North Carolina Comment

Self-explanatory.

Official Comment

1. The question of the extent to which a state statute should apply to particular condominiums involves two problems: first, the extent to which the statute should require or permit different results for condominiums created before and after the statute becomes effective; and second, whether the statute should impose any or all of its substantive requirements on condominiums located outside the state.
2. In carrying out this philosophy with respect to “new” condominiums, the Act applies to all condominiums “created” within the state after the Act’s effective date. This is the effect of the first sentence of subsection (a). The first sentence of subsection (b) makes clear that the provisions of old statutes expressly applicable to condominiums do not apply to condominiums created after the effective date of this Act.
3. The section adopts a novel three-step approach to condominiums created before the effective date of the Act. First, certain provisions of the Act automatically apply to “old” condominiums, but only prospectively, and only in a manner which does not invalidate provisions of condominium declarations and bylaws valid under “old” law. Second, “old” law remains applicable to previously created condominiums where not automatically displaced by the Act. Third, owners of “old” condominiums may amend any provisions of their declaration or bylaws, even if the amendment would not be permitted by “old” law, so long as (a) the amendment is adopted in accordance with the procedure required by “old” law and the existing declaration and bylaws, and (b) the substance of the amendment does not violate this Act.
4. Elaboration of the principles described in Comment 3 may be helpful.

Two conflicting policies are proposed when considering the applicability of this Act to “old” and “new” condominiums located in the enacting state. On the one hand, it is desirable, for reasons of uniformity, for the Act to apply to all condominiums located in a particular state, regardless of whether the condominium was created before or after adoption of the Act in that state. To the extent that different laws apply within the same state to different condominiums, confusion results in the minds of both lenders and consumers. Moreover, because of the inadequacies and uncertainties of condominiums created under old law, and because of the requirements placed on declarants and unit owners’ associations by this Act which might increase the costs of new condominiums, different markets might tend to develop for condominiums created before and after adoption of the Act.

On the other hand, to make all provisions of this Act automatically apply to “old” condominiums might violate the constitutional prohibition of impairment of contracts. In addition, aside from the constitutional issue, automatic applicability of the entire Act almost certainly would unduly alter the legitimate expectations of some present unit owners and declarants.

Accordingly, the philosophy of this section reflects a desire to maximize the uniform applicability of the Act to all condominiums in the enacting state, while avoiding the difficulties raised by automatic application of the entire Act to pre-existing condominiums.

“Creation” of a condominium pursuant to this Act occurs upon recordation of a declaration pursuant to Section 2-101; however, the definition of “condominium” in Section 1-103(7) contemplates that de facto condominiums may exist, if the nature of the ownership interest fits the definition, and the Act would apply to such a condominium. Any real estate project which includes individually owned units and common elements owned by the unit owners as tenants in common is therefore subject to the Act if created within the state after the Act’s effective date. No intent to subject the condominium to the Act is required, and an express intention to the contrary would be invalid and ineffective.

First, the second sentence of subsection (a) provides that the enumerated provisions automatically apply to condominiums created under pre-existing law, even though no action is taken by the unit owners. Many of the sections which do apply should measurably increase the ability of the unit owners to effectively manage the association, and should help to encourage the marketability of condominiums created under early condominium statutes. To avoid possible constitutional challenges, these provisions, as applied to “old” condominiums, apply only to “events and circumstances occurring after the effective date of this Act”; moreover, the provisions of this Act are subject to the provisions of the instruments creating the condominium, and this Act does not invalidate those instruments.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE 1:. Under subsection (a), Section 4-109 (Resale Certificates) automatically applies to “old” condominiums. Accordingly, unit owners in condominiums established prior to adoption of the Act would be obligated after the Act’s effective date to provide resale certificates to future purchasers of units in “old” condominiums. However, the failure of a unit owner to provide such a certificate to a purchaser who acquired the unit before the effective date of the Act would not create a cause of action in the purchaser, because the conveyance was an event occurring before the effective date of the Act.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE 2:. Under subsection (a), Section 3-118 (Association Records) automatically applies to “old” condominiums. As a result, a unit owners’ association of an “old” condominium must maintain certain financial records, and all the records of the association “shall be made reasonably available for examination by any unit owner and his authorized agents”, even if the “old” law did not require that records be kept, or access provided. If the declaration or bylaws, however, provided that unit owners could not inspect the records of the association without permission of the president of the association, the restriction in the declaration would continue to be valid and enforceable.

Second, the prior laws of the state relating to condominiums are not repealed by this Act because those laws will still apply to previously-created condominiums, except when displaced. Some states, such as Connecticut and Florida, have made certain provisions of their condominium statutes automatically applicable to pre-existing condominiums. In certain instances, this attempted retroactive application has raised serious constitutional questions, has caused doubts to arise as to the continued validity of those condominiums, and has created general confusion as to what statutory rules should be applied.

Third, the Act seeks to alleviate any undesirable consequences of “old” law, by a limited “opt-in” provision. More specifically, subsection (b) permits the owners of a pre-existing condominium to take advantage of the salutary provisions of this statute to the extent that can be accomplished consistent with the procedures for amending the condominium instruments as specified in those instruments and in the pre-existing statute.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE 3:. Under most “first generation” condominium statutes, unit owners have no power to relocate boundaries between adjoining units. Under Section 2-112 of this Act, unit owners have such power, unless limited by the declaration. While Section 2-112 does not automatically apply to “old” condominiums, if the unit owners of a pre-existing condominium amend their condominium instruments in the manner permitted by the old statute and their existing instruments to permit unit owners to relocate boundaries, this section would validate that amendment, even if it were invalid under old law.

5. In considering the permissible amendments under subsection (b), it is important to distinguish between the law governing the procedure for amending declarations, and the substance of the amendments themselves. An amendment to the declaration of the condominium created under “old” law, even if permissible under this Act, must nevertheless be adopted “in conformity with the procedures and requirements specified” by the original condominium instruments, and in compliance with the old law.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE: 4. Suppose an “old” condominium declaration and “old” state law both provide that approval by 100% of the unit owners is required to amend the declaration, but the unit owners wish to amend the declaration to provide for only 67% of the unit owners’ approval of future amendments, as permitted by Section 2-117 of this Act. The amendment would not be valid unless 100% of the unit owners approved it, because of the procedural requirement of the declaration and “old” law. Once approved, however, only 67% would be required for subsequent amendments.

6. The last sentence of subsection (b) addresses the potential problem of a declarant seeking to take undue advantage of the amendment provisions to assume a power granted by the Act without being subject to the Act’s limitations on the power. The last sentence insures that, if declarants or other persons assume any of the powers and rights which the Act grants, the correlative obligations, liabilities, and restrictions of the Act also apply to that person, even if the amendment itself does not require that result.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE: 5. Assume that, pursuant to the provisions of the “old” law, the declarant may exercise control over the association for only 3 years from the date the condominium is created, but the control may be maintained during that period for so long as declarant owns any units. In the absence of any amendment, a provision in the declaration taking full advantage of the “old” law would be valid and enforceable. Assume further that, in the second year following creation of the condominium in question, this Act is adopted. The declarant then properly amends the declaration pursuant to the subsection (b) to extend the period of declarant control for 5 years from the date of creation. The amendment would effectively extend control for 2 additional years, because Section 3-103(d) does not limit the number of the years the declarant may specify as a control period.

Nevertheless, if the declarant, before that extended time limit has expired, conveys 75 percent of the units that may ever be a part of the condominium, or fails for 2 years to exercise development rights or offer units for sale in the ordinary course of business, the period of declarant control would terminate by virtue of the limitations in Section 3-103(d). That limitation is imposed on the declarant even if the amendment called for retaining control for so long as any units were owned by declarant, and despite the provision in the “old” law permitting such a restriction.

7. The reference in subsection (b) to “all present statutes expressly applicable to condominiums or horizontal property regimes” is intended to distinguish between a state’s condominium enabling statutes and those statutes which apply not only to condominiums but to other forms of real estate, such as taxation statutes or subdivision statutes. Thus, reference to the state’s condominium or horizontal property regime enabling statutes should be included here, while references to taxation, subdivision, or other statutes which are not restricted solely to condominiums should not be included.

8. In place of the words “declaration, bylaws, and plats and plans”, each state should insert the appropriate terminology for those documents under the present state law, e.g., “master deed, rules and regulations”, etc.

9. This section does not permit a pre-existing condominium to elect to come entirely within the provisions of the Act, disregarding old law. However, the owners of a pre-existing condominium may elect to terminate the condominium under pre-existing law and create a new condominium which would be subject to all the provisions of this Act.

10. Subsection (c) reflects the fact that there are practical as well as constitutional limits regarding the extent to which a state should or may extend its jurisdiction to out-of-state transactions. A state may, of course, properly exercise its authority to protect its citizens from false or misleading information relating to condominiums located in other states but sold in that state. However, where sales contracts are executed wholly outside the enacting state and relate to condominiums located outside the state, it seems more appropriate for the courts of the jurisdiction(s) in which the condominium is located and where the transaction occurs to have jurisdiction over the transaction.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act. A reference to G.S. 47C-3-112 (Conveyance or Encumbrance of Common Elements) was added and a reference to G.S. 47C-4-109 (Resales of Units) was deleted from the list of sections made applicable to pre-existing condominiums. The addition of the reference to G.S. 47C-3-112 was made to provide an existing owners association with flexibility either in debt financing or in selling off facilities no longer desired. The deletion of the references to G.S. 47C-4-109 reflects the Commission’s belief that resales of pre-existing units should be governed by the previous statute so as not to change the responsibilities of owners who bought under the previous statute and also because the Commission was unaware of abuses in the one to one relationship involved in resales.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2005-422, s. 19, which, in subsection (a), inserted references to G.S. 47C-3-103 , 47C-3-108 and 47C-3-121, and substituted “Procedures for fines and suspension of condominium privileges or services” for “Charges for Late Payment, Fines” after “47C-3-107.1”, was effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2004-109, s. 1, effective July 17, 2004, in subsection (a), substituted “1986, unless the declaration expressly provides to the contrary. Those” for “1986; but those”.

Session Laws 2005-422, s. 19, effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date, in subsection (a), inserted references to G.S. 47C-3-103 , 47C-3-108 and 47C-3-121; and substituted “Procedures for fines and suspension of condominium privileges or services” for “Charges for Late Payment, Fines” after “47C-3-107.1.”

Official Comment

1. The first clause of this section permits the defined terms used in the Act to be defined differently in the declaration and bylaws. Regardless of how terms are used in those documents, however, terms have an unvarying meaning in the Act, and any restricted practice which depends on the definition of a term is not affected by a changed term in the documents.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE:. A declarant might vary the definition of “unit owner” in the declaration to exclude himself in an attempt to avoid assessments for units which he owns. The attempt would be futile, since the Act defines a declarant who owns a unit as a unit owner and defines the liabilities of a unit owner.

2. The definition of “affiliate of a declarant” (Section 1-103(1)) is similar to the definitions in 12 U.S.C. § 1730(a), which prescribes the authority of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation to regulate the activities of savings and loan holding companies, and in 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(18), which defines persons deemed to be associated with a broker or dealer for purposes of the federal securities laws.

The objective standards of the definition permit a ready determination of the existence of affiliate status to be made. Unlike 12 U.S.C. § 1730(a)(2)B, no power is vested in an agency to subjectively determine the existence of “control” necessary to establish affiliate status. Thus, affiliate status does not exist under the Act unless these objective criteria are met.

3. Definition (2), “allocated interests,” refers to all of the interests which this Act requires the declaration to allocate. See Section 2-107.

4. Definitions (4) and (25), treating “common elements” and “units,” should be examined in light of Section 2-102, which specifies in detail how the precise differentiation between units and common elements is to be determined in any given condominium to the extent that the declaration does not provide a different scheme. No exhaustive list of items comprising the common elements is necessary in this Act or in the declaration; as long as the boundaries between units and common elements can be ascertained with certainty, the common elements include by definition all of the real estate in the condominium not designated as part of the units.

5. Definition (7), “condominium,” makes clear that, unless the ownership interest in the common elements is vested in the owners of the units, the project is not a condominium. Thus, for example, if the common elements were owned by an association in which each unit owner was a member, the project would not be a condominium. Similarly, if a declarant sold units in a building but retained title to the common areas, granting easements over them to unit owners, no condominium would have been created. Such projects have many of the attributes of condominiums, but they are not covered by this Act.

6. Definition (8), “conversion building,” is important because of the protection which the Act provides in Section 1-112 for tenants of buildings which are being converted into a condominium. The definition distinguishes between buildings which have never been occupied by any person before the time that the building is submitted to the condominium form of ownership, and buildings, whether new or old, which have been previously occupied by tenants. In the former case, because there have been no tenants in the building, the building would not be a conversion building, and no protection of tenants is necessary.

7. Definition (9), “declarant,” is designed to exclude persons who may be called upon to execute the declaration in order to ratify the creation of the condominium, but who are not intended to be charged with the responsibilities imposed on declarants by this Act if that is all they do. Examples of such persons include holders of pre-existing liens and, in the case of leasehold condominiums, ground lessors. (Of course, such a person could become a declarant by subsequently succeeding to a special declarant right.) Other persons similarly protected by the narrow wording of this definition include real estate brokers, because they do not offer to dispose of their own interest in a unit. Similarly, unit owners reselling their units are not declarants because their units were “previously disposed of” when originally conveyed.

The last bracketed clause in this definition must be deleted in any state which chooses not to enact Article 5 of the Act.

8. Definition (11), “development rights,” includes a panoply of sophisticated development techniques that have evolved over time throughout the United States and which have been expressly recognized (and regulated) in an increasing number of jurisdictions, beginning with Virginia in 1974.

Some of these techniques relate to the phased (or incremental) development of condominiums which the declarant hopes, but cannot be sure, will be successful enough to grow to include more land than he is initially willing to commit to the condominium. For example, a declarant may be building (or converting) a 50-unit building on Parcel A with the intention, if all goes well, to “expand” the condominium by adding an additional building on Parcel B, containing additional units, as part of the same condominium. If he reserves the right to do so, i.e., to “add real estate to a condominium,” he has reserved a “development right.”

In certain cases, however, the declarant may desire, for a variety of reasons, to include both parcels in the condominium from the outset, even though he may subsequently be obliged to withdraw all or part of one parcel. Assume, for example, that in the example just given the declarant intends to build an underground parking garage that will extend into both parcels. If the project is a success, his documentation will be simpler if both parcels were included in the condominium from the beginning. If his hopes are not realized, however, and it becomes necessary to withdraw all or part of Parcel B from the condominium and devote it to some other use, he may do so if he has reserved such a development right “to withdraw real estate from a condominium.” The portion of the garage which extends into Parcel B may be left in the condominium (separated from the remainder of Parcel B by a horizontal boundary), or the garage may be divided between Parcels A and B with appropriate cross-easement agreements.

The right “to create units, common elements, or limited common elements” is frequently useful in commercial or mixed-use condominiums where the declarant needs to retain a high degree of flexibility to meet the space requirements of prospective purchasers who may not approach him until the condominium has already been created. For example, an entire floor of a high-rise building may be intended for commercial buyers, but the declarant may not know in advance whether one purchasers will want to buy the whole floor as a single units [unit] or whether several purchasers will want the floor divided into several units, separated by common element walls and served by a limited common element corridor. This development right is sometimes useful even in purely residential condominiums, especially those designed to appeal to affluent buyers. Similarly, the development rights “to subdivide units or convert units into common elements” is most often of value in commercial condominiums, but can occasionally be useful in certain kinds of residential condominiums as well.

9. Definition (12), “dispose” or “disposition,” includes voluntary transfers to purchasers of any interest in a unit, other than as security for an obligation. Consequently, the grant of a mortgage or other security interest is not a “disposition,” nor is any transfer of any interest to a person who is excluded from the definition of “purchaser,” infra . However, the term includes more than conveyances and would, for example, cover contracts of sale.

10. Definition (15), “leasehold condominium,” should be distinguished from land which is leased to a condominium but not subjected to the condominium regime. A leasehold condominium means, by definition, real estate which has been subjected to the condominium form of ownership. In such a case, units located on the leasehold real estate are typically leased for long terms. At the expiration of such a lease, the condominium unit or the real estate underlying the unit would be removed from the condominium if the lease were not extended or renewed. On the other hand, real estate may not be subjected to condominium ownership, but may be leased directly to the association or to one or more unit owners for a term of years.

This distinction is very significant. Under Section 3-105, the unit owners’ association is empowered, following expiration of the period of declarant control, to cancel any lease of recreational or parking areas or facilities to which it is a party, regardless of who the lessor is. The association also has the power to cancel any lease for any land if the declarant or an affiliate of the declarant is a party to that lease. If the leased real estate, however, is subjected by the declarant to condominium form of ownership, that lease may not be cancelled unless it is unconscionable or unless the real estate was submitted to the condominium regime for the purpose of avoiding the right to terminate the lease. See Section 3-105.

While the subjective test of declarant’s “purpose” may not always be clear, the rights of the association to cancel a lease depend upon the test. Thus, for example, a declarant who wishes to lease a swimming pool to the unit owners would have a choice of subjecting the pool for, say, a term of 20 years to the condominium form of ownership as a common element. At the end of the term, the lease would terminate and the real estate containing the pool would be automatically removed from the condominium unless there were a right to renew the lease. During the 20-year term, the lease would not be cancellable, regardless of the terms, unless it were found to be unconscionable under Section 1-112, or cancellable because submitted for the purpose of avoiding the right to cancel. On the other hand, if the pool were not submitted to the condominium form of ownership and was leased directly to the association for a 20-year term, the association could cancel that lease 90 days after the period of declarant control expired, even if, for example, 18 years remained of the term.

In either case, the terms of the lease would have to be disclosed in the public offering statement.

11. Definition (20), “purchaser,” includes a person who acquires any interest in a unit, even as a tenant, if his tenancy entitles him to occupy the premises for more than 20 years. This would include a tenant who holds a lease of a unit in a fee simple condominium for one year, if the lease entitles the tenant to renew the lease for more than 4 additional years. Excluded from the definition, however, are mortgagees, declarants, and people in the business of selling real estate for their account. Persons excluded from the definition of “purchaser” do not receive certain benefits under Article 4, such as the right to a public offering statement (Section 4-102(c)) and the right to rescind (Section 4-108).

12. Definition (21), “real estate,” is very broad, and is very similar to the definition of “real estate” in Section 1-201(16) of the Uniform Land Transactions Act.

Although often thought of in two-dimensional terms, real estate is a three-dimensional concept and the third dimension is unusually important in the condominium context. Where real estate is described in only two dimensions (length and width), it is correctly assumed that the property extends indefinitely above the earth’s surface and downwards toward a point in the center of the planet. In most condominiums, however, as in so-called “air rights” projects, ownership does not extend ab solo usque ad coelum, because units are stacked on top of units or units and common elements are interstratified. In such cases the upper and lower boundaries must be identified with the same precision as the other boundaries.

13. Definition (23), “special declarant rights,” seeks to isolate those rights reserved for the benefit of a declarant which are unique to the declarant and not shared in common with other unit owners. The list, while short, encompasses virtually every significant right which a declarant might seek in the course of creating or expanding a condominium.

Any person who possesses a special declarant right would be a “declarant”, including any who succeed under Section 3-104 to any of those rights. Thus, the concept of special declarant rights triggers the imposition of obligations on those who possess the rights. Under Section 3-104, those obligations vary significantly, depending upon the particular special declarant rights possessed by a particular declarant. These circumstances are described more fully in the comments to Section 3-104.

14. Definition (24), “time share,” is based on Section 1-102(14) and (18) of the Uniform Law Commissioners’ Model Real Estate Time-Share Act.

15. Definition (25), “unit,” describes a tangible, physical part of the project, rather than a right in, or claim to, a tangible physical part of the property. Therefore, for example, a “time-share” arrangement in which a unit is sold to 12 different persons each of whom has the right to occupy the unit for one month does not create 12 new units—there are, rather, 12 owners of the unit. (Under the section on voting (Section 2-110), a majority of the time-share owners of a unit are entitled to cast the votes assigned to that unit.)

While a separately described part of the project is not a unit unless it is designed for, and is subject to, separate ownership by persons other than the association, the association developer can hold or acquire units unless otherwise provided in the declaration. See, also, Comment 4.

16. Definition (26), “unit owners,” contemplates that a seller under a land installment contract would remain the unit owner until the contract is fulfilled. As between the seller and the buyer, various rights and responsibilities might be assigned to the buyer by the contract itself, but the association would continue to look to the seller (for payment of any arrears in common expense assessments, for example) as long as the seller holds title.

The definition makes it clear that declarants, so long as they own units in the condominium, are unit owners and are therefore subject to all of the obligations imposed on other unit owners, including the obligation to pay common expense assessments against those units. This provision is designed to resolve ambiguities on this point which have arisen under several existing state statutes.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act. The North Carolina Act adds a definition of “lessee” which may be helpful in establishing voting rights of persons who have short term possessory rights, see G.S. 47C-3-110(c). The period of twenty years was changed to five years in the definition of purchaser to make that definition more inclusive. The definition of “time share” was amended to refer to the North Carolina Timeshare Act. The reference to master associations in the definition of special declarant rights was omitted.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2021-163, s. 2(a), effective October 6, 2021, substituted “means a ‘timeshare’ as defined in G.S. 93A-41(34)” for “means a ‘time share’ as defined in G.S. 93A-41(9)” in subdivision (24).

Legal Periodicals.

For note which examines the history and development of North Carolina law dealing with condominiums, see 66 N.C.L. Rev. 199 (1987).

CASE NOTES

“Condominium”. —

Trial court erred in dismissing a homeowners association’s declaration counterclaim because the declaration at issue established a form of property ownership in the planned community’s units that was not statutorily recognized. Conleys Creek Limited Partnership v. Smoky Mt. Country Club Prop. Owners Ass'n, 255 N.C. App. 236, 805 S.E.2d 147, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 740 (2017).

Special Rights Declarant. —

Special declarant rights recognized in G.S. 47C-1-103(23) do not include the right to retain ownership of property that is located within a building in a North Carolina condominium project and not designated as a unit. Residences at Biltmore Condo. Owners' Ass'n v. Power Dev., LLC, 243 N.C. App. 711, 778 S.E.2d 467, 2015 N.C. App. LEXIS 892 (2015).

Description Sufficient. —

Surveyed boundaries set forth on the plat provided a legally sufficient description of the real estate included in each phase of the condominium because the recorded plat showed separate and distinct phases of development of the condominium. In re Skybridge Terrace, LLC Litig., 246 N.C. App. 489, 786 S.E.2d 5, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 358 (2016).

Right to Withdraw Property. —

Trial court properly granted a declarant summary judgment in its action seeking a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to withdraw certain property from a condominium because its right to withdraw “any portion” under the declaration and the Condominium Act had to be construed as the right to withdraw only the discrete and clearly identifiable portions of the condominium depicted on the plat. In re Skybridge Terrace, LLC Litig., 246 N.C. App. 489, 786 S.E.2d 5, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 358 (2016).

Reformation. —

Homeowners’ association was not entitled to reformation of a declaration to provide common areas within the portion of a planned community where condominium-style units were located were held in common by the condominium unit owners rather than by the association when the units did not fit the definition of a condominium because the property interests of the owners of those units were permitted under the Planned Community Act. Conleys Creek Ltd. P'ship v. Smoky Mt. Country Club Prop. Owners Ass'n, 799 S.E.2d 879, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 225 (N.C. Ct. App.), sub. op., 255 N.C. App. 236, 805 S.E.2d 147, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 740 (2017).

Official Comment

1. The Act is generally designed to provide great flexibility in the creation of condominiums and, to that end, the Act permits the parties to vary many of its provisions. In many instances, however, provisions of the Act may not be varied, because of the need to protect purchasers, lenders, and declarants. Accordingly, this section adopts the approach of prohibiting variation by agreement except in those cases where it is expressly permitted by the terms of the Act itself.
2. One of the consumer protections in this Act is the requirement for consent by specified percentages of unit owners to particular actions or changes in the declaration. In order to prevent declarants from evading these requirements by obtaining powers of attorney from all unit owners, or in some other fashion controlling the votes of unit owners, this section forbids the use by a declarant of any device to evade the limitations or prohibitions of the Act or of the declaration.
3. The following sections permit variation:
4. The second sentence of the section is an important limitation upon the rights of a declarant. It is the practice in many jurisdiction [jurisdictions] today, particularly jurisdictions which do not permit expansion of a condominium by statute, for a declarant to secure powers of attorney from all unit purchasers permitting the declarant unilaterally to expand the condominium by “unanimous consent” to include new units and to reallocate common element interests, common expense liability, and votes. With such powers of attorney, many declarants have purported to comply with the typical provision of “first generation” condominium statutes requiring unanimous consent for amendments of the declaration concerning such matters.
5. While freedom of contract is a principle of this Act, and variation by agreement is accordingly widely available, freedom of contract does not extend so far as to permit parties to disclaim obligations of good faith, see Section 1-113, or to enter into contracts which are unconscionable when viewed as a whole, or which contain unconscionable terms. See Section 1-112. This section derives from Section 1-102(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code.

Section 1-102. [Applicability.] Pre-existing condominiums may elect to conform to the Act.

Section 1-103. [Definitions.] All definitions used in the declaration bylaws may be varied in the declaration, but not in interpretation of the Act.

Section 1-107. [Eminent Domain.] The formulas for reallocation upon taking a part of a unit, and for allocation of proceeds attributable to limited common elements, may be varied.

Section 2-102. [Unit Boundaries.] The declaration may vary the distinctions as to what constitutes the units and common elements.

Section 2-105. [Contents of Declaration.] A declarant may add any information he desires to the required content of the declaration.

Section 2-107. [Allocation of Common Element Interests, Votes, and Common Expense Liabilities.] A declarant may allocate the interests in any way desired, subject to certain limitations.

Section 2-108. [Limited Common Elements.] The Act permits reallocation of limited common elements unless prohibited by the declaration.

Section 2-109. [Plats and Plans.] There is a presumption regarding horizontal boundaries of units, unless the declaration provides otherwise.

Section 2-111. [Alterations Within Units.] Subject to the provisions of the declaration, unit owners may make alterations and improvements to units.

Section 2-112. [Relocation of Boundaries Between Adjoining Units.] Subject to the provisions of the declaration, boundaries between adjoining units may be relocated by affected unit owners.

Section 2-113. [Subdivision of Units.] If the declaration expressly so permits, a unit may be subdivided into two or more units.

Section 2-115. [Use for Sales Purposes.] The declarant may maintain sales offices, management offices, and model units only if the declaration so provides. Unless the declaration provides otherwise, the declarant may maintain advertising on the common elements.

Section 2-116. [Easement to Facilitate Exercise of Special Declarant Rights.] Subject to the provisions of the declaration, the declarant has an easement for these purposes.

Section 2-117. [Amendment of Declaration.] The declaration of a non-residential condominium may specify less than a two-thirds vote to amend the declaration. Any declaration may require a larger majority.

Section 2-118. [Termination of Condominium.] The declaration may specify a majority larger than 80 percent to terminate and, in a non-residential condominium, a smaller majority. The declarant may require that the units be sold following termination even though none of them have horizontal boundaries.

Section 2-120. [Master Associations.] The declaration may provide for some of the powers of the Executive Board to be exercised by a master association.

Section 3-102. [Powers of the Association.] The declaration may limit the right of the association to exercise any of the listed powers, except in a manner which discriminates in favor of a declarant. The declaration may authorize the association to assign its rights to future income.

Section 3-103. [Executive Board Members and Officers.] Except as limited by the declaration or bylaws, the Executive Board may act for the association.

Section 3-106. [Bylaws.] Subject to the provisions of the declaration, the bylaws may contain any matter in addition to that required by the Act.

Section 3-107. [Upkeep of the Condominium.] Except to the extent otherwise provided by the declaration, maintenance responsibilities are set forth in this section, and income from real estate subject to development rights inures to the declarant.

Section 3-108. [Meetings.] The bylaws may provide for special meetings at the call of less than 20 percent of the Executive Board or the unit owners.

Section 3-109. [Quorums.] This section permits statutory quorum requirements to be varied by the bylaws.

Section 3-110. [Voting; Proxies.] A majority in interest of the multiple owners of a single unit determine how that unit’s vote is to be cast unless the declaration provides otherwise. The declaration may require that lessees vote on specified matters.

Section 3-113. [Insurance.] The declaration may vary the provisions of this section in non-residential condominiums, and may require additional insurance in any condominium.

Section 3-114. [Surplus Funds.] Unless otherwise provided in the declaration, surplus funds are paid or credited to unit owners in proportion to common expense liability.

Section 3-115. [Assessments for Common Expenses.] To the extent otherwise provided in the declaration, common expenses for limited common elements must be assessed against the units to which they are assigned, common expenses benefiting fewer than all the units must be assessed only against the units benefited, insurance costs must be assessed in proportion to risk, and utility costs must be assessed in proportion to usage.

Section 4-101. [Applicability; Waiver.] All of Article 4 is modifiable or waivable by agreement in a condominium restricted to non-residential use.

Section 4-115. [Warranties.] Implied warranties of quality may be excluded or modified by agreement.

Section 4-116. [Statute of Limitations on Warranties.] The 6-year limitation may be modified by agreement of the parties.

Section 2-117 requires unanimous consent to make certain amendments to the declaration and bylaws. If a declarant were permitted to use powers of attorney to accomplish such changes, the substantial protection which Section 2-117(d) provides to unit owners would be illusory. Section 1-104 prohibits the declarant from using powers of attorney for such purposes.

North Carolina Comment

The revision would allow a knowing written waiver of rights created under the act, but only after the fact, to address the Commission’s concern about the absolute statement in the Uniform Act that “rights conferred by this Act may not be waived.” The section also provides that good faith nonmaterial errors are not actionable against a declarant who is in substantial compliance.

Legal Periodicals.

For note which examines the history and development of North Carolina law dealing with condominiums, see 66 N.C.L. Rev. 199 (1987).

CASE NOTES

Substantial Compliance. —

Real estate firm could rely on the substantial compliance clause of the North Carolina Condominium Act, G.S. 47C-1-101 et seq., in G.S. 47C-1-104(c) to excuse the omission of a development time limit in a condominium declaration because, other than the omission of the time limit for the exercise of reserved development rights, as was required by G.S. 47C-2-105(a)(8), it appeared that the real estate firm’s condominium declaration contained every relevant component either mandated by the North Carolina Condominium Act or considered to be material by the firm and the buyers of the condominiums built by the firm. In re Williamson Vill. Condos., 187 N.C. App. 553, 653 S.E.2d 900, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 2554 (2007), aff'd, 362 N.C. 671 , 669 S.E.2d 310, 2008 N.C. LEXIS 996 (2008).

Because the same right of withdrawal applied to each of the two phases of the property that were actually part of the condominium, the failure to explicitly state that on the plat was not a material omission under the Condominium Act; the declaration was comprehensive and demonstrated the declarant’s substantial compliance with the Act. In re Skybridge Terrace, LLC Litig., 246 N.C. App. 489, 786 S.E.2d 5, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 358 (2016).

Official Comment

1. A condominium may be created, by the recordation of a declaration, long before the first unit is conveyed. This happens frequently with existing rental apartment projects which are converted into condominiums. Subsection (d) spares the local taxing authorities from having to assess each unit separately until such time as the declarant begins conveying units, although separate assessment from the date the condominium is created may be permitted under other law. See subsection (d). When separate tax assessments become mandatory under this section, the assessment for each unit must include the value of that unit’s common element interest, and no separate tax bill on the common elements is to be rendered to the association or the unit owners collectively. Any common elements subject to development rights, however, are separately taxed to the declarant.
2. Even if real estate subject to development rights is a part of the condominium and lawfully “owned” by the unit owners in common, it is in fact an asset of the declarant, and must not be taxed and assessed against unit owners. Under subsection (c), the declarant is exclusively liable for those taxes.
3. If there is any question in a particular state that a unit occupied as a residential dwelling is not entitled to treatment as any other residential single-family detached dwelling under the homestead statutes, this section should be modified to insure that units are similarly treated.
4. Unlike the law of New York and perhaps other states, this section imposes no limitation on the power of a jurisdiction to tax the condominium unit based on its fair market value. In most jurisdictions, experience has shown that the conversion of an apartment building to the condominium form of ownership greatly increases the fair market value of that building. Accordingly, a jurisdiction under this Act may impose real estate taxes on condominium units which reflect the fair market value of those units in the same way that the jurisdiction taxes other forms of real estate.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2012-157, s. 4, made subsection (e), as added by Session Laws 2012-157, s. 2, applicable to extraterritorial common property acquired on or after July 1, 2012.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2012-157, s. 2, effective July 1, 2012, added subsection (e). For applicability, see editor’s note.

CASE NOTES

Description Sufficient. —

Surveyed boundaries set forth on the plat provided a legally sufficient description of the real estate included in each phase of the condominium because the recorded plat showed separate and distinct phases of development of the condominium. In re Skybridge Terrace, LLC Litig., 246 N.C. App. 489, 786 S.E.2d 5, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 358 (2016).

Right to Withdraw Property. —

Trial court properly granted a declarant summary judgment in its action seeking a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to withdraw certain property from a condominium because its right to withdraw “any portion” under the declaration and the Condominium Act had to be construed as the right to withdraw the only discrete and clearly identifiable portions of the condominium depicted on the plat. In re Skybridge Terrace, LLC Litig., 246 N.C. App. 489, 786 S.E.2d 5, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 358 (2016).

Official Comment

1. The first sentence of this section prohibits discrimination against condominiums by local law-making authorities. Thus, if a local law, ordinance, or regulation imposes a requirement which cannot be met if property is subdivided as a condominium but which would not be violated if all of the property constituting the condominium were owned by a single owner, this section makes it unlawful to apply that requirement or restriction to the condominium. For example, in the case of a high-rise apartment building, if a local requirement imposing a minimum number of parking spaces per apartment would not prevent a rental apartment building from being built, this Act would override any requirement that might impose a higher number of spaces per apartment merely by virtue of the same building being owned as a condominium.
2. The second sentence makes clear that, except for the prohibition on discrimination against condominiums, the Act has no effect on real estate use laws. For example, a particular piece of real estate submitted to the condominium form of ownership might be of such size that all of the real estate is required to support a proposed density of units or to satisfy minimum setback requirements. Under this Act, part of the submitted real estate might be subject to a development right entitling the declarant to withdraw it from the condominium but the mere reservation of this right would not constitute a subdivision of the parcel into separate ownership. If a declarant or foreclosing lender at a later time sought to exercise the option to withdraw the real estate, however, withdrawal would constitute a subdivision and would be illegal if the effect of withdrawal would be to violate setback requirements, or to exceed the density of units permitted on the remaining parcel.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act, however, the phrase “substantially similar” was substituted for “physically identical” in order to prevent discrimination against condominiums based merely upon the form of ownership of a condominium where there is only a minor difference in physical form. The last sentence was added to prevent a practice in certain municipalities of requiring premature filing of the declaration at a time when the information required to be in the declaration cannot be known.

Legal Periodicals.

For article, “Searching for the Right Approach: Regulating Short-Term Rentals in North Carolina,” see 96 N.C.L. Rev. 1821 (2018).

Official Comment

1. The provisions of this statute are not intended to supplant the usual rules of eminent domain but merely to supplement the rules to address the unique problems which eminent domain raises in the context of a condominium. Nevertheless, because the law of eminent domain differs widely among the various states, the law of each state should be reviewed to ensure that the eminent domain code and this section are properly integrated.
2. When a unit is taken or partially taken by eminent domain, this section provides for a recalculation of the allocated interests of all units.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE 1:. Suppose that all allocated interests in a 9-unit condominium were originally allocated to the units on the basis of size. If eight of the units are equal in size and one is twice as large as the others, the allocated interests would be 20% for the largest unit and 10% for each of the other eight units.

Suppose that one of the smaller units is taken out of the condominium by a condemning authority. Subsection (a) provides that the allocated interests would automatically shift, at the time of the taking, so that the larger unit would have 222/9% while each of the small units would have 111/9%.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE 2:. Suppose, in Example 1, that the condemnation only reduced the size of one of the smaller units by 50%, leaving the remaining half of the unit usable. Subsection (b) provides that the allocated interests would automatically shift to 55/19% for the partially taken unit, 211/19% for the largest unit, and 1010/19% for each of the other units. Note that the fact that the partially taken unit was reduced to half its former size does not mean that its allocated interests are only half as large as before the taking. Rather, that unit participates in the reallocation in proportion to its reduced size. That is why the partially taken unit’s reallocated interests are 55/19% rather than 5%.

3. An important issue raised by this section is whether or not a governmental body acquiring a unit by eminent domain has a right to also take that unit’s allocated interests and thereby assume membership in the association by virtue of its power of eminent domain. While there is no question that a governmental body may acquire any real property by eminent domain, there is no case law on the question of whether or not the governmental body may take a condominium unit as a part of the condominium or must take the unit and have the unit excluded from the condominium.

Subsection (a) merely requires that the taking body compensate the unit owner for all of his unit and its interest in the common element, whether or not the common element interest is acquired. The Act also requires that the allocated interests are automatically reallocated upon taking to the remaining units unless the decree provides otherwise. Whether or not the decree may constitutionally provide otherwise in the case of a particular taking (for example, by allocating the common element interest, votes, and common expense liability to the government) is an unanswered question.

4. In the circumstances of a taking of part of a unit, it is important to have some objective test by which to measure the portion of allocated interest to be reallocated. Subsection (b) sets forth a formula based on relative size, but permits the declaration to vary that formula to some other more appropriate formula in a particular circumstance. This right to vary the formula in the declaration is important, since it is clear that the formula set forth in the statute may in some instances result in gross inequities.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE 1:. Suppose, in a commercial condominium consisting of four units, each unit consists of a factory and parking lot, and that the declaration provides that each unit’s common expense liability, including utilities, is equal. Suppose further that the area of the factory building and parking lot in unit #1 are equal, and that 1/2 the parking lot is taken by eminent domain, leaving the factory and 1/2 the lot intact. Under the formula set out in the statute, unit #1’s common expense liability would be reduced even though its utilities might not be reduced at all, thus resulting in a windfall for the unit owner.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE 2:. Suppose that a condominium contains ten units, each of which is allocated at 1/10 undivided interest in the common elements. Suppose further that a taking by eminent domain reduces the size of one of the units by 50%. In such case, the common element interest of all the units will be reallocated so that the partially-taken unit has a 1/19 undivided interest in the common elements and the remaining 9 units each a 2/19 undivided interest in the common elements. Thus, the partially-taken unit has a common element interest equal to 1/2 of the common element interest allocated to each of the other units. Note that this is not equivalent to the partially-taken unit having a 5% undivided interest and the remaining 9 units each having a 10% undivided interest.

5. Even before the amendment formally acknowledging the reallocation of percentages required by this section is recorded, the reallocation is deemed to have occurred simultaneously with the taking. This rule is necessary to avoid the hiatus that otherwise could occur between the taking and reallocation of interests, votes, and liabilities.

6. Subsection (c) provides that, if part of the common elements is acquired, the award is paid to the association. This would not normally be the rule in the absence of such a provision.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different, however, the revision contains changes intended to clarify the language and intent of the Uniform Act.

CASE NOTES

Judicial Process. —

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Association’s motion to consolidate the North Carolina Department of Transportation (DOT) action with the remaining actions as the property taken and valuation of the takings issues in the DOT action had been resolved and reduced to a sum certain by stipulation and consent of the parties. DOT v. Bloomsbury Ests., LLC, 2022-NCCOA-91, 870 S.E.2d 133, 2022- NCCOA-91, 2022 N.C. App. LEXIS 103 (N.C. Ct. App. 2022).

Official Comment

1. This Act displaces existing law relating to condominiums and other law only as stated by specific sections and by reasonable implication therefrom. Moreover, unless specifically displaced by this statute, common law rights are retained. The listing given in this section is merely an illustration: no listing could be exhaustive.
2. The bracketed language concerning unincorporated associations should be deleted in the event the enacting state requires incorporation of a unit owners’ association. See the parallel language contained in Section 3-101.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act, however, the Commission removed an incomplete listing of specific areas of the law in order to avoid the application of the doctrine, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.

North Carolina Comment

This section was added to the North Carolina Act for purposes of clarification.

CASE NOTES

Noncompliance. —

There were two requirements concerning the right of withdrawal with which a declarant did not comply because the plat map did not note the declarant’s reservation of a right to withdraw property, and the declaration did not list the time limit within which the right to withdraw must be exercised; however, the declarant’s omissions were not material because both of the only two existing phases of the condominium were subject to the same right of withdrawal when the declaration was recorded. In re Skybridge Terrace, LLC Litig., 246 N.C. App. 489, 786 S.E.2d 5, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 358 (2016).

Noncompliance. —

Trial court properly concluded that owners purchased condominium units without regard to the omission of the time limit in the declaration because the owners failed to present or forecast evidence that any of the current unit owners disputed or were concerned with the lack of time limit on the declarant’s right to withdraw any portion of the condominium. In re Skybridge Terrace, LLC Litig., 246 N.C. App. 489, 786 S.E.2d 5, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 358 (2016).

Substantial Compliance. —

Because the same right of withdrawal applied to each of the two phases of the property that were actually part of the condominium, the failure to explicitly state what was on the plat was not a material omission under the Condominium Act; the declaration was comprehensive and demonstrated the declarant’s substantial compliance with the Act. In re Skybridge Terrace, LLC Litig., 246 N.C. App. 489, 786 S.E.2d 5, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 358 (2016).

Description Sufficient. —

Surveyed boundaries set forth on the plat provided a legally sufficient description of the real estate included in each phase of the condominium because the recorded plat showed separate and distinct phases of development of the condominium. In re Skybridge Terrace, LLC Litig., 246 N.C. App. 489, 786 S.E.2d 5, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 358 (2016).

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2020-52, s. 11, made this section effective June 30, 2020.

Official Comment

1. A condominium is created pursuant to this Act only by recording a declaration. As with any instrument affecting real estate, the declaration must be recorded in every recording district in which any portion of the condominium is located and must be indexed in the manner described in subsection (a). Specific indexing rules are suggested in brackets and should be used in those states where this result would not otherwise occur. For example, the declaration commonly has not been indexed in the grantee’s index in the name of the condominium. Moreover, when multiple persons execute the declaration, the declaration has often been indexed solely in the name of the declarant and not in the name, for example, of lenders and other persons who might have executed the declaration. Because it is important that the names of the association and all persons executing the declaration appear in the index in order to locate all instruments in the land records, that language is not included in brackets.
2. In Section 1-103, the Act defines the term “Declaration” as any instruments, however denominated, which create a condominium, and any amendments to those instruments. “Condominium,” in turn, is defined as “real estate, portions of which are designated for separate ownership and the remainder of which is designated for common ownership solely by the owners of those portions.” It is important to emphasize that other covenants, conditions or restrictions applicable to the real estate in the condominium might be recorded before or after the instruments are recorded which divide the real estate into units and common elements, thereby creating the condominium.
3. A condominium has not been lawfully created unless the requirements of this section have been complied with. Nevertheless, a project which meets the definition of “condominium” in Section 1-103(7) is subject to this Act even if this or other sections of the Act have not been complied with.
4. Mortgagees and other lienholders need not execute the declaration, and foreclosure of a mortgage or other lien will not, of itself, terminate the condominium. However, if that lien is prior to the declaration itself, the lienholder may exclude that real estate from the condominium. See Sections 2-118(i) and (j). Moreover, the declarant may wish to obtain agreements from mortgagees or other lienholders that they will give partial releases permitting lien-free conveyance of the condominium units. See Section 4-111(a).
5. Except when development proceeds pursuant to Section 5-103, this Act contemplates that two different stages of construction must be reached before (1) a condominium may be created or (2) a unit in the condominium may be conveyed. These stages are described, respectively, in subsection (b) and Section 4-120. The purpose of imposing these requirements is to insure that a purchaser will in fact take title to a unit which may be used for its intended purpose.
6. Section 2-101(b) requires that “all structural components and mechanical systems of all buildings containing or comprising any units” which will be created by recording a declaration, must be substantially completed in accordance with the plans. The intent of subsection (b) is that if any buildings are depicted on the plats and plans which are required by Section 2-109, and these buildings contain or comprise spaces which become units by virtue of recording the declaration, the structural components and mechanical systems of these buildings must be substantially complete before the declaration is recorded. This is required even though the plats and plans recorded pursuant to Section 2-109 depict only the boundaries of the buildings and the units created in those buildings, and not the structural components or mechanical systems (which need not be shown). If the boundaries of units are not depicted, of course, then no units are created. If the declarant fails to comply with this section, title is not affected. See Comment 8, below.
7. Section 4-120, requires that, before an individual unit is conveyed, the unit must be “substantially completed.” “Substantial completion” is a well understood term in the construction industry. For example, the American Institute of Architects Document A201, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction (1976 Ed.) at para. 8.1.3, states:
8. Section 2-101(b) and 4-120 require that completion certificates be recorded, or local certificates of occupancy be issued, as evidence of the fact that the required levels of construction have been met. In the case of “substantial completion,” issuance of “a certificate of occupancy authorized by law,” as is commonly required by local ordinance or state building codes, will suffice. Once the certificates have been recorded, or issued, as the case may be, good title to the units may be conveyed in reliance on the record. It is possible, of course, that the declarant may have failed to complete the required levels of construction; the architect, surveyor or engineer (whichever is appropriate in a particular jurisdiction) may have filed a false certificate. Such acts would create a cause of action in the purchaser under Section 4-115, but would not affect the validity of the purchasers’ title to the condominium.
9. The requirement of “substantial completion” does not mean that the declarant must complete all buildings in which all possible units would be located before creating the condominium. If only some of the buildings in which units which may ultimately be located have been “structurally” completed, the declarant may create a condominium in which he reserves particular development rights (Section 2-105(a)(8)). In such a project, only the completed units might be treated as units from the outset, and the development rights would be reserved to create additional units, either by adding additional real estate and units to the condominium, by creating new units on common elements, or by subdividing units previously created. The optional units may never be completed or added to the condominium; however, this will not affect the integrity of the condominium as originally created.
10. Requiring “substantial completion” of the structural components and mechanical systems in the buildings containing or comprising the units in a condominium may encourage creation of more phased condominiums under Section 2-105 in projects which once were in fact built in phases, but under a single nonexpandable declaration. Experience in the several states where significantly more rigorous requirements are imposed by statute, however, has shown that this does not create a difficult situation either for the developer or the lender. Moreover, it appears likely that the size of the initial phase of a multi-building project will be dictated largely by economics, as occurs in most jurisdictions today, rather than this Act. Finally, many lenders and developers are increasingly sensitive to the secondary mortgage market requirements particularly those of the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC). Experience indicates that the pre-sale requirements imposed by FNMA and FHLMC frequently dictate that multi-building condominium projects be structured on a phased or expandable condominium basis.
11. The requirement of completion would be irrelevant in some types of condominiums, such as campsite condominiums or some subdivision condominiums where the units might consist of unimproved lots, and the airspace above them, within which each purchaser would be free to construct or not construct a residence. Any residence actually constructed would ordinarily become a part of the “unit” by the doctrine of fixtures, but nothing in this Act would require any residence to be built before the lots could be treated as units.
12. The term “independent” architect, surveyor or engineer in subsection (b) and elsewhere in the Act distinguishes any such professional person who acts as an independent contractor in his relationship to the declarant or lender.

Until the actual recordation of the document which accomplished that result, however, the condominium has not been created.

If the condominium were said to consist from the beginning of a certain number of units, even though some of those units had not yet been completed or even begun, serious problems would arise if the remaining units were never constructed and if no obligation to complete the construction could be enforced against any solvent person. If the insolvent owner of the unbuilt units failed to pay his common expense assessments for example, the unit owners’ association might be left with no remedy except a lien of doubtful value against mere cubicles of air space. Moreover, votes in the unit owners’ association could be assigned to units, and those votes could be cast, even though the units were never built. The Act therefore requires that significant construction take place before units are assigned an interest in the common elements, a vote in the association, and a share of the common expense liabilities, and before units are conveyed. This requirement of substantial completion [or the alternative bonding procedure and other assurances required by Section 5-103] reduces the possibility that a failure to complete will upset the expectations of purchasers or otherwise harm their interests in case the declarant becomes insolvent and no solvent person has the obligation to complete the unit.

The concept of “structural components and mechanical systems” is one commonly understood in the construction field and this comment is not intended as a comprehensive list of those components. For example, however, the term “structural components” is generally understood to include those portions of a building necessary to keep any part of the building from collapsing, and to maintain the building in a weathertight condition. This would include the foundations, bearing walls and columns, exterior walls, roof, floors and similar components. It would clearly not include such components as interior non-bearing partitions, surface finishes, interior doors, carpeting, and the like. Similarly, typical examples of “mechanical systems” include the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and other like systems. Whether or not “electrical systems” are included within the meaning of the term depends on local practice.

The Date of Substantial Completion of the Work . . . is the date certified by the Architect when construction is sufficiently complete, in accordance with the Contract Documents (that is, the owner-contractor agreement, the conditions of the contract, and the specifications and all addenda and modifications), so the Owner can occupy or utilize the Work . . . for the use for which it is intended.

This standard is also one often used by building officials in issuing certificates of occupancy. It does not suggest that the unit is “entirely completed” as that term is understood in the construction industry; lesser details, such as sticking doors, leaking windows, or some decorative items, might still remain, and the Act contemplates that they need not be completed prior to lawful conveyance.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act, however, the introductory language at the beginning of subsection (a) was changed to eliminate ambiguous language which may have been erroneously interpreted to indicate that the application of the act was optional. As noted in the official commentary to the Uniform Act “a project which meets the definition of ‘condominium’ in Section 1-103(7) is subject to this Act even if this or other sections of the Act have not been complied with.”

Editor’s Note.

Chapter 83, referred to in this section, was rewritten by Session Laws 1979, c. 871, s. 1 and has been recodified as Chapter 83A.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2012-18, s. 1.5, effective July 1, 2012, deleted “and shall be indexed in the Grantee index in the name of the condominium and in the Grantor index in the name of each person executing the declaration” from the end of subsection (a).

Session Laws 2020-52, s. 4, effective June 30, 2020, rewrote subsection (b).

CASE NOTES

As a condominium unit did not yet exist, it could not comply with the recording requirements of G.S. 47C-2-104 ; the unit had not yet come into legal, or factual, existence and no description could be recorded. Berkovich v. Vue-North Carolina, LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123049 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 23, 2011).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Incorporation of Plans by Reference. — When recording new plats and plans for units newly added to an expandable condominium, the developer-declarant may incorporate the previously recorded condominium plans by reference if an architect or engineer certifies that the previously recorded plans accurately depict the newly added units as built. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Robert H. Bartelt, Assistant County Attorney for Cumberland County, 58 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 5 (1988).

Official Comment

1. It is important for title purposes and other reasons to have a clear guide as to precisely which parts of a condominium constitute the units and which parts constitute the common elements. This section fills the gap left when the declaration merely defines unit boundaries in terms of floor, ceilings, and perimetric walls.
2. The differentiation between components constituting common elements and components which are part of the units is particularly important in light of Section 3-107(a), which (subject to the exceptions therein mentioned) makes the association responsible for upkeep of common elements and each unit owner individually responsible for upkeep of his unit.
3. The differentiation between unit components and common element components may or may not be important for insurance purposes under this Act. While the common elements in a project must always be insured, the units themselves need not be insured by the association unless the project contains units divided by horizontal boundaries; see Section 3-113(b). In a “high rise” configuration, however, Section 3-113(a) contemplates that both will normally be insured by the association (exclusive of improvements and betterments in individual units) and that the cost of such insurance will be a common expense. That common expense may be allocated, however, on the basis of risk if the declaration so requires. See Section 3-115(c)(3).

The provisions of this section may be varied, of course, to the extent that the declarant wishes to modify the details for a particular condominium.

For example, in a townhouse project structured as a condominium, it may be desirable that the boundaries of the unit constitute the exterior surfaces of the roof and exterior walls, with the center line of the party walls constituting the perimetric boundaries of the units in that plane, and the undersurface of the bottom slab dividing the unit itself from the underlying land. Alternatively, the boundaries of the units at the party walls might be extended to include actual division of underlying land itself. In those cases it would not be appropriate for walls, floors and ceilings to be designated as boundaries, and the declaration would describe the boundaries in the above manner. The differentiations made clear here, in conjunction with the provisions of Section 3-107, will assist in minimizing disputes which have historically arisen in association administration with respect to liability for repair of such things as pipes, porches and other components of a building which unit owners may expect the association to pay for and which the association may wish to have repaired by unit owners. Problems which may arise as a result of negligence in the use of components—such as stoops and pipes—are resolved by Section 3-107, which imposes liability on the unit owner who causes damage to common elements, or under the broader provisions of Section 3-115(e), which permits the association to assess common expenses “caused by the misconduct of any unit owner” exclusively against that owner. This would include, of course, not only damages to common elements, but fines or unusual service fees, such as clean-up costs, incurred as a result of the unit owner’s misuse of common elements.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

CASE NOTES

Limited Common Elements. —

The appellate court concluded that the exterior walls, roof, and gutters on each residential building were limited common elements because they did not fall within the definition of unit property as defined by the Declaration of Condominium. Alexander v. Becker, 2021-NCCOA-582, 280 N.C. App. 131, 866 S.E.2d 525, 2021- NCCOA-582, 2021 N.C. App. LEXIS 597 (2021).

Official Comment

1. Subsection (b) does not totally invalidate the rule against perpetuities as applied to condominiums. The language does provide that the rule against perpetuities is ineffective as to documents which would govern the condominium during the entire life of the project, regardless of how long that should be. With respect to deeds or devises of units, however, the policies underlying the rule against perpetuities continue to have validity and remain applicable under this Act.
2. In considering the effect of failures to comply with this Act on title matters, subsection (d) refers only to defects in the declaration—which includes the plats and plans—because the declaration is the instrument which creates and defines the units and common elements. No reference is made to other instruments, such as bylaws, because these instruments have no impact on title, whether or not recorded. However, in all cases of violations of the Act, a failure of the bylaws—or any other instrument—to comply with the Act, would entitle any affected persons to appropriate relief under Section 4-117.
3. No special prohibition against racial or other forms of discrimination is included in this Act because the provisions of generally applicable federal and state law apply as much to condominiums as to other forms of real estate.
4. Some examples may help to clarify what sorts of defects in the declaration are to be regarded as “insubstantial” within the meaning of the first sentence of subsection (d).
5. Each state has case or statutory law dealing with marketability of titles, and the question of whether substantial failures of the declaration to comply with the Act affect marketability of title should be determined by that law and not by this Act.

Suppose the declaration allocates common element interests to all the units, but fails to indicate the formula for the allocation as required by Section 2-107. This would be a substantial defect if the assigned interests were unequal, but if all units were assigned identical interests it would be possible to infer that the basis of allocation was equality—and the failure of the declaration to say so would be an insubstantial defect. Were this to happen in a condominium where the right to add new units is reserved, however, it should be noted that a subsequent amendment to the declaration adding new units could not use any formula other than equality for reallocating the common element interests unless a different formula were specified pursuant to Section 2-107(b).

Other examples of insubstantial defects that might occur include failure of the declaration to include the word “condominium” in the name of the project, as required by Section 2-105(1), or failure of the plats and plans to comply satisfactorily with the requirement of Section 2-109(a) that they be “clear and legible,” so long as they can at least be deciphered by persons with proper expertise. Failure to organize the unit owners’ association at the time specified in Section 3-101 would not be a defect in the declaration at all, and would not affect the validity or marketability of titles in the condominium. It would, however, be a violation of this Act, and create a claim for relief under Section 4-117.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

Official Comment

1. The intent of this section is that no description of a unit in a deed, lease, deed of trust, mortgage, or any other instrument or document shall be subject to challenge for failure to meet any common law or other requirements so long as the requirements of this section are satisfied, and so long as the declaration itself, together with the plats and plans which are a part of the declaration, provides a legally sufficient description.
2. The last sentence makes clear that an instrument which does meet those requirements includes all interest appurtenant to the unit. As a result, it will not be necessary under this Act to continue the practice, common in some jurisdictions, of describing the common element interests, or limited common elements, that are appurtenant to a unit in the instrument conveying title to that unit.

North Carolina Comment

This section was redrafted to authorize a legal description which complies with the general requirements of the laws of North Carolina.

CASE NOTES

As a condominium unit did not yet exist, it could not comply with the recording requirements of G.S. 47C-2-104 ; the unit had not yet come into legal, or factual, existence and no description could be recorded. Berkovich v. Vue-North Carolina, LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123049 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 23, 2011).

Official Comment

1. Many statutes and other regulatory schemes in the multi-owner project field do not separate the functions of a recorded declaration and unrecorded public offering statements or disclosure documents. As a result, many of the developer’s representations and assurances concerning his future plans must appear in the declaration as well as the public offering statement, even though they may have nothing to do with the legal structure or title of the project. See e.g., Section 47-70, Conn.Gen.Stat. (1980). This results in duplicative requirements and unnecessarily complex declarations.
2. This section requires a statement of the name of the association for the condominium as well as the name of the condominium itself, in order that the declaration may be indexed in the name of the association. See Section 2-101.
3. The Act requires that the declaration for a condominium situated in two or more recording districts be recorded in each of those districts. While the bracketed language refers to the “county” as the recording district in which the declaration is to be recorded, it would be appropriate in states where recording is done at the city, town, or parish level to amend the bracketed language accordingly.
4. Paragraph (a)(5) requires the declarant to state the largest number of units he reserves the right to build. Unlike many current condominium statutes, this Act imposes no time limit, measured by an absolute number of years, at the expiration of which the declarant must relinquish control of the association. Instead, declarant control ends when 75% of the maximum number of units which may be created by the declarant have been sold, or at the end of a 2-year period during which development is not proceeding. See Section 3-103(d). The flexibility afforded by this section may be important to a declarant as he responds to unanticipated future changes in his market.

This Act seeks functionally to distinguish between the declaration and the public offering statement. It requires the declaration to contain only those matters which affect the legal structure or title of the condominium. This includes the reserved powers of the declarant to exercise development rights within the condominium. A narrative description of those rights, however, and the possible consequences flowing from their exercise, are required to be disclosed only in the public offering statement and not in the declaration.

In theory, a declarant might overstate the maximum number of units in an attempt to artificially extend the period of declarant control, since the time might never come when a declarant had sold 75% of that number of units. As a practical matter, however, such a practice would not likely achieve long-term control.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE:. A declarant reserves the right to build 100 units, even though zoning would permit only 75 units on the site, and the declarant actually plans on building only 50 units. As a result of the reservation, the declarant would not lose control of the association under the 75% rule stated in Section 3-103(d)(i) even when all 50 units had been built and sold, because that percentage applies to all potential units, not units actually built. See Section 3-103(d)(i).

However, there are practical constraints on the declarant’s decision in this matter. Substantial exaggeration of the future density of the development might tend to impede sales of units in that project. Moreover, such a statement might also produce negative governmental reaction to proposals which might require local approval.

Even if the declarant did overstate the number of units to retain control, however, other limitations imposed by Section 3-103(d) will require turnover at an appropriate time. In the example, once the declarant had exercised the right to add the last of the 50 units which he intends to build, the 2-year period imposed by Section 3-103(d)(ii) and (iii) would begin to run, and the declarant would lose the right to control the association 2 years from the time the last units were added, even though he had reserved the right to add more units.

5. Paragraph (a)(5) requires that the boundaries of each unit created by the declaration be identified. The words “created by the declaration” emphasize that in an expandable project, new units may be created in the future by amendments to the declaration. Until those new units are actually added to the project by amending the declaration, however, they are not units within the meaning of that defined term, and they need not be described.

6. Section 2-102 makes it possible in many projects to satisfy paragraph (a)(5) of this section by merely providing the identifying number of the units and stating that each unit is bounded by its ceiling, floor, and walls. The plats and plans will show where those ceilings, floors, and perimetric walls are located, and Section 2-102 provides all other details, except to the extent the declaration may make additional or contradictory specifications because of the unique nature of the project.

7. Paragraph (a)(6) makes clear that the limited common elements described in Section 2-102(2) and (4) need not be described in the declaration. These limited common elements are typically porches, balconies, patios, or other amenities which may be included in a project. Such improvements are treated by the Act as limited common elements, rather than either common elements or parts of units, in order to minimize the attention which the documents need to give them, and to secure the result that would be desired in the usual case. Thus, if these improvements remain limited common elements, and no special provisions concerning them are included in the declaration, they may be used only by the units to which they are physically attached; maintenance of those improvements must be paid for by the association; and such improvements need not be specially referred to in the declaration. Porches, balconies and patios must be shown on the plats and plans ( see Section 2-109(b)(10)), but other limited common elements described in Section 2-102(2) and (4) need not be shown.

8. Paragraph (a)(7) contemplates that the common elements in the project may be allocated as limited common elements at some future time, either by the declarant or the association. For example, a swimming pool might serve an entire project during early phases of development. At the outset, that pool might be a common element which all the unit owners may use. At a later time, with more units and additional pools built in subsequent phases, either the declarant or the association might determine that the first pool should become a limited common element reserved for the use only of units in the first phase, while the other pools should be reserved exclusively for units in the subsequent phases. Such a potential allocation should be described in the declaration pursuant to this section.

9. Paragraph (a)(8) requires the declaration to describe all development rights and other special declarant rights which the declarant reserves. The declaration must describe the real estate to which each right applies, and state the time limit within which each of those rights must be exercised. The Act imposes no maximum time limit for the exercise of those rights, and the particular language of a declaration will vary from project to project depending on the requirements of each project. This Act contemplates that those rights may be exercised after the period of declarant control terminates.

10. Plats and plans are made a part of the declaration for legal purposes by Section 2-110, and their content may in part provide some of the information required by this section.

11. Paragraph (a)(14) is a cross-reference to other sections of the Act which require the declaration to contain particular matters. Some of these sections, such as 2-107 on the allocations of allocated interests or 2-109 on plats and plans, will affect all projects. Others, such as 2-106 on leasehold condominiums, will apply only to particular kinds of projects.

12. Subsection (b) contemplates that, in addition to the content required by subsection (a), other matters may also be included in the declaration if the declarant or lender feel they are appropriate to the particular project. In particular, the draftsman should carefully consider any desired provisions which would vary any of the many sections of the Act where variation is permitted, including such matters as expanding or restricting the association’s powers. A list of sections which may be varied appears in the comment to Section 1-104.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2020-52, s. 2, effective June 30, 2020, added “all of the following” in the introductory language of subsection (a); added the second sentence in subdivision (a)(5); in subdivision (a)(8), in the first sentence, added “or date by” near the middle and the proviso at the end, and added the last three sentences; and made minor punctuation and stylistic changes throughout.

Legal Periodicals.

For note which examines the history and development of North Carolina law dealing with condominiums, see 66 N.C.L. Rev. 199 (1987).

CASE NOTES

Substantial Compliance. —

Real estate firm could rely on the substantial compliance clause of the North Carolina Condominium Act, G.S. 47C-1-101 et seq., in G.S. 47C-1-104(c) to excuse the omission of a development time limit in a condominium declaration because, other than the omission of the time limit for the exercise of reserved development rights, as was required by G.S. 47C-2-105(a)(8), it appeared that the real estate firm’s condominium declaration contained every relevant component either mandated by the North Carolina Condominium Act or considered to be material by the firm and the buyers of the condominiums built by the firm. In re Williamson Vill. Condos., 187 N.C. App. 553, 653 S.E.2d 900, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 2554 (2007), aff'd, 362 N.C. 671 , 669 S.E.2d 310, 2008 N.C. LEXIS 996 (2008).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Incorporation of Plans by Reference. — When recording new plats and plans for units newly added to an expandable condominium, the developer-declarant may incorporate the previously recorded condominium plans by reference if an architect or engineer certifies that the previously recorded plans accurately depict the newly added units as built. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Robert H. Bartelt, Assistant County Attorney for Cumberland County, 58 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 5 (1988).

Official Comment

1. Subsection (a) requires that the lessor of any lease, which upon termination will terminate the condominium or reduce its size, must sign the declaration. This requirement insures that the lessor has consented to use of his land as a condominium.
2. Subsection (a)(1) provides alternative bracketed language which should be considered by each state based on its practice. In any state where the recording acts do not specify the essential terms which must be included in a memorandum of lease, either this section should be supplemented to specify the essential terms or else the bracketed language relating to such memoranda should be deleted.
3. This section sets out requirements concerning leasehold condominiums which are not typically contained in the statutes of most states. In particular, it requires that the declaration describe the rights of the unit owners, or state that they have no rights concerning a variety of significant matters. The section also contains a number of other consumer protection provisions. However, in contrast to the result under some states’ laws, unit owners have no statutory right to renewal of a lease upon termination.
4. The most significant matter of consumer protection in this section is subsection (b), which provides that unit owners who pay their share of the rent of the underlying lease may not be deprived of their enjoyment of the leasehold premises.
5. Subsection (d) considers the problems created when termination of a lease reduces the size of a condominium. In the event that some units are thereby withdrawn from the condominium, reallocation of the allocated interests would be required; the section describes how that reallocation would occur.

Subsection (b) is intended to protect the “unit owner” regardless of whether he is a lessee, sublessee, or even further down in a chain of transfer of leasehold interests. Thus, for example, if the “unit owner” is a sublessee, the term “lessor (or) his successor in interest” includes not only the lessor, but also the lessee.

Subsection (b) further protects the unit owner by assuring that he will not share with his fellow unit owners any collective obligations toward their common lessor. All obligations are instead fractionalized so that no unit owner can be made liable or otherwise penalized for a default by any of his fellows. Thus, a default by the association in payment of the rent due the lessor, in a case where the lease of common elements ran to the association, would not permit the lessor to terminate continued use of those common elements by those unit owners who then pay their share of the rent.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act, however, the words “after demand” were added to subsection (b) to require that demand be made to the unit owners to ensure their notification of the lessor’s termination attempt.

Official Comment

1. Most existing condominium statutes require a single common basis, usually related to the “value” of the units, to be used in the allocation of common element interests, votes in the association, and common expense liabilities. This Act departs radically from such requirements by permitting each of these allocations to be made on different bases, and by permitting allocations which are unrelated to value.
2. While the flexibility permitted in allocations is broader than that permitted by any present statutes, it is likely that the traditional bases for allocation will continue to be used, and that the allocations for all allocated interests will often be based on the same formulas. Most commonly, those bases include size, equality, or value of units. Each of these is discussed below.
3. If size is chosen as a basis of allocation, the declarant must choose between reliance on area or volume, and the choice must be indicated in the declaration. The declarant might further refine the formula by, for example, excluding unheated areas from the calculation or by partially discounting such areas by means of a ratio. Again, the declarant must indicate the choices he has made and explain the formulas he has chosen.
4. Most existing condominium statutes require that “value” be used as the basis of all allocations. Under this Act a declarant is free to select such a basis if he wishes to do so. For example, he might designate the “par value” of each unit as a stated number of dollars or points. However, the formula used to develop the par values of the various units would have to be explained in the declaration. For example, the declaration for a high-rise condominium might disclose that the par value of each unit is based on the relative area of each unit on the lower floors, but increases by specified percentages at designated higher levels. The formula for determining area in this example could be further refined in the manner suggested in Comment 2, above, and any other factors (such as the direction in which a unit faces) could also be given weight so long as the weight given to each factor is explained in the declaration.
5. The purpose of subsection (b) is to afford some advance disclosure to purchasers of units in the first phase of a flexible condominium of how common element interests, votes and common expense liabilities will be reallocated if additional units are added.
6. Subsection (e) means what it says when it states that a lien or encumbrance on a common element interest without the unit to which that common element interest is allocated is void. Thus, consider the case of a flexible condominium in which there are 50 units in the first phase, each of which initially has a 2 percent undivided interest in the common elements. The declarant borrows money by mortgaging additional real estate. When the declarant expands the condominium by adding phase 2 containing an additional 50 units, he reallocates the common element interests in the manner described in his original declaration, to give each of the 100 units a 1 percent undivided interest in the common elements in both phases of the condominium. At this point, the construction lender cannot have a lien on the undivided interest of phase 1 owners in the common elements of phase 2 because of the wording of the statute. Thus, the most that the construction lender can have is a lien on the phase 2 units together with their common element interests. The mortgage documents may be written to reflect the fact that upon the addition of phase 2 of the condominium, the lien on the additional real estate will be converted into a lien on the phase 2 units and on the common element interest as they pertain to those units in both phase 1 and phase 2; however, see Comment to Section 2-110.
7. If a unit owned only by the declarant—as opposed to the same unit if owned by another person—may be subdivided into 2 or more units but cannot be converted in whole or in part into common elements, it is still a unit that may be subdivided or converted into 2 or more units or common elements, within the meaning of the definition of development rights, and is not governed by Section 2-113 (Subdivision of Units).
8. Subsection (c) represents a significant departure from practice in most states concerning the allocation of votes. The usual rule is that a single allocation of votes is made to each unit, and that allocation applies to all matters on which those votes may be cast. This section recognizes that the increasingly complex nature of some projects requires different allocation on particular questions. It may be appropriate, for example, in a project where common expense liabilities, or questions concerning rules and regulations, affect different units differently.

Thus, all three allocations might be made equally among all units, or in proportion to the relative size of each unit, or on the basis of any other formula the declarant may select, regardless of the values of those units. Moreover, “size” might be used, for example, in allocating common expenses and common element interests, while equality is used in allocating votes in the association. This section does not require that the formulas used by the declarant be justified, but it does require that the formulas be explained. The sole restriction on the formulas to be used in these allocations is that they not discriminate in favor of the units owned by the declarant. Otherwise, each of the separate allocations may be made on any basis which the declarant chooses, and none of the allocations need be tied to any other allocation.

Unless the lender also requires phase 2 to be designated as withdrawable real estate, the phase 2 portion may not be foreclosed upon other than as condominium units and the construction lender may not dispose of phase 2 other than as units which are a part of the condominium. In the event that phase 2 is designated as withdrawable land, then the construction lender may force withdrawal of phase 2 and dispose of it as he wishes, subject to the provisions of the declaration. If one unit in phase 2, however, has been sold to anyone other than the declarant, then phase 2 ceases to be withdrawable land by operation of Section 2-110(d)(2).

OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE:. In a mixed commercial and residential project, the declaration might provide that each unit owner would have an equal vote for the election of the Board of Directors. However, on matters concerning ratification of the common expense budget, where the commercial unit owners paid a much larger share than their proportion of the total units, the vote of commercial unit owners would be increased to 3 times the number of votes the residential owners held. Alternatively, of course, it might be possible to treat this question as a class voting matter, but the draftsman is provided flexibility in this section to choose the most appropriate solution.

9. This section recognizes that there may be certain instances in which class voting in the association would be desirable. For example, in a mixed-use condominium consisting of both residential and commercial units, there may be certain kinds of issues upon which the residential or commercial unit owners should have a special voice, and the device described in Comment 9 was not desired. To prevent abuse of class voting by the declarant, subsection (c) permits class voting only with respect to specified issues directly affecting the designated class and only insofar as necessary to protect valid interests of the designated class.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE:. Owners of town house units, in a single project consisting of both town house and high-rise buildings, might properly constitute a separate class for purposes of voting on expenditures affecting just the town house units, but they might not be permitted to vote by class on rules for the use of facilities used by all the units.

The subsection further provides that the declarant may not use the class voting device for the purpose of evading any limitation imposed on declarants by this Act (e.g., to maintain declarant control beyond the period permitted by Section 3-103).

10. The last clause of subsection (c) prohibits a practice common in the planned community or other non-condominium multi-ownership projects, where units owned by declarant constitute a separate class of units for voting and other purposes. Upon transfer of title, those units lose these more favorable voting rights. This section makes clear that the votes and other attributes of ownership of a unit may not change by virtue of the identity of the owner. In those circumstances which such classes were legitimately intended to address, principally control of the association, the Act provides other, more balanced devices for declarant control. See Section 3-103(d).

North Carolina Comment

This section does not differ significantly from the Uniform Act except for the second and third sentences of subsection (d) which provides for a mathematical reallocation to ensure that the undivided shares in the common elements, stated as fractions or percentages, in the aggregate, equal either one or one hundred.

Official Comment

1. Like all other common elements, limited common elements are owned in common by all unit owners. The use of a limited common element, however, is reserved to less than all of the unit owners. Unless the declaration provides otherwise, the association is responsible for the upkeep of a limited common element and the cost of such upkeep is assessed against all the units. See Sections 3-107(a) and 3-115(c)(1). This might include the costs of repainting all shutters, or balconies, for example, which are limited common elements pursuant to Section 2-102(4). Accordingly, there may be occasions where, to meet the expectations of owners and to have costs borne directly by those who benefit from those amenities, the declaration might provide that the costs will be borne, not by all unit owners as part of their common expense assessments, but only by the owners to which the limited common elements are assigned.
2. Even common elements which are not “limited” within the meaning of this Act may nevertheless be restricted by the unit owners’ association pursuant to the powers set forth in Section 3-102(6) and (10), unless that power is limited in the declaration. For example, the association might assign reserved parking spaces to designated unit owners, or even to persons who are not unit owners. Such a parking space would differ from a limited common element in that its use would be merely a personal right of the person to whom it is assigned and this section would not have to be complied with to allocate it or to reallocate it.
3. Because a mortgage or deed of trust may restrict the borrower’s right to transfer the use of a limited common element without the lender’s consent, the terms of the encumbrance should be examined to determine whether the lender’s consent or release is needed to transfer that right of use to another person.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act, however, minor changes were made for clarification and subsection (c) was amended to authorize a common element to be changed into a limited common element by unanimous consent of all the unit owners.

Official Comment

1. The terms “plat” or “plan” have been given a variety of meanings by custom and usage in the various jurisdictions. Under this Act, it is important to recognize that a “plat” need not mean a “survey” of the entire real estate constituting a project at the time the initial plat is recorded, although, through amendments to the plat as development proceeds, it ultimately becomes a survey of the entire project.
2. Subsection (c) permits, but does not require, the plats to show the location of contemplated improvements. Since construction of contemplated improvements by a declarant involves the exercise of development rights, a declarant may not create any improvement within real estate where no development rights have been reserved, unless the plats actually show that proposed improvement or unless the association (which the declarant may control) makes the improvement pursuant to Section 3-102(7). Should the association attempt that improvement, in the face of unit owner’s objections, it may involve risk of challenge. Within land subject to development rights, of course, construction may take place in accordance with the reserved rights, even if no contemplated improvements are shown on the plats. As to the declarant’s obligation to complete an improvement that is shown, see Section 4-118(a).
3. As noted in the Comments to Section 2-101, a condominium unit may consist of unenclosed ground and/or airspace, with no “building” involved. If this were true of all units in a particular condominium, the provisions of Section 2-109 relating to plans (but not plats) would be inapplicable.
4. In detailing the required contents of the plats, two different types of legal description are contemplated. First, in subsection (b)(1), the plat must show at least a general schematic map of the entire project. While this may be by survey, the Act recognizes that a survey may be unduly expensive or impractical in a large project, and accordingly permits a general schematic map of the entire project at the commencement of development. With respect to those portions of the project, however, where no future development may take place, the flexibility of a general schematic map is not necessary. At the same time, it becomes important for title purposes to be able to identify precisely that portion of the project which is essentially completed. Accordingly, as development ceases in particular phases, subsection (b)(2) contemplates that the locations and dimensions of that real estate will be identified. As this process continues, all of the real estate originally shown in a general schematic map will have been surveyed, and the location and dimensions of that real estate identified, at the expiration of development rights. In addition, subsection (2) contemplates that existing improvements must be shown within real estate where no further development will take place. This does not mean the units which may be within each building, but it does mean the external physical dimensions of the buildings themselves. As implied by subsection (11), the nature of “existing improvements” required to be surveyed under subsection (2) should be determined by local practices in the particular state.
5. Subsection (b)(3) requires that the real estate which is subject to development rights must be identified with a legally sufficient description, that is, either a metes and bounds description, or reference to the deeds of that real estate. Since different portions of the real estate may be subject to differing development rights—for example, only a portion of the total real estate may be added as well as withdrawn from the project—the plat must identify the rights applicable to each portion of that real estate. The same reasoning applies to the legally sufficient description of easements affecting the condominium and any leasehold real estate.
6. Subsection (f) describes the amendments to the plats and plans which must be made as development rights are exercised. This section requires that the plats and plans be amended at each stage of development to reflect actual progress to date. If an original schematic map was initially recorded as required by subsection (b)(1), the survey required by (b)(2) would also constitute the amendments required by subsection (f).
7. The terms “horizontal” and “vertical” are now commonly understood in condominium parlance to refer, respectively, to “upper and lower” and “lateral or perimetric.” Thus, Section 2-102 contemplates that the perimetric walls may be designated as the “vertical” boundaries of a unit and the floor and ceiling as its “horizontal” boundaries. That is the sense in which the words “horizontal” and “vertical” are to be understood in this section and throughout this Act.
8. Sections 4-118 and 4-119 reveal the effect of labeling an improvement “MUST BE BUILT” or “NEED NOT BE BUILT,” as required by subsection (b)(3).

As to “plan,” the Act does not use that term to mean the actual building plans used for construction of the project. Instead, the required content of the plans in this Act is described in subsection (d). Essentially, the plans constitute a boundary survey of each unit. Typically, the walls will be the vertical (“up and down” or “perimetric”) boundaries, and the floors and ceilings will be the horizontal boundaries. Importantly, these boundaries need not be physically measured, but may instead be projected from the plat or from actual building construction plans. Thus, the plans under this Act are not conceived to be “as built” plans.

North Carolina Comment

Subsection (a) was amended to make it clear that even though the plan or plat is filed with the declaration, it is to be recorded separately and to clearly provide that the declaration will be recorded in the deed books, but the plan or plat will be recorded in either the plat books or a special set of books for condominiums, eliminating any presumption that plans or plats are to be recorded in the deed books along with the declarations. The language for the second and third sentences was taken from the previous statute. The term “surveyor” was deleted from the list of professionals authorized to certify the plats or plans.

Subsection (b) was amended to delete the phrase “legally sufficient” before “description” as unnecessary and to require that the plan or plat contain the same description for horizontal and vertical units. Additionally, subdivision (b)(10) was taken from (d)(3) of the Uniform Act. Subsections (e) and (f) were brought forward from the previous statute.

Editor’s Note.

Chapter 83, referred to in this section, was rewritten by Session Laws 1979, c. 871, s. 1 and has been recodified as Chapter 83A.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2012-18, s. 1.6, effective July 1, 2012, deleted the former third sentence in subsection (a), which read: “Each plat or plan shall be kept by the register of deeds in a separate file, indexed in the same manner as a conveyance entitled to be recorded, numbered serially in the order of receipt, and designated ‘Condominium’ with the name of the building, if any, and shall contain a reference to the book and page numbers and date of the recording of the declaration.”

Session Laws 2020-52, s. 1, effective June 30, 2020, rewrote the section.

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Incorporation of Plans by Reference. — When recording new plats and plans for units newly added to an expandable condominium, the developer-declarant may incorporate the previously recorded condominium plans by reference if an architect or engineer certifies that the previously recorded plans accurately depict the newly added units as built. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Robert H. Bartelt, Assistant County Attorney for Cumberland County, 58 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 5 (1988).

Official Comment

1. This section generally describes the method by which any development right may be exercised. Importantly, while new development rights may be reserved within new real estate which is added to the condominium, the original time limits on the exercise of these rights which the declarant must include in the original declaration may not be extended. Thus, the development process may continue only within the self-determined constraints originally described by the declarant.
2. The reservation and exercise of development rights is and must be closely co-ordinated with financing for the project. As a result, lender review and control of that process is common, and the financing documents should reflect the proposed development process.
3. A lender who holds a mortgage lien on one portion of a condominium may not cause that portion to be withdrawn from the condominium unless the portion constitutes withdrawable real estate in which there is no unit owner other than the declarant. Even then, the amendment effectuating the withdrawal must be executed by the declarant. Consequently, unless the lender wishes to become a declarant subsequent to foreclosure or a deed in lieu of foreclosure in order to execute the amendment, or forecloses in order to require an amendment from the association under Section 2-118(i), a lender might require that the signed amendment be deposited in escrow at the time the loan is made in order to protect against a recalcitrant borrower.
4. As indicated in the Comments to Sections 1-103(24) and 1-106, the withdrawal of real estate from a condominium may constitute a subdivision of land under the applicable subdivision ordinance. Under most subdivision ordinances, the owner of the real estate is regarded as the “subdivider.” In the event of a withdrawal under this section, however, the declarant is in fact the subdivider because of his unique interest in and control over the real estate, even though the real estate, for title purposes, is a common element until withdrawn. Accordingly, he would bear the cost of compliance with any subdivision ordinance required to withdraw a part of the real estate from the condominium.
5. Subsection (c) deals with special problems surrounding allocated interests when the declarant subdivides or converts units which were originally created in the declaration into additional units, common elements or both. This development right permits the declarant to defer a final decision as to the size of certain units by permitting the subdivision of larger interior spaces into smaller units. The declarant may thus “build to suit” for purchasers’ needs or to meet changing market demand. The concept is called “convertible space” in several existing state statutes.

A typical construction loan mortgage on a portion of a phased condominium might provide that as soon as new units are built on new land to be added (or, if the portion is also designated withdrawable land, as soon thereafter as anyone other than the declarant becomes the unit owner of a unit in the withdrawable land) the mortgage on that land converts into a mortgage on all of the units located within that portion, together with their respective common element interests. The common element interest of those units will, of course, extend to the common elements in other sections of the condominium. However, failure of a construction loan mortgage to so provide is inconsequential, because conveyance of the units in that phase to the lender or to a purchaser at a foreclosure sale would automatically transfer all of those units’ common element interests, as a result of the requirements of Sections 2-108(d) and 2-111(a).

For example, a declarant of a 5-story office building condominium may have purchasers committed at the time of the filing of the condominium declaration but a lack of purchasers for the upper 2 floors. In such a circumstance, the declarant could designate the upper 2 floors as a unit, reserving to himself the right to subdivide or convert that unit into additional units, common elements or a combination of units and common elements as needed to suit the requirements of ultimate purchasers.

If, at a later time, a purchaser wishes to purchase half of one floor as a unit, the declarant could exercise the development right to subdivide his 2-floor unit into 2 or more units. He may also wish to reserve a portion of the divided floor as a corridor which will constitute common elements. In that case, he would proceed pursuant to this subsection to reallocate the allocated interests among the units in the manner described in this section.

Alternatively, the declarant may ultimately decide that the entire 2 floors should be turned over to the unit owners’ association not as a unit but as common elements to be used perhaps as a cafeteria serving the balance of the building, or for retail space to be rented by the association. In that case, should he choose to make the entire 2 floors common elements, the provisions of paragraph (c)(1) would apply.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

CASE NOTES

Right to Withdraw Property. —

Under the Condominium Act, a declarant was prohibited from withdrawing one phase of the condominium property because it had already conveyed units in that phase, but the declarant was not precluded from withdrawing a second phase of the property because no units in the second phase had been conveyed. In re Skybridge Terrace, LLC Litig., 246 N.C. App. 489, 786 S.E.2d 5, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 358 (2016).

Right to Withdraw Property. —

Trial court properly granted a declarant summary judgment in its action alleging it was entitled to withdraw certain property from a condominium because its right to withdraw “any portion” under the declaration and the Condominium Act had to be construed as the right to withdraw the only discrete and clearly identifiable portions of the condominium depicted on the plat; the declaration did not refer to all of the condominium’s property but described the right to withdraw any “portion.” In re Skybridge Terrace, LLC Litig., 246 N.C. App. 489, 786 S.E.2d 5, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 358 (2016).

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

Incorporation of Plans by Reference. — When recording new plats and plans for units newly added to an expandable condominium, the developer-declarant may incorporate the previously recorded condominium plans by reference if an architect or engineer certifies that the previously recorded plans accurately depict the newly added units as built. See opinion of Attorney General to Mr. Robert H. Bartelt, Assistant County Attorney for Cumberland County, 58 N.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 5 (1988).

Official Comment

1. This section deals with permissible alterations of the interior of a unit, and impermissible alterations of the exterior of a unit and the common elements, in ways which reflect common practice. The stated rules, of course, may be varied by the declaration where desired.
2. Subsection (3) deals in a unique manner with the problem of creating access between adjoining units owned by the same person. The subsection provides a specific rule which would permit a door, stairwell, or removal of a partition wall between those units, so long as structural integrity is not impaired. That alteration would not be an alteration of boundaries, but would be an exception to the basic rule stated in subsection (2).
3. In considering permissible alteration of the interior of a unit, an example may be useful. A nail driven by a unit owner to hang a picture might enter a portion of the wall designated as part of the common elements, but this section would not be violated because structural integrity would not be impaired. Moreover, no trespass would be committed because each unit owner, as a part owner of the common elements, has a right to utilize them subject only to such restrictions as may be created by the Act, the declaration, bylaws, and the unit owners’ association pursuant to Section 3-102.
4. Removal of a partition or the creation of an aperture between adjoining units would permit the units to be used as one, but they would not become one unit. They would continue to be separate units within the meaning of Section 1-104 and would continue to be treated separately for the purposes of this Act.
5. In addition to the restrictions placed on unit owners by this section, the declaration or bylaws may restrict a unit owner from altering the interior appearance of his unit. Although this might be an undue restriction if imposed upon the primary residence of a unit owner, it may be appropriate in the case of time-share or other condominiums.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act, however, subdivision (3) was amended to delete references to the acquisition of an adjoining part of an adjoining unit because of confusion that would arise from maintaining the same allocated interest and because it is unlikely that the situation will occur.

Official Comment

1. This section changes the effect of most current condominium statutes, under which the boundaries between units may not be altered without unanimous or nearly unanimous consent of the unit owners. As the section makes clear, this result may be varied by restrictions in the declaration.
2. This section contemplates that, upon relocation of the unit boundaries, no reallocation of allocated interests will occur if none is specified in the application. If a reallocation is specified but the executive board deems it unreasonable, then the applicants have the choice of resubmitting the application with a reallocation more acceptable to the board, or going to court to challenge the board’s finding as unreasonable.

North Carolina Comment

Subsection (a) was amended by adding the second sentence which requires that any application must be in such form and contain such data as may be reasonably required by the association and be accompanied by a plat prepared by a registered engineer or surveyor. The requirement allows the association to make a more informed decision on the application. The third sentence was amended to read “the association, at the expense of the owners filing the application, shall prepare and record . . . .” in order to require the applicant to bear the expense of preparation and recordation of the amendment to the declaration.

Subsection (b) was amended by adding the same language regarding expenses to this subsection requiring that plats or plans reflect the altered boundaries.

Editor’s Note.

Chapter 83, referred to in this section, was rewritten by Session Laws 1979, c. 871, s. 1 and has been recodified as Chapter 83A.

Official Comment

1. This section provides for subdivision of units by unit owners, thereby creating more and smaller units than were originally created. The underlying policy of this section is that the original development plan of the project must be followed, and the expectations of unit owners realized. Accordingly, unless subdivision of the units is expressly permitted by the original declaration, a unit may not be subdivided into 2 or more units unless the declaration is amended to permit it. A subdivision itself is accomplished by an amendment to the declaration.
2. At the same time, situations will often occur where future subdivision is appropriate, and this section permits the declaration to provide for it. Most state statutes do not presently provide for subdivision of units.

An analogous concept in the context of development rights is subdivision of units by a declarant. The development right is described in Section 2-110.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act, however, language was added to ensure that the appropriate unit owners bear the administrative costs.

Official Comment

Two approaches are presented here as alternatives, since uniformity on this issue is not essential, and various states have adopted one approach or the other. Both theories recognize the fact that the actual physical boundaries may differ somewhat from what is shown on the plats and plans, and the practical effect of both is the same.

The easement approach of Alternative A [adopted in North Carolina as subsection (a)] creates easements for whatever discrepancies may arise, while the “monuments as boundaries” approach of Alternative B would make the title lines move to follow movement of the physical boundaries caused by such discrepancies or subsequent settling or shifting.

North Carolina Comment

Subsection (a) of this section is identical to Alternate A of the Uniform Act. Subsection (b) provides a six month period within which the owner of a condominium unit in existence before the effective date of the act may challenge the easement described in subsection (a).

Editor’s Note.

The introductory language to Session Laws 2020-52, s. 5, read, in part, “G.S. 47C-2-114(a) reads ...” The amendment also amended the catchline. At the direction of the Revisor of Statutes, the amended catchline has been given effect.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2020-52, s. 5, effective June 30, 2020, substituted the section heading for one which read: “Easement for encroachments”; and rewrote subsection (a).

Legal Periodicals.

For casenote, “Brevorka v. Wolfe Construction, Inc.: Did I Just Waive My Rights to the Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Construction?,” see 26 N.C. Cent. L.J. 59 (2003).

For article, “The Law Is What It Is, But Is It Equitable? The Law of Encroachments Where the Innocent, Negligent, and Willful Are Treated the Same,” see 39 Campbell L. Rev. 287 (2017).

Official Comment

1. This section prescribes the circumstances under which portions of the condominium—either units or common elements—may be used for sales offices, management offices, or models. The basic requirement is that the declarant must describe his rights to maintain such offices in the declaration. There are no limitations on that right, so that either units owned by the declarant or other persons, or the common elements themselves, may be used for that purpose. Typical common element uses might include a sales booth in the lobby of the building, or a trailer or temporary building located outside the buildings on the grounds of the property.
2. In addition, this section contains a permissive provision permitting advertising on the common elements. The declarant may choose to limit his rights in terms of the size, location, or other matters affecting the advertising. The Act, however, imposes no limitation. At the same time, the last sentence of the section recognizes that state or local zoning or other laws may limit advertising, both in terms of size and content of the advertising, or the use of the units or common elements for such purposes. This section makes it clear that local law would apply in those cases.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

Legal Periodicals.

For casenote, “Brevorka v. Wolfe Construction, Inc.: Did I Just Waive My Rights to the Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Construction?,” see 26 N.C. Cent. L.J. 59 (2003).

CASE NOTES

Reservation of Rights. —

Pursuant to G.S. 47C-2-115 , a declarant desiring to maintain management or leasing offices is allowed to reserve the right to keep such offices on site, either in the units it owns or on common elements (for so long as the declarant is a unit owner), but the declarant is not authorized to maintain offices on property that is neither a unit nor a common element. Residences at Biltmore Condo. Owners' Ass'n v. Power Dev., LLC, 243 N.C. App. 711, 778 S.E.2d 467, 2015 N.C. App. LEXIS 892 (2015).

Official Comment

1. This section grants to declarant an easement across the common elements, subject to any self-imposed restrictions on that easement contained in the declaration. At the same time, the easement is not an easement for all purposes and under all circumstances, but only a grant of such rights as may be reasonably necessary for the purpose of exercising the declarant’s rights. Thus, for example, if other access were equally available to the land where new units are being created, which did not require the declarant’s construction equipment to pass and repass over the common elements in a manner which significantly inconvenienced the unit owners, a court might apply the “reasonably necessary” test contained in this section to consider limitations on the declarant’s easement. The rights granted by this section may be enlarged by a specific reservation in the declaration.
2. The declarant is also required to repair and restore any portion of the condominium used for the easement granted under this section. See Section 4-119(b).

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

Official Comment

1. This section recognizes that the declaration, as the perpetual governing instrument for the condominium, may be amended by various parties at various times in the life of the project. The basic rule, stated in subsection (a), is that the declaration, including the plats and plans, may only be amended by vote of 67% of the unit owners. The section permits a larger percentage to be required by the declaration, and also recognizes that, in an entirely non-residential condominium, a smaller percentage might be appropriate.
2. Section 1-104 does not permit the declarant to use any device, such as powers of attorney executed by purchasers at closings, to circumvent subsection (d)’s requirement of unanimous consent. This section does not supplant any requirements of common law or of other statutes with respect to conveyancing if title to real property is to be affected.
3. Subsection (e) describes the mechanics by which amendments recorded by the association are filed, and resolves a number of matters often neglected by bylaws.

In addition to that basic rule, subsection (a) lists those other instances where the declaration may be amended by the declarant alone without association approval, or by the association acting through its board of directors.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

Editor’s Note.

Subsection (d) of G.S. 47C-1-106 , referred to in subsection (a) of this section, does not exist. It appears that a reference to G.S. 47C-2-106(d) was intended.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2020-52, s. 3(a), effective June 30, 2020, in subsection (b), added the proviso at the beginning and inserted “or pursuant to G.S. 47C-2-105(a)(8)” near the middle; and added subsection (f).

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2020-52, s. 11, made this section, as enacted by Session Laws 2020-52, s. 3(b), effective October 1, 2020, and applicable to actions filed on or after that date.

Official Comment

1. While few condominiums have yet been terminated under present state law, a number of problems are certain to arise upon termination which have not been adequately addressed by most of those statutes. These include such matters as the percentage of unit owners which should be required for termination; the time frame within which written consents from all unit owners must be secured; the manner in which common elements and units should be disposed of following termination, both in the case of sale and non-sale of all of the real estate; the circumstances under which sale of units may be imposed on dissenting owners; the powers held by the Board of Directors on behalf of the association to negotiate a sales agreement; the practical consequences to the project from the time the unit owners approve the termination until the transfer of title and occupancy actually occurs; the impact of termination on liens on the units and common elements; distribution of sales proceeds; the effect of foreclosure or enforcement of liens against the entire condominium with respect to the validity of the project; and other matters.
2. Recognizing that unanimous consent from all unit owners would be impossible to secure as a practical matter on a project of any size, subsection (a) states a general rule that 80% consent of the unit owners would be required for termination of a project. The declaration may require a larger percentage of the unit owners and, in a non-residential project, it may also require a smaller percentage. Pursuant to Section 2-119 (Rights of Secured Lenders), lenders may require that the declaration specify a larger percentage of unit owner consent or, more typically, will require the consent of a percentage of the lenders before the project may be terminated.
3. As a result of subsection (d), unless the declaration requires unanimous consent for termination, the declarant may be able to terminate the condominium despite the unanimous opposition of other unit owners if the declarant owns units to which the requisite number of votes are allocated. Such a result might occur, for example, should a declarant be unable to continue sales in a project where some sales have been made.
4. Subsection (a) describes the procedure for execution of the termination agreement. It recognizes that not all unit owners will be able to execute the same instrument, and permits execution or ratification of the master termination agreement. Since the transfer of an interest in real estate is being accomplished by the agreements, each of the ratifications must be executed in the same manner as a deed. Importantly, the agreement must specify the time within which it will be effective; otherwise, the project might be indefinitely in “limbo” if ratifications had been signed by some, but not all, required unit owners, and the signing unit owners fail to revoke their agreements. Importantly, the agreement becomes effective only when it is recorded.
5. Subsections (c) and (d) deal with the question of when all the real estate in the condominium, or the common elements, may be sold without unanimous consent of the unit owners. The section reaches a different result based on the physical configuration of the project.
6. Subsection (e) describes the powers of the association during the pendency of the termination proceedings. It empowers the association to negotiate for the sale, but makes the validity of any contract dependent on unit owner approval. This section also makes clear that, upon termination, title to the real estate shall be held by the association, so that the association may convey title without the necessity of each unit owner signing the deed. Finally, this section makes clear that, until the association delivers title to the condominium property, the project will continue to operate as it had prior to the termination, thus insuring that the practical necessities of operation of the real estate will not be impaired.
7. Subsection (f) contemplates the possibility that a condominium might be terminated but the real estate not sold. While this is not likely to be the usual case, it is important to provide for the possibility.
8. A complex series of creditors’ rights questions may arise upon termination. Those questions involve competing claims of first mortgage holders on individual units, other secured and unsecured creditors of individual unit owners, judgment creditors of the association, creditors of the association to whom a security interest in the common elements has been granted, and unsecured creditors of the association. Subsection (g) attempts to establish general rules with respect to these competing claims, but leaves to state law the resolution of the priorities of those competing claims.

Subsection (c) states that if a condominium contains only units having horizontal boundaries—a typical high rise building—the unit owners may be required to sell their units upon termination despite objection. Under subsection (d), however, if the project contains any units which do not have horizontal boundaries—for example, a single family home project where some of the units include title to land and could theoretically continue apart from a condominium as a title matter—then the termination agreement may not force dissenting unit owners to sell their units unless the declaration as originally recorded provided otherwise. Obviously, of course, if all the unit owners consent to the sale of the units, sale of the entire development would be possible.

The examples which follow illustrate the relative effects of several provisions set out in the Act, based on application of an assumed state lien priority rule of “first in time, first in right.” In those instances, particularly involving mechanics’ liens, where state law often establishes priorities at variance with that rule, that result is also indicated.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE 1:. HYPOTHETICAL FOR EXAMPLES 1A-1H: A condominium consists of 5 detached single family homes on 5 individually owned lots, together with a 6th lot which is undeveloped but intended for future construction of a swimming pool serving all units. The development is served by a private road. Lot 6 and the private road are common elements owned on an undivided interest basis by the unit owners.

The declaration provides that: (1) upon termination, all units and the common elements must be sold; (2) the association is permitted to encumber Lot 6, and to grant a security interest in that lot for any purpose; and (3) common element interest votes and common expense liabilities are allocated equally among the units. For purposes of the example, we have assumed that the documents do not require the consent of first mortgage holders before the unit owners may vote to terminate.

The 5 units were originally sold at equal prices of $50,000. Common expenses in the project are $100 per unit, per month, and are used for a variety of purposes, including insurance and upkeep of the units and common elements. At the time the units were conveyed, each of them was released from all liens affecting the condominium which were senior to the declaration.

A shopping center developer has offered $380,000 for the purchase of the entire condominium. The association’s members unanimously vote in favor of termination, and otherwise comply with Section 2-118. The appraisal required by Section 2-118(h) shows that the units are still of equal value.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE 1A:. At the time of termination, the 5 units were financed as follows:

Unit 1: The owner’s first mortgage had an unpaid balance of $50,000.

Unit 2: The owner’s first mortgage had an unpaid balance of $40,000.

Unit 3: The owner’s first mortgage had an unpaid balance of $25,000.

Units 4 and 5: The owners paid cash, and there is no mortgage on either unit.

In addition, all common expenses had been paid when due. The other assets of the association, including reserves, bank account, and all other personal property, total $20,000.

Under the Act (Section 2-118(e)), the association, following sale, holds the proceeds of sale together with the assets of the association, “as trustee for the holders of all interests in the units.” In these circumstances, the interests of each party in the total value of $400,000 would be as follows:

———————————————————————————————- ——————- Unit # 1 2 3 4 5 ———————————————————————————————- ——————- Share of Proceeds 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 Due 1st Mortgage Holders 50,000 40,000 25,000 -0- -0- Due Owners 30,000 40,000 55,000 80,000 80,000

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OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE 1B:. The facts stated in Example 1A remain true. However, at termination, Unit 1 has failed to pay its common expenses for 12 months. In these circumstances, the interests of each party would be as follows:

———————————————————————————————- ——————- Unit # 1 2 3 4 5 ———————————————————————————————- ——————- Share of Proceeds 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 Due Association (Priming 1st Mortgage) 600 -0- -0- -0- -0- Due 1st Mortgage Holders 50,000 40,000 25,000 -0- -0- Due Association (Not Priming 1st Mortgage) 600 -0- -0- -0- -0- Due Owners 28,000 40,000 55,000 80,000 80,000

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In this example, both the lenders and the association are fully paid because the sales proceeds exceed the liens on the units. Note, however, that 6 months of the unpaid assessments prime the first mortgage pursuant to Section 3-116(b). Thus, if the sales proceeds had been only $50,000 per unit, rather than $80,000, the results with respect to Unit 1 would have been as follows:

Sales Proceeds $50,000 6-Month Assessment Due Association Balance $49,400 Paid to 1st Mortgage Holder Loss to 1st Mortgage Lender (600) Loss to Association (600) 600 $49,400

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Of course, the association has, and the lender may have, a claim against the unit owner, personally, for the unpaid sums due them. Importantly, however, neither the other unit owners nor their units are subject to any liability for those claims.

Because the lien of the first mortgage holder, at termination or foreclosure, is junior to the first 6 months of unpaid assessments due the association, lenders may protect themselves under the Act by requiring the escrow of 6 months’ common expense assessments, as they often do for real property taxes.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE 1C:. The facts stated in Example 1B remain true. However, after all the units were initially sold, but before termination, 80% of the unit owners agree to build a swimming pool on Lot 6. The association contracts with XYZ Pool Company to build the pool for $100,000. XYZ does not take a security interest in the common elements, as it might have done under Section 3-112, and does not act to perfect any available mechanics’ lien under state law. The pool is properly completed. When the association fails to pay, XYZ sues the association, secures a judgment, and properly perfects its judgment pursuant to Section 3-111 (Tort and Contract Liability). As provided in Section 3-111, liens resulting from judgments against the association are governed by Section 3-117. At the time of termination, XYZ has not been paid, and its claim amounts to $100,000.

Section 3-117(a) provides that a “judgment for money against the association,” if perfected as a lien on real property under state law, “is a lien in favor of the judgment lienholder against all of the units.” However, the last sentence also provides that the judgment is not a lien on the common elements. Accordingly, XYZ holds a $20,000 lien on each of the units as of the date the lien is perfected. In these circumstances, the interests of the parties are as follows:

———————————————————————————————- ——————- Unit # 1 2 3 4 5 ———————————————————————————————- ——————- Share of Proceeds 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 Due Association (Priming 1st Mortgage) 600 -0- -0- -0- -0- Due 1st Mortgage Holders 50,000 40,000 25,000 -0- -0- Due Association (Not Priming 1st Mortgage) 600 -0- -0- -0- -0- Due XYZ 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 Due Owners 8,800 20,000 35,000 60,000 60,000

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OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE 1D:. All facts stated in example 1C remain true, except that XYZ Pool Company, at the time it contracts to build the pool, takes a security interest in Lot 6, pursuant to Section 3-112, and that security interest includes a release of that real estate, upon default, from all restrictions imposed on the real estate by the declaration. At termination, XYZ has not instituted any action against the association to enforce its claim.

In these circumstances, XYZ, as a secured creditor with respect to Lot 6, holds an interest superior to the declaration, and would have the right to exclude that real estate from the project. Any sale of the entire condominium would be subject to the superior interest of XYZ. For that reason, in the normal circumstances, the association would not be able to secure a release of that lien unless XYZ were paid in full from the proceeds of the sale, which would have the effect of reducing the value of the sale to $280,000. Note that this has the economic effect of placing the XYZ claim, at termination, ahead of prior first mortgages. For this reason, first mortgage holders will typically require their consent before common elements may be subjected to a lien.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE 1E:. The facts stated in Example 1C remain true so that XYZ holds only a perfected judgment lien, not a security interest in the common elements.

After the XYZ lien was perfected, a $50,000 uninsured judgment is entered against the owner of Unit 4, resulting from his personal business. The lien is perfected, and rests only against Unit 4. In these circumstances, the interests of the parties are as follows:

———————————————————————————————- ——————- Unit # 1 2 3 4 5 ———————————————————————————————- ——————- Share of Proceeds 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 Due Association (Priming 1st Mortgage) 600 -0- -0- -0- -0- Due 1st Mortgage Holders 50,000 40,000 25,000 -0- -0- Due Association (Not Priming 1st Mortgage) 600 -0- -0- -0- -0- Due XYZ 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 Personal Lien, Unit 4 -0- -0- -0- 50,000 -0- Due Owners 8,800 20,000 35,000 10,000 60,000

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OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE 1F:. The facts stated in Example 1E remain true. After the swimming pool is built, a neighbor’s child falls into the untended and unfenced pool, and is injured. The child sues the association. One month after the personal judgment against Unit 4 is perfected, the child secures a judgment against the association for $100,000 more than the association’s insurance. Under state law, the tort judgment, when perfected, constitutes a lien only from the date judgment is entered, and does not enjoy a higher priority. In these circumstances, the interests of the parties are as follows:

———————————————————————————————- ——————- Unit # 1 2 3 4 5 ———————————————————————————————- ——————- Share of Proceeds 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 Due Association (Priming 1st Mortgage) 600 -0- -0- -0- -0- Due 1st Mortgage Holders 50,000 40,000 25,000 -0- -0- Due Association (Not Priming 1st Mortgage) 600 -0- -0- -0- -0- Due XYZ 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 Personal Lien, Unit 4 -0- -0- -0- 50,000 -0- Tort Lien 8,800 20,000 20,000 10,000 20,000 Due Owners -0- -0- 15,000 -0- 40,000

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Note that the child’s lien realizes only $78,800; the estate is not entitled to participate in the proceeds available to Units 3 and 5 to satisfy the unmet claims against Units 1 and 4, because those units are liable only for their pro rata share of the claim, which is the same amount any of those units would have had to pay prior to termination in order to secure a partial release. Thus, if Unit 5, prior to termination, had secured a partial release for $20,000 from the estate, the result would be the same.

Note also that the value of the common elements is not segregated from the values of the units, since the sales’ values of the units reflect all of the value of the real estate. Similarly, note that, after termination, the tort claimant is not entitled to reach or segregate the personal property of the corporation, valued before termination at $20,000, even though he could have reached the bank account or other assets prior to termination. Any other rule would create enormous complexity, would impose arbitrary losses on creditors out of priority, and would tend to shift economic losses to unit owners who had paid their share of claims.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE 1G:. The facts stated in Example 1F remain true. After the Unit 4 personal lien is perfected, but, one week before the tort judgment against the association is perfected, P Paving Company begins repaving the private road. Work is completed one week after the tort judgment is perfected. The association fails to pay P $50,000 upon completion as agreed, and P immediately records its mechanics’ lien. Under state law, a mechanics’ lien, if recorded within 60 days of the time work is completed, holds priority as of the day work began. State law does not, however, grant the mechanics’ lien priority over any liens perfected before work began. P Paving sues on its lien, and secures a judgment. In these circumstances, the interests of the parties are as follows:

———————————————————————————————- ——————- Unit # 1 2 3 4 5 ———————————————————————————————- ——————- Share of Proceeds 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 Due Association (Priming 1st Mortgage) 600 -0- -0- -0- -0- Due 1st Mortgage Holders 50,000 40,000 25,000 -0- -0- Due Association (Not Priming 1st Mortgage) 600 -0- -0- -0- -0- XYZ Pool Lien 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 Personal Lien, Unit 4 -0- -0- -0- 50,000 -0- P Paving Lien 8,800 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 Tort Lien -0- 10,000 20,000 -0- 20,000 Due Owners -0- -0- 5,000 -0- 30,000

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Note that, just as in the case of the tort lien, when Unit 1 could not contribute its share of the mechanics’ lien, the remaining units were not liable for the balance.

In the example, the common expense lien arises before P Paving lien had arisen. If the common expense lien arose after the P Paving lien, we would be faced with circular liens, where: (a) the P Paving lien would prime the common expense lien; (b) 6 months of the common expense lien would prime the mortgage; and (c) the mortgage would prime the P Paving lien. Such circular lien problems, however, are not unique in the law.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE 1H:. The facts stated in example 1G remain true. Assume Unit 5, before termination, paid its pro rata share of both the P Paving lien and the tort lien. This reduces the P Paving lien to $40,000, and the tort lien to $80,000. Under Section 3-117, this entitles Unit 5 to a partial release of both claims, and neither P Paving nor the child has a further claim against Unit 5. The interests of the parties are as follows:

———————————————————————————————- ——————- Unit # 1 2 3 4 5 ———————————————————————————————- ——————- Share of Proceeds 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 Common Expense Lien 600 -0- -0- -0- -0- First Mortgage Liens 50,000 40,000 25,000 -0- -0- Common Expense Lien 600 -0- -0- -0- -0- XYZ Pool Lien 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 -0- Personal Lien, Unit 4 -0- -0- -0- 50,000 -0- P Paving Lien 8,800 10,000 10,000 10,000 -0- Tort Lien -0- 10,000 20,000 -0- 20,000 Due Owners -0- -0- 5,000 -0- 80,000

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OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE 2:. The facts stated in example 1G remain true. Assume, however, that, at the outset, Unit 5 was twice as large as the others, sold for $100,000, or twice as much as the others, and twice the common expense liability was allocated to it. At termination, it remains twice as valuable. In those circumstances, the results on sale are as follows:

———————————————————————————————- ——————- Unit # 1 2 3 4 5 ———————————————————————————————- ——————- Sale Proceeds 66,666 66,666 66,666 66,666 133,332 Common Expense Lien 600 -0- -0- -0- -0- First Mortgage Lien 50,000 40,000 25,000 -0- -0- Common Expense Lien 600 -0- -0- -0- -0- XYZ Pool Lien 15,466 16,666 16,666 16,666 33,333 Personal Lien, Unit 4 -0- -0- -0- 50,000 -0- P Paving Lien -0- 10,000 13,333 -0- 26,666 Tort Lien -0- 1,667 16,666 -0- 33,333 Due Owners -0- -0- -0- -0- 50,000

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In this example, the equal distribution of common expense liability coupled with the “fair value” distribution of sales proceeds create the greatest losses for the creditors of the association.

9. Subsection (h) departs significantly from the usual result under most condominium acts. Under those acts the proceeds of the sale of the entire project are distributed upon termination to each unit owner in accordance with the common element interest which was allocated at the outset of the project. Of course, in an older development, those original allocations will bear little resemblance to the actual value of the units. For that reason, the Act adopts an appraisal procedure for distribution of the sales proceeds. As suggested in the examples on the distribution of proceeds, this appraisal may dramatically affect the amount of dollars actually received by unit owners. Accordingly, it is likely the appraisal will be required to be distributed prior to the time the termination agreement is approved, so that unit owners may understand the likely financial consequences of the termination.

10. Subsection (h)(2) is an exception to the “fair market value” rule. It provides that, if appraisal of any unit cannot be made, either through pictures or comparison with other units, so that any unit’s appropriate share in the overall proceeds cannot be calculated, then the distribution will fall back on the only objective, albeit artificial, standard available, which is the common element interest allocated to each unit.

11. Foreclosure of a mortgage or other lien or encumbrance does not automatically terminate the condominium, but, if a mortgagee or other lienholder (or any other party) acquires units with a sufficient number of votes, that party can cause the condominium to be terminated pursuant to subsection (a) of this section.

12. A mortgage or deed of trust on a condominium unit may provide for the lien to shift, upon termination, to become a lien on what will then be the borrower’s undivided interest in the whole property. However, such a shift would be deemed to occur even in the absence of express language, pursuant to the first sentence of subsection (d).

13. With respect to the association’s role as trustee under subsection (c), see Section 3-117.

14. If an initial appraisal made pursuant to subsection (h) were rejected by vote of the unit owners, the association would be obligated to sure a new appraisal.

15. “Foreclosure” in subsection (i) includes deeds in lieu of foreclosure, and “liens” includes tax and other liens on real estate which may be converted or withdrawn from the project.

16. The termination agreement should adopt or contain any restrictions, covenants and other provisions for the governance and operation of the property formerly constituting the condominium which the owners deem appropriate. These might closely parallel the provisions of the declaration and bylaws. This is particularly important in the case of a condominium which is not to be sold pursuant to the terms of the termination agreement. In the absence of such provisions, the general law of the state governing tenancies in common would apply.

17. Note that all the liens are allocated in accordance with each unit’s common expense liability, since no special provision was made for allocating the costs of the pool, the paving or the tort claim. Unit 5 probably did not contemplate the size of its exposure; nevertheless, fewer dollars were available to creditors upon termination than in Example 1G.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

The facts stated in Example 1G remain true, including the fact that Unit 5 was originally sold at the same price ($50,000) as the remaining units. Upon appraisal, however, assume that, because of improvements, Unit 5 is now worth $75,000. Three other units have remained at $50,000, while Unit 1 was neglected, and is now worth only $40,000. Common expense liabilities never changed. In this example, the total value of the units is now $265,000. Since sales proceeds are distributed in accordance with fair market values, the following distribution of proceeds would apply:

EXAMPLE 3:.

Unit 1: (15.09433%) $ 60,377 Unit 2: (18.86793%) $ 75,472 Unit 3: (18.86793%) $ 75,472 Unit 4: (18.86793%) $ 75,472 Unit 5: (28.30188%) 100.00000% $400,000 $113,207

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———————————————————————————————- ——————- Unit # 1 2 3 4 5 ———————————————————————————————- ——————- Sales Proceeds 60,377 75,472 75,472 75,472 113,207 Common Expense Lien 600 -0- -0- -0- -0- First Mortgage Lien 50,000 40,000 25,000 -0- -0- Common Expense Lien 600 -0- -0- -0- -0- XYZ Pool Lien 9,177 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 Personal Lien, Unit 4 -0- -0- -0- 50,000 -0- P Paving Lien -0- 10,000 10,000 5,472 10,000 Tort Lien -0- 5,472 20,000 -0- 20,000 Due Owners -0- -0- 472 -0- 63,207

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North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

CASE NOTES

Construction. —

Statute imposes no explicit statutory duty upon a condominium association to abide by the provisions that the requisite number of unit owners have specified in a termination agreement. Howe v. Links Club Condo. Ass'n, 263 N.C. App. 130, 823 S.E.2d 439, 2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 1222 (2018).

When read in conjunction with the requirements of subsection (b) that a termination agreement and all ratifications thereof must be recorded and is effective only upon recordation, and a termination agreement must specify a date after which the agreement will be void unless recorded before that date, the purpose of setting forth the minimum terms of the sale under subsection (c) is not to hold a condominium association liable but to provide the public with adequate notice of the transaction. Howe v. Links Club Condo. Ass'n, 263 N.C. App. 130, 823 S.E.2d 439, 2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 1222 (2018).

Appraisal. —

General Assembly’s explicit inclusion of a requirement that a particular appraisal be obtained in order to determine the appropriate allocation of proceeds suggests that its exclusion of any prescribed mechanism for establishing a condominium’s ultimate sale price was intentional. Howe v. Links Club Condo. Ass'n, 263 N.C. App. 130, 823 S.E.2d 439, 2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 1222 (2018).

Failure to State Breach of Contract Claim. —

Trial court did not err in dismissing minority condominium unit owners’ claim that the condominium association breached the termination agreement because the complaint failed to establish that the termination agreement was a valid contract binding on the association; the complaint was devoid of allegations that the association was a party to, or otherwise bound by, the termination agreement or that the association performed any act specifically in furtherance of the agreement. Howe v. Links Club Condo. Ass'n, 263 N.C. App. 130, 823 S.E.2d 439, 2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 1222 (2018).

Failure to State a Claim for Breach of Statutory Obligations. —

Minority condominium unit owners’ complaint did not support their claim for breach of the statute because the owners did not identify any particular provision of the statute that the condominium association violated; the text of the statute does not delineate any particular method by which a condominium’s sale price must be determined. Howe v. Links Club Condo. Ass'n, 263 N.C. App. 130, 823 S.E.2d 439, 2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 1222 (2018).

Absent a specific statutory provision limiting a condominium association’s powers, there was no support for minority condominium unit owners’ contention that the association violated its obligations under the statute when it failed to obtain a separate appraisal and instead used the allocation appraisal as the basis for the condominium’s sale price. Howe v. Links Club Condo. Ass'n, 263 N.C. App. 130, 823 S.E.2d 439, 2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 1222 (2018).

Breach of Fiduciary Duty. —

Minority condominium unit owners’ claim stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against a condominium association because they adequately alleged the existence of a fiduciary relationship between themselves and the association; the complaint explicitly referenced the statute by alleging that the association, by virtue of its position as trustee for all of the unit owners, owed a fiduciary duty to each and every one of the unit owners in effectuating the condominium’s sale. Howe v. Links Club Condo. Ass'n, 263 N.C. App. 130, 823 S.E.2d 439, 2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 1222 (2018).

Minority condominium unit owners’ claim stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against a condominium association because they adequately alleged the existence of a fiduciary relationship between themselves and the association; the complaint explicitly referenced G.S. 47C-2-118 by alleging that the association, by virtue of its position as trustee for all of the unit owners, owed a fiduciary duty to each and every one of the unit owners in effectuating the condominium’s sale. Howe v. Links Club Condo. Ass'n, 263 N.C. App. 130, 823 S.E.2d 439, 2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 1222 (2018).

Trial court erred in dismissing minority condominium unit owners’ claim for breach of fiduciary duty because they alleged that a condominium association arranged for, approved, and proceeded with the forced sale of the entire condominium for an inadequate price; the owners also alleged that the association failed to have an independent appraiser generate the allocation appraisal, ensure that the appraisal used was without bias, and distribute it within the statutory time frame. Howe v. Links Club Condo. Ass'n, 263 N.C. App. 130, 823 S.E.2d 439, 2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 1222 (2018).

Official Comment

1. It is very common in large or multi-phased condominiums, particularly those developed under existing laws, for the declarant to create a master or umbrella association which provides management services or decision-making functions for a series of smaller condominiums. While it is expected that this phenomenon will be less necessary under this Act because of the permissible period of time for declarant control over the project, it is nonetheless possible in larger developments that this form of management will continue. Moreover, this section should be of significant benefit to the large number of condominiums created under prior law which have need for the benefits of a provision on master associations.
2. Subsection (a) states the general rule that the powers of a unit owners’ association may only be exercised by, or delegated to, a master association by, the declaration for the condominium permits that result. The declaration may have originally provided for a master association; alternatively, the unit owners of several condominiums may amend their declarations in similar fashion to provide for this power. Subsection (a) makes it clear that, if any of the powers of the unit owners’ association may be exercised by, or delegated to, a master association, all other provisions of this Act which apply to a unit owners’ association apply to that master association except as modified by this section. Accordingly, such provisions on notice, voting, quorums, records, meetings, and other matters which apply to the unit owners’ association would apply with equal validity to such a master association.
3. Subsection (b) changes the usual presumption with respect to the powers of the unit owners’ association, except in those cases where the master association is actually acting as the only association for one or more condominiums. In those cases where it is not so acting. However, the only power of the unit owners’ association which the master association may exercise are the ones expressly permitted in the declaration or in the delegation of power. This is in significant contrast with the rule of Section 3-102 that all of the powers described in that section may be exercised unless limited by the declaration.
4. Subsection (c) clarifies the liability of the members of the executive board of a unit owners’ association when the condominium for which the unit owners’ association acts has delegated some of its powers to a master association. In that instance, subsection (c) makes it clear that the members of the executive board of the unit owners’ association have no liability for acts and omissions of the master association board; under subsection (a), that liability lies with the members of the master association.
5. Subsection (d) addresses the question of the rights and responsibilities of the unit owners in their dealings with the master board. A variety of sections enumerated in subsection (d) provides certain rights and powers to unit owners in their dealings with their association. In the affairs of the master association, however, it would be incongruous for the unit owners to maintain those same rights if those unit owners were not in fact electing the master board. Thus, for example, the question of election of directors, meetings, notice of meetings, quorums, and other matters enumerated in those sections would have little meaning if those sections were read literally when applied to a master board which was not elected by all members of the condominiums subject to the master board. For that reason, the rights of notice, voting, and other rights enumerated in the Act are available only to the persons who actually elect the board.
6. Subsection (e) recognizes that there may be reasons for a representative form of election of directors of the master association. Alternatively, there may be cases where at-large election is reasonable. For that reason, subsection (e) provides that, after the period of declarant control has terminated, there may be 4 ways of electing the master association board. Those four ways are: (1) at-large election of the master board among all the condominiums subject to the master association; (2) at-large election of the master board only among the members of the executive boards of all condominiums subject to the master association; (3) each condominium might have designated positions on the master board, and those spaces could be filled by an at-large election among all the members of each condominium; or (4) the designated positions could be filled by an election only among the members of the executive board of the unit owners’ association for each condominium. It would only be in the case of an at-large election of the master board among all condominiums that subsection (d) would have no relevance.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

Official Comment

1. There may be circumstances where condominiums may wish to merge or consolidate their activities by the creation of a single condominium; this section provides for that possibility.
2. Under subsection (b), the merger or consolidation agreement is treated for recording purposes as an amendment to the declaration, and the same requirements for approval are mandated as for termination.
3. Subsection (c) does not state a minimum requirement for the contents of a merger or consolidation agreement, and any additional clauses not inconsistent with subsection (c) may be included. The important point that subsection (c) makes is that the reallocation of the common element interests, common expense liabilities and votes in the new association must be carefully stated.

Subsection (a) makes it clear that a merger or consolidation may occur by the same vote of the unit owners necessary to terminate the condominium. If 2 or more condominiums are merged or consolidated, the resulting condominium is for all purposes the legal successor of the pre-existing condominiums, with a single association for all purposes. In the event condominiums did not wish to completely merge or consolidate their affairs, it would also be possible for them to create a master association pursuant to Section 2-120.

Subsection (c) states 2 alternative rules in this respect. First, the reallocations may be accomplished by stating specifically the allocation of common element interests, common expense liability, and votes in the association to each unit, or by stating the formulas by which those interests may be allocated to each unit in all of the pre-existing condominiums.

Alternatively, the merger or consolidation agreement may state the percentage of overall common element interests, common expense liabilities, and votes in the association allocated to “all of the units comprising each of the pre-existing condominiums.” The agreement might then also provide that the portion of the percentage allocated to each unit from among the shares allocated to each condominium will be equal to the percentage of common expense liability and votes in the association allocated to that unit by the declaration of the pre-existing condominium. An example of how this alternative formulation would operate may be useful.

OFFICIAL COMMENT

EXAMPLE:. Assume that 2 adjoining condominiums wish to merge their activities into one condominium. Assume that the first condominium consists of 10 one-bedroom units, with an annual budget of $10,000. Assume further that each of the units, being identical, has a common element interest of 10%, equal common expense liability of 10%, and one vote per unit.

The second condominium consists of 40 units, with 20 2-bedroom units and 20 3-bedroom units. The budget of the second condominium consists of $70,000 per year. Each of the 2-bedroom units has been allocated a 2% interest in the common elements and a 2% common expense liability, while each of the 3-bedroom units has been allocated a 3% interest in the common elements, and a 3% common expense liability. Finally, each of the units in the second condominium also has an equal vote.

There is no provision in the Act which mandates a particular allocation among condominiums 1 and 2 as to either common element interest, common expense liabilities or votes. Should the unit owners wish to retain as much similarity to their previous common element interests and common expense liabilities, however, and should they wish to retain equal voting in a merged project, it would be possible for them, pursuant to subsection (c)(ii), to state “the percentage of overall allocated interests of the new condominium” as follows: as to common element interests and common expense liabilities, they might allocate 12.5% of those interests in the merged project to condominium 1, and 87.5% thereof to condominium 2. If the agreement further provided that “the portion of the percentages allocated to each unit formerly comprising a part of the pre-existing condominiums must be equal to the percentages of allocated interests allocated to that unit by the declaration of the pre-existing condominium” as required by subsection (c), each unit in condominium 1 would then have allocated to it 1.25% of both the common element interests and common expense liabilities in the new condominium. It happens that 1.25% of the common expenses of a merged condominium which has a budget of $80,000 equals $1,000.

Under the same rationale, if each of the 2-bedroom units in the second condominium to which were formerly allocated 2% of the common element interests and common expense liabilities, now has allocated 2% of the 87.5% allocated to the second condominium, each of those units would then have allocated to it 1.75% of the common element interest and common expense liabilities of the new condominium. 1.75% of $80,000 is $1,400. Similarly, each of the 3-bedroom units would then have allocated to it 2.625% of the common element interest and common expense liabilities in the merged condominium. That percentage of the common expense liabilities of $80,000 would yield an annual cost of $2,100, the same cost as previously obtained in this condominium.

Further, the unit owners are free to allocate votes among the units in any way which they see fit. Of course, if they choose to allocate equal votes to all the units, which was the method previously used in both condominiums, this would have the effect of giving 20% of the votes to condominium 1, even though condominium 1 had only 12.5% of the common expense liabilities. It may be, however, that this tracks with the expectations of the unit owners in both condominiums. Alternatively, condominium 1 might be allocated 12.5% of the votes, which, when divided up among the 10 units, would give each one-bedroom unit a .125 vote. If 87.5% of the votes were allocated equally among the unit owners in the second condominium, then each of the unit owners in condominium 2 would have .21875 votes.

If some other configuration was to be desired, then the allocations would of necessity be made pursuant to paragraphs (c)(i) rather than (c)(ii).

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

Official Comment

1. The first purchaser of a unit is entitled to have in place the legal structure of the unit owners’ association. The existence of the structure clarifies the relationship between the developer and other unit owners and makes it easy for the developer to involve unit owners in the governance of the condominium even during a period of declarant control reserved pursuant to Section 3-103(d).
2. The bracketed language preserves the flexibility existing under the vast majority of present condominium statutes to organize the association as a profit or non-profit corporation or as an unincorporated association. Although at least one state (Georgia) requires the organization of the association in corporate form, it is not desirable to mandate this result in a uniform act. If a state wishes to mandate incorporation, it should delete the bracketed language.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2006-226, s. 5, contains a severability clause.

Session Laws 2006-226, s. 6, provides: “This act does not affect an action or proceeding commenced or right accrued before this act takes effect.”

Session Laws 2006-226, s. 7, provides: “The Revisor of Statutes shall cause to be printed along with this act all relevant portions of the official comments to the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act and all explanatory comments of the drafters of this act as the Revisor deems appropriate.”

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2006-226, s. 4, effective January 1, 2007, substituted “unincorporated nonprofit association” for “unincorporated association” in the last sentence.

Official Comment

1. This section permits the declaration, subject to the limitations of subsection (b), to include limitations on the exercise of any of the enumerated powers. The bracketed language making a specific reference to unincorporated associations is not intended to exclude other forms of association; the unincorporated association would have such powers, subject to the declaration, regardless of the legal status of an unincorporated association in the state. If a state wishes to permit the association to be unincorporated and the law of the state is unclear whether an unincorporated association would have such powers in the absence of the language, the bracketed language should be retained and the brackets removed.
2. Required provisions of the bylaws of the association, referenced in paragraph (1), are set forth in Section 3-106.
3. Many state condominium statutes give the association the power to sue and be sued in its own name. In the absence of a statutory grant of standing such as that set forth in paragraph (4), some courts have held that the association, because it has no ownership interest in the condominium, has no standing to bring, defend, or to intervene in litigation or administrative proceedings in its own name.
4. Paragraph (8) refers to the power granted by Section 3-112 to sell or encumber common elements without a termination of the condominium upon a vote of the requisite number of unit owners. Paragraph (9) permits the association to grant easements, leases, licenses, and concessions with respect to the common elements without a vote of the unit owners.
5. The powers granted the association in paragraph (11) to impose charges for late payment of assessments and to levy reasonable fines for violations of the association’s rules reflect the need to provide the association with sufficient powers to exercise its “governmental” functions as the ruling body of the condominium community. These powers are intended to be in addition to any rights which the association may have under other law.
6. Under paragraph (14), the declaration may provide for the assignment of income of the association, including common expense assessment income, as security for, or payment of, debts of the association. The power may be limited in any manner specified in the declaration—for example, the power might be limited to specified purposes such as repair of existing structures, or to income from particular sources such as income from tenants, or to a specified percentage of common expense assessments. The power, in many instances, should help materially in securing credit for the association at favorable interest rates. The inability of associations to borrow because of a lack of assets, in spite of its income stream, has been a significant problem.
7. If the association is incorporated, it may, pursuant to paragraph (16), exercise all other powers of a corporation. Similarly, if the association is unincorporated, the association may, by virtue of paragraph (16), exercise all other powers of an unincorporated association. Inconsistent provisions of state corporation or unincorporated association law are subject to the provisions of this Act, as provided in Section 1-108.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act, however, subdivision (4) was amended to delete the requirement that the association act on behalf of “2 or more unit owners” because of a belief that the association should be able to act in its own name. Subdivision (11) was amended to insert a limitation of $150 on the amount of late charges or fines for violations of the declaration, bylaws, or regulations of the association. Subdivision (15) was deleted as unnecessary.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2005-422, ss. 10 and 11, which rewrote subdivision (a)(11), deleted “but only to the extent the declaration expressly so provides” at the end of subdivision (a)(14, and made a minor punctuation change, was effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2004-109, s. 2, effective July 17, 2004, substituted “Unless the declaration expressly provides to the contrary” for “Subject to the provisions of the declaration” at the beginning of subsection (a).

Session Laws 2005-422, ss. 10 and 11, effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date, rewrote subdivision (a)(11); deleted “but only to the extent the declaration expressly so provides” at the end of subdivision (a)(14); and made a minor punctuation change.

Session Laws 2020-90, s. 4(a), effective July 2, 2020, added “do all of the following” in the introductory language of subsection (a); substituted “declaration or resale certificates required by G.S. 47C-4-109 ” for “declaration, resale certificates required by G.S. 47C-4-109 , or statements of unpaid assessments” in subdivision (a)(12); added subdivision (a)(12a); and made minor stylistic changes throughout.

Legal Periodicals.

For note which examines the history and development of North Carolina law dealing with condominiums, see 66 N.C.L. Rev. 199 (1987).

CASE NOTES

Applicability of Fee Provision. —

Fee provision in new Condominium Act was not made applicable to existing condominium associations. Miesch v. Ocean Dunes Homeowners Ass'n, 120 N.C. App. 559, 464 S.E.2d 64, 1995 N.C. App. LEXIS 923 (1995).

Official Comment

1. Subsection (a) makes members of the executive board appointed by the declarant liable as fiduciaries of the unit owners with respect to their actions or omissions as members of the board. This provision imposes a very high standard of duty because the board is vested with great power over the property interests of unit owners, and because there is a great potential for conflicts of interest between the unit owners and the declarant.
2. The provisions of paragraph (c) permit the unit owners to disapprove any proposed budget, but a rejection of the budget does not result in cessation of assessment until a budget is approved. Rather, assessments continue on the basis of the last approved periodic budget until the new budget is in effect.
3. Subsection (d) and (e) recognize the practical necessity for the declarant to control the association during the developmental phases of a condominium project. However, any executive board member appointed by the declarant pursuant to subsection (d) is liable as a fiduciary to any unit owner for his acts or omissions in such capacity.
4. Subsection (d) permits a declarant to surrender his right to appoint and remove officers and executive board members prior to the termination of the period of declarant control in exchange for a veto right over certain actions of the association or its executive board. This provision is designed to encourage transfer of control by declarants to unit owners as early as possible, without impinging upon the declarant’s rights (for the duration of the period of declarant control) to maintain ultimate control of those matters which he may deem particularly important to him. It might be noted that the declarant at all times (even after the expiration of the period of declarant control) is entitled to cast the votes allocated to his units in the same manner as any other unit owner.
5. Subsection (e), in combination with subsection (d), provides for a gradual transfer of control of the association to the unit owners from the declarant. Such a gradual transfer is preferable to a one-time turnover of control since it assures that the unit owners will be involved, to some extent, in the affairs of the association from a relatively early date and that some unit owners will acquire experience in dealing with association matters.

Officers and board members elected by the unit owners are required only to exercise ordinary and reasonable care. This lower standard of care should increase the willingness of unit owners to serve as officers and members of the board.

North Carolina Comment

The second sentence of subsection (a) was amended to state expressly that the executive board acts as a fiduciary to the association and not the declarant, and by adding the standard of care set out in Chapter 55 of the General Statutes for directors of business corporations.

Changes in subsection (c) were for clarification purposes. The change in subsection (d) from a period of 60 days to 120 days for the termination of declarant control was seen as a more practical period.

In subsection (b) the provision in the Uniform Act (subsection (g)) requiring a two-thirds vote was changed to a requirement of 67 percent to simplify computation.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2005-422, ss. 12 and 13, which substituted “(G.S. 47C-3-103(e) and (f))” for “(G.S. 47C-3-103(f))” in subsection (b), and added subsection (g), were effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2005-422, ss. 12 and 13, effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date, substituted “(G.S. 47C-3-103(e) and (f))” for “(G.S. 47C-3-103(f))” in subsection (b); and added subsection (g).

Session Laws 2020-52, s. 7, effective June 30, 2020, added the last sentence in subsection (a); in subsection (b), inserted “unilaterally” twice in the first sentence, and substituted “a majority vote” for “at least sixty-seven (67%) vote” in the last sentence; substituted “10 nor more than 60 days” for “14 nor more than 30 days” in the first sentence of subsection (c); and made minor stylistic changes.

CASE NOTES

Breach of Fiduciary Duty Owed to Condominium Association. —

Trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of a developer’s owners because the evidence created a genuine issue of material fact concerning the extent, if any, to which the owners breached a fiduciary duty that they owed to a condominium association by failing to disclose relevant information in their possession; the owners, as directors of the association, had an obligation to disclose material facts regarding the existence of any construction defects of which they were aware. Trillium Ridge Condo. Ass'n v. Trillium Links & Vill., LLC, 236 N.C. App. 478, 764 S.E.2d 203, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 1015 (2014).

It was error to grant a condominium association officer a directed verdict dismissing a breach of fiduciary duty claim because a breach was sufficiently alleged when an owner claimed the officer failed to maintain a separate bank account, billed for unrelated common element charges, and refused to provide full access to books and records. Ironman Med. Props., LLC v. Chodri, 268 N.C. App. 502, 836 S.E.2d 682, 2019 N.C. App. LEXIS 969 (2019).

Official Comment

1. This section deals with the issue of the extent to which obligations and liabilities imposed upon a declarant by this Act are transferred to a third party by a transfer of the declarant’s interest in a condominium. There are two parts to be [the] problem. First, what obligations and liabilities to unit owners (both existing unit owners and persons who become unit owners in the future) should a declarant retain, notwithstanding his transfer of interests. Second, what obligations and liabilities may fairly be imposed upon the declarant’s successor in interest. No present condominium state adequately addresses these issues.
2. This section strikes a balance between the obvious need to protect the interests of unit owners and the equally important need to protect innocent successors to a declarant’s rights, especially persons such as mortgagees whose only interest in the condominium project is to protect their debt security. The general scheme of the section is to impose upon a declarant continuing obligations and liabilities for promises, acts, or omissions undertaken during the period that he was in control of the condominium, while relieving a declarant who transfers all or part of his special declarant rights in a project of such responsibilities with respect to the promises, acts, or omissions of a successor over whom he has no control. Similarly, the section imposes obligations and liabilities arising after the transfer upon a non-affiliated successor to a declarant’s interests, but absolves such a transferee of responsibility for the promises, acts, or omissions of a transferor declarant over which he had no control. Finally, the section makes special provision for the interests of certain successor declarants (e.g., a mortgagee who succeeds to the rights of the declarant pursuant to a “deed in lieu of foreclosure” and who holds the project solely for transfer to another person) by relieving such persons of virtually all of the obligations and liabilities imposed upon declarants by this Act.
3. Subsection (a) provides that a successor in interest to a declarant may acquire the special rights of the declarant only by recording an instrument which reflects a transfer of those rights. This recordation requirement is important to determine the duration of the period of declarant control pursuant to Section 3-103(d) and (e), as well as to place unit owners on notice of all persons entitled to exercise the special rights of a declarant under this Act. The transfer by a declarant of all of his interest in a condominium project to a successor, without a concomitant transfer of the special rights of a declarant pursuant to this subsection, results in the automatic termination of such special declarant rights and of any period of declarant control.
4. Under subsection (b), a transferor declarant remains liable to unit owners (both existing unit owners and persons who subsequently become unit owners) for all obligations and liabilities, including warranty obligations on all improvements made by him, arising prior to the transfer. If a declarant transfers any special declarant right to an affiliate (as defined in Section 1-103(1)), the transferor remains subject to all liabilities specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (b) and, in addition, is jointly and severally liable with his successor in interest for all obligations and liabilities of the successor.
5. The obligations and liabilities imposed upon transferee declarants under the Act are set forth in subsection (e). In general, a transferee declarant (other than an affiliate of the original declarant and other than a successor whose interest in the project is solely for the protection of debt security) becomes subject to all obligations and liabilities imposed upon a declarant by the Act or by the declaration with respect to any promises, acts, or omissions undertaken subsequent to the transfer which relate to the rights he holds. Such a transferee is liable for the promises, acts, or omissions of the original declarant undertaken prior to the transfer, except as set forth in paragraph (e)(2)(ii). For example, a successor declarant would not be liable for the warranty obligations of the original declarant with respect to improvements to the project made by the original declarant. Similarly, a successor would not be liable, under normal circumstances, for any misrepresentation or breach of fiduciary duty by the original declarant prior to the transfer. The successor is liable, however, to complete improvements labeled “MUST BE BUILT” on the original plans.
6. To preclude declarants from evading their obligations and liabilities under this Act by transferring their interests to affiliated companies, paragraph (1) of subsection (e) makes clear that any successor declarant who is an affiliate of the original declarant is subject to all obligations and liabilities imposed upon the original declarant by the Act or by the declaration. Similarly, as previously noted, paragraph (2) of subsection (b) provides that an original declarant who transfers his rights to an affiliate remains jointly and severally liable with his successor for all obligations and liabilities imposed upon declarants by the Act or by the declaration.
7. The section handles the problem of certain successor declarants (i.e., persons whose sole interest in the condominium project is the protection of debt security) in three ways. First, subsection (c) provides that, in the case of a foreclosure of a mortgage, a sale by a trustee under a deed of trust, or a sale by a trustee in bankruptcy of any units owned by a declarant, any person acquiring title to all of the units being foreclosed or sold may request the transfer of special declarant rights. In that event, and only upon such request, such rights will be transferred in the instrument conveying title to the units and such transferee will thereafter become a successor declarant subject to the other provisions of this section. In the event of a foreclosure, sale by a trustee under a deed of trust, or sale by a trustee in bankruptcy of all units owned by a declarant, if the transferee of such units does not request the transfer of special declarant rights, then, under subsection (d), such special declarant rights cease to exist and any period of declarant control terminates.

Second, any person who succeeds to special declarant rights as a result of the transfers just described or by deed in lieu of foreclosure, may, pursuant to paragraph (4) of subsection (e), declare his intention (in a recorded instrument) to hold those rights solely for transfer to another person. Thereafter, such a successor may transfer all special declarant rights to a third party acquiring title to any units owned by the successor but may not, prior to such transfer, exercise any special declarant rights other than the right to control the executive board of the association in accordance with the provisions of Section 3-103(c). A successor declarant who exercises such a right is relieved of any liability under the Act except liability for any acts or omissions related to his control of the executive board of the association. This provision is designed to deal with the typical problem of a foreclosing mortgage lender who opts to bid in and obtain the project at the foreclosure sale solely for the purpose of subsequent resale. It permits such a foreclosing lender to undertake such a transaction without incurring the full burden of declarant obligations and liabilities. At the same time, the provision recognizes the need for continuing operation of the association and, to that end, permits a foreclosing lender to assume control of the association for the purpose of ensuring a smooth transition.

Third, paragraph (3) of subsection (e) provides that a successor who has only the right to maintain model units, sales offices, and signs does not thereby become subject to any obligations or liabilities as a declarant except for the obligation to provide a public offering statement and any liability resulting therefrom. This provision also is designed to protect mortgage lenders and contemplates the situation where a lender takes over a condominium project and desires to sell out existing units without making any additional improvements to the project. This provision facilitates such a transaction by relieving the mortgage lender, in that instance, from the full burden of obligations and liabilities ordinarily imposed upon a declarant under the Act.

Under Section 2-110, a declarant may reserve the right to create additional units in portions of the condominium which were originally designated as common elements. The declarant becomes the owner of any units created, but, prior to creation of units, the title to those portions of the condominium is in the unit owners. The right to create the units is an interest in land in which a security interest might be granted. If the mortgagee of that interest forecloses, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale has the choices concerning development rights and resulting liability which are described in the preceding paragraph. That is, under subsections (c) and (d), the purchaser may limit his liability by agreeing to hold the developments only for the purpose of transfer as provided by paragraph (e)(4) or may buy the rights under paragraph (c).

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act, however, in subsection (b)(1) the qualifying phrase “imposed upon him by this act” was deleted.

Subsection (d)(2) of the Uniform Act was deleted as an unnecessary restrictive provision which would serve only to reduce the value of a condominium to a prospective purchaser at a foreclosure sale.

Subsection (f) of the Uniform Act was omitted.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2015-56, s. 2, effective June 4, 2015, added the exception in the second sentence of subsection (a); in subdivision (b)(1), substituted “transfer and remains liable for warranty obligations imposed upon the transferor by this Chapter” for “transfer, including, but not limited to, liability or obligations relating to warranties” in the first sentence, and substituted “maintain” for “bring” in the second sentence; rewrote subsections (c) through (e); and added subsections (f) and (g).

Official Comment

1. This section deals with a common problem in the development of condominium projects: the temptation on the part of the developer, while in control of the association, to enter into, on behalf of the association, long-term contracts and leases with himself or with an affiliated entity.
2. In addition to contracts or leases made by a declarant with himself or with an affiliated entity, there are also certain contracts and leases so critical to the operation of the condominium and to the unit owners’ full enjoyment of their rights of ownership that they too should be voidable by the unit owners upon the expiration of any period of declarant control. At the same time, a statutorily-sanctioned right of cancellation should not be applicable to all contracts or leases which a declarant may enter into in the course of developing a condominium project. For example, a commercial tenant would not be willing to invest substantial amounts in equipment and other improvements for the operation of his business if the lease could unilaterally be cancelled by the association. Accordingly, this section provides that (subject to the exception set forth in the last sentence thereof), upon the expiration of any period of declarant control, the association may terminate without penalty, any “critical” contract (i.e., any management contract, employment contract, or lease of recreational or parking areas or facilities) entered into during a period of declarant control, any contract or lease to which the declarant or an affiliate of the declarant is a party, or any contract or lease previously entered into by the declarant which is not bona fide or which was unconscionable to the unit owners at the time entered into under the circumstances then prevailing.
3. The last sentence of the section addresses the usual leasehold condominium situation where the underlying real estate is subject to a long-term ground lease which is then submitted to the Act. Because termination of the ground lease would terminate the condominium, this sentence prevents cancellation. However, in order to avoid the possibility that recreation and other leases otherwise cancellable under subsection (a) will be restructured to come within the exception, a subjective test of “intent” is imposed. Under the test, if a declarant’s principal purpose in subjecting the leased real estate to the condominium was to prevent termination of the lease, the lease may nevertheless be terminated.

The Act deals with this problem is [in] two ways. First, Section 3-103(a) imposes upon all executive board members appointed by the declarant liability as fiduciaries of the unit owners for all of their acts or omissions as members of the board. Second, Section 3-105 provides for the termination of certain contracts and leases made during a period of declarant control.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act, however, because of a concern for persons who in good faith enter into a contract with the executive board and expend capital towards fulfilling that contract, a sentence was added to provide that any contract or lease described by the section must contain a provision that it may be terminated by the executive board elected by the unit owners upon not less than 90 days’ notice.

Legal Periodicals.

For note which examines the history and development of North Carolina law dealing with condominiums, see 66 N.C.L. Rev. 199 (1987).

CASE NOTES

Breach of Contract. —

In a dispute over a homeowners’ association’s duty to collect dues, it was error to grant the homeowners’ association summary judgment on a clubhouse’s breach of contract and breach of good faith and fair dealing claim against the association because (1) the association had a contractual obligation to collect dues for the clubhouse, (2) the association’s statements to homeowners that the association would no longer collect dues conflicted with that obligation, and (3) the association did not show the contract was unconscionable. Conleys Creek Ltd. P'ship v. Smoky Mt. Country Club Prop. Owners Ass'n, 799 S.E.2d 879, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 225 (N.C. Ct. App.), sub. op., 255 N.C. App. 236, 805 S.E.2d 147, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 740 (2017).

Official Comment

1. Because the Act does not require the recordation of bylaws, it is contemplated that unrecorded bylaws will set forth only matters relating to the internal operations of the association and various “housekeeping” matters with respect to the condominium. The Act requires specific matters to be set forth in the recorded declaration and not in the bylaws, unless the bylaws are to be recorded as an exhibit to the declaration.
2. The requirement, set forth in subsection (a)(5), that the bylaws designate which of the officers of the association has the responsibility to prepare, execute, certify, and record amendments to the declaration reflects the obligation imposed upon the association by several provisions of this Act to record such amendments in certain circumstances. These provisions include Section 1-107 (Eminent Domain), Section 2-106 (expiration of certain leases), Section 2-112 (Relocation of Boundaries Between Adjoining Units), and Section 2-113 (subdivision or conversion of units). Section 2-117(e) provides that, if no officer is designated for this purpose, it shall be the duty of the president.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act but does contain minor stylistic changes.

Official Comment

1. The Act permits the declaration to separate maintenance responsibility from ownership. This is commonly done in practice. In the absence of any provision in the declaration, maintenance responsibility follows ownership of the unit or rests with the association in the case of common elements. Under this Act, limited common elements (which might include, for example, patios, balconies, and parking spaces) are common elements. See Section 1-103(16). As a result, under subsection (a), unless the declaration requires that unit owners are responsible for the upkeep of such limited common elements, the association will be responsible for their maintenance. Under Section 3-115(c), the cost of maintenance, repair, and replacement for such limited common elements is assessed against all the units in the condominium, unless the declaration provides for such expenses to be paid only by the units benefitted. See Comment 1 to Section 2-108.
2. Under Section 2-110, a declarant may reserve the right to create units in portions of the condominium originally designated as common elements. Prior to creation of the units, title to those portions of the condominium is in the unit owners. However, under Section 3-107(b), the developer is obligated to pay all of the expenses of (including real estate taxes properly apportionable to) that real estate. As to real estate taxes, see Section 1-105(c).

North Carolina Comment

Subsections (a), (b), (c) and (e) reflect revisions in language and structure (but not substance) of the Uniform Act. Subsection (d) is new and allows the association in cases when the claim for damages to a common element is $500 or less to hold hearings before an adjudicatory panel to determine whether a unit owner or the association is responsible for the damages. The subsection provides for minimal due process for the party charged with causing the damages. The subsection also provides that the liabilities of unit owners shall be assessments secured by lien under Section 47C-3-116 and the liabilities of the association may be offset by the unit owner against sums owing the association.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2013-34, s. 1, effective April 24, 2013, added “or the limited common element assigned to his unit” in the last sentence of subsection (a); and added “or limited common element” in subsection (b).

Legal Periodicals.

For note which examines the history and development of North Carolina law dealing with condominiums, see 66 N.C.L. Rev. 199 (1987).

CASE NOTES

Marina Association Entitled to Collect Dredge Assessment. —

Pursuant to statutory provisions and the provisions of the declaration of unit ownership establishing a marina association allowed the association to levy assessments from the owners of a private boat slip at the dock of the marina for the maintenance of the common areas, including those portions of the marina basin beneath the slips. Carolina Marlin Club Marina Ass'n v. Preddy, 238 N.C. App. 215, 767 S.E.2d 604, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 1340 (2014).

North Carolina Comment

This section was added to authorize an adjudicatory hearing, when permitted by the declaration, for fines, late payments, and violations of the condominium’s rules and regulations for up to $150.00 and is similar to the provisions of G.S. 47C-3-107(d) for a hearing on minor damages.

Editor’s Note.

This section was originally enacted as G.S. 47C-3-107 A. It has been renumbered as G.S. 47C-3-107 .1 pursuant to S.L. 1997-456, s. 27 which authorized the Revisor of Statutes to renumber or reletter sections having a number or letter designation that is incompatible with the General Assembly’s computer database.

Session Laws 2005-422, s. 14, which rewrote the section, was effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2005-422, s. 14, effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date, rewrote this section.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act. The notice provision uses a period of 50 days to conform to Chapter 55A, the Nonprofit Corporation Act.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2005-422, s. 15, which added the subsection (a) designation, and added subsections (b) and (c), was effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2004-109, s. 5, effective July 17, 2004, inserted at the end of the third sentence “or sent by electronic means, including by electronic mail over the Internet, to an electronic mailing address designated in writing by the unit owner.”

Session Laws 2005-422, s. 15, effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date, added the subsection (a) designation; and added subsections (b) and (c).

Session Laws 2020-52, s. 8, effective June 30, 2020, substituted “60 days” for “50 days” in the third sentence of subsection (a).

CASE NOTES

Sufficiency of Notice. —

Regardless of whether notice of an assessment meeting was proper, the owners of a boat slip at a marina dock were bound by the approval of the assessment at a subsequent special members meeting of the marina association. Carolina Marlin Club Marina Ass'n v. Preddy, 238 N.C. App. 215, 767 S.E.2d 604, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 1340 (2014).

Official Comment

Mandatory quorum requirements lower than 50 percent for meetings of the association are often justified because of the common difficulty of inducing unit owners to attend meetings. The problem is particularly acute in the case of resort condominiums where many owners may reside elsewhere, often at considerable distances, for most of the year.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act and there was a deliberate choice for uniformity over the provisions of Chapter 55A, the Nonprofit Corporation Act.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2020-52, s. 9, effective June 30, 2020, added subsection (c).

Official Comment

Subsection (c) addresses an increasingly important matter in the governance of condominiums: the role of tenants occupying units owned by investors or other persons. Most present statutes require voting by owners in the association. However, it may be desirable to give lessees, rather than lessors, of units the right to vote on issues involving day-to-day operation both because the lessees may have a greater interest than the lessors and because it is desirable to have lessees feel they are an integral part of the condominium community.

North Carolina Comment

Subsections (a), (c) and (d) are not significantly different from the Uniform Act. In subsection (b) the words “or purports to be revocable without notice” was deleted because such a proxy was deemed to be inconceivable.

Subsection (e) was added and authorizes provision to be made in the declaration for subgroup voting when an issue is of special interest solely to members of a defined subgroup of unit owners.

Subsection (f), also added, does not allow subgroup voting when the issue to be voted upon substantially affects the overall appearance of the condominium or the living conditions of unit owners not included in the voting subgroup.

Official Comment

1. This section provides that any action in tort or contract arising out of acts or omissions of the association shall be brought against the association and not against the individual unit owners. This changes the law in states where plaintiffs are forced to name individual unit owners as the real parties in interest to any action brought against the association. The subsection also provides that a unit owner is not precluded from bringing an action in tort or contract against the association solely because he is a unit owner or a member or officer of the association.
2. In recognition of the practical control that can (and in most cases will) be exercised by a declarant over the affairs of the association during any period of declarant control permitted pursuant to Section 3-103, subsection (a) provides that the association or any unit owner shall have a right of action against the declarant for any losses (including both payment of damages and attorneys’ fees) suffered by the association or any unit owner as a result of an action based upon a tort or breach of contract arising during any period of declarant control. To assure that the decision to bring such an action can be made by an executive board free from the influence of the declarant, the subsection also provides that any statute of limitations affecting such a right of action by the association shall be tolled until the expiration of any period of declarant control.
3. If a suit based on a claim which accrued during the period of developer control is brought against the association after control of the association has passed from the developer, reasonable notice to, and grant of an opportunity to the developer to defend, are conditions to developer liability. If, however, suit is brought against the association while the developer is still in control, obviously the developer cannot later resist a suit by the association for reimbursement on the grounds of failure to notify.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act, however, references in the Uniform Act to owners of individual units were deleted. These references were felt to be unnecessary, and to diffuse the thrust of the section.

CASE NOTES

Standing Lacking. —

Condominium unit tenant and individuals had no standing to sue a condominium association or the association’s officer because these parties were not unit owners so the association and officer owed these parties no statutorily created or other fiduciary duty, and there was no privity of contract between these parties and the association. Ironman Med. Props., LLC v. Chodri, 268 N.C. App. 502, 836 S.E.2d 682, 2019 N.C. App. LEXIS 969 (2019).

Official Comment

1. Subsection (a) provides that, on agreement of unit owners holding 80% of the votes in the association, parts of the common elements may be sold or encumbered. (80% is the percentage required for termination of the condominium under Section 2-118.) This power may be exercised during the period of declarant control, but, in order to be effective, 80% of non-declarant unit owners must approve the action.
2. Subsection (b) requires that the agreement for sale or encumbrance be evidenced by the execution of an agreement in the same manner as a deed by the requisite majority of the unit owners. The agreement then must be recorded in the land records. The recorded agreement signed by the unit owners is not the conveyance itself, but is rather a supporting document which shows that the association has full power to execute a deed or mortgage. Under subsection (c), it is contemplated that the association will execute the actual instrument of conveyance. Under subsection (e), a conveyance or encumbrance of common elements may not deprive a unit owner of rights of access and support.
3. Under the condominium form of ownership, each unit owner owns a share of the common elements as an appurtenant interest to his unit and, when the unit owner mortgages his unit, he also mortgages his appurtenant interest. The unit owner himself cannot convey his unit separately from its interest in the common elements nor can he convey his common element interest separately from the unit. Therefore, if there is a mortgage or other lien against any unit, the problem arises as to whether the association under this section can convey a part of the common elements free from the mortgage interest of the unit mortgage. Subsection (f) answers that question no. Therefore, a sale or encumbrance of common elements under this section would be subject to the superior priority of any prior mortgagee on the unit unless the mortgagee releases his interest therein.

The ability to sell a portion of the common elements without termination of the condominium gives the condominium regime desirable flexibility. For example, the unit owners, some years after the initial creation of the condominium, may decide to convey away a portion of the open space which has been reserved as a part of the common elements because they no longer find the area useful or because they wish to use sale proceeds to make other improvements. Similarly, the ability to encumber common elements gives the association power to raise money for improvements through the device of mortgaging the improvements themselves. Of course, recreational improvements will frequently not be sufficient security for a loan for their construction. Nevertheless, the ability to take a security interest in such improvements may lead lenders to be more favorably disposed toward making a loan in larger amounts and at lower interest rates.

The bracketed introductory language to subsection (f) is intended to permit an enacting state to choose whether or not the declaration could vary the rule of subsection (f). If the bracketed language is included, the declaration might provide, for example, that any subsequent conveyance of specified portions of the common elements would be free of prior security interests. In that case, the security interest in the common elements held by unit mortgagees would be cut off. Since the loss of the security interest in the common elements could significantly affect mortgagees, states considering inclusion of the bracketed language probably should consult mortgagee groups. If limited to particular common element real estate such as portions of recreational area land, and if protections are provided for lender interests, the ability to convey free of prior security interests could contribute significantly to the continued economic viability of a project. Therefore, lenders may be favorable to inclusion of the bracketed language.

The declaration could protect lender interests in connection with a conveyance free of the security interests in a number of ways. For example, the declaration might provide for payment of a specified percentage of the sales price to unit mortgagees or it might provide that a specified percentage of the mortgage debt be paid to them. Also, the declaration might provide that no sale or encumbrance of common elements would be effective without the approval of a specified percentage of lenders. There are, no doubt, other devices which could afford substantial protection to lenders.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act, however, in subsection (a) a special provision is set out concerning the distribution of the proceeds of any sale of a limited common element; and subsections (d) and (f) of the Uniform Act were deleted as unnecessary.

Legal Periodicals.

For note which examines the history and development of North Carolina law dealing with condominiums, see 66 N.C.L. Rev. 199 (1987).

Official Comment

1. Subsections (a) and (b) provide that the required insurance must be maintained only to the extent reasonably available. This permits the association to comply with the insurance requirements even if certain coverages are unavailable or unreasonably expensive.
2. Subsection (b) represents a significant departure from the present law in virtually all states by requiring that the association obtain and maintain property insurance on both the common elements and the units within buildings with “stacked” units. See Comment 3. While it has been common practice in many parts of the country (either by custom or as mandated by statute) for associations to maintain property insurance on the common elements, it has generally not been the practice for the property insurance policy to cover individual units as well. However, given the great interdependence of the unit owners in the stacked unit condominium situation, mandating property insurance for the entire building is the preferable approach. Moreover, such an approach will greatly simplify claims procedures, particularly where both common elements and portions of a unit have been destroyed. If common elements and units are insured separately, the insurers could be involved in disputes as to the coverage provided by each policy.
3. The distinction between what is a common element and what is a unit with respect to the insurance coverage required by this section is complex. The definitions of common elements and a unit in Section 1-103(4) and (25) are not sufficient for this purpose. To determine the distinction between the common elements and units, one must refer first to the declaration’s section on unit boundaries. That section will define the unit boundaries. If the declaration fails to do so, the provisions of Section 2-102 apply.
4. Although “all risk” coverage is not required as to conversion buildings, but merely fire and extended coverage, this is not intended to imply that such coverage is unnecessary. “All risk” coverage is not required because it may not be appropriate in the case of an unrenovated conversion where cost is a critical factor.
5. The minimum requirement as to the amount of insurance, which is 80% of the actual cash value, should not be viewed as a recommendation; rather, the 80% is a floor. Typically, many condominium documents require insurance in an amount equal to 100% of the replacement cost of the insured property. The Act permits greater flexibility, however, inasmuch as different types of construction and varieties of projects may not require such total coverage with its attendant higher premium cost.
6. Subsection (a)(2) covers only the liability of the association, and unit owners as members, but does not cover the unit owner’s individual liability for his acts or omissions or liability for occurrences within his unit.
7. Clause (i) of the third sentence of subsection (h) would operate as follows: (1) if the condominium consists of campsites, restoration after fire damage might consist of merely resodding the area damages; (2) if the condominium consists of separate garden-type buildings, restoration after fire damage might consist of demolishing the remaining structure and paving or landscaping the area; and (3) if the condominium consists of a single highrise building, restoration may not be required (if the building is substantially destroyed) inasmuch as “a condition compatible with the remainder of the condominium” would be damaged and unrestored.
8. The scheme of this section, as set forth in subsection (h), is that any damage or destruction to any portion of the condominium must be repaired (if repairs can be made consistent with applicable safety and health laws) absent a decision to terminate the condominium or a decision by 80% of the unit owners (including the owners of any damaged units) not to rebuild. Unless a decision is made not to rebuild, any available insurance proceeds must be used to effectuate such repairs. For this reason, subsection (e) provides that any loss covered by the association’s property insurance policy shall be adjusted with the association and that the proceeds for any loss shall be payable to the association or to any insurance trustee that may be designated for such purpose. Significantly, such insurance proceeds may not be paid to any mortgagee or other outside party. This provision is necessary to insure that insurance proceeds are available to effectuate any repairs or restoration to the condominium that may be required.
9. In the case of commercial or industrial condominiums, unit owners may prefer to act as self-insurers or make other arrangements with respect to property insurance. Accordingly, subsection (i) provides that the insurance requirements of this section may be varied or waived in the case of a condominium all of the units of which are reserved exclusively for non-residential use. Such waiver or modification is not possible in the case of a mixed-use condominium, some of the units of which are used for residential purposes.

The Act does not mandate association insurance on units in town house or other arrangements in which there are no stacked units. However, if the developer wishes, the declaration may require association insurance as to units having shared walls or as to all units in the development. Many developments will have some units with horizontal boundaries and other units with no horizontal boundaries. In that case, association insurance as to the units having horizontal boundaries is required, but it is not necessary as to other units.

In summary, Section 2-102 provides that, if the declaration is silent, all non-loadbearing and non-structural portions of the walls, floors and ceilings are part of the unit, while all loadbearing and structural portions of the walls, floors and ceilings are common elements. Further, with respect to any structure partially within and partially outside of the boundaries of a unit, any portion thereof serving only that unit is a limited common element ( see definition in Section 1-103(16)), and any portion thereof serving more than one unit or any portion of the common elements is a part of the common elements. This treats and defines ownership of all portions of the electrical, plumbing and mechanical systems serving the building not entirely within the boundaries of a unit.

All spaces, interior partitions, electrical, plumbing and mechanical systems, and all other items within the boundaries of the unit which are attached to the unit boundaries, whether or not deemed fixtures under state law, are part of the unit.

Put simply, if any item is installed, constructed, repaired or replaced by the declarant or his successor in connection with the original sale of a stacked unit, the item is insured by the association. Clearly, this does not include items of personal property easily movable within the unit or easily removable from the unit (whether or not deemed a fixture under state law), such as a vase, table or other furnishings. If installed by the unit owner, the item should be insured by the unit owner. Those items, installed by the unit owner and not covered by the association policy, are called “improvements and betterments”.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act, however, minor changes have been made for the sake of clarity and minor deletions have been made to eliminate unnecessary language. The term “actual cash value” was changed to “replacement cost”.

CASE NOTES

Flood Insurance. —

Trial court erred in granting a condominium association’s motion for summary judgment in the owners’ declaratory judgment action because, while there were no genuine issue of material fact, the association was obligated to provide flood insurance for those buildings located in a flood zone inasmuch as the condominium declaration required the association to maintain insurance coverage pursuant to the Condominium Act to the extent that such insurance was “reasonably available” and to maintain property insurance against “all risks” of direct physical loss, and flood was a risk of direct physical loss that was commonly insured against for residential buildings located in a designated flood zone. Porter v. Beaverdam Run Condo. Ass'n, 259 N.C. App. 326, 815 S.E.2d 714, 2018 N.C. App. LEXIS 433 (2018).

Official Comment

Surplus funds of the association are generally used first, for the pre-payment of reserves, and remaining funds are thereafter credited to the account of unit owners or paid to them. In some cases, however, unit owners might prefer that surplus funds be used for other purposes ( e.g., the purchase of recreational equipment). Accordingly, this section permits the declaration to specify any other use of surplus funds.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

Official Comment

1. This section contemplates that a declarant might find it advantageous, particularly in the early stages of condominium development, to pay all of the expenses of the condominium himself rather than assessing each unit individually. Such a situation might arise, for example, where a declarant owns most of the units in the condominium and wishes to avoid building the costs of each unit separately and crediting payment to each unit. It might also arise in the case of a declarant who, although willing to assume all expenses of the condominium, is unwilling to make payments for replacement reserves or for other expenses which he expects will ultimately be part of the association’s budget. Subsection (a) grants the declarant such flexibility while at the same time providing that once an assessment is made against any unit, all units, including those owned by the declarant, must be assessed for their full portion of the common expense liability.
2. Under subsection (c), the declaration may provide for assessment on a basis other than the allocation made in Section 2-107 as to limited common elements, other expenses benefiting less than all units, insurance costs, and utility costs.
3. If additional units are added to a condominium after a judgment has been entered against the association, the new units are not assessed any part of the judgment debt. Since unit owners will know the assessment, and since such unpaid judgment assessments would affect the price paid by purchasers of units, it would be complicated and unnecessary to fairness to reallocate judgment assessments when new units are added.
4. Subsection (f) refers to those instances in which various provisions of this Act require that common expense liabilities be reallocated among the units of a condominium by amendment to the declaration. These provisions include Section 1-107 (Eminent Domain), Section 2-106(d) (expiration of certain leases), Section 2-110 (Exercise of Development Rights) and Section 2-113(b) (subdivision or conversion of units).

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2020-52, s. 10, effective June 30, 2020, in subsection (e), substituted “owner or occupant” for “owner” near the middle and substituted “the unit of that owner or occupant” for “his unit” at the end.

Legal Periodicals.

For note which examines the history and development of North Carolina law dealing with condominiums, see 66 N.C.L. Rev. 199 (1987).

CASE NOTES

Marina Association Entitled to Collect Dredge Assessment. —

Pursuant to statutory provisions and the provisions of the declaration of unit ownership establishing a marina association allowed the association to levy assessments from the owners of a private boat slip at the dock of the marina for the maintenance of the common areas, including those portions of the marina basin beneath the slips. Carolina Marlin Club Marina Ass'n v. Preddy, 238 N.C. App. 215, 767 S.E.2d 604, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 1340 (2014).

Official Comment

1. Subsection (a) provides that the association’s lien on a unit for unpaid assessments shall be enforceable in the same manner as mortgage liens. In addition, if the use of a power of sale pursuant to a mortgage is permitted in a particular state, the bracketed language (with an appropriate statutory citation inserted) may be used to ensure that the association’s lien for unpaid assessments may also be enforced through the power of sale device. The bracketed language requiring notice of foreclosure should be adopted only in states in which the power of sale statute does not require notice to junior lienholders.
2. To ensure prompt and efficient enforcement of the association’s lien for unpaid assessments, such liens should enjoy statutory priority over most other liens. Accordingly, subsection (a) provides that the association’s lien takes priority over all other liens and encumbrances except those recorded prior to the recordation of the declaration, those imposed for real estate taxes or other governmental assessments or charges against the unit, and first mortgages recorded before the date the assessment became delinquent. However, as to prior first mortgages, the association’s lien does have priority for 6 months’ assessments based on the periodic budget. A significant departure from existing practice, the 6 months’ priority for the assessment lien strikes an equitable balance between the need to enforce collection of unpaid assessments and the obvious necessity for protecting the priority of the security interests of mortgage lenders. As a practical matter, mortgage lenders will most likely pay the 6 months’ assessments demanded by the association rather than having the association foreclose on the unit. If the mortgage lender wishes, an escrow for assessments can be required. Since this provision may conflict with the provisions of some state statutes which forbid some lending institutions from making loans not secured by first priority liens, the law of each state should be reviewed and amended when necessary.
3. Subsection (e) makes clear that the association may have remedies short of foreclosure of its lien that can be used to collect unpaid assessments. The association, for example, might bring an action in debt or breach of contract against a recalcitrant unit owner rather than resorting to foreclosure.
4. In view of the association’s powers to enforce its lien for unpaid assessments, subsection (f) provides unit owners with a method to determine the amount presently due and owing. A unit owner may obtain a statement of any unpaid assessment, including fines and other charges enforceable as assessments under subsection (a), currently levied against his unit. The statement is binding on the association, the executive board, and every unit owner in any subsequent action to collect such unpaid assessments.
5. Units may be part of a condominium and of a larger real estate regime (see the Uniform Planned Community Act, promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1980, which would govern most associations with assessment powers). For example, a large real estate development any [may] consist of a larger planned community which contains detached single family dwellings and town houses which are not part of any condominium and a highrise building which is organized as a condominium within the planned community. In that case, the planned community association might assess the condominium units for the general maintenance expenses of the planned community and the condominium association would assess for the direct maintenance expenses of the building itself. In such a situation, subsection (c) provides that unpaid liens of the two associations have equal priority regardless of the relative time of creation of the two regimes and regardless of the time the assessments were made or become delinquent.

North Carolina Comment

This section differs from the Uniform Act and follows previous North Carolina law by requiring that liens of the owners association must be recorded to be perfected and by preserving the priority of purchase money mortgages in order to comply with requirements established by federal mortgage agencies. The act provides for automatic attorney’s fees to the prevailing party thereby enhancing the association’s ability to enforce the lien.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2005-422, s. 16, which rewrote subsection (a), added subsections (a1), (a2), (e1), (e2) and (g), and, in subsection (e), substituted “shall” for “must” in the first sentence and added the last three sentences, was effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date.

Session Laws 2011-362, s. 4, provides: “The North Carolina Real Estate Commission shall develop and make available for homebuyers a brochure about restrictive covenants. The brochure shall include an explanation that unpaid assessments, fines, fees, or charges may result in foreclosure of the owner’s property. The brochure shall be available by December 1, 2011.”

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2005-422, s. 16, effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date, rewrote subsection (a); added subsections (a1), (a2), (e1), (e2) and (g); and in subsection (e), substituted “shall” for “must” in the first sentence and added the last three sentences.

Session Laws 2006-226, s. 14(a), effective August 10, 2006, substituted “G.S. 47C-4-117” for “G.S. 47F-4-117” in the last sentence of subsection (e).

Session Laws 2009-515, s. 2, effective October 1, 2009, and applicable to claims of lien filed on or after that date, added the second through fourth sentences in subsection (a); added the third sentence in subsection (e1); and added the last four sentences in subsection (g).

Session Laws 2011-362, s. 2, effective June 27, 2011, and applicable to foreclosure actions filed on or after October 1, 2011, in subsection (a), in the next-to-last sentence, inserted “acting through the executive board,” and inserted “or” preceding “Article 2A,” and added “if the assessment remains unpaid for 90 days or more,” and added the last sentence.

Session Laws 2013-202, s. 1, effective October 1, 2013, rewrote this section.

CASE NOTES

Fine for Each Day of Continued Violation. —

Board of directors of homeowners association did not exceed its authority in levying a fine of $100 for each day plaintiff continued in violation of condominium rule, by altering the outside of her home. Stewart v. Kopp, 118 N.C. App. 161, 454 S.E.2d 672, 1995 N.C. App. LEXIS 93 , writ denied, 340 N.C. 263 , 456 S.E.2d 838, 1995 N.C. LEXIS 271 (1995).

Attorney’s fees. —

It was error to deny a claim for attorneys’ fees in a dispute between a condominium unit owner and a condominium association and the association’s officer because such an award to a prevailing party was mandatory. Ironman Med. Props., LLC v. Chodri, 268 N.C. App. 502, 836 S.E.2d 682, 2019 N.C. App. LEXIS 969 (2019).

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2013-202, s. 5, provides, “This act becomes effective October 1, 2013. Nothing in Section 2 [which enacted G.S. 47C-3-116 .1] or Section 4 [which enacted G.S. 47F-3-116 .1] of this act shall be construed as being applicable to or affecting any pending litigation.”

Official Comment

1. This section deals with the effect on unit owners of judgments against the association. The issue is not free from difficulty. Presently, in most states, if the association is organized as a corporation, the unit owners are likely to receive the insulation from liability given shareholders of a corporation, so that the judgment lienholder can satisfy his judgment only against the property of the association. On the other hand, if the association is organized as an unincorporated association, under the law of most states each unit owner would have joint and several liability on the judgment. This Act strikes a balance between the two extremes, making the judgment lien a direct lien against each individual unit, but allowing the individual unit owner to discharge the lien by payment of his pro-rata share of the judgment. The judgment would also be a lien against any property owned by the association.
2. It should be noted that, while the judgment lien runs directly against unit owners, the actual liability of the unit owner is almost identical with what it would be if the ordinary corporation rule insulating the unit owner from direct liability were applied. If the incorporated association only is liable for a judgment, it will, of course, have no assets to satisfy the judgment except whatever personal property and real estate not a part of the common elements it owns. If a checking account or other cash funds of the association are attached or garnished by the creditor, the association, in order to maintain its operations and fulfill its other obligations, will be obliged to make an additional assessment against the unit owners to cover the judgment. The same result follows if the association is to prevent the sale of other assets at an execution sale. That additional assessment would be in precisely the amount for which this Act gives a direct lien against the individual unit owners. Further, if an association which is without sufficient assets to satisfy a judgment refuses to make assessments from which the creditor can have his claim satisfied, it is very likely that a court, in a supplemental proceeding on the judgment, would direct the association to make the necessary assessments against the unit owners. Unpaid assessment made by the association constitute liens against units just as do judgments.

Therefore, whether the lien of the judgment creditor runs against the units directly, or whether the lien is only against the association which finds it necessary to make additional assessments to satisfy the judgment, the unit owner who does not pay his proportionate share will end up with a lien against his unit.

The differences, therefore, between the lien system established by Section 3-117 and the system which would be applicable if ordinary corporation rules were applied are these:

1. The unit owner can discharge his unit from the lien and free it from the possibility of being subsequently assessed by the association for the judgment by making a payment directly to the lien holder. This ability may be valuable to a unit owner who is in the process of selling or securing a mortgage on his unit during the period between the time the judgment is entered and the time the association makes a formal assessment against individual unit owners for the amount of the judgment lien.
2. The judgment creditor through his ability to threaten to foreclose the lien on an individual unit if the judgment is not paid is given some leverage over individual unit owners to encourage them to see that the association pays the judgment. Procuring an assessment through pressure on individual unit owners may be quicker and cheaper for the judgment creditor than using supplemental proceedings and having a judge order that the board of directors make the necessary assessment.

In the rare case where, under corporation law an association could avoid payment of a judgment by dissolution of the association and vesting of title to the units in the unit owners as tenants-in-common or otherwise, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws believes that that result is inappropriate, and that the unit in the condominium itself should be viewed as equity property of the association capable of being reached by judgment creditors in satisfaction of the judgment. As a matter of social policy the condominium association is in quite a different position than the ordinary corporation. The corporation statutes provide shareholders immunity from liability for debts of the corporation to encourage investment in corporations whose entrepreneurial activities in the marketplace contribute to the general wealth and well-being of society. The condominium association, in managing the affairs of the homeowners, does not serve the same entrepreneurial function. It seems reasonable, as a matter of social policy, that an individual homeowner who would be fully liable for debts incurred in the renovation and maintenance of his home or for torts caused by his failure to adequately maintain the premises should not be able to entirely avoid that liability through the device of organizing with other homeowners into a condominium association. On the other hand, it is perhaps not fair to a unit owner in a condominium regime to have all of his assets at risk based on the contracts of the association over which he has little control and as to which he has only a fractional interest or benefit.

It should be noted that, except for situations in which the association has given a mortgage or deed of trust on common elements, the judgment creditor cannot assert a lien against common elements, but is rather left to a lien against the units. That is, the judgment creditor has no power to levy on the golf course or on the swimming pool or other open spaces and sell them independently of the units to satisfy the judgment.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

Legal Periodicals.

For note which examines the history and development of North Carolina law dealing with condominiums, see 66 N.C.L. Rev. 199 (1987).

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2005-422, s. 17, which inserted the subsection (a) designation, and rewrote the second sentence and added the last three sentences of subsection (a), and added subsections (b) and (c), was effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2005-422, s. 17, effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date, in subsection (a), inserted the subsection (a) designation, rewrote the second sentence and added the last three sentences; and added subsections (b) and (c).

Session Laws 2020-90, s. 4(b), effective July 2, 2020, added the last sentence in subsection (b).

Official Comment

Based on Section 7 of the Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act, this section is intended to protect an innocent third party in its dealings with the association only when the association is acting as a trustee for the unit owners, either under Section 3-113 for insurance proceeds, or Section 2-118 following termination.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2005-422, s. 20, made this section effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2006-226, s. 14(b), effective August 10, 2006, deleted “THE” preceding “POLITICAL SIGNS” at the end of subdivision (2)b.

Legal Periodicals.

For article, “Drafting Common Interest Community Documents: Minimalism in an Era of Micromanagement,” see 30 Campbell L. Rev. 409 (2008).

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2008-143, s. 20, effective July 31, 2008, provides: “Nothing in this act shall be construed to expand or limit the authority of a unit of government or public water supply system to regulate water use from a well located outside of its jurisdiction, a well not connected to its water system, or any other private well.”

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 14.30(v), effective July 1, 2015, substituted “Secretary of Environmental Quality” for “Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources” in subdivision (1).

Official Comment

In the case of commercial and industrial condominiums, the purchaser is often more sophisticated than the purchaser of residential units and thus better able to bargain for the protections he believes necessary. While this may not always be true, no objective test can be developed which easily distinguishes those commercial purchasers who are able to protect themselves from those who, in the ordinary course of business, have not developed such sophistication. At the same time, the cost of protection imposed by Article 4 may be substantial. Accordingly, subsection (a) permits waiver or modification of Article 4 protection in condominiums where all units are restricted to non-residential use, e.g., in the case of most commercial and industrial condominiums. However, except for certain waivers of implied warranties of quality ( see Section 4-115) and certain exemptions from public offering statement and resale certificate requirements ( see subsection (b)), no express waiver of the protections of this Article with respect to the purchasers of residential units is permitted by this subsection. Accordingly, by operation of Section 1-104, the rights provided by this Article may not be waived in the case of residential purchasers. Moreover, because of the interrelated rights of residential and commercial owners in mixed-use condominiums, waiver or modification of rights conferred by this Article is restricted to purchasers in wholly non-residential condominiums.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

Official Comment

This section permits declarants to transfer responsibility for preparation of a public offering statement to successor declarants or dealers, provided the declarant furnishes the information needed by the successor or dealer to complete the statement. The person who prepares the public offering statement is liable for his own misrepresentations and material omissions. A person who delivers a public offering statement prepared by others is responsible for any such deficiencies only to the extent he knows or reasonably should have known of them.

North Carolina Comment

Subsection (c) was rewritten to provide that a declarant or realtor who delivers a public offering statement shall be liable for incorrect information regardless of who prepared the statement, and that a declarant shall be liable for errors in a public offering statement delivered and prepared by a realtor when the error was the result of the declarant’s failure to provide the required information. With that exception the section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

Official Comment

1. The best “consumer protection” that the law can provide to any purchaser is to insure that he has an opportunity to acquire an understanding of the nature of the products which he is purchasing. Such a result is difficult to achieve, however, in the case of the condominium purchaser because of the complex nature of the bundle of rights and obligations which each unit owner obtains. For this reason, the Act, adopting the approach of many so-called “second generation” condominium statutes, sets forth a lengthy list of information which must be provided to each purchaser before he contracts for a unit. This list includes a number of important matters not typically required in public offering statements under existing law. The requirement for providing the public offering statement appears in Section 4-102(c), and Section 4-108 provides purchasers with cancellation rights and imposes civil penalties upon declarants not complying with the public offering statement requirements of the Act.
2. Paragraph (a)(2) requires a general description of the condominium and, to the extent possible, the declarant’s schedule for commencement and completion of construction for all building amenities that will comprise portions of the condominium. Under Section 2-109, the declarant is obligated to label all improvements which may be made in the condominium as either “MUST BE BUILT” or “NEED NOT BE BUILT.” Under Section 4-119, the declarant is obligated to complete all improvements labeled “MUST BE BUILT.” The estimated schedule of commencement and completion of construction dates provides a standard for judging whether a declarant has complied with the requirements of Section 4-119.
3. Paragraph (4) requires the public offering statement to include copies of the declaration, bylaws, and any rules and regulations of the condominium, as well as copies of any contracts or leases to be executed by the purchaser. In addition, the paragraph requires the public offering statement to include a brief narrative description of the significant features of those documents, as well as of any management contract, leases of recreational facilities, and other sorts of contracts which may be subject to cancellation by the association after the period of declarant control expires, as provided in Section 3-105. This latter requirement is intended to encourage the preparation of brief summaries of all condominium documents in laymen’s terms, i.e., the “brief narrative description” should be more than a simple explanation of what a declaration (or other document) is, but less than an extended legal analysis duplicating the contents of the documents themselves. The summary requirement is intended to alleviate the common problem of public offering statements being drafted in lawyers’ terms and being no more comprehensible to laymen than the documents themselves.
4. The disclosure requirement of paragraph (6) is intended to eliminate the common deceptive sales practice known as “lowballing,” a practice by which a declarant intentionally underestimates the budget for the association by providing many of the services himself during the initial sales period. In such a circumstance, the declarant commonly intends that, after a certain time, these services (which might include lawn maintenance, painting, security, bookkeeping, or other services) will become expenses of the association, thereby substantially increasing the periodic common expense assessments which association members must ultimately bear. By requiring the disclosure of these services (including the projected common expense assessment attributable to each) in paragraph (6), the Act seeks to minimize “lowballing”. In order to comply fully with the provisions of paragraph (5), the declarant must calculate the budget on the basis of his best estimate of the number of units which will be part of the condominium during that budget year. This requirement as well operates to negate the effects of any attempted “lowballing”.
5. Paragraph (9) requires disclosure of any financing “offered” by the declarant. The paragraph contemplates that a declarant disclose any arrangements for financing that may have been made, including arrangements with any unaffiliated lender to provide mortgages to qualified purchasers.
6. Under paragraph (10), the declarant is required to disclose the terms of all warranties provided by the declarant (including the statutory warranties set forth in Section 4-114) and to describe any significant limitations on such warranties, the enforcement thereof, or damages which may be collectible as a result of a breach thereof. This latter requirement would necessitate a description by the declarant of any exclusions or modifications of statutory warranties undertaken pursuant to Section 4-115. The statute of limitations for warranties set forth in Section 4-116, together with any separate written agreement (as required by Section 4-116) providing for reduction of the period of such statute of limitations, must also be disclosed.
7. Paragraph (14) requires that the declarant disclose the existence of any right of first refusal or other restrictions on the uses for which or classes of persons to whom units may be sold.
8. Paragraph (15) corrects a defect common to many condominium statutes by requiring the declarant to describe the insurance coverage provided for the benefit of unit owners. See Section 3-113.
9. Under paragraph (16), the declarant is obligated to disclose any current or expected fees or charges which unit owners may be required to pay for the use of the common elements and other facilities related to the condominium. Such fees or charges might include swimming pool fees, golf course fees, or required membership fees for recreation associations. Such fees are often not disclosed to condominium purchasers and can represent a substantial addition to their monthly assessments.
10. The “financial arrangements” required to be disclosed pursuant to paragraph (17) may vary substantially from one condominium development to another. It is the intent of the paragraph to give purchasers as much information as possible with which to assess the declarant’s ability to carry out his obligations to complete the improvements. For example, if a declarant has a commitment from a bank to provide construction financing for a swimming pool when 50% of the units in the condominium are completed, that fact should be disclosed to potential purchasers.
11. In addition to the information required to be disclosed by paragraphs (1) through (18), paragraph (19) requires that the declarant disclose all other “unusual and material circumstances, features, and characteristics” of the condominium and all units therein. This requires only information which is both “unusual and material.” Thus, the provision does not require the disclosure of “material” factors which are commonly understood to be part of the condominium, e.g., the fact that a condominium has a roof, walls, doors, and windows. Similarly, the provision does not require the disclosure of “unusual” information about the condominium which is not also “material,” e.g., the fact that a condominium is the first condominium in a particular community. Information which would normally be required to be disclosed pursuant to paragraph (19) might include, to the extent that they are unusual and material, environmental conditions affecting the use or enjoyment of the condominium, features of the location of the condominium, e.g., near the end of an airport runway or a planned rendering plant, and the like.
12. The cost of preparing a public offering statement can be substantial and may, particularly in the case of small condominiums, represent a significant portion of the cost of a unit. For that reason, subsection (b) permits a declarant to exclude from a public offering statement certain information in the case of a small condominium (i.e., less than 12 units) which is not subject to development rights and which is not potentially part of a larger condominium or group of condominiums. Essentially, subsection (b) permits a declarant to exclude from a public offering statement those materials which, as a practical matter, require extended preparation effort by an attorney or engineer in addition to the normal effort which must be exerted to provide the declaration, bylaws, plats and plans, or other documents required by the Act.

North Carolina Comment

The North Carolina Act makes the following changes in the requirements relating to the contents of the public offering statement set out in subsection (a): Subdivision (4) was amended to allow the delivery of a “proposed” declaration before it has been recorded in recognition of the fact that the actual boundaries of units and buildings after construction differ from the planned boundaries; Subdivision (9) of the Uniform Act requiring information about available financing was deleted because of rapid changes in the terms of such financing and because such information would be supplied to the purchaser as a business practice; amendments to Subdivision (9) of the North Carolina Act reflects the changes to the rescission period set out in Section 47C-4-108; and, modifications reflecting the Commission’s decision to eliminate ambiguous requirements or subjective determinations in favor of more definite information.

Subsection (b) of the North Carolina Act adds a seven day rescission period after notice of a material change in the public offering statement. Subsection (c) of the Uniform Act authorizing the omission of certain information for small condominiums was deleted because it was felt that the potential cost savings did not justify the exemption.

Official Comment

This section requires disclosure in the public offering statement of the manner in which the declarant’s exercise of development rights may affect purchasers who acquire units before those rights have been fully exercised. The purpose is to put the purchaser on notice of the extent to which the exercise of those rights may alter, sometimes quite dramatically, both the physical and the legal aspects of the project. For example, the prospective purchaser may be contemplating the acquisition of a particular unit because it enjoys a view of open, undeveloped land over which the declarant has, however, reserved development rights. It may be that the boundary of the parcel as to which development rights have been reserved actually coincides with, or runs quite close to, the outer wall of the unit in question. The disclosures or statements made pursuant to paragraphs (8) and (12) of this section will indicate to the prospective purchaser the extent (if any) to which he can rely on the declarant not to do anything which would radically alter the view from the unit which he now finds so appealing.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

Official Comment

1. Time sharing has become increasingly important in recent years, particularly with respect to resort condominiums. In recognition of this fact, this section requires the disclosure of certain information with respect to time sharing.
2. Virtually all existing state condominium statutes are silent with respect to time-share ownership. The inclusion of disclosure provisions for certain forms of time sharing in this Act, however, does not imply that other law regulating time sharing is affected in any way in a state merely because that state enacts this Act.

The Uniform Law Commissioners’ Model Real Estate Time-Share Act specifies more extensive disclosures for time-share properties. A “time-share property” may include part or all of the condominium, and Section 1-109 of the Model Act governs conflicts between this Act and time-share legislation.

North Carolina Comment

Subsection (b) was added to make it clear that the purchaser of any unit is to receive the information in subsection (a) and that a purchaser of a time share must be provided the additional information required by G.S. 93A-44 .

Official Comment

1. In the case of a condominium containing one or more conversion buildings, the disclosure of additional information relating to the condition of those buildings is required in the public offering statement because of the difficulty inherent in a single purchaser attempting to determine the condition of what is likely to be an older building being renovated for the purpose of condominium sales.
2. Paragraph (a)(1) requires the person who gives the public offering statement to retain an independent architect or engineer to report on the present condition of all structural components and fixed mechanical and electrical installations in the conversion building. Such information is as useful to declarant as to the purchaser since, under the implied warranty provisions of Section 4-114, a declarant impliedly warrants all improvements made by any person to the building “before creation of the condominium” unless such improvements are specifically excluded from the implied warranty of quality pursuant to Section 4-115(b).
3. See Comment 6 to Section 2-101 concerning the meaning of “structural components” as used in paragraph (a)(1). Any material changes in the “present condition” of these systems must be reported by an amendment to the public offering statement.
4. Under paragraph (a)(3), the person required to give the public offering statement is required to provide purchasers with a list of all outstanding notices of uncured violations of building codes or other municipal regulations. The literal wording of this provision does not require disclosure of known violations of such building codes or municipal regulations (at least violations having no effect upon the structural components or fixed mechanical and electrical installations of the condominium) unless actual “notices” of such violations have been received. To the extent that outstanding notices of uncured violations do exist, the cost of curing such violations would become a liability of the unit owners or the association following transfer of the unit to a purchaser. For that reason, the estimated cost of curing any outstanding violations must also be disclosed.
5. For the same reasons set forth in the Comment to Section 4-101(a), this section does not apply to units which are restricted exclusively to nonresidential use.

North Carolina Comment

This section was amended to incorporate the requirements of Article 2 of Chapter 47A.

Official Comment

1. Some condominiums are regarded as “investment contracts” or other “securities” under federal law because they exhibit certain investment features such as mandatory rental pools. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347 (January 1973). The purpose of this section is to permit the declarant to file or deliver, in lieu of a public offering statement specifically prepared to comply with the provisions of this Act, the prospectus filed with and distributed pursuant to the regulations of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. Absent this provision, prospective purchasers of condominiums classified by the SEC as “securities” would have to be given two public offering statements, one prepared pursuant to this Act and the other prepared pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933. Not only would this result increase the declarant’s costs (and thus the price) of units, it might also reduce the likelihood of either public offering statement actually being read by prospective purchasers.
2. The bracketed language in the first sentence of this section should be inserted by states which choose to adopt the agency provisions of Article 5 of the Act. The second sentence should also be inserted by states opting to incorporate Article 5 of the Act to avoid duplicative regulation of condominiums by the agency administering the State’s securities regulation statutes.

North Carolina Comment

Subsection (a) is not significantly different from the Uniform Act. Subsection (b) was added to provide an exemption from the securities licensing requirements for licensed real estate agents.

Official Comment

1. The “cooling off” period provided to a purchaser in this section is similar to provisions in many current state condominium statutes.
2. Subsection (a) requires that each purchaser be provided with both the public offering statement and all amendments thereto prior to the time that the unit is conveyed. If there is a contract for the sale of the unit, these documents must be provided not later than the date of the contract. The section makes clear that any amendments to the public offering statement prepared between the date of any contract and the date of conveyance must also be provided to the purchaser.
3. This section does not require the delivery of a public offering statement prior to the execution by the purchaser of an agreement pursuant to which the purchaser reserves the right to buy a unit but is not contractually bound to do so. Because such agreements (frequently referred to as “non-binding reservation agreements”) may be unilaterally cancelled at any time by a prospective purchaser without penalty, they do not constitute “contract[s] of sale” within the meaning of the section.
4. The requirement set forth in subsection (a) that a purchaser be provided with subsequent amendments to the public offering statement during the period between execution of the contract for purchase and conveyance of the unit does not, in itself, extend the “cooling off” period. Indeed, the delivery of such amendments is required even if the “cooling off” period has expired. The purpose of this requirement is to assure that purchasers of units are advised of any material change in the condominium which may affect their sales contracts under general law. While many such amendments will be merely technical and will not affect the bargain that the purchaser and declarant entered into, each purchaser should be permitted to judge for himself the materiality of any change in the nature of the condominium.
5. Under the scheme set forth in this section, it is at least theoretically possible that there will be a contract for sale of the unit, and that a public offering statement will be given to the purchaser at closing just prior to conveyance. However, the available evidence suggests that such practice would be rare, and that the provision of a public offering statement moments prior to conveyance would, in itself, tend to dampen the enthusiasm of the purchaser for immediate closing. In such circumstances, under subsection (a), the purchaser would, as a matter of right, be able to extend the date of closing for 15 days from the time the public offering statement was provided. This fact, together with the generally unsatisfactory experience with mandatory “cooling off” periods such as that imposed under the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, supports the conclusion that it is inappropriate to require a minimum period of delay between delivery of a public offering statement and conveyance.
6. Under subsection (a), the failure to deliver a public offering statement before conveyance does not result in a statutory right by the purchaser to cancel the conveyance or to reconvey the unit once conveyance has occurred. Any such cancellation or reconveyance right following an actual conveyance could create serious mechanical and title problems that could not be easily resolved. The failure of the Act to provide for such cancellation or reconveyance is not, however, intended to diminish any right which a purchaser may otherwise have under general state law. For example, where it appears that a seller, by deliberately failing to disclose certain material information with respect to a transaction, substantially changed the bargain which he and the purchaser entered into, it is possible under the common law in some states that reconveyance would be an available remedy.

Even absent such resort to general law, however, the penalty provisions of subsection (c) are designed to provide a sufficient incentive to the seller to insure that the public offering statement is provided in the timely fashion required by the Act. The penalty so specified in the subsection is in addition to any right a prevailing purchaser may have under Section 4-117 to collect punitive damages and attorney’s fees in connection with his action against the declarant.

North Carolina Comment

This section was amended to expressly provide that the public offering statement is to be provided to a purchaser before a sales contract is executed. The cancellation or ‘cooling off ’ period of seven days begins on the day the contract is executed and the conveyance is not to occur until after the cancellation period.

Official Comment

1. In the case of the resale of a unit by a private unit owner who is not a declarant or a person in the business of selling real estate for his own account, a public offering statement need not be provided. See Section 4-102(c). Nevertheless, there are important facts which a purchaser should have in order to make a rational judgment about the advisability of purchasing the particular condominium unit. Accordingly, each unit owner not required to furnish a public offering statement under Section 4-102(c) and not exempt under Section 4-101(b) is required to furnish to a resale purchaser, before the execution of any contract of sale, a copy of the declaration, bylaws, and rules and regulations of the association and a variety of fiscal, insurance, and other information concerning the condominium and the unit.
2. While the obligation to provide the information required by this section rests upon each unit owner (since the purchaser is in privity only with that unit owner), the association has an obligation to provide the information to the unit owner within 10 days after a request for such information. Under Section 3-102(a)(12), the association is entitled to charge the unit owner a reasonable fee for the preparation of the certificate. Should the association fail to provide the certificate as required, the unit owner would have a right to action against the association pursuant to Section 4-117.
3. Under subsection (c), if a purchaser receives a resale certificate which fails to state the proper amount of the unpaid assessments due from the purchased unit, the purchaser is not liable for any amount greater than that disclosed in the resale certificate. Because a resale purchaser is dependent upon the association for information with respect to the outstanding assessments against the unit which he contemplates buying, it is altogether appropriate that the association should be prohibited from later collecting greater assessments than those disclosed prior to the time of the resale purchase.

North Carolina Comment

This section was rewritten to reduce the burden upon a seller in a resale situation. The Commission was of the opinion that a resale occurs in an arms length bargaining setting and the requirements placed upon the seller in such a situation seemed unjustified by the current experience in North Carolina. Finally, the Commission was unsure of the consequences of the seller’s failure to comply with the requirements of the Uniform Act.

Official Comment

1. This section applies to the sale by persons required to furnish public offering statements of residential units and of non-residential units unless waived pursuant to the provisions of Section 4-101. It does not apply, however, to resales of units between private parties. Escrow provisions are not part of the law in several jurisdictions.
2. This section provides declarant a number of choices as to the appropriate escrow agent. Whether the escrow agent must deposit the funds in an insured institutional depository, or in a particular type of account, depends on state law, or the agreement of the parties. To minimize record keeping, of course, the institutional depository could itself be the escrow agent. The section does not require a separate account for each unit, so that mingling of funds in a single escrow account would be permitted. The account may be held whether in the state where the unit is located, or in the enacting state, in recognition that buyers are often from outside the state where the unit is located.
3. The escrow requirements of this section apply in connection with any deposit made by a purchaser, whether such deposit is made pursuant to a binding contract or pursuant to a non-binding reservation agreement (with respect to which no public offering statement is required under Section 4-101(b)(6)).
4. In some states current practice permits escrows to be held by certain title insurance or escrow companies, attorneys, or real estate brokers. Accordingly, the bracketed language should be included or deleted in accordance with local practice.
5. Under this section, any interest earned on an escrow deposit may, but need not, be credited to the purchaser at closing, added to any deposit forfeited to the seller, or added to any deposit refunded to the purchaser. In short, disposition of any interest is left to agreement of the parties.
6. In some states, such as New York, the substitution of a bond in place of a deposit escrow is permitted. The evidence indicates, however, that in many instances the use of the bonding device has forced purchasers to incur substantial costs and delay prior to obtaining refunds to which they are entitled. For this reason, this Act does not include bonding as an alternative to the required escrow of deposits.

North Carolina Comment

This section was rewritten to make it clear that the escrow period referred to is the period during which the purchaser has the right to cancel. The last sentence of subsection (a) is to negate any reference or argument in favor of ownership or right of possession to the deposit on the part of anyone other than the purchaser. Subsection (b) provides that the parties can contract for the disposition of other payments made prior to the closing.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2015-93, s. 1, effective June 19, 2015, substituted “a federally insured depository institution lawfully doing business in this State” for “an insured bank or savings and loan association in North Carolina” in subsection (a).

Session Laws 2017-25, s. 2(c), effective June 2, 2017, in the first sentence of subsection (a) substituted “or a trust institution authorized to do business in this State” for “lawfully doing business in this State” and “the” for “such” following “shall remain in.”

CASE NOTES

Evidence Regarding Requirement. —

Deposit money given to reserve a condominium unit under this section was still rightfully owned by the purchaser and was required to be placed in escrow. It follows that it was not error for the trial judge to deny defendant’s motion in limine to exclude evidence indicating such a requirement. State v. Rupe, 109 N.C. App. 601, 428 S.E.2d 480, 1993 N.C. App. LEXIS 364 (1993).

Testimony Regarding Absence of Criminal Sanctions. —

Trial judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to admit the testimony of detective that a violation of this section is not subject to criminal sanctions. State v. Rupe, 109 N.C. App. 601, 428 S.E.2d 480, 1993 N.C. App. LEXIS 364 (1993).

Applicability in Bankruptcy. —

With respect to purchase contracts for condominium units developed by a party that went into bankruptcy, the purchase contracts did not offer a basis upon which to support fraudulent use of deposit amounts by the debtor because the deposit limitations and requirements imposed by G.S. 47C-4-110 applied to the earnest money deposits at issue only during the seven-day cancellation period. Cooper v. BB Syndication Servs. (In re 222 S. Caldwell St., Ltd. P'ship), 409 B.R. 770, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2234 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.), amended, 409 B.R. 770, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3106 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2009).

Official Comment

The exemption for withdrawable real estate set forth in subsection (a) is designed to preserve flexibility for the declarant in terms of financing arrangements. Theoretically, a developer might partially avoid the lien release requirement of subsection (a) by placing part of the common element improvements such as a swimming pool or tennis court on withdrawable real estate. By doing so, it could separately mortgage that part of the common elements without being obligated to discharge the mortgage or secure partial releases when individual units are sold. (However, even if there were no withdrawable real estate exemption from the release of lien requirement, developers could still separately mortgage such improvements as pools and tennis courts without having to discharge the mortgage on sale of units. All they would have to do is leave the particular real estate out of the condominium and then convey it directly to the association subject to the mortgage.)

If a mortgage or other lien created by or arising against the developer attaches to withdrawable real estate after the declaration has been recorded, a lapse of the developer’s right to withdraw the real estate would also terminate the rights of the lienor, since the lien would attach only to the developer’s interest (the right to withdraw). However, an alert lienor would not permit the right to withdraw to lapse without taking steps to see that the right to withdraw is exercised. If the mortgage or other lien attached to the real estate and was perfected before the condominium declaration was recorded, lapse of the right to withdraw would not affect the lienor’s rights and it could foreclose on the real estate whether or not the developer had lost the right to withdraw. As a practical matter, whether the mortgage or other lien against withdrawable real estate arises before or after the declaration is recorded, unit owners may find that, if the association does not release liens on withdrawable real estate containing common elements, the lienor will be able to withdraw the land and deprive the unit owners of its use. Therefore, unit purchasers and their counsel should be alert to that possibility.

If units are created in withdrawable real estate, the units, when sold, are subject to the release-of-lien rule of subsection (b)(1) and after a unit in a particular withdrawable parcel is sold, that parcel can no longer be withdrawn. In that case, any lien created by or arising against the developer which attached to the real estate and is subordinate to the condominium declaration would automatically expire.

Editor’s Note.

G.S. 44A-16(5) and (6), referred to in subsection (a), are now designated as G.S. 44A-16(a)(5) and (a)(6), pursuant to Session Laws 2011-411, s. 3, effective September 15, 2011.

Official Comment

1. This section, together with Sections 4-114, 4-115, and 4-116, are adapted from the real estate warranty provisions contained in the Uniform Land Transactions Act (ULTA).
2. This section, which parallels Section 2-308 of ULTA, deals with express warranties, that is, with the expectations of the purchaser created by particular conduct of the declarant in connection with inducement of the sale. It is based on the principle that, once it is established that the declarant has acted so as to create particular expectations in the purchaser, warranty should be found unless it is clear that, prior to the time of final agreement, the declarant has negated the conduct which created the expectation.
3. Subsection (b) makes it clear that no specific intention to make a warranty is necessary if any of the factors mentioned in subsection (a) are made part of the basis of the bargain between the parties. In actual practice, representations made by a declarant concerning condominium property during the bargaining process are typically regarded as a part of the description. Therefore, no particular reliance on the representations need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement. Rather, the burden is on the declarant to show that representations made in the bargaining process were not relied upon by the purchaser at the time of contracting.
4. Subsection (a)(1) provides that representations as to improvements and facilities not located in the condominium may create express warranties. Declarants often assert that recreational facilities, such as swimming pools, golf courses, tennis courts, etc., will be constructed in the future and that unit owners will have the right to utilize such facilities once constructed. Such assertions are intended to be included within the language “have the benefit of facilities not located in the condominium.” If, under the circumstances, such improvements would benefit the unit being sold, then the declarant may be liable for breach of express warranty if they are not completed. Such liability is distinct from the declarant’s obligations, under Section 4-119, to complete all improvements labeled “MUST BE BUILT” on plats and plans.
5. Under subsection (a)(4), a contract provision permitting the purchaser to use a condominium unit only for a specified use or uses creates an express warranty that the unit may lawfully be used for that purpose. Therefore, if there is a limitation on use, the resulting express warranty could not be disclaimed by a disclaimer of implied warranties under Section 4-115.
6. The precise time when representations set forth in subsection (a) are made is not material. The sole question is whether the language or other representations of the declarant are fairly to be regarded as part of the contract between the parties.
7. Subsection (b) makes clear that it is not necessary to the existence of a warranty that the declarant have intended to assume a warranty obligation. On the other hand, mere statements of opinion or commendations by the declarant do not necessarily create warranties. Whether a particular statement purports to be merely opinion or commendation is basically a question of whether the purchaser could reasonably rely upon the statement as a meaningful representation or promise with respect to the condominium. That determination depends, in turn, not merely upon the words used but also upon the relative characteristics and skills of the parties. Thus a representation by a declarant to a novice purchaser that a particular condominium unit is in “good condition” may be more than mere opinion or commendation, while the same statement by a novice seller to a professional buyer would likely be only opinion or commendation, and thus not a warranty.
8. The provision of subsection (c) that the conveyance of a unit transfers to the purchaser all express warranties made by prior declarants is intended, in part, to avoid the possibility that a declarant could negate his warranty obligations through the device of transferring a unit through a shell entity to the ultimate purchaser.

North Carolina Comment

The North Carolina Act rewrote this section to provide that the North Carolina express warranty law applicable to single family residential dwellings should also be applicable to condominiums. The Commission was persuaded that the law of North Carolina (based upon a theory of negligence as opposed to contract) provides as much protection to a purchaser as the express warranty provisions of the Uniform Act, see Oates v. JAG, Inc., 314 N.C. 276 , 333 S.E.2d 222 (1985).

Official Comment

1. This section, which is based upon Section 2-309 of ULTA, overturns the rule still applied in many states that a professional seller of real estate makes no implied warranties of quality (the rule of “caveat emptor”). In recent years, that rule has been increasingly recognized as a relic of an earlier age whose continued existence defeats reasonable expectations of purchasers. Since the 1930’s, more and more courts have completely or partially abolished the caveat emptor rule, and it is clear that the judicial tide is now running in favor of seller liability.
2. The principal warranty imposed under this section is that of suitability of both the unit and common elements for ordinary uses of real estate of similar type, and of quality of construction. Both of these warranties, which arise under subsection (b), are imposed only against declarants and not against unit owners selling their units to others.
3. Many recent cases have held that a seller of new housing impliedly warrants that the houses sold are habitable. The warranty of suitability under this Act is similar to the warranty of habitability. However, under the Act, the warranty of suitability applies to both units and common elements in both commercial and residential condominiums. If, for example, a commercial unit is sold for commercial use although it is not suitable for the ordinary uses of condominium units of that type, the warranty of suitability has been breached. Moreover, this warranty of suitability arises in the case of used, as well as new, buildings or other improvements in the condominium.
4. The warranty of suitability and of quality of construction arises only against a declarant and persons in the business of selling real estate for their own account. As in the case of sales of goods, a non-professional seller is liable, if at all, only for any express warranties made by him. However, if a non-professional seller fails to disclose defects of which he is aware, he may be liable to the purchaser for fraud or misrepresentation under the common law of the state where the transaction occurred. Also, the warranties imposed by this section may be used to give content to a general “guarantee” by a non-professional seller.
5. The warranty as to quality of construction for improvements made or contracted for by the declarant or made by any person before the creation of the condominium is broader than the warranty of suitability. Particularly, it imposes liability for defects which may not be so serious as to render the condominium unsuitable for ordinary purposes of real estate of similar type. Moreover, subsection (e) prevents a declarant from avoiding liability with respect to the quality of construction warranty by having an affiliated entity make the desired improvements.
6. Under subsection (c), a declarant also warrants to a residential purchaser that an existing use contemplated by the parties does not violate applicable law. The declarant, therefore, is liable for any violation of housing codes or other laws which renders any existing use of the condominium unlawful.
7. The issue of declarant liability for warranties is an important one in cases where a transfer of the declarant’s rights occurs, either as an arm’s length transaction, as a transfer to an affiliate, or as a transfer by foreclosure or a deed in lieu of foreclosure. Subsection (f) makes clear that a conveyance of a unit transfers to the purchaser all warranties of quality made by any declarant, and Section 3-104(b)(1) makes clear that the original declarant remains liable for all warranties of quality with respect to improvements made by him, even after he transfers all declarant rights, regardless of whether the unit is purchased from the declarant who made the improvements. If the successor declarant is an affiliate of the original declarant, it is clear, under both Sections 3-104(b)(2) and 4-114(f), that the original declarant remains liable for warranties of quality or improvements made by his successor even after the declarant himself ceases to have any special declarant rights.
8. As to the liabilities of successor declarants for warranties of quality, a successor who is an affiliate of a declarant is liable, pursuant to Section 3-104(e)(1), for warranties or improvements made by his predecessor. However, any non-affiliated successor of the original declarant is liable only for warranties of quality for improvements made or contracted for by him, and is not liable for warranties which may lie against the original declarant even if the successor sells units completed by the original declarant to a purchaser. See Section 3-104(e)(2). In the case of a foreclosing lender, this is the same result as that reached under Section 2-309(f) of ULTA. The same result is also reached under ULTA in the case of a successor who, under ULTA Section 3-309(b), would be a seller in the business of selling real estate since under that subsection the seller is liable only for warranties or improvements made or contracted for by him.

North Carolina Comment

This section was rewritten to provide that the implied warranty law of North Carolina applicable to single family residential dwellings should also be applicable to condominiums. The Commission was of the belief that the common law of North Carolina provides adequate protection to purchasers of condominiums, see North Carolina commentary to G.S. 47C-4-113 , and that the law in this area is evolving through the courts.

Legal Periodicals.

For comment, “From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Equity — The Implied Warranty of Quality Under the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act,” see 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 571 (1992).

Official Comment

1. This section parallels Section 2-311(b) and (c) of ULTA.
2. Under this section, implied warranties of quality may be disclaimed. However, a warranty disclaimer clause, like any other contract clause, is subject to a possible court holding of unconscionability. Although the section imposes no requirement that a disclaimer be in writing, except in the case of residential units, an oral disclaimer might be ineffective under the law of parole and extrinsic evidence.
3. Except as against purchasers of residential units, there are no formal standards for the effectiveness of a disclaimer clause. All that is necessary under this section is that the disclaimer be calculated to effectively notify the purchaser of the nature of the disclaimer.
4. Under subsection (b), general disclaimers of implied warranties are not permitted with respect to purchasers of residential units. However, a declarant may disclaim liability for a specified defect or a specified failure to comply with applicable law in an instrument signed by such a purchaser. The requirement that the disclaimer as to each defect or failure be in a signed instrument is designed to insure that the declarant sufficiently calls each defect or failure to the purchaser’s attention and that the purchaser has the opportunity to consider the effect of the particular defect or failure upon the bargain of the parties. Consequently, this section imposes a special burden upon the declarant who desires to make a “laundry list” of defects or failures by requiring him to emphasize each item on such a list and make its import clear to prospective purchasers. For example, the declarant of a conversion condominium might, consistent with this subsection, disclaim certain warranties for “all electrical wiring and fixtures in the building, the furnace, all materials comprising or supporting the roof, and all components of the air conditioning system.”
5. This section is not intended to be inconsistent with, or to prevent, the use of insured warranty programs offered by some home builders. However, under the Act, the implied warranty that a new condominium unit will be suitable for ordinary uses (i.e., habitable) and will be constructed in a sound, workmanlike manner, and free of defective materials, cannot be disclaimed by general language.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

CASE NOTES

Breach of Warranty. —

Trial court erred in granting a developer summary judgment as to a condominium association’s breach of warranty claims on statute of limitations or statute of repose grounds because there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning the date the association knew or reasonably should have known of the existence of the construction defects; there were also genuine issues of material fact concerning the extent to which the developer knew of the defects in the construction of the condominiums. Trillium Ridge Condo. Ass'n v. Trillium Links & Vill., LLC, 236 N.C. App. 478, 764 S.E.2d 203, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 1015 (2014).

Official Comment

1. Under subsection (a), the parties may agree that the statute of limitations be reduced to as little as 2 years. However, such a contract provision (which, in the case of residential units, must be reflected in a separate written instrument executed by the purchaser) could, like other contract provisions, be subject to attack on grounds of unconscionability in particular cases.
2. Except for warranties of quality which explicitly refer to future performance or duration, a cause of action for breach of a warranty of quality would normally arise when the purchaser to whom it is first made enters into possession. Suit on such a warranty would thus have to be brought within 6 years thereafter. Even an inability to discover the breach would not delay the running of the statute of limitations in this regard.
3. Real estate sales frequently include warranties that certain components (e.g., furnaces, hot water heaters, air conditioning systems, and roofs) will last for a particular period of time. In the case of such warranties, the statute of limitations would not start running until the breach is discovered, or, if not discovered before the end of the warranty term, until the end of the term.

North Carolina Comment

Subsection (a) of the North Carolina Act reflects the Commission’s belief that the general statute of limitations provisions of North Carolina law should apply to condominiums.

Official Comment

This section provides a general clause of action or claim for relief for failure to comply with the Act by either a declarant or any other person subject to the Act’s provisions. Such persons might include unit owners, persons exercising a declarant’s rights of appointment pursuant to Section 3-103(d), or the association itself. A claim for appropriate relief might include damages, injunctive relief, specific performance, rescission or reconveyance if appropriate under the law of the state, or any other remedy normally available under state law. The section specifically refers to “any person or class of persons” to indicate that any relief available under the state class action statute would be available in circumstances where a failure to comply with this Act has occurred. This section specifically permits punitive damages to be awarded in the case of willful failure to comply with the Act and also permits attorney’s fees to be awarded in the discretion of the court to any party that prevails in an action.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act, however, the reference to punitive damages was deleted. The Commission was of the opinion that punitive damages or other deterrent provisions of law (e.g. treble damages for unfair trade practices) should be applied within the context of the general law of the state of North Carolina which is expressly made applicable to condominiums in G.S. 47C-1-108 .

CASE NOTES

Attorney’s Fees. —

Had the General Assembly wished that the recovery of attorney’s fees under the Condominium Act be governed by G.S. 6-21.2 , they could have included language to that effect. This section is a subsequently enacted, more specific statute which will be used. Brookwood Unit Ownership Ass'n v. Delon, 124 N.C. App. 446, 477 S.E.2d 225, 1996 N.C. App. LEXIS 1077 (1996).

Denial of plaintiffs’ claim for attorney’s fees in their action for the right to review financial records of an incorporated homeowners’ association and for declaratory judgments that they could attend board meetings and non-owners could not be on association committees was not an abuse of discretion; although the trial court judge did not provide findings of fact or conclusions of law, the decision was not unsupported by reason. Rosenstadt v. Queens Towers Homeowners' Ass'n, 177 N.C. App. 273, 628 S.E.2d 431, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 844 (2006).

When condominium unit owners contested a condominium association’s imposition of a lien on the owners’ unit for an alleged failure to pay an assessment for improvements, it was error for a trial court to award the owners attorney’s fees because, prior to such award, the condominium association filed a notice of appeal of the trial court’s order dismissing the association’s suit so the trial court no longer had jurisdiction under G.S. 1-294 to award fees as the issue of attorneys’ fees was not a matter included in the action and not affected by the judgment appealed from. In re Proposed Foreclosure of Claim of Lien Filed Against Johnson, 212 N.C. App. 535, 714 S.E.2d 169, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1176 (2011), aff'd, 366 N.C. 252 , 741 S.E.2d 308, 2012 N.C. LEXIS 831 (2012).

Boat slip owners’ argument against the award of attorney’s fees to a marina association was premised on the reversal of the trial court’s judgment for the association. Because the appellate court upheld the trial court’s judgment, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the award of attorney’s fees for the association. Carolina Marlin Club Marina Ass'n v. Preddy, 238 N.C. App. 215, 767 S.E.2d 604, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 1340 (2014).

G.S. 47C-4-117 is a non-remedial grant to award attorney’s fees, and may thereby be construed broadly to allow an award including fees incurred on appeal. Chapter 47C of the North Carolina General Statutes contains the North Carolina Condominium Act, including a specific grant of authority to award attorney’s fees in actions under the Chapter. Ocracomax, LLC v. Davis, 256 N.C. App. 496, 808 S.E.2d 573, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 971 (2017).

It is clear from the position of G.S. 47C-4-117 within Chapter 47C, and the granting language as a whole, that the statute was designed to convey the ability to prosecute an action notwithstanding the threat of overbearing fees, whether at the trial level or the appellate level. Ocracomax, LLC v. Davis, 256 N.C. App. 496, 808 S.E.2d 573, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 971 (2017).

Trial court acted within its sound discretion in determining the amount of attorney’s fees and costs and taxing them against the condominium residents where the underlying judgment was not conclusive as to how costs were to be allocated among defendants, and G.S. 47C-4-117 allowed reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party. Ocracomax, LLC v. Davis, 256 N.C. App. 496, 808 S.E.2d 573, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 971 (2017).

Official Comment

1. Section 2-109(c) requires that the plats and plans for every condominium indicate whether or not any improvement that might be built in the condominium must be built. However, Section 4-103 does not require that copies of the plats and plans be provided to purchasers as part of the public offering statement. Consequently, this section requiring the labeling of improvements depicted on promotional material is necessary to assure that purchasers are not deceived with respect to which improvements the declarant is obligated to make in a particular condominium project.
2. Since no contemplated improvements on real estate subject to development rights need be shown on plats and plans, additional labeling is required by this section to insure that, if the declarant shows any contemplated improvements in his promotional material which are not shown on the plats and plans, those improvements must also be appropriately labeled.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

Official Comment

1. Subsection (a) requires the declarant to complete any improvement which the plats or plans indicate, pursuant to the requirements of Section 2-109(c), “MUST BE BUILT.” This is a fundamental obligation of the declarant and is one with which a successor declarant is obligated to comply under Section 3-104.
2. Under subsection (b), in the event that a declarant exercises the right to use an easement which is created by Section 2-116, or in the event the declarant maintains model units or signs on the condominium, the declarant is obligated to restore the portions of the condominiums used to a condition compatible with the remainder of the condominium.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

Official Comment

The purpose of this section, complemented by Section 4-110, is to assure that the declarant is not able to obtain use of the purchaser’s money until the purchaser is able to get a completed unit.

North Carolina Comment

This section is not significantly different from the Uniform Act.

Editor’s Note.

Chapter 83, referred to in this section, was rewritten by Session Laws 1979, c. 871, s. 1 and has been recodified as Chapter 83A.