ARTICLE 1. Divorce, Alimony, and Child Support, Generally.

Sec.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 993, which added Article 2 of this Chapter, designated the existing provisions of this Chapter as Article 1.

§ 50-1: Repealed by Session Laws 1971, c. 1185, s. 20.

§ 50-2. Bond for costs unnecessary.

It shall not be necessary for either party to a proceeding for divorce or alimony to give any undertaking to the other party to secure such costs as such other party may recover.

History

(1871-2, c. 193, s. 41; Code, s. 1294; Rev., s. 1558; C.S., s. 1656.)

Cross References. - As to prosecution bonds generally, see G.S. 1-109 et seq.

As to costs generally, see G.S. 6-21 and G.S. 7A-305 et seq.

Legal Periodicals. - For note on consent judgments in family law in light of Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983), see 6 Campbell L. Rev. 125 (1984).

CASE NOTES

As to liability of husband for own costs, see Broom v. Broom, 130 N.C. 562, 41 S.E. 673 (1902).

Applied in Mayer v. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. 522, 311 S.E.2d 659 (1984).


§ 50-3. Venue; removal of action.

In all proceedings for divorce, the summons shall be returnable to the court of the county in which either the plaintiff or defendant resides.

[In] any action brought under Chapter 50 for alimony or divorce filed in a county where the plaintiff resides but the defendant does not reside, where both parties are residents of the State of North Carolina, and where the plaintiff removes from the State and ceases to be a resident, the action may be removed upon motion of the defendant, for trial or for any motion in the cause, either before or after judgment, to the county in which the defendant resides. The judge, upon such motion, shall order the removal of the action, and the procedures of G.S. 1-87 shall be followed.

History

(1871-2, c. 193, s. 40; Code, s. 1289; Rev., s. 1559; 1915, c. 229, s. 1; C.S., s. 1657; 1977, 2nd Sess., c. 1223.)

Legal Periodicals. - On the general question of jurisdiction in divorce, see 1 N.C.L. Rev. 95 (1923).

For note on domicile of military personnel for purpose of divorce, see 31 N.C.L. Rev. 304 (1953).

For survey of 1980 law on civil procedure, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1067 (1981).

For comment, "Conflicts of Law in Divorce Litigation: A Looking-Glass World?," see 10 Campbell L. Rev. 145 (1987).

CASE NOTES

Change in Common-Law Rule. - The common-law rule that the wife should bring her action for divorce in the domicile of her husband was changed by this section, as amended by Laws 1915, c. 229, making the summons returnable to the county in which either the plaintiff or defendant resides. Wood v. Wood, 181 N.C. 227, 106 S.E. 753 (1921).

Requirements to Invoke Statute. - There did not have to be a pending motion or trial date to invoke G.S. 50-3 because the statute required a transfer so that a motion in the cause might be resolved in a new county at some future point and did not require the underlying motion to be pending but only that there be an ongoing alimony proceeding that had not been finally resolved, which criteria were satisfied by indicating a motion to modify or terminate alimony would be filed in the future. Scheinert v. Scheinert, 260 N.C. App. 234, 818 S.E.2d 114 (2018).

Any Superior Court Has Jurisdiction If Either Party Is Domiciled in State. - In the absence of fraud, the superior court of any county in this State has jurisdiction over divorce action if either of the parties is domiciled in this State. Stokes v. Stokes, 260 N.C. 203, 132 S.E.2d 315 (1963).

But If Plaintiff Conceals Action and Whereabouts of Defendant, Jurisdiction Is Lacking. - If a plaintiff should fraudulently conceal his action for a divorce from the defendant and the whereabouts of the defendant from the court, jurisdiction would be lacking and a divorce obtained upon service of summons by publication would be a nullity. Stokes v. Stokes, 260 N.C. 203, 132 S.E.2d 315 (1963).

Venue Provisions of This Section Are Not Jurisdictional. - The provisions of this section that in divorce proceedings the summons shall be returnable to the court of the county in which either the plaintiff or the defendant resides are not jurisdictional; they relate only to venue. Stokes v. Stokes, 260 N.C. 203, 132 S.E.2d 315 (1963).

And May Be Waived. - The provisions of this section are not jurisdictional, but relate to venue, and they may be waived. Nelms v. Nelms, 250 N.C. 237, 108 S.E.2d 529 (1959).

The provision of this section that summons shall be returnable to the court of the county in which either plaintiff or defendant resides is not jurisdictional, but relates to venue, and may be waived; and if an action for divorce is instituted in any other county, it may be tried there, unless defendant before the time of answering expires demands in writing that trial be had in the proper county. Smith v. Smith, 226 N.C. 506, 39 S.E.2d 391 (1946); Denson v. Denson, 255 N.C. 703, 122 S.E.2d 507 (1961); Smith v. Smith, 56 N.C. App. 812, 290 S.E.2d 390 (1982).

But Removal Provisions Are Mandatory. - The language of this section, as amended by Session Laws 1977, 2nd Sess., c. 1223, which added the second paragraph, is mandatory. If the defendant makes a motion for change of venue, the judge shall grant it. Gardner v. Gardner, 43 N.C. App. 678, 260 S.E.2d 116 (1979), aff'd, 300 N.C. 715, 268 S.E.2d 468 (1980).

It was error to deny a husband's motion to change venue because (1) removal of all claims filed in the same action was required, and (2) all removal prerequisites were met. Dechkovskaia v. Dechkovskaia, 244 N.C. App. 26, 780 S.E.2d 175 (2015).

When a trial court's equitable distribution order was vacated and the court's alimony order was remanded for reconsideration, this procedural posture did not exempt the case from the venue provisions of G.S. 50-3 because (1) the statute's mandatory provisions applied before or after judgment, and (2) remand proceedings should have occurred in a different county, since the venue statute was raised before those proceedings began. Dechkovskaia v. Dechkovskaia, 244 N.C. App. 26, 780 S.E.2d 175 (2015).

And Apply Retroactively to Causes Which Have Accrued. - The retroactive application of this section to causes of action which accrued prior to the effective date of the statute is proper. No vested right is destroyed, nor does a question of construction arise, where a venue statute, by its own provisions, is declared to apply to transactions entered into prior to the passage of the statute. Gardner v. Gardner, 43 N.C. App. 678, 260 S.E.2d 116 (1979), aff'd, 300 N.C. 715, 268 S.E.2d 468 (1980).

But Not to Actions Settling Venue Before Effective Date. - The amendment of this section providing for removal of an action for divorce or alimony, upon motion of defendant, to the county in which defendant resides, where plaintiff has ceased to be a resident of this State, is mandatory and may be applied retroactively and even to actions pending on its effective date. However, the amendment would not be applicable to an action for divorce from bed and board where it became effective after the trial court made a decision settling the question of venue. Gardner v. Gardner, 43 N.C. App. 678, 260 S.E.2d 116 (1979), aff'd, 300 N.C. 715, 268 S.E.2d 468 (1980).

As Right to Venue as Adjudicated Is Substantial. - Although the question of venue is a procedural one, a right to venue established by statute is a substantial right. Its status is secure when finally adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, and neither the courts nor the legislature can thereafter invalidate the right's exercise or annul the judgment which fixes its investiture. Gardner v. Gardner, 300 N.C. 715, 268 S.E.2d 468 (1980).

Contempt Venue. - It was error to hold a husband in civil contempt because (1) while venue was normally proper in the county in which the order allegedly violated was issued, the husband asserted the husband's statutory right to a change of venue, under G.S. 50-3, so all subsequent proceedings had to be held in the county with proper venue, and, (2) the trial court had to reconsider the court's alimony award before that award was enforceable by contempt. Dechkovskaia v. Dechkovskaia, 244 N.C. App. 26, 780 S.E.2d 175 (2015).

Limitation on Retroactive Application of Section. - This statute may be applied retroactively only insofar as it does not impinge upon a right which is otherwise secured, established, and immune from further legal metamorphosis. Gardner v. Gardner, 300 N.C. 715, 268 S.E.2d 468 (1980).

Propriety of Motion to Remove. - This section is not jurisdictional and may be waived, and the failure therein must be taken advantage of by motion to remove the cause to the proper venue, and not by motion to dismiss. Davis v. Davis, 179 N.C. 185, 102 S.E. 270 (1920).

Failure to Make Motion as Waiver. - Any action brought in the wrong county may be removed instead of being dismissed, and a failure to make the motion for removal is a waiver of objection to the county in which it is brought. Denson v. Denson, 255 N.C. 703, 122 S.E.2d 507 (1961).

Insufficient Factfinding. - Insufficient findings supported an order to transfer an alimony proceeding because the court merely recited an allegation in an answer without making a finding that the allegation was a fact. Scheinert v. Scheinert, 260 N.C. App. 234, 818 S.E.2d 114 (2018).

Applied in Bass v. Bass, 43 N.C. App. 212, 258 S.E.2d 391 (1979).

Cited in Wood v. Wood, 181 N.C. 227, 106 S.E. 753 (1921); Batts v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 26 (E.D.N.C. 1954); Miller v. Miller, 38 N.C. App. 95, 247 S.E.2d 278 (1978); Gardner v. Gardner, 48 N.C. App. 38, 269 S.E.2d 630 (1980); State v. Mills, 232 N.C. App. 460, 754 S.E.2d 674 (2014).


§ 50-4. What marriages may be declared void on application of either party.

The district court, during a session of court, on application made as by law provided, by either party to a marriage contracted contrary to the prohibitions contained in the Chapter entitled Marriage, or declared void by said Chapter, may declare such marriage void from the beginning, subject, nevertheless, to G.S. 51-3.

History

(1871-2, c. 193, s. 33; Code, s. 1283; Rev., s. 1560; C.S., s. 1658; 1945, c. 635; 1971, c. 1185, s. 21; 1973, c. 1; 1979, c. 525, s. 10.)

Cross References. - As to marriage generally, see G.S. 51-1 et seq.

As to void and voidable marriages, see G.S. 51-3.

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "No Exit: The Problem of Same-Sex Divorce," 90 N.C.L. Rev. 73 (2011).

For comment, "Avoiding Wonderland: Clarifying Marriage Requirements in North Carolina," see 35 Campbell L. Rev. 227 (2013).

CASE NOTES

Void and Voidable Marriages Compared. - A voidable marriage is valid for all civil purposes until it is annulled by a competent tribunal in a direct proceeding, but a void marriage is a nullity and may be impeached at any time. Geitner ex rel. First Nat'l Bank v. Townsend, 67 N.C. App. 159, 312 S.E.2d 236, cert. denied, 310 N.C. 744, 315 S.E.2d 702 (1984).

Formal Decree When Marriage Is Absolutely Void. - Even though a marriage may be absolutely void, without being so declared, yet the court will formally decree its nullity, for the sake of the good order of society as well as for the quiet and relief of the party seeking the relief. Johnson v. Kincade, 37 N.C. 470 (1843); Lea v. Lea, 104 N.C. 603, 10 S.E. 488 (1889).

Marriage Induced by Duress. - A former marriage which has been decreed to be void because it was induced by duress was void ab initio, and hence did not afford ground for annulment of a later marriage between one of the parties and a third person, though such decree was rendered after the second marriage. Taylor v. White, 160 N.C. 38, 75 S.E. 941 (1912).

Test of Mental Capacity to Contract Marriage. - As to what constitutes mental capacity or incapacity to enter into a contract to marry, the general rule is that the test is the capacity of the person to understand the special nature of the contract of marriage and the duties and responsibilities which it entails, which is to be determined from the facts and circumstances of each case. Geitner ex rel. First Nat'l Bank v. Townsend, 67 N.C. App. 159, 312 S.E.2d 236, cert. denied, 310 N.C. 744, 315 S.E.2d 702 (1984).

Test of Incompetency in Guardianship Matters Compared. - Tests judicially applied for a determination of incompetency in guardianship matters differ markedly from those applied for the determination of mental capacity to contract a marriage, for even though he may be under guardianship as an incompetent, a person may have in fact sufficient mental capacity to validly contract marriage. Geitner ex rel. First Nat'l Bank v. Townsend, 67 N.C. App. 159, 312 S.E.2d 236, cert. denied, 310 N.C. 744, 315 S.E.2d 702 (1984).

Capacity to Marry as Affected by Guardianship. - Unlike other transactions, an insane person's capacity to marry is not necessarily affected by guardianship. Geitner ex rel. First Nat'l Bank v. Townsend, 67 N.C. App. 159, 312 S.E.2d 236, cert. denied, 310 N.C. 744, 315 S.E.2d 702 (1984).

Mental capacity at the precise time when marriage is celebrated controls. Geitner ex rel. First Nat'l Bank v. Townsend, 67 N.C. App. 159, 312 S.E.2d 236, cert. denied, 310 N.C. 744, 315 S.E.2d 702 (1984).

Prior adjudication of incompetency is not conclusive on the issue of later capacity to marry and does not bar a party from entering a contract to marry. Geitner ex rel. First Nat'l Bank v. Townsend, 67 N.C. App. 159, 312 S.E.2d 236, cert. denied, 310 N.C. 744, 315 S.E.2d 702 (1984).

Marriage of Person Incapable of Contracting for Want of Understanding Voidable. - Under the common law as modified by G.S. 51-3 and this section, a marriage of a person incapable of contracting for want of understanding is not void, but voidable. Geitner ex rel. First Nat'l Bank v. Townsend, 67 N.C. App. 159, 312 S.E.2d 236, cert. denied, 310 N.C. 744, 315 S.E.2d 702 (1984).

Void Ab Initio When So Declared. - Under the rule of the common law as modified by statute, the marriage of a person incapable of contracting for want of understanding is not void ipso facto, but if and when it is declared void in a legally constituted action, such marriage is void ab initio. Ivery v. Ivery, 258 N.C. 721, 129 S.E.2d 457 (1963).

The court has jurisdiction to declare marriages in proper cases void ab initio, but the marriage of a lunatic is not so ipso facto, and must be so declared by a decree of the court. Watters v. Watters, 168 N.C. 411, 84 S.E. 703 (1915). See also, State ex rel. Setzer v. Setzer, 97 N.C. 252, 1 S.E. 558 (1887).

Standing to Institute Action. - An action to declare void a marriage of a person incapable of contracting for want of understanding may be instituted in the lifetime of the parties thereto by a guardian for the alleged mentally incompetent person or by such mentally incompetent person if and when he or she becomes mentally competent to do so; and unless such marriage is followed by cohabitation and the birth of issue, such action may be instituted after the death of such mentally incompetent person by a person or persons whose legal rights depend upon whether such marriage is valid or void. Ivery v. Ivery, 258 N.C. 721, 129 S.E.2d 457 (1963).

A suit for nullity of marriage on the ground of insanity may be brought either in the name of the lunatic, by her guardian, or in the name of the guardian, though the former is, for some reasons, the preferable course. Crump v. Morgan, 38 N.C. 91, 40 Am. Dec. 447 (1843).

Burden of Persuasion as to Invalidity. - When the fact of marriage has been established by evidence, the burden of persuasion on the issue of invalidity is on the party asserting such. And even if a party's insanity is proved to be of such a chronic nature that it is presumed to continue, it does not shift the burden on the issue. Geitner ex rel. First Nat'l Bank v. Townsend, 67 N.C. App. 159, 312 S.E.2d 236, cert. denied, 310 N.C. 744, 315 S.E.2d 702 (1984).

Death of Party After Birth of Issue. - A marriage of a person incapable of contracting for want of understanding, when followed by cohabitation and the birth of issue, may not be declared void after the death of either of the parties. Ivery v. Ivery, 258 N.C. 721, 129 S.E.2d 457 (1963).

Subsequent Insanity Not Ground for Annulment. - Insanity afterwards afflicting a party to a contract of marriage is not a ground for annulment. Watters v. Watters, 168 N.C. 411, 84 S.E. 703 (1915).

Death of Party to Incestuous Marriage After Birth of Issue. - In Baity v. Cranfill, 91 N.C. 293 (1884), it was held that the authority conferred upon the court by this section was so limited by G.S. 51-3 as to deprive the court of the power to declare void the marriage of uncle and niece, "nearer of kin than first cousins, " after the husband's death, when their marriage was followed by cohabitation and the birth of issue. Ivery v. Ivery, 258 N.C. 721, 129 S.E.2d 457 (1963).

License Issued upon Fraudulent Representations as to Age - How Voided. - Prior to the 1939 amendment to G.S. 51-2, which made parents proper parties plaintiff, where a register of deeds was induced by fraudulent representations to issue a license for the marriage of a female between the ages of 14 and 16 without conforming with G.S. 51-2 as to the written consent of her parent, the marriage was voidable only at the suit of the female, and the register of deeds could not maintain a suit to declare the marriage void; the register of deeds could at most maintain an action to revoke and cancel the license issued by him before the solemnization of the marriage. Sawyer v. Slack, 196 N.C. 697, 146 S.E. 864 (1929).

Effect of 20 Years' Ratification. - Where a marriage is entered into by one under the legal age, but is followed by a cohabitation of 20 years, the parties acknowledging each other and being recognized as husband and wife, although such marriage in its inception was invalid, by reason of such ratification by the parties it would not be declared void. State v. Parker, 106 N.C. 711, 11 S.E. 517 (1890).

Suit by Nonresident. - Under this section, the courts of this State have jurisdiction of a suit to annul a marriage performed here, even though the plaintiff was a nonresident of this State at the time of commencement of the suit. Sawyer v. Slack, 196 N.C. 697, 146 S.E. 864 (1929).

Procedure Similar to Divorce Action. - An action, under this section, to have a marriage declared void, so far as procedure is concerned, is an action for divorce. Lea v. Lea, 104 N.C. 603, 10 S.E. 488 (1889); Johnson v. Johnson, 141 N.C. 91, 53 S.E. 623 (1906).

In Johnson v. Kincade, 37 N.C. 470, (1843), the marriage of the parties was declared a nullity because of the mental incapacity of one of the parties at the time of the marriage. In that decision the court declared that the "plaintiff ought to be, and is divorced from the defendant." See Lea v. Lea, 104 N.C. 603, 10 S.E. 488 (1889); Taylor v. White, 160 N.C. 38, 75 S.E. 941 (1912).

Affidavit Not Necessary. - Action for annulment under this section would not be dismissed because of failure to make the affidavit formerly prescribed in G.S. 50-8 for actions for divorce or alimony. Taylor v. White, 160 N.C. 38, 75 S.E. 941 (1912).

Allowance of Alimony Pendente Lite. - While not technically actions for divorce, actions for annulment come under that heading, in a general way, in that alimony pendente lite may be allowed. Taylor v. White, 160 N.C. 38, 75 S.E. 941 (1912). See also, Lea v. Lea, 104 N.C. 603, 10 S.E. 488 (1889).

Effect of Annulment Decree. - A decree annulling a marriage is final and conclusive and not open to collateral impeachment, although it may be vacated or set aside for good cause on proper application. Its effect is to make the supposed or pretended marriage as if it had never existed, and hence it restores both parties to their former status and to all rights of property as before the marriage. Taylor v. White, 160 N.C. 38, 75 S.E. 941 (1912).

Legitimacy of Children of Annulled Marriage. - The children of a marriage which is subsequently annulled are made legitimate by G.S. 50-11. Taylor v. White, 160 N.C. 38, 75 S.E. 941 (1912). See also G.S. 50-11.1

Setting Aside Judgment - Adversary Proceeding. - If either party to an action to annul a marriage contract desires to move to set aside the judgment rendered, it must be done in an adversary proceeding after due notice is served upon the other party; notice to counsel of record in the original action is not sufficient. Johnson v. Johnson, 141 N.C. 91, 53 S.E. 623 (1906).

Counsel Cannot Represent Both Parties Jointly. - A proceeding to set aside a judgment in an action of annulment will be dismissed where the same counsel jointly makes the motion representing both parties to the action. Johnson v. Johnson, 141 N.C. 91, 53 S.E. 623 (1906).

Collateral Attack by Second Husband on Wife's Former Divorce Decree Not Authorized. - Where a divorce decree obtained by defendant wife from her former husband on the ground of separation for one year was in all respects regular on the face of the record, the divorce decree was not void but merely voidable even though there was proof that defendant and her former husband had not lived separate and apart for one year as of the time of the divorce; therefore, plaintiff husband had no standing collaterally to attack the divorce decree as to show that his subsequent marriage to defendant was void ab initio. Maxwell v. Woods, 47 N.C. App. 495, 267 S.E.2d 516, cert. denied, 301 N.C. 236, 283 S.E.2d 132 (1980).

Universal Life Church Marriage. - Trial court could consider the validity of a marriage performed by a Universal Life Church "minister" because a husband's prayer to find the marriage invalid sought, under G.S. 50-4, to declare a voidable marriage void. Duncan v. Duncan, 232 N.C. App. 369, 754 S.E.2d 451 (2014).

Applied in Dees v. McKenna, 261 N.C. 373, 134 S.E.2d 644 (1964); Fulton v. Vickery, 73 N.C. App. 382, 326 S.E.2d 354 (1985).

Cited in Armstrong v. Armstrong, 41 N.C. App. 168, 254 S.E.2d 209 (1979); Dobos v. Dobos, 111 N.C. App. 222, 431 S.E.2d 861 (1993).


§ 50-5: Repealed by Session Laws 1983, c. 613, s. 1.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1983, c. 613, s. 1, repealed this section, except for subdivision (6) thereof, which it recodified as G.S. 50-5.1.


§ 50-5.1. Grounds for absolute divorce in cases of incurable insanity.

In all cases where a husband and wife have lived separate and apart for three consecutive years, without cohabitation, and are still so living separate and apart by reason of the incurable insanity of one of them, the court may grant a decree of absolute divorce upon the petition of the sane spouse: Provided, if the insane spouse has been released on a trial basis to the custody of his or her respective spouse such shall not be considered as terminating the status of living "separate and apart" nor shall it be considered as constituting "cohabitation" for the purpose of this section nor shall it prevent the granting of a divorce as provided by this section. Provided further, the evidence shall show that the insane spouse is suffering from incurable insanity, and has been confined or examined for three consecutive years next preceding the bringing of the action in an institution for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered or, if not so confined, has been examined at least three years preceding the institution of the action for divorce and then found to be incurably insane as hereinafter provided. Provided further, that proof of incurable insanity be supported by the testimony of two reputable physicians, one of whom shall be a staff member or the superintendent of the institution where the insane spouse is confined, and one regularly practicing physician in the community wherein such husband and wife reside, who has no connection with the institution in which said insane spouse is confined; and provided further that a sworn statement signed by said staff member or said superintendent of the institution wherein the insane spouse is confined or was examined shall be admissible as evidence of the facts and opinions therein stated as to the mental status of said insane spouse and as to whether or not said insane spouse is suffering from incurable insanity, or the parties according to the laws governing depositions may take the deposition of said staff member or superintendent of the institution wherein the insane spouse is confined; and provided further that incurable insanity may be proved by the testimony of one or more licensed physicians who are members of the staff of one of this State's accredited four-year medical schools or a state-supported mental institution, supported by the testimony of one or more other physicians licensed by the State of North Carolina, that each of them examined the allegedly incurable insane spouse at least three years preceding the institution of the action for divorce and then determined that said spouse was suffering from incurable insanity and that one or more of them examined the allegedly insane spouse subsequent to the institution of the action and that in his or their opinion the said allegedly insane spouse was continuously incurably insane throughout the full period of three years prior to the institution of the said action.

In lieu of proof of incurable insanity and confinement for three consecutive years next preceding the bringing of the action in an institution for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered prescribed in the preceding paragraph, it shall be sufficient if the evidence shall show that the allegedly insane spouse was adjudicated to be insane more than three years preceding the institution of the action for divorce, that such insanity has continued without interruption since such adjudication and that such person has not been adjudicated to be sane since such adjudication of insanity; provided, further, proof of incurable insanity existing after the institution of the action for divorce shall be furnished by the testimony of two reputable, regularly practicing physicians, one of whom shall be a psychiatrist.

In lieu of proof of incurable insanity and confinement for three consecutive years next preceding the bringing of the action in an institution for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered, or the adjudication of insanity, as prescribed in the preceding paragraphs, it shall be sufficient if the evidence shall show that the insane spouse was examined by two or more members of the staff of one of this State's accredited four-year medical schools, both of whom are medical doctors, at least three years preceding the institution of the action for divorce with a determination at that time by said staff members that said spouse is suffering from incurable insanity, that such insanity has continued without interruption since such determination; provided, further, that sworn statements signed by the staff members of the accredited medical school who examined the insane spouse at least three years preceding the commencement of the action shall be admissible as evidence of the facts and opinions therein stated as to the mental status of said insane spouse as to whether or not said insane spouse was suffering from incurable insanity; provided, further, that proof of incurable insanity under this section existing after the institution of the action for divorce shall be furnished by the testimony of two reputable physicians, one of whom shall be a psychiatrist on the staff of one of the State's accredited four-year medical schools, and one a physician practicing regularly in the community wherein such insane person resides.

In all decrees granted under this subdivision in actions in which the insane defendant has insufficient income and property to provide for his or her own care and maintenance, the court shall require the plaintiff to provide for the care and maintenance of the insane defendant for the defendant's lifetime, based upon the standards set out in G.S. 50-16.5(a). The trial court will retain jurisdiction of the parties and the cause, from term to term, for the purpose of making such orders as equity may require to enforce the provisions of the decree requiring plaintiff to furnish the necessary funds for such care and maintenance.

Service of process shall be held upon the regular guardian for said defendant spouse, if any, and if no regular guardian, upon a duly appointed guardian ad litem and also upon the superintendent or physician in charge of the institution wherein the insane spouse is confined. Such guardian or guardian ad litem shall make an investigation of the circumstances and notify the next of kin of the insane spouse or the superintendent of the institution of the action and whenever practical confer with said next of kin before filing appropriate pleadings in behalf of the defendant.

In all actions brought under this subdivision, if the jury finds as a fact that the plaintiff has been guilty of such conduct as has conduced to the unsoundness of mind of the insane defendant, the relief prayed for shall be denied.

The plaintiff or defendant must have resided in this State for six months next preceding institution of any action under this section.

History

(1945, c. 755; 1949, c. 264, s. 5; 1953, c. 1087; 1955, c. 887, s. 15; 1963, c. 1173; 1971, c. 1173, ss. 1, 2; 1975, c. 771; 1977, c. 501, s. 1; 1983, c. 613, s. 1.)

Cross References. - As to the maintenance of actions for alimony, alimony pendente lite, and custody and support as in dependent actions during the pendency of an action for divorce, and vice versa, and the effect of a divorce on a pending action for alimony or alimony pendente lite, see G.S. 50-19.

Editor's Note. - This section was subdivision (6) of former G.S. 50-5. It has been recodified as G.S. 50-5.1 by Session Laws 1983, c. 613, s. 1.

Legal Periodicals. - For comment on the 1945 amendment to this section, which was formerly G.S. 50-5(6), see 23 N.C.L. Rev. 340 (1945).

For summary of the 1949 amendments to former G.S. 50-5 and G.S. 50-6 and G.S. 50-8, see 27 N.C.L. Rev. 453 (1949).

For comment on contingent fees in domestic relations actions, see 62 N.C.L. Rev. 381 (1984).

For 1984 survey, "The Brief Death of Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation in North Carolina," see 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1317 (1985).

For article, "No Exit: The Problem of Same-Sex Divorce," 90 N.C.L. Rev. 73 (2011).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases cited below were decided under former G.S. 50-5(6).

Purpose. - The purpose of former G.S. 50-5(6), as amended (recodified as this section) is to require that a person alleged to be incurably insane shall not have his or her marital status altered until such person has been committed to an institution for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered for a period of five (now three) successive years in order that it may be ascertained whether or not the inmate's insanity is incurable. Mere confinement for a period of five (now three) successive years in such an institution would fulfill the literal meaning of the statute but it would not be in compliance with its spirit or purpose. Mabry v. Mabry, 243 N.C. 126, 90 S.E.2d 221 (1955).

Exclusive Remedy. - The remedy provided in former G.S. 50-5(6) (recodified as this section) is exclusive. Lawson v. Bennett, 240 N.C. 52, 81 S.E.2d 162 (1954).

Section Not Ambiguous. - Former G.S. 50-5(6), recodified as this section, is not ambiguous. Vaughan v. Vaughan, 4 N.C. App. 253, 166 S.E.2d 530 (1969).

The words "next preceding" in former G.S. 50-5(6) (recodified as this section) have been held to mean the time nearest to the bringing of the action. Vaughan v. Vaughan, 4 N.C. App. 253, 166 S.E.2d 530 (1969).

It is not sufficient under former G.S. 50-5(6) (recodified as this section) that the insane spouse was confined to an institution for five (now three) consecutive years at some time prior to the commencement of the action; the statute requires that confinement must be for five (now three) consecutive years "next preceding" the bringing of the action, which means the time nearest the bringing of the action. Vaughan v. Vaughan, 4 N.C. App. 253, 166 S.E.2d 530 (1969).

"Confined." - By the use of the word "confined" in former G.S. 50-5(6) (recodified as this section), the legislature did not contemplate such confinement as would require an inmate to be at all times under lock and key. Mabry v. Mabry, 243 N.C. 126, 90 S.E.2d 221 (1955); Vaughan v. Vaughan, 4 N.C. App. 253, 166 S.E.2d 530 (1969).

Release on Probation. - In a proceeding by wife for divorce on the ground of husband's insanity, where doctors testified that the husband was incurably insane, the fact that the husband during the five-year (now three-year) period of confinement had been released on probation to his relatives on separate occasions, once for 10 days and once for six months, did not bar divorce of wife on the ground of insanity, since release on probation did not constitute such acts on the part of the hospital authorities as to terminate the period of confinement within the meaning of former G.S. 50-5(6) (recodified as this section). Mabry v. Mabry, 243 N.C. 126, 90 S.E.2d 221 (1955).

Periods of probation are permissible under former G.S. 50-5(6) (recodified as this section) and may be deemed not to have constituted an interruption of the confinement or a discharge from the hospital within the meaning of the statute. Vaughan v. Vaughan, 4 N.C. App. 253, 166 S.E.2d 530 (1969).

Defendant's discharge under former G.S. 122-67 terminated his confinement and he was, therefore, not confined for five years (now three years) next preceding the institution of the action as required by former G.S. 50-5(6) (recodified as this section). Vaughan v. Vaughan, 4 N.C. App. 253, 166 S.E.2d 530 (1969).

Proof of Separation. - In a suit for divorce on the statutory ground of insanity, the insanity must be the reason for the separation of the parties, but no greater proof of separation and its continuance during the five-year (now three-year) period is required than in a proceeding for divorce based on a two-year (now one-year) separation period. Mabry v. Mabry, 243 N.C. 126, 90 S.E.2d 221 (1955).

Separation Occasioned by Mental Incompetency Other Than Incurable Insanity. - Separation occasioned by insanity is cause for divorce in North Carolina only in cases of incurable insanity. And in these cases the requirements of this section must be met. In all other instances of separation arising by reason of mental incompetency, such separation is not a ground for divorce. But to bar an action for divorce based on two (now one) years' separation under G.S. 50-6, the mental impairment must be to such extent that defendant does not understand what he or she is engaged in doing, and the nature and consequences of the act. Moody v. Moody, 253 N.C. 752, 117 S.E.2d 724 (1961).

Expert Testimony Insufficient. - Defendant's expert testimony did not satisfy the requirements of this section where only one of defendant's medical experts associated with a four-year North Carolina medical school made any determination of defendant's condition three years prior to the institution of the action for divorce. Scott v. Scott, 336 N.C. 284, 442 S.E.2d 493 (1994).

Sufficient Evidence. - In action for divorce based on one year's separation, where defendant wife asserted incurable mental illness as a defense, although plaintiff offered no expert evidence concerning the diagnosis of defendant's condition, plaintiff's own testimony showed defendant's ability to perform usual daily tasks when her illness was controlled with medication; moreover, the testimony of defendant's treating psychiatrist and the person most familiar with her condition over an extended period of time corroborated certain of plaintiff's evidence. Scott v. Scott, 336 N.C. 284, 442 S.E.2d 493 (1994).

Extent of Impairment. - To bar an action for divorce based on one year's separation, the mental impairment must be to such extent that defendant does not understand what he or she is engaged in doing and the nature and consequences of the act. Scott v. Scott, 336 N.C. 284, 442 S.E.2d 493 (1994).

Burden of Persuasion. - To bar an action for divorce based on one year's separation, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion that he or she is incurably insane within the meaning and purpose of this section. Scott v. Scott, 336 N.C. 284, 442 S.E.2d 493 (1994).

Cited in Melton ex rel. Madry v. Madry, 106 N.C. App. 83, 415 S.E.2d 72 (1992); Stark v. Ratashara, 177 N.C. App. 449, 628 S.E.2d 471 (2006), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 536, 633 S.E.2d 826 (2006); Coleman v. Coleman, 182 N.C. App. 25, 641 S.E.2d 332 (2007); Adkins v. Stanly County Bd. of Educ., 203 N.C. App. 642, 692 S.E.2d 470 (2010).

Opinions of Attorney General

Separation Prior to Onset of Incompetence. - The provisions of this section are not available to a plaintiff to obtain a divorce from an incompetent spouse where the separation occurred prior to the onset of the incompetence. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. James Lee Knight, Clerk of Superior Court, Guilford County, 55 N.C.A.G. 82 (1986).

§ 50-6. Divorce after separation of one year on application of either party.

Marriages may be dissolved and the parties thereto divorced from the bonds of matrimony on the application of either party, if and when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart for one year, and the plaintiff or defendant in the suit for divorce has resided in the State for a period of six months. A divorce under this section shall not be barred to either party by any defense or plea based upon any provision of G.S. 50-7, a plea of res judicata, or a plea of recrimination. Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 50-11, or of the common law, a divorce under this section shall not affect the rights of a dependent spouse with respect to alimony which have been asserted in the action or any other pending action.

Whether there has been a resumption of marital relations during the period of separation shall be determined pursuant to G.S. 52-10.2. Isolated incidents of sexual intercourse between the parties shall not toll the statutory period required for divorce predicated on separation of one year.

History

(1931, c. 72; 1933, c. 163; 1937, c. 100, ss. 1, 2; 1943, c. 448, s. 3; 1949, c. 264, s. 3; 1965, c. 636, s. 2; 1977, c. 817, s. 1; 1977, 2nd Sess., c. 1190, s. 1; 1979, c. 709, s. 1; 1981, c. 182; 1983, c. 613, s. 2; c. 923, s. 217; 1987, c. 664, s. 2.)

Cross References. - For provision that in an action pursuant to this section, if either or both parties have sought and obtained marital counselling by a licensed physician, licensed psychologist, or certified marital family therapist, the person rendering such counselling shall not be competent to testify in the action concerning information acquired while rendering such counselling, see G.S. 8-53.6.

As to contents and verification of complaint, see G.S. 50-8.

As to the maintenance of actions for alimony, alimony pendente lite, and custody and support as independent actions during the pendency of an action for divorce, and vice versa, and the effect of a divorce on a pending action for alimony or alimony pendente lite, see G.S. 50-19.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1977, 2nd Sess., c. 1190, s. 2, provided: "In an action initiated after August 1, 1977, a judgment of divorce under G.S. 50-6, entered before the effective date of this act [June 11, 1978] and when there was no pending action for support or alimony, shall be valid even though the court did not make a determination that there was no such pending action or a determination that all claims for support or alimony had been fully and finally adjudicated."

Legal Periodicals. - For comment on the 1943 amendment to this section, see 21 N.C.L. Rev. 347 (1921).

As to effect of this section on former G.S. 50-5, see 9 N.C.L. Rev. 368 (1931).

For note on "living apart" where both parties live in the same house, see 18 N.C.L. Rev. 247 (1940).

For note discussing cases decided under this section, see 40 N.C.L. Rev. 808 (1962).

For note on early statutory and common law of divorce in North Carolina, see 41 N.C.L. Rev. 604 (1963).

For article, "Proposed Reforms in North Carolina Divorce Law," see 8 N.C. Cent. L.J. 35 (1976).

For note discussing the application of the compulsory counterclaim provision of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 13 in divorce suits, see 57 N.C.L. Rev. 439 (1979).

For survey of 1978 family law, see 57 N.C.L. Rev. 1084 (1979).

For note on the effect of resumed marital relations on separation agreements, see 1 Campbell L. Rev. 131 (1979).

For article, "Mediation and Arbitration of Separation and Divorce Agreements," see 15 Wake Forest L. Rev. 467 (1979).

For comment on the enforceability of arbitration clauses in North Carolina separation agreements, see 15 Wake Forest L. Rev. 487 (1979).

For survey of 1979 family law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1471 (1980).

For note on voiding separation agreements by isolated acts of sexual intercourse, see 16 Wake Forest L. Rev. 137 (1980).

For survey of 1981 family law, see 60 N.C.L. Rev. 1379 (1982).

For comment on contingent fees in domestic relations actions, see 62 N.C.L. Rev. 381 (1984).

For domestic relations note, "The Validity of Foreign Divorce Decrees in North Carolina," see 20 Wake Forest L. Rev. 765 (1984).

For 1984 survey, "Estoppel and Foreign Divorce," see 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1189 (1985).

For 1984 survey, "Equitable Distribution Without Consideration of Marital Fault," see 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1204 (1985).

For 1984 survey, "The Brief Death of Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation in North Carolina," 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1317 (1985).

For note on post-separation sexual intercourse precluding enforcement of agreement requiring parties to live separate and apart, see 11 Campbell L. Rev. 73 (1988).

For article, "Bromhal v. Stott: Revisiting the Court's Role in Separation Agreements in the Context of Attorneys' Fees," see 74 N.C.L. Rev. 2151 (1996).

For article, "The Law of Alienation of Affections After McCutchen v. McCutchen: In North Carolina, Breaking Up Just Got Harder To Do," see 85 N.C.L. Rev. 1761 (2007).

For article, "Falling Out of Love with an Outdated Tort: An Argument for the Abolition of Criminal Conversation in North Carolina," 87 N.C.L. Rev. 1910 (2009).

For article, "No Exit: The Problem of Same-Sex Divorce," 90 N.C.L. Rev. 73 (2011).

For article, "Can't Live With 'Em Can't Live Without 'Em: An Analysis of the Trial Court's Authority to Hear and Decide Child-Related Claims in North Carolina Post-Baumann," see 34 Campbell L. Rev. 449 (2012).

For article, "If Loving You is Wrong….Can First Amendment Protection Be Right? Alienation of Affection, Criminal Conversation, and the Right to Free Speech," see 38 N.C. Cent. L. Rev. 93 (2016).

CASE NOTES

I. IN GENERAL.

Constitutionality. - This section, as amended, is not unconstitutional on grounds that it violates equal protection by preserving a dependent spouse's right to alimony without at the same time preserving all other property rights incident to continuation of the marital status, as the equal protection clauses of the State and federal Constitutions prohibit denial of the equal protection of the laws to persons, not to rights. Edwards v. Edwards, 42 N.C. App. 301, 256 S.E.2d 728 (1979).

Abolition of the defense of recrimination in a divorce action based on a year's separation does not deprive a spouse who was married before such abolition of a vested property right under the due process clause of the federal Constitution or the "law of the land clause" of N.C. Const., Art. I, § 19. Nor does it deprive defendant husband of a vested property right as a tenant by the entirety without due process of law on grounds that it permits plaintiff wife to obtain a divorce from defendant and defeat defendant's right upon wife's death to become the sole owner of property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety. Sawyer v. Sawyer, 54 N.C. App. 141, 282 S.E.2d 527 (1981).

This section is an indication of this State's policy, as exhibited by legislation, that if the parties have lived separate and apart for one year, the marriage is no longer viable and is not worth saving. Bruce v. Bruce, 79 N.C. App. 579, 339 S.E.2d 855, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 701, 347 S.E.2d 36 (1986).

Purpose of Section. - This section was enacted in order to enable a husband and wife to terminate their marriage without the sensationalism and public airing of dirty linen which necessarily accompany a divorce based on fault. Harrington v. Harrington, 22 N.C. App. 419, 206 S.E.2d 742, rev'd on other grounds, 286 N.C. 260, 210 S.E.2d 190 (1974).

This section creates an independent cause of divorce. Pickens v. Pickens, 258 N.C. 84, 127 S.E.2d 889 (1962); Gray v. Gray, 16 N.C. App. 730, 193 S.E.2d 492 (1972).

And Provides for "No Fault" Divorce. - As to divorces grounded on a one-year separation of the parties, this State is a "no fault" jurisdiction; that is, a showing that the parties have achieved the required periods of residency and separation is all that is necessary to obtain a divorce in this State under this section. Morris v. Morris, 45 N.C. App. 69, 262 S.E.2d 359 (1980).

Jurisdictional Requirements. - Under this section, in order to maintain an action for divorce, the husband and wife shall have (1) lived separate and apart for two years (now one year), and (2) the plaintiff, husband or wife, shall have resided in this State for a period of one year (now six months). These two requirements are jurisdictional, and if either one or the other of these elements does not exist, the court would not have jurisdiction to try the action and any decree rendered would be void. Henderson v. Henderson, 232 N.C. 1, 59 S.E.2d 227 (1950).

Under this section, in order to maintain an action for divorce, the husband and wife shall have (1) lived separate and apart for two years (now one year); and (2) the plaintiff, husband or wife, shall have resided in this State for a period of six months. The jurisdictional requirement as to residence under this section is met by allegation and proof of residence within this State for a period of six months next preceding the commencement of the action. Denson v. Denson, 255 N.C. 703, 122 S.E.2d 507 (1961).

To obtain a divorce pursuant to this section, all that is required is proof that the parties have lived separate and apart for one year and that one of the parties has lived in this State for six months next preceding institution of the suit. Bruce v. Bruce, 79 N.C. App. 579, 339 S.E.2d 855, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 701, 347 S.E.2d 36 (1986).

Statute of Limitations Not Applicable to Actions for Absolute Divorce. - Balancing the reasons for having statutes of limitation against this State's public policy of endeavoring to maintain the marital state on the one hand and not denying divorce to parties who have demonstrated a ground for divorce on the other hand, the general, residuary statute of limitations, G.S. 1-56, should not be applied to actions for absolute divorce under this section. Bruce v. Bruce, 79 N.C. App. 579, 339 S.E.2d 855, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 701, 347 S.E.2d 36 (1986).

Accrual of Cause of Action. - Separation, as a ground for divorce, is a type of continuing offense. It begins on the date the parties physically separate with the requisite intention that the separation remain permanent, and the cause of action under this section accrues at the end of one year. However, the cause of action continues to accrue even after the one year period, so long as the parties remain "separate and apart" within the meaning of the statute. Bruce v. Bruce, 79 N.C. App. 579, 339 S.E.2d 855, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 701, 347 S.E.2d 36 (1986).

But, the cessation of sexual relations alone does not constitute separation. Lin v. Lin, 108 N.C. App. 772, 425 S.E.2d 9 (1993).

An interlocutory appeal to determine the date of separation for the purposes of equitable distribution was rightfully dismissed, as the parties had been separated for a period far in excess of one year and as the date of separation was irrelevant to the validity of the divorce. Stafford v. Stafford, 351 N.C. 94, 520 S.E.2d 785 (1999).

Proper Parties. - The only persons who may bring an action for absolute divorce are those persons who are lawfully married to one another. Where there are children born to a marriage, it is neither proper nor necessary for them to be made parties to an action for divorce between their parents. Likewise, the only necessary parties in an action to set aside an absolute divorce decree after one spouse's death are the surviving spouse and the personal representative of the deceased spouse. Thomas v. Thomas, 43 N.C. App. 638, 260 S.E.2d 163 (1979).

Required Findings. - The court erred in declaring the parties' divorce decree void where the divorce decree at issue was "in all respects regular on [its] face" and the defendant was properly served; the court's findings, required by this section, were found under the heading "Conclusions of Law" rather than under "Findings of Fact." Dunevant v. Dunevant, 142 N.C. App. 169, 542 S.E.2d 242 (2001).

Applicability of G.S. 50-10. - The application to divorces under this section of the G.S. 50-10 requirement that the factual allegations supporting the divorce must be deemed denied requires a finding of the necessary facts. While it remains sound public policy not to allow the granting of such divorces on the pleadings, it would, nevertheless, appear that it would make good jurisprudential sense to clearly remove divorces under this section from the more cumbersome jury procedure and provide that all such cases be heard by the judge without a jury. Morris v. Morris, 45 N.C. App. 69, 262 S.E.2d 359 (1980).

Allegations and Proof Sufficient to Entitle Plaintiff to Divorce. - Where the complaint alleges, and there is evidence tending to show, that husband and wife, "have lived separate and apart for two years (now one year)" next immediately preceding the institution of the action, and that plaintiff "has resided in the State for a period of six months," nothing else appearing, the establishment of these allegations by proof would entitle plaintiff to a divorce. This section so provides. Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 80, 33 S.E.2d 492 (1945).

It is unnecessary to set out in the complaint the cause of the separation or to allege that it was without fault on the part of plaintiff or to aver that it was by mutual agreement of the parties. Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 80, 33 S.E.2d 492 (1945).

In order to be entitled to a divorce on the ground of separation, plaintiff must show the fact of marriage, that the parties have lived separate and apart for two years (now one year), and that plaintiff has been a resident of the State for one year (now six months). Oliver v. Oliver, 219 N.C. 299, 13 S.E.2d 549 (1941).

Where, in an action under this section, the testimony adduced by plaintiff is sufficient to establish, at the commencement of the action, that the plaintiff and defendant were husband and wife, that both of them had resided in the State for a period of six months, and that they had lived separate and apart within the meaning of the statute for an uninterrupted period of two years (now one year), the trial judge rightly refused to nonsuit the action. Mallard v. Mallard, 234 N.C. 654, 68 S.E.2d 247 (1951).

Complaint seeking an absolute divorce was not fatally defective in failing to allege that the parties lived separate and apart for one year with the intention by at least one of them that the separation be permanent, where it contained the allegations required by this section. Sharp v. Sharp, 84 N.C. App. 128, 351 S.E.2d 799 (1987).

Trial court's summary divorce judgment was not disturbed because it was uncontested that statutory residency and time requirements were met. Khaja v. Husna, 243 N.C. App. 330, 777 S.E.2d 781 (2015), dismissed, 780 S.E.2d 757, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1310 (2015), dismissed, 781 S.E.2d 293, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1291 (2015).

Joinder of Grounds in Complaint. - Where the grounds are listed in the statutes for the same kind of divorce, the several grounds may be joined in one complaint, and the decree may be granted on any one of the grounds proved. Swygert v. Swygert, 46 N.C. App. 173, 264 S.E.2d 902 (1980).

Statement in Answer. - In an action under this section, it was held that the mere statement in the answer that the allegation in the complaint "that plaintiff and defendant have not lived together as man and wife since April 1, 1942, is not denied," was not an admission of a "separation." Moody v. Moody, 225 N.C. 89, 33 S.E.2d 491 (1945).

Stay Not Required. - A stay of plaintiff's action for absolute divorce was not required pending resolution of defendant's counterclaim for alimony in plaintiff's earlier action for divorce from bed and board, since defendant's claim for alimony, having been asserted in the prior action, would not be affected by an absolute divorce obtained by plaintiff in the action for absolute divorce. Edwards v. Edwards, 42 N.C. App. 301, 256 S.E.2d 728 (1979).

When Issues to Be Passed on by Jury. - In an action under this section, where the complaint alleged sufficient facts and defendant in her answer set up a divorce a mensa with alimony granted her on the grounds of abandonment, to which plaintiff replied without admission of wrongful or unlawful conduct on his part, a judgment for defendant on the pleadings was erroneous, as there were issues of fact raised to be tried by a jury. Lockhart v. Lockhart, 223 N.C. 123, 25 S.E.2d 465 (1943).

When Plaintiff May Not Voluntarily Dismiss Claim. - Where plaintiff seeks divorce upon the ground of one year's separation and defendant in his answer likewise prays for a divorce upon the same ground, defendant's prayer is in effect a counterclaim, and plaintiff therefore cannot voluntarily dismiss her claim without defendant's consent. The rationale for this rule is that it would be manifestly unjust to allow a plaintiff who comes into court upon solemn allegations which, if true, entitle defendant to some affirmative relief against the plaintiff, to withdraw, ex parte, the allegations after defendant has demanded the relief to which they entitle him. McCarley v. McCarley, 289 N.C. 109, 221 S.E.2d 490 (1976).

Estoppel from Challenging Divorce Judgment. - Where husband filed for divorce and performed some of his obligations under separation agreement for several years, remarried in reliance on the divorce judgment, and did not object to the validity of the divorce decree or the agreement until he sought to defend his failure to comply with the judgment on grounds that it was void, he was estopped from questioning its validity and effect. Amick v. Amick, 80 N.C. App. 291, 341 S.E.2d 613 (1986).

Modification of Custody Order in Action Under This Section. - An order awarding the custody of minor children determines the present rights of the parties, but is not permanent in nature, and is subject to modification for subsequent change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the children; therefore, an order of the court, entered pursuant to former G.S. 50-16, awarding the custody of the children to the wife, did not preclude another judge of the superior court from awarding custody of the children to the husband in the wife's later action for absolute divorce under this section. Thomas v. Thomas, 259 N.C. 461, 130 S.E.2d 871 (1963).

Child Support Action Not Barred. - The inclusion in divorce judgment of a paragraph identifying plaintiff's former husband as the father of plaintiff's child operated only to identify the existence of a child born of the marriage and was not the subject of litigation; thus, collateral estoppel did not bar child support action against defendant. Guilford County ex rel. Child Support Enforcement Unit ex rel. Gardner v. Davis, 123 N.C. App. 527, 473 S.E.2d 640 (1996).

Evidence of Mental Impairment. - In action for divorce based on one year's separation where defendant wife asserted incurable mental illness as a defense, although plaintiff offered no expert evidence concerning the diagnosis of defendant's condition, plaintiff's own testimony showed defendant's ability to perform usual daily tasks when her illness was controlled with medication; moreover, the testimony of defendant's treating psychiatrist and the person most familiar with her condition over an extended period of time, corroborated certain of plaintiff's evidence. Scott v. Scott, 336 N.C. 284, 442 S.E.2d 493 (1994).

Mental Impairment. - To bar an action for divorce based on one year's separation, the mental impairment must be to such extent that defendant does not understand what he or she is engaged in doing and the nature and consequences of the act. Scott v. Scott, 336 N.C. 284, 442 S.E.2d 493 (1994).

Trial court properly excluded evidence of defendant's health and her prospects for obtaining medical insurance following divorce. Such evidence is not relevant to the trial court's determination to grant or deny a divorce pursuant to this section. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 104 N.C. App. 225, 408 S.E.2d 753 (1991).

Alimony. - When a husband was granted an absolute divorce on the grounds of separation for one year, and the wife did not file a counterclaim or separate claim for alimony before the trial court entered a judgment of absolute divorce, which did not preserve an alimony claim, a statement in the wife's answer that "the claims for alimony and equitable distribution pending this action are to be reserved" was insufficient to give the trial court jurisdiction, under G.S. 50-11, to consider the wife's amended answer and counterclaim for alimony, despite the husband's answer to that counterclaim, as subject matter jurisdiction could not be conferred by the parties' consent. Stark v. Ratashara, 177 N.C. App. 449, 628 S.E.2d 471 (2006), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 536, 633 S.E.2d 826 (2006).

For cases decided under subdivisions (1) through (5) of former G.S. 50-5, which formerly set forth various grounds for divorce, see Wood v. Wood, 27 N.C. 674 (1845); Smith v. Morehead, 59 N.C. 360 (1863); Edwards v. Edwards, 61 N.C. 534 (1868); Barringer v. Barringer, 69 N.C. 179 (1873); Horne v. Horne, 72 N.C. 530, appeal dismissed, 72 N.C. 534 (1875); Long v. Long, 77 N.C. 304 (1877); McQueen v. McQueen, 82 N.C. 471 (1880); Webber v. Webber, 83 N.C. 280 (1880); Steel v. Steel, 104 N.C. 631, 10 S.E. 707 (1889); House v. House, 131 N.C. 140, 42 S.E. 546 (1902); Kinney v. Kinney, 149 N.C. 321, 63 S.E. 97 (1908); Ellett v. Ellett, 157 N.C. 161, 72 S.E. 861 (1911); Cooke v. Cooke, 164 N.C. 272, 80 S.E. 178 (1913); Alexander v. Alexander, 165 N.C. 45, 80 S.E. 890 (1914); Bryant v. Bryant, 171 N.C. 746, 88 S.E. 147 (1916); Sanderson v. Sanderson, 178 N.C. 339, 100 S.E. 590 (1919); Brown v. Brown, 182 N.C. 42, 108 S.E. 380 (1921); Lee v. Lee, 182 N.C. 61, 108 S.E. 352 (1921); Ellis v. Ellis, 190 N.C. 418, 130 S.E. 7 (1925); Nelson v. Nelson, 197 N.C. 465, 149 S.E. 585 (1929); Keys v. Tuten, 199 N.C. 368, 154 S.E. 631 (1930); Reeves v. Reeves, 203 N.C. 792, 167 S.E. 129 (1933); Smithdeal v. Smithdeal, 206 N.C. 397, 174 S.E. 118 (1934); Hyder v. Hyder, 210 N.C. 486, 187 S.E. 798 (1936); Burrowes v. Burrowes, 210 N.C. 788, 188 S.E. 648 (1936); Woodruff v. Woodruff, 215 N.C. 685, 3 S.E.2d 5 (1939); Young v. Young, 225 N.C. 340, 34 S.E.2d 154 (1945); Pearce v. Pearce, 225 N.C. 571, 35 S.E.2d 636 (1945); Pearce v. Pearce, 226 N.C. 307, 37 S.E.2d 904 (1946); Welch v. Welch, 226 N.C. 541, 39 S.E.2d 457 (1946); Smith v. Smith, 226 N.C. 544, 39 S.E.2d 458 (1946); Norman v. Norman, 230 N.C. 61, 51 S.E.2d 927 (1949); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 234 N.C. 1, 65 S.E.2d 375 (1951); Mallard v. Mallard, 234 N.C. 654, 68 S.E.2d 247 (1951); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 244 N.C. 286, 93 S.E.2d 617 (1956); Becker v. Becker, 262 N.C. 685, 138 S.E.2d 507 (1964); Wright v. Wright, 281 N.C. 159, 188 S.E.2d 317 (1972); Greene v. Greene, 15 N.C. App. 314, 190 S.E.2d 258 (1972); Owens v. Owens, 28 N.C. App. 713, 222 S.E.2d 704, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 95, 225 S.E.2d 324 (1976).

Applied in Hyder v. Hyder, 215 N.C. 239, 1 S.E.2d 540 (1939); Nall v. Nall, 229 N.C. 598, 50 S.E.2d 737 (1948); Deaton v. Deaton, 237 N.C. 487, 75 S.E.2d 398 (1953); O'Briant v. O'Briant, 239 N.C. 101, 79 S.E.2d 252 (1953); Whitener v. Whitener, 255 N.C. 731, 122 S.E.2d 705 (1961); Hutchins v. Hutchins, 260 N.C. 628, 133 S.E.2d 459 (1963); Richardson v. Richardson, 261 N.C. 521, 135 S.E.2d 532 (1964); Jones v. Jones, 261 N.C. 612, 135 S.E.2d 554 (1964); Ponder v. Ponder, 32 N.C. App. 150, 230 S.E.2d 786 (1977); Gerringer v. Gerringer, 42 N.C. App. 580, 257 S.E.2d 98 (1979); In re Hayes, 43 N.C. App. 515, 259 S.E.2d 327 (1979); Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, 43 N.C. App. 549, 259 S.E.2d 319 (1979); Mayer v. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. 522, 311 S.E.2d 659 (1984); Hinton v. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. 665, 321 S.E.2d 161 (1984).

Cited in Teasley v. Teasley, 205 N.C. 604, 172 S.E. 197 (1934); Smithdeal v. Smithdeal, 206 N.C. 397, 174 S.E. 118 (1934); Long v. Long, 206 N.C. 706, 175 S.E. 85 (1934); State v. Henderson, 207 N.C. 258, 176 S.E. 758 (1934); Campbell v. Campbell, 207 N.C. 859, 176 S.E. 250 (1934); Goodman v. Goodman, 208 N.C. 416, 181 S.E. 328 (1935); Brown v. Brown, 213 N.C. 347, 196 S.E. 333 (1938); Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 80, 33 S.E.2d 492 (1945); Carter v. Carter, 232 N.C. 614, 61 S.E.2d 711 (1950); McLean v. McLean, 233 N.C. 139, 63 S.E.2d 138 (1951); Livingston v. Livingston, 235 N.C. 515, 70 S.E.2d 480 (1952); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 244 N.C. 286, 93 S.E.2d 617 (1956); Shaver v. Shaver, 244 N.C. 309, 93 S.E.2d 614 (1956); Shaver v. Shaver, 248 N.C. 113, 102 S.E.2d 791 (1958); Sears v. Sears, 253 N.C. 415, 117 S.E.2d 7 (1960); Hicks v. Hicks, 275 N.C. 370, 167 S.E.2d 761 (1969); Wright v. Wright, 281 N.C. 159, 188 S.E.2d 317 (1972); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 296 N.C. 574, 251 S.E.2d 441 (1979); Wise v. Wise, 42 N.C. App. 5, 255 S.E.2d 570 (1979); O'Hara v. O'Hara, 46 N.C. App. 819, 266 S.E.2d 59 (1980); McCall v. Harris, 55 N.C. App. 390, 285 S.E.2d 335 (1982); Alexander v. Alexander, 68 N.C. App. 548, 315 S.E.2d 772 (1984); Buffington v. Buffington, 69 N.C. App. 483, 317 S.E.2d 97 (1984); Seifert v. Seifert, 82 N.C. App. 329, 346 S.E.2d 504 (1986); Banner v. Banner, 86 N.C. App. 397, 358 S.E.2d 110 (1987); Coombs v. Coombs, 121 N.C. App. 746, 468 S.E.2d 807 (1996); Daniel v. Daniel, 132 N.C. App. 217, 510 S.E.2d 689 (1999); Coleman v. Coleman, 1 82 N.C. App. 25, 641 S.E.2d 332 (2007); Adkins v. Stanly County Bd. of Educ., 203 N.C. App. 642, 692 S.E.2d 470 (2010); Dickson v. Rucho, 366 N.C. 332, 737 S.E.2d 362 (2013); Dechkovskaia v. Dechkovskaia, 232 N.C. App. 350, 754 S.E.2d 831 (2014), review denied, 758 S.E.2d 870, 2014 N.C. LEXIS 436 (2014).

II. SEPARATION.

Editor's Note. - Many of the cases below were decided prior to the 1987 amendment to this section, providing that isolated incidents of sexual intercourse shall not toll the statutory period for divorce predicated on one year separation. As to resumption of marital relations, see G.S. 52-10.2.

Parties Must Have Lived Separate and Apart for One Year. - The material aspect of this statute is the requirement that the parties have lived separate and apart for one year prior to institution of the suit. Myers v. Myers, 62 N.C. App. 291, 302 S.E.2d 476 (1983).

The expression used in Byers v. Byers, 222 N.C. 298, 22 S.E.2d (1942), "that the bare fact of living separate and apart for the period of two years (now one year); standing alone, will not constitute a cause of action for divorce," should be viewed in the light of its setting, and construed accordingly. It was not intended as a delimitation of the statute. Byers v. Byers, 223 N.C. 85, 25 S.E.2d 466 (1943).

Separation Requirement Applies to Year Prior to Institution of Suit. - The requirement that parties live separate and apart for one year applies to the year prior to institution of the suit. Bruce v. Bruce, 79 N.C. App. 579, 339 S.E.2d 855, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 701, 347 S.E.2d 36 (1986).

The separation contemplated by this section is apparently unrestricted. Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 80, 33 S.E.2d 492 (1945).

Mutual Agreement to Separate Is Not Required. - A charge by the court to the jury that the living separate and apart means living separate and apart under mutual agreement only, was erroneous, entitling plaintiff to a new trial. Byers v. Byers, 222 N.C. 298, 22 S.E.2d 902 (1942), distinguishing Parker v. Parker, 210 N.C. 264, 186 S.E. 346 (1936), decided under prior wording of section. See 15 N.C.L. Rev. 348 (1937).

In order to be entitled to a divorce, a plaintiff need not show that a marital separation for the statutory period was by mutual agreement or under a decree of court. Beck v. Beck, 14 N.C. App. 163, 187 S.E.2d 355 (1972).

Husband's physical separation from his wife for the statutory one-year period of G.S. 50-6 and his accompanying intention to end the marriage were sufficient to entitle him to an absolute divorce, even though the wife did not know of his intention to end the marriage until less than a year before the husband filed for divorce; there was no requirement under G.S. 50-6 that the remaining spouse have knowledge of the other party's intention to cease cohabitation. Smith v. Smith, 151 N.C. App. 130, 564 S.E.2d 591 (2002).

But Was Required Formerly. - Before the 1937 amendment, which struck out of this section the phrase "either under deed of separation or otherwise," it was held that while the applicant need not be the injured party, the statute did not authorize a divorce where the husband had separated himself from his wife, or the wife had separated herself from her husband, without cause and without agreement, express or implied. Lee v. Lee, 182 N.C. 61, 108 S.E. 352 (1921); Parker v. Parker, 210 N.C. 264, 186 S.E. 346 (1936); Hyder v. Hyder, 210 N.C. 486, 187 S.E. 798 (1936); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 210 N.C. 554, 187 S.E. 768 (1936).

This section contains no requirement that separation of the parties be voluntary. Harrington v. Harrington, 286 N.C. 260, 210 S.E.2d 190 (1974). But see Williams v. Williams, 224 N.C. 91, 29 S.E.2d 39 (1944), holding that the separation under this section must be voluntary in its inception, and Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 80, 33 S.E.2d 492 (1945), holding that "separation" would not include an involuntary living apart, where there had been no previous separation, such as might arise from the incarceration or insanity of one of the parties.

But This Section Is Inapplicable Where Separation Is Due to Insanity of Defendant. - Divorce on the grounds of two years' (now one year's) separation under this section cannot be maintained when the separation is due to the insanity or mental incapacity of defendant spouse, the sole remedy in such instance being under former G.S. 50-5(6) (recodified as G.S. 50-5.1). Lawson v. Bennett, 240 N.C. 52, 81 S.E.2d 162 (1954); Moody v. Moody, 253 N.C. 752, 117 S.E.2d 724 (1961).

To bar an action for divorce based on two years' (now one year's) separation, the mental impairment must be to such an extent that defendant does not understand what he or she is engaged in doing and the nature and consequences of the act. Moody v. Moody, 253 N.C. 752, 117 S.E.2d 724 (1961).

"Judicial Separation" Included. - A legal separation for the requisite period of two years (now one year) is ground for divorce under this section. The separation here contemplated includes a "judicial separation" as well as one brought about by the act of the parties, or one of them. Lockhart v. Lockhart, 223 N.C. 559, 27 S.E.2d 444 (1943).

A separation by act of the parties, or one of them, or under order of court a mensa et thoro, suffices to meet the terms of this section. Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 80, 33 S.E.2d 492 (1945).

The effect of a judgment granting a divorce a mensa et thoro was to legalize the separation of the parties which theretofore had been caused by the husband's actions, and after two years (now one year) from the date of such judgment, the husband could proceed to an absolute divorce. Becker v. Becker, 262 N.C. 685, 138 S.E.2d 507 (1964). See also, Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).

The effect of a divorce a mensa et thoro obtained by the wife on the ground that her husband abandoned her, was to legalize their separation from the date of such judgment; and in such case the husband, after two years (now one year) from the date of such judgment, could proceed to an absolute divorce. Richardson v. Richardson, 257 N.C. 705, 127 S.E.2d 525 (1962).

A judgment in an action instituted under former G.S. 50-16 decreeing that the husband had willfully abandoned the wife and awarding her support and maintenance constituted a judicial separation which, two years (now one year) thereafter, would permit the husband to obtain an absolute divorce. Rouse v. Rouse, 258 N.C. 520, 128 S.E.2d 865 (1963); Wilson v. Wilson, 260 N.C. 347, 132 S.E.2d 695 (1963).

The pendente lite order in the wife's action for divorce from bed and board legalized the separation between the husband and wife, since it provided not only for alimony pendente lite and child custody, but also that the wife have the sole use and peaceful and undisturbed possession of the residence, and such separation having continued for the requisite one year thereafter, the plaintiff-husband became entitled to a divorce. Earles v. Earles, 29 N.C. App. 348, 224 S.E.2d 284 (1976).

What Constitutes Legalized Separation. - Either an action for a divorce a mensa et thoro, an action for alimony without divorce under former G.S. 50-16, or a valid separation agreement may constitute a legalized separation which thereafter will permit either of the parties to obtain an absolute divorce on the ground of one year's separation. Harrington v. Harrington, 286 N.C. 260, 210 S.E.2d 190 (1974).

Valid separation agreement legalizes separation from and after the date thereof. Harrington v. Harrington, 286 N.C. 260, 210 S.E.2d 190 (1974).

To be valid a separation agreement must be untainted by fraud, must be in all respects fair, reasonable and just, and must have been entered into without coercion or the exercise of undue influence, and with full knowledge of all the circumstances, conditions, and rights of the contracting parties. Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968).

Until deed of separation is rescinded, defendant cannot attack legality of separation or obtain alimony from plaintiff. Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968).

Effect of Resumption of Cohabitation upon Separation Agreement. - When separated spouses who have executed a separation agreement resume living together in the home which they occupied before the separation, they hold themselves out as man and wife in the ordinary acceptation of the descriptive phrase. Irrespective of whether they have resumed sexual relations, in contemplation of law, their action amounts to a resumption of marital cohabitation which rescinds their separation agreement insofar as it had not been executed. Further, a subsequent separation will not revive the agreement. In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976).

The same public policy which will not permit spouses to continue to live together in the same home, holding themselves out to the public as husband and wife, to sue each other for an absolute divorce on the ground of separation, or to base the period of separation required for a divorce on any time they live together, will also nullify a separation agreement if the parties resume marital cohabitation. In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976).

The heart of a separation agreement is the parties' intention and agreement to live separate and apart forever, and when a husband and wife enter into a deed of separation the policy of the law is that they are to live separate. Therefore, they void the separation agreement if they reestablish a matrimonial home. In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976).

Sexual intercourse between a husband and wife after the execution of separation agreement voids the contract. Murphy v. Murphy, 295 N.C. 390, 245 S.E.2d 693 (1978). But see now G.S. 52-10.2

Where a reconciliation and resumption of cohabitation has taken place, an order or separation agreement with provisions for future support and an agreement to live apart is necessarily abrogated. Williamson v. Williamson, 66 N.C. App. 315, 311 S.E.2d 325 (1984).

Grounds for Attacking Deed of Separation. - A married woman may attack the certificate of her acknowledgment and privy examination respecting her execution of a deed of separation, inter alia, upon the grounds of her mental incapacity, infancy, or the fraud of the grantee. Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968).

Effect of Decree Denying Alimony. - If a separation is legalized by an award of alimony without divorce, there is no sound reason why it should not also be legalized by a decree denying alimony based upon a finding of no dependency. In each case the court has considered and determined the respective rights and obligations of the separated parties insofar as support is concerned. In neither case is the court able to mend the broken marriage or to force the parties to live together if either persists in continuing to live apart. Cook v. Cook, 41 N.C. App. 156, 254 S.E.2d 261 (1979).

The separation of the parties became legalized by the entry of the judgment which denied defendant alimony and by entry of the order which awarded her possession of the house. The parties having lived separate and apart for more than one year after their separation thus became legalized, plaintiff was entitled to maintain an action for an absolute divorce under this section. The adjudication made in the prior action that plaintiff had originally wrongfully abandoned the defendant was not effective as a bar in the later action. Cook v. Cook, 41 N.C. App. 156, 254 S.E.2d 261 (1979).

Separation means cessation of cohabitation, and cohabitation means living together as man and wife, though not necessarily implying sexual relations. Cohabitation includes other marital responsibilities and duties. Dudley v. Dudley, 225 N.C. 83, 33 S.E.2d 489 (1945); Young v. Young, 225 N.C. 340, 34 S.E.2d 154 (1945); In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976); Tuttle v. Tuttle, 36 N.C. App. 635, 244 S.E.2d 447 (1978).

Physical Separation Must Be Accompanied by Intention to Cease Cohabitation. - A husband and wife live separate and apart for the prescribed period within the meaning of this section when, and only when, these two conditions concur: (1) They live separate and apart physically for an uninterrupted period of two years (now one year); and (2) their physical separation is accompanied by at least an intention on the part of one of them to cease their matrimonial cohabitation. Mallard v. Mallard, 234 N.C. 654, 68 S.E.2d 247 (1951); Richardson v. Richardson, 257 N.C. 705, 127 S.E.2d 525 (1962); Beck v. Beck, 14 N.C. App. 163, 187 S.E.2d 355 (1972).

The bare fact of living separate and apart for the period of two years (now one year), standing alone, will not constitute a cause of action for divorce. There must be at least an intention on the part of one of the parties to cease cohabitation, which must be shown to have existed at the time alleged as the beginning of the separation period. It must appear that the separation is with that definite purpose on the part of at least one of the parties. The exigencies of life and the necessity of making a livelihood may sometimes require that the husband shall absent himself from the wife for long periods, a situation which was not contemplated by the law as a cause of divorce in fixing the period of separation. Byers v. Byers, 222 N.C. 298, 22 S.E.2d 902 (1942).

The words "separate and apart," as used in this section, mean that there must be both a physical separation and an intention on the part of at least one of the parties to cease the matrimonial cohabitation. Earles v. Earles, 29 N.C. App. 348, 224 S.E.2d 284 (1976); Myers v. Myers, 62 N.C. App. 291, 302 S.E.2d 476 (1983).

Trial court did not err in finding a husband and wife were not separated at the time of the wife's marital misconduct, as defined in G.S. 50-16.1A(3)(a), thereby precluding an award of alimony to the wife under G.S. 50-16.3A(a), because even though there was some physical separation of the parties after a choking incident involving the parties' son, neither party expressed to the other they wanted to separate and the husband continued to maintain all of his belongings at the marital residence; although the phrase "the date of separation" as used in G.S. 50-16.3A(a) was not defined, the phrase "separate and apart" as used in G.S. 50-6 meant there had to be a physical separation and an intention on the part of at least one of the parties to cease matrimonial cohabitation. Romulus v. Romulus, 215 N.C. App. 495, 715 S.E.2d 308 (2011).

Evidence of Conjugal Relations Within Statutory Period Before Action. - Sexual relations between spouses separated for less than one year invalidates those obligations of the parties, pursuant to a separation agreement, that are contingent upon the requirement that the parties "live continuously separate and apart" for one year. Higgins v. Higgins, 86 N.C. App. 513, 358 S.E.2d 553 (1987), aff'd, 321 N.C. 482, 364 S.E.2d 426 (1988).

Evidence that within the statutory period before the institution of the divorce action defendant visited plaintiff at Army camp and plaintiff visited defendant on furloughs, and that at such times they cohabitated as man and wife, was sufficient to negative the conclusion that conjugal relations had ceased for the period prescribed by this section, and supported verdict in defendant's favor and judgment denying plaintiff's suit for divorce on the grounds of two years' (now one year's) separation. Mason v. Mason, 226 N.C. 740, 40 S.E.2d 204 (1946), decided prior to the 1987 amendment to this section.

The discontinuance of sexual relations is not in itself a living "separate and apart" within the meaning of the statute, and a divorce will be denied where it appears that, during the period relied upon, the parties had lived in the same house. Dudley v. Dudley, 33 S.E.2d 489 (1945).

Effect of Continuing Support of Spouse. - This section does not contemplate, as essential, a repudiation of all marital obligations, and the fact that the husband has supported the wife will not defeat his action. Byers v. Byers, 222 N.C. 298, 22 S.E.2d 902 (1942).

If a plaintiff in a divorce action on grounds of separation contributes to the support of his wife, solely in an attempt to fulfill the obligation imposed by statute, his conduct is not inconsistent with a legal separation; but if he makes such payments in recognition of his marital status and in discharge of his marital obligations, there is no living separate and apart within the meaning of the statute. Williams v. Williams, 224 N.C. 91, 29 S.E.2d 39 (1944).

When Requirements for Valid Separation Not Satisfied. - The law delineates two circumstances under which the law will hold spouses to have failed to satisfy the requirements of a valid separation: first, sexual activity between the parties, and, second, such association between the parties as to induce others to regard them as living together. Ledford v. Ledford, 49 N.C. App. 226, 271 S.E.2d 393 (1980), decided prior to the 1987 amendment to this section.

Casual and isolated social acts between separated spouses do not as a matter of law create a holding out as man and wife. Ledford v. Ledford, 49 N.C. App. 226, 271 S.E.2d 393 (1980).

Isolated or casual acts of sexual intercourse between separated spouses toll the statutory period required for divorce predicated on separation. Pitts v. Pitts, 54 N.C. App. 163, 282 S.E.2d 488 (1981), decided prior to the 1987 amendment to this section.

Question of Resumption of the Conjugal Relation After Separation Is for Jury. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 210 N.C. 554, 187 S.E.2d 768 (1936).

Mutuality of Intent to Reconcile Is Essential Where Evidence Conflicts. - When the evidence is conflicting, the issue of the parties' mutual intent is an essential element in deciding whether the parties were reconciled and resumed cohabitation. Williamson v. Williamson, 66 N.C. App. 315, 311 S.E.2d 325 (1984); Camp v. Camp, 75 N.C. App. 498, 331 S.E.2d 163, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 663, 335 S.E.2d 493 (1985).

Separation May Not Be Based on Evidence Showing Cohabitation. - For the purposes of obtaining a divorce under this section, separation may not be predicated upon evidence which shows that during the statutorily prescribed period the parties have cohabited as husband and wife. Camp v. Camp, 75 N.C. App. 498, 331 S.E.2d 163, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 663, 335 S.E.2d 493 (1985).

Husband's return to the marital home for a 10-day period, during which time he, inter alia, never had any sexual relations with his wife, was constantly looking for work, and did not otherwise represent himself to have resumed the marital relationship, did not constitute a resumption of marital cohabitation such as to invalidate the parties' separation agreement and bar divorce on the grounds of living separate and apart for one year. Camp v. Camp, 75 N.C. App. 498, 331 S.E.2d 163, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 663, 335 S.E.2d 493 (1985).

Resumption of the marital relation is not inherently secretive and spouses are competent to testify about it. Williamson v. Williamson, 66 N.C. App. 315, 311 S.E.2d 325 (1984).

"Inclination and Opportunity" Rule Inapplicable to Proof of Resumption of Marital Relations. - The "inclination and opportunity" concept allows a presumption of adulterous sexual intercourse if adulterous inclination and opportunity are shown. The rule applies only to cases of alleged adultery, because adultery is an illegal act which by its very nature is difficult to prove. Such justification of the rule for adultery cases is nonexistent for proof of resumption of marital relations between separated spouses, an act which is not against the law but which merely breaks a contract between the spouses. Williamson v. Williamson, 66 N.C. App. 315, 311 S.E.2d 325 (1984).

Complaint must state a date of separation to establish the general time frame for divorce based on a year's separation. Myers v. Myers, 62 N.C. App. 291, 302 S.E.2d 476 (1983).

III. FAULT.

.

Either party may secure an absolute divorce under this section, even though the applicant is the party who commits the wrong, as granting divorces is exclusively statutory and this is an independent act of the General Assembly. Long v. Long, 206 N.C. 706, 175 S.E. 85 (1934); Byers v. Byers, 222 N.C. 298, 22 S.E.2d 902 (1942).

Either party may bring an action for absolute divorce under this section, and the jury's finding that defendant did not abandon plaintiff without cause did not preclude judgment in plaintiff's favor. Campbell v. Campbell, 207 N.C. 859, 176 S.E. 250 (1934).

Plaintiff Need Not Establish That He Is Injured Party. - Where the husband sues the wife for an absolute divorce upon the ground of two years' (now one year's) separation under this section, he is not required to establish as a constituent element of his cause of action that he is the injured party. Pickens v. Pickens, 258 N.C. 84, 127 S.E.2d 889 (1962); Overby v. Overby, 272 N.C. 636, 158 S.E.2d 799 (1968).

In an action for absolute divorce under this section, the plaintiff need not allege and prove that he or she is an injured party. Earles v. Earles, 29 N.C. App. 348, 224 S.E.2d 284 (1976).

Recrimination does not constitute a bar to plaintiff's action for divorce based on one year's separation. Smith v. Smith, 42 N.C. App. 246, 256 S.E.2d 282 (1979).

For case discussing the elimination of the defense of recrimination based on former G.S. 50-5 by Session Laws 1977, c. 817, s. 1, effective Aug. 1, 1977, and recrimination based on G.S. 50-7 by Session Laws 1977, 2nd Sess., c. 1190, s. 1, effective June 16, 1978, see Gardner v. Gardner, 48 N.C. App. 38, 269 S.E.2d 630 (1980).

This section is a "no-fault" statute. Recriminatory defenses are not applicable. Bruce v. Bruce, 79 N.C. App. 579, 339 S.E.2d 855, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 701, 347 S.E.2d 36 (1986).

Where Action Is Brought After July 31, 1977. - The defense of recrimination cannot be asserted in actions for absolute divorce instituted in this State after July 31, 1977, even if the alleged adulterous acts on the part of the plaintiff occurred after the separation of the parties. Edwards v. Edwards, 43 N.C. App. 296, 259 S.E.2d 11 (1979).

Even If Acts Occurred Prior to July 31, 1977. - Recrimination cannot be asserted as a defense in actions for absolute divorce based on a year's separation brought after July 31, 1977. Therefore, since plaintiff's action was begun on August 30, 1978, the defense of recrimination in the form of abandonment would not be available to defendant, even though the alleged abandonment occurred prior to the effective date of the statute. Boone v. Boone, 44 N.C. App. 79, 259 S.E.2d 921 (1979).

But Recrimination Could Be Pleaded in Action Brought Prior to Amendment. - Where husband filed action for divorce pursuant to this section on June 1, 1976, elimination of recriminatory defenses based on G.S. 50-7 by Session Laws 1977, 2nd Sess., c. 1190, s. 1, effective June 16, 1978, would not be applied retroactively so as to bar wife from pleading such defenses. Gardner v. Gardner, 48 N.C. App. 38, 269 S.E.2d 630 (1980).

Defense of Recrimination Prior to Amendment of Section. - For cases decided under the doctrine of recrimination, which allowed a defendant in a divorce action to set up as a defense in bar of plaintiff's action that plaintiff was guilty of misconduct which in itself would have been a ground for divorce, prior to elimination of the defense of recrimination by the amendments to this section by Session Laws 1977, c. 817, s. 1, and Session Laws 1977, 2nd Sess., c. 1190, s. 1, see Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N.C. 428, 181 S.E. 338 (1935); Hyder v. Hyder, 210 N.C. 486, 187 S.E. 798 (1936); Byers v. Byers, 223 N.C. 85, 25 S.E.2d 466 (1943); Pharr v. Pharr, 223 N.C. 115, 25 S.E.2d 471 (1943); Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 80, 33 S.E.2d 492 (1945); Welch v. Welch, 226 N.C. 541, 39 S.E.2d 457 (1946); Richardson v. Richardson, 257 N.C. 705, 127 S.E.2d 525 (1962); Edmisten v. Edmisten, 265 N.C. 488, 144 S.E.2d 404 (1965); Rupert v. Rupert, 15 N.C. App. 730, 190 S.E.2d 693, cert. denied, 282 N.C. 153, 191 S.E.2d 759 (1972); Gray v. Gray, 16 N.C. App. 730, 193 S.E.2d 492 (1972); Harrington v. Harrington, 286 N.C. 260, 210 S.E.2d 190 (1974); Heilman v. Heilman, 24 N.C. App. 11, 210 S.E.2d 69 (1974).

For cases as to defense of abandonment under this section prior to elimination of defense of recrimination, see Byers v. Byers, 223 N.C. 85, 25 S.E.2d 466 (1943); Pharr v. Pharr, 223 N.C. 115, 25 S.E.2d 471 (1943); Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796 (1952); McLean v. McLean, 237 N.C. 122, 74 S.E.2d 320 (1953); Johnson v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 383, 75 S.E.2d 109 (1953); Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957); Taylor v. Taylor, 257 N.C. 130, 125 S.E.2d 373 (1962); Richardson v. Richardson, 257 N.C. 705, 127 S.E.2d 525 (1962); Pickens v. Pickens, 258 N.C. 84, 127 S.E.2d 889 (1962); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 266 N.C. 502, 146 S.E.2d 500 (1966); Campbell v. Campbell, 270 N.C. 298, 154 S.E.2d 101 (1967); Overby v. Overby, 272 N.C. 636, 158 S.E.2d 799 (1968); Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968); McLeod v. McLeod, 1 N.C. App. 396, 161 S.E.2d 635 (1968); Rupert v. Rupert, 15 N.C. App. 730, 190 S.E.2d 693, cert. denied, 282 N.C. 153, 191 S.E.2d 759 (1972); Harrington v. Harrington, 22 N.C. App. 419, 206 S.E.2d 742, rev'd on other grounds, 286 N.C. 260, 210 S.E.2d 190 (1974); Heilman v. Heilman, 24 N.C. App. 11, 210 S.E.2d 69 (1974).

IV. DOMICILE OR RESIDENCE.

.

The six months residency requirement means the six months next preceding commencement of the action. Bruce v. Bruce, 79 N.C. App. 579, 339 S.E.2d 855, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 701, 347 S.E.2d 36 (1986).

Separate Domicile for Wife. - North Carolina divorce statutes recognize the legality of a separate domicile or residence for the wife. Rector v. Rector, 4 N.C. App. 240, 166 S.E.2d 492 (1969).

To establish a domicile, there must be a residence and the intention to make it a home or to live there indefinitely. Bryant v. Bryant, 228 N.C. 287, 45 S.E.2d 572 (1947).

Plaintiff must be physically present in this State and have the intention of making his residence here a permanent abiding place in order to be domiciled here within the meaning of this section, making residence in this State for six months a jurisdictional prerequisite to the institution of an action for divorce on the grounds of two years' (now one year's) separation. Bryant v. Bryant, 228 N.C. 287, 45 S.E.2d 572 (1947).

The fact that a person obtains an automobile license and ration cards in another state, giving such state as his residence, while competent on the question of domicile, is not conclusive. Bryant v. Bryant, 228 N.C. 287, 45 S.E.2d 572 (1947).

Finding of Court as to Residence. - The finding of the court, supported by evidence, that plaintiff was physically present in this State for more than six months prior to instituting an action for divorce and that he regarded his residence here as a permanent home was sufficient to support a judgment denying defendant's motion in the cause to set aside the divorce decree on the ground of want of the jurisdictional requirement of domicile. Bryant v. Bryant, 228 N.C. 287, 45 S.E.2d 572 (1947).

District court properly exercised jurisdiction over the subject matter of the parties' divorce action as in the State of North Carolina subject matter jurisdiction for divorce involves not only bringing the matter in the correct court, but also the court's finding residence by one of the parties for the requisite length of time and verification of the pleadings. In the case at issue, the plaintiff husband sufficiently alleged that he was a citizen and resident of North Carolina for more than six months next preceding the institution of the action and had lived separate and apart from the wife for more than one year next preceding the institution of the action without resuming the marital relationship, with those district court findings being supported by the husband's verified complaint, which was treated as an affidavit. Wilson v. Wilson, 191 N.C. App. 789, 666 S.E.2d 653 (2008).

How Decree Attacked on Ground of Nonresidence. - The proper procedure to attack a divorce decree on the ground that plaintiff had not been a resident of the State for six months preceding the institution of the action is by motion in the cause. Bryant v. Bryant, 228 N.C. 287, 45 S.E.2d 572 (1947).

Defect in Jurisdiction Held Insignificant Since Either Party Could Bring Proceeding. - Although the court improperly found jurisdiction over defendant, this error was insignificant, in that this section allows a divorce proceeding on the application of either party, if and when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart for one year, and the plaintiff or defendant in the suit for divorce has resided in the State for a period of six months. Andris v. Andris, 65 N.C. App. 688, 309 S.E.2d 570 (1983).

Opinions of Attorney General

Incompetency Following Separation. - A plaintiff may pursue a divorce option under this section where, after the parties have separated, the defendant sustains injuries bringing into question his competency. G.S. 50-5.1 is not available in such a case. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. James Lee Knight, Clerk of Superior Court, Guilford County, 55 N.C.A.G. 82 (1986).


§ 50-7. Grounds for divorce from bed and board.

The court may grant divorces from bed and board on application of the party injured, made as by law provided, in the following cases if either party:

  1. Abandons his or her family.
  2. Maliciously turns the other out of doors.
  3. By cruel or barbarous treatment endangers the life of the other. In addition, the court may grant the victim of such treatment the remedies available under G.S. 50B-1, et seq.
  4. Offers such indignities to the person of the other as to render his or her condition intolerable and life burdensome.
  5. Becomes an excessive user of alcohol or drugs so as to render the condition of the other spouse intolerable and the life of that spouse burdensome.
  6. Commits adultery.

History

(1871-2, c. 193, s. 36; Code, s. 1286; Rev., s. 1562; C.S., s. 1660; 1967, c. 1152, s. 7; 1971, c. 1185, s. 22; 1979, c. 561, s. 5; 1985, c. 574, ss. 1, 2.)

Cross References. - For provision that in an action brought pursuant to this section, if either or both parties have sought and obtained marital counselling by a licensed physician, licensed psychologist, or certified marital family therapist, the person rendering such counselling shall not be competent to testify in the action concerning information acquired while rendering such counselling, see G.S. 8-53.6.

As to effect of divorce a mensa et thoro on right to administer spouse's estate, see G.S. 31A-1.

As to necessary allegations, see G.S. 50-8 and note.

As to resumption of marital relations, see G.S. 52-10.2.

Legal Periodicals. - For case law survey on alimony without divorce, see 41 N.C.L. Rev. 459 (1963).

For article dealing with marriage contracts as related to North Carolina law, see 13 Wake Forest L. Rev. 85 (1977).

For note discussing application of the compulsory counterclaim provision of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 13 in divorce suits, see 57 N.C.L. Rev. 459 (1979).

For survey of 1978 family law, see 57 N.C.L. Rev. 1084 (1979).

For survey of 1979 family law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1471 (1980).

For note on separability of support and property provisions in ambiguous separation agreements, see 16 Wake Forest L. Rev. 152 (1980).

For 1984 survey, "Estoppel and Foreign Divorce," see 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1189 (1985).

For note, "Post-Separation Failure to Support a Dependent Spouse as a Sole Ground for Alimony Despite the Absence of Marital Misconduct Before Separation - Brown v. Brown," see 15 Campbell L. Rev. 333 (1993).

For article, "The Law of Alienation of Affections After McCutchen v. McCutchen: In North Carolina, Breaking Up Just Got Harder To Do," see 85 N.C.L. Rev. 1761 (2007).

For article, "The Best Interests of the Child: Article & Empirical Study: it's the Conflict, Stupid: An Empirical Study of Factors that Inhibit Successful Medication in High-Conflict Custody Cases," see 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 505 (2008).

For article, "No Exit: The Problem of Same-Sex Divorce," 90 N.C.L. Rev. 73 (2011).

For article, "Can't Live With 'Em Can't Live Without 'Em: An Analysis of the Trial Court's Authority to Hear and Decide Child-Related Claims in North Carolina Post-Baumann," see 34 Campbell L. Rev. 449 (2012).

CASE NOTES

I. IN GENERAL.

A divorce from bed and board is nothing more than a judicial separation, that is, an authorized separation of husband and wife. Schlagel v. Schlagel, 253 N.C. 787, 117 S.E.2d 790 (1961); Triplett v. Triplett, 38 N.C. App. 364, 248 S.E.2d 69 (1978).

Suit for divorce from bed and board is not exclusively a means for collection of alimony, but also a means of establishing a certain legal relationship. Long v. Long, 71 N.C. App. 405, 322 S.E.2d 427 (1984).

Applicability of G.S. 50-10. - G.S. 50-10 applies to a divorce from bed and board under this section. Schlagel v. Schlagel, 253 N.C. 787, 117 S.E.2d 790 (1961).

Finality. - A divorce from bed and board is a final order. There is no such thing as a divorce from bed and board pendente lite. Kale v. Kale, 25 N.C. App. 99, 212 S.E.2d 234, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 259, 214 S.E.2d 431 (1975).

No Action for "No Fault" Divorce from Bed and Board. - Where a husband and wife are living together and their children are in their joint custody and are being adequately supported by the supporting spouse, in the absence of allegations which would support an award of alimony or divorce, one spouse may not maintain an action to evict the other, get sole custody of the children, and obtain an order for child support; therefore, the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, since the complaint attempted to assert, and the court allowed, what appeared to be a "no fault" divorce from bed and board, and such an action does not lie in this State. Harper v. Harper, 50 N.C. App. 394, 273 S.E.2d 731 (1981).

No Requirement for Separation of Parties. - There is no requirement for a separation of the parties in the sense of one moving out of the home before an action can be instituted and prosecuted under this section for divorce from bed and board. Triplett v. Triplett, 38 N.C. App. 364, 248 S.E.2d 69 (1978).

A wife may pursue an action for divorce from bed and board and alimony while her husband is staying in the same house with her. Triplett v. Triplett, 38 N.C. App. 364, 248 S.E.2d 69 (1978).

Plaintiff Must Petition for Divorce a Mensa. - A decree of divorce a mensa will not be granted in an action where plaintiff petitioned for absolute divorce. Morris v. Morris, 75 N.C. 168 (1876).

Allegations in a cross action for divorce a mensa et thoro, set up by defendant wife in husband's action for divorce, were held sufficient. Ragan v. Ragan, 214 N.C. 36, 197 S.E. 554 (1938).

It is not necessary for the plaintiff to establish all of the grounds for divorce a mensa et thoro alleged in her complaint in order to sustain her action. It is sufficient if she establishes the defendant's guilt of any of the acts that would constitute a cause of action for divorce from bed and board as enumerated in this section. Deaton v. Deaton, 234 N.C. 538, 67 S.E.2d 626 (1951); Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).

To obtain a divorce from bed and board the law requires that defendant establish only one of the grounds specified in this section. Stanback v. Stanback, 270 N.C. 497, 155 S.E.2d 221 (1967).

Failure to Establish Ground for Divorce. - Where in his stipulation to the existence of ground for awarding alimony defendant did not specify which ground, of the ten enumerated in former G.S. 50-16.2, existed to support an alimony award, plaintiff could not automatically assume that the ground stipulated was one of the five grounds also listed in this section. Thus, as she presented no evidence establishing one of the grounds in this section, plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof as to this issue, and the trial court properly denied her request for a divorce from bed and board. Perkins v. Perkins, 85 N.C. App. 660, 355 S.E.2d 848, cert. denied, 320 N.C. 633, 360 S.E.2d 92 (1987).

Grounds Available to Husband as Well as Wife. - The grounds for divorce a mensa given by this section are available to the husband as well as to the wife, or as stated by the express language of the statute, to "the injured party." Brewer v. Brewer, 198 N.C. 669, 153 S.E. 163 (1930); Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).

Only the party injured is entitled to a divorce under this section. Vaughan v. Vaughan, 211 N.C. 354, 190 S.E. 492 (1937). See also, Carnes v. Carnes, 204 N.C. 636, 169 S.E. 222 (1933); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 226 N.C. 624, 39 S.E.2d 807 (1946).

When the misconduct of the complaining party is calculated to and does reasonably induce the conduct of defendant relied upon in an action for divorce a mensa et thoro, he or she, as the case may be, will not be permitted to take advantage of his or her own wrong, and the decree of divorce will be denied. Byers v. Byers, 223 N.C. 85, 25 S.E.2d 466 (1943); Pressley v. Pressley, 261 N.C. 326, 134 S.E.2d 609 (1964).

Plaintiff Must Prove Unprovoked Misconduct by Defendant. - To establish the existence of a ground listed in this section, plaintiff must allege and prove acts of misconduct by defendant and show that this misconduct was not provoked by plaintiff's actions. Perkins v. Perkins, 85 N.C. App. 660, 355 S.E.2d 848, cert. denied, 320 N.C. 633, 360 S.E.2d 92 (1987).

Effect of Delay in Bringing Action. - An unreasonable delay by one party, after a probable knowledge of the criminal conduct of the other, will, if unaccounted for, preclude such party from obtaining a decree for a separation from bed and board. Whittington v. Whittington, 19 N.C. 64 (1836).

But a delay of seven years in filing a petition was sufficiently accounted for by allegations that at the happening of the matters relied upon for divorce, the petitioner was a nonresident of the State, and was at the time of suit a pauper. Schonwald v. Schonwald, 62 N.C. 215 (1867).

Evidence of Acts Occurring "More Than Ten Years Ago". - Where a wife sues her husband for divorce a mensa et thoro, under this section, it is not error to admit on the trial evidence of his misconduct occurring "more than ten years ago" when it is a part of the whole course of his dealings coming down to within six months of the beginning of the action. Page v. Page, 167 N.C. 346, 83 S.E. 625 (1914).

Condonation is an affirmative defense to be alleged and proved by the party relying upon it, and less may be sufficient to destroy condonation than to found an original suit. Cushing v. Cushing, 263 N.C. 181, 139 S.E.2d 217 (1964).

Resumption of Marital Relations as Condonation. - Nothing else appearing, the resumption of marital relations after a separation imports a condonation of previous offenses. Cushing v. Cushing, 263 N.C. 181, 139 S.E.2d 217 (1964).

Mere Forgiveness Does Not Establish Condonation. - Evidence merely of forgiveness by the plaintiff, in her action for divorce a mensa et thoro against her husband, is insufficient to establish condonation. Page v. Page, 167 N.C. 346, 83 S.E. 625 (1914); Jones v. Jones, 173 N.C. 279, 91 S.E. 960 (1917).

Condonation is forgiveness upon condition, and the condition is that the party forgiven will abstain from like offenses afterwards. If the condition is violated, the original offense is revived. Lassiter v. Lassiter, 92 N.C. 129 (1885); Cushing v. Cushing, 263 N.C. 181, 139 S.E.2d 217 (1964).

Repetition of the offense nullifies the previous condonation. Collier v. Collier, 16 N.C. 352 (1829); Gordon v. Gordon, 88 N.C. 45 (1883); Page v. Page, 167 N.C. 346, 83 S.E. 625 (1914).

Reconciliation Is Not a Defense to a Divorce from Bed and Board. - A divorce from bed and board is judicial separation. Reconciliation while the action is pending is not a defense to a divorce from bed and board, unlike other concepts such as condonation, that is, the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for divorce. Howell v. Tunstall, 64 N.C. App. 703, 308 S.E.2d 454 (1983).

But Resumption of Marital Relations Destroys Effect of Divorce. - If the parties reconcile and resume cohabitation as man and wife after a divorce from bed and board is granted, the effect of the divorce from bed and board is destroyed. No court action to end such divorce is necessary. Howell v. Tunstall, 64 N.C. App. 703, 308 S.E.2d 454 (1983).

A resumption of marital relations would invalidate a divorce a mensa et thoro. Rouse v. Rouse, 258 N.C. 520, 128 S.E.2d 865 (1963).

Findings of Fact Required. - In an action for divorce from bed and board under this section, the trial court should make adequate findings of facts (i.e. specific acts of misconduct) to support the conclusion of law that the noninjured party has (1) abandoned the family; (2) maliciously turned the other out of doors; (3) endangered the life of the other by cruel or barbarous treatment; (4) offered such indignities to the person of the other as to render his or her condition intolerable; or (5) become an excessive user of alcohol or drugs so that the other's life is burdensome. Steele v. Steele, 36 N.C. App. 601, 244 S.E.2d 466 (1978).

Judgment Invalid Without Finding of Grounds. - Where judgment of divorce from bed and board contained absolutely no finding of the existence of any of the grounds for divorce from bed and board cognizable under this section, the district court was without power or authority, and therefore without jurisdiction, to enter it. Allred v. Tucci, 85 N.C. App. 138, 354 S.E.2d 291, cert. denied, 320 N.C. 166, 358 S.E.2d 47 (1987).

Proceeding to set aside invalid divorce decree is not barred by death of one spouse where property rights are involved. Allred v. Tucci, 85 N.C. App. 138, 354 S.E.2d 291, cert. denied, 320 N.C. 166, 358 S.E.2d 47 (1987).

Alimony. - Where, in husband's action for divorce a vinculo, the wife sets up a cross action for divorce a mensa, the court has the power to make an order for the payment of alimony upon the jury's determination of the issues in favor of the wife. Norman v. Norman, 230 N.C. 61, 51 S.E.2d 927 (1949).

In an action for divorce, a verified answer and cross action setting forth a cause of action for divorce a mensa is sufficient to sustain an order allowing alimony pendente lite. Nall v. Nall, 229 N.C. 598, 50 S.E.2d 737 (1948).

Every ground for divorce from bed and board also serves as a ground for alimony. Minor v. Minor, 70 N.C. App. 76, 318 S.E.2d 865, cert. denied, 312 N.C. 495, 322 S.E.2d 558 (1984).

Applied in Albritton v. Albritton, 210 N.C. 111, 185 S.E. 762 (1936); Sumner v. Sumner, 227 N.C. 610, 44 S.E.2d 40 (1947); Bunn v. Bunn, 258 N.C. 445, 128 S.E.2d 792 (1963); Adams v. Adams, 262 N.C. 556, 138 S.E.2d 204 (1964); Haddon v. Haddon, 42 N.C. App. 632, 257 S.E.2d 483 (1979); Blair v. Blair, 44 N.C. App. 605, 261 S.E.2d 301 (1980).

Cited in Brown v. Brown, 205 N.C. 64, 169 S.E. 818 (1933); Lockhart v. Lockhart, 223 N.C. 559, 27 S.E.2d 444 (1943); Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 37 S.E.2d 118 (1946); Bateman v. Bateman, 232 N.C. 659, 61 S.E.2d 909 (1950); Bateman v. Bateman, 233 N.C. 357, 64 S.E.2d 156 (1951); Livingston v. Livingston, 235 N.C. 515, 70 S.E.2d 480 (1952); Feldman v. Feldman, 236 N.C. 731, 73 S.E.2d 865 (1952); Johnson v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 383, 75 S.E.2d 109 (1953); Morgan v. Brooks, 241 N.C. 527, 85 S.E.2d 869 (1955); McDowell v. McDowell, 243 N.C. 286, 90 S.E.2d 544 (1955); Rowland v. Rowland, 253 N.C. 328, 116 S.E.2d 795 (1960); Pickens v. Pickens, 258 N.C. 84, 127 S.E.2d 889 (1962); Richardson v. Richardson, 4 N.C. App. 99, 165 S.E.2d 678 (1969); Hicks v. Hicks, 275 N.C. 370, 167 S.E.2d 761 (1969); Williams v. Williams, 13 N.C. App. 468, 186 S.E.2d 210 (1972); Beall v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 228 S.E.2d 407 (1976); Cook v. Cook, 41 N.C. App. 156, 254 S.E.2d 261 (1979); State v. Getward, 89 N.C. App. 26, 365 S.E.2d 209 (1988); Morrow v. Morrow, 94 N.C. App. 187, 379 S.E.2d 705 (1989); Shook v. Shook, 95 N.C. App. 578, 383 S.E.2d 405 (1989); State v. Byrd, 185 N.C. App. 597, 649 S.E.2d 444 (2007); Dechkovskaia v. Dechkovskaia, 232 N.C. App. 350, 754 S.E.2d 831 (2014), review denied, 758 S.E.2d 870, 2014 N.C. LEXIS 436 (2014); Norrell v. Keely, 238 N.C. App. 441, - S.E.2d - (2014).

II. ABANDONMENT.

What Is Abandonment. - One spouse abandons the other where he or she brings their cohabitation to an end without justification, without the consent of the other spouse and without intent of renewing it. Morris v. Morris, 46 N.C. App. 701, 266 S.E.2d 381, aff'd, 301 N.C. 525, 272 S.E.2d 1 (1980); Roberts v. Roberts, 68 N.C. App. 163, 314 S.E.2d 781 (1984).

Abandonment under this subdivision is not synonymous with the offense defined in G.S. 14-322. Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).

Abandonment under this subdivision is not synonymous with the criminal offense defined in G.S. 14-322. In a prosecution under G.S. 14-322, the State must establish (1) a willful abandonment and (2) a willful failure to provide adequate support. Richardson v. Richardson, 268 N.C. 538, 151 S.E.2d 12 (1966).

There is a distinction between criminal abandonment and the matrimonial offense of desertion. Peoples v. Peoples, 10 N.C. App. 402, 179 S.E.2d 138 (1971).

It is not necessary that the husband should leave the State. Witty v. Barham, 147 N.C. 479, 61 S.E. 372 (1908).

Nor is it necessary for the husband himself to depart from his home and leave his wife in order to abandon her. By cruel treatment or failure to provide for her support, he may compel her to leave him, which would constitute abandonment by the husband. Blanchard v. Blanchard, 226 N.C. 152, 36 S.E.2d 919 (1946), holding evidence insufficient to show abandonment by husband; Somerset v. Somerset, 3 N.C. App. 473, 165 S.E.2d 33 (1969); Cox v. Cox, 10 N.C. App. 476, 179 S.E.2d 194 (1971).

It is not necessary, to constitute abandonment of a wife by the husband, that he leave her, but he may constructively abandon her by treating her with such cruelty as to compel her to leave him. Eudy v. Eudy, 24 N.C. App. 516, 211 S.E.2d 536, aff'd, 288 N.C. 71, 215 S.E.2d 782 (1975).

Continued and Persistent Cruelty or Neglect May Constitute Abandonment. - If a husband, by continued and persistent cruelty or neglect, forces his wife to leave his home, he may himself be guilty of abandonment. Somerset v. Somerset, 3 N.C. App. 473, 165 S.E.2d 33 (1969).

Sleeping in Separate Bedroom Is Not Abandonment. - A husband who has neither left the marital home nor withheld support cannot be found to have abandoned his wife merely by electing to sleep in a separate bedroom. Oakley v. Oakley, 54 N.C. App. 161, 282 S.E.2d 589 (1981).

Nor Is Separation by Mutual Agreement. - Abandonment or desertion, as a marital wrong committed by one spouse against the other, does not occur if the parties live apart by mutual agreement. Sauls v. Sauls, 288 N.C. 387, 218 S.E.2d 338 (1975).

When the complaining spouse has consented to a separation which was not caused by the other's misconduct, the plaintiff cannot obtain a divorce or alimony on the basis of abandonment. Sauls v. Sauls, 288 N.C. 387, 218 S.E.2d 338 (1975).

Unless Induced by Misconduct of One Spouse. - Where the agreement to separate is induced by the misconduct of one spouse, the other can still maintain the charge of voluntary abandonment. Sauls v. Sauls, 288 N.C. 387, 218 S.E.2d 338 (1975).

The consent which will bar divorce on grounds of abandonment is a positive willingness on the part of the complainant - a consent not induced by the misconduct of the other spouse - to cease cohabitation. Sauls v. Sauls, 288 N.C. 387, 218 S.E.2d 338 (1975).

Not Mere Acquiescence in the Inevitable. - Mere acquiescence in a wrongful and inevitable separation, which the complaining spouse could not prevent after reasonable efforts to preserve the marriage, does not make the separation voluntary or affect the right to divorce or alimony. Nor, under such circumstances, is the innocent party obliged to protest or to exert physical force or other importunity to prevent the other party from leaving. Sauls v. Sauls, 288 N.C. 387, 218 S.E.2d 338 (1975).

Abandonment imports willfulness and maliciously turning the spouse out of doors. Brooks v. Brooks, 226 N.C. 280, 37 S.E.2d 909 (1946).

Plaintiff Must Prove That Abandonment Was Willful. - Where wife sues husband for a divorce from bed and board upon the ground of abandonment under this section, she must prove as an essential part of her case that her husband has willfully abandoned her. Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796 (1952).

When Abandonment Is Justified. - The Supreme Court, in applying the provisions of subdivision (1) of this section, has never undertaken to formulate any all-embracing definition or rule of general application respecting what conduct on the part of one spouse will justify the other in withdrawing from the marital relation, and each case must be determined in large measure upon its own particular circumstances. Ordinarily, however, the withdrawing spouse is not justified in leaving the other unless the conduct of the latter is such as would likely render it impossible for the withdrawing spouse to continue the marital relation with safety, health, and self-respect, and as would constitute ground in itself for divorce at least from bed and board. Caddell v. Caddell, 236 N.C. 686, 73 S.E.2d 923 (1952).

Plaintiff Must Prove Absence of Justification. - Where a spouse seeks to recover alimony on the grounds of abandonment, that spouse has the burden of proving each and every element of abandonment, including the absence of justification. Morris v. Morris, 46 N.C. App. 701, 266 S.E.2d 381, aff'd, 301 N.C. 525, 272 S.E.2d 1 (1980).

The burden of proof upon a plaintiff alleging defendant's abandonment is not to negate every possible justification for defendant-husband's leaving, but rather to prove only the absence of conduct on her part which rendered it impossible for him to continue in the marriage. Morris v. Morris, 46 N.C. App. 701, 266 S.E.2d 381, aff'd, 301 N.C. 525, 272 S.E.2d 1 (1980).

Withdrawal from Home May Be Abandonment Even If Support Is Paid. - A husband may be deemed to have abandoned his wife within the meaning of subdivision (1) of this section, and so be liable for alimony, notwithstanding the fact that, after cohabitation is brought to an end, he voluntarily provides her with adequate support. Whether his withdrawal from the home, followed by such support, constitutes an abandonment which is ground for suit by the wife for divorce from bed and board, and therefore ground for suit by her for alimony without divorce, depends upon whether his withdrawal from the home was justified by the conduct of the wife. Schloss v. Schloss, 273 N.C. 266, 160 S.E.2d 5 (1968), decided under former G.S. 50-16.

A wife is entitled to her husband's society and the protection of his name and home in cohabitation. The permanent denial of these rights may be aggravated by leaving her destitute or may be mitigated by a liberal provision for her support, but if the cohabitation is brought to an end without justification and without the consent of the wife and without the intention of renewing it, the matrimonial offense of desertion is complete. Richardson v. Richardson, 268 N.C. 538, 151 S.E.2d 12 (1966); Peoples v. Peoples, 10 N.C. App. 402, 179 S.E.2d 138 (1971).

The husband's willful failure to provide adequate support for his wife may be evidence of his abandonment of her, but the mere fact that he provides adequate support for her does not in itself negative abandonment. Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957); Richardson v. Richardson, 268 N.C. 538, 151 S.E.2d 12 (1966); Peoples v. Peoples, 10 N.C. App. 402, 179 S.E.2d 138 (1971).

Defendant May Not Defeat Action by Making Voluntary Support Payments. - A defendant may not abandon his wife and defeat an action under this section by making voluntary payments which he may abandon at will. Thurston v. Thurston, 256 N.C. 663, 124 S.E.2d 852 (1962); Richardson v. Richardson, 268 N.C. 538, 151 S.E.2d 12 (1966).

Acts Held to Constitute Abandonment. - Where a husband drives his wife from his house, or obtains her removal by stratagem, or withholds support from her while there, he is deemed to have abandoned her. Setzer v. Setzer, 128 N.C. 170, 38 S.E. 731 (1901).

A husband who permitted and encouraged certain of his grown children to remain constantly at home in a drunken condition, and allowed them to curse, abuse, and harass his wife at all hours of the day and night, and who told his wife to get her things out of his house, was guilty of such cruel treatment toward his wife as to constitute an abandonment of her. Bailey v. Bailey, 243 N.C. 412, 90 S.E.2d 696 (1956).

Allegations that plaintiff was compelled to leave her husband because of his willful failure and refusal to provide her with support and that his failure was without provocation on her part were sufficient to state a cause of action for alimony without divorce on the ground of abandonment. Brady v. Brady, 273 N.C. 299, 160 S.E.2d 13 (1968).

Plaintiff simply moved out of his adjacent apartment and stopped supporting his wife at the same time defendant's earnings ceased and she was entering hospital to undergo surgery; the parties lived together as husband and wife "in the usually accepted sense" until that time at which time plaintiff abandoned defendant. Lin v. Lin, 108 N.C. App. 772, 425 S.E.2d 9 (1993).

Finding of Constructive Abandonment Upheld. - Where the record portrayed defendant as a busy professional who became so completely immersed in his work that, by his conduct, he effectively abandoned his wife and children; additionally, the findings of fact pointed to a pattern of behavior by defendant over a 20-year period where plaintiff was left to her own devices without defendant's assistance in maintaining a family and rearing their children, and, although the court noted that at least 10 years earlier plaintiff wife had told defendant that she needed more of his time and attention and the situation improved somewhat thereafter, it improved only for a short time, these finding supported the court's conclusion that the husband had constructively abandoned his wife. Ellinwood v. Ellinwood, 94 N.C. App. 682, 381 S.E.2d 162 (1989).

Instructions as to Burden of Proof Held Erroneous. - In an action for alimony without divorce on the ground of abandonment, an instruction that the wife had the burden of showing that the husband's separation from her was free of fault on her part and that she was blameless, was erroneous. Likewise, an instruction that plaintiff had the burden of proving that the defendant's separation was wrongful, without charging upon what phase or phases of the evidence defendant's separation would be wrongful, and without defining wrongful except in abstract terms, was insufficient. Caddell v. Caddell, 236 N.C. 686, 73 S.E.2d 923 (1952).

Lapse of seven years from time of separation did not bar a cross action for divorce a mensa on the ground of constructive abandonment, or application for alimony pendente lite, either by laches or any statute of limitation. Nall v. Nall, 229 N.C. 598, 50 S.E.2d 737 (1948).

Prior Action Under This Section Held to Abate Action under G.S. 50-6. - The pendency of a prior action by the wife for a divorce from bed and board upon the ground of abandonment under this section abated a subsequent action by the husband for an absolute divorce upon the ground of two years' (now one year's) separation under G.S. 50-6. Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796 (1952).

Question of Custody. - Whether mother abandoned father within the meaning of subdivision (1) of this section was not controlling on the question of custody. Kenney v. Kenney, 15 N.C. App. 665, 190 S.E.2d 650 (1972).

III. MALICIOUSLY TURNING SPOUSE OUT.

.

Subdivision (2) Is an Instance of Abandonment Under Subdivision (1). - The ground for divorce a mensa given the wife under subdivision (2) of this section, because of being maliciously turned out of doors by her husband, is but an instance of wrongful abandonment provided by subdivision (1). Medlin v. Medlin, 175 N.C. 529, 95 S.E. 857 (1918).

Adverse Ruling in Previous Action. - A denial of alimony in an independent action for alimony without divorce brought by the wife on grounds that her husband maliciously turned her out of doors would conclude her upon her crossbill setting up the same matter in an action thereafter brought by her husband against her for divorce a vinculo. Medlin v. Medlin, 175 N.C. 529, 95 S.E. 857 (1918).

IV. CRUEL TREATMENT.

.

Necessary Allegations Under Subdivisions (3) and (4). - A wife, in alleging a cause of action for divorce from bed and board under subdivisions (3) and (4) of this section, must set out with particularity the wrongful acts of the husband upon which she relies and also that such acts were without adequate provocation on her part. Ollis v. Ollis, 241 N.C. 709, 86 S.E.2d 420 (1955); Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).

Allegation of actual physical violence is not required under subdivision (3) of this section. Pearce v. Pearce, 226 N.C. 307, 37 S.E.2d 904 (1946).

Cruelty and indignities, like other matrimonial offenses, may be condoned. Cushing v. Cushing, 263 N.C. 181, 139 S.E.2d 217 (1964).

Revival of Cause After Condonation. - Much less cruelty or indignity is sufficient to revive a transaction occurring before the condonation, than to support an original suit for divorce. Lassiter v. Lassiter, 92 N.C. 130 (1885).

Acts Committed More Than 10 Years Before. - A divorce would not be granted for cruel and barbarous treatment where it appeared that the acts complained of were committed more than 10 years before the commencement of the action, and in the meanwhile the parties had continued to reside together. O'Connor v. O'Connor, 109 N.C. 139, 13 S.E. 887 (1891).

Illustrative Cases. - The communication of an infectious disease by the husband to the wife was not sufficient ground under subdivision (3) of this section. Long v. Long, 9 N.C. 189 (1822).

Whipping of wife held cause for divorce in Taylor v. Taylor, 76 N.C. 433 (1877).

For further illustrative cases, see also Griffith v. Griffith, 89 N.C. 113 (1883); Jackson v. Jackson, 11 S.E. 173 (1890).

V. INDIGNITIES.

.

Subdivision (4) Is Remedial. - It would seem that the legislature purposely omitted to specify the particular acts of indignity for which divorces may in all cases be obtained. The matter is left at large under general words, thus leaving the courts to deal with each particular case and to determine it upon its own peculiar circumstances, so as to carry into effect the purpose and remedial object of the statute. Taylor v. Taylor, 76 N.C. 433 (1877); Sanders v. Sanders, 157 N.C. 229, 72 S.E. 876 (1911).

Nature of Indignities. - To entitle a wife to a divorce from bed and board under subdivision (4) of this section, the indignity offered by the husband must be such as may be expected to seriously annoy a woman of ordinary sense and temper, and must be repeated or continued so that it may appear to have been done willfully and intentionally or at least consciously by the husband to the annoyance of the wife. Miller v. Miller, 78 N.C. 102 (1878).

Facts in Each Case Are Determinative. - The acts of the husband which will render the wife's condition intolerable and her life burdensome so as to entitle her to a divorce a mensa are largely dependent on the facts in each particular case, including her station in life, temperament, state of health, habits and feelings. Sanders v. Sanders, 157 N.C. 229, 72 S.E. 876 (1911).

Allegations and Proof. - Under subdivision (4) of this section plaintiff must set out with particularity the language and conduct on the part of defendant relied upon, and must allege and prove that such acts were without adequate provocation on her part. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 226 N.C. 624, 39 S.E.2d 807 (1946); Best v. Best, 228 N.C. 9, 44 S.E.2d 214 (1947); Ollis v. Ollis, 241 N.C. 709, 86 S.E.2d 420 (1955); Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957); Cushing v. Cushing, 263 N.C. 181, 139 S.E.2d 217 (1964); Butler v. Butler, 1 N.C. App. 356, 161 S.E.2d 618 (1968).

As to necessary allegations and proof under subdivision (4) of this section, see also Pearce v. Pearce, 225 N.C. 571, 35 S.E.2d 636 (1945).

Plaintiff's Innocence Must Be Shown - Generally. - The complaint must aver, and facts must be found upon which it can be seen, that the plaintiff did not by her own conduct contribute to the wrongs and abuses of which she complains. White v. White, 84 N.C. 340 (1881); Garsed v. Garsed, 170 N.C. 672, 87 S.E. 45 (1915).

In a cross-action under this section, the omission of an allegation that plaintiff's conduct was without provocation on defendant's part was fatal. Pearce v. Pearce, 225 N.C. 571, 35 S.E.2d 636 (1945).

In North Carolina, a party relying on subdivision (4) must not have provoked the "indignities" of which he complains. Puett v. Puett, 75 N.C. App. 554, 331 S.E.2d 287 (1985).

Same - General Allegation Insufficient. - It is essential that the plaintiff specifically set forth in her complaint the circumstances under which the violence was committed, what her conduct was, and especially what she had done to provoke such conduct on the part of her husband. A general allegation that such conduct was "without cause or provocation on her part" is insufficient. Everton v. Everton, 50 N.C. 202 (1857); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 109 N.C. 139, 13 S.E. 887 (1891); Martin v. Martin, 130 N.C. 27, 40 S.E. 822 (1902).

Failure to Allege and Prove That Husband's Accusations of Infidelity Were False. - In an action for divorce a mensa et thoro and for subsistence, plaintiff alleged that defendant had repeatedly accused her of having sexual relations with her foster father and other men, and her evidence tended to show that all of the specific acts of abuse and misconduct complained of occurred in connection with this accusation. Plaintiff further alleged that she had been faithful and dutiful, and that defendant's acts of abuse and misconduct were without provocation or justification, but did not specifically allege or testify that the accusation was false. It was held that defendant's motion for judgment as of nonsuit should have been allowed, since even if the allegation denying provocation or justification was taken as denial of the charge of infidelity, plaintiff offered no testimony in support of such denial. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 226 N.C. 624, 39 S.E.2d 807 (1946).

Admissible Evidence of Indignities. - In plaintiff's action for divorce from bed and board, the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence testimony concerning defendant's use of pornographic material in the presence of the parties' minor children, defendant's refusal to provide educational support for one of the parties' adult children, and defendant's sexual advances upon the parties' daughter, since such evidence was relevant to show the circumstances surrounding plaintiff's claim that defendant's acts constituted such indignities to plaintiff's person that her condition was rendered intolerable and her life burdensome. Vandiver v. Vandiver, 50 N.C. App. 319, 274 S.E.2d 243, cert. denied, 302 N.C. 634, 280 S.E.2d 449 (1981).

Grant of Divorce Reversed Where Husband's Behavior Contributed to Wife's Criticism and Accusations. - In a divorce action under subdivision (4), the judge expressly concluded that the plaintiff-husband was not blameless and the judge's findings compelled the conclusion that the husband's conduct - rescue squad activities despite wife's suspicions of unfaithfulness, public name calling - so contributed to his wife's criticism and accusations and to the parties' repeated arguments that the grant of divorce had to be reversed. Puett v. Puett, 75 N.C. App. 554, 331 S.E.2d 287 (1985).

Illustrative Cases. - Husband's persistent charge of adultery against a virtuous wife, accompanied by a contemptuous declaration that she was no longer his wife and by abandonment of her bed, was such an indignity to wife's person as would entitle her to a partial divorce and to alimony. Everton v. Everton, 50 N.C. 202 (1857).

Where petitioner alleged that her husband had become jealous of her without cause, had shaken his fist in her face and threatened her, and had declared to her face and published to the neighborhood that the child with which she was pregnant was not his, that her condition from such treatment had become intolerable and her life burdensome, and that she had been compelled to quit his house and seek the protection of her father, it was held that she had set out enough to entitle her to alimony pendente lite. Erwin v. Erwin, 57 N.C. 82 (1858).

Where a drunken husband cursed his wife and drove her from his house, and by demonstrations of violence caused her to leave the bedside of a dying child and seek safety and protection at a distance of several miles, this was sufficient cause for divorce under subdivision (4) of this section. Scoggins v. Scoggins, 85 N.C. 348 (1881).

A divorce from bed and board will be granted the wife if it is shown that the husband made foul and injurious accusations, refused to bed with wife, and denied that she was his wife. Green v. Green, 131 N.C. 533, 42 S.E. 954 (1902).

When in an action by a wife for divorce a mensa there was evidence tending to show that plaintiff, in her married life, was free from blame and that defendant's conduct was a long course of neglect, cruelty, humiliation, and insult, repeated and persisted in, it was sufficient to bring the cause within the words of subdivision (4) of this section, that defendant had offered "such indignities to [wife's] person as to render her condition intolerable and her life burdensome." Sanders v. Sanders, 157 N.C. 229, 72 S.E. 876 (1911).

Allegations that husband had been living in adultery, had repeatedly avowed his loss of affection for and his desire to be rid of his wife, had ejected her from his bed, and had finally ordered her from his home, saying that he never intended to live with her again, stated a cause of action. Pearce v. Pearce, 226 N.C. 307, 37 S.E.2d 904 (1946).

In plaintiff's action for divorce from bed and board on the ground that defendant had inflicted such indignities upon her as to render her life burdensome, evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find for plaintiff where it tended to show that at some time prior to 1969 defendant began sleeping and spending the majority of his time in the basement of the parties' home, isolated from plaintiff; that upon moving into the basement, defendant withdrew from active participation in the resolution of familial and household problems; that defendant viewed hardcore pornographic material in his basement and permitted his minor children to view such material; that during 1973 and 1974 defendant requested that plaintiff indulge him in various unnatural sexual desires; and that subsequent to 1975 defendant was absent from the parties' home every weekend and all holidays until September 24, 1976, when he left the home for good. Vandiver v. Vandiver, 50 N.C. App. 319, 274 S.E.2d 243, cert. denied, 302 N.C. 634, 280 S.E.2d 449 (1981).

As a ground for the divorce, the trial court did not err in finding that the wife subjected the husband to indignities that made the husband's life burdensome and the husband's condition intolerable under G.S. 50-7(4); there was evidence that the wife (1) was involved in an extramarital affair, (2) wrecked the marital home after being ordered to leave it, (3) twice had the husband removed after filing false domestic violence proceedings, (4) was physically violent to the husband, (5) left the husband on three occasions without telling the husband where she was going, and (6) did not return for three or four nights. Evans v. Evans, 169 N.C. App. 358, 610 S.E.2d 264 (2005).

VI. EXCESSIVE USE OF ALCOHOL OR DRUGS.

.

Allegations of Habitual Drunkenness. - Allegations in complaint that defendant had been an habitual drunkard during the prior three years were sufficient to state a cause of action for divorce from bed and board under subdivision (5) of this section. Best v. Best, 228 N.C. 9, 44 S.E.2d 214 (1947).


§ 50-8. Contents of complaint; verification; venue and service in action by nonresident; certain divorces validated.

In all actions for divorce the complaint shall be verified in accordance with the provisions of Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and G.S. 1-148. The plaintiff shall set forth in his or her complaint that the complainant or defendant has been a resident of the State of North Carolina for at least six months next preceding the filing of the complaint, and that the facts set forth therein as grounds for divorce, except in actions for divorce from bed and board, have existed to his or her knowledge for at least six months prior to the filing of the complaint: Provided, however, that if the cause for divorce is one-year separation, then it shall not be necessary to allege in the complaint that the grounds for divorce have existed for at least six months prior to the filing of the complaint; it being the purpose of this proviso to permit a divorce after such separation of one year without awaiting an additional six months for filing the complaint: Provided, further, that if the complainant is a nonresident of the State action shall be brought in the county of the defendant's residence, and summons served upon the defendant personally or service of summons accepted by the defendant personally in the manner provided in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(1). Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, any suit or action for divorce heretofore instituted by a nonresident of this State in which the defendant was personally served with summons or in which the defendant personally accepted service of the summons and the case was tried and final judgment entered in a court of this State in a county other than the county of the defendant's residence, is hereby validated and declared to be legal and proper, the same as if the suit or action for divorce had been brought in the county of the defendant's residence.

In all divorce actions the complaint shall set forth the name and age of any minor child or children of the marriage, and in the event there are no minor children of the marriage, the complaint shall so state.

In all prior suits and actions for divorce heretofore instituted and tried in the courts of this State where the averments of fact required to be contained in the affidavit heretofore required by this section are or have been alleged and set forth in the complaint in said suits or actions and said complaints have been duly verified as required by Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, said allegations so contained in said complaints shall be deemed to be, and are hereby made, a substantial compliance as to the allegations heretofore required by this section to be set forth in any affidavit; and all such suits or actions for divorce, as well as the judgments or decrees issued and entered as a result thereof, are hereby validated and declared to be legal and proper judgments and decrees of divorce.

In all suits and actions for divorce heretofore instituted and tried in this State on and subsequent to the 5th day of April, 1951, wherein the statements, averments, or allegations in the verification to the complaint in said suits or actions are not in accordance with the provisions of Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and G.S. 1-148 or the requirements of this section as to verification of complaint or the allegations, statements or averments in the verification contain the language that the facts set forth in the complaint are true "to the best of affiant's knowledge and belief" instead of the language "that the same is true to his (or her) own knowledge" or similar variation in language, said allegations, statements and averments in said verifications as contained in or attached to said complaint shall be deemed to be, and are hereby made, a substantial compliance as to the allegations, averments or statements required by this section to be set forth in any such verifications; and all such suits or actions for divorce, as well as the judgments or decrees issued and entered as a result thereof, are hereby validated and declared to be legal and proper judgments and decrees of divorce.

History

(1868-9, c. 93, s. 46; 1869-70, c. 184; Code, s. 1287; Rev., s. 1563; 1907, c. 1008, s. 1; C.S., s. 1661; 1925, c. 93; 1933, c. 71, ss. 2, 3; 1943, c. 448, s. 1; 1947, c. 165; 1949, c. 264, s. 4; 1951, c. 590; 1955, c. 103; 1965, c. 636, s. 3; c. 751, s. 1; 1967, c. 50; c. 954, s. 3; 1969, c. 803; 1971, c. 415; 1973, c. 39; 1981, c. 599, s. 15; 1997-433, s. 4.3; 1998-17, s. 1; 2013-93, s. 1.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1971, c. 1065 provided:

"Section 1. All divorces granted between January 1, 1969 and the date of the ratification of this act [July 21, 1971] are hereby validated as to the complaint being certified by the attorney rather than verified by the plaintiff.

"Sec. 2. It is the intent of the General Assembly to validate divorces which were based on complaints relying on G.S. 50-8 which, due to a typographical error, indicated that complaints for divorce should be certified rather than verified."

The Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in this section, are found in G.S. 1A-1.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2013-93, s. 1, effective June 12, 2013, deleted the former last sentence of the second paragraph which read: "In addition, when there are minor children of the marriage, the complaint shall state the social security number of the plaintiff and, if known, the social security number of the defendant.", and deleted the former last sentence of the last paragraph which read: "The judgment of divorce shall include, where there are minor children of the parties, the social security numbers of the parties."

Legal Periodicals. - For brief comment on the 1947 amendment, see 25 N.C.L. Rev. 412 (1947).

For brief comment on the 1951 amendment, see 29 N.C.L. Rev. 375 (1951).

For 1984 survey, "Estoppel and Foreign Divorce," see 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1189 (1985).

For comment, "Conflicts of Law in Divorce Litigation: A Looking-Glass World?," see 10 Campbell L. Rev. 145 (1987).

CASE NOTES

I. IN GENERAL.

No Conflict with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 13(a). - There is no conflict between the statutes dealing with procedure in divorce actions and G.S. 1A-1, Rule 13(a). Rather, G.S. 1A-1, Rule 13(a) superimposes an additional characteristic on certain kinds of counterclaims. Gardner v. Gardner, 294 N.C. 172, 240 S.E.2d 399 (1978).

The statutes dealing specifically with divorce actions do not prescribe a procedure for counterclaims different from that prescribed in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 13(a). Gardner v. Gardner, 294 N.C. 172, 240 S.E.2d 399 (1978).

Applied in Scoggins v. Scoggins, 85 N.C. 348 (1881); White v. White, 179 N.C. 592, 103 S.E. 216 (1920); Williams v. Williams, 180 N.C. 273, 104 S.E. 561 (1920); Clarke v. Clarke, 47 N.C. App. 249, 267 S.E.2d 361 (1980); Lynch v. Lynch, 302 N.C. 189, 274 S.E.2d 212 (1981); Allred v. Tucci, 85 N.C. App. 138, 354 S.E.2d 291 (1987).

Cited in Keys v. Tuten, 199 N.C. 368, 154 S.E. 631 (1930); Hodges v. Hodges, 226 N.C. 570, 39 S.E.2d 596 (1946); Rowland v. Rowland, 253 N.C. 328, 116 S.E.2d 795 (1960); Martin v. Martin, 253 N.C. 704, 118 S.E.2d 29 (1961); Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 126 S.E.2d 597 (1962); Butler v. Butler, 1 N.C. App. 356, 161 S.E.2d 618 (1968); Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378, 188 S.E.2d 711 (1972); Smith v. Smith, 56 N.C. App. 812, 290 S.E.2d 390 (1982); Bryant v. Nationwide Mut. Fire. Ins. Co., 67 N.C. App. 616, 313 S.E.2d 803 (1984); In re Triscari Children, 109 N.C. App. 285, 426 S.E.2d 435 (1993); Gaskill v. State ex rel. Cobey, 109 N.C. App. 656, 428 S.E.2d 474 (1993); State v. Thibodeaux, 352 N.C. 570, 532 S.E.2d 797 (2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1155, 121 S. Ct. 1106, 148 L. Ed. 2d 976 (2001); In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 636 S.E.2d 787 (2006); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 192 N.C. App. 248, 664 S.E.2d 616 (2008); State v. Mills, 232 N.C. App. 460, 754 S.E.2d 674 (2014).

II. COMPLAINT.

Plaintiff Must Allege Material Facts Required by This Section. - To allege a cause of action for divorce, a plaintiff, in addition to one or more of the grounds for divorce, must allege the additional material facts now required by this section. Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).

Such Allegations Are Indispensable Constituent Elements of Cause of Action. - The legal effect of the 1951 amendment to this section is that the allegations required to be set forth in the complaint are now indispensable constituent elements of plaintiff's cause of action, and the facts so alleged must be established by the verdict of a jury. Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).

The allegations required by this section are indispensable constituent elements of a divorce action and must be established either by the verdict of a jury or by a judge, as the pertinent statute may permit. Eudy v. Eudy, 288 N.C. 71, 215 S.E.2d 782 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 290 S.E.2d 653 (1982); Boyd v. Boyd, 61 N.C. App. 334, 300 S.E.2d 569 (1983).

Which Must Be Found True. - All averments required by the statute must be both alleged in the complaint and found by the finder of fact to be true before a divorce judgment may be entered. Eudy v. Eudy, 288 N.C. 71, 215 S.E.2d 782 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 290 S.E.2d 653 (1982).

Statement in General Terms. - The matters in the jurisdictional affidavit (now the complaint) in an action for divorce a mensa brought by the wife may be stated in general terms following the language of the statute. Sanders v. Sanders, 157 N.C. 229, 72 S.E. 876 (1911); Jones v. Jones, 173 N.C. 279, 91 S.E. 960 (1917).

Allegation of Six Months' Prior Knowledge - Generally. - The affidavit (now the complaint) must state that the action was not brought within six months from the time the plaintiff first acquired knowledge of the facts stated therein. Clark v. Clark, 133 N.C. 28, 45 S.E. 342 (1903). See also, O'Connor v. O'Connor, 109 N.C. 139, 13 S.E. 887 (1891); Green v. Green, 131 N.C. 533, 42 S.E. 954 (1902).

Six months' prior knowledge was formerly not required to be alleged in the complaint. Kinney v. Kinney, 149 N.C. 321, 63 S.E. 97 (1908).

While, in an action for divorce a mensa, it is advisable that the pleading allege that the facts set forth therein as grounds for divorce had existed to complaint's knowledge for at least six months prior to the filing of the pleading in accordance with the language of the statute, where the wife's pleading in her cross-action for divorce a mensa alleged gross mistreatment of her by the husband, culminating in his locking her out of her home and ordering her away on a specified date more than six months prior to the filing of the pleading, with verification that the facts alleged therein were true to her own knowledge, her pleading would be held sufficient on this aspect. Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).

Same - When Unnecessary. - By Laws 1925, c. 93, this section was amended so that in cases where the cause for divorce is five years' (now one year's) separation, then the six months' prior knowledge need not be alleged. Ellis v. Ellis, 190 N.C. 418, 130 S.E. 7 (1925); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 244 N.C. 286, 93 S.E.2d 617 (1956). See also, Smithdeal v. Smithdeal, 206 N.C. 397, 174 S.E. 118 (1934).

Section Requires Complaint to Set Forth Certain Information as to Children. - This section requires that in all divorce actions the complaint shall set forth the name and age of any minor child or children of the marriage, and that in the event there are no minor children of the marriage, the complaint shall so state. Jones v. Jones, 20 N.C. App. 607, 202 S.E.2d 279, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 234, 204 S.E.2d 23 (1974).

Allegations of the names and ages of any children of a party seeking divorce in North Carolina are required by this section, in order that the court may protect the interests of such children if the parties have failed to do so. Powers v. Parisher, 104 N.C. App. 400, 409 S.E.2d 725 (1991), appeal dismissed, 331 N.C. 286, 417 S.E.2d 254 (1992).

The obvious reason for this requirement is to bring to the attention of the court any minor children that might be affected by the divorce, to the end that the court will protect the interests of those children. Jones v. Jones, 20 N.C. App. 607, 202 S.E.2d 279, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 234, 204 S.E.2d 23 (1974); Cobb v. Cobb, 42 N.C. App. 373, 256 S.E.2d 722 (1979).

The reason for the requirement of this section for a pleading relating to minor children is not to establish jurisdiction. Cobb v. Cobb, 42 N.C. App. 373, 256 S.E.2d 722 (1979).

Answer Constituting Counterclaim. - Where the complaint in a suit for an absolute divorce alleged facts entitling either or both of the parties to the marriage to an absolute divorce, defendant's answer admitting these allegations, together with his prayer for an absolute divorce on the same grounds, was in effect a counterclaim seeking affirmative relief and arising out of the same transactions alleged in the complaint. McCarley v. McCarley, 289 N.C. 109, 221 S.E.2d 490 (1976).

Proof Must Correspond to Allegations. - As the allegations in a petition for divorce are directed by statute to be sworn to, it is more emphatically required in such a case than in others that the allegations and proofs should correspond; otherwise the court cannot decree a divorce. Foy v. Foy, 35 N.C. 90 (1851); Young v. Young, 225 N.C. 340, 34 S.E.2d 154 (1945).

III. VERIFICATION.

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In a divorce action a verification is required as an essential part of the complaint. The want of a proper verification is a fatal defect and a cause for dismissal of the action. Boyd v. Boyd, 61 N.C. App. 334, 300 S.E.2d 569 (1983).

Verification Must Be as Required. - In an application for alimony pendente lite the affidavit and petition must be verified as required by this section. Clark v. Clark, 133 N.C. 28, 45 S.E. 342 (1903). See also, Hopkins v. Hopkins, 132 N.C. 22, 43 S.E. 508 (1903).

Verification of a pleading stating that it was "sworn and subscribed to" was not sufficient. Martin v. Martin, 130 N.C. 27, 40 S.E. 822 (1902).

For case holding verification in substantial compliance with former G.S. 1-145 sufficient, see Bolin v. Bolin, 242 N.C. 642, 89 S.E.2d 303 (1955).

In Accordance with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 11. - This section requires that for a complaint for divorce to be valid, it must be verified in accordance with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 11, when it is filed. It is not sufficient to obtain verification before the complaint and summons are served on the defendant. Boyd v. Boyd, 61 N.C. App. 334, 300 S.E.2d 569 (1983).

Verification of Answer Setting Up Cross-Action. - In husband's action for divorce a vinculo, wife's answer setting up a cross-action must be verified under this section, as a jurisdictional prerequisite, and when the answer is not so verified the granting of permanent alimony is erroneous. Silver v. Silver, 220 N.C. 191, 16 S.E.2d 834 (1941).

Verification of Counterclaim. - A decree of divorce was not improperly granted because of defective verification of defendant-husband's pleadings, where the counterclaim in which the divorce was prayed for was verified, although the original pleadings were not. Swygert v. Swygert, 46 N.C. App. 173, 264 S.E.2d 902 (1980).

An action for permanent alimony is a permissive counterclaim and is not required to be verified. Newsome v. Newsome, 43 N.C. App. 580, 259 S.E.2d 577 (1979).

As to waiver of verification of subsequent pleadings, see Calaway v. Harris, 229 N.C. 117, 47 S.E.2d 796 (1948).

Impeachment of Verification. - Such uncertainties as plaintiff expressed under cross-examination as to the exact nature of his act in verifying a complaint afforded an insufficient basis to warrant impeachment of his verification. Accordingly, the court erred in allowing defendant's motion to strike the verification and in dismissing plaintiff's complaint. Skinner v. Skinner, 28 N.C. App. 412, 222 S.E.2d 258, cert. denied, 289 N.C. 726, 224 S.E.2d 674 (1976).

Effect of False Swearing on Decree. - If a decree of divorce, regular in all respects on the face of the judgment roll, is obtained by false swearing, by way of pleading and of evidence, relating to the cause or ground for divorce, the decree is voidable but not void, and is immune from attack by either party to the divorce. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 244 N.C. 286, 93 S.E.2d 617 (1956).

In an action for annulment of a marriage entered into between plaintiff husband and defendant wife following a decree of divorce in favor of defendant against her former husband, plaintiff, who had been married to defendant for six years, could not attack the divorce decree by alleging false swearing of defendant in regard to the ground or cause for divorce. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 244 N.C. 286, 93 S.E.2d 617 (1956).

In an action for divorce the affidavit formerly required by this section in connection with the complaint was jurisdictional, and a complaint accompanied by a false statutory affidavit would be regarded as insufficient to empower the court to grant a decree of divorce; the correct procedure for relief against the decree would be by motion in the cause. Young v. Young, 225 N.C. 340, 34 S.E.2d 154 (1945), wherein the plaintiff was held to have practiced imposition upon the court.

As to the affidavit formerly required by this section, see Holloman v. Holloman, 127 N.C. 15, 37 S.E. 68 (1900); Nichols v. Nichols, 128 N.C. 108, 38 S.E. 296 (1901); Johnson v. Johnson, 141 N.C. 91, 53 S.E. 623 (1906); State v. Williams, 220 N.C. 445, 17 S.E.2d 769 (1941), rev'd on other grounds, 317 U.S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279 (1942).

IV. RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE.

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Jurisdiction in divorce actions is conferred by statute. Israel v. Israel, 255 N.C. 391, 121 S.E.2d 713 (1961).

And Is Founded on Domicile. - Judicial power to grant a divorce that is, jurisdiction strictly speaking, is founded on domicile. Israel v. Israel, 255 N.C. 391, 121 S.E.2d 713 (1961).

The domicile of one spouse within a state gives power to that state to dissolve a marriage wheresoever contracted. Israel v. Israel, 255 N.C. 391, 121 S.E.2d 713 (1961).

"Domicile" Defined. - That place is properly the domicile of a person where he has his true permanent home and principal establishment, and to which he has, whenever he is absent, the intention of returning, and from which he has no present intention of moving. Israel v. Israel, 255 N.C. 391, 121 S.E.2d 713 (1961).

"Residence" has been interpreted to mean the equivalent of "domicile." Andris v. Andris, 65 N.C. App. 688, 309 S.E.2d 570 (1983).

Residence and Intent Must Be Shown. - To establish a domicile there must be a residence, and the intention to make it a home or to live there permanently or indefinitely. Israel v. Israel, 255 N.C. 391, 121 S.E.2d 713 (1961).

In order to establish a domicile, a party must make a showing of both actual residence in the new locality and the intent to remain there permanently. Andris v. Andris, 65 N.C. App. 688, 309 S.E.2d 570 (1983).

The residence requirement in this section is jurisdictional. Eudy v. Eudy, 24 N.C. App. 516, 211 S.E.2d 536, aff'd, 288 N.C. 71, 215 S.E.2d 782 (1975).

The requirement that one of the parties to a divorce action shall have resided in this State for a specified period of time next preceding the commencement of the action is jurisdictional. Israel v. Israel, 255 N.C. 391, 121 S.E.2d 713 (1961).

Residency for Six Months Required. - In order to obtain a valid divorce in North Carolina, the plaintiff or defendant must have resided in this State for at least six months next preceding institution of the action for divorce. Eudy v. Eudy, 24 N.C. App. 516, 211 S.E.2d 536, aff'd, 288 N.C. 71, 215 S.E.2d 782 (1975).

The period of residence in this section applies to an action for divorce from bed and board as well as to an action for absolute divorce. Eudy v. Eudy, 24 N.C. App. 516, 211 S.E.2d 536, aff'd, 288 N.C. 71, 215 S.E.2d 782 (1975).

But the residency requirement of this section is not applicable in an action for alimony without divorce. Eudy v. Eudy, 288 N.C. 71, 215 S.E.2d 782 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 290 S.E.2d 653 (1982).

A bona fide "residence," necessary under statutes in order to confer jurisdiction in divorce proceedings, is within the legal meaning of the word "domicile," that is, an abode animo manendi, a place where a person lives or has his home, to which, when absent, he intends to return, and from which he has no present purpose to depart. Rector v. Rector, 4 N.C. App. 240, 166 S.E.2d 492 (1969).

"Residence" means actual residence, and prior to the 1949 amendment, which allows suit to be brought where defendant has been a resident of the State for six months, a nonresident wife in suing for divorce could not avail herself of the maxim that "her domicile was that of her husband," where she had not actually satisfied the residence requirement. Schonwald v. Schonwald, 55 N.C. 367 (1856).

Separate Domicile for Wife. - North Carolina divorce statutes recognize the legality of a separate domicile, or residence, for the wife. Rector v. Rector, 4 N.C. App. 240, 166 S.E.2d 492 (1969).

There is no logical, legal or equitable reason for allowing wife, whose misconduct has brought about the separation, to insist upon the legal fiction that her domicile follows that of her husband, and thereby to defeat his action for divorce brought in the jurisdiction in which she actually resides. Rector v. Rector, 4 N.C. App. 240, 166 S.E.2d 492 (1969).

One need not be a citizen of the United States in order to establish residence or domicile within this State for purposes of divorce actions. Rector v. Rector, 4 N.C. App. 240, 166 S.E.2d 492 (1969).

Effect of Temporary Removal. - Where husband and wife establish a residence in this State, the wife, by leaving the State for a temporary purpose, without any intention of changing her residence, does not thereby lose her citizenship. Moore v. Moore, 130 N.C. 333, 41 S.E. 943 (1902).

The domicile of a soldier or sailor in the military or naval service of his country generally remains unchanged, domicile being neither gained nor lost by being temporarily stationed in the line of duty at a particular place, even for a period of years. A new domicile may, however, be acquired if both the fact and the intent concur. Israel v. Israel, 255 N.C. 391, 121 S.E.2d 713 (1961).

Naval officer was properly found to be domiciled in North Carolina where: (1) He had changed his voter registration from Pennsylvania to Guilford County, (2) He had filed a North Carolina income tax return for the year 1981, (3) He had changed his permanent address with the Navy to his father's address in Greensboro as of August 1, 1981, (4) He had opened a bank account in Greensboro in August, 1981 and had maintained it since that time, (5) He had changed the registration of his motor vehicle from Pennsylvania to North Carolina and had paid North Carolina property taxes, (6) He had resided at his parents' house whenever on leave from the Navy, and (7) He had severed all ties with the State of Pennsylvania. In short, plaintiff did everything possible to establish a residence in North Carolina. The transient nature of his career with the United States Navy prohibited him from doing anything further. Andris v. Andris, 65 N.C. App. 688, 309 S.E.2d 570 (1983).

Residency Established Via Verified Complaint. - District court properly exercised jurisdiction over the subject matter of the parties' divorce action as in the State of North Carolina subject matter jurisdiction for divorce involves not only bringing the matter in the correct court, but also the court's finding residence by one of the parties for the requisite length of time and verification of the pleadings. In the case at issue, the plaintiff husband sufficiently alleged that he was a citizen and resident of North Carolina for more than six months next preceding the institution of the action and had lived separate and apart from the wife for more than one year next preceding the institution of the action without resuming the marital relationship, with those district court findings being supported by the husband's verified complaint, which was treated as an affidavit. Wilson v. Wilson, 191 N.C. App. 789, 666 S.E.2d 653 (2008).

Opinions of Attorney General

Not Advisable for Attorney to Act as Notary and Verify Client's Divorce Complaint. - It is not advisable for a notary who is also a partner in a law firm acting of counsel to an attorney filing a divorce complaint to notarize the verification of the client. A divorce complaint which is not properly notarized is subject to dismissal. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. James Lee Knight, Notary Public, Guilford County, 58 N.C.A.G. 35 (1988).

When one partner of Firm A appears as attorney for a plaintiff in a divorce proceeding, the other partners in the firm also appear, and they could be prohibited under former G.S. 47-8 from notarizing the verification of the client. This would be true whether or not the firm appears as "of counsel" to the individual partner on the face of the complaint or answer. Therefore, such practice should be avoided, and as an attorney/notary who acts in this fashion proceeds at his own risk. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. James Lee Knight, Notary Public, Guilford County, 58 N.C.A.G. 35 (1988).


§ 50-9. Effect of answer of summons by defendant.

In all cases upon an action for a divorce absolute, where judgment of divorce has heretofore been granted and where the plaintiff has caused to be served upon the defendant in person a legal summons, whether by verified complaint or unverified complaint, and such defendant answered such summons, and where the trial of said action was duly and legally had in all other respects and judgments rendered by a judge of the superior court upon issues answered by a judge and jury, in accordance with law, such judgments are hereby declared to have the same force and effect as any judgment upon an action for divorce otherwise had legally and regularly.

History

(1929, c. 290, s. 1; 1947, c. 393.)

CASE NOTES

Cited in Piguerra v. Piguerra, 54 N.C. App. 188, 282 S.E.2d 567 (1981).


§ 50-10. Material facts found by judge or jury in divorce or annulment proceedings; when notice of trial not required; procedure same as ordinary civil actions.

  1. Except as provided for in subsection (e) of this section, the material facts in every complaint asking for a divorce or for an annulment shall be deemed to be denied by the defendant, whether the same shall be actually denied by pleading or not, and no judgment shall be given in favor of the plaintiff in any such complaint until such facts have been found by a judge or jury.
  2. Nothing herein shall require notice of trial to be given to a defendant who has not made an appearance in the action.
  3. The determination of whether there is to be a jury trial or a trial before the judge without a jury shall be made in accordance with G.S. 1A-1, Rules 38 and 39.
  4. The provisions of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56, shall be applicable to actions for absolute divorce pursuant to G.S. 50-6, for the purpose of determining whether any genuine issue of material fact remains for trial by jury, but in the event the court determines that no genuine issue of material fact remains for trial by jury, the court must find the facts as provided herein. The court may enter a judgment of absolute divorce pursuant to the procedures set forth in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56, finding all requisite facts from nontestimonial evidence presented by affidavit, verified motion or other verified pleading.
  5. The clerk of superior court, upon request of the plaintiff, may enter judgment in cases in which the plaintiff's only claim against the defendant is for absolute divorce, or absolute divorce and the resumption of a former name, and the defendant has been defaulted for failure to appear, the defendant has answered admitting the allegations of the complaint, or the defendant has filed a waiver of the right to answer, and the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person.

History

(1868-9, c. 93, s. 47; Code, s. 1288; Rev., s. 1564; C.S., s. 1662; 1963, c. 540, ss. 1, 2; 1965, c. 105; c. 636, s. 4; 1971, c. 17; 1973, cc. 2, 460; 1981, c. 12; 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1037, s. 4; 1985, c. 140; 1991, c. 568, s. 1; 2004-128, s. 6.)

Cross References. - As to competency of spouse as witness in civil actions, see G.S. 8-56.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1991, c. 568, s. 2 provides that any judgment of absolute divorce entered prior to October 1, 1991, on the basis of nontestimonial evidence pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56, which is proper in all other respects, is valid and of full force and effect.

Legal Periodicals. - For case law survey on trial practice, see 43 N.C.L. Rev. 938 (1965).

For survey of 1979 family law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1471 (1980).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under the various versions of this section applicable at the time, and may not reflect all subsequent amendments.

Purpose of Section. - The object of this section was to prevent a judgment from being taken by default or by collusion, and to require the facts to be found by a jury. Campbell v. Campbell, 179 N.C. 413, 102 S.E. 737 (1920); Cobb v. Cobb, 42 N.C. App. 373, 256 S.E.2d 722 (1979).

As to the purpose of this section, see also Moss v. Moss, 24 N.C. 55 (1841); Hooper v. Hooper, 165 N.C. 605, 81 S.E. 933 (1914).

The procedure in a divorce action is not the same as the procedure in other civil actions, in that the material facts in the complaint are deemed denied, whether actually denied by pleading or not, and in that no judgment shall be given in favor of the plaintiff until such facts have been found by a jury (now a judge or jury). Williams v. Williams, 13 N.C. App. 468, 186 S.E.2d 210 (1972).

Section Applies to Cross-Action. - This section is applicable to a defendant who files a cross-action and prays for a divorce therein from the plaintiff. Saunderson v. Saunderson, 195 N.C. 169, 141 S.E. 572 (1928).

Allegations in Counterclaim Deemed Denied in Divorce Case. - Despite the fact that the wife did not respond to allegations of marital misconduct and fault contained in the husband's counterclaim in the parties' divorce case, pursuant to G.S. 50-10(a), all of the allegations of the counterclaim were deemed denied. Phillips v. Phillips, 185 N.C. App. 238, 647 S.E.2d 481 (2007), aff'd, 362 N.C. 171, 655 S.E.2d 350 (2008).

Suits for Alimony Without Divorce. - Suits for alimony without divorce are within the analogy of divorce laws and within the purview of that portion of this section which controverts all material facts in every divorce action. Koob v. Koob, 283 N.C. 129, 195 S.E.2d 552 (1973).

G.S. 50-16.8 changes the procedure to be followed in actions for alimony without divorce from the divorce procedure set forth in this section to the procedure applicable to other civil actions. Williams v. Williams, 13 N.C. App. 468, 186 S.E.2d 210 (1972).

Presumption of Denial - Generally. - The provisions of this section that the allegations of the complaint in an action for divorce "are deemed to be denied" applies only to the trial upon the merits, since the facts must be found by a jury (now a judge or jury). Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 113 N.C. 432, 18 S.E. 334 (1893).

The denial by the statute of the plaintiff's allegations in an action for divorce presumes, as a matter of law, a meritorious defense, and does not require that this be found by the judge in passing upon a motion to set aside a judgment rendered in an action. Campbell v. Campbell, 179 N.C. 413, 102 S.E. 737 (1920).

Same - In Cross-Action. - The defendant in an action for divorce a vinculo, may file a cross-action for the same relief, and where no reply has been filed by the plaintiff, and no evidence has been offered by him, an issue is raised by this section, and upon a verdict on the required issues, a judgment may be rendered upon the cross-action if the pleadings and the evidence are sufficient. Ellis v. Ellis, 190 N.C. 418, 130 S.E. 7 (1925).

All the allegations of defendant's counterclaim wherein he sought a divorce from bed and board were deemed to be denied by the plaintiff, even though she failed to answer the counterclaim. Skamarak v. Skamarak, 81 N.C. App. 125, 343 S.E.2d 559 (1986).

Same - Time for Answering Not Affected. - The provision of this section putting in a denial of the plaintiff's allegations in an action for divorce did not affect the defendant's right to 20 days after completion of the service of summons by publication in which to answer or demur, etc. Campbell v. Campbell, 179 N.C. 413, 102 S.E. 737 (1920).

Entry of Specific Denial by Defendant Not Prejudicial. - Since this section declares in effect that the material allegations of the complaint in a divorce action shall be deemed and treated as denied, it is inconsequential whether or not the defendant enters a denial, and the entry of a specific denial by the defendant, under discretionary leave of the court, cannot prejudice the plaintiff. Walker v. Walker, 238 N.C. 299, 77 S.E.2d 715 (1953).

Facts That Must Be Alleged Must Be Proved. - Under this section and G.S. 50-8, upon the basic principle that a plaintiff must prove what he must allege, a plaintiff is entitled to a judgment of divorce only if the issues submitted and answered in favor of the plaintiff establish, inter alia, (1) the requisite facts as to residence, and (2) that (except where the alleged cause for divorce is one year's separation) the facts set forth as grounds for divorce have existed to his or her knowledge for at least six months prior to the filing of the complaint. Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).

The allegations required by G.S. 50-8 are indispensable constituent elements of a divorce action and must be established either by the verdict of a jury or by a judge, as the pertinent statute may permit. Eudy v. Eudy, 288 N.C. 71, 215 S.E.2d 782 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 290 S.E.2d 653 (1982).

The statutory changes eliminating the necessity for the filing of an affidavit and allowing a judge in some cases to become the trier of facts in divorce actions do not change the fundamental precepts that jurisdiction over the subject matter of divorce is statutory and that all averments required by the statute must be both alleged in the complaint and found by the finder of fact to be true before a divorce judgment may be entered. Eudy v. Eudy, 288 N.C. 71, 215 S.E.2d 782 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 290 S.E.2d 653 (1982).

A divorce will be granted only after the facts establishing a statutory ground for divorce have been pleaded and actually proved. Adair v. Adair, 62 N.C. App. 493, 303 S.E.2d 190, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 319, 307 S.E.2d 162 (1983).

Material Facts Must Be Found by Judge or Jury. - This section requires that, in a divorce action, the material facts as to the grounds for divorce must be found by a jury (now a judge or jury). Wicker v. Wicker, 255 N.C. 723, 122 S.E.2d 703 (1961).

The material facts in every complaint asking for a divorce are deemed to be denied under the statute, and no judgment is allowed to be given in favor of the plaintiff in any such complaint until all the material facts have been found by a jury. Skamarak v. Skamarak, 81 N.C. App. 125, 343 S.E.2d 559 (1986).

Required Findings. - The court erred in declaring the parties' divorce decree void where the divorce decree at issue was "in all respects regular on [its] face" and the defendant was properly served; the court's findings, required by this section, were found under the heading "Conclusions of Law" rather than under "Findings of Fact." Dunevant v. Dunevant, 142 N.C. App. 169, 542 S.E.2d 242 (2001).

Failure to Raise Genuine Issue of Material Fact. - The wife's answer generally denying the allegations of the husband's complaint for an absolute divorce was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Daniel v. Daniel, 132 N.C. App. 217, 510 S.E.2d 689 (1999).

Judgment Invalid Without Finding of Grounds. - Where judgment of divorce from bed and board contained absolutely no finding of the existence of any of the grounds for divorce from bed and board cognizable under G.S. 50-7, the district court was without power or authority, and therefore without jurisdiction, to enter it. Allred v. Tucci, 85 N.C. App. 138, 354 S.E.2d 291, cert. denied, 320 N.C. 166, 358 S.E.2d 47 (1987).

Order in Habeas Corpus Proceeding Is Not Res Judicata in Divorce Action. - It is patent that an order entered in a habeas corpus proceeding based on facts found by the trial judge is not res judicata in an action for divorce upon the ground of adultery. Wicker v. Wicker, 255 N.C. 723, 122 S.E.2d 703 (1961).

Summary Judgment. - Under this section as it read prior to amendment in 1991, summary judgment could not be entered granting an absolute divorce in this State. Edwards v. Edwards, 42 N.C. App. 301, 256 S.E.2d 728 (1979).

In a case in which plaintiff, in her capacity as the personal representative of the estate of the decedent, sought to annul the decedent's marriage to defendant, arguing that the marriage was invalid because the officiant was not legally authorized to perform a wedding ceremony in North Carolina, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to plaintiff because, under this statute, marriages in North Carolina could not be annulled at the summary judgment stage. Hill v. Durrett, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 470 (2019).

Rendering of Default Judgment as Sanction in Annulment Action Improper. - Default judgment was incorrectly entered pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 37, due to a purported wife's failure to comply with the trial court's discovery orders in an annulment proceeding because a judgment for annulment could not be entered by default under G.S. 50-10(a), which gave the trial court subject matter jurisdiction over the annulment action. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 192 N.C. App. 248, 664 S.E.2d 616 (2008).

Decree by Consent, Stipulation, or Admissions. - This section itself raises issues in a divorce action as to all material facts, regardless of whether the parties by their pleadings have raised any issue and even where all material facts are admitted. Thus, this section has the effect of prohibiting entry of a divorce decree by consent, stipulation, or admissions of the parties, and requires instead that all material facts be found, either by a jury where the right to a jury trial has been preserved as provided in G.S. 1A-1, Rules 38 and 39, or by the court where a jury trial has been waived. Edwards v. Edwards, 42 N.C. App. 301, 256 S.E.2d 728 (1979), decided prior to 1991 amendment.

Right to Jury Trial Preserved. - Where the defendant in apt time and manner demands a jury trial and does not thereafter waive but continues to assert her right to a jury trial, although it may seem futile for defendant to insist upon a trial by jury when, but for this section, no real issue exists, this section gives her the right to do so, and it would be error for the trial court to deny her the right to have the facts found in a trial by jury. Edwards v. Edwards, 42 N.C. App. 301, 256 S.E.2d 728 (1979).

1971 Amendment Did Not Nullify Right Conferred Prior to Amendment. - Where the last pleading was filed nearly six months prior to the 1971 amendment of this section, the amendment did not nullify the right to request a jury trial "prior to the call of the action for trial" conferred by this section at the time defendant filed the last pleading. Branch v. Branch, 282 N.C. 133, 191 S.E.2d 671 (1972).

The substance of the 1973 amendment is very similar to that of the 1971 amendment. Laws v. Laws, 22 N.C. App. 344, 206 S.E.2d 324 (1974).

The 1973 amendment did not alter the procedure for securing a jury trial in actions for absolute divorce after a one-year separation where an answer had been filed at least 10 days prior to the effective date of the amendment. Laws v. Laws, 22 N.C. App. 344, 206 S.E.2d 324 (1974).

Waiver of Jury Trial. - Defendant waived his right to trial by jury in an action for divorce on the ground of two years' (now one year's) separation when he failed to file a request therefor prior to the call of the action for trial, and the fact that defendant had alleged a cross-action for divorce for adultery did not affect this result when defendant withdrew his cross-action before the case was called. Becker v. Becker, 262 N.C. 685, 138 S.E.2d 507 (1964), decided prior to the 1973 amendment.

In a suit for divorce on the grounds of separation, where defendant was personally served with summons, the judge, in the absence of a request for a jury trial filed prior to the call of the action for trial, had authority to hear the evidence, answer the issues, and render judgment thereon. This rule applied equally to contested and uncontested divorce actions. Langley v. Langley, 268 N.C. 415, 150 S.E.2d 764 (1966), decided prior to the 1973 amendment.

A party may waive the right to a jury trial in civil actions by failure to follow the statutory procedure to preserve such right. Laws v. Laws, 1 N.C. App. 243, 161 S.E.2d 40 (1968), decided prior to the 1973 amendment.

Question for Jury. - Where the facts in a divorce action were in dispute, the case was one for the jury. Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 80, 33 S.E.2d 492 (1945).

Evidence in divorce action held insufficient to carry case to jury. Moody v. Moody, 225 N.C. 89, 33 S.E.2d 491 (1945).

Instruction Not at Variance with Section. - In an action for absolute divorce, a charge in reference to the admissions of counsel that the evidence was sufficient to support an affirmative answer to the issues of marriage, separation and residence was not equivalent to a directed verdict and not at variance with the provisions of this section. Nelson v. Nelson, 197 N.C. 465, 149 S.E. 585 (1929).

Verdict of Jury. - In a proceeding for a divorce, the issues submitted and the verdict found should be as specific and certain as the facts alleged in the petition. Wood v. Wood, 27 N.C. 674 (1845).

As to validity of verdict by 11 jurors, see Hall v. Hall, 131 N.C. 185, 42 S.E. 562 (1902).

Proof of Adultery. - For cases as to incompetence of one spouse to prove adultery of the other, prior to deletion of this provision by Session Laws 1983 (Reg. Sess., 1984), c. 1037, see Toole v. Toole, 112 N.C. 152, 16 S.E. 912 (1893); Hooper v. Hooper, 165 N.C. 605, 81 S.E. 933 (1914); Vickers v. Vickers, 188 N.C. 448, 124 S.E. 737 (1924); Becker v. Becker, 262 N.C. 685, 138 S.E.2d 507 (1964), citing Perkins v. Perkins, 88 N.C. 41 (1883); Hicks v. Hicks, 275 N.C. 370, 167 S.E.2d 761 (1969); Gordon v. Gordon, 7 N.C. App. 206, 171 S.E.2d 805 (1970); Phillips v. Phillips, 9 N.C. App. 438, 176 S.E.2d 379 (1970); Wright v. Wright, 281 N.C. 159, 188 S.E.2d 317 (1972); Greene v. Greene, 15 N.C. App. 314, 190 S.E.2d 258 (1972); Bowen v. Bowen, 19 N.C. App. 710, 200 S.E.2d 214 (1973); Earles v. Earles, 26 N.C. App. 559, 216 S.E.2d 739, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 239, 217 S.E.2d 679 (1975); Traywick v. Traywick, 28 N.C. App. 291, 221 S.E.2d 85 (1976); VanDooren v. VanDooren, 37 N.C. App. 333, 246 S.E.2d 20, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 653, 248 S.E.2d 258 (1978); Horner v. Horner, 47 N.C. App. 334, 267 S.E.2d 65, cert. denied, 301 N.C. 89, 273 S.E.2d 297 (1980); Vandiver v. Vandiver, 50 N.C. App. 319, 274 S.E.2d 243, cert. denied, 302 N.C. 634, 280 S.E.2d 449 (1981); Spencer v. Spencer, 61 N.C. App. 535, 301 S.E.2d 411, cert. denied, 308 N.C. 678, 304 S.E.2d 757 (1983).

Applied in Carpenter v. Carpenter, 244 N.C. 286, 93 S.E.2d 617 (1956); Biggs v. Biggs, 253 N.C. 10, 116 S.E.2d 178 (1960); Richardson v. Richardson, 257 N.C. 705, 127 S.E.2d 525 (1962); Hinson v. Hinson, 17 N.C. App. 505, 195 S.E.2d 98 (1973); Miller v. Miller, 38 N.C. App. 95, 247 S.E.2d 278 (1978); Watts v. Watts, 44 N.C. App. 46, 260 S.E.2d 170 (1979); Morris v. Morris, 45 N.C. App. 69, 262 S.E.2d 359 (1980); Williamson v. Williamson, 66 N.C. App. 315, 311 S.E.2d 325 (1984); Fulton v. Vickery, 73 N.C. App. 382, 326 S.E.2d 354 (1985).

Cited in State v. Davis, 229 N.C. 386, 50 S.E.2d 37 (1948); Blankenship v. Blankenship, 256 N.C. 638, 124 S.E.2d 857 (1962); Anthony v. Anthony, 8 N.C. App. 20, 173 S.E.2d 617 (1970); Whitaker v. Whitaker, 16 N.C. App. 432, 192 S.E.2d 80 (1972); Pettus v. Pettus, 62 N.C. App. 141, 302 S.E.2d 261 (1983); Bumgardner v. Bumgardner, 113 N.C. App. 314, 438 S.E.2d 471 (1994); McCall v. McCall, 138 N.C. App. 706, 531 S.E.2d 894 (2000); McCall v. McCall, 138 N.C. App. 706, 531 S.E.2d 894 (2000); Podrebarac v. Horack, Talley, Pharr, & Lowndes, P.A., 231 N.C. App. 70, 752 S.E.2d 661 (2013); Oltmanns v. Oltmanns, 241 N.C. App. 326, 773 S.E.2d 347 (2015).

Opinions of Attorney General

Service of process upon defendant in divorce action by leaving copies with defendant's mother at defendant's address was sufficient service and sufficient for nonjury trial. See opinion of Attorney General to the Honorable John S. Gardner, District Court Judge, Sixteenth Judicial District, 41 N.C.A.G. 473 (1971), decided prior to the 1973 amendment.

Service of Process by Publication Does Not Prohibit Waiver of Right to Trial by Jury. - See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Tom H. Matthews, 43 N.C.A.G. 48 (1973), decided prior to the 1973 amendment.

§ 50-11. Effects of absolute divorce.

  1. After a judgment of divorce from the bonds of matrimony, all rights arising out of the marriage shall cease and determine except as hereinafter set out, and either party may marry again without restriction arising from the dissolved marriage.
  2. No judgment of divorce shall cause any child in esse or begotten of the body of the wife during coverture to be treated as a child born out of wedlock.
  3. A divorce obtained pursuant to G.S. 50-5.1 or G.S. 50-6 shall not affect the rights of either spouse with respect to any action for alimony or postseparation support pending at the time the judgment for divorce is granted. Furthermore, a judgment of absolute divorce shall not impair or destroy the right of a spouse to receive alimony or postseparation support or affect any other rights provided for such spouse under any judgment or decree of a court rendered before or at the time of the judgment of absolute divorce.
  4. A divorce obtained outside the State in an action in which jurisdiction over the person of the dependent spouse was not obtained shall not impair or destroy the right of the dependent spouse to alimony as provided by the laws of this State.
  5. An absolute divorce obtained within this State shall destroy the right of a spouse to equitable distribution under G.S. 50-20 unless the right is asserted prior to judgment of absolute divorce; except, the defendant may bring an action or file a motion in the cause for equitable distribution within six months from the date of the judgment in such a case if service of process upon the defendant was by publication pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 4 and the defendant failed to appear in the action for divorce.
  6. An absolute divorce by a court that lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property shall not destroy the right of a spouse to equitable distribution under G.S. 50-20 if an action or motion in the cause is filed within six months after the judgment of divorce is entered. The validity of such divorce may be attacked in the action for equitable distribution.

History

(1871-2, c. 193, s. 43; Code, s. 1295; Rev., s. 1569; 1919, c. 204; C.S., s. 1663; 1953, c. 1313; 1955, c. 872, s. 1; 1967, c. 1152, s. 3; 1981, c. 190; c. 815, s. 2; 1987, c. 844, s. 3; 1991, c. 569, s. 2; 1995, c. 319, s. 8; 1998-217, s. 7(a), (b); 2013-198, s. 24.)

Cross References. - As to procedures in actions for equitable distribution of property, see G.S. 50-21.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1995, c. 319, which amended this section, in s. 12 provides that this act applies to civil actions filed on or after October 1, 1995, and shall not apply to pending litigation, or to future motions in the cause seeking to modify orders or judgments in effect on October 1, 1995.

This section, prior to the amendment by Session Laws 1995, c. 319, read as follows: " Effects of absolute divorce.

  1. After a judgment of divorce from the bonds of matrimony, all rights arising out of the marriage shall cease and determine except as hereinafter set out, and either party may marry again without restriction arising from the dissolved marriage.
  2. No judgment of divorce shall render illegitimate any child in esse, or begotten of the body of the wife during coverture.
  3. A divorce obtained pursuant to G.S. 50-5.1 or G.S. 50-6 shall not affect the rights of either spouse with respect to any action for alimony or alimony pendente lite pending at the time the judgment for divorce is granted. Furthermore, a judgment of absolute divorce shall not impair or destroy the right of a spouse to receive alimony or alimony pendente lite or affect any other rights provided for such spouse under any judgment or decree of a court rendered before or at the time of the judgment of absolute divorce.
  4. A divorce obtained outside the State in an action in which jurisdiction over the person of the dependent spouse was not obtained shall not impair or destroy the right of the dependent spouse to alimony as provided by the laws of this State.
  5. An absolute divorce obtained within this State shall destroy the right of a spouse to an equitable distribution of the marital property under G.S. 50-20 unless the right is asserted prior to judgment of absolute divorce; except, the defendant may bring an action or file a motion in the cause for equitable distribution within six months from the date of the judgment in such a case if service of process upon the defendant was by publication pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 4 and the defendant failed to appear in the action for divorce.
  6. An absolute divorce by a court that lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property shall not destroy the right of a spouse to an equitable distribution of marital property under G.S. 50-20 if an action or motion in the cause is filed within six months after the judgment of divorce is entered. The validity of such divorce may be attacked in the action for equitable distribution."

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2013-198, s. 24, effective June 26, 2013, rewrote subsection (b), which formerly read: "No judgment of divorce shall render illegitimate any child in esse, or begotten of the body of the wife during coverture."

Legal Periodicals. - For note on permanent alimony incident to absolute divorce, see 31 N.C.L. Rev. 482 (1953).

For note on choice of law rules in North Carolina, see 48 N.C.L. Rev. 243 (1970).

For article, "Proposed Reforms in North Carolina Divorce Law," see 8 N.C. Cent. L.J. 35 (1976).

For survey of 1976 case law on domestic relations, see 55 N.C.L. Rev. 1018 (1977).

For survey of 1977 law on domestic relations, see 56 N.C.L. Rev. 1045 (1978).

For article on the rights of individuals to control the distributional consequences of divorce by private contract and on the interests of the State in preserving its role as a third party to marriage and divorce, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 819 (1981).

For survey of 1980 family law, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1194 (1981).

For survey of 1981 family law, see 60 N.C.L. Rev. 1379 (1982).

For comment on the tax effects of equitable distribution upon divorce, see 18 Wake Forest L. Rev. 555 (1982).

For 1984 survey, "Estoppel and Foreign Divorce," see 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1189 (1985).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under the various versions of this section applicable at the time, and may not reflect all subsequent amendments.

Cessation of Right to Support. - This section is declarative of the common law in that one of the rights which determines and ceases after a judgment of absolute divorce is the right to support. McCarley v. McCarley, 289 N.C. 109, 221 S.E.2d 490 (1976).

Power to Enter Alimony Order Ends upon Divorce. - When a party has secured an absolute divorce, it is beyond the power of the court thereafter to enter an order for alimony. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 270 N.C. 253, 154 S.E.2d 71 (1967).

Wife's answer and counterclaim did not sufficiently preserve her claim for alimony, under G.S. 50-11(c), after an absolute divorce was granted, when she requested a certain monthly amount of alimony, because such a claim could arise on several alternative grounds requiring a trial court's consideration of at least 16 "relevant factors" in determining whether statutory grounds existed to award alimony, and if so whether such an award was equitable under G.S. 50-16.3A; so, under G.S. 1A-1-8(a)(1), an alimony pleading had to contain notice of the grounds upon which this relief was sought, and as the wife's answer did not state such grounds, it was insufficient. Coleman v. Coleman, 182 N.C. App. 25, 641 S.E.2d 332 (2007).

Jurisdiction. - Where the parties invoked the jurisdiction of the district court to equitably distribute their marital property in the action for absolute divorce and equitable distribution of their marital property, the district court did not lose jurisdiction to equitably distribute the marital property because of its failure to enter a judgment in the equitable distribution case before the special proceeding seeking partition of the marital property was filed in the office of the clerk of superior court. Garrison v. Garrison, 90 N.C. App. 670, 369 S.E.2d 628 (1988).

Jurisdiction Over Child Support. - Where a North Carolina judgment of absolute divorce made no provision for child support, and there was thus no existing order, the Texas Attorney General's petition to establish a support obligation was properly classified as a petition to establish an order of support rather than a petition to modify an order of no support; thus, under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, the Texas trial court had the authority to adjudicate the father's child support obligation, and because the North Carolina tribunal had not acquired continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, the trial court erred in granting the father's plea to the jurisdiction. Office of the AG of Tex. v. Long, 401 S.W.3d 911 (May 21, 2013).

The words "or at the time of" in subsection (c) of this section were added to complement G.S. 50-16.8(b), which allows the questions of divorce and alimony to be determined in a single action. McCarley v. McCarley, 289 N.C. 109, 221 S.E.2d 490 (1976).

Alimony May Be Awarded After Hearing on Remand. - If alimony is found to be appropriate after a hearing on remand, the ensuing judgment or decree awarding it will relate back to the time when the application for alimony should have been considered, which is "before or at the time of the rendering of the judgment for absolute divorce." McCarley v. McCarley, 289 N.C. 109, 221 S.E.2d 490 (1976).

Decree of Absolute Divorce on Counterclaim to Action for Alimony as Interlocutory Judgment. - A decree of absolute divorce upon a counterclaim to an action for alimony without divorce was not a final judgment as to the remainder of the claims to be adjudicated in the action. Instead, it was merely an interlocutory judgment, to become final upon a complete adjudication of all claims, rights and liabilities of the parties. It did not terminate or determine the remaining issues arising from the pleadings in the action. Therefore, the court could amend, modify or rescind it at anytime prior to final judgment. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 36 N.C. App. 755, 245 S.E.2d 399 (1978), aff'd, 296 N.C. 574, 251 S.E.2d 441 (1979).

A judgment of absolute divorce upon a counterclaim to an action for alimony without divorce, rendered prior to final determination of all issues, was interlocutory and subject to the provisions of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 54(b), for purposes of determining its finality. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 36 N.C. App. 755, 245 S.E.2d 399 (1978), aff'd, 296 N.C. 574, 251 S.E.2d 441 (1979).

Effect of Absolute Divorce on Prior Judgment for Alimony Without Divorce. - A judgment for absolute divorce awarded to the husband on the ground of two years' (now one year's) separation did not invalidate a judgment for alimony without divorce entered in favor of the wife before the action for absolute divorce was instituted. Blankenship v. Blankenship, 256 N.C. 638, 124 S.E.2d 857 (1962).

Subsection (e) merely requires an equitable distribution claim to be asserted at any time prior to judgment, and does not prohibit a claim asserted before a divorce action is filed. McIver v. McIver, 92 N.C. App. 116, 374 S.E.2d 144 (1988).

Trial court erred in granting a husband's motion to dismiss a wife's motion for equitable distribution, pursuant to G.S. 50-20, in a divorce action where the wife filed the motion on the day before the judgment was signed by the judge and filed, at which point the judgment became final pursuant to G.S. 1A-1-58; therefore, G.S. 50-11(e) did not destroy the wife's right to seek equitable distribution as the motion was filed before an absolute divorce was granted. Santana v. Santana, 171 N.C. App. 432, 614 S.E.2d 438 (2005).

Equitable Distribution After Judgment of Absolute Divorce. - Under this section, a judgment of absolute divorce destroys the right to equitable distribution unless the right is asserted prior to judgment of absolute divorce. Howell v. Howell, 321 N.C. 87, 361 S.E.2d 585 (1987).

If a person entitled to equitable distribution does not specifically apply for it by cross-action or by a separate action prior to the judgment of absolute divorce, the divorce judgment destroys that person's statutory right to equitable distribution. Lutz v. Lutz, 101 N.C. App. 298, 399 S.E.2d 385 (1991), cert. denied, 328 N.C. 732, 404 S.E.2d 871 (1991).

If alimony and equitable distribution claims are properly asserted, whether by the filing of an action or raising of counterclaims, and are not voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) until after judgment of absolute divorce is entered, a new action based on those claims may be filed within the one year period provided by the rule. Stegall v. Stegall, 336 N.C. 473, 444 S.E.2d 177 (1994).

Although subsection (e) requires that a claim for equitable distribution be brought prior to the granting of the divorce; where the trial court granted defendant relief from the judgment of absolute divorce and permitted defendant to file her answer, the effect was the same as if the judgment had never been entered, and defendant's right to equitable distribution was revived. Baker v. Baker, 115 N.C. App. 337, 444 S.E.2d 478 (1994).

Wife sufficiently preserved her claim to an equitable distribution of marital property under G.S. 50-11(e) when her answer to her husband's complaint for divorce requested and reserved a right to equitable distribution, because the remedy of equitable distribution in a divorce case only applied to marital assets, and G.S. 50-21(a) gave a party asserting a claim for such redress 90 days to provide specific information about the property claimed to be subject to equitable distribution; so, to constitute a valid equitable distribution claim, the wife's counterclaim for equitable distribution did not have to state that it applied to the parties' marital assets or property, and the husband was put on notice that the wife asked the court to equitably distribute the parties' marital and divisible property. Coleman v. Coleman, 182 N.C. App. 25, 641 S.E.2d 332 (2007).

In proceedings in which a former husband was granted an absolute divorce, the former wife was not entitled to compel an equitable distribution affidavit from the former husband because the wife failed to properly file her equitable distribution claim pursuant to G.S. 50-21(a) as a separate action, cross-action, or motion in the cause within six months after the husband dismissed his own equitable distribution claim as required by G.S. 50-11(e) and (f); an oral motion by the wife for such a claim did not constitute the required motion. Webb v. Webb, 188 N.C. App. 621, 656 S.E.2d 334 (2008).

Wife could not appeal an order granting a husband's motion to vacate a judgment of absolute divorce to allow the husband to assert an equitable distribution claim because, inter alia, the wife did not show the order affected a substantial right as (1) the husband was not collaterally estopped, based on G.S. 50-11(e), from making an equitable distribution claim, since no such claim had been adjudicated, so the order did not expose the wife to the risk of an inconsistent equitable distribution judgment, and (2) the wife did not show any representations the wife had made about the wife's marital status amounted to a substantial right. Campbell v. Campbell, 237 N.C. App. 1, 764 S.E.2d 630 (2014).

Trial court erred in granting defendant wife's motion to be "relieved of the effect" of a divorce judgment solely to the extent that the judgment barred her claim for equitable distribution. Howell v. Howell, 321 N.C. 87, 361 S.E.2d 585 (1987).

Authority for Equitable Distribution. - Where neither party made application or stated a claim for equitable distribution prior to the judgment of absolute divorce, the trial court lacked the authority to enter such a judgment. Stirewalt v. Stirewalt, 114 N.C. App. 107, 440 S.E.2d 854 (1994).

The superior court had no authority to partition marital property pursuant to the provisions of G.S. 46-1 et seq. where, as here, the jurisdiction of the district court has been properly invoked to equitably distribute such marital property. Garrison v. Garrison, 90 N.C. App. 670, 369 S.E.2d 628 (1988).

Effect on Pending Action for Alimony Without Divorce. - Where, pending wife's action for alimony without divorce, husband obtained decree of absolute divorce on the ground of separation for the statutory period under G.S. 50-6, it was held that the final judgment in her action would be rendered after absolute divorce, and that she therefore would not be entitled to permanent alimony in her action, since under the common law she would not be entitled to alimony after a divorce a vinculo, and that the saving provisions of this section would not be applicable. Yow v. Yow, 243 N.C. 79, 89 S.E.2d 867 (1955), decided prior to 1991 amendment.

Effect of Divorce Granted on Counterclaim to Pending Action for Alimony. - A decree of absolute divorce, granted to the defendant in a prior separate hearing on his counterclaim to an action for alimony without divorce, could not be pleaded as a bar to the judgment awarding alimony in the subsequent hearing on the plaintiff's claim which initiated the action. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 36 N.C. App. 755, 245 S.E.2d 399 (1978), aff'd, 296 N.C. 574, 251 S.E.2d 441 (1979).

Effect on Alimony Pendente Lite. - A dependent spouse's action for alimony without divorce was properly dismissed and order awarding alimony pendente lite was properly terminated on motion of the supporting spouse where he had been granted an absolute divorce in an action instituted by him after the order for alimony pendente lite was entered. Smith v. Smith, 12 N.C. App. 378, 183 S.E.2d 283 (1971), decided prior to 1991 amendment.

Where a judgment awarding the wife alimony pendente lite, to be continued until the award of permanent alimony, was rendered before rendition of judgment for absolute divorce, the rights provided for the wife by the prior judgment could not be impaired or destroyed by the subsequently rendered decree of absolute divorce, and defendant remained liable to continue to make the payments under the alimony pendente lite order. Johnson v. Johnson, 17 N.C. App. 398, 194 S.E.2d 562 (1973).

Effect on Debts. - Debt incurred after separation of the parties was not subject to equitable distribution. Harrington v. Harrington, 110 N.C. App. 782, 431 S.E.2d 240 (1993).

Effect of Divorce Under Former Law. - For other cases dealing with the effect of an absolute divorce on the right to alimony, decided under this section as it stood before the 1953, 1955 and 1967 amendments, see Duffy v. Duffy, 120 N.C. 346, 27 S.E. 28 (1897); Livingston v. Livingston, 235 N.C. 515, 70 S.E.2d 480 (1952); Feldman v. Feldman, 236 N.C. 731, 73 S.E.2d 865 (1953); Merritt v. Merritt, 237 N.C. 271, 74 S.E.2d 529 (1953); Deaton v. Deaton, 237 N.C. 487, 75 S.E.2d 398 (1953).

Absolute Defense Under Prior Law. - An alimony claim made pursuant to G.S. 50-16.3A(a) and filed within one year of plaintiff's dismissal of her first claim (under repealed G.S. 50-16.6(a)) failed to qualify as "a new action based on the same claim" under Rule 41(a)(1) because the G.S. 50-16.3A(a) claim for alimony was distinct from that set out by the repealed section in that it deferred to the court's discretion on the decision of whether to award alimony where both the supporting and dependent spouse "each participated in an act of illicit sexual behavior," whereas the old section foreclosed a dependent spouse from recovering; to allow her to maintain this new action would have deprived the defendant/husband of a statutory absolute defense he had had under the old law. Brannock v. Brannock, 135 N.C. App. 635, 523 S.E.2d 110 (1999).

South Carolina Divorce Action Did Not Destroy Right to Equitable Distribution Under This Section. - Where neither party to a divorce action in South Carolina requested an adjudication of their property rights it necessarily followed that under the South Carolina statute the court never acquired jurisdiction over their marital property and that the divorce judgment entered therein did not destroy plaintiff 's right to an equitable distribution of their marital property under this section. Cooper v. Cooper, 90 N.C. App. 665, 369 S.E.2d 630 (1988).

Asserting Claim to Property Was Not Notice of Equitable Distribution. - In divorce case, defendant's answer asserting a claim to an interest in a specific piece of property, or to proceeds in plaintiff's possession flowing from defendant's interest in that piece of property, was not sufficient to put plaintiff on notice that he was asserting a claim for equitable distribution under G.S. 50-20. Goodwin v. Zeydel, 96 N.C. App. 670, 387 S.E.2d 57 (1990).

Trial court had no authority to reaffirm divorce decree and reserve for future resolution the issue of equitable distribution where the trial court did not set aside the divorce but rather attempted to nullify the consequences of defendant's failure to assert her claim for equitable distribution prior to the entry of judgment of divorce. Even if the court had effectively set aside, briefly, the divorce decree itself and then immediately reinstated the divorce decree with a reservation of an equitable distribution claim, the reservation of the equitable distribution claim would have been a legal nullity because plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his equitable distribution claim and defendant did not, during the time the divorce was arguably set aside, file an answer, counterclaim, or separate action requesting equitable distribution. Carter v. Carter, 102 N.C. App. 440, 402 S.E.2d 469 (1991).

Waiver of Equitable Distribution Induced by Misrepresentations of Other Party. - Defendant would be estopped from asserting the defense that plaintiff did not preserve her equitable distribution claim if plaintiff, in good faith, relied on the misrepresentations of the defendant in waiving her right to equitable distribution. Harroff v. Harroff, 100 N.C. App. 686, 398 S.E.2d 340 (1990), discretionary review denied, 328 N.C. 330, 402 S.E.2d 833 (1991).

Divorce Decree Containing Provision Reserving Equitable Distribution Issue. - Where decree for absolute divorce contained a provision reserving the issue of equitable distribution for hearing at a later date, trial judge, with whom plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to dismiss defendant's claim for equitable distribution pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, had no authority to find error and reverse or vacate divorce judge's order reserving the issue. Stone v. Stone, 96 N.C. App. 633, 386 S.E.2d 602 (1989), cert. denied, 326 N.C. 805, 393 S.E.2d 906 (1990).

Rights Under Consent Judgment as Contractual. - Insofar as consent judgment imposed a duty of support on defendant-husband beyond that imposed by the common law or by statute, plaintiff-wife's rights did not arise out of the marriage, but out of contract. Haynes v. Haynes, 45 N.C. App. 376, 263 S.E.2d 783 (1980).

Consent Judgment Held Not Affected. - Where a consent judgment for alimony without divorce had been entered, a condition of which was that the wife would remain unmarried, the subsequent decreeing of a divorce a vinculo to the wife was not a violation of the terms of the consent judgment, and the judge had no authority to reduce the amount of alimony provided in the consent judgment upon that ground. Lentz v. Lentz, 193 N.C. 742, 138 S.E. 12, aff'd, 194 N.C. 673, 140 S.E. 440 (1927), overruled on other grounds, Story v. Story, 221 N.C. 114, 19 S.E.2d 136 (1942).

Contractual Right to Continued Support Under Separation Agreement. - A separation agreement by which the husband agrees to support his wife even after a decree of divorce has been entered which, under this section, would otherwise terminate his obligation, is nonetheless valid. In such a case, the wife's right to continued support does not arise out of the marriage, but arises out of contract and survives the judgment of absolute divorce. Haynes v. Haynes, 45 N.C. App. 376, 263 S.E.2d 783 (1980).

Claim for Arrearages in Payment Under Predivorce Separation Agreement. - Plaintiff's claim for arrearages in payments under a predivorce separation agreement was based on a right arising out of contract, which survived a judgment of absolute divorce, and was not a right arising out of marriage which was terminated by a judgment of absolute divorce. McKnight v. McKnight, 25 N.C. App. 246, 212 S.E.2d 902, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 466, 215 S.E.2d 624 (1975).

Enforcement of Separation Agreement. - This section does not protect a mere separation agreement as an award of alimony, and such an agreement may not be enforced by imprisonment for contempt. Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 37 S.E.2d 118 (1946).

Award of Attorneys' Fees Where Plaintiff Is Unable to Defray Expenses. - An award under either G.S. 50-13.6 for "reasonable attorneys' fees to an interested party acting in good faith who has insufficient means to defray the expense of the suit" or under subsection (c) of this section and G.S. 50-16.4, applying the doctrine of Shore v. Shore, 15 N.C. App. 629, 190 S.E.2d 666 (1972), is appropriate upon a finding by the trial court in the exercise of its discretion that the plaintiff is unable to defray the expense of the suit. Gilmore v. Gilmore, 42 N.C. App. 560, 257 S.E.2d 116 (1979).

Award of Counsel Fees for Services Rendered Subsequent to Absolute Divorce. - Unless the case falls within one of the two exceptions (now one exception) made by subsection (c) of this section, counsel fees may be awarded for services rendered to a dependent spouse subsequent to an absolute divorce in seeking to obtain or in resisting a motion for a revision of alimony or other rights provided under any judgment or decree of a court rendered before or at the time of the rendering of the judgment for absolute divorce. Shore v. Shore, 15 N.C. App. 629, 190 S.E.2d 666 (1972).

Under subsection (c) of this section, an award of counsel fees is allowed for services rendered to a dependent spouse subsequent to an absolute divorce in seeking to obtain or in resisting a motion for revision of alimony or other rights. Broughton v. Broughton, 58 N.C. App. 778, 294 S.E.2d 772, cert. denied, 307 N.C. 269, 299 S.E.2d 214 (1982).

Counsel Fees for Enforcement of Subsistence Pendente Lite. - Since a wife's right to receive subsistence pendente lite is not destroyed by a judgment of absolute divorce, where her action for alimony without divorce is still pending, it would seem that the proviso in this section is broad enough to include counsel fees to the wife to enforce the payment to her of subsistence pendente lite in arrears, for without counsel her right to enforce such payments might be impaired or destroyed. Yow v. Yow, 243 N.C. 79, 89 S.E.2d 867 (1955).

Divorce Does Not Annul or Revoke Insurance Beneficiary Designation. - Neither this section, which provides that "all rights arising out of the marriage shall cease and determine," nor G.S. 31A-1, which bars rights to "any rights or interests in the property of the other spouse," discloses a legislative intent that divorce should annul or revoke the beneficiary designation in a garden-variety insurance certificate. DeVane v. Travelers Ins. Co., 8 N.C. App. 247, 174 S.E.2d 146 (1970).

Power of Alabama Court to Modify North Carolina Alimony Decree. - An Alabama court which had in personam jurisdiction over the parties could modify a North Carolina alimony decree, where the Alabama court in effect found that circumstances had changed since the entry of the North Carolina decree. Vincent v. Vincent, 38 N.C. App. 580, 248 S.E.2d 410 (1978).

An Alabama court with in personam jurisdiction over the parties could not modify retroactively a North Carolina alimony judgment where there was no showing of any sudden emergency requiring such a reduction. Vincent v. Vincent, 38 N.C. App. 580, 248 S.E.2d 410 (1978).

Claim for Equitable Distribution Properly Dismissed. - Trial court did not err in dismissing the wife's tardy claim for equitable distribution, either on the ground that the trial court had left the issue open or upon the ground that the husband was equitably estopped from relying on subsection (e) of this section, where, although the trial court specifically reserved the issue of equitable distribution for the future in its judgment of absolute divorce, the wife had not, and the husband had asserted a claim for equitable distribution for the future prior to the judgment of absolute divorce. Lutz v. Lutz, 101 N.C. App. 298, 399 S.E.2d 385 (1991), cert. denied, 328 N.C. 732, 404 S.E.2d 871 (1991).

Where an Alabama court which had in personam jurisdiction over the parties modified a North Carolina alimony decree, the dependent spouse's right to alimony was terminated as of the entry of the Alabama decree. There was no need to prolong the litigation by requiring the supporting spouse to commence a third proceeding in North Carolina to set aside the prior North Carolina judgment. Vincent v. Vincent, 38 N.C. App. 580, 248 S.E.2d 410 (1978).

As to nonapplicability of 1953 and 1955 amendments to a 1951 judgment for absolute divorce, see Yow v. Yow, 243 N.C. 79, 89 S.E.2d 867 (1955).

Former Bar Against Alimony for Spouse Obtaining Divorce on Ground of Separation. - As to the bar against a decree of alimony for the dependent spouse where this spouse both initiated an action for and obtained a divorce on the ground of the statutory separation period under subsection (c) of this section prior to its amendment by Session Laws 1981, c. 190, see Porter v. Citizens Bank, 249 N.C. 173, 105 S.E.2d 669 (1958); Shore v. Shore, 15 N.C. App. 629, 190 S.E.2d 666 (1972); McCarley v. McCarley, 289 N.C. 109, 221 S.E.2d 490 (1976).

Modification of Alimony After Lump Sum Award Paid. - Where an ex-wife's motion to modify alimony was not filed until several years after the lump sum alimony award ordered by the trial court had been paid in full, the trial court's "modification" instead created a new award, which was forbidden by G.S. 50-11, and the wife was not entitled to a new alimony award. Cathey v. Cathey, 210 N.C. App. 230, 707 S.E.2d 638 (2011).

Power to Enter Alimony Order Ends Upon Divorce. - Party's filed counterclaim was sufficient to constitute an action pending when judgment of absolute divorce was entered, and a person had to apply specifically for the claim by cross-action or by a separate action, and the bare reservation by a trial court only preserved the claim for the party who had asserted the right prior to judgment of absolute divorce; while this applied to equitable distribution, there was no reason why alimony should not be treated the same for preservation purposes. Stark v. Ratashara, 177 N.C. App. 449, 628 S.E.2d 471 (2006), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 536, 633 S.E.2d 826 (2006).

When a husband was granted an absolute divorce on the grounds of separation for one year, and the wife did not file a counterclaim or separate claim for alimony before the trial court entered a judgment of absolute divorce, which did not preserve an alimony claim, a statement in the wife's answer that "the claims for alimony and equitable distribution pending this action are to be reserved" was insufficient to give the trial court jurisdiction, under G.S. 50-11, to consider the wife's amended answer and counterclaim for alimony, despite the husband's answer to that counterclaim, as subject matter jurisdiction could not be conferred by the parties' consent. Stark v. Ratashara, 177 N.C. App. 449, 628 S.E.2d 471 (2006), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 536, 633 S.E.2d 826 (2006).

Applied in Bowling v. Bowling, 252 N.C. 527, 114 S.E.2d 228 (1960); Biggs v. Biggs, 253 N.C. 10, 116 S.E.2d 178 (1960); Sears v. Sears, 253 N.C. 415, 117 S.E.2d 7 (1960); Darden v. Darden, 20 N.C. App. 433, 201 S.E.2d 538 (1974); Sawyer v. Sawyer, 21 N.C. App. 293, 204 S.E.2d 224 (1974); Amaker v. Amaker, 28 N.C. App. 558, 221 S.E.2d 917 (1976); Webber v. Webber, 32 N.C. App. 572, 232 S.E.2d 865 (1977); Roberts v. Roberts, 38 N.C. App. 295, 248 S.E.2d 85 (1978); Wise v. Wise, 42 N.C. App. 5, 255 S.E.2d 570 (1979); Lockamy v. Lockamy, 111 N.C. App. 260, 432 S.E.2d 176 (1993); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 111 N.C. App. 233, 431 S.E.2d 805 (1993).

Cited in In Dyer v. Dyer, 212 N.C. 620, 194 S.E. 278 (1937); Brown v. Brown, 224 N.C. 556, 31 S.E.2d 529 (1944); Pearce v. Pearce, 225 N.C. 571, 35 S.E.2d 636 (1945); Kinross-Wright v. Kinross-Wright, 248 N.C. 1, 102 S.E.2d 469 (1958); Taylor v. Taylor, 257 N.C. 130, 125 S.E.2d 373 (1962); Thurston v. Thurston, 256 N.C. 663, 124 S.E.2d 852 (1962); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 266 N.C. 502, 146 S.E.2d 500 (1966); Becker v. Becker, 273 N.C. 65, 159 S.E.2d 569 (1968); Bailey v. Bailey, 26 N.C. App. 444, 216 S.E.2d 394 (1975); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 296 N.C. 574, 251 S.E.2d 441 (1979); Britt v. Britt, 49 N.C. App. 463, 271 S.E.2d 921 (1980); O'Hara v. O'Hara, 46 N.C. App. 819, 266 S.E.2d 59 (1980); Payne v. Payne, 49 N.C. App. 132, 270 S.E.2d 546 (1980); McCall v. Harris, 55 N.C. App. 390, 285 S.E.2d 335 (1982); Robinson v. Robinson, 56 N.C. App. 737, 289 S.E.2d 612 (1982); Burmann v. Burmann, 64 N.C. App. 729, 308 S.E.2d 101 (1983); In re Cooper, 81 N.C. App. 27, 344 S.E.2d 27 (1986); Lawson v. Lawson, 84 N.C. App. 51, 351 S.E.2d 794 (1987); Banner v. Banner, 86 N.C. App. 397, 358 S.E.2d 110 (1987); Dickson v. Rucho, 366 N.C. 332, 737 S.E.2d 362 (2013).


§ 50-11.1. Children born of voidable marriage legitimate.

A child born of voidable marriage or a bigamous marriage is legitimate notwithstanding the annulment of the marriage.

History

(1951, c. 893, s. 2.)

CASE NOTES

Child of Bigamous Marriage Entitled to Proceeds of Insurance Policy on Father. - Under this section, there can be no question but that a child born of a bigamous marriage is legitimate and as such is entitled to the proceeds of a policy of insurance issued to his deceased father pursuant to the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act. Varker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 184 F. Supp. 159 (M.D.N.C. 1960).

Cited in Rehm v. Rehm, 2 N.C. App. 298, 163 S.E.2d 54 (1968).


§ 50-11.2. Judgment provisions pertaining to care, custody, tuition and maintenance of minor children.

Where the court has the requisite jurisdiction and upon proper pleadings and proper and due notice to all interested parties the judgment in a divorce action may contain such provisions respecting care, custody, tuition and maintenance of the minor children of the marriage as the court may adjudge; and from time to time such provisions may be modified upon due notice and hearing and a showing of a substantial change in condition; and if there be no minor children, the judgment may so state. The jurisdictional requirements of G.S. 50A-201, 50A-203, or 50A-204 shall apply in regard to a custody decree.

History

(1973, c. 927, s. 1; 1979, c. 110, s. 11; 1999-223, s. 10.)

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "Proposed Reforms in North Carolina Divorce Law," see 8 N.C. Cent. L.J. 35 (1976).

CASE NOTES

Jurisdiction. - Where a North Carolina judgment of absolute divorce made no provision for child support, and there was thus no existing order, the Texas Attorney General's petition to establish a support obligation was properly classified as a petition to establish an order of support rather than a petition to modify an order of no support; thus, under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, the Texas trial court had the authority to adjudicate the father's child support obligation, and because the North Carolina tribunal had not acquired continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, the trial court erred in granting the father's plea to the jurisdiction. Office of the AG of Tex. v. Long, 401 S.W.3d 911 (May 21, 2013).

Substantial Change in Condition. - A change in condition is substantial if the change would affect the best interests and welfare of the child. Carmichael v. Carmichael, 40 N.C. App. 277, 252 S.E.2d 257 (1979).

Effect of Separation Agreement. - While the marital and property rights of the parties under the provisions of a valid separation agreement cannot be ignored or set aside by the court without consent of the parties, such agreements are not final and binding as to the custody of minor children or as to the amount to be provided for the support and education of such minor children. Soper v. Soper, 29 N.C. App. 95, 223 S.E.2d 560 (1976).

Where parties to a separation agreement agree upon the amount of the support and maintenance of their minor children, there is a presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the amount mutually agreed upon is just and reasonable and that upon motion for an increase in such allowance, a court is not warranted in ordering an increase in the absence of any evidence of a change of conditions. Soper v. Soper, 29 N.C. App. 95, 223 S.E.2d 560 (1976).

Cited in Mohr v. Mohr, 155 N.C. App. 421, 573 S.E.2d 729 (2002).


§ 50-11.3. Certain judgments entered prior to January 1, 1981, validated.

Any judgment of divorce which has been entered prior to January 1, 1981, by a court of competent jurisdiction within the State of North Carolina without a conclusion of law that the plaintiff was entitled to an absolute divorce, but which is proper in all other respects, is hereby rendered valid and of full force and effect.

History

(1977, c. 320; 1981, c. 473.)

§ 50-11.4. Certain judgments of divorce validated.

Any judgment of divorce entered as a result of an action instituted prior to October 1, 1983, upon any grounds abolished by Chapter 613 of the 1983 Session Laws as amended by Section 217(O) of Chapter 923 of the 1983 Session Laws, which is proper in all other respects, is hereby rendered valid and of full force and effect.

History

(1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 952.)

§ 50-12. Resumption of maiden or premarriage surname.

  1. Any woman whose marriage is dissolved by a decree of absolute divorce may, upon application to the clerk of court of the county in which she resides or where the divorce was granted setting forth her intention to do so, change her name to any of the following:
    1. Her maiden name; or
    2. The surname of a prior deceased husband; or
    3. The surname of a prior living husband if she has children who have that husband's surname.
  2. A man whose marriage is dissolved by decree of absolute divorce may, upon application to the clerk of court of the county in which he resides or where the divorce was granted setting forth his intention to do so, change the surname he took upon marriage to his premarriage surname.
  3. The application and fee required by subsection (e) of this section shall be presented to the clerk of the court of the county in which such divorced person resides or where the divorce was granted, and shall set forth the full name of the former spouse of the applicant, the name of the county and state in which the divorce was granted, and the term or session of court at which such divorce was granted, and shall be signed by the woman in her full maiden name, or by the man in his full premarriage surname. The clerks of court of the several counties of the State shall record and index such applications in such manner as shall be required by the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  4. If an applicant, since the divorce, has adopted one of the surnames listed in subsection (a) or (a1) of this section, the applicant's use and adoption of that name is validated.
  5. In the complaint, or counterclaim for divorce filed by any person in this State, the person may petition the court to adopt any surname as provided by this section, and the court is authorized to incorporate in the divorce decree an order authorizing the person to adopt that surname.
  6. For support of the General Court of Justice, a fee in the amount of ten dollars ($10.00) shall be assessed against each person requesting the resumption of maiden or premarriage surname in accordance with this section. Sums collected under this section shall be remitted to the State Treasurer.

History

(1937, c. 53; 1941, c. 9; 1951, c. 780; 1957, c. 394; 1971, c. 1185, s. 23; 1981, c. 494, ss. 1-4; 1985, c. 488; 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994), c. 565, s. 1; 2005-38, s. 1; 2010-31, s. 15.9(a).)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2010-31, s. 15.9(a), effective October 1, 2010, and applicable to fees assessed or collected on or after that date, in the first sentence of subsection (b), inserted "and fee required by subsection (e) of this section" and substituted "shall be presented" for "shall be addressed"; and added subsection (e).

CASE NOTES

Wife Need Not Use Husband's Surname. - There is no statutory requirement in this State that a married woman use her husband's surname. In re Mohlman, 26 N.C. App. 220, 216 S.E.2d 147 (1975).

Section Merely Recognizes Possible Common-Law Change in Name. - This section does not imply a requirement that a married woman must assume her husband's surname. It merely recognizes that by her marriage the wife may have, through usage, effected a common-law change in her name, but it does not indicate that she was compelled to do so. In re Mohlman, 26 N.C. App. 220, 216 S.E.2d 147 (1975).

Woman Does Not by Marriage Give Up Right to Change Name. - Nothing in the law states that by marriage a woman gives up her right as a person to change her name as anyone else might change his or hers. In re Mohlman, 26 N.C. App. 220, 216 S.E.2d 147 (1975).

Opinions of Attorney General

Wife Must Have Filed Complaint or Counterclaim. - The court, in the divorce decree, may not grant authorization for the wife to resume her maiden name unless the wife filed complaint for divorce or a counterclaim (cross bill) for divorce. See opinion of Attorney General to the Honorable John H. Parker, District Court Judge, 10th Judicial District, 50 N.C.A.G. 16 (1980).

§ 50-13: Repealed by Session Laws 1967, c. 1153, s. 1.

Cross References. - As to actions or proceedings for custody of minor children, see G.S. 50-13.1 et seq.


§ 50-13.01. Purposes.

It is the policy of the State of North Carolina to:

  1. Encourage focused, good faith, and child-centered parenting agreements to reduce needless litigation over child custody matters and to promote the best interest of the child.
  2. Encourage parents to take responsibility for their child by setting the expectation that parenthood will be a significant and ongoing responsibility.
  3. Encourage programs and court practices that reflect the active and ongoing participation of both parents in the child's life and contact with both parents when such is in the child's best interest, regardless of the parents' present marital status, subject to laws regarding abuse, neglect, and dependency.
  4. Encourage both parents to share equitably in the rights and responsibilities of raising their child, even after dissolution of marriage or unwed relationship.
  5. Encourage each parent to establish and maintain a healthy relationship with the other parent when such is determined to be in the best interest of the child, taking into account mental illness, substance abuse, domestic violence, or any other factor the court deems appropriate.

History

(2015-278, s. 1.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2015-278, s. 3, made this section effective October 20, 2015.

§ 50-13.1. Action or proceeding for custody of minor child.

  1. Any parent, relative, or other person, agency, organization or institution claiming the right to custody of a minor child may institute an action or proceeding for the custody of such child, as hereinafter provided. Any person whose actions resulted in a conviction under G.S. 14-27.21, G.S. 14-27.22, G.S. 14-27.23, or G.S. 14-27.24 and the conception of the minor child may not claim the right to custody of that minor child. Unless a contrary intent is clear, the word "custody" shall be deemed to include custody or visitation or both.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person instituting an action or proceeding for custody ex parte who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense as defined in G.S. 14-208.6(5) shall disclose the conviction in the pleadings.
  3. Whenever it appears to the court, from the pleadings or otherwise, that an action involves a contested issue as to the custody or visitation of a minor child, the matter, where there is a program established pursuant to G.S. 7A-494, shall be set for mediation of the unresolved issues as to custody and visitation before or concurrent with the setting of the matter for hearing unless the court waives mediation pursuant to subsection (c). Issues that arise in motions for contempt or for modifications as well as in other pleadings shall be set for mediation unless mediation is waived by the court. Alimony, child support, and other economic issues may not be referred for mediation pursuant to this section. The purposes of mediation under this section include the pursuit of the following goals:
    1. To reduce any acrimony that exists between the parties to a dispute involving custody or visitation of a minor child;
    2. The development of custody and visitation agreements that are in the child's best interest;
    3. To provide the parties with informed choices and, where possible, to give the parties the responsibility for making decisions about child custody and visitation;
    4. To provide a structured, confidential, nonadversarial setting that will facilitate the cooperative resolution of custody and visitation disputes and minimize the stress and anxiety to which the parties, and especially the child, are subjected; and
    5. To reduce the relitigation of custody and visitation disputes.
  4. For good cause, on the motion of either party or on the court's own motion, the court may waive the mandatory setting under Article 39A of Chapter 7A of the General Statutes of a contested custody or visitation matter for mediation. Good cause may include, but is not limited to, the following: a showing of undue hardship to a party; an agreement between the parties for voluntary mediation, subject to court approval; allegations of abuse or neglect of the minor child; allegations of alcoholism, drug abuse, or domestic violence between the parents in common; or allegations of severe psychological, psychiatric, or emotional problems. A showing by either party that the party resides more than fifty miles from the court may be considered good cause.
  5. Either party may move to have the mediation proceedings dismissed and the action heard in court due to the mediator's bias, undue familiarity with a party, or other prejudicial ground.
  6. Mediation proceeding shall be held in private and shall be confidential. Except as provided in this Article, all verbal or written communications from either or both parties to the mediator or between the parties in the presence of the mediator made in a proceeding pursuant to this section are absolutely privileged and inadmissible in court. The mediator may assess the needs and interests of the child, and may interview the child or others who are not parties to the proceedings when he or she thinks appropriate.
  7. Neither the mediator nor any party or other person involved in mediation sessions under this section shall be competent to testify to communications made during or in furtherance of such mediation sessions; provided, there is no privilege as to communications made in furtherance of a crime or fraud. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as permitting an individual to obtain immunity from prosecution for criminal conduct or as excusing an individual from the reporting requirements of Article 3 of Chapter 7B of the General Statutes or G.S. 108A-102.
  8. Any agreement reached by the parties as a result of the mediation shall be reduced to writing, signed by each party, and submitted to the court as soon as practicable. Unless the court finds good reason not to, it shall incorporate the agreement in a court order and it shall become enforceable as a court order. If some or all of the issues as to custody or visitation are not resolved by mediation, the mediator shall report that fact to the court.
  9. If an agreement that results from mediation and is incorporated into a court order is referred to as a "parenting agreement" or called by some similar name, it shall nevertheless be deemed to be a custody order or child custody determination for purposes of Chapter 50A of the General Statutes, G.S. 14-320.1, G.S. 110-139.1, or other places where those terms appear.
  10. If the child whose custody is the subject of an action under this Chapter also is the subject of a juvenile abuse, neglect, or dependency proceeding pursuant to Subchapter 1 of Chapter 7B of the General Statutes, then the custody action under this Chapter is stayed as provided in G.S. 7B-200.

History

(1967, c. 1153, s. 2; 1989, c. 795, s. 15(b); 1998-202, s. 13(p); 2004-128, s. 10; 2005-320, s. 5; 2005-423, s. 4; 2007-462, s. 1; 2011-411, s 4; 2013-236, s. 13; 2015-181, s. 35.)

Local Modification. - Gaston: 1983, c. 761, s. 162; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1036, s. 2; 1989, c. 547, s. 2; Mecklenburg: 1983, c. 761, s. 162; 1985, c. 698, s. 18(a); 1987, c. 524, s. 5; 1987, c. 703, s. 3; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1036, s. 2; 1989, c. 547, s. 2.

Cross References. - As to jurisdiction of proceedings for child support and child custody, see G.S. 7A-244.

As to civil child-custody order, see G.S. 7B-911.

Editor's Note. - This section was amended by Session Laws 1989, c. 795, s. 15(b), in the coded bill drafting format provided by G.S. 120-20.1. Subsection (a) of this section has been set out in the form above at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.

Session Laws 2015-181, s. 35, had substituted "G.S. 14-27.21, G.S. 14-27.22, G.S. 14-27.23, or G.S. 14-27.24" for "G.S. 14-27.2, G.S. 14-27.2A, or G.S. 14- 27.3" in subsection (a).

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2005-423, s. 4, effective October 1, 2005, substituted "domestic violence between the parents in common" for "spouse abuse" in subsection (c).

Session Laws 2007-462, s. 1, effective October 1, 2007, and applicable to actions or proceedings filed on or after that date, added subsection (a1).

Session Laws 2013-236, s. 13, effective July 3, 2013, in subsection (a), inserted "G.S. 14-27.2A" and made a minor punctuation change.

Session Laws 2015-181, s. 35, effective December 1, 2015, substituted "G.S. 14-27.21, G.S. 14-27.22, G.S. 14-27.23, or G.S. 14-27.24" for "G.S. 14-27.2, G.S. 14-27.2A, or G.S. 14-27.3" in subsection (a). For applicability, see editor's note.

Legal Periodicals. - For caselaw survey on custody of children, see 41 N.C.L. Rev. 464 (1963); 44 N.C.L. Rev. 1000 (1966).

For survey of 1981 family law, see 60 N.C.L. Rev. 1379 (1982).

For article, "Equating a Stepparent's Rights and Liabilities Vis-A-Vis Custody, Visitation and Support upon Dissolution of the Marriage with Those of the Natural Parent - An Equitable Solution to a Growing Dilemma?," see 17 N.C. Cent. L.J. 1 (1988).

For comment, "An End to Settlement on the Courthouse Steps? Mediated Settlement Conferences in North Carolina Superior Courts," see 71 N.C.L. Rev. 1857 (1993).

For note, "Balancing the Welfare of Children with the Rights of Parents: Peterson v. Rogers and the Role of Religion in Custody Disputes", see 73 N.C.L. Rev. 1271 (1995).

For survey, "Why the Best Interests Standard Should Survive Petersen v. Rogers," see 73 N.C.L. Rev. 2451 (1995).

For comment, "Good Faith Mediation: Improving Efficiency, Cost, and Satisfaction in North Carolina's Pre-Trial Process," 18 Campbell L. Rev. 281 (1996).

For article, "Re-Evaluating Grandparent Visitation in North Carolina in Light of Troxel v. Granville," see 23 Campbell L. Rev. 249 (2001).

For casenote: "The Established Standard for Fathers Who Have Acknowledged Paternity and Who Are Seeking Custody of Their Illegitimate Child(ren): Rosero v. Blake, 357 N.C. 193 (2003)," see 26 N.C. Cent. L.J. 116 (2003).

For article, "When the Vow Breaks: An Analysis of the Impact of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Factors on Child Custody Resolution," see 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1297 (2006).

For article, "The Best Interests of the Child: Article & Empirical Study: Cultivating Forgiveness: Reducing Hostility and Conflict After Divorce," see 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 441 (2008).

For article, "The Best Interests of the Child: Article & Empirical Study: It's the Conflict, Stupid: An Empirical Study of Factors that Inhibit Successful Medication in High-Conflict Custody Cases," see 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 505 (2008).

For article, "Can't Live With 'Em Can't Live Without 'Em: An Analysis of the Trial Court's Authority to Hear and Decide Child-Related Claims in North Carolina Post-Baumann," see 34 Campbell L. Rev. 449 (2012).

CASE NOTES

Legislative Intent. - By the enactment of G.S. 50-13.1 et seq., the legislature has sought to eliminate conflicting and inconsistent statutes which have caused pitfalls for litigants, and to bring all of the statutes relating to child custody and support together into one act. In re Holt, 1 N.C. App. 108, 160 S.E.2d 90 (1968); In re King, 3 N.C. App. 466, 165 S.E.2d 60 (1969); Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378, 188 S.E.2d 711 (1972).

Construction With Other Sections. - Subsection 7A-289.33(1) [see now G.S. 7B-1112(1)] is an exception to the general grant of standing to seek custody under subsection (a) of this section. Krauss v. Wayne County Dep't of Social Servs., 347 N.C. 371, 493 S.E.2d 428 (1997).

Trial court, in a custody case involving the son where reunification with a parent was the original goal and the county social services agency had obtained legal custody of him while awaiting a permanent disposition, did not enter a proper civil child-custody order pursuant to G.S. 7B-911. It made no findings of fact regarding its decision to transfer the son's juvenile case pursuant to "Chapter 50," G.S. 50-13.1, and to terminate its jurisdiction. In re J.B., 197 N.C. App. 497, 677 S.E.2d 532 (2009).

This and the following sections do not alter basic legal principles concerning custody. In re Moore, 8 N.C. App. 251, 174 S.E.2d 135 (1970).

Broad Application of Section. - Had the legislature intended this section to apply to only those custody disputes involved in a divorce or separation, it would have expressly so provided; therefore, the mere fact that it is found in the chapter of the General Statutes governing divorce and alimony is not sufficient to cause its application to be restricted to custody disputes involved in separation or divorce. Oxendine v. Catawba County Dep't of Social Servs., 303 N.C. 699, 281 S.E.2d 370 (1981).

Consideration of Prior Orders. - The trial court did not err in considering temporary custody orders and prior contempt orders in determining the issue of child custody. Raynor v. Odom, 124 N.C. App. 724, 478 S.E.2d 655 (1996).

This Section and G.S. 48-9.1 Distinguished. - When this section and G.S. 48-9.1 are construed together, it is apparent that this section was intended as a broad statute, covering a myriad of situations in which custody disputes are involved, while G.S. 48-9.1 is a narrow statute, applicable only to custody of a minor child surrendered by its natural parents pursuant to G.S. 48-9(a)(1). Oxendine v. Catawba County Dep't of Social Servs., 303 N.C. 699, 281 S.E.2d 370 (1981).

G.S. 48-9.1(1) as Exception to Grant of Standing in This Section. - G.S. 48-9.1(1) was intended as an exception to the general grant of standing to contest custody set forth in this section. Oxendine v. Catawba County Dep't of Social Servs., 303 N.C. 699, 281 S.E.2d 370 (1981).

Court Declined to exercise Jurisdiction in Custody Action While Adoption Proceeding Pending by Holding Custody Action in Abeyance. - Where an adoption proceeding was filed before the child's father filed an action for custody, in order to avoid unresolvable conflicts, the trial court had to decline to exercise its jurisdiction in the custody action while the adoption proceeding was pending by holding the custody action in abeyance. Johns v. Welker, 228 N.C. App. 177, 744 S.E.2d 486 (2013).

No Jurisdiction Over Custody. - Child custody action was not pending when a neglect proceeding was initiated because as the juvenile court obtained jurisdiction over the children, the juvenile court had continuing exclusive jurisdiction unless jurisdiction was terminated by order of the court; at the time the father filed the civil custody action, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the child custody action because of the already pending neglect proceeding. McMillan v. McMillan, - N.C. App. - , 833 S.E.2d 692 (2019), cert. denied, 842 S.E.2d 597, 2020 N.C. LEXIS 534 (N.C. 2020).

Subject Matter Jurisdiction. - Trial court erred in dismissing a father's action for custody of his son, as it did not lack subject matter jurisdiction due to a prior pending adoption proceeding involving the son; the "prior pending action" doctrine did not apply, as the parties were not the same in both actions and they did not request the same relief. Johns v. Welker, 228 N.C. App. 177, 744 S.E.2d 486 (2013).

Trial court properly dismissed a grandfather's complaint for custody of his maternal grandchild because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed due to a pre-existing child custody action between the child's paternal grandparents and the child's now-deceased mother, which did not abate for reasons of constitutional and statutory law and, and, while any relative could seek custody of a child, the grandfather did not file suit against an allegedly unfit parent, and as his complaint was more akin to a request to modify the custody order than it was an initial claim for custody, the proper procedure for the grandfather was to file a motion to intervene and a motion for custody in the grandparents' custody action. Rivera v. Matthews, 263 N.C. App. 652, 824 S.E.2d 164 (2019).

Rights of Parents. - Absent a finding that parents (i) are unfit or (ii) have neglected the welfare of their children, the constitutionally-protected paramount right of parents to custody, care, and control of their children must prevail. Petersen v. Rowe, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).

Rights of Parents Following Termination for Neglect. - Plaintiff did not have standing to seek custody of his biological children as an "other" person under subsection (a) of this section where his parental rights were previously terminated for neglect. Krauss v. Wayne County Dep't of Social Servs., 347 N.C. 371, 493 S.E.2d 428 (1997).

Rights of Presumed Parents. - Where there was no evidence another man had either been adjudicated the father of the child or acknowledged paternity, the marital presumption, that plaintiff was the natural father of the child, had not been rebutted and plaintiff thus had standing under this section to seek visitation rights with the child. Jones v. Patience, 121 N.C. App. 434, 466 S.E.2d 720 (1996).

Actions by Strangers. - This section was not intended to confer upon strangers the right to bring custody or visitation actions against parents of children unrelated to such strangers. Such a right would conflict with the constitutionally-protected paramount right of parents to custody, care, and control of their children. Petersen v. Rowe, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).

Standing of Other Persons to Bring Actions. - Where a third party and a child have an established relationship in the nature of parent-child relationship, the third party has standing as an "other person" under this subsection. Ellison v. Ramos, 130 N.C. App. 389, 502 S.E.2d 891 (1998), appeal dismissed, 349 N.C. 356, 517 S.E.2d 891 (1998).

Child's putative father had standing to seek the child's custody, under G.S. 50-13.1(a), before his paternity was proved, based on the trial court's findings that the child shared his last name, and he had visited the child for two years since the child's birth. Smith v. Barbour, 154 N.C. App. 402, 571 S.E.2d 872 (2002), cert. denied, - N.C. - , 599 S.E.2d 408 (2004).

Former domestic partner's allegations that she was an "other person" who had standing to seek custody were sufficient under Ellison to support a trial court's denial of a biological mother's motion to dismiss the partner's petition for custody. The partner established standing under G.S. 50-13.1 by alleging that she and the mother: (1) jointly raised the child; (2) entered into a parenting agreement in which they each acknowledged that the partner was a de facto parent; (3) the partner had formed a psychological parenting relationship with the child; and (4) the child had lived all his life enjoying the equal participation of the mother and the partner in his emotional and financial care and support, guidance and decision-making. Mason v. Dwinnell, 190 N.C. App. 209, 660 S.E.2d 58 (2008).

When a mother sued the adoptive parents of the mother's children for, inter alia, visitation with the children, the mother was not a qualified "other person," under G.S. 50-13.1, because, once the mother consented to the children's adoption by the adoptive parents, the mother was a legal stranger to the children who had no right to seek visitation with or custody of the children. Quets v. Needham, 198 N.C. App. 241, 682 S.E.2d 214 (2009).

Third-party caregivers lacked standing to seek custody of a two-year-old child under G.S. 50-13.4(a) because they only cared for the child and provided medical care for the child for two months, which was not a significant amount of time to establish a parent-child relationship with the child. Myers v. Baldwin, 205 N.C. App. 696, 698 S.E.2d 108 (2010).

Trial court properly dismissed a former partner's complaint seeking custody of a minor child for lack of standing where although the former partner had a parent-child relationship with the children during her relationship with the mother, that relationship ended when she evicted them from the residence, that fact defeated her standing as an other person under G.S. 50-13.1, and because she never alleged that either biological parent was unfit or had abandoned or neglected the children, she failed to overcome the presumption that they had superior rights. Chavez v. Wadlington, 261 N.C. App. 541, 821 S.E.2d 289 (2018), aff'd, 832 S.E.2d 692, 2019 N.C. LEXIS 912 (N.C. 2019).

Standing of Other Persons to Bring Actions. - Trial court properly considered an aunt and uncle's petition for custody of the aunt's and uncle's nephew, under G.S. 50-13.1(a), because (1) the aunt and uncle were the child's relatives, and (2) the child's mother acted in a manner inconsistent with the mother's paramount interest in the child's custody by placing the child with other parties and by acknowledging the mother's substance abuse problems. Yurek v. Shaffer, 198 N.C. App. 67, 678 S.E.2d 738 (2009).

Grandparents' Standing. - Grandparents had standing to seek custody under G.S. 50-13.1(a) when they filed their initial motion to intervene and, later, to enforce their visitation rights. Wellons v. White, 229 N.C. App. 164, 748 S.E.2d 709 (2013).

Grandparents lacked standing to bring a claim for visitation because there was no ongoing custody proceeding, as the mother had a natural and legal right to custody and control of the child upon the father's death and the child had not been adopted by a stepparent or relative. Graham v. Jones, - N.C. App. - , 842 S.E.2d 153 (2020).

Conditions on Parental Visitation. - Trial court did not err in conditioning parent's visitation of minor children on the noncustodial parent's ability to control his obsessive compulsive behavior when with the children. Surles v. Surles, 113 N.C. App. 32, 437 S.E.2d 661 (1993).

Visitation Action Qualifies As Custody Action for Attorney Fee Purposes. - Action by intervening grandparents for visitation qualifies as an action for custody, and if that action falls within the scope of G.S. 50-13.6 as an action for the custody, support, or both of a minor child for the purposes of awarding fees to the grandparents, then such an action must also fall within the scope of the statute for purposes of ordering the grandparents to pay; an award of fees against grandparents seeking visitation rights was authorized. Sullivan v. Woody, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 306 (2020).

Claim Not Precluded by Consent to Adoption. - Where petitioner signed a consent to the adoption of his children by their grandparents, the petitioner was rendered a stranger to the blood, but this in no way precluded his right to claim custody as an "other person" within the meaning of this section. In re Rooker, 43 N.C. App. 397, 258 S.E.2d 828 (1979).

Effect of Attempted Statutory Rape Conviction. - Although plaintiff pleaded guilty to attempted statutory rape, an act which resulted in the birth of a child, a trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff's action for visitation with the child because G.S. 50-13.1(a) precluded visitation for first-degree rape or second-degree rape convictions but not an attempted statutory rape conviction. Bobbitt v. Eizenga, 215 N.C. App. 378, 715 S.E.2d 613 (2011).

Best Interests of Child. - Subsection (a) of this section does not convey an absolute right upon every person who allegedly has an interest in the child to assert custody, but must operate to promote the best interests of the child in all custody determinations. Krauss v. Wayne County Dep't of Social Servs., 347 N.C. 371, 493 S.E.2d 428 (1997).

Regardless of the relationship between stepfather and child, the trial court erred when it granted stepfather visitation based on child's best interest without first determining if mother had acted inconsistently with her parental responsibilities. Seyboth v. Seyboth, 147 N.C. App. 63, 554 S.E.2d 378 (2001).

Order that deferred to a ch. 50 custody action but required agency to develop a permanency plan and the child's aunt to take specific steps to comply with it was not a final order; since the trial court also had a continuing G.S. 7B-907 (repealed, see now G.S. 7B-906.1) duty to consider evidence regarding the child's best interests, res judicata did not bar it from terminating the aunt's parental rights. In re C.E.L., 171 N.C. App. 468, 615 S.E.2d 427 (2005).

Conclusion of law that it was in a child's best interest to grant legal custody to the child's father was supported by the findings of fact because the father's fitness and ability to provide proper care to and supervision of the child and the mother's unfitness and inability to provide proper care for the child were uncontested as it was found: (1) that the father's visitation with the child had gone well; (2) that the child enjoyed a loving relationship with the father; (3) that the father was the child's biological father; (4) that the father had not abrogated his constitutional rights to parent the child; and (5) that, even though the father testified that he did not want to disrupt the child's situation by having the child live with him permanently, he also testified that he would take the child. In re H.S.F., 182 N.C. App. 739, 645 S.E.2d 383 (2007).

Sole custody award to a mother, subject to the father's visitation rights, was proper under G.S. 50-13.1 as it was in the children's best interests since the father had physically and emotionally abused the mother, and the mother continued to fear the father; the children were more closely bonded to the mother. O'Connor v. Zelinske, 193 N.C. App. 683, 668 S.E.2d 615 (2008).

Grandparents' Rights to Visitation Following Adoption and Termination. - The provisions of this section do not grant grandparents in a Chapter 7A proceeding standing to seek custody or visitation of a child who has been placed in the custody of the Department of Social Services after the child has been surrendered for adoption by one parent and the parental rights of the other parent have been terminated. Swing v. Garrison, 112 N.C. App. 818, 436 S.E.2d 895 (1993).

Grandparent Visitation Rights Survived Termination of Parental Rights. - Trial court erred in concluding a grandmother's visitation rights under a prior custody order did not survive termination of a mother's parental rights because the grandmother not only intervened in the case but also obtained visitation rights via a permanent custody order; thus, the termination of the mother's parental rights did not extinguish the grandmother's court-ordered visitation rights, and the grandmother could seek to enforce the prior custody order through contempt proceedings. Adams v. Langdon, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 236 (2019).

Grandparents' Rights When Family Intact. - Reading subsection (a) in conjunction with G.S. 50-13.2(b1), 50-13.5(j), and 50-13.2A strongly suggests that the legislature did not intend "custody" and "visitation" to be interpreted as synonymous in the context of grandparents' rights. The three special statutes provide grandparents with the right to seek "visitation" only in certain clearly specified situations. Those situations do not include that of initiating suit against parents whose family is intact and where no custody proceeding is ongoing. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 341 N.C. 629, 461 S.E.2d 745 (1995).

G.S. 50-13.1(a) does not grant plaintiffs the right to sue for visitation when no custody proceeding is ongoing and the minor children's family is intact. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 341 N.C. 629, 461 S.E.2d 745 (1995).

Grandparents do not have standing pursuant to subsection (a) to seek visitation with their grandchildren when the natural parents have legal custody of their children and are living with them as an intact family. Fisher v. Fisher, 124 N.C. App. 442, 477 S.E.2d 251 (1996).

G.S. 50-13.5(j) makes it clear that grandparents have the right to file suit for custody or visitation during an ongoing proceeding, but it does not restrict their right to bring an initial custody suit pursuant to this section when there are allegations that the parent is unfit. Sharp v. Sharp, 124 N.C. App. 357, 477 S.E.2d 258 (1996).

Subsection (a) grants grandparents the right to bring an initial suit for custody when there are allegations that the child's parents are unfit. Sharp v. Sharp, 124 N.C. App. 357, 477 S.E.2d 258 (1996).

This statute is available for grandparents who seek visitation rights in two situations: (1) when the parents are unfit, have abandoned or neglected the child or have died; or (2) when by separation or divorce, custody is at issue between the parents; therefore, the statute was unavailable to a biological grandmother whose grandchildren had been adopted by their biological aunt. Hill v. Newman, 131 N.C. App. 793, 509 S.E.2d 226 (1998).

G.S. 50-13.1(a) did not provide a grandparent a right to sue for visitation with the children of the grandparent's deceased child, since the custody proceedings between the child and the children's surviving parent were terminated upon the child's death and the grandparent made no showing that the surviving parent was unfit. McDuffie v. Mitchell, 155 N.C. App. 587, 573 S.E.2d 606 (2002), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 165, 580 S.E.2d 368 (2003).

Grandparent Had No Rights to Proceed. - There are four statutes in North Carolina which permit a grandparent to maintain an action for custody or visitation of a minor child, and although plaintiff, mother of the deceased father of the two minor children, did not specify under which statute she filed, it was clear that she had no right to proceed under this section, or G.S. 50-13.2(b1), G.S. 50-13.2A, or G.S. 50-13.5(j). Shaut v. Cannon, 136 N.C. App. 834, 526 S.E.2d 214 (2000).

Disatisfaction with defendant mother's husband, their standard of living, and the couple's residence did not provide plaintiff grandmother and her husband with an adequate claim upon which court could justify removal of grandchild from mother's custody; plaintiff must allege facts which would support a finding that the defendant engaged in conduct inconsistent with her parental responsibility and/or constitutionally protected status. Penland v. Harris, 135 N.C. App. 359, 520 S.E.2d 105 (1999).

Grandparents, whose son was living separate and apart from his wife and children when he died in a highway accident, could not seek visitation with their grandchildren under this section because the children and their widowed mother constituted an "intact family." Montgomery v. Montgomery, 136 N.C. App. 435, 524 S.E.2d 360 (2000).

The plaintiff/grandmother had no standing to seek visitation with her grandchildren under this section where the grandchildren, whose mother died in an automobile accident, and their father were an "intact family." Price v. Breedlove, 138 N.C. App. 149, 530 S.E.2d 559 (2000).

When grandparents initiate custody lawsuits under G.S. 50-13.1(a), those grandparents are not required to prove the grandchild is not living in an intact family in order to gain custody, instead, the grandparent must show that the parent is unfit or has taken action inconsistent with her parental status in order to gain custody of the child; the requirement to show unfitness if a grandparent initiates a custody dispute is consistent with a parent's constitutionally protected right to the care, custody, and control of the child and protects the parent's right to control with whom his child associates on a daily basis. Eakett v. Eakett, 157 N.C. App. 550, 579 S.E.2d 486 (2003).

Intact family rule protects the parental right to determine with whom her children shall associate so a grandparent cannot initiate a lawsuit for visitation rights unless the child's family is already undergoing some strain on the family relationship, such as an adoption or an ongoing custody battle; accordingly, the grandparent's rights to the care, custody and control of the child are not constitutionally protected while the parent's rights are protected. Eakett v. Eakett, 157 N.C. App. 550, 579 S.E.2d 486 (2003).

Under G.S. 50-13.1(a), 50-13.2(b1), 50-13.2A, and 50-13.5(j), a grandparent's right to visitation arises either in the context of an ongoing custody proceeding or where the minor child is in the custody of a stepparent or a relative - the "intact family" rule; in a case that does not involve adoption by a stepparent or other relative, a grandparent must prove that the child's family is not intact before the grandparent can intervene to request visitation with his grandchild - G.S. 50-13.1(a), 50-13.2(b1), 50-13.2A, 50-13.5(j) does not grant grandparents the right to sue for visitation when no custody proceeding is ongoing and the minor children's family is intact. Eakett v. Eakett, 157 N.C. App. 550, 579 S.E.2d 486 (2003).

As a grandmother failed to allege conduct sufficient to support a finding that the parents engaged in conduct inconsistent with their parental rights and responsibilities, she could not overcome the presumption that the parents had the superior right to the care, custody, and control of the child, and lacked standing to intervene. Perdue v. Fuqua, 195 N.C. App. 583, 673 S.E.2d 145 (2009).

Excluding Grandfather's Evidence in Support of Custody Motion Was Error. - The trial court erred in refusing to allow appellant paternal grandfather to offer evidence on the question of the best interest of the minor child in support of his motion for custody. In re O'Neal, 140 N.C. App. 254, 535 S.E.2d 620 (2000).

Award of Custody to Great Grandmother. - Termination of the aunt's parental rights and an award of permanent custody to the child's maternal great-grandmother was supported by substantial, competent evidence and affirmed, even though they had a pending ch. 50 custody action, where evidence at the G.S. 7B-907 (repealed, see now G.S. 7B-906.1) hearing indicated that the child's aunt, who had been awarded temporary custody, failed to: (1) comply with court orders, including drug testing; (2) make reasonable and timely progress towards permanency, including providing suitable living conditions; (3) prove that it was possible for the child to return to her home within six months; and (4) prove it was in the child's best interests to live with her. In re C.E.L., 171 N.C. App. 468, 615 S.E.2d 427 (2005).

Trial court properly applied G.S. 50-13.2's "best interests of the child" standard in awarding joint custody to a child's biological mother and her former domestic partner. The partner had standing to seek custody as an "other person" under G.S. 50-13.1(a), and there was clear and convincing evidence that the partner and the child established a significant bond. Mason v. Dwinnell, 190 N.C. App. 209, 660 S.E.2d 58 (2008).

Nonretroactivity. - G.S. 50-13.1 through 50-13.8, relating to the custody and support of minor children, do not apply to litigation pending on October 1, l967, the effective date of the statutes. Speck v. Speck, 5 N.C. App. 296, 168 S.E.2d 672 (1969).

This and the following sections do not apply retroactively. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 8 N.C. App. 162, 174 S.E.2d 103 (1970).

Jurisdiction, Generally. - Where there is no question raised about the court having jurisdiction over a child, the matter of his custody is left open and this section applies. Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 184 S.E.2d 417 (1971).

Continuing Nature of Jurisdiction. - The court in which a divorce action is brought acquires jurisdiction over the custody of the unemancipated children of the marriage, and such jurisdiction continues even after the divorce becomes final. Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 204 S.E.2d 678 (1974).

Portion of Order Retaining Jurisdiction Interlocutory. - Trial court's order retaining jurisdiction to determine custody is not a final determination of issue involved; rather it determines where children's custody issue will be heard, which is preliminary to a final decree. The portion of the order retaining jurisdiction is interlocutory in nature. No substantial right of the defendant is affected which cannot be protected by the timely appeal from the trial court's ultimate disposition of the entire controversy on the merits. Walleshauser v. Walleshauser, 100 N.C. App. 594, 397 S.E.2d 371 (1990).

District court had no right to assume custody jurisdiction of minor children upon its finding that they were "neglected" children, to the exclusion of the district court which had previously acquired such custody jurisdiction in a divorce and custody proceeding involving the children's parents. In re Greer, 26 N.C. App. 106, 215 S.E.2d 404, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 664, 216 S.E.2d 910 (1975).

Meaning of Word "Parents". - The word "parents" in former G.S. 50-13 and G.S. 49-1 and the word "parent" in G.S. 49-2 relate to the rights and duties of parents in respect to their children, and are in pari materia. Dellinger v. Bollinger, 242 N.C. 696, 89 S.E.2d 592 (1955).

Family Units. - Unmarried parents living with their children have been accorded recognition as family units. Fisher v. Fisher, 124 N.C. App. 442, 477 S.E.2d 251 (1996).

A single parent living with his or her child is an intact family. Fisher v. Fisher, 124 N.C. App. 442, 477 S.E.2d 251 (1996).

"Minor Child" Under Prior Law. - Before the enactment of Chapter 48A, it was evident that the meaning of "minor child" within the purview of G.S. 50-13.1, et seq., contemplated the common-law age of majority, 21. Crouch v. Crouch, 14 N.C. App. 49, 187 S.E.2d 348, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 314, 188 S.E.2d 897 (1972).

Nothing in this section limits custody proceedings to the parent of a legitimate child. Conley v. Johnson, 24 N.C. App. 122, 210 S.E.2d 88 (1974).

Civil Action to Obtain Custody of Illegitimate Child. - Under the 1949 amendment to former G.S. 50-13, either parent could institute a special proceeding to obtain custody of his or her child in cases not theretofore provided for by former G.S. 17-39, and this amendment authorized such proceeding by the mother of an illegitimate child to obtain its custody from her aunt, with whom she had entrusted the child, and thus restricted the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in such instances. In re Cranford, 231 N.C. 91, 56 S.E.2d 35 (1949). See also, Dellinger v. Bollinger, 242 N.C. 696, 89 S.E.2d 592 (1955).

The putative father of an illegitimate child, even though his right to custody is not primary, has such an interest in the welfare of his child that he can bring a proceeding against the mother for its custody. Jolly v. Queen, 264 N.C. 711, 142 S.E.2d 592 (1965), decided under former G.S. 50-13.

Claim for Custody Held Not Frivolous. - Where there was no indication at trial that the grandparents in fact did not wish to obtain custody of the children or that their claim was made in bad faith, the fact that the grandparents had originally asked for visitation did not make their later claim for custody violative of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 11. Kerns v. Southern, 100 N.C. App. 664, 397 S.E.2d 651 (1990).

Trial Court Erred in Failing to Honor the Order Requiring the Parties to Mediate Child Custody and Visitation. - Trial court erred in failing to honor the order requiring the parties to mediate child custody and visitation issues and in prematurely deciding those issues without allowing the parties to attempt an amicable compromise beneficial to them and the minor child; nothing in the record indicated contemplation of or compliance with G.S. 50-13.1, and the record was devoid of the materials and motions expressly required for compliance with the local rules established pursuant to G.S. 50-13.1 for the regulation of mediation of custody and visitation. Chillari v. Chillari, 159 N.C. App. 670, 583 S.E.2d 367 (2003).

Where grandmother was a good housekeeper and showed the ability to care for the children the trial court erred in denying and dismissing grandmother's petition for custody on the basis of its "serious concerns" about her parenting skills because of problems experienced by her daughter. Smith v. Alleghany County Dep't of Social Servs., 114 N.C. App. 727, 443 S.E.2d 101, cert. denied, 337 N.C. 696, 448 S.E.2d 533 (1994).

Relocation to Another State Held Proper. - Mother was properly permitted to relocate with the parties' three children to Minnesota under G.S. 50-13.1 as: (1) neither the father nor the mother had a support system in North Carolina; (2) the maternal grandmother could assist in supporting the children if the mother and the children moved back to Minnesota; (3) the mother had a job lined up in Minnesota; (4) the advantages of relocation to the children outweighed the disadvantages, and relocation was in the children's best interests; and (5) the father's visitation rights had to be subordinated to the children's best interests. O'Connor v. Zelinske, 193 N.C. App. 683, 668 S.E.2d 615 (2008).

Interlocutory Order Not Appealable. - Because an order was best characterized as a temporary child custody order under G.S. ch. 50 rather than as a disposition order under G.S. ch. 7B, and was set for review in approximately four months, it was an interlocutory order that did not affect any substantial right and was not appealable. In re N.T.S., 209 N.C. App. 731, 707 S.E.2d 651 (2011), review denied 365 N.C. 203, 710 S.E.2d 7, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 462 (N.C. 2011).

Dismissal Improper. - Dismissal of a wife's claims for child support and child custody for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was error as separation or initiation of a claim for divorce from bed and board was not a precondition for maintaining those claims under G.S. 50-13.1 and G.S. 50-13.5 Baumann-Chacon v. Baumann, 212 N.C. App. 137, 710 S.E.2d 431 (2011).

Guardianship Versus Custody. - When a stepmother was granted ex parte temporary custody of orphaned stepchildren, an aunt's subsequent guardianship petition made the custody action moot because, (1) in the guardianship case, the clerk properly exercised jurisdiction, as the children had no natural guardian, and the clerk's jurisdiction was not divested by the ex parte temporary custody order, since the clerk considered other courts' custody awards, so the clerk had jurisdiction to appoint the children's general guardians, an incident of which was physical custody, and (2) any guardianship modification, including custody modification, required filing a motion with the clerk instead of a district court custody action. Corbett v. Lynch, 251 N.C. App. 40, 795 S.E.2d 564 (2016).

As to effect of foreign adjudication of paternity, see Brondum v. Cox, 292 N.C. 192, 232 S.E.2d 687 (1977).

Modification of Custody Order. - Trial court did not err in granting a mother legal and primary physical custody because the court was permitted to make an initial child custody determination since the juvenile court in the neglect proceeding returned custody to the parties; in the absence of an existing permanent child custody order, the trial court was not required to find or conclude that there existed a substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child for purposes of modifying an existing custody order. McMillan v. McMillan, - N.C. App. - , 833 S.E.2d 692 (2019), cert. denied, 842 S.E.2d 597, 2020 N.C. LEXIS 534 (N.C. 2020).

Applied in Mauney v. Mauney, 12 N.C. App. 269, 182 S.E.2d 861 (1971); In re Branch, 16 N.C. App. 413, 192 S.E.2d 43 (1972); In re Shue, 311 N.C. 586, 319 S.E.2d 567 (1984); McRoy v. Hodges, 160 N.C. App. 381, 585 S.E.2d 441 (2003); Smith v. Barbour, 195 N.C. App. 244, 671 S.E.2d 578 (2009), review denied, 363 N.C. 375, 678 S.E.2d 670 (2009); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 211 N.C. App. 267, 710 S.E.2d 235 (2011); In re E.H., 227 N.C. App. 525, 742 S.E.2d 844 (2013); Burger v. Smith, 243 N.C. App. 233, 776 S.E.2d 886 (2015).

Cited in Blake v. Blake, 6 N.C. App. 410, 170 S.E.2d 87 (1969); Collins v. Collins, 18 N.C. App. 45, 196 S.E.2d 282 (1973); Sauls v. Sauls, 288 N.C. 387, 218 S.E.2d 338 (1975); Acker v. Barnes, 33 N.C. App. 750, 236 S.E.2d 715 (1977); Winborne v. Winborne, 41 N.C. App. 756, 255 S.E.2d 640 (1979); Neal v. Neal, 69 N.C. App. 766, 318 S.E.2d 255 (1984); Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986); In re Arends, 88 N.C. App. 550, 364 S.E.2d 169 (1988); In re Duncan, 112 N.C. App. 196, 435 S.E.2d 121 (1993); Regan v. Smith, 131 N.C. App. 851, 509 S.E.2d 452 (1998); West v. Marko, 141 N.C. App. 688, 541 S.E.2d 226 (2001); David v. Ferguson, 153 N.C. App. 482, 571 S.E.2d 230 (2002); Mohr v. Mohr, 155 N.C. App. 421, 573 S.E.2d 729 (2002); Rosero v. Blake, 357 N.C. 193, 581 S.E.2d 41 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177, 124 S. Ct. 1407, 158 L. Ed. 2d 78 (2004); Chillari v. Chillari, 159 N.C. App. 670, 583 S.E.2d 367 (2003); Gorsuch v. Dees, 173 N.C. App. 223, 618 S.E.2d 747 (2005); McKoy v. McKoy, 202 N.C. App. 509, 689 S.E.2d 590 (2010); Bohannan v. McManaway, 208 N.C. App. 572, 705 S.E.2d 1 (2010); Sherrick v. Sherrick, 209 N.C. App. 166, 704 S.E.2d 314 (2011); Davis v. Davis, 229 N.C. App. 494, 748 S.E.2d 594 (2013); Respess v. Respess, 232 N.C. App. 611, 754 S.E.2d 691 (2014); Thomas v. Thomas, 2 33 N.C. App. 736, 757 S.E.2d 375 (2014); In re J.S., 250 N.C. App. 370, 792 S.E.2d 861 (2016); In re J.K., - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Apr. 4, 2017).


§ 50-13.2. Who entitled to custody; terms of custody; visitation rights of grandparents; taking child out of State; consideration of parent's military service.

  1. An order for custody of a minor child entered pursuant to this section shall award the custody of such child to such person, agency, organization or institution as will best promote the interest and welfare of the child. In making the determination, the court shall consider all relevant factors including acts of domestic violence between the parties, the safety of the child, and the safety of either party from domestic violence by the other party. An order for custody must include written findings of fact that reflect the consideration of each of these factors and that support the determination of what is in the best interest of the child. Between the parents, whether natural or adoptive, no presumption shall apply as to who will better promote the interest and welfare of the child. Joint custody to the parents shall be considered upon the request of either parent.
  2. An order for custody of a minor child may grant joint custody to the parents, exclusive custody to one person, agency, organization, or institution, or grant custody to two or more persons, agencies, organizations, or institutions. Any order for custody shall include such terms, including visitation, as will best promote the interest and welfare of the child. If the court finds that domestic violence has occurred, the court shall enter such orders that best protect the children and party who were the victims of domestic violence, in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 50B-3(a1)(1), (2), and (3). If a party is absent or relocates with or without the children because of an act of domestic violence, the absence or relocation shall not be a factor that weighs against the party in determining custody or visitation. Absent an order of the court to the contrary, each parent shall have equal access to the records of the minor child involving the health, education, and welfare of the child.
  3. An order for custody of a minor child may provide visitation rights for any grandparent of the child as the court, in its discretion, deems appropriate. As used in this subsection, "grandparent" includes a biological grandparent of a child adopted by a stepparent or a relative of the child where a substantial relationship exists between the grandparent and the child. Under no circumstances shall a biological grandparent of a child adopted by adoptive parents, neither of whom is related to the child and where parental rights of both biological parents have been terminated, be entitled to visitation rights.
  4. Any order for custody, including visitation, may, as a condition of such custody or visitation, require either or both parents, or any other person seeking custody or visitation, to abstain from consuming alcohol and may require submission to a continuous alcohol monitoring system, of a type approved by the Division of Adult Correction and Juvenile Justice of the Department of Public Safety, to verify compliance with this condition of custody or visitation. Any order pursuant to this subsection shall include an order to the monitoring provider to report any violation of the order to the court and each party to the action. Failure to comply with this condition shall be grounds for civil or criminal contempt.
  5. An order for custody of a minor child may provide for such child to be taken outside of the State, but if the order contemplates the return of the child to this State, the judge may require the person, agency, organization or institution having custody out of this State to give bond or other security conditioned upon the return of the child to this State in accordance with the order of the court.
  6. If, within a reasonable time, one parent fails to consent to adoption pursuant to Chapter 48 of the General Statutes or parental rights have not been terminated, the consent of the other consenting parent shall not be effective in an action for custody of the child.
  7. An order for custody of a minor child may provide for visitation rights by electronic communication. In granting visitation by electronic communication, the court shall consider the following:
    1. Whether electronic communication is in the best interest of the minor child.
    2. Whether equipment to communicate by electronic means is available, accessible, and affordable to the parents of the minor child.
    3. Any other factor the court deems appropriate in determining whether to grant visitation by electronic communication.
  8. In a proceeding for custody of a minor child of a service member, a court may not consider a parent's past deployment or possible future deployment as the only basis in determining the best interest of the child. The court may consider any significant impact on the best interest of the child regarding the parent's past or possible future deployment.

The court may set guidelines for electronic communication, including the hours in which the communication may be made, the allocation of costs between the parents in implementing electronic communication with the child, and the furnishing of access information between parents necessary to facilitate electronic communication. Electronic communication with a minor child may be used to supplement visitation with the child. Electronic communication may not be used as a replacement or substitution for custody or visitation. The amount of time electronic communication is used shall not be a factor in calculating child support or be used to justify or support relocation by the custodial parent out of the immediate area or the State. Electronic communication between the minor child and the parent may be subject to supervision as ordered by the court. As used in this subsection, "electronic communication" means contact, other than face-to-face contact, facilitated by electronic means, such as by telephone, electronic mail, instant messaging, video teleconferencing, wired or wireless technologies by Internet, or other medium of communication.

History

(1957, c. 545; 1967, c. 1153, s. 2; 1977, c. 501, s. 2; 1979, c. 967; 1981, c. 735, ss. 1, 2; 1985, c. 575, s. 3; 1987, c. 541, s. 2; c. 776; 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 591, s. 5; 2004-186, s. 17.1; 2009-314, s. 1; 2012-146, s. 10; 2013-27, s. 1; 2015-278, s. 2; 2017-186, s. 2(pppp).)

OFFICIAL COMMENT TO SUBSECTION (F)

[ Editor's note. - This comment is the Official Comment to Section 107 of the Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act, which was the basis for subsection (f) as added by Session Laws 2013-27, s. 1. The Official Comment is printed here pursuant to the authority in Session Laws 2013-27, s. 5, for the Revisor of Statutes to cause the Official Comments to the Act to be printed. For other provisions of the Act, see Article 3 (Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act) of Chapter 50A of the General Statutes, G.S. 50A-350 et seq.]

[Section] 107 [subsection (f) of this section], in contrast to later articles of the Act [Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act], does not directly concern custody procedures in conjunction with a service member's deployment. Instead, it seeks to amend the state's general standard for child custody to guard against the possibility that courts will use past or possible future deployment as a negative factor in determining custody by service members without serious consideration of whether the child's best interest was or would be truly compromised by such deployment.

This section [subsection (f)], prohibits the court from using a parent's past deployment or possible future deployment itself as a negative factor in determining the best interests of the child. However, the significant effects on the child of the parent's past or possible future service may be considered. The term "significant" is meant to exclude the court's considering trivial impact of a parent's deployment, such as the need to enroll a child in a different school. Under this standard, the court may only consider impacts that are material or substantial. For example, the court may consider that the child has bonded closely with step-siblings while in a temporary custody arrangement during a deployment, or that the child does not adjust well to new situations and therefore will likely have difficulty relocating if a parent is deployed in the future.

Cross References. - As to procedure, etc., in actions for custody and support, see G.S. 50-13.5 and notes thereunder.

As to written findings or denial of visitation rights to parent, see G.S. 50-13.5(i).

As to custody and visitation rights of grandparents, see G.S. 50-13.5(j).

As to the maintenance of certain actions as independent actions, see G.S. 50-19.

As to Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act, see G.S. 50A-350 et seq.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2013-27, s. 4, provides: "Nothing in Article 3 of Chapter 50A of the General Statutes, enacted in Section 3 of this act, shall affect the validity of a temporary court order concerning custodial responsibility during deployment entered before the effective date of this act."

Session Laws 2013-27, s. 5, provides: "The Revisor of Statutes shall cause to be printed, as annotations to the published General Statutes, all relevant portions of the Official Comment to the Uniform Deployed Parents Custody and Visitation Act as the Revisor may deem appropriate."

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2009-314, s. 1, effective July 17, 2009, added subsection (e).

Session Laws 2012-146, s. 10, effective December 1, 2012, added subsection (b2). For applicability, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2013-27, s. 1, effective October 1, 2013, added "consideration of parent's military service" at the end of the section heading; and added subsection (f).

Session Laws 2015-278, s. 2, effective October 20, 2015, in subsection (a), deleted "and shall make findings accordingly" at the end of the second sentence, inserted "written" and substituted "that reflect the consideration of each of these factors and that" for "which" in the third sentence, and substituted "the parents" for "the mother and father" in the fourth sentence.

Session Laws 2017-186, s. 2(pppp), effective December 1, 2017, inserted "and Juvenile Justice" in the first sentence of subsection (b2).

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "Mediation-Arbitration: A Proposal for Private Resolution of Disputes Between Divorced or Separated Parents," see 1976 Duke L.J. 911.

For article, "Proposed Reforms in North Carolina Divorce Law," see 8 N.C. Cent. L.J. 35 (1976).

For survey of 1977 law on domestic relations, see 56 N.C.L. Rev. 1045 (1978).

For survey of 1978 family law, see 57 N.C.L. Rev. 1084 (1979).

For survey of 1979 family law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1471 (1980).

For article on rights and interest of parent, child, family and state, see 4 Campbell L. Rev. 85 (1981).

For article, "Custody of the Illegitimate Child," see 18 N.C. Cent. L.J. 18 (1989).

For article, "The Parental Rights of Unwed Fathers: A Developmental Perspective," see 20 N.C. Cent. L.J. 45 (1992).

For note, "Balancing the Welfare of Children with the Rights of Parents: Peterson v. Rogers and the Role of Religion in Custody Disputes", see 73 N.C.L. Rev. 1271 (1995).

For survey, "Why the Best Interests Standard Should Survive Petersen v. Rogers," see 73 N.C.L. Rev. 2451 (1995).

For note, "The Effect on the Child of a Custodial Parent's Involvement in an Intimate Same-Sex Relationship," see 10 Campbell L. Rev. 131 (1996).

For casenote: "The Established Standard for Fathers Who Have Acknowledged Paternity and Who Are Seeking Custody of Their Illegitimate Child(ren): Rosero v. Blake, 357 N.C. 193 (2003)," see 26 N.C. Cent. L.J. 116 (2003).

CASE NOTES

I. IN GENERAL.

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases cited below were decided under former G.S. 50-13, which prior to its repeal in 1967 dealt with custody and maintenance of children in actions for divorce.

Applicability. - The plain language of G.S. 50-13.2(b) is referring to the party who is absent or has relocated with or without the children because of an act of domestic violence; therefore, a mother's claim that the trial court violated G.S. 50-13.2(b) failed because that language did not apply to the situation since the mother had not relocated due to an act of domestic violence, or, to the extent the language of the section could apply, it would apply to the father who had relocated to another country. Thus, the trial court was required not to weigh the father's absence or relocation against him in determining custody or visitation. Jordao v. Jordao, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Oct. 6, 2020).

Visitation and child support rights are independent rights accruing primarily to the benefit of the minor child and one is not, and may not be made, contingent upon the other. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

Jurisdiction. - When a divorce action is instituted, the court acquires jurisdiction over the children born to the marriage, and may hear and determine questions as to the custody and maintenance of the children both before and after final decree of divorce. Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 158 S.E.2d 77 (1967).

Custody Proceedings Are Continuing. - There is no requirement that each successive custody hearing starts with a "clean slate" and that the court cannot rely on the record previously generated. To the contrary, custody proceedings generally are continuing in nature. Best v. Best, 81 N.C. App. 337, 344 S.E.2d 363 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Petersen v. Rowe, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).

A judgment awarding custody is based upon the conditions found to exist at the time it is entered. Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 145 S.E.2d 332 (1965).

Simultaneous Adoption and Custody Actions. - Because the legislature has enunciated a public policy that every child should have a permanent plan of care, because adoption is more likely than a custody proceeding between non-parents to result in a permanent plan of care and because the superior court has jurisdiction over adoptions, that court's jurisdiction supersedes that of the district court with regard to the custody of a child the subject of a simultaneous adoption and custody proceeding. Griffin v. Griffin, 118 N.C. App. 400, 456 S.E.2d 329 (1995).

In the absence of an order of consolidation when the same child is the subject of a simultaneous custody and adoption proceeding, both the superior and district courts do not have continuing jurisdiction to fully adjudicate the respective issues before them. Griffin v. Griffin, 118 N.C. App. 400, 456 S.E.2d 329 (1995).

The filing of an adoption petition in the superior court divests the district court of jurisdiction to adjudicate issues of custody with regard to a child who is the subject of an adoption petition. Griffin v. Griffin, 118 N.C. App. 400, 456 S.E.2d 329 (1995).

Upon the entry of an interlocutory order of adoption by the superior court, the jurisdiction of the district court with regard to the custody of the child who is the subject of the interlocutory order is in abeyance until such time as the interlocutory decree is vacated, the adoption petition is dismissed, or a final decree of adoption is entered. Griffin v. Griffin, 118 N.C. App. 400, 456 S.E.2d 329 (1995).

Recommendation of Guardian Ad Litem. - Pursuant to G.S. 7A-640 [see now G.S. 7B-901 and G.S. 7B-2501], the court may consider the recommendation of a guardian ad litem concerning the needs of a juvenile. In re Gwaltney, 68 N.C. App. 686, 315 S.E.2d 750 (1984).

Mother Not Entitled to Proceeds of Forfeited Bond. - A bond posted by father in custody dispute was deemed to be an appearance bond designed to guarantee his appearance before the court and as a penalty in the event of his failure to appear, and under N.C. Const., Art. IX, § 7 the county board of education was entitled to the clear proceeds of its forfeiture. Mussallam v. Mussallam, 321 N.C. 504, 364 S.E.2d 364, rehearing denied, 321 N.C. 116, 367 S.E.2d 915 (1988).

Provisions in Custody Orders. - Provisions directing the parties to cooperate with one another and to refrain from conduct that will be detrimental to the child are commonly included in custody orders. Watkins v. Watkins, 120 N.C. App. 475, 462 S.E.2d 687 (1995), appeal dismissed, 343 N.C. 128, 468 S.E.2d 795 (1996).

Order requiring a custodial mother to move back to the county in which the parties had resided before separating to live in the marital home was set aside because, while the court could find the relative benefits of the children living with the father in one county or the mother in another county when making a primary custody determination, the order was not a "related matter" the general assembly gave trial courts the authority to decide. Kanellos v. Kanellos, 251 N.C. App. 149, 795 S.E.2d 225 (2016).

Rights of Parents to Children's Records. - Trial court properly ordered that a mother share a child's school and medical records with the father, as G.S. 50-13.2(b) provided that each parent have equal access to the records of the minor child involving the health, education, and welfare of the child. Young v. Young, 169 N.C. App. 31, 609 S.E.2d 795 (2005).

Denial to a noncustodial mother of access to the medical, educational, and counseling records of the mother's child was in error because the court's findings of fact did not support a conclusion that it was in the best interest of the child to prevent the mother from accessing the records. While the mother's behavior at the child's school was disruptive, the findings did not indicate that the mother's behavior made third-party professionals sufficiently concerned about their own safety, or have any other negative effect on the child. Paynich v. Vestal, - N.C. App. - , 837 S.E.2d 433 (2020).

Collateral estoppel effect of findings in domestic violence protective order entered under G.S. 50B-1(a), finding that the mother was responsible for the incident, collaterally estopped the finding in the custody case that the father was responsible for the incident; when the protective order was not appealed the collateral legal consequences of that order became final, precluding reconsideration of the order in the custody action under G.S. 50-13.2. Doyle v. Doyle, 176 N.C. App. 547, 626 S.E.2d 845 (2006).

Trial court erred in a custody case in finding that the father had committed domestic violence because, in a prior domestic violence case, the court specifically found that the father had not committed domestic violence; G.S. 50-13.2(a) required the court in a custody case to consider domestic violence, but collateral estoppel prevented the court in the custody case from making findings which were contrary to the findings in the prior domestic violence action. Simms v. Simms, 195 N.C. App. 780, 673 S.E.2d 753 (2009).

Electronic Communication Not Equal to In-Person Visitation. - G.S. 50-13.2 provided that electronic communication may not be used as a replacement or substitution for custody or visitation and, thus, the plaintiff's contention that electronic communication was a form of visitation equal to that of in-person visitation was incorrect. Deanes v. Deanes, - N.C. App. - , 837 S.E.2d 404 (2020).

Applied in State v. Wrenn, 16 N.C. App. 411, 191 S.E.2d 913 (1972); Powell v. Powell, 25 N.C. App. 695, 214 S.E.2d 808 (1975); Stanback v. Stanback, 31 N.C. App. 174, 229 S.E.2d 693 (1976); Hamlin v. Hamlin, 302 N.C. 478, 276 S.E.2d 381 (1981); Regan v. Smith, 131 N.C. App. 851, 509 S.E.2d 452 (1998); McDuffie v. Mitchell, 155 N.C. App. 587, 573 S.E.2d 606 (2002), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 165, 580 S.E.2d 368 (2003); In re T.H.T., 185 N.C. App. 337, 648 S.E.2d 519 (2007), aff'd in part, modified in part, 362 N.C. 446, 665 S.E.2d 54 (2008); Buck v. Greenlee, - F. Supp. 2d - (W.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2011).

Cited in Settle ex rel. Sullivan v. Beasley, 309 N.C. 616, 308 S.E.2d 288 (1983); Prescott v. Prescott, 83 N.C. App. 254, 350 S.E.2d 116 (1986); Mussallam v. Mussallam, 321 N.C. 504, 364 S.E.2d 364 (1988); Ray v. Ray, 103 N.C. App. 790, 407 S.E.2d 592 (1991); Hunt v. Hunt, 112 N.C. App. 722, 436 S.E.2d 856 (1993); In re Duncan, 112 N.C. App. 196, 435 S.E.2d 121 (1993); Westneat v. Westneat, 113 N.C. App. 247, 437 S.E.2d 899 (1994); Vann v. Vann, 128 N.C. App. 516, 495 S.E.2d 370 (1998); Penland v. Harris, 135 N.C. App. 359, 520 S.E.2d 105 (1999); Montgomery v. Montgomery, 136 N.C. App. 435, 524 S.E.2d 360 (2000); Mohr v. Mohr, 155 N.C. App. 421, 573 S.E.2d 729 (2002); Senner v. Senner, 161 N.C. App. 78, 587 S.E.2d 675 (2003); Faulkenberry v. Faulkenberry, 169 N.C. App. 428, 610 S.E.2d 237 (2005); Perdue v. Fuqua, 195 N.C. App. 583, 673 S.E.2d 145 (2009); Bohannan v. McManaway, 208 N.C. App. 572, 705 S.E.2d 1 (2010); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 211 N.C. App. 267, 710 S.E.2d 235 (2011); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 225 N.C. App. 269, 737 S.E.2d 783 (2013); Wellons v. White, 229 N.C. App. 164, 748 S.E.2d 709 (2013); State v. Allah, 231 N.C. App. 88, 750 S.E.2d 903 (2013); Respess v. Respess, 232 N.C. App. 611, 754 S.E.2d 691 (2014); In re J.D., 234 N.C. App. 342, 759 S.E.2d 375 (2014); In re J.K., - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Apr. 4, 2017).

II. WELFARE OF CHILD.

The welfare of the child is the paramount consideration in custody matters. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966); Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 158 S.E.2d 77 (1967); Williams v. Williams, 18 N.C. App. 635, 197 S.E.2d 629 (1973); Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 204 S.E.2d 678 (1974); Harrington v. Harrington, 286 N.C. 260, 210 S.E.2d 190 (1974); Goodson v. Goodson, 32 N.C. App. 76, 231 S.E.2d 178 (1977).

The best interest and welfare of the child is the paramount consideration in determining the visitation rights, as well as in determining the right to custody, and neither of these rights should be permitted to jeopardize the best interest and welfare of the child. In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971).

Although at one time under the common law the father was generally entitled to the custody of minor children, the courts at the present time almost invariably adhere to the principle that the welfare or best interest of the child is the paramount consideration. This was the rule adhered to by North Carolina courts for many years, and is now prescribed by this section. Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 184 S.E.2d 417 (1971).

The child's welfare is the principal consideration in determining custody matters. In re Morrison, 6 N.C. App. 47, 169 S.E.2d 228 (1969).

The primary consideration in custody cases is the welfare of the child or children involved. Rothman v. Rothman, 6 N.C. App. 401, 170 S.E.2d 140 (1969).

An order for custody of a minor child cannot be affirmed without a clear indication that it rested on a determination of what would be in the child's best interest. That is the paramount consideration in custody cases. In re DiMatteo, 62 N.C. App. 571, 303 S.E.2d 84 (1983).

And the Polar Star by Which Court Is Guided. - The welfare of the child is the polar star by which the discretion of the court is to be guided. In re Lewis, 88 N.C. 31 (1883); Brake v. Brake, 228 N.C. 609, 46 S.E.2d 643 (1948); Finley v. Sapp, 238 N.C. 114, 76 S.E.2d 350 (1953); Thomas v. Thomas, 259 N.C. 461, 130 S.E.2d 871 (1963); Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966); Chriscoe v. Chriscoe, 268 N.C. 554, 151 S.E.2d 33 (1966); In re Pitts, 2 N.C. App. 211, 162 S.E.2d 524 (1968); Greer v. Greer, 5 N.C. App. 160, 167 S.E.2d 782 (1969); In re Moore, 8 N.C. App. 251, 174 S.E.2d 135 (1970); Jarman v. Jarman, 14 N.C. App. 531, 188 S.E.2d 647, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 622, 190 S.E.2d 465 (1972); In re Cox, 17 N.C. App. 687, 195 S.E.2d 132, cert. denied, 283 N.C. 585, 196 S.E.2d 809 (1973); Paschall v. Paschall, 21 N.C. App. 120, 203 S.E.2d 337 (1974); Mathews v. Mathews, 24 N.C. App. 551, 211 S.E.2d 513 (1975); Pruneau v. Sanders, 25 N.C. App. 510, 214 S.E.2d 288, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 664, 216 S.E.2d 911 (1975); Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

The welfare of the child is controlling in determining the right to custody of the child as between its divorced parents. Hardee v. Mitchell, 230 N.C. 40, 51 S.E.2d 884 (1949).

This section expresses the policy of the State that the best interest and welfare of the child is the paramount and controlling factor to guide the judge in determining the custody of a child. In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971).

As the Determining Factor. - The children of the marriage become the wards of the court, and their welfare is the determining factor in custody proceedings. Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 145 S.E.2d 332 (1965); Greer v. Greer, 5 N.C. App. 160, 167 S.E.2d 782 (1969).

The welfare of the children is the determining factor in custody proceedings, and an award of custody based on that factor will be upheld when supported by competent evidence. In re Poole, 8 N.C. App. 25, 173 S.E.2d 545 (1970).

And the Guiding Principle. - The guiding principle to be used by the court in a custody hearing is the welfare of the children involved. While this guiding principle is clear, decision in particular cases is often difficult, and necessarily a wide discretion is vested in the trial judge. He has the opportunity to see the parties in person and to hear the witnesses, and his decision ought not to be upset on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Greer v. Greer, 5 N.C. App. 160, 167 S.E.2d 782 (1969); Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 184 S.E.2d 417 (1971); Falls v. Falls, 52 N.C. App. 203, 278 S.E.2d 546, cert. denied, 304 N.C. 390, 285 S.E.2d 831 (1981).

The trial court should primarily be concerned with the welfare of the child in deciding which party before it should be charged with the enormous responsibilities of custodianship of the child. In re Kowalzek, 37 N.C. App. 364, 246 S.E.2d 45, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 734, 248 S.E.2d 863 (1978).

In a custody proceeding, it is not the function of the court to punish or reward a parent by withholding or awarding custody of minor children; the function of the court in such a proceeding is to diligently seek to act for the best interests and welfare of the minor child. In re McCraw Children, 3 N.C. App. 390, 165 S.E.2d 1 (1969).

The best interest of the child is the overriding factor in custody determinations. Wilson v. Williams, 42 N.C. App. 348, 256 S.E.2d 516 (1979).

Joint custody and any other custody award must include findings of fact which support such determination of child's best interests. Witherow v. Witherow, 99 N.C. App. 61, 392 S.E.2d 627 (1990).

Considered in Light of All Surrounding Circumstances. - The best interest of the child, in light of all the surrounding circumstances, is the paramount consideration which must guide the court in awarding custody of a minor child. Campbell v. Campbell, 63 N.C. App. 113, 304 S.E.2d 262, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 460, 307 S.E.2d 362 (1983).

Tender Years Presumption Abolished. - Trial court erred in entering a custody order concerning the parties' child; the trial court improperly relied on the tender years presumption in granting custody to the mother, as that presumption had been abolished, and G.S. 50-13.2(a) required that the custody decision be based solely on the best interests of the child, and G.S. 8C-1, Rule 201(b) did not allow the trial court to take judicial notice of the assumptions underlying an abolished doctrine in order to resurrect the doctrine. Greer v. Greer, 175 N.C. App. 464, 624 S.E.2d 423 (2006).

Trial court did not apply tender years presumption in awarding a mother primary physical and legal custody of the parties' child because there was nothing in the record to suggest the trial court relied on a psychologist's affidavit or the mother's testimony regarding a "special bond" in awarding the mother custody, and, in fact, the trial court specifically noted the child was securely bonded to the father. Dixon v. Gordon, 223 N.C. App. 365, 734 S.E.2d 299 (2012), review denied, 743 S.E.2d 191, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 552 (2013).

The trial judge is entrusted by this section with the delicate and difficult task of choosing an environment which will, in his judgment, best encourage full development of the child's physical, mental, emotional, moral and spiritual faculties. In re Peal, 305 N.C. 640, 290 S.E.2d 664 (1982).

Any evidence of child abuse is of the utmost concern in determining whether the grant of custody to a particular party will best promote the interest and welfare of the child, and any evidence of such abuse must be resolved by the trial court in its findings of fact. Dixon v. Dixon, 67 N.C. App. 73, 312 S.E.2d 669 (1984).

Evidence of paternity may properly be considered in determining the best interests of the children. Surles v. Surles, 113 N.C. App. 32, 437 S.E.2d 661 (1993).

A natural parent's constitutionally protected paramount interest in the companionship, custody, care, and control of his or her child is a counterpart of the parental responsibilities the parent has assumed and is based on a presumption that he or she will act in the best interest of the child. Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997).

Acts of Domestic Violence Between Parties. - Trial court's best interests of the children determination under G.S. 50-13.2(a) was supported by its findings of fact, including its finding that the father had "body slammed" the mother 20 to 50 times during the marriage, and threatened to punch his brother-in-law in the nose. Hall v. Hall, 188 N.C. App. 527, 655 S.E.2d 901 (2008).

Although a mother voluntarily dismissed her domestic violence complaint at the time a memorandum of judgment was entered regarding custody, a trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the claim when the father filed a motion for modification of custody, pursuant to G.S. 50-13.7, because "acts of domestic violence between the parties" was one of the factors the trial court was to consider, pursuant to G.S. 50-13.2(a), when making findings as to the best interests of the child. Balawejder v. Balawejder, 216 N.C. App. 301, 721 S.E.2d 679 (2011).

In a mother's suit for the issuance of a domestic violence protective order, it was error to deny an out of state father's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction based on a theory, adopted in other states, distinguishing between "affirmative" and "prohibitive" orders because (1) that theory was not adopted, and (2) the father's substantial rights were implicated, as, inter alia, the issuance of such an order could affect the father's right to custody of the child. Mannise v. Harrell, 249 N.C. App. 322, 791 S.E.2d 653 (2016).

III. RIGHT OF PARENTS TO CUSTODY.

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A. AS AGAINST THIRD PERSONS.

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Due Process. - If a natural parent's conduct has not been inconsistent with his or her constitutionally protected status, application of the "best interest of the child" standard in a custody dispute with a nonparent would offend the Due Process Clause. Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997).

Conduct inconsistent with a parent's protected status, which need not rise to the statutory level warranting termination of parental rights, would result in application of the "best interest of the child" test without offending the Due Process Clause. Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997).

Child's biological mother voluntarily relinquished her paramount parental right to make decisions under the due process clause when she entered into a parenting agreement with her former domestic partner to hold herself, the partner, and the child out as a family unit. The voluntary relinquishment of rights was inconsistent with her paramount rights under the due process clause. Mason v. Dwinnell, 190 N.C. App. 209, 660 S.E.2d 58 (2008).

Parents Have Legal Right to Custody of Their Children. - Parents, including the mother of an illegitimate child, have the legal right to have the custody of their children unless clear and cogent reasons exist for denying them this right. This right is not absolute, and it may be interfered with or denied, but only for the most substantial and sufficient reasons, and is subject to judicial control only when the interest and welfare of the children clearly require it. In re Jones, 14 N.C. App. 334, 188 S.E.2d 580 (1972).

Where one parent is dead, the surviving parent has a natural and legal right to the custody and control of the parties' minor children. This right is not absolute, and it may be interfered with or denied, but only for the most substantial and sufficient reasons, and is subject to judicial control only when the interests and welfare of the children clearly require it. In re Griffin, 6 N.C. App. 375, 170 S.E.2d 84 (1969); In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971); Vaughn v. Tyson, 14 N.C. App. 548, 188 S.E.2d 614 (1972).

Where mother abandons any claim she may have to the custody of her daughter, father alone has the natural and legal right to the custody of the child, unless for substantial and sufficient reasons the interest and welfare of the child require that he be denied that right. Roberts v. Short, 6 N.C. App. 419, 169 S.E.2d 910 (1969).

The mother of an illegitimate child is its natural guardian, and as such, has a legal right to its custody, care and control, if she is a suitable person, even though others may offer more material advantages in life for the child. But this rule is not absolute, and the custody of an illegitimate child may be taken from the mother and placed elsewhere when it clearly and manifestly appears that the best interests and welfare of the child demand it. Wall v. Hardee, 240 N.C. 465, 82 S.E.2d 370 (1954).

Absent a finding that parents (i) are unfit or (ii) have neglected the welfare of their children, the constitutionally-protected paramount right of parents to custody, care, and control of their children must prevail. Petersen v. Rowe, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).

Which Will Be Interfered with Only When Clearly Required. - Where one parent is dead, the surviving parent has a natural and legal right to custody and control of the parties' minor children. This right is not absolute, but it may be interfered with or denied only for the most substantial and sufficient reasons, and is subject to judicial control only when the interests and welfare of the children clearly require it. Comer v. Comer, 61 N.C. App. 324, 300 S.E.2d 457 (1983).

For Parent's Misconduct or Child's Welfare. - The law presumes that the best interests of a child will be served by committing it to the custody of a parent, when the parent is a suitable person; this presumption is not overcome merely by showing that some third person can give the child better care and greater comforts and protection than the parent. A parent's right to custody of a child may be forfeited only by misconduct or by other facts which substantially affect the child's welfare. In re Jones, 14 N.C. App. 334, 188 S.E.2d 580 (1972).

But Child's Welfare Is the Paramount Consideration. - While the law presumes that the best interest of a child will be served by committing it to the custody of a parent, when the parent is a suitable person, the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration to which all other factors, including common-law preferential rights of the parents, must be deferred or subordinated. Plemmons v. Stiles, 65 N.C. App. 341, 309 S.E.2d 504 (1983).

Parent's Love Must Yield to Child's Best Interests. - The child's welfare is the paramount consideration, and a parent's love must yield to another if, after judicial investigation, it is found that the best interest of the child is subserved thereby. Greer v. Greer, 5 N.C. App. 160, 167 S.E.2d 782 (1969).

The "paramount consideration" and "polar star" which have long governed and guided the discretion of the trial judges are the welfare and needs of the child, not the persons seeking his or her custody, and even parental love must yield to the promotion of those higher interests. In re Peal, 305 N.C. 640, 290 S.E.2d 664 (1982).

The natural parent is presumed to be the appropriate custodian of his or her child, as opposed to third persons, and should not be deprived of custody merely because the child could be better cared for in a material sense. In re Kowalzek, 37 N.C. App. 364, 246 S.E.2d 45, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 734, 248 S.E.2d 863 (1978).

But This Presumption May Be Rebutted. - While it is presumed that it is in the child's best interest to be placed with a natural parent, this presumption may be rebutted by a circumstance which would substantially affect the child. Wilson v. Williams, 42 N.C. App. 348, 256 S.E.2d 516 (1979).

The primary concern of the trial court in a custody matter, as mandated by subsection (a) of this section, is the welfare of the child, and this concern outweighs the presumption favoring the award of custody to a natural parent. In re Gwaltney, 68 N.C. App. 686, 315 S.E.2d 750 (1984).

The presumption in favor of the natural parents is rebuttable. Best v. Best, 81 N.C. App. 337, 344 S.E.2d 363 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Petersen v. Rowe, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).

Although there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of a natural parent, it is not necessary to prove unfitness in order to overcome the presumption. Black v. Glawson, 114 N.C. App. 442, 442 S.E.2d 79 (1994).

A court must award custody based only upon the best interest and welfare of the child. A court must have discretion to determine the best interest of a child, and should not be restricted to awarding custody to a natural parent in the absence of a finding of unfitness. Black v. Glawson, 114 N.C. App. 442, 442 S.E.2d 79 (1994).

It is not necessary to prove a natural parent unfit in order to award custody to a third party. Black v. Glawson, 114 N.C. App. 442, 442 S.E.2d 79 (1994).

Custody May Be Granted to Third Person for Sufficient Reasons. - The welfare of the infants themselves is the polar star by which the courts are to be guided to a right conclusion, and therefore they may, within certain limits, exercise a sound discretion for the benefit of the child, and in some cases will order it into the custody of a third person for good and sufficient reasons. Roberts v. Short, 6 N.C. App. 419, 169 S.E.2d 910 (1969); Campbell v. Campbell, 63 N.C. App. 113, 304 S.E.2d 262, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 460, 307 S.E.2d 362 (1983); Phillips v. Choplin, 65 N.C. App. 506, 309 S.E.2d 716 (1983).

A child's former care giver stated a claim as against the child's father for custody of the child, where the father's former companion alleged that the father had taken actions inconsistent with his protected status as a parent, including that the father had placed the child in his parents' care and that they could not properly care for the child's diabetes, resulting in hospitalization and potentially serious and permanent health consequences, and that the father had relinquished care of the child to others, including herself, on numerous occasions. Ellison v. Ramos, 130 N.C. App. 389, 502 S.E.2d 891 (1998), appeal dismissed, 349 N.C. 356, 517 S.E.2d 891 (1998).

Fitness of Parent. - Mother's convictions for driving while intoxicated and child's developmental problems were significant and relevant to issue of mother's fitness as a parent because they indicated her inability to care for the child adequately and to provide for the child's welfare; additionally, the facts that she had substance abuse problems, did not respect authority, was unable to recognize her child's developmental problems, and was incapable of caring for the child's welfare supported the conclusion that she was an unfit parent. Raynor v. Odom, 124 N.C. App. 724, 478 S.E.2d 655 (1996).

The State failed to show that the father was unfit, as against the child's grandparents, to have custody of his child where he testified that if he were awarded custody of the child he would be willing to prohibit his brother, who was convicted for taking indecent liberties with a minor, from staying at his house and interacting with the child; where his own convictions were too remote to affect his fitness or were unrelated thereto; where he already had considerable experience in taking care of children; where his boss of 13 years and his volunteer supervisor, both described him as responsible, dependable, reliable and hardworking; and where he actively engaged in legal proceedings for approximately two years, evidencing a long-term commitment to attaining custody. Adams v. Tessener, 141 N.C. App. 64, 539 S.E.2d 324 (2000).

Parent Need Not Be Found Unfit. - Although there is a traditional preference for biological parents, the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration to which all other factors, including common-law preferential rights of the parents must be deferred or subordinated, and the trial judge's discretion is such that he is not required to find a natural parent unfit for custody as a prerequisite to awarding custody to a third person. Comer v. Comer, 61 N.C. App. 324, 300 S.E.2d 457 (1983).

The trial judge is not required to find a natural parent unfit for custody as a prerequisite to awarding custody to a third person. In re Kowalzek, 37 N.C. App. 364, 246 S.E.2d 45, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 734, 248 S.E.2d 863 (1978); Plemmons v. Stiles, 65 N.C. App. 341, 309 S.E.2d 504 (1983); In re Gwaltney, 68 N.C. App. 686, 315 S.E.2d 750 (1984).

While the fitness of a natural parent is of paramount significance in determining the best interests of the child in custody contests, it is not always determinative in itself. It is entirely possible that a natural parent may be a fit and proper person to care for the child, but that all other circumstances dictate that the best interests of the child would be served by placing custody in a third party. In re Kowalzek, 37 N.C. App. 364, 246 S.E.2d 45, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 734, 248 S.E.2d 863 (1978).

Fitness and Actions of Parent in Relationship with Domestic Partner Relevant. - While a district court could have concluded that the fitness of a child's biological mother warranted that she have sole custody, the district court was not required to do so where evidence indicated that the mother had voluntarily relinquished her due process rights to solely make decisions in the child's life, intended that her former domestic partner become a de facto parent, and the partner had established a significant bond with the child. Mason v. Dwinnell, 190 N.C. App. 209, 660 S.E.2d 58 (2008).

Temporary Relinquishment of Custody. - There are circumstances where the responsibility of a parent to act in the best interest of his or her child would require a temporary relinquishment of custody; however, to preserve the constitutional protection of parental interests in such a situation, the parent should notify the custodian upon relinquishment of custody that it is temporary and avoid conduct inconsistent with the protected parental interests. Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997).

In making custody decisions between a parent and a grandparent or other third party, the court must balance two doctrines. The first, the "parental right" doctrine, holds that ordinarily and in the absence of particular circumstances, the custody of a child should be given to the parent in preference to the grandparent, if the parent is found to be fit to have custody and can supply a proper home. The second doctrine, the "best interests of the child" doctrine, holds that custody should be awarded in accordance with the best interests of the child regardless of the fitness of the parents. Campbell v. Campbell, 63 N.C. App. 113, 304 S.E.2d 262, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 460, 307 S.E.2d 362 (1983).

To Whom Custody May Be Awarded. - If the mother and the father are both fit and proper persons to have custody of children, under ordinary circumstances the court would then proceed to determine whether the best interest, health and welfare of the children would be served by awarding custody to the mother or father. If not, then the court must deal with someone or an agency over whom the court has control. But an order awarding custody, in effect, to third persons who are not parties to the proceeding, not a public institution, and not bound by the court's order, must be reversed. Boone v. Boone, 8 N.C. App. 524, 174 S.E.2d 833 (1970).

Award of Custody to Grandparents. - Where the custody of a minor child was awarded to the mother in a divorce proceeding, and subsequently, both parents, who were deemed proper and fit persons to have the custody of such child, moved out of the State, and the child was left by the mother with the child's maternal grandparents, residents of the State and highly proper persons to rear the child, upon petition of the father for custody of the child the court had authority under this section to order that the child continue in the custody of the grandparents. Walker v. Walker, 224 N.C. 751, 32 S.E.2d 318 (1944).

Where grandmother was a good housekeeper and showed the ability to care for the children the trial court erred in denying and dismissing grandmother's petition for custody on the basis of its "serious concerns" about her parenting skills because of problems experienced by her daughter. Smith v. Alleghany County Dep't of Social Servs., 114 N.C. App. 727, 443 S.E.2d 101, cert. denied, 337 N.C. 696, 448 S.E.2d 533 (1994).

Where there are unusual circumstances and the best interests of the child justify such action, the court may refuse to award custody to either the mother or father and instead award the custody of the child to its grandparents or others. In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971).

For case affirming order transferring custody to paternal grandmother and awarding visitation rights to both mother and father, see Best v. Best, 81 N.C. App. 337, 344 S.E.2d 363 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Petersen v. Rowe, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).

Grandparents' Rights When Family Intact - Under G.S. 50-13.1(a), 50-13.2(b1), 50-13.2A, 50-13.5(j), a grandparent's right to visitation arises either in the context of an ongoing custody proceeding or where the minor child is in the custody of a stepparent or a relative - the "intact family" rule; in a case that does not involve adoption by a stepparent or other relative, a grandparent must prove that the child's family is not intact before the grandparent can intervene to request visitation with his grandchild - G.S. 50-13.1(a), 50-13.2(b1), 50-13.2A, 50-13.5(j) does not grant grandparents the right to sue for visitation when no custody proceeding is ongoing and the minor children's family is intact. Eakett v. Eakett, 157 N.C. App. 550, 579 S.E.2d 486 (2003).

Socioeconomic status of paternal grandmother, who intervened in custody case, was irrelevant to issue of mother's fitness as a parent. Raynor v. Odom, 124 N.C. App. 724, 478 S.E.2d 655 (1996).

It is only when the custody of a child is "in issue" or "being litigated" that the grandparents are entitled to relief pursuant to subsection (b1). Fisher v. Fisher, 124 N.C. App. 442, 477 S.E.2d 251 (1996).

Domestic Partner Denied Custody, Parental Status, and Reinstatement of Visitation Schedule. - Trial court properly denied defendant's claims for joint custody, recognition of parental status, and reinstatement of the original visitation schedule because plaintiff, defendant's former domestic partner, did not engage in conduct inconsistent with plaintiff's constitutionally protected status as the legal parent and did not allow defendant to function as a parent. Estroff v. Chatterjee, 190 N.C. App. 61, 660 S.E.2d 73 (2008).

Award to Department of Social Services. - For case involving sexual abuse of daughters by father, in which children were adjudicated abused and neglected, and in which award of custody to the department of social services, with mother being given physical custody of one daughter and liberal visitation with the other daughter, who was placed with her grandmother, pending review in 60 days, was approved, see In re Gwaltney, 68 N.C. App. 686, 315 S.E.2d 750 (1984).

Foster Parents Have No Standing to Bring Custody Action. - Nothing in the language of G.S. 48-9.1(1) gives foster parents standing to contest the department's or agency's exercise of its rights as legal custodian; therefore, foster parents are without standing to bring an action seeking custody of minor child placed in their home by defendant. Oxendine v. Department of Social Servs., 303 N.C. 699, 281 S.E.2d 370 (1981); In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 531, 345 S.E.2d 404, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 589 (1986).

But Custody May Be Awarded to Foster Parents. - Having acquired subject matter jurisdiction, trial court, guided by the best interests of the child, had broad dispositional powers, including the power to award legal custody of child to its foster parents. In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 531, 345 S.E.2d 404, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 589 (1986).

The case of Oxendine v. Department of Social Servs., 303 N.C. 699, 281 S.E.2d 370 (1981) does not prohibit the transfer of legal care, custody and control of a foster child to its foster parents. Oxendine stands for the proposition that foster parents have no standing to bring a custody action pursuant to G.S. 50-13.2 et seq. In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 531, 345 S.E.2d 404, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 589 (1986).

Intervention by Foster Parents. - In proceeding brought by DSS in which custody was put in issue by guardian ad litem and natural father, trial court did not err in permitting child's foster parents to intervene. In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 531, 345 S.E.2d 404, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 589 (1986), distinguishing Oxendine v. Department of Social Servs., 303 N.C. 699, 281 S.E.2d 370 (1981).

It was improper for a trial court to apply a G.S. 50-13.2(a) best interest analysis to a domestic partner's application for joint custody without first determining that a natural parent's conduct was inconsistent with her constitutionally protected status as a parent. Heatzig v. MacLean, 191 N.C. App. 451, 664 S.E.2d 347 (2008), review denied, appeal dismissed, 362 N.C. 681, 670 S.E.2d 564 (2008).

Claim for Custody Held Not Frivolous. - Where there was no indication at trial that the grandparents in fact did not wish to obtain custody of the children or that their claim was made in bad faith, the fact that the grandparents had originally asked for visitation did not make their later claim for custody violative of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 11. Kerns v. Southern, 100 N.C. App. 664, 397 S.E.2d 651 (1990).

Remand Where Custody Awarded to One Who Was Not a Party. - While the court, upon proper findings and conclusions, may award the custody of a minor child to any such person, agency or institution as will best promote the interest and welfare of the child, where the court awarded custody of the child to one who was not a party to the proceeding, the proceeding would be remanded with directions that the trial court issue the necessary notices and orders to make such individual a party to the action, to the end that the court would have effective jurisdiction over her person. In re Edwards, 25 N.C. App. 608, 214 S.E.2d 215 (1975).

Reversal of Award to Third Party. - Where in an initial custody determination, the trial court conducted the "best interest and welfare" analysis, and based solely on that analysis, awarded custody of the minor child to defendant (friend of mother who had cared for child since birth) rather than the plaintiff/father, the child's natural parent, the award of custody on this basis was error and must be reversed. Lambert v. Riddick, 120 N.C. App. 480, 462 S.E.2d 835 (1995).

B. AS BETWEEN PARENTS.

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Conviction of Abandonment Did Not Preclude Award of Custody. - The fact that father had been convicted of abandonment of his children and ordered to provide for their support did not preclude the court from finding, upon a hearing of a subsequent motion for the custody of the children in a divorce action, that father was a fit and suitable person to have custody of the children, when there was uncontradicted evidence upon the hearing that father had a good reputation in the community in which he lived. Thomas v. Thomas, 259 N.C. 461, 130 S.E.2d 871 (1963).

Effect of Prior Order of Incompetence. - In a controversy between husband and wife for custody of minor children of the marriage, it is error for the trial court to award custody to the husband on the sole ground that the wife has prior to that time been judged mentally incompetent. A prior court order which judicially declares a parent to be incompetent is not sufficient in and of itself to establish a parent's present unfitness to have a child or children; rather, this section requires a full, factual determination of all the circumstances in the case before a proper order may be entered by the court. Price v. Price, 42 N.C. App. 66, 255 S.E.2d 652 (1979).

Relevance of Evidence of Adultery. - The court committed prejudicial error in refusing to allow plaintiff to introduce evidence of defendant's adultery at a hearing on a custody motion. While evidence of adultery does not impel a finding of unfitness of the adulterous parent, it is relevant upon an inquiry of fitness of a person for the purpose of awarding custody of minor children to him or to her. Darden v. Darden, 20 N.C. App. 433, 201 S.E.2d 538 (1974); Hunt v. Hunt, 29 N.C. App. 380, 224 S.E.2d 270 (1976). See also, In re McCraw Children, 3 N.C. App. 390, 165 S.E.2d 1 (1969).

Joint Legal Custody Appropriate. - In addition to findings regarding parties' financial status and what would best serve interests of children, court had before it plaintiff's admission that she indeed thought defendant to be fit and proper person as stated in her verified reply to defendant's answer and counterclaim. Thus, joint legal custody was appropriate. Witherow v. Witherow, 99 N.C. App. 61, 392 S.E.2d 627 (1990).

Joint Legal Authority. - Trial court erred in dividing decision-making responsibilities between the parties after awarding joint legal custody because the trial court had not made the necessary findings of fact to warrant a division of joint legal authority; the trial court's mere findings that the parties had a tumultuous relationship did not satisfy the required findings. Hall v. Hall, 188 N.C. App. 527, 655 S.E.2d 901 (2008).

The fact that mother's paramour had been living with mother and minor child since the parties' separation was insufficient, standing alone, to determine custody; the court must consider all the facts of the case and decide the issue in the best interests of the child. Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

Award Where Both Parents Are Found Fit - Generally. - When there has been a finding that both parents are fit and suitable to have custody, the judge's order is conclusive when supported by evidence. Kearns v. Kearns, 6 N.C. App. 319, 170 S.E.2d 132 (1969), overruled on other grounds, 55 N.C. App. 250, 285 S.E.2d 281 (1982).

Same - Award to Father. - When the court finds that both parties are fit and proper persons to have custody, and then adjudges that it is in the best interest of the child for the father to have custody, such holding will be upheld; but it must be supported by competent evidence. Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

When the court finds that both parties are fit and proper persons to have custody of the children involved, and then finds that it is in the best interests of the children for the father to have custody of said children, such holding will be upheld when it is supported by competent evidence. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966); Boone v. Boone, 8 N.C. App. 524, 174 S.E.2d 833 (1970).

Where the evidence was sufficient to support the court's finding that father was a suitable person to have custody of his son and that the best interests of the child would be served by awarding the child's custody to him, order awarding the custody to the father was proper, even though the evidence would also have supported a finding that the child's mother was a fit and suitable person and that the best interests of the child would be served by awarding custody to her. In re White, 262 N.C. 737, 138 S.E.2d 516 (1964).

Age of Parents. - All else being equal, a 55-year-old person has a shorter remaining life span than a 33-year-old person and the consideration of continuity and stability in the life of a child will logically lead a judge to consider the age of a parent. Consideration of all aspects of both parents' lives, including the potential for continuity and stability, is necessary to promote the governmental interest of granting custody on the best interests of the child. Phelps v. Phelps, 337 N.C. 344, 446 S.E.2d 17, rehearing denied, 337 N.C. 807, 449 S.E.2d 750 (1994).

A passing comment about a party's age, when determining a child's best interest in accordance with the statute, does not constitute an unconstitutional classification in violation of a party's equal protection rights. Phelps v. Phelps, 337 N.C. 344, 446 S.E.2d 17, rehearing denied, 337 N.C. 807, 449 S.E.2d 750 (1994).

Award to Father on Finding of Changed Circumstances. - Trial judge did not abuse his discretion by ruling that a material change in circumstances had occurred with the increased age of younger child, who had been awarded previously to the mother, since the child indicated clearly his desire to stay with his father, who also had custody of his elder brother. In re Peal, 305 N.C. 640, 290 S.E.2d 664 (1982).

Where father failed to offer evidence of mother's adultery at divorce trial, but after the divorce moved for a change of custody on that ground, the trial court's reassignment of custody of the child to father due to a material change of circumstances since the date of the divorce was not erroneous merely because the crucial circumstances, e.g., the mother's adultery, existed before divorce. The child should not be placed in the custody of an unfit parent merely because the other parent failed to introduce evidence at the proper stage of the litigation. Paschall v. Paschall, 21 N.C. App. 120, 203 S.E.2d 337 (1974).

Award to Father on Condition That Physical Custody Be in Grandparents. - Where the court's conclusions that the mother was an unfit person to have custody of the children and that the father was a fit and suitable person to have their custody was supported by the findings, but neither the father nor the paternal grandparents had a suitable home for the children, and that the maternal grandparents, with whom the children were then living, had such a home, an order awarding the custody of the children to the father on condition that the physical custody of the children be vested in their maternal grandparents and that the father pay for their support would not be disturbed on appeal, the welfare of the children being the determinative factor in the award of custody. Thomas v. Thomas, 259 N.C. 461, 130 S.E.2d 871 (1963).

Award of Custody to Father Held Proper. - Trial court did not err in concluding that it would be in the best interest of minor child for her custody to be placed with defendant father where, pursuant to separation agreement, plaintiff mother gave defendant custody of the child and agreed to assist with medical and dental bills on behalf of the child; the child had lived with defendant at all times since her birth and lived solely with defendant since the parties' separation; plaintiff rarely visited the child following the parties' separation; and plaintiff admitted that defendant had done a good job of looking after the child since their separation. Ingle v. Ingle, 53 N.C. App. 227, 280 S.E.2d 460 (1981).

Findings on Award of Custody to Mother Held Sufficient. - Findings that the parties had been married and divorced, that the wife was a person of good character, resident in this State, that the husband was financially responsible, and that the best interest of the minor child of the marriage would be promoted by awarding its custody to the wife were sufficient to sustain a decree awarding its custody to her and requiring the husband to make contributions for the support of the child. Hardee v. Mitchell, 230 N.C. 40, 51 S.E.2d 884 (1949).

Award to Mother Upheld. - Where the trial court found, upon supporting evidence, that the mother was now a stable, fit, and suitable custodian of her children, and that their best interests required that their custody be awarded to her, the Supreme Court would affirm the award of custody. Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S. Ct. 1417, 39 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1974).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying a custody order to grant joint legal custody to a mother and father with the mother having primary custody because there had been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child and modification was in the child's best interests pursuant to G.S. 50-13.2(a); father had moved out of state with the child, had facilitated renewed contact with the child's maternal grandfather despite a court order prohibiting the contact, and the child had been harmed by a dog while in the father's care. Pass v. Beck, 210 N.C. App. 192, 708 S.E.2d 87 (2011).

Trial court properly entered an initial custody order awarding primary and legal custody of the parties' child to one parent and supervised visitation to the other parent, until such time as the court was able to gather more evidence of the noncustodial's parenting abilities. The trial court had authority to base its custody determination in part on its inability to determine the noncustodial parent's fitness as a parent, which was caused by the noncustodial's failure to answer questions regarding allegations of child pornography. Meadows v. Meadows, 246 N.C. App. 245, 782 S.E.2d 561 (2016).

Custody of Child Upheld Where Father Never Visited. - Where plaintiff mother had had de facto custody of five-year old child since his birth, and defendant, who had acknowledged paternity of the child when he was there, had not visited the child in a substantial length of time, nor had he requested visitation privileges or custody, formal award of custody to mother would be upheld. Craig v. Kelley, 89 N.C. App. 458, 366 S.E.2d 249 (1988).

Illegitimate Child. - As to the custody of an illegitimate child, see Jolly v. Queen, 264 N.C. 711, 142 S.E.2d 592 (1965).

By its plain language, G.S. 50-13.2(a) clearly abrogates the common-law presumption vesting custody of an illegitimate child in the child's mother. Rosero v. Blake, 357 N.C. 193, 581 S.E.2d 41 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177, 124 S. Ct. 1407, 158 L. Ed. 2d 78 (2004).

Illegitimate child's father who has acknowledged his paternity under G.S. 110-132(a) and whose conduct is consistent with his right to care for and control his child has a right to custody of his illegitimate child legally equal to that of the child's mother, and, pursuant to G.S. 50-13.2, if the best interest of the child is served by placing the child in the father's custody, he is to be awarded custody of that child. Rosero v. Blake, 357 N.C. 193, 581 S.E.2d 41 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177, 124 S. Ct. 1407, 158 L. Ed. 2d 78 (2004).

As the common-law rule that custody of an illegitimate child presumptively vested in the mother was abrogated by G.S. 50-13.2(a), the trial court properly applied the "best interest of the child" standard in awarding custody to the child's father, who had acknowledged his paternity under G.S. 110-132(a), paid child support without a court order, and provided that child with a stable and structured life. Rosero v. Blake, 357 N.C. 193, 581 S.E.2d 41 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177, 124 S. Ct. 1407, 158 L. Ed. 2d 78 (2004).

In applying the best interest of the child standard to award joint custody of an illegitimate child to the parents, district court applied the correct standard as between the parents, because the common law presumption in favor of awarding custody of the illegitimate child to the mother was abrogated by G.S. 50-13.2 and the case law. David v. Ferguson, 160 N.C. App. 89, 584 S.E.2d 102 (2003).

For case as to former preference that mother be given custody, see Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S. Ct. 1417, 39 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1974).

IV. VISITATION RIGHTS.

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Court May Divide Custody Between Parents or Award General Custody Subject to Visitation Privileges. - The trial court has discretionary power either to divide custody between contending parents for alternating periods, or to award general custody to one parent, subject to visitation privileges in favor of the unsuccessful parent. Griffin v. Griffin, 237 N.C. 404, 75 S.E.2d 133 (1953).

The standard by which the court is guided in visitation matters is the child's best interest. Kerns v. Southern, 100 N.C. App. 664, 397 S.E.2d 651 (1990).

Burden of Proof. - Grandparents seeking visitation rights had the burden of proving that the award of visitation was in the best interest of the children; therefore, where trial judge reversed the burden, so that the mother had to prove that the visitation was bad for the children, the judge was in error. Kerns v. Southern, 100 N.C. App. 664, 397 S.E.2d 651 (1990).

Findings as to Visitation. - To support an award of visitation rights, the judgment of the trial court should contain findings of fact which sustain the conclusion of law that the party is a fit person to visit the child and that such visitation rights are in the best interest of the child. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 32 N.C. App. 154, 231 S.E.2d 26 (1977); In re Kowalzek, 37 N.C. App. 364, 246 S.E.2d 45, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 734, 248 S.E.2d 863 (1978); In re Jones, 62 N.C. App. 103, 302 S.E.2d 259 (1983).

Where the trial judge specifically considered a child's best interests in determining custody and visitation in accordance with G.S. 50-13.2(a) and the evidence supported the trial court's findings, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering visitation between the minor child and the father. Pass v. Beck, 156 N.C. App. 597, 577 S.E.2d 180 (2003), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 252, 582 S.E.2d 277 (2003).

Order for Professional Consultation Within Court's Discretion. - Where trial court found defendant's contact with his minor child had been minimal, although he was fit and proper to have visitation rights, consultation with plaintiff and defendant by a third-party professional could benefit the court in awarding specific visitation rights; therefore, there was no abuse of discretion in the court's ordering the consultation prior to its consideration of visitation rights. Rawls v. Rawls, 94 N.C. App. 670, 381 S.E.2d 179 (1989).

Visitation Rights to Parent Restricted. - Trial court properly entered an initial custody order awarding primary and legal custody of the parties' child to one parent and supervised visitation to the other parent, until such time as the court was able to gather more evidence of the noncustodial's parenting abilities. The trial court had authority to base its custody determination in part on its inability to determine the noncustodial parent's fitness as a parent, which was caused by the noncustodial's failure to answer questions regarding allegations of child pornography. Meadows v. Meadows, 246 N.C. App. 245, 782 S.E.2d 561 (2016).

When Visitation May Be Denied. - A parent's right of visitation with his or her child is a natural and legal right, and when awarding custody of a child to another, the court should not deny a parent's right of visitation at appropriate times unless the parent has by conduct forfeited the right or unless the exercise of the right would be detrimental to the best interest and welfare of the child. In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971).

Courts are generally reluctant to deny all visitation rights to the divorced parent of a child of tender age, but it is generally agreed that visitation rights should not be permitted to jeopardize a child's welfare. Swicegood v. Swicegood, 270 N.C. 278, 154 S.E.2d 324 (1967).

The grandmother did not have standing under this section to seek visitation with her grandchildren, where the children had been adopted by their biological aunt and her husband, and custody was not an issue. Hill v. Newman, 131 N.C. App. 793, 509 S.E.2d 226 (1998).

Determination of Visitation Rights May Not Be Delegated. - If the court finds that the parent has by conduct forfeited the right of visitation or if the court finds that the exercise of the right would be detrimental to the best interest and welfare of the child, the court may, in its discretion, deny a parent the right of visitation with, or access to, his or her child; but the court may not delegate this authority to the custodian. In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971).

Court Should Safeguard Visitation Rights by Provision in Order. - If the court does not find that a parent has by conduct forfeited the right of visitation and does not find that the exercise of the right would be detrimental to the best interest and welfare of the child, the court should safeguard the parent's visitation rights by a provision in the order defining and establishing the time, place and conditions under which such visitation rights may be exercised. In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971).

Enforcement of Visitation Orders. - Trial judges in this State have authority to enforce orders providing for visitation by the methods set forth in this section, that is, by contempt proceedings and by injunction. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

Receipt of Support May Not Be Conditioned on Visitation. - A trial judge does not have authority to condition a minor child's receipt of support paid by the noncustodial parent on compliance with court-ordered visitation allowed the noncustodial parent by ordering that child support paid by defendant be placed in escrow if minor child fails or refuses to abide by the visitation privileges allowed defendant. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

District court was authorized to grant the father of an illegitimate child visitation privileges and to punish the mother for refusing to allow the father to visit his illegitimate child. Conley v. Johnson, 24 N.C. App. 122, 210 S.E.2d 88 (1974).

Grant of Visitation Rights to Homosexual Father. - The trial court did not err in granting a father who was homosexual unsupervised overnight visitation rights with his minor son. Woodruff v. Woodruff, 44 N.C. App. 350, 260 S.E.2d 775 (1979).

Grandparents May Not Be Awarded Visitation Rights When Custody Is Not in Issue. - While subsection (b1) of this section authorizes the court to provide for the visitation rights of grandparents when the custody of minor children is being litigated, it does not authorize the court to enter such an order when the custody of the children is not in issue. Moore v. Moore, 89 N.C. App. 351, 365 S.E.2d 662 (1988).

This section and G.S. 50-13.5 and G.S. 50-13.2A must be read in conjunction with G.S. 50-13.1(a) so as to harmonize them and give effect to a consistent legislative policy. Under them, a grandparent's right to visitation arises either in the context of an ongoing custody proceeding or where the minor child is in the custody of a stepparent or a relative. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 341 N.C. 629, 461 S.E.2d 745 (1995).

Standing to Seek Grandparent Visitation. - Mother's motion to dismiss grandparents' motion for visitation was properly denied because, although the parents had entered into a consent judgment in the underlying child custody dispute, the custody of the child was still "in issue" and "being litigated" by the parents when the grandparents moved to intervene, and thus, under G.S. 50-13.2(b1), the grandparents had standing to intervene at the time; the resolution of the custody dispute between the parents did not wipe out the grandparents' claim. Quesinberry v. Quesinberry, 196 N.C. App. 118, 674 S.E.2d 775 (2009).

Grandparents lacked standing to bring a claim for visitation because there was no ongoing custody proceeding, as the mother had a natural and legal right to custody and control of the child upon the father's death and the child had not been adopted by a stepparent or relative. Graham v. Jones, - N.C. App. - , 842 S.E.2d 153 (2020).

Paternal grandparents had statutory standing to seek permanent visitation rights, notwithstanding that the father had died, as they had been allowed to intervene when custody between the father and the mother was in dispute. Alexander v. Alexander, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Mar. 16, 2021).

Grandparent Had No Rights to Proceed. - There are four statutes in North Carolina which permit a grandparent to maintain an action for custody or visitation of a minor child, and although plaintiff, mother of the deceased father of the two minor children, did not specify under which statute she filed, it was clear that she had no right to proceed under G.S. 50-13.1(a), this section, G.S. 50-13.2A, or G.S. 50-13.5(j). Shaut v. Cannon, 136 N.C. App. 834, 526 S.E.2d 214 (2000).

Grandparents Had Right to Intervene in Pending Custody Action. - In a child custody action, the order granting intervention to the maternal grandparents on ground there was a pending matter regarding future visitation before the court was proper; because the issue of the mother's visitation was still pending, the custody of the child was still "in issue" and was "being litigated" by the parents. Smith v. Barbour, 195 N.C. App. 244, 671 S.E.2d 578 (2009), review denied, 363 N.C. 375, 678 S.E.2d 670 (2009).

Trial court erred in concluding a grandmother's visitation rights under a prior custody order did not survive termination of a mother's parental rights because the grandmother not only intervened in the case but also obtained visitation rights via a permanent custody order; thus, the termination of the mother's parental rights did not extinguish the grandmother's court-ordered visitation rights, and the grandmother could seek to enforce the prior custody order through contempt proceedings. Adams v. Langdon, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 236 (2019).

Insufficient Findings to Support Order for Grandparent Visitation. - Remand of order granting grandparent visitation was necessary because the trial court made no explanation in its findings of fact as to why it determined that it was preferable to take the majority of the grandparents' vacation visitation time out of mother's custodial time; moreover, it was unclear that the trial court considered the possible interaction between the parents' consent judgment and its order awarding visitation to the grandparents. Quesinberry v. Quesinberry, 196 N.C. App. 118, 674 S.E.2d 775 (2009).

As parents with lawful custody of their children have the prerogative of determining with whom they shall associate. Moore v. Moore, 89 N.C. App. 351, 365 S.E.2d 662 (1988).

Electronic Video Communication. - In proceedings wherein a five-year-old child was adjudicated neglected, the trial court erred in denying the mother in-person visitation and permitting only electronic video communication, G.S. 50-13.2(e), because the court failed to find the mother forfeited her right to visitation or that visitation was not in the child's best interest, G.S. 7B-905(c). In re T.R.T., 225 N.C. App. 567, 737 S.E.2d 823 (2013).

Visitation Rights to Parent In Foreign Country. - Trial court, when it awarded one parent in North Carolina the primary physical care and custody of the parties' minor child, properly awarded visitation privileges to the other parent, who was a citizen and resident of Canada and a missionary in Malawi, because the court considered the factors relevant to the child's best interest, including the characteristics of the parties and the one parent's concerns about the possible dangers to the child if the child were to travel to Malawi. Burger v. Smith, 243 N.C. App. 233, 776 S.E.2d 886 (2015).

Visitation Action Qualifies As Custody Action for Attorney Fee Purposes. - Action by intervening grandparents for visitation qualifies as an action for custody, and if that action falls within the scope of G.S. 50-13.6 as an action for the custody, support, or both of a minor child for the purposes of awarding fees to the grandparents, then such an action must also fall within the scope of the statute for purposes of ordering the grandparents to pay; an award of fees against grandparents seeking visitation rights was authorized. Sullivan v. Woody, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 306 (2020).

V. WISHES OF CHILD.

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Wishes of Child of Sufficient Age Are Entitled to Weight. - The wishes of a child of sufficient age to exercise discretion in choosing a custodian are entitled to considerable weight when the contest is between the parents, but are not controlling. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966); In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971); Falls v. Falls, 52 N.C. App. 203, 278 S.E.2d 546, cert. denied, 304 N.C. 390, 285 S.E.2d 831 (1981).

A child may be a competent witness and ought to be examined in that character. Indeed, being the party mainly concerned, he has a right to make a statement to the court as to his feelings and wishes upon the matter. This ought to be allowed serious consideration by the court, in the exercise of its discretion. Kearns v. Kearns, 6 N.C. App. 319, 170 S.E.2d 132 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Stephenson v. Stephenson, 55 N.C. App. 250, 285 S.E.2d 281 (1982).

In making the weighty choice of awarding custody, the judge may properly consider the preference or wishes of a child of suitable age and discretion. In re Peal, 305 N.C. 640, 290 S.E.2d 664 (1982).

As to the courts' consideration of the wishes of a child of suitable age, see also In re Gwaltney, 68 N.C. App. 686, 315 S.E.2d 750 (1984).

Because Child's Wishes Will Aid Determination of His Best Interests. - The child's wishes will be one factor considered by the court in determining his custody, usually not because of any legal right in the child to have his wishes granted, but because the consideration of such wishes will aid the court in making a custodial decree which is for the best interests and welfare of the child. Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 184 S.E.2d 417 (1971).

But Such Wishes Are Not Controlling. - When a child has reached the age of discretion, the court may consider the preference or wishes of the child to live with a particular person. A child has attained an age of discretion when it is of an age and capacity to form an intelligent or rational view on the matter. The expressed wish of a child of discretion is, however, never controlling upon the court, since the court must yield in all cases to what it considers to be the child's best interests, regardless of the child's personal preference. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966).

Although the preference of a child of discretion would seem to have its greatest weight when the controversy is between the parents and both are fit persons, the child's wishes are only entitled to consideration and are not controlling. Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 184 S.E.2d 417 (1971).

Weight to Be Given Child's Testimony Is for the Court. - A child has a right to have his testimony heard. However, the weight to be attached to such testimony is within the discretion of the trial judge. Kearns v. Kearns, 6 N.C. App. 319, 170 S.E.2d 132 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Stephenson v. Stephenson, 55 N.C. App. 250, 285 S.E.2d 281 (1982).

Lack of Findings as to Child's Preferences Insufficient to Upset Award. - Failure of the court to include a finding as to the preferences of the minor child is insufficient to upset its order of award of custody. Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 184 S.E.2d 417 (1971).

Ten Year Old. - A child's preference as to who shall have his custody is not controlling; however, the trial judge should consider the wishes of a 10-year-old child in making his determination. In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971).

Where the contest is between a parent and one not connected by blood to the child, the desire of the child will not ordinarily prevail over the natural right of the parent, unless essential to the child's welfare. In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971).

VI. DISCRETION OF TRIAL COURT.

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Determining the custody of minor children is never the province of a jury; it is that of the judge of the court in which the proceeding is pending. Stanback v. Stanback, 270 N.C. 497, 155 S.E.2d 221 (1967).

The question of custody is one addressed to the trial court. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966).

Trial Judge Is Vested with Broad Discretion. - The trial judge, who has the opportunity to see and hear the parties and the witnesses, is vested with broad discretion in cases involving custody of children. Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 204 S.E.2d 678 (1974); Pruneau v. Sanders, 25 N.C. App. 510, 214 S.E.2d 288, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 664, 216 S.E.2d 911 (1975); Goodson v. Goodson, 32 N.C. App. 76, 231 S.E.2d 178 (1977); Sheppard v. Sheppard, 38 N.C. App. 712, 248 S.E.2d 871 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 586, 254 S.E.2d 34 (1979); In re Peal, 305 N.C. 640, 290 S.E.2d 664 (1982).

While the welfare of the child is always to be treated as the paramount consideration, wide discretionary power is necessarily vested in the trial court in reaching decisions in particular cases. Griffin v. Griffin, 237 N.C. 404, 75 S.E.2d 133 (1953); Swicegood v. Swicegood, 270 N.C. 278, 154 S.E.2d 324 (1967); In re Moore, 8 N.C. App. 251, 174 S.E.2d 135 (1970); Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

The trial court has broad discretion in deciding child custody cases. Paschall v. Paschall, 21 N.C. App. 120, 203 S.E.2d 337 (1974).

The trial judge is vested with broad discretion in child custody cases. The "paramount consideration" which limits this discretion is the welfare and needs of the children. Phillips v. Choplin, 65 N.C. App. 506, 309 S.E.2d 716 (1983).

The trial judge is vested with broad discretion in child custody cases, and that discretion must be exercised to serve the welfare and needs of the children. Woncik v. Woncik, 82 N.C. App. 244, 346 S.E.2d 277 (1986).

Judge's Decision Will Not Be Upset Absent Abuse. - The decision to award custody of a minor is vested in the discretion of the trial judge, who has the opportunity to see the parties in person and to hear the witnesses, and his decision ought not to be upset on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. In re Pitts, 2 N.C. App. 211, 162 S.E.2d 524 (1968); In re Morrison, 6 N.C. App. 47, 169 S.E.2d 228 (1969); In re Moore, 8 N.C. App. 251, 174 S.E.2d 135 (1970); In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971); Jarman v. Jarman, 14 N.C. App. 531, 188 S.E.2d 647, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 622, 190 S.E.2d 465 (1972); In re Cox, 17 N.C. App. 687, 195 S.E.2d 132, cert. denied, 283 N.C. 585, 196 S.E.2d 809 (1973); King v. Demo, 40 N.C. App. 661, 253 S.E.2d 616 (1979); Wilson v. Williams, 42 N.C. App. 348, 256 S.E.2d 516 (1979); Comer v. Comer, 61 N.C. App. 324, 300 S.E.2d 457 (1983); Campbell v. Campbell, 63 N.C. App. 113, 304 S.E.2d 262, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 460, 307 S.E.2d 362 (1983); Plemmons v. Stiles, 65 N.C. App. 341, 309 S.E.2d 504 (1983).

Where trial judge enters a custody order that in his judgment is in the best interest of the child, the appellate division should not reverse that judgment and hold, as a matter of law, that the trial judge was obliged to have reached a different opinion, in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Decisions in custody cases are never easy, and the trial judge has the opportunity to see the parties in person and to hear the witnesses. He can detect tenors, tones and flavors that are lost in the bare printed record read months later by appellate judges. Newsome v. Newsome, 42 N.C. App. 416, 256 S.E.2d 849 (1979).

If Supported by Competent Evidence. - The trial judge's decision as to custody will not be upset, in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion, if his findings are supported by competent evidence. Sheppard v. Sheppard, 38 N.C. App. 712, 248 S.E.2d 871 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 586, 254 S.E.2d 34 (1979); Comer v. Comer, 61 N.C. App. 324, 300 S.E.2d 457 (1983).

The question of custody is one addressed to the trial court, and the court's decision will be upheld if supported by competent evidence. Roberts v. Short, 6 N.C. App. 419, 169 S.E.2d 910 (1969); Brandon v. Brandon, 10 N.C. App. 457, 179 S.E.2d 177 (1971).

The trial judge is present where he can observe and hear the parties and their witnesses, and ordinarily his decision on custody will be upheld if supported by competent evidence. In re McCraw Children, 3 N.C. App. 390, 165 S.E.2d 1 (1969).

Instead of applying an inflexible rule, the court must consider all facts of the case and decide the issue in accordance with the best interests of the child. Paschall v. Paschall, 21 N.C. App. 120, 203 S.E.2d 337 (1974).

Discretion to Allow Grandparent's Visitation Rights. - Although the trial judge determined that the appellant-defendant would continue to have primary custody of the children, it was entirely within the trial judge's discretion to allow the grandparents' visitation rights based on the best interest of the children. Kerns v. Southern, 100 N.C. App. 664, 397 S.E.2d 651 (1990).

Nature of Evidence. - An order for custody should be entered only after the most careful consideration, and only after the court has had the benefit of more reliable evidence than is usually afforded by affidavits. In re Griffin, 6 N.C. App. 375, 170 S.E.2d 84 (1969).

Discretion Not to Include A Provision. - Plaintiff provided no supporting guidance as to how or why the trial court was required to make certain findings and the issue was not addressed; moreover, as the trial court orally noted that it would not entertain a parenting-time right of first refusal as being in the best interests of the minor children, it was within the discretion of the trial court to not include such a provision, either to its granting or denial, in the child custody order. Oltmanns v. Oltmanns, 241 N.C. App. 326, 773 S.E.2d 347 (2015).

No Abuse in Child Custody Decision. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that relocation to California with the father was in the child's best interest, nor did it violate this section in its order after finding that the father had an immediately proximate support system to help him care for the child while the mother's support system was four hours away from the mother, who lived alone and was in the military since the mother's military status was not the only basis for the decision. Munoz v. Munoz, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Aug. 3, 2021).

VII. FINDINGS OF FACT.

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Trial Court Must Make Findings of Fact. - To support an award of custody, the judgment of the trial court should contain findings of fact which sustain the conclusion of law that custody of the child is awarded to the person who will best promote the interest and welfare of the child. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 32 N.C. App. 154, 231 S.E.2d 26 (1977); Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981); Story v. Story, 57 N.C. App. 657, 291 S.E.2d 923 (1982).

The court erred in not permitting the parties to a "joint custody" agreement to present extrinsic evidence of the parties' understanding of the meaning of those terms and their intent at the time of the agreement before determining whether the plaintiff wife had breached the agreement by failing to take steps to help the son who had drug abuse problems, thereby excusing the defendant husband from paying alimony. Patterson v. Taylor, 140 N.C. App. 91, 535 S.E.2d 374 (2000).

Before awarding custody of a child to a particular party, the trial court must conclude as a matter of law that the award of custody to that particular party will best promote the interest and welfare of the child. Findings of fact as to the characteristics of the competing parties must be made to support the necessary conclusion of law. These findings may concern physical, mental, or financial fitness or any other factors brought out in the evidence and relevant to the issue of the welfare of the child. Steele v. Steele, 36 N.C. App. 601, 244 S.E.2d 466 (1978).

To support an award of custody, the judgment of the trial court should contain findings of fact which sustain the conclusion of law that custody of the child is awarded to the person who will best promote the interest and welfare of the child; the conclusion of law determinative of the custody is not, therefore, that the person gaining custody is a fit and proper person to have custody, but which party will best promote the interest and welfare of the child. Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

Which Must Be More Than Mere Conclusory Statements. - A custody order is fatally defective where it fails to make detailed findings of fact from which an appellate court can determine that the order is in the best interest of the child, and custody orders are routinely vacated where the findings of fact consist of mere conclusory statements that the party being awarded custody is a fit and proper person to have custody and that it will be in the best interests of the child to award custody to that person. Dixon v. Dixon, 67 N.C. App. 73, 312 S.E.2d 669 (1984).

And Must Resolve Questions Raised by Evidence. - Findings bearing on the party's fitness to have care, custody and control of the child and findings as to the best interests of the child must resolve all questions raised by the evidence pertaining thereto. Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

But the trial judge is not required to find all the facts shown by the evidence. It is sufficient if enough material facts are found to support the judgment. In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971); Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

Findings of Fact Insufficient. - Without a finding of a substantial change of circumstances, a modification based solely on the ground that the defendant mother was over-protective was improper. Benedict v. Coe, 117 N.C. App. 369, 451 S.E.2d 320 (1994).

The trial court erred in amending the custody decree based on a finding of substantial change in circumstances where it found only that the proposed relocation of the mother after her remarriage would adversely affect the relationship between the father and his child but made no other findings about the effect of the proposed relocation on the child and on the child's best interests. Evans v. Evans, 138 N.C. App. 135, 530 S.E.2d 576 (2000).

Trial court erred in entering a custody order which prohibited a father from owning or possessing firearms until the children were emancipated; the trial court failed to make required findings pursuant to G.S. 50-13.2(a) on whether the safety of the children was endangered by the father's possession of firearms. Martin v. Martin, 167 N.C. App. 365, 605 S.E.2d 203 (2004).

Findings Supported by the Evidence. - Trial court did not err in awarding primary physical custody of the children to the husband under G.S. 50-13.2(a); by placing the children in the husband's physical custody, the children remained in the home and community where they had been raised, the husband demonstrated his ability to care for the children, and some of the husband's extended family lived nearby and could help with the children. Evans v. Evans, 169 N.C. App. 358, 610 S.E.2d 264 (2005).

Court's findings may concern physical, mental, or financial fitness or any other factors brought out by the evidence and relevant to the issue of the welfare of the child. Story v. Story, 57 N.C. App. 509, 291 S.E.2d 923 (1982).

Only One Finding. - While a court had the power under G.S. 7B-903 to enter an order transferring the custody of a minor child from her father to her mother, there was no evidence in the record in a proceeding on the parties' cross-motions for contempt that supported the finding that transferring custody to the mother was in the child's best interests. The court made only one finding, that the child missed the two people in her life who had neglected her, which was not a basis for not allowing custody to remain with the father, the trial court had a right under G.S. 50-13.2(a) to consider, but did not consider, acts of domestic violence by the child's stepfather toward her mother when determining the child's best interests, and the trial court had no right to take custody away from the father simply because he was unmarried. In re H.S.F., 177 N.C. App. 193, 628 S.E.2d 416 (2006).

Failure to Make Findings Is Error. - It is error for the court granting a decree of divorce to award the custody of a child without findings of fact from which it could be determined that the order was adequately supported by competent evidence and was for the best interest of the child. Swicegood v. Swicegood, 270 N.C. 278, 154 S.E.2d 324 (1967).

Trial court erred in granting permanent custody of a child to the child's natural parent, who had extremely limited contact with the child before the other parent's death, because it was speculative to assess what the quality of their relationship would be after a four-month "get acquainted" period during which temporary custody had been granted to the child's grandparents. McRoy v. Hodges, 160 N.C. App. 381, 585 S.E.2d 441 (2003).

And Will Necessitate Remand. - When the trial court fails to find facts so that the reviewing court can determine that the order is adequately supported by competent evidence and the welfare of the child subserved, then the order entered thereon must be vacated and the case remanded for detailed findings of fact. Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 158 S.E.2d 77 (1967); In re Moore, 8 N.C. App. 251, 174 S.E.2d 135 (1970); Austin v. Austin, 12 N.C. App. 286, 183 S.E.2d 420 (1971); Hampton v. Hampton, 29 N.C. App. 342, 224 S.E.2d 197 (1976); In re Kowalzek, 37 N.C. App. 364, 246 S.E.2d 45, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 734, 248 S.E.2d 863 (1978); Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

An order awarding custody of a child to the father, without any findings of fact other than a recital that the court had previously awarded custody to the father in a proceeding under former G.S. 17-39, was fatally defective, and the case would be remanded for detailed findings of fact. Swicegood v. Swicegood, 270 N.C. 278, 154 S.E.2d 324 (1967).

Court's Findings Are Conclusive If Supported by Evidence. - The findings of the trial court in regard to the custody of children are conclusive when supported by competent evidence. Swicegood v. Swicegood, 270 N.C. 278, 154 S.E.2d 324 (1967); In re Moore, 8 N.C. App. 251, 174 S.E.2d 135 (1970); Hampton v. Hampton, 29 N.C. App. 342, 224 S.E.2d 197 (1976).

Findings of fact by the trial court in a proceeding to determine the custody of a minor child ordinarily are conclusive when based on competent evidence. Griffin v. Griffin, 237 N.C. 404, 75 S.E.2d 133 (1953).

In a hearing to determine the right to custody of the children of the marriage, the court's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by competent evidence. Thomas v. Thomas, 259 N.C. 461, 130 S.E.2d 871 (1963).

Findings Are Binding on the Appellate Courts. - The trial judge's findings of fact in custody orders are binding on the appellate courts if supported by competent evidence. Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 204 S.E.2d 678 (1974).

Findings Will Not Be Disturbed Thereby. - The court's findings of fact as to the care and custody of children will not be disturbed when supported by competent evidence, even though the evidence be conflicting. Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 158 S.E.2d 77 (1967); In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971).

The normal rule in regard to the custody of children is that where there is competent evidence to support a judge's finding of fact, a judgment supported by such findings will not be disturbed on appeal; however, the facts found must be adequate for the appellate court to determine that the judgment is substantiated by competent evidence. Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

Even When Evidence Is Conflicting. - The findings of the trial judge regarding custody and support are conclusive when supported by competent evidence, even when the evidence is conflicting, the standard for disturbing the trial judge's decision on appeal being a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Dixon v. Dixon, 67 N.C. App. 122, 312 S.E.2d 669 (1984).

Conclusory Statements Held Inadequate. - For a case setting forth a visitation order and holding that order to be conclusive and not supported by adequate findings of fact, see Kerns v. Southern, 100 N.C. App. 664, 397 S.E.2d 651 (1990).

But an order may contain extensive findings and still be fatally defective when not supported by the evidence. Dixon v. Dixon, 67 N.C. App. 122, 312 S.E.2d 669 (1984).

Use of Fifth Amendment Privilege. - Father could not take advantage of the presumption that it is in the best interest of the child to be in the custody of his natural parent by introducing evidence of his fitness and then invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about his illegal drug activity. Qurneh v. Colie, 122 N.C. App. 553, 471 S.E.2d 433 (1996).

Where the father failed to make a showing of fitness and the court could not determine his fitness because of his assertion of the Fifth Amendment, the court acted properly in dismissing his claim for custody. Qurneh v. Colie, 122 N.C. App. 553, 471 S.E.2d 433 (1996).

Best Interests of the Child. - G.S. 50-13.2(a) and G.S. 7B-1110 both require a court to make findings of fact as to a child's best interests. In re Papathanassiou, 195 N.C. App. 278, 671 S.E.2d 572 (2009), review denied, 363 N.C. 374, 678 S.E.2d 667 (2009).

No Abuse of Discretion. - Trial court acted within its discretion in awarding primary legal custody to defendant, as supported by its findings of fact; the findings included, in part, that plaintiff struck defendant in the face while defendant was pregnant, plaintiff hid a recording device in defendant's bedroom without her knowledge or consent, plaintiff sued both of defendant's parents, who provided the minor children with childcare, and defendant handled the majority of the minor children's educational and medical treatment issues. Oltmanns v. Oltmanns, 241 N.C. App. 326, 773 S.E.2d 347 (2015).

VIII. EFFECT OF VERDICTS, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND CONSENT JUDGMENTS.

.

Verdict in Divorce Action Is Not Controlling. - The verdict in a divorce action can be an important factor in the judge's consideration of an award of custody, but it is not legally controlling. It is merely one of the circumstances for him to consider, along with all other relevant factors. Stanback v. Stanback, 270 N.C. 497, 155 S.E.2d 221 (1967).

Findings and Conclusions Not Required for Child Consent Judgments. - While G.S. 1A-1, Rule 52 and this section mandate findings of fact and conclusions when a court adjudicates child custody, child consent judgments need not contain such findings of fact and conclusions of law, and consenting parties waive their right to have the court adjudicate the merits of the case. Buckingham v. Buckingham, 134 N.C. App. 82, 516 S.E.2d 869 (1999), cert. denied, 351 N.C. 100, 540 S.E.2d 353 (1999).

When a father filed a motion for modification of custody, a trial court did not abuse its discretion in looking back to the facts surrounding the best interests of the child, pursuant to G.S. 50-13.2(a), at the time the memorandum of judgment was entered to make appropriate findings to provide a base line before it could determine if there had been a material change in circumstances, pursuant to G.S. 50-13.7, because the mother and father had waived findings of fact and conclusions of law at the time the memorandum of judgment by consent was entered. Balawejder v. Balawejder, 216 N.C. App. 301, 721 S.E.2d 679 (2011).

Nor Are Separation Agreements and Consent Judgments Based Thereon. - Valid separation agreements, including consent judgments based on such agreements with respect to marital rights, are not final and binding as to the custody of minor children or as to the amount to be provided for the support and education of such minor children. Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963); Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966).

While the marital and property rights of the parties under the provisions of a valid separation agreement cannot be ignored or set aside by the court without the consent of the parties, such agreements are not final and binding as to the custody of minor children or as to the amount to be provided for the support and education of such minor children. Soper v. Soper, 29 N.C. App. 95, 223 S.E.2d 560 (1976).

And Court Is Not Precluded Thereby from Acting Under This Section. - A deed of separation between husband and wife containing an agreement for the custody of their minor child does not preclude the court, upon granting a decree for absolute divorce in a suit brought subsequent to the deed of separation, from awarding the custody of the child in accordance with this section. In re Albertson, 205 N.C. 742, 172 S.E. 411 (1934).

The fact that petitioner agreed when separation took place between herself and her husband that the custody of their child should remain with the father was not binding on the court. Finley v. Sapp, 238 N.C. 114, 76 S.E.2d 350 (1953).

As no agreement between spouses will deprive the court of its inherent and statutory authority to protect the interests and provide for the welfare of infants. The parties may bind themselves by separate agreement or by a consent judgment, but they cannot thus withdraw the children of the marriage from the protective custody of the court. State v. Duncan, 222 N.C. 11, 21 S.E.2d 822 (1942); Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963).

Provisions in a deed of separation for support of the minor children of the marriage, entered as a consent judgment by the court, cannot deprive the court of its inherent and statutory authority to protect the interests and provide for the welfare of the infants; therefore, judgment increasing the allowance for the minor children upon findings of a change of circumstances warranting such increase would be affirmed. Bishop v. Bishop, 245 N.C. 573, 96 S.E.2d 721 (1957).

The child is not a party to a separation agreement, and the parents cannot contract away the jurisdiction of the court, which is always alert in the discharge of its duty towards its wards, the children of the State whose personal property interests require protection. State v. Duncan, 222 N.C. 11, 21 S.E.2d 822 (1942).

It is the court's duty to award custody in accordance with the best interests of the child, and no agreement, consent or condition between the parents can interfere with this duty or bind the court. Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S. Ct. 1417, 39 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1974).

But provisions of a valid separation agreement, and a consent judgment based thereon, cannot be ignored or set aside by the court without the consent of the parties. Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963); Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966).

A valid separation agreement cannot be ignored or set aside by the court without the consent of the parties. Winborne v. Winborne, 41 N.C. App. 756, 255 S.E.2d 640, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 305, 259 S.E.2d 918 (1979).

And Parties Are Bound Thereby Until Court Orders Otherwise. - Where judgment by confession purported to grant custody of child to one party, this judgment did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to determine custody, but the parties, having agreed to it, were bound by its provisions until the court made some order for custody. Pierce v. Pierce, 58 N.C. App. 815, 295 S.E.2d 247 (1982).

Presumption as to Amount Mutually Agreed upon in Separation Agreement. - Where parties to a separation agreement agree upon the amount of the support and maintenance of their minor children, there is a presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the amount mutually agreed upon is just and reasonable, and upon motion for an increase in such allowance, a court is not warranted in ordering an increase in the absence of any evidence of a change of conditions. Soper v. Soper, 29 N.C. App. 95, 223 S.E.2d 560 (1976).

There is a presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the amount mutually agreed upon in a separation agreement is just and reasonable. Winborne v. Winborne, 41 N.C. App. 756, 255 S.E.2d 640, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 305, 259 S.E.2d 918 (1979).

Party to Separation Agreement Not Precluded from Bringing Action. - When a case is properly before it, the court has the duty to award custody in accordance with the best interests of the child, and no agreement, consent or condition between the parents can interfere with this duty or bind the court. Thus, the existence of a valid separation agreement containing provisions relating to the custody and support of minor children does not prevent one of the parties to the agreement from instituting an action for a judicial determination of those same matters. Winborne v. Winborne, 41 N.C. App. 756, 255 S.E.2d 640, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 305, 259 S.E.2d 918 (1979).

Where judgment by confession placed custody issue before the court so that it retained jurisdiction to determine custody, it was error not to abate the subsequent action for custody. Pierce v. Pierce, 58 N.C. App. 815, 295 S.E.2d 247 (1982).

Effect of Custody Award on Consent Judgment. - Where a consent judgment in an action for a divorce a mensa operated as a gift to the wife of an estate in the husband's land, the fact that the court awarded custody of the children did not affect it. Morris v. Patterson, 180 N.C. 484, 105 S.E. 25 (1920).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding joint custody to both parties. Church v. Church, 119 N.C. App. 436, 458 S.E.2d 732 (1995).

Modification of Custody Order. - Trial court did not err in granting a mother legal and primary physical custody because the court was permitted to make an initial child custody determination since the juvenile court in the neglect proceeding returned custody to the parties; in the absence of an existing permanent child custody order, the trial court was not required to find or conclude that there existed a substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child for purposes of modifying an existing custody order. McMillan v. McMillan, - N.C. App. - , 833 S.E.2d 692 (2019), cert. denied, 842 S.E.2d 597, 2020 N.C. LEXIS 534 (N.C. 2020).

§ 50-13.2A. Action for visitation of an adopted grandchild.

A biological grandparent may institute an action or proceeding for visitation rights with a child adopted by a stepparent or a relative of the child where a substantial relationship exists between the grandparent and the child. Under no circumstances shall a biological grandparent of a child adopted by adoptive parents, neither of whom is related to the child and where parental rights of both biological parents have been terminated, be entitled to visitation rights. A court may award visitation rights if it determines that visitation is in the best interest of the child. An order awarding visitation rights shall contain findings of fact which support the determination by the judge of the best interest of the child. Procedure, venue, and jurisdiction shall be as in an action for custody.

History

(1985, c. 575, s. 2.)

CASE NOTES

There is a reasonable basis for the classification elicited in this section, and therefore, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantees of either the State or federal Constitutions. Hedrick v. Hedrick, 90 N.C. App. 151, 368 S.E.2d 14, cert. denied, 323 N.C. 173, 373 S.E.2d 108 (1988).

This section must be read in pari materia with G.S. 50-13.7(a), which therefore requires a showing of a substantial change of circumstances. Hedrick v. Hedrick, 90 N.C. App. 151, 368 S.E.2d 14, cert. denied, 323 N.C. 173, 373 S.E.2d 108 (1988).

Trial court did not err in allowing grandparents to intervene in adoption proceeding pursuant to this section without holding a preliminary evidentiary hearing to determine whether a substantial relationship existed between the movants and grandchildren, where the trial judge addressed the issue of whether the grandparents had a right to intervene based on the pleadings before it, and without the necessity of a preliminary hearing the trial court made a preliminary determination that the grandparents had a right to intervene. Hedrick v. Hedrick, 90 N.C. App. 151, 368 S.E.2d 14, cert. denied, 323 N.C. 173, 373 S.E.2d 108 (1988).

Grandparent Had No Right to Proceed. - There are four statutes in North Carolina which permit a grandparent to maintain an action for custody or visitation of a minor child, and although plaintiff, mother of the deceased father of the two minor children, did not specify under which statute she filed, it was clear that she had no right to proceed under G.S.G.S. 50-13.1(a), 50-13.2(b1), this section, or 50-13.5(j). Shaut v. Cannon, 136 N.C. App. 834, 526 S.E.2d 214 (2000).

Grandparents lacked standing to bring a claim for visitation because there was no ongoing custody proceeding, as the mother had a natural and legal right to custody and control of the child upon the father's death and the child had not been adopted by a stepparent or relative. Graham v. Jones, - N.C. App. - , 842 S.E.2d 153 (2020).

Standing to Bring Action Based on Substantial Relationship. - The grandmother had standing under this section to seek visitation rights with her grandchildren, where the children were adopted by their biological aunt and her husband, and the grandmother had a substantial relationship with the children, in that she had helped raise them from birth and they had lived with her for eight months prior to the adoption. Hill v. Newman, 131 N.C. App. 793, 509 S.E.2d 226 (1998).

Evidence held sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that grandparents had established a substantial relationship with their grandchildren. Hedrick v. Hedrick, 90 N.C. App. 151, 368 S.E.2d 14, cert. denied, 323 N.C. 173, 373 S.E.2d 108 (1988).

Grandparents' Rights When Family Intact - Under G.S. 50-13.1(a), 50-13.2(b1), 50-13.2A, and 50-13.5(j), a grandparent's right to visitation arises either in the context of an ongoing custody proceeding or where the minor child is in the custody of a stepparent or a relative - the "intact family" rule; in a case that does not involve adoption by a stepparent or other relative, a grandparent must prove that the child's family is not intact before the grandparent can intervene to request visitation with his grandchild - G.S. 50-13.1(a), 50-13.2(b1), 50-13.2A, 50-13.5(j) does not grant grandparents the right to sue for visitation when no custody proceeding is ongoing and the minor children's family is intact. Eakett v. Eakett, 157 N.C. App. 550, 579 S.E.2d 486 (2003).

Custody Must Be at Issue. - G.S. 50-13.2, G.S. 50-13.5, and this section must be read in conjunction with G.S. 50-13.1(a) so as to harmonize them and give effect to a consistent legislative policy. Under them, a grandparent's right to visitation arises either in the context of an ongoing custody proceeding or where the minor child is in the custody of a stepparent or a relative. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 341 N.C. 629, 461 S.E.2d 745 (1995).

There existed substantial change of circumstances when visitation rights of grandparents arbitrarily terminated by the natural mother when the grandparents had established a continuing substantial relationship with their grandchildren since the entry of earlier custody order, and based upon that, the court found sufficient facts to justify its conclusion that it was in the best interest of the grandchildren to maintain a continuing relationship with the grandparents through the granting of visitation privileges. Hedrick v. Hedrick, 90 N.C. App. 151, 368 S.E.2d 14, cert. denied, 323 N.C. 173, 373 S.E.2d 108 (1988).

Where adoption of two grandchildren by stepfather not finalized until one month after the entry of the judgment awarding grandparents visitation, whatever rights he was to gain in becoming an adoptive parent had not vested at the time of the hearing, and therefore the adjudication of the issues before the court did not require his presence in the suit. Hedrick v. Hedrick, 90 N.C. App. 151, 368 S.E.2d 14, cert. denied, 323 N.C. 173, 373 S.E.2d 108 (1988).

Trial court's findings of fact held to establish fitness of the grandparents and that the welfare of the children would be subserved by granting them visitation. Hedrick v. Hedrick, 90 N.C. App. 151, 368 S.E.2d 14, cert. denied, 323 N.C. 173, 373 S.E.2d 108 (1988).

Applied in Buck v. Greenlee, - F. Supp. 2d - (W.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2011).

Cited in Ray v. Ray, 103 N.C. App. 790, 407 S.E.2d 592 (1991); Fisher v. Fisher, 124 N.C. App. 442, 477 S.E.2d 251 (1996); Smith v. Barbour, 195 N.C. App. 244, 671 S.E.2d 578 (2009), review denied, 363 N.C. 375, 678 S.E.2d 670 (2009); Perdue v. Fuqua, 195 N.C. App. 583, 673 S.E.2d 145 (2009); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 211 N.C. App. 267, 710 S.E.2d 235 (2011); Wellons v. White, 229 N.C. App. 164, 748 S.E.2d 709 (2013).


§ 50-13.3. Enforcement of order for custody.

  1. An order providing for the custody of a minor child is enforceable by proceedings for civil contempt, and its disobedience may be punished by proceedings for criminal contempt, as provided in Chapter 5A, Contempt, of the General Statutes.
  2. Any court of this State having jurisdiction to make an award of custody of a minor child in an action or proceeding therefor, shall have the power of injunction in such action or proceeding as provided in Article 37 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes and G.S. 1A-1, Rule 65.
  3. Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, a warrant to take physical custody of a child issued by a court pursuant to G.S. 50A-311 is enforceable throughout this State.

Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 1-294, an order pertaining to child custody which has been appealed to the appellate division is enforceable in the trial court by proceedings for civil contempt during the pendency of the appeal. Upon motion of an aggrieved party, the court of the appellate division in which the appeal is pending may stay any order for civil contempt entered for child custody until the appeal is decided, if justice requires.

History

(1967, c. 1153, s. 2; 1969, c. 895, s. 16; 1977, c. 711, s. 26; 1983, c. 530, s. 2; 2017-22, s. 1.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2017-22, s. 1, added subsection (c). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases cited below were decided under subsection (a) of this section as it read prior to the 1977 amendment, which subsection formerly provided for punishment as for contempt of the "willful disobedience" of custody orders.

Jurisdiction. - Under North Carolina case law, matters of custody, which include visitation rights under this section, are pending until the death of one of the parties or until the child reaches the age of majority. The hands of the courts would be effectively tied if they had no jurisdiction to enforce the orders they enter. Beck v. Beck, 64 N.C. App. 89, 306 S.E.2d 580 (1983).

Case Law Not Overruled. - Adoption of the provision in the statute to allow a trial court to enforce custody orders pursuant to its contempt powers did not overrule certain case law; it simply created a new, specific, and limited right. Quevedo-Woolf v. Overholser, 261 N.C. App. 387, 820 S.E.2d 817 (2018), appeal dismissed, review denied, stay denied, 372 N.C. 359, 828 S.E.2d 164, 2019 N.C. LEXIS 580 (2019).

Only Willful Disobedience May Be Punished. - A failure to obey an order of a court cannot be punished by contempt proceedings unless the disobedience is willful, which imports knowledge and a stubborn resistance. Cox v. Cox, 10 N.C. App. 476, 179 S.E.2d 194 (1971).

Trial Court Must Find Defendant Possessed Means to Comply. - In order to punish by contempt proceedings, the trial court must find as a fact that the defendant possessed the means to comply with orders of the court during the period when he was in default. Cox v. Cox, 10 N.C. App. 476, 179 S.E.2d 194 (1971).

One does not act willfully in failing to comply with a judgment if it has not been within his power to do so since the judgment was rendered. Cox v. Cox, 10 N.C. App. 476, 179 S.E.2d 194 (1971).

Finding as to Present Ability to Comply. - In a contempt proceeding for violation of a custody order, no specific finding was required of the trial court as to the defendant's present ability to comply with the order, although there was in fact plenary evidence introduced to justify such a finding. Lee v. Lee, 37 N.C. App. 371, 246 S.E.2d 49 (1978).

Where the court enters judgment as for civil contempt, the court must not only find failure to comply with the order, but must also find that the defendant presently possesses the means to comply. Cox v. Cox, 10 N.C. App. 476, 179 S.E.2d 194 (1971).

Appealability of Contempt Order Where Punishment Is Withheld. - Plaintiff was entitled to appeal the order of the trial court finding that she was in contempt of child custody orders, even though the trial court withheld punishment and only made the findings a part of the record, since to withhold punishment without further limitation is to retain the right to impose it in the future. Under such circumstances, the order holding the plaintiff in contempt affected a substantial right and was therefore appealable. Clark v. Clark, 294 N.C. 554, 243 S.E.2d 129 (1978).

Review of Findings of Fact. - In proceedings for contempt, the facts found by the judge are not reviewable except for the purpose of passing upon their sufficiency to warrant the judgment. Cox v. Cox, 10 N.C. App. 476, 179 S.E.2d 194 (1971).

In contempt proceedings, the judge's findings of fact are conclusive on appeal when supported by any competent evidence and are reviewable only for the purpose of passing on their sufficiency to warrant the judgment. Clark v. Clark, 294 N.C. 554, 243 S.E.2d 129 (1978).

Review in contempt proceedings is limited to whether there is competent evidence to support findings of fact and whether findings support conclusions of law. Walleshauser v. Walleshauser, 100 N.C. App. 594, 397 S.E.2d 371 (1990).

In contempt proceedings, findings by the trial court with regard to whether a party willfully and without sufficient legal excuse or justification violated the terms of a custody order are conclusive on appeal when supported by competent evidence. Lee v. Lee, 37 N.C. App. 371, 246 S.E.2d 49 (1978).

Payment of Counsel Fees. - The court is vested with broad power when it is authorized to punish "as for contempt." This power includes the authority for a district court judge to require one whom he has found in willful contempt of court for failure to comply with a child support order entered pursuant to G.S. 50-13.1 et seq., to pay reasonable counsel fees to opposing counsel as a condition to being purged of contempt. Blair v. Blair, 8 N.C. App. 61, 173 S.E.2d 513 (1970).

Visitation and child support rights are independent rights accruing primarily to the benefit of the minor child and one is not, and may not be made, contingent upon the other. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

Receipt of Support May Not Be Conditioned on Visitation. - A trial judge does not have authority to condition a minor child's receipt of support paid by the noncustodial parent on compliance with court-ordered visitation allowed the noncustodial parent by ordering that child support paid by defendant be placed in escrow if minor child fails or refuses to abide by the visitation privileges allowed defendant. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

Enforcement of Visitation Orders. - Trial judges in this State have authority to enforce orders providing for visitation by the methods set forth in this section, that is, by contempt proceedings and by injunction. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

No Authority to Modify Father's Visitation Rights. - The trial court was without authority to transform a show cause hearing on the matter of a wife's alleged contempt in failing to comply with a custody order, on its own motion and without notice to the wife, into a hearing on the issue of modification of the father's visitation rights as set forth in prior orders. Lee v. Lee, 37 N.C. App. 371, 246 S.E.2d 49 (1978).

Finding of Contempt Supported by Competent Evidence. - Where competent evidence supported trial court's findings of defendant's failure to comply with previous visitation order and of his present ability to comply with the order, these findings were conclusive on appeal and also supported conclusion of law that defendant was in contempt of visitation order. Walleshauser v. Walleshauser, 100 N.C. App. 594, 397 S.E.2d 371 (1990).

No Finding of Contempt as Actions in Violation of Visitation Order Were Justified. - Trial court's finding that the mother's actions, suspending the father's visitation over his objection and without court authority, did not amount to contempt was upheld, as there was evidence that the mother's failure to comply with the visitation order was justified after the father physically disciplined a child in an inappropriate way, the children were visibly shaken and upset by the incident, and there had been past allegations of domestic violence involving the father. Davis v. Davis, 229 N.C. App. 494, 748 S.E.2d 594 (2013).

Violation of Order Pending Appeal. - While an appeal from an order providing for the custody of a minor child removes the cause from the trial court to the appellate court, and while pending the appeal the trial court is without jurisdiction to punish for contempt, the taking of an appeal does not authorize a violation of the custody order. If the custody order is upheld by the appellate court, the violation may be inquired into when the cause is remanded to the trial court. Sturdivant v. Sturdivant, 31 N.C. App. 341, 229 S.E.2d 318 (1976).

Applied in Morris v. Morris, 42 N.C. App. 222, 256 S.E.2d 302 (1979); Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983); Ruth v. Ruth, 158 N.C. App. 123, 579 S.E.2d 909 (2003).

Cited in Boston v. Freeman, 6 N.C. App. 736, 171 S.E.2d 206 (1969); Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378, 188 S.E.2d 711 (1972); Mather v. Mather, 70 N.C. App. 106, 318 S.E.2d 548 (1984); McLemore v. McLemore, 89 N.C. App. 451, 366 S.E.2d 495 (1988); Rosero v. Blake, 150 N.C. App. 250, 563 S.E.2d 248, cert. granted, 356 N.C. 166, 568 S.E.2d 610 (2002); Romulus v. Romulus, 216 N.C. App. 28, 715 S.E.2d 889 (2011).


§ 50-13.4. Action for support of minor child.

  1. Any parent, or any person, agency, organization or institution having custody of a minor child, or bringing an action or proceeding for the custody of such child, or a minor child by his guardian may institute an action for the support of such child as hereinafter provided.
  2. In the absence of pleading and proof that the circumstances otherwise warrant, the father and mother shall be primarily liable for the support of a minor child. In the absence of pleading and proof that the circumstances otherwise warrant, parents of a minor, unemancipated child who is the custodial or noncustodial parent of a child shall share this primary liability for their grandchild's support with the minor parent, the court determining the proper share, until the minor parent reaches the age of 18 or becomes emancipated. If both the parents of the child requiring support were unemancipated minors at the time of the child's conception, the parents of both minor parents share primary liability for their grandchild's support until both minor parents reach the age of 18 or become emancipated. If only one parent of the child requiring support was an unemancipated minor at the time of the child's conception, the parents of both parents are liable for any arrearages in child support owed by the adult or emancipated parent until the other parent reaches the age of 18 or becomes emancipated. In the absence of pleading and proof that the circumstances otherwise warrant, any other person, agency, organization or institution standing in loco parentis shall be secondarily liable for such support. Such other circumstances may include, but shall not be limited to, the relative ability of all the above-mentioned parties to provide support or the inability of one or more of them to provide support, and the needs and estate of the child. The judge may enter an order requiring any one or more of the above-mentioned parties to provide for the support of the child as may be appropriate in the particular case, and if appropriate the court may authorize the application of any separate estate of the child to his support. However, the judge may not order support to be paid by a person who is not the child's parent or an agency, organization or institution standing in loco parentis absent evidence and a finding that such person, agency, organization or institution has voluntarily assumed the obligation of support in writing. The preceding sentence shall not be construed to prevent any court from ordering the support of a child by an agency of the State or county which agency may be responsible under law for such support.
  3. Payments ordered for the support of a minor child shall be in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education, and maintenance, having due regard to the estates, earnings, conditions, accustomed standard of living of the child and the parties, the child care and homemaker contributions of each party, and other facts of the particular case. Payments ordered for the support of a minor child shall be on a monthly basis, due and payable on the first day of each month. The requirement that orders be established on a monthly basis does not affect the availability of garnishment of disposable earnings based on an obligor's pay period.
    1. If the child is otherwise emancipated, payments shall terminate at that time;
    2. If the child is still in primary or secondary school when the child reaches age 18, support payments shall continue until the child graduates, otherwise ceases to attend school on a regular basis, fails to make satisfactory academic progress towards graduation, or reaches age 20, whichever comes first, unless the court in its discretion orders that payments cease at age 18 or prior to high school graduation.
    3. (See Editor's note for applicability) If the child is enrolled in a cooperative innovative high school program authorized under Part 9 of Article 16 of Chapter 115C of the General Statutes, then payments shall terminate when the child completes his or her fourth year of enrollment or when the child reaches the age of 18, whichever occurs later.
  4. Effective July 1, 1990, the Conference of Chief District Judges shall prescribe uniform statewide presumptive guidelines for the computation of child support obligations, including retroactive support obligations, of each parent as provided in Chapter 50 or elsewhere in the General Statutes and shall develop criteria for determining when, in a particular case, application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate. The purpose of the guidelines and criteria shall be to ensure that payments ordered for the support of a minor child are in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education, and maintenance, having due regard to the estates, earnings, conditions, accustomed standard of living of the child and the parties, the child care and homemaker contributions of each party, and other facts of the particular case. The guidelines shall include a procedure for setting child support, if any, in a joint or shared custody arrangement which shall reflect the other statutory requirements herein.
  5. In non-IV-D cases, payments for the support of a minor child shall be ordered to be paid to the person having custody of the child or any other proper person, agency, organization or institution, or to the State Child Support Collection and Disbursement Unit, for the benefit of the child. In IV-D cases, payments for the support of a minor child shall be ordered to be paid to the State Child Support Collection and Disbursement Unit for the benefit of the child.
  6. For child support orders initially entered on or after January 1, 1994, the immediate income withholding provisions of G.S. 110-136.5(c1) shall apply.
  7. Payment for the support of a minor child shall be paid by lump sum payment, periodic payments, or by transfer of title or possession of personal property of any interest therein, or a security interest in or possession of real property, as the court may order. The court may order the transfer of title to real property solely owned by the obligor in payment of arrearages of child support so long as the net value of the interest in the property being transferred does not exceed the amount of the arrearage being satisfied. In every case in which payment for the support of a minor child is ordered and alimony or postseparation support is also ordered, the order shall separately state and identify each allowance.
  8. In IV-D cases, the order for child support shall provide that the clerk shall transfer the case to another jurisdiction in this State if the IV-D agency requests the transfer on the basis that the obligor, the custodian of the child, and the child do not reside in the jurisdiction in which the order was issued. The IV-D agency shall provide notice of the transfer to the obligor by delivery of written notice in accordance with the notice requirements of Chapter 1A-1, Rule 5(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The clerk shall transfer the case to the jurisdiction requested by the IV-D agency, which shall be a jurisdiction in which the obligor, the custodian of the child, or the child resides. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent a party from contesting the transfer.
  9. Remedies for enforcement of support of minor children shall be available as follows:
    1. The court may require the person ordered to make payments for the support of a minor child to secure the payments by means of a bond, mortgage or deed of trust, or any other means ordinarily used to secure an obligation to pay money or transfer property, or by requiring the execution of an assignment of wages, salary or other income due or to become due.
    2. If the court requires the transfer of real or personal property or an interest therein as provided in subsection (e) of this section as a part of an order for payment of support for a minor child, or for the securing thereof, the court may also enter an order which shall transfer title as provided in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 70 and G.S. 1-228.
    3. The remedy of arrest and bail, as provided in Article 34 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes, shall be available in actions for child-support payments as in other cases.
    4. The remedies of attachment and garnishment, as provided in Article 35 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes, shall be available in an action for child-support payments as in other cases, and for such purposes the child or person bringing an action for child support shall be deemed a creditor of the defendant. Additionally, in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 110-136, a continuing wage garnishment proceeding for wages due or to become due may be instituted by motion in the original child support proceeding or by independent action through the filing of a petition.
    5. The remedy of injunction, as provided in Article 37 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes and G.S. 1A-1, Rule 65, shall be available in actions for child support as in other cases.
    6. Receivers, as provided in Article 38 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes, may be appointed in actions for child support as in other cases.
    7. A minor child or other person for whose benefit an order for the payment of child support has been entered shall be a creditor within the meaning of Article 3A of Chapter 39 of the General Statutes pertaining to voidable transactions.
    8. Except as provided in Article 15 of Chapter 44 of the General Statutes, a judgment for child support shall not be a lien against real property unless the judgment expressly so provides, sets out the amount of the lien in a sum certain, and adequately describes the real property affected; but past due periodic payments may by motion in the cause or by a separate action be reduced to judgment which shall be a lien as other judgments and may include provisions for periodic payments.
    9. An order for the periodic payments of child support or a child support judgment that provides for periodic payments is enforceable by proceedings for civil contempt, and disobedience may be punished by proceedings for criminal contempt, as provided in Chapter 5A of the General Statutes.
    10. The remedies provided by Chapter 1 of the General Statutes, Article 28, Execution; Article 29B, Execution Sales; and Article 31, Supplemental Proceedings, shall be available for the enforcement of judgments for child support as in other cases, but amounts so payable shall not constitute a debt as to which property is exempt from execution as provided in Article 16 of Chapter 1C of the General Statutes.
    11. The specific enumeration of remedies in this section shall not constitute a bar to remedies otherwise available.
  10. An individual who brings an action or motion in the cause for the support of a minor child, and the individual who defends the action, shall provide to the clerk of the court in which the action is brought or the order is issued, the individual's social security number.
  11. Child support orders initially entered or modified on and after October 1, 1998, shall contain the name of each of the parties, the date of birth of each party, and the court docket number. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall transmit to the Department of Health and Human Services, Child Support Enforcement Program, on a timely basis, the information required to be included on orders under this subsection and the social security number of each party as required under subsection (g) of this section.

The judge may order responsible parents in a IV-D establishment case to perform a job search, if the responsible parent is not incapacitated. This includes IV-D cases in which the responsible parent is a noncustodial mother or a noncustodial father whose affidavit of parentage has been filed with the court or when paternity is not at issue for the child. The court may further order the responsible parent to participate in work activities, as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 607, as the court deems appropriate.

The court shall determine the amount of child support payments by applying the presumptive guidelines established pursuant to subsection (c1) of this section. However, upon request of any party, the Court shall hear evidence, and from the evidence, find the facts relating to the reasonable needs of the child for support and the relative ability of each parent to provide support. If, after considering the evidence, the Court finds by the greater weight of the evidence that the application of the guidelines would not meet or would exceed the reasonable needs of the child considering the relative ability of each parent to provide support or would be otherwise unjust or inappropriate the Court may vary from the guidelines. If the court orders an amount other than the amount determined by application of the presumptive guidelines, the court shall make findings of fact as to the criteria that justify varying from the guidelines and the basis for the amount ordered.

Payments ordered for the support of a child shall terminate when the child reaches the age of 18 except:

In the case of graduation, or attaining age 20, payments shall terminate without order by the court, subject to the right of the party receiving support to show, upon motion and with notice to the opposing party, that the child has not graduated or attained the age of 20.

If an arrearage for child support or fees due exists at the time that a child support obligation terminates, payments shall continue in the same total amount that was due under the terms of the previous court order or income withholding in effect at the time of the support obligation. The total amount of these payments is to be applied to the arrearage until all arrearages and fees are satisfied or until further order of the court.

Periodically, but at least once every four years, the Conference of Chief District Judges shall review the guidelines to determine whether their application results in appropriate child support award amounts. The Conference may modify the guidelines accordingly. The Conference shall give the Department of Health and Human Services, the Administrative Office of the Courts, and the general public an opportunity to provide the Conference with information relevant to the development and review of the guidelines. Any modifications of the guidelines or criteria shall be reported to the General Assembly by the Administrative Office of the Courts before they become effective by delivering copies to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The guidelines, when adopted or modified, shall be provided to the Department of Health and Human Services and the Administrative Office of the Courts, which shall disseminate them to the public through local IV-D offices, clerks of court, and the media.

Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 1-294, an order for the payment of child support which has been appealed to the appellate division is enforceable in the trial court by proceedings for civil contempt during the pendency of the appeal. Upon motion of an aggrieved party, the court of the appellate division in which the appeal is pending may stay any order for civil contempt entered for child support until the appeal is decided, if justice requires.

History

(1967, c. 1153, s. 2; 1969, c. 895, s. 17; 1975, c. 814; 1977, c. 711, s. 26; 1979, c. 386, s. 10; 1981, c. 472; c. 613, ss. 1, 3; 1983, c. 54; c. 530, s. 1; 1985, c. 689, s. 17; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1016; 1989, c. 529, ss. 1, 2; 1989 (Reg. Sess., 1990), c. 1067, s. 2; 1993, c. 335, s. 1; c. 517, s. 5; 1995, c. 319, s. 9; c. 518, s. 1; 1997-433, ss. 2.1(a), 2.2, 4.4, 7.1; 1997-443, ss. 11A.118(a), 11A.122; 1998-17, s. 1; 1998-176, s. 1; 1999-293, ss. 3, 4; 1999-456, s. 13; 2001-237, s. 1; 2003-288, s. 1; 2008-12, s. 1; 2012-20, s. 2; 2014-77, s. 8; 2014-115, s. 37; 2015-23, s. 2.)

Local Modification. - Person: 1967, c. 848, s. 2.

Cross References. - As to actions for custody and support, see also G.S. 50-13.5 and notes thereunder.

As to the maintenance of certain actions as independent actions, see G.S. 50-19.

For the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines, effective August 1, 1991, see the Annotated Rules of North Carolina.

As to liens on real and personal property of persons owing past due child support, see G.S. 44-86.

As to discharge of liens on property of persons owing past due child support, see G.S. 44-87.

As to legislation deleting the June 30, 1998 expiration date for all enactments and amendments by Session Laws 1997-443, see the editor's note under G.S. 44-86.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1995, c. 319, which amended this section, in s. 12 provides that this act applies to civil actions filed on or after October 1, 1995, and shall not apply to pending litigation, or to future motions in the cause seeking to modify orders or judgments in effect on October 1, 1995.

This section, prior to the amendment by Session Laws 1995, c. 319, read as follows: " Action for support of minor child.

  1. Any parent, or any person, agency, organization or institution having custody of a minor child, or bringing an action or proceeding for the custody of such child, or a minor child by his guardian may institute an action for the support of such child as hereinafter provided.
  2. In the absence of pleading and proof that the circumstances otherwise warrant, the father and mother shall be primarily liable for the support of a minor child, and any other person, agency, organization or institution standing in loco parentis shall be secondarily liable for such support. Such other circumstances may include, but shall not be limited to, the relative ability of all the above-mentioned parties to provide support or the inability of one or more of them to provide support, and the needs and estate of the child. The judge may enter an order requiring any one or more of the above-mentioned parties to provide for the support of the child as may be appropriate in the particular case, and if appropriate the court may authorize the application of any separate estate of the child to his support. However, the judge may not order support to be paid by a person who is not the child's parent or an agency, organization or institution standing in loco parentis absent evidence and a finding that such person, agency, organization or institution has voluntarily assumed the obligation of support in writing. The preceding sentence shall not be construed to prevent any court from ordering the support of a child by an agency of the State or county which agency may be responsible under law for such support.
  3. Payments ordered for the support of a minor child shall be in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education, and maintenance, having due regard to the estates, earnings, conditions, accustomed standard of living of the child and the parties, the child care and homemaker contributions of each party, and other facts of the particular case.
    1. If the child is otherwise emancipated, payments shall terminate at that time;
    2. If the child is still in primary or secondary school when the child reaches age 18, support payments shall continue until the child graduates, otherwise ceases to attend school on a regular basis, fails to make satisfactory academic progress towards graduation, or reaches age 20, whichever comes first, unless the court in its discretion orders that payments cease at age 18 or prior to high school graduation.
  4. Effective July 1, 1990, the Conference of Chief District Judges shall prescribe uniform statewide presumptive guidelines for the computation of child support obligations of each parent as provided in Chapter 50 or elsewhere in the General Statutes and shall develop criteria for determining when, in a particular case, application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate. Prior to May 1, 1990 these guidelines and criteria shall be reported to the General Assembly by the Administrative Office of the Courts by delivering copies to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The purpose of the guidelines and criteria shall be to ensure that payments ordered for the support of a minor child are in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education, and maintenance, having due regard to the estates, earnings, conditions, accustomed standard of living of the child and the parties, the child care and homemaker contributions of each party, and other facts of the particular case. The guidelines shall include a procedure for setting child support, if any, in a joint or shared custody arrangement which shall reflect the other statutory requirements herein.
  5. Payments for the support of a minor child shall be ordered to be paid to the person having custody of the child or any other proper person, agency, organization or institution, or to the court, for the benefit of such child.
  6. For child support orders initially entered on or after January 1, 1994, the immediate income withholding provisions of G.S. 110-136.5(c1) shall apply.
  7. Payment for the support of a minor child shall be paid by lump sum payment, periodic payments, or by transfer of title or possession of personal property of any interest therein, or a security interest in or possession of real property, as the court may order. In every case in which payment for the support of a minor child is ordered and alimony or alimony pendente lite is also ordered, the order shall separately state and identify each allowance.
  8. Remedies for enforcement of support of minor children shall be available as herein provided.
    1. The court may require the person ordered to make payments for the support of a minor child to secure the same by means of a bond, mortgage or deed of trust, or any other means ordinarily used to secure an obligation to pay money or transfer property, or by requiring the execution of an assignment of wages, salary or other income due or to become due.
    2. If the court requires the transfer of real or personal property or an interest therein as provided in subsection (e) as a part of an order for payment of support for a minor child, or for the securing thereof, the court may also enter an order which shall transfer title as provided in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 70 and G.S. 1-228.
    3. The remedy of arrest and bail, as provided in Article 34 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes, shall be available in actions for child-support payments as in other cases.
    4. The remedies of attachment and garnishment, as provided in Article 35 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes, shall be available in an action for child-support payments as in other cases, and for such purposes the child or person bringing an action for child support shall be deemed a creditor of the defendant. Additionally, in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 110-136, a continuing wage garnishment proceeding for wages due or to become due may be instituted by motion in the original child support proceeding or by independent action through the filing of a petition.
    5. The remedy of injunction, as provided in Article 37 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes and G.S. 1A-1, Rule 65, shall be available in actions for child support as in other cases.
    6. Receivers, as provided in Article 38 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes, may be appointed in action for child support as in other cases.
    7. A minor child or other person for whose benefit an order for the payment of child support has been entered shall be a creditor within the meaning of Article 3 of Chapter 39 of the General Statutes pertaining to fraudulent conveyances.
    8. A judgment for child support shall not be a lien against real property unless the judgment expressly so provides, sets out the amount of the lien in a sum certain, and adequately describes the real property affected; but past due periodic payments may by motion in the cause or by a separate action be reduced to judgment which shall be a lien as other judgments.
    9. An order for the periodic payments of child support is enforceable by proceedings for civil contempt, and its disobedience may be punished by proceedings for criminal contempt, as provided in Chapter 5A of the General Statutes.
    10. The remedies provided by Chapter 1 of the General Statutes, Article 28, Execution; Article 29B, Execution Sales; and Article 31, Supplemental Proceedings, shall be available for the enforcement of judgments for child support as in other cases, but amounts so payable shall not constitute a debt as to which property is exempt from execution as provided in Article 16 of Chapter 1C of the General Statutes.
    11. The specific enumeration of remedies in this section shall not constitute a bar to remedies otherwise available."

The court shall determine the amount of child support payments by applying the presumptive guidelines established pursuant to subsection (c1). However, upon request of any party, the Court shall hear evidence, and from the evidence, find the facts relating to the reasonable needs of the child for support and the relative ability of each parent to provide support. If, after considering the evidence, the Court finds by the greater weight of the evidence that the application of the guidelines would not meet or would exceed the reasonable needs of the child considering the relative ability of each parent to provide support or would be otherwise unjust or inappropriate the Court may vary from the guidelines. If the court orders an amount other than the amount determined by application of the presumptive guidelines, the court shall make findings of fact as to the criteria that justify varying from the guidelines and the basis for the amount ordered.

Payments ordered for the support of a child shall terminate when the child reaches the age of 18 except:

In the case of graduation, or attaining age 20, payments shall terminate without order by the court, subject to the right of the party receiving support to show, upon motion and with notice to the opposing party, that the child has not graduated or attained the age of 20.

Periodically, but at least once every four years, the Conference of Chief District Judges shall review the guidelines to determine whether their application results in appropriate child support award amounts. The Conference may modify the guidelines accordingly. The Conference shall give the Department of Human Resources, the Administrative Office of the Courts, and the general public an opportunity to provide the Conference with information relevant to the development and review of the guidelines. Any modifications of the guidelines or criteria shall be reported to the General Assembly by the Administrative Office of the Courts before they become effective by delivering copies to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The guidelines, when adopted or modified, shall be provided to the Department of Human Resources and the Administrative Office of the Courts, which shall disseminate them to the public through local IV-D offices, clerks of court, and the media.

Until July 1, 1990, the advisory guidelines adopted by the Conference of Chief District Judges pursuant to this subsection as formerly written shall operate as presumptive guidelines and the factors adopted by the Conference of Chief District Judges pursuant to this subsection as formerly written shall constitute criteria for varying from the amount of support determined by the guidelines.

Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 1-294, an order for the payment of child support which has been appealed to the appellate division is enforceable in the trial court by proceedings for civil contempt during the pendency of the appeal. Upon motion of an aggrieved party, the court of the appellate division in which the appeal is pending may stay any order for civil contempt entered for child support until the appeal is decided, if justice requires.

Session Laws 2012-20, s. 3, made subdivision (c)(3) effective October 1, 2012, and applicable to actions or motions filed on or after that date.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2008-12, s. 1, effective October 1, 2008, deleted the last sentence in subsection (g), which read: "The child support order shall contain the social security number of the parties as evidenced in the support proceeding"; and, in subsection (h), deleted "the social security number of each party," following "date of birth of each party" in the first sentence, and added "and the social security number of each party as required under subsection (g) of this section" at the end of the second sentence.

Session Laws 2012-20, s. 2, effective October 1, 2012, added subdivision (c)(3). For applicability, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2014-77, s. 8, effective July 22, 2014, substituted "computation of child support obligations, including retroactive support obligations" for "computation of child support obligations" near the beginning of the first paragraph of subsection (c1).

Session Laws 2014-115, s. 37, effective August 11, 2014, in subsection (c1), deleted the former second sentence of the first paragraph and deleted the former last paragraph, which dealt with pre-1990 reporting and guidelines, respectively.

Session Laws 2015-23, s. 1, effective October 1, 2015, in subsection (f), substituted "voidable transactions" for "fraudulent conveyances" in subdivision (f)(7), and made minor stylistic changes. For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Legal Periodicals. - For survey of 1972 case law on child support and pre-Chapter 48A consent judgments, see 51 N.C.L. Rev. 1091 (1973).

For survey of 1976 case law on domestic relations, see 55 N.C.L. Rev. 1018 (1977).

For note on the remedy of garnishment in child support, see 56 N.C.L. Rev. 169 (1978).

For survey of 1977 law on domestic relations, see 56 N.C.L. Rev. 1045 (1978).

For survey of 1981 family law, see 60 N.C.L. Rev. 1379 (1982).

For comment discussing the status of the presumption of purchase money resulting trust for wives in light of Mims v. Mims, 305 N.C. 41, 286 S.E.2d 779 (1982), see 61 N.C.L. Rev. 576 (1983).

For note, "Plott v. Plott: Use of a Formula to Determine Parental Child Support Obligations - A Continuation of Inconsistent and Inequitable Decisions?," see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 1378 (1986).

For note on child support provisions as a limit on the doctrine of necessaries, in light of Alamance County Hosp. v. Neighbors, 315 N.C. 362, 338 S.E.2d 87 (1986), see 65 N.C.L. Rev. 1308 (1987).

For note, "Legislating Responsibility: North Carolina's New Child Support Enforcement Acts," see 65 N.C.L. Rev. 1354 (1987).

For article, "Using Hindsight to Change Child Support Obligations: A Survey of Retroactive Modification and Reimbursement of Child Support in North Carolina," see 10 Campbell L. Rev. 111 (1987).

For article, "Equating a Stepparent's Rights and Liabilities Vis-A-Vis Custody, Visitation and Support upon Dissolution of the Marriage with Those of the Natural Parent - An Equitable Solution to a Growing Dilemma?," see 17 N.C. Cent. L.J. 1 (1988).

For comment, "The Seventeen Percent Solution: Formula Guidelines for Determining Child Support Awards Arrive in North Carolina," see 18 N.C. Cent. L.J. 209 (1989).

For note, "Hendricks v. Sanks: One Small Step for the Continued Parental Support of Disabled Children Beyond the Age of Majority in North Carolina," see 80 N.C.L. Rev. 2094 (2002).

For article, "Can't Live With 'Em Can't Live Without 'Em: An Analysis of the Trial Court's Authority to Hear and Decide Child-Related Claims in North Carolina Post-Baumann," see 34 Campbell L. Rev. 449 (2012).

CASE NOTES

I. IN GENERAL.

Editor's Note. - A number of the cases cited below were decided under former G.S. 50-13, which dealt with custody and maintenance of children in actions for divorce, and former G.S. 50-16, which dealt with actions for alimony without divorce.

State Policy. - It is the policy of this State that both parents have a duty to support their minor children. Nisbet v. Nisbet, 102 N.C. App. 232, 402 S.E.2d 151, cert. denied, 329 N.C. 499, 407 S.E.2d 538 (1991).

Public Policy. - The public policy of this State encourages settlement agreements and supports the inclusion of a provision for the recovery of attorney's fees in settlement agreements. Bromhal v. Stott, 341 N.C. 702, 462 S.E.2d 219 (1995).

History of Section. - For discussion of the history of this section, see Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991).

Provisions in Chapter 110 Prevail over This Chapter. - The legislature did not intend for this chapter to control all actions for child support. Reading this chapter together with Chapter 110, the more specific provisions of Chapter 110 dealing with the procedure for determining and enforcing support obligations of a father who voluntarily acknowledges paternity prevails over any conflicting procedure in this chapter for determining and enforcing custody and support of minor children. Wake County ex rel. Horton v. Ryles, 112 N.C. App. 754, 437 S.E.2d 404 (1993).

Subsection (a) does not specify that it requires judicial determination of custody before its provision can be utilized by a person or agency bringing an action for support. Craig v. Kelley, 89 N.C. App. 458, 366 S.E.2d 249 (1988).

Visitation and child support rights are independent rights accruing primarily to the benefit of the minor child and one is not, and may not be made, contingent upon the other. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

Support Exemption. - G.S. 105-149 has been repealed in apparent effort by General Assembly to bring North Carolina's personal income tax laws into conformity with the 1984 revisions of federal tax statutes. Under federal law, custodial parent, not parent paying primary support, is entitled to claim support exemption for child under circumstances such as are present here. However, federal law also provides that custodial parent may waive right to claim exemption. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

Trial court may order custodial parent to waive right to claim federal and State tax exemptions. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

Court order assigning federal and State tax dependency exemptions to payor of child support for all income tax purposes was valid. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

Mentally Retarded Children - North Carolina trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over a father's action seeking modification of a New Jersey trial court's order requiring the father to pay child support for a mentally retarded child who was born in 1964, after the child and her mother moved to North Carolina and the father moved to Maryland, and the trial court's judgment that the father's request for an order terminating his obligation to pay child support had to be granted, pursuant to G.S. 50-13.4(c), was affirmed on appeal. Lombardi v. Lombardi, 157 N.C. App. 540, 579 S.E.2d 419 (2003).

The Child Support Guidelines should not be used to determine the support obligation of a stepparent, secondarily liable for a child's needs. Duffey v. Duffey, 113 N.C. App. 382, 438 S.E.2d 445 (1994).

Support and Counsel Fees Pendente Lite on Husband's Denial of Paternity. - Where, upon wife's motion in the cause to require defendant to provide support for the minor child of the marriage, made after decree of absolute divorce, husband filed an affidavit denying paternity, and at his instance the issue was transferred to the civil issue docket, the trial court had the discretionary power to order defendant to provide for support of the child and counsel fees pendente lite. Winfield v. Winfield, 228 N.C. 256, 45 S.E.2d 259 (1947).

The requirement that a voluntary assumption of support be reduced to writing, imposed on those who are secondarily liable under subsection (b) of this section, does not apply to parents of unemancipated minors who have had a child, for they are primarily liable for support of the infant. Whitman v. Kiger, 139 N.C. App. 44, 533 S.E.2d 807 (2000), aff'd, 353 N.C. 360, 543 S.E.2d 476 (2001).

Modification Of Foreign Order. - Pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, Va. Code Ann. § 20-88.66, the trial court did not err in registering a 1997 North Carolina (N.C.) child support order, which applied the duration term set forth in a 1994 New York (N.Y.) child support order because the 1994 N.Y. order was not modified and remained in full force and effect through the 1997 N.C. order's saving language; the 1997 N.C. order provided that all provisions of previous orders not modified therein would remain in full force and effect. Moncrief v. Div. of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Joyner, 60 Va. App. 721, 732 S.E.2d 714 (2012).

Applied in Kearns v. Kearns, 6 N.C. App. 319, 170 S.E.2d 132 (1969); Little v. Little, 9 N.C. App. 361, 176 S.E.2d 521 (1970); Williams v. Williams, 12 N.C. App. 170, 182 S.E.2d 667 (1971); Williams v. Williams, 13 N.C. App. 468, 186 S.E.2d 210 (1972); Carter v. Carter, 13 N.C. App. 648, 186 S.E.2d 684 (1972); Stanback v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 215 S.E.2d 30 (1975); Brady v. Brady, 24 N.C. App. 663, 211 S.E.2d 823 (1975); Tidwell v. Booker, 27 N.C. App. 435, 219 S.E.2d 648 (1975); Amaker v. Amaker, 28 N.C. App. 558, 221 S.E.2d 917 (1976); County of Stanislaus v. Ross, 41 N.C. App. 518, 255 S.E.2d 229 (1979); Williams v. Williams, 42 N.C. App. 163, 256 S.E.2d 401 (1979); Haddon v. Haddon, 42 N.C. App. 632, 257 S.E.2d 483 (1979); Gordon v. Gordon, 46 N.C. App. 495, 265 S.E.2d 425 (1980); Lane v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 48 N.C. App. 634, 269 S.E.2d 711 (1980); In re Register, 303 N.C. 149, 277 S.E.2d 356 (1981); Hardee v. Hardee, 59 N.C. App. 465, 297 S.E.2d 606 (1982); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 64 N.C. App. 249, 307 S.E.2d 400 (1983); Champion v. Champion, 64 N.C. App. 606, 307 S.E.2d 827 (1983); Rustad v. Rustad, 68 N.C. App. 58, 314 S.E.2d 275 (1984); Stevens v. Stevens, 68 N.C. App. 234, 314 S.E.2d 786 (1984); Wilkes County ex rel. Child Support Enforcement Agency ex rel Nations v. Gentry, 311 N.C. 580, 319 S.E.2d 224 (1984); Bennett v. Bennett, 71 N.C. App. 424, 322 S.E.2d 439 (1984); Toney v. Toney, 72 N.C. App. 30, 323 S.E.2d 434 (1984); Massey v. Massey, 71 N.C. App. 753, 323 S.E.2d 451 (1984); Appelbe v. Appelbe, 75 N.C. App. 197, 330 S.E.2d 57 (1985); State ex rel. Pender County Child Support Enforcement Agency ex rel Crews v. Parker, 319 N.C. 354, 354 S.E.2d 501 (1987); Koufman v. Koufman, 97 N.C. App. 227, 388 S.E.2d 207 (1990); Hall v. Hall, 107 N.C. App. 298, 419 S.E.2d 371 (1992); Rose v. Rose, 108 N.C. App. 90, 422 S.E.2d 446 (1992); Thomas v. Thomas, 134 N.C. App. 591, 518 S.E.2d 513 (1999); Leary v. Leary, 152 N.C. App. 438, 567 S.E.2d 834 (2002); Holland v. Holland, 169 N.C. App. 564, 610 S.E.2d 231 (2005); Guilford County ex rel. Holt v. Puckett, 191 N.C. App. 693, 664 S.E.2d 362 (2008); New Hanover Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Dillon v. Rains, 193 N.C. App. 208, 666 S.E.2d 800 (2008).

Cited in Boston v. Freeman, 6 N.C. App. 736, 171 S.E.2d 206 (1969); Robinson v. Robinson, 10 N.C. App. 463, 179 S.E.2d 144 (1971); Hill v. Hill, 11 N.C. App. 1, 180 S.E.2d 424 (1971); Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378, 188 S.E.2d 711 (1972); Koob v. Koob, 16 N.C. App. 326, 192 S.E.2d 40 (1972); Koob v. Koob, 283 N.C. 129, 195 S.E.2d 552 (1973); Stanback v. Stanback, 31 N.C. App. 174, 229 S.E.2d 693 (1976); Roberson v. Roberson, 40 N.C. App. 193, 252 S.E.2d 237 (1979); Gilmore v. Gilmore, 42 N.C. App. 560, 257 S.E.2d 116 (1979); Oxendine v. Catawba County Dep't of Social Servs., 49 N.C. App. 571, 272 S.E.2d 417 (1980); Falls v. Falls, 52 N.C. App. 203, 278 S.E.2d 546 (1981); Harper v. Harper, 50 N.C. App. 394, 273 S.E.2d 731 (1981); Wake County ex rel. Carrington v. Townes, 53 N.C. App. 649, 281 S.E.2d 765 (1981); Wilkes County ex rel. Child Support Enforcement Agency ex rel Nations v. Gentry, 63 N.C. App. 432, 305 S.E.2d 207 (1983); State v. Caudill, 68 N.C. App. 268, 314 S.E.2d 592 (1984); Miller v. Kite, 69 N.C. App. 679, 318 S.E.2d 102 (1984); Minor v. Minor, 70 N.C. App. 76, 318 S.E.2d 865 (1984); Rice v. Rice, 81 N.C. App. 247, 344 S.E.2d 41 (1986); In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 531, 345 S.E.2d 404 (1986); North Carolina Baptist Hosps. v. Harris, 319 N.C. 347, 354 S.E.2d 471 (1987); Smith v. Davis, 88 N.C. App. 557, 364 S.E.2d 156 (1988); Williams v. Williams, 97 N.C. App. 118, 387 S.E.2d 217 (1990); In re Roberson, 97 N.C. App. 277, 387 S.E.2d 668 (1990); McBride v. McBride, 334 N.C. 124, 431 S.E.2d 14 (1993); Fitch v. Fitch, 115 N.C. App. 722, 446 S.E.2d 138 (1994); Allen v. Piedmond Transp. Servs., Inc., 116 N.C. App. 234, 447 S.E.2d 835 (1994); Moyer v. Moyer, 122 N.C. App. 723, 471 S.E.2d 676 (1996); Taylor v. Taylor, 128 N.C. App. 180, 493 S.E.2d 819 (1997); Glass v. Glass, 131 N.C. App. 784, 509 S.E.2d 236 (1998); Vann v. Vann, 128 N.C. App. 516, 495 S.E.2d 370 (1998); Willard v. Willard, 130 N.C. App. 144, 502 S.E.2d 395 (1998); Brewer v. Brewer, 139 N.C. App. 222, 533 S.E.2d 541 (2000); In re Estate of Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. 646, 547 S.E.2d 483 (2001), cert. granted, 353 N.C. 727, 550 S.E.2d 779; Miller v. Miller, 153 N.C. App. 40, 568 S.E.2d 914 (2002); McKinney v. Richitelli, 357 N.C. 483, 586 S.E.2d 258 (2003); Carson v. Carson, 199 N.C. App. 101, 680 S.E.2d 885 (2009); Moore v. Onafowora, 208 N.C. App. 674, 703 S.E.2d 744 (2010); Robinson v. Robinson, 210 N.C. App. 319, 707 S.E.2d 785 (2011); Baumann-Chacon v. Baumann, 212 N.C. App. 137, 710 S.E.2d 431 (2011); Romulus v. Romulus, 216 N.C. App. 28, 715 S.E.2d 889 (2011); Clements v. Clements, 219 N.C. App. 581, 725 S.E.2d 373 (2012); Dixon v. Gordon, 223 N.C. App. 365, 734 S.E.2d 299 (2012), review denied, 743 S.E.2d 191, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 552 (2013); In re A.D.N., 231 N.C. App. 54, 752 S.E.2d 201 (2013), review denied, 755 S.E.2d 626, 2014 N.C. LEXIS 232 (2014); Zurosky v. Shaffer, 236 N.C. App. 219, 763 S.E.2d 755 (2014).

II. INSTITUTION OF ACTION.

Judicial Determination of Custody. - Subsection (a) does not specify that it requires judicial determination of custody before its provisions can be utilized by person or agency bringing action for support. Thus, where mother in her proceeding for modification of support order also requested a formal adjudication of custody, which request was granted, plaintiff met the custody requirements of subsection (a). Craig v. Kelley, 89 N.C. App. 458, 366 S.E.2d 249 (1988).

Custodial Parent as Real Party in Interest. - If the custodial parent provides support which the other parent is legally obligated to provide, then the custodial parent is a real party in interest in an action to recover the support so provided. Griffith v. Griffith, 38 N.C. App. 25, 247 S.E.2d 30, cert. denied, 296 N.C. 106, 249 S.E.2d 804 (1978).

Although plaintiff alleged that he was the father of the child, he did not allege that he had custody, therefore under the provisions of this section, only a parent who has custody of a minor child may bring an action for its support. Becton v. George, 90 N.C. App. 607, 369 S.E.2d 366 (1988).

Required Notice Deemed Waived. - Where both parties introduced evidence on the reasonable needs of the children and the relative ability of each parent to pay support for the children, the defendant's failure to give proper notice of his request that a hearing be conducted regarding these issues was waived and the trial court was required to find facts and enter conclusions on this evidence. Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991); Rose v. Rose, 108 N.C. App. 90, 422 S.E.2d 446 (1992).

Notice for Hearing. - This section does not identify any time restrictions for making the request for a hearing described in subsection (c). However, to effectuate the purpose of this section, any party in a pending action requesting a variance from the guidelines must, unless the request is made in the original pleadings, give at least ten days written notice as required by G.S. 50-13.5(d)(1). Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991).

There is no limitation as to time within which actions for the support of legitimate children must be commenced. County of Lenoir ex rel. Cogdell v. Johnson, 46 N.C. App. 182, 264 S.E.2d 816 (1980).

Motion in Cause. - Plaintiff-husband, as a parent seeking custody, could seek to have his child support obligation determined through a motion in the cause in the divorce action. He was not precluded from doing so by the fact that the court had not previously entered orders in that action relating to child support. Bottomley v. Bottomley, 82 N.C. App. 231, 346 S.E.2d 317 (1986).

Discovery Held Overbroad. - For a case in which it was held that plaintiff's discovery request in a child-support case was overbroad and should have been limited by the trial court, see Powers v. Parisher, 104 N.C. App. 400, 409 S.E.2d 725 (1991), appeal dismissed, 331 N.C. 286, 417 S.E.2d 254 (1992).

Prayer for Increase in Support Actually Action Under this Section. - Although plaintiff's complaint prayed for an increase in child support based upon a substantial change in circumstances, plaintiff's action was in fact brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section because the amount sought to be increased was paid pursuant to a non-judicial separation agreement; plaintiff was actually asking the Court to enter an original award of child support. Powers v. Parisher, 104 N.C. App. 400, 409 S.E.2d 725 (1991), appeal dismissed, 331 N.C. 286, 417 S.E.2d 254 (1992).

III. LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT.

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Subsection (b) imposes primary liability upon both father and mother to support a minor child. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Subsection (b) of this section, as amended in 1981, does not diminish a father's responsibilities. Rather, it enlarges a mother's responsibilities by making both parents primarily liable for the support of their children. Alamance County Hosp. v. Neighbors, 315 N.C. 362, 338 S.E.2d 87 (1986).

Equal Duty of Support Is Rule Rather Than Exception. - Today, the equal duty of both parents to support their children is the rule rather than the exception is virtually all states. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Both parents have equal support duties under the law, absent pleading and proof that circumstances otherwise warrant. Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), modified on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Support for minor children is an obligation shared by both parents according to their relative abilities to provide support and the reasonable needs and estate of the child. Boyd v. Boyd, 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986).

But Equal Financial Contributions Are Not Necessarily Required. - Subsection (b) of this section provides that both mothers and fathers share primary liability for the support of their minor children, thus imposing an equal legal duty on the parent of each gender. However, subsection (b) neither mandates equal financial contributions nor requires any contribution from either party where it is proved that the circumstances otherwise warrant. Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), modified on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Equal legal duty to support does not impose an equal financial contribution by both parties. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Equal duty to support does not necessarily mean that the amount of child support is to be automatically divided equally between the parties. Rather, the amount of each parent's obligation varies in accordance with their respective financial resources. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Equal Financial Contributions Not Imposed Where Unfair or Burdensome. - The parental obligation for child support is not primarily an obligation of the father but is one shared by both parents. This equal duty to support, however, does not impose upon both parties an equal financial contribution when such an allocation would be unfair or place too great a burden on a party. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Discretion of Court as to Amount and Source of Support. - The trial court has considerable discretion in determining whether and in what amounts the party from whom support is sought may be ordered to provide it. Therefore, the trial court has a duty to exercise an informed and considered discretion with respect to the support obligation of the parties. Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), modified on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Amount of Each Party's Contribution Determined on Case-by-Case Basis. - The amount of each party's contribution to child support is generally determined by the judge on a case-by-case basis. The judge must evaluate the circumstances of each family and also consider certain statutory requirements in fixing the amount of child support. Subsection (c) of this section mandates that the trial judge consider the certain factors in setting child support amounts. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Relative Ability to Pay May Be Considered. - Although Session Laws 1981, c. 613 had the effect of changing the previous rule that the mother was only secondarily liable for child support, in all other relevant respects involving the relative ability or inability of the mother and father to provide such support, the relevant statutory provisions remained unchanged. Therefore, other circumstances may properly be considered, including the relative ability of the parties to pay. Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), modified on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

It was apparent from the record that the trial court considered both the existence and structure of appellee's trust fund and appellant's income as an ophthalmologist in making its determination that appellant should contribute one-half of child's necessary and actual expenses. It concluded that a father in an established ophthalmologic practice, and who had a 1991 income of at least $88,000 was able to contribute half of his child's support. Munn v. Munn, 112 N.C. App. 151, 435 S.E.2d 74 (1993).

Consideration of Ability to Pay - Procedure. - Defendant's contention that summary judgment was improper because he was financially unable to make the child support payments called for in the agreement would be relevant only to future payments and could be considered only after the defendant had filed a motion in the cause for the trial court to set an amount of child support which differs from that in the separation agreement. Nisbet v. Nisbet, 102 N.C. App. 232, 402 S.E.2d 151, cert. denied, 329 N.C. 499, 407 S.E.2d 538 (1991).

Voluntary Unemployment. - Trial court order finding that mother was obligated to pay child support to her ex-husband for their three minor children who resided with the ex-husband, which was based on a deviation from the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines, was error; although the deviation was supported by the evidence in that the mother was voluntarily unemployed and had cash reserves to meet her financial obligations of the children, the amount awarded was not supported by any evidence. Roberts v. McAllister, 174 N.C. App. 369, 621 S.E.2d 191 (2005), appeal dismissed, - N.C. - , 629 S.E.2d 608 (2006).

Determination of Relative Ability. - The relative ability of the parties to contribute under subsections (b) and (c) of this section cannot depend solely on the determination of monthly available income after expenses. Rather, it must be reflective of all the relevant circumstances, including the relative hardship to each parent in contributing to the reasonable needs of the child. Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), modified on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Stepparent in Loco Parentis. - If an individual assumes the status of in loco parentis, he is secondarily liable to the child's natural parents for the support of that child, and if the needs of the child exceed the ability of the child's natural parents to meet those needs, then and only then is the individual in loco parentis secondarily responsible for the deficiency. Duffey v. Duffey, 113 N.C. App. 382, 438 S.E.2d 445 (1994).

By signing a separation agreement in which he agreed to pay child support to plaintiff, stepparent voluntarily and in writing extended his status of in loco parentis and gave the court the authority to order that support be paid. Duffey v. Duffey, 113 N.C. App. 382, 438 S.E.2d 445 (1994).

Child's Needs and Hardship to Each Parent Must Be Considered. - Enforcement of each parent's statutory duty to contribute child support depends on the urgency of the needs of the child and the relative hardship to each parent in contributing to these needs. Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), modified on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Children with Property of Their Own. - There is nothing in the statute to suggest any legislative intent to change the firmly established rule that the supporting parent who can do so remains obligated to support his or her minor children, even though they may have property of their own. Sloop v. Friberg, 70 N.C. App. 690, 320 S.E.2d 921 (1984).

Although trial court found as a fact that each child had an estate in excess of $300,000.00, the separate incomes and estates of children did not diminish or relieve the obligation of the defendant father to support his children, even though former husband's income was about $37,000.00. Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991).

Education Needs of Child. - Although public funding may have been available for special education needs of child, but was not sought by custodial parent, court did not err in requiring noncustodial parent to pay costs of child's educational expenses in proportion to parent's gross income. Sikes v. Sikes, 98 N.C. App. 610, 391 S.E.2d 855 (1990), aff'd, 330 N.C. 595, 411 S.E.2d 588 (1992).

Mother had to continue paying child support under subdivision (c)(2) of this section for her son who had turned 18 where, although he would not be able to receive a standard high school diploma because he had Down's Syndrome, his teacher and school counselor showed that his attendance at the school was in his best interests, that he would continue to benefit in the future from the curriculum, and that he was making satisfactory academic progress toward a non-traditional graduation. Hendricks v. Sanks, 143 N.C. App. 544, 545 S.E.2d 779 (2001).

Apportionment of Costs Is Not Required Where One Parent Is Unable to Assist in Support. - Although apportionment of the costs of a child's support between his father and mother according to their respective means and responsibilities is statutorily authorized, it is not required where the mother is financially unable to assist the father with the support of their son. Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), modified on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Support of Child Legitimated Under G.S. 49-12. - Where the reputed father of a child marries the child's mother after its birth, under G.S. 49-12 such child is deemed legitimate just as if it had been born in lawful wedlock, and such child is a minor child of the marriage; thus, the father may be required to furnish support for such child upon motion made either before or after decree of divorce. Carter v. Carter, 232 N.C. 614, 61 S.E.2d 711 (1950).

Primary Liability of Father Under Former Provisions. - For cases as to father's primary liability and mother's secondary liability to support their children, prior to the amendment by Session Laws 1981, c. 613, see Bailey v. Bailey, 127 N.C. 474, 37 S.E. 502 (1900); Sanders v. Sanders, 167 N.C. 319, 83 S.E. 490 (1914); Tidwell v. Booker, 290 N.C. 98, 225 S.E.2d 816 (1976); Hicks v. Hicks, 34 N.C. App. 128, 237 S.E.2d 307 (1977); Coble v. Coble, 44 N.C. App. 327, 261 S.E.2d 34 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 300 N.C. 708, 268 S.E.2d 185 (1980); Flippin v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 270 S.E.2d 482 (1980), rehearing denied, 301 N.C. 727, 274 S.E.2d 228 (1981); In re Register, 303 N.C. 149, 277 S.E.2d 356 (1981).

As to mother's standing formerly to bring claim for loss of child's services and medical expenses, based upon her formerly secondary support obligation, prior to the amendment by Session Laws 1981, c. 613, see Flippin v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 270 S.E.2d 482 (1980), rehearing denied, 301 N.C. 727, 274 S.E.2d 228 (1981).

Father's Reduction in Payments as Evidence He Had Not Met Obligations. - Where judge found that mother provided no evidence that she was entitled to payment of back child support, the evidence did not support the judge's finding; there was evidence that father had not met his child support obligations where father testified that in 1985, he reduced the amount of the payments due to a decrease in salary. Correll v. Allen, 94 N.C. App. 464, 380 S.E.2d 580 (1989).

Equitable Estoppel Did Not Bar Claim for Past Support. - Even assuming that on some set of facts equitable estoppel might properly bar a claim for child support arrears, it was inapplicable where husband, seeking to rely on equitable estoppel, could not show that, in good faith reliance on the conduct of his ex-wife, he had changed his position for the worse; the only change made in his position was the retention to his benefit of money owed for the support of his children. Griffin v. Griffin, 96 N.C. App. 324, 385 S.E.2d 526 (1989).

Applicability of Doctrine of "Necessaries". - Although the normal vehicle today for enforcing the obligation of support is undoubtedly the payment of court-ordered support pursuant to statute, the common law provided another vehicle through the so-called doctrine of "necessaries." North Carolina accepts this process for enforcing a parent's obligation to support minor children. Alamance County Hosp. v. Neighbors, 315 N.C. 362, 338 S.E.2d 87 (1986).

Support Obligation of Noncustodial Parent. - Under new child Support Guidelines an adjustment in support obligation of noncustodial parent is reduced only when each parent has child for more than 33 percent of year. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

Right of Third Party to Recover for "Necessaries" Furnished to Child. - Because a child's right to support continues unimpaired despite the divorce of his or her parents, the right of a third party provider of goods or services to claim against the noncustodial parent also continues, unimpaired by contracts or judicial decrees or orders affecting the relations between the parents. Alamance County Hosp. v. Neighbors, 315 N.C. 362, 338 S.E.2d 87 (1986).

The payment of court-ordered child support does not bar a third party from seeking reimbursement directly from a noncustodial parent for "necessaries" provided to that parent's minor child. However, because the third party provider's right to recover against the parent is based upon the child's right to support, the third party provider must still show that the services or goods provided were legal "necessaries" and that the parent against whom relief is sought has failed or refused to provide them. In this context, any payment a noncustodial parent has made for the support of his or her child would be a factor for the trial judge to consider in deciding whether the parent has in fact met the obligation to support that child. Alamance County Hosp. v. Neighbors, 315 N.C. 362, 338 S.E.2d 87 (1986).

Non-Biological Parents. - The court will not impose the burden of child support on a non-biological parent who has not voluntarily assumed such an obligation. Pott v. Pott, 126 N.C. App. 285, 484 S.E.2d 822 (1997).

Persons Standing in Loco Parentis. - Although support of a child ordinarily is a parental obligation, other persons standing in loco parentis may also acquire a duty to support the child; thus, in a case where custodial father and child had believed him to be the father of the child, the duty of support should have accompanied the right to custody. Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997).

Parents of Unemancipated Minors Primarily Responsible for Grandchildren's Support. - The statutory language of this section, coupled with the legislative intent, imposes primary responsibility for an infant born to unemancipated minors on the minors' parents (i.e. the infant's grandparents). Whitman v. Kiger, 139 N.C. App. 44, 533 S.E.2d 807 (2000), aff'd, 353 N.C. 360, 543 S.E.2d 476 (2001).

IV. AMOUNT OF SUPPORT.

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A. IN GENERAL.

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History and Purpose of Guidelines. - As of July 1, 1991, the State adopted guidelines based on income-sharing approach for determining child support. These guidelines were promulgated by Conference of Chief District Judges in accordance with subsection (c1) of this section. Income-sharing formulas ignore problem of attempting to determine cost of raising a child and are based instead on assumption that each parent will contribute all of his or her income to one fund. Then the formulas provide method for equitably dividing income among family members. Income-sharing formulas seeking to equalize financial burden of divorce so that all family members experience about same proportional reduction in standard of living after divorce. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

Constitutionality of Guidelines. - Child Support Guidelines (2002) did not violate substantive due process; the State had a compelling interest in regulating child support obligations, and through establishing a rebuttable presumption with regard to the guidelines under G.S. 50-13.4(c), the act was narrowly drawn. Row v. Row, 185 N.C. App. 450, 650 S.E.2d 1 (2007), review denied, 362 N.C. 238, 659 S.E.2d 741 (2008), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 129 S. Ct. 144, 172 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2008).

Effective Date of Guidelines. - At time support order was entered in June, 1989, the Guidelines in subsection (c1) of this section were only advisory in nature. The Guidelines became presumptive as of October 1, 1989. New presumptive guidelines became effective July 1, 1990. Therefore, at the time, (June 1989) order was entered, trial judge was neither required to follow nor refer to advisory guidelines in order. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

Use of Guidelines to Determine Support Proper. - Where parents' combined gross income was $11,980, below the $20,000 per month threshold, the trial court was permitted to use the child support guidelines and require the husband to continue paying $1,521 per month in child support. Francis v. Francis, 169 N.C. App. 442, 612 S.E.2d 141 (2005).

The amount of a parent's child support obligation is determined by application of the Child Support Guidelines. Barham v. Barham, 127 N.C. App. 20, 487 S.E.2d 774 (1997), aff'd, 347 N.C. 570, 494 S.E.2d 763 (1998).

Guidelines Are Not Mandatory But Advisory. - An examination and interpretation of subsection (c1) as written clearly indicates that the guidelines prescribed by the Conference of Chief District Court Judges are not mandatory and binding but rather advisory in nature. Morris v. Morris, 92 N.C. App. 359, 374 S.E.2d 441 (1988), decided prior to later amendments to subsection (c1).

Deviation From Guidelines. - According to the statute, the trial court has the discretion to deviate from the presumptive guidelines in only two situations: (1) when application does not meet or exceeds the reasonable needs of the child; or (2) when application would be unjust or inappropriate. Guilford County ex rel. Child Support Enforcement Agency ex rel. Easter v. Easter, 120 N.C. App. 260, 461 S.E.2d 798 (1995), modified, 344 N.C. 166, 473 S.E.2d 6 (1996).

A trial court may deviate from the Guidelines when it finds, by the greater weight of the evidence, application of the Guidelines: (1) would not meet or would exceed the reasonable needs of the child considering the relative ability of each parent to provide support; or (2) would be otherwise unjust or inappropriate. Barham v. Barham, 127 N.C. App. 20, 487 S.E.2d 774 (1997), aff'd, 347 N.C. 570, 494 S.E.2d 763 (1998).

Although the trial court properly considered the father's settlement trust to be non-recurring income when making its child support order, the case was remanded because the trial court failed to make specific findings regarding the reasonable needs of the child when it deviated from the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines. Spicer v. Spicer, 168 N.C. App. 283, 607 S.E.2d 678 (2005).

North Carolina Child Support Guidelines were inapplicable because the combined monthly adjusted gross income of the parents exceeded $20,000; thus, the trial court was required to make a case-by-case determination. Consequently, the trial court was not bound by the Guidelines in determining the father's child support obligations. Diehl v. Diehl, 177 N.C. App. 642, 630 S.E.2d 25 (2006).

In considering a father's motion to modify child support, the trial court did not err in deviating only slightly from the guidelines; the guidelines were constitutional, and the slight deviation was not manifestly unsupported by reason. Row v. Row, 185 N.C. App. 450, 650 S.E.2d 1 (2007), review denied, 362 N.C. 238, 659 S.E.2d 741 (2008), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 129 S. Ct. 144, 172 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2008).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to deviate from the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines because it made findings regarding both the needs of the child and each parent's relative ability to provide support and did not find application of the Guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate. Simms v. Bolger, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 522 (2019).

Trial Court's Methodology Proper. - Even if the father had assigned error to the methodology employed by the trial court, there was no error in the trial court's determination process under circumstances in which both parties maintained full-time employment and earned average monthly incomes in excess of $10,000; the trial court's findings of fact included an updated analysis of the child's total reasonable needs while in the mother's care, the mother's pro rata share of the parties' gross income, and the mother's pro rata share of the child's reasonable needs while in her custody. Pascoe v. Pascoe, 183 N.C. App. 648, 645 S.E.2d 156 (2007).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that it would not base the child support calculation on the estates of the parties because they were essentially equal, and neither party would be required to deplete his or her accounts and properties to support the child. Kleoudis v. Kleoudis, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 277 (2020).

The child support guidelines were held inapplicable and child support was determined by assessing the particular facts of the case where a father's monthly income was $15,181; the denial of a father's motion to reduce child support was affirmed where the trial court acknowledged the father's income decrease, considered the father's family related expenses and support obligations, and determined, based on the father's net income of over $5,000 per month, that a reduction in child support from the original amount of $2,500 was unwarranted. Trevillian v. Trevillian, 164 N.C. App. 223, 595 S.E.2d 206 (2004).

Deviation from Guidelines Improper. - Trial court's findings that mother's live-in boyfriend earned $16.61 per hour and worked forty hours a week was insufficient to support the decision to deviate from the Child Support Guidelines. State ex rel. Carteret Child Support Enforcement Office ex rel. Horne v. Horne, 127 N.C. App. 387, 489 S.E.2d 431 (1997).

Automatic Support Increases. - Provision in judgment by confession ordering automatic child support increases based upon the C.P.I. was void where it did not contain the requirements for a valid annual adjustment formula in Falls v. Falls, 52 N.C. App. 203, 278 S.E.2d 546, cert. denied, 304 N.C. 390, 285 S.E.2d 831 (1981). Snipes v. Snipes, 118 N.C. App. 189, 454 S.E.2d 864 (1995).

The determination of child support must be done in such way as to result in fairness to all parties. Walker v. Walker, 38 N.C. App. 226, 247 S.E.2d 615 (1978); Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), modified on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Ultimate Objective. - While it is the legal obligation of the father (now father and mother) to provide for the support of his minor children, and while the welfare of the child is a primary consideration in matters of custody and maintenance, yet common sense and common justice dictate that the ultimate object in such matters is to secure support commensurate with the needs of the child and the ability of the father to meet the needs. Holt v. Holt, 29 N.C. App. 124, 223 S.E.2d 542 (1976).

No precise formula exists to assist the court in determining a fair support award, and the uniqueness of each divorce renders a precedent almost valueless. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Request for Variance from Child Support Guidelines. - G.S. 50-13.4 does not identify any time restrictions for making the request for a hearing. However, to effectuate the purpose of that statute, any party in a pending action requesting a variance from the guidelines must, unless the request is made in the original pleadings, give at least ten days written notice as required by this section. Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991).

In deviating from child support guidelines, the trial court was required to make findings of fact as to the criteria that justified varying from the guidelines and the basis of the amount ordered; the court committed error because its findings were insufficient to meet this requirement. Gowing v. Gowing, 111 N.C. App. 613, 432 S.E.2d 911 (1993).

Failure to follow the presumptive child-support guidelines prescribed pursuant to subsection (c1) required that a support order be reversed; the guidelines were not mentioned in the order and the order did not make reference to any of the factors used to vary a support payment from the presumptive amounts. Greer v. Greer, 101 N.C. App. 351, 399 S.E.2d 399 (1991).

In child support action, trial court must first determine primary liability for minor child's support under subsection (b). The court then determines the actual amount of support necessary to meet the minor child's reasonable needs pursuant to subsection (c). McLemore v. McLemore, 89 N.C. App. 451, 366 S.E.2d 495 (1988).

Deviation from Guidelines in Special Needs Case. - The trial court erred in simply halving the mother's child support obligation when she was no longer liable for the support of one of the two children; the court was required to hold a hearing and make findings of fact when it deviated from the Child Support Guidelines, and, considering the second child's special needs, an amount higher than one-half of the original total might have been more appropriate. Hendricks v. Sanks, 143 N.C. App. 544, 545 S.E.2d 779 (2001).

Where 11 U.S.C.S. § 1325(b)(2) required that child support payments be reasonably necessary to be expended for a child and where G.S. 50-13.4(c) also provided that child support payments must be in such an amount as to meet the reasonable needs of a child, the court assumed that the child support payments made to a Chapter 13 debtor were determined in accordance with state law and that the full amount of the payment was reasonably necessary for the support of the children where there had been no contention to the contrary. In re Parker, - Bankr. - (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 28, 2009).

Estimate of Child Support in Error. - In setting the child support amount, the trial court erred in estimating the children's reasonable needs by comparing them to the reasonable needs of the father where the estimate was based on speculation, and was especially inappropriate given the finding that the children lived primarily with the mother. Lasecki v. Lasecki, 246 N.C. App. 518, 786 S.E.2d 286 (2016).

Ability to Pay and Needs of Child Must Be Considered. - Ordinarily, in entering a judgment for the support of a minor child, the ability to pay, as well as the needs of such child, will be taken into consideration. Bishop v. Bishop, 245 N.C. 573, 96 S.E.2d 721 (1957); Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963); Coggins v. Coggins, 260 N.C. 765, 133 S.E.2d 700 (1963).

In providing for the support of minor children, the ability of the father (or mother) to pay, as well as the needs of the children, must be taken into consideration by the court. Martin v. Martin, 263 N.C. 86, 138 S.E.2d 801 (1964).

In determining the amount of support, the court must take into consideration the needs of the children and the ability of the defendant to pay during the time for which reimbursement is sought. Hicks v. Hicks, 34 N.C. App. 128, 237 S.E.2d 307 (1977).

An order for child support must be based not only on the needs of the child, but also on the ability of the father (or mother) to meet the needs. Poston v. Poston, 40 N.C. App. 210, 252 S.E.2d 240 (1979).

In order to be fair and just, the court entering an order for child support must consider not only the needs of the child, but also the abilities of the parents to provide support. Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), modified on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

An order for child support must be based upon the interplay of the trial court's conclusions of law as to (1) the amount of support necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child and (2) the relative ability of the parties to provide that amount. Atwell v. Atwell, 74 N.C. App. 231, 328 S.E.2d 47 (1985).

Computing the amount of child support is normally an exercise of sound judicial discretion, requiring the judge to review all of the evidence before him. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, a judge's determination of what is a proper amount of support will not be disturbed on appeal. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

The trial court's findings lacked the necessary specificity to justify its deviation from child support guidelines, where it failed to make any findings regarding the child's reasonable needs, including his education, maintenance, or accustomed standard of living. State ex rel. Fisher v. Lukinoff, 131 N.C. App. 642, 507 S.E.2d 591 (1998).

Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction under G.S. 7B-200(a) over neglect proceedings, and as G.S. 7B-903 authorized the placement of the neglected child with the child's mother, the trial court had authority under G.S. 7B-904 to order a father to pay child support to the child's mother; however, further findings were required under G.S. 7B-904(d) and G.S. 50-13.4(c) as to the reasonable needs of the child and the relative ability of the father to provide that amount. In re W.V., 204 N.C. App. 290, 693 S.E.2d 383 (2010).

Trial court did not err in referencing a father's income when dismissing the father's complaint for child support because that information was relevant to the father's claim for child support. Durham Cty. v. Adams, 258 N.C. App. 395, 812 S.E.2d 885 (2018), review denied, 814 S.E.2d 106, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 472 (2018).

When Ability to Pay Determined. - A party's ability to pay child support is determined by the party's ability to pay at the time the award is made or modified. Askew v. Askew, 119 N.C. App. 242, 458 S.E.2d 217 (1995).

As Basis of Order for Child Support. - An order for child support under this section must be based upon the interplay of the trial court's conclusions of law as to (1) the amount of support necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child, and (2) the relative ability of the parties to provide that amount. Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 268 S.E.2d 185 (1980); In re Biggers, 50 N.C. App. 332, 274 S.E.2d 236 (1981); Dishmon v. Dishmon, 57 N.C. App. 657, 292 S.E.2d 293 (1982); In re Allen, 58 N.C. App. 322, 293 S.E.2d 607 (1982); Byrd v. Byrd, 62 N.C. App. 438, 303 S.E.2d 205 (1983); Campbell v. Campbell, 63 N.C. App. 113, 304 S.E.2d 262, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 460, 307 S.E.2d 362 (1983); Newman v. Newman, 64 N.C. App. 125, 306 S.E.2d 540, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 822, 310 S.E.2d 351 (1983).

Along with Other Relevant Facts. - A court, when entering an order for support, should take into account the needs of the child, the resources of the parties and any other facts relevant to the case. McCall v. McCall, 61 N.C. App. 312, 300 S.E.2d 591 (1983).

Using disposable income (net income after expenses) is a way to fairly reflect the parties relative ability to contribute proportionately to support of the child. Savani v. Savani, 102 N.C. App. 496, 403 S.E.2d 900 (1991).

With Reference to the Special Circumstances of the Parties. - What amount is reasonable for a child's support is to be determined with reference to the special circumstances of the particular parties. Warner v. Latimer, 68 N.C. App. 170, 314 S.E.2d 789 (1984).

Judge's consideration of the factors contained in subsection (c) of this section is not guided by any magic formula. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Vacation of Support Order Absent Evidence as to Parent's Ability to Pay and Child's Needs. - An order for child support will necessarily be vacated where there is no evidence offered as to a party's ability to pay or where there is no evidence as to the child's needs and expenses. Dixon v. Dixon, 67 N.C. App. 73, 312 S.E.2d 669 (1984).

Parent's Circumstances Must Be Evaluated. - The amount of each parent's contribution to the support of the child is based upon the trial court's evaluation of each parent's circumstances, including a determination of certain factors mandated by subsection (c) of this section. Boyd v. Boyd, 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986).

Alimony and Child Support Considered Together. - Trial court reasonably could have concluded that the wife's alimony award needed to be increased because the wife's reasonable expenses had increased after the husband was no longer obligated to pay child support because the parties, minor child had turned 18-years-old. The original alimony award calculated the wife's reasonable expenses by attributing some of those expenses to the minor child, but the wife's reasonable expenses increased when the minor child attained the age of majority and those expenses were no longer attributed to the minor child. Harris v. Harris, 188 N.C. App. 477, 656 S.E.2d 316 (2008).

"Cost Sharing" Formula Improper. - Use of any cost-sharing formula by a trial judge is now improper in North Carolina. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

"Cost-sharing" approach to child support awards embodied in the Franks formula criticized by North Carolina Court of Appeals when applied to case arising before July 1, 1990, effective date of this section. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

Under this section and G.S. 50-13.7, party's ability to pay child support is ordinarily determined by party's actual income at time the support award is made or modified. However, if there is a finding by the trial court that the party was acting in bad faith by deliberately depressing his or her income or otherwise disregarding the obligation to pay child support, then the party's capacity to earn may be the basis for the award. Fischell v. Rosenberg, 90 N.C. App. 254, 368 S.E.2d 11 (1988).

Interest in Corporations or Partnerships and Nontaxable Income Relevant. - The value and nature of defendant's interest in any partnerships or corporations and the terms of any trust of which he might be the beneficiary, as well as the amount of income, including non-taxable, deferred or declined income, flowing therefrom, would all bear relevance to child support proceeding. Shaw v. Cameron, 125 N.C. App. 522, 481 S.E.2d 365 (1997).

Encumbered Cash Reserve Funds of Corporation. - The trial court's exclusion of plaintiff's corporation's encumbered cash reserve funds in its calculation of child support was prejudicial error. Barham v. Barham, 127 N.C. App. 20, 487 S.E.2d 774 (1997), aff'd, 347 N.C. 570, 494 S.E.2d 763 (1998).

Exclusive Ownership or Control of Estate Irrelevant. - Any judgment rendered against defendant setting an amount of child support would be dependent in significant part upon the amount of his income and the nature of his estate, whether exclusively owned or controlled by defendant, or jointly with others. Shaw v. Cameron, 125 N.C. App. 522, 481 S.E.2d 365 (1997).

Estate and Earnings of Both Husband and Wife Must Be Considered. - The court must consider not only the needs of the wife and children, but also the estate and earnings of both husband and wife. Roberts v. Roberts, 38 N.C. App. 295, 248 S.E.2d 85 (1978); Walker v. Tucker, 69 N.C. App. 607, 317 S.E.2d 923 (1984).

Order which contained no findings of fact regarding plaintiff's earnings or employment status was not supported by sufficient findings of fact. Smith v. Smith, 103 N.C. App. 488, 405 S.E.2d 912 (1991).

Ordinarily, Present Earnings Should Be Basis for Award. - In determining the ability of the father (or mother) to support the child, the court ordinarily should examine the father's (or mother's) present earnings, rather than select the earnings for a single year in the past and use that as the basis for an award. Holt v. Holt, 29 N.C. App. 124, 223 S.E.2d 542 (1976).

If father (or mother) is honestly and in good faith engaged in a business to which he is properly adapted, and is making a good faith effort to earn a reasonable income, the award for child support should be based on the amount which defendant is earning when the award is made. Holt v. Holt, 29 N.C. App. 124, 223 S.E.2d 542 (1976).

Ordinarily, father's (or mother's) ability to pay is determined by his income at the time the award is made if father (or mother) is honestly engaged in a business to which he is properly adapted and is in fact seeking to operate his business profitably. Beall v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 228 S.E.2d 407 (1976); Whitley v. Whitley, 46 N.C. App. 810, 266 S.E.2d 23 (1980).

The general rule is that the ability of a party to pay child support is determined by that person's income at the time the award is made. Atwell v. Atwell, 74 N.C. App. 231, 328 S.E.2d 47 (1985).

The ability of the supporting spouse to pay is ordinarily determined by his or her income at the time the award is made. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

But capacity to earn may be the basis of an award if it is based upon a proper finding that father (or mother) is deliberately depressing his income or indulging himself in excessive spending because of a disregard of his obligation to provide reasonable support for his spouse and children. Beall v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 228 S.E.2d 407 (1976).

A person's capacity to earn income may be made the basis of an award if there is a finding that the party deliberately depressed his or her income or otherwise acted in deliberate disregard of the obligation to provide reasonable support for the child. Greer v. Greer, 101 N.C. App. 351, 399 S.E.2d 399 (1991).

Under this section and G.S. 50-13.7, father's (or mother's) ability to pay child support is normally determined by his actual income at the time the award is made or modified. If, however, there is a finding that father (or mother) is deliberately depressing his income or otherwise acting in deliberate disregard of his obligation to provide reasonable support for his child, his capacity to earn may be made the basis of the award. Under these circumstances, his motion to reduce the amount of child support will be denied. Goodhouse v. DeFravio, 57 N.C. App. 124, 290 S.E.2d 751 (1982).

When the trial court makes a finding that a party deliberately depressed his or her income, then the party's capacity to earn or his potential income may be used to determine the child support obligation. McDonald v. Taylor, 106 N.C. App. 18, 415 S.E.2d 81 (1992).

Where plaintiff took early retirement at age 51, with a 3 year old daughter to support, chose to remain unemployed, despite having many skills, and there was testimony that plaintiff could earn at least $20,000 without decreasing his retirement benefits, the trial court properly based child support award on plaintiff's potential income. Osborne v. Osborne, 129 N.C. App. 34, 497 S.E.2d 113 (1998).

Trial court erred in modifying a father's child support obligation downward under G.S. 50-13.7(a) despite evidence that he voluntarily quit his $172,000 job as an engineer to follow Jesus Christ and become a minister of a fledgling church without giving consideration to how he would meet his child support obligation. Andrews v. Andrews, 217 N.C. App. 154, 719 S.E.2d 128 (2011), review denied 365 N.C. 561, 722 S.E.2d 595, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 148 (2012).

Finding Where Award Is Based on Capacity to Earn. - To base an award for child support on capacity to earn rather than actual earnings, there should be a finding based on evidence that father (or mother) is failing to exercise his capacity to earn because of a disregard of his obligation to provide reasonable support for his spouse and children. Holt v. Holt, 29 N.C. App. 124, 223 S.E.2d 542 (1976); Stanley v. Stanley, 51 N.C. App. 172, 275 S.E.2d 546, cert. denied, 303 N.C. 182, 280 S.E.2d 454, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 959, 102 S. Ct. 496, 70 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1981).

Only where there are findings, based on competent evidence, to support a conclusion that the supporting spouse or parent is deliberately depressing his or her income to avoid family responsibilities can the "earning capacity" rule be applied. Whitley v. Whitley, 46 N.C. App. 810, 266 S.E.2d 23 (1980); Atwell v. Atwell, 74 N.C. App. 231, 328 S.E.2d 47 (1985).

A party's capacity to earn income may become the basis of an award if it is found that the party deliberately depressed its income or otherwise acted in deliberate disregard of the obligation to provide reasonable support for the child. Askew v. Askew, 119 N.C. App. 242, 458 S.E.2d 217 (1995).

When calculating the child support obligation owed by a parent, a showing of bad faith income depression by the parent is a mandatory prerequisite for imputing income to that parent. Sharpe v. Nobles, 127 N.C. App. 705, 493 S.E.2d 288 (1997).

Must Be Sufficient Evidence of Proscribed Intent. - A trial court's conclusion underlying imposition of the earnings capacity rule must be based upon evidence that the actions which reduced the party's income were not taken in good faith. There must be sufficient evidence of the proscribed intent. Fischell v. Rosenberg, 90 N.C. App. 254, 368 S.E.2d 11 (1988).

Consideration of Spouse's Capacity to Earn Held Error. - Trial court could not consider father's capacity to earn in computing his income where the evidence indicated that he lost his job due to no fault of his own, and the court's order contained no findings that he had deliberately stopped working to avoid his support obligations. Greer v. Greer, 101 N.C. App. 351, 399 S.E.2d 399 (1991).

Support Should Not Have Been Based on Earning Capacity. - Where there was no evidence that defendant was engaging in any tactics to avoid paying child support, defendant had purchased a substantial amount of farm equipment for use in his farming operation, and he had experienced a net loss from farming for the last three years but had made a profit from this business in the past, the evidence pointed to a genuine effort by defendant to engage in his chosen profession and to support his family as well; therefore, the case was remanded so the court could make a determination based upon defendant's present earnings instead of his earning capacity. Cameron v. Cameron, 94 N.C. App. 168, 380 S.E.2d 121 (1989).

Wrongful Inclusion of Future Personal Expenditures. - Where trial court includes personal expenditures not yet made by party with no concrete plans to make such an expenditure, award entered cannot possibly reflect the relative abilities of parties to pay support at that time. Witherow v. Witherow, 99 N.C. App. 61, 392 S.E.2d 627 (1990).

Determination of trial court not necessary to make finding of bad faith in reduction of income where the party seeking support modification was the custodial parent was not supported by current case law, nor was the trial court correct in concluding that when a custodial parent sought a change of child support based upon a reduction in income, that custodial parent had to request the court to make a finding of fact as to his or her "good faith." Fischell v. Rosenberg, 90 N.C. App. 254, 368 S.E.2d 11 (1988).

Father's cost-free housing was properly considered to be a form of gross-income, and thus, recurring income for purposes of making a child support award. Spicer v. Spicer, 168 N.C. App. 283, 607 S.E.2d 678 (2005).

The inclusion of a gift when calculating a defendant's income for child support purposes was an error, where there was no evidence on the part of defendant's parents that such a gift would be reoccurring. Sloan v. Sloan, 87 N.C. App. 392, 360 S.E.2d 816 (1987).

But Gift Rent and Vehicle Payments by Mother's Father Should Have Been Included in Support Obligation. - Trial court erred in failing to include the mother's gift income as attributable income in calculating a father's child support obligation; the payment of the mother's vehicle and rent payments by her father totaled $1,890, which should have been included in calculating income in the child support order. State v. Williams, 179 N.C. App. 838, 635 S.E.2d 495 (2006).

Non-interest Bearing Demand Note Not by Itself a Gift. - The fact that no demand had been made on a non-interest bearing demand note from defendant's parents did not render it a gift, and the trial court's finding that the transaction was a gift was erroneous. Sloan v. Sloan, 87 N.C. App. 392, 360 S.E.2d 816 (1987).

Third-party contributions may be used to support a deviation from North Carolina Child Support Guidelines, even where third parties are under no legal obligation to make such payments. Guilford County ex rel. Child Support Enforcement Agency ex rel. Easter v. Easter, 344 N.C. 166, 473 S.E.2d 6 (1996).

Personal injury settlement, paid on a one-time, non-recurring basis met the definition of "non-recurring income" and thus, was properly considered by the trial court when making a child support award. Spicer v. Spicer, 168 N.C. App. 283, 607 S.E.2d 678 (2005).

Settlement Payouts Non-Recurring Income. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a father to make a lump sum child support payment under the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines because settlement payouts to the father constituted non-recurring income subject to application of the Guidelines. Simms v. Bolger, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 522 (2019).

Earnings of Child. - In a case involving child support payments, the trial court erred in refusing to admit the children's tax returns into evidence, the only information concerning the estate and earnings of the children. Sloan v. Sloan, 87 N.C. App. 392, 360 S.E.2d 816 (1987).

Education and Insurance Expenses. - Defendant's argument that provisions to pay for higher education and to provide life and health insurance were not in the nature of child support was not without merit. Smith v. Smith, 121 N.C. App. 334, 465 S.E.2d 52 (1996).

Trial court's order requiring a father to obtain health insurance for his child did not violate G.S. 50-13.4(c1), even though the father did not have access to employer-provided health insurance, because the father did not claim he lacked access to "other group health insurance" and if a parent had access to "other group health insurance," such insurance was considered "reasonably-priced" as a matter of law. Reams v. Riggan, 224 N.C. App. 78, 735 S.E.2d 407 (2012).

Extraordinary Expenses. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering a child support order that required a father to pay a certain percentage of the minor child's tuition, daycare expenses, and costs for summer camp because Child Support Guidelines, N.C. Ann. R. specifically allowed for extraordinary expenses for private school tuition and camp fees and the trial court was entitled to consider expenses for child care in its support determination pursuant to G.S. 50-13.4(c); the trial court ordered each party to pay a percentage of the expenses based on the party's share of the combined gross incomes pursuant to the Guidelines. Balawejder v. Balawejder, 216 N.C. App. 301, 721 S.E.2d 679 (2011).

Disability Checks Received on Behalf of Child. - Trial court properly refused to consider a disability check received by disabled defendant on child's behalf as defendant's income in figuring his obligation, but erred in allowing defendant to receive the money for his own use. Sain v. Sain, 134 N.C. App. 460, 517 S.E.2d 921 (1999).

Adoption Assistance Payments. - Adoption assistance payments received by the parties were resources for the parties' adopted children, and thus could not be set off against the father's child support obligation. Gaston County v. Miller, 168 N.C. App. 577, 608 S.E.2d 101 (2005).

Medical insurance premiums paid by a parent on behalf of a child are actual expenditures which must be considered in computing retroactive child support. Lawrence v. Tise, 107 N.C. App. 140, 419 S.E.2d 176 (1992).

Failure of the trial court to treat a portion of mother's premiums as an actual expenditure for the purposes of calculating retroactive support was not error, because there was no evidence in the record to support a finding on the portion of the premiums for the joint policy attributable only to coverage of the child. In the absence of such evidence, the trial court would only be speculating as to the child's share of the cost, and this it could not do. Lawrence v. Tise, 107 N.C. App. 140, 419 S.E.2d 176 (1992).

Consideration of Health Insurance Coverage Erroneous. - According to former subdivision (c1)(6) of this section, the trial court was not allowed to vary the presumptive amount of child support based upon the "provision of health insurance coverage;" therefore, by varying the presumptive guideline amount because of the defendant's maintenance of health insurance on the plaintiff and the children, the trial court acted in violation of this section. Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991).

Reconsideration of Alimony or Child Support After Equitable Distribution. - G.S. 50-20 (f) obviously contemplates that child support order may precede equitable distribution order. No child support order is ever final and delaying child support order in lengthy case until after equitable distribution issue was decided would have prolonged an already long-pending case. Trial court's decision to enter child support order prior to determination of equitable distribution issue was under the statute. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

Effective Date of Permanent Award. - Plaintiff contended the trial court erred in its award of child support because the permanent award should have been made effective from January 2011, rather than from January 2013, but it was well-established that a trial court had not abused its discretion where, based on the evidence before it, the trial court chose not to modify the effective date of a permanent award. Oltmanns v. Oltmanns, 241 N.C. App. 326, 773 S.E.2d 347 (2015).

Amount of Award Is Within Trial Court's Discretion. - Once an award is found to be justified, the amount lies within the trial court's discretion and will not be disturbed absent manifest abuse. Sloop v. Friberg, 70 N.C. App. 690, 320 S.E.2d 921 (1984).

Amount Should Be Fair and Not Confiscatory. - An order for the maintenance of a child should be in an amount that is fair and not confiscatory in light of the parent's earning ability. Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), modified on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985). See also, Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963).

Allowance Should Be Made for Parent's Living Expenses. - In determining the amount of an order for the support of children, a reasonable allowance should be made for the living expenses of their father (or mother) in the light of his earnings. Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963).

Dividing Parent's Income by Number of Dependents Is Disapproved. - Fixing the amount of support for minor children by dividing the income of their father (or mother) by the number of people dependent upon him for support is not approved. Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963).

Conduct of Parties May Be Considered. - In addition to the factors enumerated in subsection (c) of this section, the trial court may consider the conduct of the parties, the equities of the given case, and any other relevant facts in determining child support. Warner v. Latimer, 68 N.C. App. 170, 314 S.E.2d 789 (1984).

This section clearly allows the trial court to consider other facts of the particular case in arriving at the amount of defendant's share of support in an action for reimbursement. Thus, while the defendant's ability to pay and his earning capacity are factors to be considered, they are not controlling. The court may also consider the conduct of the parties and the equities of the case. Stanley v. Stanley, 51 N.C. App. 172, 275 S.E.2d 546, cert. denied, 303 N.C. 182, 280 S.E.2d 454, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 959, 102 S. Ct. 496, 70 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1981).

Improper Use of Earning Capacity Rule - Trial court erred in modifying a father's child support obligation pursuant to G.S. 50-13.4; the trial court found that while the father reduced his income, he did not act in bad faith, and a finding of bad faith was required to apply the earning capacity rule under N.C. Child Support Guidelines, 2003 Ann. R. N.C. 33, 35. Cook v. Cook, 159 N.C. App. 657, 583 S.E.2d 696 (2003).

Findings and Conclusions of Law Required. - In setting amounts for child support, where the trial court sits without a jury, the judge is required to find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and to direct the entry of the appropriate judgment. Dishmon v. Dishmon, 57 N.C. App. 657, 292 S.E.2d 293 (1982).

Trial court erred in failing to make findings regarding the reasonable needs of a child for support, or regarding its refusal to award support for the time between the filing of suit for support and the entry of the support order. State ex rel. Gillikin v. McGuire, 174 N.C. App. 347, 620 S.E.2d 899 (2005).

Findings Must Indicate Consideration of Needs and Earnings. - Conclusions of law must be based upon factual findings specific enough to indicate to the appellate court that the judge below took due regard of the particular estates, earnings, conditions, and accustomed standard of living of both the child and the parents. Dishmon v. Dishmon, 57 N.C. App. 657, 292 S.E.2d 293 (1982).

Findings as to Child's Past and Present Expenses Required. - In order to determine the reasonable needs of the child, the trial court must hear evidence and make findings of specific fact on the child's actual past expenditures and present reasonable expenses. Atwell v. Atwell, 74 N.C. App. 231, 328 S.E.2d 47 (1985).

Minor child's hospitalization and its resulting costs constituted a substantial change in circumstances. Thus case was remanded to take into account the parties' abilities to provide support for the minor child's medical expenses and to enter an order modifying the support order. Lawrence v. Nantz, 115 N.C. App. 478, 445 S.E.2d 87 (1994).

Award Where Father Has Substantial Income. - In an action for child support, the court, in making its award, should keep in mind that children of a man of substantial income are entitled to live accordingly. McLeod v. McLeod, 43 N.C. App. 66, 258 S.E.2d 75, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 807, 261 S.E.2d 920 (1979).

Credit for Voluntary Expenditures. - As to granting of credit towards payment of court-ordered child support for voluntary expenditures, see Goodson v. Goodson, 32 N.C. App. 76, 231 S.E.2d 178 (1977).

The trial court has a wide discretion in deciding initially whether justice requires that a credit be given under the facts of each case and then in what amount the credit is to be awarded. The better view allows credit when equitable considerations exist which would create an injustice if credit were not allowed. Evans v. Craddock, 61 N.C. App. 438, 300 S.E.2d 908 (1983).

Expenses During Visitation. - Credit is not likely to be appropriate for frivolous expenses or for expenses incurred in entertaining or feeding the child during visitation periods. Evans v. Craddock, 61 N.C. App. 438, 300 S.E.2d 908 (1983).

Whether credit is allowed for time spent in visitation with the noncustodial parent depends on the facts of the particular case and is a matter within the court's discretion, as the fact that a child spends a certain amount of time with one parent does not necessarily mean that his reasonable and necessary living expenses are incurred proportionally. Gibson v. Gibson, 68 N.C. App. 566, 316 S.E.2d 99 (1984).

Trial court's use of one-third of mother's total fixed expenses to establish reasonable needs of child was neither unfair nor impermissible where the expense figures in mother's affidavit of financial status included expenses only for herself and the child, as she had not remarried, and furthermore, where the trial court not only found that mother's living expenses were reasonable, but also reduced several of the figures on the affidavit before making that finding, and where, with the exception of the amount of scheduled visitation, father presented no evidence on which the court could have based other findings regarding the child's expenses and needs. Gibson v. Gibson, 68 N.C. App. 566, 316 S.E.2d 99 (1984).

Parties Cannot Consent to Improperly Based Order. - The parties, by their consent, cannot enable a trial judge to enter an order not based upon consideration of the several factors listed in subsection (c) of this section and G.S. 50-16.5(a). Williamson v. Williamson, 20 N.C. App. 669, 202 S.E.2d 489 (1974).

Method of Payment Is Within Discretion of Court. - In utilizing the provision in subsection (e) of this section that payment for the support of a minor child shall be paid by lump sum payment, periodic payments, or by transfer of title or possession of personal property of any interest therein as the court may order, the trial court is vested with broad discretion, and is not limited to ordering any one of the designated methods of payment. In keeping with the court's powers, an order under this section will be upheld barring an abuse of that discretion. Weaver v. Weaver, 88 N.C. App. 634, 364 S.E.2d 706, cert. denied, 322 N.C. 330, 368 S.E.2d 875 (1988).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its award of lump sum and ongoing monthly child support payments because there was no evidence as to the actual impact on the father's future income from the lump sum payments; once the actual impact on the father's income was realized, it could well support a new motion to modify the father's child support obligation. Simms v. Bolger, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 522 (2019).

Trial court's creation of a trust consisting of certain real and personal property owned by the parties in order to secure payment of alimony and child support was a proper exercise of its discretion in applying the provisions of subsection (e) of this section and G.S. 50-16.7(a) and (c) and would be affirmed. Weaver v. Weaver, 88 N.C. App. 634, 364 S.E.2d 706, cert. denied, 322 N.C. 330, 368 S.E.2d 875 (1988).

Amount Not Excessive. - Where defendant earned one hundred thirty-two dollars ($132.00) a week and had monthly expenses in the amount of fifty-two dollars ($52.00), the court's order for defendant to pay one hundred dollars ($100.00) per month in child support was not an abuse of discretion; defendant had been paying plaintiff one hundred dollars ($100.00) per week voluntarily for several months prior to the hearing, had testified that he would continue to do so, and the court had made extensive findings regarding the child's needs, the parents' estates and earnings, etc. Rawls v. Rawls, 94 N.C. App. 670, 381 S.E.2d 179 (1989).

Yearly support payment of $37,871.89 held not excessive where payor earned about $200,000.00 per year and where family enjoyed very high standard of living prior to dissolution of marriage and where court found, based on payor's testimony, that payor could pay any amount court might order up to and including $71,318.04. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

Improper Reduction of Child Support Payments. - Reducing child support payments by subtracting amount of money calculated to represent what custodial parent saves in expenses while the child is visiting with noncustodial parent was improper. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

Consideration of Shared Custody Justified. - Fact that defendant had sole custody of one of the children and furnished the child's sole support, while defendant contributed to the support of the two children in plaintiff's custody, clearly justified the trial court's consideration of the shared custody factor; trial court was not required to make findings as to how or why this custody arrangement rendered guidelines adopted pursuant to subsection (c1) inapplicable where the guidelines provided for support payments to be based upon the noncustodial parent's gross income. Morris v. Morris, 92 N.C. App. 359, 374 S.E.2d 441 (1988).

Imputed Income. - Because there was no evidence that defendant, who worked for a school system as a psychologist, intentionally depressed his income or otherwise engaged in bad faith, the trial court erred by imputing income to defendant for four weeks during the school district summer recess. Ellis v. Ellis, 126 N.C. App. 362, 485 S.E.2d 82 (1997).

Trial court erred in calculating a father's child support obligation under G.S. 50-13.4(c) by imputing to the father income based solely on a statement of income made to a bankruptcy court 18 months earlier under circumstances in which the trial court's order was devoid of findings that the father was deliberately depressing his income or indulging in excessive spending to avoid support. State v. Williams, 179 N.C. App. 838, 635 S.E.2d 495 (2006).

Trial court's determination that a husband, who worked as a school teacher, could continue to earn a minimum amount each month from a grading business was reasonably based on the court's findings of fact regarding the husband's actual earnings during the year prior to the hearing. Hartsell v. Hartsell, 189 N.C. App. 65, 657 S.E.2d 724 (2008).

Trial court erred by imputing minimum wage to a wife and a husband when it found that neither party acted in bad faith or suppressed his or her respective income to avoid or lessen child support obligations because the trial court's findings of fact were insufficient to support its conclusions of law; the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines, Child Support Guidelines, G.S. 50-51, do not authorize choosing a method of imputing income based upon the degree of bad faith found by the trial court. Ludlam v. Miller, 225 N.C. App. 350, 739 S.E.2d 555 (2013).

Trial court's determination that it was appropriate to impute income to the father should be upheld, but the order had to be remanded for findings detailing how the trial court arrived at the amount of income to be imputed to the father. Respess v. Respess, 232 N.C. App. 611, 754 S.E.2d 691 (2014).

Sufficient Findings by the Court. - In spite of trial court's failure to make finding as to husband's net income, court's findings regarding gross income of husband and wife along with wife's net income and children's expenses was sufficient to satisfy requirement under this section that court give due regard to parties' estates, earnings, conditions and standard of living in setting child support. Sikes v. Sikes, 98 N.C. App. 610, 391 S.E.2d 855 (1990), aff'd, 330 N.C. 595, 411 S.E.2d 588 (1992).

Trial court's findings supported its decision to use prior years' income from a business in the calculation of gross income for the determinations of alimony and child support because the trial court questioned whether the husband's reported income accurately represented his income from the business; the trial court found that the husband's reported income was not credible. Wise v. Wise, 264 N.C. App. 735, 826 S.E.2d 788 (2019).

In that the trial court's findings of fact regarding the parties' monthly gross income were supported by the evidence at trial, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in the court's determination of the appropriate child support obligation; the mother's paystubs plainly disclosed her pay raise, bonus, and stock award, and they supported the mother's testimony and ultimately allowed the trial court to make sufficient findings to resolve the issue of her monthly gross income. Hart v. Hart, - N.C. App. - , 836 S.E.2d 244 (2019).

Income of Business in which Defendant Held Controlling Interest. - Court neither abused its discretion nor imputed income to defendant when it allocated to him the amount of income earned by the business in which he held 51% and controlled disbursement of corporate funds. Cauble v. Cauble, 133 N.C. App. 390, 515 S.E.2d 708 (1999).

Use of Accrual Figures. - Use of accrual figures in the trial court's calculations was reflective of an appropriate level of gross income available to the defendant and not manifestly unsupported by reason. Cauble v. Cauble, 133 N.C. App. 390, 515 S.E.2d 708 (1999).

Financial Affidavits. - On appeal from a motion to modify child support, the court would not consider information outside a father's financial affidavit, i.e., expert testimony, to determine his expenses for the children; the father had sworn to the truthfulness and completeness of his affidavit, and the parties' affidavits were competent evidence on which the trial court was allowed to rely in determining the expenses of the parties' children. Row v. Row, 185 N.C. App. 450, 650 S.E.2d 1 (2007), review denied, 362 N.C. 238, 659 S.E.2d 741 (2008), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 129 S. Ct. 144, 172 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2008).

Father showed no abuse of discretion in the trial court's findings of his expenses or allocation of those expenses to him because the trial court found the father's ability to pay child support based upon all of his expenses based upon his affidavit; a reduction of the father's individual expenses would increase his ability to pay, and it would also increase the child's individual expenses. Kleoudis v. Kleoudis, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 277 (2020).

Court's findings were insufficient to support awarding no support under subsection (c) since the court failed to determine what were the reasonable needs of the minor child for health, education, and maintenance. McLemore v. McLemore, 89 N.C. App. 451, 366 S.E.2d 495 (1988).

In an action seeking an increase in child support over the amount set forth in separation agreement, order which contained no specific findings with respect to the actual past or present expenses incurred for the support of the children was insufficient to support the court's conclusion that the reasonable needs of the children amounted to $2,800.00 per month. Holderness v. Holderness, 91 N.C. App. 118, 370 S.E.2d 602 (1988).

Where the trial court made no findings whatsoever with respect to the parties' "estates, earnings, conditions, [and] accustomed standard of living" for the year 1984, its award of retroactive child support would be vacated since it was not based on sufficient findings pertaining to the year 1984. Napowsa v. Langston, 95 N.C. App. 14, 381 S.E.2d 882, cert. denied, 325 N.C. 709, 388 S.E.2d 460 (1989).

Trial court erred in ruling it had no authority to modify the income tax deduction provision of the parties' separation agreement as they requested a recalculation of child support, obliging the trial court to apply the entirety of the guidelines, including not only the worksheets, but also the commentary. Ticconi v. Ticconi, 161 N.C. App. 730, 589 S.E.2d 371 (2003).

Refusal to Consider Reduction in Income. - Trial court erred in concluding that reduction in income of father, the custodial parent, due to leaving employment to return to school, could not be considered on motion to increase plaintiff's child support obligations. Fischell v. Rosenberg, 90 N.C. App. 254, 368 S.E.2d 11 (1988).

Remand to Allow Court to Make Findings. - Appellate court remanded case to allow trial court to make findings concerning the reasonable needs of child, the relative ability of the parents to support the child, and a determination of whether a variation from the Guidelines was appropriate on these grounds. Brooker v. Brooker, 133 N.C. App. 285, 515 S.E.2d 234 (1999).

Mother admitted that clearly, the trial court did not use all of the expenses listed in the parties' financial affidavits; without more explanation, it was impossible to determine on appeal where the figures used by the trial court came from at all. Moreover, although the trial court's child support order did contain certain historical costs associated with the children, it included no findings as to the individual costs and expenses the trial court expected to be associated with each child in the future, and, while the trial court did make findings regarding the parents' particular estates, earnings, conditions, and accustomed standard of living, those were insufficient to remedy the absence of findings explaining the reasonable needs of the children; accordingly, the case was remanded for further findings of fact regarding the amount of child support awarded. Diehl v. Diehl, 177 N.C. App. 642, 630 S.E.2d 25 (2006).

Findings Unsupported by Evidence. - Judge erred by ordering mother to pay four hundred eighty dollars ($480.00) per month in child support; the figures of five hundred dollars ($500.00) and four hundred eighty dollars ($480.00) were not supported by any evidence in the record on appeal and, despite the absence of mother's financial records, the judge could have determined the child's reasonable needs through evidence offered by father; however, the figures the judge arrived at were unsupported by father's testimony, and were not supported by any of the previous orders entered in the case. Correll v. Allen, 94 N.C. App. 464, 380 S.E.2d 580 (1989).

Reduction of Income on Return to School. - Trial court erred in concluding reduction in income of father, custodial parent, due to leaving employment to return to school, could not be considered on motion to increase plaintiff's child support obligations. Fischell v. Rosenberg, 90 N.C. App. 254, 368 S.E.2d 11 (1988).

Accustomed Standard of Living. - Because the trial court unequivocally disregarded the principle that the accustomed standard of living is a factor to be considered and, instead based alimony on the standard of living the parties maintained after the divorce there was prejudicial error. Barham v. Barham, 127 N.C. App. 20, 487 S.E.2d 774 (1997), aff'd, 347 N.C. 570, 494 S.E.2d 763 (1998).

Father demonstrated no abuse of discretion in the trial court's consideration of the conditions or accustomed standard of living of the parties or child because the trial court's findings demonstrated that it took "due regard" of the conditions and accustomed standard of living of the child and parents; the father did not make any arguments regarding any dispute about the child's standard of living. Kleoudis v. Kleoudis, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 277 (2020).

Change in Circumstances Not Shown. - Because the trial court found that defendant voluntarily quit his job, willfully and intentionally depressed his income, and failed to meet his burden of proof in showing a substantial change of circumstances, the court entered a judgment against defendant denying his motion to reduce child support by reason of substantial change of circumstances. Askew v. Askew, 119 N.C. App. 242, 458 S.E.2d 217 (1995).

Factors Properly Considered. - In its calculation of child support, the trial court relied on the financial affidavits of both parties to determine each party's average monthly shared expenses, and defendant incurred significantly higher monthly expenses than plaintiff due to defendant having to pay the mortgages and maintenance on the marital home and vacation home; it was appropriate for the trial court to consider defendant's increased expenses relating to the two homes in determining child support, and plaintiff's contention that the trial court erred in not making an even 50/50 allocation as to child support was without merit. Oltmanns v. Oltmanns, 241 N.C. App. 326, 773 S.E.2d 347 (2015).

Father did not demonstrate any abuse of discretion in the trial court's child support calculations because the father's total fixed household expenses would be the same, whether a portion was attributed to the child or not, and in determining his ability to pay child support, the trial court gave him credit for 100 percent of his expenses for both of his residences; the trial court's findings clearly demonstrated how the child support was calculated, and they were supported by the evidence. Kleoudis v. Kleoudis, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 277 (2020).

Trial court did not its discretion in the calculation of a father's child support obligation because the child support order was properly based upon the actual custodial schedule stated in the permanent custody order. Kleoudis v. Kleoudis, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 277 (2020).

B. EFFECT OF SEPARATION AGREEMENTS, CONSENT JUDGMENTS AND ARBITRATION AWARDS.

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Separation Agreements Are Not Binding on the Court. - Valid separation agreements, including consent judgments with respect to marital rights based on such agreements, are not final and binding as to the amount to be provided for the support and education of minor children. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966), decided under former G.S. 50-13.

Valid separation agreements relating to marital and property rights of the parties are not final and binding as to the custody of minor children or as to the amount to be provided for the support and education of such minor children. Perry v. Perry, 33 N.C. App. 139, 234 S.E.2d 449, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 730, 235 S.E.2d 784 (1977).

And Cannot Deprive the Court of Its Authority. - Separation agreement dealing with the custody and the support of the children of the parties cannot deprive the court of its inherent as well as statutory authority to protect the interests of and provide for the welfare of minors. McKaughn v. McKaughn, 29 N.C. App. 702, 225 S.E.2d 616 (1976).

While the court cannot relieve parent of any contractual obligation he assumed to support his child in excess of what the law would require, it can, in the exercise of its inherent and statutory authority to provide for the welfare of minors, order payment of an amount either larger or smaller than that provided for in separation agreement. Bottomley v. Bottomley, 82 N.C. App. 231, 346 S.E.2d 317 (1986).

Arbitration Awards Also Remain Reviewable and Modifiable. - Just as parents cannot by agreement deprive the courts of their duty to promote the best interests of their children, they cannot do so by arbitration. Hence those provisions of an arbitration award concerning custody and child support, like those provisions in a separation agreement, will remain reviewable and modifiable by the court. Crutchley v. Crutchley, 306 N.C. 518, 293 S.E.2d 793 (1982).

Court Retains Jurisdiction Despite Support Provisions of Separation Agreement or Arbitration Award. - While the amount of child support agreed on by the parties to a separation agreement is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to be just and reasonable, it remains within the authority of the courts pursuant to this Chapter to order payments for support in such amounts as will meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education and maintenance, having due regard to the estates, earnings, conditions, and accustomed standard of living of the child and the parties, the child care and homemaker contributions of each party, and other facts of the particular case. The same reasoning applies to an arbitration award concerning child support. Crutchley v. Crutchley, 306 N.C. 518, 293 S.E.2d 793 (1982).

But Separation Agreements and Consent Judgments Cannot Be Ignored. - Provisions of a valid separation agreement, including a consent judgment based thereon, cannot be ignored or set aside by the court without the consent of the parties. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966), decided under former G.S. 50-13.

A valid separation agreement cannot be ignored or set aside by the court without the consent of the parties. Winborne v. Winborne, 41 N.C. App. 756, 255 S.E.2d 640, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 305, 259 S.E.2d 918 (1979).

Level of Support in Separation Agreement Is Only One Factor in Decision. - When a trial court is called upon for the first time to determine the appropriate level of child support payments agreed upon in separation agreements, the "presumption" of reasonableness of the agreed upon level of support in such cases is one of evidence only; that is, the agreed upon level of support constitutes some evidence of the appropriate level of support, but that this evidence must be weighed and considered by the trial court together with all other relevant and competent evidence bearing upon the statutory factors set out in subsection (c) of this section; in other words, the trial court is writing upon a clean slate, and the previously agreed upon level of support is but one factor to be considered. Morris v. Morris, 92 N.C. App. 359, 374 S.E.2d 441 (1988).

When Agreement May Be Modified. - A separation agreement is a contract between the parties, and the court is without power to modify it except (1) to provide for adequate support for minor children, and (2) with the mutual consent of the parties thereto where rights of third parties have not intervened. McKaughn v. McKaughn, 29 N.C. App. 702, 225 S.E.2d 616 (1976).

Amount Set by Agreement Is Presumptively Just and Reasonable. - Where parties to a separation agreement agree upon the amount for the support and maintenance of their minor children, there is a presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the amount mutually agreed upon is just and reasonable. Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963); Winborne v. Winborne, 41 N.C. App. 756, 255 S.E.2d 640, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 305, 259 S.E.2d 918 (1979).

It was not an abuse of discretion to decline to reduce a father's child support obligation for a prior period because (1) the obligation arose from an unincorporated separation agreement, and (2) contractual damages for the father's failure to pay support could not be reduced. Lasecki v. Lasecki, 257 N.C. App. 24, 809 S.E.2d 296 (2017).

And May Not Be Changed Absent Change in Conditions. - Where parties to a separation agreement agree concerning the support and maintenance of their minor children, there is a presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the provisions mutually agreed upon are just and reasonable, and the court is not warranted in ordering a change in the absence of any evidence of a change in conditions. McKaughn v. McKaughn, 29 N.C. App. 702, 225 S.E.2d 616 (1976).

Trial court impermissibly modified a child support order by computing increases in the father's salary and applying those increases to payments over an 18-year period because the trial court failed to find a substantial change of circumstances as required under G.S. 50-13.7(a) (2009); the incorporated agreement provided automatic annual increases in child support based on the father's salary and failed to consider the needs of the children or other factors contained in G.S. 50-13.4(c). Wilson v. Wilson, 214 N.C. App. 541, 714 S.E.2d 793 (2011).

Or Absent Need for Increase. - Where parties to a separation agreement agree upon the amount for the support and maintenance of their minor children, there is a presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the amount mutually agreed upon is just and reasonable. Upon motion, a trial court may not order an increase in the absence of any evidence of a change in conditions or of the need for such increase, particularly when the increase is awarded solely on grounds that the father's income has increased so that he is able to pay a larger amount. Dishmon v. Dishmon, 57 N.C. App. 657, 292 S.E.2d 293 (1982).

Child Referred to in Consent Judgment Is Under Protective Custody of Court. - Even though an order requiring father to make payments for the support of his child was entered by consent of the parents, the child was under the protective custody of the court. Smith v. Smith, 247 N.C. 223, 100 S.E.2d 370 (1957), rev'd on other grounds, 248 N.C. 298, 103 S.E.2d 400 (1958).

The effect of an order setting a lesser amount of child support than that provided for by separation agreement is not to deprive the custodial parent of her contractual right to recover the sums provided for in the agreement, but to limit her contempt remedy to the sums provided for by the court order. Bottomley v. Bottomley, 82 N.C. App. 231, 346 S.E.2d 317 (1986).

Right of Party to Separation Agreement to Bring Action. - When a case is properly before it, the court has the duty to award custody in accordance with the best interests of the child, and no agreement, consent or condition between the parents can interfere with this duty or bind the court. Thus, the existence of a valid separation agreement containing provisions relating to the custody and support of minor children does not prevent one of the parties to the agreement from instituting an action for a judicial determination of those same matters. Winborne v. Winborne, 41 N.C. App. 756, 255 S.E.2d 640, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 305, 259 S.E.2d 918 (1979).

The existence of a valid separation agreement relating to child support or custody does not prevent one of the parties from instituting an action for a judicial determination of those same matters. Powers v. Parisher, 104 N.C. App. 400, 409 S.E.2d 725 (1991), appeal dismissed, 331 N.C. 286, 417 S.E.2d 254 (1992).

As to effect of reconciliation and resumption of cohabitation on a separation agreement, see Hand v. Hand, 46 N.C. App. 82, 264 S.E.2d 597, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 556, 270 S.E.2d 107 (1980).

No Obligation to Support Child Past Majority Despite Disability. - Where mother's testimony offered at the hearing showed that son was 18 years old, had graduated from high school, had a part-time job, and was attempting to raise money to go to college, and mother further testified that son was not a normal 18 year old since he was involved in a wreck, trial court was without authority to order father to pay child support arrearages of five hundred dollars ($500.00); the evidence showed that pursuant to subdivision (c)(2) of this section, defendant was relieved of any obligation to support his son after his graduation from high school on June 5, 1988, and even if mother's evidence was sufficient to show that son was physically or mentally incapable of self-support, there was no longer a statutory obligation for parents to support their disabled adult children. State v. Benfield, 95 N.C. App. 451, 382 S.E.2d 776 (1989).

Obligation to Pay Is Independent of Compliance with Unrelated Provisions in Agreement. - The duty of a parent to pay child support as agreed to in a separation agreement will not be excused because the other parent does not comply with other provisions of the separation agreement unrelated to the financial support of the children. Nisbet v. Nisbet, 102 N.C. App. 232, 402 S.E.2d 151, cert. denied, 329 N.C. 499, 407 S.E.2d 538 (1991).

Defendant's obligation to pay child support as provided in the separation agreement is not dependent upon plaintiff's compliance with visitation, nonharassment, or noncohabitation provisions in the same agreement. To hold otherwise would punish the children for the misbehavior of a parent. Nisbet v. Nisbet, 102 N.C. App. 232, 402 S.E.2d 151, cert. denied, 329 N.C. 499, 407 S.E.2d 538 (1991).

V. TERMINATION OF OBLIGATION.

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A. IN GENERAL.

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When Legal Obligation to Support Child Ends. - The statutes concerning child support all use the term "minor," "minor child" or "minor children," never referring to age 21. Therefore, in substituting the new meaning of "minor" provided by Chapter 48A into the statutes, the legal obligation to support one's child ends at age 18, absent a showing that the child is insolvent, unmarried and physically or mentally incapable of earning a livelihood as contemplated by G.S. 50-13.8. Crouch v. Crouch, 14 N.C. App. 49, 187 S.E.2d 348, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 314, 188 S.E.2d 897 (1972).

In the absence of an enforceable contract otherwise obligating a parent, North Carolina courts have no authority to order child support for a child who has attained the age of majority, unless the child has not completed secondary schooling, or, pursuant to G.S. 50-13.8, the child is mentally or physically incapable of self-support. Bridges v. Bridges, 85 N.C. App. 524, 355 S.E.2d 230 (1987); Pieper v. Pieper, 90 N.C. App. 405, 368 S.E.2d 422, aff'd, Ellinwood v. Ellinwood, 88 N.C. App. 119, 362 S.E.2d 584 (1987).

Effect of One of Several Children Reaching Age 18. - While child support obligations ordered by a court terminate upon the child reaching age 18, unless the child is otherwise emancipated prior to reaching age 18 or the trial court in its discretion continues to enforce the payment obligation after the child reaches age 18 and while the child is in primary or secondary school, when one of two or more minor children for whom support is ordered reaches age 18, and when the support ordered to be paid is not allocated as to each individual child, the supporting parent has no authority to unilaterally modify the amount of the child support payment. The supporting parent must apply to the trial court for modification. Craig v. Craig, 103 N.C. App. 615, 406 S.E.2d 656 (1991).

Cases holding that where one of two minor children reaches the age of 18, a trial court may retroactively modify child support arrearages when equitable considerations exist which would create an injustice if modification is not allowed were decided before G.S. 50-13.10 became effective on October 1, 1987. Under this statute, if the supporting party is not disabled or incapacitated, a past due, vested child support payment is subject to divestment only as provided by law, and if, but only if, a written motion is filed and due notice is given to all parties before the payment is due. Craig v. Craig, 103 N.C. App. 615, 406 S.E.2d 656 (1991).

Support Improperly Terminated. - Where father unilaterally terminated child support payments after his son reached the age of 18 and had failed to make satisfactory progress towards graduation from high school, the support payments were improperly terminated. Leak v. Leak, 129 N.C. App. 142, 497 S.E.2d 702 (1998), cert. denied, 348 N.C. 498, 510 S.E.2d 385 (1998).

"Minor Child" under Prior Law. - Before the enactment of Chapter 48A, it was evident that the meaning of "minor child" within the purview of the custody and support statutes contemplated the common-law age of majority, age 21. Shoaf v. Shoaf, 14 N.C. App. 231, 188 S.E.2d 19, rev'd on other grounds, 282 N.C. 287, 192 S.E.2d 299 (1972).

Emancipation Decree Required. - In a question of first impression, the appellate court held that, when the child of divorced parents left the custodial parent's home to live on his own, but was not decreed by a court to be legally emancipated, the non-custodial parent's obligation to pay child support did not automatically terminate, because Article 35 of the Juvenile Code precluded the appellate court from accepting common law methods of emancipation for the purposes of terminating child support payments; thus, the father's child support obligations could not have automatically terminated absent a decree of emancipation. Morris v. Powell, - N.C. App. - , 840 S.E.2d 223 (2020).

B. EFFECT OF SEPARATION AGREEMENT, CONSENT JUDGMENT, ETC.

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A parent may contract to support his or her children past the age of majority, and the court has power to enforce such a contract just as it would any other. Harding v. Harding, 46 N.C. App. 62, 264 S.E.2d 131 (1980).

But Court Cannot Enlarge on Such Obligation. - Since the duty to support after the age of majority arises in contract, the court may not enlarge upon the obligation agreed to by the parties. Harding v. Harding, 46 N.C. App. 62, 264 S.E.2d 131 (1980).

Any attempt by the court to enlarge upon the obligation arising under contract by extending the duty of support beyond the age of majority would be void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Harding v. Harding, 46 N.C. App. 62, 264 S.E.2d 131 (1980).

Consent Judgment Providing for Support Until Majority. - A father's legal liability for the support of his son born on January 13, 1953, by reason of a consent judgment dated June 11, 1970, providing that payments for child support should continue until such time as said minor child reached his majority or was otherwise emancipated, would not continue until his son became 21 years of age. Shoaf v. Shoaf, 282 N.C. 287, 192 S.E.2d 299 (1972).

Support for Full-Time Student. - It was error for a trial court to terminate support solely on the finding that a child was not a "full-time" student based on language in a separation agreement, without consideration of G.S. 50-13.4; the child likely attended school regularly and made satisfactory progress towards graduation since he received a diploma in 2013. Moreover, the trial court also should have considered its discretion to terminate support when the child turned 18, but prior to his high school graduation. Malone v. Hutchinson-Malone, 246 N.C. App. 544, 784 S.E.2d 206 (2016).

VI. SEPARATE IDENTIFICATION OF ALLOWANCES.

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Allowances to Be Separated. - The allowances to be separated in the order, as required by subsection (e) of this section, are the support payments for the minor child or children and the amounts ordered for alimony or alimony pendente lite. Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 184 S.E.2d 417 (1971).

Court Need Not Designate Amounts for Each Child. - Subsection (e) of this section does not require the trial court to designate the amount of support payments for each child, although such designation may prove helpful to simplify any future adjustments or modifications. Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 184 S.E.2d 417 (1971).

Failure to Identify Purpose of Support as Health, Education and Maintenance Is Not Error. - The better practice is for the court's order to relate that the payment ordered under this section is the amount necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education, and maintenance, but the failure of the court to do so does not constitute reversible error. Andrews v. Andrews, 12 N.C. App. 410, 183 S.E.2d 843 (1971); Martin v. Martin, 35 N.C. App. 610, 242 S.E.2d 393, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 261, 245 S.E.2d 778 (1978).

Failure to Separate Allowances Held Error. - The trial court erred in failing to separately state and identify the allowances for alimony pendente lite and child support as required by subsection (e) of this section. Manning v. Manning, 20 N.C. App. 149, 201 S.E.2d 46 (1973).

VII. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.

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Judge Must Make Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. - In setting amounts for child support, where the trial court sits without a jury, the judge is required to find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment. Dishmon v. Dishmon, 57 N.C. App. 657, 292 S.E.2d 293 (1982); Gibson v. Gibson, 68 N.C. App. 566, 316 S.E.2d 99 (1984).

The requirements for findings of fact applicable to orders for alimony are also applicable to the determination of reasonable and adequate child support. Gebb v. Gebb, 77 N.C. App. 309, 335 S.E.2d 221 (1985).

The purpose of the requirement that the court make findings of those specific facts which support its ultimate disposition of the case is to allow a reviewing court to determine from the record whether the judgment, and the legal conclusions which underlie it, represent a correct application of the law. Gibson v. Gibson, 68 N.C. App. 566, 316 S.E.2d 99 (1984).

Effective appellate review of an order entered by a trial court sitting without a jury is largely dependent upon the specificity by which the order's rationale is articulated. Evidence must support findings; findings must support conclusions; conclusions must support the judgment. Gibson v. Gibson, 68 N.C. App. 566, 316 S.E.2d 99 (1984).

Remand for Further Findings. - The findings of fact in a case for child support, were insufficient to determine whether the trial court gave due regard to the estates of the parties and the case must be remanded for further findings on this matter, even though there was ample evidence contained in the record about the estates of both parties. Sloan v. Sloan, 87 N.C. App. 392, 360 S.E.2d 816 (1987).

Case was remanded for additional fact-finding where the district court failed to identify the presumptive amount of support due under the Guidelines and where there was no analysis of the reasonable needs of the two minor children, other than a finding that plaintiff's child care costs for one of the children was reasonable. Rowan County DSS v. Brooks, 135 N.C. App. 776, 522 S.E.2d 590 (1999).

Trial court erred by failing to explain in its findings of fact why it did not award child support from the time of the filing of the paternity and child support complaint; judgment was reversed and case was remanded to trial court for further findings. State v. Hinton, 147 N.C. App. 700, 556 S.E.2d 634 (2001).

Trial court was required to conduct a hearing when the trial court neither made findings related to the needs of the children at the time of a modification hearing nor concluded whether the presumption of reasonableness in a separation agreement was rebutted. Pataky v. Pataky, 160 N.C. App. 289, 585 S.E.2d 404 (2003), aff'd, 359 N.C. 65, 602 S.E.2d 360 (2004).

A case involving a motion to modify child support under G.S. 50-13.7, was remanded for further findings of fact because, in entering an order deviating from the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines, the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact regarding the reasonable needs of the children; the order only made findings regarding health insurance and the fact that the children did not need private schooling. Beamer v. Beamer, 169 N.C. App. 594, 610 S.E.2d 220 (2005).

Case was remanded for an order addressing the validity of a mother's request for a deviation from the child support guidelines because the trial court failed to make specific findings regarding the ability of each parent to provide support and the accustomed standard of the living of the children; given the absence of findings of fact, the court of appeals had no way to evaluate the correctness of the trial court's ruling that the guidelines would meet the reasonable needs of the children. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 238 N.C. App. 257, 768 S.E.2d 30 (2014).

Trial court's failure to make findings of fact addressing the relative ability of the parents to provide support and the expenses that are needed to meet the children's needs requires a reviewing court to remand the relevant case to the trial court for the entry of a new order containing additional findings of fact. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 238 N.C. App. 257, 768 S.E.2d 30 (2014).

In the absence of sufficient factual findings addressing the issue of a mother's ability to pay for children's education at a private school, the court of appeals could not determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by requiring her to pay for the cost of the education; the trial court, despite the existence of a request for a deviation from the child support guidelines, did not make any findings addressing the issue of the parties' relative abilities to pay the cost. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 238 N.C. App. 257, 768 S.E.2d 30 (2014).

Trial court had to revisit its calculations of gross income and net income used to determine child support and alimony because it had to make additional findings to support its determination of a husband's business income, which was used to calculate gross income and determine child support; the trial court also had to make additional findings to account for the husband's mandatory retirement deduction and his reasonable health insurance expenses in the calculation of his net income. Wise v. Wise, 264 N.C. App. 735, 826 S.E.2d 788 (2019).

Miscalculation of $736 for the month of December 2016 did not require reversal and remand to the trial court because $736 was less than 2 percent of the total arrears of $52,659, and the parties would likely each incur more than $736 in attorney fees in a remand for the trial court to make that small change to the arrears ordered; the de minimis error did not warrant reversal. Kleoudis v. Kleoudis, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 277 (2020).

Contents of Findings. - There are no set guidelines as to what the findings of fact concerning the needs of the minor children must contain. The appellate courts of this State require only that the findings be based on competent evidence as to what the needs of the children are, and that such findings sustain the conclusion that the support payments ordered are in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child. Byrd v. Byrd, 62 N.C. App. 438, 303 S.E.2d 205 (1983).

Adequate findings supported an order requiring a husband to pay children's private school tuition because (1) findings mandated by the Child Support Guidelines were not required, as the Child Support Guidelines did not apply, and (2) it was found that private school was part of the children's accustomed standard of living, the parties were able to pay the tuition, and the parties had agreed to privately educate the children. Smith v. Smith, 247 N.C. App. 135, 786 S.E.2d 12 (2016).

Findings supported not treating payments from a father's parents as income because (1) the father testified the payments were loans, and (2) no express, separate, findings were required. Kaiser v. Kaiser, 259 N.C. App. 499, 816 S.E.2d 223 (2018).

Findings did not support including payments from a mother's fiance as the mother's income because evidence indicating the payments were the fiance's share of household expenses was unresolved. Kaiser v. Kaiser, 259 N.C. App. 499, 816 S.E.2d 223 (2018).

Trial court could find an investment account was a mother's property because the record supported finding income from the account either belonged to the mother or was given to the mother to use for the mother's benefit, as the account was in the mother's name, the mother paid taxes on the account's dividend income, and nothing showed the mother was unable to use the income from that account. Kaiser v. Kaiser, 259 N.C. App. 499, 816 S.E.2d 223 (2018).

Trial court's findings supported denying a mother's request for child therapy expenses because there was some evidence the mother's conduct necessitated the expenses. Kaiser v. Kaiser, 259 N.C. App. 499, 816 S.E.2d 223 (2018).

Findings crediting a father for a mother's car payments were insufficient because it was not found that an injustice would otherwise exist. Kaiser v. Kaiser, 259 N.C. App. 499, 816 S.E.2d 223 (2018).

Trial judge must make conclusions of law based on factual findings specific enough to show the appellate courts that the judge took due regard of the parties' estates; there is no requirement the trial court's findings use "magic words" such as "estates" or "accustomed standard of living" where the findings demonstrate that it did consider the evidence as to these factors in setting the child support obligation. Kleoudis v. Kleoudis, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 277 (2020).

Findings Must Be Specific. - Where the trial court sits without a jury, the judge is required to make factual findings specific enough to indicate to the appellate court that due regard was taken of the factors enumerated in this section. Byrd v. Byrd, 62 N.C. App. 438, 303 S.E.2d 205 (1983).

In orders of child support, the court should make findings of specific facts (e.g. incomes, estates) to support a conclusion as to the relative abilities of the parties to provide support. Steele v. Steele, 36 N.C. App. 601, 244 S.E.2d 466 (1978).

Without findings relating to the parties' reasonable expenses, there is no basis for a determination as to the parties' relative abilities to provide the support necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the children. Holderness v. Holderness, 91 N.C. App. 118, 370 S.E.2d 602 (1988).

In order to determine the reasonable needs of the child, the trial court must hear evidence and make findings of specific fact on the child's actual past expenditures and present reasonable expenses. Holderness v. Holderness, 91 N.C. App. 118, 370 S.E.2d 602 (1988).

Case would be remanded for additional findings regarding the income or loss, if any, of one of defendant's businesses where the trial court's order failed to reflect its treatment of these figures. Cauble v. Cauble, 133 N.C. App. 390, 515 S.E.2d 708 (1999).

Findings Must Cover Factors in Subsection (c). - The trial court must hear evidence on each of the factors listed in subsection (c) of this section and substantiate its conclusions of law by making findings of specific facts on each of the listed factors. Newman v. Newman, 64 N.C. App. 125, 306 S.E.2d 540, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 822, 310 S.E.2d 351 (1983).

Conclusions of law must be based upon factual findings specific enough to indicate to the appellate court that the judge below took due regard of the particular estates, earnings, conditions, and accustomed standard of living of both the child and the parents. Dishmon v. Dishmon, 57 N.C. App. 657, 292 S.E.2d 293 (1982); Newman v. Newman, 64 N.C. App. 125, 306 S.E.2d 540, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 822, 310 S.E.2d 351 (1983); In re Botsford, 75 N.C. App. 72, 330 S.E.2d 23 (1985); Boyd v. Boyd, 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986).

To support an award of payment for support, the judgment of the trial court should contain findings of fact which sustain the conclusion of law that the support payments ordered are in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education and maintenance, having due regard to the estates, earnings, conditions, accustomed standard of living of the child and the parties, and other facts of the particular care. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 32 N.C. App. 154, 231 S.E.2d 26 (1977); Poston v. Poston, 40 N.C. App. 210, 252 S.E.2d 240 (1979); Grimes v. Grimes, 78 N.C. App. 208, 336 S.E.2d 664 (1985).

The trial court must make specific findings on each of the factors specified in subsection (c) of this section. In addition, the case law may require certain findings, as when the award is based on earning capacity rather than present income. Once the trial court has made such findings, they are conclusive if supported by any evidence, even if there is evidence contra. Sloop v. Friberg, 70 N.C. App. 690, 320 S.E.2d 921 (1984).

The trial judge must at least make findings sufficiently specific to indicate proper consideration of each of the factors established by subsection (c) of this section for a determination of child support. Spencer v. Spencer, 70 N.C. App. 159, 319 S.E.2d 636 (1984).

Orders for child support must be based upon the interplay of the trial court's conclusions of law as to the amount of support necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child and the relative abilities of the parents to provide that amount. These conclusions must, in turn, be based upon factual findings sufficiently specific to indicate to the appellate court that the trial court took due regard of the estates, earnings, conditions and accustomed standard of living of both child and parents. Little v. Little, 74 N.C. App. 12, 327 S.E.2d 283 (1985).

To comply with subsection (c) of this section, the order for child support must be premised upon the interplay of the trial court's conclusions of law as to the amount of support necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child and the relative ability of the parties to provide that amount. To support these conclusions of law, the court must also make specific findings of fact so that an appellate court can ascertain whether the judge below gave due regard to the facts of the particular case. Such findings are necessary to an appellate court's determination of whether the judge's order is sufficiently supported by competent evidence. Where the record discloses sufficient evidence to support the findings, it is not the Supreme Court's task to determine de novo the weight and credibility to be given the evidence contained in the record on appeal. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Conclusions must be based upon factual findings sufficiently specific to indicate that the trial court took "due regard" of the factors enumerated in the statute. Atwell v. Atwell, 74 N.C. App. 231, 328 S.E.2d 47 (1985).

The trial court must hear evidence and make findings of fact on the parents' income, estates and present reasonable expenses to determine the parties' relative ability to pay. Bottomley v. Bottomley, 82 N.C. App. 231, 346 S.E.2d 317 (1986).

To comply with subsection (c), the trial court is required to make findings of fact with respect to the factors listed in the statute. Holderness v. Holderness, 91 N.C. App. 118, 370 S.E.2d 602 (1988).

Fact that the record contains evidence from which the necessary findings could have been made does not have the effect of absolving the trial court from the obligation to actually make the required findings concerning the needs of the children and the parties' relative abilities to pay in a case in which a deviation from the guidelines has been requested. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 238 N.C. App. 257, 768 S.E.2d 30 (2014).

Trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law demonstrated "due regard" to the factors required by subsection (c), and thus, it did not abuse its discretion in the calculation of a father's child support obligation; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining it would not consider a bonus the mother received, and both parties' estates were approximately the same, neither was taking distributions from investments, and neither would be required to deplete his or her assets. Kleoudis v. Kleoudis, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 277 (2020).

Giving "due regard" to the estates of the parties does not require detailed findings as to the value of each individual asset but requires only that the trial court consider the evidence and make sufficient findings addressing its determination regarding the estates to allow appellate review. Kleoudis v. Kleoudis, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 277 (2020).

Findings must be based upon competent evidence, and it is not enough that there may be evidence, in the record sufficient to support findings which could have been made. The trial court must itself determine what pertinent facts are actually established by the evidence before it. Atwell v. Atwell, 74 N.C. App. 231, 328 S.E.2d 47 (1985).

Actual Past Expenditures Must Be Found. - To determine the amount of support necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education and maintenance, the court must make findings of specific facts as to what actual past expenditures have been. Warner v. Latimer, 68 N.C. App. 170, 314 S.E.2d 789 (1984).

To determine the amount of support necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education and maintenance (which are conclusions of law), the court must make findings of specific facts as to what actual past expenditures have been. Where past expenditures are below subsistence, due regard, of course, must be given to meeting the reasonable needs of the child. Steele v. Steele, 36 N.C. App. 601, 244 S.E.2d 466 (1978).

In order to determine the reasonable needs of the child, the trial court must hear evidence and make findings of specific fact on the child's actual past expenditures and present reasonable expenses. Boyd v. Boyd, 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986); Bottomley v. Bottomley, 82 N.C. App. 231, 346 S.E.2d 317 (1986).

Conclusion as to Reasonableness of Personal Expenses. - In a child support case, the trial court should be satisfied that personal expenses itemized in the parties' balance sheets are reasonable under all the circumstances before making a determination of need or liability, and though absence of a specific conclusion as to reasonableness will not necessarily be held for error, the better practice is for the order to contain such a conclusion. Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 268 S.E.2d 185 (1980).

The determination of what portion of claimed expenses is reasonable, and what portion is unreasonable, in arriving at an amount necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child, requires an exercise of judgment and is therefore not a question of fact but a conclusion of law. Boyd v. Boyd, 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986).

Error to Order Support Absent Appropriate Findings. - Where the court does not make appropriate findings based on competent evidence as to what are the reasonable needs of the children for health, education and maintenance, it is error to direct payments for their support. Hampton v. Hampton, 29 N.C. App. 342, 224 S.E.2d 197 (1976); Poston v. Poston, 40 N.C. App. 210, 252 S.E.2d 240 (1979).

In a child support action, where the trial court failed to make findings as to the actual needs of the parties' minor child or the expenses of the parties, its order directing child support payments was erroneous. Ingle v. Ingle, 53 N.C. App. 227, 280 S.E.2d 460 (1981).

Appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment ordering a father who was in college to pay $95 per month in child support because the trial court based its order on the father's earning capacity but did not find that the father was deliberately suppressing his income to avoid family responsibilities. State v. Williams, 163 N.C. App. 353, 593 S.E.2d 123 (2004).

Without findings relating to the parties' reasonable expenses, there is no basis for a determination as to the relative abilities of the parents to provide the support necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the children. Boyd v. Boyd, 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986).

Where child support for defendant's five children by three different mothers, set pursuant to the guidelines, amounted to 66% of his gross income, the trial court's duty was to determine whether this support exceeded the reasonable needs of each child, whether it was unjust or inappropriate, and whether defendant had "sufficient income to maintain a minimum standard of living based on the 1997 federal poverty level for one person." Buncombe County ex rel. Blair v. Jackson, 138 N.C. App. 284, 531 S.E.2d 240 (2000).

Award of Reimbursement for Past Support. - The trial court must make specific factual findings to support not only an award of future support but also to support an award of reimbursement for past support of the child. Buff v. Carter, 76 N.C. App. 145, 331 S.E.2d 705 (1985).

Findings as to Suppression of Income. - The trial court erred in awarding child support based upon each party's "earning capacity" without any findings as to whether either party deliberately suppressed his or her income to avoid his or her support obligation. Bowers v. Bowers, 141 N.C. App. 729, 541 S.E.2d 508 (2001).

Finding as to Income of Supporting Spouse. - Although a proper finding pertaining to the income of the supporting spouse must be based on present, as opposed to past, income, there is no rule that requires a specific finding as to the income of the supporting spouse on the precise date of the hearing. Patton v. Patton, 78 N.C. App. 247, 337 S.E.2d 607 (1985), rev'd in part on other grounds, 318 N.C. 404, 348 S.E.2d 593 (1986).

Findings calculating a father's business income sufficiently relied on a year's first eight months because predicting the final quarter's income was too speculative. Kaiser v. Kaiser, 259 N.C. App. 499, 816 S.E.2d 223 (2018).

Proper Findings Not Made for Deviation from Guidelines. - Trial court failed to make proper findings when it deviated from the child support guidelines; while the trial court made findings regarding the parties' average monthly incomes, health insurance costs for the child, and work related child care costs for the child, nothing addressed the needs of the child or the parties' ability to pay, and the order failed to meet statutory and case law requirements. Sarno v. Sarno, 255 N.C. App. 543, 804 S.E.2d 819 (2017).

Findings Held Insufficient. - Where the trial did not make an assessment of the child's needs, and found that plaintiff 's expenses exceeded her income and that her unwieldy credit card obligations were caused by defendant's failure to pay $220 in support to her in a timely manner when she had custody of both children, the findings of fact were insufficient to support the conclusion that plaintiff should not be required to support her minor children; defendant's $220 delinquency in child support payments did not mean that plaintiff 's expenses were reasonable, and the trial judge made no findings upon which to conclude that defendant had the ability to support both children. Payne v. Payne, 91 N.C. App. 71, 370 S.E.2d 428 (1988).

Appellate court would remand case where the trial court failed to make findings as to what the child support amount would be under the applicable Guidelines, as to the child's reasonable needs, and as to whether the greater weight of the evidence established that application of the presumptive Guidelines amount would be "unjust or inappropriate." Sain v. Sain, 134 N.C. App. 460, 517 S.E.2d 921 (1999).

Trial court's finding that a husband was not under any other child support obligation pursuant to a court order or other written obligation flew in the face of the uncontroverted evidence presented at trial by both parties that was under a district court order to provide child support payments for a child born from his subsequent marriage; thus, the trial court's finding was not supported by competent evidence in the record, was not sufficient to establish that the trial court took due regard of defendant's estates, earnings, conditions and other facts of the particular case as required under G.S. 50-13.4(c), and the child support order was reversed. Zaliagiris v. Zaliagiris, 164 N.C. App. 602, 596 S.E.2d 285 (2004), cert. denied, 359 N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d 662 (2005).

Adequate findings did not support a prospective child support order because the trial court did not consider the inheritance of the wife to whom custody was awarded. Smith v. Smith, 247 N.C. App. 135, 786 S.E.2d 12 (2016).

Findings calculating a mother's capital gains income were insufficient because the findings did not support using the mother's past capital gains to find current capital gains. Kaiser v. Kaiser, 259 N.C. App. 499, 816 S.E.2d 223 (2018).

Findings calculating a mother's dividend income were insufficient because it was unknown if income from assets that were previously sold were used. Kaiser v. Kaiser, 259 N.C. App. 499, 816 S.E.2d 223 (2018).

Trial court's use of a father's historical income to calculate prospective child support in the form of arrears dating back to the filing of the mother's motion to modify child support was in error because the trial court made no finding to support the use of that method; the trial court made no findings providing a rationale for using the father's income for each individual year, rather than using his current income to calculate child support owed back to the filing of the mother's motion. Simms v. Bolger, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 522 (2019).

VIII. APPELLATE REVIEW.

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Standard for reviewing child support orders resembles that for reviewing awards of custody, in that the amount of child support allowed by the trial judge will be disturbed only when there is an abuse of discretion. Dixon v. Dixon, 67 N.C. App. 73, 312 S.E.2d 669 (1984).

No Appellate Jurisdiction to Hear Appeal of Interlocutory Support Order. - Appellate court had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a denial of child support modification because: (1) an order continuing an existing order until legally interdependent custody issues could be heard was interlocutory, as, without knowing the custody arrangement, a trial court could not find which child support worksheet to use, or whether to deviate from the guidelines; (2) the order did not resolve the custody issue; and (3) allowing an appeal would lead to an unnecessary appeal. Gray v. Peele, 235 N.C. App. 554, 761 S.E.2d 739 (2014).

Support Award Will Not Be Disturbed Absent Abuse of Discretion. - The amount of child support awarded is in the discretion of the trial judge and will be disturbed only on a showing of abuse of that discretion. Coggins v. Coggins, 260 N.C. 765, 133 S.E.2d 700 (1963); Swink v. Swink, 6 N.C. App. 161, 169 S.E.2d 539 (1969); Sawyer v. Sawyer, 21 N.C. App. 293, 204 S.E.2d 224, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 591, 205 S.E.2d 723 (1974); Gibson v. Gibson, 24 N.C. App. 520, 211 S.E.2d 522 (1975); Wyatt v. Wyatt, 32 N.C. App. 162, 231 S.E.2d 42, aff'd, 35 N.C. App. 650, 242 S.E.2d 180 (1977); Minges v. Minges, 53 N.C. App. 507, 281 S.E.2d 88 (1981); Peters v. Elmore, 59 N.C. App. 404, 297 S.E.2d 154 (1982), cert. denied, 307 N.C. 577, 299 S.E.2d 651 (1983); Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983); Warner v. Latimer, 68 N.C. App. 170, 314 S.E.2d 789 (1984).

The trial court's consideration of the factors contained in subsection (c) of this section is an exercise in sound judicial discretion, and if its findings are supported by competent evidence in the record, its determination as to the proper amount of support will not be disturbed on appeal. Boyd v. Boyd, 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986).

Even If Evidence Is Conflicting. - An order for child support is a question of fairness to all parties involved. It will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial judge, even if there is conflicting evidence. Evans v. Craddock, 61 N.C. App. 438, 300 S.E.2d 908 (1983).

In determining the amount of alimony and child support to be awarded, the trial judge must follow the requirements of this section. The amount is a reasonable subsistence, to be determined by the trial judge in the exercise of a judicial discretion from the evidence before him. His determination is reviewable, but it will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Beall v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 228 S.E.2d 407 (1976).

Finding of Ability to Pay Is Conclusive When Supported by Evidence. - The trial court's discretion as to the amount of child support awarded is not absolute and unreviewable. The order must be based not only on the needs of the child, but also on the ability of the father to meet the needs. But where there is a finding of ability to pay, supported in the record by competent evidence, that finding will be conclusive. Wyatt v. Wyatt, 32 N.C. App. 162, 231 S.E.2d 42, aff'd, 35 N.C. App. 650, 242 S.E.2d 180 (1977).

Findings Regarding Standard of Living And Reasonableness of Expenses. - Without findings regarding the child's or parties' accustomed standard of living and the reasonableness of the expenses in light of that standard of living, the court of appeals cannot determine whether the trial court considered the standard of living factor and whether the trial court's finding of reasonable needs is supported by the evidence. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 238 N.C. App. 257, 768 S.E.2d 30 (2014).

Remand for Further Findings. - Where the trial judge found that the reasonable expenses of child were "in excess of $500," while the child's mother claimed that the child's expenses were $855.16, and found the reasonable living expenses of the child's father to be $800, rejecting his claimed figure of $1,196.80, lack of findings as to what claimed expenses of the child or the father the court considered unreasonable would require the appellate court to vacate the order and remand the cause for further findings. Patterson v. Patterson, 81 N.C. App. 255, 343 S.E.2d 595 (1986).

Failure to Assign Error to Trial Court's Findings. - Trial court's consideration of a child's needs, the mother's share of those needs, and the father's contribution to those needs was found to have been reasonable and adequate under circumstances in which the father did not assign error to the trial court's findings; the trial court's finding that the amount in the parties' agreement was inadequate and thus did not influence the trial court's decision, or the trial court's total calculated reasonable expenses. Pascoe v. Pascoe, 183 N.C. App. 648, 645 S.E.2d 156 (2007).

Presumption Allowing Modification. - The presumption, created in a 1994 revision, allowing modification of a child support order which is at least three years old, when there is a disparity of 15% or more between the amount of support payable under the original order and the amount owed based on the parties' current income and expenses, is within the scope of the legislative mandate to ensure adequate child support awards over time. Garrison v. Connor, 122 N.C. App. 702, 471 S.E.2d 644 (1996).

Stay Properly Denied. - Trial court did not err in denying the father's motion to stay execution and enforcement of the child support order, as, under G.S. 50-13.4, such orders were enforceable by proceedings for civil contempt during the pendency of an appeal and not subject to setting bond under G.S. 1-289(a1). Smith v. Smith, 247 N.C. App. 166, 785 S.E.2d 434 (2016).

IX. REMEDIES.

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A. IN GENERAL.

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Court Has Broad Discretion Under Subsection (e). - The court is not limited to ordering one method of payment, to the exclusion of the others provided in subsection (e) of this section. The legislature's use of the disjunctive and the phrase "as the court may order" shows that the court is to have broad discretion in providing for payment of child support orders. Moore v. Moore, 35 N.C. App. 748, 242 S.E.2d 642 (1978).

Court's Remedies Have Been Expanded. - The broad language of this statute suggests that the legislature intended to expand, not limit, the trial court's remedies in enforcing payment of child support. Griffin v. Griffin, 103 N.C. App. 65, 404 S.E.2d 478 (1991).

The enforcement provisions under subsection (f) of this section are not mutually exclusive. Griffin v. Griffin, 103 N.C. App. 65, 404 S.E.2d 478 (1991).

Nor Are the Payment Provisions. - The methods of payment listed in this section are not mutually exclusive. Warner v. Latimer, 68 N.C. App. 170, 314 S.E.2d 789 (1984).

The trial court has broad discretion under subsection (e) of this section in providing for payment of child support. Griffin v. Griffin, 103 N.C. App. 65, 404 S.E.2d 478 (1991).

Creation of Savings Account for Use of Children. - In an action for child support, the court was without the power to, in effect, attempt to create a savings account for the use of the children after they reached the age of 18. Parrish v. Cole, 38 N.C. App. 691, 248 S.E.2d 878 (1978).

Trial court erred in directing payment of child support to a custodial account for the child's benefit because that would result in surplus funds being directed to the child upon emancipation, and instead, the funds should have been directed to the benefit of the minor child no differently than in any other child support award; the error in creating a custodial account was not harmless because the purpose of the statute was to provide support for the child prior to emancipation, not after. Simms v. Bolger, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 522 (2019).

Receipt of Support May Not Be Conditioned on Visitation. - A trial judge does not have authority to condition a minor child's receipt of support paid by the noncustodial parent on compliance with court-ordered visitation allowed the noncustodial parent by ordering that child support paid by defendant be placed in escrow if minor child fails or refuses to abide by the visitation privileges allowed defendant. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

Child Support May Not Be Offset by Equitable Distribution Judgment or Other Obligations. - Defendant was not entitled to a "credit" against his future child support payments for the $12,435.50 he paid over and above his court-ordered obligation or for the $500.00 plaintiff owed him as a result of an equitable distribution judgment; child support obligations may not be offset by other obligations. Brinkley v. Brinkley, 135 N.C. App. 608, 522 S.E.2d 90 (1999).

Court Had No Authority to Order Payment of Social Security Benefits Directly to Mother. - A North Carolina district court had no authority to order the Social Security Administration and defendant father, a representative payee receiving Social Security disability payments for the benefit of his children, to pay those benefits directly to plaintiff mother. Brevard v. Brevard, 74 N.C. App. 484, 328 S.E.2d 789 (1985).

Defendant did not waive his right to support by failing to schedule notice of a hearing on the issue prior to child's emancipation; trial court was incorrect in its presumption that because the issue of custody had become moot, it could not address the issue of support. Freeman v. Freeman, 103 N.C. App. 801, 407 S.E.2d 262 (1991).

B. SECURITY.

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Nonresident Defendant May Be Required to Post Bond. - Under subsection (f)(1) of this section and G.S. 50-16.7(b), the court properly required supporting spouse to post a security bond to secure his compliance with a judgment requiring him to make monthly payments for the support of his wife and children, where the court found that defendant no longer resided within the State and that he had no attorney of record in the case. Parker v. Parker, 13 N.C. App. 616, 186 S.E.2d 607 (1972).

C. AWARD OF PROPERTY.

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Award of Home. - The award of the homeplace does not constitute a writ of possession within the meaning of G.S. 50-17, and the trial judge may award exclusive possession of the homeplace, even though it is owned by the entirety, as a part of the support under this section. Arnold v. Arnold, 30 N.C. App. 683, 228 S.E.2d 48 (1976); Rogers v. Rogers, 39 N.C. App. 635, 251 S.E.2d 663 (1979).

The General Assembly has made statutory provisions in subdivision (f)(2) of this section for awarding possession of a home as a part of child support. This is true without regard to whether the parties are divorced. To the extent that the General Assembly's will, as expressed in this section, conflicts with the common-law principle that the husband is entitled to exclusive possession of entirety property, the common law has been abrogated and supplanted. Martin v. Martin, 35 N.C. App. 610, 242 S.E.2d 393, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 261, 245 S.E.2d 778 (1978).

Award of Personal Property Does Not Require Valuation Of Property. - Because the statute requiring valuation of real property transferred for payment of child support arrearages does not require the trial court to determine the value of personal property applied towards child support arrearages, the father did not offer any support for his contention that such a transfer of personal property was analogous to a transfer of real property, and the father consented to transfer the vehicle to the mother, the trial court did not err by transferring the vehicle to the mother without making a specific finding as to its value. Respess v. Respess, 232 N.C. App. 611, 754 S.E.2d 691 (2014).

D. ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT.

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For case upholding garnishment of father's income from alleged "spendthrift" trust created in another jurisdiction and administered by a trustee bank in this State to satisfy judgment of mother against father for alimony, child support and counsel fees, see Swink v. Swink, 6 N.C. App. 161, 169 S.E.2d 539 (1969).

It was not error for trial court to enter order to withhold plaintiff's wages to collect child support arrearages that had been reduced to judgment. Griffin v. Griffin, 103 N.C. App. 65, 404 S.E.2d 478 (1991).

E. RECOVERY OF PAST DUE PAYMENTS.

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The sole limitation on a party's right to reimbursement for documented past support expenditures is imposed by G.S. 1-52(2), which limits recovery to those expenditures incurred within three years before the date the action for support is filed. Freeman v. Freeman, 103 N.C. App. 801, 407 S.E.2d 262 (1991).

Effect of Subdivision (f)(8). - The portion of subdivision (f)(8) of this section following the semicolon does not constitute an election of remedies. Nor it is true that once arrearages are reduced to judgment the party attempting to collect the judgment is limited to the execution procedures provided by G.S. 1-302. Griffin v. Griffin, 103 N.C. App. 65, 404 S.E.2d 478 (1991).

Reduction to Judgment. - A parent having custody of a minor child may institute an action for the support of such child, and once an order for support has been obtained, the past due payments may be reduced to judgment by motion in the cause. Griffith v. Griffith, 38 N.C. App. 25, 247 S.E.2d 30, cert. denied, 296 N.C. 106, 249 S.E.2d 804 (1978).

Arrearages Judgment Reduced Past Due Payments Judgment and Included Periodic Payments Provision. - As the arrearages judgment reduced the past due payments to a judgment and included a periodic payments provision, it complied with the statute allowing for this particular type of remedy for the enforcement of child support obligations, and the judgment, including its provision concerning period payments towards arrearages was not void and should not have been set aside. Duplin County DSS v. Frazier, 230 N.C. App. 480, 751 S.E.2d 621 (2013).

After Child Reaches Majority. - The fact that a child becomes 18 years of age does not prevent the parent having custody from having the past due payments which accrued while the child was a minor reduced to judgment. Griffith v. Griffith, 38 N.C. App. 25, 247 S.E.2d 30, cert. denied, 296 N.C. 106, 249 S.E.2d 804 (1978).

Notice. - The defendant in an action for unpaid child support could not complain of inadequate notice of the plaintiff's motion to reduce to judgment support payments alleged to be in arrears where the defendant's attorney of record was properly served with notice. Griffith v. Griffith, 38 N.C. App. 25, 247 S.E.2d 30, cert. denied, 296 N.C. 106, 249 S.E.2d 804 (1978).

Authority of Judge. - Arrearages judgment was a new judgment entered after the mother initiated an action seeking an amount owed from a prior judgment, and when entering this judgment, the judge had both jurisdiction and the statutory authority to reduce the arrearages to a judgment and to make provisions for period payments towards the arrearages; thus, the judgment was not void and could not be set aside. Duplin County DSS v. Frazier, 230 N.C. App. 480, 751 S.E.2d 621 (2013).

Court cannot agree with the conclusion that the statute is vague and did not authorize periodic payments towards the father's child support arrearages. Duplin County DSS v. Frazier, 230 N.C. App. 480, 751 S.E.2d 621 (2013).

F. RETROACTIVE SUPPORT AND REIMBURSEMENT.

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Retroactive Distinguished from Prospective. - Child support awarded prior to the time a party files a complaint is properly classified as retroactive child support and is determined by considering reasonably necessary expenditures made on behalf of the child by the party seeking retroactive child support and the defendant's ability to pay during the period in the past for which reimbursement is sought; child support awarded from the time a party files a complaint for child support to the date of trial is not "retroactive child support," but is in the nature of prospective child support representing that period from the time a complaint seeking child support is filed to the date of trial. Taylor v. Taylor, 118 N.C. App. 356, 455 S.E.2d 442 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, 343 N.C. 50, 468 S.E.2d 33 (1996).

Although prospective child support based upon the presumptive guidelines requires no factual findings regarding the child's reasonable needs or the supporting parent's ability to pay, the trial court must set out specific findings of fact in a reimbursement award for retroactive support. Biggs v. Greer, 136 N.C. App. 294, 524 S.E.2d 577 (2000).

Trial court's award of child support was not retroactive in nature because prior consent order was not intended as a final determination on the issue of child support; thus, under G.S. 50-13.4(c), the trial court properly followed the guidelines in awarding prospective child support. Cole v. Cole, 149 N.C. App. 427, 562 S.E.2d 11 (2002).

Claim for Retroactive Child Support. - Not only may an action be brought to collect child support payments in arrears, but a claim for retroactive child support may be brought under this section. Warner v. Latimer, 68 N.C. App. 170, 314 S.E.2d 789 (1984).

Retroactive child support is based solely on amount actually expended for support of minor children during time period in question. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

"Emergency Situation" Must Be Shown. - Child support reimbursement, or child support governing a period prior to a motion to increase an existing child support order, would constitute retroactive child support and would not be based on the presumptive guidelines. Therefore, a child support payment order may not be retroactively increased without evidence of some emergency situation that required the expenditure of sums in excess of the amount of child support paid. Biggs v. Greer, 136 N.C. App. 294, 524 S.E.2d 577 (2000).

Reasonable Necessity and Ability to Pay Must Be Considered. - When a trial court is faced with calculating a retroactive child support award, it must consider, among other things, whether what was actually expended was "reasonably necessary" for the child's support and the defendant's ability to pay during the time for which reimbursement is sought. Buff v. Carter, 76 N.C. App. 145, 331 S.E.2d 705 (1985).

Retroactive Support for Private Schooling Denied. - Award of additional retroactive child support for private schooling was denied where the trial court's limited findings failed to set forth the existence of a "sudden emergency" so unusual or extraordinary as to require plaintiff to expend sums in excess of defendant's existing support obligation, and the court's order contained no findings reflective of defendant's ability to pay during the period the emergency expenses were allegedly incurred. Biggs v. Greer, 136 N.C. App. 294, 524 S.E.2d 577 (2000).

Measure of Liability for Reimbursement of Support Funds Expended. - Where there was no evidence or finding as to the actual amount expended by plaintiff for the support of the children for which she was entitled to reimbursement from defendant, what the defendant "should have paid" was not the measure of his liability to plaintiff. The measure of defendant's liability to plaintiff was the amount actually expended by plaintiff which represented the defendant's share of support. Hicks v. Hicks, 34 N.C. App. 128, 237 S.E.2d 307 (1977); Rawls v. Rawls, 94 N.C. App. 670, 381 S.E.2d 179 (1989).

No Reimbursement for Share of Support Paid by Court Order. - In an action by a mother for child support, mother was not entitled to be reimbursed for sums expended by her for the support of the children which represented her share of support as determined by the trial judge, considering the relative ability of the parties to provide support. Hicks v. Hicks, 34 N.C. App. 128, 237 S.E.2d 307 (1977).

Mother's Homemaking Services Considered. - In determining father's share of the reasonable actual expenditures made by mother during the period for which retroactive child support is sought, the trial court must consider her child care and homemaking services rendered during this period. Lawrence v. Tise, 107 N.C. App. 140, 419 S.E.2d 176 (1992).

Mother Not Entitled to Compensation for Support by Others. - In an action by a mother for child support, she was not entitled to be compensated for support for the children which was provided by others. Hicks v. Hicks, 34 N.C. App. 128, 237 S.E.2d 307 (1977).

Extent of Recovery for Past Expenditures. - Assuming adequate proof of the expenditures under subsection (c) of this section, the plaintiff-mother could recover reimbursement for her past support expenditures (1) to the extent she paid the father's share of such expenditures, and (2) to the extent the expenditures occurred three years or less before August 8, 1986, the date she filed her claim for child support. Napowsa v. Langston, 95 N.C. App. 14, 381 S.E.2d 882, cert. denied, 325 N.C. 709, 388 S.E.2d 460 (1989).

Error Where Court Used Guidelines Instead of Actual Expenditures. - Where, although the trial court made a finding on mother's actual expenditures during the period for which retroactive support was sought, the court instead based the retroactive support award on the guidelines in effect at the time the expenses were incurred by mother, this was error requiring reversal of the order of retroactive support. Lawrence v. Tise, 107 N.C. App. 140, 419 S.E.2d 176 (1992).

Proof of Actual Expenditures. - Trial court's award of retroactive child support had to be reversed and remanded for findings on the mother's actual expenditures for the children during the relevant time period. Respess v. Respess, 232 N.C. App. 611, 754 S.E.2d 691 (2014).

The trial court was under no obligation to render findings of fact where it did not deviate from the presumptive guidelines, but rather adjusted the guideline amounts to account, prospectively, for the extraordinary expense of private schooling. Biggs v. Greer, 136 N.C. App. 294, 524 S.E.2d 577 (2000).

Where the trial court abused its discretion in calculating plaintiff's income and in failing to value plaintiff's estate, and erred in using the "retroactive child support" test for calculating prospective child support, case would be remanded. Taylor v. Taylor, 118 N.C. App. 356, 455 S.E.2d 442 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, 343 N.C. 50, 468 S.E.2d 33 (1996).

Evidence Held Sufficient to Support Award. - Where trial court specifically found that prior to filing action plaintiff expended at least four hundred dollars ($400.00) per month for the support of the parties' child and that defendant had the capacity to pay one-half of this amount toward the child's support during this time, the findings were supported by the evidence and were binding on appeal; the trial court correctly awarded plaintiff reimbursement for past child support. Rawls v. Rawls, 94 N.C. App. 670, 381 S.E.2d 179 (1989).

After the father had been found to be in contempt due to his failure to pay child support, the trial court made sufficient findings of fact to support an award of attorney's fees to the mother under G.S. 50-13.6, despite the fact that there was no finding that the mother was an interested party with insufficient means to defray the cost of the litigation; under G.S. 50-13.4(c), the children's ability to pay attorney's fees was at issue, not the mother's, and the mother was an interested party under G.S. 50-13.6, as she provided the financial support in the absence of the husband. Belcher v. Averette, 152 N.C. App. 452, 568 S.E.2d 630 (2002).

G. CONTEMPT.

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Editor's Note. - Some of the cases cited below were decided under subdivision (f)(9) of this section as it read prior to amendment in 1977. Prior to such amendment, subdivision (f)(9) provided for punishment as for contempt of the "willful disobedience" of an order for the payment of child support.

Agreement of Parties Incorporated in Judgment Is Enforceable by Contempt Proceedings. - Where, in wife's action for alimony and child support, the parties agreed to the terms of a judgment providing that husband would make specified monthly support payments, and the judgment entered by the court ordered husband to make the payments which he had agreed to make, husband's obligation to make the support payments could be enforced by contempt proceedings. Parker v. Parker, 13 N.C. App. 616, 186 S.E.2d 607 (1972).

Willfulness Is Required Under Subdivision (f)(9). - The element of willfulness is required for a finding of civil contempt under subdivision (f)(9) of this section and G.S. 5A-21. Jones v. Jones, 52 N.C. App. 104, 278 S.E.2d 260 (1981); Harris v. Harris, 91 N.C. App. 699, 373 S.E.2d 312 (1988).

Trial court did not err in not holding the father in contempt as he did not intend to willfully violate the child support order because he was under the mistaken apprehension that he could simply stop paying after his son ceased living with the mother. Morris v. Powell, - N.C. App. - , 840 S.E.2d 223 (2020).

Priority of G.S. 50-13.4(f)(8)-(9) over G.S. Ch. 5A. - Because G.S. 50-13.4(f)(8)-(9) is more specific than the generalized contempt allowances set forth in G.S. ch. 5A, G.S. 50-13.4(f)(8)-(9) must control. Brown v. Brown, 171 N.C. App. 358, 615 S.E.2d 39 (2005), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 60, 621 S.E.2d 175 (2005).

And Only Willful Disobedience May Be Punished. - A failure to obey an order of a court cannot be punished by contempt proceedings unless the disobedience is willful, which imports knowledge and a stubborn resistance. Cox v. Cox, 10 N.C. App. 476, 179 S.E.2d 194 (1971).

To constitute willful disobedience there must be an ability to comply with the court order and a deliberate and intentional failure to do so. Bennett v. Bennett, 21 N.C. App. 390, 204 S.E.2d 554 (1974).

One does not act willfully in failing to comply with a judgment if it has not been within his power to do so since the judgment was rendered. Cox v. Cox, 10 N.C. App. 476, 179 S.E.2d 194 (1971).

Ability to Pay or to Take Measures to Do So Required. - Although an order for child support is enforceable by civil contempt proceedings, a supporting party cannot be held in contempt unless the party willfully failed to comply with the support order. A finding of willful failure to comply with the order requires evidence of the present ability to pay or to take reasonable measures to comply. Brower v. Brower, 75 N.C. App. 425, 331 S.E.2d 170 (1985).

Contempt for Violation Based on Willfulness Upheld. - Trial court acted correctly when it exercised jurisdiction under this section and found defendant/husband in civil contempt, where he made a calculated and deliberate decision to pay a lower amount of child support than it had previously ordered. Burnett v. Wheeler, 133 N.C. App. 316, 515 S.E.2d 480 (1999).

Trial Court Must Make Particular Findings of Ability to Pay. - In order to hold a parent in contempt for failure to pay child support in accordance with a decree, the failure must be willful. In order to find the failure willful, there must be particular findings of the ability to pay during the period of delinquency. Goodson v. Goodson, 32 N.C. App. 76, 231 S.E.2d 178 (1977).

In order to punish by contempt proceedings, the trial court must find as a fact that the defendant possessed the means to comply with orders of the court during the period when he was in default. Cox v. Cox, 10 N.C. App. 476, 179 S.E.2d 194 (1971).

There must be a specific finding of fact, supported by competent evidence, to the effect that defendant possesses the means to comply with the court order, before he can be incarcerated for contempt until compliance. Bennett v. Bennett, 21 N.C. App. 390, 204 S.E.2d 554 (1974); Fitch v. Fitch, 26 N.C. App. 570, 216 S.E.2d 734, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 240, 217 S.E.2d 679 (1975).

A defendant may not deliberately divest himself of his property and in effect pauperize himself for appearance at a hearing for contempt and thereby escape punishment because he is at that time unable to comply with the court order. Bennett v. Bennett, 21 N.C. App. 390, 204 S.E.2d 554 (1974).

Defendant's voluntary purging of assets in bankruptcy was considered a deliberate divestment of assets; therefore, failure to comply with a child support order was willful and punishable by contempt proceedings. Harris v. Harris, 91 N.C. App. 699, 373 S.E.2d 312 (1988).

Past contempt cannot be ignored by the court even if at the exact time of the contempt hearing the defendant does not have the means to comply with the order for child support. Bennett v. Bennett, 21 N.C. App. 390, 204 S.E.2d 554 (1974).

Contempt Decree Set Aside for Lack of Findings. - Where the lower court had not found as a fact that defendant possessed the means to comply with the orders for payment of subsistence pendente lite at any time during the period when he was in default in such payments, the findings that defendant's failure to make the payments of subsistence was deliberate and willful was not supported by the record, and the decree committing him to imprisonment for contempt would be set aside. Cox v. Cox, 10 N.C. App. 476, 179 S.E.2d 194 (1971).

Child Support Arrears. - Although defendant's child support obligation terminated because her son turned 18 and was no longer in school, the arrears owed to the county remained in force, as defendant made no child support payments before her son turned 18 and the court found the purpose of the order would be served by her compliance; her challenge to be held in civil contempt failed. Cumberland Cty. ex rel. Mitchell v. Manning, 262 N.C. App. 383, 822 S.E.2d 305 (2018).

When order reducing child support arrears to a money judgment does not provide for periodic payments although the lower court's prior judgment reduced the father's child support arrearage to a money judgment, it did not provide for periodic payments so his failure to satisfy the arrearage was enforceable by execution under G.S. 1-302, and not civil contempt under G.S. 50-13.4(f)(8)-(9), so the lower court's judgment holding him in contempt was beyond its jurisdiction and was vacated. Brown v. Brown, 171 N.C. App. 358, 615 S.E.2d 39 (2005), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 60, 621 S.E.2d 175 (2005).

When order reducing child support arrears to a money judgment does not provide for periodic payments or other deadline for payment, it is not enforceable by contempt, and the trial court does not have jurisdiction to enter an order finding a defendant in contempt. Brown v. Brown, 171 N.C. App. 358, 615 S.E.2d 39 (2005), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 60, 621 S.E.2d 175 (2005).

Failure to Pay College Expenses. - Trial court properly found father in civil contempt where he willfully failed to pay his daughters college expenses as he had contracted to do. Ross v. Voiers, 127 N.C. App. 415, 490 S.E.2d 244 (1997), cert. denied, 347 N.C. 402, 496 S.E.2d 387 (1997).

Defendant Not in Contempt. - Defendant was not in civil contempt of court in deducting from child support payments made to plaintiff amounts representing voluntary expenditures for needs of the parties' children while they were visiting him. Jones v. Jones, 52 N.C. App. 104, 278 S.E.2d 260 (1981).

Review of Facts Found in Contempt Proceedings. - In proceedings for contempt, the facts found by the judge are not reviewable, except for the purpose of passing upon their sufficiency to warrant the judgment. Cox v. Cox, 10 N.C. App. 476, 179 S.E.2d 194 (1971).

Payment of Counsel Fees. - The court is vested with broad power when it is authorized to punish "as for contempt." This power includes the authority for a district court judge to require one whom he has found in willful contempt of court for failure to comply with a child support order to pay reasonable counsel fees to opposing counsel as a condition to being purged of contempt. Blair v. Blair, 8 N.C. App. 61, 173 S.E.2d 513 (1970).

Attorney Fees Included In Child Support Award. - Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to enforce attorney fee awards included in a child support award during the pendency of defendant's appeal of a child support award pursuant to G.S. 50-13.4(f)(9). Moreover, where defendant made no attempt to post an undertaking or supersedeas bond to stay civil contempt proceedings on the attorney fee awards pursuant to G.S. 1-289, defendant was subject to civil contempt proceedings pending his appeal. Simms v. Bolger, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 467 (2019).

Indefinite Jail Term. - When a defendant has the present means to comply with a court order and deliberately refuses to comply, there is a present and continuing contempt, and the court may commit such defendant to jail for an indefinite term, that is, until he complies with the order. Bennett v. Bennett, 21 N.C. App. 390, 204 S.E.2d 554 (1974); Fitch v. Fitch, 26 N.C. App. 570, 216 S.E.2d 734, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 240, 217 S.E.2d 679 (1975).

Effect of Dismissal of Contempt Action Without Explanation. - A dismissal of a contempt action, without explanation, at most signified that the supporting party was not in contempt as of that date and did not cancel the accrued child support debt; it merely forced the custodial parent or an authorized party to pursue one of the alternate remedies listed in subsection (f) to enforce the debt. Brower v. Brower, 75 N.C. App. 425, 331 S.E.2d 170 (1985).

As to effect of reconciliation and resumption of cohabitation on a separation agreement, see Hand v. Hand, 46 N.C. App. 82, 264 S.E.2d 597, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 556, 270 S.E.2d 107 (1980).

Failure to Identify Purpose of Support as Health, Education and Maintenance Is Not Error. - The better practice is for the court's order to relate that the payment ordered under this section is the amount necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education, and maintenance, but the failure of the court to do so does not constitute reversible error. Andrews v. Andrews, 12 N.C. App. 410, 183 S.E.2d 843 (1971); Martin v. Martin, 35 N.C. App. 610, 242 S.E.2d 393, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 261, 245 S.E.2d 778 (1978).

Appeal Did Not Divest Trial Court of Enforcement Jurisdiction. - Notice of appeal from a trial court order requiring a husband to make payments pursuant to a child support order did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to make an enforcement order finding the husband in contempt based on the exception to the divestment of the trial court's jurisdiction found in G.S.50-13.4(f)(9). Guerrier v. Guerrier, 155 N.C. App. 154, 574 S.E.2d 69 (2002).

Opinions of Attorney General

Medical Child Support Enforcement Provisions. - The medical child support enforcement provisions of House Bill 1563, 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994), N.C. Session Laws c. 644, are inapplicable to the North Carolina Teachers' and State Employees' Comprehensive Major Medical Plan (now State Health Plan for Teachers and State Employees) and the governmental entities whose employees and retirees, along with their dependents, are eligible for coverage under the Plan or its HMO option. Medical child support orders nonetheless may be enforced directly against State employees and retirees who fail to enroll, or maintain coverage for, their eligible dependent children under the State Health Plan in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 50-13.9, 50-13.11 and subsection (f) of this section. See opinion of Attorney General to Patricia Crawford, Associate General Counsel, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, - N.C.A.G. - (August 10, 1995).


§ 50-13.5. Procedure in actions for custody or support of minor children.

  1. Procedure. - The procedure in actions for custody and support of minor children shall be as in civil actions, except as provided in this section and in G.S. 50-19. In this G.S. 50-13.5 the words "custody and support" shall be deemed to include custody or support, or both.
  2. Type of Action. - An action brought under the provisions of this section may be maintained as follows:
    1. As a civil action.
    2. Repealed by Session Laws 1979, c. 110, s. 12.
    3. Joined with an action for annulment, or an action for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, or an action for alimony without divorce.
    4. As a cross action in an action for annulment, or an action for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, or an action for alimony without divorce.
    5. By motion in the cause in an action for annulment, or an action for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, or an action for alimony without divorce.
    6. Upon the court's own motion in an action for annulment, or an action for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, or an action for alimony without divorce.
    7. In any of the foregoing the judge may issue an order requiring that the body of the minor child be brought before him.
  3. Jurisdiction in Actions or Proceedings for Child Support and Child Custody. -
    1. The jurisdiction of the courts of this State to enter orders providing for the support of a minor child shall be as in actions or proceedings for the payment of money or the transfer of property.
    2. The courts of this State shall have jurisdiction to enter orders providing for the custody of a minor child under the provisions of G.S. 50A-201, 50A-202, and 50A-204.
    3. to (6) Repealed by Session Laws 1979, c. 110, s. 12.
  4. Service of Process; Notice; Interlocutory Orders. -
    1. Service of process in civil actions for the custody of minor children shall be as in other civil actions. Motions for support of a minor child in a pending action may be made on 10 days notice to the other parties and compliance with G.S. 50-13.5(e). Motions for custody of a minor child in a pending action may be made on 10 days notice to the other parties and after compliance with G.S. 50A-205.
    2. If the circumstances of the case render it appropriate, upon gaining jurisdiction of the minor child the court may enter orders for the temporary custody and support of the child, pending the service of process or notice as herein provided.
    3. A temporary order for custody which changes the living arrangements of a child or changes custody shall not be entered ex parte and prior to service of process or notice, unless the court finds that the child is exposed to a substantial risk of bodily injury or sexual abuse or that there is a substantial risk that the child may be abducted or removed from the State of North Carolina for the purpose of evading the jurisdiction of North Carolina courts. A temporary custody order that requires a law enforcement officer to take physical custody of a minor child shall be accompanied by a warrant to take physical custody of a minor child as set forth in G.S. 50A-311.
  5. Notice to Additional Persons in Support Actions and Proceedings; Intervention. -
    1. The parents of the minor child whose addresses are reasonably ascertainable; any person, agency, organization or institution having actual care, control, or custody of a minor child; and any person, agency, organization or institution required by court order to provide for the support of a minor child, either in whole or in part, not named as parties and served with process in an action or proceeding for the support of such child, shall be given notice by the party raising the issue of support.
    2. The notice herein required shall be in the manner provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of notices in actions. Such notice shall advise the person to be notified of the name of the child, the names of the parties to the action or proceeding, the court in which the action or proceeding was instituted, and the date thereof.
    3. In the discretion of the court, failure of such service of notice shall not affect the validity of any order or judgment entered in such action or proceeding.
    4. Any person required to be given notice as herein provided may intervene in an action or proceeding for support of a minor child by filing in apt time notice of appearance or other appropriate pleadings.
  6. Venue. - An action or proceeding in the courts of this State for custody and support of a minor child may be maintained in the county where the child resides or is physically present or in a county where a parent resides, except as hereinafter provided. If an action for annulment, for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, or for alimony without divorce has been previously instituted in this State, until there has been a final judgment in such case, any action or proceeding for custody and support of the minor children of the marriage shall be joined with such action or be by motion in the cause in such action. If an action or proceeding for the custody and support of a minor child has been instituted and an action for annulment or for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, or for alimony without divorce is subsequently instituted in the same or another county, the court having jurisdiction of the prior action or proceeding may, in its discretion direct that the action or proceeding for custody and support of a minor child be consolidated with such subsequent action, and in the event consolidation is ordered, shall determine in which court such consolidated action or proceeding shall be heard.
  7. Custody and Support Irrespective of Parents' Rights Inter Partes. - Orders for custody and support of minor children may be entered when the matter is before the court as provided by this section, irrespective of the rights of the wife and the husband as between themselves in an action for annulment or an action for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, or an action for alimony without divorce.
  8. Court Having Jurisdiction. - When a district court having jurisdiction of the matter shall have been established, actions or proceedings for custody and support of minor children shall be heard without a jury by the judge of such district court, and may be heard at any time.
  9. District Court; Denial of Parental Visitation Right; Written Finding of Fact. - In any case in which an award of child custody is made in a district court, the trial judge, prior to denying a parent the right of reasonable visitation, shall make a written finding of fact that the parent being denied visitation rights is an unfit person to visit the child or that such visitation rights are not in the best interest of the child.
  10. Custody and Visitation Rights of Grandparents. - In any action in which the custody of a minor child has been determined, upon a motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances pursuant to G.S. 50-13.7, the grandparents of the child are entitled to such custody or visitation rights as the court, in its discretion, deems appropriate. As used in this subsection, "grandparent" includes a biological grandparent of a child adopted by a stepparent or a relative of the child where a substantial relationship exists between the grandparent and the child. Under no circumstances shall a biological grandparent of a child adopted by adoptive parents, neither of whom is related to the child and where parental rights of both biological parents have been terminated, be entitled to visitation rights.

History

(1858-9, c. 53, s. 2; 1871-2, c. 193, ss. 39, 46; Code, ss. 1292, 1296, 1570, 1662; Rev., ss. 1567, 1570, 1854; 1919, c. 24; C.S., ss. 1664, 1667, 2242; 1921, c. 13; 1923, c. 52; 1939, c. 115; 1941, c. 120; 1943, c. 194; 1949, c. 1010; 1951, c. 893, s. 3; 1953, cc. 813, 925; 1955, cc. 814, 1189; 1957, c. 545; 1965, c. 310, s. 2; 1967, c. 1153, s. 2; 1971, c. 1185, s. 24; 1973, c. 751; 1979, c. 110, s. 12; c. 563; c. 709, s. 3; 1981, c. 735, s. 3; 1983, c. 587; 1985, c. 575, s. 4; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 893, s. 3.1; 1999-223, ss. 11, 12; 2017-22, s. 2.)

Cross References. - As to actions for custody, see also G.S. 50-13.1 through 50-13.3 and notes thereunder.

As to actions for support, see also G.S. 50-13.4 and notes thereunder.

As to maintenance of certain actions as independent actions, see G.S. 50-19.

For the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, see G.S. 50A-1 et seq.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2017-22, s. 2, added the last sentence of subdivision (d)(3). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Legal Periodicals. - For note on jurisdictional and full faith and credit requirements of custody awards of minor children, see 30 N.C.L. Rev. 282 (1952).

For note on the domicile rule in custody proceedings, see 35 N.C.L. Rev. 83 (1956).

For note on voluntary nonsuit in custody action, see 44 N.C.L. Rev. 1138 (1966).

For note on choice of law rules in North Carolina, see 48 N.C.L. Rev. 243 (1970).

For survey of 1972 case law on child support and pre-Chapter 48A consent judgments, see 51 N.C.L. Rev. 1091 (1973).

For survey of 1976 case law on domestic relations, see 55 N.C.L. Rev. 1018 (1977).

For survey of 1979 family law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1471 (1980).

For article, "Equating a Stepparent's Rights and Liabilities vis-a-vis Custody, Visitation and Support upon Dissolution of the Marriage with Those of the Natural Parent - An Equitable Solution to a Growing Dilemma?," see 17 N.C. Cent. L.J. 1 (1988).

For an article on recent developments in third-party custody proceedings after Petersen v. Rogers and Price v. Howard, see 76 N.C.L. Rev. 2145 (1998).

CASE NOTES

I. IN GENERAL.

Editor's Note. - A number of the cases cited below were decided under former G.S. 50-13, which dealt with custody and maintenance of children in actions for divorce, former G.S. 50-16, which dealt with custody and support of children in proceedings for alimony without divorce, and former G.S. 17-39 and former G.S. 17-39.1, which dealt with habeas corpus for custody of children.

Legislature apparently intended to provide the maximum range of choice among procedures for determination of child custody and support. Latham v. Latham, 74 N.C. App. 722, 329 S.E.2d 721 (1985).

Remarriage Does Not Reduce Choice of Procedures. - The statutory scheme of this section provides for an election of procedures in actions for custody or support; there is no reason why the remarriage of the parties should reduce the choices available. Latham v. Latham, 74 N.C. App. 722, 329 S.E.2d 721 (1985).

Effect of Defendant's Petition for Custody on Plaintiff's Right to Voluntary Nonsuit. - Where wife instituted action for divorce and husband filed his petition in the cause praying the court for a determination of his custodial rights with respect to the child, thus seeking affirmative relief of a substantial nature, it was not within the power of the clerk to divest the court of its jurisdiction by allowing wife to submit to a voluntary nonsuit during the course of the hearings and while the issue of custody was in fieri before the presiding judge. Cox v. Cox, 246 N.C. 528, 98 S.E.2d 879 (1957).

Ex Parte Order Improper. - Judge was censured for misconduct under circumstances in which the judge entered an ex parte order striking an earlier order that had been entered by a different district court judge, which had found a party in contempt for failure to pay child support, regardless of the judge's claim that his actions were allowed by G.S. 50-13.5. In re Royster, 361 N.C. 560, 648 S.E.2d 837 (2007).

Change in Circumstances. - Where parent was found to be a fit and proper parent, and in a later order found to be an unfit parent, the finding of unfitness constituted a change in circumstances. Raynor v. Odom, 124 N.C. App. 724, 478 S.E.2d 655 (1996).

Burden of Proof. - Even if privity was not a requirement of collateral estoppel, the trial court erroneously applied the doctrine because of the different burdens of proof used in custody and neglect hearings, and the trial court erred in applying the doctrine to bar the mother's questions, as the neglect hearing was held pursuant to a different burden of proof; the error made it impossible for the mother to effectively contest the allegations made in the petition under the higher, clear and convincing evidence standard, and the matter was reversed. In re K.A., 233 N.C. App. 119, 756 S.E.2d 837 (2014).

Applied in Kearns v. Kearns, 6 N.C. App. 319, 170 S.E.2d 132 (1969); Bonavia v. Torreso, 7 N.C. App. 21, 171 S.E.2d 108 (1969); Peoples v. Peoples, 10 N.C. App. 402, 179 S.E.2d 138 (1971); Williams v. Williams, 12 N.C. App. 170, 182 S.E.2d 667 (1971); Snyder v. Snyder, 18 N.C. App. 658, 197 S.E.2d 802 (1973); Roberts v. Roberts, 25 N.C. App. 198, 212 S.E.2d 410 (1975); Benson v. Benson, 39 N.C. App. 254, 249 S.E.2d 877 (1978); Francis v. Durham County Dep't of Social Servs., 41 N.C. App. 444, 255 S.E.2d 263 (1979); Rhoney v. Sigmon, 43 N.C. App. 11, 257 S.E.2d 691 (1979); Misero v. Misero, 43 N.C. App. 523, 259 S.E.2d 346 (1979); Lynch v. Lynch, 302 N.C. 189, 274 S.E.2d 212 (1981); Miller v. Kite, 69 N.C. App. 679, 318 S.E.2d 102 (1984); Glesner v. Dembrosky, 73 N.C. App. 594, 327 S.E.2d 60 (1985); Buck v. Greenlee, - F. Supp. 2d - (W.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2011).

Cited in Blair v. Blair, 8 N.C. App. 61, 173 S.E.2d 513 (1970); Texas v. Rhoades, 7 N.C. App. 388, 172 S.E.2d 235 (1970); In re Hopper, 11 N.C. App. 611, 182 S.E.2d 228 (1971); Williams v. Williams, 13 N.C. App. 468, 186 S.E.2d 210 (1972); Sauls v. Sauls, 288 N.C. 387, 218 S.E.2d 338 (1975); Beall v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 228 S.E.2d 407 (1976); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 38 N.C. App. 308, 247 S.E.2d 926 (1978); McGinnis v. McGinnis, 44 N.C. App. 381, 261 S.E.2d 491 (1980); Oxendine v. Catawba County Dep't of Social Servs., 49 N.C. App. 571, 272 S.E.2d 417 (1980); Hamlin v. Hamlin, 302 N.C. 478, 276 S.E.2d 381 (1981); Davis v. Taylor, 81 N.C. App. 42, 344 S.E.2d 19 (1986); Shingledecker v. Shingledecker, 103 N.C. App. 783, 407 S.E.2d 589 (1991); Ray v. Ray, 103 N.C. App. 790, 407 S.E.2d 592 (1991); Brooks v. Brooks, 107 N.C. App. 44, 418 S.E.2d 534 (1992); Dobos v. Dobos, 111 N.C. App. 222, 431 S.E.2d 861 (1993); Wake County ex rel. Horton v. Ryles, 112 N.C. App. 754, 437 S.E.2d 404 (1993); McIntyre v. McIntyre, 341 N.C. 629, 461 S.E.2d 745 (1995); Fisher v. Fisher, 124 N.C. App. 442, 477 S.E.2d 251 (1996); Ross v. Voiers, 127 N.C. App. 415, 490 S.E.2d 244 (1997), cert. denied, 347 N.C. 402, 496 S.E.2d 387 (1997); Penland v. Harris, 135 N.C. App. 359, 520 S.E.2d 105 (1999); Montgomery v. Montgomery, 136 N.C. App. 435, 524 S.E.2d 360 (2000); Smith v. Barbour, 154 N.C. App. 402, 571 S.E.2d 872 (2002), cert. denied, - N.C. - , 599 S.E.2d 408 (2004); McDuffie v. Mitchell, 155 N.C. App. 587, 573 S.E.2d 606 (2002), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 165, 580 S.E.2d 368 (2003); Williams v. Walker, 185 N.C. App. 393, 648 S.E.2d 536 (2007); Smith v. Barbour, 195 N.C. App. 244, 671 S.E.2d 578 (2009), review denied, 363 N.C. 375, 678 S.E.2d 670 (2009); Head v. Mosier, 197 N.C. App. 328, 677 S.E.2d 191 (2009); McKoy v. McKoy, 202 N.C. App. 509, 689 S.E.2d 590 (2010); Peters v. Pennington, 210 N.C. App. 1, 707 S.E.2d 724 (2011); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 211 N.C. App. 267, 710 S.E.2d 235 (2011); Wellons v. White, 229 N.C. App. 164, 748 S.E.2d 709 (2013); Davis v. Davis, 229 N.C. App. 494, 748 S.E.2d 594 (2013); In re J.K., - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Apr. 4, 2017); Catawba Cty. v. Loggins, 370 N.C. 83, 804 S.E.2d 474 (2017).

II. TYPE OF ACTION.

Editor's Note. - Most of the cases cited below were decided prior to the enactment of G.S. 50-19, authorizing the maintenance of certain actions as independent actions.

Justice to all parties is best served when one judge is able to see the controversy whole. In re King, 3 N.C. App. 466, 165 S.E.2d 60 (1969).

Joinder in Action for Alimony Without Divorce Is Permissible. - It is permissible under subdivision (b)(3) of this section for the wife (spouse) to join an action for custody and support of the minor children of the parties in her action for alimony without divorce. Little v. Little, 9 N.C. App. 361, 176 S.E.2d 521 (1970).

As an Additional Method of Determining Issues as to Children. - The 1953 amendment of former G.S. 50-16, granting jurisdiction to determine custody in an action for alimony without divorce, created an additional method whereby the matter of custody may be determined. Blankenship v. Blankenship, 256 N.C. 638, 124 S.E.2d 857 (1962).

The 1955 amendment to former G.S. 50-16, which provided that custody orders were authorized "in the same manner as such orders are entered by the court in an action for divorce," bolstered the decision in Blankenship v. Blankenship, 256 N.C. 638, 124 S.E.2d 857 (1962), which held that that section created an additional method whereby all questions relating to custody and child support were brought into and determined in the suit for alimony without divorce, in one action. In re Sauls, 270 N.C. 180, 154 S.E.2d 327 (1967).

Prior to 1953, custody of children could not be determined in a proceeding for alimony without divorce. Murphy v. Murphy, 261 N.C. 95, 134 S.E.2d 148 (1964).

Counterclaims. - There is no conflict between the statutes dealing with procedure in divorce actions and G.S. 1A-1, Rule 13(a). Rather G.S. 1A-1, Rule 13(a) superimposes an additional characteristic on certain kinds of counterclaims. Gardner v. Gardner, 294 N.C. 172, 240 S.E.2d 399 (1978). But see now G.S. 50-19.

Divorce action is pending for purposes of determining custody and support until the death of one of the parties or until the youngest child born of the marriage reaches maturity, whichever event occurs first. Latham v. Latham, 74 N.C. App. 722, 329 S.E.2d 721 (1985).

Remedy of Plaintiff in Divorce Suit Is by Motion in the Cause. - Where a wife institutes suit for divorce, her remedy to require the defendant to provide support for a minor child of the marriage is by motion in the cause, which may be filed either before or after final judgment. Winfield v. Winfield, 228 N.C. 256, 45 S.E.2d 259 (1947).

Plaintiff-husband, as a parent seeking custody, could seek to have his child support obligation determined through a motion in the cause in the divorce action. He was not precluded from doing so by the fact that the court had not previously entered orders in that action relating to child support. Bottomley v. Bottomley, 82 N.C. App. 231, 346 S.E.2d 317 (1986).

Modification of Order on Motion of Court or Party. - Upon motion of a party, or upon its own motion after due notice, the court may conduct a hearing to determine whether the decree should be modified. Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S. Ct. 1417, 39 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1974).

Foster Parents May Not Bring Custody Action. - Nothing in the language of G.S. 48-9.1(1) gives foster parents standing to contest the department's or agency's exercise of its rights as legal custodian; therefore, foster parents are without standing to bring an action seeking custody of minor child placed in their home by defendant. Oxendine v. Department of Social Servs., 303 N.C. 699, 281 S.E.2d 370 (1981); In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 531, 345 S.E.2d 404, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 589 (1986).

Intervention by Foster Parents. - In proceeding brought by DSS in which custody was put in issue by guardian ad litem and natural father, trial court did not err in permitting child's foster parents to intervene. In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 531, 345 S.E.2d 404, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 589 (1986), distinguishing Oxendine v. Department of Social Servs., 303 N.C. 699, 281 S.E.2d 370 (1981), and upholding award of custody to foster parents.

Guardianship Versus Custody. - When a stepmother was granted ex parte temporary custody of orphaned stepchildren, an aunt's subsequent guardianship petition made the custody action moot because, (1) in the guardianship case, the clerk properly exercised jurisdiction, as the children had no natural guardian, and the clerk's jurisdiction was not divested by the ex parte temporary custody order, since the clerk considered other courts' custody awards, so the clerk had jurisdiction to appoint the children's general guardians, an incident of which was physical custody, and (2) any guardianship modification, including custody modification, required filing a motion with the clerk instead of a district court custody action. Corbett v. Lynch, 251 N.C. App. 40, 795 S.E.2d 564 (2016).

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE.
A. IN GENERAL.

For cases involving the bringing of habeas corpus proceedings in custody disputes, prior to the amendment by Session Laws 1979, c. 110, s. 12, see Robbins v. Robbins, 229 N.C. 430, 50 S.E.2d 183 (1948); Weddington v. Weddington, 243 N.C. 702, 92 S.E.2d 71 (1956); Bunn v. Bunn, 258 N.C. 445, 128 S.E.2d 792 (1963); In re Skipper, 261 N.C. 592, 135 S.E.2d 671 (1964); In re Macon, 267 N.C. 248, 147 S.E.2d 909 (1966); Swicegood v. Swicegood, 270 N.C. 278, 154 S.E.2d 324 (1967); In re King, 3 N.C. App. 466, 165 S.E.2d 60 (1969); In re Wright, 8 N.C. App. 330, 174 S.E.2d 27 (1970).

Editor's Note. - Most of the cases cited below were decided prior to the enactment of G.S. 50-19, authorizing the maintenance of certain actions as independent actions, and prior to the enactment of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, former G.S. 50A-1 et seq., or the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, G.S. 50A-101 et seq.

Venue Provision. - Subdivision (f) of this section, enacted in 1967, is the venue provision for a child support action. Powers v. Parisher, 104 N.C. App. 400, 409 S.E.2d 725 (1991), appeal dismissed, 331 N.C. 286, 417 S.E.2d 254 (1992).

The jurisdiction of the court to protect infants is broad, comprehensive, and plenary. Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S. Ct. 1417, 39 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1974).

Action to Determine Support Is in Personam. - Under subdivision (c)(1) of this section an action to determine the matter of support is in personam in nature. Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378, 188 S.E.2d 711 (1972).

An action for child support is an action in personam and is governed by jurisdictional rules as in actions for the payment of money or the transfer of property. Lynch v. Lynch, 96 N.C. App. 601, 386 S.E.2d 607 (1989).

While Award of Custody Is in Rem. - The awarding of the custody of the children in an action for divorce is in rem. Coble v. Coble, 229 N.C. 81, 47 S.E.2d 798 (1948); Hoskins v. Currin, 242 N.C. 432, 88 S.E.2d 228 (1955).

Divorce Action Gives Court Jurisdiction of Custody. - In divorce actions, whether for the dissolution of the marriage or from bed and board, the court in which the action is brought acquires jurisdiction over the custody of the unemancipated children of the parties. Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 145 S.E.2d 332 (1965).

When Jurisdiction Is Obtained Over Defendant. - Upon the institution of a divorce action, the court is vested with jurisdiction of the children of the marriage for the purpose of entering orders respecting their care and custody. But the action is not instituted, within the meaning of this rule, until and unless the court acquires jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, and jurisdiction is subject to the fundamental requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard. If both parents are in court and subject to its jurisdiction, an order may be entered, in proper instances, binding the parties and enforceable through the court's coercive jurisdiction. Coble v. Coble, 229 N.C. 81, 47 S.E.2d 798 (1948).

And Consent Judgment Therein Does Not Divest Court of Jurisdiction as to Custody of Child. - Upon the institution of an action for divorce from bed and board, the court acquires jurisdiction of the minor children of the parties, which is not divested by a consent judgment on the issue of divorce entered in the cause with approval of the court, especially where such consent judgment expressly provides that either party may thereafter make a motion in the cause for the custody of the children, the court having the power in an action for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, before or after final judgment, to enter orders respecting the care and custody of the children under this section. Tyner v. Tyner, 206 N.C. 776, 175 S.E. 144 (1934).

Where consent judgment in a suit a mensa et thoro has been entered in the action, without providing for the children, upon motion in the original cause the court has the power to make such further orders as it deems proper requiring the father (or mother) to provide for the support of his children, whether born before or after the rendition of the consent judgment. Sanders v. Sanders, 167 N.C. 317, 83 S.E. 489 (1914).

Actions Constituting General Appearance Subject Defendant to Jurisdiction. - By submitting information to the court relevant to the merits in action for child custody and support, defendant made a general appearance prior to his assertions of lack of personal jurisdiction where defendant sought affirmative relief from the court; submission of the documents was inconsistent with defendant's later claim of lack of personal jurisdiction. Bullard v. Bader, 117 N.C. App. 299, 450 S.E.2d 757 (1994).

Remarriage of parties to each other does not divest court of its continuing jurisdiction over the minor child acquired in action for divorce. Latham v. Latham, 74 N.C. App. 722, 329 S.E.2d 721 (1985).

Previous Action Pending. - Husband's motion as to child custody and child support was properly dismissed where the wife's previously commenced action with respect to the custody and support of the children was pending at the time the husband filed his motion. Basinger v. Basinger, 80 N.C. App. 554, 342 S.E.2d 549 (1986).

Child Becomes Ward of Court. - In a custody case, the court acquires jurisdiction of the child as well as the parent, and the child thus becomes a ward of the court. Joyner v. Joyner, 256 N.C. 588, 124 S.E.2d 724 (1962).

Presence of Child. - For cases as to the effect of the child's presence in this State on the issue of jurisdiction, prior to the enactment of G.S. 50A-1 et seq., see Coble v. Coble, 229 N.C. 81, 47 S.E.2d 798 (1948); Allman v. Register, 233 N.C. 531, 64 S.E.2d 861 (1951); Hoskins v. Currin, 242 N.C. 432, 88 S.E.2d 228 (1955); Weddington v. Weddington, 243 N.C. 702, 92 S.E.2d 71 (1956); Kovacs v. Brewer, 245 N.C. 630, 97 S.E.2d 96, vacated on other grounds, 356 U.S. 604, 78 S. Ct. 963, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1008 (1957); Rothman v. Rothman, 6 N.C. App. 401, 170 S.E.2d 140 (1969); Pruneau v. Sanders, 25 N.C. App. 510, 214 S.E.2d 288, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 664, 216 S.E.2d 911 (1975); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 8 N.C. App. 162, 174 S.E.2d 103 (1970); Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378, 188 S.E.2d 711 (1972); Spence v. Durham, 16 N.C. App. 372, 191 S.E.2d 908 (1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S. Ct. 1417, 39 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1974); Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S. Ct. 1417, 39 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1974); Taylor v. Taylor, 20 N.C. App. 188, 201 S.E.2d 43 (1973); MacKenzie v. MacKenzie, 21 N.C. App. 403, 204 S.E.2d 561 (1974); Swanson v. Swanson, 22 N.C. App. 152, 205 S.E.2d 738 (1974); Mathews v. Mathews, 24 N.C. App. 551, 211 S.E.2d 513 (1975); Searl v. Searl, 34 N.C. App. 583, 239 S.E.2d 305 (1977); Dishman v. Dishman, 37 N.C. App. 543, 246 S.E.2d 819 (1978); King v. Demo, 40 N.C. App. 661, 253 S.E.2d 616 (1979).

In a grandmother's action seeking custody of her grandchildren, the trial court erred in changing venue because either the county where the complaint alleged that the children resided or the county where they were physically present could have proper venue; basing venue on the physical presence of the children would seem entirely appropriate, particularly where a grandparent is seeking to protect grandchildren whose parents have disappeared. Zetino-Cruz v. Benitez-Zetino, 249 N.C. App. 218, 791 S.E.2d 100 (2016).

Jurisdiction Vests Exclusively in Divorce Court. - The court in which a suit for divorce is pending has exclusive jurisdiction as to the care or custody of the children of the marriage, before and after the decree of divorce has been entered. In re Blake, 184 N.C. 278, 114 S.E. 294 (1922); Murphy v. Murphy, 261 N.C. 95, 134 S.E.2d 148 (1964).

When a divorce action is instituted, jurisdiction over the custody of the children born of the marriage vests exclusively in the court before whom the divorce action is pending and becomes a concomitant part of the subject matter of the court's jurisdiction in the divorce action. Cox v. Cox, 246 N.C. 528, 98 S.E.2d 879 (1957); In re Sauls, 270 N.C. 180, 154 S.E.2d 327 (1967).

Jurisdiction over the custody of the children born of the marriage rests exclusively in the court before whom the divorce action is pending, and no order for the custody of the children may be entered in a later action by one of the parties for subsistence without divorce. Reece v. Reece, 231 N.C. 321, 56 S.E.2d 641 (1949), aff'd, 232 N.C. 95, 59 S.E.2d 363 (1950).

Where plaintiff instituted his action for divorce from bed and board in the superior court, and specifically prayed "that the court determine the proper custody for the aforesaid minor child of the plaintiff and defendant," that court became vested in his suit with exclusive jurisdiction to enter orders respecting the care, custody and maintenance of the child. Bunn v. Bunn, 258 N.C. 445, 128 S.E.2d 792 (1963).

Jurisdiction of the matters relating to custody having been invoked in an action for divorce, the court in which the divorce action was pending would have exclusive jurisdiction over the question of custody. Blankenship v. Blankenship, 256 N.C. 638, 124 S.E.2d 857 (1962).

Jurisdiction Continues After Entry of Decree. - The court in which the suit for divorce is pending has exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings for custody and child support, and once they are commenced, maintains it after the divorce decree is entered. Bass v. Bass, 43 N.C. App. 212, 258 S.E.2d 391 (1979).

Jurisdiction of courts in custody and visitation cases is continuous. A decree determines only the present rights with respect to such custody and is subject to judicial alteration or modification upon a change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child. In re Jones, 62 N.C. App. 103, 302 S.E.2d 259 (1983).

The jurisdiction of the court over the custody of unemancipated children of the parties in a divorce action continues even after divorce. Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 145 S.E.2d 332 (1965).

Once jurisdiction of the court attaches to a child custody matter, it exists for all time until the cause is fully and completely determined. In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 531, 345 S.E.2d 404, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 589 (1986).

Where Custody and Support Have Been Brought to Issue. - Where custody and support are brought to issue by the pleadings, the court retains continuing jurisdiction over these matters even when the issues are not determined by the judgment. Thus, where the issues of custody and support were raised in plaintiff wife's complaint and ruled on by the trial judge, the court retained jurisdiction to entertain and rule on defendant husband's motion in the cause for custody and support of the children. Jackson v. Jackson, 68 N.C. App. 499, 315 S.E.2d 90 (1984).

Until Death of a Party or Children's Attainment of Age of Majority. - A divorce action is pending for purposes of determining custody and support until the death of one of the parties or until the youngest child born of the marriage reaches the age of majority, whichever event shall first occur. Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378, 188 S.E.2d 711 (1972); Morris v. Morris, 42 N.C. App. 222, 256 S.E.2d 302 (1979).

But Custody Jurisdiction of Court Where Action for Alimony Without Divorce Is Pending Is Not Lost. - The general rule that exclusive custody jurisdiction is vested in the divorce court is subject to the exception that a court before which an action for alimony without divorce is pending does not lose its custody jurisdiction to the court of another county in which an action for divorce is subsequently filed. In re Sauls, 270 N.C. 180, 154 S.E.2d 327 (1967).

Institution of a divorce action did not oust the jurisdiction of another court, previously acquired in an action for alimony without divorce, to determine the rights of custody of the children of the marriage. Blankenship v. Blankenship, 256 N.C. 638, 124 S.E.2d 857 (1962).

Divorce Court May Hear and Determine Questions of Custody and Support. - Upon institution of a divorce action the court acquires jurisdiction over any child born of the marriage, and may hear and determine questions both as to the custody and as to the maintenance of such child either before or after final decree of divorce. Story v. Story, 221 N.C. 114, 19 S.E.2d 136 (1942).

After the filing of a complaint in any action for divorce, whether from the bonds of matrimony or from bed and board, both before and after final judgment therein, it is lawful for the judge to make such orders respecting the care, custody, tuition and maintenance of the minor children of the marriage as may be proper. Coggins v. Coggins, 260 N.C. 765, 133 S.E.2d 700 (1963).

And May Grant Custody to Either Parent. - The court has jurisdiction to enter an order granting custody to either of the children's parents, both of whom are subject to the court's jurisdiction. Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378, 188 S.E.2d 711 (1972).

Even Though Such Questions Were Not Raised or Determined in Final Judgment. - A court in which a divorce action was tried has jurisdiction to determine custody and support of children of the marriage, even though no custody or support questions were raised prior to, or determined in, the final judgment of divorce. Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378, 188 S.E.2d 711 (1972).

Issue of Custody and Support Remains in Fieri. - If the custody and support has been brought to issue or determined in the previously instituted action between the parents, there could be no final judgment in that case, because the issue of custody and support remains in fieri until the children have become emancipated. Wilson v. Wilson, 11 N.C. App. 397, 181 S.E.2d 190 (1971); Kennedy v. Surratt, 29 N.C. App. 404, 224 S.E.2d 215 (1976); Bass v. Bass, 43 N.C. App. 212, 258 S.E.2d 391 (1979).

Jurisdiction to Modify Custody Decree. - Once a court in this State properly asserts jurisdiction to determine the rights of the parties to custody of a minor child, that court retains jurisdiction to modify its custody decree upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances. Lynch v. Lynch, 303 N.C. 367, 279 S.E.2d 840 (1981).

Subsection (f) of this section does not affect the situation where custody and support have already been determined and one of the parties seeks a modification. In such a case, the court first obtaining jurisdiction retains jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts and is the only proper court in which to bring an action for the modification of an order establishing custody and support. Tate v. Tate, 9 N.C. App. 681, 177 S.E.2d 455 (1970).

A party cannot seek modification of a child support order in a court other than that in which it was entered where there has been no change of venue by the court. Broyhill v. Broyhill, 81 N.C. App. 147, 343 S.E.2d 605 (1986).

Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. - Where a North Carolina judgment of absolute divorce made no provision for child support, and there was thus no existing order, the Texas Attorney General's petition to establish a support obligation was properly classified as a petition to establish an order of support rather than a petition to modify an order of no support; thus, under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, the Texas trial court had the authority to adjudicate the father's child support obligation, and because the North Carolina tribunal had not acquired continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, the trial court erred in granting the father's plea to the jurisdiction. Office of the AG of Tex. v. Long, 401 S.W.3d 911 (May 21, 2013).

Independent Action in Another Court Where Custody and Support Not Determined - After Final Judgment. - The first proviso of subsection (f) of this section, when read in conjunction with the first sentence of subsection (f) and in conjunction with subsection (b), makes it clear that after final judgment in a previously instituted action between the parents, where custody and support has not been brought to issue or determined, the custody and support issue may be determined in an independent action in another court. Kennedy v. Surratt, 29 N.C. App. 404, 224 S.E.2d 215 (1976).

The custody and support issue may be determined in an independent action in another court after final judgment in a previously instituted action between the parents, where custody and support has not been brought to issue or determined. In re Holt, 1 N.C. App. 108, 160 S.E.2d 90 (1968); Wilson v. Wilson, 11 N.C. App. 397, 181 S.E.2d 190 (1971).

Subsections (b) and (f) of this section, when considered together, permit questions of custody and support to be determined in independent actions, rather than only through a motion in the cause, where a divorce judgment has been entered without a determination of custody and support in that judgment. Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378, 188 S.E.2d 711 (1972).

Same - Before Final Judgment. - When a divorce action has been filed in one county, and there has not been a final judgment in that action, the courts of another county are, by virtue of the first proviso in subsection (f) of this section, without jurisdiction to entertain an independent action for custody of the minor children of the parties. Holbrook v. Holbrook, 38 N.C. App. 303, 247 S.E.2d 923 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 411, 251 S.E.2d 469 (1979).

Jurisdiction to Award Custody of Child After Denial of Divorce. - After plaintiff's suit for divorce from bed and board and defendant's cross action for alimony without divorce had both been denied, the judge had jurisdiction and power to enter the portion of the judgment awarding custody of the minor son of the parties to defendant and providing for his maintenance and support. Bunn v. Bunn, 258 N.C. 445, 128 S.E.2d 792 (1963).

Added Parties May Be Subjected to Jurisdiction to Same Extent as Original Parties. - In an action to determine custody of a child, an order which was entered in the Court of Appeals making the paternal grandparents parties, pursuant to their motion, subjected them to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court to the same extent as if they had been original parties plaintiff. Brandon v. Brandon, 10 N.C. App. 457, 179 S.E.2d 177 (1971).

Failure to Raise Issue of Venue. - Because a mother and father, defendants, never appeared or filed an answer, they made no objection to venue and, thus, they waived it. Zetino-Cruz v. Benitez-Zetino, 249 N.C. App. 218, 791 S.E.2d 100 (2016).

Failure to Raise Issue of Child Support. - Defendant's mere mentioning of "a Separation Agreement dated June 5, 1981" in his 1982 divorce complaint was insufficient to raise the issue of child support. Defendant's divorce complaint did not ask the divorce court to review the question of child support and the divorce judgment did not even allude to the parties' separation agreement; therefore, defendant's contention that his prior divorce action placed the question of child support at issue with the results that (i) the original divorce court retained jurisdiction over that question and (ii) the present independent action by his wife should have been dismissed under a theory of abatement, was rejected. Powers v. Parisher, 104 N.C. App. 400, 409 S.E.2d 725 (1991), appeal dismissed, 331 N.C. 286, 417 S.E.2d 254 (1992).

Effect of Subsequent Divorce in Another State. - Where the children of the marriage were residents of this State and the parents were personally before the court, the courts of this State had jurisdiction in the wife's action for subsistence under former G.S. 50-16 to award the custody of the children to the wife and decree the amount defendant should contribute for their support, and to punish defendant as for contempt for willful failure to comply with its order, notwithstanding the fact that the husband obtained a decree of divorce in another state after the entry of the order for support. Whitford v. Whitford, 261 N.C. 353, 134 S.E.2d 635 (1964).

Judge Held Without Jurisdiction to Hear Matter Outside District. - Upon application for the custody of the children of the marriage after decree of divorce, the resident judge entered a temporary order awarding custody to the father, and issued an order to defendant wife to appear outside the county and outside the district to show cause why the temporary order should not be made permanent. It was held that the judge was without jurisdiction to hear the matter outside the district, and an order issued upon the hearing of the order to show cause was void ab initio. Patterson v. Patterson, 230 N.C. 481, 53 S.E.2d 658 (1949).

Jurisdiction over Petition Filed by DSS. - The district court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of petition filed, signed and verified by county division of social services, which alleged that child had been placed with DSS by its mother; that the putative father was unknown; that North Carolina was the home state of the child and no other state had jurisdiction over the child; and that the best interest of the child would be served if the court assumed jurisdiction over him. In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 531, 345 S.E.2d 404, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 589 (1986).

Transfer of Venue. - For the convenience of witnesses and parties and because it may be in the best interests of justice and the parties, the court of original venue may, in its discretion, transfer the venue of an ongoing action for custody or support to a more appropriate county. Broyhill v. Broyhill, 81 N.C. App. 147, 343 S.E.2d 605 (1986).

Standing to Intervene. - As a grandmother failed to allege conduct sufficient to support a finding that the parents engaged in conduct inconsistent with their parental rights and responsibilities, she could not overcome the presumption that the parents had the superior right to the care, custody, and control of the child, and lacked standing to intervene. Perdue v. Fuqua, 195 N.C. App. 583, 673 S.E.2d 145 (2009).

Dismissal Improper. - Dismissal of a wife's claims for child support and child custody for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was error as separation or initiation of a claim for divorce from bed and board was not a precondition for maintaining those claims under G.S. 50-13.1 and G.S. 50-13.5 Baumann-Chacon v. Baumann, 212 N.C. App. 137, 710 S.E.2d 431 (2011).

B. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT.

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Generally. - For cases as to full faith and credit accorded the custody decrees of other states, prior to the enactment of G.S. 50A-1 et seq., see In re Marlowe, 268 N.C. 197, 150 S.E.2d 204 (1966); Rothman v. Rothman, 6 N.C. App. 401, 170 S.E.2d 140 (1969); In re Kluttz, 7 N.C. App. 383, 172 S.E.2d 95 (1970); Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S. Ct. 1417, 39 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1974); Mathews v. Mathews, 24 N.C. App. 551, 211 S.E.2d 513 (1975); Johnston v. Johnston, 29 N.C. App. 345, 224 S.E.2d 276 (1976).

Nature of Inquiry as to Full Faith and Credit. - In a proceeding to determine whether a custody judgment is entitled to full faith and credit, the court's inquiry is first confined to whether the judgment sought to be enforced was a final judgment rendered by a court with competent jurisdiction. If the court determines that the foreign judgment was final and was rendered by a court with proper jurisdiction, then the judgment is entitled to full faith and credit, and the court never reaches the merits of the custody action, unless one of the parties asserts that the judgment should be modified due to a substantial change in circumstances. Lynch v. Lynch, 303 N.C. 367, 279 S.E.2d 840 (1981).

When a court asserts jurisdiction to enforce a custody judgment of another state and no showing of a substantial change of circumstances is made, its jurisdiction terminates upon a final judgment awarding full faith and credit to the sister state's decree. Lynch v. Lynch, 303 N.C. 367, 279 S.E.2d 840 (1981).

A temporary custody judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit and has no effect on defendant's ability to seek full faith and credit of a final custody judgment subsequently rendered in another state. Lynch v. Lynch, 303 N.C. 367, 279 S.E.2d 840 (1981).

Indiana Order for Child Support Given Full Faith and Credit. - Although there was no jurisdictional rule requiring the trial court to dismiss plaintiff father's North Carolina action seeking definition of his child support obligations simply because defendant mother had filed an action in Indiana, where, when plaintiff's motion came on for hearing, the Indiana court had already entered an order on the issue of child support, that order was entitled to full faith and credit in this State as long as plaintiff was not denied due process of law in the Indiana court's assertion of jurisdiction over him. Lynch v. Lynch, 96 N.C. App. 601, 386 S.E.2d 607 (1989).

C. RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE.

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Findings of the court as to the residence of the parties are conclusive when supported by any competent evidence. Holbrook v. Holbrook, 38 N.C. App. 303, 247 S.E.2d 923 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 411, 251 S.E.2d 469 (1979).

Domicile of Husband Not Necessarily Domicile of Wife and Children. - Where the husband in his divorce action alleged that he had notified his wife that he would no longer live with her as husband and wife, he could not assert the fictional unity of persons for the purpose of maintaining that his domicile was the domicile of his wife and children. Coble v. Coble, 229 N.C. 81, 47 S.E.2d 798 (1948).

IV. NOTICE.

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Purpose of Subdivision (d)(1). - Subdivision (d)(1) of this section is designed to give the parties to a custody action adequate notice in order to insure a fair hearing. Clayton v. Clayton, 54 N.C. App. 612, 284 S.E.2d 125 (1981).

Five Day (now 10 Day) Notice of Custody Hearing Not Absolute Right. - Ordinarily a parent is entitled to at least five days' (now 10 days') notice (an intervening Saturday or Sunday excluded) of a hearing involving the custody of a child, but this is not an absolute right and is subject to the rule relating to waiver of notice and to the rule that a new trial will not be granted for mere technical error which could not have affected the result, but only for error which is prejudicial, amounting to the denial of a substantial right. Brandon v. Brandon, 10 N.C. App. 457, 179 S.E.2d 177 (1971).

A party entitled to notice of a motion may waive such notice. Brandon v. Brandon, 10 N.C. App. 457, 179 S.E.2d 177 (1971).

And ordinarily does this by attending the hearing of the motion and participating in it. Brandon v. Brandon, 10 N.C. App. 457, 179 S.E.2d 177 (1971).

Notice of Motion for Custody Served on Counsel of Record. - A court which acquired jurisdiction of husband in a divorce proceeding before he left the State had jurisdiction to hear motion for custody filed after divorce decree where notice of motion was served on husband's counsel of record. Weddington v. Weddington, 243 N.C. 702, 92 S.E.2d 71 (1956).

Request for Variance for Child Support Guidelines. - G.S. 50-13.4 does not identify any time restrictions for making the request for a hearing. However, to effectuate the purpose of that statute, any party in a pending action requesting a variance from the guidelines must, unless the request is made in the original pleadings, give at least ten days written notice as required by this section. Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991).

Absent a timely and proper request for a variance of the guidelines, support set consistent with the guidelines was conclusively presumed to be in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education, and maintenance. Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991).

Because the trial court elected to deny a father's motion requesting a deviation from the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines in its discretion, rather than dismiss it as untimely, the court of appeals did not need to address the timeliness of the motion. Simms v. Bolger, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 522 (2019).

Trial court's temporary custody order in an action filed by the child's putative father was not valid because the child's presumed father was not given notice, even though, under G.S. 50-13.5(e)(3), in the discretion of the court, failure of service of notice would not affect the validity of an order; that provision only applied to orders entered with respect to support actions. Smith v. Barbour, 154 N.C. App. 402, 571 S.E.2d 872 (2002), cert. denied, - N.C. - , 599 S.E.2d 408 (2004).

Adequacy of Notice. - Trial court's judgment to modify a child custody award and award sole custody of the minor children to the mother was affirmed because the father admitted that he was on actual notice that a motion to modify custody was set to be heard, but was continued to some date in the future in order to accommodate his need to find new counsel. In addition, he had actual notice of the scheduled court date for the hearing days prior to leaving for a planned vacation, but chose to proceed with the trip rather than attend the hearing; therefore, he had adequate notice of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard. Trivette v. Trivette, 162 N.C. App. 55, 590 S.E.2d 298 (2004).

No Notice. - Where there was no motion for custody before the trial court, there was no notice of a motion for custody as required by subdivision (d)(1) of this section. Jones v. Jones, 109 N.C. App. 293, 426 S.E.2d 468 (1993).

Notice Held Sufficient. - Mother had received adequate notice that the hearing would include changes to the visitation schedule since the father had moved the court for an order finding and holder the mother in contempt for her disobedience and failure to comply with the provision of prior orders entered in the case. Anderson v. Lackey, 163 N.C. App. 246, 593 S.E.2d 87 (2004).

V. HEARING.

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Time-tested methods for assuring an adequate and fair hearing must be applied in child custody proceedings. In re Griffin, 6 N.C. App. 375, 170 S.E.2d 84 (1969).

The question of custody is one addressed to the trial court. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966).

And Not to a Jury. - Determining the custody of minor children is never the province of a jury; it is that of the judge of the court in which the proceeding is pending. Stanback v. Stanback, 270 N.C. 497, 155 S.E.2d 221 (1967).

No Right to Jury Trial on Custody and Support Issues. - Pursuant to subsection (h) of this section, a supporting spouse is not entitled to a jury trial on the matter of custody and support of minor children. Austin v. Austin, 12 N.C. App. 286, 183 S.E.2d 420 (1971).

In a wife's action for alimony without divorce and for custody and support of the children, a trial court properly removed the case from the trial docket when the wife abandoned her claim to alimony, and the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of abandonment of his children. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 9 N.C. App. 453, 176 S.E.2d 358 (1970).

Jury to Determine Question of Fact. - Whether a child was a "minor child of the marriage" within the purview of former G.S. 50-13 could be a question of fact rather than an issue of fact, and the trial court could call a jury to its aid to hear the evidence and determine the question. Carter v. Carter, 232 N.C. 614, 61 S.E.2d 711 (1950).

An award of permanent custody may not be based upon affidavits. Story v. Story, 57 N.C. App. 509, 291 S.E.2d 923 (1982).

And Affidavits Are Not Admissible to Establish Material Facts in Custody Proceedings. - The question to be determined in child custody hearings is certainly as important as any presented in the usual contract or tort litigation. Affidavits are not, as a rule, admissible in the trial of contract and tort cases as independent evidence to establish facts material to the issues being tried, and there is no more justification for resort to inferior evidence in child custody proceedings than in such other litigations. In re Griffin, 6 N.C. App. 375, 170 S.E.2d 84 (1969).

But a party to a child custody proceeding must object when affidavits are offered or ask permission to cross-examine, or else his silence will be deemed to give consent. By implication, if timely objection is made, affidavits should not be received, at least not without affording an opportunity for cross-examination. In re Griffin, 6 N.C. App. 375, 170 S.E.2d 84 (1969).

VI. TEMPORARY CUSTODY AND SUPPORT.

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Court Has Inherent Authority to Make Temporary Orders. - A court having jurisdiction of children located within this State has the inherent authority to protect those children and to make such temporary orders as their best interests may require. MacKenzie v. MacKenzie, 21 N.C. App. 403, 204 S.E.2d 561 (1974).

Subdivisions (c)(2) and (d)(2) give the courts jurisdiction to enter temporary custody and support orders for minor children. Story v. Story, 57 N.C. App. 509, 291 S.E.2d 923 (1982).

Under subdivision (d)(2) of this section, in appropriate cases the court may enter orders for the temporary custody of a child pending the service of process. Zajicek v. Zajicek, 12 N.C. App. 563, 183 S.E.2d 850 (1971); Broaddus v. Broaddus, 45 N.C. App. 666, 263 S.E.2d 842 (1980). See also, Lynch v. Lynch, 45 N.C. App. 391, 264 S.E.2d 114 (1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 302 N.C. 189, 274 S.E.2d 212 (1981), modified on rehearing, 303 N.C. 367, 279 S.E.2d 840 (1981).

Once one of the bases for jurisdiction listed in G.S. 50A-3(a) has been established, the court may enter an ex parte order for temporary custody prior to service of process or notice, if the circumstances of the case render it appropriate. Hart v. Hart, 74 N.C. App. 1, 327 S.E.2d 631 (1985).

Emergency Order Not Warranted. - When defendant filed a motion for emergency custody on the day that plaintiff's five-week summer visitation was to begin, alleging the parties' child was exposed to a substantial risk of bodily injury or sexual abuse, and an immediate order curtailing plaintiff's visitation was necessary pursuant to G.S. 50-13.5(d)(3), trial court did not err in imposing G.S. 1A-1-11(a) sanctions against defendant because defendant presented no evidence to substantiate the allegations of sexual abuse and had filed the motion for the improper purpose of blocking plaintiff's scheduled summer visitation. Lamm v. Lamm, 210 N.C. App. 181, 707 S.E.2d 685 (2011).

Temporary Orders May Be Entered Ex Parte. - Temporary orders under subdivision (c)(2) and (d)(2) of this section may be entered ex parte and prior to service of process or notice. Story v. Story, 57 N.C. App. 509, 291 S.E.2d 923 (1982); Regan v. Smith, 131 N.C. App. 851, 509 S.E.2d 452 (1998).

Affidavits may be used as a basis for temporary orders under subdivision (c)(2) and (d)(2) of this section. Story v. Story, 57 N.C. App. 509, 291 S.E.2d 923 (1982).

If the circumstances of a particular case so require, the court may enter an order for temporary custody, even pending service of process or notice under subsection (d)(1) of this section, and the use of affidavits as a basis for filing necessary facts for such purpose may be appropriate. In re Griffin, 6 N.C. App. 375, 170 S.E.2d 84 (1969).

There may be occasions when there is considerable urgency for a temporary order for the custody of a child. In such instances, the judge may reach a decision on the basis of affidavits and other evidence produced at a preliminary hearing. The persons who have signed the affidavit are, of course, not present and there is no opportunity to cross-examine them, but this is said not to be objectionable, because the ultimate right of examination will be afforded the parties at the trial of the cause. Brandon v. Brandon, 10 N.C. App. 457, 179 S.E.2d 177 (1971).

Temporary Order Not Rendered Null and Void by Entry Prior to Service. - Clearly, under subdivision (e)(3) of this section, the fact that defendant was not served prior to the court's entry of a temporary order would not thereby render such order null and void. Broaddus v. Broaddus, 45 N.C. App. 666, 263 S.E.2d 842 (1980).

Temporary Custody Order Did Not Become Permanent Order. - Trial court erred in determining a June 2010 temporary custody order had, by operation of time, become a permanent custody order because the temporary order did not determine the issue of visitation, and a permanent custody hearing was set in less than twelve months from the entry of the temporary order; the father would not have been entitled to any visitation with the children if the temporary order had become the permanent order. Woodring v. Woodring, - N.C. App. - , 742 S.E.2d 295 (2013).

Order Was Temporary. - Order granting a father visitation was temporary because it did not determine all the issues a hearing was set within a reasonable time, and the temporary order did not, therefore, become a final order by operation of time. Woodring v. Woodring, 227 N.C. App. 638, 745 S.E.2d 13 (2013).

VII. VISITATION RIGHTS.

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A. IN GENERAL.

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Visitation rights should not be permitted to jeopardize a child's welfare. In re Jones, 62 N.C. App. 103, 302 S.E.2d 259 (1983).

While a noncustodial parent has a right to reasonable visitation, that right is limited to avoid jeopardizing the child's welfare. Woncik v. Woncik, 82 N.C. App. 244, 346 S.E.2d 277 (1986).

The award of visitation rights is a judicial function which may not be delegated to the custodial parent. Brewington v. Serrato, 77 N.C. App. 726, 336 S.E.2d 444 (1985).

Order giving custodial parent exclusive control over visitation will not be sustained. Brewington v. Serrato, 77 N.C. App. 726, 336 S.E.2d 444 (1985).

Duty of Court to Include Visitation Provision. - Once the parties failed to agree, it was the duty of the trial judge to safeguard defendant's right to visitation by including a provision in its order specifying visitation periods. Brewington v. Serrato, 77 N.C. App. 726, 336 S.E.2d 444 (1985).

Trial court is not required to make specific findings to support a visitation schedule whenever a party contends the frequency of visitation is not reasonable. Raynor v. Odom, 124 N.C. App. 724, 478 S.E.2d 655 (1996).

Visitation and child support rights are independent rights accruing primarily to the benefit of the minor child and one is not, and may not be made, contingent upon the other. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

Receipt of Support May Not Be Conditioned on Visitation. - A trial judge does not have authority to condition a minor child's receipt of support paid by the noncustodial parent on compliance with court-ordered visitation allowed the noncustodial parent by ordering that child support paid by defendant be placed in escrow if minor child fails or refuses to abide by the visitation privileges allowed defendant. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

Enforcement of Visitation Orders. - Trial judges in this State have authority to enforce orders providing for visitation by the methods set forth in G.S. 50-13.3, that is, by contempt proceedings and by injunction. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

Modification of Visitation Order. - Because the trial court's visitation order was a permanent order, the trial court erred by failing to mention its latest permanent order and purporting to modify that older order; Woodring v. Woodring, 227 N.C. App. 638, 745 S.E.2d 13 (2013).

B. DENIAL OF PARENTS' RIGHTS.

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Presumption In Custody Disputes Between Two Parents. - North Carolina Supreme Court also expressly overrules Moore v. Moore, 160 N.C. App. 569, 587 S.E.2d 74 (2003), and any other Court of Appeals decisions purporting to apply the Petersen v. Rogers presumption in custody disputes between two parents. Routten v. Routten, 374 N.C. 571, 843 S.E.2d 154 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 958, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 5995, 208 L. Ed. 2d 495 (U.S. 2020).

Abandonment as Ground to Deny Visitation Rights. - The general rule is that abandonment, by itself, does not constitute sufficient ground to deny visitation rights completely, and this rule is in accord with the principle adopted by the courts that the purpose of denying custody or visitation rights is not to punish the noncustodial parent. Johnson v. Johnson, 45 N.C. App. 644, 263 S.E.2d 822 (1980).

Contingent Termination of Visitation. - Where the trial judge had ample evidence before him to justify a conclusion that mother had purposefully engaged in a course of conduct designed to alienate the child's affections for his father, and that these actions were detrimental to the child's welfare, he did not abuse his discretion in fashioning an order directing termination of mother's visitation privilege, pending a court hearing, applicable only on the happening of a certain condition (a repetition of that course of conduct), designed to prevent further harm to the child from this type of behavior. Woncik v. Woncik, 82 N.C. App. 244, 346 S.E.2d 277 (1986).

Temporary Suspension of Visitation Rights. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in a child custody matter, in which primary physical custody of the parties' children was awarded to the father, by temporarily suspending the mother's visitation with the children pending their completion of a reunification program designed to repair the children's relationship with the father, which the trial court found had been damaged by the mother's alienating behaviors. Sneed v. Sneed, 261 N.C. App. 448, 820 S.E.2d 536 (2018).

Conditions on Parental Visitation. - Trial court erred in granting a father the exclusive authority to decide when, where, and if the mother had visitation and to decide under whose supervision the mother had visitation because giving the father the exclusive control over the mother's visitation could result in a complete denial of the mother's right, G.S. 50-13.5(i), and delegated a judicial function to the father. Woodring v. Woodring, - N.C. App. - , 742 S.E.2d 295 (2013).

Restrictions on Visitation Rights. - Trial court did not err in making its visitation determinations based upon its inability to determine the noncustodial parent's fitness as a parent, mainly because of the parent's refusal to testify regarding the child pornography allegations. The court stated in its order that it would revisit the issue of visitation once the parent obtained a psychological evaluation and a parenting assessment, and once the court obtained the results of forensic evaluation of the material recovered from the parent's computer. Meadows v. Meadows, 246 N.C. App. 245, 782 S.E.2d 561 (2016).

Findings Required Where Severe Restrictions Are Placed on Visitation Rights. - Where severe restrictions are placed on a parent's visitation rights with his child, there should be some finding of fact, supported by competent evidence in the record, warranting such restrictions. Johnson v. Johnson, 45 N.C. App. 644, 263 S.E.2d 822 (1980).

Where hostilities exist between estranged parents, it may be difficult for the noncustodial parent to maintain a relationship with his or her child when required to exercise visitation only in the presence of the other parent or a member of the other parent's family who may share such hostilities. There are, of course, circumstances warranting such restrictions, but if they are imposed, they must be based on appropriate factual findings. Johnson v. Johnson, 45 N.C. App. 644, 263 S.E.2d 822 (1980).

When severe restrictions are placed on the right of visitation, this section requires the trial judge to make findings of fact supported by competent evidence which warrant the restrictions. Falls v. Falls, 52 N.C. App. 203, 278 S.E.2d 546, cert. denied, 304 N.C. 390, 285 S.E.2d 831 (1981).

Subsection (i) of this section requires specific findings of fact to justify certain visitation restrictions. Sloop v. Friberg, 70 N.C. App. 690, 320 S.E.2d 921 (1984).

Because the parameters placed on a mother's visitation with the mother's child were not the severe restrictions that effectively denied the right of reasonable visitation, the trial court did not err by entering the court's visitation order without finding that the mother was an unfit person to have reasonable visitation. Evidence supported the finding that the mother's behavior had caused the child stress and been deleterious to the child's well-being so that it was in the best interest of the child that the mother was supervised for extended visits. Paynich v. Vestal, - N.C. App. - , 837 S.E.2d 433 (2020).

When Finding of Unfitness Is Not Necessary. - Trial court may grant full custody to one parent and deny visitation to the other parent, so long as the trial court has entered a written finding of fact that such a custody award is in the best interests of the children, without the need to have determined that the parent who has been denied visitation is a person deemed by the trial court to be unfit to spend time with the children. Routten v. Routten, 374 N.C. 571, 843 S.E.2d 154 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 958, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 5995, 208 L. Ed. 2d 495 (U.S. 2020).

Trial court denied visitation by defendant with the children without a determination that she was unfit; as there was no dispute that the trial court found that visitation with defendant would not be in the best interests of the children, this was a proper standard to apply in resolving the custody and visitation matters. Routten v. Routten, 374 N.C. 571, 843 S.E.2d 154 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 958, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 5995, 208 L. Ed. 2d 495 (U.S. 2020).

Statute identifies two different circumstances in which a parent can be denied visitation, and the disjunctive term "or" in G.S. 50-13.5(i) establishes that either of the circumstances is sufficient to justify the trial judge's decision to deny visitation; in a dispute between two parents, if the trial court determines that visitation with one parent is not in a child's best interests, then the trial court is authorized to deny visitation without a requirement to find the parent in question is unfit. Routten v. Routten, 374 N.C. 571, 843 S.E.2d 154 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 958, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 5995, 208 L. Ed. 2d 495 (U.S. 2020).

In a dispute between two parents with equal parental rights, the trial court must apply the best interest of the child standard to determine custody and visitation questions, and if the court determines that one parent should not be awarded reasonable visitation, the court shall make a written finding of fact that the parent being denied visitation rights is an unfit person to visit the child or that such visitation rights are not in the best interest of the child. Routten v. Routten, 374 N.C. 571, 843 S.E.2d 154 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 958, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 5995, 208 L. Ed. 2d 495 (U.S. 2020).

Visitation Rights Eliminated. - Trial court properly granted sole custody of a child to the mother and eliminated a father's visitation privileges because the findings of fact supported its conclusion that the father could have no direct contact with the child; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the mother not to inform the father of her and the child's address because the father threatened to kill her, failed to engage in therapy and to benefit from a domestic violence program, and was violent with her. Huml v. Huml, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 532 (2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by eliminating a father's access to information because the restriction was based on the specific facts of the case, and the trial court described its rationale in detail; the order was exceptionally detailed, well-organized, and thorough because the trial court noted the factual basis for the restrictions even to obtaining information from third parties and made detailed findings regarding the father's failure to follow the requirements of prior orders. Huml v. Huml, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 532 (2019).

Trial court properly granted sole custody of a child to the mother and eliminated a father's visitation privileges because the father consistently refused to take advantage of any opportunity to allow him to resume visitation; the father repeatedly failed to participate in counseling as ordered, to take medication as prescribed, to comply with orders regarding public visitation and with the rules governing supervised visitation, and to protect the child from exposure to domestic violence. Huml v. Huml, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 532 (2019).

Findings of Fact. - Trial court properly granted sole custody of a child to the mother and eliminated a father's visitation privileges because its findings of fact were sufficient; the trial court did not find that any inappropriate sexual contact or behavior actually happened but was concerned about the possibility of inappropriate sexual behavior; however, the evidence was not sufficient for the trial court to make a finding it had occurred or had not occurred. Huml v. Huml, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 532 (2019).

Findings Held Sufficient. - Finding of trial court that defendant had previously taken minor child to Texas under a false pretense and had subsequently refused to return him to North Carolina was a sufficient and appropriate factual finding to support the court's limitation as to the location of visitation (in North Carolina at plaintiff 's home.) Brewington v. Serrato, 77 N.C. App. 726, 336 S.E.2d 444 (1985).

Judge did not err by imposing excessive restrictions on mother's visitations with her son; evidence supported the judge's finding that mother's demonstrations of anger and hostility in the presence of the child and her frustration of the relationship between the child and father necessitated, for the child's best interest, the restrictions the judge imposed on the visitation. Correll v. Allen, 94 N.C. App. 464, 380 S.E.2d 580 (1989).

Trial court erred in suspending a father's visitation because the trial court failed to make written findings of fact regarding the fitness of the father or the best interests of the children, as required by G.S. 50-13.5(i). Maxwell v. Maxwell, 212 N.C. App. 614, 713 S.E.2d 489 (2011).

Trial court found that it would not be in the children's best interests to have any visitation with the father because he confessed that he had engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior with one of his minor daughters; he entered pleas of guilty to five counts of indecent liberties with that minor daughter; and he engaged in grooming behaviors with his other two daughters and inappropriately touched them. Respess v. Respess, 232 N.C. App. 611, 754 S.E.2d 691 (2014).

Findings Held Insufficient. - The trial court's findings in a child custody proceeding that respondent mother had abandoned her child and that it would not be in the best interests of the child for him to be carried back and forth between North Carolina, home of the father, and New Jersey, home of the mother, were insufficient to support the trial court's order restricting respondent's visiting privileges, which were limited to one weekend a month, to occasions only when petitioner father or his designated representative was present. Johnson v. Johnson, 45 N.C. App. 644, 263 S.E.2d 822 (1980).

No competent evidence showed that the father had engaged in any conduct that warranted forfeiture of his visitation rights or that the exercise of his visitation rights would be detrimental to the child's best interest, and the court's factual finding that the motel room where the father lived was an unfit environment for visitation did not support supervised visitation. Hinkle v. Hartsell, 131 N.C. App. 833, 509 S.E.2d 455 (1998).

Where the court merely recited the testimony of witnesses and did not make the required findings of fact, further findings of fact and a determination of the father's parental fitness was needed if he was to be denied all contact with his daughter. Moore v. Moore, 160 N.C. App. 569, 587 S.E.2d 74 (2003).

C. GRANDPARENTS' RIGHTS.

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Standing to Seek Grandparent Visitation. - Paternal grandparents had statutory standing to seek permanent visitation rights, notwithstanding that the father had died, as they had been allowed to intervene when custody between the father and the mother was in dispute. Alexander v. Alexander, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Mar. 16, 2021).

Modification of Grandparents' Visitation Rights. - Before an order providing visitation for grandparents of a minor child may be modified, the party seeking modification must show changed circumstances and an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. In re Jones, 62 N.C. App. 103, 302 S.E.2d 259 (1983).

Grandparents' Right to Seek Visitation Terminated Upon Death of Daughter/Non-Custodial Parent. - The trial court's jurisdiction over the issues of visitation and custody regarding plaintiff's grandchildren terminated upon the death of plaintiff's daughter, where the son-in-law had exclusive custody. Price v. Breedlove, 138 N.C. App. 149, 530 S.E.2d 559 (2000).

Visitation Rights Survived Termination of Parental Rights. - Trial court erred in concluding a grandmother's visitation rights under a prior custody order did not survive termination of a mother's parental rights because the grandmother not only intervened in the case but also obtained visitation rights via a permanent custody order; thus, the termination of the mother's parental rights did not extinguish the grandmother's court-ordered visitation rights, and the grandmother could seek to enforce the prior custody order through contempt proceedings. Adams v. Langdon, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 236 (2019).

Right to File Suit. - Subsection (j) of this section makes it clear that grandparents have the right to file suit for custody or visitation during an ongoing proceeding, but it does not restrict their right to bring an initial custody suit pursuant to G.S. 50-13.1 when there are allegations that the parent is unfit. Sharp v. Sharp, 124 N.C. App. 357, 477 S.E.2d 258 (1996).

The grandmother did not have standing under this section to seek visitation rights with her grandchildren, where the children had been adopted by their biological aunt and her husband, and there was no custody dispute. Hill v. Newman, 131 N.C. App. 793, 509 S.E.2d 226 (1998).

There are four statutes in North Carolina which permit a grandparent to maintain an action for custody or visitation of a minor child, and although plaintiff, mother of the deceased father of the two minor children, did not specify under which statute she filed, it was clear that she had no right to proceed under G.S. 50-13.1(a), 50-13.2(b1), 50-13.2A, or under this section. Shaut v. Cannon, 136 N.C. App. 834, 526 S.E.2d 214 (2000).

Grandparents lacked standing to bring a claim for visitation because there was no ongoing custody proceeding, as the mother had a natural and legal right to custody and control of the child upon the father's death and the child had not been adopted by a stepparent or relative. Graham v. Jones, - N.C. App. - , 842 S.E.2d 153 (2020).

Grandparents' Rights When Family Intact - Under G.S. 50-13.1(a), 50-13.2(b1), 50-13.2A, and 50-13.5(j), a grandparent's right to visitation arises either in the context of an ongoing custody proceeding or where the minor child is in the custody of a stepparent or a relative - the "intact family" rule; in a case that does not involve adoption by a stepparent or other relative, a grandparent must prove that the child's family is not intact before the grandparent can intervene to request visitation with his grandchild - G.S. 50-13.1(a), 50-13.2(b1), 50-13.2A, 50-13.5(j) does not grant grandparents the right to sue for visitation when no custody proceeding is ongoing and the minor children's family is intact. Eakett v. Eakett, 157 N.C. App. 550, 579 S.E.2d 486 (2003).

Lack of Intact Family Was Not Alleged So Grandparent Could Have Standing to Intervene for Visitation - Under G.S. 50-13.5(j), a grandparent was required to, and did not, allege that the wife and the child were not an "intact family" or that the underlying custody controversy had become active; therefore, his complaint did not allege facts to support his claim, so he lacked standing to intervene to gain visitation, and the grant of the motion to dismiss his claim for visitation was appropriate. Eakett v. Eakett, 157 N.C. App. 550, 579 S.E.2d 486 (2003).

Single Parent and One Child Can Be Intact Family - Single parent and her child can constitute an "intact family" for the purposes of the intact family rule. Eakett v. Eakett, 157 N.C. App. 550, 579 S.E.2d 486 (2003).


§ 50-13.6. Counsel fees in actions for custody and support of minor children.

In an action or proceeding for the custody or support, or both, of a minor child, including a motion in the cause for the modification or revocation of an existing order for custody or support, or both, the court may in its discretion order payment of reasonable attorney's fees to an interested party acting in good faith who has insufficient means to defray the expense of the suit. Before ordering payment of a fee in a support action, the court must find as a fact that the party ordered to furnish support has refused to provide support which is adequate under the circumstances existing at the time of the institution of the action or proceeding; provided however, should the court find as a fact that the supporting party has initiated a frivolous action or proceeding the court may order payment of reasonable attorney's fees to an interested party as deemed appropriate under the circumstances.

History

(1967, c. 1153, s. 2; 1973, c. 323.)

Legal Periodicals. - For survey of 1976 case law on domestic relations, see 55 N.C.L. Rev. 1018 (1977).

For survey of 1977 law on domestic relations, see 56 N.C.L. Rev. 1045 (1978).

For article, "Using Hindsight to Change Child Support Obligations: A Survey of Retroactive Modification and Reimbursement of Child Support in North Carolina," see 10 Campbell L. Rev. 111 (1987).

CASE NOTES

I. IN GENERAL.

Notice and Due Process Considerations. - Although this section and G.S. 50-16.4 provide for attorney's fees in both modification of child support actions and alimony actions, this authority does not override a party's basic constitutional rights to notice and due process considerations. Spencer v. Spencer, 133 N.C. App. 38, 514 S.E.2d 283 (1999).

This section applies to a proceeding to compel the future support of the child. Tidwell v. Booker, 290 N.C. 98, 225 S.E.2d 816 (1976).

And not to a proceeding to compel reimbursement for past payments made by a person secondarily liable for such child's support. Tidwell v. Booker, 290 N.C. 98, 225 S.E.2d 816 (1976).

The legislature set different standards in actions for support and in actions for custody and support in enacting this section. Taylor v. Taylor, 343 N.C. 50, 468 S.E.2d 33 (1996).

This section does not require a determination that one spouse is a dependent spouse and the other a supporting spouse. Taylor v. Taylor, 343 N.C. 50, 468 S.E.2d 33 (1996).

Attorneys' fees are not recoverable in an action for equitable distribution, so that, in a combined action, the fees awarded must be attributable to work by the attorneys on the divorce, alimony and child support actions. Patterson v. Patterson, 81 N.C. App. 255, 343 S.E.2d 595 (1986); Holder v. Holder, 87 N.C. App. 578, 361 S.E.2d 891 (1987).

Settlement Agreement May Provide for Recovery of Attorney's Fees. - The public policy of this State encourages settlement agreements and supports the inclusion of a provision for the recovery of attorney's fees in settlement agreements. Bromhal v. Stott, 341 N.C. 702, 462 S.E.2d 219 (1995).

Applicability in Action Involving Illegitimate Child. - This section does not apply to civil actions to establish paternity under G.S. 49-14, but would authorize an award of reasonable attorneys' fees for custody and support actions involving an illegitimate child whose paternity has been determined. Smith v. Price, 74 N.C. App. 413, 328 S.E.2d 811 (1985), modified on other grounds, 315 N.C. 523, 340 S.E.2d 408 (1986).

Attorneys' fees incurred in prosecuting paternity actions may not be awarded under this section, but may only be assessed as costs under G.S. 6-21(10). Napowsa v. Langston, 95 N.C. App. 14, 381 S.E.2d 882, cert. denied, 325 N.C. 709, 388 S.E.2d 460 (1989).

G.S. 50-13.6 did not apply to a civil action to establish paternity under G.S. 49-14. Guilford County ex rel. Holt v. Puckett, 191 N.C. App. 693, 664 S.E.2d 362 (2008).

Visitation Action Qualifies As Custody Action for Attorney Fee Purposes. - Action by intervening grandparents for visitation qualifies as an action for custody, and if that action falls within the scope of G.S. 50-13.6 as an action for the custody, support, or both of a minor child for the purposes of awarding fees to the grandparents, then such an action must also fall within the scope of the statute for purposes of ordering the grandparents to pay; an award of fees against grandparents seeking visitation rights was authorized. Sullivan v. Woody, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 306 (2020).

Contingent Fee Agreements Not Enforceable. - A contract for the payment of a fee to an attorney contingent upon his procuring a divorce for his client or contingent in amount upon the amount of alimony and/or property awarded is void as against public policy. Such a contract is unenforceable exclusively by virtue of the fact that it violates the public policy of this State. Thompson v. Thompson, 70 N.C. App. 147, 319 S.E.2d 315 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 313 N.C. 313, 328 S.E.2d 288 (1985).

A trial court has no