ARTICLE 1. General Provisions.

Sec.

§ 150B-1. Policy and scope.

  1. Purpose. - This Chapter establishes a uniform system of administrative rule making and adjudicatory procedures for agencies. The procedures ensure that the functions of rule making, investigation, advocacy, and adjudication are not all performed by the same person in the administrative process.
  2. Rights. - This Chapter confers procedural rights.
  3. Full Exemptions. - This Chapter applies to every agency except:
    1. The North Carolina National Guard in exercising its court-martial jurisdiction.
    2. The Department of Health and Human Services in exercising its authority over the Camp Butner reservation granted in Article 6 of Chapter 122C of the General Statutes.
    3. The Utilities Commission.
    4. Repealed by Session Laws 2011-287, s. 21(a), effective June 24, 2011, and applicable to rules adopted on or after that date.
    5. Repealed by Session Laws 2011-401, s. 1.10(a), effective November 1, 2011.
    6. The State Board of Elections in administering the HAVA Administrative Complaint Procedure of Article 8A of Chapter 163 of the General Statutes.
    7. The North Carolina State Lottery.
    8. [Expired June 30, 2012.]
  4. Exemptions from Rule Making. - Article 2A of this Chapter does not apply to the following:
    1. The Commission.
    2. Repealed by Session Laws 2000-189, s. 14, effective July 1, 2000.
    3. Repealed by Session Laws 2001-474, s. 34, effective November 29, 2001.
    4. The Department of Revenue, with respect to the notice and hearing requirements contained in Part 2 of Article 2A. With respect to the Secretary of Revenue's authority to redetermine the State net taxable income of a corporation under G.S. 105-130.5A, the Department is subject to the rule-making requirements of G.S. 105-262.1.
    5. The North Carolina Global TransPark Authority with respect to the acquisition, construction, operation, or use, including fees or charges, of any portion of a cargo airport complex.
    6. The Department of Public Safety, with respect to matters relating to executions under Article 19 of Chapter 15 of the General Statutes and matters relating solely to persons in its custody or under its supervision, including prisoners, probationers, and parolees.
    7. The Criminal Justice Education and Training Standards Commission with respect to establishing minimum standards for in-service training for criminal justice officers under G.S. 17C-6(a)(14).
    8. The Sheriffs' Education and Training Standards Commission with respect to establishing minimum standards for in-service training for justice officers under G.S. 17E-4(a)(11).
    9. The State Health Plan for Teachers and State Employees in administering the provisions of Article 3B of Chapter 135 of the General Statutes.
    10. The North Carolina Federal Tax Reform Allocation Committee, with respect to the adoption of the annual qualified allocation plan required by 26 U.S.C. § 42(m), and any agency designated by the Committee to the extent necessary to administer the annual qualified allocation plan.
    11. The Department of Health and Human Services in adopting new or amending existing medical coverage policies for the State Medicaid and NC Health Choice programs pursuant to G.S. 108A-54.2.
    12. The Economic Investment Committee in developing criteria for the Job Development Investment Grant Program under Part 2F of Article 10 of Chapter 143B of the General Statutes.
    13. The North Carolina State Ports Authority with respect to fees established pursuant to G.S. 136-262(a)(11).
    14. The Department of Commerce and the Economic Investment Committee in developing criteria and administering the Site Infrastructure Development Program under G.S. 143B-437.02.
    15. The Department of Commerce and the Governor's Office in developing guidelines for the One North Carolina Fund under Part 2H of Article 10 of Chapter 143B of the General Statutes.
    16. Repealed by Session Laws 2011-145, s. 8.18(a), as amended by Session Laws 2011-391, s. 19, effective June 15, 2011.
    17. Repealed by Session Laws 2009-445, s. 41(b), effective August 7, 2009.
    18. The State Ethics Commission with respect to Chapter 138A and Chapter 120C of the General Statutes.
    19. The Department of Commerce in developing guidelines for the NC Green Business Fund under Part 2B of Article 10 of Chapter 143B of the General Statutes.
    20. The Department of Commerce and the Economic Investment Committee in developing criteria and administering the Job Maintenance and Capital Development Fund under G.S. 143B-437.012.
    21. The Department of Commerce in developing criteria and administering the Expanded Gas Products Service to Agriculture Fund under G.S. 143B-437.020.
    22. The Department of Commerce in administering the Film and Entertainment Grant Fund under G.S. 143B-437.02A.
    23. Repealed by Session Laws 2011-145, s. 8.18(a), as amended by Session Laws 2011-391, s. 19, effective June 15, 2011.
    24. The Department of Health and Human Services in implementing, operating, or overseeing new 1915(b)/(c) Medicaid Waiver programs or amendments to existing 1915(b)/(c) Medicaid Waiver programs.
    25. Reserved for future codification purposes.
    26. The Department of Health and Human Services with respect to the content of State Plans, State Plan Amendments, and Waivers approved by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for the North Carolina Medicaid Program and the NC Health Choice program.
    27. The Department of Natural and Cultural Resources with respect to admission fees or related activity fees at historic sites and museums pursuant to G.S. 121-7.3.
    28. Tryon Palace Commission with respect to admission fees or related activity fees pursuant to G.S. 143B-71.
    29. U.S.S. Battleship Commission with respect to admission fees or related activity fees pursuant to G.S. 143B-73.
    30. The Board of Agriculture in the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services with respect to the following:
      1. Annual admission fees for the State Fair.
      2. Operating hours, admission fees, or related activity fees at State forests.
      3. Fee schedules for the preparation of forest management plans developed pursuant to G.S. 106-1004.
    31. The Department of Natural and Cultural Resources with respect to operating hours, admission fees, or related activity fees at:
      1. The North Carolina Zoological Park pursuant to G.S. 143B-135.205.
      2. State parks pursuant to G.S. 143B-135.16.
      3. The North Carolina Aquariums pursuant to G.S. 143B-135.188.
      4. The North Carolina Museum of Natural Sciences.
    32. The Division of Motor Vehicles with respect to fee adjustments under G.S. 20-4.02.
    33. The Commission for Public Health with respect to adding to the Newborn Screening Program established under G.S. 130A-125 screening tests for Pompe disease, Mucopolysaccharidosis Type I (MPS I), and X-Linked Adrenoleukodystrophy (X-ALD).
    34. (For applicability, see editor's note) The Retirement System Boards of Trustees established under G.S. 128-28 and G.S. 135-6 when adopting actuarial tables, assumptions, and contribution-based benefit cap factors after presentation of recommendations from the actuary. This exemption includes, but is not limited to, the following actuarial tables, assumptions, methods, and factors:
      1. Joint and survivor tables.
      2. Reserve transfer tables.
      3. Interest rate assumptions.
      4. Salary increase assumptions.
      5. Mortality assumptions.
      6. Separation and retirement assumptions.
      7. Asset smoothing methods.
      8. Actuarial cost methods.
      9. Contribution-based benefit cap factors.
      10. Required contribution rates.
      11. Amortization policies.
  5. Exemptions From Contested Case Provisions. - The contested case provisions of this Chapter apply to all agencies and all proceedings not expressly exempted from the Chapter. The contested case provisions of this Chapter do not apply to the following:
    1. The Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Environmental Quality in complying with the procedural safeguards mandated by Section 680 of Part H of Public Law 99-457 as amended (Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986).
    2. Repealed by Session Laws 1993, c. 501, s. 29.
    3. , (4) Repealed by Session Laws 2001-474, s. 35, effective November 29, 2001.
  6. Exemption for the University of North Carolina. - Except as provided in G.S. 143-135.3, no Article in this Chapter except Article 4 applies to The University of North Carolina.
  7. Exemption for the State Board of Community Colleges. - Except as provided in G.S. 143-135.3, no Article in this Chapter except Article 4 applies to the State Board of Community Colleges.

The Board shall annually post the admission fee and operating hours schedule on its Web site and provide notice of the schedule, along with a citation to this section, to all persons named on the mailing list maintained pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.2(d).

The exclusion from rule making for the setting of operating hours set forth in this subdivision (i) shall not apply to a decision to eliminate all public operating hours for the sites and facilities listed and (ii) does not authorize any of the sites and facilities listed in this subdivision that do not currently charge an admission fee to charge an admission fee until authorized by an act of the General Assembly.

(5) Hearings required pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, (Public Law 93-122), as amended and federal regulations promulgated thereunder. G.S. 150B-51(a) is considered a contested case hearing provision that does not apply to these hearings.

(6) Repealed by Session Laws 2007-491, s. 2, effective January 1, 2008.

(7) The Division of Adult Correction and Juvenile Justice of the Department of Public Safety.

(8) The Department of Transportation, except as provided in G.S. 136-29.

(9) The North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.

(10) The North Carolina Global TransPark Authority with respect to the acquisition, construction, operation, or use, including fees or charges, of any portion of a cargo airport complex.

(11) Repealed by Session Laws 2019-177, s. 8.2, effective July 26, 2019.

(12) The State Health Plan for Teachers and State Employees respect to disputes involving the performance, terms, or conditions of a contract between the Plan and an entity under contract with the Plan.

(13) The State Health Plan for Teachers and State Employees with respect to (i) decisions by the Executive Administrator that an internal appeal is not subject to external review under G.S. 135-48.24, or (ii) a determination by the Executive Administrator, the Plan's designated utilization review organization, or a self-funded health maintenance organization under contract with the Plan that an admission, availability of care, continued stay, or other health care service has been reviewed and, based upon the information provided, does not meet the Plan's benefits offering, or requirements for medical necessity, appropriateness, health care setting, level of care, or effectiveness, and the requested service is therefore denied, reduced, or terminated.

(14) The Department of Public Safety for hearings and appeals authorized under Chapter 20 of the General Statutes.

(15) The Wildlife Resources Commission with respect to determinations of whether to authorize or terminate the authority of a person to sell licenses and permits as a license agent of the Wildlife Resources Commission.

(16) Repealed by Session Laws 2011-399, s. 3, effective July 25, 2011.

(17) The Department of Health and Human Services with respect to the review of North Carolina Health Choice Program determinations regarding delay, denial, reduction, suspension, or termination of health services, in whole or in part, including a determination about the type or level of services, commenced under G.S. 108A-70.29(b).

(18) Hearings provided by the Department of Health and Human Services to decide appeals pertaining to adult care home resident discharges initiated by adult care homes under G.S. 131D-4.8.

(19) The Industrial Commission.

(20) The Department of Commerce for hearings and appeals authorized under Chapter 96 of the General Statutes.

(21) The Department of Health and Human Services for actions taken under G.S. 122C-124.2.

(22) The Department of Public Safety, with respect to matters relating to executions under Article 19 of Chapter 15 of the General Statutes.

(23) The Secretary of Environmental Quality for the waiver or modification of non-State cost-share requirements under G.S. 143-215.73G.

(24) The Department of Information Technology in the written decision from a protest petition under G.S. 143B-1373.

(25) The Department of Health and Human Services with respect to disputes involving the performance, terms, or conditions of a contract between the Department and a prepaid health plan, as defined in G.S. 108D-1.

(26) The State Board of Education with respect to the disapproval, termination, renewal, or nonrenewal of charters under Article 14A of Chapter 115C of the General Statutes.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1975, c. 390; c. 716, s. 5; c. 721, s. 1; c. 742, s. 4; 1981, c. 614, s. 22; 1983, c. 147, s. 2; c. 927, s. 13; 1985, c. 746, ss. 1, 19; 1987, c. 112, s. 2; c. 335, s. 2; c. 536, s. 1; c. 847, s. 2; c. 850, s. 20; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1082, s. 14; c. 1111, s. 9; 1989, c. 76, s. 29; c. 168, s. 33; c. 373, s. 2; c. 538, s. 1; c. 751, s. 7(44); 1989 (Reg. Sess., 1990), c. 1004, s. 36; 1991, c. 103, s. 1; c. 418, s. 2; c. 477, s. 1; c. 749, ss. 9, 10; 1991 (Reg. Sess., 1992), c. 1030, s. 46; 1993, c. 501, s. 29; 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994), c. 777, ss. 4(j), 4(k); 1995, c. 249, s. 4; c. 507, s. 27.8(m); 1997-35, s. 2; 1997-278, s. 1; 1997-412, s. 8; 1997-443, ss. 11A.110, 11A.119(a); 2000-189, s. 14; 2001-192, s. 1; 2001-299, s. 1; 2001-395, s. 6(c); 2001-424, ss. 6.20(b), 21.20(c); 2001-446, s. 5(d); 2001-474, ss. 34, 35; 2001-496, s. 8(c); 2002-99, s. 7(b); 2002-159, ss. 31.5(b), 49; 2002-172, s. 2.6; 2002-190, s. 16; 2003-226, s. 17(b); 2003-416, s. 2; 2003-435, 2nd Ex. Sess., s. 1.3; 2004-88, s. 1(e); 2005-133, s. 10; 2005-276, s. 31.1(ff); 2005-300, s. 1; 2005-344, s. 11.1; 2005-455, s. 3.3; 2006-66, ss. 12.8(c), 8.10(d); 2006-201, s. 2(a); 2007-323, ss. 13.2(c), 28.22A(o); 2007-345, s. 12; 2007-491, s. 2; 2007-552, 1st. Ex. Sess., s. 3; 2008-107, s. 10.15A(f); 2008-168, s. 5(a); 2008-187, s. 26(b); 2009-445, s. 41(b); 2009-475, s. 4; 2009-523, s. 2(a); 2010-70, s. 2; 2011-85, s. 2.11(a); 2011-145, ss. 8.18(a), (b), 14.6(j), 19.1(g), (h); 2011-264, s. 4; 2011-272, s. 5; 2011-287, s. 21(a), (b); 2011-391, s. 19; 2011-399, ss. 2, 3; 2011-401, ss. 1.10(a), (b); 2012-43, s. 3; 2013-85, s. 10; 2013-360, ss. 19.2(d), 12H.6(c), 12H.9(c); 2014-100, ss. 13.2(a), 15.13(b), 15.14B(b); 2014-103, s. 17; 2015-198, ss. 3, 4; 2015-241, ss. 14.6(g), 14.11(a), 14.30(c), (s), (u), (v), (w), 29.30(t); 2016-113, s. 7(a); 2017-6, s. 3; 2017-186, s. 2(ddddddddd); 2017-212, s. 4.3; 2018-5, ss. 11E.1(b), 37.1(h); 2018-142, s. 21; 2018-146, ss. 3.1(a), (b), 6.1; 2019-81, s. 10; 2019-165, s. 7; 2019-177, s. 8.2; 2020-48, s. 4.1(c); 2021-125, s. 3(c); 2021-138, s. 12(a).)

Re-recodification; Technical and Conforming Changes. - Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3, provides, in part: "The Revisor of Statutes shall recodify Chapter 138A of the General Statutes, Chapter 120C of the General Statutes, as well as Chapter 163 of the General Statutes, as amended by this act, into a new Chapter 163A of the General Statutes to be entitled 'Elections and Ethics Enforcement Act,' as enacted by Section 4 of this act. The Revisor may also recodify into the new Chapter 163A of the General Statutes other existing statutory laws relating to elections and ethics enforcement that are located elsewhere in the General Statutes as the Revisor deems appropriate." The Revisor was further authorized to make technical and conforming changes to catchlines, internal citations, and other references throughout the General Statutes to effectuate this recodification. Pursuant to this authority, the Revisor conformed multiple references in subdivisions (c)(6) and (d)(16).

Session Laws 2018-146, ss. 3.1(a), (b), and 6.1, repealed Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3, and authorized the Revisor of Statutes to re-recodify Chapter 163A into Chapters 163, 138A, and 120C and to revert the changes made by the Revisor pursuant to Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3. Pursuant to this authority, the Revisor of Statutes reverted the changes to references in subdivisions (c)(6) and (d)(16).

Community Support Providers Appeals Process. - Session Laws 2008-107, s. 10.15A(e1)-(e4), as amended by Session Laws 2009-526, s. 2(c), and Session Laws 2009-550, s. 1.1(c), provides: "(e1) For the purpose of expediting the resolution of community support provider appeals and thereby saving State and federal funds that are paid for services that are found to be unnecessary or otherwise ineligible for payment, the Department shall implement on a temporary basis a community support provider appeals process. The process shall be a substitute for informal provider appeals at the Department level and formal provider appeals by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The community support provider appeals process shall apply to a community support services provider:

"(1) Who is aggrieved by a decision of the Department to reduce, deny, recoup, or recover reimbursement for community support services, or to deny, suspend, or revoke a provider agreement to provide community support services.

"(2) Whose endorsement has been withdrawn or whose application for endorsement has been denied by a local management entity.

"(e2) The community support provider appeals process shall be developed and implemented as follows:

"(1) A hearing under this section shall be commenced by filing a petition with the chief hearings clerk of the Department within 30 days of the mailing of the notice by the Department of the action giving rise to the contested case. The petition shall identify the petitioner, be signed by the party or representative of the party, and shall describe the agency action giving rise to the contested case. As used in this section, "file or filing" means to place the paper or item to be filed into the care and custody of the chief hearings clerk of the Department and acceptance thereof by the chief hearings clerk, except that the hearing officer may permit the papers to be filed with the hearing officer, in which event the hearing officer shall note thereon the filing date. The Department shall supply forms for use in these contested cases.

"(2) If there is a timely request for an appeal, the Department shall promptly designate a hearing officer who shall hold an evidentiary hearing. The hearing officer shall conduct the hearing according to applicable federal law and regulations and shall ensure that:

"a. Notice of the hearing is given not less than 15 days before the hearing. The notice shall state the date, hour, and place of the hearing and shall be deemed to have been given on the date that a copy of the notice is mailed, via certified mail, to the address provided by the petitioner in the petition for hearing.

"b. The hearing is held in Wake County, except that the hearing officer may, take testimony and receive evidence by telephone or other electronic means. The petitioner and the petitioner's legal representative may appear before the hearing officer in Wake County.

"c. Discovery is no more extensive or formal than that required by federal law and regulations applicable to the hearings. Prior to and during the hearing, a provider representative shall have adequate opportunity to examine the provider's own case file. No later than five days before the date of the hearing, each party to a contested case shall identify each witness that the party intends to call.

"(3) The hearing officer shall have the power to administer oaths and affirmations and regulate the conduct of the hearing. The following shall apply to hearings held pursuant to this section:

"a. At the hearing, the parties may present such sworn evidence, law, and regulations as are relevant to the issues in the case.

"b. The petitioner and the respondent agency each have a right to be represented by a person of his choice, including an attorney obtained at the party's own expense.

"c. The petitioner and the respondent agency shall each have the right to cross-examine witnesses as well as make a closing argument summarizing his view of the case and the law.

"d. The appeal hearing shall be recorded. If a petition for judicial review is filed the Department shall include a copy of the recording of the hearing as part of the official record. The recording of the appeal hearing may be erased or otherwise destroyed 180 days after the final decision is mailed as provided in G.S. 108A-79(i)(5).

"(4) The hearing officer shall decide the case based upon a preponderance of the evidence, giving deference to the demonstrated knowledge and expertise of the agency as provided in G.S. 150B-34(a). The hearing officer shall prepare a proposal for the decision, citing relevant law, regulations, and evidence, which shall be served upon the petitioner or the petitioner's representative by certified mail, with a copy furnished to the respondent agency.

"(5) The petitioner and the respondent agency shall have 15 days from the date of the mailing of the proposal for decision to present written arguments in opposition to or in support of the proposal for decision to the designated official of the Department who will make the final decision. If neither written arguments are presented, nor extension of time granted by the final agency decision maker for good cause, within 15 days of the date of the mailing of the proposal for decision, the proposal for decision becomes final. If written arguments are presented, such arguments shall be considered and the final decision shall be rendered. The final decision shall be rendered not more than 180 days from the date of the filing of the petition. This time limit may be extended by agreement of the parties or by final agency decision maker, for good cause shown. The final decision shall be served upon the petitioner or the petitioner's representative by certified mail, with a copy furnished to the respondent agency. In the absence of a petition for judicial review filed pursuant to subsection (f) of this section, the final decision shall be binding upon the petitioner and the Department.

"(6) A petitioner who is dissatisfied with the final decision of the Department may file, within 30 days of the service of the decision, a petition for judicial review in the Superior Court of Wake County or of the county from which the case arose. The judicial review shall be conducted according to Article 4 of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes.

"(7) In the event of a conflict between federal law or regulations and State law or regulations, federal law or regulations shall control. This section applies to all petitions that are filed by a Medicaid community support services provider on or after July 1, 2008, and for all Medicaid community support services provider petitions that have been filed at the Office of Administrative Hearings previous to July 1, 2008, but for which a hearing on the merits has not been commenced prior to that date. The requirement that the agency decision must be rendered not more than 180 days from the date of the filing of the petition for hearing shall not apply to (i) community support services provider petitions that were filed at the Office of Administrative Hearings or (ii) requests for a hearing under the Department's informal settlement process prior to the effective date of this act. The Office of Administrative Hearings shall transfer all cases affected by this section to the Department of Health and Human Services within 30 days of the effective date of this section. This act preempts the existing informal appeal process and reconsideration review process at the Department of Health and Human Services and the existing appeal process at the Office of Administrative Hearings with regard to all appeals filed by Medicaid community support services providers under the Medical Assistance program.

"(e3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the Department of Health and Human Services may, pursuant to its statutory authority or federal Medicaid requirements, suspend the endorsement or Medicaid participation of a provider of community support services pending a final agency decision based on a fair hearing of the provider's appeal filed with the Department under its community support provider appeal process. A provider of community support services whose endorsement, Medicaid participation, or services have been suspended is not entitled to payment during the period the appeal is pending, and the Department shall make no such payment to the provider during that period. If the final agency decision is in favor of the provider, the Department shall remove the suspension, commence payment for provider services, and reimburse the provider for payments withheld during the period of appeal. Contracts between the Department or a local management entity and the provider shall contain a provision indicating the circumstances under which a provider may appeal an agency decision and giving notice of the suspension of payments to the provider while the appeal is pending. This subsection applies to community support provider appeals pending in the Department of Health and Human Services or the Office of Administrative Hearings, as applicable, on and after July 1, 2008.

"(e4) The Department's community support provider appeals process established under this section shall expire July 1, 2010. The Department shall report to the House of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee on Health and Human Services, the Senate Appropriations Committee on Health and Human Services, the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee on Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services, and the Fiscal Research Division on March 1, 2009, October 1, 2009, and March 1, 2010, on the effectiveness and efficiency of the community support provider appeals process."

Appeal to State MH/DD/SA Appeals Panel. - Session Laws 2008-107, s. 10.15A(h1)-(h6), as amended and added to by Session Laws 2008-118, s. 3.13(a), (b), Session Laws 2009-526, s. 2(a) and (b), and Session Laws 2009-550, s. 1.1(a) and (b), provides for administrative appeals by Medicaid applicants and recipients. See notes under G.S. 108A-54.

Editor's Note. - This Chapter is former Chapter 150A, as rewritten by Session Laws 1985, c. 746, s. 1, effective January 1, 1986, and recodified. Where appropriate, the historical citations to the sections in the former Chapter have been added to the corresponding sections in the Chapter as rewritten and recodified.

In addition, Session Laws 1985, c. 746, s. 19, had provided that the act would expire January 1, 1992, and would not be effective on or after that date, but the expiration date was deleted by Session Laws 1991, c. 103, ss. 1 and 2 and Session Laws 1991, c. 689, s. 182.

Section 1 of Session Laws 1987, c. 827, provided: " The General Statutes are amended by deleting the reference '150A' and substituting the reference '150B' each time it appears."

Session Laws 1987, c. 536, s. 6 provided that a county ordinance that applies to the Camp Butner reservation on the effective date of the act (July 2, 1987) shall continue to apply until the Secretary of the Department of Human Resources withdraws his approval of the ordinance or the county amends or repeals the ordinance so that it no longer applies to the Camp Butner reservation.

Session Laws 1997-412, s. 14, provided that ss. 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11 of the act, which amended G.S. 143-341(3), 143-135.3, 150B-1(f), 143-135.1, 133-1.1(d), and G.S. 116-31.11, as enacted by s. 1 thereof, would expire on July 1, 2001. Subsequently, Session Laws 2001-496, s. 8(c), effective July 1, 2001, reenacted ss. 5, 7, 8 and 10 of Session Laws 1997-412. Session Laws 2001-496, s. 14(a) provided that ss. 8(a) to 8(e) of that act would expire December 31, 2006. Subsequently, Session Laws 2005-300, s. 1, amended Session Laws 2001-496, s. 14(a), by deleting the expiration clause.

Session Laws 1999-294, s. 13 provides that the Codifier of Rules may amend the text of the administrative rules in Title 11 of the North Carolina Administrative Code to reflect the recodification of Chapter 58 of the General Statutes. An amendment pursuant to this section is exempt from Chapter 150B of the General Statutes and review by the Rules Review Commission to the extent that it does not change the substance of the rule.

Session Laws 2001-395, s. 6(c), would have added subdivision (d)(9) effective August 29, 2001. Session Laws 2001-424, s. 6.20(b), effective July 1, 2001, repealed Session Laws 2001-395, s. 6, so that the provisions of 2001-395 never went into effect.

Session Laws 2001-424, s. 21.10, provides: "The Codifier of Rules may continue the process of reorganizing Titles 10 and 15A of the North Carolina Administrative Code to reflect the recent reorganization of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The reorganization of the Code may include replacing Title 10 with a new Title 10A if desirable for clarity. The Codifier of Rules may make changes in the text of the affected rules to reflect changes in organizational structure of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. So long as the changes in text do not change the substance of the rules, the reorganization by the Codifier is exempt from the requirements of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes and does not require the review or approval of the Rules Review Commission."

Session Laws 2001-424, s. 1.2, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Acts of 2001'."

Session Laws 2001-424, s. 36.3, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2001-2003 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2001-2003 fiscal biennium."

Session Laws 2001-424, s. 36.5, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2002-190, s. 17, as amended by Session Laws 2002-159, s. 31.5, provides: "The Governor shall resolve any dispute between the Department of Transportation and the Department of Crime Control and Public Safety concerning the implementation of this act [Session Laws 2002-190]."

Session Laws 2003-226, s. 1, provides: "The purpose of this act is to ensure that the State of North Carolina has a system for all North Carolina elections that complies with the requirements for federal elections set forth in the federal Help America Vote Act of 2002, Public Law 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15481-15485.

"The General Assembly finds that the education and training of election officials as required by G.S. 163-82.34 has met and continues to meet the mandate for the education and training of precinct officials and other election officials in section 254(a)(3) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002. The General Assembly further finds that the establishment, development, and continued operation of the statewide list maintenance program for voter registration set forth in G.S. 163-82.14 has met and continues to meet the mandates of section 303(a)(2) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002.

"In certain other areas of the election statutes and other laws, the General Assembly finds that the statutes must be amended to comply with the Help America Vote Act."

Session Laws 2003-416, s. 2, provides that S.L. 2002-172 is reenacted.

Subdivision (c)(6), added by Session Laws 2003-226, s. 17(b), effective January 1, 2004, is applicable with respect to primaries and elections held on or after that date.

Session Laws 2005-133, s. 1, effective June 29, 2005, as amended by Session Laws 2006-226, s. 30, provides: "Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of North Carolina, the name of the Safety and Health Review Board is changed to the North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. The Revisor of Statutes is authorized to substitute the term 'Commission' for the term 'Board' wherever that term appears in the General Statutes in relation to the Act. The Revisor of Statutes is also authorized to insert the words 'North Carolina Occupational' in front of the phrase 'Safety and Health Review Commission' wherever that phrase appears in the General Statutes in relation to the Act."

Subdivision (d)(15) was enacted as subdivision (d)(14) by Session Laws 2006-66, s. 12.8(c). Subdivision (d)(16) was enacted as subdivision (d)(14) by Session Laws 2006-201, s. 2(a). They have been redesignated as subdivisions (d)(15) and (d)(16), respectively, at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.

Session Laws 2006-66, s. 1.2, provides: "This act shall be known as 'The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2006.' "

Session Laws 2006-66, s. 28.6, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2009-475, s. 15, provides: "The General Assembly finds that it is in the public interest of the State of North Carolina to ensure expeditious awards of ARRA [America Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009] funds to maximize the economic recovery impact of the ARRA. It is the policy of the State to provide fair regulation, oversight, and transparency for the use of ARRA funds and to quickly and efficiently complete the awards of grants and contracts under the ARRA. It is also the policy of this State that, due to the historic level of federal and State oversight of ARRA grant and contract awards, restraint should be exercised in the granting of legal and injunctive relief that might forestall awards to programs and contractors."

Session Laws 2009-475, s. 4, effective February 17, 2009, which added subdivision (c)(8), provided for a June 30, 2012 expiration.

Session Laws 2011-272, s. 5, Session Laws 2011-287, s. 21(b) and Session Laws 2011-401, s. 1.10(b) each added a subdivision designated (e)(18). At the direction of the Revisor of Statutes, the subdivision (e)(18) added by Session Laws 2011-287, s. 21(b) has been redesignated subdivision (e)(19), and the subdivision (e)(18) added by Session Laws 2011-401, s. 1.10(b) has been redesignated subdivision (e)(20).

Session Laws 2014-100, s. 15.14B(c), as amended by Session Laws 2017-212, s. 4.3, provides: "This section becomes effective January 1, 2015. The Secretary shall not award a grant for any qualifying expenses for which a taxpayer receives a tax credit under G.S. 105-130.47 or G.S. 105-151.29."

Session Laws 2014-100, s. 13.2(a) and 2014-103, s. 17 both added subdivision (d)(26) with identical provisions.

Session Laws 2014-100, s. 15.14B(b), and Session Laws 2014-100, s. 15.13(b), each added subdivisions designated as (d)(18a). At the direction of the Revisor of Statutes, the subdivision enacted by Session Laws 2014-100, s. 15.14B(b), has been redesignated as subdivision (d)(18b).

Session Laws 2014-100, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as 'The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2014.'"

Session Laws 2014-100, s. 38.4, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2014-2015 fiscal year, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2014-2015 fiscal year."

Session Laws 2014-100, s. 38.7, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2015-198, s. 7, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2015-198, s. 4 and Session Laws 2015-241, s. 14.6(g) both enacted a subdivision (e)(22). Subdivision (e)(22), as enacted by Session Laws 2015-241, s. 14.6(g) has been redesignated as subdivision (e)(23) at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 14.11(b), provides: "The Department of Environment and Natural Resources [Department of Natural and Cultural Resources], or any other department given responsibilities for the North Carolina Zoological Park, State parks, and the North Carolina Aquariums, may establish admission fees and related activity fees for those sites and facilities. In setting these fees, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources [Department of Natural and Cultural Resources] shall use a dynamic pricing strategy as defined in subsection (e) of this section. Any rule currently in the Administrative Code related to fees covered by subsection (a) of this section is ineffective and repealed upon the effective date of new admission fees and related activity fees adopted by the Department under the authority set out in that subsection. Notice of the initial adoption of new admission fees and related activity fees under subsection (a) of this section shall be given by the Department to the Codifier of Rules, who, upon receipt of notice of the initial adoption of new admission fees and related activity fees by the Department, shall note the repeal of these rules in the Administrative Code. Nothing in this subsection is intended to authorize the Department or any other department to charge new parking fees at the North Carolina Zoological Park, State parks, or the North Carolina Aquariums or to charge an admission fee at any other site or facility that does not currently charge an admission fee."

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 14.11(e), provides: "For purposes of this section, 'dynamic pricing' is the adjustment of fees for admission and related activities from time to time to reflect market forces, including seasonal variations and special event interests, with the intent and effect to maximize revenues from use of these State resources to the extent practicable to offset appropriations from the General Assembly."

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 14.11(i), provides: "This section applies to admission fees or related activity fees charged on or after the effective date [July 1, 2015] of this act."

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 14.30(c), provides authority to construe references to the "Department of Environment and Natural Resources" taking effect on or after July 1, 2015, to be construed as the "Department of Natural and Cultural Resources" where appropriate, and to construe duties or requirements of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to be the duties or requirements of the Department of Natural and Cultural Resources where appropriate. In addition, Session Laws 2015-241, s. 14.30(w) provides in part: "In any other instances in the General Statutes in which there is a reference to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources or a derivative thereof, the Revisor of Statutes may replace that reference with a reference to the Department of Natural and Cultural Resources or a derivative thereof, when necessary to harmonize the statutes with the transfers set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of this section." Pursuant to this authority, "Department of Natural and Cultural Resources" has been substituted for "Department of Environment and Natural Resources" in subdivision (d)(27) at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.

Also at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes, the references in subdivision (d)(27) to G.S. 143B-335, 113-35, and 143B-289.44 have been changed to G.S. 143B-135.205, 143B-135.16, and 143B-135.188, respectively, to conform to the recodification of those sections by Session Laws 2015-241, s. 14.30(c), (g), (i).

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 14.11(a) and Session Laws 2015-241, s. 29.30(t), both enacted a subdivision (d)(27). Subdivision (d)(27), as enacted by Session Laws 2015-241, s. 29.30(t) has been redesignated as subdivision (d)(28) at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as 'The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2015.'"

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 33.4, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2015-2017 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2015-2017 fiscal biennium."

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 33.6, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2016-113, s. 19(a), is a severability clause.

This section was amended by Session Laws 2017-186, s. 2(ddddddddd), in the coded bill drafting format provided by G.S. 120-20.1. The act failed to account for the amendment to subdivision (d)(6) by Session Laws 2015-198, s. 3, which substituted "Department of Public Safety" for "Division of Adult Correction of the Department of Public Safety" and inserted "matters relating to executions under Article 19 of Chapter 15 of the General Statutes and." Session Laws 2017-186, s. 2(ddddddddd), would have inserted "and Juvenile Justice" following "Correction" in subdivision (d)(6). Subdivision (d)(6) has been set out in the form above at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 11E.1(d), made subdivision (d)(29) of this section, as added by Session Laws 2018-5, s. 11E.1(b), effective July 1, 2018, and the fee authorized by G.S. 130A-125(c) applies to laboratory tests performed by the North Carolina State Laboratory of Public Health as part of the Newborn Screening Program on or after that date.

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2018.'"

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 39.4, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2018-2019 fiscal year, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2018-2019 fiscal year."

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 39.7, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2020-48, s. 4.1(d), made G.S. 150B-1(d)(30), as added by Session Laws 2020-48, s. 4.1(c), effective June 26, 2020, and applicable to actuarial tables, assumptions, and contribution-based benefit cap factors adopted or changed on or after that date.

Session Laws 2020-48, s. 6.1, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2021-138, s. 22(a), is a severability clause.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 1997-412, s. 8, effective January 1, 1998, and effective until July 1, 2001, substituted "for The University of North Carolina" for "from All But Judicial Review", and inserted "Except as provided in G.S. 143-135.3." Session Laws 1997-412, s. 14, provided that this amendment would expire July 1, 2001. Subsequently, Session Laws 2001-496, s. 8(c), effective July 1, 2001, and expiring December 31, 2006, reenacted Session Laws 1997-412, s. 8. Subsequently, Session Laws 2005-300, s. 1, amended Session Laws 2001-496, s. 14(a), by deleting the expiration clause.

Session Laws 2004-88, s. 1(e), effective June 30, 2004, added subdivision (d)(13).

Session Laws 2005-133, s. 10, effective June 29, 2005, rewrote subdivision (e)(9) by substituting "The North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission" for "The Occupational Safety and Health Review Board."

Session Laws 2005-344, s. 11.1, as added by Session Laws 2005-276, s. 31.1(ff), effective August 31, 2005, added subdivision (c)(7).

Session Laws 2005-455, s. 3.3, effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to determinations made on or after that date, added subdivision (e)(15).

Session Laws 2006-66, ss. 8.10(d) and 12.8(c), effective July 1, 2006, added subdivisions (d)(14) and (d)(15), respectively.

Session Laws 2006-201, s. 2(a), effective October 1, 2006, and applicable to covered persons and legislative employees on or after January 1, 2007, to gifts received on or after January 1, 2007, to acts and conflicts of interest that arise on or after January 1, 2007, and to offenses committed on or after January 1, 2007, added subdivision (d)(16).

Session Laws 2007-323, s. 13.2(c), effective July 1, 2007, added subdivision (d)(17).

Session Laws 2007-323, s. 28.22A(o), as amended by Session Laws 2007-345, s. 12, effective July 1, 2008, substituted "State Health Plan for Teachers and State Employees" for "North Carolina Teachers' and State Employees' Comprehensive Major Medical Plan" in subdivisions (d)(7) and (e)(12), and substituted "State Health Plan for Teachers and State Employees" for "Teachers' and State Employees' Comprehensive Major Medical Plan" in subdivision (e)(13).

Session Laws 2007-491, s. 2, effective January 1, 2008, deleted former subdivision (e)(6), which read: "Department of Revenue."

Session Laws 2007-552, 1st Ex. Sess., s. 3, effective July 1, 2007, added subdivision (d)(18).

Session Laws 2008-107, s. 10.15A(f), effective July 1, 2008, inserted "agencies" in the introductory paragraph of subsection (e); added subdivision (e)(16).

Session Laws 2008-168, s. 5(a), effective July 1, 2008, substituted "Article 3A of" for "Parts 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Article 3" in subdivision (d)(7).

Session Laws 2008-187, s. 26(b), effective August 7, 2008, substituted "G.S. 143B-437.012" for "G.S. 143B-437.11" in subdivision (d)(18).

Session Laws 2009-445, s. 41(b), effective August 7, 2009, deleted subdivision (d)(15), which read: "The Department of Commerce in developing guidelines for the North Carolina Economic Development Reserve."

Session Laws 2009-475, s. 4, effective February 17, 2009, and expiring June 30, 2012, added subdivision (c)(8).

Session Laws 2009-523, s. 2(a), effective August 26, 2009, added subdivision (d)(19).

Session Laws 2010-70, s. 2, effective July 1, 2010, and applicable to reviews of Health Choice Program enrollment, eligibility, or health services decisions requested by Health Choice Program applicants or recipients on or after that date, added subdivision (e)(17).

Session Laws 2011-145, s. 8.18(a) and (b), as amended by Session Laws 2011-391, s. 19, effective June 15, 2011, deleted subdivisions (d)(14) and (d)(19); and added subsection (g).

Session Laws 2011-145, s. 14.6(j), effective July 1, 2011, substituted "G.S. 136-262(a)(11)" for "G.S. 143B-454(a)(11)" in subsection (d)(11).

Session Laws 2011-264, s. 4, effective June 23, 2011, added subdivision (d)(20).

Session Laws 2011-272, s. 5, effective October 1, 2011, added subdivision (e)(18).

Session Laws 2011-287, s. 21(a) and (b), deleted subdivision (c)(4), which read: "The Industrial Commission"; and added subdivision (e)(19). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2011-399, ss. 2 and 3, effective July 25, 2011, added "pursuant to G.S. 108A-54.2" at the end of subdivision (d)(9); and deleted subdivision (e)(16).

Session Laws 2011-401, s. 1.10, effective November 1, 2011, deleted subdivision (c)(5), which read: "The Employment Security Commission"; and added subdivision (e)(20).

Session Laws 2014-100, s. 13.2(a), effective July 1, 2014, added subdivision (d)(26). See Editor's note.

Session Laws 2014-100, s. 15.13(b), effective July 1, 2014, added subdivision (d)(18a).

Session Laws 2014-100, s. 15.14B(b), effective January 1, 2015, added subdivision (d)(18a). See Editor's notes for applicability and redesignation.

Session Laws 2014-103, s. 17, effective August 6, 2014, added subdivision (d)(26).

Session Laws 2015-198, ss. 3, 4, effective August 5, 2015, in subdivision (d)(6), substituted "Department of Public Safety" for "Division of Adult Correction of the Department of Public Safety" and inserted "matters relating to executions under Article 19 of Chapter 15 of the General Statutes and"; and added subdivision (e)(22).

Session Laws 2015-198, s. 3, effective August 5, 2015, rewrote subdivision (d)(6).

Session Laws 2015-198, s. 4, effective August 5, 2015, added subdivision (e)(22).

Session Laws 2015-241, ss. 14.6(g), 14.30(s), (u), effective July 1, 2015, substituted "Department of Natural and Cultural Resources" for "Department of Cultural Resources" in subdivision (d)(23); substituted "Department of Environmental Quality" for "Department of Environment and Natural Resources" in subdivision (e)(1); and added subdivision (e)(22) (now (e)(23)).

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 14.11(a), effective July 1, 2015, and applicable to admission fees or related activity fees charged on or after July 1, 2015, in subdivision (d)(26), inserted the a. designation, inserted b., and inserted "and operating hours" in the last sentence; added subdivision (d)(27); and made minor stylistic changes.

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 14.30(v), effective July 1, 2015, substituted "Secretary of Environmental Quality" for "Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources" in subdivision (e)(23).

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 14.30(s), effective July 1, 2015, substituted "Department of Natural and Cultural Resources" for "Department of Cultural Resources" in subdivision (d)(23).

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 14.30(u), effective July 1, 2015, substituted "Department of Environmental Quality" for "Department of Environment and Natural Resources" in subdivisions (d)(27) and (e)(1).

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 14.30(v), effective July 1, 2015, substituted "Secretary of Environmental Quality" for "Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources" in subsection (a).

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 29.30(t), effective July 1, 2020, added subdivision (d)(28). See editor's note for redesignation of subdivision.

Session Laws 2016-113, s. 7(a), effective July 26, 2016, added sub-subdivision (d)(26)c.

Session Laws 2017-186, s. 2(ddddddddd), effective December 1, 2017, inserted "and Juvenile Justice" in subdivision (e)(7).

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 11E.1(b), added subdivision (d)(29). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 37.1(h), effective June 12, 2018, added subdivision (e)(24).

Session Laws 2018-142, s. 21, effective December 15, 2018, in subdivision (d)(6), deleted "and Juvenile Justice" preceding "The Department of."

Session Laws 2019-81, s. 10, effective October 1, 2019, added "commenced under G.S. 108A-70.29b" in subdivision (e)(17); and added subdivision (e)(25).

Session Laws 2019-165, s. 7, effective July 26, 2019, added subdivision (e)(26).

Session Laws 2019-177, s. 8.2, effective July 26, 2019, repealed subdivision (e)(11) pertaining to hearings on eligibility of assaultive or violent children.

Session Laws 2020-48, s. 4.1(c), added subdivision (d)(30). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2021-125, s. 3(c), effective August 30, 2021, rewrote subdivision (e)(13).

Session Laws 2021-138, s. 12(a), effective September 2, 2021, added subdivisions (d)(6a) and (d)(6b).

Legal Periodicals. - For comment on former Chapter 150, see 31 N.C.L. Rev. 378 (1953).

For note as to constitutionality of statutes licensing occupations, see 35 N.C.L. Rev. 473 (1957).

For article on administrative evidence rules, see 49 N.C.L. Rev. 635 (1971).

For interpretative analysis of former Chapter 150A, see 53 N.C.L. Rev. 833 (1975).

For survey of 1979 administrative law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1185 (1980).

For article, "A Powerless Judiciary? The North Carolina Courts' Perceptions of Review of Administrative Action," see 12 N.C. Cent. L.J. 21 (1980).

For survey of 1980 administrative law, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1026 (1981).

For survey of 1982 law on administrative law, see 61 N.C.L. Rev. 961 (1983).

For article, "The New Administrative Procedures Act: A Practical Guide to Understanding and Using It," see 9 Campbell L. Rev. 293 (1987).

For note, "The Forty-Two Hundred Dollar Question: 'May State Agencies Have Discretion in Setting Civil Penalties Under the North Carolina Constitution?'," see 68 N.C.L. Rev. 1035 (1990).

For survey of 1996 developments in constitutional law, see 75 N.C.L. Rev. 2252 (1997).

For article, "Powers of Administrative Law Judges, Agencies, and Courts: An Analytical and Empirical Assessment," see 79 N.C.L. Rev. 1571 (2001).

For article, "What Were We Thinking?: Legislative Intent and the 2000 Amendments to the North Carolina APA," see 79 N.C.L. Rev. 1657 (2001).

For article, "Wind Over North Carolina Waters: The State's Preparedness to Address Offshore and Coastal Water-Based Wind Energy Projects," see 87 N.C.L. Rev. 1819 (2009).

For article, "Plenary Power in the Modern Administrative State," see 96 N.C.L. Rev. 77 (2017).

For article, "The Re-'Tooling' of Federal ALJs: Lucia v. SEC and Executive Order 13,843," see 97 N.C. L. Rev. Addendum 21 (2019).

For article, "Reckoning with Adjudication's Exceptionalism Norm," see 69 Duke L.J. 1749 (2020).

For article, "An Article III Renaissance in Administrative Law: A Return to the Judicial Past?," see 12 Elon L. Rev. 385 (2020).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Most of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A, or prior to the 1991 amendments to this Chapter.

History of Chapter. - The original Administrative Procedure Act (APA), codified as Chapter 150A, was effective until Dec. 31, 1985; the APA was rewritten in 1985 and recodified as Chapter 150B, with the new version becoming effective Jan. 1, 1986. Vass v. Board of Trustees, 108 N.C. App. 251, 423 S.E.2d 796 (1992).

The 1991 Amendment to this section merely confirms that when a person is aggrieved by agency action, the Administrative Procedure Act only "describes the procedures" for Office of Administrative Hearings review in the event the North Carolina General Assembly vests a party with the right to administrative review, such as a contested case hearing. Empire Power Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 112 N.C. App. 566, 436 S.E.2d 594 (1993), rev'd on other grounds, 337 N.C. 569, 447 S.E.2d 768, reh'g denied, 338 N.C. 314, 451 S.E.2d 634 (1994).

The 2003 version of G.S. 150B-34(c), which excluded the Certificate of Need Act, G.S. 131E-175 et seq., from the requirements of G.S. 150B-36(b), (b1), (b2), (b3), and (d) and G.S. 150B-51, left the scope and standard of review applied under the 1999 version of G.S. 150B-51 undisturbed. Mooresville Hosp. Mgmt. Assocs. v. N.C. HHS, Div. of Facility Servs., 169 N.C. App. 641, 611 S.E.2d 431 (2005).

The primary purpose of this Act is to confer procedural rights, including the right to an administrative hearing, upon any person aggrieved by an agency decision, and statutes should be liberally construed together to preserve and effectuate that right. Empire Power Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 337 N.C. 569, 447 S.E.2d 768, rehearing denied, 338 N.C. 314, 451 S.E.2d 634 (1994).

The administrative hearing provisions of this act apply to all agencies and all proceedings except those expressly exempted, and it expressly named the particular agencies exempted therefrom, specifying the extent of each such exemption. Empire Power Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 337 N.C. 569, 447 S.E.2d 768, rehearing denied, 338 N.C. 314, 451 S.E.2d 634 (1994).

Under G.S. 90-270.15(a), the North Carolina Psychology Board is responsible for overseeing licensed psychologists practicing in the state, and it may discipline licensees who violate ethical or professional standards; under G.S. 90-270.15(e), disciplinary actions by the Board are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, § 150B-1 et seq. Farber v. N.C. Psychology Bd., 153 N.C. App. 1, 569 S.E.2d 287 (2002), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 612, 574 S.E.2d 679 (2002).

Contested case hearing provisions of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act apply to all agencies and all proceedings except those expressly exempted therefrom, and G.S. 150B-1(e) specifies the extent of each such exemption. N.C. Forestry Ass'n v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 154 N.C. App. 18, 571 S.E.2d 602 (2002), review denied sub nom. N.C. Forestry Ass'n v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Nat'l Res., 357 N.C. 251, 582 S.E.2d 276 (2003).

Although corporations were not required to be represented by attorneys in hearings before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), pursuant to G.S. 150B-23 (referring to "attorney or representative" of a party), the DMV was exempted from the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act authorizing contested cases to be brought in the OAH, G.S. 150B-1(e)(8), and therefore, in a hearing before the DMV, a corporation was required to be represented by an attorney. In re Twin County Motorsports, Inc., 230 N.C. App. 259, 749 S.E.2d 474 (2013).

Strict Separation of Agency Functions Not Required - Neither the Administrative Procedure Act, G.S. 150B-1 et seq., nor due process, requires a strict separation between agency functions. Farber v. N.C. Psychology Bd., 153 N.C. App. 1, 569 S.E.2d 287 (2002), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 612, 574 S.E.2d 679 (2002).

The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill is expressly exempted from the administrative hearings provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. Beauchesne v. University of N.C, 125 N.C. App. 457, 481 S.E.2d 685 (1997).

Application of Chapter. - Where the complaints and notices of hearing were filed prior to Jan. 1, 1986, the action was commenced prior to Jan. 1, 1986, and Chapter 150B had no application; thus, G.S. 150A-45 (rewritten and recodified as G.S. 150B-45), requiring a person seeking review to file a petition in the Superior Court of Wake County, and not G.S. 150B-45, permitting such filing in either Wake County or the county where the person resides, governed. Pinewood Manor Mobile Homes, Inc. v. North Carolina Manufactured Hous. Bd., 84 N.C. App. 564, 353 S.E.2d 231, cert. denied, 319 N.C. 674, 356 S.E.2d 780 (1987).

North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, G.S. 150B-1 et seq., applied, pursuant to G.S. 150B-1(e), to a county employee's declaratory judgment action for a ruling that the county's personnel regulations were not substantially equivalent to the standards established by the North Carolina State Personnel Act [now the North Carolina Human Resources Act], G.S. 126-1 et seq., where the employee's employment with the county was terminated. Steward v. Green, 189 N.C. App. 131, 657 S.E.2d 719 (2008).

General Assembly did not impliedly exempt the Board of Trustees from the necessity of compliance with APA's rulemaking provisions in adopting a cap factor where G.S. 135-5(a3) and G.S. 135-6(l) could be harmonized, the adoption of a cap factor was not a ministerial act in which the Board did nothing more than ratify the actuary's recommendation, case law did not support such an implied exemption, and the public interests supported the Board of Education's contention that the cap factor should be established by using the APA's rulemaking provisions to ensure the opportunity for adequate public input before a decision became final. This case was decided prior to the enactment of G.S. 150B-1(d)(30) by Session Laws 2020-48, s. 4.1(c). Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Dep't of State Treasurer, 374 N.C. 3, 839 S.E.2d 814 (2020).

Individuals aggrieved pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act are not required to seek administrative review in a contested case hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings via the contested case hearing provisions of this act; rather, they are entitled to a hearing governed by procedures established by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, P.L.102-569, 42 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. as amended. Hedgepeth v. North Carolina Div. of Servs. for the Blind, 142 N.C. App. 338, 543 S.E.2d 169 (2001).

Direct Challenge to Constitutionality of North Carolina Supreme Court Order. - A direct challenge of the constitutionality of an order of the North Carolina Supreme Court cannot be adjudicated under this Chapter. The issue must be litigated as an original action in the General Court of Justice. Beard v. North Carolina State Bar, 320 N.C. 126, 357 S.E.2d 694 (1987).

Judicial Notice of Regulations. - Where promulgating agency is not subject to the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, the court is only required to take judicial notice of its regulations if they are submitted in accordance with certain procedures designed to insure their accuracy. Southern Ry. v. O'Boyle Tank Lines, 70 N.C. App. 1, 318 S.E.2d 872 (1984).

Irreconcilable Dispute. - When a dispute between a state agency and another person arise and cannot be settled informally, the procedures for resolving the dispute are governed by this act. North Buncombe Ass'n of Concerned Citizens v. Rhodes, 100 N.C. App. 24, 394 S.E.2d 462, appeal dismissed, 327 N.C. 484, 397 S.E.2d 215 (1990).

North Carolina Human Resources Commission. - As to the applicability of former Chapter 150A to the State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission], see Stevenson v. North Carolina Dep't of Ins., 31 N.C. App. 299, 229 S.E.2d 209, cert. denied, 291 N.C. 450, 230 S.E.2d 767 (1976).

Department of Insurance. - Insurance Commissioner's promulgation of 11 N.C.A.C. 12.0319, prohibiting subrogation provisions in life or accident and health insurance contracts, supported by G.S. 58-2-40 (right to limit practices injurious to the public) and 58-50-15(a) (prohibiting provisions less favorable to the insured), did not exceed his statutory authority, even though it may change state substantive law, and did not amount to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers, because statutory provisions (G.S. 58-2-40, 58-51-15, and 58-50-15) and judicial review (available under this chapter) offer adequate procedural safeguards and support the delegation of power to the Commissioner. In re A Declaratory Ruling by the N.C. Comm'r of Ins. Regarding 11 N.C.A.C. 12.0319, 134 N.C. App. 22, 517 S.E.2d 134, cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 351 N.C. 105, 540 S.E.2d 356 (1999).

Department of Transportation. - Language which provides that Articles 2 and 3 of former Chapter 150A shall not apply to the Department of Transportation in rule-making or administrative hearings only applies to actions taken by the department pursuant to Chapter 20, which refers to regulation of motor vehicles. In contrast, Chapters 136 and 143B provide the Department of Transportation and the Board of Transportation with powers and duties to engage in the planning and construction of the state highway system, and had the General Assembly wanted to exclude actions of the Department and Board of Transportation under Chapter 136 from the requirements of Articles 2 and 3 of former Chapter 150A, it would have done so with the same specificity that it used in excluding actions taken pursuant to Chapter 20. Orange County Sensible Hwys. & Protected Env'ts, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 46 N.C. App. 350, 265 S.E.2d 890 (1980).

University of North Carolina's State Residency Committee (SRC) is exempt from this Chapter; therefore, although provisions in the act requiring judicial review of final administrative review were applicable, the SRC was not governed by G.S. 150B-36, which requires agencies to state reasons for their decisions. Wilson v. State Residence Comm., 92 N.C. App. 355, 374 S.E.2d 415 (1988), cert. denied, 324 N.C. 252, 377 S.E.2d 764 (1989).

Board of Trustees. - Language in G.S. 135-39.7 [now G.S. 135-44.7] that board of trustees "may make a binding decision" concerning a dispute between an aggrieved individual and a claims administrator of a medical plan is not an express and unequivocal exemption of the board from the requirements of this Chapter; instead, the use of the term "binding" in the statute was intended to mean only that the board's decision would be binding upon the parties absent further review according to law. Vass v. Board of Trustees, 324 N.C. 402, 379 S.E.2d 26 (1989).

Retirement Systems Division of the Department of State Treasurer (Division) erred in invoicing a school employee or school board for contributions to the employee's retirement fund pursuant to a statutory cap factor because (1) the factor was a rule not properly adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, and (2) the Division was a state agency not exempt from rule making requirements. Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Dep't of State Treasurer, 261 N.C. App. 325, 821 S.E.2d 196 (2018), aff'd, 374 N.C. 3, 839 S.E.2d 814, 2020 N.C. LEXIS 270 (2020).

The Department of Environment, Health, and Natural Resources (now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources), is not among those agencies which the Administrative Procedures Act specifically exempts from its provisions. North Buncombe Ass'n of Concerned Citizens v. Rhodes, 100 N.C. App. 24, 394 S.E.2d 462, appeal dismissed, 327 N.C. 484, 397 S.E.2d 215 (1990).

Entitlement to Administrative Hearing on Mining Permit. - Petitioners were entitled to a contested case hearing by the Office of Administrative Hearings on their claim that mining permit should not have been issued. North Buncombe Ass'n of Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health, & Natural Resources, 338 N.C. 302, 449 S.E.2d 451 (1994).

The Social Services Commission was not excluded from coverage under subsection (d). Whittington v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 100 N.C. App. 603, 398 S.E.2d 40 (1990).

Board of Dental Examiners. - The Board of Dental Examiners is an agency governed by the provisions of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act and is not exempt from the contested case provisions of the Act. Homoly v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examrs., 121 N.C. App. 695, 468 S.E.2d 481 (1996).

Where taxpayer only argued in his brief that decision by board was unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the "whole record" test, the Court of Appeals would decline to review the board's decision under the other standards of this section. Walls & Marshall Fuel Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 95 N.C. App. 151, 381 S.E.2d 815 (1989).

For discussion of respective powers and duties of Commissioner of Insurance and his designated hearing officer in the review of filed rates and entry of a final agency decision in a contested insurance rate case, see State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 61 N.C. App. 506, 300 S.E.2d 845 (1983).

Appeal Allowed. - Third party was entitled under this Act and the Air Pollution Control Act, G.S. 143-215.105 et seq., to appeal to the Office of Administrative Hearings from the decision of the Department of Environmental Management, to grant an air pollution control permit to Duke Power Company. Empire Power Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 337 N.C. 569, 447 S.E.2d 768, rehearing denied, 338 N.C. 314, 451 S.E.2d 634 (1994).

Challenges to Constitutionality of Regulation or Statute. - Under North Carolina law, plaintiffs may be able to bypass administrative review and seek direct relief from the court. For example, when an aggrieved party challenges the constitutionality of a regulation or statute, administrative remedies are deemed to be inadequate and exhaustion thereof is not required. Prentiss v. Allstate Ins. Co., 87 F. Supp. 2d 514 (W.D.N.C. 1999).

Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Medical Assistance - Pursuant to G.S. 150B-1(c), the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Medical Assistance, is an Article 3 agency and thereby subject to the mandates of G.S. 150B-44. Albemarle Mental Health Ctr. v. N.C. Dep't of HHS, 159 N.C. App. 66, 582 S.E.2d 651 (2003), aff'd, 358 N.C. 134, 591 S.E.2d 519 (2004).

Dialysis firm challenging the refusal of the N.C. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Division of Facility Services [now the Division of Health Service Regulation], Medical Facilities Planning Section, to amend a Semiannual Dialysis Report (SDR) did not have a remedy under the North Carolina Administrative Procedures Act or the North Carolina Declaratory Judgment Act since, inter alia: the enabling statute suggested that the North Carolina State Medical Facilities Plan (SMFP), which contained the SDR, was a snapshot in time intended to enable the DHHS to develop policy, criteria, and standards for health service facilities planning; and it was the role of the DHHS and the N.C. State Health Coordinating Council to develop the SMFP. Bio-Medical Applications of N.C. Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 179 N.C. App. 483, 634 S.E.2d 572 (2006), appeal dismissed, 361 N.C. 229, 641 S.E.2d 303, appeal dismissed, 361 N.C. 350, 644 S.E.2d 3, appeal dismissed, 361 N.C. 350, 644 S.E.2d 4, reh'g denied, 361 N.C. 370645 S.E.2d 762 (2007).

Disciplinary Hearing Commission. - The contention that an attorney who is accused of misconduct should be entitled to a hearing before an administrative law judge under the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, is rejected. N.C. State Bar v. Rogers, 164 N.C. App. 648, 596 S.E.2d 337 (2004).

State Board of Education. - By the 1942 amendment to the North Carolina Constitution, the framers and voters consolidated in the State Board of Education all administrative authority governing a statewide public school system, limited the Board's authority to making rules and regulations subject to laws enacted by the General Assembly, eliminated the Board's authority to legislate, and thereby restored to the General Assembly all legislative authority regarding public education. N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. State, 255 N.C. App. 514, 805 S.E.2d 518 (2017), aff'd, 371 N.C. 149, 814 S.E.2d 54, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 433 (2018).

Process of Approval Or Disapproval Of Execution Protocol Not Subject To the Administrative Procedure Act. - Superior court did not err in dismissing inmates' request for judicial review of the final decision of respondent North Carolina Council of State, which approved the lethal injection protocol the Department of Correction (DOC) submitted, because the process by which the Council approved or disapproved the DOC's lethal injection protocol was not subject to the APA, and the inmates could not challenge it by going through the Office of Administrative Hearings through the APA; instead, any issue the inmates had with the protocol rested with the General Court of Justice or the federal courts. Conner v. N.C. Council of State, 365 N.C. 242, 716 S.E.2d 836 (2011).

General Assembly intended that the Department of Correction (DOC) have primary responsibility for the lethal injection process because G.S. 15-188 does not give the North Carolina Council of State authority beyond merely approving or disapproving the submitted protocol; the General Assembly did not intend to negate the express exemption that it provided to the DOC in the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by including a requirement that the Council approve the lethal injection protocol, and thus, the process by which the Council approves or disapproves the DOC's lethal injection protocol is not subject to the APA. Conner v. N.C. Council of State, 365 N.C. 242, 716 S.E.2d 836 (2011).

Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies. - Trial court properly dismissed a former police officer's negligence action against a drug testing laboratory for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the officer failed to exhaust all administrative remedies under the North Carolina Administrative Procedures Act, G.S. 150B et seq., by not requesting an administrative hearing, pursuant to G.S. 17C-11(b), to contest the decision by the North Carolina Criminal Justice Education and Training Standards Commission to suspend the officer's law enforcement certification upon the officer's positive drug test. Vanwijk v. Prof'l Nursing Servs., 213 N.C. App. 407, 713 S.E.2d 766 (2011).

Applied in Florence Concrete Prods., Inc. v. North Carolina Licensing Bd., 113 N.C. App. 270, 437 S.E.2d 877 (1994); Simonel v. North Carolina Sch. of Arts, 119 N.C. App. 772, 460 S.E.2d 194 (1995); Johnston Health Care Ctr., L.L.C. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, Div. of Facility Servs., Certificate of Need Section, 136 N.C. App. 307, 524 S.E.2d 352 (2000); Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. Bruton, 145 N.C. App. 190, 550 S.E.2d 524 (2001); Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill v. Feinstein, 161 N.C. App. 700, 590 S.E.2d 401 (2003), cert. denied, 358 N.C. 380, 598 S.E.2d 380 (2004); Googerdy v. N.C. Agric. & Tech. State Univ., 386 F. Supp. 2d 618 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 24, 2005); Holly Ridge Assocs., LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 361 N.C. 531, 648 S.E.2d 830 (2007); Griffith v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 210 N.C. App. 544, 709 S.E.2d 412 (2011).

Cited in Eury v. North Carolina Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 115 N.C. App. 590, 446 S.E.2d 383 (1994), cert. denied, 338 N.C. 309, 451 S.E.2d 635 (1994); O.S. Steel Erectors v. Brooks, 84 N.C. App. 630, 353 S.E.2d 869 (1987); North Carolina Dep't of Justice v. Baker, 90 N.C. App. 30, 367 S.E.2d 392 (1988); Vass v. Board of Trustees, 324 N.C. 402, 379 S.E.2d 26 (1989); Walls & Marshall Fuel Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 95 N.C. App. 151, 381 S.E.2d 815 (1989); C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft & Eng'g Co., 326 N.C. 133, 388 S.E.2d 557 (1990); In re Greene, 328 N.C. 639, 403 S.E.2d 257 (1991); Huang v. North Carolina State Univ., 107 N.C. App. 710, 421 S.E.2d 812 (1992); Brooks v. BCF Piping, Inc., 109 N.C. App. 26, 426 S.E.2d 282 (1993); In re McCrary, 112 N.C. App. 161, 435 S.E.2d 359 (1993); Nailing v. UNC-CH, 117 N.C. App. 318, 451 S.E.2d 351 (1994), cert. denied, 339 N.C. 614, 454 S.E.2d 255 (1995); Byers v. North Carolina Sav. Institutions Div., 123 N.C. App. 689, 474 S.E.2d 404 (1996); Ware v. Fort, 124 N.C. App. 613, 478 S.E.2d 218 (1996); Bryant v. Hogarth, 127 N.C. App. 79, 488 S.E.2d 269, cert. denied, 347 N.C. 396, 494 S.E.2d 406 (1997); Holland Group, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Admin., 130 N.C. App. 721, 504 S.E.2d 300 (1998); Prentiss v. Allstate Ins. Co., 87 F. Supp. 2d 514 (W.D.N.C. 1999); Dialysis Care of N.C. L.L.C. v. North Carolina HHS, Div. of Facility Servs., Certificate of Need Section, 137 N.C. App. 638, 529 S.E.2d 257 (2000), aff'd, 353 N.C. 258, 538 S.E.2d 566 (2000); Living Centers-Southeast, Inc. v. North Carolina HHS, 138 N.C. App. 572, 532 S.E.2d 192 (2000); DOT v. Blue, 147 N.C. App. 596, 556 S.E.2d 609 (2001); Best v. Dep't. of Health & Human Servs., 149 N.C. App. 882, 563 S.E.2d 573 (2002), aff'd sub nom., 356 N.C. 430, 571 S.E.2d 586 (2002); Farber v. N.C. Psychology Bd., 153 N.C. App. 1, 569 S.E.2d 287 (2002), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 612, 574 S.E.2d 679 (2002); CVS Pharm., Inc. v. N.C. Bd. of Pharm., 162 N.C. App. 495, 591 S.E.2d 567 (2004); In re Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs. of N.C. Inc., 189 N.C. App. 115, 657 S.E.2d 405 (2008); Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 193 N.C. App. 350, 668 S.E.2d 571 (2008), rev'd 364 N.C. 61, 692 S.E.2d 96 N.C. LEXIS 343 (2010); Dare County v. N.C. Dep't of Ins., 207 N.C. App. 600, 701 S.E.2d 368 (2010); Rone v. Winston-Salem, 207 N.C. App. 618, 701 S.E.2d 284 (2010); Johnson v. Robertson, 227 N.C. App. 281, 742 S.E.2d 603 (2013); Robinson v. Shanahan, 233 N.C. App. 34, 755 S.E.2d 398 (2014); N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 191 L. Ed. 2d 35 (2015); Fowler v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue, 242 N.C. App. 404, 775 S.E.2d 350 (2015); Vincoli v. State, 250 N.C. App. 269, 792 S.E.2d 813 (2016).

Opinions of Attorney General

Editor's Note. - Some of the opinions below were issued prior to the 1991 amendments to this Chapter.

Applicability of G.S. 150B-23(a). - Section 150B-23(a), as amended by Session Laws 1987, Chapter 878, is not applicable to agencies governed by Article 3A of this Chapter. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Phillip T. Fisher, Executive Director, N.C. Real Estate Commission, 57 N.C.A.G. 85 (1987).

Appeals by applicants and recipients of public assistance or social services from adverse decisions of county agencies or boards are governed by the substantive provisions and procedural requirements of G.S. 108A-79, including the procedural provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act consistent with the statute, to the extent that substance and procedure are not in conflict with applicable federal law and regulations. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Phillip J. Kirk, Jr., Secretary, Department of Human Resources, 55 N.C.A.G. 91 (1986).

Procedural, Not Substantive, Provisions of Act Applicable to Appeals of County Agency Decisions. - Given the detailed substantive provisions of G.S. 108A-79, designed specifically to apply to appeals of county agency decisions, and the fact that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), by its terms, does not apply to such appeals, the Legislature, by reference to the APA, did not intend to substitute the Act's substantive requirements for those of G.S. 108A-79. The citation to the APA simply indicates a legislative intent to incorporate the powers of hearing officers and the hearing procedures detailed in the Act into G.S. 108A-79(i) by reference. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Phillip J. Kirk, Jr., Secretary, Department of Human Resources, 55 N.C.A.G. 91 (1986).

When a contested case hearing is conducted by an agency governed by Article 3A of this Chapter, a petition or other notice need not be filed with the Office of Administrative Hearings. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Phillip T. Fisher, Executive Director, N.C. Real Estate Commission, 57 N.C.A.G. 85 (1987).

Chapter 78A Does Not Take Precedence over This Act. - The provisions of Chapter 78A are not stated with the specificity and particularity sufficient to take precedence over any similar provisions of this Chapter which might conceivably apply to the actions and proceedings addressed by the Securities Act. See opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Stephen M. Wallis, Deputy Securities Administrator (acting), 58 N.C.A.G. 76 (1988).

This Chapter applies to the Secretary of State in the execution of the duties delegated in Chapter 78A. To be entirely exempt from this Chapter under subsection (c) of this section, the agency must either be listed in subsection (d) or have a specific statement of exemption from this Chapter in its enabling legislation; however, neither basis for exemption exists for Chapter 78A. Subsection (c) does have the additional effect of causing any applicable provisions of this Chapter which cannot be reconciled with provisions of Chapter 78A to fail in favor of Chapter 78A. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Stephen M. Wallis, Deputy Securities Administrator (acting), 58 N.C.A.G. 76 (1988).


§ 150B-2. Definitions.

As used in this Chapter, the following definitions apply:

  1. Administrative law judge. - A person appointed under G.S. 7A-752, 7A-753, or 7A-757.
  2. Adopt. - To take final action to create, amend, or repeal a rule.
  3. Agency. - An agency or an officer in the executive branch of the government of this State. The term includes the Council of State, the Governor's Office, a board, a commission, a department, a division, a council, and any other unit of government in the executive branch. A local unit of government is not an agency.
  4. Codifier of Rules. - The person appointed by the Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Office of Administrative Hearings pursuant to G.S. 7A-760(b).
  5. Commission. - The Rules Review Commission.
  6. Contested case. - An administrative proceeding pursuant to this Chapter to resolve a dispute between an agency and another person that involves the person's rights, duties, or privileges, including licensing or the levy of a monetary penalty. The term does not include rulemaking, declaratory rulings, or the award or denial of a scholarship, a grant, or a loan.
  7. Repealed by Session Laws 1991, c. 418, s. 3.
  8. Hearing officer. - A person or group of persons designated by an agency that is subject to Article 3A of this Chapter to preside in a contested case hearing conducted under that Article.
  9. License. - Any certificate, permit, or other evidence, by whatever name called, of a right or privilege to engage in any activity, except licenses issued under Chapter 20 and Subchapter I of Chapter 105 of the General Statutes, occupational licenses, and certifications of electronic poll books, ballot duplication systems, or voting systems under G.S. 163-165.7.
  10. Licensing. - Any administrative action issuing, failing to issue, suspending, or revoking a license or occupational license. The term does not include controversies over whether an examination was fair or whether the applicant passed the examination.
  11. Occupational license. - Any certificate, permit, or other evidence, by whatever name called, of a right or privilege to engage in a profession, occupation, or field of endeavor that is issued by an occupational licensing agency.
  12. Occupational licensing agency. - Any board, commission, committee, or other agency of the State that is established for the primary purpose of regulating the entry of persons into, or the conduct of persons within a particular profession, occupation, or field of endeavor, and that is authorized to issue and revoke licenses. The term does not include State agencies or departments that may as only a part of their regular function issue permits or licenses.
  13. Party. - Any person or agency named or admitted as a party or properly seeking as of right to be admitted as a party and includes the agency as appropriate.
  14. Person. - Any natural person, partnership, corporation, body politic, and any unincorporated association, organization, or society that may sue or be sued under a common name.
  15. Person aggrieved. - Any person or group of persons of common interest directly or indirectly affected substantially in his, her, or its person, property, or employment by an administrative decision.
  16. Recodified as subdivision (5a) of this section by Session Laws 2021-88, s. 16(a), effective July 22, 2021.
  17. Policy. - Any nonbinding interpretive statement within the delegated authority of an agency that merely defines, interprets, or explains the meaning of a statute or rule. The term includes any document issued by an agency that is intended and used purely to assist a person to comply with the law, such as a guidance document.
  18. Residence. - Domicile or principal place of business.
  19. Rule. - Any agency regulation, standard, or statement of general applicability that implements or interprets an enactment of the General Assembly or Congress or a regulation adopted by a federal agency or that describes the procedure or practice requirements of an agency. The term includes the establishment of a fee and the amendment or repeal of a prior rule. The term does not include the following:
    1. Statements concerning only the internal management of an agency or group of agencies within the same principal office or department enumerated in G.S. 143A-11 or 143B-6, including policies and procedures manuals, if the statement does not directly or substantially affect the procedural or substantive rights or duties of a person not employed by the agency or group of agencies.
    2. Budgets and budget policies and procedures issued by the Director of the Budget, by the head of a department, as defined by G.S. 143A-2 or G.S. 143B-3, or by an occupational licensing board, as defined by G.S. 93B-1.
    3. Nonbinding interpretative statements within the delegated authority of an agency that merely define, interpret, or explain the meaning of a statute or rule.
    4. A form, the contents or substantive requirements of which are prescribed by rule or statute.
    5. Statements of agency policy made in the context of another proceeding, including:
      1. Declaratory rulings under G.S. 150B-4.
      2. Orders establishing or fixing rates or tariffs.
    6. Requirements, communicated to the public by the use of signs or symbols, concerning the use of public roads, bridges, ferries, buildings, or facilities.
    7. Statements that set forth criteria or guidelines to be used by the staff of an agency in performing audits, investigations, or inspections; in settling financial disputes or negotiating financial arrangements; or in the defense, prosecution, or settlement of cases.
    8. Scientific, architectural, or engineering standards, forms, or procedures, including design criteria and construction standards used to construct or maintain highways, bridges, or ferries.
    9. Job classification standards, job qualifications, and salaries established for positions under the jurisdiction of the State Human Resources Commission.
    10. Establishment of the interest rate that applies to tax assessments under G.S. 105-241.21.
    11. The State Medical Facilities Plan, if the Plan has been prepared with public notice and hearing as provided in G.S. 131E-176(25), reviewed by the Commission for compliance with G.S. 131E-176(25), and approved by the Governor.
    12. Standards adopted by the State Chief Information Officer and applied to information technology as defined in G.S. 143B-1320.
  20. Repealed by Session Laws 2011-398, s. 61.2, effective July 25, 2011.
  21. Substantial evidence. - Relevant evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
  22. Repealed by Session Laws 1991, c. 418, s. 3.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1975, 2nd Sess., c. 983, ss. 61, 62; 1977, c. 915, s. 5; 1983, c. 641, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1022, s. 1(2)-1(5); 1987, c. 878, ss. 1, 2, 21; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1111, s. 17; 1991, c. 418, s. 3; c. 477, ss. 3.1, 3.2, 9; 1995, c. 390, s. 29; 1996, 2nd Ex. Sess., c. 18, s. 7.10(g); 1997-456, s. 27; 2003-229, s. 12; 2007-491, s. 44(1)b; 2011-13, s. 2; 2011-398, ss. 15, 61.2; 2013-188, s. 7; 2013-382, s. 9.1(c); 2013-413, s. 1; 2015-2, s. 2.2(c); 2015-241, ss. 7A.3, 30.16(a); 2017-6, s. 3; 2018-13, s. 3.8(b); 2018-146, s. 4.5(b); ss. 3.1(a), (b), 4.5(b); 2021-88, ss. 16(a), (b).)

Re-recodification; Technical and Conforming Changes. - Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3, provides, in part: "The Revisor of Statutes shall recodify Chapter 138A of the General Statutes, Chapter 120C of the General Statutes, as well as Chapter 163 of the General Statutes, as amended by this act, into a new Chapter 163A of the General Statutes to be entitled 'Elections and Ethics Enforcement Act,' as enacted by Section 4 of this act. The Revisor may also recodify into the new Chapter 163A of the General Statutes other existing statutory laws relating to elections and ethics enforcement that are located elsewhere in the General Statutes as the Revisor deems appropriate." The Revisor was further authorized to make additional technical and conforming changes to catchlines, internal citations, and other references throughout the General Statutes to effectuate this recodification. Pursuant to this authority, the Revisor of Statutes substituted "Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement" for "State Board of Elections" in sub-subdivision (8a)b. The reference was deleted by Session Laws 2018-146, s. 4.5(b).

Session Laws 2018-146, ss. 3.1(a), (b) and 6.1, repealed Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3, and authorized the Revisor of Statutes to re-recodify Chapter 163A into Chapters 163, 138A, and 120C and to revert the changes made by the Revisor pursuant to Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3.

Editor's Note. - Subdivisions (01), (1), (1a), (1b), and (1c) of this section were renumbered as subdivisions (1), (1a), (1b), (1c) and (1d), respectively, pursuant to S.L. 1997-456, s. 27 which authorized the Revisor of Statutes to renumber or reletter sections and parts of sections having a number or letter designation that is incompatible with the General Assembly's computer database.

Subdivision (8b) was enacted as subdivision (8c) by Session Laws 2011-13, s. 2. It was renumbered as subdivision (8b) and former subdivision (8b) was renumbered as subdivision (8c) to maintain alphabetical order at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 63, as amended by Session Laws 2012-187, s. 8.1, provides in relevant part: "Sections 15 through 55 of this act become effective January 1, 2012, and apply to contested cases commenced on or after that date. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.2 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 of this act become effective when the United States Environmental Protection Agency approvals referenced in Section 55.2 have been issued or October 1, 2012, whichever occurs first. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.1 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 and Sections 32 and 33 of this act become effective when the waiver referenced in Section 55.1 has been granted or February 1, 2013, whichever occurs first. Unless otherwise provided elsewhere in this act, the remainder of this act is effective when it becomes law." For Section 55.2, see editor's note under G.S. 150B-34.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 62, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2013-382, s. 9.1(b), provides: "The following entities and positions created by Chapter 126 of the General Statutes are hereby renamed by this act:

"(1) The State Personnel Commission is renamed the 'North Carolina Human Resources Commission.'

"(2) The Office of State Personnel is renamed the 'North Carolina Office of State Human Resources.'

"(3) The State Personnel Director is renamed the 'Director of the North Carolina Office of State Human Resources.'"

Session Laws 2013-382, s. 9.1(c), provides: "Modification of References. - The Revisor of Statutes shall delete any references in the General Statutes to the State Personnel Act, State Personnel Commission, the State Personnel Director, and the Office of State Personnel (or any derivatives thereof) and substitute references to the North Carolina Human Resources Act, the State Human Resources Commission, the Director of the Office of State Human Resources, and the Office of Human Resources (or the appropriate derivative thereof) to effectuate the renaming set forth in this section wherever conforming changes are necessary."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 61(b), provides: "Except as otherwise provided, this act is effective when it becomes law [August 23, 2013]." Session Laws 2013-413, s. 60(c), had provided that: "This act becomes effective July 1, 2015." Session Laws 2014-115, s. 17, amended Session Laws 2013-413, s. 60(c), to replace the reference to "This act" with the words "This Part."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 61(a), is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 7A.3, provides in part: "The Revisor of Statutes may conform names and titles changed by this section and may correct statutory references as required by this section throughout the General Statutes. In making the changes authorized by this section, the Revisor may also adjust subject and verb agreement and the placement of conjunctions." Pursuant to this authority, the Revisor of Statutes substituted "Department of Information Technology" for "Office of Information Technology Services" in sub-subdivision (8a) l .

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as 'The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2015.'"

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 33.6, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2018-13, s. 6, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2018-13, s. 7, made the amendment of subdivision (3) of this section by Session Laws 2018-13, s. 3.8(b), effective June 20, 2018, and applicable to elections held on or after that date.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2007-491, s. 44(1)b, effective January 1, 2008, substituted "G.S. 105-241.21" for "G.S. 105-241.1" in subdivision (8a)j.

Session Laws 2011-13, s. 2, effective March 25, 2011, and applicable to rules published in the North Carolina Register by an agency on or after that date, added subdivision (8b), defining "Substantial estimated additional costs."

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 61.2, effective July 25, 2011, repealed subdivision (8b), as added by Session Laws 2011-13, s. 2.

Session Laws 2015-2, s. 2.2(c), effective January 1, 2016, deleted "and the variable component of the excise tax on motor fuel under G.S. 105-449.80" at the end of subdivision (8a)j.

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 30.16(a), effective July 1, 2015, rewrote subsection (1c), which formerly read: " 'Codifier of Rules' means the Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Office of Administrative Hearings or a designated representative of the Chief Administrative Law Judge."

Session Laws 2018-13, s. 3.8(b), substituted "Statutes, occupational licenses, and certifications of electronic poll books, ballot duplication systems, or voting systems under G.S. 163A-1115" for "Statutes and occupational licenses" in subdivision (3). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2018-146, s. 4.5(b), effective December 27, 2018, substituted "G.S. 93B-1" for "G.S. 93B-1, or by the Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement" in subdivision (8a)b.

Session Laws 2021-88, ss. 16(a), (b), effective July 22, 2021, recodified subdivisions (1b), and (7) as subdivisions (1a), and (5a); added "the following definitions apply" in the introductory language; inserted "or" in subdivision (8a)b.; in subdivision (8a) l. , substituted "State Chief Information Officer" for "Department of Information Technology" and "in G.S. 143B-1320" for "by G.S. 147-33.81"; and made technical corrections throughout the section.

Legal Periodicals. - For survey of 1979 administrative law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1185 (1980).

For article, "A Powerless Judiciary? The North Carolina Courts' Perceptions of Review of Administrative Action," see 12 N.C. Cent. L.J. 21 (1980).

For survey of 1980 property law, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1209 (1981).

For note, "Contested Case Hearings Under the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act: 1985 Rewrite Contains Dual System of Administrative Adjudication," see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 852 (1986).

For survey of 1996 developments in constitutional law, see 75 N.C.L. Rev. 2252 (1997).

For article, "Outlawed and Exiled: Zero Tolerance and Second Generation Race Discrimination in Public Schools," see 29 N.C. Cent. L.J. 147 (2007).

For article, "Wind Over North Carolina Waters: The State's Preparedness to Address Offshore and Coastal Water-Based Wind Energy Projects," see 87 N.C.L. Rev. 1819 (2009).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Many of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A or prior to the 1991 amendments to this Chapter.

"Agency". - The Department of Insurance is an "agency" subject to the provisions of subdivision (1) of this section. North Carolina Reinsurance Facility v. Long, 98 N.C. App. 41, 390 S.E.2d 176 (1990).

The Department of Revenue is an administrative agency of the State. Bailey v. State, 330 N.C. 227, 412 S.E.2d 295 (1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911, 112 S. Ct. 1942, 118 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1992), overruled on other grounds, 348 N.C. 130, 500 S.E.2d 54 (1998).

Although the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (the Act) provides review only for agency decisions, G.S. 150B-50 (1991), and local units of government are not within the definition of agencies in subdivision (1), the principles embodied in the Act "are highly pertinent" to appellate review of local government actions. Vulcan Materials Co. v. Guilford County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 115 N.C. App. 319, 444 S.E.2d 639, cert. denied, 337 N.C. 807, 449 S.E.2d 758 (1994).

Where an agency is not a unit of state government, but rather a local one, it does not fall under the definition of "agency" within the confines of the The Administrative Procedure Act, specifically, G.S. 150B-2(1a). Lee Ray Bergman Real Estate Rentals v. N.C. Fair Hous. Ctr., 153 N.C. App. 176, 568 S.E.2d 883 (2002).

Local school boards are not state agencies for purposes of the North Carolina Administrative Procedures Act and the statute relating to awards of attorneys' fees for parties prevailing against a state agency simply because they may be considered agents of the State in certain circumstances. Therefore, charter schools should not have been awarded attorneys' fees in a fund dispute with a local school board. Thomas Jefferson Classical Acad. Charter Sch. v. Cleveland County Bd. of Educ., 236 N.C. App. 207, 763 S.E.2d 288 (2014).

In a dispute over funding for charter schools, attorneys' fees should not have been awarded under G.S. 150B-2 because a local school board was not a state agency. Local school boards were not state agencies for purposes of the Administrative Procedures Act simply because the local boards could have been considered agents for the State under certain circumstances. Thomas Jefferson Classical Acad. Charter Sch. v. Cleveland County Bd. of Educ., 236 N.C. App. 207, 763 S.E.2d 288 (2014).

"Contested Case". - Case challenging a consent special order entered into by Environmental Management Commission and a corporation, which order was alleged to intrude upon the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit process (which process requires a hearing), was "contested" for the purposes of former G.S. 150A-43. State ex rel. Tenn. Dep't of Health & Env't v. Environmental Mgt. Comm'n, 78 N.C. App. 763, 338 S.E.2d 781 (1986).

Where the rights of the petitioner were determined by an in-person interview and by an investigation conducted by a hearing officer of the North Carolina DMV, a state agency, they constituted "an agency proceeding." Therefore, the case was "contested" for purposes of G.S. 150B-43. Charlotte Truck Driver Training School, Inc. v. North Carolina DMV, 95 N.C. App. 209, 381 S.E.2d 861 (1989).

Petitioner's allegation that he had been "demoted in rank without sufficient cause" stated grounds for his department's action to be deemed "disciplinary" within the meaning and intent of G.S. 126-35 and for his case to be considered "contested" within the meaning and intent of G.S. 126-37(a) (now repealed). Because he had properly pursued all informal procedures mandated by the State Personnel Act [now the North Carolina Human Resources Act] and by the North Carolina Administrative Code for the resolution of his grievance, petitioner's appeal also fit the procedural profile of a "contested case" for purposes of its review by the Office of Administrative Hearings under this Chapter. Batten v. North Carolina Dep't of Cor., 326 N.C. 338, 389 S.E.2d 35 (1990), overruled on other grounds, Empire Power Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 337 N.C. 569, 447 S.E.2d 168 (1994).

Wildlife Resources Commission's rejection of sewer district's study and of its request for lower streamflow requirements constituted agency action giving rise to a dispute which ultimately became a "contested case" over which the Office of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction. Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 100 N.C. App. 171, 394 S.E.2d 668 (1990).

A contested case hearing is distinguishable from a contested case. The phrase "contested case" extends beyond an adjudicatory hearing to include any agency proceeding, by whatever name called, wherein the legal rights, duties and privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for an adjudicatory hearing. Community Psychiatric Ctrs. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 103 N.C. App. 514, 405 S.E.2d 769 (1991).

Elements of "Contested Case". - There are two elements of a "contested case": (1) An agency proceeding; (2) that determined the rights of a party or parties. Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 251 S.E.2d 843 (1979).

Clear and Convincing Evidentiary Rule Invalid. - An administrative rule requiring that clear and convincing evidence be presented to show that a transfer of assets was made exclusively for a purpose other than to establish Medicaid eligibility was invalid. Dillingham v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 132 N.C. App. 704, 513 S.E.2d 823 (1999).

Error of Law. - The reviewing court may substitute its judgment for that of the Review Board if the Board's decision was affected by an error of law. Associated Mechanical Contractors v. Payne, 342 N.C. 825, 467 S.E.2d 398 (1996).

The result of a petitioner's ineffective attempts to file a petition for a contested case hearing was only a contested case. Community Psychiatric Ctrs. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 103 N.C. App. 514, 405 S.E.2d 769 (1991).

Without the jurisdictional prerequisite of a contested case hearing, a petitioner cannot utilize G.S. 131E-188(b) to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Community Psychiatric Ctrs. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 103 N.C. App. 514, 405 S.E.2d 769 (1991).

"Person Aggrieved". - "Procedural injury," whereby petitioner State of Tennessee's right to be heard on certain aspects of a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit was substantially impaired, was sufficient under former G.S. 150A-43 to qualify petitioner as an "aggrieved person" for purposes of appeal of issuance of Environmental Management Commission's consent special order with corporation. In addition, where the consent special order contained provisions substantially identical to provisions which petitioner opposed in the proposed NPDES permit, which affected the property rights of the petitioner in the Pigeon River, these allegations also established petitioner's "aggrieved person" status. State ex rel. Tenn. Dep't of Health & Env't v. Environmental Mgt. Comm'n, 78 N.C. App. 763, 338 S.E.2d 781 (1986).

Where none of petitioner's personal rights or interests, nor any rights or interests properly attributable to him in a cognizable representative capacity, were either directly or indirectly at issue in requested rule making proceeding, he was not substantially affected by Department of Human Resources' denial of his petition for rule making. Therefore, he was not a "person aggrieved" as a result of the agency decision and had no standing to seek judicial review thereof. In re Wheeler, 85 N.C. App. 150, 354 S.E.2d 374 (1987).

"Person aggrieved" means one who is adversely affected in respect to legal rights, or who is suffering from an infringement or denial of legal rights. In re Wheeler, 85 N.C. App. 150, 354 S.E.2d 374 (1987).

A power company satisfied the definition of a "person aggrieved" because its interest in having the Department of Environment, Health and Natural Resources (now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources) prepare an Environmental Impact Statement before issuing a permit and its interest in the air resources of the State were adversely affected by DEHNR's granting of a permit issued to another power company to construct and operate combustion turbine electric generating units. Empire Power Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 112 N.C. App. 566, 436 S.E.2d 594 (1993), rev'd on other grounds, 337 N.C. 569, 447 S.E.2d 768, reh'g denied, 338 N.C. 314, 451 S.E.2d 634 (1994).

A landowner qualified as a "person aggrieved" as he owned and lived on property adjacent to the proposed site. Empire Power Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 112 N.C. App. 566, 436 S.E.2d 594 (1993), rev'd on other grounds, 337 N.C. 569, 447 S.E.2d 768, reh'g denied, 338 N.C. 314, 451 S.E.2d 634 (1994).

A pet owner was not a "person aggrieved" under G.S. 150B-2(6) as to the decision of the North Carolina Veterinary Medical Board disciplining a veterinarian against whom she filed a complaint, and therefore the pet owner was not entitled to an administrative hearing on the issue and had no standing to seek judicial review. In re Denial of Request for Full Admin. Hearing, 146 N.C. App. 258, 552 S.E.2d 230, cert. denied, 354 N.C. 573, 558 S.E.2d 867 (2001).

Neighboring property owners to a proposed landfill site for which an application for a facility permit was pending would suffer interference with the use and enjoyment of and diminution in the value of their property if the permit were granted; thus, they were persons aggrieved under the statute who had standing to challenge a superior court's judgment on review of an administrative agency decision. Furthermore, a neighboring town was also a person aggrieved because its tax base and planning jurisdiction would be affected by the proposed landfill. County of Wake v. N.C. Dep't of Env't, 155 N.C. App. 225, 573 S.E.2d 572 (2002), cert. dismissed, 357 N.C. 62, 579 S.E.2d 387 (2003).

Where the former caretaker sought a declaratory judgment pursuant to G.S. 150B-4 in the caretaker's action alleging that the caretaker could be harmed in the future by the department of health and human services' calculation of debt owed to the State for benefits taken under a certain program, the caretaker was not entitled to a declaratory judgment, because the caretaker was not aggrieved under G.S. 150B-2(6); the caretaker could be aggrieved in the future if certain events were to occur, but nothing in the record indicated that these events were certain to come to pass, imminently threatened, or likely to occur. Diggs v. N.C. HHS, 157 N.C. App. 344, 578 S.E.2d 666 (2003).

Where the former caretaker argued that the former caretaker became aggrieved pursuant to G.S. 150B-2 when the department of health and human services issued a declaratory ruling pursuant to G.S. 150B-4, thereby entitling the former caretaker to a declaratory ruling pursuant to G.S. 150B-4, the argument failed, as the former caretaker was not a person aggrieved at the time the former caretaker requested a declaratory ruling, the declaratory ruling had no effect. Diggs v. N.C. HHS, 157 N.C. App. 344, 578 S.E.2d 666 (2003).

Where a trade association, adversely affected by certain licensing procedures, was a "person aggrieved" under G.S. 150B-2(6), and where licensing issues were deemed to be "contested cases" under G.S. 150B-2(2), (3) and G.S. 150B-22, the association had standing to bring a contested case challenging the state agencies' general permitting procedures for wood chip mills. N.C. Forestry Ass'n v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 357 N.C. 640, 588 S.E.2d 880 (2003).

County employee was a person aggrieved by the North Carolina Office of State Personnel's [now the North Carolina Office of State Human Resources'] determination that a county's personnel regulations were substantially equivalent to the North Carolina State Personnel Act, G.S. 126-1 et seq. Steward v. Green, 189 N.C. App. 131, 657 S.E.2d 719 (2008).

Practitioner was not an "aggrieved party" under G.S. 150B-2(6) and lacked standing to appeal under G.S. 150B-43 because the practitioner's interest in her person, property, or employment were not affected substantially by any administrative action of the North Carolina Respiratory Care Board, which had reversed its decision requiring her to pay monetary penalties. Thompson v. N.C. Respiratory Care Bd., 202 N.C. App. 340, 688 S.E.2d 516 (2010), review denied, 364 N.C. 132, 696 S.E.2d 699, 2010 N.C. LEXIS 335 (2010).

Standing Is Question of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. - Whether one has standing to obtain judicial review of an administrative decision is a question of subject matter jurisdiction. Carter v. North Carolina State Bd. of Registration, 86 N.C. App. 308, 357 S.E.2d 705 (1987).

County had standing to challenge establishment of toxic waste site within its borders because of the effect on its tax base and planning jurisdiction, because of the final agency determination upon issuance of an environmental impact statement, and because the Environmental Policy Act (Art. 1 of Chap. 113A) includes the right to judicial review of an issue which involves a contested case. Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276 (E.D.N.C. 1981).

The intervention statute is permissive only. In re Brunswick County, 81 N.C. App. 391, 344 S.E.2d 584 (1986).

Decisions of North Carolina Council of State. - Superior court did not err in dismissing inmates' request for judicial review of the final decision of respondent North Carolina Council of State, which approved the lethal injection protocol the Department of Correction (DOC) submitted, because the process by which the Council approved or disapproved the DOC's lethal injection protocol was not subject to the APA, and the inmates could not challenge it by going through the Office of Administrative Hearings through the APA; instead, any issue the inmates had with the protocol rested with the General Court of Justice or the federal courts. Conner v. N.C. Council of State, 365 N.C. 242, 716 S.E.2d 836 (2011).

General Assembly intended that the Department of Correction (DOC) have primary responsibility for the lethal injection process because G.S. 15-188 does not give the North Carolina Council of State authority beyond merely approving or disapproving the submitted protocol; the General Assembly did not intend to negate the express exemption that it provided to the DOC in the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by including a requirement that the Council approve the lethal injection protocol, and thus, the process by which the Council approves or disapproves the DOC's lethal injection protocol is not subject to the APA. Conner v. N.C. Council of State, 365 N.C. 242, 716 S.E.2d 836 (2011).

Decisions of Municipalities Exempt from Chapter. - The North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act provides judicial review only for agency decisions, from which the decisions of local municipalities are expressly exempt. Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 299 N.C. 620, 265 S.E.2d 379, rehearing denied, 300 N.C. 562, 270 S.E.2d 106 (1980).

Standard on Review of City's Special Zoning Request Decisions. - Although the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act provides judicial review only for agency decisions and exempts cities and other local municipalities, a similar standard of review is appropriate to review city council special zoning request decisions. Jennewein v. City Council, 62 N.C. App. 89, 302 S.E.2d 7, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 461, 307 S.E.2d 365 (1983).

The Department of Insurance is an "agency" subject to the provisions of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547, rehearing denied, 301 N.C. 107, 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980), overruled on other grounds, In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 132 (2017).

Tax Review Board was an "administrative agency" under former statute. In re Halifax Paper Co., 259 N.C. 589, 131 S.E.2d 441 (1963).

North Carolina State Commission of Indian Affairs. - Tribe's petition for a contested case hearing alleging the North Carolina State Commission of Indian Affairs improperly declined to decide who, between members of competing factions of the tribe, represented the tribe on the Commission had to be dismissed because G.S. 143B-405 and G.S. 143B-406 did not indicate that the general assembly intended for the Commission to function as an administrative or judicial body with substantial decision-making power to resolve intra-tribal disputes, so the Commission did not have the authority to decide this issue. Meherrin Tribe of N.C. v. N.C. State Comm'n of Indian Affairs, 219 N.C. App. 558, 724 S.E.2d 644 (2012).

"Rule" - Specific findings by the State Banking Commission were not rules as defined under subsection (8a); thus, the Commission did not apply unpromulgated rules in denying application to sell non-credit disability insurance. Beneficial N.C. Inc. v. State ex rel. N.C. State Banking Comm'n, 126 N.C. App. 117, 484 S.E.2d 808 (1997).

The North Carolina Family and Children's Medicaid Manual was not a "rule" within the definition of G.S. 150B-2(8a), because it contained nonbinding interpretations of relevant state and federal law, and violations of its provisions were of no effect; thus, it did not have to be adopted pursuant to the requirements of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act for the adoption of rules. Okale v. N.C. HHS, 153 N.C. App. 475, 570 S.E.2d 741 (2002).

Multi-employer policy, an interpretive statement established in the North Carolina Operations Manual for occupational safety and health regulations, falls within the exception created by G.S. 150B-2(8a)(c) and does not have to be promulgated as an agency rule. Comm'r of Labor v. Weekley Homes, L.P., 169 N.C. App. 17, 609 S.E.2d 407 (2005).

There is statutory authority under G.S. 95-126(b)(2)(m) granted to the North Carolina Department of Labor to protect the health and safety of all employees in North Carolina; the operations manual is a non-binding interpretive statement, not a rule requiring formal rule-making procedures - accordingly, the exception that requires rule-making if the rights and duties of the employer are affected does not apply; thus, the operations manual merely established guidelines that directed Occupational Safety and Health Act inspectors as to what parties could be cited for violation of a rule and thus did not require formal rule-making. Comm'r of Labor v. Weekley Homes, L.P., 169 N.C. App. 17, 609 S.E.2d 407 (2005).

Trial court's findings that the N.C. State Medical Facilities Plan was specifically excluded from the definition of a rule under G.S. 150B-2(8a)(k), that a Semiannual Dialysis Report was part of the SMFP, and that the SDR was not a rule were supported by sufficient evidence. Bio-Medical Applications of N.C. Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 179 N.C. App. 483, 634 S.E.2d 572 (2006), appeal dismissed, 361 N.C. 229, 641 S.E.2d 303, appeal dismissed, 361 N.C. 350, 644 S.E.2d 3, appeal dismissed, 361 N.C. 350, 644 S.E.2d 4, reh'g denied, 361 N.C. 370645 S.E.2d 762 (2007).

Provision in 2005 waiver was neither state nor federal law, and the state's erred in relying on the waiver to deny services to a Medicaid recipient as, although the provision interpreted Medicaid eligibility and was a rule under the North Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (APA), G.S. 150B-2(8a), it was not promulgated in accordance with either the APA or the federal Administrative Procedures Act as required by G.S. 150B-18, and the circumstances presented did not fit within the Arrowood v. North Carolina Dep't Health & Human Servs., 543 S.E.2d 481 (2001), rev'g per curiam for reasons stated in the dissenting opinion, 535 S.E.2d 585 (2000), exception. McCrann v. N.C. HHS, 209 N.C. App. 241, 704 S.E.2d 899, review denied 365 N.C. 198, 710 S.E.2d 23, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 436 (2011).

It was error to conclude a dentist violated the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners' Record Content Rule (Rule) by not recording reasons for prescribing medication because: (1) the Rule's plain language had no such requirement, and (2) such a requirement would constitute a "rule" under G.S. 150B-2(8a) that had not been adopted pursuant to G.S. 150B-18 et seq. Walker v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 245 N.C. App. 559, 782 S.E.2d 518 (2016), aff'd, 369 N.C. 517, 796 S.E.2d 784, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 131 (2017).

Retirement Systems Division of the Department of State Treasurer erred in invoicing a school employee or school board for contributions to the employee's retirement fund pursuant to a statutory cap factor because the factor was a rule not properly adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Dep't of State Treasurer, 261 N.C. App. 325, 821 S.E.2d 196 (2018), aff'd, 374 N.C. 3, 839 S.E.2d 814, 2020 N.C. LEXIS 270 (2020).

General Assembly did not impliedly exempt the Board of Trustees from the necessity of compliance with APA's rulemaking provisions in adopting a cap factor where G.S. 135-5(a3) and G.S. 135-6(l) could be harmonized, the adoption of a cap factor was not a ministerial act in which the Board did nothing more than ratify the actuary's recommendation, case law did not support such an implied exemption, and the public interests supported the Board of Education's contention that the cap factor should be established by using the APA's rulemaking provisions to ensure the opportunity for adequate public input before a decision became final. This case was decided prior to the enactment of G.S. 150B-1(d)(30) by Session Laws 2020-48, s. 4.1(c). Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Dep't of State Treasurer, 374 N.C. 3, 839 S.E.2d 814 (2020).

Memorandum Was Not a "Rule" Under Subdivision (8a). - Where a memorandum constituted guidelines to be followed when investigating and prosecuting violations of state law and a statement that possession or operation of certain video machines on ABC-licensed premises transgressed that law, the memorandum fell squarely within the meaning of subdivisions (8a)(c) and (8a)(g), and therefore did not constitute a "rule." Ford v. State, Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 115 N.C. App. 556, 445 S.E.2d 425 (1994).

Interpretation of Medicaid Law as Rule. - A provision of an agency manual requiring written evidence that a transfer of assets was made exclusively for a purpose other than to establish Medicaid eligibility was an administrative rule under this section, where the requirement created a binding standard interpreting eligibility provisions of Medicaid law. Dillingham v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 132 N.C. App. 704, 513 S.E.2d 823 (1999).

Rehabilitation Act. - The Superior Court had jurisdiction over a petition for review of denial of services under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, P.L. 102-569, 42 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. as amended, where, although the petitioner's claims were not heard by an Administrative Law Judge, they were heard by an agency hearing officer, at a proceeding in which petitioner and respondent were allowed to submit and cross-examine evidence and where respondent's director reviewed and affirmed the hearing officer's decision, in accordance with its own regulations. Hedgepeth v. North Carolina Div. of Servs. for the Blind, 142 N.C. App. 338, 543 S.E.2d 169 (2001).

While subdivision (1) expressly excepts local boards of education from the coverage of the Administrative Procedure Act, nonetheless the standards for judicial review set forth in G.S. 150B-51 apply to appeals from school boards. Evers v. Pender County Bd. of Educ., 104 N.C. App. 1, 407 S.E.2d 879 (1991), aff'd, 331 N.C. 380, 416 S.E.2d 3 (1992).

Board of trustees of medical plan was an "agency" of the executive branch of State government under this section. Vass v. Board of Trustees, 324 N.C. 402, 379 S.E.2d 26 (1989).

Trustees of university were not an agency governed by the former statute. In re Carter, 262 N.C. 360, 137 S.E.2d 150 (1964).

State Employee's Attempt to Recover for Surgery Costs. - State employee's dispute with the Board of Trustees of the Teachers' and State Employees' Comprehensive Major Medical Plan (now State Health Plan for Teachers and State Employees), an administrative agency, seeking to recover costs of surgery should have been brought under this Chapter. Vass v. Board of Trustees, 89 N.C. App. 333, 366 S.E.2d 1 (1988), modified and aff'd, 324 N.C. 402, 379 S.E.2d 26 (1989).

Petitioner whose driving privilege was mandatorily suspended under G.S. 20-17(2) and G.S. 20-19(e) did not have the right to appeal under G.S. 20-25 or under this Chapter. However, the superior court could review the actions of the Commissioner by issuing a writ of certiorari. Davis v. Hiatt, 326 N.C. 462, 390 S.E.2d 338 (1990).

Intervenor Not Approved. - For purposes of meeting appeal requirements of G.S. 131E-188(b), appellant, proposed intervenor below, was not and could not be a party to contested hearing at issue below until its motion to intervene was approved. Since this motion was not approved, appellant was not a party to contested case, and therefore, did not meet jurisdictional requirements of G.S. 131E-188(b). HCA Crossroads Residential Centers, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 99 N.C. App. 193, 392 S.E.2d 398 (1990).

"Substantial Evidence". - Administrative law judge and trial court did not err in finding contradictions in the testimony of a supervisor and an employee whom the supervisor promoted; based on the inconsistencies in testimony by the supervisor and the employee, relevant evidence existed that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion that their versions were contradictory. Gordon v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 173 N.C. App. 22, 618 S.E.2d 280 (2005).

Substantial evidence supported the State Bureau of Investigation's (SBI's) decision that just cause justified terminating a special agent where the ALJ weighed the conflicting testimony, concluded that she had consumed alcohol and lied about it, considered character testimony, and sufficiently addressed the just cause factors. Brewington v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 254 N.C. App. 1, 802 S.E.2d 115 (2017), review denied, 371 N.C. 343, 813 S.E.2d 857, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 464 (2018).

Substantial Evidence to Support Licensing Suspension. - Substantial evidence under G.S. 150B-2(8b) (now G.S. 150B-2(8c)) supported the Board of Dental Examiner's findings that (1) an orthodontist's treatment of a patient was untimely and that such untimeliness was a breach of the requisite standard of care for dentists under G.S. 90-41; and (2) the orthodontist's treatment of another patient was likewise negligent because the Board could reasonably have concluded that the standard of care required the use of photographs as a means to track the progress of orthodontic case. Watkins v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 358 N.C. 190, 593 S.E.2d 764 (2004).

Substantial Evidence Supported Awarding Certificate of Need. - The findings by the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services in awarding a certificate of need to an applicant, under the whole record test, were supported by substantial evidence, that is, relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might have accepted as adequate to support a conclusion, pursuant to G.S. 150B-2(8b) (now G.S. 150B-2(8c)). Total Renal Care of N.C. LLC v. N.C. HHS, 171 N.C. App. 734, 615 S.E.2d 81 (2005).

As to applicability of former statute, see In re North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 278 N.C. 302, 180 S.E.2d 155 (1971); Carter v. Town of Chapel Hill, 14 N.C. App. 93, 187 S.E.2d 588, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 314, 188 S.E.2d 897 (1972).

Scope of Appellate Review. - In an action arising from allegations of age discrimination, while the superior court properly applied both a de novo review and the whole-record test to the respective issues on appeal under G.S. 150B-51(b) when it reviewed the final decision of the State Personnel Commission (SPC) [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission], it erred when it improperly substituted its judgment for that of the SPC under the whole-record test. Thus, remand was ordered for the superior court to affirm the SPC's final agency decision. Trotter v. N.C. HHS, 189 N.C. App. 655, 659 S.E.2d 749 (2008).

Applied in Beneficial N.C. Inc. v. State ex rel. N.C. State Banking Comm'n, 126 N.C. App. 117, 484 S.E.2d 808 (1997); Duke Univ. Medical Ctr. v. Bruton, 134 N.C. App. 39, 516 S.E.2d 633 (1999); DOT v. Blue, 147 N.C. App. 596, 556 S.E.2d 609 (2001); Hospice at Greensboro, Inc. v. N.C. HHS Div. of Facility Servs., 185 N.C. App. 1, 647 S.E.2d 651 (2007); Good Hope Health Sys., L.L.C. v. N.C. HHS, 189 N.C. App. 534, 659 S.E.2d 456 (2008), aff'd, 362 N.C. 504, 666 S.E.2d 749 (2008); Kelly v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 192 N.C. App. 129, 664 S.E.2d 625 (2008); Jailall v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Instruction, 196 N.C. App. 90, 675 S.E.2d 79, cert. denied, 363 N.C. 582, 682 S.E.2d 211, review denied, 363 N.C. 582, 682 S.E.2d 212 (2009); N.C. Dep't of Revenue v. Bill Davis Racing, 201 N.C. App. 35, 684 S.E.2d 914 (2009); City of Rockingham v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 224 N.C. App. 228, 736 S.E.2d 764 (2012); Izydore v. City of Durham, 228 N.C. App. 397, 746 S.E.2d 324 (2013), review denied, 749 S.E.2d 851, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 1198 (2013); Riggings Homeowners, Inc. v. Coastal Res. Comm'n of N.C. 228 N.C. App. 630, 747 S.E.2d 301 (2013); N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. State, 255 N.C. App. 514, 805 S.E.2d 518 (2017), aff'd, 371 N.C. 149, 814 S.E.2d 54, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 433 (2018).

Cited in Empire Power Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 337 N.C. 569, 447 S.E.2d 768, rehearing denied, 338 N.C. 314, 451 S.E.2d 634 (1994). Gummels v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 97 N.C. App. 245, 388 S.E.2d 223 (1990); Penuel v. Hiatt, 97 N.C. App. 616, 389 S.E.2d 289 (1990); North Buncombe Ass'n of Concerned Citizens v. Rhodes, 100 N.C. App. 24, 394 S.E.2d 462, appeal dismissed, 327 N.C. 484, 397 S.E.2d 215 (1990); State ex rel. Envtl. Mgt. Comm'n v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 101 N.C. App. 433, 400 S.E.2d 107 (1991); Bryant v. North Carolina State Bd. of Exmrs. of Elec. Contractors, 111 N.C. App. 875, 433 S.E.2d 814 (1993); Farnsworth v. Jones, 114 N.C. App. 182, 441 S.E.2d 597 (1994); Bryant v. North Carolina State Bd. of Exmrs. of Elec. Contractors, 338 N.C. 288, 449 S.E.2d 188 (1994); Act-Up Triangle v. Commission for Health Servs., 345 N.C. 699, 483 S.E.2d 388 (1997); Meads v. North Carolina Dep't of Agric., 349 N.C. 656, 509 S.E.2d 165 (1998); Jackson v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources Div. of Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, & Substance Abuse Servs., 131 N.C. App. 179, 505 S.E.2d 899 (1998), cert. denied, 350 N.C. 594, 537 S.E.2d 213 (1999); N.C. Forestry Ass'n v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 162 N.C. App. 467, 591 S.E.2d 549 (2004); Alston v. N.C. A&T State Univ., 304 F. Supp. 2d 774 (M.D.N.C. 2004); N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 599 S.E.2d 888 (2004); Vanderburg v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue, 168 N.C. App. 598, 608 S.E.2d 831 (2005); Hooper v. North Carolina, 379 F. Supp. 2d 804 (M.D.N.C. 2005); Trayford v. N.C. Psychology Bd., 174 N.C. App. 118, 619 S.E.2d 862 (2005), aff'd, 360 N.C. 396, 627 S.E.2d 462 (2006); In re Lustgarten, 177 N.C. App. 663, 629 S.E.2d 886 (2006); Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs. & Div. of Med. Assistance of the N.C. HHS, 364 N.C. 61, 692 S.E.2d 96 (Apr. 15, 2010); Dare County v. N.C. Dep't of Ins., 207 N.C. App. 600, 701 S.E.2d 368 (2010); Coomer v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., 220 N.C. App. 155, 723 S.E.2d 802 (2012); N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. N.C. Learns, Inc., 231 N.C. App. 270, 751 S.E.2d 625 (2013); Surgical Care Affiliates, LLC v. N.C. HHS, 235 N.C. App. 620, 762 S.E.2d 468 (2014); Fowler v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue, 242 N.C. App. 404, 775 S.E.2d 350 (2015); State ex rel. McCrory v. Berger, 368 N.C. 633, 781 S.E.2d 248 (2016).

Opinions of Attorney General

Editor's Note. - Many of the opinions below were issued prior to the 1991 amendments to this Chapter.

Procedures Substantially Affecting Nonagency Persons Must Be Adopted as Rules. - When G.S. 150B-2(8a) and G.S. 150B-11(1) are read together, it is apparent that any procedures, whether formal or informal, that directly or substantially affect the rights or procedures of nonagency persons must be adopted as rules. See opinion of Attorney General to Elizabeth H. Drury, Director, Office of Legislative and Legal Affairs, Department of Human Resources, 56 N.C.A.G. 25 (1986) decided prior to the 1991 amendment.

Employee Insurance Committees have rule-making and limited quasi-judicial powers pursuant to former G.S. 58-194.3(b) (see now G.S. 58-31-60) and are "agencies" within the meaning of G.S. 150B-2(1). See opinion of Attorney General to Elizabeth H. Drury, Director, Office of Legislative and Legal Affairs, Department of Human Resources, 56 N.C.A.G. 25 (1986) decided prior to the 1991 amendment.

The signing of a proposed memorandum of understanding with federal land managers of National Parks and Wilderness Areas in and around North Carolina would not constitute rulemaking under the N.C. Administrative Procedures Act and, therefore, did not require rulemaking by the Environmental Management Commission. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. William R. Gilkeson, Staff Attorney, N.C. General Assembly, 1998 N.C.A.G. 54 (12/4/98).

Contested Cases. - Determinations made by the securities administrator pursuant to his statutory authority are considered "contested cases" within the meaning of subdivision (2) of this section. Such determinations control or restrict the activities of dealers, salesmen, or issuers of securities, but these determinations only become "contested cases" if the administrator's action is "disputed" by the subject of such determination. See opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Stephen M. Wallis, Deputy Securities Administrator (acting), 58 N.C.A.G. 76 (1988).

The registration of securities dealers and salesmen by the Securities Division pursuant to G.S. 78A-37 constitutes the granting of an "occupational license" within the meaning of subdivision (4a) of this section. See opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Stephen M. Wallis, Deputy Securities Administrator (acting), 58 N.C.A.G. 76 (1988).

Scope of Article 3A of This Chapter. - Even though the Securities Division is determined to be an "occupational licensing agency" within the meaning of subdivision (4b) of this section, the provisions of Article 3A of this chapter (procedure for conduct of administrative hearings by occupational licensing agencies) in no way restrict or modify provisions of G.S. 78A-39(a), (c),(e) and (f); 78A-45 or 78A-46(b). See opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Stephen M. Wallis, Deputy Securities Administrator (acting), 58 N.C.A.G. 76 (1988).

The Securities Division is an "occupational licensing agency" within the meaning of subdivision (4b) of this section. See opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Stephen M. Wallis, Deputy Securities Administrator (acting), 58 N.C.A.G. 76 (1988).

Career banding project did not require formal rules. - A career banding project which the Office of State Personnel [now the Office of State Human Resources] planned to implement did not require formal rules in order to be implemented. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Thomas H. Wright, State Personnel Director, Office of State Personnel, 2002 N.C. AG LEXIS 16 (4/12/02).

§ 150B-3. Special provisions on licensing.

  1. When an applicant or a licensee makes a timely and sufficient application for issuance or renewal of a license or occupational license, including the payment of any required license fee, the existing license or occupational license does not expire until a decision on the application is finally made by the agency, and if the application is denied or the terms of the new license or occupational license are limited, until the last day for applying for judicial review of the agency order. This subsection does not affect agency action summarily suspending a license or occupational license under subsections (b) and (c) of this section.
  2. Before the commencement of proceedings for the suspension, revocation, annulment, withdrawal, recall, cancellation, or amendment of any license other than an occupational license, the agency shall give notice to the licensee, pursuant to the provisions of G.S. 150B-23. Before the commencement of such proceedings involving an occupational license, the agency shall give notice pursuant to the provisions of G.S. 150B-38. In either case, the licensee shall be given an opportunity to show compliance with all lawful requirements for retention of the license or occupational license.
  3. If the agency finds that the public health, safety, or welfare requires emergency action and incorporates this finding in its order, summary suspension of a license or occupational license may be ordered effective on the date specified in the order or on service of the certified copy of the order at the last known address of the licensee, whichever is later, and effective during the proceedings. The proceedings shall be promptly commenced and determined.
  4. This section does not apply to the following:
    1. Revocations of occupational licenses based solely on a court order of child support delinquency or a Department of Health and Human Services determination of child support delinquency issued pursuant to G.S. 110-142, 110-142.1, or 110-142.2.
    2. Refusal to renew an occupational license pursuant to G.S. 87-10.1, 87-22.2, 87-44.2, or 89C-18.1, based solely on a Department of Revenue determination that the licensee owes a delinquent income tax debt.

Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as amending or repealing any special statutes, in effect prior to February 1, 1976, which provide for the summary suspension of a license.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1995, c. 538, s. 2(i); 1997-443, s. 11A.118(a); 1998-162, s. 8.)

Legal Periodicals. - For comment, "The Problem of Procedural Delay in Contested Case Hearings . . ." under the North Carolina APA, see 7 N.C. Cent. L.J. 347 (1976).

CASE NOTES

Cited in Miller v. North Carolina State Bd. of Registration for Professional Eng'rs & Land Surveyors, 322 N.C. 465, 368 S.E.2d 605 (1988); Ramsey v. N.C. DMV, 184 N.C. App. 713, 647 S.E.2d 125 (2007), review denied, 362 N.C. 237, 659 S.E.2d 739 (2008).

Opinions of Attorney General

The requirements in subsection (c) of this section that an agency make a finding that the "public health, safety, or welfare requires emergency action" prior to a summary suspension of a license or an occupational license, and that the agency incorporate such finding in its order of suspension, are not in any way in conflict with the findings required to be made by the securities administrator by G.S. 78A-39(a) prior to denying, suspending, or revoking the registration of a securities dealer or salesman and by G.S. 78A-29(a) prior to denying, suspending, or revoking the effectiveness of a securities registration statement. See opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Stephen M. Wallis, Deputy Securities Administrator (acting), 58 N.C.A.G. 76 (1988).

Extension of Permit's Expiration Date. - Licensee's permit to operate underground storage tanks was not extended by virtue of G.S. 150B-3(a), extending a permit's expiration date until a final decision was made on whether an application for a new permit would be accepted, because he did not make a "timely and sufficient application for issuance or renewal" of his permit, so G.S. 150B-3(a) did not prevent the licensee from being fined for a lack of permits. Overcash v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 179 N.C. App. 697, 635 S.E.2d 442 (2006), review denied, 361 N.C. 220, 642 S.E.2d 445 (2007).


§ 150B-4. Declaratory rulings.

  1. On request of a person aggrieved, an agency shall issue a declaratory ruling as to the validity of a rule or as to the applicability to a given state of facts of a statute administered by the agency or of a rule or order of the agency. Upon request, an agency shall also issue a declaratory ruling to resolve a conflict or inconsistency within the agency regarding an interpretation of the law or a rule adopted by the agency. The agency shall prescribe in its rules the procedure for requesting a declaratory ruling and the circumstances in which rulings shall or shall not be issued. A declaratory ruling is binding on the agency and the person requesting it unless it is altered or set aside by the court. An agency may not retroactively change a declaratory ruling, but nothing in this section prevents an agency from prospectively changing a declaratory ruling.
  2. An agency shall respond to a request for a declaratory ruling as follows:
    1. Within 30 days of receipt of the request for a declaratory ruling, the agency shall make a written decision to grant or deny the request. If the agency fails to make a written decision to grant or deny the request within 30 days, the failure shall be deemed a decision to deny the request.
    2. If the agency denies the request, the decision is immediately subject to judicial review in accordance with Article 4 of this Chapter.
    3. If the agency grants the request, the agency shall issue a written ruling on the merits within 45 days of the decision to grant the request. A declaratory ruling is subject to judicial review in accordance with Article 4 of this Chapter.
    4. If the agency fails to issue a declaratory ruling within 45 days, the failure shall be deemed a denial on the merits, and the person aggrieved may seek judicial review pursuant to Article 4 of this Chapter. Upon review of an agency's failure to issue a declaratory ruling, the court shall not consider any basis for the denial that was not presented in writing to the person aggrieved.
  3. Repealed by Session Laws 1997-34, s. 1.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1991, c. 418, s. 4; c. 477, s. 2.1; 1997-34, s. 1; 2011-398, s. 56.)

Editor's Note. - This section is former G.S. 150B-17, as recodified by Session Laws 1991, c. 418, s. 4.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 56, effective July 25, 2011, in subsection (a), deleted "except when the agency for good cause finds issuance of a ruling undesirable" from the end of the first sentence, added the present second sentence, inserted "procedure for requesting a declaratory ruling and the" in the third sentence, and deleted the former last two sentences; and added subsection (a1).

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "Advisory Rulings by Administrative Agencies: Their Benefits and Dangers," see 2 Campbell L. Rev. 1 (1980).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Most of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former G.S. 150B-17 or Chapter 150A.

Former G.S. 150A-17 clearly did not contemplate an evidentiary proceeding. If evidence were required to establish the facts, then the proper procedure would have been to hold a contested case hearing. In re Ford, 52 N.C. App. 569, 279 S.E.2d 122 (1981).

Good Cause for Denial. - Good cause exists for denial of a request for a declaratory ruling where the denial is based on the existence of a prior agency ruling which necessarily required an interpretation on the same statute which is the subject of the request for declaratory ruling. Catawba Mem. Hosp. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 112 N.C. App. 557, 436 S.E.2d 390 (1993), cert. granted, 336 N.C. 72, 445 S.E.2d 31 (1994).

North Carolina Department of State Treasurer could properly determine that good cause existed to deny a corporation's request for a declaratory ruling as to the potential future agreements because given the missing material terms of the contracts, any ruling on whether the contracts were in compliance with G.S. 116B-78 would be purely hypothetical; the corporation could not how that any of its legal rights were legally impaired. Equity Solutions of the Carolinas, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of State Treasurer, 232 N.C. App. 384, 754 S.E.2d 243 (2014).

North Carolina Department of State Treasurer properly determined that good cause existed to decline to issue a declaratory ruling because it would be a waste of administrative resources for the State Treasurer to issue a ruling on a matter that would likely be judicially determined during the course of pending litigation between it and a corporation. Equity Solutions of the Carolinas, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of State Treasurer, 232 N.C. App. 384, 754 S.E.2d 243 (2014).

Trial court applied the proper standard of review when it affirmed the North Carolina Department of State Treasurer's decision to deny a corporation's request for a declaratory ruling and dismissing its petition for judicial review because the trial court properly applied a de novo standard of review to the issue of whether the reasons given by the State Treasurer constituted good cause to decline to issue a ruling. Equity Solutions of the Carolinas, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of State Treasurer, 232 N.C. App. 384, 754 S.E.2d 243 (2014).

A declaratory ruling by an administrative agency is subject to judicial review as though it were an agency final decision or order in a contested case. High Rock Lake Ass'n v. North Carolina Envtl. Mgt. Comm'n, 51 N.C. App. 275, 276 S.E.2d 472 (1981).

Party Not Aggrieved - Where the former caretaker sought a declaratory judgment pursuant to G.S. 150B-4 in the caretaker's action alleging that the caretaker could be harmed in the future by the department of health and human services' calculation of debt owed to the State for benefits taken under a certain program, the caretaker was not entitled to a declaratory judgment, because the caretaker was not aggrieved under G.S. 150B-2(6); the caretaker could be aggrieved in the future if certain events were to occur, but nothing in the record indicated that these events were certain to come to pass, imminently threatened, or likely to occur. Diggs v. N.C. HHS, 157 N.C. App. 344, 578 S.E.2d 666 (2003).

Declaratory Ruling Has No Effect When Petitioner Was Not Aggrieved. - Where the former caretaker argued that the former caretaker became aggrieved pursuant to G.S. 150B-2 when the department of health and human services issued a declaratory ruling pursuant to G.S. 150B-4, thereby entitling the former caretaker to a declaratory ruling pursuant to G.S. 150B-4, the argument failed, as the former caretaker was not a person aggrieved at the time the former caretaker requested a declaratory ruling, the declaratory ruling had no effect. Diggs v. N.C. HHS, 157 N.C. App. 344, 578 S.E.2d 666 (2003).

Plaintiff Failing to Exhaust Administrative Remedies Not Entitled to Judicial Relief. - Plaintiff collection agency was not entitled to seek a declaratory judgment in the superior court as to the validity and applicability of a regulation of the Department of Insurance prohibiting collection agencies from instituting judicial proceedings on behalf of other persons, where plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies by petitioning the Department of Insurance for amendment or repeal of the regulation under former G.S. 150A-16 or seeking a declaratory ruling from the Department of Insurance as to the validity and applicability of the regulation under former G.S. 150A-17, and then by seeking judicial review of an adverse Department of Insurance decision under former G.S. 150A-43 et seq. Porter v. North Carolina Dep't of Ins., 40 N.C. App. 376, 253 S.E.2d 44, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 455, 256 S.E.2d 808 (1979).

Work First benefits recipient's appeal of the denial of a declaratory judgment that the Work First Manual violated the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 12101 et seq., was dismissed as the recipient failed to exhaust her administrative remedies; she could have sought a declaratory ruling under G.S. 150B-4 and the trial court did not obtain subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint. Chatmon v. N.C. HHS, 175 N.C. App. 85, 622 S.E.2d 684 (2005), overruled in part by Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs. & Div. of Med. Assistance of the N.C. HHS, 364 N.C. 61, 692 S.E.2d 96 (2010).

Trial Court Lacked Jurisdiction Where Declaratory Relief Not Pursued in Agency Proceeding. - Original jurisdiction for a declaratory ruling as to the rights and interest of parties in a pier and boat ramp extending over a state-owned lake rested in the Department of Natural Resources and Community Development (now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources). As the parties did not pursue such declaratory relief and failed to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to instituting their civil action, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Woodlief v. Johnson, 75 N.C. App. 49, 330 S.E.2d 265 (1985).

Appeal Held Moot. - Trial court properly concluded that a lobbyist's appeal of a decision of the North Carolina Department of the Secretary of State was moot because although the Department applied aggravating factors under G.S. 120C-602(b) to enhance a civil fine, it did not enhance the fine in its final agency decision using those factors; therefore, a legal determination of whether the Department had authority to enhance the fine had no practical effect on the controversy. Beason v. N.C. Dep't of the Secy. of State, 226 N.C. App. 233, 741 S.E.2d 663 (2013).

Trial court did not err in refusing to conduct judicial review of a lobbyist's request for review because there was no longer any controversy once the North Carolina Department of the Secretary of State decided to not apply aggravating factors to the lobbyist's fine; thus, the trial court properly concluded that the case was moot regardless of whether the lobbyist was a "person aggrieved" pursuant to G.S. 150B-4 and G.S. 150B-43. Beason v. N.C. Dep't of the Secy. of State, 226 N.C. App. 233, 741 S.E.2d 663 (2013).

Applied in Affordable Care, Inc. v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 153 N.C. App. 527, 571 S.E.2d 52 (2002).

Cited in Gummels v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 97 N.C. App. 245, 388 S.E.2d 223 (1990); Total Care, Inc. v. Department of Human Resources, 99 N.C. App. 517, 393 S.E.2d 338 (1990); Florence Concrete Prods., Inc. v. North Carolina Licensing Bd., 113 N.C. App. 270, 437 S.E.2d 877 (1994); County of Durham v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't & Natural Resources, 131 N.C. App. 395, 507 S.E.2d 310 (1998); D.G. Matthews & Son v. State ex rel. McDevitt, 131 N.C. App. 520, 508 S.E.2d 331 (1998); Good Hope Health Sys., L.L.C. v. N.C. HHS, 189 N.C. App. 534, 659 S.E.2d 456 (2008), aff'd, 362 N.C. 504, 666 S.E.2d 749 (2008).


§§ 150B-5 through 150B-8: Reserved for future codification purposes.

ARTICLE 2. Rule Making.

§§ 150B-9 through 150B-16: Repealed by Session Laws 1991, c. 418, s. 5.

Cross References. - As to rulemaking, see now G.S. 150B-18 et seq.

§ 150B-17: Recodified as § 150B-4 by Session Laws 1991, c. 418, s. 4, effective October 1, 1991.

ARTICLE 2A. Rules.

Part 1. General Provisions.

Sec.

Part 2. Adoption of Rules.

Part 3. Review by Commission.

Part 4. Publication of Code and Register.

Part 5. Rules Affecting Local Governments.

PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS.

§ 150B-18. Scope and effect.

This Article applies to an agency's exercise of its authority to adopt a rule. A rule is not valid unless it is adopted in substantial compliance with this Article. An agency shall not seek to implement or enforce against any person a policy, guideline, or other interpretive statement that meets the definition of a rule contained in G.S. 150B-2(8a) if the policy, guideline, or other interpretive statement has not been adopted as a rule in accordance with this Article.

History

(1991, c. 418, s. 1; 2011-398, s. 1; 2012-187, s. 2.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1991, ch. 418 repealed former Articles 2 and 5 and enacted in their place a new Article 2A. Where appropriate, the historical citations to sections in the repealed Articles have been added to corresponding sections in new Article 2A.

Session Laws 2004-124, s. 22A.1.(a), provides: "All personnel and equipment presently assigned to the Rules Review Commission for the purpose of carrying out Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes, are transferred to the Office of Administrative Hearings by a Type I transfer as defined by G.S. 143A-6(a). The Chief Administrative Law Judge shall be responsible for the hiring of the Director and other staff of the Rules Review Commission."

Session Laws 2011-145, s. 6.3(b), provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1A(a), an agency may adopt an emergency rule in accordance with G.S. 150B-21.1A to establish or increase a fee as authorized by this act if the adoption of a rule would otherwise be required under Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes."

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 9.3(d), provides: "For the 2013-2014 fiscal year only and notwithstanding Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes, the State Board of Education shall be exempt from rulemaking in establishing a schedule of fees for teacher licensure and administrative changes pursuant to G.S. 115C-296(a2), as amended by this section."

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 13.6, provides: "Notwithstanding 02 NCAC 20B.0104, the Board of Agriculture may set admission fees for the 2013 State Fair without complying with the requirements of Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes. When this act becomes law, the Board shall post the 2013 admission fee schedule on its Web site and provide notice of the fee schedule, along with a citation to this section, to all persons named on the mailing list maintained pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.2(d)."

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2013.'"

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 38.2, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2013-2015 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2013-2015 fiscal biennium."

Session Laws 2013-360, s. 38.5, is a severability clause.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 1, effective July 25, 2011, added the last sentence.

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "Advisory Rulings by Administrative Agencies: Their Benefits and Dangers," see 2 Campbell L. Rev. 1 (1980).

For survey of 1980 administrative law, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1017 (1981).

For article discussing limitations on ad hoc adjudicatory rulemaking by an administrative agency, see 61 N.C.L. Rev. 67 (1982).

For note, "The Forty-Two Hundred Dollar Question: 'May State Agencies Have Discretion in Setting Civil Penalties Under the North Carolina Constitution?'," see 68 N.C. L. Rev. 1035 (1990).

For article, "Wind Over North Carolina Waters: The State's Preparedness to Address Offshore and Coastal Water-Based Wind Energy Projects," see 87 N.C.L. Rev. 1819 (2009).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Many of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Article 2 or earlier statutes.

Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard Required. - Substantial compliance under former G.S. 150A-9, among other things, required notice and the opportunity to be heard, as provided by former G.S. 150A-12, before the adoption of a rule. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 32 N.C. App. 552, 233 S.E.2d 398, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 729, 235 S.E.2d 782 (1977).

Limitation on Authority of Social Services Commission to Make Rules. - The Social Services Commission has and continues to have general rule making authority under its grant in G.S. 143B-153 and by the provision of G.S. 108A-71 which authorizes the Department of Human Resources to accept all "State appropriations" for programs of social services. That grant became limited, however, by this Chapter upon its enactment, thereby requiring the Commission to comply with certain procedural requirements in adopting rules if specifically authorized by legislative enactment to adopt rules. Whittington v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 100 N.C. App. 603, 398 S.E.2d 40 (1990).

Rule denying Medicaid payments to those who are eligible for Medicare, but have failed to enroll, would be struck down as unsupported by statutory or regulatory authority and as denying a substantial right. Duke Univ. Medical Ctr. v. Bruton, 134 N.C. App. 39, 516 S.E.2d 633 (1999).

Compliance with This Chapter in Administering State Abortion Fund. - Since the State Abortion Fund prior to the enactment of Session Laws 1985, c. 479, s. 93 was merely a "state appropriation," the Department of Human Resources, through its Social Services Commission, could and did enact rules and regulations pertaining to the program. However, by the passage of s. 93, which specifically limits, by legislative enactment, how the Fund is to be administered, the Department of Human Resources and the Commission's rule making authority must comply with the requirements of this Chapter. Whittington v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 100 N.C. App. 603, 398 S.E.2d 40 (1990).

Construction with Coastal Area Management Act. - The mandatory provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act must be read as complementing the procedural safeguards in the Coastal Area Management Act of 1974. Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978).

Construction with State Bar Rules. - North Carolina State Bar could not rely upon the felonious misconduct portion of N.C. St. Bar R. B.0111(e) to avoid dismissal of its claims for relief because that portion of the rule was not properly adopted under G.S. 84-21, the enabling statute governing the state bar's rulemaking authority; moreover, G.S. 84-21 did not contain a provision permitting only substantial compliance with its requirements, in contrast to G.S. 150B-18, and the more specific directions of G.S. 84-21 governed over the general rule-making provision of the North Carolina Administrative Procedures Act. N.C. State Bar v. Brewer, 183 N.C. App. 229, 644 S.E.2d 573 (2007).

Administrative agency rules may be grouped into three categories: (1) Procedural rules which describe how the agency will discharge its assigned functions and the requirements others must follow in dealing with the agency; (2) Legislative rules which are established by an agency as a result of a delegation of legislative power to the agency; and (3) Interpretative rules which interpret and apply the provisions of the statute under which the agency operates. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547, rehearing denied, 301 N.C. 107, 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980), overruled on other grounds, In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 132 (2017).

The Supreme Court is not limited to the label placed on a rule by an agency, but must look instead to the substance of the rule in question. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547, rehearing denied, 301 N.C. 107, 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980), overruled on other grounds, In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 132 (2017).

Amendments to State Guidelines as Administrative Rule-Making. - Amendments to the State guidelines by the Coastal Resources Commission are considered administrative rule-making under this section and thus subject to the comprehensive additional safeguards contained in the Administrative Procedure Act. Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural & Economic Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978).

Requirement by the Commissioner of Insurance that audited data be submitted in a ratemaking case was a legislative rule and therefore subject to the rule-making provisions of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547, rehearing denied, 301 N.C. 107, 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980), overruled on other grounds, In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 132 (2017).

Construction of Former G.S. 150A-10(4). - The exclusion of policy statements or interpretations "made in the decision of a contested case" included in subdivision (4) of former G.S. 150A-10 clearly was not intended to embrace substantive rules with anticipated future applicability. This is so because of the difference between interpretative and legislative rules and because subdivision (6) of former G.S. 150A-10, which excludes "interpretative rules and general statements of policy of the agency" would be unnecessary if subdivision (4) of former G.S. 150A-10 were intended to apply to matters beyond the contested case in question. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547, rehearing denied, 301 N.C. 107, 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980), overruled on other grounds, In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 132 (2017).

Rule Not Properly Promulgated. - Provision in 2005 waiver was neither state nor federal law, and the state's erred in relying on the waiver to deny services to a Medicaid recipient as, although the provision interpreted Medicaid eligibility and was a rule under the North Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (APA), G.S. 150B-2(8a), it was not promulgated in accordance with either the APA or the federal Administrative Procedures Act as required by G.S. 150B-18, and the circumstances presented did not fit within the Arrowood v. North Carolina Dep't Health & Human Servs., 543 S.E.2d 481 (2001), rev'g per curiam for reasons stated in the dissenting opinion, 535 S.E.2d 585 (2000), exception. McCrann v. N.C. HHS, 209 N.C. App. 241, 704 S.E.2d 899, review denied 365 N.C. 198, 710 S.E.2d 23, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 436 (2011).

It was error to conclude a dentist violated the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners' Record Content Rule (Rule) by not recording reasons for prescribing medication because: (1) the Rule's plain language had no such requirement, and (2) such a requirement would constitute a "rule" under G.S. 150B-2(8a) that had not been adopted pursuant to G.S. 150B-18 et seq. Walker v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 245 N.C. App. 559, 782 S.E.2d 518 (2016), aff'd, 369 N.C. 517, 796 S.E.2d 784, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 131 (2017).

General Assembly did not impliedly exempt the Board of Trustees from the necessity of compliance with APA's rulemaking provisions in adopting a cap factor where G.S. 135-5(a3) and G.S. 135-6(l) could be harmonized, the adoption of a cap factor was not a ministerial act in which the Board did nothing more than ratify the actuary's recommendation, case law did not support such an implied exemption, and the public interests supported the Board of Education's contention that the cap factor should be established by using the APA's rulemaking provisions to ensure the opportunity for adequate public input before a decision became final. This case was decided prior to the enactment of G.S. 150B-1(d)(30) by Session Laws 2020-48, s. 4.1(c). Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Dep't of State Treasurer, 374 N.C. 3, 839 S.E.2d 814 (2020).

Formal Rule-Making Procedure Not Required. - There is statutory authority under G.S. 95-126(b)(2)(m) granted to the North Carolina Department of Labor to protect the health and safety of all employees in North Carolina; the operations manual is a non-binding interpretive statement, not a rule requiring formal rule-making procedures - accordingly, the exception that requires rule-making if the rights and duties of the employer are affected does not apply; thus, the operations manual merely established guidelines that directed Occupational Safety and Health Act inspectors as to what parties could be cited for violation of a rule and thus did not require formal rule-making. Comm'r of Labor v. Weekley Homes, L.P., 169 N.C. App. 17, 609 S.E.2d 407 (2005).

Applied in Affordable Care, Inc. v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 153 N.C. App. 527, 571 S.E.2d 52 (2002).

Cited in Jackson v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources Div. of Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, & Substance Abuse Servs., 131 N.C. App. 179, 505 S.E.2d 899 (1998), cert. denied, 350 N.C. 594, 537 S.E.2d 213 (1999).


§ 150B-19. Restrictions on what can be adopted as a rule.

An agency may not adopt a rule that does one or more of the following:

  1. Implements or interprets a law unless that law or another law specifically authorizes the agency to do so.
  2. Enlarges the scope of a profession, occupation, or field of endeavor for which an occupational license is required.
  3. Imposes criminal liability or a civil penalty for an act or omission, including the violation of a rule, unless a law specifically authorizes the agency to do so or a law declares that violation of the rule is a criminal offense or is grounds for a civil penalty.
  4. Repeats the content of a law, a rule, or a federal regulation. A brief statement that informs the public of a requirement imposed by law does not violate this subdivision and satisfies the "reasonably necessary" standard of review set in G.S. 150B-21.9(a)(3).
  5. Establishes a fee or other charge for providing a service in fulfillment of a duty unless a law specifically authorizes the agency to do so or the fee or other charge is for one of the following:
    1. A service to a State, federal, or local governmental unit.
    2. A copy of part or all of a State publication or other document, the cost of mailing a document, or both.
    3. A transcript of a public hearing.
    4. A conference, workshop, or course.
    5. Data processing services.
  6. Allows the agency to waive or modify a requirement set in a rule unless a rule establishes specific guidelines the agency must follow in determining whether to waive or modify the requirement.
  7. Repealed by Session Laws 2011-398, s. 61.2, effective July 25, 2011.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1991, c. 418, s. 1; 1996, 2nd Ex. Sess., c. 18, s. 7.10(a); 2011-13, s. 1; 2011-398, s. 61.2.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2009-216, s. 2(c), provides: "Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to replace Wastewater Discharge Rule 15A NCAC 02B.0270. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 2(b) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.9 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2)." Section 2 of Session Laws 2009-216 pertains to wastewater discharge into the Jordan Lake Reservoir.

Session Laws 2009-216, s. 3(j), provides: "Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to replace Sections 3(c) through 3(i) of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Sections 3(c) through 3(f) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.9 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2)." Section 3 of Session Laws 2009-216 pertains to stormwater management, Jordan Lake Reservoir. For provisions on interpretation of certain rules to implement nutrient management strategies for the B. Everett Jordan Reservoir adopted pursuant to Session Laws 2009-216, see Session Laws 2012-187, s. 12.1.

Session Laws 2011-39, s. 4, provides: "Rule-making Authority. - No later than January 1, 2012, the Commission for Public Health shall adopt rules consistent with the provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rules adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of this act." Session Laws 2011-39, ss. 1 and 2, which are noted in full under G.S. 130A-280 and 130A-282, modify the applicability of certain fencing requirements to public swimming pools and provide that requirements related to dressing and sanitary facilities do not apply to interactive play attractions.

Session Laws 2011-48, s. 2(c), provides: "Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to replace Permitting by Regulation Rule 15A NCAC 02U.0113. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 2(b) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.9 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2)."

Session Laws 2011-48, s. 3(c), provides: "Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to replace Reclaimed Water Utilization Rule 15A NCAC 02U.0501. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 3(b) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.9 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2)." Session Laws 2011-48, ss. 2(b) and 3(b), which are noted in full under G.S. 143-211, 143-215.1 and 143-215.3, provide that uses of reclaimed water for irrigation of ornamental crops by field nurseries and aboveground container nurseries are deemed to be permitted by regulation without issuance of an individual permit or coverage under a general permit, and that artificial lakes or ponds that are used for storage and irrigation of reclaimed water are exempt from certain setback requirements and design criteria for wastewater treatment storage facilities."

Session Laws 2011-394, s. 15(a), provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19, as amended by S.L. 2011-13, the Commission for Public Health may adopt rules to incorporate all or part of the United States Food and Drug Administration Food Code 2009 and to require that employees of establishments regulated under subsections (a) and (a2) of G.S. 130A-248 be certified in food protection in accordance with the United States Food and Drug Administration Food Code 2009."

Session Laws 2013-77, s. 4, provides: "Additional rule-making authority. - Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the Commission shall adopt amendments to the Homeless Shelter Provision to be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 3 of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.8 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2)."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 21(a)-(d), as amended by Session Laws 2015-263, s. 16, provides: "(a) 15A NCAC 02T.1302 (Definitions) and 15A NCAC 02T.1307 (Swine Waste Management System Performance Standards). - Until the effective date of the revised permanent rules that the Environmental Management Commission is required to adopt pursuant to Section 21(c) of this act, the Commission and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall implement 15A NCAC 02T.1302 (Definitions) and 15A NCAC 02T.1307 (Swine Waste Management System Performance Standards) as provided in Section 21(b) of this act.

"(b) Implementation. - Notwithstanding 15A NCAC 02T.1302 (Definitions), "new animal waste management system" means animal waste management systems which are constructed and operated at a site where no feedlot existed previously or where a permit for a system has been rescinded, and is then reissued when the permittee confines animals in excess of the thresholds established in G.S. 143-215.10B. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of 15A NCAC 02T.1307 (Swine Waste Management System Performance Standards), the Swine Waste Management System Performance Standards shall:

"(1) Apply to any farm facility that receives a permit for its animal waste management system that allows a level of production at the farm, as measured by steady state live weight, greater than the largest production for which the farm has received a permit in the past, and so that they also apply to any other animal waste management system otherwise subject to regulation under G.S. 143-215.10I.

"(2) Not apply to any facility that meets all of the following conditions:

"a. Has had no animals on site for five continuous years or more.

"b. Notifies the Division of Water Resources in writing at least 60 days prior to bringing any animals back on to the site.

"c. The system depopulated after January 1, 2005, and the system ceased operation no longer than 10 years prior to the current date.

"d. At the time the system ceased operation, the system was in compliance with an individual permit or a general permit issued pursuant to G.S. 143-215.10C.

"e. The Division of Water Resources issues an individual permit or certificate of coverage under a general permit issued pursuant to G.S. 143-215.10C for operation of the system before any animals are brought on the facility.

"f. The permit for the animal waste management system does not allow production, measured by steady state live weight, to exceed the greatest steady state live weight previously permitted for the system under G.S. 143-215.10C.

"g. No component of the animal waste management system and swine farm, other than an existing swine house or land application site, shall be constructed on land that is located within the 100-year floodplain.

"h. The inactive animal waste management system was not closed using the expenditure of public funds and was not closed pursuant to a settlement agreement, court order, cost share agreement, or grant condition.

"(c) Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Environmental Management Commission shall adopt rules as promptly as practicable to amend 15A NCAC 02T.1302 (Definitions) and 15A NCAC 02T.1307 (Swine Waste Management System Performance Standards) consistent with Section 21(b) of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rules adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 21(b) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to Part 3 of Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2).

"(d) Sunset. - Section 21(b) of this act expires on the date that rules adopted pursuant to Section 21(c) of this act become effective."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 22(a)-(e), provides: "(a) The definitions set out in G.S. 143-212 and 15A NCAC 02U.0103 (Definitions) apply to this section.

"(b) 15A NCAC 02U.0701 (Setbacks). - Until the effective date of the revised permanent rule that the Commission is required to adopt pursuant to Section 22(d) of this act, the Commission and the Department shall implement 15A NCAC 02U.0701 (Setbacks) as provided in Section 22(c) of this act.

"(c) Implementation. - Notwithstanding 15A NCAC 02U.0701 (Setbacks), the rule shall be implemented as provided in this section.

"(1) Setbacks in subsection (c) of the rule for surface waters not classified as SA shall not apply provided that the reclaimed water to be utilized contains no more than 10 mg/l of Total Nitrogen and no more than 2 mg/l of Total Phosphorus. The elimination of setbacks to surface waters does not exempt any discharge of reclaimed water to waters of the State from meeting permit requirements established in 15A NCAC 02U.0101 (Purpose).

"(2) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of the rule, no setback shall be required between final reclaimed water effluent storage facilities and property lines provided that the proposed final effluent storage facility was constructed prior to June 18, 2011.

"(3) Setbacks between reclaimed water storage ponds and property lines or wells under separate ownership may be waived by the adjoining property owner. A copy of the signed waiver shall be provided to the Department.

"(4) Setbacks between reclaimed water storage ponds and wells under the same ownership as the reclaimed water storage pond may be waived by the property owner.

"(d) Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Environmental Management Commission shall adopt a rule to amend 15A NCAC 02U.0701 (Setbacks) consistent with Section 22(c) of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 22(c) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to Part 3 of Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2).

"(e) Sunset. - Section 22(c) of this act expires on the date that rules adopted pursuant to Section 22(d) of this act become effective."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 28(a)-(d), provides: "(a) 15A NCAC 02D.1903 (Open Burning Without an Air Quality Permit). - Until the effective date of the revised permanent rule that the Commission is required to adopt pursuant to Section 28(c) of this act, the Commission, the Department, and any other political subdivision of the State that implements 15A NCAC 02D.1903 (Open Burning Without an Air Quality Permit) shall implement the rule, as provided in Section 28(b) of this act.

"(b) Implementation. - Notwithstanding 15A NCAC 02D.1903(b)(2)(F)(Open Burning Without an Air Quality Permit), open burning for land clearing or right-of-way maintenance is permissible without an air quality permit if materials are not carried off site or transported over public roads for open burning unless the materials are carried or transported to:

"(1) Facilities permitted in accordance with 15A NCAC 02D.1904 (Air Curtain Burners) for the operation of an air curtain burner at a permanent site; or

"(2) A location, where the material is burned not more than four times per year, that meets all of the following criteria:

"a. At least 500 feet from any dwelling, group of dwellings, or commercial or institutional establishment, or other occupied structure not located on the property on which the burning is conducted.

"b. There are no more than two piles, each 20 feet in diameter, being burned at one time.

"c. The location is not a permitted solid waste management facility.

"(c) Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to amend 15A NCAC 02D.1903 (Open Burning Without an Air Quality Permit) consistent with Section 28(b) of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 28(b) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.8 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2).

"(d) Sunset. - Section 28(b) of this act expires on the date that rules adopted pursuant to Section 28(c) of this act become effective."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 34(a)-(d), as amended by Session Laws 2014-120, s. 53, provides: "(a) 15A NCAC 18A .1949(b) (Sewage Flow Rates for Design Units). - Until the effective date of the revised permanent rule that the Commission is required to adopt pursuant to Section 34(c) of this act, the Commission, the Department, and any other political subdivision of the State shall implement 15A NCAC 18A .1949(b) (Sewage Flow Rates for Design Units) as provided in Section 34(b) of this act.

"(b) Implementation. - Notwithstanding the Daily Flow for Design rates listed for dwelling units in 15A NCAC 18A .1949(a) or for other establishments in Table No. 1 of 15A NCAC 18A .1949(b)(Sewage Flow Rates for Design Units), a wastewater system shall be exempt from the Daily Flow for Design, and any other design flow standards that are established by the Department of Health and Human Services or the Commission for Public Health provided flow rates that are less than those listed in 15A NCAC 18A .1949 (Sewage Flow Rates for Design Units) can be achieved through engineering design that utilizes low-flow fixtures and low-flow technologies and the design is prepared, sealed, and signed by a professional engineer licensed pursuant to Chapter 89C of the General Statutes. The Department and Commission may establish, by rule, lower limits on reduced flow rates as necessary to ensure wastewater system integrity and protect public health, safety, and welfare, provided that the Commission relies on scientific evidence specific to soil types found in North Carolina that the lower limits are necessary for those soil types. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2). Proposed daily design flows for wastewater systems that are calculated to be less than 3,000 total gallons per day shall not require State review pursuant to 15A NCAC 18A .1938(e). Neither the State nor any local health department shall be liable for any damages caused by a system approved or permitted pursuant to this section.

"(c) Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to amend 15A NCAC 18A .1949(b)(Sewage Flow Rates for Design Units) consistent with Section 34(b) of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 34(b) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.8 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2).

"(d) Sunset. - Section 34(b) of this act expires on the date that rules adopted pursuant to Section 34(c) of this act become effective."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 61(a) is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2017-10, s. 5.1 , is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2019-129, s. 1, provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the Commission for Public Health may adopt rules to incorporate all or part of the 2017 edition of the United States Food and Drug Administration Food Code."

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-13, s. 1, effective March 25, 2011, and applicable to rules published in the North Carolina Register by an agency on or after that date, added subdivision (7).

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 61.2, effective July 25, 2011, repealed subdivision (7), as added by Session Laws 2011-13, s. 1.

CASE NOTES

Implementation or Adoption of Rules. - Because neither G.S. 160A-325(a) nor any other statute specifically authorized the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources to implement or interpret G.S. 160A-325(a), it was not part of the Department's regulatory permitting scheme for solid waste management landfills; assuming, arguendo, that a town was required to adhere to its requirements, the failure to do so did not require withdrawal of a facility permit for a proposed landfill. County of Wake v. N.C. Dep't of Env't, 155 N.C. App. 225, 573 S.E.2d 572 (2002), cert. dismissed, 357 N.C. 62, 579 S.E.2d 387 (2003).

Cited in Mosteller v. Duke Energy Corp., 207 N.C. App. 1, 698 S.E.2d 424 (2010), review denied 365 N.C. 211, 710 S.E.2d 38, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 489 (N.C. 2011); Griffith v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 210 N.C. App. 544, 709 S.E.2d 412 (2011).

Opinions of Attorney General

Adoption of Rules. - The Water Quality Committee of the Environmental Management Commission is authorized to adopt rules requiring permits for impacts to isolated wetlands and surface waters. See opinion of Attorney General to Dr. Charles H. Peterson, Vice Chairman, Environmental Management Commission, and Ms. Coleen Sullins, Water Quality Section, Division of Water Quality, 2001 N.C. AG LEXIS 33 (9/5/01).

§ 150B-19.1. Requirements for agencies in the rule-making process.

  1. In developing and drafting rules for adoption in accordance with this Article, agencies shall adhere to the following principles:
    1. An agency may adopt only rules that are expressly authorized by federal or State law and that are necessary to serve the public interest.
    2. An agency shall seek to reduce the burden upon those persons or entities who must comply with the rule.
    3. Rules shall be written in a clear and unambiguous manner and must be reasonably necessary to implement or interpret federal or State law.
    4. An agency shall consider the cumulative effect of all rules adopted by the agency related to the specific purpose for which the rule is proposed. The agency shall not adopt a rule that is unnecessary or redundant.
    5. When appropriate, rules shall be based on sound, reasonably available scientific, technical, economic, and other relevant information. Agencies shall include a reference to this information in the notice of text required by G.S. 150B-21.2(c).
    6. Rules shall be designed to achieve the regulatory objective in a cost-effective and timely manner.
  2. Each agency subject to this Article shall conduct an annual review of its rules to identify existing rules that are unnecessary, unduly burdensome, or inconsistent with the principles set forth in subsection (a) of this section. The agency shall repeal any rule identified by this review.
  3. Each agency subject to this Article shall post on its Web site, no later than the publication date of the notice of text in the North Carolina Register, all of the following:
    1. The text of a proposed rule.
    2. An explanation of the proposed rule and the reason for the proposed rule.
    3. The federal certification required by subsection (g) of this section.
    4. Instructions on how and where to submit oral or written comments on the proposed rule, including a description of the procedure by which a person can object to a proposed rule and subject the proposed rule to legislative review.
    5. Any fiscal note that has been prepared for the proposed rule.
  4. Each agency shall determine whether its policies and programs overlap with the policies and programs of another agency. In the event two or more agencies' policies and programs overlap, the agencies shall coordinate the rules adopted by each agency to avoid unnecessary, unduly burdensome, or inconsistent rules.
  5. Each agency shall quantify the costs and benefits to all parties of a proposed rule to the greatest extent possible. Prior to submission of a proposed rule for publication in accordance with G.S. 150B-21.2, the agency shall review the details of any fiscal note prepared in connection with the proposed rule and approve the fiscal note before submission.
  6. If the agency determines that a proposed rule will have a substantial economic impact as defined in G.S. 150B-21.4(b1), the agency shall consider at least two alternatives to the proposed rule. The alternatives may have been identified by the agency or by members of the public.
  7. Whenever an agency proposes a rule that is purported to implement a federal law, or required by or necessary for compliance with federal law, or on which the receipt of federal funds is conditioned, the agency shall:
    1. Prepare a certification identifying the federal law requiring adoption of the proposed rule. The certification shall contain a statement setting forth the reasons why the proposed rule is required by federal law. If all or part of the proposed rule is not required by federal law or exceeds the requirements of federal law, then the certification shall state the reasons for that opinion.
    2. Post the certification on the agency Web site in accordance with subsection (c) of this section.
    3. Maintain a copy of the federal law and provide to the Office of State Budget and Management the citation to the federal law requiring or pertaining to the proposed rule.
  8. Repealed by Session Laws 2014-120, s. 6(a), effective September 18, 2014, and applicable to proposed rules published on or after that date.

If an agency proposes any change to a rule or fiscal note prior to the date it proposes to adopt a rule, the agency shall publish the proposed change on its Web site as soon as practicable after the change is drafted. If an agency's staff proposes any such change to be presented to the rule-making agency, the staff shall publish the proposed change on the agency's Web site as soon as practicable after the change is drafted.

History

(2011-398, s. 2; 2012-187, s. 3; 2013-143, s. 1.1; 2014-120, s. 6(a).)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 63, made this section effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to rules adopted on or after that date.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 62, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 63, as amended by Session Laws 2012-187, s. 8.1, provides in relevant part: "Sections 15 through 55 of this act become effective January 1, 2012, and apply to contested cases commenced on or after that date. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.2 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 of this act become effective when the United States Environmental Protection Agency approvals referenced in Section 55.2 have been issued or October 1, 2012, whichever occurs first. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.1 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 and Sections 32 and 33 of this act become effective when the waiver referenced in Section 55.1 has been granted or February 1, 2013, whichever occurs first. Unless otherwise provided elsewhere in this act, the remainder of this act is effective when it becomes law." For Section 55.2, see editor's note under G.S. 150B-34.

Session Laws 2013-294, s. 11, provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.2, the Industrial Commission shall adopt permanent rules in accordance with the provisions of this act using the procedure and time lines for temporary rules set forth in G.S. 150B-21.1(a3). Rules adopted by the Industrial Commission in accordance with this section shall be subject to review by the Rules Review Commission as provided by G.S. 150B-21.1(b); provided however, that if the rules are approved by the Rules Review Commission, they shall become effective as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b). Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall not be subject to G.S. 150B-19.1(h) or G.S. 150B-21.4. The Industrial Commission shall consult with the Office of Administrative Hearings to ensure that rules adopted in accordance with this section are submitted to the Rules Review Commission in time to be eligible for legislative disapproval in the 2014 Regular Session of the 2013 General Assembly. The rules of the Industrial Commission that were in effect on the effective date of S.L. 2011-287 shall remain in effect with regard to rules disapproved by Sections 1 and 2 of this act until rules adopted to replace the disapproved rules become effective pursuant to this section."

Session Laws 2014-4, s. 2(g), provides: "The Mining and Energy Commission, the Environmental Management Commission, and the Commission for Public Health are exempt from the provisions of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes that require that a certification be obtained from the Office of State Budget and Management, including requirements under G.S. 150B-19.1(h) and G.S. 150B-21.4, and any requirement for preliminary review by the Office of State Budget and Management pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.26, for any rule proposed for the creation of a modern regulatory program for the management of oil and gas exploration and development activities in the State, including the use of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing for that purpose."

Session Laws 2014-120, s. 6(c), made the repeal of subsection (h) by Session Laws 2014-120, s. 6(a), applicable to proposed rules published on or after September 18, 2014.

Session Laws 2014-120, s. 60, is a severability clause.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2014-120, s. 6(a), effective September 18, 2014, deleted subsection (h). See Editor's note for applicability.

CASE NOTES

Rule Making Required. - Retirement Systems Division of the Department of State Treasurer (Division) erred in invoicing a school employee or school board for contributions to the employee's retirement fund pursuant to a statutory cap factor because (1) the factor was a rule not properly adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, and (2) the Division was a state agency not exempt from rule making requirements. Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Dep't of State Treasurer, 261 N.C. App. 325, 821 S.E.2d 196 (2018), aff'd, 374 N.C. 3, 839 S.E.2d 814, 2020 N.C. LEXIS 270 (2020).


§ 150B-19.2: Repealed by Session Laws 2013-413, s. 3(c). For effective date, see editor's note.

History

(2011-398, s. 2; repealed by 2013-413, s. 3(c). For effective date, see editor's note.)

Editor's Note. - Former G.S. 150B-19.2 pertained to review of existing rules.

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 61(b), provides: "Except as otherwise provided, this act is effective when it becomes law [August 23, 2013]." Session Laws 2013-413, s. 60(c), had provided that: "This act becomes effective July 1, 2015." Session Laws 2014-115, s. 17, amended Session Laws 2013-413, s. 60(c), to replace the reference to "This act" with the words "This Part."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 61(a), is a severability clause.

§ 150B-19.3. Limitation on certain environmental rules.

  1. An agency authorized to implement and enforce State and federal environmental laws may not adopt a rule for the protection of the environment or natural resources that imposes a more restrictive standard, limitation, or requirement than those imposed by federal law or rule, if a federal law or rule pertaining to the same subject matter has been adopted, unless adoption of the rule is required by one of the subdivisions of this subsection. A rule required by one of the following subdivisions of this subsection shall be subject to the provisions of G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as if the rule received written objections from 10 or more persons under G.S. 150B-21.3(b2):
    1. A serious and unforeseen threat to the public health, safety, or welfare.
    2. An act of the General Assembly or United States Congress that expressly requires the agency to adopt rules.
    3. A change in federal or State budgetary policy.
    4. A federal regulation required by an act of the United States Congress to be adopted or administered by the State.
    5. A court order.
  2. For purposes of this section, "an agency authorized to implement and enforce State and federal environmental laws" means any of the following:
    1. The Department of Environmental Quality created pursuant to G.S. 143B-279.1.
    2. The Environmental Management Commission created pursuant to G.S. 143B-282.
    3. The Coastal Resources Commission established pursuant to G.S. 113A-104.
    4. The Marine Fisheries Commission created pursuant to G.S. 143B-289.51.
    5. The Wildlife Resources Commission created pursuant to G.S. 143-240.
    6. The Commission for Public Health created pursuant to G.S. 130A-29.
    7. The Sedimentation Control Commission created pursuant to G.S. 143B-298.
    8. The North Carolina Oil and Gas  Commission created pursuant to G.S. 143B-293.1.
    9. The Pesticide Board created pursuant to G.S. 143-436.

History

(2011-398, s. 2; 2012-143, s. 1(d); 2014-4, s. 4(c); 2014-120, s. 57; 2015-241, s. 14.30(u).)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 63, made this section effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to rules adopted on or after that date.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 63, as amended by Session Laws 2012-187, s. 8.1, provides in relevant part: "Sections 15 through 55 of this act become effective January 1, 2012, and apply to contested cases commenced on or after that date. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.2 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 of this act become effective when the United States Environmental Protection Agency approvals referenced in Section 55.2 have been issued or October 1, 2012, whichever occurs first. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.1 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 and Sections 32 and 33 of this act become effective when the waiver referenced in Section 55.1 has been granted or February 1, 2013, whichever occurs first. Unless otherwise provided elsewhere in this act, the remainder of this act is effective when it becomes law." For Section 55.2, see editor's note under G.S. 150B-34.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 62, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2014-4, s. 2(e), provides: "G.S. 150B-19.3 shall not apply to rules adopted by the Mining and Energy Commission, the Environmental Management Commission, the Sedimentation Control Commission, and the Commission for Public Health for the management of oil and gas exploration, development, and production activities in the State, including the use of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing for that purpose."

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2014-4, s. 4(c), effective August 1, 2015, substituted "Oil and Gas Commission" for "Mining and Energy Commission" in subdivision (b)(8).

Session Laws 2014-120, s. 57, effective September 18, 2014, in the introductory language of subsection (a), substituted "subdivisions of this subsection" for "following" at the end of the first sentence and added the present last sentence.

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 14.30(u), effective July 1, 2015, substituted "Department of Environmental Quality" for "Department of Environment and Natural Resources" in subdivision (b)(1).

§ 150B-20. Petitioning an agency to adopt a rule.

  1. Petition. - A person may petition an agency to adopt a rule by submitting to the agency a written rule-making petition requesting the adoption. A person may submit written comments with a rule-making petition. If a rule-making petition requests the agency to create or amend a rule, the person must submit the proposed text of the requested rule change and a statement of the effect of the requested rule change. Each agency must establish by rule the procedure for submitting a rule-making petition to it and the procedure the agency follows in considering a rule-making petition. An agency receiving a rule-making petition shall, within three business days of receipt of the petition, send the proposed text of the requested rule change and the statement of the effect of the requested rule change to the Office of Administrative Hearings. The Office of Administrative Hearings shall, within three business days of receipt of the proposed text of the requested rule change and the statement of the effect of the requested rule change, distribute the information via its mailing list and publish the information on its Web site.
  2. Time. - An agency must grant or deny a rule-making petition submitted to it within 30 days after the date the rule-making petition is submitted, unless the agency is a board or commission. If the agency is a board or commission, it must grant or deny a rule-making petition within 120 days after the date the rule-making petition is submitted.
  3. Action. - If an agency denies a rule-making petition, it must send the person who submitted the petition a written statement of the reasons for denying the petition. If an agency grants a rule-making petition, it must inform the person who submitted the rule-making petition of its decision and must initiate rule-making proceedings. When an agency grants a rule-making petition, the notice of text it publishes in the North Carolina Register may state that the agency is initiating rule making as the result of a rule-making petition and state the name of the person who submitted the rule-making petition. If the rule-making petition requested the creation or amendment of a rule, the notice of text the agency publishes may set out the text of the requested rule change submitted with the rule-making petition and state whether the agency endorses the proposed text.
  4. Review. - Denial of a rule-making petition is a final agency decision and is subject to judicial review under Article 4 of this Chapter. Failure of an agency to grant or deny a rule-making petition within the time limits set in subsection (b) is a denial of the rule-making petition.
  5. Repealed by Session Laws 1996, Second Extra Session, c. 18, s. 7.10(b).

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1991, c. 418, s. 1; c. 477, s. 2; 1996, 2nd Ex. Sess., c. 18, s. 7.10(b); 1997-34, s. 2; 2003-229, s. 1; 2017-211, s. 1(a).)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1999-237, s. 11 provides that the Codifier of Rules may reorganize Titles 10 and 15A of the North Carolina Administrative Code to reflect the recent reorganization of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2017-211, s. 1(a), effective January 1, 2018, added the fifth and sixth sentences to subsection (a).

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "Advisory Rulings by Administrative Agencies: Their Benefits and Dangers," see 2 Campbell L. Rev. 1 (1980).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Article 2 or earlier statutes.

Judicial Review of Denial. - An agency's denial of a petition for rule making under former G.S. 150A-16 is subject to judicial review pursuant to the provisions of former G.S. 150A-43. In re Wheeler, 85 N.C. App. 150, 354 S.E.2d 374 (1987).

Where the Commission denied plaintiffs' rule-making petition, judicial review of the decision to deny the petition was available pursuant to subsection (d). Act-Up Triangle v. Commission for Health Servs., 345 N.C. 699, 483 S.E.2d 388 (1997).

Use of "Whole Record" Test. - The superior court properly employed the "whole record test" in its judicial review of the Commission's decision to deny plaintiffs' rule-making petition. Act-Up Triangle v. Commission for Health Servs., 345 N.C. 699, 483 S.E.2d 388 (1997).

Plaintiff Failing to Exhaust Administrative Remedies Not Entitled to Judicial Relief. - Plaintiff collection agency was not entitled to seek a declaratory judgment in the superior court as to the validity and applicability of a regulation of the Department of Insurance prohibiting collection agencies from instituting judicial proceedings on behalf of other persons, where plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies by petitioning the Department of Insurance for amendment or repeal of the regulation under former G.S. 150A-16 or seeking a declaratory ruling from the Department of Insurance as to the validity and applicability of the regulation under former G.S. 150A-17, and then by seeking judicial review of an adverse Department of Insurance decision under former G.S. 150A-43 et seq. Porter v. North Carolina Dep't of Ins., 40 N.C. App. 376, 253 S.E.2d 44, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 455, 256 S.E.2d 808 (1979).

Federal Court Jurisdiction. - Where plaintiff filed a petition for rule-making requesting that North Carolina Department of Human Resources remove rule from the North Carolina Food Stamp Manual, cease all further application of rule, and adopt proposed rule, and the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture moved to intervene, then removed the case to federal district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b) and 1442(a)(1), the case was remanded to the State Supreme Court because the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Thomas v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 898 F. Supp. 315 (M.D.N.C. 1995).

Applied in North Carolina Chiropractic Ass'n v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 122 N.C. App. 122, 468 S.E.2d 539 (1996); Beneficial N.C. Inc. v. State ex rel. N.C. State Banking Comm'n, 126 N.C. App. 117, 484 S.E.2d 808 (1997); Affordable Care, Inc. v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 153 N.C. App. 527, 571 S.E.2d 52 (2002); Table Rock Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. Envtl. Mgmt. Comm'n, 191 N.C. App. 362, 663 S.E.2d 333 (2008).


§ 150B-21. Agency must designate rule-making coordinator; duties of coordinator.

  1. Each agency must designate one or more rule-making coordinators to oversee the agency's rule-making functions. The coordinator shall serve as the liaison between the agency, other agencies, units of local government, and the public in the rule-making process. The coordinator shall report directly to the agency head.
  2. The rule-making coordinator shall be responsible for the following:
    1. Preparing notices of public hearings.
    2. Coordinating access to the agency's rules.
    3. Screening all proposed rule actions prior to publication in the North Carolina Register to assure that an accurate fiscal note has been completed as required by G.S. 150B-21.4(b).
    4. Consulting with the North Carolina Association of County Commissioners and the North Carolina League of Municipalities to determine which local governments would be affected by any proposed rule action.
    5. Providing the North Carolina Association of County Commissioners and the North Carolina League of Municipalities with copies of all fiscal notes required by G.S. 150B-21.4(b), prior to publication in the North Carolina Register of the proposed text of a permanent rule change.
    6. Coordinating the submission of proposed rules to the Governor as provided by G.S. 150B-21.26.
  3. At the earliest point in the rule-making process and in consultation with the North Carolina Association of County Commissioners, the North Carolina League of Municipalities, and with samples of county managers or city managers, as appropriate, the rule-making coordinator shall lead the agency's efforts in the development and drafting of any rules or rule changes that could:
    1. Require any unit of local government, including a county, city, school administrative unit, or other local entity funded by or through a unit of local government to carry out additional or modified responsibilities;
    2. Increase the cost of providing or delivering a public service funded in whole or in part by any unit of local government; or
    3. Otherwise affect the expenditures or revenues of a unit of local government.
  4. The rule-making coordinator shall send to the Office of State Budget and Management for compilation a copy of each final fiscal note prepared pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.4(b).
  5. The rule-making coordinator shall compile a schedule of the administrative rules and amendments expected to be proposed during the next fiscal year. The coordinator shall provide a copy of the schedule to the Office of State Budget and Management in a manner proposed by that Office.
  6. Repealed by Session Laws 2011-398, s. 3, effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to rules adopted on or after that date.

History

(1991, c. 418, s. 1; 1995, c. 415, s. 1; c. 507, s. 27.8(v); 2000-140, s. 93.1(a); 2001-424, s. 12.2(b); 2011-398, s. 3.)

Editor's Note. - For subject matter similar to former subsection (f), see subsection (g) of G.S. 150B-19.1.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 3, effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to rules adopted on or after that date, deleted subsection (f).

Opinions of Attorney General

Adoption of Rules. - The Water Quality Committee of the Environmental Management Commission could immediately adopt temporary rules under G.S. 150B-21(a)(5) to establish a permit program for regulating impacts to isolated wetlands and surface waters because a recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court invalidating the Army Corps of Engineers' exercise of jurisdiction over such isolated waters was a court order under G.S. 150B-21.1(a)(5). See opinion of Attorney General to Dr. Charles H. Peterson, Vice Chairman, Environmental Management Commission, and Ms. Coleen Sullins, Water Quality Section, Division of Water Quality, 2001 N.C. AG LEXIS 33 (9/5/01).

PART 2. ADOPTION OF RULES.

§ 150B-21.1. Procedure for adopting a temporary rule.

  1. Adoption. - An agency may adopt a temporary rule when it finds that adherence to the notice and hearing requirements of G.S. 150B-21.2 would be contrary to the public interest and that the immediate adoption of the rule is required by one or more of the following:
    1. A serious and unforeseen threat to the public health, safety, or welfare.
    2. The effective date of a recent act of the General Assembly or the United States Congress.
    3. A recent change in federal or State budgetary policy.
    4. A recent federal regulation.
    5. A recent court order.
    6. The need for a rule establishing review criteria as authorized by G.S. 131E-183(b) to complement or be made consistent with the State Medical Facilities Plan approved by the Governor, if the rule addresses a matter included in the State Medical Facilities Plan, and the proposed rule and a notice of public hearing is submitted to the Codifier of Rules prior to the effective date of the Plan.
    7. The need for the Wildlife Resources Commission to establish any of the following:
      1. No wake zones.
      2. Hunting or fishing seasons, including provisions for manner of take or any other conditions required for the implementation of such season.
      3. Hunting or fishing bag limits.
      4. Management of public game lands as defined in G.S. 113-129(8a).
    8. The need for the Secretary of State to implement the certification technology provisions of Article 11A of Chapter 66 of the General Statutes, to adopt uniform Statements of Policy that have been officially adopted by the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc., for the purpose of promoting uniformity of state securities regulation, and to adopt rules governing the conduct of hearings pursuant to this Chapter.
    9. The need for the Commissioner of Insurance to implement the provisions of G.S. 58-2-205.
    10. The need for the State Chief Information Officer to implement the information technology procurement provisions of Article 15 of Chapter 143B of the General Statutes.
    11. The need for the State Board of Elections to adopt a temporary rule after prior notice or hearing or upon any abbreviated notice or hearing the agency finds practical for one or more of the following:
      1. In accordance with the provisions of G.S. 163-22.2.
      2. To implement any provisions of state or federal law for which the State Board of Elections has been authorized to adopt rules.
      3. The need for the rule to become effective immediately in order to preserve the integrity of upcoming elections and the elections process.
    12. Repealed by Session Laws 2015-264, s. 22, effective October 1, 2015.
    13. , (14) Reserved.
  2. Recodified as subdivision (a)(16) of this section by Session Laws 2004-156, s. 1.
  3. A recent act, change, regulation, or order as used in subdivisions (2) through (5) of subsection (a) of this section means an act, change, regulation, or order occurring or made effective no more than 210 days prior to the submission of a temporary rule to the Rules Review Commission. Upon written request of the agency, the Commission may waive the 210-day requirement upon consideration of the degree of public benefit, whether the agency had control over the circumstances that required the requested waiver, notice to and opposition by the public, the need for the waiver, and previous requests for waivers submitted by the agency.
  4. Unless otherwise provided by law, the agency shall:
    1. At least 30 business days prior to adopting a temporary rule, submit the rule and a notice of public hearing to the Codifier of Rules, and the Codifier of Rules shall publish the proposed temporary rule and the notice of public hearing on the Internet to be posted within five business days.
    2. At least 30 business days prior to adopting a temporary rule, notify persons on the mailing list maintained pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.2(d) and any other interested parties of its intent to adopt a temporary rule and of the public hearing.
    3. Accept written comments on the proposed temporary rule for at least 15 business days prior to adoption of the temporary rule.
    4. Hold at least one public hearing on the proposed temporary rule no less than five days after the rule and notice have been published. If notice of a public hearing has been published and that public hearing has been cancelled, the agency shall publish notice at least five days prior to the date of any rescheduled hearing.
  5. An agency must also prepare a written statement of its findings of need for a temporary rule stating why adherence to the notice and hearing requirements in G.S. 150B-21.2 would be contrary to the public interest and why the immediate adoption of the rule is required. If the temporary rule establishes a new fee or increases an existing fee, the agency shall include in the written statement that it has complied with the requirements of G.S. 12-3.1. The statement must be signed by the head of the agency adopting the temporary rule.
  6. Review. - When an agency adopts a temporary rule it must submit the rule and the agency's written statement of its findings of the need for the rule to the Rules Review Commission. Within 15 business days after receiving the proposed temporary rule, the Commission shall review the agency's written statement of findings of need for the rule and the rule to determine whether the statement meets the criteria listed in subsection (a) of this section and the rule meets the standards in G.S. 150B-21.9. The Commission shall direct a member of its staff who is an attorney licensed to practice law in North Carolina to review the statement of findings of need and the rule. The staff member shall make a recommendation to the Commission, which must be approved by the Commission or its designee. The Commission's designee shall be a panel of at least three members of the Commission. In reviewing the statement, the Commission or its designee may consider any information submitted by the agency or another person. If the Commission or its designee finds that the statement meets the criteria listed in subsection (a) of this section and the rule meets the standards in G.S. 150B-21.9, the Commission or its designee must approve the temporary rule and deliver the rule to the Codifier of Rules within two business days of approval. The Codifier of Rules must enter the rule into the North Carolina Administrative Code on the sixth business day following receipt from the Commission or its designee.
  7. If the Commission or its designee finds that the statement does not meet the criteria listed in subsection (a) of this section or that the rule does not meet the standards in G.S. 150B-21.9, the Commission or its designee must immediately notify the head of the agency. The agency may supplement its statement of need with additional findings or submit a new statement. If the agency provides additional findings or submits a new statement, the Commission or its designee must review the additional findings or new statement within five business days after the agency submits the additional findings or new statement. If the Commission or its designee again finds that the statement does not meet the criteria listed in subsection (a) of this section or that the rule does not meet the standards in G.S. 150B-21.9, the Commission or its designee must immediately notify the head of the agency and return the rule to the agency.
  8. If an agency decides not to provide additional findings or submit a new statement when notified by the Commission or its designee that the agency's findings of need for a rule do not meet the required criteria or that the rule does not meet the required standards, the agency must notify the Commission or its designee of its decision. The Commission or its designee shall then return the rule to the agency. When the Commission returns a rule to an agency in accordance with this subsection, the agency may file an action for declaratory judgment in Wake County Superior Court pursuant to Article 26 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes.
  9. Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, if the agency has not complied with the provisions of G.S. 12-3.1, the Codifier of Rules shall not enter the rule into the Code.
  10. Standing. - A person aggrieved by a temporary rule adopted by an agency may file an action for declaratory judgment in Wake County Superior Court pursuant to Article 26 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes. In the action, the court shall determine whether the agency's written statement of findings of need for the rule meets the criteria listed in subsection (a) of this section and whether the rule meets the standards in G.S. 150B-21.9. The court shall not grant an ex parte temporary restraining order.
  11. Filing a petition for rule making or a request for a declaratory ruling with the agency that adopted the rule is not a prerequisite to filing an action under this subsection. A person who files an action for declaratory judgment under this subsection must serve a copy of the complaint on the agency that adopted the rule being contested, the Codifier of Rules, and the Commission.
  12. Effective Date and Expiration. - A temporary rule becomes effective on the date specified in G.S. 150B-21.3. A temporary rule expires on the earliest of the following dates:
    1. The date specified in the rule.
    2. The effective date of the permanent rule adopted to replace the temporary rule, if the Commission approves the permanent rule.
    3. The date the Commission returns to an agency a permanent rule the agency adopted to replace the temporary rule.
    4. The effective date of an act of the General Assembly that specifically disapproves a permanent rule adopted to replace the temporary rule.
    5. 270 days from the date the temporary rule was published in the North Carolina Register, unless the permanent rule adopted to replace the temporary rule has been submitted to the Commission.
  13. Publication. - When the Codifier of Rules enters a temporary rule in the North Carolina Administrative Code, the Codifier must publish the rule in the North Carolina Register.

(15) Expired pursuant to Session Laws 2002-164, s. 5, effective October 1, 2004.

(16) Expired pursuant to Session Laws 2003-184, s. 3, effective July 1, 2005.

(17) To maximize receipt of federal funds for the Medicaid or NC Health Choice programs within existing State appropriations, to reduce Medicaid or NC Health Choice expenditures, and to reduce Medicaid and NC Health Choice fraud and abuse.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1981, c. 688, s. 12; 1981 (Reg. Sess., 1982), c. 1232, s. 1; 1983, c. 857; c. 927, ss. 4, 8; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1022, s. 1(1), 1(8); 1987, c. 285, ss. 10-12; 1991, c. 418, s. 1; 1991 (Reg. Sess., 1992), c. 900, s. 149; 1993, c. 553, s. 54; 1995, c. 507, s. 27.8(c); 1996, 2nd Ex. Sess., c. 18, ss. 7.10(c), (d); 1997-403, ss. 1-3; 1998-127, s. 2; 1998-212, s. 26B(h); 1999-434, s. 16; 1999-453, s. 5(a); 2000-69, ss. 3, 5; 2000-148, ss. 4, 5; 2001-126, s. 12; 2001-421, ss. 2.3, 5.3; 2001-424, ss. 27.17(b), (c), 27.22(a), (b); 2001-487, s. 21(g); 2002-97, ss. 2, 3; 2002-164, s. 4.6; 2003-184, s. 3; 2003-229, s. 2; 2003-413, ss. 27, 29; 2004-156, s. 1; 2011-398, s. 4; 2013-360, s. 12H.9(d); 2013-413, s. 39; 2015-241, s. 7A.4(ee); 2015-264, s. 22; 2017-6, s. 3; 2018-146, ss. 3.1(a), (b), 6.1; 2020-3, s. 4.25(a).)

Cross References. - As to Commission's ability to adopt temporary rules, notwithstanding this section, to establish maximum mass loads or concentration limits relating to nitrogen and phosphorous discharge limits pursuant to G.S. 143-215.1B, see G.S. 143-215.1B(c).

Re-recodification; Technical and Conforming Changes. - Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3, provides, in part: "The Revisor of Statutes shall recodify Chapter 138A of the General Statutes, Chapter 120C of the General Statutes, as well as Chapter 163 of the General Statutes, as amended by this act, into a new Chapter 163A of the General Statutes to be entitled 'Elections and Ethics Enforcement Act,' as enacted by Section 4 of this act. The Revisor may also recodify into the new Chapter 163A of the General Statutes other existing statutory laws relating to elections and ethics enforcement that are located elsewhere in the General Statutes as the Revisor deems appropriate." The Revisor was further authorized to make additional technical and conforming changes to catchlines, internal citations, and other references throughout the General Statutes to effectuate this recodification. Pursuant to this authority, the Revisor of Statutes, in subdivision (a)(11), substituted "G.S. 163A-742" for "G.S. 163-22.2" once, and substituted "Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement" for "State Board of Elections" twice.

Session Laws 2018-146, ss. 3.1(a), (b), and 6.1 repealed Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3, and authorized the Revisor of Statutes to re-recodify Chapter 163A into Chapters 163, 138A, and 120C and to revert the changes made by the Revisor pursuant to Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3. Pursuant to this authority, the Revisor of Statutes reverted the changes to references in subdivision (a)(11).

Coastal Energy Facilities. - Session Laws 1998-221, s. 2.1 provided: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1(a) and 26 NCAC 2C.0102(11), the Coastal Resources Commission may adopt temporary rules governing coastal energy facilities until 1 July 2005."

Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program. - Session Laws 1998-165, s. 2 provides that the Soil and Water Conservation Commission may adopt temporary rules to implement the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program. This section shall constitute a recent act of the General Assembly for purposes of G.S. 150B-21.1(a)(2).

Area Mental Health Programs. - Session Laws 1998-212, s. 12.35C(b) provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1, the Secretary may adopt temporary rules to implement subsection (a) of this section [which amended G.S. 122C-112(a)], provided that the temporary rules shall not become effective until 60 days after the Secretary has provided notice and opportunity for written comment to the general public of the Secretary's intent to adopt temporary rules, the purpose and subject matter of the rules, and the effective date of the rules. Notice and comment shall be through publication in the North Carolina Register, in the print media, and through mailings to area mental health authorities and other appropriate mental health institutions and providers that will be subject to the temporary rules."

Hurricane Floyd Recovery Act. - Session Laws 1999-463, s. 4 authorizes every State agency to adopt temporary rules necessary to implement the provisions of the act, the Hurricane Floyd Recovery Act of 1999, and provides that notwithstanding § 150B-21.1 (a)(2) and 26 NCAC 2C.0102(11), the authority to adopt temporary rules to implement the provisions of the act shall continue in effect until all rules necessary to implement the provisions of the act have become effective as either temporary rules or permanent rules. Notwithstanding § 150B-21.1 (d), a temporary rule adopted to implement the provisions of the act shall specify the date on which the rule will expire and shall continue in effect until that date. Any agency that adopts a temporary rule to implement the provisions of the act shall report the text of the rule and the agency's written statement of its findings of the need for the rule to the Joint Legislative Administrative Procedure Oversight Committee within 30 days of the adoption of the temporary rule. Section 4 applies to the adoption of temporary rules by the Department of Administration under § 113A-11 (a) and to the adoption of temporary rules that establish minimum criteria by any State agency, as defined in § 113A-9, under § 113A-11 (b).

Adult Care Homes - Short-Term Admission. - Session Laws 2000-50, s. 2, provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1(a), the Medical Care Commission shall adopt temporary rules for the purpose of defining the circumstances under which adult care homes may admit residents on a short-term basis for the purpose of caregiver respite and the rules that shall apply during the course of their stay. The Commission's authority to adopt temporary rules under this section expires on the date that permanent rules pertaining to the same subject matter adopted by the Commission as authorized under G.S. 143B-165(10) become effective."

Mental Health Facilities. - Session Laws 2000-55, s. 6, provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1(a), the Commission for Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services shall adopt temporary rules to implement G.S. 122C-26(5)."

Abuser Treatment Programs. - Session Laws 2000-67, s. 21.5, provides that, notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 150B-21.1(a), the Department of Administration may adopt temporary rules to approve abuser treatment programs that apply to the North Carolina Council for Women.

Session Laws 2000-67, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as 'The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2000.' "

Session Laws 2000-67, s. 28.2, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2000-2001 fiscal year, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2000-2001 fiscal year."

Session Laws 2000-67, s. 28.4, contains a severability clause.

Approval of Temporary Rules Governing Residential Treatment for Children or Adolescents. - Session Laws 2005-276, s. 10.35B, provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1(b) and G.S. 150B-21.3(b2), the Department of Health and Human Services may adopt as temporary rules the rules governing residential treatment for children or adolescents approved for adoption or revision on May 18, 2005, by the Commission for Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services, and approved by the Rules Review Commission. The temporary rules shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(a)."

Minimum Separation Distances Between Well Serving Single-Family Dwellings and Certain Other Structures. - Session Laws 2001-113, ss. 1 to 4, provide: "For a well serving a single-family dwelling where lot size or other fixed conditions preclude the separation distances specified in subparagraph (a) (2) of 15A NCAC 2C.0107 (Standards of Construction: Water-Supply Wells), as adopted by the Environmental Management Commission on October 12, 2000, and approved by the Rules Review Commission on November 16, 2000, the required separation distances shall be the maximum possible, but shall in no case be less than the following:

"(1) Septic tank and drainfield 50 feet

"(2) Water-tight sewage or liquid-waste collection or transfer facility 25 feet

"(3) Animal barns 50 feet

"(4) Cesspool or privies 50 feet.

"This act [Session Laws 2001-113] constitutes a recent act of the General Assembly within the meaning of G.S. 150B-21.1(a). The Environmental Management Commission may adopt a temporary rule that incorporates the provisions of Section 1 of this act [Section 1 of Session Laws 2001-113]. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1(d), a temporary rule adopted in accordance with this section shall remain in effect until a permanent rule adopted to replace the temporary rule becomes effective.

"Except as provided by Section 1 of this act [Section 1 of Session Laws 2001-113], this act does not limit the authority of the Environmental Management Commission to adopt rules governing the location, construction, repair, and abandonment of wells pursuant to G.S. 87-87 and Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes.

"This act is effective retroactively to the date on which it is ratified. If the Environmental Management Commission adopts a temporary rule as provided in Section 2 of this act, Section 1 of this act [Sections 1 and 2 of Session Laws 2001-113] expires when the temporary rule becomes effective."

Air Quality. - Session Laws 2000-134, s. 21, provides that Session Laws 2000-134, relating to air quality emission inspections, and fund expenditures, constitutes a recent act of the General Assembly within the meaning of G.S. 150B-21.1, and that, notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1(a)(2) and 26 NCAC 2C.0102(11), the Environmental Management Commission and the Division of Motor Vehicles of the Department of Transportation may adopt temporary rules to implement the provisions of the act. Section 21 is to continue in effect until all rules necessary to implement the provisions of the act have become effective as either temporary rules or permanent rules.

Tar-Pamlico River Basin. - Session Laws 2001-355, s. 5(b) provides that the Environmental Management Commission may adopt a temporary rule that incorporates the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of the act (providing for implementation of the Tar-Pamlico River Basin-Nutrient Sensitive Waters Management Strategy: Agricultural Nutrient Control Strategy, as adopted by the Environmental Management Commission on 12 October 2000 and approved by the Rules Review Commission on 20 November 2000, to become effective on 1 September 2001). Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1(d), a temporary rule adopted in accordance with s. 5(b) shall remain in effect until a temporary or permanent rule adopted to replace the temporary rule becomes effective.

Catawba River Basin. - Session Laws 2001-418, s. 4(a), as amended by Session Laws 2003-340, s. 5, provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1(d), temporary rules 15A NCAC 2B.0243 and 15A NCAC 2B.0244, which were adopted pursuant to Section 7.1 of S.L. 1999-329 and which became effective on or before 1 July 2001, shall continue in effect until 1 September 2004 in order to provide sufficient time for the Environmental Management Commission to further consult with businesses and industries, local governments, landowners, and other interested or potentially affected persons in the upper and lower Catawba River Basin as to the appropriate scope of permanent rules to protect water quality and riparian buffers in that river basin. In developing permanent rules, the Commission shall consider whether riparian buffers on the main stem of the Catawba River and on lake shorelines are adequate to protect water quality in the river and whether riparian buffer protection requirements should or should not be extended to some or all of the tributary streams in the river basin, taking into account the sources of water quality degradation in the river, the topography of the land in the river basin, and other relevant factors."

Session Laws 2001-418, s. 4(b), provides: "Vested rights recognized or established under the common law or by G.S. 153A-344(b), 153A-344.1, 160A-385(b), or 160A-385.1 shall include the right, as provided in this subsection, to undertake and complete development in the Catawba River Basin without application of temporary rule 15A NCAC 2B.0243. The Commission and the Department shall not apply temporary rule 15A NCAC 2B.0243 to development with vested rights recognized or established under G.S. 153A-344(b), 153A-344.1, 160A-385(b), or 160A-385.1 prior to 1 July 2001. The Commission and the Department shall not apply temporary rule 15A NCAC 2B.0243 to development with vested rights recognized or established under the common law prior to the date this section [s. 4 of Session Laws 2001-418] becomes effective if the Commission has issued a certification pursuant to G.S. 143B-282(a)(1)u. prior to 1 July 2001. The Commission shall not adopt or enforce rules that confer or restrict a vested right to undertake or complete development. It is the intent of the General Assembly that this subsection [s. 4(b)] apply only to the particular circumstances that are the subject of this section [s. 4 of Session Laws 2001-418]. This subsection [s. 4(b)] does not establish a precedent as to the application of vesting under a zoning or land-use planning program administered by a local government or to any other environmental program."

Session Laws 2001-416, s. 4(c), provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.3(a), this section [s. 4 of Session Laws 2001-416] shall not be construed to authorize the adoption of additional temporary rules related to protection of water quality and riparian buffers."

Medicaid - Other Mental Health Services. - Session Laws 2003-284, s. 10.19(a)(22), as amended by Session Laws 2004-124, s. 10.4, contains provisions regarding the following services and payment bases: 1) services as defined by the Division of Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services and approved by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS); and 2) for children eligible for certain EPSDT services; and 3) certain services for Medicaid-eligible adults. The subdivision further provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1(a), the Department of Health and Human Services may adopt temporary rules in accordance with Chapter 150B of the General Statutes further defining the qualifications of providers and referral procedures in order to implement this subdivision. Coverage policy for services defined by the Division of Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services under sub-subdivisions a. and b.2 of this subdivision shall be established by the Division of Medical Assistance."

Reorganization of Human Resources Development Program. - Session Laws 2001-424, ss. 30.3(a) to (e), provide:

"(a) The State Board of Community Colleges shall establish a committee to develop and recommend to the Board a core series of employability skills training classes that should be coded in the Continuing Education Master Course List as Human Resources Development.

"(b) The State Board of Community Colleges may waive tuition and fees for enrollment in classes coded in the Continuing Education Master Course List as Human Resources Development if the individual enrolling:

"(1) Is unemployed;

"(2) Has received notification of a pending layoff;

"(3) Is working and is eligible for the Federal Earned Income Tax Credit (FEITC); or

"(4) Is working and earning wages at or below two hundred percent (200%) of the federal poverty guidelines.

"Individuals for whom tuition and fees are waived must sign a form adopted by the State Board of Community Colleges verifying that they meet one of these criteria.

"(c) The State Board of Community Colleges shall study the feasibility of integrating the delivery of human resources development services into the frame work of the JobLink Career Centers. The Board shall report its recommendations to the Joint Legislative Education Oversight Committee by May 1, 2002.

"(d) The State Board of Community Colleges shall report to the Joint Legislative Education Oversight Committee on its reorganization of the Human Resources Development Program by January 1, 2003.

"(e) The State Board of Community Colleges may adopt temporary rules to implement reorganization of the Human Resources Development Program."

Buffer Requirement. - Session Laws 2001-494, s. 3, provides: "The Coastal Resources Commission may adopt a temporary rule to amend 15A NCAC 7H.0209 that incorporates the provision of Section 1 of this act [s. 1 of Session Laws 2001-494, relating to the 30 foot buffer requirement along public trust and estuarine waters]. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1(d), a temporary rule adopted in accordance with this section [s. 1 of Session Laws 2001-494] shall remain in effect until the permanent rule that incorporates the temporary rule becomes effective. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1(a)(2), this act [Session Laws 2001-494] shall not be construed to authorize the adoption of temporary rules except as specifically provided in this section [s. 1 of Session Laws 2001-494]."

Motor Vehicle Emissions. - Session Laws 2001-504, s. 19, provides: "This act constitutes a recent act of the General Assembly within the meaning of G.S. 150B-21.1. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1(a) (2) and 26 NCAC 2C.0102(11), the Environmental Management Commission and the Division of Motor Vehicles of the Department of Transportation may adopt temporary rules to implement the provisions of this act. This section [s. 19 of Session Laws 2001-504] shall continue in effect until all rules necessary to implement the provisions of this act have become effective as either temporary rules or permanent rules. "

Medicaid Services and Payment Bases. - Session Laws 2011-145, s. 10.31(d), as amended by Session Laws 2012-72, s. 8, provides: "Services and Payment Bases. - The Department shall spend funds appropriated for Medicaid services in accordance with the following schedule of services and payment bases. Unless otherwise provided, services and payment bases will be as prescribed in the State Plan as established by the Department of Health and Human Services and may be changed with the approval of the Director of the Budget.

"The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) shall operate and manage the Medicaid program within the annual State appropriation. DHHS shall establish policies, practices, rates, and expenditure procedures that are in compliance with CMS regulations and approved State Plans, State laws, and regulations.

"Additionally, the Department shall be required to use the Physician's Advisory Group for review and will collaborate with other stakeholder groups in the adoption and implementation of all clinical and payment policies, including all public notice and posting provisions in use as of the effective date of this provision.

"(1) Mandatory Services. - In order to manage the Medicaid program within the annual State appropriation, the Secretary shall have the authority to submit State Plan amendments and establish temporary rules affecting the amount of service and payment rate for the following mandatory services:

"a. Hospital inpatient. - Payment for hospital inpatient services will be prescribed by the State Plan as established by the Department of Health and Human Services.

"b. Hospital outpatient. - Eighty percent (80%) of allowable costs or a prospective reimbursement plan as established by the Department of Health and Human Services.

"c. Nursing facilities. - Nursing facilities providing services to Medicaid recipients who also qualify for Medicare must be enrolled in the Medicare program as a condition of participation in the Medicaid program. State facilities are not subject to the requirement to enroll in the Medicare program. Residents of nursing facilities who are eligible for Medicare coverage of nursing facility services must be placed in a Medicare-certified bed. Medicaid shall cover facility services only after the appropriate services have been billed to Medicare.

"d. Physicians, certified nurse midwife services, nurse practitioners, physician assistants. - Fee schedules as developed by the Department of Health and Human Services.

"e. EPSDT screens. - Payments in accordance with rate schedule developed by the Department of Health and Human Services.

"f. Home health and related services, durable medical equipment. - Payments according to reimbursement plans developed by the Department of Health and Human Services.

"g. Rural health clinical services. - Provider-based, reasonable cost, nonprovider-based, single-cost reimbursement rate per clinic visit.

"h. Family planning. - Negotiated rate for local health departments. For other providers see specific services, e.g., hospitals, physicians.

"i. Independent laboratory and X-ray services. - Uniform fee schedules as developed by the Department of Health and Human Services.

"j. Medicare Buy-In. - Social Security Administration premium.

"k. Ambulance services. - Uniform fee schedules as developed by the Department of Health and Human Services. Public ambulance providers will be reimbursed at cost.

"l. Medicare crossover claims. - The Department shall apply Medicaid medical policy to Medicare claims for dually eligible recipients. The Department shall pay an amount up to the actual coinsurance or deductible or both, in accordance with the State Plan, as approved by the Department of Health and Human Services. The Department may disregard application of this policy in cases where application of the policy would adversely affect patient care.

"m. Pregnancy-related services. - Covered services for pregnant women shall include nutritional counseling, psychosocial counseling, and predelivery and postpartum home visits as described in clinical policy.

"n. Mental health services. - Coverage is limited to children eligible for EPSDT services provided by:

"1. Licensed or certified psychologists, licensed clinical social workers, licensed clinical social workers associates, certified clinical nurse specialists in psychiatric mental health advanced practice, nurse practitioners certified as clinical nurse specialists in psychiatric mental health advanced practice, licensed psychological associates, licensed professional counselors, licensed professional counselor associates, licensed marriage and family therapists, licensed marriage and family therapist associates, licensed clinical addictions specialists, licensed clinical addiction specialists associate, and certified clinical supervisors, when Medicaid-eligible children are referred by the Community Care of North Carolina primary care physician, a Medicaid-enrolled psychiatrist, or the area mental health program or local management entity, and

"2. Institutional providers of residential services as defined by the Division of Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services and approved by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for children and Psychiatric Residential Treatment Facility services that meet federal and State requirements as defined by the Department.

"(2) Optional Services. - In order to manage the Medicaid program within the annual State appropriation, the Secretary shall have the authority to submit State Plan amendments and establish temporary rules affecting the amount of service, payment rate, or elimination of the following optional services:

"a. Certified registered nurse anesthetists.

"b. Community Alternative Programs.

"c. Hearing aids. - Wholesale cost plus dispensing fee to provider.

"d. Ambulatory surgical centers.

"e. Private duty nursing, clinic services, prepaid health plans.

"f. Intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded.

"g. Chiropractors, podiatrists, optometrists, dentists.

"h. Dental coverage. - Dental services shall be provided on a restricted basis in accordance with criteria adopted by the Department to implement this subsection.

"i. Optical supplies. - Payment for materials is made to a contractor in accordance with 42 C.F.R. § 431.54(d). Fees paid to dispensing providers are negotiated fees established by the State agency based on industry charges.

"j. Physical therapy, occupational therapy, and speech therapy. - Services for adults. Payments are to be made only to qualified providers at rates negotiated by the Department of Health and Human Services.

"k. Personal care services. - Payment in accordance with the State Plan developed by the Department of Health and Human Services.

"l. Case management services. - Reimbursement in accordance with the availability of funds to be transferred within the Department of Health and Human Services.

"m. Hospice and palliative care.

"n. Medically necessary prosthetics or orthotics. - In order to be eligible for reimbursement, providers must be licensed or certified by the occupational licensing board or the certification authority having authority over the provider's license or certification. Medically necessary prosthetics and orthotics are subject to prior approval and utilization review.

"o. Health insurance premiums.

"p. Medical care/other remedial care. - Services not covered elsewhere in this section include related services in schools; health professional services provided outside the clinic setting to meet maternal and infant health goals.

"q. Bariatric surgeries. - Covered as described in clinical policy 1A-15, Surgery for Clinically Severe Obesity. In order to raise the standard of bariatric care in North Carolina, approval for these procedures shall be granted only to those providers (facilities and surgeons) who are designated as a Bariatric Surgery Center of Excellence (BSCOE) by the American Society for Metabolic and Bariatric Surgery (ASMBS). Providers must then submit to NC Medicaid documentation of their designation as a BSCOE, as well as verify their continued annual participation.

"r. Drugs. -

"1. Reimbursements. - Reimbursements shall be available for prescription drugs as allowed by federal regulations plus a professional services fee per month, excluding refills for the same drug or generic equivalent during the same month. Payments for drugs are subject to the provisions of this subdivision or in accordance with the State Plan adopted by the Department of Health and Human Services, consistent with federal reimbursement regulations. Payment of the professional services fee shall be made in accordance with the State Plan adopted by the Department of Health and Human Services, consistent with federal reimbursement regulations. The professional services fee shall be established by the Department. In addition to the professional services fee, the Department may pay an enhanced fee for pharmacy services.

"2. Limitations on quantity. - The Department of Health and Human Services may establish authorizations, limitations, and reviews for specific drugs, drug classes, brands, or quantities in order to manage effectively the Medicaid program. The Department may impose prior authorization requirements on brand-name drugs for which the phrase 'medically necessary' is written on the prescription.

"3. Dispensing of generic drugs. - Notwithstanding G.S. 90-85.27 through G.S. 90-85.31, or any other law to the contrary, under the Medical Assistance Program (Title XIX of the Social Security Act), and except as otherwise provided in this subsection for drugs listed in the narrow therapeutic index, a prescription order for a drug designated by a trade or brand name shall be considered to be an order for the drug by its established or generic name, except when the prescriber has determined, at the time the drug is prescribed, that the brand-name drug is medically necessary and has written on the prescription order the phrase 'medically necessary.' An initial prescription order for a drug listed in the narrow therapeutic drug index that does not contain the phrase 'medically necessary' shall be considered an order for the drug by its established or generic name, except that a pharmacy shall not substitute a generic or established name prescription drug for subsequent brand or trade name prescription orders of the same prescription drug without explicit oral or written approval of the prescriber given at the time the order is filled. Generic drugs shall be dispensed at a lower cost to the Medical Assistance Program rather than trade or brand-name drugs. Notwithstanding this subdivision to the contrary, the Secretary of Health and Human Services may prevent substitution of a generic equivalent drug, including a generic equivalent that is on the State maximum allowable cost list, when the net cost to the State of the brand-name drug, after consideration of all rebates, is less than the cost of the generic equivalent. As used in this subsection, 'brand name' means the proprietary name the manufacturer places upon a drug product or on its container, label, or wrapping at the time of packaging; and 'established name' has the same meaning as in section 502(e)(3) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 352(e)(3).

"4. Specialty drug provider network. - The Department of Health and Human Services shall work with specialty drug providers, manufacturers of specialty drugs, Medicaid recipients who are prescribed specialty drugs, and the medical professionals that treat Medicaid recipients who are prescribed specialty drugs to develop ways to ensure that best practices and the prevention of overutilization are maintained in the delivery and utilization of specialty drugs.

"5. Lock controlled substances prescriptions into single pharmacy/provider. - The Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Medical Assistance, shall lock Medicaid enrollees into a single pharmacy and provider when the Medicaid enrollee's utilization of selected controlled substance medications meets the lock-in criteria approved by the North Carolina Physicians Advisory Group, as follows:

"I. Enrollees may be prescribed selected controlled substance medications by only one prescribing physician and may not change the prescribing physician at any time without prior approval or authorization by the Division.

"II. Enrollees may have prescriptions for selected controlled substance medications filled at only one pharmacy and may not change to another pharmacy at any time without prior approval or authorization by the Division.

"5A. Prior authorization. - The Department of Health and Human Services shall not impose prior authorization requirements or other restrictions under the State Medical Assistance Program on medications prescribed for Medicaid recipients for the treatment of (i) mental illness, including, but not limited to, medications for schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder or (ii) HIV/AIDS. Medications prescribed for the treatment of mental illness shall be included on the Preferred Drug List (PDL). The Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Medical Assistance, may initiate prior authorization for the prescribing of drugs specified for the treatment of mental illness by providers who fail to prescribe those drugs in accordance with indications and dosage levels approved by the federal Food and Drug Administration. The Department may require retrospective clinical justification for the use of multiple psychotropic drugs for a Medicaid patient. For individuals 18 years of age and under who are prescribed three or more psychotropic medications, the Department shall implement clinical edits that target inefficient, ineffective, or potentially harmful prescribing patterns. When such patterns are identified, the Medical Director for the Division of Medical Assistance and the Chief of Clinical Policy for the Division of Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services shall require a peer-to-peer consultation with the target prescribers. Alternatives discussed during the peer-to-peer consultations shall be based upon:

"a. Evidence-based criteria available regarding efficacy or safety of the covered treatments; and

"b. Policy approval by a majority vote of the North Carolina Physicians Advisory Group (NCPAG).

"The target prescriber has final decision-making authority to determine which prescription drug to prescribe or refill.

"6. Preferred Drug List. - The Department of Health and Human Services shall establish and implement a preferred drug list program under the Division of Medical Assistance. Medications prescribed for the treatment of mental illness shall be included on the Preferred Drug List (PDL).

"The pharmaceutical and therapeutics committee of the Physician's Advisory Group (PAG) shall provide ongoing review of the preferred drug list, including the implementation of prior authorization on identified drugs. Members of the committee shall submit conflict of interest disclosure statements to the Department and shall have an ongoing duty to disclose conflicts of interest not included in the original disclosure.

"The Department, in consultation with the PAG, shall adopt and publish policies and procedures relating to the preferred drug list, including the following:

"I. Guidelines for the presentation and review of drugs for inclusion on the preferred drug list.

"II. The manner and frequency of audits of the preferred drug list for appropriateness of patient care and cost-effectiveness.

"III. An appeals process for the resolution of disputes.

"IV. Such other policies and procedures as the Department deems necessary and appropriate.

"The Department and the pharmaceutical and therapeutics committee shall consider all therapeutic classes of prescription drugs for inclusion on the preferred drug list, except medications for treatment of human immunodeficiency virus or acquired immune deficiency syndrome shall not be subject to consideration for inclusion on the preferred drug list.

"The Department shall maintain an updated preferred drug list in electronic format and shall make the list available to the public on the Department's Internet Web site.

"The Department shall (i) enter into a multistate purchasing pool; (ii) negotiate directly with manufacturers or labelers; (iii) contract with a pharmacy benefit manager for negotiated discounts or rebates for all prescription drugs under the medical assistance program; or (iv) effectuate any combination of these options in order to achieve the lowest available price for such drugs under such program.

"The Department may negotiate supplemental rebates from manufacturers that are in addition to those required by Title XIX of the Social Security Act. The committee shall consider a product for inclusion on the preferred drug list if the manufacturer provides a supplemental rebate. The Department may procure a sole source contract with an outside entity or contractor to conduct negotiations for supplemental rebates.

"The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services shall establish a Preferred Drug List (PDL) Policy Review Panel within 60 days after the effective date of this section. The purpose of the PDL Policy Review Panel is to review the Medicaid PDL recommendations from the Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Medical Assistance, and the Physician Advisory Group Pharmacy and Therapeutics (PAG P&T) Committee.

"The Secretary shall appoint the following individuals to the review panel: (i) the Director of Pharmacy for the Division of Medical Assistance, (ii) a representative from the PAG P&T Committee, (iii) a representative from the Old North State Medical Society, (iv) a representative from the North Carolina Association of Pharmacists, (v) a representative from Community Care of North Carolina, (vi) a representative from the North Carolina Psychiatric Association, (vii) a representative from the North Carolina Pediatric Society, (viii) a representative from the North Carolina Academy of Family Physicians, (ix) a representative from the North Carolina Chapter of the American College of Physicians, (x) a representative from a research-based pharmaceutical company, (xi) a representative from a hospital-based pharmacy.

"Individuals appointed to the Review Panel, except for the Division's Director of Pharmacy, shall serve only a two-year term.

"After the Department, in consultation with the PAG P&T Committee, publishes a proposed policy or procedure related to the Medicaid PDL, the Review Panel shall hold an open meeting to review the recommended policy or procedure along with any written public comments received as a result of the posting. The Review Panel shall provide an opportunity for public comment at the meeting. After the conclusion of the meeting, the Review Panel shall submit policy recommendations about the proposed Medicaid PDL policy or procedure to the Secretary.

"The Department may establish a Preferred Drug List for the North Carolina Health Choice for Children program and pursue negotiated discounts or rebates for all prescription drugs under the program in order to achieve the lowest available price for such drugs under such program. The Department may procure a sole source contract with an outside entity or contractor to conduct negotiations for these discounts or rebates. The PAG P&T Committee and Preferred Drug List Policy Review Panel will provide recommendations on policies and procedures for the NC Health Choice Preferred Drug List.

"s. Incentive Payments as outlined in the State Medicaid Health Information Plan for Electronic Health Records.

"t. Other mental health services. - Unless otherwise covered by this section, coverage is limited to the following:

"1. Services as established by the Division of Medical Assistance in consultation with the Division of Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services and approved by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) when provided in agencies meeting the requirements and reimbursement is made in accordance with a State Plan developed by the Department of Health and Human Services, not to exceed the upper limits established in federal regulations.

"2. For Medicaid-eligible adults, services provided by licensed or certified psychologists, licensed clinical social workers, certified clinical nurse specialists in psychiatric mental health advanced practice, nurse practitioners certified as clinical nurse specialists in psychiatric mental health advanced practice, licensed psychological associates, licensed professional counselors, licensed marriage and family therapists, certified clinical addictions specialists, and licensed clinical supervisors may be self-referred.

"3. Payments made for services rendered in accordance with this subdivision shall be qualified providers in accordance with approved policies and the State Plan. Nothing in sub-sub-subdivisions 1. or 2. of this sub-subdivision shall be interpreted to modify the scope of practice of any service provider, practitioner, or licensee, nor to modify or attenuate any collaboration or supervision requirement related to the professional activities of any service provider, practitioner, or licensee. Nothing in sub-sub-subdivisions 1. or 2. of this sub-subdivision shall be interpreted to require any private health insurer or health plan to make direct third-party reimbursements or payments to any service provider, practitioner, or licensee.

"Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1(a), the Department of Health and Human Services may adopt temporary rules in accordance with Chapter 150B of the General Statutes further defining the qualifications of providers and referral procedures in order to implement this subdivision. Coverage policy for services established by the Division of Medical Assistance in consultation with the Division of Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services under sub-subdivision a. and sub-sub-subdivision b.2. of this subdivision shall be established by the Division of Medical Assistance.

"u. Experimental/investigational medical procedures. - Coverage is limited to services, supplies, drugs, or devices recognized as standard medical care for the condition, disease, illness, or injury being treated as determined by nationally recognized scientific professional organizations or scientifically based federal organizations such as the Food and Drug Administration, the National Institutes of Health, the Centers for Disease Control, or the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality.

"v. Clinical trials. - The Division of Medical Assistance shall develop clinical policy for the coverage of routine costs in clinical trial services for life-threatening conditions using resources such as coverage criteria from Medicare, NC State Health Plan, and the input of the Physicians Advisory Group.

"w. Organ transplants.

"(3) Never Events and Hospital Acquired Conditions (HACs) shall not be reimbursed. Medicaid will adhere to Medicare requirements for definition of events and conditions."

For prior similar provisions, see Session Laws 2007-323, s. 10.36(d), as amended by Session Laws 2007-345, ss. 1-3, and as amended by Session Laws 2008-107, s. 10.10(b), and Session Laws 2009-451, s. 10.58(d).

Medicaid - Rules, Reports, and Other Matters. - Session Laws 2011-145, s. 10.31(g), provides: "Rules, Reports, and Other Matters. -

"Rules. - The Department of Health and Human Services may adopt temporary or emergency rules according to the procedures established in G.S. 150B-21.1 and G.S. 150B-21.1A when it finds that these rules are necessary to maximize receipt of federal funds within existing State appropriations, to reduce Medicaid expenditures, and to reduce fraud and abuse. The Department of Health and Human Services shall adopt rules requiring providers to attend training as a condition of enrollment and may adopt temporary or emergency rules to implement the training requirement.

"Prior to the filing of the temporary or emergency rules authorized under this subsection with the Rules Review Commission and the Office of Administrative Hearings, the Department shall consult with the Office of State Budget and Management on the possible fiscal impact of the temporary or emergency rule and its effect on State appropriations and local governments."

For prior similar provisions, see Session Laws 2007-323, s. 10.36(g), and Session Laws 2009-451, s. 10.58(g).

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2000-69, s. 4, in part, provides:

"Interpretation of Act.

"(a) Additional Method. This act provides an additional and alternative method for the doing of the things it authorizes and is as supplemental and additional to powers conferred by other laws. Except as otherwise expressly provided, it does not derogate any powers now existing.

"(b) Statutory References. References in this act to specific sections or Chapters of the General Statutes are intended to be references to those sections or Chapters as they may be amended from time to time by the General Assembly.

"(c) Liberal Construction. This act, being necessary for the health and welfare of the people of the State, shall be liberally construed to effect its purposes."

This section, as rewritten by Session Laws 2003-229, s. 2, effective July 1, 2003, is applicable to temporary and emergency rules adopted on or after that date and to permanent rules adopted on or after October 1, 2003.

Session Laws 2003-229, s. 14, provides that nothing in the act shall be construed to limit or repeal any specific grant of temporary rule-making authority to an agency enacted by the General Assembly prior to July 1, 2003.

Session Laws 2003-284, s. 1.2, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2003'."

Session Laws 2003-284, s. 10.19(s), provides: "The Department of Health and Human Services may adopt temporary or emergency rules according to the procedures established in G.S. 150B-21.1 and G.S. 150B-21.1A when it finds that these rules are necessary to maximize receipt of federal funds within existing State appropriations, to reduce Medicaid expenditures, and to reduce fraud and abuse. Prior to the filing of these temporary or emergency rules with the Rules Review Commission and the Office of Administrative Hearings, the Department shall consult with the Office of State Budget and Management on the possible fiscal impact of the temporary or emergency rule and its effect on State appropriations and local governments."

Session Laws 2003-284, s. 35.1(c), provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources may adopt temporary rules to establish fees under G.S. 113-35(b)(3), as amended by subsection (b) of this section, within six months after the effective date of this section." Session Laws 2003-284, s. 35.1 became effective on July 1, 2003.

Session Laws 2003-284, s. 48.1, provides: "Parts 32 through 47 of this act do not affect the rights or liabilities of the State, a taxpayer, or another person arising under a statute amended or repealed by those parts before the effective date of its amendment or repeal; nor do they affect the right to any refund or credit of a tax that accrued under the amended or repealed statute before the effective date of its amendment or repeal."

Session Laws 2003-284, s. 49.3, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2003-2005 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2003-2005 fiscal biennium."

Session Laws 2003-284, s. 49.5, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2003-352, s. 11, provides: "In order to reduce costs associated with the assessment and cleanup of discharges and releases of petroleum from petroleum underground storage tanks, the Environmental Management Commission may adopt temporary and permanent rules to modify the testing requirements set out in 15A NCAC 2L.0115 (Risk-Based Assessment and Corrective Action for Petroleum Underground Storage Tanks). Reference to this section shall satisfy the requirement for a statement of finding of need for a temporary rule."

Session Laws 2003-413, s. 29, provides in part that, if House Bill 1151, 2003 Regular Session, becomes law, then the amendment to G.S. 150B-21.1(a2) made by s. 27 of the act is instead made to G.S. 150B-21.1(a)(8). House Bill 1151 is Session Laws 2003-229, which was approved on June 19, 2003.

Session Laws 2003-427, ss. 1 and 2 provide: "Pursuant to G.S. 113A-118.1, the Coastal Resources Commission may adopt temporary and permanent rules to establish a general permit to allow the construction of offshore parallel sills made of stone or other suitable riprap materials for shoreline protection in conjunction with existing, created, or restored wetlands. The permit shall be applicable only where a shoreline is experiencing erosion in public trust areas and estuarine waters. The permit shall not apply to oceanfront shorelines or to waters and shorelines adjacent to the ocean hazard areas of environmental concern except that the permit may apply to those shorelines that exhibit characteristics of estuarine shorelines. Characteristics of estuarine shorelines include the presence of wetland vegetation, lower wave energy, and lower erosion rates than are generally characteristic of ocean erodible areas. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1(a), the authorization to adopt temporary rules pursuant to this section shall continue in effect until 1 July 2004. Reference to this section shall satisfy the requirement for a statement of finding of need for a temporary rule set out in G.S. 150B-21.1.

"The fee for a general permit established by temporary rules pursuant to Section 1 of this act shall be one hundred dollars ($100.00). In adopting permanent rules pursuant to Section 1 of this act, the Coastal Resources Commission shall set a fee for the general permit as provided in G.S. 113A-119.1."

Session Laws 2003-433, s. 4, provides: "The Environmental Management Commission shall adopt temporary and permanent rules to amend the North Carolina Administrative Code to incorporate the provisions of Section 1 of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1, this act shall not be construed to authorize the Environmental Management Commission to adopt a temporary rule related to the subject matter of this act except as specifically provided by this section, and the Environmental Management Commission shall not be required to provide prior notice or a hearing to adopt the temporary rule required by this section. Reference to this section shall satisfy the requirement for a statement of finding of need for a temporary rule set out in G.S. 150B-21.1."

Session Laws 2003-184, s. 3, amended this section by enacting a new subsection (a)(11); however, because of the rewrite of this section by Session Laws 2003-229, s. 2, the subsection was redesignated as (a1) at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes. As a result, the last paragraph of subsection (a) and former subsection (a1), as enacted by Session Laws 2003-229, s. 2, were redesignated as subsections (a2) and (a3), respectively, also at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.

Session Laws 2004-148, s. 3(a), which expires June 30, 2005, provides: "The Secretary of Transportation may adopt temporary rules in accordance with G.S. 150B-21.1 to implement the provisions of G.S. 136-28.1(k) governing the acceptance of bids by electronic means. The authority granted to the Secretary by this section shall expire when the permanent rules necessary to implement this provision are adopted."

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 1.2, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2005'."

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 46.3, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2005-2007 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2005-2007 fiscal biennium."

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 46.5 is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2006-66, s. 1.2, provides: "This act shall be known as 'The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2006'."

Session Laws 2006-66, s. 10.3(e), as amended by Session Laws 2006-198, s. 1, provides: "Services and Payment Bases. - Funds appropriated for Medicaid services shall be expended in accordance with the following schedule of services and payment bases. All services and payments are subject to the language at the end of this subsection. Unless otherwise provided, services and payment bases will be as prescribed in the State Plan as established by the Department of Health and Human Services and may be changed with the approval of the Director of the Budget.

"(1) Hospital inpatient.

"(2) Hospital outpatient. - Eighty percent (80%) of allowable costs or a prospective reimbursement plan as established by the Department of Health and Human Services.

"(3) Nursing facilities. - Nursing facilities providing services to Medicaid recipients who also qualify for Medicare must be enrolled in the Medicare program as a condition of participation in the Medicaid program. State facilities are not subject to the requirement to enroll in the Medicare program. Residents of nursing facilities who are eligible for Medicare coverage of nursing facility services must be placed in a Medicare-certified bed. Medicaid shall cover facility services only after the appropriate services have been billed to Medicare. The Division of Medical Assistance shall allow nursing facility providers sufficient time from the effective date of this act to certify additional Medicare beds if necessary. In determining the date that the requirements of this subdivision become effective, the Division of Medical Assistance shall consider the regulations governing certification of Medicare beds and the length of time required for this process to be completed.

"(4) Physicians, certified nurse midwife services, nurse practitioners. - Fee schedules as development by the Department of Health and Human Services.

"(5) Community Alternative Program, EPSDT Screens. - Payments in accordance with rate schedule developed by the Department of Health and Human Services.

"(6) Home health and related services, durable medical equipment. - Payments according to reimbursement plans developed by the Department of Health and Human Services.

"(7) Hearing aids. - Wholesale cost plus dispensing fee to provider.

"(8) Rural health clinical services. - Provider-based, reasonable cost; non-provider-based, single cost reimbursement rate per clinic visit.

"(9) Family planning. - Negotiated rate for local health departments. For other providers see specific services, e.g. hospitals, physicians.

"(10) Independent laboratory and X-ray services. - Uniform fee schedules as developed by the Department of Health and Human Services.

"(11) Ambulatory surgical centers.

"(12) Private duty nursing, clinic services, prepaid health plans.

"(13) Intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded.

"(14) Chiropractors, podiatrists, optometrists, dentists.

"(15) Limitations on Dental Coverage. - Dental services shall be provided on a restricted basis in accordance with criteria adopted by the Department to implement this subsection.

"(16) Medicare Buy-In. - Social Security Administration premium.

"(17) Ambulance services. - Uniform fee schedules as developed by the Department of Health and Human Services. Public ambulance providers will be reimbursed at cost.

"(18) Optical supplies. - Payment for materials is made to a contractor in accordance with 42 C.F.R. § 431.54(d). Fees paid to dispensing providers are negotiated fees established by the State agency based on industry charges.

"(19) Medicare crossover claims. - The Department shall apply Medicaid medical policy to Medicare claims for dually eligible recipients. The Department shall pay an amount up to the actual coinsurance or deductible or both, in accordance with the State Plan, as approved by the Department of Health and Human Services.

"(20) Physical therapy, occupational therapy, and speech therapy. - Services limited to EPSDT-eligible children. Payments are to be made only to qualified providers at rates negotiated by the Department of Health and Human Services. Physical therapy, occupational therapy, and speech therapy services are subject to prior approval and utilization review.

"(21) Personal care services.

"(22) Case management services. - Reimbursement in accordance with the availability of funds to be transferred within the Department of Health and Human Services.

"(23) Hospice.

"(24) Medically necessary prosthetics or orthotics. - In order to be eligible for reimbursement, providers must be licensed or certified by the occupational licensing board or the certification authority having authority over the provider's license or certification, or in the case of ocular prosthetists Board certified, licensed, or accredited in accordance with the requirements established by the Department. Medically necessary prosthetics and orthotics are subject to prior approval and utilization review.

"(25) Health insurance premiums.

"(26) Medical care/other remedial care. - Services not covered elsewhere in this section include related services in schools; health professional services provided outside the clinic setting to meet maternal and infant health goals; and services to meet federal EPSDT mandates.

"(27) Pregnancy-related services. - Covered services for pregnant women shall include nutritional counseling, psychosocial counseling, and predelivery and postpartum home visits by maternity care coordinators and public health nurses.

"(28) Drugs. - Reimbursements. Reimbursements shall be available for prescription drugs as allowed by federal regulations plus a professional services fee per month, excluding refills for the same drug or generic equivalent during the same month. Payments for drugs are subject to the provisions of this subdivision or in accordance with the State Plan adopted by the Department of Health and Human Services, consistent with federal reimbursement regulations. Payment of the professional services fee shall be made in accordance with the State Plan adopted by the Department of Health and Human Services, consistent with federal reimbursement regulations. The professional services fee shall be five dollars and sixty cents ($5.60) per prescription for generic drugs and four dollars ($4.00) per prescription for brand-name drugs. Adjustments to the professional services fee shall be established by the General Assembly. In addition to the professional services fee, the Department may pay an enhanced fee for pharmacy services.

"Limitations on quantity. - The Department of Health and Human Services may establish authorizations, limitations, and reviews for specific drugs, drug classes, brands, or quantities in order to manage effectively the Medicaid pharmacy program, except that the Department shall not impose limitations on brand-name medications for which there is a generic equivalent in cases where the prescriber has determined, at the time the drug is prescribed, that the brand-name drug is medically necessary and has written on the prescription order the phrase 'medically necessary'. In addition to the entities listed in subsection (a) of this section, the Department shall report to the Joint Legislative Commission on Governmental Operations on authorizations, limitations, and reviews established under this subparagraph, including limitations on monthly brand-name and generic prescriptions as well as restrictions on the total number of medications. The Department shall submit the report not later than May 1, 2006.

"Dispensing of generic drugs. - Notwithstanding G.S. 90-85.27 through G.S. 90-85.31, or any other law to the contrary, under the Medical Assistance Program (Title XIX of the Social Security Act), and except as otherwise provided in this subsection for atypical antipsychotic drugs and drugs listed in the narrow therapeutic index, a prescription order for a drug designated by a trade or brand name shall be considered to be an order for the drug by its established or generic name, except when the prescriber has determined, at the time the drug is prescribed, that the brand-name drug is medically necessary and has written on the prescription order the phrase 'medically necessary'. An initial prescription order for an atypical antipsychotic drug or a drug listed in the narrow therapeutic drug index that does not contain the phrase 'medically necessary' shall be considered an order for the drug by its established or generic name, except that a pharmacy shall not substitute a generic or established name prescription drug for subsequent brand or trade name prescription orders of the same prescription drug without explicit oral or written approval of the prescriber given at the time the order is filled. Generic drugs shall be dispensed at a lower cost to the Medical Assistance Program rather than trade or brand-name drugs. As used in this subsection, 'brand name' means the proprietary name the manufacturer places upon a drug product or on its container, label, or wrapping at the time of packaging; and 'established name' has the same meaning as in section 502(e)(3) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 352(e)(3).

"Prior authorization. - The Department of Health and Human Services shall not impose prior authorization requirements or other restrictions under the State Medical Assistance Program on medications prescribed for Medicaid recipients for the treatment of: (i) mental illness, including, but not limited to, medications for schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depressive disorder, or (ii) HIV/AIDS.

"(29) Other mental health services. - Unless otherwise covered by this section, coverage is limited to:

"a. Services as defined by the Division of Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services and approved by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) when provided in agencies meeting the requirements of the rules established by the Commission for Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services and reimbursement is made in accordance with a State Plan developed by the Department of Health and Human Services not to exceed the upper limits established in federal regulations, and

"b. For children eligible for EPSDT services provided by:

"1. Licensed or certified psychologists, licensed clinical social workers, certified clinical nurse specialists in psychiatric mental health advanced practice, nurse practitioners certified as clinical nurse specialists in psychiatric mental health advanced practice, licensed psychological associates, licensed professional counselors, licensed marriage and family therapists, certified clinical addictions specialists, and certified clinical supervisors, when Medicaid-eligible children are referred by the Community Care of North Carolina primary care physician, a Medicaid-enrolled psychiatrist, or the area mental health program or local management entity, and

"2. Institutional providers of residential services as defined by the Division of Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services and approved by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for children and Psychiatric Residential Treatment Facility services that meet federal and State requirements as defined by the Department.

"c. For Medicaid-eligible adults, services provided by licensed or certified psychologists, licensed clinical social workers, certified clinical nurse specialists in psychiatric mental health advanced practice, and nurse practitioners certified as clinical nurse specialists in psychiatric mental health advanced practice, licensed psychological associates, licensed professional counselors, licensed marriage and family therapists, licensed clinical addictions specialists, and licensed clinical supervisors, Medicaid-eligible adults may be self-referred.

"d. Payments made for services rendered in accordance with this subdivision shall be to qualified providers in accordance with approved policies and the State Plan. Nothing in sub-subdivision b. or c. of this subdivision shall be interpreted to modify the scope of practice of any service provider, practitioner, or licensee, nor to modify or attenuate any collaboration or supervision requirement related to the professional activities of any service provider, practitioner, or licensee. Nothing in sub-subdivision b. or c. of this subdivision shall be interpreted to require any private health insurer or health plan to make direct third-party reimbursements or payments to any service provider, practitioner, or licensee.

"e. The Department of Health and Human Services shall not enroll licensed psychological associates, licensed professional counselors, licensed marriage and family therapists, licensed clinical addiction specialists, and licensed clinical supervisors until all of the following conditions have been met:

"1. The fiscal impact of payments to these qualified providers has been projected;

"2. Funding for any projected requirements in excess of budgeted Division of Medical Assistance funding has been identified from within State funds appropriated to the Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services to support area mental health programs or county programs, or identified from other sources; and

"3. Approval has been obtained from the Office of State Budget and Management to transfer these State or other source funds from the Division of Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services to the Division of Medical Assistance. Upon approval and implementation, the Department of Health and Human Services shall, on a quarterly basis, provide a status report to the Office of State Budget and Management and the Fiscal Research Division.

"Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1(a), the Department of Health and Human Services may adopt temporary rules in accordance with Chapter 150B of the General Statutes further defining the qualifications of providers and referral procedures in order to implement this subdivision. Coverage policy for services defined by the Division of Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services under sub-subdivisions a. and b.2 of this subdivision shall be established by the Division of Medical Assistance."

Session Laws 2006-66, s. 10.3(h), provides: "Rules, Reports, and Other Matters. -

"(1) Rules. - The Department of Health and Human Services may adopt temporary or emergency rules according to the procedures established in G.S. 150B-21.1 and G.S. 150B-21.1A when it finds that these rules are necessary to maximize receipt of federal funds within existing State appropriations, to reduce Medicaid expenditures, and to reduce fraud and abuse. Prior to the filing of these temporary or emergency rules with the Rules Review Commission and the Office of Administrative Hearings, the Department shall consult with the Office of State Budget and Management on the possible fiscal impact of the temporary or emergency rule and its effect on State appropriations and local governments.

"(2) Changes to Medicaid program; reports. - The Department shall report on any change it anticipates making in the Medicaid program that impacts the type or level of service, reimbursement methods, or waivers, any of which require a change in the State Plan or other approval by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The reports shall be provided at the same time they are submitted to CMS for approval. In addition to the entities listed in subsection (a)(4) of this section, the report shall be submitted to the Joint Legislative Health Care Oversight Committee."

Session Laws 2006-66, s. 28.3, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2006-2007 fiscal year, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2006-2007 fiscal year."

Session Laws 2006-66, s. 28.6 is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2006-240, s. 5, provides: "The Governor's Commission on Early Childhood Vision Care may adopt temporary rules in accordance with G.S. 150B-21.1 to implement this act."

Session Laws 2006-264, s. 52(b), provides: "This section constitutes a recent act of the General Assembly within the meaning of G.S. 150B-21.1(a). The Department of Labor shall adopt within 30 days of the effective date of this section temporary rules to clarify when employees who are subject to Article 20 of Chapter 95 of the General Statutes may utilize a preliminary screening procedure involving a single-use test device consistent with this section."

Session Laws 2006-264, s. 102(a) and (b), provides: "(a) The Department of Labor shall adopt rules in connection with its requirements regarding fall protection for tower climbers as follows:

"(1) With regard to employer-provided rescue procedures, employers must ensure that at least two trained and designated rescue employees are on-site when employees are working at heights over six feet on the tower, except that where only two employees are on-site, then an employer may comply with this requirement if one employee is a trained and designated rescue employee and one employee has been employed for less than nine months and has received documented orientation from the employer outlining steps to take in an emergency.

"(2) With regard to third-party-provided rescue procedures, the employer must obtain verification from the third-party rescue service that the service is able to respond to a rescue summons in a timely manner and that the service is proficient in rescue-related tasks and equipment needed to rescue climbers from elevated heights on communication structures. The employer must also provide the selected third-party rescue service with contact information regarding the tower site and allow the service to conduct whatever preparation for rescue it deems necessary.

"(b) Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1(a), the Department of Labor may adopt the rules provided for by this section as temporary rules within 270 days after the effective date of this act."

Session Laws 2009-217, s. 5, provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1, upon the effective date of this act, the Department of Labor shall immediately adopt a temporary rule that is consistent with the requirements of Section 6 of this act without prior notice or hearing. When the Department adopts the rule, it shall submit the rule and a copy of this act to the Codifier of Rules. Within two business days after submission of the rule, the Codifier must review the rule to determine whether the rule as adopted is consistent with the requirements of this act. If the Codifier of Rules finds that the rule as adopted is consistent with the requirements of this act, the Codifier shall notify the Department and enter the rule in the North Carolina Administrative Code on the sixth business day following approval by the Codifier of Rules. The rule shall become effective and shall expire in accordance with G.S. 150B-21.1(d)." The effective date of this act is June 30, 2009.

Session Laws 2009-217, s. 6, provides: "The Department of Labor shall adopt a temporary rule in accordance with the procedure set forth in Section 5 of this act. The temporary rule shall establish the scope of application for the Department's rules governing the standards for cranes and derricks in a manner substantially identical to the rule disapproved by this act, except that the temporary rule shall include an exclusion for service trucks with mobile lifting devices designed specifically for use in the power line and electric service industries such as digger derricks (radial boom derricks)."

Session Laws 2011-145, s. 6.3(b), provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1A(a), an agency may adopt an emergency rule in accordance with G.S. 150B-21.1A to establish or increase a fee as authorized by this act if the adoption of a rule would otherwise be required under Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes."

Session Laws 2011-145, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2011.'"

Session Laws 2011-145, s. 32.2, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2011-2013 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2011-2013 fiscal biennium."

Session Laws 2011-145, s. 32.5 is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 4, which amended subsection (a3), is applicable to rules adopted on or after October 1, 2011.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 62 is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2011-401, s. 1.10(c), as amended by Session Laws 2015-238, s. 2.7, provides: "The Department of Commerce, Division of Employment Security, shall adopt rules and regulations in accordance with Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes. Any existing rule that has not been readopted and filed with the Rules Review Commission by May 20, 2015, shall expire."

Session Laws 2013-294, s. 11, provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.2, the Industrial Commission shall adopt permanent rules in accordance with the provisions of this act using the procedure and time lines for temporary rules set forth in G.S. 150B-21.1(a3). Rules adopted by the Industrial Commission in accordance with this section shall be subject to review by the Rules Review Commission as provided by G.S. 150B-21.1(b); provided however, that if the rules are approved by the Rules Review Commission, they shall become effective as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b). Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall not be subject to G.S. 150B-19.1(h) or G.S. 150B-21.4. The Industrial Commission shall consult with the Office of Administrative Hearings to ensure that rules adopted in accordance with this section are submitted to the Rules Review Commission in time to be eligible for legislative disapproval in the 2014 Regular Session of the 2013 General Assembly. The rules of the Industrial Commission that were in effect on the effective date of S.L. 2011-287 shall remain in effect with regard to rules disapproved by Sections 1 and 2 of this act until rules adopted to replace the disapproved rules become effective pursuant to this section."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 61(b), provides: "Except as otherwise provided, this act is effective when it becomes law [August 23, 2013]." Session Laws 2013-413, s. 60(c), had provided that: "This act becomes effective July 1, 2015." Session Laws 2014-115, s. 17, amended Session Laws 2013-413, s. 60(c), to replace the reference to "This act" with the words "This Part."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 61(a), is a severability clause.

At the direction of the Revisor of Statutes, the reference in subdivision (a)(10) to "Article 14 of Chapter 143B" has been changed to "Article 15 of Chapter 143B" to conform to the renumbering of that Article.

Session Laws 2020-3, s. 5, is a severability clause.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2003-184, s. 3, effective June 12, 2003 and expiring July 1, 2005, added subsection (a1)[(a)(16)]. See Editor's note.

Session Laws 2004-156, s. 1, effective August 2, 2004, in subdivision (a)(6), substituted "a rule establishing review criteria as authorized by G.S. 131E-183(b) to complement" for "the rule to implement" and added the language beginning "and the proposed rule" at the end; redesignated subsection (a1) as subdivision (a)(16); rewrote subdivision (a)(16); inserted the subsection designation and the second sentence in the subsection designated as (a4); and inserted the subsection (b1), (b2), (b3) and (c1) designations.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 4, effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to rules adopted on or after that date, deleted "at least 30 business days prior to adopting a temporary rule" following "provided by law" in the introductory paragraph of subsection (a3); and added "At least 30 business days prior to adopting a temporary rule" in subdivisions (a3)(1) and (a3)(2).

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 7A.4(ee), effective September 18, 2015, in subdivision (a)(10), inserted "State" near the beginning and substituted "Article 14 of Chapter 143B" for "Article 3D of Chapter 147."

Session Laws 2015-264, s. 22, effective October 1, 2015, repealed subdivision (a)(12).

Session Laws 2020-3, s. 4.25(a), effective retroactively to March 10, 2020, added the second sentence in subdivision (a3)(4).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Article 2.

Rule Making Required. - Retirement Systems Division of the Department of State Treasurer (Division) erred in invoicing a school employee or school board for contributions to the employee's retirement fund pursuant to a statutory cap factor because (1) the factor was a rule not properly adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, and (2) the Division was a state agency not exempt from rule making requirements. Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Dep't of State Treasurer, 261 N.C. App. 325, 821 S.E.2d 196 (2018), aff'd, 374 N.C. 3, 839 S.E.2d 814, 2020 N.C. LEXIS 270 (2020).

Rules Not Exempt from Notice and Comment Requirements of Chapter 113A. - Temporary rule issued under this section failed to comply with Coastal Area Management Act's (CAMA's) (G.S. 113A-101 et seq.) notice and comment provisions; the mandatory provisions of this chapter complement the procedural safeguards in the CAMA; the temporary rule provisions of this section exempt agencies only from the notice and comment requirements of this chapter; clearly, the General Assembly did not intend that the Commission use temporary rules promulgated under this chapter to circumvent public review and comment on major projects that could affect the State's coastal resources. Conservation Council v. Haste, 102 N.C. App. 411, 402 S.E.2d 447 (1991).

Failure to Address Merits of Claim. - Where petitioners argued that the North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission (CRC) failed to comply with the procedures for adopting a temporary rule under this section, vice-chairman's order was arbitrary and capricious because it required petitioners to specifically allege that the CRC either acted arbitrarily and capriciously or abused its discretion; this finding did not address the merits of petitioners' claim and imposed on petitioners an additional burden that G.S. 113A-121.1(b) did not require. Conservation Council v. Haste, 102 N.C. App. 411, 402 S.E.2d 447 (1991).

Applied in North Carolina Chiropractic Ass'n v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 122 N.C. App. 122, 468 S.E.2d 539 (1996).

Cited in McCrann v. N.C. HHS, 209 N.C. App. 241, 704 S.E.2d 899, review denied 365 N.C. 198, 710 S.E.2d 23, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 436 (2011); State ex rel. McCrory v. Berger, 368 N.C. 633, 781 S.E.2d 248 (2016).

Opinions of Attorney General

Adoption of Rules. - The Water Quality Committee of the Environmental Management Commission could immediately adopt temporary rules under G.S. 150B-21(a)(5) to establish a permit program for regulating impacts to isolated wetlands and surface waters because a recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court invalidating the Army Corps of Engineers' exercise of jurisdiction over such isolated waters was a court order under N.C.G.S. G.S. 150B-21.1(a)(5). See opinion of Attorney General to Dr. Charles H. Peterson, Vice Chairman, Environmental Management Commission, and Ms. Coleen Sullins, Water Quality Section, Division of Water Quality, 2001 N.C. AG LEXIS 33 (9/5/01).

§ 150B-21.1A. Adoption of an emergency rule.

  1. Adoption. - An agency may adopt an emergency rule without prior notice or hearing or upon any abbreviated notice or hearing the agency finds practical when it finds that adherence to the notice and hearing requirements of this Part would be contrary to the public interest and that the immediate adoption of the rule is required by a serious and unforeseen threat to the public health or safety. When an agency adopts an emergency rule, it must simultaneously commence the process for adopting a temporary rule by submitting the rule to the Codifier of Rules for publication on the Internet in accordance with G.S. 150B-21.1(a3). The Department of Health and Human Services or the appropriate rule-making agency within the Department may adopt emergency rules in accordance with this section when a recent act of the General Assembly or the United States Congress or a recent change in federal regulations authorizes new or increased services or benefits for children and families and the emergency rule is necessary to implement the change in State or federal law.
  2. Review. - An agency must prepare a written statement of its findings of need for an emergency rule. The statement must be signed by the head of the agency adopting the rule. When an agency adopts an emergency rule, it must submit the rule and the agency's written statement of its findings of the need for the rule to the Codifier of Rules. Within two business days after an agency submits an emergency rule, the Codifier of Rules must review the agency's written statement of findings of need for the rule to determine whether the statement of need meets the criteria in subsection (a) of this section. In reviewing the statement, the Codifier of Rules may consider any information submitted by the agency or another person. If the Codifier of Rules finds that the statement meets the criteria, the Codifier of Rules must notify the head of the agency and enter the rule in the North Carolina Administrative Code on the sixth business day following approval by the Codifier of Rules.
  3. Standing. - A person aggrieved by an emergency rule adopted by an agency may file an action for declaratory judgment in Wake County Superior Court pursuant to Article 26 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes. In the action, the court shall determine whether the agency's written statement of findings of need for the rule meets the criteria listed in subsection (a) of this section and whether the rule meets the standards in G.S. 150B-21.9. The court shall not grant an ex parte temporary restraining order.
  4. Effective Date and Expiration. - An emergency rule becomes effective on the date specified in G.S. 150B-21.3. An emergency rule expires on the earliest of the following dates:
    1. The date specified in the rule.
    2. The effective date of the temporary rule adopted to replace the emergency rule, if the Commission approves the temporary rule.
    3. The date the Commission returns to an agency a temporary rule the agency adopted to replace the emergency rule.
    4. Sixty days from the date the emergency rule was published in the North Carolina Register, unless the temporary rule adopted to replace the emergency rule has been submitted to the Commission.
  5. Publication. - When the Codifier of Rules enters an emergency rule in the North Carolina Administrative Code, the Codifier of Rules must publish the rule in the North Carolina Register.

If the Codifier of Rules finds that the statement does not meet the criteria in subsection (a) of this section, the Codifier of Rules must immediately notify the head of the agency. The agency may supplement its statement of need with additional findings or submit a new statement. If the agency provides additional findings or submits a new statement, the Codifier of Rules must review the additional findings or new statement within one business day after the agency submits the additional findings or new statement. If the Codifier of Rules again finds that the statement does not meet the criteria in subsection (a) of this section, the Codifier of Rules must immediately notify the head of the agency.

If an agency decides not to provide additional findings or submit a new statement when notified by the Codifier of Rules that the agency's findings of need for a rule do not meet the required criteria, the agency must notify the Codifier of Rules of its decision. The Codifier of Rules must then enter the rule in the North Carolina Administrative Code on the sixth business day after receiving notice of the agency's decision. Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, if the agency has not complied with the provisions of G.S. 12-3.1, the Codifier of Rules shall not enter the rule into the Code.

Filing a petition for rule making or a request for a declaratory ruling with the agency that adopted the rule is not a prerequisite to filing an action under this subsection. A person who files an action for declaratory judgment under this subsection must serve a copy of the complaint on the agency that adopted the rule being contested, the Codifier of Rules, and the Commission.

History

(2003-229, s. 3.)

Medicaid - Rules, Reports, and Other Matters. - Session Laws 2011-145, s. 10.31(g), provides: "Rules, Reports, and Other Matters. -

"Rules. - The Department of Health and Human Services may adopt temporary or emergency rules according to the procedures established in G.S. 150B-21.1 and G.S. 150B-21.1A when it finds that these rules are necessary to maximize receipt of federal funds within existing State appropriations, to reduce Medicaid expenditures, and to reduce fraud and abuse. The Department of Health and Human Services shall adopt rules requiring providers to attend training as a condition of enrollment and may adopt temporary or emergency rules to implement the training requirement.

"Prior to the filing of the temporary or emergency rules authorized under this subsection with the Rules Review Commission and the Office of Administrative Hearings, the Department shall consult with the Office of State Budget and Management on the possible fiscal impact of the temporary or emergency rule and its effect on State appropriations and local governments."

For prior similar provisions, see Session Laws 2007-323, s. 10.36(g), and Session Laws 2009-451, s. 10.58(g).

Establishing or Increasing Fees. - Session Laws 2017-57, s. 6.2(b), provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1A(a), an agency may adopt an emergency rule in accordance with G.S. 150B-21.1A to establish or increase a fee as authorized by this act if the adoption of a rule would otherwise be required under Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes."

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2003-229, s. 14, provides that nothing in the act shall be construed to limit or repeal any specific grant of temporary rule-making authority to an agency enacted by the General Assembly prior to July 1, 2003.

Session Laws 2003-284, s. 10.19(s), provides: "The Department of Health and Human Services may adopt temporary or emergency rules according to the procedures established in G.S. 150B-21.1 and G.S. 150B-21.1A when it finds that these rules are necessary to maximize receipt of federal funds within existing State appropriations, to reduce Medicaid expenditures, and to reduce fraud and abuse. Prior to the filing of these temporary or emergency rules with the Rules Review Commission and the Office of Administrative Hearings, the Department shall consult with the Office of State Budget and Management on the possible fiscal impact of the temporary or emergency rule and its effect on State appropriations and local governments."

Session Laws 2003-284, s. 1.2, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2003.' "

Session Laws 2003-284, s. 49.3, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2003-2005 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2003-2005 fiscal biennium."

Session Laws 2003-284, s. 49.5, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2006-66, s. 1.2, provides: "This act shall be known as 'The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2006.' "

Session Laws 2006-66, s. 10.3(h), provides: "Rules, Reports, and Other Matters. -

"(1) Rules. - The Department of Health and Human Services may adopt temporary or emergency rules according to the procedures established in G.S. 150B-21.1 and G.S. 150B-21.1A when it finds that these rules are necessary to maximize receipt of federal funds within existing State appropriations, to reduce Medicaid expenditures, and to reduce fraud and abuse. Prior to the filing of these temporary or emergency rules with the Rules Review Commission and the Office of Administrative Hearings, the Department shall consult with the Office of State Budget and Management on the possible fiscal impact of the temporary or emergency rule and its effect on State appropriations and local governments.

"(2) Changes to Medicaid program; reports. - The Department shall report on any change it anticipates making in the Medicaid program that impacts the type or level of service, reimbursement methods, or waivers, any of which require a change in the State Plan or other approval by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The reports shall be provided at the same time they are submitted to CMS for approval. In addition to the entities listed in subsection (a)(4) of this section, the report shall be submitted to the Joint Legislative Health Care Oversight Committee."

Session Laws 2006-66, s. 28.3, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2006-2007 fiscal year, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2006-2007 fiscal year."

Session Laws 2006-66, s. 28.6, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2011-145, s. 32.2, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2011-2013 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2011-2013 fiscal biennium."

Session Laws 2011-145, s. 32.5, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2017.'"

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 39.4, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2017-2019 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2017-2019 fiscal biennium."

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 39.6, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 6.1(b), provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1A(a), an agency may adopt an emergency rule in accordance with G.S. 150B-21.1A to establish or increase a fee as authorized by this act if the adoption of a rule would otherwise be required under Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes." For similar provisions see Session Laws 2009-451, s. 6.4(b); Session Laws 2010-31, s. 6.5(b); Session Laws 2012-142, s. 6.10(b); Session Laws 2013-360, s. 6.2(b); Session Laws 2014-100, s. 6.2(b); Session Laws 2015-241, s. 6.2(b); and Session Laws 2016-94, s. 6.1(b).

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations Appropriations Act of 2018.'"

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 39.4, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2018-2019 fiscal year, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2018-2019 fiscal year."

Session Laws 2018-5, s. 39.7, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2019-231, s. 1.4(b), provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1A(a), the Department of Transportation may adopt an emergency rule in accordance with G.S. 150B-21.1A to establish or increase a fee as authorized by this act if the adoption of a rule would otherwise be required under Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes."

Session Laws 2019-231, s. 5.3, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2019-2021 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2019-2021 fiscal biennium."

Session Laws 2019-231, s. 5.5, is a severability clause.

§ 150B-21.1B:

History

(2009-475, s. 3; expired pursuant to 2009-475, s. 16, effective June 30, 2012.)

Editor's Note. - Former G.S. 150B-21.1B, which established an expedited procedure for adoption of rules to implement the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, expired June 30, 2012, pursuant to Session Laws 2009-475, s. 16.

§ 150B-21.2. Procedure for adopting a permanent rule.

  1. Steps. - Before an agency adopts a permanent rule, the agency must comply with the requirements of G.S. 150B-19.1, and it must take the following actions:
    1. Publish a notice of text in the North Carolina Register.
    2. When required by G.S. 150B-21.4, prepare or obtain a fiscal note for the proposed rule.
    3. Repealed by Session Laws 2003-229, s. 4, effective July 1, 2003.
    4. When required by subsection (e) of this section, hold a public hearing on the proposed rule after publication of the proposed text of the rule.
    5. Accept oral or written comments on the proposed rule as required by subsection (f) of this section.
  2. Repealed by Session Laws 2003-229, s. 4, effective July 1, 2003.
  3. Notice of Text. - A notice of the proposed text of a rule must include all of the following:
    1. The text of the proposed rule, unless the rule is a readoption without substantive changes to the existing rule proposed in accordance with G.S. 150B-21.3A.
    2. A short explanation of the reason for the proposed rule.
    3. A link to the agency's website containing the information required by G.S. 150B-19.1(c).
    4. A citation to the law that gives the agency the authority to adopt the rule.
    5. The proposed effective date of the rule.
    6. The date, time, and place of any public hearing scheduled on the rule.
    7. Instructions on how a person may demand a public hearing on a proposed rule if the notice does not schedule a public hearing on the proposed rule and subsection (e) of this section requires the agency to hold a public hearing on the proposed rule when requested to do so.
    8. The (i) period of time during which and (ii) person within the agency to whom written comments may be submitted on the proposed rule.
    9. If a fiscal note has been prepared for the rule, a statement that a copy of the fiscal note can be obtained from the agency.
    10. Repealed by Session Laws 2013-143, s. 1, effective June 19, 2013.
  4. Mailing List. - An agency must maintain a mailing list of persons that have requested notice of rulemaking. When an agency publishes in the North Carolina Register a notice of text of a proposed rule, it must mail a copy of the notice of text to each person on the mailing list that has requested notice on the subject matter described in the notice or the rule affected. An agency may charge an annual fee to each person on the agency's mailing list to cover copying and mailing costs.
  5. Hearing. - An agency must hold a public hearing on a rule it proposes to adopt if the agency publishes the text of the proposed rule in the North Carolina Register and the agency receives a written request for a public hearing on the proposed rule within 15 days after the notice of text is published. The agency must accept comments at the public hearing on both the proposed rule and any fiscal note that has been prepared in connection with the proposed rule.
  6. Comments. - An agency must accept comments on the text of a proposed rule that is published in the North Carolina Register and any fiscal note that has been prepared in connection with the proposed rule for at least 60 days after the text is published or until the date of any public hearing held on the proposed rule, whichever is longer. An agency must consider fully all written and oral comments received.
  7. Adoption. - An agency shall not adopt a rule until the time for commenting on the proposed text of the rule has elapsed and shall not adopt a rule if more than 12 months have elapsed since the end of the time for commenting on the proposed text of the rule. Prior to adoption, an agency must review any fiscal note that has been prepared for the proposed rule and consider any public comments received in connection with the proposed rule or the fiscal note. An agency shall not adopt a rule that differs substantially from the text of a proposed rule published in the North Carolina Register unless the agency publishes the text of the proposed different rule in the North Carolina Register and accepts comments on the proposed different rule for the time set in subsection (f) of this section.
    1. Affects the interests of persons that, based on the proposed text of the rule published in the North Carolina Register, could not reasonably have determined that the rule would affect their interests.
    2. Addresses a subject matter or an issue that is not addressed in the proposed text of the rule.
    3. Produces an effect that could not reasonably have been expected based on the proposed text of the rule.
  8. Explanation. - An agency must issue a concise written statement explaining why the agency adopted a rule if, within 15 days after the agency adopts the rule, a person asks the agency to do so. The explanation must state the principal reasons for and against adopting the rule and must discuss why the agency rejected any arguments made or considerations urged against the adoption of the rule. The agency must issue the explanation within 15 days after receipt of the request for an explanation.
  9. Record. - An agency must keep a record of a rulemaking proceeding. The record must include all written comments received, a transcript or recording of any public hearing held on the rule, any fiscal note that has been prepared for the rule, and any written explanation made by the agency for adopting the rule.

An agency may hold a public hearing on a proposed rule and fiscal note in other circumstances. When an agency is required to hold a public hearing on a proposed rule or decides to hold a public hearing on a proposed rule when it is not required to do so, the agency must publish in the North Carolina Register a notice of the date, time, and place of the public hearing. The hearing date of a public hearing held after the agency publishes notice of the hearing in the North Carolina Register must be at least 15 days after the date the notice is published. If notice of a public hearing has been published in the North Carolina Register and that public hearing has been cancelled, the agency must publish notice in the North Carolina Register at least 15 days prior to the date of any rescheduled hearing.

An adopted rule differs substantially from a proposed rule if it does one or more of the following:

When an agency adopts a rule, it shall not take subsequent action on the rule without following the procedures in this Part. An agency must submit an adopted rule to the Rules Review Commission within 30 days of the agency's adoption of the rule.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1975, 2nd Sess., c. 983, s. 63; 1977, c. 915, s. 2; 1983, c. 927, ss. 3, 7; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1022, s. 1(1), (7); 1987, c. 285, ss. 7-9; 1989, c. 5, s. 1; 1991, c. 418, s. 1; 1995, c. 507, s. 27.8(d); 1996, 2nd Ex. Sess., c. 18, s. 7.10(e); 2003-229, s. 4; 2011-398, s. 5; 2013-143, s. 1; 2013-413, s. 3(a); 2021-88, s. 17.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1986, Extra Session, c. 2, effective February 18, 1986, s. 1 provided: "Prior to the first publication of the North Carolina Register the notice of publication requirements of G.S. 150B-12(c) [now repealed] are met if an agency publishes in one or more newspapers of general circulation notice which includes:

"(1) A reference to the statutory authority under which the action is proposed.

"(2) The time and place of the public hearing and a statement of the manner in which data, views, and arguments may be submitted to the agency either at the hearing or at other times by any person.

"(3) A statement of the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved, and the proposed effective date of the rule."

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 5, which amended subsections (a), (c), (e), (f), (g), and (i) of this section, is applicable to rules adopted on or after October 1, 2011.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 63, as amended by Session Laws 2012-187, s. 8.1, provides in relevant part: "Sections 15 through 55 of this act become effective January 1, 2012, and apply to contested cases commenced on or after that date. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.2 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 of this act become effective when the United States Environmental Protection Agency approvals referenced in Section 55.2 have been issued or October 1, 2012, whichever occurs first. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.1 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 and Sections 32 and 33 of this act become effective when the waiver referenced in Section 55.1 has been granted or February 1, 2013, whichever occurs first. Unless otherwise provided elsewhere in this act, the remainder of this act is effective when it becomes law." For Section 55.2, see editor's note under G.S. 150B-34.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 62, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2013-294, s. 11, provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.2, the Industrial Commission shall adopt permanent rules in accordance with the provisions of this act using the procedure and time lines for temporary rules set forth in G.S. 150B-21.1(a3). Rules adopted by the Industrial Commission in accordance with this section shall be subject to review by the Rules Review Commission as provided by G.S. 150B-21.1(b); provided however, that if the rules are approved by the Rules Review Commission, they shall become effective as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b). Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall not be subject to G.S. 150B-19.1(h) or G.S. 150B-21.4. The Industrial Commission shall consult with the Office of Administrative Hearings to ensure that rules adopted in accordance with this section are submitted to the Rules Review Commission in time to be eligible for legislative disapproval in the 2014 Regular Session of the 2013 General Assembly. The rules of the Industrial Commission that were in effect on the effective date of S.L. 2011-287 shall remain in effect with regard to rules disapproved by Sections 1 and 2 of this act until rules adopted to replace the disapproved rules become effective pursuant to this section."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 21(a)-(d), as amended by Session Laws 2015-263, s. 16, provides: "(a) 15A NCAC 02T.1302 (Definitions) and 15A NCAC 02T.1307 (Swine Waste Management System Performance Standards). - Until the effective date of the revised permanent rules that the Environmental Management Commission is required to adopt pursuant to Section 21(c) of this act, the Commission and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall implement 15A NCAC 02T.1302 (Definitions) and 15A NCAC 02T.1307 (Swine Waste Management System Performance Standards) as provided in Section 21(b) of this act.

"(b) Implementation. - Notwithstanding 15A NCAC 02T.1302 (Definitions), ‘new animal waste management system' means animal waste management systems which are constructed and operated at a site where no feedlot existed previously or where a permit for a system has been rescinded, and is then reissued when the permittee confines animals in excess of the thresholds established in G.S. 143-215.10B. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of 15A NCAC 02T.1307 (Swine Waste Management System Performance Standards), the Swine Waste Management System Performance Standards shall:

"(1) Apply to any farm facility that receives a permit for its animal waste management system that allows a level of production at the farm, as measured by steady state live weight, greater than the largest production for which the farm has received a permit in the past, and so that they also apply to any other animal waste management system otherwise subject to regulation under G.S. 143-215.10I.

"(2) Not apply to any facility that meets all of the following conditions:

"a. Has had no animals on site for five continuous years or more.

"b. Notifies the Division of Water Resources in writing at least 60 days prior to bringing any animals back on to the site.

"c. The system depopulated after January 1, 2005, and the system ceased operation no longer than 10 years prior to the current date.

"d. At the time the system ceased operation, the system was in compliance with an individual permit or a general permit issued pursuant to G.S. 143-215.10C.

"e. The Division of Water Resources issues an individual permit or certificate of coverage under a general permit issued pursuant to G.S. 143-215.10C for operation of the system before any animals are brought on the facility.

"f. The permit for the animal waste management system does not allow production, measured by steady state live weight, to exceed the greatest steady state live weight previously permitted for the system under G.S. 143-215.10C.

"g. No component of the animal waste management system and swine farm, other than an existing swine house or land application site, shall be constructed on land that is located within the 100-year floodplain.

"h. The inactive animal waste management system was not closed using the expenditure of public funds and was not closed pursuant to a settlement agreement, court order, cost share agreement, or grant condition.

"(c) Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Environmental Management Commission shall adopt rules as promptly as practicable to amend 15A NCAC 02T.1302 (Definitions) and 15A NCAC 02T.1307 (Swine Waste Management System Performance Standards) consistent with Section 21(b) of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rules adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 21(b) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to Part 3 of Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2).

"(d) Sunset. - Section 21(b) of this act expires on the date that rules adopted pursuant to Section 21(c) of this act become effective."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 22(a)-(e), provides: "(a) The definitions set out in G.S. 143-212 and 15A NCAC 02U.0103 (Definitions) apply to this section.

"(b) 15A NCAC 02U.0701 (Setbacks). - Until the effective date of the revised permanent rule that the Commission is required to adopt pursuant to Section 22(d) of this act, the Commission and the Department shall implement 15A NCAC 02U.0701 (Setbacks) as provided in Section 22(c) of this act.

"(c) Implementation. - Notwithstanding 15A NCAC 02U.0701 (Setbacks), the rule shall be implemented as provided in this section.

"(1) Setbacks in subsection (c) of the rule for surface waters not classified as SA shall not apply provided that the reclaimed water to be utilized contains no more than 10 mg/l of Total Nitrogen and no more than 2 mg/l of Total Phosphorus. The elimination of setbacks to surface waters does not exempt any discharge of reclaimed water to waters of the State from meeting permit requirements established in 15A NCAC 02U.0101 (Purpose).

"(2) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of the rule, no setback shall be required between final reclaimed water effluent storage facilities and property lines provided that the proposed final effluent storage facility was constructed prior to June 18, 2011.

"(3) Setbacks between reclaimed water storage ponds and property lines or wells under separate ownership may be waived by the adjoining property owner. A copy of the signed waiver shall be provided to the Department.

"(4) Setbacks between reclaimed water storage ponds and wells under the same ownership as the reclaimed water storage pond may be waived by the property owner.

"(d) Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Environmental Management Commission shall adopt a rule to amend 15A NCAC 02U.0701 (Setbacks) consistent with Section 22(c) of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 22(c) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to Part 3 of Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2).

"(e) Sunset. - Section 22(c) of this act expires on the date that rules adopted pursuant to Section 22(d) of this act become effective."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 61(b), provides: "Except as otherwise provided, this act is effective when it becomes law [August 23, 2013]." Session Laws 2013-413, s. 60(c), had provided that: "This act becomes effective July 1, 2015." Session Laws 2014-115, s. 17, amended Session Laws 2013-413, s. 60(c), to replace the reference to "This act" with the words "This Part."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 61(a), is a severability clause.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 5, effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to rules adopted on or after that date, inserted "the agency must comply with the requirements of G.S. 150B-19.1, and" in the introductory paragraph of subsection (a); added "and a link to the agency's Web site containing the information required by G.S. 150B-19.1(c)" in subdivision (c)(2); in subsection (e), added the last sentence of the first paragraph, and inserted "and fiscal note" in the first sentence of the second paragraph; inserted "and any fiscal note that has been prepared in connection with the proposed rule" in subsection (f); added the second sentence in subsection (g); and inserted "any fiscal note that has been prepared for the rule" in the last sentence of subsection (i).

Session Laws 2021-88, s. 17, effective July 22, 2021, inserted the (i) and (ii) designations in subdivision (c)(7); substituted "copy of the notice of text” for "copy of the notice or text” in the second sentence of subsection (d); substituted "must publish" for "shall publish” in the last paragraph in subsection (e); substituted "must review" for "shall review" in subsection (g); and made stylistic changes.

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "Wind Over North Carolina Waters: The State's Preparedness to Address Offshore and Coastal Water-Based Wind Energy Projects," see 87 N.C.L. Rev. 1819 (2009).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A.

Rule Making Required. - Retirement Systems Division of the Department of State Treasurer (Division) erred in invoicing a school employee or school board for contributions to the employee's retirement fund pursuant to a statutory cap factor because (1) the factor was a rule not properly adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, and (2) the Division was a state agency not exempt from rule making requirements. Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Dep't of State Treasurer, 261 N.C. App. 325, 821 S.E.2d 196 (2018), aff'd, 374 N.C. 3, 839 S.E.2d 814, 2020 N.C. LEXIS 270 (2020).

Notice and Opportunity to Be Heard Required. - Substantial compliance under former G.S. 150A-9, among other things, requires notice and the opportunity to be heard, as provided by former G.S. 150A-12, before the adoption of a rule. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 32 N.C. App. 552, 233 S.E.2d 398, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 729, 235 S.E.2d 782 (1977).

Applied in North Carolina Chiropractic Ass'n v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 122 N.C. App. 122, 468 S.E.2d 539 (1996); Affordable Care, Inc. v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 153 N.C. App. 527, 571 S.E.2d 52 (2002).

Cited in In re Declaratory Ruling by the Envtl. Mgmt. Comm'n v. Envtl. Mgmt. Comm'n, 155 N.C. App. 408, 573 S.E.2d 732 (2002), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 62, 579 S.E.2d 392 (2003).

Opinions of Attorney General

Notice Provisions of Other Statutes Controlled over Former G.S. 150A-12. - See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Gary K. Berman, Administrative Procedures Office, Department of Human Resources, 45 N.C.A.G. 217 (1976), issued under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A.


§ 150B-21.3. Effective date of rules.

  1. Temporary and Emergency Rules. - A temporary rule or an emergency rule becomes effective on the date the Codifier of Rules enters the rule in the North Carolina Administrative Code.
  2. Permanent Rule. - A permanent rule approved by the Commission becomes effective on the first day of the month following the month the rule is approved by the Commission, unless the Commission received written objections to the rule in accordance with subsection (b2) of this section, or unless the agency that adopted the rule specifies a later effective date.
  3. Delayed Effective Dates. - Except as provided in G.S. 14-4.1, if the Commission received written objections to the rule in accordance with subsection (b2) of this section, the rule becomes effective on the earlier of the thirty-first legislative day or the day of adjournment of the next regular session of the General Assembly that begins at least 25 days after the date the Commission approved the rule, unless a different effective date applies under this section. If a bill that specifically disapproves the rule is introduced in either house of the General Assembly before the thirty-first legislative day of that session, the rule becomes effective on the earlier of either the day an unfavorable final action is taken on the bill or the day that session of the General Assembly adjourns without ratifying a bill that specifically disapproves the rule. If the agency adopting the rule specifies a later effective date than the date that would otherwise apply under this subsection, the later date applies. A permanent rule that is not approved by the Commission or that is specifically disapproved by a bill enacted into law before it becomes effective does not become effective.
  4. Objection. - Any person who objects to the adoption of a permanent rule may submit written comments to the agency. If the objection is not resolved prior to adoption of the rule, a person may submit written objections to the Commission. If the Commission receives written objections from 10 or more persons, no later than 5:00 P.M. of the day following the day the Commission approves the rule, clearly requesting review by the legislature in accordance with instructions posted on the agency's Web site pursuant to G.S. 150B-19.1(c)(4), and the Commission approves the rule, the rule will become effective as provided in subsection (b1) of this section. The Commission shall notify the agency that the rule is subject to legislative disapproval on the day following the day it receives 10 or more written objections. When the requirements of this subsection have been met and a rule is subject to legislative disapproval, the agency may adopt the rule as a temporary rule if the rule would have met the criteria listed in G.S. 150B-21.1(a) at the time the notice of text for the permanent rule was published in the North Carolina Register. If the Commission receives objections from 10 or more persons clearly requesting review by the legislature, and the rule objected to is one of a group of related rules adopted by the agency at the same time, the agency that adopted the rule may cause any of the other rules in the group to become effective as provided in subsection (b1) of this section by submitting a written statement to that effect to the Commission before the other rules become effective.
  5. Executive Order Exception. - The Governor may, by executive order, make effective a permanent rule that has been approved by the Commission but the effective date of which has been delayed in accordance with subsection (b1) of this section upon finding that it is necessary that the rule become effective in order to protect public health, safety, or welfare. A rule made effective by executive order becomes effective on the date the order is issued or at a later date specified in the order. When the Codifier of Rules enters in the North Carolina Administrative Code a rule made effective by executive order, the entry must reflect this action.
  6. Fees. - Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a rule that establishes a new fee or increases an existing fee shall not become effective until the agency has complied with the requirements of G.S. 12-3.1.
  7. Legislative Day and Day of Adjournment. - As used in this section:
    1. A "legislative day" is a day on which either house of the General Assembly convenes in regular session.
    2. The "day of adjournment" of a regular session held in an odd-numbered year is the day the General Assembly adjourns by joint resolution or by operation of law for more than 30 days.
    3. The "day of adjournment" of a regular session held in an even-numbered year is the day the General Assembly adjourns sine die.
  8. OSHA Standard. - A permanent rule concerning an occupational safety and health standard that is adopted by the Occupational Safety and Health Division of the Department of Labor and is identical to a federal regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the United States Department of Labor becomes effective on the date the Division delivers the rule to the Codifier of Rules, unless the Division specifies a later effective date. If the Division specifies a later effective date, the rule becomes effective on that date.
  9. Technical Change. - A permanent rule for which no notice or hearing is required under G.S. 150B-21.5(a)(1) through (a)(5) or G.S. 150B-21.5(b) becomes effective on the first day of the month following the month the rule is approved by the Rules Review Commission.

A bill specifically disapproves a rule if it contains a provision that refers to the rule by appropriate North Carolina Administrative Code citation and states that the rule is disapproved. Notwithstanding any rule of either house of the General Assembly, any member of the General Assembly may introduce a bill during the first 30 legislative days of any regular session to disapprove a rule that has been approved by the Commission and that either has not become effective or has become effective by executive order under subsection (c) of this section.

A rule that is made effective by executive order remains in effect unless it is specifically disapproved by the General Assembly in a bill enacted into law on or before the day of adjournment of the regular session of the General Assembly that begins at least 25 days after the date the executive order is issued. A rule that is made effective by executive order and that is specifically disapproved by a bill enacted into law is repealed as of the date specified in the bill. If a rule that is made effective by executive order is not specifically disapproved by a bill enacted into law within the time set by this subsection, the Codifier of Rules must note this in the North Carolina Administrative Code.

History

(1991, c. 418, s. 1; 1995, c. 507, s. 27.8(e); 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 742, s. 43; 1996, 2nd Ex. Sess., c. 18, s. 7.10(f); 1997-34, s. 3; 2001-487, s. 80(b); 2002-97, s. 5; 2003-229, s. 5; 2004-156, ss. 2, 3; 2012-194, s. 66.5(b); 2015-264, s. 23; 2019-198, s. 2.)

Administrative Rules Governing Sanitation of Hospitals, Nursing Homes, Rest Homes, and Other Institutions. - Session Laws 2002-160, ss. 1-5, effective October 17, 2002, provide: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.3(b), amendments to the following rules governing sanitation of hospitals, nursing homes, rest homes, and other institutions, adopted by the Commission for Health Services [now the Commission for Public Health] and approved by the Rules Review Commission on October 18, 2001, become effective March 1, 2003: 15A NCAC 18A .1301 (Definitions), 15A NCAC 18A .1302 (Approval of Plans), 15A NCAC 18A .1304 (Inspections), 15A NCAC 18A .1305 (Grading Residential Care Facilities in Institutions), 15A NCAC 18A .1306 (Public Display of Grade Card), 15A NCAC 18A .1307 (Reinspections), 15A NCAC 18A .1308 (Approved Institutions), 15A NCAC 18A .1309 (Floors), 15A NCAC 18A .1310 (Walls and Ceilings), 15A NCAC 18A .1312 (Toilet: Handwashing: Laundry: and Bathing Facilities), 15A NCAC 18A .1313 (Water Supply), 15A NCAC 18A .1314 (Drinking Water Facilities: Ice Handling), 15A NCAC 18A .1315 (Liquid Wastes), 15A NCAC 18A .1316 (Solid Wastes), 15A NCAC 18A .1317 (Vermin Control: Premises: Animal Maintenance), 15A NCAC 18A .1318 (Miscellaneous), 15A NCAC 18A .1319 (Furnishings and Patient Contact Items), 15A NCAC 18A .1320 (Food Service Utensils and Equipment), 15A NCAC 18A .1322 (Milk and Milk Products), 15A NCAC 18A .1323 (Food Protection), and 15A NCAC 18A .1324 (Employees).

"Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.3(b), 15A NCAC 18A .1327 (Incorporated Rules) adopted by the Commission for Health Services [now the Commission for Public Health] and approved by the Rules Review Commission on October 18, 2001 becomes effective March 1, 2003.

"Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.3(b), amendments to 15A NCAC 18A .1311 (Lighting, Ventilation and Moisture Control) and 15A NCAC 18A .1321 (Food Supplies) adopted by the Commission for Health Services [now the Commission for Public Health] and approved by the Rules Review Commission on November 15, 2001 become effective March 1, 2003.

"The Division of Environmental Health [Division of Water Resources] of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, with the assistance of local health departments, shall field test the amended rules listed in Sections 1 through 3 of this act by conducting trial inspections of a representative sample of facilities subject to the amended rules throughout the State. Trial inspections under the amended rules shall be performed during the period 1 October 2002 through 1 February 2003 in conjunction with the regular inspection of the representative sample of facilities under rules in effect during the field test period. A facility that is subject to a trial inspection shall not be liable for an enforcement action for any violation of an amended rule that is observed during a trial inspection but may be liable for an enforcement action under rules in effect during the field test period. The purposes of the field test shall be to determine what expenditures, if any, will be required of facilities in order to comply with the amended rules and whether the amended rules will result in lower inspection grades for facilities. As a part of the field test, the Division shall also review the amended rules, giving particular attention to applicable federal regulations and to the incorporation by reference of any other rules or standards in the amended rules, to determine whether the amended rules will result in any duplication or conflict in applicable requirements or standards and whether the amended rules will result in duplicative or conflicting inspection or enforcement policies or procedures. The Division of Environmental Health [Division of Water Resources] shall compile and analyze field test data to determine whether any of the amended rules should be revised. The Division shall report the results of the field test required by this section, any recommendations to the Commission for Health Services [now the Commission for Public Health] regarding revisions to the amended rules, and the status of any recommended rule revisions to the Environmental Review Commission on or before March 1, 2003.

"The Division of Environmental Health [Division of Water Resources] of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall offer training to staff of facilities that are subject to the amended rules listed in Sections 1 through 3 of this act. Training shall be offered in the various regions of the State as appropriate and shall include information on the requirements of the amended rules, enforcement policies and procedures, and updated information as to any revisions to the amended rules that may be recommended as a result of the field test of the amended rules required by Section 4 of this act."

Temporary and Permanent Rules Governing Licensing of Family Care Homes and Homes for the Aged and Infirm. - Session Laws 2002-160, s. 6(a)-(d), effective October 17, 2002, as amended by Session Laws 2003-284, s. 10.8C, effective July 1, 2003, provides: "This act constitutes a recent act of the General Assembly within the meaning of G.S. 150B-21.1(a).

"Notwithstanding Sections 1 through 3 of this act, the Commission for Health Services [now the Commission for Public Health] may adopt temporary and permanent rules to further delay the effective date of any of the rules listed in Sections 1 through 3 of this act. The Commission for Health Services may adopt temporary and permanent rules to revise any of the rules listed in Sections 1 through 3 of this act.

"The Medical Care Commission may adopt temporary and permanent rules to amend Subchapter 42C (Licensing of Family Care Homes) and Subchapter 42D (Licensing of Homes for the Aged and Infirm) of Chapter 42 (Individual and Family Support) of Title 10 (Department of Health and Human Services) of the North Carolina Administrative Code. Prior to the adoption of temporary rules under this subsection, the Commission shall:

"(1) Consult with persons who may be interested in the subject matter of the temporary rule during the development of the text of the proposed temporary rule.

"(2) Notify persons on the mailing list that the Commission maintains pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.2(d) of its intent to adopt a temporary rule.

"(3) Publish a notice of intent to adopt a temporary rule in the North Carolina Register. The notice shall set out the text of the proposed temporary rule and include the name of the person to whom questions and written comment on the proposed rule may be submitted. The Commission shall accept written comment on the proposed temporary rule for at least 30 days after the notice of intent to adopt the temporary rule is published in the North Carolina Register.

"(4) Hold at least one public hearing on the proposed temporary rule.

"Notwithstanding 26 NCAC 2C.0102(11), the Medical Care Commission may adopt temporary rules as provided in this section until July 1, 2004."

Disapproval of Life Insurance Replacement Rules. - Session Laws 2003-143, s. 1, effective June 4, 2003, provides: "Pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.3(b), the following Life Insurance Replacement Rules that were adopted by the Department of Insurance and approved by the Rules Review Commission on December 19, 2002, are disapproved:

"(1) 11 NCAC 12.0601 - Purpose and Scope.

"(2) 11 NCAC 12.0602 - Definition of Replacement.

"(3) 11 NCAC 12.0603 - Other Definitions.

"(4) 11 NCAC 12.0604 - Exemptions.

"(5) 11 NCAC 12.0605 - Duties of Producers.

"(6) 11 NCAC 12.0606 - Duties of Existing Insurer.

"(7) 11 NCAC 12.0607 - Duties of Insurers That Use Producers.

"(8) 11 NCAC 12.0608 - Duties of Insurers With Respect to Direct Response Sales.

"(9) 11 NCAC 12.0609 - Violations and Penalties.

"(10) 11 NCAC 12.0611 - Notice Regarding Replacement.

"(11) 11 NCAC 12.0612 - Duties of Replacing Insurers That Use Producers."

Approval of Rules Governing Residential Treatment for Children or Adolescents. - Session Laws 2005-276, s. 10.35B, provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1(b) and G.S. 150B-21.3(b2), the Department of Health and Human Services may adopt as temporary rules the rules governing residential treatment for children or adolescents approved for adoption or revision on May 18, 2005, by the Commission for Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services, and approved by the Rules Review Commission. The temporary rules shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(a)."

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 1.2, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2005.' "

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 46.3, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2005-2007 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2005-2007 fiscal biennium."

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 46.5, is a severability clause.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1996, Second Extra Session, c. 18, s. 27.36, provides: "G.S. 150B-21.3(c) does not apply to a rule that extends the data set in 15A NCAC 13B.1627(c)(10)(A) for closure of a municipal solid waste landfill facility beyond January 1, 2000."

Session Laws 1999-237, s. 11.30 provides that, notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.3(b), Administrative Rules 10 NCAC 41S and 41T, adopted by the Social Services Commission on January 13, 1999, and approved by the Rules Review Commission on February 18, 1999, and Administrative Rules 10 NCAC 41E, 41G, and 41R, repealed by the Social Services Commission on January 13, 1999, and approved by the Rules Review Commission on February 18, 1999, become effective July 1, 1999.

Session Laws 2000-172, s. 2.2, as amended by Session Laws 2000-140, s. 92.1(b), provides that notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.3(a) and 25 NCAC 2C.0102(11), the Coastal Resources Commission shall adopt a temporary rule to establish use standards for waterfront development in urban areas to replace G.S. 113A-120.2 when it expires. The temporary rule shall become effective April 1, 2000, and shall remain in effect until a permanent rule that replaces the temporary rule becomes effective.

Session Laws 2000-142, s. 3, provides that, notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.3(a) and 26 NCAC 2C.0102(11), the Coastal Resources Commission may adopt a temporary rule to establish criteria for exceptions to the regulatory requirement, effective August 1, 2000, of a 30-foot development setback along public trust and estuarine waters to allow construction of residences on previously platted undeveloped lots of 5,000 square feet or less that are located in intensively developed areas and that would otherwise be prohibited under rules adopted by the Commission pursuant to Article 7 of Chapter 113A of the General Statutes. The temporary rule shall become effective upon its adoption by the Commission and shall remain in effect until a permanent rule that replaces the temporary rule becomes effective.

Session Laws 2001-361, s. 1, provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150-21.3(b), 15 NCAC 2B.0315 (Neuse River Basin), as amended by the Environmental Management Commission on 12 October 2000 and approved by the Rules Review Commission on 16 November 2000, becomes effective 1 July 2004 unless the 2004 Regular Session of the 2003 General Assembly specifically disapproves 15A NCAC 2B.0315 (Neuse River Basin), as amended by the Environmental Commission of 12 October 2000 and approved by the Rules Review Commission on 16 November 2000, by enactment of a bill as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b)."

Session Laws 2001-418, ss. 1 to 3, authorize the Coastal Resources Commission to adopt temporary rules to establish additional exceptions to the 30-foot buffer requirement along public trust and estuarine waters in certain circumstances and to allow structural modifications to piers to prevent or minimize storm damage.

Session Laws 2002-116, s. 1, effective September 17, 2002, provides: "Pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.3(b), the amendment to 15A NCAC 07H.0309 (Use Standards for Ocean Hazard Areas: Exceptions), as adopted by the Coastal Resources Commission and approved by the Rules Review Commission on 15 November 2001, by which subdivision '(9) swimming pools;' would be deleted from subsection (a) of the rule is disapproved and shall not become effective. The remainder of the amendments to 15A NCAC 7H.0309, as adopted by the Coastal Resources Commission and approved by the Rules Review Commission on 15 November 2001, shall become effective on 1 August 2002."

Session Laws 2003-433, s. 1, provides: "Pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.3(b), 15A NCAC 2B.0225 (Outstanding Resource Waters) and 15A NCAC 2B.0316 (Tar-Pamlico River Basin), as adopted by the Environmental Management Commission on 11 July 2002 and approved by the Rules Review Commission on 15 August 2002, are approved effective 1 August 2003 with respect to all waters and lands that are located west of Nash County State Road 1003 (Red Oak Road)."

Session Laws 2003-433, s. 2, provides: "With respect to all waters and lands that are located east of Nash County State Road 1003 (Red Oak Road), 15A NCAC 2B.0225 (Outstanding Resource Waters) and 15A NCAC 2B.0316 (Tar-Pamlico River Basin), as adopted by the Environmental Management Commission on 11 July 2002 and approved by the Rules Review Commission on 15 August 2002, shall not become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b) and shall become effective only as the 2004 Regular Session of the 2003 General Assembly may provide by law."

Session Laws 2003-433, s. 4, provides: "The Environmental Management Commission shall adopt temporary and permanent rules to amend the North Carolina Administrative Code to incorporate the provisions of Section 1 of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.1, this act shall not be construed to authorize the Environmental Management Commission to adopt a temporary rule related to the subject matter of this act except as specifically provided by this section, and the Environmental Management Commission shall not be required to provide prior notice or a hearing to adopt the temporary rule required by this section. Reference to this section shall satisfy the requirement for a statement of finding of need for a temporary rule set out in G.S. 150B-21.1."

Session Laws 2007-442, s. 3(b), provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.3(b1), 10A NCAC 21B.0314, adopted by the Department of Health and Human Services on January 19, 2007, and approved by the Rules Review Commission on March 15, 2007, is disapproved."

Session Laws 2007-442, s. 3.6, provides: "Unless required by federal law, the Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Medical Assistance shall limit notification of estate recovery to the application process for Medicaid and to following the death of the recipient."

Session Laws 2009-217, s. 1, provides: "Pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.3(b1), 21 NCAC 32X.0103 (Reporting of Medical Judgments, Awards, Payments or Settlements) and 21 NCAC 32X.0105 (Publication of Judgments, Awards, Payments or Settlements), as adopted by the North Carolina Medical Board on July 16, 2008, and approved by the Rules Review Commission on August 21, 2008, are disapproved."

Session Laws 2009-217, s. 4, provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.3(b1), 13 NCAC 07F.0901 (Scope) as adopted by the Department of Labor on February 19, 2009, and approved by the Rules Review Commission on March 19, 2009, is disapproved."

Session Laws 2010-157, ss. 1 to 3, provides: "SECTION 1. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.3, French Broad River Basin Rule 15A NCAC 02B.0304, as adopted by the Environmental Management Commission on March 12, 2009, and approved by the Rules Review Commission on April 16, 2009, is effective July 1, 2011. Nothing in this act restricts the authority of the General Assembly to take further action on this issue, either as to the substance of the Rule or its effective date.

"SECTION 2. No later than January 1, 2011, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall provide for at least two public meetings on French Broad River Basin Rule 15A NCAC 02B.0304, as adopted by the Environmental Management Commission on March 12, 2009, and approved by the Rules Review Commission on April 16, 2009, in the vicinity of the area to be affected by the adoption of the Rule. The purpose of the public meetings is to provide information on the operation of the Rule, including what activities would be allowed and what activities would be prohibited by operation of the Rule.

"SECTION 3. No later than January 15, 2011, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall report to the Environmental Review Commission regarding the public meetings required by Section 2 of this act."

Session Laws 2011-24, s. 1, provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.3 and S.L. 2010-157, French Broad River Basin Rule 15A NCAC 02B.0304, as adopted by the Environmental Management Commission on March 12, 2009, and approved by the Rules Review Commission on April 16, 2009, shall not become effective."

Session Laws 2013-294, s. 1, provides: "Pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.3(b1), 04 NCAC 10A.0102 (Official Forms), 04 NCAC 10A.0105 (Electronic Payment of Costs), 04 NCAC 10A.0405 (Reinstatement of Compensation), 04 NCAC 10A.0601 (Employer's Obligations Upon Notice; Denial of Liability...), 04 NCAC 10A.0603 (Responding to a Party's Request for Hearing), 04 NCAC 10A.0605 (Discovery), 04 NCAC 10A.0608 (Statement of Incident Leading to Claim), 04 NCAC 10A.0609A (Medical Motions and Emergency Medical Motions), 04 NCAC 10A.0612 (Depositions and Additional Hearings), 04 NCAC 10A.0613 (Expert Witnesses and Fees), 04 NCAC 10A.0701 (Review by Full Commission), 04 NCAC 10A.0704 (Remand from the Appellate Courts), 04 NCAC 10C.0103 (Definitions), 04 NCAC 10C.0109 (Vocational Rehabilitation Services Return to Work), 04 NCAC 10E.0201 (Document and Record Fees), 04 NCAC 10E.0202 (Hearing Costs or Fees), 04 NCAC 10E.0203 (Fees Set by the Commission), 04 NCAC 10G.0104A (Foreign Language Interpreters), as adopted by the Industrial Commission on September 20, 2012, and approved by the Rules Review Commission on October 18, 2012, are disapproved."

Session Laws 2013-294, s. 2, provides: "Pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.3(b1), 04 NCAC 10A.0801 (Suspension of Rules), 04 NCAC 10B.0501 (Suspension of Rules), 04 NCAC 10C.0108 (Interaction with Physicians), 04 NCAC 10C.0201 (Suspension of Rules), 04 NCAC 10D.0110 (Suspension of Rules), 04 NCAC 10E.0301 (Suspension of Rules), 04 NCAC 10G.0107 (Compensation of the Mediator), 04 NCAC 10G.0110 (Waiver of Rules), 04 NCAC 10H.0206 (Waiver of Rules), 04 NCAC 10I.0204 (Suspension of Rules), as adopted by the Industrial Commission on September 20, 2012, and approved by the Rules Review Commission on November 15, 2012, are disapproved."

Session Laws 2013-294, s. 11, provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.2, the Industrial Commission shall adopt permanent rules in accordance with the provisions of this act using the procedure and time lines for temporary rules set forth in G.S. 150B-21.1(a3). Rules adopted by the Industrial Commission in accordance with this section shall be subject to review by the Rules Review Commission as provided by G.S. 150B-21.1(b); provided however, that if the rules are approved by the Rules Review Commission, they shall become effective as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b). Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall not be subject to G.S. 150B-19.1(h) or G.S. 150B-21.4. The Industrial Commission shall consult with the Office of Administrative Hearings to ensure that rules adopted in accordance with this section are submitted to the Rules Review Commission in time to be eligible for legislative disapproval in the 2014 Regular Session of the 2013 General Assembly. The rules of the Industrial Commission that were in effect on the effective date of S.L. 2011-287 shall remain in effect with regard to rules disapproved by Sections 1 and 2 of this act until rules adopted to replace the disapproved rules become effective pursuant to this section."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 28(a)-(d), provides: "(a) 15A NCAC 02D.1903 (Open Burning Without an Air Quality Permit). - Until the effective date of the revised permanent rule that the Commission is required to adopt pursuant to Section 28(c) of this act, the Commission, the Department, and any other political subdivision of the State that implements 15A NCAC 02D.1903 (Open Burning Without an Air Quality Permit) shall implement the rule, as provided in Section 28(b) of this act.

"(b) Implementation. - Notwithstanding 15A NCAC 02D.1903(b)(2)(F)(Open Burning Without an Air Quality Permit), open burning for land clearing or right-of-way maintenance is permissible without an air quality permit if materials are not carried off site or transported over public roads for open burning unless the materials are carried or transported to:

"(1) Facilities permitted in accordance with 15A NCAC 02D.1904 (Air Curtain Burners) for the operation of an air curtain burner at a permanent site; or

"(2) A location, where the material is burned not more than four times per year, that meets all of the following criteria:

"a. At least 500 feet from any dwelling, group of dwellings, or commercial or institutional establishment, or other occupied structure not located on the property on which the burning is conducted.

"b. There are no more than two piles, each 20 feet in diameter, being burned at one time.

"c. The location is not a permitted solid waste management facility.

"(c) Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to amend 15A NCAC 02D.1903 (Open Burning Without an Air Quality Permit) consistent with Section 28(b) of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 28(b) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.8 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2).

"(d) Sunset. - Section 28(b) of this act expires on the date that rules adopted pursuant to Section 28(c) of this act become effective."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 34(a)-(d), as amended by Session Laws 2014-120, s. 53, provides: "(a) 15A NCAC 18A .1949(b) (Sewage Flow Rates for Design Units). - Until the effective date of the revised permanent rule that the Commission is required to adopt pursuant to Section 34(c) of this act, the Commission, the Department, and any other political subdivision of the State shall implement 15A NCAC 18A .1949(b) (Sewage Flow Rates for Design Units) as provided in Section 34(b) of this act.

"(b) Implementation. - Notwithstanding the Daily Flow for Design rates listed for dwelling units in 15A NCAC 18A .1949(a) or for other establishments in Table No. 1 of 15A NCAC 18A .1949(b)(Sewage Flow Rates for Design Units), a wastewater system shall be exempt from the Daily Flow for Design, and any other design flow standards that are established by the Department of Health and Human Services or the Commission for Public Health provided flow rates that are less than those listed in 15A NCAC 18A .1949 (Sewage Flow Rates for Design Units) can be achieved through engineering design that utilizes low-flow fixtures and low-flow technologies and the design is prepared, sealed, and signed by a professional engineer licensed pursuant to Chapter 89C of the General Statutes. The Department and Commission may establish, by rule, lower limits on reduced flow rates as necessary to ensure wastewater system integrity and protect public health, safety, and welfare, provided that the Commission relies on scientific evidence specific to soil types found in North Carolina that the lower limits are necessary for those soil types. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2). Proposed daily design flows for wastewater systems that are calculated to be less than 3,000 total gallons per day shall not require State review pursuant to 15A NCAC 18A .1938(e). Neither the State nor any local health department shall be liable for any damages caused by a system approved or permitted pursuant to this section.

"(c) Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to amend 15A NCAC 18A .1949(b)(Sewage Flow Rates for Design Units) consistent with Section 34(b) of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 34(b) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.8 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2).

"(d) Sunset. - Section 34(b) of this act expires on the date that rules adopted pursuant to Section 34(c) of this act become effective."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 61(a), is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2014-4, s. 2(a)-(c), provides: "(a) Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) and Section 1(a) of S.L. 2013-365, all rules adopted pursuant to Section 2(m) of S.L. 2012-143 shall be subject to legislative review during the next regular session of the General Assembly that begins after the date the Rules Review Commission approved the rule or during the regular session that is underway on the date the Commission approved the rule.'

"(b) Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) and any rule of either house of the General Assembly, any member of the General Assembly may introduce a bill to disapprove any rule adopted pursuant to Section 2(m) of S.L. 2012-143 that has been approved by the Rules Review Commission and that either has not become effective or has become effective by executive order, as follows: (i) if the Rules Review Commission approves the rule prior to the start of a legislative session, during the first 30 calendar days of the regular session of the General Assembly that begins after the date the Commission approved all rules adopted pursuant to Section 2(m) of S.L. 2012-143 or (ii) if the Rules Review Commission approves the rule during a legislative session, 30 calendar days from the date the Rules Review Commission approved all rules adopted pursuant to Section 2(m) of S.L. 2012-143.'

"(c) Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) and any rule of either house of the General Assembly, all rules adopted pursuant to Section 2(m) of S.L. 2012-143 become effective on the earlier of the following:

"(1) If the Rules Review Commission approves all rules adopted pursuant to Section 2(m) of S.L. 2012-143 prior to the start of a legislative session, the earlier of (i) the 31st calendar day of the regular session of the General Assembly that begins after the date the Commission approved all rules adopted pursuant to Section 2(m) of S.L. 2012-143 if a bill that specifically disapproves any of these rules has not been introduced in either house of the General Assembly by that date; (ii) if a bill that specifically disapproves a rule is introduced in either house of the General Assembly before the 31st calendar day of that session, the rule becomes effective on the earlier of either the day an unfavorable final action is taken on the bill or the 61st calendar day of that session if by that date a bill that specifically disapproves the rule has not been ratified; or (iii) the day that session of the General Assembly adjourns without ratifying a bill that specifically disapproves the rule.

"(2) If the Rules Review Commission approves all rules adopted pursuant to Section 2(m) of S.L. 2012-143 during a legislative session, the earlier of (i) the 31st calendar day after the date the Commission approved all rules adopted pursuant to Section 2(m) of S.L. 2012-143 if a bill that specifically disapproves a rule has not been introduced in either house of the General Assembly by that date; (ii) if a bill that specifically disapproves a rule is introduced in either house of the General Assembly within 30 calendar days of the date that the Commission approved all rules adopted pursuant to Section 2(m) of S.L. 2012-143, the rule becomes effective on the earlier of either the day an unfavorable final action is taken on the bill or the 61st day after the date that the Commission approved all rules adopted pursuant to Section 2(m) of S.L. 2012-143 if by that date a bill that specifically disapproves the rule has not been ratified; or (iii) the day that session of the General Assembly adjourns without ratifying a bill that specifically disapproves the rule."

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2004-156, ss. 2 and 3, effective August 2, 2004, added "or unless the agency that adopted the rule specifies a later effective date" at the end of subsection (b); and in subsection (b2), inserted "no later than 5:00 P.M. of the day following the day the commission approves the rules" in the third sentence, and added the fourth and sixth sentences.

Session Laws 2015-264, s. 23, effective October 1, 2015, substituted "posted on the agency's Web site pursuant to G.S. 150B-19.1(c)(4)" for "contained in the notice pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.2(c)(9)" in the third sentence of subsection (b2).

Session Laws 2019-198, s. 2, effective January 1, 2020, inserted "Except as provided in G.S. 14-4.1" in subsection (b1).

CASE NOTES

Cited in Frye Regional Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Hunt, 350 N.C. 39, 510 S.E.2d 159 (1999); Griffith v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 210 N.C. App. 544, 709 S.E.2d 412 (2011).


§ 150B-21.3A. Periodic review and expiration of existing rules.

  1. Definitions. - For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:
    1. Commission. - Means the Rules Review Commission.
    2. Committee. - Means the Joint Legislative Administrative Procedure Oversight Committee.
    3. Necessary rule. - Means any rule other than an unnecessary rule.
    4. , (4) Repealed by Session Laws 2019-140, s. 3(a), effective July 19, 2019, and applicable to agency rule reports submitted to the Office of Administrative Hearings pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.3A(c)(1) on or after October 1, 2019.
  2. Automatic Expiration. - Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section, any rule for which the agency that adopted the rule has not conducted a review in accordance with this section shall expire on the date set in the schedule established by the Commission pursuant to subsection (d) of this section.
  3. Review Process. - Each agency subject to this Article shall conduct a review of the agency's existing rules at least once every 10 years in accordance with the following process:
    1. Step 1: The agency shall conduct an analysis of each existing rule and make an initial determination as to whether the rule is necessary or unnecessary. The agency shall then post the results of the initial determination on its Web site and invite the public to comment on the rules and the agency's initial determination. The agency shall also submit the results of the initial determination to the Office of Administrative Hearings for posting on its Web site. The agency shall accept public comment for no less than 60 days following the posting. The agency shall review the public comments and prepare a brief response addressing the merits of each comment. After completing this process, the agency shall submit a report to the Commission. The report shall include the following items:
      1. The agency's initial determination.
      2. All public comments received in response to the agency's initial determination.
      3. The agency's response to the public comments.
    2. Step 2: The Commission shall review the reports received from the agencies pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection. If a public comment relates to a rule that the agency determined to be unnecessary, the Commission shall determine whether the public comment has merit and, if so, designate the rule as necessary. For purposes of this subsection, a public comment has merit if it addresses the specific substance of the rule. The Commission shall prepare a final determination report and submit the report to the Committee for consultation in accordance with subdivision (3) of this subsection. The report shall include the following items:
      1. The agency's initial determination.
      2. All public comments received in response to the agency's initial determination.
      3. The agency's response to the public comments.
      4. A summary of the Commission's determinations regarding public comments.
      5. Repealed by Session Laws 2019-140, s. 3(a), effective July 19, 2019, and applicable to agency rule reports submitted to the Office of Administrative Hearings pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.3A(c)(1) on or after October 1, 2019.
      6. A determination that all rules that the agency determined to be unnecessary and for which no public comment was received or for which the Commission determined that the public comment was without merit shall expire on the first day of the month following the date the report becomes effective in accordance with this section.
      7. A determination that all rules that the agency determined to be necessary or that the Commission designated as necessary shall be readopted as though the rules were new rules in accordance with this Article.
    3. Step 3: The final determination report shall not become effective until the agency has consulted with the Committee. The determinations contained in the report pursuant to sub-subdivisions f. and g. of subdivision (2) of this subsection shall become effective on the date the report is reviewed by the Committee. If the Committee does not hold a meeting to hear the consultation required by this subdivision within 60 days of receipt of the final determination report, the consultation requirement is deemed satisfied, and the determinations contained in the report become effective on the 61st day following the date the Committee received the report. If the Committee disagrees with a determination regarding a specific rule contained in the report, the Committee may recommend that the General Assembly direct the agency to conduct a review of the specific rule in accordance with this section in the next year following the consultation.
  4. Timetable. - The Commission shall establish a schedule for the review and readoption of existing rules in accordance with this section on a decennial basis as follows:
    1. With regard to the review process, the Commission shall assign each Title of the Administrative Code a date by which the review required by this section must be completed. In establishing the schedule, the Commission shall consider the scope and complexity of rules subject to this section and the resources required to conduct the review required by this section. The Commission shall have broad authority to modify the schedule and extend the time for review in appropriate circumstances. Except as provided in subsections (e) and (f) of this section, if the agency fails to conduct the review by the date set by the Commission, the rules contained in that Title which have not been reviewed will expire. The Commission shall report to the Committee any agency that fails to conduct the review. The Commission may exempt rules that have been adopted or amended within the previous 10 years from the review required by this section. However, any rule exempted on this basis must be reviewed in accordance with this section no more than 10 years following the last time the rule was amended.
    2. With regard to the readoption of rules as required by sub-subdivision (c)(2)g. of this section, once the final determination report becomes effective, the Commission shall establish a date by which the agency must readopt the rules. The Commission shall consult with the agency and shall consider the agency's rule-making priorities in establishing the readoption date. The agency may amend a rule as part of the readoption process. If a rule is readopted without substantive change or if the rule is amended to impose a less stringent burden on regulated persons, the agency is not required to prepare a fiscal note as provided by G.S. 150B-21.4.
  5. Exclusions. - The Commission shall report annually to the Committee on any rules that do not expire pursuant to this subsection. The following rules shall not expire as provided in this section:
    1. Rules adopted to conform to or implement federal law.
    2. Rules deemed by the Boards of Trustees established under G.S. 128-28 and G.S. 135-6 to protect inchoate or accrued rights of members of the Retirement Systems administered by the State Treasurer.
  6. Repealed by Session Laws 2019-140, s. 3(a), effective July 19, 2019, and applicable to agency rule reports submitted to the Office of Administrative Hearings pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.3A(c)(1) on or after October 1, 2019.
  7. Other Reviews. - Notwithstanding any provision of this section, an agency may subject a rule that it determines to be unnecessary to review under this section at any time by notifying the Commission that it wishes to be placed on the schedule for the current year. The Commission may also subject a rule to review under this section at any time by notifying the agency that the rule has been placed on the schedule for the current year.

(5) Public comment. - Means written comments objecting to the rule, in whole or in part, or objecting to an agency's determination of the rule as necessary or unnecessary, received by an agency from any member of the public, including an association or other organization representing the regulated community or other members of the public.

(6) Unnecessary rule. - Means a rule that the agency determines to be obsolete, redundant, or otherwise not needed.

History

(2013-413, s. 3(b); 2014-115, s. 17; 2014-120, s. 2; 2015-164, s. 7; 2015-286, s. 1.6(a); 2019-140, s. 3(a).)

Editor's Note. - Subsections (d1) and (e), as enacted by Session Laws 2013-413, s. 3(b), were redesignated as subsections (e) and (f), respectively, at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.

Session Laws 2019-140, s. 3(b), made the rewriting of this section by Session Laws 2019-140, s. 3(a), effective July 19, 2019, and applicable to agency rule reports submitted to the Office of Administrative Hearings pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.3A(c)(1) on or after October 1, 2019.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2014-120, s. 2, effective September 18, 2014, rewrote subsection (d).

Session Laws 2015-164, s. 7, effective October 1, 2015, added subsection (e1).

Session Laws 2015-286, s. 1.6(a), effective October 22, 2015, inserted "or if the rule is amended to impose a less stringent burden on regulated persons" in the last sentence of subdivision (d)(2). For applicability, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2019-140, s. 3(a), effective July 19, 2019, rewrote the section. For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

§ 150B-21.4. Fiscal and regulatory impact analysis on rules.

  1. State Funds. - Before an agency publishes in the North Carolina Register the proposed text of a permanent rule change that would require the expenditure or distribution of funds subject to the State Budget Act, Chapter 143C of the General Statutes, it must submit the text of the proposed rule change, an analysis of the proposed rule change, and a fiscal note on the proposed rule change to the Office of State Budget and Management and obtain certification from the Office of State Budget and Management that the funds that would be required by the proposed rule change are available. The fiscal note must state the amount of funds that would be expended or distributed as a result of the proposed rule change and explain how the amount was computed. The Office of State Budget and Management must certify a proposed rule change if funds are available to cover the expenditure or distribution required by the proposed rule change.
  2. DOT Analyses. - In addition to the requirements of subsection (a) of this section, any agency that adopts a rule affecting environmental permitting of Department of Transportation projects shall conduct an analysis to determine if the rule will result in an increased cost to the Department of Transportation. The analysis shall be conducted and submitted to the Board of Transportation when the agency submits the notice of text for publication. The agency shall consider any recommendations offered by the Board of Transportation prior to adopting the rule. Once a rule subject to this subsection is adopted, the Board of Transportation may submit any objection to the rule it may have to the Rules Review Commission. If the Rules Review Commission receives an objection to a rule from the Board of Transportation no later than 5:00 P.M. of the day following the day the Commission approves the rule, then the rule shall only become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1).
  3. Local Funds. - Before an agency publishes in the North Carolina Register the proposed text of a permanent rule change that would affect the expenditures or revenues of a unit of local government, it must submit the text of the proposed rule change and a fiscal note on the proposed rule change to the Office of State Budget and Management as provided by G.S. 150B-21.26, the Fiscal Research Division of the General Assembly, the North Carolina Association of County Commissioners, and the North Carolina League of Municipalities. The fiscal note must state the amount by which the proposed rule change would increase or decrease expenditures or revenues of a unit of local government and must explain how the amount was computed.
  4. Substantial Economic Impact. - Before an agency publishes in the North Carolina Register the proposed text of a permanent rule change that would have a substantial economic impact and that is not identical to a federal regulation that the agency is required to adopt, the agency shall prepare a fiscal note for the proposed rule change and have the note approved by the Office of State Budget and Management. The agency must also obtain from the Office a certification that the agency adhered to the regulatory principles set forth in G.S. 150B-19.1(a)(2), (5), and (6). The agency may request the Office of State Budget and Management to prepare the fiscal note only after, working with the Office, it has exhausted all resources, internal and external, to otherwise prepare the required fiscal note. If an agency requests the Office of State Budget and Management to prepare a fiscal note for a proposed rule change, that Office must prepare the note within 90 days after receiving a written request for the note. If the Office of State Budget and Management fails to prepare a fiscal note within this time period, the agency proposing the rule change shall prepare a fiscal note. A fiscal note prepared in this circumstance does not require approval of the Office of State Budget and Management.
    1. Determine and identify the appropriate time frame of the analysis.
    2. Assess the baseline conditions against which the proposed rule is to be measured.
    3. Describe the persons who would be subject to the proposed rule and the type of expenditures these persons would be required to make.
    4. Estimate any additional costs that would be created by implementation of the proposed rule by measuring the incremental difference between the baseline and the future condition expected after implementation of the rule. The analysis should include direct costs as well as opportunity costs. Cost estimates must be monetized to the greatest extent possible. Where costs are not monetized, they must be listed and described.
    5. For costs that occur in the future, the agency shall determine the net present value of the costs by using a discount factor of seven percent (7%).
  5. Content. - A fiscal note required by subsection (b1) of this section must contain the following:
    1. A description of the persons who would be affected by the proposed rule change.
    2. A description of the types of expenditures that persons affected by the proposed rule change would have to make to comply with the rule and an estimate of these expenditures.
    3. A description of the purpose and benefits of the proposed rule change.
    4. An explanation of how the estimate of expenditures was computed.
    5. A description of at least two alternatives to the proposed rule that were considered by the agency and the reason the alternatives were rejected. The alternatives may have been identified by the agency or by members of the public.
  6. Errors. - An erroneous fiscal note prepared in good faith does not affect the validity of a rule.
  7. If an agency proposes the repeal of an existing rule, the agency is not required to prepare a fiscal note on the proposed rule change as provided by this section.

If an agency prepares the required fiscal note, the agency must submit the note to the Office of State Budget and Management for review. The Office of State Budget and Management shall review the fiscal note within 14 days after it is submitted and either approve the note or inform the agency in writing of the reasons why it does not approve the fiscal note. After addressing these reasons, the agency may submit the revised fiscal note to that Office for its review. If an agency is not sure whether a proposed rule change would have a substantial economic impact, the agency shall ask the Office of State Budget and Management to determine whether the proposed rule change has a substantial economic impact. Failure to prepare or obtain approval of the fiscal note as required by this subsection shall be a basis for objection to the rule under G.S. 150B-21.9(a)(4).

As used in this subsection, the term "substantial economic impact" means an aggregate financial impact on all persons affected of at least one million dollars ($1,000,000) in a 12-month period. In analyzing substantial economic impact, an agency shall do the following:

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1979, 2nd Sess., c. 1137, s. 41.1; 1983, c. 761, s. 185; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1987, c. 827, s. 54; 1991, c. 418, s. 1; 1995, c. 415, s. 2; c. 507, s. 27.8(b); 2000-140, s. 93.1(a); 2001-424, s. 12.2(b); 2003-229, s. 6; 2005-276, s. 28.8(a); 2006-203, s. 124; 2011-398, s. 6; 2012-187, s. 4; 2013-149, s. 1; 2013-413, s. 2; 2014-115, s. 17; 2014-120, s. 6(b).)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2013-149, s. 2, made subsection (d), as added by Session Laws 2013-149, s. 1, applicable to all proposed rules published in the North Carolina Register on or after June 19, 2013.

Session Laws 2013-294, s. 11, provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.2, the Industrial Commission shall adopt permanent rules in accordance with the provisions of this act using the procedure and time lines for temporary rules set forth in G.S. 150B-21.1(a3). Rules adopted by the Industrial Commission in accordance with this section shall be subject to review by the Rules Review Commission as provided by G.S. 150B-21.1(b); provided however, that if the rules are approved by the Rules Review Commission, they shall become effective as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b). Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall not be subject to G.S. 150B-19.1(h) or G.S. 150B-21.4. The Industrial Commission shall consult with the Office of Administrative Hearings to ensure that rules adopted in accordance with this section are submitted to the Rules Review Commission in time to be eligible for legislative disapproval in the 2014 Regular Session of the 2013 General Assembly. The rules of the Industrial Commission that were in effect on the effective date of S.L. 2011-287 shall remain in effect with regard to rules disapproved by Sections 1 and 2 of this act until rules adopted to replace the disapproved rules become effective pursuant to this section."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 60(c), had provided that: "This act becomes effective July 1, 2015."

Session Laws 2014-4, s. 2(g), provides: "The Mining and Energy Commission, the Environmental Management Commission, and the Commission for Public Health are exempt from the provisions of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes that require that a certification be obtained from the Office of State Budget and Management, including requirements under G.S. 150B-19.1(h) and G.S. 150B-21.4, and any requirement for preliminary review by the Office of State Budget and Management pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.26, for any rule proposed for the creation of a modern regulatory program for the management of oil and gas exploration and development activities in the State, including the use of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing for that purpose."

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2005-276, s. 28.8(a), effective July 1, 2005, added subsection (a1).

Session Laws 2006-203, s. 124, effective July 1, 2007, and applicable to the budget for the 2007-2009 biennium and each subsequent biennium thereafter, substituted "State Budget Act, Chapter 143C of the General Statutes" for "Executive Budget Act, Article 1 of Chapter 143," in the first sentence of subsection (a).

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 6, effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to rules adopted on or after that date, rewrote the section.

Session Laws 2014-120, s. 6(b), effective September 18, 2014, in the catchline substituted "and regulatory impact analysis" for "notes"; substituted "publishes in the North Carolina Register the proposed text of" for "adopts" three times in this section; in subsection (a), near the beginning inserted "submit the text of the proposed rule change, an analysis of the proposed rule change, and a fiscal note on the proposed rule change to the Office of State Budget and Management and" and deleted the former second sentence; added the second sentence in subsection (b)(1). See Editor's note for applicability.

CASE NOTES

Applied in Affordable Care, Inc. v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 153 N.C. App. 527, 571 S.E.2d 52 (2002).


§ 150B-21.5. Circumstances when notice and rule-making hearing not required; circumstances when submission to the Commission not required.

  1. Amendment. - An agency is not required to publish a notice of text in the North Carolina Register, hold a public hearing, or submit the amended rule to the Commission for review when it proposes to amend a rule to do one of the following:
    1. Reletter or renumber the rule or subparts of the rule.
    2. Substitute one name for another when an organization or position is renamed.
    3. Correct a citation in the rule to another rule or law when the citation has become inaccurate since the rule was adopted because of the repeal or renumbering of the cited rule or law.
    4. Change information that is readily available to the public, such as an address, email address, a telephone number, or a Web site.
    5. Correct a typographical error.
    6. Repealed by Session Laws 2019-140, s. 1(a), effective July 19, 2019.
  2. Response to Commission. - An agency is not required to publish a notice of text in the North Carolina Register or hold a public hearing when it proposes to change the rule in response to a request or an objection by the Commission, unless the Commission determines that the change is substantial.
  3. Repeal. - An agency is not required to publish a notice of text in the North Carolina Register or hold a public hearing when it proposes to repeal a rule as a result of any of the following:
    1. The law under which the rule was adopted is repealed.
    2. The law under which the rule was adopted or the rule itself is declared unconstitutional.
    3. The rule is declared to be in excess of the agency's statutory authority.
  4. OSHA Standard. - The Occupational Safety and Health Division of the Department of Labor is not required to publish a notice of text in the North Carolina Register or hold a public hearing when it proposes to adopt a rule that concerns an occupational safety and health standard and is identical to a federal regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the United States Department of Labor. The Occupational Safety and Health Division is not required to submit to the Commission for review a rule for which notice and hearing is not required under this subsection.
  5. State Building Code. - The Building Code Council is not required to publish a notice of text in the North Carolina Register when it proposes to adopt a rule that concerns the North Carolina State Building Code. The Building Code Council is required to publish a notice in the North Carolina Register when it proposes to adopt a rule that concerns the North Carolina State Building Code. The notice must include all of the following:
    1. A statement of the subject matter of the proposed rule making.
    2. A short explanation of the reason for the proposed action.
    3. A citation to the law that gives the agency the authority to adopt a rule on the subject matter of the proposed rule making.
    4. The person to whom questions or written comments may be submitted on the subject matter of the proposed rule making.
  6. An agency that adopts or amends a rule pursuant to subsection (a) or (c) of this section shall notify the Codifier of Rules of its actions. When notified of an agency action taken pursuant to subsection (a) or (c) of this section, the Codifier of Rules shall make the appropriate change to the North Carolina Administrative Code.

The Building Code Council is required to submit to the Commission for review a rule for which notice of text is not required under this subsection. In adopting a rule, the Council shall comply with the procedural requirements of G.S. 150B-21.3.

History

(1991, c. 418, s. 1; 1995, c. 504, s. 12; 1997-34, s. 4; 2001-141, s. 5; 2001-421, s. 1.3; 2003-229, s. 7; 2019-140, s. 1(a).)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2019-140, s. 1(a), effective July 19, 2019, inserted "circumstances when submission to the Commission not required" in the catchline; rewrote subsection (a); and added subsections (a1) and (e).

§ 150B-21.6. Incorporating material in a rule by reference.

An agency may incorporate the following material by reference in a rule without repeating the text of the referenced material:

  1. Another rule or part of a rule adopted by the agency.
  2. All or part of a code, standard, or regulation adopted by another agency, the federal government, or a generally recognized organization or association.
  3. Repealed by Session Laws 1997-34, s. 5.

In incorporating material by reference, the agency must designate in the rule whether or not the incorporation includes subsequent amendments and editions of the referenced material. The agency can change this designation only by a subsequent rule-making proceeding. The agency must have copies of the incorporated material available for inspection and must specify in the rule both where copies of the material can be obtained and the cost on the date the rule is adopted of a copy of the material.

A statement in a rule that a rule incorporates material by reference in accordance with former G.S. 150B-14(b) is a statement that the rule does not include subsequent amendments and editions of the referenced material. A statement in a rule that a rule incorporates material by reference in accordance with former G.S. 150B-14(c) is a statement that the rule includes subsequent amendments and editions of the referenced material.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1975, 2nd Sess., c. 983, s. 64; 1981 (Reg. Sess., 1982), c. 1359, s. 5; 1983, c. 641, s. 3; c. 768, s. 19; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1987, c. 285, s. 13; 1991, c. 418, s. 1; 1997-34, s. 5.)

§ 150B-21.7. Effect of transfer of duties or termination of agency on rules.

  1. When a law that authorizes an agency to adopt a rule is repealed and another law gives the same or another agency substantially the same authority to adopt a rule, the rule remains in effect until the agency with authority over the rule amends or repeals the rule. When a law that authorizes an agency to adopt a rule is repealed and another law does not give the same or another agency substantially the same authority to adopt a rule, a rule adopted under the repealed law is repealed as of the date the law is repealed. The agency that adopted the rule shall notify the Codifier of Rules that the rule is repealed pursuant to this subsection.
  2. When an executive order abolishes part or all of an agency and transfers a function of that agency to another agency, a rule concerning the transferred function remains in effect until the agency to which the function is transferred amends or repeals the rule. When an executive order abolishes part or all of an agency and does not transfer a function of that agency to another agency, a rule concerning a function abolished by the executive order is repealed as of the effective date of the executive order. The agency that adopted the rule shall notify the Codifier of Rules that the rule is repealed pursuant to this subsection.
  3. When notified of a rule repealed under this section, the Codifier of Rules must enter the repeal of the rule in the North Carolina Administrative Code.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1991, c. 418, s. 1; 2013-143, s. 2.)

PART 3. REVIEW BY COMMISSION.

§ 150B-21.8. Review of rule by Commission.

  1. Emergency Rule. - The Commission does not review an emergency rule.
  2. Temporary and Permanent Rules. - An agency must submit temporary and permanent rules adopted by it to the Commission before the rule can be included in the North Carolina Administrative Code. The Commission reviews a temporary or permanent rule in accordance with the standards in G.S. 150B-21.9 and follows the procedure in this Part in its review of a rule.
  3. Scope. - When the Commission reviews an amendment to a permanent rule, it may review the entire rule that is being amended. The procedure in G.S. 150B-21.12 applies when the Commission objects to a part of a permanent rule that is within its scope of review but is not changed by a rule amendment.
  4. Judicial Review. - When the Commission returns a permanent rule to an agency in accordance with G.S. 150B-21.12(d), the agency may file an action for declaratory judgment in Wake County Superior Court pursuant to Article 26 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes.

History

(1991, c. 418, s. 1; 2003-229, s. 8.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2013-77, s. 4, provides: "Additional rule-making authority. - Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the Commission shall adopt amendments to the Homeless Shelter Provision to be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 3 of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.8 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2)."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 21(a)-(d), as amended by Session Laws 2015-263, s. 16, provides: "(a) 15A NCAC 02T.1302 (Definitions) and 15A NCAC 02T.1307 (Swine Waste Management System Performance Standards). - Until the effective date of the revised permanent rules that the Environmental Management Commission is required to adopt pursuant to Section 21(c) of this act, the Commission and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall implement 15A NCAC 02T.1302 (Definitions) and 15A NCAC 02T.1307 (Swine Waste Management System Performance Standards) as provided in Section 21(b) of this act.

"(b) Implementation. - Notwithstanding 15A NCAC 02T.1302 (Definitions), "new animal waste management system" means animal waste management systems which are constructed and operated at a site where no feedlot existed previously or where a permit for a system has been rescinded, and is then reissued when the permittee confines animals in excess of the thresholds established in G.S. 143-215.10B. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of 15A NCAC 02T.1307 (Swine Waste Management System Performance Standards), the Swine Waste Management System Performance Standards shall:

"(1) Apply to any farm facility that receives a permit for its animal waste management system that allows a level of production at the farm, as measured by steady state live weight, greater than the largest production for which the farm has received a permit in the past, and so that they also apply to any other animal waste management system otherwise subject to regulation under G.S. 143-215.10I.

"(2) Not apply to any facility that meets all of the following conditions:

"a. Has had no animals on site for five continuous years or more.

"b. Notifies the Division of Water Resources in writing at least 60 days prior to bringing any animals back on to the site.

"c. The system depopulated after January 1, 2005, and the system ceased operation no longer than 10 years prior to the current date.

"d. At the time the system ceased operation, the system was in compliance with an individual permit or a general permit issued pursuant to G.S. 143-215.10C.

"e. The Division of Water Resources issues an individual permit or certificate of coverage under a general permit issued pursuant to G.S. 143-215.10C for operation of the system before any animals are brought on the facility.

"f. The permit for the animal waste management system does not allow production, measured by steady state live weight, to exceed the greatest steady state live weight previously permitted for the system under G.S. 143-215.10C.

"g. No component of the animal waste management system and swine farm, other than an existing swine house or land application site, shall be constructed on land that is located within the 100-year floodplain.

"h. The inactive animal waste management system was not closed using the expenditure of public funds and was not closed pursuant to a settlement agreement, court order, cost share agreement, or grant condition.

"(c) Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Environmental Management Commission shall adopt rules as promptly as practicable to amend 15A NCAC 02T.1302 (Definitions) and 15A NCAC 02T.1307 (Swine Waste Management System Performance Standards) consistent with Section 21(b) of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rules adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 21(b) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to Part 3 of Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2).

"(d) Sunset. - Section 21(b) of this act expires on the date that rules adopted pursuant to Section 21(c) of this act become effective."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 22(a)-(e), provides: "(a) The definitions set out in G.S. 143-212 and 15A NCAC 02U.0103 (Definitions) apply to this section.

"(b) 15A NCAC 02U.0701 (Setbacks). - Until the effective date of the revised permanent rule that the Commission is required to adopt pursuant to Section 22(d) of this act, the Commission and the Department shall implement 15A NCAC 02U.0701 (Setbacks) as provided in Section 22(c) of this act.

"(c) Implementation. - Notwithstanding 15A NCAC 02U.0701 (Setbacks), the rule shall be implemented as provided in this section.

"(1) Setbacks in subsection (c) of the rule for surface waters not classified as SA shall not apply provided that the reclaimed water to be utilized contains no more than 10 mg/l of Total Nitrogen and no more than 2 mg/l of Total Phosphorus. The elimination of setbacks to surface waters does not exempt any discharge of reclaimed water to waters of the State from meeting permit requirements established in 15A NCAC 02U.0101 (Purpose).

"(2) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of the rule, no setback shall be required between final reclaimed water effluent storage facilities and property lines provided that the proposed final effluent storage facility was constructed prior to June 18, 2011.

"(3) Setbacks between reclaimed water storage ponds and property lines or wells under separate ownership may be waived by the adjoining property owner. A copy of the signed waiver shall be provided to the Department.

"(4) Setbacks between reclaimed water storage ponds and wells under the same ownership as the reclaimed water storage pond may be waived by the property owner.

"(d) Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Environmental Management Commission shall adopt a rule to amend 15A NCAC 02U.0701 (Setbacks) consistent with Section 22(c) of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 22(c) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to Part 3 of Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2).

"(e) Sunset. - Section 22(c) of this act expires on the date that rules adopted pursuant to Section 22(d) of this act become effective."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 23, provides: "No later than January 1, 2014, the Commission for Public Health shall amend and clarify its rules adopted pursuant to G.S. 130A-497 for the implementation of the prohibition on smoking in restaurants and bars. The rules shall ensure the consistent interpretation and enforcement of Part 1C of Article 23 of Chapter 130A of the General Statutes and shall specifically clarify the definition of enclosed areas for purposes of implementation of the Part. Rules adopted pursuant to this section (i) shall be exempt from the requirements of G.S. 150B-21.4, (ii) are not subject to Part 3 of Article 2A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes, and (iii) shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2). No later than November 1, 2013, the Commission shall report to the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee on Health and Human Services on its progress in amending and clarifying the rules."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 28(a)-(d), provides: "(a) 15A NCAC 02D.1903 (Open Burning Without an Air Quality Permit). - Until the effective date of the revised permanent rule that the Commission is required to adopt pursuant to Section 28(c) of this act, the Commission, the Department, and any other political subdivision of the State that implements 15A NCAC 02D.1903 (Open Burning Without an Air Quality Permit) shall implement the rule, as provided in Section 28(b) of this act.

"(b) Implementation. - Notwithstanding 15A NCAC 02D.1903(b)(2)(F)(Open Burning Without an Air Quality Permit), open burning for land clearing or right-of-way maintenance is permissible without an air quality permit if materials are not carried off site or transported over public roads for open burning unless the materials are carried or transported to:

"(1) Facilities permitted in accordance with 15A NCAC 02D.1904 (Air Curtain Burners) for the operation of an air curtain burner at a permanent site; or

"(2) A location, where the material is burned not more than four times per year, that meets all of the following criteria:

"a. At least 500 feet from any dwelling, group of dwellings, or commercial or institutional establishment, or other occupied structure not located on the property on which the burning is conducted.

"b. There are no more than two piles, each 20 feet in diameter, being burned at one time.

"c. The location is not a permitted solid waste management facility.

"(c) Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to amend 15A NCAC 02D.1903 (Open Burning Without an Air Quality Permit) consistent with Section 28(b) of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 28(b) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.8 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2).

"(d) Sunset. - Section 28(b) of this act expires on the date that rules adopted pursuant to Section 28(c) of this act become effective."

Session Laws 2013-413, s. 34(a)-(d), as amended by Session Laws 2014-120, s. 53, provides: "(a) 15A NCAC 18A .1949(b) (Sewage Flow Rates for Design Units). - Until the effective date of the revised permanent rule that the Commission is required to adopt pursuant to Section 34(c) of this act, the Commission, the Department, and any other political subdivision of the State shall implement 15A NCAC 18A .1949(b) (Sewage Flow Rates for Design Units) as provided in Section 34(b) of this act.

"(b) Implementation. - Notwithstanding the Daily Flow for Design rates listed for dwelling units in 15A NCAC 18A .1949(a) or for other establishments in Table No. 1 of 15A NCAC 18A .1949(b) (Sewage Flow Rates for Design Units), a wastewater system shall be exempt from the Daily Flow for Design, and any other design flow standards that are established by the Department of Health and Human Services or the Commission for Public Health provided flow rates that are less than those listed in 15A NCAC 18A .1949 (Sewage Flow Rates for Design Units) can be achieved through engineering design that utilizes low-flow fixtures and low-flow technologies and the design is prepared, sealed, and signed by a professional engineer licensed pursuant to Chapter 89C of the General Statutes. The Department and Commission may establish, by rule, lower limits on reduced flow rates as necessary to ensure wastewater system integrity and protect public health, safety, and welfare, provided that the Commission relies on scientific evidence specific to soil types found in North Carolina that the lower limits are necessary for those soil types. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2). Proposed daily design flows for wastewater systems that are calculated to be less than 3,000 total gallons per day shall not require State review pursuant to 15A NCAC 18A .1938(e). Neither the State nor any local health department shall be liable for any damages caused by a system approved or permitted pursuant to this section.

"(c) Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to amend 15A NCAC 18A .1949(b) (Sewage Flow Rates for Design Units) consistent with Section 34(b) of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 34(b) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.8 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2).

"(d) Sunset. - Section 34(b) of this act expires on the date that rules adopted pursuant to Section 34(c) of this act become effective."

Session Laws 2017-10, s. 5.1 , is a severability clause.

CASE NOTES

Delegation of Authority to Rules Review Commission. - Review and approval authority delegated to the North Carolina Rules Review Commission is an appropriate delegable power, and the General Assembly has adequately directed the Commission's review of the North Carolina State Board of Education proposed rules and limited the role of the Commission to evaluating those proposed rules to ensure compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act. N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. State, 255 N.C. App. 514, 805 S.E.2d 518 (2017), aff'd, 371 N.C. 149, 814 S.E.2d 54, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 433 (2018).

Rulemaking Authority of State Board of Education Subject to Review and Approval by Commission. - Trial court erred in granting the North Carolina State Board of Education summary judgment in its action to prevent the North Carolina Rules Review Commission from exercising any authority over it and controlling its enactment of rules because the Board's rulemaking authority was subject to statutes providing for review and approval by the Commission; this holding fell within the 1942 North Carolina Constitutional amendment's delineation of the General Assembly's authority over the Board. N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. State, 255 N.C. App. 514, 805 S.E.2d 518 (2017), aff'd, 371 N.C. 149, 814 S.E.2d 54, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 433 (2018).

Rules made by the North Carolina State Board of Education are subject to statutes enacted by the General Assembly requiring review and approval by the North Carolina Rules Review Commission; the General Assembly, by enacting laws adopting a uniform statutory scheme governing administrative procedure, including the establishment of the Commission to review administrative rules, has imposed the requirement that the Board's rules be reviewed and approved prior to becoming effective. N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. State, 255 N.C. App. 514, 805 S.E.2d 518 (2017), aff'd, 371 N.C. 149, 814 S.E.2d 54, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 433 (2018).

Judicial Review. - Court of Appeals properly reversed and remanded the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the State Board of Education regarding procedures for the Board's proposed rules and regulations because the General Assembly was constitutionally authorized to delegate authority to the Rules Review Commission to review and approve the State Board of Education's proposed rules, the APA provided a comprehensive statutory scheme for procedures and due process for individuals affected by administrative rules and decisions, and the Board could challenge the Commission's exercise of its delineated duties by filing a declaratory judgment action. N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. State, 371 N.C. 149, 814 S.E.2d 54 (2018).


§ 150B-21.9. Standards and timetable for review by Commission.

  1. Standards. - The Commission must determine whether a rule meets all of the following criteria:
    1. It is within the authority delegated to the agency by the General Assembly.
    2. It is clear and unambiguous.
    3. It is reasonably necessary to implement or interpret an enactment of the General Assembly, or of Congress, or a regulation of a federal agency. The Commission shall consider the cumulative effect of all rules adopted by the agency related to the specific purpose for which the rule is proposed.
    4. It was adopted in accordance with Part 2 of this Article.
  2. Entry of a rule in the North Carolina Administrative Code after review by the Commission creates a rebuttable presumption that the rule was adopted in accordance with Part 2 of this Article.
  3. Timetable. - The Commission must review a permanent rule submitted to it on or before the twentieth of a month by the last day of the next month. The Commission must review a rule submitted to it after the twentieth of a month by the last day of the second subsequent month. The Commission must review a temporary rule in accordance with the timetable and procedure set forth in G.S. 150B-21.1.

The Commission shall not consider questions relating to the quality or efficacy of the rule but shall restrict its review to determination of the standards set forth in this subsection.

The Commission may ask the Office of State Budget and Management to determine if a rule has a substantial economic impact and is therefore required to have a fiscal note. The Commission must ask the Office of State Budget and Management to make this determination if a fiscal note was not prepared for a rule and the Commission receives a written request for a determination of whether the rule has a substantial economic impact.

History

(1991, c. 418, s. 1; 1995, c. 507, s. 27.8(f); 2000-140, s. 93.1(a); 2001-424, s. 12.2(b); 2003-229, s. 9.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2003-229, s. 15 provides that the amendments to subsections (a) and (b) by s. 9 of the act are applicable to temporary and emergency rules adopted on or after that date and to permanent rules adopted on or after October 1, 2003. Subsection (a1), as amended by s. 9 of the act, applies only to rules adopted on or after July 1, 2003.

Session Laws 2009-216, as amended by Session Laws 2009-484, s. 7(a) and (b), provided for improvements in the management of the Jordan Watershed in order to restore water quality in the Jordan Reservoir. See Editor's note at G.S. 143-214.7 for details.

Session Laws 2009-216, s. 2(c), provides: "Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to replace Wastewater Discharge Rule 15A NCAC 02B.0270. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 2(b) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.9 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2)." Section 2 of Session Laws 2009-216 pertains to wastewater discharge into the Jordan Lake Reservoir.

Session Laws 2009-216, s. 3(j), provides: "Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to replace Sections 3(c) through 3(i) of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Sections 3(c) through 3(f) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.9 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2)." Section 3 of Session Laws 2009-216 pertains to stormwater management, Jordan Lake Reservoir. For provisions on interpretation of certain rules to implement nutrient management strategies for the B. Everett Jordan Reservoir adopted pursuant to Session Laws 2009-216, see Session Laws 2012-187, s. 12.1.

Session Laws 2014-4, s. 2(d), provides: "Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-21.9, the Rules Review Commission must review any permanent rule adopted pursuant to Section 2(m) of S.L. 2012-143 submitted to it by the end of a month by the last day of the next month."

CASE NOTES

Rules Properly Adopted - Trial court did not err in determining that the North Carolina Environmental Management Commission complied with the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act in adopting the wetlands rules, because the rules were entered in the North Carolina Administrative Code; therefore, under G.S. 150B-21.9(a), conclusive evidence existed that the rules were adopted in accordance with Act's requirements. In re Declaratory Ruling by the Envtl. Mgmt. Comm'n v. Envtl. Mgmt. Comm'n, 155 N.C. App. 408, 573 S.E.2d 732 (2002), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 62, 579 S.E.2d 392 (2003).

Commission's Authority. - General assembly has given the North Carolina Rules Review Commission the authority to determine whether a proposed rule is within the authority delegated to the agency by the legislature; where, only after the pharmacy board received an unfavorable outcome regarding its proposed pharmacist hours rule did it allege the process was unconstitutional, the board was estopped from raising a constitutional challenge to the commission's authority, and the trial court did not err by refusing to rule on that challenge. N.C. Bd. of Pharm. v. Rules Review Comm'n, 174 N.C. App. 301, 620 S.E.2d 893 (2005), rev'd, in part on other grounds, remanded, review improvidently allowed, 360 N.C. 638, 637 S.E.2d 515 (2006).

Review and approval authority delegated to the North Carolina Rules Review Commission is an appropriate delegable power, and the General Assembly has adequately directed the Commission's review of the North Carolina State Board of Education proposed rules and limited the role of the Commission to evaluating those proposed rules to ensure compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act. N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. State, 255 N.C. App. 514, 805 S.E.2d 518 (2017), aff'd, 371 N.C. 149, 814 S.E.2d 54, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 433 (2018).

General Assembly has by statute ensured the Rules Review Commission is unable to create and impose rules and has made clear the Commission does not have authority to review the substantive efficacy of rules proposed by the State Board of Education, and its authority to implement the review and approval process is subordinate to the General Assembly's authority to create the review and approval process; thus, the Commission's power is not in conflict with the Board's broad rulemaking authority. N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. State, 255 N.C. App. 514, 805 S.E.2d 518 (2017), aff'd, 371 N.C. 149, 814 S.E.2d 54, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 433 (2018).

Rulemaking Authority of State Board of Education Subject to Review and Approval by Commission. - Trial court erred in granting the North Carolina State Board of Education summary judgment in its action to prevent the North Carolina Rules Review Commission from exercising any authority over it and controlling its enactment of rules because the Board's rulemaking authority was subject to statutes providing for review and approval by the Commission; this holding fell within the 1942 North Carolina Constitutional amendment's delineation of the General Assembly's authority over the Board. N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. State, 255 N.C. App. 514, 805 S.E.2d 518 (2017), aff'd, 371 N.C. 149, 814 S.E.2d 54, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 433 (2018).

Rules made by the North Carolina State Board of Education are subject to statutes enacted by the General Assembly requiring review and approval by the North Carolina Rules Review Commission; the General Assembly, by enacting laws adopting a uniform statutory scheme governing administrative procedure, including the establishment of the Commission to review administrative rules, has imposed the requirement that the Board's rules be reviewed and approved prior to becoming effective. N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. State, 255 N.C. App. 514, 805 S.E.2d 518 (2017), aff'd, 371 N.C. 149, 814 S.E.2d 54, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 433 (2018).

Cited in Holly Ridge Assocs., LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 361 N.C. 531, 648 S.E.2d 830 (2007); N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 191 L. Ed. 2d 35 (2015).


§ 150B-21.10. Commission action on permanent rule.

At the first meeting at which a permanent rule is before the Commission for review, the Commission must take one of the following actions:

  1. Approve the rule, if the Commission determines that the rule meets the standards for review.
  2. Object to the rule, if the Commission determines that the rule does not meet the standards for review.
  3. Extend the period for reviewing the rule, if the Commission determines it needs additional information on the rule to be able to decide whether the rule meets the standards for review.

In reviewing a new rule or an amendment to an existing rule, the Commission may request an agency to make technical changes to the rule and may condition its approval of the rule on the agency's making the requested technical changes.

History

(1991, c. 418, s. 1.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2009-216, as amended by Session Laws 2009-484, s. 7(a) and (b), provided for improvements in the management of the Jordan Watershed in order to restore water quality in the Jordan Reservoir. See Editor's note at G.S. 143-214.7 for details.

Session Laws 2009-216, s. 2(c), provides: "Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to replace Wastewater Discharge Rule 15A NCAC 02B.0270. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 2(b) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.9 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2)." Section 2 of Session Laws 2009-216 pertains to wastewater discharge into the Jordan Lake Reservoir.

Session Laws 2009-216, s. 3(j), provides: "Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to replace Sections 3(c) through 3(i) of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Sections 3(c) through 3(f) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.9 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2)." Section 3 of Session Laws 2009-216 pertains to stormwater management, Jordan Lake Reservoir. For provisions on interpretation of certain rules to implement nutrient management strategies for the B. Everett Jordan Reservoir adopted pursuant to Session Laws 2009-216, see Session Laws 2012-187, s. 12.1.

§ 150B-21.11. Procedure when Commission approves permanent rule.

When the Commission approves a permanent rule, it must notify the agency that adopted the rule of the Commission's approval, and deliver the approved rule to the Codifier of Rules.

If the approved rule will increase or decrease expenditures or revenues of a unit of local government, the Commission must also notify the Governor of the Commission's approval of the rule and deliver a copy of the approved rule to the Governor by the end of the month in which the Commission approved the rule.

History

(1991, c. 418, s. 1; 1995, c. 415, s. 4; c. 507, s. 27.8(g); 2011-291, s. 2.59; 2011-398, s. 7; 2018-142, s. 22.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2009-216, as amended by Session Laws 2009-484, s. 7(a) and (b), provided for improvements in the management of the Jordan Watershed in order to restore water quality in the Jordan Reservoir. See Editor's note at G.S. 143-214.7 for details.

Session Laws 2009-216, s. 2(c), provides: "Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to replace Wastewater Discharge Rule 15A NCAC 02B.0270. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 2(b) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.9 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2)." Section 2 of Session Laws 2009-216 pertains to wastewater discharge into the Jordan Lake Reservoir.

Session Laws 2009-216, s. 3(j), provides: "Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to replace Sections 3(c) through 3(i) of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Sections 3(c) through 3(f) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.9 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2)." Section 3 of Session Laws 2009-216 pertains to stormwater management, Jordan Lake Reservoir. For provisions on interpretation of certain rules to implement nutrient management strategies for the B. Everett Jordan Reservoir adopted pursuant to Session Laws 2009-216, see Session Laws 2012-187, s. 12.1.

Session Laws 2011-291, s. 2.59, and Session Laws 2011-398, s. 7 both amended G.S. 150B-21.11 in the coded bill drafting format provided by G.S. 120-20.1. However, the amendment by Session Laws 2011-398, s. 7 did not account for all of the changes made by Session Laws 2011-291, s. 2.59, and the section has been set out in the form above at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 62, is a severability clause.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-291, s. 2.59, effective June 24, 2011, substituted "Joint Regulatory Reform Committee" for "Joint Legislative Administrative Procedure Oversight Committee" in the first paragraph.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 7, effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to rules adopted on or after that date, in the first paragraph, inserted "and" and deleted "and include the text of the approved rule and a summary of the rule in its next report to the Joint Legislative Administrative Procedure Oversight Committee" from the end.

Session Laws 2018-142, s. 22, effective December 15, 2018, deleted "Regulatory Reform" from the end of the first paragraph.

§ 150B-21.12. Procedure when Commission objects to a permanent rule.

  1. Action. - When the Commission objects to a permanent rule, it must send the agency that adopted the rule a written statement of the objection and the reason for the objection. The agency that adopted the rule must take one of the following actions:
    1. Change the rule to satisfy the Commission's objection and submit the revised rule to the Commission.
    2. Submit a written response to the Commission indicating that the agency has decided not to change the rule.
  2. Time Limit. - An agency that is not a board or commission must take one of the actions listed in subsection (a) of this section within 30 days after receiving the Commission's statement of objection. A board or commission must take one of these actions within 30 days after receiving the Commission's statement of objection or within 10 days after the board or commission's next regularly scheduled meeting, whichever comes later.
  3. Changes. - When an agency changes a rule in response to an objection by the Commission, the Commission must determine whether the change satisfies the Commission's objection. If it does, the Commission must approve the rule. If it does not, the Commission must send the agency a written statement of the Commission's continued objection and the reason for the continued objection. The Commission must also determine whether the change is substantial. In making this determination, the Commission shall use the standards set forth in G.S. 150B-21.2(g). If the change is substantial, the revised rule shall be published and reviewed in accordance with the procedure set forth in G.S. 150B-21.1(a3) and (b).
  4. Return of Rule. - A rule to which the Commission has objected remains under review by the Commission until the agency that adopted the rule decides not to satisfy the Commission's objection and makes a written request to the Commission to return the rule to the agency. When the Commission returns a rule to which it has objected, it must notify the Codifier of Rules of its action. If the rule that is returned would have increased or decreased expenditures or revenues of a unit of local government, the Commission must also notify the Governor of its action and must send a copy of the record of the Commission's review of the rule to the Governor. The record of review consists of the rule, the Commission's letter of objection to the rule, the agency's written response to the Commission's letter, and any other relevant documents before the Commission when it decided to object to the rule.

Regulatory Reform

History

(1991, c. 418, s. 1; 1995, c. 415, s. 5; c. 507, s. 27.8(h), (y); 2003-229, s. 10; 2011-291, s. 2.60; 2011-398, s. 8.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2009-216, as amended by Session Laws 2009-484, s. 7(a) and (b), provided for improvements in the management of the Jordan Watershed in order to restore water quality in the Jordan Reservoir. See Editor's note at G.S. 143-214.7 for details.

Session Laws 2009-216, s. 2(c), provides: "Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to replace Wastewater Discharge Rule 15A NCAC 02B.0270. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 2(b) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.9 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2)." Section 2 of Session Laws 2009-216 pertains to wastewater discharge into the Jordan Lake Reservoir.

Session Laws 2009-216, s. 3(j), provides: "Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to replace Sections 3(c) through 3(i) of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Sections 3(c) through 3(f) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.9 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2)." Section 3 of Session Laws 2009-216 pertains to stormwater management, Jordan Lake Reservoir. For provisions on interpretation of certain rules to implement nutrient management strategies for the B. Everett Jordan Reservoir adopted pursuant to Session Laws 2009-216, see Session Laws 2012-187, s. 12.1.

Session Laws 2011-291, s. 2.60, and Session Laws 2011-398, s. 8 both amended G.S. 150B-21.12 in the coded bill drafting format provided by G.S. 120-20.1. However, the amendment by Session Laws 2011-398, s. 8 did not account for all of the changes made by Session Laws 2011-291, s. 2.60, and the section has been set out in the form above at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 62, is a severability clause.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-291, s. 2.60, effective June 24, 2011, substituted "Joint Regulatory Reform Committee" for "Joint Legislative Administrative Procedure Oversight Committee" in the second sentence of subsection (d).

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 8, effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to rules adopted on or after that date, deleted "and must send a copy of the record of the Commission's review of the rule to the Joint Legislative Administrative Procedure Oversight Committee in its next report to that Committee" from the end of the second sentence in subsection (d).

CASE NOTES

Applied in Affordable Care, Inc. v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 153 N.C. App. 527, 571 S.E.2d 52 (2002).


§ 150B-21.13. Procedure when Commission extends period for review of permanent rule.

When the Commission extends the period for review of a permanent rule, it must notify the agency that adopted the rule of the extension and the reason for the extension. After the Commission extends the period for review of a rule, it may call a public hearing on the rule. Within 70 days after extending the period for review of a rule, the Commission must decide whether to approve the rule, object to the rule, or call a public hearing on the rule.

History

(1991, c. 418, s. 1.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2009-216, as amended by Session Laws 2009-484, s. 7(a) and (b), provided for improvements in the management of the Jordan Watershed in order to restore water quality in the Jordan Reservoir. See Editor's note at G.S. 143-214.7 for details.

Session Laws 2009-216, s. 2, pertains to wastewater discharge into the Jordan Lake Reservoir.

Session Laws 2009-216, s. 2(c), provides: "Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to replace Wastewater Discharge Rule 15A NCAC 02B.0270. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 2(b) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.9 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2)."

Session Laws 2009-216, s. 3, pertains to stormwater management of the Jordan Lake Reservoir.

Session Laws 2009-216, s. 3(j), provides: "Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to replace Sections 3(c) through 3(i) of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Sections 3(c) through 3(f) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.9 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2)."

§ 150B-21.14. Public hearing on a rule.

The Commission may call a public hearing on a rule when it extends the period for review of the rule. At the request of an agency, the Commission may call a public hearing on a rule that is not before it for review. Calling a public hearing on a rule not already before the Commission for review places the rule before the Commission for review. When the Commission decides to call a public hearing on a rule, it must publish notice of the public hearing in the North Carolina Register.

After a public hearing on a rule, the Commission must approve the rule or object to the rule in accordance with the standards and procedures in this Part. The Commission must make its decision of whether to approve or object to the rule within 70 days after the public hearing.

History

(1991, c. 418, s. 1.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2009-216, as amended by Session Laws 2009-484, s. 7(a) and (b), provided for improvements in the management of the Jordan Watershed in order to restore water quality in the Jordan Reservoir. See Editor's note at G.S. 143-214.7 for details.

Session Laws 2009-216, s. 2, pertains to wastewater discharge into the Jordan Lake Reservoir.

Session Laws 2009-216, s. 2(c), provides: "Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to replace Wastewater Discharge Rule 15A NCAC 02B.0270. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Section 2(b) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.9 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2)."

Session Laws 2009-216, s. 3, pertains to stormwater management of the Jordan Lake Reservoir.

Session Laws 2009-216, s. 3(j), provides: "Additional Rule-Making Authority. - The Commission shall adopt a rule to replace Sections 3(c) through 3(i) of this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 150B-19(4), the rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to this section shall be substantively identical to the provisions of Sections 3(c) through 3(f) of this act. Rules adopted pursuant to this section are not subject to G.S. 150B-21.9 through G.S. 150B-21.14. Rules adopted pursuant to this section shall become effective as provided in G.S. 150B-21.3(b1) as though 10 or more written objections had been received as provided by G.S. 150B-21.3(b2)." For provisions on interpretation of certain rules to implement nutrient management strategies for the B. Everett Jordan Reservoir adopted pursuant to Session Laws 2009-216, see Session Laws 2012-187, s. 12.1.

CASE NOTES

Cited in State ex rel. McCrory v. Berger, 368 N.C. 633, 781 S.E.2d 248 (2016).


§ 150B-21.15: Repealed by Session Laws 1995, c. 507, s. 27.8(i), effective December 1, 1995.

§ 150B-21.16: Repealed by Session Laws 2011-398, s. 9, effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to rules adopted on or after that date.

History

(1995, c. 507, s. 27.8(j); 2011-291, s. 2.61; repealed by 2011-398, s. 9, effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to rules adopted on or after that date.)

Editor's Note. - Former G.S. 150B-21.16 pertained to reports to the Joint Legislative Administrative Procedure Oversight Committee.

PART 4. PUBLICATION OF CODE AND REGISTER.

§ 150B-21.17. North Carolina Register.

  1. Content. - The Codifier of Rules must publish the North Carolina Register. The North Carolina Register must be published at least two times a month and must contain the following:
    1. Temporary rules entered in the North Carolina Administrative Code.
    2. The text of proposed rules and the text of permanent rules approved by the Commission.
    3. Emergency rules entered into the North Carolina Administrative Code.
    4. Repealed by Session Laws 2011-398, s. 10,  effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to rules adopted on or after that date
    5. Executive orders of the Governor.
    6. Final decision letters from the United States Attorney General concerning changes in laws that affect voting in a jurisdiction subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as required by G.S. 120-30.9H.
    7. Repealed by Session Laws 2011-330, s. 33(c), effective June 27, 2011, and by Session Laws 2011-398, s. 10,  effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to rules adopted on or after that date.
    8. Other information the Codifier determines to be helpful to the public.
  2. Form. - When an agency publishes notice in the North Carolina Register of the proposed text of a new rule, the Codifier of Rules must publish the complete text of the proposed new rule. In publishing the text of a proposed new rule, the Codifier must indicate the rule is new by underlining the proposed text of the rule.
  3. The Codifier may authorize and license the private indexing, marketing, sales, reproduction, and distribution of the Register.

When an agency publishes notice in the North Carolina Register of the proposed text of an amendment to an existing rule, the Codifier must publish the complete text of the rule that is being amended unless the Codifier determines that publication of the complete text of the rule being amended is not necessary to enable the reader to understand the proposed amendment. In publishing the text of a proposed amendment to a rule, the Codifier must indicate deleted text with overstrikes and added text with underlines.

When an agency publishes notice in the North Carolina Register of the proposed repeal of an existing rule, the Codifier must publish the complete text of the rule the agency proposes to repeal unless the Codifier determines that publication of the complete text is impractical. In publishing the text of a rule the agency proposes to repeal, the Codifier must indicate the rule is to be repealed.

History

(1991, c. 418, s. 1; 1995, c. 507, s. 27.8(k); 2001-141, s. 6; 2001-421, s. 1.4; 2003-229, s. 11; 2006-66, s. 18.1; 2011-330, s. 33(c); 2011-398, s. 10.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1985, c. 746, s. 4, effective January 1, 1986, provided: "All personnel and equipment presently assigned to the Department of Justice for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of Article 5, Chapter 150A [recodified as this Article] of the General Statutes, are transferred to the Office of Administrative Hearings by a Type I transfer as defined by G.S. 143A-6(a)."

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2006-66, s. 18.1, effective July 1, 2006, added subsection (c).

Session Laws 2011-330, s. 33(c), effective June 27, 2011, repealed subdivision (a)(5), which read: "Orders of the Tax Review Board issued under G.S. 105-241.2."

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 10, effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to rules adopted on or after that date, deleted subdivision (a)(2), which read: "Notices of receipt of a petition for municipal incorporation, as required by G.S. 120-165"; and deleted subdivision (a)(5), which read: "Orders of the Tax Review Board issued under G.S. 105-241.2."

§ 150B-21.18. North Carolina Administrative Code.

The Codifier of Rules must compile all rules into a Code known as the North Carolina Administrative Code. The format and indexing of the Code must conform as nearly as practical to the format and indexing of the North Carolina General Statutes. The Codifier must publish printed copies of the Code and may publish the Code in other forms. The Codifier may authorize and license the private indexing, marketing, sales, reproduction, and distribution of the Code. The Codifier must keep superseded rules.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1979, c. 69, ss. 3, 7; c. 541, s. 2; c. 688, s. 1; 1979, 2nd Sess., c. 1266, ss. 1-3; 1981 (Reg. Sess., 1982), c. 1359, s. 6; 1983, c. 641, s. 6; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1003, s. 2; c. 1022, s. 1(1), (19); c. 1032, s. 12; 1987, c. 774, ss. 2-4; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1111, s. 3; 1989, c. 500, s. 43(a); 1991, c. 418, s. 1; 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994), c. 777, s. 2; 2011-398, s. 11.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 11, effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to rules adopted on or after that date, deleted the former fourth sentence, which read: "The Codifier must keep the Code current by publishing the Code in a loose-leaf format and periodically providing new pages to be substituted for outdated pages, by publishing the Code in volumes and periodically publishing cumulative supplements, or by another means."

§ 150B-21.19. Requirements for including rule in Code.

To be acceptable for inclusion in the North Carolina Administrative Code, a rule must:

  1. Cite the law under which the rule is adopted.
  2. Be signed by the head of the agency or the rule-making coordinator for the agency that adopted the rule.
  3. Be in the physical form specified by the Codifier of Rules.
  4. Have been approved by the Commission, if the rule is a permanent rule.
  5. Have complied with the provisions of G.S. 12-3.1, if the rule establishes a new fee or increases an existing fee.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1979, c. 571, s. 1; 1981, c. 688, s. 14; 1983, c. 927, ss. 6, 9; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1022, s. 1(1); c. 1028, s. 35; 1987, c. 285, s. 16; 1991, c. 418, s. 1; 1995, c. 507, s. 27.8( l ); 2002-97, s. 4.)

§ 150B-21.20. Codifier's authority to revise rules.

  1. Authority. - After consulting with the agency that adopted the rule, the Codifier of Rules may revise a rule to do one or more of the following:
    1. Rearrange the order of the rule in the Code or the order of the subsections, subdivisions, or other subparts of the rule.
    2. Provide a catch line or heading for the rule or revise the catch line or heading of the rule.
    3. Reletter or renumber the rule or the subparts of the rule in accordance with a uniform system.
    4. Rearrange definitions and lists.
    5. Make other changes in arrangement or in form that do not change the substance of the rule and are necessary or desirable for a clear and orderly arrangement of the rule.
    6. Omit from the published rule a map, a diagram, an illustration, a chart, or other graphic material, if the Codifier of Rules determines that the Office of Administrative Hearings does not have the capability to publish the material or that publication of the material is not practicable. When the Codifier of Rules omits graphic material from the published rule, the Codifier must insert a reference to the omitted material and information on how to obtain a copy of the omitted material.
    7. Substitute one name for another when an organization or position is renamed.
    8. Correct a citation in the rule to another rule or law when the citation has become inaccurate since the rule was adopted because of the repeal or renumbering of the cited rule or law.
    9. Change information that is readily available to the public, such as an address, email address, a telephone number, or a Web site.
    10. Correct a typographical error.
  2. Effect. - Revision of a rule by the Codifier of Rules under this section does not affect the effective date of the rule or require the agency to readopt or resubmit the rule. When the Codifier of Rules revises the form of a rule, the Codifier of Rules must send the agency that adopted the rule a copy of the revised rule. The revised rule is the official rule, unless the rule was revised under subdivision (a)(6) of this section to omit graphic material. When a rule is revised under that subdivision, the official rule is the published text of the rule plus the graphic material that was not published.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1979, c. 571, s. 1; 1981, c. 688, s. 14; 1983, c. 927, ss. 6, 9; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1022, s. 1(1); c. 1028, s. 35; 1987, c. 285, s. 16; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1111, s. 23; 1991, c. 418, s. 1; 1997-34, s. 6; 2013-143, s. 3; 2019-140, s. 1(b).)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2007-444, s. 5.5(a) and(b), provides: "(a) Wherever the name 'Division of Facility Services' appears in the North Carolina Administrative Code, the Codifier of Rules shall replace 'Division of Facility Services' with 'Division of Health Service Regulation.'

"(b) Wherever the name 'Health Services Commission' appears in the North Carolina Administrative Code, the Codifier of Rules shall replace 'Health Services Commission' with 'Commission for Public Health.'"

Session Laws 2014-115, s. 55.3(h), provides: "The Codifier of Rules shall make all necessary changes in nomenclature in Title 25 of the North Carolina Administrative Rules as follows:

"(1) To change the name of the Office of State Personnel to the Office of State Human Resources.

"(2) To change the name of the State Personnel Commission to the State Human Resources Commission.

"(3) To change the name of the Director of the Office of State Personnel to the Director of the Office of State Human Resources.

"(4) To change the name of the Office of State Personnel Director to the Office of State Human Resources Director.

"(5) Any other change consistent with this section."

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2019-140, s. 1(b), effective July 19, 2019, deleted "form of" preceding "rules" from the catchline; substituted "a rule" for "the form of a rule submitted for inclusion in the North Carolina Administrative Code" in subsection (a); and added subdivisions (a)(7)-(a)(10).

§ 150B-21.21. Publication of rules of North Carolina State Bar, Building Code Council, and exempt agencies.

  1. State Bar. - The North Carolina State Bar must submit a rule adopted or approved by it and entered in the minutes of the North Carolina Supreme Court to the Codifier of Rules for inclusion in the North Carolina Administrative Code. The State Bar must submit a rule within 30 days after it is entered in the minutes of the Supreme Court. The Codifier of Rules must compile, make available for public inspection, and publish a rule included in the North Carolina Administrative Code under this subsection in the same manner as other rules in the Code.
  2. Building Code Council. - The Building Code Council shall publish the North Carolina State Building Code as provided in G.S. 143-138(g). The Codifier of Rules is not required to publish the North Carolina State Building Code in the North Carolina Administrative Code.
  3. Exempt Agencies. - Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an agency that is exempted from this Article by G.S. 150B-1 or any other statute must submit a temporary or permanent rule adopted by it to the Codifier of Rules for inclusion in the North Carolina Administrative Code. These exempt agencies must submit a rule to the Codifier of Rules within 30 days after adopting the rule.
  4. Publication. - A rule submitted to the Codifier of Rules under this section must be in the physical form specified by the Codifier of Rules. The Codifier of Rules must compile, make available for public inspection, and publish a rule submitted under this section in the same manner as other rules in the North Carolina Administrative Code.

History

(1991, c. 418, s. 1; 1997-34, s. 7; 2001-141, s. 7; 2011-398, s. 12.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 12, effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to rules adopted on or after that date, rewrote subsection (b).

§ 150B-21.22. Effect of inclusion in Code.

Official or judicial notice can be taken of a rule in the North Carolina Administrative Code and shall be taken when appropriate.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1991, c. 418, s. 1; 1997-34, s. 8.)

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A.

Judicial Notice of Regulations. - Where promulgating agency is not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, the court is only required to take judicial notice of its regulations if submitted in accordance with certain procedures designed to insure their accuracy. Southern Ry. v. O'Boyle Tank Lines, 70 N.C. App. 1, 318 S.E.2d 872 (1984).

Applied in Steele v. City of Durham, 245 N.C. App. 318, 782 S.E.2d 331 (2016).


§ 150B-21.23: Repealed by Session Laws 2011-398, s. 13, effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to rules adopted on or after that date.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1979, c. 571, s. 1; 1981, c. 688, s. 14; 1983, c. 927, ss. 6, 9; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1022, s. 1(1); c. 1028, s. 35; 1987, c. 285, s. 16; 1991, c. 418, s. 1; 1997-34, s. 9; repealed by 2011-398, s. 13, effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to rules adopted on or after that date.)

Editor's Note. - Former G.S. 150B-21.23 pertained to a manual for rule publication.

§ 150B-21.24. Access to Register and Code.

  1. Register. - The Codifier of Rules shall make available the North Carolina Register on the Internet at no charge.
  2. Code. - The Codifier of Rules shall make available the North Carolina Administrative Code on the Internet at no charge.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; c. 69, ss. 3, 7; c. 688, s. 1; 1979, c. 541, s. 2; 1979, 2nd Sess., c. 1266, ss. 1-3; 1981 (Reg. Sess., 1982), c. 1359, s. 6; 1983, c. 641, s. 6; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1003, s. 2; c. 1022, s. 1(1), (19); c. 1032, s. 12; 1987, c. 774, ss. 2-4; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1111, s. 3; 1989, c. 500, s. 43(a); 1991, c. 418, s. 1; 2002-97, s. 1; 2011-145, s. 24.1.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-145, s. 24.1, effective July 1, 2011, deleted the former last sentence of subsection (a), which read: "Upon request the Codifier shall provide a free copy of the current volume of the Register to any person who receives a free copy of the North Carolina Administrative Code or any member of the General Assembly"; deleted the former last sentence of subsection (b), which read: "The Codifier shall distribute copies of the North Carolina Administrative Code as soon after publication as practical, without charge, to the following"; and deleted subdivisions (b)(1) through (b)(9), which were the destinations of the aforementioned copies of the North Carolina Administrative Code.

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "A Powerless Judiciary? The North Carolina Courts' Perceptions of Review of Administrative Action," see 12 N.C. Cent. L.J. 21 (1980).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A.

Administrative remedies prescribed by environmental regulations were inadequate where they were not published as required by Article 5 of former Chapter 150A. Orange County Sensible Hwys. & Protected Env'ts, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 46 N.C. App. 350, 265 S.E.2d 890 (1980).


§ 150B-21.25. Paid copies of Register and Code.

A person who is not entitled to a free copy of the North Carolina Administrative Code or North Carolina Register may obtain a copy by paying a fee set by the Codifier of Rules. The Codifier must set separate fees for the North Carolina Register and the North Carolina Administrative Code in amounts that cover publication, copying, and mailing costs. All monies received under this section must be credited to the General Fund.

History

(1991, c. 418, s. 1.)

PART 5. RULES AFFECTING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

§ 150B-21.26. Office of State Budget and Management to conduct preliminary review of certain administrative rules.

  1. Preliminary Review. -  At least 60 days before an agency publishes in the North Carolina Register the proposed text of a permanent rule change that would affect the expenditures or revenues of a unit of local government, the agency must submit all of the following to the Office of State Budget and Management for preliminary review:
    1. The text of the proposed rule change.
    2. A short explanation of the reason for the proposed change.
    3. A fiscal note stating the amount by which the proposed rule change would increase or decrease expenditures or revenues of a unit of local government and explaining how the amount was computed.
  2. Scope. -  The preliminary review of a proposed permanent rule change that would affect the expenditures or revenues of a unit of local government shall include consideration of the following:
    1. The agency's explanation of the reason for the proposed change.
    2. Any unanticipated effects of the proposed change on local government budgets.
    3. The potential costs of the proposed change weighed against the potential risks to the public of not taking the proposed change.

History

(1995, c. 415, s. 3; c. 507, s. 27.8(w); 2011-398, s. 14.)

Editor's Note. - This Part was enacted by Session Laws 1995, c. 415, s. 3, as Part 4 of Article 2A. It has been renumbered as Part 5 at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.

Session Laws 2014-4, s. 2(g), provides: "The Mining and Energy Commission, the Environmental Management Commission, and the Commission for Public Health are exempt from the provisions of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes that require that a certification be obtained from the Office of State Budget and Management, including requirements under G.S. 150B-19.1(h) and G.S. 150B-21.4, and any requirement for preliminary review by the Office of State Budget and Management pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.26, for any rule proposed for the creation of a modern regulatory program for the management of oil and gas exploration and development activities in the State, including the use of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing for that purpose."

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 14, effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to rules adopted on or after that date, in the section catchline and in the introductory paragraph of subsection (a), substituted "Office of State Budget and Management" for "Governor"; in the introductory paragraph of subsection (a), substituted "60 days" for "30 days"; and in the introductory paragraph of subsection (b), deleted "Governor's" preceding "preliminary review."

§ 150B-21.27. Minimizing the effects of rules on local budgets.

In adopting permanent rules that would increase or decrease the expenditures or revenues of a unit of local government, the agency shall consider the timing for implementation of the proposed rule as part of the preparation of the fiscal note required by G.S. 150B-21.4(b). If the computation of costs in a fiscal note indicates that the proposed rule change will disrupt the budget process as set out in the Local Government Budget and Fiscal Control Act, Article 3 of Chapter 159 of the General Statutes, the agency shall specify the effective date of the change as July 1 following the date the change would otherwise become effective under G.S. 150B-21.3.

History

(1995, c. 415, s. 3; c. 507, s. 27.8(x).)

§ 150B-21.28. Role of the Office of State Budget and Management.

The Office of State Budget and Management shall:

  1. Compile an annual summary of the projected fiscal impact on units of local government of State administrative rules adopted during the preceding fiscal year.
  2. Compile from information provided by each agency schedules of anticipated rule actions for the upcoming fiscal year.
  3. Provide the Governor, the General Assembly, the North Carolina Association of County Commissioners, and the North Carolina League of Municipalities with a copy of the annual summary and schedules by no later than March 1 of each year.

History

(1995, c. 415, s. 3; 2000-140, s. 93.1(a); 2001-424, s. 12.2(b).)

ARTICLE 3. Administrative Hearings.

Sec.

§ 150B-22. Settlement; contested case.

  1. It is the policy of this State that any dispute between an agency and another person that involves the person's rights, duties, or privileges, including licensing or the levy of a monetary penalty, should be settled through informal procedures. In trying to reach a settlement through informal procedures, the agency may not conduct a proceeding at which sworn testimony is taken and witnesses may be cross-examined.
  2. If the agency and the other person do not agree to a resolution of the dispute through informal procedures, either the agency or the person may commence an administrative proceeding to determine the person's rights, duties, or privileges, at which time the dispute becomes a "contested case." A party or person aggrieved shall not be required to petition an agency for rule making or to seek or obtain a declaratory ruling before commencing a contested case pursuant to G.S. 150B-23.

History

(1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1022, s. 1(11); 1991, c. 418, s. 16; 2019-140, s. 2(a).)

Department of Health and Human Services Waiver Application. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 55.1, provides: "Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 6504, the Department of Health and Human Services shall request a waiver from the single State agency requirement contained in 42 C.F.R. § 432.10(e)(3) with regard to final decisions in administrative hearings. The waiver application shall include the following:

"(1) The waiver request is made at the direction of the North Carolina General Assembly, which is responsible for the organizational structure of State government.

"(2) The single State agency requirement prevents the establishment of the most effective and efficient arrangement for providing administrative hearings to claimants because it requires that after a hearing and decision by an administrative law judge, the case must be returned to the agency for a final decision. The return to the agency is an unnecessary, time-consuming, and costly additional step.

"(3) The use of another State administrative hearings arrangement will not endanger the objectives of the law authorizing the Medicaid program because the administrative law judges will abide by the properly adopted policies, rules, and regulations of the State Medicaid agency in making final decisions."

Request to Administer Certain Environmental Protection Programs. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 55.2, as amended by Session Laws 2012-187, s. 7.3, provides: "If necessary to effectuate the purposes of this act, the Office of Administrative Hearings shall seek United States Environmental Protection Agency approval to become an agency responsible for administering programs under the federal Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. On or before December 31, 2011, the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall jointly develop and submit any Memoranda of Agreement, delineations of programmatic responsibility, procedure for coordination, and other information that United States Environmental Protection Agency may require in order to effectuate any necessary approval process."

Report on Mediation. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 61.1, effective July 25, 2011, provides: "The Office of Administrative Hearings shall evaluate the use of mediated settlement conferences under G.S. 150B-23.1 and shall develop a plan to expand the use of mediation in the contested case process. The Office of Administrative Hearings shall report its findings and recommendations to the Joint Legislative Regulatory Reform Committee by February 1, 2012."

Appeal to State MH/DD/SA Appeals Panel. - Session Laws 2008-107, s. 10.15A(h1)-(h6), as amended and added to by Session Laws 2008-118, s. 3.13(a), (b), and as amended by Session Laws 2009-526, s. 2(a) and (b), Session Laws 2009-550, s. 1.1(a) and (b), and Session Laws 2010-31, s. 10.30(b), provides:

"(h1)(1) General Rule. - Notwithstanding any provision of State law or rules to the contrary, this subsection shall govern the process used by a Medicaid applicant or recipient to appeal a determination made by the Department of Health and Human Services to deny, terminate, suspend, or reduce Medicaid covered services. For purposes of this subsection, the phrase 'adverse determination' means a determination by the Department to deny, terminate, suspend, or reduce Medicaid covered services. For purposes of this subsection, all references to an applicant or recipient include the applicant or recipient's parent, guardian, or legal representative; however, notice need only be given to a parent, guardian, or legal representative who has requested in writing to receive the notice.

"(2) Notice. - Except as otherwise provided by federal law or regulation, at least 10 days before the effective date of an adverse determination, the Department shall notify the applicant or recipient, and the provider, if applicable, in writing of the determination and of the applicant's or recipient's right to appeal the determination. The notice shall be mailed on the date indicated on the notice as the date of the determination. The notice shall include:

"a. An identification of the applicant or recipient whose services are being affected by the adverse determination, including full name and Medicaid identification number.

"b. An explanation of what service is being denied, terminated, suspended, or reduced and the reason for the determination.

"c. The specific regulation, statute, or medical policy that supports or requires the adverse determination.

"d. The effective date of the adverse determination.

"e. An explanation of the applicant's or recipient's right to appeal the Department's adverse determination in an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge.

"f. An explanation of how the applicant or recipient can request a hearing and a statement that the applicant or recipient may represent himself or use legal counsel, a relative, or other spokesperson.

"g. A statement that the applicant or recipient will continue to receive Medicaid services at the level provided on the day immediately preceding the Department's adverse determination or the amount requested by the applicant or recipient, whichever is less, if the applicant or recipient requests a hearing before the effective date of the adverse determination. The services shall continue until the hearing is completed and a final decision is rendered.

"h. The name and telephone number of a contact person at the Department to respond in a timely fashion to the applicant's or recipient's questions.

"i. The telephone number by which the applicant or recipient may contact a Legal Aid/Legal Services office.

"j. The appeal request form described in subdivision (4) of this subsection that the applicant or recipient may use to request a hearing.

"(3) Appeals. - Except as provided by this subsection and subsection 10.15A(h2) of this act, a request for a hearing to appeal an adverse determination of the Department under this section is a contested case subject to the provisions of Article 3 of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes. The applicant or recipient must request a hearing within 30 days of the mailing of the notice required by subdivision (2) of this subsection by sending an appeal request form to the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department. Where a request for hearing concerns the reduction, modification, or termination of Medicaid services, upon the receipt of a timely appeal, the Department shall reinstate the services to the level or manner prior to action by the Department as permitted by federal law or regulation. The Department shall immediately forward a copy of the notice to the Office of Administrative Hearings electronically. The information contained in the notice is confidential unless the recipient appeals. The Office of Administrative Hearings may dispose of the records after one year. The Department may not influence, limit, or interfere with the applicant's or recipient's decision to request a hearing.

"4. Appeal Request Form. - Along with the notice required by subdivision (2) of this subsection, the Department shall also provide the applicant or recipient with an appeal request form which shall be no more than one side of one page. The form shall include the following:

"a. A statement that in order to request an appeal, the applicant or recipient must send the form by mail or fax to the address or fax number listed on the form within 30 days of mailing of the notice.

"b. The applicant's or recipient's name, address, telephone number, and Medicaid identification number.

"c. A preprinted statement that indicates that the applicant or recipient would like to appeal the specific adverse determination of which the applicant or recipient was notified in the notice.

"d. A statement informing the applicant or recipient that he or she may choose to be represented by a lawyer, a relative, a friend, or other spokesperson.

"e. A space for the applicant's or recipient's signature and date.

"(5) Final Decision. - After a hearing before an administrative law judge, the judge shall return the decision and record to the Department in accordance with subsection 10.15A(h2) of this act. The Department shall make a final decision in the case within 20 days of receipt of the decision and record from the administrative law judge and promptly notify the applicant or recipient of the final decision and of the right to judicial review of the decision pursuant to Article 4 of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes.

"(h2)(1) Application. - This subsection applies only to contested Medicaid cases commenced by Medicaid applicants or recipients under subsection 10.15A(h1) of this act. Except as otherwise provided by subsection 10.15A(h1) and this subsection governing time lines and procedural steps, a contested Medicaid case commenced by a Medicaid applicant or recipient is subject to the provisions of Article 3 of Chapter 150B. To the extent any provision in this subsection or subsection 10.15A(h1) of this act conflicts with another provision in Article 3 of Chapter 150B, this subsection and subsection 10.15A(h1) controls.

"(2) Simple Procedures. - Notwithstanding any other provision of Article 3 of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes, the chief administrative law judge may limit and simplify the procedures that apply to a contested Medicaid case involving a Medicaid applicant or recipient in order to complete the case as quickly as possible. To the extent possible, the Office of Administrative Hearings shall schedule and hear all contested Medicaid cases within 55 days of submission of a request for appeal. Hearings shall be conducted telephonically or by video technology, however the recipient or applicant, or the recipient's or applicant's representative may request that the hearing be conducted before the administrative law judge in-person. An in-person hearing shall be conducted in Wake County, however for good cause shown, the in-person hearing may be conducted in the county of residence of the recipient or applicant. Good cause shall include but is not limited to the applicant's or recipient's impairments limiting travel or the unavailability of the applicant's or recipient's treating professional witnesses. The Department shall provide written notice to the recipient or applicant of the use of telephonic hearings, hearings by video conference, and in-person hearings before the administrative law judge, and how to request a hearing in the recipient's or applicant's county of residence. The simplified procedure may include requiring that all prehearing motions be considered and ruled on by the administrative law judge in the course of the hearing of the case on the merits. An administrative law judge assigned to a contested Medicaid case shall make reasonable efforts in a case involving a Medicaid applicant or recipient who is not represented by an attorney to assure a fair hearing and to maintain a complete record of the hearing. The administrative law judge may allow brief extensions of the time limits contained in this section for good cause and to ensure that the record is complete. Good cause includes delays resulting from untimely receipt of documentation needed to render a decision and other unavoidable and unforeseen circumstances. Continuances shall only be granted in accordance with rules adopted by the Office of Administrative Hearings, and shall not be granted on the day of the hearing, except for good cause shown. If a petitioner fails to make an appearance at a hearing that has been properly noticed via certified mail by the Office of Administrative Hearings, the Office of Administrative Hearings shall immediately dismiss the contested case provision.

"(3) Mediation. - Upon receipt of an appeal request form as provided by subdivision 10.15A(h1)(4) of this act or other clear request for a hearing by a Medicaid applicant or recipient, the Office of Administrative Hearings shall immediately notify the Mediation Network of North Carolina which shall within five days contact the petitioner to offer mediation in an attempt to resolve the dispute. If mediation is accepted, the mediation must be completed within 25 days of submission of the request for appeal. Upon completion of the mediation, the mediator shall inform the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department within 24 hours of the resolution by facsimile or electronic messaging. If the parties have resolved matters in the mediation, the case shall be dismissed by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The Office of Administrative Hearings shall not conduct any contested Medicaid cases hearings until it has received notice from the mediator assigned that either: (i) the mediation was unsuccessful, or (ii) the petitioner has rejected the offer of mediation, or (iii) the petitioner has failed to appear at a scheduled mediation. Nothing in this subdivision shall restrict the right to a contested case hearing.

"(4) Burden of Proof. - The petitioner has the burden of proof to show entitlement to a requested benefit or the propriety of requested agency action when the agency has denied the benefit or refused to take the particular action. The agency has the burden of proof when the appeal is from an agency determination to impose a penalty or reduce, terminate, or suspend a benefit previously granted. The party with the burden of proof on any issue has the burden of going forward, and the administrative law judge shall not make any ruling on the preponderance of evidence until the close of all evidence.

"(4a) New Evidence. - The petitioner shall be permitted to submit evidence regardless of whether obtained prior to or subsequent to the Department's actions and regardless of whether the Department had an opportunity to consider the evidence in making its determination to deny, reduce, terminate or suspend a benefit. When such evidence is received, at the request of the Department, the administrative law judge shall continue the hearing for a minimum of 15 days and a maximum of 30 days to allow for the Department's review of the evidence. Subsequent to review of the evidence, if the Department reverses its original decision, it shall immediately inform the administrative law judge.

"(4b) Issue for Hearing. - For each penalty imposed or benefit reduced, terminated, or suspended, the hearing shall determine whether the Department substantially prejudiced the rights of the petitioner and if the Department, based upon evidence at the hearing:

"a. Exceeded its authority or jurisdiction;

"b. Acted erroneously;

"c. Failed to use proper procedure;

"d. Acted arbitrarily or capriciously; or,

"e. Failed to act as required by law or rule.

"(5) Decision. - The administrative law judge assigned to a contested Medicaid case shall hear and decide the case without unnecessary delay. The Office of Administrative Hearings shall send a copy of the audiotape or diskette of the hearing to the agency within five days of completion of the hearing. The judge shall prepare a written decision and send it to the parties. The decision must be sent together with the record to the agency within 20 days of the conclusion of the hearing.

"(h3) From funds available to the Department of Health and Human Services (Department) for the 2010-2011 fiscal year, the sum of one million dollars ($1,000,000) shall be transferred by the Department to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). These funds shall be allocated by OAH for mediation services provided for Medicaid recipient appeals and to contract for other services necessary to conduct the appeals process. OAH shall continue the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Department for mediation services provided for Medicaid recipient appeals and contracted services necessary to conduct the appeals process. The MOA will facilitate the Department's ability to draw down federal Medicaid funds to support this administrative function. Upon receipt of invoices from OAH for covered services rendered in accordance with the MOA, the Department shall transfer the federal share of Medicaid funds drawn down for this purpose.

"(h4) Effective October 1, 2008, the Department of Health and Human Services shall discontinue its current informal appeals process for Medicaid applicants and recipients appealing a determination made by the Department to deny, terminate, suspend, or reduce Medicaid covered services. All such informal appeals by Medicaid applicants or recipients under the current system which are pending on that date and for which a hearing has not been held shall be discontinued and the applicant or recipient offered an opportunity to appeal to the Office of Administrative Hearings in accordance with the provisions of subsection 10.15A(h1) of this act. The Department shall make every effort to resolve or settle all of the backlogged cases prior to the effective date of this act.

"(h5) Nothing in this act shall prevent the Department of Health and Human Services from engaging in an informal review of the case with the applicant or recipient prior to issuing a notice of adverse determination as provided by subsection 10.15A(h1) of this act.

"(h6) The appeals process for Medicaid applicants and recipients established under this section shall expire July 1, 2010. The Department of Health and Human Services and the Office of Administrative Hearings shall each report to the House of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee on Health and Human Services, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Health and Human Services, the Joint Legislative Oversight Committee on Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, and Substance Abuse Services, and the Fiscal Research Division on March 1, 2009, October 1, 2009, and March 1, 2010, on the costs, effectiveness, and efficiency of the appeals process for Medicaid applicants and recipients and make recommendations regarding the continuation of the process."

Community Support Providers Appeals Process. - Session Laws 2008-107, s. 10.15A(e1)-(e4), as amended by Session Laws 2009-526, s. 2(c), provides for administrative appeals by community support providers. See notes under G.S. 150B-1, 122C-115.4, and 122C-151.4.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2008-107, s. 1.2, provides: "This act shall be known as 'The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2008.' "

Session Laws 2008-107, s. 30.3, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2008-2009 fiscal year, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2008-2009 fiscal year."

Session Laws 2008-107, s. 30.5, is a severability clause.

This chapter was amended by various sections in Session Laws 2011-398. Session Laws 2011-398, s. 63, as amended by Session Laws 2012-187, s. 8.1, provides in relevant part: "Sections 15 through 55 of this act become effective January 1, 2012, and apply to contested cases commenced on or after that date. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.2 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 of this act become effective when the United States Environmental Protection Agency approvals referenced in Section 55.2 have been issued or October 1, 2012, whichever occurs first. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.1 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 and Sections 32 and 33 of this act become effective when the waiver referenced in Section 55.1 has been granted or February 1, 2013, whichever occurs first. Unless otherwise provided elsewhere in this act, the remainder of this act is effective when it becomes law."

Session Laws 2020-3, s. 1.1(a)-(d), provides: "(a) Interest Waiver. - As a result of the COVID-19 outbreak, the Secretary of Revenue has extended the franchise, corporate income, and individual income tax payment deadline from April 15, 2020, to July 15, 2020, and pursuant to G.S. 105-249.2, the Secretary will not assess a penalty for failure to file a return or pay a tax due as long as the return is filed and the tax due is paid by July 15, 2020. Notwithstanding G.S. 105-241.21(b), the Secretary of Revenue shall also waive the accrual of interest from April 15, 2020, through July 15, 2020, on an underpayment of tax imposed on a franchise, corporate income, or individual income tax return, including a partnership and estate and trust tax return, due from April 15, 2020, through July 15, 2020. The relief from accrual of interest from April 15, 2020, through July 15, 2020, also includes interest imposed pursuant to G.S. 105-163.15 and G.S. 105-163.41 for payments due on or before July 15, 2020.

"(b) Refund Request. - For franchise, corporate income, and individual income tax, the statute of limitations for obtaining a refund is extended to July 15, 2020, for refund claims for which the statute of limitations to seek a refund expires on or after April 15, 2020, and before July 15, 2020.

"(c) Time-Sensitive Actions. - Certain actions required to be taken by a taxpayer on or after April 1, 2020, and before July 15, 2020, will be considered timely if the request or petition is filed on or before July 15, 2020. This subsection applies to requests for Departmental review under G.S. 105-241.11, petitions for a contested case hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings under Article 3 of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes and G.S. 105-241.15, and petitions for judicial review under Article 4 of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes and G.S. 105-241.16.

"(d) This section is effective when it becomes law." Session Laws 2020-3 became law on May 4, 2020.

Session Laws 2020-3, s. 5, is a severability clause.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2019-140, s. 2(a), effective July 19, 2019, designated the existing provisions as subsections (a) and (b), and added the last sentence to subsection (b).

Legal Periodicals. - For note on the Brownfields Property Reuse Act of 1997, see 78 N.C.L. Rev. 1015 (1998).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Many of the cases below were decided prior to the 1991 amendments to this Chapter.

Timely Petition. - Failure to timely petition for a hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings constituted waiver of any right to that administrative remedy. Citizens for Responsible Roadways v. N.C. DOT, 145 N.C. App. 497, 550 S.E.2d 253 (2001).

Petitioner's allegation that he had been "demoted in rank without sufficient cause" stated grounds for his department's action to be deemed "disciplinary" within the meaning and intent of G.S. 126-35 and for his case to be considered "contested" within the meaning and intent of G.S. 126-37(a) (now repealed). Because he had properly pursued all informal procedures mandated by the State Personnel Act [now the North Carolina Human Resources Act] and by the North Carolina Administrative Code for the resolution of his grievance, petitioner's appeal also fit the procedural profile of a "contested case" for purposes of its review by the Office of Administrative Hearings under this chapter. Batten v. North Carolina Dep't of Cor., 326 N.C. 338, 389 S.E.2d 35 (1990), overruled on other grounds, Empire Power Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 337 N.C. 569, 447 S.E.2d 168 (1994).

Dispute as "Contested Case" - Wildlife Resources Commission's rejection of sewer district's study and of its request for lower streamflow requirements constituted agency action giving rise to a dispute which ultimately became a "contested case" over which the Office of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction. Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 100 N.C. App. 171, 394 S.E.2d 668 (1990).

Where a trade association, adversely affected by certain licensing procedures, was a "person aggrieved" under G.S. 150B-2(6), and where licensing issues were deemed to be "contested cases" under G.S. 150B-2(2), (3) and G.S. 150B-22, the association had standing to bring a contested case challenging the state agencies' general permitting procedures for wood chip mills. N.C. Forestry Ass'n v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 357 N.C. 640, 588 S.E.2d 880 (2003).

Exception to Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement. - Insured's breach of contract claim was properly dismissed since she did not exhaust her administrative remedies or allege the inadequacy of her administrative remedies in the complaint; she did not fall within the exception to the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) exhaustion requirement for when the remedy established by the APA was inadequate. Kane v. N.C. Teachers' & State Emples. Comprehensive Maj. Med. Plan, 229 N.C. App. 386, 747 S.E.2d 420 (2013).

State Employee's Attempt to Recover for Surgery Costs. - State employee's dispute with the Board of Trustees of the Teachers' and State Employees' Comprehensive Major Medical Plan (now State Health Plan for Teachers and State Employees), an administrative agency, seeking to recover costs of surgery should have been brought under this Chapter. Vass v. Board of Trustees, 89 N.C. App. 333, 366 S.E.2d 1 (1988), modified and aff'd, 324 N.C. 402, 379 S.E.2d 26 (1989).

Authority To Enter Into Settlement Agreements. - Superior court did not err in affirming the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings to grant summary judgment for the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in corporations' action challenging the validity of a settlement DHHS entered into with an assisted living limited liability company (LLC), which gave the LLC a contractual right to develop adult care home beds, because the court of appeals was bound by its prior decisions holding that DHHS had the authority to enter settlement agreements pursuant to G.S. 150B-22. Ridge Care, Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 214 N.C. App. 498, 716 S.E.2d 390 (2011).

Authority To Settle. - Where the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services and the applicant engaged in litigation to determine whether the applicant's assisted living center projects were exempt from a moratorium on such projects, the Department and the North Carolina Attorney General properly exercised their statutory authority under G.S. 150B-22 to settle the litigation. Carillon Assisted Living, L.L.C. v. N.C. HHS, 175 N.C. App. 265, 623 S.E.2d 629, cert. denied, 360 N.C. 531, 633 S.E.2d 675,676 (2006), appeal dismissed, 361 N.C. 218, 641 (2007).

Signature of Attorney General Not Required. - Superior court did not err in affirming the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings to grant summary judgment for the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in corporations' action challenging the validity of a settlement DHHS entered into with an assisted living limited liability company (LLC), which gave the LLC a contractual right to develop adult care home beds, because the signature of the attorney general was not required in the settlement; there is no requirement in G.S. 150B-22 that the attorney general must execute a settlement. Ridge Care, Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 214 N.C. App. 498, 716 S.E.2d 390 (2011).

Applied in North Buncombe Ass'n of Concerned Citizens v. Rhodes, 100 N.C. App. 24, 394 S.E.2d 462, appeal dismissed, 327 N.C. 484, 397 S.E.2d 215 (1990); Homoly v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 125 N.C. App. 127, 479 S.E.2d 215 (1997); Mooresville Hosp. Mgmt. Assocs. v. N.C. HHS, Div. of Facility Servs., 169 N.C. App. 641, 611 S.E.2d 431 (2005).

Cited in Empire Power Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 337 N.C. 569, 447 S.E.2d 768, rehearing denied, 338 N.C. 314, 451 S.E.2d 634 (1994). Vass v. Board of Trustees, 324 N.C. 402, 379 S.E.2d 26 (1989); Ocean Hill Joint Venture v. North Carolina Dep't of Environment, Health & Natural Resources, 333 N.C. 318, 426 S.E.2d 274 (1993); Walker v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 111 N.C. App. 851, 433 S.E.2d 767 (1993); Jackson v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources Div. of Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, & Substance Abuse Servs., 131 N.C. App. 179, 505 S.E.2d 899 (1998), cert. denied, 350 N.C. 594, 537 S.E.2d 213 (1999); Howell v. Morton, 131 N.C. App. 626, 508 S.E.2d 804 (1998); Prentiss v. Allstate Ins. Co., 87 F. Supp. 2d 514 (W.D.N.C. 1999); DOT v. Blue, 147 N.C. App. 596, 556 S.E.2d 609 (2001); N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 599 S.E.2d 888 (2004).


§ 150B-22.1. Special education petitions.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, timelines and other procedural safeguards required to be provided under IDEA and Article 9 of Chapter 115C of the General Statutes must be followed in an impartial due process hearing initiated when a petition is filed under G.S. 115C-109.6 with the Office of Administrative Hearings.
  2. The administrative law judge who conducts a hearing under G.S. 115C-109.6 shall not be a person who has a personal or professional interest that conflicts with the judge's objectivity in the hearing. Furthermore, the judge must possess knowledge of, and the ability to understand, IDEA and legal interpretations of IDEA by federal and State courts. The judges are encouraged to participate in training developed and provided by the State Board of Education under G.S. 115C-107.2(h)[(g)].
  3. For the purpose of this section, the term "IDEA" means The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq., (2004), as amended, and its regulations.

History

(2006-69, s. 5.)

Editor's Note. - The bracketed reference, "[(g)]" in subsection (b), was added at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes as it appears to be the intended reference.

§ 150B-23. Commencement; assignment of administrative law judge; hearing required; notice; intervention.

  1. A contested case shall be commenced by paying a fee in an amount established in G.S. 150B-23.2 and by filing a petition with the Office of Administrative Hearings and, except as provided in Article 3A of this Chapter, shall be conducted by that Office. The party that files the petition shall serve a copy of the petition on all other parties and, if the dispute concerns a license, the person that holds the license. A party that files a petition shall file a certificate of service together with the petition. A petition shall be signed by a party, an attorney representing a party, or other representative of the party as may specifically be authorized by law, and, if filed by a party other than an agency, shall state facts tending to establish that the agency named as the respondent has deprived the petitioner of property, has ordered the petitioner to pay a fine or civil penalty, or has otherwise substantially prejudiced the petitioner's rights and that the agency did any of the following:
    1. Exceeded its authority or jurisdiction.
    2. Acted erroneously.
    3. Failed to use proper procedure.
    4. Acted arbitrarily or capriciously.
    5. Failed to act as required by law or rule.
  2. Repealed by Session Laws 1985 (Regular Session, 1986), c. 1022, s. 1(9).
  3. An administrative law judge assigned to a contested case may require a party to the case to file a prehearing statement. A party's prehearing statement shall be served on all other parties to the contested case.
  4. A Medicaid or NC Health Choice enrollee, or the enrollee's authorized representative, who appeals a notice of resolution issued by a managed care entity under Chapter 108D of the General Statutes may commence a contested case under this Article in the same manner as any other petitioner. The case shall be conducted in the same manner as other contested cases initiated by Medicaid or NC Health Choice enrollees under this Article. Solely and only for the purposes of contested cases commenced pursuant to G.S. 108D-15 by enrollees of LME/MCOs to appeal a notice of resolution issued by the LME/MCO, an LME/MCO is considered an agency as defined in G.S. 150B-2. The LME/MCO is not considered an agency for any other purpose. When a prepaid health plan, as defined in G.S. 108D-1, other than an LME/MCO, is under contract with the Department of Health and Human Services to issue notices of resolution under Article 2 of Chapter 108D of the General Statutes, then solely and only for the purposes of contested cases commenced pursuant to G.S. 108D-15 to appeal a notice of resolution issued by the prepaid health plan, the prepaid health plan is considered an agency as defined in G.S. 150B-2. The prepaid health plan is not considered an agency for any other purpose.
  5. If an agency fails to take any required action within the time period specified by law, any person whose rights are substantially prejudiced by the agency's failure to act may commence a contested case in accordance with this section seeking an order that the agency act as required by law. If the administrative law judge finds that the agency has failed to act as required by law, the administrative law judge may order that the agency take the required action within a specified time period.
  6. A county that appeals a decision of the Department of Health and Human Services to temporarily assume Medicaid eligibility administration in accordance with G.S. 108A-70.42 or G.S. 108A-70.50 may commence a contested case under this Article in the same manner as any other petitioner. The case shall be conducted in the same manner as other contested cases under this Article.
  7. The parties to a contested case shall be given a notice of hearing not less than 15 days before the hearing by the Office of Administrative Hearings. If prehearing statements have been filed in the case, the notice shall state the date, hour, and place of the hearing.  If prehearing statements have not been filed in the case, the notice shall state the date, hour, place, and nature of the hearing, shall list the particular sections of the statutes and rules involved, and shall give a short and plain statement of the factual allegations.
  8. Notice shall be given by one of the methods for service of process under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 4(j) or Rule 4(j3). If given by registered or certified mail, by signature confirmation as provided by the United States Postal Service, or by designated delivery service authorized pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7502(f)(2) with delivery receipt, notice is deemed to have been given on the delivery date appearing on the return receipt, copy of the proof of delivery provided by the United States Postal Service, or delivery receipt. If giving of notice cannot be accomplished by a method under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 4(j) or Rule 4(j3), notice shall then be given in the manner provided in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 4(j1).
  9. Any person may petition to become a party by filing a motion to intervene in the manner provided in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 24. In addition, any person interested in a contested case may intervene and participate in that proceeding to the extent deemed appropriate by the administrative law judge.
  10. All hearings under this Chapter shall be open to the public. Hearings shall be conducted in an impartial manner. Hearings shall be conducted according to the procedures set out in this Article, except to the extent and in the particulars that specific hearing procedures and time standards are governed by another statute.
  11. Unless another statute or a federal statute or regulation sets a time limitation for the filing of a petition in contested cases against a specified agency, the general limitation for the filing of a petition in a contested case is 60 days. The time limitation, whether established by another statute, federal statute, or federal regulation, or this section, commences when notice is given of the agency decision to all persons aggrieved that are known to the agency by personal delivery, electronic delivery, or by the placing of the notice in an official depository of the United States Postal Service wrapped in a wrapper addressed to the person at the latest address given by the person to the agency. The notice shall be in writing, shall set forth the agency action, and shall inform the persons of the right, the procedure, and the time limit to file a contested case petition. When no informal settlement request has been received by the agency prior to issuance of the notice, any subsequent informal settlement request shall not suspend the time limitation for the filing of a petition for a contested case hearing. When the Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court determines and declares that catastrophic conditions exist or have existed in one or more counties of the State and issues an order pursuant to G.S. 7A-39(b), the chief administrative law judge may by order entered pursuant to this subsection extend, to a date certain no fewer than 10 days after the effective date of the order, the time or period of limitation, whether established by another statute or this section, for the filing of a petition for a contested case. The order shall be in writing and becomes effective for each affected county upon the date set forth in the order, and if no date is set forth in the order, then upon the date the order is signed by the chief administrative law judge. The order shall provide that it expires upon the expiration of the Chief Justice's order.
  12. Where multiple licenses are required from an agency for a single activity, the Secretary or chief administrative officer of the agency may issue a written determination that the administrative decision reviewable under Article 3 of this Chapter occurs on the date the last license for the activity is issued, denied, or otherwise disposed of. The written determination of the administrative decision is not reviewable under this Article. Any licenses issued for the activity prior to the date of the last license identified in the written determination are not reviewable under this Article until the last license for the activity is issued, denied, or otherwise disposed of. A contested case challenging the last license decision for the activity may include challenges to agency decisions on any of the previous licenses required for the activity.

The parties in a contested case shall be given an opportunity for a hearing without undue delay. Any person aggrieved may commence a contested case under this section.

A local government employee, applicant for employment, or former employee to whom Chapter 126 of the General Statutes applies may commence a contested case under this Article in the same manner as any other petitioner. The case shall be conducted in the same manner as other contested cases under this Article.

A business entity may represent itself using a nonattorney representative who is one or more of the following of the business entity: (i) officer, (ii) manager or member-manager, if the business entity is a limited liability company, (iii) employee whose income is reported on IRS Form W-2, if the business entity authorizes the representation in writing, or (iv) owner of the business entity, if the business entity authorizes the representation in writing and if the owner's interest in the business entity is at least twenty-five percent (25%). Authority for and prior notice of nonattorney representation shall be made in writing, under penalty of perjury, to the Office on a form provided by the Office.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1975, 2nd Sess., c. 983, s. 65; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1022, ss. 1(9), (10), 6(2), (3); 1987, c. 878, ss. 3-5; c. 879, s. 6.1; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1111, s. 5; 1991, c. 35, s. 1; 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994), c. 572, s. 2; 2009-451, s. 21A.1(a); 2011-332, s. 2.1; 2011-398, s. 16; 2012-187, s. 6; 2013-397, s. 4; 2014-120, ss. 7(a), 48, 59(a); 2016-94, s. 12H.17(c); 2017-57, s. 11H.22(d); 2018-114, s. 1; 2019-81, s. 11; 2020-3, s. 4.26(a); 2021-88, s. 16(e).)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 62, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 63, as amended by Session Laws 2012-187, s. 8.1, provides in relevant part: "Sections 15 through 55 of this act become effective January 1, 2012, and apply to contested cases commenced on or after that date. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.2 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 of this act become effective when the United States Environmental Protection Agency approvals referenced in Section 55.2 have been issued or October 1, 2012, whichever occurs first. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.1 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 and Sections 32 and 33 of this act become effective when the waiver referenced in Section 55.1 has been granted or February 1, 2013, whichever occurs first. Unless otherwise provided elsewhere in this act, the remainder of this act is effective when it becomes law." Session Laws 2011-398, s. 16 rewrote the last paragraph of subsection (a) of this section. For Section 55.2, see editor's note under G.S. 150B-34.

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 12H.17(d), effective January 1, 2017, provides: "The corrective action procedures described in this section supersede the corrective action procedures in 10A NCAC 23C .0204 and 10A NCAC 23C .0205 related to timeliness processing of Medicaid applications by county departments of social services."

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 12H.17(e), effective July 1, 2016, provides: "The Department of Health and Human Services may adopt and amend rules to implement subsections (b) through (d) of this section."

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 12H.17(f), made subsection (a5), as enacted by Session Laws 2016-94, s. 12H.17(c), effective January 1, 2017, and applicable to monthly timely processing standards beginning on that date.

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 1.2, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2016.'"

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 39.4, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2016-2017 fiscal year, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2016-2017 fiscal year."

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 39.7, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2020-3, s. 5, is a severability clause.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2009-451, s. 21A.1(a), effective October 1, 2009, and applicable to contested cases filed on and after that date, inserted "paying a fee in an amount established in G.S. 150B-23.2 and by" in the first sentence of the introductory language of subsection (a).

Session Laws 2011-332, s. 2.1, effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to notices given on or after that date, rewrote subsection (c).

Session Laws 2014-120, s. 7(a), effective September 18, 2014, added the third undesignated paragraph to subsection (a). See Editor's note for applicability.

Session Laws 2014-120, s. 48, effective September 18, 2014, added subsection (g).

Session Laws 2014-120, s. 59(a), effective September 18, 2014, added subsection (a4).

Session Laws 2016-94, s. 12H.17(c), effective January 1, 2017, added subsection (a5). See editor's note for effective date and applicability.

Session Laws 2017-57, s. 11H.22(d), effective June 28, 2017, substituted "G.S. 108A-70.42 or G.S. 108A-70.50" for "G.S. 108A-70.37" in subsection (a5).

Session Laws 2018-114, s. 1, effective June 27, 2018, inserted ", electronic delivery," in the second sentence of subsection (f).

Session Laws 2019-81, s. 11, effective October 1, 2019, rewrote subsection (a3).

Session Laws 2020-3, s. 4.26(a), effective retroactively to March 10, 2020, added the last three sentences in subsection (f).

Session Laws 2021-88, s. 16(e), effective July 22, 2021, in subsection (a), substituted "party that” for "party who” two times and "person that” for "person who”, added "did any of the following” at the end of the first paragraph, and substituted "under this section” for "hereunder”; substituted "shall be served" for "must be served" in subsection (a2); substituted "G.S. 150B-2" for "G.S. 150B-2(1a)" two times, "is not considered" for "shall not be considered" two times, and "is considered" for "shall be considered" in subsection (a3); substituted "is deemed" for "shall be deemed" in subsection (c); and made technical changes throughout subsection (f).

Legal Periodicals. - For article on administrative evidence rules, see 49 N.C.L. Rev. 635 (1971).

For comment, "The Problem of Procedural Delay in Contested Case Hearings . . ." under the North Carolina APA, see 7 N.C. Cent. L.J. 347 (1976).

For survey of 1976 case law dealing with administrative law, see 55 N.C.L. Rev. 898 (1977).

For article, "Advisory Rulings by Administrative Agencies: Their Benefits and Dangers," see 2 Campbell L. Rev. 1 (1980).

For survey of 1980 administrative law, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1017 (1981).

For survey of 1996 developments in constitutional law, see 75 N.C.L. Rev. 2252 (1997).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A, or under this Chapter prior to the 1991 amendments thereto.

Filing of Petition for "Contested Case" Hearing. - The language of G.S. 131E-188(a) leaves no room for judicial construction. The statute clearly contemplates that a petition for a contested case hearing must be filed - not mailed or served - with the Office of Administrative Hearings within the 30-day deadline. Gummels v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 98 N.C. App. 675, 392 S.E.2d 113 (1990).

Under the 1986 version of G.S. 131E-188(a) in effect at time of petitioner's request for a contested case hearing, request was timely "filed" with the Division of Facility Services [now the Division of Health Service Regulation] where it was received within 30 days of the contested decision; the version of the subdivision in effect at that time read in pertinent part: "... any affected person shall be entitled to a contested case hearing under Article 3 of Chapter 150A [now Chapter 150B] of the General Statutes, if the department receives a request therefor within 30 days after its decision." Under the current statutes, a request must be filed within 30 days, not just received. Huntington Manor v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 99 N.C. App. 52, 393 S.E.2d 104 (1990).

North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act provides in G.S. 150B-23(a) that any person aggrieved may commence a contested case hearing. N.C. Forestry Ass'n v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 154 N.C. App. 18, 571 S.E.2d 602 (2002), review denied sub nom. N.C. Forestry Ass'n v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Nat'l Res., 357 N.C. 251, 582 S.E.2d 276 (2003).

"Representative" Not Coterminous with "Attorney." - Dismissal of petition for review of a department's decision to retract a corporate owner's eligibility for reimbursement of environmental clean-up costs was in error because, although the petition was signed by a non-attorney agent for owner, 26 N.C. Admin. Code 3.0120(e) stated that a party did not need to be represented by an attorney at administrative hearings; the term "representative" as used in G.S. 150B-23, was not coterminous with the term "attorney." Allied Envtl. Servs., PLLC v. N.C. Dep't of Envtl. & Natural Res., Div. of Waste Mgmt., 187 N.C. App. 227, 653 S.E.2d 11 (2007), review denied, 362 N.C. 354, 661 S.E.2d 238 (2008).

Burden of Proof. - While neither G.S. 150B-23(a) nor G.S. 150B-29(a) specifically allocated the burden of proof in an administrative appeal, it had been held that that an administrative law judge was to determine whether a petitioner had met its burden in showing that the agency acted or failed to act as provided in G.S. 150B-23(a)(1) - (5), and it had been observed that caselaw held that unless a statute provided otherwise, a petitioner had the burden of proof in Office of Administrative Hearings contested cases. Overcash v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 179 N.C. App. 697, 635 S.E.2d 442 (2006), review denied, 361 N.C. 220, 642 S.E.2d 445 (2007).

Trial court did not err in its allocation of the burden of proof on a chicken processing facility operator because he burden of proof rests on the petitioner challenging the decision of the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources. House of Raeford Farms, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 242 N.C. App. 294, 774 S.E.2d 911 (2015).

Construction with Other Laws. - It was within the ALJ's discretion to dismiss the petition as untimely under the North Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (APA), because although the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) instructs states to make a free appropriate public education (FAPE) available, it has left to the states the procedural mechanisms for putting the same in place, and application of the APA's 60-day limitation was not inconsistent with the underlying policies of the IDEA. M.E. v. Board of Educ., 88 F. Supp. 2d 493 (W.D.N.C. 1999).

The court held that the 60-day limitations period in this section is the period associated with former G.S. 115C-116 (repealed) and rejected the idea that North Carolina's catch-all three-year statute of limitations for statutory actions for which no limitations period is otherwise provided, pursuant to G.S. 1-52(2), constituted a better borrowing choice and one more consistent with federal policies. CM by & Through JM v. Board of Educ., 241 F.3d 374 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 818, 122 S. Ct. 48, 151 L. Ed. 2d 18 (2001).

The Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to a case involving the Outdoor Advertising Control Act, G.S. 136-126 through 136-140, because there is no statute or administrative rule which requires the Department of Transportation to make an agency decision after providing an opportunity for an adjudicatory hearing, and the subject controversy is therefore not a "contested case" within the meaning of former G.S. 150A-23. National Adv. Co. v. Bradshaw, 48 N.C. App. 10, 268 S.E.2d 816, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 301 N.C. 400, 273 S.E.2d 446 (1980).

Thirty-day time limit specified in G.S. 126-38 (now repealed) only applied to the filing of the petition and not to the payment of the required fee as former G.S. 126-38 indicated that the applicable temporal requirement was satisfied if the petition for a contested case hearing was filed within 30 days of the date upon which the employee received notice of the decision or action which triggered the right of appeal; although G.S. 150B-23(a) treats both the filing of the petition and the payment of the required fee as necessary to permit the commencement of a contested case and although G.S. 150B-23.2(B) requires the North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) to collect any required fees at the time of the commencement of the contested case, nothing in the relevant statutory language requires the payment of the required fee simultaneously with the filing of the petition as a precondition for the invocation of the OAH's jurisdiction. Scott v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 222 N.C. App. 125, 730 S.E.2d 806 (2012).

Filing Fee Did Not Have to Be Paid Simultaneously With Filing of Petition. - North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings and North Carolina State Personnel Board had jurisdiction over plaintiff's challenge to his dismissal as a State trooper, even though he did not pay the contested case filing fee simultaneously with his petition, as G.S. 150B-23(a) and G.S. 150B-23.2(b) did not require payment of the filing fee simultaneously with the petition as a prerequisite for jurisdiction, and under 26 N.C. Admin. Code 03.0103, a litigant was afforded a reasonable time to pay the fee. Scott v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 222 N.C. App. 125, 730 S.E.2d 806 (2012).

Delay Due to Rehearing Not "Undue". - The delay caused when the full State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] ordered a rehearing of the dismissal case of a Department of Transportation employee after declining to accept the recommendation of the hearing officer that a default be entered against the department for its failure to appear was not an "undue delay" within the meaning of subsection (a) of former G.S. 150A-23, nor such a delay as would allow the Court of Appeals to treat the order for rehearing as a final agency decision under former G.S. 150A-43. Davis v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 39 N.C. App. 190, 250 S.E.2d 64 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 735, 254 S.E.2d 177 (1979).

Erroneous Assertion of Jurisdiction Tolls Time Limit. - In appropriate circumstances, the 60-day time limitation of subsection (f) may be tolled. Specifically, such tolling is appropriate where a court's erroneous assertion of jurisdiction brings a dispute over an administrative agency's ruling into the court which would normally review decisions of that agency, and - in reliance on this assertion of jurisdiction - a party fails to seek administrative review within the statutory time limit. House of Raeford Farms, Inc. v. State ex rel. Envt'l Mgt. Comm'n, 338 N.C. 262, 449 S.E.2d 453 (1994).

Address Supplied by Agency Must Be Correct to Trigger Time Limitation - If an agency supplies a petitioner the address of the entity to which the appeal from its actions must be sent, it must do so accurately in order to trigger the running of the 30-day filing period under G.S. 150B-23(f). Gray v. Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 149 N.C. App. 374, 560 S.E.2d 394 (2002).

The time limitation of subsection (f) of this section was tolled by the superior court's erroneous assertion of subject matter jurisdiction over respondents' penalty assessment and remained tolled until the court's assertion of jurisdiction was vacated by the Court of Appeals' mandate. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) had subject matter jurisdiction over petitioners' contested case petition, since this petition was timely filed in the OAH following the issuance of the Court of Appeals' mandate. House of Raeford Farms, Inc. v. State ex rel. Envt'l Mgt. Comm'n, 338 N.C. 262, 449 S.E.2d 453 (1994).

Failure to Comply with Time Limitation. - Plaintiffs who did not file a petition for a contested case, under former G.S. 115C-116 (repealed) within the time limit prescribed by this section, abandoned the process and sought relief in the courts without exhausting the available administrative remedies, were therefore barred from seeking relief in federal district court. Glen ex rel. Glen v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch. Bd. of Educ., 903 F. Supp. 918 (W.D.N.C. 1995).

Where petitioner mailed his petition to the Office of Administrative Hearings at the incorrect address it had supplied, and a copy was also faxed to OAH, and did not file a subsequent original petition until after the agency moved to dismiss, petition would be considered timely. By failing to object to this omission, and by actively participating in the pre-hearing procedures and hearing, the agency waived its objection. Gray v. Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 149 N.C. App. 374, 560 S.E.2d 394 (2002).

The notice requirements in former G.S. 150A-23 were strictly construed. Parrish v. North Carolina Real Estate Licensing Bd., 41 N.C. App. 102, 254 S.E.2d 268 (1979).

Factual Allegations to Be Specific. - The same rationale applicable in criminal proceedings, that an indictment must charge the offense with sufficient certainty to apprise the defendant of the specific accusation against him so as to enable him to prepare his defense, is applicable to factual allegations in proceedings pursuant to former G.S. 150A-23. Parrish v. North Carolina Real Estate Licensing Bd., 41 N.C. App. 102, 254 S.E.2d 268 (1979).

Corporation Required to be Represented by Attorney in DMV Hearings - Although corporations were not required to be represented by attorneys in hearings before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), pursuant to G.S. 150B-23 (referring to "attorney or representative" of a party), the DMV was exempted from the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act authorizing contested cases to be brought in the OAH, G.S. 150B-1(e)(8), and, therefore, in a hearing before the DMV, a corporation was required to be represented by an attorney. In re Twin County Motorsports, Inc., 230 N.C. App. 259, 749 S.E.2d 474 (2013).

Notice Sufficient. - Notice of hearing did not list the statutes and rules involved or give a short and plain statement of the facts, but those details were unnecessary since the department had filed its prehearing statement. Lincoln v. N.C. HHS, Nutrition Branch, 172 N.C. App. 567, 616 S.E.2d 622 (2005).

Notice Held Sufficient to Comply with Due Process. - Notice published in a newspaper and provided to each member of the county board of elections and each candidate whose name appeared on the ballot for a county office, to the effect that a public hearing would be held at a specified time and place to inquire into the processes relative to a general election conducted in the county, particularly the processes involving absentee ballots, was sufficient to comply with due process, it not being necessary for the State Board of Elections to particularize any charges in the notice of public hearing. In re Judicial Review by Republican Candidates, 45 N.C. App. 556, 264 S.E.2d 338, cert. denied, 299 N.C. 736, 267 S.E.2d 672 (1980).

Any variance between notice and proof was insignificant in notice served defendant real estate broker that Commission would present evidence that defendant doctored tapes he used in his defense, since defendant was not surprised nor deprived of an opportunity to present his defense when he attempted to use tapes to defend himself. Watson v. North Carolina Real Estate Comm'n, 87 N.C. App. 637, 362 S.E.2d 294 (1987), cert. denied, 321 N.C. 746, 365 S.E.2d 296 (1988).

Notice Held Insufficient to Comply with Due Process. - A notice which failed to inform petitioner of her right to contest the designation of her position as "exempt policymaking," the procedure for contesting the designation, or the time limits for filing her objection to the designation was not sufficient to start the limitation period running. Jordan v. North Carolina DOT, 140 N.C. App. 771, 538 S.E.2d 623 (2000), cert denied, 353 N.C. 376, 547 S.E.2d 412 (2001).

Defendants-school systems failed to adequately notify the parents of disabled children, as required by this section, that school authorities had reached a final decision regarding reimbursement of their special educational costs that could be challenged only in a due process hearing, which had to be requested within sixty days; the letters which the schools relied on were written during negotiations with the parents and were not express enough to trigger the limitations period, and distribution of the Handbook of Parents' Rights could not remedy the letters' inadequacies. CM by & Through JM v. Board of Educ., 241 F.3d 374 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 818, 122 S. Ct. 48, 151 L. Ed. 2d 18 (2001).

Letter to an employee after her termination while on medical leave that expressed sympathy for her medical condition and reiterated facts regarding the employee's termination did not constitute sufficient notice of the decision or action regarding the grievance filed by the employee, which triggered the right to appeal for purposes of G.S. 126-38 (now repealed); because the employer, the Department of Social Services (DSS), failed to provide the notice required under G.S. 150B-23(f) as to appealing her termination, an administrative law judge properly denied the DSS' motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely. Early v. County of Durham Dep't of Soc. Servs., 172 N.C. App. 344, 616 S.E.2d 553 (2005).

Notice Held Insufficient to Support Suspension of License. - Notice to professional engineer that charges against him involved gross negligence, incompetence or misconduct resulting from his noncompliance with certain statutes and administrative regulations in the preparation and sealing of certain plans was insufficient to support suspension of his license for misconduct in placing his seal on engineering work not prepared under his direction and for gross negligence in sealing the work of another in order to procure planning board approval when he knew that the plans did not conform to the State Building Code. In re Trulove, 54 N.C. App. 218, 282 S.E.2d 544 (1981), cert. denied, 304 N.C. 727, 288 S.E.2d 808 (1982).

Evidentiary Hearing in Contested Case. - The exercise of the right to an evidentiary hearing under the contested case provision of G.S. 131E-188(a) does not commence a de novo proceeding by the administrative law judge (ALJ) intended to lead to a formulation of the final decision pursuant to subsection (a), the ALJ, in a contested case hearing under the certificate of need law and this Act, determines whether the petitioner has met its burden in showing that the agency substantially prejudiced petitioner's rights, and that the agency also acted outside its authority, acted erroneously, acted arbitrarily and capriciously, used improper procedure, or failed to act as required by law or rule, based on a hearing limited to the evidence that is presented or available to the agency during the review period. Britthaven, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 118 N.C. App. 379, 455 S.E.2d 455 (1995).

When a provider contested granting a certificate of need to a competitor, an administrative law judge could grant summary judgment because (1) G.S. 131E-188(a) did not give the provider an unconditional right to a hearing, as the right was contingent on a valid petition, and (2) G.S. 150B-33(b)(3a) and G.S. 150B-34(e) allowed summary judgment. Cumberland County Hosp. Sys. v. N.C. HHS, 237 N.C. App. 113, 764 S.E.2d 491 (2014).

The administrative hearing provisions of this article do not establish the right of a person "aggrieved" by agency action to Office of Administrative Hearings review of that action, but only describe the procedures for such review. Batten v. North Carolina Dep't of Cor., 326 N.C. 338, 389 S.E.2d 35 (1990), overruled on other grounds, Empire Power Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 337 N.C. 569, 447 S.E.2d 168 (1994).

Compliance with Procedures Required for Jurisdiction. - Because Chapter 126 makes compliance with the procedures of this article mandatory, jurisdiction over a contested case hearing arising under Chapter 126 is not conferred upon the Office of Administrative Hearings unless petitioner follows such procedures. Nailing v. UNC-CH, 117 N.C. App. 318, 451 S.E.2d 351 (1994), cert. denied, 339 N.C. 614, 454 S.E.2d 255 (1995).

County employee, as a person aggrieved by the North Carolina Office of State Personnel's [now the North Carolina Office of State Human Resources'] determination that a county's personnel regulations were substantially equivalent to the North Carolina State Personnel Act, G.S. 126-1 et seq., was able to commence a contested case pursuant to G.S. 150B-23(a) by filing a petition with the North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings. Steward v. Green, 189 N.C. App. 131, 657 S.E.2d 719 (2008).

Trial court did not err in affirming an administrative law judge's order retroactively reinstating a sergeant and awarding him back pay and benefits because his supervisor failed to fully comply with the administrative procedures, the sergeant still had unexhausted leave credits and leave benefits when he was terminated, and the Highway Patrol prevented the sergeant from taking his annual firearms training (necessary to retain his credentials). NC Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Owens, 245 N.C. App. 230, 782 S.E.2d 337 (2016).

Subsection (a) of G.S. 150B-23 does not explicitly make a specific administrative procedure part of every contract entered into between the State and a private citizen; accordingly, subsection (a) does not disturb the superior court's original general jurisdiction of all justiciable matters of a civil nature. Intersal, Inc. v. Hamilton, 373 N.C. 89, 834 S.E.2d 404 (2019).

Where Agency Under No Statutory Obligation to Act. - Nothing in G.S. 150B-23(a)(5) permits a petition for a contested case proceeding to be filed where an agency has not acted when the agency is under no statutory direction to act. N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. N.C. Learns, Inc., 231 N.C. App. 270, 751 S.E.2d 625 (2013).

No statutory authority exists for the State Personnel Commission to review an administrative law judge's recommended decision in a case involving an exempt employee. Johnson v. Natural Resources & Community Dev., 98 N.C. App. 334, 391 S.E.2d 48 (1990).

Discretionary Intervention Under Former G.S. 150A-23(d). - While G.S. 1A-1, Rule 24 contains specific requirements which control and limit intervention, subsection (d) of former G.S. 150A-23 clearly provides for discretionary intervention by the Commissioner of Insurance by providing that the agency may permit any interested person to intervene "and participate in [the] proceeding to the extent deemed appropriate." This discretionary intervention is without limitation, and the statutory language has been construed to provide intervention broader than the permissive intervention under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 24. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 460, 269 S.E.2d 538 (1980).

Commissioner of Insurance acted within his discretion in permitting a consumer group to intervene in an automobile insurance rate case and in allowing hearings to be held throughout the State. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 460, 269 S.E.2d 538 (1980).

Intervention Not Approved. - For purposes of meeting appeal requirements of G.S. 131E-188(b), appellant, proposed intervenor below, was not and could not be a party to the contested hearing at issue below until its motion to intervene was approved. Since this motion was not approved, appellant was not a party to contested case and, therefore, did not meet jurisdictional requirements of G.S. 131E-188(b). HCA Crossroads Residential Centers, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 99 N.C. App. 193, 392 S.E.2d 398 (1990).

While the intervenors had a general interest in an underlying issue, whether the property owner was exempt from the Sedimentation Pollution Control Act of 1973, they did not have a direct interest in the civil penalty imposed by the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources, which was the property or transaction at issue pursuant to G.S. 113A-64(a)(5); accordingly, the ALJ erred by granting intervention as of right. Holly Ridge Assocs., LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 361 N.C. 531, 648 S.E.2d 830 (2007).

Because the time and expense involved in a second, unanticipated round of discovery in an environmental civil penalty matter was prejudicial to the property owner, as was the requirement that the property owner meet its burden of proof against both intervenors and the state agency authorized to impose the civil penalty, the ALJ abused his discretion in allowing permissive intervention. Holly Ridge Assocs., LLC v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 361 N.C. 531, 648 S.E.2d 830 (2007).

The 60-day time limitation of subsection (f) was tolled by the superior court's assertion of subject matter jurisdiction over assessment and remained tolled until the court's assertion of jurisdiction was vacated by the Court of Appeals, accordingly, the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) had subject matter jurisdiction over petition since it was filed in the OAH within 60 days of the Court of Appeals' decision. House of Raeford Farms, Inc. v. State ex rel. Envt'l Mgt. Comm'n, 338 N.C. 262, 449 S.E.2d 453 (1994).

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Not Required. - Trial court erred in concluding the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a marine research and recovery corporation's claim that the North Carolina Department of Natural and Cultural Resources breached a settlement agreement because the corporation was not required to exhaust administrative remedies; the corporation's ability to bring a common law breach of contract claim in superior court was not restricted by any statutory or contractual provision. Intersal, Inc. v. Hamilton, 373 N.C. 89, 834 S.E.2d 404 (2019).

Review of Agency Decision. - Although a trial court properly reviewed, under G.S. 150B-51(b)(5), a final agency decision of a contested case petition filed pursuant to G.S. 150B-23, the trial court incorrectly applied the standard of review by making its own findings of fact on unappealed issues. Town of Wallace v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., Div. of Water Quality, 160 N.C. App. 49, 584 S.E.2d 809 (2003).

Pursuant to G.S. 150B-23(f), the time for a Medicaid provider's appeal of a negative decision by the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) begins to run when DHHS notifies the health care provider of DHHS's "final decision" and of the provider's right to appeal from the agency's final decision to the Office of Administrative Hearings. N.C. HHS v. Parker Home Care, LLC, 246 N.C. App. 551, 784 S.E.2d 552 (2016), review denied, mot. dismissed, stay denied, 793 S.E.2d 690, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 988 (2016); mot. dismissed, as moot, 793 S.E.2d 688, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 1013 (2016).

ALJ and trial court had jurisdiction to hear a Medicaid provider's contest to the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services' (DHHS) decision that the provider received an overpayment, despite the provider's failure to appeal that decision within 60 days of receiving a private contractor's tentative notice of overpayment (TNO), because the TNO did not begin the time for appealing an administrative decision, as DHHS could not delegate the discretionary authority to decide how to dispose of the issue to the private contractor as (1) DHHS was the state's single state agency authorized to make such decisions, and (2) the TNO stated a "final decision" would be reached in the future, so the TNO did not inform the provider of DHHS's final decision on the matter, which initiated the appeal time. N.C. HHS v. Parker Home Care, LLC, 246 N.C. App. 551, 784 S.E.2d 552 (2016), review denied, mot. dismissed, stay denied, 793 S.E.2d 690, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 988 (2016); mot. dismissed, as moot, 793 S.E.2d 688, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 1013 (2016).

Substantial Prejudice Sufficiently Alleged. - Organizations sufficiently alleged substantial prejudice for purposes of G.S. 150B-23 as members had homes and businesses along the creek in which wastewater was to be discharged, and the organizations alleged that the state agency failed to follow its own regulations in issuing the permit, thereby causing damage to the creek's water quality, biota, and the benefits derived from the creek. Sound Rivers, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, Div. of Water Res., - N.C. App. - , 845 S.E.2d 802 (2020).

Substantial Prejudice Shown. - Issuance of a "No Review" letter by the North Carolina DHHS was properly contested because a branch office proposed by a hospice was not located within the service area of the hospice; therefore, the proposed branch office was a new institutional health service for which the hospice had to obtain a certificate of need. Hospice at Greensboro, Inc. v. N.C. HHS Div. of Facility Servs., 185 N.C. App. 1, 647 S.E.2d 651 (2007).

Substantial Prejudice Not Shown. - In a hospital's contested case petition under G.S. 131E-188(a) to challenge the conditional approval of a certificate of need (CON) permitting a medical center to expand its emergency room facilities, the medical center was entitled to summary judgment because the hospital did not prove substantial prejudice from the CON under G.S. 150B-23(a); the hospital's claim of prejudice from challenges by the medical center to a facility it was building had been declared moot in another action, and judicial estoppel did not bar the medical center from claiming that the hospital was not substantially prejudiced because the other action was not related and did not stem from a common set of circumstances. Presbyterian Hosp. v. N.C. HHS, 177 N.C. App. 780, 630 S.E.2d 213 (2006), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 361 N.C. 221, 642 S.E.2d 446 (2007).

Superior court did not err in affirming the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings to grant summary judgment for the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in corporations' action challenging the validity of a settlement DHHS entered into with an assisted living limited liability company (LLC), which gave the LLC a contractual right to develop adult care home beds, because the corporation did not demonstrate that they were substantially prejudiced as a matter of law; even if DHHS had not entered the settlement, it could not have required the LLC to submit a certificate of need application in order to give the corporations the opportunity to comment on the LLC's plans since the Certificate of Need Law, G.S. 131E-175 et seq. was held to be inapplicable to the LLC's projects. Ridge Care, Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 214 N.C. App. 498, 716 S.E.2d 390 (2011).

Superior court did not err in affirming the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings to grant summary judgment for the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in corporations' action challenging the validity of a settlement DHHS entered into with an assisted living limited liability company (LLC), which gave the LLC a contractual right to develop adult care home beds, because the corporation did not demonstrate that they were substantially prejudiced as a matter of law; there was no evidence presented that the LLC was planning to develop facilities in the counties where the corporations were located or that the corporation had suffered any actual harm. Ridge Care, Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 214 N.C. App. 498, 716 S.E.2d 390 (2011).

N.C. Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Health Service Regulation, Certificate of Need Section, properly concluded that the health care provider failed to prove that it suffered substantial prejudice from the granting of a certificate of need to a medical center for the development of two gastrointestinal endoscopy rooms because the provider's only alleged harm was only that competition would be increased. CaroMont Health, Inc. v. N.C. HHS Div. of Health Serv. Regulation, 231 N.C. App. 1, 751 S.E.2d 244 (2013).

When providers contested an agency's decision to let a competitor move specialty operating rooms to the providers' area, the agency's alleged failure to follow the agency's rules did not establish the providers' substantial prejudice as a matter of law because the providers also had to show the agency deprived the providers of property, ordered the providers to pay a fine or penalty, or otherwise substantially prejudiced the providers' rights. Surgical Care Affiliates, LLC v. N.C. HHS, 235 N.C. App. 620, 762 S.E.2d 468 (2014).

Competitor showed no error in the administrative law judge granting summary judgment for a certificate of need applicant's application because the competitor did not meet the competitor's burden to show substantial prejudice from granting the application, as (1) the proposed project added no new beds, services, or equipment, and (2) any harm from normal competition was not substantial prejudice. Blue Ridge Healthcare Hosps. Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 255 N.C. App. 451, 808 S.E.2d 271, review denied, 370 N.C. 382, 807 S.E.2d 567, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 965 (N.C. 2017).

Applied in North Buncombe Ass'n of Concerned Citizens v. Rhodes, 100 N.C. App. 24, 394 S.E.2d 462, appeal dismissed, 327 N.C. 484, 397 S.E.2d 215 (1990); Gaskill v. State ex rel. Cobey, 109 N.C. App. 656, 428 S.E.2d 474 (1993); Deep River Citizens Coalition v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 119 N.C. App. 232, 457 S.E.2d 772 (1995); Parkway Urology, P.A. v. N.C. HHS, 205 N.C. App. 529, 696 S.E.2d 187 (2010), review denied 705 S.E.2d 739, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 55 (2011), review denied 705 S.E.2d 753, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 47 (2011).

Cited in Empire Power Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 337 N.C. 569, 447 S.E.2d 768, rehearing denied, 338 N.C. 314, 451 S.E.2d 634 (1994). Lenoir Mem. Hosp. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 98 N.C. App. 178, 390 S.E.2d 448 (1990); North Carolina Dep't of Cor. v. Hodge, 99 N.C. App. 602, 394 S.E.2d 285 (1990); State ex rel. Envtl. Mgt. Comm'n v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 101 N.C. App. 433, 400 S.E.2d 107 (1991); North Carolina DOT v. Davenport, 102 N.C. App. 476, 402 S.E.2d 477 (1991); North Carolina DOT v. Davenport, 108 N.C. App. 178, 423 S.E.2d 327 (1992); Ocean Hill Joint Venture v. North Carolina Dep't of Environment, Health & Natural Resources, 333 N.C. 318, 426 S.E.2d 274 (1993); Professional Food Servs. Mgt., Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Admin., 109 N.C. App. 265, 426 S.E.2d 447 (1993); Citizens for Clean Indus., Inc. v. Lofton, 109 N.C. App. 229, 427 S.E.2d 120 (1993); North Carolina DOT v. Davenport, 334 N.C. 428, 432 S.E.2d 303 (1993); In re Sullivan, 112 N.C. App. 795, 436 S.E.2d 862 (1993); Davis v. North Carolina Dep't of Cors., 48 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 1995); Williams v. North Carolina Dep't of Economic & Community Dev., 119 N.C. App. 535, 458 S.E.2d 750 (1995); Gainey v. North Carolina Dep't of Justice, 121 N.C. App. 253, 465 S.E.2d 36 (1996); Cunningham v. Catawba County, 128 N.C. App. 70, 493 S.E.2d 82 (1997); Bryant v. Hogarth, 127 N.C. App. 79, 488 S.E.2d 269, cert. denied, 347 N.C. 396, 494 S.E.2d 406 (1997); Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n v. Tomlinson, 134 N.C. App. 286, 517 S.E.2d 401 (1999); Dialysis Care of N.C. L.L.C. v. North Carolina HHS, Div. of Facility Servs., Certificate of Need Section, 137 N.C. App. 638, 529 S.E.2d 257 (2000), aff'd, 353 N.C. 258, 538 S.E.2d 566 (2000); Blalock v. N.C. HHS, 143 N.C. App. 470, 546 S.E.2d 177 (2001); M.E. v. Bd. of Educ., 186 F. Supp. 2d 630 (W.D.N.C. 2002); Kea v. HHS, 153 N.C. App. 595, 570 S.E.2d 919 (2002), appeal dismissed, 356 N.C. 673, 577 S.E.2d 120, 357 N.C. 654, 588 S.E.2d 467 (2003); Shackleford-Moten v. Lenoir County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 155 N.C. App. 568, 573 S.E.2d 767 (2002), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 252, 582 S.E.2d 609 (2003); County of Wake v. N.C. Dep't of Env't, 155 N.C. App. 225, 573 S.E.2d 572 (2002), cert. dismissed, 357 N.C. 62, 579 S.E.2d 387 (2003); N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 599 S.E.2d 888 (2004); E. Carolina Internal Med., P.A. v. N.C. HHS, 211 N.C. App. 397, 710 S.E.2d 245 (2011); Izydore v. City of Durham, 228 N.C. App. 397, 746 S.E.2d 324 (2013), review denied, 749 S.E.2d 851, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 1198 (2013); In re Twin County Motorsports, Inc., 367 N.C. 613, 766 S.E.2d 832 (2014); AH N.C. Owner LLC v. N.C. HHS, 240 N.C. App. 92, 771 S.E.2d 537 (2015); Cumberland Cnty. Hosp. Sys. v. North Carolina HHS, 242 N.C. App. 524, 776 S.E.2d 329 (2015).

Opinions of Attorney General

Editor's Note. - Some of the opinions below were issued prior to the 1991 amendments to this Chapter.

Applicability of Subsection (a). - Subsection (a) of this section, as amended by Session Laws 1987, Chapter 878, is not applicable to agencies governed by Article 3A of this Chapter. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Phillip T. Fisher, Executive Director, N.C. Real Estate Commission, 57 N.C.A.G. 85 (1987).

Appeals by applicants and recipients of public assistance or social services from adverse decisions of county agencies or boards are governed by the substantive provisions and procedural requirements of G.S. 108A-79, including the procedural provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (G.S. 150B-1 et seq.) consistent with the statute, to the extent that substance and procedure are not in conflict with applicable federal law and regulations. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Phillip J. Kirk, Jr., Secretary, Department of Human Resources, 55 N.C.A.G. 91 (1986).

Procedural, Not Substantive Provisions of Act Applicable to Appeals of County Agency Decisions. - Given the detailed substantive provisions of G.S. 108A-79, designed specifically to apply to appeals of county agency decisions, and the fact that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), by its terms, does not apply to such appeals, the Legislature, by reference to the APA, did not intend to substitute the Act's substantive requirements for those of G.S. 108A-79. The citation to the APA simply indicates a legislative intent to incorporate the powers of hearing officers and the hearing procedures detailed in the Act into G.S. 108A-79(i) by reference. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Phillip J. Kirk, Jr., Secretary, Department of Human Resources, 55 N.C.A.G. 91 (1986).

When a contested case hearing is conducted by an agency governed by Article 3A of this Chapter, a petition or other notice need not be filed with the Office of Administrative Hearings. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Phillip T. Fisher, Executive Director, N.C. Real Estate Commission, 57 N.C.A.G. 85 (1987).

§ 150B-23.1. Mediated settlement conferences.

  1. Purpose. - This section authorizes a mediation program in the Office of Administrative Hearings in which the chief administrative law judge may require the parties in a contested case to attend a prehearing settlement conference conducted by a mediator. The purpose of the program is to determine whether a system of mediated settlement conferences may make the operation of the Office of Administrative Hearings more efficient, less costly, and more satisfying to the parties.
  2. Definitions. - The following definitions apply in this section:
    1. Mediated settlement conference. - A conference ordered by the chief administrative law judge involving the parties to a contested case and conducted by a mediator prior to a contested case hearing.
    2. Mediator. - A neutral person who acts to encourage and facilitate a resolution of a contested case but who does not make a decision on the merits of the contested case.
  3. Conference. - The chief administrative law judge may order a mediated settlement conference for all or any part of a contested case to which an administrative law judge is assigned to preside. All aspects of the mediated settlement conference shall be conducted insofar as possible in accordance with the rules adopted by the Supreme Court for the court-ordered mediation pilot program under G.S. 7A-38.
  4. Attendance. - The parties to a contested case in which a mediated settlement conference is ordered, their attorneys, and other persons having authority to settle the parties' claims shall attend the settlement conference unless excused by the presiding administrative law judge.
  5. Mediator. - The parties shall have the right to stipulate to a mediator. Upon the failure of the parties to agree within a time limit established by the presiding administrative law judge, a mediator shall be appointed by the presiding administrative law judge.
  6. Sanctions. - Upon failure of a party or a party's attorney to attend a mediated settlement conference ordered under this section, the presiding administrative law judge may impose any sanction authorized by G.S. 150B-33(b)(8) or (10).
  7. Standards. - Mediators authorized to conduct mediated settlement conferences under this section shall comply with the standards adopted by the Supreme Court for the court-ordered mediation pilot program under G.S. 7A-38.
  8. Immunity. - A mediator acting pursuant to this section shall have judicial immunity in the same manner and to the same extent as a judge of the General Court of Justice.
  9. Costs. - Costs of a mediated settlement conference shall be paid one share by the petitioner, one share by the respondent, and an equal share by any intervenor, unless otherwise apportioned by the administrative law judge.
  10. Inadmissibility of Negotiations. - All conduct or communications made during a mediated settlement conference are presumed to be made in compromise negotiations and shall be governed by Rule 408 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.
  11. Right to Hearing. - Nothing in this section restricts the right to a contested case hearing.

History

(1993, c. 321, s. 25(b); c. 363, ss. 1, 3; 1995, c. 145, s. 1.)

Editor's Note. - Section 7A-38, referred to in this section, was repealed by Session Laws, 1995, c. 500, s. 3.

Legal Periodicals. - For comment, "Good Faith Mediation: Improving Efficiency, Cost, and Satisfaction in North Carolina's Pre-Trial Process," see 18 Campbell L. Rev. 281 (1996).

§ 150B-23.2. Fee for filing a contested case hearing.

  1. Filing Fee. - In every contested case commenced in the Office of Administrative Hearings by a person aggrieved, the petitioner shall pay a filing fee, and the administrative law judge shall have the authority to assess that filing fee against the losing party, in the amount of one hundred twenty-five dollars ($125.00), unless the Office of Administrative Hearings establishes a lesser filing fee by rule.
  2. Time of Collection. - All fees that are required to be assessed, collected, and remitted under subsection (a) of this section shall be collected by the Office of Administrative Hearings at the time of commencement of the contested case except as may be allowed by rule to permit or complete late payment or in suits in forma pauperis.
  3. Forms of Payment. - The Office of Administrative Hearings may by rule provide for the acceptable forms for payment and transmission of the filing fee.
  4. Waiver or Refund. - The Office of Administrative Hearings shall by rule provide for the fee to be waived in a contested case in which the petition is filed in forma pauperis and supported by such proofs as are required in G.S. 1-110 and in a contested case involving a mandated federal cause of action. The Office of Administrative Hearings shall by rule provide for the fee to be refunded in a contested case in which the losing party is the State.

History

(2009-451, s. 21A.1(b); 2012-187, s. 5; 2015-264, s. 24.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2015-264, s. 24, effective October 1, 2015, substituted "Waiver" for "Wavier" in the subsection (d) heading.

CASE NOTES

Filing Fee Did Not Have to Be Paid Simultaneously With Filing of Petition. - North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings and North Carolina State Personnel Board had jurisdiction over plaintiff's challenge to his dismissal as a State trooper, even though he did not pay the contested case filing fee simultaneously with his petition, as G.S. 150B-23(a) and G.S. 150B-23.2(b) did not require payment of the filing fee simultaneously with the petition as a prerequisite for jurisdiction, and under 26 N.C. Admin. Code 03.0103, a litigant was afforded a reasonable time to pay the fee. Scott v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 222 N.C. App. 125, 730 S.E.2d 806 (2012).

Thirty-day time limit specified in G.S. 126-38 (now repealed) only applied to the filing of the petition and not to the payment of the required fee as former G.S. 126-38 indicated that the applicable temporal requirement was satisfied if the petition for a contested case hearing was filed within 30 days of the date upon which the employee received notice of the decision or action which triggered the right of appeal; although G.S. 150B-23(a) treats both the filing of the petition and the payment of the required fee as necessary to permit the commencement of a contested case and although G.S. 150B-23.2(B) requires the North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) to collect any required fees at the time of the commencement of the contested case, nothing in the relevant statutory language requires the payment of the required fee simultaneously with the filing of the petition as a precondition for the invocation of the OAH's jurisdiction. Scott v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 222 N.C. App. 125, 730 S.E.2d 806 (2012).

Cited in N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. N.C. Learns, Inc., 231 N.C. App. 270, 751 S.E.2d 625 (2013).


§ 150B-23.3. Electronic filing.

In addition to any other method specified in G.S. 150B-23, documents filed and served in a contested case may be filed and served electronically by means of an Electronic Filing Service Provider. For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:

  1. "Electronic filing" means the electronic transmission of the petition, notice of hearing, pleadings, or any other documents filed in a contested case with the Office of Administrative Hearings, as further defined by rules adopted by the Office of Administrative Hearings.
  2. "Electronic Filing Service Provider (EFSP)" means the service provided by the Office of Administrative Hearings for e-filing and e-service of documents via the Internet.
  3. "Electronic service" means the electronic transmission of the petition, notice of hearing, pleadings, or any other documents in a contested case, as further defined by rules adopted by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

History

(2014-120, s. 5(a).)

Editor's Note. - Pursuant to the direction of the Revisor of Statutes, quotation marks were added to the definitions in subdivisions (1) through (3).

§ 150B-24. Venue of hearing.

  1. The hearing of a contested case shall be conducted:
    1. In the county in this State in which any person whose property or rights are the subject matter of the hearing maintains his residence;
    2. In the county where the agency maintains its principal office if the property or rights that are the subject matter of the hearing do not affect any person or if the subject matter of the hearing is the property or rights of residents of more than one county; or
    3. In any county determined by the administrative law judge in his discretion to promote the ends of justice or better serve the convenience of witnesses.
  2. Any person whose property or rights are the subject matter of the hearing waives his objection to venue by proceeding in the hearing.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1987, c. 878, s. 6.)

Legal Periodicals. - For comment, "The Problem of Procedural Delay in Contested Case Hearings . . ." under the North Carolina APA, see 7 N.C. Cent. L.J. 347 (1976).

§ 150B-25. Conduct of hearing; answer.

  1. If a party fails to appear in a contested case after proper service of notice, and if no adjournment or continuance is granted, the administrative law judge may proceed with the hearing in the absence of the party.
  2. Repealed by Session Laws 1991, c. 35, s. 2.
  3. The parties shall be given an opportunity to present arguments on issues of law and policy and an opportunity to present evidence on issues of fact.
  4. A party may cross-examine any witness, including the author of a document prepared by, on behalf of, or for use of the agency and offered in evidence. Any party may submit rebuttal evidence.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1022, s. 1(13); 1987, c. 878, s. 6; 1991, c. 35, s. 2.)

Legal Periodicals. - For comment, "The Problem of Procedural Delay in Contested Case Hearings . . ." under the North Carolina APA, see 7 N.C. Cent. L.J. 347 (1976).

For article, "Advisory Rulings by Administrative Agencies: Their Benefits and Dangers," see 2 Campbell L. Rev. 1 (1980).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A, or under this Chapter prior to the 1991 amendments thereto.

Former G.S. 150A-25 was permissive, not mandatory. Frieson v. North Carolina Real Estate Licensing Bd., 72 N.C. App. 665, 325 S.E.2d 293 (1985).

Subsection (a) of Former G.S. 150A-25 Was Permissive and Not Mandatory. - The language of subsection (a) of former G.S. 150A-25, providing that if a party fails to appear after proper service of notice the agency may proceed and render its decision in the absence of that party, is permissive and not mandatory. Davis v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 39 N.C. App. 190, 250 S.E.2d 64 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 735, 254 S.E.2d 177 (1979).

Contested Case Hearing Appropriate. - Where parties forecast evidence to support recommendation by the administrative law judge and final agency decision which were contrary, a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding hospital's application for a certificate of need so that a contested case hearing would be required. Presbyterian-Orthopaedic Hosp. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 122 N.C. App. 529, 470 S.E.2d 831 (1996), discretionary review improvidently allowed, 346 N.C. 267, 485 S.E.2d 294 (1997).

Applied in Deep River Citizens Coalition v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 119 N.C. App. 232, 457 S.E.2d 772 (1995); Mission Hosps., Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 189 N.C. App. 263, 658 S.E.2d 277 (2008).

Cited in Britthaven, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 118 N.C. App. 379, 455 S.E.2d 455 (1995); Blalock v. N.C. HHS, 143 N.C. App. 470, 546 S.E.2d 177 (2001); N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 599 S.E.2d 888 (2004); E. Carolina Internal Med., P.A. v. N.C. HHS, 211 N.C. App. 397, 710 S.E.2d 245 (2011).


§ 150B-25.1. Burden of proof.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by law or by this section, the petitioner in a contested case has the burden of proving the facts alleged in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence.
  2. In a contested case involving the imposition of civil fines or penalties by a State agency for violation of the law, the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the person who was fined actually committed the act for which the fine or penalty was imposed rests with the State agency.
  3. The burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that a career State employee subject to Chapter 126 of the General Statutes was discharged, suspended, or demoted for just cause rests with the agency employer.

History

(2015-286, s. 1.2(a).)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2015-286, s. 1.2(c), made this section effective October 22, 2015, and applicable to contested cases commenced on or after that date.

Session Laws 2015-286, s. 1.2(b), provides: "The Joint Legislative Administrative Procedure Oversight Committee shall study whether there are other categories of contested cases in which the burden of proof should be placed with the agency."

Session Laws 2015-286, s. 5.1 is a severability clause.

§ 150B-26. Consolidation.

When contested cases involving a common question of law or fact or multiple proceedings involving the same or related parties are pending, the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings may order a joint hearing of any matters at issue in the cases, order the cases consolidated, or make other orders to reduce costs or delay in the proceedings.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1985, (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1022, s. 1(1), 1(14).)

Legal Periodicals. - For comment, "The Problem of Procedural Delay in Contested Case Hearings . . ." under the North Carolina APA, see 7 N.C. Cent. L.J. 347 (1976).

§ 150B-27. Subpoena.

After the commencement of a contested case, subpoenas may be issued and served in accordance with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 45. In addition to the methods of service in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 45, a State law enforcement officer may serve a subpoena on behalf of an agency that is a party to the contested case by any method by which a sheriff may serve a subpoena under that Rule. Upon a motion, the administrative law judge may quash a subpoena if, upon a hearing, the administrative law judge finds that the evidence the production of which is required does not relate to a matter in issue, the subpoena does not describe with sufficient particularity the evidence the production of which is required, or for any other reason sufficient in law the subpoena may be quashed.

Witness fees shall be paid by the party requesting the subpoena to subpoenaed witnesses in accordance with G.S. 7A-314. However, State officials or employees who are subpoenaed shall not be entitled to witness fees, but they shall receive their normal salary and they shall not be required to take any annual leave for the witness days. Travel expenses of State officials or employees who are subpoenaed shall be reimbursed as provided in G.S. 138-6.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1975, 2nd Sess., c. 983, s. 66; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1987, c. 878, s. 6; 1991, c. 35, s. 3.)

Legal Periodicals. - For comment, "The Problem of Procedural Delay in Contested Case Hearings . . ." under the North Carolina APA, see 7 N.C. Cent. L.J. 347 (1976).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A.

One of the purposes of a subpoena duces tecum is to insure that documents are described with sufficient particularity and with such definiteness that they can be identified without prolonged or extensive search. Myers v. Holshouser, 25 N.C. App. 683, 214 S.E.2d 630, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 664, 216 S.E.2d 907 (1975).


§ 150B-28. Depositions and discovery.

  1. A deposition may be used in lieu of other evidence when taken in compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, G.S. 1A-1. Parties in contested cases may engage in discovery pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure, G.S. 1A-1.
  2. Repealed by Session Laws 2007-491, s. 2, effective January 1, 2008.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 2007-491, s. 2.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2007-491, s. 2, effective January 1, 2008, deleted former subsection (b) which read: "On a request for identifiable agency records, with respect to material facts involved in a contested case, except records related solely to the internal procedures of the agency or which are exempt from disclosure by law, an agency shall promptly make the records available to a party."

CASE NOTES

Cited in Davenport v. North Carolina DOT, 3 F.3d 89 (4th Cir. 1993); Eury v. North Carolina Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 115 N.C. App. 590, 446 S.E.2d 383 (1994), cert. denied, 338 N.C. 309, 451 S.E.2d 635 (1994).


§ 150B-29. Rules of evidence.

  1. In all contested cases, irrelevant, immaterial and unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded. Except as otherwise provided, the rules of evidence as applied in the trial division of the General Court of Justice shall be followed; but, when evidence is not reasonably available under the rules to show relevant facts, then the most reliable and substantial evidence available shall be admitted. On the judge's own motion, an administrative law judge may exclude evidence that is inadmissible under this section. The party with the burden of proof in a contested case must establish the facts required by G.S. 150B-23(a) by a preponderance of the evidence. It shall not be necessary for a party or his attorney to object at the hearing to evidence in order to preserve the right to object to its consideration by the administrative law judge in making a decision or by the court on judicial review.
  2. Evidence in a contested case, including records and documents, shall be offered and made a part of the record. Factual information or evidence not made a part of the record shall not be considered in the determination of the case, except as permitted under G.S. 150B-30. Documentary evidence may be received in the form of a copy or excerpt or may be incorporated by reference, if the materials so incorporated are available for examination by the parties. Upon timely request, a party shall be given an opportunity to compare the copy with the original if available.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1987, c. 878, s. 7; 1991, c. 35, s. 4; 2000-190, s. 4; 2012-187, s. 7.1.)

Legal Periodicals. - For article on administrative evidence rules, see 49 N.C.L. Rev. 635 (1971).

For comment, "The Problem of Procedural Delay in Contested Case Hearings . . ." under the North Carolina APA, see 7 N.C. Cent. L.J. 347 (1976).

For article, "A Powerless Judiciary? The North Carolina Courts' Perceptions of Review of Administrative Action," see 12 N.C. Cent. L.J. 21 (1980).

For article, "Administrative Justice: No Longer Just a Recommendation," see 79 N.C.L. Rev. 1639 (2001).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A, or under this Chapter prior to the 1991 amendments thereto.

The standard of review, known as the "whole record test," presents to the trial judge a task which must be distinguished from both de novo review and the any competent evidence standard of review. Goodwin v. Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ., 67 N.C. App. 243, 312 S.E.2d 892, cert. denied, 311 N.C. 304, 317 S.E.2d 680 (1984).

The whole record test is not a tool of judicial intrusion; instead it merely gives a reviewing court the capability to determine whether an administrative decision has a rational basis in the evidence. Thus, the task before the trial court is to consider all the evidence, both that which supports the decision of the board and that which detracts from it. Goodwin v. Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ., 67 N.C. App. 243, 312 S.E.2d 892, cert. denied, 311 N.C. 304, 317 S.E.2d 680 (1984).

The whole record test does not allow the reviewing court to replace the board's judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter been before it de novo. On the other hand, the whole record rule requires the court, in determining the substantiality of evidence supporting the board's decision, to take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the board's evidence. Goodwin v. Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ., 67 N.C. App. 243, 312 S.E.2d 892, cert. denied, 311 N.C. 304, 317 S.E.2d 680 (1984).

Under the whole evidence rule, the court may not consider the evidence which in and of itself justifies the board's result, without taking into account contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn. Goodwin v. Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ., 67 N.C. App. 243, 312 S.E.2d 892, cert. denied, 311 N.C. 304, 317 S.E.2d 680 (1984).

Standard of Proof. - The standard of proof in administrative matters is by the greater weight of the evidence, and it is error to require a showing by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Dillingham v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 132 N.C. App. 704, 513 S.E.2d 823 (1999).

Burden of Proof. - While neither G.S. 150B-23(a) nor G.S. 150B-29(a) specifically allocated the burden of proof in an administrative appeal, it had been held that that an administrative law judge was to determine whether a petitioner had met its burden in showing that the agency acted or failed to act as provided in G.S. 150B-23(a)(1) - (5), and it had been observed that caselaw held that unless a statute provided otherwise, a petitioner had the burden of proof in Office of Administrative Hearings contested cases. Overcash v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 179 N.C. App. 697, 635 S.E.2d 442 (2006), review denied, 361 N.C. 220, 642 S.E.2d 445 (2007).

Trial court did not err in its allocation of the burden of proof on a chicken processing facility operator because he burden of proof rests on the petitioner challenging the decision of the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources. House of Raeford Farms, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 242 N.C. App. 294, 774 S.E.2d 911 (2015).

Board of Adjustment Not Required to Sound-Record Hearings. - Municipal corporations were specifically excluded from requirements under former G.S. 150A-29 and former G.S. 150A-37 that trial rules of evidence and production of evidence be followed in proceedings before State agencies. Thus, a Board of Adjustment was not required to sound-record its hearings. Washington Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Winston-Salem Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 35 N.C. App. 449, 241 S.E.2d 872, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 295 N.C. 91, 244 S.E.2d 263 (1978).

As to admissibility of evidence in proceeding before Property Tax Commission, see In re McLean Trucking Co., 281 N.C. 375, 189 S.E.2d 194, rehearing denied, 282 N.C. 156 (1972), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1099, 93 S. Ct. 909, 34 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1973).

Reports of physicians are acceptable as evidence, since an agency may use its experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge in the evaluation of evidence presented to it. Lackey v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 306 N.C. 231, 293 S.E.2d 171 (1982).

Burden of Proof on Unemployment Claimant. - Where a claimant for unemployment previously quit her job to retire and was presently claiming to have reentered the labor market, the degree of proof required of the claimant was by the greater weight of the evidence. In re Thomas, 281 N.C. 598, 189 S.E.2d 245 (1972).

School Board's Dismissal of At-Will Employee Upheld. - It was not arbitrary or capricious, nor an abuse of discretion, for school board to terminate an at-will employee for making a racial comment in a school setting. Cooper v. Board of Educ., 135 N.C. App. 200, 519 S.E.2d 536 (1999).

Evidence Properly Admitted. - When a terminated state law enforcement agent alleged discrimination on the basis of political affiliation, the testimony by a former deputy secretary of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety (DPS) that a state senator told the deputy secretary that the agent's reassignment shouldn't have occurred and that they were going to fix it and that the incoming Secretary of the DPS had agreed that the reassignment shouldn't have happened was admissible in an administrative hearing to show the declarant's existing mental state and motive. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Ledford, 247 N.C. App. 266, 786 S.E.2d 50 (2016).

Applied in Mission Hosps., Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 189 N.C. App. 263, 658 S.E.2d 277 (2008).

Cited in Eury v. North Carolina Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 115 N.C. App. 590, 446 S.E.2d 383 (1994), cert. denied, 338 N.C. 309, 451 S.E.2d 635 (1994); In re Freeman, 109 N.C. App. 100, 426 S.E.2d 100 (1993); Davenport v. North Carolina DOT, 3 F.3d 89 (4th Cir. 1993); Dialysis Care of N.C. L.L.C. v. North Carolina HHS, Div. of Facility Servs., Certificate of Need Section, 137 N.C. App. 638, 529 S.E.2d 257 (2000), aff'd, 353 N.C. 258, 538 S.E.2d 566 (2000); Living Centers-Southeast, Inc. v. North Carolina HHS, 138 N.C. App. 572, 532 S.E.2d 192 (2000); Kea v. HHS, 153 N.C. App. 595, 570 S.E.2d 919 (2002), appeal dismissed, 356 N.C. 673, 577 S.E.2d 120, 357 N.C. 654, 588 S.E.2d 467 (2003); Woodburn v. N.C. State Univ., 156 N.C. App. 549, 577 S.E.2d 154, cert. denied, 357 N.C. 470, 584 S.E.2d 296 (2003); Town of Wallace v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., Div. of Water Quality, 160 N.C. App. 49, 584 S.E.2d 809 (2003); Mooresville Hosp. Mgmt. Assocs. v. N.C. HHS, Div. of Facility Servs., 169 N.C. App. 641, 611 S.E.2d 431 (2005); McGladrey & Pullen, LLP v. N.C. State Bd. of CPA Exam'rs, 171 N.C. App. 610, 615 S.E.2d 339, cert. denied, notice of appeal dismissed, 360 N.C. 65, 621 S.E.2d 627 (2005), aff'd, 360 N.C. 399, 627 S.E.2d 461 (2006); Total Renal Care of N.C. LLC v. N.C. HHS, 171 N.C. App. 734, 615 S.E.2d 81 (2005); Gordon v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 173 N.C. App. 22, 618 S.E.2d 280 (2005); Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 185 N.C. App. 566, 649 S.E.2d 410 (2007), cert. denied, 362 N.C. 360, 661 S.E.2d 735 (2008); Early v. County of Durham, Dep't of Soc. Servs., 193 N.C. App. 334, 667 S.E.2d 512 (2008), review denied, 363 N.C. 372, 678 S.E.2d 237 (2009); Richardson v. N.C. Dept of Pub. Instruction Licensure Section, 199 N.C. App. 219, 681 S.E.2d 479, review denied, 363 N.C. 745, 688 S.E.2d 694 (2009); McCaskill v. Dep't of State Treasurer, Ret. Sys. Div., 204 N.C. App. 373, 695 S.E.2d 108 (2010), aff'd in part, 706 S.E.2d 226, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 140 (2011); Mission Hosps., Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 205 N.C. App. 35, 696 S.E.2d 163 (2010); Parkway Urology, P.A. v. N.C. HHS, 205 N.C. App. 529, 696 S.E.2d 187 (2010), review denied 705 S.E.2d 739, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 55 (2011), review denied 705 S.E.2d 753, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 47 (2011); E. Carolina Internal Med., P.A. v. N.C. HHS, 211 N.C. App. 397, 710 S.E.2d 245 (2011); Midgett v. N. Carolina Coastal Res. Comm'n, 212 N.C. App. 420, - S.E.2d - (June 7, 2011); Joyner v. N.C. HHS, 214 N.C. App. 278, 715 S.E.2d 498 (2011); Yan-Min Wang v. UNC-CH Sch. of Med., 216 N.C. App. 185, 716 S.E.2d 646 (2011); WakeMed v. N.C. HHS, 225 N.C. App. 253, 737 S.E.2d 754 (2013); CaroMont Health, Inc. v. N.C. HHS Div. of Health Serv. Regulation, 231 N.C. App. 1, 751 S.E.2d 244 (2013); Wetherington v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 231 N.C. App. 503, 752 S.E.2d 511 (2013), amended 771 S.E.2d 294, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 612 (2015), aff'd in part and modified in part 780 S.E.2d 543, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1259 (2015); Surgical Care Affiliates, LLC v. N.C. HHS, 235 N.C. App. 620, 762 S.E.2d 468 (2014); Donnelly v. Univ. of N.C. 236 N.C. App. 32, 763 S.E.2d 154 (2014); Cumberland Cnty. Hosp. Sys. v. North Carolina HHS, 242 N.C. App. 524, 776 S.E.2d 329 (2015); Blackburn v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 246 N.C. App. 196, 784 S.E.2d 509 (2016); Williford v. N.C. HHS, 250 N.C. App. 491, 792 S.E.2d 843 (2016); Harris v. N.C.
Dep't of Pub. Safety, 252 N.C. App. 94, 798 S.E.2d 127, aff'd, 370 N.C. 386, 808 S.E.2d 142, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 1020 (2017); Rittelmeyer v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 252 N.C. App. 340, 799 S.E.2d 378, review denied, 370 N.C. 67, 803 S.E.2d 385, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 606 (N.C. 2017); Brewington v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 254 N.C. App. 1, 802 S.E.2d 115 (2017), review denied, 371 N.C. 343, 813 S.E.2d 857, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 464 (2018).


§ 150B-30. Official notice.

Official notice may be taken of all facts of which judicial notice may be taken and of other facts within the specialized knowledge of the agency. The noticed fact and its source shall be stated and made known to affected parties at the earliest practicable time, and any party shall on timely request be afforded an opportunity to dispute the noticed fact through submission of evidence and argument.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1.)

Legal Periodicals. - For comment, "The Problem of Procedural Delay in Contested Case Hearings . . ." under the North Carolina APA, see 7 N.C. Cent. L.J. 347 (1976).

For article, "A Powerless Judiciary? The North Carolina Courts' Perceptions of Review of Administrative Action," see 12 N.C. Cent. L.J. 21 (1980).

For article, "Administrative Justice: No Longer Just a Recommendation," see 79 N.C.L. Rev. 1639 (2001).

For article, "What Were We Thinking?: Legislative Intent and the 2000 Amendments to the North Carolina APA," see 79 N.C.L. Rev. 1657 (2001).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A and earlier statutes.

One of the purposes behind the creation of administrative agencies was the necessity for the supervision and experience of specialists in difficult and complicated fields. Lackey v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 306 N.C. 231, 293 S.E.2d 171 (1982).

Reports of physicians are acceptable as evidence, since an agency may use its experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge in the evaluation of evidence presented to it. Lackey v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 306 N.C. 231, 293 S.E.2d 171 (1982).

Reliance on Paper Presented in Hearing on Prior Rate Filing. - While it is the better practice to produce a witness in a rate-making hearing rather than to rely on exhibits furnished by the witness in earlier hearings, the Commissioner of Insurance did not commit prejudicial error in a homeowners' insurance rate hearing in taking official notice of a paper presented by a witness in a hearing on a prior rate filing and made a part of the order disapproving the prior filing, where the commissioner gave the rate bureau adequate notice in the notice of public hearing that he would rely on the paper in the present hearing. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 474, 269 S.E.2d 595 (1980).

State Board of Assessment (now Department of Revenue) is neither required nor permitted to shut its eyes to an established fact of common knowledge. In re Valuation of Property Located at 411-417 W. Fourth St., 282 N.C. 71, 191 S.E.2d 692 (1972).

For discussion of respective powers and duties of Commissioner of Insurance and his designated hearing officer in the review of filed rates and entry of a final agency decision in a contested insurance rate case, see State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 61 N.C. App. 506, 300 S.E.2d 845 (1983).

Applied in Mission Hosps., Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 189 N.C. App. 263, 658 S.E.2d 277 (2008).

Cited in Kea v. HHS, 153 N.C. App. 595, 570 S.E.2d 919 (2002), appeal dismissed, 356 N.C. 673, 577 S.E.2d 120, 357 N.C. 654, 588 S.E.2d 467 (2003); Woodburn v. N.C. State Univ., 156 N.C. App. 549, 577 S.E.2d 154, cert. denied, 357 N.C. 470, 584 S.E.2d 296 (2003); Mooresville Hosp. Mgmt. Assocs. v. N.C. HHS, Div. of Facility Servs., 169 N.C. App. 641, 611 S.E.2d 431 (2005); McGladrey & Pullen, LLP v. N.C. State Bd. of CPA Exam'rs, 171 N.C. App. 610, 615 S.E.2d 339, cert. denied, notice of appeal dismissed, 360 N.C. 65, 621 S.E.2d 627 (2005), aff'd, 360 N.C. 399, 627 S.E.2d 461 (2006); Total Renal Care of N.C. LLC v. N.C. HHS, 171 N.C. App. 734, 615 S.E.2d 81 (2005); Gordon v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 173 N.C. App. 22, 618 S.E.2d 280 (2005); Overcash v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 179 N.C. App. 697, 635 S.E.2d 442 (2006), review denied, 361 N.C. 220, 642 S.E.2d 445 (2007); Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 185 N.C. App. 566, 649 S.E.2d 410 (2007), cert. denied, 362 N.C. 360, 661 S.E.2d 735 (2008); Early v. County of Durham, Dep't of Soc. Servs., 193 N.C. App. 334, 667 S.E.2d 512 (2008), review denied, 363 N.C. 372, 678 S.E.2d 237 (2009); Richardson v. N.C. Dept of Pub. Instruction Licensure Section, 199 N.C. App. 219, 681 S.E.2d 479, review denied, 363 N.C. 745, 688 S.E.2d 694 (2009); McCaskill v. Dep't of State Treasurer, Ret. Sys. Div., 204 N.C. App. 373, 695 S.E.2d 108 (2010), aff'd in part, 706 S.E.2d 226, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 140 (2011); Mission Hosps., Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 205 N.C. App. 35, 696 S.E.2d 163 (2010); Parkway Urology, P.A. v. N.C. HHS, 205 N.C. App. 529, 696 S.E.2d 187 (2010), review denied 705 S.E.2d 739, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 55 (2011), review denied 705 S.E.2d 753, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 47 (2011); E. Carolina Internal Med., P.A. v. N.C. HHS, 211 N.C. App. 397, 710 S.E.2d 245 (2011); Midgett v. N. Carolina Coastal Res. Comm'n, 212 N.C. App. 420, - S.E.2d - (June 7, 2011); Joyner v. N.C. HHS, 214 N.C. App. 278, 715 S.E.2d 498 (2011); Yan-Min Wang v. UNC-CH Sch. of Med., 216 N.C. App. 185, 716 S.E.2d 646 (2011); WakeMed v. N.C. HHS, 225 N.C. App. 253, 737 S.E.2d 754 (2013); CaroMont Health, Inc. v. N.C. HHS Div. of Health Serv. Regulation, 231 N.C. App. 1, 751 S.E.2d 244 (2013); Wetherington v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 231 N.C. App. 503, 752 S.E.2d 511 (2013), amended 771 S.E.2d 294, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 612 (2015), aff'd in part and modified in part 780 S.E.2d 543, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1259 (2015); Surgical Care Affiliates, LLC v. N.C. HHS, 235 N.C. App. 620, 762 S.E.2d 468 (2014); Donnelly v. Univ. of N.C. 236 N.C. App. 32, 763 S.E.2d 154 (2014); Cumberland Cnty. Hosp. Sys. v. North Carolina HHS, 242 N.C. App. 524, 776 S.E.2d 329 (2015); Blackburn v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 246 N.C. App. 196, 784 S.E.2d 509 (2016); N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Ledford, 247 N.C. App. 266, 786 S.E.2d 50 (2016); Williford v. N.C. HHS, 250 N.C. App. 491, 792 S.E.2d 843 (2016); Harris v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 252 N.C. App. 94, 798 S.E.2d 127, aff'd, 370 N.C. 386, 808 S.E.2d 142, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 1020 (2017); Rittelmeyer v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 252 N.C. App. 340, 799 S.E.2d 378, review denied, 370 N.C. 67, 803 S.E.2d 385, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 606 (N.C. 2017); Brewington v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 254 N.C. App. 1,
802 S.E.2d 115 (2017), review denied, 371 N.C. 343, 813 S.E.2d 857, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 464 (2018).


§ 150B-31. Stipulations.

  1. The parties in a contested case may, by a stipulation in writing filed with the administrative law judge, agree upon any fact involved in the controversy, which stipulation shall be used as evidence at the hearing and be binding on the parties thereto. Parties should agree upon facts when practicable.
  2. Except as otherwise provided by law, disposition may be made of a contested case by stipulation, agreed settlement, consent order, waiver, default, or other method agreed upon by the parties.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1987, c. 878, s. 6.)

CASE NOTES

Cited in Kea v. HHS, 153 N.C. App. 595, 570 S.E.2d 919 (2002), appeal dismissed, 356 N.C. 673, 577 S.E.2d 120, 357 N.C. 654, 588 S.E.2d 467 (2003); Woodburn v. N.C. State Univ., 156 N.C. App. 549, 577 S.E.2d 154, cert. denied, 357 N.C. 470, 584 S.E.2d 296 (2003); Mooresville Hosp. Mgmt. Assocs. v. N.C. HHS, Div. of Facility Servs., 169 N.C. App. 641, 611 S.E.2d 431 (2005); McGladrey & Pullen, LLP v. N.C. State Bd. of CPA Exam'rs, 171 N.C. App. 610, 615 S.E.2d 339, cert. denied, notice of appeal dismissed, 360 N.C. 65, 621 S.E.2d 627 (2005), aff'd, 360 N.C. 399, 627 S.E.2d 461 (2006); Total Renal Care of N.C. LLC v. N.C. HHS, 171 N.C. App. 734, 615 S.E.2d 81 (2005); Gordon v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 173 N.C. App. 22, 618 S.E.2d 280 (2005); Overcash v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 179 N.C. App. 697, 635 S.E.2d 442 (2006), review denied, 361 N.C. 220, 642 S.E.2d 445 (2007); Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 185 N.C. App. 566, 649 S.E.2d 410 (2007), cert. denied, 362 N.C. 360, 661 S.E.2d 735 (2008); Mission Hosps., Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 189 N.C. App. 263, 658 S.E.2d 277 (2008); Early v. County of Durham, Dep't of Soc. Servs., 193 N.C. App. 334, 667 S.E.2d 512 (2008), review denied, 363 N.C. 372, 678 S.E.2d 237 (2009); Richardson v. N.C. Dept of Pub. Instruction Licensure Section, 199 N.C. App. 219, 681 S.E.2d 479, review denied, 363 N.C. 745, 688 S.E.2d 694 (2009); McCaskill v. Dep't of State Treasurer, Ret. Sys. Div., 204 N.C. App. 373, 695 S.E.2d 108 (2010), aff'd in part, 706 S.E.2d 226, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 140 (2011); Mission Hosps., Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 205 N.C. App. 35, 696 S.E.2d 163 (2010); Parkway Urology, P.A. v. N.C. HHS, 205 N.C. App. 529, 696 S.E.2d 187 (2010), review denied 705 S.E.2d 739, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 55 (2011), review denied 705 S.E.2d 753, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 47 (2011); E. Carolina Internal Med., P.A. v. N.C. HHS, 211 N.C. App. 397, 710 S.E.2d 245 (2011); Midgett v. N. Carolina Coastal Res. Comm'n, 212 N.C. App. 420, - S.E.2d - (June 7, 2011); Joyner v. N.C. HHS, 214 N.C. App. 278, 715 S.E.2d 498 (2011); Yan-Min Wang v. UNC-CH Sch. of Med., 216 N.C. App. 185, 716 S.E.2d 646 (2011); WakeMed v. N.C. HHS, 225 N.C. App. 253, 737 S.E.2d 754 (2013); CaroMont Health, Inc. v. N.C. HHS Div. of Health Serv. Regulation, 231 N.C. App. 1, 751 S.E.2d 244 (2013); Wetherington v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 231 N.C. App. 503, 752 S.E.2d 511 (2013), amended 771 S.E.2d 294, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 612 (2015), aff'd in part and modified in part 780 S.E.2d 543, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1259 (2015); Surgical Care Affiliates, LLC v. N.C. HHS, 235 N.C. App. 620, 762 S.E.2d 468 (2014); Donnelly v. Univ. of N.C. 236 N.C. App. 32, 763 S.E.2d 154 (2014); Cumberland Cnty. Hosp. Sys. v. North Carolina HHS, 242 N.C. App. 524, 776 S.E.2d 329 (2015); Blackburn v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 246 N.C. App. 196, 784 S.E.2d 509 (2016); N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Ledford, 247 N.C. App. 266, 786 S.E.2d 50 (2016); Williford v. N.C. HHS, 250 N.C. App. 491, 792 S.E.2d 843 (2016); Harris v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 252 N.C. App. 94, 798 S.E.2d 127, aff'd, 370 N.C. 386, 808 S.E.2d 142, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 1020 (2017); Rittelmeyer v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 252 N.C. App. 340, 799 S.E.2d 378, review denied, 370 N.C. 67, 803 S.E.2d 385, 2017 N.C. LEXIS
606 (N.C. 2017); Brewington v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 254 N.C. App. 1, 802 S.E.2d 115 (2017), review denied, 371 N.C. 343, 813 S.E.2d 857, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 464 (2018).


§ 150B-31.1. Contested tax cases.

  1. Application. - This section applies only to contested tax cases. A contested tax case is a case involving a disputed tax matter arising under G.S. 105-241.15. To the extent any provision in this section conflicts with another provision in this Article, this section controls.
  2. Simple Procedures. - The Chief Administrative Law Judge may limit and simplify the procedures that apply to a contested tax case involving a taxpayer who is not represented by an attorney. An administrative law judge assigned to a contested tax case must make reasonable efforts to assist a taxpayer who is not represented by an attorney in order to assure a fair hearing.
  3. Venue. - A hearing in a contested tax case must be conducted in Wake County, unless the parties agree to hear the case in another county.
  4. Reports. - The following agency reports are admissible without testimony from personnel of the agency:
    1. Law enforcement reports.
    2. Government agency lab reports used for the enforcement of motor fuel tax laws.
  5. Confidentiality. - The record, proceedings, and decision in a contested tax case are confidential until the final decision is issued in the case.

History

(2007-491, s. 42; 2008-134, s. 9.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2008-134, s. 9, effective July 28, 2008, rewrote subsection (d).

§ 150B-32. Designation of administrative law judge.

  1. The Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings shall assign himself or another administrative law judge to preside over a contested case.
  2. Repealed by Sessions Laws 1985 (Regular Session, 1986), c. 1022, s. 1(15).
  3. On the filing in good faith by a party of a timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias or disqualification of an administrative law judge, the administrative law judge shall determine the matter as a part of the record in the case, and this determination shall be subject to judicial review at the conclusion of the proceeding.
  4. When an administrative law judge is disqualified or it is impracticable for him to continue the hearing, the Director shall assign another administrative law judge to continue with the case unless it is shown that substantial prejudice to any party will result, in which event a new hearing shall be held or the case dismissed without prejudice.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1022, s. 1(1), 1(12), 1(15); c. 1028, s. 40; 1987, c. 878, s. 8.)

Legal Periodicals. - For comment, "The Problem of Procedural Delay in Contested Case Hearings . . ." under the North Carolina APA, see 7 N.C. Cent. L.J. 347 (1976).

For article, "Lead Us Not into Temptation: Should Attorneys Who Contract to Provide Administrative Adjudication Services Be Insulated from Those Who Compensate Them?,” see 68 Duke L.J. 24 (2019).

For article, "Judicial Ethics: Ethics and Judicial Independence in an Executive Branch Judiciary," see 68 Duke L.J. 40 (2019).

CASE NOTES

Cited in Williams v. North Carolina Dep't of Economic & Community Dev., 119 N.C. App. 535, 458 S.E.2d 750 (1995); Gainey v. North Carolina Dep't of Justice, 121 N.C. App. 253, 465 S.E.2d 36 (1996).


§ 150B-33. Powers of administrative law judge.

  1. An administrative law judge shall stay any contested case under this Article on motion of an agency which is a party to the contested case, if the agency shows by supporting affidavits that it is engaged in other litigation or administrative proceedings, by whatever name called, with or before a federal agency, and this other litigation or administrative proceedings will determine the position, in whole or in part, of the agency in the contested case. At the conclusion of the other litigation or administrative proceedings, the contested case shall proceed and be determined as expeditiously as possible.
  2. An administrative law judge may:
    1. Administer oaths and affirmations;
    2. Sign, issue, and rule on subpoenas in accordance with G.S. 150B-27 and G.S. 1A-1, Rule 45;
    3. Provide for the taking of testimony by deposition and rule on all objections to discovery in accordance with G.S. 1A-1, the Rules of Civil Procedure;
    4. Rule on all prehearing motions that are authorized by G.S. 1A-1, the Rules of Civil Procedure;
    5. Regulate the course of the hearings, including discovery, set the time and place for continued hearings, and fix the time for filing of briefs and other documents;
    6. Direct the parties to appear and confer to consider simplification of the issues by consent of the parties;
    7. Stay the contested action by the agency pending the outcome of the case, upon such terms as he deems proper, and subject to the provisions of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 65;
    8. Determine whether the hearing shall be recorded by a stenographer or by an electronic device; and
    9. Enter an order returnable in the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, to show cause why the person should not be held in contempt. The Court shall have the power to impose punishment as for contempt for any act which would constitute direct or indirect contempt if the act occurred in an action pending in Superior Court.
    10. Determine that a rule as applied in a particular case is void because (1) it is not within the statutory authority of the agency, (2) is not clear and unambiguous to persons it is intended to direct, guide, or assist, or (3) is not reasonably necessary to enable the agency to fulfill a duty delegated to it by the General Assembly.
    11. Impose the sanctions provided for in G.S. 1A-1 or Chapter 3 of Title 26 of the North Carolina Administrative Code for noncompliance with applicable procedural rules.
    12. Order the assessment of reasonable attorneys' fees and witnesses' fees against the State agency involved in contested cases decided under this Article where the administrative law judge finds that the State agency named as respondent has substantially prejudiced the petitioner's rights and has acted arbitrarily or capriciously or under Chapter 126 where the administrative law judge finds discrimination, harassment, or orders reinstatement or back pay.
    13. Repealed by Session Laws 2011-398, s. 17. For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1987, c. 878, ss. 5, 9, 10, 26; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1111, ss. 18, 19; 1991, c. 35, s. 5; 2000-190, s. 5; 2004-156, s. 4; 2011-398, s. 17; 2012-187, s. 7.2.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 62, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 63, as amended by Session Laws 2012-187, s. 8.1, provides in relevant part: "Sections 15 through 55 of this act become effective January 1, 2012, and apply to contested cases commenced on or after that date. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.2 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 of this act become effective when the United States Environmental Protection Agency approvals referenced in Section 55.2 have been issued or October 1, 2012, whichever occurs first. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.1 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 and Sections 32 and 33 of this act become effective when the waiver referenced in Section 55.1 has been granted or February 1, 2013, whichever occurs first. Unless otherwise provided elsewhere in this act, the remainder of this act is effective when it becomes law." For Section 55.2, see editor's note under G.S. 150B-34.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 17, deleted subdivision (b)(12), which pertained to the acceptance of a remanded case from an agency. For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Legal Periodicals. - For comment, "The Problem of Procedural Delay in Contested Case Hearings . . ." under the North Carolina APA, see 7 N.C. Cent. L.J. 347 (1976).

For article, "Powers of Administrative Law Judges, Agencies, and Courts: An Analytical and Empirical Assessment," see 79 N.C.L. Rev. 1571 (2001).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A and earlier statutes, or under this Chapter prior to the 1991 amendments thereto.

Powers Generally. - When an agency of State government determines to use the services of a hearing officer (now administrative law judge), it is former G.S. 150A-33 that prescribes his powers. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 61 N.C. App. 262, 300 S.E.2d 586, cert. denied, 308 N.C. 548, 304 S.E.2d 242 (1983).

Proposal for Decision Required of Hearing Officer (Now Administrative Law Judge). - Under the Administrative Procedure Act, when the services of a hearing officer (now administrative law judge) are used, there must be a "proposal for decision" by the hearing officer. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 61 N.C. App. 262, 300 S.E.2d 586, cert. denied, 308 N.C. 548, 304 S.E.2d 242 (1983).

Administrative Law Judge's Decision Reviewed by Personnel Commission. - The administrative law judge must render a decision on the motion which is presented, but the administrative law judge's ruling is subject to review by the ultimate factfinder, the Personnel Commission. Eury v. North Carolina Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 115 N.C. App. 590, 446 S.E.2d 383 (1994), cert. denied, 338 N.C. 309, 451 S.E.2d 635 (1994).

Procedural Due Process - Lumber company was never unconstitutionally deprived of its permit as a result of the state agency failing to provide proper due process, since it was through due process provided by G.S. 150B that the lumber company's permit was reinstated. Godfrey Lumber Co. v. Howard, 151 N.C. App. 738, 566 S.E.2d 825, review denied, 356 N.C. 435, 572 S.E.2d 430 (2002).

For discussion of respective powers and duties of Commissioner of Insurance and his designated hearing officer in the review of filed rates and entry of a final agency decision in a contested insurance rate case, see State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 61 N.C. App. 506, 300 S.E.2d 845 (1983).

Commissioner of Insurance Has No Statutory Power to Issue Restraining Orders or Injunctions. - The statutes creating the Department of Insurance and prescribing the powers and duties of the Commissioner do not purport to grant him the power of issuing restraining orders and injunctions. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. Lanier, 16 N.C. App. 381, 192 S.E.2d 57 (1972).

Commissioner May Apply to the Courts Therefor. - In administering the laws relative to the insurance industry, the Commissioner, if he deems it necessary, may apply to the courts for restraining orders and injunctions. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. Lanier, 16 N.C. App. 381, 192 S.E.2d 57 (1972).

Attempted grant to the Commissioner of Insurance of judicial power to impose a penalty upon an insurance agent for a violation of the insurance laws, varying in the Commissioner's discretion from a nominal sum to $25,000, violated N.C. Const., Art. IV, there being no reasonable necessity for conferring such judicial power upon the Commissioner. State ex rel. Lanier v. Vines, 274 N.C. 486, 164 S.E.2d 161 (1968).

Authority to Determine Validity of Rules. - This section provides that an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) may determine that a rule as applied in a particular case is void; however, it does not authorize an ALJ to make a final decision with respect to the validity of agency rules. Fearrington v. University of N.C. 126 N.C. App. 774, 487 S.E.2d 169 (1997).

When the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Resources, Division of Facility Services, Certificate of Need Section, denied a health system's request for a certificate of need (CON) to build a hospital and granted a CON to the system's competitor, an administrative law judge was authorized to find that 10A N.C. Admin. Code 14C.2303(3), regarding findings of the utilization of computerized axial tomography equipment in a geographic area, was "void as applied" to the facts because the rule required consideration of the health system's underutilization of such equipment in a hospital that was about to close in determining whether to authorize the competitor to install such equipment in the hospital the competitor proposed for the area, and the system's underutilization was irrelevant to the area's need for such equipment, and G.S. 150B-33(b)(9)(3) allowed the administrative law judge to find that a rule was void in a particular case because the rule was not reasonably necessary to enable an agency to fulfill a duty delegated to the agency by the general assembly. Good Hope Health Sys., LLC v. N.C. HHS, 188 N.C. App. 68, 658 S.E.2d 665, review denied, 362 N.C. 470, 666 S.E.2d 484 (2008).

Administrative Law Judge Had Authority to Award Attorneys' Fees. - Court of appeals erred in invalidating an administrative law judge's decision to award back pay and attorneys' fees to a county department of social services employee because the judge had express statutory authority to award back pay and attorneys' fees to the employee; the absence of any reference to an attorneys' fee award in subdivision (b)(11) had no bearing upon the proper resolution of the issue of whether the judge had the authority to award attorneys' fees to the employee. Rouse v. Forsyth Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 373 N.C. 409, 838 S.E.2d 390 (2020).

Fact that G.S. 150B-33(b)(11) makes no reference to the making of an attorneys' fee award to a wrongfully discharged local government employee has no bearing upon the issue of whether such an award is authorized for unlawfully discharged local government employees by the North Carolina Human Resources Act, G.S. 126-34.02(e). Rouse v. Forsyth Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 373 N.C. 409, 838 S.E.2d 390 (2020).

Summary Judgment. - When a provider contested granting a certificate of need to a competitor, an administrative law judge could grant summary judgment because (1) G.S. 131E-188(a) did not give the provider an unconditional right to a hearing, as the right was contingent on a valid petition, and (2) G.S. 150B-33(b)(3a) and G.S. 150B-34(e) allowed summary judgment. Cumberland County Hosp. Sys. v. N.C. HHS, 237 N.C. App. 113, 764 S.E.2d 491 (2014).

Applied in Mission Hosps., Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 189 N.C. App. 263, 658 S.E.2d 277 (2008).

Cited in Lenoir Mem. Hosp. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 98 N.C. App. 178, 390 S.E.2d 448 (1990); Alexander v. Wilkerson, 99 N.C. App. 340, 392 S.E.2d 765 (1990); Ji-Da Dai v. Univ. of N.C. - F. Supp. 2d - (M.D.N.C. Sept. 2, 2003); Hooper v. North Carolina, 379 F. Supp. 2d 804 (M.D.N.C. 2005); Cumberland Cnty. Hosp. Sys. v. North Carolina HHS, 242 N.C. App. 524, 776 S.E.2d 329 (2015).


§ 150B-34. Final decision or order.

  1. In each contested case the administrative law judge shall make a final decision or order that contains findings of fact and conclusions of law. The administrative law judge shall decide the case based upon the preponderance of the evidence, giving due regard to the demonstrated knowledge and expertise of the agency with respect to facts and inferences within the specialized knowledge of the agency.
  2. Repealed by Session Laws 1991, c. 35, s. 6.
  3. Repealed by Session Laws 2011-398, s. 18. For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.
  4. Except for the exemptions contained in G.S. 150B-1, the provisions of this section regarding the decision of the administrative law judge shall apply only to agencies subject to Article 3 of this Chapter, notwithstanding any other provisions to the contrary relating to recommended decisions by administrative law judges.
  5. An administrative law judge may grant judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to a motion made in accordance with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(c), or summary judgment, pursuant to a motion made in accordance with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56, that disposes of all issues in the contested case. Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a decision granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment need not include findings of fact or conclusions of law, except as determined by the administrative law judge to be required or allowed by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(c), or Rule 56.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1987, c. 878, ss. 5, 23; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1111, s. 21; 1991, c. 35, s. 6; 2000-190, s. 6; 2011-398, s. 18.)

Department of Health and Human Services Waiver Application. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 55.1, provides: "Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 6504, the Department of Health and Human Services shall request a waiver from the single State agency requirement contained in 42 C.F.R. § 432.10(e)(3) with regard to final decisions in administrative hearings. The waiver application shall include the following:

"(1) The waiver request is made at the direction of the North Carolina General Assembly, which is responsible for the organizational structure of State government.

"(2) The single State agency requirement prevents the establishment of the most effective and efficient arrangement for providing administrative hearings to claimants because it requires that after a hearing and decision by an administrative law judge, the case must be returned to the agency for a final decision. The return to the agency is an unnecessary, time-consuming, and costly additional step.

"(3) The use of another State administrative hearings arrangement will not endanger the objectives of the law authorizing the Medicaid program because the administrative law judges will abide by the properly adopted policies, rules, and regulations of the State Medicaid agency in making final decisions."

Request to Administer Certain Environmental Protection Programs. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 55.2, as amended by Session Laws 2012-187, s. 7.3, provides: "If necessary to effectuate the purposes of this act, the Office of Administrative Hearings shall seek United States Environmental Protection Agency approval to become an agency responsible for administering programs under the federal Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. On or before December 31, 2011, the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall jointly develop and submit any Memoranda of Agreement, delineations of programmatic responsibility, procedure for coordination, and other information that United States Environmental Protection Agency may require in order to effectuate any necessary approval process."

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 10.40(B)(a), expiring 30 days from the date of the Department's decision on the new certificate of need or adjournment sine die of the 2005 General Assembly, whichever occurs later, provides: "Notwithstanding provisions to the contrary in Chapter 150B and Article 9 of Chapter 131E of the General Statutes, a licensed health care facility in operation on July 1, 2005, under a certificate of need issued by the Department of Health and Human Services prior to that date and subsequently invalidated based on a procedural defect in the awarding of the certificate of need, may remain in operation for the purpose of applying for a new certificate of need in accordance with Article 9 of Chapter 131E of the General Statutes. The health care facility may remain in operation for the period pending the decision of the Department on the application for the new certificate of need."

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 1.2, provides: "This act shall be known as the 'Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2005'."

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 46.3, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2005-2007 fiscal biennium, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2005-2007 fiscal biennium."

Session Laws 2005-276, s. 46.5 is a severability clause.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 62, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 63, as amended by Session Laws 2012-187, s. 8.1, provides in relevant part: "Sections 15 through 55 of this act become effective January 1, 2012, and apply to contested cases commenced on or after that date. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.2 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 of this act become effective when the United States Environmental Protection Agency approvals referenced in Section 55.2 have been issued or October 1, 2012, whichever occurs first. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.1 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 and Sections 32 and 33 of this act become effective when the waiver referenced in Section 55.1 has been granted or February 1, 2013, whichever occurs first. Unless otherwise provided elsewhere in this act, the remainder of this act is effective when it becomes law."

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 18, rewrote the section. For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Legal Periodicals. - For comment, "The Problem of Procedural Delay in Contested Case Hearings . . ." under the North Carolina APA, see 7 N.C. Cent. L.J. 347 (1976).

For article, "Advisory Rulings by Administrative Agencies: Their Benefits and Dangers," see 2 Campbell L. Rev. 1 (1980).

For article, "Administrative Justice: No Longer Just a Recommendation," see 79 N.C.L. Rev. 1639 (2001).

For article, "What Were We Thinking?: Legislative Intent and the 2000 Amendments to the North Carolina APA," see 79 N.C.L. Rev. 1657 (2001).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Many of the cases below were decided under former G.S. 150B-36, or under this Chapter prior to the 1991 amendments thereto.

Powers of Hearing Officer (Now Administrative Law Judge) Generally. - When an agency of State government determined to use the services of a hearing officer (now administrative law judge), it was former G.S. 150A-33 that prescribed his powers. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 61 N.C. App. 262, 300 S.E.2d 586, cert. denied, 308 N.C. 548, 304 S.E.2d 242 (1983), decided under corresponding provisions of Chapter 150A.

Administrative law judge's (ALJ) conclusion that an agency did not establish just cause for a state employee's dismissal was upheld because (1) the ALJ did not have to defer to the agency in finding if just cause existed, as the agency had the burden to show just cause, and (2) substantial evidence supported the ALJ's factual findings that the employee's unacceptable personal conduct did not warrant the sanction of dismissal, making those findings binding on appeal, as the ALJ was the sole fact-finder. Harris v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 252 N.C. App. 94, 798 S.E.2d 127, aff'd, 370 N.C. 386, 808 S.E.2d 142, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 1020 (2017).

Proposal for Decision Required. - Under the Administrative Procedure Act, when the services of a hearing officer (now administrative law judge) are used, there must be a "proposal for decision" by the hearing officer. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 61 N.C. App. 262, 300 S.E.2d 586, cert. denied, 308 N.C. 548, 304 S.E.2d 242 (1983), decided under corresponding provisions of Chapter 150A.

New Evidence Admissible at Medicaid Hearing. - In a medicaid case, an Administrative Law Judge properly admitted evidence about the patient's medical needs that was not provided to the agency by his case manager before the initial agency decision to modify and reduce services. Under 26 N.C. Admin. Code § 3.0122(1)(1), the ALJ could admit all evidence that had probative value. Robinson v. N.C. HHS, 215 N.C. App. 372, 715 S.E.2d 569 (2011).

Administrative Law Judge's Decision Reviewed by Personnel Commission. - The administrative law judge must render a decision on the motion which is presented, but the administrative law judge's ruling is subject to review by the ultimate factfinder, the Personnel Commission. Eury v. North Carolina Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 115 N.C. App. 590, 446 S.E.2d 383 (1994), cert. denied, 338 N.C. 309, 451 S.E.2d 635 (1994).

No statutory authority exists for the State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] to review an administrative law judge's recommended decision in a case involving an exempt employee. Johnson v. Natural Resources & Community Dev., 98 N.C. App. 334, 391 S.E.2d 48, cert. denied, 327 N.C. 140, 394 S.E.2d 176 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 328 N.C. 689, 394 S.E.2d 469 (1991).

Administrative agency's failure to comply with the mandate of G.S. 150B-34(c) and address all unadopted findings of an administrative law judge (ALJ) in its final agency decision prejudiced a party's right to meaningful appellate review to the limited extent that the party was not afforded the opportunity to address the agency's reasoning for rejecting material and essential findings by the ALJ. Upon remand, the agency was to address all unadopted findings of the ALJ in its final agency decision. Mission Hosps., Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 189 N.C. App. 263, 658 S.E.2d 277 (2008).

Standard of Review for Certificate of Need. - Final sentence of G.S. 150B-34(c) exempts certificate of need proceedings from the newly amended portions of G.S. 150B-51 and requires an appellate court to review those decisions under the previous version of G.S. 150B-51. Total Renal Care of N.C. LLC v. N.C. HHS, 171 N.C. App. 734, 615 S.E.2d 81 (2005).

Deference Based on Specialized Knowledge of Agency. - Administrative law judge (ALJ) erred in failing to give deference to the reasonable explanation of the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Health Service Regulation, Certificate of Need Section (the Agency) for its decision to exclude hospital-affiliated facilities from its calculation of the county average based on its specialized knowledge because the evidence presented at the hearing corroborated the Agency's assertion that hospital-affiliated facilities typically had significantly fewer Medicaid patients than other skilled nursing facilities within Wake County and artificially skewed the county average. AH N.C. Owner LLC v. N.C. HHS, 240 N.C. App. 92, 771 S.E.2d 537 (2015).

Agency Decision Reversed. - Final agency decision of the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), which upheld two settlement agreements between the DHHS Certificate of Need (CON) section and a group of medical centers and issued a CON to the group for a hospital project was reversed on appeal, because the DHHS failed to follow statutory procedure when it rejected an administrative law judge's recommendation to deny the CON applications of the group by erroneously considering new evidence, which it had no statutory authority to do. Mooresville Hosp. Mgmt. Assocs. v. N.C. HHS, Div. of Facility Servs., 169 N.C. App. 641, 611 S.E.2d 431 (2005).

Remand Required Where Findings Are Found Insufficient. - Where, on review of an order of a state commission permitting petitioner savings and loan association to open a branch office, the trial court determined that the commission's findings were insufficient in that they lacked the specificity required by this section, the trial court should never have reached the question of whether reversal under former G.S. 150A-51(5) was appropriate, as remand for further findings was essential upon concluding that the findings of record presented an inadequate basis for review. Under no applicable theory of law would it be appropriate for the trial court to reverse the commission and substitute its judgment for the commission's. Community Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. North Carolina Sav. & Loan Comm'n, 43 N.C. App. 493, 259 S.E.2d 373 (1979).

Case was remanded because the final decision did not indicate that the conduct of a technician who worked for a county department of social services amounted to unacceptable personal conduct, and no conclusion of law asserted the department had substantive just cause for any disciplinary action; the ALJ had to make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding whether the conduct was unacceptable personal conduct, and whether it amounted to just cause for the disciplinary action taken. Watlington v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. Rockingham Cnty., 252 N.C. App. 512, 799 S.E.2d 396 (2017), overruled on other grounds, Rouse v. Forsyth Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 2020 N.C. LEXIS 93 (N.C. 2020).

Administrative agencies should be encouraged to continue cases under active deliberation until rendition of a final decision, to assure that that decision is the product of adequate, sound deliberation. In re Alamance Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 53 N.C. App. 326, 280 S.E.2d 748, cert. denied, 304 N.C. 588, 291 S.E.2d 148 (1981).

Final agency decision in writing envisioned by former G.S. 150A-36 was not merely a memorialization of the decision, but was the decision itself, without which agency action did not become final. In re Alamance Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 53 N.C. App. 326, 280 S.E.2d 748, cert. denied, 304 N.C. 588, 291 S.E.2d 148 (1981).

Under subsection (b) of this section, a final agency decision in a contested case hearing must be based on the official record prepared pursuant to G.S. 150B-37l; the agency is not permitted to hear new evidence, and if it does so, the trial court on review is required to reverse or remand the agency decision. Everhart & Assocs. v. Department of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 127 N.C. App. 693, 493 S.E.2d 66 (1997), cert. denied, 347 N.C. 575, 502 S.E.2d 590 (1998).

Local Appointing Authority. - A "local appointing authority," within the meaning of G.S. 126-37 (now repealed), is required to render its decision in accordance with subsection (b) of this section. Cunningham v. Catawba County, 128 N.C. App. 70, 493 S.E.2d 82 (1997).

DSS was required, in rejecting the recommended decision of the Commission, to state the specific reasons why it did not adopt the recommended decision and serve a copy of its final decision on the petitioner; however, because the legislature did not specifically require that the "local appointing authority" comply with subsection (b), there was no obligation to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, as required by subsection (b). Cunningham v. Catawba County, 128 N.C. App. 70, 493 S.E.2d 82 (1997).

In discrimination cases, G.S. 126-37(b1) (now repealed) and G.S. 150B-36 provide that when the State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] makes a finding of discrimination, this is binding upon the local appointing authority; the case is then subject to judicial review. Due process concerns are not as strong in discrimination cases because the local appointing authority will never have an opportunity to reverse a finding of discrimination by the State Personnel Commission. Enoch v. Alamance County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 164 N.C. App. 233, 595 S.E.2d 744 (2004).

Duty of Agency to Allow Adequate Opportunity to File Exceptions. - This section places an affirmative duty on the agency to allow parties an adequate opportunity to file exceptions to the recommended decision, but in no way obligates parties to file specific exceptions to the recommended decision before issuance of the final agency decision. Owen v. UNC-G Physical Plant, 121 N.C. App. 682, 468 S.E.2d 813, discretionary review improvidently allowed, 344 N.C. 73, 477 S.E.2d 33 (1996).

Subsection (a) simply provides the parties with an opportunity to file written exceptions and/or written arguments; it does not create an additional exhaustion hurdle. Jackson v. Department of Admin., 127 N.C. App. 434, 490 S.E.2d 248 (1997).

No Obligation to File Specific Exceptions. - Although this section places an affirmative duty on the agency to provide the opportunity to file exceptions to the parties, the plain language in no way obligates petitioners to file specific exceptions to the recommended decision before issuance of the final agency decision. Jackson v. Department of Admin., 127 N.C. App. 434, 490 S.E.2d 248 (1997).

Decision Not Made on Unlawful Procedure. - A decision of the State Board of Elections ordering a new election for certain county officers was not made on "unlawful procedure" without findings of fact where the chairman orally announced the board's decision on December 6, 1978, to order a new election because of irregularities in assistance rendered to persons who voted by absentee ballots and in the collection and return of voted absentee ballots; a written decision was filed on the same day incorporating the oral decision; and order was entered December 14, 1978, setting a date for the new election and setting out the rules and procedures for its conduct; and on February 13, 1979, the state board filed a written order containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law. In re Judicial Review by Republican Candidates, 45 N.C. App. 556, 264 S.E.2d 338, cert. denied, 299 N.C. 736, 267 S.E.2d 672 (1980).

Service of Final Decision. - Plain language of G.S. 150B-36(b3) and G.S. 150B-42(a) applies to agencies, not the North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings, and there was no requirement that the Office of Administrative Hearings serve a final decision personally or by certified mail; in any event, a day care did not deny receiving a copy of the final decision and its substantial rights were not prejudiced in any way. Lincoln v. N.C. HHS, Nutrition Branch, 172 N.C. App. 567, 616 S.E.2d 622 (2005).

University of North Carolina's State Residence Committee (SRC) is exempt from the entire Administrative Procedure Act; therefore, although provisions in the act requiring judicial review of final administrative review were applicable, the SRC was not governed by this section, which requires agencies to state reasons for their decisions. Wilson v. State Residence Comm., 92 N.C. App. 355, 374 S.E.2d 415 (1988), cert. denied, 324 N.C. 252, 377 S.E.2d 764 (1989).

Recusal From Decision Review. - Failure of the Director of the Division of Facility Services [now the Division of Health Service Regulation] of DHHS to recuse herself from reviewing her own decision did not amount to a violation of the applicant's competitor's due process rights. Bio-Medical Applications of N.C. Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, Div. of Facility Servs., Certificate of Need Section, 136 N.C. App. 103, 523 S.E.2d 677 (1999).

Administrative Law Judge's Decision Reviewed by Personnel Commission. - The administrative law judge must render a decision on the motion which is presented, but the administrative law judge's ruling is subject to review by the ultimate factfinder, the Personnel Commission. Eury v. North Carolina Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 115 N.C. App. 590, 446 S.E.2d 383 (1994), cert. denied, 338 N.C. 309, 451 S.E.2d 635 (1994).

No statutory authority exists for the State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] to review an administrative law judge's recommended decision in a case involving an exempt employee. Johnson v. Natural Resources & Community Dev., 98 N.C. App. 334, 391 S.E.2d 48 (1990).

Failure to Adequately Explain Rejection of Administrative Law Judge's Decision. - In light of the fact that the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services had never revoked licenses of ambulance providers for understaffing their ambulances and had no guidelines for such license revocation, the Department failed to explain adequately both its revocation of a provider's license for understaffing and its rejection of an administrative law judge's decision to stay revocation, as required by G.S. 150B-36(b1). Cape Med. Transp., Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 162 N.C. App. 14, 590 S.E.2d 8 (2004).

Dismissal Proper. - Substantial evidence in the record supported an administrative law judge's findings and its dismissal of a day care's petition for a contested case hearing where the day care filed nothing in nearly six months following the filing of the petition, despite receiving several orders from the administrative law judge to file and serve prehearing statements and other responses to motions. Lincoln v. N.C. HHS, Nutrition Branch, 172 N.C. App. 567, 616 S.E.2d 622 (2005).

Summary Judgment. - When a provider contested granting a certificate of need to a competitor, an administrative law judge could grant summary judgment because (1) G.S. 131E-188(a) did not give the provider an unconditional right to a hearing, as the right was contingent on a valid petition, and (2) G.S. 150B-33(b)(3a) and G.S. 150B-34(e) allowed summary judgment. Cumberland County Hosp. Sys. v. N.C. HHS, 237 N.C. App. 113, 764 S.E.2d 491 (2014).

Memorandum of Consideration Not Final Decision. - Trial court properly held that an administrative law judge's (ALJ's) recommended decision became the final decision of the North Carolina State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] where the Commission was evenly divided and its Memorandum of Consideration did not recite any findings of fact or conclusions of law; as the Memorandum of Consideration did not constitute a final decision, the Commission failed to make a final decision within the time set forth in G.S. 150B-44 and in order to protect the employee from unreasonable delay resulting from the Commission's failure to issue a final decision, the ALJ's recommended decision became the final decision by operation of law. Teague v. N.C. DOT, 177 N.C. App. 215, 628 S.E.2d 395 (2006), cert. denied, 362 N.C. 373, 662 S.E.2d 395 (2008), cert. dismissed, mandamus dism'd, - N.C. - , 677 S.E.2d 842 (2009), cert. denied, 722 S.E.2d 602, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 381 (2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 444, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 7842, 184 L. Ed. 2d 271 (U.S. 2012).

Applied in Ford v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health, & Natural Resources, 107 N.C. App. 192, 419 S.E.2d 204 (1992).

Cited in North Carolina Dep't of Cor. v. Hodge, 99 N.C. App. 602, 394 S.E.2d 285 (1990); HCA Crossroads Residential Ctrs. Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 327 N.C. 573, 398 S.E.2d 466 (1990); Jarrett v. North Carolina Dep't of Cultural Resources, 101 N.C. App. 475, 400 S.E.2d 66 (1991); State ex rel. Envtl. Mgt. Comm'n v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 101 N.C. App. 433, 400 S.E.2d 107 (1991).


§ 150B-35. No ex parte communication; exceptions.

Unless required for disposition of an ex parte matter authorized by law, the administrative law judge assigned to a contested case may not communicate, directly or indirectly, in connection with any issue of fact, or question of law, with any person or party or his representative, except on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1987, c. 878, s. 11; 2011-398, s. 19.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 62, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 63, as amended by Session Laws 2012-187, s. 8.1, provides in relevant part: "Sections 15 through 55 of this act become effective January 1, 2012, and apply to contested cases commenced on or after that date. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.2 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 of this act become effective when the United States Environmental Protection Agency approvals referenced in Section 55.2 have been issued or October 1, 2012, whichever occurs first.With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.1 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 and Sections 32 and 33 of this act become effective when the waiver referenced in Section 55.1 has been granted or February 1, 2013, whichever occurs first. Unless otherwise provided elsewhere in this act, the remainder of this act is effective when it becomes law." For Section 55.2, see editor's note under G.S. 150B-34.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 19, deleted "neither" preceding "the administrative law judge" and "nor a member or employee of the agency making a final decision in the case" following "contested case," and substituted "may not communicate" for "may communicate." For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

CASE NOTES

Former employee's proposed amendment to a federal district court action under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, which would have added an alleged violation of G.S. 150B-35, was denied because the proposed amendments could have been addressed in the earlier state court proceedings and did not change the fact that the employee's claim was barred under the doctrine of res judicata and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Hearne v. Sherman, - F. Supp. 2d - (M.D.N.C. Nov. 12, 2002).

Ex parte communication by a director for an administrative agency to counsel for a party following a contested case hearing in the preparation of a final agency decision violated G.S. 150B-35 and constituted an error of law under G.S. 150B-51(b). Mission Hosps., Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 189 N.C. App. 263, 658 S.E.2d 277 (2008).

Cited in Hope-A Women's Cancer Center, P.A. v. N.C. HHS, 203 N.C. App. 276, 691 S.E.2d 421 (2010), review denied, 365 N.C. 87, 706 S.E.2d 254, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 144 (2011).


§ 150B-36: Repealed by Session Laws 2011-398, s. 20. For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1975, 2nd Sess., c. 983, s. 67; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1022, s. 1(16); 1987, c. 878, ss. 12, 24; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 1111, s. 20; 1991, c. 35, s. 7; 2000-190, s. 7; 2009-51, s. 1; 2011-332, s. 2.2; repealed by 2011-398, s. 20.)

Editor's Note. - Former G.S. 150B-36 pertained to final decisions.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 63, as amended by Session Laws 2012-187, s. 8.1, provides in relevant part: "Sections 15 through 55 of this act become effective January 1, 2012, and apply to contested cases commenced on or after that date. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.2 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 of this act become effective when the United States Environmental Protection Agency approvals referenced in Section 55.2 have been issued or October 1, 2012, whichever occurs first.With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.1 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 and Sections 32 and 33 of this act become effective when the waiver referenced in Section 55.1 has been granted or February 1, 2013, whichever occurs first. Unless otherwise provided elsewhere in this act, the remainder of this act is effective when it becomes law." For Section 55.2, see editor's note under G.S. 150B-34.

§ 150B-37. Official record.

  1. In a contested case, the Office of Administrative Hearings shall prepare an official record of the case that includes:
    1. Notices, pleadings, motions, and intermediate rulings;
    2. Questions and offers of proof, objections, and rulings thereon;
    3. Evidence presented;
    4. Matters officially noticed, except matters so obvious that a statement of them would serve no useful purpose; and
    5. Repealed by Session Laws 1987, c. 878, s. 25.
    6. The administrative law judge's final decision or order.
  2. Proceedings at which oral evidence is presented shall be recorded, but need not be transcribed unless requested by a party. Each party shall bear the cost of the transcript or part thereof or copy of said transcript or part thereof which said party requests, and said transcript or part thereof shall be added to the official record as an exhibit.
  3. The Office of Administrative Hearings shall forward a copy of the administrative law judge's final decision to each party.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1987, c. 878, ss. 13, 25; 2000-190, s. 8; 2011-398, s. 21.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 62, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 63, as amended by Session Laws 2012-187, s. 8.1, provides in relevant part: "Sections 15 through 55 of this act become effective January 1, 2012, and apply to contested cases commenced on or after that date. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.2 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 of this act become effective when the United States Environmental Protection Agency approvals referenced in Section 55.2 have been issued or October 1, 2012, whichever occurs first. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.1 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 and Sections 32 and 33 of this act become effective when the waiver referenced in Section 55.1 has been granted or February 1, 2013, whichever occurs first. Unless otherwise provided elsewhere in this act, the remainder of this act is effective when it becomes law." For Section 55.2, see editor's note under G.S. 150B-34.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 21, in subdivision (a)(6), substituted "final decision" for "decision"; and in subsection (c), deleted "official record to the agency making the final decision and shall forward a copy of the" following "copy of the" and inserted "final." For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided prior to the 1991 amendments to this Chapter.

Board of Adjustment Not Required to Sound-Record Hearings. - Municipal corporations are specifically excluded from requirements under former G.S. 150A-37 and former G.S. 150A-29 that trial rules of evidence and production of evidence be followed in proceedings before State agencies. Thus a Board of Adjustment is not required to sound-record its hearings. Washington Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Winston-Salem Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 35 N.C. App. 449, 241 S.E.2d 872, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 295 N.C. 91, 244 S.E.2d 263 (1978), decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A.

No statutory authority exists for the State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] to review an administrative law judge's recommended decision in a case involving an exempt employee. Johnson v. Natural Resources & Community Dev., 98 N.C. App. 334, 391 S.E.2d 48 (1990).

Official Record Required. - Under G.S. 150B-36(b), a final agency decision in a contested case hearing must be based on the official record prepared pursuant to this section; the agency is not permitted to hear new evidence, and if it does so, the trial court on review is required to reverse or remand the agency decision. Everhart & Assocs. v. Department of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 127 N.C. App. 693, 493 S.E.2d 66 (1997), cert. denied, 347 N.C. 575, 502 S.E.2d 590 (1998).

Offers of Proof Part of Official Record. - Commission properly considered offers of proof included in the record since offers of proof are part of the official record under subdivision (a)(2) of this section and not "new evidence" violative of G.S. 150B-51(a). Everhart & Assocs. v. Department of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 127 N.C. App. 693, 493 S.E.2d 66 (1997), cert. denied, 347 N.C. 575, 502 S.E.2d 590 (1998).

Applied in Deep River Citizens Coalition v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 119 N.C. App. 232, 457 S.E.2d 772 (1995); Total Renal Care of N.C. LLC v. N.C. HHS, 195 N.C. App. 378, 673 S.E.2d 137 (2009).

Cited in Living Centers-Southeast, Inc. v. North Carolina HHS, 138 N.C. App. 572, 532 S.E.2d 192 (2000); N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 599 S.E.2d 888 (2004); Mooresville Hosp. Mgmt. Assocs. v. N.C. HHS, Div. of Facility Servs., 169 N.C. App. 641, 611 S.E.2d 431 (2005); Total Renal Care of N.C. LLC v. N.C. HHS, 171 N.C. App. 734, 615 S.E.2d 81 (2005); Mission Hosps., Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 189 N.C. App. 263, 658 S.E.2d 277 (2008); Mission Hosps., Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 205 N.C. App. 35, 696 S.E.2d 163 (2010); E. Carolina Internal Med., P.A. v. N.C. HHS, 211 N.C. App. 397, 710 S.E.2d 245 (2011).

Opinions of Attorney General

Editor's Note. - The opinion below was issued prior to the 1991 amendments to this Chapter.

Tapes Must Be Included in Official Record. - The tapes of a contested case which have not been transcribed must be included in the official record prepared by the Office of Administrative Hearings pursuant to subdivision (a)(3) and forwarded to the final agency decision maker pursuant to subsection (c). See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. John B. DeLuca, Assistant Director, Office of Legal Affairs, Dept. of Human Resources, 58 N.C.A.G. 85 (1988).

ARTICLE 3A. Other Administrative Hearings.

Sec.

§ 150B-38. Scope; hearing required; notice; venue.

  1. The provisions of this Article shall apply to:
    1. Occupational licensing agencies.
    2. The State Banking Commission, the Commissioner of Banks, and the Credit Union Division of the Department of Commerce.
    3. The Department of Insurance and the Commissioner of Insurance.
    4. The State Chief Information Officer in the administration of the provisions of Article 15 of Chapter 143B of the General Statutes.
    5. The North Carolina State Building Code Council.
    6. Repealed by Session Laws 2018-146, s. 4.4(b), effective December 27, 2018.
  2. Prior to any agency action in a contested case, the agency shall give the parties in the case an opportunity for a hearing without undue delay and notice not less than 15 days before the hearing. Notice to the parties shall include all of the following:
    1. A statement of the date, hour, place, and nature of the hearing.
    2. A reference to the particular sections of the statutes and rules involved.
    3. A short and plain statement of the facts alleged.
  3. Notice shall be given by one of the methods for service of process under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 4(j) or Rule 4(j3). If given by registered or certified mail, by signature confirmation as provided by the United States Postal Service, or by designated delivery service authorized pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7502(f)(2) with delivery receipt, notice shall be deemed to have been given on the delivery date appearing on the return receipt, copy of proof of delivery provided by the United States Postal Service, or delivery receipt. If notice cannot be given by one of the methods for service of process under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 4(j) or Rule 4(j3), then notice shall be given in the manner provided in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 4(j1).
  4. A party that has been served with a notice of hearing may file a written response with the agency. If a written response is filed, a copy of the response shall be mailed to all other parties not less than 10 days before the date set for the hearing.
  5. All hearings conducted under this Article shall be open to the public. A hearing conducted by the agency shall be held in the county where the agency maintains its principal office. A hearing conducted for the agency by an administrative law judge requested under G.S. 150B-40 shall be held in a county in this State where any person whose property or rights are the subject matter of the hearing resides. If a different venue would promote the ends of justice or better serve the convenience of witnesses, the agency or the administrative law judge may designate another county. A person whose property or rights are the subject matter of the hearing waives an objection to venue by proceeding in the hearing.
  6. Any person may petition to become a party by filing with the agency or hearing officer a motion to intervene in the manner provided by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 24. In addition, any person interested in a contested case under this Article may intervene and participate to the extent deemed appropriate by the agency hearing officer.
  7. When contested cases involving a common question of law or fact or multiple proceedings involving the same or related parties are pending before an agency, the agency may order a joint hearing of any matters at issue in the cases, order the cases consolidated, or make other orders to reduce costs or delay in the proceedings.
  8. Every agency shall adopt rules governing the conduct of hearings that are consistent with the provisions of this Article.
  9. Repealed by Session Laws 2021-88, s. 16(c), effective July 22, 2021.

History

(1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1022, s. 6(3); 1989, c. 76, s. 30; c. 751, s. 7(45); 1991 (Reg. Sess., 1992), c. 959, s. 76; 1999-434, s. 17; 2001-141, s. 8; 2001-193, s. 12; 2001-487, s. 21(h); 2010-169, s. 7; 2011-332, s. 2.3; 2015-241, ss. 7A.3, 7A.4(ff); 2017-6, s. 3; 2018-146, ss. 3.1(a), (b), 4.4(b); 2021-88, s. 16(c).)

Re-recodification; Technical and Conforming Changes. - Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3, provides, in part: "The Revisor of Statutes shall recodify Chapter 138A of the General Statutes, Chapter 120C of the General Statutes, as well as Chapter 163 of the General Statutes, as amended by this act, into a new Chapter 163A of the General Statutes to be entitled 'Elections and Ethics Enforcement Act,' as enacted by Section 4 of this act. The Revisor may also recodify into the new Chapter 163A of the General Statutes other existing statutory laws relating to elections and ethics enforcement that are located elsewhere in the General Statutes as the Revisor deems appropriate." The Revisor was further authorized to make additional technical and conforming changes to catchlines, internal citations, and other references throughout the General Statutes to effectuate this recodification. Pursuant to this authority, the Revisor of Statutes, in subdivision (a)(6), substituted "Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement" for "State Board of Elections," and substituted "Article 23 of Chapter 163A" for "Article 22A of Chapter 163." Subdivision (a)(6), was deleted by Session Laws 2018-146, s. 4.4(b), effective December 27, 2018.

Session Laws 2018-146, ss. 3.1(a), (b) and 6.1, repealed Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3, and authorized the Revisor of Statutes to re-recodify Chapter 163A into Chapters 163, 138A, and 120C and to revert the changes made by the Revisor pursuant to Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 58, provides: "The Joint Regulatory Reform Committee shall study the procedural and substantive requirements of administrative hearings conducted under Article 3A of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes. The Committee shall examine the various procedures used by the entities that conduct administrative hearings under Article 3A to identify areas of consistency and inconsistency with the purpose of designing procedures that are applicable to all Article 3A hearings and that ensure that the hearings provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard and for dispute resolution. The Joint Regulatory Reform Committee shall report its findings and recommendations to the 2012 Regular Session of the 2011 General Assembly."

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 7A.3, provides, in part: "The Revisor of Statutes may conform names and titles changed by this section and may correct statutory references as required by this section throughout the General Statutes. In making the changes authorized by this section, the Revisor may also adjust subject and verb agreement and the placement of conjunctions." Pursuant to this authority, the Revisor of Statutes substituted "Article 14 of Chapter 143B" for "Article 3D of Chapter 147" in subdivision (a)(4).

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as 'The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2015.'"

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 33.6, is a severability clause.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2010-169, s. 7, effective August 2, 2010, added subdivision (a)(6).

Session Laws 2011-332, s. 2.3, effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to notices given on or after that date, rewrote subsection (c).

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 7A.4(ff), effective September 18, 2015, added subsection (i).

Session Laws 2018-146, s. 4.4(b), effective December 18, 2018, repealed subdivision (a)(6), which read: "The Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement in the administration of any investigation or audit under the provisions of Article 23 of Chapter 163A of the General Statutes."

Session Laws 2021-88, s. 16(c), effective July 22, 2021, inserted "all of the following" in subsection (b); substituted "party that has" for "party who has," and "shall be mailed" for "must be mailed" in subsection (d); substituted "an objection" for "his objection," and "by proceeding" for "if he proceeds" in the last sentence of subsection (e); repealed subsection (i), which read: "Standards adopted by the State Chief Information Officer and applied to information technology as defined in G.S. 143B-1320"; and made stylistic changes.

Legal Periodicals. - For note, "Contested Case Hearings Under the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act: 1985 Rewrite Contains Dual System of Administrative Adjudication," see 64 N.C.L. Rev. 852 (1986).

For article, "Expanding the Role of North Carolina State Courts in Resolving Public Housing Disputes," see 33 N.C. Cent. L. Rev. 40 (2010).

CASE NOTES

Applicability of Article. - Article 3 of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act applies to administrative hearings conducted by the Office of Administrative Hearings before an administrative law judge, while Article 3A applies to "other administrative hearings" which are conducted by state agencies enumerated in this section. Homoly v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examrs., 121 N.C. App. 695, 468 S.E.2d 481 (1996).

Action Sufficient to Trigger Contested Case Provisions. - Petitioner's letter, requesting expungement of a record, and requesting an opportunity to meet with the administrative board, was sufficient to trigger the contested case provisions of this section, and respondent's subsequent denial of the request constituted agency action on a contested case which affected the substantive rights of petitioner. In re Sullivan, 112 N.C. App. 795, 436 S.E.2d 862 (1993).

Revocation of Law Enforcement Officer's License. - Petitioner was entitled to both notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the revocation of his license as a law enforcement officer by the Criminal Justice Education and Training Standards Commission, where such adjudicatory action constituted agency action on a contested case affecting substantive rights. Scroggs v. North Carolina Criminal Justice Educ. & Training Stds. Comm'n, 101 N.C. App. 699, 400 S.E.2d 742 (1991) (decided prior to the 1991 amendments to this Chapter).

Charges Against Licensees of a Board. - The General Assembly intended that any person who prefers charges against, inter alia, a licensee of the Board is entitled to a hearing and decision on those charges. Bryant v. North Carolina State Bd. of Exmrs. of Elec. Contractors, 338 N.C. 288, 449 S.E.2d 188 (1994).

Notice of disciplinary hearings by the North Carolina Psychology Board must be given not less than 15 days before the hearing, under G.S. 150B-38(b); under G.S. 150B-40(a), such hearings shall be conducted in a fair and impartial manner and the parties shall be given an opportunity to present evidence on issues of fact, examine and cross-examine witnesses, including the author of a document prepared by, on behalf of or for the use of the agency and offered into evidence, submit rebuttal evidence, and present arguments on issues of law or policy. Farber v. N.C. Psychology Bd., 153 N.C. App. 1, 569 S.E.2d 287 (2002), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 612, 574 S.E.2d 679 (2002).

Board of Examiners of Electrical Contractors Required to Hold Hearing. - Though the language is not explicit in requiring that the Board of Examiners of Electrical Contractors hold a hearing on charges, such a requirement is implicit both in the language referring to "hearings of charges" and in the stated purpose of the statute governing the jurisdiction of the Board to hear such charges. Bryant v. North Carolina State Bd. of Exmrs. of Elec. Contractors, 338 N.C. 288, 449 S.E.2d 188 (1994).

Majority of Board. - Administrative hearing revoking a funeral home license was conducted by a "majority of the agency," as required by G.S. 150B-40(b); although only four members of the nine-member board were present for the entire hearing, which was held in two parts, a majority was present on each occasion. Wilson Funeral Dirs., Inc. v. N.C. Bd. of Funeral Serv., 244 N.C. App. 768, 781 S.E.2d 507 (2016).

Intent of Statute Mandated Hearing. - It would be contrary to the intent expressed in G.S. 87-47(a1), that of protecting the public, to determine that plaintiff was not entitled to a hearing and decision on charges brought to effectuate that very purpose. Bryant v. North Carolina State Bd. of Exmrs. of Elec. Contractors, 338 N.C. 288, 449 S.E.2d 188 (1994).

Applied in Cameron v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 95 N.C. App. 332, 382 S.E.2d 864 (1989); McCollough v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 111 N.C. App. 186, 431 S.E.2d 816 (1993); Act-Up Triangle v. Commission for Health Servs., 345 N.C. 699, 483 S.E.2d 388 (1997); In re Lustgarten, 177 N.C. App. 663, 629 S.E.2d 886 (2006).

Cited in Huang v. North Carolina State Univ., 107 N.C. App. 710, 421 S.E.2d 812 (1992); Adams v. North Carolina State Bd. of Registration, 129 N.C. App. 292, 501 S.E.2d 660 (1998); Brooks v. Southern Nat'l Corp., 131 N.C. App. 80, 505 S.E.2d 306 (1998); Walker v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 245 N.C. App. 559, 782 S.E.2d 518 (2016), aff'd, 369 N.C. 517, 796 S.E.2d 784, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 131 (2017).

Opinions of Attorney General

Editor's Note. - Some of the opinions below were issued prior to the 1991 amendments to this Chapter.

Applicability of G.S. 150B-23(a). - Subsection (a) of G.S. 150B-23, as amended by Session Laws 1987, Chapter 878, is not applicable to agencies governed by Article 3A of this Chapter. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Phillip T. Fisher, Executive Director, N.C. Real Estate Commission, 57 N.C.A.G. 85 (1987).

When a contested case hearing is conducted by an agency governed by this article, a petition or other notice need not be filed with the Office of Administrative Hearings. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Phillip T. Fisher, Executive Director, N.C. Real Estate Commission, 57 N.C.A.G. 85 (1987).

Intended Sanction Not Required in Notice of Hearing. - While subdivision (b)(2) of this section requires licensing boards to include in their notices a reference to the particular sections of the statutes and rules involved, it does not appear to require a board to state which sanction under the applicable disciplinary statute it intends to impose. However, once a board states with specificity that it is proposing to impose only one or two sanctions available under a referenced disciplinary statute for the stated alleged infractions, the board is then precluded from imposing a greater sanction for these infractions. Miller v. North Carolina State Bd. of Registration for Professional Eng'rs & Land Surveyors, 322 N.C. 465, 368 S.E.2d 605 (1988).


§ 150B-39. Depositions; discovery; subpoenas.

  1. A deposition may be used in lieu of other evidence when taken in compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, G.S. 1A-1. Parties in a contested case may engage in discovery pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure, G.S. 1A-1.
  2. Upon a request for an identifiable agency record involving a material fact in a contested case, the agency shall promptly provide the record to a party, unless the record relates solely to the agency's internal procedures or is exempt from disclosure by law.
  3. In preparation for, or in the conduct of, a contested case subpoenas may be issued and served in accordance with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 45. Upon a motion, the agency may quash a subpoena if, upon a hearing, the agency finds that the evidence, the production of which is required, does not relate to a matter in issue, the subpoena does not describe with sufficient particularity the evidence the production of which is required, or for any other reason sufficient in law the subpoena may be quashed. Witness fees shall be paid by the party requesting the subpoena to subpoenaed witnesses in accordance with G.S. 7A-314. However, State officials or employees who are subpoenaed shall not be entitled to any witness fees, but they shall receive their normal salary and they shall not be required to take any annual leave for the witness days. Travel expenses of State officials or employees who are subpoenaed shall be reimbursed as provided in G.S. 138-6.

History

(1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1991, c. 35, s. 8.)

§ 150B-40. Conduct of hearing; presiding officer; ex parte communication.

  1. Hearings shall be conducted in a fair and impartial manner. At the hearing, the agency and the parties shall be given an opportunity to present evidence on issues of fact, examine and cross-examine witnesses, including the author of a document prepared by, on behalf of or for the use of the agency and offered into evidence, submit rebuttal evidence, and present arguments on issues of law or policy.
  2. Except as provided under subsection (e) of this section, hearings under this Article shall be conducted by a majority of the agency. An agency shall designate one or more of its members to preside at the hearing. If a party files in good faith a timely and sufficient affidavit of the personal bias or other reason for disqualification of any member of the agency, the agency shall determine the matter as a part of the record in the case, and its determination shall be subject to judicial review at the conclusion of the proceeding. If a presiding officer is disqualified or it is impracticable for him to continue the hearing, another presiding officer shall be assigned to continue with the case, except that if assignment of a new presiding officer will cause substantial prejudice to any party, a new hearing shall be held or the case dismissed without prejudice.
  3. The presiding officer may:
    1. Administer oaths and affirmations;
    2. Sign and issue subpoenas in the name of the agency, requiring attendance and giving of testimony by witnesses and the production of books, papers, and other documentary evidence;
    3. Provide for the taking of testimony by deposition;
    4. Regulate the course of the hearings, set the time and place for continued hearings, and fix the time for filing of briefs and other documents;
    5. Direct the parties to appear and confer to consider simplification of the issues by consent of the parties; and
    6. Apply to any judge of the superior court resident in the district or presiding at a term of court in the county where a hearing is pending for an order to show cause why any person should not be held in contempt of the agency and its processes, and the court shall have the power to impose punishment as for contempt for acts which would constitute direct or indirect contempt if the acts occurred in an action pending in superior court.
  4. Unless required for disposition of an ex parte matter authorized by law, a member of an agency assigned to make a decision or to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in a contested case under this Article shall not communicate, directly or indirectly, in connection with any issue of fact or question of law, with any person or party or his representative, except on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate. This prohibition begins at the time of the notice of hearing. An agency member may communicate with other members of the agency and may have the aid and advice of the agency staff other than the staff which has been or is engaged in investigating or prosecuting functions in connection with the case under consideration or a factually-related case. This section does not apply to an agency employee or party representative with professional training in accounting, actuarial science, economics or financial analysis insofar as the case involves financial practices or conditions.
  5. When a majority of an agency is unable or elects not to hear a contested case, the agency shall apply to the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings for the designation of an administrative law judge to preside at the hearing of a contested case under this Article. Upon receipt of the application, the Director shall, without undue delay, assign an administrative law judge to hear the case.

If a party fails to appear in a contested case after he has been given proper notice, the agency may continue the hearing or proceed with the hearing and make its decision in the absence of the party.

The provisions of this Article, rather than the provisions of Article 3, shall govern a contested case in which the agency requests an administrative law judge from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

The administrative law judge assigned to hear a contested case under this Article shall sit in place of the agency and shall have the authority of the presiding officer in a contested case under this Article. The administrative law judge shall make a proposal for decision, which shall contain proposed findings of fact and proposed conclusions of law.

An administrative law judge shall stay any contested case under this Article on motion of an agency which is a party to the contested case, if the agency shows by supporting affidavits that it is engaged in other litigation or administrative proceedings, by whatever name called, with or before a federal agency, and this other litigation or administrative proceedings will determine the position, in whole or in part, of the agency in the contested case. At the conclusion of the other litigation or administrative proceedings, the contested case shall proceed and be determined as expeditiously as possible.

The agency may make its final decision only after the administrative law judge's proposal for decision is served on the parties, and an opportunity is given to each party to file exceptions and proposed findings of fact and to present oral and written arguments to the agency.

History

(1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1022, ss. 1(1), 6(3), 6(4).)

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "Powers of Administrative Law Judges, Agencies, and Courts: An Analytical and Empirical Assessment," see 79 N.C.L. Rev. 1571 (2001).

For article, "Expanding the Role of North Carolina State Courts in Resolving Public Housing Disputes," see 33 N.C. Cent. L. Rev. 40 (2010).

CASE NOTES

Changes Against Licensees of a Board. - The General Assembly intended that any person who prefers charges against, inter alia, a licensee of a board is entitled to a hearing and decision on those charges. Bryant v. North Carolina State Bd. of Exmrs. of Elec. Contractors, 338 N.C. 288, 449 S.E.2d 188 (1994).

Notice of disciplinary hearings by the North Carolina Psychology Board must be given not less than 15 days before the hearing, under G.S. 150B-38(b); under G.S. 150B-40(a), such hearings shall be conducted in a fair and impartial manner and the parties shall be given an opportunity to present evidence on issues of fact, examine and cross-examine witnesses, including the author of a document prepared by, on behalf of or for the use of the agency and offered into evidence, submit rebuttal evidence, and present arguments on issues of law or policy. Farber v. N.C. Psychology Bd., 153 N.C. App. 1, 569 S.E.2d 287 (2002), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 612, 574 S.E.2d 679 (2002).

Intent of Statute Mandated Hearing. - It would be contrary to the intent expressed in G.S. 87-47(a1), that of protecting the public, to determine that plaintiff was not entitled to a hearing and decision on charges brought to effectuate that very purpose. Bryant v. North Carolina State Bd. of Exmrs. of Elec. Contractors, 338 N.C. 288, 449 S.E.2d 188 (1994).

Spirit Not Violated - Under the plain language of G.S. 150B-40(d), the prohibition on ex parte communication by agency members "begins at the time of the notice of hearing;" where the probable cause hearing took place two months before the North Carolina Psychology Board issued its statement of charges, and nine months before it issued the notice of hearing, as the probable cause hearing occurred well before the statutory prohibition on ex parte communications arose, the trial court erred in concluding that the Board violated the spirit of G.S. 150B-40(d). Farber v. N.C. Psychology Bd., 153 N.C. App. 1, 569 S.E.2d 287 (2002), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 612, 574 S.E.2d 679 (2002).

Board of Examiners of Electrical Contractors Required to Hold Hearing. - Though the language is not explicit in requiring that the Board of Examiners of Electrical Contractors hold a hearing on charges, such a requirement is implicit both in the language referring to "hearings of charges" and in the stated purpose of the statute governing the jurisdiction of the Board to hear such charges. Bryant v. North Carolina State Bd. of Exmrs. of Elec. Contractors, 338 N.C. 288, 449 S.E.2d 188 (1994).

Majority of Board. - Administrative hearing revoking a funeral home license was conducted by a "majority of the agency," as required by G.S. 150B-40(b); although only four members of the nine-member board were present for the entire hearing, which was held in two parts, a majority was present on each occasion. Wilson Funeral Dirs., Inc. v. N.C. Bd. of Funeral Serv., 244 N.C. App. 768, 781 S.E.2d 507 (2016).

The provisions of this section do not apply to hearings conducted by the Commission for Health Services [now the Commission for Public Health]. Act-Up Triangle v. Commission for Health Servs., 345 N.C. 699, 483 S.E.2d 388 (1997).

Cited in Bryant v. North Carolina State Bd. of Exmrs. of Elec. Contractors, 111 N.C. App. 875, 433 S.E.2d 814 (1993); Farber v. N.C. Psychology Bd., 153 N.C. App. 1, 569 S.E.2d 287 (2002), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 612, 574 S.E.2d 679 (2002).

Opinions of Attorney General

Editor's Note. - Some of the opinions below were issued prior to the 1991 amendments to this Chapter.

Applicability of § 150B-23(a). - Subsection (a) of G.S. 150B-23, as amended by Session Laws 1987, Chapter 878, is not applicable to agencies governed by Article 3A of this Chapter. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Phillip T. Fisher, Executive Director, N.C. Real Estate Commission, 57 N.C.A.G. 85 (1987).

When a contested case hearing is conducted by an agency governed by this article, a petition or other notice need not be filed with the Office of Administrative Hearings. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Phillip T. Fisher, Executive Director, N.C. Real Estate Commission, 57 N.C.A.G. 85 (1987).

§ 150B-41. Evidence; stipulations; official notice.

  1. In all contested cases, irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded. Except as otherwise provided, the rules of evidence as applied in the trial division of the General Court of Justice shall be followed; but, when evidence is not reasonably available under such rules to show relevant facts, they may be shown by the most reliable and substantial evidence available. It shall not be necessary for a party or his attorney to object to evidence at the hearing in order to preserve the right to object to its consideration by the agency in reaching its decision, or by the court of judicial review.
  2. Evidence in a contested case, including records and documents shall be offered and made a part of the record. Other factual information or evidence shall not be considered in determination of the case, except as permitted under subsection (d) of this section. Documentary evidence may be received in the form of a copy or excerpt or may be incorporated by reference, if the materials so incorporated are available for examination by the parties. Upon timely request, a party shall be given an opportunity to compare the copy with the original if available.
  3. The parties in a contested case under this Article by a stipulation in writing filed with the agency may agree upon any fact involved in the controversy, which stipulation shall be used as evidence at the hearing and be binding on the parties thereto. Parties should agree upon facts when practicable. Except as otherwise provided by law, disposition may be made of a contested case by stipulation, agreed settlement, consent order, waiver, default, or other method agreed upon by the parties.
  4. Official notice may be taken of all facts of which judicial notice may be taken and of other facts within the specialized knowledge of the agency. The noticed fact and its source shall be stated and made known to affected parties at the earliest practicable time, and any party shall on timely request be afforded an opportunity to dispute the noticed fact through submission of evidence and argument. An agency may use its experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge in the evaluation of evidence presented to it.

History

(1985, c. 746, s. 1; 2014-115, s. 14.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2014-115, s. 14, effective August 11, 2014, substituted "subsection (d) of this section" for "G.S. 150B-30" at the end of the second sentence of subsection (b).

CASE NOTES

Peer Review - Court of Appeals of North Carolina found that the rationale which the Supreme Court of North Carolina used in its Leahy decision for allowing the North Carolina Board of Nursing to determine the standard of care based on its own expertise was not transferable to a case where the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners reviewed the conduct of an orthodontist because no member of the Board of Dental Examiners that sat in judgment of the orthodontist was as orthodontist. Watkins v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 157 N.C. App. 367, 579 S.E.2d 510 (2003).

Applied in Watkins v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 358 N.C. 190, 593 S.E.2d 764 (2004).

Cited in Woodlief v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 104 N.C. App. 52, 407 S.E.2d 596 (1991); Leahy v. North Carolina Bd. of Nursing, 346 N.C. 775, 488 S.E.2d 245 (1997); Farber v. N.C. Psychology Bd., 153 N.C. App. 1, 569 S.E.2d 287 (2002), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 612, 574 S.E.2d 679 (2002); N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 599 S.E.2d 888 (2004).


§ 150B-42. Final agency decision; official record.

  1. After compliance with the provisions of G.S. 150B-40(e), if applicable, and review of the official record, as defined in subsection (b) of this section, an agency shall make a written final decision or order in a contested case. The decision or order shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law. Findings of fact shall be based exclusively on the evidence and on matters officially noticed. Findings of fact, if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting them. A decision or order shall not be made except upon consideration of the record as a whole or such portion thereof as may be cited by any party to the proceeding and shall be supported by substantial evidence admissible under G.S. 150B-41. A copy of the decision or order shall be served upon each party by one of the methods for service of process under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 5(b). If service is by registered, certified, or first-class mail, by signature confirmation as provided by the United States Postal Service, or by designated delivery service authorized pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7502(f)(2) with delivery receipt, the copy shall be addressed to the party at the latest address given by the party to the agency. Service by one of the additional methods provided in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 5(b), is effective as provided therein and shall be accompanied by a certificate of service as provided in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 5(b1). G.S. 1A-1, Rule 6(e), applies if service is by first-class mail. A copy shall be furnished to the party's attorney of record.
  2. An agency shall prepare an official record of a hearing that shall include:
    1. Notices, pleadings, motions, and intermediate rulings;
    2. Questions and offers of proof, objections, and rulings thereon;
    3. Evidence presented;
    4. Matters officially noticed, except matters so obvious that a statement of them would serve no useful purpose;
    5. Proposed findings and exceptions; and
    6. Any decision, opinion, order, or report by the officer presiding at the hearing and by the agency.
  3. Proceedings at which oral evidence is presented shall be recorded, but need not be transcribed unless requested by a party. Each party shall bear the cost of the transcript or part thereof or copy of said transcript or part thereof which said party requests.

History

(1985, c. 746, s. 1; 2011-332, s. 2.4.)

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-332, s. 2.4, effective October 1, 2011, and applicable to decisions or orders served on or after that date, rewrote subsection (a).

CASE NOTES

Service of Final Decision. - Plain language of G.S. 150B-36(b3) and G.S. 150B-42(a) applies to agencies, not the North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings, and there was no requirement that the Office of Administrative Hearings serve a final decision personally or by certified mail; in any event, a day care did not deny receiving a copy of the final decision and its substantial rights were not prejudiced in any way. Lincoln v. N.C. HHS, Nutrition Branch, 172 N.C. App. 567, 616 S.E.2d 622 (2005).

Applied in Watkins v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 358 N.C. 190, 593 S.E.2d 764 (2004).

Cited in Huang v. North Carolina State Univ., 107 N.C. App. 710, 421 S.E.2d 812 (1992); N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 599 S.E.2d 888 (2004).


ARTICLE 4. Judicial Review.

Sec.

§ 150B-43. Right to judicial review.

Any party or person aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case, and who has exhausted all administrative remedies made available to the party or person aggrieved by statute or agency rule, is entitled to judicial review of the decision under this Article, unless adequate procedure for judicial review is provided by another statute, in which case the review shall be under such other statute. Nothing in this Chapter shall prevent any party or person aggrieved from invoking any judicial remedy available to the party or person aggrieved under the law to test the validity of any administrative action not made reviewable under this Article. A party or person aggrieved shall not be required to petition an agency for rule making or to seek or obtain a declaratory ruling before obtaining judicial review of a final decision or order made pursuant to G.S. 150B-34.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 2011-398, s. 22; 2012-194, s. 62.1; 2019-140, s. 2(b).)

Local Modification. - (As to Article 4) City of Gastonia: 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 902, s. 3; 1991, c. 557, s. 1.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2000-67, ss. 24(a) and (b), establishes a reserve in the Office of State Budget and Management (now the Office of State Budget, Planning, and Management), consisting of appropriations from the General Assembly and funds received from any State agency in accordance with s. 24. When a State agency files a petition for judicial review of a final decision of the Rules Review Commission under Article 4 of Chapter 150B and the Rules Review Commission prevails in that action, that State agency is to deposit to the reserve a sum equal to the Commission's actual attorneys' fees.

Session Laws 2000-67, s. 1.1, provides: "This act shall be known as 'The Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2000.' "

Session Laws 2000-67, s. 28.2, provides: "Except for statutory changes or other provisions that clearly indicate an intention to have effects beyond the 2000-2001 fiscal year, the textual provisions of this act apply only to funds appropriated for, and activities occurring during, the 2000-2001 fiscal year."

Session Laws 2000-67, s. 28.4, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 62, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 63, as amended by Session Laws 2012-187, s. 8.1, provides in relevant part: "Sections 15 through 55 of this act become effective January 1, 2012, and apply to contested cases commenced on or after that date. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.2 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 of this act become effective when the United States Environmental Protection Agency approvals referenced in Section 55.2 have been issued or October 1, 2012, whichever occurs first. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.1 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 and Sections 32 and 33 of this act become effective when the waiver referenced in Section 55.1 has been granted or February 1, 2013, whichever occurs first. Unless otherwise provided elsewhere in this act, the remainder of this act is effective when it becomes law." For Section 55.2, see editor's note under G.S. 150B-34.

Session Laws 2020-3, s. 1.1(a)-(d), provides: "(a) Interest Waiver. - As a result of the COVID-19 outbreak, the Secretary of Revenue has extended the franchise, corporate income, and individual income tax payment deadline from April 15, 2020, to July 15, 2020, and pursuant to G.S. 105-249.2, the Secretary will not assess a penalty for failure to file a return or pay a tax due as long as the return is filed and the tax due is paid by July 15, 2020. Notwithstanding G.S. 105-241.21(b), the Secretary of Revenue shall also waive the accrual of interest from April 15, 2020, through July 15, 2020, on an underpayment of tax imposed on a franchise, corporate income, or individual income tax return, including a partnership and estate and trust tax return, due from April 15, 2020, through July 15, 2020. The relief from accrual of interest from April 15, 2020, through July 15, 2020, also includes interest imposed pursuant to G.S. 105-163.15 and G.S. 105-163.41 for payments due on or before July 15, 2020.

"(b) Refund Request. - For franchise, corporate income, and individual income tax, the statute of limitations for obtaining a refund is extended to July 15, 2020, for refund claims for which the statute of limitations to seek a refund expires on or after April 15, 2020, and before July 15, 2020.

"(c) Time-Sensitive Actions. - Certain actions required to be taken by a taxpayer on or after April 1, 2020, and before July 15, 2020, will be considered timely if the request or petition is filed on or before July 15, 2020. This subsection applies to requests for Departmental review under G.S. 105-241.11, petitions for a contested case hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings under Article 3 of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes and G.S. 105-241.15, and petitions for judicial review under Article 4 of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes and G.S. 105-241.16.

"(d) This section is effective when it becomes law." Session Laws 2020-3 became law on May 4, 2020.

Session Laws 2020-3, s. 5, is a severability clause.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 22, substituted "Any party or person aggrieved" for "Any person who is aggrieved" and substituted "the party or person aggrieved" for "him," or similar language throughout. For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2019-140, s. 2(b), effective July 19, 2019, deleted "Absent a specific statutory requirement, nothing in this Chapter shall require" and inserted "shall not be required" in the last sentence.

Legal Periodicals. - For comment on former Article 33 of Chapter 143, see 31 N.C.L. Rev. 378, 382 (1953).

For note on determination of validity of rules and regulations before their application in specific cases, see 36 N.C.L. Rev. 473 (1958).

For note on judicial review of student disciplinary proceedings, see 43 N.C.L. Rev. 152 (1964).

For case law survey as to judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies, see 45 N.C.L. Rev. 816 (1967).

For article on administrative evidence rules, see 49 N.C.L. Rev. 635 (1971).

For comment, "The Problem of Procedural Delay in Contested Case Hearings . . ." under the North Carolina APA, see 7 N.C. Cent. L.J. 347 (1976).

For survey of 1976 case law dealing with administrative law, see 55 N.C.L. Rev. 898 (1977).

For survey of 1979 administrative law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1185 (1980).

For survey of 1979 tax law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1548 (1980).

For article, "Advisory Rulings by Administrative Agencies: Their Benefits and Dangers," see 2 Campbell L. Rev. 1 (1980).

For article, "A Powerless Judiciary? The North Carolina Courts' Perceptions of Review of Administrative Action," see 12 N.C. Cent. L.J. 21 (1980).

For survey of 1980 administrative law, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1017 (1981).

For comment discussing life insurance, divorce, and inheritance tax in light of In re Kapoor, 303 N.C. 102, 277 S.E.2d 403 (1981), see 13 N.C. Cent. L.J. 253 (1982).

For article, "Powers of Administrative Law Judges, Agencies, and Courts: An Analytical and Empirical Assessment," see 79 N.C.L. Rev. 1571 (2001).

CASE NOTES

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A and earlier statutes, or under this Chapter prior to the 1991 amendments thereto.

As to purpose and construction of former provisions, see In re Appeal of Harris, 273 N.C. 20, 159 S.E.2d 539 (1968).

Construction with Other Provisions. - Section 113A-123 does not set forth the scope of review but instead provides that judicial review is available pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 150B of the Administrative Procedure Act. Friends of Hatteras Island Nat'l Historic Maritime Forest Land Trust for Preservation, Inc. v. Coastal Resources Comm'n, 117 N.C. App. 556, 452 S.E.2d 337 (1995).

Procedures and requirements of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, G.S. 150B-1 et seq., were not to be incorporated into the statutory requirements under G.S. 53-92(d) for an appeal from a final decision of the North Carolina State Banking Commission. In re Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs. of N.C. Inc., 189 N.C. App. 115, 657 S.E.2d 405 (2008).

North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, G.S. 150B-1 through 150B-52, was inapplicable to the review of decisions by a hearing officer of the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services regarding Medicaid emergency medical benefits because G.S. 108A-79(k) governed the review of the decisions. Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 193 N.C. App. 350, 668 S.E.2d 571 (2008), rev'd 364 N.C. 61, 692 S.E.2d 96 N.C. LEXIS 343 (2010).

Trial court had jurisdiction under G.S. 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 70, to decide whether its previous order was being violated where that order had determined that the Medicaid recipient was to continue to receive benefits under the categorically needy eligibility group until he was determined to be ineligible under the rules as modified by that order, the decision to terminate his benefits under a program for which he appeared eligible squarely raised the issue of whether the agency had acted as a disobedient party, and neither the APA nor G.S. 108A-79 provided for administrative review of the alleged violation of the court order. Pachas v. N.C. HHS, 372 N.C. 12, 822 S.E.2d 847 (2019).

Requirements for Judicial Review Generally. - Former G.S. 150A-43 requires a four-part test for standing: an aggrieved party, a final agency decision, a contested case, and exhaustion of administration remedies. Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276 (E.D.N.C. 1981).

There are five requirements under former G.S. 150A-43: (1) plaintiff must be an aggrieved person; (2) there must be a final agency decision; (3) the decision must result from a contested case; (4) petitioner must have exhausted administrative remedies; and (5) there must be no other adequate procedure for judicial review. Dyer v. Bradshaw, 54 N.C. App. 136, 282 S.E.2d 548 (1981); State ex rel. Tenn. Dep't of Health & Env't v. Environmental Mgt. Comm'n, 78 N.C. App. 763, 338 S.E.2d 781 (1986); In re Wheeler, 85 N.C. App. 150, 354 S.E.2d 374 (1987).

This section has been interpreted as imposing five requirements in order to have standing for judicial review: (1) the petitioner must be an aggrieved party; (2) there must be a final agency decision; (3) the decision must result from a contested case; (4) the petitioner must have exhausted all administrative remedies; and (5) there must be no other adequate procedure for judicial review. Charlotte Truck Driver School, Inc. v. North Carolina DMV, 95 N.C. App. 209, 381 S.E.2d 861 (1989); Meads v. North Carolina Dep't of Agric., 349 N.C. 656, 509 S.E.2d 165 (1998).

Whether the jurisdictional prerequisites of the Administrative Procedure Act have been met is not a question of personal jurisdiction, but one of the ripeness, on a case by base basis, of the subject matter of administrative decisions for judicial review. Poret v. State Personnel Comm'n, 74 N.C. App. 536, 328 S.E.2d 880, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 117, 332 S.E.2d 491, 332 S.E.2d 492 (1985), overruled on other grounds, Batten v. N.C. Dep't of Cor., 326 N.C. 338, 389 S.E.2d 35 (1990), overruled on other grounds, Empire Power Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 337 N.C. 569, 447 S.E.2d 168 (1994).

Standing Is Question of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. - Whether one has standing to obtain judicial review of an administrative decision is a question of subject matter jurisdiction. Carter v. North Carolina State Bd. of Registration, 86 N.C. App. 308, 357 S.E.2d 705 (1987).

No statutory authority exists for the State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] to review an administrative law judge's recommended decision in a case involving an exempt employee. Johnson v. Natural Resources & Community Dev., 98 N.C. App. 334, 391 S.E.2d 48, cert. denied, 327 N.C. 140, 394 S.E.2d 176 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 328 N.C. 689, 394 S.E.2d 469 (1991).

Administrative Remedy is Exclusive. - When the General Assembly provides an effective administrative remedy by statute, that remedy is exclusive, and the party must pursue and exhaust it before resorting to the courts. Jackson v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources Div. of Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, & Substance Abuse Servs., 131 N.C. App. 179, 505 S.E.2d 899 (1998), cert. denied, 350 N.C. 594, 537 S.E.2d 213 (1999).

Requirements for Judicial Review Generally. - This section has been interpreted as imposing five requirements in order to have standing for judicial review: (1) the petitioner must be an aggrieved party; (2) there must be a final agency decision; (3) the decision must result from a contested case; (4) the petitioner must have exhausted all administrative remedies; and (5) there must be no other adequate procedure for judicial review. Charlotte Truck Driver School, Inc. v. North Carolina DMV, 95 N.C. App. 209, 381 S.E.2d 861 (1989).

Record Must Indicate Basis for Exercise of Discretion. - While it is true that the determination whether by common judgment certain conduct is disqualifying is left to the sound discretion of the board, the record must include an indication of the basis upon which the board or other agency exercised its expert discretion. Dailey v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 309 N.C. 710, 309 S.E.2d 219 (1983).

Corresponding former provisions were inappropriate to initiate an attack upon the constitutionality of a statute fixing the powers and duties of the Board of Paroles (now Parole Commission). The question of the constitutionality of a statute is not for administrative boards, but for the judicial branch. Jernigan v. State, 279 N.C. 556, 184 S.E.2d 259 (1971).

Review of Executive Interpretation of Statute Not Authorized. - Corresponding former provisions did not authorize the filing of a petition in the superior court seeking an advisory opinion on the correctness of an executive interpretation of a statute. Housing Auth. v. Johnson, 261 N.C. 76, 134 S.E.2d 121 (1964).

Upon review pursuant to former G.S. 150A-43, the "whole record" test is applicable, and the decision of the State Board of Alcoholic Control may be reversed if substantial rights of the licensee are prejudiced by administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions which are not supported by competent, material and substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted. Fay v. State Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 30 N.C. App. 492, 227 S.E.2d 298, cert. denied, 291 N.C. 175, 229 S.E.2d 689 (1976).

The clear intent of the legislature is to make the "whole record" test the principal standard of judicial review of administrative findings in this State. North Carolina State Bar v. DuMont, 304 N.C. 627, 286 S.E.2d 89 (1982).

Scope of Review Must Be Defined. - In presenting appeals to the judicial branch from State administrative agencies, it is essential that the parties present their contentions as to the applicable scope of judicial review; likewise, the reviewing court should make clear the review standard under which it proceeds. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Bird Oil Co., 302 N.C. 14, 273 S.E.2d 232 (1981).

Administrative Procedure Act does not preclude entirely the possibility of judicial review by use of the Declaratory Judgment Act or other procedures outside the act. High Rock Lake Ass'n v. North Carolina Envtl. Mgt. Comm'n, 39 N.C. App. 699, 252 S.E.2d 109 (1979).

Quasi-Judicial Hearing Contemplated. - Former provisions contemplated a quasi-judicial hearing in which the parties were permitted an opportunity to offer evidence and a decision was rendered applicable to a specific factual situation. Housing Auth. v. Johnson, 261 N.C. 76, 134 S.E.2d 121 (1964).

An agency's denial of a petition for rule making under former G.S. 150A-16 is subject to judicial review pursuant to the provisions of former G.S. 150A-43. In re Wheeler, 85 N.C. App. 150, 354 S.E.2d 374 (1987).

Doctrine of Res Judicata. - Where an administrative determination has been reviewed by the courts, the res judicata effect, if any, attaches to the court's judgment rather than to the administrative decision. State ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Thornburg, 325 N.C. 463, 385 S.E.2d 451 (1989).

Mandatory Suspension of Driving Privilege. - Petitioner whose driving privilege was mandatorily suspended under G.S. 20-17(2) and G.S. 20-19(e) did not have the right to appeal under G.S. 20-25 or under this Chapter. However, the superior court could review the actions of the Commissioner by issuing a writ of certiorari. Davis v. Hiatt, 326 N.C. 462, 390 S.E.2d 338 (1990).

Once the right to drive has been mandatorily revoked and a petitioner unsuccessfully seeks to have the license reinstated by the DMV, no superior court review of the denial is mandated unless the denial was arbitrary or illegal, because reinstatement is not a legal right but is an act of grace. Alpiser v. Eagle Pontiac-GMC-Isuzu, Inc., 97 N.C. App. 610, 389 S.E.2d 293 (1990).

The superior court acquired jurisdiction to award attorney fees when a reinstated employee petitioned for review of a final agency decision. Early v. County of Durham, Dep't of Soc. Servs., 193 N.C. App. 334, 667 S.E.2d 512 (2008), review denied, 363 N.C. 372, 678 S.E.2d 237 (2009).

Applied in Concerned Citizens v. North Carolina Envtl. Mgt. Comm'n, 89 N.C. App. 708, 367 S.E.2d 13 (1988); Wilson v. State Residence Comm., 92 N.C. App. 355, 374 S.E.2d 415 (1988); North Buncombe Ass'n of Concerned Citizens v. Rhodes, 100 N.C. App. 24, 394 S.E.2d 462, appeal dismissed, 327 N.C. 484, 397 S.E.2d 215 (1990); Meyers v. Dep't of Human Resources, 105 N.C. App. 665, 415 S.E.2d 70 (1992); Deep River Citizens Coalition v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 119 N.C. App. 232, 457 S.E.2d 772 (1995); North Carolina Chiropractic Ass'n v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 122 N.C. App. 122, 468 S.E.2d 539 (1996); Williams v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., Div. of Coastal Mgmt., 144 N.C. App. 479, 548 S.E.2d 793 (2001); Googerdy v. N.C. Agric. & Tech. State Univ., 386 F. Supp. 2d 618 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 24, 2005); Table Rock Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. Envtl. Mgmt. Comm'n, 191 N.C. App. 362, 663 S.E.2d 333 (2008); N.C. Dep't of Revenue v. Bill Davis Racing, 201 N.C. App. 35, 684 S.E.2d 914 (2009); Dare County v. N.C. Dep't of Ins., 207 N.C. App. 600, 701 S.E.2d 368 (2010); McAdams v. N.C. DOT, 215 N.C. App. 429, 716 S.E.2d 77 (2011), review denied, 365 N.C. 558, 722 S.E.2d 599, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 146 (2012); Yan-Min Wang v. UNC-CH Sch. of Med., 216 N.C. App. 185, 716 S.E.2d 646 (2011); N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Ledford, 247 N.C. App. 266, 786 S.E.2d 50 (2016).

Cited in North Carolina Dep't of Justice v. Eaker, 90 N.C. App. 30, 367 S.E.2d 392 (1988); Tay v. Flaherty, 90 N.C. App. 346, 368 S.E.2d 403 (1988); Davis v. Hiatt, 92 N.C. App. 748, 376 S.E.2d 44 (1989); Gummels v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 97 N.C. App. 245, 388 S.E.2d 223 (1990); Batten v. North Carolina Dep't of Cor., 326 N.C. 338, 389 S.E.2d 35 (1990); Tay v. Flaherty, 100 N.C. App. 51, 394 S.E.2d 217 (1990); North Carolina Dep't of Cor. v. Hodge, 99 N.C. App. 602, 394 S.E.2d 285 (1990); Huang v. North Carolina State Univ., 107 N.C. App. 710, 421 S.E.2d 812 (1992); Johnson v. North Carolina DOT, 107 N.C. App. 63, 418 S.E.2d 700 (1992); Harding v. North Carolina Dep't of Cor., 334 N.C. 414, 432 S.E.2d 298 (1993); In re McCrary, 112 N.C. App. 161, 435 S.E.2d 359 (1993); Brooks v. BCF Piping, Inc., 109 N.C. App. 26, 426 S.E.2d 282 (1993); Professional Food Servs. Mgt., Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Admin., 109 N.C. App. 265, 426 S.E.2d 447 (1993); North Carolina DOT v. Davenport, 334 N.C. 428, 432 S.E.2d 303 (1993); Williams v. North Carolina Dep't of Economic & Community Dev., 119 N.C. App. 535, 458 S.E.2d 750 (1995); North Carolina Dep't of Cors. v. Harding, 120 N.C. App. 451, 462 S.E.2d 671 (1995); Gainey v. North Carolina Dep't of Justice, 121 N.C. App. 253, 465 S.E.2d 36 (1996); Bryant v. Hogarth, 127 N.C. App. 79, 488 S.E.2d 269, cert. denied, 347 N.C. 396, 494 S.E.2d 406 (1997); Norman v. Cameron, 127 N.C. App. 44, 488 S.E.2d 297, cert. denied, 347 N.C. 398, 494 S.E.2d 416 (1997); Britt v. North Carolina Sheriffs' Educ. & Training Stds. Comm'n, 348 N.C. 573, 501 S.E.2d 75 (1998); Peace v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 349 N.C. 315, 507 S.E.2d 272 (1998); Prentiss v. Allstate Ins. Co., 87 F. Supp. 2d 514 (W.D.N.C. 1999); Avant v. Sandhills Ctr. for Mental Health, Dev. Disabilities & Substance Abuse Servs., 132 N.C. App. 542, 513 S.E.2d 79 (1999); Prentiss v. Allstate Ins. Co., 144 N.C. App. 404, 548 S.E.2d 557 (2001); Simpson v. Macon County, 132 F. Supp. 2d 407 (2001); In re Roberts, 150 N.C. App. 86, 563 S.E.2d 37 (2002), cert. granted, 356 N.C. 163, 569 S.E.2d 282 (2002), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 124 S. Ct. 103, 157 L. Ed. 2d 38 (2003); Kea v. HHS, 153 N.C. App. 595, 570 S.E.2d 919 (2002), appeal dismissed, 356 N.C. 673, 577 S.E.2d 120, 357 N.C. 654, 588 S.E.2d 467 (2003); Allen v. N.C. HHS, 155 N.C. App. 77, 573 S.E.2d 565 (2002), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 163, 580 S.E.2d 358 (2003); Hooper v. North Carolina, 379 F. Supp. 2d 804 (M.D.N.C. 2005); Newberne v. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 359 N.C. 782, 618 S.E.2d 201 (2005); Estate of Wilson v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 200 N.C. App. 747, 685 S.E.2d 135 (2009); McCrann v. N.C. HHS, 209 N.C. App. 241, 704 S.E.2d 899, review denied 365 N.C. 198, 710 S.E.2d 23, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 436 (2011); High Rock Lake Partners, LLC v. N.C. DOT, 217 N.C. App. 442, 720 S.E.2d 706 (2011), dismissed, 365 N.C. 569, 724 S.E.2d 516, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 259, rev'd, 735 S.E.2d 300, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 1004 (2012); Izydore v. City of Durham, 228 N.C. App. 397, 746 S.E.2d 324 (2013), review denied, 749 S.E.2d 851, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 1198 (2013); Sanders v. State Pers. Comm'n, 236 N.C. App. 94, 762 S.E.2d 850 (2014); Fowler v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue, 242 N.C. App. 404, 775 S.E.2d 350 (2015); Winkler v. State Bd. of Examiners of
Plumbing, Heating & Fire Sprinklers Contrs., 249 N.C. App. 578, 790 S.E.2d 727 (2016); Vincoli v. State, 250 N.C. App. 269, 792 S.E.2d 813 (2016); Harris v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 252 N.C. App. 94, 798 S.E.2d 127, aff'd, 370 N.C. 386, 808 S.E.2d 142, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 1020 (2017).

II. AGGRIEVED PERSON.

Meaning of "Person Aggrieved". - The expression "person aggrieved" has no technical meaning. What it means depends on the circumstances involved. In re Halifax Paper Co., 259 N.C. 589, 131 S.E.2d 441 (1963); Albemarle Elec. Membership Corp. v. Alexander, 282 N.C. 402, 192 S.E.2d 811 (1972); Orange County Sensible Hwys. & Protected Env'ts, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 46 N.C. App. 350, 265 S.E.2d 890 (1980).

"Person aggrieved" means one who is adversely affected in respect of legal rights, or is suffering from an infringement or denial of legal rights. Carter v. North Carolina State Bd. of Registration, 86 N.C. App. 308, 357 S.E.2d 705 (1987).

Personal Rights or Interests Not at Issue. - Where none of petitioner's personal rights or interests, nor any rights or interests properly attributable to him in a cognizable representative capacity, were either directly or indirectly at issue in requested rule making proceeding, he was not substantially affected by Department of Human Resources' denial of his petition for rule making. Therefore, he was not a "person aggrieved" as a result of the agency decision and had no standing to seek judicial review thereof. In re Wheeler, 85 N.C. App. 150, 354 S.E.2d 374 (1987).

Practitioner was not an "aggrieved party" under G.S. 150B-2(6) and lacked standing to appeal under G.S. 150B-43 because the practitioner's interest in her person, property, or employment were not affected substantially by any administrative action of the North Carolina Respiratory Care Board, which had reversed its decision requiring her to pay monetary penalties. Thompson v. N.C. Respiratory Care Bd., 202 N.C. App. 340, 688 S.E.2d 516 (2010), review denied, 364 N.C. 132, 696 S.E.2d 699, 2010 N.C. LEXIS 335 (2010).

Person Aggrieved in Representative Capacity. - One may be aggrieved when he is affected only in a representative capacity. In re Halifax Paper Co., 259 N.C. 589, 131 S.E.2d 441 (1963).

Administrative Agency as Person Aggrieved. - An administrative agency cannot be a person aggrieved by its own order, but it may be an aggrieved party to secure judicial review of a decision of an administrative reviewing agency. In re Halifax Paper Co., 259 N.C. 589, 131 S.E.2d 441 (1963).

County as "Person Aggrieved". - A county may be an aggrieved person when an agency issues a ruling that could affect the county's revenue. In re Brunswick County, 81 N.C. App. 391, 344 S.E.2d 584 (1986).

Appeals by Public Officials and Governmental Units in Cases Involving Taxation and Public Funds. - Where statutes permit appeals by persons aggrieved, appeals by public officials and governmental units are usually allowed in cases involving questions of law relating to taxation and public funds. In re Halifax Paper Co., 259 N.C. 589, 131 S.E.2d 441 (1963).

County as Party Aggrieved. - A county is a party aggrieved and is entitled to appeal from a decision of the State Board of Assessment (now the Property Tax Commission) reducing the valuation of property appraised by the county for tax purposes. In re Appeal of Harris, 273 N.C. 20, 159 S.E.2d 539 (1968).

County had standing to challenge establishment of a toxic waste site within its borders under this Chapter because of the effect on its tax base and planning jurisdiction, because of the final agency determination upon issuance of an environmental impact statement, and because the Environmental Policy Act (Art. 1 of Ch. 113A) includes the right to judicial review of an issue which involves a contested case. Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276 (E.D.N.C. 1981).

Petitioners Ordered to Forfeit Bid Bond "Aggrieved". - Petitioners were aggrieved persons when the Secretary of Administration ordered them to forfeit their $316,600.00 bid bond or be subject to liability for twice that amount. In re Metric Constructors, Inc., 31 N.C. App. 88, 228 S.E.2d 533 (1976).

Property Owners, etc., Within Proposed Corridor of Highway Were Aggrieved. - Plaintiffs were all "aggrieved" by a decision of the State Board of Transportation on the location of an interstate highway within the meaning of former G.S. 150A-43 where the individual plaintiffs were property owners within the proposed corridor of the highway, the members of plaintiff nonprofit corporation were citizens and taxpayers living in or near the proposed corridor, and plaintiff county's tax base and planning jurisdiction would be affected by the proposed highway. Orange County Sensible Hwys. & Protected Env'ts, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 46 N.C. App. 350, 265 S.E.2d 890 (1980).

"Procedural injury" implicit in agency failure to prepare an environmental impact statement as to a proposed highway project was itself a sufficient "injury in fact" to support standing as "aggrieved parties" under former G.S. 150A-43, as long as such injury was alleged by a plaintiff having a sufficient geographical nexus to the site of the challenged project that he might be expected to suffer whatever environmental consequences the project may have. Orange County Sensible Hwys. & Protected Env'ts, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 46 N.C. App. 350, 265 S.E.2d 890 (1980).

Impairment of Hearing Rights in Pollution Discharge Permit Proceeding. - "Procedural injury," whereby petitioner State of Tennessee's right to be heard on certain aspects of a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit was substantially impaired, was sufficient under former G.S. 150A-43 to qualify petitioner as an "aggrieved person" for purposes of appeal of issuance of Environmental Management Commission's consent special order with corporation. In addition, where the consent special order contained provisions substantially identical to provisions which petitioner opposed in the proposed NPDES permit, which affected the property rights of the petitioner in the Pigeon River, these allegations also established petitioner's "aggrieved person" status. State ex rel. Tenn. Dep't of Health & Env't v. Environmental Mgt. Comm'n, 78 N.C. App. 763, 338 S.E.2d 781 (1986).

Petitioner Who Had Won Case Not Aggrieved Party. - Where, although petitioner claimed that it had attempted to preserve a cross-assignment of error, the Commissioner's decision in petitioner's favor was upheld both in the trial court and by the court of appeals; the petitioner was not a party aggrieved. GMC v. Carolina Truck & Body Co., 102 N.C. App. 349, 402 S.E.2d 139 (1991).

Person Not Aggrieved. - Trial court did not err in refusing to conduct judicial review of a lobbyist's request for review because there was no longer any controversy once the North Carolina Department of the Secretary of State decided to not apply aggravating factors to the lobbyist's fine; thus, the trial court properly concluded that the case was moot regardless of whether the lobbyist was a "person aggrieved" pursuant to G.S. 150B-4 and G.S. 150B-43. Beason v. N.C. Dep't of the Secy. of State, 226 N.C. App. 233, 741 S.E.2d 663 (2013).

III. CONTESTED CASE.

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A "contested case" means an administrative proceeding pursuant to this Chapter to resolve a dispute between an agency and another person that involves the person's rights, duties, or privileges, including licensing or the levy of a monetary penalty. State ex rel. Envtl. Mgt. Comm'n v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 101 N.C. App. 433, 400 S.E.2d 107 (1991), discretionary review denied, 328 N.C. 576, 403 S.E.2d 521 (1991).

A contested case hearing is distinguishable from a contested case. The phrase "contested case" extends beyond an adjudicatory hearing to include any agency proceeding, by whatever name called, wherein the legal rights, duties and privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for an adjudicatory hearing. Community Psychiatric Ctrs. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 103 N.C. App. 514, 405 S.E.2d 769 (1991).

Proceeding Sufficient to Constitute a "Contested Case." - The Superior Court had jurisdiction over a petition for review of denial of services under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, P.L. 102-569, 42 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. as amended, where, although the petitioner's claims were not heard by an Administrative Law Judge, they were heard by an agency hearing officer, at a proceeding in which petitioner and respondent were allowed to submit and cross-examine evidence and where respondent's director reviewed and affirmed the hearing officer's decision, in accordance with its own regulations. Hedgepeth v. North Carolina Div. of Servs. for the Blind, 142 N.C. App. 338, 543 S.E.2d 169 (2001).

Case challenging a consent special order entered into by Environmental Management Commission and a corporation, which order was alleged to intrude upon the NPDES permit process (which process requires a hearing), was "contested" for the purposes of former G.S. 150A-43. State ex rel. Tenn. Dep't of Health & Env't v. Environmental Mgt. Comm'n, 78 N.C. App. 763, 338 S.E.2d 781 (1986).

Decision of State Board of Transportation as to location of an interstate highway constituted a "contested case" within the meaning of former G.S. 150A-43, where the North Carolina Environmental Policy Act, G.S. 113A-1 through 113A-10, was involved. Orange County Sensible Hwys. & Protected Env'ts, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 46 N.C. App. 350, 265 S.E.2d 890 (1980).

Where rights of petitioner were determined by an in-person interview and by an investigation conducted by a hearing officer of the North Carolina DMV, a state agency, they constituted "an agency proceeding." Therefore, the case was "contested" for purposes of this section. Charlotte Truck Driver Training School, Inc. v. North Carolina DMV, 95 N.C. App. 209, 381 S.E.2d 861 (1989).

The result of a petitioner's ineffective attempts to file a petition for a contested case hearing was only a contested case. Community Psychiatric Ctrs. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 103 N.C. App. 514, 405 S.E.2d 769 (1991).

Without the jurisdictional prerequisite of a contested case hearing, a petitioner cannot utilize G.S. 131E-188(b) to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Community Psychiatric Ctrs. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 103 N.C. App. 514, 405 S.E.2d 769 (1991).

IV. FINAL DECISION.

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In General. - Under the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, an aggrieved party has the right to judicial review of a final agency decision in a contested case. Okale v. N.C. HHS, 153 N.C. App. 475, 570 S.E.2d 741 (2002).

Decision to end a preliminary inquiry is not "a final agency decision in a contested case." Lloyd v. Babb, 296 N.C. 416, 251 S.E.2d 843 (1979).

Dismissal of State Employee. - A recommendation by the State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] is not a final decision from which a party may petition for judicial review; thus, the superior court was without jurisdiction to uphold a recommendation by the State Personnel Commission prior to review by the Local Appointing Authority, which ultimately reversed the recommendation. Howell v. Morton, 131 N.C. App. 626, 508 S.E.2d 804 (1998).

Decision by State Board of Transportation to deny plaintiffs a hearing concerning location of an interstate highway was a "final" decision within the meaning of former G.S. 150A-43, since the decision affected a right which plaintiffs had pursuant to the board's own administrative regulations. Orange County Sensible Hwys. & Protected Env'ts, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 46 N.C. App. 350, 265 S.E.2d 890 (1980).

Delay Caused by Order for Rehearing Insufficient to Make Order a Final Decision. - Delay caused when the full State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] ordered a rehearing of a dismissal case involving an employee of the Department of Transportation after declining to accept the recommendation of the hearing officer that a default be entered against the Department for its failure to appear was not an undue delay within the meaning of former G.S. 150A-23(a), nor such a delay as could allow the Court of Appeals to treat the order for rehearing as a final agency decision under former G.S. 150A-43. Davis v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 39 N.C. App. 190, 250 S.E.2d 64 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 735, 254 S.E.2d 177 (1979).

Claim as to Statute's Unconstitutionality Involved No "Decision". - Plaintiffs could not obtain judicial review under former G.S. 150A-43 of their claim that G.S. 143B-350(f)(8), conferring on the State Board of Transportation the power and duty to approve all highway construction programs, unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the board, since the claim involved no agency "decision"; however, such claim could be heard pursuant to N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 1. Orange County Sensible Hwys. & Protected Env'ts, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 46 N.C. App. 350, 265 S.E.2d 890 (1980).

V. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

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Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Required. - The Administrative Procedure Act allows judicial review of a final agency decision in a contested case when all relevant administrative remedies have been exhausted and there is no adequate judicial review provided under any other statute. In re Estate of Kapoor, 303 N.C. 102, 277 S.E.2d 403 (1981).

This section provides no authority for permitting plaintiff to bypass the requirements of G.S. 113A-121.1, because by enacting the provisions for administrative review of rules, the legislature wisely determined that the agency itself should have the first opportunity to review the propriety and applicability of its own rules, and so long as the statutory procedures provide an effective means of review of the agency action, the courts will require parties to exhaust their administrative remedies. Leeuwenburg v. Waterway Inv. Ltd. Partnership, 115 N.C. App. 541, 445 S.E.2d 614 (1994).

Where board of trustee's decision denying plaintiff's claim was subject to judicial review only under the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act and, at the time he brought the action in the District Court, plaintiff had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him under the Act, the court of appeals did not err in concluding that the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction and that the plaintiff's civil action must be dismissed. Vass v. Board of Trustees, 324 N.C. 402, 379 S.E.2d 26 (1989).

As a general rule a party must exhaust all applicable administrative remedies before filing in the superior court. Jackson v. Department of Admin., 127 N.C. App. 434, 490 S.E.2d 248 (1997).

Plaintiffs' challenge to insurance company's assessment of driving record points under the safe driver incentive plan (SDIP) required them to first exhaust their administrative remedies, as the approval of the SDIP was required by the commissioner of insurance and fell within the administrative procedures act. Prentiss v. Allstate Ins. Co., 144 N.C. App. 404, 548 S.E.2d 557 (2001).

Final agency decision regarding whether a county's personnel regulations were substantially equivalent to the North Carolina State Personnel Act [now the North Carolina Human Resources Act], G.S. 126-1 et seq., was reviewable by a trial court only after the aggrieved person had exhausted all available administrative remedies made available by statute or agency rule. Steward v. Green, 189 N.C. App. 131, 657 S.E.2d 719 (2008).

As to necessity for exhaustion of administrative remedies under former provisions, see Sinodis v. State Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 258 N.C. 282, 128 S.E.2d 587 (1962); Porter v. State Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 4 N.C. App. 284, 166 S.E.2d 695 (1969).

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is designed to avoid the interruption and cessation of proceedings before a commission by untimely and premature intervention by the courts would completely destroy the efficiency, effectiveness, and purpose of the administrative agencies. Jackson v. Department of Admin., 127 N.C. App. 434, 490 S.E.2d 248 (1997).

It was error to dismiss, for a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, a claim by state foresters against the state for overtime compensation for time spent fighting forest fires because G.S. 143-300.35(a) authorized the maintenance of a separate action in the trial division of the general courts of justice for claims brought by state employees against state agencies under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 201 et seq., without exhausting administrative remedies pursuant to G.S. 126-34.1(a)(11)(a) (now repealed). Brown v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 212 N.C. App. 337, 714 S.E.2d 154 (2011), review denied, 365 N.C. 570, 724 S.E.2d 525, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 270 (2012).

Judicial Review Precluded by Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies. - Plaintiff collection agency was not entitled to seek a declaratory judgment in the superior court as to the validity and applicability of a regulation of the Department of Insurance prohibiting collection agencies from instituting judicial proceedings on behalf of other persons, where plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies by petitioning the Department of Insurance for amendment or repeal of the regulation under former G.S. 150A-16 or seeking a declaratory ruling from the Department of Insurance as to the validity and applicability of the regulation under former G.S. 150A-17, and then by seeking judicial review of an adverse Department of Insurance decision under former G.S. 150A-43 et seq. Porter v. North Carolina Dep't of Ins., 40 N.C. App. 376, 253 S.E.2d 44, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 455, 256 S.E.2d 808 (1979).

The guardian of a child entitled to Medicaid was required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review where the child's admission to a hospital was not approved. Jackson v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources Div. of Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities, & Substance Abuse Servs., 131 N.C. App. 179, 505 S.E.2d 899 (1998), cert. denied, 350 N.C. 594, 537 S.E.2d 213 (1999).

Because a professor did not pursue each level of appeal provided by the university system from his discharge, he did not exhaust his remedies prior to filing a wrongful discharge suit in superior court. Therefore, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider his complaint and properly dismissed it under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1). Johnson v. Univ. of N.C. 202 N.C. App. 355, 688 S.E.2d 546 (2010).

University coach's complaint contesting the coach's employment separation was properly dismissed because (1) the coach did not exhaust administrative remedies available under university employment policies, as G.S. 150B-43 required, and (2) the coach's claim that exhausting those remedies would have been unfair to the team did not show inadequacy. Tucker v. Fayetteville State Univ., 238 N.C. App. 188, 767 S.E.2d 60 (2014).

Medical practices had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies with respect to their Medicaid reimbursement claims where they did not request a reconsideration review or file a petition for a contested case, their claims against a contractor that designed the payment system were intertwined with the claims against the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, and the sheer number of claims did not satisfy the medical practices's burden of showing that exhaustion would have been futile. Abrons Family Practice & Urgent Care, PA v. N.C. HHS, 370 N.C. 443, 810 S.E.2d 224 (2018).

Failure to Exhaust Inadequate Remedy Not Required. - Failure to exhaust an administrative remedy will not bar judicial review if that remedy has been shown to be inadequate. Orange County Sensible Hwys. & Protected Env'ts, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 46 N.C. App. 350, 265 S.E.2d 890 (1980).

Exhaustion of Remedies Held Unnecessary for Preliminary Injunctive Relief in Civil Rights Case. - Where a state employee asserted civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his wrongful dismissal, the superior court retained its traditional power to grant preliminary injunctive relief without requiring him to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in Chapter 126 of the General Statutes. Williams v. Greene, 36 N.C. App. 80, 243 S.E.2d 156, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 295 N.C. 471, 246 S.E.2d 12 (1978).

Application of Exhaustion Requirement Not Waived. - By entering into a Consent Judgment, which resolved ten cases then pending in the courts and the administrative hearing office, the plaintiff did not waive the application of the exhaustion requirement of this Chapter to penalties which would be assessed in the future. State ex rel. Envtl. Mgt. Comm'n v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 101 N.C. App. 433, 400 S.E.2d 107 (1991), discretionary review denied, 328 N.C. 576, 403 S.E.2d 521 (1991).

Inadequacy of Administrative Remedies Insufficiently Alleged. - Employee bringing a breach of employment contract claim against North Carolina Central University (University) inadequately alleged inadequate administrative remedies because (1) the employee's damage claims did not meet this purpose, as the unavailability of damages under G.S. 150B-43 did not make the remedy inadequate, and (2) the fact that only remand to the University was available did not cause the employee's prediction that the University would again rule against the employee to show the remedy was inadequate. Frazier v. N.C. Cent. Univ., 244 N.C. App. 37, 779 S.E.2d 515 (2015).

VI. ADEQUATE JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER ANOTHER STATUTE.

.

"Adequate procedure for judicial review" exists only if the scope of review is equal to that under Article 4 of former Chapter 150A. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 34 N.C. App. 619, 240 S.E.2d 460 (1977); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547, rehearing denied, 301 N.C. 107, 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980), overruled on other grounds, In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 132 (2017).

As to reviewability of decisions under corresponding former provisions where no other adequate procedure provided, see State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Old Fort Finishing Plant, 264 N.C. 416, 142 S.E.2d 8 (1965).

Statutory provision for review "by proceedings in the nature of certiorari" is an "adequate procedure for judicial review" only if the scope of review is equal to that under this Chapter. Jarrell v. Board of Adjustment, 258 N.C. 476, 128 S.E.2d 879 (1963).

Section 93A-6, regulating real estate brokers and salesmen, provides adequate procedure for judicial review of an order of the Real Estate Licensing Board revoking a license, and former G.S. 150A-43 does not apply. In re Dillingham, 257 N.C. 684, 127 S.E.2d 584 (1962).

Section 136-134.1 preempts former G.S. 150A-43 and specifically provides the opportunity to have a de novo proceeding before a trial judge which satisfies due process requirements. National Adv. Co. v. Bradshaw, 48 N.C. App. 10, 268 S.E.2d 816, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 301 N.C. 400, 273 S.E.2d 446 (1980).

Method of Review for Augmented Tax Review Board's Decision. - Appellate jurisdiction does not lie in a North Carolina superior court for an Augmented Tax Review Board's (ATRB's) decision; as a result, when a corporation is contesting the application of the apportionment formula before the ATRB, G.S. 105-130.4(t)(6) requires aggrieved corporations to pay the tax and bring an original civil action, thus directing them to G.S. 105-241.4 [repealed], which provides that an aggrieved corporation bypass administrative review and proceed to litigate the tax liability at issue in the superior court de novo pursuant to that court's original jurisdiction. In re Cent. Tel. Co., 167 N.C. App. 14, 604 S.E.2d 680 (2004), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 359 N.C. 281, 610 S.E.2d 203 (2005).

Termination of University Employee. - Superior court properly dismissed a university employee's petition for review of an administrative law judge's affirmation of the termination of his employment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because an adequate procedure for judicial review by direct appeal to the Court of Appeals was provided by two other statutes. Swauger v. Univ. of N.C. 259 N.C. App. 727, 817 S.E.2d 434 (2018).

VII. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.

.

Decisions of Property Tax Commission. - Any person aggrieved by a final decision of the Property Tax Commission, and who has exhausted all administrative remedies available to him, is entitled to judicial review under former G.S. 150A-43. Brock v. North Carolina Property Tax Comm'n, 290 N.C. 731, 228 S.E.2d 254 (1976).

Administrative decisions of the Property Tax Commission, whether with respect to the schedule of values or the appraisal of property, are always subject to judicial review after administrative procedures have been exhausted. Brock v. North Carolina Property Tax Comm'n, 290 N.C. 731, 228 S.E.2d 254 (1976).

Appeal by Commissioner (Now Secretary) of Revenue from Decision of Tax Review Board. - The Tax Review Board is an administrative agency of the State, and the Commissioner (now Secretary) of Revenue is entitled to appeal from a decision of the Board reversing in part an assessment of taxes made by the Commissioner (now Secretary). Section 105-241.3 [repealed] does not impliedly amend former G.S. 150A-43 so as to preclude the right of the Commissioner (now Secretary) to appeal, but the two statutes must be construed together and effect given the provisions of both. In re Halifax Paper Co., 259 N.C. 589, 131 S.E.2d 441 (1963).

State Transportation Agency's Condemnation of Property. - Owners of condemned land who challenged state transportation agency's proposed highway satisfied the five requirements for judicial review of an adverse transportation agency decision when they showed: (1) they were aggrieved; (2) there was a contested case; (3) there was a final agency decision; (4) their administrative remedies were exhausted; and (5) no other adequate procedure for judicial review could be provided by another statute. DOT v. Blue, 147 N.C. App. 596, 556 S.E.2d 609 (2001).

Rule-Making Procedure Under G.S. 143-215.13(c) Not Subject to Judicial Review. - An informal hearing conducted by the Commission to consider whether to initiate a proceeding to declare the Yadkin River Basin a capacity use area was no more than a G.S. 143-215.13(c) rule-making type procedure, and thus the plaintiffs were not entitled to judicial review under former G.S. 150A-43 et seq. High Rock Lake Ass'n v. North Carolina Envtl. Mgt. Comm'n, 39 N.C. App. 699, 252 S.E.2d 109 (1979).

As to availability of judicial review of suspension of university student, see In re Carter, 262 N.C. 360, 137 S.E.2d 150 (1964).

As to former limitation of court review of suspensions and exclusions, see Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D.N.C. 1972).

Refusal to Amend Semiannual Dialysis Report. - Summary judgment for the N.C. Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Facility Services [now the Division of Health Service Regulation], and its Medical Facilities Planning Section was affirmed as a dialysis firm challenging the refusal by the Planning Section to amend a Semiannual Dialysis Report was not a person aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case. Bio-Medical Applications of N.C. Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 179 N.C. App. 483, 634 S.E.2d 572 (2006), appeal dismissed, 361 N.C. 229, 641 S.E.2d 303, appeal dismissed, 361 N.C. 350, 644 S.E.2d 3, appeal dismissed, 361 N.C. 350, 644 S.E.2d 4, reh'g denied, 361 N.C. 370645 S.E.2d 762 (2007).

OSHA Review Board Decisions. - Judicial review of Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) Review Board decisions is under this Article. Brooks v. Austin Berryhill Fabricators, Inc., 102 N.C. App. 212, 401 S.E.2d 795 (1991).

Termination of Employment of County Superintendent of Schools Reviewable. - Decision of the Wayne County Board of Education terminating the employment of the superintendent of schools and declaring the office vacant was subject to review under former provisions, since although the section providing for the removal of school superintendents contained a proviso that such superintendent would have the right to try his title to office in the courts of the State, the statute was silent as to the procedure and the scope of review contemplated. James v. Wayne County Bd. of Educ., 15 N.C. App. 531, 190 S.E.2d 224, appeal dismissed, 282 N.C. 672, 194 S.E.2d 151 (1972).

Findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the State Board of Elections may be reviewed in an action instituted in the superior court, but appellant is not entitled to a jury trial in such action. Ponder v. Joslin, 262 N.C. 496, 138 S.E.2d 143 (1964).

Cancellation of Truck Driver School License. - Superior court had jurisdiction pursuant to this section to review order cancelling petitioner's truck driver school license, even though petitioner waived its right to an evidentiary hearing. Charlotte Truck Driver Training School, Inc. v. North Carolina DMV, 95 N.C. App. 209, 381 S.E.2d 861 (1989).

Suspension of Retail Beer Permit. - Judicial review of an order of the State Board of Alcoholic Control suspending a retail beer permit is governed by former G.S. 150A-43. Fay v. State Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 30 N.C. App. 492, 227 S.E.2d 298, cert. denied, 291 N.C. 175, 229 S.E.2d 689 (1976).

In an action regarding the termination of state employment, judicial review of an administrative decision dismissing an employee's appeal of the decision to terminate her was governed by G.S. 150B-43. Woodburn v. N.C. State Univ., 156 N.C. App. 549, 577 S.E.2d 154, cert. denied, 357 N.C. 470, 584 S.E.2d 296 (2003).

Breach of Employment Contract Claim Against North Carolina Central University. - Administrative Procedure Act (APA) applied to an employee's breach of employment contract claim against North Carolina Central University (University), requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, because the employee's use of a contractual internal appeal process and inability to use the State Personnel Act showed no lack of such remedies, as the University's decisions were reviewable under G.S. 150B-43, the employee's contract did not exempt the employee from the APA, the University did not waive sovereign immunity, and the unavailability of breach of contract damages under the APA did not make such review inadequate. Frazier v. N.C. Cent. Univ., 244 N.C. App. 37, 779 S.E.2d 515 (2015).

Environmental Impact Statement. - Department of Administration decision that an environmental impact statement was not required did not automatically mean that a permit would be issued by Department of Environmental Health and Natural Resources. Petitioners' action to challenge the decision did not become ripe until Department of Environmental Health and Natural Resources made its decision to issue the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit to applicant. Because petitioners' claim was not ripe at the time of Department of Administration decision, they did not have the right to a contested case hearing. Citizens for Clean Indus., Inc. v. Lofton, 109 N.C. App. 229, 427 S.E.2d 120 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Empire Power Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 337 N.C. 569, 447 S.E.2d 768, rehearing denied, 338 N.C. 314, 451 S.E.2d 634 (1994).

Petition Not Sufficiently Explicit. - Where petition for judicial review of county health director's decision affirming employee's termination lacked even a single exception to particular findings of fact or conclusions of law but instead, baldly asserted only that the health department's decision was "contrary to the Recommended Decision of the Administrative Law Judge and the State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission]," petition was not sufficiently explicit to permit effective judicial review of the proceedings, and department's motion to dismiss should have been allowed. Gray v. Orange County Health Dep't, 119 N.C. App. 62, 457 S.E.2d 892, cert. denied, 341 N.C. 649, 462 S.E.2d 511, rehearing dismissed, 342 N.C. 192, 463 S.E.2d 236 (1995).

Appeal Held Moot. - Trial court properly concluded that a lobbyist's appeal of a decision of the North Carolina Department of the Secretary of State was moot because although the Department applied aggravating factors under G.S. 120C-602(b) to enhance a civil fine, it did not enhance the fine in its final agency decision using those factors; therefore, a legal determination of whether the Department had authority to enhance the fine had no practical effect on the controversy. Beason v. N.C. Dep't of the Secy. of State, 226 N.C. App. 233, 741 S.E.2d 663 (2013).

Improper Dismissal of Judicial Review Petition. - Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision to uphold permits for the use of coal combustion residual as structural fill at open pit mines was reversed because: (1) the ALJ erred in sua sponte converting a motion for summary judgment into a motion for involuntary dismissal and granting the same, as the ALJ had no such authority, and (2) issues raised by environmental groups required distinctly different reviews of the evidence under the whole record standard and of issues of law under the de novo standard, but it was unclear what standards the trial court applied, as the court reweighed the evidence and rewrote the ALJ's decision without explanation. EnvironmentaLEE v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 258 N.C. App. 590, 813 S.E.2d 673 (2018).


§ 150B-44. Right to judicial intervention when final decision unreasonably delayed.

Failure of an administrative law judge subject to Article 3 of this Chapter or failure of an agency subject to Article 3A of this Chapter to make a final decision within 120 days of the close of the contested case hearing is justification for a person whose rights, duties, or privileges are adversely affected by the delay to seek a court order compelling action by the agency or by the administrative law judge.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1022, s. 1(17); 1987, c. 878, ss. 5, 27; 1991, c. 35, s. 9; 2000-190, s. 9; 2008-168, s. 5(b); 2011-398, s. 23; 2014-120, s. 59(b).)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 62, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 63, as amended by Session Laws 2012-187, s. 8.1, provides in relevant part: "Sections 15 through 55 of this act become effective January 1, 2012, and apply to contested cases commenced on or after that date. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.2 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 of this act become effective when the United States Environmental Protection Agency approvals referenced in Section 55.2 have been issued or October 1, 2012, whichever occurs first.With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.1 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 and Sections 32 and 33 of this act become effective when the waiver referenced in Section 55.1 has been granted or February 1, 2013, whichever occurs first. Unless otherwise provided elsewhere in this act, the remainder of this act is effective when it becomes law." For Section 55.2, see editor's note under G.S. 150B-34.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2008-168, s. 5(b), effective July 1, 2008, added the last sentence.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 23, deleted the former second through sixth sentences, and rewrote the next-to-last sentence. For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2014-120, s. 59(b), effective September 18, 2014, inserted "final" in the section catchline; deleted the former first sentence which read: "Unreasonable delay on the part of any agency or administrative law judge in taking any required action shall be justification for any person whose rights, duties, or privileges are adversely affected by such delay to seek a court order compelling action by the agency or administrative law judge."; and deleted the former last sentence which read: "The Board of Trustees of the North Carolina State Health Plan for Teachers and State Employees is a "board" for purposes of this section."

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "Advisory Rulings by Administrative Agencies: Their Benefits and Dangers," see 2 Campbell L. Rev. 1 (1980).

For article, "Administrative Justice: No Longer Just a Recommendation," see 79 N.C.L. Rev. 1639 (2001).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A, or under this Chapter prior to the 1991 amendments thereto.

Due Process Rights Not Violated. - North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services violated a mother's due process and equal protection rights because although the hearing officer's final decision came some time after the hearing date, the mother's children failed to take advantage of their statutory right to compel the hearing officer to take action; the children were afforded an adequate opportunity to have their concerns addressed in a timely manner, but merely failed to take advantage of that right, and their equal protection rights were not violated by the hearing officer's delay. Cloninger v. N.C. HHS, 203 N.C. App. 345, 691 S.E.2d 127 (2010), review denied 364 N.C. 324, 2010 N.C. LEXIS 1083 (2010).

Decision Held Unreasonably Delayed. - Trial court did not err in reversing decision by North Carolina State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] as untimely under G.S. 150B-44, and in adopting the administrative law judge's recommended order, due to the delay beyond 60 days in the entry of the Commission's order; the Commission did not seek to extend the time limit by consent or unilaterally when it reconsidered its original order and then reissued its order. Gordon v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 173 N.C. App. 22, 618 S.E.2d 280 (2005).

Trial court properly held that an administrative law judge's (ALJ's) recommended decision became the final decision of the North Carolina State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] where the Commission was evenly divided and its Memorandum of Consideration did not recite any findings of fact or conclusions of law; as the Memorandum of Consideration did not constitute a final decision, the Commission failed to make a final decision within the time set forth in G.S. 150B-44 and in order to protect the employee from unreasonable delay resulting from the Commission's failure to issue a final decision, the ALJ's recommended decision became the final decision by operation of law. Teague v. N.C. DOT, 177 N.C. App. 215, 628 S.E.2d 395 (2006), cert. denied, 362 N.C. 373, 662 S.E.2d 395 (2008), cert. dismissed, mandamus dism'd, - N.C. - , 677 S.E.2d 842 (2009), cert. denied, 722 S.E.2d 602, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 381 (2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 444, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 7842, 184 L. Ed. 2d 271 (U.S. 2012).

Protection from Unreasonable Delay. - Parties are protected from unreasonable delay on the part of agencies in reaching final decisions by former G.S. 150A-44 (see now this section), which allows a party adversely affected by such delay to seek a court order compelling action by the agency. In re Alamance Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 53 N.C. App. 326, 280 S.E.2d 748, cert. denied, 304 N.C. 588, 291 S.E.2d 148 (1981).

The right under former G.S. 150A-44 (see now this section) may be asserted to prevent unreasonable delay in reaching a final agency decision. Stevenson v. North Carolina Dep't of Ins., 31 N.C. App. 299, 229 S.E.2d 209 (1976).

Decision Held Unreasonably Delayed. - State Personnel Commission's [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission's] decision against a county employee issued 130 days after it had received the official record from the hearing officer was "unreasonably delayed" as defined in this section; however, the hearing officer's decision would not be reinstated. The only available remedy was a court order compelling action by the agency or hearing officer. Davis v. Vance County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 91 N.C. App. 428, 372 S.E.2d 88 (1988).

The Department of Human Resources did not make its final decision within the time limits of this section, where the Department filed an extension, but did not render its final decision until almost six months after it received the record. Holland Group, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Admin., 130 N.C. App. 721, 504 S.E.2d 300 (1998).

Since the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Medical Assistance (HHS), did not properly extend the deadline under G.S. 150B-44 for issuing a final decision regarding an administrative law judge's recommendation that it had improperly withheld Medicaid reimbursements, the judgment of the trial court that HHS adopted the recommendation was affirmed on appeal. Albemarle Mental Health Ctr. v. N.C. Dep't of HHS, 159 N.C. App. 66, 582 S.E.2d 651 (2003), aff'd, 358 N.C. 134, 591 S.E.2d 519 (2004).

Self-Executing Decisions - When an Article 3 administrative agency failed to issue a final decision regarding the recognition of a tribe as an indigenous North Carolina Indian tribe within the time limits set forth in G.S. 150B-44, the recommended decision of an administrative law judge became the final decision in the case by operation of law. Occaneechi Band of the Saponi Nation v. N.C. Comm'n of Indian Affairs, 145 N.C. App. 649, 551 S.E.2d 535, cert. denied, 354 N.C. 365, 556 S.E.2d 575 (2001).

Good Cause - It is the responsibility of an agency governed by G.S. 150B-44 to articulate "good cause" for extending the final decision deadline when there is no agreement by the parties to extend the deadline. Albemarle Mental Health Ctr. v. N.C. Dep't of HHS, 159 N.C. App. 66, 582 S.E.2d 651 (2003), aff'd, 358 N.C. 134, 591 S.E.2d 519 (2004).

Applicability - Pursuant to G.S. 150B-1(c), the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Medical Assistance, is an Article 3 agency and thereby subject to the mandates of G.S. 150B-44. Albemarle Mental Health Ctr. v. N.C. Dep't of HHS, 159 N.C. App. 66, 582 S.E.2d 651 (2003), aff'd, 358 N.C. 134, 591 S.E.2d 519 (2004).

Office of Administrative Hearings was not the appropriate forum for review of a virtual charter school applicant's challenge to the State Board of Education's inaction on its application where the applicant had not followed the G.S. 150B-44 timeline. N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. N.C. Learns, Inc., 231 N.C. App. 270, 751 S.E.2d 625 (2013).

Waiver. - Forestry association that participated in hearings conducted by the North Carolina Environmental Management Commission (EMC) to review an administrative law judge's (ALJ's) decision waived its claim that the EMC lost its power to review the ALJ's decision, by conducting the hearings beyond the time limits prescribed by G.S. 150B-44, when it failed to make its claim to the EMC. N.C. Forestry Ass'n v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 162 N.C. App. 467, 591 S.E.2d 549 (2004).

De Novo Review Proper. - Trial court properly applied the substantial evidence test in reviewing an administrative law judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law; the trial court also properly employed a de novo review of the question of the application of G.S. 150B-44. Teague v. N.C. DOT, 177 N.C. App. 215, 628 S.E.2d 395 (2006), cert. denied, 362 N.C. 373, 662 S.E.2d 395 (2008), cert. dismissed, mandamus dism'd, - N.C. - , 677 S.E.2d 842 (2009), cert. denied, 722 S.E.2d 602, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 381 (2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 444, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 7842, 184 L. Ed. 2d 271 (U.S. 2012).

Applied in White v. North Carolina Dep't of Cor., 117 N.C. App. 521, 451 S.E.2d 876 (1995).

Cited in County of Wake v. N.C. Dep't of Env't, 155 N.C. App. 225, 573 S.E.2d 572 (2002), cert. dismissed, 357 N.C. 62, 579 S.E.2d 387 (2003).


§ 150B-45. Procedure for seeking review; waiver.

  1. Procedure. - To obtain judicial review of a final decision under this Article, the person seeking review must file a petition within 30 days after the person is served with a written copy of the decision. The petition must be filed as follows:
    1. Contested tax cases. - A petition for review of a final decision in a contested tax case arising under G.S. 105-241.15 must be filed in the Superior Court of Wake County.
    2. Other final decisions. - A petition for review of any other final decision under this Article must be filed in the superior court of the county where the person aggrieved by the administrative decision resides, or in the case of a person residing outside the State, in the county where the contested case which resulted in the final decision was filed.
  2. Waiver. - A person who fails to file a petition within the required time waives the right to judicial review under this Article. For good cause shown, however, the superior court may accept an untimely petition.
  3. (See editor's note.) Judicial Review for State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement. - For a stay entered pursuant to G.S. 150B-33(b)(6), the State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement may obtain judicial review of the temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction in the superior court of the county designated in subsection (a) of this section.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1987, c. 878, s. 16; 2007-491, s. 43; 2013-143, s. 4; 2018-13, s. 3.1.)

Local Modification. - Durham: 1983, c. 373; 1993, c. 227, s. 3; 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994), c. 658, s. 1.2); city of Asheville: 1999-206, s. 3; city of Gastonia: 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 902, s. 3; 1991, c. 557, s. 1.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2007-491, s. 47, provides, in part: "The procedures for review of disputed tax matters enacted by this act apply to assessments of tax that are not final as of the effective date of this act and to claims for refund pending on or filed on or after the effective date of this act. This act does not affect matters for which a petition for review was filed with the Tax Review Board under G.S. 105-241.2 [repealed] before the effective date of this act. The repeal of G.S. 105-122(c) and G.S. 105-130.4(t) and Sections 11 and 12 apply to requests for alternative apportionment formulas filed on or after the effective date of this act. A petition filed with the Tax Review Board for an apportionment formula before the effective date of this act is considered a request under G.S. 105-122(c1) or G.S. 105-130.4(t1), as appropriate."

Session Laws 2013-143, s. 5, made the amendments to this section by Session Laws 2013-143, s. 4, effective October 1, 2013, and applicable to petitions for judicial review filed on or after that date.

Session Laws 2018-13, s. 6, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2018-13, s. 7, made subsection (c) of this section, as added by Session Laws 2018-13, s. 3.1, effective June 20, 2018, and applicable to elections held on or after that date.

Session Laws 2018-146, s. 6.1, provides: "Consistent with this act, the Revisor is authorized to change all references to the Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement to instead be references to the State Board of Elections, State Ethics Commission, or Secretary of State, as appropriate. The Revisor may modify statutory citations throughout the General Statutes, as appropriate, and may modify any references to statutory divisions, such as 'Chapter,' 'Subchapter,' 'Article,' 'Part,' 'section,' and 'subsection'; adjust the order of lists of multiple statutes to maintain statutory order; correct terms and conform names and titles changed by this act; eliminate duplicative references to the State Boards that result from the changes authorized by this section; and make conforming changes to catch lines and references to catch lines. The Revisor may also adjust subject and verb agreement and the placement of conjunctions. The Revisor shall consult with the Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement, the State Board of Elections, the State Ethics Commission, and the Secretary of State, as appropriate, on this recodification." At the direction of the Revisor of Statutes, no substitution was made for the reference to "State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement" in subsection (c) due to uncertainty as to the correct replacement.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2007-491, s. 43, effective January 1, 2008, rewrote subsection (a) and added the subsection heading in subsection (b).

Session Laws 2018-13, s. 3.1, added subsection (c). For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Legal Periodicals. - For survey of 1979 administrative law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1185 (1980).

For survey of 1979 tax law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1548 (1980).

For article, "A Powerless Judiciary? The North Carolina Courts' Perceptions of Review of Administrative Action," see 12 N.C. Cent. L.J. 21 (1980).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A, or under this Chapter prior to the 1991 amendments thereto.

Application of Section. - Where the complaints and notices of hearing were filed prior to Jan. 1, 1986, the action was commenced prior to Jan. 1, 1986, and Chapter 150B had no application in the case; thus, G.S. 150A-45 (rewritten and recodified as this section), requiring a person seeking review to file a petition in the Superior Court of Wake County, and not this section, permitting such filing in either Wake County or the county where the person resides, governed. Pinewood Manor Mobile Homes, Inc. v. North Carolina Manufactured Hous. Bd., 84 N.C. App. 564, 353 S.E.2d 231, cert. denied, 319 N.C. 674, 356 S.E.2d 780 (1987).

Procedures and requirements of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, G.S. 150B-1 et seq., were not to be incorporated into the statutory requirements under G.S. 53-92(d) for an appeal from a final decision of the North Carolina State Banking Commission. In re Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs. of N.C. Inc., 189 N.C. App. 115, 657 S.E.2d 405 (2008).

It was error to dismiss, for a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, a claim by state foresters against the State for overtime compensation for time spent fighting forest fires because G.S. 143-300.35(a) authorized the maintenance of a separate action in the trial division of the general courts of justice for claims brought by state employees against state agencies under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 201 et seq., without exhausting administrative remedies pursuant to G.S. 126-34.1(a)(11)(a) (now repealed). Brown v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 212 N.C. App. 337, 714 S.E.2d 154 (2011), review denied, 365 N.C. 570, 724 S.E.2d 525, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 270 (2012).

Jurisdiction Properly Asserted. - Trial court properly asserted jurisdiction over a county board of education because the board submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived its personal jurisdiction defense when it failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction at the hearing and argued the merits of the case. Tobe-Williams v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 234 N.C. App. 453, 759 S.E.2d 680 (2014).

Applicant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was properly denied as a petition challenging its NPDES permit was timely filed under G.S. 150B-45, and there was no challenge to the good cause shown to extend the time for service. Sound Rivers, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, Div. of Water Res., - N.C. App. - , 845 S.E.2d 802 (2020).

Good Cause Shown. - Superior court's conclusion that there was good cause shown to accept applicant's untimely new petition did not demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion because the superior court found that the applicants were diligent in its attempts to have the merits of the final agency decision litigated and decided, there was little material harm to the agency from any delay in having the petition untimely filed, and the applicants would suffer a grave injustice by being unable to prosecute the action if the agency's motion to dismiss was granted. High Rock Lake Partners, LLC v. N.C. DOT, 217 N.C. App. 442, 720 S.E.2d 706 (2011), dismissed, 365 N.C. 569, 724 S.E.2d 516, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 259, rev'd, 735 S.E.2d 300, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 1004 (2012).

Under Article 3 of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes, judicial review of a final decision under that article is to be had in the Superior Court of Wake County or the superior court of the county where the person seeking review resides. Iredell Mem. Hosp. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 103 N.C. App. 637, 406 S.E.2d 304 (1991).

Where declaratory ruling was not served on county in accordance with statute, county did not waive its right to seek judicial review by waiting more than 30 days after it received a copy of the decision to file its petition for review. In re Brunswick County, 81 N.C. App. 391, 344 S.E.2d 584 (1986).

Former G.S. 150A-45 (rewritten and recodified as this section) confers exclusive jurisdiction for judicial review of final agency decisions on the Superior Court of Wake County when a state rather than a local agency made the initial determination. State ex rel. Lee v. Williams, 55 N.C. App. 80, 284 S.E.2d 572 (1981).

Strict Construction of Waiver Provisions. - Statutory provisions providing for the waiver or forfeiture of the right to judicial review under certain conditions should be construed strictly; and, when so construed, the right to petition for review continues unless and until 30 days have expired from the date "a written copy" of the administrative order has been served on the party seeking review, either by personal service or by registered mail, return receipt requested. In re Appeal of Harris, 273 N.C. 20, 159 S.E.2d 539 (1968), decided prior to enactment of this Chapter.

No statutory authority exists for the State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] to review an administrative law judge's recommended decision in a case involving an exempt employee. Johnson v. Natural Resources & Community Dev., 98 N.C. App. 334, 391 S.E.2d 48, cert. denied, 327 N.C. 140, 394 S.E.2d 176 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 328 N.C. 689, 394 S.E.2d 469 (1991).

A petitioner seeking judicial review of a decision of the North Carolina Driver License Medical Review Board must file such petition in the Superior Court of Wake County pursuant to former G.S. 150A-45 (rewritten and recodified as this section), and may not obtain a hearing under G.S. 20-25 in the superior court of the county in which he resides. Cox v. Miller, 26 N.C. App. 749, 217 S.E.2d 198 (1975).

Denial of ABC Permit Constituting Action on "Issuance". - Where application for an ABC permit was initially denied by commission on Dec. 9, 1985, this denial was clearly a commission action on "issuance" of an ABC permit, and, pursuant to the provisions of G.S. 18B-906, the ruling on the application became a "contested case" for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act on Dec. 9, 1985. Therefore, former G.S. 150A-45 (rewritten and recodified as this section), which required petitions for review to be filed in Wake County, was applicable, rather than this section, and the trial court properly dismissed petition for judicial review, which had been filed in Craven County. In re Melkonian, 85 N.C. App. 715, 355 S.E.2d 798, cert. denied, 320 N.C. 793, 361 S.E.2d 78 (1987).

Time for Filing Petition. - Owners of condemned land were required to file their petition within 30 days of publication of final environmental impact statement concerning proposed state highway. DOT v. Blue, 147 N.C. App. 596, 556 S.E.2d 609 (2001).

Petition for Review Untimely. - Employee's petition for judicial review of a school board's determination which upheld a superintendent's decision to terminate the employee was untimely because no other statute provided guidance for the judicial review of school board decisions, so the trial court properly looked to Article 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act to determine the correct time limit; under G.S. 150B-45(a), the time limit was 30 days, and the employee filed her petition nine months after the decision, well outside the 30-day limit. Coomer v. Lee County Bd. of Educ., 220 N.C. App. 155, 723 S.E.2d 802 (2012).

The result of a petitioner's ineffective attempts to file a petition for a contested case hearing was only a contested case. Community Psychiatric Ctrs. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 103 N.C. App. 514, 405 S.E.2d 769 (1991).

Without the jurisdictional prerequisite of a contested case hearing, a petitioner cannot utilize G.S. 131E-188(b) to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Community Psychiatric Ctrs. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 103 N.C. App. 514, 405 S.E.2d 769 (1991).

Applied in Concerned Citizens v. North Carolina Envtl. Mgt. Comm'n, 89 N.C. App. 708, 367 S.E.2d 13 (1988); Gummels v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 97 N.C. App. 245, 388 S.E.2d 223 (1990); North Buncombe Ass'n of Concerned Citizens v. Rhodes, 100 N.C. App. 24, 394 S.E.2d 462, appeal dismissed, 327 N.C. 484, 397 S.E.2d 215 (1990); Meyers v. Dep't of Human Resources, 105 N.C. App. 665, 415 S.E.2d 70 (1992); Citizens for Responsible Roadways v. N.C. DOT, 145 N.C. App. 497, 550 S.E.2d 253 (2001); In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275 (2017).

Cited in North Carolina DOT v. Davenport, 102 N.C. App. 476, 402 S.E.2d 477 (1991); Huang v. North Carolina State Univ., 107 N.C. App. 710, 421 S.E.2d 812 (1992); Bashford v. North Carolina Licensing Bd., 107 N.C. App. 462, 420 S.E.2d 466 (1992); Ocean Hill Joint Venture v. North Carolina Dep't of Environment, Health & Natural Resources, 333 N.C. 318, 426 S.E.2d 274 (1993); Davenport v. North Carolina DOT, 3 F.3d 89 (4th Cir. 1993); Ellis v. North Carolina Crime Victims Comp. Comm'n, 111 N.C. App. 157, 432 S.E.2d 160 (1993); Homoly v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 125 N.C. App. 127, 479 S.E.2d 215 (1997); County of Durham v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't & Natural Resources, 131 N.C. App. 395, 507 S.E.2d 310 (1998); In re Roberts, 150 N.C. App. 86, 563 S.E.2d 37 (2002), cert. granted, 356 N.C. 163, 569 S.E.2d 282 (2002), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 124 S. Ct. 103, 157 L. Ed. 2d 38 (2003); County of Wake v. N.C. Dep't of Env't, 155 N.C. App. 225, 573 S.E.2d 572 (2002), cert. dismissed, 357 N.C. 62, 579 S.E.2d 387 (2003); Allen v. N.C. HHS, 155 N.C. App. 77, 573 S.E.2d 565 (2002), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 163, 580 S.E.2d 358 (2003); Vanderburg v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue, 168 N.C. App. 598, 608 S.E.2d 831 (2005); Hooper v. North Carolina, 379 F. Supp. 2d 804 (M.D.N.C. 2005); Newberne v. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 359 N.C. 782, 618 S.E.2d 201 (2005); In re Lustgarten, 177 N.C. App. 663, 629 S.E.2d 886 (2006); Hospice at Greensboro, Inc. v. N.C. HHS Div. of Facility Servs., 185 N.C. App. 1, 647 S.E.2d 651 (2007); Dare County v. N.C. Dep't of Ins., 207 N.C. App. 600, 701 S.E.2d 368 (2010); Frazier v. N.C. Cent. Univ., 244 N.C. App. 37, 779 S.E.2d 515 (2015); NC Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Owens, 245 N.C. App. 230, 782 S.E.2d 337 (2016).


§ 150B-46. Contents of petition; copies served on all parties; intervention.

The petition shall explicitly state what exceptions are taken to the decision or procedure and what relief the petitioner seeks. Within 10 days after the petition is filed with the court, the party seeking the review shall serve copies of the petition by personal service or by certified mail upon all who were parties of record to the administrative proceedings. Names and addresses of such parties shall be furnished to the petitioner by the agency upon request. Any party to the administrative proceeding is a party to the review proceedings unless the party withdraws by notifying the court of the withdrawal and serving the other parties with notice of the withdrawal. Other parties to the proceeding may file a response to the petition within 30 days of service. Parties, including agencies, may state exceptions to the decision or procedure and what relief is sought in the response.

Any person aggrieved may petition to become a party by filing a motion to intervene as provided in G.S. 1A-1, Rule 24.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1991, c. 35, s. 10.)

Cross References. - As to hearings and appeals of the State Banking Commission, see G.S. 53C-2-6.

Legal Periodicals. - For survey of 1979 administrative law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1185 (1980).

For article, "A Powerless Judiciary? The North Carolina Courts' Perceptions of Review of Administrative Action," see 12 N.C. Cent. L.J. 21 (1980).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A and earlier statutes, or under this Chapter prior to the 1991 amendments thereto.

Purpose of Statute Necessitates Liberal Construction. - The primary purpose of the statute is to confer the right of review, and the statute should be liberally construed to preserve and effectuate that right. James v. Wayne County Bd. of Educ., 15 N.C. App. 531, 190 S.E.2d 224, appeal dismissed, 282 N.C. 672, 194 S.E.2d 151 (1972).

"Explicit" means characterized by full clear expression; being without vagueness or ambiguity; leaving nothing implied. Vann v. North Carolina State Bar, 79 N.C. App. 173, 339 S.E.2d 97 (1986).

Service Requirements for a Petition for Judicial Review of an Agency Decision. - Conn. Gen. Stat. § 150B-46 deals with the service of a petition for judicial review of an agency decision, while N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 4 applies generally to service in all civil matters; since § 150B-46 is more specific and there is no legislative intent to the contrary, its terms control the service requirements for a petition for judicial review of an agency decision. Follum v. N.C. State Univ., 198 N.C. App. 389, 679 S.E.2d 420 (2009).

Service of Petition for Judicial Review. - Service of a petition for judicial review upon the North Carolina State University's (NCSU) counsel did not comply with G.S. 150B-46 as the counsel was an employee of the North Carolina Department of Justice and a member of North Carolina's Attorney General's (AG) staff, not of NCSU; an employee's decision to effectuate service by certified mail via a private letter carrier did not render the service of the petition upon an agency's attorney of record under § 150B-46 as the employee was aware of the physical street address of NCSU's process agent, and the fact that the AG's office only provided the employee with a post office box for the process agent did not render the service of the employee's petition in compliance with § 150B-46. Follum v. N.C. State Univ., 198 N.C. App. 389, 679 S.E.2d 420 (2009).

Petition Sufficient. - Trial court did not err by denying the State of North Carolina Board of Barber Examiners' motion to dismiss the owner's petition for judicial review because the petition was sufficiently explicit to allow effective judicial review. Kindsgrab v. State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 236 N.C. App. 564, 763 S.E.2d 913 (2014).

Extension of Time to Serve. - Trial court properly allowed the Highway Patrol to serve a sergeant properly, though outside the 10-day statutory window because the sergeant received a copy of the petition (though through regular mail) within 10 days of the filing of the petition, and once proper service was accomplished, the trial court obtained personal jurisdiction over the sergeant. NC Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Owens, 245 N.C. App. 230, 782 S.E.2d 337 (2016).

Jurisdiction Properly Asserted. - Trial court properly asserted jurisdiction over a county board of education because the board submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived its personal jurisdiction defense when it failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction at the hearing and argued the merits of the case. Tobe-Williams v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 234 N.C. App. 453, 759 S.E.2d 680 (2014).

Inadequacy of Administrative Remedies Insufficiently Alleged. - Employee bringing a breach of employment contract claim against North Carolina Central University (University) inadequately alleged inadequate administrative remedies because (1) the employee's damage claims did not meet this purpose, as the unavailability of damages under G.S. 150B-43 did not make the remedy inadequate, and (2) the fact that only remand to the University was available did not cause the employee's prediction that the University would again rule against the employee to show the remedy was inadequate. Frazier v. N.C. Cent. Univ., 244 N.C. App. 37, 779 S.E.2d 515 (2015).

Intervention Appropriate. - Trial court did not err in allowing other school boards to intervene in an action challenging the State Board of Education's inaction with respect to a virtual charter school application where the boards were faced with an imminent economic injury via loss of school funding based on the ruling of the administrative law judge, and the administrative law judge's decision could have had a significant impact on all school boards across the State, thus creating a present and substantial matter of concern for both the State Board of Education and the intervening school boards regarding issues of management, oversight, and regulation. N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. N.C. Learns, Inc., 231 N.C. App. 270, 751 S.E.2d 625 (2013).

Failure to Comply with Essential Requirements. - Trial court properly dismissed a teacher's petition for judicial review in which he sought to challenge the termination of his employment by the county board of education because, given the lack of any statutory provision governing the contents and service of petitions for judicial review, it was appropriate to apply the APA, and the teacher's petition failed to comply with several essential requirements of the APA where his petition failed to state any specific exceptions to the board's decision or the relief he sought to obtain, he failed to serve the board with his petition within the 10-day time limit, and instead simply served a copy of his petition upon the attorney for the board. Butler v. Scot. Cty. Bd. of Educ., 257 N.C. App. 570, 811 S.E.2d 185 (2018), review denied, 813 S.E.2d 853, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 448 (2018).

Applied in Gummels v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 97 N.C. App. 245, 388 S.E.2d 223 (1990).

Cited in Huang v. North Carolina State Univ., 107 N.C. App. 710, 421 S.E.2d 812 (1992); Leeuwenburg v. Waterway Inv. Ltd. Partnership, 115 N.C. App. 541, 445 S.E.2d 614 (1994); Save Our Rivers, Inc. v. Town of Highlands, 341 N.C. 635, 461 S.E.2d 333 (1995); Shackleford-Moten v. Lenoir County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 155 N.C. App. 568, 573 S.E.2d 767 (2002), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 252, 582 S.E.2d 609 (2003); In re Advance Am., Cash Advance Ctrs. of N.C. Inc., 189 N.C. App. 115, 657 S.E.2d 405 (2008); Dare County v. N.C. Dep't of Ins., 207 N.C. App. 600, 701 S.E.2d 368 (2010).


§ 150B-47. Records filed with clerk of superior court; contents of records; costs.

Within 30 days after receipt of the copy of the petition for review, or within such additional time as the court may allow, the Office of Administrative Hearings shall transmit to the reviewing court the original or a certified copy of the official record in the contested case under review. With the permission of the court, the record may be shortened by stipulation of all parties to the review proceedings. Any party unreasonably refusing to stipulate to limit the record may be taxed by the court for such additional costs as may be occasioned by the refusal. The court may require or permit subsequent corrections or additions to the record when deemed desirable.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1983, c. 919, s. 3; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1022, s. 1(18); 1987, c. 878, s. 22; 2011-398, s. 24.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 62, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 63, as amended by Session Laws 2012-187, s. 8.1, provides in relevant part: "Sections 15 through 55 of this act become effective January 1, 2012, and apply to contested cases commenced on or after that date. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.2 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 of this act become effective when the United States Environmental Protection Agency approvals referenced in Section 55.2 have been issued or October 1, 2012, whichever occurs first. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.1 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 and Sections 32 and 33 of this act become effective when the waiver referenced in Section 55.1 has been granted or February 1, 2013, whichever occurs first. Unless otherwise provided elsewhere in this act, the remainder of this act is effective when it becomes law." For Section 55.2, see editor's note under G.S. 150B-34.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 24, rewrote the first sentence. For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A.

Former G.S. 150A-47 does not apply to decisions made by town boards, including boards of adjustment. Burton v. New Hanover County Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 49 N.C. App. 439, 271 S.E.2d 550 (1980), cert. denied, 302 N.C. 217, 276 S.E.2d 914 (1981).

Motion to Supplement the Record Properly Denied. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying applicants' motion for leave to supplement the record because deposition testimony was not necessary for a determination of the issues the applicants' brought forward on appeal. High Rock Lake Partners, LLC v. N.C. DOT, 217 N.C. App. 442, 720 S.E.2d 706 (2011), dismissed, 365 N.C. 569, 724 S.E.2d 516, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 259, rev'd, 735 S.E.2d 300, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 1004 (2012).

Record Properly Amended - Trial court properly amended the record and allowed a virtual charter school application into the record where the application was related to the actions of the State Board of Education with respect to that application, and nothing in the trial court's findings indicated that the admission of the application was erroneous or prejudicial to the applicant. N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. N.C. Learns, Inc., 231 N.C. App. 270, 751 S.E.2d 625 (2013).

Applied in Leeuwenburg v. Waterway Inv. Ltd. Partnership, 115 N.C. App. 541, 445 S.E.2d 614 (1994).

Cited in Huang v. North Carolina State Univ., 107 N.C. App. 710, 421 S.E.2d 812 (1992); Harding v. North Carolina Dep't of Cor., 334 N.C. 414, 432 S.E.2d 298 (1993); Deep River Citizens Coalition v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 119 N.C. App. 232, 457 S.E.2d 772 (1995); Watkins v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 358 N.C. 190, 593 S.E.2d 764 (2004); N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 599 S.E.2d 888 (2004); Dare County v. N.C. Dep't of Ins., 207 N.C. App. 600, 701 S.E.2d 368 (2010); Frazier v. N.C. Cent. Univ., 244 N.C. App. 37, 779 S.E.2d 515 (2015).


§ 150B-48. Stay of decision.

At any time before or during the review proceeding, the person aggrieved may apply to the reviewing court for an order staying the operation of the administrative decision pending the outcome of the review. The court may grant or deny the stay in its discretion upon such terms as it deems proper and subject to the provisions of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 65.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1.)

Legal Periodicals. - For comment, "The Problem of Procedural Delay in Contested Case Hearings . . ." under the North Carolina APA, see 7 N.C. Cent. L.J. 347 (1976).

For article, "Advisory Rulings by Administrative Agencies: Their Benefits and Dangers," see 2 Campbell L. Rev. 1 (1980).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Most of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A.

Former G.S. 150A-48 must be construed in pari materia with the rest of this Article, and particularly former G.S. 150A-43, which states that any person who is aggrieved by a final agency decision in a contested case, and who has exhausted all administrative remedies made available to him by statute or agency rule, is entitled to judicial review of such decision under Article 4 of former Chapter 150A. Stevenson v. North Carolina Dep't of Ins., 31 N.C. App. 299, 229 S.E.2d 209, cert. denied, 291 N.C. 450, 230 S.E.2d 767 (1976); Davis v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 39 N.C. App. 190, 250 S.E.2d 64 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 735, 254 S.E.2d 177 (1979).

Former G.S. 150A-48 was meant to entitle the aggrieved person to a stay order only after the final agency decision and either before or after initiation of judicial review. Stevenson v. North Carolina Dep't of Ins., 31 N.C. App. 299, 229 S.E.2d 209 (1976); Davis v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 39 N.C. App. 190, 250 S.E.2d 64 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 735, 254 S.E.2d 177 (1979).

Stay of Decision Unavailable Prior to "Final Agency Decision". - Former G.S. 150A-48 is a vehicle for reinstatement only "before or during the review proceeding." Since, according to former G.S. 150A-43, review is available only after a "final agency decision," the stay of a decision is similarly only available after a "final agency decision." Davis v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 39 N.C. App. 190, 250 S.E.2d 64 (1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 735, 254 S.E.2d 177 (1979).

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Held Unnecessary for Preliminary Injunctive Relief in Federal Civil Rights Action. - Where a state employee asserted civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his wrongful dismissal, the superior court retained its traditional power to grant preliminary injunctive relief without requiring him to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in Chapter 126. Williams v. Greene, 36 N.C. App. 80, 243 S.E.2d 156, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 295 N.C. 471, 246 S.E.2d 12 (1978).

Applied in Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 71 N.C. App. 725, 323 S.E.2d 442 (1984).

Cited in Dare County v. N.C. Dep't of Ins., 207 N.C. App. 600, 701 S.E.2d 368 (2010).


§ 150B-49. New evidence.

A party or person aggrieved who files a petition in the superior court may apply to the court to present additional evidence. If the court is satisfied that the evidence is material to the issues, is not merely cumulative, and could not reasonably have been presented at the administrative hearing, the court may remand the case so that additional evidence can be taken. If an administrative law judge did not make a final decision in the case, the court shall remand the case to the agency that conducted the administrative hearing under Article 3A of this Chapter. After hearing the evidence, the agency may affirm or modify its previous findings of fact and final decision. If an administrative law judge made a final decision in the case, the court shall remand the case to the administrative law judge. After hearing the evidence, the administrative law judge may affirm or modify his previous findings of fact and final decision. The additional evidence and any affirmation or modification of a final decision shall be made part of the official record.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1987, c. 878, s. 17; 2000-190, s. 10; 2011-398, s. 25.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 62, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 63, as amended by Session Laws 2012-187, s. 8.1, provides in relevant part: "Sections 15 through 55 of this act become effective January 1, 2012, and apply to contested cases commenced on or after that date. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.2 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 of this act become effective when the United States Environmental Protection Agency approvals referenced in Section 55.2 have been issued or October 1, 2012, whichever occurs first. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.1 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 and Sections 32 and 33 of this act become effective when the waiver referenced in Section 55.1 has been granted or February 1, 2013, whichever occurs first. Unless otherwise provided elsewhere in this act, the remainder of this act is effective when it becomes law." For Section 55.2, see editor's note under G.S. 150B-34.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 25, substituted "A party or person aggrieved" for "An aggrieved person" in the first sentence; inserted "final" preceding "decision" in the third, fifth, sixth and last sentences; deleted the former next-to-last sentence; and deleted "of the administrative law judge or final decision" following "modification of a final decision" in the last sentence. For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Legal Periodicals. - For comment, "The Problem of Procedural Delay in Contested Case Hearings . . ." under the North Carolina APA, see 7 N.C. Cent. L.J. 347 (1976).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided prior to the 1991 amendments to this Chapter.

Whether new evidence offered by an organization should "reasonably have been presented" to the Coastal Resources Commission before, or during the course of, the organization's petition for a contested case hearing was a question which could not be determined from the record, and therefore, had to be remanded to the superior court for determination. Pamlico Tar River Found., Inc. v. Coastal Resources Comm'n, 103 N.C. App. 24, 404 S.E.2d 167 (1991).

When Superior Court Must Remand Case for Taking of New Evidence. - If the evidence is "material," "not merely cumulative," and "could not reasonably have been presented at the administrative hearing," the superior court must remand the case to the Coastal Resources Commission for the taking of new evidence offered by an organization opposing issuance of a permit. Pamlico Tar River Found., Inc. v. Coastal Resources Comm'n, 103 N.C. App. 24, 404 S.E.2d 167 (1991).

Denial of Remand Upheld. - Trial court's decision to deny petitioner's motion to remand for additional evidence relative to petitioner's alcohol assessment and subsequent treatment after hearing before the commission upheld. Ritter v. Department of Human Resources, 118 N.C. App. 564, 455 S.E.2d 901 (1995).

Record Properly Amended - Trial court properly amended the record and allowed a virtual charter school application into the record where the application was related to the actions of the State Board of Education with respect to that application, and nothing in the trial court's findings indicated that the admission of the application was erroneous or prejudicial to the applicant. N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v. N.C. Learns, Inc., 231 N.C. App. 270, 751 S.E.2d 625 (2013).

Applied in Save Our Rivers, Inc. v. Town of Highlands, 341 N.C. 635, 461 S.E.2d 333 (1995).

Cited in Harding v. North Carolina Dep't of Cor., 334 N.C. 414, 432 S.E.2d 298 (1993); Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs. & Div. of Med. Assistance of the N.C. HHS, 364 N.C. 61, 692 S.E.2d 96 (Apr. 15, 2010); Dare County v. N.C. Dep't of Ins., 207 N.C. App. 600, 701 S.E.2d 368 (2010); Mills v. N.C. HHS, 251 N.C. App. 182, 794 S.E.2d 566 (2016).


§ 150B-50. Review by superior court without jury.

The review by a superior court of administrative decisions under this Chapter shall be conducted by the court without a jury.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1983, c. 919, s. 2; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1987, c. 878, s. 18; 2011-398, s. 26.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 62, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 63, as amended by Session Laws 2012-187, s. 8.1, provides in relevant part: "Sections 15 through 55 of this act become effective January 1, 2012, and apply to contested cases commenced on or after that date. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.2 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 of this act become effective when the United States Environmental Protection Agency approvals referenced in Section 55.2 have been issued or October 1, 2012, whichever occurs first. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.1 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 and Sections 32 and 33 of this act become effective when the waiver referenced in Section 55.1 has been granted or February 1, 2013, whichever occurs first. Unless otherwise provided elsewhere in this act, the remainder of this act is effective when it becomes law." For Section 55.2, see editor's note under G.S. 150B-34.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 26, substituted "administrative" for "agency." For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "A Powerless Judiciary? The North Carolina Courts' Perceptions of Review of Administrative Action," see 12 N.C. Cent. L.J. 21 (1980).

For survey of 1980 property law, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1209 (1981).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A.

Judge Not Subject to Rule 52(a) Requirements. - When the judge of the superior court sits as an appellate court to review the decision of an administrative agency pursuant to former G.S. 150B-50 he is not required to make findings of fact and enter a judgment thereon in the same sense as is a trial judge pursuant to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 52(a). In re Arcadia Dairy Farms, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 459, 259 S.E.2d 368 (1979), appeal dismissed, 299 N.C. 545, 265 S.E.2d 403 (1980).

Appellate Review of Local Government Actions. - Although this section of the Act provides review only for agency decisions and local units of government are not within the definition of agencies in G.S. 150B-2(1), the principles embodied in the Act "are highly pertinent" to appellate review of local government actions. Vulcan Materials Co. v. Guilford County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 115 N.C. App. 319, 444 S.E.2d 639, cert. denied, 337 N.C. 807, 449 S.E.2d 758 (1994).

Review of Order of Real Estate Licensing Board. - Under G.S. 93A-6, review of an order of the Real Estate Licensing Board suspending or revoking a license is de novo in the superior court in all cases, and former article corresponding to Article 4 of former Chapter 150A did not apply, regardless of whether or not the Board has made a record of its proceedings. In re Dillingham, 257 N.C. 684, 127 S.E.2d 584 (1962).

Standard on Review of City's Special Zoning Request Decisions. - Although the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act provides judicial review only for agency decisions and exempts cities and other local municipalities, a similar standard of review is appropriate to review city council special zoning request decisions. Jennewein v. City Council, 62 N.C. App. 89, 302 S.E.2d 7, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 461, 307 S.E.2d 365 (1983).

Improper Dismissal of Judicial Review Petition. - Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision to uphold permits for the use of coal combustion residual as structural fill at open pit mines was reversed because: (1) the ALJ erred in sua sponte converting a motion for summary judgment into a motion for involuntary dismissal and granting the same, as the ALJ had no such authority, and (2) issues raised by environmental groups required distinctly different reviews of the evidence under the whole record standard and of issues of law under the de novo standard, but it was unclear what standards the trial court applied, as the court reweighed the evidence and rewrote the ALJ's decision without explanation. EnvironmentaLEE v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 258 N.C. App. 590, 813 S.E.2d 673 (2018).

Cited in Huang v. North Carolina State Univ., 107 N.C. App. 710, 421 S.E.2d 812 (1992); McHugh v. North Carolina Dep't of Envtl., Health & Natural Resources, 126 N.C. App. 469, 485 S.E.2d 861 (1997); Peace v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 349 N.C. 315, 507 S.E.2d 272 (1998); In re Lustgarten, 177 N.C. App. 663, 629 S.E.2d 886 (2006); Dare County v. N.C. Dep't of Ins., 207 N.C. App. 600, 701 S.E.2d 368 (2010).


§ 150B-51. Scope and standard of review.

  1. ,  (a1) Repealed by Sessions Laws, 2011-398, s. 27. For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.
  2. The court reviewing a final decision may affirm the decision or remand the case for further proceedings. It may also reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
    1. In violation of constitutional provisions;
    2. In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency or administrative law judge;
    3. Made upon unlawful procedure;
    4. Affected by other error of law;
    5. Unsupported by substantial evidence admissible under G.S. 150B-29(a), 150B-30, or 150B-31 in view of the entire record as submitted; or
    6. Arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
  3. In reviewing a final decision in a contested case, the court shall determine whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief sought in the petition based upon its review of the final decision and the official record. With regard to asserted errors pursuant to subdivisions (1) through (4) of subsection (b) of this section, the court shall conduct its review of the final decision using the de novo standard of review. With regard to asserted errors pursuant to subdivisions (5) and (6) of subsection (b) of this section, the court shall conduct its review of the final decision using the whole record standard of review.
  4. In reviewing a final decision allowing judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the court may enter any order allowed by G.S. 1A-1, Rule 12(c) or Rule 56. If the order of the court does not fully adjudicate the case, the court shall remand the case to the administrative law judge for such further proceedings as are just.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1983, c. 919, s. 4; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1987, c. 878, s. 19; 2000-140, s. 94.1; 2000-190, s. 11; 2011-398, s. 27.)

Local Modification. - City of Durham: 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994) c. 658, s. 1.2.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 62, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2011-398, s. 63, as amended by Session Laws 2012-187, s. 8.1, provides in relevant part: "Sections 15 through 55 of this act become effective January 1, 2012, and apply to contested cases commenced on or after that date. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.2 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 of this act become effective when the United States Environmental Protection Agency approvals referenced in Section 55.2 have been issued or October 1, 2012, whichever occurs first. With regard to contested cases affected by Section 55.1 of this act, the provisions of Sections 15 through 27 and Sections 32 and 33 of this act become effective when the waiver referenced in Section 55.1 has been granted or February 1, 2013, whichever occurs first. Unless otherwise provided elsewhere in this act, the remainder of this act is effective when it becomes law." For Section 55.2, see editor's note under G.S. 150B-34.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-398, s. 27, rewrote the section. For effective date and applicability, see editor's note.

Legal Periodicals. - For comment, "The Problem of Procedural Delay in Contested Case Hearings . . ." under the North Carolina APA, see 7 N.C. Cent. L.J. 347 (1976).

For survey of 1979 tax law, see 58 N.C.L. Rev. 1548 (1980).

For article, "A Powerless Judiciary? The North Carolina Courts' Perceptions of Review of Administrative Action," see 12 N.C. Cent. L.J. 21 (1980).

For survey of 1981 administrative law, see 60 N.C.L. Rev. 1165 (1982).

For article, "What Were We Thinking?: Legislative Intent and the 2000 Amendments to the North Carolina APA," see 79 N.C.L. Rev. 1657 (2001).

For article, "Negotiating the Federal Government's Compliance with Court Orders: An Initial Exploration," see 97 N.C.L. Rev. 899 (2019).

CASE NOTES

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A and earlier statutes, or under this Chapter prior to the 1991 amendments thereto.

The 2003 version of G.S. 150B-34(c), which excluded the Certificate of Need Act, G.S. 131E-175 et seq., from the requirements of G.S. 150B-36(b), (b1), (b2), (b3), and (d) and G.S. 150B-51, left the scope and standard of review applied under the 1999 version of G.S. 150B-51 undisturbed. Mooresville Hosp. Mgmt. Assocs. v. N.C. HHS, Div. of Facility Servs., 169 N.C. App. 641, 611 S.E.2d 431 (2005).

The precise scope of review by the Court of Appeals is contained in this section. Dockery v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 120 N.C. App. 827, 463 S.E.2d 580 (1995).

Reasons for Not Adopting Decision. - If the State Board of Elections determines that it will not adopt the recommended decision of a county board, it should include in its order specific reasons for such decision. In re Ramseur, 120 N.C. App. 521, 463 S.E.2d 254 (1995).

Unacceptable Personal Conduct by Employee. - Summary judgment for a state agency employer in an employee's petition for review of his demotion was proper where the conduct admitted by the employee constituted "unacceptable personal conduct," and the State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] determined that its regulations and work rules did not contain any qualification or exception for the explanations asserted by the employee. Hilliard v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 173 N.C. App. 594, 620 S.E.2d 14 (2005).

In a case in which a tenured professor appealed a superior court's affirmation of the administrative decision to terminate him, he argued unsuccessfully that the superior court erred in holding that the record contained substantial evidence to support his discharge for incompetence. The professor relied on his argument that lack of collegiality could not constitute incompetence; however, he cited no authority that disruptive behavior could not constitute incompetence. Bernold v. Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C. 200 N.C. App. 295, 683 S.E.2d 428 (2009).

State employee was improperly dismissed under 25 N.C. Admin. Code 1J.0608 for tax errors because: (1) the regulation allowed dismissals for a current incident of unacceptable conduct, and, (2) when the employee was dismissed 19 months after the employee's errors were discovered, the errors were no longer "current." Renfrow v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue, 245 N.C. App. 443, 782 S.E.2d 379 (2016).

Chapter Not Applicable to Decisions of Municipalities and Town Boards. - The current general administrative agencies review statutes are expressly not applicable to the decisions of town boards. Former Chapter 150A provides judicial review only for agency decisions, from which the decisions of local municipalities are expressly exempt. Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 299 N.C. 620, 265 S.E.2d 379, rehearing denied, 300 N.C. 562, 270 S.E.2d 106 (1980).

Principles of Former G.S. 150A-51 Are Pertinent. - While former G.S. 150A-51 is not directly applicable to reviews of town board zoning decisions, the principles it embodies are highly pertinent. Coastal Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 299 N.C. 620, 265 S.E.2d 379, rehearing denied, 300 N.C. 562, 270 S.E.2d 106 (1980).

Review of Discretionary Agency Decisions. - Former Chapter 150A does not preclude judicial review of agency decisions which are discretionary. High Rock Lake Ass'n v. North Carolina Envtl. Mgt. Comm'n, 51 N.C. App. 275, 276 S.E.2d 472 (1981).

Superior Court Review of Agency Decision. - In its role as an appellate court, the superior court reviews the agency's decision, but is not allowed to replace the agency's judgment with its own when there are two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court could have reached a different result upon de novo review. Rector v. North Carolina Sheriffs' Educ. & Training Stds. Comm'n, 103 N.C. App. 527, 406 S.E.2d 613 (1991).

Trial court properly applied the substantial evidence test in reviewing an administrative law judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law; the trial court also properly employed a de novo review of the question of the application of G.S. 150B-44. Teague v. N.C. DOT, 177 N.C. App. 215, 628 S.E.2d 395 (2006), cert. denied, 362 N.C. 373, 662 S.E.2d 395 (2008), cert. dismissed, mandamus dism'd, - N.C. - , 677 S.E.2d 842 (2009), cert. denied, 722 S.E.2d 602, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 381 (2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 444, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 7842, 184 L. Ed. 2d 271 (U.S. 2012).

Trial court's finding that it was permitted to give appropriate weight to an agency's demonstrated expertise and consistency in applying various statutes was proper because, under G.S. 150B-51(c), the agency's consistently applied interpretation of the law should have been accorded the same deference it was entitled to under prior law. Rainey v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Instruction, 361 N.C. 679, 652 S.E.2d 251 (2007).

While a superior court, as part of its de novo review under G.S. 150B-51(c) of a state board of education decision to deny petitioner a salary increase under G.S. 115C-296.2(b), was entitled to defer to the board's expertise, petitioner was entitled to the salary increase on the merits. Rainey v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Instruction, 193 N.C. App. 243, 667 S.E.2d 237 (2008), review denied, 363 N.C. 130, 673 S.E.2d 361 (2009).

Consistent with G.S. 150B-51(c) of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, G.S. 150B-1 through 150B-52, a trial court is permitted to make its own findings of fact, even though neither party objected to the findings of the agency. Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 193 N.C. App. 350, 668 S.E.2d 571 (2008), rev'd 364 N.C. 61, 692 S.E.2d 96 N.C. LEXIS 343 (2010).

Trial court did not err in reversing an administrative law judge's decision that a corporation's decertification as a provider of HIV case management services by the AIDS Care Unit at respondent North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Public Health, (DHHS) was unjustified because the trial court properly applied the standard of review from G.S. 150B-51(c), and substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings of fact that the violations found at the corporation were systemic, and DHHS was justified in not allowing corrective action. Bradley-Reid Corp. v. N.C. HHS, 201 N.C. App. 305, 689 S.E.2d 494 (2009).

Reviewing court properly conducted a de novo review of the record and made independent findings as required by G.S. 150B-51(c), even though it adopted an administrative law judge's findings, as it stated that it had given no deference to any prior decision in the case, and had reviewed and considered the official record de novo. McCrann v. N.C. HHS, 209 N.C. App. 241, 704 S.E.2d 899, review denied 365 N.C. 198, 710 S.E.2d 23, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 436 (2011).

Trial court erred in reversing the North Carolina Highway Patrol's decision to terminate a sergeant's employment because the trial court did not make adequate findings of fact, in accordance with G.S. 150B-51(c), and there was a conflict between the administrative law judge's findings of fact, which stated the Patrol failed to establish the sergeant drove a Patrol vehicle with any alcohol in his system, and the trial court's findings of fact, which stated the sergeant consumed some amount of alcohol prior to driving; the dismissal was based on the Patrol's determination that the sergeant had engaged in unacceptable personal conduct. Warren v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 221 N.C. App. 376, 726 S.E.2d 920 (2012), review dismissed, as moot, 734 S.E.2d 867, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 1064 (N.C. 2012).

Trial court applied the proper standard of review when it affirmed the North Carolina Department of State Treasurer's decision to deny a corporation's request for a declaratory ruling and dismissing its petition for judicial review because the trial court properly applied a de novo standard of review to the issue of whether the reasons given by the State Treasurer constituted good cause to decline to issue a ruling. Equity Solutions of the Carolinas, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of State Treasurer, 232 N.C. App. 384, 754 S.E.2d 243 (2014).

Scope of Appellate Review. - In an action arising from allegations of age discrimination, while the superior court properly applied both a de novo review and the whole-record test to the respective issues on appeal under G.S. 150B-51(b) when it reviewed the final decision of the State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] (SPC), it erred when it improperly substituted its judgment for that of the SPC under the whole-record test. Thus, remand was ordered for the superior court to affirm the SPC's final agency decision. Trotter v. N.C. HHS, 189 N.C. App. 655, 659 S.E.2d 749 (2008).

Review of Agency Decisions. - Under G.S. 150B-36(b), a final agency decision in a contested case hearing must be based on the official record prepared pursuant to G.S. 150B-37l; the agency is not permitted to hear new evidence, and if it does so, the trial court on review is required to reverse or remand the agency decision. Everhart & Assocs. v. Department of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 127 N.C. App. 693, 493 S.E.2d 66 (1997), cert. denied, 347 N.C. 575, 502 S.E.2d 590 (1998).

Pursuant to G.S. 150B-51(b), in reviewing a final agency decision, a court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand a case for further proceedings. It may also reverse or modify the agency's decision if substantial rights of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) in violation of constitutional provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or (6) arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Sack v. N.C. State Univ., 155 N.C. App. 484, 574 S.E.2d 120 (2002).

Where a petitioner contends an agency's decision was based on an error of law, de novo review by the trial court is proper; in turn, an appellate court examines a trial court's order regarding an agency decision for errors of law. Powell v. N.C. Crim. Justice Educ. & Training Stds. Comm'n, 165 N.C. App. 848, 600 S.E.2d 56 (2004).

In reviewing the imposition of a five-year suspension by a state police officer certification agency, a trial court erroneously applied the standard under G.S. 150B-51(b) because the agency's decision had been a summary judgment ruling, which under G.S. 150B-51(d) required application of the summary judgment standard, and the officer's evidence raised genuine issues of material fact regarding the claims concerning his suspension. Krueger v. N.C. Crim. Justice Educ. & Training Stds. Comm'n, 198 N.C. App. 569, 680 S.E.2d 216 (2009).

Trial court failed to apply the correct standard of review in reviewing the decision of the Tax Review Board, which overruled the final decision of the Assistant Secretary of Review that a taxpayer's business was ineligible for credits under the William S. Lee Quality Jobs and Expansion Act because the trial court's findings of fact ranged far beyond the findings made by the Assistant Secretary and addressed new information that did not appear to have provided any part of the basis for the Assistant Secretary's decision; the additional findings of fact made by the trial court had a definite effect on the trial court's decision. N.C. Dep't of Revenue v. Bill Davis Racing, 201 N.C. App. 35, 684 S.E.2d 914 (2009).

State hearing officer did not explain with any degree of specificity the processes used to conclude that the claimant was able to engage in light work; the decision lacked the detailed analysis necessary for meaningful appellate review, and on remand the agency was to provide a narrative discussion of whether the claimant's limitations would prevent her from performing the full range of light work. Mills v. N.C. HHS, 251 N.C. App. 182, 794 S.E.2d 566 (2016).

Administrative law judge properly approved the issuance of a certificate of need by the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Health Service Regulation, Healthcare Planning and Certificate of Need Section, because substantial evidence supported the finding that the application conformed with statutory criteria regarding the host site requirement and the reasonableness and adequacy of the applicant's projections. Furthermore, a purported rescission letter by a host site was not an amendment to the application. Mobile Imaging Partners of N.C. LLC v. N.C. HHS, - N.C. App. - , 862 S.E.2d 217 (July 6, 2021).

Nature of Error Dictates Manner of Review. - The nature of the error asserted by the party seeking review dictates the appropriate manner of review, so that if the appellant contends the agency's decision was affected by a legal error, de novo review is required, whereas if he contends the decision was not supported by the evidence or was arbitrary or capricious the whole record test is used. Dillingham v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 132 N.C. App. 704, 513 S.E.2d 823 (1999).

Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision to uphold permits for the use of coal combustion residual as structural fill at open pit mines was reversed because: (1) the ALJ erred in sua sponte converting a motion for summary judgment into a motion for involuntary dismissal and granting the same, as the ALJ had no such authority, and (2) issues raised by environmental groups required distinctly different reviews of the evidence under the whole record standard and of issues of law under the de novo standard, but it was unclear what standards the trial court applied, as the court reweighed the evidence and rewrote the ALJ's decision without explanation. EnvironmentaLEE v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 258 N.C. App. 590, 813 S.E.2d 673 (2018).

Affected by Error of Law. - Petitioner was dismissed from the North Carolina State Highway Patrol for alleged violations of the Patrol's truthfulness policy, but because the colonel did not understand that he had discretion to consider the full range of potential discipline, his decision was affected by an error of law; under the flexible definition of just cause, the colonel had discretion in dismissing an employee for violating the policy, and while dismissal may be reasonable for dishonest conduct, the better practice would be to allow for a range of disciplinary actions in response to an individual act of untruthfulness, rather than a categorical approach. Wetherington v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 368 N.C. 583, 780 S.E.2d 543 (2015).

Administrative agency decisions may be reversed as arbitrary or capricious if they are patently in bad faith, or whimsical in the sense that they indicate a lack of fair and careful consideration or fail to indicate any course of reasoning and the exercise of judgment. Rector v. North Carolina Sheriffs' Educ. & Training Stds. Comm'n, 103 N.C. App. 527, 406 S.E.2d 613 (1991).

Constitutional Review Not Contemplated Absent Assertion of Constitutional Violations. - Former G.S. 58-9.6(b)(1) (now G.S. 58-2-90(b)(1)) and subdivision (1) of former G.S. 150A-51 do not contemplate constitutional review where appellants, rate bureau and member companies, made no assertion that their rights were prejudiced because any of the findings or conclusions of the Commissioner of Insurance were in violation of any constitutional provisions. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547, rehearing denied, 301 N.C. 107, 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980), overruled on other grounds, In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 132 (2017).

The superior court misperceived the proper scope of its review where the record nowhere demonstrated petitioners raised any constitutional issues in a manner requiring the superior court to pass on the constitutional validity of any assessment under G.S. 113A-64. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 92 N.C. App. 1, 373 S.E.2d 572 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).

Appellate Review of Improper Constitutional Consideration. - Although the trial court improperly considered a constitutional issue, where that court vacated the Department of Natural Resources and Community Development's (now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources) assessment based on an interpretation of N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 3, which the department properly challenged on appeal, the Court of Appeals would address that constitutional ground in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 92 N.C. App. 1, 373 S.E.2d 572 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).

Official Acts Presumed to Be Made Lawfully and in Good Faith. - The members of the State Board of Assessment (now the Property Tax Commission) are public officers, and the Board's official acts are presumed to be made in good faith and in accordance with law; the burden is upon the party asserting otherwise to overcome such presumptions by competent evidence to the contrary. Albemarle Elec. Membership Corp. v. Alexander, 282 N.C. 402, 192 S.E.2d 811 (1972).

There is a rebuttable presumption that an administrative agency has properly performed its official duties, and while arbitrary and capricious agency action is itself prohibited by federal and state due process, any assertion of arbitrary agency action does not necessarily require the agency's action be reviewed for compliance with every other requirement under the state and federal Constitutions. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 92 N.C. App. 1, 373 S.E.2d 572 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).

In an action regarding the termination of state employment, G.S. 150B-51(b) authorized the trial court to reverse or modify an administrative agency's decision dismissing the employee's appeal if her substantial rights may have been prejudiced, because the agency's decision was (1) in violation of constitutional provisions, (2) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency, (3) made upon unlawful procedure, (4) affected by other error of law, (5) unsupported by substantial evidence admissible under G.S. 150B-29(a), 150B-30, or 150B-21 in view of the entire record as submitted, or (6) arbitrary or capricious. Woodburn v. N.C. State Univ., 156 N.C. App. 549, 577 S.E.2d 154, cert. denied, 357 N.C. 470, 584 S.E.2d 296 (2003).

Authority of Judge on Review. - The authority of the judge when reviewing the actions of administrative agencies is limited to affirming, modifying, reversing or remanding the decision of the agency. Faulkner v. North Carolina State Hearing Aid Dealers & Fitters Bd., 38 N.C. App. 222, 247 S.E.2d 668 (1978).

Under former Chapter 150A, a reviewing court's power to affirm the decision of the agency and to remand for further proceedings is not circumscribed. Harrell v. Wilson County Schools, 58 N.C. App. 260, 293 S.E.2d 687 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012, 103 S. Ct. 1251, 75 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1983).

It is unnecessary for a trial judge who reviews administrative action under former G.S. 150A-51 to explain the reasons for his decision to affirm such action. Area Mental Health v. Speed, 69 N.C. App. 247, 317 S.E.2d 22, cert. denied, 312 N.C. 81, 321 S.E.2d 893 (1984).

Standards for Judicial Review. - The standards for judicial review set forth in this section, the whole record test, govern appeals from decisions of city or county boards of education. Warren v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 104 N.C. App. 522, 410 S.E.2d 232 (1991).

Final sentence of G.S. 150B-34(c) exempts certificate of need proceedings from the newly amended portions of G.S. 150B-51 and requires an appellate court to review those decisions under the previous version of G.S. 150B-51. Total Renal Care of N.C. LLC v. N.C. HHS, 171 N.C. App. 734, 615 S.E.2d 81 (2005).

Because a reinstated employee's petition for judicial review of the final decision by the North Carolina State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] alleged errors of law, the appropriate standard of review for the superior court under G.S. 150B-51(b) was de novo. Early v. County of Durham, Dep't of Soc. Servs., 193 N.C. App. 334, 667 S.E.2d 512 (2008), review denied, 363 N.C. 372, 678 S.E.2d 237 (2009).

Standards for Judicial Review Must Be Clearly Applied. - A case involving the denial of Rehabilitation Act benefits under P.L. 102-569, 42 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. as amended, was remanded to the trial court so it could: (1) advance its own characterization of the issues presented by petitioner; and (2) clearly delineate the standards of review, detailing the standards used to resolve each distinct issue raised. Hedgepeth v. North Carolina Div. of Servs. for the Blind, 142 N.C. App. 338, 543 S.E.2d 169 (2001).

Trial Court Applied Correct Standard of Review. - Trial court's judgment reversing a decision of the state personnel commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] was affirmed where the trial court applied the correct standard of review in determining that a state employee had not been demoted for just cause. Lewis v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 153 N.C. App. 449, 570 S.E.2d 231 (2002), aff'd, 357 N.C. 246, 580 S.E.2d 694 (2003).

When a licensee sought administrative review under G.S. 150B-51(b) of an agency's decision to fine him for violations of underground storage tank regulations, he properly bore the burden of proving he was entitled to relief, as he initiated the proceeding. Overcash v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 179 N.C. App. 697, 635 S.E.2d 442 (2006), review denied, 361 N.C. 220, 642 S.E.2d 445 (2007).

Trial court appropriately applied de novo review to the North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission's first variance factor determination because the only issue was whether the manager of a homeowners' association suffered unnecessary hardships; the trial court appropriately applied the whole record test to determine whether the facts were supported by substantial evidence and de novo review to the Commission's legal determinations under Coastal Area Management Act's statutory framework. Riggings Homeowners, Inc. v. Coastal Res. Comm'n of N.C. 228 N.C. App. 630, 747 S.E.2d 301 (2013).

Statement of Mandatory Standard of Review Not Required. - Although an agency contended that a trial court's failure to state the standard of review which the trial court applied to its review of an agency decision precluded meaningful appellate review, the agency decision rejected an administrative law judge's decision and thus, under G.S. 150B-51(c), de novo review was mandatory and the trial court was not required to state the standard. Cape Med. Transp., Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 162 N.C. App. 14, 590 S.E.2d 8 (2004).

Review of Statutory Interpretation. - As incorrect statutory interpretation by an agency constitutes an error of law under subdivision (b)(4), when the issue on appeal is whether the state agency erred in interpreting a statutory term, an appellate court may substitute its own judgment for that of the agency and employ de novo review. Friends of Hatteras Island Nat'l Historic Maritime Forest Land Trust for Preservation, Inc. v. Coastal Resources Comm'n, 117 N.C. App. 556, 452 S.E.2d 337 (1995).

Because the interpretation of the Department of Health and Human Services of similar proposals within the same service area was reasonable, and a permissible construction of the statute, the court of appeals was required to defer to it. Total Renal Care of N.C. LLC v. North Carolina HHS, 242 N.C. App. 666, 776 S.E.2d 322 (2015).

This Section Distinguished from Review Pursuant to G.S. 150B-52. - When an appellate court reviews the decision of a lower court (as opposed to when it reviews an administrative agency's decision on direct appeal), the scope of review to be applied under G.S. 150B-52 is the same as it is for other civil cases. Henderson v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 91 N.C. App. 527, 372 S.E.2d 887 (1988).

Unlawful Delegation of Power to Make Final Decision. - Where the Commissioner of Insurance delegated to his appointed hearing officer the power to make the final agency decision, the Commissioner made an unlawful delegation of his powers. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 61 N.C. App. 262, 300 S.E.2d 586, cert. denied, 308 N.C. 548, 304 S.E.2d 242 (1983).

Application in Insurance Ratemaking Cases. - While former G.S. 150A-51 is the controlling judicial review statute in insurance ratemaking cases, to the extent that former G.S. 58-9.6(b) (now G.S. 58-2-90(b)) adds to the judicial review function, and in light of the virtually identical thrust of the two statutes, the Supreme Court would apply the review standards of both former G.S. 58-9.6 (now G.S. 58-2-90) and former G.S. 150A-51, where such standards could be construed as being consistent with each other. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547, rehearing denied, 301 N.C. 107, 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980), overruled on other grounds, In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 132 (2017).

Since the scope of review provided in Article 4 of former Chapter 150A is substantially broader than that provided by former G.S. 58-9.3 (now G.S. 58-2-75), the scope of judicial review applicable to a denial by the Commissioner of Insurance of a plan by a domestic insurance company to reorganize under a holding company structure was that provided for in Article 4. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 34 N.C. App. 619, 240 S.E.2d 460 (1977).

Along with Former G.S. 58-9 Through 58-27 (Now G.S. 58-2-40 Through 58-2-200) Insofar as Compatible. - While former Chapter 150A controls judicial review of insurance ratemaking procedures, the review provisions of former G.S. 58-9 through 58-27 (now G.S. 58-2-40 through 58-2-200) should also apply insofar as those provisions are compatible with the act. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 460, 269 S.E.2d 538 (1980).

Application of Review Standards in This Section and G.S. 58-2-75. - Although G.S. 58-2-75 and this section are comparable, this section is the controlling judicial review statute; however, to the extent that G.S. 58-2-75 added to and was consistent with the judicial review function of this section, the court would apply the review standards articulated in both statutes. North Carolina Reinsurance Facility v. Long, 98 N.C. App. 41, 390 S.E.2d 176 (1990).

When De Novo Review Permissible. - When the issue on appeal is whether a state agency erred in interpreting a statutory term, an appellate court may freely substitute its judgment for that of the agency and employ de novo review. Brooks v. Rebarco, Inc., 91 N.C. App. 459, 372 S.E.2d 342 (1988).

Although the interpretation of a statute by an agency created to administer that statute is traditionally accorded some deference by appellate courts, those interpretations are not binding. Bashford v. North Carolina Licensing Bd., 107 N.C. App. 462, 420 S.E.2d 466 (1992).

When a petitioner alleges that an agency violated his constitutional rights, the Supreme Court will undertake de novo review. Meads v. North Carolina Dep't of Agric., 349 N.C. 656, 509 S.E.2d 165 (1998).

Because appellees alleged in their petition for judicial review that appellants erroneously construed State and federal law regarding the relation between Medicare and Medicaid, the court would review the matter de novo and was free to substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency. Duke Univ. Medical Ctr. v. Bruton, 134 N.C. App. 39, 516 S.E.2d 633 (1999).

Superior Court properly exercised de novo review in examining the substantive issues raised by an appeal of the superior court's reversal of a final agency decision. County of Wake v. N.C. Dep't of Env't, 155 N.C. App. 225, 573 S.E.2d 572 (2002), cert. dismissed, 357 N.C. 62, 579 S.E.2d 387 (2003).

Only in contested cases commenced on or after 1 January 2001, where the agency fails to adopt the ALJ's initial decision, does G.S. 150B-51(c) require a reviewing court to engage in independent fact-finding; otherwise, where the findings of fact of an administrative agency are supported by substantial competent evidence in view of the entire record, they are binding on a reviewing court, and the reviewing court lacks authority on de novo review to make alternative findings at variance with the agency's decision. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 599 S.E.2d 888 (2004).

Judicial review of a North Carolina Psychology Board decision to place a psychological associate's license on probation, under G.S. 90-270.4(g), was de novo as the case concerned the Psychology Board's authority under G.S. 90-270.4(g); further, the psychological assistant, who maintained both a licensed psychological associate's practice and a licensed professional counselor's practice, could continue his licensed professional counselor's practice without interference from the Psychology Board pursuant to G.S. 90-332.1(c) as long as he remained a qualified licensed professional counselor and did not promote that practice by holding himself out as a licensed psychological associate. Trayford v. N.C. Psychology Bd., 174 N.C. App. 118, 619 S.E.2d 862 (2005), aff'd, 360 N.C. 396, 627 S.E.2d 462 (2006).

De Novo Review Permits New Findings of Fact. - Under G.S. 150B-51(c), a trial court is permitted to make its own findings of fact, even though neither party objects to the administrative findings. Cape Med. Transp., Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 162 N.C. App. 14, 590 S.E.2d 8 (2004).

This section, as recodified in 1985, and prior to its amendment in 1987, did not require the reviewing court to set out its reasons for reversal or modification, unlike under former G.S. 150A-51, which required the reviewing court to set out written reasons only when reversing or modifying an agency decision. Shepherd v. Consolidated Judicial Retirement Sys., 89 N.C. App. 560, 366 S.E.2d 604 (1988).

Appellate Court Review Not Limited to Superior Court's Findings and Conclusions. - Appellate court's review is limited to assignments of error to the superior court's order, but is not required to accord any particular deference to the superior court's findings and conclusions concerning the Commission's actions. Watson v. North Carolina Real Estate Comm'n, 87 N.C. App. 637, 362 S.E.2d 294 (1987), cert. denied, 321 N.C. 746, 365 S.E.2d 296 (1988).

Court of Appeals merely determines whether an administrative decision has a rational basis in the evidence. North Carolina Dep't of Cor. v. Hodge, 99 N.C. App. 602, 394 S.E.2d 285 (1990).

Reasons for Not Adopting Recommendations. - Subsection (a) did not entitle petitioner to a review of whether the specific reasons the State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] did not adopt the recommended decision were correct; only that they be stated. Oates v. North Carolina Dep't of Cor., 114 N.C. App. 597, 442 S.E.2d 542 (1994).

Review by Court of Appeals. - Court of Appeal's review of trial court's consideration of final agency decision is to determine whether trial court failed to properly apply review standard articulated in this section. Review is further limited to exceptions and assignments of error set forth to order of superior court. Walker v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 100 N.C. App. 498, 397 S.E.2d 350 (1990), cert. denied, 328 N.C. 98, 402 S.E.2d 430 (1991).

Generally, review by Court of Appeals is limited by properly presented assignments of error and exceptions. North Carolina Dep't of Cor. v. Hodge, 99 N.C. App. 602, 394 S.E.2d 285 (1990).

The scope of review applied by an appellate court when reviewing a decision of a lower court is the same as in other civil cases. Thus, the appellate court's review is limited to determining whether the superior court committed any errors of law. Crowell Constructors, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 107 N.C. App. 716, 421 S.E.2d 612 (1992), cert. denied, 333 N.C. 343, 426 S.E.2d 704 (1993).

The standard of review for an appellate court upon an appeal from an order of the superior court affirming or reversing an administrative agency decision is the same standard of review as that employed by the superior court. Dorsey v. UNC-Wilmington, 122 N.C. App. 58, 468 S.E.2d 557 (1996).

Appellate court remanded the trial court's judgment that the Director of the North Carolina Division of Water Quality acted lawfully when he excluded certain wood chip mills from coverage under a storm water general permit because the record did not show that the trial court applied the proper standard of review. N.C. Forestry Ass'n v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 162 N.C. App. 467, 591 S.E.2d 549 (2004).

Standards of Review Contrasted. - Proper standard to be applied on appeal depends on the issues presented. If it is alleged that the agency's decision was based on an error of law, then de novo review is required. Review of whether an agency decision is supported by evidence, or is arbitrary or capricious, requires the court to employ the whole record test. Walker v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 100 N.C. App. 498, 397 S.E.2d 350 (1990), cert. denied, 328 N.C. 98, 402 S.E.2d 430 (1991).

Inadequate Notice. - Agency decision dismissing a state employee was reversed where the reviewing court found that notice given to the employee did not provide her with adequate notice of the reasons for her dismissal. Owen v. UNC-G Physical Plant, 121 N.C. App. 682, 468 S.E.2d 813, discretionary review improvidently allowed, 344 N.C. 73, 477 S.E.2d 33 (1996).

Procedural safeguards within G.S. 126-35(a) serve as a prophylactic protection against summary dismissal of state employees based on inadequate notice. Owen v. UNC-G Physical Plant, 121 N.C. App. 682, 468 S.E.2d 813, discretionary review improvidently allowed, 344 N.C. 73, 477 S.E.2d 33 (1996).

The statute does not require a point-by-point refutation of the Administrative Law Judge's findings and conclusions. Webb v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, Coastal Resources Comm'n, 102 N.C. App. 767, 404 S.E.2d 29 (1991).

Where the commission's findings discussed the flawed premises of the recommended decision of the Administrative Law Judge, those findings were adequate, quite specific indeed, and went to the heart of the case. Webb v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, Coastal Resources Comm'n, 102 N.C. App. 767, 404 S.E.2d 29 (1991).

Remand Required for Insufficiency of Findings Under Former G.S. 150A-36. - Where, on review of an order of a state commission permitting petitioner savings and loan association to open a branch office, the trial court determined that the commission's findings were insufficient in that they lacked the specificity required by former G.S. 150A-36, the trial court should never have reached the question of whether reversal under subdivision (5) of former G.S. 150A-51 was appropriate, as remand for further findings was essential upon concluding that the findings of record presented an inadequate basis for review. Under no applicable theory of law would it be appropriate for the trial court to reverse the commission and substitute its judgment for the commission's. Community Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. North Carolina Sav. & Loan Comm'n, 43 N.C. App. 493, 259 S.E.2d 373 (1979).

Findings of Fact Binding Where Respondent Failed to Object. - Respondent did not object to adopted findings of fact at superior court level. Findings of fact were binding, therefore, at that appellate level, and binding for purposes of review by the Court of Appeals. Walker v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 100 N.C. App. 498, 397 S.E.2d 350 (1990), cert. denied, 328 N.C. 98, 402 S.E.2d 430 (1991).

Review of Decisions of Boards of Education. - The appropriate standard of judicial review for reviewing administrative decisions of boards of education is set forth in former G.S. 150A-51. Faulkner v. New Bern-Craven County Bd. of Educ., 65 N.C. App. 483, 309 S.E.2d 548 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 311 N.C. 42, 316 S.E.2d 281 (1984).

When a school superintendent recommended to a school board that a probationary teacher's contract, which had expired, not be renewed, and the board adopted that recommendation, a court could reverse or modify that decision only if the teacher's substantial rights might have been prejudiced because the board's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions were: (1) in violation of constitutional provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence admissible under G.S. 150B-29(a), G.S. 150B-30, or G.S. 150B-31 in view of the entire record as submitted; or (6) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion because judicial review of that decision was governed by G.S. 150B-51. Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 185 N.C. App. 566, 649 S.E.2d 410 (2007), cert. denied, 362 N.C. 360, 661 S.E.2d 735 (2008).

Applicable standard of judicial review for an appeal of a school board decision is set forth in former G.S. 150A-51. Goodwin v. Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ., 67 N.C. App. 243, 312 S.E.2d 892, cert. denied, 311 N.C. 304, 317 S.E.2d 680 (1984).

The standards for judicial review set forth in former G.S. 150A-51 are applicable to appeals from school boards to the courts, since no other statute provides guidance for judicial review of school board decisions and in the interest of uniformity in reviewing administrative board decisions. Faulkner v. New Bern-Craven County Bd. of Educ., 311 N.C. 42, 316 S.E.2d 281 (1984).

While G.S. 150B-2(1) expressly excepts local boards of education from the coverage of the Administrative Procedure Act, nonetheless the standards for judicial review set forth in this section apply to appeals from school boards. Evers v. Pender County Bd. of Educ., 104 N.C. App. 1, 407 S.E.2d 879 (1991), aff'd, 331 N.C. 380, 416 S.E.2d 3 (1992).

Appeal to Superior Court. - A teacher who is denied a promotion under the career ladder program may appeal to the superior court after exhausting his administrative remedies by appealing to the local board of education. Warren v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 104 N.C. App. 522, 410 S.E.2d 232 (1991).

As to review of teacher dismissal proceedings under former G.S. 150A-51 and former G.S. 115-142, see Thompson v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 292 N.C. 406, 233 S.E.2d 538 (1977).

Review of a decision by Commission of Motor Vehicles is governed by former G.S. 150A-51. GMC v. Kinlaw, 78 N.C. App. 521, 338 S.E.2d 114 (1985).

Basis for Review of Personnel Commission Decision. - While respondent's and petitioner's motions for summary judgment in superior court on review of State Personnel Commission's [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] decision were procedurally incorrect, the trial court's order allowing respondent's motion for summary judgment was tantamount to affirming the full Commission's ruling, and sufficiently set forth a reviewable basis for affirming such ruling. Parks v. Department of Human Resources, 79 N.C. App. 125, 338 S.E.2d 826, cert. denied, 316 N.C. 553, 344 S.E.2d 8, 345 S.E.2d 383 (1986).

Review of Discrimination Cases. - In a discrimination case, the appellate court reviews the ALJ's opinion, as adopted without alteration by the State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission], the local appointing authority, and trial court, for errors of law, violations of constitutional provisions, and whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion; all other errors are deemed abandoned. Enoch v. Alamance County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 164 N.C. App. 233, 595 S.E.2d 744 (2004).

Because the Office of Administrative Hearings had jurisdiction to hear an African-American employee's contested case of racial discrimination, the employee met his prima facie burden of discrimination, the trial court applied the appropriate standard of review, and the employee presented sufficient evidence of unequal treatment of an African-American employee compared to a Caucasian employee, and established that the Hatch Act was a pretext for discrimination, a finding of discrimination by an administrative law judge was upheld. Corbett v. N.C. DMV, 190 N.C. App. 113, 660 S.E.2d 233 (2008), review dismissed, as moot, 363 N.C. 124, 675 S.E.2d 40, review denied, 363 N.C. 124, 675 S.E.2d 41 (2009).

Review of Award of Industrial Commission. - In passing upon an appeal from an award of the Industrial Commission, the reviewing court is limited in its inquiry to two questions of law, namely: (1) Whether or not there was any competent evidence before the Commission to support its findings of fact; and (2) Whether or not the findings of fact of the Commission justified its legal conclusions and decision. Waggoner v. North Carolina Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 7 N.C. App. 692, 173 S.E.2d 548 (1970).

Cancellation of Truck Driver School License. - Superior court had jurisdiction pursuant to this section to review order cancelling petitioner's truck driver school license, even though petitioner waived its right to an evidentiary hearing. Charlotte Truck Driver Training School, Inc. v. North Carolina DMV, 95 N.C. App. 209, 381 S.E.2d 861 (1989).

Rescission of Coastal Area Management Act Development Permit. - Trial court's rescission of Coastal Area Management Act Development permit was affirmed where there were a variety of ecological concerns, potential environmental damage, and interference with public access to and use of the affected waters, and the whole record showed that the only basis for issuing the permit was that it would make the public waters adjacent to the permittee's condominium project more convenient for the permittee's use. Ballance v. North Carolina Coastal Resources Comm'n, 108 N.C. App. 288, 423 S.E.2d 815 (1992), petition for reconsideration dismissed, 333 N.C. 789, 431 S.E.2d 21 (1993).

Determining Unnecessary Hardship from Coastal Area Management Act. - To determine whether a parcel of property suffers from unnecessary hardship due to strict application of the Coastal Area Management Act, the Coastal Resources Commission must make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the impact of the Act on the landowner's ability to make reasonable use of his property. Williams v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., Div. of Coastal Mgmt., 144 N.C. App. 479, 548 S.E.2d 793 (2001).

Superior court is without power to order the North Carolina Board of Alcoholic Control to issue a permit to petitioners, but can order the Board to exercise its discretion in accordance with law. Waggoner v. North Carolina Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 7 N.C. App. 692, 173 S.E.2d 548 (1970).

Evidence held incompetent to sustain a finding of the State Board of Alcoholic Control that a licensee sold beer to a minor or failed to give his licensed premises proper supervision. Thomas v. State Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 258 N.C. 513, 128 S.E.2d 884 (1963).

Safety training violation by contractor was considered "serious" where the evidence showed that (1) the lack of proper training created the possibility of an accident, and (2) if an accident did occur, there was a substantial probability of death or serious physical harm. Associated Mechanical Contractors v. Payne, 342 N.C. 825, 467 S.E.2d 398 (1996).

Statement of Reasons for Reversing Decision Held Adequate. - Statement of superior court judge in reversing Hearing Aid Dealers and Fitters Board's conclusions that the facts found by the agency failed "to support its conclusion of law that the petitioner was grossly incompetent within the purview of G.S. 93D-13(a)(2)" constituted a succinct and adequate statement of its reasons for reversing the agency's decision. Faulkner v. North Carolina State Hearing Aid Dealers & Fitters Bd., 38 N.C. App. 222, 247 S.E.2d 668 (1978).

Evidence Supported Conclusion State Funds Had Been Misused. - Where petitioner had charged a number of personal calls to the State Telephone Network credit card he had been issued, there was substantial evidence before the commission to support its conclusion that petitioner had willfully and repeatedly misused State funds. White v. North Carolina Dep't of Envtl., Health, & Natural Resources, 117 N.C. App. 545, 451 S.E.2d 376 (1995).

Error of Law. - An error of law, as that term is used in subdivision (b)(4), exists if a conclusion of law entered by the administrative agency is not supported by the findings of fact entered by the agency or if the conclusion of law does not support the decision of the agency. Brooks v. Ansco & Assocs., 114 N.C. App. 711, 443 S.E.2d 89 (1994).

Termination After Refusing Improper Drug Testing Held Error. - Public employees met their burden of showing their employer did not have reasonable cause to ask them to submit to drug testing, and they could not be terminated for refusing to submit to testing, because they could not be required to waive a constitutionally protected right, and their termination was affected by error of law, under G.S. 150B-51(b)(4). Best v. Dep't. of Health & Human Servs., 149 N.C. App. 882, 563 S.E.2d 573 (2002), aff'd sub nom., 356 N.C. 430, 571 S.E.2d 586 (2002).

The standard of review to be applied by the reviewing court depends on the issues presented on appeal. Homoly v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 125 N.C. App. 127, 479 S.E.2d 215 (1997).

Offers of Proof Properly Considered. - Commission properly considered offers of proof included in the record since offers of proof are part of the official record under G.S. 150B-37(a)(2) and not "new evidence" violative of subsection (a) of this section. Everhart & Assocs. v. Department of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 127 N.C. App. 693, 493 S.E.2d 66 (1997), cert. denied, 347 N.C. 575, 502 S.E.2d 590 (1998).

Expert Testimony. - Three was no abuse of discretion by an administrative law judge in admitting the testimony of an applicant's expert witness, G.S. 8C-1, N.C. R. Evid. 702(a), because the witness, who prepared a blast evaluation for the applicant, was qualified in the study of ground vibration and its effect on structures and the fact the witness was neither a licensed engineer nor a licensed geologist did not render his expert testimony either "illegal" or inadmissible; the applicant, who held a mining permit, was allowed to add 37 acres to its previously permitted acreage and, within the proposed permit boundary, to increase the area disturbed by its mining operations by 22.1 acres. Stark v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 224 N.C. App. 491, 736 S.E.2d 553 (2012), review denied and cert. dismissed, 366 N.C. 589, 743 S.E.2d 193, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 547 (2013).

A trial court and the Court of Appeals improperly engaged in independent fact-finding on de novo review by reversing the State Personnel Commission's [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] decision to adopt an ALJ's findings of fact that the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources lacked just cause to demote a park ranger and to order that the ranger be reinstated; the courts had no authority to determine that such just cause did in fact exist. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 599 S.E.2d 888 (2004).

Remand Not Required Following Lower Court's Application of Improper Standard of Review. - Erroneous application of the de novo standard of review by both a trial court and the Court of Appeals, where those reviewing courts engaged in improper independent fact-finding, did not require a remand since the Supreme Court of North Carolina could reasonably determine from the record how the de novo standard should have been applied and whether the party challenging the agency's decision was entitled to a reversal or modification of that decision under the applicable provisions of G.S. 150B-51(b). N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 599 S.E.2d 888 (2004).

Substantial evidence in the record supported an administrative law judge's findings and its dismissal of a day care's petition for a contested case hearing where the day care filed nothing in nearly six months following the filing of the petition, despite receiving several orders from the administrative law judge to file and serve prehearing statements and other responses to motions; there was no requirement that the final decision be served personally or by certified mail, and in any event, the day care did not deny receiving a copy of the final decision and its substantial rights were not prejudiced in any way. Lincoln v. N.C. HHS, Nutrition Branch, 172 N.C. App. 567, 616 S.E.2d 622 (2005).

While an expert testified that a highway patrol officer's use of alcohol was a factor in his behavior, which included firing his firearm into the floor and ingesting sleeping pills, the expert also testified that the officer's behavior was caused by a combination of alcohol, the officer's first dose of lithium, "hypomania," and his being "relatively unmedicated for his bipolar disorder;" accordingly, the challenged finding of fact was supported by substantial evidence. Neither could the court conclude that the application of the rational nexus test resulted in prejudice to the Department of Crime Control and Public Safety; thus, the Department did not have just cause to dismiss the officer. Bulloch v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 223 N.C. App. 1, 732 S.E.2d 373 (2012).

Administrative law judge did not commit legal error in finding no just cause for a state employee's suspension because the employee had eight years of positive employment history, and other employees were able to cover the hour she was late one day, resulting in no negative impact to the operation of a development center or the care of its residents; pursuant to the center's policy, the employee was never "absent" from work but merely tardy. Peterson v. Caswell Developmental Ctr., 258 N.C. App. 628, 814 S.E.2d 590 (2018).

Administrative law judge (ALJ) acted within her authority by determining the center failed to meet its burden to show just cause existed to warrant a state employee's suspension for unacceptable personal conduct because the ALJ examined all the facts, circumstances, and equities present in the case, and the imposed written warning was within the authorized disciplinary alternatives. Peterson v. Caswell Developmental Ctr., 258 N.C. App. 628, 814 S.E.2d 590 (2018).

Remand Not Required After Standard of Review Not Stated. - Where an appellate court was able to review whether or not a decision by the board of education regarding a long-term suspension should have been upheld, it was not reversible error where the trial court failed to specify the standard of review utilized. Alexander v. Cumberland County Bd. of Educ., 171 N.C. App. 649, 615 S.E.2d 408 (2005).

Remand Required Following Lower Court's Application of Improper Standard of Review. - Under G.S. 150B-51(c), where an agency did not adopt an administrative law judge's decision, the reviewing court was required to review the official record, de novo, and make findings of fact and conclusions of law; a case was remanded where, in an officer disciplinary case where the state personnel commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] rejected the decision of an administrative law judge who had ruled that the officer be reinstated, the trial court applied whole record test and did not make findings of fact or conclusion of law. Royal v. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 175 N.C. App. 242, 622 S.E.2d 723 (2005).

Attorney's Fees. - Trial court lacked authority to award fees under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1988 in a proceeding seeking review of a school board's administrative assignment of a student because the case was not an action or proceeding under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983; the mere assertion of a federal constitutional violation did not transform a proceeding into a § 1983 proceeding that carried with it the right to seek fees under § 1988. The case was brought under G.S. 115C-45(c), so the trial court was sitting as an appellate court and did not review the sufficiency of evidence presented to it. Rone v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Bd. of Educ., 220 N.C. App. 401, 725 S.E.2d 422 (2012).

Applied in Johnson v. Division of Social Servs., 89 N.C. App. 481, 366 S.E.2d 538 (1988); Meyers v. Department of Human Resources, 92 N.C. App. 193, 374 S.E.2d 280 (1988); Wilson v. State Residence Comm., 92 N.C. App. 355, 374 S.E.2d 415 (1988); Uicker v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 93 N.C. 295, 378 S.E.2d 45 (1989); Cameron v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 95 N.C. App. 332, 382 S.E.2d 864 (1989); Boston v. North Carolina Private Protective Servs. Bd., 96 N.C. App. 204, 385 S.E.2d 148 (1989); Cowan v. North Carolina Private Protective Servs. Bd., 98 N.C. App. 498, 391 S.E.2d 217 (1990); Gadson v. North Carolina Mem. Hosp., 99 N.C. App. 169, 392 S.E.2d 618 (1990); Huntington Manor v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 99 N.C. App. 52, 393 S.E.2d 104 (1990); Evans v. North Carolina Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 101 N.C. App. 108, 398 S.E.2d 880 (1990); McKoy v. Department of Human Resources, 101 N.C. App. 356, 399 S.E.2d 382 (1991); Jarrett v. North Carolina Dep't of Cultural Resources, 101 N.C. App. 475, 400 S.E.2d 66 (1991); Brooks v. Austin Berryhill Fabricators, Inc., 102 N.C. App. 212, 401 S.E.2d 795 (1991); Cramer Mt. Country Club & Properties, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural Resources & Community Dev., Div. of Land Resources, 102 N.C. App. 236, 401 S.E.2d 851 (1991); GMC v. Carolina Truck & Body Co., 102 N.C. App. 349, 402 S.E.2d 139 (1991); North Carolina DOT v. Davenport, 102 N.C. App. 476, 402 S.E.2d 477 (1991); Ford v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health, & Natural Resources, 107 N.C. App. 192, 419 S.E.2d 204 (1992); Teague v. Western Carolina Univ., 108 N.C. App. 689, 424 S.E.2d 684 (1993); In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 109 N.C. App. 435, 428 S.E.2d 195 (1993); Ellis v. North Carolina Crime Victims Comp. Comm'n, 111 N.C. App. 157, 432 S.E.2d 160 (1993); Chesapeake Microfilm, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 111 N.C. App. 737, 434 S.E.2d 218 (1993), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 335 N.C. 768, 442 S.E.2d 511, aff'd per curiam, 337 N.C. 797, 448 S.E.2d 514 (1994); King v. North Carolina Envtl. Mgt. Comm'n, 112 N.C. App. 813, 436 S.E.2d 865 (1993); Fain v. State Residence Comm., 117 N.C. App. 541, 451 S.E.2d 663 (1995); Williams v. North Carolina Dep't of Economic & Community Dev., 119 N.C. App. 535, 458 S.E.2d 750 (1995); In re Ramseur, 120 N.C. App. 521, 463 S.E.2d 254 (1995); Walker v. Board of Trustees, 348 N.C. 63, 499 S.E.2d 429 (1998); Wright v. Blue Ridge Area Auth., 134 N.C. App. 668, 518 S.E.2d 772, cert. denied, 351 N.C. 122, 541 S.E.2d 472 (1999); Burke Health Investors, L.L.C. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, Div. of Facility Servs., Certificate of Need Section, 135 N.C. App. 568, 522 S.E.2d 96 (1999); Johnston Health Care Ctr., L.L.C. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, Div. of Facility Servs., Certificate of Need Section, 136 N.C. App. 307, 524 S.E.2d 352 (2000); Christenbury Surgery Ctr. v. North Carolina HHS, 138 N.C. App. 309, 531 S.E.2d 219 (2000); Living Centers-Southeast, Inc. v. North Carolina HHS, 138 N.C. App. 572, 532 S.E.2d 192 (2000); Kea v. HHS, 153 N.C. App. 595, 570 S.E.2d 919 (2002), appeal dismissed, 356 N.C. 673, 577 S.E.2d 120, 357 N.C. 654, 588 S.E.2d 467 (2003); Pittman v. N.C. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 155 N.C. App. 268, 573 S.E.2d 628 (2002); Shackleford-Moten v. Lenoir County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 155 N.C. App. 568, 573 S.E.2d 767 (2002), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 252, 582 S.E.2d 609 (2003); Campbell v. N.C. DOT - DMV, 155 N.C. App. 652, 575 S.E.2d 54 (2003), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 62,
579 S.E.2d 386 (2003); Watkins v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 358 N.C. 190, 593 S.E.2d 764 (2004); Comm'r of Labor v. Weekley Homes, L.P., 169 N.C. App. 17, 609 S.E.2d 407 (2005); Davis v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 178 N.C. App. 646, 632 S.E.2d 590 (2006); Kelly v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 192 N.C. App. 129, 664 S.E.2d 625 (2008); Granger v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 197 N.C. App. 699, 678 S.E.2d 715 (2009); Richardson v. N.C. Dept of Pub. Instruction Licensure Section, 199 N.C. App. 219, 681 S.E.2d 479, review denied, 363 N.C. 745, 688 S.E.2d 694 (2009); Keyes v. N.C. DOT, 200 N.C. App. 395, 684 S.E.2d 65 (2009); Woodard v. N.C. DOT, 201 N.C. App. 124, 684 S.E.2d 906 (2009); Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs. & Div. of Med. Assistance of the N.C. HHS, 364 N.C. 61, 692 S.E.2d 96 (Apr. 15, 2010); Rone v. Winston-Salem, 207 N.C. App. 618, 701 S.E.2d 284 (2010); Midgett v. N. Carolina Coastal Res. Comm'n, 212 N.C. App. 420, - S.E.2d - (June 7, 2011); McAdams v. N.C. DOT, 215 N.C. App. 429, 716 S.E.2d 77 (2011), review denied, 365 N.C. 558, 722 S.E.2d 599, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 146 (2012); High Rock Lake Partners, LLC v. N.C. DOT, 217 N.C. App. 442, 720 S.E.2d 706 (2011), dismissed, 365 N.C. 569, 724 S.E.2d 516, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 259, rev'd, 735 S.E.2d 300, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 1004 (2012); Poarch v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 223 N.C. App. 125, 741 S.E.2d 315 (2012), review denied 735 S.E.2d 174, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 1030 (2012); City of Rockingham v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 224 N.C. App. 228, 736 S.E.2d 764 (2012); WakeMed v. N.C. HHS, 225 N.C. App. 253, 737 S.E.2d 754 (2013); Beason v. N.C. Dep't of the Sec'y of State, 226 N.C. App. 210, 742 S.E.2d 209 (2013); Beason v. N.C. Dep't of the Secy. of State, 226 N.C. App. 222, 743 S.E.2d 41 (2013); Wetherington v. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 231 N.C. App. 503, 752 S.E.2d 511 (2013), amended 771 S.E.2d 294, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 612 (2015), aff'd in part and modified in part 780 S.E.2d 543, 2015 N.C. LEXIS 1259 (2015).

Nanny's Korner Care Ctr. v. N.C. HHS - Div. of Child Dev., 234 N.C. App. 51, 758 S.E.2d 423 (2014); AH N.C. Owner LLC v. N.C. HHS, 240 N.C. App. 92, 771 S.E.2d 537 (2015); N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Ledford, 247 N.C. App. 266, 786 S.E.2d 50 (2016); N.C. Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. TRK Dev., LLC, 259 N.C. App. 597, 816 S.E.2d 232 (2018), review denied, 372 N.C. 705, 831 S.E.2d 71 (2019).

Cited in Beaufort County Schs. v. Roach, 114 N.C. App. 330, 443 S.E.2d 339, cert. denied, 336 N.C. 602, 447 S.E.2d 384, 513 U.S. 989, 115 S. Ct. 486, 130 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1994); Eury v. North Carolina Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 115 N.C. App. 590, 446 S.E.2d 383 (1994), cert. denied, 338 N.C. 309, 451 S.E.2d 635 (1994); In re Cobb, 102 N.C. App. 466, 402 S.E.2d 475; Elliot ex rel. Casstevens v. Department of Human Resources, 115 N.C. App. 613, 446 S.E.2d 809, aff'd, 341 N.C. 191, 459 S.E.2d 273 (1995); Charter Pines Hosp. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 83 N.C. App. 161, 349 S.E.2d 639 (1986); Harris v. Flaherty, 90 N.C. App. 110, 367 S.E.2d 364 (1988); In re Medical Ctr., 91 N.C. App. 107, 370 S.E.2d 597 (1988); In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989); Brooks v. Dover Elevator Co., 94 N.C. App. 139, 379 S.E.2d 707 (1989); Taborn v. Hammonds, 324 N.C. 546, 380 S.E.2d 513 (1989); In re Coastal Resources Comm'n, 96 N.C. App. 502, 386 S.E.2d 92 (1989); North Buncombe Ass'n of Concerned Citizens v. Rhodes, 100 N.C. App. 24, 394 S.E.2d 462, appeal dismissed, 327 N.C. 484, 397 S.E.2d 215 (1990); White v. North Carolina State Bd. of Exmrs. of Practicing Psychologists, 97 N.C. App. 144, 388 S.E.2d 148 (1990); Gummels v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 97 N.C. App. 245, 388 S.E.2d 223 (1990); Burke County Bd. of Educ. v. Denton, 895 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1990); Tay v. Flaherty, 100 N.C. App. 51, 394 S.E.2d 217 (1990); Cafiero v. North Carolina Bd. of Nursing, 102 N.C. App. 610, 403 S.E.2d 582 (1991); Conservation Council v. Haste, 102 N.C. App. 411, 402 S.E.2d 447 (1991); Pamlico Tar River Found., Inc. v. Coastal Resources Comm'n, 103 N.C. App. 24, 404 S.E.2d 167 (1991); Correll v. Division of Social Servs., 103 N.C. App. 562, 406 S.E.2d 633 (1991); Woodlief v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 104 N.C. App. 52, 407 S.E.2d 596 (1991); Harding v. North Carolina Dep't of Cor., 106 N.C. App. 350, 416 S.E.2d 587 (1992); Best v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 108 N.C. App. 158, 423 S.E.2d 330 (1992); Urback v. East Carolina Univ., 105 N.C. App. 605, 414 S.E.2d 100 (1992); Vass v. Board of Trustees, 108 N.C. App. 251, 423 S.E.2d 796 (1992); Professional Food Servs. Mgt., Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Admin., 109 N.C. App. 265, 426 S.E.2d 447 (1993); In re McCrary, 112 N.C. App. 161, 435 S.E.2d 359 (1993); In re Freeman, 109 N.C. App. 100, 426 S.E.2d 100 (1993); Brooks v. BCF Piping, Inc., 109 N.C. App. 26, 426 S.E.2d 282 (1993); In re Huang, 110 N.C. App. 683, 431 S.E.2d 541 (1993); McCollough v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 111 N.C. App. 186, 431 S.E.2d 816 (1993); Davis v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 110 N.C. App. 730, 432 S.E.2d 132 (1993); Harding v. North Carolina Dep't of Cor., 334 N.C. 414, 432 S.E.2d 298 (1993); Cauthen v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 112 N.C. App. 238, 435 S.E.2d 81 (1993); Davenport v. North Carolina DOT, 3 F.3d 89 (4th Cir. 1993); Amanini v. N.C. Dep't of Human Resources, 114 N.C. App. 668, 443 S.E.2d 114 (1994); White v. North Carolina Dep't of Cor., 117 N.C. App. 521, 451 S.E.2d 876 (1995); Air-A-Plane Corp. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, 118 N.C. App. 118, 454 S.E.2d 297 (1995); Laurel Wood of Henderson, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 117 N.C. App. 601, 452 S.E.2d 334 (1995); Ritter
v. Department of Human Resources, 118 N.C. App. 564, 455 S.E.2d 901 (1995); Rusher v. Tomlinson, 119 N.C. App. 458, 459 S.E.2d 285 (1995), aff'd, 343 N.C. 119, 468 S.E.2d 57 (1996); North Carolina Dep't of Cors. v. Myers, 120 N.C. App. 437, 462 S.E.2d 824 (1995); Gainey v. North Carolina Dep't of Justice, 121 N.C. App. 253, 465 S.E.2d 36 (1996); Presbyterian-Orthopaedic Hosp. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 122 N.C. App. 529, 470 S.E.2d 831 (1996); Cates v. North Carolina Dep't of Justice, 121 N.C. App. 243, 465 S.E.2d 64 (1996), modified and aff'd, 346 N.C. 781, 487 S.E.2d 723 (1997); Cape Fear Mem. Hosp. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 121 N.C. App. 492, 466 S.E.2d 299 (1996); Fuqua v. Rockingham County Bd. of Social Servs., 125 N.C. App. 66, 479 S.E.2d 273 (1996); Andrews v. Crump, 984 F. Supp. 393 (W.D.N.C. 1996); Beneficial N.C. Inc. v. State ex rel. N.C. State Banking Comm'n, 126 N.C. App. 117, 484 S.E.2d 808 (1997); Yates Constr. Co. v. Commissioner of Labor, 126 N.C. App. 147, 484 S.E.2d 430 (1997); Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 126 N.C. App. 409, 485 S.E.2d 333 (1997); McHugh v. North Carolina Dep't of Envtl., Health & Natural Resources, 126 N.C. App. 469, 485 S.E.2d 861 (1997); Elliott v. North Carolina Psychology Bd., 126 N.C. App. 453, 485 S.E.2d 882 (1997), rev'd on other grounds, 348 N.C. 230, 498 S.E.2d 616 (1998); McHugh v. North Carolina Dep't of Envtl., Health & Natural Resources, 126 N.C. App. 469, 485 S.E.2d 861 (1997); Norman v. Cameron, 127 N.C. App. 44, 488 S.E.2d 297, cert. denied, 347 N.C. 398, 494 S.E.2d 416 (1997); Dew v. State ex rel. N.C. DMV, 127 N.C. App. 309, 488 S.E.2d 836 (1997); Elliott v. North Carolina Psychology Bd., 348 N.C. 230, 498 S.E.2d 616 (1998); Britt v. North Carolina Sheriffs' Educ. & Training Stds. Comm'n, 348 N.C. 573, 501 S.E.2d 75 (1998); Hubbard v. State Constr. Office, 130 N.C. App. 254, 502 S.E.2d 652 (1998), cert. denied, 349 N.C. 230, 515 S.E.2d 704 (1998); Darryl Burke Chevrolet, Inc. v. Aikens, 131 N.C. App. 31, 505 S.E.2d 581 (1998), aff'd, 350 N.C. 83, 511 S.E.2d 639 (1999); D.G. Matthews & Son v. State ex rel. McDevitt, 131 N.C. App. 520, 508 S.E.2d 331 (1998); North Carolina State Bar v. Barrett, 132 N.C. App. 110, 511 S.E.2d 15 (1999); Avant v. Sandhills Ctr. for Mental Health, Dev. Disabilities & Substance Abuse Servs., 132 N.C. App. 542, 513 S.E.2d 79 (1999); Dialysis Care of N.C. L.L.C. v. North Carolina HHS, Div. of Facility Servs., Certificate of Need Section, 137 N.C. App. 638, 529 S.E.2d 257 (2000), aff'd, 353 N.C. 258, 538 S.E.2d 566 (2000); In re Ramseur, 139 N.C. App. 442, 533 S.E.2d 295 (2000); Williams v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., Div. of Coastal Mgmt., 144 N.C. App. 479, 548 S.E.2d 793 (2001); Wallace v. Bd. of Trs., Local Gov't Emples. Ret. Sys., 145 N.C. App. 264, 550 S.E.2d 552, cert. denied, 354 N.C. 580, 559 S.E.2d 553 (2001); Smith v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 150 N.C. App. 291, 563 S.E.2d 258 (2002); Leeks v. Cumberland County Mental Health Developmental Disability & Substance Abuse Facility, 154 N.C. App. 71, 571 S.E.2d 684 (2002); Deadwood, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue, 356 N.C. 407, 572 S.E.2d 103 (2002); Watkins v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 157 N.C. App. 367, 579 S.E.2d 510 (2003); Kings Mt. Bd. of Educ. v. N.C. State Bd. of Educ., 159 N.C. App. 568, 583 S.E.2d 629 (2003); Luna v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 162 N.C. App. 1, 589 S.E.2d 917 (2004); Anson County Citizens Against Chem. Toxins in Underground Storage v. N.C. Dep't of Env't &
Natural Res., 167 N.C. App. 341, 606 S.E.2d 350 (2004); York Oil Co. v. N.C. Dep't of Env't, 164 N.C. App. 550, 596 S.E.2d 270 (2004); In re Lustgarten, 177 N.C. App. 663, 629 S.E.2d 886 (2006); Good Hope Health Sys., L.L.C. v. N.C. HHS, 189 N.C. App. 534, 659 S.E.2d 456 (2008), aff'd, 362 N.C. 504, 666 S.E.2d 749 (2008); Hensley v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 201 N.C. App. 1, 685 S.E.2d 570 (2009), rev'd, 364 N.C. 285, 698 S.E.2d 41, 2010 N.C. LEXIS 586 (2010); Mission Hosps., Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 35 N.C. App. 696, 696 S.E.2d 163 (2010); McCaskill v. Dep't of State Treasurer, Ret. Sys. Div., 204 N.C. App. 373, 695 S.E.2d 108 (2010), aff'd in part, 706 S.E.2d 226, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 140 (2011); Mission Hosps., Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 205 N.C. App. 35, 696 S.E.2d 163 (2010); Parkway Urology, P.A. v. N.C. HHS, 205 N.C. App. 529, 696 S.E.2d 187 (2010), review denied 705 S.E.2d 739, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 55 (2011), review denied 705 S.E.2d 753, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 47 (2011); Lee v. Gore, 206 N.C. App. 374, 698 S.E.2d 179 (2010), aff'd, 717 S.E.2d 356, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 660 (2011); Dare County v. N.C. Dep't of Ins., 207 N.C. App. 600, 701 S.E.2d 368 (2010); E. Carolina Internal Med., P.A. v. N.C. HHS, 211 N.C. App. 397, 710 S.E.2d 245 (2011); Joyner v. N.C. HHS, 214 N.C. App. 278, 715 S.E.2d 498 (2011); Meherrin Tribe of N.C. v. N.C. State Comm'n of Indian Affairs, 219 N.C. App. 558, 724 S.E.2d 644 (2012); CaroMont Health, Inc. v. N.C. HHS Div. of Health Serv. Regulation, 231 N.C. App. 1, 751 S.E.2d 244 (2013); Bailey v. Div. of Empl. Sec., 232 N.C. App. 10, 753 S.E.2d 219 (2014); Cumberland County Hosp. Sys. v. N.C. HHS, 237 N.C. App. 113, 764 S.E.2d 491 (2014); Frampton v. Univ. of N.C. 241 N.C. App. 401, 773 S.E.2d 526 (2015), review denied 781 S.E.2d 478, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 59 (2016); Frampton v. Univ. of N.C. 241 N.C. App. 401, 773 S.E.2d 526 (2015), review denied 781 S.E.2d 478, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 59 (2016); Fowler v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue, 242 N.C. App. 404, 775 S.E.2d 350 (2015); Cumberland Cnty. Hosp. Sys. v. North Carolina HHS, 242 N.C. App. 524, 776 S.E.2d 329 (2015); Frazier v. N.C. Cent. Univ., 244 N.C. App. 37, 779 S.E.2d 515 (2015); Inspection Station No. 31327 v. N.C. DMV, 244 N.C. App. 416, 781 S.E.2d 79 (2015); N.C. HHS v. Parker Home Care, LLC, 246 N.C. App. 551, 784 S.E.2d 552 (2016), review denied, mot. dismissed, stay denied, 793 S.E.2d 690, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 988 (2016); mot. dismissed, as moot, 793 S.E.2d 688, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 1013 (2016); Winkler v. State Bd. of Examiners of Plumbing, Heating & Fire Sprinklers Contrs., 249 N.C. App. 578, 790 S.E.2d 727 (2016); Vincoli v. State, 250 N.C. App. 269, 792 S.E.2d 813 (2016); Williford v. N.C. HHS, 250 N.C. App. 491, 792 S.E.2d 843 (2016); Midrex Techs. v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue, 369 N.C. 250, 794 S.E.2d 785 (2016); Heard-Leak v. N.C. State Univ. Ctr. for Urban Affairs, 250 N.C. App. 41, 798 S.E.2d 394 (2016); Rittelmeyer v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 252 N.C. App. 340, 799 S.E.2d 378, review denied, 370 N.C. 67, 803 S.E.2d 385, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 606 (N.C. 2017).

II. EXCEEDING STATUTORY AUTHORITY OR JURISDICTION.

Prohibitions in Former G.S. 150A-51(2) and (3) Distinguished. - The prohibition against agency action "in excess of statutory authority" in former G.S. 58-9.6(b)(2) (now G.S. 58-2-90(b)(2)) and subdivision (2) of former G.S. 150A-51 refers to the general authority of an administrative agency properly to discharge its statutorily assigned responsibilities, while the prohibition against agency action "made upon unlawful procedure" in former G.S. 58-9.6(b)(3) (now G.S. 58-2-90(b)(3)) and subdivision (3) of former G.S. 150A-51 refers to the procedures employed by the agency in discharging its statutorily authorized acts. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547, rehearing denied, 301 N.C. 107, 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980), overruled on other grounds, In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 132 (2017).

Order Not In Excess of Statutory Powers. - An order of the Commissioner of Insurance that data submitted in a ratemaking case be audited was not in excess of his statutory powers as contemplated by former G.S. 58-9.6(b)(2) (now G.S. 58-2-90(b)(2)) or subdivision (2) of former G.S. 150A-51. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547, rehearing denied, 301 N.C. 107, 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980), overruled on other grounds, In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 132 (2017).

Appellate court found that the superior court, which initially reviewed a decision of the Board of Pharmacy reprimanding a permitee pharmacy chain for negligent acts of its licensed pharmacists, had not erred in finding no arbitrary or capricious action by the Board in choosing a sanction; case law already made it clear that the chain could be vicariously responsible for the pharmacists' actions, and so any sanction listed as applicable to a pharmacist could also be applied against the chain. CVS Pharm., Inc. v. N.C. Bd. of Pharm., 162 N.C. App. 495, 591 S.E.2d 567 (2004).

The trial court properly applied the whole record test, where it found that the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the Environmental Management Commission did not exceed their discretion and authority under G.S. 143-211(c), 143-215.107(a)(1), (3), and G.S. 143-215.114A(a)(1) in finding that the contractor had open burning piles within 1,000 feet from a dwelling. MW Clearing & Grading, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 171 N.C. App. 170, 614 S.E.2d 568 ((2005)), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 65, 623 S.E.2d 585, rev'd in part, 360 N.C. 392, 628 S.E.2d 379 (2006) (as to finding violations rather than one).

Competitor showed no error in the administrative law judge granting summary judgment for a certificate of need applicant's application because: (1) the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (Agency) did not wrongly consider only the project's county, under G.S. 131E-183(a)(3), (3a), (4), and (6), as the statute stated no geographical scope, and the Agency used an established practice of applying the Administrative Code to fill this gap, so the Agency did not unreasonably interpret the statute, (2) the Agency's incorporation by reference of findings regarding multiple criteria did not fail to independently review each criterion, and (3) the applicant adequately identified a funding source. Blue Ridge Healthcare Hosps. Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 255 N.C. App. 451, 808 S.E.2d 271, review denied, 370 N.C. 382, 807 S.E.2d 567, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 965 (N.C. 2017).

Assessment Based upon Penalty Factors Reasonably Related to Act's Enforcement. - Department's assessment was not based upon the secretary's "absolute" discretion, but instead upon numerous penalty factors reasonably related to the act's administration and enforcement, which resulted in a fair and reasoned penalty assessment. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 92 N.C. App. 1, 373 S.E.2d 572 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).

Exceeding Authority Did Not Prejudice Competitor. - While the Department of Health and Human Services technically exceeded its authority and jurisdiction and committed errors of law by awarding a certificate of need to establish a new dialysis center on the basis of an application that was never shown to be conforming to all applicable criteria, its actions did not prejudice the applicant's competitor because the alleged mistakes and omissions, made under a settlement agreement, were corrected by final agency decision. Bio-Medical Applications of N.C. Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, Div. of Facility Servs., Certificate of Need Section, 136 N.C. App. 103, 523 S.E.2d 677 (1999).

Substantial Prejudice. - When providers contested an agency's decision to let a competitor move specialty operating rooms to the providers' area, the agency's alleged failure to follow the agency's rules did not establish the providers' substantial prejudice as a matter of law because the providers also had to show the agency deprived the providers of property, ordered the providers to pay a fine or penalty, or otherwise substantially prejudiced the providers' rights. Surgical Care Affiliates, LLC v. N.C. HHS, 235 N.C. App. 620, 762 S.E.2d 468 (2014).

Competitor showed no error in the administrative law judge granting summary judgment for a certificate of need applicant's application because the competitor did not meet the competitor's burden to show substantial prejudice from granting the application, as (1) the proposed project added no new beds, services, or equipment, and (2) any harm from normal competition was not substantial prejudice. Blue Ridge Healthcare Hosps. Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 255 N.C. App. 451, 808 S.E.2d 271, review denied, 370 N.C. 382, 807 S.E.2d 567, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 965 (N.C. 2017).

Failure of Agency to Make Required Findings. - Trial court did not have the authority to find, contrary to an agency conclusion, that a university research scientist was subjected to impermissible employment-related retaliation because of her protected activities; the agency failed to make the required factual findings, and therefore the case should have been remanded. Yan-Min Wang v. UNC-CH Sch. of Med., 216 N.C. App. 185, 716 S.E.2d 646 (2011).

Case was remanded because the final decision did not indicate that the conduct of a technician who worked for a county department of social services amounted to unacceptable personal conduct, and no conclusion of law asserted the department had substantive just cause for any disciplinary action; the ALJ had to make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding whether the conduct was unacceptable personal conduct, and whether it amounted to just cause for the disciplinary action taken. Watlington v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. Rockingham Cnty., 252 N.C. App. 512, 799 S.E.2d 396 (2017), overruled on other grounds, Rouse v. Forsyth Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 2020 N.C. LEXIS 93 (N.C. 2020).

Exceeded Scope of Review When Noncompliance with Administrative Options. - Trial court exceeded the permissible scope of review when it ordered the barbershop owner to remove the barber pole and cease advertising barber services unless licensed by the State of North Carolina Board of Barber Examiners because G.S. 86A-20.1 provided an avenue for the Board to seek an injunction and the Board did not pursue that avenue. Kindsgrab v. State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 236 N.C. App. 564, 763 S.E.2d 913 (2014).

III. UNLAWFUL PROCEDURE.

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Sufficiency of Due Process. - In a case in which a tenured professor appealed a superior court's affirmation of the administrative decision to terminate him, he argued unsuccessfully that the superior court committed reversible error in upholding his discharge on grounds of lack of collegiality, which was a substantive due process claim. The professor was terminated because his interactions with colleagues had been so disruptive that the effective and efficient operation of his department was impaired, and he was aware that collegiality was a professional expectation for his position and that his collegiality or lack thereof was one possible focus of evaluation during his post-tenure reviews; the University of North Carolina College of Engineering Regulation 05.67.04 stated that each faculty member was expected to work in a collegial manner. Bernold v. Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C. 200 N.C. App. 295, 683 S.E.2d 428 (2009).

In a case in which a tenured professor appealed a superior court's affirmation of the administrative decision to terminate him, he argued unsuccessfully that the superior court committed reversible error in failing to find that his discharge violated his right to procedural due process. Specifically, he contended that the University of North Carolina's Board of Governors failed to provide him a clear plan and timetable for addressing his deficiencies, thus violating his procedural due process; however, while Section 603 of the Code of the Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina specified the due process protections to which a tenured faculty member was entitled and contained a detailed schedule of steps involving notice and hearings which the university had to take prior to discharging a tenured faculty member, it did not contain any requirement for the tenured faculty member to be provided with a clear plan and timetable. Bernold v. Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C. 200 N.C. App. 295, 683 S.E.2d 428 (2009).

Attempt to Establish Rule Violated Former G.S. 150A-51(3). - Attempt by Commissioner of Insurance to establish a rule requiring audited data in an insurance ratemaking hearing was "made upon unlawful procedure" as contemplated by former G.S. 58-9.6(b) (3) (now G.S. 58-2-90(b)(3)) and subdivision (3) of former G.S. 150A-51, where the Commissioner sought to establish the rule on an ad hoc adjudication basis rather than following normal North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act rulemaking requirements, since the process of rulemaking would have presented no danger that its use would frustrate the effective accomplishment of the agency's functions. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547, rehearing denied, 301 N.C. 107, 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980), overruled on other grounds, In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 132 (2017).

Verification Procedure Unsupported by Federal Regulations Violated Subdivision (b)(3). - Federal regulations govern verification of information concerning a food stamp recipient by a State agency. And thus where the verification procedure used by a county was unsupported by the federal regulations, it was in violation of subdivision (b)(3) of this section. Tay v. Flaherty, 90 N.C. App. 346, 368 S.E.2d 403, cert. denied, 323 N.C. 370, 373 S.E.2d 556 (1988).

When a school board does not follow proper procedures in reviewing a case manager's report and recommendation concerning the termination of a career employee, it is bound by the case manager's findings of fact, pursuant to G.S. 150B-51(b)(3). Farris v. Burke County Bd. of Educ., 355 N.C. 225, 559 S.E.2d 774 (2002).

Unlawful Suspension Procedure. - School board's policy which allowed a student facing long-term suspension to have an adult who was not a parent with him at a hearing on that suspension, but prevented the adult from being an attorney, or from questioning witnesses, making a statement, or otherwise representing the student, violated the student's substantial due process rights regarding his protected property interest in obtaining an education, and reversal of such suspension was required under G.S. 150B-51(b). In re Roberts, 150 N.C. App. 86, 563 S.E.2d 37 (2002), cert. granted, 356 N.C. 163, 569 S.E.2d 282 (2002), cert. denied, - U.S. - , 124 S. Ct. 103, 157 L. Ed. 2d 38 (2003).

Ex Parte Communication. - Ex parte communication by a director for an administrative agency to counsel for a hospital following a contested case hearing in the preparation of a final agency decision violated G.S. 150B-35 and constituted an error of law under G.S. 150B-51(b) as an oncology treatment center's substantial right to notice and a genuine opportunity to be heard was prejudiced by the process through which the agency issued its final decision. Mission Hosps., Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 189 N.C. App. 263, 658 S.E.2d 277 (2008).

Failure To Show Ruling Made Upon Unlawful Procedure. - Trial court did not err by failing to make an "inference" of impropriety in the procedure used by the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) when it denied a health service facility's request for declaratory ruling because the record admittedly contained no indication of such impropriety; the facility did not demonstrate that DHHS made its ruling upon unlawful procedure by its consideration of comments opposed to its request. Hope-A Women's Cancer Center, P.A. v. N.C. HHS, 203 N.C. App. 276, 691 S.E.2d 421 (2010), review denied, 365 N.C. 87, 706 S.E.2d 254, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 144 (2011).

Appellate court found that a board of education's actions in dismissing an assistant principal were sufficient to comply with the requirements under G.S. 115C-325(j2)(7) because the board appropriately replaced the case manager's findings which the board deemed insufficiently supported by the evidence. Moreover, the board considered all of the information mandated for consideration by G.S. 115C-325(j2). James v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Bd. of Educ., 221 N.C. App. 560, 728 S.E.2d 422, review denied, 734 S.E.2d 868, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 1095 (2012).

IV. "WHOLE RECORD" TEST.

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Whole Record Test Retained. - Although the 1985 amendment of former G.S. 150A-51 deleted the phrase "in view of the entire record as submitted," the amendment maintained the whole record test for judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. In re K-mart Corp., 319 N.C. 378, 354 S.E.2d 468 (1987), decided prior to 1987 amendment which reinserted the phrase "in view of the entire record as submitted"; Bashford v. North Carolina Licensing Bd., 107 N.C. App. 462, 420 S.E.2d 466 (1992).

Function of "Whole Record" Test. - The "whole record" test is not a tool of judicial intrusion; instead, it merely gives a reviewing court the capability to determine whether an administrative decision has a rational basis in the evidence. North Carolina Dep't of Cor. v. Gibson, 58 N.C. App. 241, 293 S.E.2d 664 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 308 N.C. 131, 301 S.E.2d 78 (1983).

"Whole Record" Test. - In reviewing an agency's decision, the superior court applies the "whole record" test, which requires the examination of all competent evidence to determine if the administrative agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Rector v. North Carolina Sheriffs' Educ. & Training Stds. Comm'n, 103 N.C. App. 527, 406 S.E.2d 613 (1991).

The whole record test is applied when determining whether a decision is arbitrary and capricious. Rector v. North Carolina Sheriffs' Educ. & Training Stds. Comm'n, 103 N.C. App. 527, 406 S.E.2d 613 (1991).

The applicable scope of review is the "whole record" test. When the test is applied, the reviewing court is required to take into account all of the evidence, including that which supports the findings and contradictory evidence. Crowell Constructors, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Env't, Health & Natural Resources, 107 N.C. App. 716, 421 S.E.2d 612 (1992), cert. denied, 333 N.C. 343, 426 S.E.2d 704 (1993).

Under G.S. 150B-51(b)(5), upon judicial appeal from an agency, the trial court may reverse or modify an agency's decision if it is unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; the "whole record" test requires the reviewing court to examine all competent evidence to determine whether the agency decision is supported by substantial evidence, and the administrative findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record, are conclusive upon a reviewing court. Farber v. N.C. Psychology Bd., 153 N.C. App. 1, 569 S.E.2d 287 (2002), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 612, 574 S.E.2d 679 (2002).

When an assigned error contended that an agency violated G.S. 150B-51(b)(1), (2), (3), or (4), a trial court engaged in de novo review, under which the trial court considered the matter anew and freely substituted its own judgment for the agency's, but with respect to G.S. 150B-51(b)(5) or (6), the reviewing court applied the "whole record test," under which it could not substitute its judgment for the agency's as between two conflicting views, even though it could reasonably have reached a different result had it reviewed the matter de novo; rather, the court had to examine all the record evidence to determine whether there was substantial evidence to justify the agency's decision, and substantial evidence was relevant evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Overcash v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 179 N.C. App. 697, 635 S.E.2d 442 (2006), review denied, 361 N.C. 220, 642 S.E.2d 445 (2007).

"Whole Record" Test Inappropriate - The trial court erred in applying the "Whole Record" test where the appellant/ex-police officer alleged that the appellee/civil service board incorrectly applied the law in terminating his employment. The trial court was required to review that decision "de novo." Jordan v. Civil Serv. Bd. for Charlotte, 137 N.C. App. 575, 528 S.E.2d 927 (2000).

"Substantial Evidence" Defined. - Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a scintilla or a permissible inference. Lackey v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 306 N.C. 231, 293 S.E.2d 171 (1982).

Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind would regard as adequately supporting a particular conclusion. Walker v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 100 N.C. App. 498, 397 S.E.2d 350 (1990), cert. denied, 328 N.C. 98, 402 S.E.2d 430 (1991).

Standard of judicial review set forth in former G.S. 150A-51(5) is known as the "whole record" test and must be distinguished from both de novo review and the "any competent evidence" standard of review. Thompson v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 292 N.C. 406, 233 S.E.2d 538 (1977); North Carolina A & T Univ. v. Kimber, 49 N.C. App. 46, 270 S.E.2d 492 (1980); Overton v. Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ., 51 N.C. App. 303, 276 S.E.2d 458, aff'd, 304 N.C. 312, 283 S.E.2d 495 (1981); Dailey v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 60 N.C. App. 441, 299 S.E.2d 473, rev'd on other grounds, 309 N.C. 710, 309 S.E.2d 219 (1983); Burrow v. Randolph County Bd. of Educ., 61 N.C. App. 619, 301 S.E.2d 704 (1983); Faulkner v. New Bern-Craven County Bd. of Educ., 65 N.C. App. 483, 309 S.E.2d 548 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 311 N.C. 42, 316 S.E.2d 281 (1984); Goodwin v. Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ., 67 N.C. App. 243, 312 S.E.2d 892 (1984).

As distinguished from the "any competent evidence" test and a de novo review, the "whole record" test "gives a reviewing court the capability to determine whether an administrative decision has a rational basis in the evidence." Bennett v. Hertford County Bd. of Educ., 69 N.C. App. 615, 317 S.E.2d 912, cert. denied, 312 N.C. 81, 321 S.E.2d 893 (1984).

In reviewing an administrative decision to determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence, the appellate court must apply the "whole record" test. Leiphart v. North Carolina School of Arts, 80 N.C. App. 339, 342 S.E.2d 914, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 507, 349 S.E.2d 862 (1986), decided under former G.S. 150A-51.

In determining whether reversal or modification of an administrative decision is appropriate under former G.S. 150A-51(5), the test applied to the evidence must be the "whole record" test. Community Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. North Carolina Sav. & Loan Comm'n, 43 N.C. App. 493, 259 S.E.2d 373 (1979).

Court Must Consider All Evidence. - The applicable scope of review of the decision of an administrative agency is the "whole record" test. In applying the whole record test, the court must consider all the evidence, including that which supports the findings and contradictory evidence. Mount Olive Home Health Care Agency, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Human Resources, 78 N.C. App. 224, 336 S.E.2d 625 (1985).

The "whole record" test requires the court to take into account all the evidence, both that which supports the decision of the Commission and that which in fairness detracts from it. Leiphart v. North Carolina School of Arts, 80 N.C. App. 339, 342 S.E.2d 914, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 507, 349 S.E.2d 862 (1986).

Court of Appeals review of an administrative agency's decision is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, and court may reverse or modify the agency's decision only if it violates one of five statutory grounds. Court will determine if the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are affected by error of law or unsupported by substantial evidence admissible under G.S. 150B-29(a), 150B-30, or 150B-31 in view of the entire record as submitted. North Carolina Dep't of Cor. v. Hodge, 99 N.C. App. 602, 394 S.E.2d 285 (1990).

Examining the "Whole Record" to Determine If Substantial Evidence Supports Agency's Decision. - The reviewing court is required to examine all of the competent evidence, pleadings, etc., which comprise the "whole record" to determine if there is substantial evidence in the record to support the administrative tribunal's findings and conclusions. Community Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. North Carolina Sav. & Loan Comm'n, 43 N.C. App. 493, 259 S.E.2d 373 (1979); Henderson v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 91 N.C. App. 527, 372 S.E.2d 887 (1988).

To determine whether an agency's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court applies the "whole record" test. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Peace, 122 N.C. App. 313, 470 S.E.2d 63 (1996), review granted, 345 N.C. 640, 483 S.E.2d 706 (1997).

Erroneous conclusion that a dentist violated the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners' (Board) Record Content Rule by not recording reasons for prescribing medication did not affect the dentist's substantial rights because: (1) the Board had the authority pursuant to the clear language of G.S. 90-41(a)(12), which was more specific than the general limitation on an agency's rule enforcement power in G.S. 150B-18, and thereby controlling, to discipline the dentist for negligence in the practice of dentistry, and (2) substantial evidence supported the conclusion that the dentist's failure to record such reasons was negligent. Walker v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 245 N.C. App. 559, 782 S.E.2d 518 (2016), aff'd, 369 N.C. 517, 796 S.E.2d 784, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 131 (2017).

Including Contradictory and Conflicting Evidence. - The "whole record" rule set forth in former G.S. 150A-51(5) requires the court, in determining the substantiality of evidence supporting the board's decision, to take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the board's evidence. Under the whole evidence rule, the court may not consider the evidence which in and of itself justifies the board's result, without taking into account contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn. Thompson v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 292 N.C. 406, 233 S.E.2d 538 (1977); Chesnutt v. Peters, 300 N.C. 359, 266 S.E.2d 623 (1980); McCormick v. Peters, 48 N.C. App. 365, 269 S.E.2d 168 (1980); North Carolina A & T Univ. v. Kimber, 49 N.C. App. 46, 270 S.E.2d 492 (1980); In re Land & Mineral Co., 49 N.C. App. 608, 272 S.E.2d 878 (1980), cert. denied, 302 N.C. 397, 279 S.E.2d 351 (1981); Overton v. Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ., 51 N.C. App. 303, 276 S.E.2d 458, aff'd, 304 N.C. 312, 283 S.E.2d 495 (1981); North Carolina Dep't of Cor. v. Gibson, 58 N.C. App. 241, 293 S.E.2d 664 (1982); Faulkner v. New Bern-Craven County Bd. of Educ., 65 N.C. App. 483, 309 S.E.2d 548 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 311 N.C. 42, 316 S.E.2d 281 (1984); Crump v. Board of Educ., 79 N.C. App. 372, 339 S.E.2d 483, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 333, 346 S.E.2d 137 (1986).

Consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a decision under the "whole record" test does not allow the Supreme Court to replace the agency's judgment where there are two reasonably conflicting views. However, the Supreme Court is required to take into account the evidence supporting the agency's decision as well as the evidence that detracts from the weight of that evidence and its decision. In re Broad & Gales Creek Community Ass'n, 300 N.C. 267, 266 S.E.2d 645 (1980).

The "whole record" test properly takes into account the specialized expertise of the staff of an administrative agency, and thus does not allow the reviewing court to substitute its own judgment for that of the agency. It does require, however, that the court take into account evidence in the record which fairly detracts from the weight of the evidence the agency relied upon to make its decision. High Rock Lake Ass'n v. North Carolina Envtl. Mgt. Comm'n, 51 N.C. App. 275, 276 S.E.2d 472 (1981).

Testimony of All Witnesses. - Under the whole record test, judge reviewing an administrative decision must consider the complete testimony of all the witnesses. In re Environmental Mgt. Comm'n, 53 N.C. App. 135, 280 S.E.2d 520 (1981).

The reviewing court must take into account contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn and determine whether the administrative decision had a rational basis in the evidence. Henderson v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 91 N.C. App. 527, 372 S.E.2d 887 (1988).

Trial court's failure to remand a final agency decision to the department where the department failed to provide a rationale for rejecting the administrative law judge's recommendation was reversible error since the trial court could not have made a reasonable determination as to whether the department's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence. D.B. v. Blue Ridge Ctr., 173 N.C. App. 401, 619 S.E.2d 418 (2005).

Judgment Held to Meet Requirements of Section. - Where the judgment recited that the court had reviewed the record and matters on file and had considered the oral arguments and relevant statutory provisions, and based on these considerations, the judge concluded that declaratory ruling was not erroneous as a matter of law and was due to be affirmed, the judgment met all the requirements of this section and was clearly sufficient as a matter of law. Shepherd v. Consolidated Judicial Retirement Sys., 89 N.C. App. 560, 366 S.E.2d 604 (1988).

The trial court applied the "whole record test," the correct standard of review, to determine the sufficiency of the evidence, thus, no further findings were necessary where the court determined that the Real Estate Commission properly refused to license an applicant on the basis that he did not possess the requisite integrity because he had been convicted of soliciting a crime against nature. Hodgkins v. North Carolina Real Estate Comm'n, 130 N.C. App. 626, 504 S.E.2d 789 (1998).

Trial court properly applied the whole record test as the standard of review to a decision by the North Carolina Environmental Management Commission to approve a dam and reservoir project, and the trial court properly concluded that there was substantial competent evidence to support the Commission's determination that the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources provided reasonable assurance that the State of North Carolina's water quality standards would not be violated by the proposed project. Deep River Citizens' Coalition v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 165 N.C. App. 206, 598 S.E.2d 565 (2004).

Although the trial court did not specify the standard of review it applied, detail its findings of fact, or delineate its conclusions of law, appellate review of the whole record and transcripts showed no grounds existed to warrant reversal of the State Personnel Commission's [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] final decision to reinstate a trainee with the Department of Revenue who was terminated during a probationary period because of discrimination based upon his religious practices. Vanderburg v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue, 168 N.C. App. 598, 608 S.E.2d 831 (2005).

Certified public accounting firm failed to show that the North Carolina State Board of Certified Public Accountant Examiners erred by denying the accounting firm's proposed name change as the Board had authority under G.S. 93-12 to regulate name changes, and the Board's decision that the proposed name change had a capacity or tendency to deceive, in violation of N.C. Admin. Code. Tit. 21, r. 8N.0307, was supported by substantial evidence under the whole record test. McGladrey & Pullen, LLP v. N.C. State Bd. of CPA Exam'rs, 171 N.C. App. 610, 615 S.E.2d 339, cert. denied, notice of appeal dismissed, 360 N.C. 65, 621 S.E.2d 627 (2005), aff'd, 360 N.C. 399, 627 S.E.2d 461 (2006).

Substantial evidence on the whole record supported the Environmental Management Commission's finding that a contractor had nine open burning piles that were not 1,000 feet from a dwelling; the contractor presented no evidence showing that the open burning piles were located on the same property as the nearby residence. MW Clearing & Grading, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 171 N.C. App. 170, 614 S.E.2d 568 ((2005)), cert. denied, 360 N.C. 65, 623 S.E.2d 585, rev'd in part, 360 N.C. 392, 628 S.E.2d 379 (2006) (as to finding violations rather than one).

Substantial evidence existed to support findings by administrative law judge and trial court that employee who was not promoted by a state agency met her burden to show that the agency intentionally discriminated against her, where the employee presented evidence from which the finder of fact could conclude she was more qualified than the successful applicant based on her education, seniority, overall record with the agency, outstanding grades on performance reports, and higher scores on the interviewing and screening tests. Gordon v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 173 N.C. App. 22, 618 S.E.2d 280 (2005).

Substantial evidence supported the State Bureau of Investigation's (SBI's) decision that just cause justified terminating a special agent where the ALJ weighed the conflicting testimony, concluded that she had consumed alcohol and lied about it, considered character testimony, and sufficiently addressed the just cause factors. Brewington v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 254 N.C. App. 1, 802 S.E.2d 115 (2017), review denied, 371 N.C. 343, 813 S.E.2d 857, 2018 N.C. LEXIS 464 (2018).

Insufficiency of an agency's findings does not relieve trial court of responsibility for considering all competent evidence in the whole record to determine whether substantial evidence is present to support the commission's conclusions. Community Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. North Carolina Sav. & Loan Comm'n, 43 N.C. App. 493, 259 S.E.2d 373 (1979).

Conflicting Evidence. - When evidence is conflicting, the standard for judicial review of administrative decisions is that of the "whole record" test. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547, rehearing denied, 301 N.C. 107, 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980), overruled on other grounds, In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 132 (2017); Lackey v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 306 N.C. 231, 293 S.E.2d 171 (1982).

The "whole record" test does not allow the reviewing court to replace the board's judgment as between two reasonable conflicting views, even though the court could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter been before it de novo. Wilkie v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 118 N.C. App. 475, 455 S.E.2d 871 (1995).

The whole record test is not a tool of judicial intrusion; instead it merely gives a reviewing court the capability to determine whether an administrative decision has a rational basis in the evidence. Thus, the task before the trial court is to consider all the evidence, both that which supports the decision of the board and that which detracts from it. Goodwin v. Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ., 67 N.C. App. 243, 312 S.E.2d 892, cert. denied, 311 N.C. 304, 317 S.E.2d 680 (1984).

The "whole record" test is not a tool of judicial intrusion and the court is not permitted to replace the agency's judgment with its own even though the court might rationally justify reaching a different conclusion. Floyd v. North Carolina Dep't of Commerce, 99 N.C. App. 125, 392 S.E.2d 660 (1990).

The "whole record" standard of review is not intended to encourage "judicial duplication" of administrative decision-making. Watson v. North Carolina Real Estate Comm'n, 87 N.C. App. 637, 362 S.E.2d 294 (1987), cert. denied, 321 N.C. 746, 365 S.E.2d 296 (1988).

Mathematically Inconsistent Testimony. - Commissioner's derived figure for underwriting profit would not be based on "substantial evidence" if it relied on mathematically inconsistent testimony. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 96 N.C. App. 220, 385 S.E.2d 510 (1989).

Court May Not Replace Agency's Judgment with Its Own. - The "whole record" test set forth in subdivision (5) of former G.S. 150A-51 does not allow the reviewing court to replace the board's judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter been before it de novo. Thompson v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 292 N.C. 406, 233 S.E.2d 538 (1977); Chesnutt v. Peters, 300 N.C. 359, 266 S.E.2d 623 (1980); North Carolina A & T Univ. v. Kimber, 49 N.C. App. 46, 270 S.E.2d 492 (1980); Overton v. Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ., 51 N.C. App. 303, 276 S.E.2d 458, aff'd, 304 N.C. 312, 283 S.E.2d 495 (1981); Faulkner v. New Bern-Craven County Bd. of Educ., 65 N.C. App. 483, 309 S.E.2d 548 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 311 N.C. 42, 316 S.E.2d 281 (1984); Crump v. Board of Educ., 79 N.C. App. 372, 339 S.E.2d 483, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 333, 346 S.E.2d 137 (1986).

The "whole record" test is distinguishable from both de novo review and the "any competent evidence" standard of review. Under the "whole record" test, the reviewing court cannot replace the board's judgment between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court could have reached a different conclusion had the matter been before it de novo. Boehm v. North Carolina Bd. of Podiatry Exmrs., 41 N.C. 567, 255 S.E.2d 328, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 294, 259 S.E.2d 298 (1979); North Carolina Dep't of Cor. v. Gibson, 58 N.C. App. 241, 293 S.E.2d 664 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 308 N.C. 131, 301 S.E.2d 78 (1983).

The whole record test does not allow the reviewing court to replace the board's judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter been heard before it de novo. Community Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. North Carolina Sav. & Loan Comm'n, 43 N.C. App. 493, 259 S.E.2d 373 (1979); Dailey v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 60 N.C. App. 441, 299 S.E.2d 473, rev'd on other grounds, 309 N.C. 710, 309 S.E.2d 219 (1983); Meads v. North Carolina Dep't of Agric., 349 N.C. 656, 509 S.E.2d 165 (1998).

No court may weigh evidence presented to the State board and substitute its evaluation of the evidence for that of the board. In re Appeal of Amp, Inc., 287 N.C. 547, 215 S.E.2d 752 (1975); North Carolina Dep't of Cor. v. Gibson, 58 N.C. App. 241, 293 S.E.2d 664 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 308 N.C. 131, 301 S.E.2d 78 (1983).

The mere existence of conflicting evidence does not permit the reviewing court to weigh the evidence and substitute its determination for that of the administrative agency. The credibility of the witnesses and the resolution of conflicts in their testimony is a matter for the agency, not a reviewing court. Dailey v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 60 N.C. App. 441, 299 S.E.2d 473, rev'd on other grounds, 309 N.C. 710, 309 S.E.2d 219 (1983).

The whole record test does not allow the reviewing court to replace the board's judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter been before it de novo. On the other hand, the whole record rule requires the court, in determining the substantiality of evidence supporting the board's decision, to take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the board's evidence. Goodwin v. Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ., 67 N.C. App. 243, 312 S.E.2d 892, cert. denied, 311 N.C. 304, 317 S.E.2d 680 (1984).

The "whole record" test does not permit the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for the agency's as between two reasonably conflicting views; however, it does require the court to take into account both the evidence justifying the agency's decision and the contradictory evidence from which a different result could be reached. Floyd v. North Carolina Dep't of Commerce, 99 N.C. App. 125, 392 S.E.2d 660 (1990).

In applying the whole record test, reasonable but conflicting views emerge from the evidence, the Court of Appeals cannot replace the agency's judgment with its own. It must, however, take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the evidence which supports the decision. Ultimately it must determine whether the decision has a rational basis in the evidence. GMC v. Kinlaw, 78 N.C. App. 521, 338 S.E.2d 114 (1985); In re Kozy, 91 N.C. App. 342, 371 S.E.2d 778 (1988), cert. denied, 299 N.C. 736, 267 S.E.2d 672 (1980).

The reviewing court may reverse or modify an agency's decision if the substantial rights of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; this standard, the "whole record" test, does not allow the reviewing court to replace the agency's judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter been before it de novo. Mendenhall v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 119 N.C. App. 644, 459 S.E.2d 820 (1995).

The whole record test does not permit a reviewing court to replace the Disciplinary Hearing Commission's judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court may have justifiably reached a different decision. North Carolina State Bar v. Maggiolo, 124 N.C. App. 22, 475 S.E.2d 727 (1996).

Although the trial court impermissibly replaced the administrative law judge's judgment of the credibility of two witnesses with its own, this error was not prejudicial, as this finding had no bearing on the ultimate issue in the case. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety v. Greene, 172 N.C. App. 530, 616 S.E.2d 594 (2005).

Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence. - It is for the administrative agency to determine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, to draw inferences from the facts, and to appraise conflicting and circumstantial evidence. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547, rehearing denied, 301 N.C. 107, 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980), overruled on other grounds, In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 132 (2017).

Agency's Findings of Fact Supported by Competent Evidence Are Conclusive. - The administrative findings of fact made by the State Board of Opticians, if supported by competent, material and substantial evidence in view of the entire record, are conclusive upon a reviewing court, and not within the scope of its reviewing powers. In re Berman, 245 N.C. 612, 96 S.E.2d 836 (1957); In re Hawkins, 17 N.C. App. 378, 194 S.E.2d 540, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 283 N.C. 393, 196 S.E.2d 275, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1001, 94 S. Ct. 355, 38 L. Ed. 2d 237 (1973); Faulkner v. North Carolina State Hearing Aid Dealers & Fitters Bd., 38 N.C. App. 222, 247 S.E.2d 668 (1978).

When the judge of the superior court sits as an appellate court to review the decision of an administrative agency pursuant to this section, the findings of fact made by the administrative agency, if supported by competent, material and substantial evidence when viewed on the record as a whole, are conclusive upon the reviewing court. North Carolina Dep't of Cor. v. Gibson, 58 N.C. App. 241, 293 S.E.2d 664 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 308 N.C. 131, 301 S.E.2d 78 (1983).

The law of this State regarding the respective roles of the administrative agency and the reviewing court concerning conflicting evidence is premised on the notion that the credibility of the witnesses and the resolution of conflicts in their testimony is for the agency, not a reviewing court, and the findings of the agency supported by competent evidence, are conclusive upon judicial review of the agency's order. Dailey v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 60 N.C. App. 441, 299 S.E.2d 473, rev'd on other grounds, 309 N.C. 710, 309 S.E.2d 219 (1983).

When the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Resources, Division of Facility Services, Certificate of Need Section, denied a health system's request for a certificate of need (CON) to build a hospital and granted a CON to the system's competitor, competent evidence supported the agency's finding that, even though the system had previously been granted a CON for a different project, the system was not going to complete that project, and a requirement that the agency "consider" the previously granted CON did not require the agency to find that the system would successfully develop the previously approved project and factor a hypothetical completed hospital into the agency's determinations regarding the population to be served and the possibility of duplicative services. Good Hope Health Sys., LLC v. N.C. HHS, 188 N.C. App. 68, 658 S.E.2d 665, review denied, 362 N.C. 470, 666 S.E.2d 484 (2008).

Administrative law judge's (ALJ) conclusion that an agency did not establish just cause for a state employee's dismissal was upheld because: (1) the ALJ did not have to defer to the agency in finding if just cause existed, as the agency had the burden to show just cause, and (2) substantial evidence supported the ALJ's factual findings that the employee's unacceptable personal conduct did not warrant the sanction of dismissal, making those findings binding on appeal, as the ALJ was the sole fact-finder. Harris v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 252 N.C. App. 94, 798 S.E.2d 127, aff'd, 370 N.C. 386, 808 S.E.2d 142, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 1020 (2017).

Court May Not Make Findings at Variance Therewith. - The court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the State Board of Opticians in making findings of fact. In re Berman, 245 N.C. 612, 96 S.E.2d 836 (1957).

Where the superior court, at the instance of appellant, found additional facts which the Tax Review Board had, although requested, refused to make, the court, in making these findings, weighed the evidence and substituted its evaluation of the evidence for that of the Board, and in so doing it exceeded its right of review. Clark Equip Co. v. Johnson, 261 N.C. 269, 134 S.E.2d 327 (1964).

Upon a review of an order of the Property Tax Commission, the superior court is without authority to make findings at variance with the findings of the board when the findings of the board are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence. In re Appeal of Amp, Inc., 287 N.C. 547, 215 S.E.2d 752 (1975). See also, In re Property of Pine Raleigh Corp., 258 N.C. 398, 128 S.E.2d 855 (1963); In re Appeal of Reeves Broadcasting Corp., 273 N.C. 571, 160 S.E.2d 728 (1968).

When Court May Make Findings at Variance with Agency's. - Where the reviewing court determines that the findings of the agency are not supported by substantial evidence, the court may make findings of variance with those of the agency. Scroggs v. North Carolina Criminal Justice Educ. & Training Stds. Comm'n, 101 N.C. App. 699, 400 S.E.2d 742 (1991).

Finding of Fact in Accordance with Uncontradicted Evidence. - When an administrative body finds a fact in accordance with uncontradicted evidence, little remains for the reviewing court to do, other than to find no error in the administrative body's election to accord the necessary weight and credibility to the testimony. North Carolina Dep't of Cor. v. Gibson, 58 N.C. App. 241, 293 S.E.2d 664 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 308 N.C. 131, 301 S.E.2d 78 (1983).

Agency's Judgment Must Be Affirmed If Supported by Competent Evidence. - The reviewing court, while obligated to consider evidence of record that detracts from the administrative ruling, is not free to weigh all of the evidence and reach its own conclusions on the merits. If, after all the record has been reviewed, substantial competent evidence is found which would support the agency ruling, the ruling must stand. Substantial evidence in this context has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Dailey v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 60 N.C. App. 441, 299 S.E.2d 473, rev'd on other grounds, 309 N.C. 710, 309 S.E.2d 219 (1983).

The "whole record" test requires the board's judgment to be affirmed if upon consideration of the whole record as submitted, the facts found by the board are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence, taking into account any contradictory evidence, or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn. Boehm v. North Carolina Bd. of Podiatry Exmrs., 41 N.C. App. 567, 255 S.E.2d 328, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 294, 259 S.E.2d 298 (1979).

The reviewing court, while obligated to consider evidence of record that detracts from the administrative ruling, is not free to weigh all of the evidence and reach its own conclusions of the merits. If, after the record has been reviewed, substantial competent evidence is found which would support the agency ruling, the ruling must stand. Community Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. North Carolina Sav. & Loan Comm'n, 43 N.C. App. 493, 259 S.E.2d 373 (1979).

Agency findings of fact are conclusive if, upon review of the whole record, they are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence. Humana Hosp. Corp. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 81 N.C. App. 628, 345 S.E.2d 235 (1986).

Trial court erred in applying the whole record test when it reversed a decision of the North Carolina Mining Commission, approving the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources' (DENR) revocation of petitioner's permit under the Mining Act of 1971, G.S. 74-46 et seq., because, contrary to the trial court's conclusion, the DENR presented substantial evidence that petitioner's mining operations had a significant adverse impact on the Appalachian Trail where a witness testified to the impact, the DENR presented three analyses submitted by their consultants reporting in detail the negative impacts, and petitioner submitted no evidence to the contrary. Clark Stone Co. v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 164 N.C. App. 24, 594 S.E.2d 832 (2004), appeal dismissed, 358 N.C. 731, 603 S.E.2d 878 (2004).

North Carolina State Banking Commission's decision denying the applications for licensure for two mortgage loan officers was upheld on appeal and the lower court did not err by relying upon a previously entered default judgment against the two since the applicants' prior mortgage company had been awarded that default judgment for engaging in a pattern of business operations regarding false and misleading representations, and they were not exempt from the qualifications of G.S. 53-243.05 [see now 53-244.010 et seq.]pursuant to a grandfather provision, because that grandfather provision only exempted already licensed persons from taking the three-year training requirement. State ex rel. Banking Comm'n Against Weiss v. N.C. Comm'r of Banks, 174 N.C. App. 78, 620 S.E.2d 540 (2005).

Because evidence before the State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] (SPC) showed that, based on her interview and writing sample scores, an employee ranked lowest out of all of the applicants for a position, and two of the panel members testified that based on these rankings, they considered the chosen candidate to be the best applicant for that position, the trial court did not err when it failed to limit its application of the whole-record test in determining whether the decision of the SPC was supported by substantial competent evidence. N.C. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety v. Greene, 172 N.C. App. 530, 616 S.E.2d 594 (2005).

Substantial evidence supported a decision by the Division of Land Resources to approve an applicant's request for modifications to its mining permit because none of the criteria in G.S. 74-51(d)(1)-(7) were implicated, and that, to the extent any of the criteria were implicated, any adverse affects, including, inter alia, decreased wildlife, structural damage, scenic effects, and groundwater concerns, would be mitigated by the applicant as required under the terms of the permit modification. Stark v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 224 N.C. App. 491, 736 S.E.2d 553 (2012), review denied and cert. dismissed, 366 N.C. 589, 743 S.E.2d 193, 2013 N.C. LEXIS 547 (2013).

Reversal of Decisions When Supported. - Upon review, the decision of the Board of Alcoholic Control may be reversed if substantial rights of the licensee are prejudiced by administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions which are not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted. Underwood v. State Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 278 N.C. 623, 181 S.E.2d 1 (1971).

An agency decision may be reversed or modified if it is unsupported by substantial evidence, in view of the entire record as submitted. This standard of review is known as the "whole record" test. GMC v. Kinlaw, 78 N.C. App. 521, 338 S.E.2d 114 (1985).

Trial court properly reversed order of state board of elections ordering a new election based on the fact that it did not agree with the propriety of the county board's reliance on the affidavits of ineligible voters to show the effect of those votes on the outcome of the election, as the established law of the State holds that such testimony is proper. In re Harper, 118 N.C. App. 698, 456 S.E.2d 878 (1995).

Findings of Fact by Judge Not Required. - When the judge of the superior court sits as an appellate court to review the decision of an administrative agency pursuant to former G.S. 150A-51, the judge is not required to make findings of fact. Faulkner v. North Carolina State Hearing Aid Dealers and Fitters Bd., 38 N.C. App. 222, 247 S.E.2d 668 (1978).

Findings Based on Unsworn Statement Not Authorized. - Absent stipulations or waiver, a zoning board of adjustment may not base critical findings of fact as to the existence or nonexistence of a nonconforming use on unsworn statements. Jarrell v. Board of Adjustment, 258 N.C. 476, 128 S.E.2d 879 (1963).

Applicability of "Whole Record" Test to Insurance Ratemaking Proceedings. - The "whole record" test is applicable to judicial review of administrative decisions in North Carolina, and both former G.S. 58-9.6(b)(5) (now G.S. 58-2-90(b)(5)) and former G.S. 150A-51(5) put forth that test as a proper standard of judicial review of insurance ratemaking proceedings. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547, rehearing denied, 301 N.C. 107, 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980), overruled on other grounds, In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 132 (2017).

The superior court did not exceed the bounds of appropriate judicial review by engaging in independent fact finding when it reversed the Commissioner of Motor Vehicle's decision upon a review of the whole record, upon finding that the findings of fact and conclusions of law set out by the Commissioner were unsupported by substantial evidence. Star Auto. Co. v. Saab-Scania of Am., Inc., 84 N.C. App. 531, 353 S.E.2d 260 (1987).

Record Devoid of Substantial Evidence. - Department of Human Resources erred in terminating spousal support where the record is clear that nursing home resident wanted his "money" but the record was devoid of any substantial evidence that he intended to apply all of his income, exceeding his personal needs allowance, to his nursing care, rather than towards the support of his wife. English v. Britt, 121 N.C. App. 320, 465 S.E.2d 48 (1996).

Substantial evidence supported school board's decision to suspend a student for disruptive behavior, hazing, and disorderly conduct where the student pulled a classmate's pants down in front of other people, exposing her buttocks; the principal testified that having the student present while others talked about the incident could have created a disruption to the learning environment. Alexander v. Cumberland County Bd. of Educ., 171 N.C. App. 649, 615 S.E.2d 408 (2005).

Review of disciplinary hearing decisions of the Disciplinary Hearing Commission is governed by the "whole record" test. North Carolina State Bar v. Maggiolo, 124 N.C. App. 22, 475 S.E.2d 727 (1996).

Improper Application. - Although a trial court properly reviewed, under G.S. 150B-51(b)(5), a final agency decision of a contested case petition filed pursuant to G.S. 150B-23, the trial court incorrectly applied the standard of review by making its own findings of fact on unappealed issues. Town of Wallace v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., Div. of Water Quality, 160 N.C. App. 49, 584 S.E.2d 809 (2003).

Substantial Evidence Supported Administrative Law Judge's Recommended Decision. - Substantial evidence supported an administrative law judge's (ALJ) ruling that the North Carolina Department of Transportation (DOT) had just cause to dismiss an employee for unacceptable personal conduct where he knowingly violated the DOT's Statement of Understanding and Internet Policy as: (1) the employee's denial of knowledge of the Statement of Understanding was not credible, (2) the employee's claim that he was unaware that he had to obtain his supervisor's approval before installing software on his work computer was not believed by the ALJ, (3) the employee admitted not having permission to install software on his computer, and (4) the unauthorized installation of software was inconsistent with the DOT's objective to ensure that its files and computer network system were properly protected. Teague v. N.C. DOT, 177 N.C. App. 215, 628 S.E.2d 395 (2006), cert. denied, 362 N.C. 373, 662 S.E.2d 395 (2008), cert. dismissed, mandamus dism'd, - N.C. - , 677 S.E.2d 842 (2009), cert. denied, 722 S.E.2d 602, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 381 (2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 444, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 7842, 184 L. Ed. 2d 271 (U.S. 2012).

Substantial evidence supported an administrative law judge's factual findings in support of a recommendation to terminate a career state employee because the evidence showed the employee (1) left an inmate in handcuffs despite not regarding the inmate as a threat, (2) did not ensure the inmate was monitored, (3) did not complete reports, and (4) did not accept personal responsibility. Blackburn v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 246 N.C. App. 196, 784 S.E.2d 509 (2016).

Substantial Circumstantial Evidence Supported Agency's Decision. - Trial court did not err in its allocation of the burden of proof on a chicken processing facility operator because he burden of proof rests on the petitioner challenging the decision of the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources. House of Raeford Farms, Inc. v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 242 N.C. App. 294, 774 S.E.2d 911 (2015).

V. ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS FINDINGS, DECISIONS, ETC.

.

Infection of an agency decision by consideration of arbitrary and capricious matter is clearly violative of subdivision (6) of former G.S. 150A-51. North Carolina A & T Univ. v. Kimber, 49 N.C. App. 46, 270 S.E.2d 492 (1980).

Where an employee has engaged in off-duty criminal conduct, the agency need not show actual harm to its interests to demonstrate just cause for an employee's dismissal; however, it is well established that administrative agencies may not engage in arbitrary and capricious conduct. Eury v. North Carolina Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 115 N.C. App. 590, 446 S.E.2d 383 (1994), cert. denied, 338 N.C. 309, 451 S.E.2d 635 (1994).

Rational Nexus Required. - In cases in which an employee has been dismissed based upon an act of off-duty criminal conduct, the agency must demonstrate that the dismissal is supported by the existence of a rational nexus between the type of criminal conduct committed and the potential adverse impact on the employee's future ability to perform for the agency. Eury v. North Carolina Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 115 N.C. App. 590, 446 S.E.2d 383 (1994), cert. denied, 338 N.C. 309, 451 S.E.2d 635 (1994).

Factors to Consider in Determining If a Nexus Exists. - In determining whether a rational nexus exists between the type of off-duty criminal activity conducted by the employee and the employee's future ability to do his job, the Commission may consider the following factors: (1) how the conduct may have adversely affected clients or colleagues; (2) the relationship between the work performed by the employee and the type of criminal conduct committed; (3) the likelihood of recurrence of the questioned conduct and how the conduct may affect work performance, work quality, and the agency's goodwill and interests; (4) the proximity or remoteness in time of the conduct to the commencement of the disciplinary proceedings; (5) extenuating or aggravating circumstances; (6) the blameworthiness or praiseworthiness of the motives resulting in the conduct; and (7) the presence or absence of any relevant factors in mitigation. Eury v. North Carolina Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 115 N.C. App. 590, 446 S.E.2d 383 (1994), cert. denied, 338 N.C. 309, 451 S.E.2d 635 (1994).

"Whole Record" Standard of Review Applied. - The "whole record" test is applied when the court considers whether an agency decision is arbitrary and capricious. Brooks v. Rebarco, Inc., 91 N.C. App. 459, 372 S.E.2d 342 (1988).

Action Held Arbitrary and Capricious. - Where the Commissioner of Insurance did nothing more, in adopting a complicated and novel formula for determining underwriting profit, than listen to one employee of an insurance department in a sister state which was refining the policy adopted and which was given only limited approval by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, his approach was a clear example of an arbitrary and capricious action by an administrative agency as contemplated by the North Carolina Legislature in establishing that criterion for judicial review in former G.S. 58-9.6(b)(6) (now G.S. 58-2-90(b)(6)) and subdivision (6) of former G.S. 150A-51. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547, rehearing denied, 301 N.C. 107, 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980), overruled on other grounds, In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 132 (2017).

Action of the Commissioner of Insurance ordering audited data in a ratemaking case was arbitrary and capricious, as contemplated by former G.S. 58-9.6(b)(6) (now G.S. 58-2-90(b)(6)) and subdivision (6) of former G.S. 150A-51, where (1) The order was vague and uncertain in that it did not establish the extent to which examination of "original source documents" was required; (2) It did not make clear whether auditing must be performed by certified public accountants, other accountants, or actuaries; (3) It did not specify the degree of precision and reliability required of "statistical sampling"; (4) It generally did not provide adequate guidelines for compliance with the general conclusion that data in a ratemaking hearing be audited; (5) It included no determination by the Commissioner as to the possibility of performance of his new rule nor whether implementation of the rule would be economically feasible; (6) It included no determination whether statutory time limits could be complied with in face of the new rule; and (7) It included no determination whether the "original source data" contemplated by the new rule was even available for the past years involved in this filing or whether such data, if available, was located in North Carolina or outside the State in the case of the several hundred companies writing insurance in this State. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547, rehearing denied, 301 N.C. 107, 273 S.E.2d 300 (1980), overruled on other grounds, In re Redmond, 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 132 (2017).

Where the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services had never before revoked licenses of ambulance providers for understaffing their ambulances, had no guidelines for such license revocation, and failed to explain adequately its rejection of an administrative law judge's decision to stay revocation, the Department's revocation of a provider's license for understaffing was arbitrary and capricious. Cape Med. Transp., Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 162 N.C. App. 14, 590 S.E.2d 8 (2004).

Where a local board of education appealed a superior court's denial of career status to a teacher, under G.S. 115C-44, the teacher had the burden to show that the board of education's denial of tenure was arbitrary, in that it was not supported by substantial evidence. The board's decision lacked a rational basis in the evidence, and the superior court acted within its authority pursuant to G.S. 150B-51 when it modified the board's decision by directing that the teacher be reinstated with career status. Joyner v. Perquimans County Bd. of Educ., 231 N.C. App. 358, 752 S.E.2d 517 (2013).

Trial court erred in reversing a state agency's decision that it had just cause to terminate an employee where the testimony, pictures, and texts supported a finding that he had touched a housing services consumer sexually without her consent, engaged in inappropriate text messaging with her, and failed to report some of her allegations. Barron v. Eastpointe Human Servs. LME, 246 N.C. App. 364, 786 S.E.2d 304 (2016).

Assistant Principal's Procedural Rights Violated. - Process employed by a county board of education in reaching its decision not to renew an assistant principal's contract violated the assistant's procedural rights because the board based its decision on evidence not contained in the assistant's personnel file and without giving her notice of that evidence and an opportunity to respond to it; thus, the record was insufficient for a determination whether the board's decision was arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, personal, or political. Tobe-Williams v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 234 N.C. App. 453, 759 S.E.2d 680 (2014).

School Board's Termination of Teacher Was Not an Abuse of Discretion. - Where school board took into consideration the attribution rate, the qualifications, certification, evaluations and experience of teachers, and respondent had the lowest level of certification and the least amount of experience, the school board's determination to terminate respondent was not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. Taborn v. Hammonds, 91 N.C. App. 302, 371 S.E.2d 736 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 324 N.C. 546, 380 S.E.2d 513 (1989).

State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] abused its discretion and lacked careful and impartial decisionmaking when it passed over personnel office employee and filled a vacant position with an applicant who did not meet state qualifications for the position and who had filed her application and had been effectively offered the job a month before it was posted. Joyce v. Winston-Salem State Univ., 91 N.C. App. 153, 370 S.E.2d 866, cert. denied, 323 N.C. 476, 373 S.E.2d 862 (1988).

Assessment of Penalty Held Not Arbitrary or Capricious. - Where the penalty assessed by the Department of Natural Resources and Community Development (now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources) was within the statutory limits provided in G.S. 113A-64, and the record evidenced the secretary's reasoned weighing of the penalty factors announced in 15 N.C. Adm. Code 4C.006, which were reasonably related to the act's administration and enforcement, the department's assessment of the monetary penalty in this case was not arbitrary and capricious. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 92 N.C. App. 1, 373 S.E.2d 572 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 324 N.C. 373, 379 S.E.2d 30 (1989).

Dismissal Held Not Arbitrary or Capricious. - Department of Human Resource's dismissal of employee's appeal on grounds it was filed one day after the deadline was neither arbitrary or capricious where employee was informed of the time limits for perfecting appeal, offered assistance for complying with appeal procedures since legal representation was not allowed at that time of the proceeding, and employee's apparent justification for filing late was difficulty in retaining an attorney. Lewis v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 92 N.C. App. 737, 375 S.E.2d 712 (1989).

School Suspension Held Not Arbitrary or Capricious. - Even though a student failed to preserve an equal protection challenge to a suspension by failing to assign error or present authority, the argument was meritless at any rate under arbitrary and capricious review because there was a gender-neutral reason for a longer suspension; prior incidents of "shanking" at a high school did not result in the exposure of buttocks or genitalia. Alexander v. Cumberland County Bd. of Educ., 171 N.C. App. 649, 615 S.E.2d 408 (2005).

Banning Sports Fan for Life Not Arbitrary or Capricious. - In a case where a sports fan was given a lifetime ban from a university's athletic facilities, the decision was not arbitrary and capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence since it was based on a series of incidents that occurred over a number of years. The sports fan had harassed athletes, family members, staff members, and other fans over the years. Donnelly v. Univ. of N.C. 236 N.C. App. 32, 763 S.E.2d 154 (2014).

Issuance of Injunction Requiring Insurance Commissioner to Act Upheld. - The trial court did not exceed its power and authority by issuing its mandatory injunction requiring the Commissioner of Insurance to approve a domestic insurance corporation's plan to reorganize under a holding company structure where the Commissioner acted arbitrarily and capriciously when he disapproved the plan. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 34 N.C. App. 619, 240 S.E.2d 460 (1977).

Showing Necessary to Obtain Relief from Valuations of Property for Taxation. - In order to obtain relief from valuations upon their property by the State Board of Assessment (now the Property Tax Commission), appellant electric membership corporations must show that the methods used in determining true value were illegal and arbitrary, and that appellants were substantially injured by a resulting excessive valuation of their property. Albemarle Elec. Membership Corp. v. Alexander, 282 N.C. 402, 192 S.E.2d 811 (1972); In re Land & Mineral Co., 49 N.C. App. 608, 272 S.E.2d 878 (1980), cert. denied, 302 N.C. 397, 279 S.E.2d 351 (1981).

It is only when the actions of the State Board of Assessment (now the Property Tax Commission) are found to be arbitrary and capricious that courts will interfere with tax assessments because of asserted violations of the due process clause. Albemarle Elec. Membership Corp. v. Alexander, 282 N.C. 402, 192 S.E.2d 811 (1972).

Dismissal Not Required. - Trial court properly conducted a de novo review under G.S. 150B-51(c) of a decision of the North Carolina State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission], as the commission did not adopt an ALJ decision; although the trial court concluded that a captain in an enforcement section of a department of motor vehicles violated a general order in obtaining funding for a captains' meeting, it properly found that there was not cause for dismissal as: (1) the captain held a good faith belief that the captain's actions were within the accepted practice of section employees; (2) a reasonable person in the captain's position would have expected to be warned before being dismissed for such actions; and (3) the captain violated the order, but did not willfully violate the order. Ramsey v. N.C. DMV, 184 N.C. App. 713, 647 S.E.2d 125 (2007), review denied, 362 N.C. 237, 659 S.E.2d 739 (2008).

Evidence Held Sufficient. - There was substantial evidence in the record to support State Code Officials Qualification Board's findings and conclusions as to the revocation of petitioner's certificates based on Board's findings of several different violations of the N.C. Uniform Residential Building Code; many of the violations were plainly visible and should have been discovered by an inspection performed with ordinary care and prudence and many of the remaining violations, although less obvious or more technical, could have been discovered by an inspection performed with ordinary care and prudence. Bunch v. North Carolina Code Officials Qualifications Bd., 119 N.C. App. 293, 458 S.E.2d 248 (1995), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 343 N.C. 97, 468 S.E.2d 55 (1996).

Based on employee's qualifications found by both an administrative law judge and the trial court, substantial evidence existed showing that the employee was objectively better qualified for the position to which another worker was promoted. Therefore, the administrative law judge and the trial court properly found as fact and concluded as a matter of law that the employee was more qualified for the position than the other worker to support her claim of race and gender discrimination. Gordon v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 173 N.C. App. 22, 618 S.E.2d 280 (2005).

Trial court did not err in reversing an administrative law judge's decision that a corporation's decertification as a provider of HIV case management services by the AIDS Care Unit at respondent North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Public Health, (DHHS) was unjustified because the trial court properly applied the de novo standard, in addressing the corporation's contention that the actions of DHHS were arbitrary and capricious; DHHS's actions in decertification of the corporation and not allowing corrective action were not arbitrary or capricious because other HIV case management providers that were allowed corrective action did not have problems with all of their case managers correctly filling out progress notes and billing for services that did not match up to their documentation, and the corporation and other similarly situated providers had notice as to DHHS's requirements to remain certified. Bradley-Reid Corp. v. N.C. HHS, 201 N.C. App. 305, 689 S.E.2d 494 (2009).


§ 150B-52. Appeal; stay of court's decision.

A party to a review proceeding in a superior court may appeal to the appellate division from the final judgment of the superior court as provided in G.S. 7A-27. The scope of review to be applied by the appellate court under this section is the same as it is for other civil cases. In cases reviewed under G.S. 150B-51(c), the court's findings of fact shall be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. Pending the outcome of an appeal, an appealing party may apply to the court that issued the judgment under appeal for a stay of that judgment or a stay of the administrative decision that is the subject of the appeal, as appropriate.

History

(1973, c. 1331, s. 1; 1985, c. 746, s. 1; 1987, c. 878, s. 20; 2000-140, s. 94; 2000-190, s. 12.)

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases below were decided under corresponding provisions of former Chapter 150A and earlier statutes, or under this Chapter prior to the 1991 amendments thereto.

Scope of Appellate Review. - The scope of review to be applied by the appellate court under this section is the same as it is for other civil cases. That is, it must be determined whether the trial court committed any errors of law. American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 63 N.C. App. 38, 303 S.E.2d 649, cert. denied, 309 N.C. 819, 310 S.E.2d 348 (1983); Tay v. Flaherty, 90 N.C. App. 346, 368 S.E.2d 403, cert. denied, 323 N.C. 370, 373 S.E.2d 556 (1988).

Under this section, the appellate court examines the trial court's order for error of law, determining whether the trial court exercised the appropriate scope of review and, if appropriate, deciding whether the court did so properly. Eury v. North Carolina Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 115 N.C. App. 590, 446 S.E.2d 383 (1994), cert. denied, 338 N.C. 309, 451 S.E.2d 635 (1994).

When an appellate court reviews the decision of a lower court, (as opposed to when it reviews an administrative agency's decision on direct appeal), the scope of review to be applied by the appellate court under this section is the same as it is for other civil cases. Henderson v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 91 N.C. App. 527, 372 S.E.2d 887 (1988).

The Court of Appeal's review of the superior court's determination under this section, is limited to whether the superior court made any errors in law in light of the record as a whole. Scroggs v. North Carolina Criminal Justice Educ. & Training Stds. Comm'n, 101 N.C. App. 699, 400 S.E.2d 742 (1991).

Pursuant to this section, court review of a trial court's consideration of a final agency decision is to determine whether the trial court committed any errors of law which would be based upon its failure to properly apply the review standard set forth in G.S. 150B-51. Sherrod v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 105 N.C. App. 526, 414 S.E.2d 50 (1992).

Appellate court found that the superior court, which initially reviewed a decision of the Board of Pharmacy reprimanding a permitee pharmacy chain for negligent acts of its licensed pharmacists, had not erred in finding no arbitrary or capricious action by the Board in choosing a sanction; case law already made it clear that the chain could be vicariously responsible for the pharmacists' actions, and so any sanction listed as applicable to a pharmacist could also be applied against the chain. CVS Pharm., Inc. v. N.C. Bd. of Pharm., 162 N.C. App. 495, 591 S.E.2d 567 (2004).

Appellate court found that the trial court's conclusion of law that the teaching coordinator was not eligible for the substantial salary increase that accompanied the teaching coordinator's attainment of national certification could not be supported by a reading of the relevant statute, G.S. 115C-296.2(b)(2); that statute's language was broad enough to include the teaching coordinator as eligible for the salary increase and the teaching coordinator met all of the statute's requirements for the increase. Rainey v. N.C. Dep't of Pub. Instruction, 181 N.C. App. 666, 640 S.E.2d 790 (2007), rev'd, remanded, 361 N.C. 679, 652 S.E.2d 251 (2007).

In an action arising from allegations of age discrimination, while the superior court properly applied both a de novo review and the whole-record test to the respective issues on appeal under G.S. 150B-51(b) when it reviewed the final decision of the State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] (SPC), it erred when it improperly substituted its judgment for that of the SPC under the whole-record test. Thus, remand was ordered for the superior court to affirm the SPC's final agency decision. Trotter v. N.C. HHS, 189 N.C. App. 655, 659 S.E.2d 749 (2008).

Employee had abandoned any challenge to the findings of fact where she did not challenge specific finding, refer to any particular portion of the record, address any particular finding as not supported by the evidence, or raise any issues with findings she considered material. Rittelmeyer v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 252 N.C. App. 340, 799 S.E.2d 378, review denied, 370 N.C. 67, 803 S.E.2d 385, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 606 (N.C. 2017).

Appellate Review of Improper Constitutional Consideration. - Although the trial court improperly considered a constitutional issue, where that court vacated the Department of Natural Resources and Community Development's assessment based on an interpretation of N.C. Const., Art. IV, § 3, which the department properly challenged on appeal, the Court of Appeals would address that constitutional ground in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 92 N.C. App. 1, 373 S.E.2d 572, supersedeas allowed on reconsideration, 323 N.C. 625, 374 S.E.2d 873 (1988).

Examination for Error - A Twofold Task. - The appellate court should examine the trial court's order for error of law, which has been described as a twofold task: (1) determining whether the trial court exercised the appropriate scope of review and, if appropriate, (2) deciding whether the court did so properly. Amanini v. N.C. Dep't of Human Resources, 114 N.C. App. 668, 443 S.E.2d 114 (1994).

Legal proceeding must be prosecuted by a legal person, whether it be a natural person who is sui juris or a group of individuals or other entity having the capacity to sue and be sued, such as a corporation, partnership, unincorporated association, or governmental body or agency. Even a class action must be prosecuted or defended by one or more named members of the class. A legal proceeding prosecuted by an aggregation of anonymous individuals, known only to their counsel, is a phenomenon unknown to the law of this jurisdiction. In re Coleman, 11 N.C. App. 124, 180 S.E.2d 439 (1971).

Rule that appeal to appellate division may be prosecuted only at the instance of a party or parties aggrieved by the judgment of the court or tribunal from which the appeal is taken applies with as much force to proceedings governed by former Article 33 of Chapter 143 as to ordinary civil cases. In re Coleman, 11 N.C. App. 124, 180 S.E.2d 439 (1971).

No statutory authority exists for the State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] to review an administrative law judge's recommended decision in a case involving an exempt employee. Johnson v. Natural Resources & Community Dev., 98 N.C. App. 334, 391 S.E.2d 48 (1990).

Failure to Cross-Appeal as Waiver. - Where trial court erroneously failed to render conclusions concerning all statutory grounds for review raised by the petition for review, petitioners' failure to cross-appeal any such error to the appellate court waived its consideration on appeal. In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 92 N.C. App. 1, 373 S.E.2d 572, supersedeas allowed on reconsideration, 323 N.C. 625, 374 S.E.2d 873 (1988).

Appeal Must Follow Theory of Trial. - Where petitioner relied upon jurisdiction under former G.S. 143-314 before the trial court, on appeal he could not argue that the trial court had original subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to G.S. 7A-240 based upon a constitutional right to hearing and judicial review, since an appeal must follow the theory of the trial. Grissom v. North Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 34 N.C. App. 381, 238 S.E.2d 311 (1977), cert. denied, 294 N.C. 183, 241 S.E.2d 517 (1978).

Substantial Evidence Found. - Where the trial court made new findings of fact upon de novo review of an administrative decision, the findings were supported by substantial evidence since they were consistent with the testimony of witnesses at a hearing before the administrative law judge. Cape Med. Transp., Inc. v. N.C. HHS, 162 N.C. App. 14, 590 S.E.2d 8 (2004).

Substantial evidence in the record supported an administrative law judge's findings and its dismissal of a day care's petition for a contested case hearing where the day care filed nothing in nearly six months following the filing of the petition, despite receiving several orders from the administrative law judge to file and serve prehearing statements and other responses to motions. Lincoln v. N.C. HHS, Nutrition Branch, 172 N.C. App. 567, 616 S.E.2d 622 (2005).

Remand for Further Findings. - Denial of Medicaid benefits to an undocumented immigrant was reversed and remanded for further findings as the findings were inadequate to support the conclusions of law that the Medicaid benefits for rehabilitative services and chemotherapy, following surgery for medullary non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and spinal cord malignancy, were not to cover the costs of an emergency medical condition. Luna v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 162 N.C. App. 1, 589 S.E.2d 917 (2004).

Demotion Upheld. - Summary judgment for a state agency employer in an employee's petition for review of his demotion was proper where the conduct admitted by the employee constituted "unacceptable personal conduct," and the State Personnel Commission [now the North Carolina Human Resources Commission] determined that its regulations and work rules did not contain any qualification or exception for the explanations asserted by the employee. Hilliard v. N.C. Dep't of Corr., 173 N.C. App. 594, 620 S.E.2d 14 (2005).

Applied in In re Coastal Resources Comm'n, 96 N.C. App. 468, 386 S.E.2d 92 (1989); Professional Food Servs. Mgt., Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Admin., 109 N.C. App. 265, 426 S.E.2d 447 (1993); In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 109 N.C. App. 435, 428 S.E.2d 195 (1993); North Carolina Dep't of Correction v. McNeely, 135 N.C. App. 587, 521 S.E.2d 730 (1999); Chatmon v. N.C. HHS, 175 N.C. App. 85, 622 S.E.2d 684 (2005), overruled in part by Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs. & Div. of Med. Assistance of the N.C. HHS, 364 N.C. 61, 692 S.E.2d 96 (2010); White v. Tippett, 187 N.C. App. 285, 652 S.E.2d 728 (2007); Kelly v. N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 192 N.C. App. 129, 664 S.E.2d 625 (2008); Early v. County of Durham, Dep't of Soc. Servs., 193 N.C. App. 334, 667 S.E.2d 512 (2008), review denied, 363 N.C. 372, 678 S.E.2d 237 (2009); Granger v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 197 N.C. App. 699, 678 S.E.2d 715 (2009); Bradley-Reid Corp. v. N.C. HHS, 201 N.C. App. 305, 689 S.E.2d 494 (2009).

Cited in Brooks v. Dover Elevator Co., 94 N.C. App. 139, 379 S.E.2d 707 (1989); Floyd v. North Carolina Dep't of Commerce, 99 N.C. App. 125, 392 S.E.2d 660 (1990); Cafiero v. North Carolina Bd. of Nursing, 102 N.C. App. 610, 403 S.E.2d 582 (1991); Rector v. North Carolina Sheriffs' Educ. & Training Stds. Comm'n, 103 N.C. App. 527, 406 S.E.2d 613 (1991); Best v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exmrs., 108 N.C. App. 158, 423 S.E.2d 330 (1992); In re Huang, 110 N.C. App. 683, 431 S.E.2d 541 (1993); In re McCrary, 112 N.C. App. 161, 435 S.E.2d 359 (1993); Friends of Hatteras Island Nat'l Historic Maritime Forest Land Trust for Preservation, Inc. v. Coastal Resources Comm'n, 117 N.C. App. 556, 452 S.E.2d 337 (1995); Willoughby v. Board of Trustees, 121 N.C. App. 444, 466 S.E.2d 285 (1996); Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. North Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 126 N.C. App. 409, 485 S.E.2d 333 (1997); N.C. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res. v. Carroll, 358 N.C. 649, 599 S.E.2d 888 (2004); In re Lustgarten, 177 N.C. App. 663, 629 S.E.2d 886 (2006); Bobbitt v. N.C. State Univ., 179 N.C. App. 743, 635 S.E.2d 463 (2006), review denied, 361 N.C. 350, 645 S.E.2d 4, review denied, 361 N.C. 350, 645 S.E.2d 765, (2007); Ramsey v. N.C. DMV, 184 N.C. App. 713, 647 S.E.2d 125 (2007), review denied, 362 N.C. 237, 659 S.E.2d 739 (2008); Meza v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 193 N.C. App. 350, 668 S.E.2d 571 (2008), rev'd 364 N.C. 61, 692 S.E.2d 96 N.C. LEXIS 343 (2010); McCaskill v. Dep't of State Treasurer, Ret. Sys. Div., 204 N.C. App. 373, 695 S.E.2d 108 (2010), aff'd in part, 706 S.E.2d 226, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 140 (2011); Dare County v. N.C. Dep't of Ins., 207 N.C. App. 600, 701 S.E.2d 368 (2010); McCrann v. N.C. HHS, 209 N.C. App. 241, 704 S.E.2d 899, review denied 365 N.C. 198, 710 S.E.2d 23, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 436 (2011); Nanny's Korner Care Ctr. v. N.C. HHS - Div. of Child Dev., 234 N.C. App. 51, 758 S.E.2d 423 (2014); Fowler v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue, 242 N.C. App. 404, 775 S.E.2d 350 (2015).


§§ 150B-53 through 150B-57: Reserved for future codification purposes.

ARTICLE 5. Publication of Administrative Rules.

§§ 150B-58 through 150B-64: Repealed by Session Laws 1991, c. 418, s. 5, effective October 1, 1991.

Editor's Note. - Section 150B-63.1 was repealed by Session Laws 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 1022, s. 1(20).