Chapter 1 Rules of Descent

33-1-1. Real estate descending by intestacy to children or descendants, parents, or brothers and sisters.

Whenever any person having title to any real estate of inheritance shall die intestate as to such estate, it shall descend and pass in equal portions to his or her kindred, in the following course:

  1. First to the intestate’s children or their descendants, if there are any.
  2. Second, if there be no children nor their descendants, then to the intestate’s parents in equal shares, or to the surviving parent.
  3. Third, if there is no parent, then to the intestate’s brothers and sisters, and their descendants.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 933; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 1; P.L. 1913, ch. 924, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 1; P.L. 1943, ch. 1283, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-1-1 ; P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Adopted child, inheritance from natural parents, § 15-7-17 .

Adoptive kindred, inheritance by and from, § 15-7-16 .

Fixtures as personal or real property, § 34-17-1 et seq.

Life estate to spouse, irrespective of provisions of will, § 33-25-2 et seq.

Life prisoner, estate of, §§ 13-6-1 , 13-6-7 .

Real estate proceeds distributed as real estate, § 33-19-23 .

Comparative Legislation.

Rules of descent:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-425 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 190, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Ancestral Estates.

This section would apply in identifying the next of kin of an intestate in applying former statute as to ancestral estates. Oldham v. Oldham, 58 R.I. 268 , 192 A. 758, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1937).

Brothers and Sisters.

Where testator’s sister and her children survive, the sister’s children are not heirs; but the sister and the children of a deceased sister are heirs. Dodge v. Slate, 71 R.I. 191 , 43 A.2d 242, 1945 R.I. LEXIS 38 (1945).

Where will devised estate “equally among the heirs, share and share alike,” a surviving sister and two children of a deceased sister took per capita and not per stirpes. Dodge v. Slate, 71 R.I. 191 , 43 A.2d 242, 1945 R.I. LEXIS 38 (1945).

Descent to Children.

Married woman’s property would descend to children, subject to husband’s curtesy, though portion of title was acquired by her through husband’s deed to avoid creditors. Oldham v. Oldham, 58 R.I. 268 , 192 A. 758, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1937).

Because an adopted adult qualified as an heir, issue, child, or descendant of his or her adoptive parent, the adopted daughters, who were both adopted as adults over the age of eighteen, were the proper beneficiaries upon distribution of the trust. Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Hunt, 944 A.2d 846, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 36 , cert. denied sub nom. Gay v. Hunt, 555 U.S. 1048, 129 S. Ct. 646, 172 L. Ed. 2d 614, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 8767 (2008).

Exhaustion of Remedies.

Where grandchildren alleged tortious interference with their expectancy of inheritance, their claims failed to survive summary judgment because they did not exhaust their statutory remedies; Rhode Island’s statutory procedure would have provided an adequate remedy: (1) as legatees under their grandmother’s will, as well as intestate heirs, the grandchildren qualified as persons “legally interested” in the estate; and (2) the grandchildren could have made a written request to the executor or the administrator of the estate to bring an action to recover the property. Umsted v. Umsted, 446 F.3d 17, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9316 (1st Cir. 2006).

Kin of Half-Blood.

The statutes of distribution make no distinction between relatives of the full and of the half-blood in respect to inheritance from each other. Doar v. Doar, 63 R.I. 18 , 6 A.2d 738, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 58 (1939).

Lapsed Devises.

Where residuary legatee died without issue prior to death of testatrix, a brother not named in will and a nephew expressly excluded from sharing under will shared the estate by virtue of statute of descent and distribution. Powers v. Powers, 75 R.I. 461 , 67 A.2d 837, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 74 (1949).

Marriage.

Documents which a husband and his sister-in-law signed when they opened joint bank accounts did not give the sister-in-law a right of survivorship in either account; and the money which remained in both accounts belonged to husband’s widow. Gaspar v. Cordeiro, 843 A.2d 479, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 53 (2004).

Collateral References.

Alien enemy’s right to take by inheritance. 137 A.L.R. 1328; 147 A.L.R. 1297; 150 A.L.R. 1418; 152 A.L.R. 1450.

Color of title, possession under descent cast as. 2 A.L.R. 1466.

Descent and distribution to nieces and nephews as per stirpes or per capita. 19 A.L.R.2d 191.

Eligibility of illegitimate child for survivor’s benefits under Social Security Act, pursuant to § 216(h)(2)(A) of Act (42 USCS § 416(h)(2)(A)), where state intestacy law denying inheritance right, or application of that state law to § 216(h)(2)(A), may violate child’s right to equal protection of laws. 116 A.L.R. Fed. 121.

Family settlement of intestate estate. 29 A.L.R.3d 174.

Inheritance by illegitimate from mother’s other illegitimate children. 7 A.L.R.3d 677.

Real or personal property, proceeds of sale or condemnation of real property of infant or incompetent as, for purpose of descent. 90 A.L.R. 899.

Renunciation of benefits under statute of descent and distribution. 170 A.L.R. 435.

Right of adopted child to inherit from intestate natural grandparent. 60 A.L.R.3d 631.

Right of heir or devisee to have realty exonerated from lien thereon at expense of personal estate. 4 A.L.R.3d 1023.

Right of one other than grandchild of intestate to take under statute providing that if any child of intestate be dead the heirs of such child shall inherit his share. 93 A.L.R. 1511.

Right of remote kin, equally related to the intestate but belonging to different stocks, to distribution per capita rather than per stirpes, where nearer kin survive. 140 A.L.R. 1141.

33-1-2. Descent of real estate to paternal or maternal kindred.

If the intestate has no surviving parent, nor brother, nor sister, nor their descendants, the inheritance shall go in equal moieties to the intestate’s paternal and maternal kindred, each in the following course:

  1. First to the grandparents, in equal shares, if any there be.
  2. Second, if there be no grandparent, then to the uncles and aunts, or their descendants by representation, or such of them as there be.
  3. Third, if there be no grandparent, nor uncle, nor aunt, nor their descendants, then to the great grandparents in equal shares, if any there be.
  4. Fourth, if there be no great grandparent, then to the great uncles and great aunts or their descendants by representation, or such of them as there be; and so on, in other cases, without end, passing to the nearest lineal ancestors and their descendants or such of them as there be.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 934; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 2; P.L. 1913, ch. 924, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-1-2 ; P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Life estate to spouse, irrespective of provisions of will, § 33-25-2 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Unknown Heirs.

When intestate’s estate passed to the heirs of his maternal grandparents, the holding of a portion of the estate for unknown heirs of one grandparent, after due and diligent search disclosed no heirs, was contrary to public policy and the intent of the legislature in passing § 33-21-12 because it resulted in giving to the state by escheat property that otherwise would be distributed to known next of kin. MacMurray v. Comstock, 99 R.I. 368 , 208 A.2d 119, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 448 (1965).

Collateral References.

Family settlement of intestate estate. 29 A.L.R.3d 174.

Inheritance by illegitimate from mother’s other illegitimate children. 7 A.L.R.3d 677.

Right of remote kin equally related to the intestate but belonging to different stocks, to distribution per capita rather than by per stirpes where nearer next of kin survive. 140 A.L.R. 1141.

33-1-3. Descent when no paternal or maternal kindred survive.

When in this chapter the inheritance is directed to go by moieties to the intestate’s paternal and maternal kindred, if there are no such kindred on the one part, the whole shall go to the other part; and if there are no kindred either on the one part or the other the whole shall go to the intestate’s surviving spouse or if the spouse did not survive the intestate, it shall go to the spouse’s kindred in the like course as if he or she had survived the intestate and then died entitled to the estate.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 936; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 4; P.L. 1919, ch. 1787, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 4; P.L. 1944, ch. 1421, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-1-3 ; P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Failure of Line of Descent.

If no children, parents, brothers, sisters, or descendants survive the intestate, the statute does not give a preference to either line, but each moiety is distributed as a distinct estate and is not united in one line until there ceases to be a representative of the other. Cozzens v. Joslin, 1 R.I. 122 , 1848 R.I. LEXIS 3 (1848).

Parties to Proceedings.

Town treasurer had no right to intervene in proceeding on administrator’s report to contest the right of one claiming under this section. Dailey v. Connery, 75 R.I. 274 , 65 A.2d 801, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 43 (1949).

New parties seeking admission as interested parties to probate appeal on the ground that they are heirs are not required to prove intestacy as a condition precedent to admission. Spooner v. Tucker, 78 R.I. 329 , 82 A.2d 162, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 81 (1951).

In an appeal by a brother of the predeceased husband of decedent from a probate court order admitting decedent’s alleged last will and testament to probate on proponent’s petition for probate alleging that there were no known relatives or heirs, the contestant was properly before the court without evidence that decedent died without heirs or next of kin. Apollonio v. Kenyon, 101 R.I. 578 , 225 A.2d 778, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 803 (1967).

Collateral References.

Family settlement of intestate estate. 29 A.L.R.3d 174.

33-1-4. Descent to persons not in being or not capable to take as heirs.

No right in the inheritance shall accrue to any persons whatsoever other than to the children of the intestate, unless such persons are in being and capable in law to take as heirs at the time of the intestate’s death.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 935; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 33-1-4 .

33-1-5. Life estate descending to spouse.

Whenever the intestate dies and leaves a surviving spouse, the real estate of the intestate shall descend and pass to the surviving spouse for his or her natural life. The provisions of §§ 33-1-1 and 33-1-2 shall be subject to the provisions of this section and § 33-1-6 .

History of Section. G.L., ch. 316, § 4, as enacted by P.L. 1919, ch. 1787, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 4; P.L. 1944, ch. 1421, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-1-5 ; P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Life estate to spouse, irrespective of provisions of will, §§ 33-25-2 33-25-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Expenses of Administration.

Apportionment of attorneys’ fees and expenses of administration between a life tenant and a remainderman was error because the life estate was taken subject only to any encumbrance or secured lien on the property that existed at time of the decedent’s death, and the apportioned costs were not encumbrances or liens; these expenses, including legal fees and out-of-pocket expenses, were separate and apart from the closing costs associated with the sale of the real estate at issue, which properly were allocated. The fees and expenses incurred during the administration of the probate estate did not exist at the time of the decedent’s death and should have been paid from the remainder interest. Jerome v. Probate Court of Barrington, 922 A.2d 119, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 55 (2007).

Future Interest.

A vested interest in remainder expectant upon a life estate is real estate within the meaning of this section. Fischer v. Scott, 44 R.I. 368 , 117 A. 417, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 49 (1922).

Improvements by Life Tenant.

Life tenant who makes permanent improvements to property does not thereby acquire a lien which is enforceable against a remainderman. Tillinghast v. Harrop, 63 R.I. 394 , 9 A.2d 28, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 107 (1939).

Collateral References.

Interlocutory decree of divorce as affecting marital rights of one spouse in estate of the other. 76 A.L.R. 284.

Marital rights in spouse’s estate as affected by abandonment. 71 A.L.R. 285; 139 A.L.R. 488.

Misconduct of surviving husband as affecting marital rights in wife’s estate. 41 A.L.R. 277; 72 A.L.R. 389; 81 A.L.R. 1016; 112 A.L.R. 1324; 139 A.L.R. 486.

Real property in other state, or its value, as factor in computation of interest of husband in wife’s estate. 66 A.L.R. 733.

Remarriage as affecting one’s status as a “widow” or “widower” for purposes of statute of descent and distribution. 72 A.L.R. 1324.

Separation agreement as affecting right of inheritance. 35 A.L.R. 1505; 34 A.L.R.2d 1020.

33-1-6. Widow’s or husband’s allowance of real estate in fee.

The probate court having jurisdiction of the estate of the intestate, if a resident of this state, or the probate court of any city or town in which the real estate of the intestate is situated if not a resident of this state, may also, in its discretion, upon petition filed within six (6) months from the date of the first publication of notice of the qualification of the administrator of the estate of the intestate, allow and set off to the intestate’s surviving spouse in fee real estate of the intestate situated in this state to an amount not exceeding one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000) in value, over and above all incumbrances, if not required for the payment of the debts of the intestate; provided that if the real estate shall be in a single parcel of greater value over and above incumbrances than one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000) and shall be deemed by the court, because of such condition and value, to be incapable of being allowed and set off hereunder, either as a whole or by partition, without unreasonable diminution in the value thereof, the court may order the parcel to be sold by the administrator, the administrator giving bond as in other cases of the sale of real estate, and from the proceeds of such sale may allow and set off the sum of one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000) to the intestate’s surviving spouse for his or her own use and any surplus of the proceeds of sale shall be deemed to be real estate for the purposes of descent and distribution; provided, however, that title to real estate situated in any town or city of this state shall not pass by the decree of the probate court setting off and allowing such real estate, for the purpose of conveyance by the intestate’s surviving spouse until a copy of such decree as entered, duly certified by the probate clerk, is recorded in the records of land evidence in the town or city where the land is situated. The allowance and set off under this section shall be in addition to the life estate pursuant to § 33-1-5 .

History of Section. G.L., ch. 316, § 4, as enacted by P.L. 1919, ch. 1787, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 4; P.L. 1944, ch. 1421, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-1-6 ; R.P.L. 1957, ch. 155, § 1; P.L. 1965, ch. 238, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 177, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of P.L. 1986, ch. 177 provides that the amendment of this section by that Act shall take effect upon passage (June 18, 1986) and shall apply to the estates of decedents who die on or after that date.

P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Life estate to spouse, irrespective of provisions of will, § 33-25-2 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Time of Petition.

The discretionary power granted to the probate court by this section is restricted to cases where a petition is filed within one year after the decease of the intestate. Harrop v. Tillinghast, 59 R.I. 255 , 195 A. 226, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 161 (1937).

Decree granting fee simple in real estate to intestate’s husband could be collaterally attacked where record showed affirmatively and clearly that the court had lost jurisdiction years before the petition was filed. Harrop v. Tillinghast, 59 R.I. 255 , 195 A. 226, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 161 (1937).

Collateral References.

Abandonment, desertion, or refusal to support on part of surviving spouse as affecting marital rights in deceased spouse’s estate. 13 A.L.R.3d 446.

Adultery on part of surviving spouse as affecting marital rights in deceased spouse’s estate. 13 A.L.R.3d 486.

Estoppel or laches precluding lawful spouse from asserting rights in decedent’s estate as against putative spouse. 81 A.L.R.3d 110.

Prior institution of annulment proceedings or other attack on validity of one’s marriage as barring or estopping one from entitlement to property rights as surviving spouse. 31 A.L.R.4th 1190.

Rights in decedent’s estate as between legal and putative spouse. 81 A.L.R.3d 6.

Validity of inter vivos trust established by one spouse which impairs the other spouse’s distributive share or other statutory rights in property. 39 A.L.R.3d 14.

Waiver of right to widow’s allowance by postnuptial agreement. 9 A.L.R.3d 955.

33-1-7. Descendants of deceased heirs.

The descendants of any person deceased shall inherit the real and personal estate that the person would have inherited had the person survived the intestate, subject to the express provisions of these canons of descent and distribution.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 937; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 33-1-7 ; P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

33-1-8. Children born out of wedlock.

A child born out of wedlock shall be capable of inheriting or transmitting inheritance on the part of his or her mother and father in like manner as if born in lawful wedlock. Any such child whose parents shall lawfully intermarry and shall acknowledge him or her as their child shall be deemed legitimate.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 939; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 7; P.L. 1926, ch. 855, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 33-1-8 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 194, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by invidiously discriminating on the basis of illegitimacy because it prohibits an illegitimate child from inheriting from his natural father. In re Estate of Cherkas, 506 A.2d 1029, 1986 R.I. LEXIS 440 (1986) (decided prior to 1986 amendment).

Children of Illegitimate.

The children of a bastard half-sister of the intestate may inherit from the intestate. Grundy v. Hadfield, 16 R.I. 579 , 18 A. 186, 1889 R.I. LEXIS 65 (1889).

Inheritance From Father.

An illegitimate child, while capable of inheriting on the part of the mother, does not take the intestate property of the father by devolution nor is such child entitled to a child’s insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. Scalzi v. Folsom, 156 F. Supp. 838, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2871 (D.R.I. 1957) (decided prior to 1986 amendment).

Inheritance From Illegitimate.

Where an illegitimate child died intestate, her estate passed to her illegitimate sister by the same mother. Briggs v. Greene, 10 R.I. 495 , 1873 R.I. LEXIS 27 (1873).

Issue.

Where will provided for the payment of principal to the issue of children of deceased’s daughter, the illegitimate child of a grandchild was entitled to take under the will. Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Michou, 73 R.I. 190 , 54 A.2d 421, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 83 (1947).

Retroactive Application of In Re Estate of Cherkas.

The decision in In re Estate of Cherkas, 506 A.2d 1029 (R.I. 1986), applies retroactively to a claim of inheritance from a father who dies prior to the date of the decision, where the claim is brought during the administration of the father’s estate, and the estate remained open when the change in law took effect. Rekowski v. Cucca, 542 A.2d 664, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1988).

Collateral References.

Discrimination on basis of illegitimacy as denial of constitutional rights. 38 A.L.R.3d 613.

Inheritance by illegitimate. 48 A.L.R.2d 759; 60 A.L.R.2d 1182.

Inheritance by illegitimate from mother’s other illegitimate children. 7 A.L.R.3d 677.

Kindred of parents, right of child legitimated by marriage of parents to take by inheritance from. 64 A.L.R. 1124.

Legitimation by marriage to natural father of child born during mother’s marriage to another. 80 A.L.R.3d 219.

Statute regarding status or rights of children born out of wedlock as applicable to children born before it became effective. 140 A.L.R. 1323.

What amounts to recognition within statutes affecting the status or rights of illegitimates. 33 A.L.R.2d 705.

33-1-9. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 940; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 8; Repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 21, effective July 5, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-1-9 concerned dower and curtesy.

33-1-10. Surplus personalty not bequeathed.

The surplus of any chattels or personal estate of a deceased person, not bequeathed, after the payment of his or her just debts, funeral charges, and expenses of settling his or her estate, shall be distributed by order of the probate court which shall grant administration in the manner following:

  1. The sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) from the surplus and one-half (1/2) of the remainder to the widow or surviving husband forever, if the intestate died without issue.
  2. One-half (1/2) of the surplus to the widow or surviving husband forever, if the intestate died leaving issue.
  3. The residue shall be distributed among the heirs of the intestate in the same manner real estates descend and pass by this chapter, but without having any respect to the life estate and discretionary allowance provided by §§ 33-1-5 and 33-1-6 .

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 941; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 9; P.L. 1919, ch. 1787, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 9; P.L. 1943, ch. 1283, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 33-1-10 ; R.P.L. 1957, ch. 155, § 2.

Cross References.

Administration of intestate estate, § 33-8-8 .

Alcoholic beverages license as personal property, § 3-5-19 .

Limited partner’s interest as personalty, § 7-13-19 .

Proceeds of wrongful death action, § 10-7-2 .

Veterans’ home, property of deceased inmates, § 30-24-9 .

Workers’ compensation, persons to whom payable in event of death, § 28-33-23 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Distribution as Realty.

The descent of the testator’s estate was the same as to both the realty and personalty. Dodge v. Slate, 71 R.I. 191 , 43 A.2d 242, 1945 R.I. LEXIS 38 (1945).

Distribution Without Court Order.

This section does not limit § 33-18-28 , which permits distribution without court order, if distributee was entitled to an order of distribution. Wright v. Roberts, 47 R.I. 306 , 132 A. 875, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1926).

Heirs.

Wife of named person was not his heir at law, within meaning of testamentary gift to heirs at law of named person, notwithstanding her right to take personalty under this section. Skinner v. Brunsen, 69 R.I. 159 , 32 A.2d 263, 1943 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1943).

Because an adopted adult qualified as an heir, issue, child, or descendant of his or her adoptive parent, the adopted daughters, who were both adopted as adults over the age of eighteen, were the proper beneficiaries upon distribution of the trust. Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Hunt, 944 A.2d 846, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 36 , cert. denied sub nom. Gay v. Hunt, 555 U.S. 1048, 129 S. Ct. 646, 172 L. Ed. 2d 614, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 8767 (2008).

Husband or Wife.

A widow’s executor was entitled to receive one-half of her husband’s personal property where, due to the failure of the contingencies specified in the will for the property to pass to the remaindermen, the property passed intestate. Wood v. Mason, 17 R.I. 99 , 20 A. 264, 1890 R.I. LEXIS 60 (1890).

The 1919 amendment of § 33-8-8 did not deprive husband of intestate of his right in personalty but merely transferred the provision to this section. Hennessey v. Meehan, 58 R.I. 104 , 191 A. 515, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1937).

Widow was entitled to one-half of money found in husband’s safe although not reported by her as administratrix. Charpentier v. Charpentier, 59 R.I. 225 , 195 A. 210, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 155 (1937).

Next of Kin.

Bequest to the next of kin, to be distributed in the same proportions and shares provided for the descent and distribution of intestate estates, did not include one-half share to widow, since the distributees were confined to the next of kin and reference to the statute indicated only the proportions to be taken. Lewis v. Arnold, 42 R.I. 94 , 105 A. 568, 1919 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1919).

Wrongful Death Claims.

Settlement money from claim for wrongful death of decedent’s son, wrongfully released to administrator of son’s estate and trustee for father, would go as a constructive trust fund on decedent’s death intestate one-half to the surviving son under a valid settlement agreement with his stepmother and other half to be divided equally between surviving son and stepbrothers and sisters. Oldham v. Oldham, 58 R.I. 268 , 192 A. 758, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1937).

Collateral References.

Abandonment, desertion, or refusal to support on part of surviving spouse as affecting marital rights in deceased spouse’s estate. 13 A.L.R.3d 446.

Adultery on part of surviving spouse as affecting marital rights in deceased spouse’s estate. 13 A.L.R.3d 486.

Estoppel or laches precluding lawful spouse from asserting rights in decedent’s estate as against putative spouse. 81 A.L.R.3d 110.

Prior institution of annulment proceedings or other attack on validity of one’s marriage as barring or estopping one from entitlement to property rights as surviving spouse. 31 A.L.R.4th 1190.

Rights in decedent’s estate as between legal and putative spouse. 81 A.L.R.3d 6.

Validity of inter vivos trust established by one spouse which impairs the other spouse’s distributive share or other statutory rights in property. 39 A.L.R.3d 14.

Waiver of right to widow’s allowance by postnuptial agreement. 9 A.L.R.3d 955.

33-1-11. Advancements and debts of decedent.

  1. If a person dies intestate as to all or a portion of the decedent’s estate, any property given by the decedent during his or her lifetime to an individual who, at decedent’s death, is an heir, shall be treated as an advancement against the heir’s intestate share only if:
    1. The decedent declared in a contemporaneous writing, or the heir acknowledged in writing, that the gift is an advancement; or
    2. The decedent’s contemporaneous writing, or the heir’s written acknowledgment, otherwise indicates that the gift is to be taken into account in computing the division and distribution of the decedent’s intestate estate.
  2. For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, property advanced is valued as of the time the heir came into possession or enjoyment of the property or as of the time of the decedent’s death, whichever first occurs.
  3. If the recipient of the property fails to survive the decedent, the property is not taken into account in computing the division and distribution of the decedent’s intestate estate, unless the decedent’s contemporaneous writing provides otherwise.
  4. A debt owed to decedent is not charged against the intestate share of any individual except the debtor. If the debtor fails to survive the decedent, the debt is not taken into account in computing the intestate share of the debtor’s descendants.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 955; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 23; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 23; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 23; G.L. 1956, § 33-1-11 ; P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Directions to commissioners to divide real estate as to advancements, § 33-3-4 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Consideration for Deed.

Deeds did not constitute an advancement where they recited consideration, even though no present consideration passed, and where donee had for a number of years turned his earnings over to the donor and had made improvements on donor’s property. Beakhust v. Crumby, 18 R.I. 689 , 30 A. 453, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 58 (1894).

Deed for Love and Affection.

A deed to children or grandchildren for “love and affection” or “love and good will” or for a nominal consideration and love and affection is conclusive evidence of an advancement. Sayles v. Baker, 5 R.I. 457 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1858).

Memorandum.

The charge or memorandum mentioned in the statute contemplates that the donee is charged or in some manner made debtor to the donor’s estate, and where words of memorandum answers no object of donor, but simply vests property in donee, the transfer is not an advancement. Mowry v. Smith, 5 R.I. 255 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 24 (1858).

Parol Evidence.

Parol declarations by the intestate are not sufficient to establish an advancement without other proof. Law v. Smith, 2 R.I. 244 , 1852 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1852).

Delivery of personal property to a daughter was sufficient to prove an advancement when substantiated by facts and parol evidence showing an understanding that the property was intended as an advancement, even though delivery was accompanied by a memorandum purporting to land the property. Law v. Smith, 2 R.I. 244 , 1852 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1852).

Transfer of Mortgage.

The transfer of a mortgage to real estate is not a conveyance of real estate by “deed of gift.” Mowry v. Smith, 5 R.I. 255 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 24 (1858).

Voluntary Trust.

Where a father made back deposits for his children, named himself as trustee, and informed the children concerning the deposits, the deposits became voluntary trusts and were not gifts nor advancements. In re Atkinson, 16 R.I. 413 , 16 A. 712, 1889 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1889).

Collateral References.

Account book of parent as evidence of advancements to child indicated therein. 13 A.L.R.3d 284.

Account, items in form of, as advancements. 49 A.L.R. 574.

Check as evidencing advancement. 74 A.L.R.5th 491.

Grandchild’s interest in grandparent’s estate as affected by advancement to child. 68 A.L.R. 410.

Intent as factor in determining whether there is an advancement. 26 A.L.R. 1089.

Parol or extrinsic evidence to show testator’s intention as to advancements. 94 A.L.R. 183.

Pretermitted child or grandchild entitled by statute to share which he would have received if testator had died intestate, applicability of doctrine of advancement in case of. 88 A.L.R. 375.

Recovery of excess of advancement over distributable share in estate. 46 A.L.R. 1428.

Satisfaction or ademption of general legacy by inter vivos gift, transfer or payment to the legatee or another. 26 A.L.R.2d 9.

Testate succession, applicability of doctrine of advancements to. 32 A.L.R. 730.

Transfer by testator to devisee or legatee after execution of will, doctrine of advancements as applicable to. 142 A.L.R. 524.

Valuation of property for purposes of advancement. 26 A.L.R. 1178.

Widow’s distributive share as affected by advancements to others. 76 A.L.R. 1420.

Will charging distributee’s share with advancement to or debt owed by him as invoking doctrine of hotchpot. 165 A.L.R. 899.

33-1-12. Intestate estate.

  1. Any part of a decedent’s estate not effectively disposed of by will passes by intestate succession to the decedent’s heirs as prescribed in this chapter, except as modified by the decedent’s will.
  2. A decedent may by will expressly exclude or limit the right of an individual or class to succeed to property of the decedent passing by intestate succession. If that individual, or a member of that class, survives the decedent, the share of the decedent’s intestate estate to which that individual or class would have succeeded passes as if that individual or each member of that class has disclaimed an intestate share.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 3, and P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 3 enacted identical versions of this section.

33-1-13. Survivorship.

An individual who fails to survive the decedent by one hundred twenty (120) hours is considered to have predeceased the decedent for purposes of homestead allowance, exempt property, and intestate succession, and the decedent’s heirs are determined accordingly. If it is not established by clear and convincing evidence that an individual, who would otherwise be an heir, survived the decedent by one hundred twenty (120) hours, it is considered that the individual failed to survive for the required period. This section is not to be applied if its application would result in escheat of intestate estate to the state.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 3; P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 3, and P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 3 enacted identical versions of this section.

Chapter 1.1 Disposition of Property of Person Killed by Another

33-1.1-1. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Decedent” means any person whose life is taken by a slayer;
  2. “Property” shall include any real and personal property and any right or interest therein;
  3. “Slayer” means any person who wilfully and unlawfully takes or procures to be taken the life of another.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 62, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Slayer.

Superior court had jurisdiction over a wrongful death complaint brought under the Slayer’s Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-1.1-1(3) , that sought civil liability for a criminal act under R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-2 ; the complaint essentially sought a declaration under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-30-1 et seq., that the husband was a slayer of the decedent. Once a declaration was made, a probate court could determine what effect that declaration had on asset distribution. Tyre v. Swain, 946 A.2d 1189, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 57 (2008).

Collateral References.

Constitutionality of statute precluding inheritance by one who killed decedent. 6 A.L.R. 1408.

Disqualification of heir who murdered intestate as affecting rights of others in respect of the intestate estate. 156 A.L.R. 623; 161 A.L.R. 448.

Homicide as precluding taking under will or by intestacy. 25 A.L.R.4th 787.

33-1.1-2. Limitation on acquisition of property or benefit.

Neither the slayer nor any person claiming through him or her shall in any way acquire any property or receive any benefit as the result of the death of the decedent, but the property shall pass as provided in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 62, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The Slayer’s Act (this chapter) was intended to exclude a slayer from acquiring any property that was formerly held by a slain decedent; the act does not address property or benefits received by the slayer from other sources, nor should the act be construed to apply to individuals who have no right to acquire property through the decedent. Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 154 (1997).

Contingent Beneficiaries.

Though the Slayer’s Act does not specifically bar slayer’s issue from inheriting as contingent beneficiaries, the children of a testratrix’s slayer, who were contingent beneficiaries, could not inherit because they stated that they would use the inheritance to help pay for the slayer’s criminal defense, and the clear intent of the Act was to ensure that a slayer did not benefit from his wrongdoing. Swain v. Estate of Tyre, 57 A.3d 283, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 158 (2012).

Collateral References.

Felonious killing of one cotenant or tenant by the entireties by the other as affecting the latter’s right in the property. 42 A.L.R.3d 1116.

Homicide as precluding taking under will or by intestacy. 25 A.L.R.4th 787.

33-1.1-3. Statutory descent and rights.

The slayer shall be deemed to have predeceased the decedent as to property which would have passed from the estate of the decedent to the slayer under the statutes of descent and distribution, or by statutory right as surviving spouse.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 62, § 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 22.

Collateral References.

Homicide as precluding taking under will or by intestacy. 25 A.L.R.4th 787.

33-1.1-4. Wills.

The slayer shall be deemed to have predeceased the decedent as to property which would have passed to the slayer by devise or legacy from the decedent, except that the provisions of § 33-6-19 shall not apply.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 62, § 1.

Collateral References.

Homicide as precluding taking under will or by intestacy. 25 A.L.R.4th 787.

33-1.1-5. Tenancy by entirety.

One-half (1/2) of property held by the slayer and the decedent as tenants by the entirety shall pass upon the death of the decedent to his or her estate, and the other half shall be held by the slayer during his or her life subject to pass upon his or her death to the estate of the decedent.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 62, § 1.

33-1.1-6. Joint tenancy.

  1. One-half (1/2) of any property held by the slayer and the decedent as joint tenants, joint owners, or joint obligees shall pass upon the death of the decedent to his or her estate, and the other half shall pass to his or her estate upon the death of the slayer unless the slayer effects a separation or severance of the property or a decree granting partition.
  2. As to property held jointly by three (3) or more persons, including the slayer and the decedent, any enrichment which would have accrued to the slayer as a result of the death of the decedent shall pass to the estate of the decedent during the life or lives of the joint tenant or tenants (excluding the slayer). If the slayer shall not become the final survivor, then, upon the death of the slayer, such enrichment shall pass to the other surviving joint tenant or tenants. If the slayer becomes the final survivor, one-half (1/2) of the property shall immediately pass to the estate of the decedent, and the other half shall pass to his or her estate upon the death of the slayer, unless the slayer effects a separation or severance of the property or a decree granting partition.
  3. The provisions of this section shall not affect any enforceable agreement between the parties or any trust arising because a greater proportion of the property has been contributed by one party than by the other.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 62, § 1.

33-1.1-7. Reversion — Vested remainder.

Property in which the slayer holds a reversion or vested remainder and would have obtained the right of present possession upon the death of the decedent shall pass to the estate of the decedent during the period of the life expectancy of the decedent if he or she held the particular estate, or if the particular estate is held by a third person it shall remain in his or her hands for such period.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 62, § 1.

33-1.1-8. Interest subject to life of decedent.

Any interest in property, whether vested or not, held by the slayer subject to be divested, diminished in any way, or extinguished if the decedent survives him or her or lives to a certain age, shall be held by the slayer during his or her lifetime or until the decedent would have reached such age but shall then pass as if the decedent had died immediately thereafter.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 62, § 1.

33-1.1-9. Contingent remainder — Future interest.

As to any contingent remainder or executory or other future interest held by the slayer subject to become vested in him or her or increased in any way for him or her upon the condition of the death of the decedent:

  1. If the interest would not have become vested or increased if he or she had predeceased the decedent, he or she shall be deemed to have so predeceased the decedent;
  2. In any case, the interest shall not be vested or increased during the period of the life expectancy of the decedent.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 62, § 1.

33-1.1-10. Exercise of power of appointment.

  1. As to any exercise of a power of appointment in favor of the slayer in the will of the decedent, the slayer shall be deemed to have predeceased the decedent and the appointment to have lapsed.
  2. Property held either presently or in remainder by the slayer subject to be divested by the exercise by the decedent of a power of revocation or a general power of appointment shall pass to the estate of the decedent; and property so held by the slayer subject to be divested by the exercise by the decedent of a power of appointment to a particular person or persons, or to a class of persons, shall pass to such person or persons, or class of persons in equal shares to the members of such class of persons, exclusive of the slayer.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 62, § 1.

33-1.1-11. Insurance proceeds.

  1. Insurance proceeds payable to the slayer as the beneficiary or assignee of any policy or certificate of insurance on the life of the decedent or as the survivor of a joint life policy, even though such policy or certificate was procured and maintained by the slayer and even though he or she paid all the premiums, shall be paid as if the slayer had predeceased the insured.
  2. If the decedent is beneficiary or assignee of any policy or certificate of insurance on the life of the slayer, the proceeds shall be paid to the estate of the decedent upon the death of the slayer, unless the policy names some person other than the slayer or his or her estate as alternate beneficiary, or unless the slayer, by naming a new beneficiary or assigning the policy, performs an act which would have deprived the decedent of his or her interest in the policy if he or she had been living.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 62, § 1.

Collateral References.

Killing of insured by beneficiary as affecting life insurance or its proceeds. 27 A.L.R.3d 794.

33-1.1-12. Insurance companies, banks, or other obligors — Relief from liability when payment made without notice.

Any insurance company making payment according to the terms of its policy or any bank or other person performing an obligation for the slayer as one of several joint obligors shall not be subjected to additional liability by the terms of this chapter if such payment or performance is made without written notice of the killing by a slayer, at the home office of the insurance company or bank, home, or business address of the other person, of circumstances tending to bring it within the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 62, § 1.

33-1.1-13. Purchasers for value without notice.

The provisions of this chapter shall not affect the rights of any person who, before the interests of the slayer have been adjudicated, purchases from the slayer for value and without notice property which the slayer would have acquired except for the terms of this chapter; but all proceeds received by the slayer from such sale shall be held by him or her in trust for the persons entitled to the property under the provisions of this chapter, and the slayer shall also be liable both for any portion of the proceeds which he or she may have dissipated and for any difference between the actual value of the property and the amount of the proceeds.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 62, § 1.

33-1.1-14. Record of conviction admissible in civil actions.

The record of his or her conviction of having wilfully and unlawfully killed the decedent shall be admissible in evidence against a claimant of property in any civil action arising under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 62, § 1.

33-1.1-15. Construction.

This chapter shall not be considered penal in nature, but shall be construed broadly in order to effect the policy of this state that no person shall be allowed to profit by his or her own wrong.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 62, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Contingent Beneficiaries.

Though the Slayer’s Act does not specifically bar slayer’s issue from inheriting as contingent beneficiaries, the children of a testratrix’s slayer, who were contingent beneficiaries, could not inherit because they testified that they would use the inheritance to help pay for the slayer’s criminal defense, and the clear intent of the Act was to ensure that a slayer did not benefit from his wrongdoing. Swain v. Estate of Tyre, 57 A.3d 283, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 158 (2012).

33-1.1-16. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1962, ch. 62, § 1.

Chapter 2 Simultaneous Deaths

33-2-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Uniform Simultaneous Death Act”.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1871, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 33-2-1 .

Comparative Legislation.

Uniform simultaneous death act:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-440 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 190A, § 1 et seq.

33-2-2. Presumption of survivorship as to each decedent.

Where the title to property or the devolution thereof depends upon priority of death and there is no sufficient evidence that the persons have died otherwise than simultaneously, the property of each person shall be disposed of as if he or she had survived, except as provided otherwise in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1871, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-2-2 .

Collateral References.

Common disaster, succession to property as affected by death in, in absence of presumption or proof of survivorship. 43 A.L.R. 1348.

Construction, application and effect of Uniform Simultaneous Death Act. 39 A.L.R.3d 1332.

Time interval contemplated by statute of descent and distribution with reference to death of two persons simultaneously or approximately at the same time. 173 A.L.R. 1254.

33-2-3. Successive beneficiaries dying simultaneously.

Where two (2) or more beneficiaries are designated to take successively by reason of survivorship under another person’s disposition of property and there is no sufficient evidence that these beneficiaries have died otherwise than simultaneously the property thus disposed of shall be divided into as many equal portions as there are successive beneficiaries and these portions shall be distributed respectively to those who would have taken in the event that each designated beneficiary had survived.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1871, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-2-3 .

33-2-4. Joint tenants or tenants by entirety dying simultaneously.

Where there is no sufficient evidence that two (2) joint tenants or tenants by the entirety have died otherwise than simultaneously the property so held shall be distributed one-half (1/2) as if one had survived and one-half (1/2) as if the other had survived. If there are more than two (2) joint tenants and all of them have so died the property thus distributed shall be in the proportion that one bears to the whole number of joint tenants.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1871, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 33-2-4 .

Collateral References.

Common disaster, death of both tenants in, as affecting devolution of joint estate, community estate, or estate by entireties. 18 A.L.R. 105.

Validity and effect of one spouse’s conveyance to other spouse of interest in property held as estate by the entireties. 18 A.L.R.5th 230.

33-2-5. Insurance policies.

Where the insured and the beneficiary in a policy of life or accident insurance have died, and there is no sufficient evidence that they have died otherwise than simultaneously, the proceeds of the policy shall be distributed as if the insured had survived the beneficiary.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1871, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 33-2-5 .

33-2-6. Chapter not retroactive.

This chapter shall not apply to the distribution of the property of a person who has died before April 28, 1947.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1871, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 33-2-6 .

33-2-7. Chapter inapplicable where other provisions made.

This chapter shall not apply in the case of wills, living trusts, deeds, or contracts of insurance wherein provision has been made for distribution of property different from the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1871, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 33-2-7 .

Collateral References.

Construction of will provision as to which of two or more parties shall be deemed the survivor in case of death simultaneously, in a common disaster, or within a specified period of time. 40 A.L.R.3d 359.

33-2-8. Uniformity of construction.

This chapter shall be so construed and interpreted as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law in those states which enact it.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1871, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 33-2-8 .

33-2-9. Severability.

If any of the provisions of this chapter or the application thereof to any persons or circumstances is held invalid such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provisions or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1947, ch. 1871, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 33-2-9 .

Chapter 3 Division of Real Estate

33-3-1. Power of probate court — Application for division.

After payment of the debts, charges, and expenses of settling the estate of any person dying intestate, the probate court which granted administration on the estate may divide the real estate of which such intestate died seised, among the parties entitled thereto, in the proportion by law prescribed, whenever application in writing shall be made to it for such purpose by all the parties setting forth and particularly describing each parcel of the real estate.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 942; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 33-3-1 .

Cross References.

Estate chargeable with debts of decedent, § 33-12-1 .

Partition, § 34-15-1 et seq.

Proportion prescribed by law, § 33-1-1 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Real property:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-444.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 190, § 2.

Collateral References.

Executor or administrator, right to bring proceedings for partition of real property. 57 A.L.R. 573.

33-3-2. Time of proceeding — Notice.

Upon the filing of such application a time shall be appointed for proceeding therein, and notice thereof shall be given, in such manner as the probate court shall appoint, to the parties in interest.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 943; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 33-3-3 -2.

33-3-3. Decree determining parties entitled — Appointment of commissioners.

At the time appointed, the court shall by decree determine who are the parties entitled to a share of the intestate’s estate, the amount of advancement made by the intestate to any of the parties, and the share to which each of the parties is entitled out of the real estate; and shall thereupon appoint three (3) discreet and disinterested persons, residing in any of the towns wherein the lands to be divided lie, as commissioners to make partition thereof according to the decree.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 944; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 33-3-3 .

Cross References.

Advancements, § 33-1-11 .

33-3-4. Directions as to advancements.

If any child or grandchild of an intestate shall have received from him or her any real or personal estate for his or her advancement, the probate court shall ascertain the amount thereof before appointing commissioners to divide the real estate, and shall, in its decree of division, direct the commissioners to deduct the amount thereof from the share of the child or grandchild.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 954; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 22; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 22; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 33-3-4 .

Cross References.

Advancements, § 33-1-11 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Common Law Abrogated.

This statute abrogates the common law rule for bringing an advancement into hotchpot by requiring that the amount of an advancement must be deducted from the heir’s share. Law v. Smith, 2 R.I. 244 , 1852 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1852).

Value of Advancement.

The value of an advancement at the time it is made is used in ascertaining the amount to be deducted from an heir’s share. Law v. Smith, 2 R.I. 244 , 1852 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1852).

Collateral References.

Agreement that one’s share in estate shall be equal to share of certain other person as affected by gift to latter during lifetime of decedent. 5 A.L.R. 1436.

Applicability of doctrine of advancements in case of pretermitted child or grandchild entitled by statute to the share which he would have received if testator had died intestate. 88 A.L.R. 375.

Intent as factor in determining whether there is an advancement. 26 A.L.R. 1089.

Items in form of account as advancements. 49 A.L.R. 574.

Presumption and burden of proof with respect to advancements to children. 26 A.L.R. 1106; 31 A.L.R.2d 1036.

Presumption of gift, advancement or settlement where husband takes title from third person to property paid for by or with funds of wife. 113 A.L.R. 339.

Recovery of excess of advancement over distributable share in estate. 46 A.L.R. 1428.

Release by, or advancement to, child as affecting grandchild’s interest in grandparent’s estate. 68 A.L.R. 410.

Valuation of property for purposes of advancements. 26 A.L.R. 1178.

Widow’s statutory distributive share as affected by advancements to others, or by provisions of will that legatees shall take certain indebtedness owing to testator as part of their share. 76 A.L.R. 1420.

33-3-5. Warrants to commissioners.

The court shall issue its warrants to the commissioners, which shall be in substance as follows:

THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND. SC. To of in the county of Greeting: Whereas the probate court of the town of at its session on the day of did pass the following decree, to wit: [Here insert a copy of the decree.] You are therefore hereby authorized, after being engaged to the faithful discharge of the trust reposed in you, to appraise all the real estate described and referred to in the decree, each parcel by itself, at the present value thereof in money, and, after having made such appraisement, to divide the real estate among the parties named in the decree in the proportions set forth therein. You are to let all persons named in the decree have notice when you proceed to make such appraisement and division, and, having completed the same, you are to make return of this warrant, with your doings thereon, unto this probate court as soon as may be. Signed for and in behalf of the probate court on this day of , Clerk.

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History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 945; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 33-3-5 .

Compiler's Notes

In 2021, “AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS” was deleted following “STATE OF RHODE ISLAND” in this section at the direction of the Law Revision Director to reflect the 2020 amendments to the state constitution that changed the state’s name.

33-3-6. Division of property by commissioners.

The commissioners shall proceed, as soon as may be after receiving their warrant, to execute the duties required of them by virtue thereof and divide the real estate in the manner and proportions prescribed in the decree recited in the warrant.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 946; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 33-3-6 .

33-3-7. Assignment of shares by lot or agreement.

If the share of any of the parties shall be less than the share of each of the other parties, and the shares of those other parties be equal, in such case the commissioners shall set off the smaller share to such party and assign the other shares by lot; and the assignment shall also be by lot if all the shares be equal; provided, that if all the parties be sui juris the assignment may be made by agreement among themselves.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 947; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 33-3-7 .

33-3-8. Commissioners’ report.

The commissioners shall make report of all their proceedings under the warrant to the probate court that appointed them; which report shall be passed upon by the court after notice, and, if finally established, shall be recorded in the records of land evidence in the several towns or cities wherein any of the lands lie.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 948; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 33-3-8 .

Collateral References.

Interference by court with decision of commissioners in partition suit. 46 A.L.R. 348.

33-3-9. Representation of infants and persons non compos mentis.

In case any infant or person non compos mentis shall be interested in the partition of any estate as provided in § 33-3-3 , the application for the same shall be made and signed by his or her guardian, if he or she has one, otherwise by his or her guardian ad litem appointed by the court, whose acts in the premises shall be conclusive on such infant or person non compos mentis.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 949; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 33-3-9 .

33-3-10. Real estate not disposed of by will.

Whenever any person shall die leaving a last will and testament duly executed, and shall at the time of his or her decease be seised of any real estate not disposed of by the will, the estate shall be divided among the heirs at law of the deceased in the same manner as though he or she had left no will.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 950; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 33-3-10 .

33-3-11. Division of real estate devised in common.

Real estate held in common by devise may be divided, according to the respective rights of the parties entitled to such real estate, in the manner and form prescribed in this chapter for the division of intestate estates, and the like proceedings shall be had for effecting and confirming the same; provided, that the interest of surviving spouse shall be subject to distribution in accordance with §§ 33-25-1 33-25-6 .

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 951; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 19; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 19; G.L. 1956, § 33-3-11 .

33-3-12. Division of remainder in property.

Any part of the real estate of any testator or intestate as shall be assigned to his widow pursuant to § 33-1-6 shall, after her death, be divided among the devisees, or heirs at law, of the deceased, in the same manner as the real estate would have been divided in case it had not been assigned pursuant to § 33-1-6 .

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 952; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 20; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 20; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 33-3-12 ; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 23.

33-3-13. Payment of expenses of division on appeal to superior court.

Whenever partition or division shall be made by any probate court, and there shall be an appeal to the superior court, and any one or more of the interested parties shall neglect or refuse to pay their just proportion of the expense of such division, the probate court which ordered such division may issue a warrant of distress against such delinquent; provided, that an account of such expense be first laid before such probate court, and the just proportions of the persons interested be settled and allowed, they having been duly notified to be present at such settlement and allowance.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 953; G.L. 1909, ch. 316, § 21; G.L. 1923, ch. 367, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 567, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 33-3-13 .

Cross References.

Expenses as expenses of administration of decedent’s estate, § 33-12-3 .

33-3-14. Certificate of descent.

Prior to acceptance by the probate court of the final account or affidavit of complete administration, the fiduciary shall submit to the probate court an affidavit of no real property or a duly recorded certificate of descent which shall contain the name and place of residence of each person to whom the real property, or any portion thereof or interest therein is distributed, set out, or divided or descends, or a particular description of the estate, portion, or interest distributed, set out, or divided or descending to each person. Said certificate of descent shall be signed by the fiduciary.

History of Section. P.L. 2001, ch. 296, § 1; P.L. 2006, ch. 589, § 1.

Chapter 4 Dower and Jointure [Repealed.]

33-4-1 — 33-4-34. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 264, § 1-9, 11-31; C.P.A. 1905, § 1161, 1162, 1163; G.L. 1909, ch. 329, § 1-30; G.L. 1923, ch. 380, § 1-3; P.L.1929, ch. 1317, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 418, § 1-30, 31; P.L. 1941, ch. 1004, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 24, effective July 5, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former chapter 4 consisting of §§ 33-4-1 — 33-4-34 concerned dower and jointure.

Chapter 5 Execution and Revocation of Wills

33-5-1. Definitions.

As used in this chapter and chapter 6 of this title:

  1. “Personal estate” shall extend to leasehold estate, and other chattels real, and also to money, stocks and other funds, securities for money, debts, choses in action, rights, credits, goods, and all other property whatsoever which by law devolve upon the executor or administrator and to any share or interest therein;
  2. “Real estate” shall extend to lands, tenements and hereditaments, whether freehold or of any other tenure, and whether corporeal or incorporeal, and to any undivided share, of real estate, and to any estate, right or interest other than a chattel interest therein; and
  3. “Will” shall extend to a testament and to a codicil and to an appointment by will, or by writing in the nature of a will, in exercise of a power.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-5-1 .

Cross References.

Agreements as to disposition of stock nontestamentary, § 7-1-21 .

Partnership agreement deemed nontestamentary, § 7-12-1 .

Uniform Transfer on Death Security Registration Act, § 7-11.1-1 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Execution and revocation of wills:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-250 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 191, § 1 et seq.

Collateral References.

Action for tortious interference with request as precluded by will contest remedy. 18 A.L.R.5th 211.

Character of instrument as will as affected by its failure to make any disposition of property or by fact that there is no beneficiary entitled to take thereunder. 147 A.L.R. 636.

Inter vivos instrument as part of will. 45 A.L.R. 843.

Letter as a will or codicil. 54 A.L.R. 917; 40 A.L.R.2d 698.

Notation on note or securities as a will or codicil. 62 A.L.R. 292.

33-5-2. Testamentary capacity — Property subject to will.

Every person of sane mind and eighteen (18) years or older in age, may devise, bequeath, or dispose of, by his or her will, executed in the manner required by this chapter, all real estate and all personal estate, which he or she shall be entitled to either at law or in equity at the time of his or her death and which, if not so devised, bequeathed or disposed of, would devolve upon the heir at law, or upon his or her executor or administrator, but not including an estate tail. The power hereby given shall extend to all real estate, including all estate per autre vie, and all estates, whether they shall be freehold or of any other tenure, and all estates, whether they shall be corporeal or incorporeal hereditaments, and also to all contingent, executor, or other future interests, in any real or personal estate, whether the testator may or may not be ascertained as the person or one of the persons in whom the estates respectively may become vested, and whether he or she may become entitled thereto under the instrument by which the estates respectively were created, or under any disposition thereof by deed or will, and also to all rights of entry for conditions broken and other rights of entry, and also to such of the same estates, interests and rights respectively, and other real and personal estate, as the testator may be entitled to at the time of his or her death, notwithstanding that he or she may become entitled to the same subsequently to the execution of his or her will.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-5-2 ; P.L. 1988, ch. 146, § 1.

Cross References.

Married woman, testamentary power, § 15-4-7 .

Prisoner, power to make will, § 13-6-3 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Illustrative Cases.

Will contestant’s claim that the executor failed to prove the testator was of sufficient age and testamentary capacity, and that the superior court erred in not instructing the jury on plaintiff’s burden to prove those issues, was meritless because the contestant waived those issues by failing to raise them in the lower courts. Lett v. Giuliano, 35 A.3d 870, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 2 (2012).

Will contestant’s claim that the executor failed to prove testamentary capacity was meritless, as the drafting attorney’s unimpeached testimony provided ample evidence of testamentary capacity, which the contestant failed to rebut. Lett v. Giuliano, 35 A.3d 870, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 2 (2012).

Collateral References.

Admissibility and probative force of adjudication of insanity on issue of testamentary capacity. 7 A.L.R. 581; 68 A.L.R. 1309.

Admissibility of evidence other than testimony of subscribing witness to prove due execution of will, or testamentary capacity. 63 A.L.R. 1195.

Affirmative evidence of testamentary capacity, necessity of, to make prima facie case in will contest. 110 A.L.R. 675.

Alzheimer’s disease as affecting testamentary capacity. 47 A.L.R.5th 523.

Blind person’s testamentary capacity. 9 A.L.R. 1416; 37 A.L.R. 603.

Codicil as validating will invalid because of want of testamentary capacity. 87 A.L.R. 836; 21 A.L.R.2d 830.

Convict’s capacity to make will. 84 A.L.R.3d 479.

Effect upon testamentary nature of document or expression therein of intention to make more formal will, further disposition of property, or the like. 46 A.L.R.3d 938.

Enlarged interest of testator acquired subsequent to execution of will, passing by devise or bequest. 18 A.L.R.2d 519.

Epilepsy as affecting testamentary capacity. 16 A.L.R. 1418.

Fee simple conditional, power of tenant in, to dispose of property by devise. 114 A.L.R. 614.

Guardianship of adult as affecting testamentary capacity. 89 A.L.R.2d 1120.

Insane delusion as invalidating will. 175 A.L.R. 882.

Intoxicating liquor or drugs, testamentary capacity as affected by use of. 9 A.L.R.3d 15.

Life tenant with power to anticipate or enjoy principal as authorized to devise same. 2 A.L.R. 1281; 27 A.L.R. 1381; 69 A.L.R. 825; 114 A.L.R. 946.

Massachusetts or business trust, bequest of shares in. 88 A.L.R.3d 704.

May parts of will be upheld notwithstanding failure of other parts for lack of testamentary mental capacity or undue influence. 64 A.L.R.3d 261.

Necessity of laying foundation for opinion of attesting witness as to mental condition of testator or testatrix. 17 A.L.R.3d 503.

Probate where two or more testamentary documents, bearing the same date or undated, are proffered. 17 A.L.R.3d 603.

Right of reentry for breach of condition subsequent, devisability of. 16 A.L.R.2d 1246.

Soldiers’ and sailors’ wills, capacity of minor to make. 137 A.L.R. 1311; 147 A.L.R. 1296; 148 A.L.R. 1384; 149 A.L.R. 1452; 150 A.L.R. 1417; 151 A.L.R. 1453; 152 A.L.R. 1450.

Testamentary capacity as affected by use of intoxicating liquor or drugs. 9 A.L.R.3d 15.

Testator’s illiteracy or lack of knowledge of language in which will is written as affecting its validity. 37 A.L.R.3d 889.

Validity of will as affected by fact that testatrix and beneficiaries are inmates of house of prostitution. 16 A.L.R. 457; 31 A.L.R.2d 321.

33-5-3. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 5; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 33-5-3 ; Repealed by P.L. 1988, ch. 146, § 2, effective June 2, 1988.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-5-3 concerned the wills of minors.

33-5-4. Nomination of guardian by will.

Every person authorized by law to make a will may nominate by his or her will a guardian or guardians for his or her children during their minority, and a successor guardian or guardians for persons who are retarded as defined in chapter 22 of title 40.1 for whom he or she had been appointed guardian during his or her lifetime, and the probate court shall appoint the guardian or guardians unless good cause be shown to the contrary; provided, that, in the case of husband and wife, the survivor, being otherwise qualified, shall be the guardian of their children.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 33-5-4 ; P.L. 1980, ch. 141, § 1.

Cross References.

Testamentary appointment of guardian for minor children, § 33-15-6 .

Collateral References.

Extrinsic evidence to identify person whom testator intended to designate as guardian. 94 A.L.R. 127; 173.

Parent’s power to appoint testamentary guardian for adult imbecile child. 24 A.L.R. 1458.

Renunciation of will by spouse and election to take under statute as affecting provisions imposing upon spouse personal duty as guardian. 71 A.L.R. 665.

Validity of condition in will in restraint of marriage as applied to appointment of guardian. 122 A.L.R. 26.

33-5-5. Execution of will — Acknowledgment and attestation.

No will shall be valid, except as provided in §§ 33-5-6 and 33-5-7 , unless it shall be in writing and signed by the testator, or by some other person for him or her in his or her presence and by his or her express direction; and this signature shall be made or acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two (2) or more witnesses present at the same time, and the witnesses shall attest and shall subscribe the will in the presence of the testator, but no form of attestation shall be necessary, and no other publication shall be necessary.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 13; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 33-5-5 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Bank Account.

Attempted gift of bank account of decedent’s funds was void as a testamentary disposition without compliance with this section where decedent retained control of bank book. McCartin v. Devine, 66 R.I. 100 , 17 A.2d 864, 1941 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1941).

Denial of Attestation.

Verdict that instrument was the will of deceased was final and conclusive, even though the subscribing witnesses denied that they signed the will and two of the witnesses denied that they were present on the date in question, where appellant testified as to preparation of will and genuine signatures of attesting witnesses were submitted to the jurors for comparison with denied signatures. Newell v. White, 29 R.I. 343 , 73 A. 798, 1908 R.I. LEXIS 84 (1908).

Loan Agreement.

Proviso in loan agreement that title to note should vest in niece in event the lender should die before maturity was intended to operate as a will but did not pass title since agreement was not executed in compliance with provisions of this chapter. Sliney v. Cormier, 49 R.I. 74 , 139 A. 665, 1928 R.I. LEXIS 8 (1928).

Nonresident Testator.

Will of nonresident executed in the state of his domicile but which did not comply with the law of his domicile could not be probated even though it complied with this section. Pickering v. Pickering, 64 R.I. 112 , 10 A.2d 721, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1940).

Safety Deposit Box.

Disposition of property by terms of joint tenancy in safety deposit box was void where it did not qualify as a gift in praesenti and was not executed in accordance with this section. Millman v. Streeter, 66 R.I. 341 , 19 A.2d 254, 1941 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1941).

Signature by Testator.

Will was validly executed where lawyer guided the pen of testator who was too weak to make his signature, even though testator did not request assistance. Wood v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 27 R.I. 295 , 61 A. 757, 1905 R.I. LEXIS 87 (1905).

Even though a son’s handwriting expert’s affidavit was less than replete with information about the methodology he used to reach his expert conclusion that a testator’s signature was not authentic, as required by R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-5-5 , it was minimally adequate to satisfy the son’s obligation, as the nonmovant, to show the presence of a genuine issue of material fact. Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 74 (2008).

Subscription by Witnesses.

A will is invalid unless subscribed by the witnesses in the presence of the testator. A later acknowledgment to the testator of the subscriptions does not cure the defect. Pawtucket v. Ballou, 15 R.I. 58 , 23 A. 43, 1885 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1885).

Deed of trust signed by two witnesses was executed with formality required of a will though one witness attached an acknowledgment and signed as a notary public. Merrill v. Boal, 47 R.I. 274 , 132 A. 721, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1926).

Trial justice did not err in affirming the probate’s order admitting the testator’s last will and testament because it was clear that the testator, a witness, and a notary each signed the will in the presence of one another and thus, the subscribe and attest requirements of this section were satisfied. In re Est. of Cardiff, 266 A.3d 1217, 2022 R.I. LEXIS 3 (2022).

Time of Determination of Validity.

Will was valid where executed in compliance with the law existing at the time of death even though not in compliance with the law at the time of execution. Langley v. Langley, 18 R.I. 618 , 30 A. 465, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1894).

Collateral References.

Acknowledgment of signature by testator or witness to will as satisfying statutory requirements that testator or witness sign in the presence of each other. 115 A.L.R. 689.

Attesting witnesses, necessary that subscription to will be made in the presence of each other. 99 A.L.R. 554.

Attesting witnesses, place of signature of. 1 A.L.R.5th 965.

Blind person, execution of will of. 9 A.L.R. 1416; 37 A.L.R. 603.

Body of instrument, testator’s name in, as sufficient signature where statute does not require will to be signed at end. 29 A.L.R. 891.

Changes and interlineations appearing on face of will. 34 A.L.R.2d 619.

Character as witness of one who signed will for another purpose. 8 A.L.R. 1075.

Codicil as validating defectively executed will or codicil or one never executed. 87 A.L.R. 836; 21 A.L.R.2d 817.

Competency, as witness attesting will, of attorney named therein as executor’s attorney. 30 A.L.R.3d 1361.

Date in printed figures. 147 A.L.R. 898.

Effect of witnesses signing before testator signs. 91 A.L.R.2d 737.

Effect upon testamentary nature of document or expression therein of intention to make more formal will, further disposition of property, or the like. 46 A.L.R.3d 938.

Evidence as to signature other than that of subscribing witnesses. 63 A.L.R. 1202.

Experimental evidence as to possibility of testator seeing and hearing attesting witnesses. 8 A.L.R. 59; 85 A.L.R. 479.

Fingerprints, signature by. 114 A.L.R. 1116.

Illegibility of signature, effect of. 64 A.L.R. 208.

Incorporation in will of extrinsic document not in existence at date of will. 3 A.L.R.2d 682.

Initials, signature by. 114 A.L.R. 1115.

Manner of signing as affecting sufficiency of signature of testator. 31 A.L.R. 682; 42 A.L.R. 954; 114 A.L.R. 1110.

Necessity that attesting witness realize instrument was intended as will. 71 A.L.R.3d 877.

Place of signature of attesting witness to will. 1 A.L.R.5th 965.

Request on part of testator to the witnesses to attest or subscribe will, necessity of, and what amounts to. 125 A.L.R. 414.

Sufficiency of testator’s acknowledgment of signature from his conduct and the surrounding circumstances. 7 A.L.R.3d 317.

Testator’s illiteracy or lack of knowledge of language in which will is written as affecting its validity. 37 A.L.R.3d 889.

Testimony of attesting witnesses as to time of interlineations and changes appearing on face of will. 34 A.L.R.2d 662.

Validity of will drawn by layman who, in so doing, violated criminal statute forbidding such activities by one other than licensed attorney. 18 A.L.R.2d 918.

Validity of will written on disconnected sheets. 38 A.L.R.2d 477.

33-5-6. Persons in military service — Sailors.

Any soldier or airman in actual military service, or any mariner or sailor at sea, may dispose of his or her personal estate by will as he or she might heretofore have done.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 20; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 20; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 20; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 33-5-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Seaman Passenger.

A seaman on his way to assume employment is not within this section while he is a passenger aboard a ship. Warren v. Harding, 2 R.I. 133 , 1852 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1852).

Collateral References.

Soldiers’ and seamen’s wills. 137 A.L.R. 1310; 147 A.L.R. 1297; 148 A.L.R. 1384; 149 A.L.R. 1452; 150 A.L.R. 1417; 151 A.L.R. 1453; 152 A.L.R. 1450.

33-5-7. Wills conforming to laws of other states.

Any last will and testament executed outside this state in the mode prescribed by the law, either of the place where executed or of the testator’s domicile, shall be deemed to be legally executed, and shall be of the same force and effect as if executed in the mode prescribed by the laws of this state; provided, the last will and testament is in writing and subscribed by the testator.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 36; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 36; P.L. 1911, ch. 706, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 36; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 35; G.L. 1956, § 33-5-7 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Invalid Will.

Testator’s will which was invalid in state of his domicile could not be probated in Rhode Island where personal property was located, even though it would have been valid under Rhode Island law. Pickering v. Pickering, 64 R.I. 112 , 10 A.2d 721, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1940).

Personal Property Located in Rhode Island.

Upon the death of a person domiciled in another state, personal property located in Rhode Island may be disposed of under a will executed in accordance with the laws of the state in which the person was domiciled. Lapham v. Olney, 5 R.I. 413 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 60 (1858).

Collateral References.

Use of figures wholly or in part to express date of holographic will as affecting its sufficiency. 22 A.L.R.3d 866.

33-5-8. Conformation to law at time of execution.

A will of real or personal estate made and executed in conformity with the law existing at the time of execution, shall be effective to pass the estate.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 19; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 19; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 19; G.L. 1956, § 33-5-8 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Validity at Time of Death.

This section did not invalidate a will valid according to the law at the time of death, even though it was invalid according to the law in effect at the time of its execution. Langley v. Langley, 18 R.I. 618 , 30 A. 465, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1894).

33-5-9. Revocation of will by marriage.

The marriage of a person shall act as a revocation of a will made by him or her previous to the marriage, unless it appears from the will that it was made in contemplation thereof; but if the will exercises a power of appointment and the real and personal property thereby appointed would not, in default of the appointment, pass to the persons who would have been entitled to it had it been the property and estate of the testator or testatrix making the appointment and had he or she died intestate, so much of the will as makes the appointment shall not be revoked by the marriage.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 16; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 16; P.L. 1931, ch. 1754, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 33-5-9 ; P.L. 1986, ch. 175, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 3 of P.L. 1986, ch. 175 provides that the amendment of this section by that Act shall take effect on July 1, 1986 and shall apply in all cases where the testator or testatrix died on or after July 1, 1986.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Admissibility of Parol Evidence.

Revocation of a will by marriage was presumptive only and parol evidence was admissible to rebut the presumption. Miller v. Phillips, 9 R.I. 141 , 1869 R.I. LEXIS 2 (1869).

Court Consideration of Circumstances Surrounding Will.

An express statement within a will stating that it was executed in contemplation of marriage is not required to prevent a strict automatic revocation of a will by a subsequent marriage of the testator. The court may consider the circumstances surrounding the making of the will in order to establish that the will might have been made in contemplation of marriage. D'Ambra v. Cole, 572 A.2d 268, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1990).

Marriage Between Testator and Legatee.

Will was revoked by testator’s marriage after execution of the will even though his future wife was named as a residuary legatee. Hathaway v. Hathaway, 52 R.I. 39 , 156 A. 800, 1931 R.I. LEXIS 99 (1931) (decision prior to 1931 amendment).

Purpose of Section.

This section was enacted for the benefit of the surviving spouse. It is not intended in its interpretation to automatically defeat any well-defined intent on the part of the testator. D'Ambra v. Cole, 572 A.2d 268, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1990).

Rebuttal of Presumption of Revocation.

This section creates a statutory presumption of revocation of a will by a subsequent marriage of the testator. This presumption can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the will was made in contemplation of the subsequent marriage. D'Ambra v. Cole, 572 A.2d 268, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1990).

Collateral References.

Antenuptial agreement or settlement as affecting rule regarding revocation of will by marriage. 92 A.L.R. 1010.

Codicil as validating will revoked by marriage or birth of children. 87 A.L.R. 838.

Remarriage of woman after death of or divorce from former husband as revoking will executed during former marriage. 9 A.L.R.2d 510.

When will deemed to have provided for, or contemplated, contingency of future birth or marriage, or other event, which by statute wholly or partially revoked or otherwise renders such will inoperative. 38 A.L.R.4th 117.

33-5-9.1. Revocation of provision in will for divorced spouse.

The entry of a final judgment in the divorce of a person shall act as a revocation of all provisions for the benefit of the former spouse in a will made by the person prior to the divorce, unless it appears from the will that the will was made in contemplation of the divorce. All other provisions in the will shall take effect as though the former spouse had predeceased the person.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 175, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 3 of P.L. 1986, ch. 175 provides that the enactment of this section by that Act shall take effect on July 1, 1986 and shall apply to all cases where the testator or testatrix died on or after July 1, 1986.

33-5-10. Methods of revoking will.

No will or codicil or any part thereof shall be revoked except as provided in § 33-5-9 , or by another will or codicil executed in the manner required by § 33-5-5 , or by some writing declaring an intention to revoke the will and executed in the manner in which a will is required to be executed, or by burning, tearing, or otherwise destroying the will by the testator, or by some person in his or her presence and by his or her direction, with the intention of revoking the will.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 17; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 33-5-10 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Alterations.

An alteration in a will, either by substitution or cutting out, cannot effectively be made except by a properly executed codicil. Nelen v. Nelen, 52 R.I. 354 , 161 A. 121, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1932).

Testimony concerning letters and memoranda written by testator could not be admitted to contradict, vary, or alter the language of a will. Bank of Manhattan Trust Co. v. Gray, 53 R.I. 377 , 166 A. 817, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 103 (1933).

Inconsistencies.

Where codicil does not expressly revoke any part of a will, court will endeavor to reconcile inconsistencies and will give effect to the original will insofar as consistent with the codicil. Industrial Trust Co. v. Clarke, 59 R.I. 152 , 194 A. 603, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 141 (1937).

Otherwise Destroying.

The phrase “otherwise destroying” imports a destruction of both the substance and contents of the will, and anything short of a destruction of this degree is entirely ineffectual as a revocation, particularly where the original writing remains legible. Estate of Eglee, 119 R.I. 786 , 383 A.2d 586, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 613 (1978).

The phrase “otherwise destroying” does not include revocation by cancellation or obliteration. Estate of Eglee, 119 R.I. 786 , 383 A.2d 586, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 613 (1978).

Provisions Separable.

An alteration does not affect the validity of provisions not altered since the provisions are separable and enforceable independently of each other. Nelen v. Nelen, 52 R.I. 354 , 161 A. 121, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1932).

Revocation by Invalid Instrument.

A second will which was invalid because it was signed by an insufficient number of witnesses could not operate as an “other writing” to revoke the prior will. Reese v. Court of Probate, 9 R.I. 434 , 1865 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1865).

A will destroyed during the lifetime of the testator was not effective to revoke a previous will. Bates v. Hacking, 29 R.I. 1 , 68 A. 622, 1908 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1908).

Collateral References.

Ademption or revocation of specific devise or bequest by guardian, committee, conservator, or trustee of mentally or physically incompetent testator. 84 A.L.R.4th 462.

Admissibility of testator’s declarations on issue of revocation of will, in his possession at time of his death, by mutilation, alteration, or cancellation. 28 A.L.R.3d 994.

Contract, right to revoke will executed pursuant to. 3 A.L.R. 172.

Destruction or cancelation, actual or presumed, of one copy of will executed in duplicate, as revocation of other copy. 17 A.L.R.2d 805.

Effect of testator’s attempted physical alteration of will after execution. 62 A.L.R. 1367; 24 A.L.R.2d 514.

Establishment and effect, after death of one of the makers of joint, mutual, or reciprocal will, of agreement not to revoke will. 17 A.L.R.4th 167.

Evidence of declarations by testator on issue of revocation. 79 A.L.R. 1509; 172 A.L.R. 354.

Implied revocation of will by later will. 59 A.L.R.2d 11.

Later will, necessity of revocation of probate or prior will before probate of, or effect of probate after prior probate. 107 A.L.R. 254; 157 A.L.R. 1351.

Later will, revocation as reviving earlier will. 28 A.L.R. 911; 162 A.L.R. 1072.

Letter as revoking instrument. 54 A.L.R. 936; 40 A.L.R.2d 698; 40 A.L.R.2d 736.

Necessity that later will refer to earlier will in order to effect a revocation under statute providing that a will may be revoked by a subsequent will declaring the revocation. 28 A.L.R. 691.

Parol or extrinsic evidence to show intention of testator as to revocation. 94 A.L.R. 173.

Physical alteration of will as partial or total revocation. 62 A.L.R. 1376; 24 A.L.R.2d 514.

Power conferred upon third person to change will as attempted revocation. 108 A.L.R. 1098.

Presence of testator, necessity that physical destruction or mutilation of will be done in, in order to effect revocation. 100 A.L.R. 1520.

Ratification or adoption of physical destruction or mutilation of will without testator’s knowledge or consent in first instance, revocation by. 99 A.L.R. 524.

Revival under doctrine of dependent relative revocation of charitable bequest in will expressly revoked in a later will containing same charitable bequest. 75 A.L.R.3d 877.

Revocation of codicil as affecting will. 7 A.L.R.3d 1143.

Revocation of prior will by revocation clause in lost will or other lost instrument. 31 A.L.R.4th 306.

Revocation of will by writing not testamentary in character. 22 A.L.R.3d 1346.

Revocation of witnessed will by holographic will or codicil, where statute requires revocation by instrument of equal formality as will. 49 A.L.R.3d 1223.

Sufficiency of evidence of nonrevocation of lost will where codicil survives. 84 A.L.R.4th 531.

Testator’s failure to make new will, following loss of original will by fire, theft, or similar casualty, as constituting revocation of original will. 61 A.L.R.3d 958.

Validity, construction, and effect of provisions of will relating to its modification or revocation. 72 A.L.R. 871.

33-5-11. Alteration of circumstances.

No will shall be revoked by any presumption of intention on the ground of an alteration in circumstances.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 18; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 33-5-11 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Inter Vivos Gift.

Legacy of income from trust was not revoked by outright gift in the same principal amount to the same beneficiaries during the testator’s lifetime. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Keith, 26 R.I. 42 , 57 A. 1060, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1904).

Collateral References.

Sufficiency of evidence of nonrevocation of lost will where codicil survives. 84 A.L.R.4th 531.

33-5-12. Wills prior to 1896.

This chapter and chapter 6 of this title and the provisions thereof shall not extend to any will made and executed prior to February 1, 1896, except as to those provisions hereof which contain substantially the same provisions of any statute of this state existing at the time of the making and execution of the will and applicable thereto; but, the law in force at the time of the execution of the will made and executed prior to that date, shall govern the will. Every will which shall, on or after February 1, 1896, have been reexecuted or revived by any codicil, shall, for the purposes of this chapter and chapter 6 of this title, be deemed to have been made at the time at which the will shall have been so reexecuted or revived.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 45; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 45; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 45; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 44; G.L. 1956, § 33-5-12 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

A will executed before February 1, 1896, is to be construed according to the law in force at the time of its execution. In re Hawes, 22 R.I. 312 , 47 A. 705, 1900 R.I. LEXIS 115 (1900); Roach v. Roach, 25 R.I. 454 , 56 A. 684, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 108 (1903).

This section is expressly restricted to the provisions of chapters 5 and 6 of this title which were new in 1896. In re Hawes, 22 R.I. 312 , 47 A. 705, 1900 R.I. LEXIS 115 (1900).

The provisions of this chapter did not apply where will was executed in 1885, and last codicil was executed in 1886. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Noyes, 26 R.I. 323 , 58 A. 999, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 84 (1904).

Chapter 6 Proof and Construction of Wills

33-6-1. Gifts to attesting witnesses.

If any person shall attest the execution of any will or codicil to whom any beneficial devise, legacy, estate, interest, gift, or appointment, or affecting any real or personal estate, other than and except charges and direction for the payment of any debt or debts, shall be thereby given or made, the devise, legacy, estate, interest, gift or appointment shall, so far only as concerns that person attesting the execution of the will, or codicil, or any person claiming under that person, be utterly null and void; but the person so attesting shall be admitted as a witness to prove the execution of the will, or codicil, or to prove the validity or invalidity thereof, notwithstanding the devise, legacy, estate, interest, gift, or appointment, mentioned in the will, or codicil.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 32; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 32; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 32; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 31; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-1 .

Cross References.

Application to wills prior to 1896, § 33-5-12 .

Definition of terms, § 33-5-1 .

Comparative Legislation.

Proof and construction of wills:

Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 45a-261, 45a-262, 45a-258, 45a-439, 45a-446, 45a-451.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 184, § 6; ch. 191, § 22; ch. 192, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Bequest in codicil was void where beneficiary witnessed the execution thereof. Roberts v. Wright, 48 R.I. 139 , 136 A. 486, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 27 (1927).

Bequest to a witness of a will is void. Smith v. Ahern, 52 R.I. 346 , 161 A. 117, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 67 (1932).

Collateral References.

Competency of attesting witness who is not benefited by will except as it revokes an earlier will. 64 A.L.R. 1306.

Husband or wife of beneficiary as attesting witness to will. 25 A.L.R. 308.

Membership in, or other connection with, club, society, association or corporation as disqualifying one as witness to will in which it is beneficiary. 53 A.L.R. 211.

Proof, or possibility of proof, of will without testimony of attesting witness as affecting application of statute relating to invalidation of will, or of devise or legacy, where attesting witness is beneficiary under will. 133 A.L.R. 1286.

Statute avoiding devise or bequest to subscribing witness as affecting latter’s duty to elect where will disposes of property belonging to him. 29 A.L.R. 230.

33-6-2. Creditor attesting.

In case by any will or codicil any real or personal estate shall be charged with any debt or debts, and any creditor whose debt is so charged shall attest the execution of the will or codicil, the creditor, notwithstanding the charge, shall be admitted as a witness to prove the execution of the will or codicil, or to prove the validity or invalidity thereof.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 33; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 33; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 33; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 32; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-2 .

33-6-3. Death of attesting beneficiary in lifetime of testator.

In case any devisee or legatee who shall attest the execution of any will or codicil which shall hereafter be made shall die in the lifetime of the testator or before the probate of the will, the devisee or legatee shall be deemed to have been a legal witness to the execution of the will or codicil within the intent of this chapter, notwithstanding the devise or legacy.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 34; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 34; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 34; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 33; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-3 .

33-6-4. Executor or trustee as witness.

No person shall, on account of his or her being an executor of, or trustee under, a will, be incompetent to be admitted a witness to prove the execution of the will or codicil, or to prove the validity or invalidity thereof.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 35; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 35; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 35; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 34; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-4 .

Cross References.

Conflict of laws as to testamentary trust, § 18-1-1 et seq.

33-6-5. Construction as to real estate within state.

All questions arising as to the meaning, interpretation, or construction of a will executed outside the state, affecting real estate within this state, shall be determined according to the laws of this state.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 37; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 37; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 37; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 36; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-5 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

The laws of this state govern all questions concerning construction of a will executed without the state which affects real estate within the state. Bancroft v. Bancroft, 68 R.I. 406 , 27 A.2d 836, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1942).

Collateral References.

Conflict of laws, determination of members of class designated by will devising real property. 79 A.L.R. 100.

Practical construction by parties interested. 67 A.L.R. 1272.

Res judicata as applied to judicial construction of will. 136 A.L.R. 1180.

Stipulation of parties to cause as to construction of will. 92 A.L.R. 672.

Term “money” or “moneys” in will as including real property. 76 A.L.R.3d 1254.

33-6-6. Time from which will speaks.

Every will shall be construed, with reference to the real estate and personal estate comprised in it, to speak and take effect as if it had been executed immediately before the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention shall expressly appear by the will.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 6; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Ademption of Bequests.

Execution of codicil which merely republished will did not revive residuary bequest which had been adeemed by an advancement subsequent to execution of will but prior to date of codicil. Hayes v. Welling, 38 R.I. 553 , 96 A. 843, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1916).

An “in specie” test for determining whether a specific legacy has been adeemed first determines whether the gift is a specific legacy and then establishes whether the legacy is in the estate at the time of the testator’s death. Whereas a nominal or formal change of the gift does not bring about ademption, a substantial change does. Pike v. Pike, 574 A.2d 741, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 88 (1990).

There is no ademption of the legacy where the legacy is contained in a joint bank account between the testator and the legatee even though the legatee has committed conversion. The change in the gift through the conversion is a mere change of hands and is nominal in nature. Pike v. Pike, 574 A.2d 741, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 88 (1990).

Circumstances at Time of Execution.

Despite this section, the intent of the testator may be determined by circumstances at the time of execution. Moran v. Cornell, 49 R.I. 308 , 142 A. 605, 1928 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1928).

Contrary Intention of Testator.

Clause providing for distribution in the event named beneficiaries were not living “at the time this instrument is executed” was intended to provide for distribution in the event named beneficiaries were not living at the time of testator’s death, where testator knew beneficiaries personally and must have known they were living at time of execution. Hazard v. Gushee, 35 R.I. 438 , 87 A. 201, 1913 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1913).

Determination of Statute in Effect.

This section does not determine whether statute in effect at testator’s death or that at execution of will will fix interest of child omitted from will but has a limited application to the determination of the question of what property is disposed of by the will. Dwight v. Dwight, 64 R.I. 294 , 12 A.2d 227, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 41 (1940).

Identification of Heirs.

Devise of remainder interest to testator’s heirs was intended for the heirs as determined at the time of testator’s death, rather than as determined at the time of termination of determinable life estate. Starrett v. Botsford, 64 R.I. 1 , 9 A.2d 871, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 124 (1939).

Persons Born After Execution.

A devise of a residuary estate to testator’s children included children born after execution of the will. Industrial Trust Co. v. McLaughlin, 44 R.I. 350 , 117 A. 428, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 53 (1922).

Devise to “nephews and niece” showed intent to limit gift to nephews and niece of full blood alive when the will was executed, where possibility of there being more was remote, rather than to enlarge group to include some of half-blood nephews and nieces. Doar v. Doar, 63 R.I. 18 , 6 A.2d 738, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 58 (1939).

Stock Splits.

In case of stock splits, adherence to the common-law rule as embodied in this section is unnecessary as it relates to the effect and operation of the instrument. Thus, the additional stock received in a split goes to the legatee of the original stock. Egavian v. Egavian, 102 R.I. 740 , 232 A.2d 789, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 746 (1967).

33-6-7. Devise without words of limitation.

Whenever any real estate shall be devised without words of limitation, the devise shall be construed to pass the fee simple, or the other whole estate or interest which the testator had power to dispose of by will in the real estate, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 14; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-7 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Ambiguous Devise.

A bequest to a wife of “ten thousand dollars for and during her natural life, and the house at Newport” operated to give her a fee simple in the real property. Atkinson v. Staigg, 13 R.I. 725 , 1882 R.I. LEXIS 77 (1882).

Devise in Remainder.

Where testator left certain property to remaindermen upon the death of his wife, the remaindermen took remainder in fee simple. Dyer v. Blair, 62 R.I. 498 , 6 A.2d 673, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1939).

Direction of Sale.

Where will devised all of testatrix’s property outright, then directed sale and application of the income from the real estate before sale, an intention contrary to the passing of a fee simple was manifested so as to equitably convert the real estate into personalty, even though there was no devise to the executor and the party to make the sale was not named. Gaboriault v. Gaboriault, 69 R.I. 245 , 32 A.2d 623, 1943 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1943).

Directions for Enjoyment.

Instructions as to how to enjoy and further conditions that the land not be encumbered were insufficient to limit the devise as to the fee intended. Steere v. Phillips, 61 R.I. 232 , 200 A. 970, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1938).

Failure of Issue.

A devise vested the whole title in devisees, where a limitation over if no surviving issue of testator’s descent was construed to refer to failure of issue in testator’s lifetime. In re Johnson, 23 R.I. 111 , 49 A. 695, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 107 (1901).

Gift of remainder to grandchildren, and if they should die without issue then to brothers and sisters of testator, vested an estate in fee tail in sole surviving grandchild with remainder over to brothers and sisters. Langworthy v. Clarke, 53 R.I. 418 , 167 A. 127, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 118 (1933).

Gift Over in Event of Decease.

Clause devising real estate without limitation except a condition with which the devisee had complied vested the fee in the devisee, despite later clause providing for gift over in the event of decease of devisee, since the latter clause was intended to apply only in the event the devisee predeceased the testatrix. Phillips v. Smith, 47 R.I. 403 , 133 A. 661, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1926).

Power of Control.

Where devise contained no words of inheritance but was followed by powers of control in the devisee, then by a gift in remainder, an intent to limit the estate was manifested and devisee took only a life estate. Knight v. Knight, 61 R.I. 187 , 200 A. 431, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1938).

Power to Consume.

Devise to wife “to have full control . . . without any encumbrance or interference . . . to sell or draw accounts” and “if there is anything left . . . at the time of both of our deaths . . .” to go to specific devisees, created an estate for life in the wife with power to consume the corpus, with remainder in the remaindermen as to any property left. Barker v. Ashley, 58 R.I. 243 , 192 A. 304, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1937).

Powers Equivalent to Fee.

It is not necessary for a testator to use words of inheritance in order to vest an absolute estate in fee if the language shows an intent to give such absolute control over the property as would amount to an estate in fee. Barker v. Ashley, 58 R.I. 243 , 192 A. 304, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1937).

Restraint on Alienation.

Where testator devised an estate in fee simple, a proviso that devisees should not sell during their lives was inconsistent and therefore invalid as a restraint on alienation. Goffe v. Karanyianopoulos, 53 R.I. 313 , 166 A. 547, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 92 (1933).

Subsequent Estate.

Devise of a subsequent life estate in the event of the decease of the first devisee showed testator’s intent not to make a gift in fee to the first devisee. In re Willis' Will, 25 R.I. 332 , 55 A. 889, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 83 (1903).

Collateral References.

Admissibility of extrinsic evidence to determine whether fee or absolute interest, or only estate for life or years, was given. 21 A.L.R.3d 778.

33-6-8. Devise to executor or trustee.

Where any real estate shall be devised to any trustee or executor, the devise shall be construed to pass the fee simple, or the other whole estate or interest which the testator had power to dispose of by will in the real estate, unless a definite term of years, absolute or determinable, or an estate of freehold, shall be thereby expressly given to him or her.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 15; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-8 .

Cross References.

Exemption of executor or guardian from bond, § 33-17-4 .

Collateral References.

Testamentary gift to executor as one in his fiduciary capacity or in his own right. 3 A.L.R.3d 1376.

33-6-9. Gift for life with remainder to issue.

Whenever a devise or bequest is made to one for life and thereafter to his or her issue in any will hereafter made, issue shall be construed to be the children of the life tenant living at his or her death, and the lineal descendants of those children as may have then died, as tenants in common, but the descendants of any deceased child taking equally amongst them the share only which their deceased parent, if then living, would have taken.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 11; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Bequests.

Under a bequest of remainder in fee simple to testator’s brother and his issue, where both the life tenant and the brother predeceased testator, the brother’s issue then living took per stirpes and not per capita, even though such bequest was not within the scope of the statute. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Bridgham, 42 R.I. 161 , 106 A. 149, 1919 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1919).

Power to Divest.

A power of alienation in the first taker does not necessarily prevent a devise in remainder from becoming vested at a testator’s death. Rather, such remainder is subject to being divested since possession could not be taken till after the death of the first taker. Barker v. Ashley, 58 R.I. 243 , 192 A. 304, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1937).

Collateral References.

Time as of which members of class described as remainderman’s or life tenant’s “heirs,” “next of kin,” “descendants,” “issue,” “family,” or the like, substituted by will to take in place of deceased remainderman, are to be ascertained. 33 A.L.R.2d 242.

33-6-10. Limitation on fee tail.

No person seised in fee simple shall have a right to devise any estate in fee tail for a longer time than to the children of the first devisee; and a devise for life to any person and to the children or issue generally of the devisee in fee simple, shall not vest a fee tail estate in the first devisee but an estate for life only, and the remainder shall on his or her death vest in his or her children or issue generally agreeably to the direction of the will.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 10; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-10 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Attachment of Remainder.

Interest of child of the first devisee cannot be attached during the lifetime of the first devisee. Sackett v. Paine, 46 R.I. 439 , 128 A. 209, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1925).

Conditional Fee Tail.

Where a will provides a life estate, with remainder to blood children of the life tenant reaching the age of 21 or, failing the survival, remainder over to a named contingent remainderman, the rule in Shelley’s Case does not apply and life tenant takes an equitable estate for life only, while the remainder over amounts to an interest in fee by way of executory devise contingent upon the first named remaindermen reaching age 21. Boutelle v. City Sav. Bank, 18 R.I. 177 , 26 A. 53, 1893 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1893).

Duration of Entailment.

An estate in fee tail lasts only during the life of the first devisee and as soon as it reaches his children it is enlarged into a fee simple by operation of the statute. Wilcox v. Heywood, 12 R.I. 196 , 1878 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1878).

Estate of First Devisee.

The first clause in this section limits the devise of an estate tail to the children of the first devisee, regardless of the quantity of the estate of such first devisee, not to the children of the first devisee in tail. Lippitt v. Huston, 8 R.I. 415 , 1867 R.I. LEXIS 3 (1867).

Life Estate With Remainder to Heirs.

This section abrogates the rule in Shelley’s Case only when application of the rule would result in the creation of an estate tail, but where the testator devises property to a person for life and then to that person’s “heirs” the rule operates to vest a fee simple estate in the first taker. Bullock v. Waterman St. Baptist Soc'y, 5 R.I. 273 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1858); In re Manchester, 22 R.I. 636 , 49 A. 36, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 73 (1901).

Life Estate With Remainder to Issue.

The last clause of this section sets forth the policy against creation of estates tail and the abolition of the rule in Shelley’s Case, so far as it operates to create such estates, so that a devise to a person for life and then to his children or issue does not vest a fee in the life tenant but the remainder to the children is in a fee simple. Moore v. Dimond, 5 R.I. 121 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1858); Williams v. Angell, 7 R.I. 145 , 1862 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1862).

In the absence of a clear intention to the contrary, a gift over to the issue of someone other than the life tenant will result in a per stirpes distribution of the gift. Kelaghan v. Lewis, 98 R.I. 458 , 204 A.2d 633, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 196 (1964).

— Heirs of Body.

This section operates to defeat the creation of an estate tail in a person to whom a life estate is devised only when the remainder is devised in fee to the person’s “children” or “issue,” but where the remainder is devised to the “heirs of his body” then this section does not apply and an estate tail is created in the first devisee. Manchester v. Durfee, 5 R.I. 549 , 1885 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1885).

This section does not operate upon a devise where technical words of limitation are used such as “heirs male of his body,” but operates only to change the common law rule where the words used are those set forth in this section. Jillson v. Wilcox, 7 R.I. 515 , 1863 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1863).

— Male Heirs.

A devise to a person for life and then to his “male heirs” is not affected by this section but operates to create an estate tail in the first devisee under the rule in Shelley’s Case. Cooper v. Cooper, 6 R.I. 261 , 1859 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1859).

33-6-11. Death of devisee in tail in lifetime of testator.

Where any person to whom real estate shall be devised an estate tail, or an estate in quasi entail, shall die in the lifetime of the testator, leaving issue who would be inheritable under the entail, and any issue shall be living at the time of the death of the testator, the devise shall not lapse but shall take effect as if the death of the devisee had happened immediately after the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 8; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-11 .

33-6-12. Commencement of income estate.

When an annuity or the use, rent, income, or interest of property, real or personal, is given by a will, or by an instrument in the nature of a will, to or in trust for the benefit of a person for life or until the happening of a contingent event, that person shall be entitled to receive and enjoy the same from and after the death of the testator, unless it is otherwise provided in the will or instrument.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 38; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 38; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 38; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 37; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-12 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Annuities.

Annuities provided by testator’s will are payable from the date of the testator’s death. Hooker v. Drayton, 69 R.I. 290 , 33 A.2d 206, 1943 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1943).

Although will provided that payments on annuity were to commence as soon as possible after decease and commencement was delayed because of litigation, the annuity, nevertheless, vested at the death of the testator, and when payments could be made, the executors were bound to make the payments which would have been payable had no contest been made. Bowen v. Corrigan, 85 R.I. 382 , 132 A.2d 94, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 43 (1957).

Executors as Trustees.

Fact that executors are authorized by terms of a will to make payments of income to a life beneficiary, commencing with the death of testator and continuing until the trust is actually set up, does not change the executors into trustees in contemplation of the tax statute. Montgomery v. Virgadamo, 77 R.I. 490 , 77 A.2d 530, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 104 (1950).

Payment of Debts and Taxes.

Beneficiary for life of a trust estate of a residue was entitled to the income from entire residue of estate from the date of the death of testator, including portion of estate used for the payment of debts and state and federal inheritance taxes, if not provided otherwise by the will. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Taylor, 53 R.I. 126 , 163 A. 734 (1933).

Trust Income.

The life beneficiary of a testamentary trust is entitled to the income from the date of the death of the testator, unless otherwise provided. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Taylor, 53 R.I. 126 , 163 A. 734 (1933).

33-6-13. Apportionment on termination of income estate.

If the person entitled to an annuity, use, rent, income or interest dies, or if a contingent event happens, before the termination of a year from a time when the whole of the annual amount for the preceding year has become due, the annuity, use, rent, income or interest, for the then current year, shall be apportioned, and that person or his or her representatives shall be entitled to receive a proportionate part thereof, unless it is otherwise provided in the will or instrument.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 39; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 39; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 39; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 38; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-13 .

33-6-14. Suit for recovery of income from executor.

No suit for the recovery of an annuity or interest shall be brought against an executor until the expiration of one year after his or her giving bond for the discharge of his or her trust.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 40; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 40; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 40; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 39; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-14 .

33-6-15. Interest on general pecuniary legacies.

Unless otherwise provided in the will, a general pecuniary legatee shall not be entitled to interest on his or her legacy for the period of one year from and after the death of the testator. After the one year period the executor or administrator with the will annexed, unless otherwise provided by the testator, shall not be chargeable for more interest on any pecuniary legacy than the entire net income actually earned by the legacy if and when left in the investment as made by the testator, or actually invested in notes secured by mortgage upon real estate situated in this state, or in the bonds of any city or town in this state, or deposited in any savings bank in this state, or in the participation account of any trust company in this state, or invested in any other manner specially ordered by the probate court. But if otherwise invested, the legacy shall bear interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum or such larger rate as the same may have earned; provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall authorize executors or administrators to make investments other than trustees are allowed to make, unless specially authorized by the will to do so.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 41; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 41; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 41; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 40; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-15 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Legatees were not entitled to interest on specific pecuniary legacies where testatrix directed personal property to be held intact for a definite period after probate or until specified conditions occurred. Industrial Trust Co. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 69 R.I. 317 , 33 A.2d 167, 1943 R.I. LEXIS 51 (1943).

33-6-16. Life estate or term for years in property consumed by use.

When a testator shall by will bequeath the use for life or for a term of years of any livestock, provisions, wearing apparel, or other personal property, which will necessarily be consumed by using, the bequest shall give to the legatee an absolute estate in the property so bequeathed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 44; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 44; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 44; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 43; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-16 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Automobile.

Since an automobile will necessarily be “consumed” by use in the course of time, it comes within the provision of this section as an absolute bequest; thus the value of said automobile qualifies for a marital deduction for federal estate tax purposes. Markoff v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 805, 1960 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4588 (D.R.I. 1960).

Life Estate in Personalty.

A life estate in personalty is recognized in Rhode Island subject to the limitation provided for in this section. Markoff v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 805, 1960 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4588 (D.R.I. 1960).

Collateral References.

What passes under term “personal property” in will. 31 A.L.R.5th 499.

33-6-17. General devises and bequests.

A general devise of the real estate of the testator, or of the real estate of the testator in any place or in the occupation of any person mentioned in his or her will, or otherwise described in a general manner, shall be construed to include any real estate or any real estate to which the description shall extend, as the case may be, which he or she may have power to appoint in any manner he or she may think proper, and shall operate as an execution of such power, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will. In like manner, a bequest of the personal estate of the testator or any bequest of personal property described in a general manner shall be construed to include any personal estate or any personal estate to which the description shall extend, as the case may be, which he or she may have power to appoint in any manner he or she may think proper, and shall operate as an execution of such power, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 9; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-17 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Conflict of Laws.

Question as to whether power of appointment as effectively executed is controlled by the law of the donor’s domicile rather than that of the donee’s domicile. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Dunnell, 34 R.I. 394 , 83 A. 858, 1912 R.I. LEXIS 68 (1912).

Question as to whether power of appointment was effectively executed is controlled by the law at the time of the alleged exercise rather than at the time of creation of the power. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Dunnell, 34 R.I. 394 , 83 A. 858, 1912 R.I. LEXIS 68 (1912).

Contrary Intention of Testator.

Under this statute, the court is required to confine its search for a contrary intention of the testator solely to his will, and therefore, a contrary intention expressed in a letter written by testator was properly excluded. Washington Trust Co. v. Dyer, 98 R.I. 79 , 200 A.2d 1, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 134 (1964).

Implied Appointment.

Where will did not expressly exercise power of appointment, but did contain residuary clause, there being no contrary intention apparent from the will, such clause was an implied exercise of such power. Commercial Trust Co. v. Clinton, 77 R.I. 18 , 72 A.2d 836, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 31 (1950).

Where testator, in introductory clause of will, declared his intention “to dispose of all the property, real and personal, of which I may have the right or power to dispose at the time of my death” and in residuary clause devised and bequeathed all property, real, personal and mixed, including after acquired property “or to which I may be in any way entitled at the time of my decease,” he showed his intention to exercise power of appointment. Washington Trust Co. v. Dyer, 98 R.I. 79 , 200 A.2d 1, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 134 (1964).

— Legacies Otherwise Ineffectual.

A testator who set up a trust fund to be distributed to such persons as he should appoint by will executed such a power by legacies that would have been ineffectual or nullities if not in exercise of the power. Moran v. Cornell, 49 R.I. 308 , 142 A. 605, 1928 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1928).

Specific Appointment.

This section did not apply where testatrix intentionally exercised power of appointment in a specific manner. Bancroft v. Bancroft, 68 R.I. 406 , 27 A.2d 836, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1942).

Collateral References.

What passes under term “personal property” in will. 31 A.L.R.5th 499.

Residuary clause, designation of particular property in, as creating general or specific legacy. 128 A.L.R. 822; 72 A.L.R.2d 1170.

What passes under term “personal property” in will. 31 A.L.R.5th 499.

33-6-18. Devise of lands of which testator is not seised.

When a person devises lands of which he or she is not seised, but in which he or she has a right of entry, or when a testator after making a will is disseised of lands devised by the will, the lands shall nevertheless pass to the devisee in like manner as they would have descended to the testator’s heirs if he or she had died intestate; and the devisee shall have the like remedy for the recovery of the land as the heirs might have had.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-18 .

33-6-19. Substitution of issue for beneficiary predeceasing testator.

When any person to whom any real or personal estate shall be devised or bequeathed for any estate or interest not determinable at or before the death of that person, shall die in the lifetime of the testator, leaving issue, and any issue of that person shall be living at the time of the death of the testator, such devise or bequest shall not lapse, but shall take effect and operate as a devise or bequest from the testator to that issue, in such proportions as the estate of the devisee or legatee would go to them had he or she died intestate immediately after the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 31; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 31; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 31; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 30; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-19 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Adopted Children.

The word “issue” as used in this section includes adopted children. Industrial Trust Co. v. Taylor, 69 R.I. 153 , 32 A.2d 269, 1943 R.I. LEXIS 38 (1943).

Application to Particular Words in Will.

Where words in will “if he be living at the time of my death” referred to claimant’s ancestor, the provisions of this section had no application. Gray v. Leeman, 94 R.I. 451 , 182 A.2d 119, 1962 R.I. LEXIS 107 (1962).

Application to Remainder Interest.

The descendants of testator’s child who predecease the testator take the share the child would have received even though the devise is subject to a life estate. Moore v. Dimond, 5 R.I. 121 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1858).

Children of First Generation.

Where the will included a bequest to the “children of the first generation” of named persons, issue of children who had died prior to the date of the will were not entitled to share in the estate. Almy v. Jones, 17 R.I. 265 , 21 A. 616, 1891 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1891).

Effect on Pretermitted Issue.

Where will devised property to husband of testatrix if living at her death, otherwise to her son and son predeceased her, issue of son were provided for so as to avoid application of § 33-6-23 , even though the issue took nothing since the husband survived. In re McGauley, 65 R.I. 503 , 16 A.2d 493, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 146 (1940).

Gift Over in Event of Failure.

In order for a devise to a person who predeceases the testator not to pass to his lineal descendants it must clearly appear from the will that the testator did not intend this section to apply, so that a devise of any gifts which fails does not apply to gifts which can be preserved by this section for issue. Domestic & Foreign Missionary Soc'y of Protestant Episcopal Church v. Pell, 14 R.I. 456 , 1884 R.I. LEXIS 29 (1884).

Gift to Children of Life Tenant.

Bequest to named legatee and her children after her was preserved by this section for benefit of grandchildren whose parent died between execution of will and death of testatrix but not for grandchildren whose parent died before execution of the will. Williams v. Knight, 18 R.I. 333 , 27 A. 210, 1893 R.I. LEXIS 24 (1893).

Persons Not Living at Time of Execution of Will.

A bequest or devise to a person not living at the date of the will is not void if the person designated leaves issue living at the death of the testator, as this section saves devise or bequest for the issue. Winsor v. Brown, 48 R.I. 200 , 136 A. 434, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 43 (1927).

Predecease Without Issue.

Devise lapsed where devisee died without issue prior to death of testator. Howard v. Harrington, 27 R.I. 586 , 65 A. 282, 1906 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1906).

Separate Gifts to Issue.

The fact that separate legacies were made to issue of named legatee did not show an intent contrary to this section, so that legacy to the named legatee was preserved for his issue where he predeceased testator. Union Trust Co. v. Richardson, 70 R.I. 151 , 37 A.2d 777, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1944).

Shared Gifts.

Clause giving residue to two named beneficiaries, share and share alike, gave half of residue to child of named beneficiary who predeceased testatrix in the absence of contrary intent. Industrial Trust Co. v. Taylor, 69 R.I. 153 , 32 A.2d 269, 1943 R.I. LEXIS 38 (1943).

Survival as Condition.

Where the testator specified that the estate was to go to certain persons “provided they all survive me” the testator was interested in devising the estate only to such persons and when none survived, the estate passed intestate. Daboll v. Field, 9 R.I. 266 , 1869 R.I. LEXIS 27 (1869).

Collateral References.

Adopted child, right of children of, to take the share which the parent would have taken under a will if he had survived the testator. 8 A.L.R. 1012.

Devise or bequest to designated individual “or his estate,” “or his children,” “or his representatives,” or the like, other than “or his heirs,” substitution of beneficiaries upon. 11 A.L.R.2d 1387.

Devise or bequest to one “or his heirs” or one “and his heirs” as affected by death of person named before death of testator. 78 A.L.R. 992; 128 A.L.R. 94.

33-6-20. Devisee or legatee predeceased without issue.

Unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will, such real estate or interest therein as shall be comprised or intended to be comprised in any devise contained in the will, which shall fail or be void by reason of the death of the devisee in the lifetime of the testator without leaving issue of the devisee living at the time of the testator’s death, or by reason of the devise being contrary to law or otherwise incapable of taking effect, shall be included in the residuary devise, if any, contained in the will. If a residuary devisee or legatee dies before the testator without leaving issue living at the time of the testator’s death, and if there be other residuary devisees or legatees named in the will in the same residuary clause, the other residuary devisees or legatees named in that clause, whether a class or not, shall take at the testator’s death the share of the residuary devisee or legatee so dying in like proportions as their shares bear one to another as expressed in the will under the residuary clause.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 7; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-20 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Avoidance of Intestacy.

A will should not be construed to cause partial intestacy unless it cannot be reasonably otherwise interpreted. Dunham v. Randall, 51 R.I. 55 , 151 A. 193, 1930 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1930).

Interest in bulk of estate disposed of by final clause in will to person who predeceased testator without issue would go to other legatees in said clause, although it was not designed as a residuary clause, in order to avoid intestacy. Dunham v. Randall, 51 R.I. 55 , 151 A. 193, 1930 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1930).

Common Law Rule.

This statute did not have to refer to lapsed legacies since under the common law lapsed or void legacies fell into the residue. Woodward v. Congdon, 34 R.I. 316 , 83 A. 433, 1912 R.I. LEXIS 53 (1912).

Failure of Trust by Ademption.

Where corporate stock was bequeathed in trust to provide funds for the upkeep of real estate devised in trust for the use of certain named beneficiaries and both the real estate and the stock were sold to pay debts of the estate, the balance of the proceeds remaining after payment of the obligations of the estate belonged not to the beneficiaries of the trust but to the residuary legatee. MacDonald v. Manning, 103 R.I. 538 , 239 A.2d 640, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 827 (1968).

Where real estate which was devised in trust as a home for certain named beneficiaries during their lives after which it was to be conveyed to the state in trust for the use of the state fire wardens and fish and game wardens was sold to pay debts of the estate, the balance of the proceeds remaining after payment of the obligations of the estate belonged not to the beneficiaries of the trust or the state, but to the residuary legatee. MacDonald v. Manning, 103 R.I. 538 , 239 A.2d 640, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 827 (1968).

Gift in Default of Appointment.

Where will gave to life tenant power to appoint for remainder in half of residue, then made gift in default of appointment, decease of the donee of the power before testator did not cause the gift to lapse into the other part of the residue but merely accelerated the gift in remainder in default of appointment. Fiske v. Fiske's Heirs, 26 R.I. 509 , 59 A. 740, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 115 (1904).

Gifts to Residuary Legatee No Longer in Existence.

Where the testatrix’s will divided the residuary estate into ten shares, one of which was to be divided equally between a library and a nursing home, and the nursing home was no longer in existence when the testatrix died, the share of the nursing home went to the other residuary legatees. Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Glocester Manton Free Pub. Library, 107 R.I. 161 , 265 A.2d 724, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 754 (1970).

Specific Gifts to Deceased Residuary Legatee.

Pecuniary legacy and specific legacy to a person who died before the testator fell into the residue for the benefit of surviving residuary legatee, even though deceased was also a residuary legatee. Woodward v. Congdon, 34 R.I. 316 , 83 A. 433, 1912 R.I. LEXIS 53 (1912); Davis v. Crandall, 53 R.I. 33 , 163 A. 227, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1932).

33-6-21, 33-6-22. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 12; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, §§ 12, 21; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, §§ 12, 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, §§ 12, 21; P.L. 1942, ch. 1119, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 25, effective July 5, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 33-6-21 and 33-6-22 concerned curtesy rights and the filing of widow’s nonacceptance of will.

33-6-23. Pretermitted issue.

When a testator omits to provide in his or her will for any child of his or hers born after the execution of his or her will, either during his or her lifetime or after his or her death, or for any issue of a deceased child of his or hers dying after the execution of his or her will, or for any issue born after the execution of his or her will of a deceased child of his or hers dying before the will’s execution, that child or issue shall take the same share of the testator’s estate as that child or issue would have been entitled to if the testator had died intestate, unless it appears that the omission was intentional and not occasioned by accident or mistake. The term “will”, as used in this section, shall be deemed to include the testator’s will and all codicils thereto effective at the testator’s death; and the term “the execution of his or her will” shall be deemed, in a case in which there is a codicil or codicils, to refer to the execution of the latest codicil effective at the testator’s death.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, §§ 22, 23; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, §§ 22, 23; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, §§ 22, 23; P.L. 1931, ch. 1754, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-23 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction of Devise to Children.

If a testator omits to provide in his will for an unborn child, there is a presumption that the child takes the same share as if the testator died intestate, hence a devise to his children includes all children surviving him. Industrial Trust Co. v. McLaughlin, 44 R.I. 350 , 117 A. 428, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 53 (1922).

Effect of Antilapse Statute.

Where will devised property to husband of testatrix if living at her death, otherwise to son, and son predeceased her, issue of son were provided for in will so as to avoid this section since § 33-6-19 operates as a devise where there is no contrary intention in the will, even though the issue took nothing since the husband survived. In re McGauley, 65 R.I. 503 , 16 A.2d 493, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 146 (1940).

Grandchildren.

Pretermitted grandchild living at the time of execution of the will but whose mother had died prior to that time could not take under this section. Illinois State Trust Co. v. Conaty, 104 F. Supp. 729, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4386 (D.R.I. 1952).

Where a will provided that, in the event of the death of a son of the testator leaving children “by his present wife” (named), his share of the income from a trust should go to his children, the “present wife” predeceased the son and childless, and the son then remarried during the life of the testator but died leaving children by his second wife, the children by his second wife could not take his share of the trust income either by implied change in the meaning of the words “present wife” or as pretermitted issue. Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Austin, 100 R.I. 697 , 219 A.2d 389, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 499 (1966).

Intent of Testator.
— Admission of Guardian Ad Litem.

Guardian ad litem appointed in proceeding to construe a will did not have authority to admit that omission of minor was intentional. Woodworth v. Baker, 48 R.I. 99 , 135 A. 606, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1927).

— Burden of Proof.

The burden of proving intentional omission of a child from a will rests upon the claimant of his or her share under the will. Fischer v. Ennis, 51 R.I. 47 , 150 A. 750, 1930 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1930); Union Trust Co. v. Campi, 51 R.I. 76 , 151 A. 131, 1930 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1930).

— Conduct of Heirs.

Statutory presumption of an unexpressed intention to provide for children may be rebutted by extrinsic evidence and acceptance by adult heirs for many years is strong corroborative evidence that children and grandchildren were intentionally omitted. Quigley v. Spencer, 54 R.I. 228 , 172 A. 253, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1934).

— Contract for Support.

Parol evidence, including unexplained absence of missing only child and intention of testatrix to devise property to party who would support and care for her, along with written evidence of contract of sole beneficiary to support, indicated intent to intentionally omit child or her issue from will. Lindsley v. Lindsley, 60 R.I. 85 , 197 A. 98, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1938).

— Estate Left to Wife.

Testator intentionally omitted provision for after-born children where evidence showed that testator, both at the time of the will and thereafter, stated that he wanted his wife to have all of his estate since she would thus be able to take care of the children. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 48 R.I. 1 , 135 A. 35, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1926); Arnold v. Arnold, 48 R.I. 304 , 137 A. 878, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 130 (1927).

Where testator left all property to his wife and further stated that he had made no provision for children as they would be provided for by “the last survivor of us, either I or my wife,” his grandchildren born after the will was executed were intentionally and effectively omitted. Drisco v. Coutu, 54 R.I. 385 , 173 A. 355, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 95 (1934).

Lawyer testator’s intentional omission of after-born children was clearly shown by acts and statements, before and after execution of will, while expecting first child, in placing confidence in wife’s ability to handle property involved. Lindsley v. Lindsley, 60 R.I. 85 , 197 A. 98, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1938).

Testator indicated he intentionally omitted eight children where all eight children were living at the time he executed a will leaving all of his property to his wife. Jackson v. Blomstedt, 82 R.I. 27 , 105 A.2d 667, 1954 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1954).

— Parol Evidence.

Testator’s intent to omit a child or issue of deceased child may be shown by parol evidence and need not appear in the will. In re O'Connor, 21 R.I. 465 , 44 A. 591, 1899 R.I. LEXIS 97 (1899); Jenks v. Jenks, 27 R.I. 40 , 60 A. 676, 1905 R.I. LEXIS 24 (1905); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hail, 47 R.I. 64 , 129 A. 832, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1925); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 48 R.I. 1 , 135 A. 35, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1926); Drisco v. Coutu, 54 R.I. 385 , 173 A. 355, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 95 (1934); McPhillips v. McPhillips, 70 R.I. 179 , 37 A.2d 797, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 32 (1944).

— Preponderance of Evidence.

There is a presumption that testator’s omission of his children from his will is accidental and not intentional, but such presumption may be rebutted by a plain preponderance of the evidence. Lindsley v. Lindsley, 60 R.I. 85 , 197 A. 98, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1938).

Intention to exclude issue of deceased child must be shown by preponderance of evidence in will and other testimony. Tougas v. Brennan, 65 R.I. 448 , 16 A.2d 330, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 138 (1940).

— Presumption of Accident.

There is a presumption in the absence of evidence to the contrary that the omission of child from the will is due to accident and mistake. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hail, 47 R.I. 64 , 129 A. 832, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1925).

Child born after execution of will inherited intestate share under contradictory testimony as to testatrix’s intent to exclude him even though she knew herself to be pregnant at the time of execution. Fischer v. Ennis, 51 R.I. 47 , 150 A. 750, 1930 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1930).

Where a testator devised and bequeathed everything to his second wife, making no provision for his daughter, then eight years old, nor for the subsequently-born children of the daughter, who predeceased him, leaving said children surviving her, there was a rebuttable presumption that the omission of a provision for the daughter or her children was unintentional, which presumption could only be overcome or rebutted by a clear preponderance of the evidence. Vance v. Rood, 101 R.I. 608 , 226 A.2d 143, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 808 (1967).

— Statements by Testator.

The vital question of the testator’s intention when the will was made may be shown by statements made at the time or subsequently. Fischer v. Ennis, 51 R.I. 47 , 150 A. 750, 1930 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1930).

Where testator made no provision in will for children and told them he had left everything to their mother, his real estate would pass to his wife outright and not subject to a curtesy right in his daughter’s husband. Scott v. Nolan, 53 R.I. 89 , 164 A. 193, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1933).

Evidence of statements by testator subsequent to execution of will are admissible to establish that testator intentionally omitted his children from the will if these statements spell out a continuous story and corroborate other uncontradicted testimony. Lindsley v. Lindsley, 60 R.I. 85 , 197 A. 98, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1938).

Testator’s frequently expressed intention not to leave property to issue of deceased child, who were not mentioned in will, indicated clear intention required to preclude operation of this section. Tougas v. Brennan, 65 R.I. 448 , 16 A.2d 330, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 138 (1940).

Issue of Disinherited Children.

Where a testator bequeathed certain trust income to a son and to the son’s children in the event of his death and then, by a codicil provided that the son should take nothing unless he repaid certain indebtedness, which the son died without repaying, the son’s children would take nothing on his death. Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Austin, 100 R.I. 697 , 219 A.2d 389, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 499 (1966).

Omission of Children.

A testator is not required to leave anything to his children, and omission to leave anything to his children will be upheld unless due to mistake or accident. Elder v. Elder, 84 R.I. 13 , 120 A.2d 815, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1956).

— Adopted Children.

If testator fails to provide for an adopted child in his will, child takes an intestate share unless the omission is intentional. Union Trust Co. v. Campi, 51 R.I. 76 , 151 A. 131, 1930 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1930).

— After-Born Children.

The provision for an after-born child established a rule of law without regard to the will or the intent of the testator, so that evidence of intent not to provide for such child was inadmissible. Chace v. Chace, 6 R.I. 407 , 1860 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1860) (decided prior to 1931 amendment).

An after-born child is entitled to an intestate share when under the provisions of his father’s will he would take a portion of the estate only if his sister died unmarried before she was twenty years old, since such a provision is too contingent to satisfy the policy of the statute. Potter v. Brown, 11 R.I. 232 , 1875 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1875) (decided prior to 1931 amendment).

Provision increasing share of estate to go to widow in the event there should be children living at testator’s death was not a provision for the children within the meaning of statute as to after-born children. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co. v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 36 F. 863, 1888 U.S. App. LEXIS 2141 (C.C.D.R.I. 1888) (decided prior to 1931 amendment).

This section applies equally to children born before and after execution of the will. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hail, 47 R.I. 64 , 129 A. 832, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1925); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 48 R.I. 1 , 135 A. 35, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1926).

Origin of Section.

This section was taken from a similar provision in a Massachusetts statute and it is presumed that the legislature adopted the judicial construction in Massachusetts. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 48 R.I. 1 , 135 A. 35, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1926).

Proceedings to Determine Rights.
— Bill to Construe Will.

Bill brought by devisee to determine the rights of a pretermitted child under this section was primarily a bill for the construction of a will rather than a bill to remove cloud on title. Horton v. Horton, 46 R.I. 492 , 129 A. 499, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 43 (1925), limited, Industrial Nat'l Bank v. Isele, 101 R.I. 734 , 227 A.2d 203, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 829 (1967).

— Parties.

In bill in equity for construction of will from which children were omitted, the proper procedure was for the widow to bring proceeding as executrix and individually, rather than by suing in her representative capacity and naming herself individually as a defendant, but since minors were represented by a guardian ad litem the court would construe the will. Arnold v. Arnold, 48 R.I. 304 , 137 A. 878, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 130 (1927).

— Proceeding to Remove Cloud.

Widow who was sole beneficiary under will, was entitled to bring a proceeding to clear cloud on title due to the fact that deceased had left children who were omitted from the will. Jenks v. Jenks, 27 R.I. 40 , 60 A. 676, 1905 R.I. LEXIS 24 (1905).

— Time of Assertion of Claim.

One claiming title under this statute cannot delay assertion of claim until possible witnesses are dead and then complain of their absence. Quigley v. Spencer, 54 R.I. 228 , 172 A. 253, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1934).

Property Subject to Power.

A pretermitted child does not take his statutory share of property subject to power of appointment in the testator because those taking through this power take by purchase from the donor and not by descent from the donee. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Anthony, 49 R.I. 339 , 142 A. 531, 1928 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1928).

Repeal of Amendment.

Repeal of the 1931 amendment by the General Laws of 1938 did not revive the 1923 version of this section. Illinois State Trust Co. v. Conaty, 104 F. Supp. 729, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4386 (D.R.I. 1952).

Sale of Property Devised.

Grandchildren were not omitted from the will, within the meaning of this section, even though the property specifically devised to them was sold during the lifetime of the testator. Faucher v. Bouchard, 47 R.I. 150 , 131 A. 556, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 24 (1926).

Time at Which Governing Law Determined.

This section did not apply to a will executed before February 1, 1896, even though the testator died after that date. Roach v. Roach, 25 R.I. 454 , 56 A. 684, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 108 (1903).

Right of pretermitted child was determined by statute in effect at time of testator’s death, rather than statute in effect at execution of will. Dwight v. Dwight, 64 R.I. 294 , 12 A.2d 227, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 41 (1940); Hannah v. Hannah, 70 R.I. 175 , 37 A.2d 783, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1944).

Collateral References.

Adopted child as within class named in testamentary gift. 36 A.L.R.5th 395.

Adopted child as within contemplation of statute regarding rights of children pretermitted by will. 43 A.L.R.4th 947.

Adopted child, right to disinherit. 97 A.L.R. 1015.

After-born child not provided for by will, intention of testator as regards, as affecting applicability of statute to prevent disinheritance of children. 65 A.L.R. 487.

After-born children, conveyance by life tenant and remaindermen in esse as cutting off interest of unborn persons under devise for life with remainder to a class. 25 A.L.R. 770.

Child en ventre sa mere as entitled to take under devise of present interest to parent and children. 50 A.L.R. 619.

Conflict of laws as to rights of pretermitted children under will devising real property. 79 A.L.R. 106.

Disinheritance provision of will as affecting construction of will as regards children or descendants of persons disinherited claiming as pretermitted heirs. 112 A.L.R. 285.

Disinheritance provision or mere nominal bequest as affecting application of statute for benefit of pretermitted children. 152 A.L.R. 723.

Gift to one and his children, in respect of after-born children. 161 A.L.R. 612.

Illegitimate child as within contemplation of statute regarding rights of pretermitted child or preventing disinheritance of child. 142 A.L.R. 1447.

Intention of testator as regards child not provided for by will as affecting applicability of statutes to prevent disinheritance of children. 65 A.L.R. 472.

Nature of, and remedies for enforcement of, interest which pretermitted child takes by virtue of statute where parent leaves will. 123 A.L.R. 1073.

Parol or extrinsic evidence to show intention of testator as to disinheritance of children. 94 A.L.R. 209.

Pretermitted heir statutes: what constitutes sufficient testamentary reference to, or evidence of contemplation of, heir to render statute inapplicable. 83 A.L.R.4th 779.

Rule that devise over in case of first taker’s death refers to death in testator’s lifetime as affected by fact that the first devisee was unborn when will was made. 26 A.L.R. 609.

Statute as to effect of subsequent birth of a child as applicable where will provides for child, in the absence of an express exception. 30 A.L.R. 1236.

Statute for benefit of pretermitted children, what other than express disinheritance or bequest avoids application of. 170 A.L.R. 1317.

Validity and effect of will clause disinheriting children if surviving spouse elects to take against will. 32 A.L.R.2d 895.

33-6-24. Apportionment of share taken by pretermitted child.

When a posthumous child, or a child, or the issue of a child, omitted in the will, takes under the provisions of § 33-6-23 a portion of the estate of a testator, that portion shall be taken equally from all the devisees and legatees in proportion to the value of what they respectively receive under the will, unless in consequence of a specific devise or legacy, or of some other provision of the will, a different apportionment is found necessary in order to give effect to the testator’s intention regarding that part of his or her estate which passes by his or her will.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 24; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 24; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 24; P.L. 1931, ch. 1754, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 23; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-24 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Conflict of Laws.

Real estate of deceased located in a state which did not provide for a child omitted from a will of deceased was not subject to contribution to the share of the child omitted from will. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hail, 47 R.I. 64 , 129 A. 832, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1925).

General Devise.

Real estate in residuary clause of will which was devised to a brother, though a general and not a specific devise, was not subject to contribution to the share of a child omitted from the will. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hail, 47 R.I. 64 , 129 A. 832, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1925).

Pecuniary Legacies.

Pecuniary legacies are not subject to contribution to the share of a child omitted from a will. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hail, 47 R.I. 64 , 129 A. 832, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1925).

Specific Devise.

A specific devise or bequest is not subject to contribution to the share of an omitted child. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hail, 47 R.I. 64 , 129 A. 832, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1925).

Widow’s Share From Residuary Estate.

Personal estate in residuary clause, though going to the widow, was subject to contribution to share of child omitted from will, as well as real estate devised to widow though subject to widow’s dower interest. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hail, 47 R.I. 64 , 129 A. 832, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1925).

Collateral References.

Legal status of posthumously conceived child of decedent. 17 A.L.R.6th 593.

33-6-25. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 25; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 25; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 25; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 24; Repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 25, effective July 5. 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-6-25 concerned apportionment of debts among devises and legacies.

33-6-26. Intent of testator as to apportionment of debts.

In case the testator, by making a specific devise or bequest, has virtually exempted a devisee or legatee from liability to contribute with the others for the payment of debts, or if by any other provisions in his or her will he or she has prescribed or required an appropriation of his or her estate different from that prescribed in § 33-6-25 , his or her property shall be appropriated and applied in conformity with the will, so far as such appropriation and application can be made without affecting the liability of his or her whole estate for the payment of his or her debts and the charges of settling his or her estate.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 26; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 26; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 26; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 25; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-26 .

Collateral References.

Construction and effect of provisions of will regarding abatement of legacies or devises in event of insufficiency of assets to pay all in full. 101 A.L.R. 704.

33-6-27. Contribution by pretermitted issue to payment of debts.

When a posthumous child, or a child, or the issue of a child, omitted in the testator’s will, takes under § 33-6-23 a portion of the estate of a testator, that portion of the estate shall, for all purposes of §§ 33-6-25 and 33-6-26 , be considered as if it had been devised or bequeathed to that child or other descendant; and he or she shall be bound to contribute with the devisees and legatees, and shall be entitled to claim contribution from them, as provided in §§ 33-6-25 and 33-6-26 .

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 27; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 27; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 27; P.L. 1931, ch. 1754, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 26; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-27 .

Collateral References.

Legal status of posthumously conceived child of decedent. 17 A.L.R.6th 593.

33-6-28. Death or insolvency of beneficiary liable to contribution for debts.

When a person liable to contribute according to the provisions of §§ 33-6-25 to 33-6-27 is insolvent or unable to pay his or her just proportion of the contribution required, the other persons liable to contribute shall be severally liable for the loss occasioned by the insolvency, each one in proportion to the value of the property received by him or her from the estate of the deceased; and if a person so liable dies without having paid his or her proportion, his or her executors and administrators shall be liable therefor in like manner as if it had been his or her proper debt and to the extent to which he or she would have been liable if living.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 28; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 28; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 28; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 27; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-28 .

33-6-29. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 29; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 29; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 29; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 28; Repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 25, effective July 5, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-6-29 concerned contributions by devisees and legatees to widow’s dower.

33-6-30. Partial intestacy.

All real and personal property, not devised or bequeathed in the last will and testament of any person shall be distributed in the same manner as if the person had died intestate.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 30; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 30; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 30; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 29; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-30 .

Cross References.

Distribution on intestacy, § 33-1-1 et seq.

Real estate not disposed of by will, § 33-3-10 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Contingent Intestacy.

Where testatrix made no provision for disposition of her estate under certain contingencies, the disposition of the estate would be determined by the statute of descent and distribution. Washington Trust Co. v. Chatham Phenix Nat'l Bank, 52 R.I. 35 , 156 A. 514, 1931 R.I. LEXIS 95 (1931).

Because an adopted adult qualified as an heir, issue, child, or descendant of his or her adoptive parent, the adopted daughters, who were both adopted as adults over the age of eighteen, were the proper beneficiaries of the living trust under the failure provision of the trust. Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Hunt, 944 A.2d 846, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 36 , cert. denied sub nom. Gay v. Hunt, 555 U.S. 1048, 129 S. Ct. 646, 172 L. Ed. 2d 614, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 8767 (2008).

Effective Date of Section.

This section applies to property passing by intestacy from the estate of a person dying subsequent to February 1, 1896, even though that person left a will executed before such date. In re Hawes, 22 R.I. 312 , 47 A. 705, 1900 R.I. LEXIS 115 (1900).

Heirs Excluded From Will.

Even though a testator “bequeaths nothing” to his heirs at law, such heirs are not excluded from inheriting property that does not pass under the will. Caramatro v. Caramatro, 78 R.I. 402 , 82 A.2d 849, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 92 (1951).

Partial Intestacy.

A will which is not ambiguous will be given effect even though it does not dispose completely of the interest owned by the testator or testatrix in all of the property in question. Caramatro v. Caramatro, 78 R.I. 402 , 82 A.2d 849, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 92 (1951).

Collateral References.

Disposition of all or residue of testator’s property, without referring to power of appointment, as constituting sufficient manifestation of intention to exercise power, in absence of statute. 15 A.L.R.3d 346.

To whom does title to burial lot pass on testator’s death, in absence of specific provision in his will. 26 A.L.R.3d 1425.

33-6-31. Passage of title by will — Recording.

Title to real or personal property shall pass by will when the will has been finally proved; provided, however, that title to real estate situated in any town or city of this state other than that in which the will is proved shall not pass by will for the purpose of conveyance by the devisee until, in addition to probate, a copy of the will as proved, duly certified by the probate clerk, is recorded in the records of land evidence in that other town or city. Any foreign will shall be recorded as provided in §§ 33-7-18 33-7-22 , and when finally allowed, shall operate to pass title to all lands in that town or city where the will is duly recorded, and in any other town or city in which a duly certified copy thereof has been recorded in the records of land evidence in that town or city and not otherwise; provided, however, that when any will is duly proved, or proved and recorded, title to lands as devised thereby shall relate back to the date of the death of the testator.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 42; C. P. A. 1905, § 1140; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 42; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 42; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 41; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-31 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Lease.

Residuary devisee of grantor who reserved right to lease icehouses on land conveyed could bring trespass and ejectment against lessee thereof, as title to chattels real passes by will. Fiske v. Brayman, 21 R.I. 195 , 42 A. 878, 1899 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1899).

Notice of Tax Levy.

Although the probate and record of a will in probate court was sufficient to pass title to real estate to the devisees and constituted notice to tax assessors and city treasurer of provisions of such will, city treasurer was not required to give personal notice of tax levy and sale of such real estate to devisees where the will named no particular persons and made no division among them. In re Crafts, 41 R.I. 63 , 102 A. 753, 1918 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1918).

Tax Liability.

This section has no relevance to the tax liability of an executor or a legatee. While the personal property is in the hands of the executor he holds legal title thereto and the only title vested by this statute in the legatee is an equitable one. Estate of Wickes v. Stein, 107 R.I. 260 , 266 A.2d 911, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 768 (1970).

33-6-32. Filing of original wills.

Original wills shall be kept on file in the probate court where they were proved, and shall only be taken from the files by order of the court or under the provisions of statutes now or hereafter in force.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 203, § 43; G.L. 1909, ch. 254, § 43; G.L. 1923, ch. 298, § 43; G.L. 1938, ch. 566, § 42; G.L. 1956, § 33-6-32 .

33-6-33. Gifts to trustee of existing trust.

A devise, bequest, or appointment in a will validly executed under the provisions of this chapter may be made in form or substance to the trustee or trustees of a trust in writing executed by the testator or any other person or persons prior to and in existence at the time of the execution of the will, and identified in the will, whatever the size or character of the corpus of the trust (including an unfounded life insurance trust, although the settlor has reserved any or all rights of ownership in the insurance policies). A devise, bequest, or appointment shall not be invalid because the trust is amendable or revocable, or both, by the settlor or any other person or persons; nor because the trust instrument or any amendment thereto was not executed in the manner required for wills; nor because the trust was amended after the execution of the will. Unless the will provides otherwise, the property so devised, bequeathed or appointed shall not be deemed held under a testamentary trust, but shall become and be a part of the principal of the trust to which it is given to be administered and disposed of in accordance with the terms and provisions of the trust to which it is given, including any amendments, as it appears in writing at the death of the testator. In the event of complete termination of the trust prior to the testator’s death, the devise or bequest shall lapse and the appointment fail unless the will directs otherwise.

History of Section. G.L., § 33-6-33 , as enacted by P.L. 1959, ch. 74, § 1.

Collateral References.

Conflict of laws as to pretermission of heirs. 99 A.L.R.3d 724.

Limiting effect of provision in contract, will, or trust instrument fixing trustee’s or executor’s fees. 19 A.L.R.3d 520.

“Pour-over” provisions from will to inter vivos trust. 12 A.L.R.3d 56.

Chapter 7 Custody and Probate of Wills

33-7-1 — 33-7-4. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, §§ 781-784; G.L. 1909, ch. 310, §§ 1-4; G.L. 1923, ch. 361, §§ 1-4; G.L. 1938, ch. 572, §§ 1-4; P.L. 1939, ch. 659, § 2; P.L. 1977, ch. 246, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 324, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2008, ch. 306, § 1, effective December 31, 2008.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 33-7-1 — 33-7-4 concerned deposit of will with probate clerk, wrapping and indorsement and authorized opening of deposited will, person to whom delivered, and disposition of deposited will after death of testator.

33-7-5. Duty of person in possession of will to deliver into court.

  1. Every person, other than a probate clerk, who has custody of a will shall, within thirty (30) days after notice of the death of the testator, deliver the will into the probate court which has jurisdiction of the probate thereof, or to the executors named in the will, who shall themselves deliver it into court within thirty (30) days after they receive the will; and if any executor or other person neglects, without reasonable cause, to deliver a will, after being duly cited for that purpose by the court, he or she may be adjudged to be in contempt and may be committed therefor to the adult correctional institutions and shall remain there until he or she delivers the will to the court; and he or she shall be further liable, to any party aggrieved, for the damage sustained by reason of the neglect.
  2. Provided further, that a fiduciary nominated in a will may deliver such will to the probate court with an affidavit containing the following information, representations, and documentation:
    1. The date of death of the decedent accompanied by a certified copy of the decedent’s death certificate;
    2. A representative that the funeral bill of the decedent has been paid, accompanied by a receipt therefor;
    3. The names and addresses of the heirs-at-law of the decedent at the decedent’s date of death; and
    4. A representation that the affiant has received no notice of the issuance of letters testamentary or letters of administration regarding the estate of the decedent, and that there are no assets of the decedent subject to probate. Upon receipt of such will and affidavit the probate clerk, upon being paid a fee of thirty dollars ($30.00), shall receive and keep the will and accompanying affidavit and shall give a receipt of the deposit thereof.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 785; G.L. 1909, ch. 310, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 361, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 572, § 5; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-7-5 ; P.L. 1998, ch. 448, § 3; P.L. 2011, ch. 363, § 5.

Cross References.

Neglect to present will for probate as declination of office of executor, § 33-8-3 .

Comparative Legislation.

Custody and probate of wills:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-282 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 191, § 10 et seq.; ch. 192, § 9 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Contempt Proceedings.

Executors cited for contempt for failure to file will, where punishment was postponed pending chance to comply, could not get record quashed by certiorari since proceedings were interlocutory and available remedies would prevent substantial harm or injustice. In re James' Estate, 64 R.I. 144 , 11 A.2d 289, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1940).

Disqualification of Executor.

Uneducated person could recover fees and authorized expenses as administrator where jury and justice found he acted in good faith for benefit of estate, even though he failed to file written will witnessed only by himself on advice of interpreter. Chartanowicz v. Polewka, 60 R.I. 471 , 199 A. 288, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 163 (1938).

Jurisdiction of Courts.

Superior court had jurisdiction of appeal of petition for appointment of an administrator for a domiciled decedent, even though the decedent’s will had been probated in another state. In re James' Estate, 64 R.I. 144 , 11 A.2d 289, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1940).

Threat to Conceal.

An agreement extorted from the legatees by the person having custody of a will, under threat that he would otherwise conceal or destroy the will, was illegal and void, and it made no difference that the testator himself suggested this scheme. Walling v. Angell, 6 R.I. 499 , 1860 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1860).

Collateral References.

Custodian accepting will for safekeeping as under duty to produce will for probate upon testator’s death. 141 A.L.R. 1277.

Relative rights to real property as between purchasers from or through decedent’s heirs and devisees under will subsequently sought to be established as affected by concealment or withholding of will. 22 A.L.R.2d 1109.

Right to probate subsequently discovered will as affected by completed prior proceedings in intestate administration. 2 A.L.R.4th 1315.

What circumstances excuse failure to submit will for probate within time limit set by statute. 17 A.L.R.3d 1361.

33-7-6. Investigation of alleged concealment of will.

Upon complaint under oath, made to a probate court, by a person claiming to be interested in the estate of a person deceased against any one suspected of retaining, concealing, or conspiring with others to retain or conceal a will or testamentary instrument of the deceased, the court may cite the suspected person to appear before it and be examined under oath about the complaint. Upon examination, all interrogatories and answers shall be in writing, signed by the party examined, and shall be filed in the court. If the person cited refuses to appear and submit to examination, or to answer the interrogatories that are lawfully propounded to him or her, or to obey any lawful order of the court, he or she may be adjudged to be in contempt and may be committed to the adult correctional institutions, there to remain until he or she submits to the order of court. On the complaint, the court may, in its discretion, award costs to be paid by either party, and may issue execution therefor.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 786; G.L. 1909, ch. 310, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 361, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 572, § 6; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-7-6 .

Collateral References.

What circumstances excuse failure to submit will for probate within time limit set by statute. 17 A.L.R.3d 1361.

33-7-7. Penalty for theft, destruction, or concealment of will.

Any person who shall either during the life of the testator or after his or her death steal or for any fraudulent purpose destroy or conceal any will or other testamentary instrument, either before or after probate, shall be imprisoned in the adult correctional institutions for a term of not more than five (5) years, and in any complaint, information, or indictment for the offense it shall not be necessary to allege that the will, codicil, or other instrument is the property of any person or that it is of any value.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 789; G.L. 1909, ch. 310, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 361, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 572, § 9; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3721, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-7-7 .

Cross References.

Forgery or counterfeiting of will or testament, penalty, § 11-17-1 .

Collateral References.

Statute requiring production of will for probate or declaring consequences of failure or delay in that regard, constitutionality and construction of. 119 A.L.R. 1259.

Suppression of will, or agreement for its suppression, as contrary to public policy or to statute in that regard. 117 A.L.R. 1249.

What circumstances excuse failure to submit will for probate within time limit set by statute. 17 A.L.R.3d 1361.

33-7-7.1. Disposition of documents intended as last wills and testaments in the possession of the probate courts.

The several city and town probate courts within the state are hereby authorized and directed to return all documents in their possession intended as last wills and testaments and accepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter as follows:

  1. A notice, by certified mail, shall be sent to each testator, and/or person designated to receive the will upon death, including the drafting attorney, if known, at the last known address of each, indicating that the probate courts are no longer required to maintain custody of such documents and that the documents are available for return upon execution of the appropriate receipt.
  2. The probate courts shall not be required to retain further possession of such documents for a period not to exceed twelve (12) months following the issuance of the certified mail notice.

History of Section. P.L. 2008, ch. 306, § 2.

33-7-8. Proof of will of nonresident.

The will, duly executed, of any person who resides outside the state at the time of his or her death, may be proved before the probate court of any town where any property is situated upon which the will may operate.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 788; G.L. 1909, ch. 310, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 361, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 572, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 33-7-8 .

Cross References.

Jurisdiction of probate court, § 8-9-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

This section was designed to cover situation where testator domiciled in Rhode Island, but living outside the state, dies leaving property in Rhode Island upon which his will may operate. Pickering v. Pickering, 64 R.I. 112 , 10 A.2d 721, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1940).

Invalid Will.

Testator’s will which was invalid in state of his domicile and residence for lack of sufficient attesting witnesses could not be probated in Rhode Island, where personal property was located, even though it was valid under Rhode Island statutes. Pickering v. Pickering, 64 R.I. 112 , 10 A.2d 721, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1940).

Collateral References.

Probate in state where assets are found of will of nonresident which has not been admitted to probate in state of domicile. 20 A.L.R.3d 1033.

33-7-9. Notice to executors of petition for probate.

If any of the executors named in a will are not parties to a petition for probate, the clerk of the probate court, upon probate of the will, shall forthwith notify by mail the executors who are not parties and whose post office addresses are known or can be ascertained.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 816; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 33-7-9 .

Cross References.

Notice of petition for probate or administration, § 33-22-3 .

33-7-10. Proof of wills when subscribing witnesses unavailable.

Whenever it shall appear to a probate court, before which a purported will has been presented for probate, and whenever it shall appear to the superior court, before which a petition for probate of a will is pending on appeal, that a will cannot be proven as otherwise provided by law because one or more of the subscribing witnesses to the will, at the time the will is offered for probate, are serving in or present with the armed forces of the United States, or serving as merchant sailors, or are dead, or mentally or physically incapable of testifying, or otherwise are unavailable in the course of their service, the court may admit the will to probate upon the testimony in person or by deposition of at least two (2) credible disinterested witnesses that the signature to the will is in the handwriting of the person whose will it purports to be, or upon other sufficient proof of the handwriting. The foregoing provision shall not preclude the court, in its discretion, from requiring in addition, the testimony in person, or by deposition, of any available subscribing witness, or proof of such other important facts and circumstances as the court may deem necessary to admit the will to probate.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1420, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-7-10 .

Cross References.

Interested parties as witnesses, § 33-6-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

A will may be admitted to probate upon proof of the signatures of witnesses who predeceased the testator, although the attestation clause does not state that the witnesses signed in the presence of each other and of the testator, since compliance with the statutory requisites is presumed. Fry's Will, 2 R.I. 88 , 1852 R.I. LEXIS 3 (1852).

Collateral References.

Execution of will or testamentary capacity, admissibility of other than testimony of subscribing witness to prove. 63 A.L.R. 1195.

Jurisdiction in proceedings for probate of will to adjudicate as to other wills not offered for probate. 119 A.L.R. 1099.

33-7-11. Provisions of § 33-7-10 supplemental.

The provisions of § 33-7-10 , and the authority therein granted, shall be deemed to be supplemental to, and not in derogation of, the authority of the probate court and the superior court to act upon petitions for the probating of wills.

History of Section. P.L. 1944, ch. 1420, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-7-11 .

33-7-12. Compromise of controversies pending probate.

The superior court may authorize the persons named as executors in an instrument purporting to be the last will of a deceased person, or the administrator with the will annexed, at any time before a final decree approving the instrument as the last will of the deceased person is entered, to adjust by compromise all controversies that may exist or arise concerning the will.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 832; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 33-7-12 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Interest on Legacy.

Where a legacy was compromised to become a charge upon certain real estate, interest on the amount of such legacy would run from one year after testator’s death, in the same manner as though originally incorporated into the will, and not from date of such compromise. Barber v. Westcott, 21 R.I. 355 , 43 A. 844, 1899 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1899).

Collateral References.

Contract to refrain from contesting will. 55 A.L.R. 811.

Estoppel to contest will or attack its validity by acceptance of benefits thereunder. 78 A.L.R.4th 90.

Right of heirs, next of kin, or others who would have benefited by denial of probate of will, to share in the consideration for an agreement, to which they were not parties, to withdraw objection to probate. 120 A.L.R. 1495.

Right to settle or compromise will contest, and validity of agreement to induce others to do so. 42 A.L.R.2d 1319.

Stipulation of parties to cause as to validity of will or provision thereof. 92 A.L.R. 672.

What constitutes contest or attempt to defeat will within provision thereof forfeiting share of contesting beneficiary. 3 A.L.R.5th 590.

33-7-13. Action to confirm compromise.

When the executors or administrators with the will annexed have in writing compromised any controversy as provided in § 33-7-12 , they, or any party thereto, may file a civil action in the superior court for the county in which the will is pending for probate, praying the court to authorize and confirm the compromise. In this action the persons named as executors, or the administrator with the will annexed, and all persons claiming under the will whose interest will, in the opinion of the court, be affected by the proposed compromise, and those entitled to the estate as intestate, shall be parties.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 833; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 19; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 33-7-13 .

33-7-14. Representation of parties under disability.

If a person under legal disability is a necessary party to a civil action, he or she shall be represented by his or her guardian, or by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court, who shall, in the name and in behalf of the party he or she represents, make and receive all proper conveyances and payments necessary to carry into effect any compromise sanctioned by the court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 834; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 20; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 20; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 33-7-14 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Compromise agreement reforming will because of controversy by persons who would have taken estate if will was set aside was binding on minor beneficiary of will where competent guardian ad litem represented him and made independent investigation. Young v. Geoffroy, 51 R.I. 162 , 152 A. 793, 1931 R.I. LEXIS 3 (1931).

33-7-15. Representation of contingent interests and charitable gifts.

If it shall appear to the court that any future contingent interests which would arise under the will, if admitted to probate, would be affected by the compromise, the court shall appoint some suitable person or persons to represent those interests in the proceedings. The court shall have like powers as to any gifts made in the will for charitable purposes if there is no trustee who can act.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 835; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 21; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 19; G.L. 1956, § 33-7-15 .

33-7-16. Decree confirming compromise.

The compromise, if found by the court under the circumstances to be just and reasonable in relation to the parties in being, and in its effect upon any future contingent interests that might arise under the will, and to any gifts to charities made in the will, shall be confirmed by decree of the court and shall be valid and binding upon the contingent interests and gifts as well as upon the interests of all persons in being who are parties to the compromise.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 836; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 22; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 22; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 33-7-16 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Interest on Legacy.

Where a legacy was compromised to become a charge upon certain real estate, interest on the amount of such legacy would run from one year after date of testator’s death, in the same manner as though originally incorporated into the will, and not from date of such compromise. Barber v. Westcott, 21 R.I. 355 , 43 A. 844, 1899 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1899).

33-7-17. Certification of decree and compromise.

If the probate of the will in a case is pending on appeal in the superior court, the court may prove and allow the will, and the clerk of court shall certify and transmit for record copies of the decree admitting the will to probate, and copies of the compromise and the decree of the court approving the compromise, to the clerk of the court appealed from; and if the probate of the will is pending in the probate court, the clerk of the superior court shall certify and transmit for record to the clerk of the probate court copies of the compromise and the decree approving the compromise; and thereupon the probate court may admit the will to probate. The estate of the deceased person shall be administered and disposed of according to the provisions of the will as modified by the compromise.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 837; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 23; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 23; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 33-7-17 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Result of statutory compromise of a legacy is that legatee takes sum agreed upon as though she were bequeathed that sum under the will. Chase Nat'l Bank v. Sayles, 11 F.2d 948, 1926 U.S. App. LEXIS 2644 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 708, 47 S. Ct. 99, 71 L. Ed. 851, 1926 U.S. LEXIS 198 (1926).

Compromise agreement reforming will because of controversy by persons who would have taken estate if will was set aside was binding on minor beneficiary of will where competent guardian ad litem represented him and made independent investigation. Young v. Geoffroy, 51 R.I. 162 , 152 A. 793, 1931 R.I. LEXIS 3 (1931).

33-7-18. Request to record foreign probated will.

Whenever the executor or any other person interested in any will, which has been finally proved and allowed in a probate court in any territory, district, or state of the United States, or in a probate court in any foreign country, shall produce a copy of the will and of the will’s probate, duly authenticated according to an act of congress, to any probate court in any town or city in this state where the testator had property, real or personal, upon which the will may operate, and shall in writing request that the will may be filed and recorded in the office of the probate clerk in that town or city, the court shall assign a time and place for a hearing.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 790; G.L. 1909, ch. 310, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 361, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 572, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 33-7-18 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Requiring a will which has been admitted to probate in another state to be proved and admitted to probate in Rhode Island before it operates as to property located in Rhode Island does not violate U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1, since this clause requires only that full faith and credit be given to the will as it operates upon the property located in the foreign state which has admitted the will to probate. Olney v. Angell, 5 R.I. 198 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1858).

Effect of Foreign Probate.

The foreign probate of a will does not establish the validity of the will as it affects property located in Rhode Island but is prima facie evidence only of the will’s validity. Moreover, U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1 operates only to require that a state recognize the validity of the probate of a will in another state as it affects property located in such state. Bowen v. Johnson, 5 R.I. 112 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 4 (1858).

A will which has been admitted to probate in another state does not thereby operate to dispose of property in Rhode Island, but such will must be proved and admitted to probate in accordance with the Rhode Island statutory provisions. Olney v. Angell, 5 R.I. 198 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1858).

Noncompliance With Law as to Execution.

A will of a person dying domiciled in another state which disposes of both realty and personalty located in Rhode Island and is executed with the formalities required by the state of domicile but not with the formalities required by Rhode Island law should be filed and recorded as a will of the personal estate only. Lapham v. Olney, 5 R.I. 413 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 60 (1858).

Collateral References.

Probate in state where assets are found of a will of nonresident which has not been admitted to probate in state of domicile. 20 A.L.R.3d 1033.

Relative rights to real property as between purchasers from or through decedent’s heirs and devisees under foreign will subsequently sought to be established. 22 A.L.R.2d 1107.

33-7-19. Notice of offer of foreign will.

Upon the request to record a foreign probated will, the court shall cause notice thereof to be given in the same manner as if the will was presented to the court for probate, so that any person may appear and show cause why the copy should not be filed and recorded.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 791; G.L. 1909, ch. 310, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 361, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 572, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 33-7-19 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Legislative Intent.

The legislature intended in this section to provide for a show cause hearing in the probate court aimed at the adducement of evidence going to the validity of a will as well as to the authenticity of its probate by a foreign tribunal. O'Brien v. Costello, 100 R.I. 422 , 216 A.2d 694, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 454 , cert. denied, 384 U.S. 988, 86 S. Ct. 1889, 16 L. Ed. 2d 1005, 1966 U.S. LEXIS 1366 (1966).

33-7-20. Order approving foreign will — Effect on real estate titles.

If, at the hearing, no sufficient cause is shown to the contrary, the court may order the copy to be placed on file and recorded; provided, however, that, as to real estate in towns other than that in which the copy is filed and recorded, the title shall not pass, for the purposes of conveyance by the devisee, until a certified copy is recorded in the records of land evidence in any other town or city in which any real estate is situated; and provided, further, that when any copy is duly filed and recorded as aforesaid, title to lands devised by the will shall relate back to the death of the testator.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 792; G.L. 1909, ch. 310, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 361, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 572, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 33-7-20 .

33-7-21. Effect of recording of foreign will — Granting of letters.

Whenever a copy of any will which has been finally proved and allowed in any probate court in any territory, district, or state of the United States, or in any foreign country, shall be finally ordered to be filed and recorded in a probate court in this state pursuant to §§ 33-7-18 to 33-7-20 , the filing and recording of the will shall be of the same force and effect as if the will had been originally proved and allowed in this state, subject to the provisos in § 33-7-20 ; and the probate court in which the copy of the foreign will is ordered to be filed and recorded may grant letters testamentary to the named executor, or letters of administration with the will annexed to a person as the court may deem fit, taking bond from the executor or person as in case of a will proved and allowed in the probate court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 793; G.L. 1909, ch. 310, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 361, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 572, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 33-7-21 .

33-7-22. Proof of foreign will not required to be probated in domicile.

A person interested in a will which is operative without probate by the laws of the state or country where the testator had his or her domicile at the time of his or her death may produce to the probate court of any town in this state in which there is any property, real or personal, on which the will may operate, a copy of the will and of the official record, duly authenticated according to act of congress, and the court shall assign a time and place for a hearing and cause notice to be given as in the case of a will offered for probate. If at such hearing the court finds, from the copies before it and any additional proof as to the authenticity and execution of the will, that the instrument ought to be allowed in this state as the last will of the deceased, it shall order the copy to be filed and recorded, and the will shall then have the same effect as if it had been originally proved and allowed in this state.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 794; G.L. 1909, ch. 310, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 361, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 572, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 33-7-22 .

33-7-23. Probate conclusive as to execution.

The final probate of a will by the probate court, or on appeal, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 787; G.L. 1909, ch. 310, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 361, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 572, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 33-7-23 .

Cross References.

Annulment of probate by probate court, § 8-9-15 .

Collateral References.

Forged instrument, power and duty of probate court to set aside admission of, to probate as a will. 115 A.L.R. 473.

Judgment denying validity of will because of undue influence, lack of mental capacity, or the like, as res judicata as to validity of another will, deed, or other instrument. 25 A.L.R.2d 657.

Probate of will or proceedings subsequent thereto as affecting right to probate later codicil or will and rights and remedies of parties thereunder. 107 A.L.R. 249; 157 A.L.R. 1351.

What circumstances excuse failure to submit will for probate within time limit set by statute. 17 A.L.R.3d 1361.

Who entitled to appeal from decree admitting will to probate or denying probate. 88 A.L.R. 1158.

33-7-24. Taking of will from files of court — Copy retained — Proof of copy on loss of original.

The probate court in which an original will has been duly proved, allowed, and recorded may, after the expiration of the time within which an appeal may be taken from the decree admitting the will to probate, upon the petition of the executor, or of a legatee named in the will, or of any person interested in the estate of the testator, and after any notice the court may require and a hearing thereon, permit the original will, if it appears to be necessary for the purpose, to be taken from the files of the court and to be used in another state, territory, district or foreign country, for the purpose of establishing the right or title of the executor, legatee or person to the estate of the testator in the other state, territory, district or foreign country, upon the terms and conditions as the court may prescribe. Likewise, before probate, an instrument purporting to be a last will may be annexed to a commission for taking depositions in proof of the same, in this or any other state, territory, district or foreign country; a photographic copy of the instrument, duly certified, being retained on the files of the court. From any order of the court granting permission, for annexing a will to a commission as provided above, no appeal shall lie. In case the original will is lost, on proof of loss, the copy may be proved in the same manner and shall have the same effect as the original.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 795; G.L. 1909, ch. 310, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 361, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 572, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 33-7-24 .

Collateral References.

Probate of copy of lost will as precluding later contest of will under doctrine of res judicata. 55 A.L.R.3d 755.

Sufficiency of evidence that will was not accessible to testator for destruction, in proceeding to establish lost will. 86 A.L.R.3d 980.

33-7-25. Original probate of foreign wills.

  1. The will of a nondomiciliary which upon probate may operate upon any property in the state and which is executed in the same manner as is prescribed for the execution of wills of Rhode Island residents under the laws of this state may be admitted to original probate in any probate court of this state in the same manner as any other will.
  2. A will which has been admitted to probate or established in the testator’s domicile shall not later be admitted to original probate in this state except:
    1. In a case where the court is satisfied that ancillary probate would be unduly expensive, inconvenient, or impossible under the circumstances;
    2. Where the testator has directed in the will that it shall be offered for probate in this state; or
    3. Where the laws of the testator’s domicile discriminate against domiciliaries of this state either as a beneficiary or as a fiduciary.
  3. A will which by judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction in the testator’s domicile has been denied probate or establishment shall not be admitted in this state except where denial of probate or establishment is solely for a cause which is not grounds for rejection of a will of a testator domiciled in this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 151, § 1.

33-7-26. Proof of purported will or codicil.

In the absence of objection by anyone interested in the estate of a deceased person, the probate court may admit to probate a purported will or codicil of the deceased person upon oral testimony or affidavit in the following manner:

  1. The oral testimony of any one of the subscribing witnesses as to the due execution of any purported will or codicil shall constitute sufficient evidence thereof.
  2. An affidavit by the subscribing witnesses or any one or more of them, to any purported will or codicil, executed at any time after execution of the will or codicil, whether before or after the death of the testator, before any officer authorized to administer oaths in or out of this state, stating the facts as the witnesses or witness would be required to testify to in court to prove the will or codicil, shall constitute sufficient evidence of the due execution of the purported will or codicil.
  3. An affidavit substantially in the form that follows shall be deemed to meet the requirements of subdivision (2) of this section:

    Click to view

STATE OF COUNTY OF In on this day of , 20 , before me personally appeared the undersigned, who, being duly sworn, depose and say that: they witnessed the execution of the will (codicil) of ; that the signature to the will (codicil) is in the handwriting of the testator or was made by some other person for the testator, in the testator's presence and by the testator's express direction; that the testator so subscribed the will (codicil) and declared the same to be his last will (a codicil to his last will) in their presence; that they thereafter subscribed the same as witnesses in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each other; that at the time of execution of the will (codicil) the testator appeared to be of sound mind and eighteen (18) years of age or over; and that the signatures of the witnesses on the will are genuine. Subscribed and sworn to before me on the day and date first above written, Notary public

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 146, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 133, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Objection.

Although a R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-7-26 self-executing affidavit served as proof of the proper execution of a will only in the absence of an objection by an interested party, because the testator’s son had objected to the probate of the will, the will’s admission into probate was improper. Estate of Giuliano v. Giuliano, 949 A.2d 386, 2008 R.I. LEXIS 74 (2008).

Collateral References.

Competency of interested witness to testify to signature or handwriting of deceased. 13 A.L.R.3d 404.

Proper execution of self-proving affidavit as validating or otherwise curing defect in execution of will itself. 1 A.L.R.5th 965.

Chapter 8 Appointment and Qualification of Executors and Administrators

33-8-1. Grant of letters to executor named in will.

Upon the probate of a will the probate court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the executor named therein, if he or she is legally competent, and if he or she gives bond as by law required.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 815; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-8-1 .

Rules of Court.

Averment of capacity of party to sue not required, see Civil Procedure Rule 9(a).

Cross References.

Appeal pending from grant, powers of executor or administrator, § 33-23-3 .

Bond, § 33-17-1 et seq.

Death certificate required before grant of letters, § 23-3-16 .

Debtor, effect of appointment as executor, § 33-9-5 .

Fiduciaries’ emergency act, § 18-3-1 et seq.

Jurisdiction of probate court, § 8-9-9 .

Nonresident executor or administrator, appointment of agent by, § 33-18-9 .

Notice of qualification, publication, § 33-18-1 .

Notice to tax administrator of appointment, § 44-23-6 .

Removal by probate court, § 33-18-2 .

Resignation of executor or administrator, § 33-18-4 .

Temporary custodians of estates, § 8-9-10 .

Trust company as fiduciary, § 19-5-6 .

Witness to prove execution of will, executor as, § 33-6-4 .

Comparative Legislation.

Executors and administrators:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-289 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 192, § 4 et seq.; ch. 193, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Court Required to Issue Letters.

Where the executor named in the will was legally competent, the probate court had no discretionary power to refuse to issue letters testamentary to him. Trustees of House of Angel Guardian v. Donovan, 71 R.I. 407 , 46 A.2d 717, 1946 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1946).

Collateral References.

Adverse interest or position as disqualification for appointment of administrator, executor, or other personal representative. 11 A.L.R.4th 638.

Court’s power to refuse letters testamentary to one named in will as executor, absent specific statutory disqualification. 95 A.L.R. 828.

Delegation by will of power to nominate executor. 11 A.L.R.2d 1284.

Extrinsic evidence to identify person whom testator intended to name as executor. 94 A.L.R. 127.

Necessity that executor or administrator be represented by counsel in presenting matters in probate court. 19 A.L.R.3d 1104.

Physical condition as affecting competency to act as executor or administrator. 71 A.L.R.3d 675.

Propriety of court’s appointment, as administrator of decedent’s estate, of stranger rather than person having statutory preference. 84 A.L.R.3d 707.

Relation back of letters testamentary or of administration as validating prior sales of decedent’s property. 2 A.L.R.3d 1105.

Validity of condition in will in restraint of marriage as applied to appointment of executor or executrix. 122 A.L.R. 26.

33-8-2. Minority of named executor.

If a person named as executor in a will is at the time of the probate thereof under the age of eighteen (18) years, the other executor or executors, if any qualify, shall administer the estate until the minor arrives at full age, when, upon qualifying, he or she may be admitted as a joint executor of the will. If no other executor shall qualify, administration may be granted with the will annexed during the minority of the person named as executor and until he or she shall qualify.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 817; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-8-2 ; P.L. 1984, ch. 81, § 6.

Collateral References.

Capacity of infant to act as executor or administrator, and effect of improper appointment. 8 A.L.R.3d 590.

33-8-3. Neglect to present will for probate.

If a person named as executor in a will and having possession thereof neglects or refuses to present the will for probate within thirty (30) days after the decease of the testator, or within thirty (30) days after he or she has knowledge that he or she is so named, that neglect or refusal shall be deemed a declination of the office by the executor.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 818; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-8-3 .

Collateral References.

What circumstances excuse failure to submit will for probate within time limit set by statute. 17 A.L.R.3d 1361.

33-8-4. Grant of letters or administration on incompetence or failure of named executor to qualify.

If a person named as executor in a will has deceased, or is incompetent, or refuses to accept the trust, or neglects to qualify for thirty (30) days after the probate of a will, or within thirty (30) days after notice of probate, as provided in § 33-7-9 , the court shall grant letters testamentary to the other executors, if any are named in the will, who are competent and qualify; otherwise the court upon petition therefor shall grant administration on the estate with the will annexed to some suitable person.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 819; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 33-8-4 .

Cross References.

Replacement of executor or administrator, § 33-18-5 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Claim Against Estate.

The mere fact that a person has a claim against an estate does not disqualify nor render him unsuitable to be appointed administrator under this section. Murray v. Angell, 16 R.I. 692 , 19 A. 246, 1890 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1890).

Collateral References.

Guardian of infant or incompetent, right of, to appointment as executor or administrator as representative or substitute for infant or incompetent. 135 A.L.R. 585.

Physical condition as affecting competency to act as executor or administrator. 71 A.L.R.3d 675.

33-8-5. Powers of surviving and qualifying joint executors — Filling of vacancies.

If a testator shall appoint more than one executor of his or her will, and any of them die or do not qualify, or, having qualified, shall die, resign, or be removed, or become incapable of acting, those who for the time being are qualified to act shall, unless otherwise provided in the will, have the same power and authority as is given by the will to the executors named therein; provided, that, upon the petition of any party in interest, the probate court may appoint an administrator with the will annexed to fill the vacancy, in which case the probate court shall also grant letters of administration to the administrator with the will annexed if he or she shall qualify and the administrator with the will annexed shall have the same power and authority as is given by the will to the executor in whose place he or she is appointed, unless the will contains an express provision contrary thereto.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 820; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 4; P.L. 1945, ch. 1592, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-8-5 .

Cross References.

Surviving fiduciaries, powers, § 18-4-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constructive Renunciation.

Taking of an appeal from probate of will by person appointed co-executor was constructive renunciation of the office. Briggs v. Probate Court, 23 R.I. 125 , 50 A. 335, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 137 (1901).

Letters Pending Appeal.

After one of the co-executors had renounced the office, grant of letters testamentary to the other was proper, even though an appeal was pending from the decree admitting the will to probate. Briggs v. Probate Court, 23 R.I. 125 , 50 A. 335, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 137 (1901).

Letters to Renouncing Co-Executor.

This section recognizes and gives effect to the common law rule that, where there are two executors, an executor who has initially renounced the trust may take out letters testamentary after the death of the other executor, so long as the chain of executorship has not been broken by appointment of an administrator. Perry v. De Wolf, 2 R.I. 103 , 1852 R.I. LEXIS 8 (1852).

Where, upon renunciation of the office by one co-executor, the court granted letters to the other, it could not later grant letters as co-executor to the co-executor who had originally renounced. Briggs v. Probate Court, 23 R.I. 125 , 50 A. 335, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 137 (1901).

Surviving Executor.

Unless the will clearly shows an intent to the contrary, an executor may exercise all powers given by the will to the named executors when the co-executors have either failed to qualify or have died. Pell v. Mercer, 14 R.I. 412 , 1884 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1884).

Collateral References.

Co-executors, power of those who accept executorship to exercise right to sell conferred by will on several, some of whom fail to accept. 36 A.L.R. 826.

Waiver or renunciation by co-executor of right to administer decedent’s estate, scope and effect of. 153 A.L.R. 232.

33-8-6. Executor of executor.

The executor of an executor shall not, as such, administer the estate of the first testator.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 821; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 33-8-6 .

33-8-7. Residence of administrator.

No person not an inhabitant of this state shall be appointed administrator by reason of any right to the trust, unless other circumstances, in the opinion of the court, render the appointment proper.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 825; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 33-8-7 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Foreign Resident.

Appointment of resident of England as administrator, despite the fact that he was indebted to the deceased, was justified where next of kin failed to file for appointment within thirty days, where administrator was a close personal friend and had paid the funeral expenses of the deceased, and had properly inventoried a note of the administrator held by the deceased. Latham v. Mullen, 37 R.I. 297 , 92 A. 804, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1915).

Husband as Administrator.

A husband is a proper person to appoint as administrator of his deceased wife’s estate, even though he is a nonresident, within the discretion granted the court by this section. Weaver v. Chace, 5 R.I. 356 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1858).

Collateral References.

Eligibility of foreign corporation to appointment as executor, administrator, or testamentary trustee. 26 A.L.R.3d 1019.

Nature of residence contemplated by statute or rule making residence within state qualification of executor or administrator. 9 A.L.R.4th 1223.

Who is resident within meaning of statute prohibiting appointment of nonresident executor or administrator. 9 A.L.R.4th 1223.

33-8-8. Administration of intestate estate.

Administration of the estate of a person dying intestate shall be granted as follows:

  1. To the widow or surviving husband or one or more of the next of kin, or to the widow or surviving husband jointly with one or more of the next of kin, they being suitable persons and competent.
  2. If the widow or surviving husband and the next of kin shall neglect to apply for letters of administration within thirty (30) days after the decease of a person intestate, or shall be unsuitable for the discharge of the trust, or renounce the administration, the probate court may, on petition therefor of some party in interest, grant administration to any suitable person.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 824; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 10; P.L. 1919, ch. 1787, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 33-8-8 .

Cross References.

Prisoner’s estate, application for administration, §§ 13-6-4 , 13-6-5 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Administration Following Inheritance.

Illegitimate grandson who is an heir should be given preference over a stranger nominated by the other heir since, even though he is not technically next of kin, he is interested in the distribution. Johnson v. Johnson, 15 R.I. 109 , 23 A. 106, 1885 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1885).

First clause of this section recognizes the principle of law that the right to administer follows the right to inherit. The second clause is not intended to depart from that principle. Fortin v. Tanguay, 75 R.I. 102 , 64 A.2d 188, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1949).

Appointment of Stranger.

Where one of heirs was not suitable and competent because of infancy and no guardian had been appointed and other heir although otherwise suitable and competent did not make known to the probate court her desire to be appointed, probate court had jurisdiction to appoint a stranger as administrator even though infant heir had indicated another whom she desired to be appointed as administrator. Whitmarsh v. O'Reilly, 86 R.I. 361 , 134 A.2d 469, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 110 (1957).

Failure to Apply.

The failure of a widow, surviving husband, and/or next of kin to file a petition for administration within thirty days of the death of a decedent does not mean that they are forever barred from asserting such right. Malinou v. Cairns, 102 R.I. 462 , 231 A.2d 785, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 715 , cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1015, 88 S. Ct. 590, 19 L. Ed. 2d 660, 1967 U.S. LEXIS 30 (1967).

The filing of a petition for administration by an individual who alleges therein that he comes within the purview of this section precludes the public administrator from asserting any right to take charge and administer a decedent’s estate. Malinou v. Cairns, 102 R.I. 462 , 231 A.2d 785, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 715 , cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1015, 88 S. Ct. 590, 19 L. Ed. 2d 660, 1967 U.S. LEXIS 30 (1967).

Preference of Next of Kin.

Next of kin and a suitable person was entitled to priority over an equally suitable person who was the choice of some of the heirs. Peck v. Greene, 27 R.I. 487 , 63 A. 489, 1906 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1906).

Probate court was not entitled to appoint a stranger as administrator on petition filed five months after death of intestate by one of the six heirs over objections of the majority of the heirs who requested appointment of an heir as administratrix. Fortin v. Tanguay, 75 R.I. 102 , 64 A.2d 188, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1949).

Preference of Spouse.

The father and creditor of married woman could not defeat right of surviving husband to administration of personal estate where husband was under no disability. Battey v. Mathewson, 23 R.I. 474 , 51 A. 102, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 141 (1902).

Nonresident husband was entitled to be appointed administrator of wife’s estate, as opposed to local undertaker, where wife was also a nonresident and left only a personal estate, and husband agreed to pay claim of undertaker and to resist a claim filed by another person. Grogan v. O'Neill, 48 R.I. 187 , 136 A. 842, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 39 (1927).

— Attachment of Interest.

Creditor of husband of deceased beneficiary could not attach proceeds of insurance policy, since husband had no interest in the proceeds personally, but was entitled only to surplus after payment of debts of estate. Providence County Sav. Bank v. Vadnais, 26 R.I. 122 , 58 A. 454, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 27 (1904) (decided prior to 1919 amendment).

— Right to Contest Will.

A surviving husband has the right to administer his wife’s personal estate in case of her intestacy and, after payment of her debts, could under former law retain the surplus thereof for his own use, so that he could contest the validity of his wife’s will and appeal from probate order thereon. Kenyon v. Saunders, 18 R.I. 590 , 30 A. 470, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 76 (1894) (decided prior to 1949 amendment).

Priority Rights.

Priority rights under this section are limited by § 33-8-7 requiring administrator to be an inhabitant of the state. In re Estate of Fuller, 105 R.I. 163 , 250 A.2d 351, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 733 (1969).

Suitability as Administrator.

In contest between children over appointment of administrator for father’s estate, the prior appointment of one of the heirs as administratrix of mother’s estate on father’s petition was admissible to show that particular heir was competent to serve as administratrix of father’s estate. Fortin v. Tanguay, 75 R.I. 102 , 64 A.2d 188, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1949).

Where wife was charged with homicide of her husband, there were sufficient grounds for court to find such wife was not a “suitable person” under this section. In re Estate of Fuller, 105 R.I. 163 , 250 A.2d 351, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 733 (1969).

— Interest Adverse to Estate.

Guardian of intestate’s son, one of the heirs, was entitled to become administrator under this section, even though at one time he might have had adverse interests in a bank deposit in the name of the decedent as trustee for the son, since the superior court had determined that the fund belonged to any administrator of the estate. McSoley v. Slepkow, 54 R.I. 374 , 173 A. 124, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 91 (1934).

Verdict on Appeal.

A verdict in probate appeal that appellant was more than twenty-one years of age, was next of kin, and was a suitable person to be the administratrix of the estate, was proper in form. Sayles v. Probate Court, 27 R.I. 563 , 65 A. 272, 1906 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1906).

Collateral References.

Adverse interest or position as disqualification for appointment as personal representative. 11 A.L.R.4th 638.

Appointment as administrator of one not a member, nor nominee of a member of the class of persons designated by statute as eligible to appointment, where no one in better right has applied. 119 A.L.R. 143.

Divorce, separation, desertion, unfaithfulness, and the like, effect upon right to name appointee for administration of estate of spouse. 34 A.L.R.2d 876.

Propriety of court’s appointment, as administrator of decedent’s estate, of stranger rather than person having statutory preference. 84 A.L.R.3d 707.

Right of minor next of kin to apply through next friend for appointment of administrator. 161 A.L.R. 1389.

Selection of administrator from among members of class equally entitled. 1 A.L.R. 1245.

Separation agreement as affecting right of husband or wife to administer deceased spouse’s estate. 35 A.L.R. 1511; 34 A.L.R.2d 1020; 1039.

Status and acts of one appointed executor or administrator who was ineligible. 14 A.L.R. 619.

Stranger, right to pass over eligible person interested in estate and appoint. 84 A.L.R.3d 707.

Waiver or renunciation of right to administer decedent’s estate, scope and effect of. 153 A.L.R. 220.

33-8-9. Administration of partially intestate estate.

If a will which disposes of only a part of the estate of a testator is admitted to probate, the executor of the will, or the administrator with the will annexed, shall, unless otherwise provided in the will, and except as provided in the second clause of § 33-8-8 , be ex officio the administrator of the intestate estate, and shall give bond to cover all his or her duties.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 823; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 33-8-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Will which merely provided for payment of debts and appointed an executor was entitled to admission to probate. Mulholland v. Gillan, 25 R.I. 87 , 54 A. 928, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1903).

33-8-10. Administration de bonis non.

If a sole or a surviving executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed before having fully administered an estate, or there is any thing remaining to be done in execution of the will, the probate court shall grant letters of administration with the will annexed, or of administration, as the case may require, to administer the estate of the deceased not already administered.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 826; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 33-8-10 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Administration Following Property.

Where executrix and sole legatee of husband’s estate never withdrew bank deposit belonging to the husband, the probate court abused its judicial discretion in appointing as administrator with the will annexed the next of kin of deceased husband, instead of the executor and residuary legatee of the deceased executrix, since next of kin of deceased husband had no interest in the money. Emsley v. Young, 19 R.I. 65 , 31 A. 692, 1895 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1895).

This section gives no priority or preference to the next of kin; since the right to administration follows the property, therefore, the appointment of a next of kin without property rights in the estate was unsuitable. Hennessey v. Meehan, 58 R.I. 104 , 191 A. 515, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1937).

Powers of Administrator.

The administrator de bonis non with the will annexed had the power to sell real estate for the payment of debts, since he succeeded to the power of the executrix under a will provision which, in the same clause, appointed testator’s wife as executrix and authorized her to sell any of the real estate. Bailey v. Brown, 9 R.I. 79 , 1868 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1868).

Suitability as Administrator.

Statute contemplates that the person to be appointed shall be not only competent, but also suitable in view of his relation to the estate. This is consistent with the principle that the right to administer follows the right to inherit. Geaber v. Wakefield Trust Co., 76 R.I. 337 , 69 A.2d 822, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 119 (1949).

Collateral References.

Administrator de bonis non, right to recover proceeds of personal property of the estate converted by his predecessor. 3 A.L.R. 1252.

Administrator with will annexed, right of, to execute power of sale conferred by will. 9 A.L.R.2d 1324.

Preferences in appointment as administrator with the will annexed. 164 A.L.R. 844.

33-8-11. Marriage of executrix or administratrix.

If an unmarried woman shall be appointed an executor or administrator and thereafter shall marry, the marriage shall not make her husband an executor or administrator in her right nor disqualify her as executor or administrator.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 822; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 33-8-11 .

Cross References.

Power of married woman to act as executrix or administratrix, § 15-4-10 .

Chapter 9 Collection and Management of Decedents’ Estates

33-9-1. Return of inventory of estate.

Every administrator and every executor, shall, within ninety (90) days after his or her appointment or such longer period as may be allowed by the probate court, return to the probate court, under oath, a true inventory of all the personal property, both tangible and intangible, and of all claims, rights, causes of actions and other assets, other than real property, of the deceased, with an appraisement thereof as of the date of the decedent’s death.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 866; G.L. 1909, ch. 313, § 1; P.L. 1919, ch. 1787, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 364, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 577, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-1 ; P.L. 1990, ch. 405, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 4.

Cross References.

Aid of probate court in collecting estate, § 8-9-18 .

Appeal from granting of letters, powers of executor or administrator pending, § 33-23-3 .

Family allowances not assets in hands of executor or administrator, § 33-10-2 .

Foreign executor or administrator, collection and management of property by, § 33-18-24 et seq.

Jurisdiction of probate court, § 8-9-9 .

Partnership books and property, examination, § 7-12-3 .

Partnership, statement as to interest delivered to executor or administrator, § 7-12-2 .

Prisoner’s estate, powers of administrator, § 13-6-6 .

Tax administrator, inventory filed with, § 44-23-1 .

Taxation of personal property, § 44-4-14 .

Vehicle registration, § 31-4-6 .

Wages of deceased employees, payment, § 28-14-6 .

Comparative Legislation.

Management of estates:

Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 45a-340 et seq., 45a-162 et seq., 45a-324 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 195, §§ 5-10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Amendment of Inventory.

Inventory may be amended on petition if found to be in error. Browning v. Liberty, 58 R.I. 507 , 193 A. 496, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1937).

Auto Insurance Policy an Asset.

The potential right of a decedent who has been involved in an automobile collision to exoneration or indemnity under her automobile liability insurance policy is an asset that should be included in the inventory filed under this section. Smith v. Estate of Catterall, 107 R.I. 729 , 271 A.2d 300, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 835 (1970).

Deduction of Debts.

Amount of bank account as shown in inventory could be reduced to allow for payment of fees and costs attributable to conservatorship during decedent’s lifetime. Browning v. Liberty, 58 R.I. 507 , 193 A. 496, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1937).

Amount of bank account as shown in inventory should not have been reduced to allow for debts accrued during the decedent’s lifetime. Browning v. Liberty, 58 R.I. 507 , 193 A. 496, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1937).

Failure to File.

Where all of the debts of the estate were paid with the exception of plaintiff ’s claim, disappearance of assets of estate was unexplained, and the executrix filed no inventory or representation of insolvency for several years, the trial court properly granted an execution against the personal estate of the executrix in order to satisfy judgment against her in capacity as executrix. McLaughlin v. Dunlop, 71 R.I. 429 , 46 A.2d 575, 1946 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1946).

Inventory Required.

Probate court should not have approved an account which charged executors with various items of personal estate without any attempt at taking an inventory, since taking of an inventory is not a matter of form but an absolute requirement. Hayes v. Welling, 35 R.I. 76 , 85 A. 630, 1913 R.I. LEXIS 3 (1913).

Issue as to Correctness of Inventory.

The correctness of the executor’s inventory is always in issue at the hearing on his account and can be questioned then by any interested party. Browning v. Liberty, 58 R.I. 507 , 193 A. 496, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1937).

Collateral References.

Appraised value of estate as shown by inventory, or value at time of settlement, as basis for determining commissions of executor or administrator. 173 A.L.R. 1346.

Commissions, right to, as affected by failure to file, or improper filing of, inventory. 83 A.L.R. 732.

Failure to file inventory as ground for removal of executor or administrator. 33 A.L.R.4th 708.

33-9-2. Wearing apparel.

The wearing apparel of a deceased person, not including jewels and watches, shall not be included in the inventory nor be assets for the payment of debts, and if not bequeathed shall be distributed according to law.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 868; G.L. 1909, ch. 313, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 364, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 577, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-2 .

33-9-3. Emblements of lands.

If any testator or intestate shall die after March 1 in any year, all the emblements of his or her lands that shall be severed before December 31 next following shall be included in the inventory and be assets in the hands of his or her executor or administrator; but all emblements growing on the lands at the time of the death of the testator or intestate, if that event happens on or after December 31 and before March 1, shall not so be included, but shall pass with the land.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 869; G.L. 1909, ch. 313, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 364, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 577, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-3 .

Collateral References.

Unharvested crops, tenant’s personal representative as entitled to. 141 A.L.R. 1248.

33-9-4. Appraisal of property.

  1. The property comprised in the inventory shall be appraised by the executor or administrator.
  2. Upon the petition of any party in interest, the court may appoint one or more appraisers to value assets of the estate specified in the petition. The appraisers shall be sworn to the faithful discharge of their trust.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 867; G.L. 1909, ch. 313, § 2; P.L. 1915, ch. 1260, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 364, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 577, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-4 ; P.L. 1977, ch. 95, § 1.

Cross References.

Appraisal of estate by tax administrator, § 44-23-5 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Excess Fee.

Administrator who paid appraiser’s fee without having fee allowed by the court could not recover the excess from the appraiser after a part of the fee was disallowed by the court. Fairbanks v. Mann, 19 R.I. 499 , 34 A. 1112, 1896 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1896).

33-9-5. Debts owed by executor to decedent.

The appointment of a debtor as an executor shall in no case be deemed an extinguishment of the debt; but all such debts shall be accounted for as assets by the executor, unless otherwise directed by the will.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 870; G.L. 1909, ch. 313, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 364, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 577, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-5 .

Cross References.

Devise to executor or trustee, construction, § 33-6-8 .

Collateral References.

Bond of executor or administrator as covering debt due from principal to decedent. 8 A.L.R. 84.

33-9-6. Marking and care of decedent’s grave.

An executor or administrator of a solvent estate may erect a headstone, and with the permission of the probate court may erect a monument, and with like permission an executor or administrator of an insolvent estate may erect a headstone at the grave of his testator or intestate. An executor or administrator of a solvent estate may with the permission of the probate court pay to a cemetery corporation or to a town or city a reasonable sum for the perpetual care of the monument, the headstone, and the lot in which the body of the testator or intestate is buried. Where the permission of the probate court is required, it shall determine the amount of the payment and to whom the payment shall be paid. All reasonable payments made under this section shall be allowed as part of the funeral charges in the settlement of the accounts of the executor or administrator.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 969; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 4; P.L. 1921, ch. 2028, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-6 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 22, § 1.

Cross References.

Sale of cemetery lots, § 33-19-18 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Duty of Court.

This section puts a duty on a probate court to determine the amount and to whom payments should be made for the upkeep of a cemetery lot where the estate is solvent. Therefore, the probate court cannot simply deny a petition for such payment. Hall v. Burgess, 40 R.I. 314 , 100 A. 1013, 1917 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1917).

Payments in Lieu of Invalid Trust.

Under the provisions of this section, an administrator or executor may pay to a church so much of an invalid trust as may be determined by the probate court to be necessary to provide perpetual care for a grave from the income from such funds. Todd v. St. Mary's Church, 45 R.I. 282 , 120 A. 577, 1923 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1923).

Where the intention of a testatrix to have flowers placed on her grave for an indefinite length of time cannot be carried out because it is contrary to the rule against perpetuities, the executor under his discretion ought to procure perpetual care for her burial lot under this section. Meehan v. Hurley, 51 R.I. 51 , 150 A. 819, 1930 R.I. LEXIS 49 (1930).

Collateral References.

Enforcement of preference expressed by decedent as to disposition of his body at death. 54 A.L.R.3d 1037.

Tombstone or monument as a proper charge against estate of decedent. 121 A.L.R. 1103.

33-9-7. Continuation of decedent’s business.

Executors and administrators may be authorized by the probate court before which the estate is in settlement to work up and complete any stock and materials in an unfinished state, or to continue any business of the decedent so far as may be expedient for the prudent winding up of the business, if the court shall find that it will be for the interest of the estate.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 849; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 35; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 35; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 33; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-7 .

Cross References.

Closing out sales law exemption, § 6-14-15 .

Funeral directing business, continuation, § 5-33.2-1 et seq.

Pharmacy business, unlawful practices, § 5-19.1-23 .

Unfair sales practices law exemption, § 6-13-5 .

Collateral References.

Attorneys, rights of estate of deceased member of law firm in respect to business unfinished at the time of latter’s death. 78 A.L.R.2d 280.

Carrying on business pursuant to direction or permission of will, liability for losses incurred in. 109 A.L.R. 639.

Estoppel of one doing business with personal representative purporting to carry on decedent’s business, to assert representative’s personal liability. 3 A.L.R.3d 757.

Partner who is also executor of deceased partner’s estate, accountability of, for profits earned subsequently to death. 80 A.L.R. 23; 54; 55 A.L.R.2d 1391.

33-9-8. Redemption or sale of incumbered property.

The executor or administrator, if there be sufficient assets, may redeem all property of the deceased under mortgage, pledge, or levy, the redemption of which would increase the value of the estate, or he or she may sell the property subject to incumbrance; and the executor or administrator shall in that case first obtain the advice and direction of the probate court as to whether he or she shall redeem or sell the property subject to incumbrance, and failure to comply with the advice and direction shall be deemed maladministration and waste.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 850; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 36; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 36; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 34; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-8 .

Collateral References.

Mortgage or conveyance executed by his decedent, right of executor or administrator of insolvent estate to take advantage of failure to record, file, or refile. 91 A.L.R. 299.

33-9-9. Real estate mortgages as personal property.

Debts due by mortgage of real estate and the mortgaged premises shall, unless the mortgage be foreclosed and the equity barred in the lifetime of the testator or intestate, be considered personal property for every purpose in settling the estates of deceased persons.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 875; G.L. 1909, ch. 313, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 364, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 577, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-9 .

Cross References.

Sale of real estate, §§ 33-19-3 33-19-12 .

Collateral References.

Personal property, treating as, for purposes of administration, real property acquired by executor or administrator upon foreclosure or other enforcement of mortgage or other lien against it in favor of decedent. 110 A.L.R. 1397.

33-9-10. Sale of mortgage and debt.

The executor or administrator may sell the mortgage and the debt secured thereby in his or her discretion for the amount due thereon, and may sell the mortgage and the debt for a less amount upon obtaining the advice and direction therefor of the probate court upon a petition filed for that purpose.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 876; G.L. 1909, ch. 313, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 364, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 577, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-10 .

33-9-11. Taking possession of property by mortgage.

The executor or administrator may take the surrender of, or sue in ejectment for, the seisin and possession of the real estate mortgaged as provided in § 33-9-9 ; in which action it shall be sufficient for him or her to declare on the seisin and possession of the testator or intestate.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 877; G.L. 1909, ch. 313, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 364, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 577, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-11 .

Cross References.

Mortgages, exercise of power of sale, § 33-18-15 .

33-9-12. Possession and sale of property taken through mortgage.

Upon recovery or surrender of possession of real estate mortgaged as provided in § 33-9-11 , the executor or administrator shall be seised and possessed of the mortgaged estate, subject to liability to sale if necessary for the payment of debts, legacies or charges, of administration, in the manner provided by law for the sale of real estate by executors and administrators. The surplus proceeds of the sale, after payment of incidental expenses, debts, legacies, and expenses of administration, shall be held and distributed as personal property.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 878; G.L. 1909, ch. 313, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 364, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 577, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-12 .

33-9-13. Redemption of mortgaged property from executor or administrator.

After surrender or recovery of possession of real estate mortgaged as provided in § 33-9-11 , and before sale as provided in § 33-9-12 , or in case the testator or intestate die possessed of any real estate mortgaged to him or her which may be redeemed, if the mortgagor, his or her heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns shall, within the time limited for redemption, redeem the mortgaged premises, the executor or administrator shall be entitled to receive the redemption money, and shall hold the money as personal property, and shall thereupon release and discharge the mortgaged premises by release, quitclaim, or other legal conveyance.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 879; G.L. 1909, ch. 313, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 364, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 577, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-13 .

33-9-14. Authority of executor or administrator to borrow.

Whenever it shall for any reason appear to be desirable for an executor or administrator to borrow money, the superior court, upon bill or petition in equity filed by the executor or administrator, may authorize the executor or administrator to borrow, for any one or more of the purposes specified in § 33-9-15 , such sum or sums, for such period or periods of time, and upon such terms and conditions as the court shall deem advisable, and the court may authorize the executor or administrator to mortgage, pledge, or otherwise subject to lien, as security for the repayment of the money borrowed, the whole or any part or parts of the personal estate in his hands; provided, however, that property specifically bequeathed shall not be mortgaged, pledged, or otherwise subjected to lien so long as there remains personal property not specifically bequeathed which may be so mortgaged, pledged, or otherwise subjected to lien. For the purpose of exercising any powers so granted, an executor or administrator may execute such promissory notes, bonds, mortgages, deeds of trust or other instruments, containing such powers of sale, conditions, covenants or other provisions, as may be necessary or proper in the circumstances. In granting this authority, the court may impose such conditions or restrictions and give such directions as it may deem advisable; and the court may either direct that particular property may be so mortgaged or pledged, or may authorize the executor or administrator to mortgage or pledge the whole or such part or parts of the personal estate in his or her hands as he or she may in his or her discretion deem advisable, subject, however, to the provisions in regard to property specifically bequeathed.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 312, § 56, as enacted by P.L. 1921, ch. 2030, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 56; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 54; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-14 .

Cross References.

Mortgage of real estate, §§ 33-19-1 , 33-19-2 .

Collateral References.

Statutes expressly empowering executors or administrators to borrow money on mortgage, character of claims or obligations contemplated by. 85 A.L.R. 215.

33-9-15. Purposes for which borrowing authorized.

Borrowing may be authorized for any one or more of the following purposes:

  1. To discharge any existing lien or mortgage on the real or personal estate of the decedent;
  2. To pay the debts of the decedent;
  3. To pay the funeral expenses;
  4. To pay the charges of administration;
  5. To pay the estate, inheritance, legacy, or succession taxes;
  6. To pay the expenses of supporting the decedent’s family as prescribed by law;
  7. To pay the legacies under the will; and
  8. For any other purpose whatsoever which the court may approve as necessary or desirable for the protection or benefit of the estate.

History of Section. G.L., ch 312, § 56, as enacted by P.L. 1921, ch. 2030, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 56; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 54; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-15 .

33-9-16. Effect of borrowing by executor or administrator.

Any borrowing authorized as provided in § 33-9-14 shall create a debt of the estate, and any mortgage, pledge, or lien authorized as provided in § 33-9-14 shall be, to the extent and in the manner authorized, binding upon the property so mortgaged; provided, however that nothing contained in §§ 33-9-14 — 33-9-17 shall be held to affect the right of the executor or administrator subsequently to contest the validity of any claim against the estate for the payment of which the borrowing was authorized. And no transaction, and no note, bond, covenant, or other obligation executed or entered into as a part of or as an incident to the transaction shall bind the executor or administrator personally, insofar as the transaction, note, bond, covenant, or other obligation is made or entered into by the executor or administrator in his or her representative capacity.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 312, § 56, as enacted by P.L. 1921, ch. 2030, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 56; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 54; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-16 .

Collateral References.

Deficiency in case of mortgage executed by executor or administrator under statutory authority, liability for. 165 A.L.R. 1294.

33-9-17. Lender not liable for loss or misapplication.

No person lending money to an executor or administrator who has been authorized to borrow by the court in accordance with the provisions of §§ 33-9-14 33-9-16 shall be required to see to the application or be answerable for any loss or misapplication thereof.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 312, § 56, as enacted by P.L. 1921, ch. 2030, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 56; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 54; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-17 .

33-9-18. Authority to lend, invest, vote, and protect investments.

  1. The superior court may, upon complaint filed by an executor or administrator, authorize the executor or administrator to invest money belonging to the estate in such safe investments as it may approve, and may likewise authorize or direct the executor or administrator to vote the stock or shares belonging to the estate in any corporation, association, or joint stock company in such manner and for such purposes as the court may deem advisable; and if it shall in the court’s opinion be in the interest of the estate so to do, the court may authorize the executor or administrator:
    1. To lend money belonging to the estate to any corporation, association, or joint stock company, in the stock, shares, or obligations of which any portion of the estate may be invested, or in which the estate may be otherwise interested;
    2. To invest money belonging to the estate in the stock, shares, or other obligations of any such corporation, association, or joint stock company;
    3. To endorse or guarantee the obligations of the corporation, association, or joint stock company.
  2. In granting the authority, the court may impose such conditions or restrictions and give such directions as it may deem advisable.
  3. The superior court may, upon any complaint, approve any investment, loan, endorsement, guaranty, or vote previously made or given by an executor or administrator which the court might have authorized, and the approval shall have the same effect as a prior order or decree authorizing the investment, loan, endorsement, guaranty, or vote. Any endorsement or guaranty shall be binding upon the estate, and shall not be binding upon the executor or administrator personally.
  4. The powers herein conferred upon the superior court may be exercised in cases where the court deems it necessary for the protection or preservation of the estate or to prevent irreparable damage or loss to the estate, notwithstanding any provisions or directions contained in a will authorizing or restricting the powers of an executor or administrator with the will annexed to invest or lend money of the estate, to endorse or guarantee obligations, or to vote the stock or shares belonging to the estate in any corporation, association, or joint stock company; provided, however, that the court shall exercise these powers with extreme caution and shall not exercise these powers in cases where the testator has in the will expressly declared or requested that the powers shall not be exercised by the court.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 312, § 57, as enacted by P.L. 1921, ch. 2030, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 57; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 55; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-18 .

Cross References.

Housing authority bonds as legal investments, § 45-27-21 .

Management powers exercised with court approval, § 18-4-10 .

Subdivision of land, § 33-19-13 .

Transfer of stock by executor or administrator, § 18-11-4 .

Voting corporate stock, § 7-4-3 .

Collateral References.

Bank, liability on bond for loss of money deposited in, by executor or administrator in his representative capacity. 60 A.L.R. 488.

Beneficiary’s consent to, acquiescence in, or ratification of, improper investment. 128 A.L.R. 4.

Completion or enforcement by executor or administrator of decedent’s executory contract for purchase of real estate. 58 A.L.R. 436.

Corporate stock or other corporate securities held by estate, liability of executor or administrator for depreciation in value of, because of his conduct for which he is directly responsible to the corporation. 62 A.L.R. 563.

Court order authorizing investment as affecting liability of executor or administrator for loss of funds invested. 88 A.L.R. 325.

Court order authorizing investment, liability in absence of mandatory statute, of executor or administrator for loss of funds as affected by failure to obtain. 116 A.L.R. 437.

Depreciation in assets of estate after partial distribution, liability of executor in case of. 114 A.L.R. 461.

Depreciation in value of securities, liability for, as affected by appreciation of other securities. 171 A.L.R. 1422.

Final order for distribution, liability for loss of funds after. 100 A.L.R. 1126.

Fraudulent use of funds in purchase or improvement of real property. 43 A.L.R. 1428; 47 A.L.R. 371; 778 A.L.R. 1269.

Mortgage investment, surchargeability of executor or administrator in respect of, as affected by matters relating to value of property. 117 A.L.R. 871.

Option to purchase contained in lease, right of personal representatives of leaseholder to enforce. 38 A.L.R. 1176.

Protection of investment in stocks by submitting to voluntary assessment, power and duty of executor or administrator as to. 104 A.L.R. 979.

Rents and profits from real estate in another state or country, duty of executor or administrator to account for, at domicile of decedent. 99 A.L.R. 1135.

Responsibility of personal representative for loss of funds deposited in bank in his own name or other form not indicating fiduciary character. 43 A.L.R. 600.

Retaining or deferring sale of securities, liability for loss by depreciation in value because of. 47 A.L.R.2d 187.

Who may exercise voting power of corporate stock pending settlement of estate of deceased owner. 7 A.L.R.3d 629.

33-9-19. General powers of executor or administrator unaffected.

Nothing contained in §§ 33-9-14 33-9-18 shall be held to limit or restrict any powers which an executor or administrator may have apart from the provisions of those sections.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 312, § 58, as enacted by P.L. 1921, ch. 2030, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 58; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 56; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-19 .

33-9-20. Representation of contingent interests and persons non sui juris.

Whenever in any proceeding under §§ 33-9-14 33-9-18 there are contingent interests of persons not in being or not ascertainable or interests of persons non sui juris, the court may appoint a person to represent the contingent interests or a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of persons non sui juris, and in case of that representation the decree entered in the proceeding shall bind all interests.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 312, § 59, as enacted by P.L. 1921, ch. 2030, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 59; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 57; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-20 .

33-9-21. Appeals to supreme court.

An appeal may be taken to the supreme court from any final order or decree of the superior court entered in any proceeding brought under the provisions of §§ 33-9-14 33-9-18 at any time within ten (10) days from the entry of the order or decree.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 312, § 60, as enacted by P.L. 1921, ch. 2030, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 60; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 58; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-21 .

33-9-22. Validity of acts by executor or administrator subsequently removed — Validity of purchases from devisees, legatees, or heirs.

When an executor or administrator is removed, or when letters of administration or decrees are revoked, all previous sales whether of real or personal estate, lawfully made by an executor or administrator and with good faith on the part of the purchaser, and all other lawful acts done by the executor or administrator, shall remain valid and effectual. A decree allowing a will or compromise of a will or adjudicating the intestacy of the estate of a deceased person in any court in the state having jurisdiction thereof shall, after one year from the rendition thereof or, if proceedings for its reversal are had, after one year from its establishment, or in the event that administration of the estate has been fully completed within one year after the rendition or establishment, as the case may be, then after completion of administration of the estate, be final and conclusive in favor of purchasers for value in good faith without notice of any adverse claims of any property, real or personal, from devisees, legatees, or heirs claiming under the will or estate, or from their executors, administrators, guardians, or conservators. This section shall not make an adjudication of the fact of death conclusive.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 851; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 37; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 37; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 35; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-22 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 107, § 1.

Cross References.

Bona fide transfer of property to executor or administrator, § 33-18-23 .

33-9-23. Master’s deed to convey decedent’s property to party entitled to specific performance.

When a person dies holding the legal title to property, real or personal, and an action for specific performance of contract for sale thereof would have existed as against the deceased had he or she lived, a complaint against the executor or administrator alone of the deceased may be brought by the person with whom the deceased has made the contract, setting out the facts, the pendency of which bill shall be advertised at least twice each week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper published in the city of Providence, which notice shall be in addition to legal notice to the executor or administrator. And on hearing the cause, if it appear that a proper case has been made out, the superior court shall decree that a conveyance shall be made by a master to be appointed for that purpose whose deed shall vest the title of the deceased in the party entitled to specific performance on payment of the purchase price, which, less the costs of the suit, including costs as between solicitor and client, shall be personal assets in the hands of the executor or administrator.

History of Section. G.L. 1896, ch. 208, § 21; C.P.A. 1905, § 1220; G.L. 1909, ch. 259, § 21; G.L. 1923, ch. 303, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 583, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-23 .

33-9-24. Continuation of actions by or against decedent.

In case any action, suit, or proceeding is commenced or shall be pending in any court, and either party shall die before final judgment, the executor or administrator of the deceased person, or his or her successor in case the deceased was acting in a representative capacity, may, if the cause of action survives, prosecute or defend the action, suit, or proceeding to final judgment.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 970; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-24 .

Cross References.

Action in name of estate prosecuted by interested person, § 33-18-17 et seq.

Controversies, adjustment, § 33-18-16 .

Prosecution or defense of actions surviving decedent, § 9-1-7 .

Statute of limitations, effect of death of party, § 9-1-21 .

Wrongful death action, § 10-7-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Death After Decision.

Since an action of trespass for injury to the person survives, the administrator of a plaintiff who died after decision was entitled to enter his appearance and secure a judgment. Hambly v. Hayden, 20 R.I. 558 , 40 A. 417, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 109 (1898).

Death Before Trial.

Where plaintiff died while suit in assumpsit was pending, but death was unknown at time of trial, trial court should have substituted duly qualified executors, as of date preceding trial and after their appointment, where defendant had had full opportunity to defend and to cross-examine. Le Baron v. Moni, 53 R.I. 385 , 167 A. 108, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 108 (1933).

Failure to Summon Representative.

A suit which survives does not abate on the failure to summon the personal representative of a deceased defendant, since the personal representative has the duty to appear and defend. Sprague v. Greene, 20 R.I. 153 , 37 A. 699, 1897 R.I. LEXIS 65 (1897).

Foreign Representatives.

This section does not apply for foreign executors and administrators of a deceased party to a suit. Conley v. Huntoon, 37 R.I. 343 , 92 A. 865, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1915).

Plea in Abatement.

Since under this section the personal representative may and is obligated to continue an action which was commenced before decedent’s death and which survives, a plea in abatement to such an action is defective if it fails to allege that the personal representative has neglected to prosecute the action. Webster v. Baggs, 6 R.I. 247 , 1859 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1859).

Collateral References.

Substitution as party plaintiff of executor or administrator in action brought before his appointment. 135 A.L.R. 356.

33-9-25. Substitution and execution by successor administrator.

Whenever any judgment shall have been recovered by or in the name of any executor or administrator, a succeeding administrator of the estate not administered may on motion be substituted as plaintiff and may take out execution upon the judgment.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 993; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 28; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 28; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 28; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-25 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 55, § 60.

33-9-26. Liability of executor in own wrong.

Any person who shall embezzle or shall, without being thereto authorized by law, injuriously intermeddle with any personal property of a deceased person shall be liable as an executor in his or her own wrong to the creditors and other persons aggrieved.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 844; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 30; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 30; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 28; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-26 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Liability of Bank.

Bank was not liable as an intermeddler by application of bank account in name of deceased to funeral expenses, since the bank’s act did not result in injury to the estate. Mauro v. Vervena, 62 R.I. 242 , 4 A.2d 893, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1939).

Collateral References.

Liability of executor, administrator, trustee, or his counsel, for interest, penalty, or extra taxes assessed against estate because of tax law violations. 47 A.L.R.3d 507.

Liability of executor or administrator for negligence or default in defending action against estate. 14 A.L.R.3d 1036.

Liability of executor or administrator, or his bond, for loss caused to estate by act or default of his agent or attorney. 28 A.L.R.3d 1191.

Liability of executor or administrator to estate because of overpaying or unnecessarily paying tax. 55 A.L.R.3d 785.

Personal liability of executor or administrator for fees of attorney employed by him for the benefit of the estate. 13 A.L.R.3d 518.

33-9-27. Personal liability of executor or administrator for debts of estate.

No executor or administrator, except an executor in his or her own wrong, shall be holden to bail upon mesne process, nor shall his or her property be attached, nor his or her person arrested, nor his or her person or property taken on execution, for the debts or legacies of the testator or intestate, except upon suggestion of waste as provided in § 33-9-28 ; but in such suits the writs of attachment and execution shall run against the goods, chattels, rights, and credits of the deceased only in the hands of the executor or administrator.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 991; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 26; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 26; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 26; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-27 .

Cross References.

Restricted liability on instrument signed as executor or administrator, § 9-2-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Suit to Recover Under Bond.

In suit to recover legacy under bond for payment of legacy the issue of waste by the executor was immaterial, since it was not a proceeding to recover legacy out of the estate. Probate Court v. Adams, 27 R.I. 97 , 60 A. 769, 1905 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1905).

33-9-28. Civil action with suggestion of waste.

If execution shall issue against the estate of the testator or intestate in the hands of the executor or administrator, and the officer charged with the service thereof shall return thereon that he or she cannot find any estate whereon to levy the execution, and that the execution has not been satisfied by the executor or administrator, a civil action may be brought in the same court within two (2) years after the date of the first publication of the notice of the qualification of the first executor or administrator against the executor or administrator, alleging a suggestion or waste; and after process has been duly served by the officer to whom it shall be directed and by him or her returned, if the executor or administrator makes default of appearance, or, coming in, shall not show sufficient cause to the contrary, judgment and execution shall be awarded against him or her and his or her own proper estate for the sum recovered, with interest due thereon, with costs, and, for want of estate, against the body of the executor or administrator.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 992; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 27; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 27; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 27; G.L. 1956, § 33-9-28 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 55, § 60.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Reply to Scire Facias.

The executor against whom a scire facias was issued after a return by an officer in accordance with this section could not show in his reply that he did not have and never had an estate to satisfy the plaintiff ’s claim. Carver v. Wells, 17 R.I. 688 , 24 A. 466, 1892 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1892).

Unexplained Disappearance of Assets.

Where all of the debts of the estate were paid with the exception of plaintiff ’s claim, disappearance of assets of estate was unexplained, and the executrix filed no inventory or representation of insolvency for several years, the trial court probably granted an execution against the personal estate of the executrix in order to satisfy judgment against her in her capacity as executrix. McLaughlin v. Dunlop, 71 R.I. 429 , 46 A.2d 575, 1946 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1946).

33-9-29. Descent or distribution of real estate to be recorded.

When the real property of any deceased person, or any part thereof or interest therein, is devised or distributed or set out to the devisee or devisees, heir or heirs, or spouse of the decedent, or is legally divided by all the persons interested, or descends to the heir or heirs or spouse of the decedent, the executor or administrator of the decedent, shall cause a certificate of descent to be recorded in the land evidence records of every city or town in which real property of the decedent is situated, and it shall constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated in it, so far as those facts affect real estate of the decedent.

History of Section. P.L. 2001, ch. 296, § 2; P.L. 2006, ch. 589, § 2.

33-9-30. Donation of conservation easement.

An executor or administrator may donate a conservation easement on any real property in order to obtain the benefit of the estate tax exclusion allowed under sections 170 and 2031(c), respectively, of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, if:

  1. The will authorizes or directs the executor to donate a conservation easement on the real property; or
  2. Each interested party who has an interest in the real property that would be affected by the conservation easement consents in writing to the donation.

History of Section. P.L. 2009, ch. 98, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 99, § 1.

Chapter 10 Allowances to Families of Decedents

33-10-1. Wearing apparel and exempt personal property allowed to widow or widower and children.

The wearing apparel of the surviving spouse and minor children of a decedent shall belong to them, respectively. The surviving spouse shall be entitled, individually and for the family under her or his care, to such furniture, furnishings, household effects, supplies, and, in addition thereto, such other personal property of the decedent exempt from attachment by law, as the probate court shall deem necessary, having regard to all the circumstances of the case; or, if there is no surviving spouse, the minor children shall be entitled to the furniture, furnishings, household effects, or the use thereof, in such manner as the court shall direct.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 871; G.L. 1909, ch. 313, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 364, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 577, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 33-10-1 ; P.L. 1980, ch. 317, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 2, and P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Jurisdiction of probate court, § 8-9-9 .

Comparative Legislation.

Allowances:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-320.

Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 196, §§ 1, 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

This section is in derogation of the common law and therefore makes no change except by express terms or by necessary implications. Easton v. Fessenden, 65 R.I. 259 , 14 A.2d 508, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 107 (1940).

Right Must Be Personally Exercised.

Right of widow to allowance under this section must be personally exercised subject to probate court’s discretion; otherwise it does not become vested so as to pass to her executor. Easton v. Fessenden, 65 R.I. 259 , 14 A.2d 508, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 107 (1940).

Collateral References.

Abandonment, desertion, or refusal to support on part of surviving spouse as affecting marital rights in deceased spouse’s estate. 13 A.L.R.3d 446.

Adultery on part of surviving spouse as affecting marital rights in deceased spouse’s estate. 13 A.L.R.3d 486.

Bank deposit to credit of decedent or other indebtedness to him as subject to widow’s or family allowance or other estate exemption, where bank has right to apply deposit, or other debtor has right to assert counterclaim or setoff. 108 A.L.R. 773.

Eligibility of illegitimate child to receive family allowance out of estate of his deceased father. 12 A.L.R.3d 1141.

Estoppel or laches precluding lawful spouse from asserting rights in decedent’s estate as against putative spouse. 81 A.L.R.3d 110.

Interlocutory decree of divorce as affecting widow’s right to allowance. 76 A.L.R. 284.

Particular articles within statute giving surviving spouse of children certain specific items of personal property of deceased. 158 A.L.R. 313.

Prior institution of annulment proceedings or other attack on validity of one’s marriage as barring or estopping one from entitlement to property rights as surviving spouse. 31 A.L.R.4th 1190.

Rights in decedent’s estate as between legal and putative spouse. 81 A.L.R.3d 6.

Surviving spouse’s right to marital share as affected by valid contract to convey by will. 85 A.L.R.4th 418.

Treatment of widow’s allowance and exemption in computing share to which she is entitled under statute of distribution in case of death of husband intestate or of her election to take against will. 98 A.L.R. 1325.

Waiver of right to widow’s allowance by postnuptial agreement. 9 A.L.R.3d 955.

Who is included in term “family” in statutes relating to family allowances out of decedent’s estate. 88 A.L.R.2d 890.

Widow’s right of quarantine. 126 A.L.R. 796.

33-10-2. Property allowed not assets in hands of executor or administrator.

Such part of the decedent’s personal property as the court shall allow to the decedent’s surviving spouse or family, although inventoried, shall not be assets in the hands of the decedent’s personal representative.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 873; G.L. 1909, ch. 313, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 364, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 577, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 33-10-2 ; P.L. 1980, ch. 317, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 2, and P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Personal property of decedent’s estate used for family allowance was not subject to claims of beneficiaries or creditors. Industrial Trust Co. v. Dean, 68 R.I. 43 , 26 A.2d 482, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1942).

Cash.

This section does not afford any basis for cash allowance to the widow of a decedent. Babcock v. Court of Probate, 18 R.I. 555 , 30 A. 461, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 67 (1894).

33-10-3. Allowances for temporary support of family.

The probate court shall make reasonable allowance out of the decedent’s probate estate for the support of his or her family, until the support can otherwise be provided for, for a period not exceeding six (6) months from the date of the death, having regard to the situation of the family and the value and circumstances of the estate. The allowance may be fixed at any time upon application of the personal representative, or of any party in interest, filed within six (6) months after the first publication of notice of the qualification of the personal representative. The court may, in its discretion, provided a final account has not been allowed, make an additional allowance under like conditions for the support of the family for a second period not exceeding six (6) months, the allowance to be fixed at any time after the first six-month (6) period has passed and within one year after the first publication of notice of the qualification of the personal representative upon application, of the personal representative or of any party in interest. After exhausting the personal property, real estate may be sold to provide the amount of allowance decreed in the same manner as for the payment of debts. An appeal from a decree granting letters testamentary or of administration shall not prevent the allowance being made by the probate court or the payment thereof. An appeal from a decree making any allowance shall not prevent the payment of the allowance if a bond in such amount as may be fixed by the court, but no less than the amount of the allowance be given to the court by a surviving spouse, if any, or by a guardian of the minor children in case there be no surviving spouse, with surety or sureties approved by the court, and conditioned to repay all in excess of what is finally determined to be a reasonable allowance or to return all of the allowance in case the decree granting the allowance is finally reversed in the full amount. The bond required by the provisions of this section and the remedies thereon shall be governed by the provisions of chapter 17 of this title as far as the context thereof permits.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 872; G.L. 1909, ch. 313, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 364, § 7; P.L. 1926, ch. 827, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 577, § 7; P.L. 1941, ch. 1004, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-10-3 ; P.L. 1962, ch. 39, § 1; P.L. 1980, ch. 317, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 2, and P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Adequacy of Other Provisions.

By use of the words “until the same can otherwise be provided for,” the general assembly intended to limit the granting of allowances to widows to cases where there was no other adequate provision for support. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hopkins, 38 R.I. 59 , 94 A. 724, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 49 (1915).

Jury instruction that “the statute says an allowance shall be made and it is obvious that there is a tremendously wide discretion allowed to the court” was misleading in probate appeal of family allowance where the court failed to instruct on the effect of the restrictive words, “until the same can otherwise be provided for.” Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hopkins, 38 R.I. 59 , 94 A. 724, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 49 (1915).

Allowance under this section was unwarranted where widow had received income payments under the will during first six months after testator’s death which were adequate for her reasonable support during such period, and widow did not in fact expend all money received under the will. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hopkins, 38 R.I. 59 , 94 A. 724, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 49 (1915).

Probate court was required to decree allowance, even though will directed certain payments to widow pending settlement of estate, where sufficient assets were not available for support of widow and dependent children pending settlement. Industrial Trust Co. v. Dean, 68 R.I. 43 , 26 A.2d 482, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1942).

Claims Against Estate.

Personal property of decedent’s estate used for family allowance under this section was not subject to claims of beneficiaries or creditors. Industrial Trust Co. v. Dean, 68 R.I. 43 , 26 A.2d 482, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1942).

Death of Widow.

The language of this chapter when considered with co-ordinate statutory provisions, shows legislative intent to assist widow and family in widow’s lifetime and not her estate after death. Easton v. Fessenden, 65 R.I. 259 , 14 A.2d 508, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 107 (1940).

Jury Function on Appeal.

In probate appeal of family allowance, an instruction that jury was passing on the issue of allowance as the probate court in control of the estate was misleading, since the jury’s function was to consider facts under the court’s instructions on the law. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hopkins, 38 R.I. 59 , 94 A. 724, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 49 (1915).

Notice to Parties.

Probate court may grant a cash allowance for support of decedent’s family for a term not exceeding six months without the consent of the decedent’s personal representative and without notice to interested parties. Babcock v. Court of Probate, 18 R.I. 555 , 30 A. 461, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 67 (1894).

Parties to Appeal.

Executor could appeal from decree of probate court granting allowance under this section where executor was also trustee of substantial portion of testator’s estate and claim of appeal set forth interests both as executor and as trustee. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hopkins, 38 R.I. 59 , 94 A. 724, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 49 (1915).

Waiver of Allowances.

Widow had no power to waive allowance provided by this section, so far as children of decedent were concerned, by electing to accept testamentary provision in her favor. Industrial Trust Co. v. Dean, 68 R.I. 43 , 26 A.2d 482, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1942).

Widow who elected to take under will which excluded her statutory rights was not prevented from later obtaining allowance where, at time of election, she had no notice that estate was probably insolvent. Industrial Trust Co. v. Dean, 68 R.I. 43 , 26 A.2d 482, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1942).

Collateral References.

Abandonment, desertion, or refusal to support on part of surviving spouse as affecting marital rights in deceased spouse’s estate. 13 A.L.R.3d 446.

Adultery on part of surviving spouse as affecting marital rights in deceased spouse’s estate. 13 A.L.R.3d 486.

Effect of election to take under will on right of widow to fixed statutory allowance, or allowance for support. 97 A.L.R.2d 1319.

Eligibility of illegitimate child to receive family allowance out of estate of his deceased father. 12 A.L.R.3d 1140.

Estoppel or laches precluding lawful spouse from asserting rights in decedent’s estate as against putative spouse. 81 A.L.R.3d 110.

Family allowance from decedent’s estate as exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, and foreclosure. 27 A.L.R.3d 863.

Family allowance granted widow as payable from community interests of decedent and widow. 9 A.L.R.2d 529.

Interlocutory decree of divorce as affecting widow’s right to allowance. 76 A.L.R. 284.

Nonresident’s right to widow’s or child’s allowance out of estate of one who was domiciled in state. 26 A.L.R. 132.

Prior institution of annulment proceedings or other attack on validity of one’s marriage as barring or estopping one from entitlement to property rights as surviving spouse. 31 A.L.R.4th 1190.

Rights in decedent’s estate as between legal and putative spouse. 81 A.L.R.3d 6.

Sale of land in state other than domicile, right to, for purpose of paying widow’s statutory allowance. 81 A.L.R. 676.

Separation agreement as affecting right to statutory allowance. 35 A.L.R. 518; 116 A.L.R. 931; 163 A.L.R. 1019; 34 A.L.R.2d 1045.

Separation agreement invalid as contrary to public policy as affecting widow’s allowance. 109 A.L.R. 1178.

Statutory family allowance to minor children as affected by previous agreement or judgment for their support. 6 A.L.R.3d 1387.

Waiver of right to widow’s allowance by postnuptial agreement. 9 A.L.R.3d 955.

Widow’s or family allowance out of decedent’s estate as surviving death or marriage of widow or minor children, or attainment of majority by children. 144 A.L.R. 270.

33-10-4. Real estate set aside for support of widow or widower in addition to statutory life estate.

If there be no issue of a deceased person living at the time of his or her death, the probate court shall also allow and set off to the widow or widower such portion of the real estate of her or his deceased spouse not required for the payment of his or her debts as may be suitable for her or his situation and support and in accordance with the circumstances of the estate, and the widow or widower shall hold the real estate in addition to those rights afforded by chapter 25 of this title subject to the same conditions and for the same time as she or he holds her or his statutory estate pursuant to the provisions of chapter 25 of this title.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 874; G.L. 1909, ch. 313, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 364, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 577, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 33-10-4 ; P.L. 1980, ch. 317, § 1.

Cross References.

Widow’s or husband’s allowance of real estate in fee, § 33-1-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Assignment of Dower Prerequisite.

A probate court does not have jurisdiction to set off realty until after an assignment of dower has been made. Mathewson v. Mathewson, 16 R.I. 12 , 11 A. 166, 1887 R.I. LEXIS 65 (1887).

Death of Widow.

The language of this chapter, when considered with coordinate statutory provisions, shows legislative intent to assist widow in her lifetime and not her estate after death. Easton v. Fessenden, 65 R.I. 259 , 14 A.2d 508, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 107 (1940).

Effect of Claims Against Estate.

Although the probate court does not have jurisdiction to finally determine disputed claims, the court may examine the claims to determine if the amount due is such that it is probable that the real estate will need to be sold to pay them and then may allow or disallow additional real estate to be set off for the widow before the claims against the estate have been finally adjudicated. Smith v. Smith, 12 R.I. 456 , 1879 R.I. LEXIS 56 (1879).

Effective Date of Setting Off.

A decree setting off real estate to the widow takes effect upon its affirmance on appeal and the widow is not entitled to rents and profits accruing prior to such affirmance. Dyer v. Dyer, 17 R.I. 547 , 23 A. 910, 1891 R.I. LEXIS 83 (1891).

Proceeds of Sale of Land.

Proceeds of sale of real estate in partition suit are to be treated as land in determining widow’s rights under this section. Cronshaw v. Cronshaw, 21 R.I. 126 , 43 A. 1038, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1898).

Testate Estates.

The court may under proper circumstances set off property under this section from either a testate or an intestate estate. Bannon v. Bannon, 45 R.I. 83 , 120 A. 66, 1923 R.I. LEXIS 27 (1923).

Collateral References.

Abandonment, desertion, or refusal to support on part of surviving spouse as affecting marital rights in deceased spouse’s estate. 13 A.L.R.3d 446.

Adultery on part of surviving spouse as affecting marital rights in deceased spouse’s estate. 13 A.L.R.3d 486.

Estoppel or laches precluding lawful spouse from asserting rights in decedent’s estate as against putative spouse. 81 A.L.R.3d 110.

Prior institution of annulment proceedings or other attack on validity of one’s marriage as barring or estopping one from entitlement to property rights as surviving spouse. 31 A.L.R.4th 1190.

Rights in decedent’s estate as between legal and putative spouse. 81 A.L.R.3d 6.

Surviving spouse’s right to marital share as affected by valid contract to convey by will. 85 A.L.R.4th 418.

Validity of inter vivos trust established by one spouse which impairs the other spouse’s distributive share or other statutory rights in property. 39 A.L.R.3d 14.

Waiver of right to widow’s allowance by postnuptial agreement. 9 A.L.R.3d 955.

Chapter 11 Claims Against Decedents’ Estates

33-11-1. Computation of time.

Periods of time in this chapter, where no other provision is made, shall be reckoned from the date of the first publication by the probate clerk of the notice of the qualification of the original personal representative of the decedent’s estate.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 881; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 1; P.L. 1922, ch. 2196, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-1 ; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

Comparative Legislation.

Claims against estates:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-390 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 197, § 1 et seq., ch. 198, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Construction.

Section 33-23-1 and this chapter are statutes in pari materia and should be considered together to achieve harmonious interpretations consistent with their general purpose and scope. Lind v. McSoley, 419 A.2d 247, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1724 (1980).

33-11-2. Effect of administration de bonis non.

When after qualification the original personal representative dies, resigns or is removed, without having fully administered the estate, and a successor personal representative is appointed, the succeeding administration shall be deemed to be a continuation of the preceding administration, and all limitations which could be claimed for or against the predecessor may be claimed for or against the successor; provided, however, that the time when there is no personal representative of the estate shall not be reckoned as part of the periods for the filing, or proof of claims, or limitations for bringing suits; and these periods, and generally the periods referred to where no provision to the contrary is made, shall be reckoned exclusive of this time.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 974; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-2 ; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Continuation of Administration.

Where administrator de bonis non was appointed after February 1, 1896, but original administrator was appointed and qualified before such date, claims against estate were governed by the special statute of limitations under prior law, as a new administration is merely a continuation of the preceding one. Thompson v. Hoxsie, 25 R.I. 377 , 55 A. 930, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 85 (1903).

Where an executrix was removed with the estate having not been fully administered, the administration of an administrator with will annexed was deemed to be a continuation of the first administration. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Sherman, 52 R.I. 207 , 159 A. 740, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1932).

Distributions by Previous Administrator.

Administrator with will annexed could not obtain return of bank deposits given to son by prior executrix who was sole person interested in estate, except for small debts, even though formal closing of estate had not been accomplished, since formalities could have been remedied under § 33-18-28 by court order or under § 33-18-21 by recording her action. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Sherman, 52 R.I. 207 , 159 A. 740, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1932).

33-11-3. Claims payable at future day.

Claims against the estate of a deceased person, which by their terms are payable at a future day, shall, as against the estate, be deemed to be due at the time of the person’s death, and may be filed, and shall be entitled to payment with other claims, deducting interest for the anticipated payment.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 882; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-3 .

33-11-4. Manner of presentation of claims.

Claims against a decedent’s estate may be presented as follows:

  1. The claimant shall present a written statement of the claim with the clerk of the probate court indicating its basis, the amount claimed (if known), the name and address of the claimant, and the name and address of the claimant’s attorney (if any) and deliver or mail a copy thereof to the personal representative. The claim is deemed presented when filed with the probate court. The claimant has the burden of establishing proper and timely presentation of the claim. If the claim is not yet due, the date when it will become due shall be stated. If the claim is contingent or unliquidated, the nature of the condition or uncertainty shall be stated. If the claim is secured, the security shall be described. Failure to accurately describe the due date of claim not yet due, the nature of any condition or uncertainty, or the security, does not invalidate the presentation made.
  2. No presentation of claim is required for matters already claimed in proceedings which were pending against the decedent at the time of his or her death. No personal representative shall be held to defend and no decedent’s estate shall be held liable for any claim pending against the decedent until the estate shall be joined as a party with notice to the probate court and the personal representative served.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 883; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 3; P.L. 1915, ch. 1260, § 3; P.L. 1920, ch. 1937, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 3; P.L. 1941, ch. 1003, § 2; P.L. 1951, ch. 2743, § 1; P.L. 1952, ch. 3023, § 1; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3717, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-4 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 363, § 6.

Cross References.

Bill of exchange, presentment to personal representative for acceptance, §§ 6A-3-503 , 6A-3-504 .

Dishonor of negotiable instrument, notice to personal representative, § 6A-3-503 .

Estate and transfer taxes, § 44-23-1 et seq.

Joint contractor, decedent’s liability as, § 9-2-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Purpose.

The object of this section is to facilitate the settlement of the estates of deceased persons, and to make all the prescribed steps towards the distribution of the estate conclusive once they have been taken. Lind v. McSoley, 419 A.2d 247, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1724 (1980).

Construction With Other Statutes.

Construction of § 33-11-8 , placing jurisdiction in probate court to examine and determine a claim filed by a person who only afterwards becomes administrator, is not inconsistent with the general statutory provisions of this section. KIGGIN v. KIGGIN, 59 R.I. 370 , 195 A. 492, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 174 (1937).

The legislature intended to require “persons having claims” to file a statement of those claims pursuant to this section before they may assert the status under § 33-23-1 of a “person aggrieved” by a probate court order or decree concerning a decedent’s estate. Lind v. McSoley, 419 A.2d 247, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1724 (1980).

Contents of Claim.

Claimant is not required to set forth the evidence upon which he relies to justify recovery. White v. Almy, 34 R.I. 29 , 82 A. 397, 1912 R.I. LEXIS 27 (1912).

This section does not require any particular language in which claim for services must be set out, if it fairly and substantially informs executor of extent of claim, limited to amount and nature, but need not state evidence to support the claim. Lancaster v. Marshall, 69 R.I. 422 , 34 A.2d 718, 1943 R.I. LEXIS 68 (1943).

The trial justice did not err in determining that the provision requiring claims filed against the estates of deceased persons to contain an affidavit was not jurisdictional in character, as the primary purpose was to require a copy of the claim to be placed in the hands of the executor or administrator simultaneously with or prior to the filing of the claim in the probate court; therefore, claim of divorced wife filed against the estate of her former husband was not defective for lack of an affidavit. Holt v. Sullivan, 95 R.I. 412 , 187 A.2d 533, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1963).

Expenses of Administration.

Expenses of administration need not be filed as claims against a decedent’s estate and the limitation on filing of claims has no application to such expenses. McLeod v. Fielder, 79 R.I. 321 , 88 A.2d 329, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 51 (1952); Cox v. Amend, 97 R.I. 382 , 198 A.2d 48, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 95 (1964).

Funeral Expenses.

The expenses of the funeral of a deceased person contracted for by the estate, either directly or indirectly, are not claims against a deceased person within the meaning of this section. Cox v. Amend, 97 R.I. 382 , 198 A.2d 48, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 95 (1964).

Payments Under Divorce Decree.

Claim by administratrix, who was divorced from bed and board of deceased, for back alimony and support was properly filed with the clerk of the probate court. Gilbert v. Hayward, 37 R.I. 303 , 92 A. 625, 1914 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1914).

Where provisions for payments to decedent’s former wife, in agreement to establish a trust, were also incorporated in final divorce decree, claim by former wife against decedent’s estate pursuant to such provisions could be adjudicated only in the superior court. Mulry v. Industrial Nat'l Bank, 104 R.I. 597 , 247 A.2d 847, 1968 R.I. LEXIS 690 (1968).

Persons Entitled to File.

Ward who was under guardianship for lack of discretion in managing his estate could file a claim in an estate of a deceased person. Taylor v. Superior Court, 30 R.I. 560 , 76 A. 644, 1910 R.I. LEXIS 57 (1910).

A claimant has no potential interest in an estate until he complies with the filing requirements of this chapter. Lind v. McSoley, 419 A.2d 247, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1724 (1980).

Claimants who fail to file a statement of claim as required by this chapter lack standing to challenge a final account of a decedent’s estate in the probate court. Lind v. McSoley, 419 A.2d 247, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1724 (1980).

— Creditor of Beneficiary’s Estate.

A judgment creditor of the estate of decedent’s beneficiary has the identical interest in decedent’s estate as the interest asserted by a judgment creditor who commences an action to reach and apply his judgment debtor’s interest in a decedent’s estate. Lind v. McSoley, 419 A.2d 247, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1724 (1980).

A judgment creditor of the estate of decedent’s beneficiary has no standing to appeal the closing of decedent’s estate without payment of a legacy to the beneficiary’s estate unless the creditor files a claim directly against decedent’s estate. Lind v. McSoley, 419 A.2d 247, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1724 (1980).

Place of Filing.

Declaration that plaintiff presented his claim thereon to the administrator was demurrable, since plaintiff was required to file claim in the office of the clerk of probate court, but since administrator did not demur or object to evidence showing filing of claim with the clerk he could not raise question of variance on an appeal. Roberts v. White, 32 R.I. 185 , 78 A. 497, 1911 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1911).

Suit on Bond.

In order for creditor to recover in suit on bond to pay debts and legacies he must show that he has filed a claim with the clerk of the probate court within the statutory period. Municipal Court of Providence v. Bostwick, 31 R.I. 550 , 78 A. 53, 1910 R.I. LEXIS 92 (1910).

Collateral References.

Amendment of claim against decedent’s estate, introducing new or different claim or effecting substantial change in claim. 56 A.L.R.2d 627.

Amendment of statement of claim against decedent’s estate, or verification thereof. 74 A.L.R. 400.

Amount of claim filed against decedent’s estate as limiting amount recoverable in action against estate. 25 A.L.R.3d 1356.

Devise or bequest of property as compensation for personal services, claim against estate of deceased promissor for breach of. 69 A.L.R. 85; 106 A.L.R. 742.

Filing claim against estate of decedent as affecting or precluding other remedies against the estate. 120 A.L.R. 1225.

Mortgage on real estate, sufficiency of presentation of claim for. 78 A.L.R. 1153.

Necessity of presenting claim against decedent’s estate as affected by executor’s or administrator’s personal duty or obligation to claimant. 103 A.L.R. 337.

Necessity of presenting claim to executor or administrator before bringing suit. 34 A.L.R. 362.

Necessity of presenting, probating, or prosecuting claims for allowance as affected by provision of will directing payment of debts. 65 A.L.R. 861.

Presentment of claim to one of two or more executors. 115 A.L.R. 390.

Sufficiency of notice of claim against decedent’s estate. 74 A.L.R. 368.

Taxes, claims for, as within contemplation of statute requiring presentation of claims. 109 A.L.R. 1370.

Waiver of mortgage or other line by filing claim as an unsecured one. 2 A.L.R. 1132.

Workmen’s Compensation Act, necessity of filing claim under, against estate of deceased employer. 94 A.L.R. 889.

33-11-5. Time allowed for presenting claims — Late claims — Appeal.

  1. Claims shall be presented within six (6) months from the first publication or be forever barred, subject to extensions granted pursuant to subsection 33-11-5(b) .
  2. A creditor who, by reason of accident, mistake, excusable neglect or lack of adequate notice of decedent’s estate, failed to present a claim within six (6) months from the first publication, may before distribution of the estate, petition the probate court for leave to present a claim out of time. For purposes of this section, notice of commencement of probate pursuant to § 33-11-5.1 at least sixty (60) days before the expiration of the six (6) months claim period shall be deemed adequate. Upon hearing after notice to the decedent’s personal representative, heirs and beneficiaries (if any), the probate court may in its discretion, grant leave to present the claim out of time upon such terms as the court prescribes. Any claim presented out of time, if allowed, shall be paid out of the assets remaining in the personal representative’s hands when notice of the petition was received.
  3. There shall be no de novo appeal to the superior court from an order or decree of the probate court granting leave to present a claim out of time.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 883; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 3; P.L. 1915, ch. 1260, § 3; P.L. 1920, ch. 1937, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 3; P.L. 1941, ch. 1003, § 2; P.L. 1951, ch. 2743, § 1; P.L. 1952, ch. 3023, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-5 ; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

Although this section discriminates between the rights accorded the creditor and those afforded to the decedent’s estate, the purpose of this section is to give a claimant the opportunity, in the discretion of the Probate Court, to file his claim beyond the six-month period, which is a sufficient rational basis for distinguishing between the rights accorded to a creditor and the estate; hence the section does not violate the equal protection clause of the constitution. Estate of McAlpine v. Estate of McAlpine, 120 R.I. 135 , 386 A.2d 179, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 649 (1978).

Applicability.

Despite mortgagee’s failure to file a claim in the probate proceedings, the foreclosure was not time-barred as the 20-year statute of limitations applicable to foreclosures, § 9-1-17 , applied and the limitations period associated with the probate claim-filing statute, § 33-11-5 , did not apply. Summers v. Fin. Freedom Acquisition LLC, 807 F.3d 351, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 18507 (1st Cir. 2015).

Auto Insurance Policy.

The potential right of a decedent who has been involved in an automobile collision to exoneration or indemnity under her automobile liability insurance policy is an asset of the decedent’s estate and, until it has been listed in the inventory and disposed of, the assets of the estate have not been completely distributed and the estate has not been fully administered. Smith v. Estate of Catterall, 107 R.I. 729 , 271 A.2d 300, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 835 (1970).

Claim for Corporate Debt.

Administrator of an estate could not be summoned to defend suit against deceased as a stockholder in a corporation against which plaintiff had a judgment, where no claim had been filed in the estate. Andrews v. O'Reilly, 34 R.I. 256 , 83 A. 119, 1912 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1912).

Claim on Bond.

In suit by plaintiff to recover on bond of deceased, plea of estate that suit was barred due to failure to file claim within statutory period was good against demurrer, since plaintiff was a “creditor” of the estate. Municipal Court v. Whaley, 26 R.I. 25 , 57 A. 1061, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1904).

Claims Filed Out of Time.

The trial court did not err in finding that a challenge to the denial of a probate claim was not timely filed since the claimant took no further action after the denial of his claim until more than five months after the statute of limitations had run. Heflin v. Koszela, 774 A.2d 25, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 158 (2001).

— Amendment of Claim.

Creditor was not allowed to amend a claim after time for presenting claims had expired, even though original claim was mistakenly based on company account rather than on decedent’s personal account. Vennerbeck & Clase Co. v. Markham's Estate, 54 R.I. 366 , 173 A. 549, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 105 (1934).

— Discretion of Court.

The determination of the validity of the reason for late filing of a claim against an estate is left in the first instance in the trial court unless petitioner’s testimony is inherently improbable or utterly unworthy of belief, and the reasons are not limited to “accident, mistake or unforeseen cause.” Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Simons, 60 R.I. 108 , 197 A. 190, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 105 (1938) (decided prior to 1941 and 1952 amendments).

This section will be liberally construed, thus giving the probate court a wide discretion in determining possible relief to be granted under its discretionary power to allow late filings. Dunlop v. McLaughlin, 62 R.I. 417 , 6 A.2d 446, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1939) (decided prior to 1941 and 1952 amendments).

The Probate Court is given a wide, although not unlimited, discretion in the matter of filing claims against estate which are out of time, and unless the Probate Court has abused that discretion, its decision will not be reversed and its judgment on the facts after a fair hearing will stand as conclusive, unless such judgment is so lacking in evidence to support it, that there is no valid reason for the exercise of the court’s discretion. Estate of McAlpine v. Estate of McAlpine, 120 R.I. 135 , 386 A.2d 179, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 649 (1978).

— Division of Single Claim.

Claimant who filed only a portion of his claim against estate within six-month period, was not entitled to file the part omitted as a new claim within the twelve-month period, hence the administrator was not required to disallow the second claim and was not guilty of unfaithful administration for failure to pay the second claim. Potter v. Harvey, 34 R.I. 71 , 82 A. 812, 1912 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1912).

— Filing After Distribution.

Claim could not be filed after distribution of the estate even though the reason for failure to file was accident, mistake or unforeseen cause and even though the distribution had not been approved by the court. Slaimen v. Curtis, 56 R.I. 351 , 185 A. 684, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 108 (1936).

A creditor was not entitled to file a claim out of time where the final account disclosed that all debts were paid, and the remaining balance in the estate had been paid to the heirs, even though the payment to the heirs had been made without a court order. Chatigny v. Gancz, 84 R.I. 255 , 123 A.2d 140, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 53 (1956).

Probate court erred in granting a claimant’s petition for leave to file a claim out of time against an estate because the probate court was without jurisdiction to entertain the petition as it was presented for filing after the final distribution had been paid or delivered to the estate’s beneficiaries, although the distribution was made without a prior order of the probate court. The fact that the executor of the estate did not secure a release regarding another claim against the estate before distributing the assets did not alter the analysis. In re Estate of Buonanno, 909 A.2d 494, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 163 (2006).

— Reasons for Late Filing.

Excuse for failure to file claim held valid in trial court’s discretion was held sufficient in supreme court where claimant had been writing a book and therefore had not given further attention to the delinquent claim. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Simons, 60 R.I. 108 , 197 A. 190, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 105 (1938) (decided prior to 1941 and 1952 amendments).

Claims against the estate not filed within one year from first publication of notice to creditors are barred, except that a creditor who has failed to claim because of accident, mistake or unforeseen cause may file his claim before distribution. Kimball v. Kelly, 65 R.I. 484 , 16 A.2d 491, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 145 (1940) (decided prior to 1941 amendment).

Forgetfulness of the attorney for the claimant is not a valid reason for the exercise of discretion by the probate court to grant leave to file a claim which is untimely. Jablonski v. Andrusckiewicz, 70 R.I. 128 , 37 A.2d 468, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 21 (1944).

As the six-month limitation period for filing claims against a decedent’s estate was not triggered until the Department of Human Services received notice that the estate had been opened, and as it filed its claim only two months after receiving notice—well within the six-month window—its claim was not time-barred. In re Estate of Manchester, 66 A.3d 426, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 84 (2013).

— Review of Probate Court.

Decision denying leave to file late claim under the discretionary power of court is reviewable on appeal to superior court and will not be reviewed on certiorari in the supreme court. MacKenzie & Shea v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 45 R.I. 407 , 122 A. 774, 1923 R.I. LEXIS 85 (1923) (decided prior to 1952 amendment).

Unless the trial court has abused its wide discretion under this section to allow late filing of claims against an estate or has based its decision upon mistake as to its powers or upon an error of law, the supreme court will not reverse the decision. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Simons, 60 R.I. 108 , 197 A. 190, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 105 (1938) (decided prior to 1941 and 1952 amendments).

Decree granting leave to file claim out of time was in full force and effect until executrix appealed therefrom. McLaughlin v. Dunlop, 68 R.I. 4 , 26 A.2d 3, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 25 (1942) (decided prior to 1952 amendment).

Petition for leave to file claim out of time which recited grounds “of accident, mistake or unforeseen cause” as well as that “of any other cause” was sufficient to give superior court jurisdiction to hear appeal from probate court’s denial of such petition where nothing in the record showed that petition was filed solely under discretionary provision of prior law. Streeter v. Millman, 68 R.I. 456 , 29 A.2d 635, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 92 (1942) (decided prior to 1952 amendment on law prior to 1941 amendment).

Appeal from probate court’s denial of petition to file claim out of time was not required to be taken directly to supreme court where petition was based partly on accident, mistake or unforeseen cause. Streeter v. Millman, 68 R.I. 456 , 29 A.2d 635, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 92 (1942) (decided prior to 1952 amendment on law prior to 1941 amendment).

Without a transcript or summary of evidence the supreme court cannot pass independently upon the question of whether the probate judge abused his discretion in allowing the appellee to file a claim out of time, and the statement of the evidence appearing in the probate judge’s rescript cannot be accepted in lieu of an approved summary. Letendre v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 74 R.I. 276 , 60 A.2d 471, 1948 R.I. LEXIS 74 (1948) (decided prior to 1952 amendment).

Claims Pending in Other Actions.

Probate court’s refusal to allow claim of creditor was proper where claim had been pending for some years in another lawsuit and was filed more than one year after publication of notice of appointment of administrator and after final distribution of estate, and where delay was not based on “accident, mistake or unforeseen cause.” Slaimen v. Curtis, 56 R.I. 351 , 185 A. 684, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 108 (1936).

Compliance Required.

Although recovery for a tortious injury allegedly committed by a person who later dies may be uncertain, at the time of the person’s death the claim already has accrued and is not dependent upon some future event, and thus a person filing a negligence claim, like every other creditor, is required to file his probate court claim pursuant to § 33-11-5 and any subsequent action challenging the denial of that probate claim pursuant to § 33-11-48 . Heflin v. Koszela, 774 A.2d 25, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 158 (2001).

Computation of Time.

Disallowance of a claim because it was filed on the last day of the six-month period was not valid since claim filed on last day was as timely as one filed on the first day of the period. Porbate Court v. Sweet, 35 R.I. 291 , 86 A. 892, 1913 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1913).

Continuation of Business.

Insurer could not establish claim for premiums due from decedent five years after death even though administrator continued to run decedent’s business and pay for same insurance to cover business after death. C. D. Paige & Co. v. Gibbons, 53 R.I. 394 , 167 A. 138, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 124 (1933).

Debts Due United States.

The period of limitation fixed by this section does not apply to a claim by the United States for taxes owed by the decedent. United States v. Sullivan, 254 F. Supp. 254, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10510 (D.R.I. 1966).

Failure to File Claim.

Appellant had standing to challenge mortgagee’s right to foreclose after mortgagee failed to file a claim in the probate proceedings where appellant inherited an interest in the property after the probate proceedings and mortgagee sought to foreclose on the same property since appellant had a personal stake in the outcome and the right to ensure that the foreclosure conformed with the law. Summers v. Fin. Freedom Acquisition LLC, 807 F.3d 351, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 18507 (1st Cir. 2015).

Federal appellate court predicted that the Rhode Island Supreme Court would hold that the failure to file a claim in the probate court did not bar a mortgagee holding a reverse mortgage from collecting the balance due through a foreclosure as the probate process did not extinguish a real estate mortgage but only extinguished personal liability for the underlying debt. Summers v. Fin. Freedom Acquisition LLC, 807 F.3d 351, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 18507 (1st Cir. 2015).

Foreign Executor.

Where claim was filed by executor from another state and after claim was disallowed suit was brought thereon and thereafter such foreign executor obtained ancillary letters in Rhode Island, at which time the time for filing claims had expired, suit could not be maintained thereon. Fitch v. Firestone, 184 F. Supp. 424, 1960 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2855 (D.R.I. 1960).

General Statute of Limitations.

The general two-year limitation is not a bar to an action where a tort claim is timely filed against the tortfeasor’s estate and suit is filed within six months of disallowance of the claim, even though this occurs more than two years after accrual of the action. Borges v. Cory, 78 R.I. 425 , 82 A.2d 833, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 96 (1951).

Identity of Action With Claim.

Filing of a claim for a definite amount for services rendered will not support an action for damages for nonperformance of a special promise by deceased to pay for services by a legacy of a larger amount. Anderson v. Williams, 26 R.I. 64 , 58 A. 251, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1904).

Notice of a claim for a definite amount for a definite period of service to deceased will not support a suit for a longer period in excess of amount claimed in notice. Anderson v. Williams, 26 R.I. 64 , 58 A. 251, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1904).

Later Discovered Assets.

The purpose of § 33-11-20 is to relieve against the strict rigor of the statute of limitations prescribed for filing claims under this section. Allen v. National Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 61 R.I. 440 , 1 A.2d 97, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 79 (1938).

Notice to Creditor.

This section is not a self-executing statute of limitations. If a creditor’s identity is known or reasonably ascertainable, then the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that the creditor be given notice by mail, or other means as certain, to ensure actual notice. In re Estate of Santoro, 572 A.2d 298, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1990).

The filing of a timely claim against an estate in the probate court constitutes a waiver of the right to actual notice, since the objective of the notice requirement is to give creditors an opportunity to timely file their claims and to be heard. Heflin v. Koszela, 774 A.2d 25, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 158 (2001).

Purpose of Statute.

The purpose of this section is to fix the time within which claims against an estate must be presented. Williams v. Starkweather, 22 R.I. 501 , 48 A. 669, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1901).

The purpose of this section is to secure a speedy settlement of the estates of deceased persons. As such it is independent of and collateral to the general statute of limitations. Thompson v. Hoxsie, 25 R.I. 377 , 55 A. 930, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 85 (1903).

Secured Notes.

Where vendor failed to file claim on notes and mortgage against estate of vendee within one year after notice to creditors, vendor could not sue legatees and devisees of the vendee even though mortgage was foreclosed after distribution. Kimball v. Kelly, 65 R.I. 484 , 16 A.2d 491, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 145 (1940).

Tort Claims.

Claims arising in tort and claims for unliquidated damages must be filed in the probate court or such claims will be barred. Hicks v. Wilbur, 38 R.I. 268 , 94 A. 872, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1915).

Plaintiffs could not recover for personal injuries where a statement of the claim had not been filed in the office of the clerk of the probate court nor disallowed by the executor within the time limit under this section. Kelley v. Harlow, 51 R.I. 137 , 152 A. 696, 1930 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1930).

Waiver of Filing.

An executor or administrator could not waive statute of nonclaim so as to bind the estate. Thompson v. Hoxsie, 25 R.I. 377 , 55 A. 930, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 85 (1903).

Administrator who settled claim filed over two years after publication date was not entitled to credit himself for sum paid. Kenyon v. Probate Court, 27 R.I. 566 , 65 A. 267, 1906 R.I. LEXIS 42 (1906).

Administrator or his attorney cannot waive the filing of a claim. Andrews v. O'Reilly, 34 R.I. 256 , 83 A. 119, 1912 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1912).

Collateral References.

Claims for expenses of last sickness or for funeral expenses as within contemplation of statute requiring presentation of claims against decedent’s estate, or limiting time for bringing action thereon. 17 A.L.R.4th 530.

Conduct of personal representative preventing filing of claims within time allowed by statute of nonclaim. 11 A.L.R. 246; 66 A.L.R. 1415.

Failure of personal representative to file proof of publication of notice of appointment or notice to creditors within specified time as tolling statute of nonclaim. 42 A.L.R.2d 1218.

Government claim as within provision of statute fixing time for presenting claims against decedent’s estate. 34 A.L.R.2d 1003.

Necessity of compliance with nonclaim statute before bringing suit in replevin against personal representative. 42 A.L.R.2d 443.

Nonclaim statute as governing claim barred, subsequent to death of obligor, by general statute of limitations. 112 A.L.R. 289.

Partnership, applicability of statute of nonclaim as between surviving partner and estate of deceased partner. 96 A.L.R. 449; 157 A.L.R. 1114.

Presentation of claim to executor or administrator as prerequisite of its availability as counterclaim or setoff. 36 A.L.R.3d 693.

Statute forbidding suit against representative of estate until expiration of prescribed period as affecting running of statute of nonclaim. 104 A.L.R. 901.

Stock subscription, applicability of nonclaim statute to claim for unpaid balance of, upon call made after stockholder’s death. 41 A.L.R. 150; 47 A.L.R. 896.

Time for filing claim based on promise to make a will. 32 A.L.R.2d 380.

Trust funds, applicability of nonclaim statute in case of misappropriation of, or fraudulent breach of trust by decedent. 41 A.L.R. 169.

Unfiled or abandoned claim, effect of recovery of judgment on, after expiration of time allowed for filing claims. 60 A.L.R. 736.

Validity of claims against estate filed prior to publication of notice to creditors. 70 A.L.R.3d 784.

33-11-5.1. Duty to notify known or reasonably ascertainable creditors.

  1. If the identity of a creditor of the decedent’s is known to or reasonably ascertainable by the personal representative, the personal representative shall, within a reasonable period of time after qualification, take such steps as are reasonably necessary to ensure that such creditor receives or has received notice of the commencement of the decedent’s estate. The sending of a notice in the form contained in subsection (b) by the personal representative to the creditor at his/her or its last known address, by first class mail, postage prepaid, shall be deemed a means, but not the exclusive means, of satisfying the requirements of this section. The personal representative is not liable to a creditor or to a successor personal representative of the decedent for giving or failing to give notice under this section.
  2. A personal representative shall be conclusively presumed to have complied with this section by sending a written notice in substantially the following form:

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  3. In all cases where the decedent was fifty-five (55) years or older at the time of death, the personal representatives shall give notice as required by this section to the executive office of health and human services in accordance with § 40-8-15 .

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND PROBATE COURT OF COUNTY OF THE ESTATE OF (NAME OR ESTATE) (NO.) NOTICE OF COMMENCEMENT OF PROBATE To: (Name of Creditor) (last known address of creditor) Notice is hereby given by (name of personal representative) that a probate estate has been commenced for (name of decedent) in the Probate Court of the (name of municipality, address of court) docket no. , said (name of fiduciary) having been qualified on (date of qualification). A creditor must present a written statement of the claim indicating its basis, the amount claimed, the name and address of the claimant, and the name and address of the claimant’s attorney (if any) within six (6) months after qualification. Claims should be mailed to the personal representative or attorney named below and filed with the clerk of the probate court. Name and address of Estate Personal Representative or Attorney Date

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 6; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2; P.L. 2009, ch. 310, § 12; P.L. 2013, ch. 186, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 236, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 186, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 236, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2013, ch. 186, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall take effect July 11, 2013, and shall apply to all pending and future petitions.

P.L. 2013, ch. 236, § 2, provides that the amendment to this section by that act shall take effect July 11, 2013, and shall apply to all pending and future petitions.

33-11-5.2. Fiduciary’s affidavit regarding notice to creditors and OHHS.

In order to close an estate, whether by accounting or affidavit of completed administration, the fiduciary shall submit to the probate court an affidavit in substantially the following form:

STATE OF RHODE ISLANDPROBATE COURT OF THE COUNTY TOWN OF ESTATE OF NO. FIDUCIARY’S AFFIDAVIT REGARDING NOTICE TO CREDITORS AND TO THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES The undersigned fiduciary of the above-captioned estate upon oath deposes and says that (a) notice of the commencement of the estate was mailed to all known or reasonably ascertainable creditors of the estate, as well as to the executive office of health and human services when the decedent was fifty-five (55) years or older, or that (b) no such notice was required to be mailed because the estate had no known or reasonably ascertainable creditors and the decedent was under the age of fifty-five (55). Name Date Subscribed and sworn before me this day of , 20. Notary public

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History of Section. P.L. 2012, ch. 241, art. 11, § 7.

33-11-6. Address of creditor filed — Notices.

Every creditor shall file with his or her claim, in the office of the probate clerk, his or her post office address, and shall thereafter give notice to the clerk of any change of his or her address during the administration of the estate. All notices to which the creditor is entitled may be sent to his or her address so filed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 884; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-6 .

33-11-7. Affidavit to support claim.

If requested by the personal representative or any party interested in decedent’s estate, a claimant shall file in the office of the clerk of the probate court a sworn affidavit stating to the best of the claimant’s knowledge and belief: (a) the legal basis or theory of the claim; (b) the facts and documentation supporting the claim; (c) the calculation of the amount claimed as justly due; (d) whether the estate was credited for all payments and offsets to which it is entitled; (e) whether and how the claim is secured; and (f) whether the claim is upon a negotiable instrument.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 885; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-7 ; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

33-11-8. Determination of personal representative’s claim.

If a personal representative shall present a claim which he or she had against the decedent in his or her lifetime, the probate court shall examine and determine the claim. If there is a co-executor or co-administrator, he or she may be permitted to represent the estate at the hearing in the discretion of the probate court; otherwise, the probate court may appoint some disinterested person to represent the estate.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 890; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-8 ; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Claim Filed Before Appointment.

This section applies to a claim filed before the claimant became administrator even though a disallowance has been filed by another interested party. KIGGIN v. KIGGIN, 59 R.I. 370 , 195 A. 492, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 174 (1937).

Construction With Other Sections.

With respect to claims of administrators, this section, rather than §§ 33-11-5 and 33-11-14 controls, since the specific governs over the general. KIGGIN v. KIGGIN, 59 R.I. 370 , 195 A. 492, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 174 (1937).

Exercise of Power of Sale.

Executor’s final account would be disallowed where executor sold assets of estate as pledgee under power of sale and applied proceeds in part payment of deceased’s note held by it without first obtaining an order of probate court. Industrial Trust Co. v. Dean, 67 R.I. 504 , 25 A.2d 552, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1942).

Right of Appeal.

Administrator whose claim is held invalid after examination under this section may appeal to superior court. KIGGIN v. KIGGIN, 59 R.I. 370 , 195 A. 492, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 174 (1937).

Collateral References.

Personal claim of executor or administrator antedating death of decedent. 114 A.L.R. 940.

Running of statute of limitations as affected by doctrine of relation back of appointment of administrator. 3 A.L.R.3d 1234.

33-11-9. Presentation of contingent claim — Deposit by personal representative to assure payment.

A creditor who has a contingent claim against a decedent, which cannot be proved as a debt within the time allowed for presenting claims, may present its contingent claim within the time allowed for filing claims. If it is determined by the probate court, upon hearing after notice to all interested parties, that the contingent claim may become due from the estate, the personal representative shall be ordered to deposit in the registry of the court assets sufficient to satisfy the claim, or its proportionate share in case of insolvency of the estate.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 922; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 42; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 42; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 42; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-9 ; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Contingent Claim Defined.

A contingent claim within the meaning of this section is one that depends for its effect upon some future event which may or may not happen. Hicks v. Wilbur, 38 R.I. 268 , 94 A. 872, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1915).

Future Rent.

Lessor’s claim for future rent under a long-term lease was not a contingent claim within the meaning of this section. Bowler v. Emery, 29 R.I. 310 , 70 A. 7, 1908 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1908).

Tort Claim.

Tort claim against a deceased person was not a contingent claim, even though it could not be proved as a debt. Hicks v. Wilbur, 38 R.I. 268 , 94 A. 872, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1915).

Collateral References.

Action on contingent claim, presentation of claim as condition precedent. 34 A.L.R. 372.

Amount of claim filed against decedent’s estate as limiting amount recoverable in action against estate. 25 A.L.R.3d 1356.

Guaranty, suretyship, or indorsement, claim on decedent’s contract of, as contingent. 94 A.L.R. 1155.

Mortgage on real estate not yet due, contingency of claim. 78 A.L.R. 1159.

Sufficiency of notice of unmatured or contingent claim. 74 A.L.R. 385.

Unliquidated claim for damages arising out of tort as a contingent claim within statutes relating to presentation of claims against decedent’s estate. 22 A.L.R.3d 493.

33-11-10. Bond to cover contingent claim.

If a party interested in the estate offers to give bond to the contingent creditor, with sufficient surety or sureties for the payment of the claim in case it shall be proved to be due, the probate court may accept a bond instead of requiring assets to be deposited as provided in § 33-11-9 . But nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prevent any party holding the contingent claim from waiting until its right of action accrues, and then bringing suit against the heirs, devisees, legatees or next of kin, as provided in this chapter.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 923; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 43; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 43; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 43; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-10 ; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

33-11-11. Provision for payment of contingent claim not conclusive as to validity — Restrictions on action to enforce claim.

The decision of the probate court as to depositing assets or giving bond upon the contingent claim of a creditor shall not be conclusive as to the validity of the claim against the personal representative or other party interested to oppose the allowance thereof; and the personal representative shall not be compelled to pay the claim, unless it is proved to be due in an action commenced by the claimant within one year after its claim becomes payable. In case of suit against the personal representative, recovery shall be limited to the assets in the registry of the court deposited as provided in § 33-11-9 .

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 924; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 44; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 44; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 44; P.L. 1939, ch. 659, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-11 ; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

33-11-12. Party against whom contingent claim enforced — Time of bringing action.

The action referred to in § 33-11-11 shall be brought against the personal representative, if depositing assets therefor in the registry of the court was required, and an action against the personal representative may be brought although the period of two (2) years, referred to in § 33-11-50 , has elapsed; otherwise, the action shall be brought upon the bond given under § 33-11-10 .

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 925; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 45; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 45; P.L. 1926, ch. 839, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 45; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-12 ; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

33-11-13. Pleadings in action on bond for contingent claim.

If the action is brought on a bond, the plaintiff shall set forth his or her original cause of action against the decedent in like manner as would be required upon the same demand against the personal representative, and may allege the nonpayment of the demand as a breach of the condition of the bond; and the defendant may answer any matter of defense that would be available in law against the demand if prosecuted in the usual manner against the personal representative.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 926; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 46; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 46; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 46; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-13 ; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

33-11-14. Disallowance of claim.

Any claim presented within six (6) months from the first publication may be disallowed in full or in part, within six (6) months and thirty (30) days from the first publication by the personal representative, or by any interested party, by filing in the office of the clerk of the probate court a statement disallowing the claim, and giving notice in writing, either personally or by registered or certified mail, to the claimant, whose claim is disallowed; and any claim presented after six (6) months from the first publication may be disallowed in full or in part, within thirty (30) days after presentation.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 886; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 6; P.L. 1910, ch. 583, § 1; P.L. 1915, ch. 1260, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 6; P.L. 1941, ch. 1003, § 3; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3717, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-14 ; P.L. 2005, ch. 389, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

Cross References.

Controversies, adjustment, § 33-18-16 .

Settlement of debts and claims, § 18-4-8 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Claim Filed Out of Time.

Claim filed after normal time for filing claims was properly disallowed within thirty days after notice of filing. McLaughlin v. Dunlop, 68 R.I. 4 , 26 A.2d 3, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 25 (1942).

Claims of Administrator.

Construction of § 33-11-8 placing jurisdiction in probate court to examine and determine a claim filed by a person who only afterwards becomes administrator, to which a disallowance has been filed by an interested person, is not inconsistent with provisions of this section since specific governs general. KIGGIN v. KIGGIN, 59 R.I. 370 , 195 A. 492, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 174 (1937).

Failure to Disallow Claim.

Failure of executrix to disallow claim was deemed an allowance of such claim as to liability, if not as to damages, even though such claim, at the time of filing thereof, could not be proved as a debt. Hicks v. Wilbur, 38 R.I. 268 , 94 A. 872, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1915).

— Decree of Unfaithful Administration.

Administrator who fails to disallow claim within statutory time cannot escape from being guilty of unfaithful administration by filing of disallowance after the petition is filed charging him with unfaithful administration in the hope that he may discover some evidence in the future to defeat the claim. Fitz-Simon v. Fitz-Simon, 28 R.I. 555 , 68 A. 431, 1907 R.I. LEXIS 90 (1907).

Creditor who filed petition to have executrix declared guilty of unfaithful administration in not paying claim which had not been disallowed need not show that executrix had sufficient assets, since lack of assets to pay claims was matter of defense. Hicks v. Wilbur, 38 R.I. 268 , 94 A. 872, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1915).

Decree declaring executrix guilty of unfaithful administration in not paying tort claim allowed by default, through ignorance, could not be entered until claimant presented evidence as to reasonableness of his claim where evidence of executrix showed that amount of damages claimed was exorbitant and unjust. Hicks v. Wilbur, 38 R.I. 268 , 94 A. 872, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1915).

— Effect on Right to Sue on Bond.

Where executor failed to file statement allowing or denying claims, creditor could not sue on the bond under § 33-17-14 before claim was ascertained by judgment and payment demanded of executor. Municipal Court of Providence v. Wilbour, 23 R.I. 95 , 49 A. 488, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 93 (1901).

— Ignorance as Excuse.

Failure of executrix to disallow claim because of inexperience in settlement of estates, ignorance of provisions of statute, and lack of knowledge that such claim had been filed did not relieve her from legal consequences of failure to disallow. Hicks v. Wilbur, 38 R.I. 268 , 94 A. 872, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1915).

Purpose of Section.

The purpose of this section is to give the administrator thirty days to determine whether the estate is insolvent. Williams v. Starkweather, 22 R.I. 501 , 48 A. 669, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1901).

The purpose of this section is to secure a speedy settlement of the estates of deceased persons. Moreover, it is independent of and collateral to the general statute of limitations. Thompson v. Hoxsie, 25 R.I. 377 , 55 A. 930, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 85 (1903).

33-11-15. Petition for filing of late disallowance.

A personal representative, or any interested party, who has failed to disallow any claim within the time prescribed by § 33-11-14 , may at any time before the distribution of the estate, if the claim has not been paid, petition the probate court for leave to disallow the claim out of time. Upon hearing after notice to all interested parties, the probate court may in its discretion grant leave to disallow the claim out of time upon such terms as the court prescribes; and if the claim is disallowed within the time fixed by the court it has the same effect as if disallowed within the time prescribed by § 33-11-14 .

History of Section. G.L., ch. 314, § 6, as enacted by P.L. 1910, ch. 583, § 1; P.L. 1915, ch. 1260, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 6; P.L. 1941, ch. 1003, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-15 ; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Newly Discovered Evidence.

Late filing of disallowance could not be permitted on the basis of newly discovered evidence where evidence relied upon was mere hearsay. Porbate Court v. Sweet, 35 R.I. 291 , 86 A. 892, 1913 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1913).

Procedure on Appeal.

On appeal from decree permitting late filing of disallowance the executor continues to be the moving party and should present evidence first, but incorrect ruling of superior court on this procedure was not ground for reversal where the parties were not prejudiced. Davis v. Higgins, 59 R.I. 339 , 195 A. 495, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 175 (1937).

Right to Appeal.

Claimant was a person aggrieved and could appeal to superior court a decision allowing the filing of a disallowance out of time. See Davis v. Higgins, 59 R.I. 339 , 195 A. 495, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 175 (1937); In re Raposa's Estate, 78 R.I. 484 , 82 A.2d 836, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1951).

Statute of Limitations.

Where administrator has been allowed to file disallowance out of time, statute of limitations for suit on such claims is suspended from the time the administrator should have filed his disallowance to the time he actually did file it. Borges v. Cory, 78 R.I. 425 , 82 A.2d 833, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 96 (1951).

33-11-16. Probate court determination of disallowed claims against solvent estate.

If the estate is solvent, the personal representative, claimant or an interested party may request that the probate court determine the disallowed claim by petition filed within twenty (20) days of the disallowance. If no such request is timely made or if the probate court in its sole discretion finds that pleading, discovery and trial of the issues presented would be more efficiently presented in the district or superior court depending upon the amount in controversy, the disallowance shall be affirmed by order of the probate court and the claimant shall bring civil action on the disallowed claim pursuant to § 33-11-48 within thirty (30) days of the entry thereof or said claim shall be forever barred.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 888; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-16 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Executor of a solvent estate is not required by this section to request the appointment of commissioners. Carney v. Superior Court, 30 R.I. 276 , 74 A. 1018, 1910 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1910) (Decided prior to 2000 amendment).

33-11-17. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 889; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 9; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 1, effective July 5, 2008.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-11-17 concerned hearings by court.

33-11-18. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905 § 892; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 12; G.L. 1956 § 33-11-18 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; Repealed by P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 3, effective July 20, 2000.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-11-18 concerned estate insolvency.

33-11-19. Payment of claims allowed or proved.

  1. After the expiration of six (6) months and filing a statement of claims disallowed, if any there be, as provided in § 33-11-14 , the personal representative, shall proceed to pay the claims allowed or proved against the estate in the order of priority prescribed, after making provision for costs and expenses of administration, taxes, allowances, claims presented but pending determination or appeal and claims not barred that may yet be presented.
  2. Claims thereafter presented and not disallowed, or disallowed and afterwards proved, shall be payable only out of assets remaining in the hands of the personal representative.
  3. The personal representative may pay any just claim that has not been barred at any time, with or without formal presentation, but is personally liable to any other claimant whose claim is allowed and who is injured by its payment if: (1) payment was made within the claim period and the personal representative failed to require the payee to indemnify the estate for refund of any of the payment necessary to pay other claimants; or (2) payment was made, due to negligence or willful fault of the personal representative, in such manner as to deprive the injured claimant of priority.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 887; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 7; P.L. 1941, ch. 1003, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-19 ; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Burden of Petitioner.

Creditor who filed petition to have executrix declared guilty of unfaithful administration in not paying claim which had not been disallowed need not show that executrix had sufficient assets, since lack of assets to pay claims is a matter of defense. Hicks v. Wilbur, 38 R.I. 268 , 94 A. 872, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1915).

Decree declaring executrix guilty of unfaithful administration in not paying tort claim allowed by default, through ignorance, could not be entered until claimant presented evidence as to reasonableness of his claim where evidence of executrix showed that amount of damages claimed was exorbitant and unjust. Hicks v. Wilbur, 38 R.I. 268 , 94 A. 872, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1915).

Effect of Disallowing Claim.

Failure to disallow a claim is construed as an allowance of the claim. Fitz-Simon v. Fitz-Simon, 28 R.I. 555 , 68 A. 431, 1907 R.I. LEXIS 90 (1907).

Collateral References.

Presumption of payment from possession by debtor as administrator to creditor, of paper evidencing obligation. 70 A.L.R. 879; 156 A.L.R. 777.

Relation back of letters testamentary or of administration to cover payment of debts and legacies before letters are granted. 26 A.L.R. 1366.

Renewal note made or indorsed by personal representative of obligor in original paper as payment or novation of that paper. 12 A.L.R. 1546.

33-11-20. Application of later discovered assets — Extension of time for presenting claims.

If further assets are discovered and recovered by a personal representative after the expiration of six (6) months from the date of the first publication of notice of the qualification of the original personal representative, he or she shall apply the assets to the payment of the claims of creditors and account therefore in the same manner as assets received within six (6) months; and if the surplus of the assets remaining after payment of the claims in full is, in the opinion of the probate court, sufficient to warrant so doing, the probate court may order notice given of the receipt of the assets and may extend the time for presenting claims not to exceed six (6) months after notice. Claims presented within the extended time may be allowed or proved in the same manner as claims presented within six (6) months and shall be payable out of the assets remaining in the hands of the personal representative.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 975; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 10; P.L. 1941, ch. 1003, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-20 ; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Discretion of Court.

Where surplus assets of $110,000 came into the hands of the administrator after the normal time for filing of claims, it was an abuse of discretion for the probate court to fail to extend the time for filing of claims. Allen v. National Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 61 R.I. 440 , 1 A.2d 97, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 79 (1938).

Extension of Time for Proof.

Proper remedy of creditor who fails to file claim with commissioners within specified time is to file a petition for extension of period, and not for the appointment of new commissioners. Providence Steam Carpet Beating Co. v. Hazard, 20 R.I. 131 , 37 A. 635, 1897 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1897).

Purpose of Section.

The purpose of this section is to relieve against the strict rigor of the statute of limitations prescribed for filing claims under § 33-11-5 . Allen v. National Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 61 R.I. 440 , 1 A.2d 97, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 79 (1938).

Validity of Claims.

In deciding whether assets are “surplus assets” such as would warrant extension of the time for filing claims not previously filed, it is not the court’s duty to determine the validity of the claims. Allen v. National Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 61 R.I. 440 , 1 A.2d 97, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 79 (1938).

33-11-21. Estate rendered insolvent by claims after allowance of account.

If a personal representative pays out, in accordance with law, the whole of the estate, he or she shall not be required, in consequence of the presentation of further claims, to represent the estate insolvent, but this payment, after allowance of his or her account, shall bar any action against him or her.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 894; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-21 ; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

It is within the executor’s discretion whether or not to represent an estate as insolvent and he is allowed a reasonable time to exercise his discretion, so that if he pays a claim, believing the estate to be solvent, and later represents the estate as insolvent, he is allowed the amount paid to the creditor which he would have been entitled to had the claim been allowed by the commissioners. Pierce v. Allen, 12 R.I. 510 , 1880 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1880).

33-11-22. Estate rendered insolvent by late claims.

If a personal representative pays, under the provisions of § 33-11-19 , so much of the estate of the decedent that the remainder is insufficient to satisfy the claims presented after the expiration of the six (6) month period, and any of said late claims are disallowed, the personal representative may represent the estate insolvent, and shall, pursuant to decree of the probate court, divide and pay over the remaining estate among the creditors entitled to payment.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 895; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-22 ; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

33-11-23. Disallowed claims against insolvent estates to be heard by probate court.

All claims against an insolvent estate which are disallowed shall be heard and decided by the probate court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 898; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-23 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 2.

33-11-24. Hearings on insolvent estates.

A personal representative, at any time during administration, may represent the insolvent estate to the probate court, and apply for the probate court to examine and determine claims. If the probate court finds the estate is probably insolvent, it shall hear and determine all disallowed claims and the priority of payment among all presented claims.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 893; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-24 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Nature of Office.

Commissioners appointed by probate court to hear contested claims against insolvent estates do not constitute a court within the meaning of R.I. Const., Art. X, § 1 . Mason v. Taft, 23 R.I. 388 , 50 A. 648, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 154 (1901).

Personal Liability of Executor.

Where all of the debts of the estate were paid with the exception of plaintiff ’s claim, disappearance of assets of estate was unexplained, and the executrix filed no inventory or representation of insolvency for an unreasonable time, the trial court properly granted an execution against the personal estate of the executrix to satisfy judgment against her in her capacity as executrix. McLaughlin v. Dunlop, 71 R.I. 429 , 46 A.2d 575, 1946 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1946).

Time of Representation of Insolvency.

Since the statute relating to decedents’ insolvent estates fixes no time within which an estate may be represented insolvent and commissioners appointed, it must be done within a reasonable time, depending upon the circumstances of each individual case and the discretion of the court. Barber v. Collins, 18 R.I. 760 , 30 A. 796, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1894).

Where the estate was represented by the administrator as solvent, but later, after the commissioner’s report was filed but before it was confirmed by the probate court, the estate appeared to be probably insolvent, the administrator had the right to represent the estate as probably insolvent. Pearce v. Industrial Trust Co., 70 R.I. 117 , 37 A.2d 372, 1944 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1944).

The probate court properly denied the representation of insolvency and refused the appointment of commissioners on the ground that the petition, not having been filed for more than nine years after appellant knew of the probable insolvency, was not filed within a reasonable time. Dunlop v. McLaughlin, 72 R.I. 128 , 48 A.2d 254, 1946 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1946).

It was not error for the court to deny the petition of an administratrix filed under this section approximately five years after she learned of the insolvency of the estate and during the trial of a claim against the estate. Artigas v. Morris, 108 R.I. 735 , 279 A.2d 430, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1333 (1971).

33-11-25 — 33-11-27. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905 §§ 889 — 901; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, §§ 19 — 21; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, §§ 19 — 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, §§ 19 — 21; G.L. 1956, §§ 33-11-25 — 33-11-27; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5); Repealed by P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 3, effective July 20, 2000.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 33-11-25 — 33-11-27 concerned commissioners to insolvent estates.

33-11-28. Notice of hearings on insolvent estates.

In all insolvent estates, the probate court shall advertise notice of its hearings in one or more newspapers published in this state, as ordered by the court, at least once each week for two (2) successive weeks before the hearing. The court shall, by mail or otherwise, give to all creditors whose claims are disallowed at least seven (7) days’ written notice of the times and places of the hearings.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 902; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 22; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 22; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-28 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 2.

33-11-29. Statements of contested claims against insolvent estate.

At least fourteen (14) days before the first scheduled hearing date for claims in an insolvent estate as set forth in § 33-11-28 , the executor or administrator shall file in the office of the probate clerk a statement disallowing claims, not previously disallowed, as he or she intends to contest, and he or she shall from time to time, and as soon as may be, file a like statement with respect to any claim thereafter filed which he or she intends to contest.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 896; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-29 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 2.

33-11-30. Notice of disallowance by executor or administrator or objection by interested party.

When such disallowance is filed, the executor or administrator shall forthwith give written notice to the claimant, either personally or by registered or certified mail. When objection is filed by an interested person, the clerk shall forthwith give notice in like manner to the claimant.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 897; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 17; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3717, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-30 .

33-11-31. Power of probate court over witnesses.

The probate court may compel the attendance of witnesses and administer oaths during hearings on claims in the same manner as other courts of record.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 903; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 23; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 23; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 23; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-31 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 2.

33-11-32. Secured claims against insolvent estates.

If a creditor, having a security for his or her claim against an insolvent estate upon any property of the estate, files his or her claim, the probate court shall inquire into the cash value of the security, and if the court allows the claim, the executor or administrator shall give the creditor personal notice of the amount allowed and the value of the security as reported by the court and unless the creditor shall, within fifteen (15) days after receiving notice, lodge with the court a certificate of his or her election to relinquish the security, he or she is entitled to a dividend from the estate upon the excess only of his or her claim above the amount of the court’s valuation of the security.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 907; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 27; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 27; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 27; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-32 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 2.

33-11-33. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 904; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 24; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 24; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 24; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 1, effective July 5, 2008.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-11-33 concerned interest on claims against a solvent estate.

33-11-34. Interest on claims against insolvent estate.

In insolvent estate cases, the probate court shall allow interest to the death of the testator or intestate on claims drawing interest, and on claims not due at the death of the testator or intestate he or she shall ascertain their value as of the date of the death of the decedent.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 905; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 25; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 25; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 25; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-34 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 2.

33-11-35. Offset of mutual claims.

When there are mutual claims between the estate of the decedent and the claimant, which are subject to offset, the probate court, after reducing the claim to its present value, shall consider any mutual claims and allow the claimant only the balance justly due.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 906; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 26; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 26; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 26; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-35 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

33-11-36. Repealed.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-11-36 concerned proof before a commissioner of an insolvent estate

Repealed Sections.

C.P.A 1905, § 909; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 29; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 29; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 29; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-36 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; Repealed by P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 3, effective July 20, 2000.

33-11-37. Notice of disallowance by probate court.

If a claim against a solvent or insolvent estate is disallowed in whole or in part by the probate court, the probate clerk shall mail a written notice of the disallowance to the claimant or to his or her attorney within seven (7) days after the filing of the court’s order.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 908; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 28; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 28; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 28; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-37 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 2.

33-11-38 — 33-11-41. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905 § 910 - 912, 914; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 30 - 32, 34; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 30 - 32, 34; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 30 - 32, 34; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-38 - 41; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; Repealed by P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 3, effective July 20, 2000.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 33-11-38 — 33-11-41 concerned commissioners of insolvent estates.

33-11-42. Actions beyond probate court.

The exclusive remedy of any claimant whose claim is disallowed, in full or in part, by the probate court shall be a civil action on the disallowed claim in the district or superior court depending upon the amount in controversy pursuant to § 33-11-48 . The personal representative or other interested party may appeal the disallowance of any claim, in full or in part, for de novo determination in the superior court pursuant to § 33-23-1 et seq.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 915; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 35; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 35; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 35; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-42 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Alternative Remedies.

A creditor who does not prosecute his claim as provided in this section after disallowance of the claim by the commissioners is barred from proceeding against the heirs or devisees. Burlingame v. Brown, 5 R.I. 410 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1858).

Parties to Appeal.

Creditor could interpose the statute of limitations to the allowance of a claim, such defense being one which the executor or administrator could interpose. Mason v. Taft, 23 R.I. 388 , 50 A. 648, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 154 (1901).

Time for Appeal.

A creditor who desires to settle his claim under this section must proceed with the action within a reasonable time or his rights under this section will be barred. A three-month lapse of time between giving notice and serving process is unreasonable. Burlingame v. Saunders, 4 R.I. 41 , 1856 R.I. LEXIS 8 (1856).

Collateral References.

Court’s rejection of claim against decedent’s estate, right of executor or administrator to contest. 129 A.L.R. 922.

Direction of verdict based on testimony of interested witness as to claims against estates of deceased persons. 72 A.L.R. 58.

Liability of executor or administrator for negligence or default in defending action against estate. 14 A.L.R.3d 1036.

Remedies of creditors of insolvent decedent’s estate where other creditors have received excessive payments. 77 A.L.R. 981.

Who entitled to contest, or appeal from, allowance of claim against decedent’s estate. 118 A.L.R. 743.

33-11-43. Superior court judgment — Costs.

The judgment of the superior court, on appeal, shall ascertain the claims and amounts to be added to, or deducted from, the claims, pursuant to the provisions of § 33-23-1 et seq. The costs of the appeal shall be awarded by the court against either party, or be divided between them, as justice may require, and execution for the costs shall issue accordingly.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 916; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 36; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 36; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 36; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-43 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 2.

33-11-44. Claims based on action commenced against decedent before death.

Any action or suit brought against a decedent in his or her lifetime, which survives, and in which the personal representative shall be notified to take upon itself the defense as provided in § 33-18-8 , and any action or suit, upon any cause of action originating in the lifetime of the decedent and which survives, brought against the personal representative before the estate has been represented insolvent, shall not abate, but may be prosecuted to final judgment against the estate. Those claims may be presented in the office of the probate clerk as provided in §§ 33-11-4 and 33-11-5 , but need not be proved before the probate court, or the personal representative may be joined as a defendant with notice to the probate court and served in the pending action. Execution upon the judgment in the case shall be stayed. If the estate is, or shall be represented insolvent, the amount of the judgment shall be included in or added as a claim against the estate, subject to the provisions of § 33-11-32 , but shall not be subject to appeal; and if the estate is solvent, execution may issue at any time after claims of the same class are payable.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 917; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 37; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 37; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 37; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-44 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

Collateral References.

Liability of executor or administrator for negligence or default in defending action against estate. 14 A.L.R.3d 1036.

33-11-45. Claim barred by failure to prove or prosecute.

If a claimant shall not request probate court determination of its disallowed claim or bring civil action on its disallowed claim within the deadlines of this chapter, any action on said claim against the personal representative and estate of the decedent shall be forever barred. Affidavit of the personal representative or certificate of the district or superior court clerk that no civil action was brought by the claimant in the relevant time period shall be sufficient to establish failure to timely prosecute.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 918; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 38; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 38; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 38; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-45 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

33-11-46, 33-11-47. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, §§ 919, 921; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, §§ 39, 41; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, §§ 39, 41; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, §§ 39, 41; P.L. 1941, ch. 1003, § 5; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 1, effective July 5, 2008.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 33-11-46 and 33-11-47 concerned proof of claim paid before appointment of commissioner and restriction on actions against insolvent estate.

33-11-48. Action on disallowed claim.

Civil action on claims disallowed prior to the expiration of six (6) months from first publication may be brought in the district or superior court depending upon the amount in controversy no later than thirty (30) days after the expiration of six (6) months from first publication, and such civil action on claims disallowed after the expiration of six (6) months from first publication may be brought within thirty (30) days after notice is given to the claimant that the claim is disallowed or within thirty (30) days after said disallowance is affirmed by the probate court, whichever is later, unless the estate has been represented as insolvent. If, subsequent to the expiration of the period in which such civil action may be brought, the personal representative shall represent the estate as insolvent, a disallowed claim, on which suit is barred by the foregoing provision of this section, shall not be provable before the probate court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 891; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 11; P.L. 1915, ch. 1260, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-48 ; P.L. 1984, ch. 402, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 5; P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

Cross References.

Rent accrued during lifetime of decedent, action for, § 34-18-11 .

Service on nonresident executor or administrator, § 9-5-27 .

Statute of limitations, effect of death of party, § 9-1-21 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Purpose.

The statutory provisions for settlement of estates are specific and designed to effect a prompt settlement. National Casket Co. v. Montgomery, 52 R.I. 158 , 158 A. 723, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1932).

This statute of limitations was created for security and benefit of estates and not for executors and administrators as such. Gray v. Ahern, 63 R.I. 363 , 9 A.2d 38, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 108 (1939).

Amendment of Pleadings.

Suit against executor as an individual could not be amended so as to be a suit against the estate by amendment filed more than one year after disallowance of the claim by the executor. Carney v. Hawkins, 34 R.I. 297 , 83 A. 327, 1912 R.I. LEXIS 51 (1912).

Where claim was properly filed and action was duly commenced, the complaint could be amended, if no change in the cause of action originally commenced was effected. Lewis Historical Pub. Co. v. Greene, 40 R.I. 309 , 100 A. 1017, 1917 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1917).

Compliance Required.

This section is jurisdictional. Gray v. Ahern, 63 R.I. 363 , 9 A.2d 38, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 108 (1939).

The trial court did not err in finding that a challenge to the denial of a probate claim was not timely filed since the claimant took no further action after the denial of his claim until more than five months after the statute of limitations had run. Heflin v. Koszela, 774 A.2d 25, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 158 (2001).

Disallowance of Claim.

Allegation that executor failed to file statement in probate court either allowing or denying claim as required by former statute was proper, even if not necessary, as the presumption would be that he had acted as the law required and had duly rejected such claim. Slocom v. Wilbour, 23 R.I. 97 , 49 A. 489, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 95 (1901).

Plaintiff ’s suit on disallowed claim complied with time limit where brought within six months after opinion of supreme court sustaining a decision of probate court allowing executor’s petition to disallow out of time, even though brought over six months from notice of disallowance. Davis v. Higgins, 63 R.I. 352 , 8 A.2d 870, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 98 (1939).

Entry After Return Day.

Where claimant failed to file writ against the administrator, allegedly because of the failure of claimant’s attorney to file and belief that he had a sufficient remedy in the probate court, superior court could refuse to enter papers as of that date. National Casket Co. v. Montgomery, 52 R.I. 158 , 158 A. 723, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1932).

Filing of Claim.

Plaintiffs could not recover on suit based on personal injuries where a statement of the claim had not been filed nor disallowed within the time limit under § 33-11-5 . Kelley v. Harlow, 51 R.I. 137 , 152 A. 696, 1930 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1930).

Bringing suit on disallowed claim in strict compliance with this section after executrix had appealed from probate decree granting leave to file such claim out of time, was a purely procedural step not requiring immediate determination by the court. McLaughlin v. Dunlop, 68 R.I. 4 , 26 A.2d 3, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 25 (1942).

Although recovery for a tortious injury allegedly committed by a person who later dies may be uncertain, at the time of the person’s death the claim already has accrued and is not dependent upon some future event, and thus a person filing a negligence claim, like every other creditor, is required to file his probate court claim pursuant to § 33-11-5 and any subsequent action challenging the denial of that probate claim pursuant to § 33-11-48 . Heflin v. Koszela, 774 A.2d 25, 2001 R.I. LEXIS 158 (2001).

Foreign Executor.

Where claim was filed by executor from another state and after claim was disallowed suit was brought thereon, and thereafter such foreign executor obtained ancillary letters in Rhode Island at which time the time for filing claims had expired, suit could not be maintained thereon. Fitch v. Firestone, 184 F. Supp. 424, 1960 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2855 (D.R.I. 1960).

Parties to Actions.

An administrator whose claim against the estate has been rejected by the commissioners cannot bring an action against himself and plead by way of justification that if he had waited for another administrator to be appointed the time limits prescribed by this section would have been exceeded. Perkins v. Se Ipsam, 11 R.I. 270 , 1875 R.I. LEXIS 38 (1875).

Devisees and residuary legatees could not maintain writ of error from judgment in favor of claimant consented to by executor on the ground that they had objected to allowance of claim, since there is no provision permitting them to be parties to a suit against the estate. Carney v. Superior Court, 30 R.I. 276 , 74 A. 1018, 1910 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1910).

This section and the general statute of limitations, § 9-1-21 , do not apply to actions that are pending prior to the death of a party. Hopp v. C.H.B. Dev. Corp., 669 A.2d 1152, 1996 R.I. LEXIS 4 (1996).

Voluntary Discontinuance.

Plaintiff ’s action against executor on disallowed claim against estate was barred when brought over six months from disallowance, where prior action on same cause brought within the six months had been voluntarily discontinued. Gray v. Ahern, 63 R.I. 363 , 9 A.2d 38, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 108 (1939).

Collateral References.

Claims for expenses of last sickness or for funeral expenses as within contemplation of statute requiring presentation of claims against decedent’s estate, or limiting time for bringing action thereon. 17 A.L.R.4th 530.

33-11-49. Actions barred within time for filing claims.

No personal representative shall be held to answer to a civil action, by a creditor of the decedent, which is commenced within six (6) months from the date of the first publication of the notice of the qualification of the first personal representative, unless the suit is brought under the provisions of § 9-1-21 , or other special provision made by statute.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 972; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-49 ; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The notices described by this section permit the personal representative to limit the time within which actions may be brought against him. Knowles v. Whaley, 15 R.I. 97 , 23 A. 144, 1885 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1885).

Applicability.

Former statute did not apply to suits pending against deceased at his death, but only to bringing of actions against personal representatives. Sprague v. Greene, 20 R.I. 153 , 37 A. 699, 1897 R.I. LEXIS 65 (1897).

Collateral References.

Running of statute of limitations as affected by doctrine of relation back of appointment of administrator. 3 A.L.R.3d 1234.

33-11-50. Limitation of actions by creditors of decedent.

No personal representative shall be held to answer to the suit of a creditor of the decedent, except to a suit on the fiduciary’s bond, or as is otherwise provided, unless the suit is commenced within two (2) years from the date of the first publication and before any order of distribution has been made on the estate of the decedent.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 973; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 33-11-50 ; P.L. 2008, ch. 307, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

Because the Department of Human Services did not file suit—and was not required to file suit—in order to seek reimbursement of the medical assistance benefits it had paid on the decedent’s behalf, R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-11-50 did apply and did not bar the claim DHS filed with the estate. In re Estate of Manchester, 66 A.3d 426, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 84 (2013).

Action for Corporate Debts.

The limitation in this section is absolute, in the absence of fraud, so that an action will not lie against a personal representative for payment of a corporate debt out of the personal assets of testator’s estate after the statutory period has elapsed. New Eng. Commercial Bank v. Stockholders of Newport Steam Factory, 6 R.I. 154 , 1859 R.I. LEXIS 25 (1859).

In suit against representatives of deceased stockholders to establish liability for judgment against corporation, the representatives were entitled to plead former statute by way of analogy. Sayles v. Bates, 15 R.I. 342 , 5 A. 497, 1886 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1886); Warren v. Providence Tool Co., 19 R.I. 656 , 35 A. 1041, 1896 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1896).

Action on Bond.

In suit by plaintiff to recover on bond of deceased, plea of estate that suit was barred due to failure to sue within statutory period was good as against demurrer filed by plaintiff, since plaintiff was a creditor of the estate. Municipal Court v. Whaley, 26 R.I. 25 , 57 A. 1061, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1904).

Amendment of Statute.

Period of limitations which was in effect at the time personal representative’s appointment was published governed even though statutory period was changed prior to expiration thereof. Gunn v. Kelliher, 20 R.I. 180 , 38 A. 8, 1897 R.I. LEXIS 89 (1897).

Where administrator de bonis non was appointed after February 1, 1896, but original administrator had been appointed and qualified before such date, claims against estate were governed by the special statute of limitations under law applicable before such date. Thompson v. Hoxsie, 25 R.I. 377 , 55 A. 930, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 85 (1903).

Debts Due United States.

The period of limitation fixed by this section does not apply to a claim by the United States for taxes owed by the decedent. United States v. Sullivan, 254 F. Supp. 254, 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10510 (D.R.I. 1966).

Failure to Publish Notice.

If first administrator does not publish his notice of appointment, the statute starts to run from the notice of appointment of a second administrator, even though the first administrator made partial payment on the claim. Lynch v. Farnell, 24 R.I. 496 , 53 A. 869, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 116 (1902).

Recovery of Assets in Hands of Heirs.

Suit could not be maintained by creditor against administratrix after statutory period for the purpose of recovering assets in the hands of the heir and trustees for creditors under prior deed in the absence of charges of collusion between the trustees, heir and administratrix. Miner v. Aylesworth, 18 F. 199, 1883 U.S. App. LEXIS 2390 (C.C.D.R.I. 1883).

Collateral References.

Claims for expenses of last sickness or for funeral expenses as within contemplation of statute requiring presentation of claims against decedent’s estate, or limiting time for bringing action thereon. 17 A.L.R.4th 530.

Presentation of claim to executor or administrator as prerequisite of its availability as counterclaim or setoff. 36 A.L.R.3d 693.

33-11-51. Survival of child support obligations — Enforcement of claims — Child support public policy.

  1. It is the public policy of the state of Rhode Island that dependent children shall be maintained and supported, as completely as possible, from the resources of their parents thereby relieving or avoiding, to the fullest extent, the burden borne by the citizens of the state.
  2. In furtherance of said policy and not withstanding any conflicting statute or prior case law, it is declared that a parent’s legally enforceable obligation to pay child support, past and future:
    1. Continues until the child’s eighteenth (18th) birthday or such later date or event set forth in the family court’s decree of child support;
    2. Is not extinguished by but survives the parent’s death;
    3. Is enforceable as a priority creditor’s claim from the deceased parent’s probate estate;
    4. Is enforceable by imposition of a constructive trust over the deceased parent’s non-probate assets by equity petition in the superior court to the extent of any deficiency from the deceased parent’s probate estate;
    5. Takes precedence over and must be satisfied prior to any distribution of the deceased parent’s probate assets by intestacy or by will; and
    6. Cannot be nullified by disinheriting the child, however, a parent may exercise testamentary discretion and disinherit a child subject to the prior satisfaction of all his or her child support obligations, accrued and future.
  3. The family court may modify child support obligations only for a substantial change in circumstances while the child is a minor and the parent with the obligation to support the child is alive. After said parent’s death, the probate or superior court, as the case may be, shall hear and determine the child’s claim and may award:
    1. Delinquent and/or accrued child support to the date of the parent’s death, with interest therein at the statutory rate; and
    2. Future or prospective child support until the child’s eighteenth (18th) birthday or such later date or event set forth in the family court’s decree of child support, offset by social security benefits payable to or for the child by reason of the parent’s death, and discounted to present value.

History of Section. P.L. 2008, ch. 298, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 314, § 1.

Chapter 12 Payment of Decedents’ Debts and Charges

33-12-1. Estate chargeable with debts.

The estate, real and personal, of every deceased person shall be chargeable with the expenses of administration, including allowances to widow and family, the funeral charges of the deceased, including the cost of a place of burial, if necessary, and the payment of his or her debts; and the same shall be paid by the executor or administrator out of the estate, so far as the same shall be sufficient therefor.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 966; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-12-1 .

Cross References.

Jurisdiction of probate court, § 8-9-9 .

Comparative Legislation.

Payment of debts and charges:

Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 45a-392, 45a-426 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 197, § 2 et seq.; ch. 198, § 18.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Administrator’s Claim for Administration Expense.

Where a husband who was administrator of his wife’s estate died before completing administration, the administrator of the husband’s estate could establish a lien against the wife’s estate for administration expenses incurred. Moulton v. Smith, 16 R.I. 126 , 12 A. 891, 1888 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1888).

Creditor for Expense of Administration.

Person who had rendered services in the administration of the estate did not have such a claim as would enable him to obtain the appointment of a successor administrator. Evans v. Trustees of Univ. of Pa., 60 R.I. 171 , 197 A. 438, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 123 (1938).

Expenses of Ancillary Administration.

Where will directed executor to pay taxes and duties out of the residuary estate, testatrix did not intend to charge such residuary estate with ancillary administration in another state or to exonerate recipients of real estate located there from expenses of administration. Lucy C. Ayers Home for Nurses v. Fales, 77 R.I. 37 , 73 A.2d 104, 763, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1950).

Funeral Expenses.

This section applies to the funeral expenses of a married woman, so that such expenses are properly chargeable to her estate. Buxton v. Barrett, 14 R.I. 40 , 1882 R.I. LEXIS 13 (1882).

The estate was chargeable with value of flowers furnished for funeral of decedent at the order of housekeeper who was the only person in charge of the body, and such expense, not being extravagant, was reasonably incurred as a necessary funeral expense. O'Reilly v. Kelly, 22 R.I. 151 , 46 A. 681, 1900 R.I. LEXIS 70 (1900).

Real estate of deceased is subject to payment of funeral expenses only on application to the probate court by the fiduciary appointed by the court to administer the estate. Allsworth v. Scully, 105 R.I. 183 , 250 A.2d 369, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 736 (1969).

Expenses of administration and funeral charges take precedence over an unpaid judgment. Desper v. Talbot, 727 A.2d 1233, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 80 (1999).

Rights of Creditor Against Heirs.

A creditor cannot prosecute a claim against the heirs or devisees of an insolvent estate when he has failed to sustain his claim either in an action against the executor or administrator or in proceedings before commissioners. Burlingame v. Brown, 5 R.I. 410 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1858).

Collateral References.

Amount of funeral expenses allowable against decedent’s estate. 4 A.L.R.2d 995.

Eligibility of illegitimate child to receive family allowance out of estate of his deceased father. 12 A.L.R.3d 1140.

Last sickness and funeral expenses, presentation of claims for, to executor or administrator. 17 A.L.R.4th 530.

Personal credit, when funeral expenses deemed ordered on, rather than on credit of estate. 30 A.L.R. 444.

Personal liability of executor or administrator for fees of attorney employed by him for the benefit of the estate. 13 A.L.R.3d 518.

Propriety of payment of funeral expenses of life beneficiary or life tenant out of corpus or estate under instrument providing for invasion of corpus or estate for support of such person. 18 A.L.R.2d 1236.

Reimbursement, from decedent’s estate, of persons other than personal representative or surviving spouse paying funeral expenses. 35 A.L.R. 1399; 65 A.L.R. 904; 127 A.L.R. 1003.

Removing and reinterring remains as funeral expense. 40 A.L.R. 1459.

Statutory family allowance to minor children as affected by previous agreement or judgment for their support. 6 A.L.R.3d 1387.

Tombstone or monument as a proper charge against estate of decedent. 121 A.L.R. 1103.

Waiver of right to widow’s allowance by postnuptial agreement. 9 A.L.R.3d 955.

33-12-2. Order of application of property.

The personal estate shall be first chargeable for expenses, charges, and debts, and the real estate shall be chargeable only so far as the personal estate is insufficient for that purpose, except as otherwise provided by law or will.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 967; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-12-2 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Application of Personal Property.

Where there was ample personal property in the state of decedent’s domicile, creditor could not secure the appointment of a Rhode Island administrator to subject the Rhode Island real estate of a nonresident decedent to the payment of debts. Evans v. Trustees of Univ. of Pa., 60 R.I. 171 , 197 A. 438, 1938 R.I. LEXIS 123 (1938).

Control of Real Estate.

Administrator in defense to suit on claim need not allege that there is no real estate to pay claim, but only that there is no personal property available. Potter v. Dolan, 19 R.I. 514 , 34 A. 1116, 1896 R.I. LEXIS 38 (1896).

Directions of Testator.

Where testator charged the residuary estate with payment of administration expenses and debts and where the personal estate was exhausted by specific and pecuniary legacies, the debts and expenses were properly charged against the real estate in the residue. Woonsocket Inst. for Sav. v. Ballou, 16 R.I. 351 , 16 A. 144, 1888 R.I. LEXIS 63 (1888).

Where will directed executor to pay taxes and duties out of residuary estate, testatrix did not intend to charge such residuary estate with ancillary administration in another state or to exonerate the recipients of real estate located there from the expenses of administration. Lucy C. Ayers Home for Nurses v. Fales, 77 R.I. 37 , 73 A.2d 104, 763, 1950 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1950).

Specific Bequests.

If there is sufficient property in an estate not specifically bequeathed to pay the debts of the estate, no portion of the income from any fund or property specifically bequeathed can be used to pay debts. In re Martin, 25 R.I. 1 , 54 A. 589, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 3 (1903).

Collateral References.

Allocation, as between income and principal, of income on property used in paying legacies, debts, and expenses. 2 A.L.R.3d 1061.

33-12-3. Expenses included in expenses of administration.

The expenses of the division and assignment of real estate, and of the appointment of guardians of minors and others incapacitated to take care of their interests, whether they be heirs or legatees, except there be an appeal from the order making or appointing the same, shall be included in the expenses of administration.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 968; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 33-12-3 ; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 26.

Collateral References.

Necessity that executor or administrator be represented by counsel in presenting matters in probate court. 19 A.L.R.3d 1104.

Personal liability of executor or administrator for fees of attorney employed by him for the benefit of the estate. 13 A.L.R.3d 518.

Rent or its equivalent accruing after lessee’s death as expense of administration of his estate. 22 A.L.R.3d 814.

33-12-4. Sale or mortgage of real estate when personalty insufficient.

If the personal property of a deceased person is insufficient to pay his or her debts, funeral expenses, charges of administration, and the expense of supporting his or her family, as prescribed by law, and the legacies as are expressly or impliedly charged upon the real estate, his or her executor or administrator shall sell or mortgage for an amount decreed, in the manner provided in this chapter, so much of his or her real estate or of any interest in the real estate as may be subject to and required for the purpose of payments.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 734; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 1; P.L. 1918, ch. 1640, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-12-4 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The real estate of the decedent was properly sold to pay for debts and charges against the estate where the personal property was insufficient to satisfy such claims. Barlow v. Barlow, 49 R.I. 117 , 140 A. 467, 1928 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1928).

Adverse Possession of Heirs.

Adverse possession by husband of abandoned portion of highway reverting to deceased did not start to run until two years and six months after executor gave notice of his appointment. Davis v. Girard, 80 R.I. 235 , 95 A.2d 847, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 57 (1953).

Conveyances of Heirs.

Where, within three and one-half years from grant of administration, a court of probate jurisdiction decrees the sale of realty to pay debts of the decedent, such sale destroys the lien of intervening mortgages given by heirs, and where no appeal is taken from such order of sale by the heirs it becomes binding upon them and all persons claiming under them. Jacocks v. Paterson, 18 R.I. 751 , 30 A. 795, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 84 (1894).

Court Instructions for Sale.

If personal property is not sufficient to pay legacies, the executor is required to apply to the probate court for instructions for the sale of real estate. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 27 R.I. 520 , 63 A. 804, 1906 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1906).

Impeachment.

The trial court did not err in determining that the executrix’ testimony that she had to sell real estate to meet expenses was impeached where it found that the executrix failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the value of the personal property was insufficient to pay the estate’s debts. Hanley v. Alarie, 746 A.2d 125, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 41 (2000).

Mortgage of Real Estate.

A farm that is specifically devised in a will should not be sold to pay debts if the estate will eventually have enough money to pay all the debts. Alternately, the executor may apply to the probate court for permission to mortgage the farm, if necessary. Moran v. Cornell, 49 R.I. 308 , 142 A. 605, 1928 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1928).

Restraint of Competition.

Although a sale under this section is not a judicial sale since the court need not confirm it, an agreement to stifle competition in bidding is against the public policy to conserve estates and will not be enforced. Cianciarulo v. Caldarone, 69 R.I. 86 , 30 A.2d 843, 1943 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1943).

Collateral References.

Contest of order directing sale of real estate for payment of debt, right or duty of executor or administrator as to. 126 A.L.R. 903.

Homestead, order directing or confirming sale of, for payment of debts, as subject to collateral attack. 66 A.L.R. 926.

Mortgage or other encumbrance as affecting duty of executor or administrator of insolvent estate to sell real estate to pay debts, or duty of probate court to order such sale. 116 A.L.R. 910.

Rights in respect to proceeds of sale of land located in a state other than domicile for payment of decedent’s debts. 81 A.L.R. 665.

33-12-5. Real estate not devised applied first.

Unless a different intention appear by the will, real estate not devised shall be subjected to the payment of debts and legacies, before real estate devised.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 735; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-12-5 .

Collateral References.

Realty not specifically referred to in power nor devised by will as within power of sale conferred upon executor. 139 A.L.R. 1143.

33-12-6. Sale of real estate to effect prompt settlement of estate.

The executor or administrator may sell the real estate of a deceased person despite the sufficiency of the personal property to pay the debts, funeral expenses and the items above enumerated whenever in the discretion of the probate court this action seems desirable in effecting a prompt and efficient settlement of the estate; provided, however, that this authority shall not be given with reference to real estate specifically devised, unless the specific devisees consent in writing thereto. An executor with a valid power of sale under a will may convey specifically devised property with the written consent of the specific devisee.

History of Section. G.L. ch. 570, § 1, as enacted by P.L. 1945, ch. 1563, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-12-6 ; P.L. 1962, ch. 127, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 221, § 1.

Applicability.

P.L. 2001, ch. 221, § 2 provides that the amendment to this section by that Act shall take effect upon passage [July 13, 2001], and shall only apply to wills admitted to probate after that date.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Approval Required.

The clear and unambiguous language of this section provides that the representative of an estate can sell the real estate of a decedent despite the sufficiency of personal property to pay debts only upon approval of the court for such a sale, and only after obtaining the written consent of specific devisees. Hanley v. Alarie, 746 A.2d 125, 2000 R.I. LEXIS 41 (2000).

General or Specific Devise.

When a bankruptcy debtor’s mother generally devised certain real property to the debtor, in common with the debtor’s sister, in the residuary clause of the mother’s will, the debtor had no standing to occupy or intend to occupy the property, after the sister, acting as executrix of the mother’s estate, began proceedings to evict the debtor from the property, because (1) the sister did not require the consent of the debtor or of the court to sell the property, as R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-12-6 did not require the debtor’s consent for generally devised property, and the will gave the sister the authority to sell the property, and (2) the sister took affirmative steps to sell the property before the debtor filed for bankruptcy protection, divesting the debtor of the debtor’s possessory interest in the property. In re Tetreault, 11 A.3d 635, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 4 (2011).

In doubtful cases presumption is that residuary legacies are general rather than specific, and plaintiff failed to prove the contrary where will, while clearly expressing testatrix’s intent that her sons should receive all property owned by her at time of her death, described no particular real estate. Di Cristofaro v. Beaudry, 113 R.I. 313 , 320 A.2d 597, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1179 (1974).

Where the clause in a will containing a devise of real property was general, and not specific, no written consent pursuant to the mandate of this section concerning the sale of specifically devised real property was necessary before the property could be sold. Di Cristofaro v. Beaudry, 113 R.I. 313 , 320 A.2d 597, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1179 (1974).

Homestead Exemption.

When a bankruptcy debtor’s mother generally devised certain real property to the debtor, in common with the debtor’s sister, in the residuary clause of the mother’s will, the debtor could claim a homestead exemption as to the debtor’s interest in the property because (1) the debtor was immediately vested with a fee simple interest, subject to defeasance, upon the debtor’s mother’s death, and (2) any need to sell the property, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-12-6 , did not keep title from vesting. In re Tetreault, 11 A.3d 635, 2011 R.I. LEXIS 4 (2011).

Judicial Discretion.

It was within the court’s discretion to order sale of real estate where members of family had difficulty arranging things among themselves. Ranalli v. Edwards, 98 R.I. 394 , 202 A.2d 516, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 182 (1964).

Terms of Will.

This section did not bar the sale of museum property where will expressly provided for its sale in the event that the fees collected for showing of the museum were not sufficient for its maintenance. Champlin v. Powers, 80 R.I. 30 , 90 A.2d 787, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 86 (1952).

33-12-7. Powers of temporary executors and administrators with will annexed over realty.

Executors for the time being, or administrators with the will annexed, shall have the same powers to sell, lease, mortgage, or make conveyances of real estate as are given by will to the original executors, unless these powers are expressly given to the executors as individuals apart from the office, or unless provision to the contrary be made in the will.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 840; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 26; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 26; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 24; G.L. 1956, § 33-12-7 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Provisions which authorized executor to “sell my real and personal estate and convert the same in money as soon as may conveniently be done after my decease, and on such terms as he may deem proper” vested a power of sale in administrator with the will annexed. In re Adams, 32 R.I. 41 , 78 A. 524, 1911 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1911).

Where no executor was appointed by testator, administrator c.t.a. took no power to sell real estate by virtue of this statute. Stoughton v. Liscomb, 39 R.I. 489 , 98 A. 183, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1916).

Where will contemplated that realty would be converted into cash as soon as possible after testator’s death, the administrator with the will annexed had the power to sell, there being nothing in the will to the contrary. Industrial Trust Co. v. McLaughlin, 44 R.I. 350 , 117 A. 428, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 53 (1922); Trudeau v. Collins, 65 R.I. 464 , 16 A.2d 346, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 143 (1940).

Collateral References.

Administrator with will annexed, right of, to execute power of sale conferred by will. 116 A.L.R. 158; 9 A.L.R.2d 1324.

Right of administrator de bonis non to recover proceeds of personal property of the estate converted by his predecessor. 3 A.L.R. 1252.

33-12-8. Public or private sale of assets.

Any sale of the assets of an estate by the executor or administrator shall be made at public auction, after reasonable notice of the sale, or by private sale under the advice and direction of the probate court, provided that this advice and direction shall not be required in the case of a sale at private sale by an executor or an administrator with the will annexed in the exercise of a power to sell at private sale conferred on him or her by the will. A private sale, unless authorized by the probate court or by the will, or a sale by auction improperly made, shall be deemed maladministration.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1000; G.L. 1909, ch. 319, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 370, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 47; P.L. 1944, ch. 1419, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-12-8 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Effect of Improper Sale.

Conveyance of real estate sold by an administratrix in violation of this section will not be enforced by a decree of specific performance. Devlin v. Brown, 101 R.I. 569 , 225 A.2d 664, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 801 (1967).

Sale by Pledgee.

Executor’s final account would be disallowed where executor sold assets under power of sale as pledgee and applied proceeds in partial payment of deceased’s note without first obtaining order of probate court. Industrial Trust Co. v. Dean, 67 R.I. 504 , 25 A.2d 552, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1942).

Collateral References.

Illegality as basis for denying remedy of specific performance for breach of contract. 58 A.L.R.5th 387.

Power of sale conferred on executor by testator as authorizing private sale. 11 A.L.R.2d 955.

What constitutes public sale. 4 A.L.R.2d 575.

33-12-9. Application of rents and income of real estate to debts — Leases by executor or administrator.

Whenever the personal property subject to inventory, other than household furniture and stores, of any decedent shall not be sufficient to pay his or her debts and the charges against his or her estate, the probate court having jurisdiction of the estate may, instead of, or in addition to, granting leave to sell the real estate of the deceased, enter its decree empowering the executor or administrator to take upon himself or herself and supersede the possession of the heirs or devisees of the deceased, as to all or any portion of the real estate of the deceased designated in the decree, so far, and so far only, as shall be necessary to enable the executor or administrator to demand, sue for, and recover the rents and income reserved and accruing from the property after the entry of the decree from any tenants or other persons by whom rents and income shall be payable; with power also to let the property from month to month, or to make such other leases of the premises as the court shall approve and direct; and the receipt of the executor or administrator for payments made shall be valid as well against the heirs and devisees as against the executor or administrator, and any letting or lease lawfully made by the executor or administrator shall be binding also upon the heirs and devisees of the deceased; and provided, that this section shall not apply to real estate which is specifically devised, or as to which directions inconsistent with this section are given in and by a will, unless the other real estate is insufficient for the purposes of this section; and provided, further, that the court may at any time, after notice to the executor or administrator, and after a hearing, revoke its former decree without prejudice to existing leases by it approved and directed, and order the executor or administrator to surrender possession of the real estate to the heirs or devisees.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 847; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 33; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 33; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 31; P.L. 1939, ch. 659, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-12-9 ; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 26.

33-12-10. Application of rents and income from real estate for repairs, taxes, and mortgage.

The executor or administrator shall have the care and control of the real estate covered by the decree mentioned in § 33-12-9 , and shall apply so much as may be necessary of the rents and income in repairs and maintenance of the real estate and in payment of taxes and insurance on the property. He or she shall have the power, under the direction of the probate court, to apply the rents and income in payment of the interest on any mortgage on the property. And the amount received and applied shall be accounted for in his or her account as executor or administrator, and shall be subject to the approval and allowance by the court as in cases of personal property.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 848; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 34; P.L. 1922, ch. 2196, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 34; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 32; G.L. 1956, § 33-12-10 .

33-12-11. Order of preference of debts.

  1. If the estate of a decedent is insufficient to pay his or her debts, the same, after deducting the charges of administration, and any property as is set off and allowed to the widow and family, shall be applied to the payment of his or her debts and charges in the following order:
    1. The necessary funeral charges of the deceased.
    2. The necessary expenses of his or her last sickness.
    3. Debts due to the United States.
    4. Debts due to this state, and all state and town taxes.
    5. Past and future child support obligations pursuant to § 33-11-51 .
    6. Wages of labor performed within six (6) months next prior to the death of the deceased person, not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) to any one person.
    7. Proceeds due the Rhode Island state lottery pursuant to § 42-61-6.2 .
    8. Other debts filed within six (6) months of the first notice.
    9. All other debts.
  2. If there is not sufficient property to pay all the debts of any class, the creditors of that class shall be paid ratably upon their respective claims; and no payment shall be made to creditors of any class until all of those of the preceding class or classes have been paid in full.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 913; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 33; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 33; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 33; G.L. 1956, § 33-12-11 ; P.L. 1981, ch. 288, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 298, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 314, § 2.

Cross References.

Priority of town taxes, § 44-7-10 .

Settlement of debts and claims, § 18-4-8 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Administration Expenses.

Expenses incurred by the executor in prosecuting probate of the will are entitled to priority in settlement, assuming that such expenses are reasonable. Hazard v. Engs, 14 R.I. 5 , 1882 R.I. LEXIS 2 (1882).

Expense of administration was not entitled to priority over funeral expenses where there were no other debts and the only funds of the estate were applied to the funeral expenses before the taking out of the administration. Mauro v. Vervena, 62 R.I. 242 , 4 A.2d 893, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1939).

Family Allowances.

The language of chapter 10 of this title, when considered with coordinate statutory provisions, shows legislative intent to assist the widow and family of deceased during widow’s lifetime. Easton v. Fessenden, 65 R.I. 259 , 14 A.2d 508, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 107 (1940).

Funeral Charges.

Undertakers could not sue in equity for funeral charges, alleging neglect of administrator to recover equitable assets of the estate, without having exhausted his remedy at law of an action on the administrator’s bond, even though such debt is made first in order of preference. Gavitt v. Berry, 23 R.I. 14 , 49 A. 99, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 82 (1901).

Collateral References.

Construction of statutory provision giving priority on distribution to claims for wages of servants, employees, or the like. 52 A.L.R.3d 940.

Expense of preserving assets before appointment of executor or administrator as entitled to priority. 108 A.L.R. 393.

Foreclosure decree which ascertains amount of mortgage debt or other claim as judgment within statute relating to rank of claims against decedent’s estate. 57 A.L.R. 489.

Foreign judgment, or judgment of sister state, rendered in lifetime of debtor, rank of, in settlement of debtor’s estate after his death. 128 A.L.R. 1400.

Guardianship, priority in event of incompetent’s death of claims incurred during, over other claims against estate. 113 A.L.R. 402.

“Last sickness,” meaning of phrase and the like in statutes giving preference to expenses. 9 A.L.R. 462.

Personal claim of executor or administrator against estate, antedating death of decedent. 144 A.L.R. 953.

Preserving assets before appointment of executor or administrator, expense of, right to priority. 108 A.L.R. 388; 393.

Priority of payment of funeral expenses of life beneficiary or life tenant out of corpus of estate under instrument providing for invasion of corpus of estate for support of such person. 18 A.L.R.2d 1236.

Priority received by creditors as regards ancillary assets of decedent’s estate as giving them status of secured creditors so as to prevent reducing their claim upon distribution in the domiciliary jurisdiction so as to effect ultimate equality among creditors. 92 A.L.R. 595; 127 A.L.R. 504.

Rent accruing under lease after death of lessee as preferred claim or cost of administration. 22 A.L.R.3d 814.

State’s prerogative right of preference at common law. 51 A.L.R. 1355; 65 A.L.R. 1331; 90 A.L.R. 184; 167 A.L.R. 640.

Stockholders’ superadded liability, rank or preference of claim against insolvent estate in respect of. 92 A.L.R. 1040.

Tax on real estate of decedent, duty or right of executor or administrator to pay. 163 A.L.R. 724.

Vendor under executory contract for sale of lands as preferred creditor in case of vendee’s death. 35 A.L.R. 929.

33-12-12. Decrees for distribution of insolvent estates.

After the expiration of the time for claiming an appeal from the decree on the report of the commissioners on an insolvent estate, the probate court shall make a decree for the distribution of the estate among the creditors whose claims are allowed. If an appeal is claimed or if a suit is pending against the estate, the decree may be suspended until the determination of the appeal or suit, or a distribution may be ordered among the creditors whose claims are allowed, leaving in the hands of the executor or administrator an amount sufficient to pay claimants whose appeals or suits are pending a proportion equal to that of the other creditors. In case further assets shall come to the hands of the executor or administrator after the decree of distribution, the probate court shall make from time to time further decrees of distribution among the creditors.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 920; G.L. 1909, ch. 314, § 40; G.L. 1923, ch. 365, § 40; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 40; G.L. 1956, § 33-12-12 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Allowance Constitutes Lien.

The allowance of the commissioner’s report by the probate court is in the nature of a judgment and constitutes a lien upon the real estate of the deceased in favor of the creditors whose claims were approved; and such claims are paramount to the title acquired by a purchaser acquired through an attaching creditor who did not prove his claim. Mowry v. Steere, 2 R.I. 420 , 1853 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1853).

Failure to Make Distribution.

In suit against administrator for failure to make distribution to creditors, it is no defense that the probate court had not made an order for distribution on its own motion. Probate Court v. Carr, 20 R.I. 592 , 40 A. 844, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 140 (1898).

33-12-13. Disposition of assets of nonresident.

When a will is filed and recorded, or administration is granted in this state on the estate of a person who was an inhabitant of any other state, territory or district of the United States, or of a foreign country, his or her estate, real and personal, found here shall, after payment of his or her debts, be disposed of according to his or her will, if he or she left any executed according to law; otherwise, the real estate shall descend according to the laws of this state, and his or her personal estate shall be distributed and disposed of according to the laws of the state, territory, district or country of which he or she was an inhabitant.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 854; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 40; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 40; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 38; G.L. 1956, § 33-12-13 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Administration Expenses.

It was not an abuse of discretion for the probate court to refuse to transmit funds to the court of the domicile to pay administration expenses since courts of the ancillary jurisdiction can inquire into the justness of administration charges. Dolan v. Anthony, 51 R.I. 181 , 152 A. 873, 1931 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1931).

Attorney’s Fees.

Where attorney’s claim in ancillary administration was based on services rendered to executor in this state, it should have been presented to the probate court here rather than in the domiciliary state. Dolan v. Anthony, 51 R.I. 181 , 152 A. 873, 1931 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1931).

Collateral References.

Basis of distribution among decedent’s unsecured creditors, of ancillary assets where entire estate or ancillary estate is insolvent. 164 A.L.R. 765.

Discharge or assignment of debt by foreign executor or administrator. 10 A.L.R. 276.

Power to impound assets of nonresident decedent in state. 44 A.L.R. 801.

Priority received by creditors as regards ancillary assets of decedent’s estate as justification for reducing their claims or dividends upon distribution in the domiciliary jurisdiction so as to effect ultimate equality among creditors. 92 A.L.R. 595; 127 A.L.R. 504.

Remission of assets by ancillary administrator to domiciliary executor or administrator. 90 A.L.R. 1043.

Sale of land located in state other than domicile, for payment of decedent’s debts, rights and remedies in respect to, and proceeds thereof. 81 A.L.R. 665.

Situs of corporate stock for purpose of probate jurisdiction and administration. 72 A.L.R. 179.

State statutes or rules of court conferring in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents on the basis of isolated acts or transactions within state as applicable to personal representative of deceased nonresident. 19 A.L.R.3d 171.

33-12-14. Distribution or transfer to domiciliary executor or administrator of personalty of nonresident.

Upon the settlement of the estate, and after the payment of all debts for which the estate is liable in this state, the residue of the personal estate may be distributed and disposed of in the manner provided by this chapter by the probate court; or, in the discretion of the court, it may be transmitted to the executor or administrator, if any, in the state, territory, district or country where the deceased had his or her domicile.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 855; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 41; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 41; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 39; G.L. 1956, § 33-12-14 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The court having jurisdiction over the property by ancillary administration can either distribute it or transmit it to the domiciliary court, subject to principles of comity and equity. Dolan v. Anthony, 51 R.I. 181 , 152 A. 873, 1931 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1931).

33-12-15. Preference to citizens of state in distribution of insolvent estate of nonresident.

If a person dies insolvent, his or her estate found in this state shall, as far as practicable, be so disposed of that all his or her creditors here and elsewhere may receive each an equal share in proportion to their respective debts. To this end, his or her estate shall not be transmitted to the foreign executor or administrator until all the creditors who are citizens of this state, filing and proving their claims according to law, have received the just proportion that would be due to them if the whole estate of the deceased, wherever found, that is applicable to the payment of creditors, were divided among all the creditors in proportion to their respective debts, without preferring any one species of debt to another, excepting those preferred by the statutes of this state; and no creditor, who is not a citizen of this state, shall be paid out of the assets found here until all those who are citizens have received their just proportion as provided in this section.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 856; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 42; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 42; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 40; G.L. 1956, § 33-12-15 .

33-12-16. Residue of insolvent estate of nonresident after payment to citizens.

If there is any residue after payment to the citizens of this state, it may be paid to any creditors who have duly filed and proved their debts here in proportion to the amount due to each of them; but no one shall receive more than would be due to him or her if the whole estate were divided ratably among all the creditors as provided in § 33-12-15 . The balance may be transmitted to the foreign executor or administrator; but if there is no foreign executor or administrator, it shall, after the expiration of four (4) years from the qualification of the administrator in this state, be distributed ratably among all creditors, both citizens and others, who have proved their debts in this state.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 857; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 43; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 43; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 41; G.L. 1956, § 33-12-16 .

Chapter 13 Legacies, Devises, and Inheritance

33-13-1. Notice of devise or bequest to corporation or association.

Within ninety (90) days after the admission to probate of any will containing a devise or bequest to any corporation or voluntary association, the executor or administrator or other estate fiduciary shall mail by certified mail return receipt requested, a written notice of the devise or bequest directed to the devisee or legatee at the place where it is located, if the same is known. An affidavit of notice together with the return receipt shall be filed in the probate court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 864; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 50; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 50; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 48; G.L. 1956, § 33-13-1 ; P.L. 2006, ch. 335, § 1.

Comparative Legislation.

Distribution:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-425 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 197, § 19 et seq.

Collateral References.

Bequest of stated amount to several legatees as entitling each to full amount or proportionate share thereof. 1 A.L.R.3d 479.

33-13-2. Order for conversion of personalty into cash and distribution.

If the estate of a deceased person is to be distributed in whole or in part, the probate court, upon the petition of any person interested, after any notice as it may direct, may order the executor or administrator to convert the personal property into cash and to distribute the cash among the persons entitled to receive it.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1005; G.L. 1909, ch. 319, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 370, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 578, § 48; G.L. 1956, § 33-13-2 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Charitable Organizations.

Where a power of sale or conversion was given in a will for the benefit of a charitable organization, it could elect to take the property in specie where the rights of others would not be interfered with. Hogan v. Taylor, 64 R.I. 471 , 13 A.2d 262, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 65 (1940).

33-13-3. Restrictions on power of heir or devisee to incumber or alien realty.

No heir or devisee of a deceased person shall have power, within two (2) years and six (6) months after the first publication of the notice of the qualification of the first executor or administrator on the estate of the deceased person, to incumber or alien the real estate of the deceased so as to prevent or affect the sale of the real estate by the executor or administrator, if necessary, as prescribed by law; provided, however, unless otherwise directed by will or codicil, that after the expiration of the period of two (2) years and six (6) months from the date of first publication, without any deduction of time when there was no representative of the estate, the heir or devisee may alien or incumber the real estate, and the real estate shall not be chargeable with any lien for the debts of the deceased.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 994; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 29; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 29; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 29; G.L. 1956, § 33-13-3 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Adverse Possession.

Adverse possession by husband of abandoned portion of highway reverting to deceased did not start to run until the statutory period after executor gave notice of appointment. Davis v. Girard, 80 R.I. 235 , 95 A.2d 847, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 57 (1953).

Commencement of Period.

The period prescribed by this section does not begin to run before the appointment of an administrator. Appeal of Dawley, 16 R.I. 694 , 19 A. 248, 1890 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1890).

Injunction.

Creditor was not entitled to enjoin alienation of real estate pending determination of creditor’s suit, since there was no necessity to enjoin sale prior to expiration of statutory period. Nahigian v. Rosen, 48 R.I. 348 , 138 A. 182, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 134 (1927).

Priority of Claims.

An estate may be sold to pay funeral charges and expenses of administration, even though the estate has been alienated, if the heirs or devisees convey the estate within the period prescribed by this section. In re Johnson, 15 R.I. 438 , 8 A. 248, 1887 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1887).

Termination of Charge.

Alienation by heir or devisee after the statutory period has elapsed terminates the charge on the land, but an alienation by an heir or devisee prior to lapse of the period does not bar the administrator from selling the land to pay debts after the period has passed. Honeyman v. Kelliher, 20 R.I. 564 , 40 A. 499, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 120 (1898).

Collateral References.

Right of devisee to convey or mortgage real estate devised before or pending probate proceedings and prior to decree of distribution. 86 A.L.R. 400.

33-13-4. Rights of creditors and heirs where no administration granted.

Any creditor or creditors of any deceased person who shall have died intestate, being seised at the time of his or her death of real estate within the state, and upon whose estate no letters of administration shall have been taken, shall be forever barred from collecting their claim or claims against the estate of such deceased person, unless they shall, within the period of six (6) years of the death of the person, petition the probate court having jurisdiction for letters of administration upon the estate; and the heirs of the deceased person may alien or incumber the real estate freed from the claim of all creditors after the period of six (6) years shall have elapsed without a petition having been filed as provided in this section; provided, that nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the right of any creditor to satisfy his or her claim from any security held by him or her.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 318, § 30, as enacted by P.L. 1914, ch. 1099, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 30; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 30; G.L. 1956, § 33-13-4 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Funeral Expenses.

Where husband paid wife’s funeral expenses, but did not seek an administrator for his wife’s estate within six years in which he could have requested petition for sale of real estate by a fiduciary, real estate of wife was not subject to such claim. Allsworth v. Scully, 105 R.I. 183 , 250 A.2d 369, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 736 (1969).

33-13-5. Payment of legacy on giving of indemnity bond.

When an executor or administrator, after having given bond for the discharge of his or her trust, is requested by a legatee to make payment in whole or in part of a legacy, the probate court, if the executor or administrator consents, may require that the legatee shall first give bond to the executor or administrator, with surety or sureties to be approved by the court, and conditioned to refund the amount to be paid, or so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy any demands that may be afterwards recovered against the estate of the deceased, and so indemnify the executor or administrator against all other loss and damage on account of the payment.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 976; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 11; P.L. 1951, ch. 2744, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-13-5 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

This section authorizes the payment of a legacy by the executor prior to the period for payment of legacies. Frelinghuysen v. New York Life Ins. & Trust Co., 31 R.I. 150 , 77 A. 98, 1910 R.I. LEXIS 81 (1910).

33-13-6. Filing of statement listing legatees — Notice.

An executor may, and for cause shown shall, file within two (2) years after the date of the first publication, or any further time as the probate court may allow, and at the time during the periods as the court may direct, a statement in the office of the clerk of the probate court setting out the names of the legatees, the amounts to be paid, and the property to be turned over to them respectively, or to be held by himself or herself as trustee. Notice of the filing of the statement and of the time and place fixed by the court for hearing on the statement shall be given by advertisement at least twice each week for two (2) successive weeks in some newspaper, as ordered by the court. The probate clerk shall also give notice by registered or certified mail to all persons interested whose post office addresses are known.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 978; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 13; P.L. 1910, ch. 584, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 13; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3717, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-13-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cause for Requiring Statement.

Evidence that executor did not intend to pay legacy was legal cause to order executor to file statement of legacies to be paid so that legatee could bring action. Marshall v. Lancaster, 68 R.I. 184 , 26 A.2d 856, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 50 (1942).

Decree Requiring Statement.

Decree requiring executor to file statement of legacies to be paid should fix date on or before which such statement should be filed. Marshall v. Lancaster, 68 R.I. 184 , 26 A.2d 856, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 50 (1942).

Inheritance Taxes.

Taxes paid on legacies under inheritance tax of another state were not deductible from legacies in a statement filed under this section, but were a part of the general expense of the estate. Bullard v. Redwood Library, 37 R.I. 107 , 91 A. 30, 1914 R.I. LEXIS 49 (1914).

Purpose of Statute.

Provisions requiring a statement of legacies to be filed and certified to higher court for final decree were largely, if not primarily, for the protection of an executor who formerly had to run the risk of construing a will and paying legacies. Municipal Court of Providence v. McCulla, 21 R.I. 273 , 43 A. 182, 1899 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1899).

Questions Raised on Petition.

A residuary legatee may require an executor to file a statement setting out the names of the legatees and the amounts to be paid each, but if the petition does not raise same, he will not be permitted to raise questions as to who are legatees or, without notice to parties, questions concerning construction of the will. Thompson v. Clarke, 46 R.I. 307 , 127 A. 569, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 8 (1925).

Real Estate.

Proceedings for distribution of personal estate under terms of a will could not be treated as an adjudication of rights or interests of devisees of real estate. In re Crafts, 41 R.I. 63 , 102 A. 753, 1918 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1918).

Remedies of Creditors.

In bill by creditor of a nonresident legatee to enjoin payment of an amount due legatee and for discovery of the amount due, a demurrer by executor based on contention that no account had been filed by executor could not be sustained. Gorman v. Stillman, 24 R.I. 264 , 52 A. 1088, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1902).

Sufficiency of Prior Filing.

Executor was not required to file statement on order of the probate court when he had filed such statement under superior court order in earlier probate appeal involving same will and parties. Marshall v. Lancaster, 69 R.I. 79 , 31 A.2d 11, 1943 R.I. LEXIS 22 (1943).

Time Statement Required.

Decree ordering executor to file statement of legacies to be paid before first publication of notice of qualification as executor was not error where no creditors’ rights were involved, executor had acted as such for almost ten months before his appointment was confirmed, and first publication of notice was not made promptly after such confirmation. Marshall v. Lancaster, 68 R.I. 184 , 26 A.2d 856, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 50 (1942).

Question had become moot whether probate court exceeded its power to order executor to file statement of legacies to be paid before first publication of executor’s qualification where appeal to superior court was heard de novo after such publication. Marshall v. Lancaster, 68 R.I. 184 , 26 A.2d 856, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 50 (1942).

Collateral References.

Consul, right of, to receive distributive share or legacy payable to his national. 157 A.L.R. 118.

33-13-7. Approval of statement listing legatees — Order to pay legacies.

Upon a hearing on the statement, the court shall approve the statement as filed, or shall amend and approve the same as amended, and shall enter its order directing the payment and satisfaction of the legacies. If an appeal is taken, the probate court may order the payment and satisfaction of legacies not affected by the appeal.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 979; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 33-13-7 .

Cross References.

Disclaimer of estates, §§ 34-5-1 , 34-5-2 .

Interest on general pecuniary legacies, § 33-6-15 .

Minors, gifts of securities to, § 18-7-1 et seq.

Ratification of payment or delivery without order, § 33-18-28 .

Real estate proceeds distributed as real estate, § 33-19-23 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Assignment of Fund.

Probate court had no jurisdiction in making order of distribution to determine the validity of an alleged assignment of a fund. In re Doringh, 20 R.I. 459 , 40 A. 4, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 87 (1898).

33-13-8. Determination of questions as to legacies.

Whenever any question arises as to the identity of a legatee, or the construction, or the payment and satisfaction of any legacy, the probate court, upon petition setting out any questions, after notice by citation to all known parties and any additional notice the court may direct, and after a hearing thereon, may determine the questions and enter its order accordingly.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 980; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 33-13-8 .

Cross References.

Construction of wills, § 33-6-5 et seq.

Questions determined by probate court, § 8-9-12 .

Law Reviews.

Rebecca M. Murphy, Murder, Fraud, and Tortious Interference: The Interplay Between Probate Court Jurisdiction and Superior Court Jurisdiction in Rhode Island, 20 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 404 (2015).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Federal Taxes.

Where probate court determined under this section that charitable legacies were to be paid in full and the United States, though given notice of proceeding, did not appear or appeal, the estate was entitled to a deduction from the federal inheritance tax for payment of the charitable legacies in full. Hoxie v. Page, 23 F. Supp. 905, 1938 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2082 (D.R.I. 1938), aff'd, 104 F.2d 918, 1939 U.S. App. LEXIS 4255 (1st Cir. 1939).

Jurisdiction of Probate Court.

By the provisions of this section, express authority to hear and determine questions concerning a proper legatee or construction or payment to a legatee is vested in the probate court but only after petition setting out the questions and notice to the parties. Thompson v. Clarke, 46 R.I. 307 , 127 A. 569, 1925 R.I. LEXIS 8 (1925).

Jurisdiction of probate court under this section is not inconsistent with jurisdiction of supreme court under former § 9-24-28 , but probate court’s jurisdiction is limited to construction of a legacy in will under administration in the court at that time. Carr v. Railton, 66 R.I. 225 , 18 A.2d 646, 1941 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1941).

Death of legatee in only other disposing part of will did not make construction of residuary legacy under this section construction of whole will, so as to deprive probate court of jurisdiction. Carr v. Railton, 66 R.I. 225 , 18 A.2d 646, 1941 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1941).

Right of Appeal.

Party aggrieved by the construction of the language of a legacy may appeal to the superior court de novo and subsequently to the supreme court by bill of exceptions. Carr v. Railton, 66 R.I. 225 , 18 A.2d 646, 1941 R.I. LEXIS 26 (1941).

33-13-8.1. Distributions in kind in satisfaction of pecuniary bequests.

  1. As used in this section, the terms “pecuniary bequests” and “transfer in trust of a pecuniary amount” mean, respectively, a bequest in a will or a transfer under a trust agreement of a specific amount of money, which amount is either expressly stated in the instrument or determinable by means of a formula which is stated in the instrument.
  2. Whether a bequest or transfer in trust is pecuniary in character depends upon the intention of the testator or grantor.
  3. Where a will or a trust agreement authorizes the executor, administrator, or trustee (hereinafter called the “fiduciary”) to satisfy wholly or partly in kind a pecuniary bequest or transfer in trust of a pecuniary amount, unless the instrument shall otherwise expressly provide, the assets selected by the fiduciary for that purpose shall be valued at their respective values on the date or dates of their distribution.
  4. Where a will or a trust agreement authorizes the fiduciary to satisfy wholly or partly in kind a pecuniary bequest or transfer in trust of a pecuniary amount and the instrument requires the fiduciary to value the assets selected by the fiduciary for distribution as of a date other than the date or dates of their distribution, unless the instrument shall otherwise expressly provide, the assets selected by the fiduciary for that purpose, together with any cash distributed, shall have an aggregate value on the date or dates of their distribution amounting to no less than, and to the extent practicable to no more than, the amount of the bequest or transfer in trust as stated in, or determined by the formula stated in, the instrument.

History of Section. G.L., § 33-13-8.1 , as enacted by P.L. 1969, ch. 241, § 1.

33-13-9. Action for recovery of legacy — Action to preserve lien or charge upon real estate.

  1. A legatee may recover his or her legacy in a civil action; but no action shall be brought for recovery against an executor or administrator with the will annexed, for the recovery of a legacy, until the executor or administrator has filed a statement of the legacies to be paid under the provisions of § 33-13-6 or failed to comply with the provisions of § 33-13-6 .
  2. All actions to impress and preserve a lien or charge upon real estate based upon a will duly proven after May 28, 1959, wherein real estate is subject to a lien or charge expressed or implied, shall be commenced and sued within six (6) years from the date the will is proven or the right accrues and not later; and all actions to impress and preserve a lien or charge upon real estate based upon a will duly proven prior to May 28, 1959, wherein real estate is subject to a lien or charge expressed or implied, shall be commenced and sued within six (6) years from May 28, 1959, or if on the effective date the right to sue shall not have accrued, then within six (6) years of the time when the right to sue shall have accrued, and not later; and in any event any such lien or charge shall be wholly lost unless notice of the suit shall be filed in the land records of the city or town where the real estate lies within ten (10) days of the commencement of the suit.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 977; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 33-13-9 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 115, § 1.

Cross References.

Actions for recovery of income bequeathed, § 33-6-14 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Action Against Purchaser.

An action cannot be maintained under this section against purchasers of devised real estate, even though the estate was devised on condition that certain persons be supported from such estate and have a home with the devisee, since a purchaser is a stranger and cannot be charged with the condition specified in the will in absence of language in the conveyance from which a personal promise or contract can be implied. Jordan v. Donahue, 12 R.I. 199 , 1878 R.I. LEXIS 60 (1878).

Residuary Legatees.

The action prescribed by an earlier version of § 33-13-10 was exclusive of any other action at law by a residuary legatee for the recovery of his legacy, so long as its amount remained indeterminate, and comprehended an action only in the nature of an action of account; so complaint in assumpsit by residuary legatee was demurrable. Drown v. Staples, 18 R.I. 117 , 25 A. 913, 1892 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1892).

Restrictions on Right of Action.

The restrictive provisions of this section did not apply to a case where the right to maintain an action at law had accrued prior to enactment of the provisions. Municipal Court of Providence v. McCulla, 21 R.I. 273 , 43 A. 182, 1899 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1899).

Collateral References.

Legacy charged upon real estate, right of legatee to enforce payment of, as against purchaser from personal representative of devisee or testator. 116 A.L.R. 35; 134 A.L.R. 364.

Payment or delivery of legacy or distributive share before decree of distribution as defense to action by legatee or distributee on bond of personal representative. 121 A.L.R. 1069.

33-13-10. Action for an accounting brought by residuary legatee.

An executor, being a residuary legatee, may bring an action for an accounting against his or her co-executor concerning the estate in his or her hands, and for his or her part thereof, and every other residuary legatee shall have the like remedy against an executor or administrator with the will annexed; but in both cases without prejudice to any other remedies.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 981; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 33-13-10 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Alternative Remedies.

The action prescribed by P.S. 1882, ch. 189, § 24 (similar to the provisions of this section), was exclusive of any other action at law by a residuary legatee for the recovery of his legacy so long as its amount remained indeterminate, and comprehended an action only in the nature of account, so that complaint in assumpsit by residuary legatee was demurrable. Drown v. Staples, 18 R.I. 117 , 25 A. 913, 1892 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1892).

Debt on the bond of executor brought for the benefit of all concerned, alleging failure to exhibit a particular inventory and to account, could be maintained as to a residuary devisee and legatee, as the remedy of this section is expressly without prejudice to any other remedies. Probate Court v. Potter, 22 R.I. 326 , 47 A. 889, 1900 R.I. LEXIS 119 (1900).

Prerequisite to Other Actions.

The executor is not liable on his bond for failure to distribute the residuary estate until it has been determined in the due course of administration that there is a residuary estate or until the legatee has recovered judgment against the executor in an action under this section. Municipal Court of Providence v. Henry, 11 R.I. 563 , 1877 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1877).

33-13-11. Time when order of distribution allowed.

At any time after six (6) months from the date of the first publication of the notice of the qualification of the first administrator, a probate court may make an order of distribution, if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that the administrator has paid all claims that have been filed and allowed or proved.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 982; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 17; P.L. 1941, ch. 1003, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 33-13-11 .

Cross References.

Distribution of personal property not bequeathed, § 33-1-10 .

Collateral References.

Postponing distribution until payment of debts or settlement of estate as violating rule against perpetuities. 13 A.L.R. 1033.

Time for payment of legacies or distributive shares and reasonableness of delay by personal representatives sought to be personally charged with interest. 18 A.L.R.2d 1395.

33-13-12. Time when order of distribution required.

Within two (2) years after the first publication, or such further time as the probate court for cause shown may allow, administrators shall obtain an order of distribution, ascertaining the distributees and the proportion of the personal estate due each.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 983; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 33-13-12 .

33-13-13. Payment of money into court for benefit of foreign legatee or distributee.

Where it shall appear that a legatee or distributee resides outside of the United States or its territories and would not have the benefit, use, or control of the money, or other property due him or her, the probate court may direct that the money or other property be paid into the registry of the probate court for the benefit of the legatee or distributee or the person or persons as may thereafter appear to be entitled thereto. Any money or other property so paid into court shall be paid out only by special order of the probate court or pursuant to the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 579, § 11, as enacted by P.L. 1951, ch. 2744, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-13-13 .

Cross References.

Unclaimed funds, deposit in court, § 33-18-29 .

Unclaimed securities or instruments, delivery into court, §§ 33-18-30 , 33-18-31 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

This statute did not apply to legacies to hospitals in Scotland which vested prior to National Health Service Act for Scotland, but was for the purpose of controlling of nationals whose assets were subject to seizure by a totalitarian dictatorship. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Johnston, 81 R.I. 115 , 99 A.2d 12, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 22 (1953).

33-13-14. Liability of heirs, next of kin, devisees, and legatees for debts.

After the settlement of an estate by an executor or administrator, and after the expiration of six (6) months from the date of the first publication of the notice of his or her qualification by the first executor or administrator, the heirs, next of kin, devisees, and legatees of the deceased shall be liable, in the manner provided in the following sections, for all debts for which suits could not have been brought against the executor or administrator and for which provision is not made under the preceding sections of this chapter or chapters 11 and 12 of this title.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 984; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 19; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 19; P.L. 1939, ch. 706, § 1; P.L. 1941, ch. 1003, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 33-13-14 .

Cross References.

Estate and transfer taxes, § 44-22-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Parties.

Suit by creditor against administratrix, heir, guardian of the heir, and trustees was not a suit against heir under provisions of this section, since neither the administratrix or trustees would be proper parties to such a proceeding. Miner v. Aylesworth, 18 F. 199, 1883 U.S. App. LEXIS 2390 (C.C.D.R.I. 1883).

A breach of covenant creates a “debt” within the meaning of this section. Hebert v. Handy, 29 R.I. 543 , 72 A. 1102, 1909 R.I. LEXIS 56 (1909).

Collateral References.

Burden of debts and costs of administration as between residuary legatees and heirs or next of kin who take lapsed, adeemed, or invalid legacies. 144 A.L.R. 476.

Liability for debts of decedent’s estate of property which has passed out of hands of beneficiary of estate in whose hands it was liable. 103 A.L.R. 1004.

Marketability of title as affected by debts of decedent. 57 A.L.R. 1408.

Personal liability of heir of real property for debt secured by mortgage. 139 A.L.R. 711.

Real property, heir’s right to exoneration of, from lien thereon at expense of personal estate. 4 A.L.R.3d 1023.

Stockholder’s statutory added liability as devolving on his heirs at his death. 79 A.L.R. 1550; 96 A.L.R. 1468.

33-13-15. Action by creditor against heirs, next of kin, devisees, and legatees.

Any creditor holding a contingent claim, the right of action on which did not accrue during the period of six (6) months, who shall bring his or her action within one year after his or her right of action accrues, and any creditor who from accident, mistake or other cause has failed to file his or her claim within six (6) months after the first publication of notice who shall bring his or her action not later than three (3) years after the first publication, may recover his or her claim against the heirs and next of kin of the deceased, or against the devisees and legatees under his or her will, each one of whom shall be liable to the creditor to an amount not exceeding the value of real or personal estate that he or she has received from the deceased. But, if by the will of the deceased any part of his or her estate, or any one or more of the devisees or legatees, is made exclusively liable for the claim in exoneration of the residue of the estate or of other devisees or legatees, those provisions of the will shall be complied with and the persons and estates so exempted shall be liable for only so much of the claims as cannot be recovered from those who are first chargeable therewith.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 985; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 20; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 20; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 20; P.L. 1939, ch. 706, § 1; P.L. 1941, ch. 1003, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 33-13-15 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Breach of Covenant.

A breach of covenant in a deed issued by deceased prior to his death was a “contingent claim” within the meaning of this section where breach did not occur until long after death. Hebert v. Handy, 29 R.I. 543 , 72 A. 1102, 1909 R.I. LEXIS 56 (1909).

Contingent Claim Defined.

A contingent claim within the meaning of this section is one that depends for its effect upon some future event which may or may not happen. Kimball v. Kelly, 65 R.I. 484 , 16 A.2d 491, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 145 (1940).

Failure to File Claim.

Debt for deficiency from foreclosure of mortgage was not a “contingent claim” so as to make legatees and devisees of mortgagor liable after distribution of estate, even though foreclosure was after distribution, where mortgagee had not filed a claim against the estate. Kimball v. Kelly, 65 R.I. 484 , 16 A.2d 491, 1940 R.I. LEXIS 145 (1940).

Rents and Profits.

Heirs who have gone into possession and taken the rents and profits from real estate need not account to creditors of the deceased for such rents and profits nor are such sums liable for payment of deceased’s debts. Draper v. Barnes, 12 R.I. 156 , 1878 R.I. LEXIS 50 (1878).

Collateral References.

Liability of executor or administrator for negligence or default in defending action against estate. 14 A.L.R.3d 1036.

33-13-16. Liability of estate of heir, next of kin, devisee, or legatee for creditor’s claim.

If an heir, next of kin, devisee, or legatee dies, without having paid his or her just proportion of the claim, his or her estate shall be liable therefor, as for his or her own debt, to the extent to which he or she would have been liable if living.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 986; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 21; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 33-13-16 .

33-13-17. Recovery of creditors’ claims — Apportionment of liability.

In a case under §§ 33-13-15 and 33-13-16 , the creditor shall recover his or her claim by a civil action against all persons so liable, or against any of them as are within reach of process. The court shall decide how much each one of the defendants is liable to pay towards the claim.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 987; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 22; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 22; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 33-13-17 .

33-13-18. Failure of creditor to join all defendants — Addition of parties.

An action under §§ 33-13-15 and 33-13-16 shall not be dismissed or barred for not making all persons who might have been so included defendants; but, in any stage of the cause, the court, upon terms as may be deemed reasonable, may summon in other parties and allow amendments as may be necessary.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 988; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 23; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 23; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 23; G.L. 1956, § 33-13-18 .

33-13-19. Liability to creditor for amount payable by insolvent heir, devisee or other — Restriction to amount received from estate.

If an heir, devisee or other person who was originally liable with others for the claim is insolvent, unable to pay his or her proportion thereof, or beyond reach of process, the others shall be liable to the creditor for the whole amount of his or her claim; but no one shall be compelled to pay more than the amount received by him or her from the estate of the deceased.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 989; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 24; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 24; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 24; G.L. 1956, § 33-13-19 .

33-13-20. Indemnity between heirs, next of kin, legatees, and devisees.

If, in consequence of insolvency, absence, or other cause, a person liable for a claim fails to pay his or her just proportion of the claim to the creditor, he or she shall be liable to indemnify all who pay more than their just proportion of the claim. This indemnity may be recovered at their election by all of them jointly, or in separate proceedings by one or more of them for his, hers, or their parts respectively.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 990; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 25; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 25; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 25; G.L. 1956, § 33-13-20 .

Chapter 14 Accounts of Executors and Administrators

33-14-1. Times when accounts required.

Every executor and administrator, except as provided in § 33-17-3 , shall make out and return to the probate court, upon completion of the period of administration, and at such other times as shall be required by the court, pursuant to § 33-14-4 , an account relative to the estate in his or her hands, with a statement of the liquidated balance that may be due to or from him or her. Provided, however, that no interim accounting shall be required unless requested by an interested party, and any interim accounting may be excused by the probate court for good cause shown; and further provided, however, that every executor and administrator who is the sole beneficiary of the estate or who files a release from each beneficiary shall be permitted to file, in lieu of a final account, an affidavit of completed administration together with evidence that all Rhode Island estate and inheritance taxes for the estate have been satisfied, that the funeral bill has been paid, and that all claims filed against the estate have been satisfied.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 995; G.L. 1909, ch. 319, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 370, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 580, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-14-1 ; P.L. 1973, ch. 106, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 99, § 1.

Cross References.

Jurisdiction of probate court, § 8-9-9 .

Real estate proceeds, examination and accounting for, §§ 33-19-24 , 33-19-25 .

Comparative Legislation.

Accounts and settlements:

Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 45a-152, 45a-175 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 206, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Accounts in § 33-18-27.

The evidentiary accounts referred to in § 33-18-27 have no connection with and form no part of the accounts referred to in this chapter. Williams v. Herrick, 18 R.I. 120 , 25 A. 1099, 1893 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1893).

Requirements.

The requirement of this section that an account be filed is not satisfied by the filing of an affidavit of completed administration. Smith v. Estate of Catterall, 107 R.I. 729 , 271 A.2d 300, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 835 (1970); Raymond v. Raymond, 109 R.I. 265 , 284 A.2d 64, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1052 (1971).

Standing.

An executor cannot be compelled to render an account in an action brought at the instance of a person who is not interested in the estate since such person would not be able to enforce the statutory remedy on the executor’s bond. Dunnell v. Municipal Court, 9 R.I. 189 , 1869 R.I. LEXIS 8 (1869).

Collateral References.

Consul, right of, to institute or participate in accounting proceedings. 157 A.L.R. 116.

Removal of executor or administrator, expiration of statutory period for settling estate as affecting. 8 A.L.R. 178.

Third persons, adjudication of account of executor or administrator as prerequisite to remedy against, in respect of property transferred to him in breach of trust. 132 A.L.R. 1353.

33-14-2. Charges and credits shown — Investments.

  1. Accounts rendered by an executor or administrator to the probate court shall be for a period stated therein, and shall charge the executor or administrator with the amount of the inventory, or, instead the amount of the balance of the last account rendered, as the case may be, and all income, all gains from the sale of personal property, and all other property received by him or her, although not inventoried, and all rents and proceeds of the sale of real estate received by the executor or administrator; the accounts shall credit all charges, losses and payments, including legacies, distribution, and specific personal property delivered, and shall also show the investments of the balance of the account, if any, and changes of investments, along with such documentation verifying such investments as the court may request.
  2. An executor or administrator who is represented by an attorney shall not be required to submit originals or copies of evidence of charges, losses and payments which appear on his or her account, except for documentation required pursuant to the provisions of § 33-14-8 , but shall instead include with any such account a certification substantially in the form set forth in § 33-14-2.2 , signed by such executor or administrator and by said attorney. An executor or administrator who is not represented by an attorney or whose attorney declines to execute and submit such a certification shall, in addition to such certification, submit to the probate court for inspection copies of the front sides of all checks or other documents evidencing any such charges, losses and payments, unless specifically waived by the court.
  3. Provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall not prohibit the probate court, on its own motion, from ordering the executor or administrator to submit originals or copies of evidence of the charges, losses and payments which appear on the executor’s or administrator’s account, in any case where the court deems such documentation necessary to its review of such account.
  4. As used in this section and in the remainder to title 33, the term “attorney” shall mean an individual who is a member in good standing of the Rhode Island Bar Association.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 996; G.L. 1909, ch. 319, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 370, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 580, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-14-2 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 7; P.L. 2011, ch. 363, § 7.

Cross References.

Good faith delivery of property under court order, release, § 33-18-22 .

Perpetuation of evidence of payments, § 33-18-27 .

Recording of documents in court, § 33-18-21 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Affidavit Insufficient.

There is no statutory basis for the use by an executor or an administrator of an affidavit of completed administration. The probate law requires a periodic and detailed accounting of an estate’s transactions. Raymond v. Raymond, 109 R.I. 265 , 284 A.2d 64, 1971 R.I. LEXIS 1052 (1971).

Correctness of Inventory.

When executor’s account is presented, any interested party, including executor, may question correctness of inventory so that corrections can be made by amendment. Browning v. Liberty, 58 R.I. 507 , 193 A. 496, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1937).

Inventory Required.

Probate court should not have approved an account by executors which charged themselves with various items of the personal estate valued by themselves without any attempt at taking an inventory, since taking of an inventory is not a matter of form but an absolute requirement. Hayes v. Welling, 35 R.I. 76 , 85 A. 630, 1913 R.I. LEXIS 3 (1913).

Items Chargeable to Previous Conservatorship.

Executor could get inventory amended to show good faith payment of claims allowed to conservators for services, probate fees, and administrative expense of conservatorship, but not to show payment of other debts accrued during decedent’s life. Browning v. Liberty, 58 R.I. 507 , 193 A. 496, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1937).

Jurisdiction on Appeal.

The superior court had jurisdiction on appeal from the probate court to grant the executor permission to amend his inventory. Browning v. Liberty, 58 R.I. 507 , 193 A. 496, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1937).

Collateral References.

Accountability of domiciliary executor or administrator, to court of domicile, in respect of personal assets subject in another state to ancillary administration. 132 A.L.R. 1369.

Accountability of personal representative for his use of decedent’s real estate. 31 A.L.R.2d 243.

Advances to distributee before obtaining order of distribution, right of executor or administrator to credit on account of. 126 A.L.R. 780.

Agent or attorney employed by executor or administrator, charging latter with loss caused to estate by acts or default of. 28 A.L.R.3rd 1191.

Costs and other expenses incurred by administrator or executor whose appointment was improper as chargeable against estate. 4 A.L.R.2d 164.

Liability of estate for debts incurred by executor or administrator in completing performance of a contract made by decedent. 3 A.L.R. 1608.

Personal claim of executor or administrator against estate antedating death of decedent, right to credit. 144 A.L.R. 962.

Rents and profits from real estate in another state or country, duty of executor or administrator to account for at domicile of decedent. 99 A.L.R. 1135.

Tombstone or monument, credit for amount paid for. 121 A.L.R. 1115.

33-14-2.2. Form of certification.

The certification referred to in § 33-14-2 shall be in substantially the following form:

CERTIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING The undersigned, (name of attorney), attorney, and (name of fiduciary), fiduciary hereby certify that the within accounting was prepared based on information which each of the undersigned have personally examined, and further certify that, to the best of the knowledge and belief of each of the undersigned, the within is a true and accurate representation of the accounts of the estate for the period indicated. (Name of fiduciary) Fiduciary (Name of attorney) Attorney STATE OF RHODE ISLAND COUNTY OF Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of , 20. NOTARY PUBLIC My commission expires:

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History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 8.

33-14-3. Examination of executor or administrator on oath.

An executor or administrator may be examined on oath before the court upon any matter relative to his or her accounts.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 997; G.L. 1909, ch. 319, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 370, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 580, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 33-14-3 .

33-14-4. Citation to render account.

Every probate court on petition therefor, whenever it deems proper, may issue a citation to an executor or administrator, having accounts unsettled with the court, to render an account relative to the estate in his or her hands, at any time as it may order in the citation.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 998; G.L. 1909, ch. 319, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 370, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 580, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 33-14-4 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Procedure.

Complaint on administrator’s bond which alleged that administrator had failed to render an account was demurrable in the absence of an allegation that administrator was cited to render an account. Probate Court v. Carr, 20 R.I. 592 , 40 A. 844, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 140 (1898).

Collateral References.

Notice of proceedings to settle account, right to, of surety on bond of executor or administrator. 93 A.L.R. 1366.

33-14-5. Failure to account after citation.

If an executor or administrator, after being cited, shall neglect or refuse to render an account within thirty (30) days after the time named in the citation, or such further time as the court may allow, he or she shall be held accountable for the full value of the personal property of the deceased, the proceeds of the sale of real estate, and the rents received by him or her, with interest, and shall be entitled to no compensation for his or her services.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 999; G.L. 1909, ch. 319, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 370, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 580, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 33-14-5 .

Cross References.

Embezzlement and fraudulent conversion as larceny, § 11-41-3 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Failure to File Not Justified.

Failure to file an account within the time designated was not justified, where it was based solely on the ground that the administrator had been enjoined from disposing of partnership property, if inventory upon which account could be based was filed prior to injunction proceeding. West v. Municipal Court, 25 R.I. 84 , 54 A. 926, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1903).

33-14-6. Charges and disbursements allowed.

Executors and administrators shall be allowed in their accounts all reasonable and proper charges and disbursements made by them for the funeral of the deceased and in the execution of their trust.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1001; G.L. 1909, ch. 319, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 370, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 580, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 33-14-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Attorney’s Expenses.

The expense of an attorney whose services were for the benefit of the estate should be allowed as a credit in the administrator’s account. McAlear v. McAlear, 62 R.I. 158 , 4 A.2d 252, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1939).

Collateral References.

Advances or payments made from own funds to beneficiary, right of executor or administrator to reimburse himself for. 115 A.L.R. 874.

Attorney not employed by executor or administrator, allowance out of estate for services of, in connection with settlement of estate or accounting of personal representative. 79 A.L.R. 530; 142 A.L.R. 1465.

Attorneys, allowance of retaining fee paid by executor. 21 A.L.R. 1445.

Attorney’s fees or other expenses incurred in unsuccessful effort to claim property for the estate, right of personal representative to allowance for, out of the property involved. 126 A.L.R. 1349.

Broker’s commissions or other expenses incurred in sale of real property or collection of rent, right to allowance for. 91 A.L.R. 829; 155 A.L.R. 1314.

Estoppel of one doing business with personal representative purporting to carry on decedent’s business, to assert representative’s personal liability. 3 A.L.R.3d 757.

Liability of executor or administrator for negligence or default in defending action against estate. 14 A.L.R.3d 1036.

Personal liability of executor or administrator for fees of attorney employed by him for the benefit of the estate. 13 A.L.R.3d 518.

Revocation of letters of administration, allowance for expenses and disbursements by executor or administrator after. 31 A.L.R. 846.

Surcharging account, right of executor or administrator to allowance of attorney’s fees and expenses incident to controversy over. 101 A.L.R. 806.

Validity and effect of testamentary direction as to disposition of testator’s body. 7 A.L.R.3d 747.

33-14-7. Expense of prosecuting or defending appeal on admission to probate.

In case of an appeal from the order or decree of a probate court admitting or refusing to admit to probate the will of any deceased person, the court shall allow to the executor or administrator, as the case may be, his or her just and reasonable expenses, including counsel and attorney fees, in supporting or defending against the will, on appeal; and the expense shall be allowed in the account of the executor or administrator with the estate as part of the expenses of the settlement of the estate.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 865; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 51; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 51; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 49; G.L. 1956, § 33-14-7 .

Collateral References.

Attorney’s fees incurred in attempt to establish or defeat will, right to allowance out of estate for. 10 A.L.R. 783; 40 A.L.R.2d 1407.

Attorney’s fees or other expenses incurred in unsuccessful attempt to uphold particular provisions of will. 7 A.L.R. 1499.

Liability of executor or administrator for negligence or default in defending action against estate. 14 A.L.R.3d 1036.

Personal liability of executor or administrator for fees of attorney employed by him for the benefit of the estate. 13 A.L.R.3d 518.

33-14-8. Compensation of executors and administrators.

Executors and administrators shall, also, be allowed in their accounts such compensation for their services as the probate court shall consider just.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1002; G.L. 1909, ch. 319, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 370, § 8; P.L. 1930, ch. 1538, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 580, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 33-14-8 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

A court of probate may allow the administrator such fees as it may consider just. Williams v. Herrick, 18 R.I. 120 , 25 A. 1099, 1893 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1893).

Where there was a contest of the admission of a will to probate, a challenge to the alleged revocation of that will and a contest over the allowance of the first and final account, the allowance of $1,842 for the executor was fair and reasonable. Kogut v. Brenner, 113 R.I. 327 , 321 A.2d 103, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1182 (1974).

Collateral References.

Appraised value of estate as shown by inventory, or value at time of settlement, as basis for determining commissions of executor or administrator. 173 A.L.R. 1346.

Broker’s commission incurred in sale of real property, allowance of, as affecting commissions of personal representative. 91 A.L.R. 836; 155 A.L.R. 1314.

Commission on stock dividends, rights of executor, administrator, or trustee to. 55 A.L.R. 710.

Commissions, right to, as affected by failure to file, or improper filing of, inventory. 83 A.L.R. 732.

Computation of commissions of executors, administrators, or trustees, as affected by lien on or outstanding interest in property. 46 A.L.R. 239.

Death of executor or administrator as affecting right to compensation. 7 A.L.R. 1595.

Debt of personal representative himself to estate, right of commission in respect of. 88 A.L.R. 189.

Extra compensation for legal services rendered by executor or administrator. 65 A.L.R.2d 809.

Extra compensation for services other than attorney’s services, right to. 66 A.L.R. 512.

Fiduciary’s compensation on estate assets distributed in kind. 32 A.L.R.2d 778.

Interlocutory order of one judge concerning compensation as binding on another judge in same case. 132 A.L.R. 76.

Limiting effect of provision in contract, will, or trust instrument fixing trustee’s or executor’s fees. 19 A.L.R.3d 520.

Loss or depreciation of assets for which executor or administrator is not responsible as affecting the amount of his compensation. 110 A.L.R. 994.

Necessity that executor or administrator be represented by counsel in presenting matters in probate court. 19 A.L.R.3d 1104.

Preference of legacy to executor as compensation for his services as regards abatement of legacies. 34 A.L.R. 1277.

Resignation or removal of executor, administrator, guardian, or trustee, before final administration or before termination of trust, as affecting his compensation. 96 A.L.R.3d 1102.

Right to partial distribution of estate or distribution of particular assets, prior to final closing. 18 A.L.R.3d 1173.

Trustee and executor, rights of person, natural or corporate, named as, to double commission. 84 A.L.R. 667; 85 A.L.R.2d 537.

Will limiting amount of fees of executor. 19 A.L.R.3d 520.

Will, validity, construction, and effect of provisions of, to effect that legacy or devise to executor is made in consideration of, or contemplation of, services to be rendered after testator’s death, in carrying on testator’s business or in administering or caring for his estate. 116 A.L.R. 361.

33-14-9. Interest on unreasonable detention of money.

Executors and administrators may be charged in their accounts with interest, for the unreasonable detention of money, at a rate not more than twelve percent (12%) per annum.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1003; G.L. 1909, ch. 319, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 370, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 580, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 33-14-9 ; P.L. 1983, ch. 204, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Mistake of Law.

Administrator was chargeable with interest from decision of supreme court disallowing amount paid by administrator under mistake of law. Kenyon v. Kenyon, 31 R.I. 270 , 76 A. 798, 1910 R.I. LEXIS 78 (1910).

33-14-10. Application of small amounts due to persons under disability.

Whenever it shall appear in the final account of an executor or administrator that the estate of a minor or person non compos mentis in his or her hands does not exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000), the sum may be applied or disposed of in such manner as the probate court shall deem for the advantage of the minor or person non compos mentis.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1008; G.L. 1909, ch. 319, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 370, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 580, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 33-14-10 ; P.L. 1960, ch. 163, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 204, § 1.

33-14-11. Conclusiveness of settlement of accounts.

The settlement of the accounts of an executor or administrator by the probate court, or on appeal, shall be final and conclusive on all parties concerned; provided, that upon the settlement of an account, all former accounts of the same executor or administrator may be so far opened as to correct a mistake or error apparent in the settlement.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1004; G.L. 1909, ch. 319, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch 370, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 580, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 33-14-11 .

Cross References.

Estate and transfer taxes, payment as prerequisite for allowance of final account, § 44-23-36 .

Failure to pay estate and transfer taxes in another state, § 44-23-42 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Administrator’s Fee.

Allowance of administrator’s fee entirely out of the corpus of an estate, though there is income which possibly could or should bear a portion of such expense, is not manifest mistake that would warrant opening the account after it has been allowed and not appealed from. Williams v. Herrick, 18 R.I. 120 , 25 A. 1099, 1893 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1893).

Collateral References.

Appeal without bond by executor or administrator from order, decree or judgment affecting his account. 104 A.L.R. 1195.

Construction of will, decree on accounting as res judicata with respect to. 136 A.L.R. 1185.

Notice of proceedings to reopen settlement of account, right to, of surety on bond of executor or administrator. 93 A.L.R. 1366.

Self-dealing, failure of executor or administrator to disclose, as ground for vacating order or decree settling account. 132 A.L.R. 1522.

Settlement of account of executor or administrator as precluding attack upon transaction involving self-dealing. 1 A.L.R.2d 1060.

33-14-12. Accounting between executors and administrators.

Whenever two (2) or more persons shall have letters testamentary or letters of administration granted to them, and any one or more of them shall refuse or neglect to apply the property in his, her, or their hands to the settlement of the estate, or to the payment of the debts or funeral charges of the testator or intestate, or shall refuse to account with the other executor or administrator, the aggrieved executor or administrator may bring his or her action against the others for an accounting.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 839; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 25; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 25; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 23; G.L. 1956, § 33-14-12 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Counsel.

Co-executor of a decedent’s estate was permitted to engage her own counsel at her own expense because it was essential that the co-executor have the selection of an attorney who was to assist her in the performance of duties imposed on her by law; R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 33-14-12 , 33-18-2 , and 33-18-17 did not preclude the co-executor from retaining her own counsel. In re Estate of Dermanouelian, 51 A.3d 327, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 103 (2012).

33-14-13. Reopening of estates and administrations without court approval for assets totaling five thousand dollars ($5,000) or less.

  1. Subsequent to the filing of a final account of any estate or administration or an affidavit of completed administration pursuant to the provisions of § 33-14-1 , an estate or administration may be reopened by the executor or administrator without the consent of the probate court provided that the executor or administrator:
    1. Files an affidavit with the court listing every newly discovered asset discovered by the executor or administrator along with its fair market value;
    2. Provides notice to the persons who would take under the provisions of § 33-1-10 in the case of intestacy listing the asset(s) along with the fair market value;
    3. Provides notice, if applicable, to those persons who would take under the provisions of the will listing the asset(s) along with the fair market value; and
    4. Files a statement with the court and provides a copy to those persons described in subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) setting forth the proposed distribution of the asset(s) or the funds received as a result of the sale of the asset(s).
  2. If no objection is filed by said persons within thirty (30) days of the filing of the affidavit and statement, the executor or administrator may proceed to dispose of the asset(s) as indicated. If objection is filed, the probate court shall schedule a hearing on the objection within thirty (30) days of its receipt.
  3. Upon completion of the distribution of the asset(s) per the statement or per any order of the probate court, the executor or administrator shall file an affidavit stating the names and the addresses of the persons receiving the asset(s), the value or amount received, and attesting that the estate or administration has now been finalized.
  4. The procedure set forth in subsection (a) may only be used when the asset(s) subsequently discovered do not exceed the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000) in the aggregate.
  5. The executor or administrator shall be liable in his or her own wrong to all persons aggrieved by his or her actions taken in conformance with the provisions of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 348, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 385, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 348, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 385, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

Chapter 15 Limited Guardianship and Guardianship of Adults

33-15-1. Legislative intent.

The legislature finds that adjudicating a person totally incapacitated and in need of a guardian deprives that person of all his or her civil and legal rights and that this deprivation may be unnecessary. The legislature further finds that it is desirable to make available, the least restrictive form of guardianship to assist persons who are only partially incapable of caring for their needs. Recognizing that every individual has unique needs and differing abilities, the legislature declares that it is the purpose of this act to promote the public welfare by establishing a system that permits incapacitated persons to participate as fully as possible in all decisions affecting them; that assists such persons in meeting the essential requirements for their physical health and safety, in protecting their rights, in managing their financial resources, and developing or regaining their abilities to the maximum extent possible; and that accomplishes these objectives through providing, in each case, the form of assistance that least interferes with the legal capacity of a person to act in his or her own behalf. This chapter shall be liberally construed to accomplish this purpose.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 4.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 33-15-1 33-15-2 (P.L. 1926, ch. 853, §§ 1-2; G.L. 1938, ch. 427, §§ 1-2; G.L. 1956, §§ 33-15-1 33-15-2 ; P.L. 1958, ch. 103, § 1; P.L. 1965, ch. 216, § 1; P.L. 1979, ch. 348, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 204, § 2; P.L. 1984, ch. 48, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 83, § 1), concerning guardians and conservators, were repealed by P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 1, effective July 21, 1992.

Law Reviews.

Mark B. Heffner, From Idiots and Lunatics to Incapacitated Persons and Respondents: The Evolution of Guardianship Law in Rhode Island, 21 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 554 (2016).

33-15-1.1. Repealed.

Compiler’s Notes.

For repeal of former section, see note under same heading following § 33-15-1 .

33-15-2. Petition for appointment of a limited guardian or guardian.

Any person may file with the probate court clerk, in the city or town where the proposed ward resides or where an out of state proposed ward has property, a verified petition for the appointment of a guardian. The petition shall state the following information known to the petitioner:

  1. The name, age, and post office address of the proposed ward;
  2. That, based on a decision making assessment tool which reflects the proposed ward’s current level of decision making ability:
    1. The proposed ward needs a limited guardian to provide assistance with decision making in the areas of financial, health care, residential and/or relationship matters; or
    2. The proposed ward needs a full guardian to provide assistance with decision making in all areas;
  3. The guardianship powers being requested;
  4. The steps which have been taken to utilize less restrictive alternatives to guardianship; and,
  5. The qualifications of the individual proposed to serve as limited guardian or guardian.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 4; P.L. 2007, ch. 417, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

For repeal of former section, see note under same heading following § 33-15-1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Asylum Inmates.

Failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for a person who was an asylum inmate at the time of the appointment of a guardian was not jurisdictional and did not furnish a basis for certiorari. Bennett v. Randall, 28 R.I. 360 , 67 A. 525, 1907 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1907).

Collateral References.

Necessity and sufficiency of notice to alleged incompetent of application for appointment of guardian or committee. 23 A.L.R. 594.

Notice of proceeding for appointment of guardian, waiver of, by alleged incompetent. 152 A.L.R. 1247.

Notice to incompetent of application for appointment of successor to guardian, necessity and sufficiency of. 138 A.L.R. 1364.

33-15-3. Power of probate court to appoint limited guardians or guardians.

Pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, the probate court in each city or town shall have the power to appoint or approve limited guardians or guardians of individuals who shall reside or have a legal settlement within the city or town, and of individuals who reside outside this state and have an estate within the city or town.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1041; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-3 ; 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

Collateral References.

Priority and preference in appointing guardian of incompetent. 65 A.L.R.3d 991.

33-15-4. Limited guardianship.

    1. Absent a finding, based on a decision making assessment tool, that an individual is totally incapacitated, the court shall limit the scope of the powers and duties of a guardian to the terms best suited to allow the individual found partially incapacitated to participate as fully as possible in decisions affecting him or her. One such decision making assessment tool must be completed by the respondent’s primary care physician, if one exists and is available, otherwise by a physician who has examined and treated the respondent. The probate court may consider such additional decision making assessments tools signed and submitted by one or more non-physicians or consulting physicians. The court shall not appoint a guardian or limited guardian if the court finds that the needs of the proposed ward are being met or can be met by a less restrictive alternative or alternatives. The court shall authorize the guardian to make decisions for the individual in only those areas where the court finds, based on one or more decision making assessment tools, that the individual lacks the capacity to make decisions. The court must strike a delicate balance between providing the protection and support necessary to assist the individual and preserving, to the largest degree possible, the liberty, property and privacy interests of the individual. The certificate of appointment issued to the limited guardian shall clearly state that it is a limited guardianship. The court order shall clearly indicate the scope of the powers and duties of the limited guardian. The appointment of a limited guardian shall not constitute a finding of legal incompetence. An individual for whom a limited guardian is appointed shall retain all legal and civil rights except those which have been specifically suspended by the order.
    2. A decision-making assessment tool, in the form as shown in § 33-15-47 , must be filed with the petition in each case, provided, that the probate court may excuse the filing of a decision-making assessment tool only on a petition for temporary guardianship in extraordinary or emergency circumstances and upon the provision of other competent evidence.
    3. The individual’s primary care physician must complete the decision-making assessment tool, however, if the individual’s primary care physician is not available or if the individual does not have a primary care physician the decision-making assessment tool must be completed by a physician who has examined and treated the individual. Professionals, or other persons acquainted with the individual being assessed, may also complete additional decision-making assessment tools.
    4. Modification.  If, because of a change in the partially incapacitated individual’s level of decision making ability, the scope and duties of the limited guardianship order no longer meet the needs of the individual and/or fail to afford the individual as much autonomy as possible, modification of the limited guardianship order is required.
      1. Modification can be accomplished by agreement of: the partially incapacitated individual, his or her counsel, if any and the limited guardian. This agreement shall be submitted to the court and entered as an order.
      2. Where no agreement can be reached, among these parties any or all of the parties may request a hearing.
  1. However, provisions of this chapter shall not be construed to mean a person is in need of a guardian or limited guardian solely because he or she is being furnished or relies upon treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in accordance with the tenets and practices of a church or religious denomination recognized by the laws of this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 4; P.L. 1994, ch. 359, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 9; P.L. 2004, ch. 573, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 417, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former §§ 33-15-4 33-15-9 (C.P.A. 1905, § 772, §§ 10-2-1047; P.L. 1906, ch. 1338, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, §§ 4-9; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, §§ 2-9; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, §§ 2-8; G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 11; G.L. 1956, §§ 33-15-4 33-15-9 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 156, § 1; P.L. 1986, ch. 176, § 1), concerning the appointment of guardians, was repealed by P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 1, effective July 21, 1992.

Cross References.

Trust company as fiduciary, § 19-5-6 .

Law Reviews.

Mark B. Heffner, From Idiots and Lunatics to Incapacitated Persons and Respondents: The Evolution of Guardianship Law in Rhode Island, 21 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 554 (2016).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appeal Dismissed.

Superior court properly dismissed the probate appeal of the 93-year-old ward as the ward was under a full guardianship and thus lacked the capacity to retain independent counsel to pursue the probate appeal on his own behalf. Although the petition filed by the ward’s children was titled “petition for limited guardianship”, the certificate of appointment did not comply with this section because it did not clearly state that the guardian was appointed as limited guardian and it qualified the guardian as guardian of both the person and estate of the ward. Further, the December 15, 2015 order was defective because it did not clearly indicate the scope of the powers and duties of the limited guardian, and the December 18, 2015 order superseded the December 15, 2015 order. In re Estate of Chelo, 209 A.3d 1181, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 91 (2019).

Appeal of Appointment.

A guardian whose appointment was appealed continued to hold office until the final disposition of the appeal. In re Estate of Taylor, 114 R.I. 562 , 337 A.2d 236, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1453 (1975).

Upon appeal of the appointment of a guardian by the probate court, the superior court is required to conduct a de novo hearing. In re Estate of Taylor, 114 R.I. 562 , 337 A.2d 236, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1453 (1975).

Death of Ward.

Death of the ward terminates the appointment of guardianship except for an accounting and the delivery of property to the person responsible for the deceased’s estate. In re Estate of Taylor, 114 R.I. 562 , 337 A.2d 236, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1453 (1975).

Discontinuance of Petition.

Petitioner for appointment of a guardian of his person and estate could discontinue his petition before entry of decree thereon after previously entered decree had been quashed and case remitted with direction to reopen. Pratt v. Probate Court, 23 R.I. 99 , 49 A. 500, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 101 (1901).

Expenses of Petition.

Ward’s estate could not be charged with legal and medical fees incident to prosecution of petitions for appointment of a guardian where petitions were denied and discharged. Gemma v. Vervena, 68 R.I. 342 , 27 A.2d 842, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 79 (1942).

Grounds for Guardianship.

Deed executed by person under guardianship was valid, notwithstanding appointment of guardianship by probate court, where appointment was on a ground not specified by statute and therefore invalid since the grounds specified are jurisdictional. Providence County Sav. Bank v. Hughes, 26 R.I. 73 , 58 A. 254, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1904).

— Want of Discretion.

A married woman can be placed under guardianship for want of discretion in managing her estate. Tillinghast v. Holbrook, 7 R.I. 230 , 1862 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1862).

Appointment of a guardian of the person and estate was not warranted where probate court found the ward lacking in discretion but did not find him likely to bring himself to want or render himself chargeable, even though he himself petitioned for a guardian. Pratt v. Court of Probate, 22 R.I. 596 , 48 A. 943, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1901).

Notice of Petition.

Notice by publication is valid and does not deprive a person of liberty and property without due process of law although personal notice to the intended ward would be more in harmony with usual judicial procedure. Angell v. Angell, 14 R.I. 541 , 1884 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1884).

Overseer of Poor as Party.

In suit by overseer of the poor for the appointment of a guardian, it must appear that defendant’s want of discretion is likely to make her a public charge. Hopkins v. Howard, 20 R.I. 394 , 39 A. 519, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 65 (1898).

Parties to Appeal.

Petitioner who was owner of an annuity charged against the real estate of the intended ward was not entitled to appeal from a decree dismissing the petition as an aggrieved person, even though entitled to petition as a friend or relative. McKenna v. McKenna, 29 R.I. 224 , 69 A. 844, 1908 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1908).

Collateral References.

Mental condition which will justify the appointment of a guardian, committee or conservator of the estate for an incompetent or spendthrift. 9 A.L.R.3d 774.

Power of incompetent spouse’s guardian or representative to sue for granting or vacation of divorce or annulment of marriage, or to make compromise or settlement in such suit. 32 A.L.R.5th 673.

Priority and preference in appointment of conservator or guardian for an incompetent. 65 A.L.R.3d 991.

33-15-4.1. Good Samaritan guardians.

  1. Any person who files a petition for a guardianship of the person pursuant to the provisions of this chapter may also file to be qualified as a good Samaritan guardian. A good Samaritan guardian may be appointed by the probate court in those instances where the court determines that the estate of a proposed ward is insufficient to pay for the services of a guardian and that such an appointment would otherwise be in the best interests of the individual for whom the guardianship is proposed.
  2. A person filing for appointment of a good Samaritan guardianship shall file all the forms required by this chapter to initiate a guardianship petition and shall file an additional form setting forth the qualifications of the proposed guardian to serve as a good Samaritan guardian. Such forms shall include, but not be limited to, the following information:
    1. The experience, if applicable, of the proposed guardian;
    2. The willingness of the proposed guardian to serve as said good Samaritan guardian; and
    3. A statement that if appointed as a good Samaritan guardian, such person shall not seek any fees and/or monetary compensation for their services as a good Samaritan; provided, that this shall not be construed to prohibit the good Samaritan guardian from soliciting and/or utilizing charitable donations for and on behalf of the individual under guardianship.
  3. The appointment of a good Samaritan guardian shall be in the discretion of the probate court.
  4. Except as otherwise provided for herein, hearings on and notice of the application for and appointment of a good Samaritan guardianship shall proceed in the same manner as any other petition for guardianship pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 494, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 299, § 3; P.L. 2008, ch. 419, § 3.

33-15-4.2. Waiver of filing fees for good Samaritan guardianships.

The probate court may on exporting application, issue orders providing the payment of a filing fee in cases of a good Samaritan guardianship, prior to the filing of the petition. The probate court shall provide forms for such application for waiver of fee.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 494, § 1.

33-15-4.3. No cash surety required.

Notwithstanding the provisions of R.I.G.L. § 33-17-1.3 , surety shall not be required on any bond of a good Samaritan guardian unless the probate court determines that the circumstances so warrant surety.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 494, § 1.

33-15-4.4. Immunity of good Samaritan guardians.

No person acting as a duly appointed good Samaritan guardian pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, will in the performance of their duty and responsibility as such a good Samaritan guardian, shall be liable for civil damage which result from acts or omissions by such persons so acting, which may constitute ordinary negligence. This immunity shall not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross negligence or willful or wanton conduct.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 494, § 1.

33-15-4.5. Continuing duties of good Samaritan guardians.

Except as otherwise provided for in § 33-15-4.1 33-15-4.4 , a good Samaritan guardian shall be subject to all other duties and responsibilities required of a guardian under this title, including but not limited to the provisions pertaining the accountings; provided, that the probate court may waive any and all filing requirements and court fees associated with the guardianship, if in its discretion such waiver is warranted. The probate court may modify, amend and/or revoke the good Samaritan guardianship upon the discovery or addition of assets to the individual’s estate and/or which otherwise make it inequitable for the guardian to continue to serve as a good Samaritan guardian.

History of Section. P.L. 1999, ch. 494, § 1.

33-15-5. Hearing.

No limited guardian or guardian shall be appointed until after a hearing on the petition. The hearing shall be before a judge of the probate court of the city or town where the petition was filed.

  1. The respondent shall have the right to be present at the hearing and all other stages of the proceedings.
  2. The respondent shall be allowed to:
    1. Compel the attendance of witnesses;
    2. Present evidence; and
    3. Confront and cross examine witnesses.
  3. The standard of proof shall be clear and convincing evidence.
  4. The Rhode Island rules of evidence shall apply.
  5. Any professional whose training and experience aid in the assessment of decision making ability and who has so assessed the respondent may be permitted to provide expert testimony regarding the decision making assessment of the respondent.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 4; P.L. 2007, ch. 417, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

See note under same heading following § 33-15-4 .

33-15-6. Who may be appointed limited guardian or guardian.

  1. The court shall not appoint as limited guardian or guardian any agency, public or private, or representative thereof, which financially benefits from providing housing, medical, or social services to the individual found to be incapacitated.
  2. Before appointing an individual or agency as limited guardian or guardian, the court shall find that the individual or agency:
    1. Has no criminal background which bears on suitability to serve as guardian;
    2. Has the capacity to manage the financial resources involved;
    3. Has the ability to meet the unique needs of the individual case; and
    4. Has the ability to meet the requirements of the law.
  3. Individuals or agencies eligible for consideration as limited guardian or guardian include, but are not limited to, the following:
    1. Relatives or friends of the individual found to be incapacitated;
    2. Banks, trust companies and other financial institutions;
    3. Nonprofit corporations organized for charitable or religious purposes (including those organized specifically to act as limited guardian or guardian) and existing under the laws of this state.
  4. The court may appoint an out of state resident as limited guardian or guardian if the court finds that the individual meets the requirements of this section.
  5. In appointing a guardian, the court shall consider the wishes expressed by the individual found to be incapacitated as to preferences among individuals eligible to serve as limited guardian or guardian who meet the requirements of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 4.

Compiler’s Notes.

See note under same heading following § 33-15-4 .

33-15-6.1. National criminal background checks for persons appointed limited guardian or guardian.

  1. In order to assist and protect Rhode Island’s at-risk elderly and others over whom a limited guardian or guardian would be required, all persons applying for appointment as a limited guardian or guardian shall apply to the Rhode Island attorney general, the Rhode Island state police, or to the appropriate local police department for a nationwide criminal records check, utilizing a standard form to be provided by the probate court. The applicant whose criminal records check is being conducted shall be responsible for the payment of the costs of the criminal records check. The check will conform to the applicable federal standards, including the taking of fingerprints of the applicant.
  2. An individual may be appointed as a temporary limited guardian or temporary guardian for a period not to exceed ten (10) days, pending completion of the national criminal background check required by this section.
  3. For the purposes of this section, information produced by a national criminal records check pertaining to conviction for the following crimes may be considered as “disqualifying information”: murder; voluntary manslaughter; involuntary manslaughter; first-degree sexual assault; second-degree sexual assault; third-degree sexual assault; assault on persons sixty (60) years of age or older; assault with intent to commit specified felonies (murder, robbery, rape, burglary, or the abominable and detestable crime against nature); felony assault; patient abuse; neglect or mistreatment of patients; burglary; first-degree arson; robbery; felony drug offenses; felony larceny or felony banking law violations; felony obtaining money under false pretenses; felony embezzlement; abuse, neglect, and/or exploitation of adults with severe impairments; exploitation of elders; or a crime under section 1128(a) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)).
  4. For the purposes of this section, “conviction” means, in addition to judgments of conviction entered by a court subsequent to a finding of guilty or a plea of guilty, those instances where the defendant has entered a plea of nolo contendere and has received a sentence of probation and those instances where a defendant has entered into a deferred sentence agreement.
  5. If any disqualifying information is discovered with respect to the applicant, the bureau of criminal identification of the attorney general, state police, or the local police department will inform the probate court, in writing, without disclosing the nature of the disqualifying information, that an item of disqualifying nature has been discovered. In addition, the bureau of criminal identification of the attorney general, state police, or the local police department will inform the applicant, in writing, of the nature of the disqualifying information. An applicant against whom disqualifying information has been found may request that a copy of the criminal background report be sent to the probate court which shall make the determination of suitability of the applicant.
  6. At the conclusion of any background check required by this chapter, the bureau of criminal identification of the attorney general, state police, or the local police department will promptly destroy the fingerprint card of the applicant.
  7. In those situations in which no disqualifying information has been found, the bureau of criminal identification of the attorney general, state police, or the local police department shall inform both the applicant and the probate court of this fact.
  8. The probate court shall maintain a record subject to review by the department of attorney general of the evidence that criminal background checks have been initiated and completed and the results thereof, in compliance with the provisions of this section for all persons seeking appointment as a guardian or limited guardian after January 1, 2020.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 273, § 1; P.L. 2019, ch. 282, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2019, ch. 273, § 1, and P.L. 2019, ch. 282, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

33-15-7. Guardians ad litem — Duties — Legally incapacitated respondent’s right to counsel — Termination of appointment of guardian ad litem.

  1. Upon filing with the probate court clerk of a petition for the appointment of a guardian, a guardian ad litem shall be appointed for each respondent only in the proceeding for guardianship of an adult.
  2. The guardian ad litem need not be an attorney but shall have sufficient experience and/or training in dealing with elderly persons and persons with incapacities and/or disabilities and understanding of his or her role as guardian ad litem to be able to properly discharge such duties under subsection (c) below. Each probate court shall maintain a list of persons deemed qualified to serve as a guardian ad litem and shall appoint from that list on a rotating basis. Any guardian ad litem appointed for a respondent shall be ineligible to serve as legal counsel, temporary guardian, or permanent guardian for that respondent.
  3. The duties of a guardian ad litem shall include all of the following:
    1. Personally visiting the respondent;
    2. Explaining to the respondent the nature, purpose, and legal effect of the appointment of a guardian;
    3. Explaining to the respondent the hearing procedure, including, but not limited to, the right to contest the petition, to request limits on the guardian’s powers, to object to a particular person being appointed guardian, to be present at the hearing, and to be represented by legal counsel;
    4. Informing the respondent of the name of the person known to be seeking appointment as guardian;
    5. Reviewing the decision making assessment tool(s), petition for guardianship/limited guardianship, and the notice;
    6. Interviewing the prospective guardian by telephone or in person; and
    7. Making determinations, and informing the court of those determinations, on all of the following:
      1. Whether the respondent wishes to be present at the hearing;
      2. Whether the respondent wishes to contest the petition;
      3. Whether the respondent wishes limits placed on the guardian’s powers;
      4. Whether the respondent objects to a particular person being appointed guardian; and
      5. Whether the respondent wishes to be represented by legal counsel. Unless waived by the court, at least three (3) days prior to the hearing, the guardian ad litem shall file a report substantially in the form as set forth in § 33-15-47 with the court and shall mail or hand deliver a copy to each attorney of record.
  4. If the respondent wishes to contest the petition, to have limits placed on the guardian’s powers, or to object to a particular person being appointed guardian, and, if legal counsel has not been secured, the court shall appoint legal counsel.
  5. If the respondent requests legal counsel, or if the guardian ad litem determines it is in the best interest of the respondent to have legal counsel, and if legal counsel has not been secured, the court shall appoint legal counsel.
  6. If the respondent has legal counsel independently or appointed pursuant to subsection (d) or (e), the appointment of a guardian ad litem shall terminate except insofar as informing the court of the respondent’s wishes and objections determined pursuant to subsection (c).
  7. The guardian ad litem shall not interfere with interested parties and their counsel in gathering and presenting evidence according to court orders and rules of discovery and evidence. The guardian ad litem may be called and confronted as a witness regarding his or her conclusions as submitted by report and the extent of his or her personal knowledge concerning the respondent.
  8. Court awarded guardian ad litem fees shall not exceed eight hundred dollars ($800), which shall be paid by the petitioner for guardianship if a permanent guardian is not appointed for the respondent or by the guardian of the ward’s estate if a permanent guardian is appointed. The court has discretion to award guardian ad litem fees in excess of the cap if the circumstances warrant.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 4; P.L. 1994, ch. 359, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 9; P.L. 2007, ch. 417, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 299, § 3; P.L. 2017, ch. 286, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 294, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

See note under same heading following § 33-15-4 .

P.L. 2017, ch. 286, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 294, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Law Reviews.

Mark B. Heffner, From Idiots and Lunatics to Incapacitated Persons and Respondents: The Evolution of Guardianship Law in Rhode Island, 21 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 554 (2016).

33-15-8. Authority of limited guardian or guardian.

A limited guardian shall have only the authority as set forth by the limited guardianship order.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 4.

Compiler’s Notes.

See note under same heading following § 33-15-4 .

33-15-8.1. Temporary guardianship for specific purpose.

If it is established in a proper proceeding that a basis exists for the appointment of a limited guardian or guardian as described in § 35-15-5 , the court may appoint a temporary limited guardian for the specific purpose of authorizing, directing, or ratifying any transaction necessary or desirable for admission to a nursing facility, including, but not limited to, enrolling the protected person in the medicaid or general public assistance programs, in those instances where the nursing facility requires a limited guardian and the admission is in the best interest of the protected person. Prior to appointing a temporary limited guardian pursuant to this section, the court shall first make the following findings of fact:

  1. That there exists a need for a limited guardian;
  2. That no person is available to serve as full time guardian;
  3. That no financial resources are available for the protected person’s use and care; and
  4. That it is necessary for proper care and treatment, that the protected person be moved to a nursing facility. The court may accept the resignation of the temporary limited guardian after the protected person has been admitted to the nursing facility and has been enrolled in the medicaid or general public assistance programs, if applicable.

History of Section. P.L. 1990, ch. 282, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 362, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

33-15-9. Repealed.

Compiler’s Notes.

See note under same heading following § 33-15-4 .

33-15-10. Appointment of temporary limited guardian or guardian.

The probate court for cause shown after notice, pending any application for the appointment of a limited guardian or guardian, or pending any appeal from a decree appointing a limited guardian or guardian, may, if it shall deem proper, appoint a temporary limited guardian or temporary guardian of the person and estate, or of the person or estate of the respondent.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1048; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 8; P.L. 1952, ch. 2946, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-10 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Appointment of temporary guardian did not give a right to file claims against ward’s estate, because where temporary guardian was discharged without appointment of permanent guardian there was no estate. Gemma v. Vervena, 68 R.I. 342 , 27 A.2d 842, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 79 (1942).

Ward’s estate could not be charged with legal and medical fees incident to prosecution of petition for temporary guardian where petition was discharged. Gemma v. Vervena, 68 R.I. 342 , 27 A.2d 842, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 79 (1942).

Probate court has no statutory authority to pay claims for the service of a doctor rendered at the request of a temporary guardian, even though the services were beneficial to the person under guardianship. The guardian, however, may be bound personally. Miller v. Vervena, 69 R.I. 285 , 33 A.2d 178, 1943 R.I. LEXIS 53 (1943).

Jurisdiction of Family Court.

Family court had no jurisdiction to award custody of orphans after the probate court had appointed a temporary guardian. In re Kimberly, 583 A.2d 877, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 173 (1990).

Nature of Appointment.

Custody, an inherent aspect of permanent guardianship, is similarly inherent in an appointment of temporary guardianship, the only difference being that temporary guardianship is subject to a final determination. In re Kimberly, 583 A.2d 877, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 173 (1990).

33-15-11. Tenure of temporary limited guardian or guardian.

A temporary limited guardian or guardian shall serve until the question of appointment of a guardian is decided, or until he or she shall be discharged by the probate court. There shall be no appeal from the appointment of a temporary limited guardian or guardian.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1049; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-11 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Authority of Probate Court.

Probate court has authority to vacate an appointment of a temporary guardian by virtue of its inherent power even though power of probate court to modify and revoke is normally restricted to appealable orders and decrees. Estes v. Probate Court, 36 R.I. 57 , 88 A. 977, 1913 R.I. LEXIS 71 (1913).

33-15-12. Powers of temporary limited guardian or guardian — Bond.

Each limited guardian or guardian, appointed as provided in § 33-15-10 , shall have the authority granted by the temporary limited guardianship or guardianship order until he or she shall be legally discharged; and he or she shall give bond to the probate court in like manner, and with like conditions, as is required of limited guardians or guardians.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1050; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 10; P.L. 1952, ch. 2946, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-12 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jurisdiction of Family Court.

Family court had no jurisdiction to award custody of orphans after the probate court had appointed a temporary guardian. In re Kimberly, 583 A.2d 877, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 173 (1990).

Nature of Appointment.

Custody, an inherent aspect of permanent guardianship, is similarly inherent in an appointment of temporary guardianship, the only difference being that temporary guardianship is subject to a final determination. In re Kimberly, 583 A.2d 877, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 173 (1990).

Reimbursement of Support Expenses.

It is the duty of a temporary guardian to provide for care according to the means and station in life of the ward and he will be allowed in settlement of his account such reasonable sums as he has paid for such support. Tonge v. Salisbury, 54 R.I. 170 , 171 A. 372, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1934).

Appointment of temporary guardian did not give a right to file claims against ward’s estate, because where temporary guardian was discharged without appointment of permanent guardian, there was no estate. Gemma v. Vervena, 68 R.I. 342 , 27 A.2d 842, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 79 (1942).

33-15-13. Recording of petition in land records — Disability to contract.

Where the petition for appointment of a limited guardian or guardian alleges that the respondent lacks decision making ability regarding his or her real property, the petitioner shall cause a copy of the petition, with the order of notice thereon, to be recorded in the records of land evidence for the city or town in which any real property of the respondent is located. If a limited guardian or guardian is appointed with authority to administer the real property of the respondent, all contracts relative to, and sales and conveyances of, real property, made by the respondent after the record, and all other contracts, except for necessaries, and all gifts, sales, or transfers of personal property, made by the respondent after the first publication of notice of the petition and before the termination of the limited guardianship or guardianship, shall be void.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1051; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-13 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3; P.L. 2001, ch. 223, § 1.

Cross References.

Bond, § 33-17-1 et seq.

Publication of notice of qualification, § 33-18-1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Contracts of Ward.

Ward cannot recover on basis of express contract for personal services, since such contract is void, but can recover on the basis of a quantum meruit. Ralph v. Taylor, 33 R.I. 503 , 82 A. 279, 1912 R.I. LEXIS 108 (1912).

Marriage.

Out of state marriage contracted by ward not of unsound mind would be recognized if valid in state where contracted, even though the consent of the guardian was not given as required by Rhode Island law. Ex parte Chace, 26 R.I. 351 , 58 A. 978, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 80 (1904).

Real Estate Transfer.

A guardian, whose appointment under § 33-15-8 was appealed, continued to hold office until final disposition of the appeal. Thus, a real estate conveyance by the ward during the appeal was void. In re Estate of Taylor, 114 R.I. 562 , 337 A.2d 236, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1453 (1975).

Wills.

The will of a person under guardianship is not voided by this section, since a devise is not within the meaning of the word “conveyance.” Moreover, a person may lack discretion in the management of his affairs and yet have the required mental capacity to make a will. Jenckes v. Court of Probate, 2 R.I. 255 , 1852 R.I. LEXIS 31 (1852).

33-15-14. Expense of prosecuting or defending against petition.

If a limited guardian or guardian is appointed for any individual under this chapter, the court shall make an allowance to be paid by the limited guardian or guardian, for all reasonable expenses incurred in prosecuting or defending against the petition.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1052; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-14 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Resignation of Guardian.

Attorneys’ fees in connection with petitions for leave to the guardian to resign and for release of the guardianship were not allowable under this section, but fees in connection with the appointment of a successor guardian were allowable. In re Rathbun's Estate, 44 R.I. 101 , 115 A. 705, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1922).

Ward’s estate could not be charged with legal and medical fees incident to prosecution of petitions for guardian that were denied and discharged. Gemma v. Vervena, 68 R.I. 342 , 27 A.2d 842, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 79 (1942).

33-15-15. Exemption of welfare agencies from costs and bond.

In any petition for the appointment of a limited guardian or guardian filed by the director of public welfare of any city or town or the directors of social and rehabilitative services and behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals or their designated agent, in which the director or agent certifies that the petition is filed for the purpose of enabling the respondent, who is without funds, to receive assistance from funds which are financed in whole or in part by federal grants, the director or his or her agent, as petitioner, shall not be required to pay court fees or to give surety on his or her bond.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 426, § 43, as enacted by P.L. 1956, ch. 3757, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-15 ; Reorg. Plan No. 1, 1970; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

33-15-16. Guardian of estate of nonresident.

The probate court of any city or town may appoint or approve a limited guardian or guardian of the estate of an individual who resides outside this state and who has an estate in the city or town and has no limited guardian or guardian in this state and who, if a resident, would meet the standards for limited guardianship or guardianship under the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1055; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-16 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

Collateral References.

Necessity and sufficiency of notice to alleged incompetent of application for appointment of guardian or committee. 23 A.L.R. 594.

Notice of proceeding for appointment of guardian, waiver of, by alleged incompetent. 152 A.L.R. 1247.

Notice to incompetent of application for appointment of successor to guardian, necessity and sufficiency of. 138 A.L.R. 1364.

Validity of appointment of guardian or curator for infant without service of process upon, or notice to, latter. 1 A.L.R. 919.

33-15-17. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1056; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-17 ; Repealed by P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 1, effective July 21, 1992.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-15-17 concerned nonresidents as guardians of minors.

33-15-17.1. Notice.

  1. Except for the appointment of a temporary guardian, no petition for limited guardian or guardian shall be heard and no person shall be appointed limited guardian or guardian of an individual unless notice of the petition for appointment of a limited guardian or guardian and a copy of the petition itself shall be served upon the respondent in person at least fourteen (14) days prior to any hearing on the petition. If the hearing date is continued by the probate court for any reason after service on the respondent and no objection to the petition is filed by or on behalf of the respondent, no further service on the respondent shall be required. The probate court, in its discretion, may require further notice to the respondent in such manner as prescribed by the court.

    In the case of a petition for the appointment of a temporary guardian, such fourteen (14) day notice period shall be reduced to five (5) days, unless a shorter period is ordered by the court.

  2. This notice shall be in plain language, large type and shall include the time and place of the hearing, the possible loss of liberty if the petition is granted, and shall inform the respondent of his or her rights including: the court appointment of a guardian ad litem, the right to a hearing and to be present at the hearing to confront witnesses, present evidence, contest the petition, object to the appointment of a particular individual as guardian, request that limits be placed on the guardian’s powers, and the right to counsel. Notice shall be served upon the respondent by a process server duly authorized and licensed under Rhode Island law, except for “Good Samaritan” guardianships under § 33-15-4.1 in which case notice may be served upon the respondent by the guardian ad litem appointed by the court (hereinafter referred to as “court officer”).
  3. The court officer that serves this notice shall be dressed in plain clothes. He or she shall have experience dealing with individuals who may lack decision making ability.
  4. The court officer shall present the written notice and shall also read the notice to the respondent.
  5. Except for a petition for the appointment of a temporary guardian, notice shall be given by the petitioner, or his or her attorney, at least ten (10) days before the date set for hearing on the petition by regular mail, postage prepaid, addressed to (1) the respondent’s spouse and heirs at law (under the rules of descent) as set forth in § 33-1-1 only at their last known addresses; and (2) the administrator of any care and treatment facility where the respondent resides or receives primary services; and (3) any individual or entity known or reasonably known to the petitioner to be regularly providing protective services to the respondent. In the case of a petition for the appointment of a temporary guardian, such ten (10) day notice period is reduced to five (5) days, unless a shorter period is ordered by the court, with the petitioner required to use reasonable efforts in identifying and noticing those individuals described in the immediately preceding sentence within the limitations of investigation of identity of addresses of such individuals inherent in a temporary guardianship proceeding. The petitioner or his or her attorney, shall at or prior to the hearing file or leave to be filed an affidavit that notice was given setting forth the names and post office addresses of the persons to whom the notice was sent and the date of mailing, together with a copy of the notice.
  6. Should the petitioner have no knowledge of the existence or whereabouts of any of the persons required to be notified pursuant to subparagraph (e) above, an affidavit to that effect filed with the court shall satisfy this notice requirement.
  7. Notwithstanding any notice requirement of the petitioner, and except for a petition for appointment of a temporary guardian the court shall give notice of the petition by advertisement.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 283, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 206, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 89, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3; P.L. 1994, ch. 359, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 9; P.L. 2008, ch. 299, § 3; P.L. 2008, ch. 419, § 3.

Law Reviews.

Mark B. Heffner, From Idiots and Lunatics to Incapacitated Persons and Respondents: The Evolution of Guardianship Law in Rhode Island, 21 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 554 (2016).

33-15-18. Removal of limited guardian or guardian or conservator — Resignation.

  1. Removal may be requested by the ward or anyone acting on behalf of the ward, including the limited guardian, guardian or conservator. The ward may retain counsel for this purpose.
    1. The court shall remove any limited guardians, guardian or conservator appointed or approved by it upon finding that the limited guardian, guardian or conservator has not fulfilled, or is no longer able to fulfill, the duties of the appointment as set forth by the order itself and/or the limited guardianship and guardianship law.
    2. The court shall remove any limited guardian or guardian or conservator upon finding that the ward, based on a decision making assessment tool, has the capacity to make decisions regarding his or her health care, finances, residence, and/or relationships.
  2. A limited guardian or guardian or conservator may resign. The court shall accept the resignation of any limited guardian or guardian or conservator after he or she has accounted with the court for the estate of his or her ward in his or her possession and filed a report regarding the status of the ward including the ward’s current residence and condition.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1057; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-18 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3; P.L. 2007, ch. 417, § 1.

Cross References.

Embezzlement and fraudulent conversion as larceny, § 11-41-3 .

Removal of guardian by probate court, § 33-18-2 .

Replacement of guardian, § 33-18-5 et seq.

Resignation of guardian, § 33-18-4 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Breach of Duty.

Evidence of the neglect and misconduct of a guardian in the supervision of his ward and management of the estate subsequent to appointment does not show that he was not suitable at the time of appointment and therefore is inadmissible on appeal from appointment. The appropriate remedy is an action for removal for breach of duty under this section. Roullard v. McSoley, 54 R.I. 232 , 172 A. 326, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1934).

Termination of Guardianship.

Trial court properly held a decedent’s will was valid because (1) a restriction imposed in a guardianship proceeding barring the decedent from engaging in estate planning was removed when a probate court dismissed the temporary limited guardianship upon finding the decedent capable of managing the decedent’s affairs, not when the decedent’s guardian was discharged upon filing a required accounting, and (2) the will was executed after the guardianship proceeding was dismissed. Duffy v. Scire, 222 A.3d 59, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 142 (2019).

Will-Appointed Guardian.

A guardian appointed by will may be removed by the probate court for the causes set forth in this section. McPhillips v. McPhillips, 9 R.I. 536 , 1870 R.I. LEXIS 20 (1870).

Collateral References.

Consideration and weight of religious affiliations in removal of guardian for minor child. 22 A.L.R.2d 696.

Improper handling of funds, investments, or assets as ground for removal of guardian. 128 A.L.R. 535.

Resignation or removal of guardian as affecting his compensation. 96 A.L.R.3d 1102.

33-15-18.1. Rights of persons subject to limited guardianship, guardianship and conservatorship.

  1. Unless specifically authorized by court order, a limited guardian, guardian, or conservator shall not restrict a ward’s right of communication, visitation, or interaction with other persons, including the right to receive visitors, telephone calls, or personal mail. If a ward is unable to express consent to communication, visitation, or interaction with a person due to a physical or mental condition, then consent of the ward may be presumed based on the ward’s prior relationship history with the person.
  2. A limited guardian, guardian, or conservator may, for good cause shown, move the court to have restrictions placed on a person’s ability to communicate, visit, or interact with a ward in accordance with subsection (c) of this section. Good cause means and includes:
    1. Whether any protective orders have been issued to protect the ward from the person seeking access to the ward;
    2. Whether abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation of the ward by the person seeking access to the ward has occurred or is likely to occur;
    3. Documented wishes of the ward to reject communication, visitation, or interaction with specific persons; or
    4. Any other factors deemed relevant by the court.
    1. A court may order restrictions placed on the communications, visitations, or interactions a person may have with a ward upon a showing of good cause by the limited guardian, guardian, or conservator.
    2. In determining whether to issue an order in accordance with subsection (c)(1) of this section, the following factors shall be considered by the court:
      1. Whether any protective orders have been issued to protect the ward from the person seeking access to the ward;
      2. Whether the person has been charged with abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation of the ward;
      3. Whether the ward expresses a desire to communicate, visit, or interact with the person;
      4. If the ward is unable to communicate, whether a properly executed living will, durable power of attorney, or advance directive contains a preference by the ward with regard to the person’s communication, visitation, or interaction with the ward; and
      5. Any other factors deemed relevant by the court.
    3. Prior to issuing an order pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, the court shall consider the following restrictions in the order listed:
      1. Placing reasonable time, manner, or place restrictions on communication, visitation, or interaction between the ward and another person based on the history between the ward and the person or the ward’s wishes, or both;
      2. Requiring that communication, visitation, or interaction between the ward and another person be supervised; or
      3. Denying communication, visitation, or interaction between the ward and another person, provided, that, unless the court finds that the person poses a threat to the ward, supervised communication, visitation, or interaction under subsection (c)(3)(ii) of this section shall be ordered prior to the denial of any communication, visitation, or interaction.
    1. If any interested person, including the ward, reasonably believes that subsection (a) of this section or an order issued pursuant to subsection (c)(1) of this section has been violated, then such person may move the court to:
      1. Require the limited guardian, guardian, or conservator to grant a person access to the ward;
      2. Restrict, or further restrict, a person’s access to the ward;
      3. Modify the limited guardian, guardian, or conservator’s duties; or
      4. Discharge and replace the limited guardian, guardian, or conservator pursuant to § 33-15-18 .
    2. Notwithstanding actions available to the court pursuant to subsection (d)(1) of this section, a limited guardian, guardian, or conservator who is found to be knowingly isolating a ward and who has violated subsection (a) of this section or an order issued pursuant to subsection (c) of this section shall be subject to discharge and replacement pursuant to § 33-15-18 .
    1. Except as provided in subsection (e)(2) of this section, the court shall schedule a hearing on a motion filed pursuant to subsection (b) or (d) of this section no later than thirty (30) days after the date the motion is filed. The court may, in its discretion, order mediation to be conducted between the parties and the ward prior to the hearing. If mediation results in agreement of the parties and the ward with regard to communication, visitation, or interaction with the ward, the agreement shall be approved and memorialized in an order by the court.
      1. If the motion states that the ward’s health is in significant decline or that the ward’s death may be imminent, the court shall conduct an emergency hearing as soon as practicable, but no later than ten (10) days after the motion is filed.
      2. When a scheduling order is issued for a motion filed pursuant to subsection (e)(2)(i) of this section, the court shall also order that supervised communication, visitation, or interaction with the ward be granted during the period prior to the hearing.
    2. Notice of the hearing, a copy of the motion, and a copy of any order issued pursuant to subsection (e)(2)(ii) of this section, if applicable, shall be personally served upon the ward and any person against whom the motion is filed, and nothing in this section shall affect the ward’s right to appear and be heard in the proceedings.
    1. The court may award the prevailing party in any action brought under this section court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees; provided, however, that an award of court costs or attorney’s fees shall not be paid out of the ward’s estate.
    2. The court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon a limited guardian, guardian, or conservator who is found to be knowingly isolating a ward and who has violated subsection (a) of this section or an order issued pursuant to subsection (c) of this section an appropriate sanction, including an order to pay court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees of the other party or parties; provided, however, that no sanction shall be paid out of the ward’s estate.
  3. A limited guardian, guardian, or conservator shall promptly notify a ward’s closest relatives and any person designated by the ward to be notified, along with the appropriate contact information and upon the limited guardian, guardian, or conservator’s knowledge of such event and information, in the event:
    1. The ward’s residence has changed;
    2. The ward is staying at a location other than the ward’s residence for more than seven (7) consecutive days;
    3. The ward is admitted to or discharged from a nursing home or assisted-care living facility as defined in §§ 23-17-2 and 23-17.4-2 ;
    4. The ward is admitted to a medical facility for:
      1. Emergency care in response to a life-threatening injury or medical condition; or
      2. Acute care; or
      3. The ward dies, provided, that notification of the ward’s death shall be made in person or by telephone.
    1. A limited guardian, guardian, or conservator is not required to provide notice in accordance with subsection (g) of this section if:
      1. A person who is entitled to notice under subsection (g) of this section informs the limited guardian, guardian, or conservator, in writing, that the person does not wish to receive such notice; or
      2. The ward or a court order has expressly prohibited the limited guardian, guardian, or conservator from providing notice to the person.
    2. A limited guardian, guardian, or conservator shall not provide contact information in accordance with subsection (g) of this section if an order of protection or restraining order has been issued against the person on behalf of the ward.

History of Section. P.L. 2017, ch. 225, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 244, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 225, § 1, and P.L. 2017, ch. 244, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2017, ch. 225, § 2 provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [July 18, 2017] and shall apply to limited guardianships, guardianships, or conservatorships created before, on, or after the effective date of this act.”

P.L. 2017, ch. 244, § 2 provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [July 19, 2017] and shall apply to limited guardianships, guardianships, or conservatorships created before, on, or after the effective date of this act.”

33-15-19. Inventory and appraisement of estate.

  1. Within thirty (30) days after his or her appointment, or any longer time that may be allowed by the probate court, a temporary guardian, guardian, or limited guardian shall return to the probate court, under oath, an inventory and appraisement of all the real and personal property of his or her ward, as of the date of the guardian’s qualification to be made by either the guardian and/or a suitable, disinterested person or persons appointed by the court. The appraisers shall be sworn to the faithful discharge of their trust.
  2. In appraising the ward’s interest in any assets held by the ward jointly or in some other form of concurrent ownership with another party, the appraiser shall include on the inventory an explanation for the basis for appraising the inventory, as either all, none, or a portion of the value of the assets.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1059; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 19; P.L. 1915, ch. 1260, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-19 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 9; P.L. 2000, ch. 427, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 417, § 1.

Cross References.

Powers of guardian pending appeal from granting of letters, § 33-23-3 .

33-15-20. Statements of claims against estate.

Creditors of a ward shall file statements of their claims in the office of the probate clerk. Those claims filed within six (6) months, if allowed or proved, shall be preferred in payment over all claims subsequently filed. Claims filed after six (6) months shall be payable only out of the surplus property remaining in the hands of the limited guardian or guardian after paying claims filed within the time and all expenses and all allowances made by the court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1060; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 20; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 19; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-20 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Failure to Advise Creditors.

It is a breach of duty and of a guardian’s bond for him to fail to advise creditors to exhibit their claims within six months from the date of published notice of appointment. Court of Probate v. Caswell, 18 R.I. 201 , 26 A. 193, 1893 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1893).

Liens Prior to Guardianship.

An attachment lien obtained against the property of an insane person before he was declared insane is not dissolved by guardianship, rather the property passes to the guardian subject to the lien. Hargraves v. Thornton, 49 R.I. 302 , 142 A. 371, 1928 R.I. LEXIS 57 (1928).

Pleading and Proof.

That the creditor’s claim has not been presented within the period specified in this section is a matter to be pleaded by way of defense and if the creditor wishes to take advantage of the surplus property provisions, he must plead and prove the presence of surplus property in the hands of the guardian. Willard v. Fairbanks, 8 R.I. 1 , 1861 R.I. LEXIS 25 (1861).

33-15-21. Demands payable in future.

All legal demands against the ward, although due at a future day, may be filed and be payable with other claims, deducting interest for the anticipated payment.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1061; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 21; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 20; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-21 .

33-15-22. Addresses of creditors — Affidavit to support claim.

Every creditor shall file his or her post office address in the office of the probate clerk, and, if requested, an affidavit in support of his or her claim, in the same manner as is provided in the case of claims against estates of deceased persons.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1062; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 22; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-22 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

33-15-23. Notice of disallowance of claims.

Within thirty (30) days after the expiration of the six (6) months, the limited guardian or guardian shall file in the office of the probate clerk a statement disallowing any of the claims filed as he or she intends to contest, and shall give notice in writing, either personally or by registered or certified mail, to claimants whose claims are disallowed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1063; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 23; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 22; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 22; impl. am. P.L. 1956, ch. 3717, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-23 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

33-15-24. Period after notice of claims disallowance during which actions barred — Amount to which creditor entitled — Service on limited guardian or guardian.

No action shall be brought or prosecuted against any person under limited guardianship or guardianship within seven (7) months after the first publication of the notice. A creditor shall be entitled to his or her whole claim if the estate, is solvent, or a dividend if the estate should prove insolvent, upon any sum as he or she may be allowed or recover. The party bringing suit, in addition to the service of the original writ, shall cause a true copy thereof to be served upon the limited guardian or guardian.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1064; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 24; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 23; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 23; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-24 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Failure to File Claim.

Plaintiff who obtained judgment against guardian without first filing a claim could not sue guardian on his bond for failure to pay judgment since plaintiff was not a creditor of the ward. Municipal Court of Providence v. Le Valley, 25 R.I. 236 , 55 A. 640, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 53 (1903).

Guardian or Ward as Party.

In assumpsit action against a ward, the declaration should be against the ward and not his guardian since the statute does not make the guardian liable for debts of the ward. Arnold v. Angell, 1 R.I. 289 , 1850 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1850).

Where one of the parties to a bill in equity for contribution and an accounting was a person of unsound mind, his guardian was a proper party by analogy to this statute. ANDREWS v. O'REILLY, 22 R.I. 362 , 48 A. 7, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1901).

33-15-25. Action on limited guardian’s or guardian’s bond.

If a limited guardian or guardian shall neglect to return a true inventory of his or her ward’s estate, or shall neglect to apply the real and personal estate of his or her ward to the payment of the ward’s debts, it shall be deemed a breach of his or her bond, and he or she and his or her sureties shall be liable to an action on the bond by any creditor or person interested, and judgment shall be entered in the action, execution shall issue, and recovery shall be had in like manner as on administration bonds.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1065; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 25; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 24; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 24; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-25 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Decree of Unfaithful Administration.

Probate court does not have authority to enter a decree of unfaithful administration against a guardian. Bogman v. Gibbs, 33 R.I. 478 , 82 A. 262, 1912 R.I. LEXIS 104 (1912).

Failure to Pay Judgment.

Plaintiff who obtained judgment against guardian without first filing a claim could not sue guardian on his bond for failure to pay judgment since plaintiff was not a creditor of the ward. Municipal Court of Providence v. Le Valley, 25 R.I. 236 , 55 A. 640, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 53 (1903).

Creditor who secured a judgment against ward after appointment of guardian was entitled to proceed on bond of guardian where guardian failed to pay the judgment and released property to the ward. Probate Court v. Carr, 27 R.I. 184 , 61 A. 171, 1905 R.I. LEXIS 64 (1905).

Collateral References.

Accounting as necessary condition of action on bond. 119 A.L.R. 84.

Leave of court as prerequisite to action on bond of guardian. 2 A.L.R. 569.

33-15-26. Annual account.

  1. A limited guardian or guardian with authority to make decisions regarding the ward’s estate, shall return to the probate court, in every year, his or her account, in the same manner as executors and administrators are by law required to do. The probate court shall monitor each limited guardianship or guardianship file. If the court finds that an annual accounting has not been filed, the court shall cite the limited guardian or guardian and demand that an accounting be filed within thirty (30) days. If the limited guardian or guardian fails to comply with the citation for thirty (30) days, without sufficient excuse, the limited guardian or guardian shall be accountable for the full value of the estate and property of his or her ward over which he or she had authority, and shall have no compensation; but the court may, upon the application of the limited guardian or guardian, excuse him or her from rendering an account in any year if satisfied that it is not necessary or expedient that it should be rendered.
  2. Notwithstanding any provision of the general laws to the contrary, no municipality, its officers, and/or employees, individually or otherwise, shall be held civilly liable for failure to monitor guardianship estates.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1066; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 26; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 25; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 25; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-26 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3; P.L. 1995, ch. 274, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 363, § 8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

This section does not deal with the failure to file a final account. Probate Court v. Higgins, 58 R.I. 58 , 191 A. 260, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1937).

Collateral References.

Duty of personal representative of deceased trustee to render account. 36 A.L.R.3d 1071.

Lapse of time after guardian’s settlement as affecting his liability. 50 A.L.R. 61.

Rents and profits or use and occupation, duty of guardian who is also a co-tenant to account for. 27 A.L.R. 233; 51 A.L.R.2d 388.

Self-dealing, failure of guardian to disclose, as ground for vacating order or decree settling account. 132 A.L.R. 1522.

Settlement of annual or intermediate account of guardian, conclusiveness and effect of. 99 A.L.R. 996.

Third person, adjudication of account of guardian as prerequisite to remedy against, in respect of property transferred to him in breach of trust. 132 A.L.R. 1353.

33-15-26.1. Annual status report.

  1. A limited guardian or guardian with authority to make decisions regarding the ward’s person shall return to the probate court, in every year, the annual status report, in the form as shown in § 33-15-47 , regarding the status of the ward. The report shall include the following information:
    1. The residence of the ward;
    2. The condition of the ward;
    3. Any changes the limited guardian or guardian perceives in the decision making capacity of the ward; and
    4. A summary of actions taken and decisions made on behalf of the ward by the limited guardian or guardian.
  2. The probate court shall monitor each limited guardianship or guardianship file. If the court finds that the required annual status report has not been filed, the court shall cite the limited guardian or guardian and demand that the status report be filed within thirty (30) days.
  3. The probate court may waive the requirement of an annual status report, if, for good cause shown, such waiver is warranted.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 4; P.L. 1994, ch. 359, § 1; P.L. 2012, ch. 331, § 1.

33-15-27. Allowances to limited guardian or guardians.

Probate courts are authorized to allow in the settlement of the accounts of any limited guardian or guardian such reasonable sums as the limited guardian or guardian shall have paid for the suitable support of his or her ward and the ward’s family, and also a reasonable compensation to the limited guardian or guardian for his or her services. It is permissible for a limited guardian or guardian to decline compensation, and shall not be grounds for removal of the limited guardian or guardian.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1067; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 27; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 26; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 26; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-27 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

Cross References.

Expenses as expenses of administration of decedent’s estate, § 33-12-3 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Temporary guardian will be allowed in settlement of his account such reasonable sums as he has paid for care of the ward according to the ward’s means and station in life. Tonge v. Salisbury, 54 R.I. 170 , 171 A. 372, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1934).

Contracts.

Contracts made by a guardian without court approval for the care of the ward bind him personally and not the estate, even though he states he made such contracts only in his individual capacity. Tonge v. Salisbury, 54 R.I. 170 , 171 A. 372, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1934).

Collateral References.

Advances or payments made from his own fund to ward, right of guardian to reimburse himself for. 115 A.L.R. 875.

Death of guardian as affecting right to compensation. 7 A.L.R. 1595.

Fiduciary’s compensation on estate assets distributed in kind. 32 A.L.R.2d 778.

Resignation or removal of executor, administrator, guardian, or trustee, before final administration or before termination of trust, as affecting his compensation. 96 A.L.R.3d 1102.

Resignation or removal of guardian as affecting his compensation. 94 A.L.R. 1107.

Right of guardian or committee of incompetent to incur obligations so as to bind incompetent or his estate, or to make expenditures, without approval by court. 63 A.L.R.3d 780.

Right of guardian to allowance for expenditures prior to appointment. 67 A.L.R. 1405.

Right of guardian who promises to provide out of own real estate for ward to allowance out of ward’s estate. 56 A.L.R. 536.

33-15-28. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1068; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 28; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 27; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 27; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-28 ; Repealed by P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 1, effective July 21, 1992.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-15-28 concerned the responsibility of guardians for the education of minors.

33-15-29. General duties of limited guardians or guardians with respect to person and estate.

Every limited guardian or guardian with authority to make decisions with respect to the person of his or her ward shall exercise authority in the best interest of his or her ward. Every limited guardian or guardian with authority to make decisions with respect to the estate of his or her ward shall manage the estate frugally, without waste, and shall apply the income and profits from the estate, or so much thereof as may be necessary and proper, to the support and maintenance of the ward and his or her household and family.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1069; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 29; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 28; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 28; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-29 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

Cross References.

Action in name of estate prosecuted by interested person, § 33-18-17 et seq.

Adoption of child, consent to, §§ 15-7-5 , 15-7-7 .

Controversies, adjustment, § 33-18-16 .

Good faith delivery or transfer of property to guardian, §§ 33-18-22 , 33-18-23 .

Indenture of apprentices, § 28-4-1 et seq.

Mortgages, exercise of power of sale, § 33-18-15 .

Note signed as guardian or conservator, restricted liability on, § 9-2-9 .

Workers’ compensation, exercise of privileges by guardian, §§ 28-33-29 , 28-35-26 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Conservator.

From the statutes and definition of the words, the terms “conservator” and “guardian of the estate” of a person are essentially synonymous, and the duties and responsibilities are not materially different. Whitmarsh v. McGair, 90 R.I. 154 , 156 A.2d 83, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 130 (1959).

Maintenance of Ward.

A guardian may properly maintain his ward in an asylum in the hope of benefit to the ward if the ward’s estate is of a sufficient amount. In such a situation, a claim against the ward’s estate for the expense incurred may be properly allowed, although the guardian has not made payment, since the guardian is personally liable for the expense. Corcoran v. Allen, 11 R.I. 567 , 1877 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1877).

Management of Property.

A guardian is not required to lease the lands of his ward but may farm the land, for which he will be allowed his expenses incurred in his accounts. Remington v. Field, 16 R.I. 509 , 17 A. 551, 1889 R.I. LEXIS 29 (1889).

Parties to Actions.

Although the statutes do not expressly provide for actions involving real estate, such actions must be maintained in the name of the ward by his guardian. Hamilton v. Colwell, 10 R.I. 39 , 1871 R.I. LEXIS 8 (1871).

Collateral References.

Duty of trustee to diversify investments, and liability for failure to do so. 24 A.L.R.3d 730.

Involuntary disclosure or surrender of will prior to testator’s death. 75 A.L.R.4th 1144.

Power of parent, guardian, or committee to consent to surgical invasion of ward’s person for benefit of another. 4 A.L.R.5th 1000.

Right of guardian other than parent in respect of board or services furnished to ward. 64 A.L.R. 692.

Support and maintenance, right of guardian to expend principal of ward’s estate for. 5 A.L.R. 632.

33-15-30. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, §§ 1053, 1054; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, §§ 13, 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, §§ 13, 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, §§ 13, 14; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-30 ; Repealed by P.L. 1985, ch. 156, § 2, effective July 1, 1985.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-15-30 concerned commitment of drunkards to hospitals.

33-15-31. Application of personal property to debts — Priority of claims.

A limited guardian or guardian with authority to make decisions regarding the ward’s personal property shall collect all the personal property of his or her ward over which he or she has authority and sell and apply the personal property or so much as shall be necessary, at the time and in the manner as the probate court shall direct, to the payment of all the debts of his or her ward; but if the personal property shall be insufficient to pay the debts in full, then he or she shall pay the debts ratably; except that debts due to the United States, debts due to this state, and state and city or town taxes shall be paid first and in the order in which they are named.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3 purported to amend this section. However, this section had already been repealed by P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 1. The present section is set forth as an enactment with the text set forth from P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

Former § 33-15-31 (C.P.A. 1905, § 1070; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 30; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 29; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 29; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-31 ), concerning the priority of claims in the application of personal property to debts, was repealed by P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 1, effective July 21, 1992.

Cross References.

Perpetuation of evidence of payments, § 33-18-27 .

Ratification of payment or delivery without order, § 33-18-28 .

Recording of discharges in court, § 33-18-21 .

Unclaimed funds, deposit in court, § 33-18-29 .

Unclaimed securities or instruments, delivery into court, §§ 33-18-30 , 33-18-31 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

A guardian who pays claims before presenting a list to the court can nevertheless charge the estate for claims subsequently allowed by the court, although he runs the risk of having claims disallowed and the risk of the estate being insolvent. Corcoran v. Allen, 11 R.I. 567 , 1877 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1877).

Collateral References.

Sale of personal property without order of court. 108 A.L.R. 936.

33-15-32. Sale or mortgage of real estate.

If the personal property in the hands of a limited guardian or guardian is insufficient to pay the debts of his or her ward, including incumbrances on the ward’s estate, and the expense of supporting the ward and his or her family, and if the limited guardian or guardian has authority to make decisions regarding the ward’s real property, the limited guardian or guardian may be authorized by the probate court to sell, or to mortgage for an amount decreed, the real property of his or her ward or any interest therein for the purpose of paying debts. A limited guardian or guardian may also be authorized to sell the real estate of his or her ward or any interest in real estate for the purpose of making a better investment or for any other proper purpose.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 736; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-32 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cash Not Required for Sale of Real Estate.

There is no rule of law that requires a “sale” of real estate under this section to be accomplished only in exchange for cash. Crossman v. Erickson, 570 A.2d 651, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1990).

Conveyance Exchanging Care and Services for Deed.

Authorization for a conveyance exchanging past and future lifetime care and services for a conservator’s deed is well within the jurisdiction of the Probate Court as set forth in this section permitting the sale of real estate by a conservator. Crossman v. Erickson, 570 A.2d 651, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1990).

Collateral References.

Constitutionality of statute authorizing guardian to sell or lease land of ward. 4 A.L.R. 1552.

Duty of one purchasing ward’s property, or loaning money on security of such property, to see that proceeds are properly applied. 56 A.L.R. 195.

Guardian’s power to make lease for infant ward beyond minority or term of guardianship. 6 A.L.R.3d 570.

Improper purpose as invalidating guardian’s sale where sale is also for proper purpose. 158 A.L.R. 1438.

Power of court to confirm sale of ward’s property over objection of guardian. 43 A.L.R.2d 1445.

Power of guardian as to mortgaging infant’s real property. 95 A.L.R. 839.

Sale without order of court. 108 A.L.R. 936.

Statutes expressly empowering guardian to borrow money on mortgage, character of claims or obligations contemplated by. 85 A.L.R. 215.

33-15-33. Sale of personal property.

A limited guardian or guardian with authority to make decisions regarding the ward’s personal property may make application for the sale of the personal property of his or her ward, or any of it, for better or more advantageous investment, or for the support of the ward and the ward’s family, or for any other purpose beneficial to the ward, and for incidental charges. The application may be granted by the court of probate without notice. The probate court shall prescribe the manner in which the property shall be advertised and sold, and, in case of private sale, the minimum price. From the order granting the application, there shall be no appeal.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1071; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 31; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 30; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 30; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-33 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

Cross References.

Unfair sales practices law exemption, § 6-13-5 .

Collateral References.

Sale of personal property without order of court. 108 A.L.R. 936.

33-15-34. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1072; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 32; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 31; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 31; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-34 ; Repealed by P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 1, effective July 21, 1992.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-15-34 concerned the application of property to debts contracted during minority.

33-15-35. Investment of surplus funds — Relief from bond requirements.

Limited guardians or guardians may be authorized to invest any money in their hands, not needed for the payment of debts, or for the support, or education of their wards, in notes secured by mortgage upon unincumbered, improved real estate situated in this state, or in the bonds or other indebtedness of the United States or of this state, or in the bonds or notes of any city or town in this state, or in the stock of any domestic building and loan association or federal savings and loan association doing business in this state approved by the probate court, or to make deposits of money in any savings bank or trust company in this state approved by the probate court, as he or she shall deem best for the interest of his or her ward. Limited guardians or guardians may also, under the direction of the probate court, invest any money in real estate or bank stocks in this state or in any other safe income producing securities as the probate court may approve; and if a limited guardian or guardian has so deposited any money in any savings bank or trust company or invested money in stock of any association and deposited with the clerk of the probate court the savings bankbook, share certificate or other evidence of deposit or investment, to be held subject to the order of the court, the probate court in its discretion may relieve the limited guardian or guardian of the requirement of surety on his or her bond if the deposit or investment is not in excess of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) and constitutes all of the property of his or her ward, or if there be other property, reduce the amount of his or her bond by the amount of the deposit or investment, but by not in excess of ten thousand dollars ($10,000).

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1073; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 33; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 32; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 32; P.L. 1955, ch. 3495, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-35 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

Cross References.

Housing authority bonds as legal investments, § 45-27-21 .

Collateral References.

Bank deposit in his own name or other from not indicating fiduciary character, liability of guardian for loss of. 43 A.L.R. 600.

Corporate stock, right of guardian to invest trust funds in. 12 A.L.R. 574; 122 A.L.R. 657.

Court order authorizing investment as affecting liability of guardian for loss of funds invested. 88 A.L.R. 325.

Court order authorizing investment, liability in absence of mandatory statute, of guardian for loss of funds as affected by his failure to obtain. 116 A.L.R. 437.

Depreciation in value of securities, liability for, as affected by appreciation of other securities. 171 A.L.R. 1422.

Improper handling of funds, investments, or assets as ground for removal of guardian. 128 A.L.R. 535.

Limitation by agreement of guardian’s control over funds or investments as affecting his liability. 102 A.L.R. 1108.

Mortgage investment, surchargeability of guardian in respect of, as affected by matters relating to value of property. 117 A.L.R. 871.

Retaining securities coming into his hands as assets of the estate, care required of guardian with respect to. 112 A.L.R. 355.

Unauthorized securities coming into his hands, right of guardian to retain. 37 A.L.R. 559; 122 A.L.R. 801; 135 A.L.R. 1528.

Ward’s consent to, acquiescence in, or ratification of, improper investments or loans by guardian. 128 A.L.R. 4.

33-15-36. Powers of limited guardian or guardian with respect to corporate stock.

Whenever the ward is the owner of stock in any corporation, and the limited guardianship or guardianship order so authorizes, the limited guardian or guardian shall have and exercise on behalf of his or her ward all the rights and powers of voting, either personally or by proxy, the right of examination of books, and all other rights incident to ownership.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1074; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 34; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 33; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 33; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-36 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

Cross References.

Transfer of stock by guardian or conservator, § 18-11-4 .

Voting corporate stock, § 7-4-3 .

Collateral References.

Protection of investment in stocks by submitting to voluntary assessment, power and duty of guardian as to. 104 A.L.R. 979.

33-15-37. Support of dependents for whom ward has no legal obligation to provide.

Whenever a limited guardian or guardian or a conservator of the estate of any person is appointed by any court in this state and the person has, prior to the appointment of the limited guardian or guardian or conservator, provided for any other person out of his or her estate, whom the ward was not under legal obligations to support or provide for, and where it appears that the ward would have continued support or provision if the limited guardian or guardian or conservator had not been appointed, the superior or probate court, upon complaint filed by the person who received the support or provision or by the limited guardian or guardian or conservator, may authorize the limited guardian or guardian or conservator to continue to make allowances out of the estate of the ward, as the court in its sound discretion deems the ward would have made if a limited guardian or guardian or conservator had not been appointed. Provided, however, that the court shall not exercise this power in cases where the ward has prior to the appointment of a limited guardian or guardian or conservator expressly declared or requested that these powers shall not be exercised by the court. In granting the authority, the court may impose conditions or restrictions and, give such directions as it may deem advisable.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 372, § 44, as enacted by P.L. 1923, ch. 475, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 38; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-37 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 9.

33-15-37.1. Minimization of taxes — Estate planning.

  1. The superior or probate court, upon the petition of a conservator, limited guardian or guardian, other than the guardian of a minor, and after notice by publication as the court directs and other notice to all persons interested, may authorize the conservator, limited guardian or guardian to exercise any and all powers over the estate and business affairs of the ward which the ward could exercise if present and not under disability. The court may authorize the taking of such action, or the application of any funds as are not required for the ward’s own maintenance and support, in any fashion as the court shall approve as being in keeping with the ward’s wishes, so far as they can be ascertained, or which the conservator, guardian or limited guardian can demonstrate is in the best interest of the ward. In ascertaining and carrying out the ward’s wishes, or in determining which actions are in the ward’s best interests, the court may consider, but shall not be limited to minimization of current or prospective state or federal income, estate and inheritance taxes, and providing for gifts to charities, relatives and friends as would be likely recipients of donations or future inheritances from the ward.
  2. This action or application of funds may include, but shall not be limited to, the making of gifts, to the conveyance or release of the ward’s contingent and expectant interests in property including marital property rights, and any right of survivorship incident to joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety, to the exercise or release of the ward’s powers as donee of a power of appointment, the making of contracts, the creation of revocable or irrevocable trusts of property of the ward’s estate which may extend beyond the ward’s disability or life and for which the ward may or may not be a beneficiary, the exercise of options of the ward to purchase securities or other property, the exercise of the ward’s right to elect options and to change beneficiaries under insurance and annuity policies, and the surrendering of policies for their cash value, the exercise of the ward’s right to an elective share in the estate of the ward’s deceased spouse, and the renunciation or disclaimer of any interest acquired by testate or intestate succession or by inter vivos transfer.
  3. The guardian, limited guardian or conservator in the petition shall briefly outline the action or application of funds for which approval is sought, the results expected to be accomplished thereby and the tax savings, if any, expected to accrue. The proposed action or application of funds may include gifts of the ward’s personal property or real estate. Gifts may be for the benefit of prospective legatees, devisees or heirs apparent of the ward, or may be made to individuals or charities in which the ward is believed to have an interest. The conservator, limited guardian or guardian shall also indicate in the petition that any planned disposition is consistent with the intentions of the ward insofar as they can be ascertained, or are otherwise in the best interest of the ward. If the ward’s intentions cannot be ascertained, the ward will be presumed to favor reduction in the incidence of the various forms of taxation, and the partial distribution of the ward’s estate during his or her lifetime, as provided in this section. The conservator, limited guardian or guardian shall not, however, be required to include as a beneficiary any person whom there is reason to believe would be excluded by the ward.

History of Section. P.L. 1982, ch. 306, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 9.

33-15-38. Powers unimpaired by §§ 33-15-37 and 33-15-37.1.

Nothing contained in §§ 33-15-37 or 33-15-37.1 shall be held to limit or restrict any powers which a limited guardian, guardian, or conservator may have apart from the provisions of those sections.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 372, § 45, as enacted by P.L. 1923, ch. 475, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 39; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-38 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 306, § 2; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

Collateral References.

Changes in corporate organization as affecting status as trustee, executor, administrator, or guardian. 61 A.L.R. 994; 131 A.L.R. 753.

Character of claims or obligations contemplated by statutes expressly empowering executors, administrators, or guardians to borrow money. 85 A.L.R. 215.

Constitutionality of statute authorizing guardian to sell or lease land of ward. 4 A.L.R. 1552.

Factors considered in making election for incompetent to take under or against will. 3 A.L.R.3d 6.

Guardian’s power to make lease for infant ward beyond minority or term of guardianship. 6 A.L.R.3d 570.

Insolvency of, or appointment of receiver or other liquidator for, corporation, as affecting its status as executor, administrator, guardian, or trustee. 102 A.L.R. 124.

Power and duty of trustee, executor, administrator, or guardian as regards protection of investment in stocks by submitting to voluntary assessment. 104 A.L.R. 979.

Power of court or guardian as to mortgaging infant’s real property. 95 A.L.R. 839.

Power of court to authorize guardian to borrow ward’s money. 30 A.L.R. 461.

Power of guardian or committee of incompetent in respect of insurance on ward’s life, or of policy under which he has interest. 84 A.L.R. 366.

Power of guardian or committee to compromise liquidated contract claim or money judgment, and of courts to authorize or approve such a compromise. 155 A.L.R. 196.

Power of guardian to agree to, or of court to approve, voluntary partition between infant or incompetent and cotenant. 157 A.L.R. 755.

Power of guardian to sell ward’s property without order of court. 108 A.L.R. 936.

Power of incompetent spouse’s guardian, committee, or next friend to sue for granting or vacation of divorce or annulment of marriage, or to make a compromise or settlement in such suit. 6 A.L.R.3d 681.

Power to lease or to authorize lease of infant’s land beyond minority or guardianship. 6 A.L.R.3d 570.

33-15-39. Representation of incompetents and contingent interests in proceedings under § 33-15-37 or 33-15-37.1.

Whenever in any proceeding under § 33-15-37 or 33-15-37.1 there are contingent interests of persons not in being, or not ascertainable, or interests of persons non sui juris, the court may appoint a person to represent those contingent interests, or a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of persons non sui juris, and in case of representation under this section the judgment, order, or decree entered in the proceeding shall bind all the interests.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 372, § 46, as enacted by P.L. 1923, ch. 475, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 40; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-39 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 306, § 2.

33-15-40. Appeal to supreme court from proceedings under §§ 33-15-37 and 33-15-37.1.

An appeal may be taken to the supreme court from any final order, judgment, or decree of the superior court entered in any proceeding brought under the provisions of § 33-15-37 or 33-15-37.1 at any time within twenty (20) days from the entry of the order, judgment, or decree, and not thereafter.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 372, § 47, as enacted by P.L. 1923, ch. 475, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 41; P.L. 1939, ch. 659, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-40 ; P.L. 1982, ch. 306, § 2.

33-15-41. Applicability of §§ 33-15-37 — 33-15-40.

The provisions of §§ 33-15-37 33-15-40 shall apply to any estate where a limited guardian, a guardian, or a conservator has been appointed whether prior to June 13th, 1923, or thereafter.

History of Section. P.L. 1923, ch. 475, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 42; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-41 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

33-15-42. Removal of property by nonresident guardian.

In all cases where a guardian and his or her ward are both nonresidents in this state and the ward is entitled to property of any description in this state, the guardian, on producing satisfactory proof to the probate court of the city or town where any property is situated, by certificates duly authenticated according to an act of congress in such cases, that he or she has given bond and security in the state in which he or she and his or her ward reside in double the value of the property of the ward, and it is found that a removal of the property will not prejudice the interest of any other person in the property, then the guardian may demand, sue for, recover, and remove any property to the place of residence of himself or herself or the ward.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1075; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 35; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 34; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 34; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-42 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

Cross References.

Appointment of agent by nonresident guardian, § 33-18-9 .

Collection and management of property by foreign guardian, § 33-18-24 et seq.

Real estate, sale, lease or mortgage by foreign guardian of nonresident, § 33-19-27 .

Service on nonresident guardian, § 9-5-27 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

This section does not deprive a ward of property without due process of law, but merely transfers custody of property. Mitchell v. People's Sav. Bank, 20 R.I. 500 , 40 A. 502, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 124 (1898).

This section does not violate constitutional provision prohibiting the extension of chancery powers in courts other than the supreme court, since probate courts have general jurisdiction of guardianship matters which do not require the interposition of equity. Mitchell v. People's Sav. Bank, 20 R.I. 500 , 40 A. 502, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 124 (1898).

Notice to Ward.

Notice to the ward is not required in a proceeding for removal of a nonresident ward’s property from the state. Mitchell v. People's Sav. Bank, 20 R.I. 500 , 40 A. 502, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 124 (1898).

Petition.

Suit by nonresident guardian for removal of nonresident ward’s property from state should be filed in the same manner as a petition by a domestic guardian. Mitchell v. People's Sav. Bank, 20 R.I. 500 , 40 A. 502, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 124 (1898).

33-15-43. Order to resident guardian to deliver property to nonresident guardian.

Whenever a nonresident guardian shall produce an exemplification, under the seal, if any there be, of the proper court in the state of his or her residence, containing all the entries in relation to his or her appointment and in relation to his or her having given bond, duly authenticated as provided in this chapter, the probate court of the proper town in this state may cause suitable orders to be made, discharging any resident guardian, executor, or administrator and authorizing the delivering and passing over of the property, and also requiring receipts to be passed and filed if deemed advisable; provided, that in all cases thirty (30) days’ notice shall be given to the resident guardian, executor, or administrator of the intended application for the order of removal, and the court may reject the application and refuse the order whenever it is satisfied it is for the interest of the ward, or of any other person having a right in the property that the removal shall not take place.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1076; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 36; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 35; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 35; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-43 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 3.

33-15-44. Conservator for incompetent person — Disability to contract.

If a person, by reason of disability or upon his or her own election, is unable to properly care for his or her property, the probate court of the town in which he or she resides, upon his or her petition, or the petition of one or more of his or her relatives or friends, may appoint a conservator of his or her property. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall appoint a time and place for a hearing, and shall cause at least fourteen (14) days’ notice of the hearing to be given to the person for whom a conservator is to be appointed if he or she is not the petitioner. If, at the hearing, it appears that the person is incapable of properly caring for his or her property, a conservator shall be appointed, who shall have the charge and management of the property of the person subject to the direction of the court. No person convicted of a felony offense involving a charge of forgery, embezzlement, obtaining money under false pretenses, bribery, larceny, extortion, conspiracy to defraud, burglary, breaking and entering, or any other offense involving fraud or theft shall be qualified for appointment as a conservator. The conservator may be discharged by the probate court upon the application of the ward, or otherwise, when it appears that the conservatorship is no longer necessary. After the filing of the petition, the person shall be under the same disability to contract as a person for whom an application for guardianship has been made is under by virtue of the provisions of § 33-15-13 .

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1077; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 37; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 36; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 36; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-44 ; P.L. 1985, ch. 156, § 1; P.L. 1987, ch. 122, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 380, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Mark B. Heffner, From Idiots and Lunatics to Incapacitated Persons and Respondents: The Evolution of Guardianship Law in Rhode Island, 21 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 554 (2016).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Payment of Claims.

The conservator had the right to pay bills incurred for his ward’s care as well as those for work done upon her real estate. Whitmarsh v. McGair, 90 R.I. 154 , 156 A.2d 83, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 130 (1959).

Where the conservator believes that claims are just he could pay them even though they accrued more than six years before such payment. Whitmarsh v. McGair, 90 R.I. 154 , 156 A.2d 83, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 130 (1959).

It is undoubtedly the safer and wiser course for the conservator to seek permission of the probate court before paying a ward’s bills from the principal of the estate, but he may pay them, assuming that they are proper bills, and take his chance on having the payments approved later by the probate court. Whitmarsh v. McGair, 90 R.I. 154 , 156 A.2d 83, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 130 (1959).

Transfer of Real Property.

Transfer of real property by a person under conservatorship is void when made before entry of a decree terminating the conservatorship, even though conservator’s final report and resignation are on file. Marion v. English, 45 R.I. 246 , 121 A. 397, 1923 R.I. LEXIS 68 (1923).

It was proper to file a proceeding to set aside a deed in the name of the party in interest by his conservator even though deed was executed prior to the appointment of conservator. Grim v. Dolan, 80 R.I. 259 , 96 A.2d 205, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 61 (1953).

Collateral References.

Constitutionality of statute making physical disability ground for appointment of guardian of person or property. 30 A.L.R. 1381.

Mental condition which will justify the appointment of a guardian, committee or conservator of the estate for an incompetent or spendthrift. 9 A.L.R.3d 774.

Priority and preference in appointment of conservator or guardian for an incompetent. 65 A.L.R.3d 991.

Termination of continuing guaranty by appointment of guardian or conservator for guarantor. 55 A.L.R.3d 344.

33-15-45. Conservator’s bond and inventory — Management and accounting.

A conservator shall give bond and file inventory as is required of guardians of estates. All provisions of law relating to accounting and to the management, investment, sale, lease, or mortgage by guardians of estates shall apply to the accounting and to the management, investment, sale, lease, or mortgage of estates by conservators.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1078; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 38; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 37; G.L. 1938, ch. 426, § 37; G.L. 1956, § 33-15-45 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

“Conservator”.

From the statutes and definition of the words, the terms “conservator” and “guardian of the estate” of a person are essentially synonymous, and the duties and responsibilities are not materially different. Whitmarsh v. McGair, 90 R.I. 154 , 156 A.2d 83, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 130 (1959).

Collateral References.

Right of guardian or committee of incompetent to incur obligations so as to bind incompetent or his estate, or to make expenditures, without approval by court. 63 A.L.R.3d 780.

33-15-46. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1987, ch. 126, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 1, effective July 21, 1992.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-15-46 concerned the rights of parents or a guardian to have children tested for substance abuse.

33-15-47. Forms.

The following forms shall be used for the purposes of this chapter:

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND PROBATE COURT OF THE COUNTY OF No. ESTATE OF PERSONAL ESTATE ESTIMATED AT $CITY/TOWN OF 20 PETITION FOR LIMITED GUARDIANSHIP OR GUARDIANSHIP hereby petitions the Probate Court of the city/town of to appoint a limited guardian/guardian for who currently resides at , in the city/town of , and whose date of birth is . Petitioner Address Based upon an assessment conducted by on , which functional assessment reflects the current level of functioning of , it has been determined that lacks decision-making ability in one or more of the following areas as indicated: Date Respondent Respondent health care financial matters residence association other Regarding each area indicated, please describe the specific assistance needed: Indicate which of the following less restrictive alternatives to guardianship have been explored and deemed inappropriate as indicated: Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Living Will Power of Attorney Durable Power of Attorney Trusts Joint Property Arrangements Representative Payee Money Management Single Court Transactions Government Benefit and Social Service Programs Housing Options Other Please describe the basis for the determination that the alternative will not meet the needs of the respondent for each alternative explored and deemed inappropriate: The following individual/agency is willing to serve as guardian: Upon information and belief the above individual/agency has: • No conflict of interest that would interfere with guardianship duties • No criminal background that would interfere with guardian- ship duties • The capacity to manage financial resources involved. • The ability to meet requirements of law and unique needs of individual. • Demonstrated willingness to undergo training. The Respondent has the following heirs at law: NAME:RESIDENCE: Signature Name Address Telephone Subscribed and sworn to before me as to the truth of the above facts by in on the day of , 20. Notary Public Print Name DECREE Dated PROBATE JUDGE This notice should be served at once and returned to the clerk of the court. NOTICE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND BY THE PROBATE COURT OF THE OF BY THE COUNTY OF AND STATE AFORESAID To Estate or Docket No. GREETING: A petition for Limited Guardianship/Guardianship has been filed in the Probate Court of the city/town of . has requested that the Probate Court appoint Petitioner a limited guardian/guardian for you. A hearing regarding this Petition shall be held On: date At: time at the Probate Court for the town of . Address The Petition requests that the Probate Court consider the qualification of the following individual/agency to serve as your limited guardian/guardian: A guardian ad litem will be appointed by the Probate Court to visit you, explain the process and inform you of your rights. You have the right to attend the hearing to contest the petition, to request that the powers of the guardian be limited or to object to the appointment of particular individual/agency limited guardian/guardian. If you wish to contest the petition, you have the right to be represented by an attorney, at state expense, if you are indigent. If the Petition is granted and a limited guardian/guardian is appointed, the Probate Court may give the limited guardian/guardian the power to make decisions about one or more of the following: Your health care; your money; where you live; and with whom you associate. Copies of this Notice will be mailed to: The administrator of any care or treatment facility where you live or receive primary services; your spouse, and heirs at law; any individual or entity known to petitioner to be regularly supplying protection services to you. CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE I certify that I hand-delivered and read this Notice to on the day of , 20. Signature Print Name Address CERTIFICATION OF NOTICE I certify that, as required by , I mailed a copy of this Notice to the following persons, at the addresses listed, on the day of , 20. Rhode Island General Laws § 33-15-17.1(e) Signature Print Name Address Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of , 20. Notary Public WITNESS Judge of the Probate Court of the of this day of , 20. Clerk DECISION-MAKING ASSESSMENT TOOL Name of Individual being assessed: Current Address: Date of Birth: Permanent Address (if different): Instructions for Completion This document will be used by a Probate Court to determine whether to appoint a guardian to assist this individual in some or all areas of decision-making. This document has two parts. Please first complete the part which is right after these instructions, titled Assessment. Then complete the second section, titled Summary. To a physician completing this document: The individual’s treating physician must complete this document. If there is any information of which the treating physician completing this document does not have direct knowledge, he or she is encouraged to make such inquiries of such other persons as are necessary to complete the entire form. Those persons might include other medical personnel such as nurses, or other persons such as family members or social service professionals who are acquainted with the individual. If the physician has received information from others in completing the form, the names of those individuals must be listed on the Summary. To a non-physician completing this document: Professionals or other persons acquainted with the individual being assessed may also complete this document. If there is information of which a non-physician completing this document does not have knowledge, such non-physician may either leave portions of the document blank, or also make inquiries or do such investigation as is necessary to complete the entire document. Again, the names of any individual from whom information is derived should be listed on the Summary. The document must be signed and dated by the person completing it. It does not need to be notarized. A. BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT THE FOLLOWING IS BASED UPON A PHYSICAL EXAMINATION CONDUCTED BY ME ON (DATE) 1. DIAGNOSIS and PROGNOSIS: 2. MEDICATION (PLEASE LIST): How do the above medications, if any, affect the individual’s decision-making ability? Please explain: 3. CURRENT NUTRITIONAL STATUS: B. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 1. MEMORY (CIRCLE ONE) (A) Intact; (B) Mild Impairment; (C) Moderate Impairment; (D) Severe Impairment 2. ATTENTION (CIRCLE ONE) (A) Intact; (B) Mild Impairment; (C) Shifting/Wandering; (D) Delirium; (E) Unresponsive 3. JUDGMENT (CIRCLE ONE) (A) Intact; (B) Able to Make Most Decisions; (C) Impaired; (D) Gross Impairment 4. LANGUAGE (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY) (A) Intact (B) Sensory Deficits (Hearing/Speech/Sight) (C) Impairment In Comprehension/Speech: Mild/Moderate/Severe (D) Completely Unresponsive 5. EMOTION (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY) (A) ANXIETY/DEPRESSION: (1) None (2) History of Anxiety/Depression (3) Moderate Symptoms of Anxiety/Depression (4) Severe symptoms with sleep/appetite/energy disturbance (5) Suicide/Homicidal (B) OTHER: (1) Suspiciousness/Belligerence/Explosiveness (2) Delusions/Hallucinations (3) Unresponsive If you circled any of the above, other than (A) or (1) for any of the above categories, please explain whether the situation is treatable or reversible, and if so, how: C. SOCIAL ASSESSMENT 1. MOBILITY (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY) (A) Intact/Exercises (B) Drives Car Or Uses Public Transportation (C) Independent Ambulation in Home Only; (D) Walker/Cane; (E) Requires Assistance If you circled (C), (D), or (E), is situation treatable or reversible? If so, how? 2. SELF CARE (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY) (A) No Assistance Needed; (B) Requires Assistance with (1) Meals (2) Bathing (3) Dressing (4) Toileting/Feeding If you circled any of (B), is individual aware that assistance is required? Is individual willing to accept assistance? Is individual able to arrange for assistance? 3. CARE PLAN MAINTENANCE (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY) (A) No Active Problem; (B) Initiates Problem Identification; (C) Actively Cooperative; (D) Passively Cooperative; (E) Passively Uncooperative; (F) Actively Uncooperative 4. SOCIAL NETWORK RELATIONSHIPS (CIRCLE ONE IN (A) AND IN ONE IN (B)) (A) SUPPORT: (1) Very Good Supportive Network; (2) Some Support From Family And Friends; (3) No Or Limited Support From Family/Friends; (4) Needs Community Support; (5) Isolated/Homebound (B) SOCIAL SKILLS: (1) Very Good Social Skills; (2) Good Social Skills; (3) Interacts With Prompting; (4) Isolated D. SUMMARY I hereby certify that I have reviewed sections A, B, & C attached hereto and based on such assessments that the individual’s decision-making ability is as follows: (1) PLEASE DESCRIBE AS FULLY AS YOU CAN THE INDIVIDUAL’S DECISION-MAKING ABILITY IN EACH OF THE FOLLOWING AREAS: A. FINANCIAL MATTERS B. HEALTH CARE MATTERS C. RELATIONSHIPS D. RESIDENTIAL MATTERS (2) PLEASE INDICATE YOUR OPINION REGARDING WHETHER THE INDIVIDUAL NEEDS A SUBSTITUTE DECISION-MAKER IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING AREAS: (Circle one for each category. If you circle “limited” for any category, please explain.) (1) FINANCIAL MATTERSYesNoLimited (2) HEALTH CARE MATTERSYesNoLimited (3) RELATIONSHIPSYesNoLimited (4) RESIDENTIAL MATTERSYesNoLimited (5) OTHER: If there are any other areas in which you think the individual lacks decision-making ability or has limited decision-making ability, please explain. Signature Name (Print or Type) Title Date Names and titles of others who assisted in Preparation of This Assessment. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND PROBATE COURT OF THE COUNTY OF Estate of Docket No. ANNUAL STATUS REPORT (1) The residence of the ward is (2) The medical condition of the ward is: (3) I perceive the following changes in the decision making capacity of the ward: (4) The following is a summary of the actions I have taken and decisions I have made on behalf of the ward during the last year: (If more space is needed, please attach a supplement). Guardian Date STATE OF RHODE ISLAND PROBATE COURT OF COUNTY OF THE (Estate Name) Probate Court No. REPORT OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM Now comes (Name of Guardian Ad Litem) for (Name of Proposed Ward) and reports that on (Date), I personally visited the proposed ward at (Address). I explained to (Name of Proposed Ward) the following: *The nature, purpose, and legal effect of the appointment of a guardian; *The hearing procedure, including, but not limited to, the right to contest the petition, to request limits on the guardian’s powers, to object to a particular person being appointed guardian, to be present at the hearing, and to be represented by legal counsel; *The name of the person known to be seeking appointment as guardian: Based on such visit and the respondent’s reaction thereto, I make the following determination regarding the respondent’s desire to be present at the hearing, to contest the petition, to have limits placed on the guardian’s powers and respondent’s objection, if any, to a particular person being appointed as guardian. Based on my review of the petition, the decision making assessment tool, my interview with the prospective guardian, my visit with the respondent, and interviews and discussions with other parties, I made the following additional determinations: Regarding whether the respondent is in need of a guardian of the type prayed for in the petition: Regarding whether the guardian ad litem has, in the course of fulfilling his or her duties, discovered information concerning the suitability of the individual or entity to serve as such guardian: Respectfully submitted, Date: (Name of Guardian Ad Litem)

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History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 4; P.L. 1994, ch. 359, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 9.

Compiler’s Notes.

In 2021, “AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS” was deleted following “STATE OF RHODE ISLAND” in this section at the direction of the Law Revision Director to reflect the 2020 amendments to the state constitution that changed the state's name.

Chapter 15.1 Guardianship of Minors

33-15.1-1. Parents as joint natural guardians — Releases.

  1. The father and mother shall be the joint natural guardians of their minor children and shall be equally charged with their care, nurture, welfare and education; and they may be sued either jointly or separately for the support of their minor children. To the extent that any such minor child has property or an estate of his or her own, or that there is income or principal of any trust for his or her benefit, which may be used to provide the child with an education in a college, university or private school, the natural guardians shall not be obligated either jointly or separately to provide an education. The foregoing sentence shall not be deemed to create by implication any obligation to provide an education where none would otherwise exist. The natural guardians shall have equal powers and rights and neither shall have any right paramount to the right of the other concerning the custody of the minor children, and both shall be entitled to their services, and to their earnings, the payment of which to either parent shall be a valid and sufficient discharge to the employer of the children until after notice in writing has been given to him or her by both or either of the parents of their intention to both claim the earnings. Provided, however, this section and § 33-15.1-3 shall not affect the right of a probate court duly to appoint a legal guardian of the person and estate, or of the person or estate of any minor children, or the right of any court in the state, in any suit or proceedings duly brought or heard in the court, to make any order, decree, decision or judgment regarding the care, custody, education, estate or otherwise of any minor children, in which event the appointment of the probate court and the order, decree, decision or judgment of any other court shall supersede the natural guardianship insofar as the same shall be inconsistent with the appointment, order, decree, decision or judgment.
  2. A release given by both parents or by a parent or guardian who has the legal custody of a minor child or by a guardian or adult spouse of a minor spouse shall, where the amount of the release does not exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000) in value, be valid and binding upon the minor.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Release of Minor’s Claim.

In order for a release of a minor’s claims for damages in excess of $1,000 (now $5,000) to be valid and binding, it must be executed on the minor’s behalf by a court-appointed guardian ad litem and be approved by a court. Julian v. Zayre Corp., 120 R.I. 494 , 388 A.2d 813, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 694 (1978).

Where a parent executed a release of both her and her minor son’s claims for damages, the release was valid and binding as to any claim on her behalf arising out of her son’s injuries, but was not binding as to the son’s claims on his own behalf, where the son’s claims exceeded $1,000 (now $5,000). Julian v. Zayre Corp., 120 R.I. 494 , 388 A.2d 813, 1978 R.I. LEXIS 694 (1978).

Settlement Agreement on Behalf of Minor.

Although a father has no authority to enter into a binding settlement agreement on behalf of a minor child whose mother had custody under a divorce decree, the agreement is not entirely void, but is voidable only. The agreement could be ratified by the child after he comes of age and would have to be disaffirmed by him within a reasonable time after attaining majority. Sabourin ex rel. Sabourin v. LBC, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 1151, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1796 (D.R.I. 1990) (decided under former § 33-15-1 ).

Subrogation.

A parent, in the discharge of his duty to care for his child as provided in this section, can bind that child, even though a minor, to a subrogation clause of a medical service contract. Hamrick v. Hospital Serv. Corp., 110 R.I. 634 , 296 A.2d 15, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 961 (1972).

Suits for Damages to Minor.

Custody of a minor being a legally protected interest, a wrongful injury to such interest will support a right of action by the parent or parents. Bedard v. Notre Dame Hosp., 89 R.I. 195 , 151 A.2d 690, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 63 (1959).

In action by parent for damages for unlawful detention of child by hospital, claim of damages for mental anguish unaccompanied and not followed by physical illness could not be the basis for an award; however, the declaration was not subject to demurrer since it set forth a right of action which could sustain an award for nominal damages. Bedard v. Notre Dame Hosp., 89 R.I. 195 , 151 A.2d 690, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 63 (1959).

The subsequent marriage by the minor daughter to the tortfeasor does not bar the parent from maintaining a suit for consequential damages for injuries sustained by her. Trotti v. Piacente, 99 R.I. 167 , 206 A.2d 462, 1965 R.I. LEXIS 411 (1965).

Collateral References.

Award of custody of child to another as affecting right of parent to recover for injury to minor child. 147 A.L.R. 482.

Child’s right of action against third person who causes parent to desert or otherwise neglect his parental duty. 60 A.L.R.3d 924.

Condition of health of child as consideration in awarding custody. 48 A.L.R. 137.

Consent of guardian to enlistment of minor in military service. 137 A.L.R. 1471; 147 A.L.R. 1311.

Guardian de facto or de son tort of minor. 25 A.L.R.2d 752.

Infant’s property, right of natural guardian to custody or control of. 6 A.L.R. 115.

Minority of parent as affecting right to guardianship of child. 19 A.L.R. 1043.

Parents’ rights and duties as affected by appointment of guardian for infant. 63 A.L.R. 1147.

Parent’s right to notice and hearing before being deprived of custody of child by guardianship proceedings. 76 A.L.R. 242.

33-15.1-2. Guardianship for education — Educational advocates for children with disabilities under the care and custody of the state.

Whenever the family court places a child in the care and custody of the state, it shall enter an order indicating whether the parents or guardian are to be allowed to continue to make educational decisions on behalf of the child. At the same time, the family court shall make a factual determination pursuant to § 16-64-1 as to the residence of the child’s parent(s) or guardian on the date that the child is placed in the care and custody of the state, subject to § 16-64-6 . Thereafter, while the child is in the care of the state, the director of DCYF shall have the duty to update the child’s parent’s residence in accordance with § 42-72.4-1 . If the family court enters an order vesting the right to control a child’s education with a state agency, and if the court or the state agency finds that the child is in need of special education, or that the child is suspected of being in need of special education, the court or state agency shall request the commissioner of elementary and secondary education to appoint an educational advocate to exercise the child’s due process rights under applicable state and federal special education laws and regulations. The commissioner of elementary and secondary education shall also have the power to appoint an educational advocate when a child’s parents or guardian cannot be identified or when the whereabouts of a parent cannot be determined. If a parent is identified or the whereabouts of the parent become known, then the commissioner shall terminate the appointment of the educational advocate. An educational advocate, acting in good faith, shall be immune from any liability resulting from the performance of his or her duties as an educational advocate.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5; P.L. 1995, ch. 231, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 68, § 4; P.L. 1999, ch. 83, § 77; P.L. 1999, ch. 130, § 77.

33-15.1-3. No preference between parents.

In any proceedings or suit in any court, neither parent shall have any natural priority or preference in any matter relating to their minor children.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-4. Power of probate court to appoint guardians.

The probate court in each city or town, if occasion shall require, shall have power to appoint or approve guardians of the persons and estates, or of the person or estate of minors who shall reside, or have a legal settlement in the city or town, and of the estate within the city or town.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jurisdiction.

While authorized to appoint guardians, probate courts lack the express authority to terminate parental rights or divest parents of the custody of their children. Carr v. Prader, 725 A.2d 291, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1999).

Municipal probate courts lack the jurisdiction to decide petitions for guardianship opposed by a parent, which petitions may not be decided without the participation of the family court, as that court alone has the express statutory power to divest a parent of custody and/or parental rights, along with the expertise and resources essential to exercise such power. Carr v. Prader, 725 A.2d 291, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1999).

33-15.1-4.1. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 2005, ch. 326, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2008, ch. 299, § 1, effective July 5, 2008; P.L. 2008, ch. 419, § 1, effective July 8, 2008.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-15.1-4.1 concerned waiver of guardian ad litem report.

33-15.1-5. Appointment of guardians for minors.

A probate court may appoint a guardian of a minor under the age of fourteen (14) years. A minor of the age of fourteen (14) years or over may nominate his or her own guardian, who, if approved by the probate court, shall be appointed accordingly.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

Cross References.

Dependent and neglected children, guardianship of agency to which child entrusted, § 14-1-35 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appeal From Appointment.

A ward’s grandmother as his nearest relative and provider and as the person responsible for his support can appeal from a probate court decision appointing a guardian. Roullard v. McSoley, 54 R.I. 232 , 172 A. 326, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1934).

Evidence of the neglect and misconduct of a guardian in the supervision of his ward and management of the estate subsequent to appointment does not show that he was not suitable at the time of appointment and therefore is inadmissible on an appeal from the appointment. The appropriate remedy is an action for removal under § 33-15-18 . Roullard v. McSoley, 54 R.I. 232 , 172 A. 326, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1934).

Child’s Preference.

Former § 33-15-4 did not prevent the trial judge from giving substantial weight to the preference of a child less than fourteen years old in determining his custody. Goldstein v. Goldstein, 115 R.I. 152 , 341 A.2d 51, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1135 (1975).

Probate Court Jurisdiction.

In creating the family court and transferring to it all of the jurisdiction previously vested in the juvenile court as well as the court of domestic relations, the legislature did not transfer jurisdiction of the appointment of guardians of minors but left it in the traditional jurisdiction of the probate courts. In re Loudin, 101 R.I. 35 , 219 A.2d 915, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 347 (1966).

Collateral References.

Bastardizing child as affecting right to appointment as guardian. 37 A.L.R. 531.

Consideration and weight of religious affiliations in appointment of guardian for minor child. 22 A.L.R.2d 696.

Divorce court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over custody and maintenance of child as precluding guardianship proceedings in another court. 146 A.L.R. 1167.

Guardian’s position as joint tenant of or successor to property in ward’s estate as raising conflict of interest. 69 A.L.R.3d 1198.

Nonresidence as affecting one’s right to award of custody of child. 15 A.L.R.2d 432.

Priority and preference in appointment of conservator or guardian for an incompetent. 65 A.L.R.3d 991.

Termination of continuing guaranty by appointment of guardian or conservator for guarantor. 55 A.L.R.3d 344.

33-15.1-6. Appointment in lieu of guardian nominated by minor.

If a minor of the age of fourteen (14) years shall neglect to choose a guardian when cited by the court to do so, or shall choose one whom the court does not approve, or one who shall neglect to give bond as required by the court or by law, the court may appoint a guardian in the same manner as if the minor were under the age of fourteen (14) years.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-7. Testamentary appointment of guardian for minor children.

Every person authorized by law to make a will may appoint by will, subject to the approval of the probate court, a guardian or guardians for his or her minor children, whether born at the time of making the will or afterwards, to continue during the minority of the children or for a less time; provided, that, in the case of husband and wife, the survivor, being otherwise qualified, shall be guardian of their children.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-8. Nonresident as guardian of minor.

A nonresident shall not be appointed or approved as guardian of a minor resident in this state, but this provision shall not apply to a testamentary guardian.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-9. Guardian of estate of nonresident.

The probate court of any town may appoint or approve a guardian of the estate of a person who resides outside this state and has an estate in the town and has no guardian in this state and who, if a resident, would be liable to be put under guardianship under the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-10. Notice on ward for appointment of guardian of person.

No person shall be appointed guardian of the person of another, unless notice of the application for the appointment has been served upon the intended ward in person at least fourteen (14) days prior to any action on the application. Provided, if the intended ward is a minor under the age of twelve (12) years, in lieu of personal service, notice may be served upon any of the next of kin of the ward, or other interested person or friend, as the court may direct.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-11. Notice to spouse, children or heirs at law of ward.

  1. No petition for guardianship of a minor shall be heard and no person shall be appointed guardian of the person or estate of another unless notice of the application for appointment together with notice of the date, time and place set for hearing has been given to the prospective ward’s spouse, children, and/or heirs at law who would inherit the prospective ward’s estate pursuant to the terms of § 33-1-1 .
  2. Notice shall be given by the petitioner or his or her attorney at least ten (10) days before the date set for hearing on the petition by regular mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the prospective ward’s spouse and children at their last known addresses, or, if there be no children, then to the prospective ward’s heirs at law next in line (under the rules of descent) as set forth in § 33-1-1 only at their last known address. The petitioner or his or her attorney shall at or prior to the hearing, file or leave to be filed an affidavit that notice was given setting forth the names and post office addresses of the persons to whom the notice was sent and the date of mailing thereof, together with a copy of the notice.
  3. Should the petitioner have no knowledge of the existence or whereabouts of any children or of any heir at law, an affidavit to that effect filed with the court shall satisfy this notice requirement.
  4. Notwithstanding any notice requirement of the petitioner, the court shall give notice of the petition by advertisement.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-12. Expense of prosecuting or defending against petition.

If a guardian is appointed for any person liable to be put under guardianship under the provisions of this chapter, the court shall make an allowance to be paid by the guardian, for all reasonable expenses incurred in prosecuting or in defending against the petition.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-13. Exemption of welfare agencies from costs and bond.

In any petition for the appointment of a guardian filed by the director of public welfare of any city or town, or the directors of the department of human services and behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities and hospitals, or one designated by them in which the director or agent certifies that the petition is filed for the purpose of enabling the ward, who is without funds, to receive assistance from funds which are financed in whole or in part by federal grants, the director or the director’s agent, as petitioner, shall not be required to pay court fees or to give surety on his or her bond.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-14. Appointment of temporary guardian.

The probate court for cause shown after any notice as it shall direct, pending any application for the appointment of a guardian, or pending any appeal from a decree appointing a guardian, may, if it shall deem proper, appoint a temporary guardian of the person and estate, or of the person or estate of the respondent.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-15. Tenure of temporary guardian.

A temporary guardian shall hold his or her office until the question of appointment of a guardian be decided, or until he or she shall be discharged by the court of probate; and from the appointment of a temporary guardian there shall be no appeal.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-16. Powers of temporary guardian — Bond.

Every temporary guardian appointed as provided in § 33-15.1-14 shall have the care and custody of the person of his or her ward and the management of the estate of his or her ward, or care and custody of the person of his or her ward, or management of the estate of his or her ward, as the case may be, until he or she shall be legally discharged; and he or she shall give bond to the probate court in like manner, and with like condition, as is required of guardians.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-17. Inventory and appraisement of estate.

Within thirty (30) days after his or her appointment, or such longer time as may be allowed by the probate court, a guardian shall return to the probate court, under oath, an inventory and appraisement of all the real and personal estate of his or her ward, to be made by a suitable, disinterested person or persons appointed by the court, which shall fix the number of appraisers at one or three (3) in its discretion. The appraisers shall be sworn to the faithful discharge of their trust.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-18. Statements of claims against estate.

Creditors of a ward shall file statements of their claims in the office of the probate clerk. Those claims filed within six (6) months, if allowed or proved, shall be preferred in payment over all claims subsequently filed. Claims filed after six (6) months shall be payable only out of the surplus property remaining in the hands of the guardian after paying claims filed within such time and all expenses and all allowances made by the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-19. Demands payable in future.

All legal demands against the ward, although due at a future day, may be filed and be payable with other claims, deducting interest for the anticipated payment.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-20. Addresses of creditors — Affidavit to support claim.

Every creditor shall file his or her post office address in the office of the probate clerk, and, if requested, an affidavit in support of his or her claim, in the same manner as is provided in the case of claims against estates of deceased persons.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-21. Application of personal property to debts — Priority of claims.

A guardian shall collect all the personal property of his or her ward and sell and apply the personal property or so much as shall be necessary, at the time and in the manner as the court of probate shall direct, to the payment of all the debts of his or her ward; but if the property shall be insufficient to pay the debts in full, then he or she shall pay the debts ratably; except that debts due to the United States, debts due to this state, and state and town taxes shall be paid first and in the order in which they are named. Every claim against the ward, allowed by the guardian or found due by judgment, shall be a lien upon the real estate of the ward during his or her minority and for one year thereafter.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-22. Application of property to debts contracted during minority.

Whenever a guardian of the estate only is appointed, the property of the minor in the hands of the guardian shall not be chargeable with any debt against the minor contracted during the life of his or her father; but in case any part of the property of the minor is deemed necessary for his or her support or education, the property shall be paid out by the guardian for that purpose, under the advice and direction of the probate court.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-23. Sale or mortgage of real estate.

If the personal property in the hands of a guardian is insufficient to pay the debts of his or her ward, including incumbrances on his or her estate, and the expense of supporting him or her and his or her family, the guardian may be authorized by the probate court to sell, or to mortgage for an amount decreed, the real estate of his or her ward or any interest therein for the purpose of paying debts. A guardian may also be authorized to sell the real estate of his or her ward or any interest in the real estate for the purpose of making a better investment or for any other proper purpose.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-24. Sale of personal property.

A guardian may make application for the sale of the personal estate of his or her ward, or any of it, for better or more advantageous investment, or for the support of his or her ward and the ward’s family, or for any other purpose beneficial to the ward, and for incidental charges. The application may be granted by the court of probate without notice. The court shall prescribe the manner in which the property shall be advertised and sold, and, in case of a private sale, the minimum price. From the order granting the application, there shall be no appeal.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-25. Notice of disallowance of claims.

Within thirty (30) days after the expiration of the six (6) months, the guardian shall file in the office of the probate clerk a statement disallowing any of the claims filed as he or she intends to contest, and shall give notice in writing, either personally or by registered or certified mail, to claimants whose claims are disallowed.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-26. Period after notice of claims disallowances during which actions barred — Amount to which creditor entitled — Service on guardian.

No action shall be brought or prosecuted against any person under guardianship within seven (7) months after the first publication of the notice. A creditor shall be entitled to his or her whole claim if the estate is solvent, or a dividend if the estate should prove insolvent, upon any sum as he or she may be allowed to recover. The party bringing suit, in addition to the service of the original writ, shall cause a true copy of the notice to be served upon the guardian.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-27. Investment of surplus funds — Relief from bond requirements.

Guardians may be authorized to invest any money in their hands, not needed for the payment of debts, or for the support or education of their wards, in notes secured by mortgage upon unencumbered, improved real estate situated in this state, or in the bonds or other indebtedness of the United States, or of this state, or in the bonds or notes of any city or town in this state, or in the stock of any domestic building and loan association or federal savings and loan association doing business in this state approved by the probate court, or to make deposits of money in any savings bank or trust company in this state approved by the probate court, as he or she shall deem best for the interest of his or her ward; and may also, under the direction of the probate court, invest any money in real estate or bank stocks in this state or in other safe income producing securities as the probate court may approve; and if a guardian has so deposited any money in any savings bank or trust company or invested the money in stock of any association and deposited with the clerk of the probate court the savings bankbook, share certificate or other evidence of the deposit or investment, to be held subject to the order of the court, the probate court in its discretion may relieve the guardian of the requirement of surety on his or her bond.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5; P.L. 2008, ch. 299, § 2; P.L. 2008, ch. 419, § 2.

33-15.1-28. General duties with respect to person and estate.

Every guardian of the person shall take suitable charge of the person over whom he or she shall be appointed guardian, and every guardian of the estate of another shall manage the same frugally and without waste, and shall apply the income and profits of the estate or so much as may be necessary and proper to the support and maintenance of the ward and his or her household or family.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-29. Annual account.

A guardian shall return to the probate court, in every year, his or her account, in the same manner as executors and administrators are by law required to do, and upon neglect shall be cited by the court so to do; and upon failure to comply with the citation for thirty (30) days, without sufficient excuse, shall be accountable for the full value of the estate and property of his or her ward, and shall have no compensation; but the court may, upon the application of the guardian, excuse him or her from rendering an account in any year if satisfied that it is not necessary or expedient that it should be rendered.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-30. Responsibility of guardians for education of minors.

Guardians of minors shall take special charge of their education, and guardians appointed under the provisions of § 33-15-8 shall take like charge of the education of the children of their wards, unless guardians shall be appointed for those children; and the estates of wards, and also the estates of minors, shall be liable for the education of the children and minors aforesaid in the same manner as for their support and maintenance, and the estates may be sold or mortgaged for that purpose.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-31. Powers of guardian with respect to corporate stock.

Whenever the ward is the owner of stock in any corporation, the guardian shall have and exercise in behalf of his or her ward all the rights and powers of voting, either personally or by proxy, and the right of examination of books, incident to ownership.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-32. Support of dependents for whom ward has no legal obligation to provide.

Whenever a guardian or a conservator of any person or the estate of any person is appointed by any court in this state and that person has, prior to the appointment of the guardian or conservator, provided for any other person out of his or her estate, whom the person for whom a guardian or conservator has been appointed was not under legal obligations to support or provide for, and where it appears that the person for whom a guardian or conservator has been appointed would have continued the support or provision, if the guardian or conservator had not been appointed. The superior court, upon complaint filed by the person who received the support or provision, or by the guardian or conservator, may authorize the guardian or conservator to continue to make allowances out of the estate of the person for whom a guardian or conservator has been appointed, as the court in its sound discretion deems the person for whom a guardian or conservator has been appointed would have made if a guardian or conservator had not been appointed, provided, however, that the court shall not exercise the power in cases where the person for whom a guardian or conservator has been appointed has prior to the appointment of a guardian or conservator expressly declared or requested that these powers shall not be exercised by the court. In granting this authority, the court may impose conditions or restrictions and give directions as it may deem advisable.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-33. Appeal to supreme court from proceedings under § 33-15.1-32.

An appeal may be taken to the supreme court from any final order, judgment or decree of the superior court from any final order, judgment or decree of the superior court entered in any proceeding brought under the provisions of § 33-15.1-32 at any time within twenty (20) days from the entry of the order, judgment or decree, and not thereafter.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-34. Applicability of §§ 33-15.1-32 and 33-15.1-33.

The provisions of §§ 33-15.1-32 and 33-15.1-33 shall apply to any estate where a guardian or conservator has been appointed whether prior to June 13th, 1923, or thereafter.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-35. Removal of property by nonresident guardian.

In all cases where a guardian and his or her ward are both nonresidents in this state and his or her ward is entitled to property of any description in this state, the guardian, on producing satisfactory proof to the probate court of the town where any property is situated, by certificates duly authenticated according to an act of congress in those cases, that he or she has given bond and security in the state in which he or she and his or her ward reside in double the value of the property of the ward, and it is found that a removal of the property will not prejudice the interest of any other person in the property, then the guardian may demand, sue for, recover, and remove any property to the place of residence of himself or herself or his or her ward.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-36. Order to resident guardian to deliver property to nonresident guardian.

Whenever a nonresident guardian shall produce an exemplification, under the seal, if any there be, of the proper court in the state of his or her residence, containing all the entries in relation to his or her appointment and in relation to his or her having given bond, duly authenticated as required by this chapter, the probate court of the proper town in this state may cause suitable orders to be made, discharging any resident guardian, executor, or administrator and authorizing the delivering and passing over of the property, and also requiring receipts to be passed and filed if deemed advisable: provided, that in all cases thirty (30) days’ notice shall be given to the resident guardian, executor, or administrator of the intended application for the order of removal, and the court may reject the application and refuse the order whenever it is satisfied it is for the interest of the ward or of any other person having a right in the property that the removal shall not take place.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-37. Removal of guardian — Resignation.

The court may remove any guardian appointed or approved by it who, by any reason of absence, sickness, insanity or other cause, shall become incapable of executing his or her trust, or who shall neglect or refuse to do the duties thereof, or who shall waste the estate of his or her ward, or who shall neglect or refuse to give a bond or sureties on his or her bond when ordered by the court. The court shall accept the resignation of any guardian after he or she has accounted with the court for the estate of his or her ward in his or her hands.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-38. Allowances to guardians.

Probate courts are authorized to allow in the settlement of the accounts of any guardian any reasonable sums as the guardian shall have paid for the suitable support of his or her ward and family, and also a reasonable compensation to the guardian for his or her services.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-39. Action on guardian’s bond.

If a guardian shall neglect to return a true inventory of his or her ward’s estate or shall neglect to apply the real and personal estate of his or her ward to the payment of the ward’s debts, it shall be deemed a breach of his or her bond, and he or she and his or her sureties shall be liable for an action on the bond by any creditor or person interested, and judgment shall be entered in the action, execution shall issue, and recovery shall be had in like manner as on administration bonds.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

33-15.1-40. Rights of parents or guardian to have children tested for substance abuse — Admissibility of results.

The parents or guardian of a minor child who resides with the parents or guardian shall have the authority to have the child tested for substance abuse, at the discretion of the parent or guardian. The results of any tests performed pursuant to this section shall not be admissible in any judicial proceeding, civil or criminal.

History of Section. P.L. 1992, ch. 493, § 5.

Chapter 15.2 Uniform Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act

33-15.2-101. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Uniform Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1, and P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1 enacted identical versions of this chapter.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 2, provides that this chapter takes effect on January 1, 2016, except insofar as § 33-15.2-504(b) may apply.

P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 2, provides that this chapter takes effect on January 1, 2016, except insofar as § 33-15.2-504(b) may apply.

33-15.2-102. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Adult” means an individual who has attained eighteen (18) years of age.
  2. “Conservator” means a person appointed by the court to administer the property of an adult, including a person appointed under chapter 15 of title 33.
  3. “Emergency” means circumstances that likely will result in substantial harm to a respondent’s health, safety, or welfare, and in which the appointment of a guardian is necessary because no other person has authority to and is willing to act on the respondent’s behalf.
  4. “Guardian” means a person appointed by the court to make decisions regarding the person of an adult, including a person appointed under chapter 15 of title 33.
  5. “Guardianship order” means an order appointing a guardian.
  6. “Guardianship proceeding” means a proceeding in which an order for the appointment of a guardian is sought or has been issued.
  7. “Home state” means the state in which the respondent was physically present, including any period of temporary absence, for at least six (6) consecutive months immediately before the filing of a petition for the appointment of a guardian or issuance of a protective order; or if none, the state in which the respondent was physically present, including any period of temporary absence, for at least six (6) consecutive months ending within the six (6) months prior to the filing of the petition.
  8. “Incapacitated person” means an adult for whom a guardian has been appointed.
  9. “Party” means the respondent, petitioner, guardian, conservator, or any other person allowed by the court to participate in a guardianship or protective proceeding.
  10. “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited-liability company, association, joint venture, government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, public corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity.
  11. “Protected person” means an adult for whom a protective order has been made.
  12. “Protective order” means an order appointing a conservator or another court order related to management of an adult’s property.
  13. “Protective proceeding” means a judicial proceeding in which a protective order is sought or has been issued.
  14. “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
  15. “Respondent” means an adult for whom a protective order or the appointment of a guardian is sought.
  16. “Significant-connection state” means a state, other than the home state, with which a respondent has a significant connection other than mere physical presence and in which substantial evidence concerning the respondent is available.
  17. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, a federally recognized Indian tribe, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-103. International application of chapter.

A court of this state may treat a foreign country as if it were a state for the purposes of applying: §§ 33-15.2-101 through 302; and 33-15.2-501 through 504.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-104. Communication between courts.

  1. A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state concerning a proceeding arising under this chapter. The court may allow all the parties to participate in the communication. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, the court shall make a record of the communication. The record may be limited to the fact that the communication occurred and the names of the participants.
  2. Courts may communicate concerning schedules, calendars, court records, and other administrative matters without making a record.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-105. Cooperation between courts.

  1. In a guardianship or protective proceeding in this state, a court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state to:
    1. Hold an evidentiary hearing;
    2. Order a person in that state to produce or give evidence pursuant to procedures of that state;
    3. Order that an evaluation or assessment be made of the respondent, or order any appropriate investigation of a person involved in a proceeding;
    4. Forward to the court of this state a certified copy of the transcript or other record of a hearing under subsection (a)(1) of this section or any other proceeding, any evidence otherwise presented under subsection (a)(2) of this section, and any evaluation or assessment prepared in compliance with the request under subsection (a)(3) of this section;
    5. Issue any other order necessary to assure the appearance of a person necessary to make a determination, including the respondent or the incapacitated or protected person; and
    6. Issue an order after a hearing, if requested, authorizing the release of medical, financial, criminal, or other relevant information in that state, including protected health information as defined in 45 C.F.R. 160.103, as amended, to the extent permitted by law other than this chapter.
  2. If a court of another state in which a guardianship or protective proceeding is pending requests assistance of the kind provided in subsection (a) of this section, a court of this state has jurisdiction for the limited purpose of granting the request or making reasonable efforts to comply with the request.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-106. Taking testimony in another state.

  1. In a guardianship or protective proceeding, in addition to other procedures that may be available, testimony of witnesses who are located in another state may be offered by deposition or other means allowable in this state for testimony taken in another state. The court on its own motion may order that the testimony of a witness be taken in another state and may prescribe the manner in which, and the terms upon which, the testimony is to be taken.
  2. In a guardianship or protective proceeding, a court in this state may permit a witness located in another state to be deposed or to testify by telephone or audiovisual or other electronic means. A court of this state shall cooperate with courts of other states in designating an appropriate location for the deposition or testimony.
  3. Documentary evidence transmitted from another state to a court of this state by technological means that do not produce an original writing may not be excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of transmission.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-201. Significant connection factors.

Determination of whether a respondent has a significant connection with a particular state shall include consideration of the following factors:

  1. The location of the respondent’s family and others required to be notified of the guardianship or protective proceeding;
  2. The length of time the respondent at any time was physically present in the state and the duration of any absences;
  3. The location of the respondent’s property; and
  4. The extent to which the respondent has other ties to the state, such as voting registration, filing of state or local tax returns, vehicle registration, driver’s license, social relationships, and receipt of services.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-202. Exclusive basis.

Section 8-9-9 entitled “general probate jurisdiction,” chapter 15 of title 33 entitled “limited guardianship and guardianship of adults”, and this chapter provide the jurisdictional basis for a court of this state to appoint a guardian or issue a protective order for an adult.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-203. Initial jurisdiction.

In addition to the limited or special jurisdiction under § 33-15.2-204 , a court of this state has jurisdiction to appoint a guardian or issue a protective order for a respondent if:

  1. This state is the respondent’s home state;
  2. On the date the petition is filed, this state is a significant-connection state; and
    1. The respondent does not have a home state or a court of the respondent’s home state has declined to exercise jurisdiction because this state is a more appropriate forum; or
    2. The respondent has a home state, a petition for the appointment of a guardian or protective order has not been filed in a court of that state or in another significant-connection state, and, before the court makes the appointment or issues the order:
      1. A petition for appointment or order is not filed in the respondent’s home state;
      2. An objection to the jurisdiction of the court in this state has not been filed; and
      3. The court in this state concludes that it is an appropriate forum under the factors set forth in § 33-15.2-206 ; or
  3. This state does not have jurisdiction under either subsection (1) or (2) of this section, the respondent’s home state and all significant-connection states have declined to exercise jurisdiction because this state is the more appropriate forum, and jurisdiction in this state is consistent with the constitutions of this state and the United States.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-204. Special cases.

  1. A court of this state lacking jurisdiction under § 33-15.2-203 has special jurisdiction to do any of the following:
    1. Appoint a guardian in an emergency for a term not exceeding ninety (90) days for a respondent who is physically present in this state;
    2. Issue a protective order with respect to real or tangible personal property located in this state;
    3. Appoint a guardian or conservator for an incapacitated or protected person for whom a provisional or temporary order to transfer the proceeding from another state has been issued as provided under procedures similar to § 33-15.2-301 .
  2. If a petition for the appointment of a guardian in an emergency is brought in this state and this state was not the respondent’s home state on the date the petition was filed, the court shall dismiss the proceeding at the request of the court in such other state, if any, whether dismissal is requested before or after the emergency appointment.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-205. Exclusive and continuing jurisdiction.

Except as otherwise provided in § 33-15.2-204 , a court that has appointed a guardian or issued a protective order consistent with this chapter has exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the proceeding until it is terminated by the court or the appointment or order expires by its own terms.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-206. Declining jurisdiction if another court is a more appropriate forum.

  1. A court of this state having jurisdiction under § 33-15.2-203 to appoint a guardian or issue a protective order may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if it determines at any time that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.
  2. If a court of this state declines jurisdiction over a guardianship or protective proceeding under subsection (a) of this section, it shall either dismiss the proceeding or stay the proceeding. The court may impose any other condition the court considers just and proper, including the condition that a petition for the appointment of a guardian or protective order be promptly filed in another state.
  3. In determining whether it is an appropriate forum, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including:
    1. Any expressed preference of the respondent;
    2. Whether abuse, neglect, or exploitation of the respondent has occurred or is likely to occur and which state could best protect the respondent from the abuse, neglect, or exploitation;
    3. The length of time the respondent was physically present in or was a legal resident of this or another state;
    4. The distance of the respondent from the court in each state;
    5. The financial circumstances of the respondent’s estate;
    6. The nature and location of the evidence;
    7. The ability of the court in each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present evidence;
    8. The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the proceeding; and
    9. If an appointment were made, the court’s ability to monitor the conduct of the guardian or conservator.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-207. Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct.

  1. If at any time a court of this state determines that it acquired jurisdiction to appoint a guardian or issue a protective order because of unjustifiable conduct, the court may:
    1. Decline to exercise jurisdiction;
    2. Exercise jurisdiction for the limited purpose of fashioning an appropriate remedy to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of the respondent or the protection of the respondent’s property or prevent a repetition of the unjustifiable conduct, including staying the proceeding until a petition for the appointment of a guardian or issuance of a protective order is filed in a court of another state having jurisdiction; or
    3. Continue to exercise jurisdiction after considering:
      1. The extent to which the respondent and all persons required to be notified of the proceedings has acquiesced in the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction;
      2. Whether it is a more appropriate forum than the court of any other state under the factors set forth in § 33-15.2-206(c) ; and
      3. Whether the court of any other state would have jurisdiction under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of § 33-15.2-203 .
  2. If a court of this state determines that it acquired jurisdiction to appoint a guardian or issue a protective order because a party seeking to invoke its jurisdiction engaged in unjustifiable conduct, it may assess against that party necessary and reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, investigative fees, court costs, communication expenses, witness fees and expenses, and travel expenses. The court may not assess fees, costs, or expenses of any kind against this state or a governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of this state unless authorized by law other than this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-208. Notice of proceeding.

If a petition for the appointment of a guardian or issuance of a protective order is brought in this state and this state was not the respondent’s home state on the date the petition was filed, in addition to complying with the notice requirements of this state, notice of the proceeding must be given by the petitioner to those persons who would be entitled to notice of the petition if the proceeding were brought in such other state, if any. The notice must be given in the manner as required by chapters 15 of title 33 and 22 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-209. Proceedings in more than one state.

Except for a petition for the appointment of a guardian in an emergency or a protective order limited to property located in this state as provided in § 33-15.2-204(a)(1) or (a)(2), if a petition for the appointment of a guardian or protective order is filed in this and another state and neither petition has been dismissed or withdrawn, the following rules apply:

  1. If the court in this state has jurisdiction under § 33-15.2-203 , it may proceed with the case unless a court in another state acquires jurisdiction under provisions similar to § 33-15.2-203 before the appointment or issuance of the order.
  2. If the court in this state does not have jurisdiction under § 33-15.2-203 , whether at the time the petition is filed or at any time before the appointment or issuance of the order, the court shall stay the proceeding and communicate with the court in the other state. If the court in the other state has jurisdiction, the court in this state shall dismiss the petition unless the court in the other state determines that the court of this state is a more appropriate forum.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-301. Petition to transfer jurisdiction to another state.

  1. Following the appointment of a guardian or conservator, the guardian or conservator may petition the court to transfer the guardianship or conservatorship to another state.
  2. Notice of the petition to transfer a guardianship or conservatorship under subsection (a) of this section must be given by the petitioner to those persons that would be entitled to notice of a petition in this state for the appointment of a guardian or conservator.
  3. The court shall hold a hearing on a petition filed pursuant to subsection (a).
  4. The court shall issue a temporary order granting a petition to transfer a guardianship and shall direct the guardian to petition for guardianship in the other state if the court finds that:
    1. The incapacitated person is physically present in or is reasonably expected to move permanently to the other state;
    2. An objection to the transfer has not been made or, if an objection has been made, the objector has not established that the transfer would be contrary to the interests of the incapacitated person;
    3. The court is satisfied that plans for care and services for the incapacitated person in the other state are reasonable and sufficient; and
    4. The court is satisfied that the guardianship will be accepted by the court to which the proceeding will be transferred.
  5. The court shall issue a temporary order granting a petition to transfer a conservatorship and shall direct the conservator to file a petition for conservatorship in the other state if the court finds that:
    1. The protected person is physically present in or is reasonably expected to move permanently to the other state, or the protected person has a significant connection to the other state considering the factors set forth in § 33-15.2-201 ;
    2. An objection to the transfer has not been made or, if an objection has been made, the objector has not established that the transfer would be contrary to the interests of the protected person;
    3. The court is satisfied that adequate arrangements will be made for management of the protected person’s property; and
    4. The court is satisfied that the conservatorship will be accepted by the court to which the proceeding will be transferred.
  6. The court shall issue a final order confirming the transfer and terminating the guardianship or conservatorship upon its receipt of:
    1. A provisional or temporary order accepting the proceeding from the court to which the proceeding is to be transferred which is issued under provisions similar to § 33-15.2-302 ; and
    2. The documents required to terminate a guardianship or conservatorship in this state.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-302. Petition to accept proceeding transferred from another state.

  1. Upon issuance of a provisional or temporary order in another state to transfer a guardianship or conservatorship to this state under provisions similar to those in § 33-15.2-301 , the guardian or conservator shall petition the court in this state to accept the guardianship or conservatorship. The petition must include a certified copy of the other state’s provisional or temporary order and relevant file documents.
  2. Notice of a petition under subsection (a) to accept a guardianship or conservatorship from another state must be given by the petitioner to those persons that would be entitled to notice if the petition were a petition for the appointment of a guardian or issuance of a protective order in both the transferring state and this state. The notice must be given in the manner required by chapters 15 of title 33 and 22 of title 33.
  3. The court shall hold a hearing on a petition filed pursuant to subsection (a) to accept a guardianship or conservatorship from another state.
  4. If the court is satisfied with the documentation and evidence presented, the petition filed under subsection (a) shall be granted, unless an objection is made and the objector establishes that transfer of the proceeding would be contrary to the interests of the incapacitated or protected person.
  5. No later than ninety (90) days after issuance of a permanent order accepting transfer of a guardianship or conservatorship, the court shall determine whether the guardianship or conservatorship needs to be modified to conform to the law of this state.
  6. In approving a petition under this section, the court shall recognize a guardianship or conservatorship order from the other state, including the determination of the incapacitated or protected person’s incapacity and the appointment of the guardian or conservator, if the guardian or conservator is eligible to act in this state, and the determination of the need for a guardian or conservator conforms to the law of this state.
  7. The denial of a petition filed under subsection (a) of this section to accept a guardianship or conservatorship from another state does not affect the ability of a guardian or conservator appointed by a court in another state to seek appointment as guardian of the incapacitated person or conservator of the protected person under chapter 15 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-401. Registration of guardianship orders.

If a guardian has been appointed in another state and a petition for the appointment of a guardian is not pending in this state, a guardian appointed in another state, after giving notice to the appointing court of an intent to register, may register the guardianship order in this state by filing as a foreign judgment in a court of this state in any appropriate city or town of this state certified copies of the order and letters of office.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-402. Registration of protective orders.

If a conservator has been appointed in another state and a petition for a protective order is not pending in this state, the conservator appointed in another state, after giving notice to the appointing court of an intent to register, may register the protective order in this state by filing as a foreign judgment in a court of this state, in any city or town in which property belonging to the protected person is located, certified copies of the order and letters of office and of any bond.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-403. Effect of registration.

  1. Upon registration of a guardianship or protective order from another state, the guardian or conservator may exercise in this state all powers authorized in the order of appointment except as prohibited under the laws of this state, including maintaining actions and proceedings in this state and, if the guardian or conservator is not a resident of this state, subject to any conditions imposed upon nonresident parties.
  2. A court of this state may grant any relief available under this chapter and other laws of this state to enforce a registered order.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-501. Uniformity of application and construction.

In applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-502. Relation to electronic signatures in global and national commerce act.

This chapter modifies, limits, and supersedes the Federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7001, et seq., but does not modify, limit, or supersede section 101(c) of that act, 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c), or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in section 103(b) of that act, 15 U.S.C. § 7003(b).

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-503. Reserved.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

33-15.2-504. Transitional provision.

  1. This chapter applies to guardianship and protective proceedings begun on or after January 1, 2016.
  2. For proceedings begun before January 1, 2016, whether or not a guardianship or protective order has been issued, §§ 33-15.2-101 through 106 and 33-15.2-301 through 502 apply.

History of Section. P.L. 2015, ch. 210, § 1; P.L. 2015, ch. 241, § 1.

Chapter 16 Veterans’ Guardianships

33-16-1. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Uniform Veterans’ Guardianship Act”.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-1 .

Collateral References.

Constitutionality, construction, and effect of the Uniform Veterans’ Guardianship Act. 173 A.L.R. 1061.

Validity, construction, and application of Uniform Veterans’ Guardianship Act. 113 A.L.R.5th 283.

33-16-2. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Administrator” means the administrator of veterans affairs of the United States or his or her successor.
  2. “Benefits” means all money paid or payable by the United States through the veterans administration.
  3. “Conservator” shall mean any person acting as fiduciary for the estate of any “ward” who by reason of advanced age or mental weakness is unable to properly care for his or her estate.
  4. “Estate” means income on hand and assets acquired partially or wholly with “income”.
    1. “Guardian” shall mean any person acting as fiduciary for the person and estate or person or estate of any “ward”.
    2. “Guardian” shall include conservators.
  5. “Income” means money received from the veterans administration and revenue or profit from any property wholly or partially acquired therewith.
  6. “Person” means an individual, a partnership, a corporation or an association.
  7. “Veterans administration” means the veterans administration, its predecessors or successors.
  8. “Ward” means a beneficiary of the veterans administration.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-2 .

33-16-3. Administrator as party to guardianship proceedings — Notice.

The administrator shall be a party in interest in any proceeding for the appointment or removal of a guardian, or for the removal of the disability of minority or mental incapacity of a ward, and in any suit or other proceeding affecting in any manner the administration by the guardian of the estate of any present or former ward whose estate includes assets derived in whole or in part from benefits before or hereafter paid by the veterans administration. Not less than fifteen (15) days prior to a hearing in this matter, notice in writing of the time and place of the hearing shall be given by mail (unless waived in writing) to the office of the veterans administration having jurisdiction over the area in which any suit or any proceeding is pending.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-3 .

33-16-4. Appointments governed by chapter.

Whenever, pursuant to any law of the United States or regulation of the veterans administration, it is necessary, prior to the payment of benefits, that a guardian be appointed, the appointment may be made in the manner provided in this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-4 .

33-16-5. Maximum number of wards.

No person other than a bank or trust company shall be a guardian of more than five (5) wards at one time, unless all the wards are members of one family. Upon presentation of a petition by an attorney of the veterans administration, or other interested person, alleging that a guardian is acting in a fiduciary capacity for more than five (5) wards as provided in this chapter and requesting his or her discharge for that reason, the court, upon proof substantiating the petition, shall require a final accounting forthwith from the guardian and shall discharge him or her from guardianships in excess of five (5) and forthwith appoint a successor.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-5 .

33-16-6. Filing of petition for appointment of guardian.

A petition for the appointment of a guardian may be filed by any relative or friend of the ward or by any person who is authorized by law to file a petition. If there is no person so authorized or if the person so authorized refuses or fails to file a petition within thirty (30) days after the mailing of notice by the veterans administration to the last known address of the person, if any, indicating the necessity for the appointment, a petition for appointment may be filed by any resident of this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-6 .

Cross References.

Fees excused, § 33-22-22 .

33-16-7. Contents of petition for appointment.

The petition for appointment shall set forth the name, age, place of residence of the ward, the name and place of residence of the nearest relative, if known, and the fact that the ward is entitled to receive benefits payable by or through the veterans administration and shall set forth the amount of money then due and the amount of probable future payments.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-7 .

33-16-8. Additional facts shown by petition — Selection of guardian.

The petition shall also set forth the name and address of the person or institution, if any, having actual custody of the ward and the name, age, relationship, if any, occupation and address of the proposed guardian, and if the nominee is a natural person, the number of wards for whom the nominee is presently acting as guardian. Notwithstanding any law as to priority of persons entitled to appointment, or the nomination in the petition, the court may appoint some other individual, a bank, or trust company as guardian, if the court determines it is for the best interest of the ward.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-8 .

33-16-9. Rating of mental incompetence shown in petition.

In the case of a mentally incompetent ward, the petition shall show if this be the fact, that the ward has been rated incompetent by the veterans administration on examination in accordance with the laws and regulations governing the veterans administration.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-9 .

Collateral References.

Mental condition which will justify the appointment of guardian, committee, or conservator of the estate for an incompetent or spendthrift. 9 A.L.R.3d 774.

33-16-10. Showing of minority as evidence of necessity for guardian.

Where a petition is filed for the appointment of a guardian for a minor, a certificate of the administrator or his or her authorized representative, setting forth the age of the minor as shown by the records of the veterans administration, and the fact that the appointment of a guardian is a condition precedent to the payment of any money due the minor by the veterans administration, may be used as prima facie evidence of the necessity for the appointment.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-10 .

33-16-11. Certificate of mental incompetence as evidence of necessity for guardian.

Where a petition is filed for the appointment of a guardian for a mentally incompetent ward, a certificate of the administrator or his or her duly authorized representative, that the person has been rated incompetent by the veterans administration on examination in accordance with the laws and regulations governing the veterans administration, and that the appointment of a guardian is a condition precedent to the payment of any money due the ward by the veterans administration, shall be prima facie evidence of the necessity for the appointment.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-11 .

33-16-12. Notice of petition for guardianship.

  1. Upon the filing of a petition for the appointment of a guardian under this chapter, notice shall be given to the ward, to any other persons, and in any manner as is provided by the general law of this state, and also to the veterans administration as provided by this chapter.
  2. Where no person is designated to give a notice required by this section, the clerk of the proper court shall give the requisite notice.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-12 .

33-16-13. Filing of bond.

Upon the appointment of a guardian, he or she shall execute and file a bond to be approved by the court in an amount not less than the estimated value of the personal estate and anticipated income of the ward during the ensuing year. The bond shall be in the form and be conditioned as required of guardians appointed under the general guardianship laws of this state. The court may from time to time require the guardian to file an additional bond.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-13 .

33-16-14. Sureties on bond.

Where a bond is tendered by a guardian with personal sureties, there shall be at least two (2) sureties and they shall file with the court a certificate under oath which shall describe the property owned, both real and personal, and shall state that each is worth the sum named in the bond as the penalty thereof over and above all his or her debts and liabilities and the aggregate of other bonds on which he or she is principal or surety and exclusive of property exempt from execution. The court may require additional security or may require a corporate surety bond, the premium on the bond to be paid from the ward’s estate.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-14 .

33-16-15. Filing of annual account.

Every guardian, who has received or shall receive on account of his or her ward any money or other thing of value from the veterans administration shall file with the court annually, in addition to any other accounts as may be required by the court, a full, true, and accurate account under oath of all money or other things of value received by him or her, all earnings, interest or profits derived therefrom, all property acquired therewith, all disbursements therefrom, and showing the balance thereof in his or her hands at the date of the account and how it is invested.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-15 .

33-16-16. Exhibition of securities and investments — Filing of certificates.

The guardian, at the time of filing any account, shall exhibit all securities or investments held by him or her to an officer of the bank or other depository wherein the securities or investments are held for safekeeping, or to an authorized representative of the corporation which is surety on his or her bond, or to the judge or clerk of a court of record in this state, or, upon request of the guardian or other interested party, to any other reputable person designated by the court, who shall certify in writing that he or she has examined the securities or investments and identified them with those described in the account, and shall note any omissions or discrepancies. If the depository is the guardian, the certifying officer shall not be the officer verifying the account. The guardian may exhibit the securities or investments to the judge of the court, who shall endorse on the account and copy a certificate that the securities or investments shown to him or her as held by the guardian were each in fact exhibited to him or her and that those exhibited to him or her were the same as those shown in the account, and noting any omission or discrepancy. That certificate and the certificate of an official of the bank in which are deposited any funds for which the guardian is accountable, showing the amount on deposit, shall be prepared and signed in duplicate and one of each shall be filed by the guardian with his or her account.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-16 .

33-16-17. Notice of proceedings to veterans administration and others.

At the time of filing in the court any account, a certified copy of the account and a signed duplicate of each certificate filed with the court shall be sent by the guardian to the office of the veterans administration having jurisdiction over the area in which the court is located. A signed duplicate, or a certified copy of any petition, motion or other pleading, pertaining to an account, or to any matter other than an account, and which is filed in the guardianship proceedings or in any proceeding for the purpose of removing the disability of minority or mental incapacity, shall be furnished by the person filing the same to the proper office of the veterans administration. Unless a hearing be waived in writing by the attorney of the veterans administration, and by all other persons, if any, entitled to notice, the court shall fix a time and place for the hearing on the account, petition, motion or other pleading not less than fifteen (15) days nor more than sixty (60) days from the date same is filed, unless a different available date be stipulated in writing. Unless waived in writing, written notice of the time and place of hearing shall be given to the veterans administration office concerned, the guardian and any others entitled to notice, not less than fifteen (15) days prior to the date fixed for the hearing. The notice may be given by mail in which event it shall be deposited in the mail not less than fifteen (15) days prior to the hearing date. The court, or clerk of court, shall mail to the veterans administration office a copy of each order entered in any guardianship proceeding in which the administrator is an interested party.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-17 .

33-16-18. Accounting for property other than from veterans administration.

If the guardian is accountable for property derived from sources other than the veterans administration, he or she shall be accountable as is or may be required under the applicable law of this state pertaining to the property of minors or persons of unsound mind who are not beneficiaries of the veterans administration, and as to any other property shall be entitled to the compensation provided by law. The account for other property may be combined with the account filed in accordance with § 33-16-15 .

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-18 .

33-16-19. Grounds for removal of guardian.

If any guardian shall fail to file with the court any account as required by this chapter, or by an order of the court, when any account is due or within thirty (30) days after a citation issues as provided by law, or shall fail to furnish the veterans administration a true copy of any account, petition or pleading as required by this chapter, such failure may, in the discretion of the court, be grounds for his or her removal.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-19 .

33-16-20. Compensation of guardians.

Compensation payable to guardians shall be based upon services rendered and shall not exceed five percent (5%) of the amount of money received during the period covered by the account. In the event of extraordinary services by any guardian, the court, upon petition and hearing, may authorize reasonable additional compensation for the guardian. A copy of the petition and notice of hearing shall be given to the proper office of the veterans administration in the manner provided in the case of a hearing on a guardian’s account or other pleading. No commission or compensation shall be allowed on the money or other assets received from a prior guardian, nor upon the amount received from liquidation of loans, or other investments.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-20 .

33-16-21. Investments.

Every guardian shall invest the surplus funds of his or her ward’s estate in securities or property as authorized under the laws of this state, but only upon prior order of the court; except that the funds may be invested, without prior court authorization, in direct unconditional interest bearing obligations of this state or of the United States and in obligations the interest and principal of which are unconditionally guaranteed by the United States. A signed duplicate or certified copy of the petition for authority to invest shall be furnished the proper office of the veterans administration, and notice of a hearing on investments shall be given the office as provided in the case of hearing on a guardian’s account.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-21 .

Cross References.

Investment of guardianship funds, § 33-15-35 .

33-16-22. Support of persons other than ward, spouse, and children.

A guardian shall not apply any portion of the income or the estate for the support or maintenance of any person other than the ward, the spouse and the minor children of the ward, except upon petition to the probate court and prior order thereon after a hearing. A signed duplicate or certified copy of the petition shall be furnished the proper office of the veterans administration and notice of hearing thereon shall be given the office as provided in the case of hearing on a guardian’s account or other pleading.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-22 .

33-16-23. Purchase of real estate.

  1. The court may authorize the purchase of the entire fee simple title or the entire equity of redemption to real estate in this state in which the guardian has no interest, but only as a home for the ward, or to protect his or her interest, or as a home for his or her dependent family. The purchase of real estate shall not be made except upon the entry of an order of the court after hearing upon verified petition. A copy of the petition shall be furnished the proper office of the veterans administration and notice of a hearing on the purchase of real estate shall be given the office as provided in the case of a hearing on a guardian’s account.
  2. Before authorizing this investment, the court shall require written evidence of value, title and the advisability of acquiring the real estate. Title shall be taken in the ward’s name. This section does not limit the right of the guardian on behalf of his or her ward to bid and to become the purchaser of real estate at a sale thereof pursuant to a decree of foreclosure of lien held by or for the ward, or at a trustee’s sale, to protect the ward’s right in the property so foreclosed or sold; nor does it limit the right of the guardian, if necessary to protect the ward’s interest and upon prior order of the court in which the guardianship is pending, to agree with co-tenants of the ward for a partition in kind, or to purchase from co-tenants the entire undivided interests held by them, or to bid and purchase the real estate at a sale under a partition decree, or to compromise adverse claims of title to the ward’s realty.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-23 ; P.L. 1959, ch. 88, § 1.

33-16-24. Certified copies of public records.

When a copy of any public record is required by the veterans administration to be used in determining the eligibility of any person to participate in benefits made available by the veterans administration, the official custodian of the public record shall, without charge, provide the applicant for the benefits, any person acting on his or her behalf, or the authorized representative of the veterans administration, with a certified copy of the record.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-24 .

33-16-25. Termination of guardianship.

In addition to any other provisions of law relating to judicial restoration and discharge of a guardian, a certificate by the veterans administration showing that a minor ward has attained majority, or that an incompetent ward has been rated competent by the veterans administration upon examination in accordance with law shall be prima facie evidence that the ward has attained majority, or has recovered his or her competency. Upon hearing after notice as provided by this chapter and the determination by the court that the ward has attained majority or has recovered his or her competency, an order shall be entered to that effect, and the guardian shall file a final account. Upon hearing after notice to the former ward and to the veterans administration as in case of other accounts, upon approval of the final account, and upon delivery to the ward of the assets due him or her from the guardian, the guardian shall be discharged and his or her sureties released.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-25 .

33-16-26. Commitment to federal agency for medical treatment.

Whenever, in any proceeding under the laws of this state for the commitment of a person alleged to be of unsound mind or otherwise in need of confinement in a hospital or other institution for his or her proper care, it is determined after adjudication of the status of the person as may be required by law that commitment to a hospital for mental disease or other institution is necessary for safekeeping or treatment and it appears that the person is eligible for care or treatment by the veterans administration or other agency of the United States government, the court, upon receipt of a certificate from the veterans administration or other agency showing that facilities are available and that the person is eligible for care or treatment therein, may commit the person to the veterans administration or other agency. The person whose commitment is sought shall be personally served with notice of the pending commitment proceeding in the manner as provided by the law of this state; and nothing in this chapter shall affect his or her right to appear and be heard in the proceedings.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-26 .

33-16-27. Powers of federal agencies over persons committed — Retention of jurisdiction by court.

Upon commitment, a person, when admitted to any facility operated by any federal agency within or outside of this state, shall be subject to the rules and regulations of the veterans administration or other agency. The chief officer of any facility of the veterans administration or institution operated by any other agency of the United States to which the person is committed shall with respect to that person be vested with the same powers as superintendents of state hospitals for mental diseases within this state with respect to retention of custody, transfer, parole or discharge. Jurisdiction is retained in the committing or other appropriate court of this state at any time to inquire into the mental condition of the person so committed, and to determine the necessity for continuance of his or her restraint, and all commitments pursuant to this chapter are so conditioned.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-27 .

33-16-28. Effect of commitments by foreign courts.

The judgment or order of commitment by a court of competent jurisdiction of another state or of the District of Columbia committing a person to the veterans administration, or other agency of the United States government for care or treatment shall have the same force and effect as to the committed person while in this state as in the jurisdiction in which is situated the court entering the judgment or making the order; and the courts of the committing state, or the District of Columbia, shall be deemed to have retained jurisdiction of the person committed for the purpose of inquiring into the mental condition of the person, and of determining the necessity for continuance of his or her restraint as is provided in § 33-16-27 with respect to persons committed by the courts of this state. Consent is hereby given to the application of the law of the committing state or district in respect to the authority of the chief officer of any facility of the veterans administration, or of any institution operated in this state by any other agency of the United States, to retain custody, or transfer, parole, or discharge the committed person.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-28 .

33-16-29. Transfer of persons with mental illness to federal agencies.

Upon receipt of a certificate of the veterans administration or other agency of the United States that facilities are available for the care or treatment of any person theretofore committed to any hospital or other institution for the care or treatment of persons with mental illness and that the person is eligible for care or treatment, the superintendent of the institution may cause the transfer of the person to the veterans administration or other agency of the United States for care or treatment. Upon effecting any transfer, the committing court or proper court officer shall be notified of the transfer by the transferring agency. No person shall be transferred to the veterans administration or other agency of the United States if he or she be confined pursuant to conviction of any felony or misdemeanor, or if he or she has been acquitted of the charge solely on the ground of insanity, unless prior to transfer the court or other authority originally committing the person shall enter an order for such transfer after appropriate motion and hearing.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-29 ; P.L. 1999, ch. 83, § 78; P.L. 1999, ch. 130, § 78.

33-16-30. Transfer to federal agency having effect of original commitment.

Any person transferred as provided in § 33-16-29 shall be deemed to be committed to the veterans administration or other agency of the United States pursuant to the original commitment.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-30 .

33-16-31. Commitment of insane person to federal agency.

Upon the written application of the parent, guardian, relative or friend of any person, accompanied by the certificate of two (2) practicing physicians, registered in the state, that the person is insane, the veterans administration or other agency of the United States government, is hereby authorized to receive the insane person for care and treatment upon terms as may be fixed by the veterans administration or other agency of the United States government in its discretion.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-31 .

33-16-32. Applicability of general laws of guardian and ward.

Except where inconsistent with this chapter, laws of this state relating to guardian, ward, and the judicial practice relating thereto, including the right to trial by jury and the right of appeal, shall be applicable to beneficiaries and their estates.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-32 .

33-16-33. Applicability of chapter to guardians appointed under other law.

The provisions of this chapter relating to surety bonds and the administration of estates of wards shall apply to all “income” and “estate” as defined in § 33-16-2 , whether the guardian shall have been appointed under this chapter or under any other law of this state, special or general, prior or subsequent to the enactment of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 23; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-33 .

33-16-34. Uniformity of construction.

This chapter shall be construed to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 19; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-34 .

33-16-35. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are declared to be severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1711, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 33-16-35 .

Chapter 17 Bonds of Executors, Administrators, and Guardians

33-17-1. Conditions of bond.

Every executor, administrator, and guardian, before entering upon the execution of his or her trust, shall give bond to the probate court in any sum as it shall require, with sufficient surety or sureties, and with condition, except as provided in §§ 33-17-3 and 33-17-4 , substantially as follows:

  1. In the case of an executor or administrator with the will annexed:
    1. To make and return to the probate court, as by law required, a true inventory of all the testator’s personal property which, at the time of making the inventory, shall have come to his or her possession or knowledge.
    2. To administer according to law and the will of the testator, all the personal property of the testator which may come to his or her possession or into the possession of any person for him or her, and all rents and proceeds of real estate which may be received by him or her.
    3. To render upon oath true accounts of his or her administration, as by law required.
  2. In the case of an administrator:
    1. To make and return to the probate court, as by law required, a true inventory of all the intestate’s personal property which, at the time of making the inventory, shall have come to his or her possession or knowledge.
    2. To administer according to law all the personal property of the deceased and rents which may come into his or her possession or into the possession of any person for him or her.
    3. To render upon oath true accounts of his or her administration, as by law required.
    4. To deliver his or her letters of administration into the court if a will of the deceased is thereafter proved and allowed, and to settle his or her account in the probate court and to pay over and deliver all the assets remaining in his or her hands or due from him or her on settlement to the executor of the will.
  3. In the case of a guardian of an estate:
    1. To make and return to the probate court, as by law required, a true inventory of all the real and personal property of the ward which, at the time of making inventory, shall have come to his or her possession or knowledge.
    2. To manage and dispose of all property according to law and for the best interests of the ward, and faithfully to perform his or her trust.
    3. To render upon oath, as by law required, a true account of the property of his or her ward and of his or her management and disposition thereof.
    4. At the expiration of his or her trust to settle his or her account in the probate court, or with the ward or his or her legal representative, and to pay over and deliver all the property remaining in his or her hands or due from him or her on settlement to the person entitled to the property.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1012; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-1 .

Cross References.

Joint control by sureties of deposits of money or assets, § 18-8-1 .

Jurisdiction of probate court, § 8-9-9 .

Prisoner’s estate, bond of administrator, § 13-6-7 .

Trust company, bond given by, § 19-5-7 .

Trust company, security for fiduciary obligation, § 19-8-1 et seq.

Veteran’s guardianship, bond in, §§ 33-16-13 , 33-16-14 .

Comparative Legislation.

Fiduciary bonds:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-139 et seq.

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 205, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Affidavit of Complete Administration.

The third requirement of subsection (2) is not satisfied by filing an affidavit of complete administration. Smith v. Estate of Catterall, 107 R.I. 729 , 271 A.2d 300, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 835 (1970).

Bond for Several Estates.

A guardian may give one bond which covers the guardianship of several persons and need not give separate bonds. Court of Probate v. Sprague, 3 R.I. 205 , 1855 R.I. LEXIS 34 (1855).

Inventory Required.

Probate court should not have approved an account by executors which charged themselves with various items of personal estate at values fixed by themselves without any attempt at taking an inventory. Hayes v. Welling, 35 R.I. 76 , 85 A. 630, 1913 R.I. LEXIS 3 (1913).

Termination of Guardianship.

When guardianship is terminated by majority of the ward, the guardian may account either by filing a final account in the probate court or by settling with the ward. Probate Court v. Higgins, 58 R.I. 58 , 191 A. 260, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 12 (1937).

Collateral References.

Accounting as necessary condition of action on bond. 119 A.L.R. 84.

Appeal taken by executor, administrator, or guardian, official bond as covering. 132 A.L.R. 1280.

Bank deposit in his own name or other form not indicating fiduciary character, liability of guardian for loss of. 43 A.L.R. 600.

Bank, liability of bond for loss of money deposited in, by executor or administrator in his representative capacity. 60 A.L.R. 488.

Bond of executor or administrator as covering debt due from principal to decedent. 8 A.L.R. 84.

Bond of executor or administrator, liability on, for proceeds of sale of real estate under power of will. 104 A.L.R. 202.

Defalcation or deficit occurring before bond was given, liability of sureties on bond for. 82 A.L.R. 585.

Delay of executor or administrator in completing administration as affecting liability on bond. 85 A.L.R. 440.

Guardian of minor beneficiary of estate, responsibility of executor or administrator or his bond for default of. 54 A.L.R. 1274.

Interest on account of preferential payment to distributee before payment to other distributees, liability of bondsmen for. 91 A.L.R. 705.

Invalidity of appointment of administrator as affecting liability of surety on his bond. 113 A.L.R. 411.

Liability of guardian’s surety as affected by guardian’s agreement limiting his control over funds or investments. 102 A.L.R. 1108.

Public officer administering estate, liability on bond of, for acts or defaults after termination of office. 81 A.L.R. 63.

33-17-1.2. When surety not required.

  1. No surety shall be required on any bond, including surety on a bond for the sale of real estate, of an administrator of the estate of a person who died intestate, when the administrator is the surviving spouse or the sole heir of the decedent, or when the administrator is an heir-at-law of the decedent who demonstrates to the satisfaction of the probate court that circumstances warrant the waiver of surety and/or that no surety should be required. The probate court may require surety in any instance where it finds the circumstances so warrant such surety.
  2. In making a determination as to whether surety should be required, the probate court’s consideration may include, but shall not be limited to, the following:
    1. The total number of the decedent’s heirs at law;
    2. The relationship of the heirs at law to one another;
    3. The extent to which there appears to be issues and/or conflicts between the heirs at law in regard to the decedent’s estate, or the corresponding lack of such issues and/or conflicts; and
    4. The total size, extent and monetary value of the decedent’s estate; and

      In making a determination pursuant to provisions of this section, the court may conduct such hearings as it deems appropriate.

History of Section. P.L. 1977, ch. 112, § 1; P.L. 1985, ch. 159, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 484, § 2.

33-17-1.3. When surety not required for guardians.

  1. No surety shall be required on any bond of a guardian of the person and/or estate when the guardian is the spouse, parent, child, brother, sister, or other heir at law of the ward if the guardian demonstrates to the satisfaction of the probate court that circumstances warrant the waiver of surety and/or that no surety should be required.
  2. In making a determination as to whether surety should be required for guardians, the probate court’s consideration may include, but shall not be limited to, the following:
    1. The total number of the ward’s heirs at law;
    2. The relationship of the ward’s heirs at law to one another;
    3. The extent to which there appears to be issues and/or conflicts between the ward’s heirs at law in regard to the guardianship, or the corresponding lack of such issues and/or conflicts; and
    4. The total size, extent, and monetary value of the ward’s estate.
  3. In making a determination pursuant to the provision of this section, the court may conduct any hearings that it deems appropriate. The provisions of this section shall apply to both temporary and/or full guardianships.

History of Section. P.L. 1985, ch. 479, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 484, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 363, § 9.

33-17-2. Meaning of condition in bond of “faithful performance”.

A condition in any bond given to the court requiring that the executor, administrator, or guardian, as the case may be, “shall faithfully perform his or her duties according to law as such fiduciary”, shall have the same force, meaning, and effect as a full recitation of the conditions imposed by the provisions of § 33-17-1 would have, if incorporated in the bond in full.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 371, § 1, as enacted by P.L. 1930, ch. 1537, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-2 .

33-17-3. Bond to pay debts, legacies, and allowances.

Instead of the above bond, an executor, if so authorized by the will, or if he or she be the residuary legatee of the will, may give a bond to the probate court in a sum and with surety satisfactory to the court, and with condition to pay the funeral charges, debts and legacies of the testator and any allowance as may be made by the court for the support of the widow and family of the testator. In this case, an executor shall not be required to return an inventory, and an executor who is a residuary legatee need not render an account to the probate court. The giving of bond shall not discharge the lien on the real property of the testator for the payment of his or her debts, except on any part as may be sold by his or her executor or administrator with the will annexed to a purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration; and all property not so sold may be taken on execution by a creditor not otherwise satisfied, in like manner as if a bond had been given in the other form.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1013; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 2; P.L. 1915, ch. 1260, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-3 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Election of Form of Bond.

Executor who filed bond under this section, instead of bond under § 33-17-1 , could not later, after he discovered that assets were not sufficient to pay legacies, enjoin suit on his bond by legatees on the ground that he was advised by the clerk to file the bond under this section. Adams v. Probate Court, 26 R.I. 239 , 58 A. 782, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 63 (1904).

Filing of Claim.

In order for a creditor to recover in suit on bond given under this section, he must show that he has filed a claim within the statutory period. Municipal Court of Providence v. Bostwick, 31 R.I. 550 , 78 A. 53, 1910 R.I. LEXIS 92 (1910).

Inventory Excused.

Executor named in will who filed a bond under this section which was accepted by probate court was exempted from filing additional bond to return inventory. State ex rel. Leonard v. Clark, 24 R.I. 470 , 53 A. 636, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 110 (1902).

Security for Contingent Claims.

An executrix and residuary legatee who filed a bond under this section merged the estate in the bond and thereafter the probate court could not order the executrix to file sufficient assets to secure a contingent claim. Bowler v. Emery, 29 R.I. 310 , 70 A. 7, 1908 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1908).

Surplus Conditions.

Inclusion in bond given under this section of a condition requiring executor to account, though not required by this section, did not invalidate the other conditions of the bond. Probate Court v. Adams, 27 R.I. 97 , 60 A. 769, 1905 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1905).

Unfaithful Administration.

Procedure outlined in § 33-17-16 for creditor to show unfaithful administration is not applicable to suits on bonds given under this section. Municipal Court of Providence v. Bostwick, 31 R.I. 550 , 78 A. 53, 1910 R.I. LEXIS 92 (1910).

Waste Immaterial.

In a suit on a bond given under this section, the issue of waste was immaterial, since it was not a proceeding to recover out of the estate. Probate Court v. Adams, 27 R.I. 97 , 60 A. 769, 1905 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1905).

33-17-4. Testamentary exemption from bond or surety.

An order or request in a will that an executor or guardian shall be exempt from giving bond or surety shall only exempt the executor or guardian from giving surety. The probate court, however, may require the executor or guardian at any time to give bond with surety or sureties.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1015; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-4 .

33-17-5. Failure to give bond as declination of trust.

An executor, administrator, or guardian, required by the provisions of §§ 33-17-1 33-17-4 to give bond, who for thirty (30) days after his or her appointment fails to file a bond approved by the court, may be adjudged to have declined the trust.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1017; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-5 .

33-17-6. Defective bonds.

An executor, administrator or guardian who has given to the probate court an instrument purporting to be a bond, which has been accepted as a bond by the court having jurisdiction to accept it, shall be qualified as if he or she had given a proper bond, notwithstanding any defect in the instrument and notwithstanding any error committed in giving or accepting the bond; but nothing contained in this section shall affect the right of appeal in these cases or the right of the court to require a proper bond at any time. In case an appeal be sustained, the provisions of § 33-17-5 shall not apply, if a new and satisfactory bond be given within thirty (30) days after a final decree in the appeal.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1017; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-6 .

33-17-7. Examination and approval of bond.

No bond required to be given to a probate court shall be accepted until it has been examined and approved by the court, or examined by the clerk and found to conform to the order of the court, and the approval of the court or clerk entered of record.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1018; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 7; P.L. 1915, ch. 1260, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 6; P.L. 1930, ch. 1537, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-7 .

Collateral References.

Approval of bond, right of surety to take advantage of noncompliance with statutory requirement as to. 77 A.L.R. 1482.

33-17-8. Joint fiduciaries.

Joint executors, administrators and guardians may give either a joint or several bond, or each may give a separate bond.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1019; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-8 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Failure to Require Bond.

Probate decree would be reversed where court did not require either a joint bond or several bonds to be given by executors but left such determination to the parties. Chamberlain v. Anthony, 21 R.I. 331 , 43 A. 646, 1899 R.I. LEXIS 71 (1899).

Multiple Executors.

Where there was more than one executor, the probate court could require either a joint bond or several bonds. Chamberlain v. Anthony, 21 R.I. 331 , 43 A. 646, 1899 R.I. LEXIS 71 (1899).

33-17-9. Bonds payable to and suable by court — Lost bonds.

All bonds required to be given to a probate court shall be made payable to the court, and shall be filed in the office of the probate clerk. In case a bond is lost, a copy of the record of it shall be admitted in evidence. These bonds shall be sued in the name of the court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1020; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-9 .

33-17-10. Requiring further bond or sureties.

  1. If a bond given to a probate court is insufficient either in amount or security, the court shall require further bond, surety, or sureties of the executor, administrator, or guardian, and on his or her neglect or refusal to give further bond or sureties within the time fixed by the court, the court shall remove the executor, administrator, or guardian without further notice, and appoint an administrator or guardian, respectively, to succeed him or her.
  2. In the event a probate court requires: (a) a fiduciary to file a bond with surety, and the amount is subsequently ordered to be increased; or (b) in the event a bond with surety is ordered for a temporary guardian, and the bond is ordered to be increased upon the entry/appointment of a permanent guardianship, the court may order the same bond to remain in effect and to be increased in an appropriate amount, as necessary.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1021; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-10 ; P.L. 1999, ch. 484, § 2.

33-17-11. Cancelation of bond — New bond.

A probate court, for cause shown, may cancel the bond of an executor, administrator, or guardian so as to relieve the principal and sureties for any breach thereafter committed, and may take and accept a new and sufficient bond in its stead.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1022; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-11 .

Collateral References.

Discretion or power of court, after bond of executor or administrator has been given, to dispense with, discontinue, or modify bond. 121 A.L.R. 951.

33-17-12. Release of surety — New surety — Action by surety against principal.

Upon a bond taken by a probate court, the surety, or his or her heirs, executors, or administrators, may at any time make written application to the court for relief from further liability on the bond, and thereupon the court shall cause reasonable notice of the application to be given to the principal on the bond and to all persons whom the court shall find to be directly interested in the estate for the security of which the bond was given, to appear and be heard upon the application. If it appears that the petition can be granted without prejudice to the estate, the court may order the principal to give, within such time as it may limit, a new probate bond; and if the order is not complied with, may remove him or her and appoint a successor. If the new bonds be duly given and approved, the surety on the original bond and his or her representatives shall not be liable for any breach thereafter committed, nor shall the surety or sureties on the succeeding bond be liable for any default occurring prior to the approval of the new bond. In any case where the surety upon any bond has become liable on the bond, he or she shall have liberty to institute any proper suit against his or her principal for his or her protection.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1023; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-12 .

33-17-13. Order to principal on bond to exhibit condition of estate.

A surety, or any other person interested in a probate bond, may at any time make written application to the court for an order requiring the principal to exhibit fully before the court the condition of the estate held by him or her, so that it may be ascertained whether or not the estate is being properly managed; and thereupon the court shall cause reasonable notice of the application to be given to the principal on the bond, and if, upon hearing, the court shall find that the application is made in good faith, it shall make the order. If the principal shall refuse to obey the order, or if, upon obeying it, the court shall find that the estate is not being properly managed by him or her, it shall remove him or her and appoint a successor.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1024; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-13 .

33-17-14. Copies of bond — Suit in name of court.

Every person interested in a bond given to a probate court shall be entitled to a copy of the bond on payment of the fee therefor, and to sue on the bond in the name of the court to which the bond is given.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1025; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-14 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Right to Compel Account.

An action to compel the administrator to render an account will not lie when brought by an uninterested person, since such person could not bring an action on the bond in case the citation is disregarded. Dunnell v. Municipal Court, 9 R.I. 189 , 1869 R.I. LEXIS 8 (1869).

Rights of Residuary Legatee.

Action for debt on the bond of the executor, alleging failure to exhibit a particular inventory and to account, could be maintained for a residuary devisee and legatee, as § 33-13-10 , giving right to such legatee to bring an action of account, is expressly without prejudice to any other remedies. Probate Court v. Potter, 22 R.I. 326 , 47 A. 889, 1900 R.I. LEXIS 119 (1900).

Suit by Co-Executor.

A legatee who is also a co-executor can sue the sureties on a joint and several bond for the default of the other executor. Municipal Court v. Whaley, 25 R.I. 289 , 55 A. 750, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 67 (1903).

33-17-15. Beneficiaries of suit on bond shown — Costs.

The writ, in addition to the usual indorsement of the name of the plaintiff and attorney, if there be one, shall also have written thereon the name or names of the person or persons for whose benefit the suit is brought, who shall give surety for costs as in other cases, and against whom, if the defendant recover, execution for costs shall issue.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1026; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-15 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Administration Bond.

The party for whose benefit suit is brought on an administration bond is viewed as a plaintiff and is under no obligation to give surety for costs, except upon cause shown. Court of Probate v. Hopkins, 3 R.I. 282 , 1856 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1856).

The indorsement of the name of the person for whose benefit the bond is sued must be on the writ before service in order for service to be valid and cannot be added by amendment after service. Probate Court v. Lamphear, 14 R.I. 291 , 1883 R.I. LEXIS 63 (1883).

33-17-16. Facts to be shown by creditor suing on bond.

If a suit is brought by a creditor of the deceased person, he or she shall show:

  1. That his or her claim has been duly filed;
  2. That his or her claim has not been disallowed by the executor or administrator, or has been established by commissioners, or by judgment; and
  3. That a decree of unfaithful administration has been entered as provided in § 33-17-17 , and if the estate be insolvent, he or she shall also produce a copy of the order of distribution.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1027; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-16 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Allowance or Disallowance of Claims.

Where executor failed to file statement allowing or denying claims, creditor could not sue on the bond before claim was ascertained by judgment and payment demanded of executor. Municipal Court of Providence v. Wilbour, 23 R.I. 95 , 49 A. 488, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 93 (1901).

In assumpsit against executor, allegation that executor failed to file statement in probate court either allowing or denying claim was proper, even if not necessary, as the presumption would be that he had acted as the law required and had duly rejected such claim. Slocom v. Wilbour, 23 R.I. 97 , 49 A. 489, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 95 (1901).

Decree of Unfaithful Administration.

Judgment creditor of decedent’s estate could not recover on executor’s bond before citation issued by probate court under § 33-17-17 , in the absence of an order for payment or distribution, because the court might find reasonable ground for delay in payment. Probate Court v. Williams, 23 R.I. 515 , 51 A. 101, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 139 (1902).

Both creditors with claims ascertained by judgment and creditors with allowed claims must cite the administrator under § 33-17-17 before suit on the bond. Probate Court v. Williams, 23 R.I. 515 , 51 A. 101, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 139 (1902).

— Collateral Attack on Decree.

Defendant in suit on bond could not avoid the effect of a decree of unfaithful administration, since if he was aggrieved by the entry of the decree and entitled to a revision by virtue of newly discovered evidence, his remedy was by petition filed within one year after entry of decree. Probate Court v. Fitz-Simon, 29 R.I. 358 , 71 A. 641, 1908 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1908).

— Suit on Bond to Pay Legacies.

Procedure outlined in § 33-17-17 for creditor to show unfaithful administration is not applicable to suits on bonds to pay debts and legacies. Municipal Court of Providence v. Bostwick, 31 R.I. 550 , 78 A. 53, 1910 R.I. LEXIS 92 (1910).

Collateral References.

Leave of court as prerequisite to action on. 2 A.L.R. 563.

33-17-17. Decree of unfaithful administration.

If any executor or administrator shall neglect or refuse to raise money out of the estate by collecting debts due or by selling the personal estate, or the real estate, if need be, and has power, or can obtain leave, to sell the same, or shall neglect or refuse to pay over what he or she has in his or her hands to the several creditors of the testator or intestate whose claims have been filed and allowed or proved according to law, or shall otherwise fail to perform his or her duties as executor or administrator, and, after citation before the probate court, shall fail to show reasonable cause therefor, the court may decree that he or she is guilty of unfaithful administration; and thereupon an action may be brought upon the bond of the executor or administrator by any creditor who may have been damnified thereby.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1028; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-17 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Alternative Remedies.

Undertakers could not sue in equity for funeral charges, alleging neglect of administrator to recover equitable assets of the estate, without having exhausted remedy at law of an action on the bond, even though such debt is made first in order of preference. Gavitt v. Berry, 23 R.I. 14 , 49 A. 99, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 82 (1901).

Citation of Fiduciary.

The words “if cited” in former statute applied only to cases where a citation was required, as for neglect to file inventory or account, and not to an action for nonpayment of legacies after an account had been filed. Municipal Court of Providence v. McCulla, 21 R.I. 273 , 43 A. 182, 1899 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1899).

Creditor Relationship.

A decree in equity which ordered executor of life tenant’s estate to turn over property and money held by deceased life tenant established relationship of creditor and debtor and was a claim duly proved according to law within the meaning of this section. Williams v. Starkweather, 28 R.I. 145 , 66 A. 67, 1907 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1907).

Decree Against Guardian.

Probate court does not have authority to enter a decree of unfaithful administration against a guardian. Bogman v. Gibbs, 33 R.I. 478 , 82 A. 262, 1912 R.I. LEXIS 104 (1912).

Failure to Liquidate Assets.

If an administrator for a long period after the report of commissioners fails to take steps to dispose of personalty or to obtain permission to sell real estate, he is guilty of unfaithful administration and there is liability under his bond. Probate Court v. Carr, 20 R.I. 592 , 40 A. 844, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 140 (1898).

Suit by Judgment Creditor.

Both creditors with claims ascertained by judgment and creditors with allowed claims must cite the administrator before suit on the bond. Probate Court v. Williams, 23 R.I. 515 , 51 A. 101, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 139 (1902).

Suit by Legatees.

The requirement of a decree under this section applies only to creditors and not to legatees. Municipal Court of Providence v. McCulla, 21 R.I. 273 , 43 A. 182, 1899 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1899).

Suit by Successor Administrator.

Suit by succeeding administrator on executor’s bond under § 33-18-6 would not bar creditor’s suit on bond after executor was decreed guilty of unfaithful administration. Probate Court v. McCormick, 56 R.I. 308 , 185 A. 592, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 105 (1936).

33-17-18. Evidence in action by distributee.

If the suit be brought by a distributee for his or her part of the personal estate, he or she shall exhibit a copy of the decree of the probate court, ascertaining its amount, and prove that he or she has made a demand therefor upon the administrator.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1029; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-18 .

Collateral References.

Payment or delivery of legacy or distributive share before decree of distribution as defense to action by legatee or distributee on bond of personal representative. 121 A.L.R. 1069.

33-17-19. Hearing and judgment of forfeiture of bond.

Upon a hearing upon the forfeiture of a bond, the court shall examine the claims of the several persons whose names are indorsed upon the writ, and judgment shall be rendered for those persons, respectively, for the amount so ascertained to be due to each (but with only one bill of costs, each claimant, however, being allowed fees of witnesses called in his or her behalf), in form, substantially, that the probate court shall have execution for the judgment to the use of the persons in whose favor judgment shall be rendered.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1030; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 19; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-19 .

33-17-20. Execution on judgment of forfeiture.

Any person to whose use judgment shall be rendered in the name of the probate court as provided in § 33-17-19 may sue out execution thereon and have the execution levied according to law, and shall be deemed to be the creditor to every intent and purpose whatsoever.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1031; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 20; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 19; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-20 .

33-17-21. Addition of parties to suit for forfeiture.

During the pendency of a forfeiture suit, the court may, on motion, permit any person interested to become a party to the suit by indorsing his or her name on the writ, and by giving surety for costs, if required; and thereupon the person shall have the same rights and be subject to the same liabilities as if his or her name had been indorsed upon the writ before the service thereof.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1032; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 21; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 20; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-21 .

33-17-22. Action on judgment for penalty.

After judgment for the penalty of a bond, any person interested, upon giving surety for costs as in other cases, may bring a civil action on the judgment; and upon proof of his or her claim may have judgment so that an execution shall issue to his or her use.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1033; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 22; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-22 ; P.L. 1965, ch. 55, § 61.

33-17-23. Obligors not released by judgment on bond.

No suit or judgment on a bond shall abate or bar any suit thereon against any obligor against whom no suit has been commenced or judgment rendered.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1034; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 23; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 22; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-23 .

33-17-24. Suit on bond following judgment for obligor.

A judgment in favor of the obligor shall in no case bar any suit on a bond for the benefit of a different claimant or of the same claimant for a different claim.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1035; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 24; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 23; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 23; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-24 .

33-17-25. Suit for benefit of all interested in estate.

A suit may also be brought on a bond for the benefit of all concerned in the estate at the instance of any party interested, who shall give surety for costs to the defendant on the writ, and satisfactory bond to the probate court securing the court against expenses and costs; in which case, indorsement that the suit is brought for the benefit of all interested in the estate shall be made upon the writ.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1036; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 25; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 24; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 24; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-25 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Residuary Devisee.

Debt on the bond, alleging failure to exhibit a particular inventory and to account, could be maintained for a residuary devisee and legatee, as § 33-13-10 , giving right to such legatee to bring action of account, is expressly without prejudice to any other remedies. Probate Court v. Potter, 22 R.I. 326 , 47 A. 889, 1900 R.I. LEXIS 119 (1900).

33-17-26. Suit on bond for failure to inventory or account for property.

Suit on a probate bond, except the bond authorized by § 33-17-3 , may be brought whenever it shall appear that the administrator or the executor has received the personal estate of the testator or intestate and has not, after being cited by the court to do so, exhibited upon oath a particular inventory of the estate, or has refused or neglected to account upon oath for the property of the testator or intestate by him or her received.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1037; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 26; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 25; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 25; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-26 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Allegation of Breach of Condition.

In an action on an administrator’s bond, it is sufficient to withstand demurrer that administrator is alleged to have breached the condition of the bond requiring him to make a just and true accounting of his administration. Municipal Court v. McElroy, 18 R.I. 749 , 30 A. 796, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 85 (1894).

Citation Required.

In an action against an administrator for breach of his bond in omitting to render an account, it must be alleged and shown that the administrator was cited by the probate court to render an account. Court of Probate v. Eddy, 8 R.I. 339 , 1866 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1866).

A citation for neglect to file an inventory or account must issue to an executor or administrator before suit on the bond by either creditor or legatee. Municipal Court of Providence v. McCulla, 21 R.I. 273 , 43 A. 182, 1899 R.I. LEXIS 48 (1899).

Residuary Legatees.

Debt on the bond, alleging failure to exhibit a particular inventory and to account, could be maintained for a residuary devisee and legatee, as § 33-13-10 , giving right to such legatee to bring action of account, is expressly without prejudice to any other remedies. Probate Court v. Potter, 22 R.I. 326 , 47 A. 889, 1900 R.I. LEXIS 119 (1900).

33-17-27. Judgment and execution in suit for failure to inventory or account.

In the cases mentioned in § 33-17-26 , judgment shall be rendered against the executor or administrator so in default for the full penalty of the bond; and, upon a hearing upon forfeiture, the court shall award execution against the executor or administrator in favor of the probate court for the full value of the personal estate of the deceased proved to have come to his or her hands, or, in case he or she has once accounted, remaining or being in his or her hands at and since the last accounting, without any discount, abatement, or allowance for charges and expenses of administration.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1038; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 27; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 26; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 26; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-27 .

33-17-28. Administration of amount recovered in suit for failure to inventory or account.

In case of a recovery, the amount so recovered shall be deemed to be the property of the testator or intestate, and, after paying therefrom all expenses of recovery, shall be administered by a new administrator to be appointed for that purpose.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1039; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 28; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 27; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 27; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-28 .

33-17-29. Consolidation of suits against joint fiduciaries — Execution.

Whenever suits are brought upon separate bonds of joint executors, administrators, or guardians, they may be consolidated. If judgment for the penal sum is obtained upon more than one of the bonds, one execution shall issue for the amount found due for defaults for which two (2) or more principals on the bonds are found liable, and separate executions shall issue for the amount found due for all individual defaults of either of the principals.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1040; G.L. 1909, ch. 320, § 29; G.L. 1923, ch. 371, § 28; G.L. 1938, ch. 576, § 28; G.L. 1956, § 33-17-29 .

Chapter 18 Decedents’ and Incompetents’ Estates Generally

33-18-1. Publication of qualification of fiduciary — Statement filed by clerk.

Upon the qualification of every executor, administrator, conservator, or guardian, the probate clerk shall give notice of the qualification by publication in any newspaper and as often as the court may direct, and in the newspaper shall notify creditors to file their claims in the office of the probate clerk within the time required by law. The clerk shall file in the court a written statement setting out a copy of the notice, the dates, and place of its publication, and generally his or her compliance with the order of the court. A certified copy of the statement shall be admitted as evidence of the time, place, and manner in which notice was given.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 845; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 31; P.L. 1921, ch. 2075, § 1; P.L. 1922, ch. 2196, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 31; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 29; P.L. 1941, ch. 1003, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-1 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Amendment of Record.

If the record of the probate court is incomplete in that the date of the first notice is not to be found, it can be amended. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Sherman, 52 R.I. 207 , 159 A. 740, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1932).

Delay in Publication of Notice.

A notice was not invalid because it was not given as soon as it might have been, but the only effect was to delay the commencement of the running of the statute of limitations until such notice had been given. Bosworth v. Smith, 9 R.I. 67 , 1868 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1868).

Failure to Advise Creditors.

It is a breach of duty and of a guardian’s bond for him to fail to advise creditors of his ward to exhibit their claims within six months from the date of published notice of the guardian’s appointment. Court of Probate v. Caswell, 18 R.I. 201 , 26 A. 193, 1893 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1893).

Interested Parties.

Creditor was not aggrieved by and could not appeal from order of probate court amending decree to include order for notice of appointment, as order for publishing of notice operates only on the executors. Smith v. Whaley, 27 R.I. 185 , 61 A. 173, 1905 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1905).

Time of Qualification.

The notice prescribed by this section is not a condition precedent to the qualification of an executor or administrator, but rather the personal representative qualifies as soon as he gives bond, so that the general statute of limitations on suits in assumpsit begins to run against a claim as soon as the original administrator gives bond. Knowles v. Whaley, 15 R.I. 97 , 23 A. 144, 1885 R.I. LEXIS 69 (1885).

Collateral References.

Validity of claims against estate filed prior to publication of notice to creditors. 70 A.L.R.3d 784.

33-18-2. General grounds for removal of fiduciary.

Whenever an executor, administrator, or guardian shall for any cause become incapable of executing his or her trust, or shall neglect or refuse to do the duties of the trust, or shall waste the estate of his or her ward or that on which he or she administers, the probate court, upon petition, and after hearing, may remove the executor, administrator or guardian from office and appoint an administrator or guardian in place of the person so removed, and take such other action as occasion may require.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 827; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-2 .

Comparative Legislation.

Removal of fiduciary:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-242 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 195, § 11 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Counsel.

Co-executor of a decedent’s estate was permitted to engage her own counsel at her own expense because it was essential that the co-executor have the selection of an attorney who was to assist her in the performance of duties imposed on her by law; R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 33-14-12 , 33-18-2 , and 33-18-17 did not preclude the co-executor from retaining her own counsel. In re Estate of Dermanouelian, 51 A.3d 327, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 103 (2012).

Creditor as Administrator.

The mere fact that a person has a claim against an estate does not subject him to removal as an administrator except for good cause existing at the time of removal. Murray v. Angell, 16 R.I. 692 , 19 A. 246, 1890 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1890).

Parties to Proceedings.

An assignee of a devisee’s interest may bring an action for removal of the executor even though not within the literal terms of the section. Yeaw v. Searle, 2 R.I. 164 , 1852 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1852).

An assignee of a devisee’s interest who, during the pendency of an appeal from a decree refusing to remove an executor, assigned his interest in trust for the benefit of creditors cannot maintain the appeal since he no longer has a legal interest in the estate. Yeaw v. Searle, 2 R.I. 164 , 1852 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1852).

Pleadings.

Decree removing administrator should not be deemed invalid on ground of insufficiency of allegations where allegations were substantially in the language of this section, even though not as certain and particular as required by common law pleading. Kenyon v. Hart, 38 R.I. 524 , 96 A. 529, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1916).

Refusal of Appointment.

Grounds for which an executor could be removed under this section are not necessarily valid grounds for refusal to appoint as executor a person nominated by the will. Trustees of House of Angel Guardian v. Donovan, 71 R.I. 407 , 46 A.2d 717, 1946 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1946).

Vacation of Appointment.

This section did not apply to an action filed to vacate an appointment of administrator within time permitted for an appeal from order making appointment. Capwell v. Knight, 48 R.I. 81 , 135 A. 699, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1927).

Collateral References.

Appeal from order appointing or removing executor or administrator, or proceeding to supplant him, as affecting rights of persons who dealt with him pending such appeal or proceeding. 99 A.L.R. 862.

Appeal without bond by executor or administrator from order, decree, or judgment removing him, or holding letters of administration to have been improperly issued. 104 A.L.R. 1197.

Application for removal of personal representative, guardian, or trustee, right of appeal from order on. 37 A.L.R.2d 751.

Consideration and weight of religious affiliations in removal of guardian for minor child. 22 A.L.R.2d 696.

Failure to file inventory as ground for removal of executor or administrator. 72 A.L.R. 956.

Improper handling of funds, investments, or assets as ground for removal of guardian. 128 A.L.R. 535.

Personal interests of executor or administrator adverse to or conflicting with those of other persons interested in estate as ground for revocation of letters or removal. 119 A.L.R. 306.

Removal of executor because of delay in exercising power of sale. 132 A.L.R. 1479.

Resignation or removal of guardian as affecting his compensation. 96 A.L.R.3d 1102.

Statutory exemption of personal representative from suit until expiration of prescribed period as affected by removal or death of original representative and appointment of a new one. 104 A.L.R. 909.

Waiver of privilege of confidential communications to physician by persons since deceased, by administrator, in proceedings for his removal. 97 A.L.R.2d 393.

What effects removal of executor or administrator. 8 A.L.R. 173.

33-18-3. Citation in action to remove fiduciary.

Whenever complaint shall be made by any person interested in the estate, or by any creditor, or by the surety on the bond of any executor, administrator or guardian, for the removal of an executor, administrator or guardian, a citation shall issue to the executor, administrator or guardian, embodying the substance of the complaint, or with a copy of the complaint annexed, which citation shall be in the form, and shall be served, as provided in § 33-22-12 .

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 773; G.L. 1909, ch. 309, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 360, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-3 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

The formalities prescribed by this section were not required before vacation under § 8-9-14 of a decree appointing an administrator. Capwell v. Knight, 48 R.I. 81 , 135 A. 699, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1927).

33-18-4. Resignation of fiduciary.

Whenever an executor, administrator, or guardian shall in writing resign his or her trust to the probate court having jurisdiction of the estate, the court may accept the resignation and, upon petition, appoint a successor, who shall have all the power that the person resigning had unless provision to the contrary is made by will; but no resignation shall be accepted until the person resigning shall have settled his or her accounts with the court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 828; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-4 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

Where no estate has come into the hands of a guardian, it is not essential that he render an account before his resignation may be accepted. McGale v. McGale, 18 R.I. 675 , 29 A. 967, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 51 (1894).

Executor whose final account had been disallowed could not resign. Industrial Trust Co. v. Dean, 67 R.I. 504 , 25 A.2d 552, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1942).

Collateral References.

Resignation or removal of guardian as affecting his compensation. 94 A.L.R. 1107.

Revocation or termination of authority, resignation as affecting. 8 A.L.R. 175.

Right of executor or administrator to resign. 91 A.L.R. 712.

Statutory exemption of representative from suit until expiration of prescribed period as affected by resignation of original administrator and appointment of a new one. 104 A.L.R. 909.

33-18-5. Appointment of new fiduciary — Powers of survivors — New bond.

In case the person so resigning was the sole executor, administrator, or guardian, the court shall appoint an administrator or guardian as a successor; if he or she were a joint executor or joint testamentary guardian, the continuing executor or guardian, if required, shall give a new bond; but if he or she were a joint administrator or guardian appointed by the court, a new administrator or guardian, if deemed advisable, may be appointed in the place of the one so resigning; and a new bond of the survivor, or of the survivor with the new administrator or guardian, shall be given, and other proceedings shall be taken as may be deemed advisable.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 829; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-5 .

33-18-6. Transfer of records and property to successor fiduciary — Action on bond.

An administrator or guardian appointed to succeed an executor, administrator, or guardian shall demand and receive of the preceding executor, administrator, or guardian, his or her heirs, executors, or administrators, all the goods and effects, books of account, securities, documents, or papers whatsoever belonging to the estate held by him or her or them, and in case of neglect or refusal to deliver them the probate court may, upon the petition of the successor or of any person beneficially interested, after hearing thereon, order the person holding them to deliver the property so held by him or her, and shall have the power to enforce the order by summary process for contempt, and the successor may also bring an action for the recovery of property, and the successor shall also bring an action on the bond of the preceding executor, administrator or guardian against all parties liable on the bond, which action when brought shall bar all actions by others on the bond for the same breach; but if the successor neglects or refuses to bring an action on the bond after written request therefor by any person interested, it shall be deemed a breach of his or her bond, and in this case suit may be brought on the first named bond by any person interested.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 830; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Action on Bond.
— Creditor’s Remedy.

Suit by succeeding administrator on executor’s bond under this section would not bar creditor’s suit on bond under § 33-17-16 after decree of unfaithful administration. Probate Court v. McCormick, 56 R.I. 308 , 185 A. 592, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 105 (1936).

— Deceased Original Administrator.

Predecessor statute did not apply to an action brought by an administrator de bonis non on the bond of the original administrator against the person representative of such original administrator. Court of Probate v. Smith, 16 R.I. 444 , 17 A. 56, 1889 R.I. LEXIS 20 (1889).

Assignee in Insolvency.

This section has no application to an assignee in insolvency. Appellate Div. of Supreme Court v. Lawyers' Sur. Co., 21 R.I. 454 , 44 A. 594, 1899 R.I. LEXIS 100 (1899).

Powers of Successor.

An administrator with the will annexed succeeds to the powers given the executor by the will, including the power to sell realty for the purposes specified in the will, unless the will indicates that its execution was entrusted to the executor named as a matter of personal confidence and discretion. Probate Court v. Hazard, 13 R.I. 3 , 1880 R.I. LEXIS 27 (1880).

Remedies of Successor.

This section has only to do with remedies given to a succeeding administrator for recovery of goods and effects of the estate or of damages for their nondelivery by (1) a direct suit against the predecessor or his representatives, (2) a petition in the probate court for an order of delivery enforceable by contempt proceedings, or (3) a suit on the predecessor’s bond against all the parties thereon. Probate Court v. McCormick, 56 R.I. 308 , 185 A. 592, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 105 (1936).

Successor.

A second conservator was a “successor” conservator, not a new conservator, despite an 11-month hiatus between the time of the first conservator’s release and the second conservator’s appointment, during which time the ward was officially responsible for the management of her own estate, where the first conservator retained the ward’s books and continued to manage her financial affairs until the appointment of the second conservator. Beirne v. Barone, 529 A.2d 154, 1987 R.I. LEXIS 547 (1987).

Collateral References.

Right of administrator de bonis non to recover proceeds of personal property of the estate converted by his predecessor. 3 A.L.R. 1252.

33-18-7. Continuation of actions by or against successor fiduciary.

Whenever an executor, administrator, or guardian, by or against whom any action concerning the estate of the testator, intestate or ward is prosecuted shall die, resign, or be removed, the action shall not thereby be abated, but the successor, if any, may come into court to prosecute or defend, or may be summoned in, in such manner as the court may direct.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 831; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-7 .

33-18-8. Judgment against fiduciary in continuation of action by or against decedent.

If an executor, administrator, or guardian shall neglect to appear and take upon himself or herself the prosecution or defense of an action, suit, or proceeding as provided in § 33-9-24 , being duly notified thereof by order of the court where the same shall be pending, or if, having appeared and become a party thereto, judgment shall pass against the executor, administrator, or guardian, the court, subject to the provisions of § 33-11-44 , may enter judgment against the estate in the hands of the executor, administrator, or guardian, and the like process shall be had thereon as if the action, suit, or proceeding had been originally commenced against him or her in his or her original capacity.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 971; G.L. 1909, ch. 318, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 369, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-8 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Attachments.

This section does not by implication discharge a lien in attachment by the creditor upon the appointment of a guardian for the debtor, but merely limits the satisfaction of the lien as against property of the ward, hence lienholder was entitled to recover judgment out of surplus in mortgage foreclosure proceedings against debtor. Smart v. Burgess, 35 R.I. 149 , 85 A. 742, 1913 R.I. LEXIS 7 (1913).

Failure to Summon Representative.

A suit which survives does not abate on failure to summon the personal representative of a deceased defendant since the personal representative has the duty to appear and defend the suit. Sprague v. Greene, 20 R.I. 153 , 37 A. 699, 1897 R.I. LEXIS 65 (1897).

Foreign Representatives.

This section does not apply to foreign executors and administrators of a deceased party to a suit. Conley v. Huntoon, 37 R.I. 343 , 92 A. 865, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1915).

33-18-9. Appointment of agent by nonresident fiduciary.

Every executor, administrator or guardian appointed in, but residing out of, the state shall, before entering upon the duties of his or her trust, appoint in writing an agent residing in this state, and shall by the writing agree that the service of any legal process against him or her as executor, administrator, or guardian, if made on, or acknowledged by, the agent, shall be of the same legal effect as if made on himself or herself personally within this state. The writing shall have the address of the agent, and shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the probate court by which the appointment was made, and the notice of appointment of the executor, administrator, or guardian shall state the name and address of his or her agent.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 858; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 44; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 44; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 42; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Service on Agent.

Service on agent of nonresident executor gave the court jurisdiction of a proceeding to establish an equitable lien on a fund held by the executor, so far as the executor was concerned. Gorman v. Stillman, 25 R.I. 55 , 54 A. 934, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1903).

33-18-10. Appointment of agent by fiduciary removing from state.

Every executor, administrator, or guardian appointed in this state but who thereafter leaves the state shall in writing appoint a like agent with like stipulations, and shall cause the writing to be filed in the office of the clerk of the probate court which appointed him or her.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 859; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 45; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 45; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 43; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-10 .

33-18-11. Death, resignation, or removal of fiduciary’s agent from state.

If an agent appointed under the provisions of §§ 33-18-9 and 33-18-10 dies, resigns, or leaves the state before the final settlement of the estate, another like appointment shall be made and filed as above provided.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 860; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 46; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 46; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 44; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-11 .

33-18-12. Revocation of power of fiduciary’s agent.

The power of an agent appointed under either of §§ 33-18-9 33-18-11 shall not be revoked until the final settlement of the estate, unless another agent is appointed in his or her place and the appointment filed as above provided.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 861; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 47; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 47; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 45; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-12 .

33-18-13. Removal of fiduciary for failure to appoint agent.

Neglect or refusal on the part of an executor, administrator, or guardian to comply with any requirement of §§ 33-18-9 33-18-12 may be cause for removal.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 863; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 48; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 48; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 46; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-13 .

33-18-14. Service of process on fiduciary’s agent.

Service of any legal process upon an agent appointed under §§ 33-18-9 33-18-12 shall be of the same legal effect as if made upon his or her principal in this state.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 863; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 49; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 49; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 47; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-14 .

33-18-15. Exercise of power of sale in mortgage.

In case of a mortgage containing powers of sale, the executor, administrator, or guardian of the estate for the time being of the mortgagee may, on default, unless provisions to the contrary be made in the mortgage, exercise the enumerated powers of sale. The executor, administrator, or guardian may, if empowered by the mortgage or by law, and if in his or her discretion it is necessary to prevent a sacrifice of the property, bid upon and buy in the mortgaged property at the sale; and having so purchased, may, on application to the probate court, be authorized to resell the property at public or private sale pursuant to the direction of the court, and convey, without being accountable for any resulting loss. The proceeds of the sale shall be personal property.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 880; G.L. 1909, ch. 313, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 364, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 577, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-15 .

Cross References.

Taking possession by executor or administrator of deceased mortgagee, § 33-9-11 .

Collateral References.

Right of guardian or committee of incompetent to incur obligations so as to bind incompetent or his estate, or to make expenditures, without prior approval by court. 63 A.L.R.3d 780.

33-18-16. Abandonment or adjustment of controversies.

The probate court may authorize executors, administrators, guardians, and conservators to submit to arbitration, to abandon, or to adjust by compromise, or otherwise settle or dispose of, any claim in favor of or against, or any controversy or thing whatever relating to the estates by them represented, whether or not arising under, or involving the construction of, the provisions of a will, trust deed or other instrument, and for any of these purposes to enter into, give, execute, make, and do such agreements, instruments, deeds, conveyances, assignments, settlements, payments, compositions, arrangements, court or other stipulations, releases, receipts, and other things as the probate court shall by its order or decree approve or authorize.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 838; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 24; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 24; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 22; P.L. 1951, ch. 2706, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-16 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Assumption of New Liabilities.

A guardian may properly enter into a compromise under which he assumes new liabilities for his ward and such a compromise may be validly upheld. Smith v. Angell, 14 R.I. 192 , 1883 R.I. LEXIS 33 (1883).

Review by Supreme Court.

Notwithstanding the provisions of § 33-23-20 that the action of a probate court properly taken is not subject to appeal, the supreme court would pass upon a compromise settlement involving a minor, even though approved by a probate court, where the settlement approved was not for the best interest of the minor. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hodgkin, 48 R.I. 459 , 137 A. 381, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 76 (1927).

Wrongful Death Claims.

A claim for damages for wrongful death may be settled and released by the executor or administrator of the deceased, and the settlement made by him is binding upon all parties interested. Parker v. Providence & Stonington Steamboat Co., 17 R.I. 376 , 22 A. 284, 1891 R.I. LEXIS 91 (1891).

Collateral References.

Authority of executor or administrator to make agreement to drop or compromise will contest or withdraw objections to probate. 42 A.L.R.2d 1319.

Claims against estate or claims due estate, responsibility of executor or administrator in respect of compromise of. 72 A.L.R.2d 243.

Compromise of liquidated contract claim or money judgment, power of guardian as to. 155 A.L.R. 196.

Death, right of executor or administrator to settle or compromise cause of action for, and power of probate court to authorize such settlement. 72 A.L.R.2d 285.

Relation back of letters testamentary or of administration to validate compromises and settlements made by administrators or executors before they receive letters. 26 A.L.R. 1366.

33-18-17. Action in name of estate prosecuted by interested person.

If an administrator, executor, or guardian shall be requested by any person legally interested in the estate of a deceased person, or person under guardianship, to commence an action or proceeding to recover any property, personal or real, which the legally interested person may have reason to believe should be recovered for the benefit of the estate, and if the administrator, executor, or guardian shall, for fifteen (15) days after written notice so to do, either personally delivered to himself or herself or his or her agent, or left at the last and usual place of abode of himself or herself or his or her agent, refuse, neglect or for any reason be incompetent, to commence the action or proceeding, the legally interested person may institute proceedings in the name of the estate of the deceased person, or person under guardianship, in the same manner and to the same extent as the administrator, executor, or guardian may do in the case of personal property, and in the case of real estate in the same manner as a guardian, devisee, or heir at law may do, to recover the property.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 312, § 52, as enacted by P.L. 1911, ch. 707, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 52; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 50; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-17 .

Law Reviews.

Rebecca M. Murphy and Samantha M. Clarke, A New Hope: Tortious Interference with an Expected Inheritance in Rhode Island, 22 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 531 (2017).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Generally

While R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-18-17 permits an interested beneficiary to sue “in the name of” an estate, it does not convert such a suit into a suit by the estate. Haffenreffer v. Coleman, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75432 (D.R.I. Oct. 10, 2007).

Applicability

Motion to disqualify a law firm representing one brother in a state court action brought under R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-18-17 was denied because another brother—who was a co-executor with the first brother—failed to establish that the firm’s representation of the first brother as an interested beneficiary created any attorney-client relationship between the firm and the estate of the brothers’ mother or that the firm’s representation of the first brother in the state court action materially limited its representation of defendant option holders in a case brought by the second brother before the federal court. Haffenreffer v. Coleman, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75432 (D.R.I. Oct. 10, 2007).

Under R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-18-17 , although other co-executor’s did not authorize a lawsuit, the third co-executor—although barred from suing in that capacity— had standing in his capacity as a principal beneficiary of the estate to bring a state court action for what he perceived to be “the benefit of the estate” and his interest in it. Haffenreffer v. Coleman, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75432 (D.R.I. Oct. 10, 2007).

Counsel.

Co-executor of a decedent’s estate was permitted to engage her own counsel at her own expense because it was essential that the co-executor have the selection of an attorney who was to assist her in the performance of duties imposed on her by law; R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 33-14-12 , 33-18-2 , and 33-18-17 did not preclude the co-executor from retaining her own counsel. In re Estate of Dermanouelian, 51 A.3d 327, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 103 (2012).

Evidence Insufficient.

The plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient facts which, if proved, would support the action of the case in the nature of a conspiracy against the probate judge and the administrator of the estate of one sister who was also the guardian of the estate of the other sister, said plaintiffs being the heirs at law of the second sister, they claiming to have been entitled to inherit the entire estate of second sister, there not being sufficient allegations of facts from which an intent to conspire could reasonably be inferred. Stubbs v. Taft, 88 R.I. 462 , 149 A.2d 706, 1959 R.I. LEXIS 29 (1959).

Exhaustion of Remedies.

Where grandchildren alleged tortious interference with their expectancy of inheritance and undue influence regarding an inter vivos property conveyance by their grandmother, their claims failed to survive summary judgment because they did not exhaust their statutory remedies; Rhode Island’s statutory procedure would have provided an adequate remedy. Umsted v. Umsted, 446 F.3d 17, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9316 (1st Cir. 2006).

Standing.

Niece lacked standing under R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-18-17 to contest a will as the product of undue influence where the court had already concluded that there was no legitimate path to partial intestacy, and thus, she was not a person legally interested in the estate. Dauray v. Mee, 109 A.3d 832, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 16 (2015).

33-18-18. Intervention in proceedings by or against estate.

If a suit or proceeding be pending, whether instituted by the administrator, executor, guardian, or any legally interested person, then no additional suit or proceeding shall be brought for the same cause, but the administrator, executor, guardian, or any legally interested person, may intervene in the prosecution of the suit or proceeding, upon motion, in the discretion of the court having jurisdiction of the action; and if a suit or proceeding be pending against an administrator, executor or guardian, any legally interested person may, with like consent, intervene in the defense to the suit or proceeding.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 312, § 53, as enacted by P.L. 1911, ch. 707, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 53; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 51; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-18 .

Collateral References.

Substitution as party plaintiff of guardian for ward. 135 A.L.R. 350.

33-18-19. Costs and expenses in proceeding prosecuted or intervened in by interested person.

Any legally interested person instituting a suit or proceeding shall, in case of failure to prosecute the suit successfully, be entitled to no costs, and shall be personally liable to the adverse party for costs, and in no event shall those legally interested persons instituting a suit or proceeding or intervening to prosecute or defend a pending action be entitled to more than the reasonable expenses incurred by him or her in the proceedings or defense, to be allowed out of the estate of the deceased person or person under guardianship, by the court having probate jurisdiction of the estate, to be paid by the administrator, executor, or guardian; and shall not be entitled to any reimbursement for the expenses, unless the proceedings or defense, by intervention or otherwise, shall be found by the court of probate to have been necessary for the protection of the estate. In any case where additional parties intervene in the prosecution or defense of an existing suit or proceeding, the allowance made for all expenses shall not exceed such reasonable amount as the court of probate finds should have been incurred for the proper prosecution or defense of the action or proceeding.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 312, § 54, as enacted by P.L. 1911, ch. 707, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 54; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 52; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-19 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Attorneys’ Fees.

Attorneys’ fees were properly stricken from an order of the superior court in case involving property to be included within estate since the probate court had jurisdiction to fix fees and costs for services rendered to the estates of decedents although fees awarded in prior order of the superior court where no question was raised as to such fees would not be reviewed. Black v. Wiesner, 114 R.I. 609 , 337 A.2d 812, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1462 (1975).

There was no abuse of discretion in the reduction of an award of attorney’s fees to be paid from an estate under the statute because the reductions represented an adequate balance that addressed accounting failures and self-interested actions by the co-executrices. In re Estate of Cantore, 814 A.2d 331, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 21 (2003).

33-18-20. Compromise of actions prosecuted or defended by interested persons — Property recovered.

Courts of probate shall have the power to compromise all claims sued for or defended by any legally interested person referred to in §§ 33-18-17 33-18-19 in the same manner and to the same extent as may now be done by the probate courts with reference to claims by or against estates of deceased persons or persons under guardianship. All property obtained by an interested person for the benefit of the estate through the proceeding shall be turned over by the adverse party to the administrator, executor, or guardian, if personal property, in the same manner as all other property coming to the possession of the administrator, executor, or guardian; and shall become the property of the ward in cases of guardianship, or of the heirs at law or devisees under a will, as either may become entitled to the property, in case of real estate; the administrator, executor, or guardian being first required to furnish an additional bond to the probate court for the proper administration of personal property so obtained.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 312, § 55, as enacted by P.L. 1911, ch. 707, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 55; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 53; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-20 .

33-18-21. Recording of documents in court.

Any paper or instrument discharging a claim or purporting to acknowledge the performance of a duty or the payment of money, for which an executor, administrator, or guardian is chargeable or accountable in a probate court, shall, upon the request of a party interested, be recorded in the records of the court, certified copies of which record may be used in evidence; and the probate clerk shall enter, record, index and certify any original paper or instrument offered as provided in this chapter.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 846; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 32; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 32; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 30; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-21 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Administrator with will annexed could not obtain return of bank deposits given to son by prior executrix when she was sole person interested in estate, even though formal closing of estate had not been accomplished, since formalities could have been remedied under this section by recording her action. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Sherman, 52 R.I. 207 , 159 A. 740, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1932).

33-18-22. Release by good faith delivery of property under court order.

Whenever any person acting as executor, administrator, custodian, or guardian shall make payments or deliver property or estate pursuant to the order of a probate court having jurisdiction, after the expiration of the time within which an appeal lies from the order and while an appeal is not pending from the order, the person making the payment or delivery in good faith shall not be liable or in any way responsible for the money so paid or the property so delivered, although the order under or by virtue of which the payment or delivery shall be made shall afterwards be reversed, vacated, or set aside. This provision shall not prevent a recovery of the money or property, by the person entitled thereto, from any person receiving it or in possession of the money or property.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 852; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 38; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 38; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 36; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-22 .

33-18-23. Bona fide transfer of property to executor, administrator, or guardian.

All persons making or permitting to be made any payment or transfer bona fide upon any official certificate of appointment of any executor, administrator, or guardian, issued by the probate court in respect of the estate of any deceased person or ward, shall be justified and held harmless in so doing, notwithstanding any defect or circumstance whatsoever affecting the validity of the appointment; provided, that the transfer of personal property, stock, or rights of action is not made within forty (40) days from an order or decree granting letters testamentary, of administration, or of guardianship, nor while an appeal is pending from an order or decree.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 853; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 39; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 39; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 37; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-23 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appeal.

Where no appeal has been taken, executor or administrator may require payment to him of decedent’s bank account even before the end of forty days. Sumner v. Providence Inst. for Sav., 28 R.I. 467 , 68 A. 319, 1907 R.I. LEXIS 80 (1907).

33-18-24. Transfer of corporate securities and mortgages by foreign fiduciary.

Any corporation organized under the laws of this state may, before having actual notice of the pendency of an application in this state for letters testamentary, of administration, or guardianship, permit the executor of the will or administrator of the estate of a decedent who at the time of his or her death was not a resident in this state, or a guardian whose ward does not reside in this state, duly appointed, qualified, and authorized under the laws of any other state, territory, or district of the United States, to transfer to any person shares of stock and registered bonds standing in the name of the decedent or ward and to receive the dividends and interest thereon. The executor of the will or administrator of the estate of a decedent who at the time of his or her death was not a resident in this state, or a guardian whose ward does not reside in this state, duly appointed and qualified under the laws of any other state, territory, or district of the United States shall have the power to and may assign and transfer any mortgage debt, note, and mortgage, held by or belonging to the decedent or to the ward, upon any real estate or personal property located in this state, provided a duly authenticated copy of the certificate of the appointment of the executor, administrator, or guardian, and evidence that the appointment has not been revoked, are annexed to the assignment and transfer.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 853; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 27; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 27; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 25; P.L. 1943, ch. 1324, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-24 .

33-18-25. Payment of debt or delivery of property to foreign fiduciary.

Any person or corporation in this state, before having actual notice of the pendency of an application in this state for letters testamentary of administration or guardianship may pay any money owing or deliver any personal property belonging to the estate of any decedent whose residence at the time of his or her death was not in this state, or belonging to any person under guardianship whose residence is not in this state, to the executor or administrator of the decedent or to the guardian of the ward duly appointed, qualified, and authorized to receive the same under the laws of any other state, territory or district of the United States; and the receipt for payment or delivery to the executor, administrator, or guardian shall be a valid discharge for that money and personal property.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 842; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 28; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 28; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 26; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-25 .

33-18-26. Action by foreign executor or administrator — Prerequisites.

If a corporation refuses to permit a transfer as provided in § 33-18-24 or a person indebted refuses to pay, or having possession refuses to deliver personal property as permitted in § 33-18-25 , the executor or administrator, if there is no executor or administrator appointed in this state, upon application to the probate court of any town in this state in which any real estate of the decedent is located, or, if there is no real estate in this state, in which any personal property of the decedent is situated, or in which any debtor resides, or in which any corporation the decedent owned shares of stock or registered bonds is located, may be authorized by the court to transfer the shares and bonds or to take possession of the personal property and collect the debts, and the executor or administrator may demand, sue for, and recover the property or debts; provided, that no foreign executor or administrator shall be authorized to make any transfer or take possession of personal property under the provisions of this section until he or she shall have filed in the court a copy of the will, if any, and of his or her appointment, authenticated as provided in this chapter, nor until six (6) months after his or her appointment, nor until he or she shall have given bond to the probate court appointing him or her, unless sufficient bond has been given, nor until he or she shall have advertised notice of his or her application in this state at least once each week for two (2) successive weeks in some newspaper, as directed by the probate court; and provided, further, that no authority to transfer or take possession shall be granted, if any creditor of the deceased person or ward shall show to the probate court valid objections to the transfer or possession, supported by a sworn statement of his or her claim or demand and that the same is justly due.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 843; G.L. 1909, ch. 312, § 29; G.L. 1923, ch. 363, § 29; G.L. 1938, ch. 575, § 27; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-26 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Defense of Action.

This section does not apply to defense of suits against the deceased by foreign personal representatives. Conley v. Huntoon, 37 R.I. 343 , 92 A. 865, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 1 (1915).

Suit on Claims.

The wording of this section clearly indicates a legislative intent to require the procurement of ancillary letters by an executor from another state not only prior to the commencement of suit but also prior to the making of any formal demand in cases where such demand is a condition precedent to the accrual of a cause of action. Fitch v. Firestone, 184 F. Supp. 424, 1960 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2855 (D.R.I. 1960).

Where claim was filed by executor from another state and after claim was disallowed suit was brought thereon, and thereafter such foreign executor obtained ancillary letters in Rhode Island at which time the time for filing claims had expired, suit could not be maintained thereon. Fitch v. Firestone, 184 F. Supp. 424, 1960 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2855 (D.R.I. 1960).

33-18-27. Perpetuation by fiduciary of evidence of payments and delivery — Final discharge.

If an executor, administrator, or guardian has paid or delivered to the persons entitled thereto the money or other property in his or her hands as required by a decree of a probate court, he or she may perpetuate the evidence of payment or delivery by presenting to the court, within one year after the decree is made, an account of the payments or delivery, together with the vouchers therefor, which shall be kept in the files of the court. The account, being proved to the satisfaction of the court, and verified by the oath of the executor, administrator, or guardian, shall be allowed as his or her final discharge and ordered to be recorded. This discharge shall forever exonerate the executor, administrator, or guardian, and his or her sureties, from all liability under the decree unless his or her account is impeached for fraud or manifest errors.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1006; G.L. 1909, ch. 319, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 370, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 580, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-27 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

The evidentiary accounts referred to in this section have no connection with and form no part of the accounts referred to in chapter 14 of this title. Williams v. Herrick, 18 R.I. 120 , 25 A. 1099, 1893 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1893).

Distribution of Assets Before Approval of Final Accounting.

Guardian’s distribution of assets of the estate of the guardian’s deceased ward before the guardian’s final accounting was approved presented no justiciable issue on appeal; plaintiff children showed no specific instance of an impropriety or receipt of an asset by anyone the decedent did not designate. In re Estate of Ross, 131 A.3d 158, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 16 (2016).

Fraud.

Final account did not exonerate executors and surety from liability for amount which one executor fraudulently misappropriated from the funds of a third party to pay expenses of administration, debts and legacies. Hogan v. Cooney, 51 R.I. 395 , 155 A. 240, 1931 R.I. LEXIS 57 (1931).

No Breach of Fidicuary Duty.

Guardian breached no fiduciary duty because (1) nothing showed the guardian changed designations of beneficiaries of the deceased ward’s assets, (2) any change in investment vehicles only sought to appreciate the decedent’s estate, (3) the ward, while alive, independently disposed of the ward’s assets, and (4) the guardian’s failure to disclose the guardian’s joint ownership of some of the ward’s investment accounts was no fiduciary breach, as nothing showed the guardian used the estate’s income to support the guardian or anyone except the ward, and the guardian would have had the same interest in the accounts had the guardian not been guardian. In re Estate of Ross, 131 A.3d 158, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 16 (2016).

33-18-28. Decree ratifying payment or delivery by fiduciary without order.

If, without an order of court, an executor, administrator, or guardian pays or delivers any money or other property in his or her hands to a legatee, distributee, or ward, and thereafter renders an account, upon oath, with a full and detailed statement, to the probate court, and after notice it appears that the person to whom the money has been paid or property delivered would have been entitled to an order of court for the payment or delivery, and that the account ought to be allowed, the probate court may make a decree, which shall have the same effect to exonerate and discharge the executor, administrator, or guardian, and his or her sureties, from further liability as if the payment or delivery had been made under a previous order of the probate court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1007; G.L. 1909, ch. 319, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 370, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 580, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-28 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Distribution of Assets Before Approval of Final Accounting.

Guardian’s distribution of assets of the estate of the guardian’s deceased ward before the guardian’s final accounting was approved presented no justiciable issue on appeal; plaintiff children showed no specific instance of an impropriety or receipt of an asset by anyone the decedent did not designate. In re Estate of Ross, 131 A.3d 158, 2016 R.I. LEXIS 16 (2016).

Informal Distribution.

Administrator with will annexed could not obtain return of bank deposits given to son by prior executrix when she was sole person interested in estate, even though formal closing of estate had not been accomplished since formalities could have been remedied under this section by court order. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Sherman, 52 R.I. 207 , 159 A. 740, 1932 R.I. LEXIS 28 (1932).

Notice.

Notice required by this section could be waived by sole distributee who received balance of proceeds on hand in estate without an order for distribution, and lack of notice could not be asserted by claimant who failed to assert his claim within the statutory time. Wright v. Roberts, 47 R.I. 306 , 132 A. 875, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1926).

Prior Court Order Not Required.

Section 33-1-10 , providing for payment of the surplus of the personal estate under order of distribution, does not limit this section. Wright v. Roberts, 47 R.I. 306 , 132 A. 875, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1926).

An executor or administrator may under proper circumstances make final distribution without a court order, then file a final account showing complete distribution, taking the risk that such account may be disallowed. Slaimen v. Curtis, 56 R.I. 351 , 185 A. 684, 1936 R.I. LEXIS 108 (1936).

Collateral References.

Right of guardian or committee of incompetent to incur obligations so as to bind incompetent or his estate, or to make expenditures, without prior approval by court. 63 A.L.R.3d 780.

33-18-29. Deposit of unclaimed funds in court — Payment by court.

If money, which a decree of a probate court has ordered to be paid over, remains for six (6) months unclaimed, the executor, administrator, or guardian who was ordered to pay over the money may deposit it in the registry of the probate court to accumulate for the benefit of the person entitled to the money. The person making the deposit shall take the receipt of the probate court for the money, and then shall be discharged from all liability as to the money. When the person entitled to the money deposited satisfies the probate court of his or her right to receive the same, the court shall cause it to be paid over and transferred to him or her, with all accumulations of money.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1009; G.L. 1909, ch. 319, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 370, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 31; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-29 .

33-18-30. Delivery of funds, securities, or instruments into court for which fiduciary cannot give proper discharge.

If an executor, administrator, or guardian holds any money, stock certificates, bond, or other chose in action payable or deliverable to a legatee, next of kin, ward, or other person, and the person entitled thereto cannot give a proper discharge therefor, or is out of the country, or his or her whereabouts are unknown after proper inquiry, and the executor, administrator, or guardian desires to free himself or herself from further liability therefor, he or she may pay or deliver the property into the registry of the probate court which appointed him or her, and present therewith his or her petition praying to be discharged, and setting out under oath the title of the person and why he or she cannot give proper discharge therefor.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1010; G.L. 1909, ch. 319, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 370, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 32; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-30 .

33-18-31. Hearing and decree on funds, securities, or instruments for which fiduciary cannot give proper discharge — Costs and expenses — Payment or delivery by court.

Upon the filing of a petition, such notice of the time and place of hearing thereon shall be given as the court shall direct; and after a hearing on the petition, the court may enter a decree granting a discharge, if it deems it proper, and thereafter the executor, administrator or guardian shall be relieved from all liability for the money, stock certificate, bond or other chose in action, and interest thereon. All costs and expenses on the petition, including expenses and counsel fees of the executor, administrator or guardian, as allowed by the court, shall be paid or retained out of the money or be a lien on any stock or chose in action and any dividend or interest payable thereon. When any person entitled to money, stock or chose in action shall appear and satisfy the court as to his or her right thereto, the same with the accumulations thereof, after deducting the expenses and counsel fees, shall be paid or delivered to him or her as the court shall direct.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 1011; G.L. 1909, ch. 319, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 370, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 579, § 33; G.L. 1956, § 33-18-31 .

Chapter 19 Real Property of Decedents and Incompetents

33-19-1. Court consent to mortgage.

The probate court which issued letters testamentary or of administration or guardianship may authorize an executor, administrator, or guardian to mortgage the real estate of the deceased or ward upon a petition filed, describing the particular estate to be mortgaged, the amount of money necessary to be raised, and the purpose for which the money is required, and the decree of the court upon the petition shall fix the amount for which the mortgage is to be given and the rate of interest which may be paid on the mortgage, and may order the whole or any part of the loan to be paid from time to time out of the income of the property mortgaged.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 737; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 4; P.L. 1918, ch. 1640, § 2; P.L. 1920, ch. 1844, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-1 ; P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 28.

Comparative Legislation.

Mortgages:

Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 45a-162 et seq., 45a-428.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 202, § 28 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Specific Devise.

A farm that is specifically devised should not be sold to pay debts if the estate will eventually have enough money to pay all the debts, since the executor may apply for permission to mortgage the farm, if necessary. Moran v. Cornell, 49 R.I. 308 , 142 A. 605, 1928 R.I. LEXIS 59 (1928).

Collateral References.

Construction and application of provision of will expressly giving executor power to mortgage realty. 115 A.L.R. 1417.

Court’s power to authorize guardian to borrow ward’s money. 30 A.L.R. 461.

Deficiency in case of mortgage executed by executor or administrator under statutory authority, liability for. 165 A.L.R. 1294.

Duty of one purchasing ward’s property, or loaning money on security of such property, to see that proceeds are properly applied. 56 A.L.R. 195.

Execution by executor empowered to sell or mortgage, of deed or mortgage without referring to power, as exercise thereof. 91 A.L.R. 433; 127 A.L.R. 248.

Mortgage of real property, power of guardian as to. 95 A.L.R. 839.

Statutes expressly empowering guardian to borrow money on mortgage, character of claims or obligations contemplated by. 85 A.L.R. 215.

33-19-2. Terms of mortgages and notes.

A mortgage given by an executor, administrator, or guardian, under leave from a probate court, may contain such powers of sale, conditions and covenants as are usual in mortgages taken by savings banks in this state. Notes secured by, and covenants contained in, mortgages given by executors, administrators, and guardians, so far as those notes and covenants are made by the executor, administrator, or guardian as such, shall not bind the executor, administrator, or guardian personally, but only the estate of the deceased or ward.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 751; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 18; P.L. 1918, ch. 1640, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-2 .

33-19-3. Authority to sell real estate.

The probate court which issued letters testamentary, of administration, guardianship, or conservatorship may grant authority to an executor or administrator to sell the real estate of a deceased person, or to a guardian or conservator to sell the real estate of his or her ward, for cash or on credit, upon a petition filed describing the particular estate to be sold and setting forth the facts on which the petition is founded.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 738; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-3 ; P.L. 1983, ch. 204, § 3.

Cross References.

Lien of estate and transfer taxes, § 44-23-12 et seq.

Power of executor or administrator to bring action of partition, § 34-15-4 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Infants.

The power to authorize sale of real estate of infants is conferred upon a probate court and if a case arises not within the letter of this statute, the general assembly has the power to grant the guardian or trustee the power to sell. Thurston v. Thurston, 6 R.I. 296 , 1859 R.I. LEXIS 45 (1859).

Collateral References.

Administrator with will annexed, right of, to execute power of sale conferred by will. 9 A.L.R.2d 1324.

Co-executors, power of those who accept executorship to exercise right to sell conferred by will on several, some of whom failed to accept. 36 A.L.R. 826.

Commissions of executor or administrator or expenses of administration, power to sell decedent’s real estate to pay. 95 A.L.R. 1143.

Constitutionality of statute authorizing guardian to sell or lease land of ward. 4 A.L.R. 1552.

Duty of one purchasing ward’s property, or loaning money on security of such property, to see that proceeds are properly applied. 56 A.L.R. 195.

Implied power of executor to sell real estate. 134 A.L.R. 378; 23 A.L.R.2d 1000.

Power of sale as including power to mortgage. 92 A.L.R. 882.

Realty not specifically referred to in power nor devised by will as within power of sale conferred upon executor. 139 A.L.R. 1143.

Time limited by will, right to exercise power of sale of real estate after. 31 A.L.R. 1394.

Waiver or renunciation of right to administer decedent’s estate as affecting power of sale. 153 A.L.R. 239.

33-19-4. Sale of whole real estate to prevent injury.

If in any case it appears to the court to be necessary to sell only a part of the real estate described, but that by the partial sale, the residue of the estate or of some part thereof would be greatly injured, the court may authorize the sale of the whole of the estate or such part of the estate as may appear advisable.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 739; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-4 .

33-19-5. Finality of decree authorizing sale or mortgage — Claims against estate.

When a decree is granted by a probate court authorizing a sale or mortgage of real estate of a deceased person, or of a person under guardianship, the adjudication of the court that the sale or mortgage is required shall be final so far as it may affect any title acquired by virtue of the decree; but nothing contained in this section shall affect the right of the executor, administrator, or guardian to contest the validity of any claim against the estate or ward.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 760; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 27; P.L. 1918, ch. 1640, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 27; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 27; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-5 .

Collateral References.

Confirmation, conclusiveness on purchaser of provisions of order or decree of, regarding terms and conditions. 95 A.L.R. 1492.

Contest of order directing sale of real estate for payment of debt, right or duty of executor or administrator as to. 126 A.L.R. 903.

Homestead, order directing or confirming sale of, for payment of debts, as subject to collateral attack. 66 A.L.R. 926.

33-19-6. Duration of authority to sell or mortgage.

Every license granted by a probate court to sell real estate shall continue in force for one year, and every license to mortgage real estate shall continue in force for six (6) months, from the date of the decree; but the conveyance may be executed and delivered after these periods, respectively.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 761; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 28; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 28; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 28; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appeal.

Failure to perfect appeal from decree of probate court ordering sale of real estate did not authorize probate court to affirm and revive decree after period of one year had elapsed. Campbell v. Metcalf, 33 R.I. 453 , 82 A. 285, 1912 R.I. LEXIS 109 (1912).

Purchaser.

Municipal court had jurisdiction to confirm deeds executed more than one year after license of sale upon petition of purchaser who had sold real estate to others. CALEF v. STEERE, 47 R.I. 498 , 134 A. 1, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 80 (1926).

Municipal court on petition to confirm sale made more than one year after license to sell was not required to appoint a guardian to execute confirmatory deed. CALEF v. STEERE, 47 R.I. 498 , 134 A. 1, 1926 R.I. LEXIS 80 (1926).

Collateral References.

Delay in exercise of power to sell real estate conferred by will, remedies in event of. 132 A.L.R. 1473.

33-19-7. Executor’s or administrator’s bond to cover application of proceeds of mortgage or sale.

Every executor or administrator empowered to sell or mortgage real estate as provided in § 33-19-3 shall, before making the sale or mortgage, give bond with a surety or sureties satisfactory to the court that he or she will apply the proceeds of the sale or mortgage to the purposes for which it was made.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 744; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-7 .

Collateral References.

Bond of executor or administrator, liability on, for proceeds of private or unauthorized sale of real property. 104 A.L.R. 205.

Sale of property of estate which is invalid, liability on bond in respect of. 106 A.L.R. 429.

Sale of real property directed or authorized by will, liability of sureties on bond of executor or administrator c. t. a. in respect of proceeds. 91 A.L.R. 943.

33-19-8. Guardian’s bond to cover proceeds of the sale or mortgage.

Every guardian empowered to sell or mortgage as provided in this chapter shall, before making the sale or mortgage, give bond with a surety or sureties satisfactory to the court that he or she will apply the proceeds of the sale or mortgage to the purposes for which the sale or mortgage was authorized, and invest the proceeds, or the surplus thereof, as the case may be, in such investments as are allowed by law, or in such other manner as the court may direct.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 745; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-8 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Conveyance Exchanging Care for Deed.

Conservator is not required to give bond where the proposed conveyance is to be a private sale and is in exchange for past services and future lifetime care, not for cash, and the consideration given for the property sold immediately inures to the benefit of the ward. Crossman v. Erickson, 570 A.2d 651, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1990).

Substantial Compliance.

A guardian’s bond for the sale of realty conditioned upon his applying the surplus or proceeds of sale as directed is in substantial compliance with this section. McGale v. McGale, 18 R.I. 675 , 29 A. 967, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 51 (1894).

33-19-9. Public or private sale — Petitioner as purchaser — Minimum price fixed.

The probate court may authorize executors, administrators, and guardians, at their option, to sell real estate of a deceased or of a ward, either at public auction or by private contract. The court, on petition with notice, if satisfied that the action will not be prejudicial to the interests of the estate, may authorize the petitioner to become the purchaser of the real estate, at public or private sale; provided, however, that, in any instance, if a sale be made by private contract, the sale shall be made for not less than the sum fixed by the court in its decree authorizing the sale.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 740; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 7; P.L. 1929, ch. 1378, § 1; P.L. 1931, ch. 1768, § 1; P.L. 1936, ch. 2391, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-9 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The court properly set a minimum price below which the real estate could not be sold, where the realty was being sold at a private sale. Barlow v. Barlow, 49 R.I. 117 , 140 A. 467, 1928 R.I. LEXIS 17 (1928).

Collateral References.

Bond of executor or administrator, liability on, for proceeds of private or unauthorized sale of real property. 104 A.L.R. 205.

Power of sale conferred on executor by testator as authorizing private sale. 11 A.L.R.2d 955.

Public sale, what constitutes. 4 A.L.R.2d 575.

Right of executor or administrator to purchase property of estate at sale brought about by third person. 77 A.L.R. 1513.

33-19-10. Notice of sale at auction.

Before making any sale at auction, the executor, administrator, or guardian shall publish notice of the time, place, and conditions of sale for four (4) successive weeks in some public newspaper designated by the court in the decree authorizing the sale, and shall give additional notice of the auction sale in such manner as the court in its decree may direct.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 747; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-10 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Notice Sufficient.

A notice published twice a week during the first two weeks and in every issue of the same daily paper during the last two weeks satisfied the requirements of this section. In re Harris, 14 R.I. 637 , 1885 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1885).

33-19-11. Adjournment of auction sale.

The executor, administrator, or guardian may, in his or her discretion, adjourn any auction sale to a future day, whenever he or she may deem it advisable, giving notice of the adjournment in the same manner in which notice of the sale was given, as soon as may be after the adjournment and up to the day of the adjourned sale, unless the adjournment shall be from day to day only, and then by making public proclamation at the time and place of the sale and by setting up a notice of the sale at the appointed place.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 748; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-11 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Notice Sufficient.

A notice of adjournment was sufficient, although not made by proclamation or posting, where the adjournment and the date to which the sale was adjourned were added to the original notice of sale and published in every issue of a newspaper until the day of sale. In re Harris, 14 R.I. 637 , 1885 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1885).

33-19-12. Affidavit as to notice of sale.

The executor, administrator, or guardian making the sale shall, within ten (10) days after providing notice, make and file in the office of the probate clerk an affidavit stating the times and places of giving notice, which shall be prima facie evidence of the matters stated in the notice.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 750; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-12 .

33-19-13. Laying out of roads and platting of land.

Probate courts shall also have the power to grant petitions of executors, administrators, or guardians for leave to lay out, make, or dedicate highways, streets, or gangways upon lands of the deceased or ward, and to plat those lands into house lots, with streets, gangways, or open spaces: (1) in the case of executors or administrators, as preliminary to the sales of lands of the deceased, and (2) in the case of guardians, either as preliminary to the sale or as beneficial to the estate of the ward; provided, that no petition shall be granted except upon notice, as the court may require, and upon proof that the action will be beneficial to the estate.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 741; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-13 .

33-19-14. Conditions imposed by court.

In granting any petition under any of the preceding sections, the court may impose such conditions, in addition to those imposed by law, as it may see fit.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 742; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-14 .

33-19-15. Conveyances.

Every executor, administrator, or guardian making a sale as provided in this chapter may, by virtue of his or her authority, make and execute, in due form of law, conveyances of the real estate sold; and the conveyances shall make as good title to the purchaser as the testator or intestate in his or her lifetime, or ward, being competent, could have made.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 749; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-15 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Adverse Possession.

A personal representative can convey good title to real estate of the decedent sold to pay debts, even though the estate is in the hands of a person who claims by adverse possession, since the personal representative is never seised of the decedent’s realty, so that the common law rule that a person disseised of real estate cannot convey title to a stranger does not apply. Knowles v. Blodgett, 15 R.I. 463 , 8 A. 691, 1887 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1887).

Adverse possession by husband of abandoned portion of highway reverting to deceased did not start to run until two years and six months after executor gave notice of appointment. Davis v. Girard, 80 R.I. 235 , 95 A.2d 847, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 57 (1953).

Collateral References.

Acknowledgment by executors, sufficiency of certificate. 29 A.L.R. 997; 25 A.L.R.2d 1124.

Administrator with will annexed, right of, to execute power of sale conferred by will. 116 A.L.R. 158; 9 A.L.R.2d 1324.

Cloud on title, unauthorized or fraudulent conveyance by administrator or executor as. 78 A.L.R. 240.

Execution by executor empowered to sell or mortgage, of deed or mortgage without referring to power, as exercise thereof. 91 A.L.R. 433; 127 A.L.R. 248.

Marketability of title, conveyance by personal representative as affecting. 57 A.L.R. 1496.

Purchaser at sale of incompetent’s property, rights and remedies of, where sale is void or is set aside because proceedings are imperfect or irregular, or where description of property is defective. 142 A.L.R. 310.

33-19-16. Sale by guardian and payment of proceeds to fiduciary in nonresident ward’s domicile.

A guardian appointed within this state, whose ward leaves or resides out of the state, may sell the real property of his or her ward and transfer and pay over the whole or any part of the proceeds or of the ward’s personal property to a guardian, trustee, or committee appointed by competent authority in the state or country in which the ward resides, upon such terms and in such manner as the probate court by which he or she was appointed may, after notice to all parties interested, decree upon petition filed therefor.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 746; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-16 .

33-19-17. Release of interests in real estate by guardians.

Guardians, after giving notice as required upon petition for leave to sell real estate, may be authorized by probate courts to release and discharge a vested, contingent or possible right or interest in or to real estate, upon such terms and conditions as may appear to the courts to be proper.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 753; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 20; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 20; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-17 .

33-19-18. Sale of cemetery lots.

Probate courts may authorize executors, administrators, and guardians, after notice to all persons interested as provided, or upon the assent of all interested persons, filed in court, to sell and convey or release, upon the terms and in such manner as the courts may order, lots in cemeteries belonging to the persons or estates by them represented, when no provision to the contrary is made by will, deed, or the charter of the cemetery corporation.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 754; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 21; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 21; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 21; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-18 .

Collateral References.

Burial lot owned by deceased, right of personal representative or heir to sell. 76 A.L.R. 1371.

33-19-19. Exchange of cemetery lots by guardians.

Probate courts may authorize guardians appointed or approved by them to exchange any lot of their wards in any burial ground or cemetery within this state, or any right or interest of their wards in any burial or cemetery lot, for any lot, right, or interest in the lot or in any other burial ground or cemetery, upon such terms and conditions as the courts may prescribe; provided, that in all such exchanges the title of the lot, right, or interest taken in exchange shall be taken in the name or names of the ward or wards whose lot, right, or interest is given in exchange.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 755; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 22; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 22; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 22; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-19 .

33-19-20. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 755; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 22; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 22; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 22; Repealed by P.L. 1995, ch. 323, § 29, effective July 5, 1995.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-19-20 concerned release and assessment of dower upon sale of real estate.

33-19-21. Irregularities in proceedings.

No sale of real estate made by an executor, administrator, or guardian, under decree of a probate court, and no title under the sale, shall be avoided because the deed was not delivered within one year after the decree, or on account of any irregularity in the proceedings, if it appears:

  1. That the decree was granted by a court of competent jurisdiction;
  2. That the person authorized to make the sale gave a bond, if bond was required, which was approved by the probate court;
  3. That the notice of the time and place of sale, if at public auction, was given according to law and the order of the court; and
  4. That the premises were sold by public auction in accordance with the notice, or by private contract in pursuance of the decree, and are held by one who purchased them in good faith or by some one claiming under him or her.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 758; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 25; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 25; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 25; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-21 .

33-19-22. Validity of sale as against claimant adverse to decedent or ward.

If the validity of a sale is drawn in question by a person claiming adversely to the title of the deceased or of the ward, or claiming under a title that is not derived from or through the deceased or the ward, the sale shall not be held to be void on account of any irregularity in the proceedings, if it appears that the executor, administrator or guardian was authorized to make the sale by a court of competent jurisdiction, and that he or she accordingly executed and acknowledged in legal form a deed for the conveyance of the premises.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 759; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 26; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 26; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 26; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-22 .

33-19-23. Surplus real estate proceeds distributed as real estate.

Surplus proceeds arising from the sale or mortgage of the real estate of a deceased person by an executor or administrator, or from the sale or mortgage of the real estate of a ward by his or her guardian, remaining on the settlement of the final account of the executor, administrator or guardian, shall be considered as real estate, and shall pass to, or be distributed in the same proportions among, the same persons who would have taken the real estate if it had not been sold or mortgaged.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 743; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 10; P.L. 1918, ch. 1640, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-23 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Damages From Condemnation.

Where probate court ordered land sold to pay debts, claim for damages for condemnation of a portion thereof after death of testator was not land passing under executor’s deed conveying all testator’s right, title, and interest, even though such damages would be treated as land for purpose of determining to whom the money would be paid. In re Southern New England R. Co., 39 R.I. 468 , 98 A. 99, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 49 (1916).

Subjection of Surplus to Heir’s Debts.

Where the whole estate was sold in order to pay the debts of the father, any surplus remaining would be applied to pay the debts of the son, also deceased, where such surplus would have passed to the son in the place of the real estate. Thus a purchaser from the heirs of the son was entitled only to any surplus remaining after payment of the son’s debts. Draper v. Barnes, 12 R.I. 156 , 1878 R.I. LEXIS 50 (1878).

Testamentary Power of Minors as to Surplus.

A will made by a minor who died before reaching majority could not dispose of surplus money in the hands of his guardian obtained from the sale of the ward’s real estate prior to his death since the surplus is treated as realty and the minor is not capable of disposing of real estate. In re Petition of McCabe, 15 R.I. 330 , 5 A. 79, 1886 R.I. LEXIS 30 (1886).

33-19-24. Examination of sale proceedings — Recovery of damages.

Every executor, administrator, and guardian authorized to sell real estate by decree of court shall be required, upon application to the probate court by an heir, creditor, ward, or other person interested in the estate, to make answer, upon oath, as to all matters touching his or her compliance with the decree, as fully as he or she is liable, to account and be examined in reference to the personal estate. If there is any neglect or misconduct of the executor, administrator, or guardian in complying with the decree, or in making the sale under the decree, by which a person interested in the estate suffers damage, the person may recover damages for the neglect or misconduct on the probate bond or otherwise, as the case may require.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 757; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 24; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 24; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 24; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-24 .

33-19-25. Compliance with legal requirements examined on settlement of fiduciary’s accounts.

In settling the accounts of executors, administrators, and guardians, the probate courts shall examine and adjudge whether they have complied with the law and the directions of the court in regard to the sale or mortgage of real estate.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 752; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 19; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 19; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-25 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Sales of Land.

An adjudication by the probate court settling the accounts of the administrator is conclusive as to the validity of sales of land, so the fact that the files of the court failed to show that a bond had been given by the administrator did not affect the title to the land so sold. Andrews v. Goff, 17 R.I. 205 , 21 A. 347, 1891 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1891).

33-19-26. Authority for lease by guardian.

The probate court which appointed or approved a guardian, upon the petition of the guardian, setting forth a description of the real estate which it is proposed to lease, upon hearing, after the notice as the court shall order, may authorize the guardian to give a written lease of the real estate or any part thereof, and the decree of the court shall fix the term and the rental, and approve the form of the lease; provided, that a guardian of a minor shall not lease the real estate of his or her ward beyond the ward’s minority.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 762; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 29; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 29; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 29; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-26 .

Collateral References.

Constitutionality of statute authorizing guardian to sell or lease land of ward. 4 A.L.R. 1552.

Power to lease infant’s land beyond minority or guardianship. 6 A.L.R.3d 570.

33-19-27. Sale, lease, or mortgage by foreign guardian of nonresident ward.

If any person who resides out of the state, but within the United States, is under guardianship in the state, territory, or district where he or she resides, and has no guardian appointed in this state, the foreign guardian may file a copy of his or her appointment, duly authenticated according to an act of congress in those cases, in the probate court of any town or city in this state in which there is real estate of the ward. After filing and upon petition to the probate court, he or she may be authorized to sell, mortgage, or lease the real estate of the ward in any town or city, for the purposes, in the manner, after like notice, and upon the terms provided in this chapter in case of sale, mortgage, or lease, by a guardian appointed in this state.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 763; G.L. 1909, ch. 308, § 30; G.L. 1923, ch. 359, § 30; G.L. 1938, ch. 570, § 30; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-27 .

33-19-28. Definitions of terms in § 33-19-27.

  1. “Guardian” as used in § 33-19-27 shall be deemed to include a guardian, conservator, curator, committee, or trustee, and any other fiduciary having substantially the same powers and duties as a guardian, conservator, curator, committee, or trustee, with reference to the estate or property of a minor or person non sui juris, or otherwise incapacitated; and a person shall be deemed “under guardianship” within the meaning of § 33-19-27 if a guardian, conservator, curator, committee, or trustee, or other fiduciary having substantially the duties of a guardian, conservator, curator, committee, or trustee has been appointed with reference to his or her estate or property.
  2. This section shall be deemed to be declaratory of the purposes of § 33-19-27 as originally enacted, and shall not be construed so as to invalidate any action taken by any fiduciary heretofore under § 33-19-27 .

History of Section. G.L., ch. 570, § 30, as enacted by P.L. 1947, ch. 1955, § 1; P.L. 1947, ch. 1955, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-19-28 .

Chapter 19.1 Financial Exploitation of Elders and Dependent Persons Act

33-19.1-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Financial Exploitation of Elders and Dependent Persons Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 491, § 1.

Effective Dates.

P.L. 2014, ch. 491, § 2, provides that this chapter takes effect on January 1, 2015.

33-19.1-2. Definitions.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “Care custodian” means a person who provides health or social services to a dependent adult, except that “care custodian” does not include a person who provided services without remuneration if the person had a personal relationship with the dependent adult: (i) At least ninety (90) days before providing those services; (ii) At least six (6) months before the dependent adult’s death; and (iii) Before the dependent adult was admitted to hospice care, if the dependent adult was admitted to hospice care. As used in this section, “remuneration” does not include the donative transfer at issue under this chapter or the reimbursement of expenses.
  2. “Health and social services” means services provided to a dependent adult because of the person’s dependent condition, including, but not limited to, the administration of medicine, medical testing, wound care, assistance with hygiene, companionship, housekeeping, shopping, cooking, and assistance with finances.
  3. “Dependent adult” means a person who, at the time of executing the instrument at issue under this section, was a person described in either of the following:
    1. The person was sixty-five (65) years of age or older and satisfied one or both of the following criteria:
      1. The person was unable to provide properly for his or her personal needs for physical health, food, clothing, or shelter;
      2. Due to one or more deficits in the mental functions listed in § 11-5-12(b)(2) , the person had difficulty managing his or her own financial resources or resisting fraud or undue influences.
    2. The person was eighteen (18) years of age or older and satisfied one or both of the following criteria:
      1. The person was unable to provide properly for his or her personal needs for physical health, food, clothing, or shelter.
      2. Due to one or more deficits in the mental functions listed in § 11-5-12(b)(2) , the person had substantial difficulty managing his or her own financial resources or resisting fraud or undue influences.
  4. “Independent attorney” means an attorney who has no legal, business, financial, professional, or personal relationship with the beneficiary of a donative transfer at issue under this chapter, and who would not be appointed as a fiduciary or receive any pecuniary benefit as a result of the operation of the instrument containing the donative transfer at issue under this chapter.
    1. A person who is “related by blood or affinity” to a specified person means any of the following persons:
      1. A spouse or domestic partner of the specified person;
      2. A relative within a specified degree of kinship described in § 33-19.1-3 or § 33-19.1-4 to the specified person or within a specified degree of kinship described in § 33-19.1-3 or § 33-19.1-4 to the spouse or domestic partner of the specified person; or
      3. The spouse or domestic partner of a person described in subsection 5(i)(B).
    2. For the purposes of this definition, “spouse or domestic partner” includes a predeceased spouse or predeceased domestic partner.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 491, § 1.

33-19.1-3. Prohibited transaction.

  1. A provision of any document or instrument, including commercial instruments as defined in title 6A, making a donative transfer to any of the following persons is presumed to be the product of fraud or undue influence:
    1. The person who drafted the instrument;
    2. A person in a fiduciary relationship with the transferor who transcribed the instrument or caused it to be transcribed;
    3. A care custodian of a transferor who is a dependent adult, but only if the instrument was executed during the period in which the care custodian provided services to the transferor, or within ninety (90) days before or after that period;
    4. A person who is related by blood or affinity, within the third degree, to any person described in subsections (a)(1) — (a)(3).
    5. A cohabitant or employee of any person described in subsections (a)(1) — (a)(3); or
    6. A partner, shareholder, or employee of a law firm in which a person described in subsections (a)(1) — (a)(2) has an ownership interest.
  2. The presumption created by this section is a presumption affecting the burden of proof. The presumption may be rebutted by proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the donative transfer was not the product of fraud or undue influence.
  3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a)(1) — (a)(2), and with respect to a donative transfer to the person who drafted the donative instrument, or to a person who is related to, or associated with, the drafter as described in subsections (a)(4) — (a)(6), the presumption created by this section is conclusive.
  4. If a beneficiary is unsuccessful in rebutting the presumption, the beneficiary shall bear all costs of the proceeding, including reasonable attorney’s fees.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 491, § 1.

33-19.1-4. Exceptions.

Section 33-19.1-3 does not apply to any of the following instruments or transfers:

  1. A donative transfer to a person who is related by blood or affinity, within the fourth (4th) degree, to the transferor or is the cohabitant of the transferor.
  2. An instrument that is drafted or transcribed by a person who is related by blood or affinity, within the fourth (4th) degree, to the transferor or is the cohabitant of the transferor.
  3. An instrument that is approved pursuant to an order of the superior, family, district or any probate court, after full disclosure of the relationships of the persons involved.
  4. A donative transfer to a federal, state, or local public entity; an entity that qualifies for an exemption from taxation under section 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(19) of the Internal Revenue Code; or a trust holding the transferred property for the entity.
  5. A donative transfer of property valued at five thousand dollars ($5,000) or less, if the total value of the transferor’s estate equals or exceeds the amount of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
  6. An instrument executed outside of Rhode Island by a transferor who was not a resident of Rhode Island when the instrument was executed.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 491, § 1.

33-19.1-5. Review by independent attorney — Certificate of review.

  1. A gift is not subject to § 33-19.1-3 if the instrument is reviewed by an independent attorney who counsels the transferor, out of the presence of any heir or proposed beneficiary, about the nature and consequences of the intended transfer, including the effect of the intended transfer on the transferor’s heirs and on any beneficiary of a prior donative instrument; attempts to determine if the intended transfer is the result of fraud or undue influence; and signs and delivers to the transferor an original certificate in substantially the following form: Click to view
  2. An attorney whose written engagement, signed by the transferor, is expressly limited solely to compliance with the requirements of this section, shall not be considered to otherwise represent the transferor as a client.
  3. Under no circumstances shall an attorney who drafts an instrument review and certify the instrument.
  4. The attorney who conducts the independent review shall provide a copy of the signed certification to the drafting attorney.

“CERTIFICATE OF INDEPENDENT REVIEW I, , have reviewed (attorney’s name) and have counseled the transferor, (name of instrument) , on the nature and consequences of any (name of transferor) transfers of property to (name of person described in ) that would be made by the instrument. § 33-19.1-3 I am an “independent attorney” as defined in and I am in a position to advise the transferor independently, impartially, and confidentially as to the consequences of the transfer. On the basis of this counsel, I conclude that the transfers to that would (name of person described in ) be made by the instrument are not the product of fraud or undue influence. § 33-19.1-2 § 33-19.1-3 ” (Name of Attorney)(Bar#)(Date)

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 491, § 1.

33-19.1-6. Failure of gift.

If a gift fails under this chapter, the instrument making the gift shall operate as if the beneficiary had predeceased the transferor without spouse, domestic partner, or issue.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 491, § 1.

33-19.1-7. Liability.

  1. A person is not liable for transferring property pursuant to an instrument that is subject to the presumption created under § 33-19.1-3 , unless the person is served with notice, prior to transferring the property, that the instrument has been contested under this section.
  2. A person who is served with notice that an instrument has been contested under this section is not liable for failing to transfer property pursuant to the instrument, unless the person is served with notice that the validity of the transfer has been conclusively determined by a court.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 491, § 1.

33-19.1-8. Non-Waiveability.

This chapter applies notwithstanding a contrary provision in an instrument.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 491, § 1.

33-19.1-9. Applicability to present documents.

  1. This section shall apply to instruments that become irrevocable on or after January 1, 2015. For the purposes of this section, an instrument that is otherwise revocable or amendable shall be deemed to be irrevocable if, on or after January 1, 2015, the transferor by reason of incapacity was unable to change the disposition of the transferor’s property and did not regain capacity before the date of the transferor’s death.
  2. It is the intent of the general assembly that this chapter supplements the common law on undue influence, without superseding or interfering in the operation of that law. Nothing in this chapter precludes an action to contest a donative transfer under the common law or under any other applicable law. This chapter is declarative of existing law.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 491, § 1.

Chapter 20 Absentees’ Estates

33-20-1. Grounds for appointment of receiver.

  1. If a resident of this state, having property in this state, has disappeared, has been absent from his or her usual place of residence, his or her whereabouts have been unknown for more than one year, and he or she has left no agent in charge of his or her property, the court of probate of the town in which he or she was last known to reside shall have power upon the petition of the spouse, next of kin, or of one or more of his or her creditors, setting forth the above facts, to appoint a receiver to collect and take charge of the property until the fact of the death or survival of the absentee is established, and in case of his or her death, until an executor or administrator shall be appointed and qualified.
  2. If there shall be no petition by the spouse, next of kin, or creditors filed within five (5) years after the resident’s whereabouts have been unknown, all of the personalty of the resident who has disappeared or whose whereabouts are unknown shall be subject to the provisions of chapters 21 and 21.1 of this title.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 927; G.L. 1909, ch. 315, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 366, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 581, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-20-1 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 195, § 3; P.L. 1971, ch. 187, § 1.

Cross References.

Absentee husband, rights of wife in property, § 15-4-16 .

Comparative Legislation.

Absentees’ estates:

Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 45a-478, 45a-483, 45a-329, 45a-446.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 200, § 1 et seq.

Collateral References.

Administration of estate of one the fact of whose death rests upon presumption or circumstantial evidence. 140 A.L.R. 1403.

33-20-2. Notice as to appointment of receiver.

The court before appointing a receiver shall give at least thirty (30) days’ notice by publication in one or more newspaper published in the state, in the manner provided for petitions for appointment of administrators, and by mailing a copy of the notice to the last known address of the absentee. This notice shall be addressed to the absentee and to all persons who claim an interest in the property, and to all whom it may concern, citing them to appear at a time and place named and show cause why a receiver of the property of the absentee should not be appointed. The court may order other and further notice to be given within or outside the state.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 928; G.L. 1909, ch. 315, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 366, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 581, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-20-2 .

33-20-3. Wartime meaning of last known address.

During such time as the United States shall be engaged in any war, the term “last known address”, as used in § 33-20-2 , shall be construed to mean the last known address within the confines of the United States.

History of Section. G.L., ch. 581, § 9, as enacted by P.L. 1944, ch. 1485, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-20-3 .

33-20-4. Show of cause against appointment of receiver — Receiver’s bond.

Any person may appear and show cause why the prayer of the petitioner should not be granted. If a receiver is appointed, he or she shall give bond to the probate court in such sum and with such conditions as the court orders, with surety satisfactory to the court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 929; G.L. 1909, ch. 315, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 366, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 581, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 33-20-4 .

33-20-5. Orders for management or sale of property.

The court may make orders for the care, custody, leasing, and investing of the property and its proceeds. The court may order livestock or perishable property, or any property, which cannot be kept without great and disproportionate expense, to be sold at public or private sale. The court may, upon petition of the receiver, and after the notice as is required in case of sale of real estate by executors and administrators, order all or any part of the real and personal estate of the absentee to be sold at public or private sale to supply money for the payments authorized by §§ 33-20-1 33-20-7 or for reinvestment approved by the court. The court, on petition with notice, if satisfied that the action will not be prejudicial to the interests of the estate, may authorize the petitioner to become the purchaser of the real estate, at public or private sale; provided, however, that, in any instance, if the sale is made by private contract, the sale shall be made for not less than the sum fixed by the court in its decree authorizing the sale.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 930; G.L. 1909, ch. 315, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 366, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 581, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 33-20-5 ; P.L. 1968, ch. 94, § 1.

33-20-6. Maintenance of wife and children — Payment of debts.

The probate court may authorize the receiver to apply the income of the property, and if the income is insufficient, then the property or the proceeds of any sale thereof, in payment of charges incurred, or that may be incurred, in the support and maintenance of the absentee’s wife and minor children and to the payment of such debts as may be proved against the absentee before the probate court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 931; G.L. 1909, ch. 315, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 366, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 581, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 33-20-6 .

33-20-7. Compensation of and disbursements by receiver.

The receiver shall be allowed such compensation and such disbursements, to be paid out of the income, property, or proceeds, as the probate court may approve.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 932; G.L. 1909, ch. 315, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 366, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 581, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 33-20-7 .

33-20-8. Conservatorship for military absentee.

Whenever a person, hereinafter referred to as an absentee, who while serving in or with the armed forces of the United States, or while serving as a merchant seaman, has been reported or listed as missing, or missing in action, or interned in a neutral country, or beleaguered, besieged, or captured by an enemy, has an interest in any form of property in this state or is a legal resident of this state and has not provided an adequate power of attorney authorizing another to act in his or her behalf in regard to his or her property or interest, then, the probate court of the city or town of the absentee’s legal domicile or of the city or town where the property is situated, upon petition alleging the foregoing facts and showing the necessity for providing care of the property of the absentee made by any person who would have an interest in the property of the absentee were the absentee deceased, or on the court’s own motion, after notice to, or on receipt of proper waivers from, the heirs and next of kin of the absentee as provided by law for the administration of an estate, and upon good cause being shown, may, after finding the facts to be as provided in this section, appoint a conservator to take charge of the absentee’s estate, under the supervision and subject to the further orders of the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1710, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-20-8 .

Cross References.

Extension to veterans of all wars and campaigns, §§ 30-22-3 , 30-22-4 .

Power of attorney given by serviceman, §§ 34-22-8 34-22-10 .

33-20-9. Person appointed as conservator — Bond — Powers.

The court shall have full discretionary authority to appoint any suitable person as conservator and may require the conservator to post an adequate surety bond and to make such reports as the court may deem necessary. The conservator shall have the same powers and authority as the guardian of the property of an infant or incompetent and shall be considered as an officer or arm of the court.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1710, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-20-9 .

33-20-10. Termination of conservatorship.

At any time upon petition signed by the absentee, or on petition of any attorney in fact acting under an adequate power of attorney granted by the absentee, the court shall direct the termination of the conservatorship and the transfer of all property held under the conservatorship to the absentee or to the designated attorney in fact. Likewise, if at any time subsequent to the appointment of a conservator it shall appear that the absentee has died and an executor or administrator has been appointed for his or her estate, the court shall direct the termination of the conservatorship and the transfer of all property of the deceased absentee held under the conservatorship to the executor or administrator.

History of Section. P.L. 1946, ch. 1710, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 33-20-10 .

33-20-11. Escheat of excess funds.

Any personalty remaining in the hands of the probate court under the provisions of this chapter after payment of all claims on the absentees’ estate, if there are no heirs or next of kin known to be surviving, shall be subject to the provisions of chapters 21 and 21.1 of this title.

History of Section. G.L., § 33-20-11 , as enacted by P.L. 1961, ch. 195, § 4.

Chapter 21 Unclaimed Property

33-21-1. Town taking possession of property.

Whenever any person shall die leaving any real estate within this state, and shall leave no heir or legal representative to claim the real estate, the town council of the town in which the real estate is located may direct the town treasurer of the town to take the property into his or her possession for the use of the town until the heir or other legal representative of the deceased shall call for the real estate, to whom the real estate shall be delivered on being claimed and evidence of the right or title of the claimant shown; and the town shall in that case account with the claimant for the real estate, but not including any income or interest received from the real estate.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 956; G.L. 1909, ch. 317, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 368, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 582, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-21-1 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 195, § 1.

Cross References.

Unclaimed intangible and tangible property, § 33-21.1-1 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Unclaimed estates:

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 206, § 25 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Accounting by Town.

This chapter vests the beneficial interest in estates coming within its provisions in the town which takes possession, and the town has the power to use such property until the heirs or persons entitled to distribution make their claims, so that such interest cannot be recalled by the state nor does the state have a right to an accounting for the period during which the town has the beneficial use. Attorney Gen. v. Providence, 8 R.I. 8 , 1862 R.I. LEXIS 38 (1862).

Claimants to Estate Held by Town.

Probate court did not have jurisdiction to determine the right of claimants to an estate that had previously been delivered to the town treasurer under this section. Clarke v. East Providence, 44 R.I. 142 , 116 A. 2, 1922 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1922).

Property Inherited by Alien.

Property to which an alien became heir prior to the passage of § 34-2-1 passed to the town in which the estate was situated. Haigh v. Haigh, 9 R.I. 26 , 1868 R.I. LEXIS 6 (1868).

Town as Party to Probate Appeal.

Where property was still under control of the probate court, town treasurer was not a proper party to an appeal involving the right of the only claimant to inherit, since the estate was not yet unclaimed. Dailey v. Connery, 75 R.I. 274 , 65 A.2d 801, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 43 (1949).

33-21-2. Repealed.

History of Section. Former § 33-21-2 (C.P.A. 1905, § 958; G.L. 1909, ch. 317, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 368, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 582, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 33-21-2 ) was repealed by P.L. 1961, ch. 195, § 2.

33-21-3. Action for recovery of property.

If any person shall appear to be in possession of any real estate of one dying without known heirs or other legal representatives as provided in § 33-21-1 , and shall on request refuse to deliver or surrender possession of the real estate to the town treasurer directed as provided, the town treasurer may in his or her capacity commence and prosecute an action for the recovery of the real estate. For purposes of §§ 33-21-1 and 33-21-3 33-21-6 , “real estate” shall not include real estate to the extent it constitutes the underlying security for any note, obligation, or other security owned by a person dying without known heirs, and the real estate to this extent shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter and chapter 21.1 of this title. The attorney general may be joined, on behalf of the state, as a party respondent in any action involving title to the real estate.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 959; G.L. 1909, ch. 317, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 368, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 582, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 33-21-3 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 195, § 1.

Collateral References.

Notice, necessity and sufficiency of, to support title by escheat to decedent’s estate. 48 A.L.R. 1342.

33-21-4. Subjection of estate to debts of decedent.

Whenever any real estate shall be taken into possession by any town treasurer pursuant to this chapter, the real estate shall be subject and liable to the payment of the debts of the deceased to whom it belonged, as liens on the property; and these liens may be established and enforced by proceedings brought by the creditors against the town as trustee, at any time within two (2) years after the town has taken possession.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 957; G.L. 1909, ch. 317, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 368, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 582, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-21-4 ; P.L. 1961, ch. 195, § 1.

33-21-5. Order for sale of real estate.

Whenever a town shall have been in possession of any real estate under the provisions of § 33-21-1 for ten (10) years without any person having claimed the same as heir at law, devisee, legatee, or legal representative of the deceased person, and shall, by complaint setting forth all the known facts in relation to the title and possession of the real estate and in relation to the person who died leaving the property, apply to the superior court for leave to sell and convey the real estate, the court shall order such notice of the pendency of the complaint as may to the court seem proper, and may, after the return of the notice and the hearing of all persons interested in the real estate, order the sale and conveyance of real estate in such manner and upon such terms and conditions as the court shall prescribe.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 963; G.L. 1909, ch. 317, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 368, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 582, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 33-21-5 .

33-21-6. Proceeds of sale.

The proceeds of a sale, and the balance of any proceeds after proceedings by creditors under § 33-21-4 , over and above all expenses incurred by the town, shall be held by the town and be accounted for in the same way and be held for the same uses as the real estate would have been had no sale been made.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 964; G.L. 1909, ch. 317, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 368, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 582, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 33-21-6 .

33-21-7 — 33-21-9. Repealed.

History of Section. Former §§ 33-21-7 — 33-21-9 (C.P.A. 1905, §§ 960-962; G.L. 1909, ch. 317, §§ 5-7; G.L. 1923, ch. 368, §§ 5-7; G.L. 1938, ch. 582, §§ 5-7; G.L. 1956, §§ 33-21-7 to 33-21-9) were repealed by P.L. 1961, ch. 195, § 2.

33-21-10. Record of proceedings.

The town treasurer shall keep an exact record of his or her proceedings under the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 965; G.L. 1909, ch. 317, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 368, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 582, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 33-21-10 .

33-21-11 — 33-21-43. Repealed.

History of Section. Former §§ 33-21-11 — 33-21-40 (G.L. 1956, §§ 33-21-11 — 33-21-40; P.L. 1968, ch. 256, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 205, art. X, § 1; P.L. 1978, ch. 351, §§ 1, 2, 3; P.L. 1979, ch. 118, §§ 1, 3; P.L. 1979, ch. 216, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 141, § 1; P.L. 1982, ch. 364, § 1), concerning unclaimed property, were repealed by P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 2, effective July 1, 1987. For comparable provisions, see § 33-21-1 et seq. and § 33-21.1-1 et seq. Former §§ 33-21-41 — 33-21-43 (G.L. 1956, 33-21-41 to 33-21-43, as enacted by P.L. 1961, ch. 195, § 6) were repealed by P.L. 1968, ch. 256, § 2.

Chapter 21.1 Unclaimed Intangible and Tangible Property

33-21.1-1. Definitions and use of terms.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Administrator” means the general treasurer or his or her designee, including agents hired for the express purpose of auditing, assessing and collecting unclaimed property.
  2. “Apparent owner” means the person whose name appears on the records of the holder as the person entitled to property held, issued, or owing by the holder.
  3. “Banking organization” means a bank, trust, company, savings bank (industrial bank, land bank, safe deposit company), private banker, or any organization defined by any of the laws of this or any other state as a bank or banking organization.
  4. “Business association” means a public corporation, a non-public corporation, joint stock company, investment company, business trust, partnership, or association for business purposes of two (2) or more individuals, whether or not for profit, including a banking organization, financial organization, insurance company, or utility, but not including hospitals, private, nonprofit institutions of higher education, and other domestic charitable corporations as those terms are defined in this section.
  5. “Domicile” means the state of incorporation of a corporation and the state of the principal place of business of an unincorporated person.
  6. “Financial organization” means a savings and loan association, cooperative bank, building and loan association, or credit union.
  7. “Hospital” means:
    1. Any nonprofit hospital incorporated under the laws of the state, including any nonprofit subsidiary corporations formed by any hospital or formed by the parent corporation of a hospital, or
    2. Any nonprofit corporation the member or members of which consist solely of one or more hospitals or parent corporations of hospitals, or
    3. Any other hospital which is licensed as a general hospital or maternity hospital pursuant to chapter 17 of title 23 which is exempt from taxation.
  8. “Holder” means a person, wherever organized or domiciled, who is:
    1. In possession of property belonging to another,
    2. A trustee, or
    3. Indebted to another on an obligation.
  9. “Insurance company” means an association, corporation, fraternal or mutual benefit organization, whether or not for profit, which is engaged in providing insurance coverage, including accident, burial, casualty, credit life, contract performance, dental, fidelity, fire, health, hospitalization, illness, life (including endowments and annuities), malpractice, marine, mortgage, surety, and wage protection insurance; but not including a nonprofit corporation organized pursuant to chapters 19, 20, 20.1, 20.2 and 20.3 of title 27.
  10. “Intangible property” includes:
    1. Money, checks, drafts, deposits, interest, dividends, income, and bonds;
    2. Credit balances, customer overpayments, security deposits, refunds, credit memos, unpaid wages, unused airline tickets, unclaimed pari-mutuel tickets, and unidentified remittances;
    3. Stocks and other intangible ownership interests in business associations;
    4. Money deposited to redeem stocks, bonds, coupons, and other securities, or to make distributions;
    5. Amounts due and payable under the terms of insurance policies; and
    6. Amounts distributable from a trust or custodial fund established under a plan to provide health, welfare, pension, vacation, severance, retirement, death, stock purchase, profit sharing, employee savings, supplemental unemployment insurance, or similar benefits.
  11. “Last known address” means a description of the location of the apparent owner sufficient for the purpose of the delivery of mail.
  12. “Other domestic charitable corporation” means a corporation, except a hospital or private, nonprofit institution of higher education, as those terms are defined herein, organized and existing under chapter 6 of title 7, chapter 19 of title 27, or created by general or special act of the general assembly; provided however that domestic charitable corporations which qualify as charitable corporations under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) and have one hundred (100) or fewer employees shall be exempt from the provisions of this chapter.
  13. “Owner” means a depositor in the case of a deposit, a beneficiary in the case of a trust other than a deposit in trust, a creditor, claimant, or payee in the case of other intangible property, or a person having a legal or equitable interest in property subject to this chapter or his or her legal representative.
  14. “Person” means an individual, business association, state or other government, governmental subdivision or agency, public corporation, public authority, estate, trust, two (2) or more persons having a joint or common interest, or any other legal or commercial entity.
  15. “Private, nonprofit institution of higher education” means an educational institution situated within this state which by virtue of law or charter is a private, nonprofit educational institution empowered to provide a program of education beyond the high school level and which is accredited by a nationally recognized educational accrediting agency or association and awards a bachelor’s or advance degree or provides a program of not less than two (2) years’ duration which is accepted for full credit toward a bachelor’s degree.
  16. “State” means any state, district, commonwealth, territory, insular possession, or any other area subject to the legislative authority of the United States.
  17. “Tangible property” includes all other property not defined as intangible property and which is not otherwise defined in this section.
  18. “Utility” means a person who owns or operates for public use any plan, equipment, property, franchise, or license for the transmission of communications or the production, storage, transmission, sale, delivery, or furnishing of electricity, water, steam, or gas.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3; P.L. 1987, ch. 139, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 223, § 1; P.L. 1993, ch. 9, § 2; P.L. 2005, ch. 194, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 202, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 73, art. 37, § 1.

Collateral References.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes Implementing the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act or its Predecessor — Modern Status. 29 A.L.R.6th 507.

33-21.1-2. Property presumed abandoned.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, all intangible property, including any income or increment derived from intangible property, less any lawful charges, that is held, issued, or owing in the ordinary course of a holder’s business and has remained unclaimed by the owner for more than three (3) years after it became payable or distributable is presumed abandoned.
  2. Property is payable or distributable for the purpose of this chapter notwithstanding the owner’s failure to make demand or to present any instrument or document required to receive payment.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 86, § 2.

33-21.1-2.1. United States savings bonds unclaimed property escheat procedure.

  1. Notwithstanding the provisions of § 33-21.1-2(b) , United States savings bonds that are unclaimed property and subject to the provisions of this chapter shall escheat to the state of Rhode Island three (3) years after becoming unclaimed property, and all property rights to such United States savings bonds or proceeds from such bonds shall vest solely in the state of Rhode Island.
  2. If no claim has been filed pursuant to this chapter for United States savings bonds, the administrator may commence a civil action in any district court within the state of Rhode Island for a determination that such United States savings bonds shall escheat to the state. The administrator may postpone the bringing of such action until sufficient United States savings bonds have accumulated in the administrator’s custody to justify the expense of such proceedings.
  3. If no person shall file a claim or appear at the hearing to substantiate a claim, or where the court shall determine that a claimant is not entitled to the property claimed by such claimant, then the court, if satisfied by evidence that the administrator has substantially complied with the laws of this state, shall enter a judgment that the subject United States savings bonds have escheated to the state.
  4. The administrator may redeem such United States savings bonds escheated to the state and proceeds from such redemption of United States savings bonds shall be deposited in the state general fund in accordance with the provisions of § 33-21.1-23 .

History of Section. P.L. 2016, ch. 386, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 406, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2016, ch. 386, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 406, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

33-21.1-3. General rules for taking custody of intangible unclaimed property.

Unless otherwise provided in this chapter or by other statute of this state, intangible property is subject to the custody of this state as unclaimed property if the conditions raising a presumption of abandonment under §§ 33-21.1-2 and 33-21.1-5 33-21.1-16 are satisfied; and

  1. The last known address, as shown on the records of the holder, of the apparent owner is in this state; or
  2. The records of the holder do not reflect the identity of the person entitled to the property and it is established that the last known address of the person entitled to the property is in this state; or
  3. The records of the holder do not reflect the last known address of the apparent owner, and it is established that:
    1. The last known address of the person entitled to the property is in this state, or
    2. The holder is a domiciliary or a government or governmental subdivision or agency of this state and has not previously paid or delivered the property to the state of the last known address of the apparent owner or other person entitled to the property; or
  4. The last known address, as shown on the records of the holder, of the apparent owner is in a state that does not provide by law for the escheat or custodial taking of the property or its escheat or unclaimed property law is not applicable to the property and the holder is a domiciliary or a government or governmental subdivision or agency of this state; or
  5. The last known address, as shown on the records of the holder, of the apparent owner is in a foreign nation and the holder is a domiciliary or a government or governmental subdivision or agency of this state; or
  6. The transaction out of which the property arose occurred in this state, and
      1. The last known address of the apparent owner or other person entitled to the property is unknown, or
      2. The last known address of the apparent owner or other person entitled to the property is in a state that does not provide by law for the escheat or custodial taking of the property or its escheat or unclaimed property law is not applicable to the property, and
    1. The holder is a domiciliary of a state that does not provide by law for the escheat or custodial taking of the property or its escheat or unclaimed property law is not applicable to the property.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-3.1. Property originated or issued by this state, any political subdivision of the state or any entity incorporated, organized, created or otherwise located in this state.

  1. All intangible property, including, but not limited to securities, principal, interest, dividends, or other earnings thereon, less any lawful charges, held by a business association, federal, state or local government or governmental subdivision, agency or entity, or any other person or entity, regardless of where the holder may be found, if the owner has not claimed the property or corresponded in writing with the holder concerning the property within three (3) years after the date prescribed for payment or delivery by the issuer, unless the holder is a state that has taken custody pursuant to its own unclaimed property laws, in which case no additional period of holding beyond that of the state is necessary under this section, is presumed abandoned and subject to the custody of this state as unclaimed property if:
    1. The last known address of the owner is unknown: and
    2. The person or entity originating or issuing the intangible property is this state or any political subdivision of this state, or is incorporated, organized, created, or otherwise located in this state.
  2. The provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to property which is or may be presumed abandoned and subject to the custody of this state pursuant to any other section of this title or any other provision of law.
  3. The provisions of subsection (a) shall apply to all property held at the time of enactment, or at any time thereafter, regardless of when the property became or becomes presumptively abandoned.

History of Section. P.L. 1993, ch. 9, § 1.

33-21.1-4. Travelers checks and money orders.

  1. Subject to subsection (d), any sum payable on a travelers check that has been outstanding for more than fifteen (15) years after its issuance is presumed abandoned unless the owner, within fifteen (15) years, has communicated in writing with the issuer concerning it or otherwise indicated an interest as evidenced by a memorandum or other record on file prepared by an employee of the issuer.
  2. Subject to subsection (d), any sum payable on a money order or similar written instrument, other than a third party bank check, that has been outstanding for more than five (5) years after its issuance is presumed abandoned unless the owner, within five (5) years, has communicated in writing with the issuer concerning it or otherwise indicated an interest as evidenced by a memorandum or other record on file prepared by an employee of the issuer.
  3. A holder may not deduct from the amount of a travelers check or money order any charge imposed by reason of the failure to present the instrument for payment unless there is a valid and enforceable written contract between the issuer and the owner of the instrument pursuant to which the issuer may impose a charge and the issuer regularly imposes these charges and does not regularly reverse or otherwise cancel them.
  4. No sum payable on a travelers check, money order, or similar written instrument, other than a third party bank check, described in subsections (a) and (b) may be subjected to the custody of this state as unclaimed property unless:
    1. The records of the issuer show that the travelers check, money order, or similar written instrument was purchased in this state;
    2. The issuer has its principal place of business in this state and the records of the issuer do not show the state in which the travelers check, money order, or similar written instrument was purchased; or
    3. The issuer has its principal place of business in this state, the records of the issuer show the state in which the travelers check, money order, or similar written instrument was purchased and the laws of the state of purchase do not provide for the escheat or custodial taking of the property or its escheat or unclaimed property law is not applicable to the property.
  5. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, subsection (d) applies to sums payable on travelers checks, money orders, and similar written instruments presumed abandoned on or after February 1, 1971, except to the extent that those sums have been paid over to a state prior to January 1, 1981.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-5. Checks, drafts and similar instruments issued or certified by banking and financial organizations.

  1. Any sum payable on a check, draft, or similar instrument, except those subject to § 33-21.1-4 , on which a banking or financial organization is directly liable, including a cashier’s check and a certified check, which has been outstanding for more than three (3) years after it was payable or after its issuance if payable on demand, is presumed abandoned, unless the owner, within three (3) years, has communicated in writing with the banking or financial organization concerning it or otherwise indicated an interest as evidenced by a memorandum or other record on file prepared by an employee thereof.
  2. A holder may not deduct from the amount of any instrument subject to this section any charge imposed by reason of the failure to present the instrument for payment unless there is a valid and enforceable written contract between the holder and the owner of the instrument pursuant to which the holder may impose a charge, and the holder regularly imposes the charges and does not regularly reverse or otherwise cancel them.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 86, § 2.

33-21.1-6. Bank deposits and funds in financial organizations.

  1. Any demand or savings deposit with a banking or financial organization, and any funds paid toward the purchase of a share, a mutual investment certificate, or any other interest in a banking or financial organization is presumed abandoned unless the owner, within three (3) years, and, in the case of matured time deposits, including a deposit that is automatically renewable, within six (6) years, has:
    1. In the case of a deposit, increased or decreased its amount or presented the passbook or other similar evidence of the deposit for the crediting of interest;
    2. Communicated in writing with the banking or financial organization concerning the property;
    3. Otherwise indicated an interest in the property as evidenced by a memorandum or other record on file prepared by an employee of the banking or financial organization;
    4. Owned other property to which subdivision (a)(1), (2), or (3) applies and if the banking or financial organization communicates in writing with the owner with regard to the property that would otherwise be presumed abandoned under this subsection at the address to which communications regarding the other property regularly are sent; or
    5. Had another relationship with the banking or financial organization concerning which the owner has:
      1. Communicated in writing with the banking or financial organization; or
      2. Otherwise indicated an interest as evidenced by a memorandum or other record on file prepared by an employee of the banking or financial organization and if the banking or financial organization communicates in writing with the owner with regard to the property that would otherwise be abandoned under this subsection at the address to which communications regarding the other relationship regularly are sent.
  2. For the purposes of subsection (a), property includes interest and dividends.
  3. A holder may not impose with respect to property described in subsection (a) any charge due to dormancy or inactivity or cease payment of interest unless:
    1. There is an enforceable written contract between the holder and the owner of the property pursuant to which the holder may impose a charge or cease payment of interest;
    2. For property in excess of two dollars ($2.00), the holder, no more than three (3) months before the initial imposition of those charges or cessation of interest, has given written notice to the owner of the amount of those charges at the last known address of the owner stating that those charges will be imposed or that interest will cease, but the notice provided in this section need not be given with respect to charges imposed or interest ceased before July 1, 1987; and
    3. The holder regularly imposes the charges or ceases payment of interest and does not regularly reverse or otherwise cancel them or retroactively credit interest with respect to the property.
  4. Any property described in subsection (a) that is automatically renewable is matured for purposes of subsection (a) upon the expiration of its initial time period, but in the case of any renewal to which the owner consents at or about the time of renewal by communicating in writing with the banking or financial organization or otherwise indicating consent as evidenced by a memorandum or other record on file prepared by an employee of the organization, the property is matured upon the expiration of the last time period for which consent was given. If, at the time provided for delivery in § 33-21.1-19 , a penalty or forfeiture in the payment of interest would result from the delivery of the property, the time for delivery is extended until the time when no penalty or forfeiture would result.
  5. In the event that any court appointed receiver of a banking or financial organization or a business organization referenced in Executive Order 91-2 (proclamation of January 1, 1991) sells, transfers or conveys any type of property referred to in this section to a banking or financial organization or business organization pursuant to court order, then notwithstanding any inactivity with respect to the property, all time periods referred to in this section shall commence upon the date of closing of the sale, transfer or conveyance.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 30, § 2; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 86, § 2; P.L. 1993, ch. 48, § 1.

33-21.1-7. Funds owing under life insurance policies.

  1. Funds held or owing under any life or endowment insurance policy or annuity contract that has matured or terminated are presumed abandoned if unclaimed for more than three (3) years after the funds became due and payable as established from the records of the insurance company holding or owing the funds, but property described in subsection (c)(2) is presumed abandoned if unclaimed for more than two (2) years.
  2. If a person other than the insured or annuitant is entitled to the funds and an address of the person is not known to the company or it is not definite and certain from the records of the company who is entitled to the funds, it is presumed that the last known address of the person entitled to the funds is the same as the last known address of the insured or annuitant according to the records of the company.
  3. For purposes of this chapter, a life or endowment insurance policy or annuity contract not matured by actual proof of the death of the insured or annuitant according to the records of the company is matured and the proceeds due and payable, if:
    1. The company has received due proof of death that the insured or annuitant has died; or
      1. The insured has attained, or would have attained if he or she were living, the limiting age under the mortality table on which the reserve is based;
      2. The policy was in force at the time the insured attained, or would have attained, the limiting age specified in subparagraph (i); and
      3. Neither the insured nor any other person appearing to have an interest in the policy within the preceding two (2) years, according to the records of the company, has assigned, readjusted, or paid premiums on the policy, subjected the policy to a loan, corresponded in writing with the company concerning the policy, or otherwise indicated an interest as evidenced by a memorandum or other record on file prepared by an employee of the company.
  4. For purposes of this chapter, the application of an automatic premium loan provision or other nonforfeiture provision contained in an insurance policy does not prevent a policy from being matured or terminated under subsection (a) if the insured has died or the insured or the beneficiary of the policy otherwise has become entitled to the proceeds of the deposit before the depletion of the cash surrender value of a policy by the application of those provisions.
  5. If the laws of this state or the terms of the life insurance policy require the company to give notice to the insured or owner that an automatic premium loan provision or other nonforfeiture provision has been exercised and the notice, given to an insured or owner whose last known address according to the records of the company is in this state, is undeliverable, the company shall make a reasonable search to ascertain the policyholder’s correct address to which the notice must be mailed.
  6. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if the company learns of the death of the insured or annuitant and the beneficiary has not communicated with the insurer within four (4) months after the death, the company shall take reasonable steps to pay the proceeds to the beneficiary.
  7. Commencing two (2) years after July 1, 1987, every change of beneficiary form issued by an insurance company under any life or endowment insurance policy or annuity contract to an insured or owner who is a resident of this state must request the following information:
    1. The name of each beneficiary, or if a class of beneficiaries is named, the name of each current beneficiary in the class;
    2. The address of each beneficiary; and
    3. The relationship of each beneficiary to the insured.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 86, § 2.

33-21.1-8. Deposits held by utilities.

A deposit, including any interest on the deposit, made by a subscriber with a utility to secure payment or any sum paid in advance for utility services to be furnished, less any lawful deductions, that remains unclaimed by the owner for more than one year after termination of the services for which the deposit or advance payment was made is presumed abandoned.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-9. Refunds held by business associations.

  1. The sum to be paid as a refund, under an order or decision of a court or administrative agency or by agreement, remaining unclaimed for more than six (6) months after it became payable is presumed abandoned, regardless of whether the apparent owner has made any claim to the refund, unless, within the preceding six (6) months, there has been a communication between the apparent owner and the holder concerning that sum.
  2. Any sum payable or intangible property properly distributable in the course of a voluntary or involuntary dissolution or liquidation remaining unclaimed for six (6) months after the date of the final distribution or liquidation is presumed abandoned, unless, within the preceding six (6) months, there has been communication between the apparent owner and the person making the payment or distribution concerning that sum or distribution.
  3. Intangible property payable or distributable to a member of or participant in a class action, either one allowed by the court to be maintained as a class action or one essentially handled as a class action, and remaining for more than six (6) months after the time for the final payment or distribution is presumed abandoned, unless, within the preceding six (6) months, there has been a communication between the member or participant and the holder concerning the property. Intangible property payable or distributable as the result of litigation or settlement of a dispute before judicial or administrative body and remaining unclaimed for more than six (6) months after the time for the final payment or distribution is presumed abandoned, unless, within the preceding six (6) months, there has been a communication between the apparent owner and the holder concerning the property.
  4. The person actually making or having the duty to make payment or distribution shall be deemed the holder for the purpose of this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 86, § 2.

33-21.1-10. Stock and other intangible interests in business associations.

  1. Except as provided in subsections (b) and (e), stock or other intangible ownership interest in a business association, the existence of which is evidenced by records available to the association, is presumed abandoned and, with respect to the interest, the association is the holder, if a dividend, distribution, or other sum payable as a result of the interest has remained unclaimed by the owner for five (5) years and the owner within five (5) years has not:
    1. Communicated in writing with the association regarding the interest or a dividend, distribution, or other sum payable as a result of the interest; or
    2. Otherwise communicated with the association regarding the interest or a dividend, distribution, or other sum payable as a result of the interest, as evidenced by a memorandum or other record on file with the association prepared by an employee of the association.
  2. At the expiration of a five (5) year period following the failure of the owner to claim a dividend, distribution, or other sum payable to the owner as a result of the interest, the interest is not presumed abandoned unless there have been at least five (5) dividends, distributions, or other sums paid during the period, none of which has been claimed by the owner. If five (5) dividends, distributions, or other sums are paid during the five (5) year period, the period leading to a presumption of abandonment commences on the date payment of the first unclaimed dividend, distribution, or other sum became due and payable. If five (5) dividends, distributions, or other sums are not paid during the presumptive period, the period continues to run until there have been five (5) dividends, distributions, or other sums that have not been claimed by the owner.
  3. The running of the five (5) year period of abandonment ceases immediately upon the occurrence of a communication referred to in subsection (a). If any future dividend, distribution, or other sum payable to the owner as a result of the interest is subsequently not claimed by the owner, a new period of abandonment commences and relates back to the time a subsequent dividend, distribution, or other sum became due and payable.
  4. At the time an interest is presumed abandoned under this section, any dividend distribution, or other sum then held for or owing to the owner as a result of the interest, and not previously presumed abandoned, is presumed abandoned.
  5. This chapter does not apply to any stock or other intangible ownership interest enrolled in a plan that provides for the automatic reinvestment of dividends, distributions, or other sums payable as a result of the interest unless the records available to the administrator of the plan show, with respect to any intangible ownership interest not enrolled in the reinvestment plan, that the owner has not within five (5) years communicated in any manner described in subsection (a).

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-11. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3; Repealed by P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 86, § 3, effective July 1, 1992.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-21.1-11 concerned property of business associations held in course of dissolution.

33-21.1-12. Property held by agents and fiduciaries.

  1. Intangible property and any income or increment derived from the intangible property held in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of another person is presumed abandoned unless the owner, within three (3) years after it has become payable or distributable, has increased or decreased the principal, accepted payment of principal or income, communicated concerning the property, or otherwise indicated an interest as evidenced by a memorandum or other record on file prepared by the fiduciary. In applying the preceding sentence to family education accounts, as defined in § 44-30-25 , twenty (20) years shall be substituted for five (5) years.
  2. Funds in an individual retirement account or a retirement plan for self employed individuals or similar account or plan established pursuant to the internal revenue laws of the United States are not payable or distributable within the meaning of subsection (a) unless, under the terms of the account or plan, distribution of all or part of the funds would then be mandatory.
  3. For the purposes of this section, a person who holds property as an agent for a business association is deemed to hold the property in a fiduciary capacity for that business association alone, unless the agreement between him or her and the business association provides otherwise.
  4. For the purposes of this chapter, a person who is deemed to hold property in a fiduciary capacity for a business association alone is the holder of the property only insofar as the interest of the business association in the property is concerned, and the business association is the holder of the property insofar as the interest of any other person in the property is concerned.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3; P.L. 1989, ch. 220, § 2; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 86, § 2.

33-21.1-13. Property held by courts and public agencies.

Intangible property held for the owner by a court, state, or other government, governmental subdivision or agency, public corporation, or public authority which remains unclaimed by the owner for more than one year after becoming payable or distributable is presumed abandoned. Intangible property held by a state court shall escheat to the state pursuant to the provisions of § 8-12-1 — § 8-12-3 .

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3; P.L. 2010, ch. 231, § 4; P.L. 2010, ch. 238, § 4.

33-21.1-14. Gift certificates and credit memos.

  1. A credit memo issued by a business association that remains unredeemed for more than three (3) years after issuance is presumed abandoned. Pursuant to § 6-13-12 , gift certificates shall not be presumed to be abandoned.
  2. In the case of a credit memo, the amount presumed abandoned is the amount credited as shown in the memo itself.
  3. The amount of a credit memo presumed abandoned is subject to the custody of this state in the following circumstances:
    1. The records of the issuer show that the last known address of the recipient of the memo is in this state;
    2. The records of the issuer do not show the address of the purchaser or recipient, but do show that the certificate or memo was issued in this state;
    3. The records of the issuer do not show the address of the recipient and do not show the state where the memo was issued and the issuer has its principal place of business in this state;
    4. The records of the issuer show that the address of the recipient, or if none, the state where the memo was issued, is in or is a state whose escheat or unclaimed property law does provide for the escheat or custodial taking of credit memos, and the issuer has its principal place of business in this state.
  4. Commencing on July 1, 1992, a business association issuing a credit memo in this state shall have a duty to record either the name and address of a recipient of a credit memo or the state in which the memo was issued.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 86, § 2; P.L. 2005, ch. 194, § 2; P.L. 2005, ch. 202, § 2.

33-21.1-14.1. Property held by police departments.

  1. All tangible and intangible personal property and any income from this property which has been confiscated by any city, town, or state police department and has been held in the custody of the department for six (6) months or more shall be presumed abandoned and shall revert to the general fund in accordance with § 33-21.1-23 .
  2. All money which is being held by the police department as a result of confiscation shall be deposited in a special interest bearing bank account during and until the expiration of the three (3) year period prior to reversion to the general fund.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 86, § 2; P.L. 1997, ch. 30, art. 28, § 9.

33-21.1-14.2. Property held by hospitals, private, nonprofit institution of higher education or other domestic charitable corporations.

All intangible property in the form of uncashed vendor checks which have been held in the custody of a hospital, private, nonprofit institutions of higher education or such other domestic charitable corporations for three (3) or more years and satisfies the conditions found in § 33-21.1-3(1) through (6) shall be presumed abandoned.

History of Section. P.L. 1989, ch. 223, § 2; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 86, § 2.

33-21.1-15. Wages.

Unpaid wages, including wages represented by unpresented payroll checks, owing in the ordinary course of the holder’s business which remain unclaimed by the owner for more than one year after becoming payable are presumed abandoned. In addition, unpaid wages, including wages represented by unpresented payroll checks, owing in the ordinary course of the business of a hospital, private, nonprofit institution of higher education, and other domestic charitable corporation which remain unclaimed by the owner for more than one year after becoming payable are presumed abandoned.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3; P.L. 1989, ch. 223, § 3.

33-21.1-16. Contents of safe deposit box or other safekeeping repository.

All tangible and intangible property held in a safe deposit box or any other safekeeping repository in this state in the ordinary course of the holder’s business, and proceeds resulting from the sale of the property permitted by other law, which remain unclaimed by the owner for more than three (3) years after the lease or rental period on the box or other repository has expired, are presumed abandoned.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 86, § 2.

33-21.1-16.1. Unclaimed demutualization proceeds.

Property distributable in the course of a demutualization of an insurance company is deemed abandoned two (2) years after the date the property is first distributable if, at the time of the first distribution the last known address of the owner on the books and records of the holder is known to be incorrect, or the distribution or statements are returned by the post office as undeliverable; and the owner has not:

  1. Communicated in writing with the holder or its agents regarding the property; or
  2. Otherwise communicated with the holder regarding the property as evidenced by a memorandum or other record on file with the holder or its agent.

History of Section. P.L. 2003, ch. 376, art. 33, § 1.

33-21.1-17. Report of abandoned property.

  1. A person holding property tangible or intangible, presumed abandoned and subject to custody as unclaimed property under this chapter, shall report to the administrator concerning the property as provided in this section.
  2. The report must be verified and must include:
    1. Except with respect to travelers checks and money orders, the name, if known, and last-known address, if any, of each person appearing from the records of the holder to be the owner of property of the value of fifty ($50.00) dollars or more presumed abandoned under this chapter;
    2. In the case of unclaimed funds of fifty dollars ($50.00) or more held or owing under any life or endowment insurance policy or annuity contract, the full name and last known address of the insured or annuitant and of the beneficiary according to the records of the insurance company holding or owing the funds;
    3. In the case of the contents of a safe deposit box or other safekeeping repository or of other tangible property, a description of the property and the place where it is held and may be inspected by the administrator and any amounts owing to the holder;
    4. The nature and identifying number, if any, or description of the property and the amount appearing from the records to be due, but items of value under fifty dollars ($50.00) each shall be reported in the aggregate;
    5. The date the property became payable, demandable, or returnable, and the date of the last transaction with the apparent owner with respect to the property; and
    6. Other information the administrator prescribes by rule as necessary for the administration of this chapter.
  3. If the person holding property presumed abandoned and subject to custody as unclaimed property is a successor to other persons who previously held the property for the apparent owner or the holder has changed his or her name while holding the property, he or she shall file with his or her report all known names and addresses of each previous holder of the property.
  4. The report must be filed before November 1 of each year as of June 30, next preceding, and the report of any life insurance company, including the report of unclaimed insurance company demutualization proceeds made pursuant to § 33-21.1-16.1 , must be filed before November 1 of each year as of June 30 next preceding. On written request by any person required to file a report, the administrator may postpone the reporting date.
  5. Not more than one hundred and twenty (120) days before filing the report required by this section, the holder in possession of property presumed abandoned and subject to custody as unclaimed property under this chapter shall send written notice to the apparent owner at his or her last known address informing him or her that the holder is in possession of property subject to this chapter if:
    1. The holder has in its records an address for the apparent owner which the holder’s records do not disclose to be inaccurate;
    2. The claim of the apparent owner is not barred by the statute of limitations; and
    3. The property has a value of fifty dollars ($50.00) or more.
  6. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the administrator may provide information in the form of a social security number or taxpayer identification number to the department of taxation and department of labor and training for the sole purpose of obtaining the name and current address of rightful property owner(s) to implement § 33-21.1-24 . The information obtained and/or provided shall be kept confidential and the administrator shall be subject to the same confidentiality laws that apply to the state departments providing the information.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3; P.L. 1987, ch. 36, § 1; P.L. 2003, ch. 376, art. 33, § 2; P.L. 2004, ch. 57, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 129, § 1; P.L. 2017, ch. 189, § 2; P.L. 2017, ch. 319, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2017, ch. 189, § 2, and P.L. 2017, ch. 319, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

33-21.1-18. Notice and publication of lists of abandoned property.

  1. The administrator shall place an advertisement, twice a year, one not later than March 1 and one not later than October 15, at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper or combination of newspapers of general circulation that reach each county in the state. The advertisement shall: (1) Not exceed one quarter (1/4) of a newspaper page; and (2) List a phone number citizens can call to request a written copy of the unclaimed property publication; and (3) List a website that provides the information contained in the unclaimed property publication. The unclaimed property publication shall consist of two (2) parts.
  2. Part one of the unclaimed property publication must be entitled “Names of Persons Appearing to be Owners of Abandoned Property” and contain:
    1. The names in alphabetical order and last known address, if any, of persons listed in the report and entitled to notice within the state;
    2. A statement that information concerning the property and the name and last known address of the holder may be obtained by any person possessing an interest in the property by addressing an inquiry to the administrator; and
    3. A statement that if proof of claim is not presented by the owner to the holder and the owner’s right to receive the property is not established to the holder’s satisfaction the property will be placed in the custody of the administrator and all further claims must thereafter be directed to the administrator.
    4. This section is not applicable to sums payable on travelers checks, money orders, and other written instruments presumed abandoned under § 33-21.1-4 or museum property subject to chapter 44.1 of title 34.
    1. Part two (2) of the unclaimed property publication must be entitled “Names of Persons Appearing to be Owners of Abandoned Museum Property” and contain the following information that a museum, as defined in chapter 44.1 of title 34, has provided to the administrator:
      1. The name and address of the museum and brief and general description of the unclaimed property, including the approximate date the property came into the custody of the museum;
      2. If known, the name and address of the lender on record with the museum;
      3. A request that all persons who may have any knowledge of the whereabouts of the lender provide written notice to the museum;
      4. The name, and contact information of the person at the museum to be contacted regarding the property; and
      5. Language providing that if a written assertion of title is not presented by the lender to the museum within sixty (60) days from the last day that the notice is included in the unclaimed property publication, the property shall be considered abandoned and donated and shall become the property of the museum.
    2. After notice has been posted in part two (2) of the unclaimed property publication for six (6) months, the administrator shall provide in writing to each museum confirmation of the dates that the properties were included in the unclaimed property publication.
    3. The administrator shall have the authority to establish procedures to implement the provisions of this subsection (c); provided however, that at no time shall any property be placed in the custody of the administrator and provided further that the administrator shall have no authority to determine any claim of ownership. All claims shall be directed to the museum that has custody of the property and any claim of ownership shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of chapter 44.1 of title 34. The administrator, and the administrator’s employees and agents, shall not be liable for any actions taken in carrying out the requirements of this subsection (c).
  3. The administrator is not required to publish in the unclaimed property publication any items of less than fifty dollars ($50.00) unless the administrator considers their publication to be in the public interest or a museum’s requests that an item be published in the unclaimed property publication.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 86, § 2; P.L. 2003, ch. 376, art. 33, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 281, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 160, § 2; P.L. 2013, ch. 219, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 160, § 2, and P.L. 2013, ch. 219, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

33-21.1-19. Payment or delivery of abandoned property.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a person who is required to file a report under § 33-21.1-17 , shall at the time of filing the report as required by § 33-21.1-17 pay or deliver to the administrator all abandoned property required to be reported.
  2. If the owner establishes the right to receive the abandoned property to the satisfaction of the holder before the property has been delivered or it appears that for some other reason the presumption of abandonment is erroneous, the holder need not pay or deliver the property to the administrator, and the property will no longer be presumed abandoned. In that case, the holder shall file with the administrator a verified written explanation of the proof of claim or of the error in the presumption of abandonment.
  3. The holder of an interest under § 33-21.1-10 shall deliver a duplicate certificate or other evidence of ownership if the holder does not issue certificates of ownership to the administrator. Upon delivery of a duplicate certificate to the administrator, the holder and any transfer agent, registrar, or other person acting for or on behalf of a holder in executing or delivering the duplicate certificate is relieved of all liability of every kind in accordance with the provision of § 33-21.1-20 to every person, including any person acquiring the original certificate or the duplicate of the certificate issued to the administrator, for any losses or damages resulting to any person by the issuance and delivery to the administrator of the duplicate certificate.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 86, § 2.

33-21.1-20. Custody by state — Defense of holder — Payment of safe deposit box or repository charges.

  1. Upon the payment or delivery of property to the administrator, the state assumes custody and responsibility for the safekeeping of the property. A person who pays or delivers property to the administrator in good faith is relieved of all liability to the extent of the value of the property paid or delivered for any claim then existing or which thereafter may arise or be made in respect to the property.
  2. A holder who has paid money to the administrator pursuant to this chapter may make payment to any person appearing to the holder to be entitled to payment and, upon filing proof of payment and proof that the payee was entitled to payment, the administrator shall promptly reimburse the holder for the payment without imposing any fee or other charge. If reimbursement is sought for a payment made on a negotiable instrument, including a travelers check or money order, the holder must be reimbursed under this subsection upon filing proof that the instrument was duly presented and that payment was made to a person who appeared to the holder to be entitled to payment. The holder must be reimbursed for payment made under this subsection even if the payment was made to a person whose claim was barred under § 33-21.1-29(a) .
  3. A holder who has delivered property, including a certificate of any interest in a business association, other than money to the administrator pursuant to this chapter may reclaim the property if still in the possession of the administrator, without paying any fee or other charge, upon filing proof that the owner has claimed the property from the holder.
  4. The administrator may accept the holder’s affidavit as sufficient proof of the facts that entitle the holder to recover money and property under this section.
  5. If the holder pays or delivers property to the administrator in good faith and later another person claims the property from the holder or another state claims the money or property under its laws relating to escheat, abandoned, or unclaimed property, the administrator, upon written notice of the claim, shall defend the holder against the claim and indemnify the holder against any liability on the claim.
  6. For the purposes of this section, “good faith” means that:
    1. Payment or delivery was made in a reasonable attempt to comply with this chapter;
    2. The person delivering the property was not a fiduciary then in breach of trust in respect to the property and had a reasonable basis for believing, based on the facts then known to him or her, that the property was abandoned for the purposes of this chapter; and
    3. There is no showing that the records pursuant to which the delivery was made did not meet reasonable commercial standards of practice in the industry.
  7. Property removed from a safe deposit box or other safekeeping repository is received by the administrator subject to the holder’s right under this subsection to be reimbursed for the actual cost of the opening and to any valid lien or contract providing for the holder to be reimbursed for unpaid rent or storage charges. The administrator shall reimburse or pay the holder out of the proceeds remaining after deducting the administrator’s selling cost.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-21. Crediting of dividends, interest or increments to owner’s account.

Whenever property, other than money, is paid or delivered to the administrator under this chapter, the owner is entitled to receive from the administrator any dividends, interest, or other increments, realized or accruing on the property at or before liquidation or conversion of the property into money.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-22. Public sale of abandoned property.

  1. The administrator shall sell abandoned property to the highest bidder at public sale in whatever city in the state affords in the judgment of the administrator the most favorable market for the property involved. The administrator may decline the highest bid and reoffer the property for sale if in the judgment of the administrator the bid is insufficient. If in the judgment of the administrator the probable cost of sale exceeds the value of the property, it need not be offered for sale. Any sale held under this section must be preceded by a single publication of notice, at least three (3) weeks in advance of sale, in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the property is to be sold.
    1. [As amended by   P.L. 2009, ch. 232, § 1]. If medals awarded to United States military personnel are delivered to the general treasurer under this chapter, the general treasurer shall not offer those medals for public sale or at public auction. Medals shall only be returned to the owner of the safe deposit box containing the medals, or the heirs of that owner.

      (1) [As amended by P.L. 2009, ch. 305, § 1]. If medals awarded to United States military personnel are delivered to the general treasurer pursuant to this section, the general treasurer shall not offer those medals for public sale or at public auction. Medals shall be returned only to the owner of the safe deposit box containing the medals, or the heirs of the recipient of the medal.

  2. Securities listed on an established stock exchange must be sold at prices prevailing at the time of sale on the exchange. Other securities may be sold over the counter at prices prevailing at the time of sale or by any other method the administrator considers advisable.
  3. Unless the administrator considers it to be in the best interest of the state to do otherwise, all securities, other than those presumed abandoned under § 33-21.1-10 , delivered to the administrator must be held for at least one year before he or she may sell them.
  4. Unless the administrator considers it to be in the best interest of the state to do otherwise, all securities presumed abandoned under § 33-21.1-10 , and delivered to the administrator must be held for at least one year before he or she may sell them. If the administrator sells any securities delivered pursuant to § 33-21.1-10 before the expiration of the one year period, any person making a claim pursuant to this chapter before the end of the one year period is entitled to either the proceeds of the sale of the securities or the market value of the securities at the time the claim is made, whichever amount is greater, less any deduction for fees pursuant to § 33-21.1-23(b) . A person making a claim under this chapter after the expiration of this period is entitled to receive either the securities delivered to the administrator by the holder, if they still remain in the hands of the administrator, or the proceeds received from sale, less any amounts deducted pursuant to § 33-21.1-23(b) , but no person has any claim under this chapter against the state, the holder, any transfer agent, registrar, or other person acting for or on behalf of a holder for any appreciation in the value of the property occurring after delivery by the holder to the administrator.
  5. The purchaser of property at any sale conducted by the administrator pursuant to this chapter takes the property free of all claims of the owner or previous holder of the property and of all persons claiming through or under them. The administrator shall execute all documents necessary to complete the transfer of ownership.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3; P.L. 2004, ch. 305, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 232, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 305, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by two acts (P.L. 2009, ch. 232, § 1; P.L. 2009, ch. 305, § 1) passed by the 2009 General Assembly. The director of law revision of the joint committee on legislative services has determined that the changes made to subdivision (a)(1) by P.L. 2009, ch. 232 and P.L. 2009, ch. 305 cannot be reconciled and coexist until further resolution of legislative intent.

33-21.1-23. Deposit of funds.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by this section, the administrator shall promptly deposit in the general fund of this state all funds received under this chapter, including the proceeds from the sale of abandoned property under § 33-21.1-22 . The administrator shall retain in a separate bank account an amount not less than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) from which prompt payment of claims duly allowed must be made by him or her. Before making the deposit, the administrator shall record the name and last known address of each person appearing from the holders’ reports to be entitled to the property and the name and last known address of each insured person or annuitant and beneficiary and with respect to each policy or contract listed in the report of an insurance company its number and the name of the company. The record with the exception of the amount due must be available for public inspection at all reasonable business hours.
  2. Before making any transfer from the account surplus to the credit of the general fund, the administrator may deduct:
    1. Any costs in connection with the sale of abandoned property;
    2. Costs of mailing and publication in connection with any abandoned property;
    3. Reasonable service charges;
    4. Costs incurred in examining records of holders of property and in collecting the property from those holders; and
    5. Any other charges, costs or expenses incurred in the administration of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3; P.L. 1987, ch. 246, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 110, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 86, § 2; P.L. 1993, ch. 138, art. 7, § 1; P.L. 1994, ch. 427, § 4.

33-21.1-24. Filing of claim with administrator.

  1. A person, excluding another state, claiming an interest in any property paid or delivered to the administrator may file with him or her a claim on a form prescribed by him or her and verified by the claimant.
  2. The administrator shall consider each claim within ninety (90) days after it is filed and give written notice to the claimant if the claim is denied in whole or in part. The notice may be given by mailing it to the last address, if any, stated in the claim as the address to which notices are to be sent. If no address for notices is stated in the claim, the notice may be mailed to the last address, if any, of the claimant as stated in the claim. No notice of denial need be given if the claim fails to state either the last address to which notices are to be sent or the address of the claimant.
  3. If a claim is allowed, the administrator shall pay over or deliver to the claimant the property or the amount the administrator actually received, or the net proceeds if it has been sold by the administrator, together with any additional amount required by § 33-21.1-21 . If the claim is for property presumed abandoned under § 33-21.1-10 which was sold by the administrator within three (3) years after the date of delivery, the amount payable for that claim is the value of the property at the time the claim was made or the net proceeds of sale, whichever is greater. If the property claimed was interest bearing to the owner on the date of surrender by the holder, the administrator also shall pay interest at a rate of five percent (5%) a year or any lesser rate the property earned while in the possession of the holder. Interest begins to accrue when the property is delivered to the administrator and ceases on the earlier of the expiration of fifteen (15) years after delivery or the date on which payment is made to the owner. No interest on interest bearing property is payable for any period before the effective date of this chapter.
  4. Any holder who pays the owner for property that has been delivered to the state and which, if claimed from the administrator, would be subject to subsection (c) shall add interest as provided in subsection (c). The added interest must be repaid to the holder by the administrator in the same manner as the principal.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-25. Claim of another state to recover property; procedure.

  1. At any time after property has been paid or delivered to the administrator under this chapter, another state may recover the property if:
    1. The property was subjected to custody by this state because the records of the holder did not reflect the last known address of the apparent owner when the property was presumed abandoned under this chapter, and the other state establishes that the last known address of the apparent owner or other person entitled to the property was in that state and under the laws of that state the property escheated to or was subject to a claim of abandonment by that state;
    2. The last known address of the apparent owner or other person entitled to the property, as reflected by the records of the holder, is in the other state and under the laws of that state the property has escheated to or become subject to a claim of abandonment by that state;
    3. The records of the holder were erroneous in that they did not accurately reflect the actual owner of the property and the last known address of the actual owner is in the other state and under the laws of that state the property escheated to or was subject to a claim of abandonment by that state;
    4. The property was subjected to custody by this state under § 33-21.1-3(6) and under the laws of the state of domicile of the holder the property has escheated to or become subject to a claim of abandonment by that state; or
    5. The property is the sum payable on a travelers check, money order, or other similar instrument that was subjected to custody by this state under § 33-21.1-4 , and the instrument was purchased in the other state, and under the laws of that state the property escheated to or became subject to a claim of abandonment by that state.
  2. The claim of another state to recover escheated or abandoned property must be presented in a form prescribed by the administrator, who shall decide the claim within ninety (90) days after it is presented. The administrator shall allow the claim if he or she determines that the other state is entitled to the abandoned property under subsection (a).
  3. The administrator shall require a state, before recovering property under this section, to agree to indemnify this state and its officers and employees against any liability on a claim for the property.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-26. Action to establish claim.

A person aggrieved by a decision of the administrator, or whose claim has not been acted upon within ninety (90) days after its filing, may bring an action to establish the claim in the superior court, naming the administrator as a defendant. The action must be brought within ninety (90) days after the decision of the administrator or within one hundred and eighty (180) days after the filing of the claim if he or she has failed to act on it. The action shall be tried de novo without a jury.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-27. Election to take payment or delivery.

  1. The administrator may decline to receive any property reported under this chapter which he or she considers to have a value less than the expense of giving notice and of sale. If the administrator elects not to receive custody of the property, the holder shall be notified within one hundred and twenty (120) days after filing the report required under § 33-21.1-17 .
  2. A holder, with the written consent of the administrator and upon conditions and terms prescribed by him or her, may report and deliver property before the property is presumed abandoned. Property delivered under this subsection must be held by the administrator and is not presumed abandoned until such time as it otherwise would be presumed abandoned under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-28. Destruction or disposition of property having insubstantial commercial value — Immunity from liability.

If the administrator determines after investigation that any property delivered under this chapter has insubstantial commercial value, the administrator may destroy or otherwise dispose of the property at any time. No action or proceeding may be maintained against the state, or any officer, or against the holder for on account of any action taken by the administrator pursuant to this section.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-28.1. Disposition of “de minimis” property.

  1. The administrator may dispose of any “de minimis” property delivered under this chapter that has been in possession of the administrator for more than ten (10) years. No action or proceeding may be maintained against the state, or any officer, or against the holder for any action taken by the administrator pursuant to this section.
  2. For the purposes of this chapter, “de minimis” property means any property with a value of less than fifty dollars ($50.00).

History of Section. P.L. 2011, ch. 293, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 301, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2011, ch. 293, § 1, and P.L. 2011, ch. 301, § 1 enacted identical versions of this section.

33-21.1-29. Limitation periods.

  1. The expiration, before or after July 1, 1987, of any period of time specified by contract, statute, or court order, during which a claim for money or property can be made or during which an action or proceeding may be commenced or enforced to obtain payment of a claim for money or to recover property, does not prevent the money or property from being presumed abandoned or affect any duty to file a report or to pay or deliver abandoned property to the administrator as required by this chapter.
  2. No action or proceeding may be commenced by the administrator with respect to any duty of a holder under this chapter more than ten (10) years after the duty arose; however, this limitation shall not apply to any action or proceeding brought by or on behalf of the administrator against any federal, state, or local government, or governmental subdivision, agency, or entity for the payment or delivery of any abandoned property to the administrator pursuant to this chapter or to enforce or collect any penalty provided by this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3; P.L. 1990, ch, 233, § 1.

33-21.1-30. Requests for reports and examination of records.

  1. The administrator may require any person who has not filed a report to file a verified report stating whether or not the person is holding any unclaimed property reportable or deliverable under this chapter.
  2. The administrator, at reasonable times and upon reasonable notice, may examine the records of any person to determine whether the person has complied with the provisions of this chapter. The administrator may conduct the examination even if the person believes he or she is not in possession of any property reportable or deliverable under this chapter.
  3. If a person is treated under § 33-21.1-12 as the holder of the property only insofar as the interest of the business association in the property is concerned, the administrator, pursuant to subsection (b), may examine the records of the person if the administrator has given the notice required by subsection (b) to both the person and the business association at least ninety (90) days before the examination.
  4. If an examination of the records of a person results in the disclosure of property reportable and deliverable under this chapter, the administrator may assess the cost of the examination against the holder at the rate of one hundred dollars ($100) a day for each examiner, but in no case may the charges exceed the value of the property found to be reportable and deliverable. The cost of examination made pursuant to subsection (c) may be imposed only against the business association.
  5. If a holder fails after July 1, 1987 to maintain the records required by § 33-21.1-31 and the records of the holder available for the periods subject to this chapter are insufficient to permit the preparation of a report, the administrator may require the holder to report and pay any amounts as may reasonably be estimated from any available records.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-31. Retention of records.

  1. Every holder required to file a report under § 33-21.1-17 , as to any property for which it has obtained the last known address of the owner, shall maintain a record of the name and last known address of the owner for seven (7) years after the property becomes reportable, except to the extent that a shorter time is provided in subsection (b) or by rule of the administrator.
  2. Any business association that sells in this state its travelers checks, money orders, or other similar written instruments, other than third party bank checks on which the business association is directly liable, or that provides these instruments to others for sale in this state, shall maintain a record of those instruments while they remain outstanding, indicating the state and date of issue for three (3) years after the date the property is reportable.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-32. Enforcement.

The administrator may bring an action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enforce this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-33. Interstate agreements and cooperation — Joint and reciprocal actions with other states.

  1. The administrator may enter into agreements with other states to exchange information needed to enable this or another state to audit or otherwise determine unclaimed property that it or another state may be entitled to subject to a claim of custody. The administrator by rule may require the reporting of information needed to enable compliance with agreements made pursuant to this section and prescribe the form.
  2. To avoid conflicts between the administrator’s procedures and the procedures of administrators in other jurisdictions that enact the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act, the administrator, so far as is consistent with the purposes, policies, and provisions of this chapter, before adopting, amending or repealing rules, shall advise and consult with administrators in other jurisdictions that enact substantially the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act and take into considerations the rules of administrators in other jurisdictions that enact the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act.
  3. The administrator may join with other states to seek enforcement of this chapter against any person who is or may be holding property reportable under this chapter.
  4. At the request of another state, the attorney general of this state may bring an action in the name of the administrator of the other state in any court of competent jurisdiction to enforce the unclaimed property laws of the other state against a holder in this state of property subject to escheat or a claim of abandonment by the other state, if the other state has agreed to pay expenses incurred by the attorney general in bringing the action.
  5. The administrator may request that the attorney general of another state, or any other person, bring an action in the name of the administrator in the other state. This state shall pay all expenses including attorney’s fees in any action under this subsection. The administrator may agree to pay the person bringing the action attorney’s fees based in whole or in part on a percentage of the value of any property recovered in the action. Any expenses paid pursuant to this subsection may not be deducted from the amount that is subject to the claim by the owner under this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-34. Interest and penalties.

  1. A person who fails to pay or deliver property within the time prescribed by this chapter may be required to pay to the administrator interest at the annual rate of twelve percent (12%) above the annual rate of discount, in effect on the date the property should have been paid or delivered, for the most recent issue of fifty-two (52) week United States Treasury bills on the property or value thereof from the date the property should have been paid or delivered.
  2. A person who willfully fails to render any report or perform other duties required under this chapter shall pay a civil penalty of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) for each day the report is withheld or the duty is not performed, but not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
  3. A person who willfully fails to pay or deliver property to the administrator as required under this chapter, shall pay a civil penalty equal to twenty five percent (25%) of the value of the property that should have been paid or delivered.
  4. A person who willfully refuses after written demand by the administrator to pay or deliver property to the administrator as required under this chapter, is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction may be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or both.
  5. The holder in possession of property who fails to comply with the notice provisions required under subsection 33-21.1-17(e) shall pay a civil penalty of ten dollars ($10.00) for each account for which the statutory notice as required by subsection 33-21.1-17(e) is not given.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3; P.L. 1992, ch. 133, art. 86, § 2.

33-21.1-35. Agreement to locate reported property.

All agreements to pay compensation to recover or assist in the recovery of property reported under § 33-21.1-17 , made within twenty four (24) months after the date payment or delivery is made under § 33-21.1-19 , are unenforceable.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-36. Foreign transactions.

This chapter does not apply to any property held due and owing in a foreign country and arising out of a foreign transaction.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-37. Effect of new provisions — Clarification of application.

  1. This chapter does not relieve a holder of a duty that arose before July 1, 1987 to report, pay, or deliver property. A holder who did not comply with the law in effect before July 1, 1987 is subject to the applicable enforcement and penalty provisions that then existed and these provisions are continued in effect for the purpose of this subsection, subject to § 33-21.1-29(b) .
  2. The initial report filed under this chapter for property that was not required to be reported before July 1, 1987 but which is subject to this chapter, must include all items of property that would have been presumed abandoned during the ten (10) year period preceding July 1, 1987, as if this chapter had been in effect during that period.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-38. Rules.

The administrator may adopt necessary rules to carry out the provisions of this chapter.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-39. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or the application of this chapter to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are severable.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-40. Uniformity of application and construction.

This chapter shall be applied and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among states enacting it.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

33-21.1-41. Short title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Uniform Unclaimed Property Act”.

History of Section. P.L. 1986, ch. 500, § 3.

Chapter 21.2 Lost Property

33-21.2-1. Report of lost money or goods by finder.

Any person who finds money or goods of a value of fifty ($50.00) dollars or more, the owner of which is unknown, may, within two (2) days of the finding thereof report the finding to the officer in charge of the police station in the city or town where said property was found and deliver over the property to said officer.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 240, § 1.

33-21.2-2. Restitution of lost money or goods.

If within ninety (90) days of turning the lost money or goods over to the police the owner appears and pays all reasonable costs incurred by the finder and/or the police, he or she shall have restitution of the money or goods.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 240, § 1.

33-21.2-3. Rights of finder if no owner appears.

If the owner of lost money or goods does not appear and claim his or her property as provided in § 33-21.2-2 , the property shall enure to the finder.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 240, § 1.

33-21.2-4. Disposition of lost money or goods.

If the finder fails to claim said money or goods within six (6) months of reporting and delivering the lost property to the police, the property shall be presumed abandoned and shall revert to the general fund of the state in accordance with the state’s unclaimed intangible and tangible property program, pursuant to chapter 21.1 of this title.

History of Section. P.L. 1995, ch. 240, § 1.

Chapter 21A Escheat of Postal Savings System Accounts

33-21A-1. Declaration of escheat.

All postal savings system accounts created by the deposits of persons whose last known addresses are in this state which have not been claimed by the persons entitled thereto before May 1, 1971, are presumed to have been abandoned by their owners and are declared to escheat and become the property of this state.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 28, § 1.

33-21A-2. Obtaining information on accounts.

The general treasurer shall request from the bureau of accounts of the United States treasury department records providing the following information: the names of depositors at the post offices of this state whose accounts are unclaimed, their last addresses as shown by the records of the United States postal service, and the balance in each account. He or she shall agree to return to the bureau of accounts promptly all account cards showing last addresses in another state.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 28, § 1.

33-21A-3. Proceeding to adjudicate escheat.

  1. The general treasurer may bring proceedings in the superior court for Providence and Bristol counties to escheat unclaimed postal savings system accounts held by the United States treasury department. A single proceeding may be used to escheat as many accounts as may be available for escheat at one time.
  2. If the superior court shall find that the notice required by § 33-21A-4 has been duly given not less than twenty (20) days prior to the date of hearing and that no claim to an account has been made (which findings may be supported solely by the affidavit of the general treasurer), then it shall enter a final judgment of escheat against the account. A single final judgment may include more than one account.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 28, § 1.

33-21A-4. Notice.

The general treasurer shall notify depositors whose accounts are to be escheated as follows:

  1. A letter advising that a postal savings system account in the name of the addressee is about to be escheated and setting forth the procedure by which a deposit may be claimed shall be mailed by first class mail to the named depositor at the last address shown on the account records for each account to be escheated having an unpaid principal balance of more than twenty-five dollars ($25.00).
  2. A general notice of intention to escheat postal savings system accounts shall be published once in each of three (3) successive weeks in one or more newspapers which combine to provide general circulation throughout this state.
  3. A special notice of intention to escheat the unclaimed postal savings system accounts originally deposited in each post office must be published once in each of three (3) successive weeks in a newspaper published in the county in which the post office is located or, if there is none, in a newspaper having general circulation in the county. This notice must list the names of the owners of each unclaimed account to be escheated having a principal balance of three dollars ($3.00) or more.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 28, § 1.

33-21A-5. Collection and deposit of funds.

The general treasurer shall present a copy of each final judgment of escheat to the United States treasury department for payment of the principal due and the interest computed under regulations of the United States treasury department. The payment received shall be deposited in the general funds of the state.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 28, § 1.

33-21A-6. Indemnification of the United States.

This state shall indemnify the United States for any losses suffered as a result of the escheat of unclaimed postal savings system accounts. The burden of indemnification falls upon the fund into which the proceeds of the escheated accounts have been paid.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 28, § 1.

33-21A-7. Short title.

This act may be cited as the “Escheat of Postal Savings System Accounts Act”.

History of Section. P.L. 1971, ch. 28, § 1.

Chapter 21B Property in Custody of Federal Officers, Agencies, and Departments [Repealed.]

33-21B-1 — 33-21B-9. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1979, ch. 118, § 4; Repealed by P.L. 1990, ch. 233, § 2, effective July 1, 1990.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former chapter 21B of this title, consisting of §§ 33-21B-1 — 33-21B-9 concerned property in custody of federal officers, agencies, and departments.

Chapter 22 Practice in Probate Courts

33-22-1. Petitions in writing and signed — Notice to institution of petition concerning deceased inmate.

Every application, petition, or complaint to a probate court shall be in writing and signed by or in behalf of the party making the petition, and on the filing of certificate of death of an inmate of an institution maintained or controlled by the state, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the probate court to give written notice of the filing of the petition accompanying the same, to the commission, board, department, or division having the management or control of the institution.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 764; G.L. 1909, ch. 309, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 360, § 1; P.L. 1930, ch. 1575, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-1 .

Cross References.

Organization and powers of probate courts, § 8-9-2.1 et seq.

Comparative Legislation.

Probate proceedings:

Conn. Gen. Stat. 1958, § 45a-2 et seq.

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 215, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

It is not necessary for applications to be in writing in order to give the court jurisdiction since this provision is directory only. Robbins v. Tafft, 12 R.I. 67 , 1878 R.I. LEXIS 20 (1878).

33-22-2. Contents of petition for probate or administration.

Whenever any petition shall be filed for the probate of a will or for the first grant of original or ancillary administration in this state, the petitioner shall set forth under oath in the petition:

  1. The title of the proceeding and the name and address of the petitioner.
  2. The domicile of the decedent, together with any other facts upon which the jurisdiction of the probate court to which the petition is directed may depend.
  3. So far as known to the petitioner:
    1. The names and post office addresses of the surviving spouse and heirs at law. Provided, however, if no heirs at law are listed, the petitioner shall file an affidavit under oath setting forth what efforts the petitioner has made to locate heirs at law.
    2. If the person is under the age of eighteen (18) years, his or her age, post office address, and the names and post office addresses of his or her parents, or such of them as may be living, and of his or her guardian or guardians if any.
    3. If the person is an adjudged incompetent, the name and post office address of his or her guardian or guardians if any, and the name and post office address of the person or institution having the care or custody of the incompetent.
    4. If the petition is for the allowance of a will, it shall also contain the names and post office addresses of the named beneficiaries entitled to take there under to the extent that they are different than the heirs at law.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 20; P.L. 1951, ch. 2742, § 1; P.L. 1952, ch. 3022, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-2 ; P.L. 1984, ch. 81, § 7; P.L. 1990, ch. 36, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 296, § 1; P.L. 2008, ch. 315, § 1.

Collateral References.

Estoppel to contest will or attack its validity by acceptance of benefits thereunder. 78 A.L.R.4th 90.

33-22-3. Notice given by petitioner on filing of petition and hearing.

In addition to the notice prescribed by § 33-7-9 , and to notice by publication in the manner as prescribed by § 33-22-11 , the petitioner or his or her attorney shall, at least ten (10) days before the date set for hearing on the petition, send or cause to be sent by mail, postage prepaid, addressed to each person whose name and post office address is by § 33-22-2(3) required to be set forth in the petition, as the names and addresses are set forth therein or as then known to the petitioner, notice of the filing, the nature of the petition, and of the time and place set for hearing on the petition, or in lieu thereof a copy of the newspaper notice published pursuant to the provisions of § 33-22-11 ; provided, however, that in the case of any person entitled to notice hereunder whose post office address is outside the continental limits of the United States this notice shall be sent at least three (3) weeks before the date set for the hearing; and provided further that the petitioner or his or her attorney shall not be required to send this notice to any person sui juris who shall at, or prior to, the hearing waive notice of its pendency in writing either on the petition or by instrument separately filed. The petitioner or his or her attorney shall at or prior to the hearing file or cause to be filed an affidavit that the notice was given, setting forth the names and post office addresses of the persons to whom the notice was sent and the date of mailing of the notice, together with a copy of the notice.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 21; P.L. 1951, ch. 2742, § 1; P.L. 1952, ch. 3022, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-3 ; P.L. 2012, ch. 241, art. 11, § 8; P.L. 2013, ch. 88, § 1; P.L. 2013, ch. 96, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2013, ch. 88, § 1, and P.L. 2013, ch. 96, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Collateral References.

Consul’s right to be notified of his national’s death or institution of administration upon his estate. 157 A.L.R. 107.

33-22-4. Repealed.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 22; P.L. 1951, ch. 2742, § 1; P.L. 1952, ch. 3022, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-4 ; Repealed by P.L. 2014, ch. 351, § 1, effective July 2, 2014; P.L. 2014, ch. 398, § 1, effective July 2, 2014.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-22-4 concerned listing of and notice to legatees and devisees in will contests.

33-22-5. Waiver of notice.

If all interested parties shall, in writing, waive the notice required by § 33-22-3 and assent to action upon the petition by the court at any time, the court may proceed to hear the cause without publication or further notice and any decree entered in the proceeding shall be of the same force and effect as if notice had been given in the manner provided by this chapter.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 23; P.L. 1951, ch. 2742, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-5 ; P.L. 2014, ch. 351, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 398, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 351, § 2, and P.L. 2014, ch. 398, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

33-22-6. Additional notice given — Failure to comply.

The notice prescribed by § 33-7-9 and the notice by publication in the manner as prescribed by § 33-22-11 shall also be given in all cases in which notice by mail is required by § 33-22-3 , unless waived in writing by the persons entitled to such notice, but failure to comply with any of the provisions in §§ 33-22-2 and 33-22-3 shall not defeat the jurisdiction of the court or affect adversely the regularity of any proceedings in which the failure shall have occurred, and upon discovery of the failure the court may make such further orders as the circumstances may require.

History of Section. G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 24; P.L. 1951, ch. 2742, § 1; P.L. 1952, ch. 3022, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-6 ; P.L. 2014, ch. 351, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 398, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 351, § 2, and P.L. 2014, ch. 398, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applicability.

Where administration of estate was made on application of heir who claimed that he was sole heir and funds of estate were still in registry of court, this section provided the proper remedy for other heirs, five years later, to reopen the estate. Davtian v. Barsamian, 106 R.I. 185 , 256 A.2d 510, 1969 R.I. LEXIS 609 (1969).

33-22-7. Proceedings in which notice given by court.

  1. Every probate court shall, before proceeding, give notice to all parties known to be interested in the following cases:
    1. In the granting of letters of administration.
    2. In the probate of a will.
    3. In the appointment or approval of a conservator or guardian.
    4. In any complaint for the removal of an executor, administrator, conservator, or guardian.
    5. In the making of any decree upon the account of an executor, conservator, or guardian.
    6. In any petition of an executor, administrator, conservator, or guardian for leave to sell real estate of the testator, intestate, or ward.
    7. In setting off and allowing real estate in fee, or the proceeds of sale thereof, to a widow or surviving husband.
  2. Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to limit the court’s discretion to order whatever notice it considers appropriate given the circumstances of the matter before it and whose interests may be affected by the court’s action.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 765; G.L. 1909, ch. 309, § 2; P.L. 1915, ch. 1260, § 1; P.L. 1918, ch. 1640, § 7; P.L. 1919, ch. 1787, § 2; G.L. 1923, ch. 360, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 3; P.L. 1939, ch. 659, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-7 ; P.L. 1992, ch. 315, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 351, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 398, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 351, § 2, and P.L. 2014, ch. 398, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Appointment of Guardian.

Notice to the intended ward is sufficient in an action to appoint a guardian for a person of full age and it is not necessary to notify his wife and children. Hamilton v. Court of Probate, 9 R.I. 204 , 1869 R.I. LEXIS 11 (1869).

Revocation of Appointment.

Probate court had no jurisdiction to revoke letters testamentary on petition by another for letters as co-executor, where no petition for revocation was before the court and legal notice was never given of the pendency of such petition. Briggs v. Probate Court, 23 R.I. 125 , 50 A. 335, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 137 (1901).

Sale of Real Property.

A guardian who was granted a petition to mortgage his ward’s real estate cannot insert a power of sale in the mortgage, then sell the realty, since such a procedure would allow the sale of the real estate without the notice required by this section. Barry v. Clarke, 13 R.I. 65 , 1880 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1880).

33-22-8. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 766; G.L. 1909, ch. 309, § 3; P.L. 1918, ch. 1640, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 360, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-8 ; Repealed by P.L. 2014, ch. 351, § 1, effective July 2, 2014; P.L. 2014, ch. 398, § 1, effective July 2, 2014.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-22-8 concerned notice of authority to sell or mortgage real estate.

33-22-9. Notice of account containing credit for sale or mortgage of real estate.

Whenever the account of any executor, administrator or guardian contains a credit of the proceeds of any sale or mortgage of real estate, or of any interest therein, the notice given before the settling of this account shall state that the account contains the credit.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 774; G.L. 1909, ch. 309, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 360, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-9 .

33-22-10. Notice in discretion of court.

In all other cases in which notice is not required by law, the court may, in its discretion, before proceeding, order notice.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 767; G.L. 1909, ch. 309, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 360, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-10 .

33-22-11. Notice by advertisement.

In all cases in which notice is required and special provision is not made for it, it shall be given by advertisement of a notice once a week for at least two (2) weeks, the first advertisement to be published at least fourteen (14) days before the first of any hearing dates contained in such notice, in a newspaper printed in English and published or previously published in the county and presently distributed in the city or town or in a newspaper having general circulation within the county in which the matter is to be acted upon, as the probate court by general rule or special order may designate for that purpose; provided, however, that when a probate court shall give, or order to be given, notice by advertisement in a newspaper that has furnished the court with a definite schedule of prices for this advertising, the court shall require the cost of the advertising to be paid to the clerk of the court in advance, and the court shall pay over each month to the newspaper the sums so paid in, upon proof that the notice has been advertised as ordered; provided, however, that any advertisement affecting probate matters in the town of New Shoreham shall be given in a newspaper printed in English and published or previously published in the county and presently distributed in the counties of Washington and/or Providence.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 768; G.L. 1909, ch. 309, § 5; G.L. 1916, ch. 1357, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 360, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 7; P.L. 1947, ch. 1913, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-11 ; P.L. 1963, ch. 84, § 4; P.L. 1969, ch. 255, § 1; P.L. 2004, ch. 573, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 351, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 365, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 398, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 407, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by four acts (P.L. 2014, ch. 351, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 365, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 398, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 407, § 1) as passed by the 2014 General Assembly. Since the acts are not in conflict with each other, the section is set out as amended by all four acts.

P.L. 2014, ch. 351, § 2, and P.L. 2014, ch. 398, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2014, ch. 365, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 407, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Notice Insufficient.

A notice published once a week for four successive weeks but in a different newspaper each week would not comply with this section. In re Harris, 14 R.I. 637 , 1885 R.I. LEXIS 9 (1885).

Notice Sufficient.

Notice by publication of petition for guardianship is valid and does not deprive a person of liberty and property without due process of law although personal notice to the intended ward would be more in harmony with usual judicial procedure. Angell v. Angell, 14 R.I. 541 , 1884 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1884).

33-22-12. Notice by service or mail.

Notice may also be given, in addition to the foregoing, in any one of the following modes:

  1. By causing a citation to be served, if within this state, by a deputy sheriff, town sergeant, or constable, and, if outside the state, by some disinterested person, upon all known parties interested, at least seven (7) days before proceeding. The citation shall give notice of the subject matter of the proceeding and of the time and place thereof, and shall be served by reading the citation to each of the parties or by leaving an attested copy of the citation with him or her or at his or her last and usual place of abode with some person living there. If service is made outside the state, the person making the service shall make return under oath of the manner in which, the time when, and the place where service was made.
  2. By mailing notice to all persons interested whose post office addresses are known.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 768; G.L. 1909, ch. 309, § 5; G.L. 1916, ch. 1357, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 360, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-12 ; P.L. 2012, ch. 324, § 63.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Notice Sufficient.

In a proceeding for appointment of a guardian, service in one of the forms prescribed is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction; even though the court has ordered service to be made in two forms, if the court does not insist upon compliance with its order. Angell v. Court of Probate, 11 R.I. 187 , 1875 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1875).

In a proceeding for appointment of a guardian, the citation is sufficient if it states that a petition for such appointment has been made without stating the allegations of the petition or its substance. Angell v. Court of Probate, 11 R.I. 187 , 1875 R.I. LEXIS 23 (1875).

33-22-13. Advertisement in foreign language newspaper or other notice.

The court may also, in addition to the foregoing modes, order notice by advertisement in a newspaper published in other than the English language, or in such other manner as the case may require.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 769; G.L. 1909, ch. 309, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 360, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-13 .

33-22-14. Findings of court as to notice.

If it shall appear to the court, before proceeding, that notice has been given to all known parties interested, in accordance with the foregoing provisions, and in a manner satisfactory to the court, it shall be sufficient to warrant proceeding; and its findings as to notice, unless appealed from, shall be conclusive. Notice by telephone, facsimile, e-mail, or other electronic transmission may supplement, but shall not discharge any party’s obligation under this chapter to give notice by service or mail.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 770; P.L. 1907, ch. 1461, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 309, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 360, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-14 ; P.L. 2007, ch. 158, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 257, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 351, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 398, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 351, § 2, and P.L. 2014, ch. 398, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Failure of Notice.

Where heirs were not listed in petition for probate, so that court did not know of parties to whom notice should be given, heirs could contest probate even after probate had been decreed. MacNeil v. Morgan, 73 R.I. 165 , 54 A.2d 409, 1947 R.I. LEXIS 79 (1947).

33-22-15. Dispensation with notice by assent of parties.

The notice required by law in any proceeding in a probate court may be dispensed with if all parties entitled thereto assent in writing to the proceeding.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 771; G.L. 1909, ch. 309, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 360, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-15 .

33-22-16. Probate forms.

The legislative commission established under chapter 26 of this title shall prescribe the forms to be used by the probate courts and for the records thereof, which shall be printed, and furnished by the secretary of state or his or her designee to the clerks of the probate courts, to attorneys admitted to practice before the courts of this state, and to the public, without charge. All probate courts shall also furnish the forms without charge to parties and attorneys, and may require all parties to use them.

History of Section. P.L. 1906, ch. 1310, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 44; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 43; G.L. 1938, ch. 574, § 6; impl. am. P.L. 1951, ch. 2727, art. 1, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-16 ; P.L. 1969, ch. 35, § 1; P.L. 1970, ch. 49, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 218, § 1; P.L. 2001, ch. 339, § 1.

33-22-17. Representation of unborn, unascertained, and incompetent persons.

When before or at the hearing on any proceeding in a probate court it appears to the court that the interest of a person unborn, unascertained, or legally incompetent to act in his or her own behalf, is not fully represented, the court may appoint some competent and disinterested person to act as guardian ad litem, or next friend, for the person unborn, unascertained, or legally incompetent, and to represent his or her interest in the case. The person so appointed shall make oath to perform his or her duty faithfully and impartially, and shall be entitled to such reasonable compensation, out of the estate, for his or her services, as the court may allow. In any action involving wills, estates, trusts or fiduciaries in the probate court, a minor, an incapacitated person or an unborn or unascertained person whose identity and location is unknown and not reasonably ascertainable, unless otherwise represented, may be represented by and bound by another having a substantially identical interest with respect to the particular question or dispute, but only to the extent that: (1) the person’s interest is adequately represented; and (2) there is no conflict of interest between the representative and the person represented.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 779; G.L. 1909, ch. 309, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 360, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-17 ; P.L. 2004, ch. 573, § 2.

Applicability.

P.L. 2004, ch. 573, § 5 provides that the amendment to this section by that act takes effect upon passage [July 9, 2004] and shall apply to all actions involving trusts and trustees commenced after that date.

Collateral References.

Authority of guardian ad litem or next friend to make agreement to drop or compromise will contest or withdraw objection to probate. 42 A.L.R.2d 1319.

33-22-18. Administration of oaths.

Oaths required in proceedings in probate courts may be administered by the judge or clerk, in or out of court, or by a notary public or justice of the peace; and when administered out of court, a certificate thereof shall be returned and filed or recorded with the proceedings, but the judge may require any oath to be taken in open court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 776; G.L. 1909, ch. 309, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 360, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-18 .

33-22-19. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 775; G.L. 1909, ch. 309, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 360, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-19 ; Repealed by P.L. 2014, ch. 351, § 1, effective July 2, 2014; P.L. 2014, ch. 398, § 1, effective July 2, 2014.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-22-19 concerned decrees and orders in writing; recording.

33-22-19.1. Record of probate court proceedings.

  1. At the request of any party thereto, or at the request of the probate judge presiding thereat, any proceedings held in probate court shall be recorded by the probate clerk, by either electronic or stenographic means (the means utilized to be determined by the probate clerk), which means are reasonably designed to produce a true and accurate verbatim transcription of such proceedings.
  2. This section shall not be construed to prohibit a party from privately recording or transcribing any probate court proceeding at his or her own expense, which private recording or transcript shall not be deemed part of the record of proceedings unless admitted by the probate court into evidence as an exhibit, ordered by the probate court or stipulated to by the parties. Nothing contained herein shall preclude a party from purchasing a transcript from the stenographer. This section shall not be construed as requiring a party to record or transcribe the proceeding in order to take an appeal to superior court.
  3. No city or town shall be obligated to assist a party to produce a written or typed transcription from any proceeding other than in instances where an appeal is claimed pursuant to the provisions of § 33-23-1 et seq. In the event such an appeal is claimed, the appellant shall be responsible for all transcription costs. If the city or town utilizes electronic means to record proceedings, the probate clerk shall, upon request, provide the appellant’s stenographer with accommodations to transcribe the original tape recording on site or provide a true copy thereof to permit transcription off site. Physical possession of the original recording or transcription notes shall remain with the probate court unless otherwise ordered by the superior court. The written transcript and electronic recording shall be deemed a public record.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 10; P.L. 2007, ch. 158, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 257, § 1.

33-22-19.2. Hearings in probate courts — Evidence and discovery.

  1. In uncontested matters and/or matters on waiver, the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence adopted by the supreme court, may be used as a guide, but need not be followed, for the admission or exclusion of evidence.
  2. In all contested matters, the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence shall be applied; provided, however, that this section shall not prohibit parties from stipulating or waiving the requirements of the Rules of Evidence as to any particular matter.
  3. In all contested matters, the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied. The probate court may limit the scope of discovery to what is relevant to the contested issue before it and may shorten or enlarge deadlines for compliance as the circumstances warrant.
  4. In all matters, the probate court shall have the jurisdiction and discretion to compel discovery, award costs and fees, impose sanctions and otherwise to enforce its orders consistent with Rule 37 of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 10; P.L. 2007, ch. 158, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 257, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Rebecca M. Murphy, Murder, Fraud, and Tortious Interference: The Interplay Between Probate Court Jurisdiction and Superior Court Jurisdiction in Rhode Island, 20 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 404 (2015).

Rebecca M. Murphy and Samantha M. Clarke, A New Hope: Tortious Interference with an Expected Inheritance in Rhode Island, 22 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 531 (2017).

33-22-20. Deposit of money paid into registry.

Whenever money is directed to be paid into the registry of the probate court, the court shall forthwith deposit the money in one of the institutions for savings or in one of the trust companies of this state. This deposit shall be made in the name of the probate court and shall be subject to the order of the court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 780; G.L. 1909, ch. 309, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 360, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 19.

33-22-21. Fees enumerated — Hearing date to be noted on receipt.

  1. The fees in probate courts shall be as follows: for every petition for the appointment of a custodian, administrator, guardian, or conservator, or for the probate of a will, one percent (1.0%) of the personal property of the decedent or ward over which the court has jurisdiction, but in no event shall the fee be less than thirty dollars ($30.00) nor more than one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500); for every petition of a foreign administrator, executor, or guardian to transfer or sell real or personal estate, one percent (1.0%) of the personal property of the decedent, or ward located in Rhode Island, but in no event shall the fee be less than thirty dollars ($30.00) nor more than one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) which fees shall be in lieu of all subsequent filing and recording fees in the same proceedings, except as hereinafter provided, and shall be paid before the petition is filed, and shall be based upon estimates submitted by the petitioner or someone on his or her behalf, and shall be subject to revision whenever it appears that the estimates were incorrect, and upon revision a further payment or rebate shall be made promptly. In the event that the appointment of a custodian, pending the appointment of an administrator, guardian, or conservator, or the probate of a will, is necessary, the fee so paid for the petition shall be applied on the amount to be paid upon the filing of a petition for the appointment of the administrator, guardian, or conservator, or for the probate of the will. The court at any time may cite in and examine any custodian, executor, administrator, guardian, or conservator for the purpose of determining the full fee due and payable. Also, the following fees shall be charged:
    1. For every petition to file a claim out of time, thirty dollars ($30.00);
    2. For every petition for the removal of an executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, or other fiduciary, thirty dollars ($30.00);
    3. For every petition for appointment of a successor guardian under the uniform gifts to minors act, thirty dollars ($30.00);
    4. For every petition to file a will with no probate, thirty dollars ($30.00);
    5. For every affidavit of complete administration, thirty dollars ($30.00);
    6. For every certificate of appointment, five dollars ($5.00);
    7. For every petition to remove or fill a vacancy of a trustee of any trust established under a will, or the termination of such trust, thirty dollars ($30.00);
    8. For every petition for tax minimization or estate planning, thirty dollars ($30.00);
    9. For every petition for change of name, thirty dollars ($30.00); and
    10. For every petition for adoption, thirty dollars ($30.00).
  2. Upon payment of any fee enumerated in this section, the clerk of the court shall issue a written receipt to the person making payment. In the event that the matter filed with the court calls for a hearing, the clerk of the court shall note the hearing date and time on the receipt whenever possible; otherwise, as soon as is practicable after the filing of the matter, the clerk of the court shall provide written notice of the hearing date and time directly to the person filing the matter.
  3. The clerk of the court shall charge one dollar and fifty cents ($1.50) per page and three dollars ($3.00) to certify any probate documents on file with the probate court.

History of Section. P.L. 1907, ch. 1464, § 1; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 39; P.L. 1915, ch. 1260, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 38; G.L. 1938, ch. 574, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-21 ; P.L. 1977, ch. 246, § 2; P.L. 1983, ch. 79, § 1; P.L. 1989, ch. 397, § 1; P.L. 1990, ch. 155, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 11; P.L. 2014, ch. 351, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 398, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 351, § 2, and P.L. 2014, ch. 398, § 2 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Collateral References.

Probate fees or taxes as a property tax or an excise tax. 103 A.L.R. 91.

Validity of statutes imposing a graduated probate fee based upon value of estate. 76 A.L.R.3d 1117.

33-22-22. Fees excused on veterans’ guardianships.

No probate fees shall be charged in any estate where the appointment of a guardian is for the purpose of receiving benefits of the laws administered by the United States veterans administration.

History of Section. G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 40; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 39; G.L. 1938, ch. 574, § 2; P.L. 1945, ch. 1595, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-22 .

33-22-23. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1907, ch. 1464, § 2; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 41; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 40; G.L. 1938, ch. 574, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-23 ; Repealed by P.L. 2014, ch. 351, § 1, effective July 2, 2014; P.L. 2014, ch. 398, § 1, effective July 2, 2014.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-22-23 concerned division of fees.

33-22-24. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1907, ch. 1464, § 3; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 42; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 41; G.L. 1938, ch. 574, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-24 ; Repealed by P.L. 1977, ch. 246, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-22-24 concerned the clerk’s fee for recording of proceedings.

33-22-25. Payment of fees into local treasury — Power to provide for fixed salaries.

Any city council, or any town at the annual town meeting, may provide for the payment into the city or town treasury of all fees allowed the probate court or probate clerk, or both, and may allow in lieu of a fee a salary for the town council, probate judge, or probate clerk for their services.

History of Section. P.L. 1907, ch. 1464, § 4; G.L. 1909, ch. 321, § 43; G.L. 1923, ch. 372, § 42; G.L. 1938, ch. 574, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-25 .

33-22-26. Cost and fees in contested and appealed cases — Persons deemed parties of record.

In cases contested before a probate court or on appeal from the probate court, costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees in the discretion of the court may be awarded to either party to be paid by the other, or to either or both parties to be paid out of the estate which is the subject of the controversy, as justice may require. Any person petitioning or objecting to a petition shall be deemed to be a party of record in the matter in which he or she appears.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 777; G.L. 1909, ch. 309, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 360, § 14; G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-26 ; P.L. 2007, ch. 158, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 257, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Attorney’s Fees.

Attorney’s fees are not included in the term “costs” as used in this section. Di Iorio v. Cantone, 49 R.I. 452 , 144 A. 148, 1929 R.I. LEXIS 87 (1929).

Amount of attorney’s fees awarded ($7,875) constituted a partially unsustainable exercise of discretion on the part of the trial justice; and the case was remanded to the superior court with the direction that it enter instead an award of $5,906.25 in attorney’s fees. The award of attorney’s fees in this particular case moderately exceeded what was called for under the totality of the circumstances, especially in view of the fact that other sanctions were subsequently imposed. In re Estate of Brown, 206 A.3d 127, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 60 (2019).

Expenses

In a case involving a will dispute involving a dual citizen of the United States and Greece, as R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-22-26 did not limit the use of estate assets for the payment of litigation expenses to only those cases contested in Rhode Island, there was a true conflict between Rhode Island and Greek law. Smile of the Child v. Est. of Papadopouli, 2022 R.I. LEXIS 29 (R.I. Apr. 11, 2022).

Collateral References.

Personal representative’s right to allowance, out of property involved, for attorneys’ fees or other expenses incurred in unsuccessful effort to claim the property for the estate. 126 A.L.R. 1349.

Right to allowance out of estate of attorneys’ fees incurred in attempt to establish or defeat will. 40 A.L.R.2d 1407.

33-22-27. Execution for cost and fees.

When costs and/or fees are awarded to be paid by one party to the other pursuant to § 33-22-26 , the probate court may issue execution for costs in like manner as a court of common law.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 778; G.L. 1909, ch. 309, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 360, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 571, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 33-22-27 ; P.L. 2007, ch. 158, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 257, § 1.

33-22-28. Name change.

In every petition for change of name in the probate court, the judge shall grant or deny the petition without consideration of presence or absence of spousal consent.

History of Section. P.L. 1991, ch. 63, § 1.

Collateral References.

Circumstances Justifying Grant or Denial of Petition to Change Transsexual or Transgender Individual’s Name. 39 A.L.R.7th Art. 9 (2019).

33-22-29. Local rules of probate court.

The probate court of each city or town shall promulgate local administrative rules designed to facilitate the efficient discharge of the statutory duties of such court; provided, however, that no such local administrative rule shall expand, contract or otherwise vary any specific provision of title 33 or any other provision of the General Laws. Such local administrative rules shall include the following: the dates and times when the court is in session; procedures for docketing of cases at hearings of the court; the scheduling of special sessions; and deadlines for the submission of pleadings or other filings. Such local administrative rules shall be clearly posted in the office of the probate clerk and copies of such rules shall be available to any interested party from the probate clerk.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 10.

33-22-30. Probate court docket and special sessions.

Dockets of matters at regular sessions of the probate court shall be prepared by the clerk and heard by the court in such a way as to ensure that formal and uncontested matters are heard before contested matters. The probate court may hold such additional special sessions as reasonably necessary to hear contested matters without additional fees or charges therefor.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 10.

33-22-31. Form of order and decree.

  1. Every decision of a probate court shall be reduced to a written order or decree, promptly executed by the probate judge, entered and filed in a timely fashion by the probate clerk. No party can rely upon any action, inaction or instructions of the probate court nor take an appeal from any decision of the probate court that has not been reduced to a written order or decree duly executed by the probate judge.
  2. If a form of order or decree is not available for execution by the probate judge at the time of hearing, the court shall require the prevailing party to submit a proposed form of order or decree by regular mail to all parties who have entered an appearance in the matter. Absent written objection setting forth the reason for such objections by any such party within seven (7) days after mailing, the prevailing party shall file the original thereof with the probate court. Such order or decree shall contain a certificate that notice has been given pursuant to this subsection.
  3. For all purposes, the effective date of an order or decree is the date executed by the probate judge and not the date of hearing.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Probate.

Where the probate judge drew clear and final legal conclusions in his decision, the ruling was a decree for purposes of R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-23-1 and triggered the 30-day period within which the executors were required to file in the superior court a certified copy of the claim and record and the reasons of appeal; as they failed to meet the deadline, they failed to perfect their appeal. Kelley v. Jepson, 811 A.2d 119, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 227 (2002).

Requirements.

Probate court’s written, signed decision that clearly settled the respective rights and claims of the contestants challenging the probating of a decedent’s will and terminating litigation of a will contest satisfied the requirements of a decree under the statute and triggered the procedural requirements of R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-23-1 . Kelley v. Jepson, 811 A.2d 119, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 227 (2002).

Chapter 23 Judicial Review of Probate Court Orders and Decisions

33-23-1. Filing of claim of appeal, record, and reasons.

  1. Any person aggrieved by an order or decree of a probate court (hereinafter “appellant”), may, unless provisions be made to the contrary, appeal to the superior court for the county in which the probate court is established by taking the following procedure:
    1. Within twenty (20) days after execution of the order or decree by the probate judge, the appellant shall file, in the office of the clerk of the probate court, a claim of appeal to the superior court and a request for a certified copy of the claim and shall pay the clerk his or her fees therefor.
    2. Within thirty (30) days after the entry of the order or decree, the appellant shall file, in the superior court, a certified copy of the claim and the reasons of appeal specifically stated, to which reasons the appellant shall be restricted, unless, for cause shown, and with or without terms, the superior court shall allow amendments and additions thereto.
    3. The appellant shall file with the probate clerk an affidavit in proof of the filing and docketing of the probate appeal pursuant to the time deadlines set forth in subdivision (a)(2).
  2. An appeal under this chapter is not an appeal on error but is to be heard de novo in the superior court. The record of proceedings, including the certified documents and the transcript (if any) from the probate proceedings, may be introduced in the superior court without further authentication. The findings of fact and/or decisions of the probate court may be given as much weight and deference as the superior court deems appropriate, however, the superior court shall not be bound by any such findings or decisions. Nothing herein shall preclude a witness who testified at the probate court proceeding from testifying at the superior court hearing, however, the transcript of such probate court testimony may be used for any evidentiary purpose, consistent with the Rhode Island rules of evidence.
  3. The deadline of subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2) are jurisdictional and may not be extended by either the probate court or the superior court.
  4. Nothing in this chapter shall preclude interested parties in a probate proceeding from stipulating to a probate appeal from the probate court to the superior court and, toward that end, to build a record by agreed statement of facts and otherwise; to fashion on a form of order or decree to preserve or frame issues as the parties desire; and to preserve the status quo ante pending appeal through custodianship of assets or otherwise. Such a stipulated probate appeal shall be governed by, and be subject to, the procedural requirements of this chapter.
  5. The executor, administrator, guardian, or other fiduciary, pending a probate appeal, shall annually, or more often as requested by the probate court, file a written report of the status of the appeal.
  6. The filing fees payable to the superior court clerk for reasons of appeal in a probate appeal shall be the same as those established from time to time for the filing of a complaint in a civil action.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 796; G.L. 1909, ch. 311, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 362, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 573, § 1; G.L. 1956, § 33-23-1 ; P.L. 1975, ch. 120, § 1; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 13; P.L. 2007, ch. 158, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 257, § 2; P.L. 2014, ch. 314, § 1; P.L. 2014, ch. 550, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 485, § 1; P.L. 2016, ch. 495, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 314, § 1, and P.L. 2014, ch. 550, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

P.L. 2016, ch. 485, § 1, and P.L. 2016, ch. 495, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Cross References.

Appeal in actions for damages in laying out of highways, § 9-1-11 .

Appellate jurisdiction of superior court, § 8-2-17 .

Law Reviews.

Rebecca M. Murphy, Murder, Fraud, and Tortious Interference: The Interplay Between Probate Court Jurisdiction and Superior Court Jurisdiction in Rhode Island, 20 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 404 (2015).

Comparative Legislation.

Probate appeals:

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-186 et seq.

Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 215, § 9 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Amendment of Reasons.

Court has power to allow amendments to reasons for appeal, but would not do so where such reasons, as amended, would not state a case. Battey v. Mathewson, 23 R.I. 474 , 51 A. 102, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 141 (1902).

Under this section the court has power to permit amendment of the reasons of appeal, but that power must not be exercised arbitrarily. Spooner v. Tucker, 86 R.I. 266 , 134 A.2d 403, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1957).

Appeal Bond.

The intent of the provisions requiring an appellant to give bond to cover costs is that the prevailing party, whether appellant or appellee, can recover the costs. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 2 R.I. 1 , 1851 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1851).

Bond requirement did not apply to an appeal by a ward from a decree dismissing his application for the removal of the guardian. Atwood v. Court of Probate, 17 R.I. 537 , 23 A. 99, 1891 R.I. LEXIS 68 (1891).

Appeal Properly Dismissed.

Tenant’s appeal of a probate court’s judgment to a superior court was properly dismissed because the tenant did not make a good faith effort to comply with R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-23-1 , as (1) the tenant failed to submit any records from the probate court proceedings, (2) the tenant fatally neglected to file a claim of appeal with the probate court, which was an all-important condition precedent for the taking of an effective appeal, and (3) the superior court did not have the discretion to overlook the tenant’s failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-23-1 . Ims v. Audette, 40 A.3d 236, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 32 (2012).

Tenant’s appeal of a probate court’s judgment to a superior court was properly dismissed because (1) the tenant did not pay the requisite filing fees, (2) the tenant did not substantiate the tenant’s untimely claim that the tenant lacked the means to pay the fees, and (3) the tenant’s claim that the tenant could not afford the fees did not excuse the tenant’s failure to file a claim of appeal in the probate court, and the tenant’s consequent failure to satisfy R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-23-1(a) . Ims v. Audette, 40 A.3d 236, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 32 (2012).

Superior court properly dismissed a pro se executrix’s appeal from a probate court order because (1) the executrix’s claims about the probate judge’s attitude were irrelevant in a de novo appeal, and (2) the executrix otherwise raised no cognizable legal issue. Estate of Prete v. Probate Court of Narragansett, 205 A.3d 463, 2019 R.I. LEXIS 55 (2019).

Authority of Court.

An estate’s proper remedy where an appeal was not timely filed was to file a petition pursuant to § 9-21-6 , since the probate court lacked the authority to “level the playing field” by extending the time in which the estate could bring its appeal. McBride v. Leach (In re Estate of Speight), 739 A.2d 229, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 185 (1999).

Challenges to Decedent’s Residence.

Challenges to decedent’s residence shall be made either by an appeal to the superior court from a decree appointing an administrator or executor or by seeking modification or revocation of an uncontested petition within the specified appeal period. George v. Infantolino, 446 A.2d 757, 1982 R.I. LEXIS 892 (1982).

Construction With Chapter 11.

This section and chapter 11 of title 33 are statutes in pari materia and should be considered together to achieve harmonious interpretations consistent with their general purpose and scope. Lind v. McSoley, 419 A.2d 247, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1724 (1980).

The legislature intended to require “persons having claims” to file a statement of those claims pursuant to § 33-11-4 before they may assert the status under this section of a “person aggrieved” by a probate court order or decree concerning a decedent’s estate. Lind v. McSoley, 419 A.2d 247, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1724 (1980).

Hearing De Novo in Superior Court.

Upon appeal of the appointment of a guardian by the probate court under § 33-15-8 , the superior court is required to conduct a de novo hearing. In re Estate of Taylor, 114 R.I. 562 , 337 A.2d 236, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1453 (1975).

Appeal of a decision by a probate court to diminish a co-administrator’s decision-making authority mandated a de novo hearing where the decision was based on deference to the probate court’s findings and the probate court record was devoid of any factual findings. In re Estate of Paroda, 845 A.2d 1012, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 76 (2004).

Although a trial court properly dismissed a probate appeal by two of a decedent’s heirs because their signatures were not on the claim of appeal, the trial court erred in dismissing the probate appeal by a third heir because the third heir was the only party that satisfied R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-23-1(a)(1) , and the consent order, in which the parties stipulated to the appeal and framed the issues that were to form the basis of the appeal to the trial court, was sufficient to provide notice and to confine the appeal to those enumerated issues; the consent order was referred within and attached to the claim of appeal when it was filed in the probate court, and was filed within the thirty-day time limitation of § 33-23-1(a)(2) . Mendes v. Factor, 41 A.3d 994, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 51 (2012).

Matters Not Included in Reasons.

Whether a certain heir should have been appointed administrator was not a part of the proceedings where such heir was not present in the probate court either in person or by counsel, the record did not show that any request was made to the probate court to appoint her and no mention was made of such heir in the reasons of appeal. Whitmarsh v. O'Reilly, 86 R.I. 361 , 134 A.2d 469, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 110 (1957).

Trial court did not err in dismissing appeals from a probate court order because appellants did not merely fail to produce a transcript of the probate court proceedings, but they failed to produce anything beyond that court’s decision and their own reasons for appeal; the trial court correctly held that R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-23-1(c) applied only to transcripts and that it did not have the authority to extend the deadline to file the record. In re Estate of Griggs, 63 A.3d 867, 2013 R.I. LEXIS 50 (2013).

Persons Aggrieved.

A party is aggrieved by a judgment or decree when it operates on his property rights or bears directly on his interest. Ankney v. Pettine, 79 R.I. 471 , 90 A.2d 430, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 77 (1952).

The word “aggrieved” in this section refers to a substantial grievance, a denial of some personal or property right or the imposition of a burden or obligation. Ankney v. Pettine, 79 R.I. 471 , 90 A.2d 430, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 77 (1952).

A person is “aggrieved” and entitled to prosecute an appeal if he shows that, in the circumstances that existed with reference to the estate prior to the admission to probate of the challenged will, he could have presented to an appropriate court a justiciable question as to his right to share in the deceased’s estate. Spooner v. Tucker, 86 R.I. 266 , 134 A.2d 403, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1957).

Under this statute an appellant, if his interest does not appear in the record, must set out in his reasons of appeal the facts and circumstances upon which he bases his claim to be entitled to appeal as a person “aggrieved.” Such allegations will be sufficient however, if they show an interest in the subject matter of the controversy and that the decree has adversely affected some personal or property right or imposes upon him some burden or obligation. Spooner v. Tucker, 86 R.I. 266 , 134 A.2d 403, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1957).

The term “person aggrieved” as used in this section is not synonymous with “interested party” as used in § 33-23-8 . Apollonio v. Kenyon, 101 R.I. 578 , 225 A.2d 778, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 803 (1967).

A former attorney of a patient in the state hospital for mental diseases who, without specific employment, filed a petition to dismiss pending guardianship proceedings against such patient was not an aggrieved person within the contemplation of this section. Crofwell v. Goldstein, 102 R.I. 356 , 230 A.2d 854, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 696 (1967).

A person is aggrieved within the meaning of this section if a probate court order or decree adversely affects in a substantial manner some personal or property right of the one seeking review or imposes some burden or obligation upon him. Lind v. McSoley, 419 A.2d 247, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1724 (1980).

A ward’s adult child did not have standing to appeal a probate court’s decision to permit the ward’s guardians to pursue a malpractice claim on the ward’s behalf because the child had previously waived all interest in the ward’s estate and the ward’s well-being would not have been adversely affected by pursuit of the claim. Pettis v. Cuddy, 828 A.2d 521, 2003 R.I. LEXIS 189 (2003).

— Assignees.

The assignee of a fractional interest of the residuary estate may appeal from a decree allowing charges in the executor’s account since he is a person aggrieved. O'Rourke v. Elsbree, 11 R.I. 430 , 1877 R.I. LEXIS 16 (1877).

— Attorneys.

An attorney is not a person aggrieved under general rule which prohibits attorney’s fees from being taxed as part of the costs of litigation in the absence of specific statutory authority or contractual liability. Malinou v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 116 R.I. 548 , 359 A.2d 43, 1976 R.I. LEXIS 1306 (1976).

— Beneficiary of Charge Against Property.

Owner of an annuity charged against real estate of intended ward was not entitled to appeal from decree dismissing petition for appointment of guardian, even though he was entitled to file petition as a friend or relative. McKenna v. McKenna, 29 R.I. 224 , 69 A. 844, 1908 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1908).

— Creditors.

Creditor could not appeal from order amending decree to include order for notice of appointment since creditor was not an aggrieved person. Smith v. Whaley, 27 R.I. 185 , 61 A. 173, 1905 R.I. LEXIS 66 (1905).

Tort claimant against estate is an aggrieved person and may appeal from an order permitting disallowance of his claim out of time, even though such order does not prejudice his right to maintain an action at law. In re Raposa's Estate, 78 R.I. 484 , 82 A.2d 836, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1951).

— Creditors of Beneficiary’s Estate.

A judgment creditor of the estate of decedent’s beneficiary has no standing to appeal the closing of decedent’s estate without payment of a legacy to the beneficiary’s estate unless the creditor files a claim directly against decedent’s estate. Lind v. McSoley, 419 A.2d 247, 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1724 (1980).

— Executors and Administrators.

An appeal in behalf of executors lies from an order directing them to file an inventory and account. Tillinghast v. Brown Univ., 24 R.I. 179 , 52 A. 891, 1902 R.I. LEXIS 43 (1902).

Executor could appeal from decree granting allowance to widow under § 33-10-3 , where executor was also trustee of substantial portion of estate and claim of appeal set forth interests both as executor and as trustee. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hopkins, 38 R.I. 59 , 94 A. 724, 1915 R.I. LEXIS 49 (1915).

Administrator has a right to appeal from a decree denying permission to provide for perpetual care of decedent’s grave. Hall v. Burgess, 40 R.I. 314 , 100 A. 1013, 1917 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1917).

Administrator who submits his own claim to determination under § 33-11-8 does not thereby preclude himself from appealing from an adverse decree thereon, even though he could have prosecuted such claim by action at law as on a disallowed claim. KIGGIN v. KIGGIN, 59 R.I. 370 , 195 A. 492, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 174 (1937).

An individual nominated in a will as an executor can be considered as a person aggrieved by the denial of his petition to admit the will to probate. Vermette v. Cirillo, 114 R.I. 66 , 328 A.2d 419, 1974 R.I. LEXIS 1061 (1974).

When a co-administrator’s decision-making authority concerning the administration of the estate is diminished or eliminated by an order of a probate court, that person’s personal right in administering the estate has been adversely affected and the person is aggrieved within the meaning of § 33-23-1(a) . In re Estate of Paroda, 845 A.2d 1012, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 76 (2004).

— Expectant Heirs.

Expectant heir of ward was not an aggrieved person who could appeal from order appointing guardian. Hadfield v. Cushing, 35 R.I. 306 , 86 A. 897, 1913 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1913).

— Husband of Decedent.

Husband excluded from will and having no issue was not an aggrieved person and could not appeal from decree authorizing settlement of a claim where the husband’s own claim against the estate had been settled and paid. Girard v. Sawyer, 66 R.I. 403 , 19 A.2d 769, 1941 R.I. LEXIS 46 (1941).

— Persons Liable for Support.

A ward’s grandmother, as his nearest relative and provider and responsible for his support, can appeal as a person aggrieved from decision appointing guardian. Roullard v. McSoley, 54 R.I. 232 , 172 A. 326, 1934 R.I. LEXIS 54 (1934).

Daughter of an insane ward upon whom the obligation to support would devolve were the ward to become indigent could appeal the appointment of a guardian though she was not a party to the proceeding to establish guardianship. Ankney v. Pettine, 79 R.I. 471 , 90 A.2d 430, 1952 R.I. LEXIS 77 (1952).

Son of ward was entitled to appeal from a decree denying removal of guardian since he was subject to a penalty for failure to support father should the guardian waste the assets of the father’s estate. Duff v. Leighton, 80 R.I. 360 , 97 A.2d 110, 1953 R.I. LEXIS 75 (1953).

Minor grandchild of ward was entitled to appeal from decree allowing guardian’s account, since minor grandchild was an aggrieved person due to potential financial liability for support of grandmother. Whitmarsh v. McGair, 84 R.I. 226 , 122 A.2d 748, 1956 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1956).

— Probate Judge.

A probate judge is not a party aggrieved in a proceeding before him and therefore cannot be deemed a party on appeal from a decree removing a party as administrator of an estate. Malinou v. McCarthy, 98 R.I. 189 , 200 A.2d 578, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 145 (1964).

— Public Administrator.

The official interest of the public administrator is limited to those estates where three conditions exist, namely, intestacy, an absence of known next of kin, and no prior pending proceedings for administration. Therefore, the public administrator was not an “aggrieved person” and had no standing to appeal decree of probate court admitting testamentary instrument. Malinou v. Mears, 97 R.I. 15 , 195 A.2d 232, 1963 R.I. LEXIS 122 (1963).

A public administrator does not have a property right in serving as administrator of estates pending during his tenure so as to be a “person aggrieved” under this section by the appointment of his successor as administrator of estates that were pending during his tenure but for which he was never appointed administrator de bonis non. Malinou v. Kiernan, 107 R.I. 342 , 267 A.2d 692, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 778 (1970).

The incumbent public administrator was not by virtue of his office vested with a contractual right to act as administrator of and to complete the administration of any estates left unfinished by the prior incumbent and the appointment of another to such trusts did not deprive him of a contractual or property right and constitute him a person “aggrieved” for appeal from such appointments. Malinou v. Kiernan, 107 R.I. 342 , 267 A.2d 692, 1970 R.I. LEXIS 778 (1970).

Record of Proceedings.

In a will contest, defendant’s motion to dismiss the superior court action on grounds the executrix failed to transmit the complete transcript of the probate court proceedings as required by R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-23-1 was properly denied, as the motion was made mid-trial, and defendant failed to show how the missing transcript was relevant to the superior court proceedings, or how its omission prejudiced his defense. Lett v. Giuliano, 35 A.3d 870, 2012 R.I. LEXIS 2 (2012).

Review by Supreme Court.

Fact that superior court heard appeal on its merits, even though suggestion was made that appellant was not a person aggrieved, did not preclude appellee from again raising same question in supreme court. Hadfield v. Cushing, 35 R.I. 306 , 86 A. 897, 1913 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1913).

Question not submitted to superior court on probate appeal could not be considered by the supreme court. Gilbert v. Hayward, 37 R.I. 303 , 92 A. 625, 1914 R.I. LEXIS 47 (1914).

Question not presented to superior court in appeal from juvenile court could not be raised by exception in supreme court. Shea v. Shea, 76 R.I. 66 , 68 A.2d 71, 1949 R.I. LEXIS 92 (1949).

Where an appeal to the superior court could have been taken, certiorari to the Supreme Court is unavailable unless there are unusual or exceptional circumstances. Costello v. Probate Court, 98 R.I. 420 , 204 A.2d 307, 1964 R.I. LEXIS 190 (1964).

Because an administrator did not bring a motion in the superior court or argue for application of R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-23-12 to her appeal of a probate court order diminishing her responsibilities as co-administrator, the supreme court would not address the issue for the first time on appeal. In re Estate of Paroda, 845 A.2d 1012, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 76 (2004).

Only those orders of the Probate Courts that contain an element of finality, including the appointment of an executor, an administrator C.T.A., or an administrator, or an order admitting or refusing to admit a will to probate, are orders that are sufficiently final and thereby appealable to the Superior Court pursuant to R.I.G.L. § 33-23-1 . Discovery orders of a probate court were not appealable to the superior court as they lacked the requisite finality. Burford v. Estate of Skelly, 699 A.2d 854, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 254 (1997).

Revised Commissioners’ Report.

This section did not give a right of appeal from a decree revising a commissioner’s report on allowance of claims in an insolvent estate because express provision has been made to the contrary. Yeaw v. Searle, 2 R.I. 168 , 1852 R.I. LEXIS 24 (1852).

Time for Filing Appeal.

Where last day for filing an appeal fell on Sunday, an appeal filed on the following day was timely. West v. West, 20 R.I. 464 , 40 A. 6, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 90 (1898).

Co-executor’s appeal was properly deemed not perfected because a transcript of the probate proceedings was not provided within the statutorily-mandated 30-day period and an extension was not warranted Kelley v. Jepson, 811 A.2d 119, 2002 R.I. LEXIS 227 (R.I. 2002).

Deadlines of R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-23-1(a)(1) , (2) are jurisdictional and cannot be extended, except to extend the time to file the transcript; daughters failed to perfect an appeal from a probate court where they waited nearly six months from the date of a probate court order denying their application for their father’s guardianship to request that certain sealed records be transmitted to the trial court since those documents should have been transmitted within 30 days. Griggs v. Estate of Griggs, 845 A.2d 1006, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 74 (2004).

Since the relevant portions of the transcript were submitted to the superior court within 30 days of the execution of an order, and the estate’s appeal was perfected, the hearing justice erroneously granted the motion to dismiss. Estate of Hart v. LeBlanc, 853 A.2d 1217, 2004 R.I. LEXIS 126 (2004).

Petitioner’s failure to submit a written transcript of the Probate Court proceedings within the time prescribed by R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-23-1 was fatal to his Superior Court appeal. In re Estate of Tinney, 911 A.2d 272, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 166 (2006).

Probate court did not err in dismissing daughters’ appeals because they failed to file a substantial portion of the record; the daughters’ mere references to exhibits that existed, without providing them, were insufficient to comply with the statute. Duffy v. Estate of Scire, 111 A.3d 358, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 41 (2015).

Because the differences between a surviving spouse’s two claims were de minimis, amounting to the elimination of surplus verbiage that was neither substantive nor material, there was no question that either of the two filed claims was sufficient to provide notice and to confine the appeal to those enumerated issues identically stated in both; a certified copy of the second claim was filed in the Superior Court within the 30-day time limitation. Estate of Garan, 249 A.3d 1254, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 32 (2021).

— Leave to File Belated Appeal.

A petition for leave to file a belated probate appeal must be filed in supreme court within one year after the entry of such decree, rather than one year after expiration of time normally allowed for appeal. Walquist v. Hodson, 53 R.I. 322 , 166 A. 546, 1933 R.I. LEXIS 91 (1933).

— Payment of Fees.

Either the surviving spouse or her agent paid fees for certified copies of both claims; some fees requested by the probate court clerk were paid by the spouse within the 20-day period, and the spouse submitted a receipt and an affidavit that stated she also gave the clerk’s office a $10 bill. Estate of Garan, 249 A.3d 1254, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 32 (2021).

Because a surviving spouse perfected her probate appeal, the superior court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the executrix; the spouse claimed that she paid sufficient fees for a certified copy of the first claim of appeal, which was virtually identical to her second claim, and the probate court clerk indicated in her affidavit that when a certified copy was requested, it was the practice of the clerk’s office to issue that copy the same day. Estate of Garan, 249 A.3d 1254, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 32 (2021).

— Request for Certified Copy.

Summary judgment in favor of an executrix was not justified as to a surviving spouse’s request for a certified copy of her claim, as there was competent evidence before the superior court proving the existence of a disputed issue of material fact; the spouse complied with the 20-day requirement when she not only filed with the probate court her claim of appeal to the superior court but also requested a certified copy of the claim. Estate of Garan, 249 A.3d 1254, 2021 R.I. LEXIS 32 (2021).

— Waiver.

This section is jurisdictional and an agreement between petitioner and respondent, made to permit time for them to confer on the matter, that respondent would not object to a late filing of the reasons for petitioner’s appeal was not sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of an appeal perfected after the time prescribed in this section. Steinhof v. Keefer, 101 R.I. 472 , 224 A.2d 897, 1966 R.I. LEXIS 418 (1966).

Failure to file an appeal within the statutory time cannot be waived by the parties. Kenyon v. Probate Court, 17 R.I. 652 , 24 A. 149, 1892 R.I. LEXIS 55 (1892).

Time for Filing Reasons of Appeal.

Appeal was properly dismissed where appellant did not file reasons of appeal within the statutory period. Dugdale v. Chase, 52 R.I. 63 , 157 A. 430, 1931 R.I. LEXIS 110 (1931).

— Extension of Time.

Motion for further time in which to file reasons of appeal need not be filed within fifty (now thirty) days from date of the determination appealed from, as the accident, mistake, or other cause which might prevent filing of the reasons might also prevent filing of motion for further time within such period. Cannon v. McEnanley, 21 R.I. 60 , 41 A. 1016, 1898 R.I. LEXIS 37 (1898).

Section 9-4-8 does not apply to probate appeals so as to give superior court jurisdiction to permit late filing of reasons of appeal. Fish v. Field, 40 R.I. 180 , 100 A. 306, 1917 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1917).

Daughters’ failure to satisfy the requirements of the statute was the result of excusable neglect, and thus, justice required that their appeal be allowed to proceed; the letter from the probate court setting forth the cost of copying the certified record was not sent to the daughters’ counsel until after the due date for submitting the probate court record to the superior court had come and gone, and the cost had been properly and timely requested by counsel in writing. Duffy v. Estate of Scire, 111 A.3d 358, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 41 (2015).

Collateral References.

Admitting will to probate or denying probate, who entitled to appeal from decree. 88 A.L.R. 1158; 157 A.L.R. 114.

Appeal taken by executor or administrator, official bond as covering. 132 A.L.R. 1280.

Appeal without bond by executor or administrator from order, decree or judgment affecting his account. 104 A.L.R. 1195.

Appealability of probate orders allowing or disallowing claims against estate. 84 A.L.R.4th 269.

Application for removal of personal representative, guardian, or trustee, right of appeal from order on. 37 A.L.R.2d 751.

Creditor’s or debtor’s right to attack issuance of letters of administration. 123 A.L.R. 1225.

Estoppel to contest will or attack its validity by acceptance of benefits thereunder. 78 A.L.R.4th 90.

Ineligibility of one appointed executor or administrator as ground for collateral attack on his authority. 14 A.L.R. 619.

Mortgage foreclosure forbearance statutes — modern status. 83 A.L.R.4th 243.

Order of distribution, executor’s or administrator’s right to appeal from. 16 A.L.R.3d 1274.

Probate of will, right of husband or wife, prospective heir, or next of kin of living person entitled to appeal, to do so. 149 A.L.R. 1270.

Rejection of claim against decedent’s estate by court, executor’s or administrator’s right to appeal from. 129 A.L.R. 922.

Right of executor or administrator to appeal from order granting or denying distribution. 16 A.L.R.3d 1274.

Who entitled to contest, or appeal from, allowance of claim against decedent’s estate. 118 A.L.R. 743.

33-23-2. Suspension of order or decree pending appeal.

If an appeal is claimed from an order or decree of a probate court, the operation of the order or decree shall be suspended, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, until the appeal is dismissed or discontinued, or the order or decree shall be finally affirmed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 806; G.L. 1909, ch. 311, § 11; G.L. 1923, ch. 362, § 11; G.L. 1938, ch. 573, § 11; G.L. 1956, § 33-23-2 ; P.L. 2007, ch. 158, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 257, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Rents and Profits Pending Appeal.

Decree setting off additional real estate to widow did not take effect until its affirmance on appeal, thus she was not entitled to rents and profits accruing prior to that time. Dyer v. Dyer, 17 R.I. 547 , 23 A. 910, 1891 R.I. LEXIS 83 (1891).

Sale of Real Estate Pending Appeal.

During the pendency of an appeal, the decree admitting the will and appointing the executor is suspended; in order to sell real estate, the fiduciary must first seek the permission of the Probate Court. Tangleridge Dev. Corp. v. Joslin, 570 A.2d 1109, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 44 (1990).

Time for Action on Disallowed Claims.

Appeal from a decree permitting late filing of disallowance of claim suspended operation of the decree, so that the time prescribed by § 33-11-48 for commencement of an action did not start to run until the appeal had been finally disposed of, even though notice of disallowance was given before the claim of appeal. Davis v. Higgins, 63 R.I. 352 , 8 A.2d 870, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 98 (1939).

Bringing suit on disallowed claim in strict compliance with § 33-11-48 , after the executrix had appealed from a decree granting leave to file such claim out of time, was a purely procedural step not requiring immediate determination by the court and was not prohibited by this section, even though appeal was still pending. McLaughlin v. Dunlop, 68 R.I. 4 , 26 A.2d 3, 1942 R.I. LEXIS 25 (1942).

Collateral References.

Appeal from order appointing or removing executor or administrator, or proceedings to supplant him, as affecting rights of persons who dealt with him pending such appeal or proceeding. 99 A.L.R. 862.

Premature granting of letters of administration or letters testamentary as affecting acts or proceedings thereunder. 113 A.L.R. 1398.

33-23-3. Effect of appeal from granting of letters.

If an appeal is claimed from a decree of a probate court granting letters testamentary, of administration, of administration with the will annexed, or of guardianship, the executor, administrator, administrator with the will annexed, or guardian, on giving bond as by law required, file an inventory and collect, receive, and take possession of all the rights, credits, and estates of the testator, intestate, or ward, as if no appeal had been claimed. All claims against the estate of the deceased or ward shall be filed within the time prescribed by law, and the executor, administrator, or guardian may, under the direction of the probate court, do such acts as the law requires concerning claims; and all limitations in regard to claims shall apply as if no appeal had been claimed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 807; G.L. 1909, ch. 311, § 12; G.L. 1923, ch. 362, § 12; G.L. 1938, ch. 573, § 12; G.L. 1956, § 33-23-3 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 13; P.L. 2007, ch. 158, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 257, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Claims Against Estate Pending Appeal.

An administrator has no authority pending appeal from grant of letters to pay any claims or expenses, preferred or otherwise, except, perhaps to pay incidental expenses of taking inventory or necessary expenses in collecting assets. Probate Court v. Thornton, 21 R.I. 518 , 45 A. 150, 1900 R.I. LEXIS 7 (1900).

Administrator is not required to pay any expenses during pendency of appeal from grant of letters. Probate Court v. Thornton, 21 R.I. 518 , 45 A. 150, 1900 R.I. LEXIS 7 (1900).

The second sentence of this section applies only when appeal has been claimed from a decree granting letters. Davis v. Higgins, 63 R.I. 352 , 8 A.2d 870, 1939 R.I. LEXIS 98 (1939).

Guardian Pending Appeal.

A guardian, whose appointment under § 33-15-8 was appealed, continued to hold office until the final disposition of the appeal. In re Estate of Taylor, 114 R.I. 562 , 337 A.2d 236, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1453 (1975).

Letters to Co-Executor.

After appeal had been claimed by one of two co-executors named in will from decree admitting will to probate, decree granting letters testamentary to the other co-executor alone was proper. Briggs v. Probate Court, 23 R.I. 125 , 50 A. 335, 1901 R.I. LEXIS 137 (1901).

Notices Served on Administrator.

Notice by surviving partner of determination to dissolve partnership served on administrator of deceased partner was valid though appeal from appointment of administrator was pending. Egan v. Wirth, 26 R.I. 363 , 58 A. 987, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 83 (1904).

Statute of Limitations.

Period of limitations which commenced with the grant of letters testamentary was not interrupted by an appeal from the appointment. Mowry v. Harris, 18 R.I. 519 , 28 A. 657, 1894 R.I. LEXIS 5 (1894).

33-23-4. Sale of tangible personal property pending appeal.

In case of an appeal from an order or decree of a probate court granting letters testamentary, of administration, of administration with the will annexed or of guardianship, the executor, administrator, administrator with the will annexed, or guardian, pending the appeal, upon leave of the probate court first obtained, may sell at public auction or private sale any tangible personal property of the testator, intestate, or ward, which are liable to perish or waste or to be greatly reduced in value by keeping, or which cannot be kept without great and disproportionate expense, and hold the proceeds of those sales, after deducting from the proceeds the necessary expenses of sale, for the benefit of the estate.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 808; G.L. 1909, ch. 311, § 13; G.L. 1923, ch. 362, § 13; G.L. 1938, ch. 573, § 13; G.L. 1956, § 33-23-4 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 13.

33-23-5. Sale of personalty in general pending appeal.

In case of an appeal taken from an order or decree of a probate court granting letters testamentary, of administration, of administration with the will annexed, or of guardianship, the executor, administrator, administrator with the will annexed, or guardian, having given bond according to law, the court shall, pending the appeal and until the order or decree is finally affirmed or disaffirmed, have power to authorize the executor, administrator, administrator with the will annexed, or guardian to sell the personal estate of the deceased person or ward, as the case may be, according to such terms and conditions as the court may require or impose, pending the appeal.

History of Section. G.L. 1923, ch. 362, § 20; P.L. 1931, ch. 1723, § 1; P.L. 1932, ch. 1923, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 573, § 20; G.L. 1956, § 33-23-5 .

33-23-6. Powers over real estate pending appeal.

In case of an appeal taken from an order or decree of a probate court granting letters testamentary, of administration, of administration with the will annexed, or of guardianship, the executor, administrator, or administrator with the will annexed, or guardian, having given bond according to law, shall, pending the appeal and until the order or decree is finally affirmed or disaffirmed, have power to collect, sue for, and hold the income and rents of the real and personal estate of the testator or ward for the benefit of the persons entitled to the real estate, and the executor, administrator, administrator with the will annexed, or guardian, may bring suit in his or her name for the possession of any real or personal estate, pending the appeal, and shall have the power, under the direction of the probate court, to pay any debts of the testator, intestate, or ward, and the probate court may authorize the executor, administrator, administrator with the will annexed, or guardian to sell real estate, or any interest therein, of the deceased person or ward, as the case may be, subject to the conditions, according to the practice, and in the manner provided by chapter 19 of this title.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 809; G.L. 1909, ch. 311, § 14; G.L. 1923, ch. 362, § 14; P.L. 1931, ch. 1771, § 1; G.L. 1938, ch. 573, § 14; G.L. 1956, § 33-23-6 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

The provision whereby an executor may collect the income and the rents from the real and personal estate of the deceased and bring suit for the possession of any such property applies to an administrator with the will annexed. Scott v. Monks, 16 R.I. 225 , 14 A. 860, 1888 R.I. LEXIS 35 (1888).

Payment of Claims.

Probate court did not have authority to order payment of claims pending appeal from appointment of executor where executor had neither allowed nor disallowed claims. Clarke v. Probate Court, 29 R.I. 37 , 69 A. 4, 1908 R.I. LEXIS 14 (1908).

Permission for Sale.

During the pendency of an appeal, the decree admitting the will and appointing the executor is suspended; in order to sell real estate, the fiduciary must first seek the permission of the Probate Court. Tangleridge Dev. Corp. v. Joslin, 570 A.2d 1109, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 44 (1990).

Sale of Real Estate Requires Court’s Permission.

During the pendency of an appeal, the decree admitting the will and appointing the executor is suspended; in order to sell real estate, the fiduciary must first seek the permission of the Probate Court. Tangleridge Dev. Corp. v. Joslin, 570 A.2d 1109, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 44 (1990).

Void Conveyance.

A guardian, whose appointment was appealed, continued to hold office until final disposition of the appeal; thus a real estate conveyance by the ward during the appeal was void. In re Estate of Taylor, 114 R.I. 562 , 337 A.2d 236, 1975 R.I. LEXIS 1453 (1975).

33-23-7. Transfer of estate pending appeal from decree removing fiduciary.

A decree of a probate court removing an executor, administrator or guardian shall have effect, notwithstanding an appeal, until otherwise finally determined on appeal. The probate court may in this case appoint a successor to the person removed, to whom, when qualified, the person removed shall promptly deliver all the property held by him or her as executor, administrator, or guardian, and the successor shall proceed in the performance of his or her duties in like manner as if no appeal had been taken. But if the decree or removal is reversed by final decree, the powers of the successor shall cease, and he or she shall promptly deliver to his or her predecessor in the trust, or to such person as the court may order, all property of the estate in his or her possession.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 810; G.L. 1909, ch. 311, § 15; G.L. 1923, ch. 362, § 15; G.L. 1938, ch. 573, § 15; G.L. 1956, § 33-23-7 .

33-23-8. Notice of appeal.

  1. When a probate appeal is entered in the superior court, the appellant shall serve a true copy of the reasons of appeal by regular mail, postage prepaid, to all interested persons in the estate of the deceased or ward and to all persons who entered an appearance, pro se or through counsel, in the underlying probate proceedings. The appellant shall further notify such persons that they have the right to enter an appearance or move to intervene in the superior court probate appeal within twenty (20) days after service. The appellant shall file a certificate in the superior court that notice was given in the manner prescribed in this section and shall identify the names and addresses of the persons to whom notice was given. If an interested person fails to enter an appearance or move to intervene within twenty (20) days after notice, the superior court may entertain the appellant’s probate appeal without further notice to such person.
  2. The superior court may, sua sponte or on the motion of any interested party, order notice of the probate appeal advertised in a newspaper of general circulation in this state upon such terms and conditions as the court may direct.
  3. The superior court may at any time during the pendency of a probate appeal direct any additional notice or service.
  4. Any interested person in the estate of a deceased or ward may enter an appearance in the probate court or superior court and, upon doing so, is entitled to copies, at his or her own expense, of any and all filings in the estate by any party.
  5. The superior court may, upon motion, permit any interested person to intervene in a probate appeal and, upon doing so, is entitled to participate in any and all superior court proceedings concerning the appeal. The executor, administrator, guardian or other fiduciary shall automatically be a party to the superior court proceedings without motion to intervene.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 797; G.L. 1909, ch. 311, § 2; P.L. 1909, ch. 427, § 1; G.L. 1923, ch. 362, § 2; G.L. 1938, ch. 573, § 2; G.L. 1956, § 33-23-8 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 13.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Admission of New Parties.

The superior court has power to hear and decide motions of persons alleging interested-party status in a probate appeal pending in that court, but the power must not be exercised arbitrarily. Spooner v. Tucker, 78 R.I. 329 , 82 A.2d 162, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 81 (1951).

Where a probate appeal is pending in superior court and persons by motion allege interested-party status therein, in the absence of a sworn motion or petition by such persons, it is incumbent upon the court to receive evidence to determine whether such persons are parties in interest when their motion has been objected to by parties already in the case. Spooner v. Tucker, 78 R.I. 329 , 82 A.2d 162, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 81 (1951).

The court may permit any interested party to enter an appearance either in the status of a party appellee or a party appellant, as his interests may require, however the party seeking to be added as a party appellant must show that he has an interest in the estate and that he is aggrieved by the decree. Spooner v. Tucker, 86 R.I. 266 , 134 A.2d 403, 1957 R.I. LEXIS 106 (1957).

In order to be made parties to an appeal, it is necessary to prove only that they have an interest in the estate and that they are aggrieved by the decree and not the ultimate fact of the right to inherit. Spooner v. Tucker, 86 R.I. 226 , 134 A.2d 403 (1957).

In an appeal by a brother of the predeceased husband of decedent from a probate court order admitting decedent’s alleged last will and testament to probate, another brother and a half-sister of said husband were entitled to intervene upon a showing that they could present a justiciable question as to their right to share in the estate without first proving that they would share in the estate if the probate of the will should be set aside. Apollonio v. Kenyon, 101 R.I. 578 , 225 A.2d 778, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 803 (1967).

Where purported intervenors failed to make a motion to intervene and did not allege that they had the status of interested parties, but merely filed an entry of appearance, the purported appearance was properly stricken. Insana v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 110 R.I. 476 , 294 A.2d 181, 1972 R.I. LEXIS 941 (1972).

— Heirs.

Intestacy of the decedent need not be shown as a condition precedent to the admission of heirs as parties to an appeal from a decree admitting a will to probate. Spooner v. Tucker, 78 R.I. 329 , 82 A.2d 162, 1951 R.I. LEXIS 81 (1951).

Adverse Parties.

In order for an administrator to appeal from an order of the probate court receiving his report upon its own motion and over his objection, notice must be given the creditors whose claims were allowed since they and not the probate court are the adverse parties. Sheldon v. Court of Probate, 5 R.I. 436 , 1858 R.I. LEXIS 63 (1858).

Persons Aggrieved.

The term “interested party” as used in this section is not synonymous with “person aggrieved” as used in § 33-23-1 . Apollonio v. Kenyon, 101 R.I. 578 , 225 A.2d 778, 1967 R.I. LEXIS 803 (1967).

33-23-9. Assignment day.

The probate appeal may be assigned to the formal and special cause calendar, the continuous non-jury trial calendar, or the continuous jury trial calendar, as the case may be, which occurs not less than seventy-five (75) days from the date that the probate order or decree appealed was executed by the probate judge.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 798; G.L. 1909, ch. 311, § 3; G.L. 1923, ch. 362, § 3; G.L. 1938, ch. 573, § 3; G.L. 1956, § 33-23-9 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 13; P.L. 2004, ch. 573, § 3.

33-23-10. Assignment for hearing.

  1. The appellant may, in the reasons of appeal, claim a trial by jury of any factual dispute or issue raised in his or her reasons of appeal. Any interested person may, within twenty (20) days after service of notice of the probate appeal, claim a trial by jury of any factual dispute raised in the appeal.
  2. If the probate appeal raises a genuine issue of material fact, upon motion of the appellant or any party to the proceedings pursuant to § 33-23-8(e) , the matter shall be assigned to the continuous non-jury trial calendar or jury trial calendar, as claimed pursuant to § 33-23-10(a) .
  3. If the probate appeal can be decided as a matter of law, upon motion of the appellant or any party to the proceedings pursuant to § 33-23-8(e) , the matter shall be assigned to the formal and special cause calendar where a briefing schedule shall be established and the matter further assigned to a justice of the superior court for decision based upon the record and the briefs submitted. The justice assigned may request or permit oral argument.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 799; G.L. 1909, ch. 311, § 4; G.L. 1923, ch. 362, § 4; G.L. 1938, ch. 573, § 4; G.L. 1956, § 33-23-10 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 13.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

In General.

Written motion for assignment of case for jury trial constituted a claim for a jury trial. Arnold v. Regan, 29 R.I. 71 , 69 A. 292, 1908 R.I. LEXIS 18 (1908).

Summary Judgment.

Superior court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff’s undue influence claim because plaintiff’s primary contention that the attorney used certain knowledge that he obtained while representing plaintiff to then later unduly influence plaintiff’s father when preparing the new will was pure, unsubstantiated speculation that was wholly unsupported in the record as the father specifically addressed in the will why he decided to exclude plaintiff from any share in the trust; and because plaintiff’s broad-based allegations were not sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment without the production of competent evidence that proved the existence of a disputed issue of material fact. Bettez v. Bettez, 114 A.3d 82, 2015 R.I. LEXIS 59 (2015).

Waiver.

Appellant did not, by proceeding to trial before the court, waive his right to a jury trial where he objected at every stage of the proceeding and reserved exceptions. Buckley v. Hammond, 29 R.I. 442 , 72 A. 389, 1909 R.I. LEXIS 36 (1909).

33-23-11. Failure to file appeal claimed.

If the appellant fails to file his or her reasons of appeal in the superior court within the time allowed by § 33-23-1(a)(2) , the probate court from which the appeal was taken shall, upon petition of any person interested, and upon such notice to the appellant as the court shall order, affirm the order or decree appealed from and further proceed as if no claim of appeal had been filed; and in that case the probate court may award double costs against the appellant.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 800; G.L. 1909, ch. 311, § 5; G.L. 1923, ch. 362, § 5; G.L. 1938, ch. 573, § 5; G.L. 1956, § 33-23-11 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 13; P.L. 2007, ch. 158, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 257, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Sale of Real Estate.

Failure to perfect appeal from decree ordering sale of real estate did not authorize probate court to affirm and revive decree after period during which such decree would have effect under statute. Campbell v. Metcalf, 33 R.I. 453 , 82 A. 285, 1912 R.I. LEXIS 109 (1912).

33-23-12. Repealed.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 801; G.L. 1909, ch. 311, § 6; G.L. 1923, ch. 362, § 6; G.L. 1938, ch. 573, § 6; G.L. 1956, § 33-23-12 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 13; P.L. 2004, ch. 573, § 3; P.L. 2007, ch. 158, § 2; P.L. 2007, ch. 257, § 2; Repealed by P.L. 2014, ch. 314, § 2, effective July 1, 2014; P.L. 2014, ch. 550, § 2, effective July 8, 2014.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-23-12 concerned failure to perfect or prosecute appeal.

33-23-13. Discontinuance of appeal.

The party taking an appeal from an order or decree of a probate court may, at any time, discontinue the appeal in the manner provided for the discontinuance of proceedings in the superior court; and upon presentation to the probate court of a certificate of the discontinuance from the clerk of the superior court having jurisdiction of the appeal, the appeal shall then be entered on the record of the probate court as discontinued; and the suspension of the operation of the order or decree appealed from, provided in § 33-23-2 , shall then cease, and the original order or decree shall then take effect as if an appeal had not been taken.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 802; G.L. 1909, ch. 311, § 7; G.L. 1923, ch. 362, § 7; G.L. 1938, ch. 573, § 7; G.L. 1956, § 33-23-13 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 13.

33-23-14. Modification of decrees after discontinuance of appeal.

In case an appeal shall have been taken from a decree granting letters testamentary, or of administration with the will annexed, or of administration, or of guardianship, any order or decree of the probate court made previous to discontinuance of the appeal, prescribing the amount and nature of bonds to be given by the executor, administrator, or guardian, may, after discontinuance, be modified or vacated, and new orders and decrees may be substituted if necessary, and bonds given accordingly; and in case of the modification or vacation of any such former orders or decrees, the bond or bonds given thereunder may be cancelled and discharged by the probate court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 811; G.L. 1909, ch. 311, § 16; G.L. 1923, ch. 362, § 16; G.L. 1938, ch. 573, § 16; G.L. 1956, § 33-23-14 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 13.

33-23-15. Want of jurisdiction — Amendments to supply defects.

No order or decree of a probate court which may be appealed from, or in any collateral proceeding when the same shall not have been appealed from, shall be deemed to be invalid, or be quashed, for want of proper form, or for want of jurisdiction appearing upon the record, if the probate court had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the order or decree. The superior court having jurisdiction of the parties to a probate appeal may allow amendments to be made in the papers filed in the case, to supply any deficiency or correct errors therein, upon such terms as it may deem proper.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 803; G.L. 1909, ch. 311, § 8; G.L. 1923, ch. 362, § 8; G.L. 1938, ch. 573, § 8; G.L. 1956, § 33-23-15 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Jurisdictional Matters.
— Guardian Ad Litem.

Failure to appoint guardian ad litem for person who was inmate of an insane asylum was not a jurisdictional defect so as to justify certiorari to review appointment of guardian. Bennett v. Randall, 28 R.I. 360 , 67 A. 525, 1907 R.I. LEXIS 62 (1907).

— Inventory.

Superior court should have reversed a decree approving account which charged executors with personal estate at values fixed by them without an inventory, since the taking of an inventory is an absolute requirement. Hayes v. Welling, 35 R.I. 76 , 85 A. 630, 1913 R.I. LEXIS 3 (1913).

— Nonstatutory Ground for Guardianship.

Decree appointing guardian on a ground not specified by the statute was not effective to invalidate conveyance thereafter made by intended ward. Providence County Sav. Bank v. Hughes, 26 R.I. 73 , 58 A. 254, 1904 R.I. LEXIS 19 (1904).

— Residence of Decedent.

Decree appointing an administrator may be collaterally attacked on a showing that decedent was a resident in a town other than that of the court making the appointment. People's Sav. Bank v. Wilcox, 15 R.I. 258 , 3 A. 211, 1886 R.I. LEXIS 15 (1886).

— Residence of Ward.

An order for appointment of a guardian is prima facie valid even though the record does not show that the ward resided in or had legal settlement in the town. Angell v. Angell, 14 R.I. 541 , 1884 R.I. LEXIS 52 (1884).

— Situs of Property.

Jury verdict that decedent left property in Rhode Island, supported by evidence that she left property in Providence, made it possible for common pleas division to reverse decree of Providence municipal court denying administration. Williams v. Ripley, 25 R.I. 510 , 56 A. 777, 1903 R.I. LEXIS 118 (1903).

— Time Expired.

Decree setting off real estate to husband under § 33-1-6 could be collaterally attacked where record clearly showed that the decree was entered after the time allowed by that section. Harrop v. Tillinghast, 59 R.I. 255 , 195 A. 226, 1937 R.I. LEXIS 161 (1937).

Supplying Defects.
— Description of Property.

The court may have recourse to the inventory to supply a defect in the record, so that a mortgage given by a guardian was valid although the decree did not show the guardian’s authority to mortgage the particular real estate, since from the inventory it was apparent that the ward had no other property. Barry v. Clarke, 13 R.I. 65 , 1880 R.I. LEXIS 40 (1880).

— Insufficiency of Allegations.

Decree removing administrator should not be deemed invalid on appeal to superior court on ground of insufficiency of allegations where allegations were substantially in the language of § 33-18-2 , even though not as certain and particular as required by common law pleading. Kenyon v. Hart, 38 R.I. 524 , 96 A. 529, 1916 R.I. LEXIS 10 (1916).

33-23-16. Correction of want of notice.

Whenever it shall appear in any probate proceeding that any person interested in the probate proceeding has not been duly notified, the jurisdiction of the court where the proceeding is pending shall not be defeated thereby, but the court may order notice to be given to that person. The notice shall be served not less than fourteen (14) days before the return day, and after the service and return thereof all orders and proceedings of the court shall be effective in binding the person named in the notice.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 804; G.L. 1909, ch. 311, § 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 362, § 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 573, § 9; G.L. 1956, § 33-23-16 .

33-23-17. Consolidation of appeals — Addition of parties.

Whenever there shall be more than one probate appeal in the superior court, relating to substantially the same matter, the superior court may by special order provide for the consolidation of the appeals, for admitting or summoning in other parties, and for giving notice or further notice to parties in interest.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 805; G.L. 1909, ch. 311, § 10; G.L. 1923, ch. 362, § 10; G.L. 1938, ch. 573, § 10; G.L. 1956, § 33-23-17 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 13.

33-23-18. Affirmance, reversal, or entry of new decree.

The superior court may, upon appeal, affirm or reverse, in whole or in part, any order or decree of a probate court, and may enter such decrees as the probate court ought to have entered and may remand the case for further proceedings, with or without instructions, to the probate court.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 812; G.L. 1909, ch. 311, § 17; G.L. 1923, ch. 362, § 17; G.L. 1938, ch. 573, § 17; G.L. 1956, § 33-23-18 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 13.

33-23-19. Transmission of final decree to probate court.

A copy of the final judgment entered by the superior court, in any probate appeal under the provisions of this chapter, shall be certified and transmitted by the clerk of the superior court, without fee therefor, to the probate court appealed from.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 813; G.L. 1909, ch. 311, § 18; G.L. 1923, ch. 362, § 18; G.L. 1938, ch. 573, § 18; G.L. 1956, § 33-23-19 ; P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 13.

33-23-20. Conclusiveness of advice or direction of probate court.

In all cases where an executor, administrator, or guardian is directed by law to obtain the advice and direction of the probate court before acting, there shall be no appeal from that advice or direction; and the advice and direction shall be conclusive, and all parties acting on the advice and direction shall be protected thereunder.

History of Section. C.P.A. 1905, § 814; G.L. 1909, ch. 311, § 19; G.L. 1923, ch. 362, § 19; G.L. 1938, ch. 573, § 19; G.L. 1956, § 33-23-20 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Supreme Court Review.

Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the supreme court would pass upon a compromise settlement involving a minor, even though approved by probate court, where settlement was not for the best interests of the minor. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hodgkin, 48 R.I. 459 , 137 A. 381, 1927 R.I. LEXIS 76 (1927).

Chapter 24 Small Estates

33-24-1. Voluntary informal administration of small estates.

  1. If a resident of Rhode Island dies leaving an estate consisting entirely of personal property the total value of which otherwise subject to being listed on a probate inventory pursuant to § 33-9-1 , exclusive of tangible personal property of which the decedent was owner, does not exceed fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) in value, his or her surviving spouse, child, grandchild, parent, brother, sister, niece, nephew, aunt or uncle, or any interested party, if of full age and legal capacity and a resident of this state, may, after the expiration of thirty (30) days from the death of the decedent, provided no petition for letters testamentary or letters of administration has been filed with the probate court of the city or town in which the decedent resided, file with said probate court upon a form prescribed by the court a statement, verified by oath or affirmation containing:
    1. The name and residential address of the affiant,
    2. The name, residence and date of death of the deceased,
    3. The relationship of the affiant to the deceased,
    4. A schedule showing every asset known to the affiant titled solely in the decedent’s name and all assets known or believed to be titled in the decedent’s name as of the decedent’s date of death, and the estimated value of each such asset,
    5. A statement that the affiant has undertaken to act as voluntary administrator of the estate of the deceased and will administer the same according to law, and apply the proceeds thereof in conformity with this section,
    6. The names and addresses known to the affiant of the persons who would take under the provisions of Rhode Island general laws § 33-1-10 in the case of intestacy.
  2. Upon presentation of such statement, accompanied by a certificate of the death of the deceased and payment of a fee of thirty dollars ($30.00), the clerk of the probate court shall file these documents as a part of the permanent record of the court. Upon the payment of five dollars ($5.00), the clerk of the probate court shall, if no other probate proceeding for administration of such estate is pending in said court, issue a certification of appointment of voluntary administrator, but only after such certification has been reviewed by the judge of the probate court. No hearing in the probate court shall be required as a condition for the issuance of the certification by the clerk of the probate court; provided, however, that the probate judge may require a hearing to take place in order to determine whether such certification should issue.
  3. Upon the presentation of a copy of such a certification of appointment by the clerk of the probate court, the tender of a proper receipt in writing and the surrender of any policy, passbook, note, certificate or other evidentiary instrument, a voluntary administrator may, as the legal representative of the deceased and his or her estate, receive payment of any debt or obligation in the nature of a debt, or delivery of any chattel or asset, scheduled in such statement. Payments and deliveries made under this section shall discharge the liability of the debtor, obligor or deliverer to all persons with respect to such debt, chattel, obligation or other asset unless, at the time of such payment or delivery, a written demand has been made upon such debtor, obligor or deliverer by a duly appointed executor or administrator.
  4. A voluntary administrator may sell any chattel so received and negotiate or assign any choice in action to convert the same to cash in a reasonable amount.
  5. A voluntary administrator shall, as far as possible out of the assets which come into his or her hands, first discharge the necessary expenses of the funeral and last sickness of the deceased and the necessary expenses of administration without fee for his or her services, and then pay the debts of the deceased in the order specified in Rhode Island general laws § 33-12-11 and any other debts of the estate, and then distribute the balance, if any, to the surviving spouse, or, if there is no surviving spouse, to the persons and in the proportions prescribed by § 33-1-10 .
  6. A voluntary administrator shall be liable as an executor in his or her own wrong to all persons aggrieved by his or her administration of the estate, and, if letters testamentary or letters of administration are at any time granted, shall be liable as such an executor to the rightful executor or administrator.

History of Section. P.L. 1966, ch. 178, § 1; P.L. 1967, ch. 65, § 1; P.L. 1968, ch. 93, § 1; P.L. 1973, ch. 134, § 1; P.L. 1977, ch. 72, § 1; P.L. 1981, ch. 68, § 1; P.L. 1983, ch. 204, § 4; P.L. 1998, ch. 448, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 484, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 389, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 363, § 10.

33-24-2. Administration of small estates where executor named in will — Voluntary executors.

  1. If a resident of Rhode Island dies leaving an estate that would otherwise be subject to being listed on a probate inventory pursuant to § 33-9-1 , consisting entirely of personal property, the total value, exclusive of tangible personal property of which the decedent was owner, does not exceed fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000) in value, and he or she leaves a will naming a person as executor, the named person, if of full age and legal capacity, may, (or, if the named person declines or is unable to serve, then any person named as alternate, or, if such alternate declines or is unable to serve, then the surviving spouse, child, grandchild, parent, brother, sister, niece, nephew, aunt or uncle, or any interested party, if of full age and legal capacity and a resident of this state), after the expiration of thirty (30) days from the death of the decedent, provided no petition for letters testamentary or letters of administration has been filed with the probate court of the city or town in which the decedent resided, file with said probate court upon a form prescribed by the court a statement, verified by oath or affirmation containing:
    1. The name and residential address of the affiant,
    2. The name, residence and date of death of the deceased,
    3. The relationship of the affiant to the deceased,
    4. A schedule showing every asset known to the affiant titled solely in the decedent’s name and all assets known or believed to be titled in the decedent’s name as of the decedent’s date of death and the estimated value of each such asset,
    5. A statement that the affiant has undertaken to act as voluntary administrator of the estate of the deceased and will administer the same according to law, and apply the proceeds thereof in conformity with this section,
    6. The names and addresses known to the affiant of the persons who would take under the provisions of Rhode Island general laws § 33-1-10 in the case of intestacy, and
    7. The names and addresses known to the affiant of the persons who would take under the provisions of the will.
  2. The original of the will shall be filed with the above statement and if the executor resides outside the state he or she shall appoint a resident agent to represent him or her in the state.
  3. Upon presentation of such statement, accompanied by a certificate of the death of the deceased and payment of a fee of thirty dollars ($30.00), the clerk of the probate court shall file these documents as a part of the permanent record of the court. Upon the payment of five dollars ($5.00), the clerk of the probate court shall, if no other probate proceeding for administration of such estate is pending in said court, issue a certification of appointment of executor, but only after such certification has been reviewed by the judge of the probate court. No hearing in the probate court shall be required as a condition for the issuance of the certification by the clerk of the probate court; provided, however, that the probate judge may require a hearing to take place in order to determine whether such certification should issue.
  4. Upon the presentation of a copy of such a certification of appointment by the clerk of the probate court, the tender of a proper receipt in writing and the surrender of any policy, passbook, note, certificate or other evidentiary instrument, a voluntary executor may, as the legal representative of the deceased and his or her estate, receive payment of any debt or obligation in the nature of a debt, or delivery of any chattel or asset, scheduled in such statement. Payments and deliveries made under this section shall discharge the liability of the debtor, obligor or deliverer to all persons with respect to such debt, chattel, obligation or other asset unless, at the time of such payment or delivery, a written demand has been made upon such debtor, obligor or deliverer by a duly appointed executor or administrator.
  5. A voluntary executor may sell any chattel so received and negotiate or assign any choice in action to convert the same to cash in a reasonable amount.
  6. A voluntary executor shall, as far as possible out of the assets which come into his or her hands, first discharge the necessary expenses of the funeral and last sickness of the deceased and the necessary expenses of administration without fee for his or her services, and then pay the debts of the deceased in the order specified in Rhode Island general laws § 33-12-11 and any other debts of the estate, and then distribute the balance, if any, according to the terms of the will, and should that prove impossible, the balance to the surviving spouse, or, if there is no surviving spouse, to the persons and in the proportions prescribed by § 33-1-10 .
  7. A voluntary executor shall be liable as an executor in his or her own wrong to all persons aggrieved by his or her administration of the estate, and, if letters testamentary or letters of administration are at any time granted, shall be liable as such an executor to the rightful executor or administrator.

History of Section. P.L. 1966, ch. 178, § 1; P.L. 1967, ch. 65, § 1; P.L. 1998, ch. 448, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 484, § 1; P.L. 2005, ch. 389, § 2; P.L. 2011, ch. 363, § 10.

33-24-3. Repealed.

History of Section. P.L. 1966, ch. 178, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 1998, ch. 448, § 2, effective July 23, 1998.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-24-3 concerned finality of payment.

Chapter 25 Dower and Curtesy

33-25-1. Dower and curtesy abolished.

The right of a widow to common law and/or statutory dower in the estate of her husband and the right of a husband to common law and/or statutory curtesy in the estate of his wife are hereby abolished.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 26, § 1.

Law Reviews.

2001 Survey of Rhode Island Law, see 7 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 403 (2002).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Dower Claims Without Merit.

Contention that the wife had a dower interest in lots owned by her husband and that such interest would create a merger with a lot owned by the husband and wife jointly was without merit since both dower and curtesy have been abolished by statute. Sako v. Delsesto, 688 A.2d 1296, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 74 (1997).

33-25-2. Life estate to spouse.

  1. Whenever any person shall die leaving a husband or wife surviving, the real estate owned by the decedent in fee simple at his or her death shall descend and pass to the husband or wife for his or her natural life subject, however, to any encumbrances existing at death; provided that the liability, if any, of the decedent to discharge the encumbrance or encumbrances shall not be impaired. The provisions of §§ 33-1-1 and 33-1-2 shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter and of § 33-1-6 .
  2. For purposes of this section, any real estate conveyed by the decedent prior to his or her death, with or without monetary consideration, shall not be subject to the life estate granted in subsection (a) if the instrument or instruments evidencing such conveyance were recorded in the records of land evidence in the city or town where the real estate is located prior to the death of the decedent. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require that the instrument or instruments evidencing the conveyance must be recorded prior to the death of the decedent to be valid and thus not subject to the life estate contained herein.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 26, § 1; P.L. 1999, ch. 444, § 1.

Law Reviews.

Survey Section: Trusts, see 3 Roger Williams U.L. Rev. 570 (1998).

For note and comment, Spousal Disinheritance in Rhode Island: Barrett v. Barrett and the (De)evolution of the Elective Share Law, see 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 420 (2007).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Expectancy Interest.

This section creates only an expectancy interest in the surviving spouse; the interest that descends and passes by this section does not become vested until one spouse dies while owning real property in fee simple. Pezza v. Pezza, 690 A.2d 345, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1997) (decided prior to 1999 amendment).

Expenses of Administration.

Apportionment of attorneys’ fees and expenses of administration between a life tenant and a remainderman was error because the life estate was taken subject only to any encumbrance or secured lien on the property that existed at time of the decedent’s death, and the apportioned costs were not encumbrances or liens; these expenses, including legal fees and out-of-pocket expenses, were separate and apart from the closing costs associated with the sale of the real estate at issue, which properly were allocated. The fees and expenses incurred during the administration of the probate estate did not exist at the time of the decedent’s death and should have been paid from the remainder interest. Jerome v. Probate Court of Barrington, 922 A.2d 119, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 55 (2007).

Illusory Transfer Test.

The illusory transfer test is the proper test to be used when determining whether a now-deceased spouse’s inter vivos transfer of real property is sufficient to defeat a surviving spouse’s statutory share pursuant to this section. Pezza v. Pezza, 690 A.2d 345, 1997 R.I. LEXIS 72 (1997) (decided prior to 1999 amendment).

R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-25-2(b) and the illusory transfer test are incompatible; the illusory transfer test was adopted in the absence of any legislative determination respecting inter vivos trusts of real property or whether a transfer to a trust is sufficient to defeat a surviving spouse’s right to a life estate, and by its enactment of R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-25-2(b) , the General Assembly has spoken in the clearest of terms, and has declared that the only predicate to defeating a surviving spouse’s right to a life estate is a conveyance of the real estate that is recorded prior to death. Barrett v. Barrett, 894 A.2d 891, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 37 (2006).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the trustees of a trust in an action by the wife of a decedent for a declaration of her rights to property, as pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-25-2(b) , the husband’s transfer of the property to the trust extinguished the wife’s right under R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-25-4 to a life estate over the property. Barrett v. Barrett, 894 A.2d 891, 2006 R.I. LEXIS 37 (2006).

Collateral References.

Abandonment, desertion, or refusal to support on part of surviving spouse as affecting marital rights in deceased spouse’s estate. 13 A.L.R.3d 446.

Adultery on part of surviving spouse as affecting marital rights in deceased spouse’s estate. 13 A.L.R.3d 486.

Estoppel or laches precluding lawful spouse from asserting rights in decedent’s estate as against putative spouse. 81 A.L.R.3d 110.

Prior institution of annulment proceedings or other attack on validity of one’s marriage as barring or estopping one from entitlement to property rights as surviving spouse. 31 A.L.R.4th 1190.

Rights in decedent’s estate as between legal and putative spouse. 81 A.L.R.3d 6.

Validity of inter vivos trust established by one spouse which impairs the other spouse’s distributive share or other statutory rights in property. 39 A.L.R.3d 14.

Waiver of right to widow’s allowance by postnuptial agreement. 9 A.L.R.3d 955.

33-25-3. Life estate precedence.

The life estates provided in this chapter shall take effect notwithstanding any provisions of the will of the decedent, except as provided in § 33-25-4 , and shall take precedence over any claims of creditors of the decedent or decedent’s estate, except claims secured by lien or any form of encumbrance on the real estate.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 26, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Expenses of Administration.

Apportionment of attorneys’ fees and expenses of administration between a life tenant and a remainderman was error because the life estate was taken subject only to any encumbrance or secured lien on the property that existed at time of the decedent’s death, and the apportioned costs were not encumbrances or liens; these expenses, including legal fees and out-of-pocket expenses, were separate and apart from the closing costs associated with the sale of the real estate at issue, which properly were allocated. The fees and expenses incurred during the administration of the probate estate did not exist at the time of the decedent’s death and should have been paid from the remainder interest. Jerome v. Probate Court of Barrington, 922 A.2d 119, 2007 R.I. LEXIS 55 (2007).

33-25-4. Election by surviving spouse — Recording of waiver and claim.

If any estate, real or personal, be devised or bequeathed to a surviving spouse, the devise or bequest shall bar the life estate unless the surviving spouse shall, within six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the qualifications of the fiduciary of the estate of the deceased spouse, file in the probate court granting probate a written statement waiving and renouncing the devise and bequest and claiming his or her life estate in the real estate of the decedent. If any of this real estate be located in any city or town other than that in which the will of the decedent is probated, the waiver and claim shall also be filed in the records of deeds in each city and town where the real estate is located.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 26, § 1; P.L. 1988, ch. 192, § 1; P.L. 1992, ch. 198, § 1.

Collateral References.

Surviving spouse taking elective share as chargeable with estate or inheritance tax. 67 A.L.R.3d 199.

33-25-5. Payment of value of life estate in lieu thereof.

In any case where real estate shall be ordered sold by any court, except where otherwise specifically provided, or real estate is taken under authority of law, and it shall appear that a surviving husband or wife is or may be entitled under this chapter to a life estate in the property, the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings may, in its discretion, upon the petition of the surviving husband or wife as the case may be, and after notice, determine the present value of the life estate and order it to be paid to him or her in lieu of the life estate out of the proceeds of the sale or taking.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 26, § 1.

33-25-6. Applicability.

This chapter shall apply to rights of common law and/or statutory dower or common law and/or statutory curtesy as they existed prior to April 17, 1978, but, if it should be held that this chapter cannot constitutionally apply thereto, it shall nevertheless be fully effective with regard to the estate of all persons who shall die after April 17, 1978 any other law or statute notwithstanding.

History of Section. P.L. 1978, ch. 26, § 1.

Chapter 26 Establishing a Legislative Commission to Study the Feasibility of Modernizing Probate Law and Procedure to Make Recommendations Therefor

33-26-1. Legislative commission established.

  1. There is hereby established a special legislative commission consisting of twenty-one (21) members: three (3) of whom shall be from the house of representatives, not more than two (2) from the same political party to be appointed by the speaker; two (2) of whom shall be from the senate, not more than one from the same political party, to be appointed by the president of the senate; one of whom shall be the president of the Rhode Island Probate Judges Association, or his or her designee, one of whom shall be the president of the Rhode Island Town Clerks Association, or his or her designee; five (5) of whom shall be members in good standing of the Rhode Island Bar Association with experience in probate matters, of whom three (3) shall be appointed by the speaker and two (2) by the president of the senate; two (2) of whom shall be currently serving probate clerks, one to be appointed by the speaker and one to be appointed by the president of the senate; one of whom shall be the chairperson of the Rhode Island Bar Association Committee on Probate and Trust Law; and one of whom shall be the executive director, or his or her designee, of the alliance for better long-term care; one of whom shall be appointed by the director of the department of elderly affairs; and four (4) of whom shall be members of the general public who have an interest in probate matters, of whom one shall be appointed by the speaker, one of whom shall be appointed by the house minority leader, and one by the president of the senate and one by the senate minority leader. Each member shall serve for a term of two (2) years or until his or her successor is appointed, whichever occurs later.
  2. In lieu of any appointment of a member of the legislature to a permanent advisory commission, a legislative study commission, or any commission created by a general assembly resolution, the appointing authority may appoint a member of the general public to serve in lieu of a legislator, provided that the president of the senate or the minority leader of the political party which is entitled to the appointment consents to the appointment of the member of the general public.
  3. The purpose of said commission shall be to study the feasibility of modernizing probate law and procedure in Rhode Island, including but not limited to the feasibility of adopting the Uniform Probate Code, and to make recommendations therefor.
  4. Forthwith upon passage of this resolution, the members of the commission shall meet at the call of the speaker of the house and organize and shall select from among their members a chairperson. Vacancies in said commission shall be filled in like manner as the original appointment.
  5. The membership of said commission shall receive no compensation for their services.
  6. All departments and agencies of the state shall furnish such advice and information, documentary and otherwise, to said commission and its agents as is deemed necessary or desirable by the commission to facilitate the purposes of this resolution.
  7. The speaker of the house is hereby authorized and directed to provide suitable quarters for said commission.
  8. The commission shall report its findings and recommendations to the general assembly on an annual basis on or before February 10 of each year.

History of Section. P.L. 1996, ch. 110, § 14; P.L. 2001, ch. 180, § 69; P.L. 2004, ch. 573, § 4; P.L. 2011, ch. 363, § 11.

Chapter 27 Access to Decedents’ Electronic Mail Accounts Act [Repealed.]

33-27-1. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 172, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 256, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 1, effective July 15, 2019; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 1, effective July 15, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-27-1 concerned short title.

33-27-2. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 172, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 256, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 363, § 12; Repealed by P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 1, effective July 15, 2019; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 1, effective July 15, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-27-2 concerned definitions.

33-27-3. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 172, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 256, § 1; P.L. 2011, ch. 363, § 12; Repealed by P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 1, effective July 15, 2019; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 1, effective July 15, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-27-3 concerned access to decedents’ electronic mail.

33-27-4. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 172, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 256, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 1, effective July 15, 2019; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 1, effective July 15, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-27-4 concerned violation of federal law.

33-27-5. [Repealed.]

History of Section. P.L. 2007, ch. 172, § 1; P.L. 2007, ch. 256, § 1; Repealed by P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 1, effective July 15, 2019; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 1, effective July 15, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former § 33-27-5 concerned severability.

Chapter 27.1 Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act

33-27.1-1. Short title.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as “The Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act.”

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 2.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 2, and P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 2 enacted identical versions of this chapter.

33-27.1-2. Definitions.

For the purposes of this chapter:

  1. “Account” means an arrangement under a terms-of-service agreement in which a custodian carries, maintains, processes, receives, or stores a digital asset of the user or provides goods or services to the user.
  2. “Agent” means an attorney-in-fact granted authority under a durable or nondurable power of attorney.
  3. “Carries” means engages in the transmission of an electronic communication.
  4. “Catalogue of electronic communications” means information that identifies each person with which a user has had an electronic communication; the time and date of the communication; and the electronic address of the person.
  5. “Conservator” means a person appointed by a court to administer the property of a living individual pursuant to chapter 15 of title 33. The term includes a limited conservator.
  6. “Content of an electronic communication” means information concerning the substance or meaning of the communication that:
    1. Has been sent or received by a user;
    2. Is in electronic storage by a custodian providing an electronic communication service to the public or is carried or maintained by a custodian providing a remote computing service to the public; and
    3. Is not readily accessible to the public.
  7. “Court” means a court of competent jurisdiction, including the probate court and the superior court.
  8. “Custodian” means a person who or that carries, maintains, processes, receives, or stores a digital asset of a user.
  9. “Designated recipient” means a person chosen by a user using an online tool to administer digital assets of the user.
  10. “Digital asset” means an electronic record in which an individual has a right or interest. The term does not include an underlying asset or liability unless the asset or liability is itself an electronic record.
  11. “Electronic” means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.
  12. “Electronic communication” has the meaning set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq., as amended.
  13. “Electronic communication service” means a custodian who or that provides to a user the ability to send or receive an electronic communication.
  14. “Fiduciary” means an original, additional, or successor personal representative, guardian, conservator, agent, or trustee.
  15. “Guardian” means a person appointed by the court to make decisions regarding the estate of a living individual, including a person appointed pursuant to chapter 15 of title 33. The term includes a limited guardian.
  16. “Information” means data, text, images, videos, sounds, codes, computer programs, software, databases, or the like.
  17. “Online tool” means an electronic service provided by a custodian that allows the user, in an agreement distinct from the terms-of-service agreement between the custodian and user, to provide directions for disclosure or nondisclosure of digital assets to a third person.
  18. “Person” means an individual, estate, partnership, association, trust, business or nonprofit entity, public corporation, government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or other legal entity.
  19. “Personal representative” means an executor, administrator, special administrator, or person who or that performs substantially the same function under law of this state other than this chapter.
  20. “Power of attorney” means a record that grants an agent authority to act in the place of a principal.
  21. “Principal” means an individual who grants authority to an agent in a power of attorney.
  22. “Protected person” means an individual for whom a guardian or conservator has been appointed pursuant to chapter 15 title 33.
  23. “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
  24. “Remote computing service” means a custodian that provides to a user computer-processing services or the storage of digital assets by means of an electronic communications system, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq., as amended.
  25. “Terms-of-service agreement” means an agreement that controls the relationship between a user and a custodian.
  26. “Trustee” means a fiduciary with legal title to property under an agreement or declaration that creates a beneficial interest in another. The term includes a successor trustee.
  27. “User” means a person that has an account with a custodian.
  28. “Will” includes a codicil, a testamentary instrument that only appoints an executor, and an instrument that revokes or revises a testamentary instrument.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 2.

33-27.1-3. Applicability.

  1. This chapter applies to:
    1. A fiduciary acting under a will or power of attorney executed before, on, or after July 15, 2019;
    2. A personal representative acting for a decedent who died before, on, or after July 15, 2019;
    3. A guardian or conservator appointed before, on, or after July 15, 2019; and
    4. A trustee acting under a trust created before, on, or after July 15, 2019.
  2. This chapter applies to a custodian if the user resides in this state or resided in this state at the time of the user’s death.
  3. This chapter does not apply to a digital asset of an employer used by an employee in the ordinary course of the employer’s business.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 2.

33-27.1-4. User direction for disclosure of digital assets.

  1. A user may use an online tool to direct the custodian to disclose to a designated recipient or not disclose some or all of the user’s digital assets, including the content of electronic communications. If the online tool allows the user to modify or delete a direction at all times, a direction regarding disclosure using an online tool overrides a contrary direction by the user in a will, trust, power of attorney, or other record.
  2. If a user has not used an online tool to give direction under subsection (a) or if the custodian has not provided an online tool, the user may allow or prohibit in a will, trust, power of attorney, or other record, disclosure to a fiduciary of some or all of the user’s digital assets, including the content of electronic communications sent or received by the user.
  3. A user’s direction under subsection (a) or (b) overrides a contrary provision in a terms-of-service agreement that does not require the user to act affirmatively and distinctly from the user’s assent to the terms of service.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 2.

33-27.1-5. Terms-of-service agreement.

  1. This chapter does not change or impair a right of a custodian or a user under a terms-of-service agreement to access and use digital assets of the user.
  2. This chapter does not give a fiduciary or designated recipient any new or expanded rights other than those held by the user for whom, or for whose estate, the fiduciary or designated recipient acts or represents.
  3. A fiduciary’s or designated recipient’s access to digital assets may be modified or eliminated by a user, by federal law, or by a terms-of-service agreement if the user has not provided direction under § 33-27.1-4 .

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 2.

33-27.1-6. Procedure for disclosing digital assets.

  1. When disclosing digital assets of a user pursuant to one or more of §§ 33-27.1-7 through 33-27.1-15 , the custodian may at its sole discretion:
    1. Grant a fiduciary or designated recipient full access to the user’s account;
    2. Grant a fiduciary or designated recipient partial access to the user’s account sufficient to perform the tasks with which the fiduciary or designated recipient is charged; or
    3. Provide a fiduciary or designated recipient a copy in a record of any digital asset that on the date the custodian received the request for disclosure, the user could have accessed if the user were alive and had full capacity and access to the account.
  2. A custodian may assess a reasonable administrative charge for the cost of disclosing digital assets under this chapter.
  3. A custodian need not disclose under this chapter a digital asset deleted by a user.
  4. If a user directs or a fiduciary requests a custodian to disclose under this chapter some, but not all, of the user’s digital assets, the custodian need not disclose the assets if segregation of the assets would impose an undue burden on the custodian. If the custodian believes the direction or request imposes an undue burden, the custodian or fiduciary may seek an order from the court to disclose:
    1. A subset limited by date of the user’s digital assets;
    2. All of the user’s digital assets to the fiduciary or designated recipient;
    3. None of the user’s digital assets; or
    4. All of the user’s digital assets to the court for review in camera.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 2.

33-27.1-7. Disclosure of content of electronic communications of deceased user.

If a deceased user consented or a court directs disclosure of the contents of electronic communications of the user, the custodian shall disclose to the personal representative of the estate of the user the content of an electronic communication sent or received by the user if the representative gives the custodian:

  1. A written request for disclosure in physical or electronic form;
  2. A certified copy of the death certificate of the user;
  3. A certified copy of the letter of appointment of the representative or a small estate affidavit or court order;
  4. Unless the user provided direction using an online tool, a copy of the user’s will, trust, power of attorney, or other record evidencing the user’s consent to disclosure of the content of electronic communications;
  5. A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the user’s account;
  6. Evidence linking the account to the user;
  7. A finding by the court that disclosure of the content of electronic communications of the user is reasonably necessary for the administration of the estate; and
  8. If requested by the custodian, a finding by the court that:
    1. The user had a specific account with the custodian, identifiable by the information specified in subsection (5) of this section;
    2. Disclosure of the content of electronic communications of the user would not violate 18 U.S.C. Section 2701 et seq., as amended, 47 U.S.C. Section 222 et seq., as amended, or other applicable law; or
    3. Unless the user provided direction using an online tool, the user consented to disclosure of the content of electronic communications.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 2.

33-27.1-8. Disclosure of other digital assets of deceased user.

Unless the user prohibited disclosure of digital assets or the court directs otherwise, a custodian shall disclose to the personal representative of the estate of a deceased user a catalogue of electronic communications sent or received by the user and digital assets, other than the content of electronic communications of the user, if the representative gives the custodian:

  1. A written request for disclosure in physical or electronic form;
  2. A certified copy of the death certificate of the user;
  3. A certified copy of the letter of appointment of the representative or a small estate affidavit or court order;
  4. A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the user’s account;
  5. Evidence linking the account to the user;
  6. A finding by the court that disclosure of the user’s digital assets is reasonably necessary for administration of the estate; and
  7. If requested by the custodian, a finding by the court that the user had a specific account with the custodian, identifiable by the information specified in subsection (4).

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 2.

33-27.1-9. Disclosure of content of electronic communications of principal.

To the extent a power of attorney expressly grants an agent authority over the content of electronic communications sent or received by the principal and unless directed otherwise by the principal or the court, a custodian shall disclose to the agent the content if the agent gives the custodian:

  1. A written request for disclosure in physical or electronic form;
  2. An original or copy of the power of attorney expressly granting the agent authority over the content of electronic communications of the principal;
  3. A certification by the agent, under penalty of perjury, that the power of attorney is in effect;
  4. A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the principal’s account; and
  5. Evidence linking the account to the principal.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 2.

33-27.1-10. Disclosure of other digital assets of principal.

Unless otherwise ordered by the court, directed by the principal, or provided by a power of attorney, a custodian shall disclose to an agent with specific authority over digital assets or general authority to act on behalf of a principal a catalogue of electronic communications sent or received by the principal and digital assets, other than the content of electronic communications, of the principal if the agent gives the custodian:

  1. A written request for disclosure in physical or electronic form;
  2. An original or a copy of the power of attorney that gives the agent specific authority over digital assets or general authority to act on behalf of the principal;
  3. A certification by the agent, under penalty of perjury, that the power of attorney is in effect;
  4. A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the principal’s account; and
  5. Evidence linking the account to the principal.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 2.

33-27.1-11. Disclosure of digital assets held in trust when trustee is original user.

Unless otherwise ordered by the court or provided in a trust, a custodian shall disclose to a trustee who or that is an original user of an account any digital asset of the account held in trust, including a catalogue of electronic communications of the trustee and the content of electronic communications.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 2.

33-27.1-12. Disclosure of content of electronic communications held in trust when trustee is not original user.

Unless otherwise ordered by the court, directed by the user, or provided in a trust, a custodian shall disclose to a trustee who or that is not an original user of an account the content of an electronic communication sent or received by an original or successor user and carried, maintained, processed, received, or stored by the custodian in the account of the trust if the trustee gives the custodian:

  1. A written request for disclosure in physical or electronic form;
  2. A certified copy of the trust instrument that includes consent to disclosure of the content of electronic communications to the trustee;
  3. An affidavit or memorandum by the trustee, under penalty of perjury, pursuant to § 34-4-27 , that the trust exists and the trustee is a currently acting trustee of the trust;
  4. A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the trust’s account; and
  5. Evidence linking the account to the trust.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 2; P.L. 2020, ch. 79, art. 2, § 17.

33-27.1-13. Disclosure of other digital assets held in trust when trustee is not original user.

Unless otherwise ordered by the court, directed by the user, or provided in a trust, a custodian shall disclose, to a trustee who or that is not an original user of an account, a catalogue of electronic communications sent or received by an original or successor user and stored, carried, or maintained by the custodian in an account of the trust and any digital assets, other than the content of electronic communications, in which the trust has a right or interest if the trustee gives the custodian:

  1. A written request for disclosure in physical or electronic form;
  2. A certified copy of the trust instrument;
  3. An affidavit or memorandum by the trustee, under penalty of perjury, pursuant to § 34-4-27 , that the trust exists and the trustee is a currently acting trustee of the trust;
  4. A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the trust’s account; and
  5. Evidence linking the account to the trust.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 2.

33-27.1-14. Disclosure of digital assets to guardian or conservator of protected person.

  1. After an opportunity for a hearing under chapter 15 of title 33, the court may grant a guardian or conservator access to the digital assets of a protected person.
  2. Unless otherwise ordered by the court or directed by the user, a custodian shall disclose to a guardian or conservator the catalogue of electronic communications sent or received by a protected person and any digital assets, other than the content of electronic communications, in which the protected person has a right or interest if the guardian or conservator gives the custodian:
    1. A written request for disclosure in physical or electronic form;
    2. A certified copy of the court order that gives the guardian or conservator authority over the digital assets of the protected person;
    3. A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the account of the protected person;
    4. Evidence linking the account to the protected person; and
    5. A finding by the court that disclosure of the digital assets of the user is reasonably necessary for the performance of the duties of the guardian or conservator.
  3. A guardian or conservator with general authority to manage the assets of a protected person may request a custodian of the digital assets of the protected person to suspend or terminate an account of the protected person for good cause. A request made under this section must be accompanied by a certified copy of the court order giving the guardian or conservator authority over the protected person’s property.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 2.

33-27.1-15. Fiduciary duty and authority.

  1. The legal duties imposed on a fiduciary charged with managing tangible property apply to the management of digital assets, including:
    1. The duty of care;
    2. The duty of loyalty; and
    3. The duty of confidentiality.
  2. A fiduciary’s or designated recipient’s authority with respect to a digital asset of a user:
    1. Except as otherwise provided in § 33-27.1-4 , is subject to the applicable terms of service;
    2. Is subject to other applicable law, including copyright law;
    3. In the case of a fiduciary, is limited by the scope of the fiduciary’s duties; and
    4. May not be used to impersonate the user.
  3. A fiduciary with authority over the property of a decedent, protected person, principal, or settlor has the right to access any digital asset in which the decedent, protected person, principal, or settlor had a right or interest and that is not held by a custodian or subject to a terms-of-service agreement.
  4. A fiduciary acting within the scope of the fiduciary’s duties is an authorized user of the property of the decedent, protected person, principal, or settlor for the purpose of applicable computer fraud and unauthorized computer access laws, including chapter 52 of title 11.
  5. A fiduciary with authority over the tangible, personal property of a decedent, protected person, principal, or settlor:
    1. Has the right to access the property and any digital asset stored in it; and
    2. Is an authorized user for the purpose of computer fraud and unauthorized computer access laws, including chapter 52 of title 11.
  6. A custodian may disclose information in an account to a fiduciary of the user when the information is required to terminate an account used to access digital assets licensed to the user.
  7. A fiduciary of a user may request a custodian to terminate the user’s account. A request for termination must be in writing, in either physical or electronic form, and accompanied by:
    1. If the user is deceased, a certified copy of the death certificate of the user;
    2. A certified copy of the letter of appointment of the representative or a small estate affidavit, court order, power of attorney, or trust giving the fiduciary authority over the account;
    3. A number, username, address, or other unique subscriber or account identifier assigned by the custodian to identify the user’s account;
    4. Evidence linking the account to the user; and
    5. If the user is a decedent or protected person:
      1. A finding by the court that termination of the account is reasonably necessary for the administration of the estate of a decedent or the performance of the duties of the conservator or guardian; and
      2. If requested by the custodian, a finding by the court that the user had a specific account with the custodian, identifiable by the information specified in subsection (g)(3) of this section.
  8. This chapter does not affect any right or remedy of a protected person, a principal, a beneficiary or an estate against a guardian or conservator, an agent, a trustee, or a personal representative, respectively, for any violation of this chapter by such fiduciary.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 2.

33-27.1-16. Custodian compliance and immunity.

  1. Not later than sixty (60) days after receipt of the information required under §§ 33-27.1-7 through 33-27.1-15 , a custodian shall comply with a request under this chapter from a fiduciary or designated recipient to disclose digital assets or terminate an account. If the custodian fails to comply, the fiduciary or designated recipient may apply to the court for an order directing compliance.
  2. An order under subsection (a) of this section directing compliance must contain a finding that compliance is not in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2702 et seq., as amended.
  3. Wherever practicable, a custodian shall notify the user or the user’s account that a request for disclosure or to terminate an account was made under this chapter.
  4. A custodian may deny a request under this chapter from a fiduciary or designated recipient for disclosure of digital assets or to terminate an account if the custodian is aware of any lawful access to the account following the receipt of the fiduciary’s request.
  5. This chapter does not limit a custodian’s ability to obtain or require a fiduciary or designated recipient requesting disclosure or termination under this chapter to obtain a court order which:
    1. Specifies that an account belongs to the protected person or principal;
    2. Specifies that there is sufficient consent from the protected person or principal to support the requested disclosure; and
    3. Contains a finding required by law other than this chapter.
  6. A custodian and its officers, employees, and agents are immune from liability for an act or omission done in good faith in compliance with this chapter, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., and all applicable state and federal laws.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 2.

33-27.1-17. Uniformity of application and construction.

In applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 2.

33-27.1-18. Relation to Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.

This chapter modifies, limits, or supersedes the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act. 15 U.S.C. Section 7001 et seq., but does not modify, limit, or supersede 15 U.S.C. Section 7001(c), or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in 15 U.S.C. Section 7003(b).

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 2.

33-27.1-19. Severability.

If any provision of this chapter or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this chapter which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this chapter are severable.

History of Section. P.L. 2019, ch. 200, § 2; P.L. 2019, ch. 262, § 2.

Chapter 28 Elective Share

33-28-1. Elective share.

  1. The surviving spouse of a decedent who dies domiciled in this state has a right of election, under the limitations and conditions stated in this chapter, to take an elective share equal to:
    1. The life estate and allowance in an intestate’s real estate titled in the name of the decedent individually at the time of the decedent’s death pursuant to §§ 33-1-5 and 33-1-6 ; and
    2. The share of the decedent’s personal estate subject to probate pursuant to § 33-1-10 . The elective share may be taken in kind or the value thereof.
  2. If the right of election is exercised by, or on behalf of, the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse’s allowances pursuant to chapter 10 of this title, if any, are not charged against, but are in addition to, the elective share.
  3. The right, if any, of the surviving spouse of a decedent who dies domiciled outside this state to take an elective share in property in this state is governed by the law of the decedent’s domicile at death.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 4; P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 4; P.L. 2018, ch. 149, § 1; P.L. 2018, ch. 235, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 4, and P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 4 enacted identical versions of this chapter.

P.L. 2018, ch. 149, § 1, and P.L. 2018, ch. 235, § 1 enacted identical amendments to this section.

Applicability.

P.L. 2018, ch. 149, § 2, provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [July 2, 2018] and shall apply to the estates of decedents dying on and after July 1, 2018.”

P.L. 2018, ch. 235, § 2, provides: “This act shall take effect upon passage [July 2, 2018] and shall apply to the estates of decedents dying on and after July 1, 2018.”

33-28-2. Right of election personal to surviving spouse — Incapacitated surviving spouse.

  1. The right of election may be exercised only by a surviving spouse who is living when the petition for the elective share is filed in the probate court pursuant to § 33-28-4(a) . If the election is not exercised by the surviving spouse personally, it may be exercised on the surviving spouse’s behalf by the surviving spouse’s conservator, guardian, or agent under the authority of a power of attorney.
  2. If the election is exercised on behalf of a surviving spouse who is an incapacitated person, the probate court may authorize transfer of property in kind, or payment of the value thereof, to the spouse’s personal representative upon such terms and conditions as the court determines to be in the spouse’s best interest.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 4; P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 4.

33-28-3. Waiver of right to elect and of other rights.

  1. The right of election of a surviving spouse and the rights of the surviving spouse to allowances pursuant to chapter 10 of this title may be waived, wholly or partially, before or after marriage, by a written contract, agreement, or waiver signed by the surviving spouse. The written contract, agreement, or waiver is enforceable without consideration.
  2. A surviving spouse’s waiver is not enforceable if the surviving spouse proves that: (1) The surviving spouse did not execute the waiver voluntarily; or (2) The waiver was unconscionable when it was executed and, before execution of the waiver, the surviving spouse: (i) Was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the decedent; (ii) Did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the decedent beyond the disclosure provided; and (iii) Did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the decedent.
  3. An issue of unconscionability of a waiver is for decision by the probate court or other court of competent jurisdiction as a matter of law.
  4. Unless it provides to the contrary, a waiver of “all rights” or equivalent language in the property or estate of a present or prospective spouse or a complete property settlement entered into after, or in anticipation of, separation or divorce is a waiver of all rights to elective share and allowances pursuant to chapter 10 of this title by each spouse in the property of the other and a renunciation by each of all benefits that would otherwise pass to that spouse from the other by intestate succession or by virtue of any will executed before the waiver or property settlement.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 4; P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 4.

33-28-4. Proceeding for elective share — Time limit.

  1. If any estate, real or personal, be devised or bequeathed to a surviving spouse, the devise or bequest shall bar the elective share unless the surviving spouse shall, within six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the qualifications of the fiduciary of the estate of the deceased spouse, file in the probate court a written statement waiving and renouncing the devise and bequest and petitioning for the elective share. If any of the deceased spouse’s real estate is located in any city or town other than that in which the will of the decedent is probated, the waiver and petition shall also be filed in the records of deeds in each city and town where the real estate is located. The surviving spouse shall give notice of the time and place set for hearing to persons interested in the estate and to those whose interests will be adversely affected by the taking of the elective share.
  2. Within six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the qualifications of the fiduciary of the estate of the deceased spouse, the surviving spouse may petition the probate court for an extension of time for making an election not to exceed nine (9) months after the decedent’s death, upon notice of the time and place set for hearing, to persons interested in the estate and to those whose interests will be adversely affected by the taking of the elective share.
  3. The surviving spouse may withdraw a waiver and petition for an elective share at any time before entry of a final determination by the probate court.
  4. The order or judgment of the probate court may be enforced as necessary in suit for contribution or payment in other courts of this state or other jurisdictions.

History of Section. P.L. 2014, ch. 260, § 4; P.L. 2014, ch. 312, § 4.