GSNC

ARTICLE 1. Definitions and Statutory Construction.

Sec.

§ 160A-1. Application and meaning of terms.

Unless otherwise specifically provided, or unless otherwise clearly required by the context, the words and phrases defined in this section shall have the meaning indicated when used in this Chapter.

"Charter" means the entire body of local acts currently in force applicable to a particular city, including articles of incorporation issued to a city by an administrative agency of the State, and any amendments thereto adopted pursuant to 1917 Public Laws, Chapter 136, Subchapter 16, Part VIII, sections 1 and 2, or Article 5, Part 4, of this Chapter.
"City" means a municipal corporation organized under the laws of this State for the better government of the people within its jurisdiction and having the powers, duties, privileges, and immunities conferred by law on cities, towns, and villages. The term "city" does not include counties or municipal corporations organized for a special purpose. "City" is interchangeable with the terms "town" and "village," is used throughout this Chapter in preference to those terms, and shall mean any city as defined in this subdivision without regard to the terminology employed in charters, local acts, other portions of the General Statutes, or local customary usage. The terms "city" or "incorporated municipality" do not include a municipal corporation that, without regard to its date of incorporation, would be disqualified from receiving gasoline tax allocations by G.S. 136-41.2(a), except that the end of status as a city under this sentence shall not affect the levy or collection of any tax or assessment, or any criminal or civil liability, and shall not serve to escheat any property until five years after the end of such status as a city, or until September 1, 1991, whichever comes later.
"Council" means the governing board of a city. "Council" is interchangeable with the terms "board of aldermen" and "board of commissioners," is used throughout this Chapter in preference to those terms, and shall mean any city council as defined in this subdivision without regard to the terminology employed in charters, local acts, other portions of the General Statutes, or local customary usage.
"General law" means an act of the General Assembly applying to all units of local government, to all cities, or to all cities within a class defined by population or other criteria, including a law that meets the foregoing standards but contains a clause or section exempting from its effect one or more cities or all cities in one or more counties.
"Local act" means an act of the General Assembly applying to one or more specific cities by name, or to all cities within one or more specifically named counties. "Local act" is interchangeable with the terms "special act," "public-local act," and "private act," is used throughout this Chapter in preference to those terms, and shall mean a local act as defined in this subdivision without regard to the terminology employed in charters, local acts, or other portions of the General Statutes.
"Mayor" means the chief executive officer of a city by whatever title known.
"Publish," "publication," and other forms of the verb "to publish" mean insertion in a newspaper qualified under G.S. 1-597 to publish legal advertisements in the county or counties in which the city is located.
"Rural Fire Department" means, for the purpose of Articles 4A or 14 of this Chapter, a bona fide department which, as determined by the Commissioner of Insurance, is classified as not less than class "9" in accordance with rating methods, schedules, classifications, underwriting rules, bylaws or regulations effective or applied with respect to the establishment of rates or premiums used or charged pursuant to Article 36 or Article 40 of Chapter 58 of the General Statutes, and which operates fire apparatus and equipment of the value of five thousand dollars ($5,000) or more; but it does not include a municipal fire department.

History

(1971, c. 698, s. 1; 1973, c. 426, s. 3; 1983, c. 636, s. 17.1; 1985 (Reg. Sess., 1986), c. 934, s. 1.)

Local Modification. - Guilford: 2017-210, s. 1(b) (applicable to notices published on or after December 1, 2017); Union: 1983, c. 150; (As to Chapter 160A) Cabarrus: 1985, c. 194, s. 3.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1983, c. 636, which amended this section, in s. 37.1, as amended by Session Laws 1983, c. 768, s. 25, provided: "The General Assembly intends by this act to repeal all acts and provisions of acts that modify the application to particular cities and towns of Parts 2 and 3 of Article 4A of Chapter 160A of the General Statutes or that exempt particular cities or towns from the application of either or both of those two Parts. Therefore, all such acts and provisions of acts, even if not specifically listed and repealed in Sections 26 through 35.4 of this act, are repealed. Neither this section nor Sections 26 through 35.4 of this act shall affect any annexation in progress on the dates of ratification of this act under any of the repealed or amended sections."

Section 38 of Session Laws 1983, c. 636 provided: "This act shall be effective with respect to all annexations where resolutions of intent are adopted on or after the date of ratification of this act, except that Sections 36 and 37 shall become effective with respect to all annexations where resolutions of intent are adopted on or after July 1, 1984, Sections 25.1 through 35.5 and Section 37.1 are effective upon ratification and Section 25 shall become effective as provided in that section. No annexation where a resolution of intent was adopted prior to the date of ratification of this act shall be affected by this act except as provided in Section 25."

The act was ratified June 29, 1983.

Legal Periodicals. - For note, "Tax Increment Financing in North Carolina: The Myth of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty," see 83 N.C. L. Rev. 1526 (2005).

For article, "Do North Carolina Governments Need Home Rule," see 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1983 (2006).

For article, "Democracy in Rural America,” see 98 N. C.L. Rev. 837 (2020).

CASE NOTES

Constitutionality. - See In re Annexation Ordinance No. 1219, 62 N.C. App. 588, 303 S.E.2d 380, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 309 N.C. 820, 310 S.E.2d 351 (1983).

Enactment Held a "Local Act". - Under this Chapter, Session Laws 1967, c. 506, which permits the City of Durham to employ the "quick-take" condemnation procedure provided by Article 9 of Chapter 136 of the General Statutes, is a local act and a part of the charter of the City of Durham. City of Durham v. Manson, 285 N.C. 741, 208 S.E.2d 662 (1974).

Session Laws 1967, c. 506, relating to municipal eminent domain procedures, is a legislative act which applies specifically to Durham by name, and is, therefore, a "local act" as that term is defined in subdivision (5) of this section, and as such it is subject to the applicable provisions of this Chapter. City of Durham v. Manson, 21 N.C. App. 161, 204 S.E.2d 41, modified and aff'd, 285 N.C. 741, 208 S.E.2d 662 (1974).

Time Limitations. - Landowner's challenges to zoning ordinance amendments were time-barred under the two-month limitations period of G.S. 160A-364.1; even if an amendment was adopted inconsistent with the notice requirements of G.S. ch. 160A, an action which attacked the validity of the amendment but was commenced in more time than the statutory period from the adoption of the amendment was barred. Templeton v. Town of Boone, 208 N.C. App. 50, 701 S.E.2d 709 (2010).

Housing authority provided a governmental function and was entitled to rely on doctrine of governmental immunity as it related to a personal injury suit brought against it; G.S. 160A-485(a) did not control whether or not the housing authority had legal capacity to waive its immunity by buying insurance, but authority could have accepted liability to the extent of insurance purchased, and the case was therefore remanded since the appellate court was unable to discern whether the trial court's denial of the housing authority's motion to dismiss was premised upon the housing authority's insurance coverage. Evans v. Hous. Auth., 359 N.C. 50, 602 S.E.2d 668 (2004).

Cited in In re University of N.C. 300 N.C. 563, 268 S.E.2d 472 (1980); Thrash v. City of Asheville, 95 N.C. App. 457, 383 S.E.2d 657 (1989); Garrity v. Morrisville Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 115 N.C. App. 273, 444 S.E.2d 653 (1994); Disher v. Weaver, 308 F. Supp. 2d 614 (M.D.N.C. 2004); Boyd v. Robeson County, 169 N.C. App. 460, 621 S.E.2d 1 (2005), cert. denied, 359 N.C. 629, 615 S.E.2d 866 (2005); City of Asheville v. State, 369 N.C. 80, 794 S.E.2d 759 (2016).

§ 160A-2. Effect upon prior laws.

Nothing in this Chapter shall repeal or amend any city charter in effect as of January 1, 1972, or any portion thereof, unless this Chapter or a subsequent enactment of the General Assembly shall clearly show a legislative intent to repeal or supersede all local acts. The provisions of this Chapter, insofar as they are the same in substance as laws in effect as of December 31, 1971, are intended to continue such laws in effect and not to be new enactments. The enactment of this Chapter shall not require the readoption of any city ordinance enacted pursuant to laws that were in effect before January 1, 1972, and are restated or revised herein. The provisions of this Chapter shall not affect any act heretofore done, any liability incurred, any right accrued or vested, or any suit or prosecution begun or cause of action accrued as of January 1, 1972.

History

(1971, c. 698, s. 1.)

CASE NOTES

Specific legislative intent of this Chapter was not to repeal local acts by implication, but to save them. City of Durham v. Manson, 285 N.C. 741, 208 S.E.2d 662 (1974).

It was the express intent of the legislature to retain local acts unless otherwise specifically indicated. City of Durham v. Manson, 21 N.C. App. 161, 204 S.E.2d 41, modified and aff'd, 285 N.C. 741, 208 S.E.2d 662 (1974).

This section manifests the legislative concern that certain prior laws should be preserved. City of Durham v. Manson, 21 N.C. App. 161, 204 S.E.2d 41, modified and aff'd, 285 N.C. 741, 208 S.E.2d 662 (1974).

This section is made more meaningful by reference to G.S. 160A-1, wherein the definitions of "charter" and "local act" are contained. City of Durham v. Manson, 21 N.C. App. 161, 204 S.E.2d 41, modified and aff'd, 285 N.C. 741, 208 S.E.2d 662 (1974).

Chapter 506 of Session Laws 1967, which became a part of the charter of the City of Durham, was not repealed by this Chapter. City of Durham v. Manson, 285 N.C. 741, 208 S.E.2d 662 (1974).

Applied in Guilford County v. Boyan, 42 N.C. App. 627, 257 S.E.2d 463 (1979).

Cited in Town of Mt. Olive v. Price, 20 N.C. App. 302, 201 S.E.2d 362 (1973).

§ 160A-3. General laws supplementary to charters.

When a procedure that purports to prescribe all acts necessary for the performance or execution of any power, duty, function, privilege, or immunity is provided by both a general law and a city charter, the two procedures may be used as alternatives, and a city may elect to follow either one.
When a procedure for the performance or execution of any power, duty, function, privilege, or immunity is provided by both a general law and a city charter, but the charter procedure does not purport to contain all acts necessary to carry the power, duty, function, privilege, or immunity into execution, the charter procedure shall be supplemented by the general law procedure; but in case of conflict or inconsistency between the two procedures, the charter procedure shall control.
When a power, duty, function, privilege, or immunity is conferred on cities by a general law, and a charter enacted earlier than the general law omits or expressly denies or limits the same power, duty, function, privilege or immunity, the general laws shall supersede the charter.

History

(1971, c. 698, s. 1.)

Local Modification. - Town of Badin: 1989 (Reg. Sess., 1990), c. 894, s. 1, as amended by 2015-253, s. 2; village of Bald Head Island: 1985, c. 156.

CASE NOTES

The provisions of a municipal charter are supplemented by the General Statutes of the State. Parsons v. Wright, 223 N.C. 520, 27 S.E.2d 534 (1943), decided prior to enactment of this section.

City Charter Superseded by State Statute. - Summary judgment was properly awarded to a city and its officials in an action by property owners challenging an annexation because, pursuant to G.S. 160A-3(c), the statutory provision establishing involuntary annexations superseded a city charter provision permitting only voluntary annexations. Brown v. City of Winston-Salem, 171 N.C. App. 266, 614 S.E.2d 599 (2005).

Cited in Moores v. Greensboro Minimum Hous. Stds. Comm'n, 198 N.C. App. 384, 679 S.E.2d 480 (2009); Disher v. Weaver, 308 F. Supp. 2d 614 (M.D.N.C. 2004).

§ 160A-4. Broad construction.

It is the policy of the General Assembly that the cities of this State should have adequate authority to execute the powers, duties, privileges, and immunities conferred upon them by law. To this end, the provisions of this Chapter and of city charters shall be broadly construed and grants of power shall be construed to include any additional and supplementary powers that are reasonably necessary or expedient to carry them into execution and effect: Provided, that the exercise of such additional or supplementary powers shall not be contrary to State or federal law or to the public policy of this State.

History

(1971, c. 698, s. 1.)

Local Modification. - Town of Badin: 1989 (Reg. Sess., 1990), c. 894, s. 1, as amended by 2015-253, s. 2.

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "Economic Development Incentives and North Carolina Local Governments: A Framework for Analysis," see 91 N.C. L. Rev. 2021 (2013).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Some of the cases cited below were decided prior to enactment of this section.

Legislative Mandate. - The North Carolina Supreme Court treats the language in this section as a legislative mandate to construe in a broad fashion the provisions and grants of power contained in this Chapter. Homebuilders Ass'n v. City of Charlotte, 336 N.C. 37, 442 S.E.2d 45 (1994).

Mandate of G.S. 160A-4 Has Replaced "Dillon's Rule." - Narrow rule of statutory construction entitled "Dillon's Rule," used when interpreting municipal powers, has been replaced by the mandate of G.S. 160A-4; and the language of Chapter 160A must be construed in favor of extending powers to a municipality where there is an ambiguity in the authorizing language, or the powers clearly authorized reasonably necessitate additional and supplementary powers to carry them into execution and effect. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Laurinburg, 168 N.C. App. 75, 606 S.E.2d 721, cert. denied, - N.C. - , 615 S.E.2d 660, cert. denied, 359 N.C. 629, - S.E.2d - (2005).

Construction with G.S. 160A-301. - Zoning amendment, which addressed the number of vehicles that could be parked on a private lot, did not address the same subject as G.S. 160A-301, which governed ordinary parking on public vehicular areas; therefore, G.S. 160A-301 is not a more "specific" statute that renders the provisions of G.S. 160A-4 inapplicable because it simply addresses a different subject. Patmore v. Town of Chapel Hill N.C. 233 N.C. App. 133, 757 S.E.2d 302, review denied, 367 N.C. 519, 758 S.E.2d 874, 2014 N.C. LEXIS 447 (2014).

A municipality may not exercise any power not granted to it, and possesses no inherent authority to exercise powers either expressly or impliedly prohibited by statute. Porsh Bldrs., Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 302 N.C. 550, 276 S.E.2d 443 (1981).

Municipal Powers Must Be Expressly Granted or Implied from Express Grants. - A municipal corporation is a political subdivision of the State and can exercise only such powers as are granted in express words, or those necessary or fairly implied or incident to the powers expressly conferred, or those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation. Stephenson v. City of Raleigh, 232 N.C. 42, 59 S.E.2d 195 (1950).

A municipal corporation has only such powers as are granted to it by the General Assembly in its specific charter or by the general laws of the State applicable to all municipal corporations, and the powers granted in its charter will be construed together with those given under the General Statutes. Laughinghouse v. City of New Bern, 232 N.C. 596, 61 S.E.2d 802 (1950); Starbuck v. Town of Havelock, 252 N.C. 176, 113 S.E.2d 278 (1960).

A municipal corporation is a creature of the General Assembly and has no inherent power, but can exercise such powers as are expressly conferred by the General Assembly or such as are necessarily implied by those expressly given. State v. McGraw, 249 N.C. 205, 105 S.E.2d 659 (1958).

An incorporated city or town is an agency created by the State. It has no governmental power or authority except such as has been granted to it by the legislature, expressly or by necessary implication from the powers expressly conferred. State v. Furio, 267 N.C. 353, 148 S.E.2d 275 (1966).

Municipal corporations are created by legislative enactment and possess only those powers conferred in the express language of a statute and those necessarily implied by law therefrom. Porsh Bldrs., Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 302 N.C. 550, 276 S.E.2d 443 (1981).

What Municipal Powers Are Implied. - The implied powers of a municipality are those which are necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted or essential to the accomplishment of the purposes of the corporation. Green v. Kitchin, 229 N.C. 450, 50 S.E.2d 545 (1948), commented on in 27 N.C.L. Rev. 500 (1949).

A municipal corporation is authorized by implication to do an act if the doing of such act is necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted, or is essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation. Harrelson v. City of Fayetteville, 271 N.C. 87, 155 S.E.2d 749 (1967).

Municipal corporations have no inherent police powers and can exercise only those conferred, which powers are subject to strict construction. Kass v. Hedgepeth, 226 N.C. 405, 38 S.E.2d 164 (1946).

An incorporated city or town has no inherent police powers. State v. Furio, 267 N.C. 353, 148 S.E.2d 275 (1966).

A city or town in this State has no inherent police power. It may exercise only such powers as are expressly conferred upon it by the General Assembly or as are necessarily implied from those expressly so conferred. Town of Conover v. Jolly, 277 N.C. 439, 177 S.E.2d 879 (1970).

Town had no Authority to Impose Impact Fees. - Water and sewer "impact fee" ordinances were invalid because the Public Enterprise Statutes failed to empower the town to impose impact fees for future services; the enabling statutes clearly and unambiguously empowered the town to charge for the contemporaneous use of water and sewer services, not to collect fees for future discretionary spending, and because the legislature alone controlled the extension of municipal authority, the ordinances exceeded the powers delegated to the town. Quality Built Homes, Inc. v. Town of Carthage, 369 N.C. 15, 789 S.E.2d 454 (2016).

No Power to Spend Tax Revenues Absent Authorization. - A municipality is a creature of the State, with the powers prescribed by the statute and those necessarily implied by law, and no other; therefore a city or town cannot make a rightful outlay of its tax revenues unless the outlay is explicitly or implicitly authorized by a statute conforming to the Constitution. Horner v. Chamber of Commerce, 231 N.C. 440, 57 S.E.2d 789 (1950), aff'd, 235 N.C. 77, 68 S.E.2d 660 (1952); Wilson v. City of High Point, 238 N.C. 14, 76 S.E.2d 546 (1953).

A municipal corporation has no authority to waive its immunity from tort liability in performance of its governmental functions. Stephenson v. City of Raleigh, 232 N.C. 42, 59 S.E.2d 195 (1950).

Municipal Authority to Charge User Fees. - Applying the broad rule of construction of this section, city possessed the authority to charge regulatory user fees as an additional and supplementary power that was reasonably necessary or expedient to carry a regulatory program into execution and effect. Homebuilders Ass'n v. City of Charlotte, 336 N.C. 37, 442 S.E.2d 45 (1994).

Absent Statutory Authority. - In the absence of statutory authority, a municipality has no authority to contract away or waive its governmental immunity in respect to torts committed in the exercise of its governmental function. Valevais v. City of New Bern, 10 N.C. App. 215, 178 S.E.2d 109 (1970).

Ordinances Having Effect Outside Territorial Limits of Corporation. - While the legislature may confer upon a municipal corporation the power to enact ordinances having effect in territory contiguous to the corporation, in the absence of the grant of such power a city or town may not, by its ordinance, prohibit acts outside its territorial limits or impose criminal liability therefor. State v. Furio, 267 N.C. 353, 148 S.E.2d 275 (1966).

Statutory delegations of power to municipalities should be strictly construed, resolving any ambiguity against the corporation's authority to exercise the power. Porsh Bldrs., Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 302 N.C. 550, 276 S.E.2d 443 (1981).

Any Doubts Must Be Resolved Against Municipality. - A municipality has no inherent police powers, but can exercise only those conferred by the State, and any reasonable doubt concerning such powers is resolved against it. State v. Dannenberg, 150 N.C. 799, 63 S.E. 946 (1909).

Discretion as to Accomplishment of Municipal Purposes. - A municipal corporation has only those powers expressly granted in its charter and by the general law, construing the acts together, and those powers reasonably implied in or incident to the granted powers which are necessary to effect the fair intent and purpose of its creation; however, it may exercise a sound discretion as to the means by which the purposes of its creation may be accomplished. Riddle v. Ledbetter, 216 N.C. 491, 5 S.E.2d 542 (1939).

A municipal corporation may exercise all the powers within the fair intent and purpose of its creation which are reasonably necessary to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and in doing this it may exercise discretion as to the means to the end. Keeter v. Town of Lake Lure, 264 N.C. 252, 141 S.E.2d 634 (1965).

Although the power to impose a privilege license tax must be construed broadly to include incidental powers, a privilege license tax, standing alone, is only a tax and does not carry with it any powers wholly unrelated to its imposition or administration. Fantasy World, Inc. v. Greensboro Bd. of Adjustment, 162 N.C. App. 603, 592 S.E.2d 205, cert. denied, 358 N.C. 543, 599 S.E.2d 43 (2004).

The courts will not inquire into the motives which prompt a municipality's legislative body to enact an ordinance which is valid on its face. Clark's Greenville, Inc. v. West, 268 N.C. 527, 151 S.E.2d 5 (1966).

Contracts with Firefighters Not Ultra Vires. - As the legislature expressly authorized municipal corporations to fix salaries or other compensation or to approve and adopt pay plans to compensate city employees, and thus, the city could legally form contracts for the services of firefighters and offer a plan for accumulated vacation leave as a benefit under the contracts, even though they may have been executed improperly, any contracts entered into by the city through its agents to compensate firefighters with accumulated vacation leave were not ultra vires the city. Pritchard v. Elizabeth City, 81 N.C. App. 543, 344 S.E.2d 821, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 417, 349 S.E.2d 598 (1986).

Contract with Town Manager Not Ultra Vires. - The execution of an employment contract providing severance pay to an at-will town manager was not ultra vires. Myers v. Town of Plymouth, 135 N.C. App. 707, 522 S.E.2d 122 (1999).

Eminent Domain Power of a City. - City lawfully exercised its eminent domain power because, consistent with the mandates of G.S. 160A-4 and G.S. 160A-312, the city could acquire property by condemnation to establish a gas transmission and distribution system, even in the absence of a concrete, immediate plan to furnish gas services to its citizens as the acquisition was for a public use by the city in compliance with G.S. 160A-240.1 and G.S. 40A-3(b). Town of Midland v. Morris, 209 N.C. App. 208, 704 S.E.2d 329, review denied, 365 N.C. 198, 710 S.E.2d 3, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 245, dismissed and review denied, 365 N.C. 198, 710 S.E.2d 1, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 265 (2011).

City had the authority to allow the city tax collector to assess zoning compliance as part of the administration of the business privilege license tax and to deny a business privilege license to a sexually oriented business because the business sought to operate in violation of a zoning ordinance. Fantasy World, Inc. v. Greensboro Bd. of Adjustment, 162 N.C. App. 603, 592 S.E.2d 205, cert. denied, 358 N.C. 543, 599 S.E.2d 43 (2004).

Authority to Impose Water And Sewer Fees. - City was entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law because an act transferred the authority of the Board of Light and Water to collect water and sewer fees for services "to be furnished" to the city, and thus, there was no genuine issue as to any material fact with respect to the city's legislative authority to charge those fees to developers for their developments; the General Assembly was not required to use the word "transfer" in order to transfer the powers of the Board. JVC Enters., LLC v. City of Concord, - N.C. - , - S.E.2d - (Mar. 12, 2021).

Applied in City of Durham v. Herndon, 61 N.C. App. 275, 300 S.E.2d 460 (1983); River Birch Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 100, 388 S.E.2d 538 (1990); Town of Midland v. Morris, 209 N.C. App. 208, 704 S.E.2d 329, review denied, 365 N.C. 198, 710 S.E.2d 3, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 245, dismissed and review denied, 365 N.C. 198, 710 S.E.2d 1, 2011 N.C. LEXIS 265 (2011).

Cited in Smith v. Keator, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.2d 203 (1974); In re Wilkins, 294 N.C. 528, 242 S.E.2d 829 (1978); Town of West Jefferson v. Edwards, 74 N.C. App. 377, 329 S.E.2d 407 (1985); Grace Baptist Church v. City of Oxford, 320 N.C. 439, 358 S.E.2d 372 (1987); Quality Water Supply, Inc. v. City of Wilmington, 97 N.C. App. 400, 388 S.E.2d 608 (1990); Ricks v. Town of Selma, 99 N.C. App. 82, 392 S.E.2d 437 (1990); Bowers v. City of High Point, 339 N.C. 413, 451 S.E.2d 284 (1994); Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 467 S.E.2d 615 (1996); Durham Land Owners Ass'n v. County of Durham, 177 N.C. App. 629, 630 S.E.2d 200 (2006); Five C'S, Inc. v. County of Pasquotank, 195 N.C. App. 410, 672 S.E.2d 737 (2009); Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary, 206 N.C. App. 38, 698 S.E.2d 404 (2010); Lanvale Props., LLC v. County of Cabarrus, 366 N.C. 142, 731 S.E.2d 800 (2012); King v. Town of Chapel Hill, 367 N.C. 400, 758 S.E.2d 364 (2014).

Opinions of Attorney General

Condemnation of Property to Improve Road. - A proposed escrow agreement between a town and various property owners to collect and dispose of funds in order to acquire right of way, by condemnation or otherwise, in order to widen and improve a road was not prohibited by this section or public policy. See opinion of Attorney General to William C. Coward, Coward, Hicks & Siler, P.A., 2000 N.C. AG LEXIS 28 (4/10/2000).

§ 160A-4.1: Repealed by Session Laws 2019-111, s. 2.6(b), as amended by Session Laws 2020-3, s. 4.33(a), and Session Laws 2020-25, s. 51(a), (b), (d), effective June 19, 2020.

History

(2009-436, s. 2; 2010-180, s. 11(b); repealed by 2019-111, s. 2.6(b), as amended by 2020-3, s. 4.33(a), and 2020-25, s. 51(a), (b), (d), effective June 19, 2020.)

Editor's Note. - Former G.S. 160A-4.1 pertained to the notice of new fees and fee increases; public comment period.

Session Laws 2019-111, s. 2.8, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2019-111, s. 3.2 provided for the delayed repeal of this section, effective January 1, 2021, and applicable to local government development regulation decisions made on or after that date, and further provided that "Part II of this act clarifies and restates the intent of existing law and applies to ordinances adopted before, on, and after the effective date." Session Laws 2020-3, s. 4.33(a), extended the delayed repeal of this section, making it effective August 1, 2021, and applicable to local government development regulation decisions made on or after that date. Session Laws 2020-25, s. 51(a), (d), repealed Session Laws 2019-111, s. 3.2, and Session Laws 2020-3, s. 4.33, effective June 19, 2020.

Session Laws 2020-3, s. 5, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2020-25, s. 51(b), provides: "Part II of S.L. 2019-111 is effective when this act becomes law [June 19, 2020]. Part II of S.L. 2019-111 clarifies and restates the intent of law existing on the effective date of this act [June 19, 2020] and applies to ordinances adopted before, on, and after that date. Valid local government development regulations that are in effect at the time of the effective date of Part II of S.L. 2019-111 remain in effect but local governments shall amend those regulations to conform to the provisions of Part II of S.L. 2019-111 on or before July 1, 2021. Part II of S.L. 2019-111 applies to local government development regulation decisions made on or after the earlier of:

"(1) The effective date of the amendments to local development regulations made to conform to the provisions of Part II of S.L. 2019-111 or

"(2) July 1, 2021."

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2010-180, s. 11(b), effective February 1, 2011, deleted "Electronic" from the beginning of the section catchline; in the introductory paragraph in subsection (a), in the first sentence, substituted "A city shall provide notice to interested parties of the imposition" for "If a city has a Web site maintained by one or more of its employees, the city shall provide notice of the imposition" and deleted "on the city's Web site" following "Part 2 of Article 19 of this Chapter," and added the last sentence; added subdivisions (a)(1) through (a)(4); and added subsection (a1).

§ 160A-5. Statutory references deemed amended to conform to Chapter.

Whenever a reference is made in another portion of the General Statutes or any local act, or any city ordinance, resolution, or order, to a portion of Chapter 160 of the General Statutes that is repealed or superseded by this Chapter, the reference shall be deemed amended to refer to that portion of this Chapter which most nearly corresponds to the repealed or superseded portion of Chapter 160.

History

(1971, c. 698, s. 1; 1973, c. 426, s. 2.)

CASE NOTES

Applied in City of Durham v. Manson, 285 N.C. 741, 208 S.E.2d 662 (1974).

ARTICLE 1A. Municipal Board of Control.

§§ 160A-6 through 160A-10: Repealed by Session Laws 1981 (Regular Session, 1982), c. 1191, s. 63.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1981 (Reg. Sess., 1982), c. 1191, s. 64, provided that the repeal of this Article did not affect the validity of any corporate charter issued by the Municipal Board of Control prior to the effective date thereof. Section 65 of the act provided that the repeal became effective October 1, 1982, except that an order incorporating a city which was entered prior to October 1, 1982, but subject to a referendum to be held under G.S. 160A-9.3 between October 1, 1982, and January 1, 1983, would be valid notwithstanding the abolition of the Municipal Board of Control.

ARTICLE 2. General Corporate Powers.

Sec.

§ 160A-11. Corporate powers.

The inhabitants of each city heretofore or hereafter incorporated by act of the General Assembly or by the Municipal Board of Control shall be and remain a municipal corporation by the name specified in the city charter. Under that name they shall be vested with all of the property and rights in property belonging to the corporation; shall have perpetual succession; may sue and be sued; may contract and be contracted with; may acquire and hold any property, real and personal, devised, sold, or in any manner conveyed, dedicated to, or otherwise acquired by them, and from time to time may hold, invest, sell, or dispose of the same; may have a common seal and alter and renew the same at will; and shall have and may exercise in conformity with the city charter and the general laws of this State all municipal powers, functions, rights, privileges, and immunities of every name and nature whatsoever.

All documents required or permitted by law to be executed by municipal corporations will be legally valid and binding in this respect when a legible corporate stamp, which is a facsimile of its seal, is used in lieu of an imprinted or embossed corporate or common seal.

History

(Code, ss. 704, 3117; 1901, c. 283; 1905, c. 526; Rev., s. 2916; 1907, c. 978; P.L. 1917, c. 223; C.S., s. 2623; Ex. Sess. 1921, c. 58; 1927, c. 14; 1933, c. 69; 1949, c. 938; 1955, c. 77; 1959, c. 391; 1961, c. 308; 1967, c. 100, s. 2; c. 1122, s. 1; 1969, c. 944; 1971, c. 698, s. 1; 1973, c. 170; c. 426, s. 7; 2011-284, s. 110.)

Cross References. - As to construction of grants of power to municipalities, see G.S. 160A-4.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-284, s. 110, effective June 24, 2011, deleted "bequeathed" following "devised" in the middle of the first paragraph.

Legal Periodicals. - For note on abrogation of contractual sovereign immunity, see 12 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1082 (1976).

CASE NOTES

Editor's Note. - Many of the cases cited below were decided under former similar provisions.

Control of Municipal Territory and Affairs. - When a municipal corporation is established it takes control of the territory and affairs over which it is given authority to the exclusion of other governmental agencies. Gunter v. Sanford, 186 N.C. 452, 120 S.E. 41 (1923); Parsons v. Wright, 223 N.C. 520, 27 S.E.2d 534 (1943).

Exclusive Control of Municipal Streets. - The object of incorporating a town or city is to invest the inhabitants of the municipality with the government of all matters that are of special municipal concern, and certainly the streets are as much of a special and local concern as anything connected with a town or city can be. It ought, therefore, to be presumed that they pass under the exclusive control of the municipality as soon as it comes into existence under the law. Gunter v. Sanford, 186 N.C. 452, 120 S.E. 41 (1923); Parsons v. Wright, 223 N.C. 520, 27 S.E.2d 534 (1943).

Power to Purchase Land at Tax Sale. - The title of the purchaser at a tax foreclosure sale may not be challenged by the listed owner upon the purchaser's motion for a writ of assistance; such purchaser may be a municipality where it does not appear of record that the purchase of the land was ultra vires, a municipality having the power to purchase land for certain purposes. Wake County v. Johnson, 206 N.C. 478, 174 S.E. 303 (1934).

Ordinance Within Power Granted Presumed Reasonable. - When an ordinance is within the grant of power to the municipality, the presumption is that it is reasonable. Gene's, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 259 N.C. 118, 129 S.E.2d 889 (1963).

A town must be sued in its corporate name and not in the name of its officers. Young v. Barden, 90 N.C. 424 (1886).

Service Against City. - A summons against a city may be served on the mayor and on the secretary of the board of aldermen. Loughran v. Hickory, 129 N.C. 281, 40 S.E. 46 (1901).

Venue of Suits Against Cities or Towns. - Cities and towns must be sued in the county in which they are located, and if suit is brought in another county, they have the right to have it removed. Jones v. Town of Statesville, 97 N.C. 86, 2 S.E. 346 (1887).

Action in Name of All Citizens Against City. - In an action against a municipal corporation to enjoin the collection of an illegal tax, it was not error to allow all citizens other than the original plaintiff to be made parties plaintiff. Cobb v. Elizabeth City, 75 N.C. 1 (1876).

Action Against City. - In this Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) action, ADEA authorized a suit against the City of Winston-Salem, but not the Winston-Salem Police Department because North Carolina law implied that a city was the employer of the police officer working for the city's police department. Fisher v. Winston-Salem Police Dep't, 28 F. Supp. 3d 526 (M.D.N.C. 2014).

Applied in North Carolina Consumers Power, Inc. v. Duke Power Co., 21 N.C. App. 237, 204 S.E.2d 399 (1974).

Cited in Carolina Action v. Pickard, 465 F. Supp. 576 (W.D.N.C. 1979); Davidson County v. City of High Point, 85 N.C. App. 26, 354 S.E.2d 280 (1987); Concrete Mach. Co. v. City of Hickory, 134 N.C. App. 91, 517 S.E.2d 155 (1999); Myers v. Town of Plymouth, 135 N.C. App. 707, 522 S.E.2d 122 (1999); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pennington, 141 N.C. App. 495, 541 S.E.2d 503 (2000), aff'd, 356 N.C. 571, 573 S.E.2d 118 (2002); City of Asheville v. State, 369 N.C. 80, 794 S.E.2d 759 (2016).

Opinions of Attorney General

Ownership and Operation of Private For-Profit Corporation. - The authority of a city to hold property granted by this section should not be interpreted to authorize a city to act as a shareholder of a private for-profit corporation organized under the provisions of Chapter 55, and to appoint city officials and employees as corporate directors or officers. See opinion of the Attorney General to H. Michael Boyd, Deputy City Attorney, City of Charlotte, 60 N.C.A.G. 114 (1992).

While there may be authority for a city to purchase all of the stock of a corporation which owns and operates a water and sewer system, there is no authority to operate and continue the existence of a private for-profit corporation which is outside of the traditional functions of a municipality and for which there is no judicial or legislative approval. See opinion of the Attorney General to H. Michael Boyd, Deputy City Attorney, City of Charlotte, 60 N.C.A.G. 114 (1992).

§ 160A-12. Exercise of corporate power.

All powers, functions, rights, privileges, and immunities of the corporation shall be exercised by the city council and carried into execution as provided by the charter or the general law. A power, function, right, privilege, or immunity that is conferred or imposed by charter or general law without directions or restrictions as to how it is to be exercised or performed shall be carried into execution as provided by ordinance or resolution of the city council.

History

(Code, s. 703; Rev., s. 2917; C.S., s. 2624; 1971, c. 698, s. 1.)

CASE NOTES

Cited in Concrete Mach. Co. v. City of Hickory, 134 N.C. App. 91, 517 S.E.2d 155 (1999).

Opinions of Attorney General

Editor's Note. - Many of the opinions cited below were decided under former similar provisions.

Exercise of Corporate Powers by Board of Aldermen. - Where city had not adopted one of the plans of government prescribed in former Article 21 of Chapter 160, and its charter granted only those powers enumerated by the General Statutes, the corporate powers could only be exercised by the board of aldermen, unless otherwise provided by law. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Richard A. Williams, Maiden Town Attorney, 40 N.C.A.G. 450 (1969), issued under former statutory provisions.

Effect of Action by Individual Commissioner. - Individual commissioner's representation about payment of a damage claim neither created a duty on the town to pay the same, nor authorized it to pay, unless the board of commissioners, by resolution, authorized the individual to make such an offer, as the municipal power to contract was given to the board, and boards, nothing else appearing, must act through a quorum at a meeting rather than through an individual member on an ad hoc basis. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. John W. Twisdale, Clayton Town Attorney, 40 N.C.A.G. 522 (1970), issued under former G.S. 160-3.

§§ 160A-13 through 160A-15: Reserved for future codification purposes.

ARTICLE 3. Contracts.

Sec.

§ 160A-16. Contracts to be in writing; exception.

All contracts made by or on behalf of a city shall be in writing. A contract made in violation of this section shall be void and unenforceable unless it is expressly ratified by the council.

History

(1917, c. 136, subch. 13, s. 8; C.S., s. 2831; 1971, c. 698, s. 1.)

Cross References. - As to report on guaranteed energy savings contracts, see G.S. 143-64.17G.

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "The Regulation of Contractual Change: A Guide to No Oral Modification Clauses for North Carolina Lawyers," see 81 N.C.L. Rev. 2239 (2003).

CASE NOTES

City Not Liable Absent Agreement for Treatment of Inebriate Injured While Being Assisted by Police. - A city was not liable to a hospital for the cost of treating a habitual inebriate who was injured when he fell while being assisted by city police officers, where there was no express agreement to pay for such services. Nor was there an implied promise to pay, pursuant to a statutory duty, since persons arrested by city police officers, if confined, were confined in the county jail. Under G.S. 153A-224(b), the cost of emergency medical services rendered to persons confined in local confinement facilities is imposed on the local governmental unit operating the facility. Craven County Hosp. Corp. v. Lenoir County, 75 N.C. App. 453, 331 S.E.2d 690, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 663, 336 S.E.2d 620 (1985).

Where no duty was imposed by statute upon city to pay for medical services rendered to persons in custody of its police officers, there was no relationship implied by law which would obligate the city to pay the costs of such treatment. Craven County Hosp. Corp. v. Lenoir County, 75 N.C. App. 453, 331 S.E.2d 690, cert. denied, 314 N.C. 663, 336 S.E.2d 620 (1985).

Sovereign immunity does not apply to breach of contract claims. Houpe v. City of Statesville, 128 N.C. App. 334, 497 S.E.2d 82, cert. denied, 348 N.C. 72, 505 S.E.2d 871 (1998).

A viable claim for breach of an employment contract must allege the existence of contractual terms regarding the duration or means of terminating employment. Houpe v. City of Statesville, 128 N.C. App. 334, 497 S.E.2d 82, cert. denied, 348 N.C. 72, 505 S.E.2d 871 (1998).

Cited in Carolina Water Serv., Inc. v. Town of Atlantic Beach, 121 N.C. App. 23, 464 S.E.2d 317 (1995); Concrete Mach. Co. v. City of Hickory, 134 N.C. App. 91, 517 S.E.2d 155 (1999); M Series Rebuild, LLC v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 222 N.C. App. 59, 730 S.E.2d 254 (2012).

§ 160A-17. Continuing contracts.

A city is authorized to enter into continuing contracts, some portion or all of which are to be performed in ensuing fiscal years. Sufficient funds shall be appropriated to meet any amount to be paid under the contract in the fiscal year in which it is made, and in each ensuing fiscal year, the council shall appropriate sufficient funds to meet the amounts to be paid during the fiscal year under continuing contracts previously entered into.

History

(1971, c. 698, s. 1.)

§ 160A-17.1. Grants from other governments.

Federal and State. - The governing body of any city or county is hereby authorized to make contracts for and to accept grants-in-aid and loans from the federal and State governments and their agencies for constructing, expanding, maintaining, and operating any project or facility, or performing any function, which such city or county may be authorized by general law or local act to provide or perform.
1. Enter into and carry out contracts with the State or federal government or any agency or institution thereof under which such government, agency, or institution grants financial or other assistance to the city or county;
2. Accept such assistance or funds as may be granted or loaned by the State or federal government with or without such a contract;
3. Agree to and comply with any lawful and reasonable conditions which are imposed upon such grants or loans;
4. Agree to and comply with minimum minority business enterprise participation requirements established by the federal government and its agencies in projects financed by federal grants-in-aid or loans, by including such minimum requirements in the specifications for contracts to perform all or part of such projects and awarding bids pursuant to G.S. 143-129 and 143-131, if applicable, to the lowest responsible bidder or bidders meeting these and any other specifications.
5. Make expenditures from any funds so granted.
Expired effective December 31, 2010.

In order to exercise the authority granted by this section, the governing body of any city or county may:

History

(1971, c. 896, s. 10; c. 937, ss. 1, 1.5; 1973, c. 426, s. 8; 1981, c. 827; 2007-91, s. 1.)

§ 160A-17.2. Security interests in United States Department of Agriculture loans.

A county or municipality may pledge a security interest in an escrow account funded with loan proceeds, or a certificate of deposit, to secure repayment of the loan, only if the loan is an interest-free loan agreement entered into with the United States Department of Agriculture or an authorized intermediary acting on behalf of the United States Department of Agriculture. Any such escrow account must be substantiated by a written escrow agreement, and the funds must be deposited in accordance with G.S. 159-30 and G.S. 159-31. Any certificate of deposit shall comply with the requirements of G.S. 159-30.
An interest-free loan agreement entered into under this section is subject to approval by the Local Government Commission under Article 8 of Chapter 159 of the General Statutes, unless exempted in G.S. 159-148(b).
No deficiency judgment may be rendered against any county or municipality in any action for breach of a contractual obligation authorized by this section. The taxing power of a county or municipality is not and may not be pledged directly or indirectly to secure any moneys due under a contract authorized by this section.

History

(2015-207, s. 3.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2015-207, s. 7, made this section effective August 11, 2015.

§ 160A-18. Certain deeds validated.

All deeds made, executed, and delivered by any city before July 1, 1970, for a good and valuable consideration are hereby in all respects validated, ratified, and confirmed notwithstanding any lack of authority to make the deed or any irregularities in the procedures by which conveyance of the land or premises described therein was authorized by the city council.
All conveyances and sales of any interest in real property by private sale, including conveyances in fee and releases of vested or contingent future interests, made by the governing body of any city, school district, or school administrative unit before July 1, 1970, are hereby validated, ratified, and confirmed notwithstanding the fact that such conveyances or releases were made by private sale and not after notice and public outcry.
All conveyances of any interest in real property by private sale, including conveyance in fee, made by the governing body of any county before January 1, 1977, are hereby validated, ratified, and confirmed notwithstanding the fact that such conveyances were made by private sale, without advertisement, and not after notice and public outcry.
Nothing in this section shall affect any action or proceeding begun before January 1, 1977.

History

(Ex. Sess. 1924, c. 95; 1951, c. 44; 1959, c. 487; 1971, c. 698, s. 1; 1977, c. 1103.)

§ 160A-19. Leases.

A city is authorized to lease as lessee, with or without option to purchase, any real or personal property for any authorized public purpose. A lease of personal property with an option to purchase is subject to Article 8 of Chapter 143 of the General Statutes.

History

(1973, c. 426, s. 9.)

§ 160A-20. Security interests.

Purchase. - A unit of local government may purchase, or finance or refinance the purchase of, real or personal property by installment contracts that create in some or all of the property purchased a security interest to secure payment of the purchase price to the seller or to an individual or entity advancing moneys or supplying financing for the purchase transaction.
Improvements. - A unit of local government may finance or refinance the construction or repair of fixtures or improvements on real property by contracts that create in some or all of the fixtures or improvements, or in all or some portion of the property on which the fixtures or improvements are located, or in both, a security interest to secure repayment of moneys advanced or made available for the construction or repair.
Accounts. - A unit of local government may use escrow accounts in connection with the advance funding of transactions authorized by this section, whereby the proceeds of the advance funding are invested pending disbursement. A unit of local government may also use other accounts, such as debt service payment accounts and debt service reserve accounts, to facilitate transactions authorized by this section. To secure transactions authorized by this section, a unit of local government may also create security interests in these accounts.
Nonsubstitution. - No contract entered into under this section may contain a nonsubstitution clause that restricts the right of a unit of local government to:
1. Continue to provide a service or activity; or
2. Replace or provide a substitute for any fixture, improvement, project, or property financed, refinanced, or purchased pursuant to the contract.
Oversight. - A contract entered into under this section is subject to approval by the Local Government Commission under Article 8 of Chapter 159 of the General Statutes if it:
1. Meets the standards set out in G.S. 159-148(a)(1), 159-148(a)(2), and 159-148(a)(3), or involves the construction or repair of fixtures or improvements on real property; and
2. Is not exempted from the provisions of that Article by one of the exemptions contained in G.S. 159-148(b).
Public Hospitals. - A nonprofit entity operating or leasing a public hospital may enter into a contract pursuant to this section only if the nonprofit entity will have an ownership interest in the property being financed or refinanced, including a leasehold interest. The security interest granted in the property shall be only to the extent of the nonprofit entity's property interest. In addition, any contract entered into by a nonprofit entity operating or leasing a public hospital pursuant to this section is subject to the approval of the city, county, hospital district, or hospital authority that owns the hospital. Approval of the city, county, hospital district, or hospital authority may be withheld only under one or more of the following circumstances:
1. The contract would cause the city, county, hospital district, or hospital authority to breach or violate any covenant in an existing financing instrument entered into by the nonprofit entity.
2. The contract would restrict the ability of the city, county, hospital district, or hospital authority to incur anticipated bank-eligible indebtedness under federal tax laws.
3. The entering into of the contract would have a material, adverse impact on the credit ratings of the city, county, hospital district, or hospital authority or would otherwise materially interfere with an anticipated financing by the nonprofit entity.
Limit of Security. - No deficiency judgment may be rendered against any unit of local government in any action for breach of a contractual obligation authorized by this section. The taxing power of a unit of local government is not and may not be pledged directly or indirectly to secure any moneys due under a contract authorized by this section.
Public Hearing. - Before entering into a contract under this section involving real property, a unit of local government shall hold a public hearing on the contract. A notice of the public hearing shall be published once at least 10 days before the date fixed for the hearing.
Local Government Defined. - As used in this section, the term "unit of local government" means any of the following:
1. A county.
2. A city.
3. A water and sewer authority created under Article 1 of Chapter 162A of the General Statutes.
4. A metropolitan sewerage district created under Article 5 of Chapter 162A of the General Statutes.
5. A sanitary district created under Part 2 of Article 2 of Chapter 130A of the General Statutes.
6. A county water and sewer district created under Article 6 of Chapter 162A of the General Statutes.
7. A metropolitan water district created under Article 4 of Chapter 162A of the General Statutes.
8. A metropolitan water and sewerage district created under Article 5A of Chapter 162A of the General Statutes.
9. An airport authority whose situs is entirely within a county that has (i) a population of over 120,000 according to the most recent federal decennial census and (ii) an area of less than 200 square miles.
10. An airport authority in a county in which there are two incorporated municipalities with a population of more than 65,000 according to the most recent federal decennial census.
11. An airport board or commission authorized by agreement between two cities pursuant to G.S. 63-56, one of which is located partially but not wholly in the county in which the jointly owned airport is located, and where the board or commission provided water and wastewater services off the airport premises before January 1, 1995, except that the authority granted by this subdivision may be exercised by such a board or commission with respect to water and wastewater systems or improvements only.
12. A local airport authority that was created pursuant to a local act of the General Assembly.
13. A local school administrative unit whose board of education is authorized to levy a school tax.
14. Any other local school administrative unit, but only for the purpose of financing energy conservation measures acquired pursuant to Part 2 of Article 3B of Chapter 143 of the General Statutes.
15. A community college, but only for the purpose of financing energy conservation measures acquired pursuant to Part 2 of Article 3B of Chapter 143 of the General Statutes.
16. An area mental health, developmental disabilities, and substance abuse authority, acting in accordance with G.S. 122C-147.
17. A consolidated city-county, as defined by G.S. 160B-2(1).
18. Repealed by Session Laws 2001-414, s. 52, effective September 14, 2001.
19. A regional natural gas district, as defined by Article 28 of this Chapter.
20. A regional public transportation authority or a regional transportation authority created pursuant to Article 26 or Article 27 of this Chapter.
21. A nonprofit corporation or association operating or leasing a public hospital as defined in G.S. 159-39.
22. A public health authority created under Part 1B of Article 2 of Chapter 130A of the General Statutes.
23. A special district created under Article 43 of Chapter 105 of the General Statutes.
24. A Ferry Transportation Authority created pursuant to Article 29 of this Chapter.

History

(1979, c. 743; 1987 (Reg. Sess., 1988), c. 981, s. 1; 1989, c. 708; 1991, c. 741, s. 1; 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994), c. 592, s. 2; 1995, c. 461, s. 6; 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 644, s. 2; 1997-380, s. 3; 1997-426, s. 7; 1997-426, s. 7.1; 1998-70, s. 1; 1998-117, s. 1; 1999-386, ss. 1, 2; 2001-414, s. 52; 2002-161, s. 10; 2003-259, s. 1; 2003-388, s. 3; 2007-226, s. 1; 2007-229, s. 3; 2009-527, s. 2(g); 2015-207, s. 5(a); 2017-120, s. 4.)

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1989, c. 708, which amended this section, in ss. 2 and 3, provides:

"Sec. 2. (a) Any contract made or entered into, prior to the date of ratification of this act, by a city, a county, or a water and sewer authority created under Article 1 of Chapter 162A of the General Statutes which would have been valid under G.S. 160A-20, subsections (a), (b), (c), and (f), as rewritten by this act, is hereby validated, ratified, and confirmed. Furthermore, such a contract may not be held invalid because it contains a nonsubstitution clause, or because no public hearing was advertised and held on the contract, or both.

"(b) Any contract made or entered into, prior to the date of ratification of this act, by a city, a county, or a water and sewer authority created under Article 1 of Chapter 162A of the General Statutes which would have been valid under subsection (a) of this Section 2 or under G.S. 160A-20 as it existed prior to the ratification of this act or as rewritten by this act, except that the Local Government Commission did not approve the contract, is hereby validated, ratified, and confirmed.

"Sec. 3. Nothing in this act shall be interpreted to limit or restrict the authority of cities, counties, or water and sewer authorities created under Article 1 of Chapter 162A of the General Statutes to purchase, improve, or finance the purchase or improvement of real or personal property pursuant to any other applicable law, whether general, special, or local."

Session Laws 1997-426, s. 7.1, provided that if Ratified Senate Bill 389, 1997 Regular Session, became law, then subdivision (h)(9) was recodified as subdivision (h)(10) of this section. Senate Bill 389 became S.L.1997-380, which became law on August 7, 1997.

Session Laws 1997-426, s. 10(a)-(c), provides that, insofar as the provisions of that act are not consistent with the provisions of any other law, public or private, the provisions of that act shall be controlling; that references in that act to specific sections or Chapters of the General Statutes are intended to be references to such sections or Chapters as they may be amended from time to time by the General Assembly; and that that act, being necessary for the health and welfare of the people of the State, shall be liberally construed to effect the purposes thereof.

Session Laws 1997-426, s. 10(d), is a severability clause.

Session Laws 1999-377, s. 4, effective August 4, 1999, provides that any hospital continuing to operate under Article 2 of Chapter 131 of the General Statutes pursuant to Section 3 of Chapter 775 of the 1983 Session Laws shall be considered to be a "public hospital" within the meaning of G.S. 159-39 and to be a "unit of local government" within the meaning of G.S. 160A-20.

Session Laws 2002-161, s. 12, provides that nothing in the act limits the use of any method of contracting authorized by local law or other applicable laws.

Session Laws 2003-388, provides in its preamble:

"Whereas, the State Treasurer's Office formed a Public Finance Advisory Committee comprised of representative city and county governments, as well as the public finance bar and financial services sectors, to review and propose changes to the General Statutes dealing with public finance in an effort to strengthen, modernize, and provide for the most efficient method of issuing of public debt by local governments and other political subdivisions of the State; and

"Whereas, the Public Finance Advisory Committee has developed, and the State Treasurer's Office has reviewed, a set of recommendations to the General Assembly for specific changes to relevant General Statutes around which there is consensus that the proposed changes are beneficial to local governments in their issuance of public debt; and

"Whereas, the Local Government Commission remains the statutorily designated entity to which all proposed issuances must be submitted for approval, and these recommendations in no way lower or lessen the level of due diligence performed in determining the appropriateness of a specific issuance; and

"Whereas, for these reasons, this legislation is submitted for consideration by the General Assembly on behalf of the State Treasurer, the staff of the Local Government Commission, and the Public Finance Advisory Committee; Now, therefore,"

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2007-226, s. 1, effective July 18, 2007, added subdivision (h)(3c).

Session Laws 2007-229, s. 3, effective July 18, 2007, added subdivision (h)(13).

Session Laws 2009-527, s. 2(g), effective August 27, 2009, added subdivision (h)(14).

Session Laws 2015-207, s. 5(a), effective August 11, 2015, added subdivisions (h)(3d) and (h)(3e).

Session Laws 2017-120, s. 4, effective July 18, 2017, added subdivision (h)(15).

Legal Periodicals. - For note, "Constitutional Expansion of Local Government Financing Alternatives: Wayne County Citizens Association v. Wayne County Board of Commissioners," see 70 N.C.L. Rev. 1947 (1992).

CASE NOTES

This section does not contravene N.C. Const., Art. V, § 4, which authorizes the General Assembly to regulate local government finance. Wayne County Citizens v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs, 328 N.C. 24, 399 S.E.2d 311 (1991).

County's installment purchase contract for construction of a new courthouse and jail was authorized by this section. Wayne County Citizens v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs, 328 N.C. 24, 399 S.E.2d 311 (1991).

§ 160A-20.1. Contracts with private entities; contractors must use E-Verify.

Authority. - A city may contract with and appropriate money to any person, association, or corporation, in order to carry out any public purpose that the city is authorized by law to engage in. A city may not require a private contractor under this section to abide by any restriction that the city could not impose on all employers in the city, such as paying minimum wage or providing paid sick leave to its employees, as a condition of bidding on a contract.
Repealed by Session Laws 2015-294, s. 1(b), effective October 1, 2015, and applicable to contracts entered into on or after that date.

History

(1985, c. 271, s. 1; 2013-413, s. 5(d); 2013-418, s. 2(b); 2014-119, s. 13(a); 2015-294, s. 1(b); 2016-3, 2nd Ex. Sess., s. 2.3; 2017-4, s. 1.)

Cross References. - As to procedure for letting of public contracts, see G.S. 143-129.

Executive Order No. 93. - On April 12, 2016, Governor Pat McCrory issued Executive Order No. 93, "To Protect Privacy and Equality," which provides: "WHEREAS, North Carolina's rich legacy of inclusiveness, diversity and hospitality makes North Carolina a global destination for jobs, business, tourists and talent;

"WHEREAS, it is the policy of the Executive Branch that government services be provided equally to all people;

"WHEREAS, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-499.2 permits municipalities to adopt ordinances prohibiting discrimination in housing and real estate transactions, and any municipality may expand such ordinance consistent with the federal Fair Housing Act;

"WHEREAS, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.2(c) permits local governments or other political subdivisions of the State to set their own employment policies applicable to their own personnel;

"WHEREAS, North Carolina law allows private businesses and nonprofit employers to establish their own non-discrimination employment policies;

"WHEREAS, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-128.2 requires each city, county or other local public entity to adopt goals for participation by minority businesses and to make good faith efforts to recruit minority participation in line with those goals;

"WHEREAS, North Carolina law allows a private business or nonprofit to set their own restroom, locker room or shower policies;

"WHEREAS, our citizens have basic common-sense expectations of privacy in our restrooms, locker rooms and shower facilities for children, women and men;

"WHEREAS, to protect expectations of privacy in restrooms, locker rooms and shower facilities in public buildings, including our schools, the State of North Carolina maintains these facilities on the basis of biological sex;

"WHEREAS, State agencies and local governments are allowed to make reasonable accommodations in restrooms, locker rooms and shower facilities due to special individual circumstances;

"NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the authority vested in me as Governor by the Constitution and laws of the State of North Carolina, IT IS ORDERED:

"Section 1. Public Services

"In the provision of government services and in the administration of programs, including, but not limited to public safety, health and welfare, public agencies shall serve all people equally, consistent with the mission and requirements of the service or program.

"Section 2. Equal Employment Opportunity Policy for State Employees

"I hereby affirm that the State of North Carolina is committed to administering and implementing all State human resources policies, practices and programs fairly and equitably, without unlawful discrimination, harassment or retaliation on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, age, political affiliation, genetic information, or disability.

"I also affirm that private businesses, nonprofit employers and local governments may establish their own non-discrimination employment policies.

"Section 3. Restroom Accommodations

"In North Carolina, private businesses can set their own rules for their own restroom, locker room and shower facilities, free from government interference.

"Under current law, every multiple occupancy restroom, locker room or shower facility located in a cabinet agency must be designated for and only used by persons based on their biological sex. Agencies may make reasonable accommodations upon a person's request due to special circumstances.

"Therefore, when readily available and when practicable in the best judgment of the agency, all cabinet agencies shall provide a reasonable accommodation of a single occupancy restroom, locker room or shower facility upon request due to special circumstances.

"All council of state agencies, cities, counties, the University of North Carolina System and the North Carolina Community College System are invited and encouraged to make a similar accommodation when practicable.

"Section 4. State Buildings and Facilities Leased to Private Entities

"The Department of Administration shall interpret the application of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-760 as follows:

"When a private entity leases State real property and the property in the lessee's exclusive possession includes multiple occupancy restrooms, locker rooms or other like facilities, the private entity will control the signage and use of these facilities.

"All council of state agencies, cities, counties, the University of North Carolina System and the North Carolina Community College System are invited and encouraged to adopt a similar interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-760.

"Section 5. Human Relations Commission

"Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-391, the Human Relations Commission in the Department of Administration shall promote equality and opportunity for all citizens.

"The Human Relations Commission shall work with local government officials to study problems and promote understanding, respect and goodwill among all citizens in all communities in North Carolina.

"The Human Relations Commission shall receive, investigate and conciliate fair housing, employment discrimination and public accommodations complaints.

"The Human Relations Commission shall submit an annual report by April 1st to the Governor detailing the number of complaints received, the number of investigations completed, and the number of conciliations in the preceding calendar year. This report shall also describe any education and outreach efforts made by the Commission in that same calendar year.

"Section 6. State Cause of Action for Wrongful Discharge

"I support and encourage the General Assembly to take all necessary steps to restore a State cause of action for wrongful discharge based on unlawful employment discrimination.

"Section 7. State or Federal Law

"Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as an abrogation of any requirements otherwise imposed by applicable federal or state laws or regulations.

"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto signed my name and affixed the Great Seal of the State of North Carolina at the Capitol in the City of Raleigh, this twelfth day of April in the year of our Lord two thousand and sixteen."

Session Laws 2015-294, s. 17, made the repeal of subsection (b) of this section by Session Laws 2015-294, s. 1(b), applicable to contracts entered into on or after October 1, 2015.

Session Laws 2016-3, 2nd Ex. Sess., provides in its preamble: "Whereas, the North Carolina Constitution directs the General Assembly to provide for the organization and government of all cities and counties and to give cities and counties such powers and duties as the General Assembly deems advisable in Section 1 of Article VII of the North Carolina Constitution; and

"Whereas, the North Carolina Constitution reflects the importance of statewide laws related to commerce by prohibiting the General Assembly from enacting local acts regulating labor, trade, mining, or manufacturing in Section 24 of Article II of the North Carolina Constitution; and

"Whereas, the General Assembly finds that laws and obligations consistent statewide for all businesses, organizations, and employers doing business in the State will improve intrastate commerce; and

"Whereas, the General Assembly finds that laws and obligations consistent statewide for all businesses, organizations, and employers doing business in the State benefit the businesses, organizations, and employers seeking to do business in the State and attracts new businesses, organizations, and employers to the State; Now, therefore,"

Session Laws 2016-3, 2nd Ex. Sess., s. 4, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2016-3, 2nd Ex. Sess., s. 5, provides: "This act is effective when it becomes law [March 23, 2016] and applies to any action taken on or after that date, to any ordinance, resolution, regulation, or policy adopted or amended on or after that date, and to any contract entered into on or after that date. The provisions of Sections 2.1 [amending G.S. 95-25.1], 2.2 [amending G.S. 153A-449(a)], 2.3 [amending G.S. 160A-20.1(a)], 3.1 [amending G.S. 143-422.2], 3.2 [amending G.S. 143-422.3], and 3.3 [enacting Article 49B of Chapter 143] of this act supersede and preempt any ordinance, resolution, regulation, or policy adopted prior to the effective date of this act that purports to regulate a subject matter preempted by this act or that violates or is not consistent with this act, and such ordinances, resolutions, regulations, or policies shall be null and void as of the effective date of this act."

Session Laws 2017-4, s. 1, effective March 30, 2017, provides: "S.L. 2016-3 and S.L. 2016-99 are repealed." Session Laws 2016-3, 2nd Ex. Sess., s. 2.3, effective March 23, 2016, and applicable to any action taken on or after that date, to any ordinance, resolution, regulation, or policy adopted or amended on or after that date, and to any contract entered into on or after that date, had amended subsection (a) by substituting "regulations or controls on the contractor's employment practices or mandate or prohibit the provision of goods, services, or accommodations to any member of the public as a condition of bidding on a contract or a qualification-based selection, except as otherwise required or allowed by State law" for "any restriction that the city could not impose on all employers in the city, such as paying minimum wage or providing paid sick leave to its employees, as a condition of bidding on a contract."

Session Laws 2017-4, s. 3, provides: "No local government in this State may enact or amend an ordinance regulating private employment practices or regulating public accommodations." Section 3 of this act expires on December 1, 2020.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2013-413, s. 5(d), effective August 23, 2013, added the second sentence in this section. For applicability, see Editor's note.

Session Laws 2013-418, s. 2(b), effective September 4, 2013, added "contractors must use E-verify" in the section heading; designated the existing provisions as subsection (a); added "Authority" as the subsection heading in subsection (a); and added subsection (b).

Session Laws 2014-119, s. 13(a), effective October 1, 2014, inserted "subject to G.S. 143-129" near the beginning of subsection (b). See Editor's note for applicability.

Session Laws, 2015-294, s. 1(b), effective October 1, 2015, repealed subsection (b). For applicability, see editor's note.

Session Laws 2016-3, 2nd Ex. Sess., s. 2.3, effective March 23, 2016, in the second sentence of subsection (a), substituted "regulations or controls on the contractor's employment practices or mandate or prohibit the provision of goods, services, or accommodations to any member of the public as a condition of bidding on a contract or a qualification-based selection, except as otherwise required or allowed by State law" for "any restriction that the city could not impose on all employers in the city, such as paying minimum wage or providing paid sick leave to its employees, as a condition of bidding on a contract".

ARTICLE 4. Corporate Limits.

Part 1. General Provisions.

Sec.

PART 1.

GENERAL PROVISIONS.

§ 160A-21. Existing boundaries.

The boundaries of each city shall be those specified in its charter with any alterations that are made from time to time in the manner provided by law or by local act of the General Assembly.

History

(1971, c. 698, s. 1.)

Legal Periodicals. - For 1984 survey, "Competitive Annexation Among Municipalities: North Carolina Adopts the Prior Jurisdiction Rule," see 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1260 (1985).

CASE NOTES

Constitutionality of Annexation by Local Act Where Essential Service Not Provided. - Annexation to a municipality by a local act of the General Assembly is not invalid constitutionally where the municipality fails to provide one of the many essential services to the newly acquired territory. Abbott v. Town of Highlands, 52 N.C. App. 69, 277 S.E.2d 820, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 303 N.C. 710, 283 S.E.2d 136 (1981).

Contiguity and cohesiveness were not constitutionally required in an annexation proceeding under this section. Abbott v. Town of Highlands, 52 N.C. App. 69, 277 S.E.2d 820, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 303 N.C. 710, 283 S.E.2d 136 (1981).

Legislature Has Power to Regulate Annexation. - Annexation by a municipal corporation is a political question which is within the power of the state legislature to regulate. Abbott v. Town of Highlands, 52 N.C. App. 69, 277 S.E.2d 820, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 303 N.C. 710, 283 S.E.2d 136 (1981).

But Such Power Is Not Unlimited. - The power of the legislature to expand the boundaries of cities, towns, or other local units, though great, is not unlimited. Abbott v. Town of Highlands, 52 N.C. App. 69, 277 S.E.2d 820, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 303 N.C. 710, 283 S.E.2d 136 (1981).

Scope of Legislative Discretion. - Enlargement of municipal boundaries by the annexation of new territory, and the consequent extension of corporate jurisdiction, including that of levying taxes, are legitimate subjects of legislation. In the absence of constitutional restriction, the extent to which such legislation shall be enacted, both with respect to the terms and circumstances under which the annexation may be had, and the manner in which it may be made, rests entirely in the discretion of the legislature. Abbott v. Town of Highlands, 52 N.C. App. 69, 277 S.E.2d 820, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 303 N.C. 710, 283 S.E.2d 136 (1981).

Judicial Review of Local Annexation Act. - A local annexation act is not insulated from judicial review when it is an instrument for circumventing a constitutionally protected right. Abbott v. Town of Highlands, 52 N.C. App. 69, 277 S.E.2d 820, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 303 N.C. 710, 283 S.E.2d 136 (1981).

Cited in Jones v. Jeanette, 34 N.C. App. 526, 239 S.E.2d 293 (1977); Piedmont Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. City of Greensboro, 90 N.C. App. 692, 370 S.E.2d 262 (1988); Pinehurst Enters., Inc. v. Town of S. Pines, 690 F. Supp. 444 (M.D.N.C. 1988).

§ 160A-22. Map of corporate limits.

The current city boundaries shall at all times be drawn on a map, or set out in a written description, or shown by a combination of these techniques. This delineation shall be retained permanently in the office of the city clerk. Alterations in these established boundaries shall be indicated by appropriate entries upon or additions to the map or description made by or under the direction of the officer charged with that duty by the city charter or by the council. Copies of the map or description reproduced by any method of reproduction that gives legible and permanent copies, when certified by the city clerk, shall be admissible in evidence in all courts and shall have the same force and effect as would the original map or description. The council may provide for revisions in any map or other description of the city boundaries. A revised map or description shall supersede for all purposes the earlier map or description that it is designated to replace.

History

(1971, c. 698, s. 1; 1973, c. 426, s. 10.)

CASE NOTES

Cited in Potter v. City of Hamlet, 141 N.C. App. 714, 541 S.E.2d 233, cert. denied, 355 N.C. 379, 547 S.E.2d 814 (2001); Town of Boone v. State, 369 N.C. 126, 794 S.E.2d 710 (2016).

§ 160A-23. District map; reapportionment.

If the city is divided into electoral districts for the purpose of electing the members of the council, the map or description required by G.S. 160A-22 shall also show the boundaries of the several districts.
The council shall have authority to revise electoral district boundaries from time to time. If district boundaries are set out in the city charter and the charter does not provide a method for revising them, the council may revise them only for the purpose of (i) accounting for territory annexed to or excluded from the city, and (ii) correcting population imbalances among the districts shown by a new federal census or caused by exclusions or annexations. When district boundaries have been established in conformity with the federal Constitution, the council shall not be required to revise them again until a new federal census of population is taken or territory is annexed to or excluded from the city, whichever event first occurs. In establishing district boundaries, the council may use data derived from the most recent federal census and shall not be required to use any other population estimates.

History

(1969, c. 629; 1971, c. 698, s. 1.)

Local Modification. - City of Greensboro: 2015-138, s. 2(b), as amended by 2015-264, s. 85.5.

Legal Periodicals. - For article, "Political Gerrymandering After Davis v. Bandemer," see 9 Campbell L. Rev. 207 (1987).

For article, "Racial Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act in North Carolina," see 9 Campbell L. Rev. 255 (1987).

For article, "Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting," see 70 Duke L.J. 261 (2020).

For article, "Math for the People: Reining in Gerrymandering While Protecting Minority Rights,” see 98 N.C.L. Rev. 273 (2020).

§ 160A-23.1. Special rules for redistricting after a federal decennial census.

As soon as possible after receipt of federal decennial census information, the council of any city which elects the members of its governing board on a district basis, or where candidates for such office must reside in a district in order to run, shall evaluate the existing district boundaries to determine whether it would be lawful to hold the next election without revising districts to correct population imbalances. If such revision is necessary, the council shall consider whether it will be possible to adopt the changes (and obtain approval from the United States Department of Justice, if necessary) before the third day before opening of the filing period for the municipal election. The council shall take into consideration the time that will be required to afford ample opportunities for public input. If the council determines that it most likely will not be possible to adopt the changes (and obtain federal approval, if necessary) before the third business day before opening of the filing period, and determines further that the population imbalances are so significant that it would not be lawful to hold the next election using the current electoral districts, it may adopt a resolution delaying the election so that it will be held on the timetable provided by subsection (d) of this section. Before adopting such a resolution, the council shall hold a public hearing on it. The notice of public hearing shall summarize the proposed resolution and shall be published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation, not less than seven days before the date fixed for the hearing. Notwithstanding adoption of such a resolution, if the council proceeds to adopt the changes, (and federal approval is obtained, if necessary) by the end of the third business day before the opening of the filing period, the election shall be held on the regular schedule under the revised electoral districts. Any resolution adopted under this subsection, and any changes in electoral district boundaries made under this section shall be submitted to the United States Department of Justice (if the city is covered under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965), the State Board of Elections, and to the board conducting the elections for that city.
In adopting any revisal under this section, if the council determines that in order for the plan to conform to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the number of district seats needs to be increased or decreased, it may do so by following the procedures set forth in Part 4 of Article 5 of Chapter 160A of the General Statutes, except that the ordinance under G.S. 160A-102 may be adopted at the same meeting as the public hearing, and any referendum on the change under G.S. 160A-103 shall not apply to the municipal election in the two years following a federal decennial census.
If the resolution provided for in subsection (a) of this section is not adopted and:
1. Proposed changes to the electoral districts are not adopted, or
2. Such changes are adopted, but approval under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, is required, and notice of such approval is not received,
If the council adopts the resolution provided for in subsection (a) of this section and does not adopt the changes, or does adopt the changes, but approval under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, is required, and notice of such approval is not received, by the end of the third day before the opening of the filing period, the municipal election shall be rescheduled as provided in this subsection and current officeholders shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified. For cities using the:
1. Partisan primary and election method under G.S. 163-291, the primary shall be held on the primary election date for county officers in the second year following a federal decennial census, the second primary, if necessary, shall be held on the second primary election date for county officers in that year, and the general election shall be held on the general election date for county officers in that year.
2. Nonpartisan primary and election method under G.S. 163-294, the primary shall be held on the primary election date for county officers in the second year following a federal decennial census, and the election shall be held on the date for the second primary for county officers in that year.
3. Nonpartisan plurality election method under G.S. 163-292, the election shall be held on the primary election date for county officers in the second year following a federal decennial census.
4. Election and runoff method under G.S. 163-293, the election shall be held on the primary election date for county officers in the second year following a federal decennial census, and the runoffs, if necessary, shall be held on the date for the second primary for county officers in that year.
This section does not apply to any municipality that, under its charter, is not scheduled to hold an election in the year following a federal decennial census.

by the end of the third business day before the opening of the filing period, the election shall be held on the regular schedule using the current electoral districts.

The organizational meeting of the new council may be held at any time after the results of the election have been officially determined and published, but not later than the time and date of the first regular meeting of the council in November of the second year following a federal decennial census, except in the case of partisan municipal elections, when the organizational meeting shall be held not later than the time and date of the first regular meeting of the council in December of the second year following a federal decennial census.

History

(1989 (Reg. Sess., 1990), c. 1012, s. 2; 1999-227, s. 4; 2000-140, s. 34; 2002-159, s. 52; 2009-414, s. 1; 2017-6, s. 3; 2018-146, ss. 3.1(a), (b), 6.1.)

Re-recodification; Technical and Conforming Changes. - Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3, provides, in part: "The Revisor of Statutes shall recodify Chapter 138A of the General Statutes, Chapter 120C of the General Statutes, as well as Chapter 163 of the General Statutes, as amended by this act, into a new Chapter 163A of the General Statutes to be entitled 'Elections and Ethics Enforcement Act,' as enacted by Section 4 of this act. The Revisor may also recodify into the new Chapter 163A of the General Statutes other existing statutory laws relating to elections and ethics enforcement that are located elsewhere in the General Statutes as the Revisor deems appropriate." The Revisor was further authorized to make additional technical and conforming changes to catchlines, internal citations, and other references throughout the General Statutes to effectuate this recodification, in consultation with the State Ethics Commission, the State Board of Elections, the Secretary of State, and the new Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement. Pursuant to this authority, the Revisor of Statutes substituted "Bipartisan State Board of Elections and Ethics Enforcement" for "State Board of Elections" near the end of subsection (a); substituted "163A-1615" for "163-291" in subdivision (d)(1); substituted "163A-1618" for "163-294" in subdivision (d)(2); substituted "163A-1616" for "163-292" in subdivision (d)(3); and substituted "163A-1617" for "163-293" in subdivision (d)(4).

Session Laws 2018-146, ss. 3.1(a), (b) and 6.1, repealed Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3, and authorized the Revisor of Statutes to re-recodify Chapter 163A into Chapters 163, 138A, and 120C and to revert the changes made by the Revisor pursuant to Session Laws 2017-6, s. 3. Pursuant to this authority, the Revisor of Statutes reverted the changes to the references in this section.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1999-227, s. 3, contains findings of the General Assembly regarding, in part, the use of census data for congressional redistricting.

Session Laws 2021-56, s. 1(b), provides: "Revision of Districts After Release of 2020 Census Data. - G.S. 160A-23.1, and any resolution adopted under that statute, shall not apply with respect to any election delayed to 2022 in accordance with this act. Notwithstanding G.S. 160A-23.1, upon the release of the 2020 Census data by the U.S. Census Bureau, each municipality with elections delayed in accordance with this act shall review and revise its electoral districts in accordance with State and federal law on or before the date provided in Section 1(c) of this act. In revising the electoral districts, the municipality with elections delayed in accordance with this act may seek and provide an opportunity for public input prior to the release of the 2020 Census data. In addition, the municipality with elections delayed in accordance with this act shall provide an opportunity for public input after the release of the 2020 Census data and shall conduct at least one public hearing prior to adopting revised districts."

Session Laws 2021-56, s. 1.9, provides: "This act shall not apply to offices elected at large in any municipality where there is an election of municipal officers scheduled for 2021, where less than the entire jurisdiction is eligible to vote for candidates for one or more offices on the 2021, and that municipality has notified the county board of elections at least five business days prior to the opening of the 2021 filing period as provided in Article 23 or 24 of Chapter 163 of the General Statutes for the method of election for that municipality. If the county board of elections is so notified, the county board of elections shall open the filing period for the offices elected at large only for that municipality and conduct the election in 2021 in accordance with that municipality's charter and Chapter 163 of the General Statutes."

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2009-414, s. 1, effective August 5, 2009, in the section heading, substituted "a federal decennial census" for "2000 census"; in subsection (a), substituted "decennial census information" for "census information in 2001"; in subsection (b), substituted "the two years following a federal decennial census" for "2001 or 2002"; in subsection (d), substituted "the second year following a federal decennial census" or "that year" for "2002" throughout; and added subsection (e).

ARTICLE 4A. Extension of Corporate Limits.

Part 1. Extension by Petition.

Sec.

Part 2. Annexation by Cities of Less Than 5,000.

Part 3. Annexation by Cities of 5,000 or More.

Part 4. Annexation of Noncontiguous Areas.

Part 4A. Effective Dates of Certain Annexation Ordinances.

Part 5. Property Tax Liability of Newly Annexed Territory.

Part 6. Annexation Agreements.

Part 7. Annexations Initiated by Municipalities.

Part 8. Recording and Reporting.

Local Modification. - (As to this Article) Municipalities in Craven County: 1985, c. 92, s. 2; town of Butner: 2007-269, s. 1.1 (restrictions on annexation); town of Wallburg: 2004-37, s. 1 (shall not extend boundaries into Forsyth County); village of Pinehurst: 1985, c. 379, s. 4. (As to Article 4A) Special Airport District for Burke and Caldwell: 2001-306, s. 3.1.

PART 1. EXTENSION BY PETITION.

§§ 160A-24 through 160A-28: Repealed by Session Laws 1983, c. 636, s. 26.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1983, c. 636, which repealed these sections, in s. 37.1, as amended by Session Laws 1983, c. 768, s. 25, provided: "The General Assembly intends by this act to repeal all acts and provisions of acts that modify the application to particular cities and towns of Parts 2 and 3 of Article 4A of Chapter 160A of the General Statutes or that exempt particular cities or towns from the application of either or both of those two Parts. Therefore, all such acts and provisions of acts, even if not specifically listed and repealed in Sections 26 through 35.4 of this act, are repealed. Neither this section nor Sections 26 through 35.4 of this act shall affect any annexation in progress on the dates of ratification of this act under any of the repealed or amended sections."

The act was ratified June 29, 1983.

§ 160A-29. Map of annexed area, copy of ordinance and election results recorded in the office of register of deeds.

Whenever the limits of any municipal corporation are enlarged, in accordance with the provisions of this Article, it shall be the duty of the mayor of the city or town to cause an accurate map of such annexed territory, together with a copy of the ordinance duly certified, and the official results of the election, if conducted, to be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county or counties in which such territory is situated and in the office of the Secretary of State. The documents required to be filed with the Secretary of State under this section shall be filed not later than 30 days following the effective date of the annexation ordinance. All documents shall have an identifying number affixed thereto and shall conform in size in accordance with rules prescribed by the Secretary. Failure to file within 30 days shall not affect the validity of the annexation. Any annexation shall be reported as part of the Boundary and Annexation Survey of the United States Bureau of the Census.

History

(1947, c. 725, s. 6; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; 1987, c. 715, s. 6; c. 879, s. 3; 1989, c. 440, s. 7; 1991, c. 586, s. 1.)

Local Modification. - (As to Article 4A) Bladen: 1991 (Reg. Sess., 1992), c. 807, ss. 2, 3; Cabarrus and municipalities located therein: 1987, c. 233, s. 2; 1991, c. 685, s. 7; (As to Article 4A) Davidson: 2012-54; New Hanover: 1997-415; Orange and municipalities located therein: 1987, c. 233, s. 2; 1991, c. 685, s. 7; (As to Article 4A) city of Durham: 1993, c. 342, s. 1; 2014-47, s. 4; (As to Article 4A) city of Reidsville: 1997-360; city of Washington: 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994), c. 713, s. 1; (as to Part 1) town of Dobbins Heights: 1983, c. 658; (As to Article 4A) town of Holden Beach: 1991, c. 638, s. 1; (As to Article 4A) town of Lewisville: 1991, c. 116, s. 1; (As to Article 4A) town of Middlesex: 1993, c. 480; town of Oak Ridge: 1998-113; (As to Article 4A) town of Swepsonville: 1997-448, s. 2.

Cross References. - As to effective date of annexation ordinances adopted under Article 4A of Chapter 160A, see G.S. 160A-58.9A.

Twelve-year Prohibition on Involuntary Annexation. - Session Laws 2012-3, s. 3, effective July 1, 2012, provides: "Twelve-year prohibition on involuntary annexation. - All areas affected by the annexation ordinances described in Section 4 of this act shall not be subject to any annexation proceeding, other than a voluntary annexation under Part 1 or Part 4 of Article 4A of Chapter 160A of the General Statutes, or local act of the General Assembly, for a period of 12 years from and after the effective date of this act. After the 12-year period, the area may be subject to annexation in accordance with State law effective at that time."

Session Laws 2012-3, s. 4, provides: "Repealed involuntary annexation ordinances.

"(1) Kinston annexation ordinance, as described in House Bill 5, First Edition, 2011 Regular Session.

"(2) Lexington annexation ordinance, as described in House Bill 37, First Edition, 2011 Regular Session.

"(3) Rocky Mount annexation ordinance, as described in House Bill 56, First Edition, 2011 Regular Session.

"(4) Wilmington annexation ordinance, described in House Bill 180, First Edition, 2011 Regular Session.

"(5) Asheville•iltmore Lake annexation ordinance, as described in House Bill 236, First Edition, 2011 Regular Session.

"(6) Marvin annexation ordinance, affecting the area described in RS 2008-02-02, a resolution of the Village of Marvin Council.

"(7) Southport annexation ordinance, affecting 'Area A' and 'Area B,' as described in City of Southport annexation ordinance, adopted June 9, 2011.

"(8) Goldsboro annexation ordinance, affecting the area described in Senate Bill 314, First Edition, 2011 Regular Session.

"(9) Fayetteville Gates Four annexation ordinance, as described in House Bill 231, First Edition, 2011 Regular Session."

Session Laws 2012-103, s. 2, effective June 29, 2012, provides: "Twelve-year prohibition on involuntary annexation. - All areas affected by the annexation ordinances described in Section 3 of this act shall not be subject to any annexation proceeding, other than a voluntary annexation under Part 1 or Part 4 of Article 4A of Chapter 160A of the General Statutes, or local act of the General Assembly, for a period of 12 years from and after the effective date of this act. After the 12-year period, the area may be subject to annexation in accordance with State law effective at that time."

Session Laws 2012-103, s. 3, provides: "Repealed involuntary annexation ordinances. -

"(1) Elizabethtown Annexation Ordinance 2011-04 (Area A) adopted June 6, 2011.

"(2) Elizabethtown Annexation Ordinance 2011-05 (Area B) adopted June 6, 2011.

"(3) Elizabethtown Annexation Ordinance 2011-06 (Area C) adopted June 6, 2011.

"(4) Elizabethtown Annexation Ordinance 2011-07 (Area D) adopted June 6, 2011."

Session Laws 2012-104, s. 2, effective June 29, 2012, provides: "Twelve-year prohibition on involuntary annexation. - All areas affected by the annexation ordinances described in Section 3 of this act shall not be subject to any annexation proceeding, other than a voluntary annexation under Part 1 or Part 4 of Article 4A of Chapter 160A of the General Statutes, or local act of the General Assembly, for a period of 12 years from and after the effective date of this act. After the 12-year period, the area may be subject to annexation in accordance with State law effective at that time."

Session Laws 2012-104, s. 3, provides: "Repealed involuntary annexation ordinances. -

"(1) Elizabethtown Annexation Ordinance 2011-09 (Area J) adopted June 6, 2011.

"(2) Elizabethtown Annexation Ordinance 2011-10 (Area N) adopted June 6, 2011.

"(3) Elizabethtown Annexation Ordinance 2011-07 (Area Q) adopted June 6, 2011."

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2012-3, s. 6, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2012-103, s. 4, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2012-104, s. 4, is a severability clause.

CASE NOTES

As to the constitutionality of this Article, see Forsyth Citizens Opposing Annexation v. City of Winston-Salem, 67 N.C. App. 164, 312 S.E.2d 517, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 310 N.C. 743, 315 S.E.2d 701, appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 802, 105 S. Ct. 57, 83 L. Ed. 2d 8 (1984).

Right to Annexation Conditioned on Compliance with Duty to Create Record. - For an annexation ordinance to be valid, the record must show prima facie complete and substantial compliance with Article 4A of G.S. 160A as a condition precedent to the municipality's right to annex the territory. Matheson v. City of Asheville, 102 N.C. App. 156, 402 S.E.2d 140 (1991).

If Record Is Complete, Burden of Showing Irregularity Shifts to Those Opposing Annexation. - Once a municipality has made its prima facie showing of compliance with this Article, the burden shifts to those opposing annexation to prove either a procedural irregularity in the annexation process materially prejudicing the rights of those opposing annexation or a failure on the part of the municipality to comply with statutory prerequisites to annexation as a matter of fact. Matheson v. City of Asheville, 102 N.C. App. 156, 402 S.E.2d 140 (1991).

§ 160A-30. Surveys of proposed new areas.

The governing bodies of the cities and towns after five days' written notice to the owner of record or persons in possession of the premises are hereby authorized to enter upon any lands to make surveys or examinations as may be necessary in carrying out the mapping requirements of proposed annexations under any provision of Article 4A of Chapter 160A; provided, the city or town authorizing such entry shall make reimbursement for any damage resulting from such activity.

History

(1947, c. 725, s. 7; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; 1975, c. 312.)

Legal Periodicals. - For survey of 1980 constitutional law, see 59 N.C.L. Rev. 1093 (1981).

§ 160A-31. Annexation by petition.

The governing board of any municipality may annex by ordinance any area contiguous to its boundaries upon presentation to the governing board of a petition signed by the owners of all the real property located within such area. The petition shall be signed by each owner of real property in the area and shall contain the address of each such owner.
The petition shall be prepared in substantially the following form: DATE: To the ______________ (name of governing board) of the (City or Town) of ____________ 1. We the undersigned owners of real property respectfully request that the area described in paragraph 2 below be annexed to the (City or Town) of ____________ 2. The area to be annexed is contiguous to the (City or Town) of ____________ and the boundaries of such territory are as follows: ______________________________________________________________________________ (b1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section, if fifty-one percent (51%) of the households in an area petitioning for annexation pursuant to this section have incomes that are two hundred percent (200%) or less than the most recently published United States Census Bureau poverty thresholds, the governing board of any municipality shall annex by ordinance any area the population of which is no more than ten percent (10%) of that of the municipality and one-eighth of the aggregate external boundaries of which are contiguous to its boundaries, upon presentation to the governing board of a petition signed by the owners of at least seventy-five percent (75%) of the parcels of real property in that area. A municipality shall not be required to adopt more than one ordinance under this subsection within a 36-month period. (b2) The petition under subsection (b1) of this section shall be prepared in substantially the following form: DATE: To the ______________ (name of governing board) of the (City or Town) of ____________ 1. We the undersigned owners of real property believe that the area described in paragraph 2 below meets the requirements of G.S. 160A-31(b1) and respectfully request that the area described in paragraph 2 below be annexed to the (City or Town) of ____________. 2. The area to be annexed is contiguous to the (City or Town) of ____________, and the boundaries of such territory are as follows: ______________________________________________________________________________ (c) Upon receipt of the petition, the municipal governing board shall cause the clerk of the municipality to investigate the sufficiency thereof and to certify the result of the investigation. For petitions received under subsection (b1) or (j) of this section, the clerk shall receive the evidence provided under subsection (l) of this section before certifying the sufficiency of the petition. Upon receipt of the certification, the municipal governing board shall fix a date for a public hearing on the question of annexation, and shall cause notice of the public hearing to be published once in a newspaper having general circulation in the municipality at least 10 days prior to the date of the public hearing; provided, if there be no such paper, the governing board shall have notices posted in three or more public places within the area to be annexed and three or more public places within the municipality. (d) At the public hearing persons resident or owning property in the area described in the petition and persons resident or owning property in the municipality shall be given an opportunity to be heard. The governing board shall then determine whether the petition meets the requirements of this section. Upon a finding that the petition that was not submitted under subsection (b1) or (j) of this section meets the requirements of this section, the governing board shall have authority to pass an ordinance annexing the territory described in the petition. The governing board shall have authority to make the annexing ordinance effective immediately or on the June 30 after the date of the passage of the ordinance or the June 30 of the following year after the date of passage of the ordinance. (d1) Upon a finding that a petition submitted under subsection (j) of this section meets the requirements of this section, the governing body shall have the authority to adopt an annexation ordinance for the area with an effective date no later than 24 months after the adoption of the ordinance. (d2) Upon a finding that a petition submitted under subsection (b1) of this section meets the requirements of this section, the governing body shall, within 60 days of the finding, estimate the capital cost to the municipality of extending water and sewer lines to all parcels within the area covered by the petition and estimate the annual debt service payment that would be required if those costs were financed by a 20-year revenue bond. If the estimated annual debt service payment is less than five percent (5%) of the municipality's annual water and sewer systems revenue for the most recent fiscal year, then the governing body shall within 30 days adopt an annexation ordinance for the area with an effective date no later than 24 months after the adoption of the ordinance. If the estimated annual debt service payment is greater than or equal to five percent (5%) of the municipality's annual water and sewer systems revenue for the most recent fiscal year, then the governing body may adopt a resolution declining to annex the area. If such a resolution is adopted, the governing body shall immediately submit a request to the Local Government Commission to certify that its estimate of the annual debt service payment is reasonable based on established governmental accounting principles. (1) If the Local Government Commission certifies the estimate, the municipality is not required to annex the area and no petition to annex the area may be submitted under subsection (b1) of this section for 36 months following the certification. During the 36-month period, the municipality shall make ongoing, annual good faith efforts to secure Community Development Block Grants or other grant funding for extending water and sewer service to all parcels in the areas covered by the petition. If sufficient funding is secured so that the estimated capital cost to the municipality for extending water and sewer service, less the funds secured, would result in an annual debt service payment cost to the municipality of less than five percent (5%) of the municipality's annual water and sewer systems revenue for the most recent fiscal year, then the governing body shall within 30 days adopt an annexation ordinance for the area with an effective date no later than 24 months after the adoption of the ordinance. (2) If the Local Government Commission notifies the governing board that the estimates are not reasonable based on established governmental accounting principles and that a reasonable estimate of the annual debt service payment is less than five percent (5%) of the municipality's annual water and sewer systems revenue for the most recent fiscal year, then the governing body shall within 30 days of the notification adopt an annexation ordinance for the area with an effective date no later than 24 months after the adoption of the ordinance. (d3) Municipal services shall be provided to an area annexed under subsections (b1) and (j) of this section in accordance with the requirements of Part 7 of this Article. (e) From and after the effective date of the annexation ordinance, the territory and its citizens and property shall be subject to all debts, laws, ordinances and regulations in force in such municipality and shall be entitled to the same privileges and benefits as other parts of such municipality. Real and personal property in the newly annexed territory on the January 1 immediately preceding the beginning of the fiscal year in which the annexation becomes effective is subject to municipal taxes as provided in G.S. 160A-58.10. If the effective date of annexation falls between June 1 and June 30, and the effective date of the privilege license tax ordinance of the annexing municipality is June 1, then businesses in the area to be annexed shall be liable for taxes imposed in such ordinance from and after the effective date of annexation. (f) For purposes of this section, an area shall be deemed "contiguous" if, at the time the petition is submitted, such area either abuts directly on the municipal boundary or is separated from the municipal boundary by the width of a street or street right-of-way, a creek or river, or the right-of-way of a railroad or other public service corporation, lands owned by the municipality or some other political subdivision, or lands owned by the State of North Carolina. A connecting corridor consisting solely of a street or street right-of-way may not be used to establish contiguity. In describing the area to be annexed in the annexation ordinance, the municipal governing board may include within the description any territory described in this subsection which separates the municipal boundary from the area petitioning for annexation. (g) The governing board may initiate annexation of contiguous property owned by the municipality by adopting a resolution stating its intent to annex the property, in lieu of filing a petition. The resolution shall contain an adequate description of the property, state that the property is contiguous to the municipal boundaries and fix a date for a public hearing on the question of annexation. Notice of the public hearing shall be published as provided in subsection (c) of this section. The governing board may hold the public hearing and adopt the annexation ordinance as provided in subsection (d) of this section. (h) A city council which receives a petition for annexation under this section may by ordinance require that the petitioners file a signed statement declaring whether or not vested rights with respect to the properties subject to the petition have been established under G.S. 160A-385.1 or G.S. 153A-344.1. If the statement declares that such rights have been established, the city may require petitioners to provide proof of such rights. A statement which declares that no vested rights have been established under G.S. 160A-385.1 or G.S. 153A-344.1 shall be binding on the landowner and any such vested right shall be terminated. (i) A municipality has no authority to adopt a resolution or petition itself under this Part for annexation of property it does not own or have any legal interest in. For the purpose of this subsection, a municipality has no legal interest in a State-maintained street unless it owns the underlying fee and not just an easement. (j) Using the procedures under this section, the governing board of any municipality may annex by ordinance any distressed area contiguous to its boundaries upon presentation to the governing board of a petition signed by at least one adult resident of at least two-thirds of the resident households located within such area. For purposes of this subsection, a "distressed area" is defined as an area in which at least fifty-one percent (51%) of the households in the area petitioning to be annexed have incomes that are two hundred percent (200%) or less than the most recently published United States Census Bureau poverty thresholds. The municipality may require reasonable proof that the petitioner in fact resides at the address indicated. (k) The petition under subsection (j) of this section shall be prepared in substantially the following form: DATE: To the ______________ (name of governing board) of the (City or Town) of ____________ 1. We the undersigned residents of real property believe that the area described in paragraph 2 below meets the requirements of G.S. 160A-31(j) and respectfully request that the area described in paragraph 2 below be annexed to the (City or Town) of____________. 2. The area to be annexed is contiguous to the (City or Town) of ________ ________, and the boundaries of such territory are as follows: _____________________________________________________________________________
For purposes of determining whether the percentage of households in the area petitioning for annexation meets the poverty thresholds under subsections (b1) and (j) of this section, the petitioners shall submit to the municipal governing board any reasonable evidence that demonstrates the area in fact meets the income requirements of that subsection. The evidence presented may include data from the most recent federal decennial census, other official census documents, signed affidavits by at least one adult resident of the household attesting to the household size and income level, or any other documentation verifying the incomes for a majority of the households within the petitioning area. Petitioners may select to submit name, address, and social security number to the clerk, who shall in turn submit the information to the Department of Revenue. Such information shall be kept confidential and is not a public record. The Department shall provide the municipality with a summary report of income for households in the petitioning area. Information for the report shall be gleaned from income tax returns, but the report submitted to the municipality shall not identify individuals or households.

History

(1947, c. 725, s. 8; 1959, c. 713; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; 1975, c. 576, s. 2; 1977, c. 517, s. 4; 1987, c. 562, s. 1; 1989 (Reg. Sess., 1990), c. 996, s. 3; 2011-57, s. 3; 2011-396, s. 10.)

Local Modification. - City of Asheville: 2005-139, s. 2 (Applicable to petitions for annexation received on or after June 30, 2005); city of Concord: 2004-102, s. 1; city of Durham: 1987, c. 606; 1993, c. 342, s. 1; 2013-386, s. 3; 2015-82, s. 1 (as to subsection (i)); city of Fayetteville: 1969, c. 715; city of Greensboro: 1959, c. 1137, s. 18; city of Kinston: 2017-85, s. 3(a) (as to subsection (a); city of Mount Holly: 2000-24, s. 1; city of Reidsville: 1997-343; town of Atlantic Beach: 1959, c. 395; town of Huntersville: 1999-19, s. 1; 1999-337, s. 45; town of Morrisville: 1989, c. 389, s. 1.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2011-396, s. 12, provides: "Except for Sections 10, 11.1, and 11.2, this act does not apply to any municipality that in its charter requires that an annexation must be approved by (i) either the voters in a referendum or at the request of a majority of the property owners; (ii) the voters in a referendum; or (iii) the request of a majority of the property owners." Sections 10, 11.1, and 11.2 amended G.S. 160A-31, 143B-437.04(a), and 159G-23, respectively.

Session Laws 2011-396, s. 13, is a severability clause.

Session Laws 2011-396, s. 14, provides: "This act is effective when it becomes law [July 1, 2011] and applies to annexations initiated by municipalities on or after that date and to petitions for annexation under Part 1 and Part 4 of Article 4A of Chapter 160A of the General Statutes presented on or after that date. Annexations initiated prior to the effective date of this act by any action under Part 2 or Part 3 of Article 4A of Chapter 160A of the General Statutes, but for which an annexation ordinance has not been adopted, shall terminate and may be reinitiated in compliance with Part 7 of Article 4A of Chapter 160A of the General Statutes as enacted by this act."

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2011-57, s. 3, effective April 28, 2011, added subsection (i).

Session Laws 2011-396, s. 10, effective July 1, 2011, rewrote the section to the extent that a detailed comparison is impracticable. For applicability, see editor's notes.

Legal Periodicals. - For survey of 1981 administrative law, see 60 N.C.L. Rev. 1165 (1982).

For 1984 survey, "Competitive Annexation Among Municipalities: North Carolina Adopts the Prior Jurisdiction Rule," see 63 N.C.L. Rev. 1260 (1985).

For casenote, "Carolina Power & Light v. City of Asheville Municipal Annexation in North Carolina: The Pros, the Cons and the Judiciary," see 27 N.C. Cent. L.J. 224 (2005).

CASE NOTES

Deliberate preference for voluntary annexation is incorporated into the law. Town of Hazelwood v. Town of Waynesville, 320 N.C. 89, 357 S.E.2d 686, cert. denied, 320 N.C. 639, 360 S.E.2d 106 (1987).

G.S. 160A-37(e), 160A-49(e), and this section are in pari materia. Conover v. Newton, 297 N.C. 506, 256 S.E.2d 216 (1979).

No Authorization to Annex Only Part of Area Described. - If the General Assembly had intended to authorize cities proceeding pursuant to a petition for voluntary annexation to annex merely a part of the area described in the petition, it would have so provided, as it has explicitly done in G.S. 160A-37(e) and 160A-49(e). The absence of such statutory authorization, in light of the explicit provisions for it in the involuntary annexation statutes, is cogent evidence that the General Assembly intended a petition for voluntary annexation to stand or fall as a unity. Conover v. Newton, 297 N.C. 506, 256 S.E.2d 216 (1979).

"Contiguous". - North Carolina annexation statutes do not permit municipality to annex by voluntary means tract of land that is contiguous with its municipal boundaries only by virtue of second tract of land that is being annexed simultaneously. City of Kannapolis v. City of Concord, 326 N.C. 512, 391 S.E.2d 493 (1990).

Standing to Contest Annexation. - Because this section describes a voluntary annexation undertaken at the request of land owners and does not authorize suit by neighboring municipalities, plaintiff town did not have standing to contest the annexation scheme of defendant neighboring town; only if another town owned property in the annexed area, or if both towns were simultaneously attempting to annex controverted property, could there be a justiciable controversy, giving one town standing to contest the annexation by the other, and, even then, G.S. 160A-360 provides a way to resolve such a conflict. Town of Ayden v. Town of Winterville, 143 N.C. App. 136, 544 S.E.2d 821 (2001).

Annexation of Undeveloped Lands Only on Petition. - Large tracts of agricultural or vacant lands, where no evidence of urban development can be shown, should not be annexed in any event, except upon petition of the landowners. Lithium Corp. of Am. v. Town of Bessemer City, 261 N.C. 532, 135 S.E.2d 574 (1964).

Property owners who have signed a voluntary annexation petition have the right to withdraw from the petition at any time up until the governing municipal body has taken action upon the petition by annexing the area described in the petition. Conover v. Newton, 297 N.C. 506, 256 S.E.2d 216 (1979).

Resolution of intent is "first mandatory public procedural step" for purposes of the prior jurisdiction rule. Town of Hazelwood v. Town of Waynesville, 320 N.C. 89, 357 S.E.2d 686, cert. denied, 320 N.C. 639, 360 S.E.2d 106 (1987).

The adoption of a resolution of intent is the critical date for determining whether a municipality utilizing involuntary annexation procedures has prior jurisdiction over the same territory being considered for voluntary annexation by a different municipality. Town of Hazelwood v. Town of Waynesville, 320 N.C. 89, 357 S.E.2d 686, cert. denied, 320 N.C. 639, 360 S.E.2d 106 (1987).

Property Not Contiguous. - Where city sought to annex private property and municipal property, and where municipal property was not contiguous with city but was contiguous to private property, city could not annex municipal property on the theory that the area as a whole was contiguous; the private property and municipal property were annexed by different procedures with independent requirements and could not be considered one whole area for the purpose of satisfying the contiguity requirement. City of Kannapolis v. City of Concord, 95 N.C. App. 591, 383 S.E.2d 402, rev'd on other grounds, 326 N.C. 512, 391 S.E.2d 493 (1990).

At the time town purported to annex defendant counties' property, the property was not contiguous and the attempted annexation was invalid. Town of Valdese v. Burke, Inc., 125 N.C. App. 688, 482 S.E.2d 24 (1997).

Effect of Withdrawal. - Where six owners of real property located within the area described in a voluntary annexation petition validly withdrew their signatures from the petition before the annexation ordinance was passed, the city governing body was without jurisdiction to take any further action on the petition as submitted, and the entire ordinance purporting to annex all the area described in the petition was void. Conover v. Newton, 297 N.C. 506, 256 S.E.2d 216 (1979).

Condemnor-County May Enjoin Municipal Annexation Proceeding. - When a county initiates condemnation of property for a sanitary landfill, and the property is being considered for voluntary annexation into a municipality, the county may proceed with the condemnation action. The county is entitled to an injunction enjoining the annexation proceeding, and the property owners and the municipality may raise the proposed annexation in the answer to the condemnation complaint, for appropriate consideration by the court. Yandle v. Mecklenburg County, 85 N.C. App. 382, 355 S.E.2d 216 (1987).

Annexation Held Proper. - City's division of an annexation area into sub-areas did not result in the improper annexation of an "island" not contiguous with the city limits as of the date of the original resolution of intent, although the boundaries of the sub-area, if considered in isolation, rather than as a sub-part of the area originally identified and eventually annexed, were not contiguous with the city limits on the date of the initial resolution. U.S. Cold Storage, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 170 N.C. App. 411, 612 S.E.2d 415 (2005).

Annexation Held Void. - City's annexation of three developments was void despite utility agreements with the developers barring future lot owners from withdrawing consent to an annexation. No easements were created through the agreements, deeds to non-consenting lot owners did not refer to the agreements, and all owners had to consent under G.S. 160A-31(a). Cunningham v. City of Greensboro, 212 N.C. App. 86, 711 S.E.2d 477 (2011).

Applied in Texfi Indus., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 269 S.E.2d 142 (1980).

Cited in Thompson v. Whitley, 344 F. Supp. 480 (E.D.N.C. 1972); Abbott v. Town of Highlands, 52 N.C. App. 69, 277 S.E.2d 820 (1981); Town of Hazelwood v. Town of Waynesville, 83 N.C. App. 670, 351 S.E.2d 558 (1987); South Shell Inv. v. Town of Wrightsville Beach, 703 F. Supp. 1192 (E.D.N.C. 1988).

§ 160A-31.1. Assumption of debt.

If the city has annexed under this Part any area which is served by a rural fire department and which is in:
1. An insurance district defined under G.S. 153A-233;
2. A rural fire protection district under Article 3A of Chapter 69 of the General Statutes; or
3. A fire service district under Article 16 of Chapter 153A of the General Statutes,
The annual payments from the city to the rural fire department on such shared debt service shall be calculated as follows:
1. The rural fire department shall certify to the city each year the amount that will be expended for debt service subject to be shared by the city as provided by subsection (a) of this section; and
2. The amount determined under subdivision (1) of this subsection shall be multiplied by the percentage determined by dividing the assessed valuation of the area of the district annexed by the assessed valuation of the entire district, each such valuation to be fixed as of the date the annexation ordinance becomes effective.
This section does not apply in any year as to any annexed area(s) for which the payment calculated under this section as to all annexation ordinances adopted under this Part by a city during a particular calendar year does not exceed one hundred dollars ($100.00).
The city and rural fire department shall jointly present a payment schedule to the Local Government Commission for approval and no payment may be made until such schedule is approved. The Local Government Commission shall approve a payment schedule agreed upon between the city and the rural fire department in cases where the assessed valuation of the district may not readily be determined, if there is a reasonable basis for the agreement.

then beginning with the effective date of annexation the city shall pay annually a proportionate share of any payments due on any debt (including principal and interest) relating to facilities or equipment of the rural fire department, if the debt was existing at the time of submission of the petition for annexation to the city under this Part. The rural fire department shall make available to the city not later than 30 days following a written request from the city, information concerning such debt. The rural fire department forfeits its rights under this section if it fails to make a good faith response within 45 days following receipt of the written request for information from the city, provided that the city's written request so states by specific reference to this section.

History

(1989, c. 598, s. 2.)

§ 160A-32: Repealed by Session Laws 1983, c. 636, s. 26.1.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 1983, c. 636, which repealed this section, in s. 37.1, as amended by Session Laws 1983, c. 768, s. 25, provided: "The General Assembly intends by this act to repeal all acts and provisions of acts that modify the application to particular cities and towns of Parts 2 and 3 of Article 4A of Chapter 160A of the General Statutes or that exempt particular cities or towns from the application of either or both of those two Parts. Therefore, all such acts and provisions of acts, even if not specifically listed and repealed in Sections 26 through 35.4 of this act, are repealed. Neither this section nor Sections 26 through 35.4 of this act shall affect any annexation in progress on the dates of ratification of this act under any of the repealed or amended sections."

The act was ratified June 29, 1983.

PART 2. ANNEXATION BY CITIES OF LESS THAN 5,000.

§§ 160A-33 through 160A-42: Repealed by Session Laws 2011-396, s. 1, effective July 1, 2011. For applicability, see editor's note.

History

(§ 160A-33: 1959, c. 1010, s. 1; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; 1983, c. 636, s. 8; repealed by 2011-396, s. 1, effective July 1, 2011. § 160A-34: 1959, c. 1010, s. 2; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; 1985, c. 92, s. 1; repealed by 2011-396, s. 1, effective July 1, 2011. § 160A-35: 1959, c. 1010, s. 3; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; 1983, c. 636, ss. 7.1, 16, 18; 1985, c. 610, ss. 1, 5, 7; 1989, c. 598, s. 5; 1991, c. 25, s. 1; c. 761, s. 30; 1998-150, s. 4; repealed by 2011-396, s. 1, effective July 1, 2011. § 160A-35.1: 1991, c. 25, s. 1; c. 761, s. 30; 1998-150, s. 5; repealed by 2011-396, s. 1, effective July 1, 2011. § 160A-36: 1959, c. 1010, s. 4; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; 1985, c. 757, s. 205(c); 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994), c. 696, s. 6; c. 714, s. 6; 1998-150, s. 6; repealed by 2011-396, s. 1, effective July 1, 2011. § 160A-37: 1959, c. 1010, s. 5; 1967, c. 1226, s. 1; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; 1975, c. 576, s. 3; 1977, c. 517, s. 5; 1983, c. 636, ss. 2, 4, 6, 36; 1985, c. 384, s. 1; 1987, c. 44, s. 1; 1989, c. 598, s. 11; 1998-150, s. 7; 2001-487, s. 36; 2006-264, s. 17(a)-(c); repealed by 2011-396, s. 1, effective July 1, 2011. § 160A-37.1: 1983, c. 636, s. 20; 1987, c. 827, s. 1; repealed by 2011-396, s. 1, effective July 1, 2011. § 160A-37.2: 1983, c. 636, s. 22; 1998-150, s. 8; repealed by 2011-396, s. 1, effective July 1, 2011. § 160A-37.3: 1985, c. 610, s. 3; 1987, c. 827, s. 1; 1989, c. 598, s. 6; 1998-150, s. 9; 2006-193, s. 1; repealed by 2011-396, s. 1, effective July 1, 2011. § 160A-38: 1959, c. 1010, s. 6; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; 1977, c. 148, ss. 6, 7; 1989, c. 598, s. 7; 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 746, s. 4; 1998-150, s. 10; 1999-148, s. 2; 2009-570, s. 27; repealed by 2011-396, s. 1, effective July 1, 2011. § 160A-39: 1959, c. 1010, s. 7; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; 1987, c. 715, s. 7; c. 879, s. 3; 1989, c. 440, s. 8; 1991, c. 586, s. 2; repealed by 2011-396, s. 1, effective July 1, 2011. § 160A-40: 1959, c. 1010, s. 8; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; repealed by 2011-396, s. 1, effective July 1, 2011. § 160A-41: 1959, c. 1010, s. 9; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; repealed by 2011-396, s. 1, effective July 1, 2011. § 160A-42: 1959, c. 1010, s. 10; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; 1998-150, s. 11; repealed by 2011-396, s. 1, effective July 1, 2011.)

Cross References. - As to effective date of annexation ordinances adopted under Article 4A of Chapter 160A, see G.S. 160A-58.9A. For current provisions as to annexations initiated by municipalities, see G.S. 160A-58.50 et seq.

Editor's Note. - Session Laws 2011-396, s. 14, provides: "This act is effective when it becomes law [July 1, 2011] and applies to annexations initiated by municipalities on or after that date and to petitions for annexation under Part 1 and Part 4 of Article 4A of Chapter 160A of the General Statutes presented on or after that date. Annexations initiated prior to the effective date of this act by any action under Part 2 or Part 3 of Article 4A of Chapter 160A of the General Statutes, but for which an annexation ordinance has not been adopted, shall terminate and may be reinitiated in compliance with Part 7 of Article 4A of Chapter 160A of the General Statutes as enacted by this act."

Former G.S. 160A-33 through 160A-42, repealed by Session Laws 2011-396, s. 1, pertained to annexation by cities having a population of less than 5,000 persons. For current provisions, see G.S. 160A-58.50 et seq.

Former G.S. 160A-36, was amended by Session Laws 2011-363, s. 2, effective June 27, 2011, and applicable to annexations of property used for bona fide farm purposes that were initiated by municipalities on or after that date or are pending on that date, by adding a subsection (f), which read: "(f) As used in this subsection, 'bona fide farm purposes' is as described in G.S. 153A-340. As used in this subsection, 'property' means a single tract of property or an identifiable portion of a single tract. Property that is being used for bona fide farm purposes on the date of the resolution of intent to consider annexation may not be annexed without the written consent of the owner or owners of the property."

§§ 160A-43, 160A-44: Repealed by Session Laws 1983, c. 636, s. 27.

The act was ratified June 29, 1983.

PART 3. ANNEXATION BY CITIES OF 5,000 OR MORE.

§§ 160A-45 through 160A-49: Repealed by Session Laws 2011-396, s. 7, effective July 1, 2011. For applicability, see editor's note.

History

(§ 160A-45: 1959, c. 1009, s. 1; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; 1983, c. 636, s. 9; repealed by 2011-396, s. 7, effective July 1, 2011. § 160A-46: 1959, c. 1009, s. 2; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; repealed by 2011-396, s. 7, effective July 1, 2011. § 160A-47: 1959, c. 1009, s. 3; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; 1983, c. 636, ss. 7, 10, 11, 17, 19; 1985, c. 610, ss. 2, 6, 7; 1989, c. 598, s. 8; 1991, c. 25, s. 2; c. 761, s. 31; 1998-150, s. 12; repealed by 2011-396, s. 7, effective July 1, 2011. § 160A-47.1: 1991, c. 25, s. 2; c. 761, s. 31; 1998-150, s. 13; repealed by 2011-396, s. 7, effective July 1, 2011. § 160A-48: 1959, c. 1009, s. 4; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; 1983, c. 636, s. 15; 1985, c. 757, s. 205(d); 1993 (Reg. Sess., 1994), c. 696, s. 7; c. 714, s. 7; 1998-150, s. 14; repealed by 2011-396, s. 7, effective July 1, 2011. § 160A-49: 1959, c. 1009, s. 5; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; 1975, c. 576, s. 4; 1977, c. 517, s. 6; 1983, c. 636, ss. 1, 3, 5, 6, 12-14, 37; c. 768, s. 25; 1985, c. 384, s. 1; 1987, c. 44, s. 2; 1989, c. 598, s. 12; 1998-150, s. 15; 2006-162, s. 21; 2006-264, s. 18(a); repealed by 2011-396, s. 7, effective July 1, 2011.)

Cross References. - As to annexations initiated by municipalities, see G.S. 160A-58.50 et seq.

Editor's Note. - Former G.S. 160A-48 was amended by Session Laws 2011-363, s. 3, effective June 27, 2011, and applicable to annexations of property used for bona fide farm purposes that were initiated by municipalities on or after that date or are pending on that date, by adding a subsection (g), which read: "(g) As used in this subsection, 'bona fide farm purposes' is as described in G.S. 153A-340. As used in this subsection, 'property' means a single tract of property or an identifiable portion of a single tract. Property that is being used for bona fide farm purposes on the date of the resolution of intent to consider annexation may not be annexed without the written consent of the owner or owners of the property."

Former Part 3 of Article 4A of Chapter 160A, which was repealed by Session Laws 2011-396, s. 7, pertained to annexation by cities having a population of 5,000 or more persons. For current provisions, see G.S. 160A-58.50 et seq. The current provisions include five sections recodified from former Part 3.

§ 160A-49.1: Recodified to G.S. 160A-58.57 by Session Laws 2011-396, s. 2, effective July 1, 2011.

§ 160A-49.2: Recodified to G.S. 160A-58.58 by Session Laws 2011-396, s. 3, effective July 1, 2011.

§ 160A-49.3: Recodified to G.S. 160A-58.59 by Session Laws 2011-396, s. 4, effective July 1, 2011.

§ 160A-50: Repealed by Session Laws 2011-396, s. 7, effective July 1, 2011. For applicability, see editor's note.

History

(1959, c. 1009, s. 6; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; 1981, c. 682, ss. 20, 21; 1983, c. 636, s. 14.1; 1989, c. 598, s. 10; 1995 (Reg. Sess., 1996), c. 746, s. 3; 1998-150, s. 18; 1999-148, s. 1; 2009-570, s. 27; repealed by Acts 2011-396, s. 7, effective July 1, 2011.)

Cross References. - As to annexations initiated by municipalities, see G.S. 160A-58.50 et seq.

Effect of Amendments. - Session Laws 2009-570, s. 27, effective August 28, 2009, substituted "judgment" for "judgement" in the last sentence of subsection (i).

§ 160A-51: Recodified to G.S. 160A-58.61 by Session Laws 2011-396, s. 5, effective July 1, 2011.

§ 160A-52: Recodified to G.S. 160A-58.62 by Session Laws 2011-396, s. 6, effective July 1, 2011.

§§ 160A-53, 160A-54: Repealed by Session Laws 2011-396, s. 7, effective July 1, 2011. For applicability, see editor's note.

History

(§ 160A-53: 1959, c. 1009, s. 9; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; repealed 2011-396, s. 7, effective July 1, 2011. § 160A-54: 1959, c. 1009, s. 10; 1973, c. 426, s. 74; 1998-150, s. 19; repealed 2011-396, s. 7, effective July 1, 2011.)

§§ 160A-55, 160A-56: Repealed by Session Laws 1983, c. 636.

Session Laws 1983, c. 636 was ratified June 29, 1983.

§ 160A-57: Reserved for future codification purposes.

PART 4. ANNEXATION OF NONCONTIGUOUS AREAS.

§ 160A-58. Definitions.

The words and phrases defined in this section have the meanings indicated when used in this Part unless the context clearly requires another meaning:

"City" means any city, town, or village without regard to population, except cities not qualified to receive gasoline tax allocations under G.S. 136-41.2.
"Primary corporate limits" means the corporate limits of a city as defined in its charter, enlarged or diminished by subsequent annexations or exclusions of contiguous territory pursuant to Parts 1, 2, and 3 of this Article or local acts of the General Assembly.
"Satellite corporate limits" means the corporate limits of a noncontiguous area annexed pursuant to this Part or a local act authorizing or effecting noncontiguous annexations.

History

(1973, c. 1173, s. 2.)

Local Modification. - (As to Part 4) Iredell and municipalities located therein: 1989, c. 598, s. 12.1; Union: 2003-321, s. 1; (as to Part 4) town of Dobbins Heights: 1983, c. 658; town of Moorehead City and Newport: 1997-219, s. 1; 1997-363, s. 1.1; (as to Part 4) city of Sanford: 2007-43, s. 2 (shall not annex areas located within Chatham County).