Article 1. General Provisions.

§ 47F-1-101. Short title.

This Chapter shall be known and may be cited as the North Carolina Planned Community Act.

History. 1998-199, s. 1.

North Carolina Comment

  1. This Act is based, in part, on the provisions of the Uniform Planned Community Act. Many sections, however, have been substantially revised from those that appear in the Uniform Act. Some other sections marked “Reserved” contained provisions which were included in the Uniform Act but were deemed inappropriate for inclusion in this Act. Because of these differences, the Official Comments to the Uniform Act have not been included.
  2. It is understood and intended that any development which incorporates or permits horizontal boundaries or divisions between the physical portions of the planned community designated for separate ownership or occupancy will be created under and governed by the North Carolina Condominium Act and not this Act.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 1998-199, s. 1, originally enacted this Chapter as 47E, since Chapter 47E already existed this Chapter has been renumbered as 47F at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.

Session Laws 2017-110, s. 20 provides: “The Legislative Research Commission shall study the creation of a process for the mediation and arbitration of disputes between the owners of property located in a homeowners or property owners association and the governing entities of such homeowners or property owners associations. The Legislative Research Commission shall report its findings and recommendations to the 2018 Regular Session of the 2017 General Assembly when it convenes.”

Legal Periodicals.

For article discussing the changes and effects of North Carolina Planned Community Act, see 22 Campbell L. Rev. 1 (1999).

For article, “Wise v. Harrington Grove Community Association, Inc.: A Pickwickian Critique,” see 27 Campbell L. Rev. 139 (2005).

For comment, “The Road Not Often Taken: Alternative Dispute Resolution for Common Interest Communities in North Carolina,” see 30 Campbell L. Rev. 315 (2008).

CASE NOTES

Power of Homeowners’ Association Not Covered by Act. —

In a community that was not subject to the North Carolina Planned Community Act, the homeowners’ association’s amendment to the declaration of restrictive covenants to provide almost unlimited power to assess lot owners was unreasonable; the amendment exceeded the original intent of the contracting parties, as the original declaration provided no such authority, and the community had public roads, no common areas, and no amenities. Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners Ass'n, 360 N.C. 547 , 633 S.E.2d 78, 2006 N.C. LEXIS 845 (2006).

Where a community is not governed by the North Carolina Planned Community Act, amendments to a declaration of restrictive covenants must be reasonable; reasonableness may be ascertained from the language of the declaration, deeds, and plats, together with other objective circumstances surrounding the parties’ bargain, including the nature and character of the community. Armstrong v. Ledges Homeowners Ass'n, 360 N.C. 547 , 633 S.E.2d 78, 2006 N.C. LEXIS 845 (2006).

§ 47F-1-102. Applicability.

  1. This Chapter applies to all planned communities created within this State on or after January 1, 1999, except as otherwise provided in this section.
  2. This Chapter does not apply to a planned community created within this State on or after January 1, 1999:
    1. Which contains no more than 20 lots (including all lots which may be added or created by the exercise of development rights) unless the declaration provides or is amended to provide that this Chapter does apply to that planned community; or
    2. In which all lots are restricted exclusively to nonresidential purposes, unless the declaration provides or is amended to provide that this Chapter does apply to that planned community.
  3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, G.S. 47F-1-104 (Variation), G.S. 47F-2-103 (Construction and validity of declaration and bylaws), G.S. 47F-2-117 (Amendment of declaration), G.S. 47F-3-102(1) through (6) and (11) through (17)(Powers of owners’ association), G.S. 47F-3-103(f) (Executive board members and officers), G.S. 47F-3-107 (a), (b), and (c)(Upkeep of planned community; responsibility and assessments for damages), G.S. 47F-3-107 .1 (Procedures for fines and suspension of planned community privileges or services), G.S. 47F-3-108 (Meetings), G.S. 47F-3-115 (Assessments for common expenses), G.S. 47F-3-116 (Lien for assessments), G.S. 47F-3-118 (Association records), and G.S. 47F-3-121 (American and State flags and political sign displays), and G.S. 47F-3-104 (Transfer of Special Declarant Rights) apply to all planned communities created in this State before January 1, 1999, unless the articles of incorporation or the declaration expressly provides to the contrary, and G.S. 47F-3-120 (Declaration limits on attorneys’ fees) applies to all planned communities created in this State before January 1, 1999. These sections apply only with respect to events and circumstances occurring on or after January 1, 1999, and do not invalidate existing provisions of the declaration, bylaws, or plats and plans of those planned communities. G.S. 47F-1-103 (Definitions) also applies to all planned communities created in this State before January 1, 1999, to the extent necessary in construing any of the preceding sections.
  4. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (c) of this section, any planned community created prior to January 1, 1999, may elect to make the provisions of this Chapter applicable to it by amending its declaration to provide that this Chapter shall apply to that planned community. The amendment may be made by affirmative vote or written agreement signed by lot owners of lots to which at least sixty-seven percent (67%) of the votes in the association are allocated or any smaller majority the declaration specifies. To the extent the procedures and requirements for amendment in the declaration conflict with the provisions of this subsection, this subsection shall control with respect to any amendment to provide that this Chapter applies to that planned community.
  5. This Chapter does not apply to planned communities or lots located outside this State.

History. 1998-199, s. 1; 2002-112, s. 2; 2004-109, s. 3; 2005-214, s. 1; 2005-422, s. 9; 2006-226, s. 15(a); 2013-34, s. 6; 2014-57, s. 1.

North Carolina Comment

The Act is effective January 1, 1999 and applies in its entirety to all planned communities created on or after that date except as provided in subsection (b). G.S. 47F-3-102 (1) through (6) and (11) through (17), G.S. 47F-3-107(a), (b) and (c), G.S. 47F-3-115 and G.S. 47F-3-116 also apply to planned communities created prior to January 1, 1999. Subsection (d) provides the process through which planned communities created prior to January 1, 1999 can make all provisions of the Act applicable to them.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 1998-199, s. 3, provided: “This act [Session Laws 1998-199, which in s. 1 enacted Chapter 47F] becomes effective January 1, 1999, and applies to planned communities created on or after that date. G.S. 47F-3-102(1) through (6) and (11) through (17), G.S. 47F-3-107(a), (b), and (c), G.S. 47F-3-115 , and G.S. 47F-3-116 as enacted by Section 1 of this act apply to planned communities created prior to the effective date, except that the provisions of G.S. 47F-3-116 (e) as enacted by Section 1 of this act, apply to actions arising on or after the effective date.” Session Laws 2002-112, s. 3, amended Session Laws 1998-199, s. 3, to read as follows: “This act becomes effective January 1, 1999.”

Session Laws 2014-57, s. 4, provides, in part: “Nothing in this act shall be construed as being applicable to or affecting any pending litigation, except that the last sentence of G.S. 47F-3-104(c) shall be applicable to any mortgage, deed of trust, tax lien, or other conveyance providing for foreclosure recorded on or after January 1, 1999.”

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2004-109, s. 3, effective July 17, 2004, inserted “unless the articles of incorporation or the declaration expressly provides to the contrary” at the end of the first sentence of subsection (c).

Session Laws 2005-422, s. 9, effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date, in subsection (c), inserted references to G.S. 47F-3-107 .1, 47F-3-108, 47F-3-118, and 47C-3-121.

Session Laws 2006-226, s. 15(a), effective August 10, 2006, substituted “G.S. 47F-3-121” for “G.S. 47C-3-121” in the first sentence of subsection (c).

Session Laws 2013-34, s. 6, effective April 24, 2013, inserted “G.S. 47F-1-104 (Variation), G.S. 47F-2-103 (Construction and validity of declaration and bylaws), G.S. 47F-2-117 (Amendment of declaration)” in the first sentence of subsection (c).

Session Laws 2014-57, s. 1, effective July 7, 2014, added “and G.S. 47F-3-104 (Transfer of Special Declarant Rights)” following “political sign displays)” near the middle of subsection (c).

CASE NOTES

Substantive Due Process. —

When a homeowner’s association fined homeowners under G.S. 47F-3-102 and G.S. 47F-3-107 .1 as provided for by G.S. 47F-1-102(c) for doing construction that the association’s architectural committee disapproved, the retroactive application of these statutes to the homeowners did not violate the homeowners’ rights to substantive due process because the Planned Community Act, ch. 47F, of which these statutes were a part, served the legitimate purpose of providing a statutory framework for dealing with modern real estate developments and the statutes were rationally related to that purpose. Reidy v. Whitehart Ass'n, 185 N.C. App. 76, 648 S.E.2d 265, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1740 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1243, 128 S. Ct. 1484, 170 L. Ed. 2d 298, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2250 (2008).

Application to Pre-1999 Planned Communities. —

G.S. 47F-2-117 applies to pre-1999 formed planned communities where (1) either the terms of the declaration or articles of incorporation do not expressly provide to the contrary pursuant to G.S. 47F-1-102(c) , or (2) the association has adopted the terms of the Planned Community Act pursuant to G.S. 47F-1-102(d) . Kimler v. Crossings at Sugar Hill Prop. Owner's Ass'n, 248 N.C. App. 518, 789 S.E.2d 507, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 827 (2016).

Recreational association was entitled to relief from the automatic stay in a Chapter 13 case to pursue its interest in the debtor’s real property; the association was not subject to the notice requirements of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002.1 because it did not hold a secured claim in the debtor’s residence, as the association did not perfect its security interest as required by G.S. 47F-3-116 and the language of the association’s declaration was not contradictory to G.S. 47F-3-116 . In re Gregory, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 3681 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Dec. 4, 2020).

Summary judgment for non-profit property management company was proper in a property owner’s suit under the Planned Community Act because the property owner had not asserted any events or circumstances occurring after January 1, 1999 to invoke the retroactive provisions of the statute, so the Act did not apply. Davis v. Lake Junaluska Assembly, Inc., 868 S.E.2d 667, 2022- NCCOA-28, 2022 N.C. App. LEXIS 27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2022).

Contracts Clause. —

When a homeowner’s association fined homeowners under G.S. 47F-3-102 and G.S. 47F-3-107 .1 as provided for by G.S. 47F-1-102(c) for doing construction that the association’s architectural committee disapproved, the retroactive application of these statutes to the homeowners did not violate the contracts clause in U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 1, because this application did not disturb a vested right, impair a binding contract, or create a new obligation, as it only provided an additional remedy to enforce a declaration regarding the homeowners’ development. Reidy v. Whitehart Ass'n, 185 N.C. App. 76, 648 S.E.2d 265, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1740 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1243, 128 S. Ct. 1484, 170 L. Ed. 2d 298, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2250 (2008).

Scope of Authority of Homeowners’ Association. —

Homeowners’ association did not act beyond the scope of its authority in its pro rata disbursement to its members of the balance of a litigation fund from the settlement of a lawsuit between the association and one of the residents of the subdivision community. The association also did not commit ultra vires acts by constructing and maintaining a security gate, as well as installing a video camera, at the entrance to the subdivision. Happ v. Creek Pointe Homeowner's Ass'n, 215 N.C. App. 96, 717 S.E.2d 401, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1753 (2011), limited, Mt. Club Ass'n v. Mt. Club at Cashiers, LLC, 272 N.C. App. 222, 843 S.E.2d 487, 2020 N.C. App. LEXIS 478 (2020).

Fines for Covenant Violations. —

Court erred in issuing an order preventing a homeowners association’s foreclosure on liens imposed on an owner’s property based on fines for the owner’s covenant violations because, under G.S. 47F-3-102 , the homeowners association had the enumerated powers unless its documents expressly provided to the contrary; the homeowners association’s articles of incorporation and declaration did not expressly provide that it may not fine residents who violated its rules and regulations. All of the events in question occurred after July 17, 2004, when the G.S. 47F-3-102 was amended. RiverPointe Homeowners Ass'n v. Mallory, 188 N.C. App. 837, 656 S.E.2d 659, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 262 (2008).

Because there was no evidence in the record that a resolution was added by amendment to the homeowners association’s recorded covenants, conditions and restrictions at the time the owners’ fines were assessed against them, the association was bound by G.S. 47F-1-102(c) to assess fines against the owners in accordance with the procedures established in G.S. 47F-3-107 .1. Consequently, the association properly complied with the procedural requirements of G.S. 47F-3-107 .1 prior to assessing $400 against the owners for violating the parking and screening restrictions. Schwartz v. Banbury Woods Homeowners Ass'n, 196 N.C. App. 584, 675 S.E.2d 382, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 528 (2009).

Retroactive Provision. —

Although under G.S. 47F-1-102(c) , G.S. 47F-3-116 was retroactive and a subdivision’s declaration did not provide otherwise, a homeowners association’s suit seeking to recover under contract law a special assessment for attorney’s fees incurred in a dispute with the homeowners was not the type of action that allowed the association to collect mandatory attorney’s fees under G.S. 47F-3-116 (e). Willow Bend Homeowners Ass'n v. Robinson, 192 N.C. App. 405, 665 S.E.2d 570, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 1614 (2008).

§ 47F-1-103. Definitions.

In the declaration and bylaws, unless specifically provided otherwise or the context otherwise requires, and in this Chapter:

  1. “Affiliate of declarant” means any person who succeeds to any special declarant rights and who controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with a declarant. A person “controls” a declarant if the person is any of the following:
    1. A general partner, officer, director, or employer of the declarant.
    2. Directly or indirectly or acting in concert with one or more other persons, or through one or more subsidiaries, owns, controls, holds with power to vote, or holds proxies representing more than twenty percent (20%) of the voting interest in the declarant.
    3. Controls in any manner the election of a majority of the directors of the declarant.
    4. Has contributed more than twenty percent (20%) of the capital of the declarant.

      A person “is controlled by” a declarant if the declarant (i) is a general partner, officer, director, or employer of the person; (ii) directly or indirectly or acting in concert with one or more other persons, or through one or more subsidiaries, owns, controls, holds with power to vote, or holds proxies representing more than twenty percent (20%) of the voting interest in the person; (iii) controls in any manner the election of a majority of the directors of the person; or (iv) has contributed more than twenty percent (20%) of the capital of the person. Control does not exist if the powers described in this subdivision are held solely as security for an obligation and are not exercised.

  2. “Allocated interests” means the common expense liability and votes in the association allocated to each lot.
  3. “Association” or “owners’ association” means the association organized as allowed under North Carolina law, including G.S. 47F-3-101 .
  4. “Common elements” means any real estate within a planned community owned or leased by the association, other than a lot.
  5. “Common expenses” means expenditures made by or financial liabilities of the association, together with any allocations to reserves.
  6. “Common expense liability” means the liability for common expenses allocated to each lot as permitted by this Chapter, the declaration or otherwise by law.
  7. “Condominium” means real estate, as defined and created under Chapter 47C [of the General Statutes].
  8. “Cooperative” means real estate owned by a corporation, trust, trustee, partnership, or unincorporated association, where the governing instruments of that organization provide that each of the organization’s members, partners, stockholders, or beneficiaries is entitled to exclusive occupancy of a designated portion of that real estate.
  9. “Declarant” means any person or group of persons acting in concert who (i) as part of a common promotional plan, offers to dispose of the person’s or group’s interest in a lot not previously disposed of, or (ii) reserves or succeeds to any special declarant right.
  10. “Declaration” means any instruments, however denominated, that create a planned community and any amendments to those instruments.
  11. “Development rights” means any right or combination of rights reserved by a declarant in the declaration (i) to add real estate to a planned community; (ii) to create lots, common elements, or limited common elements within a planned community; (iii) to subdivide or combine lots or convert lots into common elements; or (iv) to withdraw real estate from a planned community.
  12. Reserved.
  13. “Executive board” means the body, regardless of name, designated in the declaration to act on behalf of the association.
  14. , (15) Reserved. (16) “Leasehold planned community” means a planned community in which all or a portion of the real estate is subject to a lease, the expiration or termination of which will terminate the planned community or reduce its size.

    (17) “Lessee” means the party entitled to present possession of a leased lot whether lessee, sublessee, or assignee.

    (18) “Limited common element” means a portion of the common elements allocated by the declaration or by operation of law for the exclusive use of one or more but fewer than all of the lots.

    (19) “Lot” means a physical portion of the planned community designated for separate ownership or occupancy by a lot owner.

    (20) “Lot owner” means a declarant or other person who owns a lot, or a lessee of a lot in a leasehold planned community whose lease expires simultaneously with any lease the expiration or termination of which will remove the lot from the planned community, but does not include a person having an interest in a lot solely as security for an obligation.

    (21) “Master association” means an organization described in G.S. 47F-2-120 , whether or not it is also an association described in G.S. 47F-3-101 .

    (22) “Person” means a natural person, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or other legal or commercial entity.

    (23) “Planned community” means real estate with respect to which any person, by virtue of that person’s ownership of a lot, is expressly obligated by a declaration to pay real property taxes, insurance premiums, or other expenses to maintain, improve, or benefit other lots or other real estate described in the declaration. For purposes of this act, neither a cooperative nor a condominium is a planned community, but real estate comprising a condominium or cooperative may be part of a planned community. “Ownership of a lot” does not include holding a leasehold interest of less that [than] 20 years in a lot, including renewal options.

    (24) “Purchaser” means any person, other than a declarant or a person in the business of selling real estate for the purchaser’s own account, who by means of a voluntary transfer acquires a legal or equitable interest in a lot, other than (i) a leasehold interest (including renewal options) of less than 20 years, or (ii) as security for an obligation.

    (25) “Real estate” means any leasehold or other estate or interest in, over, or under land, including structures, fixtures, and other improvements and interests which by custom, usage, or law pass with a conveyance of land though not described in the contract of sale or instrument of conveyance. “Real estate” includes parcels with or without upper or lower boundaries, and spaces that may be filled with air or water.

    (26) “Reasonable attorneys’ fees” means attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred without regard to any limitations on attorneys’ fees which otherwise may be allowed by law.

    (27) Reserved.

    (28) “Special declarant rights” means rights reserved for the benefit of a declarant including, without limitation, any right (i) to complete improvements indicated on plats and plans filed with the declaration; (ii) to exercise any development right; (iii) to maintain sales offices, management offices, signs advertising the planned community, and models; (iv) to use easements through the common elements for the purpose of making improvements within the planned community or within real estate which may be added to the planned community; (v) to make the planned community part of a larger planned community or group of planned communities; (vi) to make the planned community subject to a master association; or (vii) to appoint or remove any officer or executive board member of the association or any master association during any period of declarant control.

    (29) Reserved.

History. 1998-199, s. 1; 2014-57, s. 2.

North Carolina Comment

The definitions above apply to planned communities formed prior to January 1, 1999 to the extent necessary in construing or applying any of the other provisions made applicable to planned communities formed prior to that date.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2014-57, s. 4, provides, in part: “Nothing in this act shall be construed as being applicable to or affecting any pending litigation, except that the last sentence of G.S. 47F-3-104(c) shall be applicable to any mortgage, deed of trust, tax lien, or other conveyance providing for foreclosure recorded on or after January 1, 1999.”

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2014-57, s. 2, effective July 7, 2014, added subdivisions (1) and (11).

Legal Periodicals.

For comment, “The Road Not Often Taken: Alternative Dispute Resolution for Common Interest Communities in North Carolina,” see 30 Campbell L. Rev. 315 (2008).

For article, “Drafting Common Interest Community Documents: Minimalism in an Era of Micromanagement,” see 30 Campbell L. Rev. 409 (2008).

CASE NOTES

Common Elements. —

G.S. 47F-1-103(4) applied to the private roads in a subdivision that were owned by a private corporation and maintained by a homeowners’ association, and the roads were common elements subject to maintenance, repair, replacement, and modification. Happ v. Creek Pointe Homeowner's Ass'n, 215 N.C. App. 96, 717 S.E.2d 401, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1753 (2011), limited, Mt. Club Ass'n v. Mt. Club at Cashiers, LLC, 272 N.C. App. 222, 843 S.E.2d 487, 2020 N.C. App. LEXIS 478 (2020).

Trial court’s instruction regarding assessments for road maintenance was proper because under the declaration of covenant, conditions, and restrictions, the subdivision roads were not limited common areas; the declaration clearly indicated the intent of the developers to require all lot owners to pay a pro rata share of the road maintenance. Tater Patch Estates Home Owner's Ass'n v. Sutton, 251 N.C. App. 686, 796 S.E.2d 84, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 23 (2017).

§ 47F-1-104. Variation.

  1. Except as specifically provided in specific sections of this Chapter, the provisions of this Chapter may not be varied by the declaration or bylaws. To the extent not inconsistent with the provisions of this Chapter, the declaration, bylaws, and articles of incorporation form the basis for the legal authority for the planned community to act as provided in the declaration, bylaws, and articles of incorporation, and the declaration, bylaws, and articles of incorporation are enforceable by their terms.
  2. The provisions of this Chapter may not be varied by agreement; however, after breach of a provision of this Chapter, rights created hereunder may be knowingly waived in writing.
  3. Notwithstanding any of the provisions of this Chapter, a declarant may not act under a power of attorney or proxy or use any other device to evade the limitations or prohibitions of this Chapter, the declaration, or the bylaws.

History. 1998-199, s. 1; 2013-34, s. 3.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2013-34, s. 3, effective April 24, 2013, added the second sentence to subsection (a).

CASE NOTES

Association’s Bylaws Governed. —

Fines were not properly imposed on members of a property owners’ association because no written notice of the imposition of fines was mailed to the members as required by the association’s bylaws, even if the members were given a proper opportunity to be heard regarding the fines. Bilodeau v. Hickory Bluffs Cmty. Servs. Ass'n, 244 N.C. App. 1, 780 S.E.2d 205, 2015 N.C. App. LEXIS 959 (2015).

§ 47F-1-105. Taxation.

Extraterritorial common property taxed pursuant to G.S. 105-277.8 shall be assessed, pro rata, among the lot owners based on the number of lots in the association.

History. 2012-157, s. 3.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2012-157, s. 3, makes this section effective July 1, 2012, and applicable to extraterritorial common property acquired on or after July 1, 2012.

§ 47F-1-106. Applicability of local ordinances, regulations, and building codes.

A zoning, subdivision, or building code or other real estate use law, ordinance, or regulation may not prohibit a planned community or impose any requirement upon a planned community which it would not impose upon a substantially similar development under a different form of ownership or administration. Otherwise, no provision of this Chapter invalidates or modifies any provision of any zoning, subdivision, or building code or any other real estate use law, ordinance, or regulation. No local ordinance or regulation may require the recordation of a declaration prior to the date required by this Chapter.

History. 1998-199, s. 1.

Legal Periodicals.

For article, “Searching for the Right Approach: Regulating Short-Term Rentals in North Carolina,” see 96 N.C.L. Rev. 1821 (2018).

§ 47F-1-107. Eminent domain.

  1. If a lot is acquired by eminent domain, or if part of a lot is acquired by eminent domain leaving the lot owner with a remnant which may not practically or lawfully be used for any purpose permitted by the declaration, the award shall compensate the lot owner for his lot and its interest in the common element. Upon acquisition, unless the decree otherwise provides, the lot’s allocated interests are automatically reallocated to the remaining lots in proportion to the respective allocated interests of those lots before the taking, exclusive of the lot taken.
  2. Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, if part of a lot is acquired by eminent domain, the award shall compensate the lot owner for the reduction in value of the lot. Upon acquisition, unless the decree otherwise provides, (i) that lot’s allocated interests are reduced in proportion to the reduction in the size of the lot, or on any other basis specified in the declaration, and (ii) the portion of the allocated interests divested from the partially acquired lot are automatically reallocated to that lot and the remaining lots in proportion to the respective allocated interests of those lots before the taking, with the partially acquired lot participating in the reallocation on the basis of its reduced allocated interests.
  3. If there is any reallocation under subsection (a) or (b) of this section, the association shall promptly prepare, execute, and record an amendment to the declaration reflecting the reallocations. Any remnant of a lot remaining after part of a lot is taken under this subsection is thereafter a common element.
  4. If part of the common elements is acquired by eminent domain, the portion of the award attributable to the common elements taken shall be paid to the association. Unless the declaration provides otherwise, any portion of the award attributable to the acquisition of a limited common element shall be apportioned among the owners of the lots to which that limited common element was allocated at the time of acquisition based on their allocated interest in the common elements before the taking.
  5. The court decree shall be recorded in every county in which any portion of the planned community is located.

History. 1998-199, s. 1.

§ 47F-1-108. Supplemental general principles of law applicable.

The principles of law and equity as well as other North Carolina statutes (including the provisions of the North Carolina Nonprofit Corporation Act) supplement the provisions of this Chapter, except to the extent inconsistent with this Chapter. When these principles or statutes are inconsistent or conflict with this Chapter, the provisions of this Chapter will control.

History. 1998-199, s. 1.

§ 47F-1-109.

Reserved for future codification purposes.

Article 2. Creation, Alteration, and Termination of Planned Communities.

§ 47F-2-101. Creation of the planned community.

A declaration creating a planned community shall be executed in the same manner as a deed and shall be recorded in every county in which any portion of the planned community is located.

History. 1998-199, s. 1; 2012-18, s. 1.7.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2012-18, s. 1.7, effective July 1, 2012, substituted “deed and” for “deed” near the middle, and deleted “and shall be indexed in the Grantee index in the name of the planned community and the association and in the Grantor index in the name of each person executing the declaration” from the end of the section.

Legal Periodicals.

For article, “Drafting Common Interest Community Documents: Minimalism in an Era of Micromanagement,” see 30 Campbell L. Rev. 409 (2008).

§ 47F-2-102.

Reserved for future codification purposes.

§ 47F-2-103. Construction and validity of declaration and bylaws.

  1. To the extent not inconsistent with the provisions of this Chapter, the declaration, bylaws, and articles of incorporation form the basis for the legal authority for the planned community to act as provided in the declaration, bylaws, and articles of incorporation, and the declaration, bylaws, and articles of incorporation are enforceable by their terms. All provisions of the declaration and bylaws are severable.
  2. The rule against perpetuities may not be applied to defeat any provision of the declaration, bylaws, rules, or regulations adopted pursuant to G.S. 47F-3-102(1) .
  3. In the event of a conflict between the provisions of the declaration and the bylaws, the declaration prevails except to the extent the declaration is inconsistent with this Chapter.
  4. Title to a lot and common elements is not rendered unmarketable or otherwise affected by reason of an insubstantial failure of the declaration to comply with this Chapter. Whether a substantial failure to comply with this Chapter impairs marketability shall be determined by the law of this State relating to marketability.

History. 1998-199, s. 1; 2013-34, s. 4.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2013-34, s. 4, effective April 24, 2013, added the first sentence to subsection (a).

CASE NOTES

Breach of Contract. —

In a dispute over a homeowners’ association’s duty to collect dues, it was error to grant the homeowners’ association summary judgment on a clubhouse’s breach of contract and breach of good faith and fair dealing claim against the association because (1) the association had a contractual obligation to collect dues for the clubhouse, (2) the association’s statements to homeowners that the association would no longer collect dues conflicted with that obligation, and (3) the association did not show the contract was unconscionable. Conleys Creek Ltd. P'ship v. Smoky Mt. Country Club Prop. Owners Ass'n, 799 S.E.2d 879, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 225 (N.C. Ct. App.), sub. op., 255 N.C. App. 236, 805 S.E.2d 147, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 740 (2017).

§§ 47F-2-104 through 47F-2-116.

Reserved for future codification purposes.

§ 47F-2-117. Amendment of declaration.

  1. Except in cases of amendments that may be executed by a declarant under the terms of the declaration or by certain lot owners under G.S. 47F-2-118(b) , the declaration may be amended only by affirmative vote or written agreement signed by lot owners of lots to which at least sixty-seven percent (67%) of the votes in the association are allocated, or any larger majority the declaration specifies or by the declarant if necessary for the exercise of any development right. The declaration may specify a smaller number only if all of the lots are restricted exclusively to nonresidential use.
  2. No action to challenge the validity of an amendment adopted pursuant to this section may be brought more than one year after the amendment is recorded.
  3. Every amendment to the declaration shall be recorded in every county in which any portion of the planned community is located and is effective only upon recordation.
  4. Any amendment passed pursuant to the provisions of this section or the procedures provided for in the declaration are presumed valid and enforceable.
  5. Amendments to the declaration required by this Chapter to be recorded by the association shall be prepared, executed, recorded, and certified in accordance with G.S. 47-41.01 or G.S. 47-41.02 .

History. 1998-199, s. 1; 2012-18, s. 1.8; 2013-34, s. 5; 2019-177, s. 4.3.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2013-34, s. 7, made subsection (d) of this section, as added by Session Laws 2013-34, s. 5, effective October 1, 2013, and applicable to any amendment of a planned community declaration recorded on or after that date.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2012-18, s. 1.8, effective July 1, 2012, deleted the former second sentence of subsection (c), which read: “An amendment shall be indexed in the Grantee index in the name of the planned community and the association and in the Grantor index in the name of each person executing the amendment.”

Session Laws 2013-34, s. 5, effective October 1, 2013, added subsection (d). For applicability, see editor’s note.

Session Laws 2019-177, s. 4.3, effective July 26, 2019, substituted “G.S. 47-41.01 or G.S. 47-41.02 ” for “G.S. 47-41” in subsection (e).

CASE NOTES

Applicability. —

Trial court properly dismissed the parties’ claims and counterclaims regarding a clubhouse because the Planned Community Act did not forbid the arrangement whereby the developer retained ownership of the clubhouse and the homeowners association (HOA) was obligated to assess dues to the owners and remit the dues to the developer, the one-year time limit only applied to challenges to “amendments” to an existing declaration, not to challenges to the declaration itself, and the HOA was statutorily authorized to collect the clubhouse dues. Conleys Creek Limited Partnership v. Smoky Mt. Country Club Prop. Owners Ass'n, 255 N.C. App. 236, 805 S.E.2d 147, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 740 (2017).

G.S. 47F-2-117(d) did not eliminate the reasonableness requirement for amending a declaration of covenants as it addressed only the procedure for amending declarations. Poovey v. Vista N.C. Ltd. P'ship, 271 N.C. App. 453, 843 S.E.2d 336, 2020 N.C. App. LEXIS 390 (2020).

Amendment Valid. —

Amendment to the declaration allowing HOA to collect dues on a per-lot basis from owners of multiple contiguous lots that were not conveyed by the developer, which was adopted by a 71 percent vote, was intended to clarify language about how the dues were to be collected in the declaration as originally written, and was a valid and enforceable amendment. Kimler v. Crossings at Sugar Hill Prop. Owner's Ass'n, 248 N.C. App. 518, 789 S.E.2d 507, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 827 (2016).

Amendment of Declaration Permitted. —

HOA was authorized to amend the declaration by a vote of at least 67 percent where nothing in the declaration or articles of incorporation expressly prohibited application of G.S. 47F-2-117 . Kimler v. Crossings at Sugar Hill Prop. Owner's Ass'n, 248 N.C. App. 518, 789 S.E.2d 507, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 827 (2016).

For those planned communities to which G.S. 47F-2-117(a) applies, even if not authorized by the declaration, an owners’ association may amend the declaration by a 67 percent vote and a declarant may amend the declaration if necessary to exercise a development right. Kimler v. Crossings at Sugar Hill Prop. Owner's Ass'n, 248 N.C. App. 518, 789 S.E.2d 507, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 827 (2016).

Application to Pre-1999 Planned Communities. —

G.S. 47F-2-117 applies to pre-1999 formed planned communities where (1) either the terms of the declaration or articles of incorporation do not expressly provide to the contrary pursuant to G.S. 47F-1-102(c) , or (2) the association has adopted the terms of the Planned Community Act pursuant to G.S. 47F-1-102(d) . Kimler v. Crossings at Sugar Hill Prop. Owner's Ass'n, 248 N.C. App. 518, 789 S.E.2d 507, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 827 (2016).

Statute of Repose Inapplicable. —

In a dispute over a homeowners’ association’s duty to collect dues, it was error to dismiss the association’s counterclaims based on the statute of repose in G.S. 47F-2-117(b) because (1) the statute of repose only applied to amended declarations, and (2) a declaration merging planned communities was not such an amendment. Conleys Creek Ltd. P'ship v. Smoky Mt. Country Club Prop. Owners Ass'n, 799 S.E.2d 879, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 225 (N.C. Ct. App.), sub. op., 255 N.C. App. 236, 805 S.E.2d 147, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 740 (2017).

§ 47F-2-118. Termination of planned community.

  1. Except in the case of taking of all the lots by eminent domain (G.S. 47F-1-107), a planned community may be terminated only by agreement of lot owners of lots to which at least eighty percent (80%) of the votes in the association are allocated, or any larger percentage the declaration specifies. The declaration may specify a smaller percentage only if all of the lots in the planned community are restricted exclusively to nonresidential uses.
  2. An agreement to terminate shall be evidenced by the execution of a termination agreement, or ratifications thereof, in the same manner as a deed, by the requisite number of lot owners. The termination agreement shall specify a date after which the agreement will be void unless it is recorded before that date. A termination agreement and all ratifications thereof shall be recorded in every county in which a portion of the planned community is situated and is effective only upon recordation.
  3. A termination agreement may provide for sale of the common elements, but may not require that the lots be sold following termination, unless the declaration as originally recorded provided otherwise or unless all the lot owners consent to the sale. If, pursuant to the agreement, any real estate in the planned community is to be sold following termination, the termination agreement shall set forth the minimum terms of the sale.
  4. The association, on behalf of the lot owners, may contract for the sale of real estate in the planned community, but the contract is not binding until approved pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of this section. Until the sale has been concluded and the proceeds thereof distributed, the association continues in existence with all powers it had before termination. Proceeds of the sale shall be distributed to lot owners and lienholders as their interests may appear, as provided in the termination agreement.
  5. If the real estate constituting the planned community is not to be sold following termination, title to the common elements vests in the lot owners upon termination as tenants in common in proportion to their respective interests as provided in the termination agreement.
  6. Following termination of the planned community, the proceeds of any sale of real estate, together with the assets of the association, are held by the association as trustee for lot owners and holders of liens on the lots as their interests may appear. All other creditors of the association are to be treated as if they had perfected liens on the common elements immediately before termination.
  7. If the termination agreement does not provide for the distribution of sales proceeds pursuant to subsection (d) of this section or the vesting of title pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, sales proceeds shall be distributed and title shall vest in accordance with each lot owner’s allocated share of common expense liability.
  8. Except as provided in subsection (i) of this section, foreclosure or enforcement of a lien or encumbrance against the common elements does not of itself terminate the planned community, and foreclosure or enforcement of a lien or encumbrance against a portion of the common elements other than withdrawable real estate does not withdraw that portion from the planned community. Foreclosure or enforcement of a lien or encumbrance against withdrawable real estate does not of itself withdraw that real estate from the planned community, but the person taking title thereto has the right to require from the association, upon request, an amendment excluding the real estate from the planned community.
  9. If a lien or encumbrance against a portion of the real estate comprising the planned community has priority over the declaration and the lien or encumbrance has not been partially released, the parties foreclosing the lien or encumbrance may, upon foreclosure, record an instrument excluding the real estate subject to that lien or encumbrance from the planned community.

History. 1998-199, s. 1.

North Carolina Comment

Rights under subsection (i) are lost upon the partial release of any lien or encumbrance by its holder. Subsection (i) is consistent with the Uniform Planned Community Act.

§ 47F-2-119.

Reserved for future codification purposes.

§ 47F-2-120. Master associations.

If the declaration for a planned community provides that any of the powers described in G.S. 47F-3-102 are to be exercised by or may be delegated to a profit or nonprofit corporation which exercises those or other powers on behalf of one or more other planned communities or for the benefit of the lot owners of one or more other planned communities, all provisions of this act applicable to lot owners’ associations apply to any such corporation.

History. 1998-199, s. 1.

§ 47F-2-121. Merger or consolidation of planned communities.

  1. Any two or more planned communities, by agreement of the lot owners as provided in subsection (b) of this section, may be merged or consolidated into a single planned community. In the event of a merger or consolidation, unless the agreement otherwise provides, the resultant planned community is, for all purposes, the legal successor of all of the preexisting planned communities, and the operations and activities of all associations of the preexisting planned communities shall be merged or consolidated into a single association which shall hold all powers, rights, obligations, assets, and liabilities of all preexisting associations.
  2. An agreement of two or more planned communities to merge or consolidate pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be evidenced by an agreement prepared, executed, recorded, and certified by the president of the association of each of the preexisting planned communities following approval by owners of lots to which are allocated the percentage of votes in each planned community required to terminate that planned community. Any such agreement shall be recorded in every county in which a portion of the planned community is located and is not effective until recorded.
  3. Every merger or consolidation agreement shall provide for the reallocation of the allocated interests in the new association among the lots of the resultant planned community either (i) by stating the reallocations or the formulas upon which they are based or (ii) by stating the percentage of overall common expense liabilities and votes in the new association which are allocated to all of the lots comprising each of the preexisting planned communities, and providing that the portion of the percentages allocated to each lot formerly comprising a part of the preexisting planned community shall be equal to the percentages of common expense liabilities and votes in the association allocated to that lot by the declaration of the preexisting planned community.

History. 1998-199, s. 1.

CASE NOTES

Statute of Repose Inapplicable. —

In a dispute over a homeowners’ association’s duty to collect dues, it was error to dismiss the association’s counterclaims based on the statute of repose in G.S. 47F-2-117(b) because (1) the statute of repose only applied to amended declarations, and (2) a declaration merging planned communities was not such an amendment. Conleys Creek Ltd. P'ship v. Smoky Mt. Country Club Prop. Owners Ass'n, 799 S.E.2d 879, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 225 (N.C. Ct. App.), sub. op., 255 N.C. App. 236, 805 S.E.2d 147, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 740 (2017).

Article 3. Management of Planned Community.

§ 47F-3-101. Organization of owners’ association.

A lot owners’ association shall be incorporated no later than the date the first lot in the planned community is conveyed. The membership of the association at all times shall consist exclusively of all the lot owners or, following termination of the planned community, of all persons entitled to distributions of proceeds under G.S. 47F-2-118 . Every association created after the effective date of this Chapter shall be organized as a nonprofit corporation.

History. 1998-199, s. 1.

CASE NOTES

Creation of Homeowners’ Association. —

When a homeowner’s association fined homeowners for doing construction that the association’s architectural committee disapproved, the homeowners could not assert that the association had been improperly formed under G.S. 47F-3-101 , because this statute was not made applicable to pre-January 1, 1999 communities pursuant to G.S. 47F-3-102 . Reidy v. Whitehart Ass'n, 185 N.C. App. 76, 648 S.E.2d 265, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1740 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1243, 128 S. Ct. 1484, 170 L. Ed. 2d 298, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2250 (2008).

§ 47F-3-102. Powers of owners’ association.

Unless the articles of incorporation or the declaration expressly provides to the contrary, the association may do all of the following:

  1. Adopt and amend bylaws and rules and regulations.
  2. Adopt and amend budgets for revenues, expenditures, and reserves and collect assessments for common expenses from lot owners.
  3. Hire and discharge managing agents and other employees, agents, and independent contractors.
  4. Institute, defend, or intervene in litigation or administrative proceedings on matters affecting the planned community.
  5. Make contracts and incur liabilities.
  6. Regulate the use, maintenance, repair, replacement, and modification of common elements.
  7. Cause additional improvements to be made as a part of the common elements.
  8. Acquire, hold, encumber, and convey in its own name any right, title, or interest to real or personal property, provided that common elements may be conveyed or subjected to a security interest only pursuant to G.S. 47F-3-112 .
  9. Grant easements, leases, licenses, and concessions through or over the common elements.
  10. Impose and receive any payments, fees, or charges for the use, rental, or operation of the common elements other than the limited common elements and for services provided to lot owners.
  11. Impose reasonable charges for late payment of assessments, not to exceed the greater of twenty dollars ($20.00) per month or ten percent (10%) of any assessment installment unpaid and, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, suspend privileges or services provided by the association (except rights of access to lots) during any period that assessments or other amounts due and owing to the association remain unpaid for a period of 30 days or longer.
  12. After notice and an opportunity to be heard, impose reasonable fines or suspend privileges or services provided by the association (except rights of access to lots) for reasonable periods for violations of the declaration, bylaws, and rules and regulations of the association.
  13. Impose reasonable charges in connection with the preparation and recordation of documents, including, without limitation, amendments to the declaration.

    (13a) Impose reasonable charges in connection with the preparation of statements of unpaid assessments, which must be furnished within 10 business days after receipt of the request, in an amount not to exceed two hundred dollars ($200.00) per statement or request, and an additional expedite fee in an amount not to exceed one hundred dollars ($100.00) if the request is made within 48 hours of closing, all of which charges may be collected by the association, its managers, or its agents.

  14. Provide for the indemnification of and maintain liability insurance for its officers, executive board, directors, employees, and agents.
  15. Assign its right to future income, including the right to receive common expense assessments.
  16. Exercise all other powers that may be exercised in this State by legal entities of the same type as the association.
  17. Exercise any other powers necessary and proper for the governance and operation of the association.

History. 1998-199, s. 1; 2004-109, s. 4; 2005-422, s. 1; 2020-90, s. 4(c).

North Carolina Comment

  1. No specific dollar limitations have been placed on the association’s right to impose reasonable late payment charges under subdivision (11). This is intended to afford the association the maximum reasonable latitude in this area. Limitations on the amount of fines levied under subdivision (12) are set forth in G.S. 47F-3-107 .1. None of the powers granted to the association in this section are subject to any limitations set forth in Chapter 24 of the General Statutes.
  2. In subdivision (15), the association is granted the power to assign its right to future income, including assessments regardless of whether or not its declaration expressly allows such assignments. This differs from the North Carolina Condominium Act and is intended to facilitate the acquisition of financing by the association, which is believed to be the primary goal of the provision.
  3. Subdivisions (11) and (12) allow the association to suspend privileges and services under certain circumstances after notice and hearing in addition to other remedies provided for nonpayment of violations.
  4. Subdivisions (1) through (6) and (11) through (17) apply to planned communities formed prior to January 1, 1999.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2004-109, s. 2, effective July 17, 2004, rewrote the introductory paragraph.

Session Laws 2005-422, s. 1, effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date, inserted “not to exceed the greater of twenty dollars ($20.00) per month or ten percent (10%) of any assessment installment unpaid” in subdivision (11).

Session Laws 2020-90, s. 4(c), effective July 2, 2020, added “do all of the following” in the introductory language; deleted “or statements of unpaid assessments” following “declaration” in subdivision (13); added subdivision (13a); and made minor stylistic changes.

Legal Periodicals.

For article, “Wise v. Harrington Grove Community Association, Inc.: A Pickwickian Critique,” see 27 Campbell L. Rev. 139 (2005).

For article, “Searching for the Right Approach: Regulating Short-Term Rentals in North Carolina,” see 96 N.C.L. Rev. 1821 (2018).

CASE NOTES

Homeowners’ Associations. —

The trial court correctly held that the statute provided an association with power to impose reasonable fines against its members as nothing in the association’s Articles of Incorporation or Declaration limited fining powers. Wise v. Harrington Grove Cmty. Ass'n, 151 N.C. App. 344, 566 S.E.2d 499, 2002 N.C. App. LEXIS 780 (2002), rev'd, 357 N.C. 396 , 584 S.E.2d 731, 2003 N.C. LEXIS 835 (2003).

Statute does not require homeowners’ associations to wield the enumerated powers, but merely provides them an option to do so; the statute also explicitly states that the listed powers are subject to the provisions of the articles of incorporation or the declaration. Wise v. Harrington Grove Cmty. Ass'n, 357 N.C. 396 , 584 S.E.2d 731, 2003 N.C. LEXIS 835 (2003).

Relevant legal instruments creating a homeowners’ association may withhold the statutory powers described under the statute from a homeowners’ association, if those instruments expressly so provide. Wise v. Harrington Grove Cmty. Ass'n, 357 N.C. 396 , 584 S.E.2d 731, 2003 N.C. LEXIS 835 (2003).

When a homeowner’s association fined homeowners under G.S. 47F-3-102 and G.S. 47F-3-107 .1 as provided for by G.S. 47F-1-102(c) for doing construction that the association’s architectural committee disapproved, the retroactive application of these statutes to the homeowners did not violate the contracts clause in U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 1, because this application did not disturb a vested right, impair a binding contract, or create a new obligation, as it only provided an additional remedy to enforce a declaration regarding the homeowners’ development. Reidy v. Whitehart Ass'n, 185 N.C. App. 76, 648 S.E.2d 265, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1740 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1243, 128 S. Ct. 1484, 170 L. Ed. 2d 298, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2250 (2008).

When a homeowner’s association fined homeowners for doing construction that the association’s architectural committee disapproved, the homeowners could not assert that the association had been improperly formed under G.S. 47F-3-101 , because this statute was not made applicable to pre-January 1, 1999, communities pursuant to G.S. 47F-3-102 . Reidy v. Whitehart Ass'n, 185 N.C. App. 76, 648 S.E.2d 265, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1740 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1243, 128 S. Ct. 1484, 170 L. Ed. 2d 298, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2250 (2008).

When a homeowner’s association fined homeowners under G.S. 47F-3-102 and G.S. 47F-3-107 .1 as provided for by G.S. 47F-1-102(c) for doing construction that the association’s architectural committee disapproved, the retroactive application of these statutes to the homeowners did not violate the homeowners’ rights to substantive due process because the Planned Community Act, G.S. ch. 47F, of which these statutes were a part, served the legitimate purpose of providing a statutory framework for dealing with modern real estate developments and the statutes were rationally related to that purpose. Reidy v. Whitehart Ass'n, 185 N.C. App. 76, 648 S.E.2d 265, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1740 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1243, 128 S. Ct. 1484, 170 L. Ed. 2d 298, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2250 (2008).

Court erred in issuing an order preventing a homeowners association’s foreclosure on liens imposed on an owner’s property based on fines for the owner’s covenant violations because, under G.S. 47F-3-102 , the homeowners association had the enumerated powers unless its documents expressly provided to the contrary; the homeowners association’s articles of incorporation and declaration did not expressly provide that it may not fine residents who violated its rules and regulations. All of the events in question occurred after July 17, 2004, when the G.S. 47F-3-102 was amended. RiverPointe Homeowners Ass'n v. Mallory, 188 N.C. App. 837, 656 S.E.2d 659, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 262 (2008).

Homeowners’ association did not act beyond the scope of its authority in its pro rata disbursement to its members of the balance of a litigation fund from the settlement of a lawsuit between the association and one of the residents of the subdivision community. The association also did not commit ultra vires acts by constructing and maintaining a security gate, as well as installing a video camera, at the entrance to the subdivision. Happ v. Creek Pointe Homeowner's Ass'n, 215 N.C. App. 96, 717 S.E.2d 401, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1753 (2011), limited, Mt. Club Ass'n v. Mt. Club at Cashiers, LLC, 272 N.C. App. 222, 843 S.E.2d 487, 2020 N.C. App. LEXIS 478 (2020).

Trial court properly dismissed the owners’ derivative claims for lack of standing because the property owners’ association (POA), not the owners, had standing to sue the third parties for the alleged harm done to the corporation where, inter alia, a majority of disinterested directors was present and voted at a special meeting, and the POA availed itself of the statutory procedure to bring its own claims against the third parties. Anderson v. Seascape at Holden Plantation, LLC, 241 N.C. App. 191, 773 S.E.2d 78, 2015 N.C. App. LEXIS 464 (2015).

Fines were not properly imposed on members of a property owners’ association because no written notice of the imposition of fines was mailed to the members as required by the association’s bylaws, even if the members were given a proper opportunity to be heard regarding the fines. Bilodeau v. Hickory Bluffs Cmty. Servs. Ass'n, 244 N.C. App. 1, 780 S.E.2d 205, 2015 N.C. App. LEXIS 959 (2015).

In a dispute over a homeowners’ association’s duty to collect dues, the association’s claim that the association had no authority to collect dues for a clubhouse failed because (1) the association had statutory authority to collect dues for services provided to lot owners, and (2) the clubhouse owner provided a service to homeowners. Conleys Creek Ltd. P'ship v. Smoky Mt. Country Club Prop. Owners Ass'n, 799 S.E.2d 879, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 225 (N.C. Ct. App.), sub. op., 255 N.C. App. 236, 805 S.E.2d 147, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 740 (2017).

In a dispute over a homeowners’ association’s duty to collect dues, the association’s claim for reimbursement of wrongly collected dues was properly dismissed because (1) the association had statutory authority to collect dues, and (2) a homeowner’s failure to use a clubhouse did not entitle the homeowner to reimbursement. Conleys Creek Ltd. P'ship v. Smoky Mt. Country Club Prop. Owners Ass'n, 799 S.E.2d 879, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 225 (N.C. Ct. App.), sub. op., 255 N.C. App. 236, 805 S.E.2d 147, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 740 (2017).

Trial court properly dismissed the parties’ claims and counterclaims regarding a clubhouse because the Planned Community Act did not forbid the arrangement whereby the developer retained ownership of the clubhouse and the homeowners association (HOA) was obligated to assess dues to the owners and remit the dues to the developer, the one-year time limit only applied to challenges to “amendments” to an existing declaration, not to challenges to the declaration itself, and the HOA was statutorily authorized to collect the clubhouse dues. Conleys Creek Limited Partnership v. Smoky Mt. Country Club Prop. Owners Ass'n, 255 N.C. App. 236, 805 S.E.2d 147, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 740 (2017).

Homeowners’ Association May Obtain Power to Fine Its Members Through Amendment of the Declaration. —

Where the declaration of a homeowners’ association created prior to 1999 is silent as to whether an association has the power to fine its own members, but provides, as the instant declaration does, for amendment of the declaration provisions, the homeowners’ association may certainly obtain the power to fine its members as described under G.S. 47F-3-102(12) by following the prescribed amendment procedure and by adding appropriate language to the declaration. Wise v. Harrington Grove Cmty. Ass'n, 357 N.C. 396 , 584 S.E.2d 731, 2003 N.C. LEXIS 835 (2003).

Power to Impose Fines. —

Homeowners’ association (association) had no power to fine homeowners for not posting a bond to perform landscape maintenance on the homeowners’ lot because (1) the covenants only allowed the association to impose reasonable fees for the use of common areas or to assess costs for damage to common areas caused by activity on a homeowner’s lot, and (2) this authority granted by the covenants could not be implied to let the association impose the fine. McVicker v. Bogue Sound Yacht Club, Inc., 257 N.C. App. 69, 809 S.E.2d 136, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 1056 (2017).

Power to Rescind Fines. —

Board of directors of a property owners’ association (association) (board) had authority to rescind the imposition of fines because (1) the power of an entity to take action inherently included the power to alter or rescind such actions once taken, and (2) the association’s governing documents, G.S. 47F-3-102(17) , and Robert’s Rules of Order could not reasonably be interpreted to prevent the board from ever revising or rescinding fines previously imposed or re-visiting any board action previously taken. Bilodeau v. Hickory Bluffs Cmty. Servs. Ass'n, 244 N.C. App. 1, 780 S.E.2d 205, 2015 N.C. App. LEXIS 959 (2015).

Owner Prevented Access to Property. —

Trial court properly denied a home owner’s association (HOA) a directed verdict on a property owner’s counterclaim seeking damages done to her property because evidence was presented to allow the jury to determine the owner was prevented access to her property and unaware of the construction and lowering of the elevation of a road to the detriment of her property; evidence was presented to show the HOA had changed the lock on the entrance gate because the owner failed to pay her assessments. Tater Patch Estates Home Owner's Ass'n v. Sutton, 251 N.C. App. 686, 796 S.E.2d 84, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 23 (2017).

§ 47F-3-103. Executive board members and officers.

  1. Except as provided in the declaration, in the bylaws, in subsection (b) of this section, or in other provisions of this Chapter, the executive board may act in all instances on behalf of the association. In the performance of their duties, officers and members of the executive board shall discharge their duties in good faith. Officers shall act according to the standards for officers of a nonprofit corporation set forth in G.S. 55A-8-42 , and members shall act according to the standards for directors of a nonprofit corporation set forth in G.S. 55A-8-30 .
  2. The executive board may not act unilaterally on behalf of the association to amend the declaration (G.S. 47F-2-117), to terminate the planned community (G.S. 47F-2-118), or to elect members of the executive board or determine the qualifications, powers and duties, or terms of office of executive board members (G.S. 47F-3-103(e)), but the executive board may unilaterally fill vacancies in its membership for the unexpired portion of any term. Notwithstanding any provision of the declaration or bylaws to the contrary, the lot owners, by a majority vote of all persons present and entitled to vote at any meeting of the lot owners at which a quorum is present, may remove any member of the executive board with or without cause, other than a member appointed by the declarant.
  3. Within 30 days after adoption of any proposed budget for the planned community, the executive board shall provide to all the lot owners a summary of the budget and a notice of the meeting to consider ratification of the budget, including a statement that the budget may be ratified without a quorum. The executive board shall set a date for a meeting of the lot owners to consider ratification of the budget, such meeting to be held not less than 10 nor more than 60 days after mailing of the summary and notice. There shall be no requirement that a quorum be present at the meeting. The budget is ratified unless at that meeting a majority of all the lot owners in the association or any larger vote specified in the declaration rejects the budget. In the event the proposed budget is rejected, the periodic budget last ratified by the lot owners shall be continued until such time as the lot owners ratify a subsequent budget proposed by the executive board.
  4. The declaration may provide for a period of declarant control of the association, during which period a declarant, or persons designated by the declarant, may appoint and remove the officers and members of the executive board.
  5. Not later than the termination of any period of declarant control, the lot owners shall elect an executive board of at least three members, at least a majority of whom shall be lot owners. The executive board shall elect the officers. The executive board members and officers shall take office upon election.
  6. The association shall publish the names and addresses of all officers and board members of the association within 30 days of their election.

History. 1998-199, s. 1; 2005-422, ss. 2, 3.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2005-422, ss. 2 and 3, effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date, substituted “(G.S. 47F-3-103(e))” for “(G.S. 47F-3-103(f))” in subsection (b); and added subsection (f).

CASE NOTES

Declarant Control. —

Developers, as the declarants, were well within their statutory rights to include a period of control over the executive board into the terms of the master declaration. Anderson v. Seascape at Holden Plantation, LLC, 241 N.C. App. 191, 773 S.E.2d 78, 2015 N.C. App. LEXIS 464 (2015).

§ 47F-3-104. Transfer of special declarant rights.

  1. No special declarant right (G.S. 47F-1-103(28)) defined under this Chapter may be transferred except by an instrument evidencing the transfer recorded in every county in which any portion of the planned community is located. Except for the transfer of declarant rights pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, the instrument is not effective unless executed by the transferee.
  2. Upon transfer of any special declarant right, the liability of a transferor declarant is as follows:
    1. A transferor is not relieved of any obligation or liability arising before the transfer and remains liable for warranty obligations imposed upon the transferor by this Chapter. Lack of privity does not deprive any lot owner of standing to maintain an action to enforce any obligation of the transferor.
    2. If a successor to any special declarant right is an affiliate of a declarant (G.S. 47F-1-103(1)), the transferor is jointly and severally liable with the successor for any obligations or liabilities of the successor relating to the planned community.
    3. If a transferor retains any special declarant rights but transfers other special declarant rights to a successor who is not an affiliate of the declarant, the transferor is liable for any obligations or liabilities imposed on a declarant by this Chapter or by the declaration relating to the retained special declarant rights and arising after the transfer.
    4. A transferor has no liability for any act or omission or any breach of a contractual or warranty obligation arising from the exercise of a special declarant right by a successor declarant who is not an affiliate of the transferor.
  3. Unless otherwise provided in a mortgage instrument, deed of trust, or other agreement creating a security interest, in case of foreclosure of a security interest, sale by a trustee under an agreement creating a security interest, tax sale, judicial sale, or sale under Bankruptcy Code or receivership proceedings of any lots owned by a declarant, or real estate in a planned community subject to development rights, or real estate subject to development rights for a planned community, a person acquiring title to all the property being foreclosed or sold, but only upon the person’s request in an instrument recorded in every county in which any portion of the planned community is located, succeeds to all special declarant rights (G.S. 47F-1-103(28)) related to that property held by that declarant and requested by the person acquiring title. The judgment or instrument conveying title shall provide for transfer of only the special declarant rights requested. The mortgage, deed of trust, tax lien, or other conveyance to be foreclosed under this subsection shall not be required to contain specific reference to an assignment of special declarant rights but shall be deemed to include the special declarant rights as part of the right, title, and interest encumbered by the mortgage, deed of trust, tax lien, or other conveyance.
  4. Upon foreclosure of a security interest, sale by a trustee under an agreement creating a security interest, tax sale, judicial sale, or sale under Bankruptcy Code or receivership proceedings of all interests in a planned community owned by a declarant, the declarant ceases to have any special declarant rights and the period of declarant control (G.S. 47F-3-103(d)) terminates unless either of the following applies:
    1. The judgment or instrument conveying title provides for transfer of all special declarant rights held by that declarant to a successor declarant.
    2. The declarant transferred special declarant rights related to the appointment of executive board members to another person pursuant to this section prior to the foreclosure or sale.
  5. The liabilities and obligations of a person who succeeds to special declarant rights are as follows:
    1. A successor to any special declarant right who is an affiliate of a declarant is subject to all obligations and liabilities imposed on the transferor by this Chapter or by the declaration.
    2. Unless otherwise specified in the declaration as to the holder of a mortgage instrument, deed of trust, or other agreement creating a security interest, in case of foreclosure of a security interest, sale by a trustee under an agreement creating a security interest, tax sale, judicial sale, or sale under Bankruptcy Code or receivership proceedings, a successor to any special declarant right who is not an affiliate of a declarant, other than a successor described in subdivision (3) or (4) of this subsection, is subject to the obligations and liabilities expressly imposed by this Chapter or the declaration:
      1. On a declarant which relate to the successor’s exercise or nonexercise of special declarant rights; or
      2. On his or her transferor, other than:
        1. Misrepresentations by the transferor or any previous declarant;
        2. Warranty obligations on improvements made by the transferor or any previous declarant or made before the planned community was created;
        3. Obligations and liabilities arising out of contractual agreements between the transferor or any previous declarant and third parties other than the declaration;
        4. Breach of any fiduciary obligation by the transferor or any previous declarant or his or her appointees to the executive board; or
        5. Any liability or obligation imposed on the transferor or any previous declarant as a result of the transferor’s acts or omissions after the transfer.
    3. A successor to only a right reserved in the declaration to maintain sales offices, management offices, signs advertising the planned community, and models, if the successor is not an affiliate of the declarant, may not exercise any other special declarant right and is not subject to any liability or obligation as a declarant.
    4. A successor to all special declarant rights held by a transferor who is not an affiliate of the declarant who succeeded to those rights pursuant to a deed or other instrument of conveyance in lieu of foreclosure or a judgment or instrument conveying title under subsection (c) of this section may declare in a recorded instrument the intention to hold those rights solely for transfer to another person. Thereafter, until transferring all special declarant rights to any person acquiring title to any lot or real estate subject to development rights owned by the successor, or until recording an instrument permitting exercise of all those rights, that successor may not exercise any of those rights other than any right held by his or her transferor to control the executive board in accordance with G.S. 47F-3-103(d) for the duration of any period of declarant control, and any attempted exercise of those rights is void. So long as a successor declarant does not have the right to exercise special declarant rights under this subsection, the successor declarant is not subject to any liability or obligation as a declarant other than liability for his or her acts and omissions under G.S. 47F-3-103(d) .
  6. Nothing in this section subjects any successor to a special declarant right to any claims against or other obligations of a transferor declarant other than claims and obligations expressly arising under this Chapter or the declaration.
  7. For purposes of this section, “assignment of declarant rights” shall include any assignment by the declarant of special declarant rights to a person, including, without limitation, an assignment pursuant to this section.

History. 1998-199, s. 1; 2014-57, s. 3.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2014-57, s. 4, provides, in part: “Nothing in this act shall be construed as being applicable to or affecting any pending litigation, except that the last sentence of G.S. 47F-3-104(c) shall be applicable to any mortgage, deed of trust, tax lien, or other conveyance providing for foreclosure recorded on or after January 1, 1999.”

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2014-57, s. 3, effective July 7, 2014, rewrote the section, which read “Except for transfer of declarant rights pursuant to foreclosure, no special declarant right (G.S. 47F-1-103(28)) may be transferred except by an instrument evidencing the transfer recorded in every county in which any portion of the planned community is located. The instrument is not effective unless executed by the transferee.” For applicability, see Editor’s note.

§ 47F-3-105. Termination of contracts and leases of declarant.

If entered into before the executive board elected by the lot owners pursuant to G.S. 47F-3-103(e) takes office, any contract or lease affecting or related to the planned community that is not bona fide or was unconscionable to the lot owners at the time entered into under the circumstances then prevailing, may be terminated without penalty by the association at any time after the executive board elected by the lot owners pursuant to G.S. 47F-3-103(e) takes office upon not less than 90 days’ notice to the other party.

History. 1998-199, s. 1.

§ 47F-3-106. Bylaws.

  1. The bylaws of the association shall provide for:
    1. The number of members of the executive board and the titles of the officers of the association;
    2. Election by the executive board of officers of the association;
    3. The qualifications, powers and duties, terms of office, and manner of electing and removing executive board members and officers and filling vacancies;
    4. Which, if any, of its powers the executive board or officers may delegate to other persons or to a managing agent;
    5. Which of its officers may prepare, execute, certify, and record amendments to the declaration on behalf of the association; and
    6. The method of amending the bylaws.
  2. The bylaws may provide for any other matters the association deems necessary and appropriate.

History. 1998-199, s. 1.

§ 47F-3-107. Upkeep of planned community; responsibility and assessments for damages.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in the declaration, G.S. 47F-3-113(h) or subsection (b) of this section, the association is responsible for causing the common elements to be maintained, repaired, and replaced when necessary and to assess the lot owners as necessary to recover the costs of such maintenance, repair, or replacement except that the costs of maintenance, repair, or replacement of a limited common element shall be assessed as provided in G.S. 47F-3-115(c)(1). Except as otherwise provided in the declaration, each lot owner is responsible for the maintenance and repair of his lot and any improvements thereon. Each lot owner shall afford to the association and when necessary to another lot owner access through the lot owner’s lot or the limited common element allocated to the lot owner’s lot reasonably necessary for any such maintenance, repair, or replacement activity.
  2. If a lot owner is legally responsible for damage inflicted on any common element or limited common element, the association may direct such lot owner to repair such damage, or the association may itself cause the repairs to be made and recover damages from the responsible lot owner.
  3. If damage is inflicted on any lot by an agent of the association in the scope of the agent’s activities as such agent, the association is liable to repair such damage or to reimburse the lot owner for the cost of repairing such damages. The association shall also be liable for any losses to the lot owner.
  4. When the claim under subsection (b) or (c) of this section is less than or equal to the jurisdictional amount established for small claims by G.S. 7A-210 , any aggrieved party may request that a hearing be held before an adjudicatory panel appointed by the executive board to determine if a lot owner is responsible for damages to any common element or the association is responsible for damages to any lot. If the executive board fails to appoint an adjudicatory panel to hear such matters, hearings under this section shall be held before the executive board. Such panel shall accord to the party charged with causing damages notice of the charge, opportunity to be heard and to present evidence, and notice of the decision. This panel may assess liability for each damage incident against each lot owner charged or against the association not in excess of the jurisdictional amount established for small claims by G.S. 7A-210 . When the claim under subsection (b) or (c) of this section exceeds the jurisdictional amount established for small claims by G.S. 7A-210, liability of any lot owner charged or the association shall be determined as otherwise provided by law. Liabilities of lot owners determined by adjudicatory hearing or as otherwise provided by law shall be assessments secured by lien under G.S. 47F-3-116 . Liabilities of the association determined by adjudicatory hearing or as otherwise provided by law may be offset by the lot owner against sums owing to the association and if so offset, shall reduce the amount of any lien of the association against the lot at issue.
  5. The association shall not be liable for maintenance, repair, and all other expenses in connection with any real estate which has not been incorporated into the planned community.

History. 1998-199, s. 1; 2013-34, s. 2.

North Carolina Comment

  1. Subsection (a) allocates maintenance, repair and replacement responsibilities when those responsibilities are not otherwise allocated in the declaration. Responsibility for repair, maintenance or replacement of lots, common elements or improvements thereon may be allocated differently by express provisions in the declarations or in a duly authorized and adopted amendment to the declaration.
  2. Subsection (b) differs from the corresponding section in the North Carolina Condominium Act in that lot owners are legally responsible for the damage they cause whether or not it is covered by insurance provided by the association.
  3. Subsection (d) provides for an adjudicatory hearing process for the determination by an adjudicatory panel of damage claims in amounts less than or equal to the jurisdictional amount established by the General Assembly for small claims in G.S. 7A-210 . References to small claims and G.S. 7A-210 are only for the purpose of establishing the jurisdictional amount for adjudicatory hearings under subsection (d) and for no other purpose. They are not intended to nor should they be construed to incorporate any of the rules or procedures which may be otherwise applicable to small claims under Chapter 7 of the General Statutes.
  4. Subsections (a), (b) and (c) apply to planned communities formed prior to January 1, 1999.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2013-34, s. 2, effective April 24, 2013, added “or the limited common element allocated to the lot owner’s lot” in the last sentence of subsection (a); and added “or limited common element” in subsection (b).

§ 47F-3-107.1. Procedures for fines and suspension of planned community privileges or services.

Unless a specific procedure for the imposition of fines or suspension of planned community privileges or services is provided for in the declaration, a hearing shall be held before the executive board or an adjudicatory panel appointed by the executive board to determine if any lot owner should be fined or if planned community privileges or services should be suspended pursuant to the powers granted to the association in G.S. 47F-3-102(11) and (12). Any adjudicatory panel appointed by the executive board shall be composed of members of the association who are not officers of the association or members of the executive board. The lot owner charged shall be given notice of the charge, opportunity to be heard and to present evidence, and notice of the decision. If it is decided that a fine should be imposed, a fine not to exceed one hundred dollars ($100.00) may be imposed for the violation and without further hearing, for each day more than five days after the decision that the violation occurs. Such fines shall be shall be assessments secured by liens under G.S. 47F-3-116 . If it is decided that a suspension of planned community privileges or services should be imposed, the suspension may be continued without further hearing until the violation or delinquency is cured. The lot owner may appeal the decision of an adjudicatory panel to the full executive board by delivering written notice of appeal to the executive board within 15 days after the date of the decision. The executive board may affirm, vacate, or modify the prior decision of the adjudicatory body.

History. 1997-456, s. 27; 1998-199, s. 1; 2005-422, s. 4.

North Carolina Comment

  1. This section is applicable to all planned communities based on the fact that the power to fine and suspend planned community privileges or services is granted to all planned communities under G.S. 47F-3-102 (11) and (12).
  2. This section has been modified from the corresponding text in the North Carolina Condominium Act to clarify that the procedure for the imposition of fines and suspension of planned community privileges or services may be altered by specific provisions in the declaration. It has also been modified to clarify the amount of and how often the same fine may be imposed for a recurring violation without further hearing.

Editor’s Note.

This section was originally enacted as G.S. 47F-3-107 A. It has been renumbered as G.S. 47F-3-107 .1 pursuant to S.L. 1997-456, s. 27 which authorized the Revisor of Statutes to renumber or reletter sections having a number or letter designation that is incompatible with the General Assembly’s computer database.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2005-422, s. 4, effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date, inserted “the executive board or” in the first sentence, rewrote the second sentence, substituted “one hundred dollars ($100.00)” for “one hundred fifty dollars ($150.00)” and inserted “more than five days” in the fourth sentence and added the last two sentences.

CASE NOTES

Procedural Due Process. —

When a homeowner’s association fined homeowners under G.S. 47F-3-107 .1 for doing construction that the association’s architectural committee disapproved, the association did not violate the homeowners’ rights to procedural due process because: (1) G.S. 47F-3-107 .1 provided that the homeowners were entitled to notice of the charge against them, an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence, and notice of the decision; and (2) the association provided the homeowners with these rights. Reidy v. Whitehart Ass'n, 185 N.C. App. 76, 648 S.E.2d 265, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1740 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1243, 128 S. Ct. 1484, 170 L. Ed. 2d 298, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2250 (2008).

Fines were not properly imposed on members of a property owners’ association because no written notice of the imposition of fines was mailed to the members as required by the association’s bylaws, even if the members were given a proper opportunity to be heard regarding the fines. Bilodeau v. Hickory Bluffs Cmty. Servs. Ass'n, 244 N.C. App. 1, 780 S.E.2d 205, 2015 N.C. App. LEXIS 959 (2015).

Substantive Due Process. —

When a homeowner’s association fined homeowners under G.S. 47F-3-102 and G.S. 47F-3-107 .1 as provided for by G.S. 47F-1-102(c) for doing construction that the association’s architectural committee disapproved, the retroactive application of these statutes to the homeowners did not violate the homeowners’ rights to substantive due process because the Planned Community Act, G.S. ch. 47F, of which these statutes were a part, served the legitimate purpose of providing a statutory framework for dealing with modern real estate developments and the statutes were rationally related to that purpose. Reidy v. Whitehart Ass'n, 185 N.C. App. 76, 648 S.E.2d 265, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1740 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1243, 128 S. Ct. 1484, 170 L. Ed. 2d 298, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2250 (2008).

Contracts Clause. —

When a homeowner’s association fined homeowners under G.S. 47F-3-102 and G.S. 47F-3-107 .1 as provided for by G.S. 47F-1-102(c) for doing construction that the association’s architectural committee disapproved, the retroactive application of these statutes to the homeowners did not violate the contracts clause in U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 1, because this application did not disturb a vested right, impair a binding contract, or create a new obligation, as it only provided an additional remedy to enforce a declaration regarding the homeowners’ development. Reidy v. Whitehart Ass'n, 185 N.C. App. 76, 648 S.E.2d 265, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1740 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1243, 128 S. Ct. 1484, 170 L. Ed. 2d 298, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2250 (2008).

Association Properly Complied With Procedural Requirements. —

Because there was no evidence in the record that a resolution was added by amendment to the homeowners association’s recorded covenants, conditions and restrictions at the time the owners’ fines were assessed against them, the association was bound by G.S. 47F-1-102(c) to assess fines against the owners in accordance with the procedures established in G.S. 47F-3-107 .1. Consequently, the association properly complied with the procedural requirements of G.S. 47F-3-107 .1 prior to assessing $400 against the owners for violating the parking and screening restrictions. Schwartz v. Banbury Woods Homeowners Ass'n, 196 N.C. App. 584, 675 S.E.2d 382, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 528 (2009).

§ 47F-3-108. Meetings.

  1. A meeting of the association shall be held at least once each year. Special meetings of the association may be called by the president, a majority of the executive board, or by lot owners having ten percent (10%), or any lower percentage specified in the bylaws, of the votes in the association. Not less than 10 nor more than 60 days in advance of any meeting, the secretary or other officer specified in the bylaws shall cause notice to be hand-delivered or sent prepaid by United States mail to the mailing address of each lot or to any other mailing address designated in writing by the lot owner, or sent by electronic means, including by electronic mail over the Internet, to an electronic mailing address designated in writing by the lot owner. The notice of any meeting shall state the time and place of the meeting and the items on the agenda, including the general nature of any proposed amendment to the declaration or bylaws, any budget changes, and any proposal to remove a director or officer.
  2. Meetings of the executive board shall be held as provided in the bylaws. At regular intervals, the executive board meeting shall provide lot owners an opportunity to attend a portion of an executive board meeting and to speak to the executive board about their issues or concerns. The executive board may place reasonable restrictions on the number of persons who speak on each side of an issue and may place reasonable time restrictions on persons who speak.
  3. Except as otherwise provided in the bylaws, meetings of the association and the executive board shall be conducted in accordance with the most recent edition of Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised.

History. 1998-199, s. 1; 2004-109, s. 6; 2005-422, s. 5.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2004-109, s. 6, effective July 17, 2004, inserted at the end of the third sentence “or sent by electronic means, including by electronic mail over the Internet, to an electronic mailing address designated in writing by the lot owner.”

Session Laws 2005-422, s. 5, effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date, added the subsection (a) designation; and added subsections (b) and (c).

CASE NOTES

Power to Rescind Fines. —

Board of directors of a property owners’ association (association) (board) had authority to rescind the imposition of fines because (1) the power of an entity to take action inherently included the power to alter or rescind such actions once taken, and (2) the association’s governing documents, G.S. 47F-3-102(17) , and Robert’s Rules of Order could not reasonably be interpreted to prevent the board from ever revising or rescinding fines previously imposed or re-visiting any board action previously taken. Bilodeau v. Hickory Bluffs Cmty. Servs. Ass'n, 244 N.C. App. 1, 780 S.E.2d 205, 2015 N.C. App. LEXIS 959 (2015).

§ 47F-3-109. Quorums.

  1. Unless the bylaws provide otherwise, a quorum is present throughout any meeting of the association if persons entitled to cast ten percent (10%) of the votes which may be cast for election of the executive board are present in person or by proxy at the beginning of the meeting.
  2. Unless the bylaws specify a larger percentage, a quorum is deemed present throughout any meeting of the executive board if persons entitled to cast fifty percent (50%) of the votes on that board are present at the beginning of the meeting.
  3. In the event business cannot be conducted at any meeting because a quorum is not present, that meeting may be adjourned to a later date by the affirmative vote of a majority of those present in person or by proxy. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in the declaration or the bylaws, the quorum requirement at the next meeting shall be one-half of the quorum requirement applicable to the meeting adjourned for lack of a quorum. This provision shall continue to reduce the quorum by fifty percent (50%) from that required at the previous meeting, as previously reduced, until such time as a quorum is present and business can be conducted.

History. 1998-199, s. 1.

§ 47F-3-110. Voting; proxies.

  1. If only one of the multiple owners of a lot is present at a meeting of the association, the owner who is present is entitled to cast all the votes allocated to that lot. If more than one of the multiple owners are present, the votes allocated to that lot may be cast only in accordance with the agreement of a majority in interest of the multiple owners, unless the declaration or bylaws expressly provide otherwise. Majority agreement is conclusively presumed if any one of the multiple owners casts the votes allocated to that lot without protest being made promptly to the person presiding over the meeting by any of the other owners of the lot.
  2. Votes allocated to a lot may be cast pursuant to a proxy duly executed by a lot owner. If a lot is owned by more than one person, each owner of the lot may vote or register protest to the casting of votes by the other owners of the lot through a duly executed proxy. A lot owner may not revoke a proxy given pursuant to this section except by actual notice of revocation to the person presiding over a meeting of the association. A proxy is void if it is not dated. A proxy terminates 11 months after its date, unless it specifies a shorter term.
  3. If the declaration requires that votes on specified matters affecting the planned community be cast by lessees rather than lot owners of leased lots, (i) the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section apply to lessees as if they were lot owners; (ii) lot owners who have leased their lots to other persons may not cast votes on those specified matters; and (iii) lessees are entitled to notice of meetings, access to records, and other rights respecting those matters as if they were lot owners. Lot owners shall also be given notice, in the manner provided in G.S. 47F-3-108 , of all meetings at which lessees may be entitled to vote.
  4. No votes allocated to a lot owned by the association may be cast.
  5. The declaration may provide that on specified issues only a defined subgroup of lot owners may vote provided:
    1. The issue being voted is of special interest solely to the members of the subgroup; and
    2. All except de minimis cost that will be incurred based on the vote taken will be assessed solely against those lot owners entitled to vote.
  6. For purposes of subdivision (e)(1) above, an issue to be voted on is not a special interest solely to a subgroup if it substantially affects the overall appearance of the planned community or substantially affects living conditions of lot owners not included in the voting subgroup.

History. 1998-199, s. 1.

§ 47F-3-111. Tort and contract liability.

  1. Neither the association nor any lot owner except the declarant is liable for that declarant’s torts in connection with any part of the planned community which that declarant has the responsibility to maintain.
  2. An action alleging a wrong done by the association shall be brought against the association and not against a lot owner.
  3. Any statute of limitation affecting the association’s right of action under this section is tolled until the period of declarant control terminates. A lot owner is not precluded from bringing an action contemplated by this section because the person is a lot owner or a member of the association.

History. 1998-199, s. 1.

CASE NOTES

Statute of Repose Not Tolled. —

Homeowners’ association’s claim that under the North Carolina Planned Community Act, specifically G.S. 47F-3-111 , the statute of repose of G.S. 1-50(a)(5)(a) did not apply to its claims for breach of the implied warranty of workmanship and fitness for a purpose and negligent construction was rejected as by its plain language, G.S. 47F-3-111 tolled the statute of limitation, not the statute of repose. Glens of Ironduff Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Daly, 224 N.C. App. 217, 735 S.E.2d 445, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 1359 (2012).

By its plain language, the North Carolina Planned Community Act, specifically G.S. 47F-3-111 , tolls only the statute of limitation; it does not toll the statute of repose, G.S. 1-50(a)(5)(a) . Glens of Ironduff Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Daly, 224 N.C. App. 217, 735 S.E.2d 445, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 1359 (2012).

§ 47F-3-112. Conveyance or encumbrance of common elements.

  1. Portions of the common elements may be conveyed or subjected to a security interest by the association if persons entitled to cast at least eighty percent (80%) of the votes in the association, or any larger percentage the declaration specifies, agree in writing to that action; provided that all the owners of lots to which any limited common element is allocated shall agree in order to convey that limited common element or subject it to a security interest. The declaration may specify a smaller percentage only if all the lots are restricted exclusively to nonresidential uses. Distribution of proceeds of the sale of a limited common element shall be as provided by agreement between the lot owners to which it is allocated and the association. Proceeds of the sale or financing of a common element (other than a limited common element) shall be an asset of the association.
  2. The association, on behalf of the lot owners, may contract to convey common elements or subject them to a security interest, but the contract is not enforceable against the association until approved pursuant to subsection (a) of this section. Thereafter, the association has all powers necessary and appropriate to effect the conveyance or encumbrance, free and clear of any interest of any lot owner or the association in or to the common element conveyed or encumbered, including the power to execute deeds or other instruments.
  3. Any purported conveyance, encumbrance, or other voluntary transfer of common elements, unless made pursuant to this section is void.
  4. No conveyance or encumbrance of common elements pursuant to this section may deprive any lot of its rights of access and support.

History. 1998-199, s. 1.

North Carolina Comment

  1. The requirement included in subsection (b) of the corresponding provision of the North Carolina Condominium Act stating that consenting owners must execute an agreement in the form of a deed has been deleted because lot owners in the planned community have no interest in the common elements other than by virtue of their membership in the association.
  2. Subsection (b) (subsection (c) in the North Carolina Condominium Act) has been modified to clarify that if conveyance or encumbrance is authorized by the required percentage of owners, common elements may be conveyed or encumbered free and clear of any easements, rights of way or claims which might be asserted by individual lot owners in or to that common area by virtue of the declaration by virtue of their ownership of lots.

§ 47F-3-113. Insurance.

  1. Commencing not later than the time of the first conveyance of a lot to a person other than a declarant, the association shall maintain, to the extent reasonably available:
    1. Property insurance on the common elements insuring against all risks of direct physical loss commonly insured against including fire and extended coverage perils. The total amount of insurance after application of any deductibles shall be not less than eighty percent (80%) of the replacement cost of the insured property at the time the insurance is purchased and at each renewal date, exclusive of land, excavations, foundations, and other items normally excluded from property policies; and
    2. Liability insurance in reasonable amounts, covering all occurrences commonly insured against for death, bodily injury, and property damage arising out of or in connection with the use, ownership, or maintenance of the common elements.
  2. If the insurance described in subsection (a) of this section is not reasonably available, the association promptly shall cause notice of that fact to be hand-delivered or sent prepaid by United States mail to all lot owners. The declaration may require the association to carry any other insurance, and the association in any event may carry any other insurance it deems appropriate to protect the association or the lot owners.
  3. Insurance policies carried pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall provide that:
    1. Each lot owner is an insured person under the policy to the extent of the lot owner’s insurable interest;
    2. The insurer waives its right to subrogation under the policy against any lot owner or member of the lot owner’s household;
    3. No act or omission by any lot owner, unless acting within the scope of the owner’s authority on behalf of the association, will preclude recovery under the policy; and
    4. If, at the time of a loss under the policy, there is other insurance in the name of a lot owner covering the same risk covered by the policy, the association’s policy provides primary insurance.
  4. Any loss covered by the property policy under subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall be adjusted with the association, but the insurance proceeds for that loss are payable to any insurance trustee designated for that purpose, or otherwise to the association, and not to any mortgagee or beneficiary under a deed of trust. The insurance trustee or the association shall hold any insurance proceeds in trust for lot owners and lienholders as their interests may appear. Subject to the provisions of subsection (h) of this section, the proceeds shall be disbursed first for the repair or restoration of the damaged property, and lot owners and lienholders are not entitled to receive payment of any portion of the proceeds unless there is a surplus of proceeds after the property has been completely repaired or restored, or the planned community is terminated.
  5. An insurance policy issued to the association does not prevent a lot owner from obtaining insurance for the lot owner’s own benefit.
  6. An insurer that has issued an insurance policy under this section shall issue certificates or memoranda of insurance to the association and, upon written request, to any lot owner, mortgagee, or beneficiary under a deed of trust. The insurer issuing the policy may not cancel or refuse to renew it until 30 days after notice of the proposed cancellation or nonrenewal has been mailed to the association, each lot owner, and each mortgagee or beneficiary under a deed of trust to whom certificates or memoranda of insurance have been issued at their respective last known addresses.
  7. Any portion of the planned community for which insurance is required under subdivision (a)(1) of this section which is damaged or destroyed shall be repaired or replaced promptly by the association unless (i) the planned community is terminated, (ii) repair or replacement would be illegal under any State or local health or safety statute or ordinance, or (iii) the lot owners decide not to rebuild by an eighty percent (80%) vote, including one hundred percent (100%) approval of owners assigned to the limited common elements not to be rebuilt. The cost of repair or replacement in excess of insurance proceeds and reserves is a common expense. If any portion of the planned community is not repaired or replaced, (i) the insurance proceeds attributable to the damaged common elements shall be used to restore the damaged area to a condition compatible with the remainder of the planned community, (ii) the insurance proceeds attributable to limited common elements which are not rebuilt shall be distributed to the owners of the lots to which those limited common elements were allocated, or to lienholders, as their interests may appear, and (iii) the remainder of the proceeds shall be distributed to all the lot owners or lienholders, as their interests may appear, in proportion to the common expense liabilities of all the lots. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, G.S. 47F-2-118 (termination of the planned community) governs the distribution of insurance proceeds if the planned community is terminated.
  8. The provisions of this section may be varied or waived in the case of a planned community all of whose lots are restricted to nonresidential use.

History. 1998-199, s. 1.

North Carolina Comment

This section requires the association to maintain property and casualty insurance covering common elements and limited common elements only. Under subsection (b), the declaration may provide for the maintenance and provision of additional insurance by the association, possibly covering lots and improvements on lots. If such provisions are included in the declaration as originally drafted or as amended, care should be taken to provide for the allocation of responsibility for the payment of insurance deductibles and deficiencies and distribution of any surplus.

§ 47F-3-114. Surplus funds.

Unless otherwise provided in the declaration, any surplus funds of the association remaining after payment of or provision for common expenses, the funding of a reasonable operating expense surplus, and any prepayment of reserves shall be paid to the lot owners in proportion to their common expense liabilities or credited to them to reduce their future common expense assessments.

History. 1998-199, s. 1.

CASE NOTES

Disbursement of Funds Remaining in Litigation Fund. —

Homeowners’ association did not act beyond the scope of its authority in its pro rata disbursement to its members of the balance of a litigation fund from the settlement of a lawsuit between the association and one of the residents of the subdivision community. Happ v. Creek Pointe Homeowner's Ass'n, 215 N.C. App. 96, 717 S.E.2d 401, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1753 (2011), limited, Mt. Club Ass'n v. Mt. Club at Cashiers, LLC, 272 N.C. App. 222, 843 S.E.2d 487, 2020 N.C. App. LEXIS 478 (2020).

§ 47F-3-115. Assessments for common expenses.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in the declaration, until the association makes a common expense assessment, the declarant shall pay all common expenses. After any assessment has been made by the association, assessments thereafter shall be made at least annually.
  2. Except for assessments under subsections (c), (d), and (e) of this section, all common expenses shall be assessed against all the lots in accordance with the allocations set forth in the declaration. Any past-due common expense assessment or installment thereof bears interest at the rate established by the association not exceeding eighteen percent (18%) per year. For planned communities created prior to January 1, 1999, interest may be charged on any past-due common expense assessment or installment only if the declaration provides for interest charges, and where the declaration does not otherwise specify the interest rate, the rate may not exceed eighteen percent (18%) per year.
  3. To the extent required by the declaration:
    1. Any common expense associated with the maintenance, repair, or replacement of a limited common element shall be assessed against the lots to which that limited common element is assigned, equally, or in any other proportion that the declaration provides;
    2. Any common expense or portion thereof benefiting fewer than all of the lots shall be assessed exclusively against the lots benefitted; and
    3. The costs of insurance shall be assessed in proportion to risk and the costs of utilities shall be assessed in proportion to usage.
  4. Assessments to pay a judgment against the association may be made only against the lots in the planned community at the time the judgment was entered, in proportion to their common expense liabilities.
  5. If any common expense is caused by the negligence or misconduct of any lot owner or occupant, the association may assess that expense exclusively against that lot owner or occupant’s lot.
  6. If common expense liabilities are reallocated, common expense assessments and any installment thereof not yet due shall be recalculated in accordance with the reallocated common expense liabilities.

History. 1998-199, s. 1.

North Carolina Comment

  1. Subsection (e) has been modified to clarify that any expenses incurred by the association as the result of negligent or intentional acts or omissions by an owner or anyone who is present with the express or implied consent of the owner may be asserted by the association exclusively against the owner’s lot.
  2. This section applies in its entirety to planned communities formed prior to January 1, 1999.

CASE NOTES

Assessments for Road Maintenance. —

Trial court’s instruction regarding assessments for road maintenance was proper because under the declaration of covenant, conditions, and restrictions, the subdivision roads were not limited common areas; the declaration clearly indicated the intent of the developers to require all lot owners to pay a pro rata share of the road maintenance. Tater Patch Estates Home Owner's Ass'n v. Sutton, 251 N.C. App. 686, 796 S.E.2d 84, 2017 N.C. App. LEXIS 23 (2017).

§ 47F-3-116. Lien for sums due the association; enforcement.

  1. Any assessment attributable to a lot which remains unpaid for a period of 30 days or longer shall constitute a lien on that lot when a claim of lien is filed of record in the office of the clerk of superior court of the county in which the lot is located in the manner provided in this section. Once filed, a claim of lien secures all sums due the association through the date filed and any sums due to the association thereafter. Unless the declaration provides otherwise, fees, charges, late charges, and other charges imposed pursuant to G.S. 47F-3-102 , 47F-3-107, 47F-3-107.1, and 47F-3-115 are subject to the claim of lien under this section as well as any other sums due and payable to the association under the declaration, the provisions of this Chapter, or as the result of an arbitration, mediation, or judicial decision.
  2. The association must make reasonable and diligent efforts to ensure that its records contain the lot owner’s current mailing address. No fewer than 15 days prior to filing the lien, the association shall mail a statement of the assessment amount due by first-class mail to the physical address of the lot and the lot owner’s address of record with the association and, if different, to the address for the lot owner shown on the county tax records for the lot. If the lot owner is a corporation or limited liability company, the statement shall also be sent by first-class mail to the mailing address of the registered agent for the corporation or limited liability company. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Chapter, the association is not required to mail a statement to an address known to be a vacant lot on which no dwelling has been constructed or to a lot for which there is no United States postal address.
  3. A claim of lien shall set forth the name and address of the association, the name of the record owner of the lot at the time the claim of lien is filed, a description of the lot, and the amount of the lien claimed. A claim of lien may also appoint a trustee to conduct a foreclosure, as provided in subsection (f) of this section. The first page of the claim of lien shall contain the following statement in print that is in boldface, capital letters, and no smaller than the largest print used elsewhere in the document:

    “THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A LIEN AGAINST YOUR PROPERTY, AND IF THE LIEN IS NOT PAID, THE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION MAY PROCEED WITH FORECLOSURE AGAINST YOUR PROPERTY IN LIKE MANNER AS A MORTGAGE UNDER NORTH CAROLINA LAW.”

    The person signing the claim of lien on behalf of the association shall attach to and file with the claim of lien a certificate of service attesting to the attempt of service on the record owner, which service shall be attempted in accordance with G.S. 1A-1 , Rule 4(j), for service of a copy of a summons and a complaint. If the actual service is not achieved, the person signing the claim of lien on behalf of the association shall be deemed to have met the requirements of this subsection if service has been attempted pursuant to both of the following: (i) G.S. 1A-1 , Rule 4(j)(1)c, d, or e and (ii) by mailing a copy of the lien by regular, first-class mail, postage prepaid to the physical address of the lot and the lot owner’s address of record with the association, and, if different, to the address for the lot owner shown on the county tax records and the county real property records for the lot. In the event that the owner of record is not a natural person, and actual service is not achieved, the person signing the claim of lien on behalf of the association shall be deemed to have met the requirements of this subsection if service has been attempted once pursuant to the applicable provisions of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(3) through G.S. 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(9). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Chapter, the association is not required to mail a claim of lien to an address which is known to be a vacant lot on which no dwelling has been constructed or to a lot for which there is no United States postal address. A lien for unpaid assessments is extinguished unless proceedings to enforce the lien are instituted within three years after the filing of the claim of lien in the office of the clerk of superior court.

  4. A claim of lien filed under this section is prior to all liens and encumbrances on a lot except (i) liens and encumbrances, specifically including, but not limited to, a mortgage or deed of trust on the lot, recorded before the filing of the claim of lien in the office of the clerk of superior court and (ii) liens for real estate taxes and other governmental assessments and charges against the lot. This subsection does not affect the priority of mechanics’ or materialmen’s liens.
  5. The association shall be entitled to recover the reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs it incurs in connection with the collection of any sums due. A lot owner may not be required to pay attorneys’ fees and court costs until the lot owner is notified in writing of the association’s intent to seek payment of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. The notice must be sent by first-class mail to the physical address of the lot and the lot owner’s address of record with the association and, if different, to the address for the lot owner shown on the county tax records for the lot. The association must make reasonable and diligent efforts to ensure that its records contain the lot owner’s current mailing address. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Chapter, there shall be no requirement that notice under this subsection be mailed to an address which is known to be a vacant lot on which no dwelling has been constructed or a lot for which there is no United States postal address. The notice shall set out the outstanding balance due as of the date of the notice and state that the lot owner has 15 days from the mailing of the notice by first-class mail to pay the outstanding balance without the attorneys’ fees and court costs. If the lot owner pays the outstanding balance within this period, then the lot owner shall have no obligation to pay attorneys’ fees, costs, or expenses. The notice shall also inform the lot owner of the opportunity to contact a representative of the association to discuss a payment schedule for the outstanding balance, as provided in subsection (i) of this section, and shall provide the name and telephone number of the representative.
  6. Except as provided in subsection (h) of this section, the association, acting through the executive board, may foreclose a claim of lien in like manner as a mortgage or deed of trust on real estate under power of sale, as provided in Article 2A of Chapter 45 of the General Statutes, if the assessment remains unpaid for 90 days or more. The association shall not foreclose the claim of lien unless the executive board votes to commence the proceeding against the specific lot.The following provisions and procedures shall be applicable to and complied with in every nonjudicial power of sale foreclosure of a claim of lien, and these provisions and procedures shall control to the extent they are inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions of Article 2A of Chapter 45 of the General Statutes:
    1. The association shall be deemed to have a power of sale for purposes of enforcement of its claim of lien.
    2. The terms “mortgagee” and “holder” as used in Article 2A of Chapter 45 of the General Statutes shall mean the association, except as provided otherwise in this Chapter.
    3. The term “security instrument” as used in Article 2A of Chapter 45 of the General Statutes shall mean the claim of lien.
    4. The term “trustee” as used in Article 2A of Chapter 45 of the General Statutes shall mean the person or entity appointed by the association under subdivision (6) of this subsection.
    5. After the association has filed a claim of lien and prior to the commencement of a nonjudicial foreclosure, the association shall give to the lot owner notice of the association’s intention to commence a nonjudicial foreclosure to enforce its claim of lien. The notice shall contain the information required in G.S. 45-21.16(c)(5a).
    6. The association shall appoint a trustee to conduct the nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding and sale. The appointment of the trustee shall be included in the claim of lien or in a separate instrument filed with the clerk of court in the county in which the planned community is located as an exhibit to the notice of hearing. The association, at its option, may from time to time remove a trustee previously appointed and appoint a successor trustee by filing a Substitution of Trustee with the clerk of court in the foreclosure proceeding. Counsel for the association may be appointed by the association to serve as the trustee and may serve in that capacity as long as the lot owner does not contest the obligation to pay or the amount of any sums due the association, or the validity, enforcement, or foreclosure of the claim of lien, as provided in subdivision (12) of this subsection. Any trustee appointed pursuant to this subsection shall have the same fiduciary duties and obligations as a trustee in the foreclosure of a deed of trust.
    7. If a valid debt, default, and notice to those entitled to receive notice under G.S. 45-21.16(b) are found to exist, then the clerk of court shall authorize the sale of the property described in the claim of lien by the trustee.
    8. If, prior to the expiration of the upset bid period provided in G.S. 45-21.27 , the lot owner satisfies the debt secured by the claim of lien and pays all expenses and costs incurred in filing and enforcing the association assessment lien, including, but not limited to, advertising costs, attorneys’ fees, and the trustee’s commission, then the trustee shall dismiss the foreclosure action and the association shall cancel the claim of lien of record in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 45-36.3 . The lot owner shall have all rights granted under Article 4 of Chapter 45 of the General Statutes to ensure the association’s satisfaction of the claim of lien.
    9. Any person, other than the trustee, may bid at the foreclosure sale. Unless prohibited in the declaration or bylaws, the association may bid on the lot at a foreclosure sale directly or through an agent. If the association or its agent is the high bidder at the sale, the trustee shall allow the association to pay the costs and expenses of the sale and apply a credit against the sums due by the lot owner to the association in lieu of paying the bid price in full.
    10. Upon the expiration of the upset bid period provided in G.S. 45-21.27 , the trustee shall have full power and authority to execute a deed for the lot to the high bidder.
    11. The trustee shall be entitled to a commission for services rendered which shall include fees, costs, and expenses reasonably incurred by the trustee in connection with the foreclosure, whether or not a sale is held. Except as provided in subdivision (12) of this subsection, the trustee’s commission shall be paid without regard to any limitations on compensation otherwise provided by law, including, without limitation, the provisions of G.S. 45-21.15 .
    12. If the lot owner does not contest the obligation to pay the amount of any sums due the association or the validity, enforcement, or foreclosure of the claim of lien at any time after the expiration of the 15-day period following notice as required in subsection (b) of this section, then attorneys’ fees and the trustee’s commission collectively charged to the lot owner shall not exceed one thousand two hundred dollars ($1,200), not including costs or expenses incurred. The obligation to pay and the amount of any sums due the association and the validity, enforcement, or foreclosure of the claim of lien remain uncontested as long as the lot owner does not dispute, contest, or raise any objection, defense, offset, or counterclaim as to the amount or validity of any portion of the sums claimed due by the association or the validity, enforcement, or foreclosure of the claim of lien. Any judgment, decree, or order in any action brought under this section shall include costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees for the prevailing party.
    13. Lot owners shall be deemed to have the rights and remedies available to mortgagors under G.S. 45-21.34 .
  7. The provisions of subsection (f) of this section do not prohibit or prevent an association from pursuing judicial foreclosure of a claim of lien, from taking other actions to recover the sums due the association, or from accepting a deed in lieu of foreclosure. Any judgment, decree, or order in any judicial foreclosure or civil action relating to the collection of assessments shall include an award of costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees for the prevailing party, which shall not be subject to the limitation provided in subdivision (f)(12) of this section.
  8. A claim of lien securing a debt consisting solely of fines imposed by the association, interest on unpaid fines, or attorneys’ fees incurred by the association solely associated with fines imposed by the association may only be enforced by judicial foreclosure, as provided in Article 29A of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes. In addition, an association shall not levy, charge, or attempt to collect a service, collection, consulting, or administration fee from any lot owner unless the fee is expressly allowed in the declaration, and any claim of lien securing a debt consisting solely of these fees may only be enforced by judicial foreclosure, as provided in Article 29A of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes.
  9. The association, acting through its executive board and in the board’s sole discretion, may agree to allow payment of an outstanding balance in installments. Neither the association nor the lot owner is obligated to offer or accept any proposed installment schedule. Reasonable administrative fees and costs for accepting and processing installments may be added to the outstanding balance and included in an installment payment schedule. Reasonable attorneys’ fees may be added to the outstanding balance and included in an installment schedule after the lot owner has been given notice, as required in subsection (e) of this section. Attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with any request that the association agrees to accept payment of all or any part of sums due in installments shall not be included or considered in the calculation of fees chargeable under subdivision (f)(12) of this section.
  10. Where the holder of a first mortgage or first deed of trust of record or other purchaser of a lot obtains title to the lot as a result of foreclosure of a first mortgage or first deed of trust, the purchaser and its heirs, successors, and assigns shall not be liable for the assessments against the lot which became due prior to the acquisition of title to the lot by the purchaser. The unpaid assessments shall be deemed to be common expenses collectible from all the lot owners, including the purchaser, its heirs, successors, and assigns. For purposes of this subsection, the term “acquisition of title” means and refers to the recording of a deed conveying title or the time at which the rights of the parties are fixed following the foreclosure of a mortgage or deed of trust, whichever occurs first.

History. 1998-199, s. 1; 2005-422, s. 6; 2009-515, s. 1; 2011-362, s. 1; 2013-202, s. 3.

North Carolina Comment

  1. Subsection (a) differs from the corresponding section in the North Carolina Condominium Act in that it clarifies that the association’s lien is created upon the filing of a claim of lien in the office of the clerk of superior court. Subsection (e) codifies and confirms existing public policy and prior case law by allowing the recovery of attorney’s fees by the prevailing party. Subsection (g) has been added to clarify information which must be included in any claim of lien.
  2. This section applies in its entirety to planned communities formed prior to January 1, 1999.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2011-362, s. 4, provides: “The North Carolina Real Estate Commission shall develop and make available for homebuyers a brochure about restrictive covenants. The brochure shall include an explanation that unpaid assessments, fines, fees, or charges may result in foreclosure of the owner’s property. The brochure shall be available by December 1, 2011.”

As amended by Session Laws 2013-202, s. 3, this section contained two subsections designated as (g). The first subsection (g) was redesignated as the second paragraph of subsection (f) at the direction of the Revisor of Statutes.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2005-422, s. 6, effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date, rewrote subsection (a); added subsections (a1), (a2), (e1) and (e2); and added the second through fourth sentences in subsection (e).

Session Laws 2009-515, s. 1, effective October 1, 2009, and applicable to claims of lien filed on or after that date, added the second through fourth sentences in subsection (a); added the third sentence in subsection (e1); and added the last four sentences in subsection (g).

Session Laws 2011-362, s. 1, effective June 27, 2011, and applicable to foreclosure actions filed on or after October 1, 2011, in subsection (a), in the next-to-last sentence, inserted “acting through the executive board,” and inserted “or” preceding “under Article 2A,” and added “if the assessment remains unpaid for 90 days or more” and added the last sentence.

Session Laws 2013-202, s. 3, effective October 1, 2013, rewrote this section.

CASE NOTES

Failure to Perfect Lien. —

Homeowners association’s late claim for assessments that had not been paid by a debtor who had filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy was allowed as a postpetition debt on a ruling holding that the sum represented an actual and necessary cost of preserving the bankruptcy estate and thus was a permitted administrative expense under 11 U.S.C.S. § 503(b) and that the result was consistent with the rule on such claims as adopted by the Fourth Circuit; moreover, though the association did not have a secured claim to recover prepetition arrearages arising from the debtor’s membership in the association because it did not comply with the filing requirements in G.S. 47F-3-116 , that sum was allowed as an unsecured claim. In re Guillebeaux, 361 B.R. 87, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 430 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2007).

Because the claimant never filed a notice of lien with the Clerk of the Superior Court of Wake County, its prepetition claim for delinquent homeowners dues and assessments was never perfected under G.S. 47F-3-116 or art. V, § 12 of its own declaration, both requiring written notice of the assessment lien to be recorded with the Clerk of the Superior Court of Wake County. Although not allowed as a secured claim, its claim for delinquent homeowners association dues was allowed as a general unsecured claim. In re Castell, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 5400 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Nov. 20, 2012), aff'd, 585 Fed. Appx. 837, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22112 (4th Cir. 2014).

Recreational association was entitled to relief from the automatic stay in a Chapter 13 case to pursue its interest in the debtor’s real property to recover an alleged postpetition delinquency of $275; the association was not subject to the notice requirements of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002.1 because it did not hold a secured claim in the debtor’s residence, as the association did not perfect its security interest as required by North Carolina law. In re Gregory, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 3681 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Dec. 4, 2020).

Validity of Lien. —

Where a Chapter 13 debtor filed an objection to a homeowners association’s claim, the association instituted proceedings to enforce the lien within three years of docketing the claim of lien, as G.S. 47F-3-116(c) by commencing a foreclosure action against the debtor, and the lien was valid. In re Gore, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4082 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Sept. 23, 2013).

Foreclosure. —

It was no error to deny a mortgagee’s motion to set aside a homeowners’ association’s foreclosure because (1) the mortgagee had notice mailed to an address the mortgagee gave in prior communications, and (2) the mortgagee did not timely object within one year. In re Foreclosure of Real Prop. Under Deed of Trust from Garrett, 250 N.C. App. 358, 795 S.E.2d 1, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 1156 (2016).

Trial court correctly determined a foreclosure sale was void due to lack of personal jurisdiction over the homeowner because the foreclosure trustee failed to serve all record owners of the property; the attempted service of the notice of foreclosure upon the homeowner by leaving a copy at the property was inadequate because the property was not his dwelling house or usual place of abode. In re Proposed Foreclosure of Claim of Lien Filed on George, 264 N.C. App. 38, 825 S.E.2d 19, 2019 N.C. App. LEXIS 156 (2019), rev'd in part, aff'd, 377 N.C. 129 , 856 S.E.2d 483, 2021- NCSC-35, 2021 N.C. LEXIS 325 (2021).

Lien Extinguished by Foreclosure Sale. —

Chapter 7 debtor was not entitled to an order under 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(f) which avoided a lien a homeowners’ association (“HOA”) obtained pursuant to G.S. 47F-3-116 on a condominium the debtor had owned because the HOA purchased the condominium at a foreclosure sale before the debtor declared bankruptcy and that sale extinguished the lien. Although the debtor left personal property in the condominium when she was evicted, the court denied the HOA’s motion for an order under 11 U.S.C.S. § 554(b) which required the Chapter 7 trustee to abandon the debtor’s property; instead, it directed the trustee to remove the debtor’s property. In re Roszkowski, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 5166 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Nov. 5, 2012).

Accord and Satisfaction. —

Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of a homeowner’s association in a foreclosure action, G.S. 45-21.16(d), against a property owner for unpaid assessments, pursuant to the North Carolina Planned Community Act, G.S. 47F-3-116(a), because the owner’s notation on his check’s memo line of “full payment” was not sufficient evidence to constitute a dispute for purposes of accord and satisfaction; the owner failed to introduce any evidence demonstrating the existence of a dispute at any time prior to tendering the check to the association. In re Foreclosure of a Lien by Five Oaks Rec. Ass'n, 219 N.C. App. 321, 724 S.E.2d 98, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 327 (2012).

Attorney Fees. —

When a homeowner’s association fined homeowners for doing construction that the association’s architectural committee disapproved, but the trial court, which granted the association judgment for the amount of these fines did not award the association reasonable attorney fees under G.S. 47F-3-116(e), an appellate court could not review the trial court’s decision because, when the association sought to file a cross-appeal after the homeowners appealed the trial court’s judgment on other matters, the association did not file a notice of the association’s cross-appeal with the trial court, as required by N.C. R. App. P. 3(a), so the appellate court had no jurisdiction over the cross-appeal. Reidy v. Whitehart Ass'n, 185 N.C. App. 76, 648 S.E.2d 265, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1740 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1243, 128 S. Ct. 1484, 170 L. Ed. 2d 298, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2250 (2008).

Although under G.S. 47F-1-102(c) , G.S. 47F-3-116 was retroactive and a subdivision’s declaration did not provide otherwise, a homeowners association’s suit seeking to recover under contract law a special assessment for attorney’s fees incurred in a dispute with the homeowners was not the type of action that allowed the association to collect mandatory attorney’s fees under G.S. 47F-3-116 (e). Willow Bend Homeowners Ass'n v. Robinson, 192 N.C. App. 405, 665 S.E.2d 570, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 1614 (2008).

§ 47F-3-116.1. Validation of certain nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings and sales.

All nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings commenced by an association before October 1, 2013, and all sales and transfers of real property as part of those proceedings pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter or provisions contained in the declaration of the planned community, are declared to be valid, unless an action to set aside the foreclosure is commenced on or before October 1, 2013, or within one year after the date of the sale, whichever occurs last.

History. 2013-202, s. 4.

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2013-202, s. 5, provides, “This act becomes effective October 1, 2013. Nothing in Section 2 [which enacted G.S. 47C-3-116 .1] or Section 4 [which enacted G.S. 47F-3-116 .1] of this act shall be construed as being applicable to or affecting any pending litigation.”

CASE NOTES

Untimely Motion to Set Aside Foreclosure. —

It was no error to deny a mortgagee’s motion to set aside a homeowners’ association’s foreclosure because (1) the mortgagee had notice mailed to an address the mortgagee gave in prior communications, and (2) the mortgagee did not timely object within one year. In re Foreclosure of Real Prop. Under Deed of Trust from Garrett, 250 N.C. App. 358, 795 S.E.2d 1, 2016 N.C. App. LEXIS 1156 (2016).

§ 47F-3-117.

Reserved for future codification purposes.

North Carolina Comment

The North Carolina Condominium Act as well as the Uniform Planned Community Act on which this act is based both are designed to apply to communities in which title to common elements is vested in individual owners. Because title to common elements under this act is vested in the association, no provision similar to G.S. 47C-3-117 or Section 3-117 of the Uniform Act has been included.

§ 47F-3-118. Association records.

  1. The association shall keep financial records sufficiently detailed to enable the association to comply with this Chapter. All financial and other records, including records of meetings of the association and executive board, shall be made reasonably available for examination by any lot owner and the lot owner’s authorized agents as required in the bylaws and Chapter 55A of the General Statutes. If the bylaws do not specify particular records to be maintained, the association shall keep accurate records of all cash receipts and expenditures and all assets and liabilities. In addition to any specific information that is required by the bylaws to be assembled and reported to the lot owners at specified times, the association shall make an annual income and expense statement and balance sheet available to all lot owners at no charge and within 75 days after the close of the fiscal year to which the information relates. Notwithstanding the bylaws, a more extensive compilation, review, or audit of the association’s books and records for the current or immediately preceding fiscal year may be required by a vote of the majority of the executive board or by the affirmative vote of a majority of the lot owners present and voting in person or by proxy at any annual meeting or any special meeting duly called for that purpose.
  2. The association, upon written request, shall furnish to a lot owner or the lot owner’s authorized agents a statement setting forth the amount of unpaid assessments and other charges against a lot. The statement shall be furnished within 10 business days after receipt of the request and is binding on the association, the executive board, and every lot owner. The association, its managers, or its agents may charge a reasonable fee for providing statements of unpaid assessments, not to exceed two hundred dollars ($200.00) per statement or request, and an additional expedite fee in an amount not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100.00) if the request for a statement is made within 48 hours of closing.
  3. In addition to the limitations of Article 8 of Chapter 55A of the General Statutes, no financial payments, including payments made in the form of goods and services, may be made to any officer or member of the association’s executive board or to a business, business associate, or relative of an officer or member of the executive board, except as expressly provided for in the bylaws or in payments for services or expenses paid on behalf of the association which are approved in advance by the executive board.

History. 1998-199, s. 1; 2005-422, s. 7; 2020-90, s. 4(d).

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2005-422, s. 7, effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date, rewrote the second sentence and added the last three sentences in subsection (a); and added subsection (c).

Session Laws 2020-90, s. 4(d), effective July 2, 2020, added the last sentence in subsection (b).

§ 47F-3-119. Association as trustee.

With respect to a third person dealing with the association in the association’s capacity as a trustee under G.S. 47F-2-118 following termination or G.S. 47F-3-113 for insurance proceeds, the existence of trust powers and their proper exercise by the association may be assumed without inquiry. A third person is not bound to inquire whether the association has power to act as trustee or is properly exercising trust powers, and a third person, without actual knowledge that the association is exceeding or improperly exercising its powers, is fully protected in dealing with the association as if it possessed and properly exercised the powers it purports to exercise. A third person is not bound to assure the proper application of trust assets paid or delivered to the association in its capacity as trustee.

History. 1998-199, s. 1.

§ 47F-3-120. Declaration limits on attorneys’ fees.

Except as provided in G.S. 47F-3-116 , in an action to enforce provisions of the articles of incorporation, the declaration, bylaws, or duly adopted rules or regulations, the court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party if recovery of attorneys’ fees is allowed in the declaration.

History. 1998-199, s. 1.

CASE NOTES

Not Entitled to Attorneys’ Fees. —

Homeowners’ association and others were not entitled to attorneys’ fees under the North Carolina Planned Community Act (PCA), G.S. 47F-3-120 , in their suit to enforce a restrictive covenant because the development predated the statute, and there was no express incorporation of Chapter 47F in the association’s declaration, as required for application of the PDA’s attorneys’ fee provision. Moss Creek Homeowners Ass'n v. Bissette, 200 N.C. App. 356, 684 S.E.2d 694, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 1641 (2009), superseded, 202 N.C. App. 222, 689 S.E.2d 180, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 185 (2010).

Planned Community Act (PCA), G.S. 47F-1-101 et seq., provided no statutory basis for an award of attorneys’ fees to a homeowners association and its members for homeowners violation of restrictive covenants because the provisions of the PCA allowing attorneys’ fees in actions to enforce the restrictive covenants did not apply in the absence of an express incorporation of Chapter 47F in the development’s declaration; the development was created in 1987, the record did not show that the declaration had been amended to incorporate revised Chapter 47, and the association commenced the action in 2005. Moss Creek Homeowners Ass'n v. Bissette, 202 N.C. App. 222, 689 S.E.2d 180, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 185 (2010).

Where an award of attorneys’ fees was based upon a trial court’s determination that defendants violated restrictive covenants in their individual capacities and where that determination was reversed on appeal, then the award, which was based on a statute allowing such an award in an action to enforce the provisions of the articles of incorporation, the declaration, bylaws, or duly adopted rules or regulations of a planned community, was reversed. Warrender v. Gull Harbor Yacht Club, Inc., 228 N.C. App. 520, 747 S.E.2d 592, 2013 N.C. App. LEXIS 815 (2013).

§ 47F-3-121. American and State flags and political sign displays.

Notwithstanding any provision in any declaration of covenants, no restriction on the use of land shall be construed to:

  1. Regulate or prohibit the display of the flag of the United States or North Carolina, of a size no greater than four feet by six feet, which is displayed in accordance with or in a manner consistent with the patriotic customs set forth in 4 U.S.C. §§ 5-10, as amended, governing the display and use of the flag of the United States unless:
    1. For restrictions registered prior to October 1, 2005, the restriction specifically uses the following terms:
      1. Flag of the United States of America;
      2. American flag;
      3. United States flag; or
      4. North Carolina flag.
    2. For restrictions registered on or after October 1, 2005, the restriction shall be written on the first page of the instrument or conveyance in print that is in boldface type, capital letters, and no smaller than the largest print used elsewhere in the instrument or conveyance. The restriction shall be construed to regulate or prohibit the display of the United States or North Carolina flag only if the restriction specifically states: “THIS DOCUMENT REGULATES OR PROHIBITS THE DISPLAY OF THE FLAG OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OR STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA” .

      This subdivision shall apply to owners of property who display the flag of the United States or North Carolina on property owned exclusively by them and does not apply to common areas, easements, rights-of-way, or other areas owned by others.

  2. Regulate or prohibit the indoor or outdoor display of a political sign by an association member on property owned exclusively by the member, unless:
    1. For restrictions registered prior to October 1, 2005, the restriction specifically uses the term “political signs”.
    2. For restrictions registered on or after October 1, 2005, the restriction shall be written on the first page of the instrument or conveyance in print that is in boldface type, capital letters, and no smaller than the largest print used elsewhere in the instrument or conveyance. The restriction shall be construed to regulate or prohibit the display of political signs only if the restriction specifically states: “THIS DOCUMENT REGULATES OR PROHIBITS THE DISPLAY OF POLITICAL SIGNS” .

      Even when display of a political sign is permitted under this subdivision, an association (i) may prohibit the display of political signs earlier than 45 days before the day of the election and later than seven days after an election day, and (ii) may regulate the size and number of political signs that may be placed on a member’s property if the association’s regulation is no more restrictive than any applicable city, town, or county ordinance that regulates the size and number of political signs on residential property. If the local government in which the property is located does not regulate the size and number of political signs on residential property, the association shall permit at least one political sign with the maximum dimensions of 24 inches by 24 inches on a member’s property. For the purposes of this subdivision, “political sign” means a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election, including supporting or opposing an issue on the election ballot. This subdivision shall apply to owners of property who display political signs on property owned exclusively by them and does not apply to common areas, easements, rights-of-way, or other areas owned by others.

History. 2005-422, s. 8; 2006-226, s. 15(b).

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2005-422, s. 20, made this section effective January 1, 2006, and applicable to violations occurring and proceedings commenced on or after that date and to fiscal years beginning on or after that date.

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2006-226, s. 15(b), effective August 10, 2006, deleted “THE” preceding “POLITICAL SIGNS” at the end of subdivision (2)b.

Legal Periodicals.

For article, “Drafting Common Interest Community Documents: Minimalism in an Era of Micromanagement,” see 30 Campbell L. Rev. 409 (2008).

§ 47F-3-122. Irrigation of landscaping.

Notwithstanding any provision in any declaration of covenants, no requirement to irrigate landscaping shall be construed to:

  1. Require the irrigation of landscaping, during any period in which the U.S. Drought Monitor, as defined in G.S. 143-350 , or the Secretary of Environmental Quality has designated an area in which the association is located as an area of severe, extreme, or exceptional drought and the Governor, a State agency, or unit of local government has imposed water conservation measures applicable to the area unless:
    1. For declarations of covenants registered prior to October 1, 2008, the covenant specifically requires the irrigation of landscaping notwithstanding water conservation measures imposed by the Governor, a State agency, or unit of local government. The association may not fine or otherwise penalize an owner of land for violation of an irrigation requirement during a period of a drought as designated under this subdivision, unless the covenant specifically authorizes fines or other penalties.
    2. For covenants registered on or after October 1, 2008, the covenant must specifically state that any requirement to irrigate landscaping is suspended to the extent the requirement would otherwise be prohibited during any period in which the Governor, a State agency, or unit of local government has imposed water conservation measures. The association may not fine or otherwise penalize an owner of land for violation of an irrigation requirement during a drought designated under this subdivision, unless the covenant authorizes the fines or other penalties. This authorization must be written on the first page of the covenant in print that is in boldface type, capital letters, and no smaller than the largest print used elsewhere in the declarations of covenants.
  2. For purposes of this section, the term “landscaping” includes lawns, trees, shrubbery, and other ornamental or decorative plants.

History. 2008-143, s. 19(b); 2015-241, s. 14.30(v).

Editor’s Note.

Session Laws 2008-143, s. 20, effective July 31, 2008, provides: “Nothing in this act shall be construed to expand or limit the authority of a unit of government or public water supply system to regulate water use from a well located outside of its jurisdiction, a well not connected to its water system, or any other private well.”

Effect of Amendments.

Session Laws 2015-241, s. 14.30(v), effective July 1, 2015, substituted “Secretary of Environmental Quality” for “Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources” in subdivision (1).