ARTICLE 1. General Provisions.

Sec.

§ 29-1. Short title.

This Chapter shall be known and may be cited as the Intestate Succession Act.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1959, c. 879, s. 1 inserted this present Chapter numbered 29 and entitled "Intestate Succession" to replace former Chapter 29 entitled "Descents." By the same act G.S. 28-149, with regard to order of distribution, was repealed and other related statutory provisions were repealed or amended to conform with the new Intestate Succession Law. Section 15 of the 1959 act provides: "This act shall become effective July 1, 1960, and shall be applicable only to estates of persons dying on or after July 1, 1960."

Some of the cases cited in the notes to the sections of this Chapter construe similar provisions of the former Chapter.

Section 4.1 of Session Laws 1963, c. 1209, provides that from and after the certification of the constitutional amendment to G.S. 6 of Art. X (see now N.C. Const. Art. X, G.S. 4) which was proposed by c. 1209, wherever the word "spouse" appears in the General Statutes with reference to testate or intestate successions, it shall apply alike to both husband and wife. The approval of the amendment by vote of the people was certified by the Governor on February 6, 1964.

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "North Carolina's New Intestate Succession Act," see 39 N.C.L. Rev. 1 (1960).

For comment on 1959 changes in intestate succession statutes, see 40 N.C.L. Rev. 297 (1962).

For note, "Does North Carolina Law Adequately Protect Surviving Spouses?," see 48 N.C.L. Rev. 361 (1970).

For note discussing the limitation on collateral inheritance in North Carolina, see 14 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1085 (1978).

For survey of 1979 tax law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1548 (1980).

For article on installment land contracts in North Carolina, see 3 Campbell L. Rev. 29 (1981).

For article, "Requiem for the Rule in Shelley's Case," see 67 N.C.L. Rev. 681 (1989).

For comment, "In re Estate of Lunsford and Statutory Ambiguity: Trying to Reconcile Child Abandonment and the Intestate Succession Act," 81 N.C.L. Rev. 1149 (2003).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under prior law.

Purpose of Chapter. - Taken as a whole, this Chapter conveys an intent by the legislature to write a reasonable will for those residents who have not done so. Newlin v. Gill, 293 N.C. 348, 237 S.E.2d 819 (1977).

Descents are regulated by statute in this State. Edwards v. Yearby, 168 N.C. 663, 85 S.E. 19 (1915); University of N.C. v. Markham, 174 N.C. 338, 93 S.E. 845 (1917).

English Canons of Descent Formerly Followed. - The English canons of descent remained in force in North Carolina until 1784. Because certain provisions seemed repugnant to republican principles, the legislature was led to make the changes which distinguish this section from the English act. Clement v. Cauble, 55 N.C. 82 (1854).

Legislative Intent as to Effect of Adoption. - The General Assembly, on its own motion and also in response to judicial decisions, has, with every amendment and every rewrite of G.S. 48-23, evidenced its intent that by adoption the child adopted becomes legally a child of its new parents, and the adoption makes him legally a stranger to the bloodline of his natural parents. Crumpton v. Crumpton, 28 N.C. App. 358, 221 S.E.2d 390 (1976), aff'd, 53 N.C. App. 97, 281 S.E.2d 1 (1981).

Wrongful Death Beneficiaries Determined as of Time of Death. - The persons who, under the Intestate Succession Act, are entitled to the recovery in a wrongful death action are to be determined as of the time of the decedent's death. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Hackney, 266 N.C. 17, 145 S.E.2d 352 (1965).

Proof of the death of a person raises a presumption that such person died intestate. Collins v. R.L. Coleman & Co., 262 N.C. 478, 137 S.E.2d 803 (1964).

Cited in Chisholm v. Hall, 255 N.C. 374, 121 S.E.2d 726 (1961); Chappell v. Chappell, 260 N.C. 737, 133 S.E.2d 666 (1963); In re Peacock, 261 N.C. 749, 136 S.E.2d 91 (1964); Byers v. North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n, 3 N.C. App. 139, 164 S.E.2d 535 (1968); Baxter v. Jones, 14 N.C. App. 296, 188 S.E.2d 622 (1972); Rodman v. Rodman, 21 N.C. App. 397, 204 S.E.2d 695 (1974); Wake County ex rel. Carrington v. Townes, 53 N.C. App. 649, 281 S.E.2d 765 (1981); Bowling v. Combs, 60 N.C. App. 234, 298 S.E.2d 754 (1983); In re Estate of Finch, 97 N.C. App. 489, 389 S.E.2d 126 (1990).


§ 29-2. Definitions.

As used in this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, the term:

  1. "Advancement" means an irrevocable inter vivos gift of property, made by an intestate donor to any person who would be the donor's heir or one of the donor's heirs upon the donor's death, and intended by the intestate donor to enable the donee to anticipate the donee's inheritance to the extent of the gift; except that no gift to a spouse shall be considered an advancement unless so designated by the intestate donor in a writing signed by the donor at the time of the gift.
  2. "Estate" means all the property of a decedent, including but not limited to:
    1. An estate for the life of another; and
    2. All future interests in property not terminable by the death of the owner thereof, including all reversions, remainders, executory interests, rights of entry and possibilities of reverter, subject, however, to all limitations and conditions imposed upon such future interests.
  3. "Heir" means any person entitled to take real or personal property upon intestacy under the provisions of this Chapter.
  4. "Lineal descendants" of a person means all children of such person and successive generations of children of such children.
  5. "Net estate" means the estate of a decedent, exclusive of family allowances, costs of administration, and all lawful claims against the estate.
  6. "Share," when used to describe the share of a net estate or property which any person is entitled to take, includes both the fractional share of the personal property and the undivided fractional interest in the real property, which the person is entitled to take.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 1961, c. 958, s. 1; 2011-344, s. 5.)

Cross References. - As to meaning of "next of kin," see G.S. 41-6.1.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-344, s. 5, effective January 1, 2012, and applicable to estates of decedents dying on or after that date, in subdivision (1), substituted "the donor's" for "his" throughout, and substituted "the donee's inheritance" for "his inheritance."

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "The Rule Against Perpetuities in North Carolina," see 57 N.C.L. Rev. 727 (1979).

For survey of 1979 property law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1509 (1980).

For note on a surviving spouse's right to dissent, see 16 Wake Forest L. Rev. 251 (1980).

For survey of 1980 property law, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1209 (1981).

For article, "Class Gifts in North Carolina - When Do We 'Call The Role'?," see 21 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1 (1985).

For article, "Does the Fee Tail Exist in North Carolina?," see 23 Wake Forest L. Rev. 767 (1988).

For a comment on the acquisition, abandonment, and preservation of rail corridors in North Carolina, see 75 N.C.L. Rev. 1989 (1997).

CASE NOTES

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Editor's Note. - Reserved for future annotations.

II. ADVANCEMENT.

Whether a gift is an advancement depends on the intention of the parent at the time the gift is made. Parrish v. Adams, 10 N.C. App. 700, 179 S.E.2d 880 (1971).

Knowledge That Conveyance Represents an Advancement Estops Claim to Any Other Lands. - Where a child accepts a deed with knowledge that the lands conveyed therein represent an advancement of his full share of the parents' realty, he is estopped to claim any other lands owned by the parents at the time of their deaths. Parrish v. Adams, 10 N.C. App. 700, 179 S.E.2d 880 (1971).

III. ESTATE.

.

"Estate" Defined. - Estate of a decedent includes all property owned by decedent which she may direct to her legatees and devisees under will and which would pass to her heirs and next of kin under laws of intestacy if she died without will. In re Estate of Francis, 327 N.C. 101, 394 S.E.2d 150 (1990).

The distinction between a vested and a contingent remainder is the capacity to take upon the termination of the preceding estate. Strickland v. Jackson, 259 N.C. 81, 130 S.E.2d 22 (1963).

Where those who are to take in remainder cannot be determined until the happening of a stated event, the remainder is contingent. Strickland v. Jackson, 259 N.C. 81, 130 S.E.2d 22 (1963).

Estate Tail Distinguishable from Life Estate with Remainder. - Inasmuch as an estate tail is an estate of inheritance which descends to particular heirs, it is distinguishable from a life estate with remainder. Strickland v. Jackson, 259 N.C. 81, 130 S.E.2d 22 (1963).

IV. NET ESTATE.

.

Computation of Net Estate. - To ascertain "net estate" under subdivision (5) it is necessary to subtract from the value of the gross estate, "family allowances, costs of administration, and all lawful claims against the estate." Phillips v. Phillips, 296 N.C. 590, 252 S.E.2d 761 (1979).

Federal Estate Tax Is "Lawful Claim." - The federal estate tax is one of the "lawful claims" against testator's estate, and the widow's intestate share of the estate is to be computed after its deduction. Phillips v. Phillips, 296 N.C. 590, 252 S.E.2d 761 (1979).

Legacies Not Excluded in Determining Net Estate. - The phrase "all lawful claims against the estate," as used in subdivision (5), does not include either specific legacies or general legacies for specific amounts. If it did, the net estate in many instances would be so deleted by their payment that it would be insufficient to provide the widow with the same share of her husband's real and personal property as if he died intestate. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Melvin, 259 N.C. 255, 130 S.E.2d 387 (1963).

As Legacies or Distributive Shares Are Not "Lawful Claims." - In the use of the phrase "lawful claims against the estate" in subdivision (5), the legislature was not referring to claims of beneficiaries created either by the will or the statute of descents and distributions. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Melvin, 259 N.C. 255, 130 S.E.2d 387 (1963).

Property Owned as Tenants by the Entirety. - The value of real property owned by couple as tenants by the entirety should not be included in testatrix's net estate for purposes of the dissent statute. In re Estate of Francis, 94 N.C. App. 744, 381 S.E.2d 484, cert. denied, 325 N.C. 708, 388 S.E.2d 456 (1989).

Residue of Net Estate after Distribution to Dissenting Widow. - When the dissenting widow was entitled to one half of the deceased spouse's net estate as defined in subdivision (5) of this section, former G.S. 30-3(c) said that the residue of the testator's net estate for distribution to other devisees and legatees was as defined in this section. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Melvin, 259 N.C. 255, 130 S.E.2d 387 (1963).

V. SHARE.

.

Definition of "Share" Applies to Share of Net Estate. - The definition contained in subdivision (6) is intended to apply when "share" is used "to describe the share of a net estate or property," e.g., a share under G.S. 29-14, which "includes . . . the undivided fractional interest in the real property." Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 143 S.E.2d 300 (1965).

VI. HEIRS.

.

Technical Construction of Term "Heirs." - Absent words expressing testatrix's contrary intent, the court would construe the word "heirs" in will in the technical sense. Rawls v. Rideout, 74 N.C. App. 368, 328 S.E.2d 783 (1985).

Consideration of Laws in Effect at Time of Death. - In construing a will with a remainder interest to a class of the testatrix's "heirs," the courts look to the intestacy laws in effect at the testatrix's death to determine who the "heirs" are and the shares which they are entitled to take, unless the language of the will reveals a contrary intent. Rawls v. Rideout, 74 N.C. App. 368, 328 S.E.2d 783 (1985).

For discussion of construction of the phrase "to my nearest (relatives) heirs" in the remainder clause of a devise by testatrix who died in May, 1962, see Rawls v. Rideout, 74 N.C. App. 368, 328 S.E.2d 783 (1985).

VII. LINEAL DESCENDANTS.

.

Children Distinguished from Others. - The phrase "lineal descendants" generally applies not to distinguish between children of various marriages or out of wedlock, but to distinguish children from other collateral descendants, e.g., nieces and nephews. In re Estate of Edwards, 77 N.C. App. 302, 335 S.E.2d 39 (1985), aff'd, 316 N.C. 698, 343 S.E.2d 913 (1986).

Illegitimate and Adopted Children Included. - The term "lineal descendants" would include even illegitimate children of a deceased female, under G.S. 29-19(a), and clearly includes adopted children, under G.S. 29-17. In re Estate of Edwards, 77 N.C. App. 302, 335 S.E.2d 39 (1985), aff'd, 316 N.C. 698, 343 S.E.2d 913 (1986).

Children Adopted by Wife's Second Husband. - Children born to wife and her first husband became lineal descendants of her second husband upon his adoption of them because they became in law his children. In re Estate of Edwards, 316 N.C. 698, 343 S.E.2d 913, rehearing denied, 317 N.C. 704, 347 S.E.2d 40 (1986).

VIII. COSTS OF ADMINISTRATION.

.

Costs of administration, as used in subdivision (5) of this section, means those ordinary, usual, and necessary expenses of administering a decedent's estate; a will caveat and its expense is neither of these, for a will caveat is a claim that the will involved is invalid, and its expense is a cost of court taxable against either party, or apportioned among the parties, in the discretion of the court. In re Estate of Ward, 97 N.C. App. 660, 389 S.E.2d 441 (1990).


§ 29-3. Certain distinctions as to intestate succession abolished.

In the determination of those persons who take upon intestate succession there is no distinction:

  1. Between real and personal property, or
  2. Between ancestral and nonancestral property, or
  3. Between relations of the whole blood and those of the half blood.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1.)

CASE NOTES

Distinctions Abolished Only for Purposes of Determining Succession. - This section abolishes the distinction between real and personal property only in the determination of those persons who take upon intestate succession. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Melvin, 259 N.C. 255, 130 S.E.2d 387 (1963).

Applied in In re Johnston, 16 N.C. App. 38, 190 S.E.2d 879 (1972).


§ 29-4. Curtesy and dower abolished.

The estates of curtesy and dower are hereby abolished.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1.)

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "Does the Fee Tail Exist in North Carolina?," see 23 Wake Forest L. Rev. 767 (1988).

CASE NOTES

Cited in Dudley v. Staton, 257 N.C. 572, 126 S.E.2d 590 (1962); Marlowe v. Clark, 112 N.C. App. 181, 435 S.E.2d 354 (1993); Watson v. Smoker, 138 N.C. App. 158, 530 S.E.2d 344 (2000).


§ 29-5. Computation of next of kin.

Degrees of kinship shall be computed as provided in G.S. 104A-1.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1.)

Cross References. - As to meaning of "next of kin," see G.S. 41-6.1.

§ 29-6. Lineal succession unlimited.

There shall be no limitation on the right of succession by lineal descendants of an intestate.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1.)

§ 29-7. Collateral succession limited.

There shall be no right of succession by collateral kin who are more than five degrees of kinship removed from an intestate; provided that if there is no collateral relative within the five degrees of kinship referred to herein, then collateral succession shall be unlimited to prevent any property from escheating.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1.)

Legal Periodicals. - For survey of 1977 law on wills, trusts and estates, see 56 N.C.L. Rev. 1152 (1978).

For note discussing the limitation on collateral inheritance in North Carolina, see 14 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1085 (1978).

CASE NOTES

Rights of collateral succession are limited to the descendants of the intestate's parents or grandparents. This section limits such succession to those persons who are within five degrees of kinship to the intestate, and the effect of the proviso engrafted upon this section is to provide for unlimited succession by collateral kinsmen descended from the intestate's parents or grandparents in the event there are no collateral kinsmen of the fifth degree in such lines of descent. Newlin v. Gill, 293 N.C. 348, 237 S.E.2d 819 (1977).

The limitation upon collateral succession to heirs within five degrees of kinship to the intestate contained in this section is a limitation upon succession by heirs descended from parents or grandparents of the intestate. Newlin v. Gill, 293 N.C. 348, 237 S.E.2d 819 (1977).

Escheats Not Eliminated by Proviso of this Section. - This section at most imposes a limitation upon intestate succession, as defined in G.S. 29-15, and by its proviso restates the existing effect of G.S. 29-15, i.e., that collateral descent shall be unlimited when it is within the parentela of an intestate's parents or grandparents. Thus, in enacting this section, the legislature did not intend to eliminate escheats. Newlin v. Gill, 293 N.C. 348, 237 S.E.2d 819 (1977).

Effect of Section as to Escheat under G.S. 29-12. - This section has no application to escheat under G.S. 29-12 unless the common ancestor of the collateral kin and the decedent is a parent or grandparent of the decedent. In such an event the main clause in this section operates to exclude a collateral kinsman of a sixth or higher degree from succeeding to the estate, even though he is a lineal descendent of the decedent's parents or grandparents. The proviso in this section, in order to prevent the escheat of the decedent's estate, provides for unlimited succession by collateral kinsmen who are descendants of the decedent's parents or grandparents when there is no such collateral kinsman within the fifth degree. Newlin v. Gill, 32 N.C. App. 392, 232 S.E.2d 213, aff'd, 293 N.C. 348, 237 S.E.2d 819 (1977).


§ 29-8. Partial intestacy.

If part but not all of the estate of a decedent is validly disposed of by the decedent's will, the part not disposed of by such will shall descend and be distributed as intestate property.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 2011-344, s. 5.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-344, s. 5, effective January 1, 2012, and applicable to estates of decedents dying on or after that date, substituted "the decedent's will" for "his will."

CASE NOTES

Section Codifies Common Law. - This section, which was adopted in 1959, was a codification of the common law. Ferguson v. Croom, 73 N.C. App. 316, 326 S.E.2d 373 (1985).

Section Adopts Majority Rule. - The rule adopted by this section is also in accordance with the rule followed by a majority of the sister states. Ferguson v. Croom, 73 N.C. App. 316, 326 S.E.2d 373 (1985).

This section creates a mandatory plan for disposing of a decedent's property which does not pass by will. It directs that the property pass by intestate succession without regard to the intent expressed by a testator in a will. Ferguson v. Croom, 73 N.C. App. 316, 326 S.E.2d 373 (1985).

Presumption against partial intestacy is merely a rule of construction and cannot have the effect of transferring property in the face of contrary provisions in the will. The presumption must yield when outweighed by manifest and unequivocal intent. McKinney v. Mosteller, 321 N.C. 730, 365 S.E.2d 612 (1988).

Illustrative Case. - Where, as gleaned from will itself, the intent of the testator was that the residue of his estate was to pass to named beneficiaries under the residuary clause of the will only if testator's wife survived him, and she did not, the residue would pass to his heirs at law in accordance with the laws of intestacy as enacted by the legislature. McKinney v. Mosteller, 321 N.C. 730, 365 S.E.2d 612 (1988).

Where decedent did not provide a testamentary disposition of four parcels of land, either specifically or through a residuary clause, the land did not pass under decedent's will, but instead qualified as a partial intestacy. Tarlton v. Stidham, 122 N.C. 77, 469 S.E.2d 38 (1996).


§ 29-9. Inheritance by unborn infant.

Lineal descendants and other relatives of an intestate born within 10 lunar months after the death of the intestate, shall inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the intestate and had survived him.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1.)

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "Class Gifts in North Carolina - When Do We 'Call The Roll'?," see 21 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1 (1985).

For note on the wrongful death of a viable fetus, see 23 Wake Forest L. Rev. 849 (1988).

CASE NOTES

Child Born after 10 Months. - If a child is born more than 10 lunar months or 280 days after the death of the intestate, the presumption is that the child was not en ventre sa mere when the intestate died, but this presumption may be rebutted by evidence tending to show that he was in fact the father of the child. Byerly v. Tolbert, 250 N.C. 27, 108 S.E.2d 29 (1959), decided under former Rule 7 of old § 29-1. See also Britton v. Miller, 63 N.C. 268 (1869); In re Will of Hester, 84 N.C. App. 585, 353 S.E.2d 643 (1987).


§ 29-10. Renunciation.

Renunciation of an intestate share shall be as provided for in Chapter 31B of the General Statutes.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 1961, c. 958, s. 2; 1975, c. 371, s. 2.)

CASE NOTES

A renunciation is not a grant of legal title by the renouncer. It merely triggers a set of statutorily defined legal rights which ultimately determine ownership. Hinson v. Hinson, 80 N.C. App. 561, 343 S.E.2d 266 (1986), decided under this section as it read prior to October 1, 1975.

A renunciation relates back to the death of the testator or intestate. The renouncer never actually holds legal title to the property. Hinson v. Hinson, 80 N.C. App. 561, 343 S.E.2d 266 (1986), decided under this section as it read prior to Oct. 1, 1975.

A parol trust may not be engrafted upon a renounced interest. Hinson v. Hinson, 80 N.C. App. 561, 343 S.E.2d 266 (1986), decided under this section as it read prior to Oct. 1, 1975.

Action Seeking Constructive Trust. - Plaintiff, who sought to assert that defendant unduly influenced his decision to sign a "Petition to Renounce" his interest in will, could maintain an action seeking the declaration of a constructive trust. Hinson v. Hinson, 80 N.C. App. 561, 343 S.E.2d 266 (1986), decided under this section as it read prior to Oct. 1, 1975.

Collateral Attack. - The legality of plaintiff 's renunciation under this section as it read prior to Oct. 1, 1975, was a matter before the clerk, who, having exclusive original jurisdiction of the administration of testatrix's estate, allowed plaintiff 's "Petition to Renounce." As a party to the original action, plaintiff could not later collaterally attack it. Hinson v. Hinson, 80 N.C. App. 561, 343 S.E.2d 266 (1986), decided under this section as it read prior to Oct. 1, 1975.

Cited in Brown v. Green, 3 N.C. App. 506, 165 S.E.2d 534 (1969).


§ 29-11. Aliens.

Unless otherwise provided by law, it shall be no bar to intestate succession by any person, that the person, or any other person through whom the person traces the person's inheritance, is or has been an alien.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 2011-344, s. 5.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-344, s. 5, effective January 1, 2012, and applicable to estates of decedents dying on or after that date, substituted "that the person, or any other person through whom the person traces the person's inheritance" for "that he, or any person through whom he traces his inheritance."

§ 29-12. Escheats.

If there is no person entitled to take under G.S. 29-14 or G.S. 29-15, or if in case of an intestate born out of wedlock, there is no one entitled to take under G.S. 29-21 or G.S. 29-22, the net estate shall escheat as provided in G.S. 116B-2.2.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 1961, c. 83; 1973, c. 1446, s. 7; 1999-456, s. 1; 1999-460, s. 8; 2013-198, s. 6; 2020-48, s. 3.1(g).)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2020-48, s. 6.1, is a severability clause.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2013-198, s. 6, effective June 26, 2013, in the undesignated provisions of this section, substituted "intestate born out of wedlock" for "illegitimate intestate" and made a minor punctuation change.

Session Laws 2020-48, s. 3.1(g), effective June 26, 2020, substituted "G.S. 116B-2.2" for "G.S. 116B-2."

Legal Periodicals. - For survey of 1977 law on wills, trusts and estates, see 56 N.C.L. Rev. 1152 (1978).

For note discussing the limitation on collateral inheritance in North Carolina, see 14 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1085 (1978).

CASE NOTES

There is a distinction between derelict property and escheated property. An escheat occurs when the property owner dies intestate and without relatives descended from a common parent or grandparent. North Carolina State Treas. v. City of Asheville, 61 N.C. App. 140, 300 S.E.2d 283 (1983).

Presumption That Distant Relatives Not Included in Will. - Underlying this provision for escheat of the estate in the absence of certain relatives is a logical presumption that the intestate would not have included distant relatives in his will. Newlin v. Gill, 293 N.C. 348, 237 S.E.2d 819 (1977).

Effect of G.S. 29-7 as to Escheat under This Section. - G.S. 29-7 has no application to escheat under this section unless the common ancestor of the collateral kin and the decedent is a parent or grandparent of the decedent. In such an event the main clause in G.S. 29-7 operates to exclude a collateral kinsman of a sixth or higher degree from succeeding to the estate, even though he is a lineal descendent of the decedent's parents or grandparents. The proviso in G.S. 29-7 in order to prevent the escheat of the decedent's estate provides for unlimited succession by collateral kinsmen who are descendants of the decedent's parents or grandparents when there is no such collateral kinsman within the fifth degree. Newlin v. Gill, 32 N.C. App. 392, 232 S.E.2d 213, aff'd, 293 N.C. 348, 237 S.E.2d 819 (1977).

G.S. 29-7 at most imposes a limitation upon intestate succession, as defined in G.S. 29-15, and by its proviso restates the existing effect of G.S. 29-15, i.e., that collateral descent shall be unlimited when it is within the parentela of an intestate's parents or grandparents. Thus, in enacting G.S. 29-7, the legislature did not intend to eliminate escheats. Newlin v. Gill, 293 N.C. 348, 237 S.E.2d 819 (1977).

Unrefunded ticket proceeds is neither abandoned nor derelict property. By purchasing a ticket to a concert, the ticket holder enters into a contract with the auditorium and the performer. If the contract is not performed, he or she may rescind the agreement and demand a refund, but is not compelled to do so. Nor must the auditorium operator or performer refund the purchase price absent a demand. If that were the case, the ticket holder would be unjustly enriched in retaining both money and memento. The auditorium is not a trustee of the unrefunded proceeds of the ticket sale; the auditorium is simply a party to an unperformed contract. North Carolina State Treas. v. City of Asheville, 61 N.C. App. 140, 300 S.E.2d 283 (1983).


§ 29-12.1. Controversies under this Chapter.

Any controversy arising under this Chapter shall be determined as an estate proceeding under Article 2 of Chapter 28A of the General Statutes, except that controversies arising under Article 8 of this Chapter shall be determined as set forth in that Chapter.

History

(2011-344, s. 5.)

ARTICLE 2. Shares of Persons Who Take upon Intestacy.

Sec.

§ 29-13. Descent and distribution upon intestacy; 120-hour survivorship requirement, revised simultaneous death act, Article 24, Chapter 28A.

  1. All the estate of a person dying intestate shall descend and be distributed, subject to the payment of costs of administration and other lawful claims against the estate, and subject to the payment of State inheritance or estate taxes, as provided in this Chapter.
  2. The determination of whether an heir has predeceased a person dying intestate shall be made as provided by Article 24 of Chapter 28A of the General Statutes.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 1999-337, s. 5; 2007-132, s. 2.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1999-337, s. 46, provides: "This act does not affect the rights or liabilities of the State, a taxpayer, or another person arising under a statute amended or repealed by this act before the effective date of its amendment or repeal; nor does it affect the right to any refund or credit of a tax that accrued under the amended or repealed statute before the effective date of its amendment or repeal."

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2007-132, s. 2, effective October 1, 2007, and applicable to determinations of title to or devolution of property dependent upon the death of an individual occurring on or after that date, added "120-hour survivorship requirement, revised simultaneous death act, Article 24, Chapter 28A" in the section heading, designated the existing provisions as subsection (a), and added subsection (b).

CASE NOTES

The power of the legislature to determine who shall take the property of a person dying subsequent to the effective date of a legislative act cannot be doubted. Johnson v. Blackwelder, 267 N.C. 209, 148 S.E.2d 30 (1966).

Law at Time of Death Governs. - It is well settled that an estate must be distributed among heirs and distributees according to the law as it exists at the time of the death of the ancestor. Johnson v. Blackwelder, 267 N.C. 209, 148 S.E.2d 30 (1966).

Even Though Decedent Became Incompetent to Make Will Before Law Changed. - Where it was alleged that an intestate became mentally incapable of making a will prior to ratification of the Intestate Succession Act on June 10, 1959, and that such mental incapacity continued until his death, and it was contended that the intestate's personal estate should be distributed in accordance with the Intestate Succession Law as it existed on June 9, 1959, it was held that this contention assumes: Before he became mentally incapable of making a will, the intestate had knowledge of and was pleased with the statutes of descent and distribution; if he had made a will, he would have disposed of his estate as provided by the statutes then in effect; he would have been displeased with the provisions of the 1959 act; and, but for his mental incapacity, would have made a will disposing of his estate as provided by the statutes in effect prior to ratification of the 1959 act. Such successive assumptions underlying the contention are unwarranted. They relate to matters that lie wholly within the realm of speculation. The intestate had no vested right in the statutes of descent and distribution in effect prior to the ratification of the 1959 act. He was charged with knowledge that these statutes were subject to change by the General Assembly. Johnson v. Blackwelder, 267 N.C. 209, 148 S.E.2d 30 (1966).

Determinative fact is that the intestate made no will. Hence, his estate "shall descend and be distributed" in accordance with the statutes in effect on the date of his death, namely, this Chapter. Johnson v. Blackwelder, 267 N.C. 209, 148 S.E.2d 30 (1966).

Wife's right to dissent from her husband's will depends on whether she is entitled to take a widow's share of his estate under this section and G.S. 29-14. Sloop v. Sloop, 24 N.C. App. 295, 210 S.E.2d 262 (1974).

Wife Waived Right to Dissent from Will. - Where, by the terms of a deed of separation a wife released her right to take a widow's share of her husband's estate, she thereby waived her right to dissent from his will. Sloop v. Sloop, 24 N.C. App. 295, 210 S.E.2d 262 (1974).

Any or all of the marital rights under this section may be surrendered by a properly drawn separation agreement complying with the requirements of former G.S. 52-6. Lane v. Scarborough, 19 N.C. App. 32, 198 S.E.2d 45, rev'd on other grounds, 284 N.C. 407, 200 S.E.2d 622 (1973).

Intent to Release Share Implicit in Separation Agreement. - Where the intention of each party to the marriage to release his or her share in the estate of the other is implicit in the express provisions of their separation agreement, their situation and purpose at the time the instrument was executed, the law will imply release of rights under this section and specifically enforce the agreement. Lane v. Scarborough, 284 N.C. 407, 200 S.E.2d 622 (1973).

Provisions in a separation agreement that each would thereafter acquire, hold, and dispose of property as though unmarried and that each renounced the right to administer upon the estate of the other refuted the contention that one spouse intended to retain any rights in the other's estate. Lane v. Scarborough, 284 N.C. 407, 200 S.E.2d 622 (1973).

Wife May Be Administratrix Where Marital Relations Resumed. - Where, after the execution of a separation agreement and consent judgment between husband and wife, the wife returned to the marital home which she and her husband shared before the separation; thereafter the commissioners named in the consent judgment to sell the couple's joint property for division were instructed not to do so; the husband paid the wife's attorney for representing her in the litigation between them; and from the time the wife returned to the marital home until her husband's death, the husband and wife lived continuously in their marital residence, the wife was entitled to qualify as administratrix of the estate of her husband and share in his estate as his widow without prejudice by reason of the separation agreement and consent judgment. In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976).

Cited in Tolson v. Young, 260 N.C. 506, 133 S.E.2d 135 (1963); In re Estate of Connor, 5 N.C. App. 228, 168 S.E.2d 245 (1969); Long v. Coble, 11 N.C. App. 624, 182 S.E.2d 234 (1971).


§ 29-14. Share of surviving spouse.

  1. Real Property. - The share of the surviving spouse in the real property is:
    1. If the intestate is survived by only one child or by any lineal descendant of only one deceased child, a one-half undivided interest in the real property;
    2. If the intestate is survived by two or more children, or by one child and any lineal descendant of one or more deceased children or by lineal descendants of two or more deceased children, a one-third undivided interest in the real property;
    3. If the intestate is not survived by a child, children or any lineal descendant of a deceased child or children, but is survived by one or more parents, a one-half undivided interest in the real property;
    4. If the intestate is not survived by a child, children or any lineal descendant of a deceased child or children, or by a parent, all the real property.
  2. The share of the surviving spouse in the personal property is:
    1. If the intestate is survived by only one child or by any lineal descendant of only one deceased child, and the net personal property does not exceed sixty thousand dollars ($60,000) in value, all of the personal property; if the net personal property exceeds sixty thousand dollars ($60,000) in value, the sum of sixty thousand dollars ($60,000) plus one half of the balance of the personal property;
    2. If the intestate is survived by two or more children, or by one child and any lineal descendant of one or more deceased children, or by lineal descendants of two or more deceased children, and the net personal property does not exceed sixty thousand dollars ($60,000) in value, all of the personal property; if the net personal property exceeds sixty thousand dollars ($60,000) in value, the sum of sixty thousand dollars ($60,000) plus one third of the balance of the personal property;
    3. If the intestate is not survived by a child, children, or any lineal descendant of a deceased child or children, but is survived by one or more parents, and the net personal property does not exceed one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) in value, all of the personal property; if the net personal property exceeds one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) in value, the sum of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) plus one half of the balance of the personal property;
    4. If the intestate is not survived by a child, children, or any lineal descendant of a deceased child or children, or by a parent, all of the personal property.
  3. When an equitable distribution of property is awarded to the surviving spouse pursuant to G.S. 50-20 subsequent to the death of the decedent, the share of the surviving spouse determined under subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be first determined as though no property had been awarded to the surviving spouse pursuant to G.S. 50-20 subsequent to the death of the decedent, and then reduced by the net value of the marital estate awarded to the surviving spouse pursuant to G.S. 50-20 subsequent to the death of the decedent.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 1979, c. 186, s. 1; 1981, c. 69; 1995, c. 262, s. 3; 2001-364, s. 6; 2012-71, s. 1.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2012-71, s. 1, substituted "sixty thousand dollars ($60,000)" for "thirty thousand dollars ($30,000)" in subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2), and substituted "one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000)" for "fifty thousand dollars ($50,000)" in subdivision (b)(3). For effective date and applicability provisions, see the Editor's notes.

Legal Periodicals. - For note, "Does North Carolina Law Adequately Protect Surviving Spouses?," see 48 N.C.L. Rev. 361 (1970).

For article, "Transferring North Carolina Real Estate Part I: How the Present System Functions," see 49 N.C.L. Rev. 413 (1971).

For note discussing the limitation on collateral inheritance in North Carolina, see 14 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1085 (1978).

For survey of 1979 property law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1509 (1980).

For note on a surviving spouse's right to dissent, see 16 Wake Forest L. Rev. 251 (1980).

For article, "Class Gifts in North Carolina - When Do We 'Call The Roll'?," see 21 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1 (1985).

For recent development, "Death and the Partnership Principle: Interpreting Recent Abatement Amendments to North Carolina's Equitable Distribution Act," see 80 N.C.L. Rev. 1089 (2002).

CASE NOTES

This section defines the share of the surviving spouse of an intestate. Tolson v. Young, 260 N.C. 506, 133 S.E.2d 135 (1963); Peoples Oil Co. v. Richardson, 271 N.C. 696, 157 S.E.2d 369 (1967).

Words Describing Relationships Bear Ordinary Meanings. - In carefully naming the persons who take in cases of intestacy using words describing family relationships such as "parents," "brothers," "sisters," "grandparents," "aunts" and "uncles," the legislature intended that these words bear their ordinary and usual meaning. Newlin v. Gill, 293 N.C. 348, 237 S.E.2d 819 (1977).

Words Cannot Be Expanded. - The words "brother," "parent" and "grandparent" cannot be expanded to include other relationships such as "great-grandfather" or "great uncle." Therefore, the maxim, "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another) tends to exclude collateral kin who are not in the parentela of the intestate's parents or grandparents. Newlin v. Gill, 293 N.C. 348, 237 S.E.2d 819 (1977).

Definition of "Share" in G.S. 29-2(6) Applies. - The definition contained in G.S. 29-2(6) is intended to apply when "share" is used "to describe the share of a net estate or property," e.g., a share under this section which thus "includes . . . the undivided fractional interest in the real property." Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 143 S.E.2d 300 (1965).

The intestate share does not include the value of property passing by survivorship (which includes property owned as tenants by the entirety), joint accounts with right of survivorship, and insurance payable to the surviving spouse. In re Estate of Connor, 5 N.C. App. 228, 168 S.E.2d 245 (1969).

Estate Does Not Include Property Conveyed Away Prior to Death. - For purposes of this section a wife's husband's estate would not include property which he had conveyed away prior to his death, even though she had not joined in the conveyance. Heller v. Heller, 7 N.C. App. 120, 171 S.E.2d 335 (1969).

A deed by plaintiff's husband, which was executed while he and plaintiff were living together and which conveyed his separate real property to his children by a prior marriage, was effective to convey title to the children free from any claims of plaintiff. Heller v. Heller, 7 N.C. App. 120, 171 S.E.2d 335 (1969).

Insofar as concerns any rights which the spouse of a married person might acquire by virtue of the provisions of this section, the General Assembly has prescribed no regulation or limitations relating to the conveyance during lifetime by such married person of his or her separate real or personal property. Heller v. Heller, 7 N.C. App. 120, 171 S.E.2d 335 (1969).

Present Right of Possession Not Conferred. - A wife is not a real party in interest so as to interpose as a defense or counterclaim, in an action in ejectment instituted by her husband's grantee, that her husband had fraudulently conveyed the lands without her joinder in order to deprive her of the possession thereof, since this section, defining the share of the surviving spouse of an intestate, and G.S. 29-30, providing for a life estate at the election of the surviving spouse, do not give her a present right of possession. Peoples Oil Co. v. Richardson, 271 N.C. 696, 157 S.E.2d 369 (1967).

Surviving Wife and Child Each Take Undivided One Half of Lands. - Upon the death of an intestate, title to his lands immediately vests in his wife and child under this section, each taking a one-half undivided interest in fee. Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 143 S.E.2d 300 (1965).

Share of Second or Successive Spouse. - Former G.S. 30-3(b), which provided that a second or successive spouse who dissented from the will of his deceased spouse should take only one half the amount provided by the Intestate Succession Act for the surviving spouse if the testator had surviving him lineal descendants by a former marriage but there were not surviving lineal descendants by the second or successive marriage, was not arbitrarily discriminatory and capricious so as to be violative of the due process provisions of the federal and State Constitutions. Vinson v. Chappell, 275 N.C. 234, 166 S.E.2d 686 (1969).

Absence of Lineal Descendants. - There being no lineal descendants, under this section the surviving widow is entitled to "all the net estate" of an intestate. Johnson v. Blackwelder, 267 N.C. 209, 148 S.E.2d 30 (1966).

Where decedent was not survived by a child, children, or any lineal decedent of a deceased child or children, or by a parent, surviving spouse was proper recipient of remainder interest in four parcels of land that passed as partial intestacy. Tarlton v. Stidham, 122 N.C. App. 77, 469 S.E.2d 38 (1996).

Wife's right to dissent from her husband's will depends on whether she is entitled to take a widow's share of his estate under G.S. 29-13 and this section. Sloop v. Sloop, 24 N.C. App. 295, 210 S.E.2d 262 (1974).

Wife Waived Right to Dissent from Will. - Where by the terms of a deed of separation a wife released her right to take a widow's share of her husband's estate, she thereby waived her right to dissent from his will. Sloop v. Sloop, 24 N.C. App. 295, 210 S.E.2d 262 (1974).

Distribution of Estate When Surviving Spouse Dissents from Will. - When a surviving spouse dissents from a will, the intestate share should be allocated so as to cause the least possible disruption of the decedent's plan for the distribution of his estate. In partitioning testatrix's property, her will should be given consideration, and insofar as possible the beneficiaries of the will should receive the property testatrix intended for them to receive. In re Estate of Etheridge, 33 N.C. App. 585, 235 S.E.2d 924, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 253, 237 S.E.2d 535 (1977).

This section does not purport to give a dissenting spouse the right to select the particular property he or she will receive in opposition to the dominant intent expressed in a will. The dominant intent expressed in the will is still controlling so long as it can be carried out and leave the dissenting spouse with the prescribed interest in value in the estate. In re Estate of Etheridge, 33 N.C. App. 585, 235 S.E.2d 924, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 253, 237 S.E.2d 535 (1977).

Wrongful Death Action. - In a wrongful death action, the real parties in interest were the beneficiaries as defined in the Wrongful Death Act, who were the same persons who would have received property had the decedent died intestate; where the decedent was not survived by a child, children, or any lineal descendant of a deceased child or children, or by a parent, the decedent's spouse received all of the wrongful death proceeds, and where the widow was not entitled to a wrongful death recovery, the remaining beneficiaries did not succeed to a full 100 percent, but only received their original percentage, so there were no beneficiaries to the wrongful death claim. Locust v. Pitt County Mem'l Hosp., 154 N.C. App. 103, 571 S.E.2d 668 (2002), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 673, 579 S.E.2d 272 (2003).

Where decedent's ex-spouse abandoned her interest in the decedent's estate at the time of death, decedent's siblings were entitled to share in any wrongful death proceeds, distribution was dictated by the laws of intestacy, and decedent's sister, as administratrix had standing to file the action. Locust v. Pitt County Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 358 N.C. 113, 591 S.E.2d 543 (2004).

Wrongful Act Bars Husband from Share of Wrongful Death Recovery. - Where it is a husband's wrongful act which caused the death of his wife intestate, he may not share in a recovery from an action for wrongful death. Should the jury return a verdict in favor of the administrator of her estate, the court will enter judgment for only two thirds of the amount of the verdict. Cummings v. Locklear, 12 N.C. App. 572, 183 S.E.2d 832, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 726, 184 S.E.2d 883 (1971).

In an action by an administrator under the Wrongful Death Act, G.S. 28A-18-2, where husband caused the death of his wife, the award must be reduced by the statutory share of the wrongdoer. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lack, 476 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 1973).

This result is not precluded by the "slayer statute," G.S. 31A-4, which excludes the wrongdoer from taking by declaring him to have constructively died prior to the deceased, since the slayer's exclusion by G.S. 31A-4 appears to apply only to inheritance from the decedent's "estate," while wrongful death awards have consistently been deemed not to pass through the personal estate of the deceased, but rather to arise out of a right of action belonging peculiarly to the personal representative for the benefit of the intestate successors. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lack, 476 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 1973).

Any or all of the marital rights under this section may be surrendered by a properly drawn separation agreement complying with the requirements of former G.S. 52-6. Lane v. Scarborough, 19 N.C. App. 32, 198 S.E.2d 45, rev'd on other grounds, 284 N.C. 407, 200 S.E.2d 622 (1973).

Remarriage Restores All Rights and Privileges. - When a married couple enters into a separation agreement, later divorces, and then remarries, each party to the marriage regains all rights and privileges incident to marriage unless there is evidence to the contrary. Batten v. Batten, 125 N.C. App. 685, 482 S.E.2d 18 (1997).

Intent to Release Share Implicit in Separation Agreement. - Where the intention of each party to the marriage to release his or her share in the estate of the other is implicit in the express provisions of their separation agreement, their situation and purpose at the time the instrument was executed, the law will imply release of rights under this section and specifically enforce the agreement. Lane v. Scarborough, 284 N.C. 407, 200 S.E.2d 622 (1973).

Provisions in a separation agreement that each would thereafter acquire, hold, and dispose of property as though unmarried and that each renounced the right to administer upon the estate of the other refuted the contention that one spouse intended to retain any rights in the other's estate. Lane v. Scarborough, 284 N.C. 407, 200 S.E.2d 622 (1973).

Wife May Be Administratrix Where Marital Relations Resumed. - Where, after the execution of a separation agreement and consent judgment between husband and wife, the wife returned to the marital home which she and her husband shared before the separation; thereafter the commissioners named in the consent judgment to sell the couple's joint property for division were instructed not to do so; the husband paid the wife's attorney for representing her in the litigation between them; and from the time the wife returned to the marital home until her husband's death, the husband and wife lived continuously in their marital residence, the wife was entitled to qualify as administratrix of the estate of her husband and share in his estate as his widow without prejudice by reason of the separation agreement and consent judgment. In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976).

Applied in Smith v. Perdue, 258 N.C. 686, 129 S.E.2d 293 (1963); Cox v. Shaw, 263 N.C. 361, 139 S.E.2d 676 (1965); Phillips v. Phillips, 296 N.C. 590, 252 S.E.2d 761 (1979); Tighe v. Michal, 41 N.C. App. 15, 254 S.E.2d 538 (1979).

Cited in Ivery v. Ivery, 258 N.C. 721, 129 S.E.2d 457 (1963); Forgy v. Schwartz, 262 N.C. 185, 136 S.E.2d 668 (1964); Swain v. Tillet, 269 N.C. 46, 152 S.E.2d 297 (1967); In re Will of Farr, 277 N.C. 86, 175 S.E.2d 578 (1970); Phillips v. Phillips, 34 N.C. App. 428, 238 S.E.2d 790 (1977); Newlin v. Gill, 32 N.C. App. 392, 232 S.E.2d 213 (1977); Harris v. Ashley, 38 N.C. App. 494, 248 S.E.2d 393 (1978); Bowling v. Combs, 60 N.C. App. 234, 298 S.E.2d 754 (1983); Carver v. Carver, 310 N.C. 669, 314 S.E.2d 739 (1984); Rawls v. Rideout, 74 N.C. App. 368, 328 S.E.2d 783 (1985); In re Estate of Edwards, 77 N.C. App. 302, 335 S.E.2d 39 (1985); In re Estate of Edwards, 316 N.C. 698, 343 S.E.2d 913 (1986); In re Estate of Francis, 327 N.C. 101, 394 S.E.2d 150 (1990); Olvera v. Edmundson, - F. Supp. 2d - (W.D.N.C. Sept. 21, 2001).


§ 29-15. Shares of others than surviving spouse.

Those persons surviving the intestate, other than the surviving spouse, shall take that share of the net estate not distributable to the surviving spouse, or the entire net estate if there is no surviving spouse, as follows:

  1. If the intestate is survived by only one child or by only one lineal descendant of only one deceased child, that person shall take the entire net estate or share, but if the intestate is survived by two or more lineal descendants of only one deceased child, they shall take as provided in G.S. 29-16; or
  2. If the intestate is survived by two or more children or by one child and any lineal descendant of one or more deceased children, or by lineal descendants of two or more deceased children, they shall take as provided in G.S. 29-16; or
  3. If the intestate is not survived by a child, children or any lineal descendant of a deceased child or children, but is survived by both parents, they shall take in equal shares, or if either parent is dead, the surviving parent shall take the entire share; or
  4. If the intestate is not survived by such children or lineal descendants or by a parent, the brothers and sisters of the intestate, and the lineal descendants of any deceased brothers or sisters, shall take as provided in G.S. 29-16; or
  5. If there is no one entitled to take under the preceding subdivisions of this section or under G.S. 29-14,
    1. The paternal grandparents shall take one half of the net estate in equal shares, or, if either is dead, the survivor shall take the entire one half of the net estate, and if neither paternal grandparent survives, then the paternal uncles and aunts of the intestate and the lineal descendants of deceased paternal uncles and aunts shall take said one half as provided in G.S. 29-16; and
    2. The maternal grandparents shall take the other one half in equal shares, or if either is dead, the survivor shall take the entire one half of the net estate, and if neither maternal grandparent survives, then the maternal uncles and aunts of the intestate and the lineal descendants of deceased maternal uncles and aunts shall take one half as provided in G.S. 29-16; but
    3. If there is no grandparent and no uncle or aunt, or lineal descendant of a deceased uncle or aunt, on the paternal side, then those of the maternal side who otherwise would be entitled to take one half as hereinbefore provided in this subdivision shall take the whole; or
    4. If there is no grandparent and no uncle or aunt, or lineal descendant of a deceased uncle or aunt, on the maternal side, then those on the paternal side who otherwise would be entitled to take one half as hereinbefore provided in this subdivision shall take the whole.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1.)

Legal Periodicals. - For note, "Does North Carolina Law Adequately Protect Surviving Spouses?," see 48 N.C.L. Rev. 361 (1970).

For survey of 1977 law on wills, trusts and estates, see 56 N.C.L. Rev. 1152 (1978).

For note discussing the limitation on collateral inheritance in North Carolina, see 14 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1085 (1978).

CASE NOTES

Words Describing Relationships Bear Ordinary Meanings. - In carefully naming the persons who take in cases of intestacy using words describing family relationships such as "parents," "brothers," "sisters," "grandparents," "aunts" and "uncles," the legislature intended that these words bear their ordinary and usual meaning. Newlin v. Gill, 293 N.C. 348, 237 S.E.2d 819 (1977).

Words Cannot Be Expanded. - The words "brother," "parent" and "grandparent" cannot be expanded to include other relationships such as "great-grandfather" or "great uncle." Therefore, the maxim "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another) tends to exclude collateral kin who are not in the parentela of the intestate's parents or grandparents. Newlin v. Gill, 293 N.C. 348, 237 S.E.2d 819 (1977).

G.S. 31A-2 Modifies Subdivision (3) of This Section. - G.S. 31A-2, which specifies acts barring rights of parents to intestate succession in child's estate and to administer child's estate, must be deemed a part of the Intestate Succession Act and a modification of subdivision (3) of this section, as fully as if it had been written thereinto or specifically designated as an amendment thereto. Williford v. Williford, 288 N.C. 506, 219 S.E.2d 220 (1975).

When a gift is made to a class of "heirs," the intestacy laws govern not only the identification of the "heirs," but also the shares to which they are entitled. Rawls v. Rideout, 74 N.C. App. 368, 328 S.E.2d 783 (1985).

Per Capita Distribution. - This chapter calls for a per capita distribution of the decedent's real and personal property to all surviving persons in the same degree of relationship to the decedent. The distribution scheme is commonly referred to as "per capita at each generation." Rawls v. Rideout, 74 N.C. App. 368, 328 S.E.2d 783 (1985).

Wrongful Death Action. - In a wrongful death action, the real parties in interest were the beneficiaries as defined in the Wrongful Death Act, who were the same persons who would have received property had the decedent died intestate; where a widow, who was the decedent's sole intestate beneficiary, had abandoned the decedent before his death, she was not entitled to a wrongful death recovery, and since the remaining beneficiaries did not succeed to a full 100 percent, but only received their original percentage, there were no beneficiaries to the wrongful death claim. Locust v. Pitt County Mem'l Hosp., 154 N.C. App. 103, 571 S.E.2d 668 (2002), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 673, 579 S.E.2d 272 (2003).

Where decedent's ex-spouse abandoned her interest in the decedent's estate at the time of death, decedent's siblings were entitled to share in any wrongful death proceeds, distribution was dictated by the laws of intestacy, and decedent's sister, as administratrix had standing to file the action. Locust v. Pitt County Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 358 N.C. 113, 591 S.E.2d 543 (2004).

Plaintiff father, having abandoned the deceased when the latter was a minor child, could not share in the proceeds of the settlement of the claim for wrongful death now in the hands of the administratrix. Williford v. Williford, 288 N.C. 506, 219 S.E.2d 220 (1975).

Putative Child Not Heir - Putative child was not the child's putative father's heir because strict compliance, not substantial compliance, with the procedures in G.S. 29-19(b)(2) was required to establish an illegitimate child as a legal heir, and the statute was not strictly complied with when the father's affidavit of paternity was not filed with the clerk. In re Estate of Williams, 246 N.C. App. 76, 783 S.E.2d 253 (2016).

Applied in Smith v. Allied Exterminators, Inc., 279 N.C. 583, 184 S.E.2d 296 (1971); Cummings v. Locklear, 12 N.C. App. 572, 183 S.E.2d 832 (1971); Bowen v. Constructors Equip. Rental Co., 283 N.C. 395, 196 S.E.2d 789 (1973); Forester v. Marler, 31 N.C. App. 84, 228 S.E.2d 646 (1976); Jernigan v. Stokley, 34 N.C. App. 358, 238 S.E.2d 318 (1977); McDowell v. Estate of Anderson, 69 N.C. App. 725, 318 S.E.2d 258 (1984); Betts v. Parrish, 312 N.C. 47, 320 S.E.2d 662 (1984).

Cited in Sloop v. Williams Exxon Serv., 24 N.C. App. 129, 210 S.E.2d 111 (1974); Newlin v. Gill, 32 N.C. App. 392, 232 S.E.2d 213 (1977); Christenbury v. Hedrick, 32 N.C. App. 708, 234 S.E.2d 3 (1977); Harris v. Ashley, 38 N.C. App. 494, 248 S.E.2d 393 (1978); In re Estate of McCoy, 39 N.C. App. 52, 249 S.E.2d 473 (1978); Lucas v. Jarrett, 55 N.C. App. 185, 284 S.E.2d 711 (1981); Herndon v. Robinson, 57 N.C. App. 318, 291 S.E.2d 305 (1982); Betts v. Parrish, 62 N.C. App. 77, 302 S.E.2d 288 (1983); Carver v. Carver, 310 N.C. 669, 314 S.E.2d 739 (1984); Jenkins v. Wheeler, 69 N.C. App. 140, 316 S.E.2d 354 (1984); McKinney v. Mosteller, 321 N.C. 730, 365 S.E.2d 612 (1988); State v. Smith, 90 N.C. App. 161, 368 S.E.2d 33 (1988); Brimley v. Logging, 93 N.C. App. 467, 378 S.E.2d 52 (1989); Stutts v. Adair, 94 N.C. App. 227, 380 S.E.2d 411 (1989); State v. Gilmore, 330 N.C. 167, 409 S.E.2d 888 (1991); Hales v. Thompson, 111 N.C. App. 350, 432 S.E.2d 388 (1993); Early v. Bowen, 116 N.C. App. 206, 447 S.E.2d 167 (1994), cert. denied, 339 N.C. 611, 454 S.E.2d 249 (1995), cert. denied, 456 S.E.2d 519 (1995); Hixson v. Krebs, 136 N.C. App. 183, 523 S.E.2d 684 (1999); In re Estate of Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. 646, 547 S.E.2d 483 (2001), cert. granted, 353 N.C. 727, 550 S.E.2d 779; Olvera v. Edmundson, - F. Supp. 2d - (W.D.N.C. Sept. 21, 2001); In re Estate of Lunsford, 359 N.C. 382, 610 S.E.2d 366 (2005); In re J.A.A., 175 N.C. App. 66, 623 S.E.2d 45 (2005); In re C.C., 173 N.C. App. 375, 618 S.E.2d 813 (2005).


ARTICLE 3. Distribution among Classes.

Sec.

§ 29-16. Distribution among classes.

  1. Children and Their Lineal Descendants. - If the intestate is survived by lineal descendants, their respective shares in the property which they are entitled to take under G.S. 29-15 of this Chapter shall be determined in the following manner:
    1. Children. - To determine the share of each surviving child, divide the property by the number of surviving children plus the number of deceased children who have left lineal descendants surviving the intestate.
    2. Grandchildren. - To determine the share of each surviving grandchild by a deceased child of the intestate in the property not taken under the preceding subdivision of this subsection, divide that property by the number of such surviving grandchildren plus the number of deceased grandchildren who have left lineal descendants surviving the intestate.
    3. Great-Grandchildren. - To determine the share of each surviving great-grandchild by a deceased grandchild of the intestate in the property not taken under the preceding subdivisions of this subsection, divide that property by the number of such surviving great-grandchildren plus the number of deceased great-grandchildren who have left lineal descendants surviving the intestate.
    4. Great-Great-Grandchildren. - To determine the share of each surviving great-great-grandchild by a deceased great-grandchild of the intestate in the property not taken under the preceding subdivisions of this subsection, divide that property by the number of such surviving great-great-grandchildren plus the number of deceased great-great-grandchildren who have left lineal descendants surviving the intestate.
    5. Other Lineal Descendants of Children. - Divide, according to the formula established in the preceding subdivisions of this subsection, any property not taken under such preceding subdivisions, among the lineal descendants of the children of the intestate not already participating.
  2. Brothers and Sisters and Their Lineal Descendants. - If the intestate is survived by brothers and sisters or the lineal descendants of deceased brothers and sisters, their respective shares in the property which they are entitled to take under G.S. 29-15 of this Chapter shall be determined in the following manner:
    1. Brothers and Sisters. - To determine the share of each surviving brother and sister, divide the property by the number of surviving brothers and sisters plus the number of deceased brothers and sisters who have left lineal descendants surviving the intestate within the fifth degree of kinship to the intestate.
    2. Nephews and Nieces. - To determine the share of each surviving nephew or niece by a deceased brother or sister of the intestate in the property not taken under the preceding subdivision of this subsection, divide that property by the number of such surviving nephews or nieces plus the number of deceased nephews and nieces who have left lineal descendants surviving the intestate within the fifth degree of kinship to the intestate.
    3. Grandnephews and Grandnieces. - To determine the share of each surviving grandnephew or grandniece by a deceased nephew or niece of the intestate in the property not taken under the preceding subdivisions of this subsection, divide that property by the number of such surviving grandnephews and grandnieces plus the number of deceased grandnephews and grandnieces who have left children surviving the intestate.
    4. Great-Grandnephews and Great-Grandnieces. - To determine the share of each surviving child of a deceased grandnephew or grandniece of the intestate, divide equally among the great-grandnephews and great-grandnieces of the intestate any property not taken under the preceding subdivisions of this subsection.
    5. Grandparents and Others. - If there is no one within the fifth degree of kinship to the intestate entitled to take the property under the preceding subdivisions of this subsection, then the intestate's property shall go to those entitled to take under G.S. 29-15(5).
  3. Uncles and Aunts and Their Lineal Descendants. - If the intestate is survived by uncles and aunts or the lineal descendants of deceased uncles and aunts, their respective shares in the property which they are entitled to take under G.S. 29-15 shall be determined in the following manner:
    1. Uncles and Aunts. - To determine the share of each surviving uncle and aunt, divide the property by the number of surviving uncles and aunts plus the number of deceased uncles and aunts who have left children or grandchildren surviving the intestate.
    2. Children of Uncles and Aunts. - To determine the share of each surviving child of a deceased uncle or aunt of the intestate in the property not taken under the preceding subdivision of this subsection, divide that property by the number of surviving children of deceased uncles and aunts plus the number of deceased children of deceased uncles and aunts who have left children surviving the intestate.
    3. Grandchildren of Uncles and Aunts. - To determine the share of each surviving child of a deceased child of a deceased uncle or aunt of the intestate, divide equally among the grandchildren of uncles or aunts of the intestate any property not taken under the preceding subdivisions of this subsection.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 1979, c. 107, ss. 2, 3.)

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under prior law.

When a gift is made to a class of "heirs," the intestacy laws govern not only the identification of the "heirs," but also the shares to which they are entitled. Rawls v. Rideout, 74 N.C. App. 368, 328 S.E.2d 783 (1985).

Per Capita Distribution. - This chapter calls for a per capita distribution of the decedent's real and personal property to all surviving persons in the same degree of relationship to the decedent. The distribution scheme is commonly referred to as "per capita at each generation." Rawls v. Rideout, 74 N.C. App. 368, 328 S.E.2d 783 (1985).

There is no logical reason for the Court of Appeals to favor a per capita distribution over a per stirpes distribution absent the intent of the testatrix as ascertained from the four corners of the will. Lewis v. Ecklin, 110 N.C. App. 73, 428 S.E.2d 855 (1993).

Not Function of Administrator to Partition Real Estate. - It is the duty of the administrator to make distribution of the surplus of his intestate's personal property among those entitled thereto, but it is not his function to partition the real estate of his decedent among the heirs. King v. Neese, 233 N.C. 132, 63 S.E.2d 123 (1951).

Siblings. - Where decedent's ex-spouse abandoned her interest in the decedent's estate at the time of death, decedent's siblings were entitled to share in any wrongful death proceeds, distribution was dictated by the laws of intestacy, and decedent's sister, as administratrix had standing to file the action. Locust v. Pitt County Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 358 N.C. 113, 591 S.E.2d 543 (2004).

Applied in Cummings v. Locklear, 12 N.C. App. 572, 183 S.E.2d 832 (1971); Jernigan v. Stokley, 34 N.C. App. 358, 238 S.E.2d 318 (1977); Ferguson v. Croom, 73 N.C. App. 316, 326 S.E.2d 373 (1985).

Cited in Sloop v. Williams Exxon Serv., 24 N.C. App. 129, 210 S.E.2d 111 (1974); House v. White, 35 N.C. App. 124, 240 S.E.2d 489 (1978); Harris v. Ashley, 38 N.C. App. 494, 248 S.E.2d 393 (1978); Ladd v. Estate of Kellenberger, 314 N.C. App. 477, 334 S.E.2d 751 (1985); Brimley v. Logging, 93 N.C. App. 467, 378 S.E.2d 52 (1989); Jamin v. Williamson, 94 N.C. App. 699, 381 S.E.2d 345 (1989); Early v. Bowen, 116 N.C. App. 206, 447 S.E.2d 167 (1994), cert. denied, 339 N.C. 611, 454 S.E.2d 249 (1995), cert. denied, 456 S.E.2d 519 (1995); Allen v. Piedmond Transp. Servs., Inc., 116 N.C. App. 234, 447 S.E.2d 835 (1994).


ARTICLE 4. Adopted Children.

Sec.

§ 29-17. Succession by, through and from adopted children.

  1. A child, adopted in accordance with Chapter 48 of the General Statutes or in accordance with the applicable law of any other jurisdiction, and the heirs of such child, are entitled by succession to any property by, through and from the child's adoptive parents and their heirs the same as if the child were the natural legitimate child of the adoptive parents.
  2. An adopted child is not entitled by succession to any property, by, through, or from the child's natural parents or their heirs, except as provided in subsection (e) of this section.
  3. The adoptive parents and the heirs of the adoptive parents are entitled by succession to any property, by, through and from an adopted child the same as if the adopted child were the natural legitimate child of the adoptive parents.
  4. The natural parents and the heirs of the natural parents are not entitled by succession to any property, by, through or from an adopted child, except as provided in subsection (e) of this section.
  5. If a natural parent has previously married, is married to, or shall marry an adoptive parent, the adopted child is considered the child of such natural parent for all purposes of intestate succession.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 2011-344, s. 5.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-344, s. 5, effective January 1, 2012, and applicable to estates of decedents dying on or after that date, in subsections (a) and (b), substituted "the child's" for "his"; and in subsection (a), substituted "the child" for "he."

Legal Periodicals. - For article on interstate and foreign adoptions in North Carolina, see 40 N.C.L. Rev. 691 (1962).

For article, "Recognition of Foreign Judgments," see 50 N.C.L. Rev. 21 (1971).

For comment, "The Adoptee's Right of Access to Sealed Adoption Records in North Carolina," see 16 Wake Forest L. Rev. 563 (1980).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under prior law.

North Carolina recognizes the doctrine of equitable adoption. Lankford v. Wright, 347 N.C. 115, 489 S.E.2d 604 (1997).

Equitable adoption, does not confer the incidents of formal statutory adoption; rather, it merely confers rights of inheritance upon the foster child in the event of intestacy of the foster parents. Lankford v. Wright, 347 N.C. 115, 489 S.E.2d 604 (1997).

The term "lineal descendants" is defined at G.S. 29-2(4) as "all children of such person"; this would include even illegitimate children of a deceased female, under G.S. 29-19(a), and clearly includes adopted children, under this section. In re Estate of Edwards, 77 N.C. App. 302, 335 S.E.2d 39 (1985), aff'd, 316 N.C. 698, 343 S.E.2d 913 (1986).

The purpose of subsection (e) of this section is to make it clear that the relationship of parent and child is not severed when the child is adopted by the spouse of the biological parent. In re Estate of Edwards, 316 N.C. 698, 343 S.E.2d 913, rehearing denied, 317 N.C. 704, 347 S.E.2d 40 (1986).

Rights of Adopted Child Same as for Natural Child. - The legislature has provided that an adopted child from the date of its adoption shall have the same property rights as a natural born child from the date of its birth. Headen v. Jackson, 255 N.C. 157, 120 S.E.2d 598 (1961).

Any provision of law which prevented an adopted child from sharing in property, by descent or distribution in the same manner and to the same extent as a natural born child, was swept away by the repealing clause in chapter 813, Session Laws of 1955. Headen v. Jackson, 255 N.C. 157, 120 S.E.2d 598 (1961).

An adopted child shall be entitled to inherit property by, through, and from his adoptive parents as if he were born the legitimate child of the adoptive parents. Greenlee v. Quinn, 255 N.C. 601, 122 S.E.2d 409 (1961).

Right of an adopted child to inherit vests as of death of her adoptive parent, and therefore where the parent died prior to the effective date of an act creating a new rule of descent and of distribution the act is not applicable. Wilson v. Anderson, 232 N.C. 521, 61 S.E.2d 447 (1950).

Inheritance from Brother of Adopting Parent. - Under the provisions of Session Laws 1955, c. 813, s. 6, an adopted child was entitled to inherit property from the brother of the adopting parent, notwithstanding that the decree of adoption was entered prior to the passage of the statute, the legislature having the power to determine who shall take the property of a person dying subsequent to the effective date of a legislative act. Bennett v. Cain, 248 N.C. 428, 103 S.E.2d 510 (1958).

Section Has No Bearing upon Whether Adopted Child Takes under Will. - The statutes relating to the right of adopted children to take as distributees and heirs have no bearing upon whether an adopted child takes under a will, except insofar as they establish and define the parent and child relationship between the adoptive parents and the adopted child. Bradford v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 572, 75 S.E.2d 632 (1953).

Biological Parent Need Not Join in Spouse's Petition for Adoption of Children. - Subsection (e) of this section and G.S. 48-7(d) were enacted, not to retain adopted children's status as "lineal descendants" by the former marriage, but instead to provide that the parent-child relationship between adopted children and their biological parent is not severed by the parent's spouse's adoption of her children from a former marriage. Since the relationship remains intact in this limited situation, it is not necessary for such a biological parent to become a co-petitioner in her husband's adoption of her legitimate children of a former marriage. This biological parent, however, must consent to the adoption, as must any biological parent who does not come within the ambit of G.S. 48-6. In re Estate of Edwards, 316 N.C. 698, 343 S.E.2d 913, rehearing denied, 317 N.C. 704, 347 S.E.2d 40 (1986).

Wife's failure to "join" in her husband's petition for the adoption of her two minor children by a previous marriage in no way affected her relationship with the children and was immaterial to a determination of her husband's distributive share under former G.S. 30-3(b). In re Estate of Edwards, 316 N.C. 698, 343 S.E.2d 913, rehearing denied, 317 N.C. 704, 347 S.E.2d 40 (1986).

Cited in Crumpton v. Mitchell, 303 N.C. 657, 281 S.E.2d 1 (1981); Jenkins v. Wheeler, 69 N.C. App. 140, 316 S.E.2d 354 (1984); Ladd v. Estate of Kellenberger, 314 N.C. App. 477, 334 S.E.2d 751 (1985).


ARTICLE 5. Legitimated Children.

Sec.

§ 29-18. Succession by, through and from legitimated children.

A child born out of wedlock who has been legitimated in accordance with G.S. 49-10 or 49-12 or in accordance with the applicable law of any other jurisdiction, and the heirs of the child, are entitled by succession to property by, through and from the child's father and mother and their heirs the same as if born in lawful wedlock; and if the child dies intestate, the child's property shall descend and be distributed as if the child had been born in lawful wedlock.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 2011-344, s. 5; 2013-198, s. 7.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-344, s. 5, effective January 1, 2012, and applicable to estates of decedents dying on or after that date, throughout the section, substituted "the child's" for "his," or similar language.

Session Laws 2013-198, s. 7, effective June 26, 2013, substituted "out of wedlock who has" for "an illegitimate who shall have" and substituted "the child" for "such child."

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "Recognition of Foreign Judgments," see 50 N.C.L. Rev. 21 (1971).

CASE NOTES

Right to Inherit by, through and from Parents. - A legitimated child shall have the same right to inherit by, through, and from his father and mother as if such child had been born in lawful wedlock. Greenlee v. Quinn, 255 N.C. 601, 122 S.E.2d 409 (1961).

Right to Inherit from Collaterals. - The legislature intended to confer upon the legitimated child the same right to inherit from collateral relations as it would have had had it been born in lawful wedlock. Greenlee v. Quinn, 255 N.C. 601, 122 S.E.2d 409 (1961).

Cited in Hayes v. Dixon, 83 N.C. App. 52, 348 S.E.2d 609 (1986).


ARTICLE 6. Children Born Out of Wedlock.

Sec.

§ 29-19. Succession by, through and from children born out of wedlock.

  1. For purposes of intestate succession, a child born out of wedlock shall be treated as if that child were the legitimate child of the child's mother, so that the child and the child's lineal descendants are entitled to take by, through and from the child's mother and the child's other maternal kindred, both descendants and collaterals, and they are entitled to take from the child.
  2. For purposes of intestate succession, a child born out of wedlock shall be entitled to take by, through and from:
    1. Any person who has been finally adjudged to be the father of the child pursuant to the provisions of G.S. 49-1 through 49-9 or the provisions of G.S. 49-14 through 49-16;
    2. Any person who has acknowledged himself during his own lifetime and the child's lifetime to be the father of the child in a written instrument executed or acknowledged before a certifying officer named in G.S. 52-10(b) and filed during his own lifetime and the child's lifetime in the office of the clerk of superior court of the county where either he or the child resides.
    3. A person who died prior to or within one year after the birth of the child and who can be established to have been the father of the child by DNA testing.
  3. Any person described under subdivision (b)(1), (2), or (3) of this section and the person's lineal and collateral kin shall be entitled to inherit by, through and from the child.
  4. Any person who acknowledges that he is the father of a child born out of wedlock in his duly probated last will shall be deemed to have intended that the child be treated as expressly provided for in the will or, in the absence of any express provision, the same as a legitimate child.

Notwithstanding the above provisions, no person shall be entitled to take hereunder unless the person has given written notice of the basis of the person's claim to the personal representative of the putative father within six months after the date of the first publication or posting of the general notice to creditors.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 1973, c. 1062, s. 1; 1975, c. 54, s. 1; 1977, c. 375, s. 6; c. 591; c. 757, s. 3; 2011-344, s. 5; 2013-198, s. 9.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2013-198, s. 8 substituted "Children Born Out of Wedlock" for "Illegitimate Children" in the Article 6 heading to Chapter 29.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-344, s. 5, effective January 1, 2012, and applicable to estates of decedents dying on or after that date, throughout subsection (a), substituted "the child's" for "his," or similar language; in subsections (b) and (c) substituted "the person" for "he" or similar language; and in subsection (d) substituted "that he is" for "himself to be."

Session Laws 2013-198, s. 9, effective June 26, 2013, substituted "children born out of wedlock" for "illegitimate children" in the section heading; substituted "a child born out of wedlock" for "an illegitimate child" in subsections (a), (b), and (d); substituted "the" for "such" preceding "child" or "will" in subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2) and subsection (d); added subdivision (b)(3); and, in subsection (c), substituted "(b)(1), (2), or (3) of this section" for "(b)(1) or (2) above" and deleted "illegitimate" preceding "child" near the end. For applicability, see editor's note.

Legal Periodicals. - For note on illegitimacy in North Carolina, see 46 N.C.L. Rev. 813 (1968).

For note on constitutional law and illegitimate's paternal inheritance rights, see 16 Wake Forest L. Rev. 205 (1980).

For survey of 1982 law on property, see 61 N.C.L. Rev. 1171 (1983).

For 1984 survey, "Intestate Succession of Illegitimate Children in North Carolina," see 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1274 (1985).

For casenote: "The Established Standard for Fathers Who Have Acknowledged Paternity and Who Are Seeking Custody of Their Illegitimate Child(ren): Rosero v. Blake, 357 N.C. 193 (2003)," see 26 N.C. Cent. L.J. 116 (2003).

For comment, " "If Doubt Arises': How the Department of State's Interpretation of the Immigration and Naturalization Act Invites Discrimination Against the Children of Gay and Lesbian Americans," see 42 Campbell L. Rev. 119 (2020).

CASE NOTES

Statute Does Not Violate Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. - This section and the statutes in pari materia are substantially related to the lawful State interests. They are intended to promote, and are not in violation of the equal protection and due process clauses. Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206, 254 S.E.2d 762 (1979); Herndon v. Robinson, 57 N.C. App. 318, 291 S.E.2d 305, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 306 N.C. 557, 294 S.E.2d 223 (1982).

This section and G.S. 49-10 through 49-12 and G.S. 49-14 through 49-16, construed together, do not violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206, 254 S.E.2d 762 (1979).

The statutory scheme established by this section and the other statutes referred to herein (G.S. 49-14 through 49-16 and former G.S. 52-6(c)) does not discriminate against illegitimate children in such manner as to violate the Equal Protection Clause of U.S. Const., Amend. XIV. Outlaw v. Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 41 N.C. App. 571, 255 S.E.2d 189 (1979).

G.S. 29-19(b)(2) did not violate equal protection as applied to a deceased father's illegitimate putative child because the statute furthered the state's legitimate permissive interest in the just and orderly disposition of property at death. In re Estate of Williams, 246 N.C. App. 76, 783 S.E.2d 253 (2016).

In General. - Illegitimate children may inherit from their putative fathers if they have been legitimated by one of the methods established in G.S. 49-10 through 49-14, or if paternity has been established in an action for criminal nonsupport. Helms v. Young-Woodard, 104 N.C. App. 746, 411 S.E.2d 184 (1991), cert. denied, 331 N.C. 117, 414 S.E.2d 756, 506 U.S. 829, 113 S. Ct. 91, 121 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1992).

Subdivision (b)(1) is constitutional on its face. Estate of Lucas v. Jarrett, 55 N.C. App. 185, 284 S.E.2d 711 (1981).

Application of subdivision (b)(1) to decedent's estate was not unconstitutional on grounds that decedent was not represented by counsel when he was adjudged the father of plaintiff's illegitimate children. Estate of Lucas v. Jarrett, 55 N.C. App. 185, 284 S.E.2d 711 (1981).

Different Treatment of Mother and Father Not Unconstitutional. - While this section classifies the illegitimate's mother and her heirs and the putative father and his heirs differently by placing the additional requirement on the father to establish his paternity by one of the statutorily prescribed methods before he is permitted to inherit, this classification is substantially related to permissible State interests. This section does not violate the equal protection clause of U.S. Const., Amend. XIV in this regard. Estate of Stern v. Stern, 66 N.C. App. 507, 311 S.E.2d 909 (1984), appeal dismissed, 471 U.S. 1011, 105 S. Ct. 2010, 85 L. Ed. 2d 294 (1985).

Interest of State in Inheritance Rights of Illegitimate Children. - By specifying the manner and time in which an illegitimate may establish his paternity, this State has sought (1) to mitigate the hardships created by former law (which permitted illegitimates to inherit only from the mother and from each other); (2) to equalize insofar as practical the inheritance rights of legitimate and illegitimate children; and, (3) at the same time to safeguard the just and orderly disposition of a decedent's property and the dependability of titles passing under intestate laws. Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206, 254 S.E.2d 762 (1979).

This section and the other statutes referred to herein (G.S. 49-14 through 49-16), insofar as they provide that an illegitimate child may inherit from its father only if paternity has been acknowledged in writing or finally adjudged in the lifetime of the father and otherwise in accord with those applicable statutes, establish a statutory scheme which bears an evident and substantial relation to the permissible and important interest of the State in providing for the just and orderly disposition of property at death. Outlaw v. Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 41 N.C. App. 571, 255 S.E.2d 189 (1979).

Interest of State in Inheritance by Father from Illegitimate Child. - The requirement imposed on the father of an illegitimate who would inherit from his illegitimate child is substantially related to the important State interests that this section is intended to promote. Estate of Stern v. Stern, 66 N.C. App. 507, 311 S.E.2d 909 (1984).

Birth certification amendment application form did not meet requirements of subsection (b) where it contained no statement by the putative father or anyone else that he was the father of the child, and even if his signature in the blank space involved could be construed to be an unambiguous acknowledgment of paternity, he did not swear to it before any official authorized to administer oaths. In re Will of Bunch, 86 N.C. App. 463, 358 S.E.2d 118 (1987).

The term "lineal descendants" is defined at G.S. 29-2(4) as "all children of such person"; this would include even illegitimate children of a deceased female, under subsection (a) of this section, and clearly includes adopted children, pursuant to G.S. 29-17. In re Estate of Edwards, 77 N.C. App. 302, 335 S.E.2d 39 (1985), aff'd, 316 N.C. 698, 343 S.E.2d 913 (1986).

Right to Inherit Established upon Adjudication of Paternity. - Once plaintiffs satisfied the notice requirement of this section, and showed that decedent had been adjudged their father under G.S. 49-1 through 49-9, their right to inherit was established as a matter of law; it did not depend upon a declaration in a court order or judgment. Estate of Lucas v. Jarrett, 55 N.C. App. 185, 284 S.E.2d 711 (1981).

A putative father and his kindred are only entitled to inherit from an illegitimate child if paternity has been established by one of the methods prescribed in G.S. 29-19(b). In re Estate of Morris, 123 N.C. App. 264, 472 S.E.2d 786 (1996).

Acknowledgment Not Filed. - Where petitioner acknowledged his paternity before a notary public and executed the "Affidavit Of Parentage For Child Born Out Of Wedlock" but never filed the acknowledgment with the clerk of court, he did not fulfill all the requirements under G.S. 29-19(b). In re Estate of Morris, 123 N.C. App. 264, 472 S.E.2d 786 (1996).

Putative child was not the child's putative father's heir because strict compliance, not substantial compliance, with the procedures in G.S. 29-19(b)(2) was required to establish an illegitimate child as a legal heir, and the statute was not strictly complied with when the father's affidavit of paternity was not filed with the clerk. In re Estate of Williams, 246 N.C. App. 76, 783 S.E.2d 253 (2016).

Compliance with Section Essential. - Where there has been no compliance with this section, illegitimate child has no right to inherit from deceased putative father. Hayes v. Dixon, 83 N.C. App. 52, 348 S.E.2d 609 (1986), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 319 N.C. 224, 353 S.E.2d 402, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 824, 108 S. Ct. 88, 98 L. Ed. 2d 50 (1987).

Illegitimate child's complaint seeking a declaration that she was the sole heir of a decedent was properly dismissed where the complaint did not claim that the decedent was adjudged to be the child's father, or that the decedent had acknowledged himself to be the child's father in a written instrument which was duly executed and filed; absent G.S. 29-19(b), an illegitimate child had no right to inherit from his or her putative father, and, although a deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) test had established that the decedent was the child's biological father, a positive DNA test was not listed in the statute as a method of meeting the requirements to legitimate a child. Phillips v. Ledford, 162 N.C. App. 150, 590 S.E.2d 280, cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 358 N.C. 377, 597 S.E.2d 133 (2004).

Clerk of court did not err in finding that claimants failed to show compliance with any of the four forms of legitimation necessary for illegitimate children to inherit from or through their putative fathers because they did not fulfill the statutory requirements for establishing legitimation under G.S. 29-19(b); four legitimation methods available in North Carolina were a verified petition filed with a court, the marriage of the mother and putative father, a civil action to establish paternity, or an action for criminal nonsupport. In re Williams, 208 N.C. App. 148, 701 S.E.2d 399 (2010).

Plea of Guilty in Bastardy Action as Basis for Inheritance by Child. - An illegitimate child may inherit, through intestate succession, from the estate of a father who acknowledged paternity to the child by pleading guilty in a criminal bastardy action. Sanders v. Brantley, 71 N.C. App. 797, 323 S.E.2d 426 (1984).

Notice under Subsection (b) as Condition Precedent. - The requirement of subsection (b) that illegitimate children give written notice of their claims of inheritance to the personal representatives of their putative fathers' estates within six months after the first publication or posting of general notice to creditors is a condition precedent to an illegitimate child's right to receive a distribution from the estate of a father who meets the description in subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (b). Estate of Lucas v. Jarrett, 55 N.C. App. 185, 284 S.E.2d 711 (1981).

Form of Notice. - Subsection (b) does not specify any particular form the notice required of illegitimate children must take. Estate of Lucas v. Jarrett, 55 N.C. App. 185, 284 S.E.2d 711 (1981).

Plaintiffs' verified complaint seeking revocation of defendant's letters, which fully alleged the basis of their claim of entitlement to inherit from decedent and was received by defendant, as personal representative of the estate, within the statutory period for notice, satisfied the notice requirement of subsection (b) of this section. Estate of Lucas v. Jarrett, 55 N.C. App. 185, 284 S.E.2d 711 (1981).

The formalities of subdivision (b)(2) of this section serve a dual purpose. - As a method for establishing paternity, a written instrument acknowledging paternity, executed and filed with the clerk of superior court, assures the requisite degree of certainty. The formalities further assure that the decedent intended that the illegitimate child share in his estate, much in the same way that a father intentionally excludes legitimate children as beneficiaries under his will. Herndon v. Robinson, 57 N.C. App. 318, 291 S.E.2d 305, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 306 N.C. 557, 294 S.E.2d 223 (1982).

Documents Inadequate under Subdivision (b)(2). - Plaintiff's proof of numerous written documents, signed by his putative father, which clearly acknowledged paternity, did not rise to the dignity of constructive compliance with subdivision (b)(2) of this section, where the documents were offered for purposes other than to establish paternity as contemplated under subdivision (b)(2). Herndon v. Robinson, 57 N.C. App. 318, 291 S.E.2d 305, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 306 N.C. 557, 294 S.E.2d 223 (1982).

Voluntary Support Agreement Used to Establish Right to Inherit. - G.S. 110-132 does not imply that voluntary support agreements are strictly limited such that they may have no legal implications other than that of child support; it acknowledges that voluntary support agreements, when properly acknowledged and approved by a trial court, have the same force and effect as a trial court's order of support. Accordingly, a voluntary support agreement could be used to establish that an out-of-wedlock child was entitled to inherit under G.S. 29-19(b). In re Estate of Potts, 186 N.C. App. 460, 651 S.E.2d 297 (2007).

Decedent's out-of-wedlock child was entitled to inherit under G.S. 29-19(b)(2). The decedent had acknowledged in a voluntary support agreement that he was the child's father; the agreement was executed by a notary, who was a certifying officer; and it was filed during both the decedent's and the child's lifetimes with the clerk of superior court in the decedent's county. In re Estate of Potts, 186 N.C. App. 460, 651 S.E.2d 297 (2007).

Action by Father Required to Include Illegitimate Child. - Just as a father must act to exclude a legitimate child from sharing in his estate, he must also act to include an illegitimate child. The distinction is an important one. Herndon v. Robinson, 57 N.C. App. 318, 291 S.E.2d 305, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 306 N.C. 557, 294 S.E.2d 223 (1982).

Applicability of Subsection (d). - Subsection (d) of this section is clear in its meaning and applies only when the child is taking under a will from the putative father and not when the putative father or his heirs are attempting to inherit from the child under the intestacy statutes. Estate of Stern v. Stern, 66 N.C. App. 507, 311 S.E.2d 909 (1984).

No Inheritance from Father Prior to 1973 Amendment. - See Jolly v. Queen, 264 N.C. 711, 142 S.E.2d 592 (1965).

This section confers upon illegitimate children same rights enjoyed by legitimate children under laws of intestate succession once there is proper adjudication or acknowledgment of paternity. Notification of the personal representative within six months of published notice to creditors does not establish or define the illegitimate child's right, but merely sets a time limitation for an illegitimate child to seek its enforcement. Jefferys v. Tolin, 90 N.C. App. 233, 368 S.E.2d 201 (1988).

Subsection (b) is Statute of Limitation. - The six-month limitation period in subsection (b), relating to notice of the claim of an illegitimate child to take from father's estate, is a statute of limitation which is subject to being tolled under the provisions of G.S. 1-17. Jefferys v. Tolin, 90 N.C. App. 233, 368 S.E.2d 201 (1988).

Father's Right to Inherit from Illegitimate Child Established. - Because a father acknowledged himself to be his daughter's father in a parenting agreement filed in the county where the mother and daughter were residents and because the agreement was acknowledged by all parties and approved by a district court judge, the requirements of G.S. 29-19 were followed and the father was an heir of the daughter's estate. In re Estate of Mangum, 212 N.C. App. 211, 713 S.E.2d 18 (2011).

Paternity Established. - By presenting a DNA test, plaintiff established the decedent's paternity at a probability of 99.99%. Because there was no evidence in the record contradicting the evidence offered by plaintiff, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's paternity claim. Swint v. Doe, 265 N.C. App. 104, 827 S.E.2d 309 (2019).

Former Law. - See Flintham v. Holder, 16 N.C. 345 (1829); Fairly v. Priest, 56 N.C. 383 (1857); McBryde v. Patterson, 78 N.C. 412 (1878); Bettis v. Avery, 140 N.C. 184, 52 S.E. 584 (1905); Ashe v. Camp Mfg. Co., 154 N.C. 241, 70 S.E. 295 (1911); Brown v. Brown, 168 N.C. 4, 84 S.E. 25 (1915); Wilson v. Wilson, 189 N.C. 85, 126 S.E. 181 (1925); Bryant v. Bryant, 190 N.C. 372, 130 S.E. 21 (1925); Battle v. Shore, 197 N.C. 449, 149 S.E. 590 (1929); Paul v. Willoughby, 204 N.C. 595, 169 S.E. 226 (1933); Brown v. Holland, 221 N.C. 135, 19 S.E.2d 255 (1942); Board of Educ. v. Johnston, 224 N.C. 86, 29 S.E.2d 126 (1944).

Applied in Poteat v. Robinson, 90 N.C. App. 764, 370 S.E.2d 61 (1988).

Cited in Settle ex rel. Sullivan v. Beasley, 309 N.C. 616, 308 S.E.2d 288 (1983); Brimley v. Logging, 93 N.C. App. 467, 378 S.E.2d 52 (1989); Rosero v. Blake, 357 N.C. 193, 581 S.E.2d 41 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177, 124 S. Ct. 1407, 158 L. Ed. 2d 78 (2004).


§ 29-20. Descent and distribution upon intestacy of children born out of wedlock.

All the estate of a person who was born out of wedlock and dies intestate shall descend and be distributed, subject to the payment of costs of administration and other lawful claims against the estate, and subject to the payment of State inheritance or estate taxes, as provided in this Article.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 1999-337, s. 6; 2013-198, s. 10.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1999-337, s. 46, provides: "This act does not affect the rights or liabilities of the State, a taxpayer, or another person arising under a statute amended or repealed by this act before the effective date of its amendment or repeal; nor does it affect the right to any refund or credit of a tax that accrued under the amended or repealed statute before the effective date of its amendment or repeal."

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2013-198, s. 10, effective June 26, 2013, substituted "children born out of wedlock" for "illegitimate children" in the section heading; and substituted "who was born out of wedlock and dies" for "dying illegitimate and" near the beginning of this section.

§ 29-21. Share of surviving spouse.

The share of the surviving spouse of an intestate born out of wedlock shall be the same as provided in G.S. 29-14 for the surviving spouse of a legitimate person. In determining whether the intestate is survived by one or more parents as provided in G.S. 29-14(3), any person identified as the father under G.S. 29-19(b)(1) or (b)(2) shall be regarded as a parent.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 1977, c. 757, s. 1; 2013-198, s. 11.)

Editor's Note. - Section 29-14(3), referred to in this section, has been rewritten. For provisions as to illegitimate intestates who are survived by one or more parents, see now G.S. 29-14(a)(3) and G.S. 29-14(b)(3).

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2013-198, s. 11, effective June 26, 2013, substituted "an intestate born out of wedlock" for "an illegitimate intestate" in the first sentence and deleted "illegitimate" preceding "intestate is survived" in the second sentence.

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "Transferring North Carolina Real Estate Part I: How the Present System Functions," see 49 N.C.L. Rev. 413 (1971).

CASE NOTES

Words Describing Relationships Bear Ordinary Meanings. - In carefully naming the persons who take in cases of intestacy using words describing family relationships such as "parents," "brothers," "sisters," "grandparents," "aunts" and "uncles," the legislature intended that these words bear their ordinary and usual meaning. Newlin v. Gill, 293 N.C. 348, 237 S.E.2d 819 (1977).

Words Cannot Be Expanded. - The words "brother," "parent" and "grandparent" cannot be expanded to include other relationships such as "great-grandfather" or "great uncle." Therefore, the maxim, "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another) tends to exclude collateral kin who are not in the parentela of the intestate's parents or grandparents. Newlin v. Gill, 293 N.C. 348, 237 S.E.2d 819 (1977).

Cited in Heller v. Heller, 7 N.C. App. 120, 171 S.E.2d 335 (1969).


§ 29-22. Shares of others than the surviving spouse.

Those persons surviving an intestate born out of wedlock, other than the surviving spouse, shall take that share of the net estate provided in G.S. 29-15. In determining whether the intestate is survived by one or more parents or their collateral kindred as provided in G.S. 29-15, any person identified as the father under G.S. 29-19(b)(1) or (b)(2) shall be regarded as a parent.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 1977, c. 757, s. 2; 2013-198, s. 12.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2013-198, s. 12, effective June 26, 2013, substituted "an intestate born out of wedlock" for "an illegitimate intestate" in the first sentence and deleted "illegitimate" preceding "intestate is survived" in the second sentence.

CASE NOTES

Words Describing Relationships Bear Ordinary Meanings. - In carefully naming the persons who take in cases of intestacy using words describing family relationships such as "parents," "brothers," "sisters," "grandparents," "aunts" and "uncles," the legislature intended that these words bear their ordinary and usual meaning. Newlin v. Gill, 293 N.C. 348, 237 S.E.2d 819 (1977).

Words Cannot Be Expanded. - The words "brother," "parent" and "grandparent" cannot be expanded to include other relationships such as "great-grandfather" or "great uncle." Therefore, the maxim, "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another) tends to exclude collateral kin who are not in the parentela of the intestate's parents or grandparents. Newlin v. Gill, 293 N.C. 348, 237 S.E.2d 819 (1977).


ARTICLE 7. Advancements.

Sec.

§ 29-23. In general.

If a person dies intestate as to all the person's estate, property which the person gave in his lifetime as an advancement shall be counted toward the advancee's intestate share, and to the extent that it does not exceed such intestate share, shall be taken into account in computing the estate to be distributed.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 2011-344, s. 5.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-344, s. 5, effective January 1, 2012, and applicable to estates of decedents dying on or after that date, substituted "the person's estate" for "his estate" and similar language.

Legal Periodicals. - For survey of 1980 property law, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1209 (1981).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - The cases below were decided under prior law.

A child must account for advancements in order to share by inheritance or by distribution in the real estate and personal property owned by the parent at death, and therefore it must be ascertained that the parent left property before the question of advancements can arise. Atkinson v. Bennett, 242 N.C. 456, 88 S.E.2d 76 (1955).

Decisions under Former Law as to Advancements. - See Stallings v. Stallings, 16 N.C. 298 (1829); Brown v. Brown, 37 N.C. 309 (1842); Lamb v. Carroll, 28 N.C. 4 (1845); Meadows v. Meadows, 33 N.C. 148 (1850); Headen v. Headen, 42 N.C. 159 (1850); Daves v. Haywood, 54 N.C. 253 (1854); Skinner v. Wynne, 55 N.C. 41 (1854); Shiver v. Brock, 55 N.C. 137 (1855); Ward v. Riddick, 57 N.C. 22 (1858); Jerkins v. Mitchell, 57 N.C. 207 (1858); Dixon v. Coward, 57 N.C. 354 (1859); Hollister v. Attmore, 58 N.C. 373 (1860); Bradsher v. Cannady, 76 N.C. 445 (1877); Melvin v. Bullard, 82 N.C. 34 (1880); Harper v. Harper, 92 N.C. 300 (1885); Eller v. Lillard, 107 N.C. 486, 12 S.E. 462 (1890); Kiger v. Terry, 119 N.C. 456, 26 S.E. 38 (1896); Ex parte Griffin, 142 N.C. 116, 54 S.E. 1007 (1906); Thompson v. Smith, 160 N.C. 256, 75 S.E. 1010 (1912); Nobles v. Davenport, 183 N.C. 207, 111 S.E. 180 (1922); Southern Distrib. Co. v. Carraway, 189 N.C. 420, 127 S.E. 427 (1925); Paschal v. Paschal, 197 N.C. 40, 147 S.E. 680 (1929); Prevette v. Prevette, 203 N.C. 89, 164 S.E. 623 (1932); Wolfe v. Galloway, 211 N.C. 361, 190 S.E. 213 (1937); Parker v. Eason, 213 N.C. 115, 195 S.E. 360 (1938); Harrelson v. Gooden, 229 N.C. 654, 50 S.E.2d 901 (1948).

Applied in Thompson v. Soles, 299 N.C. 484, 263 S.E.2d 599 (1980).


§ 29-24. Presumption of gift.

A gratuitous inter vivos transfer is presumed to be an absolute gift and not an advancement unless shown to be an advancement.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1.)

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - The case below was decided under prior law.

Right to Change Advancement into Gift. - While a parent cannot change into an advancement that which was intended as a gift at the time of delivery, there is no apparent reason why a parent cannot by deed change into a gift that which was at the time of delivery intended as an advancement. Atkinson v. Bennett, 242 N.C. 456, 88 S.E.2d 76 (1955).

Effect of Previous Advancement on Conveyance by Deed. - Where more than a year after an alleged advancement, the parent executes a deed conveying all of her property in equal division between two of the children, without providing for advancements previously made, the asserted advancement to one of them should not be taken into account in the division of the property conveyed by the deed. Atkinson v. Bennett, 242 N.C. 456, 88 S.E.2d 76 (1955).

Applied in Lassiter v. Lassiter, 15 N.C. App. 588, 190 S.E.2d 283 (1972).


§ 29-25. Effect of advancement.

If the amount of the advancement equals or exceeds the intestate share of the advancee, the advancee shall be excluded from any further portion in the distribution of the estate, but the advancee shall not be required to refund any part of such advancement; and if the amount of the advancement is less than the advancee's share, the advancee shall be entitled to such additional amount as will give the advancee the advancee's full share of the intestate donor's estate.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 2011-344, s. 5.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-344, s. 5, effective January 1, 2012, and applicable to estates of decedents dying on or after that date, substituted "share of the advancee, the advance shall" for "share of the advance, he shall" or similar language.

CASE NOTES

Purpose. - The proviso to former Rule 2 of old G.S. 29-1 was enacted to establish a perfect equality in the division of the intestate's whole estate, real and personal, amongst an intestate's children, excepting only, that no property given by a parent to a child is in any case to be taken away. King v. Neese, 233 N.C. 132, 63 S.E.2d 123 (1951). See Atkinson v. Bennett, 242 N.C. 456, 88 S.E.2d 76 (1955).


§ 29-26. Valuation.

The value of the property given as an advancement shall be determined as of the time when the advancee came into possession or enjoyment, or at the time of the death of the intestate, whichever first occurs. However, if the value of the property, so advanced, is stated by the intestate donor in a writing signed by the intestate donor and designating the gift as an advancement, such value shall be deemed the value of the advancement.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 2011-344, s. 5.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-344, s. 5, effective January 1, 2012, and applicable to estates of decedents dying on or after that date, substituted "signed by the intestate donor" for "signed by him."

§ 29-27. Death of advancee before intestate donor.

If the advancee dies before the intestate donor leaving a lineal heir or heirs who take by intestate succession from the intestate donor, the advancement shall be taken into account in the same manner as if it had been made directly to such heir or heirs, but the value shall be determined as of the time the original advancee came into possession or enjoyment, or when the heir or heirs came into possession or enjoyment or at the time of the death of the intestate donor, whichever first occurs.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 1961, c. 958, s. 3.)

§ 29-28. Inventory.

If any person who has, in the lifetime of an intestate donor, received a part of the donor's property, refuses, upon order of the clerk of superior court of the county in which the administrator or collector qualifies, to give an inventory on oath, setting forth therein to the best of the person's knowledge and belief the particulars of the transfer of such property, the person shall be considered to have received the person's full share of the donor's estate, and shall not be entitled to receive any further part or share.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 2011-344, s. 5.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-344, s. 5, effective January 1, 2012, and applicable to estates of decedents dying on or after that date, throughout the section, substituted "the person's" for "his," or similar language.

§ 29-29. Release by advancee.

If the advancee acknowledges to the intestate donor by a signed writing that the advancee has been advanced the advancee's full share of the intestate donor's estate, both the advancee and those claiming through the advancee shall be excluded from any further participation in the intestate donor's estate.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 2011-344, s. 5.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-344, s. 5, effective January 1, 2012, and applicable to estates of decedents dying on or after that date, throughout the section, substituted "the advance" for "his," or similar language.

ARTICLE 8. Election to Take Life Interest in Lieu of Intestate Share.

Sec.

§ 29-30. Election of surviving spouse to take life interest in lieu of intestate share provided.

  1. Except as provided in this subsection, in lieu of the intestate share provided in G.S. 29-14 or G.S. 29-21, or of the elective share provided in G.S. 30-3.1, the surviving spouse of an intestate or the surviving spouse who has petitioned for an elective share is entitled to take as the surviving spouse's intestate share or elective share a life estate in one third in value of all the real estate of which the deceased spouse was seised and possessed of an estate of inheritance at any time during coverture. The surviving spouse is not entitled to take a life estate in any of the following circumstances:
    1. The surviving spouse has waived the surviving spouse's rights by joining with the other spouse in a conveyance of the real estate.
    2. The surviving spouse has waived the right to take a life estate in lieu of an intestate or elective share by an express written waiver.
    3. The surviving spouse has waived, released, or conveyed the surviving spouse's interest in the real estate in accordance with G.S. 52-10.
    4. The surviving spouse was not required by law to join in a conveyance of the real estate in order to bar the elective life estate.
    5. The surviving spouse has executed a written declaration permitting the deceased spouse to convey or encumber the real estate without the consent or joinder of the surviving spouse.
    6. The real estate in which the deceased spouse had an interest was either apportioned to or sold to another person in a partition proceeding initiated before the deceased spouse's death.
    7. The surviving spouse is otherwise not legally entitled to the election provided in this section.
  2. The surviving spouse may elect to take a life estate in the usual dwelling house occupied by the surviving spouse at the time of the death of the deceased spouse if the dwelling house was owned by the deceased spouse at the time of the deceased spouse's death, together with the outbuildings, improvements and easements thereunto belonging or appertaining, and lands upon which situated and reasonably necessary to the use and enjoyment thereof, as well as a fee simple ownership in the household furnishings therein, despite the fact that a life estate therein might exceed the fractional limitation provided for in subsection (a) of this section. If the value of a life estate in the dwelling house is less than the value of a life estate in one-third in value of all the real estate, the surviving spouse may elect to take a life estate in the dwelling and a life estate in such other real estate as to make the aggregate life estate of the surviving spouse equal to a life estate in one-third in value of all the real estate.
  3. The election provided for in subsection (a) of this section shall be made by the filing of a petition in accordance with Article 2 of Chapter 28A of the General Statutes (i) with the clerk of the superior court of the county in which the administration of the estate is pending or (ii) if no administration is pending, then with the clerk of the superior court of any county in which the administration of the estate could be commenced, together with the recording of a notice indicating the county and file number of the clerk's filing with the register of deeds in every county where real property to be claimed under the filing is located. The election shall be made prior to the following applicable periods:
    1. In case of testacy, the shorter of (i) within 12 months of the date of death of the deceased spouse if letters testamentary are not issued within that period, or (ii) within one month after the expiration of the time limit for filing a claim for elective share if letters have been issued.
    2. In case of intestacy, the shorter of (i) within 12 months after the date of death of the deceased spouse if letters of administration are not issued within that period, or (ii) within one month after the expiration of the time limit for filing claims against the estate, if letters have been issued.
    3. Repealed by Session Laws 2011-344, s. 5, effective January 1, 2012.
    4. If litigation that affects the share of the surviving spouse in the estate is pending, including a pending petition for determination of an elective share, then within such reasonable time as may be allowed by written order of the clerk of the superior court.
  4. The petition shall do all of the following:
    1. Be directed to the clerk with whom filed.
    2. State that the surviving spouse making the petition elects to take under this section rather than under the provisions of G.S. 29-14, 29-21, or 30-3.1, as applicable.
    3. Set forth the names of all heirs, devisees, personal representatives and all other persons in possession of or claiming an estate or an interest in the property described in subsection (a) of this section.
    4. Request the allotment of the life estate provided for in subsection (a) of this section.
  5. The petition may be filed in person, or by attorney authorized in a writing executed and duly acknowledged by the surviving spouse and attested by at least one witness. If the surviving spouse is a minor or an incompetent, the petition may be executed and filed by a general guardian or by the guardian of the person or estate of the minor or incompetent spouse. If the minor or incompetent spouse has no guardian, the petition may be executed and filed by a guardian ad litem appointed by the clerk. The petition, whether in person or by attorney, shall be filed as a record of the court, and a summons together with a copy of the petition shall be served upon each of the interested persons named in the petition, in accordance with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 4.
  6. In case of election to take a life estate in lieu of an intestate share or elective share, as provided in either G.S. 29-14, 29-21, or 30-3.1, the clerk of superior court, with whom the petition has been filed, shall summon and appoint a jury of three disinterested persons who being first duly sworn shall promptly allot and set apart to the surviving spouse the life estate provided for in subsection (a) of this section and make a final report of this action to the clerk.
  7. The final report shall be filed by the jury not more than 60 days after the summoning and appointment thereof, shall be signed by all jurors, and shall describe by metes and bounds the real estate in which the surviving spouse shall have been allotted and set aside a life estate. It shall be filed as a record of court and a certified copy thereof shall be filed and recorded in the office of the register of deeds of each county in which any part of the real property of the deceased spouse, affected by the allotment, is located.
  8. In the election and procedure to have the life estate allotted and set apart provided for in this section, the rules of procedure relating to partition proceedings apply except insofar as the rules would be inconsistent with the provisions of this section. A determination of the life estate under this section may be appealed in accordance with G.S. 1-301.3.
  9. Neither the household furnishings in the dwelling house nor the life estates taken by election under this section are subject to the payment of debts due from the estate of the deceased spouse, except those debts secured by such property as follows:
    1. By a mortgage or deed of trust in which the surviving spouse has waived the surviving spouse's rights by joining with the other spouse in the making thereof.
    2. By a mortgage or deed of trust given by the deceased spouse to secure a loan, the proceeds of which were used to pay all or a portion of the purchase price of the encumbered real property, regardless of whether the secured party is the seller of the real property or a third-party lender, or by a conditional sales contract of personal property in which title is retained by the vendor, made prior to or during the marriage.
    3. By a mortgage or deed of trust made prior to the marriage.
    4. By a mortgage or deed of trust constituting a lien on the property at the time of its acquisition by the deceased spouse either before or during the marriage.
    5. By a mortgage or deed of trust on property with respect to which the elective life estate provided for in this section does not apply as provided in subsection (a) of this section.
  10. If no election is made in the manner and within the time provided for in subsection (c) of this section, the surviving spouse shall be conclusively deemed to have waived the surviving spouse's right to elect to take under the provisions of this section, and any interest which the surviving spouse may have had in the real estate of the deceased spouse by virtue of this section shall terminate.

Nothing in this subsection extends the period of time for a surviving spouse to petition for an elective share under Article 1A of Chapter 30 of the General Statutes.

History

(1959, c. 879, s. 1; 1961, c. 958, ss. 4-8; 1965, c. 848; 1997-456, s. 27; 2000-178, s. 3; 2011-284, s. 22; 2011-344, s. 5; 2020-23, s. 17.)

Cross References. - For provision that a decedent's one-half of community property is not subject to the right to elect a life estate under this Article, see G.S. 31C-3.

As to right of elective share, see G.S. 30-3.1 et seq.

Editor's Note. - The subsection designations (c1) and (c2) were added pursuant to S.L. 1997-456, s. 27, which authorized the Revisor of Statutes to renumber or reletter sections and parts of sections having a number or letter designation that is incompatible with the General Assembly's computer database.

G.S. 30-3.3, referred to in subsection (d), was repealed by Session Laws 2009-368, s. 1, effective July 27, 2009.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-284, s. 22, effective June 24, 2011, deleted "legatees" following "devisees" in subdivision (c1)(3).

Session Laws 2011-344, s. 5, effective January 1, 2012, and applicable to estates of decedents dying on or after that date, rewrote the section to the extent that a detailed comparison is impracticable.

Session Laws 2020-23, s. 17, effective October 1, 2020, rewrote the section.

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "Transferring North Carolina Real Estate Part I: How the Present System Functions," see 49 N.C.L. Rev. 413 (1971).

For article on installment land contracts in North Carolina, see 3 Campbell L. Rev. 29 (1981).

For comment, "Offer to Purchase and Contract: Buyer Beware," see 8 Campbell L. Rev. 473 (1986).

For comment, "The Uniform Probate Code's 'Augmented Estate' Concept: A Remedy for the North Carolina Dissent Statute," see 12 Campbell L. Rev. 425 (1990).

For article, "Legislative Kudzu and the New Millennium: An Opportunity for Reflection and Reform," see 23 Campbell L. Rev. 157 (2001).

CASE NOTES

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Section Preserves Benefits of Dower and Curtesy. - Dower, as such, has been abolished in North Carolina, but this section preserves to a surviving spouse the benefits of the former rights of dower and curtesy. Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 143 S.E.2d 300 (1965); Heller v. Heller, 7 N.C. App. 120, 171 S.E.2d 335 (1969); Taylor v. Bailey, 49 N.C. App. 216, 271 S.E.2d 296 (1980), appeal dismissed, 301 N.C. 726, 274 S.E.2d 235 (1981).

This section has the practical effect of providing the benefits of dower to the surviving spouse, at her election. Peoples Oil Co. v. Richardson, 271 N.C. 696, 157 S.E.2d 369 (1967).

To protect the rights of dower or curtesy, the General Assembly has prescribed regulations and limitations on the right of a married person to convey his or her real property free from the elective life estate provided for his or her spouse by this section. Heller v. Heller, 7 N.C. App. 120, 171 S.E.2d 335 (1969).

This section limits the right of a married person to convey his or her real property free from the elective life estate provided by this section. Taylor v. Bailey, 49 N.C. App. 216, 271 S.E.2d 296 (1980), appeal dismissed, 301 N.C. 726, 274 S.E.2d 235 (1981).

Purpose. - The reason for granting the surviving spouse an election or choice is to prevent such spouse from being rendered penniless and turned out of doors by reason of a small net estate or an insolvent estate. Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 143 S.E.2d 300 (1965).

A surviving spouse is given this election so as not to be rendered penniless and would elect this option when the estate is small or insolvent. Taylor v. Bailey, 49 N.C. App. 216, 271 S.E.2d 296 (1980), appeal dismissed, 301 N.C. 726, 274 S.E.2d 235 (1981).

Trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the brother's wife about conversations she had with decedent, and about conversations she overheard between decedent and the brother; since the wife was an interested party because she stood to inherit the property the brother was seeking if his specific performance action to enforce decedent's contract to make a will in the brother's favor was resolved in the brother's favor, she was barred from testifying about what a dead man had said in that regard. Taylor v. Abernethy, 174 N.C. App. 93, 620 S.E.2d 242 (2005), appeal dismissed, 360 N.C. 367, 630 S.E.2d 454 (2006).

Present Right of Possession Not Conferred. - A wife is not a real party in interest so as to interpose as a defense or counterclaim in an action in ejectment instituted by her husband's grantee that her husband had fraudulently conveyed the lands without her joinder in order to deprive her of the possession thereof, since G.S. 29-14, defining the share of the surviving spouse of an intestate, and this section, providing for a life estate at the election of the surviving spouse, do not give her a present right of possession. Peoples Oil Co. v. Richardson, 271 N.C. 696, 157 S.E.2d 369 (1967).

Effect of Inchoate Dower Interest. - An inchoate dower interest is not an estate in land nor a vested interest, but, nevertheless, it acts as an encumbrance upon real property. Taylor v. Bailey, 49 N.C. App. 216, 271 S.E.2d 296 (1980), appeal dismissed, 301 N.C. 726, 274 S.E.2d 235 (1981).

Different Time Limits Are Fixed to Give Surviving Spouse Opportunity to Decide. - The reason different time limits are fixed for making the election, under the different circumstances, as set out in subsection (c), subdivisions (1), (2), (3) and (4), is to give the surviving spouse ample opportunity to make a decision as to which choice is most beneficial. Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 143 S.E.2d 300 (1965).

Not Subject to Ordinary Debts of Estate. - The life estate, which the surviving spouse elects, is not subject to the payment of the ordinary debts due from the estate of the deceased spouse. Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 143 S.E.2d 300 (1965).

Spouse Would Elect Life Estate Where Estate Is Insolvent. - A surviving spouse would certainly elect to take a life estate where it would require a sale of all of the property of deceased's estate to pay the debts. Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 143 S.E.2d 300 (1965).

Inchoate Right to Dower May Be Protected by Redemption from Tax Sale. - A wife who claims in property an inchoate right to dower is possessed of such an interest that she clearly has the right to protect such interest by redeeming such property from a tax sale. Samet v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 214 (M.D.N.C. 1965).

Any or all of the marital rights under this section may be surrendered by a properly drawn separation agreement complying with the requirements of former G.S. 52-6. Lane v. Scarborough, 19 N.C. App. 32, 198 S.E.2d 45, rev'd on other grounds, 284 N.C. 407, 200 S.E.2d 622 (1973).

Where seller's wife refused to release her dower interest in the subject property, buyer is entitled to specific performance on the contract to convey the property, with an abatement in the purchase price for the value of defendant's wife's dower interest and for rents and profits for the period he was denied possession. Taylor v. Bailey, 49 N.C. App. 216, 271 S.E.2d 296 (1980), appeal dismissed, 301 N.C. 726, 274 S.E.2d 235 (1981).

Separately Conveyed Property Subject to Life Estate. - Where a married person conveys separate property without permission or joinder of their spouse and the non-owner spouse survives the owner spouse, the conveyed property is subject to the non-owner spouse's elective life estate. Melvin v. Mills-Melvin, 126 N.C. App. 543, 486 S.E.2d 84 (1997).

Applied in Lucas v. Felder, 261 N.C. 169, 134 S.E.2d 154 (1964).

Cited in Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 34, 143 S.E.2d 311 (1965); McLeod v. McLeod, 266 N.C. 144, 146 S.E.2d 65 (1966).

II. PENDING LITIGATION.

Subdivision (c)(4) Authorizes Fixing of Time for Election Where Litigation Is Pending. - Subdivision (c)(4) contemplates that the outcome of the litigation may well determine whether the surviving spouse will elect to take a life estate. Therefore, it authorizes the surviving spouse, if such litigation is pending, to request of the clerk a written order allowing a reasonable time within which the notice of election and the proceedings pursuant thereto may be filed and instituted. Upon such request, it becomes the duty of the clerk forthwith to make a written order fixing a time within which an election may be filed in accordance with subsection (c). Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 143 S.E.2d 300 (1965).

"Share" under Subdivision (c)(4) Means Any Share Spouse Is Entitled to. - As used in subdivision (c)(4), "share" means such share in the estate (not necessarily the net estate or property) as the surviving spouse shall be entitled to take by any provision of this Chapter. Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 143 S.E.2d 300 (1965).

Any Litigation Affecting Spouse's Choice Affects Such Share. - Any litigation which may substantially and materially affect the choice the surviving spouse is entitled to make "affects the share of the surviving spouse in the estate" under subdivision (c)(4). Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 143 S.E.2d 300 (1965).

Such as Suit on Disputed Claim Large Enough to Render Estate Insolvent. - If there is a disputed claim which, if allowed, would render the estate insolvent or nearly so, and which, if disallowed, would leave a large net estate, the outcome of the suit on the claim would affect the share of the surviving spouse and might well determine the matter of election, though the subject of the litigation is a mere debt and not the title to land. Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 143 S.E.2d 300 (1965).

Suit to Set Aside Deed from Son to Surviving Spouse of His Interest in Estate. - Where, before the time limit for making an election, as provided in subdivision (c)(3), had expired, a son instituted litigation to set aside a deed to his mother of his interest in his deceased father's lands, on the ground that she had defrauded him, the outcome of the litigation would affect her choice or election, i.e., her share of the estate. The pendency of the litigation extended her time for making the election. Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 143 S.E.2d 300 (1965).

Action by Widow Not "Pending" Litigation. - An action by the widow, commenced after time for election had expired, to declare void a deed executed by her husband which conveyed the husband's separate realty to his children of a prior marriage, does not constitute "pending" litigation within the meaning of subdivision (c)(4) of this section. Heller v. Heller, 7 N.C. App. 120, 171 S.E.2d 335 (1969).

Time Allowed Should Be Reasonable Time after Litigation Ends. - The time allowed under subdivision (c)(4) should be such time after the termination of the pending litigation as to the clerk, in the exercise of his sound discretion, seems reasonable under the circumstances. Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 143 S.E.2d 300 (1965).

Twenty Days Is Not Unreasonable. - Twenty days allowed under subdivision (c)(4) by the clerk for filing notice of election and issuing of summons is not unreasonable. Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 143 S.E.2d 300 (1965).

The order fixing the time limit under subdivision (c)(4) must be made forthwith upon the ex parte request of the surviving spouse. Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 143 S.E.2d 300 (1965).

Such Order Is Only Ministerial. - The written order under subdivision (c)(4) is only ministerial, it merely fixes the time limit, and it is not an adjudication of any issues or questions of law which may be raised in the proceeding between the surviving spouse and other interested parties. Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 143 S.E.2d 300 (1965).

Rights of Parties Are Not Determined Until Later. - The rights of the parties are determined after notice of election has been filed pursuant to the order fixing the time limit, summons served and the pleadings are in. Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 143 S.E.2d 300 (1965).

Procedure is in Accordance with Rules Relating to Partition. - Proceedings determining the rights of the parties and allotting the life estate are in accordance with the rules of procedure relating to partition of lands as far as practicable. Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 143 S.E.2d 300 (1965).