I. IN GENERAL.

Constitutionality. - This section, as amended, is not unconstitutional on grounds that it violates equal protection by preserving a dependent spouse's right to alimony without at the same time preserving all other property rights incident to continuation of the marital status, as the equal protection clauses of the State and federal Constitutions prohibit denial of the equal protection of the laws to persons, not to rights. Edwards v. Edwards, 42 N.C. App. 301, 256 S.E.2d 728 (1979).

Abolition of the defense of recrimination in a divorce action based on a year's separation does not deprive a spouse who was married before such abolition of a vested property right under the due process clause of the federal Constitution or the "law of the land clause" of N.C. Const., Art. I, § 19. Nor does it deprive defendant husband of a vested property right as a tenant by the entirety without due process of law on grounds that it permits plaintiff wife to obtain a divorce from defendant and defeat defendant's right upon wife's death to become the sole owner of property held by the parties as tenants by the entirety. Sawyer v. Sawyer, 54 N.C. App. 141, 282 S.E.2d 527 (1981).

This section is an indication of this State's policy, as exhibited by legislation, that if the parties have lived separate and apart for one year, the marriage is no longer viable and is not worth saving. Bruce v. Bruce, 79 N.C. App. 579, 339 S.E.2d 855, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 701, 347 S.E.2d 36 (1986).

Purpose of Section. - This section was enacted in order to enable a husband and wife to terminate their marriage without the sensationalism and public airing of dirty linen which necessarily accompany a divorce based on fault. Harrington v. Harrington, 22 N.C. App. 419, 206 S.E.2d 742, rev'd on other grounds, 286 N.C. 260, 210 S.E.2d 190 (1974).

This section creates an independent cause of divorce. Pickens v. Pickens, 258 N.C. 84, 127 S.E.2d 889 (1962); Gray v. Gray, 16 N.C. App. 730, 193 S.E.2d 492 (1972).

And Provides for "No Fault" Divorce. - As to divorces grounded on a one-year separation of the parties, this State is a "no fault" jurisdiction; that is, a showing that the parties have achieved the required periods of residency and separation is all that is necessary to obtain a divorce in this State under this section. Morris v. Morris, 45 N.C. App. 69, 262 S.E.2d 359 (1980).

Jurisdictional Requirements. - Under this section, in order to maintain an action for divorce, the husband and wife shall have (1) lived separate and apart for two years (now one year), and (2) the plaintiff, husband or wife, shall have resided in this State for a period of one year (now six months). These two requirements are jurisdictional, and if either one or the other of these elements does not exist, the court would not have jurisdiction to try the action and any decree rendered would be void. Henderson v. Henderson, 232 N.C. 1, 59 S.E.2d 227 (1950).

Under this section, in order to maintain an action for divorce, the husband and wife shall have (1) lived separate and apart for two years (now one year); and (2) the plaintiff, husband or wife, shall have resided in this State for a period of six months. The jurisdictional requirement as to residence under this section is met by allegation and proof of residence within this State for a period of six months next preceding the commencement of the action. Denson v. Denson, 255 N.C. 703, 122 S.E.2d 507 (1961).

To obtain a divorce pursuant to this section, all that is required is proof that the parties have lived separate and apart for one year and that one of the parties has lived in this State for six months next preceding institution of the suit. Bruce v. Bruce, 79 N.C. App. 579, 339 S.E.2d 855, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 701, 347 S.E.2d 36 (1986).

Statute of Limitations Not Applicable to Actions for Absolute Divorce. - Balancing the reasons for having statutes of limitation against this State's public policy of endeavoring to maintain the marital state on the one hand and not denying divorce to parties who have demonstrated a ground for divorce on the other hand, the general, residuary statute of limitations, G.S. 1-56, should not be applied to actions for absolute divorce under this section. Bruce v. Bruce, 79 N.C. App. 579, 339 S.E.2d 855, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 701, 347 S.E.2d 36 (1986).

Accrual of Cause of Action. - Separation, as a ground for divorce, is a type of continuing offense. It begins on the date the parties physically separate with the requisite intention that the separation remain permanent, and the cause of action under this section accrues at the end of one year. However, the cause of action continues to accrue even after the one year period, so long as the parties remain "separate and apart" within the meaning of the statute. Bruce v. Bruce, 79 N.C. App. 579, 339 S.E.2d 855, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 701, 347 S.E.2d 36 (1986).

But, the cessation of sexual relations alone does not constitute separation. Lin v. Lin, 108 N.C. App. 772, 425 S.E.2d 9 (1993).

An interlocutory appeal to determine the date of separation for the purposes of equitable distribution was rightfully dismissed, as the parties had been separated for a period far in excess of one year and as the date of separation was irrelevant to the validity of the divorce. Stafford v. Stafford, 351 N.C. 94, 520 S.E.2d 785 (1999).

Proper Parties. - The only persons who may bring an action for absolute divorce are those persons who are lawfully married to one another. Where there are children born to a marriage, it is neither proper nor necessary for them to be made parties to an action for divorce between their parents. Likewise, the only necessary parties in an action to set aside an absolute divorce decree after one spouse's death are the surviving spouse and the personal representative of the deceased spouse. Thomas v. Thomas, 43 N.C. App. 638, 260 S.E.2d 163 (1979).

Required Findings. - The court erred in declaring the parties' divorce decree void where the divorce decree at issue was "in all respects regular on [its] face" and the defendant was properly served; the court's findings, required by this section, were found under the heading "Conclusions of Law" rather than under "Findings of Fact." Dunevant v. Dunevant, 142 N.C. App. 169, 542 S.E.2d 242 (2001).

Applicability of G.S. 50-10. - The application to divorces under this section of the G.S. 50-10 requirement that the factual allegations supporting the divorce must be deemed denied requires a finding of the necessary facts. While it remains sound public policy not to allow the granting of such divorces on the pleadings, it would, nevertheless, appear that it would make good jurisprudential sense to clearly remove divorces under this section from the more cumbersome jury procedure and provide that all such cases be heard by the judge without a jury. Morris v. Morris, 45 N.C. App. 69, 262 S.E.2d 359 (1980).

Allegations and Proof Sufficient to Entitle Plaintiff to Divorce. - Where the complaint alleges, and there is evidence tending to show, that husband and wife, "have lived separate and apart for two years (now one year)" next immediately preceding the institution of the action, and that plaintiff "has resided in the State for a period of six months," nothing else appearing, the establishment of these allegations by proof would entitle plaintiff to a divorce. This section so provides. Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 80, 33 S.E.2d 492 (1945).

It is unnecessary to set out in the complaint the cause of the separation or to allege that it was without fault on the part of plaintiff or to aver that it was by mutual agreement of the parties. Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 80, 33 S.E.2d 492 (1945).

In order to be entitled to a divorce on the ground of separation, plaintiff must show the fact of marriage, that the parties have lived separate and apart for two years (now one year), and that plaintiff has been a resident of the State for one year (now six months). Oliver v. Oliver, 219 N.C. 299, 13 S.E.2d 549 (1941).

Where, in an action under this section, the testimony adduced by plaintiff is sufficient to establish, at the commencement of the action, that the plaintiff and defendant were husband and wife, that both of them had resided in the State for a period of six months, and that they had lived separate and apart within the meaning of the statute for an uninterrupted period of two years (now one year), the trial judge rightly refused to nonsuit the action. Mallard v. Mallard, 234 N.C. 654, 68 S.E.2d 247 (1951).

Complaint seeking an absolute divorce was not fatally defective in failing to allege that the parties lived separate and apart for one year with the intention by at least one of them that the separation be permanent, where it contained the allegations required by this section. Sharp v. Sharp, 84 N.C. App. 128, 351 S.E.2d 799 (1987).

Trial court's summary divorce judgment was not disturbed because it was uncontested that statutory residency and time requirements were met. Khaja v. Husna, 243 N.C. App. 330, 777 S.E.2d 781 (2015), dismissed, 780 S.E.2d 757, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1310 (2015), dismissed, 781 S.E.2d 293, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1291 (2015).

Joinder of Grounds in Complaint. - Where the grounds are listed in the statutes for the same kind of divorce, the several grounds may be joined in one complaint, and the decree may be granted on any one of the grounds proved. Swygert v. Swygert, 46 N.C. App. 173, 264 S.E.2d 902 (1980).

Statement in Answer. - In an action under this section, it was held that the mere statement in the answer that the allegation in the complaint "that plaintiff and defendant have not lived together as man and wife since April 1, 1942, is not denied," was not an admission of a "separation." Moody v. Moody, 225 N.C. 89, 33 S.E.2d 491 (1945).

Stay Not Required. - A stay of plaintiff's action for absolute divorce was not required pending resolution of defendant's counterclaim for alimony in plaintiff's earlier action for divorce from bed and board, since defendant's claim for alimony, having been asserted in the prior action, would not be affected by an absolute divorce obtained by plaintiff in the action for absolute divorce. Edwards v. Edwards, 42 N.C. App. 301, 256 S.E.2d 728 (1979).

When Issues to Be Passed on by Jury. - In an action under this section, where the complaint alleged sufficient facts and defendant in her answer set up a divorce a mensa with alimony granted her on the grounds of abandonment, to which plaintiff replied without admission of wrongful or unlawful conduct on his part, a judgment for defendant on the pleadings was erroneous, as there were issues of fact raised to be tried by a jury. Lockhart v. Lockhart, 223 N.C. 123, 25 S.E.2d 465 (1943).

When Plaintiff May Not Voluntarily Dismiss Claim. - Where plaintiff seeks divorce upon the ground of one year's separation and defendant in his answer likewise prays for a divorce upon the same ground, defendant's prayer is in effect a counterclaim, and plaintiff therefore cannot voluntarily dismiss her claim without defendant's consent. The rationale for this rule is that it would be manifestly unjust to allow a plaintiff who comes into court upon solemn allegations which, if true, entitle defendant to some affirmative relief against the plaintiff, to withdraw, ex parte, the allegations after defendant has demanded the relief to which they entitle him. McCarley v. McCarley, 289 N.C. 109, 221 S.E.2d 490 (1976).

Estoppel from Challenging Divorce Judgment. - Where husband filed for divorce and performed some of his obligations under separation agreement for several years, remarried in reliance on the divorce judgment, and did not object to the validity of the divorce decree or the agreement until he sought to defend his failure to comply with the judgment on grounds that it was void, he was estopped from questioning its validity and effect. Amick v. Amick, 80 N.C. App. 291, 341 S.E.2d 613 (1986).

Modification of Custody Order in Action Under This Section. - An order awarding the custody of minor children determines the present rights of the parties, but is not permanent in nature, and is subject to modification for subsequent change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the children; therefore, an order of the court, entered pursuant to former G.S. 50-16, awarding the custody of the children to the wife, did not preclude another judge of the superior court from awarding custody of the children to the husband in the wife's later action for absolute divorce under this section. Thomas v. Thomas, 259 N.C. 461, 130 S.E.2d 871 (1963).

Child Support Action Not Barred. - The inclusion in divorce judgment of a paragraph identifying plaintiff's former husband as the father of plaintiff's child operated only to identify the existence of a child born of the marriage and was not the subject of litigation; thus, collateral estoppel did not bar child support action against defendant. Guilford County ex rel. Child Support Enforcement Unit ex rel. Gardner v. Davis, 123 N.C. App. 527, 473 S.E.2d 640 (1996).

Evidence of Mental Impairment. - In action for divorce based on one year's separation where defendant wife asserted incurable mental illness as a defense, although plaintiff offered no expert evidence concerning the diagnosis of defendant's condition, plaintiff's own testimony showed defendant's ability to perform usual daily tasks when her illness was controlled with medication; moreover, the testimony of defendant's treating psychiatrist and the person most familiar with her condition over an extended period of time, corroborated certain of plaintiff's evidence. Scott v. Scott, 336 N.C. 284, 442 S.E.2d 493 (1994).

Mental Impairment. - To bar an action for divorce based on one year's separation, the mental impairment must be to such extent that defendant does not understand what he or she is engaged in doing and the nature and consequences of the act. Scott v. Scott, 336 N.C. 284, 442 S.E.2d 493 (1994).

Trial court properly excluded evidence of defendant's health and her prospects for obtaining medical insurance following divorce. Such evidence is not relevant to the trial court's determination to grant or deny a divorce pursuant to this section. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 104 N.C. App. 225, 408 S.E.2d 753 (1991).

Alimony. - When a husband was granted an absolute divorce on the grounds of separation for one year, and the wife did not file a counterclaim or separate claim for alimony before the trial court entered a judgment of absolute divorce, which did not preserve an alimony claim, a statement in the wife's answer that "the claims for alimony and equitable distribution pending this action are to be reserved" was insufficient to give the trial court jurisdiction, under G.S. 50-11, to consider the wife's amended answer and counterclaim for alimony, despite the husband's answer to that counterclaim, as subject matter jurisdiction could not be conferred by the parties' consent. Stark v. Ratashara, 177 N.C. App. 449, 628 S.E.2d 471 (2006), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 536, 633 S.E.2d 826 (2006).

For cases decided under subdivisions (1) through (5) of former G.S. 50-5, which formerly set forth various grounds for divorce, see Wood v. Wood, 27 N.C. 674 (1845); Smith v. Morehead, 59 N.C. 360 (1863); Edwards v. Edwards, 61 N.C. 534 (1868); Barringer v. Barringer, 69 N.C. 179 (1873); Horne v. Horne, 72 N.C. 530, appeal dismissed, 72 N.C. 534 (1875); Long v. Long, 77 N.C. 304 (1877); McQueen v. McQueen, 82 N.C. 471 (1880); Webber v. Webber, 83 N.C. 280 (1880); Steel v. Steel, 104 N.C. 631, 10 S.E. 707 (1889); House v. House, 131 N.C. 140, 42 S.E. 546 (1902); Kinney v. Kinney, 149 N.C. 321, 63 S.E. 97 (1908); Ellett v. Ellett, 157 N.C. 161, 72 S.E. 861 (1911); Cooke v. Cooke, 164 N.C. 272, 80 S.E. 178 (1913); Alexander v. Alexander, 165 N.C. 45, 80 S.E. 890 (1914); Bryant v. Bryant, 171 N.C. 746, 88 S.E. 147 (1916); Sanderson v. Sanderson, 178 N.C. 339, 100 S.E. 590 (1919); Brown v. Brown, 182 N.C. 42, 108 S.E. 380 (1921); Lee v. Lee, 182 N.C. 61, 108 S.E. 352 (1921); Ellis v. Ellis, 190 N.C. 418, 130 S.E. 7 (1925); Nelson v. Nelson, 197 N.C. 465, 149 S.E. 585 (1929); Keys v. Tuten, 199 N.C. 368, 154 S.E. 631 (1930); Reeves v. Reeves, 203 N.C. 792, 167 S.E. 129 (1933); Smithdeal v. Smithdeal, 206 N.C. 397, 174 S.E. 118 (1934); Hyder v. Hyder, 210 N.C. 486, 187 S.E. 798 (1936); Burrowes v. Burrowes, 210 N.C. 788, 188 S.E. 648 (1936); Woodruff v. Woodruff, 215 N.C. 685, 3 S.E.2d 5 (1939); Young v. Young, 225 N.C. 340, 34 S.E.2d 154 (1945); Pearce v. Pearce, 225 N.C. 571, 35 S.E.2d 636 (1945); Pearce v. Pearce, 226 N.C. 307, 37 S.E.2d 904 (1946); Welch v. Welch, 226 N.C. 541, 39 S.E.2d 457 (1946); Smith v. Smith, 226 N.C. 544, 39 S.E.2d 458 (1946); Norman v. Norman, 230 N.C. 61, 51 S.E.2d 927 (1949); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 234 N.C. 1, 65 S.E.2d 375 (1951); Mallard v. Mallard, 234 N.C. 654, 68 S.E.2d 247 (1951); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 244 N.C. 286, 93 S.E.2d 617 (1956); Becker v. Becker, 262 N.C. 685, 138 S.E.2d 507 (1964); Wright v. Wright, 281 N.C. 159, 188 S.E.2d 317 (1972); Greene v. Greene, 15 N.C. App. 314, 190 S.E.2d 258 (1972); Owens v. Owens, 28 N.C. App. 713, 222 S.E.2d 704, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 95, 225 S.E.2d 324 (1976).

Applied in Hyder v. Hyder, 215 N.C. 239, 1 S.E.2d 540 (1939); Nall v. Nall, 229 N.C. 598, 50 S.E.2d 737 (1948); Deaton v. Deaton, 237 N.C. 487, 75 S.E.2d 398 (1953); O'Briant v. O'Briant, 239 N.C. 101, 79 S.E.2d 252 (1953); Whitener v. Whitener, 255 N.C. 731, 122 S.E.2d 705 (1961); Hutchins v. Hutchins, 260 N.C. 628, 133 S.E.2d 459 (1963); Richardson v. Richardson, 261 N.C. 521, 135 S.E.2d 532 (1964); Jones v. Jones, 261 N.C. 612, 135 S.E.2d 554 (1964); Ponder v. Ponder, 32 N.C. App. 150, 230 S.E.2d 786 (1977); Gerringer v. Gerringer, 42 N.C. App. 580, 257 S.E.2d 98 (1979); In re Hayes, 43 N.C. App. 515, 259 S.E.2d 327 (1979); Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, 43 N.C. App. 549, 259 S.E.2d 319 (1979); Mayer v. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. 522, 311 S.E.2d 659 (1984); Hinton v. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. 665, 321 S.E.2d 161 (1984).

Cited in Teasley v. Teasley, 205 N.C. 604, 172 S.E. 197 (1934); Smithdeal v. Smithdeal, 206 N.C. 397, 174 S.E. 118 (1934); Long v. Long, 206 N.C. 706, 175 S.E. 85 (1934); State v. Henderson, 207 N.C. 258, 176 S.E. 758 (1934); Campbell v. Campbell, 207 N.C. 859, 176 S.E. 250 (1934); Goodman v. Goodman, 208 N.C. 416, 181 S.E. 328 (1935); Brown v. Brown, 213 N.C. 347, 196 S.E. 333 (1938); Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 80, 33 S.E.2d 492 (1945); Carter v. Carter, 232 N.C. 614, 61 S.E.2d 711 (1950); McLean v. McLean, 233 N.C. 139, 63 S.E.2d 138 (1951); Livingston v. Livingston, 235 N.C. 515, 70 S.E.2d 480 (1952); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 244 N.C. 286, 93 S.E.2d 617 (1956); Shaver v. Shaver, 244 N.C. 309, 93 S.E.2d 614 (1956); Shaver v. Shaver, 248 N.C. 113, 102 S.E.2d 791 (1958); Sears v. Sears, 253 N.C. 415, 117 S.E.2d 7 (1960); Hicks v. Hicks, 275 N.C. 370, 167 S.E.2d 761 (1969); Wright v. Wright, 281 N.C. 159, 188 S.E.2d 317 (1972); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 296 N.C. 574, 251 S.E.2d 441 (1979); Wise v. Wise, 42 N.C. App. 5, 255 S.E.2d 570 (1979); O'Hara v. O'Hara, 46 N.C. App. 819, 266 S.E.2d 59 (1980); McCall v. Harris, 55 N.C. App. 390, 285 S.E.2d 335 (1982); Alexander v. Alexander, 68 N.C. App. 548, 315 S.E.2d 772 (1984); Buffington v. Buffington, 69 N.C. App. 483, 317 S.E.2d 97 (1984); Seifert v. Seifert, 82 N.C. App. 329, 346 S.E.2d 504 (1986); Banner v. Banner, 86 N.C. App. 397, 358 S.E.2d 110 (1987); Coombs v. Coombs, 121 N.C. App. 746, 468 S.E.2d 807 (1996); Daniel v. Daniel, 132 N.C. App. 217, 510 S.E.2d 689 (1999); Coleman v. Coleman, 1 82 N.C. App. 25, 641 S.E.2d 332 (2007); Adkins v. Stanly County Bd. of Educ., 203 N.C. App. 642, 692 S.E.2d 470 (2010); Dickson v. Rucho, 366 N.C. 332, 737 S.E.2d 362 (2013); Dechkovskaia v. Dechkovskaia, 232 N.C. App. 350, 754 S.E.2d 831 (2014), review denied, 758 S.E.2d 870, 2014 N.C. LEXIS 436 (2014).

II. SEPARATION.

Editor's Note. - Many of the cases below were decided prior to the 1987 amendment to this section, providing that isolated incidents of sexual intercourse shall not toll the statutory period for divorce predicated on one year separation. As to resumption of marital relations, see G.S. 52-10.2.

Parties Must Have Lived Separate and Apart for One Year. - The material aspect of this statute is the requirement that the parties have lived separate and apart for one year prior to institution of the suit. Myers v. Myers, 62 N.C. App. 291, 302 S.E.2d 476 (1983).

The expression used in Byers v. Byers, 222 N.C. 298, 22 S.E.2d (1942), "that the bare fact of living separate and apart for the period of two years (now one year); standing alone, will not constitute a cause of action for divorce," should be viewed in the light of its setting, and construed accordingly. It was not intended as a delimitation of the statute. Byers v. Byers, 223 N.C. 85, 25 S.E.2d 466 (1943).

Separation Requirement Applies to Year Prior to Institution of Suit. - The requirement that parties live separate and apart for one year applies to the year prior to institution of the suit. Bruce v. Bruce, 79 N.C. App. 579, 339 S.E.2d 855, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 701, 347 S.E.2d 36 (1986).

The separation contemplated by this section is apparently unrestricted. Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 80, 33 S.E.2d 492 (1945).

Mutual Agreement to Separate Is Not Required. - A charge by the court to the jury that the living separate and apart means living separate and apart under mutual agreement only, was erroneous, entitling plaintiff to a new trial. Byers v. Byers, 222 N.C. 298, 22 S.E.2d 902 (1942), distinguishing Parker v. Parker, 210 N.C. 264, 186 S.E. 346 (1936), decided under prior wording of section. See 15 N.C.L. Rev. 348 (1937).

In order to be entitled to a divorce, a plaintiff need not show that a marital separation for the statutory period was by mutual agreement or under a decree of court. Beck v. Beck, 14 N.C. App. 163, 187 S.E.2d 355 (1972).

Husband's physical separation from his wife for the statutory one-year period of G.S. 50-6 and his accompanying intention to end the marriage were sufficient to entitle him to an absolute divorce, even though the wife did not know of his intention to end the marriage until less than a year before the husband filed for divorce; there was no requirement under G.S. 50-6 that the remaining spouse have knowledge of the other party's intention to cease cohabitation. Smith v. Smith, 151 N.C. App. 130, 564 S.E.2d 591 (2002).

But Was Required Formerly. - Before the 1937 amendment, which struck out of this section the phrase "either under deed of separation or otherwise," it was held that while the applicant need not be the injured party, the statute did not authorize a divorce where the husband had separated himself from his wife, or the wife had separated herself from her husband, without cause and without agreement, express or implied. Lee v. Lee, 182 N.C. 61, 108 S.E. 352 (1921); Parker v. Parker, 210 N.C. 264, 186 S.E. 346 (1936); Hyder v. Hyder, 210 N.C. 486, 187 S.E. 798 (1936); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 210 N.C. 554, 187 S.E. 768 (1936).

This section contains no requirement that separation of the parties be voluntary. Harrington v. Harrington, 286 N.C. 260, 210 S.E.2d 190 (1974). But see Williams v. Williams, 224 N.C. 91, 29 S.E.2d 39 (1944), holding that the separation under this section must be voluntary in its inception, and Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 80, 33 S.E.2d 492 (1945), holding that "separation" would not include an involuntary living apart, where there had been no previous separation, such as might arise from the incarceration or insanity of one of the parties.

But This Section Is Inapplicable Where Separation Is Due to Insanity of Defendant. - Divorce on the grounds of two years' (now one year's) separation under this section cannot be maintained when the separation is due to the insanity or mental incapacity of defendant spouse, the sole remedy in such instance being under former G.S. 50-5(6) (recodified as G.S. 50-5.1). Lawson v. Bennett, 240 N.C. 52, 81 S.E.2d 162 (1954); Moody v. Moody, 253 N.C. 752, 117 S.E.2d 724 (1961).

To bar an action for divorce based on two years' (now one year's) separation, the mental impairment must be to such an extent that defendant does not understand what he or she is engaged in doing and the nature and consequences of the act. Moody v. Moody, 253 N.C. 752, 117 S.E.2d 724 (1961).

"Judicial Separation" Included. - A legal separation for the requisite period of two years (now one year) is ground for divorce under this section. The separation here contemplated includes a "judicial separation" as well as one brought about by the act of the parties, or one of them. Lockhart v. Lockhart, 223 N.C. 559, 27 S.E.2d 444 (1943).

A separation by act of the parties, or one of them, or under order of court a mensa et thoro, suffices to meet the terms of this section. Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 80, 33 S.E.2d 492 (1945).

The effect of a judgment granting a divorce a mensa et thoro was to legalize the separation of the parties which theretofore had been caused by the husband's actions, and after two years (now one year) from the date of such judgment, the husband could proceed to an absolute divorce. Becker v. Becker, 262 N.C. 685, 138 S.E.2d 507 (1964). See also, Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).

The effect of a divorce a mensa et thoro obtained by the wife on the ground that her husband abandoned her, was to legalize their separation from the date of such judgment; and in such case the husband, after two years (now one year) from the date of such judgment, could proceed to an absolute divorce. Richardson v. Richardson, 257 N.C. 705, 127 S.E.2d 525 (1962).

A judgment in an action instituted under former G.S. 50-16 decreeing that the husband had willfully abandoned the wife and awarding her support and maintenance constituted a judicial separation which, two years (now one year) thereafter, would permit the husband to obtain an absolute divorce. Rouse v. Rouse, 258 N.C. 520, 128 S.E.2d 865 (1963); Wilson v. Wilson, 260 N.C. 347, 132 S.E.2d 695 (1963).

The pendente lite order in the wife's action for divorce from bed and board legalized the separation between the husband and wife, since it provided not only for alimony pendente lite and child custody, but also that the wife have the sole use and peaceful and undisturbed possession of the residence, and such separation having continued for the requisite one year thereafter, the plaintiff-husband became entitled to a divorce. Earles v. Earles, 29 N.C. App. 348, 224 S.E.2d 284 (1976).

What Constitutes Legalized Separation. - Either an action for a divorce a mensa et thoro, an action for alimony without divorce under former G.S. 50-16, or a valid separation agreement may constitute a legalized separation which thereafter will permit either of the parties to obtain an absolute divorce on the ground of one year's separation. Harrington v. Harrington, 286 N.C. 260, 210 S.E.2d 190 (1974).

Valid separation agreement legalizes separation from and after the date thereof. Harrington v. Harrington, 286 N.C. 260, 210 S.E.2d 190 (1974).

To be valid a separation agreement must be untainted by fraud, must be in all respects fair, reasonable and just, and must have been entered into without coercion or the exercise of undue influence, and with full knowledge of all the circumstances, conditions, and rights of the contracting parties. Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968).

Until deed of separation is rescinded, defendant cannot attack legality of separation or obtain alimony from plaintiff. Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968).

Effect of Resumption of Cohabitation upon Separation Agreement. - When separated spouses who have executed a separation agreement resume living together in the home which they occupied before the separation, they hold themselves out as man and wife in the ordinary acceptation of the descriptive phrase. Irrespective of whether they have resumed sexual relations, in contemplation of law, their action amounts to a resumption of marital cohabitation which rescinds their separation agreement insofar as it had not been executed. Further, a subsequent separation will not revive the agreement. In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976).

The same public policy which will not permit spouses to continue to live together in the same home, holding themselves out to the public as husband and wife, to sue each other for an absolute divorce on the ground of separation, or to base the period of separation required for a divorce on any time they live together, will also nullify a separation agreement if the parties resume marital cohabitation. In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976).

The heart of a separation agreement is the parties' intention and agreement to live separate and apart forever, and when a husband and wife enter into a deed of separation the policy of the law is that they are to live separate. Therefore, they void the separation agreement if they reestablish a matrimonial home. In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976).

Sexual intercourse between a husband and wife after the execution of separation agreement voids the contract. Murphy v. Murphy, 295 N.C. 390, 245 S.E.2d 693 (1978). But see now G.S. 52-10.2

Where a reconciliation and resumption of cohabitation has taken place, an order or separation agreement with provisions for future support and an agreement to live apart is necessarily abrogated. Williamson v. Williamson, 66 N.C. App. 315, 311 S.E.2d 325 (1984).

Grounds for Attacking Deed of Separation. - A married woman may attack the certificate of her acknowledgment and privy examination respecting her execution of a deed of separation, inter alia, upon the grounds of her mental incapacity, infancy, or the fraud of the grantee. Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968).

Effect of Decree Denying Alimony. - If a separation is legalized by an award of alimony without divorce, there is no sound reason why it should not also be legalized by a decree denying alimony based upon a finding of no dependency. In each case the court has considered and determined the respective rights and obligations of the separated parties insofar as support is concerned. In neither case is the court able to mend the broken marriage or to force the parties to live together if either persists in continuing to live apart. Cook v. Cook, 41 N.C. App. 156, 254 S.E.2d 261 (1979).

The separation of the parties became legalized by the entry of the judgment which denied defendant alimony and by entry of the order which awarded her possession of the house. The parties having lived separate and apart for more than one year after their separation thus became legalized, plaintiff was entitled to maintain an action for an absolute divorce under this section. The adjudication made in the prior action that plaintiff had originally wrongfully abandoned the defendant was not effective as a bar in the later action. Cook v. Cook, 41 N.C. App. 156, 254 S.E.2d 261 (1979).

Separation means cessation of cohabitation, and cohabitation means living together as man and wife, though not necessarily implying sexual relations. Cohabitation includes other marital responsibilities and duties. Dudley v. Dudley, 225 N.C. 83, 33 S.E.2d 489 (1945); Young v. Young, 225 N.C. 340, 34 S.E.2d 154 (1945); In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976); Tuttle v. Tuttle, 36 N.C. App. 635, 244 S.E.2d 447 (1978).

Physical Separation Must Be Accompanied by Intention to Cease Cohabitation. - A husband and wife live separate and apart for the prescribed period within the meaning of this section when, and only when, these two conditions concur: (1) They live separate and apart physically for an uninterrupted period of two years (now one year); and (2) their physical separation is accompanied by at least an intention on the part of one of them to cease their matrimonial cohabitation. Mallard v. Mallard, 234 N.C. 654, 68 S.E.2d 247 (1951); Richardson v. Richardson, 257 N.C. 705, 127 S.E.2d 525 (1962); Beck v. Beck, 14 N.C. App. 163, 187 S.E.2d 355 (1972).

The bare fact of living separate and apart for the period of two years (now one year), standing alone, will not constitute a cause of action for divorce. There must be at least an intention on the part of one of the parties to cease cohabitation, which must be shown to have existed at the time alleged as the beginning of the separation period. It must appear that the separation is with that definite purpose on the part of at least one of the parties. The exigencies of life and the necessity of making a livelihood may sometimes require that the husband shall absent himself from the wife for long periods, a situation which was not contemplated by the law as a cause of divorce in fixing the period of separation. Byers v. Byers, 222 N.C. 298, 22 S.E.2d 902 (1942).

The words "separate and apart," as used in this section, mean that there must be both a physical separation and an intention on the part of at least one of the parties to cease the matrimonial cohabitation. Earles v. Earles, 29 N.C. App. 348, 224 S.E.2d 284 (1976); Myers v. Myers, 62 N.C. App. 291, 302 S.E.2d 476 (1983).

Trial court did not err in finding a husband and wife were not separated at the time of the wife's marital misconduct, as defined in G.S. 50-16.1A(3)(a), thereby precluding an award of alimony to the wife under G.S. 50-16.3A(a), because even though there was some physical separation of the parties after a choking incident involving the parties' son, neither party expressed to the other they wanted to separate and the husband continued to maintain all of his belongings at the marital residence; although the phrase "the date of separation" as used in G.S. 50-16.3A(a) was not defined, the phrase "separate and apart" as used in G.S. 50-6 meant there had to be a physical separation and an intention on the part of at least one of the parties to cease matrimonial cohabitation. Romulus v. Romulus, 215 N.C. App. 495, 715 S.E.2d 308 (2011).

Evidence of Conjugal Relations Within Statutory Period Before Action. - Sexual relations between spouses separated for less than one year invalidates those obligations of the parties, pursuant to a separation agreement, that are contingent upon the requirement that the parties "live continuously separate and apart" for one year. Higgins v. Higgins, 86 N.C. App. 513, 358 S.E.2d 553 (1987), aff'd, 321 N.C. 482, 364 S.E.2d 426 (1988).

Evidence that within the statutory period before the institution of the divorce action defendant visited plaintiff at Army camp and plaintiff visited defendant on furloughs, and that at such times they cohabitated as man and wife, was sufficient to negative the conclusion that conjugal relations had ceased for the period prescribed by this section, and supported verdict in defendant's favor and judgment denying plaintiff's suit for divorce on the grounds of two years' (now one year's) separation. Mason v. Mason, 226 N.C. 740, 40 S.E.2d 204 (1946), decided prior to the 1987 amendment to this section.

The discontinuance of sexual relations is not in itself a living "separate and apart" within the meaning of the statute, and a divorce will be denied where it appears that, during the period relied upon, the parties had lived in the same house. Dudley v. Dudley, 33 S.E.2d 489 (1945).

Effect of Continuing Support of Spouse. - This section does not contemplate, as essential, a repudiation of all marital obligations, and the fact that the husband has supported the wife will not defeat his action. Byers v. Byers, 222 N.C. 298, 22 S.E.2d 902 (1942).

If a plaintiff in a divorce action on grounds of separation contributes to the support of his wife, solely in an attempt to fulfill the obligation imposed by statute, his conduct is not inconsistent with a legal separation; but if he makes such payments in recognition of his marital status and in discharge of his marital obligations, there is no living separate and apart within the meaning of the statute. Williams v. Williams, 224 N.C. 91, 29 S.E.2d 39 (1944).

When Requirements for Valid Separation Not Satisfied. - The law delineates two circumstances under which the law will hold spouses to have failed to satisfy the requirements of a valid separation: first, sexual activity between the parties, and, second, such association between the parties as to induce others to regard them as living together. Ledford v. Ledford, 49 N.C. App. 226, 271 S.E.2d 393 (1980), decided prior to the 1987 amendment to this section.

Casual and isolated social acts between separated spouses do not as a matter of law create a holding out as man and wife. Ledford v. Ledford, 49 N.C. App. 226, 271 S.E.2d 393 (1980).

Isolated or casual acts of sexual intercourse between separated spouses toll the statutory period required for divorce predicated on separation. Pitts v. Pitts, 54 N.C. App. 163, 282 S.E.2d 488 (1981), decided prior to the 1987 amendment to this section.

Question of Resumption of the Conjugal Relation After Separation Is for Jury. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 210 N.C. 554, 187 S.E.2d 768 (1936).

Mutuality of Intent to Reconcile Is Essential Where Evidence Conflicts. - When the evidence is conflicting, the issue of the parties' mutual intent is an essential element in deciding whether the parties were reconciled and resumed cohabitation. Williamson v. Williamson, 66 N.C. App. 315, 311 S.E.2d 325 (1984); Camp v. Camp, 75 N.C. App. 498, 331 S.E.2d 163, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 663, 335 S.E.2d 493 (1985).

Separation May Not Be Based on Evidence Showing Cohabitation. - For the purposes of obtaining a divorce under this section, separation may not be predicated upon evidence which shows that during the statutorily prescribed period the parties have cohabited as husband and wife. Camp v. Camp, 75 N.C. App. 498, 331 S.E.2d 163, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 663, 335 S.E.2d 493 (1985).

Husband's return to the marital home for a 10-day period, during which time he, inter alia, never had any sexual relations with his wife, was constantly looking for work, and did not otherwise represent himself to have resumed the marital relationship, did not constitute a resumption of marital cohabitation such as to invalidate the parties' separation agreement and bar divorce on the grounds of living separate and apart for one year. Camp v. Camp, 75 N.C. App. 498, 331 S.E.2d 163, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 663, 335 S.E.2d 493 (1985).

Resumption of the marital relation is not inherently secretive and spouses are competent to testify about it. Williamson v. Williamson, 66 N.C. App. 315, 311 S.E.2d 325 (1984).

"Inclination and Opportunity" Rule Inapplicable to Proof of Resumption of Marital Relations. - The "inclination and opportunity" concept allows a presumption of adulterous sexual intercourse if adulterous inclination and opportunity are shown. The rule applies only to cases of alleged adultery, because adultery is an illegal act which by its very nature is difficult to prove. Such justification of the rule for adultery cases is nonexistent for proof of resumption of marital relations between separated spouses, an act which is not against the law but which merely breaks a contract between the spouses. Williamson v. Williamson, 66 N.C. App. 315, 311 S.E.2d 325 (1984).

Complaint must state a date of separation to establish the general time frame for divorce based on a year's separation. Myers v. Myers, 62 N.C. App. 291, 302 S.E.2d 476 (1983).

III. FAULT.

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Either party may secure an absolute divorce under this section, even though the applicant is the party who commits the wrong, as granting divorces is exclusively statutory and this is an independent act of the General Assembly. Long v. Long, 206 N.C. 706, 175 S.E. 85 (1934); Byers v. Byers, 222 N.C. 298, 22 S.E.2d 902 (1942).

Either party may bring an action for absolute divorce under this section, and the jury's finding that defendant did not abandon plaintiff without cause did not preclude judgment in plaintiff's favor. Campbell v. Campbell, 207 N.C. 859, 176 S.E. 250 (1934).

Plaintiff Need Not Establish That He Is Injured Party. - Where the husband sues the wife for an absolute divorce upon the ground of two years' (now one year's) separation under this section, he is not required to establish as a constituent element of his cause of action that he is the injured party. Pickens v. Pickens, 258 N.C. 84, 127 S.E.2d 889 (1962); Overby v. Overby, 272 N.C. 636, 158 S.E.2d 799 (1968).

In an action for absolute divorce under this section, the plaintiff need not allege and prove that he or she is an injured party. Earles v. Earles, 29 N.C. App. 348, 224 S.E.2d 284 (1976).

Recrimination does not constitute a bar to plaintiff's action for divorce based on one year's separation. Smith v. Smith, 42 N.C. App. 246, 256 S.E.2d 282 (1979).

For case discussing the elimination of the defense of recrimination based on former G.S. 50-5 by Session Laws 1977, c. 817, s. 1, effective Aug. 1, 1977, and recrimination based on G.S. 50-7 by Session Laws 1977, 2nd Sess., c. 1190, s. 1, effective June 16, 1978, see Gardner v. Gardner, 48 N.C. App. 38, 269 S.E.2d 630 (1980).

This section is a "no-fault" statute. Recriminatory defenses are not applicable. Bruce v. Bruce, 79 N.C. App. 579, 339 S.E.2d 855, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 701, 347 S.E.2d 36 (1986).

Where Action Is Brought After July 31, 1977. - The defense of recrimination cannot be asserted in actions for absolute divorce instituted in this State after July 31, 1977, even if the alleged adulterous acts on the part of the plaintiff occurred after the separation of the parties. Edwards v. Edwards, 43 N.C. App. 296, 259 S.E.2d 11 (1979).

Even If Acts Occurred Prior to July 31, 1977. - Recrimination cannot be asserted as a defense in actions for absolute divorce based on a year's separation brought after July 31, 1977. Therefore, since plaintiff's action was begun on August 30, 1978, the defense of recrimination in the form of abandonment would not be available to defendant, even though the alleged abandonment occurred prior to the effective date of the statute. Boone v. Boone, 44 N.C. App. 79, 259 S.E.2d 921 (1979).

But Recrimination Could Be Pleaded in Action Brought Prior to Amendment. - Where husband filed action for divorce pursuant to this section on June 1, 1976, elimination of recriminatory defenses based on G.S. 50-7 by Session Laws 1977, 2nd Sess., c. 1190, s. 1, effective June 16, 1978, would not be applied retroactively so as to bar wife from pleading such defenses. Gardner v. Gardner, 48 N.C. App. 38, 269 S.E.2d 630 (1980).

Defense of Recrimination Prior to Amendment of Section. - For cases decided under the doctrine of recrimination, which allowed a defendant in a divorce action to set up as a defense in bar of plaintiff's action that plaintiff was guilty of misconduct which in itself would have been a ground for divorce, prior to elimination of the defense of recrimination by the amendments to this section by Session Laws 1977, c. 817, s. 1, and Session Laws 1977, 2nd Sess., c. 1190, s. 1, see Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N.C. 428, 181 S.E. 338 (1935); Hyder v. Hyder, 210 N.C. 486, 187 S.E. 798 (1936); Byers v. Byers, 223 N.C. 85, 25 S.E.2d 466 (1943); Pharr v. Pharr, 223 N.C. 115, 25 S.E.2d 471 (1943); Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 80, 33 S.E.2d 492 (1945); Welch v. Welch, 226 N.C. 541, 39 S.E.2d 457 (1946); Richardson v. Richardson, 257 N.C. 705, 127 S.E.2d 525 (1962); Edmisten v. Edmisten, 265 N.C. 488, 144 S.E.2d 404 (1965); Rupert v. Rupert, 15 N.C. App. 730, 190 S.E.2d 693, cert. denied, 282 N.C. 153, 191 S.E.2d 759 (1972); Gray v. Gray, 16 N.C. App. 730, 193 S.E.2d 492 (1972); Harrington v. Harrington, 286 N.C. 260, 210 S.E.2d 190 (1974); Heilman v. Heilman, 24 N.C. App. 11, 210 S.E.2d 69 (1974).

For cases as to defense of abandonment under this section prior to elimination of defense of recrimination, see Byers v. Byers, 223 N.C. 85, 25 S.E.2d 466 (1943); Pharr v. Pharr, 223 N.C. 115, 25 S.E.2d 471 (1943); Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796 (1952); McLean v. McLean, 237 N.C. 122, 74 S.E.2d 320 (1953); Johnson v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 383, 75 S.E.2d 109 (1953); Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957); Taylor v. Taylor, 257 N.C. 130, 125 S.E.2d 373 (1962); Richardson v. Richardson, 257 N.C. 705, 127 S.E.2d 525 (1962); Pickens v. Pickens, 258 N.C. 84, 127 S.E.2d 889 (1962); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 266 N.C. 502, 146 S.E.2d 500 (1966); Campbell v. Campbell, 270 N.C. 298, 154 S.E.2d 101 (1967); Overby v. Overby, 272 N.C. 636, 158 S.E.2d 799 (1968); Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968); McLeod v. McLeod, 1 N.C. App. 396, 161 S.E.2d 635 (1968); Rupert v. Rupert, 15 N.C. App. 730, 190 S.E.2d 693, cert. denied, 282 N.C. 153, 191 S.E.2d 759 (1972); Harrington v. Harrington, 22 N.C. App. 419, 206 S.E.2d 742, rev'd on other grounds, 286 N.C. 260, 210 S.E.2d 190 (1974); Heilman v. Heilman, 24 N.C. App. 11, 210 S.E.2d 69 (1974).

IV. DOMICILE OR RESIDENCE.

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The six months residency requirement means the six months next preceding commencement of the action. Bruce v. Bruce, 79 N.C. App. 579, 339 S.E.2d 855, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 701, 347 S.E.2d 36 (1986).

Separate Domicile for Wife. - North Carolina divorce statutes recognize the legality of a separate domicile or residence for the wife. Rector v. Rector, 4 N.C. App. 240, 166 S.E.2d 492 (1969).

To establish a domicile, there must be a residence and the intention to make it a home or to live there indefinitely. Bryant v. Bryant, 228 N.C. 287, 45 S.E.2d 572 (1947).

Plaintiff must be physically present in this State and have the intention of making his residence here a permanent abiding place in order to be domiciled here within the meaning of this section, making residence in this State for six months a jurisdictional prerequisite to the institution of an action for divorce on the grounds of two years' (now one year's) separation. Bryant v. Bryant, 228 N.C. 287, 45 S.E.2d 572 (1947).

The fact that a person obtains an automobile license and ration cards in another state, giving such state as his residence, while competent on the question of domicile, is not conclusive. Bryant v. Bryant, 228 N.C. 287, 45 S.E.2d 572 (1947).

Finding of Court as to Residence. - The finding of the court, supported by evidence, that plaintiff was physically present in this State for more than six months prior to instituting an action for divorce and that he regarded his residence here as a permanent home was sufficient to support a judgment denying defendant's motion in the cause to set aside the divorce decree on the ground of want of the jurisdictional requirement of domicile. Bryant v. Bryant, 228 N.C. 287, 45 S.E.2d 572 (1947).

District court properly exercised jurisdiction over the subject matter of the parties' divorce action as in the State of North Carolina subject matter jurisdiction for divorce involves not only bringing the matter in the correct court, but also the court's finding residence by one of the parties for the requisite length of time and verification of the pleadings. In the case at issue, the plaintiff husband sufficiently alleged that he was a citizen and resident of North Carolina for more than six months next preceding the institution of the action and had lived separate and apart from the wife for more than one year next preceding the institution of the action without resuming the marital relationship, with those district court findings being supported by the husband's verified complaint, which was treated as an affidavit. Wilson v. Wilson, 191 N.C. App. 789, 666 S.E.2d 653 (2008).

How Decree Attacked on Ground of Nonresidence. - The proper procedure to attack a divorce decree on the ground that plaintiff had not been a resident of the State for six months preceding the institution of the action is by motion in the cause. Bryant v. Bryant, 228 N.C. 287, 45 S.E.2d 572 (1947).

Defect in Jurisdiction Held Insignificant Since Either Party Could Bring Proceeding. - Although the court improperly found jurisdiction over defendant, this error was insignificant, in that this section allows a divorce proceeding on the application of either party, if and when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart for one year, and the plaintiff or defendant in the suit for divorce has resided in the State for a period of six months. Andris v. Andris, 65 N.C. App. 688, 309 S.E.2d 570 (1983).

Opinions of Attorney General

Incompetency Following Separation. - A plaintiff may pursue a divorce option under this section where, after the parties have separated, the defendant sustains injuries bringing into question his competency. G.S. 50-5.1 is not available in such a case. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. James Lee Knight, Clerk of Superior Court, Guilford County, 55 N.C.A.G. 82 (1986).

I. IN GENERAL.

A divorce from bed and board is nothing more than a judicial separation, that is, an authorized separation of husband and wife. Schlagel v. Schlagel, 253 N.C. 787, 117 S.E.2d 790 (1961); Triplett v. Triplett, 38 N.C. App. 364, 248 S.E.2d 69 (1978).

Suit for divorce from bed and board is not exclusively a means for collection of alimony, but also a means of establishing a certain legal relationship. Long v. Long, 71 N.C. App. 405, 322 S.E.2d 427 (1984).

Applicability of G.S. 50-10. - G.S. 50-10 applies to a divorce from bed and board under this section. Schlagel v. Schlagel, 253 N.C. 787, 117 S.E.2d 790 (1961).

Finality. - A divorce from bed and board is a final order. There is no such thing as a divorce from bed and board pendente lite. Kale v. Kale, 25 N.C. App. 99, 212 S.E.2d 234, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 259, 214 S.E.2d 431 (1975).

No Action for "No Fault" Divorce from Bed and Board. - Where a husband and wife are living together and their children are in their joint custody and are being adequately supported by the supporting spouse, in the absence of allegations which would support an award of alimony or divorce, one spouse may not maintain an action to evict the other, get sole custody of the children, and obtain an order for child support; therefore, the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, since the complaint attempted to assert, and the court allowed, what appeared to be a "no fault" divorce from bed and board, and such an action does not lie in this State. Harper v. Harper, 50 N.C. App. 394, 273 S.E.2d 731 (1981).

No Requirement for Separation of Parties. - There is no requirement for a separation of the parties in the sense of one moving out of the home before an action can be instituted and prosecuted under this section for divorce from bed and board. Triplett v. Triplett, 38 N.C. App. 364, 248 S.E.2d 69 (1978).

A wife may pursue an action for divorce from bed and board and alimony while her husband is staying in the same house with her. Triplett v. Triplett, 38 N.C. App. 364, 248 S.E.2d 69 (1978).

Plaintiff Must Petition for Divorce a Mensa. - A decree of divorce a mensa will not be granted in an action where plaintiff petitioned for absolute divorce. Morris v. Morris, 75 N.C. 168 (1876).

Allegations in a cross action for divorce a mensa et thoro, set up by defendant wife in husband's action for divorce, were held sufficient. Ragan v. Ragan, 214 N.C. 36, 197 S.E. 554 (1938).

It is not necessary for the plaintiff to establish all of the grounds for divorce a mensa et thoro alleged in her complaint in order to sustain her action. It is sufficient if she establishes the defendant's guilt of any of the acts that would constitute a cause of action for divorce from bed and board as enumerated in this section. Deaton v. Deaton, 234 N.C. 538, 67 S.E.2d 626 (1951); Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).

To obtain a divorce from bed and board the law requires that defendant establish only one of the grounds specified in this section. Stanback v. Stanback, 270 N.C. 497, 155 S.E.2d 221 (1967).

Failure to Establish Ground for Divorce. - Where in his stipulation to the existence of ground for awarding alimony defendant did not specify which ground, of the ten enumerated in former G.S. 50-16.2, existed to support an alimony award, plaintiff could not automatically assume that the ground stipulated was one of the five grounds also listed in this section. Thus, as she presented no evidence establishing one of the grounds in this section, plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof as to this issue, and the trial court properly denied her request for a divorce from bed and board. Perkins v. Perkins, 85 N.C. App. 660, 355 S.E.2d 848, cert. denied, 320 N.C. 633, 360 S.E.2d 92 (1987).

Grounds Available to Husband as Well as Wife. - The grounds for divorce a mensa given by this section are available to the husband as well as to the wife, or as stated by the express language of the statute, to "the injured party." Brewer v. Brewer, 198 N.C. 669, 153 S.E. 163 (1930); Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).

Only the party injured is entitled to a divorce under this section. Vaughan v. Vaughan, 211 N.C. 354, 190 S.E. 492 (1937). See also, Carnes v. Carnes, 204 N.C. 636, 169 S.E. 222 (1933); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 226 N.C. 624, 39 S.E.2d 807 (1946).

When the misconduct of the complaining party is calculated to and does reasonably induce the conduct of defendant relied upon in an action for divorce a mensa et thoro, he or she, as the case may be, will not be permitted to take advantage of his or her own wrong, and the decree of divorce will be denied. Byers v. Byers, 223 N.C. 85, 25 S.E.2d 466 (1943); Pressley v. Pressley, 261 N.C. 326, 134 S.E.2d 609 (1964).

Plaintiff Must Prove Unprovoked Misconduct by Defendant. - To establish the existence of a ground listed in this section, plaintiff must allege and prove acts of misconduct by defendant and show that this misconduct was not provoked by plaintiff's actions. Perkins v. Perkins, 85 N.C. App. 660, 355 S.E.2d 848, cert. denied, 320 N.C. 633, 360 S.E.2d 92 (1987).

Effect of Delay in Bringing Action. - An unreasonable delay by one party, after a probable knowledge of the criminal conduct of the other, will, if unaccounted for, preclude such party from obtaining a decree for a separation from bed and board. Whittington v. Whittington, 19 N.C. 64 (1836).

But a delay of seven years in filing a petition was sufficiently accounted for by allegations that at the happening of the matters relied upon for divorce, the petitioner was a nonresident of the State, and was at the time of suit a pauper. Schonwald v. Schonwald, 62 N.C. 215 (1867).

Evidence of Acts Occurring "More Than Ten Years Ago". - Where a wife sues her husband for divorce a mensa et thoro, under this section, it is not error to admit on the trial evidence of his misconduct occurring "more than ten years ago" when it is a part of the whole course of his dealings coming down to within six months of the beginning of the action. Page v. Page, 167 N.C. 346, 83 S.E. 625 (1914).

Condonation is an affirmative defense to be alleged and proved by the party relying upon it, and less may be sufficient to destroy condonation than to found an original suit. Cushing v. Cushing, 263 N.C. 181, 139 S.E.2d 217 (1964).

Resumption of Marital Relations as Condonation. - Nothing else appearing, the resumption of marital relations after a separation imports a condonation of previous offenses. Cushing v. Cushing, 263 N.C. 181, 139 S.E.2d 217 (1964).

Mere Forgiveness Does Not Establish Condonation. - Evidence merely of forgiveness by the plaintiff, in her action for divorce a mensa et thoro against her husband, is insufficient to establish condonation. Page v. Page, 167 N.C. 346, 83 S.E. 625 (1914); Jones v. Jones, 173 N.C. 279, 91 S.E. 960 (1917).

Condonation is forgiveness upon condition, and the condition is that the party forgiven will abstain from like offenses afterwards. If the condition is violated, the original offense is revived. Lassiter v. Lassiter, 92 N.C. 129 (1885); Cushing v. Cushing, 263 N.C. 181, 139 S.E.2d 217 (1964).

Repetition of the offense nullifies the previous condonation. Collier v. Collier, 16 N.C. 352 (1829); Gordon v. Gordon, 88 N.C. 45 (1883); Page v. Page, 167 N.C. 346, 83 S.E. 625 (1914).

Reconciliation Is Not a Defense to a Divorce from Bed and Board. - A divorce from bed and board is judicial separation. Reconciliation while the action is pending is not a defense to a divorce from bed and board, unlike other concepts such as condonation, that is, the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for divorce. Howell v. Tunstall, 64 N.C. App. 703, 308 S.E.2d 454 (1983).

But Resumption of Marital Relations Destroys Effect of Divorce. - If the parties reconcile and resume cohabitation as man and wife after a divorce from bed and board is granted, the effect of the divorce from bed and board is destroyed. No court action to end such divorce is necessary. Howell v. Tunstall, 64 N.C. App. 703, 308 S.E.2d 454 (1983).

A resumption of marital relations would invalidate a divorce a mensa et thoro. Rouse v. Rouse, 258 N.C. 520, 128 S.E.2d 865 (1963).

Findings of Fact Required. - In an action for divorce from bed and board under this section, the trial court should make adequate findings of facts (i.e. specific acts of misconduct) to support the conclusion of law that the noninjured party has (1) abandoned the family; (2) maliciously turned the other out of doors; (3) endangered the life of the other by cruel or barbarous treatment; (4) offered such indignities to the person of the other as to render his or her condition intolerable; or (5) become an excessive user of alcohol or drugs so that the other's life is burdensome. Steele v. Steele, 36 N.C. App. 601, 244 S.E.2d 466 (1978).

Judgment Invalid Without Finding of Grounds. - Where judgment of divorce from bed and board contained absolutely no finding of the existence of any of the grounds for divorce from bed and board cognizable under this section, the district court was without power or authority, and therefore without jurisdiction, to enter it. Allred v. Tucci, 85 N.C. App. 138, 354 S.E.2d 291, cert. denied, 320 N.C. 166, 358 S.E.2d 47 (1987).

Proceeding to set aside invalid divorce decree is not barred by death of one spouse where property rights are involved. Allred v. Tucci, 85 N.C. App. 138, 354 S.E.2d 291, cert. denied, 320 N.C. 166, 358 S.E.2d 47 (1987).

Alimony. - Where, in husband's action for divorce a vinculo, the wife sets up a cross action for divorce a mensa, the court has the power to make an order for the payment of alimony upon the jury's determination of the issues in favor of the wife. Norman v. Norman, 230 N.C. 61, 51 S.E.2d 927 (1949).

In an action for divorce, a verified answer and cross action setting forth a cause of action for divorce a mensa is sufficient to sustain an order allowing alimony pendente lite. Nall v. Nall, 229 N.C. 598, 50 S.E.2d 737 (1948).

Every ground for divorce from bed and board also serves as a ground for alimony. Minor v. Minor, 70 N.C. App. 76, 318 S.E.2d 865, cert. denied, 312 N.C. 495, 322 S.E.2d 558 (1984).

Applied in Albritton v. Albritton, 210 N.C. 111, 185 S.E. 762 (1936); Sumner v. Sumner, 227 N.C. 610, 44 S.E.2d 40 (1947); Bunn v. Bunn, 258 N.C. 445, 128 S.E.2d 792 (1963); Adams v. Adams, 262 N.C. 556, 138 S.E.2d 204 (1964); Haddon v. Haddon, 42 N.C. App. 632, 257 S.E.2d 483 (1979); Blair v. Blair, 44 N.C. App. 605, 261 S.E.2d 301 (1980).

Cited in Brown v. Brown, 205 N.C. 64, 169 S.E. 818 (1933); Lockhart v. Lockhart, 223 N.C. 559, 27 S.E.2d 444 (1943); Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 37 S.E.2d 118 (1946); Bateman v. Bateman, 232 N.C. 659, 61 S.E.2d 909 (1950); Bateman v. Bateman, 233 N.C. 357, 64 S.E.2d 156 (1951); Livingston v. Livingston, 235 N.C. 515, 70 S.E.2d 480 (1952); Feldman v. Feldman, 236 N.C. 731, 73 S.E.2d 865 (1952); Johnson v. Johnson, 237 N.C. 383, 75 S.E.2d 109 (1953); Morgan v. Brooks, 241 N.C. 527, 85 S.E.2d 869 (1955); McDowell v. McDowell, 243 N.C. 286, 90 S.E.2d 544 (1955); Rowland v. Rowland, 253 N.C. 328, 116 S.E.2d 795 (1960); Pickens v. Pickens, 258 N.C. 84, 127 S.E.2d 889 (1962); Richardson v. Richardson, 4 N.C. App. 99, 165 S.E.2d 678 (1969); Hicks v. Hicks, 275 N.C. 370, 167 S.E.2d 761 (1969); Williams v. Williams, 13 N.C. App. 468, 186 S.E.2d 210 (1972); Beall v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 228 S.E.2d 407 (1976); Cook v. Cook, 41 N.C. App. 156, 254 S.E.2d 261 (1979); State v. Getward, 89 N.C. App. 26, 365 S.E.2d 209 (1988); Morrow v. Morrow, 94 N.C. App. 187, 379 S.E.2d 705 (1989); Shook v. Shook, 95 N.C. App. 578, 383 S.E.2d 405 (1989); State v. Byrd, 185 N.C. App. 597, 649 S.E.2d 444 (2007); Dechkovskaia v. Dechkovskaia, 232 N.C. App. 350, 754 S.E.2d 831 (2014), review denied, 758 S.E.2d 870, 2014 N.C. LEXIS 436 (2014); Norrell v. Keely, 238 N.C. App. 441, - S.E.2d - (2014).

II. ABANDONMENT.

What Is Abandonment. - One spouse abandons the other where he or she brings their cohabitation to an end without justification, without the consent of the other spouse and without intent of renewing it. Morris v. Morris, 46 N.C. App. 701, 266 S.E.2d 381, aff'd, 301 N.C. 525, 272 S.E.2d 1 (1980); Roberts v. Roberts, 68 N.C. App. 163, 314 S.E.2d 781 (1984).

Abandonment under this subdivision is not synonymous with the offense defined in G.S. 14-322. Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).

Abandonment under this subdivision is not synonymous with the criminal offense defined in G.S. 14-322. In a prosecution under G.S. 14-322, the State must establish (1) a willful abandonment and (2) a willful failure to provide adequate support. Richardson v. Richardson, 268 N.C. 538, 151 S.E.2d 12 (1966).

There is a distinction between criminal abandonment and the matrimonial offense of desertion. Peoples v. Peoples, 10 N.C. App. 402, 179 S.E.2d 138 (1971).

It is not necessary that the husband should leave the State. Witty v. Barham, 147 N.C. 479, 61 S.E. 372 (1908).

Nor is it necessary for the husband himself to depart from his home and leave his wife in order to abandon her. By cruel treatment or failure to provide for her support, he may compel her to leave him, which would constitute abandonment by the husband. Blanchard v. Blanchard, 226 N.C. 152, 36 S.E.2d 919 (1946), holding evidence insufficient to show abandonment by husband; Somerset v. Somerset, 3 N.C. App. 473, 165 S.E.2d 33 (1969); Cox v. Cox, 10 N.C. App. 476, 179 S.E.2d 194 (1971).

It is not necessary, to constitute abandonment of a wife by the husband, that he leave her, but he may constructively abandon her by treating her with such cruelty as to compel her to leave him. Eudy v. Eudy, 24 N.C. App. 516, 211 S.E.2d 536, aff'd, 288 N.C. 71, 215 S.E.2d 782 (1975).

Continued and Persistent Cruelty or Neglect May Constitute Abandonment. - If a husband, by continued and persistent cruelty or neglect, forces his wife to leave his home, he may himself be guilty of abandonment. Somerset v. Somerset, 3 N.C. App. 473, 165 S.E.2d 33 (1969).

Sleeping in Separate Bedroom Is Not Abandonment. - A husband who has neither left the marital home nor withheld support cannot be found to have abandoned his wife merely by electing to sleep in a separate bedroom. Oakley v. Oakley, 54 N.C. App. 161, 282 S.E.2d 589 (1981).

Nor Is Separation by Mutual Agreement. - Abandonment or desertion, as a marital wrong committed by one spouse against the other, does not occur if the parties live apart by mutual agreement. Sauls v. Sauls, 288 N.C. 387, 218 S.E.2d 338 (1975).

When the complaining spouse has consented to a separation which was not caused by the other's misconduct, the plaintiff cannot obtain a divorce or alimony on the basis of abandonment. Sauls v. Sauls, 288 N.C. 387, 218 S.E.2d 338 (1975).

Unless Induced by Misconduct of One Spouse. - Where the agreement to separate is induced by the misconduct of one spouse, the other can still maintain the charge of voluntary abandonment. Sauls v. Sauls, 288 N.C. 387, 218 S.E.2d 338 (1975).

The consent which will bar divorce on grounds of abandonment is a positive willingness on the part of the complainant - a consent not induced by the misconduct of the other spouse - to cease cohabitation. Sauls v. Sauls, 288 N.C. 387, 218 S.E.2d 338 (1975).

Not Mere Acquiescence in the Inevitable. - Mere acquiescence in a wrongful and inevitable separation, which the complaining spouse could not prevent after reasonable efforts to preserve the marriage, does not make the separation voluntary or affect the right to divorce or alimony. Nor, under such circumstances, is the innocent party obliged to protest or to exert physical force or other importunity to prevent the other party from leaving. Sauls v. Sauls, 288 N.C. 387, 218 S.E.2d 338 (1975).

Abandonment imports willfulness and maliciously turning the spouse out of doors. Brooks v. Brooks, 226 N.C. 280, 37 S.E.2d 909 (1946).

Plaintiff Must Prove That Abandonment Was Willful. - Where wife sues husband for a divorce from bed and board upon the ground of abandonment under this section, she must prove as an essential part of her case that her husband has willfully abandoned her. Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796 (1952).

When Abandonment Is Justified. - The Supreme Court, in applying the provisions of subdivision (1) of this section, has never undertaken to formulate any all-embracing definition or rule of general application respecting what conduct on the part of one spouse will justify the other in withdrawing from the marital relation, and each case must be determined in large measure upon its own particular circumstances. Ordinarily, however, the withdrawing spouse is not justified in leaving the other unless the conduct of the latter is such as would likely render it impossible for the withdrawing spouse to continue the marital relation with safety, health, and self-respect, and as would constitute ground in itself for divorce at least from bed and board. Caddell v. Caddell, 236 N.C. 686, 73 S.E.2d 923 (1952).

Plaintiff Must Prove Absence of Justification. - Where a spouse seeks to recover alimony on the grounds of abandonment, that spouse has the burden of proving each and every element of abandonment, including the absence of justification. Morris v. Morris, 46 N.C. App. 701, 266 S.E.2d 381, aff'd, 301 N.C. 525, 272 S.E.2d 1 (1980).

The burden of proof upon a plaintiff alleging defendant's abandonment is not to negate every possible justification for defendant-husband's leaving, but rather to prove only the absence of conduct on her part which rendered it impossible for him to continue in the marriage. Morris v. Morris, 46 N.C. App. 701, 266 S.E.2d 381, aff'd, 301 N.C. 525, 272 S.E.2d 1 (1980).

Withdrawal from Home May Be Abandonment Even If Support Is Paid. - A husband may be deemed to have abandoned his wife within the meaning of subdivision (1) of this section, and so be liable for alimony, notwithstanding the fact that, after cohabitation is brought to an end, he voluntarily provides her with adequate support. Whether his withdrawal from the home, followed by such support, constitutes an abandonment which is ground for suit by the wife for divorce from bed and board, and therefore ground for suit by her for alimony without divorce, depends upon whether his withdrawal from the home was justified by the conduct of the wife. Schloss v. Schloss, 273 N.C. 266, 160 S.E.2d 5 (1968), decided under former G.S. 50-16.

A wife is entitled to her husband's society and the protection of his name and home in cohabitation. The permanent denial of these rights may be aggravated by leaving her destitute or may be mitigated by a liberal provision for her support, but if the cohabitation is brought to an end without justification and without the consent of the wife and without the intention of renewing it, the matrimonial offense of desertion is complete. Richardson v. Richardson, 268 N.C. 538, 151 S.E.2d 12 (1966); Peoples v. Peoples, 10 N.C. App. 402, 179 S.E.2d 138 (1971).

The husband's willful failure to provide adequate support for his wife may be evidence of his abandonment of her, but the mere fact that he provides adequate support for her does not in itself negative abandonment. Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957); Richardson v. Richardson, 268 N.C. 538, 151 S.E.2d 12 (1966); Peoples v. Peoples, 10 N.C. App. 402, 179 S.E.2d 138 (1971).

Defendant May Not Defeat Action by Making Voluntary Support Payments. - A defendant may not abandon his wife and defeat an action under this section by making voluntary payments which he may abandon at will. Thurston v. Thurston, 256 N.C. 663, 124 S.E.2d 852 (1962); Richardson v. Richardson, 268 N.C. 538, 151 S.E.2d 12 (1966).

Acts Held to Constitute Abandonment. - Where a husband drives his wife from his house, or obtains her removal by stratagem, or withholds support from her while there, he is deemed to have abandoned her. Setzer v. Setzer, 128 N.C. 170, 38 S.E. 731 (1901).

A husband who permitted and encouraged certain of his grown children to remain constantly at home in a drunken condition, and allowed them to curse, abuse, and harass his wife at all hours of the day and night, and who told his wife to get her things out of his house, was guilty of such cruel treatment toward his wife as to constitute an abandonment of her. Bailey v. Bailey, 243 N.C. 412, 90 S.E.2d 696 (1956).

Allegations that plaintiff was compelled to leave her husband because of his willful failure and refusal to provide her with support and that his failure was without provocation on her part were sufficient to state a cause of action for alimony without divorce on the ground of abandonment. Brady v. Brady, 273 N.C. 299, 160 S.E.2d 13 (1968).

Plaintiff simply moved out of his adjacent apartment and stopped supporting his wife at the same time defendant's earnings ceased and she was entering hospital to undergo surgery; the parties lived together as husband and wife "in the usually accepted sense" until that time at which time plaintiff abandoned defendant. Lin v. Lin, 108 N.C. App. 772, 425 S.E.2d 9 (1993).

Finding of Constructive Abandonment Upheld. - Where the record portrayed defendant as a busy professional who became so completely immersed in his work that, by his conduct, he effectively abandoned his wife and children; additionally, the findings of fact pointed to a pattern of behavior by defendant over a 20-year period where plaintiff was left to her own devices without defendant's assistance in maintaining a family and rearing their children, and, although the court noted that at least 10 years earlier plaintiff wife had told defendant that she needed more of his time and attention and the situation improved somewhat thereafter, it improved only for a short time, these finding supported the court's conclusion that the husband had constructively abandoned his wife. Ellinwood v. Ellinwood, 94 N.C. App. 682, 381 S.E.2d 162 (1989).

Instructions as to Burden of Proof Held Erroneous. - In an action for alimony without divorce on the ground of abandonment, an instruction that the wife had the burden of showing that the husband's separation from her was free of fault on her part and that she was blameless, was erroneous. Likewise, an instruction that plaintiff had the burden of proving that the defendant's separation was wrongful, without charging upon what phase or phases of the evidence defendant's separation would be wrongful, and without defining wrongful except in abstract terms, was insufficient. Caddell v. Caddell, 236 N.C. 686, 73 S.E.2d 923 (1952).

Lapse of seven years from time of separation did not bar a cross action for divorce a mensa on the ground of constructive abandonment, or application for alimony pendente lite, either by laches or any statute of limitation. Nall v. Nall, 229 N.C. 598, 50 S.E.2d 737 (1948).

Prior Action Under This Section Held to Abate Action under G.S. 50-6. - The pendency of a prior action by the wife for a divorce from bed and board upon the ground of abandonment under this section abated a subsequent action by the husband for an absolute divorce upon the ground of two years' (now one year's) separation under G.S. 50-6. Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796 (1952).

Question of Custody. - Whether mother abandoned father within the meaning of subdivision (1) of this section was not controlling on the question of custody. Kenney v. Kenney, 15 N.C. App. 665, 190 S.E.2d 650 (1972).

III. MALICIOUSLY TURNING SPOUSE OUT.

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Subdivision (2) Is an Instance of Abandonment Under Subdivision (1). - The ground for divorce a mensa given the wife under subdivision (2) of this section, because of being maliciously turned out of doors by her husband, is but an instance of wrongful abandonment provided by subdivision (1). Medlin v. Medlin, 175 N.C. 529, 95 S.E. 857 (1918).

Adverse Ruling in Previous Action. - A denial of alimony in an independent action for alimony without divorce brought by the wife on grounds that her husband maliciously turned her out of doors would conclude her upon her crossbill setting up the same matter in an action thereafter brought by her husband against her for divorce a vinculo. Medlin v. Medlin, 175 N.C. 529, 95 S.E. 857 (1918).

IV. CRUEL TREATMENT.

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Necessary Allegations Under Subdivisions (3) and (4). - A wife, in alleging a cause of action for divorce from bed and board under subdivisions (3) and (4) of this section, must set out with particularity the wrongful acts of the husband upon which she relies and also that such acts were without adequate provocation on her part. Ollis v. Ollis, 241 N.C. 709, 86 S.E.2d 420 (1955); Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).

Allegation of actual physical violence is not required under subdivision (3) of this section. Pearce v. Pearce, 226 N.C. 307, 37 S.E.2d 904 (1946).

Cruelty and indignities, like other matrimonial offenses, may be condoned. Cushing v. Cushing, 263 N.C. 181, 139 S.E.2d 217 (1964).

Revival of Cause After Condonation. - Much less cruelty or indignity is sufficient to revive a transaction occurring before the condonation, than to support an original suit for divorce. Lassiter v. Lassiter, 92 N.C. 130 (1885).

Acts Committed More Than 10 Years Before. - A divorce would not be granted for cruel and barbarous treatment where it appeared that the acts complained of were committed more than 10 years before the commencement of the action, and in the meanwhile the parties had continued to reside together. O'Connor v. O'Connor, 109 N.C. 139, 13 S.E. 887 (1891).

Illustrative Cases. - The communication of an infectious disease by the husband to the wife was not sufficient ground under subdivision (3) of this section. Long v. Long, 9 N.C. 189 (1822).

Whipping of wife held cause for divorce in Taylor v. Taylor, 76 N.C. 433 (1877).

For further illustrative cases, see also Griffith v. Griffith, 89 N.C. 113 (1883); Jackson v. Jackson, 11 S.E. 173 (1890).

V. INDIGNITIES.

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Subdivision (4) Is Remedial. - It would seem that the legislature purposely omitted to specify the particular acts of indignity for which divorces may in all cases be obtained. The matter is left at large under general words, thus leaving the courts to deal with each particular case and to determine it upon its own peculiar circumstances, so as to carry into effect the purpose and remedial object of the statute. Taylor v. Taylor, 76 N.C. 433 (1877); Sanders v. Sanders, 157 N.C. 229, 72 S.E. 876 (1911).

Nature of Indignities. - To entitle a wife to a divorce from bed and board under subdivision (4) of this section, the indignity offered by the husband must be such as may be expected to seriously annoy a woman of ordinary sense and temper, and must be repeated or continued so that it may appear to have been done willfully and intentionally or at least consciously by the husband to the annoyance of the wife. Miller v. Miller, 78 N.C. 102 (1878).

Facts in Each Case Are Determinative. - The acts of the husband which will render the wife's condition intolerable and her life burdensome so as to entitle her to a divorce a mensa are largely dependent on the facts in each particular case, including her station in life, temperament, state of health, habits and feelings. Sanders v. Sanders, 157 N.C. 229, 72 S.E. 876 (1911).

Allegations and Proof. - Under subdivision (4) of this section plaintiff must set out with particularity the language and conduct on the part of defendant relied upon, and must allege and prove that such acts were without adequate provocation on her part. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 226 N.C. 624, 39 S.E.2d 807 (1946); Best v. Best, 228 N.C. 9, 44 S.E.2d 214 (1947); Ollis v. Ollis, 241 N.C. 709, 86 S.E.2d 420 (1955); Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957); Cushing v. Cushing, 263 N.C. 181, 139 S.E.2d 217 (1964); Butler v. Butler, 1 N.C. App. 356, 161 S.E.2d 618 (1968).

As to necessary allegations and proof under subdivision (4) of this section, see also Pearce v. Pearce, 225 N.C. 571, 35 S.E.2d 636 (1945).

Plaintiff's Innocence Must Be Shown - Generally. - The complaint must aver, and facts must be found upon which it can be seen, that the plaintiff did not by her own conduct contribute to the wrongs and abuses of which she complains. White v. White, 84 N.C. 340 (1881); Garsed v. Garsed, 170 N.C. 672, 87 S.E. 45 (1915).

In a cross-action under this section, the omission of an allegation that plaintiff's conduct was without provocation on defendant's part was fatal. Pearce v. Pearce, 225 N.C. 571, 35 S.E.2d 636 (1945).

In North Carolina, a party relying on subdivision (4) must not have provoked the "indignities" of which he complains. Puett v. Puett, 75 N.C. App. 554, 331 S.E.2d 287 (1985).

Same - General Allegation Insufficient. - It is essential that the plaintiff specifically set forth in her complaint the circumstances under which the violence was committed, what her conduct was, and especially what she had done to provoke such conduct on the part of her husband. A general allegation that such conduct was "without cause or provocation on her part" is insufficient. Everton v. Everton, 50 N.C. 202 (1857); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 109 N.C. 139, 13 S.E. 887 (1891); Martin v. Martin, 130 N.C. 27, 40 S.E. 822 (1902).

Failure to Allege and Prove That Husband's Accusations of Infidelity Were False. - In an action for divorce a mensa et thoro and for subsistence, plaintiff alleged that defendant had repeatedly accused her of having sexual relations with her foster father and other men, and her evidence tended to show that all of the specific acts of abuse and misconduct complained of occurred in connection with this accusation. Plaintiff further alleged that she had been faithful and dutiful, and that defendant's acts of abuse and misconduct were without provocation or justification, but did not specifically allege or testify that the accusation was false. It was held that defendant's motion for judgment as of nonsuit should have been allowed, since even if the allegation denying provocation or justification was taken as denial of the charge of infidelity, plaintiff offered no testimony in support of such denial. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 226 N.C. 624, 39 S.E.2d 807 (1946).

Admissible Evidence of Indignities. - In plaintiff's action for divorce from bed and board, the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence testimony concerning defendant's use of pornographic material in the presence of the parties' minor children, defendant's refusal to provide educational support for one of the parties' adult children, and defendant's sexual advances upon the parties' daughter, since such evidence was relevant to show the circumstances surrounding plaintiff's claim that defendant's acts constituted such indignities to plaintiff's person that her condition was rendered intolerable and her life burdensome. Vandiver v. Vandiver, 50 N.C. App. 319, 274 S.E.2d 243, cert. denied, 302 N.C. 634, 280 S.E.2d 449 (1981).

Grant of Divorce Reversed Where Husband's Behavior Contributed to Wife's Criticism and Accusations. - In a divorce action under subdivision (4), the judge expressly concluded that the plaintiff-husband was not blameless and the judge's findings compelled the conclusion that the husband's conduct - rescue squad activities despite wife's suspicions of unfaithfulness, public name calling - so contributed to his wife's criticism and accusations and to the parties' repeated arguments that the grant of divorce had to be reversed. Puett v. Puett, 75 N.C. App. 554, 331 S.E.2d 287 (1985).

Illustrative Cases. - Husband's persistent charge of adultery against a virtuous wife, accompanied by a contemptuous declaration that she was no longer his wife and by abandonment of her bed, was such an indignity to wife's person as would entitle her to a partial divorce and to alimony. Everton v. Everton, 50 N.C. 202 (1857).

Where petitioner alleged that her husband had become jealous of her without cause, had shaken his fist in her face and threatened her, and had declared to her face and published to the neighborhood that the child with which she was pregnant was not his, that her condition from such treatment had become intolerable and her life burdensome, and that she had been compelled to quit his house and seek the protection of her father, it was held that she had set out enough to entitle her to alimony pendente lite. Erwin v. Erwin, 57 N.C. 82 (1858).

Where a drunken husband cursed his wife and drove her from his house, and by demonstrations of violence caused her to leave the bedside of a dying child and seek safety and protection at a distance of several miles, this was sufficient cause for divorce under subdivision (4) of this section. Scoggins v. Scoggins, 85 N.C. 348 (1881).

A divorce from bed and board will be granted the wife if it is shown that the husband made foul and injurious accusations, refused to bed with wife, and denied that she was his wife. Green v. Green, 131 N.C. 533, 42 S.E. 954 (1902).

When in an action by a wife for divorce a mensa there was evidence tending to show that plaintiff, in her married life, was free from blame and that defendant's conduct was a long course of neglect, cruelty, humiliation, and insult, repeated and persisted in, it was sufficient to bring the cause within the words of subdivision (4) of this section, that defendant had offered "such indignities to [wife's] person as to render her condition intolerable and her life burdensome." Sanders v. Sanders, 157 N.C. 229, 72 S.E. 876 (1911).

Allegations that husband had been living in adultery, had repeatedly avowed his loss of affection for and his desire to be rid of his wife, had ejected her from his bed, and had finally ordered her from his home, saying that he never intended to live with her again, stated a cause of action. Pearce v. Pearce, 226 N.C. 307, 37 S.E.2d 904 (1946).

In plaintiff's action for divorce from bed and board on the ground that defendant had inflicted such indignities upon her as to render her life burdensome, evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find for plaintiff where it tended to show that at some time prior to 1969 defendant began sleeping and spending the majority of his time in the basement of the parties' home, isolated from plaintiff; that upon moving into the basement, defendant withdrew from active participation in the resolution of familial and household problems; that defendant viewed hardcore pornographic material in his basement and permitted his minor children to view such material; that during 1973 and 1974 defendant requested that plaintiff indulge him in various unnatural sexual desires; and that subsequent to 1975 defendant was absent from the parties' home every weekend and all holidays until September 24, 1976, when he left the home for good. Vandiver v. Vandiver, 50 N.C. App. 319, 274 S.E.2d 243, cert. denied, 302 N.C. 634, 280 S.E.2d 449 (1981).

As a ground for the divorce, the trial court did not err in finding that the wife subjected the husband to indignities that made the husband's life burdensome and the husband's condition intolerable under G.S. 50-7(4); there was evidence that the wife (1) was involved in an extramarital affair, (2) wrecked the marital home after being ordered to leave it, (3) twice had the husband removed after filing false domestic violence proceedings, (4) was physically violent to the husband, (5) left the husband on three occasions without telling the husband where she was going, and (6) did not return for three or four nights. Evans v. Evans, 169 N.C. App. 358, 610 S.E.2d 264 (2005).

VI. EXCESSIVE USE OF ALCOHOL OR DRUGS.

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Allegations of Habitual Drunkenness. - Allegations in complaint that defendant had been an habitual drunkard during the prior three years were sufficient to state a cause of action for divorce from bed and board under subdivision (5) of this section. Best v. Best, 228 N.C. 9, 44 S.E.2d 214 (1947).

I. IN GENERAL.

No Conflict with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 13(a). - There is no conflict between the statutes dealing with procedure in divorce actions and G.S. 1A-1, Rule 13(a). Rather, G.S. 1A-1, Rule 13(a) superimposes an additional characteristic on certain kinds of counterclaims. Gardner v. Gardner, 294 N.C. 172, 240 S.E.2d 399 (1978).

The statutes dealing specifically with divorce actions do not prescribe a procedure for counterclaims different from that prescribed in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 13(a). Gardner v. Gardner, 294 N.C. 172, 240 S.E.2d 399 (1978).

Applied in Scoggins v. Scoggins, 85 N.C. 348 (1881); White v. White, 179 N.C. 592, 103 S.E. 216 (1920); Williams v. Williams, 180 N.C. 273, 104 S.E. 561 (1920); Clarke v. Clarke, 47 N.C. App. 249, 267 S.E.2d 361 (1980); Lynch v. Lynch, 302 N.C. 189, 274 S.E.2d 212 (1981); Allred v. Tucci, 85 N.C. App. 138, 354 S.E.2d 291 (1987).

Cited in Keys v. Tuten, 199 N.C. 368, 154 S.E. 631 (1930); Hodges v. Hodges, 226 N.C. 570, 39 S.E.2d 596 (1946); Rowland v. Rowland, 253 N.C. 328, 116 S.E.2d 795 (1960); Martin v. Martin, 253 N.C. 704, 118 S.E.2d 29 (1961); Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 126 S.E.2d 597 (1962); Butler v. Butler, 1 N.C. App. 356, 161 S.E.2d 618 (1968); Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378, 188 S.E.2d 711 (1972); Smith v. Smith, 56 N.C. App. 812, 290 S.E.2d 390 (1982); Bryant v. Nationwide Mut. Fire. Ins. Co., 67 N.C. App. 616, 313 S.E.2d 803 (1984); In re Triscari Children, 109 N.C. App. 285, 426 S.E.2d 435 (1993); Gaskill v. State ex rel. Cobey, 109 N.C. App. 656, 428 S.E.2d 474 (1993); State v. Thibodeaux, 352 N.C. 570, 532 S.E.2d 797 (2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1155, 121 S. Ct. 1106, 148 L. Ed. 2d 976 (2001); In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 636 S.E.2d 787 (2006); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 192 N.C. App. 248, 664 S.E.2d 616 (2008); State v. Mills, 232 N.C. App. 460, 754 S.E.2d 674 (2014).

II. COMPLAINT.

Plaintiff Must Allege Material Facts Required by This Section. - To allege a cause of action for divorce, a plaintiff, in addition to one or more of the grounds for divorce, must allege the additional material facts now required by this section. Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).

Such Allegations Are Indispensable Constituent Elements of Cause of Action. - The legal effect of the 1951 amendment to this section is that the allegations required to be set forth in the complaint are now indispensable constituent elements of plaintiff's cause of action, and the facts so alleged must be established by the verdict of a jury. Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).

The allegations required by this section are indispensable constituent elements of a divorce action and must be established either by the verdict of a jury or by a judge, as the pertinent statute may permit. Eudy v. Eudy, 288 N.C. 71, 215 S.E.2d 782 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 290 S.E.2d 653 (1982); Boyd v. Boyd, 61 N.C. App. 334, 300 S.E.2d 569 (1983).

Which Must Be Found True. - All averments required by the statute must be both alleged in the complaint and found by the finder of fact to be true before a divorce judgment may be entered. Eudy v. Eudy, 288 N.C. 71, 215 S.E.2d 782 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 290 S.E.2d 653 (1982).

Statement in General Terms. - The matters in the jurisdictional affidavit (now the complaint) in an action for divorce a mensa brought by the wife may be stated in general terms following the language of the statute. Sanders v. Sanders, 157 N.C. 229, 72 S.E. 876 (1911); Jones v. Jones, 173 N.C. 279, 91 S.E. 960 (1917).

Allegation of Six Months' Prior Knowledge - Generally. - The affidavit (now the complaint) must state that the action was not brought within six months from the time the plaintiff first acquired knowledge of the facts stated therein. Clark v. Clark, 133 N.C. 28, 45 S.E. 342 (1903). See also, O'Connor v. O'Connor, 109 N.C. 139, 13 S.E. 887 (1891); Green v. Green, 131 N.C. 533, 42 S.E. 954 (1902).

Six months' prior knowledge was formerly not required to be alleged in the complaint. Kinney v. Kinney, 149 N.C. 321, 63 S.E. 97 (1908).

While, in an action for divorce a mensa, it is advisable that the pleading allege that the facts set forth therein as grounds for divorce had existed to complaint's knowledge for at least six months prior to the filing of the pleading in accordance with the language of the statute, where the wife's pleading in her cross-action for divorce a mensa alleged gross mistreatment of her by the husband, culminating in his locking her out of her home and ordering her away on a specified date more than six months prior to the filing of the pleading, with verification that the facts alleged therein were true to her own knowledge, her pleading would be held sufficient on this aspect. Pruett v. Pruett, 247 N.C. 13, 100 S.E.2d 296 (1957).

Same - When Unnecessary. - By Laws 1925, c. 93, this section was amended so that in cases where the cause for divorce is five years' (now one year's) separation, then the six months' prior knowledge need not be alleged. Ellis v. Ellis, 190 N.C. 418, 130 S.E. 7 (1925); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 244 N.C. 286, 93 S.E.2d 617 (1956). See also, Smithdeal v. Smithdeal, 206 N.C. 397, 174 S.E. 118 (1934).

Section Requires Complaint to Set Forth Certain Information as to Children. - This section requires that in all divorce actions the complaint shall set forth the name and age of any minor child or children of the marriage, and that in the event there are no minor children of the marriage, the complaint shall so state. Jones v. Jones, 20 N.C. App. 607, 202 S.E.2d 279, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 234, 204 S.E.2d 23 (1974).

Allegations of the names and ages of any children of a party seeking divorce in North Carolina are required by this section, in order that the court may protect the interests of such children if the parties have failed to do so. Powers v. Parisher, 104 N.C. App. 400, 409 S.E.2d 725 (1991), appeal dismissed, 331 N.C. 286, 417 S.E.2d 254 (1992).

The obvious reason for this requirement is to bring to the attention of the court any minor children that might be affected by the divorce, to the end that the court will protect the interests of those children. Jones v. Jones, 20 N.C. App. 607, 202 S.E.2d 279, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 234, 204 S.E.2d 23 (1974); Cobb v. Cobb, 42 N.C. App. 373, 256 S.E.2d 722 (1979).

The reason for the requirement of this section for a pleading relating to minor children is not to establish jurisdiction. Cobb v. Cobb, 42 N.C. App. 373, 256 S.E.2d 722 (1979).

Answer Constituting Counterclaim. - Where the complaint in a suit for an absolute divorce alleged facts entitling either or both of the parties to the marriage to an absolute divorce, defendant's answer admitting these allegations, together with his prayer for an absolute divorce on the same grounds, was in effect a counterclaim seeking affirmative relief and arising out of the same transactions alleged in the complaint. McCarley v. McCarley, 289 N.C. 109, 221 S.E.2d 490 (1976).

Proof Must Correspond to Allegations. - As the allegations in a petition for divorce are directed by statute to be sworn to, it is more emphatically required in such a case than in others that the allegations and proofs should correspond; otherwise the court cannot decree a divorce. Foy v. Foy, 35 N.C. 90 (1851); Young v. Young, 225 N.C. 340, 34 S.E.2d 154 (1945).

III. VERIFICATION.

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In a divorce action a verification is required as an essential part of the complaint. The want of a proper verification is a fatal defect and a cause for dismissal of the action. Boyd v. Boyd, 61 N.C. App. 334, 300 S.E.2d 569 (1983).

Verification Must Be as Required. - In an application for alimony pendente lite the affidavit and petition must be verified as required by this section. Clark v. Clark, 133 N.C. 28, 45 S.E. 342 (1903). See also, Hopkins v. Hopkins, 132 N.C. 22, 43 S.E. 508 (1903).

Verification of a pleading stating that it was "sworn and subscribed to" was not sufficient. Martin v. Martin, 130 N.C. 27, 40 S.E. 822 (1902).

For case holding verification in substantial compliance with former G.S. 1-145 sufficient, see Bolin v. Bolin, 242 N.C. 642, 89 S.E.2d 303 (1955).

In Accordance with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 11. - This section requires that for a complaint for divorce to be valid, it must be verified in accordance with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 11, when it is filed. It is not sufficient to obtain verification before the complaint and summons are served on the defendant. Boyd v. Boyd, 61 N.C. App. 334, 300 S.E.2d 569 (1983).

Verification of Answer Setting Up Cross-Action. - In husband's action for divorce a vinculo, wife's answer setting up a cross-action must be verified under this section, as a jurisdictional prerequisite, and when the answer is not so verified the granting of permanent alimony is erroneous. Silver v. Silver, 220 N.C. 191, 16 S.E.2d 834 (1941).

Verification of Counterclaim. - A decree of divorce was not improperly granted because of defective verification of defendant-husband's pleadings, where the counterclaim in which the divorce was prayed for was verified, although the original pleadings were not. Swygert v. Swygert, 46 N.C. App. 173, 264 S.E.2d 902 (1980).

An action for permanent alimony is a permissive counterclaim and is not required to be verified. Newsome v. Newsome, 43 N.C. App. 580, 259 S.E.2d 577 (1979).

As to waiver of verification of subsequent pleadings, see Calaway v. Harris, 229 N.C. 117, 47 S.E.2d 796 (1948).

Impeachment of Verification. - Such uncertainties as plaintiff expressed under cross-examination as to the exact nature of his act in verifying a complaint afforded an insufficient basis to warrant impeachment of his verification. Accordingly, the court erred in allowing defendant's motion to strike the verification and in dismissing plaintiff's complaint. Skinner v. Skinner, 28 N.C. App. 412, 222 S.E.2d 258, cert. denied, 289 N.C. 726, 224 S.E.2d 674 (1976).

Effect of False Swearing on Decree. - If a decree of divorce, regular in all respects on the face of the judgment roll, is obtained by false swearing, by way of pleading and of evidence, relating to the cause or ground for divorce, the decree is voidable but not void, and is immune from attack by either party to the divorce. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 244 N.C. 286, 93 S.E.2d 617 (1956).

In an action for annulment of a marriage entered into between plaintiff husband and defendant wife following a decree of divorce in favor of defendant against her former husband, plaintiff, who had been married to defendant for six years, could not attack the divorce decree by alleging false swearing of defendant in regard to the ground or cause for divorce. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 244 N.C. 286, 93 S.E.2d 617 (1956).

In an action for divorce the affidavit formerly required by this section in connection with the complaint was jurisdictional, and a complaint accompanied by a false statutory affidavit would be regarded as insufficient to empower the court to grant a decree of divorce; the correct procedure for relief against the decree would be by motion in the cause. Young v. Young, 225 N.C. 340, 34 S.E.2d 154 (1945), wherein the plaintiff was held to have practiced imposition upon the court.

As to the affidavit formerly required by this section, see Holloman v. Holloman, 127 N.C. 15, 37 S.E. 68 (1900); Nichols v. Nichols, 128 N.C. 108, 38 S.E. 296 (1901); Johnson v. Johnson, 141 N.C. 91, 53 S.E. 623 (1906); State v. Williams, 220 N.C. 445, 17 S.E.2d 769 (1941), rev'd on other grounds, 317 U.S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279 (1942).

IV. RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE.

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Jurisdiction in divorce actions is conferred by statute. Israel v. Israel, 255 N.C. 391, 121 S.E.2d 713 (1961).

And Is Founded on Domicile. - Judicial power to grant a divorce that is, jurisdiction strictly speaking, is founded on domicile. Israel v. Israel, 255 N.C. 391, 121 S.E.2d 713 (1961).

The domicile of one spouse within a state gives power to that state to dissolve a marriage wheresoever contracted. Israel v. Israel, 255 N.C. 391, 121 S.E.2d 713 (1961).

"Domicile" Defined. - That place is properly the domicile of a person where he has his true permanent home and principal establishment, and to which he has, whenever he is absent, the intention of returning, and from which he has no present intention of moving. Israel v. Israel, 255 N.C. 391, 121 S.E.2d 713 (1961).

"Residence" has been interpreted to mean the equivalent of "domicile." Andris v. Andris, 65 N.C. App. 688, 309 S.E.2d 570 (1983).

Residence and Intent Must Be Shown. - To establish a domicile there must be a residence, and the intention to make it a home or to live there permanently or indefinitely. Israel v. Israel, 255 N.C. 391, 121 S.E.2d 713 (1961).

In order to establish a domicile, a party must make a showing of both actual residence in the new locality and the intent to remain there permanently. Andris v. Andris, 65 N.C. App. 688, 309 S.E.2d 570 (1983).

The residence requirement in this section is jurisdictional. Eudy v. Eudy, 24 N.C. App. 516, 211 S.E.2d 536, aff'd, 288 N.C. 71, 215 S.E.2d 782 (1975).

The requirement that one of the parties to a divorce action shall have resided in this State for a specified period of time next preceding the commencement of the action is jurisdictional. Israel v. Israel, 255 N.C. 391, 121 S.E.2d 713 (1961).

Residency for Six Months Required. - In order to obtain a valid divorce in North Carolina, the plaintiff or defendant must have resided in this State for at least six months next preceding institution of the action for divorce. Eudy v. Eudy, 24 N.C. App. 516, 211 S.E.2d 536, aff'd, 288 N.C. 71, 215 S.E.2d 782 (1975).

The period of residence in this section applies to an action for divorce from bed and board as well as to an action for absolute divorce. Eudy v. Eudy, 24 N.C. App. 516, 211 S.E.2d 536, aff'd, 288 N.C. 71, 215 S.E.2d 782 (1975).

But the residency requirement of this section is not applicable in an action for alimony without divorce. Eudy v. Eudy, 288 N.C. 71, 215 S.E.2d 782 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 290 S.E.2d 653 (1982).

A bona fide "residence," necessary under statutes in order to confer jurisdiction in divorce proceedings, is within the legal meaning of the word "domicile," that is, an abode animo manendi, a place where a person lives or has his home, to which, when absent, he intends to return, and from which he has no present purpose to depart. Rector v. Rector, 4 N.C. App. 240, 166 S.E.2d 492 (1969).

"Residence" means actual residence, and prior to the 1949 amendment, which allows suit to be brought where defendant has been a resident of the State for six months, a nonresident wife in suing for divorce could not avail herself of the maxim that "her domicile was that of her husband," where she had not actually satisfied the residence requirement. Schonwald v. Schonwald, 55 N.C. 367 (1856).

Separate Domicile for Wife. - North Carolina divorce statutes recognize the legality of a separate domicile, or residence, for the wife. Rector v. Rector, 4 N.C. App. 240, 166 S.E.2d 492 (1969).

There is no logical, legal or equitable reason for allowing wife, whose misconduct has brought about the separation, to insist upon the legal fiction that her domicile follows that of her husband, and thereby to defeat his action for divorce brought in the jurisdiction in which she actually resides. Rector v. Rector, 4 N.C. App. 240, 166 S.E.2d 492 (1969).

One need not be a citizen of the United States in order to establish residence or domicile within this State for purposes of divorce actions. Rector v. Rector, 4 N.C. App. 240, 166 S.E.2d 492 (1969).

Effect of Temporary Removal. - Where husband and wife establish a residence in this State, the wife, by leaving the State for a temporary purpose, without any intention of changing her residence, does not thereby lose her citizenship. Moore v. Moore, 130 N.C. 333, 41 S.E. 943 (1902).

The domicile of a soldier or sailor in the military or naval service of his country generally remains unchanged, domicile being neither gained nor lost by being temporarily stationed in the line of duty at a particular place, even for a period of years. A new domicile may, however, be acquired if both the fact and the intent concur. Israel v. Israel, 255 N.C. 391, 121 S.E.2d 713 (1961).

Naval officer was properly found to be domiciled in North Carolina where: (1) He had changed his voter registration from Pennsylvania to Guilford County, (2) He had filed a North Carolina income tax return for the year 1981, (3) He had changed his permanent address with the Navy to his father's address in Greensboro as of August 1, 1981, (4) He had opened a bank account in Greensboro in August, 1981 and had maintained it since that time, (5) He had changed the registration of his motor vehicle from Pennsylvania to North Carolina and had paid North Carolina property taxes, (6) He had resided at his parents' house whenever on leave from the Navy, and (7) He had severed all ties with the State of Pennsylvania. In short, plaintiff did everything possible to establish a residence in North Carolina. The transient nature of his career with the United States Navy prohibited him from doing anything further. Andris v. Andris, 65 N.C. App. 688, 309 S.E.2d 570 (1983).

Residency Established Via Verified Complaint. - District court properly exercised jurisdiction over the subject matter of the parties' divorce action as in the State of North Carolina subject matter jurisdiction for divorce involves not only bringing the matter in the correct court, but also the court's finding residence by one of the parties for the requisite length of time and verification of the pleadings. In the case at issue, the plaintiff husband sufficiently alleged that he was a citizen and resident of North Carolina for more than six months next preceding the institution of the action and had lived separate and apart from the wife for more than one year next preceding the institution of the action without resuming the marital relationship, with those district court findings being supported by the husband's verified complaint, which was treated as an affidavit. Wilson v. Wilson, 191 N.C. App. 789, 666 S.E.2d 653 (2008).

Opinions of Attorney General

Not Advisable for Attorney to Act as Notary and Verify Client's Divorce Complaint. - It is not advisable for a notary who is also a partner in a law firm acting of counsel to an attorney filing a divorce complaint to notarize the verification of the client. A divorce complaint which is not properly notarized is subject to dismissal. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. James Lee Knight, Notary Public, Guilford County, 58 N.C.A.G. 35 (1988).

When one partner of Firm A appears as attorney for a plaintiff in a divorce proceeding, the other partners in the firm also appear, and they could be prohibited under former G.S. 47-8 from notarizing the verification of the client. This would be true whether or not the firm appears as "of counsel" to the individual partner on the face of the complaint or answer. Therefore, such practice should be avoided, and as an attorney/notary who acts in this fashion proceeds at his own risk. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. James Lee Knight, Notary Public, Guilford County, 58 N.C.A.G. 35 (1988).

I. IN GENERAL.

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases cited below were decided under former G.S. 50-13, which prior to its repeal in 1967 dealt with custody and maintenance of children in actions for divorce.

Applicability. - The plain language of G.S. 50-13.2(b) is referring to the party who is absent or has relocated with or without the children because of an act of domestic violence; therefore, a mother's claim that the trial court violated G.S. 50-13.2(b) failed because that language did not apply to the situation since the mother had not relocated due to an act of domestic violence, or, to the extent the language of the section could apply, it would apply to the father who had relocated to another country. Thus, the trial court was required not to weigh the father's absence or relocation against him in determining custody or visitation. Jordao v. Jordao, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Oct. 6, 2020).

Visitation and child support rights are independent rights accruing primarily to the benefit of the minor child and one is not, and may not be made, contingent upon the other. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

Jurisdiction. - When a divorce action is instituted, the court acquires jurisdiction over the children born to the marriage, and may hear and determine questions as to the custody and maintenance of the children both before and after final decree of divorce. Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 158 S.E.2d 77 (1967).

Custody Proceedings Are Continuing. - There is no requirement that each successive custody hearing starts with a "clean slate" and that the court cannot rely on the record previously generated. To the contrary, custody proceedings generally are continuing in nature. Best v. Best, 81 N.C. App. 337, 344 S.E.2d 363 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Petersen v. Rowe, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).

A judgment awarding custody is based upon the conditions found to exist at the time it is entered. Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 145 S.E.2d 332 (1965).

Simultaneous Adoption and Custody Actions. - Because the legislature has enunciated a public policy that every child should have a permanent plan of care, because adoption is more likely than a custody proceeding between non-parents to result in a permanent plan of care and because the superior court has jurisdiction over adoptions, that court's jurisdiction supersedes that of the district court with regard to the custody of a child the subject of a simultaneous adoption and custody proceeding. Griffin v. Griffin, 118 N.C. App. 400, 456 S.E.2d 329 (1995).

In the absence of an order of consolidation when the same child is the subject of a simultaneous custody and adoption proceeding, both the superior and district courts do not have continuing jurisdiction to fully adjudicate the respective issues before them. Griffin v. Griffin, 118 N.C. App. 400, 456 S.E.2d 329 (1995).

The filing of an adoption petition in the superior court divests the district court of jurisdiction to adjudicate issues of custody with regard to a child who is the subject of an adoption petition. Griffin v. Griffin, 118 N.C. App. 400, 456 S.E.2d 329 (1995).

Upon the entry of an interlocutory order of adoption by the superior court, the jurisdiction of the district court with regard to the custody of the child who is the subject of the interlocutory order is in abeyance until such time as the interlocutory decree is vacated, the adoption petition is dismissed, or a final decree of adoption is entered. Griffin v. Griffin, 118 N.C. App. 400, 456 S.E.2d 329 (1995).

Recommendation of Guardian Ad Litem. - Pursuant to G.S. 7A-640 [see now G.S. 7B-901 and G.S. 7B-2501], the court may consider the recommendation of a guardian ad litem concerning the needs of a juvenile. In re Gwaltney, 68 N.C. App. 686, 315 S.E.2d 750 (1984).

Mother Not Entitled to Proceeds of Forfeited Bond. - A bond posted by father in custody dispute was deemed to be an appearance bond designed to guarantee his appearance before the court and as a penalty in the event of his failure to appear, and under N.C. Const., Art. IX, § 7 the county board of education was entitled to the clear proceeds of its forfeiture. Mussallam v. Mussallam, 321 N.C. 504, 364 S.E.2d 364, rehearing denied, 321 N.C. 116, 367 S.E.2d 915 (1988).

Provisions in Custody Orders. - Provisions directing the parties to cooperate with one another and to refrain from conduct that will be detrimental to the child are commonly included in custody orders. Watkins v. Watkins, 120 N.C. App. 475, 462 S.E.2d 687 (1995), appeal dismissed, 343 N.C. 128, 468 S.E.2d 795 (1996).

Order requiring a custodial mother to move back to the county in which the parties had resided before separating to live in the marital home was set aside because, while the court could find the relative benefits of the children living with the father in one county or the mother in another county when making a primary custody determination, the order was not a "related matter" the general assembly gave trial courts the authority to decide. Kanellos v. Kanellos, 251 N.C. App. 149, 795 S.E.2d 225 (2016).

Rights of Parents to Children's Records. - Trial court properly ordered that a mother share a child's school and medical records with the father, as G.S. 50-13.2(b) provided that each parent have equal access to the records of the minor child involving the health, education, and welfare of the child. Young v. Young, 169 N.C. App. 31, 609 S.E.2d 795 (2005).

Denial to a noncustodial mother of access to the medical, educational, and counseling records of the mother's child was in error because the court's findings of fact did not support a conclusion that it was in the best interest of the child to prevent the mother from accessing the records. While the mother's behavior at the child's school was disruptive, the findings did not indicate that the mother's behavior made third-party professionals sufficiently concerned about their own safety, or have any other negative effect on the child. Paynich v. Vestal, - N.C. App. - , 837 S.E.2d 433 (2020).

Collateral estoppel effect of findings in domestic violence protective order entered under G.S. 50B-1(a), finding that the mother was responsible for the incident, collaterally estopped the finding in the custody case that the father was responsible for the incident; when the protective order was not appealed the collateral legal consequences of that order became final, precluding reconsideration of the order in the custody action under G.S. 50-13.2. Doyle v. Doyle, 176 N.C. App. 547, 626 S.E.2d 845 (2006).

Trial court erred in a custody case in finding that the father had committed domestic violence because, in a prior domestic violence case, the court specifically found that the father had not committed domestic violence; G.S. 50-13.2(a) required the court in a custody case to consider domestic violence, but collateral estoppel prevented the court in the custody case from making findings which were contrary to the findings in the prior domestic violence action. Simms v. Simms, 195 N.C. App. 780, 673 S.E.2d 753 (2009).

Electronic Communication Not Equal to In-Person Visitation. - G.S. 50-13.2 provided that electronic communication may not be used as a replacement or substitution for custody or visitation and, thus, the plaintiff's contention that electronic communication was a form of visitation equal to that of in-person visitation was incorrect. Deanes v. Deanes, - N.C. App. - , 837 S.E.2d 404 (2020).

Applied in State v. Wrenn, 16 N.C. App. 411, 191 S.E.2d 913 (1972); Powell v. Powell, 25 N.C. App. 695, 214 S.E.2d 808 (1975); Stanback v. Stanback, 31 N.C. App. 174, 229 S.E.2d 693 (1976); Hamlin v. Hamlin, 302 N.C. 478, 276 S.E.2d 381 (1981); Regan v. Smith, 131 N.C. App. 851, 509 S.E.2d 452 (1998); McDuffie v. Mitchell, 155 N.C. App. 587, 573 S.E.2d 606 (2002), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 165, 580 S.E.2d 368 (2003); In re T.H.T., 185 N.C. App. 337, 648 S.E.2d 519 (2007), aff'd in part, modified in part, 362 N.C. 446, 665 S.E.2d 54 (2008); Buck v. Greenlee, - F. Supp. 2d - (W.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2011).

Cited in Settle ex rel. Sullivan v. Beasley, 309 N.C. 616, 308 S.E.2d 288 (1983); Prescott v. Prescott, 83 N.C. App. 254, 350 S.E.2d 116 (1986); Mussallam v. Mussallam, 321 N.C. 504, 364 S.E.2d 364 (1988); Ray v. Ray, 103 N.C. App. 790, 407 S.E.2d 592 (1991); Hunt v. Hunt, 112 N.C. App. 722, 436 S.E.2d 856 (1993); In re Duncan, 112 N.C. App. 196, 435 S.E.2d 121 (1993); Westneat v. Westneat, 113 N.C. App. 247, 437 S.E.2d 899 (1994); Vann v. Vann, 128 N.C. App. 516, 495 S.E.2d 370 (1998); Penland v. Harris, 135 N.C. App. 359, 520 S.E.2d 105 (1999); Montgomery v. Montgomery, 136 N.C. App. 435, 524 S.E.2d 360 (2000); Mohr v. Mohr, 155 N.C. App. 421, 573 S.E.2d 729 (2002); Senner v. Senner, 161 N.C. App. 78, 587 S.E.2d 675 (2003); Faulkenberry v. Faulkenberry, 169 N.C. App. 428, 610 S.E.2d 237 (2005); Perdue v. Fuqua, 195 N.C. App. 583, 673 S.E.2d 145 (2009); Bohannan v. McManaway, 208 N.C. App. 572, 705 S.E.2d 1 (2010); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 211 N.C. App. 267, 710 S.E.2d 235 (2011); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 225 N.C. App. 269, 737 S.E.2d 783 (2013); Wellons v. White, 229 N.C. App. 164, 748 S.E.2d 709 (2013); State v. Allah, 231 N.C. App. 88, 750 S.E.2d 903 (2013); Respess v. Respess, 232 N.C. App. 611, 754 S.E.2d 691 (2014); In re J.D., 234 N.C. App. 342, 759 S.E.2d 375 (2014); In re J.K., - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Apr. 4, 2017).

II. WELFARE OF CHILD.

The welfare of the child is the paramount consideration in custody matters. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966); Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 158 S.E.2d 77 (1967); Williams v. Williams, 18 N.C. App. 635, 197 S.E.2d 629 (1973); Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 204 S.E.2d 678 (1974); Harrington v. Harrington, 286 N.C. 260, 210 S.E.2d 190 (1974); Goodson v. Goodson, 32 N.C. App. 76, 231 S.E.2d 178 (1977).

The best interest and welfare of the child is the paramount consideration in determining the visitation rights, as well as in determining the right to custody, and neither of these rights should be permitted to jeopardize the best interest and welfare of the child. In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971).

Although at one time under the common law the father was generally entitled to the custody of minor children, the courts at the present time almost invariably adhere to the principle that the welfare or best interest of the child is the paramount consideration. This was the rule adhered to by North Carolina courts for many years, and is now prescribed by this section. Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 184 S.E.2d 417 (1971).

The child's welfare is the principal consideration in determining custody matters. In re Morrison, 6 N.C. App. 47, 169 S.E.2d 228 (1969).

The primary consideration in custody cases is the welfare of the child or children involved. Rothman v. Rothman, 6 N.C. App. 401, 170 S.E.2d 140 (1969).

An order for custody of a minor child cannot be affirmed without a clear indication that it rested on a determination of what would be in the child's best interest. That is the paramount consideration in custody cases. In re DiMatteo, 62 N.C. App. 571, 303 S.E.2d 84 (1983).

And the Polar Star by Which Court Is Guided. - The welfare of the child is the polar star by which the discretion of the court is to be guided. In re Lewis, 88 N.C. 31 (1883); Brake v. Brake, 228 N.C. 609, 46 S.E.2d 643 (1948); Finley v. Sapp, 238 N.C. 114, 76 S.E.2d 350 (1953); Thomas v. Thomas, 259 N.C. 461, 130 S.E.2d 871 (1963); Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966); Chriscoe v. Chriscoe, 268 N.C. 554, 151 S.E.2d 33 (1966); In re Pitts, 2 N.C. App. 211, 162 S.E.2d 524 (1968); Greer v. Greer, 5 N.C. App. 160, 167 S.E.2d 782 (1969); In re Moore, 8 N.C. App. 251, 174 S.E.2d 135 (1970); Jarman v. Jarman, 14 N.C. App. 531, 188 S.E.2d 647, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 622, 190 S.E.2d 465 (1972); In re Cox, 17 N.C. App. 687, 195 S.E.2d 132, cert. denied, 283 N.C. 585, 196 S.E.2d 809 (1973); Paschall v. Paschall, 21 N.C. App. 120, 203 S.E.2d 337 (1974); Mathews v. Mathews, 24 N.C. App. 551, 211 S.E.2d 513 (1975); Pruneau v. Sanders, 25 N.C. App. 510, 214 S.E.2d 288, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 664, 216 S.E.2d 911 (1975); Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

The welfare of the child is controlling in determining the right to custody of the child as between its divorced parents. Hardee v. Mitchell, 230 N.C. 40, 51 S.E.2d 884 (1949).

This section expresses the policy of the State that the best interest and welfare of the child is the paramount and controlling factor to guide the judge in determining the custody of a child. In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971).

As the Determining Factor. - The children of the marriage become the wards of the court, and their welfare is the determining factor in custody proceedings. Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 145 S.E.2d 332 (1965); Greer v. Greer, 5 N.C. App. 160, 167 S.E.2d 782 (1969).

The welfare of the children is the determining factor in custody proceedings, and an award of custody based on that factor will be upheld when supported by competent evidence. In re Poole, 8 N.C. App. 25, 173 S.E.2d 545 (1970).

And the Guiding Principle. - The guiding principle to be used by the court in a custody hearing is the welfare of the children involved. While this guiding principle is clear, decision in particular cases is often difficult, and necessarily a wide discretion is vested in the trial judge. He has the opportunity to see the parties in person and to hear the witnesses, and his decision ought not to be upset on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Greer v. Greer, 5 N.C. App. 160, 167 S.E.2d 782 (1969); Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 184 S.E.2d 417 (1971); Falls v. Falls, 52 N.C. App. 203, 278 S.E.2d 546, cert. denied, 304 N.C. 390, 285 S.E.2d 831 (1981).

The trial court should primarily be concerned with the welfare of the child in deciding which party before it should be charged with the enormous responsibilities of custodianship of the child. In re Kowalzek, 37 N.C. App. 364, 246 S.E.2d 45, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 734, 248 S.E.2d 863 (1978).

In a custody proceeding, it is not the function of the court to punish or reward a parent by withholding or awarding custody of minor children; the function of the court in such a proceeding is to diligently seek to act for the best interests and welfare of the minor child. In re McCraw Children, 3 N.C. App. 390, 165 S.E.2d 1 (1969).

The best interest of the child is the overriding factor in custody determinations. Wilson v. Williams, 42 N.C. App. 348, 256 S.E.2d 516 (1979).

Joint custody and any other custody award must include findings of fact which support such determination of child's best interests. Witherow v. Witherow, 99 N.C. App. 61, 392 S.E.2d 627 (1990).

Considered in Light of All Surrounding Circumstances. - The best interest of the child, in light of all the surrounding circumstances, is the paramount consideration which must guide the court in awarding custody of a minor child. Campbell v. Campbell, 63 N.C. App. 113, 304 S.E.2d 262, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 460, 307 S.E.2d 362 (1983).

Tender Years Presumption Abolished. - Trial court erred in entering a custody order concerning the parties' child; the trial court improperly relied on the tender years presumption in granting custody to the mother, as that presumption had been abolished, and G.S. 50-13.2(a) required that the custody decision be based solely on the best interests of the child, and G.S. 8C-1, Rule 201(b) did not allow the trial court to take judicial notice of the assumptions underlying an abolished doctrine in order to resurrect the doctrine. Greer v. Greer, 175 N.C. App. 464, 624 S.E.2d 423 (2006).

Trial court did not apply tender years presumption in awarding a mother primary physical and legal custody of the parties' child because there was nothing in the record to suggest the trial court relied on a psychologist's affidavit or the mother's testimony regarding a "special bond" in awarding the mother custody, and, in fact, the trial court specifically noted the child was securely bonded to the father. Dixon v. Gordon, 223 N.C. App. 365, 734 S.E.2d 299 (2012), review denied, 743 S.E.2d 191, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 552 (2013).

The trial judge is entrusted by this section with the delicate and difficult task of choosing an environment which will, in his judgment, best encourage full development of the child's physical, mental, emotional, moral and spiritual faculties. In re Peal, 305 N.C. 640, 290 S.E.2d 664 (1982).

Any evidence of child abuse is of the utmost concern in determining whether the grant of custody to a particular party will best promote the interest and welfare of the child, and any evidence of such abuse must be resolved by the trial court in its findings of fact. Dixon v. Dixon, 67 N.C. App. 73, 312 S.E.2d 669 (1984).

Evidence of paternity may properly be considered in determining the best interests of the children. Surles v. Surles, 113 N.C. App. 32, 437 S.E.2d 661 (1993).

A natural parent's constitutionally protected paramount interest in the companionship, custody, care, and control of his or her child is a counterpart of the parental responsibilities the parent has assumed and is based on a presumption that he or she will act in the best interest of the child. Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997).

Acts of Domestic Violence Between Parties. - Trial court's best interests of the children determination under G.S. 50-13.2(a) was supported by its findings of fact, including its finding that the father had "body slammed" the mother 20 to 50 times during the marriage, and threatened to punch his brother-in-law in the nose. Hall v. Hall, 188 N.C. App. 527, 655 S.E.2d 901 (2008).

Although a mother voluntarily dismissed her domestic violence complaint at the time a memorandum of judgment was entered regarding custody, a trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the claim when the father filed a motion for modification of custody, pursuant to G.S. 50-13.7, because "acts of domestic violence between the parties" was one of the factors the trial court was to consider, pursuant to G.S. 50-13.2(a), when making findings as to the best interests of the child. Balawejder v. Balawejder, 216 N.C. App. 301, 721 S.E.2d 679 (2011).

In a mother's suit for the issuance of a domestic violence protective order, it was error to deny an out of state father's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction based on a theory, adopted in other states, distinguishing between "affirmative" and "prohibitive" orders because (1) that theory was not adopted, and (2) the father's substantial rights were implicated, as, inter alia, the issuance of such an order could affect the father's right to custody of the child. Mannise v. Harrell, 249 N.C. App. 322, 791 S.E.2d 653 (2016).

III. RIGHT OF PARENTS TO CUSTODY.

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A. AS AGAINST THIRD PERSONS.

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Due Process. - If a natural parent's conduct has not been inconsistent with his or her constitutionally protected status, application of the "best interest of the child" standard in a custody dispute with a nonparent would offend the Due Process Clause. Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997).

Conduct inconsistent with a parent's protected status, which need not rise to the statutory level warranting termination of parental rights, would result in application of the "best interest of the child" test without offending the Due Process Clause. Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997).

Child's biological mother voluntarily relinquished her paramount parental right to make decisions under the due process clause when she entered into a parenting agreement with her former domestic partner to hold herself, the partner, and the child out as a family unit. The voluntary relinquishment of rights was inconsistent with her paramount rights under the due process clause. Mason v. Dwinnell, 190 N.C. App. 209, 660 S.E.2d 58 (2008).

Parents Have Legal Right to Custody of Their Children. - Parents, including the mother of an illegitimate child, have the legal right to have the custody of their children unless clear and cogent reasons exist for denying them this right. This right is not absolute, and it may be interfered with or denied, but only for the most substantial and sufficient reasons, and is subject to judicial control only when the interest and welfare of the children clearly require it. In re Jones, 14 N.C. App. 334, 188 S.E.2d 580 (1972).

Where one parent is dead, the surviving parent has a natural and legal right to the custody and control of the parties' minor children. This right is not absolute, and it may be interfered with or denied, but only for the most substantial and sufficient reasons, and is subject to judicial control only when the interests and welfare of the children clearly require it. In re Griffin, 6 N.C. App. 375, 170 S.E.2d 84 (1969); In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971); Vaughn v. Tyson, 14 N.C. App. 548, 188 S.E.2d 614 (1972).

Where mother abandons any claim she may have to the custody of her daughter, father alone has the natural and legal right to the custody of the child, unless for substantial and sufficient reasons the interest and welfare of the child require that he be denied that right. Roberts v. Short, 6 N.C. App. 419, 169 S.E.2d 910 (1969).

The mother of an illegitimate child is its natural guardian, and as such, has a legal right to its custody, care and control, if she is a suitable person, even though others may offer more material advantages in life for the child. But this rule is not absolute, and the custody of an illegitimate child may be taken from the mother and placed elsewhere when it clearly and manifestly appears that the best interests and welfare of the child demand it. Wall v. Hardee, 240 N.C. 465, 82 S.E.2d 370 (1954).

Absent a finding that parents (i) are unfit or (ii) have neglected the welfare of their children, the constitutionally-protected paramount right of parents to custody, care, and control of their children must prevail. Petersen v. Rowe, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).

Which Will Be Interfered with Only When Clearly Required. - Where one parent is dead, the surviving parent has a natural and legal right to custody and control of the parties' minor children. This right is not absolute, but it may be interfered with or denied only for the most substantial and sufficient reasons, and is subject to judicial control only when the interests and welfare of the children clearly require it. Comer v. Comer, 61 N.C. App. 324, 300 S.E.2d 457 (1983).

For Parent's Misconduct or Child's Welfare. - The law presumes that the best interests of a child will be served by committing it to the custody of a parent, when the parent is a suitable person; this presumption is not overcome merely by showing that some third person can give the child better care and greater comforts and protection than the parent. A parent's right to custody of a child may be forfeited only by misconduct or by other facts which substantially affect the child's welfare. In re Jones, 14 N.C. App. 334, 188 S.E.2d 580 (1972).

But Child's Welfare Is the Paramount Consideration. - While the law presumes that the best interest of a child will be served by committing it to the custody of a parent, when the parent is a suitable person, the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration to which all other factors, including common-law preferential rights of the parents, must be deferred or subordinated. Plemmons v. Stiles, 65 N.C. App. 341, 309 S.E.2d 504 (1983).

Parent's Love Must Yield to Child's Best Interests. - The child's welfare is the paramount consideration, and a parent's love must yield to another if, after judicial investigation, it is found that the best interest of the child is subserved thereby. Greer v. Greer, 5 N.C. App. 160, 167 S.E.2d 782 (1969).

The "paramount consideration" and "polar star" which have long governed and guided the discretion of the trial judges are the welfare and needs of the child, not the persons seeking his or her custody, and even parental love must yield to the promotion of those higher interests. In re Peal, 305 N.C. 640, 290 S.E.2d 664 (1982).

The natural parent is presumed to be the appropriate custodian of his or her child, as opposed to third persons, and should not be deprived of custody merely because the child could be better cared for in a material sense. In re Kowalzek, 37 N.C. App. 364, 246 S.E.2d 45, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 734, 248 S.E.2d 863 (1978).

But This Presumption May Be Rebutted. - While it is presumed that it is in the child's best interest to be placed with a natural parent, this presumption may be rebutted by a circumstance which would substantially affect the child. Wilson v. Williams, 42 N.C. App. 348, 256 S.E.2d 516 (1979).

The primary concern of the trial court in a custody matter, as mandated by subsection (a) of this section, is the welfare of the child, and this concern outweighs the presumption favoring the award of custody to a natural parent. In re Gwaltney, 68 N.C. App. 686, 315 S.E.2d 750 (1984).

The presumption in favor of the natural parents is rebuttable. Best v. Best, 81 N.C. App. 337, 344 S.E.2d 363 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Petersen v. Rowe, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).

Although there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of a natural parent, it is not necessary to prove unfitness in order to overcome the presumption. Black v. Glawson, 114 N.C. App. 442, 442 S.E.2d 79 (1994).

A court must award custody based only upon the best interest and welfare of the child. A court must have discretion to determine the best interest of a child, and should not be restricted to awarding custody to a natural parent in the absence of a finding of unfitness. Black v. Glawson, 114 N.C. App. 442, 442 S.E.2d 79 (1994).

It is not necessary to prove a natural parent unfit in order to award custody to a third party. Black v. Glawson, 114 N.C. App. 442, 442 S.E.2d 79 (1994).

Custody May Be Granted to Third Person for Sufficient Reasons. - The welfare of the infants themselves is the polar star by which the courts are to be guided to a right conclusion, and therefore they may, within certain limits, exercise a sound discretion for the benefit of the child, and in some cases will order it into the custody of a third person for good and sufficient reasons. Roberts v. Short, 6 N.C. App. 419, 169 S.E.2d 910 (1969); Campbell v. Campbell, 63 N.C. App. 113, 304 S.E.2d 262, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 460, 307 S.E.2d 362 (1983); Phillips v. Choplin, 65 N.C. App. 506, 309 S.E.2d 716 (1983).

A child's former care giver stated a claim as against the child's father for custody of the child, where the father's former companion alleged that the father had taken actions inconsistent with his protected status as a parent, including that the father had placed the child in his parents' care and that they could not properly care for the child's diabetes, resulting in hospitalization and potentially serious and permanent health consequences, and that the father had relinquished care of the child to others, including herself, on numerous occasions. Ellison v. Ramos, 130 N.C. App. 389, 502 S.E.2d 891 (1998), appeal dismissed, 349 N.C. 356, 517 S.E.2d 891 (1998).

Fitness of Parent. - Mother's convictions for driving while intoxicated and child's developmental problems were significant and relevant to issue of mother's fitness as a parent because they indicated her inability to care for the child adequately and to provide for the child's welfare; additionally, the facts that she had substance abuse problems, did not respect authority, was unable to recognize her child's developmental problems, and was incapable of caring for the child's welfare supported the conclusion that she was an unfit parent. Raynor v. Odom, 124 N.C. App. 724, 478 S.E.2d 655 (1996).

The State failed to show that the father was unfit, as against the child's grandparents, to have custody of his child where he testified that if he were awarded custody of the child he would be willing to prohibit his brother, who was convicted for taking indecent liberties with a minor, from staying at his house and interacting with the child; where his own convictions were too remote to affect his fitness or were unrelated thereto; where he already had considerable experience in taking care of children; where his boss of 13 years and his volunteer supervisor, both described him as responsible, dependable, reliable and hardworking; and where he actively engaged in legal proceedings for approximately two years, evidencing a long-term commitment to attaining custody. Adams v. Tessener, 141 N.C. App. 64, 539 S.E.2d 324 (2000).

Parent Need Not Be Found Unfit. - Although there is a traditional preference for biological parents, the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration to which all other factors, including common-law preferential rights of the parents must be deferred or subordinated, and the trial judge's discretion is such that he is not required to find a natural parent unfit for custody as a prerequisite to awarding custody to a third person. Comer v. Comer, 61 N.C. App. 324, 300 S.E.2d 457 (1983).

The trial judge is not required to find a natural parent unfit for custody as a prerequisite to awarding custody to a third person. In re Kowalzek, 37 N.C. App. 364, 246 S.E.2d 45, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 734, 248 S.E.2d 863 (1978); Plemmons v. Stiles, 65 N.C. App. 341, 309 S.E.2d 504 (1983); In re Gwaltney, 68 N.C. App. 686, 315 S.E.2d 750 (1984).

While the fitness of a natural parent is of paramount significance in determining the best interests of the child in custody contests, it is not always determinative in itself. It is entirely possible that a natural parent may be a fit and proper person to care for the child, but that all other circumstances dictate that the best interests of the child would be served by placing custody in a third party. In re Kowalzek, 37 N.C. App. 364, 246 S.E.2d 45, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 734, 248 S.E.2d 863 (1978).

Fitness and Actions of Parent in Relationship with Domestic Partner Relevant. - While a district court could have concluded that the fitness of a child's biological mother warranted that she have sole custody, the district court was not required to do so where evidence indicated that the mother had voluntarily relinquished her due process rights to solely make decisions in the child's life, intended that her former domestic partner become a de facto parent, and the partner had established a significant bond with the child. Mason v. Dwinnell, 190 N.C. App. 209, 660 S.E.2d 58 (2008).

Temporary Relinquishment of Custody. - There are circumstances where the responsibility of a parent to act in the best interest of his or her child would require a temporary relinquishment of custody; however, to preserve the constitutional protection of parental interests in such a situation, the parent should notify the custodian upon relinquishment of custody that it is temporary and avoid conduct inconsistent with the protected parental interests. Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997).

In making custody decisions between a parent and a grandparent or other third party, the court must balance two doctrines. The first, the "parental right" doctrine, holds that ordinarily and in the absence of particular circumstances, the custody of a child should be given to the parent in preference to the grandparent, if the parent is found to be fit to have custody and can supply a proper home. The second doctrine, the "best interests of the child" doctrine, holds that custody should be awarded in accordance with the best interests of the child regardless of the fitness of the parents. Campbell v. Campbell, 63 N.C. App. 113, 304 S.E.2d 262, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 460, 307 S.E.2d 362 (1983).

To Whom Custody May Be Awarded. - If the mother and the father are both fit and proper persons to have custody of children, under ordinary circumstances the court would then proceed to determine whether the best interest, health and welfare of the children would be served by awarding custody to the mother or father. If not, then the court must deal with someone or an agency over whom the court has control. But an order awarding custody, in effect, to third persons who are not parties to the proceeding, not a public institution, and not bound by the court's order, must be reversed. Boone v. Boone, 8 N.C. App. 524, 174 S.E.2d 833 (1970).

Award of Custody to Grandparents. - Where the custody of a minor child was awarded to the mother in a divorce proceeding, and subsequently, both parents, who were deemed proper and fit persons to have the custody of such child, moved out of the State, and the child was left by the mother with the child's maternal grandparents, residents of the State and highly proper persons to rear the child, upon petition of the father for custody of the child the court had authority under this section to order that the child continue in the custody of the grandparents. Walker v. Walker, 224 N.C. 751, 32 S.E.2d 318 (1944).

Where grandmother was a good housekeeper and showed the ability to care for the children the trial court erred in denying and dismissing grandmother's petition for custody on the basis of its "serious concerns" about her parenting skills because of problems experienced by her daughter. Smith v. Alleghany County Dep't of Social Servs., 114 N.C. App. 727, 443 S.E.2d 101, cert. denied, 337 N.C. 696, 448 S.E.2d 533 (1994).

Where there are unusual circumstances and the best interests of the child justify such action, the court may refuse to award custody to either the mother or father and instead award the custody of the child to its grandparents or others. In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971).

For case affirming order transferring custody to paternal grandmother and awarding visitation rights to both mother and father, see Best v. Best, 81 N.C. App. 337, 344 S.E.2d 363 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Petersen v. Rowe, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).

Grandparents' Rights When Family Intact - Under G.S. 50-13.1(a), 50-13.2(b1), 50-13.2A, 50-13.5(j), a grandparent's right to visitation arises either in the context of an ongoing custody proceeding or where the minor child is in the custody of a stepparent or a relative - the "intact family" rule; in a case that does not involve adoption by a stepparent or other relative, a grandparent must prove that the child's family is not intact before the grandparent can intervene to request visitation with his grandchild - G.S. 50-13.1(a), 50-13.2(b1), 50-13.2A, 50-13.5(j) does not grant grandparents the right to sue for visitation when no custody proceeding is ongoing and the minor children's family is intact. Eakett v. Eakett, 157 N.C. App. 550, 579 S.E.2d 486 (2003).

Socioeconomic status of paternal grandmother, who intervened in custody case, was irrelevant to issue of mother's fitness as a parent. Raynor v. Odom, 124 N.C. App. 724, 478 S.E.2d 655 (1996).

It is only when the custody of a child is "in issue" or "being litigated" that the grandparents are entitled to relief pursuant to subsection (b1). Fisher v. Fisher, 124 N.C. App. 442, 477 S.E.2d 251 (1996).

Domestic Partner Denied Custody, Parental Status, and Reinstatement of Visitation Schedule. - Trial court properly denied defendant's claims for joint custody, recognition of parental status, and reinstatement of the original visitation schedule because plaintiff, defendant's former domestic partner, did not engage in conduct inconsistent with plaintiff's constitutionally protected status as the legal parent and did not allow defendant to function as a parent. Estroff v. Chatterjee, 190 N.C. App. 61, 660 S.E.2d 73 (2008).

Award to Department of Social Services. - For case involving sexual abuse of daughters by father, in which children were adjudicated abused and neglected, and in which award of custody to the department of social services, with mother being given physical custody of one daughter and liberal visitation with the other daughter, who was placed with her grandmother, pending review in 60 days, was approved, see In re Gwaltney, 68 N.C. App. 686, 315 S.E.2d 750 (1984).

Foster Parents Have No Standing to Bring Custody Action. - Nothing in the language of G.S. 48-9.1(1) gives foster parents standing to contest the department's or agency's exercise of its rights as legal custodian; therefore, foster parents are without standing to bring an action seeking custody of minor child placed in their home by defendant. Oxendine v. Department of Social Servs., 303 N.C. 699, 281 S.E.2d 370 (1981); In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 531, 345 S.E.2d 404, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 589 (1986).

But Custody May Be Awarded to Foster Parents. - Having acquired subject matter jurisdiction, trial court, guided by the best interests of the child, had broad dispositional powers, including the power to award legal custody of child to its foster parents. In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 531, 345 S.E.2d 404, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 589 (1986).

The case of Oxendine v. Department of Social Servs., 303 N.C. 699, 281 S.E.2d 370 (1981) does not prohibit the transfer of legal care, custody and control of a foster child to its foster parents. Oxendine stands for the proposition that foster parents have no standing to bring a custody action pursuant to G.S. 50-13.2 et seq. In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 531, 345 S.E.2d 404, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 589 (1986).

Intervention by Foster Parents. - In proceeding brought by DSS in which custody was put in issue by guardian ad litem and natural father, trial court did not err in permitting child's foster parents to intervene. In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 531, 345 S.E.2d 404, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 589 (1986), distinguishing Oxendine v. Department of Social Servs., 303 N.C. 699, 281 S.E.2d 370 (1981).

It was improper for a trial court to apply a G.S. 50-13.2(a) best interest analysis to a domestic partner's application for joint custody without first determining that a natural parent's conduct was inconsistent with her constitutionally protected status as a parent. Heatzig v. MacLean, 191 N.C. App. 451, 664 S.E.2d 347 (2008), review denied, appeal dismissed, 362 N.C. 681, 670 S.E.2d 564 (2008).

Claim for Custody Held Not Frivolous. - Where there was no indication at trial that the grandparents in fact did not wish to obtain custody of the children or that their claim was made in bad faith, the fact that the grandparents had originally asked for visitation did not make their later claim for custody violative of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 11. Kerns v. Southern, 100 N.C. App. 664, 397 S.E.2d 651 (1990).

Remand Where Custody Awarded to One Who Was Not a Party. - While the court, upon proper findings and conclusions, may award the custody of a minor child to any such person, agency or institution as will best promote the interest and welfare of the child, where the court awarded custody of the child to one who was not a party to the proceeding, the proceeding would be remanded with directions that the trial court issue the necessary notices and orders to make such individual a party to the action, to the end that the court would have effective jurisdiction over her person. In re Edwards, 25 N.C. App. 608, 214 S.E.2d 215 (1975).

Reversal of Award to Third Party. - Where in an initial custody determination, the trial court conducted the "best interest and welfare" analysis, and based solely on that analysis, awarded custody of the minor child to defendant (friend of mother who had cared for child since birth) rather than the plaintiff/father, the child's natural parent, the award of custody on this basis was error and must be reversed. Lambert v. Riddick, 120 N.C. App. 480, 462 S.E.2d 835 (1995).

B. AS BETWEEN PARENTS.

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Conviction of Abandonment Did Not Preclude Award of Custody. - The fact that father had been convicted of abandonment of his children and ordered to provide for their support did not preclude the court from finding, upon a hearing of a subsequent motion for the custody of the children in a divorce action, that father was a fit and suitable person to have custody of the children, when there was uncontradicted evidence upon the hearing that father had a good reputation in the community in which he lived. Thomas v. Thomas, 259 N.C. 461, 130 S.E.2d 871 (1963).

Effect of Prior Order of Incompetence. - In a controversy between husband and wife for custody of minor children of the marriage, it is error for the trial court to award custody to the husband on the sole ground that the wife has prior to that time been judged mentally incompetent. A prior court order which judicially declares a parent to be incompetent is not sufficient in and of itself to establish a parent's present unfitness to have a child or children; rather, this section requires a full, factual determination of all the circumstances in the case before a proper order may be entered by the court. Price v. Price, 42 N.C. App. 66, 255 S.E.2d 652 (1979).

Relevance of Evidence of Adultery. - The court committed prejudicial error in refusing to allow plaintiff to introduce evidence of defendant's adultery at a hearing on a custody motion. While evidence of adultery does not impel a finding of unfitness of the adulterous parent, it is relevant upon an inquiry of fitness of a person for the purpose of awarding custody of minor children to him or to her. Darden v. Darden, 20 N.C. App. 433, 201 S.E.2d 538 (1974); Hunt v. Hunt, 29 N.C. App. 380, 224 S.E.2d 270 (1976). See also, In re McCraw Children, 3 N.C. App. 390, 165 S.E.2d 1 (1969).

Joint Legal Custody Appropriate. - In addition to findings regarding parties' financial status and what would best serve interests of children, court had before it plaintiff's admission that she indeed thought defendant to be fit and proper person as stated in her verified reply to defendant's answer and counterclaim. Thus, joint legal custody was appropriate. Witherow v. Witherow, 99 N.C. App. 61, 392 S.E.2d 627 (1990).

Joint Legal Authority. - Trial court erred in dividing decision-making responsibilities between the parties after awarding joint legal custody because the trial court had not made the necessary findings of fact to warrant a division of joint legal authority; the trial court's mere findings that the parties had a tumultuous relationship did not satisfy the required findings. Hall v. Hall, 188 N.C. App. 527, 655 S.E.2d 901 (2008).

The fact that mother's paramour had been living with mother and minor child since the parties' separation was insufficient, standing alone, to determine custody; the court must consider all the facts of the case and decide the issue in the best interests of the child. Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

Award Where Both Parents Are Found Fit - Generally. - When there has been a finding that both parents are fit and suitable to have custody, the judge's order is conclusive when supported by evidence. Kearns v. Kearns, 6 N.C. App. 319, 170 S.E.2d 132 (1969), overruled on other grounds, 55 N.C. App. 250, 285 S.E.2d 281 (1982).

Same - Award to Father. - When the court finds that both parties are fit and proper persons to have custody, and then adjudges that it is in the best interest of the child for the father to have custody, such holding will be upheld; but it must be supported by competent evidence. Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

When the court finds that both parties are fit and proper persons to have custody of the children involved, and then finds that it is in the best interests of the children for the father to have custody of said children, such holding will be upheld when it is supported by competent evidence. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966); Boone v. Boone, 8 N.C. App. 524, 174 S.E.2d 833 (1970).

Where the evidence was sufficient to support the court's finding that father was a suitable person to have custody of his son and that the best interests of the child would be served by awarding the child's custody to him, order awarding the custody to the father was proper, even though the evidence would also have supported a finding that the child's mother was a fit and suitable person and that the best interests of the child would be served by awarding custody to her. In re White, 262 N.C. 737, 138 S.E.2d 516 (1964).

Age of Parents. - All else being equal, a 55-year-old person has a shorter remaining life span than a 33-year-old person and the consideration of continuity and stability in the life of a child will logically lead a judge to consider the age of a parent. Consideration of all aspects of both parents' lives, including the potential for continuity and stability, is necessary to promote the governmental interest of granting custody on the best interests of the child. Phelps v. Phelps, 337 N.C. 344, 446 S.E.2d 17, rehearing denied, 337 N.C. 807, 449 S.E.2d 750 (1994).

A passing comment about a party's age, when determining a child's best interest in accordance with the statute, does not constitute an unconstitutional classification in violation of a party's equal protection rights. Phelps v. Phelps, 337 N.C. 344, 446 S.E.2d 17, rehearing denied, 337 N.C. 807, 449 S.E.2d 750 (1994).

Award to Father on Finding of Changed Circumstances. - Trial judge did not abuse his discretion by ruling that a material change in circumstances had occurred with the increased age of younger child, who had been awarded previously to the mother, since the child indicated clearly his desire to stay with his father, who also had custody of his elder brother. In re Peal, 305 N.C. 640, 290 S.E.2d 664 (1982).

Where father failed to offer evidence of mother's adultery at divorce trial, but after the divorce moved for a change of custody on that ground, the trial court's reassignment of custody of the child to father due to a material change of circumstances since the date of the divorce was not erroneous merely because the crucial circumstances, e.g., the mother's adultery, existed before divorce. The child should not be placed in the custody of an unfit parent merely because the other parent failed to introduce evidence at the proper stage of the litigation. Paschall v. Paschall, 21 N.C. App. 120, 203 S.E.2d 337 (1974).

Award to Father on Condition That Physical Custody Be in Grandparents. - Where the court's conclusions that the mother was an unfit person to have custody of the children and that the father was a fit and suitable person to have their custody was supported by the findings, but neither the father nor the paternal grandparents had a suitable home for the children, and that the maternal grandparents, with whom the children were then living, had such a home, an order awarding the custody of the children to the father on condition that the physical custody of the children be vested in their maternal grandparents and that the father pay for their support would not be disturbed on appeal, the welfare of the children being the determinative factor in the award of custody. Thomas v. Thomas, 259 N.C. 461, 130 S.E.2d 871 (1963).

Award of Custody to Father Held Proper. - Trial court did not err in concluding that it would be in the best interest of minor child for her custody to be placed with defendant father where, pursuant to separation agreement, plaintiff mother gave defendant custody of the child and agreed to assist with medical and dental bills on behalf of the child; the child had lived with defendant at all times since her birth and lived solely with defendant since the parties' separation; plaintiff rarely visited the child following the parties' separation; and plaintiff admitted that defendant had done a good job of looking after the child since their separation. Ingle v. Ingle, 53 N.C. App. 227, 280 S.E.2d 460 (1981).

Findings on Award of Custody to Mother Held Sufficient. - Findings that the parties had been married and divorced, that the wife was a person of good character, resident in this State, that the husband was financially responsible, and that the best interest of the minor child of the marriage would be promoted by awarding its custody to the wife were sufficient to sustain a decree awarding its custody to her and requiring the husband to make contributions for the support of the child. Hardee v. Mitchell, 230 N.C. 40, 51 S.E.2d 884 (1949).

Award to Mother Upheld. - Where the trial court found, upon supporting evidence, that the mother was now a stable, fit, and suitable custodian of her children, and that their best interests required that their custody be awarded to her, the Supreme Court would affirm the award of custody. Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S. Ct. 1417, 39 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1974).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying a custody order to grant joint legal custody to a mother and father with the mother having primary custody because there had been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child and modification was in the child's best interests pursuant to G.S. 50-13.2(a); father had moved out of state with the child, had facilitated renewed contact with the child's maternal grandfather despite a court order prohibiting the contact, and the child had been harmed by a dog while in the father's care. Pass v. Beck, 210 N.C. App. 192, 708 S.E.2d 87 (2011).

Trial court properly entered an initial custody order awarding primary and legal custody of the parties' child to one parent and supervised visitation to the other parent, until such time as the court was able to gather more evidence of the noncustodial's parenting abilities. The trial court had authority to base its custody determination in part on its inability to determine the noncustodial parent's fitness as a parent, which was caused by the noncustodial's failure to answer questions regarding allegations of child pornography. Meadows v. Meadows, 246 N.C. App. 245, 782 S.E.2d 561 (2016).

Custody of Child Upheld Where Father Never Visited. - Where plaintiff mother had had de facto custody of five-year old child since his birth, and defendant, who had acknowledged paternity of the child when he was there, had not visited the child in a substantial length of time, nor had he requested visitation privileges or custody, formal award of custody to mother would be upheld. Craig v. Kelley, 89 N.C. App. 458, 366 S.E.2d 249 (1988).

Illegitimate Child. - As to the custody of an illegitimate child, see Jolly v. Queen, 264 N.C. 711, 142 S.E.2d 592 (1965).

By its plain language, G.S. 50-13.2(a) clearly abrogates the common-law presumption vesting custody of an illegitimate child in the child's mother. Rosero v. Blake, 357 N.C. 193, 581 S.E.2d 41 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177, 124 S. Ct. 1407, 158 L. Ed. 2d 78 (2004).

Illegitimate child's father who has acknowledged his paternity under G.S. 110-132(a) and whose conduct is consistent with his right to care for and control his child has a right to custody of his illegitimate child legally equal to that of the child's mother, and, pursuant to G.S. 50-13.2, if the best interest of the child is served by placing the child in the father's custody, he is to be awarded custody of that child. Rosero v. Blake, 357 N.C. 193, 581 S.E.2d 41 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177, 124 S. Ct. 1407, 158 L. Ed. 2d 78 (2004).

As the common-law rule that custody of an illegitimate child presumptively vested in the mother was abrogated by G.S. 50-13.2(a), the trial court properly applied the "best interest of the child" standard in awarding custody to the child's father, who had acknowledged his paternity under G.S. 110-132(a), paid child support without a court order, and provided that child with a stable and structured life. Rosero v. Blake, 357 N.C. 193, 581 S.E.2d 41 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177, 124 S. Ct. 1407, 158 L. Ed. 2d 78 (2004).

In applying the best interest of the child standard to award joint custody of an illegitimate child to the parents, district court applied the correct standard as between the parents, because the common law presumption in favor of awarding custody of the illegitimate child to the mother was abrogated by G.S. 50-13.2 and the case law. David v. Ferguson, 160 N.C. App. 89, 584 S.E.2d 102 (2003).

For case as to former preference that mother be given custody, see Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S. Ct. 1417, 39 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1974).

IV. VISITATION RIGHTS.

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Court May Divide Custody Between Parents or Award General Custody Subject to Visitation Privileges. - The trial court has discretionary power either to divide custody between contending parents for alternating periods, or to award general custody to one parent, subject to visitation privileges in favor of the unsuccessful parent. Griffin v. Griffin, 237 N.C. 404, 75 S.E.2d 133 (1953).

The standard by which the court is guided in visitation matters is the child's best interest. Kerns v. Southern, 100 N.C. App. 664, 397 S.E.2d 651 (1990).

Burden of Proof. - Grandparents seeking visitation rights had the burden of proving that the award of visitation was in the best interest of the children; therefore, where trial judge reversed the burden, so that the mother had to prove that the visitation was bad for the children, the judge was in error. Kerns v. Southern, 100 N.C. App. 664, 397 S.E.2d 651 (1990).

Findings as to Visitation. - To support an award of visitation rights, the judgment of the trial court should contain findings of fact which sustain the conclusion of law that the party is a fit person to visit the child and that such visitation rights are in the best interest of the child. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 32 N.C. App. 154, 231 S.E.2d 26 (1977); In re Kowalzek, 37 N.C. App. 364, 246 S.E.2d 45, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 734, 248 S.E.2d 863 (1978); In re Jones, 62 N.C. App. 103, 302 S.E.2d 259 (1983).

Where the trial judge specifically considered a child's best interests in determining custody and visitation in accordance with G.S. 50-13.2(a) and the evidence supported the trial court's findings, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering visitation between the minor child and the father. Pass v. Beck, 156 N.C. App. 597, 577 S.E.2d 180 (2003), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 252, 582 S.E.2d 277 (2003).

Order for Professional Consultation Within Court's Discretion. - Where trial court found defendant's contact with his minor child had been minimal, although he was fit and proper to have visitation rights, consultation with plaintiff and defendant by a third-party professional could benefit the court in awarding specific visitation rights; therefore, there was no abuse of discretion in the court's ordering the consultation prior to its consideration of visitation rights. Rawls v. Rawls, 94 N.C. App. 670, 381 S.E.2d 179 (1989).

Visitation Rights to Parent Restricted. - Trial court properly entered an initial custody order awarding primary and legal custody of the parties' child to one parent and supervised visitation to the other parent, until such time as the court was able to gather more evidence of the noncustodial's parenting abilities. The trial court had authority to base its custody determination in part on its inability to determine the noncustodial parent's fitness as a parent, which was caused by the noncustodial's failure to answer questions regarding allegations of child pornography. Meadows v. Meadows, 246 N.C. App. 245, 782 S.E.2d 561 (2016).

When Visitation May Be Denied. - A parent's right of visitation with his or her child is a natural and legal right, and when awarding custody of a child to another, the court should not deny a parent's right of visitation at appropriate times unless the parent has by conduct forfeited the right or unless the exercise of the right would be detrimental to the best interest and welfare of the child. In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971).

Courts are generally reluctant to deny all visitation rights to the divorced parent of a child of tender age, but it is generally agreed that visitation rights should not be permitted to jeopardize a child's welfare. Swicegood v. Swicegood, 270 N.C. 278, 154 S.E.2d 324 (1967).

The grandmother did not have standing under this section to seek visitation with her grandchildren, where the children had been adopted by their biological aunt and her husband, and custody was not an issue. Hill v. Newman, 131 N.C. App. 793, 509 S.E.2d 226 (1998).

Determination of Visitation Rights May Not Be Delegated. - If the court finds that the parent has by conduct forfeited the right of visitation or if the court finds that the exercise of the right would be detrimental to the best interest and welfare of the child, the court may, in its discretion, deny a parent the right of visitation with, or access to, his or her child; but the court may not delegate this authority to the custodian. In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971).

Court Should Safeguard Visitation Rights by Provision in Order. - If the court does not find that a parent has by conduct forfeited the right of visitation and does not find that the exercise of the right would be detrimental to the best interest and welfare of the child, the court should safeguard the parent's visitation rights by a provision in the order defining and establishing the time, place and conditions under which such visitation rights may be exercised. In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971).

Enforcement of Visitation Orders. - Trial judges in this State have authority to enforce orders providing for visitation by the methods set forth in this section, that is, by contempt proceedings and by injunction. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

Receipt of Support May Not Be Conditioned on Visitation. - A trial judge does not have authority to condition a minor child's receipt of support paid by the noncustodial parent on compliance with court-ordered visitation allowed the noncustodial parent by ordering that child support paid by defendant be placed in escrow if minor child fails or refuses to abide by the visitation privileges allowed defendant. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

District court was authorized to grant the father of an illegitimate child visitation privileges and to punish the mother for refusing to allow the father to visit his illegitimate child. Conley v. Johnson, 24 N.C. App. 122, 210 S.E.2d 88 (1974).

Grant of Visitation Rights to Homosexual Father. - The trial court did not err in granting a father who was homosexual unsupervised overnight visitation rights with his minor son. Woodruff v. Woodruff, 44 N.C. App. 350, 260 S.E.2d 775 (1979).

Grandparents May Not Be Awarded Visitation Rights When Custody Is Not in Issue. - While subsection (b1) of this section authorizes the court to provide for the visitation rights of grandparents when the custody of minor children is being litigated, it does not authorize the court to enter such an order when the custody of the children is not in issue. Moore v. Moore, 89 N.C. App. 351, 365 S.E.2d 662 (1988).

This section and G.S. 50-13.5 and G.S. 50-13.2A must be read in conjunction with G.S. 50-13.1(a) so as to harmonize them and give effect to a consistent legislative policy. Under them, a grandparent's right to visitation arises either in the context of an ongoing custody proceeding or where the minor child is in the custody of a stepparent or a relative. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 341 N.C. 629, 461 S.E.2d 745 (1995).

Standing to Seek Grandparent Visitation. - Mother's motion to dismiss grandparents' motion for visitation was properly denied because, although the parents had entered into a consent judgment in the underlying child custody dispute, the custody of the child was still "in issue" and "being litigated" by the parents when the grandparents moved to intervene, and thus, under G.S. 50-13.2(b1), the grandparents had standing to intervene at the time; the resolution of the custody dispute between the parents did not wipe out the grandparents' claim. Quesinberry v. Quesinberry, 196 N.C. App. 118, 674 S.E.2d 775 (2009).

Grandparents lacked standing to bring a claim for visitation because there was no ongoing custody proceeding, as the mother had a natural and legal right to custody and control of the child upon the father's death and the child had not been adopted by a stepparent or relative. Graham v. Jones, - N.C. App. - , 842 S.E.2d 153 (2020).

Paternal grandparents had statutory standing to seek permanent visitation rights, notwithstanding that the father had died, as they had been allowed to intervene when custody between the father and the mother was in dispute. Alexander v. Alexander, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Mar. 16, 2021).

Grandparent Had No Rights to Proceed. - There are four statutes in North Carolina which permit a grandparent to maintain an action for custody or visitation of a minor child, and although plaintiff, mother of the deceased father of the two minor children, did not specify under which statute she filed, it was clear that she had no right to proceed under G.S. 50-13.1(a), this section, G.S. 50-13.2A, or G.S. 50-13.5(j). Shaut v. Cannon, 136 N.C. App. 834, 526 S.E.2d 214 (2000).

Grandparents Had Right to Intervene in Pending Custody Action. - In a child custody action, the order granting intervention to the maternal grandparents on ground there was a pending matter regarding future visitation before the court was proper; because the issue of the mother's visitation was still pending, the custody of the child was still "in issue" and was "being litigated" by the parents. Smith v. Barbour, 195 N.C. App. 244, 671 S.E.2d 578 (2009), review denied, 363 N.C. 375, 678 S.E.2d 670 (2009).

Trial court erred in concluding a grandmother's visitation rights under a prior custody order did not survive termination of a mother's parental rights because the grandmother not only intervened in the case but also obtained visitation rights via a permanent custody order; thus, the termination of the mother's parental rights did not extinguish the grandmother's court-ordered visitation rights, and the grandmother could seek to enforce the prior custody order through contempt proceedings. Adams v. Langdon, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 236 (2019).

Insufficient Findings to Support Order for Grandparent Visitation. - Remand of order granting grandparent visitation was necessary because the trial court made no explanation in its findings of fact as to why it determined that it was preferable to take the majority of the grandparents' vacation visitation time out of mother's custodial time; moreover, it was unclear that the trial court considered the possible interaction between the parents' consent judgment and its order awarding visitation to the grandparents. Quesinberry v. Quesinberry, 196 N.C. App. 118, 674 S.E.2d 775 (2009).

As parents with lawful custody of their children have the prerogative of determining with whom they shall associate. Moore v. Moore, 89 N.C. App. 351, 365 S.E.2d 662 (1988).

Electronic Video Communication. - In proceedings wherein a five-year-old child was adjudicated neglected, the trial court erred in denying the mother in-person visitation and permitting only electronic video communication, G.S. 50-13.2(e), because the court failed to find the mother forfeited her right to visitation or that visitation was not in the child's best interest, G.S. 7B-905(c). In re T.R.T., 225 N.C. App. 567, 737 S.E.2d 823 (2013).

Visitation Rights to Parent In Foreign Country. - Trial court, when it awarded one parent in North Carolina the primary physical care and custody of the parties' minor child, properly awarded visitation privileges to the other parent, who was a citizen and resident of Canada and a missionary in Malawi, because the court considered the factors relevant to the child's best interest, including the characteristics of the parties and the one parent's concerns about the possible dangers to the child if the child were to travel to Malawi. Burger v. Smith, 243 N.C. App. 233, 776 S.E.2d 886 (2015).

Visitation Action Qualifies As Custody Action for Attorney Fee Purposes. - Action by intervening grandparents for visitation qualifies as an action for custody, and if that action falls within the scope of G.S. 50-13.6 as an action for the custody, support, or both of a minor child for the purposes of awarding fees to the grandparents, then such an action must also fall within the scope of the statute for purposes of ordering the grandparents to pay; an award of fees against grandparents seeking visitation rights was authorized. Sullivan v. Woody, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 306 (2020).

V. WISHES OF CHILD.

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Wishes of Child of Sufficient Age Are Entitled to Weight. - The wishes of a child of sufficient age to exercise discretion in choosing a custodian are entitled to considerable weight when the contest is between the parents, but are not controlling. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966); In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971); Falls v. Falls, 52 N.C. App. 203, 278 S.E.2d 546, cert. denied, 304 N.C. 390, 285 S.E.2d 831 (1981).

A child may be a competent witness and ought to be examined in that character. Indeed, being the party mainly concerned, he has a right to make a statement to the court as to his feelings and wishes upon the matter. This ought to be allowed serious consideration by the court, in the exercise of its discretion. Kearns v. Kearns, 6 N.C. App. 319, 170 S.E.2d 132 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Stephenson v. Stephenson, 55 N.C. App. 250, 285 S.E.2d 281 (1982).

In making the weighty choice of awarding custody, the judge may properly consider the preference or wishes of a child of suitable age and discretion. In re Peal, 305 N.C. 640, 290 S.E.2d 664 (1982).

As to the courts' consideration of the wishes of a child of suitable age, see also In re Gwaltney, 68 N.C. App. 686, 315 S.E.2d 750 (1984).

Because Child's Wishes Will Aid Determination of His Best Interests. - The child's wishes will be one factor considered by the court in determining his custody, usually not because of any legal right in the child to have his wishes granted, but because the consideration of such wishes will aid the court in making a custodial decree which is for the best interests and welfare of the child. Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 184 S.E.2d 417 (1971).

But Such Wishes Are Not Controlling. - When a child has reached the age of discretion, the court may consider the preference or wishes of the child to live with a particular person. A child has attained an age of discretion when it is of an age and capacity to form an intelligent or rational view on the matter. The expressed wish of a child of discretion is, however, never controlling upon the court, since the court must yield in all cases to what it considers to be the child's best interests, regardless of the child's personal preference. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966).

Although the preference of a child of discretion would seem to have its greatest weight when the controversy is between the parents and both are fit persons, the child's wishes are only entitled to consideration and are not controlling. Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 184 S.E.2d 417 (1971).

Weight to Be Given Child's Testimony Is for the Court. - A child has a right to have his testimony heard. However, the weight to be attached to such testimony is within the discretion of the trial judge. Kearns v. Kearns, 6 N.C. App. 319, 170 S.E.2d 132 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Stephenson v. Stephenson, 55 N.C. App. 250, 285 S.E.2d 281 (1982).

Lack of Findings as to Child's Preferences Insufficient to Upset Award. - Failure of the court to include a finding as to the preferences of the minor child is insufficient to upset its order of award of custody. Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 184 S.E.2d 417 (1971).

Ten Year Old. - A child's preference as to who shall have his custody is not controlling; however, the trial judge should consider the wishes of a 10-year-old child in making his determination. In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971).

Where the contest is between a parent and one not connected by blood to the child, the desire of the child will not ordinarily prevail over the natural right of the parent, unless essential to the child's welfare. In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971).

VI. DISCRETION OF TRIAL COURT.

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Determining the custody of minor children is never the province of a jury; it is that of the judge of the court in which the proceeding is pending. Stanback v. Stanback, 270 N.C. 497, 155 S.E.2d 221 (1967).

The question of custody is one addressed to the trial court. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966).

Trial Judge Is Vested with Broad Discretion. - The trial judge, who has the opportunity to see and hear the parties and the witnesses, is vested with broad discretion in cases involving custody of children. Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 204 S.E.2d 678 (1974); Pruneau v. Sanders, 25 N.C. App. 510, 214 S.E.2d 288, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 664, 216 S.E.2d 911 (1975); Goodson v. Goodson, 32 N.C. App. 76, 231 S.E.2d 178 (1977); Sheppard v. Sheppard, 38 N.C. App. 712, 248 S.E.2d 871 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 586, 254 S.E.2d 34 (1979); In re Peal, 305 N.C. 640, 290 S.E.2d 664 (1982).

While the welfare of the child is always to be treated as the paramount consideration, wide discretionary power is necessarily vested in the trial court in reaching decisions in particular cases. Griffin v. Griffin, 237 N.C. 404, 75 S.E.2d 133 (1953); Swicegood v. Swicegood, 270 N.C. 278, 154 S.E.2d 324 (1967); In re Moore, 8 N.C. App. 251, 174 S.E.2d 135 (1970); Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

The trial court has broad discretion in deciding child custody cases. Paschall v. Paschall, 21 N.C. App. 120, 203 S.E.2d 337 (1974).

The trial judge is vested with broad discretion in child custody cases. The "paramount consideration" which limits this discretion is the welfare and needs of the children. Phillips v. Choplin, 65 N.C. App. 506, 309 S.E.2d 716 (1983).

The trial judge is vested with broad discretion in child custody cases, and that discretion must be exercised to serve the welfare and needs of the children. Woncik v. Woncik, 82 N.C. App. 244, 346 S.E.2d 277 (1986).

Judge's Decision Will Not Be Upset Absent Abuse. - The decision to award custody of a minor is vested in the discretion of the trial judge, who has the opportunity to see the parties in person and to hear the witnesses, and his decision ought not to be upset on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. In re Pitts, 2 N.C. App. 211, 162 S.E.2d 524 (1968); In re Morrison, 6 N.C. App. 47, 169 S.E.2d 228 (1969); In re Moore, 8 N.C. App. 251, 174 S.E.2d 135 (1970); In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971); Jarman v. Jarman, 14 N.C. App. 531, 188 S.E.2d 647, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 622, 190 S.E.2d 465 (1972); In re Cox, 17 N.C. App. 687, 195 S.E.2d 132, cert. denied, 283 N.C. 585, 196 S.E.2d 809 (1973); King v. Demo, 40 N.C. App. 661, 253 S.E.2d 616 (1979); Wilson v. Williams, 42 N.C. App. 348, 256 S.E.2d 516 (1979); Comer v. Comer, 61 N.C. App. 324, 300 S.E.2d 457 (1983); Campbell v. Campbell, 63 N.C. App. 113, 304 S.E.2d 262, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 460, 307 S.E.2d 362 (1983); Plemmons v. Stiles, 65 N.C. App. 341, 309 S.E.2d 504 (1983).

Where trial judge enters a custody order that in his judgment is in the best interest of the child, the appellate division should not reverse that judgment and hold, as a matter of law, that the trial judge was obliged to have reached a different opinion, in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Decisions in custody cases are never easy, and the trial judge has the opportunity to see the parties in person and to hear the witnesses. He can detect tenors, tones and flavors that are lost in the bare printed record read months later by appellate judges. Newsome v. Newsome, 42 N.C. App. 416, 256 S.E.2d 849 (1979).

If Supported by Competent Evidence. - The trial judge's decision as to custody will not be upset, in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion, if his findings are supported by competent evidence. Sheppard v. Sheppard, 38 N.C. App. 712, 248 S.E.2d 871 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 586, 254 S.E.2d 34 (1979); Comer v. Comer, 61 N.C. App. 324, 300 S.E.2d 457 (1983).

The question of custody is one addressed to the trial court, and the court's decision will be upheld if supported by competent evidence. Roberts v. Short, 6 N.C. App. 419, 169 S.E.2d 910 (1969); Brandon v. Brandon, 10 N.C. App. 457, 179 S.E.2d 177 (1971).

The trial judge is present where he can observe and hear the parties and their witnesses, and ordinarily his decision on custody will be upheld if supported by competent evidence. In re McCraw Children, 3 N.C. App. 390, 165 S.E.2d 1 (1969).

Instead of applying an inflexible rule, the court must consider all facts of the case and decide the issue in accordance with the best interests of the child. Paschall v. Paschall, 21 N.C. App. 120, 203 S.E.2d 337 (1974).

Discretion to Allow Grandparent's Visitation Rights. - Although the trial judge determined that the appellant-defendant would continue to have primary custody of the children, it was entirely within the trial judge's discretion to allow the grandparents' visitation rights based on the best interest of the children. Kerns v. Southern, 100 N.C. App. 664, 397 S.E.2d 651 (1990).

Nature of Evidence. - An order for custody should be entered only after the most careful consideration, and only after the court has had the benefit of more reliable evidence than is usually afforded by affidavits. In re Griffin, 6 N.C. App. 375, 170 S.E.2d 84 (1969).

Discretion Not to Include A Provision. - Plaintiff provided no supporting guidance as to how or why the trial court was required to make certain findings and the issue was not addressed; moreover, as the trial court orally noted that it would not entertain a parenting-time right of first refusal as being in the best interests of the minor children, it was within the discretion of the trial court to not include such a provision, either to its granting or denial, in the child custody order. Oltmanns v. Oltmanns, 241 N.C. App. 326, 773 S.E.2d 347 (2015).

No Abuse in Child Custody Decision. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that relocation to California with the father was in the child's best interest, nor did it violate this section in its order after finding that the father had an immediately proximate support system to help him care for the child while the mother's support system was four hours away from the mother, who lived alone and was in the military since the mother's military status was not the only basis for the decision. Munoz v. Munoz, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Aug. 3, 2021).

VII. FINDINGS OF FACT.

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Trial Court Must Make Findings of Fact. - To support an award of custody, the judgment of the trial court should contain findings of fact which sustain the conclusion of law that custody of the child is awarded to the person who will best promote the interest and welfare of the child. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 32 N.C. App. 154, 231 S.E.2d 26 (1977); Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981); Story v. Story, 57 N.C. App. 657, 291 S.E.2d 923 (1982).

The court erred in not permitting the parties to a "joint custody" agreement to present extrinsic evidence of the parties' understanding of the meaning of those terms and their intent at the time of the agreement before determining whether the plaintiff wife had breached the agreement by failing to take steps to help the son who had drug abuse problems, thereby excusing the defendant husband from paying alimony. Patterson v. Taylor, 140 N.C. App. 91, 535 S.E.2d 374 (2000).

Before awarding custody of a child to a particular party, the trial court must conclude as a matter of law that the award of custody to that particular party will best promote the interest and welfare of the child. Findings of fact as to the characteristics of the competing parties must be made to support the necessary conclusion of law. These findings may concern physical, mental, or financial fitness or any other factors brought out in the evidence and relevant to the issue of the welfare of the child. Steele v. Steele, 36 N.C. App. 601, 244 S.E.2d 466 (1978).

To support an award of custody, the judgment of the trial court should contain findings of fact which sustain the conclusion of law that custody of the child is awarded to the person who will best promote the interest and welfare of the child; the conclusion of law determinative of the custody is not, therefore, that the person gaining custody is a fit and proper person to have custody, but which party will best promote the interest and welfare of the child. Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

Which Must Be More Than Mere Conclusory Statements. - A custody order is fatally defective where it fails to make detailed findings of fact from which an appellate court can determine that the order is in the best interest of the child, and custody orders are routinely vacated where the findings of fact consist of mere conclusory statements that the party being awarded custody is a fit and proper person to have custody and that it will be in the best interests of the child to award custody to that person. Dixon v. Dixon, 67 N.C. App. 73, 312 S.E.2d 669 (1984).

And Must Resolve Questions Raised by Evidence. - Findings bearing on the party's fitness to have care, custody and control of the child and findings as to the best interests of the child must resolve all questions raised by the evidence pertaining thereto. Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

But the trial judge is not required to find all the facts shown by the evidence. It is sufficient if enough material facts are found to support the judgment. In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971); Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

Findings of Fact Insufficient. - Without a finding of a substantial change of circumstances, a modification based solely on the ground that the defendant mother was over-protective was improper. Benedict v. Coe, 117 N.C. App. 369, 451 S.E.2d 320 (1994).

The trial court erred in amending the custody decree based on a finding of substantial change in circumstances where it found only that the proposed relocation of the mother after her remarriage would adversely affect the relationship between the father and his child but made no other findings about the effect of the proposed relocation on the child and on the child's best interests. Evans v. Evans, 138 N.C. App. 135, 530 S.E.2d 576 (2000).

Trial court erred in entering a custody order which prohibited a father from owning or possessing firearms until the children were emancipated; the trial court failed to make required findings pursuant to G.S. 50-13.2(a) on whether the safety of the children was endangered by the father's possession of firearms. Martin v. Martin, 167 N.C. App. 365, 605 S.E.2d 203 (2004).

Findings Supported by the Evidence. - Trial court did not err in awarding primary physical custody of the children to the husband under G.S. 50-13.2(a); by placing the children in the husband's physical custody, the children remained in the home and community where they had been raised, the husband demonstrated his ability to care for the children, and some of the husband's extended family lived nearby and could help with the children. Evans v. Evans, 169 N.C. App. 358, 610 S.E.2d 264 (2005).

Court's findings may concern physical, mental, or financial fitness or any other factors brought out by the evidence and relevant to the issue of the welfare of the child. Story v. Story, 57 N.C. App. 509, 291 S.E.2d 923 (1982).

Only One Finding. - While a court had the power under G.S. 7B-903 to enter an order transferring the custody of a minor child from her father to her mother, there was no evidence in the record in a proceeding on the parties' cross-motions for contempt that supported the finding that transferring custody to the mother was in the child's best interests. The court made only one finding, that the child missed the two people in her life who had neglected her, which was not a basis for not allowing custody to remain with the father, the trial court had a right under G.S. 50-13.2(a) to consider, but did not consider, acts of domestic violence by the child's stepfather toward her mother when determining the child's best interests, and the trial court had no right to take custody away from the father simply because he was unmarried. In re H.S.F., 177 N.C. App. 193, 628 S.E.2d 416 (2006).

Failure to Make Findings Is Error. - It is error for the court granting a decree of divorce to award the custody of a child without findings of fact from which it could be determined that the order was adequately supported by competent evidence and was for the best interest of the child. Swicegood v. Swicegood, 270 N.C. 278, 154 S.E.2d 324 (1967).

Trial court erred in granting permanent custody of a child to the child's natural parent, who had extremely limited contact with the child before the other parent's death, because it was speculative to assess what the quality of their relationship would be after a four-month "get acquainted" period during which temporary custody had been granted to the child's grandparents. McRoy v. Hodges, 160 N.C. App. 381, 585 S.E.2d 441 (2003).

And Will Necessitate Remand. - When the trial court fails to find facts so that the reviewing court can determine that the order is adequately supported by competent evidence and the welfare of the child subserved, then the order entered thereon must be vacated and the case remanded for detailed findings of fact. Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 158 S.E.2d 77 (1967); In re Moore, 8 N.C. App. 251, 174 S.E.2d 135 (1970); Austin v. Austin, 12 N.C. App. 286, 183 S.E.2d 420 (1971); Hampton v. Hampton, 29 N.C. App. 342, 224 S.E.2d 197 (1976); In re Kowalzek, 37 N.C. App. 364, 246 S.E.2d 45, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 734, 248 S.E.2d 863 (1978); Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

An order awarding custody of a child to the father, without any findings of fact other than a recital that the court had previously awarded custody to the father in a proceeding under former G.S. 17-39, was fatally defective, and the case would be remanded for detailed findings of fact. Swicegood v. Swicegood, 270 N.C. 278, 154 S.E.2d 324 (1967).

Court's Findings Are Conclusive If Supported by Evidence. - The findings of the trial court in regard to the custody of children are conclusive when supported by competent evidence. Swicegood v. Swicegood, 270 N.C. 278, 154 S.E.2d 324 (1967); In re Moore, 8 N.C. App. 251, 174 S.E.2d 135 (1970); Hampton v. Hampton, 29 N.C. App. 342, 224 S.E.2d 197 (1976).

Findings of fact by the trial court in a proceeding to determine the custody of a minor child ordinarily are conclusive when based on competent evidence. Griffin v. Griffin, 237 N.C. 404, 75 S.E.2d 133 (1953).

In a hearing to determine the right to custody of the children of the marriage, the court's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by competent evidence. Thomas v. Thomas, 259 N.C. 461, 130 S.E.2d 871 (1963).

Findings Are Binding on the Appellate Courts. - The trial judge's findings of fact in custody orders are binding on the appellate courts if supported by competent evidence. Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 204 S.E.2d 678 (1974).

Findings Will Not Be Disturbed Thereby. - The court's findings of fact as to the care and custody of children will not be disturbed when supported by competent evidence, even though the evidence be conflicting. Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 158 S.E.2d 77 (1967); In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971).

The normal rule in regard to the custody of children is that where there is competent evidence to support a judge's finding of fact, a judgment supported by such findings will not be disturbed on appeal; however, the facts found must be adequate for the appellate court to determine that the judgment is substantiated by competent evidence. Green v. Green, 54 N.C. App. 571, 284 S.E.2d 171 (1981).

Even When Evidence Is Conflicting. - The findings of the trial judge regarding custody and support are conclusive when supported by competent evidence, even when the evidence is conflicting, the standard for disturbing the trial judge's decision on appeal being a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Dixon v. Dixon, 67 N.C. App. 122, 312 S.E.2d 669 (1984).

Conclusory Statements Held Inadequate. - For a case setting forth a visitation order and holding that order to be conclusive and not supported by adequate findings of fact, see Kerns v. Southern, 100 N.C. App. 664, 397 S.E.2d 651 (1990).

But an order may contain extensive findings and still be fatally defective when not supported by the evidence. Dixon v. Dixon, 67 N.C. App. 122, 312 S.E.2d 669 (1984).

Use of Fifth Amendment Privilege. - Father could not take advantage of the presumption that it is in the best interest of the child to be in the custody of his natural parent by introducing evidence of his fitness and then invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about his illegal drug activity. Qurneh v. Colie, 122 N.C. App. 553, 471 S.E.2d 433 (1996).

Where the father failed to make a showing of fitness and the court could not determine his fitness because of his assertion of the Fifth Amendment, the court acted properly in dismissing his claim for custody. Qurneh v. Colie, 122 N.C. App. 553, 471 S.E.2d 433 (1996).

Best Interests of the Child. - G.S. 50-13.2(a) and G.S. 7B-1110 both require a court to make findings of fact as to a child's best interests. In re Papathanassiou, 195 N.C. App. 278, 671 S.E.2d 572 (2009), review denied, 363 N.C. 374, 678 S.E.2d 667 (2009).

No Abuse of Discretion. - Trial court acted within its discretion in awarding primary legal custody to defendant, as supported by its findings of fact; the findings included, in part, that plaintiff struck defendant in the face while defendant was pregnant, plaintiff hid a recording device in defendant's bedroom without her knowledge or consent, plaintiff sued both of defendant's parents, who provided the minor children with childcare, and defendant handled the majority of the minor children's educational and medical treatment issues. Oltmanns v. Oltmanns, 241 N.C. App. 326, 773 S.E.2d 347 (2015).

VIII. EFFECT OF VERDICTS, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND CONSENT JUDGMENTS.

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Verdict in Divorce Action Is Not Controlling. - The verdict in a divorce action can be an important factor in the judge's consideration of an award of custody, but it is not legally controlling. It is merely one of the circumstances for him to consider, along with all other relevant factors. Stanback v. Stanback, 270 N.C. 497, 155 S.E.2d 221 (1967).

Findings and Conclusions Not Required for Child Consent Judgments. - While G.S. 1A-1, Rule 52 and this section mandate findings of fact and conclusions when a court adjudicates child custody, child consent judgments need not contain such findings of fact and conclusions of law, and consenting parties waive their right to have the court adjudicate the merits of the case. Buckingham v. Buckingham, 134 N.C. App. 82, 516 S.E.2d 869 (1999), cert. denied, 351 N.C. 100, 540 S.E.2d 353 (1999).

When a father filed a motion for modification of custody, a trial court did not abuse its discretion in looking back to the facts surrounding the best interests of the child, pursuant to G.S. 50-13.2(a), at the time the memorandum of judgment was entered to make appropriate findings to provide a base line before it could determine if there had been a material change in circumstances, pursuant to G.S. 50-13.7, because the mother and father had waived findings of fact and conclusions of law at the time the memorandum of judgment by consent was entered. Balawejder v. Balawejder, 216 N.C. App. 301, 721 S.E.2d 679 (2011).

Nor Are Separation Agreements and Consent Judgments Based Thereon. - Valid separation agreements, including consent judgments based on such agreements with respect to marital rights, are not final and binding as to the custody of minor children or as to the amount to be provided for the support and education of such minor children. Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963); Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966).

While the marital and property rights of the parties under the provisions of a valid separation agreement cannot be ignored or set aside by the court without the consent of the parties, such agreements are not final and binding as to the custody of minor children or as to the amount to be provided for the support and education of such minor children. Soper v. Soper, 29 N.C. App. 95, 223 S.E.2d 560 (1976).

And Court Is Not Precluded Thereby from Acting Under This Section. - A deed of separation between husband and wife containing an agreement for the custody of their minor child does not preclude the court, upon granting a decree for absolute divorce in a suit brought subsequent to the deed of separation, from awarding the custody of the child in accordance with this section. In re Albertson, 205 N.C. 742, 172 S.E. 411 (1934).

The fact that petitioner agreed when separation took place between herself and her husband that the custody of their child should remain with the father was not binding on the court. Finley v. Sapp, 238 N.C. 114, 76 S.E.2d 350 (1953).

As no agreement between spouses will deprive the court of its inherent and statutory authority to protect the interests and provide for the welfare of infants. The parties may bind themselves by separate agreement or by a consent judgment, but they cannot thus withdraw the children of the marriage from the protective custody of the court. State v. Duncan, 222 N.C. 11, 21 S.E.2d 822 (1942); Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963).

Provisions in a deed of separation for support of the minor children of the marriage, entered as a consent judgment by the court, cannot deprive the court of its inherent and statutory authority to protect the interests and provide for the welfare of the infants; therefore, judgment increasing the allowance for the minor children upon findings of a change of circumstances warranting such increase would be affirmed. Bishop v. Bishop, 245 N.C. 573, 96 S.E.2d 721 (1957).

The child is not a party to a separation agreement, and the parents cannot contract away the jurisdiction of the court, which is always alert in the discharge of its duty towards its wards, the children of the State whose personal property interests require protection. State v. Duncan, 222 N.C. 11, 21 S.E.2d 822 (1942).

It is the court's duty to award custody in accordance with the best interests of the child, and no agreement, consent or condition between the parents can interfere with this duty or bind the court. Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S. Ct. 1417, 39 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1974).

But provisions of a valid separation agreement, and a consent judgment based thereon, cannot be ignored or set aside by the court without the consent of the parties. Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963); Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966).

A valid separation agreement cannot be ignored or set aside by the court without the consent of the parties. Winborne v. Winborne, 41 N.C. App. 756, 255 S.E.2d 640, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 305, 259 S.E.2d 918 (1979).

And Parties Are Bound Thereby Until Court Orders Otherwise. - Where judgment by confession purported to grant custody of child to one party, this judgment did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to determine custody, but the parties, having agreed to it, were bound by its provisions until the court made some order for custody. Pierce v. Pierce, 58 N.C. App. 815, 295 S.E.2d 247 (1982).

Presumption as to Amount Mutually Agreed upon in Separation Agreement. - Where parties to a separation agreement agree upon the amount of the support and maintenance of their minor children, there is a presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the amount mutually agreed upon is just and reasonable, and upon motion for an increase in such allowance, a court is not warranted in ordering an increase in the absence of any evidence of a change of conditions. Soper v. Soper, 29 N.C. App. 95, 223 S.E.2d 560 (1976).

There is a presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the amount mutually agreed upon in a separation agreement is just and reasonable. Winborne v. Winborne, 41 N.C. App. 756, 255 S.E.2d 640, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 305, 259 S.E.2d 918 (1979).

Party to Separation Agreement Not Precluded from Bringing Action. - When a case is properly before it, the court has the duty to award custody in accordance with the best interests of the child, and no agreement, consent or condition between the parents can interfere with this duty or bind the court. Thus, the existence of a valid separation agreement containing provisions relating to the custody and support of minor children does not prevent one of the parties to the agreement from instituting an action for a judicial determination of those same matters. Winborne v. Winborne, 41 N.C. App. 756, 255 S.E.2d 640, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 305, 259 S.E.2d 918 (1979).

Where judgment by confession placed custody issue before the court so that it retained jurisdiction to determine custody, it was error not to abate the subsequent action for custody. Pierce v. Pierce, 58 N.C. App. 815, 295 S.E.2d 247 (1982).

Effect of Custody Award on Consent Judgment. - Where a consent judgment in an action for a divorce a mensa operated as a gift to the wife of an estate in the husband's land, the fact that the court awarded custody of the children did not affect it. Morris v. Patterson, 180 N.C. 484, 105 S.E. 25 (1920).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding joint custody to both parties. Church v. Church, 119 N.C. App. 436, 458 S.E.2d 732 (1995).

Modification of Custody Order. - Trial court did not err in granting a mother legal and primary physical custody because the court was permitted to make an initial child custody determination since the juvenile court in the neglect proceeding returned custody to the parties; in the absence of an existing permanent child custody order, the trial court was not required to find or conclude that there existed a substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child for purposes of modifying an existing custody order. McMillan v. McMillan, - N.C. App. - , 833 S.E.2d 692 (2019), cert. denied, 842 S.E.2d 597, 2020 N.C. LEXIS 534 (N.C. 2020).

I. IN GENERAL.

Editor's Note. - A number of the cases cited below were decided under former G.S. 50-13, which dealt with custody and maintenance of children in actions for divorce, and former G.S. 50-16, which dealt with actions for alimony without divorce.

State Policy. - It is the policy of this State that both parents have a duty to support their minor children. Nisbet v. Nisbet, 102 N.C. App. 232, 402 S.E.2d 151, cert. denied, 329 N.C. 499, 407 S.E.2d 538 (1991).

Public Policy. - The public policy of this State encourages settlement agreements and supports the inclusion of a provision for the recovery of attorney's fees in settlement agreements. Bromhal v. Stott, 341 N.C. 702, 462 S.E.2d 219 (1995).

History of Section. - For discussion of the history of this section, see Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991).

Provisions in Chapter 110 Prevail over This Chapter. - The legislature did not intend for this chapter to control all actions for child support. Reading this chapter together with Chapter 110, the more specific provisions of Chapter 110 dealing with the procedure for determining and enforcing support obligations of a father who voluntarily acknowledges paternity prevails over any conflicting procedure in this chapter for determining and enforcing custody and support of minor children. Wake County ex rel. Horton v. Ryles, 112 N.C. App. 754, 437 S.E.2d 404 (1993).

Subsection (a) does not specify that it requires judicial determination of custody before its provision can be utilized by a person or agency bringing an action for support. Craig v. Kelley, 89 N.C. App. 458, 366 S.E.2d 249 (1988).

Visitation and child support rights are independent rights accruing primarily to the benefit of the minor child and one is not, and may not be made, contingent upon the other. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

Support Exemption. - G.S. 105-149 has been repealed in apparent effort by General Assembly to bring North Carolina's personal income tax laws into conformity with the 1984 revisions of federal tax statutes. Under federal law, custodial parent, not parent paying primary support, is entitled to claim support exemption for child under circumstances such as are present here. However, federal law also provides that custodial parent may waive right to claim exemption. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

Trial court may order custodial parent to waive right to claim federal and State tax exemptions. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

Court order assigning federal and State tax dependency exemptions to payor of child support for all income tax purposes was valid. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

Mentally Retarded Children - North Carolina trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over a father's action seeking modification of a New Jersey trial court's order requiring the father to pay child support for a mentally retarded child who was born in 1964, after the child and her mother moved to North Carolina and the father moved to Maryland, and the trial court's judgment that the father's request for an order terminating his obligation to pay child support had to be granted, pursuant to G.S. 50-13.4(c), was affirmed on appeal. Lombardi v. Lombardi, 157 N.C. App. 540, 579 S.E.2d 419 (2003).

The Child Support Guidelines should not be used to determine the support obligation of a stepparent, secondarily liable for a child's needs. Duffey v. Duffey, 113 N.C. App. 382, 438 S.E.2d 445 (1994).

Support and Counsel Fees Pendente Lite on Husband's Denial of Paternity. - Where, upon wife's motion in the cause to require defendant to provide support for the minor child of the marriage, made after decree of absolute divorce, husband filed an affidavit denying paternity, and at his instance the issue was transferred to the civil issue docket, the trial court had the discretionary power to order defendant to provide for support of the child and counsel fees pendente lite. Winfield v. Winfield, 228 N.C. 256, 45 S.E.2d 259 (1947).

The requirement that a voluntary assumption of support be reduced to writing, imposed on those who are secondarily liable under subsection (b) of this section, does not apply to parents of unemancipated minors who have had a child, for they are primarily liable for support of the infant. Whitman v. Kiger, 139 N.C. App. 44, 533 S.E.2d 807 (2000), aff'd, 353 N.C. 360, 543 S.E.2d 476 (2001).

Modification Of Foreign Order. - Pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, Va. Code Ann. § 20-88.66, the trial court did not err in registering a 1997 North Carolina (N.C.) child support order, which applied the duration term set forth in a 1994 New York (N.Y.) child support order because the 1994 N.Y. order was not modified and remained in full force and effect through the 1997 N.C. order's saving language; the 1997 N.C. order provided that all provisions of previous orders not modified therein would remain in full force and effect. Moncrief v. Div. of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Joyner, 60 Va. App. 721, 732 S.E.2d 714 (2012).

Applied in Kearns v. Kearns, 6 N.C. App. 319, 170 S.E.2d 132 (1969); Little v. Little, 9 N.C. App. 361, 176 S.E.2d 521 (1970); Williams v. Williams, 12 N.C. App. 170, 182 S.E.2d 667 (1971); Williams v. Williams, 13 N.C. App. 468, 186 S.E.2d 210 (1972); Carter v. Carter, 13 N.C. App. 648, 186 S.E.2d 684 (1972); Stanback v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 215 S.E.2d 30 (1975); Brady v. Brady, 24 N.C. App. 663, 211 S.E.2d 823 (1975); Tidwell v. Booker, 27 N.C. App. 435, 219 S.E.2d 648 (1975); Amaker v. Amaker, 28 N.C. App. 558, 221 S.E.2d 917 (1976); County of Stanislaus v. Ross, 41 N.C. App. 518, 255 S.E.2d 229 (1979); Williams v. Williams, 42 N.C. App. 163, 256 S.E.2d 401 (1979); Haddon v. Haddon, 42 N.C. App. 632, 257 S.E.2d 483 (1979); Gordon v. Gordon, 46 N.C. App. 495, 265 S.E.2d 425 (1980); Lane v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 48 N.C. App. 634, 269 S.E.2d 711 (1980); In re Register, 303 N.C. 149, 277 S.E.2d 356 (1981); Hardee v. Hardee, 59 N.C. App. 465, 297 S.E.2d 606 (1982); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 64 N.C. App. 249, 307 S.E.2d 400 (1983); Champion v. Champion, 64 N.C. App. 606, 307 S.E.2d 827 (1983); Rustad v. Rustad, 68 N.C. App. 58, 314 S.E.2d 275 (1984); Stevens v. Stevens, 68 N.C. App. 234, 314 S.E.2d 786 (1984); Wilkes County ex rel. Child Support Enforcement Agency ex rel Nations v. Gentry, 311 N.C. 580, 319 S.E.2d 224 (1984); Bennett v. Bennett, 71 N.C. App. 424, 322 S.E.2d 439 (1984); Toney v. Toney, 72 N.C. App. 30, 323 S.E.2d 434 (1984); Massey v. Massey, 71 N.C. App. 753, 323 S.E.2d 451 (1984); Appelbe v. Appelbe, 75 N.C. App. 197, 330 S.E.2d 57 (1985); State ex rel. Pender County Child Support Enforcement Agency ex rel Crews v. Parker, 319 N.C. 354, 354 S.E.2d 501 (1987); Koufman v. Koufman, 97 N.C. App. 227, 388 S.E.2d 207 (1990); Hall v. Hall, 107 N.C. App. 298, 419 S.E.2d 371 (1992); Rose v. Rose, 108 N.C. App. 90, 422 S.E.2d 446 (1992); Thomas v. Thomas, 134 N.C. App. 591, 518 S.E.2d 513 (1999); Leary v. Leary, 152 N.C. App. 438, 567 S.E.2d 834 (2002); Holland v. Holland, 169 N.C. App. 564, 610 S.E.2d 231 (2005); Guilford County ex rel. Holt v. Puckett, 191 N.C. App. 693, 664 S.E.2d 362 (2008); New Hanover Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Dillon v. Rains, 193 N.C. App. 208, 666 S.E.2d 800 (2008).

Cited in Boston v. Freeman, 6 N.C. App. 736, 171 S.E.2d 206 (1969); Robinson v. Robinson, 10 N.C. App. 463, 179 S.E.2d 144 (1971); Hill v. Hill, 11 N.C. App. 1, 180 S.E.2d 424 (1971); Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378, 188 S.E.2d 711 (1972); Koob v. Koob, 16 N.C. App. 326, 192 S.E.2d 40 (1972); Koob v. Koob, 283 N.C. 129, 195 S.E.2d 552 (1973); Stanback v. Stanback, 31 N.C. App. 174, 229 S.E.2d 693 (1976); Roberson v. Roberson, 40 N.C. App. 193, 252 S.E.2d 237 (1979); Gilmore v. Gilmore, 42 N.C. App. 560, 257 S.E.2d 116 (1979); Oxendine v. Catawba County Dep't of Social Servs., 49 N.C. App. 571, 272 S.E.2d 417 (1980); Falls v. Falls, 52 N.C. App. 203, 278 S.E.2d 546 (1981); Harper v. Harper, 50 N.C. App. 394, 273 S.E.2d 731 (1981); Wake County ex rel. Carrington v. Townes, 53 N.C. App. 649, 281 S.E.2d 765 (1981); Wilkes County ex rel. Child Support Enforcement Agency ex rel Nations v. Gentry, 63 N.C. App. 432, 305 S.E.2d 207 (1983); State v. Caudill, 68 N.C. App. 268, 314 S.E.2d 592 (1984); Miller v. Kite, 69 N.C. App. 679, 318 S.E.2d 102 (1984); Minor v. Minor, 70 N.C. App. 76, 318 S.E.2d 865 (1984); Rice v. Rice, 81 N.C. App. 247, 344 S.E.2d 41 (1986); In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 531, 345 S.E.2d 404 (1986); North Carolina Baptist Hosps. v. Harris, 319 N.C. 347, 354 S.E.2d 471 (1987); Smith v. Davis, 88 N.C. App. 557, 364 S.E.2d 156 (1988); Williams v. Williams, 97 N.C. App. 118, 387 S.E.2d 217 (1990); In re Roberson, 97 N.C. App. 277, 387 S.E.2d 668 (1990); McBride v. McBride, 334 N.C. 124, 431 S.E.2d 14 (1993); Fitch v. Fitch, 115 N.C. App. 722, 446 S.E.2d 138 (1994); Allen v. Piedmond Transp. Servs., Inc., 116 N.C. App. 234, 447 S.E.2d 835 (1994); Moyer v. Moyer, 122 N.C. App. 723, 471 S.E.2d 676 (1996); Taylor v. Taylor, 128 N.C. App. 180, 493 S.E.2d 819 (1997); Glass v. Glass, 131 N.C. App. 784, 509 S.E.2d 236 (1998); Vann v. Vann, 128 N.C. App. 516, 495 S.E.2d 370 (1998); Willard v. Willard, 130 N.C. App. 144, 502 S.E.2d 395 (1998); Brewer v. Brewer, 139 N.C. App. 222, 533 S.E.2d 541 (2000); In re Estate of Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. 646, 547 S.E.2d 483 (2001), cert. granted, 353 N.C. 727, 550 S.E.2d 779; Miller v. Miller, 153 N.C. App. 40, 568 S.E.2d 914 (2002); McKinney v. Richitelli, 357 N.C. 483, 586 S.E.2d 258 (2003); Carson v. Carson, 199 N.C. App. 101, 680 S.E.2d 885 (2009); Moore v. Onafowora, 208 N.C. App. 674, 703 S.E.2d 744 (2010); Robinson v. Robinson, 210 N.C. App. 319, 707 S.E.2d 785 (2011); Baumann-Chacon v. Baumann, 212 N.C. App. 137, 710 S.E.2d 431 (2011); Romulus v. Romulus, 216 N.C. App. 28, 715 S.E.2d 889 (2011); Clements v. Clements, 219 N.C. App. 581, 725 S.E.2d 373 (2012); Dixon v. Gordon, 223 N.C. App. 365, 734 S.E.2d 299 (2012), review denied, 743 S.E.2d 191, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 552 (2013); In re A.D.N., 231 N.C. App. 54, 752 S.E.2d 201 (2013), review denied, 755 S.E.2d 626, 2014 N.C. LEXIS 232 (2014); Zurosky v. Shaffer, 236 N.C. App. 219, 763 S.E.2d 755 (2014).

II. INSTITUTION OF ACTION.

Judicial Determination of Custody. - Subsection (a) does not specify that it requires judicial determination of custody before its provisions can be utilized by person or agency bringing action for support. Thus, where mother in her proceeding for modification of support order also requested a formal adjudication of custody, which request was granted, plaintiff met the custody requirements of subsection (a). Craig v. Kelley, 89 N.C. App. 458, 366 S.E.2d 249 (1988).

Custodial Parent as Real Party in Interest. - If the custodial parent provides support which the other parent is legally obligated to provide, then the custodial parent is a real party in interest in an action to recover the support so provided. Griffith v. Griffith, 38 N.C. App. 25, 247 S.E.2d 30, cert. denied, 296 N.C. 106, 249 S.E.2d 804 (1978).

Although plaintiff alleged that he was the father of the child, he did not allege that he had custody, therefore under the provisions of this section, only a parent who has custody of a minor child may bring an action for its support. Becton v. George, 90 N.C. App. 607, 369 S.E.2d 366 (1988).

Required Notice Deemed Waived. - Where both parties introduced evidence on the reasonable needs of the children and the relative ability of each parent to pay support for the children, the defendant's failure to give proper notice of his request that a hearing be conducted regarding these issues was waived and the trial court was required to find facts and enter conclusions on this evidence. Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991); Rose v. Rose, 108 N.C. App. 90, 422 S.E.2d 446 (1992).

Notice for Hearing. - This section does not identify any time restrictions for making the request for a hearing described in subsection (c). However, to effectuate the purpose of this section, any party in a pending action requesting a variance from the guidelines must, unless the request is made in the original pleadings, give at least ten days written notice as required by G.S. 50-13.5(d)(1). Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991).

There is no limitation as to time within which actions for the support of legitimate children must be commenced. County of Lenoir ex rel. Cogdell v. Johnson, 46 N.C. App. 182, 264 S.E.2d 816 (1980).

Motion in Cause. - Plaintiff-husband, as a parent seeking custody, could seek to have his child support obligation determined through a motion in the cause in the divorce action. He was not precluded from doing so by the fact that the court had not previously entered orders in that action relating to child support. Bottomley v. Bottomley, 82 N.C. App. 231, 346 S.E.2d 317 (1986).

Discovery Held Overbroad. - For a case in which it was held that plaintiff's discovery request in a child-support case was overbroad and should have been limited by the trial court, see Powers v. Parisher, 104 N.C. App. 400, 409 S.E.2d 725 (1991), appeal dismissed, 331 N.C. 286, 417 S.E.2d 254 (1992).

Prayer for Increase in Support Actually Action Under this Section. - Although plaintiff's complaint prayed for an increase in child support based upon a substantial change in circumstances, plaintiff's action was in fact brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section because the amount sought to be increased was paid pursuant to a non-judicial separation agreement; plaintiff was actually asking the Court to enter an original award of child support. Powers v. Parisher, 104 N.C. App. 400, 409 S.E.2d 725 (1991), appeal dismissed, 331 N.C. 286, 417 S.E.2d 254 (1992).

III. LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT.

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Subsection (b) imposes primary liability upon both father and mother to support a minor child. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Subsection (b) of this section, as amended in 1981, does not diminish a father's responsibilities. Rather, it enlarges a mother's responsibilities by making both parents primarily liable for the support of their children. Alamance County Hosp. v. Neighbors, 315 N.C. 362, 338 S.E.2d 87 (1986).

Equal Duty of Support Is Rule Rather Than Exception. - Today, the equal duty of both parents to support their children is the rule rather than the exception is virtually all states. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Both parents have equal support duties under the law, absent pleading and proof that circumstances otherwise warrant. Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), modified on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Support for minor children is an obligation shared by both parents according to their relative abilities to provide support and the reasonable needs and estate of the child. Boyd v. Boyd, 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986).

But Equal Financial Contributions Are Not Necessarily Required. - Subsection (b) of this section provides that both mothers and fathers share primary liability for the support of their minor children, thus imposing an equal legal duty on the parent of each gender. However, subsection (b) neither mandates equal financial contributions nor requires any contribution from either party where it is proved that the circumstances otherwise warrant. Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), modified on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Equal legal duty to support does not impose an equal financial contribution by both parties. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Equal duty to support does not necessarily mean that the amount of child support is to be automatically divided equally between the parties. Rather, the amount of each parent's obligation varies in accordance with their respective financial resources. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Equal Financial Contributions Not Imposed Where Unfair or Burdensome. - The parental obligation for child support is not primarily an obligation of the father but is one shared by both parents. This equal duty to support, however, does not impose upon both parties an equal financial contribution when such an allocation would be unfair or place too great a burden on a party. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Discretion of Court as to Amount and Source of Support. - The trial court has considerable discretion in determining whether and in what amounts the party from whom support is sought may be ordered to provide it. Therefore, the trial court has a duty to exercise an informed and considered discretion with respect to the support obligation of the parties. Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), modified on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Amount of Each Party's Contribution Determined on Case-by-Case Basis. - The amount of each party's contribution to child support is generally determined by the judge on a case-by-case basis. The judge must evaluate the circumstances of each family and also consider certain statutory requirements in fixing the amount of child support. Subsection (c) of this section mandates that the trial judge consider the certain factors in setting child support amounts. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Relative Ability to Pay May Be Considered. - Although Session Laws 1981, c. 613 had the effect of changing the previous rule that the mother was only secondarily liable for child support, in all other relevant respects involving the relative ability or inability of the mother and father to provide such support, the relevant statutory provisions remained unchanged. Therefore, other circumstances may properly be considered, including the relative ability of the parties to pay. Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), modified on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

It was apparent from the record that the trial court considered both the existence and structure of appellee's trust fund and appellant's income as an ophthalmologist in making its determination that appellant should contribute one-half of child's necessary and actual expenses. It concluded that a father in an established ophthalmologic practice, and who had a 1991 income of at least $88,000 was able to contribute half of his child's support. Munn v. Munn, 112 N.C. App. 151, 435 S.E.2d 74 (1993).

Consideration of Ability to Pay - Procedure. - Defendant's contention that summary judgment was improper because he was financially unable to make the child support payments called for in the agreement would be relevant only to future payments and could be considered only after the defendant had filed a motion in the cause for the trial court to set an amount of child support which differs from that in the separation agreement. Nisbet v. Nisbet, 102 N.C. App. 232, 402 S.E.2d 151, cert. denied, 329 N.C. 499, 407 S.E.2d 538 (1991).

Voluntary Unemployment. - Trial court order finding that mother was obligated to pay child support to her ex-husband for their three minor children who resided with the ex-husband, which was based on a deviation from the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines, was error; although the deviation was supported by the evidence in that the mother was voluntarily unemployed and had cash reserves to meet her financial obligations of the children, the amount awarded was not supported by any evidence. Roberts v. McAllister, 174 N.C. App. 369, 621 S.E.2d 191 (2005), appeal dismissed, - N.C. - , 629 S.E.2d 608 (2006).

Determination of Relative Ability. - The relative ability of the parties to contribute under subsections (b) and (c) of this section cannot depend solely on the determination of monthly available income after expenses. Rather, it must be reflective of all the relevant circumstances, including the relative hardship to each parent in contributing to the reasonable needs of the child. Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), modified on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Stepparent in Loco Parentis. - If an individual assumes the status of in loco parentis, he is secondarily liable to the child's natural parents for the support of that child, and if the needs of the child exceed the ability of the child's natural parents to meet those needs, then and only then is the individual in loco parentis secondarily responsible for the deficiency. Duffey v. Duffey, 113 N.C. App. 382, 438 S.E.2d 445 (1994).

By signing a separation agreement in which he agreed to pay child support to plaintiff, stepparent voluntarily and in writing extended his status of in loco parentis and gave the court the authority to order that support be paid. Duffey v. Duffey, 113 N.C. App. 382, 438 S.E.2d 445 (1994).

Child's Needs and Hardship to Each Parent Must Be Considered. - Enforcement of each parent's statutory duty to contribute child support depends on the urgency of the needs of the child and the relative hardship to each parent in contributing to these needs. Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), modified on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Children with Property of Their Own. - There is nothing in the statute to suggest any legislative intent to change the firmly established rule that the supporting parent who can do so remains obligated to support his or her minor children, even though they may have property of their own. Sloop v. Friberg, 70 N.C. App. 690, 320 S.E.2d 921 (1984).

Although trial court found as a fact that each child had an estate in excess of $300,000.00, the separate incomes and estates of children did not diminish or relieve the obligation of the defendant father to support his children, even though former husband's income was about $37,000.00. Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991).

Education Needs of Child. - Although public funding may have been available for special education needs of child, but was not sought by custodial parent, court did not err in requiring noncustodial parent to pay costs of child's educational expenses in proportion to parent's gross income. Sikes v. Sikes, 98 N.C. App. 610, 391 S.E.2d 855 (1990), aff'd, 330 N.C. 595, 411 S.E.2d 588 (1992).

Mother had to continue paying child support under subdivision (c)(2) of this section for her son who had turned 18 where, although he would not be able to receive a standard high school diploma because he had Down's Syndrome, his teacher and school counselor showed that his attendance at the school was in his best interests, that he would continue to benefit in the future from the curriculum, and that he was making satisfactory academic progress toward a non-traditional graduation. Hendricks v. Sanks, 143 N.C. App. 544, 545 S.E.2d 779 (2001).

Apportionment of Costs Is Not Required Where One Parent Is Unable to Assist in Support. - Although apportionment of the costs of a child's support between his father and mother according to their respective means and responsibilities is statutorily authorized, it is not required where the mother is financially unable to assist the father with the support of their son. Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), modified on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Support of Child Legitimated Under G.S. 49-12. - Where the reputed father of a child marries the child's mother after its birth, under G.S. 49-12 such child is deemed legitimate just as if it had been born in lawful wedlock, and such child is a minor child of the marriage; thus, the father may be required to furnish support for such child upon motion made either before or after decree of divorce. Carter v. Carter, 232 N.C. 614, 61 S.E.2d 711 (1950).

Primary Liability of Father Under Former Provisions. - For cases as to father's primary liability and mother's secondary liability to support their children, prior to the amendment by Session Laws 1981, c. 613, see Bailey v. Bailey, 127 N.C. 474, 37 S.E. 502 (1900); Sanders v. Sanders, 167 N.C. 319, 83 S.E. 490 (1914); Tidwell v. Booker, 290 N.C. 98, 225 S.E.2d 816 (1976); Hicks v. Hicks, 34 N.C. App. 128, 237 S.E.2d 307 (1977); Coble v. Coble, 44 N.C. App. 327, 261 S.E.2d 34 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 300 N.C. 708, 268 S.E.2d 185 (1980); Flippin v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 270 S.E.2d 482 (1980), rehearing denied, 301 N.C. 727, 274 S.E.2d 228 (1981); In re Register, 303 N.C. 149, 277 S.E.2d 356 (1981).

As to mother's standing formerly to bring claim for loss of child's services and medical expenses, based upon her formerly secondary support obligation, prior to the amendment by Session Laws 1981, c. 613, see Flippin v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 270 S.E.2d 482 (1980), rehearing denied, 301 N.C. 727, 274 S.E.2d 228 (1981).

Father's Reduction in Payments as Evidence He Had Not Met Obligations. - Where judge found that mother provided no evidence that she was entitled to payment of back child support, the evidence did not support the judge's finding; there was evidence that father had not met his child support obligations where father testified that in 1985, he reduced the amount of the payments due to a decrease in salary. Correll v. Allen, 94 N.C. App. 464, 380 S.E.2d 580 (1989).

Equitable Estoppel Did Not Bar Claim for Past Support. - Even assuming that on some set of facts equitable estoppel might properly bar a claim for child support arrears, it was inapplicable where husband, seeking to rely on equitable estoppel, could not show that, in good faith reliance on the conduct of his ex-wife, he had changed his position for the worse; the only change made in his position was the retention to his benefit of money owed for the support of his children. Griffin v. Griffin, 96 N.C. App. 324, 385 S.E.2d 526 (1989).

Applicability of Doctrine of "Necessaries". - Although the normal vehicle today for enforcing the obligation of support is undoubtedly the payment of court-ordered support pursuant to statute, the common law provided another vehicle through the so-called doctrine of "necessaries." North Carolina accepts this process for enforcing a parent's obligation to support minor children. Alamance County Hosp. v. Neighbors, 315 N.C. 362, 338 S.E.2d 87 (1986).

Support Obligation of Noncustodial Parent. - Under new child Support Guidelines an adjustment in support obligation of noncustodial parent is reduced only when each parent has child for more than 33 percent of year. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

Right of Third Party to Recover for "Necessaries" Furnished to Child. - Because a child's right to support continues unimpaired despite the divorce of his or her parents, the right of a third party provider of goods or services to claim against the noncustodial parent also continues, unimpaired by contracts or judicial decrees or orders affecting the relations between the parents. Alamance County Hosp. v. Neighbors, 315 N.C. 362, 338 S.E.2d 87 (1986).

The payment of court-ordered child support does not bar a third party from seeking reimbursement directly from a noncustodial parent for "necessaries" provided to that parent's minor child. However, because the third party provider's right to recover against the parent is based upon the child's right to support, the third party provider must still show that the services or goods provided were legal "necessaries" and that the parent against whom relief is sought has failed or refused to provide them. In this context, any payment a noncustodial parent has made for the support of his or her child would be a factor for the trial judge to consider in deciding whether the parent has in fact met the obligation to support that child. Alamance County Hosp. v. Neighbors, 315 N.C. 362, 338 S.E.2d 87 (1986).

Non-Biological Parents. - The court will not impose the burden of child support on a non-biological parent who has not voluntarily assumed such an obligation. Pott v. Pott, 126 N.C. App. 285, 484 S.E.2d 822 (1997).

Persons Standing in Loco Parentis. - Although support of a child ordinarily is a parental obligation, other persons standing in loco parentis may also acquire a duty to support the child; thus, in a case where custodial father and child had believed him to be the father of the child, the duty of support should have accompanied the right to custody. Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528 (1997).

Parents of Unemancipated Minors Primarily Responsible for Grandchildren's Support. - The statutory language of this section, coupled with the legislative intent, imposes primary responsibility for an infant born to unemancipated minors on the minors' parents (i.e. the infant's grandparents). Whitman v. Kiger, 139 N.C. App. 44, 533 S.E.2d 807 (2000), aff'd, 353 N.C. 360, 543 S.E.2d 476 (2001).

IV. AMOUNT OF SUPPORT.

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A. IN GENERAL.

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History and Purpose of Guidelines. - As of July 1, 1991, the State adopted guidelines based on income-sharing approach for determining child support. These guidelines were promulgated by Conference of Chief District Judges in accordance with subsection (c1) of this section. Income-sharing formulas ignore problem of attempting to determine cost of raising a child and are based instead on assumption that each parent will contribute all of his or her income to one fund. Then the formulas provide method for equitably dividing income among family members. Income-sharing formulas seeking to equalize financial burden of divorce so that all family members experience about same proportional reduction in standard of living after divorce. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

Constitutionality of Guidelines. - Child Support Guidelines (2002) did not violate substantive due process; the State had a compelling interest in regulating child support obligations, and through establishing a rebuttable presumption with regard to the guidelines under G.S. 50-13.4(c), the act was narrowly drawn. Row v. Row, 185 N.C. App. 450, 650 S.E.2d 1 (2007), review denied, 362 N.C. 238, 659 S.E.2d 741 (2008), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 129 S. Ct. 144, 172 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2008).

Effective Date of Guidelines. - At time support order was entered in June, 1989, the Guidelines in subsection (c1) of this section were only advisory in nature. The Guidelines became presumptive as of October 1, 1989. New presumptive guidelines became effective July 1, 1990. Therefore, at the time, (June 1989) order was entered, trial judge was neither required to follow nor refer to advisory guidelines in order. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

Use of Guidelines to Determine Support Proper. - Where parents' combined gross income was $11,980, below the $20,000 per month threshold, the trial court was permitted to use the child support guidelines and require the husband to continue paying $1,521 per month in child support. Francis v. Francis, 169 N.C. App. 442, 612 S.E.2d 141 (2005).

The amount of a parent's child support obligation is determined by application of the Child Support Guidelines. Barham v. Barham, 127 N.C. App. 20, 487 S.E.2d 774 (1997), aff'd, 347 N.C. 570, 494 S.E.2d 763 (1998).

Guidelines Are Not Mandatory But Advisory. - An examination and interpretation of subsection (c1) as written clearly indicates that the guidelines prescribed by the Conference of Chief District Court Judges are not mandatory and binding but rather advisory in nature. Morris v. Morris, 92 N.C. App. 359, 374 S.E.2d 441 (1988), decided prior to later amendments to subsection (c1).

Deviation From Guidelines. - According to the statute, the trial court has the discretion to deviate from the presumptive guidelines in only two situations: (1) when application does not meet or exceeds the reasonable needs of the child; or (2) when application would be unjust or inappropriate. Guilford County ex rel. Child Support Enforcement Agency ex rel. Easter v. Easter, 120 N.C. App. 260, 461 S.E.2d 798 (1995), modified, 344 N.C. 166, 473 S.E.2d 6 (1996).

A trial court may deviate from the Guidelines when it finds, by the greater weight of the evidence, application of the Guidelines: (1) would not meet or would exceed the reasonable needs of the child considering the relative ability of each parent to provide support; or (2) would be otherwise unjust or inappropriate. Barham v. Barham, 127 N.C. App. 20, 487 S.E.2d 774 (1997), aff'd, 347 N.C. 570, 494 S.E.2d 763 (1998).

Although the trial court properly considered the father's settlement trust to be non-recurring income when making its child support order, the case was remanded because the trial court failed to make specific findings regarding the reasonable needs of the child when it deviated from the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines. Spicer v. Spicer, 168 N.C. App. 283, 607 S.E.2d 678 (2005).

North Carolina Child Support Guidelines were inapplicable because the combined monthly adjusted gross income of the parents exceeded $20,000; thus, the trial court was required to make a case-by-case determination. Consequently, the trial court was not bound by the Guidelines in determining the father's child support obligations. Diehl v. Diehl, 177 N.C. App. 642, 630 S.E.2d 25 (2006).

In considering a father's motion to modify child support, the trial court did not err in deviating only slightly from the guidelines; the guidelines were constitutional, and the slight deviation was not manifestly unsupported by reason. Row v. Row, 185 N.C. App. 450, 650 S.E.2d 1 (2007), review denied, 362 N.C. 238, 659 S.E.2d 741 (2008), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 129 S. Ct. 144, 172 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2008).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to deviate from the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines because it made findings regarding both the needs of the child and each parent's relative ability to provide support and did not find application of the Guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate. Simms v. Bolger, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 522 (2019).

Trial Court's Methodology Proper. - Even if the father had assigned error to the methodology employed by the trial court, there was no error in the trial court's determination process under circumstances in which both parties maintained full-time employment and earned average monthly incomes in excess of $10,000; the trial court's findings of fact included an updated analysis of the child's total reasonable needs while in the mother's care, the mother's pro rata share of the parties' gross income, and the mother's pro rata share of the child's reasonable needs while in her custody. Pascoe v. Pascoe, 183 N.C. App. 648, 645 S.E.2d 156 (2007).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that it would not base the child support calculation on the estates of the parties because they were essentially equal, and neither party would be required to deplete his or her accounts and properties to support the child. Kleoudis v. Kleoudis, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 277 (2020).

The child support guidelines were held inapplicable and child support was determined by assessing the particular facts of the case where a father's monthly income was $15,181; the denial of a father's motion to reduce child support was affirmed where the trial court acknowledged the father's income decrease, considered the father's family related expenses and support obligations, and determined, based on the father's net income of over $5,000 per month, that a reduction in child support from the original amount of $2,500 was unwarranted. Trevillian v. Trevillian, 164 N.C. App. 223, 595 S.E.2d 206 (2004).

Deviation from Guidelines Improper. - Trial court's findings that mother's live-in boyfriend earned $16.61 per hour and worked forty hours a week was insufficient to support the decision to deviate from the Child Support Guidelines. State ex rel. Carteret Child Support Enforcement Office ex rel. Horne v. Horne, 127 N.C. App. 387, 489 S.E.2d 431 (1997).

Automatic Support Increases. - Provision in judgment by confession ordering automatic child support increases based upon the C.P.I. was void where it did not contain the requirements for a valid annual adjustment formula in Falls v. Falls, 52 N.C. App. 203, 278 S.E.2d 546, cert. denied, 304 N.C. 390, 285 S.E.2d 831 (1981). Snipes v. Snipes, 118 N.C. App. 189, 454 S.E.2d 864 (1995).

The determination of child support must be done in such way as to result in fairness to all parties. Walker v. Walker, 38 N.C. App. 226, 247 S.E.2d 615 (1978); Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), modified on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Ultimate Objective. - While it is the legal obligation of the father (now father and mother) to provide for the support of his minor children, and while the welfare of the child is a primary consideration in matters of custody and maintenance, yet common sense and common justice dictate that the ultimate object in such matters is to secure support commensurate with the needs of the child and the ability of the father to meet the needs. Holt v. Holt, 29 N.C. App. 124, 223 S.E.2d 542 (1976).

No precise formula exists to assist the court in determining a fair support award, and the uniqueness of each divorce renders a precedent almost valueless. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Request for Variance from Child Support Guidelines. - G.S. 50-13.4 does not identify any time restrictions for making the request for a hearing. However, to effectuate the purpose of that statute, any party in a pending action requesting a variance from the guidelines must, unless the request is made in the original pleadings, give at least ten days written notice as required by this section. Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991).

In deviating from child support guidelines, the trial court was required to make findings of fact as to the criteria that justified varying from the guidelines and the basis of the amount ordered; the court committed error because its findings were insufficient to meet this requirement. Gowing v. Gowing, 111 N.C. App. 613, 432 S.E.2d 911 (1993).

Failure to follow the presumptive child-support guidelines prescribed pursuant to subsection (c1) required that a support order be reversed; the guidelines were not mentioned in the order and the order did not make reference to any of the factors used to vary a support payment from the presumptive amounts. Greer v. Greer, 101 N.C. App. 351, 399 S.E.2d 399 (1991).

In child support action, trial court must first determine primary liability for minor child's support under subsection (b). The court then determines the actual amount of support necessary to meet the minor child's reasonable needs pursuant to subsection (c). McLemore v. McLemore, 89 N.C. App. 451, 366 S.E.2d 495 (1988).

Deviation from Guidelines in Special Needs Case. - The trial court erred in simply halving the mother's child support obligation when she was no longer liable for the support of one of the two children; the court was required to hold a hearing and make findings of fact when it deviated from the Child Support Guidelines, and, considering the second child's special needs, an amount higher than one-half of the original total might have been more appropriate. Hendricks v. Sanks, 143 N.C. App. 544, 545 S.E.2d 779 (2001).

Where 11 U.S.C.S. § 1325(b)(2) required that child support payments be reasonably necessary to be expended for a child and where G.S. 50-13.4(c) also provided that child support payments must be in such an amount as to meet the reasonable needs of a child, the court assumed that the child support payments made to a Chapter 13 debtor were determined in accordance with state law and that the full amount of the payment was reasonably necessary for the support of the children where there had been no contention to the contrary. In re Parker, - Bankr. - (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 28, 2009).

Estimate of Child Support in Error. - In setting the child support amount, the trial court erred in estimating the children's reasonable needs by comparing them to the reasonable needs of the father where the estimate was based on speculation, and was especially inappropriate given the finding that the children lived primarily with the mother. Lasecki v. Lasecki, 246 N.C. App. 518, 786 S.E.2d 286 (2016).

Ability to Pay and Needs of Child Must Be Considered. - Ordinarily, in entering a judgment for the support of a minor child, the ability to pay, as well as the needs of such child, will be taken into consideration. Bishop v. Bishop, 245 N.C. 573, 96 S.E.2d 721 (1957); Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963); Coggins v. Coggins, 260 N.C. 765, 133 S.E.2d 700 (1963).

In providing for the support of minor children, the ability of the father (or mother) to pay, as well as the needs of the children, must be taken into consideration by the court. Martin v. Martin, 263 N.C. 86, 138 S.E.2d 801 (1964).

In determining the amount of support, the court must take into consideration the needs of the children and the ability of the defendant to pay during the time for which reimbursement is sought. Hicks v. Hicks, 34 N.C. App. 128, 237 S.E.2d 307 (1977).

An order for child support must be based not only on the needs of the child, but also on the ability of the father (or mother) to meet the needs. Poston v. Poston, 40 N.C. App. 210, 252 S.E.2d 240 (1979).

In order to be fair and just, the court entering an order for child support must consider not only the needs of the child, but also the abilities of the parents to provide support. Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), modified on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

An order for child support must be based upon the interplay of the trial court's conclusions of law as to (1) the amount of support necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child and (2) the relative ability of the parties to provide that amount. Atwell v. Atwell, 74 N.C. App. 231, 328 S.E.2d 47 (1985).

Computing the amount of child support is normally an exercise of sound judicial discretion, requiring the judge to review all of the evidence before him. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, a judge's determination of what is a proper amount of support will not be disturbed on appeal. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

The trial court's findings lacked the necessary specificity to justify its deviation from child support guidelines, where it failed to make any findings regarding the child's reasonable needs, including his education, maintenance, or accustomed standard of living. State ex rel. Fisher v. Lukinoff, 131 N.C. App. 642, 507 S.E.2d 591 (1998).

Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction under G.S. 7B-200(a) over neglect proceedings, and as G.S. 7B-903 authorized the placement of the neglected child with the child's mother, the trial court had authority under G.S. 7B-904 to order a father to pay child support to the child's mother; however, further findings were required under G.S. 7B-904(d) and G.S. 50-13.4(c) as to the reasonable needs of the child and the relative ability of the father to provide that amount. In re W.V., 204 N.C. App. 290, 693 S.E.2d 383 (2010).

Trial court did not err in referencing a father's income when dismissing the father's complaint for child support because that information was relevant to the father's claim for child support. Durham Cty. v. Adams, 258 N.C. App. 395, 812 S.E.2d 885 (2018), review denied, 814 S.E.2d 106, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 472 (2018).

When Ability to Pay Determined. - A party's ability to pay child support is determined by the party's ability to pay at the time the award is made or modified. Askew v. Askew, 119 N.C. App. 242, 458 S.E.2d 217 (1995).

As Basis of Order for Child Support. - An order for child support under this section must be based upon the interplay of the trial court's conclusions of law as to (1) the amount of support necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child, and (2) the relative ability of the parties to provide that amount. Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 268 S.E.2d 185 (1980); In re Biggers, 50 N.C. App. 332, 274 S.E.2d 236 (1981); Dishmon v. Dishmon, 57 N.C. App. 657, 292 S.E.2d 293 (1982); In re Allen, 58 N.C. App. 322, 293 S.E.2d 607 (1982); Byrd v. Byrd, 62 N.C. App. 438, 303 S.E.2d 205 (1983); Campbell v. Campbell, 63 N.C. App. 113, 304 S.E.2d 262, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 460, 307 S.E.2d 362 (1983); Newman v. Newman, 64 N.C. App. 125, 306 S.E.2d 540, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 822, 310 S.E.2d 351 (1983).

Along with Other Relevant Facts. - A court, when entering an order for support, should take into account the needs of the child, the resources of the parties and any other facts relevant to the case. McCall v. McCall, 61 N.C. App. 312, 300 S.E.2d 591 (1983).

Using disposable income (net income after expenses) is a way to fairly reflect the parties relative ability to contribute proportionately to support of the child. Savani v. Savani, 102 N.C. App. 496, 403 S.E.2d 900 (1991).

With Reference to the Special Circumstances of the Parties. - What amount is reasonable for a child's support is to be determined with reference to the special circumstances of the particular parties. Warner v. Latimer, 68 N.C. App. 170, 314 S.E.2d 789 (1984).

Judge's consideration of the factors contained in subsection (c) of this section is not guided by any magic formula. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Vacation of Support Order Absent Evidence as to Parent's Ability to Pay and Child's Needs. - An order for child support will necessarily be vacated where there is no evidence offered as to a party's ability to pay or where there is no evidence as to the child's needs and expenses. Dixon v. Dixon, 67 N.C. App. 73, 312 S.E.2d 669 (1984).

Parent's Circumstances Must Be Evaluated. - The amount of each parent's contribution to the support of the child is based upon the trial court's evaluation of each parent's circumstances, including a determination of certain factors mandated by subsection (c) of this section. Boyd v. Boyd, 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986).

Alimony and Child Support Considered Together. - Trial court reasonably could have concluded that the wife's alimony award needed to be increased because the wife's reasonable expenses had increased after the husband was no longer obligated to pay child support because the parties, minor child had turned 18-years-old. The original alimony award calculated the wife's reasonable expenses by attributing some of those expenses to the minor child, but the wife's reasonable expenses increased when the minor child attained the age of majority and those expenses were no longer attributed to the minor child. Harris v. Harris, 188 N.C. App. 477, 656 S.E.2d 316 (2008).

"Cost Sharing" Formula Improper. - Use of any cost-sharing formula by a trial judge is now improper in North Carolina. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

"Cost-sharing" approach to child support awards embodied in the Franks formula criticized by North Carolina Court of Appeals when applied to case arising before July 1, 1990, effective date of this section. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

Under this section and G.S. 50-13.7, party's ability to pay child support is ordinarily determined by party's actual income at time the support award is made or modified. However, if there is a finding by the trial court that the party was acting in bad faith by deliberately depressing his or her income or otherwise disregarding the obligation to pay child support, then the party's capacity to earn may be the basis for the award. Fischell v. Rosenberg, 90 N.C. App. 254, 368 S.E.2d 11 (1988).

Interest in Corporations or Partnerships and Nontaxable Income Relevant. - The value and nature of defendant's interest in any partnerships or corporations and the terms of any trust of which he might be the beneficiary, as well as the amount of income, including non-taxable, deferred or declined income, flowing therefrom, would all bear relevance to child support proceeding. Shaw v. Cameron, 125 N.C. App. 522, 481 S.E.2d 365 (1997).

Encumbered Cash Reserve Funds of Corporation. - The trial court's exclusion of plaintiff's corporation's encumbered cash reserve funds in its calculation of child support was prejudicial error. Barham v. Barham, 127 N.C. App. 20, 487 S.E.2d 774 (1997), aff'd, 347 N.C. 570, 494 S.E.2d 763 (1998).

Exclusive Ownership or Control of Estate Irrelevant. - Any judgment rendered against defendant setting an amount of child support would be dependent in significant part upon the amount of his income and the nature of his estate, whether exclusively owned or controlled by defendant, or jointly with others. Shaw v. Cameron, 125 N.C. App. 522, 481 S.E.2d 365 (1997).

Estate and Earnings of Both Husband and Wife Must Be Considered. - The court must consider not only the needs of the wife and children, but also the estate and earnings of both husband and wife. Roberts v. Roberts, 38 N.C. App. 295, 248 S.E.2d 85 (1978); Walker v. Tucker, 69 N.C. App. 607, 317 S.E.2d 923 (1984).

Order which contained no findings of fact regarding plaintiff's earnings or employment status was not supported by sufficient findings of fact. Smith v. Smith, 103 N.C. App. 488, 405 S.E.2d 912 (1991).

Ordinarily, Present Earnings Should Be Basis for Award. - In determining the ability of the father (or mother) to support the child, the court ordinarily should examine the father's (or mother's) present earnings, rather than select the earnings for a single year in the past and use that as the basis for an award. Holt v. Holt, 29 N.C. App. 124, 223 S.E.2d 542 (1976).

If father (or mother) is honestly and in good faith engaged in a business to which he is properly adapted, and is making a good faith effort to earn a reasonable income, the award for child support should be based on the amount which defendant is earning when the award is made. Holt v. Holt, 29 N.C. App. 124, 223 S.E.2d 542 (1976).

Ordinarily, father's (or mother's) ability to pay is determined by his income at the time the award is made if father (or mother) is honestly engaged in a business to which he is properly adapted and is in fact seeking to operate his business profitably. Beall v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 228 S.E.2d 407 (1976); Whitley v. Whitley, 46 N.C. App. 810, 266 S.E.2d 23 (1980).

The general rule is that the ability of a party to pay child support is determined by that person's income at the time the award is made. Atwell v. Atwell, 74 N.C. App. 231, 328 S.E.2d 47 (1985).

The ability of the supporting spouse to pay is ordinarily determined by his or her income at the time the award is made. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

But capacity to earn may be the basis of an award if it is based upon a proper finding that father (or mother) is deliberately depressing his income or indulging himself in excessive spending because of a disregard of his obligation to provide reasonable support for his spouse and children. Beall v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 228 S.E.2d 407 (1976).

A person's capacity to earn income may be made the basis of an award if there is a finding that the party deliberately depressed his or her income or otherwise acted in deliberate disregard of the obligation to provide reasonable support for the child. Greer v. Greer, 101 N.C. App. 351, 399 S.E.2d 399 (1991).

Under this section and G.S. 50-13.7, father's (or mother's) ability to pay child support is normally determined by his actual income at the time the award is made or modified. If, however, there is a finding that father (or mother) is deliberately depressing his income or otherwise acting in deliberate disregard of his obligation to provide reasonable support for his child, his capacity to earn may be made the basis of the award. Under these circumstances, his motion to reduce the amount of child support will be denied. Goodhouse v. DeFravio, 57 N.C. App. 124, 290 S.E.2d 751 (1982).

When the trial court makes a finding that a party deliberately depressed his or her income, then the party's capacity to earn or his potential income may be used to determine the child support obligation. McDonald v. Taylor, 106 N.C. App. 18, 415 S.E.2d 81 (1992).

Where plaintiff took early retirement at age 51, with a 3 year old daughter to support, chose to remain unemployed, despite having many skills, and there was testimony that plaintiff could earn at least $20,000 without decreasing his retirement benefits, the trial court properly based child support award on plaintiff's potential income. Osborne v. Osborne, 129 N.C. App. 34, 497 S.E.2d 113 (1998).

Trial court erred in modifying a father's child support obligation downward under G.S. 50-13.7(a) despite evidence that he voluntarily quit his $172,000 job as an engineer to follow Jesus Christ and become a minister of a fledgling church without giving consideration to how he would meet his child support obligation. Andrews v. Andrews, 217 N.C. App. 154, 719 S.E.2d 128 (2011), review denied 365 N.C. 561, 722 S.E.2d 595, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 148 (2012).

Finding Where Award Is Based on Capacity to Earn. - To base an award for child support on capacity to earn rather than actual earnings, there should be a finding based on evidence that father (or mother) is failing to exercise his capacity to earn because of a disregard of his obligation to provide reasonable support for his spouse and children. Holt v. Holt, 29 N.C. App. 124, 223 S.E.2d 542 (1976); Stanley v. Stanley, 51 N.C. App. 172, 275 S.E.2d 546, cert. denied, 303 N.C. 182, 280 S.E.2d 454, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 959, 102 S. Ct. 496, 70 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1981).

Only where there are findings, based on competent evidence, to support a conclusion that the supporting spouse or parent is deliberately depressing his or her income to avoid family responsibilities can the "earning capacity" rule be applied. Whitley v. Whitley, 46 N.C. App. 810, 266 S.E.2d 23 (1980); Atwell v. Atwell, 74 N.C. App. 231, 328 S.E.2d 47 (1985).

A party's capacity to earn income may become the basis of an award if it is found that the party deliberately depressed its income or otherwise acted in deliberate disregard of the obligation to provide reasonable support for the child. Askew v. Askew, 119 N.C. App. 242, 458 S.E.2d 217 (1995).

When calculating the child support obligation owed by a parent, a showing of bad faith income depression by the parent is a mandatory prerequisite for imputing income to that parent. Sharpe v. Nobles, 127 N.C. App. 705, 493 S.E.2d 288 (1997).

Must Be Sufficient Evidence of Proscribed Intent. - A trial court's conclusion underlying imposition of the earnings capacity rule must be based upon evidence that the actions which reduced the party's income were not taken in good faith. There must be sufficient evidence of the proscribed intent. Fischell v. Rosenberg, 90 N.C. App. 254, 368 S.E.2d 11 (1988).

Consideration of Spouse's Capacity to Earn Held Error. - Trial court could not consider father's capacity to earn in computing his income where the evidence indicated that he lost his job due to no fault of his own, and the court's order contained no findings that he had deliberately stopped working to avoid his support obligations. Greer v. Greer, 101 N.C. App. 351, 399 S.E.2d 399 (1991).

Support Should Not Have Been Based on Earning Capacity. - Where there was no evidence that defendant was engaging in any tactics to avoid paying child support, defendant had purchased a substantial amount of farm equipment for use in his farming operation, and he had experienced a net loss from farming for the last three years but had made a profit from this business in the past, the evidence pointed to a genuine effort by defendant to engage in his chosen profession and to support his family as well; therefore, the case was remanded so the court could make a determination based upon defendant's present earnings instead of his earning capacity. Cameron v. Cameron, 94 N.C. App. 168, 380 S.E.2d 121 (1989).

Wrongful Inclusion of Future Personal Expenditures. - Where trial court includes personal expenditures not yet made by party with no concrete plans to make such an expenditure, award entered cannot possibly reflect the relative abilities of parties to pay support at that time. Witherow v. Witherow, 99 N.C. App. 61, 392 S.E.2d 627 (1990).

Determination of trial court not necessary to make finding of bad faith in reduction of income where the party seeking support modification was the custodial parent was not supported by current case law, nor was the trial court correct in concluding that when a custodial parent sought a change of child support based upon a reduction in income, that custodial parent had to request the court to make a finding of fact as to his or her "good faith." Fischell v. Rosenberg, 90 N.C. App. 254, 368 S.E.2d 11 (1988).

Father's cost-free housing was properly considered to be a form of gross-income, and thus, recurring income for purposes of making a child support award. Spicer v. Spicer, 168 N.C. App. 283, 607 S.E.2d 678 (2005).

The inclusion of a gift when calculating a defendant's income for child support purposes was an error, where there was no evidence on the part of defendant's parents that such a gift would be reoccurring. Sloan v. Sloan, 87 N.C. App. 392, 360 S.E.2d 816 (1987).

But Gift Rent and Vehicle Payments by Mother's Father Should Have Been Included in Support Obligation. - Trial court erred in failing to include the mother's gift income as attributable income in calculating a father's child support obligation; the payment of the mother's vehicle and rent payments by her father totaled $1,890, which should have been included in calculating income in the child support order. State v. Williams, 179 N.C. App. 838, 635 S.E.2d 495 (2006).

Non-interest Bearing Demand Note Not by Itself a Gift. - The fact that no demand had been made on a non-interest bearing demand note from defendant's parents did not render it a gift, and the trial court's finding that the transaction was a gift was erroneous. Sloan v. Sloan, 87 N.C. App. 392, 360 S.E.2d 816 (1987).

Third-party contributions may be used to support a deviation from North Carolina Child Support Guidelines, even where third parties are under no legal obligation to make such payments. Guilford County ex rel. Child Support Enforcement Agency ex rel. Easter v. Easter, 344 N.C. 166, 473 S.E.2d 6 (1996).

Personal injury settlement, paid on a one-time, non-recurring basis met the definition of "non-recurring income" and thus, was properly considered by the trial court when making a child support award. Spicer v. Spicer, 168 N.C. App. 283, 607 S.E.2d 678 (2005).

Settlement Payouts Non-Recurring Income. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a father to make a lump sum child support payment under the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines because settlement payouts to the father constituted non-recurring income subject to application of the Guidelines. Simms v. Bolger, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 522 (2019).

Earnings of Child. - In a case involving child support payments, the trial court erred in refusing to admit the children's tax returns into evidence, the only information concerning the estate and earnings of the children. Sloan v. Sloan, 87 N.C. App. 392, 360 S.E.2d 816 (1987).

Education and Insurance Expenses. - Defendant's argument that provisions to pay for higher education and to provide life and health insurance were not in the nature of child support was not without merit. Smith v. Smith, 121 N.C. App. 334, 465 S.E.2d 52 (1996).

Trial court's order requiring a father to obtain health insurance for his child did not violate G.S. 50-13.4(c1), even though the father did not have access to employer-provided health insurance, because the father did not claim he lacked access to "other group health insurance" and if a parent had access to "other group health insurance," such insurance was considered "reasonably-priced" as a matter of law. Reams v. Riggan, 224 N.C. App. 78, 735 S.E.2d 407 (2012).

Extraordinary Expenses. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering a child support order that required a father to pay a certain percentage of the minor child's tuition, daycare expenses, and costs for summer camp because Child Support Guidelines, N.C. Ann. R. specifically allowed for extraordinary expenses for private school tuition and camp fees and the trial court was entitled to consider expenses for child care in its support determination pursuant to G.S. 50-13.4(c); the trial court ordered each party to pay a percentage of the expenses based on the party's share of the combined gross incomes pursuant to the Guidelines. Balawejder v. Balawejder, 216 N.C. App. 301, 721 S.E.2d 679 (2011).

Disability Checks Received on Behalf of Child. - Trial court properly refused to consider a disability check received by disabled defendant on child's behalf as defendant's income in figuring his obligation, but erred in allowing defendant to receive the money for his own use. Sain v. Sain, 134 N.C. App. 460, 517 S.E.2d 921 (1999).

Adoption Assistance Payments. - Adoption assistance payments received by the parties were resources for the parties' adopted children, and thus could not be set off against the father's child support obligation. Gaston County v. Miller, 168 N.C. App. 577, 608 S.E.2d 101 (2005).

Medical insurance premiums paid by a parent on behalf of a child are actual expenditures which must be considered in computing retroactive child support. Lawrence v. Tise, 107 N.C. App. 140, 419 S.E.2d 176 (1992).

Failure of the trial court to treat a portion of mother's premiums as an actual expenditure for the purposes of calculating retroactive support was not error, because there was no evidence in the record to support a finding on the portion of the premiums for the joint policy attributable only to coverage of the child. In the absence of such evidence, the trial court would only be speculating as to the child's share of the cost, and this it could not do. Lawrence v. Tise, 107 N.C. App. 140, 419 S.E.2d 176 (1992).

Consideration of Health Insurance Coverage Erroneous. - According to former subdivision (c1)(6) of this section, the trial court was not allowed to vary the presumptive amount of child support based upon the "provision of health insurance coverage;" therefore, by varying the presumptive guideline amount because of the defendant's maintenance of health insurance on the plaintiff and the children, the trial court acted in violation of this section. Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991).

Reconsideration of Alimony or Child Support After Equitable Distribution. - G.S. 50-20 (f) obviously contemplates that child support order may precede equitable distribution order. No child support order is ever final and delaying child support order in lengthy case until after equitable distribution issue was decided would have prolonged an already long-pending case. Trial court's decision to enter child support order prior to determination of equitable distribution issue was under the statute. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

Effective Date of Permanent Award. - Plaintiff contended the trial court erred in its award of child support because the permanent award should have been made effective from January 2011, rather than from January 2013, but it was well-established that a trial court had not abused its discretion where, based on the evidence before it, the trial court chose not to modify the effective date of a permanent award. Oltmanns v. Oltmanns, 241 N.C. App. 326, 773 S.E.2d 347 (2015).

Amount of Award Is Within Trial Court's Discretion. - Once an award is found to be justified, the amount lies within the trial court's discretion and will not be disturbed absent manifest abuse. Sloop v. Friberg, 70 N.C. App. 690, 320 S.E.2d 921 (1984).

Amount Should Be Fair and Not Confiscatory. - An order for the maintenance of a child should be in an amount that is fair and not confiscatory in light of the parent's earning ability. Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983), modified on other grounds, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985). See also, Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963).

Allowance Should Be Made for Parent's Living Expenses. - In determining the amount of an order for the support of children, a reasonable allowance should be made for the living expenses of their father (or mother) in the light of his earnings. Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963).

Dividing Parent's Income by Number of Dependents Is Disapproved. - Fixing the amount of support for minor children by dividing the income of their father (or mother) by the number of people dependent upon him for support is not approved. Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963).

Conduct of Parties May Be Considered. - In addition to the factors enumerated in subsection (c) of this section, the trial court may consider the conduct of the parties, the equities of the given case, and any other relevant facts in determining child support. Warner v. Latimer, 68 N.C. App. 170, 314 S.E.2d 789 (1984).

This section clearly allows the trial court to consider other facts of the particular case in arriving at the amount of defendant's share of support in an action for reimbursement. Thus, while the defendant's ability to pay and his earning capacity are factors to be considered, they are not controlling. The court may also consider the conduct of the parties and the equities of the case. Stanley v. Stanley, 51 N.C. App. 172, 275 S.E.2d 546, cert. denied, 303 N.C. 182, 280 S.E.2d 454, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 959, 102 S. Ct. 496, 70 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1981).

Improper Use of Earning Capacity Rule - Trial court erred in modifying a father's child support obligation pursuant to G.S. 50-13.4; the trial court found that while the father reduced his income, he did not act in bad faith, and a finding of bad faith was required to apply the earning capacity rule under N.C. Child Support Guidelines, 2003 Ann. R. N.C. 33, 35. Cook v. Cook, 159 N.C. App. 657, 583 S.E.2d 696 (2003).

Findings and Conclusions of Law Required. - In setting amounts for child support, where the trial court sits without a jury, the judge is required to find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and to direct the entry of the appropriate judgment. Dishmon v. Dishmon, 57 N.C. App. 657, 292 S.E.2d 293 (1982).

Trial court erred in failing to make findings regarding the reasonable needs of a child for support, or regarding its refusal to award support for the time between the filing of suit for support and the entry of the support order. State ex rel. Gillikin v. McGuire, 174 N.C. App. 347, 620 S.E.2d 899 (2005).

Findings Must Indicate Consideration of Needs and Earnings. - Conclusions of law must be based upon factual findings specific enough to indicate to the appellate court that the judge below took due regard of the particular estates, earnings, conditions, and accustomed standard of living of both the child and the parents. Dishmon v. Dishmon, 57 N.C. App. 657, 292 S.E.2d 293 (1982).

Findings as to Child's Past and Present Expenses Required. - In order to determine the reasonable needs of the child, the trial court must hear evidence and make findings of specific fact on the child's actual past expenditures and present reasonable expenses. Atwell v. Atwell, 74 N.C. App. 231, 328 S.E.2d 47 (1985).

Minor child's hospitalization and its resulting costs constituted a substantial change in circumstances. Thus case was remanded to take into account the parties' abilities to provide support for the minor child's medical expenses and to enter an order modifying the support order. Lawrence v. Nantz, 115 N.C. App. 478, 445 S.E.2d 87 (1994).

Award Where Father Has Substantial Income. - In an action for child support, the court, in making its award, should keep in mind that children of a man of substantial income are entitled to live accordingly. McLeod v. McLeod, 43 N.C. App. 66, 258 S.E.2d 75, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 807, 261 S.E.2d 920 (1979).

Credit for Voluntary Expenditures. - As to granting of credit towards payment of court-ordered child support for voluntary expenditures, see Goodson v. Goodson, 32 N.C. App. 76, 231 S.E.2d 178 (1977).

The trial court has a wide discretion in deciding initially whether justice requires that a credit be given under the facts of each case and then in what amount the credit is to be awarded. The better view allows credit when equitable considerations exist which would create an injustice if credit were not allowed. Evans v. Craddock, 61 N.C. App. 438, 300 S.E.2d 908 (1983).

Expenses During Visitation. - Credit is not likely to be appropriate for frivolous expenses or for expenses incurred in entertaining or feeding the child during visitation periods. Evans v. Craddock, 61 N.C. App. 438, 300 S.E.2d 908 (1983).

Whether credit is allowed for time spent in visitation with the noncustodial parent depends on the facts of the particular case and is a matter within the court's discretion, as the fact that a child spends a certain amount of time with one parent does not necessarily mean that his reasonable and necessary living expenses are incurred proportionally. Gibson v. Gibson, 68 N.C. App. 566, 316 S.E.2d 99 (1984).

Trial court's use of one-third of mother's total fixed expenses to establish reasonable needs of child was neither unfair nor impermissible where the expense figures in mother's affidavit of financial status included expenses only for herself and the child, as she had not remarried, and furthermore, where the trial court not only found that mother's living expenses were reasonable, but also reduced several of the figures on the affidavit before making that finding, and where, with the exception of the amount of scheduled visitation, father presented no evidence on which the court could have based other findings regarding the child's expenses and needs. Gibson v. Gibson, 68 N.C. App. 566, 316 S.E.2d 99 (1984).

Parties Cannot Consent to Improperly Based Order. - The parties, by their consent, cannot enable a trial judge to enter an order not based upon consideration of the several factors listed in subsection (c) of this section and G.S. 50-16.5(a). Williamson v. Williamson, 20 N.C. App. 669, 202 S.E.2d 489 (1974).

Method of Payment Is Within Discretion of Court. - In utilizing the provision in subsection (e) of this section that payment for the support of a minor child shall be paid by lump sum payment, periodic payments, or by transfer of title or possession of personal property of any interest therein as the court may order, the trial court is vested with broad discretion, and is not limited to ordering any one of the designated methods of payment. In keeping with the court's powers, an order under this section will be upheld barring an abuse of that discretion. Weaver v. Weaver, 88 N.C. App. 634, 364 S.E.2d 706, cert. denied, 322 N.C. 330, 368 S.E.2d 875 (1988).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its award of lump sum and ongoing monthly child support payments because there was no evidence as to the actual impact on the father's future income from the lump sum payments; once the actual impact on the father's income was realized, it could well support a new motion to modify the father's child support obligation. Simms v. Bolger, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 522 (2019).

Trial court's creation of a trust consisting of certain real and personal property owned by the parties in order to secure payment of alimony and child support was a proper exercise of its discretion in applying the provisions of subsection (e) of this section and G.S. 50-16.7(a) and (c) and would be affirmed. Weaver v. Weaver, 88 N.C. App. 634, 364 S.E.2d 706, cert. denied, 322 N.C. 330, 368 S.E.2d 875 (1988).

Amount Not Excessive. - Where defendant earned one hundred thirty-two dollars ($132.00) a week and had monthly expenses in the amount of fifty-two dollars ($52.00), the court's order for defendant to pay one hundred dollars ($100.00) per month in child support was not an abuse of discretion; defendant had been paying plaintiff one hundred dollars ($100.00) per week voluntarily for several months prior to the hearing, had testified that he would continue to do so, and the court had made extensive findings regarding the child's needs, the parents' estates and earnings, etc. Rawls v. Rawls, 94 N.C. App. 670, 381 S.E.2d 179 (1989).

Yearly support payment of $37,871.89 held not excessive where payor earned about $200,000.00 per year and where family enjoyed very high standard of living prior to dissolution of marriage and where court found, based on payor's testimony, that payor could pay any amount court might order up to and including $71,318.04. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

Improper Reduction of Child Support Payments. - Reducing child support payments by subtracting amount of money calculated to represent what custodial parent saves in expenses while the child is visiting with noncustodial parent was improper. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

Consideration of Shared Custody Justified. - Fact that defendant had sole custody of one of the children and furnished the child's sole support, while defendant contributed to the support of the two children in plaintiff's custody, clearly justified the trial court's consideration of the shared custody factor; trial court was not required to make findings as to how or why this custody arrangement rendered guidelines adopted pursuant to subsection (c1) inapplicable where the guidelines provided for support payments to be based upon the noncustodial parent's gross income. Morris v. Morris, 92 N.C. App. 359, 374 S.E.2d 441 (1988).

Imputed Income. - Because there was no evidence that defendant, who worked for a school system as a psychologist, intentionally depressed his income or otherwise engaged in bad faith, the trial court erred by imputing income to defendant for four weeks during the school district summer recess. Ellis v. Ellis, 126 N.C. App. 362, 485 S.E.2d 82 (1997).

Trial court erred in calculating a father's child support obligation under G.S. 50-13.4(c) by imputing to the father income based solely on a statement of income made to a bankruptcy court 18 months earlier under circumstances in which the trial court's order was devoid of findings that the father was deliberately depressing his income or indulging in excessive spending to avoid support. State v. Williams, 179 N.C. App. 838, 635 S.E.2d 495 (2006).

Trial court's determination that a husband, who worked as a school teacher, could continue to earn a minimum amount each month from a grading business was reasonably based on the court's findings of fact regarding the husband's actual earnings during the year prior to the hearing. Hartsell v. Hartsell, 189 N.C. App. 65, 657 S.E.2d 724 (2008).

Trial court erred by imputing minimum wage to a wife and a husband when it found that neither party acted in bad faith or suppressed his or her respective income to avoid or lessen child support obligations because the trial court's findings of fact were insufficient to support its conclusions of law; the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines, Child Support Guidelines, G.S. 50-51, do not authorize choosing a method of imputing income based upon the degree of bad faith found by the trial court. Ludlam v. Miller, 225 N.C. App. 350, 739 S.E.2d 555 (2013).

Trial court's determination that it was appropriate to impute income to the father should be upheld, but the order had to be remanded for findings detailing how the trial court arrived at the amount of income to be imputed to the father. Respess v. Respess, 232 N.C. App. 611, 754 S.E.2d 691 (2014).

Sufficient Findings by the Court. - In spite of trial court's failure to make finding as to husband's net income, court's findings regarding gross income of husband and wife along with wife's net income and children's expenses was sufficient to satisfy requirement under this section that court give due regard to parties' estates, earnings, conditions and standard of living in setting child support. Sikes v. Sikes, 98 N.C. App. 610, 391 S.E.2d 855 (1990), aff'd, 330 N.C. 595, 411 S.E.2d 588 (1992).

Trial court's findings supported its decision to use prior years' income from a business in the calculation of gross income for the determinations of alimony and child support because the trial court questioned whether the husband's reported income accurately represented his income from the business; the trial court found that the husband's reported income was not credible. Wise v. Wise, 264 N.C. App. 735, 826 S.E.2d 788 (2019).

In that the trial court's findings of fact regarding the parties' monthly gross income were supported by the evidence at trial, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in the court's determination of the appropriate child support obligation; the mother's paystubs plainly disclosed her pay raise, bonus, and stock award, and they supported the mother's testimony and ultimately allowed the trial court to make sufficient findings to resolve the issue of her monthly gross income. Hart v. Hart, - N.C. App. - , 836 S.E.2d 244 (2019).

Income of Business in which Defendant Held Controlling Interest. - Court neither abused its discretion nor imputed income to defendant when it allocated to him the amount of income earned by the business in which he held 51% and controlled disbursement of corporate funds. Cauble v. Cauble, 133 N.C. App. 390, 515 S.E.2d 708 (1999).

Use of Accrual Figures. - Use of accrual figures in the trial court's calculations was reflective of an appropriate level of gross income available to the defendant and not manifestly unsupported by reason. Cauble v. Cauble, 133 N.C. App. 390, 515 S.E.2d 708 (1999).

Financial Affidavits. - On appeal from a motion to modify child support, the court would not consider information outside a father's financial affidavit, i.e., expert testimony, to determine his expenses for the children; the father had sworn to the truthfulness and completeness of his affidavit, and the parties' affidavits were competent evidence on which the trial court was allowed to rely in determining the expenses of the parties' children. Row v. Row, 185 N.C. App. 450, 650 S.E.2d 1 (2007), review denied, 362 N.C. 238, 659 S.E.2d 741 (2008), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 129 S. Ct. 144, 172 L. Ed. 2d 39 (2008).

Father showed no abuse of discretion in the trial court's findings of his expenses or allocation of those expenses to him because the trial court found the father's ability to pay child support based upon all of his expenses based upon his affidavit; a reduction of the father's individual expenses would increase his ability to pay, and it would also increase the child's individual expenses. Kleoudis v. Kleoudis, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 277 (2020).

Court's findings were insufficient to support awarding no support under subsection (c) since the court failed to determine what were the reasonable needs of the minor child for health, education, and maintenance. McLemore v. McLemore, 89 N.C. App. 451, 366 S.E.2d 495 (1988).

In an action seeking an increase in child support over the amount set forth in separation agreement, order which contained no specific findings with respect to the actual past or present expenses incurred for the support of the children was insufficient to support the court's conclusion that the reasonable needs of the children amounted to $2,800.00 per month. Holderness v. Holderness, 91 N.C. App. 118, 370 S.E.2d 602 (1988).

Where the trial court made no findings whatsoever with respect to the parties' "estates, earnings, conditions, [and] accustomed standard of living" for the year 1984, its award of retroactive child support would be vacated since it was not based on sufficient findings pertaining to the year 1984. Napowsa v. Langston, 95 N.C. App. 14, 381 S.E.2d 882, cert. denied, 325 N.C. 709, 388 S.E.2d 460 (1989).

Trial court erred in ruling it had no authority to modify the income tax deduction provision of the parties' separation agreement as they requested a recalculation of child support, obliging the trial court to apply the entirety of the guidelines, including not only the worksheets, but also the commentary. Ticconi v. Ticconi, 161 N.C. App. 730, 589 S.E.2d 371 (2003).

Refusal to Consider Reduction in Income. - Trial court erred in concluding that reduction in income of father, the custodial parent, due to leaving employment to return to school, could not be considered on motion to increase plaintiff's child support obligations. Fischell v. Rosenberg, 90 N.C. App. 254, 368 S.E.2d 11 (1988).

Remand to Allow Court to Make Findings. - Appellate court remanded case to allow trial court to make findings concerning the reasonable needs of child, the relative ability of the parents to support the child, and a determination of whether a variation from the Guidelines was appropriate on these grounds. Brooker v. Brooker, 133 N.C. App. 285, 515 S.E.2d 234 (1999).

Mother admitted that clearly, the trial court did not use all of the expenses listed in the parties' financial affidavits; without more explanation, it was impossible to determine on appeal where the figures used by the trial court came from at all. Moreover, although the trial court's child support order did contain certain historical costs associated with the children, it included no findings as to the individual costs and expenses the trial court expected to be associated with each child in the future, and, while the trial court did make findings regarding the parents' particular estates, earnings, conditions, and accustomed standard of living, those were insufficient to remedy the absence of findings explaining the reasonable needs of the children; accordingly, the case was remanded for further findings of fact regarding the amount of child support awarded. Diehl v. Diehl, 177 N.C. App. 642, 630 S.E.2d 25 (2006).

Findings Unsupported by Evidence. - Judge erred by ordering mother to pay four hundred eighty dollars ($480.00) per month in child support; the figures of five hundred dollars ($500.00) and four hundred eighty dollars ($480.00) were not supported by any evidence in the record on appeal and, despite the absence of mother's financial records, the judge could have determined the child's reasonable needs through evidence offered by father; however, the figures the judge arrived at were unsupported by father's testimony, and were not supported by any of the previous orders entered in the case. Correll v. Allen, 94 N.C. App. 464, 380 S.E.2d 580 (1989).

Reduction of Income on Return to School. - Trial court erred in concluding reduction in income of father, custodial parent, due to leaving employment to return to school, could not be considered on motion to increase plaintiff's child support obligations. Fischell v. Rosenberg, 90 N.C. App. 254, 368 S.E.2d 11 (1988).

Accustomed Standard of Living. - Because the trial court unequivocally disregarded the principle that the accustomed standard of living is a factor to be considered and, instead based alimony on the standard of living the parties maintained after the divorce there was prejudicial error. Barham v. Barham, 127 N.C. App. 20, 487 S.E.2d 774 (1997), aff'd, 347 N.C. 570, 494 S.E.2d 763 (1998).

Father demonstrated no abuse of discretion in the trial court's consideration of the conditions or accustomed standard of living of the parties or child because the trial court's findings demonstrated that it took "due regard" of the conditions and accustomed standard of living of the child and parents; the father did not make any arguments regarding any dispute about the child's standard of living. Kleoudis v. Kleoudis, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 277 (2020).

Change in Circumstances Not Shown. - Because the trial court found that defendant voluntarily quit his job, willfully and intentionally depressed his income, and failed to meet his burden of proof in showing a substantial change of circumstances, the court entered a judgment against defendant denying his motion to reduce child support by reason of substantial change of circumstances. Askew v. Askew, 119 N.C. App. 242, 458 S.E.2d 217 (1995).

Factors Properly Considered. - In its calculation of child support, the trial court relied on the financial affidavits of both parties to determine each party's average monthly shared expenses, and defendant incurred significantly higher monthly expenses than plaintiff due to defendant having to pay the mortgages and maintenance on the marital home and vacation home; it was appropriate for the trial court to consider defendant's increased expenses relating to the two homes in determining child support, and plaintiff's contention that the trial court erred in not making an even 50/50 allocation as to child support was without merit. Oltmanns v. Oltmanns, 241 N.C. App. 326, 773 S.E.2d 347 (2015).

Father did not demonstrate any abuse of discretion in the trial court's child support calculations because the father's total fixed household expenses would be the same, whether a portion was attributed to the child or not, and in determining his ability to pay child support, the trial court gave him credit for 100 percent of his expenses for both of his residences; the trial court's findings clearly demonstrated how the child support was calculated, and they were supported by the evidence. Kleoudis v. Kleoudis, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 277 (2020).

Trial court did not its discretion in the calculation of a father's child support obligation because the child support order was properly based upon the actual custodial schedule stated in the permanent custody order. Kleoudis v. Kleoudis, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 277 (2020).

B. EFFECT OF SEPARATION AGREEMENTS, CONSENT JUDGMENTS AND ARBITRATION AWARDS.

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Separation Agreements Are Not Binding on the Court. - Valid separation agreements, including consent judgments with respect to marital rights based on such agreements, are not final and binding as to the amount to be provided for the support and education of minor children. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966), decided under former G.S. 50-13.

Valid separation agreements relating to marital and property rights of the parties are not final and binding as to the custody of minor children or as to the amount to be provided for the support and education of such minor children. Perry v. Perry, 33 N.C. App. 139, 234 S.E.2d 449, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 730, 235 S.E.2d 784 (1977).

And Cannot Deprive the Court of Its Authority. - Separation agreement dealing with the custody and the support of the children of the parties cannot deprive the court of its inherent as well as statutory authority to protect the interests of and provide for the welfare of minors. McKaughn v. McKaughn, 29 N.C. App. 702, 225 S.E.2d 616 (1976).

While the court cannot relieve parent of any contractual obligation he assumed to support his child in excess of what the law would require, it can, in the exercise of its inherent and statutory authority to provide for the welfare of minors, order payment of an amount either larger or smaller than that provided for in separation agreement. Bottomley v. Bottomley, 82 N.C. App. 231, 346 S.E.2d 317 (1986).

Arbitration Awards Also Remain Reviewable and Modifiable. - Just as parents cannot by agreement deprive the courts of their duty to promote the best interests of their children, they cannot do so by arbitration. Hence those provisions of an arbitration award concerning custody and child support, like those provisions in a separation agreement, will remain reviewable and modifiable by the court. Crutchley v. Crutchley, 306 N.C. 518, 293 S.E.2d 793 (1982).

Court Retains Jurisdiction Despite Support Provisions of Separation Agreement or Arbitration Award. - While the amount of child support agreed on by the parties to a separation agreement is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to be just and reasonable, it remains within the authority of the courts pursuant to this Chapter to order payments for support in such amounts as will meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education and maintenance, having due regard to the estates, earnings, conditions, and accustomed standard of living of the child and the parties, the child care and homemaker contributions of each party, and other facts of the particular case. The same reasoning applies to an arbitration award concerning child support. Crutchley v. Crutchley, 306 N.C. 518, 293 S.E.2d 793 (1982).

But Separation Agreements and Consent Judgments Cannot Be Ignored. - Provisions of a valid separation agreement, including a consent judgment based thereon, cannot be ignored or set aside by the court without the consent of the parties. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966), decided under former G.S. 50-13.

A valid separation agreement cannot be ignored or set aside by the court without the consent of the parties. Winborne v. Winborne, 41 N.C. App. 756, 255 S.E.2d 640, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 305, 259 S.E.2d 918 (1979).

Level of Support in Separation Agreement Is Only One Factor in Decision. - When a trial court is called upon for the first time to determine the appropriate level of child support payments agreed upon in separation agreements, the "presumption" of reasonableness of the agreed upon level of support in such cases is one of evidence only; that is, the agreed upon level of support constitutes some evidence of the appropriate level of support, but that this evidence must be weighed and considered by the trial court together with all other relevant and competent evidence bearing upon the statutory factors set out in subsection (c) of this section; in other words, the trial court is writing upon a clean slate, and the previously agreed upon level of support is but one factor to be considered. Morris v. Morris, 92 N.C. App. 359, 374 S.E.2d 441 (1988).

When Agreement May Be Modified. - A separation agreement is a contract between the parties, and the court is without power to modify it except (1) to provide for adequate support for minor children, and (2) with the mutual consent of the parties thereto where rights of third parties have not intervened. McKaughn v. McKaughn, 29 N.C. App. 702, 225 S.E.2d 616 (1976).

Amount Set by Agreement Is Presumptively Just and Reasonable. - Where parties to a separation agreement agree upon the amount for the support and maintenance of their minor children, there is a presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the amount mutually agreed upon is just and reasonable. Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963); Winborne v. Winborne, 41 N.C. App. 756, 255 S.E.2d 640, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 305, 259 S.E.2d 918 (1979).

It was not an abuse of discretion to decline to reduce a father's child support obligation for a prior period because (1) the obligation arose from an unincorporated separation agreement, and (2) contractual damages for the father's failure to pay support could not be reduced. Lasecki v. Lasecki, 257 N.C. App. 24, 809 S.E.2d 296 (2017).

And May Not Be Changed Absent Change in Conditions. - Where parties to a separation agreement agree concerning the support and maintenance of their minor children, there is a presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the provisions mutually agreed upon are just and reasonable, and the court is not warranted in ordering a change in the absence of any evidence of a change in conditions. McKaughn v. McKaughn, 29 N.C. App. 702, 225 S.E.2d 616 (1976).

Trial court impermissibly modified a child support order by computing increases in the father's salary and applying those increases to payments over an 18-year period because the trial court failed to find a substantial change of circumstances as required under G.S. 50-13.7(a) (2009); the incorporated agreement provided automatic annual increases in child support based on the father's salary and failed to consider the needs of the children or other factors contained in G.S. 50-13.4(c). Wilson v. Wilson, 214 N.C. App. 541, 714 S.E.2d 793 (2011).

Or Absent Need for Increase. - Where parties to a separation agreement agree upon the amount for the support and maintenance of their minor children, there is a presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the amount mutually agreed upon is just and reasonable. Upon motion, a trial court may not order an increase in the absence of any evidence of a change in conditions or of the need for such increase, particularly when the increase is awarded solely on grounds that the father's income has increased so that he is able to pay a larger amount. Dishmon v. Dishmon, 57 N.C. App. 657, 292 S.E.2d 293 (1982).

Child Referred to in Consent Judgment Is Under Protective Custody of Court. - Even though an order requiring father to make payments for the support of his child was entered by consent of the parents, the child was under the protective custody of the court. Smith v. Smith, 247 N.C. 223, 100 S.E.2d 370 (1957), rev'd on other grounds, 248 N.C. 298, 103 S.E.2d 400 (1958).

The effect of an order setting a lesser amount of child support than that provided for by separation agreement is not to deprive the custodial parent of her contractual right to recover the sums provided for in the agreement, but to limit her contempt remedy to the sums provided for by the court order. Bottomley v. Bottomley, 82 N.C. App. 231, 346 S.E.2d 317 (1986).

Right of Party to Separation Agreement to Bring Action. - When a case is properly before it, the court has the duty to award custody in accordance with the best interests of the child, and no agreement, consent or condition between the parents can interfere with this duty or bind the court. Thus, the existence of a valid separation agreement containing provisions relating to the custody and support of minor children does not prevent one of the parties to the agreement from instituting an action for a judicial determination of those same matters. Winborne v. Winborne, 41 N.C. App. 756, 255 S.E.2d 640, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 305, 259 S.E.2d 918 (1979).

The existence of a valid separation agreement relating to child support or custody does not prevent one of the parties from instituting an action for a judicial determination of those same matters. Powers v. Parisher, 104 N.C. App. 400, 409 S.E.2d 725 (1991), appeal dismissed, 331 N.C. 286, 417 S.E.2d 254 (1992).

As to effect of reconciliation and resumption of cohabitation on a separation agreement, see Hand v. Hand, 46 N.C. App. 82, 264 S.E.2d 597, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 556, 270 S.E.2d 107 (1980).

No Obligation to Support Child Past Majority Despite Disability. - Where mother's testimony offered at the hearing showed that son was 18 years old, had graduated from high school, had a part-time job, and was attempting to raise money to go to college, and mother further testified that son was not a normal 18 year old since he was involved in a wreck, trial court was without authority to order father to pay child support arrearages of five hundred dollars ($500.00); the evidence showed that pursuant to subdivision (c)(2) of this section, defendant was relieved of any obligation to support his son after his graduation from high school on June 5, 1988, and even if mother's evidence was sufficient to show that son was physically or mentally incapable of self-support, there was no longer a statutory obligation for parents to support their disabled adult children. State v. Benfield, 95 N.C. App. 451, 382 S.E.2d 776 (1989).

Obligation to Pay Is Independent of Compliance with Unrelated Provisions in Agreement. - The duty of a parent to pay child support as agreed to in a separation agreement will not be excused because the other parent does not comply with other provisions of the separation agreement unrelated to the financial support of the children. Nisbet v. Nisbet, 102 N.C. App. 232, 402 S.E.2d 151, cert. denied, 329 N.C. 499, 407 S.E.2d 538 (1991).

Defendant's obligation to pay child support as provided in the separation agreement is not dependent upon plaintiff's compliance with visitation, nonharassment, or noncohabitation provisions in the same agreement. To hold otherwise would punish the children for the misbehavior of a parent. Nisbet v. Nisbet, 102 N.C. App. 232, 402 S.E.2d 151, cert. denied, 329 N.C. 499, 407 S.E.2d 538 (1991).

V. TERMINATION OF OBLIGATION.

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A. IN GENERAL.

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When Legal Obligation to Support Child Ends. - The statutes concerning child support all use the term "minor," "minor child" or "minor children," never referring to age 21. Therefore, in substituting the new meaning of "minor" provided by Chapter 48A into the statutes, the legal obligation to support one's child ends at age 18, absent a showing that the child is insolvent, unmarried and physically or mentally incapable of earning a livelihood as contemplated by G.S. 50-13.8. Crouch v. Crouch, 14 N.C. App. 49, 187 S.E.2d 348, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 314, 188 S.E.2d 897 (1972).

In the absence of an enforceable contract otherwise obligating a parent, North Carolina courts have no authority to order child support for a child who has attained the age of majority, unless the child has not completed secondary schooling, or, pursuant to G.S. 50-13.8, the child is mentally or physically incapable of self-support. Bridges v. Bridges, 85 N.C. App. 524, 355 S.E.2d 230 (1987); Pieper v. Pieper, 90 N.C. App. 405, 368 S.E.2d 422, aff'd, Ellinwood v. Ellinwood, 88 N.C. App. 119, 362 S.E.2d 584 (1987).

Effect of One of Several Children Reaching Age 18. - While child support obligations ordered by a court terminate upon the child reaching age 18, unless the child is otherwise emancipated prior to reaching age 18 or the trial court in its discretion continues to enforce the payment obligation after the child reaches age 18 and while the child is in primary or secondary school, when one of two or more minor children for whom support is ordered reaches age 18, and when the support ordered to be paid is not allocated as to each individual child, the supporting parent has no authority to unilaterally modify the amount of the child support payment. The supporting parent must apply to the trial court for modification. Craig v. Craig, 103 N.C. App. 615, 406 S.E.2d 656 (1991).

Cases holding that where one of two minor children reaches the age of 18, a trial court may retroactively modify child support arrearages when equitable considerations exist which would create an injustice if modification is not allowed were decided before G.S. 50-13.10 became effective on October 1, 1987. Under this statute, if the supporting party is not disabled or incapacitated, a past due, vested child support payment is subject to divestment only as provided by law, and if, but only if, a written motion is filed and due notice is given to all parties before the payment is due. Craig v. Craig, 103 N.C. App. 615, 406 S.E.2d 656 (1991).

Support Improperly Terminated. - Where father unilaterally terminated child support payments after his son reached the age of 18 and had failed to make satisfactory progress towards graduation from high school, the support payments were improperly terminated. Leak v. Leak, 129 N.C. App. 142, 497 S.E.2d 702 (1998), cert. denied, 348 N.C. 498, 510 S.E.2d 385 (1998).

"Minor Child" under Prior Law. - Before the enactment of Chapter 48A, it was evident that the meaning of "minor child" within the purview of the custody and support statutes contemplated the common-law age of majority, age 21. Shoaf v. Shoaf, 14 N.C. App. 231, 188 S.E.2d 19, rev'd on other grounds, 282 N.C. 287, 192 S.E.2d 299 (1972).

Emancipation Decree Required. - In a question of first impression, the appellate court held that, when the child of divorced parents left the custodial parent's home to live on his own, but was not decreed by a court to be legally emancipated, the non-custodial parent's obligation to pay child support did not automatically terminate, because Article 35 of the Juvenile Code precluded the appellate court from accepting common law methods of emancipation for the purposes of terminating child support payments; thus, the father's child support obligations could not have automatically terminated absent a decree of emancipation. Morris v. Powell, - N.C. App. - , 840 S.E.2d 223 (2020).

B. EFFECT OF SEPARATION AGREEMENT, CONSENT JUDGMENT, ETC.

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A parent may contract to support his or her children past the age of majority, and the court has power to enforce such a contract just as it would any other. Harding v. Harding, 46 N.C. App. 62, 264 S.E.2d 131 (1980).

But Court Cannot Enlarge on Such Obligation. - Since the duty to support after the age of majority arises in contract, the court may not enlarge upon the obligation agreed to by the parties. Harding v. Harding, 46 N.C. App. 62, 264 S.E.2d 131 (1980).

Any attempt by the court to enlarge upon the obligation arising under contract by extending the duty of support beyond the age of majority would be void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Harding v. Harding, 46 N.C. App. 62, 264 S.E.2d 131 (1980).

Consent Judgment Providing for Support Until Majority. - A father's legal liability for the support of his son born on January 13, 1953, by reason of a consent judgment dated June 11, 1970, providing that payments for child support should continue until such time as said minor child reached his majority or was otherwise emancipated, would not continue until his son became 21 years of age. Shoaf v. Shoaf, 282 N.C. 287, 192 S.E.2d 299 (1972).

Support for Full-Time Student. - It was error for a trial court to terminate support solely on the finding that a child was not a "full-time" student based on language in a separation agreement, without consideration of G.S. 50-13.4; the child likely attended school regularly and made satisfactory progress towards graduation since he received a diploma in 2013. Moreover, the trial court also should have considered its discretion to terminate support when the child turned 18, but prior to his high school graduation. Malone v. Hutchinson-Malone, 246 N.C. App. 544, 784 S.E.2d 206 (2016).

VI. SEPARATE IDENTIFICATION OF ALLOWANCES.

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Allowances to Be Separated. - The allowances to be separated in the order, as required by subsection (e) of this section, are the support payments for the minor child or children and the amounts ordered for alimony or alimony pendente lite. Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 184 S.E.2d 417 (1971).

Court Need Not Designate Amounts for Each Child. - Subsection (e) of this section does not require the trial court to designate the amount of support payments for each child, although such designation may prove helpful to simplify any future adjustments or modifications. Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 184 S.E.2d 417 (1971).

Failure to Identify Purpose of Support as Health, Education and Maintenance Is Not Error. - The better practice is for the court's order to relate that the payment ordered under this section is the amount necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education, and maintenance, but the failure of the court to do so does not constitute reversible error. Andrews v. Andrews, 12 N.C. App. 410, 183 S.E.2d 843 (1971); Martin v. Martin, 35 N.C. App. 610, 242 S.E.2d 393, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 261, 245 S.E.2d 778 (1978).

Failure to Separate Allowances Held Error. - The trial court erred in failing to separately state and identify the allowances for alimony pendente lite and child support as required by subsection (e) of this section. Manning v. Manning, 20 N.C. App. 149, 201 S.E.2d 46 (1973).

VII. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.

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Judge Must Make Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. - In setting amounts for child support, where the trial court sits without a jury, the judge is required to find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment. Dishmon v. Dishmon, 57 N.C. App. 657, 292 S.E.2d 293 (1982); Gibson v. Gibson, 68 N.C. App. 566, 316 S.E.2d 99 (1984).

The requirements for findings of fact applicable to orders for alimony are also applicable to the determination of reasonable and adequate child support. Gebb v. Gebb, 77 N.C. App. 309, 335 S.E.2d 221 (1985).

The purpose of the requirement that the court make findings of those specific facts which support its ultimate disposition of the case is to allow a reviewing court to determine from the record whether the judgment, and the legal conclusions which underlie it, represent a correct application of the law. Gibson v. Gibson, 68 N.C. App. 566, 316 S.E.2d 99 (1984).

Effective appellate review of an order entered by a trial court sitting without a jury is largely dependent upon the specificity by which the order's rationale is articulated. Evidence must support findings; findings must support conclusions; conclusions must support the judgment. Gibson v. Gibson, 68 N.C. App. 566, 316 S.E.2d 99 (1984).

Remand for Further Findings. - The findings of fact in a case for child support, were insufficient to determine whether the trial court gave due regard to the estates of the parties and the case must be remanded for further findings on this matter, even though there was ample evidence contained in the record about the estates of both parties. Sloan v. Sloan, 87 N.C. App. 392, 360 S.E.2d 816 (1987).

Case was remanded for additional fact-finding where the district court failed to identify the presumptive amount of support due under the Guidelines and where there was no analysis of the reasonable needs of the two minor children, other than a finding that plaintiff's child care costs for one of the children was reasonable. Rowan County DSS v. Brooks, 135 N.C. App. 776, 522 S.E.2d 590 (1999).

Trial court erred by failing to explain in its findings of fact why it did not award child support from the time of the filing of the paternity and child support complaint; judgment was reversed and case was remanded to trial court for further findings. State v. Hinton, 147 N.C. App. 700, 556 S.E.2d 634 (2001).

Trial court was required to conduct a hearing when the trial court neither made findings related to the needs of the children at the time of a modification hearing nor concluded whether the presumption of reasonableness in a separation agreement was rebutted. Pataky v. Pataky, 160 N.C. App. 289, 585 S.E.2d 404 (2003), aff'd, 359 N.C. 65, 602 S.E.2d 360 (2004).

A case involving a motion to modify child support under G.S. 50-13.7, was remanded for further findings of fact because, in entering an order deviating from the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines, the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact regarding the reasonable needs of the children; the order only made findings regarding health insurance and the fact that the children did not need private schooling. Beamer v. Beamer, 169 N.C. App. 594, 610 S.E.2d 220 (2005).

Case was remanded for an order addressing the validity of a mother's request for a deviation from the child support guidelines because the trial court failed to make specific findings regarding the ability of each parent to provide support and the accustomed standard of the living of the children; given the absence of findings of fact, the court of appeals had no way to evaluate the correctness of the trial court's ruling that the guidelines would meet the reasonable needs of the children. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 238 N.C. App. 257, 768 S.E.2d 30 (2014).

Trial court's failure to make findings of fact addressing the relative ability of the parents to provide support and the expenses that are needed to meet the children's needs requires a reviewing court to remand the relevant case to the trial court for the entry of a new order containing additional findings of fact. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 238 N.C. App. 257, 768 S.E.2d 30 (2014).

In the absence of sufficient factual findings addressing the issue of a mother's ability to pay for children's education at a private school, the court of appeals could not determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by requiring her to pay for the cost of the education; the trial court, despite the existence of a request for a deviation from the child support guidelines, did not make any findings addressing the issue of the parties' relative abilities to pay the cost. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 238 N.C. App. 257, 768 S.E.2d 30 (2014).

Trial court had to revisit its calculations of gross income and net income used to determine child support and alimony because it had to make additional findings to support its determination of a husband's business income, which was used to calculate gross income and determine child support; the trial court also had to make additional findings to account for the husband's mandatory retirement deduction and his reasonable health insurance expenses in the calculation of his net income. Wise v. Wise, 264 N.C. App. 735, 826 S.E.2d 788 (2019).

Miscalculation of $736 for the month of December 2016 did not require reversal and remand to the trial court because $736 was less than 2 percent of the total arrears of $52,659, and the parties would likely each incur more than $736 in attorney fees in a remand for the trial court to make that small change to the arrears ordered; the de minimis error did not warrant reversal. Kleoudis v. Kleoudis, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 277 (2020).

Contents of Findings. - There are no set guidelines as to what the findings of fact concerning the needs of the minor children must contain. The appellate courts of this State require only that the findings be based on competent evidence as to what the needs of the children are, and that such findings sustain the conclusion that the support payments ordered are in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child. Byrd v. Byrd, 62 N.C. App. 438, 303 S.E.2d 205 (1983).

Adequate findings supported an order requiring a husband to pay children's private school tuition because (1) findings mandated by the Child Support Guidelines were not required, as the Child Support Guidelines did not apply, and (2) it was found that private school was part of the children's accustomed standard of living, the parties were able to pay the tuition, and the parties had agreed to privately educate the children. Smith v. Smith, 247 N.C. App. 135, 786 S.E.2d 12 (2016).

Findings supported not treating payments from a father's parents as income because (1) the father testified the payments were loans, and (2) no express, separate, findings were required. Kaiser v. Kaiser, 259 N.C. App. 499, 816 S.E.2d 223 (2018).

Findings did not support including payments from a mother's fiance as the mother's income because evidence indicating the payments were the fiance's share of household expenses was unresolved. Kaiser v. Kaiser, 259 N.C. App. 499, 816 S.E.2d 223 (2018).

Trial court could find an investment account was a mother's property because the record supported finding income from the account either belonged to the mother or was given to the mother to use for the mother's benefit, as the account was in the mother's name, the mother paid taxes on the account's dividend income, and nothing showed the mother was unable to use the income from that account. Kaiser v. Kaiser, 259 N.C. App. 499, 816 S.E.2d 223 (2018).

Trial court's findings supported denying a mother's request for child therapy expenses because there was some evidence the mother's conduct necessitated the expenses. Kaiser v. Kaiser, 259 N.C. App. 499, 816 S.E.2d 223 (2018).

Findings crediting a father for a mother's car payments were insufficient because it was not found that an injustice would otherwise exist. Kaiser v. Kaiser, 259 N.C. App. 499, 816 S.E.2d 223 (2018).

Trial judge must make conclusions of law based on factual findings specific enough to show the appellate courts that the judge took due regard of the parties' estates; there is no requirement the trial court's findings use "magic words" such as "estates" or "accustomed standard of living" where the findings demonstrate that it did consider the evidence as to these factors in setting the child support obligation. Kleoudis v. Kleoudis, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 277 (2020).

Findings Must Be Specific. - Where the trial court sits without a jury, the judge is required to make factual findings specific enough to indicate to the appellate court that due regard was taken of the factors enumerated in this section. Byrd v. Byrd, 62 N.C. App. 438, 303 S.E.2d 205 (1983).

In orders of child support, the court should make findings of specific facts (e.g. incomes, estates) to support a conclusion as to the relative abilities of the parties to provide support. Steele v. Steele, 36 N.C. App. 601, 244 S.E.2d 466 (1978).

Without findings relating to the parties' reasonable expenses, there is no basis for a determination as to the parties' relative abilities to provide the support necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the children. Holderness v. Holderness, 91 N.C. App. 118, 370 S.E.2d 602 (1988).

In order to determine the reasonable needs of the child, the trial court must hear evidence and make findings of specific fact on the child's actual past expenditures and present reasonable expenses. Holderness v. Holderness, 91 N.C. App. 118, 370 S.E.2d 602 (1988).

Case would be remanded for additional findings regarding the income or loss, if any, of one of defendant's businesses where the trial court's order failed to reflect its treatment of these figures. Cauble v. Cauble, 133 N.C. App. 390, 515 S.E.2d 708 (1999).

Findings Must Cover Factors in Subsection (c). - The trial court must hear evidence on each of the factors listed in subsection (c) of this section and substantiate its conclusions of law by making findings of specific facts on each of the listed factors. Newman v. Newman, 64 N.C. App. 125, 306 S.E.2d 540, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 822, 310 S.E.2d 351 (1983).

Conclusions of law must be based upon factual findings specific enough to indicate to the appellate court that the judge below took due regard of the particular estates, earnings, conditions, and accustomed standard of living of both the child and the parents. Dishmon v. Dishmon, 57 N.C. App. 657, 292 S.E.2d 293 (1982); Newman v. Newman, 64 N.C. App. 125, 306 S.E.2d 540, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 822, 310 S.E.2d 351 (1983); In re Botsford, 75 N.C. App. 72, 330 S.E.2d 23 (1985); Boyd v. Boyd, 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986).

To support an award of payment for support, the judgment of the trial court should contain findings of fact which sustain the conclusion of law that the support payments ordered are in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education and maintenance, having due regard to the estates, earnings, conditions, accustomed standard of living of the child and the parties, and other facts of the particular care. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 32 N.C. App. 154, 231 S.E.2d 26 (1977); Poston v. Poston, 40 N.C. App. 210, 252 S.E.2d 240 (1979); Grimes v. Grimes, 78 N.C. App. 208, 336 S.E.2d 664 (1985).

The trial court must make specific findings on each of the factors specified in subsection (c) of this section. In addition, the case law may require certain findings, as when the award is based on earning capacity rather than present income. Once the trial court has made such findings, they are conclusive if supported by any evidence, even if there is evidence contra. Sloop v. Friberg, 70 N.C. App. 690, 320 S.E.2d 921 (1984).

The trial judge must at least make findings sufficiently specific to indicate proper consideration of each of the factors established by subsection (c) of this section for a determination of child support. Spencer v. Spencer, 70 N.C. App. 159, 319 S.E.2d 636 (1984).

Orders for child support must be based upon the interplay of the trial court's conclusions of law as to the amount of support necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child and the relative abilities of the parents to provide that amount. These conclusions must, in turn, be based upon factual findings sufficiently specific to indicate to the appellate court that the trial court took due regard of the estates, earnings, conditions and accustomed standard of living of both child and parents. Little v. Little, 74 N.C. App. 12, 327 S.E.2d 283 (1985).

To comply with subsection (c) of this section, the order for child support must be premised upon the interplay of the trial court's conclusions of law as to the amount of support necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child and the relative ability of the parties to provide that amount. To support these conclusions of law, the court must also make specific findings of fact so that an appellate court can ascertain whether the judge below gave due regard to the facts of the particular case. Such findings are necessary to an appellate court's determination of whether the judge's order is sufficiently supported by competent evidence. Where the record discloses sufficient evidence to support the findings, it is not the Supreme Court's task to determine de novo the weight and credibility to be given the evidence contained in the record on appeal. Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, 326 S.E.2d 863 (1985).

Conclusions must be based upon factual findings sufficiently specific to indicate that the trial court took "due regard" of the factors enumerated in the statute. Atwell v. Atwell, 74 N.C. App. 231, 328 S.E.2d 47 (1985).

The trial court must hear evidence and make findings of fact on the parents' income, estates and present reasonable expenses to determine the parties' relative ability to pay. Bottomley v. Bottomley, 82 N.C. App. 231, 346 S.E.2d 317 (1986).

To comply with subsection (c), the trial court is required to make findings of fact with respect to the factors listed in the statute. Holderness v. Holderness, 91 N.C. App. 118, 370 S.E.2d 602 (1988).

Fact that the record contains evidence from which the necessary findings could have been made does not have the effect of absolving the trial court from the obligation to actually make the required findings concerning the needs of the children and the parties' relative abilities to pay in a case in which a deviation from the guidelines has been requested. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 238 N.C. App. 257, 768 S.E.2d 30 (2014).

Trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law demonstrated "due regard" to the factors required by subsection (c), and thus, it did not abuse its discretion in the calculation of a father's child support obligation; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining it would not consider a bonus the mother received, and both parties' estates were approximately the same, neither was taking distributions from investments, and neither would be required to deplete his or her assets. Kleoudis v. Kleoudis, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 277 (2020).

Giving "due regard" to the estates of the parties does not require detailed findings as to the value of each individual asset but requires only that the trial court consider the evidence and make sufficient findings addressing its determination regarding the estates to allow appellate review. Kleoudis v. Kleoudis, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 277 (2020).

Findings must be based upon competent evidence, and it is not enough that there may be evidence, in the record sufficient to support findings which could have been made. The trial court must itself determine what pertinent facts are actually established by the evidence before it. Atwell v. Atwell, 74 N.C. App. 231, 328 S.E.2d 47 (1985).

Actual Past Expenditures Must Be Found. - To determine the amount of support necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education and maintenance, the court must make findings of specific facts as to what actual past expenditures have been. Warner v. Latimer, 68 N.C. App. 170, 314 S.E.2d 789 (1984).

To determine the amount of support necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education and maintenance (which are conclusions of law), the court must make findings of specific facts as to what actual past expenditures have been. Where past expenditures are below subsistence, due regard, of course, must be given to meeting the reasonable needs of the child. Steele v. Steele, 36 N.C. App. 601, 244 S.E.2d 466 (1978).

In order to determine the reasonable needs of the child, the trial court must hear evidence and make findings of specific fact on the child's actual past expenditures and present reasonable expenses. Boyd v. Boyd, 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986); Bottomley v. Bottomley, 82 N.C. App. 231, 346 S.E.2d 317 (1986).

Conclusion as to Reasonableness of Personal Expenses. - In a child support case, the trial court should be satisfied that personal expenses itemized in the parties' balance sheets are reasonable under all the circumstances before making a determination of need or liability, and though absence of a specific conclusion as to reasonableness will not necessarily be held for error, the better practice is for the order to contain such a conclusion. Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 268 S.E.2d 185 (1980).

The determination of what portion of claimed expenses is reasonable, and what portion is unreasonable, in arriving at an amount necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child, requires an exercise of judgment and is therefore not a question of fact but a conclusion of law. Boyd v. Boyd, 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986).

Error to Order Support Absent Appropriate Findings. - Where the court does not make appropriate findings based on competent evidence as to what are the reasonable needs of the children for health, education and maintenance, it is error to direct payments for their support. Hampton v. Hampton, 29 N.C. App. 342, 224 S.E.2d 197 (1976); Poston v. Poston, 40 N.C. App. 210, 252 S.E.2d 240 (1979).

In a child support action, where the trial court failed to make findings as to the actual needs of the parties' minor child or the expenses of the parties, its order directing child support payments was erroneous. Ingle v. Ingle, 53 N.C. App. 227, 280 S.E.2d 460 (1981).

Appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment ordering a father who was in college to pay $95 per month in child support because the trial court based its order on the father's earning capacity but did not find that the father was deliberately suppressing his income to avoid family responsibilities. State v. Williams, 163 N.C. App. 353, 593 S.E.2d 123 (2004).

Without findings relating to the parties' reasonable expenses, there is no basis for a determination as to the relative abilities of the parents to provide the support necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the children. Boyd v. Boyd, 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986).

Where child support for defendant's five children by three different mothers, set pursuant to the guidelines, amounted to 66% of his gross income, the trial court's duty was to determine whether this support exceeded the reasonable needs of each child, whether it was unjust or inappropriate, and whether defendant had "sufficient income to maintain a minimum standard of living based on the 1997 federal poverty level for one person." Buncombe County ex rel. Blair v. Jackson, 138 N.C. App. 284, 531 S.E.2d 240 (2000).

Award of Reimbursement for Past Support. - The trial court must make specific factual findings to support not only an award of future support but also to support an award of reimbursement for past support of the child. Buff v. Carter, 76 N.C. App. 145, 331 S.E.2d 705 (1985).

Findings as to Suppression of Income. - The trial court erred in awarding child support based upon each party's "earning capacity" without any findings as to whether either party deliberately suppressed his or her income to avoid his or her support obligation. Bowers v. Bowers, 141 N.C. App. 729, 541 S.E.2d 508 (2001).

Finding as to Income of Supporting Spouse. - Although a proper finding pertaining to the income of the supporting spouse must be based on present, as opposed to past, income, there is no rule that requires a specific finding as to the income of the supporting spouse on the precise date of the hearing. Patton v. Patton, 78 N.C. App. 247, 337 S.E.2d 607 (1985), rev'd in part on other grounds, 318 N.C. 404, 348 S.E.2d 593 (1986).

Findings calculating a father's business income sufficiently relied on a year's first eight months because predicting the final quarter's income was too speculative. Kaiser v. Kaiser, 259 N.C. App. 499, 816 S.E.2d 223 (2018).

Proper Findings Not Made for Deviation from Guidelines. - Trial court failed to make proper findings when it deviated from the child support guidelines; while the trial court made findings regarding the parties' average monthly incomes, health insurance costs for the child, and work related child care costs for the child, nothing addressed the needs of the child or the parties' ability to pay, and the order failed to meet statutory and case law requirements. Sarno v. Sarno, 255 N.C. App. 543, 804 S.E.2d 819 (2017).

Findings Held Insufficient. - Where the trial did not make an assessment of the child's needs, and found that plaintiff 's expenses exceeded her income and that her unwieldy credit card obligations were caused by defendant's failure to pay $220 in support to her in a timely manner when she had custody of both children, the findings of fact were insufficient to support the conclusion that plaintiff should not be required to support her minor children; defendant's $220 delinquency in child support payments did not mean that plaintiff 's expenses were reasonable, and the trial judge made no findings upon which to conclude that defendant had the ability to support both children. Payne v. Payne, 91 N.C. App. 71, 370 S.E.2d 428 (1988).

Appellate court would remand case where the trial court failed to make findings as to what the child support amount would be under the applicable Guidelines, as to the child's reasonable needs, and as to whether the greater weight of the evidence established that application of the presumptive Guidelines amount would be "unjust or inappropriate." Sain v. Sain, 134 N.C. App. 460, 517 S.E.2d 921 (1999).

Trial court's finding that a husband was not under any other child support obligation pursuant to a court order or other written obligation flew in the face of the uncontroverted evidence presented at trial by both parties that was under a district court order to provide child support payments for a child born from his subsequent marriage; thus, the trial court's finding was not supported by competent evidence in the record, was not sufficient to establish that the trial court took due regard of defendant's estates, earnings, conditions and other facts of the particular case as required under G.S. 50-13.4(c), and the child support order was reversed. Zaliagiris v. Zaliagiris, 164 N.C. App. 602, 596 S.E.2d 285 (2004), cert. denied, 359 N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d 662 (2005).

Adequate findings did not support a prospective child support order because the trial court did not consider the inheritance of the wife to whom custody was awarded. Smith v. Smith, 247 N.C. App. 135, 786 S.E.2d 12 (2016).

Findings calculating a mother's capital gains income were insufficient because the findings did not support using the mother's past capital gains to find current capital gains. Kaiser v. Kaiser, 259 N.C. App. 499, 816 S.E.2d 223 (2018).

Findings calculating a mother's dividend income were insufficient because it was unknown if income from assets that were previously sold were used. Kaiser v. Kaiser, 259 N.C. App. 499, 816 S.E.2d 223 (2018).

Trial court's use of a father's historical income to calculate prospective child support in the form of arrears dating back to the filing of the mother's motion to modify child support was in error because the trial court made no finding to support the use of that method; the trial court made no findings providing a rationale for using the father's income for each individual year, rather than using his current income to calculate child support owed back to the filing of the mother's motion. Simms v. Bolger, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 522 (2019).

VIII. APPELLATE REVIEW.

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Standard for reviewing child support orders resembles that for reviewing awards of custody, in that the amount of child support allowed by the trial judge will be disturbed only when there is an abuse of discretion. Dixon v. Dixon, 67 N.C. App. 73, 312 S.E.2d 669 (1984).

No Appellate Jurisdiction to Hear Appeal of Interlocutory Support Order. - Appellate court had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a denial of child support modification because: (1) an order continuing an existing order until legally interdependent custody issues could be heard was interlocutory, as, without knowing the custody arrangement, a trial court could not find which child support worksheet to use, or whether to deviate from the guidelines; (2) the order did not resolve the custody issue; and (3) allowing an appeal would lead to an unnecessary appeal. Gray v. Peele, 235 N.C. App. 554, 761 S.E.2d 739 (2014).

Support Award Will Not Be Disturbed Absent Abuse of Discretion. - The amount of child support awarded is in the discretion of the trial judge and will be disturbed only on a showing of abuse of that discretion. Coggins v. Coggins, 260 N.C. 765, 133 S.E.2d 700 (1963); Swink v. Swink, 6 N.C. App. 161, 169 S.E.2d 539 (1969); Sawyer v. Sawyer, 21 N.C. App. 293, 204 S.E.2d 224, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 591, 205 S.E.2d 723 (1974); Gibson v. Gibson, 24 N.C. App. 520, 211 S.E.2d 522 (1975); Wyatt v. Wyatt, 32 N.C. App. 162, 231 S.E.2d 42, aff'd, 35 N.C. App. 650, 242 S.E.2d 180 (1977); Minges v. Minges, 53 N.C. App. 507, 281 S.E.2d 88 (1981); Peters v. Elmore, 59 N.C. App. 404, 297 S.E.2d 154 (1982), cert. denied, 307 N.C. 577, 299 S.E.2d 651 (1983); Plott v. Plott, 65 N.C. App. 657, 310 S.E.2d 51 (1983); Warner v. Latimer, 68 N.C. App. 170, 314 S.E.2d 789 (1984).

The trial court's consideration of the factors contained in subsection (c) of this section is an exercise in sound judicial discretion, and if its findings are supported by competent evidence in the record, its determination as to the proper amount of support will not be disturbed on appeal. Boyd v. Boyd, 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986).

Even If Evidence Is Conflicting. - An order for child support is a question of fairness to all parties involved. It will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial judge, even if there is conflicting evidence. Evans v. Craddock, 61 N.C. App. 438, 300 S.E.2d 908 (1983).

In determining the amount of alimony and child support to be awarded, the trial judge must follow the requirements of this section. The amount is a reasonable subsistence, to be determined by the trial judge in the exercise of a judicial discretion from the evidence before him. His determination is reviewable, but it will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Beall v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 228 S.E.2d 407 (1976).

Finding of Ability to Pay Is Conclusive When Supported by Evidence. - The trial court's discretion as to the amount of child support awarded is not absolute and unreviewable. The order must be based not only on the needs of the child, but also on the ability of the father to meet the needs. But where there is a finding of ability to pay, supported in the record by competent evidence, that finding will be conclusive. Wyatt v. Wyatt, 32 N.C. App. 162, 231 S.E.2d 42, aff'd, 35 N.C. App. 650, 242 S.E.2d 180 (1977).

Findings Regarding Standard of Living And Reasonableness of Expenses. - Without findings regarding the child's or parties' accustomed standard of living and the reasonableness of the expenses in light of that standard of living, the court of appeals cannot determine whether the trial court considered the standard of living factor and whether the trial court's finding of reasonable needs is supported by the evidence. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 238 N.C. App. 257, 768 S.E.2d 30 (2014).

Remand for Further Findings. - Where the trial judge found that the reasonable expenses of child were "in excess of $500," while the child's mother claimed that the child's expenses were $855.16, and found the reasonable living expenses of the child's father to be $800, rejecting his claimed figure of $1,196.80, lack of findings as to what claimed expenses of the child or the father the court considered unreasonable would require the appellate court to vacate the order and remand the cause for further findings. Patterson v. Patterson, 81 N.C. App. 255, 343 S.E.2d 595 (1986).

Failure to Assign Error to Trial Court's Findings. - Trial court's consideration of a child's needs, the mother's share of those needs, and the father's contribution to those needs was found to have been reasonable and adequate under circumstances in which the father did not assign error to the trial court's findings; the trial court's finding that the amount in the parties' agreement was inadequate and thus did not influence the trial court's decision, or the trial court's total calculated reasonable expenses. Pascoe v. Pascoe, 183 N.C. App. 648, 645 S.E.2d 156 (2007).

Presumption Allowing Modification. - The presumption, created in a 1994 revision, allowing modification of a child support order which is at least three years old, when there is a disparity of 15% or more between the amount of support payable under the original order and the amount owed based on the parties' current income and expenses, is within the scope of the legislative mandate to ensure adequate child support awards over time. Garrison v. Connor, 122 N.C. App. 702, 471 S.E.2d 644 (1996).

Stay Properly Denied. - Trial court did not err in denying the father's motion to stay execution and enforcement of the child support order, as, under G.S. 50-13.4, such orders were enforceable by proceedings for civil contempt during the pendency of an appeal and not subject to setting bond under G.S. 1-289(a1). Smith v. Smith, 247 N.C. App. 166, 785 S.E.2d 434 (2016).

IX. REMEDIES.

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A. IN GENERAL.

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Court Has Broad Discretion Under Subsection (e). - The court is not limited to ordering one method of payment, to the exclusion of the others provided in subsection (e) of this section. The legislature's use of the disjunctive and the phrase "as the court may order" shows that the court is to have broad discretion in providing for payment of child support orders. Moore v. Moore, 35 N.C. App. 748, 242 S.E.2d 642 (1978).

Court's Remedies Have Been Expanded. - The broad language of this statute suggests that the legislature intended to expand, not limit, the trial court's remedies in enforcing payment of child support. Griffin v. Griffin, 103 N.C. App. 65, 404 S.E.2d 478 (1991).

The enforcement provisions under subsection (f) of this section are not mutually exclusive. Griffin v. Griffin, 103 N.C. App. 65, 404 S.E.2d 478 (1991).

Nor Are the Payment Provisions. - The methods of payment listed in this section are not mutually exclusive. Warner v. Latimer, 68 N.C. App. 170, 314 S.E.2d 789 (1984).

The trial court has broad discretion under subsection (e) of this section in providing for payment of child support. Griffin v. Griffin, 103 N.C. App. 65, 404 S.E.2d 478 (1991).

Creation of Savings Account for Use of Children. - In an action for child support, the court was without the power to, in effect, attempt to create a savings account for the use of the children after they reached the age of 18. Parrish v. Cole, 38 N.C. App. 691, 248 S.E.2d 878 (1978).

Trial court erred in directing payment of child support to a custodial account for the child's benefit because that would result in surplus funds being directed to the child upon emancipation, and instead, the funds should have been directed to the benefit of the minor child no differently than in any other child support award; the error in creating a custodial account was not harmless because the purpose of the statute was to provide support for the child prior to emancipation, not after. Simms v. Bolger, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 522 (2019).

Receipt of Support May Not Be Conditioned on Visitation. - A trial judge does not have authority to condition a minor child's receipt of support paid by the noncustodial parent on compliance with court-ordered visitation allowed the noncustodial parent by ordering that child support paid by defendant be placed in escrow if minor child fails or refuses to abide by the visitation privileges allowed defendant. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

Child Support May Not Be Offset by Equitable Distribution Judgment or Other Obligations. - Defendant was not entitled to a "credit" against his future child support payments for the $12,435.50 he paid over and above his court-ordered obligation or for the $500.00 plaintiff owed him as a result of an equitable distribution judgment; child support obligations may not be offset by other obligations. Brinkley v. Brinkley, 135 N.C. App. 608, 522 S.E.2d 90 (1999).

Court Had No Authority to Order Payment of Social Security Benefits Directly to Mother. - A North Carolina district court had no authority to order the Social Security Administration and defendant father, a representative payee receiving Social Security disability payments for the benefit of his children, to pay those benefits directly to plaintiff mother. Brevard v. Brevard, 74 N.C. App. 484, 328 S.E.2d 789 (1985).

Defendant did not waive his right to support by failing to schedule notice of a hearing on the issue prior to child's emancipation; trial court was incorrect in its presumption that because the issue of custody had become moot, it could not address the issue of support. Freeman v. Freeman, 103 N.C. App. 801, 407 S.E.2d 262 (1991).

B. SECURITY.

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Nonresident Defendant May Be Required to Post Bond. - Under subsection (f)(1) of this section and G.S. 50-16.7(b), the court properly required supporting spouse to post a security bond to secure his compliance with a judgment requiring him to make monthly payments for the support of his wife and children, where the court found that defendant no longer resided within the State and that he had no attorney of record in the case. Parker v. Parker, 13 N.C. App. 616, 186 S.E.2d 607 (1972).

C. AWARD OF PROPERTY.

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Award of Home. - The award of the homeplace does not constitute a writ of possession within the meaning of G.S. 50-17, and the trial judge may award exclusive possession of the homeplace, even though it is owned by the entirety, as a part of the support under this section. Arnold v. Arnold, 30 N.C. App. 683, 228 S.E.2d 48 (1976); Rogers v. Rogers, 39 N.C. App. 635, 251 S.E.2d 663 (1979).

The General Assembly has made statutory provisions in subdivision (f)(2) of this section for awarding possession of a home as a part of child support. This is true without regard to whether the parties are divorced. To the extent that the General Assembly's will, as expressed in this section, conflicts with the common-law principle that the husband is entitled to exclusive possession of entirety property, the common law has been abrogated and supplanted. Martin v. Martin, 35 N.C. App. 610, 242 S.E.2d 393, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 261, 245 S.E.2d 778 (1978).

Award of Personal Property Does Not Require Valuation Of Property. - Because the statute requiring valuation of real property transferred for payment of child support arrearages does not require the trial court to determine the value of personal property applied towards child support arrearages, the father did not offer any support for his contention that such a transfer of personal property was analogous to a transfer of real property, and the father consented to transfer the vehicle to the mother, the trial court did not err by transferring the vehicle to the mother without making a specific finding as to its value. Respess v. Respess, 232 N.C. App. 611, 754 S.E.2d 691 (2014).

D. ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT.

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For case upholding garnishment of father's income from alleged "spendthrift" trust created in another jurisdiction and administered by a trustee bank in this State to satisfy judgment of mother against father for alimony, child support and counsel fees, see Swink v. Swink, 6 N.C. App. 161, 169 S.E.2d 539 (1969).

It was not error for trial court to enter order to withhold plaintiff's wages to collect child support arrearages that had been reduced to judgment. Griffin v. Griffin, 103 N.C. App. 65, 404 S.E.2d 478 (1991).

E. RECOVERY OF PAST DUE PAYMENTS.

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The sole limitation on a party's right to reimbursement for documented past support expenditures is imposed by G.S. 1-52(2), which limits recovery to those expenditures incurred within three years before the date the action for support is filed. Freeman v. Freeman, 103 N.C. App. 801, 407 S.E.2d 262 (1991).

Effect of Subdivision (f)(8). - The portion of subdivision (f)(8) of this section following the semicolon does not constitute an election of remedies. Nor it is true that once arrearages are reduced to judgment the party attempting to collect the judgment is limited to the execution procedures provided by G.S. 1-302. Griffin v. Griffin, 103 N.C. App. 65, 404 S.E.2d 478 (1991).

Reduction to Judgment. - A parent having custody of a minor child may institute an action for the support of such child, and once an order for support has been obtained, the past due payments may be reduced to judgment by motion in the cause. Griffith v. Griffith, 38 N.C. App. 25, 247 S.E.2d 30, cert. denied, 296 N.C. 106, 249 S.E.2d 804 (1978).

Arrearages Judgment Reduced Past Due Payments Judgment and Included Periodic Payments Provision. - As the arrearages judgment reduced the past due payments to a judgment and included a periodic payments provision, it complied with the statute allowing for this particular type of remedy for the enforcement of child support obligations, and the judgment, including its provision concerning period payments towards arrearages was not void and should not have been set aside. Duplin County DSS v. Frazier, 230 N.C. App. 480, 751 S.E.2d 621 (2013).

After Child Reaches Majority. - The fact that a child becomes 18 years of age does not prevent the parent having custody from having the past due payments which accrued while the child was a minor reduced to judgment. Griffith v. Griffith, 38 N.C. App. 25, 247 S.E.2d 30, cert. denied, 296 N.C. 106, 249 S.E.2d 804 (1978).

Notice. - The defendant in an action for unpaid child support could not complain of inadequate notice of the plaintiff's motion to reduce to judgment support payments alleged to be in arrears where the defendant's attorney of record was properly served with notice. Griffith v. Griffith, 38 N.C. App. 25, 247 S.E.2d 30, cert. denied, 296 N.C. 106, 249 S.E.2d 804 (1978).

Authority of Judge. - Arrearages judgment was a new judgment entered after the mother initiated an action seeking an amount owed from a prior judgment, and when entering this judgment, the judge had both jurisdiction and the statutory authority to reduce the arrearages to a judgment and to make provisions for period payments towards the arrearages; thus, the judgment was not void and could not be set aside. Duplin County DSS v. Frazier, 230 N.C. App. 480, 751 S.E.2d 621 (2013).

Court cannot agree with the conclusion that the statute is vague and did not authorize periodic payments towards the father's child support arrearages. Duplin County DSS v. Frazier, 230 N.C. App. 480, 751 S.E.2d 621 (2013).

F. RETROACTIVE SUPPORT AND REIMBURSEMENT.

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Retroactive Distinguished from Prospective. - Child support awarded prior to the time a party files a complaint is properly classified as retroactive child support and is determined by considering reasonably necessary expenditures made on behalf of the child by the party seeking retroactive child support and the defendant's ability to pay during the period in the past for which reimbursement is sought; child support awarded from the time a party files a complaint for child support to the date of trial is not "retroactive child support," but is in the nature of prospective child support representing that period from the time a complaint seeking child support is filed to the date of trial. Taylor v. Taylor, 118 N.C. App. 356, 455 S.E.2d 442 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, 343 N.C. 50, 468 S.E.2d 33 (1996).

Although prospective child support based upon the presumptive guidelines requires no factual findings regarding the child's reasonable needs or the supporting parent's ability to pay, the trial court must set out specific findings of fact in a reimbursement award for retroactive support. Biggs v. Greer, 136 N.C. App. 294, 524 S.E.2d 577 (2000).

Trial court's award of child support was not retroactive in nature because prior consent order was not intended as a final determination on the issue of child support; thus, under G.S. 50-13.4(c), the trial court properly followed the guidelines in awarding prospective child support. Cole v. Cole, 149 N.C. App. 427, 562 S.E.2d 11 (2002).

Claim for Retroactive Child Support. - Not only may an action be brought to collect child support payments in arrears, but a claim for retroactive child support may be brought under this section. Warner v. Latimer, 68 N.C. App. 170, 314 S.E.2d 789 (1984).

Retroactive child support is based solely on amount actually expended for support of minor children during time period in question. Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990).

"Emergency Situation" Must Be Shown. - Child support reimbursement, or child support governing a period prior to a motion to increase an existing child support order, would constitute retroactive child support and would not be based on the presumptive guidelines. Therefore, a child support payment order may not be retroactively increased without evidence of some emergency situation that required the expenditure of sums in excess of the amount of child support paid. Biggs v. Greer, 136 N.C. App. 294, 524 S.E.2d 577 (2000).

Reasonable Necessity and Ability to Pay Must Be Considered. - When a trial court is faced with calculating a retroactive child support award, it must consider, among other things, whether what was actually expended was "reasonably necessary" for the child's support and the defendant's ability to pay during the time for which reimbursement is sought. Buff v. Carter, 76 N.C. App. 145, 331 S.E.2d 705 (1985).

Retroactive Support for Private Schooling Denied. - Award of additional retroactive child support for private schooling was denied where the trial court's limited findings failed to set forth the existence of a "sudden emergency" so unusual or extraordinary as to require plaintiff to expend sums in excess of defendant's existing support obligation, and the court's order contained no findings reflective of defendant's ability to pay during the period the emergency expenses were allegedly incurred. Biggs v. Greer, 136 N.C. App. 294, 524 S.E.2d 577 (2000).

Measure of Liability for Reimbursement of Support Funds Expended. - Where there was no evidence or finding as to the actual amount expended by plaintiff for the support of the children for which she was entitled to reimbursement from defendant, what the defendant "should have paid" was not the measure of his liability to plaintiff. The measure of defendant's liability to plaintiff was the amount actually expended by plaintiff which represented the defendant's share of support. Hicks v. Hicks, 34 N.C. App. 128, 237 S.E.2d 307 (1977); Rawls v. Rawls, 94 N.C. App. 670, 381 S.E.2d 179 (1989).

No Reimbursement for Share of Support Paid by Court Order. - In an action by a mother for child support, mother was not entitled to be reimbursed for sums expended by her for the support of the children which represented her share of support as determined by the trial judge, considering the relative ability of the parties to provide support. Hicks v. Hicks, 34 N.C. App. 128, 237 S.E.2d 307 (1977).

Mother's Homemaking Services Considered. - In determining father's share of the reasonable actual expenditures made by mother during the period for which retroactive child support is sought, the trial court must consider her child care and homemaking services rendered during this period. Lawrence v. Tise, 107 N.C. App. 140, 419 S.E.2d 176 (1992).

Mother Not Entitled to Compensation for Support by Others. - In an action by a mother for child support, she was not entitled to be compensated for support for the children which was provided by others. Hicks v. Hicks, 34 N.C. App. 128, 237 S.E.2d 307 (1977).

Extent of Recovery for Past Expenditures. - Assuming adequate proof of the expenditures under subsection (c) of this section, the plaintiff-mother could recover reimbursement for her past support expenditures (1) to the extent she paid the father's share of such expenditures, and (2) to the extent the expenditures occurred three years or less before August 8, 1986, the date she filed her claim for child support. Napowsa v. Langston, 95 N.C. App. 14, 381 S.E.2d 882, cert. denied, 325 N.C. 709, 388 S.E.2d 460 (1989).

Error Where Court Used Guidelines Instead of Actual Expenditures. - Where, although the trial court made a finding on mother's actual expenditures during the period for which retroactive support was sought, the court instead based the retroactive support award on the guidelines in effect at the time the expenses were incurred by mother, this was error requiring reversal of the order of retroactive support. Lawrence v. Tise, 107 N.C. App. 140, 419 S.E.2d 176 (1992).

Proof of Actual Expenditures. - Trial court's award of retroactive child support had to be reversed and remanded for findings on the mother's actual expenditures for the children during the relevant time period. Respess v. Respess, 232 N.C. App. 611, 754 S.E.2d 691 (2014).

The trial court was under no obligation to render findings of fact where it did not deviate from the presumptive guidelines, but rather adjusted the guideline amounts to account, prospectively, for the extraordinary expense of private schooling. Biggs v. Greer, 136 N.C. App. 294, 524 S.E.2d 577 (2000).

Where the trial court abused its discretion in calculating plaintiff's income and in failing to value plaintiff's estate, and erred in using the "retroactive child support" test for calculating prospective child support, case would be remanded. Taylor v. Taylor, 118 N.C. App. 356, 455 S.E.2d 442 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, 343 N.C. 50, 468 S.E.2d 33 (1996).

Evidence Held Sufficient to Support Award. - Where trial court specifically found that prior to filing action plaintiff expended at least four hundred dollars ($400.00) per month for the support of the parties' child and that defendant had the capacity to pay one-half of this amount toward the child's support during this time, the findings were supported by the evidence and were binding on appeal; the trial court correctly awarded plaintiff reimbursement for past child support. Rawls v. Rawls, 94 N.C. App. 670, 381 S.E.2d 179 (1989).

After the father had been found to be in contempt due to his failure to pay child support, the trial court made sufficient findings of fact to support an award of attorney's fees to the mother under G.S. 50-13.6, despite the fact that there was no finding that the mother was an interested party with insufficient means to defray the cost of the litigation; under G.S. 50-13.4(c), the children's ability to pay attorney's fees was at issue, not the mother's, and the mother was an interested party under G.S. 50-13.6, as she provided the financial support in the absence of the husband. Belcher v. Averette, 152 N.C. App. 452, 568 S.E.2d 630 (2002).

G. CONTEMPT.

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Editor's Note. - Some of the cases cited below were decided under subdivision (f)(9) of this section as it read prior to amendment in 1977. Prior to such amendment, subdivision (f)(9) provided for punishment as for contempt of the "willful disobedience" of an order for the payment of child support.

Agreement of Parties Incorporated in Judgment Is Enforceable by Contempt Proceedings. - Where, in wife's action for alimony and child support, the parties agreed to the terms of a judgment providing that husband would make specified monthly support payments, and the judgment entered by the court ordered husband to make the payments which he had agreed to make, husband's obligation to make the support payments could be enforced by contempt proceedings. Parker v. Parker, 13 N.C. App. 616, 186 S.E.2d 607 (1972).

Willfulness Is Required Under Subdivision (f)(9). - The element of willfulness is required for a finding of civil contempt under subdivision (f)(9) of this section and G.S. 5A-21. Jones v. Jones, 52 N.C. App. 104, 278 S.E.2d 260 (1981); Harris v. Harris, 91 N.C. App. 699, 373 S.E.2d 312 (1988).

Trial court did not err in not holding the father in contempt as he did not intend to willfully violate the child support order because he was under the mistaken apprehension that he could simply stop paying after his son ceased living with the mother. Morris v. Powell, - N.C. App. - , 840 S.E.2d 223 (2020).

Priority of G.S. 50-13.4(f)(8)-(9) over G.S. Ch. 5A. - Because G.S. 50-13.4(f)(8)-(9) is more specific than the generalized contempt allowances set forth in G.S. ch. 5A, G.S. 50-13.4(f)(8)-(9) must control. Brown v. Brown, 171 N.C. App. 358, 615 S.E.2d 39 (2005), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 60, 621 S.E.2d 175 (2005).

And Only Willful Disobedience May Be Punished. - A failure to obey an order of a court cannot be punished by contempt proceedings unless the disobedience is willful, which imports knowledge and a stubborn resistance. Cox v. Cox, 10 N.C. App. 476, 179 S.E.2d 194 (1971).

To constitute willful disobedience there must be an ability to comply with the court order and a deliberate and intentional failure to do so. Bennett v. Bennett, 21 N.C. App. 390, 204 S.E.2d 554 (1974).

One does not act willfully in failing to comply with a judgment if it has not been within his power to do so since the judgment was rendered. Cox v. Cox, 10 N.C. App. 476, 179 S.E.2d 194 (1971).

Ability to Pay or to Take Measures to Do So Required. - Although an order for child support is enforceable by civil contempt proceedings, a supporting party cannot be held in contempt unless the party willfully failed to comply with the support order. A finding of willful failure to comply with the order requires evidence of the present ability to pay or to take reasonable measures to comply. Brower v. Brower, 75 N.C. App. 425, 331 S.E.2d 170 (1985).

Contempt for Violation Based on Willfulness Upheld. - Trial court acted correctly when it exercised jurisdiction under this section and found defendant/husband in civil contempt, where he made a calculated and deliberate decision to pay a lower amount of child support than it had previously ordered. Burnett v. Wheeler, 133 N.C. App. 316, 515 S.E.2d 480 (1999).

Trial Court Must Make Particular Findings of Ability to Pay. - In order to hold a parent in contempt for failure to pay child support in accordance with a decree, the failure must be willful. In order to find the failure willful, there must be particular findings of the ability to pay during the period of delinquency. Goodson v. Goodson, 32 N.C. App. 76, 231 S.E.2d 178 (1977).

In order to punish by contempt proceedings, the trial court must find as a fact that the defendant possessed the means to comply with orders of the court during the period when he was in default. Cox v. Cox, 10 N.C. App. 476, 179 S.E.2d 194 (1971).

There must be a specific finding of fact, supported by competent evidence, to the effect that defendant possesses the means to comply with the court order, before he can be incarcerated for contempt until compliance. Bennett v. Bennett, 21 N.C. App. 390, 204 S.E.2d 554 (1974); Fitch v. Fitch, 26 N.C. App. 570, 216 S.E.2d 734, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 240, 217 S.E.2d 679 (1975).

A defendant may not deliberately divest himself of his property and in effect pauperize himself for appearance at a hearing for contempt and thereby escape punishment because he is at that time unable to comply with the court order. Bennett v. Bennett, 21 N.C. App. 390, 204 S.E.2d 554 (1974).

Defendant's voluntary purging of assets in bankruptcy was considered a deliberate divestment of assets; therefore, failure to comply with a child support order was willful and punishable by contempt proceedings. Harris v. Harris, 91 N.C. App. 699, 373 S.E.2d 312 (1988).

Past contempt cannot be ignored by the court even if at the exact time of the contempt hearing the defendant does not have the means to comply with the order for child support. Bennett v. Bennett, 21 N.C. App. 390, 204 S.E.2d 554 (1974).

Contempt Decree Set Aside for Lack of Findings. - Where the lower court had not found as a fact that defendant possessed the means to comply with the orders for payment of subsistence pendente lite at any time during the period when he was in default in such payments, the findings that defendant's failure to make the payments of subsistence was deliberate and willful was not supported by the record, and the decree committing him to imprisonment for contempt would be set aside. Cox v. Cox, 10 N.C. App. 476, 179 S.E.2d 194 (1971).

Child Support Arrears. - Although defendant's child support obligation terminated because her son turned 18 and was no longer in school, the arrears owed to the county remained in force, as defendant made no child support payments before her son turned 18 and the court found the purpose of the order would be served by her compliance; her challenge to be held in civil contempt failed. Cumberland Cty. ex rel. Mitchell v. Manning, 262 N.C. App. 383, 822 S.E.2d 305 (2018).

When order reducing child support arrears to a money judgment does not provide for periodic payments although the lower court's prior judgment reduced the father's child support arrearage to a money judgment, it did not provide for periodic payments so his failure to satisfy the arrearage was enforceable by execution under G.S. 1-302, and not civil contempt under G.S. 50-13.4(f)(8)-(9), so the lower court's judgment holding him in contempt was beyond its jurisdiction and was vacated. Brown v. Brown, 171 N.C. App. 358, 615 S.E.2d 39 (2005), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 60, 621 S.E.2d 175 (2005).

When order reducing child support arrears to a money judgment does not provide for periodic payments or other deadline for payment, it is not enforceable by contempt, and the trial court does not have jurisdiction to enter an order finding a defendant in contempt. Brown v. Brown, 171 N.C. App. 358, 615 S.E.2d 39 (2005), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 60, 621 S.E.2d 175 (2005).

Failure to Pay College Expenses. - Trial court properly found father in civil contempt where he willfully failed to pay his daughters college expenses as he had contracted to do. Ross v. Voiers, 127 N.C. App. 415, 490 S.E.2d 244 (1997), cert. denied, 347 N.C. 402, 496 S.E.2d 387 (1997).

Defendant Not in Contempt. - Defendant was not in civil contempt of court in deducting from child support payments made to plaintiff amounts representing voluntary expenditures for needs of the parties' children while they were visiting him. Jones v. Jones, 52 N.C. App. 104, 278 S.E.2d 260 (1981).

Review of Facts Found in Contempt Proceedings. - In proceedings for contempt, the facts found by the judge are not reviewable, except for the purpose of passing upon their sufficiency to warrant the judgment. Cox v. Cox, 10 N.C. App. 476, 179 S.E.2d 194 (1971).

Payment of Counsel Fees. - The court is vested with broad power when it is authorized to punish "as for contempt." This power includes the authority for a district court judge to require one whom he has found in willful contempt of court for failure to comply with a child support order to pay reasonable counsel fees to opposing counsel as a condition to being purged of contempt. Blair v. Blair, 8 N.C. App. 61, 173 S.E.2d 513 (1970).

Attorney Fees Included In Child Support Award. - Trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to enforce attorney fee awards included in a child support award during the pendency of defendant's appeal of a child support award pursuant to G.S. 50-13.4(f)(9). Moreover, where defendant made no attempt to post an undertaking or supersedeas bond to stay civil contempt proceedings on the attorney fee awards pursuant to G.S. 1-289, defendant was subject to civil contempt proceedings pending his appeal. Simms v. Bolger, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 467 (2019).

Indefinite Jail Term. - When a defendant has the present means to comply with a court order and deliberately refuses to comply, there is a present and continuing contempt, and the court may commit such defendant to jail for an indefinite term, that is, until he complies with the order. Bennett v. Bennett, 21 N.C. App. 390, 204 S.E.2d 554 (1974); Fitch v. Fitch, 26 N.C. App. 570, 216 S.E.2d 734, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 240, 217 S.E.2d 679 (1975).

Effect of Dismissal of Contempt Action Without Explanation. - A dismissal of a contempt action, without explanation, at most signified that the supporting party was not in contempt as of that date and did not cancel the accrued child support debt; it merely forced the custodial parent or an authorized party to pursue one of the alternate remedies listed in subsection (f) to enforce the debt. Brower v. Brower, 75 N.C. App. 425, 331 S.E.2d 170 (1985).

As to effect of reconciliation and resumption of cohabitation on a separation agreement, see Hand v. Hand, 46 N.C. App. 82, 264 S.E.2d 597, cert. denied, 300 N.C. 556, 270 S.E.2d 107 (1980).

Failure to Identify Purpose of Support as Health, Education and Maintenance Is Not Error. - The better practice is for the court's order to relate that the payment ordered under this section is the amount necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education, and maintenance, but the failure of the court to do so does not constitute reversible error. Andrews v. Andrews, 12 N.C. App. 410, 183 S.E.2d 843 (1971); Martin v. Martin, 35 N.C. App. 610, 242 S.E.2d 393, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 261, 245 S.E.2d 778 (1978).

Appeal Did Not Divest Trial Court of Enforcement Jurisdiction. - Notice of appeal from a trial court order requiring a husband to make payments pursuant to a child support order did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to make an enforcement order finding the husband in contempt based on the exception to the divestment of the trial court's jurisdiction found in G.S.50-13.4(f)(9). Guerrier v. Guerrier, 155 N.C. App. 154, 574 S.E.2d 69 (2002).

Opinions of Attorney General

Medical Child Support Enforcement Provisions. - The medical child support enforcement provisions of House Bill 1563, 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994), N.C. Session Laws c. 644, are inapplicable to the North Carolina Teachers' and State Employees' Comprehensive Major Medical Plan (now State Health Plan for Teachers and State Employees) and the governmental entities whose employees and retirees, along with their dependents, are eligible for coverage under the Plan or its HMO option. Medical child support orders nonetheless may be enforced directly against State employees and retirees who fail to enroll, or maintain coverage for, their eligible dependent children under the State Health Plan in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 50-13.9, 50-13.11 and subsection (f) of this section. See opinion of Attorney General to Patricia Crawford, Associate General Counsel, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, - N.C.A.G. - (August 10, 1995).

I. IN GENERAL.

Editor's Note. - A number of the cases cited below were decided under former G.S. 50-13, which dealt with custody and maintenance of children in actions for divorce, former G.S. 50-16, which dealt with custody and support of children in proceedings for alimony without divorce, and former G.S. 17-39 and former G.S. 17-39.1, which dealt with habeas corpus for custody of children.

Legislature apparently intended to provide the maximum range of choice among procedures for determination of child custody and support. Latham v. Latham, 74 N.C. App. 722, 329 S.E.2d 721 (1985).

Remarriage Does Not Reduce Choice of Procedures. - The statutory scheme of this section provides for an election of procedures in actions for custody or support; there is no reason why the remarriage of the parties should reduce the choices available. Latham v. Latham, 74 N.C. App. 722, 329 S.E.2d 721 (1985).

Effect of Defendant's Petition for Custody on Plaintiff's Right to Voluntary Nonsuit. - Where wife instituted action for divorce and husband filed his petition in the cause praying the court for a determination of his custodial rights with respect to the child, thus seeking affirmative relief of a substantial nature, it was not within the power of the clerk to divest the court of its jurisdiction by allowing wife to submit to a voluntary nonsuit during the course of the hearings and while the issue of custody was in fieri before the presiding judge. Cox v. Cox, 246 N.C. 528, 98 S.E.2d 879 (1957).

Ex Parte Order Improper. - Judge was censured for misconduct under circumstances in which the judge entered an ex parte order striking an earlier order that had been entered by a different district court judge, which had found a party in contempt for failure to pay child support, regardless of the judge's claim that his actions were allowed by G.S. 50-13.5. In re Royster, 361 N.C. 560, 648 S.E.2d 837 (2007).

Change in Circumstances. - Where parent was found to be a fit and proper parent, and in a later order found to be an unfit parent, the finding of unfitness constituted a change in circumstances. Raynor v. Odom, 124 N.C. App. 724, 478 S.E.2d 655 (1996).

Burden of Proof. - Even if privity was not a requirement of collateral estoppel, the trial court erroneously applied the doctrine because of the different burdens of proof used in custody and neglect hearings, and the trial court erred in applying the doctrine to bar the mother's questions, as the neglect hearing was held pursuant to a different burden of proof; the error made it impossible for the mother to effectively contest the allegations made in the petition under the higher, clear and convincing evidence standard, and the matter was reversed. In re K.A., 233 N.C. App. 119, 756 S.E.2d 837 (2014).

Applied in Kearns v. Kearns, 6 N.C. App. 319, 170 S.E.2d 132 (1969); Bonavia v. Torreso, 7 N.C. App. 21, 171 S.E.2d 108 (1969); Peoples v. Peoples, 10 N.C. App. 402, 179 S.E.2d 138 (1971); Williams v. Williams, 12 N.C. App. 170, 182 S.E.2d 667 (1971); Snyder v. Snyder, 18 N.C. App. 658, 197 S.E.2d 802 (1973); Roberts v. Roberts, 25 N.C. App. 198, 212 S.E.2d 410 (1975); Benson v. Benson, 39 N.C. App. 254, 249 S.E.2d 877 (1978); Francis v. Durham County Dep't of Social Servs., 41 N.C. App. 444, 255 S.E.2d 263 (1979); Rhoney v. Sigmon, 43 N.C. App. 11, 257 S.E.2d 691 (1979); Misero v. Misero, 43 N.C. App. 523, 259 S.E.2d 346 (1979); Lynch v. Lynch, 302 N.C. 189, 274 S.E.2d 212 (1981); Miller v. Kite, 69 N.C. App. 679, 318 S.E.2d 102 (1984); Glesner v. Dembrosky, 73 N.C. App. 594, 327 S.E.2d 60 (1985); Buck v. Greenlee, - F. Supp. 2d - (W.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2011).

Cited in Blair v. Blair, 8 N.C. App. 61, 173 S.E.2d 513 (1970); Texas v. Rhoades, 7 N.C. App. 388, 172 S.E.2d 235 (1970); In re Hopper, 11 N.C. App. 611, 182 S.E.2d 228 (1971); Williams v. Williams, 13 N.C. App. 468, 186 S.E.2d 210 (1972); Sauls v. Sauls, 288 N.C. 387, 218 S.E.2d 338 (1975); Beall v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 228 S.E.2d 407 (1976); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 38 N.C. App. 308, 247 S.E.2d 926 (1978); McGinnis v. McGinnis, 44 N.C. App. 381, 261 S.E.2d 491 (1980); Oxendine v. Catawba County Dep't of Social Servs., 49 N.C. App. 571, 272 S.E.2d 417 (1980); Hamlin v. Hamlin, 302 N.C. 478, 276 S.E.2d 381 (1981); Davis v. Taylor, 81 N.C. App. 42, 344 S.E.2d 19 (1986); Shingledecker v. Shingledecker, 103 N.C. App. 783, 407 S.E.2d 589 (1991); Ray v. Ray, 103 N.C. App. 790, 407 S.E.2d 592 (1991); Brooks v. Brooks, 107 N.C. App. 44, 418 S.E.2d 534 (1992); Dobos v. Dobos, 111 N.C. App. 222, 431 S.E.2d 861 (1993); Wake County ex rel. Horton v. Ryles, 112 N.C. App. 754, 437 S.E.2d 404 (1993); McIntyre v. McIntyre, 341 N.C. 629, 461 S.E.2d 745 (1995); Fisher v. Fisher, 124 N.C. App. 442, 477 S.E.2d 251 (1996); Ross v. Voiers, 127 N.C. App. 415, 490 S.E.2d 244 (1997), cert. denied, 347 N.C. 402, 496 S.E.2d 387 (1997); Penland v. Harris, 135 N.C. App. 359, 520 S.E.2d 105 (1999); Montgomery v. Montgomery, 136 N.C. App. 435, 524 S.E.2d 360 (2000); Smith v. Barbour, 154 N.C. App. 402, 571 S.E.2d 872 (2002), cert. denied, - N.C. - , 599 S.E.2d 408 (2004); McDuffie v. Mitchell, 155 N.C. App. 587, 573 S.E.2d 606 (2002), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 165, 580 S.E.2d 368 (2003); Williams v. Walker, 185 N.C. App. 393, 648 S.E.2d 536 (2007); Smith v. Barbour, 195 N.C. App. 244, 671 S.E.2d 578 (2009), review denied, 363 N.C. 375, 678 S.E.2d 670 (2009); Head v. Mosier, 197 N.C. App. 328, 677 S.E.2d 191 (2009); McKoy v. McKoy, 202 N.C. App. 509, 689 S.E.2d 590 (2010); Peters v. Pennington, 210 N.C. App. 1, 707 S.E.2d 724 (2011); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 211 N.C. App. 267, 710 S.E.2d 235 (2011); Wellons v. White, 229 N.C. App. 164, 748 S.E.2d 709 (2013); Davis v. Davis, 229 N.C. App. 494, 748 S.E.2d 594 (2013); In re J.K., - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Apr. 4, 2017); Catawba Cty. v. Loggins, 370 N.C. 83, 804 S.E.2d 474 (2017).

II. TYPE OF ACTION.

Editor's Note. - Most of the cases cited below were decided prior to the enactment of G.S. 50-19, authorizing the maintenance of certain actions as independent actions.

Justice to all parties is best served when one judge is able to see the controversy whole. In re King, 3 N.C. App. 466, 165 S.E.2d 60 (1969).

Joinder in Action for Alimony Without Divorce Is Permissible. - It is permissible under subdivision (b)(3) of this section for the wife (spouse) to join an action for custody and support of the minor children of the parties in her action for alimony without divorce. Little v. Little, 9 N.C. App. 361, 176 S.E.2d 521 (1970).

As an Additional Method of Determining Issues as to Children. - The 1953 amendment of former G.S. 50-16, granting jurisdiction to determine custody in an action for alimony without divorce, created an additional method whereby the matter of custody may be determined. Blankenship v. Blankenship, 256 N.C. 638, 124 S.E.2d 857 (1962).

The 1955 amendment to former G.S. 50-16, which provided that custody orders were authorized "in the same manner as such orders are entered by the court in an action for divorce," bolstered the decision in Blankenship v. Blankenship, 256 N.C. 638, 124 S.E.2d 857 (1962), which held that that section created an additional method whereby all questions relating to custody and child support were brought into and determined in the suit for alimony without divorce, in one action. In re Sauls, 270 N.C. 180, 154 S.E.2d 327 (1967).

Prior to 1953, custody of children could not be determined in a proceeding for alimony without divorce. Murphy v. Murphy, 261 N.C. 95, 134 S.E.2d 148 (1964).

Counterclaims. - There is no conflict between the statutes dealing with procedure in divorce actions and G.S. 1A-1, Rule 13(a). Rather G.S. 1A-1, Rule 13(a) superimposes an additional characteristic on certain kinds of counterclaims. Gardner v. Gardner, 294 N.C. 172, 240 S.E.2d 399 (1978). But see now G.S. 50-19.

Divorce action is pending for purposes of determining custody and support until the death of one of the parties or until the youngest child born of the marriage reaches maturity, whichever event occurs first. Latham v. Latham, 74 N.C. App. 722, 329 S.E.2d 721 (1985).

Remedy of Plaintiff in Divorce Suit Is by Motion in the Cause. - Where a wife institutes suit for divorce, her remedy to require the defendant to provide support for a minor child of the marriage is by motion in the cause, which may be filed either before or after final judgment. Winfield v. Winfield, 228 N.C. 256, 45 S.E.2d 259 (1947).

Plaintiff-husband, as a parent seeking custody, could seek to have his child support obligation determined through a motion in the cause in the divorce action. He was not precluded from doing so by the fact that the court had not previously entered orders in that action relating to child support. Bottomley v. Bottomley, 82 N.C. App. 231, 346 S.E.2d 317 (1986).

Modification of Order on Motion of Court or Party. - Upon motion of a party, or upon its own motion after due notice, the court may conduct a hearing to determine whether the decree should be modified. Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S. Ct. 1417, 39 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1974).

Foster Parents May Not Bring Custody Action. - Nothing in the language of G.S. 48-9.1(1) gives foster parents standing to contest the department's or agency's exercise of its rights as legal custodian; therefore, foster parents are without standing to bring an action seeking custody of minor child placed in their home by defendant. Oxendine v. Department of Social Servs., 303 N.C. 699, 281 S.E.2d 370 (1981); In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 531, 345 S.E.2d 404, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 589 (1986).

Intervention by Foster Parents. - In proceeding brought by DSS in which custody was put in issue by guardian ad litem and natural father, trial court did not err in permitting child's foster parents to intervene. In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 531, 345 S.E.2d 404, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 589 (1986), distinguishing Oxendine v. Department of Social Servs., 303 N.C. 699, 281 S.E.2d 370 (1981), and upholding award of custody to foster parents.

Guardianship Versus Custody. - When a stepmother was granted ex parte temporary custody of orphaned stepchildren, an aunt's subsequent guardianship petition made the custody action moot because, (1) in the guardianship case, the clerk properly exercised jurisdiction, as the children had no natural guardian, and the clerk's jurisdiction was not divested by the ex parte temporary custody order, since the clerk considered other courts' custody awards, so the clerk had jurisdiction to appoint the children's general guardians, an incident of which was physical custody, and (2) any guardianship modification, including custody modification, required filing a motion with the clerk instead of a district court custody action. Corbett v. Lynch, 251 N.C. App. 40, 795 S.E.2d 564 (2016).

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE.

A. IN GENERAL.

For cases involving the bringing of habeas corpus proceedings in custody disputes, prior to the amendment by Session Laws 1979, c. 110, s. 12, see Robbins v. Robbins, 229 N.C. 430, 50 S.E.2d 183 (1948); Weddington v. Weddington, 243 N.C. 702, 92 S.E.2d 71 (1956); Bunn v. Bunn, 258 N.C. 445, 128 S.E.2d 792 (1963); In re Skipper, 261 N.C. 592, 135 S.E.2d 671 (1964); In re Macon, 267 N.C. 248, 147 S.E.2d 909 (1966); Swicegood v. Swicegood, 270 N.C. 278, 154 S.E.2d 324 (1967); In re King, 3 N.C. App. 466, 165 S.E.2d 60 (1969); In re Wright, 8 N.C. App. 330, 174 S.E.2d 27 (1970).

Editor's Note. - Most of the cases cited below were decided prior to the enactment of G.S. 50-19, authorizing the maintenance of certain actions as independent actions, and prior to the enactment of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, former G.S. 50A-1 et seq., or the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, G.S. 50A-101 et seq.

Venue Provision. - Subdivision (f) of this section, enacted in 1967, is the venue provision for a child support action. Powers v. Parisher, 104 N.C. App. 400, 409 S.E.2d 725 (1991), appeal dismissed, 331 N.C. 286, 417 S.E.2d 254 (1992).

The jurisdiction of the court to protect infants is broad, comprehensive, and plenary. Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S. Ct. 1417, 39 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1974).

Action to Determine Support Is in Personam. - Under subdivision (c)(1) of this section an action to determine the matter of support is in personam in nature. Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378, 188 S.E.2d 711 (1972).

An action for child support is an action in personam and is governed by jurisdictional rules as in actions for the payment of money or the transfer of property. Lynch v. Lynch, 96 N.C. App. 601, 386 S.E.2d 607 (1989).

While Award of Custody Is in Rem. - The awarding of the custody of the children in an action for divorce is in rem. Coble v. Coble, 229 N.C. 81, 47 S.E.2d 798 (1948); Hoskins v. Currin, 242 N.C. 432, 88 S.E.2d 228 (1955).

Divorce Action Gives Court Jurisdiction of Custody. - In divorce actions, whether for the dissolution of the marriage or from bed and board, the court in which the action is brought acquires jurisdiction over the custody of the unemancipated children of the parties. Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 145 S.E.2d 332 (1965).

When Jurisdiction Is Obtained Over Defendant. - Upon the institution of a divorce action, the court is vested with jurisdiction of the children of the marriage for the purpose of entering orders respecting their care and custody. But the action is not instituted, within the meaning of this rule, until and unless the court acquires jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, and jurisdiction is subject to the fundamental requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard. If both parents are in court and subject to its jurisdiction, an order may be entered, in proper instances, binding the parties and enforceable through the court's coercive jurisdiction. Coble v. Coble, 229 N.C. 81, 47 S.E.2d 798 (1948).

And Consent Judgment Therein Does Not Divest Court of Jurisdiction as to Custody of Child. - Upon the institution of an action for divorce from bed and board, the court acquires jurisdiction of the minor children of the parties, which is not divested by a consent judgment on the issue of divorce entered in the cause with approval of the court, especially where such consent judgment expressly provides that either party may thereafter make a motion in the cause for the custody of the children, the court having the power in an action for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, before or after final judgment, to enter orders respecting the care and custody of the children under this section. Tyner v. Tyner, 206 N.C. 776, 175 S.E. 144 (1934).

Where consent judgment in a suit a mensa et thoro has been entered in the action, without providing for the children, upon motion in the original cause the court has the power to make such further orders as it deems proper requiring the father (or mother) to provide for the support of his children, whether born before or after the rendition of the consent judgment. Sanders v. Sanders, 167 N.C. 317, 83 S.E. 489 (1914).

Actions Constituting General Appearance Subject Defendant to Jurisdiction. - By submitting information to the court relevant to the merits in action for child custody and support, defendant made a general appearance prior to his assertions of lack of personal jurisdiction where defendant sought affirmative relief from the court; submission of the documents was inconsistent with defendant's later claim of lack of personal jurisdiction. Bullard v. Bader, 117 N.C. App. 299, 450 S.E.2d 757 (1994).

Remarriage of parties to each other does not divest court of its continuing jurisdiction over the minor child acquired in action for divorce. Latham v. Latham, 74 N.C. App. 722, 329 S.E.2d 721 (1985).

Previous Action Pending. - Husband's motion as to child custody and child support was properly dismissed where the wife's previously commenced action with respect to the custody and support of the children was pending at the time the husband filed his motion. Basinger v. Basinger, 80 N.C. App. 554, 342 S.E.2d 549 (1986).

Child Becomes Ward of Court. - In a custody case, the court acquires jurisdiction of the child as well as the parent, and the child thus becomes a ward of the court. Joyner v. Joyner, 256 N.C. 588, 124 S.E.2d 724 (1962).

Presence of Child. - For cases as to the effect of the child's presence in this State on the issue of jurisdiction, prior to the enactment of G.S. 50A-1 et seq., see Coble v. Coble, 229 N.C. 81, 47 S.E.2d 798 (1948); Allman v. Register, 233 N.C. 531, 64 S.E.2d 861 (1951); Hoskins v. Currin, 242 N.C. 432, 88 S.E.2d 228 (1955); Weddington v. Weddington, 243 N.C. 702, 92 S.E.2d 71 (1956); Kovacs v. Brewer, 245 N.C. 630, 97 S.E.2d 96, vacated on other grounds, 356 U.S. 604, 78 S. Ct. 963, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1008 (1957); Rothman v. Rothman, 6 N.C. App. 401, 170 S.E.2d 140 (1969); Pruneau v. Sanders, 25 N.C. App. 510, 214 S.E.2d 288, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 664, 216 S.E.2d 911 (1975); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 8 N.C. App. 162, 174 S.E.2d 103 (1970); Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378, 188 S.E.2d 711 (1972); Spence v. Durham, 16 N.C. App. 372, 191 S.E.2d 908 (1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S. Ct. 1417, 39 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1974); Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S. Ct. 1417, 39 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1974); Taylor v. Taylor, 20 N.C. App. 188, 201 S.E.2d 43 (1973); MacKenzie v. MacKenzie, 21 N.C. App. 403, 204 S.E.2d 561 (1974); Swanson v. Swanson, 22 N.C. App. 152, 205 S.E.2d 738 (1974); Mathews v. Mathews, 24 N.C. App. 551, 211 S.E.2d 513 (1975); Searl v. Searl, 34 N.C. App. 583, 239 S.E.2d 305 (1977); Dishman v. Dishman, 37 N.C. App. 543, 246 S.E.2d 819 (1978); King v. Demo, 40 N.C. App. 661, 253 S.E.2d 616 (1979).

In a grandmother's action seeking custody of her grandchildren, the trial court erred in changing venue because either the county where the complaint alleged that the children resided or the county where they were physically present could have proper venue; basing venue on the physical presence of the children would seem entirely appropriate, particularly where a grandparent is seeking to protect grandchildren whose parents have disappeared. Zetino-Cruz v. Benitez-Zetino, 249 N.C. App. 218, 791 S.E.2d 100 (2016).

Jurisdiction Vests Exclusively in Divorce Court. - The court in which a suit for divorce is pending has exclusive jurisdiction as to the care or custody of the children of the marriage, before and after the decree of divorce has been entered. In re Blake, 184 N.C. 278, 114 S.E. 294 (1922); Murphy v. Murphy, 261 N.C. 95, 134 S.E.2d 148 (1964).

When a divorce action is instituted, jurisdiction over the custody of the children born of the marriage vests exclusively in the court before whom the divorce action is pending and becomes a concomitant part of the subject matter of the court's jurisdiction in the divorce action. Cox v. Cox, 246 N.C. 528, 98 S.E.2d 879 (1957); In re Sauls, 270 N.C. 180, 154 S.E.2d 327 (1967).

Jurisdiction over the custody of the children born of the marriage rests exclusively in the court before whom the divorce action is pending, and no order for the custody of the children may be entered in a later action by one of the parties for subsistence without divorce. Reece v. Reece, 231 N.C. 321, 56 S.E.2d 641 (1949), aff'd, 232 N.C. 95, 59 S.E.2d 363 (1950).

Where plaintiff instituted his action for divorce from bed and board in the superior court, and specifically prayed "that the court determine the proper custody for the aforesaid minor child of the plaintiff and defendant," that court became vested in his suit with exclusive jurisdiction to enter orders respecting the care, custody and maintenance of the child. Bunn v. Bunn, 258 N.C. 445, 128 S.E.2d 792 (1963).

Jurisdiction of the matters relating to custody having been invoked in an action for divorce, the court in which the divorce action was pending would have exclusive jurisdiction over the question of custody. Blankenship v. Blankenship, 256 N.C. 638, 124 S.E.2d 857 (1962).

Jurisdiction Continues After Entry of Decree. - The court in which the suit for divorce is pending has exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings for custody and child support, and once they are commenced, maintains it after the divorce decree is entered. Bass v. Bass, 43 N.C. App. 212, 258 S.E.2d 391 (1979).

Jurisdiction of courts in custody and visitation cases is continuous. A decree determines only the present rights with respect to such custody and is subject to judicial alteration or modification upon a change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child. In re Jones, 62 N.C. App. 103, 302 S.E.2d 259 (1983).

The jurisdiction of the court over the custody of unemancipated children of the parties in a divorce action continues even after divorce. Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 145 S.E.2d 332 (1965).

Once jurisdiction of the court attaches to a child custody matter, it exists for all time until the cause is fully and completely determined. In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 531, 345 S.E.2d 404, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 589 (1986).

Where Custody and Support Have Been Brought to Issue. - Where custody and support are brought to issue by the pleadings, the court retains continuing jurisdiction over these matters even when the issues are not determined by the judgment. Thus, where the issues of custody and support were raised in plaintiff wife's complaint and ruled on by the trial judge, the court retained jurisdiction to entertain and rule on defendant husband's motion in the cause for custody and support of the children. Jackson v. Jackson, 68 N.C. App. 499, 315 S.E.2d 90 (1984).

Until Death of a Party or Children's Attainment of Age of Majority. - A divorce action is pending for purposes of determining custody and support until the death of one of the parties or until the youngest child born of the marriage reaches the age of majority, whichever event shall first occur. Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378, 188 S.E.2d 711 (1972); Morris v. Morris, 42 N.C. App. 222, 256 S.E.2d 302 (1979).

But Custody Jurisdiction of Court Where Action for Alimony Without Divorce Is Pending Is Not Lost. - The general rule that exclusive custody jurisdiction is vested in the divorce court is subject to the exception that a court before which an action for alimony without divorce is pending does not lose its custody jurisdiction to the court of another county in which an action for divorce is subsequently filed. In re Sauls, 270 N.C. 180, 154 S.E.2d 327 (1967).

Institution of a divorce action did not oust the jurisdiction of another court, previously acquired in an action for alimony without divorce, to determine the rights of custody of the children of the marriage. Blankenship v. Blankenship, 256 N.C. 638, 124 S.E.2d 857 (1962).

Divorce Court May Hear and Determine Questions of Custody and Support. - Upon institution of a divorce action the court acquires jurisdiction over any child born of the marriage, and may hear and determine questions both as to the custody and as to the maintenance of such child either before or after final decree of divorce. Story v. Story, 221 N.C. 114, 19 S.E.2d 136 (1942).

After the filing of a complaint in any action for divorce, whether from the bonds of matrimony or from bed and board, both before and after final judgment therein, it is lawful for the judge to make such orders respecting the care, custody, tuition and maintenance of the minor children of the marriage as may be proper. Coggins v. Coggins, 260 N.C. 765, 133 S.E.2d 700 (1963).

And May Grant Custody to Either Parent. - The court has jurisdiction to enter an order granting custody to either of the children's parents, both of whom are subject to the court's jurisdiction. Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378, 188 S.E.2d 711 (1972).

Even Though Such Questions Were Not Raised or Determined in Final Judgment. - A court in which a divorce action was tried has jurisdiction to determine custody and support of children of the marriage, even though no custody or support questions were raised prior to, or determined in, the final judgment of divorce. Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378, 188 S.E.2d 711 (1972).

Issue of Custody and Support Remains in Fieri. - If the custody and support has been brought to issue or determined in the previously instituted action between the parents, there could be no final judgment in that case, because the issue of custody and support remains in fieri until the children have become emancipated. Wilson v. Wilson, 11 N.C. App. 397, 181 S.E.2d 190 (1971); Kennedy v. Surratt, 29 N.C. App. 404, 224 S.E.2d 215 (1976); Bass v. Bass, 43 N.C. App. 212, 258 S.E.2d 391 (1979).

Jurisdiction to Modify Custody Decree. - Once a court in this State properly asserts jurisdiction to determine the rights of the parties to custody of a minor child, that court retains jurisdiction to modify its custody decree upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances. Lynch v. Lynch, 303 N.C. 367, 279 S.E.2d 840 (1981).

Subsection (f) of this section does not affect the situation where custody and support have already been determined and one of the parties seeks a modification. In such a case, the court first obtaining jurisdiction retains jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts and is the only proper court in which to bring an action for the modification of an order establishing custody and support. Tate v. Tate, 9 N.C. App. 681, 177 S.E.2d 455 (1970).

A party cannot seek modification of a child support order in a court other than that in which it was entered where there has been no change of venue by the court. Broyhill v. Broyhill, 81 N.C. App. 147, 343 S.E.2d 605 (1986).

Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. - Where a North Carolina judgment of absolute divorce made no provision for child support, and there was thus no existing order, the Texas Attorney General's petition to establish a support obligation was properly classified as a petition to establish an order of support rather than a petition to modify an order of no support; thus, under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, the Texas trial court had the authority to adjudicate the father's child support obligation, and because the North Carolina tribunal had not acquired continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, the trial court erred in granting the father's plea to the jurisdiction. Office of the AG of Tex. v. Long, 401 S.W.3d 911 (May 21, 2013).

Independent Action in Another Court Where Custody and Support Not Determined - After Final Judgment. - The first proviso of subsection (f) of this section, when read in conjunction with the first sentence of subsection (f) and in conjunction with subsection (b), makes it clear that after final judgment in a previously instituted action between the parents, where custody and support has not been brought to issue or determined, the custody and support issue may be determined in an independent action in another court. Kennedy v. Surratt, 29 N.C. App. 404, 224 S.E.2d 215 (1976).

The custody and support issue may be determined in an independent action in another court after final judgment in a previously instituted action between the parents, where custody and support has not been brought to issue or determined. In re Holt, 1 N.C. App. 108, 160 S.E.2d 90 (1968); Wilson v. Wilson, 11 N.C. App. 397, 181 S.E.2d 190 (1971).

Subsections (b) and (f) of this section, when considered together, permit questions of custody and support to be determined in independent actions, rather than only through a motion in the cause, where a divorce judgment has been entered without a determination of custody and support in that judgment. Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 378, 188 S.E.2d 711 (1972).

Same - Before Final Judgment. - When a divorce action has been filed in one county, and there has not been a final judgment in that action, the courts of another county are, by virtue of the first proviso in subsection (f) of this section, without jurisdiction to entertain an independent action for custody of the minor children of the parties. Holbrook v. Holbrook, 38 N.C. App. 303, 247 S.E.2d 923 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 411, 251 S.E.2d 469 (1979).

Jurisdiction to Award Custody of Child After Denial of Divorce. - After plaintiff's suit for divorce from bed and board and defendant's cross action for alimony without divorce had both been denied, the judge had jurisdiction and power to enter the portion of the judgment awarding custody of the minor son of the parties to defendant and providing for his maintenance and support. Bunn v. Bunn, 258 N.C. 445, 128 S.E.2d 792 (1963).

Added Parties May Be Subjected to Jurisdiction to Same Extent as Original Parties. - In an action to determine custody of a child, an order which was entered in the Court of Appeals making the paternal grandparents parties, pursuant to their motion, subjected them to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and of the trial court to the same extent as if they had been original parties plaintiff. Brandon v. Brandon, 10 N.C. App. 457, 179 S.E.2d 177 (1971).

Failure to Raise Issue of Venue. - Because a mother and father, defendants, never appeared or filed an answer, they made no objection to venue and, thus, they waived it. Zetino-Cruz v. Benitez-Zetino, 249 N.C. App. 218, 791 S.E.2d 100 (2016).

Failure to Raise Issue of Child Support. - Defendant's mere mentioning of "a Separation Agreement dated June 5, 1981" in his 1982 divorce complaint was insufficient to raise the issue of child support. Defendant's divorce complaint did not ask the divorce court to review the question of child support and the divorce judgment did not even allude to the parties' separation agreement; therefore, defendant's contention that his prior divorce action placed the question of child support at issue with the results that (i) the original divorce court retained jurisdiction over that question and (ii) the present independent action by his wife should have been dismissed under a theory of abatement, was rejected. Powers v. Parisher, 104 N.C. App. 400, 409 S.E.2d 725 (1991), appeal dismissed, 331 N.C. 286, 417 S.E.2d 254 (1992).

Effect of Subsequent Divorce in Another State. - Where the children of the marriage were residents of this State and the parents were personally before the court, the courts of this State had jurisdiction in the wife's action for subsistence under former G.S. 50-16 to award the custody of the children to the wife and decree the amount defendant should contribute for their support, and to punish defendant as for contempt for willful failure to comply with its order, notwithstanding the fact that the husband obtained a decree of divorce in another state after the entry of the order for support. Whitford v. Whitford, 261 N.C. 353, 134 S.E.2d 635 (1964).

Judge Held Without Jurisdiction to Hear Matter Outside District. - Upon application for the custody of the children of the marriage after decree of divorce, the resident judge entered a temporary order awarding custody to the father, and issued an order to defendant wife to appear outside the county and outside the district to show cause why the temporary order should not be made permanent. It was held that the judge was without jurisdiction to hear the matter outside the district, and an order issued upon the hearing of the order to show cause was void ab initio. Patterson v. Patterson, 230 N.C. 481, 53 S.E.2d 658 (1949).

Jurisdiction over Petition Filed by DSS. - The district court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of petition filed, signed and verified by county division of social services, which alleged that child had been placed with DSS by its mother; that the putative father was unknown; that North Carolina was the home state of the child and no other state had jurisdiction over the child; and that the best interest of the child would be served if the court assumed jurisdiction over him. In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 531, 345 S.E.2d 404, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 589 (1986).

Transfer of Venue. - For the convenience of witnesses and parties and because it may be in the best interests of justice and the parties, the court of original venue may, in its discretion, transfer the venue of an ongoing action for custody or support to a more appropriate county. Broyhill v. Broyhill, 81 N.C. App. 147, 343 S.E.2d 605 (1986).

Standing to Intervene. - As a grandmother failed to allege conduct sufficient to support a finding that the parents engaged in conduct inconsistent with their parental rights and responsibilities, she could not overcome the presumption that the parents had the superior right to the care, custody, and control of the child, and lacked standing to intervene. Perdue v. Fuqua, 195 N.C. App. 583, 673 S.E.2d 145 (2009).

Dismissal Improper. - Dismissal of a wife's claims for child support and child custody for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was error as separation or initiation of a claim for divorce from bed and board was not a precondition for maintaining those claims under G.S. 50-13.1 and G.S. 50-13.5 Baumann-Chacon v. Baumann, 212 N.C. App. 137, 710 S.E.2d 431 (2011).

B. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT.

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Generally. - For cases as to full faith and credit accorded the custody decrees of other states, prior to the enactment of G.S. 50A-1 et seq., see In re Marlowe, 268 N.C. 197, 150 S.E.2d 204 (1966); Rothman v. Rothman, 6 N.C. App. 401, 170 S.E.2d 140 (1969); In re Kluttz, 7 N.C. App. 383, 172 S.E.2d 95 (1970); Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S. Ct. 1417, 39 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1974); Mathews v. Mathews, 24 N.C. App. 551, 211 S.E.2d 513 (1975); Johnston v. Johnston, 29 N.C. App. 345, 224 S.E.2d 276 (1976).

Nature of Inquiry as to Full Faith and Credit. - In a proceeding to determine whether a custody judgment is entitled to full faith and credit, the court's inquiry is first confined to whether the judgment sought to be enforced was a final judgment rendered by a court with competent jurisdiction. If the court determines that the foreign judgment was final and was rendered by a court with proper jurisdiction, then the judgment is entitled to full faith and credit, and the court never reaches the merits of the custody action, unless one of the parties asserts that the judgment should be modified due to a substantial change in circumstances. Lynch v. Lynch, 303 N.C. 367, 279 S.E.2d 840 (1981).

When a court asserts jurisdiction to enforce a custody judgment of another state and no showing of a substantial change of circumstances is made, its jurisdiction terminates upon a final judgment awarding full faith and credit to the sister state's decree. Lynch v. Lynch, 303 N.C. 367, 279 S.E.2d 840 (1981).

A temporary custody judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit and has no effect on defendant's ability to seek full faith and credit of a final custody judgment subsequently rendered in another state. Lynch v. Lynch, 303 N.C. 367, 279 S.E.2d 840 (1981).

Indiana Order for Child Support Given Full Faith and Credit. - Although there was no jurisdictional rule requiring the trial court to dismiss plaintiff father's North Carolina action seeking definition of his child support obligations simply because defendant mother had filed an action in Indiana, where, when plaintiff's motion came on for hearing, the Indiana court had already entered an order on the issue of child support, that order was entitled to full faith and credit in this State as long as plaintiff was not denied due process of law in the Indiana court's assertion of jurisdiction over him. Lynch v. Lynch, 96 N.C. App. 601, 386 S.E.2d 607 (1989).

C. RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE.

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Findings of the court as to the residence of the parties are conclusive when supported by any competent evidence. Holbrook v. Holbrook, 38 N.C. App. 303, 247 S.E.2d 923 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 411, 251 S.E.2d 469 (1979).

Domicile of Husband Not Necessarily Domicile of Wife and Children. - Where the husband in his divorce action alleged that he had notified his wife that he would no longer live with her as husband and wife, he could not assert the fictional unity of persons for the purpose of maintaining that his domicile was the domicile of his wife and children. Coble v. Coble, 229 N.C. 81, 47 S.E.2d 798 (1948).

IV. NOTICE.

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Purpose of Subdivision (d)(1). - Subdivision (d)(1) of this section is designed to give the parties to a custody action adequate notice in order to insure a fair hearing. Clayton v. Clayton, 54 N.C. App. 612, 284 S.E.2d 125 (1981).

Five Day (now 10 Day) Notice of Custody Hearing Not Absolute Right. - Ordinarily a parent is entitled to at least five days' (now 10 days') notice (an intervening Saturday or Sunday excluded) of a hearing involving the custody of a child, but this is not an absolute right and is subject to the rule relating to waiver of notice and to the rule that a new trial will not be granted for mere technical error which could not have affected the result, but only for error which is prejudicial, amounting to the denial of a substantial right. Brandon v. Brandon, 10 N.C. App. 457, 179 S.E.2d 177 (1971).

A party entitled to notice of a motion may waive such notice. Brandon v. Brandon, 10 N.C. App. 457, 179 S.E.2d 177 (1971).

And ordinarily does this by attending the hearing of the motion and participating in it. Brandon v. Brandon, 10 N.C. App. 457, 179 S.E.2d 177 (1971).

Notice of Motion for Custody Served on Counsel of Record. - A court which acquired jurisdiction of husband in a divorce proceeding before he left the State had jurisdiction to hear motion for custody filed after divorce decree where notice of motion was served on husband's counsel of record. Weddington v. Weddington, 243 N.C. 702, 92 S.E.2d 71 (1956).

Request for Variance for Child Support Guidelines. - G.S. 50-13.4 does not identify any time restrictions for making the request for a hearing. However, to effectuate the purpose of that statute, any party in a pending action requesting a variance from the guidelines must, unless the request is made in the original pleadings, give at least ten days written notice as required by this section. Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991).

Absent a timely and proper request for a variance of the guidelines, support set consistent with the guidelines was conclusively presumed to be in such amount as to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education, and maintenance. Browne v. Browne, 101 N.C. App. 617, 400 S.E.2d 736 (1991).

Because the trial court elected to deny a father's motion requesting a deviation from the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines in its discretion, rather than dismiss it as untimely, the court of appeals did not need to address the timeliness of the motion. Simms v. Bolger, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 522 (2019).

Trial court's temporary custody order in an action filed by the child's putative father was not valid because the child's presumed father was not given notice, even though, under G.S. 50-13.5(e)(3), in the discretion of the court, failure of service of notice would not affect the validity of an order; that provision only applied to orders entered with respect to support actions. Smith v. Barbour, 154 N.C. App. 402, 571 S.E.2d 872 (2002), cert. denied, - N.C. - , 599 S.E.2d 408 (2004).

Adequacy of Notice. - Trial court's judgment to modify a child custody award and award sole custody of the minor children to the mother was affirmed because the father admitted that he was on actual notice that a motion to modify custody was set to be heard, but was continued to some date in the future in order to accommodate his need to find new counsel. In addition, he had actual notice of the scheduled court date for the hearing days prior to leaving for a planned vacation, but chose to proceed with the trip rather than attend the hearing; therefore, he had adequate notice of the hearing and an opportunity to be heard. Trivette v. Trivette, 162 N.C. App. 55, 590 S.E.2d 298 (2004).

No Notice. - Where there was no motion for custody before the trial court, there was no notice of a motion for custody as required by subdivision (d)(1) of this section. Jones v. Jones, 109 N.C. App. 293, 426 S.E.2d 468 (1993).

Notice Held Sufficient. - Mother had received adequate notice that the hearing would include changes to the visitation schedule since the father had moved the court for an order finding and holder the mother in contempt for her disobedience and failure to comply with the provision of prior orders entered in the case. Anderson v. Lackey, 163 N.C. App. 246, 593 S.E.2d 87 (2004).

V. HEARING.

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Time-tested methods for assuring an adequate and fair hearing must be applied in child custody proceedings. In re Griffin, 6 N.C. App. 375, 170 S.E.2d 84 (1969).

The question of custody is one addressed to the trial court. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966).

And Not to a Jury. - Determining the custody of minor children is never the province of a jury; it is that of the judge of the court in which the proceeding is pending. Stanback v. Stanback, 270 N.C. 497, 155 S.E.2d 221 (1967).

No Right to Jury Trial on Custody and Support Issues. - Pursuant to subsection (h) of this section, a supporting spouse is not entitled to a jury trial on the matter of custody and support of minor children. Austin v. Austin, 12 N.C. App. 286, 183 S.E.2d 420 (1971).

In a wife's action for alimony without divorce and for custody and support of the children, a trial court properly removed the case from the trial docket when the wife abandoned her claim to alimony, and the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of abandonment of his children. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 9 N.C. App. 453, 176 S.E.2d 358 (1970).

Jury to Determine Question of Fact. - Whether a child was a "minor child of the marriage" within the purview of former G.S. 50-13 could be a question of fact rather than an issue of fact, and the trial court could call a jury to its aid to hear the evidence and determine the question. Carter v. Carter, 232 N.C. 614, 61 S.E.2d 711 (1950).

An award of permanent custody may not be based upon affidavits. Story v. Story, 57 N.C. App. 509, 291 S.E.2d 923 (1982).

And Affidavits Are Not Admissible to Establish Material Facts in Custody Proceedings. - The question to be determined in child custody hearings is certainly as important as any presented in the usual contract or tort litigation. Affidavits are not, as a rule, admissible in the trial of contract and tort cases as independent evidence to establish facts material to the issues being tried, and there is no more justification for resort to inferior evidence in child custody proceedings than in such other litigations. In re Griffin, 6 N.C. App. 375, 170 S.E.2d 84 (1969).

But a party to a child custody proceeding must object when affidavits are offered or ask permission to cross-examine, or else his silence will be deemed to give consent. By implication, if timely objection is made, affidavits should not be received, at least not without affording an opportunity for cross-examination. In re Griffin, 6 N.C. App. 375, 170 S.E.2d 84 (1969).

VI. TEMPORARY CUSTODY AND SUPPORT.

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Court Has Inherent Authority to Make Temporary Orders. - A court having jurisdiction of children located within this State has the inherent authority to protect those children and to make such temporary orders as their best interests may require. MacKenzie v. MacKenzie, 21 N.C. App. 403, 204 S.E.2d 561 (1974).

Subdivisions (c)(2) and (d)(2) give the courts jurisdiction to enter temporary custody and support orders for minor children. Story v. Story, 57 N.C. App. 509, 291 S.E.2d 923 (1982).

Under subdivision (d)(2) of this section, in appropriate cases the court may enter orders for the temporary custody of a child pending the service of process. Zajicek v. Zajicek, 12 N.C. App. 563, 183 S.E.2d 850 (1971); Broaddus v. Broaddus, 45 N.C. App. 666, 263 S.E.2d 842 (1980). See also, Lynch v. Lynch, 45 N.C. App. 391, 264 S.E.2d 114 (1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 302 N.C. 189, 274 S.E.2d 212 (1981), modified on rehearing, 303 N.C. 367, 279 S.E.2d 840 (1981).

Once one of the bases for jurisdiction listed in G.S. 50A-3(a) has been established, the court may enter an ex parte order for temporary custody prior to service of process or notice, if the circumstances of the case render it appropriate. Hart v. Hart, 74 N.C. App. 1, 327 S.E.2d 631 (1985).

Emergency Order Not Warranted. - When defendant filed a motion for emergency custody on the day that plaintiff's five-week summer visitation was to begin, alleging the parties' child was exposed to a substantial risk of bodily injury or sexual abuse, and an immediate order curtailing plaintiff's visitation was necessary pursuant to G.S. 50-13.5(d)(3), trial court did not err in imposing G.S. 1A-1-11(a) sanctions against defendant because defendant presented no evidence to substantiate the allegations of sexual abuse and had filed the motion for the improper purpose of blocking plaintiff's scheduled summer visitation. Lamm v. Lamm, 210 N.C. App. 181, 707 S.E.2d 685 (2011).

Temporary Orders May Be Entered Ex Parte. - Temporary orders under subdivision (c)(2) and (d)(2) of this section may be entered ex parte and prior to service of process or notice. Story v. Story, 57 N.C. App. 509, 291 S.E.2d 923 (1982); Regan v. Smith, 131 N.C. App. 851, 509 S.E.2d 452 (1998).

Affidavits may be used as a basis for temporary orders under subdivision (c)(2) and (d)(2) of this section. Story v. Story, 57 N.C. App. 509, 291 S.E.2d 923 (1982).

If the circumstances of a particular case so require, the court may enter an order for temporary custody, even pending service of process or notice under subsection (d)(1) of this section, and the use of affidavits as a basis for filing necessary facts for such purpose may be appropriate. In re Griffin, 6 N.C. App. 375, 170 S.E.2d 84 (1969).

There may be occasions when there is considerable urgency for a temporary order for the custody of a child. In such instances, the judge may reach a decision on the basis of affidavits and other evidence produced at a preliminary hearing. The persons who have signed the affidavit are, of course, not present and there is no opportunity to cross-examine them, but this is said not to be objectionable, because the ultimate right of examination will be afforded the parties at the trial of the cause. Brandon v. Brandon, 10 N.C. App. 457, 179 S.E.2d 177 (1971).

Temporary Order Not Rendered Null and Void by Entry Prior to Service. - Clearly, under subdivision (e)(3) of this section, the fact that defendant was not served prior to the court's entry of a temporary order would not thereby render such order null and void. Broaddus v. Broaddus, 45 N.C. App. 666, 263 S.E.2d 842 (1980).

Temporary Custody Order Did Not Become Permanent Order. - Trial court erred in determining a June 2010 temporary custody order had, by operation of time, become a permanent custody order because the temporary order did not determine the issue of visitation, and a permanent custody hearing was set in less than twelve months from the entry of the temporary order; the father would not have been entitled to any visitation with the children if the temporary order had become the permanent order. Woodring v. Woodring, - N.C. App. - , 742 S.E.2d 295 (2013).

Order Was Temporary. - Order granting a father visitation was temporary because it did not determine all the issues a hearing was set within a reasonable time, and the temporary order did not, therefore, become a final order by operation of time. Woodring v. Woodring, 227 N.C. App. 638, 745 S.E.2d 13 (2013).

VII. VISITATION RIGHTS.

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A. IN GENERAL.

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Visitation rights should not be permitted to jeopardize a child's welfare. In re Jones, 62 N.C. App. 103, 302 S.E.2d 259 (1983).

While a noncustodial parent has a right to reasonable visitation, that right is limited to avoid jeopardizing the child's welfare. Woncik v. Woncik, 82 N.C. App. 244, 346 S.E.2d 277 (1986).

The award of visitation rights is a judicial function which may not be delegated to the custodial parent. Brewington v. Serrato, 77 N.C. App. 726, 336 S.E.2d 444 (1985).

Order giving custodial parent exclusive control over visitation will not be sustained. Brewington v. Serrato, 77 N.C. App. 726, 336 S.E.2d 444 (1985).

Duty of Court to Include Visitation Provision. - Once the parties failed to agree, it was the duty of the trial judge to safeguard defendant's right to visitation by including a provision in its order specifying visitation periods. Brewington v. Serrato, 77 N.C. App. 726, 336 S.E.2d 444 (1985).

Trial court is not required to make specific findings to support a visitation schedule whenever a party contends the frequency of visitation is not reasonable. Raynor v. Odom, 124 N.C. App. 724, 478 S.E.2d 655 (1996).

Visitation and child support rights are independent rights accruing primarily to the benefit of the minor child and one is not, and may not be made, contingent upon the other. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

Receipt of Support May Not Be Conditioned on Visitation. - A trial judge does not have authority to condition a minor child's receipt of support paid by the noncustodial parent on compliance with court-ordered visitation allowed the noncustodial parent by ordering that child support paid by defendant be placed in escrow if minor child fails or refuses to abide by the visitation privileges allowed defendant. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

Enforcement of Visitation Orders. - Trial judges in this State have authority to enforce orders providing for visitation by the methods set forth in G.S. 50-13.3, that is, by contempt proceedings and by injunction. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

Modification of Visitation Order. - Because the trial court's visitation order was a permanent order, the trial court erred by failing to mention its latest permanent order and purporting to modify that older order; Woodring v. Woodring, 227 N.C. App. 638, 745 S.E.2d 13 (2013).

B. DENIAL OF PARENTS' RIGHTS.

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Presumption In Custody Disputes Between Two Parents. - North Carolina Supreme Court also expressly overrules Moore v. Moore, 160 N.C. App. 569, 587 S.E.2d 74 (2003), and any other Court of Appeals decisions purporting to apply the Petersen v. Rogers presumption in custody disputes between two parents. Routten v. Routten, 374 N.C. 571, 843 S.E.2d 154 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 958, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 5995, 208 L. Ed. 2d 495 (U.S. 2020).

Abandonment as Ground to Deny Visitation Rights. - The general rule is that abandonment, by itself, does not constitute sufficient ground to deny visitation rights completely, and this rule is in accord with the principle adopted by the courts that the purpose of denying custody or visitation rights is not to punish the noncustodial parent. Johnson v. Johnson, 45 N.C. App. 644, 263 S.E.2d 822 (1980).

Contingent Termination of Visitation. - Where the trial judge had ample evidence before him to justify a conclusion that mother had purposefully engaged in a course of conduct designed to alienate the child's affections for his father, and that these actions were detrimental to the child's welfare, he did not abuse his discretion in fashioning an order directing termination of mother's visitation privilege, pending a court hearing, applicable only on the happening of a certain condition (a repetition of that course of conduct), designed to prevent further harm to the child from this type of behavior. Woncik v. Woncik, 82 N.C. App. 244, 346 S.E.2d 277 (1986).

Temporary Suspension of Visitation Rights. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in a child custody matter, in which primary physical custody of the parties' children was awarded to the father, by temporarily suspending the mother's visitation with the children pending their completion of a reunification program designed to repair the children's relationship with the father, which the trial court found had been damaged by the mother's alienating behaviors. Sneed v. Sneed, 261 N.C. App. 448, 820 S.E.2d 536 (2018).

Conditions on Parental Visitation. - Trial court erred in granting a father the exclusive authority to decide when, where, and if the mother had visitation and to decide under whose supervision the mother had visitation because giving the father the exclusive control over the mother's visitation could result in a complete denial of the mother's right, G.S. 50-13.5(i), and delegated a judicial function to the father. Woodring v. Woodring, - N.C. App. - , 742 S.E.2d 295 (2013).

Restrictions on Visitation Rights. - Trial court did not err in making its visitation determinations based upon its inability to determine the noncustodial parent's fitness as a parent, mainly because of the parent's refusal to testify regarding the child pornography allegations. The court stated in its order that it would revisit the issue of visitation once the parent obtained a psychological evaluation and a parenting assessment, and once the court obtained the results of forensic evaluation of the material recovered from the parent's computer. Meadows v. Meadows, 246 N.C. App. 245, 782 S.E.2d 561 (2016).

Findings Required Where Severe Restrictions Are Placed on Visitation Rights. - Where severe restrictions are placed on a parent's visitation rights with his child, there should be some finding of fact, supported by competent evidence in the record, warranting such restrictions. Johnson v. Johnson, 45 N.C. App. 644, 263 S.E.2d 822 (1980).

Where hostilities exist between estranged parents, it may be difficult for the noncustodial parent to maintain a relationship with his or her child when required to exercise visitation only in the presence of the other parent or a member of the other parent's family who may share such hostilities. There are, of course, circumstances warranting such restrictions, but if they are imposed, they must be based on appropriate factual findings. Johnson v. Johnson, 45 N.C. App. 644, 263 S.E.2d 822 (1980).

When severe restrictions are placed on the right of visitation, this section requires the trial judge to make findings of fact supported by competent evidence which warrant the restrictions. Falls v. Falls, 52 N.C. App. 203, 278 S.E.2d 546, cert. denied, 304 N.C. 390, 285 S.E.2d 831 (1981).

Subsection (i) of this section requires specific findings of fact to justify certain visitation restrictions. Sloop v. Friberg, 70 N.C. App. 690, 320 S.E.2d 921 (1984).

Because the parameters placed on a mother's visitation with the mother's child were not the severe restrictions that effectively denied the right of reasonable visitation, the trial court did not err by entering the court's visitation order without finding that the mother was an unfit person to have reasonable visitation. Evidence supported the finding that the mother's behavior had caused the child stress and been deleterious to the child's well-being so that it was in the best interest of the child that the mother was supervised for extended visits. Paynich v. Vestal, - N.C. App. - , 837 S.E.2d 433 (2020).

When Finding of Unfitness Is Not Necessary. - Trial court may grant full custody to one parent and deny visitation to the other parent, so long as the trial court has entered a written finding of fact that such a custody award is in the best interests of the children, without the need to have determined that the parent who has been denied visitation is a person deemed by the trial court to be unfit to spend time with the children. Routten v. Routten, 374 N.C. 571, 843 S.E.2d 154 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 958, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 5995, 208 L. Ed. 2d 495 (U.S. 2020).

Trial court denied visitation by defendant with the children without a determination that she was unfit; as there was no dispute that the trial court found that visitation with defendant would not be in the best interests of the children, this was a proper standard to apply in resolving the custody and visitation matters. Routten v. Routten, 374 N.C. 571, 843 S.E.2d 154 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 958, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 5995, 208 L. Ed. 2d 495 (U.S. 2020).

Statute identifies two different circumstances in which a parent can be denied visitation, and the disjunctive term "or" in G.S. 50-13.5(i) establishes that either of the circumstances is sufficient to justify the trial judge's decision to deny visitation; in a dispute between two parents, if the trial court determines that visitation with one parent is not in a child's best interests, then the trial court is authorized to deny visitation without a requirement to find the parent in question is unfit. Routten v. Routten, 374 N.C. 571, 843 S.E.2d 154 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 958, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 5995, 208 L. Ed. 2d 495 (U.S. 2020).

In a dispute between two parents with equal parental rights, the trial court must apply the best interest of the child standard to determine custody and visitation questions, and if the court determines that one parent should not be awarded reasonable visitation, the court shall make a written finding of fact that the parent being denied visitation rights is an unfit person to visit the child or that such visitation rights are not in the best interest of the child. Routten v. Routten, 374 N.C. 571, 843 S.E.2d 154 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 958, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 5995, 208 L. Ed. 2d 495 (U.S. 2020).

Visitation Rights Eliminated. - Trial court properly granted sole custody of a child to the mother and eliminated a father's visitation privileges because the findings of fact supported its conclusion that the father could have no direct contact with the child; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the mother not to inform the father of her and the child's address because the father threatened to kill her, failed to engage in therapy and to benefit from a domestic violence program, and was violent with her. Huml v. Huml, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 532 (2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by eliminating a father's access to information because the restriction was based on the specific facts of the case, and the trial court described its rationale in detail; the order was exceptionally detailed, well-organized, and thorough because the trial court noted the factual basis for the restrictions even to obtaining information from third parties and made detailed findings regarding the father's failure to follow the requirements of prior orders. Huml v. Huml, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 532 (2019).

Trial court properly granted sole custody of a child to the mother and eliminated a father's visitation privileges because the father consistently refused to take advantage of any opportunity to allow him to resume visitation; the father repeatedly failed to participate in counseling as ordered, to take medication as prescribed, to comply with orders regarding public visitation and with the rules governing supervised visitation, and to protect the child from exposure to domestic violence. Huml v. Huml, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 532 (2019).

Findings of Fact. - Trial court properly granted sole custody of a child to the mother and eliminated a father's visitation privileges because its findings of fact were sufficient; the trial court did not find that any inappropriate sexual contact or behavior actually happened but was concerned about the possibility of inappropriate sexual behavior; however, the evidence was not sufficient for the trial court to make a finding it had occurred or had not occurred. Huml v. Huml, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 532 (2019).

Findings Held Sufficient. - Finding of trial court that defendant had previously taken minor child to Texas under a false pretense and had subsequently refused to return him to North Carolina was a sufficient and appropriate factual finding to support the court's limitation as to the location of visitation (in North Carolina at plaintiff 's home.) Brewington v. Serrato, 77 N.C. App. 726, 336 S.E.2d 444 (1985).

Judge did not err by imposing excessive restrictions on mother's visitations with her son; evidence supported the judge's finding that mother's demonstrations of anger and hostility in the presence of the child and her frustration of the relationship between the child and father necessitated, for the child's best interest, the restrictions the judge imposed on the visitation. Correll v. Allen, 94 N.C. App. 464, 380 S.E.2d 580 (1989).

Trial court erred in suspending a father's visitation because the trial court failed to make written findings of fact regarding the fitness of the father or the best interests of the children, as required by G.S. 50-13.5(i). Maxwell v. Maxwell, 212 N.C. App. 614, 713 S.E.2d 489 (2011).

Trial court found that it would not be in the children's best interests to have any visitation with the father because he confessed that he had engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior with one of his minor daughters; he entered pleas of guilty to five counts of indecent liberties with that minor daughter; and he engaged in grooming behaviors with his other two daughters and inappropriately touched them. Respess v. Respess, 232 N.C. App. 611, 754 S.E.2d 691 (2014).

Findings Held Insufficient. - The trial court's findings in a child custody proceeding that respondent mother had abandoned her child and that it would not be in the best interests of the child for him to be carried back and forth between North Carolina, home of the father, and New Jersey, home of the mother, were insufficient to support the trial court's order restricting respondent's visiting privileges, which were limited to one weekend a month, to occasions only when petitioner father or his designated representative was present. Johnson v. Johnson, 45 N.C. App. 644, 263 S.E.2d 822 (1980).

No competent evidence showed that the father had engaged in any conduct that warranted forfeiture of his visitation rights or that the exercise of his visitation rights would be detrimental to the child's best interest, and the court's factual finding that the motel room where the father lived was an unfit environment for visitation did not support supervised visitation. Hinkle v. Hartsell, 131 N.C. App. 833, 509 S.E.2d 455 (1998).

Where the court merely recited the testimony of witnesses and did not make the required findings of fact, further findings of fact and a determination of the father's parental fitness was needed if he was to be denied all contact with his daughter. Moore v. Moore, 160 N.C. App. 569, 587 S.E.2d 74 (2003).

C. GRANDPARENTS' RIGHTS.

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Standing to Seek Grandparent Visitation. - Paternal grandparents had statutory standing to seek permanent visitation rights, notwithstanding that the father had died, as they had been allowed to intervene when custody between the father and the mother was in dispute. Alexander v. Alexander, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Mar. 16, 2021).

Modification of Grandparents' Visitation Rights. - Before an order providing visitation for grandparents of a minor child may be modified, the party seeking modification must show changed circumstances and an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. In re Jones, 62 N.C. App. 103, 302 S.E.2d 259 (1983).

Grandparents' Right to Seek Visitation Terminated Upon Death of Daughter/Non-Custodial Parent. - The trial court's jurisdiction over the issues of visitation and custody regarding plaintiff's grandchildren terminated upon the death of plaintiff's daughter, where the son-in-law had exclusive custody. Price v. Breedlove, 138 N.C. App. 149, 530 S.E.2d 559 (2000).

Visitation Rights Survived Termination of Parental Rights. - Trial court erred in concluding a grandmother's visitation rights under a prior custody order did not survive termination of a mother's parental rights because the grandmother not only intervened in the case but also obtained visitation rights via a permanent custody order; thus, the termination of the mother's parental rights did not extinguish the grandmother's court-ordered visitation rights, and the grandmother could seek to enforce the prior custody order through contempt proceedings. Adams v. Langdon, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 236 (2019).

Right to File Suit. - Subsection (j) of this section makes it clear that grandparents have the right to file suit for custody or visitation during an ongoing proceeding, but it does not restrict their right to bring an initial custody suit pursuant to G.S. 50-13.1 when there are allegations that the parent is unfit. Sharp v. Sharp, 124 N.C. App. 357, 477 S.E.2d 258 (1996).

The grandmother did not have standing under this section to seek visitation rights with her grandchildren, where the children had been adopted by their biological aunt and her husband, and there was no custody dispute. Hill v. Newman, 131 N.C. App. 793, 509 S.E.2d 226 (1998).

There are four statutes in North Carolina which permit a grandparent to maintain an action for custody or visitation of a minor child, and although plaintiff, mother of the deceased father of the two minor children, did not specify under which statute she filed, it was clear that she had no right to proceed under G.S. 50-13.1(a), 50-13.2(b1), 50-13.2A, or under this section. Shaut v. Cannon, 136 N.C. App. 834, 526 S.E.2d 214 (2000).

Grandparents lacked standing to bring a claim for visitation because there was no ongoing custody proceeding, as the mother had a natural and legal right to custody and control of the child upon the father's death and the child had not been adopted by a stepparent or relative. Graham v. Jones, - N.C. App. - , 842 S.E.2d 153 (2020).

Grandparents' Rights When Family Intact - Under G.S. 50-13.1(a), 50-13.2(b1), 50-13.2A, and 50-13.5(j), a grandparent's right to visitation arises either in the context of an ongoing custody proceeding or where the minor child is in the custody of a stepparent or a relative - the "intact family" rule; in a case that does not involve adoption by a stepparent or other relative, a grandparent must prove that the child's family is not intact before the grandparent can intervene to request visitation with his grandchild - G.S. 50-13.1(a), 50-13.2(b1), 50-13.2A, 50-13.5(j) does not grant grandparents the right to sue for visitation when no custody proceeding is ongoing and the minor children's family is intact. Eakett v. Eakett, 157 N.C. App. 550, 579 S.E.2d 486 (2003).

Lack of Intact Family Was Not Alleged So Grandparent Could Have Standing to Intervene for Visitation - Under G.S. 50-13.5(j), a grandparent was required to, and did not, allege that the wife and the child were not an "intact family" or that the underlying custody controversy had become active; therefore, his complaint did not allege facts to support his claim, so he lacked standing to intervene to gain visitation, and the grant of the motion to dismiss his claim for visitation was appropriate. Eakett v. Eakett, 157 N.C. App. 550, 579 S.E.2d 486 (2003).

Single Parent and One Child Can Be Intact Family - Single parent and her child can constitute an "intact family" for the purposes of the intact family rule. Eakett v. Eakett, 157 N.C. App. 550, 579 S.E.2d 486 (2003).

I. IN GENERAL.

Notice and Due Process Considerations. - Although this section and G.S. 50-16.4 provide for attorney's fees in both modification of child support actions and alimony actions, this authority does not override a party's basic constitutional rights to notice and due process considerations. Spencer v. Spencer, 133 N.C. App. 38, 514 S.E.2d 283 (1999).

This section applies to a proceeding to compel the future support of the child. Tidwell v. Booker, 290 N.C. 98, 225 S.E.2d 816 (1976).

And not to a proceeding to compel reimbursement for past payments made by a person secondarily liable for such child's support. Tidwell v. Booker, 290 N.C. 98, 225 S.E.2d 816 (1976).

The legislature set different standards in actions for support and in actions for custody and support in enacting this section. Taylor v. Taylor, 343 N.C. 50, 468 S.E.2d 33 (1996).

This section does not require a determination that one spouse is a dependent spouse and the other a supporting spouse. Taylor v. Taylor, 343 N.C. 50, 468 S.E.2d 33 (1996).

Attorneys' fees are not recoverable in an action for equitable distribution, so that, in a combined action, the fees awarded must be attributable to work by the attorneys on the divorce, alimony and child support actions. Patterson v. Patterson, 81 N.C. App. 255, 343 S.E.2d 595 (1986); Holder v. Holder, 87 N.C. App. 578, 361 S.E.2d 891 (1987).

Settlement Agreement May Provide for Recovery of Attorney's Fees. - The public policy of this State encourages settlement agreements and supports the inclusion of a provision for the recovery of attorney's fees in settlement agreements. Bromhal v. Stott, 341 N.C. 702, 462 S.E.2d 219 (1995).

Applicability in Action Involving Illegitimate Child. - This section does not apply to civil actions to establish paternity under G.S. 49-14, but would authorize an award of reasonable attorneys' fees for custody and support actions involving an illegitimate child whose paternity has been determined. Smith v. Price, 74 N.C. App. 413, 328 S.E.2d 811 (1985), modified on other grounds, 315 N.C. 523, 340 S.E.2d 408 (1986).

Attorneys' fees incurred in prosecuting paternity actions may not be awarded under this section, but may only be assessed as costs under G.S. 6-21(10). Napowsa v. Langston, 95 N.C. App. 14, 381 S.E.2d 882, cert. denied, 325 N.C. 709, 388 S.E.2d 460 (1989).

G.S. 50-13.6 did not apply to a civil action to establish paternity under G.S. 49-14. Guilford County ex rel. Holt v. Puckett, 191 N.C. App. 693, 664 S.E.2d 362 (2008).

Visitation Action Qualifies As Custody Action for Attorney Fee Purposes. - Action by intervening grandparents for visitation qualifies as an action for custody, and if that action falls within the scope of G.S. 50-13.6 as an action for the custody, support, or both of a minor child for the purposes of awarding fees to the grandparents, then such an action must also fall within the scope of the statute for purposes of ordering the grandparents to pay; an award of fees against grandparents seeking visitation rights was authorized. Sullivan v. Woody, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 306 (2020).

Contingent Fee Agreements Not Enforceable. - A contract for the payment of a fee to an attorney contingent upon his procuring a divorce for his client or contingent in amount upon the amount of alimony and/or property awarded is void as against public policy. Such a contract is unenforceable exclusively by virtue of the fact that it violates the public policy of this State. Thompson v. Thompson, 70 N.C. App. 147, 319 S.E.2d 315 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 313 N.C. 313, 328 S.E.2d 288 (1985).

A trial court has no discretion to award statutory legal fees for services rendered in a child custody and support action pursuant to a contingent fee contract, which is void as against public policy. Davis v. Taylor, 81 N.C. App. 42, 344 S.E.2d 19, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 414, 349 S.E.2d 593 (1986).

Contingent fee provision in contract between mother seeking child support and attorneys, whose stated purpose was to recover a lump sum award, from which a percentage attorneys' fee would be derived, permeated the entire agreement, as it was the essence of the contract; therefore, the entire contract was void as against public policy. Davis v. Taylor, 81 N.C. App. 42, 344 S.E.2d 19, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 414, 349 S.E.2d 593 (1986).

But Fees May Be Awarded for Services after Withdrawal of Contract. - Statutory legal fees for services rendered in a child custody and support action may be awarded for the period beginning after illegal contingent fee contract is withdrawn. Davis v. Taylor, 81 N.C. App. 42, 344 S.E.2d 19, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 414, 349 S.E.2d 593 (1986).

Trial judge is permitted to exercise considerable discretion in allowing or disallowing attorneys' fees in child custody or support cases. Brandon v. Brandon, 10 N.C. App. 457, 179 S.E.2d 177 (1971); Warner v. Latimer, 68 N.C. App. 170, 314 S.E.2d 789 (1984).

The amount awarded as counsel fees also comes within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Kearns v. Kearns, 6 N.C. App. 319, 170 S.E.2d 132 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Stephenson v. Stephenson, 55 N.C. App. 250, 285 S.E.2d 281 (1981).

When the statutory requirements for a custody suit or a custody and support suit have been met, the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge and is reviewable on appeal only for abuse of discretion. Hudson v. Hudson, 299 N.C. 465, 263 S.E.2d 719 (1980); Patton v. Patton, 78 N.C. App. 247, 337 S.E.2d 607 (1985), rev'd in part on other grounds, 318 N.C. 404, 348 S.E.2d 593 (1986).

In a custody and support action, once the statutory requirements of this section have been met, whether to award attorney's fees and in what amounts is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and is only reviewable based on an abuse of discretion. Savani v. Savani, 102 N.C. App. 496, 403 S.E.2d 900 (1991).

The amount of the award of attorneys' fees is within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Cobb v. Cobb, 79 N.C. App. 592, 339 S.E.2d 825 (1986).

Court's discretion in disallowing attorneys' fees is limited only by the abuse of discretion rule. Puett v. Puett, 75 N.C. App. 554, 331 S.E.2d 287 (1985).

As to the effect of this section and other statutes on the court's discretion, see Brandon v. Brandon, 10 N.C. App. 457, 179 S.E.2d 177 (1971).

Binding Effect of Trial Court's Determination Absent Abuse. - The trial court's determination of attorneys' fees is binding on the appellate courts in the absence of abuse of discretion. Wyche v. Wyche, 29 N.C. App. 685, 225 S.E.2d 626, cert. denied, 290 N.C. 668, 228 S.E.2d 459 (1976); Evans v. Craddock, 61 N.C. App. 438, 300 S.E.2d 908 (1983).

Reviewable Question of Law in Custody and Custody and Support Suits. - Whether the requirements of this section for a custody suit or a custody and support suit have been met is a question of law reviewable on appeal. Hudson v. Hudson, 299 N.C. 465, 263 S.E.2d 719 (1980); Patton v. Patton, 78 N.C. App. 247, 337 S.E.2d 607 (1985), rev'd in part on other grounds, 318 N.C. 404, 348 S.E.2d 593 (1986); Cox v. Cox, 133 N.C. App. 221, 515 S.E.2d 61 (1999).

Proof Required to Support Award in Custody and Custody and Support Suits. - In a custody suit or a custody and support suit, the trial judge, pursuant to the first sentence in this section, has the discretion to award attorneys' fees to an interested party when that party is (1) acting in good faith and (2) has insufficient means to defray the expense of the suit. The facts required by the statute must be alleged and proved to support an order for attorneys' fees. Hudson v. Hudson, 299 N.C. 465, 263 S.E.2d 719 (1980).

Trial court found sufficient facts to support an award of attorney's fees to the mother under G.S. 50-13.6 in the father's action seeking child support; because the trial court considered both child custody and child support issues, it was not required to make an additional finding of fact regarding a refusal to provide child support in order to award the mother attorney's fees. Burr v. Burr, 153 N.C. App. 504, 570 S.E.2d 222 (2002).

Award of counsel fees is appropriate whenever it is shown that the spouse is, in fact, dependent, is entitled to the relief demanded, and is without sufficient means whereon to subsist during the prosecution and defray the necessary expenses thereof. Fungaroli v. Fungaroli, 53 N.C. App. 270, 280 S.E.2d 787 (1981).

Award Proper in Case of Frivolous Action. - Evidence of the father's lack of contact with the child after the parties separated was sufficient to support the district court's conclusion that the father's action for custody of the child was frivolous; therefore, the award of attorney's fees to the mother was proper. Doan v. Doan, 156 N.C. App. 570, 577 S.E.2d 146 (2003).

Financial Circumstances. - Trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to a father because it could have misapprehended its ability to consider the financial circumstances of the mother; the order was remanded for the trial court to reconsider its discretionary award, and in exercising its discretion, the trial court could decline to consider the mother's financial situation in light of all of the circumstances of the case or it could consider her financial situation and compare it to the father's situation. Schneider v. Schneider, 256 N.C. App. 228, 807 S.E.2d 165 (2017).

Trial court is not required to consider the financial circumstances of the party ordered to pay attorney fees, but the trial court is allowed, in its discretion, to consider the financial circumstances of the party ordered to pay and to compare the financial situations of the parties. Schneider v. Schneider, 256 N.C. App. 228, 807 S.E.2d 165 (2017).

Consideration of Estate. - Trial court, in ruling on a motion for attorney's fees in a child custody and support action, may determine that a party has sufficient means to defray the cost of the action without considering the estate of the other party. Taylor v. Taylor, 343 N.C. 50, 468 S.E.2d 33 (1996).

Requirement of Insufficient Means. - Before attorneys' fees may be awarded in an alimony case to the dependent spouse under G.S. 50-16.3 and G.S. 50-16.4, and before attorneys' fees may be awarded to the interested party in a custody, support, or custody and support suit under this section, that person must have insufficient means to defray the expense of the suit; that is, he or she must be unable to employ adequate counsel in order to proceed as litigant to meet the other spouse as litigant in the suit. Hudson v. Hudson, 299 N.C. 465, 263 S.E.2d 719 (1980); Boyd v. Boyd, 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986).

Sufficient Allegations of Insufficient Means. - Allegations that plaintiff was the dependent spouse and that she had insufficient means to support the children during the pendency of the suit were sufficient to support an award of counsel fees under this section. Rogers v. Rogers, 39 N.C. App. 635, 251 S.E.2d 663 (1979).

Required Facts Must Be Found and Proved. - Before attorneys' fees can be taxed under this section, the facts required by the section, that movant (1) is acting in good faith, and (2) has insufficient means to defray the expenses of the suit, must be both alleged and proved. Allen v. Allen, 65 N.C. App. 86, 308 S.E.2d 656 (1983), cert. denied, 310 N.C. 475, 312 S.E.2d 881 (1984).

An order for attorneys' fees pursuant to this section in an action for child custody or support, or both, must be supported by findings, required by the statute, that the party seeking the award is (1) an interested party acting in good faith and (2) has insufficient means to defray the expense of the suit. Cobb v. Cobb, 79 N.C. App. 592, 339 S.E.2d 825 (1986).

Before awarding attorneys' fees, the trial court must make specific findings of fact concerning: (1) The ability of the movants to defray the cost of the suit, i.e., that the movants are unable to employ adequate counsel in order to proceed as a litigant to meet the other litigants in the suit; (2) the good faith of the movants in proceeding in the suit; (3) the lawyer's skill; (4) the lawyer's hourly rate; and (5) the nature and scope of the legal services rendered. In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 662, 345 S.E.2d 411, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 590 (1986).

In order to be awarded attorneys' fees in an action for divorce, alimony, custody and child support, a spouse must be found to be a dependent spouse in addition to being found to be unable to defray the expense of the suit. Patterson v. Patterson, 81 N.C. App. 255, 343 S.E.2d 595 (1986).

In order to award attorneys' fees in an action involving only child support, the trial court must find as fact that (1) the interested party (a) acted in good faith and (b) has insufficient means to defray the expenses of the action and further, that (2) the supporting party refused to provide adequate support under the circumstances existing at the time of the institution of the action or proceeding. Boyd v. Boyd, 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986).

An award of attorney's fees to the father was not supported by sufficient factual findings, where the trial court concluded that the father did not have sufficient assets with which to pay his attorney's fees and that the mother did have the means to pay, but there were no findings as to father's monthly income or expenses, and no explicit finding that he acted in good faith in instituting a civil contempt action. Cox v. Cox, 133 N.C. App. 221, 515 S.E.2d 61 (1999).

Trial court did not err in awarding attorney's fees to plaintiff for previous appeal where they were not mentioned in remand instruction because trial court made necessary findings required by statute; plaintiff's motion for modification of custody and support was filed in good faith, defendant was paying inadequate amount of child support, defendant had refused to mediate issue, and plaintiff had insufficient means to defray expense of suit. McKinney v. McKinney, 228 N.C. App. 300, 745 S.E.2d 356 (2013), review denied, 753 S.E.2d 678, 2014 N.C. LEXIS 46 (2014), review dismissed, as moot, 753 S.E.2d 679, 2014 N.C. LEXIS 50 (2014).

Trial court failed to make any findings in its order as to whether plaintiff had acted in good faith and whether defendant refused to provide adequate child support, and the findings of fact, without more, were insufficient to support an award of attorney fees to plaintiff; the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact upon which a determination of the requisite reasonableness could be based, and the trial court also failed to make findings regarding the nature and scope of the legal services rendered to support its award. Davignon v. Davignon, 245 N.C. App. 358, 782 S.E.2d 391 (2016).

Reasonableness as Key Factor. - Reasonableness, not arbitrary classification of attorney activity, is the key factor under all the attorneys' fees statutes. Coastal Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Goodson Farms, Inc., 70 N.C. App. 221, 319 S.E.2d 650, cert. denied, 312 N.C. 621, 323 S.E.2d 922 (1984).

Order Must Contain Factual Findings. - A proper order under this section must contain factual findings upon which a determination of the reasonableness of the counsel fees might be based, e.g., findings as to the nature and scope of the legal services rendered, and the time and skill required. Atwell v. Atwell, 74 N.C. App. 231, 328 S.E.2d 47 (1985); Patton v. Patton, 78 N.C. App. 247, 337 S.E.2d 607 (1985), rev'd in part on other grounds, 318 N.C. 404, 348 S.E.2d 593 (1986).

The trial court made insufficient findings relative to its award of attorneys' fees where it failed to take into account the plaintiff's liquid estate of $88,000 and focused instead on her negative disposable income and where it failed to determine whether she was an interested party acting in good faith, required for actions involving child support. Bookholt v. Bookholt, 136 N.C. App. 247, 523 S.E.2d 729 (1999).

In a father's appeal from a child custody and support order, although the trial court denied a mother's request for attorneys' fees under G.S. 50-13.6, it made no findings relating to that denial, such as whether the mother acted in good faith or whether she had insufficient means to defray the expense of the suit. Consequently, the case was remanded for entry of proper factual findings to support the trial court's decision regarding the mother's request for attorneys' fees. Diehl v. Diehl, 177 N.C. App. 642, 630 S.E.2d 25 (2006).

In a custody dispute, a trial court abused its discretion in awarding a father reasonable attorney's fees, G.S. 50-13.6, because the trial court failed to make findings of fact supported by evidence that the father did not have sufficient means to employ counsel and the mother had sufficient disposable income to pay the father's attorney's fees; although information regarding the father's gross income and employment was present in the record in the father's testimony, there were no findings in the trial court's order which detailed the information. Dixon v. Gordon, 223 N.C. App. 365, 734 S.E.2d 299 (2012), review denied, 743 S.E.2d 191, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 552 (2013).

Although the trial court was not required to find that the father had resources available in order to award attorney's fees to the mother, the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to the mother without determining whether the mother had insufficient means to defray the cost of counsel. Respess v. Respess, 232 N.C. App. 611, 754 S.E.2d 691 (2014).

Trail court's order awarding attorney fees to the father failed to make any findings regarding the reasonableness of the attorney fees, as it did not make any findings as to nature and scope of the legal services rendered, the sill and time required, the attorney's hourly rate, or its reasonableness in comparison with that of other lawyers. Lueallen v. Lueallen, 249 N.C. App. 292, 790 S.E.2d 690 (2016).

Trial court's award of attorney's fees to a mother was vacated because the trial court failed to make any of the requisite findings necessary to award attorney's fees. Wilson v. Guinyard, 254 N.C. App. 229, 801 S.E.2d 700 (2017).

Findings of Fact Must Support Reasonableness of Fees. - G.S. 50-16.4 and this section permit the entering of a proper order for reasonable counsel fees for the benefit of a dependent spouse, but only where the record contains findings of fact, such as the nature and scope of the legal services rendered and the skill and time required, upon which a determination of the requisite reasonableness could be based. Austin v. Austin, 12 N.C. App. 286, 183 S.E.2d 420 (1971).

The trial court erred in failing to make findings of fact as to the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees incurred by the plaintiff after requesting and receiving a detailed affidavit from the plaintiff's counsel setting forth the nature and scope of the legal services. Rogers v. Rogers, 39 N.C. App. 635, 251 S.E.2d 663 (1979).

To support an award of attorneys' fees, the trial court should make findings as to the lawyer's skill, his hourly rate, its reasonableness in comparison with that of other lawyers, what he did, and the hours he spent. Falls v. Falls, 52 N.C. App. 203, 278 S.E.2d 546, cert. denied, 304 N.C. 390, 285 S.E.2d 831 (1981); Cox v. Cox, 133 N.C. App. 221, 515 S.E.2d 61 (1999).

As this section requires that awards of attorneys' fees be reasonable, cases construing the statute have in effect annexed a fifth requirement concerning reasonableness onto the express statutory ones; namely, that the record must contain findings of fact upon which a determination of the requisite reasonableness can be based, for example, findings pertaining to the nature and scope of the legal services rendered and the skill and time required. Warner v. Latimer, 68 N.C. App. 170, 314 S.E.2d 789 (1984).

Because this section allows for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees, cases construing the statute have in effect annexed an additional requirement concerning reasonableness onto the express statutory ones. Thus, the record must contain additional findings of fact upon which a determination of the requisite reasonableness can be based, such as findings regarding the nature and scope of the legal services rendered, the skill and time required, the attorneys' hourly rate, and its reasonableness in comparison with that of other lawyers. Cobb v. Cobb, 79 N.C. App. 592, 339 S.E.2d 825 (1986).

An order awarding counsel fees in a child support or alimony action must contain a finding or findings upon which a determination of the reasonableness of the award can be based, such as the nature and scope of the legal services rendered, the time and skill required, and the attorney's hourly rate in comparison to the customary charges of attorneys practicing in that general area. Weaver v. Weaver, 88 N.C. App. 634, 364 S.E.2d 706, cert. denied, 322 N.C. 330, 368 S.E.2d 875 (1988).

Partial listing of legal expenses is an insufficient finding of fact as to the reasonable worth of attorneys' fees. Wyatt v. Wyatt, 32 N.C. App. 162, 231 S.E.2d 42, aff'd, 35 N.C. App. 650, 242 S.E.2d 180 (1977).

Fees Where Increase in Support Not Warranted. - The court would abuse its discretion if, after determining that an increase in the award of child support was not warranted under the circumstances, it nevertheless proceeded to award attorneys' fees to plaintiff. Walker v. Tucker, 69 N.C. App. 607, 317 S.E.2d 923 (1984).

Merit Bonus. - While the quality of services rendered is properly considered in awarding fees, as well as the nature of the services required, and hence the scope and complexity of the case, there is no North Carolina authority for an award of a "merit bonus." Even assuming such bonuses are allowed, as under federal practice, that should occur only in the rare case where the applicant specifically shows superior quality representation and exceptional success. Coastal Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Goodson Farms, Inc., 70 N.C. App. 221, 319 S.E.2d 650, cert. denied, 312 N.C. 621, 323 S.E.2d 922 (1984).

Remand for Lack of Evidence as to Reasonableness. - Where an award of counsel's fees was based on attorney's affidavit stating the number of hours spent on the case, but there was no evidence before the trial court as to the nature and scope of the legal services and the skill and time required, the award was not sufficiently based, and would be vacated and remanded. Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 21 N.C. App. 276, 204 S.E.2d 198 (1974).

Order awarding attorneys' fees which failed to satisfy requirement of findings as to the lawyer's skill, his hourly rate, its reasonableness in comparison with that of other lawyers, what he did, and the hours he spent was insufficient and case would be remanded for appropriate findings as to attorneys' fees. Coleman v. Coleman, 74 N.C. App. 494, 328 S.E.2d 871 (1985).

Where trial judge made no finding of good faith by plaintiff and no indication of what portion of attorney fees was attributable to custody and support aspects of case, award of attorneys' fees would be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings on that issue. Smith v. Price, 315 N.C. 523, 340 S.E.2d 408 (1986).

Findings supported plaintiff's good faith and that plaintiff had insufficient means to defray the expense of this heavily litigated child custody dispute, and while the trial court also made extensive findings concerning the nature of the legal services rendered, the trial court failed to make the findings of fact necessary for a determination regarding what amount of fees were reasonably incurred as the result of litigation by the grandparents as intervenors, requiring remand. Sullivan v. Woody, - N.C. App. - , 843 S.E.2d 306 (2020).

Multiple awards of counsel fees in the same domestic action are, in the proper circumstances, within the court's discretion to allow. Patton v. Patton, 78 N.C. App. 247, 337 S.E.2d 607 (1985), rev'd in part on other grounds, 318 N.C. 404, 348 S.E.2d 593 (1986).

Legitimate work by counsel in precursory activity is allowable within an attorneys' fee award in connection with a domestic case. Cobb v. Cobb, 79 N.C. App. 592, 339 S.E.2d 825 (1986).

Unreasonable Depletion of Separate Estate Not Intended. - It would be contrary to the intent of the legislature to require one seeking an award of attorneys' fees to meet the expenses of litigation through the unreasonable depletion of her separate estate, where her separate estate is smaller than that of the other party. Cobb v. Cobb, 79 N.C. App. 592, 339 S.E.2d 825 (1986).

Findings Held Insufficient. - Factual findings on award of attorneys' fees were deficient as to child support where there was no finding that the supporting spouse refused to provide adequate support under the circumstances existing at the time the action was initiated, and as to both alimony and child support, where there were no factual findings upon which a determination of the reasonableness of the award could be based, other than the trial court's statement that the time expended was "reasonably necessary." Patton v. Patton, 78 N.C. App. 247, 337 S.E.2d 607 (1985), rev'd in part on other grounds, 318 N.C. 404, 348 S.E.2d 593 (1986).

Award of Fees Not Proper. - Since the merits of custody modification case were not considered, an award of attorney fees under G.S. 50-13.6 was not permitted. Hausle v. Hausle, 226 N.C. App. 241, 739 S.E.2d 203 (2013).

In a child support case, a mother was not awarded attorney's fees because she had the means to defray the cost of the litigation; moreover, the father did not refuse to provide support which was adequate under the circumstances. The record indicated that the father complied with the terms of an agreement directing him to make child support payments; in fact, he voluntarily made support payments in excess of what he was required to pay. Hinshaw v. Kuntz, 234 N.C. App. 502, 760 S.E.2d 296 (2014).

Trial court erred by awarding the wife attorney fees for the modification of child support because the husband was still paying his full obligation at the time of the institution of both motions to modify child support and by awarding fees without specifying the basis. Hill v. Hill, 261 N.C. App. 600, 821 S.E.2d 210 (2018).

Award of Fees Held Error. - The trial court erred in requiring plaintiff father to pay counsel fees of defendant mother for a hearing upon defendant's motion for an increase in the amount of child support payments made by plaintiff, where there was no showing or finding that at the time of the hearing defendant was a dependent spouse. Crouch v. Crouch, 14 N.C. App. 49, 187 S.E.2d 348, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 314, 188 S.E.2d 897 (1972), decided prior to the 1973 amendment to this section.

Where the trial court failed to make a finding of fact with respect to the wife's ability to defray the expense of the suit, as required by this section, the court abused its discretion in ordering plaintiff husband to pay attorneys' fees. Nolan v. Nolan, 20 N.C. App. 550, 202 S.E.2d 344, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 234, 204 S.E.2d 24 (1974); Rogers v. Rogers, 39 N.C. App. 635, 251 S.E.2d 663 (1979).

The trial court could not order defendant to pay plaintiff's attorney for the time spent in representing her on a contempt citation stemming from her violation of defendant's court-ordered visitation rights. Daniels v. Hatcher, 46 N.C. App. 481, 265 S.E.2d 429 (1980).

For additional case in which award of fees was held error, see Norton v. Norton, 76 N.C. App. 213, 332 S.E.2d 724 (1985).

Findings were inadequate to support an award for payment of attorneys' fees where trial court failed to make specific findings of fact required by statute and case law and instead found only that plaintiff did not have the ability to defray the costs and expenses to employ adequate representation, that the attorney had provided valuable services, and that the attorney expended in excess of five hours representing plaintiff. Cameron v. Cameron, 94 N.C. App. 168, 380 S.E.2d 121 (1989).

Where plaintiff introduced affidavits of her legal expenses but trial court made no findings on all the factors required under this section, award of attorneys' fees was vacated. Napowsa v. Langston, 95 N.C. App. 14, 381 S.E.2d 882, cert. denied, 325 N.C. 709, 388 S.E.2d 460 (1989).

While attorney fees were proper for a prospective child support claim and for a claim for recovery reasonable and necessary medical expenses, they were erroneously imposed for a retroactive child support claim, which was not warranted by applicable law. Carson v. Carson, 199 N.C. App. 101, 680 S.E.2d 885 (2009).

Reversal of Fee Award Where Increase in Support Reversed. - Where that part of order increasing child support payments was reversed, the award of attorneys' fees also had to be reversed. Mullen v. Mullen, 79 N.C. App. 627, 339 S.E.2d 838 (1986).

Where both of plaintiff's attorneys, who represented her in the custody and support hearings, submitted detailed affidavits of their experience, time, and preparation of the case, the trial judge properly found that an attorneys' fee of $80.00 per hour for 75 and 10 hours of time respectively was a reasonable amount to award for time spent on the issue of support only. Savani v. Savani, 102 N.C. App. 496, 403 S.E.2d 900 (1991).

Trial Court Erred in Considering Relative Estates of Parties. - Where the evidence failed to show that defendant did not have ample income to defry the expenses of the action and would have been required to deplete her estate to pay expenses, the trial court erred in considering the relative estates of the parties in assessing the defendant's ability to employ "adequate" counsel. Van Every v. McGuire, 125 N.C. App. 578, 481 S.E.2d 377 (1997), aff'd, 348 N.C. 58, 497 S.E.2d 689 (1998).

Award of Fees Appropriate. - The trial court did not err in requiring father to pay reasonable attorneys' fees of mother in a habeas corpus proceeding to determine the custody of their minor children, where custody of the children had been awarded to mother by both North Carolina and South Carolina courts, and father's failure to return the children to mother in South Carolina after a visit in this State forced mother to come to this State to secure their return, and father was not providing support for the children as he had been ordered. In re Hopper, 11 N.C. App. 611, 182 S.E.2d 228, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 727, 184 S.E.2d 884 (1971).

Where district court found that defendant acted in good faith and could not defray the expenses of lawsuit without impoverishing herself, and the plaintiff had not furnished adequate support for several months, the findings were sufficient to support award of attorney's fees. Osborne v. Osborne, 129 N.C. App. 34, 497 S.E.2d 113 (1998).

Where father unilaterally terminated child support payments after his son reached the age of 18 and failed to make satisfactory progress towards graduation from high school, the support payments were improperly terminated and father was properly ordered to pay the mother's attorney's fees. Leak v. Leak, 129 N.C. App. 142, 497 S.E.2d 702 (1998), cert. denied, 348 N.C. 498, 510 S.E.2d 385 (1998).

Attorney fees were properly awarded to the father in a child custody case, where the trial court made factual findings as to the parties' financial resources, that the father was an interested party acting in good faith, and as to father's attorney's skill, rates, and rendition of services. Cox v. Cox, 133 N.C. App. 221, 515 S.E.2d 61 (1999).

Trial court did not err in awarding attorney's fees to plaintiff's counsel where defendant had substantial assets, retirement and investment accounts, a home, an aircraft, a boat and a business, and plaintiff had a $41,000 income plus $2,000 in modest bank accounts. Burnett v. Wheeler, 133 N.C. App. 316, 515 S.E.2d 480 (1999).

Trial court could order the husband to pay the wife's attorney's fees incurred in seeking to have the husband held in contempt, even though he could not be held in civil contempt due to obeying the trial court's orders prior to the contempt hearing, where the trial court found: (1) the wife was acting in good faith; (2) she had insufficient means to pay her attorney's fees; and (3) the attorney's fees were reasonable. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 147 N.C. App. 566, 557 S.E.2d 126 (2001), cert. denied, 355 N.C. 493, 563 S.E.2d 567 (2002).

There was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of the wife's inability to defray the cost of litigation in a divorce proceeding as she had been paying all of the uninsured medical expenses for the past two years and had outstanding balances on those expenses at the time of the hearing. Leary v. Leary, 152 N.C. App. 438, 567 S.E.2d 834 (2002).

In an action by a mother to modify a father's child support pursuant to G.S. 50-13.7(a), the trial court properly granted attorney's fees to the mother pursuant to G.S. 50-13.6, because the trial court specifically found as a fact that the mother was a party acting in good faith to obtain reasonable support for her daughter, that the mother lacked sufficient means to pay her attorney fees, and that the father refused to provide support which was reasonable under the circumstances. Mason v. Erwin, 157 N.C. App. 284, 579 S.E.2d 120 (2003).

Order that the father pay attorneys' fees was proper because the action involved both child custody and child support, and the trial court based its calculation on an extensive discussion with the mother's counsel as well as careful consideration of the attorneys' affidavit stating the number of hours he worked on the custody and support claims. Spicer v. Spicer, 168 N.C. App. 283, 607 S.E.2d 678 (2005).

Attorney's fee award in favor of the mother in a child custody and support action was proper because, inter alia, the affidavit and detailed billing records submitted in support of the request, along with the husband's stipulation as to reasonableness of counsel's hourly rate, supported the award. Attorney fee award was not used as punishment but was based upon mother's insufficient means to defray expense of suit. Kuttner v. Kuttner, 193 N.C. App. 158, 666 S.E.2d 883 (2008).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the father to pay $40,000 of the maternal grandparents' attorneys' fee, where the fees were sought because of the father's failure to cooperate with the grandparents regarding visitation, the father did not object to the evidence offered at trial, and the trial court found that the father had the ability to pay those fees. Smith v. Barbour, 195 N.C. App. 244, 671 S.E.2d 578 (2009), review denied, 363 N.C. 375, 678 S.E.2d 670 (2009).

Trial court properly awarded a wife attorneys' fees under G.S. 50-13.6 following husband's unsuccessful, frivolous motion for contempt alleging that the wife had failed to give notice of the weeks she intended to have visitation over the summer. Additionally, fees were appropriate because the wife proceeded in good faith and did not have sufficient means to defray the costs. Wiggins v. Bright, 198 N.C. App. 692, 679 S.E.2d 874 (2009).

Entire amount of an arrearage claim and the attorney's fees owed to dependent former spouse were domestic support obligations as defined in 11 U.S.C.S. § 101(14A), and thus were allowable under 11 U.S.C.S. § 502(b)(5), and entitled to first priority status, under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(A). The attorney's fees had been awarded under G.S. 50-13.6, and the arrearage was allowed under 11 U.S.C.S. § 1322(b)(5). In re Peterson, - Bankr. - (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Nov. 29, 2012).

Trial court properly awarded attorney's fees to a former wife under the statute because its findings that the wife's actions were filed in good faith and that she had insufficient means to defray the costs of her action were supported by the wife's affidavits; the attorney's fees provision in the separation agreement did not apply because there was no determination of a breach of the agreement or order for specific performance. Hennessey v. Duckworth, 231 N.C. App. 17, 752 S.E.2d 194 (2013).

Wife was properly awarded attorney fees related to her successful child custody claim. Comstock v. Comstock, 240 N.C. App. 304, 771 S.E.2d 602 (2015).

Former wife was entitled to attorney's fees because (1) the former wife filed a custody action in good faith, despite the former wife's parental deficiencies, and (2) the former wife had insufficient means to defray suit costs, given the former wife's income and lack of personal assets. Setzler v. Setzler, 244 N.C. App. 465, 781 S.E.2d 64 (2015).

Father was properly ordered to pay a mother's attorney's fees because the trial court made statutorily required findings as well as findings of the reasonableness of the award. Summerville v. Summerville, 259 N.C. App. 228, 814 S.E.2d 887 (2018).

Order requiring a husband to pay a wife's attorney's fees was not an abuse of discretion because (1) the court properly relied on pleadings and the court record, including uncontested custody and support orders and a motion to continue, (2) disparity of financial resources was not a required consideration, and (3) detailed findings supported the conclusion that the wife was a dependent spouse with insufficient means to defray litigation costs. Beasley v. Beasley, 259 N.C. App. 735, 816 S.E.2d 866 (2018).

Award of attorney's fees to a mother was appropriate because, although the parties settled their custody dispute by consent order in a manner more favorable to the father than to what the mother sought, the mother acted in good faith in defending against the father's child custody and child support claims and in pursuing counterclaims. Moreover, because the father's monthly income was several times more than the mother's income, and the mother had recently declared bankruptcy, the mother had insufficient means to defray the expense of the suit. Conklin v. Conklin, 264 N.C. App. 142, 825 S.E.2d 678 (2019).

Award Within Discretion of Trial Court. - Award of appellate attorney's fees in matters of child custody and support, as well as alimony, is within discretion of trial court; this holding applies to any appeal of child custody or support order, whether order is interlocutory or final. McKinney v. McKinney, 228 N.C. App. 300, 745 S.E.2d 356 (2013), review denied, 753 S.E.2d 678, 2014 N.C. LEXIS 46 (2014), review dismissed, as moot, 753 S.E.2d 679, 2014 N.C. LEXIS 50 (2014).

Denial of Fees Upheld. - Respondent in a child custody proceeding was not entitled to an award of counsel fees or to have court costs taxed against petitioner father, where respondent introduced no evidence with respect to her dependent status or inability to defray the expense of the suit, and where she was not the party for whom judgment had been given. In re Cox, 17 N.C. App. 687, 195 S.E.2d 132, cert. denied, 283 N.C. 585, 196 S.E.2d 809 (1973).

Where defendant complied with all orders that directed him to make child support payments, and when necessary defendant voluntarily made payments for the support of the parties' children, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny plaintiff's motion for an award of attorneys' fees. Prescott v. Prescott, 83 N.C. App. 254, 350 S.E.2d 116 (1986).

Disallowance of Fees As Matter of Law Held Improper. - The trial court, in its discretion, was fully authorized to disallow attorneys' fees for defendant's counsel, but to disallow such fees as a matter of law was error. Brandon v. Brandon, 10 N.C. App. 457, 179 S.E.2d 177 (1971).

Entitlement to Legal Representation Not Limited to Trial Level. - There is nothing in our statutory or case law to suggest that a dependent spouse in this State is entitled to meet the supporting spouse on equal footing, in terms of adequate and suitable legal representation, at the trial level only. Fungaroli v. Fungaroli, 53 N.C. App. 270, 280 S.E.2d 787 (1981).

Award of attorneys' fees for services performed on appeal should ordinarily be granted, provided the general statutory requirements for such an award are duly met, especially where the appeal is taken by the supporting spouse. Fungaroli v. Fungaroli, 53 N.C. App. 270, 280 S.E.2d 787 (1981).

Award of Fees by Appellate Court. - Neither this section nor any other statute authorizes an appellate court to make an award of attorneys' fees. Tilley v. Tilley, 30 N.C. App. 581, 227 S.E.2d 640 (1976).

Distinction Between Taxing Fees as Costs and Ordering Payment. - As to the difference between including attorney fees in the costs taxed against a party to a lawsuit and in ordering the payment of attorneys' fees, see Smith v. Price, 315 N.C. 523, 340 S.E.2d 408 (1986).

A request for attorneys' fees may be properly raised by a motion in the cause subsequent to the determination of the main custody action. In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 662, 345 S.E.2d 411, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 590 (1986).

Time for Motion. - Where intervenors' motion for attorneys' fees was made approximately four months after the trial court had entered order awarding custody to the intervenors, and approximately four months after county division of social services had filed its notice of appeal to that order, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the intervenors' motion. However, following resolution of the appeal of the custody order, the trial court could consider intervenors' motion for attorneys' fees. In re Scearce, 81 N.C. App. 662, 345 S.E.2d 411, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 415, 349 S.E.2d 590 (1986).

Reservation of Issue of Fees when Judgment Rendered. - Since the trial court expressly reserved the issue of attorney's fees at the time it rendered judgment as to the custody matters before it, it retained the authority to consider the issue since attorney's fees were within the court's "oral announcements." Surles v. Surles, 113 N.C. App. 32, 437 S.E.2d 661 (1993).

Review of Attorney's Fees on Appeal. - While whether the statutory requirements have been met is a question of law, reviewable on appeal, the amount of attorneys' fees is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and is only reviewable for an abuse of discretion. Atwell v. Atwell, 74 N.C. App. 231, 328 S.E.2d 47 (1985).

The findings required by this section must be supported by competent evidence and are fully reviewable on appeal. Boyd v. Boyd, 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986).

The trial court committed error in failing to make adequate findings of fact to support its denial of attorney's fees. Gowing v. Gowing, 111 N.C. App. 613, 432 S.E.2d 911 (1993).

Judicial Notice of Rates of Local Attorneys. - Denial of a mother's motion for attorney fees was error because, contrary to the trial court's finding, it was not barred from taking judicial notice of customary rates of local attorneys under G.S. 8C-1-201(b); trial court's belief that it lacked authority to apply judicial notice was instrumental in its decision. Simpson v. Simpson, 209 N.C. App. 320, 703 S.E.2d 890 (2011).

Applied in Williams v. Williams, 12 N.C. App. 170, 182 S.E.2d 667 (1971); Collins v. Collins, 18 N.C. App. 45, 196 S.E.2d 282 (1973); Sawyer v. Sawyer, 21 N.C. App. 293, 204 S.E.2d 224 (1974); Powell v. Powell, 25 N.C. App. 695, 214 S.E.2d 808 (1975); Tidwell v. Booker, 27 N.C. App. 435, 219 S.E.2d 648 (1975); Holt v. Holt, 29 N.C. App. 124, 223 S.E.2d 542 (1976); Hampton v. Hampton, 29 N.C. App. 342, 224 S.E.2d 197 (1976); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 34 N.C. App. 201, 237 S.E.2d 561 (1977); Gilmore v. Gilmore, 42 N.C. App. 560, 257 S.E.2d 116 (1979); Byrd v. Byrd, 62 N.C. App. 438, 303 S.E.2d 205 (1983); Darden v. Darden, 66 N.C. App. 432, 311 S.E.2d 600 (1984); Forbes v. Forbes, 72 N.C. App. 684, 325 S.E.2d 272 (1985); Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C. App. 334, 396 S.E.2d 344 (1990); Lawrence v. Tise, 107 N.C. App. 140, 419 S.E.2d 176 (1992).

Cited in Fonvielle v. Fonvielle, 8 N.C. App. 337, 174 S.E.2d 67 (1970); Andrews v. Andrews, 12 N.C. App. 410, 183 S.E.2d 843 (1971); Brandon v. Brandon, 10 N.C. App. 457, 179 S.E.2d 177 (1971); Winters v. Winters, 11 N.C. App. 595, 181 S.E.2d 604 (1971); Winborne v. Winborne, 41 N.C. App. 756, 255 S.E.2d 640 (1979); Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986); In re Cooper, 81 N.C. App. 27, 344 S.E.2d 27 (1986); Craig v. Kelley, 89 N.C. App. 458, 366 S.E.2d 249 (1988); McLemore v. McLemore, 89 N.C. App. 451, 366 S.E.2d 495 (1988); Glatz v. Glatz, 98 N.C. App. 324, 390 S.E.2d 763 (1990); Hartsell v. Hartsell, 99 N.C. App. 380, 393 S.E.2d 570 (1990); Van Every v. McGuire, 125 N.C. App. 578, 481 S.E.2d 377 (1997), aff'd, 348 N.C. 58, 497 S.E.2d 689 (1998); Cox v. Cox, 133 N.C. App. 221, 515 S.E.2d 61 (1999); Eakes v. Eakes, 194 N.C. App. 303, 669 S.E.2d 891 (2008); Peters v. Pennington, 210 N.C. App. 1, 707 S.E.2d 724 (2011); Robinson v. Robinson, 210 N.C. App. 319, 707 S.E.2d 785 (2011); Baumann-Chacon v. Baumann, 212 N.C. App. 137, 710 S.E.2d 431 (2011); Brown's Builders Supply, Inc. v. Johnson, 240 N.C. App. 8, 769 S.E.2d 653 (2015); Savage v. Zelent, 243 N.C. App. 535, 777 S.E.2d 801 (2015); Williams v. Chaney, 250 N.C. App. 476, 792 S.E.2d 207 (2016).

II. ACTIONS FOR SUPPORT ONLY.

Second Sentence of Section Is Limited to Support Actions. - The General Assembly, having limited the second sentence to support actions, apparently did not intend the requirement to apply to custody or custody and support actions. Stanback v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 215 S.E.2d 30 (1975).

Finding Under Second Sentence Is Required Only in Support Actions. - The duty to make the required finding under the second sentence of this section is imposed only in a support action. Stanback v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 215 S.E.2d 30 (1975).

And Not in Custody or Custody and Support Actions. - The requirement of a finding that the party ordered to pay support has refused to provide support applies only in support actions and not in custody or custody and support actions. Arnold v. Arnold, 30 N.C. App. 683, 228 S.E.2d 48 (1976). See also, Goodson v. Goodson, 32 N.C. App. 76, 231 S.E.2d 178 (1977).

Where cause was heard upon plaintiff's motion for an increase in child support payments and upon defendant's motion for a modification of the child custody order, the trial court's award of attorney fees did not have to be supported by a finding that defendant, the party ordered to furnish support, had refused to provide support which was adequate at the time of the institution of the action. Fellows v. Fellows, 27 N.C. App. 407, 219 S.E.2d 285 (1975).

This section requires, in a child support action, a finding that defendant refused to provide support. In an action for custody and support, findings of fact are not required to sustain an award for counsel fees. Walker v. Walker, 38 N.C. App. 226, 247 S.E.2d 615 (1978).

Findings Required in Action for Support. - A finding of fact supported by competent evidence must be made on the issue of whether the party ordered to furnish support has refused to provide support which is adequate under the circumstances existing at the time of the institution of the action or proceeding, in addition to meeting the requirements of "good faith" and "insufficient means," before attorneys' fees may be awarded in a support suit. This issue is a question of law, reviewable on appeal. Hudson v. Hudson, 299 N.C. 465, 263 S.E.2d 719 (1980).

Before a court can award attorneys' fees to an interested party under this section in a motion in the cause proceeding for a modification of child support, the court must make the following three findings of fact: (1) the party is acting in good faith; (2) the party has insufficient means to defray the expenses of the suit; and (3) the party ordered to pay support has refused to provide support which is adequate under the circumstances existing at the time of the institution of the action or proceeding. Quick v. Quick, 67 N.C. App. 528, 313 S.E.2d 233 (1984).

The text of this section sets out four requirements to support an award of attorneys' fees, namely: (1) that the party awarded fees be an interested party; (2) that that party be acting in good faith; (3) that that party have insufficient means to defray the expense of the suit; and (4) that the party ordered to furnish support have refused to provide adequate support under the circumstances existing at the time the action was instituted. Warner v. Latimer, 68 N.C. App. 170, 314 S.E.2d 789 (1984).

Where the action is one for custody or custody and support, the first sentence of this section applies, and the court may award attorneys' fees to an interested party if it finds (1) that the party acted in good faith and (2) that the party lacks the means to defray the expense of the suit. Where the action is solely one for support, attorneys' fees may be awarded provided the court finds, in addition, that the party ordered to furnish support has refused to provide support which is adequate under the circumstances existing at the time of institution of the action or proceeding. Gibson v. Gibson, 68 N.C. App. 566, 316 S.E.2d 99 (1984).

In actions for support only, the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to a party if it finds: (1) that the party is acting in good faith; (2) that the party has insufficient means to defray the costs of the action; and (3) that the party ordered to pay support had not provided adequate support under the circumstances existing at the time of the institution of the action or proceeding. Plott v. Plott, 72 N.C. App. 82, 327 S.E.2d 273 (1985).

To award attorneys' fees in a child support action, the trial court must find as fact that: (1) The interested party (a) acted in good faith and (b) has insufficient means to defray the expenses of the action; and (2) the supporting party refused to provide adequate support "under the circumstances existing at the time of the institution of the action or proceeding." Moreover, the required findings of fact must in turn be supported by competent evidence, such as that of the parties' incomes, estates and debts. Brower v. Brower, 75 N.C. App. 425, 331 S.E.2d 170 (1985).

Where trial court's order was devoid of any statutorily required findings of fact, the award of attorneys' fees could not stand. Harris v. Harris, 91 N.C. App. 699, 373 S.E.2d 312 (1988).

Case would be remanded where trial court failed to make specific findings that: (1) the mother was acting in good faith; (2) the mother's means were insufficient to defray the expenses of the suit; and (3) the father refused to provide the child support which was adequate under the circumstances existing at the time of the action. Thomas v. Thomas, 134 N.C. App. 591, 518 S.E.2d 513 (1999).

After the father had been found to be in contempt due to his failure to pay child support, the trial court made sufficient findings of fact to support an award of attorney's fees to the mother under G.S. 50-13.6, despite the fact that there was no finding that the mother was an interested party with insufficient means to defray the cost of the litigation; under G.S. 50-13.4(c), the children's ability to pay attorney's fees was at issue, not the mother's, and the mother was an interested party under G.S. 50-13.6, as she provided the financial support in the absence of the husband. Belcher v. Averette, 152 N.C. App. 452, 568 S.E.2d 630 (2002).

In a child support and alimony modification case, there was no dispute that the husband had stayed current with his child support payments, and had in fact overpaid; therefore, although the amount of child support was modified, the wife was not entitled to attorney's fees under this section. Parsons v. Parsons, 231 N.C. App. 397, 752 S.E.2d 530 (2013).

Mother appeared to have met the statutory requirements but the trial court made no findings on the factors, and thus, the court of appeals could not review the denial of attorney fees; the father refused to provide support adequate under the circumstances existing at the time of institution of the action, and the trial court's findings had address each of the four statutory factors on remand. Crews v. Paysour, 261 N.C. App. 557, 821 S.E.2d 469 (2018).

Comparison of Parties' Estates. - Plaintiff requested the court to consider and compare the parties' estates when reviewing the trial court's award of attorney's fees, but case law held that the statute did not require the trial court to compare the relative estates of the parties. Sarno v. Sarno, 255 N.C. App. 543, 804 S.E.2d 819 (2017).

Insufficient Means to Defray Expense of Suit. - Trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to a mother following a child custody dispute because, although she testified she would soon be leaving her university position in the following months, the trial court was required to calculate her earnings as they existed at the time of the hearing, not as they would allegedly stand in the future, and, had the trial court correctly calculated the mother's monthly earnings from employment, the amount would have exceeded her monthly expenses, and the court could not have properly determined whether the mother had "insufficient means" to defray the costs of the suit. Sherrill v. Sherrill, - N.C. App. - , 846 S.E.2d 336 (2020).

Plaintiff's contention that proceeding was solely one for support was without merit, where plaintiff's modification motion initially put the issue of custody before the court, even though the issue of custody was quickly settled by agreement. Theokas v. Theokas, 97 N.C. App. 626, 389 S.E.2d 278, cert. denied, 327 N.C. 437, 395 S.E.2d 697 (1990).

Court estimates of time required and attorney's hourly rate are not sufficient. - Brower v. Brower, 75 N.C. App. 425, 331 S.E.2d 170 (1985).

Award Upheld. - Trial court order requiring mother to pay $2,500 to the father of the parties' three minor children was proper because the three children resided with the father, along with his new wife and three other children, the father had inadequate monthly income, and the attorneys' fees were reasonable. The fees were found to have been increased as a result of the mother's failure to contribute a reasonable sum to the support of the children after being asked to do so. Roberts v. McAllister, 174 N.C. App. 369, 621 S.E.2d 191 (2005), appeal dismissed, - N.C. - , 629 S.E.2d 608 (2006).

Trial court's order for fees met the statutory requirements, as it found that defendant was an interested party acting in good faith and had insufficient means to defray the expense of the suit; in the findings, the trial court noted defendant's gross income, how he had borne all of the expenses associated with the child while in his primary care, and his attorney filed an affidavit, outlining costs and fees incurred by defendant in the action. Sarno v. Sarno, 255 N.C. App. 543, 804 S.E.2d 819 (2017).

Trial court's decision to award attorney's fees for defendant's response to the petition for writ of mandamus was not manifestly unsupported by reason; although the petition might have been moot, it could not be said that defendant's filing was wholly unnecessary, and it was in the discretion of the trial court to award fees for this filing. Sarno v. Sarno, 255 N.C. App. 543, 804 S.E.2d 819 (2017).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering attorneys' fees because there was evidence to support its determination as to the reasonableness and amount of attorneys' fees; the mother's counsel presented evidence of supplemental attorney's fees and expenses in connection with the matter, and the trial court found the amount reasonable. Simms v. Bolger, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 522 (2019).

Original award of attorneys' fees was not unreasonable and did not otherwise constitute an abuse of discretion because the trial court noted that the mother had the means and ability to defray a large portion of the expenses of the suit, and the award would be both just and within the father's ability to pay. Simms v. Bolger, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 522 (2019).

I. IN GENERAL.

Editor's Note. - A number of the cases cited below were decided under former G.S. 17-39.1, which dealt with determining custody of children in habeas corpus proceedings, former G.S. 50-13, which dealt with custody and maintenance of children in divorce proceedings, and former G.S. 50-16, which dealt with custody and support of children in actions for alimony without divorce.

Some of the cases below were decided prior to enactment of G.S. 50-13.10, relating to the vesting of past due child support payments.

G.S. 50-13.2A must be read in pari materia with subsection (a), which therefore requires a showing of a substantial change of circumstances. Hedrick v. Hedrick, 90 N.C. App. 151, 368 S.E.2d 14, cert. denied, 323 N.C. 173, 373 S.E.2d 108 (1988).

No Voluntary Dismissal of Final Order Permitted. - Under Rule 41(a) and existing case law, parties may not voluntarily dismiss a final custody and child support order. Massey v. Massey, 121 N.C. App. 263, 465 S.E.2d 313 (1996).

Use of Word "May". - Where defendant contended that the use of the word "may" in this statute authorizes the trial court in the exercise of its discretion to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction, he misconstrued the statute. The word "may" authorizes the trial judge to enter an order of modification upon a showing of changed circumstances. Morris v. Morris, 91 N.C. App. 432, 371 S.E.2d 756 (1988).

There is no requirement that each successive custody hearing start with a "clean slate" and that the court not rely on the record previously generated. To the contrary, custody proceedings generally are continuing in nature. Best v. Best, 81 N.C. App. 337, 344 S.E.2d 363 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Petersen v. Rowe, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).

Noncustodial parent is not entitled as a matter of law to a credit against accrued arrearage in child support for expenses incurred while the child was with the noncustodial parent. Each case must be decided upon it own facts, and the guiding principle is whether an injustice would exist if a credit is not given. Simmons v. Simmons, 74 N.C. App. 725, 329 S.E.2d 723 (1985). And see now G.S. 50-13.10

Decision to allow, or disallow, a credit to the noncustodial parent against accrued arrearage in child support expenses incurred while the child was with the noncustodial parent is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. Simmons v. Simmons, 74 N.C. App. 725, 329 S.E.2d 723 (1985).

Custody orders are never permanent, but rather are always subject to revision based upon changes in circumstances pursuant to G.S. 50-13.7(a). Heatzig v. MacLean, 191 N.C. App. 451, 664 S.E.2d 347 (2008), review denied, appeal dismissed, 362 N.C. 681, 670 S.E.2d 564 (2008).

Applied in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 9 N.C. App. 453, 176 S.E.2d 358 (1970); Paschall v. Paschall, 26 N.C. App. 491, 216 S.E.2d 415 (1975); Roberts v. Roberts, 38 N.C. App. 295, 248 S.E.2d 85 (1978); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 45 N.C. App. 189, 262 S.E.2d 836 (1980); In re Register, 303 N.C. 149, 277 S.E.2d 356 (1981); Harris v. Harris, 56 N.C. App. 122, 286 S.E.2d 859 (1982); Newman v. Newman, 64 N.C. App. 125, 306 S.E.2d 540 (1983); O'Neal v. Wynn, 64 N.C. App. 149, 306 S.E.2d 822 (1983); Cartrette v. Cartrette, 73 N.C. App. 169, 325 S.E.2d 671 (1985); Glesner v. Dembrosky, 73 N.C. App. 594, 327 S.E.2d 60 (1985); Little v. Little, 74 N.C. App. 12, 327 S.E.2d 283 (1985); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 107 S. Ct. 3008, 97 L. Ed. 2d 485 (1987); Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 408 S.E.2d 729 (1991); Bost v. Van Nortwick, 117 N.C. App. 1, 449 S.E.2d 911 (1994); Shipman v. Shipman, 155 N.C. App. 523, 573 S.E.2d 755 (2002), aff'd, 357 N.C. 471, 586 S.E.2d 250 (2003); Sherrick v. Sherrick, 209 N.C. App. 166, 704 S.E.2d 314 (2011).

Cited in In re Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971); Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 184 S.E.2d 417 (1971); Moore v. Moore, 14 N.C. App. 165, 187 S.E.2d 371 (1972); Carmichael v. Carmichael, 40 N.C. App. 277, 252 S.E.2d 257 (1979); County of Stanislaus v. Ross, 41 N.C. App. 518, 255 S.E.2d 229 (1979); Williams v. Richardson, 53 N.C. App. 663, 281 S.E.2d 777 (1981); Phillips v. Choplin, 65 N.C. App. 506, 309 S.E.2d 716 (1983); Mather v. Mather, 70 N.C. App. 106, 318 S.E.2d 548 (1984); Coleman v. Coleman, 74 N.C. App. 494, 328 S.E.2d 871 (1985); Graham v. Graham, 77 N.C. App. 422, 335 S.E.2d 210 (1985); Griffin v. Griffin, 81 N.C. App. 665, 344 S.E.2d 828 (1986); Craig v. Kelley, 89 N.C. App. 458, 366 S.E.2d 249 (1988); Dobos v. Dobos, 111 N.C. App. 222, 431 S.E.2d 861 (1993); Jones v. Jones, 109 N.C. App. 293, 426 S.E.2d 468 (1993); Griffin v. Griffin, 118 N.C. App. 400, 456 S.E.2d 329 (1995); Garrison v. Connor, 122 N.C. App. 702, 471 S.E.2d 644 (1996); Kelly v. Otte, 123 N.C. App. 585, 474 S.E.2d 131 (1996); Cox v. Cox, 133 N.C. App. 221, 515 S.E.2d 61 (1999); Price v. Breedlove, 138 N.C. App. 149, 530 S.E.2d 559 (2000); In re Estate of Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. 646, 547 S.E.2d 483 (2001), cert. granted, 353 N.C. 727, 550 S.E.2d 779; King v. King, 144 N.C. App. 391, 547 S.E.2d 846 (2001); Mohr v. Mohr, 155 N.C. App. 421, 573 S.E.2d 729 (2002); Pataky v. Pataky, 160 N.C. App. 289, 585 S.E.2d 404 (2003), aff'd, 359 N.C. 65, 602 S.E.2d 360 (2004); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 171 N.C. App. 550, 615 S.E.2d 675 (2005); New Hanover Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Dillon v. Rains, 193 N.C. App. 208, 666 S.E.2d 800 (2008); Hibshman v. Hibshman, 212 N.C. App. 113, 710 S.E.2d 438 (2011); Ludlam v. Miller, 225 N.C. App. 350, 739 S.E.2d 555 (2013); Wellons v. White, 229 N.C. App. 164, 748 S.E.2d 709 (2013); Burger v. Smith, 243 N.C. App. 233, 776 S.E.2d 886 (2015); Guilford Cnty. ex rel. St. Peter v. Lyon, 247 N.C. App. 74, 785 S.E.2d 131 (2016); In re J.K., - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Apr. 4, 2017).

II. MODIFICATION, GENERALLY.

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided prior to enactment of G.S. 50-13.10, relating to the vesting of past due child support payments.

This section gives North Carolina courts subject matter jurisdiction to modify child support orders entered by another state. Morris v. Morris, 91 N.C. App. 432, 371 S.E.2d 756 (1988).

Jurisdiction To Modify Custody Order. - Trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction under G.S. 50A-203(2) to modify a Michigan custody order because North Carolina was the children's "home state" at the time the custody action was initiated, G.S. 50A-102(7), and neither the children nor the mother or father continued to reside in Michigan Crenshaw v. Williams, 211 N.C. App. 136, 710 S.E.2d 227 (2011).

Trial court did not err in granting a mother legal and primary physical custody because the court was permitted to make an initial child custody determination since the juvenile court in the neglect proceeding returned custody to the parties; in the absence of an existing permanent child custody order, the trial court was not required to find or conclude that there existed a substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child for purposes of modifying an existing custody order. McMillan v. McMillan, - N.C. App. - , 833 S.E.2d 692 (2019), cert. denied, 842 S.E.2d 597, 2020 N.C. LEXIS 534 (N.C. 2020).

Statutory Compliance Required. - Since there is a statutory procedure for modifying a custody determination, a party seeking modification of a custody decree must comply with its provisions. Bivens v. Cottle (Westlake), 120 N.C. App. 467, 462 S.E.2d 829 (1995), appeal dismissed, 346 N.C. 270, 485 S.E.2d 296 (1997).

Trial Court May Not Sua Sponte Modify Child Support. - It was error to order a father to pay all children's uninsured medical expenses because neither party asked the court to reevaluate a prior apportionment of such expenses, nor were the expenses subsumed in a prior child support order before the court, since the expenses were separately dealt with, so the trial court had no authority to modify previously agreed support on the court's own motion. Moore v. Moore, 237 N.C. App. 455, 768 S.E.2d 4 (2014).

Trial court's sua sponte child support modification was vacated because (1) such modifications were generally prohibited, and (2) there was no showing of acts sufficient to satisfy the statutory purpose. Summerville v. Summerville, 259 N.C. App. 228, 814 S.E.2d 887 (2018).

A court is without authority to sua sponte modify an existing support order. Royall v. Sawyer, 120 N.C. App. 880, 463 S.E.2d 578 (1995).

Trial court's order allowing partial payment of support obligation at contempt proceeding did not constitute a modification, such modification of child support being only allowed "upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances by either party." Bogan v. Bogan, 134 N.C. App. 176, 516 S.E.2d 641 (1999).

Court does not have the authority to sua sponte modify an existing support order, and modification of a support order cannot occur until the threshold issue of substantial change in circumstances has been shown. Miller v. Miller, 153 N.C. App. 40, 568 S.E.2d 914 (2002).

The welfare of the children in controversies involving custody is the polar star by which the courts must be guided in awarding custody. Pruneau v. Sanders, 25 N.C. App. 510, 214 S.E.2d 288, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 664, 216 S.E.2d 911 (1975); Dean v. Dean, 32 N.C. App. 482, 232 S.E.2d 470 (1977).

And the Determinative Factor. - The welfare of the child, not the frustration of the court order, is the determinative factor. Gordon v. Gordon, 46 N.C. App. 495, 265 S.E.2d 425 (1980).

And Is the Ultimate Object in Securing Child Support. - The welfare of the child is the "polar star" in the matters of custody and maintenance, yet common sense and common justice dictate that the ultimate object in such matters is to secure support commensurate with the needs of the child and the ability of the father to meet the needs. Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 158 S.E.2d 77 (1967).

The ultimate object in setting awards of child support is to secure support commensurate with the needs of the children and the ability of the father to meet the needs. Gibson v. Gibson, 24 N.C. App. 520, 211 S.E.2d 522 (1975).

The welfare of the child is always open to inquiry by the court, and upon the showing of a change of circumstances the order of custody may be modified. In re Mason, 13 N.C. App. 334, 185 S.E.2d 433 (1971), cert. denied, 280 N.C. 495, 186 S.E.2d 513 (1972).

Best Interests of the Child. - When a father filed a motion for modification of custody, a trial court did not abuse its discretion in looking back to the facts surrounding the best interests of the child, pursuant to G.S. 50-13.2(a), at the time the memorandum of judgment was entered to make appropriate findings to provide a base line before it could determine if there had been a material change in circumstances, pursuant to G.S. 50-13.7, because the mother and father had waived findings of fact and conclusions of law at the time the memorandum of judgment by consent was entered. Balawejder v. Balawejder, 216 N.C. App. 301, 721 S.E.2d 679 (2011).

Father's appeal was timely because, while the trial court orally rendered an order modifying child custody at the conclusion of the hearing and entered the order, the record did not contain a certificate to evidence when the father was served with the order or anything indicating when he received actual notice that it had been entered, and the order, although denominated a "temporary order," was in fact a permanent order that was immediately appealable, and a "best interests of the child" standard was properly applied in modifying a prior temporary custody order since it left certain issues to be determined at a later date. Brown v. Swarn, 257 N.C. App. 418, 810 S.E.2d 237 (2018).

"Best Interests of Child" Standard Applied to Temporary Order. - Trial court properly applied the "best interests of the child" standard in declining to modify a child custody award because the initial custody order was not final where it left open a parent's visitation periods and was subject to regular review to ensure the parent's increased participation pending recovery from a traumatic brain injury. Simmons v. Arriola, 160 N.C. App. 671, 586 S.E.2d 809 (2003).

Trial court's order which ordered that plaintiff mother retain physical custody of the child during the school year and that defendant father have physical custody during the summer months was affirmed because there was competent evidence to support the trial court's finding that the child custody matter did not lie dormant after the May 26, 2006 consent order was entered and this finding supported the trial court's conclusion that the May 26, 2006 consent order remained a temporary order. Therefore, the trial court did not err in utilizing the best interest of the child standard to establish child custody rather than reviewing the evidence for a substantial change in circumstances. Miller v. Miller, 201 N.C. App. 577, 686 S.E.2d 909 (2009).

The control and custody of minor children cannot be determined finally. Changed conditions will always justify inquiry by the courts into the interest and welfare of the children, and decrees may be entered as often as the facts justify. In re Herring, 268 N.C. 434, 150 S.E.2d 775 (1966); In re Bowen, 7 N.C. App. 236, 172 S.E.2d 62 (1970).

Neither agreements nor adjudications for the custody or support of a minor child are ever final. McLeod v. McLeod, 266 N.C. 144, 146 S.E.2d 65 (1966).

As children develop, their needs change, and these needs must be supplied by the parent, whose ability to supply them may change. For these reasons orders in custody proceedings are not final. Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 145 S.E.2d 332 (1965).

A judgment awarding custody is based upon conditions found to exist at the time it is entered. The judgment is subject to such change as is necessary to make it conform to changed conditions when they occur. In re Bowen, 7 N.C. App. 236, 172 S.E.2d 62 (1970); Owen v. Owen, 31 N.C. App. 230, 229 S.E.2d 49 (1976).

And Is Temporary in Nature. - All custody orders are from their very nature temporary and founded upon conditions and circumstances existing at the time of the hearing. Brandon v. Brandon, 10 N.C. App. 457, 179 S.E.2d 177 (1971).

Although they provide guidance, prior custody orders are not binding in subsequent proceedings. Custody orders are not permanent, but remain freely modifiable upon appropriate evidence of changed circumstances. Williams v. Williams, 91 N.C. App. 469, 372 S.E.2d 310 (1988).

Decrees with respect to custody and support are subject to further orders of the court. Blankenship v. Blankenship, 256 N.C. 638, 124 S.E.2d 857 (1962); Thomas v. Thomas, 259 N.C. 461, 130 S.E.2d 871 (1963).

And May Be Altered upon a Change in Circumstances. - Decrees entered by North Carolina courts in child custody and support matters are impermanent in character and are res judicata of the issue only so long as the facts and circumstances remain the same as when the decree was rendered. The decree is subject to alteration upon a change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child. Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 158 S.E.2d 77 (1967); Tate v. Tate, 9 N.C. App. 681, 177 S.E.2d 455 (1970); Gilmore v. Gilmore, 42 N.C. App. 560, 257 S.E.2d 116 (1979).

A decree for the support of a minor child is subject to alteration upon a change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child. Bishop v. Bishop, 245 N.C. 573, 96 S.E.2d 721 (1957); Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963).

It is elementary that court decrees in child custody and support matters are not permanent in character and may be modified by the court in the future if subsequent events and the welfare of the child require. In re Rose, 9 N.C. App. 413, 176 S.E.2d 249 (1970).

An order awarding the custody of minor children determines the present rights of the parties, but is not permanent in nature, and is subject to modification for a subsequent change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the children. Thomas v. Thomas, 259 N.C. 461, 130 S.E.2d 871 (1963); In re Bowen, 7 N.C. App. 236, 172 S.E.2d 62 (1970); Owen v. Owen, 31 N.C. App. 230, 229 S.E.2d 49 (1976).

The entry of an order in a custody matter does not finally determine the rights of parties as to the custody, care and control of a child, and thus when a substantial change of condition affecting the child's welfare is properly established, the court may modify a prior custody decree. Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 204 S.E.2d 678 (1974); Hassell v. Means, 42 N.C. App. 524, 257 S.E.2d 123 (1979).

On a hearing in a custody suit, the judgment is not intended to be a final determination of the rights of the parties touching the care and control of the child; thus, on a change of conditions, properly established, the question may be further heard and determined. Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 145 S.E.2d 332 (1965).

The purpose of a child support proceeding is to determine the nature and extent of the support required. The initial determination is subject to modification or vacation at any time upon motion and a showing of changed circumstances. The support issue thus may be before the court on numerous occasions during a child's minority. Leach v. Alford, 63 N.C. App. 118, 304 S.E.2d 265 (1983).

Since the ruling in Petersen v. Rogers, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994) that recognized the constitutionally - protected paramount right of parents to custody, the ruling has been interpreted to apply only to an initial custody determination, and not to motions for change of custody based on changed circumstances. Speaks v. Fanek, 122 N.C. App. 389, 470 S.E.2d 82 (1996).

As May Agreements on Such Matters. - Decrees entered by courts in child custody and support matters, or written agreements with respect to such matters, are impermanent in character and are subject to alteration by the court upon a change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child. Williams v. Williams, 18 N.C. App. 635, 197 S.E.2d 629 (1973).

While the provisions of a valid separation agreement relating to marital and property rights of the parties cannot be set aside by the court without the consent of the parties, no agreement between husband and wife can serve to deprive the courts of their inherent authority to protect the interests of and provide for the welfare of minor children. Hershey v. Hershey, 57 N.C. App. 692, 292 S.E.2d 141 (1982).

Change in Circumstances Is Threshold Issue. - Modification of a support order cannot occur until the threshold issue of substantial change in circumstances has been shown. Davis v. Risley, 104 N.C. App. 798, 411 S.E.2d 171 (1991).

Trial court applied an incorrect standard in granting a father's motion to modify a child custody order since the order from another state was a permanent custody order, and rather than first determining whether a substantial change in circumstances had occurred as required by G.S. 50-13.7(b), the trial court proceeded straight into a best interests analysis. Hatcher v. Matthews, 248 N.C. App. 491, 789 S.E.2d 499 (2016).

Party Required to Demonstrate Substantially Changed Circumstances. - Under this section, a party is required to demonstrate substantially changed circumstances affecting the welfare of the child in order to be granted a modification of an existing custody order. The word custody under the statute also includes visitation. Savani v. Savani, 102 N.C. App. 496, 403 S.E.2d 900 (1991).

No agreement or contract between husband and wife will serve to deprive the courts of their inherent as well as their statutory authority to protect the interests and provide for the welfare of infants. The parties may bind themselves by a separation agreement or by a consent judgment, but they cannot thus withdraw the children of the marriage from the protective custody of the court. Voss v. Summerfield, 77 N.C. App. 839, 336 S.E.2d 144 (1985).

Retroactive Increase Requires "Emergency Situation". - Child support reimbursement or child support governing a period prior to a motion to increase an existing child support order would constitute retroactive child support and would not be based on the presumptive guidelines. Therefore, a child support payment order may not be retroactively increased without evidence of some emergency situation that required the expenditure of sums in excess of the amount of child support paid. Biggs v. Greer, 136 N.C. App. 294, 524 S.E.2d 577 (2000).

Separation Agreement Incorporated into Consent Judgment Is Modifiable. - Where a separation agreement is adopted by incorporation into a consent judgment, the terms thereof are subject to modification by the court upon a showing of changed circumstances. Mann v. Mann, 57 N.C. App. 587, 291 S.E.2d 794 (1982).

Deference Due Agreement. - On motion filed by defendant to modify consent order to provide for child support, the defendant, as movant, will have the burden of showing a "substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child." Deference due the agreement gives rise to the presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the amount agreed upon is just and reasonable. Voss v. Summerfield, 77 N.C. App. 839, 336 S.E.2d 144 (1985).

Burden in Seeking Modification of Separation Agreement Not Incorporated in Order. - When a motion is made to modify the child support provisions of a separation agreement which has not previously been incorporated into an order or judgment of the court, the moving party's only burden is to show the amount of support necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child at the time of the hearing, and he is not required to show a change in circumstances. Should the evidence establish, giving due regard to the factors contained in G.S. 50-13.4(b) and (c), that such amount substantially exceeds the amount agreed upon in the separation agreement, such evidence would necessarily rebut the presumption of reasonableness of the amount of child support established in the agreement and establish the need for an increase. However, absent such a showing, the agreement of the parties will be deemed to be reasonable. Boyd v. Boyd, 81 N.C. App. 71, 343 S.E.2d 581 (1986).

Mother did not establish that she relied to her detriment on the parties' agreement to reduce child support; since the support order was not judicially modified, the separation agreement remained in full force and effect. Baker v. Showalter, 151 N.C. App. 546, 566 S.E.2d 172 (2002).

Effect of Reconciliation on Support Provisions of Separation Agreement. - A separation agreement is terminated for every purpose, insofar as it remains executory, when the parties resume the marital relationship. Among the executory purposes for which a separation agreement is terminated is the payment of child support. But while the courts have held that reconciliation voids alimony provisions, whether in a separation agreement or a court order, this principle has not been applied to void, as a matter of law, a judgment ordering payment of child support. Walker v. Walker, 59 N.C. App. 485, 297 S.E.2d 125 (1982).

Defendant may, upon a proper showing, be entitled to relief from those payments which, under a judgment, fell due during a period of reconciliation. Walker v. Walker, 59 N.C. App. 485, 297 S.E.2d 125 (1982).

Relitigation of Paternity Not Basis for Modifying Support Agreement. - While a voluntary support agreement may, upon motion and a showing of changed circumstances, be modified or vacated at any time, it cannot be modified or vacated on the basis of relitigation, in a proceeding related solely to the order for support, of the paternity issue. That issue is res judicata and shall not be reconsidered by the court in such a proceeding. Beaufort County v. Hopkins, 62 N.C. App. 321, 302 S.E.2d 662 (1983).

Arbitration Award Remains Reviewable and Modifiable. - While there exists no prohibition to the parties settling the issues of custody and child support by arbitration, the provisions of an award for custody or child support will always be reviewable and modifiable by the courts, as parents cannot by agreement deprive the court of its inherent and statutory authority to protect the interests of their children, and further, a court order pertaining to custody or support of a minor child does not finally determine the rights of the parties as to these matters. Crutchley v. Crutchley, 306 N.C. 518, 293 S.E.2d 793 (1982).

Because all awards or orders concerning child support or custody are reviewable and modifiable, any arbitration concerning these issues is not binding. Cyclone Roofing Co. v. David M. LaFave Co., 312 N.C. 224, 321 S.E.2d 872 (1984).

Temporary resumption of marital relationship does not require court to void support order on motion pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(4). Walker v. Walker, 59 N.C. App. 485, 297 S.E.2d 125 (1982).

Custody Provisions in a Divorce Decree Are Subject to Modification. - The provision of a final decree of divorce awarding the custody of the minor children of the marriage is subject to modification for subsequent change of condition as often as the facts justify. In re Marlowe, 268 N.C. 197, 150 S.E.2d 204 (1966).

A decree awarding custody of the child of the marriage as between its divorced parents is determinative of the present rights of the parties, but is not permanent, and may be later modified by the court upon a change of conditions. Hardee v. Mitchell, 230 N.C. 40, 51 S.E.2d 884 (1949); Griffin v. Griffin, 237 N.C. 404, 75 S.E.2d 133 (1953).

As Are Support Provisions Therein. - The court has jurisdiction to modify an order for the support of a child of the marriage entered in the husband's action for absolute divorce and may do so upon the wife's motion in the cause made subsequent to the rendition of the decree of absolute divorce. Story v. Story, 221 N.C. 114, 19 S.E.2d 136 (1942).

While the rule in Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983) did not apply to a divorce judgment entered prior thereto, the language used by the court in absolute divorce judgment, incorporating separation agreement into the judgment, was sufficient under the law as it existed prior to Walters to evidence the court's intent to make the parties' separation agreement its own determination of their respective rights and obligations. Thus, when the court adopted the parties' agreement as to child support as its own determination of the amount of child support to be paid by defendant, this order of support became modifiable in the same manner as any other child support order. Holthusen v. Holthusen, 79 N.C. App. 618, 339 S.E.2d 823 (1986).

Modification of Payments Accrued After Motion Filed. - Any child support payments which accrued after the filing of mother's motion for an increase based on changed circumstances could be subject to modification as provided by law. Mackins v. Mackins, 114 N.C. App. 538, 442 S.E.2d 352, cert. denied, 337 N.C. 694, 448 S.E.2d 527 (1994).

Modification Where Consent Judgment in Divorce Action Determined Custody. - Where custody was awarded by court order by the adoption of a consent judgment relative to child custody by the court in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, custody being awarded to defendant as part of the divorce judgment, not merely by agreement of the parties, any subsequent modification must be made in accordance with subsection (a) of this section. Barnes v. Barnes, 55 N.C. App. 670, 286 S.E.2d 586 (1982).

When child support agreement was incorporated into parties divorce judgment it became an order of court that was modifiable only as other judgments involving child custody and support are modifiable. Tyndall v. Tyndall, 80 N.C. App. 722, 343 S.E.2d 284, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 420, 349 S.E.2d 606 (1986), upholding trial court's refusal to disregard the terms of judgment and make a new, independent determination where no grounds for modifying the judgment were presented.

Modification of Support Provisions in Order of Alimony Without Divorce. - An order of alimony without divorce and child support is temporary in nature, and if future circumstances justify a change, defendant is at liberty to seek relief in the trial court by motion in the cause. Fonvielle v. Fonvielle, 8 N.C. App. 337, 174 S.E.2d 67 (1970).

In wife's action for alimony without divorce and for child support, the Court of Appeals would not disturb an order of the trial court requiring husband to make substantial payments to wife for alimony and for support of the minor children, notwithstanding husband's contention that he anticipates a substantial decrease in earning, since the order was temporary in nature and is subject to modification upon change of circumstances. Fonvielle v. Fonvielle, 8 N.C. App. 337, 174 S.E.2d 67 (1970).

Modification of Order Transferring Child Custody. - An order which transferred child custody from the plaintiff to the defendant was a final order under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 60(b), but the order could be changed subsequently upon a proper showing of change of circumstances under this section. Dishman v. Dishman, 37 N.C. App. 543, 246 S.E.2d 819 (1978).

Order May Not Be Vacated by Stipulation. - Where an order of the trial court awarding plaintiff permanent custody and obligating defendant to pay permanent child support was rendered, nothing in Rule 41 granted authority to the parties, without action by the trial court, to vacate by stipulation the order previously entered in the action. Massey v. Massey, 121 N.C. App. 263, 465 S.E.2d 313 (1996).

As to the weight to be accorded the wishes of a child who has reached the age of discretion in choosing a custodian, see Elmore v. Elmore, 4 N.C. App. 192, 166 S.E.2d 506 (1969); In re Harrell, 11 N.C. App. 351, 181 S.E.2d 188 (1971); In re Williamson, 32 N.C. App. 616, 233 S.E.2d 677 (1977); Clark v. Clark, 294 N.C. 554, 243 S.E.2d 129 (1978); Hassell v. Means, 42 N.C. App. 524, 257 S.E.2d 123 (1979).

The trial court must determine the present reasonable needs of the child before ordering a modification in child support. Mullen v. Mullen, 79 N.C. App. 627, 339 S.E.2d 838 (1986); Smith v. Smith, 89 N.C. App. 232, 365 S.E.2d 688 (1988).

To properly determine child's present reasonable needs, trial court must hear evidence and make findings of specific fact on the actual past expenditures for the minor child, the present reasonable expenses of the minor child, and the parties' relative abilities to pay. Mullen v. Mullen, 79 N.C. App. 627, 339 S.E.2d 838 (1986); Smith v. Smith, 89 N.C. App. 232, 365 S.E.2d 688 (1988).

Determination of Relative Ability to Pay. - Evidence of, and findings of fact on, the parties' income, estates, and present reasonable expenses are necessary to determine their relative abilities to pay. Mullen v. Mullen, 79 N.C. App. 627, 339 S.E.2d 838 (1986).

Inclusion of Estimated Expenses for Items That Custodial Parent Cannot Currently Afford Not Improper. - In support modification proceedings it was not improper for the court to include in its findings estimated expenses for certain items that plaintiff could not currently afford; simply because a custodial parent is unable to afford a certain item or expense is no reason to disqualify that item as a reasonable need of the child. Findings of fact as to actual past expenditures are meant to aid the trial court in determining the reasonable needs of the children, not to hamper the court's ability to assess the children's reasonable needs. Smith v. Smith, 89 N.C. App. 232, 365 S.E.2d 688 (1988).

An order providing for temporary child support is not an appealable final order, whereas an order providing for permanent child support until emancipation is an appealable final order even though permanent child support orders may be modified upon a showing of change of circumstances. Banner v. Hatcher, 124 N.C. App. 439, 477 S.E.2d 249 (1996).

Modification of Support Provisions Upheld. - Where, in a decree of divorce, father was ordered to pay a certain sum monthly for the support of his infant daughter, and by its first order the court retained the cause subject to the right of either party at any time to apply for a modification of the order, and pursuant to this provision the court later, upon father's insolvency, made the sums assessed a charge on plaintiff's homestead and personal property exemptions when allotted, the modification was authorized by statute as well as by the order of the courts. Walker v. Walker, 204 N.C. 210, 167 S.E. 818 (1933).

In the modification of an order for child support, there was no error where the trial court found sufficient facts to justify an increase in the child support payments, and these findings were supported by competent evidence in the record. Gibson v. Gibson, 24 N.C. App. 520, 211 S.E.2d 522 (1975).

Modification of Custody and Support Provisions Upheld - Trial court's judgment transferring custody of a child from his mother to his father and ordering the mother to pay child support was supported by evidence which showed that the mother moved frequently, had no home of her own, moved in with her boyfriend, and actively attempted to prevent the father from visiting his child, and that the father was about to remarry and could provide a stable home for the child. Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471, 586 S.E.2d 250 (2003).

Modification of Custody and Support Provisions Erroneous. - The trial court errs in modifying a previous order as to custody of and support of children in the absence of a motion for modification and absent any showing of changed circumstances. Smith v. Smith, 15 N.C. App. 180, 189 S.E.2d 525 (1972).

In the absence of any evidence and finding of any change in circumstances, it was error for the trial court to order an increase in the amount of child support. Childers v. Childers, 19 N.C. App. 220, 198 S.E.2d 485 (1973).

Trial court's findings held insufficient to justify an increase in support payment of $500.00 for two children, as specified in separation agreement, to payment of $800.00 for one child following older child's attaining of her majority. Rice v. Rice, 81 N.C. App. 247, 344 S.E.2d 41, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 706, 347 S.E.2d 439 (1986).

Where there was no evidence that defendant, who worked for a school system as a psychologist, intentionally depressed his income or otherwise engaged in bad faith, the trial court erred by imputing income to defendant for four weeks during the school district summer recess. Ellis v. Ellis, 126 N.C. App. 362, 485 S.E.2d 82 (1997).

Father did not show sufficient changed circumstances to warrant modification of either the support or custody order of his three children, even though mother no longer retained custody of the oldest daughter, as the welfare of the children at the time the contest came on for hearing was the controlling consideration and, based on their welfare, modification in his favor was not warranted. Davis v. Davis, (N.C. App. Aug. 7, 2001).

Evidence of Child-Oriented Expenses in Modification Hearings. - In seeking a modification of child support, the moving party must present evidence of child-oriented expenses, including the amount of those expenses at the time of the original support hearing. Fischell v. Rosenberg, 90 N.C. App. 254, 368 S.E.2d 11 (1988).

Modification of Custody Order Erroneous. - Where the trial court correctly found that no change in circumstances affecting minor's welfare had been shown, its order requiring plaintiff/mother to give defendant/father final decision-making authority as to child's schooling, extracurricular activities, and travel constituted a wrongful modification of prior custody order. Sain v. Sain, 134 N.C. App. 460, 517 S.E.2d 921 (1999).

Where there was no written order signed before the wife filed her motion to modify custody, and the written order granting joint custody was eventually entered on the same day that the trial court heard the motion to modify, an appellate court reversed the order modifying custody because there was nothing to modify since there was no order when the mother filed her motion to modify; even if it were proper for the trial court to hear the motion, it was impossible for there to have been a change in circumstances between the time the order was entered and the time it was modified on the same day, and in deciding whether a change of circumstances had occurred, the trial court should not have considered the events that transpired between the time it announced its joint custody decision and the date of the entry of the order. Carland v. Branch, 164 N.C. App. 403, 595 S.E.2d 742 (2004).

Where although father, the custodial parent, presented some evidence of present and future expenses, he presented no evidence of child-oriented expenses at the time of the prior hearing, the trial court did not have all of the evidence necessary to establish a change of circumstances and did not err in refusing to modify plaintiff 's child support. Fischell v. Rosenberg, 90 N.C. App. 254, 368 S.E.2d 11 (1988).

Trial court erred by purporting to modify a June 2010 custody order because the June order was a temporary order and the trial court did not consider the July 2011 permanent order when considering the modification. Woodring v. Woodring, - N.C. App. - , 742 S.E.2d 295 (2013).

Trial court erred by using findings of fact that were res judicata in purporting to modify a June 2010 custody order because the June order was a temporary order, the modification order contained findings since the entry of the temporary order, but a permanent order was entered in July 2011, and the only facts that were not res judicata for a determination of a substantial change in circumstances were facts that occurred after the July 2011 hearing or prior facts that were not disclosed to the court. Woodring v. Woodring, - N.C. App. - , 742 S.E.2d 295 (2013).

For case involving refusal to modify custody decree where child was actually in custody of another married couple, see Fearrington v. Fearrington, 251 N.C. 694, 111 S.E.2d 850 (1960).

For case affirming order transferring custody to paternal grandmother and awarding visitation rights to both mother and father, see Best v. Best, 81 N.C. App. 337, 344 S.E.2d 363 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Petersen v. Rowe, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).

Parent can obligate himself to support a child after emancipation and past majority, and his contract will be enforceable, it being beyond the inherent power of the court to modify same absent the consent of the parties. Hershey v. Hershey, 57 N.C. App. 692, 292 S.E.2d 141 (1982).

Modification When One of Several Children Reaches Age 18. - While child support obligations ordered by a court terminate upon the child reaching age 18, unless the child is otherwise emancipated prior to reaching age 18 or the trial court in its discretion continues to enforce the payment obligation after the child reaches age 18 and while the child is in primary or secondary school, when one of two or more minor children for whom support is ordered reaches age 18, and when the support ordered to be paid is not allocated as to each individual child, the supporting parent has no authority to unilaterally modify the amount of the child support payment. The supporting parent must apply to the trial court for modification. Craig v. Craig, 103 N.C. App. 615, 406 S.E.2d 656 (1991).

Cases holding that where one of two minor children reaches the age of 18, a trial court may retroactively modify child support arrearages when equitable considerations exist which would create an injustice if modification is not allowed, were decided before G.S. 50-13.10 became effective on October 1, 1987. Under this statute, if the supporting party is not disabled or incapacitated, a past due, vested child support payment is subject to divestment only as provided by law, and if, but only if, a written motion is filed, and due notice is given to all parties before the payment is due. Craig v. Craig, 103 N.C. App. 615, 406 S.E.2d 656 (1991).

Continuing Obligation to Support Illegitimate Child. - G.S. 49-7, read together with this section, clearly contemplates a continuing obligation on the part of the parents of an illegitimate child to provide support, including when necessary the modification or increase of payments ordered to satisfy this obligation. Having been conclusively determined a "responsible parent," as that term is defined in G.S. 110-129, the father of an illegitimate child must necessarily remain liable for the future support of his minor child. Wilkes County ex rel. Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Nations v. Gentry, 311 N.C. 580, 319 S.E.2d 224 (1984).

Substantial Decrease in Parent's Income Not Shown. - Although a substantial decrease in the non-custodial parent's income can support a modification without a showing of a change in the needs of the child, the decrease in defendant's income of $500 a year was not substantial in this case. Wiggs v. Wiggs, 128 N.C. App. 512, 495 S.E.2d 401 (1998).

Unilateral Reduction of Payments. - The father was properly held in contempt, despite his claim that the evidence did not show that he had the means to comply with the trial court's purge order, where he unilaterally reduced his child support payments after suffering a substantial reduction in income. Chused v. Chused, 131 N.C. App. 668, 508 S.E.2d 559 (1998).

III. CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES.

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided prior to enactment of G.S. 50-13.10, relating to the vesting of past due child support payments.

A change in circumstances must be shown in order to modify an order relating to custody, support or alimony. Rock v. Rock, 260 N.C. 223, 132 S.E.2d 342 (1963); Elmore v. Elmore, 4 N.C. App. 192, 166 S.E.2d 506 (1969); In re Griffin, 6 N.C. App. 375, 170 S.E.2d 84 (1969); Rothman v. Rothman, 6 N.C. App. 401, 170 S.E.2d 140 (1969); Rabon v. Ledbetter, 9 N.C. App. 376, 176 S.E.2d 372 (1970); McDowell v. McDowell, 13 N.C. App. 643, 186 S.E.2d 621 (1972); Kenney v. Kenney, 15 N.C. App. 665, 190 S.E.2d 650 (1972); Register v. Register, 18 N.C. App. 333, 196 S.E.2d 550 (1973); Pruneau v. Sanders, 25 N.C. App. 510, 214 S.E.2d 288, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 664, 216 S.E.2d 911 (1975).

Where a provision for a reduction in support payments was omitted from the original order, that order could not thereafter be modified by inserting such provision without a showing and finding of change in circumstances. Rabon v. Ledbetter, 9 N.C. App. 376, 176 S.E.2d 372 (1970).

When the parties have entered into a consent order providing for the custody and support of their children, any modification of that order must be based upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child. Woncik v. Woncik, 82 N.C. App. 244, 346 S.E.2d 277 (1986).

Where a Virginia court which had issued a divorce decree denied modification of the original child support order, and the former spouse and minor children were living in North Carolina, U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1 required the Virginia order denying modification to be given full faith and credit in North Carolina subject to changed circumstances under this section. Morris v. Morris, 91 N.C. App. 432, 371 S.E.2d 756 (1988).

A Georgia divorce judgment precluded a North Carolina court from making any findings as to child support without a showing of a change in circumstances. Shores v. Shores, 91 N.C. App. 435, 371 S.E.2d 747 (1988).

Trial court erred in modifying an existing support decree from the State of Georgia when there were no findings of fact or conclusions of law showing a change of circumstances to support such a conclusion. Shores v. Shores, 91 N.C. App. 435, 371 S.E.2d 747 (1988).

Without evidence of any change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child or an increase in need, an increase for support based solely on the ground that the support payor's income has increased is improper. Greer v. Greer, 101 N.C. App. 351, 399 S.E.2d 399 (1991).

There are no exceptions in North Carolina law to the requirement that a change in circumstances be shown before a custody decree may be modified. Bivens v. Cottle (Westlake), 120 N.C. App. 467, 462 S.E.2d 829 (1995), appeal dismissed, 346 N.C. 270, 485 S.E.2d 296 (1997).

Because a trial court could not, on the one hand, conclude there was not a substantial change of circumstances, and at the same time change the existing consent order, and the parties' incomes had to be considered to properly evaluate the mother's motion to modify child support, the modification of custody and support was reversed and remanded. Lewis v. Lewis, 181 N.C. App. 114, 638 S.E.2d 628 (2007).

In a custody case, trial court erred in granting intervener caretaker's motion to intervene and motion for custody because it did not contain any grounds for modification of the prior custody order and did not allege a substantial change in circumstances as required under G.S. 50-13.7(a). Bohannan v. McManaway, 208 N.C. App. 572, 705 S.E.2d 1 (2010).

A party seeking modification of child custody has the burden of showing changed circumstances only where an order for permanent custody already exists. Regan v. Smith, 131 N.C. App. 851, 509 S.E.2d 452 (1998).

A change in circumstances may be shown in any of several ways: an increase or decrease in the child's needs; a substantial and involuntary decrease in the income of the non-custodial parent; a voluntary decrease in income of either supporting parent; and, if the support order is at least three years old, proof of a disparity of fifteen percent or more between the original order and the amount under the Child Support Guidelines. Wiggs v. Wiggs, 128 N.C. App. 512, 495 S.E.2d 401 (1998).

Or a Separation Agreement. - Where parties to a separation agreement agree upon the amount of the support and maintenance of their minor children, there is a presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the amount mutually agreed upon is just and reasonable, and that upon motion for an increase in such allowance, a court is not warranted in ordering an increase in the absence of any evidence of a change of conditions. Soper v. Soper, 29 N.C. App. 95, 223 S.E.2d 560 (1976); Dishmon v. Dishmon, 57 N.C. App. 657, 292 S.E.2d 293 (1982); Hershey v. Hershey, 57 N.C. App. 692, 292 S.E.2d 141 (1982).

Modification of a child support order involves a two-step process: 1) the court must first determine a substantial change of circumstances has taken place; and 2) only then does it proceed to apply the guidelines to calculate the applicable amount of support. McGee v. McGee, 118 N.C. App. 19, 453 S.E.2d 531 (1995).

Meaning of "Changed Circumstances". - "Changed circumstances," as used in this section, means such a change as affects the welfare of the child. In re Harrell, 11 N.C. App. 351, 181 S.E.2d 188 (1971); Hensley v. Hensley, 21 N.C. App. 306, 204 S.E.2d 228 (1974); Hassell v. Means, 42 N.C. App. 524, 257 S.E.2d 123, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 568, 261 S.E.2d 122 (1979); O'Briant v. O'Briant, 70 N.C. App. 360, 320 S.E.2d 277, cert. denied as to additional issues, 312 N.C. 623, 323 S.E.2d 923 (1984); Wehlau v. Witek, 75 N.C. App. 596, 331 S.E.2d 223 (1985).

Although a court must make findings concerning the party's ability to pay, the changed circumstances with which the courts are concerned are those relating to child-oriented expenses. Greer v. Greer, 101 N.C. App. 351, 399 S.E.2d 399 (1991).

The changed circumstances with which the courts are concerned are those which relate to child-oriented expenses. Gilmore v. Gilmore, 42 N.C. App. 560, 257 S.E.2d 116 (1979).

The court erred in concluding that a finding of change in child-oriented expenses is a threshold requirement that must be satisfied before a court can modify a support order because of a change in the supporting party's circumstances, where the defendant presented evidence of a decreased income that could support a modification based on changed circumstances. Padilla v. Lusth, 118 N.C. App. 709, 457 S.E.2d 319 (1995).

The trial court was not required to find adverse changes in circumstances, but properly modified custody based on special needs child's best interests, where (1) reformed father's lifestyle would be better suited to providing the boy with the proper structure and educational opportunities he needed; (2) defendant/mother's job would require her to be away from the child in the evenings, leaving him in the care of others; (3) mother's home schooling of him would not meet his social and educational needs; (4) since father enrolled the child in the local public schools during the trial custody period, the boy had exhibited "phenomenal" improvement with respect to his stuttering and motor tics due to the specialized speech therapy he received; (5) father lived in a spacious new home where the boy had his own bedroom and bathroom; and (6) mother lived in an overcrowded rental home in which the boy shared a bathroom with four other people. Metz v. Metz, 138 N.C. App. 538, 530 S.E.2d 79 (2000).

Change of Circumstances in Conclusion of Law. - A substantial change of circumstances is unequivocally a conclusion of law, meaning that a change has occurred among the parties, and that change has affected the welfare of the children involved. Garrett v. Garrett, 121 N.C. App. 192, 464 S.E.2d 716 (1995).

Change Must Be Substantial. - There must generally be a substantial change of circumstances before an order of custody is changed. Rothman v. Rothman, 6 N.C. App. 401, 170 S.E.2d 140 (1969); Todd v. Todd, 18 N.C. App. 458, 197 S.E.2d 1 (1973).

Before the court will modify a custody order, it must be shown that the circumstances have so changed that the welfare of the child will be adversely affected unless the custody provision is modified. Rothman v. Rothman, 6 N.C. App. 401, 170 S.E.2d 140 (1969); Searl v. Searl, 34 N.C. App. 583, 239 S.E.2d 305 (1977); Wachacha v. Wachacha, 38 N.C. App. 504, 248 S.E.2d 375 (1978); Daniels v. Hatcher, 46 N.C. App. 481, 265 S.E.2d 429 (1980); Gordon v. Gordon, 46 N.C. App. 495, 265 S.E.2d 425 (1980); O'Briant v. O'Briant, 70 N.C. App. 360, 320 S.E.2d 277 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 313 N.C. 432, 329 S.E.2d 370 (1985).

Reduction of the monthly child support award was error because the trial court did not make a finding pursuant to G.S. 50-13.7(a) that there had been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the husband and wife's three minor children. A reduction could not be based on the fact that the husband remarried and had a child born to the new marriage, as the remarriage and obligation of also supporting a new child was a voluntary undertaking on the husband's part. Frey v. Best, 189 N.C. App. 622, 659 S.E.2d 60 (2008).

The moving party has the burden of showing a substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child. Searl v. Searl, 34 N.C. App. 583, 239 S.E.2d 305 (1977); Ebron v. Ebron, 40 N.C. App. 270, 252 S.E.2d 235 (1979); Barnes v. Barnes, 55 N.C. App. 670, 286 S.E.2d 586 (1982); Kelly v. Kelly, 77 N.C. App. 632, 335 S.E.2d 780 (1985).

When plaintiff moved that original order be vacated and either modified or eliminated, he assumed the burden of showing that circumstances had changed between the time of the order and the time of the hearing upon his motion. Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 158 S.E.2d 77 (1967); In re Harrell, 11 N.C. App. 351, 181 S.E.2d 188 (1971); Gilmore v. Gilmore, 42 N.C. App. 560, 257 S.E.2d 116 (1979).

The original decree ordering the payment of money is an adjudication of the court as to what was reasonable and proper at the time it was made. The burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a material change in the circumstances has occurred is upon the party requesting the modification. Allen v. Allen, 7 N.C. App. 555, 173 S.E.2d 10 (1970).

The party seeking to have custody order vacated has the burden of showing that circumstances have changed. Hensley v. Hensley, 21 N.C. App. 306, 204 S.E.2d 228 (1974); Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 204 S.E.2d 678 (1974); King v. Allen, 25 N.C. App. 90, 212 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 259, 214 S.E.2d 431 (1975); King v. Demo, 40 N.C. App. 661, 253 S.E.2d 616 (1979); Daniels v. Hatcher, 46 N.C. App. 481, 265 S.E.2d 429 (1980); Gordon v. Gordon, 46 N.C. App. 495, 265 S.E.2d 425 (1980); Dishmon v. Dishmon, 57 N.C. App. 657, 292 S.E.2d 293 (1982); Woncik v. Woncik, 82 N.C. App. 244, 346 S.E.2d 277 (1986).

A finding of change in child-oriented expenses is not a threshold requirement that must be satisfied before a court can modify a support order because of a change in the supporting party's circumstances. Padilla v. Lusth, 118 N.C. App. 709, 457 S.E.2d 319 (1995).

Interference with Visitation. - Because the welfare of the child is the paramount concern in custody cases, interference with visitation of the noncustodial parent which has a negative impact on the welfare of the child can constitute a substantial change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a change of custody. Woncik v. Woncik, 82 N.C. App. 244, 346 S.E.2d 277 (1986).

Communication Between Parents. - There was insufficient evidence to support trial court's findings of a substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification of a child custody order based on findings that subsequent to the parents' failed efforts to reunite, communication between them had been unsuccessful, issues relating to domestic violence had not been effectively resolved and had resulted in emotional trauma to the child, and that the parents' failure to communicate regarding issues with the minor child had jeopardized the success of the joint custodial arrangement of the previous order; instead, a review of the record showed ample evidence that although the parents had disagreements and verbal disputes, they had developed ways to communicate regarding the welfare of their son, communicated about the child's health, and that upon request by the mother, the father had delivered medicine to the child's pre-school and had cared for the child at unscheduled times. Ford v. Wright, 170 N.C. App. 89, 611 S.E.2d 456 (2005).

Removal of Parent to Another Residence. - A finding that mother "is now residing in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina" is not a finding of a substantial change of circumstances that will support the modification of a child custody order. Harrington v. Harrington, 16 N.C. App. 628, 192 S.E.2d 638 (1972).

Where a parent changes his residence, the effect on the welfare of the child must be shown in order for the court to modify a custody decree based on change of circumstances. Gordon v. Gordon, 46 N.C. App. 495, 265 S.E.2d 425 (1980); Ramirez-Barker v. Barker, 107 N.C. App. 71, 418 S.E.2d 675 (1992).

While it is true that a parent's change of residence does not of itself amount to a substantial change of circumstances, the effects of such a move on the welfare of the child may well amount to a change of circumstances requiring modification of the original custody order. O'Briant v. O'Briant, 70 N.C. App. 360, 320 S.E.2d 277 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 313 N.C. 432, 329 S.E.2d 370 (1985).

Relocation After Remarriage. - The trial court erred in amending the custody decree based on a finding of substantial change in circumstances where it found only that the proposed relocation of mother after her remarriage would adversely affect the relationship between father and his child, but made no other findings about the effect of the proposed relocation on the child and on the child's best interests. Evans v. Evans, 138 N.C. App. 135, 530 S.E.2d 576 (2000).

Removal of Child to Another Jurisdiction. - Before an order of custody is changed, more must be shown than mere removal of child from a jurisdiction which may enter an adverse decision to the removing parent. Rothman v. Rothman, 6 N.C. App. 401, 170 S.E.2d 140 (1969).

Although it is not so as a matter of law, it will be a rare case where the child will not be adversely affected when a relocation of the custodial parent and child requires substantial alteration of a successful custody-visitation arrangement in which both parents have substantial contact with the child. Ramirez-Barker v. Barker, 107 N.C. App. 71, 418 S.E.2d 675 (1992).

Trial court considered the impact of a father's relocation on the children's welfare because it found that the father took a job in another state after he lost his job in North Carolina and that the father planned to relocate his family to the other state since his prospects for future employment in his position were good, and his monthly salary allowed the father to support the children financially. Crenshaw v. Williams, 211 N.C. App. 136, 710 S.E.2d 227 (2011).

Change in Custody Between Parents. - A change in custody from the father to the mother was a changed circumstance supporting modification of the mother's child support obligation. Kowalick v. Kowalick, 129 N.C. App. 781, 501 S.E.2d 671 (1998).

Trial court did not err in modifying a father's support obligation because the significant change in the parties' custodial arrangement alone was sufficient to warrant modification of the existing support order; there was a significant difference in the amount of time that the children were able to spend with the father once the children had all moved to North Carolina. Hart v. Hart, - N.C. App. - , 836 S.E.2d 244 (2019).

Adverse Effect on Child as Factor to Support Modification. - An adverse effect on a child as the result of a change in circumstances is an acceptable factor for the courts to consider and will support a modification of a prior custody order, but showing an adverse effect is not necessary for modification. Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 501 S.E.2d 898 (1998).

Where parties crossed out a cohabitation provision on the face of their separation memorandum, the trial court only partially discharged its duty in finding that a change of circumstances occurred when husband began cohabiting with his girlfriend because it failed to determine whether plaintiff's wife had met her burden of showing the effect, if any, such change had upon the welfare of the children. Browning v. Helff, 136 N.C. App. 420, 524 S.E.2d 95 (2000).

Because the trial court carefully laid out in sequential order the facts regarding the father's relationship with a married woman, resulting in him resigning from his job, and culminating in his separation from his wife who provided at least 50 percent of the minor child's care, including helping the child with his homework, and then found that the child's grades had suffered as a result, it provided a nexus between the substantial change in circumstances and the affect on the child's welfare to overrule the father's motion to dismiss the mother's custody modification action; moreover, when balanced against the mother's attainment of both a stable living environment and a vast improvement in health after suffering from a brain tumor, the trial court's custody modification order in favor of the mother was upheld. Karger v. Wood, 174 N.C. App. 703, 622 S.E.2d 197 (2005).

Parties' allegations would be sufficient to allege a substantial change in circumstances to permit the trial court to consider a modification of child custody because a father's motion in the cause alleged that the mother had relapsed and had allegedly been observed to be highly intoxicated around the child during custody exchanges; the mother filed a response to the motion containing her own rebuttal and allegations. McMillan v. McMillan, - N.C. App. - , 833 S.E.2d 692 (2019), cert. denied, 842 S.E.2d 597, 2020 N.C. LEXIS 534 (N.C. 2020).

Father Met Burden of Showing Adverse Effect of Relocation. - Father met his burden of showing that the proposed relocation of mother and child to California likely would adversely affect the welfare of the child, and thus the "best interest" question was properly before the trial court. Ramirez-Barker v. Barker, 107 N.C. App. 71, 418 S.E.2d 675 (1992).

Decree Is Res Judicata Only as to Facts Then Existing and Before Court. - To modify a custody order, a court must find a change in circumstances. However, when facts pertinent to the custody issue existed at the time of the custody decree but were not disclosed to the court, the prior decree is res judicata only to the facts that were before the court, and other pertinent facts may be considered in subsequent custody determinations. Wehlau v. Witek, 75 N.C. App. 596, 331 S.E.2d 223 (1985).

Speculation as to Future Detrimental Change Insufficient. - A court cannot modify a custody order based on speculation or conjecture that a detrimental change may take place sometime in the future. Wehlau v. Witek, 75 N.C. App. 596, 331 S.E.2d 223 (1985).

In a custody matter, it was error to order that a father's therapist's lack of concerns about the father's mental health or ability to care for the children would constitute a change in circumstances, for modification purposes, because this predetermined such a change. Cox v. Cox, 238 N.C. App. 22, 768 S.E.2d 308 (2014).

Evidence of Husband's Suitability Did Not Negate Suitability of Former Wife. - The former husband's evidence that he was a suitable parent for custody did not negate the former wife's standing as a suitable parent for custody and did not represent a change of circumstances. Wehlau v. Witek, 75 N.C. App. 596, 331 S.E.2d 223 (1985).

Proof Required Absent Evidence of Change in Either Party's Fitness. - Where there is no evidence that the fitness or unfitness of either party has changed, the trial court may not modify a prior order unless sufficient change of circumstances adversely affecting the welfare of the child is shown. Wehlau v. Witek, 75 N.C. App. 596, 331 S.E.2d 223 (1985).

Increase in Father's Income. - The court is not warranted in ordering an increase of child support in the absence of any evidence of a change in conditions or of the need for such increase, particularly when the increase is awarded solely on the ground that the father's income has increased so that he is able to pay a larger amount. Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 133 S.E.2d 487 (1963); Dishmon v. Dishmon, 57 N.C. App. 657, 292 S.E.2d 293 (1982). See also, Crosby v. Crosby, 272 N.C. 235, 158 S.E.2d 77 (1967).

Trial court erred in finding that a mother could not seek an increase in child support from a father; G.S. 50-13.7(a) provided that child support orders were modifiable at any time, so a provision of the divorce order which stated that the father's support obligation was not modifiable was void. Young v. Young, 169 N.C. App. 31, 609 S.E.2d 795 (2005).

Decrease in Father's Income. - Where father's income had decreased from $24,000.00 per month to $2083.33 per month, he had been voluntarily terminated, he had continuously sought employment since being terminated, but those efforts had been impaired due to criminal non-support actions instituted both in Florida and in North Carolina, and his estate had been "substantially depleted,"; although the court failed to use sequentially the words "substantial involuntary reduction" in income, its findings indisputably reflected precisely that. McGee v. McGee, 118 N.C. App. 19, 453 S.E.2d 531 (1995).

Trial court erred in modifying original child-support order, where most of its findings of fact were insufficient to support the modification, and the sole valid finding was an increase in father's annual income. Thomas v. Thomas, 134 N.C. App. 591, 518 S.E.2d 513 (1999).

Because the changes in circumstances necessary to support a modification should be determined from the date of the most recent child support order which addressed the obligation in question, and an allegation of a change to the parties' income, without more, was not sufficient to support a motion to modify child support; thus, the ex-husband's motion to modify child support was properly dismissed. Devaney v. Miller, 191 N.C. App. 208, 662 S.E.2d 672 (2008).

Trial court did not err in denying a father's motion for a downward modification of child support under G.S. 50-13.7(a) because the trial court found that the father had incurred no additional cost in covering the child on his wife's health insurance policy, and no documentation about the insurance was included in the record on appeal; the trial court found that the father's insurance coverage of the child was unnecessary because the mother had been providing coverage for the child on her policy. Orange County ex rel. Pattison v. Hamilton, 213 N.C. App. 205, 714 S.E.2d 184 (2011).

Although a father was entitled to the presumption of a substantial change in circumstances, in accordance with Child Support Guidelines, N.C. Ann. R. 41 and 46, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not modifying the amount of child support, pursuant to G.S. 50-13.7(a), because the presumption was rebutted by evidence the father intentionally left his job, thereby voluntarily depressing his income. Johnston County v. Bugge, 218 N.C. App. 438, 722 S.E.2d 512 (2012).

Ability to Pay. - Where there was no evidence that the needs of defendant's minor children had changed; however, there was evidence that defendant's ability to pay his support payments had decreased, the decision of the trial court denying motion for reduction of support was remanded to the district court. Pittman v. Pittman, 114 N.C. App. 808, 443 S.E.2d 96 (1994).

A party's ability to pay child support is determined by the party's ability to pay at the time the award is made or modified. Askew v. Askew, 119 N.C. App. 242, 458 S.E.2d 217 (1995).

Involuntary Decrease in Income. - A significant involuntary decrease in a child support obligor's income satisfies the necessary showing even in the absence of any change affecting the child's needs. Hammill v. Cusack, 118 N.C. App. 82, 453 S.E.2d 539 (1995).

Voluntary Decrease in Income. - Father was not entitled to reduction in child and post-separation support payments under G.S. 50-13.7 and G.S. 50-16.9 despite being fired from job; evidence indicated that the father's unemployment was voluntary and that the father disregarded marital and parental obligations, as the father was fired for engaging in several incidents of intentional misconduct. Wolf v. Wolf, 151 N.C. App. 523, 566 S.E.2d 516 (2002).

Trial court erred in modifying a father's child support obligation downward under G.S. 50-13.7(a) despite evidence that he voluntarily quit his $ 172,000 job as an engineer to follow Jesus Christ and become a minister of a fledgling church without giving consideration to how he would meet his child support obligation. Andrews v. Andrews, 217 N.C. App. 154, 719 S.E.2d 128 (2011), review denied 365 N.C. 561, 722 S.E.2d 595, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 148 (2012).

Earning Capacity. - The father's earning capacity could not be used in determining his child support obligation, where the father was involuntarily terminated from his former job, and no evidence was presented that he acted in bad faith by deliberately depressing his income. Chused v. Chused, 131 N.C. App. 668, 508 S.E.2d 559 (1998).

Imposition of Earnings Capacity Rule. - Under G.S. 50-13.4 and this section, a husband's ability to pay child support is normally determined by his actual income at the time the award is made or modified. If, however, there is a finding that the husband is deliberately depressing his income or otherwise acting in deliberate disregard of his obligation to provide reasonable support for his child, his capacity to earn may be made the basis of the award. Under these circumstances, his motion to reduce the amount of child support will be denied. Goodhouse v. DeFravio, 57 N.C. App. 124, 290 S.E.2d 751 (1982); Harris v. Harris, 91 N.C. App. 699, 373 S.E.2d 312 (1988).

A court may refuse to modify a support and/or alimony award on the grounds that husband has failed to exercise his reasonable capacity to earn because of a disregard of his marital and parental obligations to provide reasonable support for his wife and minor child. Wachacha v. Wachacha, 38 N.C. App. 504, 248 S.E.2d 375 (1978).

The determination that a husband's change in circumstances has been voluntarily effected by him in disregard of his marital and parental obligations justifying imposition of the earnings capacity rule is a conclusion of law based on the factual findings in the particular case. Wachacha v. Wachacha, 38 N.C. App. 504, 248 S.E.2d 375 (1978).

A party's capacity to earn income may become the basis of an award if it is found that the party deliberately depressed its income or otherwise acted in deliberate disregard of the obligation to provide reasonable support for the child. Askew v. Askew, 119 N.C. App. 242, 458 S.E.2d 217 (1995).

Trial court properly increased a father's child support obligation pursuant to G.S. 50-13.7(a), as the trial court made sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion that the father retired and voluntarily reduced his income in deliberate disregard of his obligations, based on the fact that the father retired shortly after his wife won a large lottery award, and the trial court therefore properly imputed income to the father pursuant to Child Support Guidelines, N.C. Ann. R. (2003) 33, 35, at the level of the father's earnings prior to his retirement. Mason v. Erwin, 157 N.C. App. 284, 579 S.E.2d 120 (2003).

Where trial court made no findings as to self-employed father's present earnings, nor as to his reduction of income in bad faith that would support application of the earnings capacity rule, and made no findings as to a substantial change in his income compared to the findings in the previous order, the trial court's conclusion and order increasing his child support under the guidelines for self-employed individuals was not supported by the findings. Ford v. Wright, 170 N.C. App. 89, 611 S.E.2d 456 (2005).

A person's capacity to earn income may be made the basis of an award if there is a finding that the party deliberately depressed his or her income or otherwise acted in deliberate disregard of the obligation to provide reasonable support for the child. Greer v. Greer, 101 N.C. App. 351, 399 S.E.2d 399 (1991).

Consideration of Spouse's Capacity to Earn Held Error. - Trial court could not consider father's capacity to earn in computing his income where the evidence indicated that he lost his job due to no fault of his own, and the court's order contained no findings that he had deliberately stopped working to avoid his support obligations. Greer v. Greer, 101 N.C. App. 351, 399 S.E.2d 399 (1991).

The court's conclusion underlying imposition of the earnings capacity rule must be based on evidence that tends to show that husband's actions resulting in the reduction of his income were not taken in good faith. Wachacha v. Wachacha, 38 N.C. App. 504, 248 S.E.2d 375 (1978).

Voluntary Expenses. - Fact that defendant had voluntarily assumed the responsibility of supporting his emancipated son was not a factor to be considered in determining a change of circumstances sufficient to support a reduction in support of his minor children. Dishmon v. Dishmon, 57 N.C. App. 657, 292 S.E.2d 293 (1982).

It was error for the trial court to reduce the amount of child support payments required of defendant by one-third where defendant's showing of changed circumstances related almost exclusively to additional expenses to which defendant had obligated himself, including sending a child who had reached the age of majority to college, the expenses of a new home and family, and additional travel and telephone expenses incident to visiting his children from out-of-state, and where defendant made no showing with respect to changed circumstances affecting the remaining minor children and made no showing that the expenses relating to the children's maintenance and support decreased by one-third when one of the children reached majority. Gilmore v. Gilmore, 42 N.C. App. 560, 257 S.E.2d 116 (1979).

The fact that defendant voluntarily assumed the financial burden to send his eldest child to a high-tuition, out-of-state university did not justify consideration of this factor in lowering child support payments. Gilmore v. Gilmore, 42 N.C. App. 560, 257 S.E.2d 116 (1979).

The trial court did not err in denying the husband credit for the purchase of two automobiles for his children, considering his history of delinquent payments and the lack of the wife's consent to these voluntary expenditures. Brower v. Brower, 75 N.C. App. 425, 331 S.E.2d 170 (1985).

Waiver of Credit for Child's Receipt of Earnings. - There was no evidence that the husband ever objected to his unemancipated child's receipt of earnings. His right to credit for those earnings was therefore waived. Brower v. Brower, 75 N.C. App. 425, 331 S.E.2d 170 (1985).

Inability to Claim Children as Dependents for Tax Purposes. - The husband was not entitled to credit for his inability to claim his children as dependents for income tax purposes. Brower v. Brower, 75 N.C. App. 425, 331 S.E.2d 170 (1985).

Rehabilitation from Alcoholism. - In case in which custody of child was taken from the mother because of the mother's problem with alcohol, the district court's subsequent finding that the mother had made substantial progress in rehabilitation from alcoholism and that her accomplishments constituted a material change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child were upheld. Perdue v. Perdue, 76 N.C. App. 600, 334 S.E.2d 86 (1985).

Inappropriate Conduct by Custodial Parent. - A change in custody from the father to the mother was justified, where the father lived with a homosexual partner and engaged in homosexual relationships and activities, including physical lovemaking, which was witnessed by the children; the father kept admittedly improper sexual material in the home; and the father's partner took the children out of the home without their father's knowledge of their whereabouts. Pulliam v. Smith, 348 N.C. 616, 501 S.E.2d 898 (1998).

Remarriage. - Remarriage in and of itself is not a sufficient change of circumstance to justify modification of a child custody order. Hassell v. Means, 42 N.C. App. 524, 257 S.E.2d 123, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 568, 261 S.E.2d 122 (1979).

Remarriage without a finding of fact indicating the effect of remarriage on a child is not a sufficient change of circumstances to justify modification of a child custody order. Kelly v. Kelly, 77 N.C. App. 632, 335 S.E.2d 780 (1985).

Consideration of Needs of Father's Second Family. - In determining a father's ability to meet the required payments for the support of his children, some reasonable allowance must be made for his living expenses and for the fact that he has a second family. However, the needs of children of his first marriage cannot be made subservient to the needs of his second family. Beasley v. Beasley, 37 N.C. App. 255, 245 S.E.2d 820 (1978), aff'd, 296 N.C. 580, 251 S.E.2d 433 (1979).

Court erred in reducing a father's child support obligation for one child on the ground that he had a newborn child in his home; the fact that the father had a newborn child to care for did not constitute a significant and material change of circumstances. State ex rel. Cross v. Saunders, 168 N.C. App. 235, 607 S.E.2d 309 (2005).

Attainment of Majority by One of Several Children. - Where plaintiff agreed to support his children by the payment of a certain amount per month until the youngest reached 18, the fact that the oldest child had reached 18 was not a change in circumstances, and the court erred in ordering a reduction of payment by reason of the fact that the oldest child had reached 18. Hershey v. Hershey, 57 N.C. App. 692, 292 S.E.2d 141 (1982).

Where a person having custody under a prior order has become unfit or is no longer able or suited to retain custody, such a consideration is of utmost importance in inquiring into the matter of custody, but it is not alone determinative. In re Bowen, 7 N.C. App. 236, 172 S.E.2d 62 (1970).

If the parent who was awarded custody of children were subsequently to become unfit, it would be possible for the trial court, upon proper findings, to grant custody to a fit person. Where there is no evidence that the fitness or unfitness of either party has changed, the trial court may not modify a prior order awarding custody unless some other sufficient change of condition is shown. In re Poole, 8 N.C. App. 25, 173 S.E.2d 545 (1970).

Finding of Unfitness. - Where parent was found to be a fit and proper parent, and in a later order found to be an unfit parent, the finding of unfitness constituted a change in circumstances. Raynor v. Odom, 124 N.C. App. 724, 478 S.E.2d 655 (1996).

Where Person Denied Custody Under Prior Order Due to Unfitness Becomes Fit. - Where at the time of the first hearing the poor health and emotional instability of the mother rendered her unsuitable to have custody of the two oldest children of the parties, but subsequently this changed, the court was entitled, in view of these changed circumstances, to inquire again into the matter of custody and to determine whether the welfare of the children would be better served by placing them in the custody of their mother. Kenney v. Kenney, 15 N.C. App. 665, 190 S.E.2d 650 (1972).

Father's Interference With Mother's Relationship With Children - Trial court properly granted a mother's motion, pursuant to G.S. 50-13.7, to modify a custody order and granted primary custody of the parties' two children to the mother; the trial court properly found a substantial change in circumstances based on the father's interference with the mother's relationship with the children, the trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to G.S. 50A-202(a), and the trial court properly denied the father's motions pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 59 and G.S. 1A-1, Rule 60 to stay the order and for a new trial. Senner v. Senner, 161 N.C. App. 78, 587 S.E.2d 675 (2003).

Arbitrary termination of visitation rights of grandparents by mother constituted a substantial change of circumstances where the grandparents had established a continuing substantial relationship with their grandchildren since the entry of earlier custody order, and the court found sufficient facts to justify its conclusion that it was in the best interest of the grandchildren to maintain a continuing relationship with the grandparents through the granting of visitation privileges. Hedrick v. Hedrick, 90 N.C. App. 151, 368 S.E.2d 14, cert. denied, 323 N.C. 173, 373 S.E.2d 108 (1988).

Parent Denied Custody Despite Doctor's Recommendation. - Although doctor recommended that custody should continue with mother, it was not an abuse of discretion for judge to order a change of custody of the child from mother to father where doctor testified that the child had severe emotional problems requiring "substantial immediate change", that the visitation schedule be limited, and that one parent (mother) exercise more control; the judge agreed with doctor that the child's problems needed immediate remedy; however, he believed that father was the parent to exercise more control. Correll v. Allen, 94 N.C. App. 464, 380 S.E.2d 580 (1989).

Bearing of Illegitimate Child. - Where wife who had left this State after she had been awarded custody of children later returned with an illegitimate child, there was a change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the children, which empowered the court to alter or modify the custody order if it was deemed necessary to do so to further the welfare of the children. Thomas v. Thomas, 259 N.C. 461, 130 S.E.2d 871 (1963).

Whether the birth of a child out of wedlock constitutes a substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child sufficient to justify a change in custody is to be determined by examining the facts of each case. Kelly v. Kelly, 77 N.C. App. 632, 335 S.E.2d 780 (1985), holding that under the circumstances the trial court found insufficient changes to justify a change in custody.

Minor child's hospitalization and its resulting costs constituted a substantial change in circumstances. Thus case was remanded to take into account the parties' abilities to provide support for the minor child's medical expenses and to enter an order modifying the support order. Lawrence v. Nantz, 115 N.C. App. 478, 445 S.E.2d 87 (1994).

Date from which to measure change in circumstances. - As a husband did not allege any change in circumstances under G.S. 50-13.7(a) after the date the separation agreement was incorporated into the final divorce decree, the date of the final divorce decree was the proper date from which to measure a change in circumstances in concluding that there had been no change in circumstances. Smart v. State, 198 N.C. App. 161, 678 S.E.2d 720 (2009).

Change in Circumstances Shown. - In light of a prior instance of sexual abuse of children by one of mother's boyfriends and the court's express previous instruction that she not "bring dates to the same residence with the children," mother's admission that she allowed boyfriend to live in her home for several weeks and continued to see him, along with psychologist's testimony as to a deterioration in the children's behavior corresponding with boyfriend's involvement with their mother, involved a substantial change of circumstances. Best v. Best, 81 N.C. App. 337, 344 S.E.2d 363 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Petersen v. Rowe, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).

The court's finding that father had improved, after finding him totally uninvolved at the time of the prior order, represented a changed circumstance justifying some modification at least with respect to the father. Best v. Best, 81 N.C. App. 337, 344 S.E.2d 363 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Petersen v. Rowe, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).

The court's findings as to child's poor health and conduct when with defendant mother, and as to her improved state when with plaintiff father, supported by competent evidence as to the child's conduct, habits, health, schedule, treatment, and response at different times, justified changing the joint custody arrangement that was in force, for these findings indicated changed circumstances that were affecting the welfare of the child. Teague v. Teague, 84 N.C. App. 545, 353 S.E.2d 242 (1987).

The trial court did not err in transferring custody of the minor child to defendant where the financial strain caused by plaintiff 's loss of her job and the birth of two additional children within two years out of wedlock clearly constitutes a substantial change of circumstances. White v. White, 90 N.C. App. 553, 369 S.E.2d 92 (1988).

The court's effective determination of a "substantial involuntary reduction" in father's income was adequate to support its conclusion that there had been a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant modification of previous child support order; thus the court did not err in failing to make findings concerning the actual past expenditures of the minor children prior to reaching its change of circumstances decision. McGee v. McGee, 118 N.C. App. 19, 453 S.E.2d 531 (1995).

In child custody action, findings supported trial court's conclusion that there had been a substantial change of circumstances since the order where father had consistently attempted to thwart efforts by the defendant to maintain and develop a mother-child relationship with child, where father threatened to stop or disallow visitation by the mother with the child, and where mother's home life and family situation changed and improved since the order. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 93 N.C. App. 639, 379 S.E.2d 93 (1989).

Evidence about child's psychological state supported judge's finding of a substantial change of circumstances and the change of custody of the child from the mother to the father where doctor testified that the disappearance of child's emotional equilibrium occurred during a period when the predominate parental influence upon him was mother and that a possible cause of the child's problems was his mother's hostility which centered around the child's visitations with father, visitations which were often interfered with by mother. Correll v. Allen, 94 N.C. App. 464, 380 S.E.2d 580 (1989).

Court properly modified support order to reflect changed circumstances where child's needs and related expenses had greatly increased. Brooker v. Brooker, 133 N.C. App. 285, 515 S.E.2d 234 (1999).

Order modifying custody was affirmed where trial court found, inter alia, that the mother's new fiancee was a convicted child abuser. McConnell v. McConnell, 151 N.C. App. 622, 566 S.E.2d 801 (2002).

Modification of a child custody order was in the child's best interest where the mother, although able to provide for the child, exposed the child to emotional harm and caused the deterioration of the child's relationship with his father. Jordan v. Jordan, 162 N.C. App. 112, 592 S.E.2d 1 (2004).

Modification of a child custody order was in the child's best interest where the trial court's findings were adequately supported by the evidence. Both parties testified that the mother allowed the child to view electronic mail messages that were sent by the father to the mother and the father also presented evidence that he had not been able to place telephone calls to the child as part of his visitation schedule. Jordan v. Jordan, 162 N.C. App. 112, 592 S.E.2d 1 (2004).

Modification of prior custody order was upheld where the mother's remarriage exposed the children to alcohol abuse, violent behavior, illegal drugs, and risk of physical harm, thus supporting the trial court's decision that there was a material and substantial change in circumstances and that modification would be of material benefit and in the children's best interest. Dreyer v. Smith, 163 N.C. App. 155, 592 S.E.2d 594 (2004).

Trial court's order increasing the husband's child support obligation was based on a material and substantial increase in both parties' incomes, living costs, and an increase in the costs of the needs and extra-curricular activities of the children. Meehan v. Lawrance, 166 N.C. App. 369, 602 S.E.2d 21 (2004).

Prior custody order was properly modified for a substantial change in circumstances under G.S. 50-13.7(a) as the trial court properly considered events after the prior custody order in finding that: (1) a mother had given birth to the child's sibling; (2) the mother had separated from her husband; (3) the child was in first grade; (4) the child had been diagnosed with and had treatment recommended for ADHD; and (5) the child needed ADHD medication and a father was willing to provide it. Lang v. Lang, 197 N.C. App. 746, 678 S.E.2d 395 (2009).

Trial court did not err in modifying a custody order because its unchallenged findings supported the conclusion that a father met his burden of showing that a change in circumstances actually had occurred and that the changes had affected the welfare of the children; the evidence revealed material changes in the circumstances, with respect to the parties' comparative stability as well as other considerations, between the time of the hearing resulting in the custody order and the modification proceedings. Crenshaw v. Williams, 211 N.C. App. 136, 710 S.E.2d 227 (2011).

Father was entitled to modification of a child custody order vesting primary custody of the children with the mother based on a substantial change of circumstances, where the mother had engaged in a course of conduct demonstrating hostility toward the father in front of the children, the mother lived over an hour from the children's school and often failed to get the children to school on time or at all, and the mother was emotionally unstable and volatile. Stephens v. Stephens, 213 N.C. App. 495, 715 S.E.2d 168 (2011).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying a father's monthly child support obligation because there had been a substantial change in circumstances since the initial child support order; the father had settled his workers' compensation and third-party claim, resulting in two large distributions and cessation of his monthly workers' compensation benefits, the child's expenses for day care and health insurance, and the child's expenses for day care and health insurance had increased. Simms v. Bolger, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 522 (2019).

In a case in which the father had been traveling out of town frequently for his work, his travel schedule was irregular, and he and the mother had serious difficulties in communicating and making arrangements for changes in the child's schedule, to the child's detriment, the father's motion to modify custody was improperly dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the father's motion to modify alleged at least one substantial change of circumstances as the father was no longer required to travel and was available and able to care for the minor child on an equal basis with the mother. Stern v. Stern, - N.C. App. - , 826 S.E.2d 490 (2019).

Trial court did not err by modifying the custody order because its conclusion of law that there had been a substantial change in circumstances was supported by findings of fact, which were in turn based on competent evidence. The substantial change in circumstances presented by the father justified the trial court's decision to enter the modification order, including his new job, his new home, the child beginning first grade, the father marrying his girlfriend, and the child's close relationships with the girlfriend and her stepbrother. Fecteau v. Spierer, - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (Apr. 20, 2021).

Showing of Changed Circumstances Held Insufficient. - Where there was no finding of the plaintiff's original child-oriented expenses and no finding that the needs of the children had increased other than the unsupported finding that the children were older and thus their needs had substantially increased, there was not a sufficient showing of a "change in circumstances" within the meaning of this section. Waller v. Waller, 20 N.C. App. 710, 202 S.E.2d 791 (1974).

In a case where the sole finding of fact regarding a change of circumstances was a general finding that the child was older and that inflation had occurred, this, standing alone, was inadequate to support an order of increased support payments. Holder v. Holder, 87 N.C. App. 578, 361 S.E.2d 891 (1987).

In a child custody order modifying the rights of defendant, the evidence was insufficient to show a substantial change in circumstances since the only change was defendant's new job enabling him to keep child with him at work and plaintiff's plans to marry, her increased income and that she no longer lived with her mother. Hinton v. Hinton, 87 N.C. App. 676, 362 S.E.2d 287 (1987).

Findings of fact found by the trial court held supported by the evidence and clearly and more than amply supported the court's conclusion that defendant had failed to show a substantial change of circumstances that would warrant a modification of consent judgment providing for alimony and child support. Outlaw v. Outlaw, 89 N.C. App. 538, 366 S.E.2d 247 (1988).

In an action to modify child support provisions of a separation agreement which has not previously been incorporated into an order or judgment of the court, the court is called upon, for the first time, to make a determination that the reasonable needs of the children are provided for in accordance with the abilities of those responsible for the children's support. Holderness v. Holderness, 91 N.C. App. 118, 370 S.E.2d 602 (1988).

Where the trial court found that defendant voluntarily quit his job, willfully and intentionally depressed his income, and failed to meet his burden of proof in showing a substantial change of circumstances, the court entered a judgment against defendant denying his motion to reduce child support by reason of substantial change of circumstances. Askew v. Askew, 119 N.C. App. 242, 458 S.E.2d 217 (1995).

As a substantial change in child's circumstances that was not present before the entry of the original child custody order was not shown, and the father's relocation to Hawaii was not a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child's welfare requiring that the joint custody order be amended allowing the father to move the child to Hawaii, trial court improperly modified the custody order, and the appellate court would vacate and remand the case to the trial court. Carlton v. Carlton, 145 N.C. App. 252, 549 S.E.2d 916 (2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 944, 122 S. Ct. 2630, 153 L. Ed. 2d 811 (2002).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that there had not been a change in circumstances affecting the welfare of a husband and wife's child because the mother spanked the child, the child expressed a desire to live with the husband, and the child had lived with the husband for four months, and the court's judgment denying the husband's motion for a change of custody was affirmed. Scott v. Scott, 157 N.C. App. 382, 579 S.E.2d 431 (2003).

There was insufficient evidence to support trial court's findings of a substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification of a child custody order based on findings that the parents' failure to communicate regarding issues with the minor child had resulted in trauma to the child and jeopardized the success of the joint custodial arrangement of the previous order; other than the mother's testimony regarding the child's normal reaction to a parental disagreement, no testimony was offered which supported a finding of emotional harm; indeed, the trial court made a specific finding of fact as to the current condition of the minor child, stating that he was very smart, very inquisitive and very happy, and daycare workers, grandparents, individuals who knew the parties, and both parents supported the trial court's finding as to the child's condition. Ford v. Wright, 170 N.C. App. 89, 611 S.E.2d 456 (2005).

There was insufficient evidence to support trial court's findings of a substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification of a child custody order based on findings that issues relating to domestic violence had not been effectively resolved; the trial court's findings reflected no substantial changes in the parties' communication difficulties from the prior order, the trial court had already considered the parties' past domestic troubles and communication difficulties in the prior custody order, and without findings of additional changes in circumstances or conditions, modification of the prior custody order was in error. Ford v. Wright, 170 N.C. App. 89, 611 S.E.2d 456 (2005).

Where an initial custody order awarded custody of a child to the paternal grandmother, the mother's motion to modify custody was properly denied under G.S. 50-13.7(a) because: (1) the "substantial change in circumstances" standard was properly applied to the motion to modify since the initial custody order was not on appeal; and (2) the mother did not present evidence that the mother's substantial change in circumstances affected the child. Warner v. Brickhouse, 189 N.C. App. 445, 658 S.E.2d 313 (2008).

Trial court properly granted a directed verdict pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 58 to a former wife, and dismissed the former husband's motion for modification of his child support obligation pursuant to G.S. 50-13.7(a), as the evidence supported the finding that the husband did not show a substantial material change in circumstances; the evidence supported the determination that the husband's motivation in not looking for employment in good faith was to avoid child support obligations. Young v. Young, 224 N.C. App. 388, 736 S.E.2d 538 (2012).

With respect to a former husband's motion for modification of his child support obligation pursuant to G.S. 50-13.7(a), the trial court properly denied review of evidence regarding the former wife's failure to submit a financial affidavit or other information to determine whether a change had occurred, as her financial status had no bearing on the husband's ability to meet his support obligations due to his unemployment. Young v. Young, 224 N.C. App. 388, 736 S.E.2d 538 (2012).

With respect to a former husband's motion for modification of his child support obligation pursuant to G.S. 50-13.7(a), even if his income was reduced by more than 15 percent due to his unemployment, the presumption in the Child Support Guidelines that a change in circumstances occurred did not apply, as three years had not passed since the initial support order. Young v. Young, 224 N.C. App. 388, 736 S.E.2d 538 (2012).

Trial court erred in modifying visitation and ordering the father to attend anger management classes because, while the father might have disciplined a child in an inappropriate manner, the father's inappropriate discipline did not affect the welfare of the children, and there was no finding of a substantial change in circumstances. Davis v. Davis, 229 N.C. App. 494, 748 S.E.2d 594 (2013).

Failure to Find Change in Circumstances. - Trial court impermissibly modified a child support order by computing increases in the father's salary and applying those increases to payments over an 18-year period because the trial court failed to find a substantial change of circumstances as required under G.S. 50-13.7(a) the incorporated agreement provided automatic annual increases in child support based on the father's salary and failed to consider the needs of the children or other factors contained in G.S. 50-13.4(c). Wilson v. Wilson, 214 N.C. App. 541, 714 S.E.2d 793 (2011).

Reduction of Custodial Parent's Income on Return to School. - Trial court erred in concluding reduction in income of father, custodial parent, due to leaving employment to return to school could not be considered on motion to increase wife's child support obligations. Fischell v. Rosenberg, 90 N.C. App. 254, 368 S.E.2d 11 (1988).

Plaintiff who quit her job to attend college could claim a voluntary reduction in income as a change of circumstance. Schroader v. Schroader, 120 N.C. App. 790, 463 S.E.2d 790 (1995).

Interim Child Support Order. - An interim child support order is temporary and is subject to retroactive modification; the requisite showing of changed circumstances is not applicable until there is a final determination of child support based upon the merits of the case. Miller v. Miller, 153 N.C. App. 40, 568 S.E.2d 914 (2002).

Showing of Substantial Change Not Necessary for Modification Where Prior Order Was Temporary. - Where trial court's prior order regarding custody and visitation was not, by its own language, permanent, the father was not required to show a substantial change in circumstances before the trial court modified its prior order to grant the father unsupervised visits. Anderson v. Lackey, 163 N.C. App. 246, 593 S.E.2d 87 (2004).

Trial court's joint physical custody order did not err for a failure to find a change in circumstances, when the order differed from a prior temporary order, because such a finding was not required. Smith v. Smith, 247 N.C. App. 135, 786 S.E.2d 12 (2016).

Trail Court Erred By Using Findings Of Fact That Were Res Judicata. - Trial court erred by using findings of fact that were res judicata to support a conclusion of law that there had been a substantial change of circumstances and to modify custody because the findings contained information that was disclosed to the trial court on or before the hearing; Woodring v. Woodring, 227 N.C. App. 638, 745 S.E.2d 13 (2013).

IV. VISITATION RIGHTS.

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Custody Encompasses Visitation Rights. - Visitation privileges are but a lesser degree of custody. Thus, the word "custody," as used in this section, was intended to encompass visitation rights as well as general custody. Clark v. Clark, 294 N.C. 554, 243 S.E.2d 129 (1978).

Jurisdiction of courts in custody and thus, visitation, cases is continuous. A decree determines only the present rights with respect to such custody and is subject to judicial alteration or modification upon a change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child. In re Jones, 62 N.C. App. 103, 302 S.E.2d 259 (1983).

Visitation and child support rights are independent rights accruing primarily to the benefit of the minor child and one is not, and may not be made, contingent upon the other. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

Receipt of Support May Not Be Conditioned on Visitation. - A trial judge does not have authority to condition a minor child's receipt of support paid by the noncustodial parent on compliance with court-ordered visitation allowed the noncustodial parent by ordering that child support paid by defendant be placed in escrow if minor child fails or refuses to abide by the visitation privileges allowed defendant. Appert v. Appert, 80 N.C. App. 27, 341 S.E.2d 342 (1986).

An agreement by the parties that the court may change visitation privileges in a custody order without any showing of changed conditions does not relieve the court of its duty to determine whether changed circumstances affecting the welfare of the child justify a modification. Clark v. Clark, 294 N.C. 554, 243 S.E.2d 129 (1978).

Trial court properly refused to consider issue of visitation rights on plaintiff's motion to set aside a child custody order, where such consideration would be a modification of the prior order's grant of exclusive custody to defendant, since the court may modify custody or visitation only upon a showing of changed circumstances and on adequate motion in the cause, and plaintiff's motion was inadequate for this purpose. Dishman v. Dishman, 37 N.C. App. 543, 246 S.E.2d 819 (1978).

Pervasive Interference with Visitation Rights Warranted Change in Custody. - Where the trial court made findings detailing a mother's pervasive interference with the father's visitation rights, as well as violent actions by the mother and her family at the father in the presence of the child, and these actions prevented the father from developing a relationship with his daughter resulting in an adverse effect on the welfare of the minor child, a change of custody was warranted. Hicks v. Alford, 156 N.C. App. 384, 576 S.E.2d 410 (2003).

Modification of Visitation Order. - Because the trial court's visitation order was a permanent order, the trial court erred by failing to mention its latest permanent order and purporting to modify that older order. Woodring v. Woodring, 227 N.C. App. 638, 745 S.E.2d 13 (2013).

Contempt Order Did Not Improperly Modify Custody. - Trial court did not improperly modify custody or impose improper purge conditions because its contempt order identified what a father could and could not do regarding visitation times in order to purge himself of the civil contempt and insure his compliance with the previous court orders regarding the exchange time for weekend visitations; permanent joint legal custody and secondary physical custody remained with the father both before and after the contempt order. Wilson v. Guinyard, 254 N.C. App. 229, 801 S.E.2d 700 (2017).

Modification of Grandparents' Visitation Rights. - Before an order providing visitation for grandparents of a minor child may be modified, the party seeking modification must show changed circumstances and an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. In re Jones, 62 N.C. App. 103, 302 S.E.2d 259 (1983).

Failure to State Findings on Issue of Visitation. - Where there is no finding by the trial court that ordered visitations are in the children's best interest, the case must be remanded for proper findings and conclusions on the issue. Clark v. Clark, 294 N.C. 554, 243 S.E.2d 129 (1978).

Best Interest of the Child Standard Proper as Visitation Order was Temporary. - Because of the outstanding issues and the order's specification that a further review hearing would be held in a period of time reasonably brief under the circumstances, the order was not a permanent order with respect to visitation; further, because the trial court correctly determined that the order was a temporary order with respect to visitation, it also properly applied a "best interests of the child" standard rather than requiring that the father demonstrate a change of circumstances. Lamond v. Mahoney, 159 N.C. App. 400, 583 S.E.2d 656 (2003).

V. FINDINGS AND DISCRETION OF TRIAL COURT.

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When Capacity to Pay May Be Basis for Award. - Under G.S. 50-13.4 and this section, a party's ability to pay child support is ordinarily determined by the party's actual income at time support award is made or modified. However, if there is a finding by the trial court that the party was acting in bad faith by deliberately depressing his or her income or otherwise disregarding the obligation to pay child support, then the party's capacity to earn may be the basis for the award. Fischell v. Rosenberg, 90 N.C. App. 254, 368 S.E.2d 11 (1988).

Trial Court Required to Make Specific Findings. - It is not sufficient that there may be evidence in the record sufficient to support findings that could have been made; the trial court is required to make specific findings of fact with respect to factors listed in the statute. Such findings are required in order for the appellate court to determine whether the trial court gave "due regard" to the factors listed. Greer v. Greer, 101 N.C. App. 351, 399 S.E.2d 399 (1991).

Because the juvenile was already the subject of a custody order, the trial court was required to enter an order with findings and conclusions that supported modification of that order, yet no findings or conclusions were made, plus the trial court failed to find that there was not a need for continued State intervention, and remand was required. In re S.M.L., - N.C. App. - , - S.E.2d - (July 21, 2020).

Modification of a custody decree must be supported by findings of fact based on competent evidence that there has been a substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child. Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 204 S.E.2d 678 (1974); Goodson v. Goodson, 32 N.C. App. 76, 231 S.E.2d 178 (1977); Clark v. Clark, 294 N.C. 554, 243 S.E.2d 129 (1978); Ebron v. Ebron, 40 N.C. App. 270, 252 S.E.2d 235 (1979); Hassell v. Means, 42 N.C. App. 524, 257 S.E.2d 123, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 568, 261 S.E.2d 122 (1979); Best v. Best, 81 N.C. App. 337, 344 S.E.2d 363 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Petersen v. Rowe, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).

As Must an Increase in Child Support. - The court is not warranted in ordering an increase of child support in the absence of findings of fact supported by competent evidence to show a substantial change of condition affecting the welfare of the children. Ebron v. Ebron, 40 N.C. App. 270, 252 S.E.2d 235 (1979).

Findings Held Unsupported. - It was error to order continued counseling on reunifying a child with the child's mother because the trial court's findings of fact did not support the order, as (1) the court found prior reunification efforts caused the child intense psychological stress and that more reunification counseling would re-traumatize the child, and (2) uncontested findings uniformly showed the mother made no improvements in years of prior counseling attempts and that the mother-son relationship had deteriorated further due to the mother's attitude, behavior, and general unwillingness to accept responsibility for the state of the mother's relationship with the child. Williams v. Chaney, 254 N.C. App. 593, 802 S.E.2d 756 (2017).

To properly determine a child's present reasonable needs, the trial court must hear evidence and make findings of specific fact on the actual past expenditures for the minor child, the present reasonable expenses of the minor child, and the parties' relative abilities to pay. Norton v. Norton, 76 N.C. App. 213, 332 S.E.2d 724 (1985).

Findings as to Child's Best Interests. - In making the best interest decision, the trial court is vested with broad discretion and can be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Ramirez-Barker v. Barker, 107 N.C. App. 71, 418 S.E.2d 675 (1992).

In exercising its discretion in determining the best interest of the child in a relocation case, factors appropriately considered by the trial court include but are not limited to: the advantages of the relocation in terms of its capacity to improve the life of the child; the motives of the custodial parent in seeking the move; the likelihood that the custodial parent will comply with visitation orders when he or she is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of North Carolina; the integrity of the noncustodial parent in resisting the relocation; and the likelihood that a realistic visitation schedule can be arranged which will preserve and foster the parental relationship with the noncustodial parent. Ramirez-Barker v. Barker, 107 N.C. App. 71, 418 S.E.2d 675 (1992).

Although a mother voluntarily dismissed her domestic violence complaint at the time a memorandum of judgment was entered regarding custody, a trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the claim when the father filed a motion for modification of custody, pursuant to G.S. 50-13.7, because "acts of domestic violence between the parties" was one of the factors the trial court was to consider, pursuant to G.S. 50-13.2(a), when making findings as to the best interests of the child. Balawejder v. Balawejder, 216 N.C. App. 301, 721 S.E.2d 679 (2011).

Insufficient Findings as to Child's Best Interests. - Trial court's conclusion for a father to be granted primary physical custody and the mother to be granted secondary physical custody was remanded because the findings of fact did not explain why it was in the best interests of the children for the father to be granted primary physical custody; the custody order merely recognized the existence of disputes and identified evidence from both parties that could bear upon those disputes without resolving the disputes. Hinson v. Hinson, - N.C. App. - , 836 S.E.2d 309 (2019).

Findings as to Relative Abilities of Parties. - The court must make findings as to the relative abilities of the parties to provide support before the court can order a change in the amount of support payments. Daniels v. Hatcher, 46 N.C. App. 481, 265 S.E.2d 429 (1980).

Findings as to Past Expenditures. - The court must make findings of specific facts as to actual past expenditures in order to determine the amount of support necessary to meet the reasonable needs of the child for health, education, and maintenance. Ebron v. Ebron, 40 N.C. App. 270, 252 S.E.2d 235 (1979); Daniels v. Hatcher, 46 N.C. App. 481, 265 S.E.2d 429 (1980); Walker v. Tucker, 69 N.C. App. 607, 317 S.E.2d 923 (1984).

Finding That Father Is Fit. - That the father is a fit person to have sole or joint custody of the children, by itself, is no basis for modifying the order previously entered. Ratley v. Ratley, 99 N.C. App. 219, 392 S.E.2d 653 (1990).

Evaluation of Parties' Fitness. - The trial court, in deciding cases involving the custody of children, may be called upon to evaluate the emotional stability and fitness of the parties. In making such an evaluation, the court, sitting as the trier of fact, may exercise its own reason and common sense, and use the knowledge acquired by its observation and experience in everyday life. O'Briant v. O'Briant, 70 N.C. App. 360, 320 S.E.2d 277 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 313 N.C. 432, 329 S.E.2d 370 (1985).

Finding of Failure to Prove Change. - While the court must make findings of fact to support its order, it is not required to make findings in addition to a finding that the moving party has failed to prove a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant modification of the custody order. Daniels v. Hatcher, 46 N.C. App. 481, 265 S.E.2d 429 (1980).

Conclusive Effect of Court's Finding. - A court's findings of fact in modifying a child custody order are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence. In re Bowen, 7 N.C. App. 236, 172 S.E.2d 62 (1970); Daniels v. Hatcher, 46 N.C. App. 481, 265 S.E.2d 429 (1980).

The trial judge's findings of fact in custody orders are binding on the appellate courts if supported by competent evidence. Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 204 S.E.2d 678 (1974); Hassell v. Means, 42 N.C. App. 524, 257 S.E.2d 123, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 568, 261 S.E.2d 122 (1979).

A finding by the district court that there has been no sufficient change of circumstances to justify modification of a custody order is conclusive and binding on the Court of Appeals if supported by competent evidence. Searl v. Searl, 34 N.C. App. 583, 239 S.E.2d 305 (1977). See also, In re Harrell, 11 N.C. App. 351, 181 S.E.2d 188 (1971).

Wide Discretion Is Vested in the Trial Judge. - Custody cases often involve difficult decisions; however, it is necessary that the trial judge be given wide discretion in making his determination, for the trial judge has the opportunity to see the parties in person and to hear the witnesses. Pruneau v. Sanders, 25 N.C. App. 510, 214 S.E.2d 288, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 664, 216 S.E.2d 911 (1975).

The trial judge, having the opportunity to see and hear the parties and the witnesses, is vested with broad discretion in cases involving the custody of children. O'Briant v. O'Briant, 70 N.C. App. 360, 320 S.E.2d 277 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 313 N.C. 432, 329 S.E.2d 370 (1985).

Judge's Decision Will Not Be Upset Absent Abuse. - In determining child custody wide discretion is necessarily vested in the trial judge who has the opportunity to see the parties and hear the witnesses, and his decision ought not to be upset on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. In re Mason, 13 N.C. App. 334, 185 S.E.2d 433 (1971), cert. denied, 280 N.C. 495, 186 S.E.2d 513 (1972).

In determining matters of child custody, the trial court is vested with wide discretion, and his decision should not be upset absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Hensley v. Hensley, 21 N.C. App. 306, 204 S.E.2d 228 (1974).

What represents the welfare of the child is frequently a difficult determination and the trial court is in the best position to observe the parties and evaluate the evidence. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal if the evidence supports the findings of fact and those findings form a valid basis for the conclusions of law and order. Wehlau v. Witek, 75 N.C. App. 596, 331 S.E.2d 223 (1985).

If Evidence Supports Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. - Because the trial court has the opportunity to observe all the parties and evaluate evidence which sometimes appears differently in cold print, if the evidence supports the findings of fact by the trial court and those findings of fact form a valid basis for the conclusions of law, the judgment entered will not be disturbed on appeal. Paschall v. Paschall, 21 N.C. App. 120, 203 S.E.2d 337 (1974).

Even If There Is Evidence to the Contrary. - The scope of appellate review of a trial court's judgment awarding custody of children is well settled: The court's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by any competent evidence, and judgment supported by such findings will be affirmed, even though there is evidence to the contrary, or even though some incompetent evidence may have been admitted. In re Williamson, 32 N.C. App. 616, 233 S.E.2d 677 (1977); O'Briant v. O'Briant, 70 N.C. App. 360, 320 S.E.2d 277 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 313 N.C. 432, 329 S.E.2d 370 (1985).

The court's findings in modifying a custody decree are conclusive if supported by competent evidence, even if there is evidence contra or incompetent evidence in the record. Best v. Best, 81 N.C. App. 337, 344 S.E.2d 363 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Petersen v. Rowe, 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994); Vuncannon v. Vuncannon, 82 N.C. App. 255, 346 S.E.2d 274 (1986).

But the trial court may not sua sponte enter an order modifying a previously entered custody decree. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 107 N.C. App. 695, 421 S.E.2d 795 (1992).

Good Faith Finding Required. - Determination of the trial court that it was not necessary to make a finding of bad faith in reduction of income where the party seeking support modification was the custodial parent was not supported by current case law, nor was the trial court correct in concluding that when a custodial parent sought a change of child support based upon a reduction in income, that custodial parent had to request the court to make a finding of fact as to his or her good faith. Fischell v. Rosenberg, 90 N.C. App. 254, 368 S.E.2d 11 (1988).

Must Be Sufficient Evidence of Proscribed Intent. - A trial court's conclusion underlying imposition of the earnings capacity rule must be based upon evidence that the actions which reduced the party's income were not taken in good faith. There must be sufficient evidence of the proscribed intent. Fischell v. Rosenberg, 90 N.C. App. 254, 368 S.E.2d 11 (1988).

Error to Reduce Arrearage Absent Findings or Evidence. - Without the requisite, specific findings or evidence in the record on the child's needs and expenses, or on the relative abilities of the parties to provide support, the trial court erred in reducing the child support arrearage. Brower v. Brower, 75 N.C. App. 425, 331 S.E.2d 170 (1985).

Modification Improper Without Sufficient Findings of Fact. - Without a finding of a substantial change of circumstances, a modification based solely on the ground that the defendant mother was over-protective was improper. Benedict v. Coe, 117 N.C. App. 369, 451 S.E.2d 320 (1994).

Court's Discretion To Permit Relocation. - Although most relocations will present both advantages and disadvantages for the child, when the disadvantages are outweighed by the advantages, as determined and weighed by the trial court, the trial court is well within its discretion to permit the relocation. Ramirez-Barker v. Barker, 107 N.C. App. 71, 418 S.E.2d 675 (1992).

Findings Held Sufficient. - Trial court did not err in modifying a Michigan custody order because the trial court's findings demonstrated that it considered factors beyond the parties' relative incomes and standards of living in determining whether there had been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the children's welfare; the trial court addressed the level of involvement of the mother and father in the children's education and extra-curricular activities, the mother's lack of full participation in the children's activities, the mother's missing four or five visits per year with her children, the father's disciplining the children by taking away their privileges, and the mother's not disciplining them. Crenshaw v. Williams, 211 N.C. App. 136, 710 S.E.2d 227 (2011).

Findings Held Insufficient. - In an action seeking an increase in child support over the amount set forth in separation agreement, the order which contained no specific findings with respect to the actual past or present expenses incurred for the support of the children was insufficient to support the court's conclusion that the reasonable needs of the children amounted to $2,800.00 per month. Holderness v. Holderness, 91 N.C. App. 118, 370 S.E.2d 602 (1988).

Where the factors listed by the trial court as dispositive on the substantial change of circumstance requirement were oriented toward parental fitness, not adverse alterations of the children's welfare, and were bare observations of plaintiff's or defendant's actions, not examples of how those actions adversely impacted the children, the findings, without more, did not meet the standard required to show circumstances must be so changed that the welfare of the child would be adversely affected unless the custody provision was modified. Garrett v. Garrett, 121 N.C. App. 192, 464 S.E.2d 716 (1995).

Award of additional retroactive child support for private schooling was denied where the trial court's limited findings failed to set forth the existence of a "sudden emergency" so unusual or extraordinary as to require plaintiff to expend sums in excess of defendant's existing support obligation, and the court's order contained no findings reflective of defendant's ability to pay during the period the emergency expenses were allegedly incurred. Biggs v. Greer, 136 N.C. App. 294, 524 S.E.2d 577 (2000).

While the record indicated that there may have been evidence to support the visitation decree, the trial court's sparse findings of fact did not support it; the findings, standing alone, were not sufficient to support the extension of physical, telephonic, and electronic visitation. Lamond v. Mahoney, 159 N.C. App. 400, 583 S.E.2d 656 (2003).

A case involving a motion to modify child support under G.S. 50-13.7, was remanded for further findings of fact because, in entering an order deviating from the North Carolina Child Support Guidelines, the trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact regarding the reasonable needs of the children; the order only made findings regarding health insurance and the fact that the children did not need private schooling. Beamer v. Beamer, 169 N.C. App. 594, 610 S.E.2d 220 (2005).

When a father sought a modification of child support, remand was required because without a specific finding as to the father's income at the time of the hearing, the issue of whether his income had been involuntarily decreased could not be resolved. Armstrong v. Droessler, 177 N.C. App. 673, 630 S.E.2d 19 (2006).

Trial court impermissibly modified child custody without finding a substantial change in circumstances; despite re-captioning the contempt order as one modifying custody, the trial court denied both parties an opportunity to submit evidence or present arguments regarding custody modification. In addition, the trial court made no findings of fact or conclusion of law regarding a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the minor child, only a best interest conclusion. Jackson v. Jackson, 192 N.C. App. 455, 665 S.E.2d 545 (2008).

VI. JURISDICTION.

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases cited below were decided prior to enactment of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, former G.S. 50A-1 et seq., and prior to enactment of the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, G.S. 50A-101 et seq.

First Court to Acquire Jurisdiction Retains Jurisdiction. - Except as provided in G.S. 50-13.5(f), the ordinary rule of civil procedure applies to this section, namely, that the first court to acquire jurisdiction of a cause retains jurisdiction, to the exclusion of other courts. Thus, if a judgment involving the custody and the support of a minor child has been entered in this State, the judge trying a subsequent action for absolute divorce may not interfere with the earlier judgment. Only the court of this State which entered the earlier judgment for custody and support of the minor child may modify or vacate it, upon a motion in the cause and a showing of a change of circumstances. Tate v. Tate, 9 N.C. App. 681, 177 S.E.2d 455 (1970).

G.S. 50-13.5(f) contemplates only the institution of an action for custody and support. It does not affect the situation where custody and support have already been determined and one of the parties seeks a modification of the order establishing custody and support. In such a case, the court first obtaining jurisdiction retains jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts and is the only proper court to bring an action for the modification of an order establishing custody and support. Tate v. Tate, 9 N.C. App. 681, 177 S.E.2d 455 (1970).

Filing of a motion in a cause in which the court has not acquired jurisdiction does not serve to confer jurisdiction under this section. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 8 N.C. App. 162, 174 S.E.2d 103 (1970).

Failure to File Motion Did Not Divest Court of Jurisdiction. - Mother's failure to file a motion to modify the father's child support obligation did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to modify the Voluntary Support Agreement and Order under this section, as the trial court was not divested of its continuing jurisdiction and the provision requiring such a motion was directory, not mandatory. Catawba Cty. v. Loggins, 370 N.C. 83, 804 S.E.2d 474 (2017).

What Plaintiff Must Show to Obtain Modification of Another State's Order. - In order to invoke the aid of subsection (b) of this section, governing the entry of a new order for child custody or support modifying or superseding an order entered by a court of another state, a plaintiff must show (1) jurisdiction and (2) changed circumstances. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 8 N.C. App. 162, 174 S.E.2d 103 (1970).

For cases as to full faith and credit accorded to out-of-state decrees, decided prior to enactment of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, G.S. 50A-1 et seq., see Thomas v. Thomas, 248 N.C. 269, 103 S.E.2d 371 (1958); In re Marlowe, 268 N.C. 197, 150 S.E.2d 204 (1966); Rothman v. Rothman, 6 N.C. App. 401, 170 S.E.2d 140 (1969); In re Kluttz, 7 N.C. App. 383, 172 S.E.2d 95 (1970).

Presence of Child. - For cases as to the effect of the presence of the child in this State on the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, decided prior to enactment of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, G.S. 50A-1 et seq., see Rothman v. Rothman, 6 N.C. App. 401, 170 S.E.2d 140 (1969); Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918, 94 S. Ct. 1417, 39 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1974); Stanback v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 215 S.E.2d 30 (1975); Pruneau v. Sanders, 25 N.C. App. 510, 214 S.E.2d 288, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 664, 216 S.E.2d 911 (1975).

North Carolina Court Had Authority to Modify Florida Order. - While a Florida order granted custody to the grandmother pursuant to a procedure not found in North Carolina, once the trial court in North Carolina obtained jurisdiction, it had authority to modify the Florida order pursuant to the statute, based upon findings of substantial change in circumstances and that modification would be in the child's best interest; the terms of the Florida order had to be considered, along with what transpired after. Quevedo-Woolf v. Overholser, 261 N.C. App. 387, 820 S.E.2d 817 (2018), appeal dismissed, review denied, stay denied, 372 N.C. 359, 828 S.E.2d 164, 2019 N.C. LEXIS 580 (2019).

VII. PROCEDURE.

.

This section provides the procedural mechanism permitting modification. Goodhouse v. DeFravio, 57 N.C. App. 124, 290 S.E.2d 751 (1982).

Reduction of Support Without Notice and Hearing Unconstitutional. - In an action seeking enforcement of the provisions of a separation agreement relating to child support, reduction of the child support payments without a proper proceeding and notice and opportunity to be heard deprived plaintiff of her constitutional rights under the due process provisions of the State and federal constitutions. Mann v. Mann, 57 N.C. App. 587, 291 S.E.2d 794 (1982).

Reliance on Previous Adjudication Order Sufficient. - Trial court's finding of fact and conclusions of law that, based on a previous adjudication order, the order granting the father exclusive custody of the children was in the best interests of the children was sufficient to support the modification pursuant to G.S. 50-13.7. In re A.S., 182 N.C. App. 139, 641 S.E.2d 400 (2007).

Valid Custody Order May Not Be Collaterally Modified. - A valid order awarding custody of the child of the marriage is conclusive upon the parties and may not be modified collaterally by a petition praying that the child's custody be awarded to petitioner during a certain period. Robbins v. Robbins, 266 N.C. 635, 146 S.E.2d 671 (1966).

A child support order may be modified or vacated only after an equitable distribution. Dorton v. Dorton, 77 N.C. App. 667, 336 S.E.2d 415 (1985).

Modification of child support would be vacated and remanded where it was part of an equitable distribution judgment and thus appeared to have been decided and entered at the same time as the equitable distribution, rather than after the equitable distribution as required by subsection (f) of G.S. 50-20. Dorton v. Dorton, 77 N.C. App. 667, 336 S.E.2d 415 (1985).

Proceeding Where Divorce Was Awarded Outside State. - When the parents were divorced outside this State, either parent may have the question of custody as between them determined in a special proceeding. In re Sauls, 270 N.C. 180, 154 S.E.2d 327 (1967). See also G.S. 50A-1 et seq.

Standing of County in Modification Action. - Where plaintiff mother, who received public assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program, assigned to county her right to receive any support on behalf of her children, the county, by virtue of the assignment pursuant to G.S. 110-137, had an interest in the order for the support of plaintiff's children. Therefore, under subsection (a) of this section, the county had standing to make a motion in an action between plaintiff mother and defendant father to modify a child support order to require that the support be paid to the county. Cox v. Cox, 44 N.C. App. 339, 260 S.E.2d 812 (1979).

Premature Request for Modification. - Plaintiff's request that trial court alter provisions in incorporated separation agreement for modification of child support payments and payments for wife's separate maintenance after July, 1990, was properly denied as premature where the date in question had not yet occurred. Theokas v. Theokas, 97 N.C. App. 626, 389 S.E.2d 278 (1990).

Proper procedure to follow when a supported child reaches majority is to apply to the trial court for relief under this section. Tilley v. Tilley, 30 N.C. App. 581, 227 S.E.2d 640 (1976).

A husband had no authority to unilaterally attempt his own modification of child support payments upon one of his children reaching the age of 18, and being no longer a "minor" under G.S. 48A-2, even though the support order directed the husband to pay support for "his two minor children. . . ." The proper procedure for the husband to follow would have been to apply to the trial court for relief pursuant to this section. Brower v. Brower, 75 N.C. App. 425, 331 S.E.2d 170 (1985).

Procedure and Contents of Order for Retrospective Increase. - An order for retrospective increase of an existing child support order must set out a conclusion of law that there was a substantial and material change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child occasioned by a sudden emergency so as to warrant such an increase. The court's conclusion of law must be sustained by specific factual findings based upon competent evidence, reflecting the actual amount disbursed by a party within three years or less of the date of filing of the current motion, towards reasonably necessary expenditures made on behalf of the child. The findings also must reflect the ability to pay of the parent subject to the motion during the period for which increased support is sought. Biggs v. Greer, 136 N.C. App. 294, 524 S.E.2d 577 (2000).

Court Not Required to Weigh Children's Needs Against Obligor's Ability to Pay Absent Request by Obligor. - Grant of motion to modify obligor's child support was proper, because, inter alia, there had been a substantial change in circumstances in that it had been more than three years since the calculation of the obligor's child support obligation and the current obligations calculation was greater than 15 % of the prior obligation calculation, and trial court made findings concerning the obligor's earning capacity, but was not required to weigh the children's needs against the obligor's ability to pay the amount of support where the obligor did not request a deviation requiring the trial court to make such findings. Head v. Mosier, 197 N.C. App. 328, 677 S.E.2d 191 (2009).

Arbitration. - While, in the absence of court proceedings, parties may settle their disputes by arbitration, once the issues are brought into court, the court may not delegate its duty to resolve those issues to arbitration. Crutchley v. Crutchley, 306 N.C. 518, 293 S.E.2d 793 (1982).

Where the only issue before the trial court was the custody of plaintiff's and defendant's son and there was no motion to modify the child support, the trial court was without authority to issue an order modifying an earlier consent order setting child support. Royall v. Sawyer, 120 N.C. App. 880, 463 S.E.2d 578 (1995).

Attorney's Fees - In an action by a mother to modify a father's child support pursuant to G.S. 50-13.7(a), the trial court properly granted attorney's fees to the mother pursuant to G.S. 50-13.6, because the trial court specifically found as a fact that the mother was a party acting in good faith to obtain reasonable support for her daughter, that the mother lacked sufficient means to pay her attorney fees, and that the father refused to provide support which was reasonable under the circumstances. Mason v. Erwin, 157 N.C. App. 284, 579 S.E.2d 120 (2003).

Waiver of Issue on Appeal. - Because a mother asserted inconsistent legal positions on whether a substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the children had occurred before the trial court and the court of appeals, she waived that argument on appeal; the trial court did not err in concluding that a substantial change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the children had occurred. Hinson v. Hinson, - N.C. App. - , 836 S.E.2d 309 (2019).

Appeal. - Where an initial custody order awarded custody of a child to the paternal grandmother and the mother's motion to modify custody was denied, the appellate court could not consider the mother's challenge to the initial custody order because the mother's notice of appeal from the denial of the motion to modify made no reference to the initial order and did not properly present the underlying judgment for review. Warner v. Brickhouse, 189 N.C. App. 445, 658 S.E.2d 313 (2008).

Appellate Jurisdiction. - Appellate court had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a denial of child support modification because: (1) an order continuing an existing order until legally interdependent custody issues could be heard was interlocutory, as, without knowing the custody arrangement, a trial court could not find which child support worksheet to use, or whether to deviate from the guidelines; (2) the order did not resolve the custody issue; and (3) allowing an appeal would lead to an unnecessary appeal. Gray v. Peele, 235 N.C. App. 554, 761 S.E.2d 739 (2014).