CHAPTER 25-01 General Provisions

25-01-01. Definitions. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

In this title, unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires:

  1. “Licensed physician” means an individual licensed under the laws of this state to practice medicine and also means a medical officer of the government of the United States while in this state in the performance of the physician’s official duties.
  2. “Mentally ill individual” means an individual having a psychiatric or other disease which substantially impairs the individual’s mental health.
  3. “North Dakota vision services - school for the blind” means the North Dakota vision services - school for the blind as maintained under section 25-06-01.
  4. “School for the deaf” means the school for the deaf of North Dakota.
  5. “State hospital” means the state hospital for the mentally ill.
  6. “Superintendent” means the superintendent of the state hospital, of the life skills and transition center, of North Dakota vision services - school for the blind, or of the school for the deaf, as the case may be.
  7. “Supervising officer” means the executive director of the department of human services or the superintendent of public instruction, as the case may be.
  8. “Tier 1 mental health professional” means a tier 1a or tier 1b mental health professional.
    1. A tier 1a mental health professional is a psychiatrist licensed under chapter 43-17 or a psychologist licensed under chapter 43-32.
    2. A tier 1b mental health professional is a licensed physician or a physician assistant licensed under chapter 43-17 or an advanced practice registered nurse licensed under chapter 43-12.
  9. “Tier 2 mental health professional” means a tier 2a or a tier 2b mental health professional.
    1. A tier 2a mental health professional is an independent clinician who is a licensed clinical social worker licensed under chapter 43-41, a licensed professional clinical counselor licensed under chapter 43-47, or a licensed marriage and family therapist licensed under chapter 43-53.
    2. A tier 2b mental health professional is an addiction counselor licensed under chapter 43-45 or a registered nurse licensed under chapter 43-12.
  10. “Tier 3 mental health professional” means a licensed associate professional counselor licensed under chapter 43-47, a licensed master social worker or licensed baccalaureate social worker licensed under chapter 43-41, a licensed professional counselor licensed under chapter 43-47, an associate marriage and family therapist licensed under chapter 43-53, an occupational therapist licensed under chapter 43-40, a licensed practical nurse licensed under chapter 43-12, a behavior analyst licensed or registered under chapter 43-32, a vocational rehabilitation counselor practicing under chapter 50-06.1, a school psychologist, or a human relations counselor.
  11. “Tier 4 mental health professional” means a direct care associate or technician.

Source:

S.L. 1879, ch. 23, § 45; R.C. 1895, § 1532; R.C. 1899, § 1532; R.C. 1905, § 1909; C.L. 1913, § 2567; S.L. 1931, ch. 146, § 1; 1937, ch. 142, § 6; R.C. 1943, § 25-0101; S.L. 1957, ch. 196, § 1; 1957, ch. 197, § 1; 1957 Supp., § 25-0101; S.L. 1961, ch. 209, §§ 1, 5; 1963, ch. 220, § 1; 1965, ch. 203, § 42; 1967, ch. 214, § 11; 1971, ch. 271, § 1; 1979, ch. 315, §§ 16, 19; 1987, ch. 570, § 4; 1991, ch. 592, § 6; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2001, ch. 257, § 6; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2017, ch. 97, § 19, eff August 1, 2017; 2019, ch. 366, § 1, eff February 1, 2020.

Cross-References.

Appointment, powers and duties of director of institutions, see N.D.C.C. ch. 54-21.

Public institutions, see N.D. Const., Art. IX, §§ 12, 13.

State mental health and retardation division, see N.D.C.C. ch. 25-10.

Word defined by statute always has same meaning, see § 1-01-09.

Notes to Decisions

Incapacity.

—Ability to Make Medical Decisions.

The trial court properly found, by clear and convincing evidence, that a person was incapacitated for purposes of medical decisionmaking, but its finding of complete incapacity was not supported by convincing evidence, and was clearly erroneous. In re Guardianship of Braaten, 502 N.W.2d 512, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 136 (N.D. 1993).

Law Reviews.

North Dakota Handbook for Guardians Ad Litem in Actions for Adjudication of Incapacity, 66 N.D. L. Rev. 45 (1990).

25-01-01. Definitions. [Effective September 1, 2022]

In this title, unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires:

  1. “Licensed physician” means an individual licensed under the laws of this state to practice medicine and also means a medical officer of the government of the United States while in this state in the performance of the physician’s official duties.
  2. “Mentally ill individual” means an individual having a psychiatric or other disease which substantially impairs the individual’s mental health.
  3. “North Dakota vision services - school for the blind” means the North Dakota vision services - school for the blind as maintained under section 25-06-01.
  4. “School for the deaf” means the school for the deaf of North Dakota.
  5. “State hospital” means the state hospital for the mentally ill.
  6. “Superintendent” means the superintendent of the state hospital, of the life skills and transition center, of North Dakota vision services - school for the blind, or of the school for the deaf, as the case may be.
  7. “Supervising officer” means the executive director of the department of health and human services or the superintendent of public instruction, as the case may be.
  8. “Tier 1 mental health professional” means a tier 1a or tier 1b mental health professional.
    1. A tier 1a mental health professional is a psychiatrist licensed under chapter 43-17 or a psychologist licensed under chapter 43-32.
    2. A tier 1b mental health professional is a licensed physician or a physician assistant licensed under chapter 43-17 or an advanced practice registered nurse licensed under chapter 43-12.
  9. “Tier 2 mental health professional” means a tier 2a or a tier 2b mental health professional.
    1. A tier 2a mental health professional is an independent clinician who is a licensed clinical social worker licensed under chapter 43-41, a licensed professional clinical counselor licensed under chapter 43-47, or a licensed marriage and family therapist licensed under chapter 43-53.
    2. A tier 2b mental health professional is an addiction counselor licensed under chapter 43-45 or a registered nurse licensed under chapter 43-12.
  10. “Tier 3 mental health professional” means a licensed associate professional counselor licensed under chapter 43-47, a licensed master social worker or licensed baccalaureate social worker licensed under chapter 43-41, a licensed professional counselor licensed under chapter 43-47, an associate marriage and family therapist licensed under chapter 43-53, an occupational therapist licensed under chapter 43-40, a licensed practical nurse licensed under chapter 43-12, a behavior analyst licensed or registered under chapter 43-32, a vocational rehabilitation counselor practicing under chapter 50-06.1, a school psychologist, or a human relations counselor.
  11. “Tier 4 mental health professional” means a direct care associate or technician.

Source:

S.L. 1879, ch. 23, § 45; R.C. 1895, § 1532; R.C. 1899, § 1532; R.C. 1905, § 1909; C.L. 1913, § 2567; S.L. 1931, ch. 146, § 1; 1937, ch. 142, § 6; R.C. 1943, § 25-0101; S.L. 1957, ch. 196, § 1; 1957, ch. 197, § 1; 1957 Supp., § 25-0101; S.L. 1961, ch. 209, §§ 1, 5; 1963, ch. 220, § 1; 1965, ch. 203, § 42; 1967, ch. 214, § 11; 1971, ch. 271, § 1; 1979, ch. 315, §§ 16, 19; 1987, ch. 570, § 4; 1991, ch. 592, § 6; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2001, ch. 257, § 6; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2017, ch. 97, § 19, eff August 1, 2017; 2019, ch. 366, § 1, eff February 1, 2020; 2021, ch. 352, § 270, eff September 1, 2022.

25-01-01.1. State council on developmental disabilities. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

There must be maintained in the department of human services a state council on developmental disabilities consisting of one representative of each of the following departments, divisions, institutions, and organizations designated by the head of such agency or organization:

  1. Office of superintendent of public instruction.
  2. North Dakota department of human services.
  3. State department of health.
  4. Life skills and transition center.
  5. Job service North Dakota.

The council shall, at a minimum, include representation that conforms to federal law requirements regarding state councils on developmental disabilities. All members of the council must be appointed by the governor. The council shall select its own officers who shall serve for a term of two years commencing on October first of each year. Meetings must be held at least twice a year or at the call of the chairman or upon notice in writing signed by not less than three members of the council. A simple majority of the council constitutes a quorum and may act upon any matter coming before the council. Members of the council are entitled to reimbursement in the same manner and at the same rate provided by law for other state officials.

The council shall assist in the development of the state plan for developmental disabilities, monitor and evaluate the implementation of such state plan, and review and comment on all state plans in the state which relate to programs affecting individuals with developmental disabilities. The council may take any action reasonably necessary to secure and administer any money made available to state councils on developmental disabilities through the Developmentally Disabled and Bill of Rights Act [Pub. L. 95-602; 92 Stat. 2955; 42 U.S.C. 6000 et seq.]. The council, if approved by the governor, shall appoint a full-time director who shall assist the council. The director must be classified under the state personnel merit system. The council shall also perform studies and surveys of the needs of individuals with developmental disabilities in North Dakota and shall facilitate coordination of the activities of all state departments, divisions, agencies, and institutions having responsibilities in the field of developmental disabilities.

Source:

S.L. 1963, ch. 219, § 1; 1979, ch. 332, § 1; 1981, ch. 486, § 9; 1989, ch. 333, § 13; 1991, ch. 508, § 1; 1991, ch. 592, § 7; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 1995, ch. 243, § 2; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2015, ch. 200, § 1, eff August 1, 2015.

Cross-References.

Mileage and travel expenses of state officers, see §§ 44-08-04, 54-06-09.

25-01-01.1. State council on developmental disabilities. [Effective September 1, 2022]

  1. There must be maintained in the department of health and human services a state council on developmental disabilities consisting of:
    1. One representative of each of the following departments, divisions, institutions, and organizations designated by the head of such agency or organization:
      1. Office of superintendent of public instruction.
      2. Job service North Dakota.
    2. Three representatives of the department of health and human services to include at least:
      1. One representative from the life skills and transition center designated by its superintendent; and
      2. One representative from the department’s health division.
  2. The council shall, at a minimum, include representation that conforms to federal law requirements regarding state councils on developmental disabilities. All members of the council must be appointed by the governor. The council shall select its own officers who shall serve for a term of two years commencing on October first of each year. Meetings must be held at least twice a year or at the call of the chairman or upon notice in writing signed by not less than three members of the council. A simple majority of the council constitutes a quorum and may act upon any matter coming before the council. Members of the council are entitled to reimbursement in the same manner and at the same rate provided by law for other state officials.
  3. The council shall assist in the development of the state plan for developmental disabilities, monitor and evaluate the implementation of such state plan, and review and comment on all state plans in the state which relate to programs affecting individuals with developmental disabilities. The council may take any action reasonably necessary to secure and administer any money made available to state councils on developmental disabilities through the Developmentally Disabled and Bill of Rights Act [Pub. L. 95-602; 92 Stat. 2955; 42 U.S.C. 6000 et seq.]. The council, if approved by the governor, shall appoint a full-time director who shall assist the council. The director must be classified under the state personnel merit system. The council shall also perform studies and surveys of the needs of individuals with developmental disabilities in North Dakota and shall facilitate coordination of the activities of all state departments, divisions, agencies, and institutions having responsibilities in the field of developmental disabilities.

Source:

S.L. 1963, ch. 219, § 1; 1979, ch. 332, § 1; 1981, ch. 486, § 9; 1989, ch. 333, § 13; 1991, ch. 508, § 1; 1991, ch. 592, § 7; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 1995, ch. 243, § 2; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2015, ch. 200, § 1, eff August 1, 2015; 2021, ch. 352, § 271, eff September 1, 2022.

25-01-02. Transfer of patients between institutions.

The supervising officer may transfer patients of the state hospital or life skills and transition center between such institutions whenever the superintendent of any such institution shall recommend such transfer and the supervising department is satisfied, upon investigation, that such transfer is advisable. If any patient, so transferred, is maintained at the expense of the county from which the patient was committed, the cost of the patient’s maintenance in the institution to which the patient is transferred must be charged to such county and must be collected therefrom upon notice to the county auditor of such county by the supervising officer.

Source:

S.L. 1885, ch. 68, § 8; 1891, ch. 132, § 1; R.C. 1895, § 992; R.C. 1899, § 992; S.L. 1903, ch. 108, § 4; 1905, ch. 119, § 1; R.C. 1905, §§ 1163, 1189; S.L. 1913, ch. 58, § 1; C.L. 1913, §§ 1712, 1755; S.L. 1919, ch. 145, § 1; 1925 Supp., § 1755; S.L. 1927, ch. 166, § 1; 1931, ch. 264, § 1; R.C. 1943, § 25-0102; S.L. 1945, ch. 205, § 1; 1957, ch. 197, § 2; 1957 Supp., § 25-0102; S.L. 1961, ch. 209, § 2; 1963, ch. 220, § 2; 1965, ch. 203, § 43; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2013, ch. 226, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Contracts for Utilities.

Public service commission had no power to interfere with lawful conduct of board of administration in the making and carrying out of contracts for purchase of commodities, such as light and power, which were reasonably necessary for operation of institutions. City of Grafton v. Otter Tail Power Co., 86 N.W.2d 197, 1957 N.D. LEXIS 167 (N.D. 1957).

Board of administration had power to contract for purchase of light and power from source other than municipality, even though institution was located in municipality owning electric power plant. City of Grafton v. Otter Tail Power Co., 86 N.W.2d 197, 1957 N.D. LEXIS 167 (N.D. 1957).

25-01-02.1. Health council to investigate mental health of patients. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1987, ch. 570, § 45.

25-01-03. Supervising officer to appoint superintendent of institutions — Salaries — Removal.

  1. The supervising officer shall appoint a superintendent for each of the institutions under its control, except for the state hospital, where the supervising officer shall appoint a superintendent in consultation with a state hospital governing body.
  2. The tenure of office of each superintendent is two years from the date of the superintendent’s appointment, and the superintendent must possess qualifications required by this title. Any superintendent may be removed by the supervising officer for misconduct, neglect of duty, incompetency, or other proper cause showing the superintendent’s inability or refusal properly to perform the duties of office. A removal at a time other than a termination of the superintendent’s two-year tenure may be had only after an opportunity is given to the person to be heard before a board consisting of the governor, attorney general, and supervising officer of the institution on preferred written charges. A removal when made, however, is final. This subsection does not apply to the superintendent of North Dakota vision services — school for the blind or the superintendent of the school for the deaf, whose positions are included in the classified service as provided in section 54-44.3-20.
  3. The supervising officer shall fix the compensation of each superintendent within the limits prescribed in this title and within the appropriations made by the legislative assembly for compensation.

Source:

S.L. 1885, ch. 68, § 8; 1890, ch. 161, § 6; 1891, ch. 132, § 1; 1893, ch. 123, § 2; 1895, ch. 24, § 7; R.C. 1895, §§ 956, 972, 992; R.C. 1899, §§ 956, 972, 992; S.L. 1903, ch. 108, § 5; 1905, ch. 119, § 1; R.C. 1905, §§ 1138, 1157, 1164, 1189; S.L. 1911, ch. 44, § 4; 1911, ch. 62, § 23; 1913, ch. 58, § 1; C.L. 1913, §§ 258, 1685, 1704, 1713, 1755, 2586; S.L. 1919, ch. 145, § 1; 1925 Supp., § 1755; S.L. 1927, ch. 166, § 1; 1931, ch. 264, § 1; R.C. 1943, § 25-0103; S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 45; 1995, ch. 266, § 1; 1997, ch. 13, § 22; 1997, ch. 241, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Power of Removal.

Trustees having the power of appointment also have the power of removal. State ex rel. Moore v. Archibald, 5 N.D. 359, 66 N.W. 234, 1896 N.D. LEXIS 35 (N.D. 1896).

25-01-04. Superintendent of each institution to qualify.

The superintendent of each of the institutions mentioned in this chapter, before entering upon the duties of office, shall take the oath prescribed for civil officers.

Source:

S.L. 1885, ch. 68, § 10; R.C. 1895, § 994; R.C. 1899, § 994; R.C. 1905, § 1191; S.L. 1911, ch. 62, § 29; C.L. 1913, §§ 264, 1757; R.C. 1943, § 25-0104; S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 46; 1999, ch. 113, § 8.

Cross-References.

Bonds of state officers, see N.D.C.C. ch. 44-01.

Oath of civil officers, see § 44-01-05.

State Bonding Fund, see N.D.C.C. ch. 26.1-21.

25-01-05. General powers and duties of superintendents of various institutions.

The superintendent of each of the institutions mentioned in this chapter is the chief executive officer of the institution of which the person is superintendent and, in connection with such institution, shall:

  1. Employ all employees and assistants required in the management of the institution, the number of whom must be determined in cooperation with the supervising officer.
  2. Have general charge of the institution and of the grounds thereof.
  3. Have general charge of the direction, treatment, control, and discipline of all persons, employees, and patients at or connected with the institution.
  4. Formulate, subject to the approval of the supervising officer, all rules and regulations relating to the conduct of the persons within and employees of the institution.
  5. Maintain salutary discipline among all employees and persons or patients in or connected with the institution and enforce strict obedience to all rules and regulations thereof.
  6. Cause complete records to be kept of all persons admitted to the institution.
  7. Submit to the supervising officer reports of the institution in such form, at such times, and containing such information, as may be required by the supervising officer.
  8. Employ only licensed physicians as members of the institutional physician staff.

Source:

S.L. 1885, ch. 68, § 10; 1890, ch. 161, § 14; 1893, ch. 123, § 5; R.C. 1895, §§ 964, 994; R.C. 1899, §§ 964, 994; S.L. 1903, ch. 108, § 5; R.C. 1905, §§ 1145, 1164, 1191; S.L. 1911, ch. 44, § 4; 1911, ch. 62, § 34; C.L. 1913, §§ 269, 1692, 1713, 1757, 2586; R.C. 1943, § 25-0105; S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 47; 1985, ch. 307, § 1.

Cross-References.

Supervising officer authorized to transfer patients between schools, see § 25-01-02.

Notes to Decisions

Approval of Employment.

The board of administration had authority to employ and fix the salaries of instructors in the state school for the deaf and dumb, and the superintendent of such school could recommend the employment of a certain person as an instructor, but could employ only with the approval of the board. Wood v. Buchanan, 72 N.D. 216, 5 N.W.2d 680, 1942 N.D. LEXIS 134 (N.D. 1942).

25-01-06. Duty of superintendent and the supervising officer in case of questionable commitment.

The superintendent of the state hospital and the superintendent of the life skills and transition center shall notify the supervising officer immediately if there is any question as to the propriety of the commitment or detention of any person received at the institution, and the supervising officer, upon such notification, shall inquire into the matter presented and shall take such action as may be deemed proper in the premises.

Source:

S.L. 1911, ch. 62, § 27; C.L. 1913, § 262; R.C. 1943, § 25-0106; S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 48; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2013, ch. 226, § 1.

25-01-07. Salaries of officers and employees other than superintendent — How fixed.

The supervising officer in cooperation with the superintendent, prior to July first in each year, shall fix the annual or monthly salaries of all of the officers, exclusive of the superintendent, and all of the employees in each of the several institutions mentioned in this chapter. It shall classify such officers and employees into grades, and the salaries paid to those in each grade, all other factors being equal, must be uniform in the several institutions. The schedule of salaries fixed by the supervising officer shall become operative on July first in the year in which the same are fixed. The supervising officer in cooperation with the superintendent may fix the salaries of additional employees hired after July first and may increase the salary of any employee deemed worthy of such increase. Such salaries must be paid in the same manner as other expenses of the several institutions are paid. All of the salaries in each institution, however, must be within the limits fixed by the appropriations made by the legislative assembly for salaries in such institution.

Source:

S.L. 1911, ch. 62, § 35; 1913, ch. 57, § 1; C.L. 1913, § 270; S.L. 1915, ch. 230, § 5; 1925 Supp., § 270; R.C. 1943, § 25-0107; S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 49.

Cross-References.

Salaries payable monthly, see § 54-06-06.

25-01-08. Discharge of subordinate officers and employees.

The superintendent of any institution mentioned in this chapter may discharge any person employed therein, subject to such restrictions as may be placed upon such power by the supervising officer. The superintendent shall show in the record of any person discharged the reason therefor.

Source:

S.L. 1911, ch. 62, § 34; C.L. 1913, § 269; R.C. 1943, § 25-0108; S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 50.

25-01-09. Officers of institutions to be furnished food supplies. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1971, ch. 501, § 2.

25-01-10. Supervising officer may accept gifts and bequests — State treasurer to have custody of funds.

The supervising officer may accept in the name of the state and hold in trust for any institution mentioned in this chapter any lands conveyed or devised and any money or other personal property given or bequeathed for application to any purpose connected with such institution. All moneys and property coming into the hands of the supervising officer as grants, donations, devises, gifts, and bequests must be used for the specific purposes for which they are granted, donated, devised, bequeathed, or given. If no terms are imposed upon the use of any grant, donation, devise, bequest, or gift, it must be used for the general maintenance of the institution for the benefit of which it is made.

Source:

S.L. 1885, ch. 68, § 4; R.C. 1895, § 989; R.C. 1899, § 989; S.L. 1903, ch. 108, § 10; R.C. 1905, §§ 1169, 1186; S.L. 1911, ch. 44, § 7; C.L. 1913, §§ 1720, 1752, 2589; R.C. 1943, § 25-0110; S.L. 1965, ch. 181, § 2; 1965, ch. 203, § 51.

Cross-References.

Authority for devise, bequest, legacy, and gift to state institution, see § 1-08-02.

25-01-11. State treasurer to have custody of income from granted lands.

The state treasurer is custodian of all funds arising from the sale of any lands granted to any institution named in this chapter, and such funds must be deposited with the state treasurer. The state treasurer shall keep a separate account for each such institution to which a land grant has been made, and moneys in each such separate fund must be used exclusively for the benefit of the institution to which the same belongs.

Source:

S.L. 1895, ch. 24, § 6; R.C. 1895, § 971; S.L. 1897, ch. 72, § 2; 1899, ch. 99, § 2; R.C. 1899, §§ 966b, 971, 1008b; S.L. 1903, ch. 44, § 2; R.C. 1905, §§ 1148, 1156, 1208; C.L. 1913, §§ 1695, 1703, 1774; R.C. 1943, § 25-0111; S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 52.

25-01-12. Drawing of funds — Sale of lands — Release of mortgages — Appropriations limit power to contract.

Moneys appropriated or given to any institution mentioned in this chapter shall be expended only upon order of the supervising officer. The supervising officer, however, does not have the power to bind the state for any purpose in connection with any such institution beyond the amount of the appropriation which may have been made to such institution for such purpose, nor to sell or convey any part of the real estate belonging to any such institution without the consent of the legislative assembly, except that it may release any mortgage or convey any real estate which may have been received by it through any gift, bequest, or devise or upon any trust, the terms of which authorize such satisfaction or conveyance.

Source:

S.L. 1885, ch. 64, § 4; R.C. 1895, § 989; R.C. 1899, § 989; S.L. 1903, ch. 108, § 10; R.C. 1905, §§ 1169, 1186; C.L. 1913, §§ 1720, 1752; R.C. 1943, § 25-0112; S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 53.

Cross-References.

Expenditure of amount in excess of appropriation unlawful, see N.D.C.C.§ 54-27-12.

25-01-13. Members of board and officers of institutions not to be interested in certain contracts. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 86.

25-01-14. Claim for or proceedings to recover money in inmates’ or patients’ fund — Limitation. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1961, ch. 211, § 9.

25-01-15. Money remaining in inmates’ or patients’ personal accounts transferred to general welfare account of institution. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1975, ch. 425, § 29.

25-01-16. Treating patients cruelly — Penalty.

Any person responsible for the care or custody of any person admitted to a state institution in accordance with the provisions of this title, who treats the person admitted with severity, harshness, or cruelty, or who abuses that person in any way, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

Source:

S.L. 1975, ch. 106, § 267.

Collateral References.

Hospital’s liability for mentally deranged patient’s self-inflicted injuries, 36 A.L.R.4th 117.

Liability of hospital or clinic for sexual relationships with patients by staff physicians, psychologists, and other healers, 45 A.L.R.4th 289.

25-01-17. Religious exercise of patient or resident under the care of the department of human services. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

  1. The department of human services may not:
    1. Substantially burden the exercise of religion by patient or resident under the department’s care unless the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest;
    2. Treat religious conduct more restrictively than any comparable secular conduct unless the department demonstrates the disparate treatment is necessary to further a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest; or
    3. Deny clergy access to a patient or resident for the purpose of providing religious services unless the department demonstrates the denial is necessary to further a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
  2. A patient or resident of the department of human services claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of this section, may assert, after exhausting appropriate administrative remedies, that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief, including costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.

Source:

S.L. 2021, ch. 92, § 4, eff August 1, 2021.

25-01-17. Religious exercise of patient or resident under the care of the department of health and human services. [Effective September 1, 2022]

  1. The department of human services may not:
    1. Substantially burden the exercise of religion by patient or resident under the department’s care unless the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest;
    2. Treat religious conduct more restrictively than any comparable secular conduct unless the department demonstrates the disparate treatment is necessary to further a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest; or
    3. Deny clergy access to a patient or resident for the purpose of providing religious services unless the department demonstrates the denial is necessary to further a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
  2. A patient or resident of the department of health and human services claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of this section, may assert, after exhausting appropriate administrative remedies, that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief, including costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.

Source:

S.L. 2021, ch. 92, § 4, eff August 1, 2021; 2021, ch. 92, § 4, eff September 1, 2022.

CHAPTER 25-01.1 Institutional Management

25-01.1-01. Definition of supervising department.

In this chapter unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires, “supervising department” means that department, division, board, or office responsible for and exercising supervision, control, and administration over the state hospital, as provided by law.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 2.

Cross-References.

Appointment, powers and duties of director of institutions, see N.D.C.C. ch. 54-21.

State hospital, see chapter 25-02.

Word defined by statute always has same meaning, see § 1-01-09.

25-01.1-02. Heads of institutions responsible to supervising department.

For the exercise of the duties of general supervision over the institutions subject to the control of the supervising department, the heads of the institutions are responsible to the supervising department.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 3.

25-01.1-03. Adopt uniform system of accounting.

The supervising department shall devise and install a system of accounting and auditing of all moneys appropriated, received, and expended. Such system must be adapted to the institutions under its control and must be made as nearly uniform as the necessities of the case may permit and in accordance with requirements of the office of management and budget.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 4.

25-01.1-04. Books and accounts kept by supervising department.

The supervising department shall keep at its office a proper and complete system of books and accounts with each institution under its control which must show every expenditure authorized and made thereat. The book must exhibit an account of each extraordinary or special appropriation made by the legislative assembly, with each item of expenditure thereof.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 5.

25-01.1-05. Blanks and forms furnished by supervising department.

The supervising department shall formulate and furnish to each institution under its control proper blanks and forms for all statements and accounts necessary to furnish the information required of the institution.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 6.

25-01.1-06. Supervising department to have access to institutions and to books and records of institutions.

The supervising department shall have access to all the state institutions under its management and control and to all books, accounts, vouchers, supplies, and equipment of each of the institutions so that the supervising department may familiarize itself with the conditions, needs, and requirements of the institutions. All books, documents, and records relating to the concerns and business of such institutions except personal records of patients at all times must be open to the examination of any citizen of this state. Personal records of patients must be made available upon court order or in accordance with rules and regulations established by the supervising department.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 7.

Cross-References.

Confidentiality of records of patients in treatment facilities, see § 25-03.1-43.

Records of treatment or care center for mentally retarded confidential, see § 25-16-07.

25-01.1-07. Rules for procedure and administration of institutions.

The supervising department shall make all necessary rules for its own procedure and for the general administration, supervision, and management of the institutions under its control and management.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 8.

25-01.1-08. Inspection of institutions.

The supervising department or its duly authorized representative shall visit and inspect the institutions under its administration and control concerning administration, treatment, or finances of such institutions at any time, but shall make such inspection at least twice each year. If deemed necessary, the supervising department shall examine under oath the officers and attendants, guards, and other employees and make such inquiries as will determine their fitness for their respective duties.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 9.

25-01.1-09. Investigation of institutions — Witnesses — Fees — Not excused from testifying.

The supervising department, in aid of the investigation of any institution under its control, may summon and compel the attendance of witnesses and examine the same under oath, which any member thereof shall have the power to administer. The supervising department shall have access to all books, accounts, papers, and property material to such investigation and may order the production of any other books or papers material thereto. Witnesses other than those in the employ of the state are entitled to the same fees as are allowed in civil cases in the district court. The claim that any testimony or evidence sought to be elicited or produced on such examination may tend to incriminate the person giving or producing it, or expose that person to public ignominy, does not excuse that person from testifying or producing evidence, documentary or otherwise, but no person may be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for and on account of any matter or thing concerning which the person may testify or produce such evidence. The witness is not exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 10.

Cross-References.

Affirmation in lieu of oath, see N.D.R.Civ.P. 43(d); N.D.R.Ev. 603.

Compelling attendance of witnesses, see N.D.C.C. ch. 31-03; N.D.R.Civ.P. 45.

Fees and mileage, see §§ 31-01-16, 31-03-29.

Perjury, see § 12.1-11-01.

Self-incrimination, right against, see N.D. Const., Art. XII, § 13; § 31-01-09.

25-01.1-10. Testimony taken at investigation transcribed and filed.

The supervising department shall cause the testimony taken at any investigation to be transcribed and filed in its office within ten days after the same is taken, or as soon thereafter as practicable. When so filed, the evidence must be open for inspection of any person.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 11.

25-01.1-11. Failure to testify — Contempt.

Any person who fails or refuses to obey the orders of the supervising department issued in an investigation of any institution under its control, or to give or produce evidence when required, must be reported by the supervising department to the district court or any judge thereof and must be dealt with by the court or judge as for contempt of court.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 12.

Cross-References.

Contempts, see N.D.C.C. ch. 27-10.

Criminal contempt, see N.D.R.Crim.P. 42.

Failure to appear, produce information or be sworn, see § 12.1-10-02.

Refusal to testify an offense, see § 12.1-10-03.

25-01.1-12. Report to governor any abuses and wrongs existing in institutions.

The supervising department shall investigate and report to the governor any abuses or wrongs alleged to exist in the institutions under its control and management.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 13.

25-01.1-13. Supervising department to keep record of persons in institutions.

The supervising department shall keep in its office a record showing:

  1. The residence, sex, age, nativity, occupation, religion, civil condition, and date of entrance or commitment of every person, patient, or inmate in the institutions under its control and administration.
  2. The date of discharge of every such person from the institutions, and whether such discharge was final.
  3. The condition of the person at the time the person left the institution.
  4. If a person is transferred from one institution to another, to what institution transferred.
  5. If a person, patient, or inmate of an institution dies, the date and cause of death.

This information must be furnished to the supervising department by the institutions under its control. Such other obtainable facts must be furnished as the supervising department, from time to time, may require. No one may have access to the records, except as authorized by the supervising department, or on the order of a court of record.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 14.

Cross-References.

Confidentiality of records of patients in treatment facilities, see § 25-03.1-43.

Records of treatment or care center for mentally retarded confidential, see § 25-16-07.

25-01.1-14. Entrance and discharge record of persons at institutions.

The managing officer of each institution, within thirty days after the commitment or entrance of a person, patient, or inmate to the institution, shall cause a true copy of the entrance record to be made and forwarded to the office of the supervising department. When a patient or inmate leaves, or is discharged, transferred, or dies in any institution, the superintendent or person in charge, within ten days thereafter, shall send such information to the supervising department having control of such institution. All such information must be furnished on forms which the supervising department may prescribe.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 15.

25-01.1-14.1. Heads of institutions — Duty to appoint surrogate parents.

The heads of each of the state institutions shall establish as required by the state superintendent a procedure for determining whether a patient under the age of twenty-one years needs a surrogate parent and for assigning such a surrogate parent for the purpose of special education and related services.

Source:

S.L. 1979, ch. 333, § 1.

25-01.1-15. Supervising department to provide protection against fire — Means of escape.

The supervising department under advisement of the state fire marshal shall compel the superintendent of each of the institutions under its control to:

  1. Provide at each institution adequate and ready means of protection against fire.
  2. Construct proper means of escape for the patients and attendants where the same are not already constructed.
  3. Establish and enforce rigid rules and regulations by which the danger of fire shall be minimized.
  4. Prevent, as far as possible, injury to the patients or pupils and loss or destruction, by any cause, of the property of the state.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 16.

25-01.1-16. Inventory of stocks and supplies.

The supervising department, annually on June thirtieth of each year, shall require the superintendent of each institution under its charge to make a complete, minute, and accurate inventory of the stock and supplies on hand, and the amount and value thereof. The inventory must be under the following heads:

  1. Livestock.
  2. Produce of the farm on hand.
  3. Automobiles, trucks, and other vehicles.
  4. Agricultural implements.
  5. Machinery.
  6. Mechanical fixtures.
  7. Real estate.
  8. Beds and bedding in patients’ department.
  9. Other furniture in patients’ department.
  10. Personal property of the state in superintendent’s department.
  11. Readymade clothing.
  12. Dry goods.
  13. Provisions and groceries.
  14. Drugs and medicines.
  15. Fuel.
  16. Library property.
  17. All other property under such heads as the supervising department may deem proper.

A like inventory must be submitted by the proper superintendent of each institution to the supervising department when requested by the supervising department.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 17.

Cross-References.

Person in charge of state institution to maintain inventory, see § 44-04-07.

25-01.1-17. Moneys remitted to state treasurer.

All moneys belonging to the state, derived from any source at any of the institutions under the control of the supervising department, must be accounted for and remitted to the state treasurer not later than the tenth day of each month. The state treasurer shall maintain a special operating fund within the state treasury for each remitting institution. All rents, interests, or income from land, money, or property donated or granted by the United States and allocated to specific charitable institutions under the terms of the Enabling Act and the Constitution of North Dakota must be deposited in such special operating fund of each institution and expended in accordance with section 1 of article IX of the Constitution of North Dakota. The state treasurer shall make periodic transfers upon order of the director of the office of management and budget from each institutional general fund appropriation to the appropriate institutional special operating fund whenever its balance falls so low as to require supplementation. All funds for necessary expenditures of such institutions must be drawn from the special operating fund in the state treasury as provided by this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 18; 1983, ch. 82, § 49.

Cross-References.

State treasurer’s duties, see § 54-11-01.

25-01.1-18. Property of institution is property of state.

All public property of every kind and all public money in the charge of the superintendent of any institution under the control of the supervising department, or that comes to the superintendent’s control on account of the institution under the superintendent’s charge, or from the business thereof, is the property of the state and at all times must be kept separate and apart from the property of such superintendent.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 19.

25-01.1-19. Funds belonging to institutions or patients to be paid to superintendent.

Each officer and employee of all state institutions under the management and control of the supervising department shall pay over to the superintendent of the institution without delay any funds which may come into the officer’s or employee’s hands belonging to any patient of the institution and of which the superintendent is the legal custodian. An officer or employee shall pay over to the proper officer of the institution without delay any funds belonging to the institution.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 20.

25-01.1-20. Care and custody of funds belonging to patients of state institutions.

The superintendent of any state institution under the management and control of the supervising department, when the care and custody of any funds belonging to patients of a state institution are by law devolved upon the superintendent, shall keep accurate accounts of these funds in books provided for that purpose and shall pay out these funds under rules as may be prescribed by law or by the supervising department, taking proper vouchers of the funds in all cases from the patient or responsible representative of the patient. Each superintendent shall give a bond conditioned for the faithful performance of duties.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 21; 1979, ch. 187, § 42; 2001, ch. 122, § 2; 2005, ch. 261, § 5.

25-01.1-21. Property of patients to be returned.

The money and effects, except clothing, in possession of each patient when committed to any institution under control of the supervising department must be preserved by the superintendent of such institution and returned to such patient when discharged.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 22.

25-01.1-22. Estimate of expenditures of institutions presented to supervising department and office of management and budget — Revision.

At the times and in the manner provided by the office of management and budget, the superintendent shall cause to be prepared triplicate estimates of all expenditures required for the institution. Two of the said triplicate estimates must be sent to the supervising department and the third must be kept by the superintendent. The supervising department may revise the estimates for supplies or other expenditures and shall certify that it has carefully examined the same and that the articles contained in such estimates as approved, or revised by it, are, to its best knowledge and belief, actually required for the use of the institution. An approved copy containing any revisions of the estimate by the supervising department must be forwarded by the supervising department to the office of management and budget which shall contract for the required purchases.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 23.

Cross-References.

Department of accounts and purchases, see N.D.C.C. ch. 54-44.

Director of budget, preparation of budget data, see § 54-44.1-06.

25-01.1-23. Office of management and budget to advertise for bids for supplies — State firm given preference. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1979, ch. 568, § 11.

25-01.1-24. Contract for supplies sent to institution.

When the estimates for supplies for the institutions under the control of the supervising department have been certified and revised by the supervising department and bids for the supplies enumerated and described therein have been received and contracts for furnishing the supplies have been let by the office of management and budget, a copy of such revised estimates and the contract for furnishing the supplies enumerated and described in such revised estimates, duly certified, must be sent to the institution and another copy must be sent to the supervising department having control of such institution.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 25.

25-01.1-25. Office of management and budget may purchase supplies on open market. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1979, ch. 568, § 11.

25-01.1-26. Bill presented to institution — Form — Thirty days allowed to pay for supplies.

The supplies purchased for the institutions under the control of the supervising department must be purchased so as to permit at least thirty days’ time to pay therefor. The officer of the institution designated by the supervising department shall require itemized bills to be rendered by the person who furnishes supplies, in duplicate, for all purchases whether made upon contract or otherwise, which must be in the form prescribed by the office of management and budget and certified as required for other claims against the state.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 27.

25-01.1-27. Rules for purchase of supplies — Jobbers to file address with office of management and budget or institutions. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1979, ch. 568, § 11.

25-01.1-28. Supplies of institutions — Duties of officers.

The officer of each institution who is designated by the supervising department to have charge of and to be accountable for all the supplies and stores of the institution must be charged therewith at their invoice value, and shall:

  1. Direct all purchases of such institution as may be ordered by the office of management and budget under the estimates as provided in section 25-01.1-22, in conjunction with the superintendent of each institution.
  2. Issue all the supplies upon requisition approved by the superintendent or other officer designated by the supervising department. The requisition shall be the officer’s voucher therefor.
  3. Examine and register all goods delivered, according to their amount and quality, and if found to correspond with the samples and in good order and correct in charge, the officer shall certify the bills.
  4. Make a consolidated report of all purchases to the office of management and budget and the supervising department and all other transactions of such institution to such supervising department at the close of the annual period.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 29.

25-01.1-29. Shortage in supplies — Liability of officer in charge.

If it appears that there is a shortage in the supplies of any institution, the supervising department having control of such institution shall appoint a committee to investigate the cause thereof. If it appears that the shortage resulted from unavoidable loss, without the negligence of the officer designated to have charge of the supplies, such officer must be credited therewith, otherwise the officer must be charged with the amount thereof and must be required to pay the same into the state treasury within sixty days after the determination of the loss. If default is made in such payment, the officer shall forfeit the office and suit must be instituted upon the officer’s official bond to recover the same.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 30.

25-01.1-30. Monthly statement of institutional expenditures and payroll to supervising department.

An officer designated by the supervising department for each institution under its control shall prepare two monthly statements showing first the payroll and second the expenditures of every kind during the preceding month. Such statement must be signed by the officer, approved by the superintendent of the institution, and filed with the supervising department on a date fixed by the supervising department for the examination and audit of such department. Attached thereto must be the affidavit of the officer stating that the services therein specified were rendered and that the goods and other articles therein specified were purchased and received by the officer or under the officer’s direction at the institution and were purchased at a fair cash market price on credit not exceeding thirty days, that neither the officer nor any person in the officer’s behalf had any pecuniary or other interest in the purchases made, that the officer did not receive any pecuniary or other benefit therefrom, directly or indirectly, by commission, percentage, deductions or in any other manner whatever, and that the articles contained in such bill conformed in all respects to the invoiced goods received and ordered by the officer or the samples from which the goods were purchased, both in quality and quantity. Such monthly statement must be accompanied by the original invoices of all institutional purchases and a complete itemized statement of each institutional expenditure. If any invoice or statement, or any part thereof, is found objectionable, the supervising department having control of such institution shall endorse its disapproval thereon with its reasons therefor, and shall return it to the management of the institution, and when the matter disapproved of is corrected, the statement and invoice must be returned to the supervising department.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 31.

Cross-References.

Supervising department, officers and employees not to be interested in contracts, see § 25-01.1-34.

25-01.1-31. Audit of monthly statements of expenditures — Abstracts of statement — Payment.

When the monthly statement of expenditures of an institution have been audited by the supervising department having control of such institution and found correct, the supervising department shall prepare an abstract, in duplicate, showing the name, residence, and the amount due each claimant, and the institution and the fund thereof on account of which the payment shall be made. The supervising department shall deliver one copy thereof to the office of management and budget and the other copy must be retained in the office of the department. The office of management and budget, upon receipt of the certified abstract, after approval by the office of the budget, shall issue a warrant or warrants for the amount or amounts thereof and shall deliver the same to the supervising department for delivery to the proper officer of the institution, to be paid out in conformity with such rules as the supervising department may prescribe.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 32.

25-01.1-32. Examination of monthly payroll — Payment.

When the monthly statement of the payroll of an institution has been audited by the supervising department and found correct, the supervising department shall prepare an abstract, in duplicate, showing the name, residence, and the amount due each claimant, and the institution and the fund from which the payment shall be made. The supervising department shall deliver one copy thereof to the office of management and budget and the other copy must be retained in the office of the supervising department. The office of management and budget, upon receipt of the certified abstract, after approval by the office of the budget, shall issue a warrant or warrants for the amounts thereof and shall deliver the same to the supervising department for delivery to the proper officer of the institution, to be paid out in accordance with such rules as the supervising department may prescribe.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 33.

25-01.1-33. Use of patient labor in erection or repair of buildings of institutions.

All work for the erection, repair, or improvement of buildings, grounds, or properties under the control of the supervising department must be let by contract, except that the work of patients in such institutions may be utilized if approved by the superintendent of such institution as having possible benefits to the patient and not detrimental to the patient’s health or treatment and when the use of such labor will not substantially depart from the requirements of chapter 48-01.2.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 34; 1995, ch. 443, § 3; 2007, ch. 403, § 4.

25-01.1-34. Supervising department, employees, or employees of institutions not to be interested in contracts.

No member of the supervising department, nor any employee of any of the same, nor any employee of the institutions under control of the supervising department, may be interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract, purchase, or sale for or on account of any of the institutions under control of such supervising department. Any violation of the provisions of this section is sufficient cause for removal from office.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 35.

Cross-References.

Affidavit that no pecuniary or other benefit received from expenditures, see § 25-01.1-30.

Public servant’s interest in public contracts, misdemeanor, see § 12.1-13-03.

25-01.1-35. Members of supervising department and officers and employees of institutions prohibited from accepting gifts — Penalty.

No member of the supervising department, nor any officer, agent, or employee thereof, and no superintendent, officer, manager, or employee of any of the institutions under the charge and control of the supervising department, directly or indirectly, for that person or to benefit any other person, may receive or accept any gift or gratuity from any person dealing in goods, merchandise, or supplies which may be used in any of the institutions, or from any employee, servant, or agent of such person. Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Such violation is cause for removal from office.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 36; 1975, ch. 106, § 268.

25-01.1-36. Employees — Penalty for influencing appointment.

Any member of the supervising department and any officer thereof who exerts any improper influence, by solicitation or otherwise, on the superintendent of any institution under the control of the supervising department, in the selection of any employee or assistant, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 37; 1975, ch. 106, § 269.

25-01.1-37. Political influence or contribution by members of supervising department or employees of institution prohibited.

Any member or officer of the supervising department, or any officer or employee of an institution subject to control of the supervising department, who, by solicitation or otherwise, exerts the person’s influence, directly or indirectly, to induce other officers or employees of the state to adopt the person’s political views must be removed from the person’s office or position by the proper authorities.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 38.

Cross-References.

Trading in public office and political endorsement unlawful, see § 12.1-12-04.

Use of state services or property for political purposes unlawful, see § 16.1-10-02.

25-01.1-38. Child welfare — Powers and duties of supervising department.

In addition to the other duties prescribed by law, the supervising department has the following duties and powers:

  1. To accept the guardianship of the persons or children who may be committed to its care by courts of competent jurisdiction as neglected, delinquent, dependent, or defective.
  2. To make such provisions for children committed to its care as are within the resources of the supervising department, and as will afford them proper care and protection.
  3. To take the initiative in protecting and conserving the rights and interests of neglected, dependent, delinquent, illegitimate, and defective children.
  4. To act as parole officers of juveniles upon the request of courts of the state to which dependent, neglected, handicapped, or delinquent children may be committed.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 39.

Cross-References.

Guardianship, see N.D.C.C. ch. 30.1-27.

State Youth Authority, see N.D.C.C. ch. 27-21.

Uniform Juvenile Court Act, see N.D.C.C. ch. 27-20.

CHAPTER 25-01.2 Developmental Disability

25-01.2-01. Definitions. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

In this chapter, unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires:

  1. “Applicant” means an entity that has requested licensure from the department.
  2. “Department” means the department of human services.
  3. “Developmental disability” means a severe, chronic disability of an individual which:
    1. Is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or combination of mental and physical impairments, including Down syndrome;
    2. Is manifested before the individual attains age twenty-two;
    3. Is likely to continue indefinitely;
    4. Results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of the following areas of major life activity:
      1. Self-care;
      2. Receptive and expressive language;
      3. Learning;
      4. Mobility;
      5. Self-direction;
      6. Capacity for independent living; and
      7. Economic sufficiency; and
    5. Reflects the individual’s needs for a combination and sequence of special, interdisciplinary, or generic care, treatment, or other services which are of lifelong or extended duration and are individually planned and coordinated.
  4. “Individualized setting” means a setting where an individual owns or rents the individual’s residence and a public or private agency or organization provides services to an individual with a developmental disability.
  5. “Institution or facility” means any school, hospital, residence center, group home, or any other setting operated by any public or private agency or organization, that provides services to an individual with a developmental disability.
  6. “Least restrictive appropriate setting” means that setting that allows an individual with a developmental disability to develop and realize the individual’s fullest potential and enhances the individual’s ability to cope with the individual’s environment without unnecessarily curtailing fundamental personal liberties.
  7. “License” means authorization by the department to provide services to individuals with developmental disabilities, pursuant to chapter 25-16.
  8. “Service or services to an individual with a developmental disability” means services provided by any public or private agency or organization, directed toward the alleviation of a developmental disability or toward the social, personal, physical, or economic habilitation or rehabilitation of an individual with a developmental disability.

Source:

S.L. 1981, ch. 294, § 1; 1983, ch. 312, § 1; 2015, ch. 200, § 2, eff August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 207, § 1, eff August 1, 2017; 2017, ch. 208, § 1, eff August 1, 2017.

Notes to Decisions

Developmentally Disabled.

Where the evidence showed that a nine-year old boy’s adjustment to social situations, self-care and self-control were substantially below that of his peers, and his I.Q. was so high as to override any conclusion that his inability to measure up to his peers was due to mental retardation, he was adjudged developmentally disabled as the phrase is used in this section. Association for Retarded Citizens v. Sinner, 115 F.R.D. 28, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1462 (D.N.D. 1987).

Federal Statute Comparison.

This section, which defines developmental disability is identical to the federal statute except that the format is improved and in place of the phrase “economic self-sufficiency” this section uses the phrase “economic sufficiency”; therefore, the two statutes have identical meanings. Association for Retarded Citizens v. Sinner, 115 F.R.D. 28, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1462 (D.N.D. 1987).

Invalid Regulations.

Chapters of DHR’s Manual, which prescribed the method to determine who may be appropriately served by the Developmental Disabilities Division and served to identify the members of the plaintiff class in ARC v. Olson and others who may be appropriately served, did not deal only with internal management of the department so as to be exempt from the rulemaking requirements of Chapter 28-32 pursuant to the definition of “rule” in section 28-32-01. And because these chapters were not adopted in accordance with Chapter 28-32, they were invalid, and the department’s denials of applications for case management services were ineffective. Mullins v. North Dakota Dep't of Human Servs., 454 N.W.2d 732, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 107 (N.D. 1990).

Law Reviews.

The Right to Treatment for Developmentally Disabled Persons: Reassessment of an Evolving Legal and Scientific Interface, 63 N.D. L. Rev. 7 (1987).

25-01.2-01. Definitions. [Effective September 1, 2022]

In this chapter, unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires:

  1. “Applicant” means an entity that has requested licensure from the department.
  2. “Department” means the department of health and human services.
  3. “Developmental disability” means a severe, chronic disability of an individual which:
    1. Is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or combination of mental and physical impairments, including Down syndrome;
    2. Is manifested before the individual attains age twenty-two;
    3. Is likely to continue indefinitely;
    4. Results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of the following areas of major life activity:
      1. Self-care;
      2. Receptive and expressive language;
      3. Learning;
      4. Mobility;
      5. Self-direction;
      6. Capacity for independent living; and
      7. Economic sufficiency; and
    5. Reflects the individual’s needs for a combination and sequence of special, interdisciplinary, or generic care, treatment, or other services which are of lifelong or extended duration and are individually planned and coordinated.
  4. “Individualized setting” means a setting where an individual owns or rents the individual’s residence and a public or private agency or organization provides services to an individual with a developmental disability.
  5. “Institution or facility” means any school, hospital, residence center, group home, or any other setting operated by any public or private agency or organization, that provides services to an individual with a developmental disability.
  6. “Least restrictive appropriate setting” means that setting that allows an individual with a developmental disability to develop and realize the individual’s fullest potential and enhances the individual’s ability to cope with the individual’s environment without unnecessarily curtailing fundamental personal liberties.
  7. “License” means authorization by the department to provide services to individuals with developmental disabilities, pursuant to chapter 25-16.
  8. “Service or services to an individual with a developmental disability” means services provided by any public or private agency or organization, directed toward the alleviation of a developmental disability or toward the social, personal, physical, or economic habilitation or rehabilitation of an individual with a developmental disability.

Source:

S.L. 1981, ch. 294, § 1; 1983, ch. 312, § 1; 2015, ch. 200, § 2, eff August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 207, § 1, eff August 1, 2017; 2017, ch. 208, § 1, eff August 1, 2017; 2021, ch. 352, § 272, eff September 1, 2022.

25-01.2-02. Appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation — Treatment in least restrictive appropriate setting.

All individuals with developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation for those disabilities. Treatment, services, and habilitation for individuals with a developmental disability must be provided in the least restrictive appropriate setting.

Source:

S.L. 1981, ch. 294, § 2; 2015, ch. 200, § 3, eff August 1, 2015.

Law Reviews.

United States— Mental Health —The “Bill of Rights” of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act Did Not Create Substantive Rights for the Mentally Retarded to Appropriate Treatment in the Least Restrictive Environment,58 N.D. L. Rev. 7 (1982).

The Right to Treatment for Developmentally Disabled Persons: Reassessment of an Evolving Legal and Scientific Interface, 63 N.D. L. Rev. 7 (1987).

25-01.2-03. Presumption of incompetence prohibited — Discrimination prohibited — Deprivation of constitutional, civil, or legal rights prohibited.

An individual with a developmental disability may not be presumed to be incompetent and may not be deprived of any constitutional, civil, or legal right solely because of admission to or residence at an institution, facility, or individualized setting or solely because of receipt of services to individuals with developmental disabilities. However, nothing in this section may be construed to limit or modify section 16.1-01-04. The constitutional, civil, or legal rights which may not be varied or modified under the provisions of this section include:

  1. The right to vote at elections;
  2. The free exercise of religion;
  3. The right of reasonable opportunities to interact with members of the opposite sex; and
  4. The right to confidential handling of personal and medical records.

Source:

S.L. 1981, ch. 294, § 3; 1983, ch. 82, § 50; 2015, ch. 200, § 4, eff August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 207, § 2, eff August 1, 2017.

25-01.2-04. Communication rights.

  1. Except as provided in this section, every individual with a developmental disability who resides in an institution, facility, or individualized setting has the right of private, unimpeded, and uncensored communication, including visitation, with persons of the individual’s choice.
  2. A public or private agency or organization licensed by the department to provide services to an individual with a developmental disability shall document any restrictions of these rights in the individual’s person-centered service plan.
  3. A public or private agency or organization not licensed by the department may establish in writing reasonable times and places for use of telephones and for visits, provided that an individual’s ability to contact an attorney, guardian, or custodian, may not be restricted and provided that any rules or restrictions must be posted in each institution, facility, or individualized setting.
  4. A copy of any rules or restrictions must be given to all individuals over eighteen years of age, to the parents or custodians of all individuals under eighteen years of age, or guardian, upon admission.

Source:

S.L. 1981, ch. 294, § 4; 1983, ch. 312, § 2; 2015, ch. 200, § 5, eff August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 207, § 3, eff August 1, 2017.

Notes to Decisions

No Duty of Constant Supervision.

In termination of parental rights case of a retarded mother and her son, chapter did not entitle retarded mother to services that consisted of constant supervision in order for her to parent child. In Interest of J.A.L., 432 N.W.2d 876, 1988 N.D. LEXIS 232 (N.D. 1988).

25-01.2-05. Personal property.

  1. Except as provided in this subsection, every individual with a developmental disability who resides in an institution, facility, or individualized setting must be permitted to receive, possess, and use lawful personal property and must be provided with a secure, convenient, and reasonable amount of storage space for that property.
  2. A public or private agency or organization providing services to an individual with a developmental disability may restrict the possession and use of certain classes of property which may be dangerous or may harm an individual.
  3. Notice of any restrictions must be immediately given in writing to all individuals over eighteen years of age, to the parents or custodian of all individuals under eighteen years of age, or guardian.
  4. A restriction of the rights of an individual with a developmental disability which is imposed by a public or private agency or organization that provides services to the individual must be reviewed at least annually as part of the individual’s individualized habilitation, person-centered service, or individual education plan team meeting.
  5. Unless a restriction applies universally, the restricting agency or organization shall remove the restriction placed on an individual with a developmental disability at the earliest point at which the individual demonstrates the ability to mitigate the need for the restriction.
  6. When an individual is discharged from services provided from a public or private agency or organization, all of the individual’s lawful personal property that is in the custody of the public or private agency or organization must be returned to the individual.
  7. A public or private agency or organization licensed by the department to provide services to an individual with a developmental disability shall document any restrictions of these rights in the individual’s person-centered service plan.

Source:

S.L. 1981, ch. 294, § 5; 1983, ch. 312, § 3; 2017, ch. 207, § 4, eff August 1, 2017.

25-01.2-06. Labor — Wages — Money.

  1. An individual with a developmental disability who is receiving services from a public or private agency or organization must be permitted to seek employment and work in integrated settings if this is a desire of the individual.
  2. An individual with a developmental disability who performs labor that is of any consequential economic benefit to a public or private agency or organization shall receive wages that are commensurate with the value of the work performed, in accordance with applicable federal and state laws and regulations. An individual of an institution, facility, or individualized setting may be required to perform tasks of a personal housekeeping nature in the individual’s living quarters without compensation.
  3. An individual with a developmental disability may use the individual’s money as the individual chooses, unless the individual is a minor or is prohibited from doing so under a court guardianship or conservatorship order.
  4. An individual with a developmental disability may deposit money, or cause money to be deposited, in the individual’s name with a financial institution of the individual’s choice, or the individual may deposit the money with a public or private agency or organization. The public or private agency or organization may not retain any money deposited with the public or private agency or organization under this subsection, but shall hold all such funds in an account in the individual’s name. All earnings attributable to an individual’s money must accrue to the individual.
  5. No public or private agency or organization, nor any of the public or private agency or organization’s employees may be made representative payee for an individual without the individual’s informed consent.
  6. When an individual is discharged, all of the individual’s money, including earnings, must be returned to the individual.
  7. A public or private agency or organization licensed by the department to provide services to an individual with a developmental disability shall document any restrictions of these rights in the individual’s person-centered service plan.

Source:

S.L. 1981, ch. 294, § 6; 1983, ch. 312, § 4; 2017, ch. 207, § 5, eff August 1, 2017.

25-01.2-07. Medical and dental services — Application to residential institution or facility.

All residents of an institution or facility are entitled to appropriate and adequate medical and dental services, which must be provided by qualified professionals who are licensed to practice or are otherwise authorized to provide medical and dental services pursuant to state and federal law and regulations. This section applies only with respect to an institution or facility that provides residential care.

Source:

S.L. 1981, ch. 294, § 7; 1983, ch. 312, § 5.

25-01.2-08. Medication — Chemical restraints.

An individual with a developmental disability receiving services at any institution, facility, or individualized setting from a public or private agency or organization may not be administered at any time any drug or medication, or be chemically restrained or tranquilized in any manner, except upon the written authorization of a licensed physician, physician assistant, or advanced practice registered nurse when necessary and appropriate as an element of the service being received or as a treatment of any medical or physical condition in conformity with accepted standards for that treatment. The nature, amount of, and reasons for the administration of any drug or medication must be promptly recorded in the individual’s medical record. A public or private agency or organization licensed by the department to provide services to an individual with a developmental disability shall document any restrictions of these rights in the individual’s person-centered service plan.

Source:

S.L. 1981, ch. 294, § 8; 2015, ch. 200, § 6, eff August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 207, § 6, eff August 1, 2017.

25-01.2-09. Punishment — Seclusion — Restraints — Psychosurgery — Sterilization — Shock treatment.

An individual with a developmental disability receiving services at any institution, facility, or individualized setting from a public or private agency or organization may not at any time:

  1. Be subjected to any corporal punishment or shock treatment.
  2. Be secluded, except to ensure immediate physical safety of the individual or others.
  3. Be restrained, except to ensure immediate physical safety of the individual or others.
  4. Be subjected to psychosurgery, sterilization, medical behavioral research, or pharmacological research, except in conformity with an order of a court of competent jurisdiction. Under no circumstances may an individual receiving treatment be subjected to hazardous or intrusive experimental research that is not directly related to the specific goals of that individual’s treatment program.
  5. Be subjected to electroconvulsive therapy without that individual’s or guardian’s written and informed consent. If the recipient of services is a minor, the recipient’s parent, custodian, or guardian may provide informed consent for that treatment, which the parent, custodian, or guardian believes to be in the recipient’s best interests.

Source:

S.L. 1981, ch. 294, § 9; 2015, ch. 200, § 7, eff August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 207, § 7, eff August 1, 2017; 2021, ch. 220, § 1, eff August 1, 2021.

Law Reviews.

A Study of Guardianship in North Dakota, 60 N.D. L. Rev. 45 (1984).

25-01.2-10. Seclusion or physical restraint — Administrator to be notified.

  1. Whenever an individual with a developmental disability receiving services from a public or private agency or organization not licensed by the department, is placed in seclusion or is physically restrained, the public or private agency or organization administrator or the administrator’s representative must be notified and shall determine if the isolation or restraint is necessary. The isolation or restraint may be continued only upon written order of the administrator or the administrator’s representative and for a period of not more than twenty-four hours. Any individual who is in seclusion or who is physically restrained must be checked by an attendant at least once every thirty minutes.
  2. A public or private agency or organization licensed by the department to provide services to an individual with a developmental disability may not place an individual in seclusion. In order to use physical restraints, the restraint must be in compliance with the individual’s person-centered service plan or done in accordance with the public or private agency’s or organization’s emergency restraint policy.

Source:

S.L. 1981, ch. 294, § 10; 2017, ch. 207, § 8, eff August 1, 2017.

25-01.2-11. Psychosurgery, sterilization, or research — Court order required — Hearing — Right to attorney at public expense.

A court of competent jurisdiction may issue the orders required for the procedures or treatments in subsection 4 of section 25-01.2-09 upon application of the party alleging the necessity of the procedure, the individual who is receiving or is entitled to receive the treatment, the parents or custodian of the individual under eighteen years of age, or guardian, following a hearing on the application.

  1. The individual receiving or entitled to treatment shall:
    1. Receive prior notice of the hearing;
    2. Have the right and the opportunity to present evidence; and
    3. Have the right to be confronted with and to cross-examine witnesses.
  2. If the individual with a developmental disability is indigent, counsel shall be provided at public expense not less than ten days before the hearing.
  3. The burden of proof is on the party alleging the necessity of the procedure or treatment.
  4. An order allowing the procedure or treatment may not be granted unless the party alleging the necessity of the procedure or treatment proves by clear and convincing evidence that the procedure is in the best interest of the recipient and that no less drastic measures are feasible.

Source:

S.L. 1981, ch. 294, § 11; 1983, ch. 312, § 6; 2007, ch. 119, § 9; 2015, ch. 200, § 8, eff August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 207, § 9, eff August 1, 2017.

Law Reviews.

A Study of Guardianship in North Dakota, 60 N.D. L. Rev. 45 (1984).

25-01.2-12. Diet.

Every individual with a developmental disability receiving residential services in an institution, facility, or individualized setting, must be allowed access to food at any time and meal choices must be provided. Any public or private agency or organization licensed by the department to provide services to an individual with a developmental disability shall document in the individual’s person-centered service plan any restrictions on access to or choice of food because of health and safety concerns.

Source:

S.L. 1981, ch. 294, § 12; 1983, ch. 312, § 7; 2017, ch. 207, § 10, eff August 1, 2017.

25-01.2-13. Education.

Every child with a developmental disability is entitled to a free and appropriate education in the least restrictive appropriate setting in accordance with chapter 15.1-32.

Source:

S.L. 1981, ch. 294, § 13; 2001, ch. 161, § 25; 2015, ch. 200, § 9, eff August 1, 2015.

25-01.2-14. Individualized habilitation, person-centered service, or individual education plan — Contents.

Any public or private agency or organization that provides services to an individual with a developmental disability must have a written, individualized habilitation, person-centered service, or individual educational plan developed and put into effect for each individual for whom that public or private agency or organization is primarily responsible for the delivery, or coordinating the delivery, of services. A plan required under this section must:

  1. Be developed and put into effect within thirty days following admission of the individual.
  2. Be reviewed and updated from time to time, but no less than annually.
  3. Include a statement of the long-term habilitation or education goals for the individual and the intermediate objectives relating to the attainment of those goals. The objectives must be stated specifically, in sequence, and in behavioral or other terms that provide measurable indices of progress.
  4. State an objective criteria and an evaluation procedure and schedule for determining whether the objectives and goals are being achieved.
  5. Describe the personnel necessary for the provision of the services described in the plan.
  6. Specify the date of initiation and the anticipated duration of each service to be provided.
  7. State whether the individual with a developmental disability appears to need a guardian and determine the type of protection needed by the individual based on the individual’s actual mental and adaptive limitations and other conditions which may warrant the appointment of a guardian. Any member of the individual habilitation, person-centered service, or individual educational plan team may petition, or notify any interested person of the need to petition, for a finding of incapacity and appointment of a guardian.

Source:

S.L. 1981, ch. 294, § 14; 1983, ch. 312, § 8; 1983, ch. 313, § 2; 2015, ch. 200, § 10, eff August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 207, § 11, eff August 1, 2017.

Law Reviews.

A Study of Guardianship in North Dakota, 60 N.D. L. Rev. 45 (1984).

25-01.2-15. Right to refuse services.

An adult recipient of services, parents or custodian if the recipient is a minor, or the recipient’s guardian, must be given the opportunity to refuse generally accepted behavioral health or developmental disability services, including medication, unless those services are necessary to prevent the recipient from causing serious harm to the recipient or to others. If services are refused, the recipient, guardian, or parent or custodian of a minor must be informed of alternate services available, the risks of those alternate services, and the possible consequences to the recipient of the refusal of generally accepted services.

Source:

S.L. 1981, ch. 294, § 15; 2017, ch. 207, § 12, eff August 1, 2017.

25-01.2-16. Notice of rights.

Any public or private agency or organization that provides services to an individual with a developmental disability in an institution or facility shall post conspicuously in public areas a summary of the rights that are set out in this chapter. In addition, upon commencement of services or as soon after commencement as the recipient’s condition permits, every recipient who is eighteen years of age or older, the parents or custodian of all recipients under eighteen years of age, and the guardian must be given written notice of the rights guaranteed by this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 1981, ch. 294, § 16; 2017, ch. 207, § 13, eff August 1, 2017.

25-01.2-17. Enforcement of rights.

Every individual with a developmental disability is entitled to enforce any of the rights guaranteed by this chapter by civil action or any other remedy available by common law or statute. In any proceeding to enforce these rights, the court may, in its discretion, award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to a successful plaintiff. An individual with a developmental disability who is successful in an administrative proceeding may also be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Any award of attorney’s fees and costs must be in addition to any actual or punitive damages to which the individual may be entitled.

Source:

S.L. 1981, ch. 294, § 17; 2015, ch. 200, § 11, eff August 1, 2015.

Notes to Decisions

Attorney’s Fees.

District court did not abuse its discretion when it denied plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees and costs. Plaintiff did not obtain a declaration that a right guaranteed by the Developmental Disability Act was violated, nor did plaintiff obtain injunctive relief to enforce any type of right. Neppel v. Dev. Homes, Inc., 2021 ND 5, 953 N.W.2d 642, 2021 N.D. LEXIS 9 (N.D. 2021).

25-01.2-18. Authority to adopt rules. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

The director of the state department of human services may adopt, in accordance with chapter 28-32, any rules necessary to implement this chapter. The superintendent of public instruction may adopt rules to implement this chapter in schools. The rules adopted may not restrict or limit the rights guaranteed by this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 1981, ch. 294, § 18; 1983, ch. 312, § 9.

Notes to Decisions

Invalid Regulations.

Chapters of DHR’s Manual, which prescribed the method to determine who may be appropriately served by the Developmental Disabilities Division and served to identify the members of the plaintiff class in ARC v. Olson and others who may be appropriately served, did not deal only with internal management of the department so as to be exempt from the rulemaking requirements of N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32 pursuant to the definition of “rule” in section 28-32-01. And because these chapters were not adopted in accordance with N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32, they were invalid, and the department’s denials of applications for case management services as a result of the application of those regulations were ineffective. Mullins v. North Dakota Dep't of Human Servs., 454 N.W.2d 732, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 107 (N.D. 1990).

25-01.2-18. Authority to adopt rules. [Effective September 1, 2022]

The department of health and human services may adopt, in accordance with chapter 28-32, any rules necessary to implement this chapter. The superintendent of public instruction may adopt rules to implement this chapter in schools. The rules adopted may not restrict or limit the rights guaranteed by this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 1981, ch. 294, § 18; 1983, ch. 312, § 9; 2021, ch. 352, § 273, eff September 1, 2022.

CHAPTER 25-01.3 Committee on Protection and Advocacy

25-01.3-01. Definitions.

In sections 25-01.3-01 through 25-01.3-12, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Abuse” means:
    1. Willful use of offensive, abusive, or demeaning language by a caretaker that causes mental anguish of any person with developmental disabilities;
    2. Knowing, reckless, or intentional acts or failures to act which cause injury or death to a developmentally disabled or mentally ill person or which placed that person at risk of injury or death;
    3. Rape or sexual assault of a developmentally disabled or mentally ill person;
    4. Corporal punishment or striking of a developmentally disabled or mentally ill person;
    5. Unauthorized use or the use of excessive force in the placement of bodily restraints on a developmentally disabled or mentally ill person; and
    6. Use of bodily or chemical restraints on a developmentally disabled or mentally ill person which is not in compliance with federal or state laws and administrative regulations.
  2. “Advocacy” means action to assist or represent a person or group of persons with developmental disabilities or mental illnesses in securing their rights, obtaining needed services, investigating complaints, and removing barriers to identified needs.
  3. “Advocate” means an employee of the project.
  4. “Caretaker” means a person, organization, association, or facility who has assumed legal responsibility or a contractual obligation for the care of a person with developmental disabilities or mental illness, or a parent, spouse, sibling, other relative, or person who has voluntarily assumed responsibility for the person’s care.
  5. “Committee” means the committee on protection and advocacy.
  6. “Complaint” means an allegation of a violation of human or legal rights, or a lack of needed services, which is not a report of abuse, neglect, or exploitation.
  7. “Developmental disability” is a disability as defined in section 25-01.2-01.
  8. “Eligibility for services” means persons eligible for services of the project, including:
    1. An adult with developmental disabilities.
    2. An adult suffering from a mental illness who is an inpatient or resident in a facility rendering care or treatment, even if the location of the person is unknown.
    3. An adult suffering from a mental illness who is in the process of being admitted to a facility rendering care or treatment, including persons being transported to such a facility.
    4. An adult suffering from a mental illness who within the last ninety days was an inpatient or resident of a facility rendering care or treatment.
    5. A child with developmental disabilities or a child with mental illness who meets the criteria of subdivision b, c, or d is eligible for advocacy services.
    6. A child with developmental disabilities or mental illness who is not an abused or neglected child as defined in chapter 50-25.1 is eligible for protective services.
  9. “Exploitation”, when committed by a caretaker or relative of, or any person in a fiduciary relationship with, a person with developmental disabilities or mental illness, means:
    1. The taking or misuse of property or resources of a person with developmental disabilities or mental illness by means of undue influence, breach of fiduciary relationship, deception, harassment, criminal coercion, theft, or other unlawful or improper means;
    2. The use of the services of a person with developmental disabilities or mental illness without just compensation; or
    3. The use of a person with developmental disabilities or mental illness for the entertainment or sexual gratification of others under circumstances that cause degradation, humiliation, or mental anguish to the person with developmental disabilities or mental illness.
  10. “Facility” means a school, residence center, group home, nursing home, foster home, boarding home, or other facility operated by any public or private agency, organization, or institution, which provides services to a person with developmental disabilities or mental illness.
  11. “Individually identifiable health information” and “personal representative” have the meaning set forth in title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, part 160, section 103 and part 164, section 5-02, subsection g, respectively.
  12. “Mental health professional” means a mental health professional as defined in section 25-03.1-02.
  13. “Mental illness” means significant mental illness or emotional impairment as determined by a mental health professional.
  14. “Neglect” means:
    1. Inability of a person with developmental disabilities or mental illness to provide food, shelter, clothing, health care, or services necessary to maintain the mental and physical health of that person;
    2. Failure by any caretaker of a person with developmental disabilities or mental illness to meet, either by commission or omission, any statutory obligation, court order, administrative rule or regulation, policy, procedure, or minimally accepted standard for care of persons with developmental disabilities or mental illnesses;
    3. Negligent act or omission by any caretaker which causes injury or death to a person with developmental disabilities or mental illness or which places that person at risk of injury or death;
    4. Failure by any caretaker, who is required by law or administrative rule, to establish or carry out an appropriate individual program or treatment plan for a person with developmental disabilities or mental illness;
    5. Failure by any caretaker to provide adequate nutrition, clothing, or health care to a person with developmental disabilities or mental illness;
    6. Failure by any caretaker to provide a safe environment for a person with developmental disabilities or mental illness; and
    7. Failure by any caretaker to maintain adequate numbers of appropriately trained staff at a facility providing care and services for persons with developmental disabilities or mental illnesses.
  15. “Other appropriate remedies” means remedies achieved through alternative dispute resolution, such as discussion, education, conciliation, and mediation.
  16. “Project” means the protection and advocacy project.
  17. “Protective services” means actions to assist persons with developmental disabilities or mental illnesses who are unable to manage their own resources or to protect themselves from abuse, neglect, exploitation, or other hazards.
  18. “Report” means a verbal or written communication, including an anonymous communication, alleging the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a person with developmental disabilities or mental illness.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 333, § 1; 2003, ch. 211, § 14; 2021, ch. 221, § 1, eff August 1, 2021.

25-01.3-02. Committee on protection and advocacy.

  1. The committee on protection and advocacy in its capacity of supervising and directing the project shall operate independently of the governor and any state agency that provides treatment, services, or habilitation to persons with disabilities or mental illnesses.
  2. The committee consists of seven members who:
    1. Meet federal eligibility requirements for membership;
    2. Do not provide direct treatment, nonadvocacy services, or habilitation to address a need related to a disability or a mental illness;
    3. Do not hold an interest, whether as an officer, director, employee, or otherwise, in an entity that provides direct treatment, nonadvocacy services, or habilitation to address a need related to a disability or a mental illness; and
      1. Broadly represent persons served by the protection and advocacy project; or
      2. Are knowledgeable about the needs of persons served by the protection and advocacy project.
  3. The appointments and terms of committee members are as follows:
    1. The governor shall appoint two committee members for two-year terms, beginning on August first in each even-numbered year.
    2. The legislative management shall appoint one member from each house of the legislative assembly for two-year terms, beginning on August first in each odd-numbered year.
    3. The governing board of the arc of North Dakota shall appoint one committee member for a three-year term, beginning August first in each year that is evenly divisible by three.
    4. The governing board of a North Dakota nonprofit advocacy group for people with disabilities shall appoint one committee member for a three-year term, beginning on August first in each year that is divisible by three with a remainder of one. Whenever an appointment to this position is to be made, the other members of the committee shall select a North Dakota nonprofit advocacy group for people with disabilities to make this appointment.
    5. The governing board of the mental health association in North Dakota shall appoint one committee member for a three-year term, beginning on August first in each year that is divisible by three with a remainder of two.
  4. Each committee member appointed by a North Dakota nonprofit advocacy group for people with disabilities must be:
    1. An individual with disabilities who is eligible for services; or
    2. A parent, family member, guardian, advocate, or other authorized representative of an individual with disabilities who is eligible for services.
  5. A member may not serve more than six consecutive years.
  6. A member’s term ends on July thirty-first in the last year of the term and a member shall serve until a successor has been appointed.
  7. If any vacancy occurs on the committee, the appointing authority shall appoint an individual to fill the vacancy for the remainder of the term. If the federal government designates a member ineligible, the appointing body shall fill the vacancy for the remainder of the term. Any vacancy on the committee must be filled within sixty days after the date on which the vacancy occurs.
  8. The committee is responsible for and shall adopt rules for the administrative supervision and direction and for the planning, design, implementation, and functioning of the project.
  9. The committee shall develop a formal process to review complaints from providers or other persons concerning protection and advocacy activities.
  10. The governor, upon compliance with federal law and regulations, may redesignate the agency responsible for carrying out the responsibilities of the project under this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 333, § 2; 1995, ch. 267, § 1; 1999, ch. 249, § 1; 2007, ch. 255, §§ 1, 2; 2009, ch. 482, § 17.

25-01.3-03. Director — Administrative authority.

The committee shall appoint a director, who serves at the will of the committee. The committee shall set the salary of the director within the limits of the amount appropriated for salaries by the legislative assembly. The director shall employ necessary staff, including advocates, who must be classified under the state personnel merit system. The director and other employees of the project are entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred in carrying out their duties at the same rate and in the same manner as other state officials and employees. The director, with the advice and consent of the committee, may adopt rules for administration of the project, the conduct of its employees, the performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of the records, documents, and property pertaining to the committee. The director shall submit to the committee bimonthly reports concerning the status of revenue, expenditures, and protection or advocacy efforts engaged in by project personnel.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 333, § 3.

Law Reviews.

Summary of significant decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court in 1990 relating to mental health law, 66 N.D. L. Rev. 753 (1990).

25-01.3-04. Reporting of abuse, neglect, or exploitation — Immunity for good-faith reports.

  1. Every medical, mental health, or developmental disabilities professional, educational professional, police or law enforcement officer, or caretaker having knowledge of or reasonable cause to suspect that an adult with developmental disabilities or mental illness coming before the individual providing services in that individual’s official or professional capacity is abused, neglected, or exploited shall report the circumstances of that abuse, neglect, or exploitation to the project. For the purposes of this section:
    1. “Educational professional” means a professional providing educational services either at a school, academy, or other educational facility, or at a private facility or residence, as a teacher, professor, tutor, aide, administrator, or other education professional.
    2. “Medical, mental health, or developmental disabilities professional” means a professional providing health care or services to persons with developmental disabilities or mental illnesses, on a full-time or part-time basis, on an individual basis or at the request of a caretaker, and includes a physician, medical examiner, coroner, dentist, optometrist, chiropractor, nurse, physical therapist, mental health professional, hospital personnel, nursing home personnel, congregate care personnel, social worker, or any other person providing medical, mental health, or developmental disabilities services.
  2. An individual not listed in subsection 1 having knowledge of or reasonable cause to suspect that an adult with developmental disabilities or mental illness is abused, neglected, or exploited may report those circumstances to the committee or the project.
  3. An individual other than the alleged perpetrator participating in good faith in the making of a report, assisting an investigator, furnishing information to an advocate or other employee of the committee, or in providing protective services under this section, is immune from any liability, civil or criminal, that otherwise might result from the reporting of the alleged case of abuse, neglect, or exploitation.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 333, § 4.

25-01.3-05. Retaliation — Presumptions — Penalty.

  1. An employer that imposes any form of discipline or retaliation against an employee solely because the employee reported having knowledge of or reasonable cause to suspect that a person with developmental disabilities or mental illness was abused, neglected, or exploited is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
  2. A rebuttable presumption that retaliation has occurred arises when an adverse action is taken within ninety days of the report. For the purpose of this subsection, “adverse action” means any action taken against the reporter or the person with developmental disabilities or mental illness about whom the report was made by a facility or person involved in a report because of the report. Adverse action includes:
    1. Discharge from or termination of the employment of the employee.
    2. Demotion, negative work performance evaluation, reduction of hours worked or benefits or work privileges, or reduction in remuneration for services of the employee.
    3. Restriction or prohibition of access by the employee to a facility or to the residents of the facility.
    4. Discharge or transfer of the person with developmental disabilities or mental illness from or within a facility or from the supervision of a caretaker.
    5. Failure of a facility to perform customary services for the person with developmental disabilities or mental illness.
  3. It is a defense to any charge brought under this section that the good faith of the individual making the report, described in subsection 3 of section 25-01.3-04, has been rebutted, but only as to actions taken against the employee.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 333, § 5.

25-01.3-06. Authority of project — Annual report.

  1. Pursuant to rules adopted by the committee, the project, within the limits of legislative appropriations, shall provide advocacy and protective services for persons with developmental disabilities and persons with mental illnesses. The rules adopted by the committee relating to the need for the consent of the client must balance the rights of persons with developmental disabilities or mental illnesses to privacy and to refuse services under section 25-01.3-11 with the committee’s duties to protect the human and legal rights of persons eligible for services and to monitor facilities for compliance with federal and state laws and rules.
  2. The project may:
    1. Represent persons with developmental disabilities or mental illnesses so the persons may realize the rights and services to which they are entitled.
    2. Investigate complaints and reports if the alleged incidents are reported to the committee or the project or if there is probable cause to believe the incidents occurred.
    3. Monitor individual habilitation or treatment plans, program plans, educational plans, facilities and programs, and all other services and care provided to persons with developmental disabilities or mental illnesses.
    4. Employ counsel to represent clients to pursue legal, administrative, voluntary compliance, and other appropriate remedies to ensure the protection of the rights of persons with developmental disabilities or mental illnesses, and employ counsel to represent the project or the committee when, in the opinion of the attorney general, a conflict of interest under the North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct exists between the office of attorney general and the committee or the project, and the conflict cannot be avoided by the appointment of counsel under subsection 3 of section 54-12-01 or section 54-12-08.
    5. Pursue legal, administrative, voluntary compliance, and other appropriate remedies to ensure the protection and the rights of persons with developmental disabilities or mental illnesses. Before instituting legal action in a federal or state court on behalf of a person with developmental disabilities or mental illnesses, the project shall exhaust in a timely manner all administrative remedies if appropriate. If, in pursuing administrative remedies, the project determines a matter with respect to that person will not be resolved within a reasonable time, the project may pursue alternative remedies, including the initiation of a legal action with the consent of the committee. However, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to initiation of a legal action if that action is instituted to prevent or eliminate imminent serious harm to a person with developmental disabilities or mental illnesses.
    6. Sign a criminal complaint necessary to protect the interests of a person with developmental disabilities or mental illness, or group of persons with developmental disabilities or mental illnesses, who appear to have been victimized by or subjected to criminal conduct.
    7. Review each annual survey report and plan of corrections for cited deficiencies made pursuant to titles XVIII and XIX of the Social Security Act with respect to any facility rendering care or treatment to persons with developmental disabilities or mental illnesses.
    8. Provide the public, on an annual basis, an opportunity to comment on the priorities established by, and the activities of the committee.
    9. Establish a grievance procedure for clients or prospective clients to ensure persons with developmental disabilities or mental illnesses have full access to the services of the committee.
    10. Prepare an annual report to the legislative assembly and the governor describing the priorities, activities, accomplishments, and expenditures of the system.
    11. Provide information on and referral to programs and services addressing the needs of persons with developmental disabilities or mental illnesses.
    12. Accept and administer gifts, grants, or contracts with individuals or organizations, including the federal government, on such terms as may be beneficial to the state.
    13. Contract with any person, public or private, to carry out any responsibilities of the project under this chapter and section 25-01-01.1.
  3. The project shall use the report, complaint, and investigation process to assess the opportunity for voluntary compliance and other appropriate remedies.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 333, § 6; 1995, ch. 267, § 2; 1997, ch. 51, § 16; 2021, ch. 221, § 2, eff August 1, 2021.

25-01.3-07. Access to records, facilities, and persons — Rules.

A caretaker shall provide the project access to the person with developmental disabilities or mental illness and to the facility where the person resides. The committee shall adopt rules regarding access to the records of a client for the purpose of investigating complaints or reports and monitoring service delivery systems. Any rules adopted under this section must comply with subsection 4 of section 25-01.2-03, section 25-16-07, 42 U.S.C. 6042, and 42 U.S.C. 10805.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 333, § 7.

25-01.3-08. Investigation of reports and complaints.

  1. Upon receipt of any report of suspected abuse, neglect, exploitation, or a complaint made pursuant to sections 25-01.3-01 through 25-01.3-12, the project shall assess the need for an investigation of the report or complaint. If the project determines the report or complaint is warranted, the project shall investigate or cause the report or complaint to be investigated. For the purpose of investigating a report or a complaint, the project may:
    1. Interview the alleged victim who has developmental disabilities or mental illness at any time of the day or night, with or without notice.
    2. Interview any other individual who may have knowledge of the situation.
    3. Access all locations under the control of the caretaker where records or other information exist, including the residence of the alleged victim.
    4. Coordinate investigations with other agencies, departments, or other entities providing services necessary or advisable for the person with developmental disabilities or mental illness.
    5. Delegate investigatory powers to the extent necessary and appropriate to any individual or entity.
  2. This section does not limit the responsibilities of law enforcement agencies to enforce the laws of this state or preclude law enforcement agencies from investigating, as appropriate, any alleged criminal conduct.
  3. This section does not prohibit the project from assessing the opportunity for voluntary compliance and other appropriate remedies in the course of investigating a report or complaint.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 333, § 8; 2021, ch. 221, § 3, eff August 1, 2021.

25-01.3-09. Conflict of interest.

In any situation in which the project is representing, or has been requested to represent, two or more persons with developmental disabilities or mental illnesses, if those persons have conflicting interests in the matter for which the project is requested to act, the project may provide services to the first person making application for services for that purpose. Any additional person, with conflicting interests, may be referred to another agency or individuals for assistance.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 333, § 9.

25-01.3-10. Confidentiality and privileged information.

  1. All information relating to an individual with a disability, including individually identifiable health information, that is in the possession of the committee, project, or any advocate is confidential and is not subject to disclosure, except:
    1. If an authorization for disclosure is given in writing by each individual with a disability who may be identifiable from the information, or that individual’s personal representative;
    2. In a judicial proceeding when ordered by the presiding judge;
    3. To a law enforcement officer for a law enforcement purpose, a health oversight agency, or, at the discretion of the committee, to any other legally constituted board or agency serving the interests of an individual with a disability for any other purpose authorized by this chapter, or any other state or federal law; or
    4. To the parents of a minor who is an eligible person under sections 25-01.3-01 through 25-01.3-12 or legal guardians of the person with a disability except that no information may be disclosed to a person with mental illness who is the subject of the information when such a disclosure is prohibited by state or federal law.
  2. Unless ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction, the name of an individual who in good faith makes a report or complaint may not be disclosed by the committee or the project.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 333, § 10; 2003, ch. 211, § 15.

25-01.3-11. Refusal of services — Alternatives.

If a person with developmental disabilities or mental illness refuses an offer of services from the project and, in the judgment of the project, the person’s life, safety, or health is seriously jeopardized, the project may petition a court of competent jurisdiction for the appointment of a guardian or conservator. The project may also refer the matter to an appropriate agency, department, or authority for possible civil action on behalf of the person with mental illness or developmental disabilities, or for criminal prosecution of any individual abusing, neglecting, or exploiting a person with mental illness or developmental disabilities.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 333, § 11.

25-01.3-12. Penalties.

  1. A person who permits or allows the unauthorized disclosure of reports or complaints obtained under sections 25-01.3-01 through 25-01.3-12 is guilty of an infraction.
  2. A person who willfully fails to report the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of any person with developmental disabilities or mental illness, if required to report pursuant to sections 25-01.3-01 through 25-01.3-12, is guilty of an infraction.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 333, § 12.

CHAPTER 25-02 State Hospital

25-02-01. State hospital for the mentally ill — Location — Title — Administration and control. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

An institution for the care of the mentally ill must be maintained at the city of Jamestown and must be known as the state hospital. The department of human services shall administer and control the state hospital.

Source:

S.L. 1885, ch. 68, § 1; R.C. 1895, § 984; R.C. 1899, § 984; R.C. 1905, § 1181; C.L. 1913, § 1747; R.C. 1943, § 25-0201; S.L. 1951, ch. 182, § 1; S.L. 1957, ch. 196, § 2; 1957 Supp., § 25-0201; S.L. 1985, ch. 82, § 38.

Cross-References.

Alcoholic beverages and controlled substances prohibited, see § 12-47-21.

Commitment of one found not fit to proceed, see § 12.1-04-08.

Commitment procedures, see N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.1.

Criminal charges, mental disease or defect as defense, temporary commitment, see §§ 12.1-04-04 to 12.1-04-07.

Criminal Responsibility and Post-Trial Responsibility Act, see N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-04.1.

Cruel treatment of patients a misdemeanor, see § 25-01-16.

Defense of insanity, see N.D.R.Crim.P. 12.2.

Definition of mentally ill individual, see § 25-01-01.

Definition of mentally ill person, see § 25-03.1-02.

Escape from treatment facility, see § 25-03.1-36.

Fees and expenses, see N.D.C.C. ch. 50-06.3.

Location at Jamestown, see N.D. Const., Art. IX, § 12.

Notice of defense based on mental condition, see N.D.R.Crim.P. 12.2.

Patients may fish without license, see § 20.1-03-04.

Right of state to establish custody and restraint for persons of unsound mind, see § 54-01-19.

Rights of patients, see §§ 25-02-09, 25-03.1-40, 25-03.1-41.

25-02-01. State hospital for the mentally ill — Location — Title — Administration and control. [Effective September 1, 2022]

An institution for the care of the mentally ill must be maintained at the city of Jamestown and must be known as the state hospital. The department of health and human services shall administer and control the state hospital.

Source:

S.L. 1885, ch. 68, § 1; R.C. 1895, § 984; R.C. 1899, § 984; R.C. 1905, § 1181; C.L. 1913, § 1747; R.C. 1943, § 25-0201; S.L. 1951, ch. 182, § 1; S.L. 1957, ch. 196, § 2; 1957 Supp., § 25-0201; S.L. 1985, ch. 82, § 38; 2021, ch. 352, § 274, eff September 1, 2022.

25-02-01.1. Maintenance of state hospital accreditation — Governing body membership — Rulemaking authority. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

  1. The department of human services shall seek appropriations and resources sufficient to ensure maintenance of the state hospital’s accreditation by the joint commission and certification by the centers for Medicare and Medicaid services or by similar accrediting and certifying organizations and agencies possessing hospital standards recognized by the health care industry and accepted by the department.
  2. The department, in consultation with the state hospital, shall create a state hospital governing body and shall by rules describe the powers and duties of the governing body. The department shall compensate members not employed by the department in the amount of one hundred dollars per day and reimburse members for expenses incurred in attending meetings in the amounts provided by sections 44-08-04 and 54-06-09.
  3. The governing body must be composed of the executive director of the department of human services; the director of the division of behavioral health of the department, who shall serve as chairman of the governing body; the state hospital superintendent; the state hospital medical director; a representative of the department’s fiscal administration division; a behavioral health consumer selected by the mental health association; and a legislator selected by the legislative management. The governing body may include other persons as appointed by the governing body.

Source:

S.L. 1991, ch. 292, § 1; 1995, ch. 266, § 2; 1997, ch. 432, § 16; 1999, ch. 250, § 1; 2001, ch. 12, § 25; 2009, ch. 482, § 18; 2017, ch. 209, § 1, eff August 1, 2017; 2017, ch. 57, § 6, eff August 1, 2017.

25-02-01.1. Maintenance of state hospital accreditation — Governing body membership — Rulemaking authority. [Effective September 1, 2022]

  1. The department of health and human services shall seek appropriations and resources sufficient to ensure maintenance of the state hospital’s accreditation by the joint commission and certification by the centers for Medicare and Medicaid services or by similar accrediting and certifying organizations and agencies possessing hospital standards recognized by the health care industry and accepted by the department.
  2. The department, in consultation with the state hospital, shall create a state hospital governing body and shall by rules describe the powers and duties of the governing body. The department shall compensate members not employed by the department in the amount of one hundred dollars per day and reimburse members for expenses incurred in attending meetings in the amounts provided by sections 44-08-04 and 54-06-09.
  3. The governing body must be composed of the executive director of the department of health and human services; the director of the division of behavioral health of the department, who shall serve as chairman of the governing body; the state hospital superintendent; the state hospital medical director; a representative of the department’s fiscal administration division; a behavioral health consumer selected by the mental health association; and a legislator selected by the legislative management. The governing body may include other persons as appointed by the governing body.

Source:

S.L. 1991, ch. 292, § 1; 1995, ch. 266, § 2; 1997, ch. 432, § 16; 1999, ch. 250, § 1; 2001, ch. 12, § 25; 2009, ch. 482, § 18; 2017, ch. 209, § 1, eff August 1, 2017; 2017, ch. 57, § 6, eff August 1, 2017; 2021, ch. 352, § 275, eff September 1, 2022.

25-02-02. Additional hospital for mentally ill located at Rugby. [Repealed]

Source:

S.L. 1917, ch. 146, § 1; 1925 Supp., § 1774a; R.C. 1943, § 25-0202; S.L. 1957, ch. 196, § 2; 1957 Supp., § 25-0202; S.L. 1983, ch. 82, § 51; Repealed by 2017, ch. 353, § 10, eff August 1, 2017.

25-02-03. Object of state hospital. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

The state hospital is an institution for mental diseases serving specialized populations of the mentally ill, including persons suffering from drug addiction or alcoholism. The state hospital is one component of the North Dakota mental health delivery system and serves as a resource to community-based treatment programs. The state hospital shall, pursuant to rules adopted by the department of human services, receive and care for all mentally ill persons, including persons suffering from drug addiction or alcoholism, residing within this state in accordance with this title, and shall furnish to those mentally ill persons all needed food, shelter, treatment, and support that may tend to restore their mental health or to alleviate their illness or suffering.

Source:

S.L. 1885, ch. 68, § 3; R.C. 1895, § 988; R.C. 1899, § 988; R.C. 1905, § 1185; C.L. 1913, § 1751; R.C. 1943, § 25-0203; S.L. 1957, ch. 196, § 2; 1957 Supp., § 25-0203; S.L. 1989, ch. 334, § 1; 1989, ch. 335, § 1.

Cross-References.

“Mentally ill individual” defined, see § 25-01-01.

“Mentally ill person” defined, see § 25-03.1-02.

Right of patient to treatment, see § 25-03.1-40.

25-02-03. Object of state hospital. [Effective September 1, 2022]

The state hospital is an institution for mental diseases serving specialized populations of the mentally ill, including persons suffering from drug addiction or alcoholism. The state hospital is one component of the North Dakota mental health delivery system and serves as a resource to community-based treatment programs. The state hospital shall, pursuant to rules adopted by the department of health and human services, receive and care for all mentally ill persons, including persons suffering from drug addiction or alcoholism, residing within this state in accordance with this title, and shall furnish to those mentally ill persons all needed food, shelter, treatment, and support that may tend to restore their mental health or to alleviate their illness or suffering.

Source:

S.L. 1885, ch. 68, § 3; R.C. 1895, § 988; R.C. 1899, § 988; R.C. 1905, § 1185; C.L. 1913, § 1751; R.C. 1943, § 25-0203; S.L. 1957, ch. 196, § 2; 1957 Supp., § 25-0203; S.L. 1989, ch. 334, § 1; 1989, ch. 335, § 1; 2021, ch. 352, § 276, eff September 1, 2022.

25-02-04. Superintendent to possess certain qualifications — Medical director — Employees.

The superintendent of the state hospital must be a skilled health care administrator with professional training and experience relating to the management of facilities for mentally ill and chemically dependent persons and relating to the needs of the mentally ill and chemically dependent persons. The medical director, who must be a licensed physician and board-certified psychiatrist, shall recommend appointment of all physicians and clinical staff, define their qualifications and duties, and have final authority for the organization and delivery of all medical and clinical services delivered to patients at the state hospital. The state hospital governing body has final approval of all physician and clinical staff appointments to the state hospital. The superintendent shall appoint the medical director in consultation with the supervising officer and with the approval of the governing body. If the superintendent is not a licensed physician and board-certified psychiatrist, the medical director, or a qualified designee of the medical director, shall act as the superintendent’s designee in all matters in which the superintendent’s opinion on medical or clinical treatment is required by law. Every physician on the professional staff must have a license issued by the North Dakota board of medicine.

Source:

S.L. 1885, ch. 68, § 8; 1891, ch. 132, § 1; R.C. 1895, § 992; R.C. 1899, § 992; S.L. 1905, ch. 119, § 1; R.C. 1905, § 1189; S.L. 1913, ch. 58, § 1; C.L. 1913, § 1755; S.L. 1919, ch. 145, § 1; 1925 Supp., § 1755; S.L. 1927, ch. 166, § 1; 1931, ch. 264, § 1; R.C. 1943, § 25-0205; S.L. 1945, ch. 264, § 11; 1949, ch. 314, § 12; 1953, ch. 185, § 1; 1957, ch. 196, § 2; 1957 Supp., § 25-0204; S.L. 1961, ch. 208, § 4; 1965, ch. 203, § 55; 1981, ch. 486, § 10; 1983, ch. 479, § 1; 1987, ch. 572, § 2; 1989, ch. 336, § 1; 1995, ch. 266, § 3; 1997, ch. 241, § 2; 2015, ch. 297, § 9, eff August 1, 2015.

25-02-05. Superintendent to furnish forms and bylaws to county mental health boards. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 48.

25-02-05.1. Specialists. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1957, ch. 196, § 22.

25-02-06. Nonresidents admitted to state hospital.

A resident of another state or territory may be admitted to the state hospital upon payment of the full cost of treatment of such nonresident, but no resident of another state or territory may be received for treatment to the exclusion of any resident of this state.

Source:

S.L. 1907, ch. 137, § 2; C.L. 1913, § 1761; R.C. 1943, § 25-0209; S.L. 1957, ch. 196, § 2; 1957 Supp., § 25-0206.

Cross-References.

Fees and expenses, see N.D.C.C. ch. 50-06.3.

25-02-06.1. Disposition of nonresidents — Exceptions — Reciprocal agreements.

If a person who has no legal residence in this state or whose residence is unknown is found to be a person requiring treatment in the state hospital, the person must be sent to the state hospital in the same manner, and accompanied by the same documents, as in the case of a resident of this state. The supervising department shall immediately inquire as to the residence of the person, and, if the residence is found to be in another state or country, the supervising department may arrange for transportation of the person to the place of legal residence or legal settlement. The supervising department may enter into reciprocal agreements with other states regarding the mutual exchange, return, and transportation of persons requiring treatment who are within one state but have legal residence or legal settlement in another state. The agreements may not contain any provision conflicting with any law of this state.

Source:

S.L. 1985, ch. 527, § 1.

25-02-07. Disposition of mentally ill nonresident. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1961, ch. 211, § 9.

25-02-08. Expense for care of patient. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1961, ch. 211, § 9.

25-02-09. Care of patients to be impartial.

All patients at the state hospital must be provided with equal care and treatment in accordance with the different degrees or conditions of mental and physical health.

Source:

S.L. 1879, ch. 23, § 23; R.C. 1895, § 999; R.C. 1899, § 999; R.C. 1905, § 1197; C.L. 1913, § 1763; R.C. 1943, § 25-0216; S.L. 1957, ch. 196, § 2; 1957 Supp., § 25-0209; S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 56; 1981, ch. 486, § 11.

Cross-References.

Cruel treatment of patients a misdemeanor, see § 25-01-16.

Fees and expenses, see N.D.C.C. ch. 50-06.3.

Rights of patients, see §§ 25-03.1-40, 25-03.1-41.

25-02-10. Attorney general to bring action against county. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1961, ch. 211, § 9.

25-02-11. County mental health board — Members, appointment, term, quorum. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 48.

25-02-12. Oath required of appointive members. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 48.

25-02-13. Meetings of county mental health board. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 48.

25-02-14. Duties of chairman of county mental health board. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 48.

25-02-15. Absence of member of county mental health board — Substitute. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 48.

25-02-16. Powers of county mental health board. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 48.

25-02-17. Compensation and expenses of county mental health board. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 48.

25-02-18. Nonliability of certain officers for detention of mentally ill persons. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 48.

CHAPTER 25-03 Custody and Release of the Mentally Ill [Repealed]

[Repealed by S.L. 1957, ch. 196, § 22; S.L. 1961, ch. 211, § 9; S.L. 1975, ch. 106, § 673; S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 48]

CHAPTER 25-03.1 Commitment Procedures

25-03.1-01. Legislative intent.

The provisions of this chapter are intended by the legislative assembly to:

  1. Provide prompt evaluation and treatment of persons with serious mental disorders or a substance use disorder.
  2. Safeguard individual rights.
  3. Provide continuity of care for persons with serious mental disorders or a substance use disorder.
  4. Encourage the full use of all existing agencies, professional personnel, and public funds to prevent duplication of services and unnecessary expenditures.
  5. Encourage, whenever appropriate, that services be provided within the community.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 3; 1989, ch. 149, § 2; 2019, ch. 225, § 6, eff August 1, 2019.

Cross-References.

Addiction hospitals, licensing of, see N.D.C.C. ch. 23-17.1.

City or county alcoholic counseling services, see § 5-01-05.4.

Commitment of one found not fit to proceed, see § 12.1-04-08.

Criminal charges, mental disease or defect as defense, temporary commitment, see §§ 12.1-04-04 to 12.1-04-07.

Criminal Responsibility and Post-Trial Responsibility Act, see N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-04.1.

Cruel treatment of patients a misdemeanor, see § 25-01-16.

Defense of insanity, see N.D.R.Crim.P. 12.2.

Definition of mentally ill individual, see § 25-01-01.

Definition of mentally ill person, see § 25-03.1-02.

Detoxification, detention by peace officer for, see § 5-01-05.1.

Division of alcoholism and drug abuse, see N.D.C.C. ch. 54-38.

Division of mental health and retardation, see N.D.C.C. ch. 25-10.

Fees and expenses, see N.D.C.C. ch. 50-06.3.

Fishing without license permitted, see § 20.1-03-04.

Minors, treatment for alcoholism or drug abuse without parent’s consent, see § 14-10-17.

Notice of defense based on mental condition, see N.D.R.Crim.P. 12.2.

Public institutions, see N.D. Const., Art. IX, §§ 12, 13.

Public intoxication not to be prosecuted, see § 5-01-05.2.

Right of state to establish custody and restraint for persons of unsound mind, see § 54-01-19.

Rights of patients, see §§ 25-02-09, 25-03.1-13, 25-03.1-40, 25-03.1-41.

Special care upon payment therefor, see § 25-02-09.

Notes to Decisions

Civil and Criminal Procedures Compared.

For discussion on the differences between the class of potential civil commitment candidates and the class of insanity detainees after a criminal trial, including their different standards of proof, see State v. Nording, 485 N.W.2d 781, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 103 (N.D. 1992).

Incarceration in Barred Hospital.

Incarceration in a barred hospital, for a person who does not require it for his own protection from serious harm or the protection of society from serious harm, is no different than incarceration in a barred jail. In Interest of Goodwin, 366 N.W.2d 809, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 315 (N.D. 1985).

Procedures.

Procedures established for mental health hearings by this chapter do not apply to prosecutions under N.D.C.C. ch. 39-08. State v. Chapin, 429 N.W.2d 16, 1988 N.D. App. LEXIS 7 (N.D. Ct. App. 1988).

Collateral References.

Witness in lunacy inquisition, alleged incompetent as, 22 A.L.R.2d 756.

Validity and construction of statutes providing for psychiatric examination of accused to determine mental condition, 32 A.L.R.2d 434, 444.

Report under statute providing for psychiatric examination of accused to determine mental condition, as basis for commitment to institution, 32 A.L.R.2d 434, 444.

Jury trial: constitutional right to jury trial in proceeding for adjudication of incompetency or insanity or for restoration, 33 A.L.R.2d 1145.

Counsel: right to counsel in insanity or incompetency adjudication proceedings, 87 A.L.R.2d 950.

Right, without judicial proceeding, to arrest and detain one who is, or is suspected of being, mentally deranged, 92 A.L.R.2d 570.

Malpractice liability with respect to diagnosis and treatment of mental disease, 99 A.L.R.2d 599.

Physician-patient privilege: testimony as to communications or observations as to mental condition of patient treated for other condition, 100 A.L.R.2d 648.

Malicious prosecution: liability for malicious prosecution predicated upon institution of, or conduct in connection with, insanity proceedings, 30 A.L.R.3d 455.

False imprisonment: liability for false imprisonment predicated upon institution of, or conduct in connection with, insanity proceedings, 30 A.L.R.3d 523.

Release from institution: liability of one releasing institutionalized mental patient for harm he causes, 38 A.L.R.3d 699.

Acquittal: validity of statutory provision for commitment to mental institution of one acquitted of crime on ground of insanity without formal determination of mental condition at time of acquittal, 50 A.L.R.3d 144.

Drug addiction or related mental state as defense to criminal charge, 73 A.L.R.3d 16.

Malpractice in connection with electroshock treatment, 94 A.L.R.3d 317.

Civil liability for physical measures undertaken in connection with treatment of mentally disordered patient, 8 A.L.R.4th 464.

Law Reviews.

An Old Man’s Problem, 46 N.D. L. Rev. 311.

A Study of Guardianship in North Dakota, 60 N.D. L. Rev. 45 (1984).

Summary of the 1991 North Dakota Supreme Court decision on Mental Health, 68 N.D. L. Rev. 758 (1991).

Article: The Tail Still Wags the Dog: The Pervasive and Inappropriate Influence by the Psychiatric Profession on the Civil Commitment Process, see 86 N.D. L. Rev. 259 (2010).

25-03.1-02. Definitions. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

In this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Advanced practice registered nurse” means an individual who is licensed as an advanced practice registered nurse under chapter 43-12.1 within the role of certified nurse practitioner or certified clinical nurse specialist, who has completed the requirements for a minimum of a master’s degree in psychiatric and mental health nursing from an accredited program, and who is functioning within the scope of practice in one of the population foci as approved by the state board of nursing. This chapter does not expand the scope of practice of an advanced practice registered nurse beyond the scope of practice established by the state board of nursing.
  2. “Alternative treatment order” means an involuntary outpatient order for a treatment program, other than hospitalization, which may include treatment with a prescribed medication.
  3. “Consent” means voluntary permission based upon full disclosure of facts necessary to make a decision and which is given by an individual who has the ability to understand those facts.
  4. “Court” means, except when otherwise indicated, the district court serving the county in which the respondent resides.
  5. “Department” means the department of human services.
  6. “Director” means the director of a treatment facility or the director’s designee.
  7. “Expert examiner” means a licensed physician, physician assistant, psychiatrist, psychologist trained in a clinical program, advanced practice registered nurse, or licensed addiction counselor appointed by the court to examine the respondent and to provide an evaluation of whether the respondent is a person requiring treatment.
  8. “Independent expert examiner” means a licensed physician, physician assistant, psychiatrist, psychologist trained in a clinical program, advanced practice registered nurse, or licensed addiction counselor, chosen at the request of the respondent to provide an independent evaluation of whether the respondent is a person requiring treatment.
  9. “Individual with a substance use disorder” means an individual with an illness or disorder characterized by a maladaptive pattern of usage of alcohol or drugs, or a combination thereof, resulting in social, occupational, psychological, or physical problems.
  10. “Magistrate” means the judge of the appropriate district or juvenile court or a judge assigned by the presiding judge of the judicial district.
  11. “Mental health professional” means:
    1. A psychologist with at least a master’s degree who has been either licensed or approved for exemption by the North Dakota board of psychology examiners.
    2. A social worker with a master’s degree in social work from an accredited program.
    3. An advanced practice registered nurse.
    4. A registered nurse with a minimum of two years of psychiatric clinical experience under the supervision of an expert examiner.
    5. A licensed addiction counselor.
    6. A licensed professional counselor with a master’s degree in counseling from an accredited program who has either successfully completed the advanced training beyond the master’s degree as required by the national academy of mental health counselors or a minimum of two years of clinical experience in a mental health agency or setting under the supervision of a psychiatrist or psychologist.
    7. A physician assistant.
  12. “Mentally ill person” or “person who is mentally ill” means an individual with an organic, mental, or emotional disorder that substantially impairs the capacity to use self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of personal affairs and social relations. The term does not include an individual with an intellectual disability of significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that originates during the developmental period and is associated with impairment in adaptive behavior, although an individual who is intellectually disabled may also be a person who is mentally ill. A substance use disorder does not per se constitute mental illness, although an individual with a substance use disorder may also be a person who is mentally ill.
  13. “Person requiring treatment” means a person who is mentally ill or an individual with a substance use disorder, and there is a reasonable expectation that if the individual is not treated for the mental illness or substance use disorder there exists a serious risk of harm to that individual, others, or property.
  14. “Physician assistant” means an individual licensed to practice as a physician assistant under chapter 43-17, who is authorized by the North Dakota board of medicine to practice in the field of psychiatry, holds a certification in psychiatry approved by the board, and is practicing under the supervision of a psychiatrist licensed to practice medicine in this state. This chapter does not expand the scope of practice of a physician assistant beyond the scope of practice authorized by the North Dakota board of medicine.
  15. “Private treatment facility” means any facility established under chapter 10-19.1 or 10-33 and licensed under chapter 23-16 or 50-31.
  16. “Psychiatrist” means a licensed physician who has completed a residency program in psychiatry.
  17. “Public treatment facility” means any treatment facility not falling under the definition of a private treatment facility.
  18. “Qualified service organization” means a person that provides services to a treatment facility such as data processing, bill collecting, dosage preparation, laboratory analysis, or legal, medical, accounting, or other professional services, and which agrees that in dealing with patient records, that person is bound by the confidentiality restrictions of this chapter, except as otherwise provided for by law.
  19. “Respondent” means an individual subject to petition for involuntary treatment.
  20. “Serious risk of harm” means a substantial likelihood of:
    1. Suicide, as manifested by suicidal threats, attempts, or significant depression relevant to suicidal potential;
    2. Killing or inflicting serious bodily harm on another individual or inflicting significant property damage, as manifested by acts or threats;
    3. Substantial deterioration in physical health, substantial injury, disease, or death, based upon recent poor self-control or judgment in providing one’s shelter, nutrition, or personal care; or
    4. Substantial deterioration in mental health which would predictably result in danger to that individual, others, or property, based upon:
      1. Evidence of objective facts to establish the loss of cognitive or volitional control over the individual’s thoughts or actions; or
      2. Acts or threats; patterns in the individual’s treatment history; the individual’s current condition; and other relevant factors, including the effect of the individual’s mental condition on the individual’s ability to consent.
  21. “Substantial likelihood” may take into account an individual’s history and recent behavior.
  22. “Superintendent” means the state hospital superintendent or the superintendent’s designee.
  23. “Third-party payer” means a person that pays, or agrees to pay, for diagnosis or treatment furnished to a patient on the basis of a contractual relationship with the patient or a member of the patient’s family, or on the basis of the patient’s eligibility for federal, state, or local governmental benefits, and includes any person providing audit or evaluation activities for the third-party payer.
  24. “Treatment facility” or “facility” means any hospital, including the state hospital at Jamestown, or any evaluation and treatment facility that provides directly, or by direct arrangement with other public or private agencies, emergency evaluation and treatment, outpatient care, and inpatient care to a person who is mentally ill or a person who has a substance use disorder.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 1; 1979, ch. 334, § 4; 1981, ch. 320, § 45; 1983, ch. 314, § 1; 1983, ch. 315, § 1; 1985, ch. 147, § 22; 1985, ch. 308, § 1; 1987, ch. 536, § 2; 1989, ch. 149, § 3; 1991, ch. 292, § 2; 1991, ch. 293, §§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 326, § 71; 1993, ch. 279, § 1; 1999, ch. 50, § 41; 2003, ch. 224, § 1; 2003, ch. 432, § 1; 2005, ch. 248, § 1; 2009, ch. 238, § 1; 2009, ch. 239, § 1; 2011, ch. 207, § 6; 2015, ch. 201, § 1, eff August 1, 2015; 2019, ch. 225, § 7, eff August 1, 2019; 2019, ch. 226, § 1, eff August 1, 2019.

Notes to Decisions

Burden of Proof.

The law authorizes an involuntary commitment only if the petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a person requiring treatment as defined under former subsection (10) (now subsection (13)) of this section. In Interest of M.B., 467 N.W.2d 902, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 70 (N.D. 1991).

Involuntary commitment is authorized only upon clear and convincing evidence that a respondent requires treatment. In Interest of T.A., 472 N.W.2d 226, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 120 (N.D. 1991).

A finding that the person is mentally ill is not alone sufficient to justify court-ordered treatment; the law authorizes an involuntary commitment only if the petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a person requiring treatment as defined in this section. In Interest of M.S.H., 466 N.W.2d 151, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 33 (N.D. 1991).

Where there is no evidence to prove underlying allegations, and those allegations are generalized descriptions of inappropriate behavior that connote little risk of physical harm to the patient, the record does not meet the statutory standard requiring clear and convincing evidence of a substantial likelihood of substantial deterioration in physical health, and the involuntary treatment order must be reversed. Denning v. R.N. (In the Interest of R.N.), 1997 ND 246, 572 N.W.2d 820, 1997 N.D. LEXIS 308 (N.D. 1997).

Expert Examiner.

A licensed physician specializing in psychiatry who was not “board certified” as a psychiatrist was qualified as an “expert examiner”; this section does not require such certification. In Interest of Nyflot, 340 N.W.2d 178, 1983 N.D. LEXIS 412 (N.D. 1983).

Evaluation of respondent’s mental status was properly made by licensed physician specializing in psychiatry where, despite fact she was not licensed at the time of the initial examination, the majority of the interviews with the respondent and her conclusions and recommendations were arrived at following licensure. In Interest of Nyflot, 340 N.W.2d 178, 1983 N.D. LEXIS 412 (N.D. 1983).

Findings.

In a case in which a patient appealed the trial court’s orders for hospitalization and treatment, insufficient findings appeared in the record to support the trial court’s orders. The trial court erred in failing to make finding specially whether hospitalization was the least restrictive alternative form of treatment for the patient. Beane v. S.R.B.(In re S.R.B.), 2013 ND 75, 830 N.W.2d 565, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 76 (N.D. 2013).

Insufficient Evidence.

Where, at best, the record led only to the conclusion that a patient was a person who would benefit from treatment with medication and that such treatment would only be possible if he were hospitalized, because otherwise he refused to take medication, the statutory standard which authorized courts to commit the mentally ill had not been met. The standard for involuntary commitment remains clear and convincing proof that the mentally ill individual is a person who requires treatment as defined by the statute. In Interest of M.B., 467 N.W.2d 902, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 70 (N.D. 1991).

Orders for involuntary hospitalization and treatment were reversed because the State had not shown by clear and convincing evidence substantial determinations based upon recent poor self-control or judgment in providing one’s shelter, nutrition, or personal care, N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-02(12) [now (13)], nor did a generalized natural tendency for schizophrenics to worsen establish a substantial likelihood for a particular individual. M.M.K. v. W.K. (In re W.K.), 2009 ND 218, 776 N.W.2d 572, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 229 (N.D. 2009).

Mentally Ill.

Where evidence of a nine-year old boy’s mental illness included extreme hyperactivity and bizarre behavior associated with Tourette’s Syndrome, the court held him to be mentally ill as the phrase is used in this section. Association for Retarded Citizens v. Sinner, 115 F.R.D. 28, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1462 (D.N.D. 1987).

Where patient took such impulsive aggressive actions including ramming a car and exhibited behavior evidencing dangerousness to himself, others, and property, and treating physician testified that patient’s condition would deteriorate substantially if he did not take his medication, such findings supported the involuntary commitment hearing that patient with history of chronic paranoid schizophrenia was mentally ill and in need of treatment. In Interest of T.A., 472 N.W.2d 226, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 120 (N.D. 1991).

Respondent was held to be a “mentally ill person”, where expert testified that if he did not take his medication he had episodes of seizures and unwarranted behavior, which he might not be able to remember, and that he had not taken his medication prior to admission to hospital, which resulted in assaultive behavior and physical aggression. Avard v. K.J.L. (In Interest of K.J.L.), 541 N.W.2d 698, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 6 (N.D. 1996).

Trial court did not err in ordering a patient’s hospitalization and treatment at the State Hospital for 90 days because the patient had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, and the record supported the trial court’s findings and conclusion that the patient’s mental illness put him at risk of hurting himself or others and that alternative treatment would not be sufficient to meet the patient’s needs because of safety concerns. Beane v. S.R.B. (In re S.R.B.), 2013 ND 109, 832 N.W.2d 42, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 112 (N.D. 2013).

District court did not err in finding respondent mentally ill under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-02(12) where three doctors testified to his delusional disorder and concluded that he was suffering from mental illness, and the only contrary evidence was respondent’s own testimony. DeDona v. E.S. (In the Interest of E.S.), 2019 ND 12, 921 N.W.2d 408, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 16 (N.D. 2019).

Patient's History.

A court is entitled to consider what has happened in the past as relevant “prognostic” evidence of what is likely to occur in the future. Kottke v. R.N., 513 N.W.2d 370, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 69 (N.D. 1994).

A court can use what has happened in the past with a patient as prognostic evidence to help predict future conduct. Waters v. J.S. (In re J.S.), 545 N.W.2d 145, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 69 (N.D. 1996).

Person Requiring Treatment.

Determination that a person is in need of treatment is a finding of fact rather than a conclusion of law; as such, it is subject to the clearly erroneous rule on appeal. Dayap v. Kupperion, 331 N.W.2d 22 (N.D. 1983).

Trial court’s finding that individual was a “person requiring treatment” was not supported by clear and convincing evidence, and was therefore clearly erroneous, where no expert witnesses were called to give an opinion as to whether or not the individual was mentally ill and posed a serious risk of harm to himself, to others or to property as to constitute a “person requiring treatment”, and none of the medical reports admitted into evidence contained such a determination. In Interest of Rambousek, 331 N.W.2d 548, 1983 N.D. LEXIS 257 (N.D. 1983).

Trial court’s finding that twenty-five year old woman diagnosed as having a schizo-affective disorder, with a long-standing delusional system, was severely mentally ill and therefore a “person requiring treatment” would be upheld. In Interest of Abbott, 369 N.W.2d 116, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 333 (N.D. 1985).

State law authorizes an involuntary commitment only if the petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a person requiring treatment as defined under subdivision 10 (now subdivision 13) of this section. Radmore v. R.N., 450 N.W.2d 758 (N.D. 1990).

Where at best the record led only to the conclusion that respondent was a person who would benefit from treatment with medication and that such treatment was only possible if she were hospitalized, because she otherwise refused to take medication, the evidence was insufficient to support her involuntary commitment; the standard for involuntary commitment remains clear and convincing proof that the mentally ill individual is a person who requires treatment as defined by the statute, not one who would benefit from treatment. Radmore v. R.N., 450 N.W.2d 758 (N.D. 1990).

The determination that an individual is a person requiring treatment under the statutory definition is a two-step process. Initially, the court must find that the individual is “mentally ill” and, secondly, the court must conclude that there is a reasonable expectation that if the person is not treated there exists a serious risk of harm to that person, others, or property. In Interest of L.B., 452 N.W.2d 75, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 51 (N.D. 1990).

The county court could have found that there was clear and convincing evidence that appellant was a mentally ill person within the meaning of subdivision 9 (now 12) of this section, who requires treatment pursuant to subdivision 10 (now 11). In Interest of L.B., 452 N.W.2d 75, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 51 (N.D. 1990).

The statutory definition of a person requiring treatment is not the same as a medical opinion or diagnosis that such person is in need of treatment. It may well be “conclusive” from a medical standpoint that a given individual requires treatment for that person’s optimum health, but still not satisfy the statute. In this sense, a court should not accept as conclusive an opinion of a medical expert that a person requires treatment, unless that opinion is supported by facts. In Interest of M.H., 475 N.W.2d 552, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 167 (N.D. 1991).

Where defendant had injured a staff person at the State Hospital and was delusional and verbally and physically aggressive and the court held that an alternative treatment program, less restrictive than hospitalization, would not meet her needs, finding that she would injure others and act on her delusions, defendant was properly found to be a person requiring treatment. In Interest of S.S., 491 N.W.2d 721, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 209 (N.D. 1992).

Where the record contained no clear and convincing evidence that a person was a threat to himself, to others, or to property, the statutory standard for involuntary commitment had not been met. In Interest of D.H., 507 N.W.2d 314, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 187 (N.D. 1993).

A person must continue to be mentally ill to require continued treatment. Kottke v. R.N., 513 N.W.2d 370, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 69 (N.D. 1994).

Evidence supported trial court’s conclusion respondent required treatment and that out patient treatment was appropriate; by ordering out patient treatment, trial court did not imply treatment was not required, since out patient treatment was ordered so respondent would receive medication necessary to prevent seizures and stabilize his mood, so that he would not pose a risk of harm. Avard v. K.J.L. (In Interest of K.J.L.), 541 N.W.2d 698, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 6 (N.D. 1996).

Where patient demonstrated continued aggressiveness and poor judgment, made statements that he would not take his medication if he was not in the hospital, and where he hit a doctor and another patient when his medication was previously reduced, the doctor could conclude that patient would be dangerous to himself and others without his current treatment. Waters v. J.S. (In re J.S.), 545 N.W.2d 145, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 69 (N.D. 1996).

Evidence that the patient had schizophrenia of the paranoid type, delusional in nature, had made suicide threats to his mother, and had told doctor he was the father of over 70 cows and was inventing a new religion he could use against his doctor, was sufficient to support a finding the patient was a person requiring treatment. M.K. v. J.K. (In the Interest of J.K.), 1999 ND 182, 599 N.W.2d 337, 1999 N.D. LEXIS 201 (N.D. 1999).

Although patient with bipolar I disorder was mentally ill under the first prong of the test for determining whether someone is “a person requiring treatment” for purposes of N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-02(12) [now (13)], the second prong of the test was not met because the patient’s lack of prudence and business acumen as revealed by her act of writing a large check in anticipation of a check coming in, was not the predictable dangerousness to property envisioned by § 25-03.1-02(12) sufficient to subject the patient to a mental health treatment order. Haider v. H.G. (In the Interest of H.G.), 2001 ND 142, 632 N.W.2d 458, 2001 N.D. LEXIS 168 (N.D. 2001).

Court properly committed patient to state hospital where the patient suffered from delusions that police and his family were in danger to him and he took inventory of guns and ammunition in response to confrontation with police. D.P. v. D.P., 2001 ND 203, 636 N.W.2d 921, 2001 N.D. LEXIS 235 (N.D. 2001).

Commitment order was not clearly erroneous under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-02(12) [now (13)] where the patient was mentally ill and, given witness testimony and other evidence, there was a reasonable expectation that if the patient was not hospitalized there existed a serious risk of harm to himself, others, or property. Pryatel v. C.H. (In re C.H.), 2005 ND 130, 699 N.W.2d 849, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 158 (N.D. 2005).

Although the citizen argued that he was not mentally ill, that he was not a person requiring treatment, and that involuntary hospitalization and treatment with medication was not the least restrictive alternative treatment, the appellate court noted that if the citizen was not hospitalized and treated, his kidney condition would have eventually led to renal failure or other life-threatening conditions; thus, the evidence sufficiently showed that he was a mentally ill person requiring treatment under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-02(12). Pryatel v. M.M. (In the Interest of M.M.), 2005 ND 219, 707 N.W.2d 78, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 257 (N.D. 2005).

Involuntary commitment order was upheld because a patient was a person requiring treatment under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-02(12) [now (13)] where the evidence showed that he entered a police station armed with a gun, he had routine fears that people were out to get him, he imagined that microphones were in his home, he thought that his name was being announced over police scanners, and he was fearful of answering the telephone and leaving his home. Weisenburger v. R.S. (In the Interest of R.S.), 2006 ND 253, 725 N.W.2d 193, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 259 (N.D. 2006).

Order granting a state hospital psychiatrist’s request to involuntarily treat appellant with prescription medication was overturned where there was no finding under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-02(12) [now (13)] that appellant was mentally ill or chemically dependent and that there was a reasonable expectation that if appellant was not treated there existed a serious risk of harm to appellant, others, or property. Van Valkenburg v. T.E. (In re T.E.), 2008 ND 86, 748 N.W.2d 677, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 88 (N.D. 2008).

District court did not clearly err when it found that the patient was a mentally ill person requiring inpatient treatment because the State hospital established that the patient had a mental illness by clear and convincing evidence and that he posed a serious risk of harm to either himself, others, or property; doctors stated in their reports that the patient had a mental illness, and the patient displayed extremely risky behavior. State v. B.A.C. (In the Interest of B.A.C.), 2017 ND 247, 902 N.W.2d 767, 2017 N.D. LEXIS 253 (N.D. 2017).

District court erred in finding that a patient was a person requiring treatment because there was not clear and convincing evidence of a reasonable expectation that if the patient was not treated for mental illness, there would be a serious risk of harm to her, others, or property; a doctor testified that the patient required no restraint, medication, or seclusion while hospitalized, and the record only supports the conclusion that she would benefit from medication. Ressler v. B.A.K. (In the Interest of B.A.K.), 2018 ND 139, 911 N.W.2d 882, 2018 N.D. LEXIS 142 (N.D. 2018).

For purposes of an involuntary commitment, the district court did not err in ordering that the patient continue her treatment at the state hospital because she presented a serious risk of harm to herself as she suffered from a disorder which substantially impaired her self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of personal affairs and social relations; and the psychologist testified that without the supervised medication the patient was likely to regress to a similar state in which she was initially found, putting herself at risk of injury or death; and because alternative treatment would not presently be adequate to meet the patient’s needs for treatment or to prevent harm to herself or others. Pryatel v. Doe (In re Doe), 2019 ND 23, 921 N.W.2d 403, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 8 (N.D. 2019).

District court’s finding that respondent was a person requiring treatment was not clearly erroneous where it had already found that the evidence supported the finding that he was mentally ill, and the evidence showed that he was at high risk of discontinuing medication, his condition was likely to deteriorate without treatment, and thus, he was likely to pose a risk to himself or others. DeDona v. E.S. (In the Interest of E.S.), 2019 ND 12, 921 N.W.2d 408, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 16 (N.D. 2019).

Right to Least Restrictive Conditions.

When an individual is found by a trial court to be a “person requiring treatment” under subsection (10) (now subsection (13)) of this section, he or she has the right to the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the purposes of treatment. In Interest of J.A.D., 492 N.W.2d 82, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 208 (N.D. 1992).

Sufficient Evidence.

Trial court’s finding that individual with schizo affective and schizophrenia was in need of treatment under the provisions of subsection (10)(d) (now subsection (13)) of this section was not clearly erroneous. Individual would be at serious risk of substantial deterioration in her mental health without forced hospitalization. In Interest of M.H., 475 N.W.2d 552, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 167 (N.D. 1991).

The county court did not err in its determination that a patient was a person requiring treatment under the statutory definition in subsection 11 [now subsection (13)] of this section where the patient refused medication, had made threats and had used physical force against his father, and had maimed and killed some kittens. In the Interest of B.D., 510 N.W.2d 629, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 21 (N.D. 1994).

Where doctor testified that patient suffered from a chronic mental illness called bi-polar disorder, which if untreated caused hyperactivity, and also testified that she tended to quit taking her medicine because she lacked insight into her illness, this testimony clearly and convincingly showed that patient suffered from a mental illness impairing her judgment and self control. Kottke v. R.N., 513 N.W.2d 370, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 69 (N.D. 1994).

Trial court’s conclusion that if petitioner was not treated for her mental illness there was a substantial likelihood she would pose a danger to herself or others was supported by clear and convincing evidence, where doctor and social worker testified that she had made several past suicide attempts and threats, and that she refused treatment for her mental illness. Waters v. C.W. (In re C.W.), 552 N.W.2d 382, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 193 (N.D. 1996).

There was sufficient evidence to support the district court’s findings that the inmate was mentally ill and required treatment because a correctional officer testified that the inmate had engaged in bizarre activities such as washing his undergarments and hands in an unflushed toilet. A doctor testified that he had diagnosed the inmate with schizophrenia and that the inmate had been engaging in sexually aggressive and predatory behavior while at the state hospital. Eckroth v. B.L.S. (In the Interest of B.L.S.), 2006 ND 218, 723 N.W.2d 395, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 222 (N.D. 2006).

Clear and convincing evidence supported order committing respondent to a state hospital for 90 days under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-02(12) [now (13)]; a psychiatrist testified that respondent was delusional, was getting inadequate sleep, and posed a danger to respondent’s self or others. Miller v. B.D.K (In re B.D.K.), 2007 ND 186, 742 N.W.2d 41, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 188 (N.D. 2007).

Court properly found that a patient posed a “serious risk of harm” because a letter from the patient’s sister indicated a substantial likelihood of the patient inflicting serious bodily harm on another person, and a witness testified the patient’s manic behaviors made it unlikely he would be able to stay in a homeless shelter or find work. Without treatment the patient would be unable to provide himself with food, clothing, and shelter. N.D. State Hosp. v. C.A.H. (In the Interest of C.A.H.), 2010 ND 131, 785 N.W.2d 253, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 142 (N.D. 2010).

25-03.1-02. Definitions. [Effective September 1, 2022]

In this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Advanced practice registered nurse” means an individual who is licensed as an advanced practice registered nurse under chapter 43-12.1 within the role of certified nurse practitioner or certified clinical nurse specialist, who has completed the requirements for a minimum of a master’s degree in psychiatric and mental health nursing from an accredited program, and who is functioning within the scope of practice in one of the population foci as approved by the state board of nursing. This chapter does not expand the scope of practice of an advanced practice registered nurse beyond the scope of practice established by the state board of nursing.
  2. “Alternative treatment order” means an involuntary outpatient order for a treatment program, other than hospitalization, which may include treatment with a prescribed medication.
  3. “Consent” means voluntary permission based upon full disclosure of facts necessary to make a decision and which is given by an individual who has the ability to understand those facts.
  4. “Court” means, except when otherwise indicated, the district court serving the county in which the respondent resides.
  5. “Department” means the department of health and human services.
  6. “Director” means the director of a treatment facility or the director’s designee.
  7. “Expert examiner” means a licensed physician, physician assistant, psychiatrist, psychologist trained in a clinical program, advanced practice registered nurse, or licensed addiction counselor appointed by the court to examine the respondent and to provide an evaluation of whether the respondent is a person requiring treatment.
  8. “Independent expert examiner” means a licensed physician, physician assistant, psychiatrist, psychologist trained in a clinical program, advanced practice registered nurse, or licensed addiction counselor, chosen at the request of the respondent to provide an independent evaluation of whether the respondent is a person requiring treatment.
  9. “Individual with a substance use disorder” means an individual with an illness or disorder characterized by a maladaptive pattern of usage of alcohol or drugs, or a combination thereof, resulting in social, occupational, psychological, or physical problems.
  10. “Magistrate” means the judge of the appropriate district or juvenile court or a judge assigned by the presiding judge of the judicial district.
  11. “Mental health professional” means:
    1. A psychologist with at least a master’s degree who has been either licensed or approved for exemption by the North Dakota board of psychology examiners.
    2. A social worker with a master’s degree in social work from an accredited program.
    3. An advanced practice registered nurse.
    4. A registered nurse with a minimum of two years of psychiatric clinical experience under the supervision of an expert examiner.
    5. A licensed addiction counselor.
    6. A licensed professional counselor with a master’s degree in counseling from an accredited program who has either successfully completed the advanced training beyond the master’s degree as required by the national academy of mental health counselors or a minimum of two years of clinical experience in a mental health agency or setting under the supervision of a psychiatrist or psychologist.
    7. A physician assistant.
  12. “Mentally ill person” or “person who is mentally ill” means an individual with an organic, mental, or emotional disorder that substantially impairs the capacity to use self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of personal affairs and social relations. The term does not include an individual with an intellectual disability of significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that originates during the developmental period and is associated with impairment in adaptive behavior, although an individual who is intellectually disabled may also be a person who is mentally ill. A substance use disorder does not per se constitute mental illness, although an individual with a substance use disorder may also be a person who is mentally ill.
  13. “Person requiring treatment” means a person who is mentally ill or an individual with a substance use disorder, and there is a reasonable expectation that if the individual is not treated for the mental illness or substance use disorder there exists a serious risk of harm to that individual, others, or property.
  14. “Physician assistant” means an individual licensed to practice as a physician assistant under chapter 43-17, who is authorized by the North Dakota board of medicine to practice in the field of psychiatry, holds a certification in psychiatry approved by the board, and is practicing under the supervision of a psychiatrist licensed to practice medicine in this state. This chapter does not expand the scope of practice of a physician assistant beyond the scope of practice authorized by the North Dakota board of medicine.
  15. “Private treatment facility” means any facility established under chapter 10-19.1 or 10-33 and licensed under chapter 23-16 or 50-31.
  16. “Psychiatrist” means a licensed physician who has completed a residency program in psychiatry.
  17. “Public treatment facility” means any treatment facility not falling under the definition of a private treatment facility.
  18. “Qualified service organization” means a person that provides services to a treatment facility such as data processing, bill collecting, dosage preparation, laboratory analysis, or legal, medical, accounting, or other professional services, and which agrees that in dealing with patient records, that person is bound by the confidentiality restrictions of this chapter, except as otherwise provided for by law.
  19. “Respondent” means an individual subject to petition for involuntary treatment.
  20. “Serious risk of harm” means a substantial likelihood of:
    1. Suicide, as manifested by suicidal threats, attempts, or significant depression relevant to suicidal potential;
    2. Killing or inflicting serious bodily harm on another individual or inflicting significant property damage, as manifested by acts or threats;
    3. Substantial deterioration in physical health, substantial injury, disease, or death, based upon recent poor self-control or judgment in providing one’s shelter, nutrition, or personal care; or
    4. Substantial deterioration in mental health which would predictably result in danger to that individual, others, or property, based upon:
      1. Evidence of objective facts to establish the loss of cognitive or volitional control over the individual’s thoughts or actions; or
      2. Acts or threats; patterns in the individual’s treatment history; the individual’s current condition; and other relevant factors, including the effect of the individual’s mental condition on the individual’s ability to consent.
  21. “Substantial likelihood” may take into account an individual’s history and recent behavior.
  22. “Superintendent” means the state hospital superintendent or the superintendent’s designee.
  23. “Third-party payer” means a person that pays, or agrees to pay, for diagnosis or treatment furnished to a patient on the basis of a contractual relationship with the patient or a member of the patient’s family, or on the basis of the patient’s eligibility for federal, state, or local governmental benefits, and includes any person providing audit or evaluation activities for the third-party payer.
  24. “Treatment facility” or “facility” means any hospital, including the state hospital at Jamestown, or any evaluation and treatment facility that provides directly, or by direct arrangement with other public or private agencies, emergency evaluation and treatment, outpatient care, and inpatient care to a person who is mentally ill or a person who has a substance use disorder.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 1; 1979, ch. 334, § 4; 1981, ch. 320, § 45; 1983, ch. 314, § 1; 1983, ch. 315, § 1; 1985, ch. 147, § 22; 1985, ch. 308, § 1; 1987, ch. 536, § 2; 1989, ch. 149, § 3; 1991, ch. 292, § 2; 1991, ch. 293, §§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 326, § 71; 1993, ch. 279, § 1; 1999, ch. 50, § 41; 2003, ch. 224, § 1; 2003, ch. 432, § 1; 2005, ch. 248, § 1; 2009, ch. 238, § 1; 2009, ch. 239, § 1; 2011, ch. 207, § 6; 2015, ch. 201, § 1, eff August 1, 2015; 2019, ch. 225, § 7, eff August 1, 2019; 2019, ch. 226, § 1, eff August 1, 2019; 2021, ch. 352, § 277, eff September 1, 2022.

25-03.1-03. Jurisdiction.

The district courts have original jurisdiction over the proceedings governed by this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 2; 1979, ch. 334, § 6; 1981, ch. 320, § 46; 1983, ch. 315, § 2; 1991, ch. 326, § 72.

25-03.1-03.1. Disclosure of health information.

A treating facility or mental health professional may disclose individually identifiable health information to a court, regional human service center, state’s attorney, appointed counsel, retained counsel, or other mental health professional, including an expert examiner, and the disclosure is a disclosure for treatment, including the provision, coordination, and management of health care and to carry out the purposes of this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 2003, ch. 225, § 1; 2021, ch. 222, § 1, eff August 1, 2021.

25-03.1-04. Screening and admission to a public treatment facility.

Under rules adopted by the department, screening of an individual to a public treatment facility for observation, diagnosis, care, or treatment for mental illness or a substance use disorder must be performed, in person when reasonably practicable, by a regional human service center. This screening must be performed in the region where the individual is physically located. Upon the request of a court, a law enforcement official, a mental health professional, the individual’s legal guardian, a minor’s parent or legal custodian, or the individual requesting services, the regional human service center shall conduct a screening. If a request for screening is made by a mental health professional and the individual who is the subject of the screening does not authorize the disclosure of the individual’s protected health information, upon the request of the regional human service center, any mental health professional who treated the individual within the previous six months shall disclose, subject to the requirements of title 42, Code of Federal Regulations, part 2, to the human service center any relevant protected health information regarding that treatment. Upon receipt of the request, the regional human service center shall arrange for a screening of the individual and, if appropriate, shall treat the applicant or refer the applicant to the appropriate treatment facility. Upon admittance to a public treatment facility, the superintendent or director shall immediately designate a tier 1 or tier 2 mental health professional to examine the individual.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 4; 1979, ch. 334, § 8; 1989, ch. 149, § 4; 1989, ch. 335, § 2; 1993, ch. 279, § 2; 1999, ch. 34, § 7; 2003, ch. 226, § 1; 2009, ch. 239, § 2; 2015, ch. 201, § 2, eff August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 97, § 20, eff August 1, 2017; 2019, ch. 225, § 8, eff August 1, 2019.

25-03.1-05. Discharge of voluntary patients.

Any voluntary patient who has recovered, or whose treatment the superintendent or director determines is no longer advisable, must be discharged. If, upon discharge, it is determined that the individual would benefit from the receipt of further treatment, the superintendent or director shall offer the individual appropriate treatment on a voluntary basis or shall aid the individual to obtain treatment from another source on a voluntary basis. With the patient’s consent, appropriate referrals may be made for the patient.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 5; 1979, ch. 334, § 9.

25-03.1-06. Right to release on application — Exception — Judicial proceedings.

An individual voluntarily admitted for inpatient treatment to a treatment facility or the state hospital must be orally advised of the right to release and must be further advised in writing of the rights under this chapter. A voluntary patient who requests release must be immediately released. However, if the superintendent or the director determines the patient is a person requiring treatment, the release may be postponed until a petition for involuntary commitment has been filed with the clerk of court and judicial proceedings for involuntary treatment have been held in the county in which the hospital or facility is located. The patient must be served the petition within twenty-four hours, exclusive of weekends and holidays, from the time release is requested, unless extended by the magistrate for good cause shown. The treatment hearing must be held within seven days from the time the petition is served.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 6; 1979, ch. 334, § 10; 1989, ch. 149, § 5; 2015, ch. 201, § 3, eff August 1, 2015; 2021, ch. 222, § 2, eff August 1, 2021.

25-03.1-07. Involuntary admission standards.

An individual may not be involuntarily admitted under this chapter to the state hospital or another treatment facility unless it is determined the individual is a person requiring treatment.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 7; 1989, ch. 149, § 6; 2015, ch. 201, § 4, eff August 1, 2015; 2019, ch. 226, § 2, eff August 1, 2019.

Notes to Decisions

Statutory Standard Met.

Order by trial court requiring continuing treatment for a patient was not clearly erroneous, as uncontradicted evidence revealed that the patient became violent when not taking his medication and the patient denied his illness and refused to voluntarily take his medication. Pryatel v. J.S. (In the Interest of J.S.), 1998 ND 92, 578 N.W.2d 91, 1998 N.D. LEXIS 89 (N.D. 1998).

Although the citizen argued that he was not mentally ill, that he was not a person requiring treatment, and that involuntary hospitalization and treatment with medication was not the least restrictive alternative treatment, the appellate court noted that if the citizen was not hospitalized and treated, his kidney condition would have eventually led to renal failure or other life-threatening conditions; thus, the evidence sufficiently showed that he was a mentally ill person requiring treatment under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-02(12). Pryatel v. M.M. (In the Interest of M.M.), 2005 ND 219, 707 N.W.2d 78, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 257 (N.D. 2005).

Order committing respondent to a state hospital for 90 days was upheld where there was clear and convincing evidence to support an order for involuntary inpatient treatment; a psychiatrist testified that respondent was delusional, was getting inadequate sleep, and posed a danger to respondent’s self or others. Miller v. B.D.K (In re B.D.K.), 2007 ND 186, 742 N.W.2d 41, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 188 (N.D. 2007).

Statutory Standard Not Met.

Where, at best, the record led only to the conclusion that the patient was a person who would benefit from treatment with medication and that such treatment would only be possible if he were hospitalized, because otherwise he refuses to take medication, the statutory standard which authorized courts to commit the mentally ill had not been met. The standard for involuntary commitment remains clear and convincing proof that the mentally ill individual is a person who requires treatment as defined by the statute. In Interest of M.B., 467 N.W.2d 902, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 70 (N.D. 1991).

Orders for involuntary hospitalization and treatment were reversed because the State had not shown by clear and convincing evidence substantial determinations based upon recent poor self-control or judgment in providing one’s shelter, nutrition, or personal care, N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-02(12) [now (13)], nor did a generalized natural tendency for schizophrenics to worsen establish a substantial likelihood for a particular individual. M.M.K. v. W.K. (In re W.K.), 2009 ND 218, 776 N.W.2d 572, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 229 (N.D. 2009).

District court erred in finding that a patient was a person requiring treatment because there was not clear and convincing evidence of a reasonable expectation that if the patient was not treated for mental illness, there would be a serious risk of harm to her, others, or property; a doctor testified that the patient required no restraint, medication, or seclusion while hospitalized, and the record only supports the conclusion that she would benefit from medication. Ressler v. B.A.K. (In the Interest of B.A.K.), 2018 ND 139, 911 N.W.2d 882, 2018 N.D. LEXIS 142 (N.D. 2018).

Law Reviews.

Summary of significant decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court in 1989 relating to mental health law, 65 N.D. L. Rev. 529 (1989).

Article: The Tail Still Wags the Dog: The Pervasive and Inappropriate Influence by the Psychiatric Profession on the Civil Commitment Process, see 86 N.D. L. Rev. 259 (2010).

25-03.1-08. Application to state’s attorney or retained attorney — Petition for involuntary treatment — Investigation by mental health professional.

  1. An individual eighteen years of age or over shall present, in good faith, the information necessary for the commitment of an individual for involuntary treatment to the state’s attorney of the county in which the respondent is presently located, or which is the respondent’s place of residence, or to an attorney retained by the petitioner to represent the petitioner throughout the proceedings. The attorney shall assist the petitioner in completing the petition. The petition must be verified by affidavit of the petitioner and contain assertions that the respondent is a person requiring the treatment; the facts, in detail, that are the basis of that assertion; the names, telephone numbers, and addresses, if known, of any witnesses to those facts; and, if known, the name, telephone number, and address of the nearest relative or guardian of the respondent, or, if none, of a friend of the respondent.
  2. The petition may be accompanied by any of the following:
    1. A written statement supporting the petition from a tier 1 mental health professional or an addiction counselor who is practicing within the professional scope of practice and who has personally examined the respondent within forty-five days of the date of the petition.
    2. One or more supporting affidavits otherwise corroborating the petition.
  3. In assisting the petitioner in completing the petition, the state’s attorney may direct a tier 1 or tier 2 mental health professional designated by the regional human service center to investigate and evaluate the specific facts alleged by the petitioner. The investigation must be completed as promptly as possible and include observations of and conversation with the respondent, unless the respondent cannot be found or refuses to meet with the mental health professional. A written report of the results of the investigation must be delivered to the state’s attorney. Copies of the report must be made available upon request to the respondent, the respondent’s counsel, and any expert examiner conducting an examination under section 25-03.1-11. The state’s attorney or retained attorney shall file the petition if the information provided by the petitioner or gathered by investigation provides probable cause to believe the subject of the petition is a person requiring treatment. A state’s attorney who determines there are insufficient grounds for filing a petition may refer the individual to other community resources. A state’s attorney’s decision not to institute proceedings may be reviewed under section 11-16-06.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 8; 1979, ch. 334, § 11; 1989, ch. 149, § 7; 1993, ch. 279, § 3; 2009, ch. 239, § 3; 2015, ch. 201, § 5, eff August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 97, § 21, eff August 1, 2017; 2021, ch. 222, § 3, eff August 1, 2021.

Notes to Decisions

Insufficient Evidence to Commit.

Where neither a licensed psychiatrist nor a clinical psychologist testified in continued commitment proceedings, but only a physician, and only a physician’s report was filed with the petition, neither specifically identifying or incorporating the details of a report by a psychiatrist or a clinical psychologist evaluating appellants mental illness, and while the evidence was far from clear and convincing that commitment to the state hospital was necessary, in view of the physician’s testimony that a nursing home would be suitable, if financial assistance were available, the order of indefinite commitment would be reversed, and the case would be remanded for a new hearing consistent with statutory requirements, at which the availability and appropriateness of alternative treatment in a less restrictive institution, such as a nursing home, would be fairly considered. In Interest of Goodwin, 366 N.W.2d 809, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 315 (N.D. 1985).

25-03.1-09. Review of petition for involuntary treatment — Probable cause established — Respondent notified — Rights.

  1. Upon the filing of a petition for involuntary treatment, the clerk of court shall immediately notify the magistrate who shall review the petition and accompanying documentation to determine whether it complies with requirements of section 25-03.1-08 and whether it establishes probable cause to believe the respondent is a person requiring treatment. If probable cause has not been so established, the petition must be dismissed unless an amendment would cure the defect.
  2. If probable cause has been established, the magistrate shall cause to be served on the respondent and the respondent’s nearest relative or guardian or, if none, a friend of the respondent:
    1. A copy of the petition and supporting documentation.
    2. A notice informing the respondent of the procedures required by this chapter.
    3. A notice of the respondent’s right to a preliminary and a treatment hearing when in custody under section 25-03.1-25 and if mental illness or a combination of mental illness and a substance use disorder of the respondent is alleged in the petition, or, if not in custody or if in custody and a substance use disorder alone is alleged in the petition, the right to a treatment hearing; of the right to be present at the hearings; of the right to have counsel before the hearings and any court-ordered examination; of the right to an independent evaluation; and, if the respondent is indigent, of the right to counsel and to an independent expert examiner, each at the expense of the county which is the respondent’s place of residence.
    4. Notice that if an independent expert examiner is to be appointed, the respondent must be given an opportunity to select that examiner.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 9; 1979, ch. 334, § 12; 1989, ch. 149, § 8; 1993, ch. 279, § 4; 2019, ch. 225, § 9, eff August 1, 2019.

25-03.1-10. Involuntary treatment — Court-ordered examination.

If the petition is not accompanied by a written supportive statement of a tier 1 mental health professional or a licensed addiction counselor who has examined the respondent within the last forty-five days, the court shall order the respondent be examined by an expert examiner of the respondent’s own choice or one appointed by the court. The order must state the date and time within which the respondent must appear; the address to which the respondent is to report; a statement that if the respondent fails to appear at the appointed place at or before the ordered date and time, the respondent may be involuntarily taken into custody and transported to the appointed place; and a statement the expert examiner may consult with or request participation in the examination by a mental health professional and may include with the written examination report any findings or observations by that mental health professional. Accompanying the order must be an explanation of the intended uses and possible effects of this examination. The examination may be conducted at a treatment facility, at the respondent’s home, or at any other suitable place in the community. A request for examination at the state hospital must be screened and approved by a regional human service center. The respondent may be accompanied by one or more relatives or friends at the place of the examination. The costs of the court-ordered examination must be borne by the county that is the respondent’s place of residence.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 10; 1979, ch. 334, § 13; 1993, ch. 279, § 5; 2003, ch. 225, § 2; 2009, ch. 239, § 4; 2015, ch. 201, § 6, eff August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 97, § 22, eff August 1, 2017.

25-03.1-10.1. Use of telemedicine technology authorized.

For purposes of court-ordered examinations conducted under this chapter, an expert examiner may use telemedicine technologies to assist the expert examiner in conducting those examinations.

Source:

S.L. 2011, ch. 203, § 1.

25-03.1-11. Involuntary treatment — Examination — Report.

  1. The respondent must be examined within a reasonable time by an expert examiner as ordered by the court. If the respondent is taken into custody under the emergency treatment provisions of this chapter, the examination must be conducted within the time limitations set forth in section 25-03.1-26. Any expert examiner conducting an examination under this section may consult with or request participation in the examination by any mental health professional and may include with the written examination report any findings or observations by that mental health professional. This examination report, and that of the independent examiner, if one has been requested, must be filed with the court and immediately sent to the petitioner and the respondent. The report must contain:
    1. Evaluations of the respondent’s physical condition and mental status.
    2. A conclusion as to whether the respondent is a person requiring treatment, with a clear explanation of how that conclusion was derived from the evaluation.
    3. If the report concludes the respondent is a person requiring treatment, a list of available forms of care and treatment that may serve as alternatives to involuntary hospitalization.
    4. The signature of the examiner who prepared the report.
  2. For purposes of any examination conducted pursuant to this section:
    1. An evaluation of a respondent’s physical condition may be made only by a tier 1b mental health professional.
    2. An evaluation of a respondent’s mental status may be made only by a tier 1 mental health professional.
    3. An evaluation of whether the respondent is an individual with a substance use disorder may be made only by a tier 1 mental health professional or a licensed addiction counselor.
  3. If the expert examiner concludes the respondent is not a person requiring treatment, the court may without taking any other additional action terminate the proceedings and dismiss the petition. If the expert examiner concludes the respondent is a person requiring treatment, or makes no conclusion whether the respondent is a person requiring treatment, the court shall set a date for hearing and shall give notice of hearing to the persons designated in section 25-03.1-12. If the respondent is in custody and is alleged to be a person who is mentally ill or a person who is both mentally ill and has a substance use disorder, the preliminary hearing date must be within four days, exclusive of weekends and holidays, of the date the respondent was taken into custody through emergency commitment under section 25-03.1-25 unless a delay or continuance is concurred in by the respondent or unless extended by the magistrate for good cause shown. If a preliminary hearing is not required, the treatment hearing must be held within four days, exclusive of weekends and holidays, of the date the court received the expert examiner’s report, not to exceed fourteen days from the time the petition was served.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 11; 1979, ch. 334, § 14; 1989, ch. 149, § 9; 1993, ch. 279, § 6; 2003, ch. 227, § 1; 2009, ch. 238, § 2; 2011, ch. 204, § 1; 2015, ch. 201, § 7, eff August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 350, § 2, eff August 1, 2017; 2017, ch. 97, § 23, eff August 1, 2017; 2021, ch. 223, § 1, eff August 1, 2021.

Notes to Decisions

Report.

Respondent’s due process right to notice of the particular issues to be determined at the hearing was not affected by failure of examiner’s report to contain, as required by this section, a clear explanation of how the examiner arrived at the conclusion that the respondent was a person requiring treatment where the facts on which examiner based her conclusions were clearly stated in the record and were known by the respondent, and the determination that the respondent presented a serious risk of harm did not rest upon psychiatric interpretations of the subtle manifestations of mental disorder but rested on the respondent’s willful, overt acts which clearly demonstrated a serious risk of harm to the respondent and to the community. In Interest of Nyflot, 340 N.W.2d 178, 1983 N.D. LEXIS 412 (N.D. 1983).

25-03.1-11.1. Combination of preliminary and treatment hearings.

With the consent of the court, the parties may waive the preliminary hearing and conduct the treatment hearing within the time period set for the preliminary hearing.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 149, § 10.

25-03.1-12. Notice of hearings.

The court shall cause notice of a petition and of the time and place of any hearings under this chapter to be given to the respondent; the respondent’s parents, if a minor; the respondent’s attorney; the petitioner; the state’s attorney; the superintendent or the director of any hospital or treatment facility in which the respondent is hospitalized or is being treated; the spouse of the respondent, if the spouse’s whereabouts is known; the guardian, if any, of the respondent; and such other relatives or persons as the court may determine. The notice must be given at the earliest possible time and sufficiently in advance of the hearing date to permit preparation for the hearing.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 12.

Notes to Decisions

Timely Notice.

Trial court’s finding that need for involuntary commitment of alleged addict was supported by clear and convincing evidence had to be reversed; the alleged addict was not given sufficient time to prepare for the involuntary commitment hearing, and the trial court erred in denying the alleged addict’s motions for continuance. Byzewski v. R.O. (In the Interest of R.O.), 2002 ND 154, 652 N.W.2d 327, 2002 N.D. LEXIS 194 (N.D. 2002).

Collateral References.

Notice: inclusion or exclusion of first and last days in computing time for giving notice of incompetency proceedings which must be given a number of days before a known future date, 98 A.L.R.2d 1331.

25-03.1-13. Right to counsel — Indigency — Waiver — Recoupment — Limitations.

  1. Every respondent under this chapter is entitled to legal counsel. The counsel has access to the respondent’s medical records upon proof of representation.
  2. Unless an appearance has been entered on behalf of the respondent, the court shall, within twenty-four hours, exclusive of weekends or holidays, from the time the petition was filed, appoint counsel to represent the respondent. If a respondent retains counsel, the retained counsel shall immediately notify the court of that fact.
  3. If, after consultation with counsel, the respondent wants to waive the right to counsel or the right to any of the hearings provided for under this chapter, the respondent may do so by notifying the court in writing. The notification must clearly state the respondent’s reasons for the waiver and must also be signed by counsel.
  4. If the court determines that the respondent is indigent, the court shall order that appointed counsel be compensated from county funds of the county that is the respondent’s place of residence in a reasonable amount based upon time and expenses. After notice and hearing, the court may order a respondent with appointed counsel to reimburse the county for expenditures made on the respondent’s behalf.
  5. If the state’s attorney of a county that has expended sums under subsection 4 on behalf of a respondent who is liable to reimburse the county determines that the respondent may have funds or property to reimburse the county, the state’s attorney shall seek civil recovery of those sums. Commencement of the action must occur within six years after the date the sums were paid.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 13; 1979, ch. 334, § 15; 1989, ch. 149, § 11; 1993, ch. 279, § 7; 2003, ch. 225, § 3.

Notes to Decisions

Assistance of Counsel.

This chapter contemplates that counsel be made available to advise and assist an involuntary patient during a periodic review if the patient desires. In Interest of T. H., 482 N.W.2d 615, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1992).

Notice to Counsel.

Where there is modification of medication combinations in case of refusal by patient, the court should condition the alternative combination of medications upon at least 24 hours prior notice to the patient, his most recent attorney, and the court that issued the forced medication order. Shannon J. v. R.A.J. (In the Interest of R.A.J.), 554 N.W.2d 809, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 240 (N.D. 1996).

Right to Counsel.

Individuals subject to North Dakota civil commitment proceedings are entitled to representation by counsel, and state law specifically provides the right to counsel, at state expense if necessary, in any judicial proceeding concerning a patient’s commitment. Rashid v. J. B., 410 N.W.2d 530, 1987 N.D. LEXIS 380 (N.D. 1987).

There is no statutory right to select a particular court-appointed attorney under this section or to substitute new counsel, and such selection and substitution are matters within the trial court’s discretion. Rashid v. J. B., 410 N.W.2d 530, 1987 N.D. LEXIS 380 (N.D. 1987).

Waiver of Right to Counsel.

Because the record did not show that appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, an order committing him to treatment in the state hospital for one year and allowing the State to involuntarily medicate him was reversed. The record did not demonstrate that appellant was made aware of the disadvantages of pro se representation at a March 16, 2006 hearing. Appellant’s comments that he thought he understood his right to an attorney, coupled with his subsequent comments, should have put the district court on notice that he was possibly not making his choice with eyes open; even if appellant validly waived his right to counsel at the March 16 hearing, the proceedings at the March 23 hearing should also have included another colloquy to determine appellant’s competence to waive counsel. Miller v. C.S. (In the Interest of C.S.), 2006 ND 104, 713 N.W.2d 542, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 101 (N.D. 2006).

Order involuntarily committing a patient and requiring forced medications was reversed on appeal because there was no colloquy conducted on the record as to whether or not the patient knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to counsel under N.D.C.C. § 25.03.1-13(1); moreover, it was unclear whether the patient or his standby counsel was conducting the proceeding. Eckroth v. B.L.S. (In the Interest of B.L.S.), 2006 ND 188, 721 N.W.2d 50, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 194 (N.D. 2006).

Collateral References.

Right to counsel in insanity or incompetency adjudication proceedings, 87 A.L.R.2d 950.

25-03.1-14. Duty of state’s attorney in court proceedings.

Unless the petitioner has retained an attorney, the state’s attorney for the county in which proceedings under this chapter are initiated shall appear and represent the state in all court proceedings and hearings. The state’s attorney or an attorney retained by the petitioner need not appear at proceedings initiated by the state hospital under sections 25-03.1-23 and 25-03.1-26. The county of residence of the respondent shall bear the cost of the state’s attorney in such proceedings in a reasonable amount based upon time and expenses.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 14; 1979, ch. 334, § 16; 1989, ch. 149, § 12.

25-03.1-15. Respondent’s attendance at hearings.

The respondent must be present at all hearings unless the respondent waives the right to be present either orally or in writing. A respondent’s refusal to attend a hearing is presumed to be a waiver of the right to be present at the hearing. The judge must be notified if the respondent has been medicated within twenty-four hours of the beginning of the hearing or an adjourned session of the hearing, and of the probable effects of the medication.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 15; 2021, ch. 222, § 4, eff August 1, 2021.

Notes to Decisions

Behavior in Courtroom.

A court should not summarily eject a mentally ill person for outbursts and interruptions that might be controlled or decreased by less severe alternatives. Arevalo v. J.S., 530 N.W.2d 331, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 73 (N.D. 1995).

Waiver of Hearing.

Record did not indicate whether respondent wanted to waive respondent’s right under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-15 to be present at respondent’s continuing treatment hearing or to attend the hearing, nor were findings made about the waiver issue; under those circumstances, it was error to hold the hearing without respondent’s presence. Thorfinnson v. L.T. (In re L.T.), 2011 ND 51, 795 N.W.2d 324, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 65 (N.D. 2011).

25-03.1-16. Medication pending treatment order.

A patient who has requested release or an individual who is the subject of a petition for treatment has the right to refuse medication and other forms of treatment before the preliminary or treatment hearing. However, a physician, a physician assistant, or an advanced practice registered nurse may prescribe medication or a less restrictive alternative if it is necessary to prevent bodily harm to the respondent or others or to prevent imminent deterioration of the respondent’s physical or mental condition. The patient has the right to be free of the effects of medication at the preliminary or treatment hearing by discontinuance of medication no later than twenty-four hours before the hearing unless, in the opinion of the prescriber, the need for the medication still exists or discontinuation would hamper the respondent’s preparation for and participation in the proceedings.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 16; 1979, ch. 334, § 17; 1993, ch. 279, § 8; 2015, ch. 201, § 8, eff August 1, 2015.

25-03.1-17. Involuntary treatment — Right to preliminary hearing.

  1. A respondent who is in custody under section 25-03.1-25 and who is alleged to be a mentally ill person or to be a person who is both mentally ill and has a substance use disorder is entitled to a preliminary hearing.
    1. At the preliminary hearing the court shall review the medical report. During the hearing the court shall allow the petitioner and the respondent an opportunity to testify and to present and cross-examine witnesses, and the court may receive the testimony of any other interested person. The court may receive evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible at a treatment hearing.
    2. At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court does not find probable cause to believe the individual is a person requiring treatment, the court shall dismiss the petition and order the respondent be discharged from the treatment facility if the respondent was detained before the hearing.
  2. If the court finds probable cause to believe the respondent is a person requiring treatment, the court shall consider less restrictive alternatives to involuntary detention and treatment.
    1. The court may order the respondent to undergo up to fourteen days’ treatment under a less restrictive alternative or, if the court finds alternative treatment is not in the best interests of the respondent or others, the court shall order the respondent detained for up to fourteen days for involuntary treatment in a treatment facility.
    2. The court shall specifically state to the respondent and give written notice that if involuntary treatment beyond the fourteen-day period is to be sought, the respondent will have the right to a treatment hearing as required by this chapter.
  3. Except for good cause, the court may not consider medical records relating to the respondent, unless the petitioner and respondent receive the medical records at least twenty-four hours before the hearing.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 17; 1983, ch. 314, § 2; 1989, ch. 149, § 13; 1993, ch. 279, § 9; 2015, ch. 201, § 9, eff August 1, 2015; 2019, ch. 226, § 3, eff August 1, 2019; 2021, ch. 223, § 2, eff August 1, 2021.

25-03.1-18. Involuntary treatment — Release.

The superintendent or the director may release a patient subject to a fourteen-day evaluation and treatment order or a seven-day emergency order if, in the superintendent’s or director’s opinion, the respondent does not meet the criteria of a person requiring treatment or, before the expiration of the fourteen-day order, the respondent no longer requires inpatient treatment. The court must be notified of the release and the reasons therefor. If the respondent is released because the respondent does not meet the criteria of a person requiring treatment, the court shall dismiss the petition.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 18; 1989, ch. 149, § 14.

Notes to Decisions

Least Restrictive Form of Treatment.

Court did not err by ordering a patient’s involuntary treatment with medication because psychiatrists testified the proposed medication was clinically appropriate and necessary to treat the patient, the benefits of the proposed medication outweighed the risks, and the patient testified that he refused medication since his most recent commitment and quit taking his medication shortly after his most recent release from the state hospital. N.D. State Hosp. v. C.A.H. (In the Interest of C.A.H.), 2010 ND 131, 785 N.W.2d 253, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 142 (N.D. 2010).

25-03.1-18.1. Court-authorized involuntary treatment with prescribed medication.

    1. Upon notice and hearing, a tier 1b mental health professional may request authorization from the court to treat an individual under a mental health treatment order with prescribed medication. The request may be considered by the court in an involuntary treatment hearing. As a part of the request, a psychiatrist or a final year psychiatric resident physician not involved in the current diagnosis or treatment of the patient shall certify:
      1. That the proposed prescribed medication is clinically appropriate and necessary to effectively treat the patient and that the patient is a person requiring treatment;
      2. That the patient was offered that treatment and refused it or that the patient lacks the capacity to make or communicate a responsible decision about that treatment;
      3. That prescribed medication is the least restrictive form of intervention necessary to meet the treatment needs of the patient; and
      4. That the benefits of the treatment outweigh the known risks to the patient.
    2. The court shall inquire whether the patient has had a sufficient opportunity to adequately prepare to meet the issue of involuntary treatment with prescribed medication and, at the request of the patient, the court may continue the involuntary treatment hearing for a period not exceeding seven days or may appoint an independent expert examiner as provided in subsection 4.
    1. Evidence of the factors certified under subsection 1 may be presented to the court at an involuntary treatment hearing held pursuant to sections 25-03.1-19 and 25-03.1-22, or at a separate hearing after motion and notice. The court in ruling on the requested authorization for involuntary treatment with prescribed medication shall consider all relevant evidence presented at the hearing, including:
      1. The danger the patient presents to self or others;
      2. The patient’s current condition;
      3. The patient’s treatment history;
      4. The results of previous medication trials;
      5. The efficacy of current or past treatment modalities concerning the patient;
      6. The patient’s prognosis; and
      7. The effect of the patient’s mental condition on the patient’s capacity to consent.
    2. Involuntary treatment with prescribed medication may not be authorized by the court solely for the convenience of facility staff or for the purpose of punishment.
  1. If the factors certified under subsection 1 have been demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, the court may include in its involuntary treatment order a provision, or it may issue a separate order after notice and hearing, authorizing the tier 1b mental health professional to involuntarily treat the patient with prescribed medication on such terms and conditions as are appropriate. The order for involuntary treatment with prescribed medication, however, may not be in effect for more than ninety days.
  2. If a patient has requested an examination by an independent expert examiner under this chapter, and if the tier 1b mental health professional has requested authorization for involuntary treatment with prescribed medication, only a psychiatrist or final year psychiatric resident physician may independently examine the patient as to the issue of involuntary treatment with prescribed medication.

Source:

S.L. 1991, ch. 292, § 3; 1993, ch. 279, § 10; 2003, ch. 224, § 2; 2015, ch. 201, § 10, eff August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 97, § 24, eff August 1, 2017.

Notes to Decisions

Appeal.

Issue of forced medication that was raised in a mental patient’s appeal of a continuing treatment order was not properly raised because the doctor did not seek an order requesting forced medication. Abordo v. J.S., 2004 ND 159, 684 N.W.2d 657, 2004 N.D. LEXIS 288 (N.D. 2004).

Applicability to Criminal and Civil Commitments.

The very specific protections afforded by this section are applicable to all persons committed for treatment. There is no language under N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-04.1 that manifests a legislative intent to avoid application of this section to persons who have been committed for treatment under N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-04.1. State v. Nording, 485 N.W.2d 781, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 103 (N.D. 1992).

This section applies to insanity detainees who are committed to treatment facilities under N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-04.1. The court has authority to commit and order treatment under N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-04.1 but, when the treatment is to include forced medication, the procedural requirements of this section must be met. State v. Nording, 485 N.W.2d 781, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 103 (N.D. 1992).

Authorization.

Involuntary treatment may not be authorized solely for the convenience of facility staff or for punishment. Arevalo v. J.S. (In the Interest of J.S.), 528 N.W.2d 367, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 28 (N.D. 1995).

Benefits of Medication.

The county court did not err in determining that the evidence was clear and convincing that the benefits of forced medication outweighed its risks to the patient where, except for evidence of stiffness, there was no evidence that the patient had suffered side effects when taking the medication in the past. In the Interest of B.D., 510 N.W.2d 629, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 21 (N.D. 1994).

Clear and Convincing Evidence.

There was clear and convincing evidence to show that forced medication of the inmate with medication named in the request was necessary and appropriate because a second physician certified that the use of the medication was clinically appropriate and necessary; she further certified that there was a reasonable expectation that, if not treated with the medications, the inmate’s condition created a serious risk of harm to his person and that he was offered the appropriate medication but refused it. Eckroth v. B.L.S. (In the Interest of B.L.S.), 2006 ND 218, 723 N.W.2d 395, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 222 (N.D. 2006).

District court’s finding that the patient refused medication was not clearly erroneous, because the evidence established that the patient would refuse to take medication once the court-ordered medication period expired. The refusal requirement of N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a)(2) can be met when a patient who is not literally refusing medication but is taking medication only because of a prior forced medication order indicates he would not take further medication unless ordered to do so by a court. Pryatel v. T.E. (In re T.E.), 2007 ND 166, 740 N.W.2d 100, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 160 (N.D. 2007) sub. nom.Van Valkenburg v. T.E. (In re T.E.), 2008 ND 86, 748 N.W.2d 677, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 88 (N.D. 2008).

Orders for involuntary hospitalization and treatment were reversed because the State had not shown by clear and convincing evidence substantial determinations based upon recent poor self-control or judgment in providing one’s shelter, nutrition, or personal care, N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-02(12) [now (13)], nor did a generalized natural tendency for schizophrenics to worsen establish a substantial likelihood for a particular individual. M.M.K. v. W.K. (In re W.K.), 2009 ND 218, 776 N.W.2d 572, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 229 (N.D. 2009).

Evidence presented at the patient’s involuntary commitment proceeding showed that the patient was also in need of the involuntary treatment and medication that the trial court ordered. The state supreme court could uphold that involuntary treatment and medication order on appeal because the evidence presented clear and convincingly met all four factors of the test for making that order under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a). Krine v. W.J.C.A. (In re Interest of W.J.C.A), 2012 ND 12, 810 N.W.2d 327, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 12 (N.D. 2012).

Psychiatrist filed a request for authorization to treat a patient prescribed medication with the trial court. Because the record indicated the patient was provided neither notice of a hearing on the request for authorization to treat him with prescribed medication nor a hearing on the matter and the trial court did not make findings whether the psychiatrist proved by clear and convincing evidence the four statutory factors outlined in N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a)(1)-(4), the trial court violated the patient’s statutory rights. Beane v. S.R.B.(In re S.R.B.), 2013 ND 75, 830 N.W.2d 565, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 76 (N.D. 2013).

Expert Testimony.

District court’s acceptance of uncontroverted expert testimony was not clearly erroneous where counsel for patient presented no testimony in opposition to expert’s conclusion; if counsel wished to attack the expert opinion of the state’s psychiatrist, he should have requested an independent expert examiner for his client. Arevalo v. J.S. (In the Interest of J.S.), 528 N.W.2d 367, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 28 (N.D. 1995).

Extension of Medication Orders.

Reviewing court rejected the patient’s argument that the district court’s forced medication order should be reversed since a State Hospital patient could not be subjected to more than one 90-day medication order, because the district court’s issuance of an additional 90-day forced medication order following a hearing on the matter did not violate N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-18.1(3); legislative history clearly reflected the intention of the 1993 amendments to N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-18.1(3), was not to place a limitation on the number of 90-day forced medication orders that could be issued, but was to require a court hearing before an extension could be granted rather than allowing an extension based only on the report of a psychiatrist. Pryatel v. T.E. (In re T.E.), 2007 ND 166, 740 N.W.2d 100, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 160 (N.D. 2007) sub. nom.Van Valkenburg v. T.E. (In re T.E.), 2008 ND 86, 748 N.W.2d 677, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 88 (N.D. 2008).

Least Restrictive Form of Treatment.

When the choice is between involuntarily treating a patient with drugs which could stabilize the patient and allow an early release from hospitalization, and not medicating the patient at all which could cause a deterioration in condition and lead to indefinite hospitalization, forced medication is the least restrictive form of treatment. Waters v. C.W. (In re C.W.), 552 N.W.2d 382, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 193 (N.D. 1996).

Based on the testimony of the patient’s treating physicians, it was clinically appropriate and necessary to treat the patient with the prescribed medication, i.e., injectable anti-psychotic medications, the prescribed medication was the least restrictive form of treatment necessary to meet his needs, and the benefits of the treatment outweighed known risks. Furthermore, the requested injectable medications would only be used if patient failed to take one of his anti-psychotic medications in pill form and, although patient was taking his pills at the time of the hearing, a recent history of failure to take the pills supported entry of the forced medication order. Therefore, the trial court considered all relevant evidence presented in authorizing involuntary treatment with prescribed medication under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-18.1. N.D. State Hosp. v. D.A. (In the Interest of D.A.), 2005 ND 116, 698 N.W.2d 474, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 135 (N.D. 2005).

Medications prescribed to treat a mentally ill individual’s kidney stone ailment were the least restrictive form of intervention necessary to treat him and the benefits of the treatment outweighed any risks; therefore, the trial court properly authorized treatment with prescribed medication under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-18.1. Pryatel v. M.M. (In the Interest of M.M.), 2005 ND 219, 707 N.W.2d 78, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 257 (N.D. 2005).

Multiple Combinations of Medicines.

The potential differences in the length of hospitalizing patient for treatment, the relative brevity of 90-days forced medication, and the need for judicial economy, made it sensible to authorize more than one combination of medicines, depending on later refusals. Shannon J. v. R.A.J. (In the Interest of R.A.J.), 554 N.W.2d 809, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 240 (N.D. 1996).

Proof Required.

To support involuntary treatment, each of the factors listed in this section must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Arevalo v. J.S. (In the Interest of J.S.), 528 N.W.2d 367, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 28 (N.D. 1995).

Because additional medications ordered by the district court were not certified by an independent physician as required by N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a), the inmate’s statutory rights were violated as to those medications. The inmate was not afforded adequate notice of the additional medications, the district court failed to inquire whether the inmate had been given the opportunity to prepare to address the additional medications, and the record did not disclose that a second physician had certified the clinical appropriateness and necessity of the additional medications. Eckroth v. B.L.S. (In the Interest of B.L.S.), 2006 ND 218, 723 N.W.2d 395, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 222 (N.D. 2006).

Order granting a state hospital psychiatrist’s request to involuntarily treat appellant with prescription medication was overturned where the trial court failed to find that appellant was a person requiring treatment in its order for involuntary treatment with medication; the absent finding was required by N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a)(1). Van Valkenburg v. T.E. (In re T.E.), 2008 ND 86, 748 N.W.2d 677, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 88 (N.D. 2008).

Language of N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a) is clear, and the legislative intent can be discerned from the statute itself; the legislature intends that forced medication orders may only be issued after all four factors under § 25-03.1-18.1(1)(a) are made by clear and convincing evidence. Van Valkenburg v. T.E. (In re T.E.), 2008 ND 86, 748 N.W.2d 677, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 88 (N.D. 2008).

It was not error to order a patient's involuntary medication based, in part, on the recommendation of a physician who later became the patient's treating physician because, at the time of the recommendation, the physician was not the patient's treating physician, as the statute required. J.S. v. G.A.S. (In the Interest of G.A.S.), 2016 ND 136, 881 N.W.2d 615, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 134 (N.D. 2016).

Trial court made proper findings and conclusions in ordering involuntary medication because the court found the statutory factors were proved by clear and convincing evidence based on testimony that (1) the patient would benefit from the medication, (2) posed a risk of harm to himself without it, and (3) refused the medication, which was the most effective form of treatment, after considering alternatives, and the benefits of which outweighed risks. J.S. v. G.A.S. (In the Interest of G.A.S.), 2016 ND 136, 881 N.W.2d 615, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 134 (N.D. 2016).

Purpose.

By enacting this section, the legislature has recognized the complexity of the question of administering psychotic drugs forcefully. This new legislation is designed to safeguard a patient’s right to be free of forced medication unless the prescribed medication is necessary to effectively treat the patient, unless the medication is the least restrictive form of intervention available for the patient’s treatment, and unless the benefits of the medication outweigh its known risks to the patient. State v. Nording, 485 N.W.2d 781, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 103 (N.D. 1992).

Specification of Medication.

The request for authorization for treatment should specify the prescribed medication and the court order should specify the medication, at least by generic name, which it authorizes to be involuntarily administered. In the Interest of B.D., 510 N.W.2d 629, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 21 (N.D. 1994).

A trial court must specify the medication to be involuntarily administered, at least by generic name, in its order for involuntary medication. Arevalo v. J.S. (In the Interest of J.S.), 528 N.W.2d 367, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 28 (N.D. 1995).

Prescription medication ordered under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-18.1 is not limited to psychotropic medications used to treat mental illness. Eckroth v. B.L.S. (In the Interest of B.L.S.), 2006 ND 218, 723 N.W.2d 395, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 222 (N.D. 2006).

Testimony of Physicians.

This statute does not specifically require that both doctors testify at a treatment hearing. In the Interest of B.D., 510 N.W.2d 629, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 21 (N.D. 1994).

District court properly authorized involuntary treatment of a patient because treating and non-treating physicians were not both required to testify at the hearing, the patient did not adequately raise the issue of whether the treatment form met the certification requirements where, while neither box was checked, the form was not dated, and the treating physician was on vacation, a letter signed by the physician attached to the form stated the patient was noncompliant, she testified that she refused the medication, the physician was aware that another treating physician and a non-treating physician signed the request in his absence, and the patient did argue lack of notice or ability to communicate a decision about the treatment. Dingeman v. F.M.G., 2017 ND 123, 894 N.W.2d 850, 2017 N.D. LEXIS 127 (N.D. 2017).

Valid Order Required.

Where patient was not a person requiring treatment within the meaning of N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-02(12) [now (13)], the trial court’s order for involuntary hospitalization and treatment was not valid and, therefore, the trial court’s order to treat with medication had to be reversed. Haider v. H.G. (In the Interest of H.G.), 2001 ND 142, 632 N.W.2d 458, 2001 N.D. LEXIS 168 (N.D. 2001).

Law Reviews.

North Dakota Supreme Court Review (In re M.M.), 82 N.D. L. Rev. 1033 (2006).

The 2015 amendment of this section by section 10 of chapter 201, S.L. 2015 became effective August 1, 2015.

25-03.1-18.2. Guardian consent to involuntary treatment with prescribed medication.

Notwithstanding sections 25-03.1-16, 25-03.1-18.1, and 25-03.1-24, if a patient refuses treatment with prescribed medication, a treating physician, physician assistant, psychiatrist, or advanced practice registered nurse may treat the patient with prescribed medication upon consent of the patient’s guardian pursuant to subsection 6 of section 30.1-28-12.

  1. The guardian’s consent for involuntary treatment with prescribed medication may not be in effect for more than ninety days without receiving another recommendation and determination pursuant to subsection 6 of section 30.1-28-12.
  2. The patient has the right to be free of the effects of medication at the preliminary or treatment hearing by discontinuance of medication no later than twenty-four hours before the hearing unless, in the opinion of the prescriber, the need for the medication still exists or discontinuation would hamper the patient’s preparation for and participation in the proceedings.

Source:

S.L. 2017, ch. 231, § 1, eff April 17, 2017.

25-03.1-19. Involuntary treatment hearing.

  1. The involuntary treatment hearing, unless waived by the respondent or the respondent has been released as a person not requiring treatment, must be held within fourteen days of the preliminary hearing. If the preliminary hearing is not required, the involuntary treatment hearing must be held within four days, exclusive of weekends and holidays, of the date the court received the expert examiner’s report, not to exceed fourteen days from the time the petition was served. The court may extend the time for hearing for good cause. The respondent has the right to an examination by an independent expert examiner if so requested. If the respondent is indigent, the county of residence of the respondent shall pay for the cost of the examination and the respondent may choose an independent expert examiner.
  2. The hearing must be held in the county of the respondent’s residence or location or the county in which the state hospital or treatment facility treating the respondent is located, if the respondent requests a change of venue. At the hearing, evidence in support of the petition must be presented by the state’s attorney, private counsel, or counsel designated by the court. During the hearing, the petitioner and the respondent must be afforded an opportunity to testify and to present and cross-examine witnesses. The court may receive the testimony of any other interested person. All individuals not necessary for the conduct of the proceeding must be excluded, except that the court may admit individuals having a legitimate interest in the proceeding. The hearing must be conducted in as informal a manner as practical, but the issue must be tried as a civil matter. Discovery and the power of subpoena permitted under the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure are available to the respondent. The court shall receive all relevant and material evidence that may be offered as governed by the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. There is a presumption in favor of the respondent, and the burden of proof in support of the petition is upon the petitioner.
  3. If, upon completion of the hearing, the court finds the petition has not been sustained by clear and convincing evidence, the court shall deny the petition, terminate the proceeding, and order the respondent be discharged if the respondent has been hospitalized before the hearing.
  4. Except for good cause, the court may not consider a medical record or expert examiner’s report relating to the respondent unless the petitioner and respondent receive the medical record or the expert examiner’s report at least twenty-four hours before the hearing.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 19; 1979, ch. 334, § 18; 1989, ch. 149, § 15; 2003, ch. 227, § 2; 2015, ch. 201, § 11, eff August 1, 2015; 2021, ch. 223, § 3, eff August 1, 2021; 2021, ch. 222, § 5, eff August 1, 2021.

Note.

Section 25-03.1-19 was amended 2 times by the 2021 Legislative Assembly. Pursuant to Section 1-02-09.1, the section is printed above to harmonize and give effect to the changes made in Section 5 of Chapter 222, Session Laws 2021, House Bill 1117; and Section 3 of Chapter 223, Session Laws 2021, House Bill 1034.

Cross-References.

Discovery, see N.D.R.Civ.P. 26 to 37.

Subpoena, see N.D.R.Civ.P. 45.

Notes to Decisions

Appellate Review.

The scope of the Supreme Court’s review of an involuntary commitment order is limited to a review of procedures, findings, and conclusions of the lower court. In Interest of L.B., 452 N.W.2d 75, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 51 (N.D. 1990).

Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a) the trial court’s determination of whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a person in need of treatment is a finding of fact which will not be set aside on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. In Interest of L.B., 452 N.W.2d 75, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 51 (N.D. 1990).

A trial court’s determination of clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a person requiring treatment is a finding of fact subject to a “clearly erroneous” standard of review. Avard v. K.J.L. (In Interest of K.J.L.), 541 N.W.2d 698, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 6 (N.D. 1996).

Burden of Proof.

The burden of proof in an involuntary commitment proceeding lies with the petitioner, and there is a presumption in favor of the respondent that he does not require the treatment sought. Dayap v. Kupperion, 331 N.W.2d 22 (N.D. 1983).

Clear and Convincing Evidence.

Trial court’s finding that individual was a “person requiring treatment” was not supported by clear and convincing evidence, and was therefore clearly erroneous, where no expert witnesses were called to give an opinion as to whether or not the individual was mentally ill and posed a serious risk of harm to himself, to others, or to property as to constitute a “person requiring treatment”, and none of the medical reports admitted into evidence contained such a determination. In Interest of Rambousek, 331 N.W.2d 548, 1983 N.D. LEXIS 257 (N.D. 1983).

Before a court can issue an order for an involuntary treatment, the petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a person requiring treatment. Kottke v. R.N., 513 N.W.2d 370, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 69 (N.D. 1994).

Where the record showed that (1) when the son was admitted to the treatment center he had a blood alcohol level of .430 and he tested positive for cannabis, and (2) the son admitted to a counselor that he had a binge drinking problem and that when he was drinking he did not take his medication for diabetes and Wernicke’s Syndrome, the order for involuntary treatment was affirmed because (1) the district court properly relied on the counselor’s assessment, in that the counselor’s testimony was based on the son’s medical records and his own statements, and the counselor did not rely solely on the allegations in the petition; thus, (2) the counselor’s testimony provided clear and convincing evidence to support the allegations in the petition. Martell v. L.D. (In re L.D.), 2003 ND 182, 671 N.W.2d 791, 2003 N.D. LEXIS 197 (N.D. 2003).

Findings Required.

Trial court is required to make and prepare findings of fact which will justify legal conclusion of either commitment, alternative treatment, or no treatment; use of preprinted forms is not prohibited if forms are appropriately supplemented with specific facts on face of form or otherwise. In Interest of Riedel, 353 N.W.2d 773, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 377 (N.D. 1984).

In a case in which a patient appealed the trial court’s orders for hospitalization and treatment, insufficient findings appeared in the record to support the trial court’s orders. The trial court erred in failing to make finding specially whether hospitalization was the least restrictive alternative form of treatment for the patient. Beane v. S.R.B.(In re S.R.B.), 2013 ND 75, 830 N.W.2d 565, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 76 (N.D. 2013).

Person Requiring Treatment.

State law authorizes an involuntary commitment only if the petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a person requiring treatment as defined under subdivision 12 of section 25-03.1-02. Radmore v. R.N., 450 N.W.2d 758 (N.D. 1990).

Where at best the record led only to the conclusion that respondent was a person who would benefit from treatment with medication and that such treatment was only possible if she were hospitalized, because she otherwise refused to take medication, the evidence was insufficient to support her involuntary commitment; the standard for involuntary commitment remains clear and convincing proof that the mentally ill individual is a person who requires treatment as defined by the statute, not one who would benefit from treatment. Radmore v. R.N., 450 N.W.2d 758 (N.D. 1990).

Evidence supported trial court’s conclusion respondent required treatment and that out patient treatment was appropriate; by ordering out patient treatment, trial court did not imply treatment was not required, since out patient treatment was ordered so respondent would receive medication necessary to prevent seizures and stabilize his mood, so that he would not pose a risk of harm. Avard v. K.J.L. (In Interest of K.J.L.), 541 N.W.2d 698, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 6 (N.D. 1996).

Order by trial court requiring continuing treatment for a patient was not clearly erroneous, as uncontradicted evidence revealed that the patient became violent when not taking his medication and the patient denied his illness and refused to voluntarily take his medication. Pryatel v. J.S. (In the Interest of J.S.), 1998 ND 92, 578 N.W.2d 91, 1998 N.D. LEXIS 89 (N.D. 1998).

Presence of Witnesses.

Witnesses in an involuntary commitment proceeding under this chapter must be present in court to present oral testimony unless all the principal parties, including the respondent, with the court’s approval, agree otherwise. In Interest of Gust, 345 N.W.2d 42, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 264 (N.D. 1984).

Presumption.

This section provides a presumption that respondent does not require treatment. Radmore v. R.N., 450 N.W.2d 758 (N.D. 1990).

While there exists a presumption in favor of the respondent that he or she does not require treatment, a court can order the involuntary treatment of a respondent if the petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a person requiring treatment. In Interest of L.B., 452 N.W.2d 75, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 51 (N.D. 1990).

“Reasonable Doubt” Standard.

The “reasonable doubt” standard is not constitutionally required for mental illness commitment. In Interest of Goodwin, 366 N.W.2d 809, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 315 (N.D. 1985).

An involuntary commitment petition must be supported by evidence which is clear and convincing. Dayap v. Kupperion, 331 N.W.2d 22 (N.D. 1983).

Time for Holding Treatment Hearing.

The statutory fourteen-day time limit for holding an involuntary treatment hearing following the preliminary hearing is not jurisdictional and may be extended upon a showing of good cause. In Interest of Nyflot, 340 N.W.2d 178, 1983 N.D. LEXIS 412 (N.D. 1983).

Collateral References.

Witness in lunacy inquisition, alleged incompetent as, 22 A.L.R.2d 756.

Report under statute providing for psychiatric examination of accused to determine mental condition, as basis for commitment to institution, 32 A.L.R.2d 434, 444.

Jury trial: constitutional right to jury trial in proceeding for adjudication of incompetency or insanity or for restoration, 33 A.L.R.2d 1145.

Physician-patient privilege: testimony as to communications or observations as to mental condition of patient treated for other condition, 100 A.L.R.2d 648.

Privilege, in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, arising from relationship between psychiatrist or psychologist and patient, 44 A.L.R.3d 24.

Acquittal: validity of statutory provision for commitment to mental institution of one acquitted of crime on ground of insanity without formal determination of mental condition at time of acquittal, 50 A.L.R.3d 144.

Expert witness: admissibility on issue of sanity of expert opinion based partly on medical, psychological or hospital reports, 55 A.L.R.3d 551.

Qualification of nonmedical psychologist to testify as to mental condition or competency, 72 A.L.R.5th 529.

25-03.1-20. Involuntary treatment hearing — Findings and dispositions.

If an individual is found at the involuntary treatment hearing to be a person requiring treatment, the findings and conclusions must be entered in the record of the proceedings and the court may:

  1. Order the individual to undergo a program of treatment other than hospitalization;
  2. Order the individual hospitalized in a public institution; or
  3. Order the individual hospitalized in any other private hospital if the attending physician agrees. The reason supporting the court’s particular treatment order must be entered in the record.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 20.

Notes to Decisions

Agreement of Attending Physician.

The apparent purpose of the statutory requirement of the agreement of the attending physician to private hospitalization is to assume that the physician is willing and available to treat the individual. Insofar as there was no agreement by the attending physician to hospitalization in the private hospital, the court did not err in ordering hospitalization at the state hospital. In Interest of M.S.H., 466 N.W.2d 151, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 33 (N.D. 1991).

Findings.

Supreme court disapproved of trial court practice of entering findings and conclusions by placing a check mark beside applicable statements on a preprinted form and urged trial courts to enter full and specific findings showing the underlying basis upon which the court reached its determination that a person is or is not in need of treatment. In Interest of Rambousek, 331 N.W.2d 548, 1983 N.D. LEXIS 257 (N.D. 1983).

Trial court’s determination of whether or not there is clear and convincing evidence that a person is in need of treatment is a finding of fact which will not be set aside on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. Dayap v. Kupperion, 331 N.W.2d 22 (N.D. 1983); In Interest of Rambousek, 331 N.W.2d 548, 1983 N.D. LEXIS 257 (N.D. 1983).

A court’s findings and conclusions in an involuntary treatment case must be entered into the record, and can be stated orally if recorded in open court; a court’s findings are sufficient if they enable the supreme court to understand the reasoning behind the court’s decision. Kottke v. R.N., 513 N.W.2d 370, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 69 (N.D. 1994).

Trial court properly found that a patient, who had been involuntarily committed to a state hospital, was a mentally ill person in need of treatment and that alternative treatment to involuntary commitment at the state hospital was not appropriate. Castillo v. D.Z. (In the Interest of D.Z.), 2002 ND 132, 649 N.W.2d 231, 2002 N.D. LEXIS 176 (N.D. 2002).

Reasons Sufficiently Expressed.

Although the court found that the patient required treatment, it did not expressly find she was mentally ill or posed a serious risk to herself or others where the court was ruling on a petition to continue her treatment; it had already ordered both her outpatient treatment and hospitalization for failure to take her medicine, each time finding that the patient was mentally ill and if untreated would probably present a serious risk of danger to herself or others. This was the third time in three months the trial court found that she required treatment, and in light of these other recent orders by the same court, the factual reasons for continuing patient’s treatment were sufficiently expressed. Kottke v. R.N., 513 N.W.2d 370, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 69 (N.D. 1994).

Although the citizen argued that he was not mentally ill, that he was not a person requiring treatment, and that involuntary hospitalization and treatment with medication was not the least restrictive alternative treatment, the appellate court noted that if the citizen was not hospitalized and treated, his kidney condition would have eventually led to renal failure or other life-threatening conditions; thus, the evidence sufficiently showed that he was a mentally ill person requiring treatment under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-02(12). Pryatel v. M.M. (In the Interest of M.M.), 2005 ND 219, 707 N.W.2d 78, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 257 (N.D. 2005).

25-03.1-21. Involuntary treatment order — Alternatives to hospitalization — Noncompliance with alternative treatment order — Emergency detention by certain professionals — Application for continuing treatment order.

  1. Before the court makes a decision in an involuntary treatment hearing, the court shall review a report assessing the availability and appropriateness for the respondent of treatment programs other than hospitalization which has been prepared and submitted by the state hospital or treatment facility. If the court finds a treatment program other than hospitalization is adequate to meet the respondent’s treatment needs and is sufficient to prevent serious risk of harm, the court shall order the respondent to receive whatever treatment, other than hospitalization, is appropriate for a period of ninety days.
  2. If the respondent is not complying with the alternative treatment order or the alternative treatment has not been sufficient to prevent serious risk of harm, the department, a representative of the treatment program involved in the alternative treatment order, the petitioner’s retained attorney, or the state’s attorney may apply to the court or to the district court of a different judicial district in which the respondent is located to modify the alternative treatment order. The court shall hold a hearing within seven days after the application is filed and served on the respondent. Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing and other available information, the court may:
    1. Continue the alternative treatment order;
    2. Consider other alternatives to hospitalization, modify the court’s original order, and direct the respondent undergo another program of alternative treatment for the remainder of the ninety-day period; or
    3. Enter a new order directing the respondent be hospitalized until discharged from the hospital under section 25-03.1-30. If the respondent refuses to comply with this hospitalization order, the court may direct a peace officer to take the respondent into protective custody and transport the respondent to a treatment facility.
  3. If a peace officer, physician either in person or directing an emergency medical services professional, or any mental health professional reasonably believes the respondent is not complying with an order for alternative treatment, that the alternative treatment is not sufficient to prevent serious risk of harm , and that considerations of time and safety do not allow intervention by a court, the designated professional may cause the respondent to be taken into custody and detained at a treatment facility as provided in subsection 3 of section 25-03.1-25 and, within twenty-four hours, shall file a notice with the court stating the circumstances and factors of the case. The state hospital or public treatment facility immediately shall accept, if appropriately screened and medically stable, and a private treatment facility may accept, the respondent on a provisional basis. The superintendent or director shall require an immediate examination of the respondent and, within twenty-four hours after admission, shall release the respondent subject to the conditions of the original order or file a notice with the court stating in detail the circumstances and factors of the case. The court , within forty-eight hours of receipt of the notice of the superintendent or director, after a hearing and based on the evidence presented and other available information, shall:
    1. Release the respondent from hospitalization and continue the alternative treatment order;
    2. Consider other alternatives to hospitalization, modify the original order of the court, and direct the respondent undergo another program of alternative treatment for the remainder of the commitment period; or
    3. Enter a new order directing the respondent remain hospitalized until discharged from the hospital under section 25-03.1-30.
  4. If, at the date of expiration of an order of alternative treatment, it is believed an individual continues to require treatment, a petition for a determination that the individual continues to be a person requiring treatment may be filed with the court where the individual is located.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 21; 1979, ch. 334, § 19; 1987, ch. 323, § 1; 1989, ch. 149, § 16; 1991, ch. 326, § 73; 2009, ch. 239, § 5; 2013, ch. 223, § 1; 2015, ch. 201, § 12, eff August 1, 2015; 2019, ch. 226, § 4, eff August 1, 2019; 2021, ch. 222, § 6, eff August 1, 2021.

Notes to Decisions

Alternative Treatment Not Appropriate.

Assuming that this section is applicable to a hearing for continuing treatment held pursuant to section 25-03.1-22(2), trial court did not err in refusing to order treatment outside a hospital where the evidence was clear and convincing that such limited treatment was not appropriate at that time and the evidence was also clear and convincing that a treatment program other than hospitalization would not, at that time, be adequate to meet the individual’s treatment needs nor sufficient to prevent harm or injury to him. Alagada v. Marty, 345 N.W.2d 46, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 263 (N.D. 1984).

Evidence as to the nature of appellant’s mental illness and its volatile and explosive characteristics, evoking behavior that was aggressive, uncontrollable and unpredictable, held to constitute clear and convincing evidence that any treatment outside of the hospital setting was not appropriate for appellant at the present time and would not be adequate to meet his treatment needs or to prevent harm to others. In Interest of Palmer, 363 N.W.2d 401, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 257 (N.D. 1985).

A reporting doctor may reasonably conclude that less restrictive alternatives to hospitalization simply do not exist. Waters v. J.S. (In re J.S.), 545 N.W.2d 145, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 69 (N.D. 1996).

Less restrictive alternative treatment was inappropriate when the patient suffered from paranoid schizophrenia so severe that he was unable to accept or believe the information provided to him by the professional staff at the hospital, the patient did not appear to be any closer to recognizing that he had a serious mental illness, and he was not accepting of his diabetic condition. Pryatel v. J.S. (In the Interest of J.S.), 2003 ND 138, 667 N.W.2d 641, 2003 N.D. LEXIS 144 (N.D. 2003).

Because a homeless patient’s early-stage dementia might have caused a harmful overdose of medication that he took for bipolar disorder, the district court did not err in finding, pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-21(1), that a treatment program other than hospitalization was not suitable to the patient’s treatment needs. State Hosp. v. R.F. (In re R.F.), 2005 ND 54, 692 N.W.2d 905, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 61 (N.D. 2005).

Trial court did not err in ordering a patient’s hospitalization and treatment at the State Hospital for 90 days because the patient had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, and the record supported the trial court’s findings and conclusion that the patient’s mental illness put him at risk of hurting himself or others and that alternative treatment would not be sufficient to meet the patient’s needs because of safety concerns. Beane v. S.R.B. (In re S.R.B.), 2013 ND 109, 832 N.W.2d 42, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 112 (N.D. 2013).

Alternatives to Hospitalization.

If another course than hospitalization is adequate for treatment and prevention of harm, the court is directed to use that alternative, rather than involuntary commitment. In Interest of T.A., 472 N.W.2d 226, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 120 (N.D. 1991).

Neither the report assessing the appropriateness of alternate treatment for paranoid schizophrenic patient written on a pre-printed form with preprinted conclusions simply checked off nor the testimony of the psychiatric expert complied with the statutory requirement that availability and appropriateness of alternative treatment be considered before hospitalization is ordered. M.K. v. J.K. (In the Interest of J.K.), 1999 ND 182, 599 N.W.2d 337, 1999 N.D. LEXIS 201 (N.D. 1999).

N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-21(1) requires the North Dakota State Hospital to prepare a report analyzing “treatment programs other than hospitalization.” However, the State Hospital does not have a statutory obligation to assess and review hospitals in other states before satisfying itself that hospitalization is the least restrictive treatment available; that was true where the patient desired an “alternative treatment program” in an out-of-state private facility, but where a State Hospital psychologist reported that the patient was not amenable to an alternative treatment program and that she needed a highly structured setting in a hospitalized environment. N.D. State Hosp. v. R.F. (In re R.F.), 2005 ND 102, 697 N.W.2d 311, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 121 (N.D. 2005).

Application.

In applying this section, the trial court must make a two-fold inquiry: (1) whether or not a treatment program other than hospitalization is adequate to meet the individual’s treatment needs, and (2) whether or not an alternative treatment program is sufficient to prevent harm or injuries which an individual may inflict upon himself or others. In Interest of J.A.D., 492 N.W.2d 82, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 208 (N.D. 1992).

Where the evidence did not establish that the patient was a person requiring treatment within the meaning of N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-02(12), so that the initial order for involuntary hospitalization and treatment was not valid, the predicate to an alternative treatment order was not present and that alternative treatment order had to be vacated. Haider v. H.G. (In the Interest of H.G.), 2001 ND 142, 632 N.W.2d 458, 2001 N.D. LEXIS 168 (N.D. 2001).

Clear and Convincing Evidence.
—In General.

In making its decision under this section, the trial court must determine by clear and convincing evidence that alternative treatment is not adequate and sufficient to prevent harm or injuries which an individual may inflict upon himself or others. In Interest of Palmer, 363 N.W.2d 401, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 257 (N.D. 1985).

The trial court must determine by clear and convincing evidence that alternative treatment is not adequate and that hospitalization is the least restrictive alternative; this determination will not be set aside on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a). In Interest of J.S., 499 N.W.2d 604, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 67 (N.D. 1993).

Court erred by finding that there was no less restrictive means to treat mentally ill patient when commitment to state hospital where the court’s findings were not supported by clear and convincing evidence. D.P. v. D.P., 2001 ND 203, 636 N.W.2d 921, 2001 N.D. LEXIS 235 (N.D. 2001).

Court properly continued a mentally ill patient’s commitment where the clear and convincing evidence presented in the record reflected that the patient still posed a danger to himself because of his inability to care for himself and his risk of suicide. Shaleen v. K.L. (In the Interest of K.L.), 2006 ND 103, 713 N.W.2d 537, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 99 (N.D. 2006).

—Violent Behavior.

Violent, aggressive, and unpredictable behavior constitutes clear and convincing evidence that treatment outside a hospital would not be appropriate. In Interest of J.S., 499 N.W.2d 604, 1993 N.D. LEXIS 67 (N.D. 1993).

Subsection (2) of this section did not require a finding of actual harm before a patient’s alternative treatment order could be terminated; hence, where the patient lit a match in her coat pocket while being transported in a police car, burning a hole in the carseat, her behavior constituted clear and convincing evidence that she was a danger to herself or others and her alternative treatment order was properly terminated. Trinidad v. K.P. (In re K.P.), 2003 ND 114, 665 N.W.2d 65, 2003 N.D. LEXIS 130 (N.D. 2003).

The court properly found that an alternative treatment order had failed to prevent the patient from harming herself or others when evidence showed that the patient had missed doses of her medication and brandished a scalpel at a police officer. Pryatel v. K.P. (In re K.P.), 2004 ND 52, 676 N.W.2d 744, 2004 N.D. LEXIS 65 (N.D. 2004).

Finding by Trial Court.

Trial court’s determination of whether or not there is clear and convincing evidence that a treatment program other than hospitalization is not adequate and that this alternative treatment is not sufficient to prevent harm or injuries which an individual may inflict upon himself or others is a finding of fact which will not be set aside on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. In Interest of Daugherty, 332 N.W.2d 217, 1983 N.D. LEXIS 276 (N.D. 1983).

Supreme court urges trial courts to enter full, specific, and individualized written findings showing the underlying basis for its ultimate finding that inpatient treatment, rather than outpatient treatment, or vice versa, is required. In Interest of Daugherty, 332 N.W.2d 217, 1983 N.D. LEXIS 276 (N.D. 1983).

It is imperative for trial courts to set forth findings of fact that clearly support and explain both the determinations that (1) there is or is not in fact alternative treatment sufficient to meet a respondent’s needs, and (2) there is or is not in fact alternative treatment sufficient to prevent harm. In Interest of Palmer, 363 N.W.2d 401, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 257 (N.D. 1985).

Incomplete Record.

The trial court’s finding of inadequate alternative treatment was not supported by the evidence where it was based upon an incomplete record which was not in compliance with this section. O'Callaghan v. L.B., 447 N.W.2d 326, 1989 N.D. LEXIS 204 (N.D. 1989).

Merely because report listed no alternative treatment options due to appellant’s resistance to alternative treatment did not render the report submitted void for purposes of subsection (1) of this section. In Interest of L.B., 452 N.W.2d 75, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 51 (N.D. 1990).

Inquiry by Trial Court.

Under this section, the trial court must make a twofold inquiry: (1) Whether or not a treatment program other than hospitalization is adequate to meet an individual’s treatment needs; and (2) whether or not an alternative treatment program is sufficient to prevent harm or injuries which the individual may inflict upon himself or others. In Interest of Daugherty, 332 N.W.2d 217, 1983 N.D. LEXIS 276 (N.D. 1983).

In applying this section, the trial court must make a twofold inquiry: (1) Whether or not a treatment program other than hospitalization is adequate to meet an individual’s treatment needs, and (2) whether or not an alternative treatment program is sufficient to prevent harm or injuries which an individual may inflict upon himself or others. In Interest of Palmer, 363 N.W.2d 401, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 257 (N.D. 1985).

Least Restrictive Alternatives.

Individual found by a trial court to be a “person requiring treatment” has a right to be submitted to the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the purposes of treatment. In Interest of Daugherty, 332 N.W.2d 217, 1983 N.D. LEXIS 276 (N.D. 1983).

Where neither a licensed psychiatrist nor a clinical psychologist testified in continued commitment proceedings, but only a physician, and only a physician’s report was filed with the petition, neither specifically identifying or incorporating the details of a report by a psychiatrist or a clinical psychologist evaluating appellants mental illness, and while the evidence was far from clear and convincing that commitment to the state hospital was necessary, in view of the physician’s testimony that a nursing home would be suitable, if financial assistance were available, the order of indefinite commitment would be reversed, and the case would be remanded for a new hearing consistent with statutory requirements, at which the availability and appropriateness of alternative treatment in a less restrictive institution, such as a nursing home, would be fairly considered. In Interest of Goodwin, 366 N.W.2d 809, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 315 (N.D. 1985).

The order for hospitalization and treatment was reversed, where defendant was not given a chance at less restrictive alternatives. In Interest of J.A.D., 492 N.W.2d 82, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 208 (N.D. 1992).

Although the patient argued that as part of the least restrictive conditions for his involuntary treatment under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-40(2), he should have been allowed to work outside of a state hospital, the supreme court found that he remained a risk if left unsupervised and allowing him to work ran counter to the continuing treatment order. Pryatel v. P.B. (In the Interest of P.B.), 2005 ND 201, 706 N.W.2d 78, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 252 (N.D. 2005).

In a case in which a patient appealed the trial court’s orders for hospitalization and treatment, insufficient findings appeared in the record to support the trial court’s orders. The trial court erred in failing to make finding specially whether hospitalization was the least restrictive alternative form of treatment for the patient. Beane v. S.R.B.(In re S.R.B.), 2013 ND 75, 830 N.W.2d 565, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 76 (N.D. 2013).

No Appropriate Alternative.

Report which adequately assessed the availability of treatment programs other than hospitalization and weighed their appropriateness, explained, conclusions and rejection of community-based treatment, and provided the basis for its conclusion that there were no appropriate alternative programs, complied with both the letter and the spirit of this section. In Interest of R.R., 479 N.W.2d 138, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 11 (N.D. 1992).

Trial court did not err when it found that hospitalization was the least restrictive alternative for respondent pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-21(1) where respondent, who suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia, tardive dyskinesia, Type II diabetes, hypertension, and arthritis, testified that he did not believe that he had any illnesses and would not take any medications if he was released. Van Valkenburg v. J.S. (In re J.S.), 2006 ND 143, 717 N.W.2d 598, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 147 (N.D. 2006).

Order committing respondent to a state hospital for 90 days was upheld where hospitalization was the least restrictive treatment option available under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-21(1); pyschiatrist-prepared report assessing alternatives concluded that none of alternatives would meet respondent’s needs; further, respondent’s bare assertion that he would get his own psychiatrist did not constitute a viable alternative to hospitalization requiring the trial court to order less restrictive treatment. Miller v. B.D.K (In re B.D.K.), 2007 ND 186, 742 N.W.2d 41, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 188 (N.D. 2007).

Noncompliance.

Subsection (2) of this section did not require a finding that a patient’s noncompliance with her alternative treatment order was willful before the order could be terminated; hence, where the patient failed to take medications as required under the order, refused to leave her apartment, refused to allow her outpatient caregiver to enter the apartment, and threatened the caregiver and police, her behavior constituted noncompliance meriting termination of the alternative treatment order. Trinidad v. K.P. (In re K.P.), 2003 ND 114, 665 N.W.2d 65, 2003 N.D. LEXIS 130 (N.D. 2003).

Outpatient Treatment.

Evidence supported trial court’s conclusion respondent required treatment and that out patient treatment was appropriate; by ordering out patient treatment, trial court did not imply treatment was not required, since out patient treatment was ordered so respondent would receive medication necessary to prevent seizures and stabilize his mood, so that he would not pose a risk of harm. Avard v. K.J.L. (In Interest of K.J.L.), 541 N.W.2d 698, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 6 (N.D. 1996).

Private Hospitalization.

The applicable statutes do not provide that hospitalization in a private hospital is an alternative treatment to hospitalization in the state hospital, but if the court is to order hospitalization in a private hospital, the attending physician must agree. In Interest of M.S.H., 466 N.W.2d 151, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 33 (N.D. 1991).

Venue.

Nothing in this section indicates that the proper county of venue should be other than the location where the order of detention was entered; a patient requesting a change of venue for the interests of justice and convenience of witnesses did not object to the telephonic testimony of her witness or establish that she was prejudiced by use of the telephone. Pryatel v. K.P. (In re K.P.), 2004 ND 52, 676 N.W.2d 744, 2004 N.D. LEXIS 65 (N.D. 2004).

25-03.1-22. Length of involuntary and continuing treatment orders.

  1. An order for involuntary treatment following a preliminary hearing may not exceed fourteen days. An order for involuntary treatment following a treatment hearing may not exceed ninety days.
  2. If the director or superintendent believes a patient continues to require treatment, the director or superintendent, not less than fourteen days before the expiration of the initial order, shall petition the court where the facility is located for a determination that the patient continues to be a person requiring treatment and for an order of continuing treatment, which order may be for a period not to exceed one year. The court shall set a hearing date that must be within fourteen days after the petition was filed, unless extended for good cause shown.
  3. A respondent subject to a continuing treatment order of indefinite duration retains the rights to periodic review and to petition for discharge under section 25-03.1-31 as that section existed on July 31, 1993.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 22; 1979, ch. 334, § 20; 1989, ch. 149, § 17; 1993, ch. 279, § 11; 2021, ch. 222, § 7, eff August 1, 2021.

25-03.1-23. Petition for continuing treatment orders.

A petition for an order authorizing continuing treatment must contain a statement setting forth the specific facts that are the basis of the determination the patient continues to be a person requiring treatment; a statement describing the treatment program provided to the patient and the results of that treatment; and a clinical estimate as to how long further treatment will be required. The petition must be accompanied by a certificate executed by a physician, physician assistant, psychiatrist, psychologist, advanced practice registered nurse, or licensed addiction counselor, any of whom is practicing within that individual’s professional scope of practice.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 23; 1979, ch. 334, § 21; 1993, ch. 279, § 12; 2011, ch. 205, § 1; 2015, ch. 201, § 13, eff August 1, 2015; 2021, ch. 222, § 8, eff August 1, 2021.

Notes to Decisions

Insufficient Evidence for Continued Commitment.

Where neither a licensed psychiatrist nor a clinical psychologist testified in continued commitment proceedings, but only a physician, and only a physician’s report was filed with the petition, neither specifically identifying or incorporating the details of a report by a psychiatrist or a clinical psychologist evaluating appellant’s mental illness, and while the evidence was far from clear and convincing that commitment to the state hospital was necessary, in view of the physician’s testimony that a nursing home would be suitable, if financial assistance were available, the order of indefinite commitment would be reversed, and the case would be remanded for a new hearing consistent with statutory requirements, at which the availability and appropriateness of alternative treatment in a less restrictive institution, such as a nursing home, would be fairly considered. In Interest of Goodwin, 366 N.W.2d 809, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 315 (N.D. 1985).

Petition Requirements.

A petition to extend a continuing-treatment order does not have to summarize all of the evidence the petitioner intends to introduce at the hearing. Waters v. J.S. (In re J.S.), 545 N.W.2d 145, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 69 (N.D. 1996).

25-03.1-24. Right to treat.

State hospital or treatment facility personnel may treat a patient with prescribed medication or a less restrictive alternative if, in the opinion of a psychiatrist or physician, these treatments are necessary to prevent bodily harm to the patient or others or to prevent imminent deterioration of the respondent’s physical or mental condition and there is not time to obtain a court order. This chapter does not prohibit a hospital from rendering emergency medical care without the need for consultation, if in the exercise of sound medical judgment that care is immediately necessary and delay would endanger the life of or adversely and substantially affect the health of the patient.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 24; 1979, ch. 334, § 22; 1995, ch. 268, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Duration of Treatment.

Treatment with prescribed medication under this section should not continue beyond a reasonable time in which a court order could be obtained. Eckroth v. B.L.S. (In the Interest of B.L.S.), 2006 ND 218, 723 N.W.2d 395, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 222 (N.D. 2006).

Collateral References.

Physician’s liability to third person for prescribing drug to known drug addict, 42 A.L.R.4th 586.

Nonconsensual treatment of involuntarily committed mentally ill persons with neuroleptic or antipsychotic drugs as violative of state constitutional guaranty, 74 A.L.R.4th 1099.

25-03.1-25. Detention or hospitalization — Emergency procedure.

  1. When a peace officer, physician either in person or directing an emergency medical services professional, psychiatrist, physician assistant, psychologist, advanced practice registered nurse, or mental health professional has reasonable cause to believe that an individual is a person requiring treatment and there exists a serious risk of harm to that individual, others, or property of an immediate nature that considerations of safety do not allow preliminary intervention by a magistrate, the peace officer, physician either in person or directing an emergency medical services professional, psychiatrist, physician assistant, psychologist, advanced practice registered nurse, or mental health professional, using the screening process set forth in section 25-03.1-04, may cause the individual to be taken into custody and detained at a treatment facility as provided in subsection 3, and subject to section 25-03.1-26, except that if emergency conditions exist that prevent the immediate conveyance of the individual to a public treatment facility, a private facility that has adequate resources and capacity to hold that individual may hold the individual in anticipation of conveyance to a public treatment facility for up to twenty-three hours:
    1. Without conducting an immediate examination required under section 25-03.1-26; and
    2. Without following notice and hearing requirements for a transfer to another treatment facility required under subsection 3 of section 25-03.1-34.
  2. If a petitioner seeking the involuntary treatment of a respondent requests that the respondent be taken into immediate custody and the magistrate, upon reviewing the petition and accompanying documentation, finds probable cause to believe that the respondent is a person requiring treatment and there exists a serious risk of harm to the respondent, others, or property if allowed to remain at liberty, the magistrate may enter a written order directing that the respondent be taken into immediate custody and be detained as provided in subsection 3 until the preliminary or treatment hearing, which must be held no more than seven days after the date of the order.
  3. Detention under this section may be:
    1. In a treatment facility where the director or superintendent must be informed of the reasons why immediate custody has been ordered. The facility may provide treatment that is necessary to preserve the respondent’s life or to appropriately control behavior by the respondent which is likely to result in physical injury to self or to others if allowed to continue, but may not otherwise provide treatment to the respondent without the respondent’s consent; or
    2. In a public or private facility in the community which is suitably equipped and staffed for the purpose. Detention in a jail or other correctional facility may not be ordered except in cases of actual emergency when no other secure facility is accessible, and then only for a period of not more than twenty-four hours and under close supervision.
  4. Immediately upon being taken into custody, the individual must be advised of the purpose of custody, of the intended uses and possible effects of any evaluation that the individual undergoes, and of the individual’s rights to counsel and to a preliminary or treatment hearing.
  5. Upon arrival at a facility the peace officer, physician, physician assistant, psychiatrist, psychologist, advanced practice registered nurse, or mental health professional who conveyed the individual or who caused the individual to be conveyed shall complete an application for evaluation and shall deliver a detailed written report from the peace officer, physician, physician assistant, psychiatrist, psychologist, advanced practice registered nurse, or the mental health professional who caused the individual to be conveyed. The written report must state the circumstances under which the individual was taken into custody. The report must allege in detail the overt act that constituted the basis for the beliefs that the individual is a person requiring treatment and that, because of that individual’s condition, there exists a serious risk of harm to that individual, others, or property if the individual is not immediately detained.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 25; 1979, ch. 334, § 23; 1983, ch. 314, § 3; 1989, ch. 149, § 18; 1993, ch. 279, § 13; 1995, ch. 269, § 1; 2009, ch. 239, § 6; 2013, ch. 223, § 2; 2015, ch. 201, § 14, eff August 1, 2015.

Notes to Decisions

Police Custody.

Regardless of whether the initial admission of defendant to the hospital was under the involuntary commitment statute or under the public intoxication statute, he was not in police custody for purposes of Miranda when he confessed to killing his wife as law enforcement was not involved in the decision to hold defendant or to transfer him to a second hospital as that was based on a doctor's determination. State v. Rogers, 2014 ND 134, 848 N.W.2d 257, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 131 (N.D. 2014).

25-03.1-26. Emergency procedure — Acceptance of petition and individual — Notice — Court hearing set.

  1. A public treatment facility immediately shall accept and a private treatment facility may accept on a provisional basis the application and the individual admitted under section 25-03.1-25. The superintendent or director shall require an immediate examination of the subject and, either within twenty-four hours, exclusive of holidays, after admission or within seventy-two hours after admission, exclusive of holidays, if the individual is admitted with a serious physical condition or illness that requires prompt treatment, shall either:
    1. Release the individual if the superintendent or director finds that the subject does not meet the emergency commitment standards; or
    2. File a petition if one has not been filed with the court of the individual’s residence or the court which directed immediate custody under subsection 2 of section 25-03.1-25, giving notice to the court and stating in detail the circumstances and facts of the case.
  2. Upon receipt of the petition and notice of the emergency detention, the magistrate shall set a date for a preliminary hearing, if the respondent is alleged to be a person who is mentally ill or a person who is both mentally ill and has a substance use disorder, or a treatment hearing, if the respondent is alleged to be a person who has a substance use disorder, to be held no later than four days, exclusive of weekends and holidays, after detention unless the person has been released as a person not requiring treatment, has been voluntarily admitted for treatment, has requested or agreed to a continuance, or unless the hearing has been extended by the magistrate for good cause shown. The magistrate shall appoint counsel if one has not been retained by the respondent.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 26; 1979, ch. 334, § 24; 1983, ch. 314, § 4; 1985, ch. 309, § 1; 1989, ch. 69, § 19; 1989, ch. 149, § 19; 1993, ch. 279, § 14; 2003, ch. 227, § 3; 2015, ch. 201, § 15, eff August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 350, § 3, eff August 1, 2017; 2021, ch. 223, § 4, eff August 1, 2021.

Notes to Decisions

Delay in Scheduling Hearing.

Scheduling difficulties may well justify briefly postponing a liberty hearing, though a trial judge’s personal schedule cannot be the sole factor in postponing the hearing and the judge should state on the record what efforts were made to seek another judge for a timely hearing. Wayne P. v. P.L.P. (In the Interest of P.L.P.), 556 N.W.2d 657, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 261 (N.D. 1996).

Five-day extension of time before hearing was conducted under this section, though troublesome in length, did not call for retroactively throwing out treatment hearing, where counsel made no effort to expedite the hearing. Wayne P. v. P.L.P. (In the Interest of P.L.P.), 556 N.W.2d 657, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 261 (N.D. 1996).

25-03.1-27. Notice and statement of rights.

  1. If an individual is detained for emergency evaluation and treatment under this chapter, the superintendent or director shall cause both the patient and, if possible, a responsible member of the patient’s immediate family, a guardian, or a friend, if any, to receive:
    1. A copy of the petition that asserted the individual is a person requiring treatment.
    2. A written statement explaining the individual will be examined by an expert examiner within twenty-four hours of hospitalization, excluding holidays.
    3. A written statement in simple terms explaining the rights of the individual alleged to be a person who is mentally ill or a person who is both mentally ill and has a substance use disorder to a preliminary hearing, to be present at the hearing, and to be represented by legal counsel, if the individual is certified by an expert examiner or examiners as a person requiring treatment.
    4. A written statement in simple terms explaining the rights of the individual to a treatment hearing, to be present at the hearing, to be represented by legal counsel, and the right to an independent medical evaluation.
  2. If the individual is unable to read or understand the written materials, every reasonable effort must be made to explain the written material in a language the individual understands, and a note of the explanation and by whom made must be entered into the patient record.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 27; 1979, ch. 334, § 25; 1989, ch. 149, § 20; 1993, ch. 279, § 15; 2015, ch. 201, § 16, eff August 1, 2015; 2021, ch. 223, § 5, eff August 1, 2021.

Cross-References.

Rights of patients generally, see §§ 25-03.1-40, 25-03.1-41.

Right to counsel, see § 25-03.1-13.

Right to equal care and treatment, see § 25-02-09.

25-03.1-28. Records and proceedings.

A record must be made of all court hearings conducted under this chapter and a copy must be provided to the respondent upon request for purposes of appellate review of the proceedings. If the respondent is indigent, the copy must be provided free of charge, with the expense thereof borne by the county of residence of the respondent.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 28.

25-03.1-29. Appeal.

  1. The respondent has the right to an expedited appeal from an order of involuntary commitment or alternative treatment, an order modifying a treatment order, an alternative treatment order or less restrictive treatment order, a continuing treatment order, an order denying a petition for discharge, or an order of transfer. Upon entry of an appealable order, the court shall notify the respondent of the right of appeal and the right to counsel. The notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after the order has been entered. Such appeal must be to the supreme court and the hearing must be commenced within fourteen days of filing of the notice of appeal. The hearing must be limited to a review of the procedures, findings, and conclusions of the lower court. The name of the respondent may not appear on the record on appeal.
  2. Pending appeal, the order appealed from remains in effect, unless the supreme court determines otherwise. The respondent may not be denied the opportunity to be present at the appeal hearing, and the court conducting the appeal may issue such interim order as will assure this opportunity to the respondent while protecting the interest sought to be served by the order appealed from.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 29; 1979, ch. 334, § 26; 1981, ch. 320, § 47; 1987, ch. 324, § 1; 2021, ch. 222, § 9, eff August 1, 2021.

Cross-References.

Procedures governing expedited appeals, see N.D.R.App.P. 2.1.

Notes to Decisions

Appeal.

Issue of forced medication that was raised in a mental patient’s appeal of a continuing treatment order was not properly raised because the doctor did not seek an order requesting forced medication. Abordo v. J.S., 2004 ND 159, 684 N.W.2d 657, 2004 N.D. LEXIS 288 (N.D. 2004).

Assistance of Counsel.

This chapter contemplates that counsel be made available to advise and assist an involuntary patient during a periodic review if the patient desires. In Interest of T. H., 482 N.W.2d 615, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1992).

Denial of Motion to End Continuous Treatment.

An order denying a motion for relief from a continuing treatment order was probably not appealable under this section where petitioner did not challenge court’s findings or conclusions. The judgment was an appealable order under subdivision 2 of section 28-27-02. In Interest of C.W., 453 N.W.2d 806, 1990 N.D. LEXIS 73 (N.D. 1990).

District court did not clearly err when it found that the patient was a mentally ill person requiring inpatient treatment because the State hospital established that the patient had a mental illness by clear and convincing evidence and that he posed a serious risk of harm to either himself, others, or property; doctors stated in their reports that the patient had a mental illness, and the patient displayed extremely risky behavior. State v. B.A.C. (In the Interest of B.A.C.), 2017 ND 247, 902 N.W.2d 767, 2017 N.D. LEXIS 253 (N.D. 2017).

Findings.

Trial court’s determination of whether or not there is clear and convincing evidence that a person is in need of treatment is a finding of fact which will not be set aside on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. Dayap v. Kupperion, 331 N.W.2d 22 (N.D. 1983); In Interest of Rambousek, 331 N.W.2d 548, 1983 N.D. LEXIS 257 (N.D. 1983).

The trial court’s determination of whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a person requiring treatment is a finding of fact which the Supreme Court will not set aside on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Radmore v. R.N., 450 N.W.2d 758 (N.D. 1990).

Trial court’s finding that need for involuntary commitment of alleged addict was supported by clear and convincing evidence had to be reversed; the alleged addict was not given sufficient time to prepare for the involuntary commitment hearing, and the trial court erred in denying the alleged addict’s motions for continuance. Byzewski v. R.O. (In the Interest of R.O.), 2002 ND 154, 652 N.W.2d 327, 2002 N.D. LEXIS 194 (N.D. 2002).

Hearing.

The fourteen-day period in which the hearing on appeal is to be commenced begins to run only after notice of appeal has been filed in the supreme court, and not when it is initially filed in the county court. Dayap v. Kupperion, 331 N.W.2d 22 (N.D. 1983).

Interaction with Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Rules of Civil Procedure supplement, rather than supplant, the particularized procedures of the mental-health statutes. Neither the rules nor the statutes command that findings and conclusions be stated for the summary dismissal of an unsupported petition for discharge. In Interest of T. H., 482 N.W.2d 615, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1992).

Limited Review.

On appeal, the court’s review of involuntary commitment cases is limited to a review of the procedures, findings, and conclusions of the lower court. In Interest of M.H., 475 N.W.2d 552, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 167 (N.D. 1991).

No Indefinite Extension.

The times for appeal of numerous mental health orders were not extended indefinitely by the court’s failure to notify petitioner of his rights for those appeals, but only for the statutory thirty-day period after the time that the record clearly showed that his counsel acquired knowledge of the lingering rights to appeal. In Interest of T. H., 482 N.W.2d 615, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1992).

Scope of Review.

Scope of supreme court’s review under this section is limited to a review of procedures, findings, and conclusions of lower court; supreme court is not authorized to conduct a trial de novo type review. In Interest of Riedel, 353 N.W.2d 773, 1984 N.D. LEXIS 377 (N.D. 1984).

The Supreme Court’s review in involuntary commitment cases is limited to an examination of the procedures, findings and conclusions of the lower court. Radmore v. R.N., 450 N.W.2d 758 (N.D. 1990).

The trial court’s determination of whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a person requiring treatment is a finding of fact which will not be set aside on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a). In Interest of M.B., 467 N.W.2d 902, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 70 (N.D. 1991).

The supreme court’s review in involuntary commitment cases is limited to an examination of the procedures, findings and conclusions of the lower court. In Interest of M.B., 467 N.W.2d 902, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 70 (N.D. 1991).

In involuntary commitment cases, when the supreme court reviews a trial court’s determination that there is clear and convincing evidence that a person requires treatment, the court treats the determination as a finding of fact and will not set it aside unless it is clearly erroneous under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a). In Interest of M.H., 475 N.W.2d 552, 1991 N.D. LEXIS 167 (N.D. 1991).

A trial court’s determination of clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a person requiring treatment is a finding of fact subject to a “clearly erroneous” standard of review. Avard v. K.J.L. (In Interest of K.J.L.), 541 N.W.2d 698, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 6 (N.D. 1996).

Time for Filing Appeal.

Rules authorizing additional time for action after service of a paper by mail do not extend the time for filing a mental health appeal; however, the time for appeal does not begin until the trial court formally advises respondent of his or her right to appeal. Kadrmas v. A.O., 443 N.W.2d 624, 1989 N.D. LEXIS 138 (N.D. 1989).

Trial court’s issuance of 30-day extension to appeal order for continuing treatment had effect of granting extension of 90 days from actual notice of entry of an appealable order rather than 30-day extension from date of order granting extension, so appeal filed within 90-day extension was timely filed. Pryatel v. J.S. (In the Interest of J.S.), 1998 ND 92, 578 N.W.2d 91, 1998 N.D. LEXIS 89 (N.D. 1998).

25-03.1-30. Discharge of hospitalized patient — Transfer to alternative treatment — Termination of alternative treatment.

  1. The superintendent or director at any time may discharge a voluntarily hospitalized patient who is clinically suitable for discharge.
  2. The superintendent or director shall discharge a patient hospitalized by court order if the patient’s mental condition is such that the patient no longer is a person requiring treatment.
  3. If a patient discharged under subsection 1 or 2 has been hospitalized by a court order, or if court proceedings are pending, the treatment facility shall notify the court of the discharge.
  4. A person responsible for providing treatment, other than hospitalization, to an individual ordered to undergo a program of alternative treatment may terminate the alternative treatment if the patient is clinically suitable for termination of treatment. The person shall terminate the alternative treatment if the patient no longer is a person requiring treatment and shall notify the court upon that termination.
  5. If, upon the discharge of a hospitalized patient or the termination of alternative treatment of an individual under this chapter, the individual would benefit from further treatment, the hospital or provider of alternative treatment shall offer appropriate treatment on a voluntary basis or shall aid the individual to obtain treatment from another source on a voluntary basis.
    1. With the individual’s consent, the superintendent or director shall notify the appropriate community agencies or persons of the release and of the suggested release plan. Community agencies include regional mental health centers, state and local counseling services, public and private associations the function of which is to assist persons who are mentally ill or individuals with a substance use disorder, and the individual’s physician.
    2. The agencies and persons notified of the individual’s release shall report to the facility that initial contact with the individual has been accomplished.
  6. If, before expiration of an initial treatment order, the superintendent or director determines a less restrictive form of treatment is more appropriate for a patient hospitalized by court order, the superintendent or director may petition the court that last ordered the patient’s hospitalization to modify the order of the court. The petition must contain statements setting forth the reasons for the determination the patient continues to be a person requiring treatment, the reasons for the determination a less restrictive form of treatment is more appropriate for the patient, and describing the recommended treatment program. If the patient consents, without a hearing, the court may modify the treatment order of the court by directing the patient to undergo the agreed treatment program for the remainder of the treatment order. The patient must be given an opportunity to protest the discharge and modification of treatment order and to receive a hearing on the merits of the protest.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 30; 1977, ch. 240, § 1; 1979, ch. 334, § 28; 1989, ch. 149, § 21; 1993, ch. 279, § 16; 2019, ch. 226, § 5, eff August 1, 2019; 2021, ch. 223, § 6, eff August 1, 2021.

Collateral References.

Habeas corpus on ground of restoration to sanity of one confined as incompetent other than in connection with crime, 21 A.L.R.2d 1004.

Liability of one releasing institutionalized mental patient for harm he causes, 38 A.L.R.3d 699.

Law Reviews.

Article: The Tail Still Wags the Dog: The Pervasive and Inappropriate Influence by the Psychiatric Profession on the Civil Commitment Process, see 86 N.D. L. Rev. 259 (2010).

25-03.1-31. Procedure to extend continuing treatment orders — Respondent’s right to petition for discharge.

  1. If the director or superintendent believes that a respondent continues to be a person requiring treatment, the director or superintendent, not less than thirty days before expiration of the order, shall petition the court where the facility is located for another continuing treatment order in the manner prescribed by section 25-03.1-23. The petition must also contain a notice to the respondent that, unless the respondent waives a hearing on the petition within fifteen days after service of the petition upon the respondent, a hearing will be held by the court. The court shall appoint counsel for the respondent upon receipt of the petition, unless retained counsel has appeared on behalf of the respondent. If retained counsel has appeared, the court shall provide notice of the petition to the attorney. If the hearing is not waived, it must be held within thirty days after the petition was filed, unless extended for good cause shown. The burden of proof is the same as in an involuntary treatment hearing.
  2. Every individual subject to an order of continuing treatment has the right to petition the court for discharge once annually. The petition may be presented to the court or a representative of the facility who shall transmit it to the court forthwith. If the patient is indigent or is unable for reasons satisfactory to the court to obtain an independent expert examiner, the court shall appoint an independent expert examiner to examine the patient and to furnish a report to the court. The court shall set a hearing date which must be within fourteen days of receipt of the examiner’s report. At the hearing, the burden of proof is the same as in an involuntary treatment hearing.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 31; 1979, ch. 334, § 29; 1993, ch. 279, § 17.

Notes to Decisions

Agreement and Disagreement Between Experts.

If required procedures are properly followed, and both the facility’s report of examination and the independent examiner’s report satisfactorily explain that the patient still needs involuntary treatment, then this section does not compel the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing. If there is a disagreement between the experts, lack of a satisfactory report from one expert, or another reason to think that an involuntary patient may no longer need treatment, then a trial court should hold an evidentiary hearing upon periodic review. In Interest of T. H., 482 N.W.2d 615, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1992).

Assistance of Counsel.

This chapter contemplates that counsel be made available to advise and assist an involuntary patient during a periodic review if the patient desires. In Interest of T. H., 482 N.W.2d 615, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1992).

Repeated deprivations of the right to counsel, during past periodic reviews of petitioner’s continuations of involuntary treatment, compelled an evidentiary hearing under this section, to dispel any doubt about his continued need for treatment. In Interest of T. H., 482 N.W.2d 615, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1992).

Burden of Proof.

In deciding whether to continue a person’s treatment, the burden of proof is the same as in an involuntary treatment hearing. Kottke v. R.N., 513 N.W.2d 370, 1994 N.D. LEXIS 69 (N.D. 1994).

Ceasing Confinement.

Even though the initial order for treatment was proper, the State cannot constitutionally continue the confinement of a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself, or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends. In Interest of T. H., 482 N.W.2d 615, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1992).

Denial of Discharge.

When an independent examiner reports that the involuntary patient continues to need treatment, thus concurring with the corresponding report of the facility’s examiner, usually there is no factual dispute to decide under this section. Hence, there is no need for a trial court to find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions in order to summarily deny a discharge. In Interest of T. H., 482 N.W.2d 615, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1992).

When the reason for denial of a petition for discharge is undisputed, that is, when there is no evidence to indicate that the involuntary patient may no longer be a “person requiring treatment,” there is no reason for the trial court to repeat the experts’ reasons in order to act. In Interest of T. H., 482 N.W.2d 615, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1992).

Legislative Intent.

The legislature intended to make continuation of an alternative treatment order for outpatient care subject to periodic review. In Interest of T.J., 482 N.W.2d 850, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 59 (N.D. 1992).

Need of Further Treatment.

An evidentiary hearing is not contemplated when the reviewing examiners, both the facility’s and the patient’s, agree, and satisfactorily explain why, the patient still needs treatment. In Interest of T. H., 482 N.W.2d 615, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1992).

Periodic Review.

This section contemplates periodic review for a continuing order of outpatient treatment, as well as for a continuing order of hospitalization. In Interest of T.J., 482 N.W.2d 850, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 59 (N.D. 1992).

A periodic review requires the same judicial scrutiny as commencement of involuntary treatment. The standard for continuation are the same as for an involuntary treatment to commence. In Interest of T. H., 482 N.W.2d 615, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 1992).

Remedy.

Where there was a delay of, at most, twelve days, between the date patient should have received periodic review and the date patient moved to dismiss the continuing treatment order, the delay was characterized as de minimis but the case was remanded with directions that patient promptly receive a review of his continuing treatment order to determine if he was still a person requiring outpatient treatment. In Interest of L.L., 482 N.W.2d 854, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 51 (N.D. 1992).

Standard of Proof.

The petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the patient continues to be a person requiring treatment. Waters v. J.S. (In re J.S.), 545 N.W.2d 145, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 69 (N.D. 1996).

25-03.1-32. Periodic hearing and petition for discharge — Continuing hospitalization. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1979, ch. 334, § 33.

25-03.1-33. Legal incompetence — Presumption — Finding — Adjudication negated.

  1. No determination that a person requires treatment, no court order authorizing hospitalization or alternative treatment, nor any form of admission to a hospital gives rise to a presumption of, constitutes a finding of, or operates as an adjudication of legal incompetence, or of the inability to give or withhold consent.
  2. No order of commitment under any previous statute of this state, in the absence of a concomitant appointment of a guardian, constitutes a finding of or operates as an adjudication of legal incompetence, or of the inability to give or withhold consent.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 33; 1993, ch. 279, § 18.

Notes to Decisions

Competence to Waive Counsel.

Because the record did not show that appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, an order committing him to treatment in the state hospital for one year and allowing the State to involuntarily medicate him was reversed. The record did not demonstrate that appellant was made aware of the disadvantages of pro se representation at a March 16, 2006 hearing. Appellant’s comments that he thought he understood his right to an attorney, coupled with his subsequent comments, should have put the district court on notice that he was possibly not making his choice with eyes open; even if appellant validly waived his right to counsel at the March 16 hearing, the proceedings at the March 23 hearing should also have included another colloquy to determine appellant’s competence to waive counsel. Miller v. C.S. (In the Interest of C.S.), 2006 ND 104, 713 N.W.2d 542, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 101 (N.D. 2006).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Effect of Board of Insanity Order.

An order of a board of insanity adjudging one to be insane was held to have no bearing upon his legal mental status. State ex rel. Sathre v. Roberts, 67 N.D. 92, 269 N.W. 913, 1936 N.D. LEXIS 155 (N.D. 1936).

Since finding of commissioners of insanity was not a judicial determination of insanity of judge, there was no vacancy in his office. State ex rel. Sathre v. Roberts, 67 N.D. 92, 269 N.W. 913, 1936 N.D. LEXIS 155 (N.D. 1936).

25-03.1-34. Transfer of patients.

  1. The superintendent or director of a treatment facility may transfer, or authorize the transfer of, an involuntary patient from a hospital to another facility if the superintendent or director determines it would be consistent with the medical needs of the patient to do so. Due consideration must be given to the relationship of the patient to family, legal guardian, or friends, so as to maintain relationships and encourage visits beneficial to the patient. If a treatment facility licensed by any state for the care and treatment of persons who are mentally ill or individuals with a substance use disorder agrees with the patient or patient’s guardian to accept the patient for treatment, the superintendent or director of the treatment facility shall release the patient to the other facility.
  2. Upon receipt of notice from an agency of the United States that facilities are available for the care or treatment of any individual ordered hospitalized who is eligible for care or treatment in a treatment facility of that agency, the superintendent or director of the treatment facility may cause the individual’s transfer to that agency of the United States for treatment. An individual may not be transferred to any agency of the United States if the individual is confined pursuant to conviction of any felony or misdemeanor or the individual has been acquitted of the charge solely on the ground of mental illness unless the court originally ordering confinement of the individual enters an order for transfer after appropriate motion and hearing. An individual transferred under this section to an agency of the United States is deemed committed to that agency under the original order of treatment.
  3. A facility may not transfer a patient to another hospital or agency without first notifying the patient and the patient’s legal guardian, spouse, or next of kin, if known, or a chosen friend of the patient and the court that ordered treatment. The patient must be given an opportunity to protest the transfer and to receive a hearing on the protest. The patient’s objection to the transfer must be presented to the court where the facility is located or to a representative of the facility within seven days after the notice of transfer was received. If the objection is presented to a representative of the facility, the representative shall transmit the objection to the court. The court shall set a hearing date, which must be within fourteen days of the date of receipt of the objection. If an objection has not been filed or the patient consents to a transfer, the court may enter an ex parte order authorizing transfer.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 34; 1979, ch. 334, § 30; 1989, ch. 149, § 22; 1993, ch. 279, § 19; 2009, ch. 239, § 7; 2021, ch. 223, § 7, eff August 1, 2021.

Notes to Decisions

Least Restrictive Treatment.

The legislature intended that when a patient is transferred from outpatient treatment to the state hospital, the party attempting the transfer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that hospitalization is the least restrictive treatment. In Interest of Cuypers, 389 N.W.2d 812, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 368 (N.D. 1986).

Review by Trial Court.

In reviewing propriety of patient’s transfer from one inpatient facility to another inpatient facility, the trial court’s role was to determine if there was a preponderance of evidence showing the transfer would be consistent with patient’s medical needs and that due consideration was given to patient’s relationship with family and friends. This evaluation had to take into account the opinions of the mental health professionals charged with patient’s care. In Interest of R.N., 492 N.W.2d 582, 1992 N.D. LEXIS 233 (N.D. 1992).

25-03.1-34.1. Exchange of individuals with a substance use disorder. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

The director of the department of human services, a county, a city, or a local law enforcement agency may enter into reciprocal agreements with the appropriate authorities of any other state regarding the mutual exchange, return, and transportation of individuals with a mental illness or substance use disorder who are treated or confined in hospitals of one state for treatment of a substance use disorder or mental illness but who have legal residence in another state.

Source:

S.L. 1995, ch. 270, § 1; 2019, ch. 225, § 10, eff August 1, 2019.

25-03.1-34.1. Exchange of individuals with a substance use disorder. [Effective September 1, 2022]

The director of the department of health and human services, a county, a city, or a local law enforcement agency may enter into reciprocal agreements with the appropriate authorities of any other state regarding the mutual exchange, return, and transportation of individuals with a mental illness or substance use disorder who are treated or confined in hospitals of one state for treatment of a substance use disorder or mental illness but who have legal residence in another state.

Source:

S.L. 1995, ch. 270, § 1; 2019, ch. 225, § 10, eff August 1, 2019; 2021, ch. 352, § 278, eff September 1, 2022.

25-03.1-34.2. Interstate contracts for treatment of mental illness or a substance use disorder.

  1. For purposes of this section, “bordering state” means Minnesota, Montana, or South Dakota.
  2. Unless prohibited by another law and subject to the exceptions in subsection 3, the department may contract with any appropriate treatment or detoxification facility in a bordering state for the treatment of mental illness or substance use disorders or for providing substance use disorder detoxification services for residents of North Dakota. The department may also contract with any public or private agency or facility to provide treatment of mental illness or substance use disorders or to provide substance use disorder detoxification services in North Dakota to residents of a bordering state. An individual who receives treatment for mental illness or a substance use disorder or who receives substance use disorder detoxification services in another state under this section is subject to the laws of the state in which treatment or detoxification is provided. An individual who receives treatment or detoxification in another state under this section must be informed of the consequences of receiving treatment or detoxification in another state, including the implications of the differences in state laws.
  3. A contract may not be entered under this section for treatment or detoxification to individuals who:
    1. Are serving a sentence after conviction of a criminal offense;
    2. Are on probation or parole;
    3. Are the subject of a presentence investigation; or
    4. Have been committed involuntarily in North Dakota under chapter 25-03.1 for treatment of mental illness or a substance use disorder, except as provided under subsection 5.
  4. Contracts entered under this section must, at a minimum:
    1. Describe the services to be provided;
    2. Establish responsibility for the costs of services;
    3. Establish responsibility for the costs of transporting individuals receiving services under this section;
    4. Specify the duration of the contract;
    5. Specify the means of terminating the contract;
    6. Specify the terms and conditions for refusal to admit or retain an individual; and
    7. Identify the goals to be accomplished by the placement of an individual under this section.
  5. The department may enter negotiations with appropriate personnel of a bordering state to develop an agreement that conforms to the requirements of this section. An agreement with a bordering state may enable the placement in North Dakota of individuals who require detoxification services, are on emergency holds, or who have been involuntarily committed as mentally ill or having a substance use disorder in a bordering state and enable the temporary placement in a bordering state of patients who require detoxification services or who are on emergency holds in North Dakota under chapter 25-03.1. An agreement with a bordering state must provide that the North Dakota courts retain jurisdiction over North Dakota residents, and that the bordering state affords to North Dakota residents the rights afforded to the residents under North Dakota law. Individuals committed by a court of a bordering state and placed in North Dakota facilities continue to be in the legal custody of the bordering state. The bordering state’s laws governing length of commitment, re-examinations, and extension of commitment must continue to apply to these residents. In all other respects, residents of a bordering state placed in North Dakota facilities are subject to North Dakota laws. An agreement with a bordering state must specify that responsibility for payment for the cost of care of a resident of a bordering state remains with the bordering state of which that individual is a resident and the cost of care of a North Dakota resident remains with the state of North Dakota. This section applies to detoxification services regardless of whether the services are provided on a voluntary or involuntary basis.

Source:

S.L. 2003, ch. 228, § 1; 2011, ch. 206, § 1; 2019, ch. 225, § 11, eff August 1, 2019; 2021, ch. 224, § 1, eff August 1, 2021.

25-03.1-35. Treatment by an agency of the United States.

  1. If a respondent under this chapter is eligible for treatment by any agency of the United States, the court, upon receipt of notice from that agency showing that facilities are available and that the individual is eligible for care or treatment therein, may order the respondent placed in the custody of the agency for treatment. Any individual admitted under the order of the court to any treatment facility operated by any agency of the United States within or without the state is subject to the rules and regulations of the agency. The chief officer of any treatment facility operated by an agency has the same powers as the heads of treatment facilities within this state with respect to detention, custody, transfer, conditional release, or discharge of patients. Jurisdiction is retained in the committing court of this state at any time to inquire into the mental condition of an individual so transferred or placed and to determine the necessity for continuance of treatment.
  2. An order of a court of competent jurisdiction of another state or of the District of Columbia authorizing treatment of an individual by any agency of the United States has the same force and effect as to the individual while in this state as in the geographical jurisdiction of the court entering the order; and the courts of the state or district issuing the order retain jurisdiction of the individual for the purposes of inquiring into the individual’s mental condition and of determining the necessity for continuance of treatment. Consent is hereby given to the application of the law of the state or district in which the court issuing the order for treatment is located with respect to the authority of the chief officer of any treatment facility operated in this state by any agency of the United States to retain custody, transfer, conditionally release, or discharge the individual being treated.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 35; 1993, ch. 279, § 20.

25-03.1-36. Escape of patient from treatment facility.

If any patient escapes from a treatment facility, the superintendent or director may cause an immediate search to be made. If the patient cannot be found, the superintendent or director shall cause notice of the escape to be given forthwith to the court of the county of residence of the patient and to such health officials or officers of the law as may be of assistance in locating the patient. If the patient is found in the county of residence, the court, at the request of the superintendent or director, shall cause the patient to be returned to the treatment facility and shall issue its order to that effect. The patient must thereupon be transported to the treatment facility as provided in other cases. Should the patient be found other than in the county of the patient’s residence, the patient may be transported at the request of the superintendent to the state hospital as directed and at the expense of the state hospital.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 36.

Collateral References.

Hospital’s liability for patient’s injury or death resulting from escape or attempted escape, 37 A.L.R.4th 200.

25-03.1-37. Reports to and additional powers of department.

The superintendent or director of a treatment facility, by means of nonidentifying data, shall notify the department of all admissions under this chapter to the state hospital or facility. In addition to the specific authority granted under the provisions of this chapter, the department shall have authority to require nonidentifying statistical data from the head of any hospital relating to the admission, examination, diagnosis, release, or discharge of any mentally ill patient.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 37.

25-03.1-38. Expenses of district court serving Stutsman County.

All expenses of the district court serving Stutsman County involving patients in residence at the state hospital must be paid by the state hospital under the direction of the department.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 38; 1991, ch. 326, § 74.

25-03.1-39. Transportation — Expenses.

Whenever an individual is about to be involuntarily hospitalized under the provisions of this chapter, an official or person designated by the court shall arrange for the individual’s transportation to the treatment facility with suitable medical or nursing attendants and by such means as may be suitable for the individual’s medical condition. Whenever practicable, the individual to be hospitalized must be permitted to be accompanied by one or more of the individual’s friends or relatives, and when practicable shall not be transported by police officers or in police vehicles. If the proposed patient is unable to pay for expenses of transportation, and friends or relatives do not oblige themselves to pay such expenses, the court may direct that such expenses be paid by the county of the patient’s residence.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 39.

Cross-References.

Transportation of patients by sheriff, see §§ 11-15-24, 11-15-25.

25-03.1-40. Rights of patients.

Each patient of a treatment facility retains the following rights, subject only to the limitations and restrictions authorized by section 25-03.1-41. A patient has the right:

  1. To receive appropriate treatment for mental and physical ailments and for the prevention of illness or disability.
  2. To the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the purposes of treatment.
  3. To be treated with dignity and respect.
  4. To be free from unnecessary restraint and isolation.
  5. To visitation and telephone communications.
  6. To send and receive sealed mail.
  7. To keep and use personal clothing and possessions.
  8. To regular opportunities for outdoor physical exercise.
  9. To be free to exercise religious faith of choice.
  10. To be free from unnecessary medication.
  11. To exercise all civil rights, including the right of habeas corpus.
  12. Not to be subjected to experimental research without the express and informed written consent of the patient or of the patient’s guardian.
  13. Not to be subjected to psychosurgery or electroconvulsive treatment without the express and informed written consent of the patient or of the patient’s guardian.
  14. In a manner appropriate to the patient’s capabilities, to ongoing participation in the planning of services.
  15. Not to be required to participate in the development of an individual treatment plan.
  16. To be free from aversive reinforcement conditioning.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 40; 1993, ch. 279, § 21; 1995, ch. 268, § 2; 2021, ch. 220, § 2, eff August 1, 2021.

Cross-References.

Cruel treatment a misdemeanor, see § 25-01-16.

Hunting, fishing and trapping without license permitted, see § 20.1-03-04.

Right to counsel, see § 25-03.1-13.

Right to equal care and treatment, see § 25-02-09.

Notes to Decisions

Appropriate Treatment.

Evidence as to the nature of appellant’s mental illness and its volatile and explosive characteristics, evoking behavior that was aggressive, uncontrollable and unpredictable, held to constitute clear and convincing evidence that any treatment outside of the hospital setting was not appropriate for appellant at the present time and would not be adequate to meet his treatment needs or to prevent harm to others. In Interest of Palmer, 363 N.W.2d 401, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 257 (N.D. 1985).

Evidence supported trial court’s conclusion respondent required treatment and that out patient treatment was appropriate; by ordering out patient treatment, trial court did not imply treatment was not required, since out patient treatment was ordered so respondent would receive medication necessary to prevent seizures and stabilize his mood, so that he would not pose a risk of harm. Avard v. K.J.L. (In Interest of K.J.L.), 541 N.W.2d 698, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 6 (N.D. 1996).

The availability and appropriateness of alternative treatment other than hospitalization was not fairly considered. Waters v. R.M. (In the Interest of R.M.), 555 N.W.2d 798, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 256 (N.D. 1996).

For purposes of an involuntary commitment, the district court did not err in ordering that the patient continue her treatment at the state hospital because she presented a serious risk of harm to herself as she suffered from a disorder which substantially impaired her self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of personal affairs and social relations; and the psychologist testified that without the supervised medication the patient was likely to regress to a similar state in which she was initially found, putting herself at risk of injury or death; and because alternative treatment would not presently be adequate to meet the patient’s needs for treatment or to prevent harm to herself or others. Pryatel v. Doe (In re Doe), 2019 ND 23, 921 N.W.2d 403, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 8 (N.D. 2019).

Delay in Scheduling Hearing.

Five-day extension of time before hearing was conducted under section 25-03.1-26, though troublesome in length, did not call for retroactively throwing out treatment hearing, where counsel made no effort to expedite the hearing. Wayne P. v. P.L.P. (In the Interest of P.L.P.), 556 N.W.2d 657, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 261 (N.D. 1996).

Habeas Corpus.

This section does not authorize an appeal to the supreme court of a district court’s order denying a writ of habeas corpus; involuntary committed mental patient’s proper procedure for securing a writ of habeas corpus from the supreme court is to file an original application with such court. In Interest of Klein, 325 N.W.2d 227, 1982 N.D. LEXIS 349 (N.D. 1982).

Least Restrictive Conditions.

An individual who is found by a trial court to be a “person requiring treatment” has a right to be submitted to the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the purposes of treatment. In Interest of Rosenthal, 392 N.W.2d 796, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 394 (N.D. 1986).

Where neither a licensed psychiatrist nor a clinical psychologist testified in continued commitment proceedings, but only a physician, and only a physician’s report was filed with the petition, neither specifically identifying or incorporating the details of a report by a psychiatrist or a clinical psychologist evaluating appellants mental illness, and while the evidence was far from clear and convincing that commitment to the state hospital was necessary, in view of the physician’s testimony that a nursing home would be suitable, if financial assistance were available, the order of indefinite commitment would be reversed, and the case would be remanded for a new hearing consistent with statutory requirements, at which the availability and appropriateness of alternative treatment in a less restrictive institution, such as a nursing home, would be fairly considered. In Interest of Goodwin, 366 N.W.2d 809, 1985 N.D. LEXIS 315 (N.D. 1985).

Where both sides were advocating alternative treatment, and the district court ordered such treatment, the respondent’s right to the least restrictive conditions necessary for the purposes of treatment had not been violated. Arevalo v. M.S. (In the Interest of M.S.), 1999 ND 117, 594 N.W.2d 924, 1999 N.D. LEXIS 91 (N.D. 1999).

A patient has the right to the least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the treatment purposes; however, in some cases, a reporting doctor may reasonably conclude that less restrictive alternatives to hospitalization simply to dot exist. Pryatel v. J.S. (In the Interest of J.S.), 2002 ND 7, 638 N.W.2d 45, 2002 N.D. LEXIS 3 (N.D. 2002).

Injectable form of Haloperidol was necessary only if the patient refused to take his oral medication; thus, the inclusion of that anti-psychotic drug in the order for treatment with medication under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-40 was supported by the evidence and was not clearly erroneous. N.D. State Hosp. v. D.A. (In the Interest of D.A.), 2005 ND 116, 698 N.W.2d 474, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 135 (N.D. 2005).

Although the patient argued that as part of the least restrictive conditions for his involuntary treatment under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-40(2), he should have been allowed to work outside of a state hospital, the supreme court found that he remained a risk if left unsupervised and allowing him to work ran counter to the continuing treatment order. Pryatel v. P.B. (In the Interest of P.B.), 2005 ND 201, 706 N.W.2d 78, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 252 (N.D. 2005).

Collateral References.

Hospital’s liability for mentally deranged patient’s self-inflicted injuries, 36 A.L.R.4th 117.

Construction and application of state patient bill of rights statutes, 87 A.L.R.5th 277.

Law Reviews.

Article: The Tail Still Wags the Dog: The Pervasive and Inappropriate Influence by the Psychiatric Profession on the Civil Commitment Process, see 86 N.D. L. Rev. 259 (2010).

25-03.1-41. Limitations and restrictions of patient’s rights.

The rights enumerated in subsections 5, 6, 7, and 8 of section 25-03.1-40 may be limited or restricted by the treating physician, physician assistant, psychiatrist, advanced practice registered nurse, or psychologist trained in a clinical program, if in that individual’s professional judgment to do so would be in the best interests of the patient and the rights are restricted or limited in the manner authorized by the rules adopted pursuant to section 25-03.1-46. When a physician, physician assistant, psychiatrist, advanced practice registered nurse, or psychologist trained in a clinical program responsible for treatment of a particular patient imposes a special restriction on the rights of the patient as authorized by the rules, a written order specifying the restriction and the reasons for the restriction must be signed by the physician, physician assistant, psychiatrist, advanced practice registered nurse, or psychologist trained in a clinical program and attached to the patient’s chart. These restrictions must be reviewed at intervals of not more than fourteen days and may be renewed by following the procedure set out in this section.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 41; 1979, ch. 334, § 31; 1993, ch. 279, § 22; 2015, ch. 201, § 17, eff August 1, 2015.

Notes to Decisions

Transfer to State Hospital.

This section does not require testimony by a physician, psychiatrist, or clinical psychologist before a patient may be transferred from an outpatient facility to the state hospital. It simply delineates the procedure by which patient’s treating physician, psychiatrist or clinical psychologist may, in exercising professional judgment, limit the patient’s statutorily protected rights in the patient’s best interest. In Interest of Cuypers, 389 N.W.2d 812, 1986 N.D. LEXIS 368 (N.D. 1986).

25-03.1-42. Limitation of liability — Penalty for false petition.

  1. A person acting in good faith upon either actual knowledge or reliable information which makes the petition for involuntary treatment of an individual under this chapter is not subject to civil or criminal liability.
  2. A physician, physician assistant, psychiatrist, psychologist, advanced practice registered nurse, mental health professional, employee of a treatment facility, state’s attorney, or peace officer who in good faith exercises professional judgment in fulfilling an obligation or discretionary responsibility under this chapter is not subject to civil or criminal liability for acting unless it can be shown that it was done in a negligent manner.
  3. A person that makes a petition for involuntary treatment of an individual without having good cause to believe the individual is a person who is both mentally ill and has a substance use disorder and as a result is likely to cause serious harm to self or others is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 42; 1979, ch. 334, § 32; 1989, ch. 149, § 23; 1993, ch. 279, § 23; 2015, ch. 201, § 18, eff August 1, 2015; 2021, ch. 223, § 8, eff August 1, 2021.

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

Cause of Action Allowed.

An action would lie for prosecution, with malice and without probable cause, of a proceeding to have a person committed to the state hospital for the insane. JOHNSON v. HUHNER, 76 N.D. 13, 33 N.W.2d 268, 1948 N.D. LEXIS 55 (N.D. 1948).

Collateral References.

Malpractice liability with respect to diagnosis and treatment of mental disease, 99 A.L.R.2d 599.

Libel and slander: actionability of imputing to private person mental disorder or incapacity, or impairment of mental faculties, 23 A.L.R.3d 652.

Malicious prosecution: liability for malicious prosecution predicated upon institution of, or conduct in connection with, insanity proceedings, 30 A.L.R.3d 455.

False imprisonment: liability for false imprisonment predicated upon institution of, or conduct in connection with, insanity proceedings, 30 A.L.R.3d 523.

Sexual relationship with patient, civil liability of doctor or psychologist for having, 33 A.L.R.3d 1393.

Release from institution: liability of one releasing institutionalized mental patient for harm he causes, 38 A.L.R.3d 699.

Malpractice in connection with electroshock treatment, 94 A.L.R.3d 317.

Civil liability for physical measures undertaken in connection with treatment of mentally disordered patient, 8 A.L.R.4th 464.

25-03.1-43. Confidential records.

All information and records obtained in the course of an investigation, an evaluation, an examination, or treatment under this chapter and the presence or past presence of a patient in a treatment facility are confidential, but the information and records may be disclosed to and be used by a court as required to carry out the purposes of this chapter, and as authorized under title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, part 164. Courts also may release nonclinical identifying information of persons subject to proceedings under this chapter for the purposes of section 62.1-02-01.2. Any information disclosed to a court remains confidential information, except as provided in section 62.1-02-01.2.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 43; 1989, ch. 149, § 24; 1991, ch. 293, § 3; 1991, ch. 592, § 8; 1993, ch. 133, § 2; 1993, ch. 279, § 24; 1995, ch. 271, § 1; 1997, ch. 242, § 1; 2003, ch. 225, § 4; 2011, ch. 502, § 1.

Cross-References.

Supervising department’s access to books and records, see § 25-01.1-06.

Notes to Decisions

Notice to Representatives.

Where there is modification of medication combinations in case of refusal by patient, the court should condition the alternative combination of medications upon at least 24 hours prior notice to the patient, his most recent attorney, and the court that issued the forced medication order. Shannon J. v. R.A.J. (In the Interest of R.A.J.), 554 N.W.2d 809, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 240 (N.D. 1996).

25-03.1-44. Records of disclosure. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2003, ch. 225, § 6.

25-03.1-45. Expungement of records.

Following the discharge of a respondent from a treatment facility or the state hospital or the issuance of a court order denying a petition for commitment, a respondent may at any time move to have all court records pertaining to the proceedings expunged on condition that the respondent file a full release of all claims of whatever nature arising out of the proceedings.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 45.

25-03.1-46. Rules and regulations — Preparation of forms.

The department shall, under chapter 28-32, adopt and enforce such rules as may be necessary for the implementation of this chapter. The supreme court, in consultation with the department, the associations of district judges and state’s attorneys, and other affected organizations, is responsible for the preparation and the department is responsible for distribution of the necessary and appropriate forms to enable compliance with this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 239, § 46; 1989, ch. 149, § 25; 1991, ch. 326, § 75.

CHAPTER 25-03.2 Residential Treatment Centers for Children

25-03.2-01. Definitions. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Child” or “children” means a person or persons under the age of twenty-one.
  2. “Clinical supervision” means the oversight responsibility for individual treatment plans and individual service delivery.
  3. “Department” means the department of human services.
  4. “Diagnostic assessment” means a written summary of the history, diagnosis, and individual treatment needs of a mentally ill person using diagnostic, interview, and other relevant assessment techniques.
  5. “Individual treatment plan” means a written plan of intervention, treatment, and services for a mentally ill person that is developed under the clinical supervision of a mental health professional on the basis of a diagnostic assessment.
  6. “Mentally ill person” has the same meaning provided for in section 25-03.1-02.
  7. “Psychiatric residential treatment facility for children” means a facility or a distinct part of a facility that provides to children a total, twenty-four hour, therapeutic environment integrating group living, educational services, and a clinical program based upon a comprehensive, interdisciplinary clinical assessment, and an individualized treatment plan that meets the needs of the child and family. The services are available to children in need of and able to respond to active psychotherapeutic intervention and who cannot be effectively treated in their own family, in another home, or in a less restrictive setting. The facility must meet the requirements of a psychiatric residential treatment facility as set out in title 42, Code of Federal Regulations, part 483.352.
  8. “Residential treatment” means a twenty-four hour a day program under the clinical supervision of a mental health professional, in a community residential setting other than an acute care hospital, for the active treatment of mentally ill persons.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 337, § 1; 2007, ch. 256, § 2; 2015, ch. 202, § 1, eff August 1, 2015.

25-03.2-01. Definitions. [Effective September 1, 2022]

In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Child” or “children” means a person or persons under the age of twenty-one.
  2. “Clinical supervision” means the oversight responsibility for individual treatment plans and individual service delivery.
  3. “Department” means the department of health and human services.
  4. “Diagnostic assessment” means a written summary of the history, diagnosis, and individual treatment needs of a mentally ill person using diagnostic, interview, and other relevant assessment techniques.
  5. “Individual treatment plan” means a written plan of intervention, treatment, and services for a mentally ill person that is developed under the clinical supervision of a mental health professional on the basis of a diagnostic assessment.
  6. “Mentally ill person” has the same meaning provided for in section 25-03.1-02.
  7. “Psychiatric residential treatment facility for children” means a facility or a distinct part of a facility that provides to children a total, twenty-four hour, therapeutic environment integrating group living, educational services, and a clinical program based upon a comprehensive, interdisciplinary clinical assessment, and an individualized treatment plan that meets the needs of the child and family. The services are available to children in need of and able to respond to active psychotherapeutic intervention and who cannot be effectively treated in their own family, in another home, or in a less restrictive setting. The facility must meet the requirements of a psychiatric residential treatment facility as set out in title 42, Code of Federal Regulations, part 483.352.
  8. “Residential treatment” means a twenty-four hour a day program under the clinical supervision of a mental health professional, in a community residential setting other than an acute care hospital, for the active treatment of mentally ill persons.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 337, § 1; 2007, ch. 256, § 2; 2015, ch. 202, § 1, eff August 1, 2015; 2021, ch. 352, § 279, eff September 1, 2022.

25-03.2-02. License required.

The operator of a publicly or privately operated psychiatric residential treatment facility for children shall meet the requirements for licensure and shall secure a license from the department.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 337, § 1; 2007, ch. 256, § 3.

25-03.2-03. Requirements for license.

The department shall issue a license for the operation of a psychiatric residential treatment facility for children upon a showing that:

  1. The premises to be used are in fit, safe, and sanitary condition and properly equipped to provide good care and treatment;
  2. The program director of the facility holds, at a minimum, a master’s degree in social work, psychology, or in a related field with at least two years of professional experience in the treatment of children suffering from mental illnesses or emotional disturbances. The executive director of the facility must have, at a minimum, a bachelor’s degree in a behavioral science or a bachelor’s degree in any field and two years of experience in administration;
  3. The staff employed by the facility is supervised by the program director and qualified by training and experience to provide services to children suffering from mental illnesses or emotional disturbances. The facility annually must provide training to staff which is relevant to the needs of the client population;
  4. The health, safety, and well-being of the children cared for and treated in the facility will be properly safeguarded;
  5. There are sufficient treatment, educational, recreational and leisure, and physical facilities and services available to the children in the facility;
  6. The facility will provide for a medical and psychological examination of each child within seventy-two hours of admission and thereafter as needed by the child;
  7. An interdisciplinary team will review each individual treatment plan at least monthly and update or amend the plan to meet the needs of the child;
  8. The facility develops postdischarge plans and coordinates facility services and related community services with partial discharge plans with each child’s family, school, and community upon discharge to ensure continuity of care; and
  9. The facility is in compliance with requirements for psychiatric residential treatment facilities under 42 U.S.C. 1396d [Pub. L. 89-97; 79 Stat. 351] and title 42, Code of Federal Regulations, part 441, and with this chapter and rules adopted under this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 337, § 1; 2007, ch. 256, § 4; 2015, ch. 202, § 2, eff August 1, 2015.

25-03.2-03.1. Moratorium on expansion of psychiatric residential treatment facility for children bed capacity — Exchange of bed capacity.

  1. Notwithstanding sections 25-03.2-03 and 25-03.2-08, unless a needs assessment conducted by the department indicates a need for the licensing of additional bed capacity, the department may not issue a license under this chapter for any additional bed capacity for a psychiatric residential treatment facility for children above the state’s gross number of beds licensed as of June 30, 2003. This subsection does not apply to nor prohibit the department from licensing additional bed capacity for a new psychiatric residential treatment facility for children if the additional beds are designated for the care of children and adolescents who are residents of other states.
  2. Notwithstanding subsection 1, the department may develop a policy to:
    1. Exchange qualified residential treatment program bed capacity licensed under chapter 50-11 with psychiatric residential treatment facility bed capacity; or
    2. Exchange psychiatric residential treatment facility bed capacity with qualified residential treatment program bed capacity licensed under chapter 50-11.

Source:

S.L. 1999, ch. 34, § 8; 2001, ch. 255, § 1; 2003, ch. 229, § 1; 2005, ch. 409, § 1; 2007, ch. 256, § 5; 2007, ch. 257, § 1; 2013, ch. 224, § 1; 2019, ch. 404, § 2, eff October 1, 2019.

25-03.2-04. Conviction not bar to licensure — Exceptions.

Conviction of an offense by an owner or operator of a facility does not disqualify the center from licensure unless the department determines that the offense has a direct bearing upon a person’s ability to serve the public as an owner or operator of a psychiatric residential treatment facility for children, or that, following conviction of any offense, the person is not sufficiently rehabilitated under section 12.1-33-02.1.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 337, § 1; 2007, ch. 256, § 6.

25-03.2-05. Content of license.

The license to operate a psychiatric residential treatment facility for children must specify:

  1. The name of the licensee.
  2. The premises to which the license is applicable.
  3. The number of children who may be received in the premises at any one time.
  4. The date of expiration of the license.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 337, § 1; 2007, ch. 256, § 7.

25-03.2-06. Admission criteria.

A child may be admitted to a psychiatric residential treatment facility for children if, the child has been diagnosed by a psychiatrist or psychologist as suffering from a mental illness or emotional disturbance and the child is in need of and able to respond to active psychotherapeutic intervention and cannot be effectively treated in the child’s family, in another home, or in a less restrictive setting. The facility must take into account the age and diagnosis of the child in order to provide an environment that is safe and therapeutic for all children.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 337, § 1; 2007, ch. 256, § 8.

25-03.2-07. Method of providing service.

A psychiatric residential treatment facility for children shall provide for the development of an individual treatment plan, based upon a comprehensive interdisciplinary diagnostic assessment, which includes the role of the family, identifies the goals and objectives of the therapeutic activities and treatment, provides a schedule for accomplishing the therapeutic activities and treatment goals and objectives, and identifies the individuals responsible for providing services, consistent with the individual treatment plan, to children. Clinical supervision of the individual treatment plan must be accomplished as set forth by the department in rules. Clinical supervision must be documented in individual treatment plans and by entries in the child’s record regarding supervisory activity.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 337, § 1; 2007, ch. 256, § 9; 2015, ch. 202, § 3, eff August 1, 2015.

25-03.2-08. Revocation or denial of license.

The department may revoke a license or deny an application for a license under this chapter if:

  1. Any requirement and condition of this chapter for the issuance of a license is not met, or has ceased to be met;
  2. The license was issued or requested upon fraudulent or untrue representations;
  3. The owner or operator has violated any rule of the department; or
  4. The owner, operator, or an employee of the facility is or has been found guilty of an offense determined by the department to have a direct bearing on the person’s ability to serve as an owner, operator, or employee, or the department determines, following conviction of an offense, that the person is not sufficiently rehabilitated under section 12.1-33-02.1.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 337, § 1; 2007, ch. 256, § 10.

25-03.2-09. Hearing on denial or revocation of license.

In any case in which the department determines that a license should be revoked or an application for a license should be denied, written reasons for the revocation or denial must be provided to the licensee or applicant. The licensee or applicant is entitled to a hearing before the department if a hearing is requested within ten days after the charges are provided.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 337, § 1.

25-03.2-10. Department may adopt rules.

The department may adopt rules for the conduct of psychiatric residential treatment facilities for children and shall adopt rules defining which professionals may provide clinical supervision and review, and may develop, update, and sign an individual treatment plan within a psychiatric residential treatment facility for children.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 337, § 1; 2007, ch. 256, § 11; 2015, ch. 202, § 4, eff August 1, 2015.

CHAPTER 25-03.3 Commitment of Sexually Dangerous Individuals

25-03.3-01. Definitions. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Committed individual” means an individual committed for custody and treatment pursuant to this chapter.
  2. “Executive director” means the executive director of the department of human services or the executive director’s designee.
  3. “Intellectual disability” means mental retardation as defined in the “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders”, American psychiatric association, (4th edition, text revision 2000).
  4. “Qualified expert” means an individual who has an expertise in sexual offender evaluations and who is a psychiatrist or psychologist trained in a clinical program and licensed pursuant to this state’s law or a psychologist approved for exemption by the North Dakota board of psychologist examiners. For purposes of evaluating an individual with an intellectual disability, the qualified expert must have specialized knowledge in sexual offender evaluations of individuals with an intellectual disability.
  5. “Respondent” means an individual subject to a commitment proceeding pursuant to this chapter.
  6. “Sexual act” means sexual contact between human beings, including contact between the penis and the vulva, the penis and the anus, the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the vulva and the vulva; or the use of an object that comes in contact with the victim’s anus, vulva, or penis. Sexual contact between the penis and the vulva, or between the penis and the anus, or an object and the anus, vulva, or penis of the victim, occurs upon penetration, however slight. Emission is not required.
  7. “Sexual contact” means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of an individual for the purpose of arousing or satisfying sexual or aggressive desires.
  8. “Sexually dangerous individual” means an individual who is shown to have engaged in sexually predatory conduct and who has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction that makes that individual likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health or safety of others. It is a rebuttable presumption that sexually predatory conduct creates a danger to the physical or mental health or safety of the victim of the conduct. For these purposes, intellectual disability is not a sexual disorder, personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction.
  9. “Sexually predatory conduct” means:
    1. Engaging or attempting to engage in a sexual act or sexual contact with another individual, or causing or attempting to cause another individual to engage in a sexual act or sexual contact, if:
      1. The victim is compelled to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping directed toward the victim or any human being, or the victim is compelled to submit by any threat or coercion that would render a person reasonably incapable of resisting;
      2. The victim’s power to appraise or control the victim’s conduct has been substantially impaired by the administration or employment, without the victim’s knowledge, of intoxicants or other means for purposes of preventing resistance;
      3. The actor knows or should have known that the victim is unaware that a sexual act is being committed upon the victim;
      4. The victim is less than fifteen years old;
      5. The actor knows or should have known that the victim has a disability that substantially impairs the victim’s understanding of the nature of the sexual act or contact;
      6. The victim is in official custody or detained in a treatment facility, health care facility, correctional facility, or other institution and is under the supervisory authority, disciplinary control, or care of the actor;
      7. The victim is a minor and the actor is an adult; or
      8. The other individual is a person related to the actor within a degree of consanguinity within which marriages are declared incestuous and void by section 14-03-03 and the actor knows that; or
    2. Engaging in or attempting to engage in sexual contact with another individual or causing or attempting to cause another individual to have sexual contact, if:
      1. The actor knows or should have known that the contact is offensive to the victim; or
      2. The victim is a minor, fifteen years of age or older, and the actor is the minor’s parent, guardian, or is otherwise responsible for general supervision of the victim’s welfare.
  10. “Should have known” means a reasonable individual without a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction in the actor’s circumstances would have known.
  11. “Superintendent” means the superintendent of the state hospital or the superintendent’s designee.
  12. “Treatment facility” means any hospital, including the state hospital, or any treatment facility, including the life skills and transition center, which can provide directly, or by direct arrangement with other public or private agencies, evaluation and treatment of sexually dangerous individuals.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, § 1; 2011, ch. 208, § 1; 2011, ch. 207, § 7; 2013, ch. 226, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Constitutionality.

The statutory scheme for commitment of sexually dangerous individuals is not a criminal punishment and thus commitment under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3 does not violate a defendant’s double jeopardy rights. Grosinger v. M.D. (In the Interest of M.D.), 1999 ND 160, 598 N.W.2d 799, 1999 N.D. LEXIS 180 (N.D. 1999).

The creation of a civil procedure for involuntary commitment of sexually dangerous individuals under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3 did not violate double jeopardy; therefore, an offender convicted of several sexual offenses was properly committed after several evaluations. Van Grinsven v. G.R.H. (In re G.R.H.), 2006 ND 56, 711 N.W.2d 587, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 70 (N.D. 2006).

Confidentiality.

Dismissal of the petition is not required for violation of the confidentiality provisions of N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3. Grosinger v. M.D. (In the Interest of M.D.), 1999 ND 160, 598 N.W.2d 799, 1999 N.D. LEXIS 180 (N.D. 1999).

Double Jeopardy.

District court order denying an individual's petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual was reversed and remanded where the district court did not address or make sufficient findings of fact regarding the due process consideration of whether the individual had difficulty controlling his behavior, as required by judicial precedent. Nesvig v. Hoff (In re Hoff), 2014 ND 63, 844 N.W.2d 866, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 66 (N.D. 2014).

Not Impermissibly Punitive.

North Dakota’s civil commitment framework for sexually dangerous individuals under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3 was not impermissibly punitive in nature because it conformed to all of the requirements of Hendricks, as it contained procedural and evidentiary safeguards for affected individuals. N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) required that the individual’s dangerous condition be manifested by a sexual disorder, personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction, and by requiring the connection between the dangerous condition and a mental disorder, ch. 25-03.3 narrowed the class of affected individuals to those with impairments rendering them dangerous beyond their conduct. G.R.H. v. G.R.H., 2011 ND 21, 793 N.W.2d 460, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 32 (N.D. 2011).

Practice and Procedure.

Appellate court retained jurisdiction, and remanded a district court’s order denying an individual’s petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual, because the district court’s findings were inadequate to permit appellate review. The district court was instructed to make specific findings of fact on whether the individual was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct and whether the individual had serious difficulty in controlling behavior. Koppy v. G.L.D., 2019 ND 304, 936 N.W.2d 539, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 310 (N.D. 2019).

Appellate court remanded, while retaining jurisdiction, with instructions that a district court make required specific findings of fact because the district court’s conclusory general findings in denying a petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual were insufficient for civil commitment decisions. Kummer v. Hehn (In re Hehn), 2020 ND 226, 949 N.W.2d 848, 2020 N.D. LEXIS 207 (N.D. 2020).

Sexually Dangerous Individual.

Evidence that the defendant had had repeated contact with underage boys, including the victim involved in his conviction for gross sexual imposition, his failure to complete sex offender treatment while in prison and after his release, together with expert testimony that he suffered from paraphilia, with a fixation on adolescent boys and was likely to commit sexually predatory conduct in the future, established he was a sexually dangerous person. Grosinger v. M.D. (In the Interest of M.D.), 1999 ND 160, 598 N.W.2d 799, 1999 N.D. LEXIS 180 (N.D. 1999).

Court properly committed a patient as a sexually dangerous individual where two experts diagnosed him with pedophilia, sexual sadism, and antisocial personality disorder, and he was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct. Bertsch v. D.V.A. (In the Interest of D.V.A.), 2004 ND 57, 676 N.W.2d 776, 2004 N.D. LEXIS 72 (N.D. 2004).

Where State presented two experts who testified respondent, who was found to be a sexually dangerous individual, suffered from disorders, which made him likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct, the district court’s order of commitment was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Feland v. B.V. (In re B.V.), 2006 ND 22, 708 N.W.2d 877, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 32 (N.D. 2006).

Supreme Court of North Dakota construes the definition of a sexually dangerous individual in N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) to mean that proof of a nexus between the requisite disorder and dangerousness encompasses proof that the disorder involves serious difficulty in controlling behavior and suffices to distinguish a dangerous sexual offender whose disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist in the ordinary criminal case. That nexus between the requisite disorder and future dangerousness satisfies the due process requirements. Van Grinsven v. G.R.H. (In re G.R.H.), 2006 ND 56, 711 N.W.2d 587, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 70 (N.D. 2006).

Respondent was properly committed as a sexually dangerous individual because he had a history of sexually predatory conduct and numerous mental diseases that made him likely to re-offend, and the State carried its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent was a sexually dangerous individual. Evaluating psychologists could properly consider circumstances surrounding respondent’s convictions for criminal trespass involving his lurking in and around women’s bedrooms and a conviction for gross sexual imposition that had been reversed on procedural grounds. All sexually predatory conduct, including conduct that did not result in a charge or conviction, may be considered under a N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) analysis. Feland v. P.F. (In the Interest of P.F.), 2006 ND 82, 712 N.W.2d 610, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 86 (N.D. 2006).

Commitment as a sexually dangerous person was affirmed because the evidence in the record clearly and convincingly established that the claimant had a congenital or acquired condition that was manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction and that the disorder made the claimant likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct, and the claimant could not show he was prejudiced by the delay in holding the commitment hearing, when the State petitioned to commit him while he was still incarcerated for gross sexual imposition. Feland v. J.M. (In the Interest of J.M.), 2006 ND 96, 713 N.W.2d 518, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 106 (N.D. 2006).

State proved that a patient was a sexually dangerous individual because experts concluded that he engaged in sexually predatory conduct, he had a “severe” or “significant” antisocial personality disorder, and all three experts found the required nexus or “causative connection” between the patient’s personality disorder and his dangerousness by noting his impulse-control problems as evidenced by the 1998 and 2000 incidents as well as the many fights and “write-ups” he had while incarcerated. Experts stressed the significance of the patient’s failure to complete sex offender treatment and concluded that the patient was a sexually dangerous individual. State v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 2007 ND 50, 730 N.W.2d 570, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 47 (N.D. 2007).

Order committing respondent as a sexually dangerous individual pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) was upheld where the constitutional right to confrontation did not apply to civil commitments of sexually dangerous individuals; respondent was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the psychologists and to point out strengths and weaknesses of the psychological evaluations. State v. Midgett (In re Midgett), 2007 ND 198, 742 N.W.2d 803, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 193 (N.D. 2007).

Order committing respondent as a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01 was affirmed because respondent’s antisocial personality disorder made him likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct, and his failure to complete sex offender treatment and an alcohol treatment program increased his risk levels overall. Gaddie v. Barrera (In re Barrera), 2008 ND 25, 744 N.W.2d 744, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 18 (N.D. 2008).

Where the victim in respondent’s gross sexual imposition conviction was a seven-year-old female, the first element of the sexually dangerous individual test was met. Gaddie v. Barrera (In re Barrera), 2008 ND 25, 744 N.W.2d 744, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 18 (N.D. 2008).

Where all three experts diagnosed respondent as having an antisocial personality disorder, based on numerous factors outlined in each expert’s individual report, the second element of the sexually dangerous individual test was met. Gaddie v. Barrera (In re Barrera), 2008 ND 25, 744 N.W.2d 744, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 18 (N.D. 2008).

District court had the ultimate decision to determine whether the State had met its burden of producing clear and convincing evidence sufficient for commitment, and a psychological test could not act as a substitute for independent judicial review; thus, the fact that the actuarial tests did not indicate respondent was statistically likely to re-offend was of little consequence in determining whether there was clear and convincing evidence to support his conviction. Stokes v. Hehn (In re Hehn), 2008 ND 36, 745 N.W.2d 631, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 37 (N.D. 2008).

There was clear and convincing evidence to support the district court’s conclusion that respondent was a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8), where, based on a diagnosis of hebephilia and psychopathy, two experts concluded that respondent was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct that constituted a danger to the safety of others, and testimony by the others at the hearing, including respondent’s probation officer and community members who had filed complaints, supported the expert determinations. Stokes v. Hehn (In re Hehn), 2008 ND 36, 745 N.W.2d 631, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 37 (N.D. 2008).

Respondent was entitled to a remand of the order finding him a sexually dangerous individual and committing him under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) because the district court did not address the due process consideration and made conclusory and general findings of fact on the statutory elements, which did not comply with N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Cass County State's Atty. v. Vantreece (In re Vantreece), 2008 ND 197, 758 N.W.2d 909, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 218 (N.D. 2008).

Denial of appellant’s petition for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual was appropriate pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) because he failed to progress in treatment, he had a sexual relationship with a young-looking resident in violation of the treatment program rules, and he showed a lack of empathy for his victims. Grosinger v. M.D. (In re M.D.), 2008 ND 208, 757 N.W.2d 559, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 220 (N.D. 2008).

Patient’s petition for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual was properly denied because the State of North Dakota proved by clear an convincing evidence that the patient remained a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-18(4). One expert concluded that the patient remained a sexually dangerous individual and a second acknowledged that if the age of certain victims was proper a diagnosis of sexual perversion of sexual attraction to adolescents would be justified. Van Grinsven v. G.R.H. (In re G.R.H.), 2008 ND 222, 758 N.W.2d 719, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 203 (N.D. 2008).

Order civilly committing appellant as a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3 was affirmed because the trial court properly found a nexus between appellant’s disorders and sexual dangerousness, the trial court properly interpreted the evidence presented at the commitment hearing, and the trial court did not commit reversible procedural error by failing to set aside sufficient time during appellant’s first commitment hearing. Griffin v. Rush (In re Rush), 2009 ND 102, 766 N.W.2d 720, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 102 (N.D. 2009).

Denial of a committed individual’s petition for discharge under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-18(4) from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) was appropriate because the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the committed individual had difficulty controlling his actions and that when he had been conditionally released in the past, he had not done well and had committed multiple sex crimes. Cass County State's Attorney v. R.A.S. (In re R.A.S.), 2009 ND 101, 766 N.W.2d 712, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 101 (N.D. 2009).

District court’s finding that defendant was a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) was supported by clear and convincing evidence because the complainant and two licensed psychologists testified and there was evidence from which the district court could have found that defendant had uncontrolled anger, rage and reduced impulse control and that a nexus existed between defendant’s diagnosed disorders and dangerousness which established serious difficulty in controlling defendant’s behavior sufficient to distinguish defendant from other ordinary criminal recidivists. Furthermore, the court’s decision satisfied the substantive due process requirements. Cass County State's Atty. v. Vantreece (In re Vantreece), 2009 ND 152, 771 N.W.2d 585, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 162 (N.D. 2009).

Patient was committed as a sexually dangerous individual based on his molestation of two boys, alleged raped of a woman, sexual assault of two girls, and rape of a developmentally disabled adult female; when he petitioned for discharge under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-18(1), the only evidence presented was a doctor’s expert testimony that the patient had a high risk for reoffending. His diagnosis was based on the patient’s failure to follow rules, deceitfulness about past sex offenses, impulsivity, aggression, lack of remorse, and irresponsibility regarding his treatment; the district court did not err by denying the patient’s petition for discharge, because the doctor’s expert testimony proved that the patient continued to be a sexually dangerous individual within the meaning of N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8). Cass County State's Atty. v. O.H.W. (In re O.H.W.), 2009 ND 194, 775 N.W.2d 73, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 198 (N.D. 2009).

District court did not err in denying defendant’s petition for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual as the State presented sufficient evidence to show defendant was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constituted a danger to physical or mental health or safety of others, N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8). State v. T.O. (In re T.O.), 2009 ND 209, 776 N.W.2d 47, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 213 (N.D. 2009).

Civil commitment order ruling that appellant was a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) for siring three children with two daughters, molesting one grandson, showing pornography to another grandson/son, and impregnating a 16-year-old was overturned because the district court made a legal error by finding that incest between consenting adults fell within the statutory definition of sexually predatory conduct under N.D.C.C.§ 25-03.3-01(9) and by omitting findings related to the first and second prongs of the analysis used to determine if appellant was a sexually dangerous individual. State v. Voisine (In re Voisine), 2010 ND 17, 777 N.W.2d 908, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 20 (N.D. 2010).

State presented clear and convincing evidence to establish that a sex offender’s commitment as a sexually dangerous person was necessary because he had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. The State presented evidence that the sex offender engaged in grooming behavior and flattery when dealing with a female therapist, that he touched a female volunteer who came to the prison for a religious retreat in violation of the rules, and that he did not recognize that his behavior was inappropriate; this evidence, coupled with the expert opinion of an examining forensic psychologist that the sex offender was unable to control his behavior, constituted clear and convincing evidence to support his commitment. That a competing expert opined that the sex offender could control his behavior did not warrant a different result because the responsibility of resolving credibility issues and weighing the evidence was vested in the district court. Hanenberg v. Hanenberg, 2010 ND 8, 777 N.W.2d 62, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 10 (N.D. 2010).

Denial of petitioner’s request for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual was proper, as a psychologist testified that petitioner’s pedophilia and antisocial personality disorder were lifelong disorders that could be controlled with the right treatment, but that petitioner had not yet successfully completed treatment or even advanced beyond the Basic Skills, or pre-treatment, program. State v. Midgett (In re Midgett), 2010 ND 98, 783 N.W.2d 27, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 108 (N.D. 2010).

Order that respondent remain committed to a state hospital as a sexually dangerous individual was upheld because a finding under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) that respondent suffered from the sexual disorders of paraphilia and fetishism and therefore had a congenital or acquired condition manifested by a sexual disorder was not clearly erroneous. Feland v. A.M. (In re A.M.), 2010 ND 163, 787 N.W.2d 752, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 165 (N.D. 2010).

Sexually dangerous individual is defined under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) as an individual who is shown to have engaged in sexually predatory conduct and who has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction that makes that individual likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health or safety of others. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that commitment as a sexually dangerous individual is unconstitutional unless the person is found to have serious difficulty controlling his or her behavior; therefore, consistent with N.D.C.C. § 1-02-38(1), the definition of a sexually dangerous individual is construed to require a connection between the disorder and dangerousness, including evidence showing the person has serious difficulty controlling his behavior, which distinguishes a sexually dangerous individual from other dangerous persons. Maedche v. Maedche, 2010 ND 171, 788 N.W.2d 331, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 170 (N.D. 2010).

All sexually predatory conduct may be considered in an analysis under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8), including conduct not resulting in a charge or conviction. Maedche v. Maedche, 2010 ND 171, 788 N.W.2d 331, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 170 (N.D. 2010).

District court did not clearly err in concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence that appellant was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) because: (1) the district court reasonably considered the results of a specific test that both experts used to classify appellant as a high risk individual; and (2) the district court’s consideration of the experts’ testimony was also reasonable. It was proper for the experts to consider appellant’s admissions in treatment, and they had a wealth of other information on which to form their opinions, including their own interviews of appellant. G.R.H. v. G.R.H., 2011 ND 21, 793 N.W.2d 460, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 32 (N.D. 2011).

Petitioner was not entitled to discharge from treatment as a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8), as a doctor’s report and testimony supported the district court’s finding that petitioner remained a sexually dangerous individual and had serious difficulty controlling petitioner’s behavior, including petitioner’s sexual behavior, which distinguished petitioner from a typical recidivist in an ordinary criminal case. G.L.D. v. G.L.D., 2011 ND 52, 795 N.W.2d 346, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 49 (N.D. 2011).

Trial court did not err in denying petitioner’s motion for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous person because the State did not fail to prove that he had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior or fail to establish a nexus between his antisocial personal disorder and his future dangerousness; while one expert opined that petitioner was not likely to reoffend, the trial court did not err in rejecting that opinion on the ground that the expert did not adequately consider petitioner’s actual behavior and lack of progress in sex offender treatment. Where another expert opined that petitioner was highly likely to reoffend if released and where the record established that petitioner acted inappropriately toward hospital staff, violated the rules of his treatment program, made minimal progress in his sex offender treatment, showed no empathy for his victims, and had psychopathic traits that made him impulsive, sensation-seeking, irresponsible, and violative of social and legal norms, the district court did not err in concluding that petitioner had serious difficulty controlling his behavior and would be likely to reoffend if discharged. Burdick v. Wolff (In re Wolff), 2011 ND 76, 796 N.W.2d 644, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 75 (N.D. 2011).

In a sexually dangerous individual proceeding, the district court’s denial of the patient’s discharge petition was not clearly erroneous; the court gave more weight to the testimony and report of the State’s expert than the testimony and reports of patient’s experts and made detailed findings, including credibility determinations and references to the evidence relied on. Enget v. J.T.N. (In re J.T.N.), 2011 ND 231, 807 N.W.2d 570, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 220 (N.D. 2011).

Trial court properly denied respondent’s petition for discharge from civil commitment because the State established by clear and convincing evidence that he remained a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8); he was diagnosed with pedophilia, was terminated from a treatment program, and lacked insight into his condition. Erickson v. Rubey (In re Rubey), 2012 ND 133, 818 N.W.2d 731, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 149 (N.D. 2012).

Trial court did not err under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) in denying appellant’s petition for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous person because there was evidence that he had difficulty controlling his behavior and was likely to reoffend; he made statements in treatment during the review period that he would take advantage of an underage black male if he knew he would not get caught. Assistant State's Atty. v. M.D. (In re Grosinger), 2012 ND 261, 825 N.W.2d 838, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 266 (N.D. 2012).

District court did not abuse its discretion in not striking the testimony and opinion of the State’s expert witness about whether the patient remained a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) because her admitted failure to review the patient’s entire file at the state hospital went to the weight of her opinion and not to its admissibility, and her testimony established an adequate factual basis for her opinion. Suhr v. J.M. (In re J.M.), 2013 ND 11, 826 N.W.2d 315, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 10 (N.D. 2013).

Committed man’s claim had to be rejected in a case involving the denial of the committed man’s petition for discharge that the trial court had erred in determining that the committed man had not engaged in N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) sexually predatory conduct, as well as the finding that the committed man remained a sexually dangerous individual as defined under that statute. The claim about not having engaged in sexually predatory conduct was barred by res judicata since it had been previously decided, and the evidence, including the reports of two experts, supported a finding that the committed man was still a sexually dangerous individual. Grosinger v. J.G., 2013 ND 26, 827 N.W.2d 341, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 22 (N.D. 2013).

Supreme court was unable to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in limiting evidence as to elements of the sexually dangerous individual analysis because an individual who was civilly committed as a sexually dangerous individual failed to make an offer of proof when his expert’s testimony was limited, and the expert’s report was silent as to one of the elements. Erickson v. Rubey, 2013 ND 190, 838 N.W.2d 446, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 195 (N.D. 2013).

District court’s finding that an individual who was civilly committed as a sexually dangerous individual remained sexually dangerous was not clearly erroneous because its preference for a doctor’s opinions regarding the individual’s risk factors was not an erroneous view of the law. Erickson v. Rubey, 2013 ND 190, 838 N.W.2d 446, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 195 (N.D. 2013).

Clear and convincing evidence supported an inmate’s civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person because, inter alia, the inmate did not contest that the inmate had been convicted of sexually predatory offenses under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(9). Wamstad v. Mangelsen, 2014 ND 31, 843 N.W.2d 8, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 22 (N.D. 2014), op. withdrawn, 884 N.W.2d 748, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 184 (N.D. 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence supported an inmate’s civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person because, inter alia, a finding that the inmate had serious difficulty controlling the inmate’s sexual behavior, under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8), did not have to be based solely on conduct of a sexual nature, so other misconduct was properly considered. Wamstad v. Mangelsen, 2014 ND 31, 843 N.W.2d 8, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 22 (N.D. 2014), op. withdrawn, 884 N.W.2d 748, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 184 (N.D. 2016).

Clear and convincing evidence supported an inmate’s civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person because, inter alia, the fact that the inmate’s prior sexual convictions involved “low level” sexual offenses did not bar finding the inmate to be a sexually dangerous individual. Wamstad v. Mangelsen, 2014 ND 31, 843 N.W.2d 8, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 22 (N.D. 2014), op. withdrawn, 884 N.W.2d 748, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 184 (N.D. 2016).

Civil commitment order was supported by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner had serious difficulty controlling his behavior because evidence existed of his long-term predatory conduct, his lack of treatment, the long-term possession of child pornography, persistent efforts to develop relationships with children and an inability to abide by his terms of probation. Wamstad v. Corman (In the Interest of Corman), 2014 ND 88, 845 N.W.2d 335, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 82 (N.D. 2014).

Civil commitment order was supported by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner’s mental disorder made him likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct because a physician’s report stated that he was diagnosed with pedophilia, hebephilia, and narcissistic personality disorder with antisocial traits, risk assessment instruments indicated he posed a high risk of future sexually offensive behavior, he had not participated adequately in sex offender treatment, and he was unmanageable on probation. Wamstad v. Corman (In the Interest of Corman), 2014 ND 88, 845 N.W.2d 335, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 82 (N.D. 2014).

Sufficient evidence existed supporting the district court’s finding that the State showed a nexus between petitioner’s sexual and personality disorders and his lack of control, distinguishing him from the typical recidivist in an ordinary case, and therefore the district court did not err by finding clear and convincing evidence that petitioner had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. Grosinger v. Thill, 2014 ND 89, 845 N.W.2d 330, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 84 (N.D. 2014).

District court’s finding that petitioner was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct was supported by clear and convincing evidence because a physician found that petitioner’s test results placed him in the high-risk range for re-offense, another test score indicated a high existence of psychopathy and placed him at a greater risk for recidivism, and it was the physician’s opinion that petitioner had not received sufficient treatment. Grosinger v. Thill, 2014 ND 89, 845 N.W.2d 330, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 84 (N.D. 2014).

Clear and convincing evidence supported the district court's finding that a committed individual was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constituted a danger to the physical or mental health or safety of others, as required by N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8), given the conflicting expert opinions. Grosinger v. J.G., 2015 ND 207, 869 N.W.2d 108, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 236 (N.D. 2015).

District court's finding that defendant was a sexually dangerous individual was supported by clear and convincing evidence because defendant was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct and had difficulty controlling his behavior; defendant failed to complete his program of treatment, he lacked support in the community if he was released and supervision, and his diagnosis of pedophilia and antisocial personality disorder made the likelihood of re-offending likely. Whitetail v. Whitetail, 2015 ND 206, 868 N.W.2d 833, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 230 (N.D. 2015).

District court erred in denying defendant's petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual because, while the State met its burden of showing that defendant engaged in sexually predatory conduct and had sexual disorders characterized as pedophilic disorder and sexual sadism disorder, the district court relied on a mistaken belief that defendant had a conviction after completion of sex offender treatment defendant, and the court did not identify the facts on which it relied in determining defendant's likelihood to engage in further sexual predatory conduct or the facts on which it relied in determining defendant had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior. Grosinger v. Thill (In re Thill), 2015 ND 295, 872 N.W.2d 617, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 307 (N.D. 2015).

It was no error to deny an inmate discharge from a civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual because (1) the inmate had prior sexually predatory conduct and a sexual disorder, and (2) experts agreed the inmate was likely to engage in further such conduct and had serious difficulty controlling the inmate's behavior. De La Cour v. D.W., 2016 ND 156, 883 N.W.2d 444, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 156 (N.D. 2016).

District court, which denied appellant's petition for discharge from a state hospital, was not clearly erroneous in finding there was a sufficient nexus between appellant's sexual disorder of other specified paraphilic disorder and his dangerousness and that he had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior. Byers v. Voisine (In the Interest of Voisine), 2016 ND 254, 888 N.W.2d 781, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 254 (N.D. 2016).

District court's findings supporting petitioner's civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual were inadequate to enable appellate review where the court had not made specific findings that he was likely to engage in further sexually predatory conduct or had serious difficulty controlling his behavior, and the evidence did not permit such findings. Olson v. Nelson (In the Interest of Nelson), 2017 ND 28, 889 N.W.2d 879, 2017 N.D. LEXIS 21 (N.D. 2017).

Alleged sexually dangerous person's civil commitment was reversed because findings did not show a likelihood to engage in further sexually predatory conduct or serious difficulty controlling behavior, despite evidence of past sexually predatory conduct and a congenital or acquired condition manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder, as (1) conduct occurring 23 years ago was too remote to show likelihood to engage in sexually predatory conduct in the future, (2) the presence of a mental disorder alone was not clear and convincing evidence of such likelihood, and (3) describing the disorder's characteristics did not prove serious difficulty in controlling behavior. Olson v. Nelson (In the Interest of Nelson), 2017 ND 152, 896 N.W.2d 923, 2017 N.D. LEXIS 152 (N.D. 2017).

Clear and convincing evidence showed an alleged sexually dangerous individual was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct because (1) the individual's diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder was characterized by opportunistic and predatory offending, impulsivity, deceitfulness, and a lack of remorse or empathy for victims, predisposing the individual to act impulsively and disregard others' wishes to achieve the individual's own ends, (2) the individual acted out sexually during the relevant review period after being warned and reprimanded, and (3) the individual had serious difficulty controlling the individual's behavior, as the individual acted out sexually in a highly restrictive environment where the individual knew the individual was observed. Tanner v. Tanner, 2017 ND 153, 897 N.W.2d 901, 2017 N.D. LEXIS 151 (N.D. 2017).

District court’s finding that respondent had a sexual disorder, personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction was affirmed where its findings and order made clear that it had considered both experts’ opinions and found the State’s expert more credible and persuasive given its consistency with other expert opinions. Byers v. Voisine (In the Interest of Voisine), 2018 ND 181, 915 N.W.2d 647, 2018 N.D. LEXIS 183 (N.D. 2018).

District court’s finding that respondent was likely to reoffend was affirmed where the State’s expert testified that he had seen no or extremely minimal treatment progress, and the analysis of respondent’s expert was not as comprehensive and was based on her belief that respondent had been misdiagnosed by at least four other experts. Byers v. Voisine (In the Interest of Voisine), 2018 ND 181, 915 N.W.2d 647, 2018 N.D. LEXIS 183 (N.D. 2018).

District court’s finding that respondent had trouble controlling his behavior was affirmed given the lack of meaningful progress in treatment and respondent’s failure to engage in behavior modification work. Byers v. Voisine (In the Interest of Voisine), 2018 ND 181, 915 N.W.2d 647, 2018 N.D. LEXIS 183 (N.D. 2018).

Inmate’s request for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual was properly denied because clear and convincing evidence demonstrated statutory factors and the Crane factor, as (1) expert testimony showed the inmate had a likelihood to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct, and (2) the inmate had difficulty controlling the inmate’s behavior, as the inmate acquired stimulating prohibited materials when on the verge of being released into the community, jeopardizing the inmate’s release. State v. Carter (In the Interest of Carter), 2019 ND 67, 924 N.W.2d 112, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 68 (N.D. 2019).

In denying petitioner discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual, the district court’s findings of fact were not sufficient to permit appellate review on the elements of likely to reoffend and serious difficulty controlling behavior, and the district court was instructed to make specific findings of fact on these elements. Lawyer v. T.A.G. (In the Interest of T.A.G.), 2019 ND 115, 926 N.W.2d 702, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 118 (N.D. 2019).

Individual committed as sexually dangerous was entitled to discharge because (1) the State showed no nexus between the individual’s disorder and sexual dangerousness to others, and (2) a district court’s denial of the petition did not specifically find the individual was any more dangerous than other released convicts, as actuarial test scores were not enough to require continued commitment, limited rule infractions did not show a connection between a disorder and a likelihood of sexually reoffending, and the record established the individual had not acted out sexually, had not had any rule violations that were sexual in nature, and had either completed sex offender treatment or made substantial progress since a last evaluation, so the record did not establish a propensity towards sexual violence of such a degree as to pose a threat to others. Lawyer v. J.M. (In re J.M.), 2019 ND 125, 927 N.W.2d 422, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 121 (N.D. 2019).

Inmate’s petition for discharge from a civil commitment was properly denied because the State proved by clear and convincing evidence the inmate had serious difficulty controlling the inmate’s behavior based on the inmate’s history of irritability and aggressiveness, physical violence, sexual violence and verbal aggression towards others, pervasive disregard for others’ rights, and absence of remorse for the inmate’s actions all related to the inmate’s mental disorders affecting the inmate’s capacity to control the inmate’s sexual behavior. Murray v. J.B. (In the Interest of J.B.), 2019 ND 258, 934 N.W.2d 538, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 263 (N.D. 2019).

Taken together, both petitioner’s past and present conduct, the district court’s finding petitioner had serious difficulty controlling his behavior was not clearly erroneous and was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Review of the record reflected more than just lack of progress, it showed a lack of participation in treatment. Fremgen v. Didier (In re Didier), 2019 ND 263, 934 N.W.2d 417, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 252 (N.D. 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence did not support the finding that appellant remained a sexually dangerous individual where he had participated in treatment and was not a management problem, and instances of having extra food in his room did not establish a serious difficulty controlling behavior. Moreover, the lack of behavioral write-ups, progress in treatment, and the lack of evidence about how he remained a threat ran counter to finding by clear and convincing evidence that he had serious difficulty in controlling his sexual behavior. Evidence that a 76-year-old man whose first language was not English, was on medication for his heart condition, and sometimes appeared asleep in group alone was insufficient to meet the requirement for commitment. Voisine v. Voisine, 2019 ND 302, 936 N.W.2d 544, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 308 (N.D. 2019).

Sexually Predatory Conduct.

Denial of a committed individual’s petition for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual was appropriate because his argument that he had not committed any acts of sexually predatory conduct while at the State Hospital for four years, as defined in N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(9), was without merit since such a requirement did not exist for the continued civil commitment of a sexually dangerous individual. Rather, the State had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the individual remained a sexually dangerous individual, as defined in N.D.C.C. §§ 25-03.3-01(8) and 25-03.3-18(4), and the State had done so. Cass County State's Attorney v. R.A.S. (In re R.A.S.), 2009 ND 101, 766 N.W.2d 712, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 101 (N.D. 2009).

Incest between consenting adults is not sexually predatory conduct under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(9). State v. Voisine (In re Voisine), 2010 ND 17, 777 N.W.2d 908, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 20 (N.D. 2010).

District court did not err in finding that respondent remained a sexually dangerous individual as both experts reached the conclusion that respondent was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct if he were released. Hehn v. Hehn, 2013 ND 191, 838 N.W.2d 469, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 188 (N.D. 2013).

Collateral References.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statute Including “Sexually Motivated Offenses” Within Definition of Sex Offense for Purposes of Sentencing or Classification of Defendant as Sex Offender, 30 A.L.R.6th 373.

Validity, Construction, and Application of Overt Act Requirement of State Statutes Providing for Commitment of Sexually Dangerous Persons. 56 A.L.R.6th 647.

Law Reviews.

For Note: Letting in the Light: the Need for Independent Review of Sex Offender Assessments in North Dakota, see 85 N.D. L. Rev. 171 (2009).

Case Comment: Mental Health — Sex Offenders: The North Dakota Supreme Court Contemplates the Use of Self-Incriminating Statements While Denying A Petition For Discharge, In Re G.R.H., 2008 ND 222, 758 N.W.2D 719, see 86 N.D. L. Rev. 231 (2010).

Article: The Tail Still Wags the Dog: The Pervasive and Inappropriate Influence by the Psychiatric Profession on the Civil Commitment Process, see 86 N.D. L. Rev. 259 (2010).

North Dakota Supreme Court Review (In re Voisine), see 86 N.D. L. Rev. 437 (2010).

25-03.3-01. Definitions. [Effective September 1, 2022]

In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Committed individual” means an individual committed for custody and treatment pursuant to this chapter.
  2. “Executive director” means the executive director of the department of health and human services or the executive director’s designee.
  3. “Intellectual disability” means mental retardation as defined in the “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders”, American psychiatric association, (4th edition, text revision 2000).
  4. “Qualified expert” means an individual who has an expertise in sexual offender evaluations and who is a psychiatrist or psychologist trained in a clinical program and licensed pursuant to this state’s law or a psychologist approved for exemption by the North Dakota board of psychologist examiners. For purposes of evaluating an individual with an intellectual disability, the qualified expert must have specialized knowledge in sexual offender evaluations of individuals with an intellectual disability.
  5. “Respondent” means an individual subject to a commitment proceeding pursuant to this chapter.
  6. “Sexual act” means sexual contact between human beings, including contact between the penis and the vulva, the penis and the anus, the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the vulva and the vulva; or the use of an object that comes in contact with the victim’s anus, vulva, or penis. Sexual contact between the penis and the vulva, or between the penis and the anus, or an object and the anus, vulva, or penis of the victim, occurs upon penetration, however slight. Emission is not required.
  7. “Sexual contact” means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of an individual for the purpose of arousing or satisfying sexual or aggressive desires.
  8. “Sexually dangerous individual” means an individual who is shown to have engaged in sexually predatory conduct and who has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction that makes that individual likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or mental health or safety of others. It is a rebuttable presumption that sexually predatory conduct creates a danger to the physical or mental health or safety of the victim of the conduct. For these purposes, intellectual disability is not a sexual disorder, personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction.
  9. “Sexually predatory conduct” means:
    1. Engaging or attempting to engage in a sexual act or sexual contact with another individual, or causing or attempting to cause another individual to engage in a sexual act or sexual contact, if:
      1. The victim is compelled to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping directed toward the victim or any human being, or the victim is compelled to submit by any threat or coercion that would render a person reasonably incapable of resisting;
      2. The victim’s power to appraise or control the victim’s conduct has been substantially impaired by the administration or employment, without the victim’s knowledge, of intoxicants or other means for purposes of preventing resistance;
      3. The actor knows or should have known that the victim is unaware that a sexual act is being committed upon the victim;
      4. The victim is less than fifteen years old;
      5. The actor knows or should have known that the victim has a disability that substantially impairs the victim’s understanding of the nature of the sexual act or contact;
      6. The victim is in official custody or detained in a treatment facility, health care facility, correctional facility, or other institution and is under the supervisory authority, disciplinary control, or care of the actor;
      7. The victim is a minor and the actor is an adult; or
      8. The other individual is a person related to the actor within a degree of consanguinity within which marriages are declared incestuous and void by section 14-03-03 and the actor knows that; or
    2. Engaging in or attempting to engage in sexual contact with another individual or causing or attempting to cause another individual to have sexual contact, if:
      1. The actor knows or should have known that the contact is offensive to the victim; or
      2. The victim is a minor, fifteen years of age or older, and the actor is the minor’s parent, guardian, or is otherwise responsible for general supervision of the victim’s welfare.
  10. “Should have known” means a reasonable individual without a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction in the actor’s circumstances would have known.
  11. “Superintendent” means the superintendent of the state hospital or the superintendent’s designee.
  12. “Treatment facility” means any hospital, including the state hospital, or any treatment facility, including the life skills and transition center, which can provide directly, or by direct arrangement with other public or private agencies, evaluation and treatment of sexually dangerous individuals.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, § 1; 2011, ch. 208, § 1; 2011, ch. 207, § 7; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2021, ch. 352, § 280, eff September 1, 2022.

25-03.3-02. Jurisdiction and venue.

The district court has original jurisdiction over the proceedings governed by this chapter. A proceeding pursuant to this chapter may be tried in any county in which the respondent resides or is located, or has committed any sexually predatory conduct, or if the respondent is an inmate, any of the foregoing venues or a county to which the respondent has indicated an intent to relocate upon release from the correctional facility.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, § 2.

25-03.3-03. Sexually dangerous individual — Petition.

  1. If it appears that an individual is a sexually dangerous individual, the state’s attorney may file a petition in the district court alleging that the individual is a sexually dangerous individual and stating sufficient facts to support the allegation.
  2. The petition and any proceeding under section 25-03.3-11 are confidential and are not public records or proceedings under sections 44-04-18 and 44-04-19 and sections 5 and 6 of article XI of the Constitution of North Dakota. The court may permit access to a respondent’s records or proceedings under this chapter to the respondent’s guardian, guardian ad litem, or other similarly situated individual. The court may permit access to information in the respondent’s records to other individuals who require the information for use in performing official governmental duties. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, proceedings under section 25-03.3-13 and any evidence introduced or presented to the court for any such proceeding are required to be open to the public, with the exception of a proceeding involving an individual who has not been convicted of a sexual act as defined in section 25-03.3-01. The protections of subsection 10 of section 12.1-34-02 and section 12.1-35-03 apply to any records or proceedings under this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, § 3; 2005, ch. 249, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Case Comment: Mental Health — Sex Offenders: The North Dakota Supreme Court Contemplates the Use of Self-Incriminating Statements While Denying A Petition For Discharge, In Re G.R.H., 2008 ND 222, 758 N.W.2D 719, see 86 N.D. L. Rev. 231 (2010).

25-03.3-03.1. Referral of inmates to state’s attorneys — Immunity.

  1. The department of corrections and rehabilitation shall maintain treatment records for any inmate who has been convicted of an offense that includes sexually predatory conduct. Approximately six months before the projected release date of the inmate, the department shall complete an assessment of the inmate to determine whether a recommendation is to be made to a state’s attorney for civil commitment of the inmate under this chapter. The assessment must be based on actuarial and clinical evaluations or any other information determined by the director to be relevant, including inmate behavior and whether the inmate participated in sexual offender treatment while incarcerated.
  2. If, upon the completion of the assessment, the department determines the inmate may meet the definition of a sexually dangerous individual, the department shall refer the inmate to a state’s attorney of an appropriate county as provided for in section 25-03.3-02. The department may make a referral of an inmate to more than one county.
  3. Any referral from the department must include a summary of the factors considered material to the determination that the inmate is appropriate for referral. The department shall provide a copy of the referral and summary to the attorney general and the superintendent of the life skills and transition center and the state hospital.
  4. Following the receipt of a referral, but at least sixty days before the release date of the inmate, the state’s attorney shall notify the department and the attorney general of the state’s attorney’s intended disposition of the referral.
  5. Any person participating in good faith in the assessment and referral of an inmate is immune from any civil or criminal liability. For the purpose of any civil or criminal proceeding, the good faith of any person required to participate in the assessment and referral of an inmate is presumed.

Source:

S.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 4; 2005, ch. 249, § 2; 2013, ch. 226, § 1.

25-03.3-04. Retention of records.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all adult and juvenile case files and court records of an alleged offense defined by chapters 12.1-20 and 12.1-27.2 must be retained for twenty-five years and made available to any state’s attorney for purposes of investigation or proceedings pursuant to this chapter. If the subject of a case file or court record has died before the expiration of the twenty-five-year period, the official, department, or agency possessing the case files and records shall maintain the case files and records in accordance with the case file and records retention policies of that official, department, or agency. For purposes of this section, “adult and juvenile case files” mean the subject’s medical, psychological, and treatment clinical assessments, evaluations, and progress reports; offenses in custody records; case notes; and criminal investigation reports and records.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2011, ch. 208, § 2; 2019, ch. 227, § 1, eff August 1, 2019.

25-03.3-05. Abrogation of confidentiality statutes and privileges.

  1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law requiring confidentiality of information about individuals receiving care, custody, education, treatment, or any other services from the state or any political subdivision, any confidential information about a respondent or committed individual must be released to a state’s attorney for proceedings pursuant to this chapter unless release results in the loss of federal funds. The physician-patient privilege and psychotherapist-patient privilege do not apply to communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to commit an individual as a sexually dangerous person if the physician or psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment determines the patient is in need of commitment and to communications with a committed individual. The provision of any confidential or privileged information to the state’s attorney does not render the state, any political subdivision, or any state or political subdivision official or employee, or other person liable pursuant to any criminal or civil law relating to confidentiality or privilege.
  2. For purposes of this chapter, the disclosure of individually identifiable health information by a treating facility or mental health professional to the state hospital or a mental health professional, including an expert examiner, is a disclosure for treatment. A retained or appointed counsel has the right to obtain individually identifiable health information regarding a respondent in a proceeding under this chapter. In any other case, the right of an inmate or a patient to obtain protected health information must be in accordance with title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, part 164.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2005, ch. 249, § 3; 2007, ch. 258, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Review.

Supreme court was unable to meaningfully and intelligently review defendant's arguments because he did not provide a transcript of the telephonic hearing during which the district court apparently addressed and disposed of at least some of the issues; while the information and records defendant sought were potentially relevant and subject to discovery,he did not comply with the civil procedural rules to obtain the information and records and failed to comply with the rule governing subpoenas. Hehn v. Hehn, 2015 ND 218, 868 N.W.2d 551, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 234 (N.D. 2015).

25-03.3-06. Use of confidential records.

Upon request, any confidential records provided to the state’s attorney pursuant to this chapter must be made available to the respondent or committed individual, the attorney of the respondent or committed individual, a qualified expert charged with examining the respondent or committed individual, the court, and any treatment facility in which the respondent or committed individual is being evaluated or treated pursuant to this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Review.

Supreme court was unable to meaningfully and intelligently review defendant's arguments because he did not provide a transcript of the telephonic hearing during which the district court apparently addressed and disposed of at least some of the issues; while the information and records defendant sought were potentially relevant and subject to discovery,he did not comply with the civil procedural rules to obtain the information and records and failed to comply with the rule governing subpoenas. Hehn v. Hehn, 2015 ND 218, 868 N.W.2d 551, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 234 (N.D. 2015).

25-03.3-07. Appointment of guardian ad litem. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

At any stage of a proceeding under this chapter, on application of any individual or on its own motion, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor or an individual with an intellectual disability who is a respondent or witness or otherwise involved in the proceeding, if the minor or an individual with an intellectual disability has no parent, guardian, or custodian appearing on behalf of the minor or the individual with an intellectual disability or the interests of those persons conflict with those of the minor or an individual with an intellectual disability. The department of human services shall pay the expense of the guardian ad litem fee as established by the court.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, § 5; 2011, ch. 207, § 8.

25-03.3-07. Appointment of guardian ad litem. [Effective September 1, 2022]

At any stage of a proceeding under this chapter, on application of any individual or on its own motion, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor or an individual with an intellectual disability who is a respondent or witness or otherwise involved in the proceeding, if the minor or an individual with an intellectual disability has no parent, guardian, or custodian appearing on behalf of the minor or the individual with an intellectual disability or the interests of those persons conflict with those of the minor or an individual with an intellectual disability. The department of health and human services shall pay the expense of the guardian ad litem fee as established by the court.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, § 5; 2011, ch. 207, § 8; 2021, ch. 352, § 281, eff September 1, 2022.

25-03.3-08. Sexually dangerous individual — Procedure on petition — Detention. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

  1. Upon the filing of a petition pursuant to this chapter, the court shall determine whether to issue an order for detention of the respondent named in the petition. The petition may be heard ex parte. The court shall issue an order for detention if there is cause to believe that the respondent is a sexually dangerous individual. If the court issues an order for detention, the order must direct that the respondent be taken into custody and transferred to an appropriate treatment facility or local correctional facility to be held for subsequent hearing pursuant to this chapter. Under this section, the department of human services shall pay for any expense incurred in the detention or evaluation of the respondent.
  2. If the state’s attorney knows or believes the respondent named in the petition is an individual with an intellectual disability, the state’s attorney shall notify the court in the petition and shall advise the court of the name of the legal guardian of the respondent or, if none is known, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the respondent. Before service of the notice required in section 25-03.3-10, the court shall appoint an attorney for the respondent. An individual with an intellectual disability may be detained in a correctional facility before the probable cause hearing only when no other secure facility is accessible, and then only under close supervision.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, § 6; 2011, ch. 207, § 9.

Collateral References.

Validity, Construction, and Application of Overt Act Requirement of State Statutes Providing for Commitment of Sexually Dangerous Persons. 56 A.L.R.6th 647.

25-03.3-08. Sexually dangerous individual — Procedure on petition — Detention. [Effective September 1, 2022]

  1. Upon the filing of a petition pursuant to this chapter, the court shall determine whether to issue an order for detention of the respondent named in the petition. The petition may be heard ex parte. The court shall issue an order for detention if there is cause to believe that the respondent is a sexually dangerous individual. If the court issues an order for detention, the order must direct that the respondent be taken into custody and transferred to an appropriate treatment facility or local correctional facility to be held for subsequent hearing pursuant to this chapter. Under this section, the department of health and human services shall pay for any expense incurred in the detention or evaluation of the respondent.
  2. If the state’s attorney knows or believes the respondent named in the petition is an individual with an intellectual disability, the state’s attorney shall notify the court in the petition and shall advise the court of the name of the legal guardian of the respondent or, if none is known, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the respondent. Before service of the notice required in section 25-03.3-10, the court shall appoint an attorney for the respondent. An individual with an intellectual disability may be detained in a correctional facility before the probable cause hearing only when no other secure facility is accessible, and then only under close supervision.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, § 6; 2011, ch. 207, § 9; 2021, ch. 352, § 282, eff September 1, 2022.

25-03.3-09. Right to counsel — Waiver.

  1. Every respondent is entitled to legal counsel. Unless an appearance has been entered on behalf of the respondent, the court, within twenty-four hours from the time the petition was filed, exclusive of weekends or holidays, shall appoint counsel to represent the respondent. If a respondent retains counsel, the retained counsel immediately shall notify the court of that fact.
  2. After consultation with counsel, the respondent may waive the right to counsel or the right to any hearing provided pursuant to this chapter by notifying the court in writing. The notification must clearly state the respondent’s reasons for the waiver and the respondent’s counsel shall separately certify that counsel has explained to the respondent the proceedings, the legal and factual issues, potential defenses, the burden of proof, and possible outcomes of the proceedings. No guardian, guardian ad litem, attorney, or other individual may waive the right to counsel on behalf of an individual with an intellectual disability.
  3. If the court determines that the respondent is indigent, the court shall appoint counsel and order that appointed counsel be compensated by the county that is the respondent’s place of residence in a reasonable amount based upon time and expenses.
  4. The state’s attorney of a county that has expended sums pursuant to subsection 3 may seek civil recovery of those sums from property of the respondent. Commencement of the action must occur within six years after the date the sums were paid. After notice and hearing, the court may order an individual to reimburse the county for expenditures made on that individual’s behalf pursuant to this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, § 7; 2011, ch. 207, § 10.

25-03.3-10. Notice.

If a respondent is detained pursuant to section 25-03.3-08, the state’s attorney shall provide the respondent, or the respondent’s guardian, if appropriate, with a copy of the petition filed with the court. The state’s attorney shall provide the respondent with written notice of the respondent’s right to a preliminary hearing and a commitment hearing, if probable cause is found to exist; the right to counsel and that counsel will be appointed for the respondent, if the respondent is indigent; and the right to have an expert of the respondent’s choosing conduct an evaluation and testify on the respondent’s behalf or, if the respondent is indigent, that the court will appoint a qualified expert for the respondent. The notice must state the date, time, and place for the preliminary hearing. If notice is given to a respondent who the state’s attorney knows or believes is an individual with an intellectual disability, the state’s attorney also shall give notice to the respondent’s attorney, guardian, and guardian ad litem, if any.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, § 8; 2011, ch. 207, § 11.

Notes to Decisions

Independent Evaluator.

Respondent, who was found to be a sexually dangerous individual, argued that he had the right to choose his own independent evaluator at his hearing; however, an indigent respondent did not have the right to choose his own evaluator, and the district court was more than indulgent in allowing respondent to reject two evaluators. Feland v. B.V. (In re B.V.), 2006 ND 22, 708 N.W.2d 877, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 32 (N.D. 2006).

25-03.3-11. Preliminary hearing — Probable cause.

The respondent is entitled to a preliminary hearing within seventy-two hours of being taken into custody pursuant to an order of the court, excluding weekends and holidays, unless the respondent knowingly waives the preliminary hearing pursuant to section 25-03.3-09. The respondent has a right to be present, to testify, and to present and cross-examine witnesses at any preliminary hearing. The court may receive evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible at a commitment hearing. If the court determines after a preliminary hearing that there is probable cause to believe the respondent is a sexually dangerous individual, the court shall order that the respondent be transferred to an appropriate treatment facility for an evaluation as to whether the respondent has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction that makes the respondent likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct. If the court determines that probable cause does not exist to believe that the respondent is a sexually dangerous individual, the court shall dismiss the petition. If the respondent waives the preliminary hearing, then the respondent must be immediately transferred to an appropriate treatment facility for an evaluation as to whether the respondent has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction that makes the respondent likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct. An individual with an intellectual disability may be evaluated under this chapter at a facility only if that facility provides care and treatment to individuals with an intellectual disability.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, § 9; 2005, ch. 249, § 4; 2011, ch. 207, § 12.

Notes to Decisions

Confidentiality.

Dismissal of the petition is not required for violation of the confidentiality provisions of N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3. Grosinger v. M.D. (In the Interest of M.D.), 1999 ND 160, 598 N.W.2d 799, 1999 N.D. LEXIS 180 (N.D. 1999).

25-03.3-12. Sexually dangerous individual — Evaluation. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

The evaluation must be conducted by one or more experts chosen by the executive director. Whenever a respondent is subject to an evaluation pursuant to this chapter, the respondent may retain an expert to perform an evaluation or testify on the respondent’s behalf. When the respondent is an adult with an intellectual disability and a guardian or guardian ad litem has not been appointed for the respondent, the court shall appoint an expert to perform an evaluation on behalf of the respondent. In the case of a respondent who is indigent, the court shall appoint a qualified expert to perform an examination or participate in the commitment proceeding on the respondent’s behalf. The department of human services shall compensate any qualified expert appointed by the court on behalf of an indigent respondent in a reasonable amount based on time and expenses. An expert retained on behalf of the respondent must have reasonable access to the respondent for the purpose of the examination and to all relevant medical, psychological, and court records and reports.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, § 10; 2011, ch. 207, § 13.

Collateral References.

Admissibility of Actuarial Risk Assessment Testimony in Proceeding to Commit Sex Offender. 20 A.L.R.6th 607.

Validity, Construction, and Application of Overt Act Requirement of State Statutes Providing for Commitment of Sexually Dangerous Persons. 56 A.L.R.6th 647.

Law Reviews.

Case Comment: Mental Health - Sex Offenders: The North Dakota Supreme Court Contemplates the Use of Self-Incriminating Statements While Denying A Petition For Discharge, In Re G.R.H., 2008 ND 222, 758 N.W.2D 719, see 86 N.D. L. Rev. 231 (2010).

Notes to Decisions

Expert Testimony.

N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-12 unambiguously allows a respondent to be evaluated by an expert or call an expert to testify regardless of whether the expert is privately retained or appointed by the district court. There is no language within § 25-03.3-12 that compels the disclosure of an indigent respondent's expert. Lawyer v. Gomez (In re Civil Commitment of Gomez), 2018 ND 16, 906 N.W.2d 87, 2018 N.D. LEXIS 12 (N.D. 2018).

25-03.3-12. Sexually dangerous individual — Evaluation. [Effective September 1, 2022]

The evaluation must be conducted by one or more experts chosen by the executive director. Whenever a respondent is subject to an evaluation pursuant to this chapter, the respondent may retain an expert to perform an evaluation or testify on the respondent’s behalf. When the respondent is an adult with an intellectual disability and a guardian or guardian ad litem has not been appointed for the respondent, the court shall appoint an expert to perform an evaluation on behalf of the respondent. In the case of a respondent who is indigent, the court shall appoint a qualified expert to perform an examination or participate in the commitment proceeding on the respondent’s behalf. The department of health and human services shall compensate any qualified expert appointed by the court on behalf of an indigent respondent in a reasonable amount based on time and expenses. An expert retained on behalf of the respondent must have reasonable access to the respondent for the purpose of the examination and to all relevant medical, psychological, and court records and reports.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, § 10; 2011, ch. 207, § 13; 2021, ch. 352, § 283, eff September 1, 2022.

25-03.3-13. Sexually dangerous individual — Commitment proceeding — Report of findings.

Within sixty days after the finding of probable cause, the court shall conduct a commitment proceeding to determine whether the respondent is a sexually dangerous individual. The court may extend the time for good cause. At the commitment proceeding, any testimony and reports of an expert who conducted an examination are admissible, including risk assessment evaluations. Any proceeding pursuant to this chapter must be tried to the court and not a jury. At the commitment proceeding, the state’s attorney shall present evidence in support of the petition and the burden is on the state to show by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a sexually dangerous individual. An individual may not be committed unless expert evidence is admitted establishing that the individual has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction that makes that individual likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct. The respondent has a right to be present, to testify, and to present and cross-examine witnesses. If the respondent is found to be a sexually dangerous individual, the court shall commit the respondent to the care, custody, and control of the executive director. The executive director shall place the respondent in an appropriate facility or program at which treatment is available. The appropriate treatment facility or program must be the least restrictive available treatment facility or program necessary to achieve the purposes of this chapter. The executive director may not be required to create a less restrictive treatment facility or treatment program specifically for the respondent or committed individual. Unless the respondent has been committed to the legal and physical custody of the department of corrections and rehabilitation, the respondent may not be placed at and the treatment program for the respondent may not be provided at the state penitentiary or an affiliated penal facility. If the respondent is found not to be a sexually dangerous individual, the court shall discharge the respondent.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, § 11; 2005, ch. 249, § 5; 2007, ch. 258, § 2.

Notes to Decisions

Constitutionality.

The statutory scheme for commitment of sexually dangerous individuals is not a criminal punishment and thus commitment under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3 does not violate a defendant’s double jeopardy rights. Grosinger v. M.D. (In the Interest of M.D.), 1999 ND 160, 598 N.W.2d 799, 1999 N.D. LEXIS 180 (N.D. 1999).

N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13, which authorizes the executive director of the North Dakota Department of Human Services to determine the least restrictive treatment, does not negate the civil nature of the law and does not violate the double jeopardy provisions of the state and federal constitutions; moreover, there are pre-commitment and post-commitment safeguards designed to protect liberty interests as a person proceeds through the treatment process, so due process is also not violated. Van Grinsven v. G.R.H. (In re G.R.H.), 2006 ND 56, 711 N.W.2d 587, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 70 (N.D. 2006).

N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3 did not violate equal protection, as applied to an inmate who was committed as a sexually dangerous individual, regardless of the level of scrutiny applied, because the state had a compelling interest in protecting the public, and the inmate failed to show that the legislature was not justified in treating mentally ill and sexually dangerous individuals differently. Feland v. P.F (In re P.F.), 2008 ND 37, 744 N.W.2d 724, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 35 (N.D. 2008).

N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13 does not violate equal protection by treating the commitment of sexually dangerous individuals differently from the commitment of mentally ill or chemically dependent individuals, given the differences in the potential level of danger posed to society by these groups. The state has a compelling interest in protecting the public from sexually dangerous individuals, who pose a heightened risk to society, especially children, which justifies the classification and differences in the treatment of sexually dangerous individuals, and the distinct procedures and safeguards set forth in § 25-03.3-13 further the state’s interest in protecting the public. Feland v. P.F (In re P.F.), 2008 ND 37, 744 N.W.2d 724, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 35 (N.D. 2008).

N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13 does not violate equal protection by treating the commitment of sexually dangerous individuals differently from the commitment of mentally ill or chemically dependent individuals by removing the determination of the least restrictive treatment available treatment program facility from the district court and giving it to the executive director of the department of human services, given the differences in the potential level of danger posed to society by these groups. The state has a compelling interest in protecting the public from sexually dangerous individuals, who pose a heightened risk to society, especially children, which justifies the classification and differences in the treatment of sexually dangerous individuals, and the distinct procedures and safeguards set forth in § 25-03.3-13 further the state’s interest in protecting the public. Feland v. P.F (In re P.F.), 2008 ND 37, 744 N.W.2d 724, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 35 (N.D. 2008).

Because defendant did not argue in the district court that a hospital had “withheld” treatment as punishment in violation of his statutory and constitutional rights, the supreme court would not address that issue on appeal. Hehn v. Hehn, 2015 ND 218, 868 N.W.2d 551, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 234 (N.D. 2015).

Confidentiality.

Dismissal of the petition is not required for violation of the confidentiality provisions of N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3. Grosinger v. M.D. (In the Interest of M.D.), 1999 ND 160, 598 N.W.2d 799, 1999 N.D. LEXIS 180 (N.D. 1999).

Expert Testimony.

Court properly admitted experts’ opinions in a sexually dangerous individual’s commitment where the patient did not produce any evidence indicating that the information relied upon by the experts was not reasonably relied upon by psychologists in determining whether an individual was sexually dangerous; further, the weakness or nonexistence of a basis for an expert’s opinion went to his credibility and not necessarily to the admissibility of the opinion evidence. Bertsch v. D.V.A. (In the Interest of D.V.A.), 2004 ND 57, 676 N.W.2d 776, 2004 N.D. LEXIS 72 (N.D. 2004).

Trial court, in its discretion, could consider the relevant testimony of any qualified expert at trial, and, in considering the totality of the evidence, it could rely on the testimony of an expert witness called by a defendant in arriving at a decision to commit the individual as a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13. O'Donnell v. L.D.M. (In re L.D.M.), 2005 ND 177, 704 N.W.2d 838, 2005 N.D. LEXIS 206 (N.D. 2005).

Where State presented two experts who testified respondent, who was found to be a sexually dangerous individual, suffered from disorders, which made him likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct, the district court’s order of commitment was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Feland v. B.V. (In re B.V.), 2006 ND 22, 708 N.W.2d 877, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 32 (N.D. 2006).

District court did not clearly err in concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence that appellant was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) because: (1) the district court reasonably considered the results of a specific test that both experts used to classify appellant as a high risk individual; and (2) the district court’s consideration of the experts’ testimony was also reasonable. It was proper for the experts to consider appellant’s admissions in treatment, and they had a wealth of other information on which to form their opinions, including their own interviews of appellant. G.R.H. v. G.R.H., 2011 ND 21, 793 N.W.2d 460, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 32 (N.D. 2011).

District court found that a doctor’s opinion was more credible than another expert’s, which was reflected in the district court’s determination that appellant was a sexually dangerous individual, and the court would not second-guess the district court’s credibility determination. Reierson v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 2013 ND 146, 835 N.W.2d 806, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 144 (N.D. 2013).

Extension of Hearing Date.

Where the psychiatric expert had been unable to complete his evaluation of the defendant and the attorney handling the case had been ill and out of the office for two weeks, there was good cause for the 30-day extension of the commitment hearing date granted by the district court. Grosinger v. M.D. (In the Interest of M.D.), 1999 ND 160, 598 N.W.2d 799, 1999 N.D. LEXIS 180 (N.D. 1999).

The State’s failure to move for an extension of the commitment hearing date until after the original 30-day period had expired did not deprive the court of authority to consider whether there was good cause to extend the time for the hearing. Grosinger v. M.D. (In the Interest of M.D.), 1999 ND 160, 598 N.W.2d 799, 1999 N.D. LEXIS 180 (N.D. 1999).

Trial court did not err in holding a civil commitment hearing more than 60 days after the probable cause finding when several delays were attributable to respondent; these delays were caused by respondent’s continual requests to change the independent evaluator. Feland v. B.V. (In re B.V.), 2006 ND 22, 708 N.W.2d 877, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 32 (N.D. 2006).

In a sexually dangerous person individual commitment case, a court properly extended the hearing deadline on the sixty-first day where the State Hospital issued a letter to the district court indicating its inability to complete the psychiatric assessments due to scheduling constraints, an extension was requested, and the court ordered the respondent’s release in the interim. Feland v. P.F. (In the Interest of P.F.), 2006 ND 82, 712 N.W.2d 610, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 86 (N.D. 2006).

In a sexually dangerous person commitment proceeding, the court did not err in finding good cause for the extension of the proceeding because, absent the patient’s motion for a continuance to obtain an independent evaluation, the commitment hearing would have been delayed only 18 days beyond the statutory deadline; the patient caused the bulk of the delay. Furthermore, by not opposing the State’s motion for a continuance, the patient’s counsel essentially eliminated the need for a hearing on the matter of good cause for the extension. State v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 2007 ND 50, 730 N.W.2d 570, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 47 (N.D. 2007).

On appellant’s petition for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous person, the court did not err in granting the State’s motion for a continuance because its expert witness had a medical emergency and was not available to testify. Assistant State's Atty. v. M.D. (In re Grosinger), 2012 ND 261, 825 N.W.2d 838, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 266 (N.D. 2012).

Right to Jury Trial.

In a patient’s sexually dangerous person commitment proceeding, the patient was not denied the right to a trial by jury because the involuntary civil commitment provisions of N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3 created a statutory proceeding that was unknown at the time that the North Dakota Constitution was adopted in 1889. Consequently, there was no right to a jury trial. State v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 2007 ND 50, 730 N.W.2d 570, 2007 N.D. LEXIS 47 (N.D. 2007).

Sexually Dangerous Individual.

Evidence that the defendant had had repeated contact with underage boys, including the victim involved in his conviction for gross sexual imposition, his failure to complete sex offender treatment while in prison and after his release, together with expert testimony that he suffered from paraphilia with a fixation on adolescent boys and was likely to commit sexually predatory conduct in the future, established he was a sexually dangerous person. Grosinger v. M.D. (In the Interest of M.D.), 1999 ND 160, 598 N.W.2d 799, 1999 N.D. LEXIS 180 (N.D. 1999).

Phrase “likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct” as used in this section means that the person’s propensity towards sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose a threat to others. Grosinger v. M.B.K. (In re M.B.K.), 2002 ND 25, 639 N.W.2d 473, 2002 N.D. LEXIS 23 (N.D. 2002).

Respondent was properly committed as a sexually dangerous individual because he had a history of sexually predatory conduct and numerous mental diseases that made him likely to re-offend, and the State carried its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent was a sexually dangerous individual. Evaluating psychologists could properly consider circumstances surrounding respondent’s convictions for criminal trespass involving his lurking in and around women’s bedrooms and a conviction for gross sexual imposition that had been reversed on procedural grounds. All sexually predatory conduct, including conduct that did not result in a charge or conviction, may be considered under a N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) analysis. Feland v. P.F. (In the Interest of P.F.), 2006 ND 82, 712 N.W.2d 610, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 86 (N.D. 2006).

Commitment as a sexually dangerous person was affirmed because the evidence in the record clearly and convincingly established that the claimant had a congenital or acquired condition that was manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction and that the disorder made the claimant likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct, and the claimant could not show he was prejudiced by the delay in holding the commitment hearing, when the State petitioned to commit him while he was still incarcerated for gross sexual imposition. Feland v. J.M. (In the Interest of J.M.), 2006 ND 96, 713 N.W.2d 518, 2006 N.D. LEXIS 106 (N.D. 2006).

District court’s finding that defendant was a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) was supported by clear and convincing evidence because the complainant and two licensed psychologists testified and there was evidence from which the district court could have found that defendant had uncontrolled anger, rage and reduced impulse control and that a nexus existed between defendant’s diagnosed disorders and dangerousness which established serious difficulty in controlling defendant’s behavior sufficient to distinguish defendant from other ordinary criminal recidivists. Furthermore, the court’s decision satisfied the substantive due process requirements. Cass County State's Atty. v. Vantreece (In re Vantreece), 2009 ND 152, 771 N.W.2d 585, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 162 (N.D. 2009).

Order that respondent remain committed to a state hospital as a sexually dangerous individual was upheld because a finding that respondent suffered from the sexual disorders of paraphilia and fetishism and therefore had a congenital or acquired condition manifested by a sexual disorder was not clearly erroneous. Feland v. A.M. (In re A.M.), 2010 ND 163, 787 N.W.2d 752, 2010 N.D. LEXIS 165 (N.D. 2010).

Order finding that respondent remained a sexually dangerous individual and continuing respondent’s civil commitment was proper because the State presented evidence that respondent’s treatment at the N.D. State Hospital was the least restrictive program available, given respondent’s diagnosis of mild mental retardation and respondent’s level of cognitive functioning. Whelan v. A.O., 2011 ND 26, 793 N.W.2d 471, 2011 N.D. LEXIS 27 (N.D. 2011).

Trial court properly denied respondent’s petition for discharge from civil commitment because the State established by clear and convincing evidence that he remained a sexually dangerous individual; he was diagnosed with pedophilia, was terminated from a treatment program, and lacked insight into his condition. Erickson v. Rubey (In re Rubey), 2012 ND 133, 818 N.W.2d 731, 2012 N.D. LEXIS 149 (N.D. 2012).

District court’s finding that appellant was a sexually dangerous individual was supported by the record, as the doctor’s diagnosis was based on her review of appellant’s records and the interview she conducted with him, and the conclusion that appellant had a disorder manifested by a sexual disorder or dysfunction was not clearly erroneous because it was established in the testimony and a report. Reierson v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 2013 ND 146, 835 N.W.2d 806, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 144 (N.D. 2013).

Court properly found that respondent was a sexually dangerous individual and ordered his commitment because respondent showed he had serious difficulty controlling his disorder and reoffended sexually on the same victims, probation or sex offender treatment did not act as a guard for the victims, and respondent continued to accumulate write ups while incarcerated for his second set of offenses. Binder v. Whitetail (In re Whitetail), 2013 ND 143, 835 N.W.2d 827, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 146 (N.D. 2013).

Supreme court was unable to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in limiting evidence as to elements of the sexually dangerous individual analysis because an individual who was civilly committed as a sexually dangerous individual failed to make an offer of proof when his expert’s testimony was limited, and the expert’s report was silent as to one of the elements. Erickson v. Rubey, 2013 ND 190, 838 N.W.2d 446, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 195 (N.D. 2013).

District court’s finding that an individual who was civilly committed as a sexually dangerous individual remained sexually dangerous was not clearly erroneous because its preference for a doctor’s opinions regarding the individual’s risk factors was not an erroneous view of the law. Erickson v. Rubey, 2013 ND 190, 838 N.W.2d 446, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 195 (N.D. 2013).

District court’s order requiring petitioner’s civil commitment was supported by clear and convincing evidence because it showed that he had a congenital or acquired condition, hebephilia, that was manifested by a sexual disorder and a factual basis existed for a physician’s diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder with antisocial traits. Wamstad v. Corman (In the Interest of Corman), 2014 ND 88, 845 N.W.2d 335, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 82 (N.D. 2014).

Civil commitment order was supported by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner’s mental disorder made him likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct because a physician’s report stated that he was diagnosed with pedophilia, hebephilia, and narcissistic personality disorder with antisocial traits, risk assessment instruments indicated he posed a high risk of future sexually offensive behavior, he had not participated adequately in sex offender treatment, and he was unmanageable on probation. Wamstad v. Corman (In the Interest of Corman), 2014 ND 88, 845 N.W.2d 335, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 82 (N.D. 2014).

Civil commitment order was supported by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner had serious difficulty controlling his behavior because evidence existed of his long-term predatory conduct, his lack of treatment, the long-term possession of child pornography, persistent efforts to develop relationships with children and an inability to abide by his terms of probation. Wamstad v. Corman (In the Interest of Corman), 2014 ND 88, 845 N.W.2d 335, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 82 (N.D. 2014).

District court did not clearly err in civilly committing defendant as a sexually dangerous individual because the State proved that he remained a sexually dangerous individual where he had previously engaged in sexually predatory conduct, both expert witnesses diagnosed him with having a congenital or acquired condition that was manifested by a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction making him likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct, and the experts agreed in the results of the examinations using methodology accepted in the profession. Loy v. Loy, 2015 ND 92, 862 N.W.2d 500, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 89 (N.D. 2015).

District court did not err in refusing to order that the individual be committed to the Community Transitional Center as the least restrictive treatment facility or program, as required by N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-13, where the evidence showed that although he had made some progress, he had not successfully completed a sex offender treatment program, thus making transition to the Center inappropriate. Grosinger v. J.G., 2015 ND 207, 869 N.W.2d 108, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 236 (N.D. 2015).

District court's finding that defendant was a sexually dangerous individual was supported by clear and convincing evidence because defendant was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct and had difficulty controlling his behavior; defendant failed to complete his program of treatment, he lacked support in the community if he was released and supervision, and his diagnosis of pedophilia and antisocial personality disorder made the likelihood of re-offending likely. Whitetail v. Whitetail, 2015 ND 206, 868 N.W.2d 833, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 230 (N.D. 2015).

When an inmate civilly committed as a sexually dangerous individual claimed the inmate suffered from a certain condition and that the North Dakota State Hospital should be required to treat that condition, the claim failed because the North Dakota State Hospital could not be required to create an individualized treatment program for the inmate. De La Cour v. D.W., 2016 ND 156, 883 N.W.2d 444, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 156 (N.D. 2016).

Individual committed as sexually dangerous was entitled to discharge because (1) the State showed no nexus between the individual’s disorder and sexual dangerousness to others, and (2) a district court’s denial of the petition did not specifically find the individual was any more dangerous than other released convicts, as actuarial test scores were not enough to require continued commitment, limited rule infractions did not show a connection between a disorder and a likelihood of sexually reoffending, and the record established the individual had not acted out sexually, had not had any rule violations that were sexual in nature, and had either completed sex offender treatment or made substantial progress since a last evaluation, so the record did not establish a propensity towards sexual violence of such a degree as to pose a threat to others. Lawyer v. J.M. (In re J.M.), 2019 ND 125, 927 N.W.2d 422, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 121 (N.D. 2019).

District court erred in ordering defendant to be civilly committed as a sexually dangerous individual because it was unclear whether the State offered a psychologist’s expert report into evidence, and the district court’s order was silent on whether it was part of the hearing record. Skorick v. Skorick (In the Interest of Skorick), 2020 ND 162, 946 N.W.2d 513, 2020 N.D. LEXIS 158 (N.D. 2020).

Shackles.

In a civil commitment proceeding, a trial court abused the court’s discretion in denying an inmate’s counsel’s request to have the inmate’s shackles removed, when the court deferred to a sheriff’s determination that the inmate should be shackled, because (1) the court did not independently make an individualized determination on the record as to whether the inmate’s restraints were necessary, (2) it was not suggested on the record that the inmate presented a security risk, (3) reports of examining professionals did not refer to any act of violence the inmate committed, and (4) the State did not meet the State’s burden to establish the need for restraints, deferring instead to the sheriff. Nesvig v. Hoff (In re Hoff), 2013 ND 68, 830 N.W.2d 608, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 75 (N.D. 2013).

In a civil commitment proceeding, when a trial court abused the court’s discretion in denying an inmate’s counsel’s request to have the inmate’s shackles removed, the error was not harmless because (1) the inmate’s continued commitment was based on expert testimony, and the experts did not agree, (2) the experts agreed that the inmate had no sexual deviancy, and (3) the use and acceptance of risk assessment instruments used to determine the inmate’s dangerousness were in flux, so the tools’ application to an individual had to be carefully scrutinized. Nesvig v. Hoff (In re Hoff), 2013 ND 68, 830 N.W.2d 608, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 75 (N.D. 2013).

Supervision.

District court did not err by concluding it lacked authority to place defendant on extended supervision because the executive director of the North Dakota Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Field Services Division did not petition for community placement; the restrictions and requirements for committed individuals were for a committed individual placed in the community as ordered by the district court after petition from the executive director. Whitetail v. Whitetail, 2015 ND 206, 868 N.W.2d 833, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 230 (N.D. 2015).

Collateral References.

Admissibility of Actuarial Risk Assessment Testimony in Proceeding to Commit Sex Offender. 20 A.L.R.6th 607.

Law Reviews.

North Dakota Supreme Court Review (In the Interest of M.B.K., 2002 ND 25, 639 N.W.2d 473), see 79 N.D. L. Rev. 589 (2003).

Case Comment: Mental Health — Sex Offenders: The North Dakota Supreme Court Contemplates the Use of Self-Incriminating Statements While Denying A Petition For Discharge, In Re G.R.H., 2008 ND 222, 758 N.W.2D 719, see 86 N.D. L. Rev. 231 (2010).

25-03.3-14. Interagency placement.

If a committed individual also has been committed to the legal and physical custody of the department of corrections and rehabilitation, the director of the department of corrections and rehabilitation and the executive director may consult one another and determine the appropriate placement of the individual and may transfer the individual between placements.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1.

25-03.3-15. Evidence of prior acts.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any proceeding pursuant to this chapter, evidence of prior sexually predatory conduct or criminal conduct, including a record of the juvenile court, is admissible.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Case Comment: Mental Health — Sex Offenders: The North Dakota Supreme Court Contemplates the Use of Self-Incriminating Statements While Denying A Petition For Discharge, In Re G.R.H., 2008 ND 222, 758 N.W.2D 719, see 86 N.D. L. Rev. 231 (2010).

25-03.3-16. Limitation on findings as evidence in criminal proceedings.

Any determination made pursuant to this chapter regarding whether a respondent is a sexually dangerous individual or has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction is inadmissible in any criminal proceeding against the respondent, including any criminal proceeding to determine whether the respondent is fit to stand trial, incapable of forming requisite intent, or not guilty by reason of lack of responsibility because of mental disease or defect.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Case Comment: Mental Health — Sex Offenders: The North Dakota Supreme Court Contemplates the Use of Self-Incriminating Statements While Denying A Petition For Discharge, In Re G.R.H., 2008 ND 222, 758 N.W.2D 719, see 86 N.D. L. Rev. 231 (2010).

25-03.3-17. Postcommitment proceeding, discharge, and further disposition. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

  1. A committed individual must remain in the care, custody, and control of the executive director until, in the opinion of the executive director, the individual is safe to be at large.
  2. Each committed individual must have an examination of that individual’s mental condition at least once a year. A report regarding the examination must be provided to the court that committed the individual. At the time of the annual examination, the committed individual has the right to have an expert examine the individual, and, upon the request of an indigent committed individual, the court shall appoint a qualified expert to examine the committed individual and report to the court. The department of human services shall compensate a qualified expert appointed by the court in a reasonable amount based on time and expenses. That expert must have reasonable access to the committed individual and to all records relating to the committed individual, including confidential records.
  3. If a committed individual has been committed to an out-of-state facility by the executive director for purposes of treatment, an expert from that state may be appointed by the court as a qualified expert for an indigent committed individual for any postcommitment proceeding.
  4. After any report pursuant to this section is provided to the court, the court may order further examination and investigation of the committed individual as the court considers necessary. The court may set the matter for a hearing. At the hearing, the committed individual is entitled to be present and to the benefit of the protections afforded at the commitment proceeding. The state’s attorney shall represent the state at the hearing. After the hearing, the court shall determine whether the committed individual is to be discharged or to be retained as a sexually dangerous individual in the care, custody, and control of the executive director.
  5. The executive director may only discharge a sexually dangerous individual from commitment pursuant to a court order. The executive director may petition the committing court at any time for the discharge of the committed individual. The executive director shall give the state’s attorney notice of any petition for discharge the executive director files with the court. Before the petition is granted, the state’s attorney has the right to be heard by the court on the petition. The state’s attorney may waive this right.
  6. If the executive director moves a committed individual from a placement in the community to a placement in a secure treatment facility that is more restrictive, the committed individual may challenge the move at a hearing to be held within thirty days after the move in accordance with procedures established by the department of human services.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, §§ 12, 13.

Notes to Decisions

Constitutionality.

N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-17 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine by unconstitutionally delegating judicial authority to the executive director of the department of human services. Feland v. P.F (In re P.F.), 2008 ND 37, 744 N.W.2d 724, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 35 (N.D. 2008).

Inmate, who was committed as a sexually dangerous individual, did not have standing to challenge N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-17(1), on the basis that the statute represented a practical impediment to discharge; he petitioned for discharge under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-18, and yet he did not show that he was denied release by the district court based upon the decision of the executive director of the department of human services. Rather, he was denied discharge upon the district court’s finding that he continued to suffer from a severe antisocial disorder and had not received sex offender treatment; consequently, the inmate did not show that the district court delegated its authority to decide whether to continue his commitment to the executive director, and thus did not show that N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-17 was unconstitutional as applied to him. Feland v. P.F (In re P.F.), 2008 ND 37, 744 N.W.2d 724, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 35 (N.D. 2008).

Inmate, who was committed as a sexually dangerous individual, was denied discharge from commitment because he did not show that N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-17 violated the separation of powers doctrine by unconstitutionally delegating judicial authority to the executive director of the department of human services. Although the statute allowed the executive director to petition for the release of the inmate if the director determined that the inmate was safe to be at large, the statute merely allowed the district court to consider the director’s report but required the district court to make the ultimate decision about the inmate’s discharge. Feland v. P.F (In re P.F.), 2008 ND 37, 744 N.W.2d 724, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 35 (N.D. 2008).

Annual Report.

State complied with the statutory requirements under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-17(2) when a hospital staff psychologist completed a patient’s annual evaluation and submitted the report to the district court; even though the report was not admitted during the patient’s discharge hearing, it was part of the record and readily available for the district court’s review because it was filed with the district court. Cass County State's Atty. v. E.W.F. (In re E.W.F.), 2008 ND 130, 751 N.W.2d 686, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 134 (N.D. 2008).

Evidence Insufficient to Support Discharge.

Conclusion that a patient continued to be sexually dangerous individual was supported by the evidence which included the patient’s prior gross sexual imposition conviction and the State psychologist’s testimony that the patient suffered from two sexual disorders, that the patient had not completed sex offender treatment, and that the patient still engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior while in treatment. Cass County State's Atty. v. E.W.F. (In re E.W.F.), 2008 ND 130, 751 N.W.2d 686, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 134 (N.D. 2008).

Expert Testimony.

District court erred in extending res judicata to the question whether a committed individual had a congenital or acquired condition manifested by a sexual disorder, personality disorder or other mental disorder or dysfunction; although the patient’s expert was presenting his previously expressed disagreement with the patient’s original diagnoses, the fact did not change the potential effect his expert opinion may have had on the patient’s diagnoses in 2013, and his testimony should not have been excluded on res judicata grounds. Hetland v. Graham (In the Interest of Graham), 2013 ND 171, 837 N.W.2d 382, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 175 (N.D. 2013).

Trial court did not err in denying the petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually danger individual, as the experts’ reliance on the State Hospital’s behavioral acknowledgments or write-ups was not unreasonable and petitioner’s objection went to the report’s weight rather than its admissibility. Petitioner had the opportunity to cross-examine on the petition and the underlying data and reports and other information that were used as a basis and thus, there was no abuse its discretion in the admission of the report. Kummer v. Hehn (In re Hehn), 2021 ND 20, 954 N.W.2d 689, 2021 N.D. LEXIS 31 (N.D. 2021).

Right to Hearing.

Trial court did not err in not holding a post-commitment hearing under N.D.C.C. § § 25-03.3-17(4) because requirements for appellant’s continued designation as a sexually dangerous individual were met. Feland v. D.V.A. (In re D.V.A.), 2009 ND 75, 764 N.W.2d 417, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 71 (N.D. 2009).

Supervision.

District court did not err by concluding it lacked authority to place defendant on extended supervision because the executive director of the North Dakota Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Field Services Division did not petition for community placement; the restrictions and requirements for committed individuals were for a committed individual placed in the community as ordered by the district court after petition from the executive director. Whitetail v. Whitetail, 2015 ND 206, 868 N.W.2d 833, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 230 (N.D. 2015).

Law Reviews.

North Dakota Supreme Court Review (In re E.W.F., 2008 ND 130, 751 N.W.2d 686. (2008)), see 85 N. Dak. L. Rev. 503 (2009).

25-03.3-17. Postcommitment proceeding, discharge, and further disposition. [Effective September 1, 2022]

  1. A committed individual must remain in the care, custody, and control of the executive director until, in the opinion of the executive director, the individual is safe to be at large.
  2. Each committed individual must have an examination of that individual’s mental condition at least once a year. A report regarding the examination must be provided to the court that committed the individual. At the time of the annual examination, the committed individual has the right to have an expert examine the individual, and, upon the request of an indigent committed individual, the court shall appoint a qualified expert to examine the committed individual and report to the court. The department of health and human services shall compensate a qualified expert appointed by the court in a reasonable amount based on time and expenses. That expert must have reasonable access to the committed individual and to all records relating to the committed individual, including confidential records.
  3. If a committed individual has been committed to an out-of-state facility by the executive director for purposes of treatment, an expert from that state may be appointed by the court as a qualified expert for an indigent committed individual for any postcommitment proceeding.
  4. After any report pursuant to this section is provided to the court, the court may order further examination and investigation of the committed individual as the court considers necessary. The court may set the matter for a hearing. At the hearing, the committed individual is entitled to be present and to the benefit of the protections afforded at the commitment proceeding. The state’s attorney shall represent the state at the hearing. After the hearing, the court shall determine whether the committed individual is to be discharged or to be retained as a sexually dangerous individual in the care, custody, and control of the executive director.
  5. The executive director may only discharge a sexually dangerous individual from commitment pursuant to a court order. The executive director may petition the committing court at any time for the discharge of the committed individual. The executive director shall give the state’s attorney notice of any petition for discharge the executive director files with the court. Before the petition is granted, the state’s attorney has the right to be heard by the court on the petition. The state’s attorney may waive this right.
  6. If the executive director moves a committed individual from a placement in the community to a placement in a secure treatment facility that is more restrictive, the committed individual may challenge the move at a hearing to be held within thirty days after the move in accordance with procedures established by the department of health and human services.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, §§ 12, 13; 2021, ch. 352, § 284, eff September 1, 2022.

25-03.3-18. Petition for discharge — Notice. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

  1. Annually, the executive director shall provide the committed individual with written notice that the individual has a right to petition the court for discharge. The notice must explain to the committed person when the committed person has a right to a hearing on the petition. The notice must inform the committed person of the rights this chapter affords the committed person at a discharge hearing. The executive director shall forward a copy of the notice to the committing court. If the committed individual is an individual with an intellectual disability, the executive director shall also provide the written notice to the individual’s attorney, guardian, and guardian ad litem, if any.
  2. If the committed individual files a petition for discharge and has not had a hearing pursuant to section 25-03.3-17 or this section during the preceding twelve months, the committed individual has a right to a hearing on the petition.
  3. At the hearing on the petition for discharge, the committed individual is entitled to be present and to the benefit of the protections afforded at the commitment proceeding. The state’s attorney shall represent the state and may have the committed individual evaluated by experts chosen by the state. The committed individual is entitled to have an expert of the committed individual’s choice conduct an evaluation. The court shall appoint a qualified expert if the committed individual is indigent and requests an appointment. The department of human services shall compensate a qualified expert appointed by the court in a reasonable amount based on time and expenses. That expert must have reasonable access to the committed individual and to all records relating to the committed individual, including confidential records.
  4. At any hearing held pursuant to a petition for discharge, the burden of proof is on the state to show by clear and convincing evidence that the committed individual remains a sexually dangerous individual.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, § 14; 2011, ch. 207, § 14.

Notes to Decisions

Annual Report.

State complied with the statutory requirements under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-17(2) when a hospital staff psychologist completed a patient’s annual evaluation and submitted the report to the district court; even though the report was not admitted during the patient’s discharge hearing, it was part of the record and readily available for the district court’s review because it was filed with the district court. Cass County State's Atty. v. E.W.F. (In re E.W.F.), 2008 ND 130, 751 N.W.2d 686, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 134 (N.D. 2008).

Court’s Findings.

Order denying appellant’s petition for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous person was improper because the trial court did not comply with N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a) and its finding was inadequate to permit appellate review; the trial court’s finding was general and conclusory, and merely stated that the State sustained its burden of proof. Cass County State's Attorney v. R.A.S. (In re R.A.S.), 2008 ND 185, 756 N.W.2d 771, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 184 (N.D. 2008).

District court’s finding that an individual who was civilly committed as a sexually dangerous individual remained sexually dangerous was not clearly erroneous because its preference for a doctor’s opinions regarding the individual’s risk factors was not an erroneous view of the law. Erickson v. Rubey, 2013 ND 190, 838 N.W.2d 446, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 195 (N.D. 2013).

District court erred in denying defendant's petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual because, while the district court determined defendant engaged in sexually predatory conduct as evidenced by his prior convictions, suffered from antisocial personality disorder, and presented a high risk for re-offending, it did not make any specific findings on whether defendant remained a sexually dangerous individual or whether he had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior, and an analysis of defendant's past criminal history, alone, was insufficient. Reierson v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 2015 ND 71, 861 N.W.2d 484, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 73 (N.D. 2015).

Individual committed as sexually dangerous was entitled to discharge because (1) the State showed no nexus between the individual’s disorder and sexual dangerousness to others, and (2) a district court’s denial of the petition did not specifically find the individual was any more dangerous than other released convicts, as actuarial test scores were not enough to require continued commitment, limited rule infractions did not show a connection between a disorder and a likelihood of sexually reoffending, and the record established the individual had not acted out sexually, had not had any rule violations that were sexual in nature, and had either completed sex offender treatment or made substantial progress since a last evaluation, so the record did not establish a propensity towards sexual violence of such a degree as to pose a threat to others. Lawyer v. J.M. (In re J.M.), 2019 ND 125, 927 N.W.2d 422, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 121 (N.D. 2019).

Clear and convincing evidence did not support the finding that appellant remained a sexually dangerous individual where he had participated in treatment and was not a management problem, and instances of having extra food in his room did not establish a serious difficulty controlling behavior. Moreover, the lack of behavioral write-ups, progress in treatment, and the lack of evidence about how he remained a threat ran counter to finding by clear and convincing evidence that he had serious difficulty in controlling his sexual behavior. Evidence that a 76-year-old man whose first language was not English, was on medication for his heart condition, and sometimes appeared asleep in group alone was insufficient to meet the requirement for commitment. Voisine v. Voisine, 2019 ND 302, 936 N.W.2d 544, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 308 (N.D. 2019).

Appellate court remanded, while retaining jurisdiction, with instructions that a district court make required specific findings of fact because the district court’s conclusory general findings in denying a petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual were insufficient for civil commitment decisions. Kummer v. Hehn (In re Hehn), 2020 ND 226, 949 N.W.2d 848, 2020 N.D. LEXIS 207 (N.D. 2020).

Evidence Insufficient to Support Discharge.

Conclusion that a patient continued to be sexually dangerous individual was supported by the evidence which included the patient’s prior gross sexual imposition conviction and the State psychologist’s testimony that the patient suffered from two sexual disorders, that the patient had not completed sex offender treatment, and that the patient still engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior while in treatment. Cass County State's Atty. v. E.W.F. (In re E.W.F.), 2008 ND 130, 751 N.W.2d 686, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 134 (N.D. 2008).

Denial of appellant’s petition for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-18(1) was appropriate because he failed to progress in treatment, he had a sexual relationship with a young-looking resident in violation of the treatment program rules, and he showed a lack of empathy for his victims. Grosinger v. M.D. (In re M.D.), 2008 ND 208, 757 N.W.2d 559, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 220 (N.D. 2008).

Patient’s petition for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual was properly denied because the State of North Dakota proved by clear an convincing evidence that the patient remained a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-18(4). One expert concluded that the patient remained a sexually dangerous individual and a second acknowledged that if the age of certain victims was proper a diagnosis of sexual perversion of sexual attraction to adolescents would be justified. Van Grinsven v. G.R.H. (In re G.R.H.), 2008 ND 222, 758 N.W.2d 719, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 203 (N.D. 2008).

Denial of a committed individual’s petition for discharge under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-18(4) from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) was appropriate because the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the committed individual had difficulty controlling his actions and that when he had been conditionally released in the past, he had not done well and had committed multiple sex crimes. Cass County State's Attorney v. R.A.S. (In re R.A.S.), 2009 ND 101, 766 N.W.2d 712, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 101 (N.D. 2009).

Denial of a committed individual’s petition for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual was appropriate because his argument that he had not committed any acts of sexually predatory conduct while at the State Hospital for four years, as defined in N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(9), was without merit since such a requirement did not exist for the continued civil commitment of a sexually dangerous individual. Rather, the State had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the individual remained a sexually dangerous individual, as defined in N.D.C.C. §§ 25-03.3-01(8) and 25-03.3-18(4), and the State had done so. Cass County State's Attorney v. R.A.S. (In re R.A.S.), 2009 ND 101, 766 N.W.2d 712, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 101 (N.D. 2009).

Because the district court’s order denying defendant’s petition for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual was not induced by an erroneous view of the law and was supported by clear and convincing evidence that defendant remained a sexually dangerous individual, the district court did not clearly err in denying defendant’s petition. Feland v. A.M. (In re A.M.), 2009 ND 104, 766 N.W.2d 437, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 108 (N.D. 2009).

Evidence Sufficient to Deny Discharge.

Patient was committed as a sexually dangerous individual based on his molestation of two boys, alleged raped of a woman, sexual assault of two girls, and rape of a developmentally disabled adult female; when he petitioned for discharge under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-18(1), the only evidence presented was a doctor’s expert testimony that the patient had a high risk for reoffending. His diagnosis was based on the patient’s failure to follow rules, deceitfulness about past sex offenses, impulsivity, aggression, lack of remorse, and irresponsibility regarding his sex offender treatment; the district court did not err by denying the patient’s petition for discharge, because the doctor’s expert testimony proved that the patient continued to be a sexually dangerous individual within the meaning of N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8). Cass County State's Atty. v. O.H.W. (In re O.H.W.), 2009 ND 194, 775 N.W.2d 73, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 198 (N.D. 2009).

District court’s finding that petitioner was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct was supported by clear and convincing evidence because a physician found that petitioner’s test results placed him in the high-risk range for re-offense, another test score indicated a high existence of psychopathy and placed him at a greater risk for recidivism, and it was the physician’s opinion that petitioner had not received sufficient treatment. Grosinger v. Thill, 2014 ND 89, 845 N.W.2d 330, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 84 (N.D. 2014).

Sufficient evidence existed supporting the district court’s finding that the State showed a nexus between petitioner’s sexual and personality disorders and his lack of control, distinguishing him from the typical recidivist in an ordinary case, and therefore the district court did not err by finding clear and convincing evidence that petitioner had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. Grosinger v. Thill, 2014 ND 89, 845 N.W.2d 330, 2014 N.D. LEXIS 84 (N.D. 2014).

Expert Testimony.

District court erred in extending res judicata to the question whether a committed individual had a congenital or acquired condition manifested by a sexual disorder, personality disorder or other mental disorder or dysfunction; although the patient’s expert was presenting his previously expressed disagreement with the patient’s original diagnoses, the fact did not change the potential effect his expert opinion may have had on the patient’s diagnoses in 2013, and his testimony should not have been excluded on res judicata grounds. Hetland v. Graham (In the Interest of Graham), 2013 ND 171, 837 N.W.2d 382, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 175 (N.D. 2013).

District court did not err in finding that respondent remained a sexually dangerous individual as both experts reached the conclusion that respondent was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct if he were released. Hehn v. Hehn, 2013 ND 191, 838 N.W.2d 469, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 188 (N.D. 2013).

District court did not clearly err in civilly committing defendant because the State proved that he remained a sexually dangerous individual where he had previously engaged in sexually predatory conduct, both expert witnesses diagnosed him with having a congenital or acquired condition that was manifested by a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction making him likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct, and the experts agreed in the results of the examinations using methodology accepted in the profession. Loy v. Loy, 2015 ND 92, 862 N.W.2d 500, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 89 (N.D. 2015).

Review.

Supreme court was unable to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in limiting evidence as to elements of the sexually dangerous individual analysis because an individual who was civilly committed as a sexually dangerous individual failed to make an offer of proof when his expert’s testimony was limited, and the expert’s report was silent as to one of the elements. Erickson v. Rubey, 2013 ND 190, 838 N.W.2d 446, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 195 (N.D. 2013).

Taken together, both petitioner’s past and present conduct, the district court’s finding petitioner had serious difficulty controlling his behavior was not clearly erroneous and was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Review of the record reflected more than just lack of progress, it showed a lack of participation in treatment. Fremgen v. Didier (In re Didier), 2019 ND 263, 934 N.W.2d 417, 2019 N.D. LEXIS 252 (N.D. 2019).

Right to Hearing.

Appellant, who was committed as a sexually dangerous individual, was not entitled to a discharge hearing pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-18(2) because appellant failed to petition for discharge. Feland v. D.V.A. (In re D.V.A.), 2009 ND 75, 764 N.W.2d 417, 2009 N.D. LEXIS 71 (N.D. 2009).

District court did not err in concluding that respondent was not entitled to another discharge hearing until 12 months had passed since the last discharge hearing because the statute unambiguously provided that a committed individual was only entitled to one discharge hearing within a 12-month period. Hehn v. Hehn, 2013 ND 191, 838 N.W.2d 469, 2013 N.D. LEXIS 188 (N.D. 2013).

Law Reviews.

North Dakota Supreme Court Review (In re E.W.F., 2008 ND 130, 751 N.W.2d 686. (2008)), see 85 N. Dak. L. Rev. 503 (2009).

25-03.3-18. Petition for discharge — Notice. [Effective September 1, 2022]

  1. Annually, the executive director shall provide the committed individual with written notice that the individual has a right to petition the court for discharge. The notice must explain to the committed person when the committed person has a right to a hearing on the petition. The notice must inform the committed person of the rights this chapter affords the committed person at a discharge hearing. The executive director shall forward a copy of the notice to the committing court. If the committed individual is an individual with an intellectual disability, the executive director shall also provide the written notice to the individual’s attorney, guardian, and guardian ad litem, if any.
  2. If the committed individual files a petition for discharge and has not had a hearing pursuant to section 25-03.3-17 or this section during the preceding twelve months, the committed individual has a right to a hearing on the petition.
  3. At the hearing on the petition for discharge, the committed individual is entitled to be present and to the benefit of the protections afforded at the commitment proceeding. The state’s attorney shall represent the state and may have the committed individual evaluated by experts chosen by the state. The committed individual is entitled to have an expert of the committed individual’s choice conduct an evaluation. The court shall appoint a qualified expert if the committed individual is indigent and requests an appointment. The department of health and human services shall compensate a qualified expert appointed by the court in a reasonable amount based on time and expenses. That expert must have reasonable access to the committed individual and to all records relating to the committed individual, including confidential records.
  4. At any hearing held pursuant to a petition for discharge, the burden of proof is on the state to show by clear and convincing evidence that the committed individual remains a sexually dangerous individual.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, § 14; 2011, ch. 207, § 14; 2021, ch. 352, § 285, eff September 1, 2022.

25-03.3-18.1. Annual review — Petition for discharge — Inapplicability during periods of imprisonment.

Sections 25-03.3-17 and 25-03.3-18 do not apply if a respondent, during a period of commitment under this chapter, is transferred to the custody of the department of corrections and rehabilitation in accordance with section 29-27-07 or is serving a term of imprisonment in a county jail or regional corrections center. Upon release from imprisonment, the respondent must be retransferred to the care, custody, and control of the executive director. Upon retransfer, the respondent is entitled to a review to determine whether continued commitment under this chapter is warranted.

Source:

S.L. 2013, ch. 225, § 2.

Effective Date.

This section became effective August 1, 2013.

25-03.3-19. Appeal.

The respondent has the right to an appeal from an order of commitment or an order denying a petition for discharge. Upon entry of an appealable order, the court shall notify the respondent of the right to appeal and the right to counsel. The notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after entry of the order. The appeal must be limited to a review of the procedures, findings, and conclusions of the committing court. Pending a decision on appeal, the order appealed from remains in effect. If the respondent is an individual with an intellectual disability, the court shall provide notice of the right to appeal to the respondent’s attorney, the respondent’s guardian, and guardian ad litem.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2001, ch. 256, § 15; 2011, ch. 207, § 15.

Notes to Decisions

Motion for New Trial.

Because N.D.R.Civ.P. 59 does not conflict with the statutory scheme and is not inconsistent with the aims of the Commitment of Sexually Dangerous Individuals Act, a motion for a new trial may be made in a proceeding under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3. Stokes v. Hehn (In re Hehn), 2008 ND 36, 745 N.W.2d 631, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 37 (N.D. 2008).

Tolling of Time to Appeal.

Because a motion for new trial under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59 tolled the time for filing an appeal under N.D.R.App.P. 4, respondent’s appeal from the order committing him as a sexually dangerous individual was timely where it was filed less than 30 days after notice of entry of the order denying the motion for new trial. Stokes v. Hehn (In re Hehn), 2008 ND 36, 745 N.W.2d 631, 2008 N.D. LEXIS 37 (N.D. 2008).

25-03.3-20. Limitation of liability.

A person acting in good faith upon either actual knowledge or reliable information, who provides information to the state’s attorney or the court pursuant to this chapter, is not subject to civil or criminal liability.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1.

25-03.3-21. Recovery of expense. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

The department of human services, to the extent it has expended sums or provided services pursuant to this title, may seek civil recovery from the property of the respondent or committed individual. The department of human services must commence the action within six years after the department paid the sums or provided the services to the respondent or committed individual. After notice and hearing, the court may order an individual to reimburse the department of human services for all or part of the expenditures made for that individual pursuant to this chapter. In establishing the amount of reimbursement ordered under this section, the court shall consider the ability of the respondent or committed individual to pay.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1.

25-03.3-21. Recovery of expense. [Effective September 1, 2022]

The department of health and human services, to the extent it has expended sums or provided services pursuant to this title, may seek civil recovery from the property of the respondent or committed individual. The department of health and human services must commence the action within six years after the department paid the sums or provided the services to the respondent or committed individual. After notice and hearing, the court may order an individual to reimburse the department of health and human services for all or part of the expenditures made for that individual pursuant to this chapter. In establishing the amount of reimbursement ordered under this section, the court shall consider the ability of the respondent or committed individual to pay.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 243, § 1; 2021, ch. 352, § 286, eff September 1, 2022.

25-03.3-22. Rules. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

The department of human services may adopt rules under chapter 28-32 to implement this chapter, but the rules may not restrict or limit the rights guaranteed by this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 16.

25-03.3-22. Rules. [Effective September 1, 2022]

The department of health and human services may adopt rules under chapter 28-32 to implement this chapter, but the rules may not restrict or limit the rights guaranteed by this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 16; 2021, ch. 352, § 287, eff September 1, 2022.

25-03.3-23. Individual rights.

For so long as a committed individual is placed in and resides at a treatment facility, the committed individual has the same rights as other residents of the facility, subject to the following limitations and restrictions:

  1. The individual’s rights are subordinate to legitimate safety precautions and to the terms of the applicable individualized habilitation or treatment plan.
  2. If an individual’s rights are inconsistent with this chapter in a particular situation, the specific provisions of this chapter prevail.

Source:

S.L. 2001, ch. 256, § 17.

25-03.3-24. Postcommitment community placement — Penalty.

  1. Following commitment of a sexually dangerous individual, the executive director may conduct a risk management assessment of the committed individual for the purpose of determining whether the individual may be treated safely in the community on an outpatient basis. The executive director may place a committed individual in the community for treatment on an outpatient basis only pursuant to a court order. The executive director may petition the court at any time for community placement. The executive director shall give the state’s attorney of the county of community placement notice of any petition for community placement the executive director files with the court. Before the petition is granted, the state’s attorney has the right to be heard by the court. The state’s attorney may waive this right. At any hearing held pursuant to a petition by the executive director for the community placement of a committed individual, the burden of proof required of the executive director is a preponderance of the evidence. The court’s order of community placement must contain appropriate restrictions and requirements for the committed individual, including:
    1. Participation and compliance with a specific course of treatment;
    2. Submission to electronic monitoring and any other appropriate supervision;
    3. Prohibition of the individual changing place of residency or leaving the state without prior authorization of the court;
    4. Establishment of safety zones, and compliance by the committed individual with those safety zones;
    5. Requirement that the committed individual notify the court within twenty-four hours of any change in the individual’s status that affects proper treatment or supervision;
    6. Contact with victims is prohibited independent of a supervised treatment plan; and
    7. Any other restriction or requirement deemed necessary by the court to assure public safety and proper treatment of the committed individual.
  2. Violation by a committed individual of a court order issued pursuant to this section is a class C felony.

Source:

S.L. 2005, ch. 250, § 1.

Notes to Decisions

Constitutionality.

The statutory condition that a district court could order community placement of a sexually dangerous individual only when the Executive Director of the North Dakota Department of Human Services filed a petition requesting community placement did not violate the separation of powers doctrine. Therefore, because the individual rather that the Executive director petitioned for community placement of the individual, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the individual’s petition. Murray v. J.B. (In the Interest of J.B.), 2021 ND 90, 959 N.W.2d 869, 2021 N.D. LEXIS 91 (N.D. 2021).

Supervision.

District court did not err by concluding it lacked authority to place defendant on extended supervision because the executive director of the North Dakota Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Field Services Division did not petition for community placement; the restrictions and requirements for committed individuals were for a committed individual placed in the community as ordered by the district court after petition from the executive director. Whitetail v. Whitetail, 2015 ND 206, 868 N.W.2d 833, 2015 N.D. LEXIS 230 (N.D. 2015).

CHAPTER 25-04 Care of Developmentally Disabled

25-04-00.1. Definitions.

For the purposes of this chapter:

  1. “Nonresident patient at the life skills and transition center” includes:
    1. Any patient at the life skills and transition center who is under eighteen years old and whose responsible relative is not a bona fide resident of this state.
    2. Any Indian patients for whom the United States government has, through its statutes and regulations, a responsibility for their care.
  2. “Nonresident responsible relative” includes the patient’s nonresident spouse, father, or mother. It includes the bureau of Indian affairs in those cases involving Indian patients for whom the United States government has, through its statutes and regulations, a responsibility for their care.

Source:

S.L. 1985, ch. 527, § 4; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2013, ch. 226, § 1.

Effective Date.

The 2013 amendment of this section by section 1 of chapter 226, S.L. 2013 became effective August 1, 2013.

25-04-01. Life skills and transition center — Name — Administration and control. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

A facility for individuals with developmental disabilities must be maintained at or near the city of Grafton in Walsh County. The facility must also be available for an individual who is determined to be an individual who may benefit from the facility’s services. The facility must be known and designated as the life skills and transition center. The department of human services has administrative authority and control of the life skills and transition center.

Source:

S.L. 1903, ch. 108, § 1; R.C. 1905, § 1160; C.L. 1913, § 1709; S.L. 1933, ch. 240, § 1; R.C. 1943, § 25-0401; S.L. 1957, ch. 197, § 3; 1957 Supp., § 25-0401; S.L. 1961, ch. 209, § 3; 1963, ch. 220, § 3; 1967, ch. 214, § 12; 1979, ch. 315, § 17; 1985, ch. 310, § 1; 1985, ch. 311, § 1; 1989, ch. 239, §§ 4, 5; 1989, ch. 338, §§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 294, § 1; 1995, ch. 34, § 7; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2015, ch. 200, § 12, eff August 1, 2015.

Cross-References.

Cruel treatment of persons admitted to state institutions a misdemeanor, see § 25-01-16.

Fees and expenses, see N.D.C.C. ch. 50-06.3.

Location at Grafton, see N.D. Const., Art. IX, § 12.

Patient may fish without license, see § 20.1-03-04.

Notes to Decisions

Purchase of Utilities.

Grafton state school (now westwood park) is not a legal entity separate or apart from the state, but it may contract for purchase of utilities without being subject to regulation by public service commission. City of Grafton v. Otter Tail Power Co., 86 N.W.2d 197, 1957 N.D. LEXIS 167 (N.D. 1957).

Law Reviews.

Schools — Nature of the Right to Instruction — The Substantive Requirements of “Free Appropriate Public Education” Under the Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 59 N.D. L. Rev. 551 (1983).

The 2015 amendment of this section by section 12 of chapter 200, S.L. 2015 became effective August 1, 2015.

25-04-01. Life skills and transition center — Name — Administration and control. [Effective September 1, 2022]

A facility for individuals with developmental disabilities must be maintained at or near the city of Grafton in Walsh County. The facility must also be available for an individual who is determined to be an individual who may benefit from the facility’s services. The facility must be known and designated as the life skills and transition center. The department of health and human services has administrative authority and control of the life skills and transition center.

Source:

S.L. 1903, ch. 108, § 1; R.C. 1905, § 1160; C.L. 1913, § 1709; S.L. 1933, ch. 240, § 1; R.C. 1943, § 25-0401; S.L. 1957, ch. 197, § 3; 1957 Supp., § 25-0401; S.L. 1961, ch. 209, § 3; 1963, ch. 220, § 3; 1967, ch. 214, § 12; 1979, ch. 315, § 17; 1985, ch. 310, § 1; 1985, ch. 311, § 1; 1989, ch. 239, §§ 4, 5; 1989, ch. 338, §§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 294, § 1; 1995, ch. 34, § 7; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2015, ch. 200, § 12, eff August 1, 2015; 2021, ch. 352, § 288, eff September 1, 2022.

25-04-01.1. Life skills and transition center to be substituted for developmental center at westwood park, Grafton.

The legislative council shall delete, where appropriate, “developmental center at westwood park, Grafton”, “developmental center”, or any derivatives of those terms, which when used in context indicate an intention to refer to those terms, wherever they appear in the North Dakota Century Code, in supplements to the North Dakota Century Code, and in the North Dakota Administrative Code, and to insert in lieu of each deletion “life skills and transition center” or an appropriate derivative of that phrase. These changes are to be made when any volume or supplement of the North Dakota Century Code is being reprinted. Life skills and transition center is to be substituted for, shall take any action previously to be taken by, and shall perform any duties previously to be performed by the developmental center at westwood park, Grafton.

Source:

S.L. 2013, ch. 226, § 1.

25-04-02. Purpose of life skills and transition center. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

  1. The life skills and transition center must be maintained for the relief, instruction, care, and custody of individuals with developmental disabilities or other individuals who may benefit from the services offered at the center. For this purpose the department of human services may introduce and establish such trades and manual industries as in its judgment will best prepare the residents for future self-support.
  2. The department may provide onsite and offsite additional services and effectuate its powers and duties to best serve individuals with developmental disabilities and other individuals who may benefit from those activities. The services provided and the duties effectuated need not be accredited by the accreditation council on services for people with developmental disabilities or certified by the health care financing administration, or any other similar accrediting or certifying organization, if the service or duty is not provided to individuals with developmental disabilities or if such accrediting or certifying organization does not accredit or certify the service or duty.

Source:

S.L. 1903, ch. 108, § 4; R.C. 1905, § 1163; C.L. 1913, § 1712; R.C. 1943, § 25-0402; S.L. 1967, ch. 214, § 13; 1985, ch. 311, § 2; 1991, ch. 294, § 2; 1993, ch. 280, § 1; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2015, ch. 200, § 13, eff August 1, 2015.

25-04-02. Purpose of life skills and transition center. [Effective September 1, 2022]

  1. The life skills and transition center must be maintained for the relief, instruction, care, and custody of individuals with developmental disabilities or other individuals who may benefit from the services offered at the center. For this purpose the department of health and human services may introduce and establish such trades and manual industries as in its judgment will best prepare the residents for future self-support.
  2. The department may provide onsite and offsite additional services and effectuate its powers and duties to best serve individuals with developmental disabilities and other individuals who may benefit from those activities. The services provided and the duties effectuated need not be accredited by the accreditation council on services for people with developmental disabilities or certified by the health care financing administration, or any other similar accrediting or certifying organization, if the service or duty is not provided to individuals with developmental disabilities or if such accrediting or certifying organization does not accredit or certify the service or duty.

Source:

S.L. 1903, ch. 108, § 4; R.C. 1905, § 1163; C.L. 1913, § 1712; R.C. 1943, § 25-0402; S.L. 1967, ch. 214, § 13; 1985, ch. 311, § 2; 1991, ch. 294, § 2; 1993, ch. 280, § 1; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2015, ch. 200, § 13, eff August 1, 2015; 2021, ch. 352, § 289, eff September 1, 2022.

25-04-02.1. Accreditation of life skills and transition center. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

The department of human services shall request appropriations and resources sufficient to ensure maintenance of the life skills and transition center’s accreditation by the accreditation council on services for people with developmental disabilities and certification by the health care financing administration and, if deemed necessary, by similar accrediting and certifying organizations and agencies possessing standards applicable to an individual with a developmental disability and disciplines needed to provide quality services to individuals served.

Source:

S.L. 1991, ch. 294, § 3; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2017, ch. 207, § 14, eff August 1, 2017; 2019, ch. 228, § 1, eff August 1, 2019.

25-04-02.1. Accreditation of life skills and transition center. [Effective September 1, 2022]

The department of health and human services shall request appropriations and resources sufficient to ensure maintenance of the life skills and transition center’s accreditation by the accreditation council on services for people with developmental disabilities and certification by the health care financing administration and, if deemed necessary, by similar accrediting and certifying organizations and agencies possessing standards applicable to an individual with a developmental disability and disciplines needed to provide quality services to individuals served.

Source:

S.L. 1991, ch. 294, § 3; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2017, ch. 207, § 14, eff August 1, 2017; 2019, ch. 228, § 1, eff August 1, 2019; 2021, ch. 352, § 290, eff September 1, 2022.

25-04-02.2. Institutional sale of services — Budget section approval.

Subject to approval of the legislative assembly or the budget section if the legislative assembly is not in session, the life skills and transition center may provide any service not otherwise authorized by law under contract with a governmental or nongovernmental person. The life skills and transition center shall determine the rates for services provided. The legislative assembly or the budget section may approve the provision of a service under this section only after determining the service is not otherwise being provided by either the private or public sector. Any request considered by the budget section must comply with section 54-35-02.9.

Source:

S.L. 1993, ch. 281, § 1; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2009, ch. 482, § 98; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2019, ch. 438, § 5, eff August 1, 2019.

Effective Date.

The 2009 amendment of this section by section 98 of chapter 482, S.L. 2009 became effective August 1, 2009.

25-04-03. Qualifications of superintendent.

The superintendent of the life skills and transition center must be a skilled administrator with professional training and experience relating to the needs of individuals with developmental disabilities. All employees must be appointed and removed by the superintendent or by the superintendent’s designee. The salaries of all employees shall be fixed by the superintendent or the superintendent’s designee within the limits of the legislative appropriations made for such purpose.

Source:

S.L. 1903, ch. 108, § 5; R.C. 1905, § 1164; C.L. 1913, § 1713; R.C. 1943, § 25-0403; S.L. 1953, ch. 187, § 1; 1957 Supp., § 25-0403; S.L. 1963, ch. 220, § 4; 1973, ch. 226, § 1; 1979, ch. 315, § 18; 1985, ch. 311, § 3; 1989, ch. 338, § 3; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2015, ch. 200, § 14, eff August 1, 2015.

25-04-03.1. Biennial report — Assistant superintendent. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1989, ch. 338, § 6.

25-04-04. Who may receive benefits of life skills and transition center. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

Subject to this chapter and to any rules adopted by the department of human services, the benefits of the life skills and transition center may be received by:

  1. Individuals with developmental disabilities and other individuals who may benefit from services provided at the life skills and transition center who, in the opinion of the superintendent of the life skills and transition center are of suitable age and capacity to receive instruction in the center and whose deficiencies prevent them from receiving proper training and instruction in the public schools;
  2. Individuals with developmental disabilities and other individuals who may benefit from services provided at the life skills and transition center who cannot be properly cared for in their homes or other available facilities; or
  3. Individuals with developmental disabilities and other individuals who may benefit from onsite and offsite services provided or duties effectuated by the life skills and transition center.

Residents and nonresidents of this state may receive the benefits of the life skills and transition center. Priority, however, must be given to residents of this state and first priority must be given to individuals with developmental disabilities.

Source:

S.L. 1903, ch. 108, § 6; R.C. 1905, § 1165; S.L. 1907, ch. 237, § 1; 1909, ch. 213, § 1; 1913, ch. 166, § 1; C.L. 1913, § 1714; S.L. 1917, ch. 143, § 1; 1921, ch. 64, § 1; 1925 Supp., § 1714; R.C. 1943, § 25-0404; S.L. 1957, ch. 196, § 19; 1957 Supp., § 25-0404; S.L. 1961, ch. 211, § 6; 1967, ch. 214, § 14; 1985, ch. 311, § 5; 1987, ch. 325, § 1; 1991, ch. 294, § 4; 1993, ch. 280, § 2; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2015, ch. 200, § 15, eff August 1, 2015.

Collateral References.

Change of state or national domicil of mental incompetent, 96 A.L.R.2d 1236.

25-04-04. Who may receive benefits of life skills and transition center. [Effective September 1, 2022]

Subject to this chapter and to any rules adopted by the department of health and human services, the benefits of the life skills and transition center may be received by:

  1. Individuals with developmental disabilities and other individuals who may benefit from services provided at the life skills and transition center who, in the opinion of the superintendent of the life skills and transition center are of suitable age and capacity to receive instruction in the center and whose deficiencies prevent them from receiving proper training and instruction in the public schools;
  2. Individuals with developmental disabilities and other individuals who may benefit from services provided at the life skills and transition center who cannot be properly cared for in their homes or other available facilities; or
  3. Individuals with developmental disabilities and other individuals who may benefit from onsite and offsite services provided or duties effectuated by the life skills and transition center.

Residents and nonresidents of this state may receive the benefits of the life skills and transition center. Priority, however, must be given to residents of this state and first priority must be given to individuals with developmental disabilities.

Source:

S.L. 1903, ch. 108, § 6; R.C. 1905, § 1165; S.L. 1907, ch. 237, § 1; 1909, ch. 213, § 1; 1913, ch. 166, § 1; C.L. 1913, § 1714; S.L. 1917, ch. 143, § 1; 1921, ch. 64, § 1; 1925 Supp., § 1714; R.C. 1943, § 25-0404; S.L. 1957, ch. 196, § 19; 1957 Supp., § 25-0404; S.L. 1961, ch. 211, § 6; 1967, ch. 214, § 14; 1985, ch. 311, § 5; 1987, ch. 325, § 1; 1991, ch. 294, § 4; 1993, ch. 280, § 2; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2015, ch. 200, § 15, eff August 1, 2015; 2021, ch. 352, § 291, eff September 1, 2022.

25-04-04.1. Program management for a resident.

The department shall ensure active program management is maintained for eligible individuals residing at the life skills and transition center.

Source:

S.L. 2019, ch. 228, § 2, eff August 1, 2019.

25-04-05. Qualifications for admission to state facility — Screening required prior to admission or readmission — Educational or related services without charge for persons twenty-one years of age and under. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

  1. The superintendent may admit a person to the life skills and transition center when all of the following conditions have been met:
    1. Application for admission has been made on behalf of the person by a parent or guardian or the person or agency having legal custody, or by the person seeking admission, in accordance with procedures established by the department of human services.
    2. A comprehensive evaluation of the person has been made within three months of the date of application, a report of which has been filed with the superintendent and which, together with such other information or reviews as the department of human services may require, indicates to the superintendent’s satisfaction that the person is eligible for admission to the life skills and transition center.
    3. The person may be admitted without exceeding the resident capacity of the facility as specified in the professional standards adopted by the department of human services.
  2. No person may be admitted or readmitted to the life skills and transition center unless that person has undergone a screening process at the life skills and transition center to determine whether the admission or readmission is appropriate. Length of stay criteria may be established under rules as the department of human services may adopt. Any person who is suspected of being able to benefit from the services offered at the center may be screened to ascertain whether or not that person is actually a proper case for care, treatment, and training at the life skills and transition center. If in the opinion of the superintendent the person screened under this subsection is a proper subject for institutional care, treatment, and training at the life skills and transition center, that person may remain as a voluntary resident at the center at the discretion of the superintendent if all other conditions for admission required by this section are met.
  3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no handicapped patient, twenty-one years of age or under, or the estate or the parent of such patient, may be charged for educational or related services provided at the life skills and transition center. Except as provided in subsection 4, the department of human services has prior claim on all benefits accruing to such patients for medical and medically related services under entitlement from the federal government, medical or hospital insurance contracts, workforce safety and insurance, or medical care and disability programs. For purposes of this subsection, “related services” means transportation and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services, as determined by the department of public instruction, as are required to assist a handicapped patient to benefit from special education. The cost of related services other than medical and medically related services must be paid by the life skills and transition center, the school district of residence of the handicapped child, and other appropriate state agencies and political subdivisions of this state. The department of public instruction, the department of human services, the school district of residence, and other appropriate state agencies and political subdivisions, as determined by the department of public instruction, shall determine and agree to that portion of related services, other than medical and medically related services, for which each agency and political subdivision is liable. The department of public instruction may adopt rules necessary to implement this section.
  4. Parents of an individual with a developmental disability, who is twenty-one years of age or under, are not required to file, assist in filing, agree to filing, or assign an insurance claim when filing the claim would pose a realistic threat that the parents would suffer a financial loss not incurred by similarly situated parents of children with disabilities. Financial losses do not include incidental costs such as the time needed to file or assist in filing an insurance claim or the postage needed to mail the claim. Financial losses include:
    1. A decrease in available lifetime coverage or any other benefit under an insurance policy.
    2. An increase in premiums or the discontinuation of a policy.
    3. An out-of-pocket expense such as the payment of a deductible amount incurred in filing a claim unless the life skills and transition center pays or waives the out-of-pocket expense.

Source:

S.L. 1903, ch. 108, § 6; R.C. 1905, § 1165; S.L. 1907, ch. 237, § 1; 1909, ch. 213, § 1; 1913, ch. 166, § 1; C.L. 1913, § 1714; S.L. 1917, ch. 143, § 1; 1921, ch. 64, § 1; 1925 Supp., § 1714; R.C. 1943, § 25-0405; S.L. 1965, ch. 205, § 1; 1967, ch. 214, § 15; 1975, ch. 245, § 1; 1979, ch. 335, § 1; 1981, ch. 223, § 2; 1985, ch. 311, § 6; 1987, ch. 325, § 2; 1991, ch. 294, § 5; 1991, ch. 295, § 1; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2003, ch. 561, § 3; 2009, ch. 12, § 19; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2017, ch. 207, § 15, eff August 1, 2017.

Cross-References.

Criminal Responsibility and Post-Trial Responsibility Act, see N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-04.1.

Guardianship, see N.D.C.C. ch. 30.1-28.

Persons capable of contracting, see §§ 9-02-01, 9-02-02, 14-01-01.

Superintendent to report alien convicted of felony to United States immigration officer, see § 44-04-04.

25-04-05. Qualifications for admission to state facility — Screening required prior to admission or readmission — Educational or related services without charge for persons twenty-one years of age and under. [Effective September 1, 2022]

  1. The superintendent may admit a person to the life skills and transition center when all of the following conditions have been met:
    1. Application for admission has been made on behalf of the person by a parent or guardian or the person or agency having legal custody, or by the person seeking admission, in accordance with procedures established by the department of health and human services.
    2. A comprehensive evaluation of the person has been made within three months of the date of application, a report of which has been filed with the superintendent and which, together with such other information or reviews as the department of health and human services may require, indicates to the superintendent’s satisfaction that the person is eligible for admission to the life skills and transition center.
    3. The person may be admitted without exceeding the resident capacity of the facility as specified in the professional standards adopted by the department of health and human services.
  2. No person may be admitted or readmitted to the life skills and transition center unless that person has undergone a screening process at the life skills and transition center to determine whether the admission or readmission is appropriate. Length of stay criteria may be established under rules as the department of health and human services may adopt. Any person who is suspected of being able to benefit from the services offered at the center may be screened to ascertain whether or not that person is actually a proper case for care, treatment, and training at the life skills and transition center. If in the opinion of the superintendent the person screened under this subsection is a proper subject for institutional care, treatment, and training at the life skills and transition center, that person may remain as a voluntary resident at the center at the discretion of the superintendent if all other conditions for admission required by this section are met.
  3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no handicapped patient, twenty-one years of age or under, or the estate or the parent of such patient, may be charged for educational or related services provided at the life skills and transition center. Except as provided in subsection 4, the department of health and human services has prior claim on all benefits accruing to such patients for medical and medically related services under entitlement from the federal government, medical or hospital insurance contracts, workforce safety and insurance, or medical care and disability programs. For purposes of this subsection, “related services” means transportation and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services, as determined by the department of public instruction, as are required to assist a handicapped patient to benefit from special education. The cost of related services other than medical and medically related services must be paid by the life skills and transition center, the school district of residence of the handicapped child, and other appropriate state agencies and political subdivisions of this state. The department of public instruction, the department of health and human services, the school district of residence, and other appropriate state agencies and political subdivisions, as determined by the department of public instruction, shall determine and agree to that portion of related services, other than medical and medically related services, for which each agency and political subdivision is liable. The department of public instruction may adopt rules necessary to implement this section.
  4. Parents of an individual with a developmental disability, who is twenty-one years of age or under, are not required to file, assist in filing, agree to filing, or assign an insurance claim when filing the claim would pose a realistic threat that the parents would suffer a financial loss not incurred by similarly situated parents of children with disabilities. Financial losses do not include incidental costs such as the time needed to file or assist in filing an insurance claim or the postage needed to mail the claim. Financial losses include:
    1. A decrease in available lifetime coverage or any other benefit under an insurance policy.
    2. An increase in premiums or the discontinuation of a policy.
    3. An out-of-pocket expense such as the payment of a deductible amount incurred in filing a claim unless the life skills and transition center pays or waives the out-of-pocket expense.

Source:

S.L. 1903, ch. 108, § 6; R.C. 1905, § 1165; S.L. 1907, ch. 237, § 1; 1909, ch. 213, § 1; 1913, ch. 166, § 1; C.L. 1913, § 1714; S.L. 1917, ch. 143, § 1; 1921, ch. 64, § 1; 1925 Supp., § 1714; R.C. 1943, § 25-0405; S.L. 1965, ch. 205, § 1; 1967, ch. 214, § 15; 1975, ch. 245, § 1; 1979, ch. 335, § 1; 1981, ch. 223, § 2; 1985, ch. 311, § 6; 1987, ch. 325, § 2; 1991, ch. 294, § 5; 1991, ch. 295, § 1; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2003, ch. 561, § 3; 2009, ch. 12, § 19; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2017, ch. 207, § 15, eff August 1, 2017; 2021, ch. 352, § 292, eff September 1, 2022.

25-04-05.1. Transfer of residents — Visiting privileges — Release and placement of patients. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

  1. The superintendent shall have the right of temporary transfer of any resident of the life skills and transition center to an appropriate hospital or other specialized facility when in the superintendent’s opinion the immediate health and safety of the resident requires the transfer. The superintendent shall also have the right and responsibility of indefinite transfer of a resident from one state facility for individuals with developmental disabilities to another when the best interest of the resident will be served thereby, or when the transfer is required in conformity with the policies of the department of human services; provided, however, that no transfer may be effected until all reasonable efforts have been made to consult with the resident’s parent or guardian of the person.
  2. Subject to reasonable rules for the orderly operation of the life skills and transition center or other state facility for individuals with developmental disabilities, any parent or guardian of the person of a resident shall have the right of visiting and communicating with a child or ward and authorizing visits and communications with others.
  3. The superintendent may authorize the temporary release of any resident to the custody of the resident’s parent or guardian of the person, or to another person designated by the parent or such guardian. In the absence of such authorization, any parent or guardian of the person of any resident may formally request, in writing, the resident’s temporary release. The release must be granted at the earliest reasonable opportunity, but not more than thirty days after receipt of a written application. If a release is, or would be, effected contrary to the advice of the superintendent based on a recent comprehensive evaluation of the individual, the superintendent shall so advise the parent or such guardian in writing.
  4. The superintendent may arrange for the suitable placement of a resident outside the life skills and transition center or other state facility and to release the resident on placement, provided placement has been preceded by a comprehensive evaluation. No such placement may be effected until all reasonable efforts have been made to consult with the resident’s parent or guardian of the person.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 214, § 16; 1985, ch. 311, § 7; 1991, ch. 121, § 4; 1991, ch. 326, § 76; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2015, ch. 200, § 16, eff August 1, 2015.

25-04-05.1. Transfer of residents — Visiting privileges — Release and placement of patients. [Effective September 1, 2022]

  1. The superintendent shall have the right of temporary transfer of any resident of the life skills and transition center to an appropriate hospital or other specialized facility when in the superintendent’s opinion the immediate health and safety of the resident requires the transfer. The superintendent shall also have the right and responsibility of indefinite transfer of a resident from one state facility for individuals with developmental disabilities to another when the best interest of the resident will be served thereby, or when the transfer is required in conformity with the policies of the department of health and human services; provided, however, that no transfer may be effected until all reasonable efforts have been made to consult with the resident’s parent or guardian of the person.
  2. Subject to reasonable rules for the orderly operation of the life skills and transition center or other state facility for individuals with developmental disabilities, any parent or guardian of the person of a resident shall have the right of visiting and communicating with a child or ward and authorizing visits and communications with others.
  3. The superintendent may authorize the temporary release of any resident to the custody of the resident’s parent or guardian of the person, or to another person designated by the parent or such guardian. In the absence of such authorization, any parent or guardian of the person of any resident may formally request, in writing, the resident’s temporary release. The release must be granted at the earliest reasonable opportunity, but not more than thirty days after receipt of a written application. If a release is, or would be, effected contrary to the advice of the superintendent based on a recent comprehensive evaluation of the individual, the superintendent shall so advise the parent or such guardian in writing.
  4. The superintendent may arrange for the suitable placement of a resident outside the life skills and transition center or other state facility and to release the resident on placement, provided placement has been preceded by a comprehensive evaluation. No such placement may be effected until all reasonable efforts have been made to consult with the resident’s parent or guardian of the person.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 214, § 16; 1985, ch. 311, § 7; 1991, ch. 121, § 4; 1991, ch. 326, § 76; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2015, ch. 200, § 16, eff August 1, 2015; 2021, ch. 352, § 293, eff September 1, 2022.

25-04-05.2. San haven — Transportation costs — Payment limited. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1989, ch. 338, § 6.

25-04-06. Juvenile court commitment of dependent, neglected, or delinquent mentally deficient — Commitment for observation — Appeal.

In any proceeding instituted in juvenile court, the court may make an order committing the child to the life skills and transition center whenever it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the child involved in the proceeding is:

  1. Dependent and a candidate for services at the life skills and transition center;
  2. Neglected and a candidate for services at the life skills and transition center; or
  3. Delinquent and a candidate for services at the life skills and transition center.

If the court is in doubt as to whether the child is a candidate for services offered at the life skills and transition center, the court may make an order committing the child to the life skills and transition center for observation only by the authorities of such institution. If it is ascertained as a result of such observation that the child is a candidate for services offered at the life skills and transition center, a report to such effect must be made by the authorities of the life skills and transition center to the court. The court thereupon shall make an order fixing a time for a hearing upon the report showing the child to be in need of these services. Notice of the hearing must be given to the parents, custodian, or guardian of such child in the manner prescribed by law for the giving of notice in other proceedings in juvenile court. Upon such hearing, the court shall make such order as it may deem proper. Any parent, custodian, guardian, or other person charged with the control of such child may take an appeal from the order made by the court in the manner now prescribed by law for the taking of appeals from decisions of the juvenile court. The procedure provided in this section is not exclusive but is in addition to other procedures provided in this chapter for the commitment of children to the life skills and transition center.

Source:

S.L. 1903, ch. 108, § 6; R.C. 1905, § 1165; S.L. 1907, ch. 237, § 1; 1909, ch. 213, § 1; 1913, ch. 166, § 1; C.L. 1913, § 1714; S.L. 1917, ch. 143, § 1; 1921, ch. 64, § 1; 1925 Supp., § 1714; R.C. 1943, § 25-0406; S.L. 1961, ch. 210, § 1; 1967, ch. 214, § 17; 1989, ch. 69, § 20; 1991, ch. 294, § 6; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2013, ch. 226, § 1.

Cross-References.

State Youth Authority, see N.D.C.C. ch. 27-21.

Uniform Juvenile Court Act, see N.D.C.C. ch. 27-20.

Law Reviews.

Thoughts on the Social and Legal Nature of Deviancy and Delinquency, 31 N.D. L. Rev. 45 (1955).

25-04-07. Disabled defendants. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1991, ch. 121, § 5.

25-04-08. Discharge of resident from institution. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

A person who has been admitted as a resident must be permanently discharged within thirty days under any one of the following conditions:

  1. The superintendent, on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation, finds that the care, treatment, training, rehabilitation, and supervision offered by the state are no longer required.
  2. The parent or guardian who voluntarily committed the parent’s child or the guardian’s ward as a resident and who retains legal custody makes a written request for discharge.
  3. The person is admitted on indefinite transfer to a hospital, school, or other facility, or a protective service under the jurisdiction of another state, or another agency or department of this state; provided, however, that if such admission be by contractual arrangement made by the department of human services, the person must be placed on nonresident release status, but not discharged.
  4. A court of competent jurisdiction orders the discharge of the person.

Any person who is to be discharged under subsection 2 or 4 shall first receive a comprehensive evaluation unless such evaluation is not completed within thirty days of the request for discharge.

Source:

S.L. 1903, ch. 108, § 6; R.C. 1905, § 1165; S.L. 1907, ch. 237, § 1; 1909, ch. 213, § 1; 1913, ch. 166, § 1; C.L. 1913, § 1714; S.L. 1917, ch. 143, § 1; 1921, ch. 64, § 1; 1925 Supp., § 1714; R.C. 1943, § 25-0408; S.L. 1965, ch. 205, § 2; 1967, ch. 214, § 19; 1985, ch. 311, § 8; 1991, ch. 294, § 8.

25-04-08. Discharge of resident from institution. [Effective September 1, 2022]

A person who has been admitted as a resident must be permanently discharged within thirty days under any one of the following conditions:

  1. The superintendent, on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation, finds that the care, treatment, training, rehabilitation, and supervision offered by the state are no longer required.
  2. The parent or guardian who voluntarily committed the parent’s child or the guardian’s ward as a resident and who retains legal custody makes a written request for discharge.
  3. The person is admitted on indefinite transfer to a hospital, school, or other facility, or a protective service under the jurisdiction of another state, or another agency or department of this state; provided, however, that if such admission be by contractual arrangement made by the department of health and human services, the person must be placed on nonresident release status, but not discharged.
  4. A court of competent jurisdiction orders the discharge of the person.

Any person who is to be discharged under subsection 2 or 4 shall first receive a comprehensive evaluation unless such evaluation is not completed within thirty days of the request for discharge.

Source:

S.L. 1903, ch. 108, § 6; R.C. 1905, § 1165; S.L. 1907, ch. 237, § 1; 1909, ch. 213, § 1; 1913, ch. 166, § 1; C.L. 1913, § 1714; S.L. 1917, ch. 143, § 1; 1921, ch. 64, § 1; 1925 Supp., § 1714; R.C. 1943, § 25-0408; S.L. 1965, ch. 205, § 2; 1967, ch. 214, § 19; 1985, ch. 311, § 8; 1991, ch. 294, § 8; 2021, ch. 352, § 294, eff September 1, 2022.

25-04-08.1. Notification before discharge. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

Before discharge the superintendent shall consult with the parent or guardian of the person to be discharged, or with the court that ordered the commitment, and shall notify the director of the county social service board or human service zone of the county in which it is proposed that such person will assume residence and also shall notify the executive director of the department of human services.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 205, § 3; 1967, ch. 214, § 20; 1985, ch. 311, § 9; 1989, ch. 69, § 22; 1991, ch. 54, § 10; 1991, ch. 294, § 9; 2019, ch. 391, § 20, eff January 1, 2020.

25-04-08.1. Notification before discharge. [Effective September 1, 2022]

Before discharge the superintendent shall consult with the parent or guardian of the person to be discharged, or with the court that ordered the commitment, and shall notify the director of the county social service board or human service zone of the county in which it is proposed that such person will assume residence and also shall notify the executive director of the department of health and human services.

Source:

S.L. 1965, ch. 205, § 3; 1967, ch. 214, § 20; 1985, ch. 311, § 9; 1989, ch. 69, § 22; 1991, ch. 54, § 10; 1991, ch. 294, § 9; 2019, ch. 391, § 20, eff January 1, 2020; 2021, ch. 352, § 295, eff September 1, 2022.

25-04-09. Expense for care of inmates to be charge upon county — County to remit to state treasurer. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1961, ch. 211, § 9.

25-04-10. Transfer of inmate of state school when person legally responsible for support moves to another state. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1961, ch. 211, § 9.

25-04-11. Disposition of person who is not a legal resident. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

If a person who has no legal residence in this state is subject to admission to the life skills and transition center or other appropriate state facility, by order of a court of competent jurisdiction, such person must be sent, at the expense of the county or human service zone, to the life skills and transition center in the same manner as a resident of this state who is found to be in need of services offered at the life skills and transition center, and the superintendent of the life skills and transition center shall then arrange for the transportation of such person to the place where the person belongs. The department of human services shall ascertain the place where such person belongs when the same conveniently can be done.

Source:

S.L. 1931, ch. 146, § 2; R.C. 1943, § 25-0411; S.L. 1957, ch. 196, § 20; 1957 Supp., § 25-0411; S.L. 1967, ch. 214, § 21; 1985, ch. 311, § 9; 1991, ch. 294, § 10; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2019, ch. 391, § 21, eff January 1, 2020.

Cross-References.

Fees and expenses, see N.D.C.C. ch. 50-06.3.

25-04-11. Disposition of person who is not a legal resident. [Effective September 1, 2022]

If a person who has no legal residence in this state is subject to admission to the life skills and transition center or other appropriate state facility, by order of a court of competent jurisdiction, such person must be sent, at the expense of the county or human service zone, to the life skills and transition center in the same manner as a resident of this state who is found to be in need of services offered at the life skills and transition center, and the superintendent of the life skills and transition center shall then arrange for the transportation of such person to the place where the person belongs. The department of health and human services shall ascertain the place where such person belongs when the same conveniently can be done.

Source:

S.L. 1931, ch. 146, § 2; R.C. 1943, § 25-0411; S.L. 1957, ch. 196, § 20; 1957 Supp., § 25-0411; S.L. 1967, ch. 214, § 21; 1985, ch. 311, § 9; 1991, ch. 294, § 10; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2019, ch. 391, § 21, eff January 1, 2020; 2021, ch. 352, § 296, eff September 1, 2022.

25-04-11.1. Disposition of nonresidents — Exceptions — Reciprocal agreements.

If a person who has no legal residence in this state or whose residence is unknown is found to be a person requiring care and treatment in the life skills and transition center, the person must be sent to the life skills and transition center in the same manner, and accompanied by the same documents, as in the case of a resident of this state. The supervising department shall immediately inquire as to the residence of the person or the person’s responsible relatives, and, if the residence is found to be in another state or country, the supervising department shall arrange for transportation of the person to the place of legal residence or legal settlement unless the person can be accommodated at the life skills and transition center without depriving a North Dakota resident of care and treatment at the life skills and transition center and adequate costs of care are paid for within a reasonable time, or unless a reciprocal agreement has been entered into with another state regarding the care and commitment of the nonresident. The supervising department may enter into reciprocal agreements with other states regarding the mutual exchange, return, and transportation of persons who are within one state but have legal residence or legal settlement in another state. The agreements may not contain any provision conflicting with any law of this state.

Source:

S.L. 1985, ch. 310, § 2; 1985, ch. 527, § 2; 1989, ch. 69, § 23; 1991, ch. 294, § 11; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2013, ch. 226, § 1.

25-04-11.2. Liability for care and treatment of nonresident patients.

Nonresident patients at the life skills and transition center and nonresident responsible relatives of patients are liable for the chargeable costs of care and treatment at the life skills and transition center.

Source:

S.L. 1987, ch. 325, § 3; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2013, ch. 226, § 1.

25-04-12. Electric power may be furnished to city of Dunseith from state school power plant. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1961, ch. 209, § 5.

25-04-13. Guardianship of person and estate — Superintendent and director of institutions to act as guardians in lieu of court appointment or assumption by parent. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1973, ch. 257, § 82.

25-04-13.1. Guardianship — Superintendent to act as guardian. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1987, ch. 326, § 2.

25-04-14. Expenses chargeable against patient or patient’s estate — Filing claims. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

Expenses for care and treatment of each patient at the life skills and transition center must, if practicable, be in accordance with the cost of providing care and treatment for the different degrees or conditions of mental and physical health and charges may be adjusted in accordance with the patient’s ability to pay which must include an estimate of potential future receipts, including amounts from estates. The supervising department shall recover from the patient or from a discharged patient expenses chargeable for care and treatment. If any patient is receiving social security benefits or is a veteran or a dependent of a veteran who has received, is receiving, or is entitled to receive compensation or pension from the veterans’ administration, the expenses are a current claim against the patient and may be recovered monthly by the supervising department except that any amount required by the payer of the benefits to be paid directly to the patient must, upon approval of the department of human services, be credited to the patient’s personal account from any money thus received.

Source:

S.L. 1985, ch. 527, § 3; 1987, ch. 325, § 4; 1989, ch. 69, § 24; 1991, ch. 295, § 2; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2013, ch. 226, § 1.

Cross-References.

Imposition and collection of fees and expenses, see N.D.C.C. ch. 50-06.3.

25-04-14. Expenses chargeable against patient or patient’s estate — Filing claims. [Effective September 1, 2022]

Expenses for care and treatment of each patient at the life skills and transition center must, if practicable, be in accordance with the cost of providing care and treatment for the different degrees or conditions of mental and physical health and charges may be adjusted in accordance with the patient’s ability to pay which must include an estimate of potential future receipts, including amounts from estates. The supervising department shall recover from the patient or from a discharged patient expenses chargeable for care and treatment. If any patient is receiving social security benefits or is a veteran or a dependent of a veteran who has received, is receiving, or is entitled to receive compensation or pension from the veterans’ administration, the expenses are a current claim against the patient and may be recovered monthly by the supervising department except that any amount required by the payer of the benefits to be paid directly to the patient must, upon approval of the department of health and human services, be credited to the patient’s personal account from any money thus received.

Source:

S.L. 1985, ch. 527, § 3; 1987, ch. 325, § 4; 1989, ch. 69, § 24; 1991, ch. 295, § 2; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2021, ch. 352, § 297, eff September 1, 2022.

25-04-15. Expenses chargeable against guardianship estate of patient — Restrictions. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

The expenses chargeable by the state for the care and treatment of any patient over twenty-one years of age at the life skills and transition center must be charged against the guardianship estate of such patient, if the patient has such an estate, subject to the following restrictions:

  1. No part of the estate may be taken for such purpose if the patient has dependents within the United States dependent upon the estate for support and the taking of all or a portion of the estate would result in undue hardship to those dependents.
  2. No real property belonging to the estate may be sold during the lifetime of the patient except for the maintenance and support of the patient’s dependents, unless it is shown that the sale of the property will not result in undue hardship to those dependents, and it may be sold only upon the order of the district court having jurisdiction of the estate, with the consent of the department of human services.
  3. No personal property belonging to the estate may be sold within five years from the date upon which the patient was sent to the life skills and transition center unless the property is ordered sold by the district court having jurisdiction of the estate for the reason that the property is likely to deteriorate in value during the time herein specified.
  4. No claim may be made to recover from the estate of a former resident of the life skills and transition center who has left the life skills and transition center and married and leaves a spouse or issue dependent upon such estate.

Source:

S.L. 1985, ch. 527, § 5; 1987, ch. 325, § 5; 1989, ch. 69, § 25; 1991, ch. 326, § 77; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2013, ch. 226, § 1.

25-04-15. Expenses chargeable against guardianship estate of patient — Restrictions. [Effective September 1, 2022]

The expenses chargeable by the state for the care and treatment of any patient over twenty-one years of age at the life skills and transition center must be charged against the guardianship estate of such patient, if the patient has such an estate, subject to the following restrictions:

  1. No part of the estate may be taken for such purpose if the patient has dependents within the United States dependent upon the estate for support and the taking of all or a portion of the estate would result in undue hardship to those dependents.
  2. No real property belonging to the estate may be sold during the lifetime of the patient except for the maintenance and support of the patient’s dependents, unless it is shown that the sale of the property will not result in undue hardship to those dependents, and it may be sold only upon the order of the district court having jurisdiction of the estate, with the consent of the department of health and human services.
  3. No personal property belonging to the estate may be sold within five years from the date upon which the patient was sent to the life skills and transition center unless the property is ordered sold by the district court having jurisdiction of the estate for the reason that the property is likely to deteriorate in value during the time herein specified.
  4. No claim may be made to recover from the estate of a former resident of the life skills and transition center who has left the life skills and transition center and married and leaves a spouse or issue dependent upon such estate.

Source:

S.L. 1985, ch. 527, § 5; 1987, ch. 325, § 5; 1989, ch. 69, § 25; 1991, ch. 326, § 77; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2021, ch. 352, § 298, eff September 1, 2022.

25-04-15.1. Statute of limitations not bar to recovery.

No statute of limitations or similar statute or the doctrine of laches may bar the recovery of costs of care furnished under this chapter. It is not necessary to bill currently any person for those accounts determined to be inactive, currently uncollectible, or for which it has been determined as provided by law that there is no present ability to pay. Current billings may be made for amounts chargeable by law or for which it has been determined the responsible party presently has an ability to pay, but the manner of billing may not affect the total amount due. This section applies to claims for the cost of care furnished on or after July 1, 1961.

Source:

S.L. 1993, ch. 282, § 1.

25-04-16. Waiver of payment — Use of income tax data — Confidentiality — Definition. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

  1. Except with respect to services provided and duties effectuated for persons other than residents of the life skills and transition center who are developmentally disabled, and except with respect to services provided and duties effectuated under subsection 2 of section 25-04-02, the resident, former resident, parent of a resident or former resident under age eighteen, personal representative, or guardian may make application to the supervising department to pay less than the costs or none of the costs incurred by the state for the resident’s care and treatment at the life skills and transition center. An application from a resident, former resident, personal representative, or guardian must be accompanied by proof of the resident’s or the estate of the resident’s inability to pay. An application from a parent of a resident or former resident must be accompanied by proof that the parent has applied for or cooperated fully in an application for medical and medically related services under entitlement from the federal government, medical or hospital insurance contracts, workforce safety and insurance, or medical care and disability programs for provision of services to the resident, and has assured the contribution of those services, compensation, and contract and program benefits to meet the cost of care provided to the resident by the life skills and transition center. A waiver must be granted upon receipt of an application from such a parent, which is complete and supported by the required proofs and is effective for so long as the parent continues to apply for or cooperate fully in applications for services, compensation, and contract and program benefits, and continues to assure the contribution of those services, compensation, and benefits to meet the costs of care. A waiver, once granted with respect to a resident under age eighteen, extinguishes any debt that would otherwise be owed by the resident, the resident’s parents, or the resident’s estate with respect to care and treatment furnished during times the waiver is effective.
  2. Upon receipt of such application, the supervising department shall direct the human service zone of the county from which the patient was admitted to determine whether the application is complete and supported by the required proofs. The supervising department shall approve, reject, or amend the determination made by the human service zone. The determination made by the supervising department may be appealed to the district court of the county of residence of the patient.
  3. Any patient, former patient, parent of a patient or former patient, guardian, or personal representative who seeks relief from the payment of the cost of care and treatment by filing an application for relief of payment shall do so with the understanding that the supervising department may, in its discretion, and to its satisfaction, verify any statement made in such application for relief of payment by a request for information from financial institutions, including commercial banks, and from other sources likely to possess verifying information. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 57-38-57, this verification may include a review of such applicant’s state income tax return or any other document or report submitted to or held by any office or department of the state of North Dakota or any of its political subdivisions.
  4. When any official or employee of the life skills and transition center who, pursuant to subsection 1, obtains income tax information or other tax information from the state tax commissioner the confidentiality of which is protected by law, such official or employee may not divulge such information except to the extent necessary for the administration of this chapter or when otherwise directed by judicial order or when otherwise provided by law.
  5. As used in this chapter, “supervising department” means the department of human services.

Source:

S.L. 1985, ch. 527, § 6; 1989, ch. 69, § 26; 1989, ch. 338, § 4; 1991, ch. 295, § 3; 1993, ch. 280, § 3; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2003, ch. 561, § 3; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2019, ch. 391, § 22, eff January 1, 2020.

25-04-16. Waiver of payment — Use of income tax data — Confidentiality — Definition. [Effective September 1, 2022]

  1. Except with respect to services provided and duties effectuated for persons other than residents of the life skills and transition center who are developmentally disabled, and except with respect to services provided and duties effectuated under subsection 2 of section 25-04-02, the resident, former resident, parent of a resident or former resident under age eighteen, personal representative, or guardian may make application to the supervising department to pay less than the costs or none of the costs incurred by the state for the resident’s care and treatment at the life skills and transition center. An application from a resident, former resident, personal representative, or guardian must be accompanied by proof of the resident’s or the estate of the resident’s inability to pay. An application from a parent of a resident or former resident must be accompanied by proof that the parent has applied for or cooperated fully in an application for medical and medically related services under entitlement from the federal government, medical or hospital insurance contracts, workforce safety and insurance, or medical care and disability programs for provision of services to the resident, and has assured the contribution of those services, compensation, and contract and program benefits to meet the cost of care provided to the resident by the life skills and transition center. A waiver must be granted upon receipt of an application from such a parent, which is complete and supported by the required proofs and is effective for so long as the parent continues to apply for or cooperate fully in applications for services, compensation, and contract and program benefits, and continues to assure the contribution of those services, compensation, and benefits to meet the costs of care. A waiver, once granted with respect to a resident under age eighteen, extinguishes any debt that would otherwise be owed by the resident, the resident’s parents, or the resident’s estate with respect to care and treatment furnished during times the waiver is effective.
  2. Upon receipt of such application, the supervising department shall direct the human service zone of the county from which the patient was admitted to determine whether the application is complete and supported by the required proofs. The supervising department shall approve, reject, or amend the determination made by the human service zone. The determination made by the supervising department may be appealed to the district court of the county of residence of the patient.
  3. Any patient, former patient, parent of a patient or former patient, guardian, or personal representative who seeks relief from the payment of the cost of care and treatment by filing an application for relief of payment shall do so with the understanding that the supervising department may, in its discretion, and to its satisfaction, verify any statement made in such application for relief of payment by a request for information from financial institutions, including commercial banks, and from other sources likely to possess verifying information. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 57-38-57, this verification may include a review of such applicant’s state income tax return or any other document or report submitted to or held by any office or department of the state of North Dakota or any of its political subdivisions.
  4. When any official or employee of the life skills and transition center who, pursuant to subsection 1, obtains income tax information or other tax information from the state tax commissioner the confidentiality of which is protected by law, such official or employee may not divulge such information except to the extent necessary for the administration of this chapter or when otherwise directed by judicial order or when otherwise provided by law.
  5. As used in this chapter, “supervising department” means the department of health and human services.

Source:

S.L. 1985, ch. 527, § 6; 1989, ch. 69, § 26; 1989, ch. 338, § 4; 1991, ch. 295, § 3; 1993, ch. 280, § 3; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2003, ch. 561, § 3; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2019, ch. 391, § 22, eff January 1, 2020; 2021, ch. 352, § 299, eff September 1, 2022.

25-04-17. Reduction or writeoff of accounts — Report to legislative audit and fiscal review committee.

The supervising department may authorize the reduction or writeoff of a patient’s past-due account from the life skills and transition center’s financial records upon determining that the account is not collectible. The supervising department, by September first after the close of each fiscal year, shall present a detailed report to the legislative audit and fiscal review committee on the status of accounts receivable for that fiscal year. The report must include:

  1. An aging by patient classification of accounts remaining unpaid.
  2. The amounts by patient classification by which accounts were reduced or written off for reasons other than payment during that fiscal year.

Source:

S.L. 1987, ch. 325, § 6; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 1995, ch. 272, § 1; 2013, ch. 226, § 1.

25-04-18. Limitations of this chapter.

The provisions of this chapter may not be construed to limit or broaden the plaintiff class as defined by order of the United States district court for the district of North Dakota entered on January 13, 1981, in civil number A1-80-141.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 338, § 5.

25-04-19. Quality assurance review committees — Reports — Immunity.

Any information, data, report, or record made available to an internal quality assurance review committee of the life skills and transition center is confidential and may be used by the committee and the members thereof only in the exercise of the proper functions of the committee. The proceedings and records of the committee are not subject to subpoena or discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action arising out of any matter under consideration by the committee. Any information, document, or record otherwise available from original sources is not immune from discovery or use in any civil action merely because it was presented during the proceedings of the committee, nor may any person who testified before the committee or who is a member of it be prevented from testifying as to matters within that person’s knowledge, but a witness cannot be asked about that witness’s testimony before the committee. This section does not relieve any person of any liability incurred as a result of furnishing health care to the resident. No person furnishing information, data, reports, or records to the committee with respect to any resident of the life skills and transition center is, by reason of furnishing the information, data, reports, or records, liable in damages to any resident, or answerable for willful violation of a privileged or confidential communication. No member of the committee is liable in damages to any person for any action taken or recommendation made within the scope of the functions of the committee if the committee member acts without malice and in the reasonable belief that the action or recommendation is warranted by the facts known to the member.

Source:

S.L. 1993, ch. 280, § 4; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2013, ch. 226, § 1.

25-04-20. Westwood park assets management committee. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1999, ch. 34, § 39.

CHAPTER 25-04.1 Recommendation for Sterilization [Repealed]

[Repealed by S.L. 1979, ch. 93, § 1]

CHAPTER 25-05 Care of Tubercular Persons [Repealed]

[Repealed by S.L. 1961, ch. 211, § 9; S.L. 1965, ch. 203, § 86; S.L. 1979, ch. 315, § 19]

CHAPTER 25-06 Education of Blind Persons

25-06-01. North Dakota vision services — school for the blind — Maintained — Location.

There must be maintained at Grand Forks, in Grand Forks County, a statewide service, resource, and referral center for the education and training of all residents of this state who are blind or have a visual impairment and to serve as the national instructional materials access center authorized user for the purpose of facilitating access to and conversion of accessible instructional materials in alternate formats for use by blind individuals, individuals with visual impairment, and students with other print disabilities, which must be known as the North Dakota vision services — school for the blind.

Source:

S.L. 1895, ch. 24, § 1; R.C. 1895, § 967; R.C. 1899, § 967; R.C. 1905, § 1152; C.L. 1913, § 1699; R.C. 1943, § 25-0601; I.M. June, 1958, S.L. 1959, ch. 428, § 1; 2001, ch. 257, § 2; 2009, ch. 240, § 1.

Cross-References.

Cruel treatment of persons admitted to state institutions a misdemeanor, see § 25-01-16.

Location of blind school, see N.D. Const., Art. IX, § 13.

Participation of blind in social and economic activities, see N.D.C.C. ch. 25-13.

Students may fish without license, see § 20.1-03-04.

Law Reviews.

Schools — Nature of the Right to Instruction — The Substantive Requirements of “Free Appropriate Public Education” Under the Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 59 N.D. L. Rev. 551 (1983).

25-06-01.1. Definitions.

For purposes of this chapter:

  1. An individual who is blind means an individual who is totally blind or whose central visual acuity does not exceed twenty/two hundred in the better eye with corrective lenses, or the widest diameter of the visual field is no greater than twenty degrees;
  2. An individual with a visual impairment means an individual with an impairment in vision which, even with correction, adversely affects the individual’s functional ability; and
  3. A student with print disabilities means a student enrolled in elementary or secondary school who has an individualized education program, which includes documentation of either an inability to read or use standard printed material as a result of physical limitations or a reading disability resulting from an organic dysfunction that has been certified by competent authority to be of sufficient severity to prevent reading of printed material in a normal manner.

Source:

S.L. 2001, ch. 257, § 1; 2009, ch. 240, § 2.

25-06-02. Duties and responsibilities of North Dakota vision services — school for the blind.

Within the limits of legislative appropriation, North Dakota vision services — school for the blind shall:

  1. Provide vision-specific services that include consultations, evaluations, information, training, and educational services, including instruction in orientation, mobility, braille, braille music, daily living skills, technology, career and technical education training, and recreation.
  2. Collect and distribute information on vision services and resources available in the state.
  3. Coordinate loans of adaptive devices, equipment, and materials.
  4. Maintain a database of residents who are blind or have a visual impairment.
  5. Facilitate collaboration with agencies and programs providing services to individuals who are blind or have a visual impairment.
  6. Assist residents to access appropriate services, including services available from the vocational rehabilitation division, independent living centers, infant development programs, developmental disabilities programs, the state library, local education programs, and advocacy programs.
  7. Serve as the national instructional materials access center authorized user for the purpose of facilitating access to and conversion of accessible instructional materials in alternate formats for use by blind individuals, individuals with visual impairment, and students with other print disabilities.

Source:

R.C. 1943, § 25-0602; S.L. 1997, ch. 244, § 1; 2001, ch. 257, § 3; 2003, ch. 138, § 72; 2009, ch. 240, § 3.

25-06-02.1. North Dakota vision services — school for the blind — Appointment of superintendent, budget, staff, and reporting structure.

The superintendent of the North Dakota vision services — school for the blind is appointed by and reports to the superintendent of public instruction. The North Dakota vision services — school for the blind must have a separate budget and separate staff from the department of public instruction.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 239, § 6; 2001, ch. 257, § 6.

25-06-02.2. Superintendent — Special duties.

The superintendent of the North Dakota vision services — school for the blind may also be the superintendent of the school for the deaf.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 244, § 2; 2001, ch. 257, § 6.

25-06-03. Superintendent to possess certain qualifications.

The superintendent of the North Dakota vision services — school for the blind must possess those qualifications, educational and otherwise, as in the opinion of the superintendent of public instruction may qualify that person to instruct and minister to the needs of blind persons.

Source:

R.C. 1943, § 25-0603; S.L. 1989, ch. 239, § 7; 1989, ch. 339, § 1; 1991, ch. 296, § 1; 2001, ch. 257, § 6.

25-06-03.1. Criminal history record checks.

The school for the blind may require any employee, final applicant for employment, or any individual otherwise providing services to the school to submit to a statewide and nationwide criminal history record check. The nationwide criminal history record check must be conducted in the manner provided in section 12-60-24. The school for the blind may assess all costs associated with obtaining a criminal history record check to the individual upon whom the criminal history record check is conducted.

Source:

S.L. 2019, ch. 100, § 3, eff August 1, 2019.

25-06-04. Qualifications for admission to school for the blind — Residents of state entitled to free education. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 257, § 5.

25-06-05. Services to nonresidents.

Individuals who are blind or have a visual impairment who are not residents of this state may receive services from North Dakota vision services — school for the blind if the individuals pay the cost of the services as determined by the superintendent of public instruction. Nonresidents may not receive services to the exclusion of residents of this state.

Source:

R.C. 1943, § 25-0605; S.L. 1989, ch. 239, § 9; 2001, ch. 257, § 4.

25-06-06. Transportation of indigent persons. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1979, ch. 336, § 3.

25-06-07. Instruction at school for the blind. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 257, § 5.

25-06-08. Accounts for clothing — How collected. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1997, ch. 244, § 4.

25-06-09. Blind persons — Duty to report. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 257, § 5.

25-06-10. Purchase and resale of vision-specific adaptive aids, devices, and appliances — Revolving fund — Continuing appropriation.

A revolving vision aids, devices, and appliances fund is hereby established in the state treasury to be used by the North Dakota vision services — school for the blind to purchase and resell vision-specific adaptive aids, devices, and appliances to be used by blind and visually impaired persons resident in this state. The North Dakota vision services — school for the blind may apply service charges when needed to cover the cost of purchasing, invoicing, and shipping, and all revenue from the sale of aids, appliances, devices, and shipping and postage fees must be deposited in the fund. The North Dakota vision services — school for the blind may receive gifts, grants, and donations for deposit in and use by the fund. All moneys in the revolving fund are hereby appropriated to the North Dakota vision services — school for the blind on a continuing basis for expenditure for the purposes of this section.

Source:

S.L. 1997, ch. 245, § 1; 2001, ch. 257, § 6.

25-06-11. School for the blind fund.

The school for the blind fund is a special fund in the state treasury. All moneys received pursuant to section 2 of article IX of the Constitution of North Dakota, revenues received from services and leases, and contributions must be deposited in the fund. Moneys in the fund are to be used pursuant to legislative appropriation for the provision of services under this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 2017, ch. 12, § 24, eff July 1, 2017.

CHAPTER 25-07 Education of Deaf Persons

25-07-01. School for the deaf — Maintained — Location — Purpose.

There must be maintained at Devils Lake, in Ramsey County, a school for the deaf, which may provide education and training and serve as a resource and referral center for individuals who are deaf or hearing impaired.

Source:

S.L. 1890, ch. 161, § 1; 1893, ch. 123, § 1; R.C. 1895, § 951; R.C. 1899, § 951; R.C. 1905, § 1133; C.L. 1913, § 1680; R.C. 1943, § 25-0701; S.L. 1971, ch. 162, § 6; 2005, ch. 251, § 1.

Cross-References.

Cruel treatment of persons admitted to state institutions a misdemeanor, see § 25-01-16.

Location of deaf school, see N.D. Const., Art. IX, § 12.

Students may fish without license, see § 20.1-03-04.

Law Reviews.

Schools — Nature of the Right to Instruction — The Substantive Requirements of “Free Appropriate Public Education” Under the Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 59 N.D. L. Rev. 551 (1983).

25-07-01.1. School for the deaf — Appointment of superintendent, budget, staff, and reporting structure.

The superintendent of the school for the deaf is appointed by and reports to the superintendent of public instruction. The school for the deaf must have a separate budget and separate staff from the department of public instruction.

Source:

S.L. 1989, ch. 239, § 12.

25-07-02. Superintendent — Special duties.

The superintendent of the school for the deaf may also act as superintendent of the North Dakota vision services — school for the blind.

Source:

S.L. 1890, ch. 161, § 14; 1893, ch. 123, § 4; R.C. 1895, § 964; R.C. 1899, § 964; R.C. 1905, § 1145; C.L. 1913, § 1692; R.C. 1943, § 25-0702; S.L. 1971, ch. 274, § 1; 1989, ch. 339, § 2; 1991, ch. 297, § 1; 2001, ch. 257, § 6.

25-07-02.1. Criminal history record checks.

The school for the deaf may require any employee, final applicant for employment, or any individual otherwise providing services to the school to submit to a statewide and nationwide criminal history record check. The nationwide criminal history record check must be conducted in the manner provided in section 12-60-24. The school for the deaf may assess all costs associated with obtaining a criminal history record check to the individual upon whom the criminal history record check is conducted.

Source:

S.L. 2019, ch. 100, § 4, eff August 1, 2019.

25-07-03. Matron — Duties. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1971, ch. 274, § 3.

25-07-04. Qualifications for admission to school for the deaf — Residents of state entitled to free education.

  1. A child who is a resident of this state and who, because of deafness or a hearing impairment, is unable to receive an education in the public schools, is entitled to attend the school for the deaf at the expense of the state. A child is entitled to attend the school at any age up to twenty-one.
  2. The school for the deaf shall provide application forms upon request. A child may not be admitted to the school until the child’s application is completed and approved.
  3. The school for the deaf shall provide transportation to any child who has been admitted, in accordance with the child’s individual education plan.
  4. Any child who is a resident of this state and who is deaf or hearing impaired is entitled to receive special education and related services in accordance with the child’s individual education program. Each individual education program must address the child’s academic, recreational, and leisure needs, as well as the acquisition of independent living skills and career and technical education opportunities.

Source:

S.L. 1890, ch. 161, § 10; R.C. 1895, § 960; R.C. 1899, § 960; R.C. 1905, § 1142; C.L. 1913, § 1689; R.C. 1943, § 25-0704; S.L. 1971, ch. 162, § 7; 1979, ch. 336, § 2; 1981, ch. 223, § 5; 1985, ch. 313, § 1; 1987, ch. 328, § 1; 1989, ch. 239, § 10; 1991, ch. 297, § 2; 2003, ch. 138, § 73; 2005, ch. 251, § 2.

25-07-05. Admission of nonresidents.

A child who is deaf or hearing-impaired but who is not a resident of this state may be admitted to the school for the deaf, provided the annual cost of the child’s education, as determined by the superintendent of public instruction, is paid on behalf of the child in advance of the child’s admission and on a yearly basis thereafter. The school may not admit a child who is not a resident of this state to the exclusion of a child who is a resident of this state.

Source:

S.L. 1890, ch. 161, § 9; R.C. 1895, § 959; R.C. 1899, § 959; R.C. 1905, § 1141; C.L. 1913, § 1688; R.C. 1943, § 25-0705; S.L. 1971, ch. 162, § 8; 1989, ch. 239, § 11; 2005, ch. 251, § 3.

25-07-06. Instruction at school for the deaf.

The superintendent of the school for the deaf shall provide special education and related services designed to meet the unique needs of each child who is deaf or hearing impaired, in accordance with the child’s individual education program.

Source:

S.L. 1890, ch. 161, § 14; 1893, ch. 123, § 5; R.C. 1895, § 964; R.C. 1899, § 964; R.C. 1905, § 1145; C.L. 1913, § 1692; R.C. 1943, § 25-0706; S.L. 1971, ch. 274, § 2; 1991, ch. 297, § 3, 2005, ch. 251 § 4.

25-07-07. Transportation of indigent children to and from school for deaf. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1979, ch. 336, § 3.

25-07-08. Clothing may be furnished when necessary — Accounts for clothing.

The school for the deaf shall provide clothing to a child who is enrolled in the school if the child does not have suitable clothing. If the child is a minor, the school shall charge the child’s parent or legal guardian for any clothing provided to the child under this section and shall charge the individual for any clothing provided to the individual under this section if the individual has reached the age of majority. If the superintendent certifies any charges under this section as being correct, the charges are presumed correct in all courts.

Source:

S.L. 1890, ch. 161, § 12; R.C. 1895, § 962; R.C. 1899, § 962; R.C. 1905, § 1143; C.L. 1913, § 1690; R.C. 1943, § 25-0708; 2005, ch. 251, § 5.

25-07-09. Collection of clothing account. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1999, ch. 106, § 18.

25-07-10. Deaf persons — Duty to report.

It is the duty of every public school superintendent, physician, otologist, audiologist, nurse, clinic, hospital, and social and welfare agency in this state to report in writing to the superintendent of the North Dakota school for the deaf the name, age, and residence of persons under the age of twenty-one years who are deaf or hard of hearing, and in such cases to furnish such additional pertinent information as the superintendent of the North Dakota school for the deaf may request. All reports must be forwarded to said superintendent of the school for the deaf within thirty days after diagnosis, examination, or discovery.

Source:

S.L. 1971, ch. 273, § 2.

25-07-11. Home intervention program.

The school for the deaf may provide a home intervention program for children who are under the age of five and who are deaf or hearing impaired. The program must include information, counseling services, auditory training, and basic language development instruction for the parents of such children. This home intervention program must be carried out by college or university trained teachers of the deaf, speech pathologists, or audiologists.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 241, § 1; 2005, ch. 251, § 6.

25-07-12. Provision of services — Collaboration — Competition.

The school for the deaf may collaborate with public and private entities for the provision of services to individuals who are deaf or hearing impaired. The school for the deaf may not compete with any public or private entity offering the same services within a region.

Source:

S.L. 2005, ch. 251, § 7.

25-07-13. School for the deaf fund.

The school for the deaf fund is a special fund in the state treasury. All moneys received pursuant to section 2 of article IX of the Constitution of North Dakota and all revenues received from the lease of buildings and the provision of meals and services, including interpreter services, must be deposited in the fund. Moneys in the fund are to be used pursuant to legislative appropriation for provision of services under this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 2017, ch. 12, § 25, eff July 1, 2017.

CHAPTER 25-08 Expense and Care of Patients [Repealed]

[Repealed by S.L. 1961, ch. 211, § 9]

CHAPTER 25-09 Expenses of Care and Treatment of Patients [Repealed]

[Repealed by S.L. 1985, ch. 527, § 8]

CHAPTER 25-10 Mental Health Services [Repealed]

25-10-01. Mental health services. [Repealed]

Source:

S.L. 1961, ch. 208, § 1; 1965, ch. 203, § 71; 1981, ch. 486, § 12; 1987, ch. 570, § 5; Repealed by 2017, ch. 353, § 10, eff August 1, 2017.

25-10-01.1. Unified mental health delivery system. [Repealed]

Source:

S.L. 1995, ch. 266, § 4; Repealed by 2017, ch. 353, § 10, eff August 1, 2017.

25-10-02. Psychiatric clinic. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1987, ch. 570, § 45.

25-10-03. Mental health coordinating committee — Membership — Purpose. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1971, ch. 276, § 1.

25-10-04. Transfer of institutions under the director of institutions. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1985, ch. 82, § 162.

25-10-05. Mental health and retardation service units. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 1981, ch. 486, § 37.

CHAPTER 25-11 Interstate Mental Health Compact

25-11-01. Enactment of interstate compact on mental health.

The interstate compact on mental health is hereby enacted into law and entered into by this state with all other states legally joined therein in the form substantially as follows:

Source:

S.L. 1963, ch. 224, § 1.

ARTICLE I

The party states find that the proper and expeditious treatment of the mentally ill and mentally deficient can be facilitated by cooperative action, to the benefit of the patients, their families, and society as a whole. Further, the party states find that the necessity of and desirability for furnishing such care and treatment bears no primary relation to the residence or citizenship of the patient but that, on the contrary, the controlling factors of community safety and humanitarianism require that facilities and services be made available for all who are in need of them. Consequently, it is the purpose of this compact and of the party states to provide the necessary legal basis for the institutionalization or other appropriate care and treatment of the mentally ill and mentally deficient under a system that recognizes the paramount importance of patient welfare and to establish the responsibilities of the party states in terms of such welfare.

ARTICLE II

As used in this compact:

  1. “After-care” means care, treatment, and services provided a patient, as defined herein, on convalescent status or conditional release.
  2. “Institution” means any hospital or other facility maintained by a party state or political subdivision thereof for the care and treatment of mental illness or mental deficiency.
  3. “Mental deficiency” means mental deficiency as defined by appropriate clinical authorities to such extent that a person so afflicted is incapable of managing the person’s self and affairs, but shall not include mental illness as defined herein.
  4. “Mental illness” means mental disease to such extent that a person so afflicted requires care and treatment for the person’s own welfare, or the welfare of others, or of the community.
  5. “Patient” means any person subject to or eligible as determined by the laws of the sending state, for institutionalization or other care, treatment, or supervision pursuant to the provisions of this compact.
  6. “Receiving state” means a party state to which a patient is transported pursuant to the provisions of the compact or to which it is contemplated that a patient may be so sent.
  7. “Sending state” means a party state from which a patient is transported pursuant to the provisions of the compact or from which it is contemplated that a patient may be so sent.
  8. “State” means any state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

ARTICLE III

1. Whenever a person physically present in any party state shall be in need of institutionalization by reason of mental illness or mental deficiency, the person shall be eligible for care and treatment in an institution in that state irrespective of the person’s residence, settlement, or citizenship qualifications.

2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this article to the contrary notwithstanding, any patient may be transferred to an institution in another state whenever there are factors based upon clinical determinations indicating that the care and treatment of said patient would be facilitated or improved thereby. Any such institutionalization may be for the entire period of care and treatment or for any portion or portions thereof. The factors referred to in this paragraph shall include the patient’s full record with due regard for the location of the patient’s family, character of the illness and probable duration thereof, and such other factors as shall be considered appropriate.

3. No state shall be obliged to receive any patient pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article unless the sending state has given advance notice of its intention to send the patient; furnished all available medical and other pertinent records concerning the patient; given the qualified medical or other appropriate clinical authorities of the receiving state an opportunity to examine the patient if said authorities so wish; and unless the receiving state shall agree to accept the patient.

4. In the event that the laws of the receiving state establish a system of priorities for the admission of patients, an interstate patient under this compact shall receive the same priority as a local patient and shall be taken in the same order and at the same time that the person would be taken if the person was a local patient.

5. Pursuant to this compact, the determination as to the suitable place of institutionalization for a patient may be reviewed at any time and such further transfer of the patient may be made as seems likely to be in the best interest of the patient.

ARTICLE IV

1. Whenever, pursuant to the laws of the state in which a patient is physically present, it shall be determined that the patient should receive after-care or supervision, such care or supervision may be provided in a receiving state. If the medical or other appropriate clinical authorities having responsibility for the care and treatment of the patient in the sending state shall have reason to believe that after-care in another state would be in the best interest of the patient and would not jeopardize the public safety, they shall request the appropriate authorities in the receiving state to investigate the desirability of affording the patient such after-care in said receiving state, and such investigation shall be made with all reasonable speed. The request for investigation shall be accompanied by complete information concerning the patient’s intended place of residence and the identity of the person in whose charge it is proposed to place the patient, the complete medical history of the patient, and such other documents as may be pertinent.

2. If the medical or other appropriate clinical authorities having responsibility for the care and treatment of the patient in the sending state and the appropriate authorities in the receiving state find that the best interest of the patient would be served thereby, and if the public safety would not be jeopardized thereby, the patient may receive after-care or supervision in the receiving state.

3. In supervising, treating, or caring for a patient on after-care pursuant to the terms of this article, a receiving state shall employ the same standards of visitation, examination, care, and treatment that it employs for similar local patients.

ARTICLE V

Whenever a dangerous or potentially dangerous patient escapes from an institution in any party state, that state shall promptly notify all appropriate authorities within and without the jurisdiction of the escape in a manner reasonably calculated to facilitate the speedy apprehension of the escapee. Immediately upon the apprehension and identification of any such dangerous or potentially dangerous patient, that patient shall be detained in the state where found pending disposition in accordance with law.

ARTICLE VI

The duly accredited officers of any state party to this compact, upon the establishment of their authority and the identity of the patient, shall be permitted to transport any patient being moved pursuant to this compact through any and all states party to this compact, without interference.

ARTICLE VII

1. No person shall be deemed a patient of more than one institution at any given time. Completion of transfer of any patient to an institution in a receiving state shall have the effect of making the person a patient of the institution in the receiving state.

2. The sending state shall pay all costs of and incidental to the transportation of any patient pursuant to this compact, but any two or more party states may, by making a specific agreement for that purpose, arrange for a different allocation of costs as among themselves.

3. No provision of this compact shall be construed to alter or affect any internal relationships among the departments, agencies, and officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a party state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor.

4. Nothing in this compact shall be construed to prevent any party state or subdivision thereof from asserting any right against any person, agency, or other entity in regard to costs for which such party state or subdivision thereof may be responsible pursuant to any provision of this compact.

5. Nothing in this compact shall be construed to invalidate any reciprocal agreement between a party state and a nonparty state relating to institutionalization, care, or treatment of the mentally ill or mentally deficient, or any statutory authority pursuant to which such agreements may be made.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Nothing in this compact shall be construed to abridge, diminish, or in any way impair the rights, duties, and responsibilities of any patient’s guardian on the guardian’s own behalf or in respect of any patient for whom the guardian may serve, except that when the transfer of any patient to another jurisdiction makes advisable the appointment of a supplemental or substitute guardian, any court of competent jurisdiction in the receiving state may make such supplemental or substitute appointment and the court which appointed the previous guardian shall upon being duly advised of the new appointment, and upon the satisfactory completion of such accounting and other acts as such court may by law require, relieve the previous guardian of power and responsibility to whatever extent shall be appropriate in the circumstances; provided, however, that in the case of any patient having settlement in the sending state, the court of competent jurisdiction in the sending state shall have the sole discretion to relieve a guardian appointed by it or continue the guardian’s power and responsibility, whichever it shall deem advisable. The court in the receiving state may, in its discretion, confirm or reappoint the person or persons previously serving as guardian in the sending state in lieu of making a supplemental or substitute appointment.

2. The term “guardian” as used in paragraph 1 of this article shall include any guardian, trustee, legal committee, conservator, or other person or agency however denominated who is charged by law with power to act for or responsibility for the person or property of a patient.

ARTICLE IX

1. No provision of this compact except article V shall apply to any person institutionalized while under sentence in a penal or correctional institution or while subject to trial on a criminal charge, or whose institutionalization is due to the commission of an offense for which, in the absence of mental illness or mental deficiency, said person would be subject to incarceration in a penal or correctional institution.

2. To every extent possible, it shall be the policy of states party to this compact that no patient shall be placed or detained in any prison, jail, or lockup, but such patient shall, with all expedition, be taken to a suitable institutional facility for mental illness or mental deficiency.

ARTICLE X

1. Each party state shall appoint a “compact administrator” who, on behalf of the person’s state, shall act as general coordinator of activities under the compact in the person’s state and who shall receive copies of all reports, correspondence, and other documents relating to any patient processed under the compact by the person’s state either in the capacity of sending or receiving state. The compact administrator or the compact administrator’s duly designated representative shall be the official with whom other party states shall deal in any matter relating to the compact or any patient processed thereunder.

2. The compact administrators of the respective party states shall have power to promulgate reasonable rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this compact.

ARTICLE XI

The duly constituted administrative authorities of any two or more party states may enter into supplementary agreements for the provision of any service or facility or for the maintenance of any institution on a joint or cooperative basis whenever the states concerned shall find that such agreements will improve services, facilities, or institutional care and treatment in the fields of mental illness or mental deficiency. No such supplementary agreement shall be construed so as to relieve any party state of any obligation which it otherwise would have under other provisions of this compact.

ARTICLE XII

This compact shall enter into full force and effect as to any state when enacted by it into law and such state shall thereafter be a party thereto with any and all states legally joining therein.

ARTICLE XIII

1. A state party to this compact may withdraw therefrom by enacting a statute repealing the same. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year after notice thereof has been communicated officially and in writing to the governors and compact administrators of all other party states. However, the withdrawal of any state shall not change the status of any patient who has been sent to said state or sent out of said state pursuant to the provisions of the compact.

2. Withdrawal from any agreement permitted by Article VII-2 as to costs or from any supplementary agreement made pursuant to Article XI shall be in accordance with the terms of such agreement.

ARTICLE XIV

This compact shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate the purposes thereof. The provisions of this compact shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person, or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this compact and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person, or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this compact shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state party thereto, the compact shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

25-11-02. Compact administrator — Powers. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

Pursuant to said compact, the executive director of the department of human services must be the compact administrator and who, acting jointly with like officers of other party states, may adopt rules to carry out more effectively the terms of the compact. The compact administrator shall cooperate with all departments, agencies, and officers of and in the government of this state and its subdivisions in facilitating the proper administration of the compact or any supplementary agreement or agreements entered into by this state thereunder.

Source:

S.L. 1963, ch. 224, § 2; 1987, ch. 570, § 6.

25-11-02. Compact administrator — Powers. [Effective September 1, 2022]

Pursuant to said compact, the executive director of the department of health and human services must be the compact administrator and who, acting jointly with like officers of other party states, may adopt rules to carry out more effectively the terms of the compact. The compact administrator shall cooperate with all departments, agencies, and officers of and in the government of this state and its subdivisions in facilitating the proper administration of the compact or any supplementary agreement or agreements entered into by this state thereunder.

Source:

S.L. 1963, ch. 224, § 2; 1987, ch. 570, § 6; 2021, ch. 352, § 300, eff September 1, 2022.

25-11-03. Power to make supplementary agreements — Limitation.

The compact administrator is hereby authorized and empowered to enter into supplementary agreements with appropriate officials of other states pursuant to articles VII and XI of the compact. In the event that such supplementary agreements require or contemplate the use of any institution or facility of this state or require or contemplate the provision of any service by this state, no such agreement may have force or effect until approved by the head of the department or agency under whose jurisdiction said institution or facility is operated or whose department or agency will be charged with the rendering of such service.

Source:

S.L. 1963, ch. 224, § 3.

25-11-04. Discharge of financial obligations.

The compact administrator, subject to the approval of the state treasurer, may make or arrange for any payments necessary to discharge any financial obligations imposed upon this state by the compact or by any supplementary agreement entered into thereunder.

Source:

S.L. 1963, ch. 224, § 4.

25-11-05. Transfer of patients — Approval of court.

The compact administrator is hereby directed to consult with the immediate family of any proposed transferee and, in the case of a proposed transferee from an institution in this state to an institution in another party state, to take no final action without approval of the district court which committed the patient, or if such patient was not committed, then without approval of the district court serving Stutsman County.

Source:

S.L. 1963, ch. 224, § 5; 1991, ch. 326, § 78.

25-11-06. Transmission of copies of chapter.

Duly authorized copies of this chapter must, upon its approval, be transmitted by the secretary of state to the governor of each state, the attorney general and the administrator of general services of the United States, and the council of state governments.

Source:

S.L. 1963, ch. 224, § 6.

CHAPTER 25-12 Mental Health and Retardation Service Units [Repealed]

[Repealed by S.L. 1981, ch. 486, §§ 37, 38]

CHAPTER 25-13 Blind and Disabled Persons’ Activities

25-13-01. Legislative policy.

It is the policy of this state to encourage and enable the blind, the visually handicapped, and the otherwise physically disabled to participate fully in the social and economic life of the state and to engage in remunerative employment.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 220, § 1.

25-13-01.1. Definitions.

For purposes of this chapter “service animal” means any dog trained to do work, perform tasks, or provide assistance for the benefit of an individual with a disability. The term includes a dog trained to provide assistance to an individual with a disability, pull a wheelchair, lend balance support, retrieve dropped objects, or provide assistance in a medical crisis.

Source:

S.L. 2001, ch. 258, § 1; 2009, ch. 241, § 1; 2021, ch. 225, § 1, eff August 1, 2021.

25-13-02. Individual with a disability — Service animal — Admission to public places.

An individual with a disability is entitled to be accompanied by a service animal in places of public accommodations, common carriers, facilities of a health care provider, and all places to which the public is generally invited, without being required to pay an extra charge for the animal; provided, that the individual is liable for any damage done to the premises or facility by the animal.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 220, § 2; 1983, ch. 316, § 1; 1985, ch. 314, § 1; 1989, ch. 340, § 1; 2001, ch. 258, § 2; 2009, ch. 241, § 2.

Collateral References.

What constitutes “Service Animal” and accommodation thereof, under Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 75 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 49.

25-13-02.1. Trainer and a service animal in training — Admission to public places.

  1. A trainer with a service animal in training may enter any place of public accommodation, common carrier, facility of a health care provider, and any place to which the public is generally invited, without being required to pay an extra charge for the service animal in training, provided:
    1. The trainer notifies an onsite manager that a service animal in training is being brought onto the premises;
    2. The trainer wears a photo identification card issued by a nationally recognized service animal training program; and
    3. The trainer is liable for any damage done to the premises or facility by the service animal in training.
  2. Upon receiving notice as provided in subsection 1, the onsite manager may not deny admission to the trainer and the service animal in training without good cause.

Source:

S.L. 2001, ch. 258, § 3; 2009, ch. 241, § 3.

Collateral References.

What constitutes “Service Animal” and accommodation thereof, under Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 75 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 49.

25-13-02.2. Service animal — Misrepresentation — Penalty.

An individual is guilty of an infraction if the individual, in an attempt to gain admission to a public place under this chapter or obtain a reasonable housing accommodation under section 47-16-07.5, knowingly makes a false claim that a pet is a service animal.

Source:

S.L. 2019, ch. 229, § 1, eff August 1, 2019.

25-13-03. Driver of motor vehicle — Precaution — Individual with service animal.

If the driver of a motor vehicle approaches an individual who is blind or visually impaired and who is carrying a cane predominately white or metallic in color, with or without a red tip, or who is accompanied by a service animal, the driver shall take all reasonable precautions to avoid injury to the individual and the service animal. Any driver who fails to take reasonable precautions is liable to the individual for any injury caused. An individual who is blind or visually impaired and not carrying a cane or an individual with a disability who is not accompanied by a service animal has all of the rights and privileges conferred by law upon other individuals. The failure of an individual who is blind or visually impaired to carry a cane or the failure of an individual with a disability to be accompanied by a service animal is not by itself evidence of fault.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 220, § 3; 2001, ch. 258, § 4; 2009, ch. 241, § 4.

Cross-References.

Comparative negligence, see § 9-10-07.

Right of way of blind pedestrian with white cane or guide dog, see § 39-10-33.3.

Collateral References.

What constitutes “Service Animal” and accommodation thereof, under Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 75 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 49.

25-13-04. Penalty for interfering or denying use of facilities.

Any person who denies or interferes with admittance to or enjoyment of the public places or facilities enumerated in section 25-13-02 or otherwise interferes with the rights of an individual who is blind or visually impaired, or with the rights of an individual who is accompanied by a service animal, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. This section does not apply to a denial of admission under section 25-13-02.1.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 220, § 4; 1975, ch. 106, § 272; 2001, ch. 258, § 5; 2009, ch. 241, § 5.

25-13-05. State employment of individuals who are blind or otherwise disabled.

It is the policy of this state that individuals who are blind, visually impaired, or otherwise disabled shall be employed in the state service, the service of the political subdivisions of the state, the public schools, and all other employment supported in whole or in part by public funds on the same terms and conditions as individuals who are not disabled, unless the particular disability prevents the performance of the work involved.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 220, § 5; 2009, ch. 241, § 7.

25-13-06. Killing or injury of service animal — Penalty.

  1. A person is guilty of a class C felony and is subject to a civil penalty of up to ten thousand dollars if that person willfully and unjustifiably kills, shoots, tortures, torments, beats, kicks, strikes, mutilates, disables, or otherwise injures a service animal.
  2. A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and is subject to a civil penalty of up to five thousand dollars if that person willfully:
    1. Harasses, taunts, or provokes a service animal; or
    2. Interferes with a service animal while the animal is working.
  3. This section does not apply to a veterinarian who terminates the life of a service animal to relieve the animal of undue suffering and pain.

Source:

S.L. 2009, ch. 241, § 6.

CHAPTER 25-14 Interstate Compact on Mentally Disordered Offenders

25-14-01. Enactment of interstate compact on mentally disordered offenders.

The interstate compact on mentally disordered offenders, hereinafter called “the compact”, is hereby enacted and entered into with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein. The provisions of said compact are as follows:

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 221, § 1.

INTERSTATE COMPACT ON MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS

ARTICLE I PURPOSE AND POLICY

  1. The party states, desiring by common action to improve their programs for the care and treatment of mentally disordered offenders, declare that it is the policy of each of the party states to:
    1. Strengthen their own programs and laws for the care and treatment of the mentally disordered offender.
    2. Encourage and provide for such care and treatment in the most appropriate locations, giving due recognition to the need to achieve adequacy of diagnosis, care, treatment, after-care, and auxiliary services and facilities and, to every extent practicable, to do so in geographic locations convenient for providing a therapeutic environment.
    3. Authorize cooperation among the party states in providing services and facilities, when it is found that cooperative programs can be more effective and efficient than programs separately pursued.
    4. Place each mentally disordered offender in a legal status which will facilitate the offender’s care, treatment, and rehabilitation.
    5. Authorize research and training of personnel on a cooperative basis, in order to improve the quality or quantity of personnel available for the proper staffing of programs, services, and facilities for mentally disordered offenders.
    6. Care for and treat mentally disordered offenders under conditions which will improve the public safety.
  2. Within the policies set forth in this article, it is the purpose of this compact to:
    1. Authorize negotiation, entry into, and operations under contractual arrangements among any two or more of the party states for the establishment and maintenance of cooperative programs in any one or more of the fields for which specific provision is made in the several articles of this compact.
    2. Set the limits within which such contracts may operate, so as to assure protection of the civil rights of mentally disordered offenders and protection of the rights and obligations of the public and of the party states.
    3. Facilitate the proper disposition of criminal charges pending against mentally disordered offenders, so that programs for their care, treatment, and rehabilitation may be carried on efficiently.
  3. “Receiving state” means a state party to this compact to which a mentally disordered offender is sent for care, after-care, treatment, or rehabilitation, or within the meaning of article V, the state in which a petition in connection with an untried indictment, information, or complaint has been filed.
  4. “Sending state” means a state party to this compact in which the mentally disordered offender was convicted; or the state in which the offender would be subject to trial on or conviction of an offense, except for the offender’s mental condition; or, within the meaning of article V, the state whose authorities have filed a petition in connection with an untried indictment, information, or complaint.
    1. Its duration.
    2. Payments to be made to the receiving state by the sending state for patient care, treatment, and extraordinary services, if any.
    3. Determination of responsibility for ordering or permitting the furnishing of extraordinary services, if any.
    4. Participation in compensated activities, if any, available to patients; the disposition or crediting of any payment received by patients on account thereof; and the crediting of proceeds from or disposal of any products resulting therefrom.
    5. Delivery and retaking of mentally disordered offenders.
    6. Such other matters as may be necessary and appropriate to fix the obligations, responsibilities, and rights of the sending and receiving states.
  5. All patients who may be in a facility or receiving after-care from a facility pursuant to the provisions of this compact shall be treated in a reasonable and humane manner and shall be cared for, treated, and supervised in accordance with the standards pertaining to the program administered at the facility. The fact of presence in a receiving state shall not deprive any patient of any legal rights which said patient would have had if in custody or receiving care, treatment, or supervision as appropriate in the sending state.
  6. Any hearing or hearings to which a patient present in a receiving state pursuant to this compact may be entitled by the laws of the sending state shall be had before the appropriate authorities of the sending state, or of the receiving state if authorized by the sending state. The receiving state shall provide adequate facilities for such hearings as may be conducted by the appropriate officials of a sending state. In the event such hearing or hearings are had before officials of the receiving state, the governing law shall be that of the sending state and a record of the hearing or hearings as prescribed by the sending state shall be made. Said record together with any recommendations of the hearing officials shall be transmitted forthwith to the official or officials before whom the hearing would have been had if it had taken place in the sending state. In any and all proceedings had pursuant to the provisions of this paragraph, the officials of the receiving state shall act solely as agents of the sending state and no final determination shall be made in any matter except by the appropriate officials of the sending state. Costs of records made pursuant to this paragraph shall be borne by the sending state.
  7. Any patient confined pursuant to this compact shall be released within the territory of the sending state unless the patient, and the sending and receiving states, shall agree upon release in some other place. The sending state shall bear the cost of such return to its territory.
  8. Any patient pursuant to the terms of this compact shall be subject to civil process and shall have any and all rights to sue, be sued, and participate in and derive any benefits or incur or be relieved of any obligations or have such obligations modified or the patient’s status changed on account of any action or proceeding in which the patient could have participated if in any appropriate facility of the sending state or being supervised therefrom, as the case may be, located within such state.
  9. The parent, guardian, trustee, or other person or persons entitled under the laws of the sending state to act for, advise, or otherwise function with respect to any patient shall not be deprived of or restricted in the exercise of any power in respect of any patient pursuant to the terms of this compact.
    1. The defendant or the defendant’s duly empowered legal representative requested or expressly acquiesced in the making of the petition, and was afforded an opportunity to participate in person in the hearing; or
    2. The defendant offers or consents to the introduction of the determination or adjudication at such subsequent proceedings.

ARTICLE II DEFINITIONS

As used in this compact:

1. “Mentally disordered offender” means a person who has been determined, by adjudication or other method legally sufficient for the purpose in the party state where the determination is made, to be mentally ill and:

a. Is under sentence for the commission of crime; or

b. Who is confined or committed on account of the commission of an offense for which, in the absence of mental illness, said person would be subject to incarceration in a penal or correctional facility.

2. “Patient” means a mentally disordered offender who is cared for, treated, or transferred pursuant to this compact.

ARTICLE III CONTRACTS

1. Each party state may make one or more contracts with any one or more of the other party states for the care and treatment of mentally disordered offenders on behalf of a sending state in facilities situated in receiving states, or for the participation of such mentally disordered offenders in programs of after-care on conditional release administered by the receiving state. Any such contract shall provide for:

2. Prior to the construction or completion of construction of any facility for mentally disordered offenders or addition to such facility by a party state, any other party state or states may contract therewith for the enlargement of the planned capacity of the facility or addition thereto, or for the inclusion therein of particular equipment or structures, and for the reservation of a specific per centum of the capacity of the facility to be kept available for use by patients of the sending state or states so contracting. Any sending state so contracting may, to the extent that moneys are legally available therefor, pay to the receiving state, a reasonable sum as consideration for such enlargement of capacity, or provision of equipment or structures, and reservation of capacity. Such payment may be in a lump sum or in installments as provided in the contract.

3. A party state may contract with any one or more other party states for the training of professional or other personnel whose services, by reason of such training, would become available for or be improved in respect of ability to participate in the care and treatment of mentally disordered offenders. Such contracts may provide for such training to take place at any facility being operated or to be operated for the care and treatment of mentally disordered offenders; at any institution or facility having resources suitable for the offering of such training; or may provide for the separate establishment of training facilities, provided that no such separate establishment shall be undertaken, unless it is determined that an appropriate existing facility or institution cannot be found at which to conduct the contemplated program. Any contract entered into pursuant to this paragraph shall provide for:

a. The administration, financing, and precise nature of the program.

b. The status and employment or other rights of the trainees.

c. All other necessary matters.

4. No contract entered into pursuant to this compact shall be inconsistent with any provision thereof.

ARTICLE IV PROCEDURES AND RIGHTS

1. Whenever the duly constituted judicial or administrative authorities in a state party to this compact, and which has entered into a contract pursuant to article III, shall decide that custody, care, and treatment in, or transfer of a patient to, a facility within the territory of another party state, or conditional release for after-care in another party state is necessary in order to provide adequate care and treatment or is desirable in order to provide an appropriate program of therapy or other treatment, or is desirable for clinical reasons, said officials may direct that the custody, care, and treatment be within a facility or in a program of after-care within the territory of said other party state, the receiving state to act in that regard solely as agent for the sending state.

2. The appropriate officials of any state party to this compact shall have access, at all reasonable times, to any facility in which it has a contractual right to secure care or treatment of patients for the purpose of inspection and visiting such of its patients as may be in the facility or served by it.

3. Except as otherwise provided in article VI, patients in a facility pursuant to the terms of this compact shall at all times be subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and may at any time be removed for transfer to a facility within the sending state, for transfer to another facility in which the sending state may have a contractual or other right to secure care and treatment of patients, for release on after-care or other conditional status, for discharge, or for any other purpose permitted by the laws of the sending state; provided that the sending state shall continue to be obligated to such payments as may be required pursuant to the terms of any contract entered into under the terms of article III.

4. Each receiving state shall provide regular reports to each sending state on the patients of that sending state in facilities pursuant to this compact, including a psychiatric and behavioral record of each patient and certify said record to the official designated by the sending state, in order that each patient may have the benefit of the patient’s record in determining and altering the disposition of said patient in accordance with the law which may obtain in the sending state and in order that the same may be a source of information for the sending state.

ARTICLE V DISPOSITION OF CHARGES

1. Whenever the authorities responsible for the care and treatment of a mentally disordered offender, whether convicted or adjudicated in the state or subject to care, after-care, treatment, or rehabilitation pursuant to a contract, are of the opinion that charges based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints in another party state present obstacles to the proper care and treatment of a mentally disordered offender or to the planning or execution of a suitable program for the offender, such authorities may petition the appropriate court in the state where the untried indictment, information, or complaint is pending for prompt disposition thereof. If the mentally disordered offender is a patient in a receiving state, the appropriate authorities of the sending state, upon recommendation of the appropriate authorities in the receiving state, shall, if they concur in the recommendation, file the petition contemplated by this paragraph.

2. The court shall hold a hearing on the petition within thirty days of the filing thereof. Such hearing shall be only to determine whether the proper safeguarding and advancement of the public interest, the condition of the mentally disordered offender, and the prospects for more satisfactory care, treatment, and rehabilitation of the offender warrant disposition of the untried indictment, information, or complaint prior to termination of the defendant’s status as a mentally disordered offender in the sending state. The prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction from which the untried indictment, information, or complaint is pending, the petitioning authorities, and such other persons as the court may determine shall be entitled to be heard.

3. Upon any hearing pursuant to this article, the court may order such adjournments or continuances as may be necessary for the examination or observation of the mentally disordered offender or for the securing of necessary evidence. In granting or denying any such adjournment or continuance, the court shall give primary consideration to the purposes of this compact, and more particularly to the need for expeditious determination of the legal and mental status of a mentally disordered offender so that the offender’s care, treatment, and discharge to the community only under conditions which will be consonant with the public safety may be implemented.

4. The presence of a mentally disordered offender within a state wherein a petition is pending or being heard pursuant to this article, or the offender’s presence within any other state through which the offender is being transported in connection with such petition or hearing, shall be only for the purposes of this compact, and no court, agency, or person shall have or obtain jurisdiction over such mentally disordered offender for any other purpose by reason of the offender’s presence pursuant to this article. The mentally disordered offender shall, at all times, remain in the custody of the sending state. Any acts of officers, employees, or agencies of the receiving state in providing or facilitating detention, housing, or transportation for the mentally disordered offender shall be only as agents for the sending state.

5. Promptly upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall dismiss the untried indictment, information, or complaint, if it finds that the purposes enumerated in paragraph 2 would be served thereby. Otherwise, the court shall make such order with respect to the petition and the untried indictment, information, or complaint as may be appropriate in the circumstances and consistent with the status of the defendant as a mentally disordered offender in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state.

6. No fact or other matter established or adjudicated at any hearing pursuant to this article, or in connection therewith, shall be deemed established or adjudicated, nor shall the same be admissible in evidence, in any subsequent prosecution of the untried indictment, information, or complaint concerned in a petition filed pursuant to this article unless:

ARTICLE VI ACTS NOT REVIEWABLE IN RECEIVING STATE — RETURN

1. Any decision of the sending state in respect of any matter over which it retains jurisdiction pursuant to this compact shall be conclusive upon and not reviewable within the receiving state, but if at the time the sending state seeks to remove a patient from the receiving state there is pending against the patient within such state any criminal charge or if the patient is suspected of having committed within such state a criminal offense, the patient shall not be returned without the consent of the receiving state until discharged from prosecution or other form of proceeding, imprisonment, or detention for such offense. The duly accredited officers of the sending state shall be permitted to transport patients pursuant to this compact through any and all states party to this compact without interference.

2. A patient who escapes while receiving care and treatment or who violates provisions of after-care by leaving the jurisdiction, or while being detained or transported pursuant to this compact shall be deemed an escapee from the sending state and from the state in which the facility is situated or the after-care was being provided. In the case of an escape to a jurisdiction other than the sending or receiving state, the responsibility for return shall be that of the sending state, but nothing contained herein shall be construed to prevent or affect the activities of officers and agencies of any jurisdiction directed toward the apprehension and return of an escapee.

ARTICLE VII FEDERAL AID

Any state party to this compact may accept federal aid for use in connection with any facility or program, the use of which is or may be affected by this compact or any contract pursuant thereto and any patient in a receiving state pursuant to this compact may participate in any such federally aided program or activity for which the sending and receiving states have made contractual provision; provided that if such program or activity is not part of the customary regimen of the facility or program, the express consent of the appropriate official of the sending state shall be required therefor.

ARTICLE VIII ENTRY INTO FORCE

This compact shall enter into force and become effective and binding upon the states so acting when it has been enacted into law by any two states from among the states of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. Thereafter, this compact shall enter into force and become effective and binding as to any other of said states, or any other state upon similar action by such state.

ARTICLE IX WITHDRAWAL AND TERMINATION

This compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon a party state until it shall have enacted a statute repealing the same and providing for the sending of formal written notice of withdrawal from the compact to the appropriate officials of all other party states. An actual withdrawal shall not take effect until two years after the notices provided in said statute have been sent. Such withdrawal shall not relieve the withdrawing state from its obligations assumed hereunder prior to the effective date of withdrawal. Before the effective date of withdrawal, a withdrawing state shall remove to its territory, at its own expense, such patients as it may have in other party states pursuant to the provisions of this compact.

ARTICLE X OTHER ARRANGEMENTS UNAFFECTED

Nothing contained in this compact shall be construed to abrogate or impair any agreement or other arrangement which a party state may have with a nonparty state for the custody, care, treatment, rehabilitation, or after-care of patients nor to repeal any other laws of a party state authorizing the making of cooperative arrangements.

ARTICLE XI CONSTRUCTION AND SEVERABILITY

The provisions of this compact shall be liberally construed and shall be severable. If any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision of this compact is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any participating state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person, or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this compact and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person, or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this compact shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state participating therein, the compact shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

25-14-02. State health officer shall administer compact. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

The state health officer is hereby authorized to negotiate and enter into contracts on behalf of the state pursuant to article III of the compact and may perform such contracts; provided that no funds, personnel, facilities, equipment, supplies, or materials shall be pledged, committed, or used on account of any such contract unless legally available therefor.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 221, § 2.

Cross-References.

State health officer, see N.D.C.C. § 23-01-05.

25-14-02. Department of health and human services shall administer compact. [Effective September 1, 2022]

The department of health and human services may negotiate and enter contracts on behalf of the state pursuant to article III of the compact and may perform such contracts; provided that no funds, personnel, facilities, equipment, supplies, or materials shall be pledged, committed, or used on account of any such contract unless legally available therefor.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 221, § 2; 2021, ch. 352, § 301, eff September 1, 2022.

CHAPTER 25-15 Sheltered Workshops for the Handicapped [Repealed]

[Repealed by S.L. 1993, ch. 283, § 1]

CHAPTER 25-16 Residential Care and Services for the Developmentally Disabled

25-16-01. Definitions. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

In this chapter unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires:

  1. “Department” means the department of human services.
  2. “Treatment or care center” means an entity providing services to individuals with developmental disabilities and licensed by the department to provide services.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 223, § 1; 1981, ch. 297, §§ 3, 4; 1985, ch. 315, § 1; 1987, ch. 570, § 9; 2015, ch. 200, § 17, eff August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 207, § 16, eff August 1, 2017.

Cross-References.

State mental health and retardation division, see N.D.C.C. ch. 25-10.

Word defined by statute always has same meaning, see § 1-01-09.

Law Reviews.

Summary of significant decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court in 1990 relating to mental health law, 66 N.D. L. Rev. 753 (1990).

25-16-01. Definitions. [Effective September 1, 2022]

In this chapter unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires:

  1. “Department” means the department of health and human services.
  2. “Treatment or care center” means an entity providing services to individuals with developmental disabilities and licensed by the department to provide services.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 223, § 1; 1981, ch. 297, §§ 3, 4; 1985, ch. 315, § 1; 1987, ch. 570, § 9; 2015, ch. 200, § 17, eff August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 207, § 16, eff August 1, 2017; 2021, ch. 352, § 302, eff September 1, 2022.

25-16-02. License required.

The operator of a treatment or care center for individuals with a developmental disability shall secure annually from the department a license as required by rules adopted under this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 223, § 2; 1981, ch. 297, § 5; 1985, ch. 315, § 2; 1987, ch. 570, § 10; 2015, ch. 200, § 18, eff August 1, 2015.

25-16-03. Requirements for license.

The department shall issue a license for the operation of a treatment or care center for individuals with a developmental disability upon a showing that:

  1. The premises to be used are in fit, safe, sanitary condition and properly equipped to provide good care and treatment;
  2. The persons in active charge of the center and their assistants are qualified by training and experience to carry on efficiently the duties required of them;
  3. The health, safety, and well-being of the residents cared for and treated therein will be properly safeguarded;
  4. There is sufficient entertainment, treatment, educational, and physical facilities and services available to the residents therein;
  5. Appropriate arrangements are made for a medical and psychological examination of each resident; and
  6. The provider is in compliance with rules adopted by the department under this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 223, § 3; 1981, ch. 297, § 6; 1985, ch. 315, § 3; 1987, ch. 570, § 11; 2015, ch. 200, § 19, eff August 1, 2015.

25-16-03.1. Conviction not bar to licensure — Exceptions.

Conviction of an offense does not disqualify a person from licensure under this chapter unless the division determines that the offense has a direct bearing upon a person’s ability to serve the public as an owner or operator of a treatment or care center for individuals with a developmental disability, or that, following conviction of any offense, the person is not sufficiently rehabilitated under section 12.1-33-02.1.

Source:

S.L. 1977, ch. 130, § 6; 1981, ch. 297, § 7; 2015, ch. 200, § 20, eff August 1, 2015.

Cross-References.

Definition of offense, see § 12.1-01-04.

25-16-04. Inspection and report by department.

The department may inspect the facilities and premises of the applicant to determine the premises are fit, safe, and sanitary to provide quality care and treatment.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 223, § 4; 1987, ch. 570, § 12; 2017, ch. 207, § 17, eff August 1, 2017.

25-16-05. Content of license.

The license to operate a treatment or care center for individuals with a developmental disability issued under the provisions of this chapter must specify:

  1. The name of the licensee.
  2. The premises to which the license is applicable.
  3. The number of residents who may be received in such premises at any one time.
  4. The date of expiration of the license.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 223, § 5; 1981, ch. 297, § 8; 2015, ch. 200, § 21, eff August 1, 2015.

25-16-06. Department to prescribe forms — Rules.

The department may prescribe forms for the registration and record of the persons residing in treatment or care centers for individuals with a developmental disability and may adopt reasonable rules for the conduct of such centers as are necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 223, § 6; 1981, ch. 297, § 9; 1987, ch. 570, § 13; 2015, ch. 200, § 22, eff August 1, 2015.

25-16-07. Records of treatment or care center confidential. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

Except as otherwise authorized by law, an agent of the department of human services or the superintendent of the life skills and transition center or the licensee or their agents or employees may not disclose the contents of the individual records of a treatment or care center for individuals with a developmental disability, nor of the reports received from those records, except:

  1. In a judicial proceeding when ordered by the presiding judge;
  2. To a law enforcement official for a law enforcement purpose or any other legally constituted boards or agencies serving the interests of the residents for treatment, payment, or health care operations, to arrange, facilitate, or coordinate service to any such person;
  3. To the parents or legal guardians of the resident;
  4. To a physician to aid in the treatment of an individual within the fourth degree of consanguinity of a deceased resident, if the disclosure is limited to genetic health information that has a direct bearing on the health of the relative, the relative’s child, or the relative’s decision to have a child; or
  5. To an individual who is within the fourth degree of consanguinity of a deceased resident, if the disclosure is limited to information about a resident needed to establish a family’s genealogy.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 223, § 7; 1981, ch. 297, §§ 10, 11; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2003, ch. 211, § 16; 2003, ch. 230, § 1; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2015, ch. 200, § 23, eff August 1, 2015.

25-16-07. Records of treatment or care center confidential. [Effective September 1, 2022]

Except as otherwise authorized by law, an agent of the department or the superintendent of the life skills and transition center or the licensee or their agents or employees may not disclose the contents of the individual records of a treatment or care center for individuals with a developmental disability, nor of the reports received from those records, except:

  1. In a judicial proceeding when ordered by the presiding judge;
  2. To a law enforcement official for a law enforcement purpose or any other legally constituted boards or agencies serving the interests of the residents for treatment, payment, or health care operations, to arrange, facilitate, or coordinate service to any such person;
  3. To the parents or legal guardians of the resident;
  4. To a physician to aid in the treatment of an individual within the fourth degree of consanguinity of a deceased resident, if the disclosure is limited to genetic health information that has a direct bearing on the health of the relative, the relative’s child, or the relative’s decision to have a child; or
  5. To an individual who is within the fourth degree of consanguinity of a deceased resident, if the disclosure is limited to information about a resident needed to establish a family’s genealogy.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 223, § 7; 1981, ch. 297, §§ 10, 11; 1995, ch. 34, § 10; 2003, ch. 211, § 16; 2003, ch. 230, § 1; 2013, ch. 226, § 1; 2015, ch. 200, § 23, eff August 1, 2015; 2021, ch. 352, § 303, eff September 1, 2022.

25-16-08. Revocation of license.

The department may revoke a license of a treatment or care center for individuals with a developmental disability upon a proper showing that:

  1. Any of the conditions set forth in section 25-16-03 as requirements for the issuance of the license no longer exists;
  2. The license was issued upon fraudulent or untrue representations;
  3. The owner or operator has violated any of the rules of the department; or
  4. The owner or operator of the center has been guilty of an offense determined by the department to have a direct bearing upon a person’s ability to serve the public as an owner or operator, or the department determines, following conviction of an offense, that the person is not sufficiently rehabilitated under section 12.1-33-02.1.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 223, § 8; 1977, ch. 130, § 7; 1981, ch. 297, § 12; 1987, ch. 570, § 14; 2015, ch. 200, § 24, eff August 1, 2015.

Cross-References.

Definition of offense, see § 12.1-01-04.

25-16-09. Hearing on denial or revocation of license.

Before any application for a license to conduct a treatment or care center for individuals with a developmental disability is denied or before the revocation of such license by the department, written charges as to the reasons for the revocation or denial must be served upon the applicant or licensee, who has a right to a hearing before the department, if a hearing is requested within ten days after service of written charges.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 223, § 9; 1981, ch. 297, § 13; 1987, ch. 570, § 15; 2015, ch. 200, § 25, eff August 1, 2015.

25-16-10. Purchase of services. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2003, ch. 231, § 2.

Note.

Section 3 of chapter 231, S.L. 2003, repealed this section effective July 1, 2003.

25-16-10.1. Maximum annual return on investment. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2003, ch. 231, § 3.

25-16-11. Funds of state department of human services for purchasing residential care, custody, treatment, and education for developmentally disabled persons. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 259, § 1.

25-16-12. Efforts to obtain private and governmental grants. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

The department of human services and the duly licensed treatment or care centers for individuals with a developmental disability may exert all possible efforts to obtain grants, both private and governmental, for the care, custody, treatment, training, and education of individuals with a developmental disability.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 223, § 12; 1981, ch. 297, §§ 18, 19; 1987, ch. 570, § 17; 2015, ch. 200, § 26, eff August 1, 2015.

25-16-12. Efforts to obtain private and governmental grants. [Effective September 1, 2022]

The department and the duly licensed treatment or care centers for individuals with a developmental disability may exert all possible efforts to obtain grants, both private and governmental, for the care, custody, treatment, training, and education of individuals with a developmental disability.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 223, § 12; 1981, ch. 297, §§ 18, 19; 1987, ch. 570, § 17; 2015, ch. 200, § 26, eff August 1, 2015; 2021, ch. 352, § 304, eff September 1, 2022.

25-16-13. Expenses chargeable against patient, patient’s estate, or responsible relatives.

This chapter does not relieve the responsibility of the patient, the patient’s estate, or responsible relatives of the expenses for care and treatment as provided in chapter 25-04 or 50-06.3. The provisions of chapter 25-04 or 50-06.3 applicable to the expenses of care and treatment of patients apply to this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 223, § 13; 1987, ch. 325, § 7.

Cross-References.

Westwood park, free care and treatment for persons under twenty-one, see § 25-04-05.

Collateral References.

Support: constitutionality of statute imposing liability upon estate or relative of insane person for his support in asylum, 20 A.L.R.3d 363.

25-16-14. Definitions — Group homes for individuals with developmental disabilities — Zoning.

  1. For the purposes of this section:
    1. “Group home” means any community residential facility, foster home, family care facility, or other similar home for individuals with a developmental disability.
    2. “Individual with a developmental disability” means an individual with a severe, chronic disability which:
      1. Is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or combination of mental and physical impairments;
      2. Is manifested before the individual attains age twenty-two;
      3. Is likely to continue indefinitely;
      4. Results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of the following areas of major life activity:
        1. Self-care;
        2. Receptive and expressive language;
        3. Learning;
        4. Mobility;
        5. Self-direction;
        6. Capacity for independent living; and
        7. Economic sufficiency; and
      5. Reflects the individual’s needs for a combination and sequence of special, interdisciplinary, or generic care, treatment, or other services which are lifelong or extended duration and are individually planned and coordinated.
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions in chapter 11-33, 40-47, or 58-03, or any other provisions authorizing any political subdivision to establish or enforce zoning regulations, a licensed group home serving six or fewer individuals with a developmental disability must be considered a permitted use in a single-family or equivalent least-density residential zone, and a licensed group home serving eight or fewer individuals with a developmental disability must be considered a permitted use in any area zoned for residential use of greater density than single-family use.

Source:

S.L. 1983, ch. 317, §§ 1, 2; 2015, ch. 200, § 27, eff August 1, 2015.

Collateral References.

Validity, construction, and effect of statute requiring consultation with, or approval of, local governmental unit prior to locating group home, halfway house, or similar community residence for the mentally ill, 51 A.L.R.4th 1096.

25-16-15. Depreciation recapture on the sale of fixed assets. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2003, ch. 231, § 2.

Note.

Section 3 of chapter 231, S.L. 2003, repealed this section effective July 1, 2003.

25-16-16. Owner compensation for services provided. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2003, ch. 231, § 3.

CHAPTER 25-16.1 Receivers for Developmentally Disabled Facilities

25-16.1-01. Definitions. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

In this chapter, unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires:

  1. “Department” means the department of human services.
  2. “Treatment or care center” means an entity providing services to individuals with developmental disabilities and licensed by the department to provide services.

Source:

S.L. 1985, ch. 134, § 4; 2015, ch. 200, § 28, eff August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 207, § 18, eff August 1, 2017.

25-16.1-01. Definitions. [Effective September 1, 2022]

In this chapter, unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires:

  1. “Department” means the department of health and human services.
  2. “Treatment or care center” means an entity providing services to individuals with developmental disabilities and licensed by the department to provide services.

Source:

S.L. 1985, ch. 134, § 4; 2015, ch. 200, § 28, eff August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 207, § 18, eff August 1, 2017; 2021, ch. 352, § 305, eff September 1, 2022.

25-16.1-02. Conditions for appointment of receiver.

When the department has revoked the license of a treatment or care center, or when the operator of a center has requested, the department may file a petition with the district court to place the center under the control of a receiver if necessary to protect the health or safety of clients at the center. The court may grant the petition upon a finding that the health or safety of the clients at the center would be seriously threatened if a condition existing at the time the petition was filed is permitted to continue. Such a finding may be based upon evidence concerning the physical plant, the program and services offered by the center, but not solely upon evidence that a center:

  1. Has been denied a license to operate as a center, or has had a previously issued license revoked; or
  2. Has been denied certification as an intermediate care facility for individuals with intellectual disabilities, or has lost or had revoked such certification.

Source:

S.L. 1985, ch. 134, § 4; 2011, ch. 207, § 16.

25-16.1-03. Appointment of receiver.

The court shall appoint, as receiver, the executive director of the department who shall designate a qualified individual not employed by this state or its political subdivisions, or a nonprofit organization to execute the receivership. The receiver appointed by the court shall use the income and assets of the treatment or care center to maintain and operate the center and to attempt to correct the conditions which constitute a threat to the clients. The receiver may not liquidate the assets of the treatment or care center.

Source:

S.L. 1985, ch. 134, § 4; 2017, ch. 207, § 19, eff August 1, 2017.

25-16.1-04. Termination of receivership.

The receivership shall be terminated when the receiver and the court certify that the conditions which prompted the appointment have been corrected, when the license is restored, when a new license is issued, or, in the case of an election by the owner or owners to discontinue operation, when the clients are safely placed or provided services in other centers.

Source:

S.L. 1985, ch. 134, § 4.

25-16.1-05. Accounting.

Upon the termination of the receivership, the receiver shall render a complete accounting to the court and shall dispose of surplus funds as the court directs.

Source:

S.L. 1985, ch. 134, § 4.

CHAPTER 25-16.2 Work Activity Center Contract Awards

25-16.2-01. Work activity center — Definition. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

As used in this chapter “work activity center” means a facility, licensed by the department of human services, which is located in the state and operated by a nonprofit corporation organized for the primary purpose of employing and providing rehabilitative activities for individuals with physical disabilities, developmental disabilities, or chronic mental illnesses.

Source:

S.L. 1987, ch. 329, § 1; 2011, ch. 209, § 2.

25-16.2-01. Work activity center — Definition. [Effective September 1, 2022]

As used in this chapter “work activity center” means a facility, licensed by the department of health and human services, which is located in the state and operated by a nonprofit corporation organized for the primary purpose of employing and providing rehabilitative activities for individuals with physical disabilities, developmental disabilities, or chronic mental illnesses.

Source:

S.L. 1987, ch. 329, § 1; 2011, ch. 209, § 2; 2021, ch. 352, § 306, eff September 1, 2022.

25-16.2-01.1. Purpose.

It is in the public interest to advance employment opportunities to individuals with disabilities so that those individuals may acquire job skills and training and gain greater independence and quality of life. This state is committed to promoting self-sufficiency, integrating individuals with disabilities into our communities, and maximizing the earning potential of individuals with disabilities.

Source:

S.L. 2011, ch. 209, § 1.

25-16.2-02. Direct bidding with work activity centers for highway grade stakes.

Unless no work activity center bids on the contract, the office of management and budget or the department of transportation, whichever may be authorized to purchase highway grade stakes, shall award any contract for the purchase of highway grade stakes to work activity centers. The office of management and budget or the department of transportation shall request bids from work activity centers and shall award any contract for the purchase of highway grade stakes on the basis of these factors:

  1. Whether the product contracted for is supplied by the work activity center at a fair market price.
  2. Whether the product to be supplied by the work activity center meets the specifications of the department of transportation.
  3. The ability, capacity, and skill of the work activity center to perform the contract required.
  4. The character, integrity, reputation, judgment, experience, and efficiency of the work activity center.
  5. Whether the work activity center can perform the contract within the time specified.
  6. The quality of performance of previous contracts negotiated with the work activity center.
  7. The previous and existing compliance by the work activity center with laws relating to the contract.

Source:

S.L. 1987, ch. 329, § 2.

25-16.2-03. Contract requirement.

Any contract awarded pursuant to this chapter must be in writing and must be made available by the purchasing party to any person upon request. The contract must include the purchase price, the quantity of commodity or service purchased, and the time period for which the commodity or service will be provided.

Source:

S.L. 1987, ch. 329, § 3; 2011, ch. 209, § 3.

25-16.2-04. Direct purchase from work activity centers.

If acceptable commodities or services are produced or provided by a work activity center at fair market price, any state entity or political subdivision may enter a contract to purchase directly from the work activity center without obtaining competition.

Source:

S.L. 2011, ch. 209, § 4.

Effective Date.

This section became effective August 1, 2011.

CHAPTER 25-17 Testing and Treatment of Newborns

25-17-00.1. Definitions. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Confirmatory-diagnostic testing” means testing to prove or disprove the presence of a specific metabolic disease or genetic disease.
  2. “Confirmatory-diagnostic testing laboratory” means a laboratory performing confirmatory-diagnostic testing.
  3. “Department” means the state department of health.
  4. “Licensed clinician” means a currently licensed physician, physician assistant, or advanced practice registered nurse.
  5. “Low-protein modified food product” means a food product that is specially formulated to have less than one gram of protein per serving and is intended to be used under the direction of a licensed clinician for the dietary treatment of a metabolic disease. The term does not include a natural food that is naturally low in protein.
  6. “Medical food” means a food that is intended for the dietary treatment of a disease or condition for which nutritional requirements are established by medical evaluation and is formulated to be consumed or administered under the direction of a licensed clinician.
  7. “Metabolic disease” and “genetic disease” mean a disease as designated by rule of the state health council for which early identification and timely intervention will lead to a significant reduction in mortality, morbidity, and associated disabilities.
  8. “Newborn screening program” means a program facilitating access to appropriate testing, followup, diagnosis, intervention, management, evaluation, and education regarding metabolic diseases and genetic diseases identified in newborns.
  9. “Out-of-range screening result” means a screening result that is outside of the expected range of testing results established for a particular disease.
  10. “Responsible clinician” means the licensed clinician, midwife, naturopath, or birth attendant attending a newborn.
  11. “Screening” means initial testing of a newborn for the possible presence of metabolic disease or genetic disease.
  12. “Screening laboratory” means the laboratory the department selects to perform screening.

Source:

S.L. 2001, ch. 260, § 1; 2011, ch. 210, § 2; 2015, ch. 204, § 2, eff August 1, 2015.

25-17-00.1. Definitions. [Effective September 1, 2022]

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Confirmatory-diagnostic testing” means testing to prove or disprove the presence of a specific metabolic disease or genetic disease.
  2. “Confirmatory-diagnostic testing laboratory” means a laboratory performing confirmatory-diagnostic testing.
  3. “Department” means the department of health and human services.
  4. “Licensed clinician” means a currently licensed physician, physician assistant, or advanced practice registered nurse.
  5. “Low-protein modified food product” means a food product that is specially formulated to have less than one gram of protein per serving and is intended to be used under the direction of a licensed clinician for the dietary treatment of a metabolic disease. The term does not include a natural food that is naturally low in protein.
  6. “Medical food” means a food that is intended for the dietary treatment of a disease or condition for which nutritional requirements are established by medical evaluation and is formulated to be consumed or administered under the direction of a licensed clinician.
  7. “Metabolic disease” and “genetic disease” mean a disease as designated by rule of the department for which early identification and timely intervention will lead to a significant reduction in mortality, morbidity, and associated disabilities.
  8. “Newborn screening program” means a program facilitating access to appropriate testing, followup, diagnosis, intervention, management, evaluation, and education regarding metabolic diseases and genetic diseases identified in newborns.
  9. “Out-of-range screening result” means a screening result that is outside of the expected range of testing results established for a particular disease.
  10. “Responsible clinician” means the licensed clinician, midwife, naturopath, or birth attendant attending a newborn.
  11. “Screening” means initial testing of a newborn for the possible presence of metabolic disease or genetic disease.
  12. “Screening laboratory” means the laboratory the department selects to perform screening.

Source:

S.L. 2001, ch. 260, § 1; 2011, ch. 210, § 2; 2015, ch. 204, § 2, eff August 1, 2015; 2021, ch. 352, § 307, eff September 1, 2022.

25-17-01. Newborn screening education programs and tests. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

The state department of health shall:

  1. Develop and implement a metabolic disease and genetic disease educational program among licensed clinicians, hospital staffs, public health nurses, and the citizens of this state. This educational program must include information about the nature of the diseases and about screening for the early detection of these diseases so that proper measures may be taken to reduce mortality, morbidity, and associated disabilities.
  2. Provide, on a statewide basis, a newborn screening program.
  3. Coordinate with or refer individuals to public and private health care service providers for long-term followup services for metabolic diseases and genetic diseases.
  4. Select a screening laboratory.
  5. Store, maintain, and dispose of blood spots used for screening.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 224, § 1; 1991, ch. 298, § 1; 1995, ch. 243, § 2; 1995, ch. 245, § 2; 2001, ch. 260, § 2; 2011, ch. 210, § 3; 2015, ch. 204, § 3, eff August 1, 2015.

Cross-References.

State department of health, see N.D.C.C. ch. 23-01.

25-17-01. Newborn screening education programs and tests. [Effective September 1, 2022]

The department shall:

  1. Develop and implement a metabolic disease and genetic disease educational program among licensed clinicians, hospital staffs, public health nurses, and the citizens of this state. This educational program must include information about the nature of the diseases and about screening for the early detection of these diseases so that proper measures may be taken to reduce mortality, morbidity, and associated disabilities.
  2. Provide, on a statewide basis, a newborn screening program.
  3. Coordinate with or refer individuals to public and private health care service providers for long-term followup services for metabolic diseases and genetic diseases.
  4. Select a screening laboratory.
  5. Store, maintain, and dispose of blood spots used for screening.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 224, § 1; 1991, ch. 298, § 1; 1995, ch. 243, § 2; 1995, ch. 245, § 2; 2001, ch. 260, § 2; 2011, ch. 210, § 3; 2015, ch. 204, § 3, eff August 1, 2015; 2021, ch. 352, § 308, eff September 1, 2022.

25-17-02. Rulemaking requirement. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

The state health council shall adopt rules necessary to implement this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 224, § 2; 1991, ch. 298, § 2; 1995, ch. 243, § 2; 2001, ch. 260, § 3; 2007, ch. 39, § 17.

25-17-02. Rulemaking requirement. [Effective September 1, 2022]

The department shall adopt rules necessary to implement this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 224, § 2; 1991, ch. 298, § 2; 1995, ch. 243, § 2; 2001, ch. 260, § 3; 2007, ch. 39, § 17; 2021, ch. 352, § 309, eff September 1, 2022.

25-17-02.1. Testing and reporting requirements.

  1. A responsible clinician shall provide the parents and guardians of a newborn written information on the nature of newborn screening and confirmatory-diagnostic testing. The parents or guardians of a newborn may object to screening after receiving the written information. A newborn may not be subject to screening to which the newborn’s parents or guardians object. In the case of an objection, the responsible clinician shall record the objection in a document signed by the parents or guardians and shall submit the document to the department.
  2. The responsible clinician attending a newborn shall cause that newborn to be subjected to screening in the manner prescribed by the department.
  3. The screening laboratory shall provide to the department screening results and any blood spots used in screening.
  4. If screening shows an out-of-range screening result, the responsible clinician shall cause the newborn to be subjected to appropriate clinical followup by a licensed clinician which may include confirmatory-diagnostic testing. The responsible clinician shall ensure the department receives any confirmatory-diagnostic testing results.
  5. A licensed clinician attending a patient with a metabolic disease or genetic disease that was not detected by the state’s newborn screening program shall report the case to the department.

History. S.L. 2015, ch. 204, § 4, eff August 1, 2015.

25-17-03. Treatment for positive diagnosis — Registry of cases. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

The state department of health shall:

  1. Notify responsible clinicians regarding cases with out-of-range screening results or positive confirmatory-diagnostic testing results in order to facilitate access to appropriate treatment. If the responsible clinician is not a licensed clinician, the responsible clinician shall refer the patient to a licensed clinician for appropriate followup care.
  2. Refer every diagnosed case of a metabolic disease or genetic disease to a licensed clinician for necessary treatment.
  3. Maintain a registry of cases of metabolic diseases and genetic diseases.
  4. Provide medical food at no cost to males under age twenty-six and females under age forty-five who are diagnosed with phenylketonuria or maple syrup urine disease, regardless of income. If treatment services under this subsection are provided to an individual by the department, the department may seek reimbursement from any government program that provides coverage to that individual for the treatment services provided by the department.
  5. Offer for sale at cost medical food to females age forty-five and over and to males age twenty-six and over who are diagnosed with phenylketonuria or maple syrup urine disease, regardless of income. These individuals are responsible for payment to the department for the cost of medical food.
  6. Provide low-protein modified food products, if medically necessary as determined by a qualified health care provider, to females under age forty-five and males under age twenty-six who are receiving medical assistance and are diagnosed with phenylketonuria or maple syrup urine disease.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 224, § 3; 1991, ch. 298, § 3; 1995, ch. 243, § 2; 2001, ch. 260, § 4; 2007, ch. 39, § 18; 2011, ch. 210, § 4; 2015, ch. 204, § 5, eff August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 210, § 1, eff August 1, 2017.

25-17-03. Treatment for positive diagnosis — Registry of cases. [Effective September 1, 2022]

The department shall:

  1. Notify responsible clinicians regarding cases with out-of-range screening results or positive confirmatory-diagnostic testing results in order to facilitate access to appropriate treatment. If the responsible clinician is not a licensed clinician, the responsible clinician shall refer the patient to a licensed clinician for appropriate followup care.
  2. Refer every diagnosed case of a metabolic disease or genetic disease to a licensed clinician for necessary treatment.
  3. Maintain a registry of cases of metabolic diseases and genetic diseases.
  4. Provide medical food at no cost to males under age twenty-six and females under age forty-five who are diagnosed with phenylketonuria or maple syrup urine disease, regardless of income. If treatment services under this subsection are provided to an individual by the department, the department may seek reimbursement from any government program that provides coverage to that individual for the treatment services provided by the department.
  5. Offer for sale at cost medical food to females age forty-five and over and to males age twenty-six and over who are diagnosed with phenylketonuria or maple syrup urine disease, regardless of income. These individuals are responsible for payment to the department for the cost of medical food.
  6. Provide low-protein modified food products, if medically necessary as determined by a qualified health care provider, to females under age forty-five and males under age twenty-six who are receiving medical assistance and are diagnosed with phenylketonuria or maple syrup urine disease.

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 224, § 3; 1991, ch. 298, § 3; 1995, ch. 243, § 2; 2001, ch. 260, § 4; 2007, ch. 39, § 18; 2011, ch. 210, § 4; 2015, ch. 204, § 5, eff August 1, 2015; 2017, ch. 210, § 1, eff August 1, 2017; 2021, ch. 352, § 310, eff September 1, 2022.

25-17-04. Testing and reporting requirements. [Repealed]

Source:

S.L. 1967, ch. 224, § 4; 1991, ch. 298, § 4; 1995, ch. 243, § 2; 2001, ch. 260, § 5; 2011, ch. 210, § 5; Repealed by 2015, ch. 204, § 9, eff August 1, 2015.

25-17-05. Testing charges.

A screening and confirmatory-diagnostic testing laboratory may charge fees for necessary services.

Source:

S.L. 1991, ch. 298, § 5; 1995, ch. 243, § 2; 2001, ch. 260, § 6; 2015, ch. 204, § 6, eff August 1, 2015.

25-17-06. Pulse oximetry screening for critical congenital heart defects — Exception. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

Before discharge of a newborn child born in a hospital with a birthing center, the newborn child must receive a pulse oximetry screening for critical congenital heart defects. The screening requirement of this section does not apply if the parents or guardians of a newborn child object to the screening. The state department of health shall provide medical staff and facilities that provide birthing services with notice regarding this screening requirement. For purposes of this chapter, pulse oximetry screening is not a test under section 25-17-05 and a congenital heart defect detected by screening under this section is not a metabolic disease or genetic disease as those terms are used under this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 2013, ch. 227, § 1; 2015, ch. 204, § 7, eff August 1, 2015.

25-17-06. Pulse oximetry screening for critical congenital heart defects — Exception. [Effective September 1, 2022]

Before discharge of a newborn child born in a hospital with a birthing center, the newborn child must receive a pulse oximetry screening for critical congenital heart defects. The screening requirement of this section does not apply if the parents or guardians of a newborn child object to the screening. The department shall provide medical staff and facilities that provide birthing services with notice regarding this screening requirement. For purposes of this chapter, pulse oximetry screening is not a test under section 25-17-05 and a congenital heart defect detected by screening under this section is not a metabolic disease or genetic disease as those terms are used under this chapter.

Source:

S.L. 2013, ch. 227, § 1; 2015, ch. 204, § 7, eff August 1, 2015; 2021, ch. 352, § 311, eff September 1, 2022.

25-17-07. Institutional review board.

A person that conducts research on blood spots, other specimens, or registry data that is maintained by the department shall follow institutional review board processes for human research which must include obtaining parent or guardian authorization.

History. S.L. 2015, ch. 204, § 8, eff August 1, 2015.

CHAPTER 25-18 Fee for Service Ratesetting for Developmentally Disabled Facilities

25-18-01. Definitions. [Effective through August 31, 2022]

In this chapter, unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires:

  1. “Department” means the department of human services.
  2. “Treatment or care center” means an entity providing services to individuals with developmental disabilities and licensed by the department to provide services.

Source:

S.L. 2003, ch. 231, § 1; 2005, ch. 252, § 2; 2011, ch. 207, § 17; 2017, ch. 207, § 20, eff August 1, 2017.

25-18-01. Definitions. [Effective September 1, 2022]

In this chapter, unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires:

  1. “Department” means the department of health and human services.
  2. “Treatment or care center” means an entity providing services to individuals with developmental disabilities and licensed by the department to provide services.

Source:

S.L. 2003, ch. 231, § 1; 2005, ch. 252, § 2; 2011, ch. 207, § 17; 2017, ch. 207, § 20, eff August 1, 2017; 2021, ch. 352, § 312, eff September 1, 2022.

25-18-02. Workgroup — Membership — Facilitator. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2005, ch. 252, § 4.

25-18-03. Purchase of services.

The department may purchase, from funds appropriated to it for that purpose, residential care, custody, treatment, training, and education for individuals with developmental disabilities from any treatment or care center licensed in this state.

Source:

S.L. 2003, ch. 231, § 1.

25-18-04. Fee-for-service system — Fee determination. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2005, ch. 252, § 4.

25-18-05. Limitation on owner compensation for services provided.

For-profit treatment or care centers may compensate working owners and their families for time worked on behalf of the treatment or care center. The amount of total annual compensation allowed for an owner acting in an executive or administrative capacity must be limited as follows:

Number of clients served: Compensation limit: 1 - 15 $25,000 16 - 30 $35,000 31 - 45 $45,000 46 + $50,000

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The limits in this section are intended to be the total compensation allowed by this state in any one year regardless of the number of owners performing work for the treatment or care center. A proration of the total compensation for owners who perform services in this state and who perform services in other states must be made on the basis of individual time distribution records. For family members working in direct care, housekeeping, maintenance, dietary, or clerical positions, wages are limited to the wage paid to any nonrelated employee, with the same qualifications and experience, working in a similar job function for that treatment or care center. The allowable compensation limit is inclusive of all salaries and related fringe benefits and may not be construed to be an addition or enhancement to the rate payable to a treatment or care center.

Source:

S.L. 2003, ch. 231, § 1; 2005, ch. 252, § 3.

25-18-06. Extraordinary client needs — Effect on fee. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2005, ch. 252, § 4.

25-18-07. Trust fund. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2005, ch. 252, § 4.

25-18-08. Transition to establishment of fees. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2005, ch. 252, § 4.

25-18-09. Federal requirements — Supremacy.

If any provision of this chapter is determined by the United States government to be in conflict with existing or future requirements of the United States government so as to limit or preclude federal financial participation in medical assistance, the department shall comply with the federal requirements to the extent necessary to obtain federal financial participation and shall not comply with the provisions of this chapter if necessary to avoid a loss of federal financial participation.

Source:

S.L. 2003, ch. 231, § 1.

25-18-10. Exclusion of state-owned or state-operated treatment or care centers.

This chapter does not apply to state-owned or state-operated treatment or care centers.

Source:

S.L. 2003, ch. 231, § 1.

25-18-11. Rulemaking authority of the department. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2005, ch. 252, § 4.

25-18-12. Reporting to legislative council. [Repealed]

Repealed by S.L. 2005, ch. 252, § 4.

25-18-13. Treatment or care center budget flexibility.

The department shall allow treatment or care centers to transfer funds received from the department between budget categories and line items.

Source:

S.L. 2005, ch. 252, § 1.

25-18-14. Maximum annual return on investment.

Profit-motivated institutions or facilities must be allowed an annual return on investment in fixed assets related to client care. The maximum return on investment must be established based upon the existing debt divided by original asset cost and must be determined as follows:

Annual average percentage debt to annual average assets Return 51 to 80 percent - 2 percent return on original cost of fixed assets 0 to 50 percent - 3 percent return on original cost of fixed assets

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Source:

S.L. 2005, ch. 252, § 1.

25-18-15. Payment for services to medically fragile children.

The department may consider the unique level of care, the additional cost required to provide services to medically fragile clients under twenty-one years of age, and the actual and reasonable cost of providing services to individuals with developmental disabilities when reimbursing an intermediate care facility for individuals with intellectual disabilities.

Source:

S.L. 2005, ch. 12, § 18; 2011, ch. 207, § 18; 2015, ch. 200, § 29, eff August 1, 2015.