013003001, 1950013003002, 1950013003003, 1950013003004, 1950013003005, 1950013003006, 1950013003007, 1950013003008, 1950013003009, 1950013003010, 1950013003011, 1950013003012, 1950013003013, 1950013003014, 1950013003015, 1950013003016, 1950013003017, 1950013003018, 1950013003019, 1950013003020, 1950013004000, 1950013004001, 1950013004002, 1950013004003, 1950013004004, 1950013004005, 1950013004006, 1950013004007, 1950013004008, 1950013004009, 1950013004010, 1950013004011, 1950013004012, 1950013004013, 1950013004014, 1950013004015, 1950013004016, 1950013004017, 1950013004018, 1950013004019, 1950013004020, 1950013004021, 1950013004022, 1950013004023, 1950013004024, 1950013004025, 1950013004026, 1950013004027, 1950013004028, 1950013004029, 1950013004030, 1950013004031, 1950013004032, 1950013004033, 1950013004034, 1950013004035, 1950013004036, 1950013004037, 1950013004038, 1950013004039, 1950013004040, 1950013004041, 1950013004042, 1950013004043, 1950013004044, 1950013004045, 1950013004046, 1950013004047, 1950013004048, 1950013004049, 1950013004050, 1950013004051, 1950013004052, 1950013004053, 1950013004054, 1950013004055; VTD: PRWB: 1950002001047, 1950002001048, 1950002001049, 1950002001050, 1950002001051, 1950002001061; VTD: PRWC: 1950004002000, 1950004002001, 1950004002010, 1950004002011, 1950004002012, 1950004003000, 1950004003001, 1950004003002, 1950004003003, 1950004003004, 1950004003005, 1950004003006, 1950004003007, 1950004003008, 1950004003009, 1950004003010, 1950004003011, 1950004003012, 1950004003013, 1950004003014, 1950004003015, 1950004003016, 1950004003017, 1950004003018, 1950004003019, 1950004003020, 1950004003021, 1950004003022, 1950004003023, 1950004003024, 1950004003025; VTD: PRWD, VTD: PRWE: Block(s) 1950001001000, 1950001001001, 1950001001002, 1950001001003, 1950001001010, 1950001001011, 1950001001013, 1950001001014, 1950001001015, 1950001002000, 1950001002001, 1950001002002, 1950001002011, 1950001002012, 1950001002013, 1950006002000, 1950006002001, 1950006002004, 1950006002005, 1950006002006, 1950006002007, 1950006002008, 1950006002009, 1950006002010, 1950006002011, 1950006002012, 1950006002013, 1950006002014, 1950006002015, 1950006002016, 1950006003000, 1950006003001, 1950006003002, 1950006003003, 1950006003004, 1950006003005, 1950006003006, 1950006003007, 1950006003008, 1950006003009, 1950006003010, 1950006003011, 1950006003012, 1950006003013, 1950006003014, 1950006003015, 1950006003016, 1950006003017, 1950006003018, 1950006003019, 1950006003020, 1950006005019, 1950006005020, 1950006005021, 1950006005022, 1950006005023, 1950006005075, 1950013003021, 1950013003022; VTD: PRWI, VTD: PRWJ, VTD: PRWK, VTD: PRWL, VTD: PRWM, VTD: PRWP. It has one judge.
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0519801001046, 0519801001047, 0519801001048, 0519801001049, 0519801001051, 0519801001052, 0519801001053, 0519801001054, 0519801001055, 0519801001056, 0519801001057, 0519801001058, 0519801001059, 0519801001060, 0519801001061, 0519801001062, 0519801001063, 0519801001064, 0519801001065, 0519801001066, 0519801001067, 0519801001068, 0519802001000, 0519802001001, 0519802001002, 0519802001003, 0519802001004, 0519802001005, 0519802001006, 0519802001007, 0519802001008, 0519802001009, 0519802001010, 0519802001011, 0519802001012, 0519802001013, 0519802001014, 0519802001015, 0519802001016, 0519802001017, 0519802001018, 0519802001019, 0519802001020, 0519802001021, 0519802001022, 0519802001023, 0519802001024, 0519802001025, 0519802001026, 0519802001028, 0519802001029, 0519802001030, 0519802001031, 0519802001032, 0519802001033, 0519802001034, 0519802001035, 0519802001036, 0519802001037, 0519802001038, 0519802001039, 0519802001040, 0519802001041, 0519802001042, 0519802001043, 0519802001044, 0519802001045;
VTD: G2: 0510012001000, 0510012001001, 0510012001002, 0510012001003, 0510012001004, 0510012001005, 0510012001006, 0510012001007, 0510012001008, 0510012001009, 0510012001010, 0510024022002, 0510024022003, 0510024022005, 0510024022006, 0510024023000, 0510024023001, 0510024023002, 0510024023003, 0510024023004, 0510024023005, 0510024023006, 0510024023007, 0510024023008, 0510024023009, 0510024023011, 0510024023012, 0510024023013, 0510025013009, 0510025013010, 0510025013011, 0510025013012, 0510025013013, 0510025013018, 0510025013019, 0510025013021, 0510025013022, 0510025013024, 0510025013025, 0510025013026, 0510025013027, 0510025013028, 0510025013029, 0510025013030, 0510025013032, 0510025013034, 0510025013035, 0510025013036, 0510025013041, 0510025013042, 0510025013043, 0510025013044, 0510025013045, 0510025013046, 0510025013047, 0510025013048, 0510025013049, 0510025013050, 0510025013051, 0510025013052, 0510025013063, 0510025013064, 0510025013065, 0510025013068, 0510025013071, 0510025013072, 0510025013073, 0510025013074, 0510025013075, 0510025013076; VTD: LR63, VTD: MB62: Block(s) 0510033071009, 0510033071010, 0510033072000, 0510033072001, 0510033072002, 0510033072003, 0510033072004, 0510033072005, 0510033072006, 0510033072007, 0510033072008, 0510033072029, 0510033141000, 0510033141001, 0510033141002, 0510033141003, 0510033141004, 0510033141005, 0510033141006, 0510033141007, 0510033141008, 0510033141009, 0510033141010, 0510033141011, 0510033141012, 0510033141013, 0510033141014, 0510033141015, 0510033141016, 0510033141017, 0510033141018, 0510033141019, 0510033141020, 0510033141021, 0510033141022, 0510033141023, 0510033141024, 0510033141025, 0510033143000, 0510033143001, 0510033143002, 0510033143003, 0510033143009, 0510033143010, 0510033143011, 0510033143012, 0510033143013, 0510033143014. It has one judge.
0510025022014, 0510025022015, 0510025022016, 0510025022017, 0510025022018, 0510025022019, 0510025022020, 0510025022021, 0510025022022, 0510025022023, 0510025022024, 0510025022025, 0510025022026, 0510025022027, 0510025022028, 0510025022029, 0510025022030, 0510025022031, 0510025022032, 0510025022033, 0510025022034, 0510025022035, 0510025022036, 0510025022037, 0510025022038, 0510025022039, 0510025022040, 0510025022041, 0510025022042, 0510025022043, 0510025022044, 0510025022045, 0510025022046, 0510025022047, 0510025022048, 0510025022049, 0510025022050, 0510025022051, 0510025022052, 0510025022053, 0510025022054, 0510025022055, 0510025022056, 0510025022057, 0510025022058, 0510025022059, 0510025022060, 0510025022061, 0510025022062, 0510025022063, 0510025022064, 0510025022065, 0510025022066, 0510025022067, 0510025022068, 0510025022069, 0510025022070, 0510025022071, 0510025022072, 0510025022073, 0510025022074, 0510025022075, 0510025022076, 0510025022077, 0510025022078, 0510025022079, 0510025022080, 0510025022081, 0510025022082, 0510025022083, 0510025022084, 0510025023000, 0510025023001, 0510025023002, 0510025023003, 0510025023004, 0510025023005, 0510025023006, 0510025023007, 0510025023008, 0510025023009, 0510025023010, 0510025023011, 0510025023012, 0510025023013, 0510025023014, 0510025023015, 0510025023016, 0510025023017, 0510025023018, 0510025023019, 0510025023020, 0510025023021, 0510025023022, 0510025023023, 0510025023024, 0510025023025, 0510025023026, 0510025023027, 0510025023028, 0510025023029, 0510025023030, 0510025023031, 0510025023032, 0510025023033, 0510025023034, 0510025023035, 0510025023036, 0510025031000, 0510025031001, 0510025031002, 0510025031003, 0510025031004, 0510025031005, 0510025031006, 0510025031007, 0510025031008, 0510025031009, 0510025031010, 0510025031011, 0510025031012, 0510025031013, 0510025031014, 0510025031015, 0510025031016, 0510025031017, 0510025031018, 0510025031019, 0510025031020, 0510025031021, 0510025031022, 0510025031023, 0510025031024, 0510025031025, 0510025032000, 0510025032001, 0510025032002, 0510025032003, 0510025032004, 0510025032005, 0510025032006, 0510025032007, 0510025032008, 0510025032009, 0510025033000, 0510025033001, 0510025033002, 0510025033003, 0510025033004, 0510025033005, 0510025033006, 0510025033007, 0510025033008, 0510025033009, 0510025033010, 0510025033011, 0510025033012, 0510025033013, 0510025033014, 0510025033015, 0510025033016, 0510025033017, 0510025033018, 0510025033019, 0510025033020, 0510025033021, 0510025033022, 0510025033023, 0510025033024, 0510025033025, 0510025033026, 0510025033027, 0510025033028, 0510025033029, 0510025033030, 0510025033031, 0510025033032, 0510025033033, 0510025033034, 0510025033035, 0510025041001, 0510025041002, 0510025041003, 0510025041004, 0510025041005, 0510025041006, 0510025041007, 0510025041008, 0510025041009, 0510025041010, 0510025041011, 0510025041012, 0510025041013, 0510025041014, 0510025041015, 0510025041016, 0510025041017, 0510025041018, 0510025041019, 0510025041020, 0510025041021, 0510025041022, 0510025041023, 0510025041024, 0510025041025, 0510025041026, 0510025041027, 0510025041028, 0510025041029, 0510025041030, 0510025042000, 0510025042001, 0510025042002, 0510025042003, 0510025042004, 0510025042005, 0510025042006, 0510025042007, 0510025042008, 0510025042009, 0510025042010, 0510025042011, 0510025042012, 0510025042013, 0510025042014, 0510025042015, 0510025042016, 0510025042017, 0510025042018, 0510025042019, 0510025042020, 0510025042021, 0510025042022, 0510025042023, 0510025042024, 0510025042025, 0510025042026, 0510025042027, 0510025042028, 0510025042029, 0510025042030, 0510025042031, 0510025042032, 0510025042033, 0510025042034, 0510025042035, 0510025042036, 0510025042037, 0510025042038, 0510025042039, 0510025042040, 0510025042041, 0510025042042, 0510025042043, 0510025042044, 0510025042045, 0510025042046, 0510025042047, 0510025043000, 0510025043001, 0510025043002, 0510025043003, 0510025043004, 0510025043005, 0510025043006, 0510025043007, 0510025043008, 0510025043009, 0510025043010, 0510025043011, 0510025043012, 0510025043013, 0510025043014, 0510025043015, 0510025043016, 0510025043017, 0510025043018, 0510025043019, 0510025043020, 0510025043021, 0510025043022, 0510025043023, 0510025043024, 0510025043025, 0510025043026, 0510025043027, 0510025043028, 0510025043029, 0510025043030, 0510025043031, 0510025043032, 0510025043033, 0510025043034, 0510025043035, 0510025043036, 0510025043037, 0510025043038, 0510026002016, 0510037001001, 0510037001002, 0510037001004, 0510037001005, 0510037001006, 0510037001010, 0510037001011, 0510037001012, 0510037001013, 0510037001014, 0510037001015, 0510037001016, 0510037001017, 0510037001018, 0510037001019, 0510037001020, 0510037001021, 0510037001022, 0510037001025, 0510037001026, 0510037003088, 0510037003089, 0510037003090, 0510037003098, 0510037003099, 0510037003100, 0510037003101, 0510037003103, 0510037003104, 0510037003105, 0510037003106, 0510037003107, 0510037003110, 0510037003111, 0510037003112, 0510037003113, 0510037003114, 0519802001027;
VTD: G3, VTD: G4, VTD: G6, VTD: G7, VTD: G8: Block(s) 0510016011000, 0510016011028, 0510016011029, 0510016011030, 0510016011031, 0510016011033, 0510016011034, 0510016011035, 0510016011036, 0510016011037, 0510016011038, 0510016011039, 0510016011040, 0510016011042, 0510016012003, 0510016012004, 0510016012005, 0510016012006, 0510016012007, 0510016012008, 0510016012009, 0510016012012, 0510016012013, 0510016012014, 0510016012016, 0510016012017, 0510016012018, 0510016012019, 0510016012020, 0510016012021, 0510016012022, 0510016012023, 0510016012024, 0510016012025, 0510016012026, 0510016012027, 0510016012028, 0510016012029, 0510016012030, 0510016012032, 0510016012033, 0510016012034, 0510016012035, 0510016012036, 0510016012037, 0510016012038, 0510016012039, 0510016012040, 0510016012042, 0510016012043, 0510016012044, 0510016012045, 0510016012046, 0510016012047, 0510016012048, 0510016012049, 0510016012050, 0510016012051, 0510016012052, 0510016012053, 0510016032017, 0510016032018, 0510016032019, 0510016032020, 0510016032022, 0510016032023, 0510016032028, 0510016032029, 0510016032030, 0510016032031, 0510016032032, 0510016032044, 0510019011006, 0510019011007, 0510019011019, 0510019011027, 0510019011040, 0510019031013, 0510019031014, 0510031033002, 0510031033003, 0510031033004, 0510031033005, 0510031033006, 0510031041002, 0510031041003, 0510031041004, 0510031041005, 0510031041006, 0510031041007, 0510031041008, 0510031041009, 0510031041010, 0510031041011, 0510031041012, 0510031041013, 0510031041014, 0510031041015, 0510031042011, 0510032014052, 0510032014053, 0510032014054; VTD: G9, VTD: LI65, VTD: SH77. It has two judges.
History
(1969, c. 1171, ss. 1-3; c. 1190, s. 4; 1971, c. 377, s. 5; c. 997; 1973, c. 47, s. 2; c. 646; c. 855, s. 1; 1975, c. 529; c. 956, ss. 1, 2; 1975, 2nd Sess., c. 983, s. 114; 1977, c. 1119, ss. 1, 3, 4; c. 1130, ss. 1, 2; 1977, 2nd Sess., c. 1238, s. 1; c. 1243, s. 4; 1979, c. 838, s. 119; c. 1072, s. 1; 1979, 2nd Sess., c. 1221, s. 1; 1981, c. 964, ss. 1, 2; 1981 (Reg. Sess., 1982), c. 1282, s. 71.2; 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1109, ss. 4, 4.1; 1985, c. 698, s. 11(a); 1987, c. 509, s. 1; c. 549, s. 6.6; c. 738, s. 124; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 1; c. 1056, ss. 14, 15; 1989, c. 795, s. 22(a); 1991, c. 746, s. 1; 1993, c. 321, ss. 200.4(a), 200.5(a), (d); 1995, c. 51, s. 1; c. 509, s. 3; 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 589, s. 1(a), (c); 1998-212, s. 16.16A(a); 1998-217, s. 67.3(c); 1999-237, ss. 17.12(b), 17.19(a)-(d), 17.20(a)-(c); 1999-396, s. 1; 2000-67, s. 15.6(a); 2000-140, s. 36; 2001-333, ss. 1, 2; 2001-424, s. 22.4(b); 2001-507, ss. 3, 4; 2003-284, ss. 13.14(a), 13.14(b); 2004-124, s. 14.6(b); 2004-127, s. 2(a); 2005-276, ss. 14.2(a), 14.2(e1); 2006-96, s. 2; 2007-323, s. 14.25(a); 2011-203, ss. 1-3; 2011-417, s. 1; 2012-182, s. 2(a), (b); 2013-360, s. 18B.22(a); 2017-57, s. 18B.9(a); 2018-5, s. 18B.5(a); 2018-14, s. 1(a); 2018-121, ss. 1(a), 10.)
Preclearance Under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. - Information on receipt of preclearance was published in the Register. Please refer to the North Carolina Register (website at http://www.oah.state.nc.us/rules/register) or the Administrative Office of the Courts (website at http://www.nccourts.org) as described in Chapter 120, Article 6A, G.S. 120-30.9A et seq.
Session Laws 1993, c. 321, s. 200.4, which amended subsection (a), was effective November 1, 1993, or 15 days after the date upon which s. 200.4(a) and (b) were approved under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever was later. Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated February 14, 1994.
Session Laws 1993, c. 321, s. 200.5(a), which amended this section, was effective November 1, 1993, or the date upon which s. 200.5(a) and (b) were approved under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever was later. Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated February 14, 1994.
Session Laws 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 589, s. 5 provides that c. 589, s. 1, which amended this section, becomes effective January 4, 1997, or the date upon which that section is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later. Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated December 16, 1996.
Session Laws 2000-67, s. 15.6(c), provides that subsection (a) of the section becomes effective December 15, 2000, as to any district in which no county is subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Act) and, as to any district in which any county is subject to section 5 of the Act, subsection (a) becomes effective December 15, 2000, or 15 days after the date upon which that subsection is approved under section 5 of the Act, whichever is later. Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated October 26, 2000.
Session Laws 2001-333, s. 3, provides: "As to a district in a county not subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, this act is effective when it becomes law. As to a district in a county subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, this act becomes effective when the district is precleared pursuant to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended." Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated December 20, 2001.
Session Laws 2001-424, s. 22.4(d), provides that the amendment to this section by s. 22.4(b) is effective October 1, 2001, except that the elimination of the vacant judgeship in Superior Court District 4B becomes effective the later of October 1, 2001, or the date upon which it is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Session Laws 2004-124, s. 14.6(d) provides: "As to District 15B, subsection (b) of this section becomes effective December 1, 2004. As to District 3B, subsection (b) of this section becomes effective December 1, 2004, or 15 days after the date upon which that subsection is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later." As of October 19, 2004, preclearance under the Voting Rights Act was still pending.
Session Laws 2005-276, s. 14.2(a), which amended subsection (a), was effective December 1, 2005, or the date upon which subsection (a) is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later. Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated January 5, 2006.
Session Laws 2005-276, s. 14.2(e1), which also amended subsection (a), is effective January 1, 2011, or the date on which subsection (a) is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later. Preclearance was received from the U.S. Department of Justice by letter dated January 5, 2006.
Session Laws 2005-276, s. 14.2(q), provides in part: "With respect to the realignment of Superior Court Districts 20A and 20B, subsections (a) through (e) of this section become effective December 1, 2005, or the date upon which subsection (a) of this section is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later. With respect to the addition of a judge in Superior Court District 20B, subsections (e1) and (e2) of this section become effective January 1, 2011, or the date upon which subsection (e1) of this section is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later. With respect to the division of Superior Court District 29, subsections (a) through (e) of this section become effective December 1, 2005."
Session Laws 2006-96, s. 5, provides, in part: "Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the act become effective October 1, 2006, or the date upon which Section 2 of this act is approved under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, whichever is later." Preclearance was received by letter dated December 21, 2006.
Session Laws 2006-96, s. 3, provides: "The superior court judgeship established for District 13A by Section 2 of this act shall be filled by the judge currently serving District 13 who resides in Bladen or Columbus County, who shall serve until the expiration of that judge's current term."
Appointment of Superior Court Judge by Governor. - Session Laws 2007-323, s. 14.25(b)-(d), provides: "(b) The two superior court judgeships established for District 22A by subsection (a) of this section shall be filled by the two judges currently serving District 22 who reside in Alexander and Iredell Counties. The term of one of those judges expires December 31, 2008, and a successor shall be elected in the 2008 election. The term of the other judges expires December 31, 2010, and a successor shall be elected in the 2010 election.
"(c) One of the superior court judgeships established for District 22B by subsection (a) of this section shall be filled by the judge currently serving District 22 who resides in Davidson County. That judge's term expires December 31, 2014, and a successor shall be elected in the 2014 election.
"(d) The additional judgeship established for District 22B by subsection (a) of this section shall be filled by election in the 2008 election for an eight-year term expiring December 31, 2016. That judge's successor shall be elected in the 2016 election."
Session Laws 2013-360, s. 18B.22(c), provides: "The two superior court judgeships established for Superior Court District 16A by subsection (a) of this section shall be filled by the superior court judge currently serving Superior Court District 16A who resides in Scotland County and by the superior court judge currently serving Superior Court District 20A who resides in Richmond County. The terms of those judges expire December 31, 2016, and successors shall be elected in the 2016 general election for eight-year terms commencing January 1, 2017."
Session Laws 2013-360, s. 18B.22(e), provides: "The superior court judgeship established for Superior Court District 20A by subsection (a) of this section shall be filled by the superior court judge currently serving Superior Court District 20A who resides in Stanly County. The term of that judge expires December 31, 2016, and a successor shall be elected in the 2016 general election for an eight-year term commencing January 1, 2017."
Elections for Judicial Offices 2018. - Session Laws 2017-214, s. 4(a), eliminated party primary elections for candidates for Justice of the Supreme Court, Judges of the Court of Appeals, superior court judges, and district court judges, for the November 6, 2018, general election, and s. 4(b)-(k) of that act provides for notices of candidacy, requirements, a timeline, filing fees, and method of determining the winner of each race. For full text of Session Laws 2017-214, s. 4(a)-(k), see note at G.S. 163A-970.
Session Laws 2018-3, s. 2(a)-(d), as amended by Session Laws 2018-130, ss. 2, 3, provides: "The General Assembly finds that both chambers of the General Assembly have carefully examined judicial redistricting and the forms of judicial selection with multiple committees considering various proposals of selection and new judicial district maps. The General Assembly finds that, to allow for more time to thoughtfully consider these changes, the General Assembly enacted S.L. 2017-214, the Electoral Freedom Act of 2017, which, among other items, provided for a one-time cancellation of partisan primaries for the offices of district court judge, superior court judge, judges of the Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court justices for the 2018 election cycle. The General Assembly finds that all elections for judges in 2018 were to be treated uniformly under S.L. 2017-214, the Electoral Freedom Act of 2017, while those changes were considered.
"The General Assembly notes that election to these offices will be held under a plurality election system, with candidates running under a political party label on the ballot, without having gone through a party primary. The General Assembly finds that ballot language above the sections of election ballots regarding these impacted offices setting forth that the listed party affiliation is only the self-identified party of a candidate at the time of filing will aid voters' understanding of the 2018 judicial races.
"(b) For the 2018 general election, the State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement shall, notwithstanding G.S. 163A-1114(b)(2), list the following judicial offices at the end of all partisan offices listed on the general election ballot:
"(1) Justices of the Supreme Court.
"(2) Judges of the Court of Appeals.
"(3) Judges of the superior courts.
"(4) Judges of the district courts.
"(c) Notwithstanding G.S. 163A-1112, immediately prior to the placement of the judicial offices listed in subsection (b) of this section on the ballot, the following information shall be printed:
"No primaries for judicial office were held in 2018. The information listed by each of the following candidates' names indicates only the candidates' party affiliation or unaffiliated status on their voter registration at the time they filed to run for office.
"(d) Except as provided in this section, ballot order for the judicial offices listed in subsection (b) of this section shall be as provided in Section 4(j) of S.L. 2017-214."
Sessions Laws 2018-121, s. 6, provides: "Other than the filing period, the election for the office of judge for Superior Court District 19D and District Court District 20A shall be held in accordance with Section 4 of S.L. 2017-214, as amended. Candidates seeking the office of judge for Superior Court District 19D or District Court District 20A shall file their notice of candidacy with the State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement no earlier than 12:00 noon on July 9, 2018, and no later than 12:00 noon on July 13, 2018."
Editor's Note. - The reference to superior court districts has been inserted in brackets in the second sentence of subdivision (d)(30) at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes in view of Session Laws 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 1.
Session Laws 2005-276, s. 1.2, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2005'."
Session Laws 2005-276, s. 46.3, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2005-2007 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2005-2007 fiscal biennium."
Session Laws 2005-276, s. 46.5 is a severability clause.
Session Laws 2007-323, s. 1.2, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2007'."
Session Laws 2007-323, s. 32.3, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2007-2009 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2007-2009 fiscal biennium."
Session Laws 2007-323, s. 32.5 is a severability clause.
Session Laws 2011-203, ss. 1 through 3, which, in the table in subsection (a), for superior court districts 10A and 10B, decreased the number of resident judges from 2 to 1 and added the entries for superior court districts 10E and 10F; rewrote subdivisions (b)(3) through (b)(6), and added subdivisions (b)(6a) and (6b); and rewrote subdivision (c)(2a), was applicable to the 2012 election.
Session Laws 2011-417, s. 1, which amended subdivision (b)(4) to assign additional areas inadvertently left unassigned by Session Laws 2011-203, was applicable to the 2012 election.
Session Laws 2012-182, ss. 2(a) and 2(b), effective July 12, 2012, which, in subsection (b), rewrote the provisions for all of the Superior Court Districts except Superior Court Districts 10A, 10B, 10C, 10D, 10E, 10F, to use the voting tabulation districts, tracts, block groups, and blocks shown on the 2010 Census Redistricting TIGER/Line Shapefiles, renumbered the subdivisions, placing them in order by Superior Court number, rewrote subsection (c) to coincide with the changes to the superior court districts made by subsection (b), and added subsections (c1) and (c2), is applicable to elections held on or after January 1, 2013. Session Laws 2012-182, s. 2(c), further provides: "This section shall not prevent any judge elected or appointed in 2012 or before from serving the remainder of the term to which that judge was elected or appointed."
Session Laws 2013-360, s. 18B.22(q), makes the amendments to the table in subsection (a) of this section by Session Laws 2013-360, s. 18B.22(a), effective January 1, 2015, except that those provisions of this section requiring election in the 2014 general election are effective to provide for those elections when they become law [July 1, 2013].
Session Laws 2013-360, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2013.'"
Session Laws 2013-360, s. 38.2, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2013-2015 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2013-2015 fiscal biennium."
Session Laws 2013-360, s. 38.5 is a severability clause.
Session Laws 2017-57, s. 18B.9(b), provides: "In order to implement the changes in subsection (a) of this section, the superior court judgeship serving District 9A shall be allocated to Judicial District 17A of the superior court of the General Court of Justice effective January 1, 2019."
Session Laws 2017-57, s. 18B.9(j), provides: "This section is effective when it becomes law [June 28, 2017], and elections conducted in 2018 shall be conducted in accordance with the districts as modified by this section."
Session Laws 2017-57, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2017.'"
Session Laws 2017-57, s. 39.4, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2017-2019 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2017-2019 fiscal biennium."
Session Laws 2017-57, s. 39.6, is a severability clause.
Session Laws 2018-5, s. 18B.5(b), provides: "In order to implement the changes in subsection (a) of this section, the following applies:
"(1) In order to implement the changes in subsection (a) of this section, the superior court judgeship serving District 17A that was allocated to Judicial District 9A of the superior court of the General Court of Justice pursuant to Section 18B.9(b) of S.L. 2017-57 shall be reallocated to Judicial District 19B of the superior court of the General Court of Justice effective January 1, 2019.
"(2) The reduction in judgeships in Judicial District 17B of the superior court of the General Court of Justice applies to the judgeship with a term that expires on December 31, 2018."
Session Laws 2018-5, s. 18B.5(c), made the amendment of subsection (a) of this section by Session Laws 2018-5, s. 18B.5(a), effective January 1, 2019, and further provided that "elections conducted in 2018 shall be conducted in accordance with the districts as modified by this section."
Session Laws 2018-5, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2018.'"
Session Laws 2018-5, s. 39.4, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2018]2019 fiscal year, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2018]2019 fiscal year."
Session Laws 2018-5, s. 39.7, is a severability clause.
Session Laws 2018-14, s. 1(b), (c), as amended by Session Laws 2018-121, s. 9, provides: "(b) The judge in District 26A, as established by this act, shall take office on January 1, 2021, with an election in 2020 to be held accordingly.
"(c) In order to implement the superior court districts as enacted by this section, in 2018 and every eight years thereafter, elections shall be conducted for Districts 5B, 26C, 26E, 26F, and 26H; in 2020 and every eight years thereafter, elections shall be conducted for District 26A; and in 2022 and every eight years thereafter, elections shall be conducted for Districts 26B, 26D, and 26G; and in 2024 and every eight years thereafter, elections shall be conducted for Districts 5A and 5C."
Session Laws 2018-14, s. 4, made the amendment of this section by Session Laws 2018-14, s. 1(a), which rewrote subsection (a), rewrote subdivisions (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(26), (b)(27), and (b)(28), and added subdivisions (b)(29) through (b)(33), effective January 1, 2019, and further provided that "elections in 2018 and thereafter shall be held accordingly." See editor's note for Session Laws 2018-121, s. 10, for repeal of the assignment of judicial divisions in subsection (a) made by 2018-14, s. 1(a).
Session Laws 2018-121, s. 1(b)-(d), provides: "(b) The additional judge in District 19D, as established by this section, shall take office on January 1, 2019, with an election in 2018 to be held accordingly.
"(c) The additional judge in District 20A, as established by this section, shall take office on January 1, 2021, with an election in 2020 to be held accordingly.
"(d) Except as provided in this section, this section becomes effective January 1, 2019, and elections in 2018 shall be held accordingly."
Session Laws 2018-121, s. 10, provides: "If Senate Bill 757, 2018 Regular Session, becomes law, the assignment of judicial divisions in G.S. 7A-41(a), as enacted by that act, shall be repealed." Senate Bill 757 is Session Laws 2018-14. The amendments to the assignment of judicial divisions in subsection (a) made by Session Laws 2018-14, s. 1(a), have been treated as repealed and have not been given effect.
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-203, ss. 1 through 3, effective January 1, 2013, and applicable to the 2012 election, in the table in subsection (a), for superior court districts 10A and 10B, decreased the number of resident judges from 2 to 1 and added the entries for superior court districts 10E and 10F; rewrote subdivisions (b)(3) through (b)(6), and added subdivisions (b)(6a) and (6b); and rewrote subdivision (c)(2a), which formerly read: "For Wake County, the precincts area as they were adopted by the Wake County Board of Elections and in effect as of January 1, 2001."
Session Laws 2011-417, s. 1, effective January 1, 2013, and applicable to the 2012 election, amended subdivision (b)(4) to assign additional areas inadvertently left unassigned by Session Laws 2011-203.
Session Laws 2012-182, ss. 2(a) and 2(b), effective July 12, 2012, and applicable to elections held on or after January 1, 2013, in subsection (b), rewrote the provisions for all of the Superior Court Districts except Superior Court Districts 10A, 10B, 10C, 10D, 10E, 10F, to use the voting tabulation districts, tracts, block groups, and blocks shown on the 2010 Census Redistricting TIGER/Line Shapefiles; and renumbered the subdivisions, placing them in order by Superior Court number. Session Laws 2012-182, s. 2(b), rewrote subsection (c) were updated to coincide with the changes to the superior court districts made by subsection (b); and added subsections (c1) and (c2). For applicability, see editor's note.
Session Laws 2013-360, s. 18B.22(a), effective January 1, 2015, in the table in subsection (a), added "Anson, Richmond" following "16A," and substituted "2" for "1" preceding "Fourth 16B," "Fourth" for "Fifth" preceding "19D," and "Stanly" and "1" for "Anson, Richmond, Stanley" and "2" respectively, following "20A." For effective date, see editor's note.
Session Laws 2017-57, s. 18B.9.(a), in the table of subsection (a), inserted "Person" in Superior Court District 9, deleted Superior Court District 9A concerning Person and Caswell Counties, and, in Superior Court District 17A, added "Caswell" and substituted "3" for "2". For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.
Session Laws 2018-5, s. 18B.5(a), in the table in subsection (a), for superior court district 17A, decreased the number of resident judges from 3 to 2, for superior court district 17B, decreased the number of resident judges from 2 to 1, and, for superior court district 19B, increased the number of resident judges from 1 to 2. For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.
Session Laws 2018-14, s. 1(a), effective January 1, 2019, in the table of subsection (a), in District 5A, deleted "part of" preceding "Pender"; in District 5B, added "Second" and deleted "part of Pender" preceding "see subsection" in District 5C, added "Second" added Districts 26D, 26E, 26F, 26G, and 26H; rewrote subdivisions (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(26), (b)(27), and (b)(28); and added subdivisions (b)(29) through (b)(33). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.
Session Laws 2018-121, s. 1(a), rewrote subsection (a); and added subsection (b1). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.
Legal Periodicals. - For article on plea bargaining statutes and practices in North Carolina, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 477 (1981).
CASE NOTES
1987 Amendment Held Constitutional. - The provisions of Session Laws 1987, c. 509, which amended subsection (d) of this section, did not violate the North Carolina Constitution. State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473 (1989).
The provisions of Session Laws 1987, c. 509, which amended subsection (d) of this section, creating a one-time delay of elections and a one-time interim or hiatus between terms of office for certain superior court judgeships (causing the incumbents to hold over until the next elections were held and the succeeding terms of office began) served a public purpose and did not violate the Constitution of North Carolina. State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473 (1989).
By enacting Session Laws 1987, c. 509, the legislature eliminated staggered terms within multi-seat judicial districts by creating a one-time interim or hiatus between certain terms of office; as the Constitution anticipates such "hold over" situations
by providing that elected judges remain in office "until their successors are elected and qualified," the act was not unconstitutional. State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438,
385 S.E.2d 473 (1989).
Constitutionality. - Redistricting plan for the superior courts in a county enacted pursuant to G.S. 7A-41 did not violate N.C. Const., Art. I, § 19, as the one person, one vote principle did not apply to judicial elections. Blankenship v. Bartlett, 184 N.C. App. 327, 646 S.E.2d 584 (2007), review granted, appeal dismissed, 668 S.E.2d 24 (N.C. 2008).
Court of appeals erred in reversing a trial court's judgment entered in favor of attorneys qualified to run for superior court judge and a voter in their action against the North Carolina State Board of Elections and the attorney general alleging that
the 1993 amendment to G.S. 7A-41 unconstitutionally created an additional superior court judgeship in Wake County Superior Court District 10A because the Equal Protection Clause, N.C. Const. art. I,
§
19, applied to the General Assembly's creation of an additional judgeship in District 10A, and the attorneys and voter demonstrated gross disparity in voting power between similarly situated residents of the county;
residents of District 10A had a voting power roughly five times greater than residents of District 10C, four and a half times greater than residents of District 10B, and four times greater than residents of District 10D. Blankenship
v. Bartlett, 363 N.C. 518, 681 S.E.2d 759 (2009).
Preclearance of Acts Pursuant to Voting Rights Act. - Where superior court judges were elected pursuant to Session Laws 1965, c. 262, Session Laws 1967, c. 997, Session Laws 1977, cc. 1119, 1130 and 1238, and Session Laws 1983, c. 1109, and such legislative acts had not been precleared by the Attorney General as required by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, the federal district court would enjoin such elections retroactively in those counties subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act; the fact that an election law deals with the election of members of the judiciary does not remove it from the ambit of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Haith v. Martin, 618 F. Supp. 410 (E.D.N.C. 1985), aff'd, 477 U.S. 901, 106 S. Ct. 3268, 91 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1986).
Elections proposed to be held in Judicial Districts 3, 4, 8 and 12 would not offend provisions of federal court order of Sept. 24, 1985, and thus would not be enjoined, as such elections would not result in any retrogression in the voting right privileges of racial minorities in those districts, and the judgeships to be filled in those districts in 1986, all of which were created under law prior to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, have not become an integral part of the voting procedures established by the North Carolina statutes creating new judgeships in those districts. Haith v. Martin, 643 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
New Judicial District Was Not Arbitrary and Capricious. - Creation of the Wake County Superior Court judicial district was not arbitrary and capricious where the General Assembly had consulted with the Administrative Office of the Courts and the new judgeship
was based on heavy caseloads and maintaining minority districts. Blankenship v. Bartlett, 184 N.C. App. 327, 646 S.E.2d 584 (2007), review granted, appeal dismissed,
668 S.E.2d 24 (N.C. 2008).
Cited in Kelly v. Davenport, 7 N.C. App. 670, 173 S.E.2d 600 (1970); Austin v. Austin, 12 N.C. App. 286, 183 S.E.2d 420 (1971); Holshouser v. Scott, 335 F. Supp. 928
(M.D.N.C. 1971); State v. Braswell, 283 N.C. 332, 196 S.E.2d 185 (1973); Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992), rehearing denied, 991 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
828, 114 S. Ct. 93, 126 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1993); ITS Leasing, Inc. v. Ram Dog Enters., LLC, 206 N.C. App. 572, 696 S.E.2d 880 (2010).
§ 7A-41.1. District and set of districts defined; senior resident superior court judges and their authority.
-
In this section and in any other law which refers to this section:
- "District" means any superior court district established by G.S. 7A-41 which consists exclusively of one or more entire counties;
- "Set of districts" means any set of two or more superior court districts established under G.S. 7A-41, none of which consists exclusively of one or more entire counties, but both or all of which include territory from the same county or counties and together comprise all of the territory of that county or those counties;
- "Regular resident superior court judge of the district or set of districts" means a regular superior court judge who is a resident judge of any of the superior court districts established under G.S. 7A-41 which comprise or are included in a district or set of districts as defined herein.
-
There shall be one and only one senior resident superior court judge for each district or set of districts as defined in subsection (a) of this section, who shall be:
- Where there is only one regular resident superior court judge for the district, that judge; and
- Where there are two or more regular resident superior court judges for the district or set of districts, the judge who, from among all the regular resident superior court judges of the district or set of districts, has the most continuous service as a regular resident superior court judge; provided if two or more judges are of equal seniority, the oldest of those judges shall be the senior regular resident superior court judge.
- Where there is a set of districts, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall designate one of the judges as senior resident superior court judge to serve in that capacity at the pleasure of the Chief Justice, if that set of districts are wholly contained in one county that is specified in law as the sole proper venue for certain actions.
- Senior resident superior court judges and regular resident superior court judges possess equal judicial jurisdiction, power, authority and status, but all duties placed by the Constitution or statutes on the resident judge of a superior court district, including the appointment to and removal from office, which are not related to a case, controversy or judicial proceeding and which do not involve the exercise of judicial power, shall be discharged, throughout a district as defined in subsection (a) of this section or throughout all of the districts comprising a set of districts so defined, for each county in that district or set of districts, by the senior resident superior court judge for that district or set of districts. That senior resident superior court judge alone among the superior court judges of that district or set of districts shall receive the salary and benefits of a senior resident superior court judge.
- A senior resident superior court judge for a district or set of districts as defined in subsection (a) of this section with two or more regular resident superior court judges, by notice in writing to the Administrative Officer of the Courts, may decline to exercise the authority vested in him by this section, in which event such authority shall be exercised by the regular resident superior court judge who, among the other regular resident superior court judges of the district or set of districts, is next senior in point of service or age, respectively.
- In the event a senior resident superior court judge for a district or set of districts with one or more regular resident superior court judges is unable, due to mental or physical incapacity, to exercise the authority vested in him by the statute, and the Chief Justice, in his discretion, has determined that such incapacity exists, the Chief Justice shall appoint an acting senior regular resident superior court judge from the other regular resident judges of the district or set of districts, to exercise, temporarily, the authority of the senior regular resident judge. Such appointee shall serve at the pleasure of the Chief Justice and until his temporary appointment is vacated by appropriate order.
History
(1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 2; 2010-105, s. 1; 2012-194, s. 63.5.)
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2009-451, s 15.13(b), provides: "In its March 1, 2010, report, the Office of Indigent Defense Services shall provide a progress report on the pilot program for alternative scheduling authorized by Section 14.1 of S.L. 2008-107. In its March 1, 2011, report, the Office of Indigent Defense Services shall provide a final report on that pilot program."
Session Laws 2010-105, s. 2, provides, in part, that "each senior resident superior court judge seated on [October 1, 2010] in a multi-judge district shall continue to serve as senior resident superior court judge until that judge vacates the seat."
Session Laws 2012-194, s. 72, made the amendments to this section by Session Laws 2012-194, s. 63.5, applicable to vacancies occurring on or after July 17, 2012.
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2010-105, s. 1, effective October 1, 2010, rewrote subdivision (b)(2), which formerly read: "Where there are two or more regular resident superior court judges for the district or set of districts, the judge who, from among all the regular resident superior court judges of the district or set of districts, has the most continuous service as a regular resident superior court judge; provided if two or more judges are of equal seniority, the oldest of those judges shall be the senior regular resident superior court judge."
Session Laws 2012-194, s. 63.5, effective July 17, 2012, rewrote subdivision (b)(2); and added subdivision (b)(3). For applicability, see editor's note.
CASE NOTES
Administrative Order Issued In Contravention of G.S. 15A-535. - District court was not obligated to follow an administrative order because there was no evidence that the senior resident superior court judge of the 24th Judicial District entered the administrative
order in a manner consistent with G.S. 15A-535(a); there was no signature of the chief district court judge on the 24th District administrative order, and there was no evidence of a consultation with the chief district court
judge or judges of all the district court districts in which were located any of the counties in the senior resident superior court judge's district. State v. Harrison, 217 N.C. App. 363, 719 S.E.2d 204 (2011).
Cited in Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 185 N.C. App. 566, 649 S.E.2d 410 (2007), cert. denied, 362 N.C. 360, 661 S.E.2d 735 (2008).
Opinions of Attorney General
Regarding requirements for becoming a Senior Resident Superior Court Judge, see opinion of Attorney General to Honorable Thomas Ross, Superior Court Judge, N.C. General Assembly, 1999 N.C.A.G. 14 (5/27/99).
§ 7A-41.2. Nomination and election of regular superior court judges.
Candidates for the office of regular superior court judge shall be both nominated and elected by the qualified voters of the superior court district for which the election is sought.
History
(1996, 2nd Ex. Sess., c. 9, s. 1.)
Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1996, Second Extra Session, c. 9, s. 23, provides: "Part 1 of this act becomes effective only if Parts 1 and 2 of this act are both effective under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965." Preclearance was received by letter dated October 1, 1996.
Session Laws 1996, Second Extra Session, c. 9, s. 24, makes this section effective upon ratification, and applicable beginning with the 1996 elections, except that Sections 1 and 2 of that act shall be applied to the 1994 general election and the results of that election validated and confirmed under those sections. The Act was ratified August 2, 1996. Preclearance was received by letter dated October 1, 1996.
§ 7A-42. Sessions of superior court in cities other than county seats.
- Sessions of the superior court shall be held in each city in the State which is not a county seat and which has a population of 35,000 or more, according to the 1960 federal census.
- In addition to the sessions of superior court authorized by subsection (a) of this section, sessions of superior court in the following counties may be held in the additional seats of court listed by order of the Senior Resident Superior Court Judge after consultation with the Chief District Court Judge:
- For the purpose of segregating the cases to be tried in any city referred to in subsection (a), and to designate the place of trial, the clerk of superior court in any county having one or more such cities shall set up a criminal docket and a civil docket, which dockets shall indicate the cases and proceedings to be tried in each such city in his county. Such dockets shall bear the name of the city in which such sessions of court are to be held, followed by the word "Division." Summons in actions to be tried in any such city shall clearly designate the place of trial.
- For the purpose of determining the proper place of trial of any action or proceeding, whether civil or criminal, the county in which any city described in subsection (a) is located shall be divided into divisions, and the territory embraced in the division in which each such city is located shall consist of the township in which such city lies and all contiguous townships within such county, such division of the superior court to be known by the name of such city followed by the word "Division." All other townships of any such county shall constitute a division of the superior court to be known by the name of the county seat followed by the word "Division." All laws, rules, and regulations now or hereafter in force and effect in determining the proper venue as between the superior courts of the several counties of the State shall apply for the purpose of determining the proper place of trial as between such divisions within such county and as between each of such divisions and any other county of the superior court in North Carolina.
- The clerk of superior court of any county with an additional seat of superior court may, but shall not be required to, hear matters in any place other than at his office at the county seat.
- The grand jury for the several divisions of court of any county in which a city described in subsection (a) is located shall be drawn from the whole county, and may hold hearings and meetings at either the county seat or elsewhere within the county as it may elect, or as it may be directed by the judge holding any session of superior court within such county; provided, however, that in arranging the sessions of the court for the trial of criminal cases for any county in which any such city is located a session of one week or more shall be held at the county seat preceding any session of one week or more to be held in any such city, so as to facilitate the work of the grand jury, and so as to confine its meetings to the county seat as fully as may be practicable. All petit jurors for all sessions of court in the several divisions of such county shall be drawn, as now or hereafter provided by law, from the whole of the county in which any such city is located for all sessions of courts in the several divisions of such county.
- Special sessions of court for the trial of either civil or criminal cases in any city described in subsection (a) may be arranged as by law now or hereafter provided for special sessions of the superior court.
- All court records of all such divisions of the superior court of any such county shall be kept in the office of the clerk of the superior court at the county seat, but they may be temporarily removed under the direction and supervision of the clerk to any such division or divisions. No judgment or order rendered at any session held in any such city shall become a lien upon or otherwise affect the title to any real estate within such county until it has been docketed in the office of the clerk of the superior court at the county seat as now or may hereafter be provided by law; provided, that nothing herein shall affect the provisions of G.S. 1-233 and the equities therein provided for shall be preserved as to all judgments and orders rendered at any session of the superior court in any such city.
- It shall be the duty of the board of county commissioners of the county in which any such city is located to provide a suitable place for holding such sessions of court, and to provide for the payment of the extra expense, if any, of the sheriff and his deputies in attending the sessions of court of any such division, and the expense of keeping, housing and feeding prisoners while awaiting trial.
- Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, when exigent circumstances exist, sessions of superior court may be conducted at a location outside a county seat by order of the Senior Resident Superior Court Judge of a county, with the prior approval of the location and the facilities by the Administrative Office of the Courts and after consultation with the Clerk of Superior Court and county officials of the county. An order entered under this subsection shall be filed in the office of the Clerk of Superior Court in the county and posted at the courthouse within the county seat and notice shall be posted in other conspicuous locations. The order shall be limited to such session or sessions as are approved by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina.
Additional County Seats of Court Davidson Thomasville Iredell Mooresville
The courtrooms and related judicial facilities for these sessions of superior court may be provided by the municipality, and in such cases the facilities fee collected for the State by the clerk of superior court shall be remitted to the municipality to assist in meeting the expense of providing those facilities.
History
(1943, c. 121; 1969, c. 1190, s. 48; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1037, s. 2.1; 1997-304, s. 4.)
Editor's Note. - This section was formerly G.S. 7-70.2. It was revised and transferred to its present position by Session Laws 1969, c. 1190, s. 48.
CASE NOTES
Obligation to Provide "Suitable" Facilities. - In cities other than county seats where sessions of superior court are held, boards of commissioners are obligated by statute to provide "suitable" places for holding such sessions of court. In re Alamance
County Ct. Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 405 S.E.2d 125 (1991).
Hearing Ordered to Probe Adequacy of Court Facilities. - A hearing ordered by a superior court judge to inquire into the adequacy of the Alamance County court facilities probes the scope of the court's inherent power to direct county commissioners to
ameliorate such facilities and the proper means of effecting that end. Such power exists, but the order invoking it was procedurally and substantively flawed where the commissioners against whom the order was directed were
not made parties to the action, the order was ex parte, and the order intruded on discretion that properly belonged to the commissioners. In re Alamance County Ct. Facilities, 329 N.C. 84,
405 S.E.2d 125 (1991).
Cited in Blankenship v. Bartlett, 363 N.C. 518, 681 S.E.2d 759 (2009).
§ 7A-43: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§§ 7A-43.1 through 7A-43.3: Repealed by Session Laws 1967, c. 1049, s. 6.
§ 7A-44. Salary and expenses of superior court judge.
- A judge of the superior court, regular or special, shall receive the annual salary set forth in the Current Operations Appropriations Act, and in addition shall be paid the same travel allowance as State employees generally by G.S. 138-6(a), provided that no travel allowance be paid for travel within his county of residence. The Administrative Officer of the Courts may also reimburse superior court judges, in addition to the above funds for travel, for travel and subsistence expenses incurred for professional education.
- In lieu of merit and other increment raises paid to regular State employees, a judge of the superior court, regular or special, shall receive as longevity pay an annual amount equal to four and eight-tenths percent (4.8%) of the annual salary set forth in the Current Operations Appropriations Act payable monthly after five years of service, nine and six-tenths percent (9.6%) after 10 years of service, fourteen and four-tenths percent (14.4%) after 15 years of service, nineteen and two-tenths percent (19.2%) after 20 years of service, and twenty-four percent (24%) after 25 years of service. "Service" means service as a justice or judge of the General Court of Justice, as a member of the Utilities Commission, as an administrative law judge, or as director or assistant director of the Administrative Office of the Courts. Service shall also mean service as a district attorney or as a clerk of superior court.
History
(Code, ss. 918, 3734; 1891, c. 193; 1901, c. 167; 1905, c. 208; Rev., s. 2765; 1907, c. 988; 1909, c. 85; 1911, c. 82; 1919, c. 51; C.S., s. 3884; 1921, c. 25, s. 3; 1925, c. 227; 1927, c. 69, s. 2; 1949, c. 157, s. 1; 1953, c. 1080, s. 1; 1957, c. 1416; 1961, c. 957, s. 2; 1963, c. 839, s. 2; 1965, c. 921, s. 2; 1967, c. 691, s. 40; 1969, c. 1190, s. 36; 1973, c. 1474; 1975, 2nd Sess., c. 983, s. 13; 1977, c. 802, s. 41.1; 1979, 2nd Sess., c. 1137, s. 28; 1981, c. 964, s. 18; 1983, c. 761, s. 244; 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1034, s. 165; c. 1109, ss. 2.2, 11, 13.1; 1985, c. 698, s. 10(a); 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1086, s. 30(b); c. 1100, s. 15(c); 2007-323, s. 28.18A(c); 2009-451, s. 15.10; 2009-575, s. 13; 2017-57, s. 35.4(f).)
Cross References. - As to salaries of judges, see N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 20.
Editor's Note. - This section was formerly G.S. 7-42. It was revised and transferred to its present position by Session Laws 1969, c. 1190, s. 36.
Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2007-322, s. 28.18A(c), effective July 1, 2007, in the first sentence of subsection (b), deleted "and" preceding "nineteen" and added "and twenty-four percent (24%) after 25 years of service" at the end.
Session Laws 2009-451, s. 15.10, effective July 1, 2009, in subsection (a), deleted the former second sentence, which read: "In addition, a judge of the superior court shall be allowed seven thousand dollars ($7,000) per year, payable monthly, in lieu of necessary subsistence expenses while attending court or transacting official business at a place other than in the county of his residence and in lieu of other professional expenses incurred in the discharge of his official duties." and substituted "funds for travel" for "funds for travel and subsistence" in the last sentence.
Session Laws 2009-575, s. 13, effective July 1, 2009, substituted "G.S. 138-6(a)" for "G.S. 138-6(a)(1) and (2)" in the first sentence of subsection (a).