Chapter 1
General Provisions

28-1-101. [Repealed.]

Code 1858, § 2761; Shan., § 4452; Code 1932, § 8578; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-101; repealed by Acts 2020, ch. 749, § 37, effective July 1, 2020.

Compiler's Notes. Former § 28-8-101 defined “action.”

28-1-102. Commencement at time of right to make demand.

When a right exists, but a demand is necessary to entitle the party to an action, the limitation commences from the time the plaintiff's right to make the demand was completed, and not from the date of the demand.

Code 1858, § 2780; Shan., § 4477; Code 1932, § 8604; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-102.

Cross-References. Commencement of criminal prosecution, § 40-2-104.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 1 Tenn. Juris., Agency, § 38; 4 Tenn. Juris., Bailments, § 17; 15 Tenn. Juris., Insurance, § 83; 18 Tenn. Juris., Limitations of Actions, § 24.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Demand Requirements.

2. —Accrual of Cause.

Limitation in favor of personal representative does not begin to run until accrual of cause of action in or to the creditor claimant. Gillespie v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 167 Tenn. 245, 68 S.W.2d 479, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (1934).

Abandonment, repudiation or other breach of contract creates a cause of action. Gillespie v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 167 Tenn. 245, 68 S.W.2d 479, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (1934).

Where contract provided for the conveyance of timber land as soon as proper survey could be made, the right to make a demand for the execution of the contract existed immediately after the contract and the statute of limitations began to run from that time. Northcutt v. Massie, 201 Tenn. 638, 301 S.W.2d 355, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 344 (1957).

In case of a constructive trust, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date the wrongful and adverse holding begins and is or should be known to the complainant. Vick v. Vick, 60 Tenn. App. 600, 449 S.W.2d 717, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).

Lender's suit against the borrowers to collect on a loan was properly dismissed as the general six-year statute codified at T.C.A. § 28-3-109(a)(3) applied; the statute of limitations on the alleged obligation accrued when the borrowers received the money from the lender, and there was no revival of the debt as the complaint did not allege any acknowledgment or promise after six years beyond the time the loan was made. Wilson v. Harris, 304 S.W.3d 824, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 404 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2009), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (Tenn. Jan. 25, 2010).

3. —Gratuitous Bailee.

A special deposit of specific money for an indefinite time, made for the benefit of the depositor, and as his property without permission or authority, expressly or impliedly given to the bailee, to use it, constitutes a gratuitous bailment to be held for the benefit of the bailor, and if the money is lost without the bailee's negligence, he incurs no liability to replace it, but unless it is so lost, he is obligated to return it on demand only, and until demand is made, no right of action accrues, and until such demand and refusal, the statute of limitations does not begin to run. Where bailee converts the money, the right of action accrues without demand. Goodwin v. Ray, 108 Tenn. 614, 69 S.W. 730, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 5, 91 Am. St. Rep. 761 (1902); Jenkins v. Dewar, 112 Tenn. 684, 82 S.W. 470, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 63 (1904).

4. —Note Payable on Demand.

Where a note is payable on demand, the right to make demand of payment accrues and is complete at its date, and the limitation commences to run from the date of the note. Jenkins v. Dewar, 112 Tenn. 684, 82 S.W. 470, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 63 (1904).

Where a note was payable on demand, the statute of limitation commenced to run on the date of the note, although the note charged maker's estate with payment and note bore interest after one year. Todd v. Third Nat'l Bank, 172 Tenn. 586, 113 S.W.2d 740, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (1938).

The statute of limitations begins to run against a note payable on demand from the date of the note and not from the date of the demand. First Nat'l Bank v. Hunter, 22 Tenn. App. 626, 125 S.W.2d 183, 1938 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1938); Hall v. Skidmore, 26 Tenn. App. 189, 168 S.W.2d 800, 1942 Tenn. App. LEXIS 32 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1942), overruled, Graves v. Sawyer, 588 S.W.2d 542, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 497 (Tenn. 1979).

Where a note was, at least by amendment of the parties, an instalment note payable in eight equal instalments and was in the hands of the original payee, it was not a demand note. Brown v. United States, 37 F. Supp. 444, 1941 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 165 (Ct. Cl. 1941).

The date of maturity of a demand note securing a deed of trust was the date of its execution and a suit to enforce the lien securing the indebtedness evidenced by the note was required to be brought within ten years from the maturity of the debt. Slaughter v. Slaughter, 922 S.W.2d 115, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 806 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995), appeal denied, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. May 13, 1996).

5. —Certificates of Deposit.

A certificate of deposit issued by bank payable on return of certificate properly endorsed is payable on demand and the statute of limitation does not begin to run until demand is made, however, a demand must be made in a reasonable time and what is a reasonable time is a question of fact depending on the circumstances of the case. Whitlock v. Bank of Maryville, 612 S.W.2d 481, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

6. —Assessment on National Bank Stock.

The limitation upon the claim of a receiver of a national bank for double liability assessment begins to run from the date finally fixed by the comptroller of the currency, after extensions of dates previously fixed, for payment. Fisher v. Whiton, 317 U.S. 217, 63 S. Ct. 175, 87 L. Ed. 223, 1942 U.S. LEXIS 1043 (1942).

7. —Bill of Review by Remaindermen Not Covered.

A remainderman's right to prosecute a bill of review to reverse a decree affecting his interest in land is barred unless he proceeds within three years after the date of the decree, or, in case of his disability, within three years after its removal, notwithstanding the existence and continuance of the life estate. In such case, this section does not apply. Wilson v. Schaefer, 107 Tenn. 300, 64 S.W. 208, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1901).

8. —Cosurety's Right to Contribution.

A cosurety's right to contribution arises against another cosurety from the time he pays the demand or judgment. Reeves v. Pulliam, 68 Tenn. 153, 1877 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (1877).

9. —Bank Stock Subscriptions.

Subscriptions for stock in a bank is considered as a debt subsisting independently of notes that may have been issued for payment, and limitations will run from date of call for payment. Moses v. Ocoee Bank, 69 Tenn. 398, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 110 (1878).

10. —Resulting Trust.

The statute of limitations generally does not begin to run in the case of a resulting trust until the trustee does some act hostile to the cestui que trust. Vick v. Vick, 60 Tenn. App. 600, 449 S.W.2d 717, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).

11. Avoidance of Bar.

12. —Necessary Pleading.

Where a statute of limitations which would ordinarily bar the action has run, any intervening fact, such as disability of complainant, fraudulent concealment of the cause of action, nonresidence of the defendant, or a promise to pay within the period of limitation, must be alleged in the original bill, or in an amendment, when made necessary by a defense set up in the answer, and without such allegation, evidence of such fact is irrelevant and inadmissible for any purpose. Jenkins v. Dewar, 112 Tenn. 684, 82 S.W. 470, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 63 (1904), approving Gross v. Disney, 95 Tenn. 592, 32 S.W. 632, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 133 (1895); Sully v. Childress, 106 Tenn. 109, 60 S.W. 499, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 138, 82 Am. St. Rep. 875 (1900); Gernt v. Cusack, 106 Tenn. 141, 59 S.W. 335, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 141 (1900); Thompson v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P.R.R., 109 Tenn. 268, 70 S.W. 612, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 73 (1902).

13. —New Promise.

Wife's account against her husband is not barred where the husband promised to pay same, as in mortgage securing the indebtedness, which kept it alive as to limitation. Robertson v. Wade, 17 Tenn. App. 457, 68 S.W.2d 487, 1933 Tenn. App. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933).

Where a note has become barred by the statute of limitations, the bar can be removed only by an express promise to pay, or an acknowledgment of the debt accompanied by an expression of willingness to pay it. Hall v. Skidmore, 26 Tenn. App. 189, 168 S.W.2d 800, 1942 Tenn. App. LEXIS 32 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1942), overruled, Graves v. Sawyer, 588 S.W.2d 542, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 497 (Tenn. 1979).

Although a debtor continued to pay the interest due on a note after the statute of limitations had run, the bar of the statute of limitations was not removed since Tennessee requires not only an acknowledgment of the debt, which the payment of the interest was, but also an expression of willingness to pay it and mere payment of interest is not sufficient by itself to indicate this willingness. Hall v. Skidmore, 26 Tenn. App. 189, 168 S.W.2d 800, 1942 Tenn. App. LEXIS 32 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1942), overruled, Graves v. Sawyer, 588 S.W.2d 542, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 497 (Tenn. 1979).

14. —Waiver of Limitations — Effect.

The express waiver of the defense of the statute of limitations revives a barred debt, and postpones the bar of the statute for a new statutory period from that date, and gives to an unbarred debt a new statutory period of limitation from that date, but the waiver does not bind the party never to plead the statutory bar. Jordan v. Jordan, 85 Tenn. 561, 3 S.W. 896, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1887); Moore v. Taylor, 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 556 (1897).

28-1-103. Accrual of agent's liability to principal.

When an injury arises from the act or omission of a deputy or agent, the time for the limitation of an action by the principal against such deputy or agent does not commence to run until the liability of the principal for the act or omission is ascertained by suit of the aggrieved party against such principal, or otherwise.

Code 1858, § 2781; Shan., § 4478; Code 1932, § 8605; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-103.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 1 Tenn. Juris., Agency, § 38; 18 Tenn. Juris., Limitation of Actions, § 8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Deputy Sheriff's Default.

Under an indemnity bond given by a deputy sheriff to hold the sheriff harmless, the covenant is broken as soon as judgment is recovered against the sheriff for the default of his deputy, and the limitation of the sheriff's action on such bond runs from the date of such judgment, and is not postponed to payment of the judgment. Atkins v. Scarborough's adm'r., 28 Tenn. 517, 1848 Tenn. LEXIS 114 (1848); Hurley v. Murrell, 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 620 (1876).

2. Nonperformance of Duty Concealed.

Where defendant was obligated to pay note for plaintiff, and concealed the fact that he had not paid the note, the statute did not start to run until plaintiff learned that the note had not been paid. Moore v. Hudson, 7 Tenn. App. 199, — S.W.2d —, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 29 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928).

28-1-104. Accrual of principal's liability to surety or endorser.

The time for the limitation of an action by either a surety or accommodation endorser against their principal on negotiable paper, or for any matter growing out of the suretyship, does not commence to run until judgment is rendered against the surety or endorser, or the surety or endorser until the surety or endorser has paid the money.

Code 1858, § 2782; Shan., § 4479; Code 1932, § 8606; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-104.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Date Statute Begins to Run.

Surety's cause of action is the payment of the judgment, and the statute of limitations commences to run against him from time of payment, and not from the rendition of the judgment. Marshall v. Hudson, 17 Tenn. 57, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1836); Maxey v. Carter, 18 Tenn. 521, 1837 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (1837); Reeves v. Pulliam, 66 Tenn. 119, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1874); Vanderville v. Persons, 3 Shan. 415 (1875); Gibson v. Jones, 81 Tenn. 684, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (1884); Glass v. Williams, 84 Tenn. 697, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 158 (1886).

2. Surety's Right on Barred Debt.

Surety who pays debt after same was barred as to both himself and principal cannot recover from his principal. Henderson v. Locke, 153 Tenn. 108, 282 S.W. 193, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (1926).

3. Surety Not Entitled to Benefit of State's Exemption.

Action by surety more than six years after paying to state amount misappropriated by his principal, a public official, where suit is to recover of a third person alleged to have participated in the misappropriation, is barred. The state's exemption from operation of the state does not inure to the surety, to prevent bar. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 165 Tenn. 395, 54 S.W.2d 964, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1932).

28-1-105. New action after adverse decision — Contractual limitations periods.

  1. If the action is commenced within the time limited by a rule or statute of limitation, but the judgment or decree is rendered against the plaintiff upon any ground not concluding the plaintiff's right of action, or where the judgment or decree is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and is arrested, or reversed on appeal, the plaintiff, or the plaintiff's representatives and privies, as the case may be, may, from time to time, commence a new action within one (1) year after the reversal or arrest. Actions originally commenced in general sessions court and subsequently recommenced pursuant to this section in circuit or chancery court shall not be subject to the monetary jurisdictional limit originally imposed in the general sessions court.
  2. In the case of a contract which limits the time within which an action arising out of such contract must be brought, if such action is commenced within the time as limited by the contract but the judgment or decree is rendered against the plaintiff upon any ground not concluding the plaintiff's right of action, or where the judgment or decree is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and is arrested, or reversed on appeal, the plaintiff, or the plaintiff's representatives or successors, as the case may be, may, from time to time, commence a new action within one (1) year after the nonsuit, dismissal without prejudice, reversal or arrest.

Code 1858, § 2755 (deriv. Acts 1715, ch. 27, § 6; 1819, ch. 28, § 3); Shan., § 4446; mod. Code 1932, § 8572; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-106; Acts 1985, ch. 344, § 1; 1989, ch. 225, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1989, ch. 225, § 2 provided that subsection (b) applies to all nonsuits, dismissals without prejudice, reversals or arrests entered on or after May 2, 1989.

Cross-References. Monetary jurisdiction of general sessions court, § 16-15-501.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 780.

Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), Nos. 1-13.01, 1-41.01-4.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 4 Tenn. Juris., Automobiles, § 36; 10 Tenn. Juris., Eminent Domain, § 66; 11 Tenn. Juris., 18 Tenn. Juris., Limitations of Actions, §§ 40, 44;  24 Tenn. Juris., Vendor and Purchaser, § 10; 26 Tenn. Juris., Workers' Compensation, § 13.

Law Reviews.

10 Significant Differences Between State and Federal Civil Procedure, 38 No. 7 Tenn. B.J. 27 (2002).

Adaptation of Program of Procedural Reform to Tennessee Practice (Walter P. Armstrong), 15 Tenn. L. Rev. 614.

Champerty as We Know It (R.D. Cox), 13 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 139 (1983).

Civil Procedure — Appeal and Nonsuit — Inconclusive Dismissal, 34 Tenn. L. Rev. 511.

Conflict of Laws — 1956 Tennessee Survey (John W. Wade), 9 Vand. L. Rev. 940.

Counterclaims, Amendments, Relation-back and the Statute of Limitations, 9 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 441.

Labor Law and Workmen's Compensation — 1959 Tennessee Survey (Paul H. Sanders and J. Gilmer Bowman, Jr.), 12 Vand. L. Rev. 1231.

Limitation of Actions — Broadening Scope of Tennessee Saving Statute, 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 326.

Nonsuits Don't Necessarily Save You (Donald F. Paine), 25 No. 1 Tenn. B.J. 28 (1989).

Nonsuits IV: An Updated List of Don'ts (Donald F. Paine), 39 No. 2 Tenn. B.J. 15 (2003).

Procedure — 1963 Tennessee Survey (William J. Harbison), 17 Vand. L. Rev. 1108.

Real Property — 1963 Tennessee Survey (Thomas G. Roady, Jr.), 17 Vand. L. Rev. 1124.

Savings Statutes v. Statutes of Repose: A Decision Is Reached with Cronin v. Howe (Philip E. Mischke), 32 No. 1 Tenn. B.J. 21 (1996).

Sex, Lies and Nonsuits (Donald F. Paine), 29 No. 5 Tenn. B.J. 17 (1993).

Statute of Limitations — Tolling of Statute by Suit in Court without Jurisdiction, 9 Tenn. L. Rev. 200.

Survey of Civil Procedure in Tennessee — 1977, II. Selecting a Proper Forum (John L. Sobieski, Jr.), 46 Tenn. L. Rev. 273.

Survey of Civil Procedure in Tennessee — 1977, IV. Pretrial Procedure (John L. Sobieski, Jr.), 46 Tenn. L. Rev. 308.

Tennessee Annexation Law: History, Analysis, and Proposed Amendments (Frederic S. Le Clercq), 55 Tenn. L. Rev. 577 (1989).

The Category of Tough: Nonsuits III (Donald F. Paine), 34 No. 5 Tenn. B.J. 16 (1998).

The Tennessee Saving Statute, 29 Tenn. L. Rev. 287.

Title by Adverse Possession in Tennessee, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 621.

Torts — 1956 Tennessee Survey (John W. Wade), 9 Vand. L. Rev. 1137.

Voluntary Dismissals and Nonsuits in Tennessee (Clinton H. McKay), 15 Tenn. L. Rev. 787.

Workers' Compensation Outline (Paul Campbell III), 18 No. 3 Tenn. B.J. 11 (1982).

Wrongful Death Actions in Tennessee (T. A. Smedley), 27 Tenn. L. Rev. 447.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The retrospective application of the 1985 amendment to this section which added the last sentence, is remedial and does not impair a vested right of the defendant in the statute of limitations and is constitutional. Morford v. Yong Kyun Cho, 732 S.W.2d 617, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2605 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

The statute of repose does not violate state or federal constitutional due process or equal protection provisions. Via v. General Electric Co., 799 F. Supp. 837, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14532 (W.D. Tenn. 1992).

Where a contract was already executed and contractual rights accrued before the effective date of the 1989 amendment to this section, retrospectively applying the amendment would impair the obligation of contract and violate Tenn. Const., art. I, § 20. Kee v. Shelter Ins., 852 S.W.2d 226, 1993 Tenn. LEXIS 146 (Tenn. 1993); Algee v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 890 S.W.2d 445, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).

2. Purpose and Policy.

3. —Statutory Purpose.

The statute is for the benefit of a plaintiff whose first case has been dismissed without a hearing on its merits. Reed v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 136 Tenn. 499, 190 S.W. 458, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 154 (1916).

This statute, permitting a new action by plaintiff whose right of action has not been concluded by the disposition of the case, is remedial, and is to be liberally construed, but protection against laches, negligence, or other fault of the plaintiff was no part of its purpose, nor was it intended to hold open the way indefinitely for vexatious and harassing continuation or renewal of litigation. Moran v. Weinberger, 149 Tenn. 537, 260 S.W. 966, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 112 (1924).

The letter of this section as well as the spirit which prompted its enactment shows its basic purpose was to aid the courts in administering the law fairly between litigants without binding them to minor and technical mistakes made by their counsel in interpreting the complexities of the laws of procedure. General Acci. Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Kirkland, 210 Tenn. 39, 356 S.W.2d 283, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 410 (1962).

The saving statute was designed to protect diligent suitors, those whose timely filed complaints put their defendants on notice that the complainants intended to assert their legal rights. Lee v. Crenshaw, 622 F.2d 202, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 18770 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1980).

The purpose of subsection (a) is to provide a diligent plaintiff with an opportunity to renew its suit if its complaint is dismissed by any judgment or decree that does not conclude its right of action. Turner v. Aldor Co. of Nashville, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 318, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 911 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

4. —Liberal Construction.

This section is remedial and should be liberally construed to insure to a diligent suitor a hearing in court until he reaches a judgment on the merits, thus where an action for wrongful death was brought in federal court, under diversity of citizenship, against joint tort-feasors, and plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit, another action could be brought within one year, against a single wrongdoer, since failure to join other defendant would not increase remaining defendant's liability, or alter facts for recovery or defense. Privett v. West Tennessee Power & Light Co., 19 F. Supp. 812, 1937 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1738 (D. Tenn. 1937), aff'd, 103 F.2d 1021, 1939 U.S. App. LEXIS 3771 (6th Cir. 1939).

This statute is remedial, and should be liberally construed in furtherance of its purpose, and in order to bring cases within its spirit and fair intention. Nashville, C. & S. L. R. Co. v. Bolton, 134 Tenn. 447, 184 S.W. 9, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 170 (1916); Woods v. Palmer, 496 S.W.2d 474, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 476 (Tenn. 1973); Galbraith v. Kirby, 21 Tenn. App. 303, 109 S.W.2d 1168, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 35 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937); Energy Sav. Products, Inc. v. Carney, 737 S.W.2d 783, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2799 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

The statute is to receive a liberal construction. Brooksbank v. Roane County, 207 Tenn. 524, 341 S.W.2d 570, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 488 (1960); Balsinger v. Gass, 214 Tenn. 343, 379 S.W.2d 800, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 483 (1964).

While this section should be construed liberally, it should not be used to insulate a plaintiff from its own laches, negligence, or other similar fault. Turner v. Aldor Co. of Nashville, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 318, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 911 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

5. Conflict of Laws.

Action commenced in North Carolina would not toll Tennessee statute of limitations, and where action commenced in North Carolina was nonsuited this section would not apply to permit the commencement of a new action in Tennessee after the statute of limitations in Tennessee had run. Sigler v. Youngblood Truck Lines, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 61, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3823 (D. Tenn. 1957).

6. Federal Court Proceedings — Application.

Although plaintiff could have refiled suit in state court under this section, federal court does not have to entertain such action, where if original suit had been in federal court case could have been dismissed with prejudice. Eager v. Kain, 158 F. Supp. 222, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2413 (D. Tenn. 1957).

Where action for libel was brought in state circuit court and plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit while plaintiff's first witness was being cross-examined, suit brought in federal court within the one year period was timely filed. Venn v. Tennessean Newspapers, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 47, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6090 (M.D. Tenn. 1962), aff'd, 313 F.2d 639, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 5969 (6th Cir. Mar. 6, 1963).

Bankruptcy Code § 108(a) can stop or toll the running of a state limitations period that has not run against a debtor before bankruptcy. In re Gaskins, 98 B.R. 328, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 2128 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989).

Since T.C.A. § 28-1-115 rather than T.C.A. § 28-1-105 controlled the limitations on actions dismissed by federal courts for lack of jurisdiction, the court denied plaintiff's Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) motion to file a voluntary dismissal. Johnson v. Hill Bros. Transp. Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 889, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8325 (E.D. Tenn. 2003).

7. Construction and Interpretation.

The fact that such a specific negative averment will likely result in a prompt curative amendment by plaintiff does not reduce the stringency of this rule. Goss v. Hutchins, 751 S.W.2d 821, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (Tenn. 1988).

Because an estate did not comply with T.C.A. § 16-15-710 by either having process reissued within nine months after the previous process was returned unserved, or recommencing the action within one year after the return of the initial process not served, the estate could not rely on the original filing in the general sessions court to toll the statute of limitations, and T.C.A. § 29-1-105, the savings statute, did not apply because a voluntary nonsuit was taken. Davis v. Mirts, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 231 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2007).

Constitutional claims in both the original action and the instant action were properly construed as Bivens claims and the claims against all of the deputized officers named in the original action were timely under T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(3) because the statute of limitations was tolled under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. Moreover, the Tennessee Savings Statute, T.C.A. 28-1-105(a) “saved” the Bivens claims where the court interpreted the term “commence a new action” to include reasserting the cause of action, whether through an independent lawsuit or through reasserting the claims in the context of an existing action premised on the same underlying facts. Pike v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 2d 667, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51243 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 11, 2012).

Legal malpractice claim was barred by the termination date established in a tolling agreement because the agreement precluded application of the savings statute under T.C.A. § 28-1-105(a); the applicable time limitation was established by contract, not by rule or statute of limitation. Circle C Constr., LLC v. Nilsen, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 444 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 2014), rev'd, Circle C Constr., LLC v. Nilsen, 484 S.W.3d 914, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 170 (Tenn. Mar. 7, 2016).

8. —Construction with Other Statutes and Rules.

This section addresses itself to time while Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01 addresses itself to the number of dismissals (nonsuits) that can be taken; thus there is no conflict between the statute and the rule. Payne v. Matthews, 633 S.W.2d 494, 1982 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).

Where a person is made a party, then voluntarily dismissed, then made a party again more than a year later, through an amended complaint in a continuing action against another person, the statute of limitations in this section does not bar the proceedings as to that party; and amended complaint under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 avoids the impact of the statute of limitations by letting the amendment relate back to the original filing, and therefore this section is inapplicable for the reason that no statutory bar to the amendment exists. Floyd v. Rentrop, 675 S.W.2d 165, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 829 (Tenn. 1984).

Where the plaintiff did not issue new process after the original process was not served or returned within 30 days from issuance, within the six months period required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3, and did not recommence the action within one year from issuance of the initial unserved process, as prescribed by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3, the action was not “commenced within the time limited by a rule or statute of limitations,” and thus this section was inapplicable. Little v. Franceschini, 688 S.W.2d 91, 1985 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2629 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Cureton, 842 F.2d 887, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 3483 (6th Cir. 1988).

The general savings provision of this section was applicable under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, title 4, ch. 21, against a governmental entity, to save an action by former city employee for race and sex discrimination. Eason v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 866 S.W.2d 952, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 479 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

This section does not apply to a statute of repose; thus, a medical malpractice plaintiff could not commence a new action within one year after voluntary dismissal of her original action when the new action was filed beyond the three-year statute of repose in § 29-26-116(a)(3). Bruce v. Hamilton, 894 S.W.2d 274, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), overruled, Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. 1995).

In a personal injury action, where plaintiffs did not obtain the issuance of new process within six months of the issuance of previous process or recommence their action within one year of the issuance of the initial process pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3, they could not rely on the date of filing of their original complaint to toll the running of the statute of limitations pursuant to this section. Gregory v. McCulley, 912 S.W.2d 175, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 524 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

Although T.C.A. § 28-1-105 provides that a plaintiff has one year to refile the dismissed action, T.C.A. § 67-1-1801(b) specifically limits the time to file a suit challenging a tax assessment to 90 days; therefore, that section applied to an action against the state. AMC Mortg. Co. v. Tennessee Dep't of Revenue (In re AMC Mortg. Co.), 213 F.3d 917, 2000 FED App. 175P, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11751 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2000).

Filing of a proposed amended complaint and motion to amend with the trial court clerk two days before the expiration of the one-year limitation period of the saving statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-105, commenced an action within the meaning of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3, and the amended complaint was timely filed even though the trial court did not grant the motion to amend until two days after the limitation period had run. Frazier v. East Tenn. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 55 S.W.3d 925, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 703 (Tenn. 2001).

Because injured plaintiff failed to serve defendant doctor within 30 days of filing a malpractice suit, in compliance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3, nonsuited, then refiled, without ever obtaining service on the original complaint, or copying the doctor on the notice of voluntary dismissal and complaint, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01, plaintiff could not rely on the filing date of the original complaint to satisfy the applicable one year statute of limitations regarding the second suit, and the savings statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-105 was inapplicable. Frye v. Blue Ridge Neuroscience Ctr., 70 S.W.3d 710, 2002 Tenn. LEXIS 123 (Tenn. 2002).

In a personal injury action, summary judgment was improperly granted in favor of an employer and an employee where the evidence showed that an injured party mailed a copy of a voluntary dismissal to their last known business address and there was no evidence to refute the certificate of service or the affidavit of counsel; the injured party was entitled to the protections of the saving statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-105, based on compliance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01Boone v. Morris, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2004).

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01 requires that a nonsuiting plaintiff, at the time of the nonsuit, serve a copy of the notice of dismissal and a copy of the dismissed complaint on any defendant who has not been previously served with a summons and complaint and that such service must comply with the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 5, not with the requirements for service of process under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4. Boone v. Morris, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2004).

Extension of the statute of limitations set out in T.C.A. § 20-1-119(a), (b) is not available to a plaintiff in a lawsuit recommenced, pursuant to T.C.A. § 28-1-105(a), after a nonsuit; therefore, the dismissal of a driver from a personal injury action was proper where the driver was only named as a defendant after the case was refiled. Boone v. Morris, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 644 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2004).

Summary judgment in favor of defendants in a products liability action was reversed and remanded because T.C.A. § 28-1-105 saved the action, which had been filed within the statutes of limitations and repose, had been voluntarily dismissed and refiled within one year, notwithstanding the expiration of the products liability statute of repose under T.C.A. § 29-28-103 during the one-year savings period. Maino v. Southern Co., 253 S.W.3d 646, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 711 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2007), appeal denied, Maino v. The Southern Co., — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. LEXIS 254 (Tenn. Apr. 7, 2008).

Although plaintiff had one year after dismissal of his case without prejudice for lack of venue to file a new case, plaintiff needed to effectuate service of process within 90 days of the dismissal of the first case because no new process was issued after the dismissal of the case. Dolan v. United States, 514 F.3d 587, 2008 FED App. 48P, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 1790 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 2008), cert. denied, 171 L. Ed. 2d 888, 128 S. Ct. 2971554 U.S. 919, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 5183 (U.S. 2008).

Where a next of kin appealed a trial court's dismissal of his health care liability suit as untimely, he did not file his first complaint within the one year statute of limitations in T.C.A. § 29-26-116, and, since he did not comply with T.C.A. § 29-26-121, he could not obtain an extension, and he could not rely on T.C.A. § 28-1-105. Byrge v. Parkwest Med. Ctr., 442 S.W.3d 245, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 38 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 538 (Tenn. June 24, 2014).

9. —Statutory Bar as Prerequisite.

A statutory bar must exist and the section does not apply where the cause of action is not barred by some statute of limitation. Dushan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 14 Tenn. App. 422, — S.W.2d —, 1931 Tenn. App. LEXIS 53 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1931).

Under Tennessee law a claim would be barred because Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations for personal injury cases, § 28-3-104, is not tolled under § 28-1-105 by the filing of the lawsuit in another state where there was no basis for personal jurisdiction. Graham v. Ferguson, 593 F.2d 764, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 16392 (6th Cir. Mich. 1979).

10. —Date Statute Begins to Run.

The one-year statute of limitations run from the date of the entry of the order of dismissal by the court and not from the date of filing the notice of nonsuit. Evans v. Perkey, 647 S.W.2d 636, 1982 Tenn. App. LEXIS 404 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).

Judgment dismissing plaintiffs' refiled action against defendants, finding that the new action was not timely filed under the savings statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-105, was reversed and remanded because the one-year statute of limitations for filing a new action under T.C.A. § 28-1-105(a) did not commence on the date of the appellate court's judgment remanding the cause to the trial court for further proceedings, but commenced on the date of the trial court's order of dismissal on remand. Parrish v. Marquis, 137 S.W.3d 621, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. 2004).

11. —Valid Cause of Action.

This statute necessarily implies the existence of a cause of action otherwise valid. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Beasley, 123 Tenn. 629, 134 S.W. 306, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 31 (1911).

Under the law that existed at the time of the decedent's death and under current law, the relevant statute of limitations had not expired; thus, the bank and company's claims against the estate were not barred. T.C.A. § 28-1-105 was a tolling statute and, so long as the statute of limitations had not expired, did not limit the time lapse between dismissal and refiling. In re Estate of Quandt, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. 2006).

12. —Contractual Limitations Not Covered.

A contractual limitation embodied in an insurance policy is not extended or controlled by this statute. Guthrie v. Connecticut Indem. Ass'n, 101 Tenn. 643, 49 S.W. 829, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 115 (1898), superseded by statute as stated in, Algee v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 890 S.W.2d 445, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).

In the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, the validity of a provision in a policy of insurance requiring suit under the policy to be brought within a prescribed period of time cannot be disputed, and this section is wholly inapplicable. Arcon Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 591 F. Supp. 15, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10790 (M.D. Tenn. 1983).

13. —Final Determination.

The plaintiff in error was entitled to the benefit of this section for their judgment in the first suit was not upon any ground concluding their right of action, nor have they been guilty of such negligence or carelessness in the bringing of their first suit as should exclude them from the benefit of this section. Smith v. McNeal, 109 U.S. 426, 3 S. Ct. 319, 27 L. Ed. 986, 1883 U.S. LEXIS 985 (1883).

There is no final determination of an ejectment suit voluntarily dismissed until one year after such dismissal. Fox v. Smith, 130 Tenn. 611, 172 S.W. 317, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1914).

Where it appears on the face of a decree of dismissal that it was not upon the merits the suit may be reinstituted at any time within one year and such a decree is not res judicata. W. R. Grace & Co. v. Taylor, 55 Tenn. App. 227, 398 S.W.2d 81, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 251 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

The voluntary dismissal of an appeal to the circuit court from a judgment of a general sessions court does not so reinstate the judgment of the general sessions court so as to preclude a second appeal from such judgment. Kirby v. Cramer, 219 Tenn. 447, 410 S.W.2d 724, 1967 Tenn. LEXIS 364 (1967).

14. —Second Suit Not Within Statute.

The pendency of one suit will not prevent the running of the statute of limitations in another suit, when the latter suit does not fall within the saving of this section. Hopkins' Heirs v. Calloway, 47 Tenn. 37, 1869 Tenn. LEXIS 6 (1869). See Anderson v. Bedford, 44 Tenn. 464, 1867 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (1867).

The Tennessee “savings” statute is not invoked by the filing of a suit in another state where there is no basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Graham v. Ferguson, 593 F.2d 764, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 16392 (6th Cir. Mich. 1979).

Where cause of action arose in Tennessee, the filing of an action in another state did not toll the statute of limitations. Elias v. A & C Distributing Co., 588 S.W.2d 768, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1075, 100 S. Ct. 1022, 62 L. Ed. 2d 757, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 711 (1980).

Because the employee's second workers'  compensation complaint was not filed until more than nineteen months after the voluntary dismissal of the first action, the savings statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-105, did not save the employee's claim. Dye v. Witco Corp., 216 S.W.3d 317, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 226 (Tenn. 2007).

In a suit originally filed in general sessions court, the circuit court had not erred by dismissing a litigant's action for failure to refile within one year of that court's order of voluntary dismissal under T.C.A. § 28-1-105 because the general sessions court had entered its final judgment against the litigant who no longer had either a right of action or right to a voluntary nonsuit under T.C.A. § 28-1-105 in general sessions court. McGee v. Jacobs, 236 S.W.3d 162, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 320 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 18, 2007), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 379 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 8, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 815 (Tenn. Sept. 24, 2007).

Dismissal of health care liability complaint against a physician was appropriate because the physician was not served with process as required by the saving statute in that the patient did not continue the action against the physician by obtaining issuance of new process within one year from issuance of the previous process, or within one year of the filing of the complaint. Furthermore, the patient was not entitled to rely on the fraudulent concealment doctrine or the discovery rule to toll and extend the statute of limitations. Brookins v. Tabor, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 621 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2018).

Although a loss of consortium claim by a patient's spouse was a cause of action separate from that of the patient, the claim was still derivative of the patient's health care liability claim and was barred by the statute of limitations applicable to all health care liability claims. Furthermore, because the spouse was not a party to the patient's prior complaint that was dismissed without prejudice, the spouse was unable to take advantage of the saving statute that was available to the patient. Brookins v. Tabor, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 621 (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2018).

Selling shareholder cited no specific procedural rule in support of his motion to reinstate the manager and the officer as party defendants because he did not file a new action against them within one year of the order of voluntary dismissal. Lance v. Alcoa Hotel Hosp., LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 507 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2020).

15. —Limitations Barring Right.

This section applies only to statutes of limitation of a general nature which affect only the right and not the remedy and does not apply to a suit instituted by a taxpayer under § 67-2310 (now § 67-1-908) to recover state gasoline taxes paid under protest. Automobile Sales Co. v. Johnson, 174 Tenn. 38, 122 S.W.2d 453, 1938 Tenn. LEXIS 61, 120 A.L.R. 370 (1938).

This section does not toll the running of the period during which the secretary of state may act as agent to receive process under § 20-2-203. Oliver v. Altsheler, 198 Tenn. 155, 278 S.W.2d 675, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 356 (1955).

This section applies only to limitations of a general nature which relate only to the remedy and does not apply to cases where the right itself must be exercised in a limited time. Brent v. Greeneville, 203 Tenn. 60, 309 S.W.2d 121, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 464 (1957); Breneman v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 48 Tenn. App. 290, 346 S.W.2d 273, 1961 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961).

There was no commencement of an action for compensation by the issuance of a summons without the filing of a petition and, therefore, the issuance of such a summons and the later voluntary nonsuit did not stop the running of the statute of limitations. Bradshaw v. Claridy, 213 Tenn. 297, 375 S.W.2d 852, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 390 (1964).

Neither this section nor § 28-1-115 can be used to extend the period within which suit must be filed against a governmental entity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. Nance v. City of Knoxville, 883 S.W.2d 629, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 221 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994), overruled, Moore v. Coffee County, 2010 FED App. 0715N, 402 Fed. Appx. 107, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23639, 2010 FED App. 715N (6th Cir.) (6th Cir. Tenn. 2010).

Claims were barred by the statutes of limitation, T.C.A. §§ 28-1-105 and 30-2-310, where the son never set forth any proof establishing the existence of a material fact with regard to when the statute of limitations began to run. Vandergriff v. Vandergriff, 106 S.W.3d 682, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 35 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, Vandegriff v. Vandegriff, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 476 (Tenn. May 19, 2003).

16. —Application to State.

This section does not apply to the state. Williams v. Cravens, 31 Tenn. App. 246, 214 S.W.2d 57, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948); Brown v. State, 783 S.W.2d 567, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 727 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).

Sovereign immunity bars application of this section to actions against the state. Webster v. Tennessee Bd. of Regents, 902 S.W.2d 412, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

T.C.A. §§ 28-1-105 and 28-1-115 do not specifically state that they are applicable to the state of Tennessee; the statutes are held to be in derogation of sovereign immunity and do not effectively toll any statute of limitations as to the state of Tennessee, such that the motion to dismiss the inmate's suit could not be avoided. Gore v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., 132 S.W.3d 369, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 713 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

Neither T.C.A. § 28-1-105 nor § 28-1-115 applied, without more, to save the employee's Public Protection Act claim against the state; there was no mention of the state in the savings statutes and suits against the state of Tennessee could only be brought in strict compliance with an enabling statute; the state was immune from suit except when it consented to be sued. Farmer v. Tenn. Dep't of Safety, 228 S.W.3d 96, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 614 (Tenn. June 25, 2007), overruled, Moore v. Coffee County, 2010 FED App. 0715N, 402 Fed. Appx. 107, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23639, 2010 FED App. 715N (6th Cir.) (6th Cir. Tenn. 2010).

Although the trial court erred by denying an attorney's motion for a voluntary nonsuit when Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01(1) applied to the appeal of hearing panel judgments, the sixty-day period within which the attorney was permitted to file a petition for writ of certiorari from the panel's order of disbarment, T.C.A. § 27-9-102 and Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 8.3, had long since passed, and principles of sovereign immunity precluded the application of the one-year savings statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-105(a); the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee (BPR) was an arm of the State, and § 28-1-105(a) does not “save” a claim against the BPR when the statute of limitations has otherwise run. Rayburn v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility of the Supreme Court, 300 S.W.3d 654, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 741 (Tenn. Dec. 1, 2009).

17. Prerequisites to Application.

The availability of this section is a function of notice to the defendant and diligence by the plaintiff. Advey v. Celotex Corp., 962 F.2d 1177, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 8452 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1992), rehearing denied, — F.2d —, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14459 (6th Cir. June 16, 1992).

Because property owners were not sued by the landowners in the landowners' original complaint, the saving statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-105, did not apply in connection with the landowners' subsequent refiling of their complaint. Edwards v. Banco Lumber Co., 101 S.W.3d 69, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 779 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 195 (Tenn. Feb. 24, 2003).

Where the landowners refiled their suit against the lumber company for trespass and taking timber, and the landowners also filed suit against the sellers for the first time, the second action against the timber company was timely filed; but, because the sellers were never sued by the owners in the first complaint, the Saving Statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-105, was not applicable and, the statute of limitations had run on the claim against the sellers. Edwards v. Banco Lumber Co., 101 S.W.3d 69, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 779 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 195 (Tenn. Feb. 24, 2003).

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment for defendant doctors in wrongful death case where plaintiff nephew voluntarily dismissed the claim but refiled the action within one year of nonsuiting but beyond the expiration of the original statute of limitations, adding the decedent's husband as a plaintiff; in light of the Tennessee supreme court's avowed liberality in permitting the substitution of a proper party plaintiff for an improper party plaintiff, even after the statute of limitations has passed, it was error to find that the original lawsuit was a nullity; the claim was not void, but, rather, merely voidable because the savings statute, T.C.A. 28-1-105, applied. Foster v. St. Joseph Hosp., 158 S.W.3d 418, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 491 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (Tenn. Jan. 31, 2005).

18. —Identity of Parties and Cause.

The parties, purpose, and subject matter must be the same in both cases, in order that a new suit shall be saved from the bar of the statutes of limitation. Anderson v. Bedford, 44 Tenn. 464, 1867 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (1867); Hughes v. Brown, 88 Tenn. 578, 13 S.W. 286, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 79, 8 L.R.A. 480 (1889). See Moran v. Weinberger, 149 Tenn. 537, 260 S.W. 966, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 112 (1924).

Where the first suit, after severance, stood as one against widow of A, alone, a second suit in equity against the widow and heirs cannot be deemed a continuance of the first, so as to make the statute applicable in favor of applicant. East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. Walton, 35 S.W. 459, 1895 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 8 (1895).

Where the first suit was against several defendants, each claiming distinct part of a 100,000 acre boundary, but before nonsuit therein there had been a severance as to defendant in both suits claiming only one portion, the operation of the statute is not defeated, since at the time of the nonsuit the cause was one between the two litigants in both cases. East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. Lawson, 35 S.W. 456, 1895 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 7 (1895).

This statute must be construed as a whole, and, while the “new action” is necessarily new in the sense that it is freshly started, it must be confined in its parties and purposes, and in the cause on which the action rests, to its original limits. Moran v. Weinberger, 149 Tenn. 537, 260 S.W. 966, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 112 (1924).

Where suit by foreign administratrix against foreign power company and city to recover damages for death of deceased as result of defective insulated wire was dismissed when plaintiff took a nonsuit, a second suit filed within one year thereafter by domestic administratrix against power company was not barred by limitations even though city was not made a party defendant in second action. Privett v. West Tennessee Power & Light Co., 19 F. Supp. 812, 1937 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1738 (D. Tenn. 1937), aff'd, 103 F.2d 1021, 1939 U.S. App. LEXIS 3771 (6th Cir. 1939).

For purposes of the savings statute, there was an identity of parties in the action that was first filed and the subsequent action that was filed following the voluntary dismissal of the first action as, while the second action was brought in the name of an individual who was not mentioned in the first action, the individual merely served as a representative of the decedent's estate, and the original action was brought in the name of the decedent's estate. Howell v. Claiborne & Hughes Health Ctr., — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 24, 2010), overruled in part, Myers v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., 382 S.W.3d 300, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 735 (Tenn. Oct. 4, 2012).

19. —Party Added by Amendment.

Amendments adding a claim or defense arising out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence described in the original complaint automatically relate back to the original filing. Where, however, the amendment changes the party against whom a claim is asserted, the amendment relates back only if the party added by amendment had notice of the claim within the applicable statute of limitations period and knew or should have known that, but for a misnomer or other similar mistake, the action would have been brought against him. Bennett v. Town & Country Ford, Inc., 816 S.W.2d 52, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

The savings statute is not applicable to the claims in a renewed complaint against a party not named as a defendant in the original complaint. Turner v. Aldor Co. of Nashville, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 318, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 911 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

20. —Commencement of Action.

An innocent mistake of the complainant, not superinduced by the defendant, as to the existence of an injunction in the defendant's prior suit against the complainant, is insufficient to enable a court of chancery to interfere with the defendant's legal right to rely upon the statute of limitations. Such a case is not within the provisions of this section. Chilton v. Scruggs, 73 Tenn. 308, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 129 (1880).

Neither the presentation of a claim to the personal representative nor its filing with the clerk would prevent the running of the statute. Bates v. Elrod, 81 Tenn. 156, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 18 (1884).

Where the summons was delivered to the plaintiff's attorney, but was never delivered to an officer, and the plaintiff dismissed his suit for want of service of process, and thereafter, within 12 months, brought a new suit, this statute does not apply, because the first suit was never “commenced.” East Tennessee Coal Co. v. Daniel, 100 Tenn. 65, 42 S.W. 1062, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1897). But see Cherry v. Mississippi Valley Ins. Co., 84 Tenn. 292, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 99 (1886), and Bryant v. Mulder, 163 Tenn. 600, 45 S.W.2d 48, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 154 (1932), in which summons was delivered to an officer.

New suits brought within one year after dismissal of a suit irregularly instituted are within the spirit of the statute. Jacobs v. Pope, 8 Tenn. Civ. App. 452 (1915).

Contention that suing out of warrants before justice of peace (now general sessions court) could not be considered commencement of an action had no merit in view of fact that words “warrant” and “summons,” as applicable to proceedings before justices of peace, are used interchangeably both in decisions and statutes. Galbraith v. Kirby, 21 Tenn. App. 303, 109 S.W.2d 1168, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 35 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

A writ or notice is issued when it is put in proper form and placed in an officer's hands for service. Hoover Lines, Inc. v. Whitaker, 22 Tenn. App. 223, 120 S.W.2d 983, 1938 Tenn. App. LEXIS 19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1938).

Where cause of action accrued on November 18, 1950 and suit was filed on November 10, 1951, but summons was not delivered until November 27, 1951, the action was not timely. West v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 108 F. Supp. 276, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2250 (D. Tenn. 1952).

Because notification of a suit was not a valid substitute for service of process as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.03, a party so notified could not be deemed served for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 and the savings statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-105(a), when there was no actual service of process. Sims v. Adesa Corp., 294 S.W.3d 581, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 170 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2008).

Circuit court properly upheld the constitutionality of the health care liability act and granted summary judgment to a doctor in a health care liability action by a patient and his wife (jointly, the patient) because, inter alia, there was no violation of the right to privacy since pursuing a health care liability action constituted a voluntary waiver, the patient failed to provide written notice of the suit within the limitations period and could not rely on the savings statute where the initial action was not filed within the applicable statute of limitations, and the disclosure of medical records was based on the patient's choice to sue the providers to whom the records would be given. Webb v. Magee, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 211 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2019), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 411 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2019).

21. —Dismissal on Merits.

The statute does not apply where the judgment or decree of dismissal is on the merits. A decree or judgment of dismissal upon demurrer is upon the merits, even if it dismisses the bill for laches of “alone upon the ground of lapse of time.” Parkes v. Clift, 77 Tenn. 524, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 95 (1882).

A decree dismissing a bill upon demurrer on the ground of laches is one on the merits. Parkes v. Clift, 77 Tenn. 524, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 95 (1882).

A judgment was rendered for purposes of this section when the general sessions judge signed a written order, approved by both counsel, dismissing plaintiff's suit, and filed that order with the clerk of that court. Christopher v. Spooner, 640 S.W.2d 833, 1982 Tenn. App. LEXIS 418 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).

22. —Dismissal Not on Merits.

This section allows a plaintiff to refile against a defendant after the statute of limitations has run, when the original suit ends for some reason not going to the merits — provided the action that came to an inconclusive end began within the original limitation period. Bennett v. Town & Country Ford, Inc., 816 S.W.2d 52, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

Because the savings statute applied, the trial court properly denied an employer's motion for summary judgment; a truck driver and his wife were entitled to the benefits afforded by the savings statute because their action was commenced within the limitations period, the voluntary dismissal of a prior case did not conclude their right of action, and they commenced the new action within one year of the voluntary dismissal without prejudice Helyukh v. Buddy Head Livestock & Trucking, Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 395 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2020).

23. Cases Covered.

24. —Annexation Proceedings.

This section does not apply to proceedings to test validity of annexation ordinances under title 6, ch. 51, parts 1-3, since under such provisions the right rather than the remedy is limited. Brent v. Greeneville, 203 Tenn. 60, 309 S.W.2d 121, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 464 (1957).

25. —Eminent Domain.

Where landowner whose land was taken possession of for the purpose of internal improvements filed his suit under §§ 29-16-123, 29-16-124 within 12 months of the actual taking of possession but took a voluntary nonsuit when he misconceived his remedy and filed his petition against the proper defendant within one year of the nonsuit, such suit was saved by the bar of the statute of limitations. Brooksbank v. Roane County, 207 Tenn. 524, 341 S.W.2d 570, 1960 Tenn. LEXIS 488 (1960).

Where suit by landowner for damages under § 29-16-123 of eminent domain statutes which was commenced within the period of limitation provided by § 29-16-124 was dismissed other than on the merits, suing out summons in reverse condemnation proceedings within one year thereafter did not save the running of the limitation where the petition required by § 29-16-104 was not filed for more than one year after the dismissal of the original suit as reverse condemnation suit was commenced only by filing of petition and not by summons alone. Johnson v. Roane County, 212 Tenn. 433, 370 S.W.2d 496, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 438 (1963).

26. —Paternity Suits.

This section is applicable to paternity suits commenced under § 36-224 (now § 36-2-301 et seq.). Young v. Willis, 58 Tenn. App. 678, 436 S.W.2d 445, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 321 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).

The dismissal of a paternity case for failure to prosecute by order stating dismissal was with prejudice did not preclude renewal of the suit within the period of a year. Patrick v. Dickson, 526 S.W.2d 449, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 596 (Tenn. 1975).

There is no statutory requirement that a defendant in a paternity suit must raise in the juvenile court the issue of the limitation period as a prerequisite to having it tried in the circuit court before a jury. Tennessee Dep't of Human Services v. Patterson, 605 S.W.2d 541, 1980 Tenn. LEXIS 469 (Tenn. 1980).

27. —Personal Injury — Death of Plaintiff.

The suit of a husband for personal injuries wrongfully inflicted, upon his death, becomes the suit of his widow, without revivor; and upon dismissal of such suit as for its abatement, a new suit may be commenced by such widow within one year thereafter. Stuber v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 113 Tenn. 305, 87 S.W. 411, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1904).

28. —Medical Malpractice.

Where a medical malpractice action was timely filed within the one-year statute of limitations and the three-year statute of repose, § 29-26-116, a plaintiff who nonsuited the initial action could rely on this section and refile within one year of the nonsuit, even if the nonsuit and refiling occurred beyond the three-year statute of repose. Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 501 (Tenn. 1995), overruled in part, Pratcher v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hosps., 407 S.W.3d 727, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 594 (Tenn. June 28, 2013).

In a medical malpractice case, a second voluntary dismissal under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01, which was taken beyond the one-year savings period in T.C.A. § 28-1-105, operated as a complete bar as to any further action against an emergency room doctor. As a result, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of a hospital, as it was no longer vicariously liable for the acts of the doctor. Abshure v. Upshaw, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2009), rev'd, Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hosps., 325 S.W.3d 98,  2010 Tenn. LEXIS 948 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2010).

In a medical malpractice case, a trial court improperly determined that a medical malpractice complaint did not include a vicarious liability claim against a hospital because it was apparent from the hospital's answer that it had notice of the claim prior to taking a deposition; therefore, because the initial claim was timely filed, the expiration of the statute of repose in T.C.A. § 29-26-116 did not extinguish the claim for vicarious liability by operation of law where a patient and her husband voluntarily nonsuited the action in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01 and T.C.A. § 28-1-105. Abshure v. Upshaw, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2009), rev'd, Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hosps., 325 S.W.3d 98,  2010 Tenn. LEXIS 948 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2010).

Court erred in dismissing a medical malpractice action where the original lawsuit was “commenced” for purposes of the savings statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-105, because, although it was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations in T.C.A. §§ 28-3-104 and 29-26-116, it was filed within one year of the order of voluntary nonsuit, and it was filed in the name of the proper party plaintiff under T.C.A. § 20-5-107. Howell v. Claiborne & Hughes Health Ctr., — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 24, 2010), overruled in part, Myers v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., 382 S.W.3d 300, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 735 (Tenn. Oct. 4, 2012).

Trial court did not err in dismissing a doctor's motion for summary judgment in a patient's medical malpractice action because the patient was entitled to the 120 day extension to the one year statute of limitation set out in the Medical Malpractice Act, T.C.A. § 29-26-116(a)(1), as well as to the same extension to the three year statute of repose set out in § 29-26-116(a)(3); the Act, T.C.A. § 29-26-121(c), does apply to the saving statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-105. Rajvongs v. Wright, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 393 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2012), aff'd, 432 S.W.3d 808, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 1000 (Tenn. Dec. 12, 2013).

Transitional plaintiff who properly provides pre-suit notice is entitled to the same procedural benefits of a 120-day extension of the statute of limitations or statute of repose that T.C.A. § 29-26-121 makes available to a plaintiff filing an initial health care liability complaint. Rajvongs v. Wright, 432 S.W.3d 808, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 1000 (Tenn. Dec. 12, 2013).

Patient who filed his initial health care liability action before the enactment of the pre-suit notice requirements, voluntarily dismissed his original action, gave pre-suit notice and refiled his suit more than one year later filed his suit after the one-year period under the saving statute since T.C.A. § 29-26-121 did not alter the traditional definition of commencement of a suit with the filing of the complaint; however, the patient was entitled to the 120-day extension of the savings statute under T.C.A. § 29-26-121 because he gave pre-suit notice before filing the second complaint. Rajvongs v. Wright, 432 S.W.3d 808, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 1000 (Tenn. Dec. 12, 2013).

It was error to dismiss a patient's refiled health care liability complaint as untimely because, when the patient gave pre-suit notices before filing each complaint, within one year of the voluntary dismissal, the patient was entitled to a 120-day extension of the saving statute, as (1) it could not be concluded that the general assembly required plaintiffs to provide pre-suit notice before refiling under the saving statute and yet deprived plaintiffs of the 120-day extension, and (2) the patient was not only entitled to the use of one extension, as the refiled complaint was a new and independent action. Tinnel v. E. Tenn. Ear, Nose and Throat Specialists, P.C., — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2015).

Because the medical authorization sent by a conservator with the first notice letter was deficient, as it only permitted the recipient providers to send medical records to the conservator's counsel and not to other providers sent notice, the conservator did not receive a 120 day extension, which made the first complaint time-barred as it was filed beyond the statute of limitations. Although the conservator voluntarily dismissed and refiled the action, the second complaint was time-barred because of the untimeliness of the first complaint. Dortch v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hosps., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 62 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 332 (Tenn. June 7, 2018).

29. —General Sessions Court Suits Covered.

Suits brought before justices of the peace (now general sessions courts) are within the protection of this statute. Moran v. Weinberger, 149 Tenn. 537, 260 S.W. 966, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 112 (1924); Glenn v. Payne, 153 Tenn. 240, 280 S.W. 1019, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1926); Galbraith v. Kirby, 21 Tenn. App. 303, 109 S.W.2d 1168, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 35 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

In a case appealed from the general sessions court to the circuit court and subjected to de novo review, the rule limiting plaintiff's recovery to the jurisdictional limits of the general sessions court is not viable in the light of the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principles of judicial economy; abrogating Moran v. Weinberger, 149 Tenn. 537, 260 S.W. 966, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 112 (1924). Ware v. Meharry Medical College, 898 S.W.2d 181, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 189 (Tenn. 1995).

30. Governmental Tort Liability.

This section is not applicable to actions commenced under title 29, ch. 20. Rael v. Montgomery County, 769 S.W.2d 211, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 675 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

The twelve-month limitation for bringing suit against a governmental entity pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, § 29-20-305(b), cannot be extended by the Tennessee savings statute. Williams v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 773 S.W.2d 522, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988), superseded by statute as stated in, Cunningham v. Williamson County Hosp. Dist., — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2011).

Tennessee legislature has intended that the 2003 amendments to T.C.A. § 29-20-102(3)(B) apply not only to actions arising from injuries sustained after July 1, 2003, but to “all claims filed” on or after that date; therefore, summary judgment was properly granted to medical center in a malpractice case where an injury allegedly occurred in 2002, a case was filed and nonsuited in 2003, and was refiled pursuant to T.C.A. § 28-1-105 in 2004. Bertrand v. Regional Med. Ctr., — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 545 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2008), overruled in part, Estate of Bell v. Shelby County Health Care Corp., 318 S.W.3d 823,  2010 Tenn. LEXIS 569 (Tenn. June 24, 2010).

31. General Sessions Courts — Jurisdictional Limits.

A new action for $10,000 in the circuit court for personal injuries, after a voluntary nonsuit before a justice of the peace (now general sessions court) two years after the injury, of the original suit in the justice's court, with the jurisdiction limited to $500, but brought within one year after the taking of the nonsuit, is not saved from the bar of the statute of limitations, by this section, except to the extent of the $500. Moran v. Weinberger, 149 Tenn. 537, 260 S.W. 966, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 112 (1924).

This section in no way indicates that the plaintiff must take a voluntary nonsuit in general sessions court in order not to be bound by the court's jurisdictional limit. Therefore, the statute removes the jurisdictional limit from an action commenced in general sessions court, appealed to circuit court and subsequently recommended in circuit or chancery court. Morford v. Yong Kyun Cho, 732 S.W.2d 617, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2605 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

In a case stemming from property damage, a trial court did not err by allowing a property owner to dismiss the lawsuit following an appeal by an adjacent landowner from a general sessions court judgment in favor of the property owner; a voluntary nonsuit was permitted at any time before the trial of a cause, and there was no authority holding that the party not filing an appeal from general sessions court was not allowed to nonsuit the action in circuit court. An argument that it was unfair to allow the owner to nonsuit the action and then potentially refile his claim in circuit court, seeking a larger amount of damages, because he did not appeal the general sessions judgment was rejected under the savings statute. Layman v. Acor, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 450 (Tenn. June 23, 2016).

32. —Action for Death Improperly Begun.

Where action for wrongful death of child was erroneously instituted by a parent in his individual capacity and the administrator was not substituted as plaintiff until a year after the injuries, the original suing out of the summons was the commencement of the action, within the requirements of the statute of limitation. Whitson v. Tennessee C. R. Co., 163 Tenn. 35, 40 S.W.2d 396, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 136 (1931).

Wrongful death action instituted within one year after accident which was dismissed, and refiled on the same day in another county was not barred by one year limitation period on the ground that second suit was filed more than one year after accident, since new suit was filed within one year after dismissal of first suit. Denny v. Webb, 199 Tenn. 39, 281 S.W.2d 698, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 426 (1955).

33. —Equity Suits Covered.

This statute applies to suits in equity as well as to actions at law. Nashville, C. & S. L. R. Co. v. Bolton, 134 Tenn. 447, 184 S.W. 9, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 170 (1916); Roberts v. N.C. & S.L. Ry., 6 Tenn. Civ. App. (6 Higgins) 149 (1915), overruled, National Linen Service Corp. v. Teichner, 213 Tenn. 407, 374 S.W.2d 377, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (1964); Flournoy v. Brown, 216 Tenn. 166, 391 S.W.2d 617, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 569 (1965).

34. —Workers' Compensation Cases Covered.

This statute applies to workers' compensation cases. Rye v. Dupont Rayon Co., 163 Tenn. 95, 40 S.W.2d 1041, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 92 (1931); Bradshaw v. Claridy, 213 Tenn. 297, 375 S.W.2d 852, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 390 (1964).

Where employee commenced suit in August 1956 based on theory of occupational disease and such suit was terminated by voluntary nonsuit in March 1957, and subsequent suit was commenced in June 1957, based on theory that disability resulted from accident in course of employment which occurred in February 1956, and from which total disability resulted in April 1956, one year limitation on workers' compensation actions as provided by § 50-1002 (now § 50-6-203) was inapplicable since original action could have been amended to include allegations of second suit so that provisions of this section were applicable. Norton v. Standard Coosa-Thatcher Co., 203 Tenn. 649, 315 S.W.2d 245, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 230 (1958).

This savings statute cannot be used to extend the limitations period against a defendant protected by sovereign immunity in a workers' compensation case. Roettger v. Metropolitan Gov't, 991 S.W.2d 244, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 286 (Tenn. Special Workers' Comp. App. Panel 1999), aff'd, Roettger v. Metro Gov't of Nashville, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 285 (Tenn. May 27, 1999).

35. —Common Law and Workers' Compensation.

Where the first action is under the common law and the second proceeding is for workers' compensation, the two do not rest upon the same cause of action. Oman v. Delius, 162 Tenn. 192, 35 S.W.2d 570, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1931).

36. —Suits Under Federal Employers' Liability Act.

This section was applicable to a suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Breneman v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 48 Tenn. App. 290, 346 S.W.2d 273, 1961 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961).

37. —Federal Court — State Action.

This section permitting second suit following dismissal of first suit by nonsuit applies also to federal court proceedings. Privett v. West Tennessee Power & Light Co., 19 F. Supp. 812, 1937 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1738 (D. Tenn. 1937), aff'd, 103 F.2d 1021, 1939 U.S. App. LEXIS 3771 (6th Cir. 1939).

Where plaintiff filed her personal injury action in Tennessee within the one-year statute of limitations but was unable to obtain service of summons on defendant because of his removal to Chicago, Illinois, an action filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois after the expiration of the Tennessee limit but within the Illinois limitation was not timely filed under this section. Speight v. Miller, 437 F.2d 781, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 11951 (7th Cir. Ill. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 827, 92 S. Ct. 60, 30 L. Ed. 2d 55, 1971 U.S. LEXIS 979 (1971).

Where plaintiff failed to appear and prosecute his cause because he was incarcerated, the savings statute operated to permit a subsequent action in federal court on the same terms as if it had been commenced in state court. Moore v. Fields, 464 F.2d 549, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8221 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1972).

Where the action was dismissed under the time limit set in this section, it was held to be timely under the state savings statute. Moore v. Fields, 464 F.2d 549, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8221 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1972).

This section permitting second suit following dismissal of first suit by nonsuit applies also to federal court proceedings. Privett v. West Tennessee Power & Light Co., 19 F. Supp. 812, 1937 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1738 (D. Tenn. 1937), aff'd, 103 F.2d 1021, 1939 U.S. App. LEXIS 3771 (6th Cir. 1939).

Where a wrongful death action was filed in the Tennessee court within the one year limitation period, and later was dismissed other than on the merits, a subsequent action based on substantially the same facts filed in federal court under the Federal Civil Rights Act (42 U. S. C. § 1983 et seq.) was not bound by § 28-3-104 since the limitation was tolled by the operation of this section. Bailey v. Harris, 377 F. Supp. 401, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8019 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).

38. —Bill in Equity After Dismissal of Ejectment.

The filing of a bill in equity after dismissal of an action of ejectment is not a new suit, the relief being in effect the same in each. East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. Lawson, 35 S.W. 456, 1895 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 7 (1895); East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. Ferguson's Heirs, 35 S.W. 900, 1895 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 28 (1895). But see East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. Walton, 35 S.W. 459, 1895 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 8 (1895), holding that a bill to remove a cloud on a title is not a continuation of ejectment against only one of the parties in the first case.

This section applies to workers' compensation cases. General Acci. Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Kirkland, 210 Tenn. 39, 356 S.W.2d 283, 1962 Tenn. LEXIS 410 (1962).

39. —Product Liability.

This section, the Tennessee saving statute, may not be used to revive a claim after the 10-year period of repose for product liability cases at § 29-28-103 has run. Via v. General Electric Co., 799 F. Supp. 837, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14532 (W.D. Tenn. 1992).

40. Judgment on Merits — Application.

The common law courts of this state do not have jurisdiction, like courts of equity, to enter decrees dismissing actions “without prejudice” to the plaintiff's right to sue defendant again on the same cause or “with prejudice” to such right and the decisive test as to whether or not plaintiff can bring his action again is whether or not the dismissal is on the merits. Long v. Kirby-Smith, 40 Tenn. App. 446, 292 S.W.2d 216, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956), superseded by statute as stated in, Lovelace v. State, — S.W.2d —, 1989 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 1989).

This statute does not apply to cases where judgment of dismissal is on the merits. Isham v. Harriman, 223 Tenn. 461, 447 S.W.2d 364, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (1969).

Where a demurrer raises questions not going to the right of the petitioner to maintain his action such as a formal defect in pleading the sustaining of such demurrer is generally recognized not to constitute judgment on the merits, but where the demurrer puts in issue whether or not the facts alleged are sufficient to support a cause of action against the defendant a judgment sustaining the demurrer is on the merits. Isham v. Harriman, 223 Tenn. 461, 447 S.W.2d 364, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (1969).

41. —Voluntary Nonsuit.

The statute applies where the plaintiff takes a voluntary nonsuit, and brings another suit within a year, because such judgment of dismissal is not rendered upon any ground concluding the plaintiff's right of action. Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Pillow, 56 Tenn. 248, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (1872); Parkes v. Clift, 77 Tenn. 524, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 95 (1882); Hooper v. Atlanta, K. & N.R.R., 106 Tenn. 28, 60 S.W. 607 (1900); Railroad v. Bentz, 108 Tenn. 670, 69 S.W. 317, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 14, 91 Am. St. Rep. 763, 58 L.R.A. 690 (1902); Stuber v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 113 Tenn. 305, 87 S.W. 411, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1904); La Follette Coal, Iron & Ry. Co. v. Minton, 117 Tenn. 415, 101 S.W. 178, 1906 Tenn. LEXIS 55, 11 L.R.A. (n.s.) 478 (1906); Swift & Co. v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S.W. 480, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1913); Nashville, C. & S. L. R. Co. v. Bolton, 134 Tenn. 447, 184 S.W. 9, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 170 (1916); Reed v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 136 Tenn. 499, 190 S.W. 458, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 154 (1916).

The statute applies in favor of one who sued as plaintiff in an action of ejectment at law, but took a voluntary nonsuit and subsequently sues in equity for recovery of the same land. East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. Lawson, 35 S.W. 456, 1895 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 7 (1895).

Where plaintiff's suit was brought within the time prescribed by the statute and was dismissed by the plaintiff, she may bring and dismiss as many suits as she thinks proper within one year after the first suit is dismissed, provided she was without fault in dismissing her different suits. Young v. Cumberland Grocery Co., 15 Tenn. App. 89, — S.W.2d —, 1932 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1932).

It is wholly immaterial whether a nonsuit was voluntary or involuntary, so long as the dismissal was not on a ground concluding plaintiff's right of action. Privett v. West Tennessee Power & Light Co., 19 F. Supp. 812, 1937 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1738 (D. Tenn. 1937), aff'd, 103 F.2d 1021, 1939 U.S. App. LEXIS 3771 (6th Cir. 1939).

Plaintiff instituted an action against the defendant and caused summons to issue just prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, but service could not be had on the defendant in that county and plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit since these acts of plaintiff tolled the statute of limitations he could, within a year institute another action against defendant. Hoover Lines, Inc. v. Whitaker, 22 Tenn. App. 223, 120 S.W.2d 983, 1938 Tenn. App. LEXIS 19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1938).

Unless a plaintiff is grossly negligent in choosing the forum of his first suit he may dismiss the first action and institute another within one year thereafter. Hoover Lines, Inc. v. Whitaker, 22 Tenn. App. 223, 120 S.W.2d 983, 1938 Tenn. App. LEXIS 19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1938).

Circuit court could order a dismissal upon motion for a nonsuit but could not decree a dismissal with prejudice under such circumstances and words “with full prejudice” contained in such an order were mere surplusage. Long v. Kirby-Smith, 40 Tenn. App. 446, 292 S.W.2d 216, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956), superseded by statute as stated in, Lovelace v. State, — S.W.2d —, 1989 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 1989).

Where Tennessee resident injured in automobile accident in Alabama commenced action for personal injuries in Tennessee by procuring issuance of summons within one year of date of accident, took voluntary nonsuit when service could not be had on defendant and refiled suit within one year thereafter, expiration of period of limitations for personal injuries in Alabama did not bar plaintiff's right of action in Tennessee. Fowler v. Herman, 200 Tenn. 201, 292 S.W.2d 11, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 396 (1956).

Where otherwise applicable the statute embraces a voluntary nonsuit. Balsinger v. Gass, 214 Tenn. 343, 379 S.W.2d 800, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 483 (1964).

Where defendant, in his representative capacity, was the defendant in both actions, and the second action was filed within one year of the voluntary nonsuit in the first action, the time requirement stated in this section had been met, and the saving statute saved the second action from the limitations bar. Goss v. Hutchins, 751 S.W.2d 821, 1988 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (Tenn. 1988).

Trial court had erred in denying a hospital's motion to dismiss, which motion was predicated on the three-year medical malpractice statute of repose and consequently, the hospital was not a proper party at trial, because the three-year medical malpractice statute of repose barred plaintiff's renaming of the hospital as defendant in 2001 after she had voluntarily nonsuited the hospital on September 24, 1999 and had not renamed the hospital as a defendant within the one-year savings statute found at T.C.A. § 28-1-105. Norris v. East Tenn. Children's Hosp., 195 S.W.3d 78, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 684 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, Norris v. E. Tenn. Children's Hosp., — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 544 (Tenn. June 5, 2006).

Once the professor filed her breach of contract claim against the university before the Tennessee claims commission and the waiver had been activated, it could not be undone, despite the voluntary dismissal or nonsuit; T.C.A. § 9-8-307(b) provided that filing the claim activated the waiver, regardless of the subsequent disposition of the claim, and dismissal activated the one-year time limit of the savings statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-105; the waiver provision of T.C.A. § 9-8-307(b) was activated upon the filing of the claim, even if the claim was later voluntarily withdrawn or nonsuited. Haley v. Univ. of Tennessee-Knoxville, 188 S.W.3d 518, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 192 (Tenn. 2006).

Medical malpractice action brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act was barred by the three year statute of repose in T.C.A. § 29-26-116(a)(3) because the Tennessee savings statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-105(a), was long exhausted with the voluntary dismissal of plaintiffs' state court action, and the filing of plaintiffs'  Federal Tort Claims Act claims was well beyond both the statute of limitations and the statute of repose. Logan Proffitt Irrevocable Trust v. Mathers, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111200 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 2, 2011).

Statute of limitations, T.C.A. § 28-3-104, had expired as to a truck buyer's products liability negligence claim against the seller, because it was filed more than one year after a nonsuit, T.C.A. § 28-1-105. The buyer's strict liability claim under T.C.A. § 29-28-106(b) was timely, however, because this claim did not accrue until the manufacturer was insolvent. Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 889, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 1151 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2011).

42. —Involuntary Dismissal.

Legal effect of action of justice of peace (now general sessions court) in rendering valid judgment against only one of two codefendants was automatic informal dismissal of suit as to other. Galbraith v. Kirby, 21 Tenn. App. 303, 109 S.W.2d 1168, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 35 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

Where in an action to recover for the pollution of gas wells, evidence showed that plaintiff had brought a former action on the same cause within the statutory period and that the action had been dismissed on a plea in abatement whereupon plaintiff within one year instituted the present suit, the action was not barred by the three year statute of limitations. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Bennett, 123 F.2d 884, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 2842 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1941).

Where the dismissal of plaintiff's action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted did not foreclose the merits, she may timely recommence the action by filing a new complaint within one year of the appellate court's affirmance of the dismissal. Adams v. Carter County Memorial Hospital, 548 S.W.2d 307, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 544 (Tenn. 1977).

43. —Hiatus in Process.

Where there was no service of process on the defendant and no issue joined in the former suit, the judgment of dismissal thereof for hiatus in issuance of pluries summons was a determination of the former suit not affecting the merits. Cherry v. Mississippi Valley Ins. Co., 84 Tenn. 292, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 99 (1886). But see East Tennessee Coal Co. v. Daniel, 100 Tenn. 65, 42 S.W. 1062, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1897); La Follette Coal, Iron & Ry. Co. v. Minton, 117 Tenn. 415, 101 S.W. 178, 1906 Tenn. LEXIS 55, 11 L.R.A. (n.s.) 478 (1906), where summons was never delivered to an officer.

Where action was brought in time, but process was not executed and there was a hiatus in issuing alias process, the suing out of an original summons on the same cause of action within one year from failure to serve the first process and the filing of a declaration reciting the above facts was a reasonable mode of recommencing the action within the year. In such case, it is proper for plaintiff to take voluntary nonsuit on the first summons, notwithstanding the hiatus. Bryant v. Mulder, 163 Tenn. 600, 45 S.W.2d 48, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 154 (1932).

44. —Failure to File Declaration.

The dismissal of the plaintiff's suit on account of his failure to file a declaration does not conclude his right of action. La Follette Coal, Iron & Ry. Co. v. Minton, 117 Tenn. 415, 101 S.W. 178, 1906 Tenn. LEXIS 55, 11 L.R.A. (n.s.) 478 (1906); Rye v. Dupont Rayon Co., 163 Tenn. 95, 40 S.W.2d 1041, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 92 (1931).

45. —Failure to Issue Summons.

The plaintiff cannot, after withholding process from the hands of an officer until after his cause of action has become barred, thereby preventing service of process within the period of limitation, claim the right to institute a new action under the saving provisions of this section. Hoover Lines, Inc. v. Whitaker, 22 Tenn. App. 223, 120 S.W.2d 983, 1938 Tenn. App. LEXIS 19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1938).

The trial court erred in charging the jury that the suing out of a summons in the office of the circuit court clerk is the commencement of an action within the meaning of this section, and should have charged defendant's special request embodying the rule that there must also be a bona fide intention, at least, to deliver the process of an officer for service, since the undisputed evidence showed that the summons issued by the circuit court clerk was, in fact, both issued and delivered to an officer for the bona fide purpose of having it served. Hoover Lines, Inc. v. Whitaker, 22 Tenn. App. 223, 120 S.W.2d 983, 1938 Tenn. App. LEXIS 19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1938).

46. —Defective Pauper's Oath.

Where the complainant's bill was dismissed upon motion, because of defective pauper's oath, without a hearing upon the merits, and he, thereafter within one year from the final dismissal of the prior suit, filed a new bill praying for the same relief, the case is within the spirit and meaning of this statute, and obviates the bar of the statutes of limitations. Graham v. Caldwell, 2 Shan. 71 (1876).

47. —Clerk's Failure to Make Notation.

The clerk's failure to timely make a notation in the docket book does not extend plaintiff's rights under this section. Christopher v. Spooner, 640 S.W.2d 833, 1982 Tenn. App. LEXIS 418 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).

48. —Dismissal for Want of Jurisdiction.

Under this section the one year's saving clause would give the plaintiff another year within which to bring his suit, upon the reversal by the appellate court for want of jurisdiction. Larkin v. Saffarans, 15 F. 147, 1883 U.S. App. LEXIS 1998 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1883).

An action commenced within the statute of limitations, though dismissed for want of jurisdiction, sufficiently notifies the parties as to suspend the running of the statute, and permit the institution of a new action within one year; however, there may be cases in which the plaintiff was so grossly negligent that the rule in Sweet v. Chattanooga Elec. Light Co., 97 Tenn. 252, 36 S.W. 1090, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 135 (1896), would be applied. Burns v. Peoples Tel. & Tel. Co., 161 Tenn. 382, 33 S.W.2d 76, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1930), reviewing the cases, overruling Sweet v. Chattanooga Elec. Light Co., 97 Tenn. 252, 36 S.W. 1090, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 135 (1896), questioned, Henley v. Cobb, 916 S.W.2d 915, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (Tenn. 1996), overruled, Burns v. Peoples Tel. & Tel. Co., 161 Tenn. 382, 33 S.W.2d 76, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1930), questioned, Myers v. Hurst Constr. Co., 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 150 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1997), questioned, Green v. Prince, 53 Tenn. App. 541, 385 S.W.2d 127, 1964 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120, 1964 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964), questioned, Moore v. Fields, 464 F.2d 549, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8221 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1972), and citing Moran v. Weinberger, 149 Tenn. 537, 260 S.W. 966, 1923 Tenn. LEXIS 112 (1924); Davis v. Parks, 151 Tenn. 321, 270 S.W. 444, 1924 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (1924).

Where suit fails for lack of jurisdiction right of action is saved. Burns v. Peoples Tel. & Tel. Co., 161 Tenn. 382, 33 S.W.2d 76, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1930).

Where plaintiff's attorney believed in good faith that he could obtain service of process on freight agent in Greene County, but later learned that freight agent was not the agent of defendant, it was held that he was not guilty of such negligence in choosing that forum as would bar plaintiff from dismissing that suit and later instituting another suit within one year thereafter. Hoover Lines, Inc. v. Whitaker, 22 Tenn. App. 223, 120 S.W.2d 983, 1938 Tenn. App. LEXIS 19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1938).

Unless a plaintiff is grossly negligent in choosing the forum of his first suit, he may dismiss the first action and institute another within one year thereafter. Hoover Lines, Inc. v. Whitaker, 22 Tenn. App. 223, 120 S.W.2d 983, 1938 Tenn. App. LEXIS 19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1938).

Unless the plaintiff is grossly negligent in choosing the forum of his first suit, a second suit may be brought within one year after dismissal of first suit for want of jurisdiction. Green v. Prince, 53 Tenn. App. 541, 385 S.W.2d 127, 1964 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964).

Where plaintiff honestly thought that by moving across state line he could institute personal injury action in federal court and made no attempt to defraud anyone, suit could be brought in state court within one year after dismissal of suit in federal court for want of jurisdiction. Green v. Prince, 53 Tenn. App. 541, 385 S.W.2d 127, 1964 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964).

The limitation periods provided in the Federal Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, are not tolled, for the purpose of an action filed at least 15 months and as much as 39 months after the expiration of such limitation periods, by commencement of a prior action within such limitation periods, which action failed for lack of in personam jurisdiction, where defendant could at any time have been sued in its home district. Chambliss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 274 F. Supp. 401, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11090 (E.D. Tenn. 1967), aff'd, Chambliss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 414 F.2d 256, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 11367 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1969).

49. —Voluntary Nonsuit in Federal Court.

This statute applies where the plaintiff takes a voluntary nonsuit in the federal court, where the cause had been removed from the state court, and the new action is brought within one year thereafter in the state court. Hooper v. Atlanta, K. & N.R.R., 106 Tenn. 28, 60 S.W. 607 (1900); Railroad v. Bentz, 108 Tenn. 670, 69 S.W. 317, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 14, 91 Am. St. Rep. 763, 58 L.R.A. 690 (1902); Stuber v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 113 Tenn. 305, 87 S.W. 411, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1904).

After the remandment of the case by the federal appellate court to the lower court, with directions “to grant a new trial, to sustain the plea of the statute of limitations made to the amended declaration, and to enter judgment for the defendant,” the plaintiff may take a nonsuit in the federal trial court, and, within one year thereafter, institute a new suit in the state court. Hooper v. Atlanta, K. & N.R.R., 107 Tenn. 712, 65 S.W. 405 (1901).

Where plaintiff's motion for voluntary nonsuit without prejudice was orally granted, but the judge signed no written order to that effect until one month later, the one-year limitation ran from date order was signed. Powers v. Hopson, 552 F.2d 713, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 13934 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1977).

Where plaintiff filed suit within the applicable one-year statute of limitations and took an immediate nonsuit, but no summons was ever issued, plaintiff was entitled to refile his suit within the additional year provided for under this statute unless it appeared that plaintiff's counsel acted affirmatively to short-circuit the issuance of process after the initial filing in order to avoid giving notice to defendants of the cause of action. Lee v. Crenshaw, 562 F.2d 380, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 11621 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1977).

50. —Involuntary Dismissal in Federal Court.

Suit within one year in state court following dismissal of case in federal court for violation of federal rule of procedure was not barred where statute under which new federal rules were adopted stated that rule “shall neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant,” since right of plaintiff to refile within one year after dismissal without a trial on the merits was a substantive right. Adcox v. Southern R. Co., 182 Tenn. 6, 184 S.W.2d 37, 1944 Tenn. LEXIS 295, 156 A.L.R. 1091 (1944).

51. —Wrong Venue.

Where the first suit is brought in county other than that in which plaintiff resided or in which injury arose, new suit may be maintained. Davis v. Parks, 151 Tenn. 321, 270 S.W. 444, 1924 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (1924).

An action by a nonresident father for the wrongful death of his child dismissed by a federal court on the ground that the divorced and resident mother was a necessary party plaintiff and her joinder as such would destroy the federal jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship may be refiled by the parents in a state court within a year after such dismissal. Jamison v. Memphis Transit Management Co., 381 F.2d 670, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5416 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1967).

Although a plaintiff's right of action for damages against a nonresident motorist, where his case is dismissed by a federal district court because filed in the wrong district, might be saved by this section, his right to service of process under § 20-2-203 et seq. would not be extended beyond the one year limit of that act. Ptaszynki v. Ferrell, 277 F. Supp. 969, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7519 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).

Dismissal for lack of venue is not a dismissal on the merits. Burton v. Borden Foods Co., 494 S.W.2d 775, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 309 (Tenn. 1972).

Failure of plaintiffs to file a personal injury action in the proper venue did not preclude the application of this section, allowing refiling of the action, since the adverse parties were given actual notice of the plaintiffs' claims against them. Henley v. Cobb, 916 S.W.2d 915, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (Tenn. 1996).

52. —Papers Lost.

This statute includes a case where the prior suit was dismissed because the papers were lost and not supplied when the case was regularly reached and called for trial. Cole v. Nashville, 45 Tenn. 639, 1868 Tenn. LEXIS 56 (1868).

Where, before the judgment was barred by the statute of limitations, the plaintiff made proper affidavit of the destruction of the justice's (now general sessions court's) docket and papers, for the purpose of procuring the issuance of an execution, but the justice made no affidavit, and the execution was issued and levied on property, but was quashed and superseded under a certiorari and supersedeas, another execution may be issued, upon the justice making the required affidavit, at any time within one year after the prior execution was so quashed, though the judgment would have been barred by the statute of limitations, but for such prior proceedings. Such summary proceeding is an “action” in the sense of this statute. Thomas v. Pointer, 82 Tenn. 343, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 133 (1884).

53. —Want of Due Prosecution.

This statute includes a dismissal for want of due prosecution. Madison v. New Lumber Co., 3 Tenn. Civ. App. (3 Higgins) 1 (1912); Rye v. Dupont Rayon Co., 163 Tenn. 95, 40 S.W.2d 1041, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 92 (1931).

This statute applies in case of a judgment of dismissal by reason of default. Nash v. Davis, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. 634 (1913).

54. —Dismissal Without Prejudice.

Where a judge of the federal court directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that plaintiff's claim grew out of a written contract instead of an oral contract as declared, and ordered that the judgment should be without prejudice to a future suit, a suit by the plaintiff in the written contract was not barred. Condon v. Knoxville, C. G. & L. R. Co., 35 S.W. 781, 1895 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 24 (1895).

The chancellor, before any decretal order and in the absence of cross bill or counterclaim, can dismiss a suit in equity without prejudice after it has been taken under advisement by him. Roberts v. N.C. & S.L. Ry., 6 Tenn. Civ. App. (6 Higgins) 149 (1915), overruled, National Linen Service Corp. v. Teichner, 213 Tenn. 407, 374 S.W.2d 377, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 400 (1964).

Suit dismissed without prejudice for failure of both parties to prosecute diligently could be brought again within one year. Flournoy v. Brown, 216 Tenn. 166, 391 S.W.2d 617, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 569 (1965).

Where wrongful death action was commenced initially within one year after the cause of action arose, was dismissed without prejudice and then was refiled within one year after such dismissal and where subsequently the present plaintiff was substituted with the same effect as if the refiled action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest, the action was not barred by the statute of limitations. Caldwell v. Metcalfe, 458 F. Supp. 847, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12616 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).

55. —Motion in Arrest of Judgment.

The provision in this section entitling the plaintiff to commence a new action, within one year after the arrest of the judgment in his favor, was primarily intended to prevent the bar of the statute of limitations in the cases mentioned, but it necessarily implies the existence of a cause of action otherwise valid and, moreover, contemplates a case wherein a motion in arrest of judgment was granted for matter of substance. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Beasley, 123 Tenn. 629, 134 S.W. 306, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 31 (1911).

56. —Death of Plaintiff.

Where the action abates by the death of the plaintiff, a new action may be brought within a year after such death, because such case is within the equity of the statute. Norment v. Smith, 20 Tenn. 46, 1839 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1839); Jones v. Preston, 40 Tenn. 161, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1859); Anderson v. Bedford, 44 Tenn. 464, 1867 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (1867); Stuber v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 113 Tenn. 305, 87 S.W. 411, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1904); Rye v. Dupont Rayon Co., 163 Tenn. 95, 40 S.W.2d 1041, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 92 (1931).

57. —Appellate Court's Reversal of Judgment on Writs of Certiorari and Supersedeas and Dismissal of Motion.

Where, upon motion, a judgment was recovered in the county court against the administrator of the deceased clerk of that court and the sureties on the clerk's bond, and defendants afterwards undertook, by writs of certiorari and supersedeas, to remove the cause into the circuit court for a new trial, which writs were there dismissed on motion of plaintiffs, and thereupon defendants appealed in error to the Supreme Court, where the proceedings below were reversed, and the motion dismissed, such judgment of reversal and dismissal was not on the merits, because (1) it was not a dismissal of plaintiffs' cause of action, but of the motion, and (2) the motion would not lie against defendants on account of the death of the clerk, in which case the remedy is alone by an ordinary action. Fowlkes v. State, 82 Tenn. 14, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 98 (1884).

58. —Champerty.

Where a suit is dismissed on account of the complainant's champerty, this statute does not apply, and a new suit cannot be commenced within one year, so as to prevent the bar of the statute of limitations. Anderson v. Bedford, 44 Tenn. 464, 1867 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (1867). See Vincent v. Ashley, 24 Tenn. 593, 1845 Tenn. LEXIS 140 (1845); Sweet v. Chattanooga Elec. Light Co., 97 Tenn. 252, 36 S.W. 1090, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 135 (1896), questioned, Henley v. Cobb, 916 S.W.2d 915, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 118 (Tenn. 1996), overruled, Burns v. Peoples Tel. & Tel. Co., 161 Tenn. 382, 33 S.W.2d 76, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1930), questioned, Myers v. Hurst Constr. Co., 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 150 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1997), questioned, Green v. Prince, 53 Tenn. App. 541, 385 S.W.2d 127, 1964 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120, 1964 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964), questioned, Moore v. Fields, 464 F.2d 549, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8221 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1972).

59. —Workers' Compensation.

Where trial court dismissed the petition of a worker for compensation upon the finding that the refusal of the worker to undergo an operation for hernia was unreasonable and the order dismissing the suit recited that “recovery should be denied until such time as petitioner would submit to said surgical operation to have said hernia repaired,” a second suit within one year after such dismissal but more than one year after the accident was not barred by the statute of limitations but fell within the clause of this section which provides that a new action may be brought within one year after an inconclusive judgment of dismissal. Blevins v. Pearson Hardwood Flooring Co., 176 Tenn. 606, 144 S.W.2d 781, 1940 Tenn. LEXIS 107 (1940).

60. —Dismissal for Defective Service.

An action for damages for pollution of wells by escaping gasoline was not barred by § 28-3-105 although the action was not instituted within three years from the discovery of the pollution where a prior action, instituted seasonably, had been dismissed on plea in abatement on the ground of defective service upon a corporate agent and the subsequent action instituted within one year of dismissal. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Bennett, 123 F.2d 884, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 2842 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1941).

In an action for wrongful death, where the plaintiff and defendants lived in different counties, and defendant filed cross action and had summons served on plaintiff, the trial judge correctly sustained motion to quash the summons issued by the clerk of the circuit court where the original action was commenced to a sheriff in a different county. Nunn v. Walker, 186 Tenn. 685, 212 S.W.2d 665, 1948 Tenn. LEXIS 602 (1948).

61. —Directed Verdict — Effect.

Where plaintiff sued coal company and its alleged employee for damages, and court following submission of plaintiff's case sustained a motion for a directed verdict in favor of coal company and plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit as to the employee the plaintiff could not thereafter on the basis of this section file a second suit against the coal company. Patterson v. Ridenour, 196 Tenn. 23, 263 S.W.2d 537, 1953 Tenn. LEXIS 401 (1953), superseded by statute as stated in, Frank Rudy Heirs Assocs. v. Sholodge, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 810, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 162 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

62. Period for Filing New Suit.

The new suit or any subsequent suit must be instituted within one year after the termination of the action brought within the period limited by the statute of limitations. Turner v. N. C. & S. L. Railway, 199 Tenn. 137, 285 S.W.2d 122, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 437, 54 A.L.R.2d 1225 (1955).

In third action for breach of warranty against manufacturer brought within one year of second action which was brought within one year of first action which was brought within four years of delivery of motor home under § 47-2-725, third suit was barred because second suit was begun more than four years after delivery, and suit allowed under this section must be one following action begun within four years under § 47-2-725, here the first action only. Poppenheimer v. Bluff City Motor Homes, etc., 658 S.W.2d 106, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 713 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

Where plaintiff's second pro se medical malpractice complaint was filed within one year of the date of the voluntary dismissal of her first complaint, this was timely under the saving statute, T.C.A. 28-1-105(a); however, where the second complaint was not served on the defendants within one year of filing and plaintiff could not rely on the saving statute, the complaint was properly dismissed as untimely. Slone v. Mitchell, 205 S.W.3d 469, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 586 (Tenn. June 26, 2006).

T.C.A. § 29-26-121 does not change the traditional definition of commencement under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3; therefore, although the pre-suit notice requirements must be given, unless properly excused, a failure to satisfy them before the filing of a complaint does not prevent that filing from being considered a commencement within the meaning of § 29-26-121(c). Therefore, a refiled medical malpractice case should not have been dismissed based on an allegation that the pre-suit notice requirements were not met in the original filing because, despite nonsuiting a first lawsuit, a second lawsuit was commenced within the one year time period provided for in T.C.A. § 28-1-105. Cartwright v. DMC-Memphis Inc., 468 S.W.3d 517, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 796 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2014), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. Apr. 14, 2015).

In a case arising from an automobile accident, damages should not have been awarded for personal injuries because an insurer's claim was not made until after the statute of limitations had run, and an appeal to the circuit court from the general sessions court did not extend the limitations period; in such an appeal, the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure did not expand the circuit court's jurisdiction. The savings statute did not permit the insurer to refile the previous action and rely upon the original filing of the lawsuit in order to add a claim for personal injuries. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Blondin, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 189 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2016).

63. —Former Suit Pending.

Where the evidence is uncontroverted that the former suit was not dismissed at the time of the institution of such later suit, but is still pending, it is proper for the court to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant. Seymour v. Southern R. Co., 117 Tenn. 98, 98 S.W. 174, 1906 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1906).

64. —Death of Plaintiff.

The new suit, after prior suit has abated by death of the plaintiff, must be brought within a year from the plaintiff's death, and it is not sufficient that new suit be brought within a year from the suggestion of his death and the record of abatement made. Norment v. Smith, 20 Tenn. 46, 1839 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1839).

65. —Hiatus in Process.

Judgment of dismissal or discontinuance for hiatus in the issuance of pluries summons is necessary to terminate the suit, and a new suit may be brought within one year from such judgment, or from the last day the pluries summons could have been issued and served so as to be returnable to the next term. Cherry v. Mississippi Valley Ins. Co., 84 Tenn. 292, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 99 (1886).

Where, within the time allowed by the statute of limitations, plaintiff obtained a judgment on a note against two defendants, one of whom had not been served with process, the judgment was void as to defendant not served, and had the legal effect of a judgment against plaintiff, as an informal dismissal of the action not affecting the merits of the cause, entitling plaintiff to bring a new action within one year, although plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of limitations before the new suit was brought. Galbraith v. Kirby, 21 Tenn. App. 303, 109 S.W.2d 1168, 1937 Tenn. App. LEXIS 35 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1937).

66. —Voluntary Nonsuit After Reversal and Remandment.

Plaintiff, who obtained a judgment which was reversed with remandment for new trial, and who, after the remandment, took a voluntary nonsuit, may commence a new action within one year after such nonsuit, and is not required to commence such action within one year from the reversal and remandment, as the word “reversed” in this statute means a reversal of the judgment nisi that terminates, in the appellate court, the suit without an adjudication of the merits, and not a reversal with a remandment for a new trial. Nashville, C. & S. L. R. Co. v. Bolton, 134 Tenn. 447, 184 S.W. 9, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 170 (1916).

67. —Third Suit After Two Voluntary Nonsuits.

Where the plaintiff in a personal injury case voluntarily took nonsuit because the action was filed in the wrong county, and the second suit was dismissed because she failed to file a declaration and the third suit was filed more than a year after the first action the case was barred notwithstanding it was filed within the one year period from the second suit, but which was more than one year after the first action was nonsuited. Boyce v. Southern R.R., 5 Tenn. Civ. App. (5 Higgins) 140 (1914).

In a personal injury case, the first nonsuit was entered more than one year after the institution of the suit, and the second nonsuit was entered about one year thereafter, and within a few days thereafter, the third suit was instituted. Such third suit was not instituted within one year after the termination of the action that was brought within the time limited by the statute of limitations. Reed v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 136 Tenn. 499, 190 S.W. 458, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 154 (1916). See Boyce v. Southern R.R., 5 Tenn. Civ. App. (5 Higgins) 140 (1914).

Action for damages against railroad company for death of plaintiff's husband filed within one year after voluntary nonsuit on similar action which in turn was filed within one year of similar disposition of action brought within the one year period of limitation was barred by the statute of limitations where the last action was not brought within one year of the disposition of the action brought within the period of limitation. Turner v. N. C. & S. L. Railway, 199 Tenn. 137, 285 S.W.2d 122, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 437, 54 A.L.R.2d 1225 (1955).

Where two actions were brought within the period of the statute of limitations with an inconclusive dismissal of both by voluntary nonsuit, a third action brought within one year of the dismissal of the second suit was within the provisions of this section the second action having been brought independently of any rights afforded the plaintiff under this section. Balsinger v. Gass, 214 Tenn. 343, 379 S.W.2d 800, 1964 Tenn. LEXIS 483 (1964).

The failure to bring a third action within one year following the voluntary dismissal of the initial suit results in the case being time barred, notwithstanding the fact that the third suit was filed within one year of the voluntary dismissal of the second suit. Creed v. Valentine, 967 S.W.2d 325, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

68. —Second Suit Within Limitations.

A suit on insurance policy brought within six years after accrual of cause of action is not barred simply because a former suit was dismissed without prejudice more than a year prior thereto. Dushan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 14 Tenn. App. 422, — S.W.2d —, 1931 Tenn. App. LEXIS 53 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1931).

Where complainant in present case had filed cross-bill claiming disputed property in action between other parties and the former suit was dismissed without prejudice, complainant could bring a new action over one year after dismissal without being barred by this section if within seven year limit in § 28-2-102. Winborn v. Alexander, 39 Tenn. App. 1, 279 S.W.2d 718, 1954 Tenn. App. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954).

Where plaintiffs' counsel told the clerk prior to trial that plaintiffs desired to take a voluntary nonsuit but where written notice of the dismissal was not filed pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01 until several months later, the court was without authority to make such written notice effective retrospectively to the date of the conversation between counsel and the clerk, hence a second suit filed within one year of the filing of the written notice of nonsuit was timely under the requirements of this section. Snell v. Leffew, 558 S.W.2d 849, 1977 Tenn. App. LEXIS 315 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).

This section accords a plaintiff who files his second action within one year of the voluntary non-suit of his first suit the same procedural and substantive benefits which were available to the plaintiff in the first action. (citing also Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15). Energy Sav. Products, Inc. v. Carney, 737 S.W.2d 783, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2799 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

69. —Estoppel.

The “saving statute,” is available to a plaintiff who files his second action within one year of the voluntary nonsuit of his first suit even though that first suit was not filed within the period fixed by the appropriate statute of limitations, provided, the facts and circumstances are such that the defendant is estopped to assert that the filing of the first action was tardy. Dukes v. Montgomery County Nursing Home, 639 S.W.2d 910, 1982 Tenn. LEXIS 349 (Tenn. 1982).

70. —Fraudulent Concealment of Cause.

Plaintiff's contention that the fraudulent concealment of the cause of action by the defendants suspended the running of the statute, could not be sustained where it appears that plaintiff testified to having brought a former suit against same defendants more than one year before present action was brought. Hudson v. Shoulders, 22 Tenn. App. 301, 122 S.W.2d 817, 1938 Tenn. App. LEXIS 29 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1938).

71. —Application to State.

This section providing for the commencement of a new suit within one year does not apply to the state. Williams v. Cravens, 31 Tenn. App. 246, 214 S.W.2d 57, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

Where commencement of tax suit cut off defense of statute of limitations, right of state to collect these taxes was not lost by dismissal of suit, since within a reasonable time state could have instituted another suit for the taxes, the right not being limited by this section, but by doctrine of laches. Williams v. Cravens, 31 Tenn. App. 246, 214 S.W.2d 57, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

Construing the language of this savings statute strictly, it cannot be applied against the state because it does not specifically name the state. Statutes permitting suits against the state must be strictly construed, and general procedural statutes do not apply against the state unless the state's specifically named in the statute. AMC Mortg. Co. v. Tennessee Dep't of Revenue (In re AMC Mortg. Co.), 213 F.3d 917, 2000 FED App. 175P, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11751 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2000).

72. Procedure and Practice.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting children's motion to amend to assert a claim that a contractor was liable for negligent training and supervision because they did not enter a voluntary nonsuit when they did not include the claim in the second amended complaint, and there was no other judgment rendered against them that concluded the right of action; there had not been any disposition of the children's claim, and the statute had not been triggered. Harmon v. Hickman Cmty. Healthcare Servs., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 374 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2018), rev'd, 594 S.W.3d 297, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Jan. 28, 2020).

73. —Burden of Proof.

Where the plaintiff in an action prima facie barred by lapse of time relies upon the commencement of a former action and a dismissal thereof within one year before the commencement of the second action, the burden rests upon him to show that the former action was “commenced.” East Tennessee Coal Co. v. Daniel, 100 Tenn. 65, 42 S.W. 1062, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1897).

When the plaintiff's declaration shows on its face that the claim sued on is barred by the statute of limitations, a plea interposed by the defendant will shift the burden of producing evidence to the plaintiff who must produce evidence to show that the suit falls in the savings clause; but where the plaintiff anticipates the defense and alleges facts in his declaration which would bring his cause of action within the saving statute and these facts are not specifically denied by defendant, plaintiff is relieved of the statutory bar and need not produce any proof pertaining thereto. Knox County v. Moncier, 224 Tenn. 361, 455 S.W.2d 153, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 334 (1970).

74. —Pleading Defense of Limitations.

Chancery court, dismissing suit because remedy is at law, may enjoin reliance on statute of limitations in a court of law for the period of pendency of the bill, especially where the want of jurisdiction in the chancery court was not so clear that the bringing of the suit therein would show such gross negligence and indifference as to exclude the plaintiff from the benefit of this section. Smith v. McNeal, 109 U.S. 426, 3 S. Ct. 319, 27 L. Ed. 986, 1883 U.S. LEXIS 985 (1883).

Where, after the plea of the statute of limitations, the plaintiff amended his declaration showing that there was a former suit in which he took a nonsuit without its being determined upon the merits, and the defendant did not plead the limitation to the amended declaration, he waived the defense thereof, and could not raise it by motion in arrest of judgment. Carolina, C. & O. R. Co. v. Mumpower, 205 F. 872, 1913 U.S. App. LEXIS 1505 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1913).

Where the declaration avers not only an original cause of action, but the bringing of suit thereon within one year after its accrual, and that the same was dismissed without a trial upon the merits, within one year next before the present suit was instituted, a simple plea thereto “that the cause of action arose more than one year before the bringing of this suit,” presents no defense, for the unanswered averment of the declaration, which is admitted under the rules of pleading, constituted a sufficient answer to the plea. Railroad v. Harris, 101 Tenn. 527, 47 S.W. 1096, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (1898); Holliston Mills of Tennessee v. McGuffin, 177 Tenn. 1, 145 S.W.2d 1, 1940 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (1940).

Where in an action for personal injuries the plaintiff alleged the bringing of a former suit and its dismissal by nonsuit and the bringing of the present suit within 12 months thereafter and the plea filed by defendant raising such issue simply alleged that “plaintiff's alleged cause of action, if any, accrued more than one year before the institution of this suit, and more than one year before the institution of original suit, and defendant here pleads and relies upon the one year statute of limitations as a complete bar,” the filing of such plea did not put upon the plaintiff the burden of making proof to sustain the averments of the declaration in this regard. Holliston Mills of Tennessee v. McGuffin, 177 Tenn. 1, 145 S.W.2d 1, 1940 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (1940).

75. —Injunction Suspending Statute of Limitations.

Where the chancery court dismisses the bill because the complainant's remedy is at law, it may, by its decree of dismissal, enjoin the defendant from pleading and relying on the statute of limitations during the pendency of the bill, as a defense to an action which may be brought at law. Love v. White, 5 Tenn. 210, 1817 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (1817); Swift & Co. v. Memphis Cold Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Tenn. 82, 158 S.W. 480, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1913).

76. —Objections.

Where a nonsuit is taken and a new action brought, in order that a defendant may take advantage of any qualifications to this section, it must affirmatively appear that the errors complained of were brought to the attention of the trial court. Sears-Roebuck & Co. v. Finney, 169 Tenn. 547, 89 S.W.2d 749, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 81 (1936).

77. —Failure of Record to Show.

The statute of limitations was a good defense to a malpractice action by the plaintiff where he did not read into evidence the record of a former suit between the same parties on the same facts wherein the plaintiff had taken a voluntary nonsuit. Hudson v. Shoulders, 22 Tenn. App. 301, 122 S.W.2d 817, 1938 Tenn. App. LEXIS 29 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1938).

78. —Authority of Attorney.

An attorney has implied authority to agree to a dismissal or nonsuit which does not bar the right of the client to sue again but has no implied authority to release a claim or cause of action or otherwise give up the rights of the client. Long v. Kirby-Smith, 40 Tenn. App. 446, 292 S.W.2d 216, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956), superseded by statute as stated in, Lovelace v. State, — S.W.2d —, 1989 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 167 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 1989).

79. —Sufficiency of Complaint.

A corporate complaint signed by its nonlawyer president was invalid since it did not meet the requirement of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11, that it be signed by an attorney of record or the party, and the defect in the filing was not cured by the subsequent filing of a notice of appearance by the corporation's attorney. Old Hickory Eng'g & Mach. Co. v. Henry, 937 S.W.2d 782, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 515 (Tenn. 1996).

80. —Tolling Agreement.

Tennessee savings statute applied to save an action because the action was filed by a former client within the extended statute of limitations set by a tolling agreement between the client and the client's former legal counsel. Furthermore, the action was voluntarily nonsuited and was refiled within one year, but after the extended statute of limitations in the tolling agreement. Circle C Constr., LLC v. Nilsen, 484 S.W.3d 914, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 170 (Tenn. Mar. 7, 2016).

81. Savings Statute.

Causes of action under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977, T.C.A. § 47-18-101 et seq., set forth in the subsequent complaint, did not arise in any sense from the alteration or improper preparation of hospital records. The district court properly concluded that the claims in the two complaints were not related closely enough to each other, and did not arise from the same set of operative facts, so as to give proper notice to the hospital regarding the nature of the complaints; as a result, the second complaint could not be deemed timely even through operation of Tennessee's savings statute. Scott v. Mem'l Health Care Sys., — F.3d —, 2016 FED App. 0492N, 2016 FED App. 492N, 660 Fed. Appx. 366, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15630 (6th Cir. Aug. 22, 2016), cert. denied, 197 L. Ed. 2d 200, 137 S. Ct. 1089, — U.S. —, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 1290 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2017).

Tennessee savings statute applied to save an action because the action was filed by a former client within the extended statute of limitations set by a tolling agreement between the client and the client's former legal counsel. Furthermore, the action was voluntarily nonsuited and was refiled within one year, but after the extended statute of limitations in the tolling agreement. Circle C Constr., LLC v. Nilsen, 484 S.W.3d 914, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 170 (Tenn. Mar. 7, 2016).

Tennessee's general savings statutes provide plaintiffs with additional time to refile a complaint after the dismissal of previous action. However, these general savings statutes are inapplicable to suits against the State of Tennessee or other governmental entities. Jackson v. City of Cleveland, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 948 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2016).

Tennessee saving statute did not operate to save the lawsuit because the third refiling was filed outside the one year saving period and after the statute of limitations had expired and, because the saving statute itself barred the customer's third case, the trial court's focus on the improper service of process in the second case was unnecessary. Greenwood v. Nat'l Dentex Corp., — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 639 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2016).

Absent application of the savings statute, appellant's lawsuit would be time-barred, but his reliance on the savings statute was misplaced because application of the statute would run afoul of the doctrine of sovereign immunity; given Tennessee precedent holding that the savings statute did not apply to save claims against governmental entities, the savings statute was unavailable to allow the maintenance of appellant's lawsuit against appellee, and the trial court's dismissal of the complaint was justified. Clark v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 226 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2017).

Even assuming that the savings statute was somehow available, the trial court did not err in dismissing the case because at the time the trial court's order of dismissal was entered, over a year had elapsed from the filing of the complaint without any issuance of process. Clark v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 226 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2017).

Trial court properly dismissed a wife's claim for loss of consortium as barred by the statute of limitations because the wife she was not a party to the patient's original health care liability complaint that was dismissed without prejudice; thus, the wife was unable to take advantage of the saving statute that was available to the patient, her husband. Brookins v. Tabor, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 139 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2018), substituted opinion, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2018).

Trial court did not err in dismissing a patient's health care liability company against a doctor because they were barred since the patient failed to comply with the saving statutes; the patient did not serve the doctor with process as required by the saving statute because the doctor was not served with the complaint before the trial court dismissed it for lack of prosecution. Brookins v. Tabor, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 139 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2018), substituted opinion, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2018).

Dismissal of executrix's second health care liability action was appropriate because the executrix's original complaint was untimely filed as no reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that the executrix, in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should not have known that the executrix was injured as a result of the health care provider's allegedly wrongful conduct when the executrix learned that the executrix's parent had escaped from a hospital and killed their spouse before committing suicide. Herpst v. Parkridge Med. Ctr., Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 492 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2018).

Appellants commenced the first complaint within the statute of limitations applicable to their personal injury claim, a dismissal was entered without prejudice and not upon any ground concluding appellants'  right of action; therefore, the one-year statute of limitations under the savings statute commenced upon entry of the dismissal order and the second complaint was timely filed. The delay in filing the return of service did not bar application of the savings statute. Villalba v. McCown, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 424 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2019).

Trial court properly granted the defendants'  motion to dismiss because the plaintiff's individual action—for declaratory relief and recovery of personal property concerning a vehicle that allegedly belonged to a decedent's estate—was untimely since it was not saved by the savings statute where, while he was a co-personal representatives of the estate in the original action, the plaintiff, in his individual capacity, was not a privy of the other co-personal representative in his second action since they did not have a mutuality of interest or a mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property. Townsend v. Little, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 193 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020).

Trial court properly ruled that a church's 2019 complaint against a lending institution was barred by the statutes of limitation and the savings statute because the complaint was not filed within one year from the date the church's initial complaint was dismissed; the statute of limitations for the lending institution's breach of contract and fraud claims had run by the time the church filed its complaint, and as a result, the church's nonsuit of its 2018 lawsuit operated as a dismissal on the merits of those claims. Mount Hopewell Missionary Baptist Church v. Found. Capital Res., — S.W.3d —, 2021 Tenn. App. LEXIS 39 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2021).

28-1-106. Accrual of right if person under eighteen years of age, adjudicated incompetent, or lacking capacity.

  1. If the person entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of action accrued, either under eighteen (18) years of age, or adjudicated incompetent, such person, or such person's representatives and privies, as the case may be, may commence the action, after legal rights are restored, within the time of limitation for the particular cause of action, unless it exceeds three (3) years, and in that case within three (3) years from restoration of legal rights.
  2. Persons over the age of eighteen (18) years of age are presumed competent.
    1. If the person entitled to commence an action, at the time the cause of action accrued, lacks capacity, such person or such person's representatives and privies, as the case may be, may commence the action, after removal of such incapacity, within the time of limitation for the particular cause of action, unless it exceeds three (3) years, and in that case within three (3) years from removal of such incapacity, except as provided for in subdivision (c)(2).
    2. Any individual with court-ordered fiduciary responsibility towards a person who lacks capacity, or any individual who possesses the legal right to bring suit on behalf of a person who lacks capacity, shall commence the action on behalf of that person within the applicable statute of limitations and may not rely on any tolling of the statute of limitations, unless that individual can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the individual did not and could not reasonably have known of the accrued cause of action.
    3. Any person asserting lack of capacity and the lack of a fiduciary or other representative who knew or reasonably should have known of the accrued cause of action shall have the burden of proving the existence of such facts.
    4. Nothing in this subsection (c) shall affect or toll any statute of repose within this code.
  3. For purposes of this section, the term “person who lacks capacity” means and shall be interpreted consistently with the term “person of unsound mind” as found in this section prior to its amendment by Chapter 47 of the Public Acts of 2011.

Code 1858, § 2757 (deriv. Acts 1715, ch. 27, § 9; 1819, ch. 28, §§ 1, 2; 1823, ch. 16, § 1; 1827, ch. 75); Acts 1901, ch. 15, § 1; Shan., § 4448; mod. Code 1932, § 8574; Acts 1971, ch. 162, § 2; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-107; Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 17; 2016, ch. 932, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 107 provided that nothing in the legislation shall be construed to alter or otherwise affect the eligibility for services or the rights or responsibilities of individuals covered by the provision on the day before the date of enactment of this legislation, which was July 1, 2011.

Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 108 provided that the provisions of the act are declared to be remedial in nature and all provisions of the act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.

Acts 2016, ch. 932, § 2 provided that the act, which amended this section, shall apply only to causes of action filed on or after April 27, 2016.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), §§ 325, 352.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 1 Tenn. Juris., Adverse Possession, §§ 2, 25, 39, 56, 63; 5 Tenn. Juris., Beneficial and Benevolent Associations, §§ 26, 30, 32; 14 Tenn. Juris., Guardian and Ward, § 32; 18 Tenn. Juris., Limitations of Actions, §§ 4, 20, 25; 18 Tenn. Juris., Mental Illness, etc., §§ 8, 14; 19 Tenn. Juris., Negligence, § 14; 20 Tenn. Juris., Physicians and Surgeons, § 8; 25 Tenn. Juris., Wills, § 60.

Law Reviews.

Accrual of Cause of Action in Products Liability and Other Tort Actions, 42 Tenn. L. Rev. 593.

Day on Torts: Can a Minor Sue for Pre-majority Medical Expenses? (John A. Day), 43 Tenn B.J. 29 (2007).

Domestic Relations — 1963 Tennessee Survey (T. A. Smedley), 17 Vand. L. Rev. 1039.

Negligence — Subsequent Emancipation — Effect on Family Immunity, 29 Tenn. L. Rev. 595.

Statutes of Limitations — Personal Injury, Property Damage and Breach of Warranty, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 803.

Amending Tennessee's Incapacity Statute: It “May Not Be a Sexy Story, But It's One, Frankly, That … Will Help People”, 49 U. Mem. L. Rev. 575 (Winter 2018).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Acts of 1901, ch. 15 which repealed a part of this section which provided for the protection of persons living beyond the limits of the United States and the territories thereof, was constitutional because it did not cut off all rights of action immediately, but gave to persons formerly beyond the limits of the United States the full period of the statute of limitations after the enactment thereof in which to bring suits. Jones v. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co., 133 Tenn. 159, 180 S.W. 179, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1915).

The Legal Responsibility Act of 1971 (amending §§ 23-1201 (now § 29-31-101), 28-1-106, 39-1003 (now § 39-17-310), 39-3706 (repealed), 57-3-210) is not unconstitutional as being retrospective. Arnold v. Davis, 503 S.W.2d 100, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. 1973).

2. Purpose and Policy.

The right of action of a person under disability is protected against lapse of time by this section. Hatcher v. State, 24 Tenn. App. 213, 142 S.W.2d 326, 1940 Tenn. App. LEXIS 27 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940).

The Products Liability Act suggests that there is a general legislative policy not to include minors in the operation of restrictive statutes of limitations and thus supports the view that § 29-26-116 was not intended to supersede the legal disability statute in the case of minors. Parlato v. Howe, 470 F. Supp. 996, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12922 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).

The legal disability statute represents a long-standing policy of the state of Tennessee to protect potential causes of actions by minors during the period of their minority. Parlato v. Howe, 470 F. Supp. 996, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12922 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).

The exclusion of minors from the operation of the products liability statute of limitations, § 29-28-103 renders it extremely unlikely that the legislature intended to include minors in the operation of § 29-26-116. Parlato v. Howe, 470 F. Supp. 996, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12922 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).

Any further liberalization of this section is properly a legislative prerogative. Jane Doe A v. Coffee County Bd. of Educ., 852 S.W.2d 899, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1019 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

A patient who was able to manage her personal affairs and understand her legal rights and liabilities, was not entitled to an extension of the statute of limitations under T.C.A. § 28-1-106. Crawford v. Beatty, 108 S.W.3d 877, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 543 (Tenn. June 2, 2003).

3. Construction.

T.C.A. § 28-1-106 clearly provides that the period of mental incompetency is not chargeable, from a statute of limitations standpoint, against such person's representatives and privies; “the person entitled to commence an action,” as that language is used in the statute, refers to the person under the disability and not to one who holds his or her power of attorney. Sullivan v. Chattanooga Med. Investors, LP, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2006), aff'd, Sullivan v. Chattanooga Med. Investors, 221 S.W.3d 506, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2007).

4. Construction with Other Statutes.

Section 29-26-116 does not eliminate the special rights of minors under § 28-1-106. Braden v. Yoder, 592 S.W.2d 896, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 366 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979), overruled, Calaway ex rel. Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1061 (Tenn. 2005), overruled, Walker v. Lazar, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 621 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2006), overruled in part, Crespo v. McCullough, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 673 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2008).

Actions for personal injuries to minors against city and public utility initiated three years after accident were barred by § 29-20-305 as not having been initiated within one year after the cause of action accrued; and § 29-20-104(b), enacted in 1980, making this section applicable to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, was not applied retroactively to these actions which had accrued in 1978, and did not save the causes of these minor plaintiffs. Collier v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 657 S.W.2d 771, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

Where minor plaintiffs were barred under § 29-20-305 from bringing actions against city and utility for personal injury, contentions certain street and utility conditions created an action independent of the Governmental Tort Liability Act for damages due to injuries caused by nuisance, and thus allowed the minor plaintiffs the benefits of the statute of limitations under this section, tolling the other statute until they attained age 18, were rejected. Collier v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 657 S.W.2d 771, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

This section is applicable to post-conviction proceedings. Watkins v. State, 903 S.W.2d 302, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 340 (Tenn. 1995).

The three-year limitation period contained in § 29-26-116 was tolled by plaintiff's disability of minority. Bowers by Bowers v. Hammond, 954 S.W.2d 752, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 310 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), overruled, Calaway ex rel. Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1061 (Tenn. 2005), overruled, Walker v. Lazar, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 621 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2006), overruled, Miller v. Dacus, 231 S.W.3d 903, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 648 (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2007), overruled in part, Crespo v. McCullough, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 673 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2008), overruled, Bentley v. Wellmont Health Sys., — S.W.3d —, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2014).

T.C.A. § 40-30-202, pertaining to post conviction procedures, is not tolled due to mental incompetence under the savings provision in T.C.A. § 28-1-106. Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 347 (Tenn. 2000).

The plain language of T.C.A. § 28-1-106 applies only to toll statutes of limitations rather than statutes of repose. To the extent that the language in Bowers by Bowers v. Hammond, 954 S.W.2d 752, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 310 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) can be read to toll any statute of repose for mental incompetency under T.C.A. § 28-1-106, it is overruled. Penley v. Honda Motor Co., 31 S.W.3d 181, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 458 (Tenn. 2000).

This tolling provision has no application to Title VII of the Federal Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) et seq. claims. Wade v. Knoxville Utils. Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 2001 FED App. 246P, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16932 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2001).

While T.C.A. § 28-1-106 tolls the applicable statute of limitation for mental incompetency, no such statutory exception exists for the medical malpractice statute of repose, T.C.A. § 29-26-116(a)(3); mental incompetency does not require tolling of T.C.A. § 29-26-116(a)(3). Mills v. Wong, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003), aff'd, 155 S.W.3d 916, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 102 (Tenn. 2005).

Legal disability statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-106, was not intended to serve as an exception to the medical malpractice statute of repose, T.C.A. § 29-26-116; the medical malpractice statute of repose contained no express exception for minors, and neither did any other part of the Code, including the legal disability statute, reference the statute of repose with respect to minors; the statute served to toll only statutes of limitations and not statutes of repose. Calaway ex rel. Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1061 (Tenn. 2005).

T.C.A. § 28-1-106 and T.C.A. § 34-6-103 could be harmonized as, while T.C.A. § 34-6-103 addressed the binding-on-the-principal effect of an act undertaken by a holder of a power of attorney, it did not necessarily or logically follow that the holder of the power's failure to act, that was, the failure of the plaintiff to file suit within the one-year limitations period, also bound plaintiff as if the principal had been competent and not disabled. Sullivan v. Chattanooga Med. Investors, LP, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2006), aff'd, Sullivan v. Chattanooga Med. Investors, 221 S.W.3d 506, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2007).

5. Wrongful Death Actions.

Application of this provision to state wrongful death statutes is contrary to the basic theory of those statutes. Jones v. Black, 539 S.W.2d 123, 1976 Tenn. LEXIS 572 (Tenn. 1976).

In wrongful death suit brought by decedent's minor children and their parent against city, in whose jail decedent was incarcerated when the decedent committed suicide, the statute of limitations for the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, compiled in title 29, chapter 20, was not tolled by the children's minority, nor was it tolled by the pendency of the suit in federal court; trial court properly granted the city's motion to dismiss. Lynn v. City of Jackson, 63 S.W.3d 332, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 858 (Tenn. 2001), overruled, Moore v. Coffee County, 2010 FED App. 0715N, 402 Fed. Appx. 107, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23639, 2010 FED App. 715N (6th Cir.) (6th Cir. Tenn. 2010).

Where plaintiff parents brought their wrongful death claims more than three years after the death of their minor children, Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations barred these claims. T.C.A. § 28-1-106 did not have the effect of tolling the limitations period. Lemons v. Cloer, 206 S.W.3d 60, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 285 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 795 (Tenn. 2006).

Although the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment to a nursing home because a family untimely filed their wrongful death case, given the recent decision in Abels v. Genie Industries, Inc. , — S.W.3d —, the judgment was vacated and the case was remanded for the parties to present proof of the decedent's mental state in light of Abels  and the legal disability statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-106; although there was evidence indicating that he might have been of unsound mind, that was a factual matter to be decided by the trier of fact. Burk v. RHA/Sullivan, Inc., 220 S.W.3d 896, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (Tenn. Jan. 29, 2007).

6. Actions Accruing After Disability Removed.

If plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue while he was under disability, this section is not applicable. Minter v. Clark, 92 Tenn. 459, 22 S.W. 73, 1893 Tenn. LEXIS 1 (1893).

7. Actions Against Personal Representatives.

The general provisions of this section do not apply to actions against personal representatives. The limitation of actions against them is specially provided for elsewhere. Jones v. Reynolds, 64 Tenn. 644, 1875 Tenn. LEXIS 147 (1875). See §§ 30-2-308, 30-2-501 et seq.

8. Prisoners Unprotected.

The disability of imprisonment was not retained and brought forward from the old statutes of limitations into the Code; and so the operation of such statutes is not suspended by imprisonment of the party entitled to sue. Bledsoe v. Stokes, 60 Tenn. 312, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 497 (1873); Puckett v. Springfield, 97 Tenn. 264, 37 S.W. 2, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 138 (1896).

9. Suits During Disability.

This section does not disqualify a wife from suing to recover damages for personal injuries, before the disability is removed, if she joins her husband as a nominal plaintiff. Rink v. Campbell, 70 F. 664, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 2539 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1895).

10. Deceased Minors.

In products liability case, where two minors were killed, although the cause of action accrued at date of sale of product, the one-year statute of limitations would not bar the suit, as the injuries resulted to minors, and the minors had they lived, would have had a cause of action. Rives v. International Oil Burner Co., 298 F. Supp. 1146, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9034 (E.D. Tenn. 1969).

11. Commencement of Period.

Deeds by father and stepmother of pretermitted son of testatrix which conveyed farm to third party and back to them as tenants by the entireties would not cause statute of limitations to run against pretermitted son where son had remainder in fee simple under pretermitted child statute after father's life estate by curtesy and son had no notice, either actual or constructive, of father's intention to defeat his remainder interest. Young v. Young, 48 Tenn. App. 645, 349 S.W.2d 545, 1961 Tenn. App. LEXIS 90 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961).

12. Computation of Period.

A person who was emancipated on May 11, 1971, by virtue of the 1971 amendment to this section has such period after such date as provided by applicable statute of limitations to bring his action, up to a period of three years. Arnold v. Davis, 503 S.W.2d 100, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. 1973).

Plaintiff was 17 years old at the time he allegedly suffered his injuries, and he had up until his nineteenth birthday to commence an action related to his alleged injury; while he timely filed an action against the company in August 2017, he did not amend his complaint to add the successor company until July 30, 2018, and because his original pre-suit notice only applied to the company, it did not extend the time to file suit against the successor company for 120 days beyond the statute of limitations. His amended complaint was untimely. Waller v. Varangon Corp., — S.W.3d —, 2021 Tenn. App. LEXIS 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2021).

13. —Three Year Period.

Where a cause of action accrues to a person under disability, such person is entitled to the whole period of time limited for the bringing of the particular cause of action, counting from the accrual of the cause of action; and the three year period after the removal of disability provided for by this section was intended, in a sense, as a period of grace, and not to cut down the time fixed by statute, for the particular cause of action, to three years after the removal of the disability, regardless of the question whether the time limited for the particular cause of action had expired or not. Patton v. Dixon, 105 Tenn. 97, 58 S.W. 299, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (1900); Jackson v. Crutchfield, 111 Tenn. 394, 77 S.W. 776, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1903).

Where the time limited for bringing the particular cause of action expires during the disability, then the action must be brought within three years after the removal of such disability. Jackson v. Crutchfield, 111 Tenn. 394, 77 S.W. 776, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1903).

14. —Limitation for Particular Action.

A right to damages for taking a right-of-way, accruing to an incompetent, expired as to right of action one year from the incompetent's death, which was the time of limitation for that particular cause of action. Griffith v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 147 Tenn. 224, 246 S.W. 532, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1922).

15. —Lapse of Time — Insignificance.

Mere lapse of time creates no presumption or prejudice against a person under disability and within the saving of the statute of limitations. Gaugh v. Henderson, 39 Tenn. 628, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 293 (1859).

16. —Adverse Possession.

When an adverse possessor has had seven years' possession of land of a person under disability, the title is thereby vested in the adverse possessor subject only to be divested in case action is brought by the owner within three years after his disability is removed; otherwise the title of the adverse possessor becomes absolute and a subsequent abandonment of possession does not affect the title of the adverse possessor or operate to revest title in the original owner. Dewey v. Sewanee Fuel & Iron Co., 191 F. 450, 1910 U.S. App. LEXIS 5798 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1910).

17. —Presumption of Title from Lapse of Time.

This section has no bearing upon the presumption of title from lapse of time; and where one was an infant at the time of inheriting land to which another claims title by adverse possession, only the time during which the disability existed will be counted in determining the length of the adverse possession. Ferguson v. Prince, 136 Tenn. 543, 190 S.W. 548, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 160 (1916).

18. Infant — Time of Suit.

For damages to his person, an infant may sue by next friend, during his minority, or he may sue in his own name, within one year after he comes of age. Whirley v. Whiteman, 38 Tenn. 610, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 236 (1858), overruled in part, McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 336 (Tenn. 1992).

The right of an infant to recover his land from one who purchased it from his guardian is not postponed until termination of his wardship. The statute began to run after emergence from his infancy. Hale v. Ellison, 59 S.W. 673, 1900 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 112 (1900).

While a note payable to the guardian may be barred by the statute of limitation of six years, the ward may, under this section, sue within three years after reaching majority. Moyers v. Kinnick, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 65 (1901).

To enjoy the protection of this section, the right of action must accrue during minority. Tate v. Eli Lilly & Co., 522 F. Supp. 1048, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14544 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).

Claim that a school's use of gym-mat fencings to isolate a student violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act was not time-barred since the minority-tolling law applied to these claims. I.L. v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Educ., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92257 (E.D. Tenn. June 15, 2017), aff'd, I.L. v. Tenn. Dep't of Educ., — F.3d —, 2018 FED App. 312N (6th Cir.), 739 Fed. Appx. 319, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 17162 (6th Cir. Tenn. June 25, 2018).

19. —Tax Redemption.

No special protection is accorded an infant under the tax redemption statute (§ 64-801 (now § 66-8-101)) although the general statute of limitations preserves the right of action of a minor until after the removal of disability (§ 28-1-106) and despite the fact that under § 54-12-421 relating to assessments for road improvement districts, the right of redemption of lands is extended for the period of one year after the removal of the disability of an infant. Section 64-801 (now § 66-8-101) providing for the redemption of land sold for taxes contains no such exemption. McGee v. Carter, 31 Tenn. App. 141, 212 S.W.2d 902, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 78 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

20. —Ward's Suits After Becoming of Age.

The ward's right of action against his guardian and sureties does not accrue until that relation is terminated in some way; and if the guardian continues in the relation until the ward reaches his majority, the ward is not limited in his time for suing by this section, but by §§ 28-3-109, 28-3-110. Jones v. Ward, 18 Tenn. 160, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 112 (1836); State use of Heirs of Howard v. Parker, 67 Tenn. 495, 1875 Tenn. LEXIS 73 (1875), overruled in part, Jackson v. Crutchfield, 111 Tenn. 394, 77 S.W. 776, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1903); Lane v. Farmer, 79 Tenn. 568, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 109 (1883); Minter v. Clark, 92 Tenn. 459, 22 S.W. 73, 1893 Tenn. LEXIS 1 (1893); Prewitt v. Bunch, 101 Tenn. 723, 50 S.W. 748, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 129 (1898).

21. —Termination of Guardianship.

An action by the administrator of the deceased against the guardian, to recover money allegedly coming into the hands of the defendant while acting as guardian, was not barred until six years after the cause of action accrued upon death of ward. Joslin v. Vaughn, 181 Tenn. 349, 181 S.W.2d 340, 1944 Tenn. LEXIS 379 (1944).

22. Persons of Unsound Mind.

Mental imbecility from extreme old age brings a party within the exception of unsound mind. Porter v. Porter, 22 Tenn. 586, 1842 Tenn. LEXIS 154 (1842).

Evidence regarding plaintiff's unsoundness of mind was sufficient to warrant denial of summary judgment. Smith v. Grumman-Olsen Corp., 913 F. Supp. 1077, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19800 (E.D. Tenn. 1995).

Where plaintiff's anxiety and depression was not shown to render her of unsound mind and she was aware of facts sufficient to put her on notice that she suffered an injury, her claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations and were not tolled. Jacobs v. Baylor Sch., 957 F. Supp. 1002, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20704 (E.D. Tenn. 1996).

A psychological evaluation of plaintiff wife, made prior to an altercation with her husband, showing that she suffered from depression with psychotic symptoms, was not evidence that she was of unsound mind on the date her cause of action for assault must have accrued. Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12566 (E.D. Tenn. 1997).

The statute of repose under the Products Liability Act, compiled in title 29, chapter 28, was not tolled by T.C.A. § 28-1-106 during the twenty days that the plaintiff remained mentally incapacitated in the hospital. Penley v. Honda Motor Co., 31 S.W.3d 181, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 458 (Tenn. 2000).

Grant of summary judgment in favor of the physician in a medical-malpractice action was inappropriate because there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the patient was of unsound mind on the date the cause of action accrued, thus tolling the limitations period under T.C.A. § 29-26-116(a)(1). Sherrill v. Souder, 325 S.W.3d 584, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 988 (Tenn. Oct. 28, 2010).

Claims arising from a utility company's denial of services, which allegedly resulted in a decedent's death, were not filed within the applicable one-year limitations period; however, there was a factual dispute as to whether the decedent was of “unsound mind” under the version of the tolling statute in effect at the time, as there was evidence that the decedent was mentally disabled, illiterate, and unable to care for himself without help. Johnson v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., 777 F.3d 838, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 1935, 2015 FED App. 23P (6th Cir. Feb. 6, 2015).

There was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether a property owner's mother was of unsound mind when she became aware of the forged deed because the evidence did not demonstrate that the mother was or had been incapable of attending to business or unable to manage her day-to-day affairs such that the statute of limitations would be tolled; an affidavit confirmed that the mother was in good health when the forgery occurred and that she knew what had occurred. Patton v. Shelby County Gov't, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2017).

Probate court properly awarded a trustee summary judgment based on the expiration of the statute of limitations in a dispute over the conveyance of real property held in a testamentary trust because the statute of limitations was not tolled as the decedent was of sound mind when the cause of action accrued in that no facts were presented to demonstrate the decedent's incapacity during the relevant time. In re Conservatorship of Cross, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 449 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2020).

23. Procedure and Practice.

24. —Pleading Facts Avoiding Limitations.

The disability or facts that avoid the bar of the statute of limitations must be pleaded. Gross v. Disney, 95 Tenn. 592, 32 S.W. 632, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 133 (1895); Sully v. Childress, 106 Tenn. 109, 60 S.W. 499, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 138, 82 Am. St. Rep. 875 (1900); Gernt v. Cusack, 106 Tenn. 141, 59 S.W. 335, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 141 (1900); Jenkins v. Dewar, 112 Tenn. 684, 82 S.W. 470, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 63 (1904).

Where, in ejectment, defendant pleaded adverse possession, plaintiff's reply that, during such adverse possession, she was under the disability of infancy and that the adverse possession was abandoned before the disability was removed, was defective for failure to charge that her action was brought within three years after disability was removed. Dewey v. Sewanee Fuel & Iron Co., 191 F. 450, 1910 U.S. App. LEXIS 5798 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1910).

25. —Burden of Proof.

Where persons claim that, by reason of disabilities, they are within the saving of the statutes of limitations which otherwise appear to have barred their action, the burden is on them to bring themselves within such saving. Shropshire v. Shropshire, 15 Tenn. 164, 15 Tenn. 165, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 32 (1834); McClung v. Sneed, 40 Tenn. 218, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (1859); Alvis v. Oglesby's Ex'rs, 87 Tenn. 172, 10 S.W. 313, 1888 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1889); Gross v. Disney, 95 Tenn. 592, 32 S.W. 632, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 133 (1895); East Tennessee Coal Co. v. Daniel, 100 Tenn. 65, 42 S.W. 1062, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1897).

Appellate court affirmed the trial court's rejection of the inmate's claim that the statute of limitations in T.C.A. § 4-5-322 should be tolled due to a mental disability under T.C.A. § 28-1-106 as the inmate presented no evidence of mental illness or mental disability. Hughley v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2005), rev'd, 208 S.W.3d 388, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 1108 (Tenn. 2006).

26. —Equitable Relief.

Where a married woman has the right to possession and use of land, and she cannot maintain an action of ejectment because her husband refuses to join or by his laches his right to do so has become barred, equity has jurisdiction of the action of the wife, by her next friend, because she is without adequate remedy at law. Burt v. Cumberland Coal & Cooke Co., 159 F. 905, 1908 U.S. App. LEXIS 4151 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1908).

27. —Co-Defendants.

Although knowledge of misconduct on the part of one defendant does not automatically result in a finding of inquiry notice of claims against a potential co-defendant, a plaintiff should be charged with inquiry notice of what an investigation of the potential co-defendant would have revealed where potential co-defendants are closely connected, as with an employer/employee relationship; therefore, a motion to dismiss should have been granted in a case based on sexual abuse perpetrated by a priest because the action was time-barred under T.C.A. § 28-3-104 since a congregant could have learned when he reached the age of majority that he had a right of action against a diocese for negligent supervision and retention, and equitable estoppel, fraudulent concealment, and discovery rule did not operate to toll the limitations period. Doe v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis, 306 S.W.3d 712, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 144 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2009).

28. Emotional Harm.

The fact that plaintiffs insisted that they did not become fully aware that they had been “emotionally harmed” until some later date was not enough to toll the statute of limitations. Where they had known for quite some time that defendant had injured them, they were not allowed to delay filing suit until they became fully aware of all the injurious effects of defendant's conduct. Jane Doe A v. Coffee County Bd. of Educ., 852 S.W.2d 899, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1019 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Plaintiff-students were unable to take advantage of this section in a suit against a teacher for sexual abuse and the resulting emotional harm where they did not repress the memory of the incidents and remained aware of their injuries and the wrongfulness of defendant's conduct. Rather than being incapable of protecting their rights, they consciously chose not to pursue the matter to avoid embarrassment; therefore, their reluctance to come forward could not postpone the commencement of the running of either § 28-3-104(a)(1) or § 29-20-305(b). Jane Doe A v. Coffee County Bd. of Educ., 852 S.W.2d 899, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1019 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

29. Tolling During Disability.

Supreme court of Tennessee held that a child born alive has an independent cause of action for injuries caused by the failure of a physician to obtain informed consent from the child's mother during labor, and T.C.A. § 28-1-106 tolled the three-year statute of repose for the minor plaintiff's lack of informed consent claim, because her claim was commenced before the dates when the supreme court overruled the rule in Bowers v. Hammond, 954 S.W.2d 752, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 310. Miller v. Dacus, 231 S.W.3d 903, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 648 (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2007).

In answer to certified questions, the supreme court of Tennessee held that the tolling provision of Tennessee's legal disability statute remains in effect as to plaintiffs of unsound mind for so long as they remain of unsound mind regardless of the appointment of a legal guardian and/or the commencement of a lawsuit by a representative on behalf of the disabled plaintiff; the discovery rule is inapplicable to plaintiffs of unsound mind for so long as they remain of unsound mind. Abels v. Genie Indus., 202 S.W.3d 99, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 836 (Tenn. 2006).

The legal disability statute gives the legal representatives of minor persons and those of unsound mind the right to commence an action after the removal of such disability; the statute is silent, however, as to the effect of a representative commencing an action before the disability is removed. Abels v. Genie Indus., 202 S.W.3d 99, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 836 (Tenn. 2006).

Legal disability statute grants a period of grace for minors and those of unsound mind during their disability, and provides a maximum of three years in which to bring a claim after the disability is removed. Importantly, the statute does not treat the two disabilities differently but provides the same protections for individuals of unsound mind that it does for those under the age of eighteen. Abels v. Genie Indus., 202 S.W.3d 99, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 836 (Tenn. 2006).

Plain language of Tennessee's legal disability statute tolls the running of the statute of limitations while the claimant is either under the age of eighteen years, or of unsound mind; the disability of unsound mind is removed when the individual is no longer of unsound mind, due either to a change in the individual's condition or the individual's death and the statute contains no language which would lead the supreme court of Tennessee to conclude that the legislature intended for removal of either of these two disabilities upon appointment of a guardian. Abels v. Genie Indus., 202 S.W.3d 99, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 836 (Tenn. 2006).

Execution of a durable power of attorney, even if it authorizes the attorney in fact to handle claims and litigation, does not deprive the disabled person or the disabled person's representative of the tolling benefit of T.C.A. § 28-1-106. Sullivan v. Chattanooga Med. Investors, LP, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2006), aff'd, Sullivan v. Chattanooga Med. Investors, 221 S.W.3d 506, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2007).

Tolling statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-106, is the more specific statute, and it controls over the more general provision of the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act. Sullivan v. Chattanooga Med. Investors, 221 S.W.3d 506, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2007).

Intent of the language that “all acts done by an attorney in fact during any period of disability” shall bind the principal “as if the principal were competent and not disabled,” was to give the citizens of Tennessee the statutory authority to create a durable power of attorney; the statute does not refer to and was not intended to override the protections afforded to persons with disabilities under the tolling statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-106. Sullivan v. Chattanooga Med. Investors, 221 S.W.3d 506, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2007).

Court of appeals did not err in reversing the decision of the trial court that found that a deceased nursing home resident's negligence claims against the home were barred by the statute of limitations; the deceased was mentally incapacitated while he was a resident at the home, and therefore T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(1), the statute of limitations on his negligence claims, remained tolled by T.C.A. § 28-1-106 until his disability was removed by his death, and the tolling was uninterrupted by the existence of a durable power of attorney in his representative. Sullivan v. Chattanooga Med. Investors, 221 S.W.3d 506, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2007).

Supreme court of Tennessee held that the statute of limitations, T.C.A. § 28-3-104, is tolled for purposes of T.C.A. § 28-1-106, the tolling statute, for so long as the person to whom the claim belongs is under a disability because of age or unsound mind. Sullivan v. Chattanooga Med. Investors, 221 S.W.3d 506, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2007).

All minors have some person, either a guardian or a parent or a next friend, who has the authority to file a lawsuit on their behalf. It is the opinion of the supreme court of Tennessee; therefore, “the person entitled to commence an action” refers to the person who suffered the legal wrong or to whom the claim belongs. Sullivan v. Chattanooga Med. Investors, 221 S.W.3d 506, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2007).

If the supreme court of Tennessee were to construe the language in the tolling statute, “the person entitled to commence an action,” to include anyone with the authority to commence an action, the tolling statute would never apply in any case when a person is deemed to have the authority to act for someone who is disabled because of age or unsound mind; such a construction would conflict not only with the purpose of the statute but also with the supreme court's previous jurisprudence. Sullivan v. Chattanooga Med. Investors, 221 S.W.3d 506, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2007).

Person “entitled to commence an action” was a deceased nursing home resident who was incompetent while residing there because it was the deceased who had suffered the alleged negligent treatment at the hands of the nursing home; the deceased's representative, who had a durable power of attorney, was not the person entitled to commence the action. Sullivan v. Chattanooga Med. Investors, 221 S.W.3d 506, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2007).

Person “entitled to commence an action” is more than just a person who has the authority to bring an action; the term clearly refers to the person who is under the disability, who suffered the legal wrong, and to whom the claim belongs. Sullivan v. Chattanooga Med. Investors, 221 S.W.3d 506, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2007).

Neither the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act nor the tolling statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-106, contains any language which would lead the supreme court of Tennessee to conclude that the legislature intended to remove the disability of unsound mind upon the granting of a power of attorney. Sullivan v. Chattanooga Med. Investors, 221 S.W.3d 506, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2007).

T.C.A. § 34-6-103 was not intended to remove the protection afforded to persons with disabilities under T.C.A. § 28-1-106 and the supreme court of Tennessee must presume that in enacting T.C.A. § 34-6-103, of the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act, the legislature was aware of the tolling statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-106; yet, the legislature failed to provide that T.C.A. § 34-6-103 should remove the disability of a person under T.C.A. § 28-1-106. Sullivan v. Chattanooga Med. Investors, 221 S.W.3d 506, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2007).

If a minor can recover for prenatal injuries caused by negligence, a minor should be able to recover for prenatal injuries caused by the failure of a health care provider to obtain informed consent; there is no meaningful distinction between a minor who suffers injuries in utero from the negligence of a driver on the road and a minor who suffers injuries in utero from the failure of a physician to disclose all appropriate information to the minor's mother before performing a medical procedure. Miller v. Dacus, 231 S.W.3d 903, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 648 (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2007).

If a minor has an independent action for lack of informed consent for injuries that occur after birth, the minor should have an independent action for injuries that occur prior to birth, as it would be arbitrary to allow a minor to recover for injuries sustained ten minutes after delivery and to prohibit a minor to recover from injuries sustained ten minutes before delivery; the minor is unable to consent in either circumstance, and effective consent must be obtained from a parent or guardian. Miller v. Dacus, 231 S.W.3d 903, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 648 (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2007).

There is no language either in the informed consent statute or in prior jurisprudence to suggest that a claim for lack of informed consent should be limited to injuries sustained after birth. Miller v. Dacus, 231 S.W.3d 903, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 648 (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2007).

Appellate court erred by dismissing appellant's claims under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) on statute of limitations grounds because it was premature, as the decisions regarding the diocese's alleged fraudulent concealment of its knowledge of and responsibility for the priest's alleged sexual abuse of appellant and appellant's diligence in pursuing his claims against the diocese required further development of the facts through discovery. There was no dispute that appellant's 18th birthday occurred on August 18, 1978 and that in accordance with T.C.A. § 28-1-106 he had one year from that date to file suit; there was also no dispute that appellant did not sue the church diocese until almost 29 years after the statute of limitations would have expired. Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. Feb. 27, 2012).

Statutory language in T.C.A. § 28-1-106 clearly contemplated that judicial intervention was necessary in order for an individual to be adjudicated incompetent. Johnson v. UHS of Lakeside, LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 984 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015), appeal denied, Johnson v. UHS of Lakeside, LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. May 6, 2016).

Reading T.C.A. § 28-1-108 in conjunction with the current version of T.C.A. § 28-1-106, a plaintiff's mental incompetency must have been judicially adjudicated at the time his cause of action accrued. Johnson v. UHS of Lakeside, LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 984 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015), appeal denied, Johnson v. UHS of Lakeside, LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. May 6, 2016).

With respect to the decedent, the one-year statute of limitations was not tolled where he had not been adjudicated as incompetent as of the date of his fall, and even if an admission summary constituted an adjudication of his incompetency, there was no indication that it was entered as of the date of his fall. Johnson v. UHS of Lakeside, LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 984 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015), appeal denied, Johnson v. UHS of Lakeside, LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. May 6, 2016).

Patient's mental incompetency must have been judicially adjudicated at the time his cause of action accrued, and he was not “adjudicated incompetent” for purposes of the tolling statute at the time of accrual of his cause of action, and thus had one year from August 21, 2013 in which to file suit; because the patient failed to do so, this case was untimely and had to be dismissed. Jones v. City of Franklin, — F.3d —,  2017 FED App. 0077N, 2017 FED App. 77N, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1562 (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 2017).

Mother's claims accrued on June 21, 2012, and she was adjudicated incompetent on November 29, 2012, and T.C.A. § 28-1-106 did not apply to toll the statute of limitations; her claims, filed in September 2015, were barred by the statute of limitations under T.C.A. § 29-26-116, and even if the limitations period had been extended pursuant to T.C.A. § 29-26-121(c), the last day on which her claims could have been filed was October 2013. Woodruff v. Walker, 542 S.W.3d 486, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 648 (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2017).

Appellant's review of the conservatorship file showed that information regarding the theft from decedent's account, including appellee's role in recouping the stolen funds, was readily discoverable by appellant, yet after learning of appellee's actions within three years of decedent's death, appellant waited close to three more years to file his complaint; without proof of an exception that tolled the statute of limitations, the maximum amount of time in which to file a complaint against appellee was three years from decedent's death. Brown v. Weaver, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 202 (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2019).

30. Will Contest.

Statute of limitations under T.C.A. § 32-4-108 for grandchildren's will contest was not tolled under T.C.A. § 28-1-106 because the grandchildren failed to allege sufficient facts to show that a sole beneficiary concealed, with by an affirmative act or by silence, facts that were material to putting the grandchildren on notice of a claim of undue influence. In re Estate of Morris v. Morris, 329 S.W.3d 779, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 818 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2009), appeal denied, In re Estate of Morris, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 603 (Tenn. June 17, 2010).

31. Statute of Repose.

Summary judgment in favor of defendants based upon the construction statute of repose, T.C.A. § 28-3-202, was proper, because the injured's minority did not toll the statute, and there existed no question of fact as to the date of substantial completion; T.C.A. § 20-1-119(b) could not operate to extend the statute of repose, and the Tennessee Supreme Court had pronounced that T.C.A. § 28-1-106 could not operate to toll statutes of repose. Etheridge v. YMCA, 391 S.W.3d 541, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2012), appeal denied, Etheridge ex rel. Etheridge v. YMCA, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 425 (Tenn. June 19, 2012).

28-1-107. Cases in which disability not an excuse.

Section 28-1-106 shall not apply to actions on a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, or to actions against the estate of a deceased person brought more than seven (7) years from the death of the deceased, and the time the cause of action accrued, nor to cases provided for in § 28-2-105.

Code 1858, § 2758; Shan., § 4449; Code 1932, § 8575; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-108.

Cross-References. Action against decedent's estate, § 28-3-102.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Lapse of Period — Effect.

After the lapse of the period, the right as well as the remedy is barred or extinguished. Sparks v. First Nat'l Bank, 164 Tenn. 64, 46 S.W.2d 43, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (1932).

2. Actions Against Estate of Deceased.

The statute authorizing actions by persons of unsound mind within three years after the removal of their disability, expressly provides that such extension shall have no application to actions brought against the estate of a deceased person more than seven years from the death of the deceased. Bass v. Harkreader, 162 Tenn. 518, 39 S.W.2d 275, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 117 (1931).

28-1-108. Disability at time of accrual — Two or more disabilities.

No person can claim use of a disability unless it existed when the right of action accrued; but when two (2) or more disabilities exist at the time of accrual, the limitation does not attach until all are removed.

Code 1858, § 2759 (deriv. Acts 1819, ch. 28, § 1); Shan., 4450; Code 1932, § 8576; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-109.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 18 Tenn. Juris., Limitations of Actions, § 34.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Statutory Exceptions.

The courts cannot create disabilities or make exceptions to the operation of the statutes of limitations, and cannot add or make other exceptions where the legislature has made certain specific exceptions to the operation of such statutes. Pea v. Waggoner, 6 Tenn. 1, 1818 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (1818); Patton v. M'Clure, 8 Tenn. 332, 8 Tenn. 333, 1828 Tenn. LEXIS 11 (1828); Hickman's Lessee v. Gaither, 10 Tenn. 200, 1828 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1828); Guion's Lessee v. Bradley Academy, 12 Tenn. 231, 12 Tenn. 232, 1833 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (1833); McLain v. Ferrell, 31 Tenn. 48, 1851 Tenn. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Sep. 1851); Clark v. Chase, 37 Tenn. 636, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1858).

Reading T.C.A. § 28-1-108 in conjunction with the current version of T.C.A. § 28-1-106, a plaintiff's mental incompetency must have been judicially adjudicated at the time his cause of action accrued. Johnson v. UHS of Lakeside, LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 984 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015), appeal denied, Johnson v. UHS of Lakeside, LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. May 6, 2016).

2. Concurrent and Successive Disabilities.

Successive, cumulative, or supervenient disabilities will not be allowed or added to that or those existing at the time the right of action accrued, so as to render the statute of limitations inoperative or ineffective. Guion's Lessee v. Bradley Academy, 12 Tenn. 231, 12 Tenn. 232, 1833 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (1833); M'Donald v. Johns, 12 Tenn. 257, 12 Tenn. 258, 1833 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1833); Jones v. Preston, 40 Tenn. 161, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1859); Alvis v. Oglesby's Ex'rs, 87 Tenn. 172, 10 S.W. 313, 1888 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1889); East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. Wiggin, 68 F. 446, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 2880 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1895); Patton v. Dixon, 105 Tenn. 97, 58 S.W. 299, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (1900); Scruggs v. Baugh, 3 Tenn. App. 256, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

Concurrent disabilities are available to prevent the running of the statute of limitations only when they are united in one and the same person. Concurrent disabilities existing in different persons, or successive disabilities, whether of the same or different persons, are never available. Patton v. Dixon, 105 Tenn. 97, 58 S.W. 299, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (1900).

3. Disabilities Contracted During Suspension.

Where, after the right of action accrues the operation of the statute of limitations is suspended, and during such suspension a disability arises and is existing at the end of such suspension it cannot be relied on to defeat the bar of the statute. State use of Heirs of Howard v. Parker, 67 Tenn. 495, 1875 Tenn. LEXIS 73 (1875), overruled in part, Jackson v. Crutchfield, 111 Tenn. 394, 77 S.W. 776, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1903); Alvis v. Oglesby's Ex'rs, 87 Tenn. 172, 10 S.W. 313, 1888 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1889).

4. Disabilities Arising After Statute Begins to Run.

Where the right of action accrues to a person capable of suing, the statute of limitations begins to run against it, and the running is not stopped by his death, the infancy of his representatives, and no grant of administration. When the statute has once begun to run, no disability subsequently arising will arrest its progress. Lawrence v. Thornhill, 1 Shan. 388 (1875); Anderson v. Anderson, 2 Shan. 437 (1877).

Where claimant's right of action accrued and he was capable of suing, the statute of limitations begins to run and having begun to run, continues to run notwithstanding the death of the claimant. Anderson v. Anderson, 2 Shan. 437 (1877).

Once the statute has commenced to run, its operation is not halted by the death of an ancestor and the disability of his heir. Allen v. Folwell, 1 Tenn. App. 515, — S.W. —, 1925 Tenn. App. LEXIS 72 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1925).

When the statute of limitations once begins to run, it continues even against those under disability. A disability must exist when the right of action accrues, and successive disabilities, whether of the same or different persons are not available. Scruggs v. Baugh, 3 Tenn. App. 256, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

Patient's mental incompetency must have been judicially adjudicated at the time his cause of action accrued, and he was not “adjudicated incompetent” for purposes of the tolling statute at the time of accrual of his cause of action, and thus had one year from August 21, 2013 in which to file suit; because the patient failed to do so, this case was untimely and had to be dismissed. Jones v. City of Franklin, — F.3d —,  2017 FED App. 0077N, 2017 FED App. 77N, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1562 (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 2017).

28-1-109. Suspension during injunction.

When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction, the time of the continuance of the injunction is not to be counted.

Code 1858, § 2756; Shan., § 4447; Code 1932, § 8573; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-110.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 18 Tenn. Juris., Limitations of Actions, § 38.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Injunction Time — Effect.

Where defendants claimed land by adverse possession but the evidence showed that plaintiff's predecessor in title had been under an injunction not to molest the defendant for 19 years, the time during which the injunction was in force could not be counted in computing the statutory period of seven years. Robinson v. Harris, 37 Tenn. App. 105, 260 S.W.2d 404, 1952 Tenn. App. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1952).

2. Parties to Which Section Applicable.

The writ of injunction acts in personam, and is only operative between and for the benefit of the parties to the suit in which it is sued out; and this section only applies between parties to the suit and does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations in favor of third persons. Terrell v. Ingersoll, 78 Tenn. 77, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 145 (1882).

3. Mistake as to Injunction — Effect.

A creditor's innocent mistake, not superinduced by the debtor, as to the existence of an injunction in a prior suit, is insufficient to enable the chancery court to interfere with the debtor's legal right to rely upon the statute of limitations. Chilton v. Scruggs, 73 Tenn. 308, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 129 (1880); Hubbard v. Fravell, 80 Tenn. 304, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 173 (1883).

28-1-110. Suspension pending administration of estate.

The time between the death of a person and the grant of letters testamentary or of administration on such person's estate, not exceeding six (6) months, and the six (6) months within which a personal representative is exempt from suit, is not to be taken as a part of the time limited for commencing actions which lie against the personal representative.

Code 1858, § 2760; Shan., § 4451; Code 1932, § 8577; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-111.

Cross-References. Time limitation in actions against representatives, § 30-2-501.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 707.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 12 Tenn. Juris., Executors and Administrators, § 99.

Law Reviews.

Note, Laches at Law in Tennessee, 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 211 (1997).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Personal Representative Suing.

2. —Accrual of Right Before Death of Party.

The general rule is that if a cause of action accrues in his favor during the lifetime of a party, the statutes of limitations begin to run, and their operation is not suspended during the time that elapses between his death and the appointment and qualification of his personal representative. Fowlkes v. Nashville & D. R. Co., 56 Tenn. 829, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 211 (1872).

3. —Accrual of Right After Death.

If the cause of action in favor of a party does not accrue until after his death, the statutes of limitations do not begin to run until the appointment and qualification of a personal representative. Lawrence v. Thornhill, 1 Shan. 388 (1875).

Trial court did not err in granting an uninsured motorist carrier summary judgment because an insured's claim against it was barred; because a driver, the alleged tortfeasor, died prior to the filing of the complaint, in order to comply with the Survival Statute, T.C.A. § 20-5-103(a), the insured was required to serve the driver's personal representative with process prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(1), but the insured failed to submit any evidence showing that an estate was ever established for the driver. Liput v. Grinder, 405 S.W.3d 664, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 136 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. July 11, 2013).

Trial court did not err in granting an uninsured motorist carrier summary judgment because an insured's claim against it was barred since the insured failed to ever serve any personal representative for a driver's estate; pursuant to T.C.A. § 28-1-110, the one-year statute of limitations contained in T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(1) was tolled for the maximum allowance of six months from the date of the driver's death, but the insured did not obtain issuance of new process within one year of the original issuance as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 to maintain his claim. Liput v. Grinder, 405 S.W.3d 664, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 136 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. July 11, 2013).

4. Suits Against Personal Representative.

Trial court properly dismissed plaintiff's personal injury lawsuit and denied plaintiff's relief based on excusable neglect; plaintiff filed suit against the former personal representative of defendant, after the estate was opened, administered, and closed. The trial court found that the original lawsuit, while timely filed, was a nullity because the estate had been closed. The failure to strictly follow the statute by naming the personal representative was fatal to the survivability of the action. Algee v. Craig, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 137 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2020), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. LEXIS 329 (Tenn. July 23, 2020).

5. —Accrual of Right.

It is well settled that the statute does not begin to run in favor of the personal representatives until the time when the right of action accrues in the creditor claimant. Gillespie v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 167 Tenn. 245, 68 S.W.2d 479, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (1934).

6. —Accrual of Right over Six Months After Administration.

Where the creditor's right to sue does not accrue from more than six months after the grant of administration upon his deceased debtor's estate, his right of action will be barred, unless suit is instituted within 18 months after the accrual of his right to sue. An additional six months will not be allowed in such case. Woods v. Woods, 99 Tenn. 50, 41 S.W. 345, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1897).

7. —Periods of Suspension.

The statute of limitations of six years does not run against the creditors of a decedent, either during the six months immediately after the administration is granted, or during the period, not exceeding six months, actually elapsing between the decedent's death and the granting of administration on his estate. Both periods must be excluded. Bright v. Moore, 87 Tenn. 186, 10 S.W. 356, 1888 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (1889).

The periods within which creditors must bring suit against personal representatives do not begin to run until six months after their qualification, during which time they are exempt from suit, or from accrual of cause of action, if that occurs after the expiration of the six months, and this rule applies to insolvent estates as well as solvent ones. PREWETT v. GOODLETT, 98 Tenn. 82, 38 S.W. 434, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 206 (1896); Woods v. Woods, 99 Tenn. 50, 41 S.W. 345, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1897).

Both § 28-1-110 and § 30-512 (now § 30-2-309) are for the benefit of creditors and there is no conflict between the statutes or repeal by implication which would warrant the courts disregarding § 28-1-110 in favor of § 30-512 (now § 30-2-309). In re Estate of Myers, 55 Tenn. App. 195, 397 S.W.2d 831, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 249 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

Neither § 30-512 (now § 30-2-309) nor § 30-1001 (now § 30-2-501) limited or affected the provisions of § 28-1-110 relative to suspension of period of limitation. In re Estate of Myers, 55 Tenn. App. 195, 397 S.W.2d 831, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 249 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

The statute of limitations of six years does not run against the creditors of a decedent. either during the six months' period after the administration is granted, or during the period not exceeding six months actually elapsing between the decedent's death and the granting of administration of his estate. In re Estate of Myers, 55 Tenn. App. 195, 397 S.W.2d 831, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 249 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

In personal injury actions the statute of limitations (§ 28-3-104) is suspended under the first provision of this section for a period of up to six months between the death of the defendant and the appointment of the personal representative, but the second provision of this section for a six months suspension has no application to tort actions. Carpenter v. Johnson, 514 S.W.2d 868, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. 1974).

8. —Absence of Executor.

Nonresidence or absence of executor from the state does not prevent or suspend the running of the statute of limitations from the date of executor's qualification. Mann v. Smith, 158 Tenn. 463, 14 S.W.2d 722, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (1929).

9. Remainderman Suing Life Tenant's Heirs.

This statute is not controlling in action by remainderman against heirs of a life tenant. Bynum v. McDowell, 3 Tenn. App. 340, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

10. Commencement of Action.

An action brought and prosecuted to judgment will stop the statute. Bibb v. Tarkington, 70 Tenn. 21, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 180 (1878).

The issuance of a warrant by a justice of the peace (now general sessions court) is the commencement of an action, and arrests the operation of the statute of limitations before service of such warrant upon the defendant. Glenn v. Payne, 153 Tenn. 240, 280 S.W. 1019, 1925 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1926).

Where suit was not filed in a personal injury action until after the death of the defendant, at which time the one-year period of limitation of action under § 28-3-104 had not expired, and subsequently, after the expiration of the one-year period, the trial court ordered the substitution of the personal representative as defendant, the court held that that order commenced the action within the meaning of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3, but that the first provision of this section tolled the running of the statute of limitations for the same period of time after the appointment of the personal representative as the unexpired period of time existing at the time of death of the original defendant, up to six months, and that the action was not, therefore, barred by § 28-3-104. Carpenter v. Johnson, 514 S.W.2d 868, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. 1974).

11. Tort Actions.

The statute of limitations in tort actions (§ 28-3-104) is tolled by the first provision of this section for a period of up to six months between the death of the defendant and the appointment of the personal representative, but the second provision of the section concerning the six-month period in which the personal representative is immune from suit has no application to tort actions. Carpenter v. Johnson, 514 S.W.2d 868, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. 1974).

When a decedent died the survival statute paused the statute of limitations, and because no personal representative was appointed during the six month period following his death, the statute of limitations recommenced; because the statute of limitations period ran before a driver and her husband filed their action against the administrator ad litem, the statute of limitations barred their personal injury claims, and the administrator's motion to dismiss was properly granted. Putnam v. Leach, 572 S.W.3d 605, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 22 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. May 17, 2018).

Statute of limitations tolled for six months beginning on the date of the decedent tortfeasor's death, and appellants had six months to have an administrator ad litem appointed for the estate. Owens v. Muenzel, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 752 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. LEXIS 189 (Tenn. Apr. 11, 2019).

28-1-111. Suspension during absence from state.

If at any time any cause of action shall accrue against any person who shall be out of this state, the action may be commenced within the time limited therefor, after such person shall have come into the state; and, after any cause of action shall have accrued, if the person against whom it has accrued shall be absent from or reside out of the state, the time of absence or residence out of the state shall not be taken as any part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.

Acts 1865, ch. 10, § 3; Shan., § 4455; Code 1932, § 8581; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-112.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 6 Tenn. Juris., Conflict of Laws, Domicile and Residence, § 35; 7 Tenn. Juris., Corporations, § 101; 12 Tenn. Juris., Executors and Administrators, § 100; 18 Tenn. Juris., Limitations of Actions, § 36.

Law Reviews.

Civil Procedure — Carr v. Borchers: Tennessee's Nonresident Motorist Statute Revisited, 22 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 357 (1992).

Torts — Statute of Limitations — Action for Personal Injury Resulting from Faulty Construction of Building Does Not Accrue Until Date of Injury, 2 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 231.

Uniform Statute of Limitation on Foreign Claims Act: Tolling Problems (David H. Vernon), 12 Vand. L. Rev. 971.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction and Interpretation.

2. —History of Statute.

This statute was passed immediately after the Civil War, to meet the facts resulting from the distributed state of society of that period of our history. Taylor v. McGill, 74 Tenn. 294, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 251 (1880).

3. —Absence from State.

Where defendant worked in adjoining state during war, but maintained residence within this state, returning to his home over weekends, he was not absent from the state so as to prevent statute of limitations from running against rights of creditor. Spiegel, Inc. v. Luster, 31 Tenn. App. 342, 215 S.W.2d 16, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

Brief visits made to state by former resident did not make him a “resident” while visiting the state so as to prevent tolling of statute of limitations against action on note executed by him. Farmers State Bank v. Jones, 34 Tenn. App. 57, 232 S.W.2d 658, 1949 Tenn. App. LEXIS 140 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949).

Although defendant considered himself resident of state where he was absent from state most of the time between time of accident and filing of suit, and the total time he was in the state during that period did not amount to one year, this section was applicable, especially since at that time only personal service could be had, substituted service not being permitted under § 20-2-203 for residents temporarily absent until after the 1957 amendment. Shelton v. Breeding, 43 Tenn. App. 609, 310 S.W.2d 469, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 138 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

Where defendant maintained her place of abode and her absences were brief, the evidence was not sufficient to overcome the prima facie appearance of the running of the statute. Stockburger v. Ray, 488 S.W.2d 378, 1972 Tenn. App. LEXIS 323 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).

4. —Classes of Persons Covered.

The first clause applies to cases were the person against whom the action accrued was out of the state at the time, and came into the state afterwards. Smith v. Arnold, 69 Tenn. 378, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 103 (1878).

Where a cause of action accrues against a person then absent or out of the state, the first part of this statute provides that the suit may be commenced within the time limited by our statutes of limitation, after the return of such person to this state. Taylor v. McGill, 74 Tenn. 294, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 251 (1880). See Mann v. Smith, 158 Tenn. 463, 14 S.W.2d 722, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 176 (1929).

The terms are broad and comprehensive, and embrace those persons who are temporarily absent, as well as nonresidents, and make no distinction between those who are nonresidents by removal from the state and those who have always been such. Carlin v. Wallace, 81 Tenn. 571, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 72 (1884).

This section applies to actions that have accrued against the defendants who were nonresidents when the action accrued or who became absentees or nonresidents after the action accrued. Pilcher v. Carroll, 15 Tenn. App. 423, — S.W.2d —, 1932 Tenn. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1932).

5. —Contractual Limitations Unaffected.

The contractual limitation of action, contained in an insurance policy, is not within or extended or controlled by this statute. Guthrie v. Connecticut Indem. Ass'n, 101 Tenn. 643, 49 S.W. 829, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 115 (1898), superseded by statute as stated in, Algee v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 890 S.W.2d 445, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).

6. Suspension During Absence.

7. —Demand Note of Nonresident.

Where demand note was executed by resident of Michigan but payable in Tennessee so that the law of Tennessee governed its validity and where the maker continued to reside in Michigan until his death, the provisions of this section were applicable so as to toll the statute of limitations and allow the holder to proceed against the heirs of the maker by attaching their interest in property of the maker in Tennessee. Edgington v. Edgington, 179 Tenn. 83, 162 S.W.2d 1082, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 97 (1942).

8. —Personal Representatives.

This statute includes personal representatives who remove from the state or are temporarily absent therefrom, before the expiration of the time limited by the statutes of limitation for bringing actions against them, notwithstanding the action accrued against the decedent during his lifetime. Smith v. Arnold, 69 Tenn. 378, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 103 (1878).

Personal representative may be sued, notwithstanding his temporary absence, by the filing of a bill which may arrest the statute. McFarland v. Bowling, 139 Tenn. 691, 203 S.W. 254, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (1918).

9. —Return to State.

Where a nonresident of this state executes his note to a resident of this state, and afterwards becomes a resident of this state himself, the statutes of limitation of this state only begin to run in favor of the debtor from the time he becomes a resident of this state. Ridge v. Cowley, 74 Tenn. 166, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 224 (1880).

10. —Suits Against Nonresident Decedents' Estates.

The seven years' statute as to suits against decedents' estates begins to run on the death of the nonresident debtor. Sparks v. First Nat'l Bank, 164 Tenn. 64, 46 S.W.2d 43, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (1932).

11. —Due Diligence.

Where the plaintiff had used due diligence in trying to ascertain the location of the defendant, he was not precluded from relying upon the suspension statute. Lam v. Smith, 891 S.W.2d 207, 1994 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (Tenn. 1994).

Suspension statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-111, was inapplicable to the owners'  personal injury action against the driver where the owners knew the driver was no longer a Tennessee resident and did not exercise due diligence in obtaining the driver's new address after they received the return of the original summons; the owners made no attempt to have an alias summons served on the driver within a year after the original summons was returned, despite having been informed that the driver had moved to Georgia. Jones v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d 338, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 438 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 16, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 1056 (Tenn. 2007).

12. Absence After Accrual of Cause.

The last part of this statute applies where the defendant absents himself or becomes a nonresident after the accrual of the right of action. Ridge v. Cowley, 74 Tenn. 166, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 224 (1880); Taylor v. McGill, 74 Tenn. 294, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 251 (1880).

13. Absence of Corporation.

A corporation is a person, within the purview of this statute, excluding the absence from the state in computing the time for the running of the statutes of limitation; but a foreign corporation is not “absent from,” and does not “reside out of,” the state, within the meaning of such statute, where it has, for the period requisite for the running of the statute, continuously operated its business within the state, maintaining an office, with officers and agents subject, under our statutes, to service of process that binds the corporation, and such corporation is entitled to plead and rely upon the defense of the statutes of limitation, to the same extent as a domestic corporation, although it may have failed to comply with the requirements of the law for the domestication of foreign corporations. Turcott v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 101 Tenn. 102, 45 S.W. 1067, 1898 Tenn. LEXIS 37, 70 Am. St. Rep. 661, 40 L.R.A. 768 (1898).

Affidavit of corporation employee showing no more than that he solicited orders for the corporation was insufficient to show that nonresident corporation was subject to service in Tennessee through such employee. Young v. Hicks, 250 F.2d 80, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 4452 (8th Cir. Mo. 1957).

Fact that defendant's agent for service of process died before the one year period of limitation had expired would not toll the statute since § 48-910 (repealed) provides for service on secretary of state in such cases. Sigler v. Youngblood Truck Lines, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 61, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3823 (D. Tenn. 1957).

Where plaintiff contended that statute of limitations had not run because of suspension under this section since defendant was a corporation not domesticated and not doing business in Tennessee, but was subject to suit in Tennessee because as of a certain date a certain corporation opened a Knoxville office handling defendant's products and thereby became an agent for the purpose of service of process, plaintiff could not contend that period of limitations had not run where it was shown that such agency agreement was actually entered into one and a half years earlier. Harris v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 248 F. Supp. 599, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6033 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).

14. Absent Defendant — Remedy Sufficient.

15. —Statute Inapplicable.

Where the remedy of the suitor is unaffected by the absence of the defendant from the state and the nonresidence of the defendant does not affect the right to sue, the provisions of this section are without application. Arrowood v. McMinn County, 173 Tenn. 562, 121 S.W.2d 566, 1938 Tenn. LEXIS 43, 119 A.L.R. 855 (1938).

The object of this section is to save the creditor's remedy while he is kept from enforcing it by his debtor being out of the state, but if the debtor's absence is not such as to prevent his creditor from suing him and having him personally served with process in the state, it is not an absence within this section, and does not suspend the running of the statute. Spiegel, Inc. v. Luster, 31 Tenn. App. 342, 215 S.W.2d 16, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

Worker's compensation recipient must bring action against nonresident third party tortfeasor in another state within one year after the injury or as a matter of law the cause of action is assigned to his employer, since this section does not toll the running of the time specified in § 50-914 (now § 50-6-112). Willis v. Weil Pump Co., 130 F. Supp. 896, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2281 (D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 222 F.2d 261, 1955 U.S. App. LEXIS 3797 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1955).

This statute does not apply to an action against a nonresident subject to service of process under § 20-2-214. Burris v. Alexander Mfg. Co., 51 Misc. 2d 543, 273 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1966).

16. —Nonresident Motor Vehicle Operator.

Under the provisions of § 20-2-203 the nonresident operators of an automobile which struck and killed plaintiff's intestate were given the status of residents of the county of action and could have at all times been served through the secretary of state so that the provisions of this section with reference to the tolling of the statute of limitations were inapplicable. Arrowood v. McMinn County, 173 Tenn. 562, 121 S.W.2d 566, 1938 Tenn. LEXIS 43, 119 A.L.R. 855 (1938).

Nonresidence of motorist does not toll statute of limitations since service may be had on tary of state under § 20-2-203. Young v. Hicks, 250 F.2d 80, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 4452 (8th Cir. Mo. 1957).

In a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident, even though plaintiff was unaware of the fact that defendant was, or had become, a nonresident, where plaintiff had not used due diligence in attempting to locate and serve defendant, he failed to satisfy the prerequisites necessary to toll the statute of limitations. Ballard v. Ardehani, 901 S.W.2d 369, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 18 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

This section is generally inapplicable to nonresident motorists who may be served through the secretary of state under the provisions of § 20-2-203. Ballard v. Ardehani, 901 S.W.2d 369, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 18 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

17. —Remedy by Attachment.

Where a nonresident debtor has property in this state subject to attachment, the operation of the statutes of limitation against a suit to subject such property by attachment to the payment of the debt is not arrested by such nonresidence. Rowsey v. Burkhead, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. (3 Higgins) 361 (1912).

Where complete relief might not be given in an attachment case, this section applies. Edgington v. Edgington, 179 Tenn. 83, 162 S.W.2d 1082, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 97 (1942).

The continued nonresidence of defendant tolled the statute of limitations. The fact he had money or property within the state subject to attachment did not suspend the statute of limitations. Farmers State Bank v. Jones, 34 Tenn. App. 57, 232 S.W.2d 658, 1949 Tenn. App. LEXIS 140 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949).

18. —Personal Service Unnecessary.

Where the action may be prosecuted without the necessary of personal services upon the defendant and full relief granted, the statute of limitations does not apply. Edgington v. Edgington, 179 Tenn. 83, 162 S.W.2d 1082, 1941 Tenn. LEXIS 97 (1942).

19. —Service by Publication.

Where the creditor may proceed against the heir, and make the absent personal representative a party defendant, by publication, the operation of the statutes of limitation will not be arrested by his absence. Taylor v. McGill, 74 Tenn. 294, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 251 (1880); Boro v. Hidell, 122 Tenn. 80, 120 S.W. 961, 1909 Tenn. LEXIS 4, 135 Am. St. Rep. 857 (1909).

The section does not apply in case of a bill to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, since full relief may be had by publication. Boro v. Hidell, 122 Tenn. 80, 120 S.W. 961, 1909 Tenn. LEXIS 4, 135 Am. St. Rep. 857 (1909).

20. Service on Secretary of State.

Service of process on the secretary of state, pursuant to § 20-2-203 et seq, is sufficient to toll the running of the statute of limitations, provided the plaintiff uses or has used due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of the defendant, and to serve the requisite notice to make service consummate. Carr v. Borchers, 815 S.W.2d 528, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 243 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 314 (Tenn. Aug. 5, 1991).

21. Conflict of Laws.

A distinction is made between the bar of the remedy and the bar of the right in another state, and the bar of the remedy cannot be relied on here, where the remedy is not barred by our statutes, but where lapse of time has vested in the defendant the property or right in the thing sued for, that defense may be relied on in this state. Coleson v. Blanton, 4 Tenn. 152, 1816 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (1816).

Statutes of limitation are local. The law of the state where the action is brought governs as to the limitation of the action. This is the general rule, without regard to the place where the cause of action originated. Coleson v. Blanton, 4 Tenn. 152, 1816 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (1816); Pike v. Greene, 9 Tenn. 465, 1831 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1831), questioned, Phipps v. Richmond, 20 Tenn. 21, 1839 Tenn. LEXIS 3 (1839); Estes v. Kyle, 19 Tenn. 34, 1838 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1838); Graham's Heirs v. Nelson, 24 Tenn. 605, 1845 Tenn. LEXIS 145 (1845); Gassaway v. Hopkins, 38 Tenn. 583, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 232 (Tenn. Dec. 1858); Waters v. Barton, 41 Tenn. 450, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1860); Hubbard v. Epps, 68 Tenn. 231, 1877 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1877); Ridge v. Cowley, 74 Tenn. 166, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 224 (1880); Fitzsimmons v. Johnson, 90 Tenn. 416, 17 S.W. 100, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1891).

22. Pleading.

23. —Complaint as Notice.

Bill of complaint was sufficient to put defendant on notice that his nonresidence was being asserted to defeat his anticipated plea of the statute of limitations. Farmers State Bank v. Jones, 34 Tenn. App. 57, 232 S.W.2d 658, 1950 Tenn. App. LEXIS 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950).

24. —Facts Avoiding Statute.

Where the absence of the personal representative from the state is relied upon by the complainant to arrest the operation of the statutes of limitation, the facts should be stated with sufficient definiteness and reasonable certainty. Taylor v. McGill, 74 Tenn. 294, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 251 (1880).

If a note should be barred by the statute of limitations, and it becomes necessary to disclose this fact in the bill, it is essential to go further, and set up the facts which avoid the bar of the statute, such as nonresidence of the defendant, or a promise to pay the note made within six years. Farmers State Bank v. Jones, 34 Tenn. App. 57, 232 S.W.2d 658, 1949 Tenn. App. LEXIS 140 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949).

25. —Timely Assertion of Statute.

The question of whether defendant was outside the state cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal. Roberts v. Berry, 541 F.2d 607, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 7276 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1976).

28-1-112. Application of foreign statutes.

Where the statute of limitations of another state or government has created a bar to an action upon a cause accruing therein, while the party to be charged was a resident in such state or such government, the bar is equally effectual in this state.

Code 1858, § 2783; Shan., § 4480; Code 1932, § 8607; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-114.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 4 Tenn. Juris., Automobiles, § 36; 6 Tenn. Juris., Conflict of Laws, Domicile and Residence, § 35.

Law Reviews.

A Review of Tennessee Conflicts of Law: Statute of Limitation, Statute of Frauds, Forum Non Conveniems, Torts (Robert L. Denkelspiel), 6 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 37.

Business Associations — 1961 Tennessee Survey (Kenneth L. Roberts), 14 Vand. L. Rev. 1141.

Choice-of-Law Statutes (Robert A. Leflar), 44 Tenn. L. Rev. 951.

Civil Procedure — Maestas v. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc.: The Tennessee Supreme Court's Rejection of the Doctrine of Cross-Jurisdictional Tolling, 32 U. Mem. L. Rev. 521 (2002).

Conflict of Laws — Limitation of Actions — Lex Loci or Lex Fori, 23 Tenn. L. Rev. 1038.

Conflict of Laws — 1957 Tennessee Survey (John H. Wade), 10 Vand. L. Rev. 995.

Statute of Limitations and Radiation Injury, 23 Tenn. L. Rev. 278.

Uniform Statute of Limitation on Foreign Claims Act: Tolling Problems (David H. Vernon), 12 Vand. L. Rev. 971.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Foreign Bar Controlling.

2. —Generally.

The local law of another state governed personalty held adversely therein for the prescriptive period of that state, and determined its status before its removal to this state; and the former owner lost his title by knowingly suffering his property to be taken and to remain within the jurisdiction of such other state during the period prescribed by the law of that state. Waters v. Barton, 41 Tenn. 450, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1860).

3. —Foreign Residence upon Accrual Requisite.

A suit cannot be defeated by a plea of the statute of the state in which the cause of action accrued, unless the bar became complete during the debtor's residence in such state. Kempe v. Bader, 86 Tenn. 189, 6 S.W. 126, 1887 Tenn. LEXIS 36 (1887).

This statute was intended to cover actions that accrued against parties while they were residents of another state, and not to actions that accrued while the parties were residents of this state. Pilcher v. Carroll, 15 Tenn. App. 423, — S.W.2d —, 1932 Tenn. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1932), distinguishing Kempe v. Bader, 86 Tenn. 189, 6 S.W. 126, 1887 Tenn. LEXIS 36 (1887).

This section does not apply unless the bar becomes complete while the party to be charged was a resident of the foreign state. Sigler v. Youngblood Truck Lines, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 61, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3823 (D. Tenn. 1957).

4. —Tennessee Accrual.

Where the cause of action arose in Tennessee, and defendant pleaded a two-year statute of Texas, to which state he had removed, invoking this section, the statute of limitations of Tennessee was applied, this section not being applicable. Pilcher v. Carroll, 15 Tenn. App. 423, — S.W.2d —, 1932 Tenn. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1932).

5. —Residence in Foreign State.

In order for the statute of limitations of another state to bar action on a note, it must be shown that the maker resided in the other state for the full statutory period, even in a case where the note itself provided that it should be subject to the law of the other state. O'Brien v. Biles, 1 Tenn. App. 595, — S.W. —, 1925 Tenn. App. LEXIS 79 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1925).

6. Terms of Foreign Statute — Presumption.

A plea of the statute of limitations is a good defense to an action in this state; and, in the absence of proof of the foreign statute of limitations, it will, in such case, be presumed to be the same as our own. Bagwell v. McTighe, 85 Tenn. 616, 4 S.W. 46, 1887 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1887); Kempe v. Bader, 86 Tenn. 189, 6 S.W. 126, 1887 Tenn. LEXIS 36 (1887); Hubbell v. Morristown Land & Improv. Co., 95 Tenn. 585, 32 S.W. 965, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 132 (1895).

7. Tennessee Resident — Action Accruing in Other State.

Where Tennessee resident injured in automobile accident in Alabama commenced action for personal injuries in Tennessee by procuring issuance of summons within one year from date of accident, took voluntary nonsuit when service could not be had on defendant and refiled suit within one year thereafter, plaintiff's cause of action was saved and the expiration of the period of limitations for personal injuries in Alabama did not bar plaintiff's right of action in Tennessee. Fowler v. Herman, 200 Tenn. 201, 292 S.W.2d 11, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 396 (1956).

28-1-113. Actions by state.

This title does not apply to actions brought by the state of Tennessee, unless otherwise expressly provided.

Code 1858, § 2762 (deriv. Acts 1855-1856, ch. 113, § 3); impl. am. Acts 1865, ch. 36, § 34; impl. am. Acts 1873, ch. 13; Shan., § 4453; Code 1932, § 8579; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-115.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 12 Tenn. Juris., Executors and Administrators, § 98; 18 Tenn. Juris., Limitations of Actions, §§ 7, 8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction with Other Acts.

The statute in favor of personal representatives does not apply to suits by the state. O'Neal's Sureties v. State, 78 Tenn. 727, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 243 (1882).

Section 28-1-105 providing for the commencement of a new suit within one year, does not apply to the state. Williams v. Cravens, 31 Tenn. App. 246, 214 S.W.2d 57, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

The clear and unambiguous provisions of § 28-1-112 exempt the state from the ambit of § 28-3-105 statute of limitation. Dunn v. W. F. Jameson & Sons, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 799, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 627 (Tenn. 1978).

2. Construction and Interpretation.

Word “title” referred to by T.C.A. § 28-1-113 is Title 28 of the Tennessee Code in its entirety, which is devoted to various statutes of limitations. Cases interpreting this section make clear that it is the statutes of limitations themselves which do not apply to the state unless expressly provided otherwise; this is a codification of the common law rule nullum tempus occurrit regi (“no time runs against the king”). In re Faye Foods, Inc., — B.R. —, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 402 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Feb. 5, 2016), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Collins v. Tenn., 555 B.R. 670, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107262 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 3, 2016).

3. —Limitations Against State Not Favored.

Statutes of limitation against the state as the sovereign are looked upon with disfavor, and will not be enforced unless there is a clear and explicit authority therefor given by statute. Anderson v. Security Mills, 175 Tenn. 197, 133 S.W.2d 478, 1939 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (1939).

This section provides that statutes of limitation against the state as the sovereign are looked upon with disfavor, and will not be enforced unless there is a clear and explicit authority therefor given by statute. Dunn v. W. F. Jameson & Sons, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 799, 1978 Tenn. LEXIS 627 (Tenn. 1978).

4. —Immunity of State.

The state cannot be subjected to litigation at the suit of an individual unless the words of the act are so plain, clear and unmistakable as to leave no doubt of the intention of the legislature that it should be done. Quinton v. Board of Claims, 165 Tenn. 201, 54 S.W.2d 953, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 38 (1932).

5. Actions by State.

6. —Ouster of Foreign Corporation.

Statutes of limitation are not applicable to the state in civil actions, such as a suit to oust a foreign corporation from the state and to restrain it from doing business within the state. State ex rel. Cates v. Standard Oil Co., 120 Tenn. 86, 110 S.W. 565, 1907 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1907), aff'd, Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413, 30 S. Ct. 543, 54 L. Ed. 817, 1910 U.S. LEXIS 1967 (1910).

7. —Surety of Defaulting Official Unprotected.

The exemption of the state does not pass to a surety of a defaulting official, when he pays the state the amount of a misappropriation. Action is barred against one alleged to have participated in the misappropriation, when brought by the surety more than six years after surety made settlement with the state. Such is not subrogee or assignee of the sovereign's exemption. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 165 Tenn. 395, 54 S.W.2d 964, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1932).

8. —Municipal Assessments — Action to Enforce.

An action by a city to enforce its lien for special assessments is not an action brought by the state of Tennessee. Knoxville v. Gervin, 169 Tenn. 532, 89 S.W.2d 348, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 80, 103 A.L.R. 877 (1936).

9. —Special Assessment Lien.

Statute of limitations can be pleaded by property owner in suit by city to enforce special assessment lien. Knoxville v. Gervin, 169 Tenn. 532, 89 S.W.2d 348, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 80, 103 A.L.R. 877 (1936).

10. —Recovery of School Funds.

Suit by state to recover funds for use of city school authorities from county trustee was not subject to defense of limitations. State ex rel. Dossett v. Obion County, 188 Tenn. 538, 221 S.W.2d 705, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 372 (1949).

11. —Bond of Tax Collector.

A suit by the state against the executors of a surety upon a bond of a tax collector is not barred by this section. Callaway's Ex'rs v. State, 2 Shan. 112 (1876).

12. Actions by County.

13. —Collection of Fines and Costs.

The fact that the fine and costs assessed against a defendant convicted of unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquors were sought to be collected against the sureties of defendant through medium of a bond did not change such exercise of power from a governmental function to a private function. Nelson v. Loudon County, 176 Tenn. 632, 144 S.W.2d 791, 1940 Tenn. LEXIS 111 (1940).

14. —County When Arm of State Government.

The statute of limitations does not run against a county which is seeking to enforce a demand arising out of or dependent upon the exercise of its governmental functions as an arm of the state government. Nelson v. Loudon County, 176 Tenn. 632, 144 S.W.2d 791, 1940 Tenn. LEXIS 111 (1940).

15. —County School System.

The maintenance of the physical structure and land of county schools is a local concern and function to which the immunity from the statute of limitations does not apply. Anderson County Bd. of Education v. National Gypsum Co., 821 F.2d 1230, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 7205 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1987).

The immunity does not extend to every action of a subordinate body such as a county, municipality or school board, even when it can be characterized as acting in furtherance of a state function. There must be some direct nexus between the action complained of and the state function. Anderson County Bd. of Education v. National Gypsum Co., 821 F.2d 1230, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 7205 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1987).

A local school board engaged in a governmental function when it brought an action to recover the cost of asbestos abatement or removal and, therefore, this section applied to render the board immune from statute of limitations otherwise applicable to the action. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ. v. Asbestospray Corp., 909 S.W.2d 783, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 613 (Tenn. 1995).

16. Actions by Municipalities.

17. —Metropolitan Board of Education.

Immunity in school desegregation case, Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 836 F.2d 986, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 16899 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1987), cert. denied, Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ. v. Tennessee, 487 U.S. 1206, 108 S. Ct. 2848, 101 L. Ed. 2d 885, 1988 U.S. LEXIS 2848 (1988).

28-1-114. Counterclaim or third party complaint.

  1. A counterclaim or third party complaint or cross-claim is not barred by the applicable statute of limitations or any statutory limitation of time, however characterized, if it was not barred at the time the claims asserted in the complaint were interposed.
  2. If a nonsuit is taken as to the original civil action, any counterclaim, cross-claim or third party complaint arising from such action shall not be terminated but may proceed as an original civil action. However, if a counterclaim, cross-claim or third party complaint is filed as a civil action as permitted by this subsection (b) and such action does not proceed to an adjudication on the merits of such claim, the defendant shall have the right to file a counterclaim, cross-claim or third party complaint within the time allowed for the filing of a responsive pleading only if the original action is reinstituted pursuant to § 28-1-105.
  3. Any counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party complaint arising from an action or suit originally commenced in general sessions court and subsequently recommenced as an original action or as a counterclaim, cross-claim or third party complaint pursuant to this section in circuit or chancery court according to the provisions of § 28-1-105, shall not be subject to the monetary jurisdictional limit originally imposed in general sessions court.

Acts 1978, ch. 758, § 1; T.C.A., § 28-116; Acts 1983, ch. 365, § 1; 1984, ch. 520, §§ 2, 4; 1985, ch. 344, § 2.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1984, ch. 964, § 1 provided that the 1984 amendment not apply to any nonsuit or notice of dismissal filed prior to April 13, 1984, and that the law in effect on the date of the nonsuit or notice of dismissal was filed shall govern any such suit. The legislative intent was that the 1984 amendment not be applied retroactively to any nonsuit or notice of dismissal filed prior to April 13, 1984, and that notwithstanding the 1984 amendment or Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01 or any construction to the contrary, nonsuit taken prior to April 13, 1984, shall also terminate any counterclaim filed in a civil suit.

Cross-References. Limitation of actions, contracts for sale, § 47-2-725.

Limitation of actions, personal tort actions, § 28-3-104.

Limitation of actions, Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, § 29-11-104.

Monetary jurisdiction of general sessions court, § 16-15-501.

Statute of limitations in contracts for sale, § 47-2-725.

Textbooks. Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), No. 1-13.01.

Law Reviews.

Counterclaims, Amendments, Relation-back and the Statute of Limitations, 9 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 441.

Selected Tennessee Legislation of 1983 (N. L. Resener, J. A. Whitson, K. J. Miller), 50 Tenn. L. Rev. 785 (1983).

Survey of Civil Procedure in Tennessee — 1977, IV. Pretrial Procedure (John L. Sobieski, Jr.), 46 Tenn. L. Rev. 308.

The Nonparty Tortfeasor (June F. Entman), 23 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 105 (1992).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

While subsection (b) does expressly preserve only those claims asserted “within the time allowed for the filing of a responsive pleading,” such limitation is not applicable to claims not barred under subsection (a). Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hooper, 700 F. Supp. 915, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14175 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).

Although a homeowner's association followed the correct procedure in its restrictive covenants to increase the amount of dues, an appellate court was unable to review the dismissal of a lot owner's counterclaims because the trial court did not make findings, as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04, concerning the ground for its application of laches or whether T.C.A. § 28-1-114 “saved” the owner's counterclaims. Grand Valley Lakes Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Burrow, 376 S.W.3d 66, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 686 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2011), rehearing denied, 376 S.W.3d 66, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 925 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 364 (Tenn. May 18, 2012).

In a case in which appellants filed suit to assert rights to a tract of real property by adverse possession, the trial court was correct in ordering appellants to vacate the disputed property because appellants'  petition was filed before they had adversely possessed the property for a total of seven years. Moreover, pursuant to T.C.A. § 28-1-114, appellee's counterclaim for ejectment related back to the filing of appellants'  original petition. Phelps v. Benke, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 18 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2017).

2. Counterclaims Accrued Prior to Enactment.

Absent any indication by the legislature that this section should be given prospective application only, a federal court applied the statute to a counterclaim already accrued but not yet barred at the enactment of this section. McAllister v. Matlock, 461 F. Supp. 518, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14538 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).

No vested right of a complaining plaintiff was infringed by the application of this section to a counterclaim which had accrued prior to the enactment of this section and which was not then already barred. McAllister v. Matlock, 461 F. Supp. 518, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14538 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).

3. Claims Not Barred.

Although defendant did not file his counterclaim and cross-claim until April 1992, more than seven years after his cause of action had accrued, he was given the benefit of plaintiff's October 1990 filing pursuant to this section. Defendant's claims were, therefore, not barred by § 28-2-103, although they were asserted outside of the applicable seven-year period. Cross v. McCurry, 859 S.W.2d 349, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

28-1-115. Dismissed federal court actions.

Notwithstanding any applicable statute of limitation to the contrary, any party filing an action in a federal court that is subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction shall have one (1) year from the date of such dismissal to timely file such action in an appropriate state court.

Acts 1984, ch. 520, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 1984, ch. 964, § 1 provided that this section does not apply to any nonsuit or notice of dismissal filed prior to April 13, 1984, and the law in effect on the date of nonsuit or notice of dismissal was filed shall govern any such suit. It is the legislative intent that this section not be applied retroactively to any nonsuit or notice of dismissal filed prior to April 13, 1984, and that notwithstanding this section or Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01, or any construction to the contrary, nonsuit taken prior to April 13, 1984 shall also terminate any counterclaim filed in a civil suit.

Law Reviews.

Nonsuits IV: An Updated List of Don'ts (Donald F. Paine), 39 No. 2 Tenn. B.J. 15 (2003).

Sex, Lies and Nonsuits (Donald F. Paine), 29 No. 5 Tenn. B.J. 17 (1993).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Limitations Barring Right.

Neither this section nor § 28-1-105 can be used to extend the period within which suit must be filed against a governmental entity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. Nance v. City of Knoxville, 883 S.W.2d 629, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 221 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994), overruled, Moore v. Coffee County, 2010 FED App. 0715N, 402 Fed. Appx. 107, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23639, 2010 FED App. 715N (6th Cir.) (6th Cir. Tenn. 2010).

In wrongful death suit brought by decedent's minor children and their parent against city, in whose jail decedent was incarcerated when the decedent committed suicide, the statute of limitations for the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, compiled in title 29, chapter 20, was not tolled by the children's minority, nor was it tolled by the pendency of the suit in federal court; trial court properly granted the city's motion to dismiss. Lynn v. City of Jackson, 63 S.W.3d 332, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 858 (Tenn. 2001), overruled, Moore v. Coffee County, 2010 FED App. 0715N, 402 Fed. Appx. 107, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23639, 2010 FED App. 715N (6th Cir.) (6th Cir. Tenn. 2010).

2. Application to State.

Sovereign immunity bars application of this section to actions against the state. Webster v. Tennessee Bd. of Regents, 902 S.W.2d 412, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

Since T.C.A. § 28-1-115 rather than T.C.A. § 28-1-105 controlled the limitations on actions dismissed by federal courts for lack of jurisdiction, the court denied plaintiff's Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) motion to file a voluntary dismissal. Johnson v. Hill Bros. Transp. Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 889, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8325 (E.D. Tenn. 2003).

T.C.A. §§ 28-1-105 and 28-1-115 do not specifically state that they are applicable to the state of Tennessee; the statutes are held to be in derogation of sovereign immunity and do not effectively toll any statute of limitations as to the state of Tennessee, such that the motion to dismiss the inmate's suit could not be avoided. Gore v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., 132 S.W.3d 369, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 713 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

Neither T.C.A. § 28-1-105 nor § 28-1-115 applied, without more, to save the employee's Public Protection Act claim against the state; there was no mention of the state in the savings statutes and suits against the state of Tennessee could only be brought in strict compliance with an enabling statute; the state was immune from suit except when it consented to be sued. Farmer v. Tenn. Dep't of Safety, 228 S.W.3d 96, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 105 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 614 (Tenn. June 25, 2007), overruled, Moore v. Coffee County, 2010 FED App. 0715N, 402 Fed. Appx. 107, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23639, 2010 FED App. 715N (6th Cir.) (6th Cir. Tenn. 2010).

Tennessee's general savings statutes provide plaintiffs with additional time to refile a complaint after the dismissal of previous action. However, these general savings statutes are inapplicable to suits against the State of Tennessee or other governmental entities. Jackson v. City of Cleveland, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2016), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 948 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2016).

3. Basis for Dismissal.

This section did not apply to make timely defendant's filing of a petition for writ of certiorari within one year of the dismissal of a federal habeas corpus action he had previously filed, where the federal action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and because defendant failed to exhaust his state court remedies. A'La v. Tennessee Dep't of Correction, 914 S.W.2d 914, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

28-1-116. Extension during disaster.

In the event that a duly authorized member of the appellate judiciary enters an order declaring a disaster pursuant to the Tennessee supreme court rules, or the Tennessee rules of civil or appellate procedure, all applicable statutes of limitation and statutes of repose shall be extended in the counties subject to the order by the same number of days by which other applicable filing deadlines are extended. In the event an action could be properly filed in more than one (1) county, the deadline for that action shall be extended only in the county or counties in which a disaster is declared by the order.

Acts 2008, ch. 725, § 1.

Chapter 2
Limitation of Real Actions

28-2-101. Adverse possession — State conveyance.

  1. Any person having had, either personally or through those through whom that person's claim arises, individually or through whom a person claims, seven (7) years' adverse possession of any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, granted by this state or the state of North Carolina, holding by conveyance, devise, grant, or other assurance of title, purporting to convey an estate in fee, without any claim by action at law or in equity commenced within that time and effectually prosecuted against such person is vested with a good and indefeasible title in fee to the land described in such person's assurance of title.
  2. No title shall be vested by virtue of such adverse possession, unless such conveyance, devise, grant, or other assurance of title shall have been recorded in the register's office for the county or counties in which the land lies during the full term of such seven (7) years' adverse possession.

Code 1858, § 2763 (deriv. Acts 1819, ch. 28, § 1); Acts 1895, ch. 38, § 1; Shan., § 4456; Code 1932, § 8582; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-201.

Cross-References. Limitation of actions to test tax title, § 67-5-2504.

Limitation on forcible entry and detainer, § 29-18-109.

Presumption of ownership from possession of personal property, § 66-3-103.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 177.

Tennessee Forms (Robinson, Ramsey and Harwell), No. 1-8-9.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 1 Tenn. Juris., Acknowledgments, § 6; 1 Tenn. Juris., Adverse Possession, §§ 2, 3, 9-18, 25, 30, 32, 34-38, 44, 49-58, 60, 63; 6 Tenn. Juris., Constitutional Law, § 97; 8 Tenn. Juris., Cotenancy, § 12; 9 Tenn. Juris., Deeds, § 7; 13 Tenn. Juris., Fraudulent and Voluntary Conveyances, § 47; 20 Tenn. Juris., Partition, § 3; 21 Tenn. Juris., Private Ways, § 3.

Law Reviews.

Adverse Possession Against Tenants in Common in Tennessee (Eston Wycliffe Orr), 37 Tenn. L. Rev. 776.

Adverse Possession and the Presumption of Title (R.D. Cox), 11 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 1.

Adverse Possession — Purchaser Under An Oral Contract, 20 Tenn. L. Rev. 214.

Adverse Possession — Statutes — May One Acquire an Indefeasible Life Estate Under Tennessee Code Section 8582? 5 Vand. L. Rev. 818.

An Exegesis of the Ejectment Statutes of Tennessee (R.D. Cox), 18 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 581 (1988).

Bringing Tennessee into the Twentieth Century Re Possibilities of Reverter, Powers of Termination and Executory Interests When Used as Land Control Devices (Nicholas L. White), 15 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 555 (1985).

History of the Adverse Possession Statutes of Tennessee (R.D. Cox), 6 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 673.

Real Property (Herman L. Trautman), 6 Vand. L. Rev. 1080.

Real Property — Adverse Possession by Husband and Wife Does Not Ripen into a Tenancy by the Entirety, 10 Vand. L. Rev. 460.

Real Property — Adverse Possession — Cotenant Claims Title by Prescription Against Other Cotenants, 11 Vand. L. Rev. 645.

Real Property — Adverse Possession — Life Tenant Holding Against Remainderman, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 968.

Real Property — Adverse Possession — Tenancy in Common or Tenancy By Entirety?, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 892.

Real Property — 1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 Vand. L. Rev. 921.

Real Property — 1956 Tennessee Survey (Herman L. Trautman), 9 Vand. L. Rev. 1089.

Survey of Tennessee Property Law, IV. Transfers of Land (Beverly A. Rowlett), 48 Tenn. L. Rev. 72.

Tacking Adverse Possessions in Tennessee, 23 Tenn. L. Rev. 295.

The Tennessee Recording System (Toxey H. Sewell), 50 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 (1982).

Title by Adverse Possession in Tennessee, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 621.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The statute of 1895, ch. 38, is not unconstitutional under provision prohibiting enactment of retrospective laws, though the grantee's deed was executed before the enactment of the statute requiring registration, there being no impairment of obligation of contracts. Snider v. Brown, 48 S.W. 377, 1898 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 93 (1898).

2. In General.

A misuse or expanded use of an easement did not result in a forfeiture of the easement; the proper remedy was to enjoin the unauthorized use and award such damages as the proof merited. Knight v. Utz, 673 S.W.2d 161, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2798 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

Court affirmed the trial court's resolution of a boundary line dispute under T.C.A. § 16-11-106 in a landowner's favor because (1) the evidence supported the finding that the various deeds and surveys of the disputed boundary line were inconsistent and not determinative, (2) the evidence supported the finding that since at least 1937, an old fence was considered the boundary, and (3) it was clear that for almost 40 years, the landowner and family had openly and notoriously had exclusive possession and control of the property up to the fence line; because the court determined that the boundary line ran along the fence line, it was unnecessary to address whether the landowner obtained the title by adverse possession under T.C.A. § 28-2-101 et seq.Jackson v. Bownas, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 356 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2005).

3. Construction and Interpretation.

The limitation of this section does not operate against the state. Whitaker v. House, 213 Tenn. 61, 372 S.W.2d 194, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 495 (1963).

4. —Effect of Statutory Changes.

The effect of adverse possession is subject to change by statute at any time. Preston v. Smith, 41 Tenn. App. 222, 293 S.W.2d 51, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).

5. —History.

For the history of this section, see Earnest v. Little River Land & Lumber Co., 109 Tenn. 427, 75 S.W. 1122, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1902).

6. —Construction with Other Sections.

This and the next following section are to be construed together. Kittel v. Steger, 121 Tenn. 400, 117 S.W. 500, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1909).

Sections 28-2-101 and 28-2-105 deal with rights and convey title to the adverse holder while §§ 28-2-102 and 28-2-103 deal with defensive rights and can be used by the adverse holder defensively only. Savely v. Bridges, 57 Tenn. App. 372, 418 S.W.2d 472, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

Section 28-2-105 differs from § 28-2-101 in that § 28-2-101 deals only with land granted by the state and requires only seven years' adverse possession of the land under recorded assurance of title of such land to perfect legal title in the adverse holder to the extent of the boundaries set forth in the color of title under which the land is held even though possession is located only on a part of the land included in the boundaries of the adverse holder's assurance of title, while § 28-2-105 does not require proof that the land is granted land but does require 30 years' color of title and seven years' adverse possession under registered color of title; the 30 years' registration carrying the presumption that the land was granted from the state. Savely v. Bridges, 57 Tenn. App. 372, 418 S.W.2d 472, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

This section and § 28-2-102 protect persons who are holding adversely under a color of title from suits to oust them from the entire boundary of lands on which they are adversely holding a portion, and § 28-2-103 protects an adverse holder without color of title only to that portion of land which is being held adversely. Shearer v. Vandergriff, 661 S.W.2d 680, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. 1983).

7. —Generally.

Seven years' adverse possession of granted land, by a person and those through whom he claims, under color or assurance of title, purporting to convey an estate in fee, without any intermediate existing estate and without any claim by action at law or in equity commenced within that time, extinguishes the equitable and legal title of the true owner and draws the same to the possessor's title, and invests him with a good and indefeasible title in fee, provided the true owner was under no legal disability or exception in the statute, and the possession was adverse to him. Gray v. Darby's Lessee, 8 Tenn. 396, 1825 Tenn. LEXIS 13 (1825); Miller v. Miller, 19 Tenn. 484, 1838 Tenn. LEXIS 79, 33 Am. Dec. 157 (1838); Wallace v. Hannum, 20 Tenn. 443, 1839 Tenn. LEXIS 76, 34 Am. Dec. 659 (1839); Pullen v. Hopkins, Clark & Co., 69 Tenn. 741, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 172 (1878); Thurston v. University of North Carolina, 72 Tenn. 513, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1880); Nelson v. Trigg, 72 Tenn. 701, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1880); McBee v. Bearden, 75 Tenn. 731, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 180 (1881); Hanks v. Folsom, 79 Tenn. 555, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 107 (1883); Brown v. Brown, 82 Tenn. 253, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 125, 52 Am. Rep. 169 (1884); Tennessee & P. R. Co. v. Mabry, 85 Tenn. 47, 1 S.W. 511, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 10 (1886); Sanders v. Logue, 88 Tenn. 355, 12 S.W. 722, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (1890); Bleidorn v. Pilot Mountain Coal & Mining Co., 89 Tenn. 166, 15 S.W. 737, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 36 (1890); McLemore v. Durivage, 92 Tenn. 482, 92 Tenn. 82, 22 S.W. 207, 1893 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (1893); Hopson v. Fowlkes, 92 Tenn. 697, 23 S.W. 55, 1893 Tenn. LEXIS 26, 36 Am. St. Rep. 120, 23 L.R.A. 805 (1893); East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. Broyles' Heirs, 95 Tenn. 612, 32 S.W. 761, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 136 (1895); Patton v. Dixon, 105 Tenn. 97, 58 S.W. 299, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (1900); Earnest v. Little River Land & Lumber Co., 109 Tenn. 427, 75 S.W. 1122, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1902); Bell v. North American Coal & Coke Co., 155 F. 712, 1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 4671 (6th Cir. 1907); Kittel v. Steger, 121 Tenn. 400, 117 S.W. 500, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1909); Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911); Jones v. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co., 133 Tenn. 159, 180 S.W. 179, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1915); Northcut v. Church, 135 Tenn. 541, 188 S.W. 220, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1915); Smith v. Cross, 125 Tenn. 159, 140 S.W. 1060, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1911).

Adverse possession under an assurance of title may nullify or extinguish the title of the real owner and draw or transfer the same to the adverse possessor. Creech v. Jones, 37 Tenn. 631, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (1858); Cooper v. Great Falls Cotton Mills Co., 94 Tenn. 588, 30 S.W. 353, 1894 Tenn. LEXIS 72 (1895); Snapp v. Purcell, 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 565 (1897); Kittel v. Steger, 121 Tenn. 400, 117 S.W. 500, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1909).

Where the state has issued three successive grants covering the same land, and the defendants, claiming under the third grant, have held the adverse possession of a part of the land covered by the three grants, for a period of seven years, under an assurance of title purporting to convey a fee, the statute took away the title of the real owner, the first grantee, and transferred it, in legal effect, to the adverse occupant, and thus clothed him with a perfect title, and the extinguishment of the title of the first grantee did not vitalize the second grant nor infuse title into the second grantee. Earnest v. Little River Land & Lumber Co., 109 Tenn. 427, 75 S.W. 1122, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1902).

Legal title by adverse possession may be acquired by seven years adverse possession under a registered assurance of title where the land has been originally granted by the state, or by 20 years adverse holding, which amounts to an assurance of title. Scruggs v. Baugh, 3 Tenn. App. 256, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

This section deals with land granted by the state and requires only seven years' adverse possession of the land under recorded assurance of title of such land to perfect legal title in the adverse holder to the extent of the boundaries set forth in the color of title under which the land is held, even though possession is located only on a part of the land included in the boundaries of the adverse holder's assurance of title. Moore v. Brannan, 42 Tenn. App. 542, 304 S.W.2d 660, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

When the requirements of this section are met, title is transferred by operation of the statute from the holder of the legal title to the adverse claimant. The statute takes the place of a formal conveyance of land such as a grant or deed. Moore v. Brannan, 42 Tenn. App. 542, 304 S.W.2d 660, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

A suit by a person having a right-of-way to abate an adverse use must be brought within seven years from the time the cause of action arose or the right of action is barred; in the interim period of time between the seven years and 20 years, if the adverse holding ceases, the person who has the right-of-way may resume his use, as the right-of-way still exists, on the other hand, he may not bring an action to abate the adverse use during that period and if the adverse use continues for 20 years, the right-of-way is extinguished. Shearer v. Vandergriff, 661 S.W.2d 680, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. 1983).

8. —Liens and Judgments Not Covered.

This section has no application to an action which merely seeks to subject the land to the burden of a debt or charge imposed either by contract or by statute. The limitation could not be set up by a judgment debtor in bar of the enforcement, by execution, of a judgment more than seven years old, or in bar of a lien or charge in subordination to which possession is taken. Henry v. Mills, 69 Tenn. 144, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 65 (1878); Bragg v. Witherspoon, 7 Tenn. App. 466, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 66 (1928).

9. —Removal of Cloud from Title Not Covered.

This statute applies where there is an adverse holding of real estate, but it does not apply in an action to remove a cloud on title affecting the marketability of land, or under which an adverse possession might be attempted, and thus endanger the rights of the complainant, and a bill to remove cloud from title may be maintained, where the owner is in possession, or as some of the cases put it, where the owner is not out of possession. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Patton, 134 Tenn. 556, 184 S.W. 855, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 177 (1916).

10. —Connection with State Grant.

Possession of land for seven years under a void grant, as under a grant of lands within the Indian boundary prohibited from appropriation, will not avail in ejectment. Cocke's Lessee v. Dotson, 1 Tenn. 169, 1805 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1805); Sharp v. Vanwinkle, 80 Tenn. 15, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1883).

A deed of conveyance of land previously granted by the state, by whomsoever made and upon whatsoever consideration, is an assurance of title, though it forms no connection with the grant by a regular chain of conveyances from the state's grantee; and adverse possession under such deed for seven years will perfect the possessor's title. Hampton's Lessee v. M'Ginnis, 1 Tenn. 286, 1808 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (1808); Craddock v. Stalcup, 1 Tenn. 351, 1808 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (1808); Sawyer v. Shannon, 21 F. Cas. 579, 1 Tenn. 465, 1809 Tenn. LEXIS 32 (1809); Patton's Lessee v. Hynes, F. Cas. No. 10835, 18 F. Cas. 1338, 3 Tenn. 356, 1 Cooke 356, 1813 Tenn. LEXIS 32 (1813); Barton v. Shall, 7 Tenn. 214, 7 Tenn. 215, 1823 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (1823); Gray v. Darby's Lessee, 8 Tenn. 396, 1825 Tenn. LEXIS 13 (1825); Campbell v. Crockett, 16 Tenn. 225, 1835 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1835); Earnest v. Little River Land & Lumber Co., 109 Tenn. 427, 75 S.W. 1122, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1902).

A deed for granted lands is founded upon a grant, in the sense of the statute of limitations, though such deed be made without connection of the title with the grant. Gray v. Darby's Lessee, 8 Tenn. 396, 1825 Tenn. LEXIS 13 (1825); Green v. Lessee of Neal, 31 U.S. 291, 8 L. Ed. 402, 1832 U.S. LEXIS 474 (Jan. 28, 1832); Campbell v. Crockett, 16 Tenn. 225, 1835 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1835); Moore v. Brown, 52 U.S. 414, 13 L. Ed. 751, 1850 U.S. LEXIS 1518 (1850).

Entries made at a time when the office is closed by law are absolute nullities, and grants thereon after the office is opened communicate no titles. Woodfolk's Lessee v. Nall, 34 Tenn. 674, 1855 Tenn. LEXIS 117 (1855); Egnew v. Cochrane, 39 Tenn. 320, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Apr. 1859); Berry v. Wagner, 81 Tenn. 591, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 75 (1884).

Where the state's grant includes within its boundaries, but excludes from its operation, all older and superior claims, it is not operative as color of title to land so included and excluded, and sufficiently identified and located within the grant, and shown to be covered by older and superior title, and a possession of part or all of such included and excluded land is not a possession under color of title. Wright v. Hurst, 122 Tenn. 656, 127 S.W. 701, 1909 Tenn. LEXIS 39 (1910).

The state's grant is of no force to transmit title to land where the state had previously granted the same, and has no interest left which it can grant or convey, and its second grant can only serve as an assurance of title to be made effective by seven years' adverse possession thereunder. Smith v. Cross, 125 Tenn. 159, 140 S.W. 1060, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1911).

Where it does not appear that the land in question, or how much of it, was ever granted by Tennessee or North Carolina, the statutes of limitation do not run. Northcut v. Church, 135 Tenn. 541, 188 S.W. 220, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1915); Roysdon v. Terry, 4 Tenn. App. 638, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

It is the rule that the statute of limitations does not run until there is a valid grant of land from the sovereignty having title and jurisdiction for the obvious reason that until there is a grant the title is in the sovereign or state and the statute does not run against the sovereign. Roysdon v. Terry, 4 Tenn. App. 638, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 214 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

Statement in Sharp v. VanWinkle, 80 Tenn. 15, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1883), to the effect that the statute did not commence to run until there was a valid grant from the state because the statute did not run against the sovereign was the law at the time the case was decided, but since 1923, a thirty year statute of limitations does run against the state under §§ 28-2-105 and 28-2-106. Webb v. Harris, 44 Tenn. App. 492, 315 S.W.2d 274, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 100 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

11. —North Carolina Grants.

The State of North Carolina, after the Cession Act (Acts 1789, ch. 3), ceding to the United States the territory afterwards embraced in the State of Tennessee, had no power to issue grants for lands, within such ceded territory, except to perfect incipient rights or titles, in pursuance of the reservation made in the act. Polk's Lessee v. Windel, F. Cas. No. 11251, 19 F. Cas. 940, 2 Tenn. 433, 1817 Tenn. LEXIS 1 (1817), rev'd, Polk's Lessee v. Wendal, 13 U.S. 87, 3 L. Ed. 665, 1815 U.S. LEXIS 371 (1815), rev'd, Polk's Lessee v. Wendell, 18 U.S. 293, 5 L. Ed. 92, 1820 U.S. LEXIS 256 (1820).

Grants issued by North Carolina, after the cession act, for lands in Tennessee not previously entered, were void, and not validated by our statutes reenacted in this section and in the following section. Calloway v. Hopkins, 58 Tenn. 349, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 270 (1872); Rhodes v. Crutchfield, 75 Tenn. 518, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 150 (1881).

Inasmuch as the state of North Carolina once owned the territory now the state of Tennessee, and exercised its sovereignty by granting lands therein, the legislature intended in this section to recognize the grants of North Carolina, while sovereign in such territory, in the same way as the grants of Tennessee itself. Sharp v. Vanwinkle, 80 Tenn. 15, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1883).

12. —Possession Under Own Assurance of Title.

The adverse possessor must hold under his own assurance of title, and not under that of the original owner. This is manifest from the language of this section, which says that he is vested with a good and indefeasible title in fee to the land described in his assurance of title. This view is borne out, strengthened, and sustained by § 28-2-102. Coal Creek Consol. Coal Co. v. East Tennessee, Iron & Coal Co., 105 Tenn. 563, 59 S.W. 634, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 107 (1900), overruled, Earnest v. Little River Land & Lumber Co., 109 Tenn. 427, 75 S.W. 1122, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1902).

13. —Scope of 1895 Amendment.

Acts 1895, ch. 38 precludes the running of limitation, after its enactment, in favor of a grantee of an unrecorded deed executed before its enactment, so long as the deed remains unrecorded. Snider v. Brown, 48 S.W. 377, 1898 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 93 (1898).

14. Adverse Possession — Requisites.

15. —Essentials.

The title of the owner out of possession is not barred by his mere failure to sue for seven years, when the adverse claimant is not in possession, for it is the adverse possession of the adverse claimant that bars the title. Neddy v. State's Lessee, 16 Tenn. 249, 1835 Tenn. LEXIS 88 (1835).

Actual possession is necessary to perfect title under this section or to resist a recovery under § 28-2-103. There must be exclusive, actual, adverse, continuous, open, and notorious possession for the entire prescriptive period, under a claim of right or title to the property. Irvine's Heirs v. McRee, 24 Tenn. 554, 1845 Tenn. LEXIS 121 (1845); Stewart v. Harris, 28 Tenn. 714, 1849 Tenn. LEXIS 110 (1849); West v. Lanier, 28 Tenn. 762, 1849 Tenn. LEXIS 123 (1849); Waddle v. Stuart, 36 Tenn. 534, 1857 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (1857); Creech v. Jones, 37 Tenn. 631, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (1858); Kincaid v. Meadows, 40 Tenn. 188, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1859); Snoddy v. Kreutch, 40 Tenn. 301, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (1859); Allen v. Suseng, 41 Tenn. 204, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (1860); Cass v. Richardson, 42 Tenn. 28, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (1865); Copeland v. Murphey, 42 Tenn. 64, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 18 (1865); Pullen v. Hopkins, Clark & Co., 69 Tenn. 741, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 172 (1878); Garrett v. Belmont Land Co., 94 Tenn. 459, 29 S.W. 726, 1894 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1895); Sequatchie Valley Coal & Iron Co. v. Coppinger, 95 Tenn. 526, 32 S.W. 465, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 126 (1895); Tidwell v. Van Deventer, 686 S.W.2d 899, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2990 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

From the reason and policy of the statute, as well as from the obvious import of the language employed, the possession shall be adverse, for it would be absurd to maintain that a permissive possession should be held to ripen into a title, or to bar the right of the legal owner. Story v. Saunders, 27 Tenn. 663, 1848 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1848).

To constitute adverse possession, the possession must be accompanied with a claim of right to the property. It requires both the actual possession and an intent, fully developed by words or action, to claim the property against the true owner, in order to render the possession adverse. The possession must be adverse, whether it be asserted under § 28-2-101 or § 28-2-103. Story v. Saunders, 27 Tenn. 663, 1848 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1848); Rutherford v. Franklin, 31 Tenn. 321, 1851 Tenn. LEXIS 77 (1851); Turner v. Turner, 34 Tenn. 27, 1854 Tenn. LEXIS 6 (1854).

A possession by permission of the owner, or in subordination of his title, is not an adverse possession. Story v. Saunders, 27 Tenn. 663, 1848 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1848); Memphis v. Lenore, 46 Tenn. 412, 1869 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (1869).

The statutes of limitation can confer title upon no one except the person in adverse possession, and, therefore, adverse possession by trustee under a void deed of trust may vest title in the trustee, but not in claimants as remainderman under such void deed, because no estate in remainder was vested in them for the reason that such deed was void. Stevens v. Bomar, 28 Tenn. 546, 1848 Tenn. LEXIS 120 (1848); Watkins v. Specht, 47 Tenn. 585, 1870 Tenn. LEXIS 177 (1870).

The public cannot acquire a right-of-way by mere use which is permissive, and not adverse, and without any intention on the part of the owner of the land to dedicate the way to the public. Henderson v. Alloway, 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 688 (1878).

The adverse possession must be of such open and notorious character that the owner may be reasonably presumed to have known of it. Kirkman v. Brown, 93 Tenn. 476, 27 S.W. 709, 1893 Tenn. LEXIS 75 (1894); Sequatchie Valley Coal & Iron Co. v. Coppinger, 95 Tenn. 526, 32 S.W. 465, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 126 (1895).

Though deed described more land than grantor owned and possessed, grantee could not acquire title to the excess without taking and holding actual possession thereof. Wattenbarger v. Powers, 10 Tenn. App. 584, — S.W.2d —, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928).

Adverse possession requires the presence of certain definite ingredients. The essential ones are, that the possession be open, notorious, continuous, exclusive, actual, and of course adverse. United States v. McCulley, 100 F. Supp. 379, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3942 (D. Tenn. 1951).

16. —Actual Possession — What Constitutes.

Possession of land so as to be adverse must be an actual possession of some party to dispute. Napier's Lessee v. Simpson, 1 Tenn. 448, 1809 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1809).

The possession of a church by the officers thereof, for the ordinary purposes of public worship, is as much an actual adverse possession of the premises as if there were a residence or dwellinghouse thereon, and that actually inhabited. Randolph v. Meek, 8 Tenn. 58, 8 Tenn. 64, 1827 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1827); Macon v. Sheppard, 21 Tenn. 335, 1841 Tenn. LEXIS 13 (1841).

The claimant of land may take or continue possession by locking the doors of the house, closing the windows, and pasturing, grazing, or ranging stock on the premises, if there be a concurrence of acts and intention to fill the idea of actual occupation or possession. Davidson v. Phillips, 17 Tenn. 93, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (1836); West v. Lanier, 28 Tenn. 762, 1849 Tenn. LEXIS 123 (1849); Allen v. Suseng, 41 Tenn. 204, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (1860); Mansfield v. Northcut, 112 Tenn. 536, 80 S.W. 437, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 121 (1903); Stockley v. Cissna, 119 Tenn. 135, 104 S.W. 792, 1907 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (1907).

To determine what is actual possession, reference must be had to the nature and situation of the property, the usage to which it is adapted, and the kind of possession of which it is susceptible. There may be actual possession in law, without actual occupation or cultivation. West v. Lanier, 28 Tenn. 762, 1849 Tenn. LEXIS 123 (1849); Waddle v. Stuart, 36 Tenn. 534, 1857 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (1857); Creech v. Jones, 37 Tenn. 631, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (1858); Allen v. Suseng, 41 Tenn. 204, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (1860); Copeland v. Murphey, 42 Tenn. 64, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 18 (1865); Pullen v. Hopkins, Clark & Co., 69 Tenn. 741, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 172 (1878); King v. Mabry, 71 Tenn. 237, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 68 (1879); Green v. Cumberland Coal & Coke Co., 110 Tenn. 35, 72 S.W. 459, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1903).

An ore bank, a sand bank, a fish trap, a coal ravine, a sand pit, a stone quarry, or a meadow below tidewater might be possessed without being built upon or inclosed. Cass v. Richardson, 42 Tenn. 28, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (1865); Pullen v. Hopkins, Clark & Co., 69 Tenn. 741, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 172 (1878); Green v. Cumberland Coal & Coke Co., 110 Tenn. 35, 72 S.W. 459, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1903).

The owner of a water mill situated on a stream acquires, by occupation and operation of the mill, actual adverse possession, not only of the mill buildings and wheel pit, but of the bed of the stream to its thread, between such points above and below the mill as will afford the free and unobstructed use of the water in the operation of the mill; and if such possession be continued for seven years under an assurance of title, with claim of ownership, the title will be perfected, and if such possession, without assurance of title, be continued for seven years, such mill owner would acquire a defensive title to the extent of the above defined adverse possession. Cooper v. Great Falls Cotton Mills Co., 94 Tenn. 588, 30 S.W. 353, 1894 Tenn. LEXIS 72 (1895); Green v. Cumberland Coal & Coke Co., 110 Tenn. 35, 72 S.W. 459, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1903).

Possession is a fact composed of act and intention, but what constitutes possession in a given instance is sometimes difficult to determine, owing to the existence of qualifying circumstances. A house occupied or kept locked, or a fenced field with the inclosures maintained, constitutes possession, but the act of a casual trespasser does not constitute possession. Round Mountain Lumber & Coal Co. v. Bass, 136 Tenn. 687, 191 S.W. 341, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 171 (1916).

Maintenance of a cowpen on a small portion of land, which is used to salt animals, is not sufficient basis for claim of actual possession. Sage v. Dayton Coal & Iron Co., 148 Tenn. 1, 251 S.W. 780, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (1922).

Actual possession usually requires inclosure. It requires more than a casual use, more than the erection of a shelter or a stockpen for casual use, and more than a spot of cultivation within an unfenced wilderness of several thousand acres. The possession must be comparable to the susceptible uses to which a person of the claimant's character and occupation would normally make of the land. United States v. McCulley, 100 F. Supp. 379, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3942 (D. Tenn. 1951).

When no claimant has actual possession the constructive possession is in the title holder. United States v. McCulley, 100 F. Supp. 379, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3942 (D. Tenn. 1951).

Where possession was intermittent, of the nature of casual or seasonal trespass, it was not enough to satisfy the rigid requirements of adverse possession. United States v. McCulley, 100 F. Supp. 379, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3942 (D. Tenn. 1951).

17. —Adverse Holding Requisite.

Adverse holding is necessary to make the statute effective in barring the owner out of possession; and the bar was not intended to be applicable to cases where there was no adverse claim against the party entitled to the land. Graham's Heirs v. Nelson, 24 Tenn. 605, 1845 Tenn. LEXIS 145 (1845); Lincoln v. Purcell, 39 Tenn. 143, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 267 (1858); Martin v. Niblett, 86 Tenn. 383, 7 S.W. 123, 1887 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (1888).

Where the evidence failed to show the intention to dedicate land for a public street, the fencing of the lot including the street indicates that it was held adversely to the city. Mayor, etc., of Morristown v. Cain, 44 S.W. 471, 1897 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 100 (1897).

Where a divorce decree in 1902 directed that homestead be set aside in certain lands with such interest to be vested in the wife for life and then in fee to the three children of the marriage and where the wife died the same year without the decree having been executed and where there was no effort made to revive and execute the decree, a daughter, who for 23 years after coming of age in 1909, made no claim to the right to possession against the father who had remained in possession, farmed the property and paid taxes on it was barred by the provisions of this section from asserting any right in the land upon the death of the father. Nicholson v. Holt, 174 Tenn. 358, 125 S.W.2d 483, 1938 Tenn. LEXIS 99 (1939).

One holding for another, such as a tenant for his landlord, or a tenant in common for his cotenants, cannot hold adversely to such other while that relation exists. But he may throw off that relation, may work an ouster of his landlord or his cotenants; and upon such an ouster this section begins to run. Hood v. Cravens, 31 Tenn. App. 532, 218 S.W.2d 71, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 111 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

Where a tenant makes a deed purporting to convey the land to another, or where a tenant in common makes a deed purporting to convey the entire estate in the land, this amounts to an actual ouster and disseizin which the landlord or the cotenant is bound to notice. Hood v. Cravens, 31 Tenn. App. 532, 218 S.W.2d 71, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 111 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

18. —Continuous Possession.

A break of a single day is sufficient to destroy the operation of the statute and the possession in such cases must take a new beginning, and the possession must during all the time of the seven years be absolutely adverse and under the claim of right of the particular title asserted and under color of title. Free v. Fine, 59 S.W. 384, 1900 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 88 (1900).

19. —Constructive Possession.

Where neither of the contending parties is in actual possession of land, the constructive possession is with the one who holds the legal title. West v. Lanier, 28 Tenn. 762, 1849 Tenn. LEXIS 123 (1849); Padgett v. Baker, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 222 (1873); Walker v. Fox, 85 Tenn. 154, 2 S.W. 98, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1886).

Where the owner of a tract of granted land sold and conveyed the westerly half thereof by specific metes and bounds and retained the easterly half; and thereafter the entire original tract was assessed and sold for taxes, as one body of land and as the land of the original grantee who had, 45 years prior thereto, parted with his title by a conveyance of the land; and the tax deed, covering and conveying the land as one tract or body, was made to the purchaser under the tax sale, who took actual possession within the boundaries of the easterly half, and held the same adversely for more than seven years, but did not take any actual possession of the westerly half until a short time before the ejectment suit of the owner thereof was brought against such tax purchaser, it was held that such possession of the easterly half did not create a constructive possession of the westerly half, so as to displace the true owner's constructive possession, and to create the bar of the statute against such owner thereof, who had never been in actual, but only in constructive possession. The tax assessment, proceeding, and sale must have been treated as void, and as communicating no title to the purchaser thereunder, though it is not so stated in the opinion. Stewart v. Harris, 28 Tenn. 714, 1849 Tenn. LEXIS 110 (1849).

A vendee's possession of that part of the land purchased by him and held for himself does not have the effect to give the vendor a constructive possession of the remainder of the tract, to which the vendor retains title. Cunningham v. Robertson's Lessee, 31 Tenn. 138, 1851 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1851).

Where there is no actual possession of land, the constructive possession, which attaches to the land by reason of ownership, is not available under the statutes of limitation, to perfect title or to create the bar of the statute. Oldham v. York, 99 Tenn. 68, 41 S.W. 333, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 10 (1897).

There can be no constructive adverse possession which is not based upon a claim under an assurance or color of title, purporting to convey an estate in fee, and a possession outside of the boundaries recited in a deed is not under such assurance of title, because the possession without some written instrument defining the land is only notice to the boundaries actually inclosed or possessed, and, being limited in effect to the actual possession, cannot be invoked by the possessor as constructive adverse possession of land within the deed. Slatton v. Tennessee C., I. & R. Co., 109 Tenn. 415, 75 S.W. 926, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 85 (1902).

Seven years' actual adverse possession of the whole or some part of a tract of land previously granted by the state, when held under an assurance of title, purporting to convey an estate in fee, vests the possessor with a perfect and indefeasible title in fee to the limits of the boundaries described in his assurance of title. Earnest v. Little River Land & Lumber Co., 109 Tenn. 427, 75 S.W. 1122, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1902); Kittel v. Steger, 121 Tenn. 400, 117 S.W. 500, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1909).

The actual adverse possession of a part of a tract of land, under an assurance of title, constructively extends to the boundaries thereof, and if such adverse possession be within the superior title, its continuance for seven years perfects the title of the adverse possessor to the extent of his boundaries. The fact that there is a small tract of inferior title covered by a deed within the superior title on which there is no possession is immaterial, since the only title necessary to be affected or barred by the adverse possession is the superior title, and when that is barred, all is barred. Jones v. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co., 133 Tenn. 159, 180 S.W. 179, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1915).

Possession within the boundaries of an inferior grant is not limited to the boundaries of that grant where at the time it was instituted the possessor claimed under a tax deed giving color of title to the full extent of a superior grant. Southern Coal & I. Co. v. Schwoon, 145 Tenn. 191, 239 S.W. 398, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1921).

20. —Exclusive Possession.

The placing of a pavement over the land claimed and using it as a means of access to other property of claimant was sufficient to put the owner on notice that a hostile claim was being asserted to his land and that the use of the way by the public did not destroy the exclusiveness of claimant's possession. Lamons v. Mathes, 33 Tenn. App. 609, 232 S.W.2d 558, 1950 Tenn. App. LEXIS 119 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950).

21. —Presumptions.

There is no presumption in favor of a party in ejectment that a deed has been executed, arising out of the fact that, for a period of 50 years, his predecessors in title have from time to time conveyed the land, without attack, where there has been no long possession of the land by any one or more of them. Earls v. Bennett, 137 Tenn. 174, 192 S.W. 916, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1917).

22. —Inclosures.

An inclosure or residence on land is not necessary for the purpose of constituting actual adverse possession, but only such use and occupation of the land, under claim of ownership, as it is susceptible of, considering its nature and character, is necessary for that purpose. Cutting timber and digging ore will constitute actual possession under some circumstances. West v. Lanier, 28 Tenn. 762, 1849 Tenn. LEXIS 123 (1849); Creech v. Jones, 37 Tenn. 631, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (1858); Cass v. Richardson, 42 Tenn. 28, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 7 (1865); Copeland v. Murphey, 42 Tenn. 64, 1865 Tenn. LEXIS 18 (1865); Pullen v. Hopkins, Clark & Co., 69 Tenn. 741, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 172 (1878); Garrett v. Belmont Land Co., 94 Tenn. 459, 29 S.W. 726, 1894 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1895); Sequatchie Valley Coal & Iron Co. v. Coppinger, 95 Tenn. 526, 32 S.W. 465, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 126 (1895); Green v. Cumberland Coal & Coke Co., 110 Tenn. 35, 72 S.W. 459, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1903); Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911).

The possession of a spring or ford for the ordinary purposes of use by one's family and hands, under claim of ownership, may constitute actual adverse possession as much as if they had been inclosed, for a spring or ford is often susceptible of no other possession than that of ordinary use and enjoyment. Allen v. McCorkle, 40 Tenn. 181, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1859).

A fence on three sides of land is not such inclosure as to constitute actual possession, for the inclosure relied on for that purpose must be a substantial one. Allen v. Suseng, 41 Tenn. 204, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (1860).

Where rights of defendants in ejectment turned upon actual inclosure, there was no error in charging the jury that if the possession was disturbed by an army burning the fences, such would not arrest the running of the statute, if it be shown that defendants resumed actual possession as soon thereafter as they reasonably could do. Temporary destruction of the fences by an army or by an accidental fire would not arrest the operation of limitations, if the fences be replaced within a reasonable time. McColgan v. Langford, 74 Tenn. 108, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 215 (1880).

Adverse possession must be actual by fences, inclosures, or buildings, where the land is capable of such possession; and where it is not, such fact must be stated in the pleadings. Hicks v. Tredericks, 77 Tenn. 491, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1882); Garrett v. Belmont Land Co., 94 Tenn. 459, 29 S.W. 726, 1894 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1895); Sequatchie Valley Coal & Iron Co. v. Coppinger, 95 Tenn. 526, 32 S.W. 465, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 126 (1895); Hubbard v. Godfrey, 100 Tenn. 150, 47 S.W. 81, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 98 (1898).

Where the defendant had held possession under an inclosure extending partly over the line claimed by the complainant for seven years before the beginning of the suit, he was entitled to the strip within the inclosure by limitations. Bell v. Whitehead, 62 S.W. 213, 1901 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 33 (1901).

The grantee's possession of the land owned by the grantor is not a constructive possession of the land not owned by him, though inclosed in the conveyance. Byrd v. Phillips, 120 Tenn. 14, 111 S.W. 1109, 1907 Tenn. LEXIS 36 (1907).

Where lands were inclosed and cultivated for two years, and then houses were erected within the inclosures, and thereafter the fences around the inclosures were torn down in order to facilitate the logging business of the possessor, but the occupancy of the houses were continuously kept up until such possession had been held consecutively for more than seven years before the bill was filed, the adverse possession of the defendant was established. Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911).

23. —Acts Insufficient to Constitute Adverse Possession — Examples.

Cutting wood and burning several coalpits on land do not constitute actual adverse possession. Creech v. Jones, 37 Tenn. 631, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (1858).

Sugar camps do not constitute adverse possession. Foster v. Grizzle, 41 Tenn. 530, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 101 (1860).

The cutting of timber is not sufficient to constitute adverse possession, where the timber constitutes the principal source of value of the land, if the land is susceptible of cultivation. Pullen v. Hopkins, Clark & Co., 69 Tenn. 741, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 172 (1878).

A lettuce and mustard bed, 10 feet square, on a spot of ground in the woods, does not constitute adverse possession of the tract of land upon which it is situated. King v. Mabry, 71 Tenn. 237, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 68 (1879).

The cutting of timber and the grazing of cattle do not constitute actual possession where the possessor has demonstrated that the land is capable of inclosure by buildings, fences, or other similar improvements. Hicks v. Tredericks, 77 Tenn. 491, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1882).

A hogpen in the woods, in which stock hogs are fed, does not constitute adverse possession of the tract of land on which it is situated. Hicks v. Tredericks, 77 Tenn. 491, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1882); Hubbard v. Godfrey, 100 Tenn. 150, 47 S.W. 81, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 98 (1898); Sage v. Dayton Coal & Iron Co., 148 Tenn. 1, 251 S.W. 780, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (1922).

Unimproved or vacant and unused town lots must be inclosed, if susceptible of inclosure, in order to constitute actual adverse possession; and the mere payment of taxes on town lots is not sufficient. Garrett v. Belmont Land Co., 94 Tenn. 459, 29 S.W. 726, 1894 Tenn. LEXIS 59 (1895).

Lime kilns not used continuously for seven years, and houses burned within four or five years after their erection, and not rebuilt, do not constitute adverse possession. Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911).

The land must be valuable exclusively for the timber thereon, in order that the cutting and removal of the timber may constitute actual adverse possession, and the cutting of timber, not shown to be the only use the land was susceptible of, does not constitute adverse possession. Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911); Bolton College v. Wellborn, 4 Tenn. App. 399, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 194 (1926).

Adverse possession is not established by intermittent acts of having dirt dumped on the land to fill holes, and the occasional storing of lumber and wagons thereon. Ferguson v. Prince, 136 Tenn. 543, 190 S.W. 548, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 160 (1916).

Possession of limestone on disputed land, which was fragmentary, irregular, and not for purpose of ripening title, does not make a case of adverse possession. Campbell v. Tennessee C., I. & R. Co., 150 Tenn. 423, 265 S.W. 674, 1924 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1924).

Where under grant of easement for electric transmission line grantee selected location of line in accordance with terms of the grant and built such line, such grantee thereby exhausted the right to fix the location of its easement and where such lines were removed and relocated possession at the new location did not amount to possession under color or original grant. Rogers v. Knoxville, 40 Tenn. App. 170, 289 S.W.2d 868, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 103 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).

24. —Taking of Possession.

Where a person takes possession of land within the bounds of the deed under which he claims, and after living there a year built a house and later rented to a tenant for one year and then sold it to his brother, who rented to a tenant for one year, such occupancy amounted to actual, open, notorious and intentional adverse possession. Fuller v. Jackson, 62 S.W. 274, 1901 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 37 (1901).

Where the grant to the complainant and defendant interlapped, complainant's predecessor maintained possession of the land involved for more than seven years prior to the conveyance to the complainant, claimant acquired title. State v. Seals, 26 Tenn. App. 333, 171 S.W.2d 836, 1942 Tenn. App. LEXIS 55 (1942).

25. — —Privity of Estate.

Successive possessions under fraudulent, void, inoperative, or forged deeds may be connected or united, so as to perfect title under the statute. Gray v. Darby's Lessee, 8 Tenn. 396, 1825 Tenn. LEXIS 13 (1825); Love v. Love's Lessee, 10 Tenn. 288, 1829 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (1829); Love's Lessee v. Shields, 11 Tenn. 404, 11 Tenn. 405, 1832 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (1832); Vance's Heirs v. Johnson, 29 Tenn. 214, 1849 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1849); Clark v. Chase, 37 Tenn. 636, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1858); Martin v. Pryor, 59 Tenn. 668, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (1874); Hunter v. O'Neal, 63 Tenn. 494, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 296 (1874); Jackson v. Hodges, 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 276 (1875); Thurston v. University of North Carolina, 72 Tenn. 513, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1880); Nelson v. Trigg, 72 Tenn. 701, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1880); Ramsey v. Quillen, 73 Tenn. 184, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 109 (1880); Earnest v. Little River Land & Lumber Co., 109 Tenn. 427, 75 S.W. 1122, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1902); Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911); Smith v. Cross, 125 Tenn. 159, 140 S.W. 1060, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1911).

As between successive, naked trespassers, without color of title, there can be no privity of estate, and their possessions cannot be connected or united, so as to make out the period necessary to create a defensive or possessory title or to make out the common law prescriptive period of 20 years. But when they hold under color of title, though their deeds be fraudulent or void, their possessions may be connected so as to perfect their title and bar actions. Vance's Heirs v. Fisher, 29 Tenn. 211, 1849 Tenn. LEXIS 50 (1849); Vance's Heirs v. Johnson, 29 Tenn. 214, 1849 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1849); Moffitt v. McDonald, 30 Tenn. 457, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 155 (1850); Clark v. Chase, 37 Tenn. 636, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1858); Heirs of Marr v. Gilliam, 41 Tenn. 488, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (1860); Baker v. Hale, 65 Tenn. 46, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 297 (1873); Corder v. Dolin, 63 Tenn. 238, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 237 (1874); Nelson v. Trigg, 72 Tenn. 701, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1880); Ellege v. Cooke, 73 Tenn. 622, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1880); East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. Broyles' Heirs, 95 Tenn. 612, 32 S.W. 761, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 136 (1895).

Separate successive disseizins do not aid one another, and to connect them, there must be a privity of estate between the successive disseizors. Heirs of Marr v. Gilliam, 41 Tenn. 488, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (1860); Baker v. Hale, 65 Tenn. 46, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 297 (1873); Erck v. Church, 87 Tenn. 575, 11 S.W. 794, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 11, 4 L.R.A. 641 (1889).

The possession of a widow cannot be connected or united with that of her deceased husband, because there is no privity of estate between them; but the possession of children (the heirs) can be connected with that of their deceased father (the ancestor). Heirs of Marr v. Gilliam, 41 Tenn. 488, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (1860).

To create privity of estate between successive possessors, there must exist, as between the different disseizors, some such relation as that of ancestor and heir, grantor and grantee, or devisor and devisee. Heirs of Marr v. Gilliam, 41 Tenn. 488, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (1860); Baker v. Hale, 65 Tenn. 46, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 297 (1873); Erck v. Church, 87 Tenn. 575, 11 S.W. 794, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 11, 4 L.R.A. 641 (1889); McLemore v. Durivage, 92 Tenn. 482, 92 Tenn. 82, 22 S.W. 207, 1893 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (1893); Ferguson v. Prince, 136 Tenn. 543, 190 S.W. 548, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 160 (1916).

Successive possessions, to be connected so as to make out a perfect and complete title, must be held under a deed or some assurance of title purporting to convey the fee; but a possession under a title bond for part of the time and under a deed for part will not be sufficient to make out a title, because the title bond does not purport to convey the estate; but so long as the possession is retained in such case, it is a perfect defense to any possessory action, provided it has been held for seven years. Ellege v. Cooke, 73 Tenn. 622, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1880); Woodruff v. Roysden, 105 Tenn. 491, 58 S.W. 1066, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 96, 80 Am. St. Rep. 905 (1900); Slatton v. Tennessee C., I. & R. Co., 109 Tenn. 415, 75 S.W. 926, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 85 (1902).

Where a husband goes into the possession of land, under his wife's claim of title, and holds under that claim during her life, and after her death continues to possess and claim in the same right, under his curtesy claim, there is privity between the successive tenants. Mimms v. Ewing, 83 Tenn. 667, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 92 (1885).

26. —Possession Through Others.

The adverse possession for the claimant may be held by his overseer or agent. Jones' Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. 59, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 102 (1836); Brown v. Brown, 82 Tenn. 253, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 125, 52 Am. Rep. 169 (1884).

Adverse possession of land by members of the family of the possessor, or by his tenants, or by the occupation and cultivation of the land, is as operative under this section as a possession by actual residence, in person, upon the premises. Hammett v. Blount's Lessee, 31 Tenn. 385, 1852 Tenn. LEXIS 123 (1852); Ellege v. Cooke, 73 Tenn. 622, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1880); Brown v. Brown, 82 Tenn. 253, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 125, 52 Am. Rep. 169 (1884).

The adverse possession may be held by a tenant for the landlord, without the tenant's knowledge of the adverse holding, for the tenant's possession is, in law, the landlord's possession, and its character depends upon the acts or intentions of the landlord, and not upon those of the tenant, and his declarations in reference to the same are immaterial. Waddle v. Stuart, 36 Tenn. 534, 1857 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (1857).

The possession of successive tenants under a landlord, claiming title by entry only, can be connected so as to create a bar to the better title, because a possession under an entry for seven years will confer a fee simple title. Sims v. Eastland, 40 Tenn. 368, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 102 (1859).

Possession of the father, as natural guardian of his child, inures to the benefit of the child. McLemore v. Durivage, 92 Tenn. 482, 92 Tenn. 82, 22 S.W. 207, 1893 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (1893).

A person may take or hold possession of real estate for adverse possession purposes through others. Mahunda v. Thomas, 55 Tenn. App. 470, 402 S.W.2d 485, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

27. —Possession by Administrator.

The possession of an administrator is not by one in privity with decedent or heirs. East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. Ferguson's Heirs, 35 S.W. 900, 1895 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 28 (1895).

28. —Life Tenant and Remaindermen.

Where devisees and legatees under a will go into possession of land, and the will is afterwards set aside, the possession of a tenant for life inures to the benefit of the remaindermen as adverse possessors since the interests of the life tenant and remainder constitute a fee. Brown v. Brown, 82 Tenn. 253, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 125, 52 Am. Rep. 169 (1884).

29. —Vendor and Vendee.

The successive possessions of vendor and vendee may be united so as to make out the requisite time for perfecting the title where the vendee is in possession under a deed in fee and the vendor was holding under color of title, or where the sale is by parol and the deed in fee is subsequently made; but this rule does not apply where the vendee is in possession under a title bond. Napier's Lessee v. Simpson, 1 Tenn. 448, 1809 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1809); Valentine v. Cooley, 19 Tenn. 613, 1838 Tenn. LEXIS 97 (1838); Baker v. Hale, 65 Tenn. 46, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 297 (1873); Ellege v. Cooke, 73 Tenn. 622, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1880).

A purchaser in possession under an unrepudiated parol contract is holding the possession for himself, and not for his vendor, so as to perfect the vendor's title, in seven years, against a superior title of a third party; and such vendee's possession may be adverse to the vendor. Cunningham v. Robertson's Lessee, 31 Tenn. 138, 1851 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1851); James v. Patterson's Lessee, 31 Tenn. 309, 1851 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (1851); Redmond v. Bowles, 37 Tenn. 547, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 60 (1858); Baker v. Hale, 65 Tenn. 46, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 297 (1873); Slatton v. Tennessee C., I. & R. Co., 109 Tenn. 415, 75 S.W. 926, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 85 (1902).

30. —Husband and Wife.

Where lands are purchased by the husband, with a consideration passing from the wife, and title is taken to himself, a resulting trust arises, which is subject to be barred by the statute of limitations of seven years; but such statute will not run against the wife during the joint possession of her husband and herself. McCammon v. Pettitt, 35 Tenn. 242, 1855 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (1855); Earles v. Earles, 40 Tenn. 366, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 101 (1859); Chaney v. Moore, 41 Tenn. 48, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 11 (1860); Haynes v. Swann, 53 Tenn. 458, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 395 (1871); Cummings v. Stovall, 74 Tenn. 679, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 197 (1881).

Joint possession of land by husband and wife, held under the wife's title, or assurance of title, inures to her benefit. Ramsey v. Quillen, 73 Tenn. 184, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 109 (1880); Welcker v. Staples, 88 Tenn. 49, 12 S.W. 340, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 33, 17 Am. St. R. 869 (1889); Templeton v. Twitty, 88 Tenn. 595, 14 S.W. 435, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Dec. 1889); Smith v. Cross, 125 Tenn. 159, 140 S.W. 1060, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1911).

Where, after the severance of an estate by the entirety by divorce of the owners, the entire interest in the lands is sold under decree for the husband's debt, and thereafter held adversely by the purchaser for the term of seven years, the wife's title is barred. Hopson v. Fowlkes, 92 Tenn. 697, 23 S.W. 55, 1893 Tenn. LEXIS 26, 36 Am. St. Rep. 120, 23 L.R.A. 805 (1893).

Possession by a deceased husband cannot be tacked to that of his widow who succeeds to possession without deed or devise, though she resided on the land with him during his possession. East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. Walton, 35 S.W. 459, 1895 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 8 (1895).

Where wife claims possession was, under agreement, for her benefit, the burden is on her to show. Ferring v. Fleischman, 39 S.W. 19, 1896 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 79 (1896).

The wife has no separate right to the possession of the whole estate held by the entirety until her husband's death, when she becomes the owner of the whole property by right of survivorship; and, therefore, she would not be barred by lapse of time reckoned from the date of the conveyance made by her husband, for the statute of limitations of seven years would not begin to run against her until her husband's death. Whitley v. Meador, 137 Tenn. 163, 192 S.W. 718, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 64, L.R.A. (n.s.) 1917D736 (1917).

A husband's continued occupation of land jointly with his wife, who owned an undivided interest, after judicial sale of husband's other undivided interest to a judgment creditor, is not adverse to such creditor. Sipes v. Sanders, 17 Tenn. App. 162, 66 S.W.2d 261, 1933 Tenn. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933).

Where husband and wife held property as tenants by the entirety until such time as husband divorced wife for desertion, parties thereafter held as tenants in common during which period husband continued in possession and husband did not hold adversely to wife so as to acquire entire fee by adverse possession where there was nothing in the record to show that husband gave his former wife notice that he was claiming adversely or to show that he gave any sort of notice which might be considered an ouster. Hampton v. Manuel, 56 Tenn. App. 95, 405 S.W.2d 47, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 226 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

31. —Joint Possession by True Owner and Another.

If the actual possession be mixed or concurrent, the legal seizin or possession shall be adjudged to the person who has the title; and the constructive possession, which the law annexes to the legal title, will be in the true owner, if there is no adverse possession, until an actual disseizin or adverse possession by another. Stewart v. Harris, 28 Tenn. 714, 1849 Tenn. LEXIS 110 (1849); Waddle v. Stuart, 36 Tenn. 534, 1857 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (1857); Padgett v. Baker, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 222 (1873); Hurd v. French, 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 350 (1875); Welcker v. Staples, 88 Tenn. 49, 12 S.W. 340, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 33, 17 Am. St. R. 869 (1889); Smith v. Cross, 125 Tenn. 159, 140 S.W. 1060, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1911).

In cases of joint friendly occupation of land, the benefit of such possession inures to the person who has the legal title, and the legal presumption is that the possession is with the legal title. Ramsey v. Quillen, 73 Tenn. 184, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 109 (1880); Smith v. Cross, 125 Tenn. 159, 140 S.W. 1060, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1911).

The existence of a private way over the land of another is not established by the opening of such road, under an oral contract with the landowner, which road was fenced and gated at their joint expense and for their common benefit, and kept in repair by the claimant, and used for 18 years, where the claimant's possession was not adverse, but joint with the landowner, and his expenditures on the road did not exceed a fair compensation for its use. Long v. Mayberry, 96 Tenn. 378, 36 S.W. 1040, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 40 (1896).

Where the defendant, as a trespasser, entered into the peaceable possession of land, his actual possession of part, by a tenant under a lease covering the whole tract, extended his constructive possession to the balance of the tract; but where the complainant, holding the legal title, subsequently entered into peaceable possession of a part of the land not so actually possessed by the defendant, and was not excluded therefrom so as to force him to his action of ejectment, such possession being acquiesced in, the possession of the parties must be deemed to be concurrent; and the complainant's possession and superior title gave him constructive possession of the entire tract, except that part so in the actual possession of the defendant. The defendant's possession did not ripen into adverse title, where his possession did not continue for the statutory period, excluding the time while the complainant was so in possession, for the time of such concurrent possession must be deducted from the defendant's time of possession. Sequatchie & S. P. Coal & Iron Co. v. Tennessee C. I. & R. Co., 131 Tenn. 221, 174 S.W. 1122, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 101 (1915); Jones v. Coal Creek Min. & Mfg. Co., 133 Tenn. 183, 180 S.W. 991, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1915).

In a contest between the true owner and a trespasser under color of title, both holding actual adverse possession of different parts, at the same time, the constructive possession as to that part of the land outside the actual possessions is that of the true owner; and the fact that such trespasser was first in such actual possession can make no difference. Jones v. Coal Creek Min. & Mfg. Co., 133 Tenn. 183, 180 S.W. 991, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1915).

32. —Joint Possession by Claimants.

Where two persons are in possession, and both claim title, the possession is neutralized; and the fact that one title may be equitable and the other legal, or that one may be in deed and the other in parol, as resulting trust, can make no difference. McCammon v. Pettitt, 35 Tenn. 242, 1855 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (1855).

The actual possessions by two adverse claimants, neither of which has title, neutralize the constructive possession of each in that part not actually possessed by either, and priority of possession creates no advantage. Jones v. Coal Creek Min. & Mfg. Co., 133 Tenn. 183, 180 S.W. 991, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1915).

33. —Notice of Claim.

Bulldozing and clear-cutting around one's claimed line and placing posted signs on rural unimproved land constitutes notice to the world of an adverse claim just as much as fencing in city property would constitute an open and notorious claim. Panter v. Miller, 698 S.W.2d 634, 1985 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2827 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).

34. Assurance or Color of Title.

35. —Necessity Generally.

Seven years' adverse possession by mere trespasser is not sufficient to bar action by owner, since defendant must claim peaceably under a color of title. Patton's Lessee v. Hynes, F. Cas. No. 10835, 18 F. Cas. 1338, 3 Tenn. 356, 1 Cooke 356, 1813 Tenn. LEXIS 32 (1813).

Adverse possession of seven years is a bar only when held under a grant or a deed founded on a grant. Den ex dem. Walker v. Turner, 22 U.S. 541, 6 L. Ed. 155, 1824 U.S. LEXIS 391 (1824); Piles v. Bouldin, 24 U.S. 325, 6 L. Ed. 486, 1826 U.S. LEXIS 315 (1826).

Registration formerly was not, but now is, necessary for the creation of a good defensive or possessory title by adverse possession. Jones' Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. 59, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 102 (1836); Meriwether v. Vaulx, 37 Tenn. 300, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (1858); Nelson v. Trigg, 72 Tenn. 701, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1880); Kittel v. Steger, 121 Tenn. 400, 117 S.W. 500, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1909); Smith v. Cross, 125 Tenn. 159, 140 S.W. 1060, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1911).

Where predecessor held under no color of title and no claim of title could be perfected under his holding, without such color defining his boundaries, his possession was merely a defensive right which was lost by the abandonment of the possession after his death. Schmittow v. McFall, 39 S.W. 886, 1896 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 98 (1896).

By the terms of this section, the adverse possession under the state's grant is not effective in perfecting the title, unless such grant is registered. Smith v. Cross, 125 Tenn. 159, 140 S.W. 1060, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1911).

Case was not made out under this section because deed had not been registered for seven years. Jones v. Mosley, 29 Tenn. App. 559, 198 S.W.2d 652, 1946 Tenn. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946).

Attempt to rely on this section was overruled where there was no evidence of any grant from this state or the state of North Carolina. Bailey v. Eagle Mountain Tel. Co., 202 Tenn. 195, 303 S.W.2d 726, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 379 (1957).

No legal title can be acquired under this statute unless the claimant is holding adversely under recorded assurance of title purporting to convey an estate in fee for seven years. Moore v. Brannan, 42 Tenn. App. 542, 304 S.W.2d 660, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

36. —Miscellaneous Illustrations.

Illustrations of “assurance of title” are as follows:

A grant of land from the state, void because of prior grant, and a sheriff's deed in an attachment proceeding, are both sufficient color of title under adverse possession statute. East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. Wiggin, 68 F. 446, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 2880 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1895).

Title by descent. King v. Travis, 5 Tenn. 279, 5 Tenn. 280, 1818 Tenn. LEXIS 1 (1818); Barton v. Shall, 7 Tenn. 214, 7 Tenn. 215, 1823 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (1823); Guion v. Burton, 19 Tenn. 565, 1838 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1838); King v. Rowan, 57 Tenn. 675, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 286 (1873); Corder v. Dolin, 63 Tenn. 238, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 237 (1874); East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. Broyles' Heirs, 95 Tenn. 612, 32 S.W. 761, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 136 (1895).

Title by devise. King v. Travis, 5 Tenn. 279, 5 Tenn. 280, 1818 Tenn. LEXIS 1 (1818); Barton v. Shall, 7 Tenn. 214, 7 Tenn. 215, 1823 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (1823); Cox's Lessee v. Peck, 11 Tenn. 435, 1832 Tenn. LEXIS 85 (1832); Thurston v. University of North Carolina, 72 Tenn. 513, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1880); Brown v. Brown, 82 Tenn. 253, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 125, 52 Am. Rep. 169 (1884).

A deed founded on a void judicial sale. Darby's Lessee v. Russel, 6 Tenn. 138, 6 Tenn. 139, 1818 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1818).

A fraudulent deed. Porter's Lessee v. Cocke, 7 Tenn. 29, 7 Tenn. 30, 1823 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1823); Gray v. Darby's Lessee, 8 Tenn. 396, 1825 Tenn. LEXIS 13 (1825); Reeves v. Dougherty, 15 Tenn. 222, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 35, 27 Am. Dec. 496 (1834); York v. Bright, 23 Tenn. 312, 1843 Tenn. LEXIS 92 (1843); Blantire v. Whitaker, 30 Tenn. 313, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 123 (1850); Baker v. Morgan, 37 Tenn. 521, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 54 (1858), questioned, Ramsey v. Quillen, 73 Tenn. 184, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 109 (1880); Hunter v. O'Neal, 63 Tenn. 494, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 296 (1874); Hurd v. French, 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 350 (1875); Thurston v. University of North Carolina, 72 Tenn. 513, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1880); Howell v. Thompson, 95 Tenn. 396, 32 S.W. 309, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 107 (1895); Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911); Smith v. Cross, 125 Tenn. 159, 140 S.W. 1060, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1911).

A sheriff's deed founded on a void judgment, execution, or sale. Gray v. Darby's Lessee, 8 Tenn. 396, 1825 Tenn. LEXIS 13 (1825).

A partition decree. Duncan & Fisk v. Gibbs, 9 Tenn. 256, 1829 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (1829); Sawyers v. Cator, 27 Tenn. 256, 1847 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (1847); Johnson v. Britt's Heirs, 56 Tenn. 756, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 200 (1872); Nelson v. Trigg, 72 Tenn. 701, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1880); Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911).

A void deed. Love v. Love's Lessee, 10 Tenn. 288, 1829 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (1829); Vance's Heirs v. Johnson, 29 Tenn. 214, 1849 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1849); Blantire v. Whitaker, 30 Tenn. 313, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 123 (1850); Lea v. Polk County Copper Co., 62 U.S. 493, 16 L. Ed. 203, 1858 U.S. LEXIS 675 (1858); Hunter v. O'Neal, 63 Tenn. 494, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 296 (1874); Mulloy v. Paul, 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 156 (1874); Lieberman, Loveman & O'Brien v. Clark, 114 Tenn. 117, 85 S.W. 258, 1904 Tenn. LEXIS 77 (1904); Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911); Smith v. Cross, 125 Tenn. 159, 140 S.W. 1060, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1911); Moffat v. Schenck, 141 Tenn. 305, 210 S.W. 157, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 91 (1919).

A sheriff's deed based on a void tax sale. Love's Lessee v. Shields, 11 Tenn. 404, 11 Tenn. 405, 1832 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (1832); Blantire v. Whitaker, 30 Tenn. 313, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 123 (1850); Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911); Smith v. Cross, 125 Tenn. 159, 140 S.W. 1060, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1911).

A married woman's deed with the joinder of her husband, but invalid for want of her privy examination. Ferguson v. Kennedy, 7 Tenn. 321, 1824 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1824); a married woman's deed void for want of the joinder of her husband and for the want of her privy examination. Hanks v. Folsom, 79 Tenn. 555, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 107 (1883).

A marshal's deed founded upon a void or voidable decree. Whiteside v. Singleton, 19 Tenn. 207, 1838 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1838).

A deed founded on a void or voidable decree. Whiteside v. Singleton, 19 Tenn. 207, 1838 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1838).

Title under unprobated or probated will where probate is subsequently set aside. Rogers v. Winton, 21 Tenn. 178, 1840 Tenn. LEXIS 61 (1840); Brown v. Brown, 82 Tenn. 253, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 125, 52 Am. Rep. 169 (1884).

A deed procured by fraud. York v. Bright, 23 Tenn. 312, 1843 Tenn. LEXIS 92 (1843); Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 22 L. Ed. 636, 1874 U.S. LEXIS 1374 (1875); Fuller v. Montague, 59 F. 212, 1893 U.S. App. LEXIS 2350 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1893).

A deed inoperative or void in its inception. Vance's Heirs v. Johnson, 29 Tenn. 214, 1849 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1849); Hunter v. O'Neal, 63 Tenn. 494, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 296 (1874); Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911).

A deed fraudulent in law or fact. Blantire v. Whitaker, 30 Tenn. 313, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 123 (1850); Thurston v. University of North Carolina, 72 Tenn. 513, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1880).

A forged deed. Clark v. Chase, 37 Tenn. 636, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1858); Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911).

A partition decree not divesting or vesting title. Johnson v. Britt's Heirs, 56 Tenn. 756, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 200 (1872); Thurston v. University of North Carolina, 72 Tenn. 513, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1880).

A champertous deed. Goodloe v. Pope, 3 Shan. 634 (1875); Smith v. Cross, 125 Tenn. 159, 140 S.W. 1060, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1911).

A partition deed under a will, though testator had no title. Thurston v. University of North Carolina, 72 Tenn. 513, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1880); Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911).

A partition deed, though not, in legal terms, vesting each partitioner with a fee. Thurston v. University of North Carolina, 72 Tenn. 513, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 55 (1880).

A marshal's deed void or voidable, because based upon a levy and sale of land held under title bond by the execution debtor. Nelson v. Trigg, 72 Tenn. 701, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1880).

A voidable deed. Nelson v. Trigg, 72 Tenn. 701, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1880).

A second grant of the state. Sharp v. Vanwinkle, 80 Tenn. 15, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1883); East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. Wiggin, 68 F. 446, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 2880 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1895).

A voidable or void decree. Morelock v. Bernard, 83 Tenn. 169, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 38 (1885).

A deed of one of the tenants in common conveying the whole estate is color of title to the whole estate. Morelock v. Bernard, 83 Tenn. 169, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 38 (1885); Fuller v. Montague, 59 F. 212, 1893 U.S. App. LEXIS 2350 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1893).

A void tax sale and deed. Hubbard v. Godfrey, 100 Tenn. 150, 47 S.W. 81, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 98 (1898); Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911); Southern Coal & I. Co. v. Schwoon, 145 Tenn. 191, 239 S.W. 398, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1921).

Void partition sale and deed. Hubbard v. Godfrey, 100 Tenn. 150, 47 S.W. 81, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 98 (1898).

A decree confirming a chancery sale and vesting title in the purchaser. Patton v. Dixon, 105 Tenn. 97, 58 S.W. 299, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (1900).

A second deed purporting to convey the fee which had been previously conveyed by the first deed. Poindexter v. Rawlings, 106 Tenn. 97, 59 S.W. 766, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 137, 82 Am. St. Rep. 869 (1900).

Where the owner of a tract of land occupied an adjoining parcel included in another tract embraced in a registered deed under which a third person claimed, until such owner sold his tract to such third person, who then took possession thereof and also of such parcel, and continued in possession of such parcel for more than seven years under his previously registered deed, which enabled any adverse claimant to determine the nature of the claim of such third person's possession, the third person's possession ripened into a title by adverse possession, over the objection that there was but a secret change of possession from one who had no color of title to one who had color of title, without bringing knowledge of the changed possession to the adverse claimant; for the inclosure and possession were notorious, and the adverse claim, or the extent thereof, was shown by the registered deed under which the possession was held. Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911).

Contract to convey by general warranty deed. Chandler v. Stockton, 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 488 (1901).

37. —Estate in Fee.

An assurance of title purporting to convey an estate in fee, though not, in fact, conveying such estate, constitutes color of title; and it may be a fraudulent or forged deed, or it may be a will, or a decree divesting and vesting title, or any other paper purporting to transfer a title in fee. Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911).

The decree of the chancery court and the will of the deceased purported to convey only the right, title and interest of the deceased. It was insufficient to show color of title, as it is necessary that the paper under which the claim is made purports to convey an estate in fee. Marbury v. May, 9 F.2d 587, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 2433 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1925).

The statute requires only that the assurance of title purports to convey an estate in fee. Banner Baptist Church v. Watson, 193 Tenn. 290, 246 S.W.2d 17, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 357 (1951).

Finding of chancellor that plaintiff had taken title by adverse possession was in error where nowhere in the record was it proven that the conveyance to plaintiff purported to convey an estate in fee. Arrowood v. Williams, 586 S.W.2d 131, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).

38. —Fee with Condition Subsequent.

The statutory provisions for an assurance of title are not restricted to estates in fee simple absolute, it being sufficient that deed purported to convey an estate in fee simple upon a condition subsequent. Banner Baptist Church v. Watson, 193 Tenn. 290, 246 S.W.2d 17, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 357 (1951).

39. —Void Assurance.

It may be that the assurance of title of the adverse possessor is void for the reason that his grantor had no title to convey. The claimant under the void title must, in order to oust the true owner, oust him actually and openly by a hostile and exclusive possession, and must exclude him uninterruptedly for seven years. United States v. McCulley, 100 F. Supp. 379, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3942 (D. Tenn. 1951).

One may be in possession under color of title even though the writing claimed as such is wholly void. Wallace v. McPherson, 187 Tenn. 333, 214 S.W.2d 50, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 278 (1947); Craig v. Turner, 628 S.W.2d 33, 1982 Tenn. App. LEXIS 464 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).

40. —Right and Title of Grantors.

The deed of an executor, showing on its face that it was made in pursuance of a power conferred by the will, and purporting to convey “all the right, title, and claim” of the testator who held under registered tax deeds purporting to convey an estate in fee, is an assurance of title vesting title in one who has had seven years' adverse possession of land under an assurance of title. Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911).

One who makes a deed conveying all his right, title, estate, and interest in certain described lands, or who uses equivalent words, necessarily refers to his title papers, and the deed conveys whatever interest those title papers show that he has; and where his title papers do not convey a title to him, in fact and law, but only purport to do so, the effect will be the same, that is, the deed would carry whatever force or effect such assurance has under our statutes of limitation. Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911).

While it may be that a deed purporting to convey all the right, title, and interest of the grantor in a specified tract of land, nothing else appearing, would not be an assurance of title, yet, when such deed is accompanied by proof of deeds purporting to convey an estate in fee to him, it and the grantor's title papers constitute color of title. Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911); Hitt v. Caney Fork Gulf Coal Co., 124 Tenn. 334, 139 S.W. 693, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (1911); Brier Hill Collieries v. Pile, 4 Tenn. App. 468, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

A deed reciting that the grantors do hereby “absolutely give, grant, remise, release, and forever quitclaim unto the grantee” named “all such right and title as … the grantors have, or ought to have, in and to the” land described, is not a quitclaim deed; but, under the provision that every grant shall pass all the estate of the grantor, it conveys the grantors' whole estate in the premises, and refers to and must be taken in connection with the chain of title on which it is based, whereby it must appear what was the estate owned by the grantors, and was conveyed by them. Such deed purports to “convey,” since the word “grant” is equivalent to the word “convey.” Such deed is an assurance of title. Hitt v. Caney Fork Gulf Coal Co., 124 Tenn. 334, 139 S.W. 693, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (1911).

A deed conveying only the grantor's rights in certain described land is not “color of title” to a parcel within the description previously conveyed by the grantor, and the grantee cannot acquire title by seven years' adverse possession under the statute of limitations contained in this section. Brier Hill Collieries v. Gernt, 131 Tenn. 542, 175 S.W. 560, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 126 (1915); Jones v. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co., 133 Tenn. 159, 180 S.W. 179, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1915).

41. —Effect of Divesting.

If color of title should be divested before the lapse of seven years, this would not destroy adverse possession. Its only effect would be to reduce the constructive possession to actual possession — to reduce it from the whole extent of the boundaries to that actually held by enclosures or otherwise. Hood v. Cravens, 31 Tenn. App. 532, 218 S.W.2d 71, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 111 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

42. — —Deeds of Trust and Mortgages.

Grantee's conveyance of property in trust to secure payment of purchase money would not preclude grantee from holding adversely. Mahunda v. Thomas, 55 Tenn. App. 470, 402 S.W.2d 485, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

43. —Description of Land — Sufficiency.

A deed as registered is sufficient, though it is erroneously transcribed, so as to cause confusion in the boundaries, where the registration contains the description of land as that on which Josiah Terry lived, if the place is prominently located and well known. Smith v. Cross, 125 Tenn. 159, 140 S.W. 1060, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1911).

A tax deed which does not on its face identify the land conveyed thereby as a particular grant, but calls for the corners of another grant from which, under the evidence, it is apparent that the description in the tax deed was intended to cover the first grant, is sufficient to give color of title to that grant. Southern Coal & I. Co. v. Schwoon, 145 Tenn. 191, 239 S.W. 398, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1921).

In ejectment, where the adverse possession under a deed was interposed as a defense as to two tracts of land, a description in a deed as to one tract was held to be so vague and uncertain that it could not operate as a proper location of the boundaries thereof, so as to extend the operation of the statutes of limitation beyond the improvements themselves. Ragsdale v. McFall, 145 Tenn. 684, 237 S.W. 66, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 106 (1922).

In ejectment, where adverse possession under a deed as to one tract was interposed as a defense, and the exact location of the corners called for by the deed could be found by trees on the boundary line of adjoining lands, it was held that the description was sufficient to fix the definite boundaries of that tract, so as to extend the operation of the statutes of limitations to the entire tract. Ragsdale v. McFall, 145 Tenn. 684, 237 S.W. 66, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 106 (1922).

A deed must contain some definite description which will identify the lands claimed thereunder, in order to be an assurance of title under this statute, and if the description is indefinite so as to make it impossible from the deed to locate the land, the conveyance and holding thereunder is void as a basis for the constructive possession. Ragsdale v. McFall, 145 Tenn. 684, 237 S.W. 66, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 106 (1922); Fingar v. Beard, 12 Tenn. App. 604, 1930 Tenn. App. LEXIS 109 (1930).

Facts alleged in adverse possession complaint were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss because the company attempted to tack previous owners'  period of ownership to reach the statutorily mandated time period, and deed description was of sufficient definiteness to convey color of title to the strip of land in question, as it referenced the plat book that court must presume contained further description that included the land in issue. Underwood Repair Serv. v. Dean, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 354 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2008).

44. —Informal Muniments of Title.

An entry is not color of title, but a special entry, though unsurveyed, furnishes evidence of the extent of the constructive possession created by actual possession on some part of the entry, so as to create a possessory right or defensive title to the whole entry. Dunlap v. Gibbs, 12 Tenn. 93, 12 Tenn. 94, 1833 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (1833); Ramsey v. Monroe, 35 Tenn. 329, 1855 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1855); Meriwether v. Vaulx, 37 Tenn. 300, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (1858); Sims v. Eastland, 40 Tenn. 368, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 102 (1859); Bon Air Coal Land & Lumber Co. v. Parks, 94 Tenn. 263, 29 S.W. 130, 1894 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1895); Kittel v. Steger, 121 Tenn. 400, 117 S.W. 500, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1909).

A land warrant is not an assurance of title, but a defensive title may be created by adverse possession thereunder. Dunlap v. Gibbs, 12 Tenn. 93, 12 Tenn. 94, 1833 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (1833); Neal v. President & Trustees of E. Tenn. College, 14 Tenn. 189, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 62 (Tenn. Mar. 1834).

There may be informal muniments of title which are assurances of title, though they do not convey the estate, such as title bonds, entries, and certificates of surveys. Such instruments are not effective under this and the section following, but they are effective to create a constructive possession under § 28-2-103 to the extent of the boundaries defined therein, by adverse possession on some part of the land under a claim of the whole of it. Brown v. Johnson, 20 Tenn. 261, 1839 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1839); Bounds v. Bounds, 58 Tenn. 318, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 265 (1872); Sharp v. Vanwinkle, 80 Tenn. 15, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1883).

A private surveyor's certificate of survey, made at the time of a parol gift of lands, is evidence to define boundaries. Bounds v. Bounds, 58 Tenn. 318, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 265 (1872).

Receipts for purchase money, designating the land and naming the payer as the vendee, may be assurances of title for creation of constructive possession. Sanders v. Everett, 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 520 (1877); Kittel v. Steger, 121 Tenn. 400, 117 S.W. 500, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1909).

45. —Deed of Bargain and Sale.

A deed which uses the expression “bargained and sold, and do hereby quitclaim and transfer to” the grantee (named), “his heirs and assigns forever, all the right, title, and claim” of the grantor in and to certain described land, purports to convey the land, and is not a mere quitclaim deed, but is a color of title. Hanks v. Folsom, 79 Tenn. 555, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 107 (1883); Hitt v. Caney Fork Gulf Coal Co., 124 Tenn. 334, 139 S.W. 693, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (1911).

46. —Deed by Incompetent Grantor.

This section barred action brought by adult to invalidate deeds on grounds of grantor's mental incapacity. Green v. Greer, 29 Tenn. App. 586, 198 S.W.2d 822, 1946 Tenn. App. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946).

47. —Tax Deed.

Ejectment suit by heirs of original owner under grant filed over 80 years after tax deed issued under which defendants claimed was barred. Schooler v. Birge, 51 F. Supp. 610, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2221 (D. Tenn. 1943).

48. —Valid Acknowledgment — Necessity.

Adverse possession under a deed upon the register's record, without authority because the certificates of acknowledgment were fatally defective, and held for three or four years before the enactment of the statute making registration requisite, cannot be perfected by the continued adverse possession after the enactment. Byrd v. Phillips, 120 Tenn. 14, 111 S.W. 1109, 1907 Tenn. LEXIS 36 (1907).

The adverse possession, to be effective in perfecting title under color of title, must be under a registered deed duly probated and authenticated for registration. The registration of a deed under a void acknowledgment is void as to adverse possession under color of title. Byrd v. Phillips, 120 Tenn. 14, 111 S.W. 1109, 1907 Tenn. LEXIS 36 (1907); Breckenridge Cannel Coal Co. v. Scott, 121 Tenn. 88, 114 S.W. 930, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 10 (1908).

Where the certificate of acknowledgment of a married woman's deed was insufficient under the statute to entitle it to registration, it could not operate as color of title, so as to perfect title by adverse possession, notwithstanding it was actually found upon the records in the register's office. Ragsdale v. McFall, 145 Tenn. 684, 237 S.W. 66, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 106 (1922).

49. —Condemnation Decree.

In a suit by the United States government to quiet title to land acquired in condemnation proceedings, the evidence established that the government had acquired an indefeasible title to part of the land in question by the condemnation decree and seven years of subsequent adverse possession. United States v. McCulley, 100 F. Supp. 379, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3942 (D. Tenn. 1951).

50. —Decree in Ejectment Adjudging Title.

A decree in an ejectment suit, which declares that the complainant therein is the owner in fee of the land in controversy described, that his title is superior to that claimed by the defendant therein, removing the defendant's title as a cloud upon complainant's title, and decreeing a recovery of the land in favor of complainant and against the defendant, but not purporting to divest and vest title, is not an assurance of title. Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911).

51. —Assurance of Title Subsequently Acquired.

In order to perfect title by adverse possession, there must be a concurrence of adverse possession for the full period of seven years and an assurance or color of title, purporting to convey the fee under which the possessor claims during the whole of such period, and a color of title subsequently acquired cannot be invoked to perfect, by relation, the adverse possession. Slatton v. Tennessee C., I. & R. Co., 109 Tenn. 415, 75 S.W. 926, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 85 (1902).

Where a person, as a naked trespasser, made a clearing and inclosure upon the lands of another, and held adverse possession of the same for more than seven years, and thus acquiring a possessory title, and thereafter obtained a grant from the state for a large quantity of land, including within the same the clearing and inclosure, and continued his adverse possession in the interlap, without any extension thereof, for more than seven years under such grant, he thereby acquired a perfected title to the extent of the boundaries of his grant. Breckenridge Cannel Coal Co. v. Scott, 121 Tenn. 88, 114 S.W. 930, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 10 (1908); Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911).

Even if a tax deed under which possession was originally taken was insufficient color of title to extend possession to the entire tract, the possession by subsequent grantees, whose deeds purported to convey the entire tract, would extend to the lands described by their deeds. Southern Coal & I. Co. v. Schwoon, 145 Tenn. 191, 239 S.W. 398, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1921).

The mere fact that one had been in possession for more than seven years, under color of title to a small tract including an improvement, does not alone prevent such possession from extending thereafter to a larger tract, including the smaller tract, under a new color of title. Southern Coal & I. Co. v. Schwoon, 145 Tenn. 191, 239 S.W. 398, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1921).

Where the claimant of a grant, which excluded therefrom a prior special entry, took possession of the special entry under a deed giving color of title thereto, his possession extended only to the limits of the special entry, and he could not base thereon a claim to the entire grant by adverse possession. Southern Coal & I. Co. v. Schwoon, 145 Tenn. 191, 239 S.W. 398, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1921).

Where the possession of improvements had ripened into title of a tract to which the possessor held color of title, so that the continued possession of the improvements could not be adverse to anyone, the continued possession did not extend to a larger tract under a newly acquired color of title which included the former tract. Southern Coal & I. Co. v. Schwoon, 145 Tenn. 191, 239 S.W. 398, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1921).

52. —Reference to Prior Unregistered Deed for Description.

There is no case holding that a reference in one deed to another for a more sufficient description of the land must be to a duly recorded conveyance. It may be that such will be the rule since the passage of the statute requiring an instrument relied on as color of title to be recorded. Harriman Land Co. v. Hilton, 121 Tenn. 308, 120 S.W. 162, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 21 (1908).

53. —Beginning of Color of Title.

There is color of title from the date of registration. Allen v. Folwell, 1 Tenn. App. 515, — S.W. —, 1925 Tenn. App. LEXIS 72 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1925).

54. Cotenancies.

Property company, the recent purchaser of the property at issue, failed to establish that the couple who sold them the property held same exclusively and adversely. It was stipulated that the devisee (a cotenant whose one fifth interest had never been extinguished), would have testified that the couple built on and occupied the property “with permissive possession” in exchange for payment of taxes and maintenance; further supporting that assertion was the underlying family relationship between said devisee and the couple, and therefore, the property company failed to provide any clear and positive proof rebutting the evidence that the couples'  possession of the property was permissive. Envision Props., LLC v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 690 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2005).

Where plaintiffs acquired an interest in their father's property by intestacy, they could not prove their claim to quiet title against other co-tenants pursuant to the doctrine of title by prescription as plaintiffs were under the disability of minority during the 21-year period in which their father continuously occupied the property; plaintiffs'  contention that their disability merely extended the time to contest the prescriptive period by three years under T.C.A. § 28-1-106 was misplaced because a presumption of title based upon the doctrine of prescription was made without any reference to the statute of limitations. Amos v. Taylor, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 243 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2008).

55. —Accrual.

Adverse possession of land held by one of several tenants in common, but not adversely to his cotenants, for the term of seven years, under deeds purporting to convey the lands in fee to the several tenants in common, invests them all with title according to their respective claims. Woodruff v. Roysden, 105 Tenn. 491, 58 S.W. 1066, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 96, 80 Am. St. Rep. 905 (1900).

The statute of limitations would not begin to run against a tenant in common until there was a clear and definite action of ouster by another tenant in common, and as this did not occur more than seven years prior to the commencement of the action a plea of the statute of limitations was not available as a defense. Woods v. Richardson, 190 Tenn. 662, 231 S.W.2d 340, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 590 (1950).

56. —Presumption of Possession for All.

The possession of land by one tenant in common is presumed to be for all the tenants owning the same, for every presumption is that the possession is in subordination to the title of the true owners. Hubbard v. Wood's Lessee, 33 Tenn. 279, 1853 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1853); Elliott v. Holder, 40 Tenn. 698, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 205 (1859); Heirs of Marr v. Gilliam, 41 Tenn. 488, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (1860).

The statutes of limitation must receive a strict construction in favor of the cotenant not in actual possession, as the presumption is against an adverse possession between privies. The possession of one cotenant is consistent with the right of the other, and in support of their common title. Hubbard v. Wood's Lessee, 33 Tenn. 279, 1853 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1853); Heirs of Marr v. Gilliam, 41 Tenn. 488, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (1860); Drewery v. Nelms, 132 Tenn. 254, 177 S.W. 946, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 18 (1915).

To remove the presumption that one tenant in common in possession of the land is holding for all, the fact must be affirmatively proved, by clear and convincing evidence, not merely that he held the possession for himself, and adversely to his cotenants, for seven years, but that his cotenants had full knowledge of such adverse claim and holding, during all that period of time. Elliott v. Holder, 40 Tenn. 698, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 205 (1859).

To overturn the presumed entirety of possession of one tenant in common, there must be some plain demonstration that he has repudiated the rights of his cotenants, and his adverse possession must, by some act or conduct of his, produce an actual ouster of his cotenants. Drewery v. Nelms, 132 Tenn. 254, 177 S.W. 946, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 18 (1915).

While we adhere to the accepted rule that a tenant in possession is presumed to be holding for all other cotenants, as well as for himself, this presumption should not be indulged where the person in possession is a stranger to the instrument which created the alleged tenancy in common. Wallace v. McPherson, 187 Tenn. 333, 214 S.W.2d 50, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 278 (1947).

Possession by one tenant in common is also possession by other tenants in common and statute will not begin to run against them until he disseizes them by actual ouster or such an act as would give them actual notice that he was holding adverse to them. Eckhardt v. Eckhardt, 43 Tenn. App. 1, 305 S.W.2d 346, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 100 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

57. —Cotenant's Possession as Bar — Requisites.

One tenant in common may oust his cotenant, and hold as severalty; but a silent possession, accompanied with no act amounting to an ouster, or the giving of notice to his cotenant that his possession is adverse, cannot be construed into an adverse possession. M'Clung v. Ross, 18 U.S. 116, 5 L. Ed. 46, 1820 U.S. LEXIS 246 (1820).

Though tenants in common are not within any exception of the statutes of limitation, they will not be barred by the possession of a cotenant, except where his possession is exclusive and operates as a disseizin and actual ouster of the other tenants. Story v. Saunders, 27 Tenn. 663, 1848 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1848).

The mere silent and sole occupation by one of the entire property, though he claims the whole estate and appropriates the whole rents, without notice to his cotenants that his possession is adverse, where unaccompanied by some act which can amount to an exclusion and ouster of the other cotenants, cannot be construed into an adverse possession. Drewery v. Nelms, 132 Tenn. 254, 177 S.W. 946, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 18 (1915).

Where husband and wife owned land as tenants in common, after the death of the husband the wife owned the fee in one half of the property, the other half descended to the husband's heirs, and the wife held possession not only for herself but for the heirs, and hence did not hold adversely to them. The fact that she collected the rent and paid the taxes was not an actual ouster of the heirs. Wallace v. McPherson, 187 Tenn. 333, 214 S.W.2d 50, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 278 (1947).

The filing of a will for probate, the acceptance, by a stranger to the instrument creating a tenancy in common, of a devise purporting to pass the whole property in question, taking possession, payment of the inheritance tax on the value of the whole property, collection of rents and making of valuable improvements, and the contest of the will, coupled with a failure by any of the cotenants to assert any interest in the property for more than seven years, constituted an ouster. Wallace v. McPherson, 187 Tenn. 333, 214 S.W.2d 50, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 278 (1947).

Where tenant in common and his wife executed a warranty deed to property in question conveying such property to a third person who without taking possession reconveyed the property to such tenant in common and his wife for the purpose of creating an estate by the entireties in such tenant in common and his wife and where both deeds were duly registered, such conveyances and registration was not such notice to the other tenants in common of a hostile possession by such tenant in common and his wife to amount to an ouster or to cause the statute of limitations to run. Moore v. Cole, 200 Tenn. 43, 289 S.W.2d 695, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 375 (1956).

Holding of land by one cotenant and taking the profits without accounting to the others was not sufficient proof of the ouster of the others. Eckhardt v. Eckhardt, 43 Tenn. App. 1, 305 S.W.2d 346, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 100 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

Will giving “all my property of every kind and description, real, personal and mixed,” without specifically describing any of it was not an assurance of title and was too general to be constructive notice to other cotenants that their interests were being devised. Eckhardt v. Eckhardt, 43 Tenn. App. 1, 305 S.W.2d 346, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 100 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

58. —Adverse Possession Barring Cotenants.

The exclusive adverse possession by one tenant in common, or his exclusive receipt of the rents and profits, without demand made by the other tenants or, if made, refused, and their title denied, would be evidence of an actual ouster or disseizin, and would vest title in such adverse possessor, if continued long enough. Hubbard v. Wood's Lessee, 33 Tenn. 279, 1853 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1853); Hilton v. Duncan, 41 Tenn. 313, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 69 (1860); Heirs of Marr v. Gilliam, 41 Tenn. 488, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (1860); King v. Rowan, 57 Tenn. 675, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 286 (1873); Morelock v. Bernard, 83 Tenn. 169, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 38 (1885); Burns v. Headrick, 85 Tenn. 102, 2 S.W. 259, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1886).

The adverse possession by one tenant in common for the seven year period vests him with the absolute and indefeasible title to the whole tract. Hubbard v. Wood's Lessee, 33 Tenn. 279, 1853 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1853); Hilton v. Duncan, 41 Tenn. 313, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 69 (1860); King v. Rowan, 57 Tenn. 675, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 286 (1873); Fisher v. Loague, 3 Shan. 123 (1882).

The open, exclusive, continuous, and adverse possession by a tenant in common, for seven years, under a parol partition, amounting to an actual ouster of the other cotenants, will vest the whole indefeasible title in the adverse possessor as against his cotenants. Fisher v. Loague, 3 Shan. 123 (1882); Morelock v. Bernard, 83 Tenn. 169, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 38 (1885).

As between tenants in common, an ouster may be presumed in favor of one who, with the knowledge of his cotenants, and without objection, takes and holds, for many years, the adverse and exclusive possession of land owned in common, receives all the rents and profits thereof, conveys the land to secure his debts, and subsequently conveys it, in fee simple, to a purchaser who held adversely for many years before suit was brought. Burns v. Headrick, 85 Tenn. 102, 2 S.W. 259, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1886).

Possession of land by one tenant in common operates against his cotenants where it is intended or understood by all the parties to be adverse, as where person in possession of land purchases an undivided interest in the land from an adverse claimant with a view to protect himself against litigation. Cooper v. Great Falls Cotton Mills Co., 94 Tenn. 588, 30 S.W. 353, 1894 Tenn. LEXIS 72 (1895).

Where the possession of a tenant in common was open and notorious, and, for the statutory period of seven years, he cultivated the land, removed practically all the merchantable timber, sold some 15 tracts off the land, the deeds being recorded, and never made nor was asked for an accounting, the possession was adverse, and the right of the other tenants was barred. Taylor v. Blackwell, 141 Tenn. 184, 207 S.W. 738, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1918).

Where deceased and first husband acquired property as tenants in common and upon her death subsequent to her first husband devised property described by house number to stepdaughter and her heirs, and stepdaughter in will contest sustained validity of will and thereafter paid taxes and made repairs for a period in excess of seven years she claimed fee by color of title and could plead seven year period of adverse possession against heirs of first husband of deceased. Wallace v. McPherson, 187 Tenn. 333, 214 S.W.2d 50, 1947 Tenn. LEXIS 278 (1947).

59. —Part of Cotenants Barred.

Some tenants in common may be barred while the others may not be. The bar of some will not operate to bar the others. Barrow's Lessee v. Nave, 10 Tenn. 227, 1828 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (1828); Wade v. Johnson, 24 Tenn. 117, 1844 Tenn. LEXIS 38 (1844).

The effect of the bar of the statutes of limitation cannot be obviated by a partition and allotment of that part of the land to the one not barred as to it, and as to which the others were barred. Wade v. Johnson, 24 Tenn. 117, 1844 Tenn. LEXIS 38 (1844).

60. —Grantee of One Cotenant.

The adverse possession of land, for seven years, under the deed of one tenant in common, assuming to convey the entire land, or any specific part of it by metes and bounds, will bar not only the right of possession, but also the right of property or the title of the other cotenants. Weisinger v. Murphy, 39 Tenn. 674, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 299 (1859); Heirs of Marr v. Gilliam, 41 Tenn. 488, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (1860); Morelock v. Bernard, 83 Tenn. 169, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 38 (1885).

61. —Tenants in Common as Against Third Parties.

The possession by one tenant in common will inure in favor of the other tenants in common not in possession, as against third parties or claimants, so as to invest all the tenants with a perfected title or possessory right, as the case may be, under the statutes of limitation. Cunningham v. Robertson's Lessee, 31 Tenn. 138, 1851 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1851); Hubbard v. Wood's Lessee, 33 Tenn. 279, 1853 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1853).

62. Landlord and Tenant.

A tenant may hold land adversely for and on behalf of his landlord. Mahunda v. Thomas, 55 Tenn. App. 470, 402 S.W.2d 485, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

Where grantor only reserved right to live on property for remainder of her life but did not reserve life estate, grantor was in effect a tenant of grantees so that her living on the land would not prevent grantees claiming by adverse possession. Mahunda v. Thomas, 55 Tenn. App. 470, 402 S.W.2d 485, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

Where tenant who farmed one tract of land and lived on second tract had been tenant of grantor and continued to live on land after purported conveyance and continued to pay rent to grantor who credited such amount to grantees as part of purchase payments, tenant was tenant of grantees rather than grantor and held adversely for grantees. Mahunda v. Thomas, 55 Tenn. App. 470, 402 S.W.2d 485, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 292 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965).

63. —Presumption.

The tenant's possession is the possession of the landlord. Hammett v. Blount's Lessee, 31 Tenn. 385, 1852 Tenn. LEXIS 123 (1852).

Possession by tenant at will inures to the benefit of his landlord, and is available under the statutes of limitation against an older grantee. Ellege v. Cooke, 73 Tenn. 622, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1880); Brown v. Brown, 82 Tenn. 253, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 125, 52 Am. Rep. 169 (1884).

Where the purchaser of the timber on a tract of land, under a contract giving him no right to possession of the tract, constructed some houses thereon where he and his employees lived, while engaged in removing the timber, his possession was that of tenant for the vendor of the timber on which the vendor can base a claim by adverse possession. Southern Coal & I. Co. v. Schwoon, 145 Tenn. 191, 239 S.W. 398, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1921).

64. —Disputing Title of Landlord.

A tenant, or a purchaser or lessee from him, is estopped, within the period necessary to form a bar by adverse possession, to deny or dispute his landlord's title, without first restoring the possession and putting the landlord in statu quo. Phillips's Lessee v. Robertson, 5 Tenn. 153, 5 Tenn. 154, 1817 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1817); Rogers v. Waller, 5 Tenn. 205, 1817 Tenn. LEXIS 99, 9 Am. Dec. 758 (1817); Phillips v. Robertson, 6 Tenn. 100, 6 Tenn. 101, 1818 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (1818); Wilson v. Smith, 13 Tenn. 379, 1825 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (1825); Porter v. Gordon, 13 Tenn. 99, 13 Tenn. 100, 1833 Tenn. LEXIS 113 (1833); Duke v. Harper, 14 Tenn. 279, 14 Tenn. 280, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 75 (1834); Lane's Lessee v. Osment, 17 Tenn. 86, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 20 (1836); Galloway v. Finley, 37 U.S. 264, 9 L. Ed. 1079, 1838 U.S. LEXIS 358, 2 Ohio F. Dec. 668 (Mar. 12, 1838); Howard v. Terry, 36 Tenn. 419, 1857 Tenn. LEXIS 23 (1857); Long v. Douglass, 59 Tenn. 147, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 37 (1873); Campbell v. Hampton, 79 Tenn. 440, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (1883).

The rule that a tenant cannot rightfully dispute the title of his landlord, without first restoring the possession, applies to a tenant who goes into possession under a parol lease for a longer term than one year, which is voidable under the statute of frauds. Phillips's Lessee v. Robertson, 5 Tenn. 153, 5 Tenn. 154, 1817 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1817); Phillips v. Robertson, 6 Tenn. 100, 6 Tenn. 101, 1818 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (1818).

One who has come in under a person as his landlord, by express contract, and has occupied under him, cannot be allowed to prove that the title is not in his landlord, but in some other. Wilson v. Smith, 13 Tenn. 379, 1825 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (1825).

The possession of a tenant is the possession of his landlord, and is not adverse; but if the tenant disavow the title of the landlord, and hold for himself or another, with actual notice to the landlord or with his actual personal knowledge, such holding is an adverse possession, and if continued for seven years, with such knowledge of the landlord, the statute of limitations will form a bar; but the tenant can in no case contest the right of his landlord, or defend himself under a claim or title adverse to the landlord, during the prescriptive period. Lea's Lessee v. Netherton, 17 Tenn. 315, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 52 (1836); Watson v. Smith, 18 Tenn. 476, 1837 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (1837); Ross v. Blair, 19 Tenn. 525, 1838 Tenn. LEXIS 85 (1838); Howard v. Terry, 36 Tenn. 419, 1857 Tenn. LEXIS 23 (1857); Waddle v. Stuart, 36 Tenn. 534, 1857 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (1857); Heirs of Marr v. Gilliam, 41 Tenn. 488, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (1860); Ellege v. Cooke, 73 Tenn. 622, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1880).

65. —Notice to Landlord of Disclaimer.

The landlord must have actual personal knowledge or notice of the tenant's adverse holding. Constructive notice will not be sufficient, such as the tenant's notice of disclaimer to the landlord's agent, who had authority to receive rents only, and had no authority to enter or to sue for possession, where such disclaimer was not communicated to the landlord, nor is the tenant's refusal to pay rent to such agent notice of the disclaimer. Duke v. Harper, 14 Tenn. 279, 14 Tenn. 280, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 75 (1834); Fennell v. Loague, 107 Tenn. 239, 63 S.W. 1121, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (1901); Boro v. Hidell, 122 Tenn. 80, 120 S.W. 961, 1909 Tenn. LEXIS 4, 135 Am. St. Rep. 857 (1909).

Tenant's notice of disclaimer of the landlord's title, given to the landlord's agent authorized to enter upon the premises or to sue for them, by reason of forfeiture, operates as notice to the landlord. Duke v. Harper, 14 Tenn. 279, 14 Tenn. 280, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 75 (1834); Boro v. Hidell, 122 Tenn. 80, 120 S.W. 961, 1909 Tenn. LEXIS 4, 135 Am. St. Rep. 857 (1909).

If the tenant disclaims his landlord's title, and holds adversely to it, with the knowledge of the landlord, the statute begins to run in his favor from that time, and will form a bar in seven years; but until the period prescribed expires, the landlord may recover in ejectment, the possession, by the mere force of the tenure, without any other evidence than the proof of the tenancy, for the tenant cannot set up the adverse claim against his landlord during the time the statute has to run. Duke v. Harper, 14 Tenn. 279, 14 Tenn. 280, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 75 (1834); Lane's Lessee v. Osment, 17 Tenn. 86, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 20 (1836); Lea's Lessee v. Netherton, 17 Tenn. 315, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 52 (1836); Watson v. Smith, 18 Tenn. 476, 1837 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (1837); Ross v. Blair, 19 Tenn. 525, 1838 Tenn. LEXIS 85 (1838); Ellege v. Cooke, 73 Tenn. 622, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1880).

The making and recording of a deed by tenant purporting to convey a fee simple estate amounted to an actual ouster and disseizin of owner claiming land, which started the running of the statute of limitations. Hood v. Cravens, 31 Tenn. App. 532, 218 S.W.2d 71, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 111 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

66. —Lease Taken Under Mistake or Fraud.

Where a claimant, by fraud or false representation as to his title, induces another to take a lease or to enter under him, the contract is vitiated by the fraud, which prevents the operation of the technical rule that the tenant cannot dispute the landlord's title. Shultz v. Elliott, 30 Tenn. 183, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (1850); Beatty v. Jones, Scott & Baker, 41 Tenn. 482, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 95 (1860); Allison v. Casey, 63 Tenn. 587, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 310 (1874); Hammons v. McClure, 85 Tenn. 65, 2 S.W. 37, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (1886).

67. —Acquired Outstanding Title.

A tenant cannot defend, under an acquired outstanding title, against his landlord's action, though he has acquired the outstanding title from the purchaser at execution sale made before the tenancy under the lease. Wood v. Turner, 26 Tenn. 517, 1847 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (1847); Wood v. Turner, 27 Tenn. 685, 1848 Tenn. LEXIS 21 (1848).

The tenant may defend against the action of his landlord by showing the expiration of his title, his sale and conveyance, or a judicial sale, subsequent to the lease. Wood v. Turner, 27 Tenn. 685, 1848 Tenn. LEXIS 21 (1848); Bowser v. Bowser, 29 Tenn. 49, 1849 Tenn. LEXIS 5 (1849); Moss v. Union Bank, 66 Tenn. 216, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 109 (1874).

68. —Void Lease.

A void lease of an infant's land is not binding on the lessee, and does not estop him to hold under another. Ross v. Cobb, 17 Tenn. 463, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (1836).

69. —Purchaser of Landlord's Reversion.

The purchaser of the landlord's reversion in land subject to a lease is entitled to the possession, after the expiration of the term, and is entitled to the same remedies against the tenant as the landlord would have been entitled to, had he not made the sale. Marley v. Rodgers, 13 Tenn. 217, 1833 Tenn. LEXIS 143 (1833).

70. —Attornment Under Mistake of Title.

Where a person is in possession of land under another title, and, by mistake of the title and right of a third person, attorns to him or acknowledges his title, such tenant is probably not estopped to show the mistake. Washington v. Conrad, 21 Tenn. 562, 1841 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (1841); Shultz v. Elliott, 30 Tenn. 183, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (1850); Allison v. Casey, 63 Tenn. 587, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 310 (1874).

71. —Third Person Claiming Under Tenant.

While the landlord cannot be defeated of his title by third person collusively obtaining possession from his tenant, and holding under an outstanding title, where the tenant conveys the land to a third person by deed purporting to be in fee, under which such third person enters and holds possession, openly and notoriously, for himself, either by himself or his tenants, for seven years, the statute of limitations confirms the title of such third person. Doak v. Donelson's Lessee, 10 Tenn. 249, 1829 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (1829); Allison v. Casey, 63 Tenn. 587, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 310 (1874).

Neither the tenant himself, nor his purchaser in fee or subtenant, whether with or without notice of the landlord's right, can dispute or deny the title of the landlord until after his right of action has been barred. Lane's Lessee v. Osment, 17 Tenn. 86, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 20 (1836); Winnard v. Robbins, 22 Tenn. 614, 1842 Tenn. LEXIS 160 (1842).

A person obtaining possession through collusion with the tenant is estopped to deny the landlord's title until he surrenders possession. Scott v. Mangrum, 7 Tenn. App. 437, — S.W.2d —, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928).

72. Adverse Possession — Estate Acquired.

An estate by the entirety could not arise by operation of the statutes of limitation but only by devise, deed or other instrument. Preston v. Smith, 41 Tenn. App. 222, 293 S.W.2d 51, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).

73. —Life Estate.

A life estate may be acquired by adverse possession. Mimms v. Ewing, 83 Tenn. 667, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 92 (1885); Joy v. Outlaw, 28 Tenn. App. 565, 192 S.W.2d 81, 1945 Tenn. App. LEXIS 95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1945).

74. —Right-of-Way.

A right-of-way is an incorporeal hereditament embraced in this statute, and may be acquired by seven years' adverse possession by user. Bloomstein v. Clees Bros., 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 433 (1877).

75. —Mineral Rights.

Where the grantee of mineral rights of an adverse possessor holding under color of title takes possession, he may unite his subsequent possession with his grantor's prior possession to make out adverse possession for the period of seven years, but such grantee must take immediate and appropriate possession thereof. Northcut v. Church, 135 Tenn. 541, 188 S.W. 220, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1915).

Adverse possession of the surface of land by one holding under color of title, and who has, by his conveyance of the mineral interest, severed that interest from the surface, is not a possession of the severed mineral interest, nor does such possession inure to the owner of the mineral interest, for distinct estates were created by the severance. Northcut v. Church, 135 Tenn. 541, 188 S.W. 220, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1915).

Where minerals are conveyed, the grantor, by implication of law, conveyed the right to obtain access to them through the surface, and as against that purpose he no longer held the surface adversely, because the grantor held it as trustee for the grantee, for the right of access was an incident to the conveyance of the mineral right, and became a part of that right when severed. Northcut v. Church, 135 Tenn. 541, 188 S.W. 220, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1915).

The acts of adverse possession required for the surface and those for the mineral interest are different; the latter requiring some form of mining, or activities directly related thereto. Northcut v. Church, 135 Tenn. 541, 188 S.W. 220, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1915).

76. —Homestead.

Where for 23 years after she became of age, appellant took no steps to enforce any right she might have had to a homestead, but suffered her father to remain in unmolested possession of the land, use it for farming purposes, and pay all taxes assessed against it, any such right was barred by the adverse possession of her father, and the seven year statute of limitations. Nicholson v. Holt, 174 Tenn. 358, 125 S.W.2d 483, 1938 Tenn. LEXIS 99 (1939).

77. —Family Burying Ground.

Right of burial and maintenance of family burying ground is an easement, acquirable by adverse possession, but may not interfere with rights of ancestor's conveyee in mining below surface. Boyd v. Ducktown Chemical & Iron Co., 19 Tenn. App. 392, 89 S.W.2d 360, 1935 Tenn. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935).

78. Adverse Possession — Extent.

79. —Claim of Possessor.

The extent of the estate is fixed by the claim of the possessor. Mimms v. Ewing, 83 Tenn. 667, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 92 (1885); Joy v. Outlaw, 28 Tenn. App. 565, 192 S.W.2d 81, 1945 Tenn. App. LEXIS 95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1945); West v. Moore, 193 Tenn. 431, 246 S.W.2d 74, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 309 (1952).

80. —Deed Describing Several Tracts Separately.

The possession of one of several adjoining tracts conveyed by the same deed, but separately described by distinct boundaries, and not covered by one general boundary, was not constructive possession of either of the other tracts. Camp v. Riddle, 128 Tenn. 294, 160 S.W. 844, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1913).

Having two tracts of land conveyed by separate descriptions indicates a purpose to hold them apart as separate tracts, and to suffer the legal consequences of that situation. Round Mountain Lumber & Coal Co. v. Bass, 136 Tenn. 687, 191 S.W. 341, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 171 (1916).

81. —Deed Description by General Boundaries.

Where tax deed described the land by metes and bounds and included a portion of adjoining tract owned by complainant, the occupancy by defendants puts the seven year statute in operation against the complainants where the improvements and boundaries of the original smaller tract became lost. Sullivan v. Davidson, 43 S.W. 122, 1897 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 82 (1897).

It is settled law of this state that seven years adverse possession, under a special entry of land, is protected to the extent of the call. Childers v. Ryan, 43 S.W. 126, 1897 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 84 (1897).

A deed which conveys several tracts of land by general description constitutes color of title to all land embraced within the general boundaries, and adverse possession within the boundaries for a period of more than seven years ripens the title of the vendee into an indefeasible title against all persons not under some legal disability at the time the adverse possession was begun. Smith v. Gernt, 2 Tenn. Civ. App. (2 Higgins) 65 (1911).

82. —Consolidated Tracts.

The adverse possession under the original grants or previous deeds will not extend and perfect the title beyond their respective boundaries and to the boundaries of a new grant or deed, consolidating and conveying the several tracts and covering the existing and previous possessions and more, unless such possessions be intentionally extended and adversely held under the new grant or deed, for the requisite period of seven years. The consolidating grant or deed obliterates the separate tracts by uniting them in one tract under one boundary, and the former subdivisions become nonexistent and unimportant. Peck v. Houston, 73 Tenn. 227, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 114 (1880); Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Ross, 80 Tenn. 1, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 133 (1883); Bon Air Coal Land & Lumber Co. v. Parks, 94 Tenn. 263, 29 S.W. 130, 1894 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1895); Turnage v. Kenton, 102 Tenn. 328, 52 S.W. 174, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 54 (1899); Elliott v. Cumberland Coal & Coke Co., 109 Tenn. 745, 71 S.W. 749, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 106 (1902); Breckenridge Cannel Coal Co. v. Scott, 121 Tenn. 88, 114 S.W. 930, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 10 (1908); Camp v. Riddle, 128 Tenn. 294, 160 S.W. 844, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1913).

Adverse possession for the requisite period of seven years, within the boundaries of a deed conveying and describing the land as a single tract, extended or made and held under such deed and after its execution, operates to perfect the title in the possessor to the entire tract, not covered by a counter possession on some part thereof, notwithstanding the land had been originally granted by the state to different persons and in several tracts, but, in case of conflicting titles, the possession must be on the disputed part; and the possession of one of several adjoining tracts conveyed by the same deed is not constructive possession of either of the other tracts, where the several tracts were separately described by the deed, and were not covered by one general boundary. Turnage v. Kenton, 102 Tenn. 328, 52 S.W. 174, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 54 (1899); Elliott v. Cumberland Coal & Coke Co., 109 Tenn. 745, 71 S.W. 749, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 106 (1902); Kittel v. Steger, 121 Tenn. 400, 117 S.W. 500, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1909); Camp v. Riddle, 128 Tenn. 294, 160 S.W. 844, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1913).

A claimant under a deed of consolidation of a tract with several other tracts could show possession of that tract by showing the establishment of a seat of possession anywhere within the consolidated tract, as against the heirs of one who previously abandoned possession without acquisition of title by adverse possession, where they entered upon the particular tract after the consolidation was effected. Round Mountain Lumber & Coal Co. v. Bass, 136 Tenn. 687, 191 S.W. 341, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 171 (1916).

83. —Description Erroneous.

A deed of conveyance is effective as intended where the description therein is erroneous as to the land actually surveyed and marked out on the ground. Staub v. Hampton, 117 Tenn. 706, 101 S.W. 776, 1906 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (Tenn. Dec. 1906).

84. —Boundaries Possessed.

A tenant's possession of a part of a tract of land under a lease, with prescribed boundaries, does not extend his possession for the lessor beyond those boundaries. Ross v. Cobb, 17 Tenn. 463, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (1836); Brown v. Johnson, 20 Tenn. 261, 1839 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1839); Massengill v. Boyles, 30 Tenn. 112, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (1850); Kincaid v. Meadows, 40 Tenn. 188, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1859); Bell v. North American Coal & Coke Co., 155 F. 712, 1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 4671 (6th Cir. 1907); Glen Mary Coal & Coke Co. v. Wolfe, 243 F. 131, 1917 U.S. App. LEXIS 2095 (6th Cir. 1917).

Where a tract of land is leased, without circumscribing the tenant in the boundaries thereof, then a possession under such lease would be a possession of the whole tract, although the lessee might actually occupy only a part thereof. Ross v. Cobb, 17 Tenn. 463, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (1836); Brown v. Johnson, 20 Tenn. 261, 1839 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1839); Massengill v. Boyles, 30 Tenn. 112, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (1850); Bell v. North American Coal & Coke Co., 155 F. 712, 1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 4671 (6th Cir. 1907); Brier Hill Collieries v. Pile, 4 Tenn. App. 468, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

Where, at the time of execution of a deed conveying a part of the grantor's lands, the boundaries are actually marked upon the land, but vary from the boundary lines described in the deed and the previous conveyances under which the grantor claims title, and the liens thus marked are known and recognized by the parties as the true boundary lines of the land, and adverse possession of such land for a period of seven years, claiming up to the new boundaries thus made, will vest an estate in fee in the conveyee. Mayse v. Lafferty, 38 Tenn. 60, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 119 (1858); Staub v. Hampton, 117 Tenn. 706, 101 S.W. 776, 1906 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (Tenn. Dec. 1906).

Where one accidentally and unintentionally inclosed the land of another, and upon discovery of the mistake, he agreed to hold “that possession” for a claimant under a void tax title, without more, such possession, without any subsequent extension of his fences or actual occupation, is not the possession of such claimant under such void tax title, to the extent of his boundaries, so as to perfect his tax title, but is effective only to the extent of the actual possession. Treece v. American Asso., 122 F. 598, 1903 U.S. App. LEXIS 3909 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1903), cert. denied, 191 U.S. 568, 24 S. Ct. 841, 48 L. Ed. 305, 1903 U.S. LEXIS 1513 (1903).

Where the grantor divided his land into three tracts and conveyed the first tract as containing his vineyard and by mistake described the second tract as being in the northeast corner of his land whereas it was in the northwest corner, the purchaser of the first tract entered into possession of the vineyard and retained possession adversely for over seven years and was entitled to such part of the second tract as he took possession. Louisville Trust Co. v. Alford, 53 S.W. 974, 1899 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 81 (1899).

The vendor's claim by adverse possession, based on occupation by purchaser of timber as vendor's lessee, is limited to the land occupied, and does not extend to the entire tract. Southern Coal & I. Co. v. Schwoon, 145 Tenn. 191, 239 S.W. 398, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1921).

As a legal proposition one cannot sit by and let another acquire the title to a tract of land by adverse possession and afterwards restrict his boundaries so as to leave out the possessions and claim title to that part not actually enclosed. Beaty v. Owens, 6 Tenn. App. 154, — S.W. —, 1927 Tenn. App. LEXIS 125 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1927).

85. —Interlap of Possession.

The exclusive adverse possession of part of the interference between two grants, held by the younger grantee for seven years, will vest in him an indefeasible title in fee, coextensive with the boundaries of his grant, so as to include the whole interference. Waddle v. Stuart, 36 Tenn. 534, 1857 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (1857); Creech v. Jones, 37 Tenn. 631, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (1858); Snapp v. Purcell, 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 565 (1897).

There is no possession of the interlap, where the possession is upon an adjacent tract under a different grant from that relied on in the suit. Peck v. Houston, 73 Tenn. 227, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 114 (1880).

In the case of conflicting land titles, the adverse possession must be the actual possession of some part of the land in dispute, or within the bounds of the disputed part, in order to make the statutes of limitation effective. Possession of some part of the true owner's land, not within the bounds of the disputed part, is not sufficient, because possession outside of the conflict or interference does not displace the constructive possession of the true owner, which the law attaches to him in virtue of his better title. Peck v. Houston, 73 Tenn. 227, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 114 (1880); Hebard v. Scott, 95 Tenn. 467, 32 S.W. 390, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 117 (1895); Elliott v. Cumberland Coal & Coke Co., 109 Tenn. 745, 71 S.W. 749, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 106 (1902); Wright v. Hurst, 122 Tenn. 656, 127 S.W. 701, 1909 Tenn. LEXIS 39 (1910).

The adverse possession must be on some part of the disputed land, without any counter possession thereon, in order to nullify the constructive possession of the true owner as to the part not adversely held by actual possession. Kittel v. Steger, 121 Tenn. 400, 117 S.W. 500, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1909).

Adverse possession under a younger grant on its interlap with an older grant perfects title under the younger grant; but adverse possession under a younger grant, when not within the interlap with the older grant, does not toll or affect the title of the older grant. Wright v. Hurst, 122 Tenn. 656, 127 S.W. 701, 1909 Tenn. LEXIS 39 (1910).

Where the defendant's adverse possession bars the superior title of the complainant, though it be by actual possession of part constructively extending to the whole boundaries, the complainant is not entitled to recover that part of the land in the defendant's constructive possession, where there is a conflict between the grant under which complainant was holding and an inferior grant under which the defendant held another and additional deed, there being no title under such deed and grant within the interlap, for, when the superior title of the complainant was thus barred by actual possession of part constructively extending to the whole boundaries, all was barred. Jones v. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co., 133 Tenn. 159, 180 S.W. 179, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1915).

Assuming that an adverse possessor under a tax deed as color of title, for more than seven years, acquired title to a small tract before abandoning the possession, the true owner, to defeat such title, must have had possession thereon during the adverse party's possession of the specific tract, and the true owner's possession of a number of other contiguous tracts which, with the one involved, had been embraced in boundaries inclosing one large tract, was not sufficient, for the general rule is that where there are several interlapping grants or conveyances, there must be actual possession on the interlap or disputed ground, in order to start adverse holding in respect thereto. Round Mountain Lumber & Coal Co. v. Bass, 136 Tenn. 687, 191 S.W. 341, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 171 (1916).

When A has superior title defining his boundaries to a grant of land, without actual possession thereon, and B enters under color of title to a smaller tract lying within A's grant and establishes actual possession thereon, B's possession to the extent of his boundaries is constructive to put into operation the running of the seven-year statute; and the subsequent location by A of an actual possession on his grant outside of B's tract, which is the disputed area, does not reconfer by construction the possession of A within B's boundaries, nor suspend the running of the statute. Conveyances by A of lands so possessed by B were champertous. Allis v. Hunt, 155 Tenn. 155, 294 S.W. 509, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (1927).

In case of conflict of title by reason of interlap, the possession must be located within the disputed area to be effective and to neutralize the possession of the other. Allis v. Hunt, 155 Tenn. 155, 294 S.W. 509, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 30 (1927).

86. Accrual of Adverse Possession.

Statute did not commence to run until time of registration of deed under which title was claimed. Welch v. A. B. C. Coal Co., 41 Tenn. App. 208, 293 S.W.2d 44, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 164 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

87. —Sheriff's Deed.

Adverse possession under purchase of land at sheriff's sale is effective under the sheriff's deed subsequently executed. A sheriff's deed relates back to and vests title from the time the sale was made, so that the statute of limitations will run in the intermediate period from the date of possession until the deed is made. Porter's Lessee v. Cocke, 7 Tenn. 29, 7 Tenn. 30, 1823 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1823); Tennessee & P. R. Co. v. Mabry, 85 Tenn. 47, 1 S.W. 511, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 10 (1886).

88. —Judgment Execution.

Where two judgments are liens on land and the purchaser of the land sold under the second judgment goes into possession before a sale under the first judgment, the statute of limitations begins to run at the date of his taking possession, and not at the second sale, and seven years' continuous adverse possession by the first purchaser under the second judgment, and his vendee, holding under conveyance purporting to transfer an estate in fee, invest such vendee with an indefeasible title in fee simple, and bars the claim of the second purchaser under the first judgment, although seven years may not have elapsed from the date of the second purchase. Tennessee & P. R. Co. v. Mabry, 85 Tenn. 47, 1 S.W. 511, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 10 (1886).

89. —Possession After Divorce.

Possession by the husband of the wife's land, after divorce, in the absence of any agreement, is adverse. Ferring v. Fleischman, 39 S.W. 19, 1896 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 79 (1896).

90. —Against Remaindermen.

Seven-year statute of limitations runs against a trustee of a life estate in favor of one in adverse possession but does not run against the remainderman since his right of action does not accrue until the death of the life estate. Ewin v. Lindsay, 58 S.W. 388, 1900 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 47 (1900).

The statute of limitations is not applicable because the present owners acquired the life estate of the life tenant and their holding was not adverse, but was under a claim of right, until the falling in of the life estate a short time before the filing of the present suit. Miller v. Gratz, 3 Tenn. App. 498, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

The possession of the defendants could not be adverse to the rights of the remainderman until the falling in of the life estate, which occurred upon the death of the life tenant. Delk v. Williams, 10 Tenn. App. 246, — S.W.2d —, 1929 Tenn. App. LEXIS 29 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1929).

Where life tenant undertook to convey a fee, possession of grantees did not become adverse to remaindermen until death of life tenant. Quarles v. Arthur, 33 Tenn. App. 291, 231 S.W.2d 589, 1950 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950).

Where a husband devised land to his widow for her life, with remainder to their children, and the husband in fact had only a life estate himself and the remainder was in the children under a prior deed, and upon the husband's death the widow went into possession under the will and remained in possession for seven years, the rule which prevents a life tenant under an instrument from holding adversely to persons named remaindermen in that same instrument was not applicable, and, every element within the definition of adverse possession being present in the possession of the widow, she acquired a life estate in the land. West v. Moore, 193 Tenn. 431, 246 S.W.2d 74, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 309 (1952).

The statute of limitations does not run against remaindermen or reversioners during the continuance of the life estate. Hutchison v. Board, 194 Tenn. 223, 250 S.W.2d 82, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 371 (1952).

91. —Persons Under Disability.

Where a minor is the owner of land in possession of another, his disability did not prevent the initiation of suit for adverse possession during minority, but his right will be barred unless suit is brought within three years after the termination of the disability. Dewey v. Sewanee Fuel & Iron Co., 191 F. 450, 1910 U.S. App. LEXIS 5798 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1910).

92. —Against Equity Owner.

The owner of an equity to land, as the owner of an entry, will be barred by seven years' adverse possession, notwithstanding the impediments to the assertion of his own title. Hickman's Lessee v. Gaither, 10 Tenn. 200, 1828 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1828); Guion's Lessee v. Bradley Academy, 12 Tenn. 231, 12 Tenn. 232, 1833 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (1833); Peeler v. Norris' Lessee, 12 Tenn. 331, 1833 Tenn. LEXIS 71 (1833); Miller v. Miller, 19 Tenn. 484, 1838 Tenn. LEXIS 79, 33 Am. Dec. 157 (1838).

93. —Maturity of Adverse Period.

Adverse possession proven for seven years at the date of the trial does not prove adverse possession for seven years at the commencement of the suit. Morelock v. Barnard, 3 Shannon's Cases 284, 2 S.W. 32 (1886).

94. Twenty Year Presumption.

95. —Title Acquired.

Where the defendant had been in open, notorious, continuous, adverse and peaceable possession for more than 20 years under his purchase at partition sale of the disputed land, he acquired title to the land in question by adverse possession. Tellico v. Williams, 59 S.W. 1075, 1900 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 130 (1900).

If the owner of land has allowed another party to use a right-of-way over his land under a claim of right, uninterrupted for a period of 20 years and without objection a grant is presumed on account of this long, peaceable, uninterrupted, and unquestioned use of the right-of-way, and prescription runs against the owner capable of asserting his rights. Jackson v. Cody, 63 S.W. 302, 1901 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 69 (1901).

Twenty years continuous adverse possession of land under claim of right has the legal effect of vesting the possessor with fee simple title thereto. Preston v. Smith, 41 Tenn. App. 222, 293 S.W.2d 51, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).

Where husband and wife acquired title to land by 20 years continuous adverse possession without color of title the estate so acquired was a tenancy in common and not a tenancy by the entirety. Preston v. Smith, 41 Tenn. App. 222, 293 S.W.2d 51, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).

Where proof of case and record as a whole showed that adverse possession of land for 20 years was by husband and wife jointly and was not considered by them to be the exclusive possession of the husband, title so acquired was not in the husband alone but in husband and wife as tenants in common. Preston v. Smith, 41 Tenn. App. 222, 293 S.W.2d 51, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).

96. — —Law Controlling.

The law as it existed at the time 20 years' adverse possession was perfected and title passed would control rather than the law as it existed at the beginning of the adverse possession. Preston v. Smith, 41 Tenn. App. 222, 293 S.W.2d 51, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).

97. —Burden of Proof.

The burden is upon the complainant who seeks to establish a right-of-way by prescription to show affirmatively that, during the entire prescription period of 20 years, there was an uninterrupted user of the road under adverse claim of right, while the owners of the land were capable of contracting and granting the easement, and while they had the estate in the land which he claims to have acquired, and while all such persons were free from disability to resist the claim and user and were seized of the estate in fee and in possession during the requisite period. McKinney v. Duncan, 121 Tenn. 265, 118 S.W. 683, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (1909).

The burden of proof is upon a complainant to show affirmatively that during the entire prescriptive period the owners of the servient estate were competent to convey the title, at least where the owner, at the time the adverse user commenced, was under disability. McKinney v. Duncan, 121 Tenn. 265, 118 S.W. 683, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (1909).

Where complainant failed to show a record title to the land claimed, the burden was upon him to show by clear and positive proof that the possession for 20 years was adverse. Suddath v. Beaty, 37 Tenn. App. 540, 267 S.W.2d 112, 1953 Tenn. App. LEXIS 110 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1953).

98. —Presumption as to Grant from State.

Independent of the statutes of limitation, and upon common law principles and the general principle of public policy, a grant from the state will be presumed, where there has been a continued and uninterrupted adverse possession and enjoyment of land by actual occupation or enclosure under claim of ownership, for 20 years, though there be no paper title nor color of title, but the adverse possession must be the same character of possession as that required to perfect title under the statutes of limitation. Gwathney v. Stump, 2 Tenn. 308, 1814 Tenn. LEXIS 23 (1814); Hanes v. Peck, 8 Tenn. 227, 8 Tenn. 228, 1827 Tenn. LEXIS 39 (1827); Cannon v. Phillips, 34 Tenn. 211, 1854 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1854); White v. Lavender, 37 Tenn. 648, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (1858); Heirs of Marr v. Gilliam, 41 Tenn. 488, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (1860); Ferrell v. Ferrell, 60 Tenn. 329, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 502 (1872); Mimms v. Ewing, 83 Tenn. 667, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 92 (1885); Rightsell v. Hale, 90 Tenn. 556, 18 S.W. 245, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1891); Drewery v. Nelms, 132 Tenn. 254, 177 S.W. 946, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 18 (1915).

The presumption is that the state's grant was issued to the last holder of the possession, where the 20 years' possession is made out by separate, successive, and consecutive adverse possessions, continued without break or hiatus, though there be no privity of title or occupation between them, and no transfers, verbal or written. Chilton v. Wilson's Heirs, 28 Tenn. 399, 1848 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (1848); Scales v. Cockrill, 40 Tenn. 432, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 121 (1859); Heirs of Marr v. Gilliam, 41 Tenn. 488, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (1860); Mimms v. Ewing, 83 Tenn. 667, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 92 (1885); Ferguson v. Prince, 136 Tenn. 543, 190 S.W. 548, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 160 (1916).

Grant from the state will not be presumed from actual adverse possession for 20 years, as to land included in the conflict of boundaries, but not included in the actual possession. White v. Lavender, 37 Tenn. 648, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (1858); Snoddy v. Kreutch, 40 Tenn. 301, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (1859).

The presumption of the state's grant from adverse possession for 20 years does not rest upon the probability of the fact, but upon the legal possibility thereof; and to destroy the foundation of such presumption, it must appear that the issuance of a grant, in the given case, was a legal impossibility. Williams v. Donell, 39 Tenn. 695, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 303 (1859).

Actual adverse possession of part of a tract of land, claimed under a deed or paper title describing the boundaries of the land conveyed, creates a constructive possession as to the part not actually possessed, and if such possession be held and continued for 20 years, without any counter possession, it raises a presumption of a grant from the state, not only as to the land actually occupied or inclosed, but also to the extent of the boundaries of such deed or paper title. Scales v. Cockrill, 40 Tenn. 432, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 121 (1859); Hunter v. Bills, 3 Shan. 97 (1879).

There is a presumption of grant or deed whether the continuous possession be in one person, or there be several successive possessions; but the successive possessions must be connected without any hiatus, though there need be no privity of contract or other legal privity between the successive occupants. Ferguson v. Prince, 136 Tenn. 543, 190 S.W. 548, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 160 (1916).

After 20 years of adverse possession, a grant from the state will be presumed. Webb v. Harris, 44 Tenn. App. 492, 315 S.W.2d 274, 1958 Tenn. App. LEXIS 100 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958).

99. —Sui Juris Owners.

It must appear that the parties against whom the presumption of a grant or deed to land is sought to be enforced were, during the whole 20 years, in a position to resist the possession, that is, were not under disability; and, where the adverse possession was less than 20 years when the owner died leaving minor children, one of them, still a minor, is entitled to recover his inherited undivided interest in the land, because the presumption had not completely run as to him. Ferguson v. Prince, 136 Tenn. 543, 190 S.W. 548, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 160 (1916).

The three years' saving for infants prescribed by our statutes of limitation has no bearing upon the presumption of title from the lapse of time; and where one was an infant at the time of inheriting land to which another claimed title by adverse possession, only the time during which the disability existed will be counted in determining the length of the adverse possession. Ferguson v. Prince, 136 Tenn. 543, 190 S.W. 548, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 160 (1916).

To establish a right by prescription, the acts by which it is sought to establish it must operate against persons capable of making a grant, and in a condition to resist it. Davis v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 147 Tenn. 1, 244 S.W. 483, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1922).

While it is said in some cases that it is a part of the case of one claiming a prescriptive right to show affirmatively that the owners of the servient estate during the prescriptive period were competent to convey title, in the absence of any proof on the subject, it will be presumed that they were capable of suing or acquiescing in the prescription and the fact that they were not sui juris or capable of granting a right must be pleaded and proved. Davis v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 147 Tenn. 1, 244 S.W. 483, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1922).

Under the seven year statute, when the limitations begin to run and no disability exists subsequent disabilities do not toll the statute; but under the 20 year period successive disabilities do arrest the operation of the limitation. Scruggs v. Baugh, 3 Tenn. App. 256, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 99 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

100. —Cotenancy.

Where it is verbally agreed between tenants in common as the owners of land descended to them that all should give up their shares to one of their number, for a certain compensation, whereupon he entered into the exclusive possession, and held the land adversely for 20 years, the whole title was vested in such tenant. Hilton v. Duncan, 41 Tenn. 313, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 69 (1860); Drewery v. Nelms, 132 Tenn. 254, 177 S.W. 946, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 18 (1915).

An ouster may be presumed by 20 or more years' adverse possession. Eckhardt v. Eckhardt, 43 Tenn. App. 1, 305 S.W.2d 346, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 100 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

101. —Taking Possession.

Where grantor was in possession of land, some of which he held adversely, and conveyed only the part to which he held good title, but gave possession of all, the court held no privity between grantor and grantee under the seven year statute, but that title could be perfected under the 20 year presumption since there was successive occupation. Ferguson v. Prince, 136 Tenn. 543, 190 S.W. 548, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 160 (1916).

Where neither of parties had 20 years possession but together their period of adverse possession amounted to more than 20 years without interruption, the title and right to possession by prescription prevailed. Hill v. Hill, 55 Tenn. App. 589, 403 S.W.2d 769, 1965 Tenn. App. LEXIS 267 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964).

102. Suspending Operation of Statute.

The operation of the statute in favor of one in actual possession under color of title can be suspended or stopped only by actual suit, or by the entry and actual possession of the true owner, made and taken before the bar is completed by adverse and peaceable possession for seven years. The peaceable possession cannot continue and exist, after the person having the better title takes actual possession in pursuance of his right. M'Clung v. Ross, 18 U.S. 116, 5 L. Ed. 46, 1820 U.S. LEXIS 246 (1820).

The only method by which the operation of the statute may be arrested or suspended is by suit in law or equity effectually prosecuted against the person or persons in possession, or by peaceable entry, in a legal sense, that is, an entry by the rightful owner with the consent and acquiescence of the adverse possessor. Norvell v. Gray's, 31 Tenn. 96, 1851 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1851); Wooldridge v. Planters' Bank, 33 Tenn. 297, 1853 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1853); Creech v. Jones, 37 Tenn. 631, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (1858).

The statute is not suspended by the abatement of an action of forcible entry and detainer upon the death of the ancestor. Jones v. Preston, 40 Tenn. 161, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1859); Hopkins' Heirs v. Calloway, 47 Tenn. 37, 1869 Tenn. LEXIS 6 (1869).

103. —Abandonment and Disclaimer of Title.

Failure to assert a valid title does not amount to an abandonment or operate to extinguish such title. Marbury v. May, 9 F.2d 587, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 2433 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1925).

It is true, as a general proposition, that a party cannot be divested of his title to land by a mere oral disclaimer. Boles v. Smith, 1 Shan. 149 (1859); Round Mountain Lumber & Coal Co. v. Bass, 136 Tenn. 687, 191 S.W. 341, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 171 (1916).

Where a party, without claim of right or color of title, goes upon a tract of land legally belonging to another, upon abandonment of his possession before the acquisition of title by adverse possession, all of his rights ceased and nothing descended to his heirs. Round Mountain Lumber & Coal Co. v. Bass, 136 Tenn. 687, 191 S.W. 341, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 171 (1916).

104. —Abandonment After Seven Years.

Where land has been previously granted by the state to certain persons, seven years' adverse possession thereof by others under color of title will toll the true title, operating just as if a valid deed had been made, and the subsequent relinquishment or abandonment of possession cannot divest the title. East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. Wiggin, 68 F. 446, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 2880 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1895); Round Mountain Lumber & Coal Co. v. Bass, 136 Tenn. 687, 191 S.W. 341, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 171 (1916).

105. Adverse Title — Sufficiency.

106. —Title Purchaser Required to Accept.

A purchaser under an executory contract will not be compelled to accept a possessory right or defensive title sufficient to bar the action of the legal owner, because such right or title is a doubtful title. Cunningham v. Sharp, 30 Tenn. 116, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 71 (1850).

Such purchaser will be compelled to accept a title perfected by the statute of limitations when such perfection is clearly established. Goss v. Singleton, 39 Tenn. 67, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 254 (Tenn. Dec. 1858); Mullins v. Aiken, 49 Tenn. 535, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1871); Scott v. Simpson, 58 Tenn. 310, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 262 (1872); Cohen v. Woollard, 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 686 (1876); Jones v. Fulghum, 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 193 (1876).

107. —Indefeasible Title.

Where it is established, a seven year adverse possession under a registered assurance of title purporting to convey the fee, vests a good and indefeasible title in fee to the land described in the assurance of title no less than if the true owner of the fee had conveyed it by deed, and such a title will support an action in ejectment or any other affirmative action, subject only to the qualification that it must appear that the land in question was granted by the state of Tennessee or the state of North Carolina. Robinson v. Harris, 37 Tenn. App. 105, 260 S.W.2d 404, 1952 Tenn. App. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1952).

108. Pleading — When Unnecessary.

The defendant need not plead the seven year statute of limitations in order to make his defense under this section, since seven years' adverse possession thereunder operates as a transfer of title. Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911); Jones v. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co., 133 Tenn. 159, 180 S.W. 179, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1915).

109. Trial.

110. —Presumptions and Proof.

Actual possession under a deed raises no presumption that such possession began at the date of the deed. Stockley v. Cissna, 119 F. 812, 1902 U.S. App. LEXIS 4728 (6th Cir. 1902).

The doctrine of adverse possession is to be taken strictly, and the adverse possession must be made out by clear and positive proof, and not by inference, for every presumption is in favor of a possession in subordination to the title of the true owner. Drewery v. Nelms, 132 Tenn. 254, 177 S.W. 946, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 18 (1915).

Color of title must be proved, in an ejectment suit, to ripen title in one holding adversely. Demarcus v. Campbell, 17 Tenn. App. 56, 65 S.W.2d 876, 1933 Tenn. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933).

Adverse possession must be made out by proof clear and positive, not by inferences. Every presumption is in favor of the possession being in subordination to the true title. Mathis v. Campbell, 22 Tenn. App. 40, 117 S.W.2d 764, 1938 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1938).

111. —Burden of Proof.

In an action of ejectment by the landlord against the tenant, before his adverse possession has formed a bar, the tenancy is all that need be proved. It is not necessary for the landlord to prove title, and the tenant cannot prove that his landlord has no title. Duke v. Harper, 14 Tenn. 279, 14 Tenn. 280, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 75 (1834).

The doctrine of adverse possession as between cotenants must be made out by clear and positive proof, and not by inference. Heirs of Marr v. Gilliam, 41 Tenn. 488, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (1860).

A deed conveying all that portion of a certain described tract of land not previously conveyed or held by older title, without description of the excluded land, operates prima facie to convey the whole described tract. It devolves on the defendant, who disputes the title of plaintiff claiming under a grant excluding older but not definitely described older titles, to show the existence of such. Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911); Brier Hill Collieries v. Pile, 4 Tenn. App. 468, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 198 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

Although the instruments under which an adverse claimant made his claim did not appear, but it was established that there was such a claim, another claimant, seeking in an action to establish title by adverse possession, had the burden of clearing up the question raised by the existence of the other claim, and of showing its invalidity. Jones v. Coal Creek Min. & Mfg. Co., 133 Tenn. 183, 180 S.W. 991, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1915).

In spite of the principle that a tenant cannot attorn to another, so as to hold adversely to his landlord without notice to him, where it appeared that a tenant had claimed adversely to his landlord, a third party seeking to establish adverse possession to the same land, as against both the landlord and the tenant and their assignees, has the burden of showing positively that the tenant had no title by adverse possession, and of showing the absence of a lease inferred from the testimony of his own witness. Jones v. Coal Creek Min. & Mfg. Co., 133 Tenn. 183, 180 S.W. 991, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1915).

It is incumbent upon the adverse possessor to establish, by clear and positive testimony, such adverse possession as will bar the real title. Jones v. Coal Creek Min. & Mfg. Co., 133 Tenn. 183, 180 S.W. 991, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1915); Davis v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 147 Tenn. 1, 244 S.W. 483, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1922); O'Brien v. Waggoner, 20 Tenn. App. 145, 96 S.W.2d 170, 1936 Tenn. App. LEXIS 11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1936); Harrison v. Beaty, 24 Tenn. App. 13, 137 S.W.2d 946, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).

Where a party bases his title or right upon adverse possession the burden is upon him to sustain such contention. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Sharp, 141 Tenn. 146, 207 S.W. 728, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (1918); Blakemore v. Matthews, 154 Tenn. 334, 285 S.W. 567, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 130 (1926); Hoge v. Southern Cities Power Co., 8 Tenn. App. 636, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 186 (1928).

The rule of law that one seeking to show title by adverse possession has the burden to make out by clear and positive testimony such adverse possession as will bar the title is applicable to the length of time as well as to the character of the possession. Southern Coal & I. Co. v. Schwoon, 145 Tenn. 191, 239 S.W. 398, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1921).

The requirements of adverse possession, being in negation of the rights of the true owner, put upon the adverse claimant the burden of proving an adverse possession inclusive of all of its elements. United States v. McCulley, 100 F. Supp. 379, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3942 (D. Tenn. 1951).

112. —Evidence — Sufficiency.

Evidence was insufficient to establish seven years' adverse possession under color of title. Demarcus v. Campbell, 17 Tenn. App. 56, 65 S.W.2d 876, 1933 Tenn. App. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933).

Trial court incorrectly applied the law when it refused to find that T.C.A. § 28-2-103 barred the claimants' cause of action because the preponderance of evidence offered at trial was against the finding that the owners had not possessed parts of the right-of-way across their land for at least seven years and that the possession was of such an open and obvious nature to put the claimants on notice, when the owners offered clear and convincing proof that they had continuous, actual, and exclusive possession of parts of the right-of-way that ran through their individual properties; further, the possession was open, visible, and notorious. Ball v. McDowell, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 21 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2008), rev'd, 288 S.W.3d 833, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 320 (Tenn. 2009).

113. —Jury and Court — Respective Provinces.

Whether the facts which constitute adverse possession existed is a question for the jury to determine, but whether the facts which are found to exist amount to adverse possession is a question of law for the court. Cox's Lessee v. Peck, 11 Tenn. 435, 1832 Tenn. LEXIS 85 (1832); Whiteside v. Martin, 15 Tenn. 383, 15 Tenn. 384, 1835 Tenn. LEXIS 15 (1835); Ellege v. Cooke, 73 Tenn. 622, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1880).

28-2-102. Action barred after seven years.

Any person, and those claiming under such person neglecting for the term of seven (7) years to avail themselves of the benefit of any title, legal or equitable, by action at law or in equity, effectually prosecuted against the person in possession, under recorded assurance of title, as in § 28-2-101, are forever barred.

Code 1858, § 2764 (deriv. Acts 1819, ch. 28, § 1); Acts 1895, ch. 38, § 2; Shan., § 4457; Code 1932, § 8583; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-202.

Cross-References. Adverse possession, state conveyance, § 28-2-101.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 1 Tenn. Juris., Adverse Possession, §§ 3, 37, 44, 58, 63.

Law Reviews.

Adverse Possession and the Presumption of Title (R.D. Cox), 11 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

This section and § 28-2-101 must be construed together. Section 28-2-101 bars the right; and this section bars the remedy. Kittel v. Steger, 121 Tenn. 400, 117 S.W. 500, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1909).

Possession under this section can be used by the adverse holder defensively only. Moore v. Brannan, 42 Tenn. App. 542, 304 S.W.2d 660, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

This section contemplates a contest by the holder of the legal title out of possession against a claimant in adverse possession under a registered assurance of title. Moore v. Brannan, 42 Tenn. App. 542, 304 S.W.2d 660, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957); Bynum v. Hollowell, 656 S.W.2d 400, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 602 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

The limitation of this section does not operate against the state. Whitaker v. House, 213 Tenn. 61, 372 S.W.2d 194, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 495 (1963).

Sections 28-2-101 and 28-2-105 deal with rights and convey title to the adverse holder while §§ 28-2-102 and 28-2-103 deal with defensive rights and can be used by the adverse holder defensively only. Savely v. Bridges, 57 Tenn. App. 372, 418 S.W.2d 472, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

Sections 28-2-101 and this section protect persons who are holding adversely under a color of title from suits to oust them from the entire boundary of lands on which they are adversely holding a portion, and § 28-2-103 protects an adverse holder without color of title only to that portion of land which is being held adversely. Shearer v. Vandergriff, 661 S.W.2d 680, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. 1983).

2. Actions by Owner.

Where complainant in present case had filed cross bill claiming disputed property in action between other parties and the former suit was dismissed without prejudice, complainant could bring a new action over one year after dismissal without being barred by § 28-1-105 if within seven year limit in this section. Winborn v. Alexander, 39 Tenn. App. 1, 279 S.W.2d 718, 1954 Tenn. App. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954).

3. Accrual of Action.

This section clearly contemplates a party in possession, holding adversely to the claimant out of possession, who has a right to sue; but that right to sue does not accrue except when there is a party in adverse possession to the claimant who is to be barred, and, until that accrues, the statute does not begin to run. Coal Creek Consol. Coal Co. v. East Tennessee, Iron & Coal Co., 105 Tenn. 563, 59 S.W. 634, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 107 (1900), overruled, Earnest v. Little River Land & Lumber Co., 109 Tenn. 427, 75 S.W. 1122, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 86 (1902).

4. —Nonresidence of Defendant.

Defendant's nonresidence did not suspend or affect the running of the seven year statute of limitation because the bill could have been filed and complete relief had at any time notwithstanding her nonresidence. Akers v. Gillentine, 33 Tenn. App. 212, 231 S.W.2d 372, 1950 Tenn. App. LEXIS 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950).

5. —Laches.

A purchaser at sheriff's sale who, by mutual mistake, thought that he was purchasing only a reversionary interest, and who did not assert his title until the death of his predecessor in interest, was not barred by laches, even though the purchaser had in fact bought an undivided share in the fee. Sipes v. Sanders, 17 Tenn. App. 162, 66 S.W.2d 261, 1933 Tenn. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933).

6. Adverse Possession.

Although the chancellor erred by failing to grant a motion to amend before entering judgment to add an alternative theory of defensive adverse possession under T.C.A. § 28-2-102 and T.C.A. § 28-2-103, the error was harmless because the Tennessee supreme court held that the neighboring land owner had acquired title by common law adverse possession. Cumulus Broadcasting, Inc. v. Shim, 226 S.W.3d 366, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Apr. 27, 2007).

7. —Equitable Titles.

The statutes of limitation will operate as a bar to equitable titles where the equitable interest is of such a nature that were it turned into a legal interest the statute would have operated against it. Porter's Lessee v. Cocke, 7 Tenn. 29, 7 Tenn. 30, 1823 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1823); Ramsey v. Quillen, 73 Tenn. 184, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 109 (1880); Hughes v. Brown, 88 Tenn. 578, 13 S.W. 286, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 79, 8 L.R.A. 480 (1889).

8. —Successive Possessions.

Successive possessions cannot aid each other unless they be connected by some form of contract privity. Ferguson v. Prince, 136 Tenn. 543, 190 S.W. 548, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 160 (1916).

9. —Fraudulent Conveyance.

This seven year statute is applicable to a suit to set aside a deed as a fraudulent conveyance. Akers v. Gillentine, 33 Tenn. App. 212, 231 S.W.2d 372, 1950 Tenn. App. LEXIS 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950).

That the statute of limitations protects a fraudulent vendee is clear under the authorities, and that the concealment of the cause of action by the vendor or principal will not prevent the running of the statute of limitations in favor of such fraudulent vendee is fully established. Akers v. Gillentine, 33 Tenn. App. 212, 231 S.W.2d 372, 1950 Tenn. App. LEXIS 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950).

Fact that husband did not reveal to his children his execution of deeds to his wife to certain realty duly registered but never delivered did not amount to a fraudulent concealment of a cause of action so as to prevent the running of statute of limitations against claim of person claiming through the wife. Ellison v. Garber, 39 Tenn. App. 668, 287 S.W.2d 564, 1955 Tenn. App. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).

10. —Railroad Right-of-Way.

Where the railroad company owns only an easement, the use thereof by an adjoining owner of land not inconsistent with railroad's user does not start limitation until the railroad company demands use of the easement for railroad purposes. Southern R. Co. v. Forrest, 13 Tenn. App. 547, — S.W.2d —, 1931 Tenn. App. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1931).

11. —Accrual Against Remaindermen.

Seven year statute will not run against the remaindermen during the existence of the life estate. Southern R. Co. v. Jennings, 130 Tenn. 450, 171 S.W. 82, 1914 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (1914).

12. —Husband and Wife.

Where husband and wife, who had been cotenants, continued to jointly occupy the land after a sheriff's sale of the husband's interest, their occupation was occupation by the wife and was not adverse to the purchaser at the sheriff's sale. Sipes v. Sanders, 17 Tenn. App. 162, 66 S.W.2d 261, 1933 Tenn. App. LEXIS 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933).

13. —Grantor's Mental Incapacity.

This section barred action brought by adult to invalidate deeds on grounds of grantor's mental incapacity. Green v. Greer, 29 Tenn. App. 586, 198 S.W.2d 822, 1946 Tenn. App. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946).

14. —Cotenancies.

Evidence to effect that tenants in common occupied premises for more than 20 years, paid taxes, made repairs, collected rent and appropriated same to themselves but gave no actual notice of an adverse claim was not sufficient to preponderate against trial court's judgment to effect that ouster as to other tenants in common had not been established and that adverse claim of exclusive ownership by prescription had not been shown. Memphis Housing Authority v. Mahoney, 50 Tenn. App. 117, 359 S.W.2d 851, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

15. —Governmental Entity.

A governmental entity may acquire title to property by adverse possession. Johnson v. Mt. Pleasant, 713 S.W.2d 659, 1985 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3299 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).

16. Rights-of-Way.

A suit by person having right-of-way to abate an adverse use must be brought within seven years from the time the cause of action arose or the right of action is barred; in the interim period of time between the seven years and 20 years, if the adverse holding ceases, the person who has the right-of-way may resume his use, as the right-of-way still exists, on the other hand he may not bring an action to abate the adverse use during that period and if the adverse use continues for 20 years, the right-of-way is extinguished. Shearer v. Vandergriff, 661 S.W.2d 680, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. 1983).

Trial court incorrectly applied the law when it refused to find that T.C.A. § 28-2-103 barred the claimants' cause of action because the preponderance of evidence offered at trial was against the finding that the owners had not possessed parts of the right-of-way across their land for at least seven years and that the possession was of such an open and obvious nature to put the claimants on notice, when the owners offered clear and convincing proof that they had continuous, actual, and exclusive possession of parts of the right-of-way that ran through their individual properties; further, the possession was open, visible, and notorious. Ball v. McDowell, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 21 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2008), rev'd, 288 S.W.3d 833, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 320 (Tenn. 2009).

17. Constructive Trusts.

A constructive trustee may not invoke the bar of this section or § 28-2-103 to the detriment of the beneficiaries of the constructive trust. Tanner v. Tanner, 698 S.W.2d 342, 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 565 (Tenn. 1985).

28-2-103. Seven-year period runs from time right accrued — Extent of possession.

  1. No person or anyone claiming under such person shall have any action, either at law or in equity, for the recovery of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, but within seven (7) years after the right of action accrued.
  2. No possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments shall be deemed to extend beyond the actual possession of an adverse holder until the muniment of title, if any, under which such adverse holder claims such lands, tenements or hereditaments is duly recorded in the county in which the lands are located.

Code 1858, § 2765 (deriv. Acts 1819, ch. 28, § 2); Shan., § 4458; Code 1932, § 8584; mod. C. Supp. 1950, § 8584; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-203.

Cross-References. See case notes under §§ 28-2-101, 28-2-102.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 1 Tenn. Juris., Acknowledgments, § 6; 1 Tenn. Juris., Advancements, § 5; 1 Tenn. Juris., Adverse Possession, §§ 3, 9, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22, 25, 30, 32, 36, 37, 38, 41, 43, 53, 56, 58, 60, 63; 14 Tenn. Juris., Gifts, § 9; 16 Tenn. Juris., Judgments and Decrees, § 30; 18 Tenn. Juris., Liens, § 10; 21 Tenn. Juris., Private Ways, §§ 3, 6.

Law Reviews.

Adverse Possession Against Tenants in Common in Tennessee (Eston Wycliffe Orr), 37 Tenn. L. Rev. 776.

Adverse Possession and the Presumption of Title (R.D. Cox), 11 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 1.

An Exegesis of the Ejectment Statutes of Tennessee (R.D. Cox), 18 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 581 (1988).

History of the Adverse Possession Statutes of Tennessee (R.D. Cox), 6 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 673.

Nuisances — Permanent Injury — Limitations of Actions, 28 Tenn. L. Rev. 433.

Real Property — 1960 Tennessee Survey (Thomas G. Roady, Jr.), 13 Vand. L. Rev. 1241.

The Tennessee Recording System (Toxey H. Sewell), 50 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 (1982).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction and Interpretation.

The limitation of this section does not operate against the state. Whitaker v. House, 213 Tenn. 61, 372 S.W.2d 194, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 495 (1963).

Sections 28-2-101 and 28-2-105 deal with rights and convey title to the adverse holder while §§ 28-2-102 and 28-2-103 deal with defensive rights and can be used by the adverse holder defensively only. Savely v. Bridges, 57 Tenn. App. 372, 418 S.W.2d 472, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

Sections 28-2-101 and 28-2-102 protect persons who are holding adversely under a color of title from suits to oust them from the entire boundary of lands on which they are adversely holding a portion, and this section protects an adverse holder without color of title only to that portion of land which is being held adversely. Shearer v. Vandergriff, 661 S.W.2d 680, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. 1983).

2. —Scope of Section.

Ejectment suit by heirs of original owner under grant filed over 80 years after tax deed issued under which defendants claimed was barred. Schooler v. Birge, 51 F. Supp. 610, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2221 (D. Tenn. 1943).

The statute does not contemplate adverse possession in the defendant, unless it be in a case where the taking and holding of possession gives a cause of action not otherwise existing. Where the defendant procured a land warrant to be issued to himself when it ought to have been issued to the complainant, and thus appropriated it to his own use, the complainant's right of action therefor then accrued, though the defendant did not take possession of the land, but subsequently procured a grant by virtue of the warrant. Dunlap v. Gibbs, 12 Tenn. 93, 12 Tenn. 94, 1833 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (1833); Neal v. President & Trustees of E. Tenn. College, 14 Tenn. 189, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 62 (Tenn. Mar. 1834).

This section has a broader scope than the preceding sections, in the fact that it creates a possessory right or defensive title to the extent of the boundaries of a title bond or other informal paper not conveying the title, but simply contracting to do so, or of unregistered deeds, where adverse possession has been held for seven years on some part of the tract described in such paper. Brown v. Johnson, 20 Tenn. 261, 1839 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1839); Rutherford v. Franklin, 31 Tenn. 321, 1851 Tenn. LEXIS 77 (1851); Bon Air Coal Land & Lumber Co. v. Parks, 94 Tenn. 263, 29 S.W. 130, 1894 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1895); Kittel v. Steger, 121 Tenn. 400, 117 S.W. 500, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1909); Ragsdale v. McFall, 145 Tenn. 684, 237 S.W. 66, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 106 (1922); City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Knoxville, 158 Tenn. 143, 11 S.W.2d 853, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1928).

Where defendant had entered into parol contract to sell farm back to complainant in consideration of cancelation of purchase money notes and promised to execute deed conveying same, but failed to do so, complainant did not perfect title to farm by seven years' adverse possession inasmuch as such possession without color of title only bars right of owner to recover possession and does not give the party holding adversely the right to have title decreed in him. Culwell v. Culwell, 23 Tenn. App. 389, 133 S.W.2d 1009, 1939 Tenn. App. LEXIS 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1939).

Where there is no proof in the record to support actual possession of any tract of land described in the answer to the extent of definitely described boundaries this is the only statute upon which defendants can rely. Moore v. Brannan, 42 Tenn. App. 542, 304 S.W.2d 660, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

This section does not vest title in an adverse holder but it sets up a defense to anyone — including the title owner — seeking to dispossess him. Foster v. Hill, 510 S.W.2d 520, 1973 Tenn. App. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).

This statute applies in a boundary line dispute even though title was not deraigned from a state grant or a common source of title. Williams v. Daniel, 545 S.W.2d 120, 1976 Tenn. App. LEXIS 258 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976).

3. —Statutory Purpose.

The purpose of this section was to give a defensive possession and not to punish a parol vendor or donor. Gaylor v. Gaylor, 1 Tenn. App. 645, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

There are two statutes of limitations of seven years, one requiring color of title and this section based purely upon adverse possession without benefit of title. Peoples v. Hagaman, 31 Tenn. App. 398, 215 S.W.2d 827, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

Possession under this section can be used by the adverse possessor defensively only. Moore v. Brannan, 42 Tenn. App. 542, 304 S.W.2d 660, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

This statute provides a defensive remedy only and cannot be used by plaintiff to enjoin the enclosing of certain land. Pyron v. Colbert, 46 Tenn. App. 287, 328 S.W.2d 825, 1959 Tenn. App. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959).

Adverse possession may be used defensively against one bringing an action to dispossess, even though seven-year statute of limitations did not vest in indefeasible title. Teeples v. Key, 500 S.W.2d 452, 1973 Tenn. App. LEXIS 284 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).

Adverse possession is a defense to a claim of forcible entry. Foster v. Hill, 510 S.W.2d 520, 1973 Tenn. App. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).

4. —Liens — Effect.

The vendor's equity or implied lien will be barred by the vendee's possession of the land for seven years from the maturity of the debt for the purchase money, or from the maturity of any instalment thereof, as respects such installment. Sheratz v. Nicodemus, 15 Tenn. 8, 15 Tenn. 9, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 1 (1834); Fisher v. Fisher, 68 Tenn. 71, 1876 Tenn. LEXIS 21 (1876); Thompson v. Thompson, 71 Tenn. 126, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 46 (1879); White v. Blakemore, 76 Tenn. 49, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (1881); Poindexter v. Rawlings, 106 Tenn. 97, 59 S.W. 766, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 137, 82 Am. St. Rep. 869 (1900).

A purchaser from the vendee at a chancery sale of land, and the subsequent purchasers, upon the principle of lis pendens, take the land subject to the lien retained in the court sale for the payment of the purchase money, and such lien is not barred by the seven year statute. Ex parte Spence, 74 Tenn. 391, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 263 (1880); Ross v. Swan, 75 Tenn. 463, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 144 (1881); Epperson v. Robertson, 91 Tenn. 407, 19 S.W. 230, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 6 (1892).

Though the debt for the purchase money may be barred by the statutes of limitation, as by the statutes in favor of personal representatives or the estates of decedents, or by the six-year statute, so that a personal judgment cannot be obtained therefor, yet the liens retained in deeds or in court decrees or lien declared on land recovered to secure the fees of attorneys, or liens created by mortgages and deeds of trust, may not be barred. Martin v. Niblett, 86 Tenn. 383, 7 S.W. 123, 1887 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (1888); Leneave v. McDowell, 91 Tenn. 75, 17 S.W. 1031, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1892); Irvine v. Shrum, 97 Tenn. 259, 36 S.W. 1089, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (1896).

5. —Contract to Convey.

Action to enforce specific performance of contract to convey timber land, where contract provided for survey by seller prior to conveyance, was barred after almost 16 years although no survey was ever made. Northcutt v. Massie, 201 Tenn. 638, 301 S.W.2d 355, 1957 Tenn. LEXIS 344 (1957).

6. Adverse Possession — Requisites.

Evidence to effect that tenants in common occupied premises for more than 20 years, paid taxes, made repairs, collected rent and appropriated same to themselves but gave no actual notice of an adverse claim was not sufficient to preponderate against trial court's judgment to effect that ouster as to other tenants in common had not been established and that adverse claim of exclusive ownership by prescription had not been shown. Memphis Housing Authority v. Mahoney, 50 Tenn. App. 117, 359 S.W.2d 851, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

Where a grantor mistakenly conveyed a portion of property by deed to an adjacent parcel, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, at Nashville, held that the grantor could assert adverse possession of that property, so long as he could prove that the possession was at least seven years in duration and was of such a character as to leave no doubt of claim of ownership by adverse possession and to give notice to the public of the possession and the claim, and that the trial court had erred in granting summary judgment on the issue to the grantee especially as there had been no hearing nor discovery as to whether the possession was adverse or exactly what portion of the property the grantor possessed. XI Props. v. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2003), appeal denied, XI Props., Inc. v. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 196 (Tenn. Mar. 8, 2004), aff'd, XI Props. v. RaceTrac Petroleum, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 443, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 1110 (Tenn. 2004).

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, at Nashville, finds that the exception to the general rule, that a grantor was usually estopped by his deed from claiming that his holding was adverse, should be adopted in Tennessee as the more reasoned rule; i.e., a grantor who mistakenly conveys a portion of property by deed may assert adverse possession of that property, so long as he can prove that the possession was at least seven years in duration and must be of such a character as to leave no doubt of claim of ownership by adverse possession and to give notice to the public of the possession and the claim. XI Props. v. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2003), appeal denied, XI Props., Inc. v. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 196 (Tenn. Mar. 8, 2004), aff'd, XI Props. v. RaceTrac Petroleum, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 443, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 1110 (Tenn. 2004).

Essentially what T.C.A. § 28-2-103 allows is that if a party can show exactly what portion of the conveyed property he possessed, the grantee cannot recapture possession of the property, which the grantor has possessed, even though the grantor has no color of title. In order for the grantor to get title to the possessed property, he would have to possess it for 20 years, the prescriptive period. XI Props. v. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2003), appeal denied, XI Props., Inc. v. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 196 (Tenn. Mar. 8, 2004), aff'd, XI Props. v. RaceTrac Petroleum, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 443, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 1110 (Tenn. 2004).

7. —Generally.

The defense of the statute of limitations cannot be pleaded successfully by a defendant who was never in possession. Williams v. American Asso., 197 F. 500, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1301 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1912).

Where defendants claimed title to certain land through a tax sale and tax deed dated May 23, 1856, and had altogether exercised such visible, open, exclusive, continuous domain and acts of ownership over the land, using it for the purposes for which it was adapted, for more than seven years, and more than 20 years before action was commenced, it was held that defendants had proven adverse possession of the land in controversy of the requisite character, under the recorded color of title and that defendants, under §§ 28-2-101, 28-2-105 had established title to the land by prescription; and, also, that under this section plaintiffs' action, if any they ever had, was barred by statute of limitations. Schooler v. Birge, 51 F. Supp. 610, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2221 (D. Tenn. 1943).

Neighbor established ownership of the disputed property by adverse possession where the parties disputed the boundary between their properties and the landowners failed to take action to resolve the adverse use of their property by the neighbors until the neighbor commenced the cause of action; the neighbor's use of the disputed strip of land on the landowner's property was open, exclusive, notorious, and hostile and continued uninterrupted for at least 20 years prior to the commencement of the lawsuit. Wilson v. Price, 195 S.W.3d 661, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (Tenn. Feb. 6, 2006).

8. —Exclusive Possession.

The adverse possessor's exclusive possession is not destroyed or impaired by the use of the public under his license or permission. Use as a means of passing from one street to another does not prevent his possession from being exclusive, because such use by the public is different in character from that to which he devotes the premises. Bensdorff v. Uihlein, 132 Tenn. 193, 177 S.W. 481, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 11, 2 A.L.R. 1364 (1915).

Exclusivity does not imply that the possessor can never allow anyone on his adverse holding without the holding being broken but that the holder claims exclusive right to say who can and who cannot come on his possession. Hightower v. Pendergrass, 662 S.W.2d 932, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 734 (Tenn. 1983).

9. —Permissive Use of Premises.

The permissive use of the disputed premises by the legal title holder did not amount to such a reentry as to oust the adverse holder and did not make unavailable the benefit of the seven year statute of limitations. Hightower v. Pendergrass, 662 S.W.2d 932, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 734 (Tenn. 1983).

10. —Actual Occupancy.

A suit for the reformation of a deed, by correcting the description in accordance with the actual survey, and to quiet complainant's title to the land as correctly described, as against a second grantee from complainant's grantor, is one “for lands,” within the meaning of this section, and the limitation is applicable; but the limitation cannot be relied on by a defendant who has never been in possession of the land. Williams v. American Asso., 197 F. 500, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1301 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1912).

Defendants who entered on land in dispute without color of title though holding a deed from illegitimate son of one who took under an entry was not entitled to claim land by adverse possession except that portion of land actually enclosed. Walsh v. Tipton, 183 Tenn. 28, 190 S.W.2d 294, 1945 Tenn. LEXIS 270 (1945).

Actual residence on or occupancy of premises is not always necessary in order that statute begin to run provided there be such use of it open, notorious and continuous, as the situation, nature and character of the property is capable of. Moffitt v. Meeks, 29 Tenn. App. 609, 199 S.W.2d 463, 1946 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946).

Even though the trial court erred by finding that defendant had adversely possessed the area of land under her dock for a full 20 years prior to commencement of plaintiff's trespass action, as the time period between defendant's acquisition of title to her property and the commencement of the action was six years short of 20 years, the error was harmless because defendant established the seven-year period necessary for the statute defense provided, regardless of color of title, by this section. Plaintiff was on record or constructive notice of her ownership rights in the disputed property well before October 3, 2005. Frinks v. Horvath, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 142 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2017).

11. —Adverse Claim.

A judgment debtor, remaining in possession after an execution or judicial sale of his land, is presumed to be holding as the purchaser's quasi tenant at will, and not adversely to the purchaser; but he may claim to hold adversely for himself to the extent of his actual inclosures, and if he so holds for seven years from the date of the sale, he will be protected in his possession. Keaton v. Thomasson's Lessee, 32 Tenn. 138, 1852 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1852); Thomasson's Lessee v. Keaton, 33 Tenn. 155, 1853 Tenn. LEXIS 22 (1853).

The vendee's possession under a title bond, or deed or decree expressly retaining a lien to secure the payment of the purchase money, or the possession of subsequent purchasers, is not adverse to the vendor's right to enforce his lien for the payment of the purchase money, unless the possession becomes actually hostile and adverse, in contemplation of law, with notice thereof to the lienholder, and not then until after the maturity of the lien debt. Lincoln v. Purcell, 39 Tenn. 143, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 267 (1858); Gudger v. Barnes, 51 Tenn. 570, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 207 (1871); Whitby v. Armour, 72 Tenn. 683, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (1880); Ellege v. Cooke, 73 Tenn. 622, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1880); White v. Blakemore, 76 Tenn. 49, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (1881); Martin v. Niblett, 86 Tenn. 383, 7 S.W. 123, 1887 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (1888); Poindexter v. Rawlings, 106 Tenn. 97, 59 S.W. 766, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 137, 82 Am. St. Rep. 869 (1900).

The possession of the vendee is not adverse to the vendor's lien, when it was taken and held under an instrument recognizing the lien, as is expressly provided by § 28-2-108. Jones v. Fulghum, 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 199 (1876); Knox v. McCain, 81 Tenn. 197, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 23 (1884).

The vendor's lien in a court decree may be barred by the adverse possession of a subvendee for more than seven years after the case has been finally disposed of and dismissed, or it may be lost by laches of the parties. Whitby v. Armour, 72 Tenn. 683, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (1880); Martin v. Niblett, 86 Tenn. 383, 7 S.W. 123, 1887 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (1888); McElwee v. McElwee, 97 Tenn. 649, 37 S.W. 560, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 192 (1896).

Possession of land by vendees of a purchaser at chancery sale is not adverse to the lien retained in the decree to secure the payment of the purchase money due from such purchaser, until the possession of the land becomes adverse to the lien, with the knowledge of the holder of the lien, or until the vendees have disclaimed, and communicated notice of their hostile attitude to the lienholder. Martin v. Niblett, 86 Tenn. 383, 7 S.W. 123, 1887 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (1888).

A widow whose dower has never been assigned to her cannot, by merely remaining in possession of property that belonged to her deceased husband, start the running of the statute of limitations as against the heirs. Lee v. Harris, 188 Tenn. 373, 219 S.W.2d 892, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 347 (1949).

Where a county instructed the owner of certain buildings on the county's land to remove the buildings and the owner by letter answered saying he would comply but did not do so whereupon the county instituted proceedings for a temporary injunction, the owner could not rely on a right by adverse possession since his letter had admitted his use to be permissive and further his answer would constitute a waiver of the statute of limitations, thus when the court by error rendered a decree on the merits no prejudice resulted to the owner and the decree was affirmed. Menefee v. Davidson County, 195 Tenn. 547, 260 S.W.2d 283, 1953 Tenn. LEXIS 378 (1953).

12. —Tortious Holding.

A trespasser's adverse possession of land for seven years, without color of title, protects him only to the extent of his inclosures and actual possession or occupancy; and his inclosures must be substantial and his actual occupancy must be to the whole extent of inclosures, and must be definite, positive, and notorious, for the whole term of seven years. Dyche v. Gass' Lessee, 11 Tenn. 396, 11 Tenn. 397, 1832 Tenn. LEXIS 72 (1832); Jones' Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. 59, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 102 (1836); Brown v. Johnson, 20 Tenn. 261, 1839 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1839); Pickens v. Delozier, 21 Tenn. 400, 1841 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1841); Allen v. Suseng, 41 Tenn. 204, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (1860); Green v. Cumberland Coal & Coke Co., 110 Tenn. 35, 72 S.W. 459, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1903); City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Knoxville, 158 Tenn. 143, 11 S.W.2d 853, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 134 (1928).

13. —Possession by Tenants.

A tenant in common is presumed to hold on behalf of himself and all other cotenants and therefore the possession of one tenant in common is not ordinarily held to be hostile to the cotenants. Walker v. Moore, 745 S.W.2d 292, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3130 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

14. —Possession Before Color of Title.

Where a purchaser under an oral contract goes into the possession of land, and afterwards obtains a deed for the same and thereafter continues his possession until the united possessions make out the period of seven years, the bar of the statute is created. Valentine v. Cooley, 19 Tenn. 613, 1838 Tenn. LEXIS 97 (1838); Sanders v. Logue, 88 Tenn. 355, 12 S.W. 722, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 57 (1890).

Actual adverse possession without title is effective without extension thereof after a grant or deed covering the possession and including other lands, while such possession under a title is not so effective without an extension thereof after taking another deed or grant covering such possession and other lands. Smith v. Lee, 41 Tenn. 549, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 105 (1860); Bon Air Coal Land & Lumber Co. v. Parks, 94 Tenn. 263, 29 S.W. 130, 1894 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1895); Elliott v. Cumberland Coal & Coke Co., 109 Tenn. 745, 71 S.W. 749, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 106 (1902).

Where persons lived on a tract of land, and each claimed the particular land upon which he erected his improvements, understanding that each was holding for himself under the terms of the deed for the whole tract to their grantor, which was conditioned that he convey 500 acres to each of them, and understanding that each was to have a deed to his particular land, each making his improvements on the land for which he expected to receive a deed, and for which he afterwards did actually receive a deed, the occupancy of each of the persons was on his own account alone and in his own right, and, after the lapse of seven years, gave a possessory or a defensive right, to the land actually inclosed; and the continued possession of the parties for seven years subsequent to execution of their respective deeds perfected the title of each to the extent of the boundaries set out in his deed. Inman v. Tucker, 138 Tenn. 512, 198 S.W. 247, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 60 (1917).

Where one enters upon land without any claim of right he may not attach the period of such a possession with the time held under a subsequent deed to make out the seven years. Walsh v. Tipton, 183 Tenn. 28, 190 S.W.2d 294, 1945 Tenn. LEXIS 270 (1945).

15. —Constructive Possession Under Assurance of Title.

Where a person, as a naked trespasser, entered upon a large tract of land of another, and inclosed and held adverse possession of a portion thereof for more than seven years, thus acquiring a possessory title to his actual inclosures, and thereafter obtained an entry for a larger portion of the land, including within the same his actual inclosure, and continued his adverse possession, without any extension of his boundaries, for more than seven years under the entry, he thereby acquired a possessory or defensive title, not only to the actual inclosure, but also to the extent of the boundaries of his entry. Bon Air Coal Land & Lumber Co. v. Parks, 94 Tenn. 263, 29 S.W. 130, 1894 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1895); Elliott v. Cumberland Coal & Coke Co., 109 Tenn. 745, 71 S.W. 749, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 106 (1902); Bell v. North American Coal & Coke Co., 155 F. 712, 1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 4671 (6th Cir. 1907); Breckenridge Cannel Coal Co. v. Scott, 121 Tenn. 88, 114 S.W. 930, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 10 (1908); Kittel v. Steger, 121 Tenn. 400, 117 S.W. 500, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1909).

Where one is in the actual possession of a part of a tract of land under some character of assurance or claim of title, with boundaries defined by a written instrument, claiming to the extent of such defined boundaries, his actual possession gives him a constructive possession of the remaining part of the tract, and such constructive possession is superior to that which results merely from the ownership of the legal title, and is sufficient to put the statute of limitations in operation as to the entire tract. Green v. Cumberland Coal & Coke Co., 110 Tenn. 35, 72 S.W. 459, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1903).

16. —Constructive Possession Under Special Entry.

A possession under an entry, although not an assurance of title, if sufficiently definite to point out the land intended to be appropriated, as a special entry does, will be protected under this section, and actual adverse possession of part will extend the constructive possession to the boundaries of such entry. Ramsey v. Monroe, 35 Tenn. 329, 1855 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1855); Meriwether v. Vaulx, 37 Tenn. 300, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (1858); Sims v. Eastland, 40 Tenn. 368, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 102 (1859); Bon Air Coal Land & Lumber Co. v. Parks, 94 Tenn. 263, 29 S.W. 130, 1894 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1895); Bell v. North American Coal & Coke Co., 155 F. 712, 1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 4671 (6th Cir. 1907).

Adverse possession of part of a tract of land, held under a special entry, though unsurveyed, extends to the boundaries thereof, provided the entry is sufficiently special to indicate clearly the land intended to be appropriated, and to enable the surveyor, from the face of the paper, to trace the lines with a compass, in accordance with its calls; and if such possession be continued for seven years, the possessor will be protected by the creation of a possessory right or defensive title, under this section, to the extent of the boundaries of such entry; but no absolute title is acquired by virtue of such entry and possession, under § 28-2-101, for the reason that a mere entry is no color or assurance of title purporting to convey an estate in fee. The fact that the possession is held for part of the time under the entry, and for part of the time under a grant, and by the enterer for part of the time, and by his conveyee for part of the time, after the issuance of the grant to the enterer, is immaterial. Ramsey v. Monroe, 35 Tenn. 329, 1855 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1855); Meriwether v. Vaulx, 37 Tenn. 300, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (1858); Sims v. Eastland, 40 Tenn. 368, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 102 (1859); Bon Air Coal Land & Lumber Co. v. Parks, 94 Tenn. 263, 29 S.W. 130, 1894 Tenn. LEXIS 42 (1895); Breckenridge Cannel Coal Co. v. Scott, 121 Tenn. 88, 114 S.W. 930, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 10 (1908).

Where one in possession of land without color of title attorned to another who had made entry from the state of a definite tract, including that held by the person attorning and the latter agreed to hold possession of the whole for his landlord, it amounted to an abandonment of his own possession, and from that time his possession was that of his landlord and referable to the entry, and extended to the whole tract, although there was no extension of his actual inclosure. Bell v. North American Coal & Coke Co., 155 F. 712, 1907 U.S. App. LEXIS 4671 (6th Cir. 1907).

17. —Unintentional Inclosures.

The accidental inclosure of a small part of the tract of land of another, by the extension of inclosures or by separate and independent inclosures, but not intended to be on the other's land, is not such adverse possession as will operate as constructive possession of the whole tract, nor to the extent of the possessor's boundaries under an inferior assurance of title, so as to perfect his title to the extent of his such boundaries; but such possession continued for seven years, under a mistaken belief of ownership, operates as adverse possession to the extent of the inclosures or actual possession, and creates in the possessor a defensive title to such possession. Gates v. Butler, 22 Tenn. 447, 1842 Tenn. LEXIS 121 (1842); Erck v. Church, 87 Tenn. 575, 11 S.W. 794, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 11, 4 L.R.A. 641 (1889); Williams v. Hewitt, 128 Tenn. 689, 164 S.W. 1198, 1913 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (1913); Lemm v. Adams, 955 S.W.2d 70, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

A small extension of possession, made by a tenant under the direction of his landlord with the intention of establishing an adverse possession, was adverse, though the tenant knew nothing of the intention of his landlord. Waddle v. Stuart, 36 Tenn. 534, 1857 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (1857).

The rule as to accidental inclosures operating as adverse possession is strictly limited to its facts, and is not to be applied when the fence or structure is not made by the possessory claimant but by the tenant of his adversary as a temporary one, without thought or intent of fixing a property line. Intent to be adverse is lacking. Buchanan v. Nixon, 163 Tenn. 364, 43 S.W.2d 380, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 124, 80 A.L.R. 151 (1931).

The rule is that where a purchaser of land accidentally or by mistake incloses a contiguous strip, believing that he is placing the fence on the boundary, and holds the inclosed strip for seven years, his possession is adverse, and will avail against the true owner. Peoples v. Hagaman, 31 Tenn. App. 398, 215 S.W.2d 827, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948); Liberto v. Steele, 188 Tenn. 529, 221 S.W.2d 701, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 371 (1949); Frumin v. May, 36 Tenn. App. 32, 251 S.W.2d 314, 1952 Tenn. App. LEXIS 92 (1952).

Adverse possession may be established by a person who possesses land between the actual property boundary and a fence upon another's land even though the person possesses the land by mistake and even though the fence was not erected with the purpose of marking the true property boundary. Foster v. Hill, 510 S.W.2d 520, 1973 Tenn. App. LEXIS 265 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).

18. —Inclosure Impracticable.

The inclosure of land is not necessary to establish adverse possession, where such inclosure would be impracticable, but adverse possession of such property may be established by such use and occupation as the land, from its situation, nature, and character, admits. Bensdorff v. Uihlein, 132 Tenn. 193, 177 S.W. 481, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 11, 2 A.L.R. 1364 (1915).

Where the owner and keeper of a storehouse paved a triangular lot, used mainly as a means of access to the storehouse, first with brick and then with granolithic paving, and maintained such pavement for more than seven years, his possession thereof was sufficiently open and notorious to give him the possessory title. Bensdorff v. Uihlein, 132 Tenn. 193, 177 S.W. 481, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 11, 2 A.L.R. 1364 (1915).

A small triangular lot between two streets and a storehouse, which lot is principally valuable as a means of access to the storehouse, is not susceptible of inclosure, because such inclosure would destroy its chief value. Inclosure will not be required unless it is practicable, and the land is practically susceptible of inclosure, and “susceptible,” in that rule, is not synonymous with “possible.” Bensdorff v. Uihlein, 132 Tenn. 193, 177 S.W. 481, 1915 Tenn. LEXIS 11, 2 A.L.R. 1364 (1915).

19. —Privity of Possession.

Separate successive disseizins do not aid one another; and to connect them there must be privity of estate between the successive disseizors, such as the relation of ancestor and heir, grantor and grantee, or devisor and devisee, or there must be some privity of contract. Heirs of Marr v. Gilliam, 41 Tenn. 488, 1860 Tenn. LEXIS 96 (1860); Baker v. Hale, 65 Tenn. 46, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 297 (1873); Nelson v. Trigg, 72 Tenn. 701, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 79 (1880); Erck v. Church, 87 Tenn. 575, 11 S.W. 794, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 11, 4 L.R.A. 641 (1889); McLemore v. Durivage, 92 Tenn. 482, 92 Tenn. 82, 22 S.W. 207, 1893 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (1893); Ferguson v. Prince, 136 Tenn. 543, 190 S.W. 548, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 160 (1916).

A parol bargain and sale of the possession of premises, held by actual adverse possession, followed by delivery thereof, will give rise to such privity of possession between such successive occupants as will permit the last one to tack the possession of his predecessor to his, so as to make a continuous adverse possession. Rembert v. Edmondson, 99 Tenn. 15, 41 S.W. 935, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 2, 63 Am. St. Rep. 819 (1897).

Successive possessions, if consistent and under the same title, may be connected, so as to make out the time required to create the bar of the statute. Woodruff v. Roysden, 105 Tenn. 491, 58 S.W. 1066, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 96, 80 Am. St. Rep. 905 (1900).

A deed does not of itself create privity between the grantor and the grantee as to land not described in the deed but occupied by the grantor in connection therewith, although the grantee enters into possession of the land not described and uses it in connection with that conveyed. Peoples v. Hagaman, 31 Tenn. App. 398, 215 S.W.2d 827, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

The general rule that successive adverse possessions cannot be tacked unless the possessors are connected by some form of legal privity is subject to exceptions. Peoples v. Hagaman, 31 Tenn. App. 398, 215 S.W.2d 827, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

No fatal gap between possessions was created by the conveyance of a lot to the defendants by their mother, where the parties believed that the strip of land in dispute was embraced in the lot when the deed was executed, the disputed strip was clearly appurtenant to the lot and necessary for its full use and enjoyment, and the parties were all members of the same household and continued to reside on the lot and to use the disputed strip in the same manner as before the deed was executed. Peoples v. Hagaman, 31 Tenn. App. 398, 215 S.W.2d 827, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

Under subsection (a) of this section the courts have held that a defendant in adverse possession under any muniment of title, such as a parol sale or unrecorded deed, could hold to the extent of his boundaries set forth in his muniment of title against an attack by the holder of the legal title out of possession, even though the adverse possessor had actual possession to only part of the land covered by his muniment of title. Moore v. Brannan, 42 Tenn. App. 542, 304 S.W.2d 660, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

Although separate successive disseizins do not aid one another in the absence of privity between the successive disseizors, successive possessions, if consistent and under the same title, may be connected so as to make out the time to create the bar of this section. Teeples v. Key, 500 S.W.2d 452, 1973 Tenn. App. LEXIS 284 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).

20. —Privity Between Husband and Wife.

As a matter of law, the wife cannot tack her adverse possession to the previous adverse possession of her husband, in order to complete the statutory period. Tuggle v. Southern R. Co., 140 Tenn. 275, 204 S.W. 857, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1918).

The husband, on taking possession of land, without title, can validly, by oral agreement, transfer his possession to his wife, and her possession thereafter, though they lived together, is available to her under her claim of adverse possession. Tuggle v. Southern R. Co., 140 Tenn. 275, 204 S.W. 857, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1918).

Evidence examined was sufficient to show title in widow by adverse possession after death of husband who had conveyed land reserving life estate in himself. Rhea v. Redus, 7 Tenn. App. 478, — S.W.2d —, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 68 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928).

21. —De Minimis Maxim Application.

Doctrine of “de minimis non curat lex” would control contention as to area in rear of garage approximately two feet by four feet in area, which strip was shown to have been adversely held for only six years, or one year short of the statutory period. Peoples v. Hagaman, 31 Tenn. App. 398, 215 S.W.2d 827, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

22. —Generally.

To establish adverse possession, it must appear by clear and positive proof that the possession was open, notorious, continuous, and adverse for the required time, and where an old fence row had not been mutually recognized as the true boundary line, it does not become so by adverse possession. Mathis v. Campbell, 22 Tenn. App. 40, 117 S.W.2d 764, 1938 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1938).

23. —Actual Occupancy Not Necessary.

Actual residence on or occupancy of the premises is not always necessary to establish possession sufficient to start operation of statute, provided there be such use of it open, notorious and continuous, as the situation, nature and character of the property is capable of. Moffitt v. Meeks, 29 Tenn. App. 609, 199 S.W.2d 463, 1946 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946).

24. —Moving Tools Into House.

Where record showed that house was unfit for occupancy as a home, but defendant took possession by moving tools there for purpose of repairing it and this was known to owner the possession amounted to such actual and adverse possession as to sustain defense of adverse possession under this section. Moffitt v. Meeks, 29 Tenn. App. 609, 199 S.W.2d 463, 1946 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946).

25. —Building Garage and Driveway.

The construction of a garage and the grading and using of a well-defined driveway are effective in giving notice to the true owner of an adverse use of his property. It is not essential that defendants be challenged during the seven years' adverse possession and their rights maintained against the claim of the true owner. Peoples v. Hagaman, 31 Tenn. App. 398, 215 S.W.2d 827, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

Statute of limitations did not bar a homeowners association's claim as to an encroachment created when a neighboring property owner built a driveway on the association's property because the owner did not present clear and convincing proof of exclusive possession of the property upon which the driveway encroached for the requisite period of time in that there was conflicting testimony as to who maintained the property. Franklin Square Towne Homeowners Ass'n v. Kyles, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 300 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10, 2017).

26. —Cutting Timber and Paying Taxes.

Cutting timber on lands from time to time, and paying taxes thereon, did not constitute adverse possession. Call v. Cozart, 48 S.W. 312, 1898 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 77 (1898).

27. —Agent Licensees or Tenants.

Adverse possession through a licensee is the same as adverse possession through and by the claimant; what a claimant can do himself, he can do by an agent licensee or tenant. Hightower v. Pendergrass, 662 S.W.2d 932, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 734 (Tenn. 1983).

28. —Encroachment by Building.

Where plaintiff sought damages and execution of a quitclaim deed against defendants, alleging that ownership of a strip of land upon which plaintiff's building encroached now belonged to plaintiff, the applicable statute of limitations was the seven-year period of this section, which applies in cases of adverse possession without color of title, and not § 28-3-105, the three-year statute of limitations for injuries to real property. Cross v. McCurry, 859 S.W.2d 349, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

Statute of limitations barred a homeowners association's claim as to an encroachment created by a neighboring property owner's air conditioning pads and air conditioning units because the property upon which the air conditioners were actually placed appeared to have been in actual, adverse, continuous, exclusive, open and notorious use for the requisite number of years. Franklin Square Towne Homeowners Ass'n v. Kyles, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 300 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10, 2017).

29. Possessory or Defensive Title — Acquiring.

Although the chancellor erred by failing to grant a motion to amend before entering judgment to add an alternative theory of defensive adverse possession under T.C.A. § 28-2-102 and T.C.A. § 28-2-103, the error was harmless because the Tennessee supreme court held that the neighboring land owner had acquired title by common law adverse possession. Cumulus Broadcasting, Inc. v. Shim, 226 S.W.3d 366, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Apr. 27, 2007).

30. —Original Permissive Occupancy.

The erection of a milldam upon the lands of another, originally made under oral license or permission, but maintained and used for more than seven years under a continuous and adverse holding, constitutes a possessory or defensive title at law, which may be protected in equity against invasion. Heiskell v. Cobb, 58 Tenn. 638, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 313 (1872).

31. —Possession Beyond Grant.

Where a younger grant called for the line of an older grant, and a dispute arose as to the boundary line between the two grants or tracts, and the claimant under the older grant had been in the possession of the disputed part, for more than seven years before the ejectment suit was brought against him by the claimant under the younger grant, though such possession was beyond the true line of the older grant, it created in the possessor a possessory right or defensive title which was a bar to the plaintiff's action. Hightower v. Smith, 15 Tenn. 500, 1835 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1835); Tilghman v. Baird, 34 Tenn. 196, 1854 Tenn. LEXIS 32 (1854).

32. —Possession Less than Extent of Boundaries.

Subsection (b) of this section came into the Code by the 1950 amendment and since the effective date of the amendment an adverse holder could only defeat the suit of the holder of the legal title to the extent of the actual possession of the adverse holder and not to the extent of the boundaries set forth in the muniment of title under which the adverse holder claimed the right to possession when the adverse holder had actual possession of only a part of the land covered by his muniment of title, when the muniment of title of the adverse holder was “duly recorded in the county in which the lands” were located. Moore v. Brannan, 42 Tenn. App. 542, 304 S.W.2d 660, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

33. —Possession Under Parol Purchase.

Where the purchaser of land under a parol contract has held the adverse possession for seven years, he will be protected against the vendor's action of ejectment to the extent of the land in his actual possession. James v. Patterson's Lessee, 31 Tenn. 309, 1851 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (1851); Slatton v. Tennessee C., I. & R. Co., 109 Tenn. 415, 75 S.W. 926, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 85 (1902); Gaylor v. Gaylor, 1 Tenn. App. 645, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

A party in possession of land under a parol contract of purchase is not a trespasser. He has a colorable, descendible, alienable, and devisable title. There exists between him and his vendor and his alienee, devisee, or heir such privity as to authorize the connection of their possessions, so as to create a defensive title under this section and to bar the true owner. Baker v. Hale, 65 Tenn. 46, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 297 (1873); Brown v. Watkins, 98 Tenn. 454, 40 S.W. 480, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 239 (1897).

A purchaser, in possession of land under a parol contract, is not holding the possession for his vendor, so as to make out the latter's title, but for himself. Slatton v. Tennessee C., I. & R. Co., 109 Tenn. 415, 75 S.W. 926, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 85 (1902).

A parol sale is only voidable and not void, and under this section seven years adverse possession by a parol vendee cuts off the right of the parol vendor to repudiate the sale and recover possession of the land but it is believed that it neither passes title upon which an ejectment suit can be maintained, or cuts off the right of the parol vendor to set up the statute of frauds as a defense to a suit by the parol vendee to compel specific performance of the parol sale by the execution to him of a deed. Wilburn v. Kingsley, 3 Tenn. App. 88, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

34. —Possession Under Parol Gift.

Adverse possession under a parol gift, continued for seven years, will protect the possessor to the extent of his inclosure or actual possession. Haynes v. Jones, 39 Tenn. 372, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 228 (1859); Keys v. Keys, 58 Tenn. 425, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 280 (1872); O'Neal v. Breecheen, 64 Tenn. 604, 1875 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (1875); Jordan v. Maney, 78 Tenn. 135, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 154 (1882); Choate v. Sewell, 142 Tenn. 487, 221 S.W. 190, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (1919); Gaylor v. Gaylor, 1 Tenn. App. 645, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926); Marks v. Rosenbloom, 2 Tenn. App. 180, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

Where one goes into possession of land under parol donation, he occupies the same relation in respect to his possession as a purchaser by parol. Inman v. Tucker, 138 Tenn. 512, 198 S.W. 247, 1917 Tenn. LEXIS 60 (1917).

Despite § 29-2-101(4), which requires transfer of real estate to be in writing signed by the transferrer, a parol gift of land coupled with an entry by the donee and adverse possession by him for more than seven years will vest him with a possessory or defensive right to the land, under this section. Choate v. Sewell, 142 Tenn. 487, 221 S.W. 190, 1919 Tenn. LEXIS 76 (1919).

The action of ejectment is a repudiation of the parol gift, but the action must be brought before the expiration of seven years of adverse possession. Marks v. Rosenbloom, 2 Tenn. App. 180, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926); Tharpe v. McAuley, 3 Tenn. App. 18, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 67 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

This section applies to a parol gift of land where the donee has entered into possession with the donor's knowledge and is claiming adversely and to all the land embraced in the parol gift, whether it is under inclosure or not, the statute running against the right of repudiation. McGammon v. Brooks, 17 Tenn. App. 339, 67 S.W.2d 173, 1933 Tenn. App. LEXIS 67 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933).

A parol gift of land coupled with an entry by the donee and adverse possession by him for more than seven years will vest him with a possessory or defensive right to the land, however such a donee has the burden of proving by evidence entirely satisfactory, not only the gift to show adverse claim but also his adverse possession. Mercy v. Miller, 25 Tenn. App. 621, 166 S.W.2d 628, 1942 Tenn. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1942).

35. —Parol License.

Possession originally taken under parol license or permission, and continued adversely for seven years, will create a possessory or defensive title which will enable the possessor to defend his possession, and to protect it from invasion by bill in equity. Heiskell v. Cobb, 58 Tenn. 638, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 313 (1872); Bloomstein v. Clees Bros., 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 433 (1877).

36. —Possession Under Void Deed.

Where husband sold wife's land and purchaser took possession and retained it for more than seven years before the death of the wife, it was a complete bar to an ejectment action, and also barred heirs who did not bring suit until after three years from the date of the wife's death. Cooper v. Wills, 1 Shan. 391 (1875).

37. —Regaining Possession After Extinguishment of Title by Adverse Possession.

Adverse possession of a part of the interference or conflict between two grants, commenced by the elder grantee and held for more than seven years, after his title had been extinguished by the previous adverse possession of the younger grantee, who had thus acquired an indefeasible title in fee simple to the whole interference or conflict, cannot neutralize such acquired title of the younger grantee to the whole interference or conflict, in which he continued his prior possession, but merely operates to restore to such elder grantee a defensive title to the extent of his inclosures or actual possession. Waddle v. Stuart, 36 Tenn. 534, 1857 Tenn. LEXIS 48 (1857); Cooper v. Great Falls Cotton Mills Co., 94 Tenn. 588, 30 S.W. 353, 1894 Tenn. LEXIS 72 (1895).

38. —Judgment Debtor in Possession After Sale.

Whether the purchaser of land at a sheriff's sale obtains a conveyance from the sheriff or not is wholly immaterial so far as respects the operation of the statutes of limitation in favor of the judgment debtor remaining in possession, and claiming to hold adversely, in point of fact, to the title, acquired by the purchaser; and the judgment debtor's adverse possession for seven years bars the action of the purchaser, though it be brought within seven years from the execution of the sheriff's deed. Keaton v. Thomasson's Lessee, 32 Tenn. 138, 1852 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1852).

39. —Unregistered Deed.

Adverse possession of land under an unregistered deed for more than seven years creates a good defensive title. Kittel v. Steger, 121 Tenn. 400, 117 S.W. 500, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1909).

40. —Vendee's Possession.

As between vendor and vendee, the vendee's possession under vendor's title bond is adverse to a right of possession in the vendor, and the vendee's possession for seven years will protect him against any possessory action by the vendor, not only in his actual inclosures, but to the extent of the boundaries defined in the title bond. Brown v. Johnson, 20 Tenn. 261, 1839 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (1839); Lincoln v. Purcell, 39 Tenn. 143, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 267 (1858); Gudger v. Barnes, 51 Tenn. 570, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 207 (1871); Corder v. Dolin, 63 Tenn. 238, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 237 (1874); Ellege v. Cooke, 73 Tenn. 622, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1880).

The claim and possession of the vendee is adverse to the vendor, whether the contract of sale be in writing or parol, valid or invalid. Redmond v. Bowles, 37 Tenn. 547, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 60 (1858); Ellege v. Cooke, 73 Tenn. 622, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1880); Slatton v. Tennessee C., I. & R. Co., 109 Tenn. 415, 75 S.W. 926, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 85 (1902).

The vendee under an unregistered title bond, and like conveyance of part of a tract of land, pending payment of purchase money, having possession seven years, will be protected in his defensive possessory right, against the judgment creditor of his vendor, seeking to subject the land to satisfaction of his claim. Moore v. Dinning, 158 Tenn. 374, 13 S.W.2d 798, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 165 (1929).

41. —Tax Sale Purchase.

This statute of limitations is not applicable where possession of land is based solely on the strength of a purchase at a tax sale, since even if the sale is void, the possession is not adverse but under, and in privity with, and by succession to the estate and title of the debtor. Hunt v. Liles, 35 Tenn. App. 173, 243 S.W.2d 149, 1950 Tenn. App. LEXIS 132 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950).

42. —Donee Under Parol Gift.

Adverse possession by donee for requisite period entitles him to protection of this section. McGammon v. Brooks, 17 Tenn. App. 339, 67 S.W.2d 173, 1933 Tenn. App. LEXIS 67 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933).

43. —Partnership Land Division.

Where partnership land is divided and the parties acquiesce in the division and take possession, one who holds continuous adverse possession of the land allotted to him for more than seven years before suit is brought, an indefeasible title is vested in him. Fisher v. Loague, 3 Shan. 123 (1882).

44. —Possession Between Cotenants.

Actual ouster must be clearly established in order to give effect of the statute of limitations in favor of one tenant in common against another. Valley v. Lambuth, 1 Tenn. App. 547, — S.W. —, 1925 Tenn. App. LEXIS 74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1925).

45. —Successive Possessions of Tenants.

The possessions of successive tenants under a landlord, claiming title by entry only, may be connected so as to create the bar under this section, and to create in the landlord a defensive title to the extent of the boundaries of the entry. Sims v. Eastland, 40 Tenn. 368, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 102 (1859); Kittel v. Steger, 121 Tenn. 400, 117 S.W. 500, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1909).

It can make no difference how many tenants there may have been, if they succeed each other, so as to leave no hiatus, where all entered and occupied under the same title. Sims v. Eastland, 40 Tenn. 368, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 102 (1859).

46. —Against Remaindermen.

The rule that a life tenant under an instrument cannot hold adversely to persons named remaindermen in that instrument did not apply to remaindermen under a deed whose claim to a right of immediate possession was founded upon a will in which they were not remaindermen, and to which the life tenant was a stranger. West v. Moore, 193 Tenn. 431, 246 S.W.2d 74, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 309 (1952).

Where a life tenant conveyed fee simple to his brother in 1968, the deed was recorded in 1991, and the life tenant died in 1996, the trial court erred in finding that the brother owned the property by seven years of adverse possession because the possession was not adverse as to the remaindermen until the death of the life tenant in 1996, not on the recording of the deed in 1991 because that did not given notice which clearly conveyed to the remaindermen that the property was held or claimed adversely and not under the life tenancy, and the remaindermen's suit was timely filed in 2001. Brown v. Seal, 179 S.W.3d 481, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 231 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 977 (Tenn. 2005)

47. Estates Acquired.

48. —Interest in Realty Covered.

Action to recover any interest in realty is barred. Tharpe v. McAuley, 3 Tenn. App. 18, — S.W. —, 1926 Tenn. App. LEXIS 67 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1926).

Trial court erred in granting a neighboring property owner a perpetual easement for the use of a driveway when the owner built a driveway that encroached on the property of a homeowners association because the evidence preponderated against the trial court's finding that the removal of the encroaching driveway would have undermined the value of both parcels. The homeowners association was, therefore, entitled to remove the encroaching driveway. Franklin Square Towne Homeowners Ass'n v. Kyles, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 300 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10, 2017).

49. —Railroad Right-of-Way.

A railroad right-of-way conveyed to it in fee is barred by possession adverse to the railroad company for seven years. Southern R. Co. v. Forrest, 13 Tenn. App. 547, — S.W.2d —, 1931 Tenn. App. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1931).

50. —Life Estate.

Where testator devised life estate to wife with remainder to children, when in fact testator had only life estate under deed granting remainder to children upon his death, children were precluded under this section from asserting remainder interests during life estate because wife had enjoyed exclusive control, dominion and possession of land for more than seven years after testator's death, thus acquiring life estate. West v. Moore, 193 Tenn. 431, 246 S.W.2d 74, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 309 (1952).

51. Against Whom Statute Runs.

52. —Heirs.

If this statute begins to run against the parent it will continue to run against the heirs. Green v. Greer, 29 Tenn. App. 586, 198 S.W.2d 822, 1946 Tenn. App. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946).

53. —Persons Ignorant of Title.

Where complainants, by virtue of a recorded deed, became the owners of land and entitled to its possession eleven years before they commenced a suit for partition, their neglect and consequent failure to discover the existence of the cause of action within the statutory limitation did not prevent the running of the statute, there being no fraudulent concealment. West v. Moore, 193 Tenn. 431, 246 S.W.2d 74, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 309 (1952).

54. —Grantor's Mental Incapacity.

This section barred action brought by adult to invalidate deeds on grounds of grantor's mental incapacity. Green v. Greer, 29 Tenn. App. 586, 198 S.W.2d 822, 1946 Tenn. App. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946).

55. Constructive Trusts.

A constructive trustee may not invoke the bar of § 28-2-102 or this section to the detriment of the beneficiaries of the constructive trust. Tanner v. Tanner, 698 S.W.2d 342, 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 565 (Tenn. 1985).

56. Possessory Title — Protection Against Trespass.

One who has possessory title by adverse possession is entitled to an injunction restraining a railroad company from trespassing by entering and destroying her house, without compensation. Tuggle v. Southern R. Co., 140 Tenn. 275, 204 S.W. 857, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 41 (1918).

57. Accrual of Limitations.

58. —Sheriff's Sale.

A sheriff's deed relates to the date of the sale, and vests title in the purchaser from that time, so that his adverse possession in the intermediate period before the execution of the sheriff's deed may be connected with or added to such possession after the sheriff's deed, so as to make out the period of the bar of the statute. Porter's Lessee v. Cocke, 7 Tenn. 29, 7 Tenn. 30, 1823 Tenn. LEXIS 2 (1823); Mulloy v. Paul, 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 156 (1874); Tennessee & P. R. Co. v. Mabry, 85 Tenn. 47, 1 S.W. 511, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 10 (1886).

59. —Time of Possession.

Statute begins to run from the time of taking adverse possession of the land. Moffitt v. Meeks, 29 Tenn. App. 609, 199 S.W.2d 463, 1946 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946).

60. —As Between Cotenants.

Where will of tenant in common devised all of his real estate to heirs but will was not recorded where land held in cotenancy was located statute of limitations did not start to run as against heirs of cotenant until devisees under will transferred land to third parties. Woods v. Richardson, 190 Tenn. 662, 231 S.W.2d 340, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 590 (1950).

61. —Counterclaims.

Although defendant did not file his counterclaim and cross-claim until April 1992, more than seven years after the accrual of his cause of action, he was given the benefit of the plaintiff's October 1990 filing pursuant to § 28-1-114. Defendant's claims were, therefore, not barred by this section, although they were asserted outside of the applicable seven-year period. Cross v. McCurry, 859 S.W.2d 349, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 335 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

62. Pleading.

Where a claim of adverse possession is interposed merely as a defense the statute must be specifically pleaded to be available. Moore v. Brannan, 42 Tenn. App. 542, 304 S.W.2d 660, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

63. —Facts.

While the exact language of the statute need not be used in pleading limitation, the particular defense must be expressly stated, and nothing left to conjecture. The particular statute must be designated. Merely setting forth possession for 20 years without facts showing it adverse is insufficient. Ferring v. Fleischman, 39 S.W. 19, 1896 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 79 (1896).

64. —Necessity.

The statute of limitation goes only to the remedy, the rule in an action at law to be that the statute must be pleaded. Barnes v. Louisville & N.R.R., 3 Shan. 15 (1878).

Where the defense is that of a mere possessory right, the defense of the seven year statute of limitations must be pleaded. Southern Iron & Coal Co. v. Schwoon, 124 Tenn. 176, 135 S.W. 785, 1910 Tenn. LEXIS 51 (1911).

Where party did not specifically plead defense of adverse possession under unregistered deed it was not available to him. Jones v. Mosley, 29 Tenn. App. 559, 198 S.W.2d 652, 1946 Tenn. App. LEXIS 91 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946).

Where the defense is merely of a possessory right unaided by title or color of title the defense of seven years adverse possession must be specially pleaded either in the answer or by separate pleading, and while it is not necessary to plead the exact language of the statute, the defense should be expressly pleaded in language sufficient to remove any reasonable doubt that the pleader is relying upon his possessory rights. Peoples v. Hagaman, 31 Tenn. App. 398, 215 S.W.2d 827, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

65. —Sufficient Plea.

A plea which asserted that defendants and those through whom they claimed had been in possession of the property in question by virtue of their title and “by right of possession for more than 21 years,” and then set up defendants' rights under the statute of limitations of seven years, did not exclude a defense of seven years' adverse possession based purely upon an adverse holding without title, especially where the plaintiff treated the answer as raising a defense under this section in the trial court, and the issue of adverse possession was fully developed in the taking of proof. Peoples v. Hagaman, 31 Tenn. App. 398, 215 S.W.2d 827, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

66. Trial.

67. —Burden of Proof.

Claimant under gift has burden of proving by satisfactory evidence not only the gift, but also the adverse possession, so as to show that the holding was adverse. Mercy v. Miller, 25 Tenn. App. 621, 166 S.W.2d 628, 1942 Tenn. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1942).

68. —Evidence — Sufficiency.

Plea of defendant of title and by right of possession for more than 21 years was sufficient, it appearing that the issue of adverse possession was fully developed in the taking of proof. Peoples v. Hagaman, 31 Tenn. App. 398, 215 S.W.2d 827, 1948 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1948).

Where there was no deed to the lot in question proof failed to establish a possessory right under this section. Eckhardt v. Eckhardt, 43 Tenn. App. 1, 305 S.W.2d 346, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 100 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

69. Abandonment of Possessory Right.

The constructive possession of land is dependent upon title; and, therefore, where a possessor, after acquiring a possessory right, abandons the possession, or the minor heirs of such deceased possessor abandon the possession, the constructive possession does not remain with him or his heirs, but reverts to the owner of the title. Brown v. Watkins, 98 Tenn. 454, 40 S.W. 480, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 239 (1897).

Abandonment of a possessory right, to bring about a loss of the right, must be shown by clear, unmistakable acts indicating a purpose to repudiate ownership. Phy v. Hatfield, 122 Tenn. 694, 126 S.W. 105, 1909 Tenn. LEXIS 41, 135 Am. St. Rep. 888 (1910).

Before defensive right under a parol gift has ripened, there may be termination or abandonment, by the donee, or the donor's reentry or suit. Bailey ex rel. State v. Henry, 125 Tenn. 390, 143 S.W. 1124, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (Tenn. Dec. 1911).

70. Transfer in Fraud of Creditors.

Where a speculator in the commodities market transferred real and personal property to his wife and subsequently became bankrupt, it not having been shown that he was insolvent at the time of such transfers, and his creditors did not challenge such transfers until 13 years later when they contended the transfers were fraudulent under §§ 64-301 (now § 66-3-101), 64-313 (now § 66-3-306) and 64-314 (now § 66-3-307) in view of the speculative nature of the transferor's business, the court held it unnecessary to decide this contention on the merits since the claim was barred by either the equitable doctrine of laches or by the limitation of actions provisions of §§ 28-2-103, 28-3-109 and 28-3-110. Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. Butler, 496 F.2d 806, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 8973 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1974).

Although a Chapter 7 trustee's claims seeking avoidance under 11 U.S.C. § 548 and the Tennessee Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act of transfers a debtor made to her daughter in 2007 and 2008 were time-barred, the trustee's claims seeking avoidance of those transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 544 and T.C.A. § 66-3-101 were not time-barred because T.C.A. § 28-2-103 allowed claims for recovery of real property under § 66-3-101 to be filed within seven years; however, there were issues of fact concerning the debtor's intent in transferring fifteen houses to her daughter which precluded the court from granting summary judgment to the trustee or the daughter on the trustee's claims seeking avoidance of the transfers. Paris v. Walker (In re Walker), 566 B.R. 503, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 929 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Apr. 3, 2017).

71. Rights-of-Way.

A suit by person having right-of-way to abate an adverse use must be brought within seven years from the time the cause of action arose or the right of action is barred; in the interim period of time between the seven years and 20 years, if the adverse holding ceases, the person who has the right-of-way may resume his use, as the right-of-way still exists, on the other hand he may not bring an action to abate the adverse use during that period and if the adverse use continues for 20 years, the right-of-way is extinguished. Shearer v. Vandergriff, 661 S.W.2d 680, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 737 (Tenn. 1983).

28-2-104. Application to school lands.

Sections 28-2-101 — 28-2-103 do not apply to lands, tenements, or hereditaments reserved for the use of schools.

Code 1858, § 2766 (deriv. Acts 1819, ch. 28, § 3); Shan., § 4459; Code 1932, § 8585; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-204.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 1 Tenn. Juris., Adverse Possession, § 55.

Law Reviews.

Adverse Possession and the Presumption of Title (R.D. Cox), 11 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 1.

History of the Adverse Possession Statutes of Tennessee (R. D. Cox), 6 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 673.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Lands Covered.

This exception does not apply to lands held by a school under the state's grant, for such lands are not “reserved for the use of schools.” The exception applies to the lands required by the Act of Congress of 1806 to be reserved and appropriated for the benefit of colleges, academies, and schools. Sampson v. Lessee University of Nashville, 32 Tenn. 600, 1853 Tenn. LEXIS 89 (1853); Puckett v. State, 33 Tenn. 355, 1853 Tenn. LEXIS 54 (1853), superseded by statute as stated in, Armstrong v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 656 S.W.2d 18, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 716 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

28-2-105. Adverse possession — Assurance of title.

Any person holding any real estate or land of any kind or any legal or equitable interest therein, and such person and those through whom such person claims having been in adverse possession of same for seven (7) years, where the real estate is held and claimed by such person or those through whom such person claims by a conveyance, devise, grant, a decree of a court of record, or other assurance of title purporting to convey an estate in fee, and such conveyance, devise, grant, or other assurance of title, has been recorded in the register's office of the county in which the land lies for a period of thirty (30) years or more or such decree entered on the minutes of such court for a period of thirty (30) years or more, is vested with an absolute and indefeasible title to such real estate or interest therein.

Acts 1923, ch. 90, § 1; Shan. Supp., § 4460a1; Code 1932, § 8586; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-205.

Cross-References. Adverse possession generally, §§ 28-2-10128-2-103.

Presumption as to deed registered for 20 years, § 66-26-106.

Presumption as to deeds by attorney after 20 years' registration, §§ 66-26-108, 66-26-109.

Presumption as to subscription after 30 years' registration, § 66-26-107.

Statute not suspended by disability, § 28-1-107.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 1 Tenn. Juris., Adverse Possession, §§ 3, 14, 29, 30, 51, 56, 57, 63.

Law Reviews.

Adverse Possession Against Tenants in Common in Tennessee (Eston Wycliffe Orr), 37 Tenn. L. Rev. 776.

Adverse Possession and the Presumption of Title (R.D. Cox), 11 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 1.

Champerty as We Know It (R.D. Cox), 13 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 139 (1983).

Survey of Tennessee Property Law, IV. Transfers of Land (Beverly A. Rowlett), 48 Tenn. L. Rev. 72.

The Tennessee Recording System (Toxey H. Sewell), 50 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 (1982).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Indefeasible Title Acquisition.

A deed absolute on its face may be shown to be a mortgage but this cannot be done after a lapse of 30 years. Savely v. Bridges, 57 Tenn. App. 372, 418 S.W.2d 472, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

2. —Generally.

A railway company is barred from recovering possession of a portion of its right-of-way in which it owned the fee, where for more than 83 years it had permitted the adverse occupation of another. Southern R. Co. v. Forrest, 13 Tenn. App. 547, — S.W.2d —, 1931 Tenn. App. LEXIS 94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1931).

Ejectment suit by heirs of original owner under grant filed over 80 years after tax deed issued under which defendants claimed was barred. Schooler v. Birge, 51 F. Supp. 610, 1943 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2221 (D. Tenn. 1943).

This section conferred a right and operated to vest in the adverse holder under color of title a legal title to land adversely held for seven years, provided the color of title has been recorded in the county where the land lies for a period of 30 years; or the decree of a court under which the adverse holder claims title had been entered on the minutes of the court for a period of 30 years. Moore v. Brannan, 42 Tenn. App. 542, 304 S.W.2d 660, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

This section does not require proof that the land is granted land, but does require 30 years' registered color of title and seven years' adverse possession under registered color of title. Moore v. Brannan, 42 Tenn. App. 542, 304 S.W.2d 660, 1957 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957).

Where claimants did not assert claim that deed was a mortgage for 34 years and did not pay taxes during such period, claim was barred. Van Dyke v. Inman, 50 Tenn. App. 493, 362 S.W.2d 795, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 158 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

It is clear from §§ 28-1-106 and 28-2-106 that the legislature expressly intended to save no person from the operation of this section. Savely v. Bridges, 57 Tenn. App. 372, 418 S.W.2d 472, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

This section is a statute of repose and in cases falling within its terms it has the effect of vesting absolutely the legal title to the land in the person holding adverse possession thereof during the seven year period of limitation fixed by the statute and under assurance of title for a period of thirty years. Savely v. Bridges, 57 Tenn. App. 372, 418 S.W.2d 472, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

This section was enacted for the purpose of putting an end to the litigation of stale cases the evidence of which may have disappeared with the passing of time. Savely v. Bridges, 57 Tenn. App. 372, 418 S.W.2d 472, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

Because there was a concurrent use of the disputed property, the neighbors as junior titleholders were not entitled to ownership of the entire parcel claimed, but only to the portion they actually adversely possessed. Corrado v. Hickman, 113 S.W.3d 319, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 195 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 629 (Tenn. June 30, 2003).

3. —Against State.

This section will operate against the state. Whitaker v. House, 213 Tenn. 61, 372 S.W.2d 194, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 495 (1963).

4. —Against Minors.

Any interest or claim of minor in land sold in court proceedings more than 30 years previously is barred by this section. State ex rel. Tobin v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 171 Tenn. 13, 100 S.W.2d 228, 1936 Tenn. LEXIS 54 (1937).

5. —Against Divorced Spouse.

Where decree of chancellor granting divorce divested husband of all interest in land and vested it in the wife and her heirs and assigns and she held such land under the decree for more than 30 years, the divorced husband was entitled to no interest in the land. Cobb v. Brown, 42 Tenn. App. 595, 305 S.W.2d 241, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

6. —Against Person Under Disability.

This section operates against persons under disability. Savely v. Bridges, 57 Tenn. App. 372, 418 S.W.2d 472, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

7. —Against Cotenants.

To establish title by prescription, the holder must prove that the prescriptive holder, had been in exclusive and uninterrupted possession of the land in question for a period of more than 20 years claiming the same as his own, without any account with its cotenants or claim on their part, they being under no disability to assert their rights, and that the prescriptive holder's occupancy of the property in question is without permission, either actual or implied, of the other cotenants. Livesay v. Keaton, 611 S.W.2d 581, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 402 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

8. —Rights of Remaindermen.

Possession of land by purchaser who acquired title through foreclosure of mortgage executed by the life tenant is not adverse to the rights of the tenants in remainder nor will this statute begin to run against the remainderman during the life estate. Guy v. Culberson, 164 Tenn. 509, 51 S.W.2d 500, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1932).

Where life tenant undertook to convey a fee, possession of grantees did not become adverse to remaindermen until death of life tenant. Quarles v. Arthur, 33 Tenn. App. 291, 231 S.W.2d 589, 1950 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1950).

9. —Rights of Reversioner.

The statute of limitations for adverse possession does not run against a reversioner until after the death of the life tenant. Cobb v. Brown, 42 Tenn. App. 595, 305 S.W.2d 241, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

10. Exceptions to Statute — Burden of Proof.

The burden of proof to establish an exception to the operation of the statute of limitations is upon him who asserts it, and the defense of statute of limitations must be specially pleaded in order to be available and where there was an adverse user for a period of 20 years, it will be presumed that the owner of the land was capable of suing or acquiesced in the prescription. Smelcer v. Rippetoe, 24 Tenn. App. 516, 147 S.W.2d 109, 1940 Tenn. App. LEXIS 57 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940).

11. Assurance of Title.

Deed of trust conveying legal title of land to trustee who subsequently sold and conveyed the land under such deed of trust was a link in the title chain under this section and a conveyance and assurance of title. Savely v. Bridges, 57 Tenn. App. 372, 418 S.W.2d 472, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

Statutory adverse possession was not established in a boundary dispute case because adequate assurance of title was not shown based upon a deed or a 1990 tax map. A second neighbor could not identify a deed or specific instrument of record that gave him title to to the property at issue; rather, he could only point to statements he had heard from relatives over the years. Summers v. Stubblefield, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2015).

12. Construction with Other Sections.

Sections 28-2-101 and 28-2-105 deal with rights and convey title to the adverse holder while §§ 28-2-102 and 28-2-103 deal with defensive rights and can be used by the adverse holder defensively only. Savely v. Bridges, 57 Tenn. App. 372, 418 S.W.2d 472, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

Section 28-2-105 differs from § 28-2-101 in that § 28-2-101 deals only with land granted by the state and requires only seven years' adverse possession of the land under recorded assurance of title of such land to perfect legal title in the adverse holder to the extent of the boundaries set forth in the color of title under which the land is held even though possession is located only on a part of the land included in the boundaries of the adverse holder's assurance of title, while § 28-2-105 does not require proof that the land is granted land but does require 30 years' color of title and seven years' adverse possession under registered color of title; the 30 years' registration carrying the presumption that the land was granted from the state. Savely v. Bridges, 57 Tenn. App. 372, 418 S.W.2d 472, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

Trial court erred in ruling for a landowner in his action against an adjacent landowner to quiet title to a strip of land, which the parties'  referred to as the interlock, because the landowner's deed to the interlock was champertous and thus, void; the adjacent landowner's act of enclosing a portion of the interlock in a fence constituted actual possession of that portion of the interlock since the fence enclosed a portion of the interlock, it was open and obvious, and it gave notice to the world that the adjacent landowner claimed ownership of the property enclosed by the fence. Foust v. Metcalf, 338 S.W.3d 457, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2010).

Although a landowner was not the true owner of a strip of land because the landowner's deed to the interlock was champertous, that did not mean that an adjacent landowner was the true owner because the deed from a purchaser to the landowner was void and thus, the seller still possessed whatever interest it had in the property; if the seller was the true owner of the property, then it was an indispensable party to any action brought by the adjacent landowner pursuant to T.C.A. § 28-2-105 to establish that the adjacent landowner owned the property by adverse possession. Foust v. Metcalf, 338 S.W.3d 457, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 693 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2010).

28-2-106. Action for recovery prohibited.

Where such land or interest therein is held as set out in § 28-2-105, no person, whether upon disability or not, nor the state of Tennessee, shall commence or sustain an action for the recovery of same in any court.

Acts 1923, ch. 90, § 2; Shan. Supp., § 4460a2; Code 1932, § 8587; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-206.

Cross-References. Adverse possession, assurance of title, § 28-2-105.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 1 Tenn. Juris., Adverse Possession, § 51.

Law Reviews.

Adverse Possession and the Presumption of Title (R.D. Cox), 11 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application and Scope.

Sections 28-2-105, 28-2-106 do not save any person from the operation thereof. Savely v. Bridges, 57 Tenn. App. 372, 418 S.W.2d 472, 1967 Tenn. App. LEXIS 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).

2. Commencement of Period.

Deeds by father and stepmother of pretermitted son of testatrix which conveyed farm to third party and back to them as tenants by the entireties would not cause statute of limitations to run against pretermitted son where son had remainder in fee simple under pretermitted child statute after father's life estate by curtesy and son had no notice, either actual or constructive, of father's intention to defeat his remainder interest. Young v. Young, 48 Tenn. App. 645, 349 S.W.2d 545, 1961 Tenn. App. LEXIS 90 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961).

3. Against State.

Sections 28-2-105, 28-2-106 specifically apply against the State. Whitaker v. House, 213 Tenn. 61, 372 S.W.2d 194, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 495 (1963).

4. Owner of Land Under Disability.

Adverse possession under the statute of limitations will not confer title where the owner of the land is under disability, and one claiming title by adverse possession must necessarily make out his case by showing the facts necessary to confer title. Davis v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 147 Tenn. 1, 244 S.W. 483, 1921 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1922).

Trial court properly determined that suit to set aside a warranty deed was not barred by the statute of limitations due to the property seller's history of drug and alcohol abuse, which rendered the seller mentally incompetent, and T.C.A. § 28-2-106 was the applicable statute. Owen v. Summers, 97 S.W.3d 114, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 953 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

Grantee stated a legally sufficient defense of adverse possession where she alleged that she and her predecessors in interest possessed the subject property adversely and exclusively in excess of seven years and had color of title through the succession of quitclaim deeds; T.C.A. § 28-2-106 did not apply as the property was in the name of an adult trustee, and therefore was not considered to be laboring under a disability and the prescriptive period for purposes of adverse possession was not tolled. Brewer v. Piggee, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 406 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3, 2007).

28-2-107. Rights under other laws preserved.

Nothing in § 28-2-105 or § 28-2-106 is to be construed as affecting any rights which any person may now or hereafter have under other laws in regard to limitation of actions for real estate where the limitation is for a period of less than thirty (30) years.

Acts 1923, ch. 90, § 3; Shan. Supp., § 4460a3; Code 1932, § 8588; modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-207.

Law Reviews.

Adverse Possession and the Presumption of Title (R.D. Cox), 11 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 1.

28-2-108. Subordinate possession not adverse.

Possession is not adverse within the meaning of this chapter, as to any person claiming a right or interest in the land, when taken and continued under a title bond, mortgage or other instrument acknowledging that right or interest, or when taken and continued in subordination to the right or interest of another.

Code 1858, § 2768; Shan., § 4461; Code 1932, § 8589; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-208.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 1 Tenn. Juris., Adverse Possession, § 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Adverse Possession by Mortgagee.

The mere fact of possession of the mortgagee under the mortgage deed will not bar the equity of redemption, unless it be continued so long as to afford a presumption of right. The mortgagee's possession, claiming against the right of redemption, to bar such right, must be continued the same length of time it would require to bar the debt by the mortgagor's possession, claiming against the debt. Gudger v. Barnes, 51 Tenn. 570, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 207 (1871); Ellege v. Cooke, 73 Tenn. 622, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1880); Lincoln Sav. Bank v. Ewing, 80 Tenn. 598, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 211 (1883).

2. —Trust Relationship.

The mortgagee holds the legal title in trust for the mortgagor, and the mortgagor, the equitable owner, is a trustee for the mortgagee, to the extent of the unpaid mortgage debt. Seat v. Knight, 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 262 (1876).

3. —Possession Under Outstanding Title.

The mortgagee's adverse possession under an outstanding title purchased by him, when held adversely to the mortgagor for seven years, with his knowledge, will form a complete protection against the equity of redemption, and will perfect the title in him, if so held for seven years under a title purporting to convey a fee simple estate, or will protect his possession, if held under a title of less dignity. Wallen v. Huff, 24 Tenn. 91, 1844 Tenn. LEXIS 26 (1844); Gudger v. Barnes, 51 Tenn. 570, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 207 (1871). See Wood v. Jones, 19 Tenn. 513, 1838 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1838).

4. Remaindermen's Rights.

5. —Limitation Statutes Inapplicable.

While remaindermen and reversioners are not within any of the exceptions to the statutes of limitation, such statutes cannot be construed to include remaindermen and reversioners. McCorry v. King, 22 Tenn. 267, 1842 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (1842); Story v. Saunders, 27 Tenn. 663, 1848 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1848); Teague v. Sowder, 121 Tenn. 132, 114 S.W. 484, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 11 (1908); Smith v. Cross, 125 Tenn. 159, 140 S.W. 1060, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1911); Hall v. Gossum, 144 Tenn. 1, 228 S.W. 1039, 1920 Tenn. LEXIS 58 (1920); Johnson v. Covington, 148 Tenn. 47, 251 S.W. 893, 1922 Tenn. LEXIS 78 (1923).

6. —Suit for Possession — Time.

The remainderman or reversioner cannot sue for the possession of the property until after the termination of the particular estate. McCorry v. King, 22 Tenn. 267, 1842 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (1842); Guion v. Anderson, 27 Tenn. 298, 1847 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1847); Templeton v. Twitty, 88 Tenn. 595, 14 S.W. 435, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (Tenn. Dec. 1889); Smith v. Cross, 125 Tenn. 159, 140 S.W. 1060, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1911).

7. —Laches.

A remainderman or reversioner is not bound to assert his title, during the existence of the life estate, and his failure to do so does not constitute laches; nor does his standing by and allowing the life tenant or those claiming under him to enjoy the property as owners of the fee and to develop it, without objection, constitute laches which will estop him from instituting a suit for the reformation of the deed, on the ground that it created only a life estate in the first taker, with remainder to him. Teague v. Sowder, 121 Tenn. 132, 114 S.W. 484, 1908 Tenn. LEXIS 11 (1908).

8. —Purchaser on Foreclosure of Life Tenant's Mortgage.

Purchaser under foreclosure of life tenant's mortgage does not hold adversely to remainderman. Guy v. Culberson, 164 Tenn. 509, 51 S.W.2d 500, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1932).

28-2-109. Presumption of ownership from payment of taxes.

Any person holding any real estate or land of any kind, or any legal or equitable interest therein, who has paid, or who and those through whom such person claims have paid, the state and county taxes on the same for more then twenty (20) years continuously prior to the date when any question arises in any of the courts of this state concerning the same, and who has had or who and those through whom such person claims have had, such person's deed, conveyance, grant or other assurance of title recorded in the register's office of the county in which the land lies, for such period of more than twenty (20) years, shall be presumed prima facie to be the legal owner of such land.

Acts 1947, ch. 28, § 1; mod. C. Supp. 1950, § 9159.1 (Williams, § 9746.1); T.C.A. (orig.ed.), § 28-209.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 477.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 1 Tenn. Juris., Adverse Possession, §§ 8, 28, 60, 63; 18 Tenn. Juris., Limitation of Actions, § 17.

Tennessee Law of Evidence (2nd ed., Cohen, Paine and Sheppeard), § 300.12.

Law Reviews.

An Exegesis of the Ejectment Statutes of Tennessee (R.D. Cox), 18 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 581 (1988).

Real Property — 1955 Tennessee Survey (Wade H. Sides, Jr.), 8 Vand. L. Rev. 1110.

The Tennessee Employer's Wrongful Discharge and the Union's Breach of the Duty of Fair Representation — Does Tennessee Need a Statute of Limitations? (Marsha H. Ashlock), 20 No. 2 Tenn. B.J. 15 (1984).

The Tennessee Recording System (Toxey H. Sewell), 50 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 (1982).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Presumption Rebuttable.

The presumption created by this section is rebuttable. Welch v. A. B. C. Coal Co., 41 Tenn. App. 208, 293 S.W.2d 44, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 164 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

Where proof showed that cross-complainants had paid taxes on at least part of land involved but also showed that complainants and cross-defendants has also paid taxes on the land for many years and the record conclusively showed that cross-complainants had no title to the land, the presumption of ownership under this section failed in face of proof. Welch v. A. B. C. Coal Co., 41 Tenn. App. 208, 293 S.W.2d 44, 1956 Tenn. App. LEXIS 164 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956).

Where a party paid taxes continuously for more than 20 years and had assurance of title that had been of record for more than 20 years, a rebuttable presumption of ownership arose under T.C.A. § 28-2-109. Corrado v. Hickman, 113 S.W.3d 319, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 195 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 629 (Tenn. June 30, 2003).

Trial court properly held that any affirmative action by plaintiffs to claim an interest in the disputed property was barred and it summarily dismissed the complaint because a rebuttable presumption of ownership arose as defendants had paid taxes on the property continuously for over 20 years; plaintiffs were not entitled to notice of the tax sale in 1994 as plaintiffs did not hold an ownership interest in the property at the time of the sale as there deed was not recorded until 1995; there was no proof in the record that the tax sale to defendants was invalid; and defendants'  predecessors in interest purchased the property at a tax sale in 1994, and their deed was duly recorded prior to plaintiffs'  deed. Kinder v. Bryant, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 286 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 2018).

2. Commencement of Period.

Deeds by father and stepmother of pretermitted son of testatrix which conveyed farm to third party and back to them as tenants by the entireties would not cause statute of limitations to run against pretermitted son where son had remainder in fee simple under pretermitted child statute after father's life estate by curtesy and son had no notice, either actual or constructive, of father's intention to defeat his remainder interest. Young v. Young, 48 Tenn. App. 645, 349 S.W.2d 545, 1961 Tenn. App. LEXIS 90 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961).

3. School Lands.

Since school lands could be disposed of only according to the procedures established by the legislature under Tennessee Acts 1843 — 1844, ch. 104, § 2, pp. 122, 123 and Tennessee Acts 1845-1846, ch. 121, pp. 188-190, title to such lands could not have vested in a private individual under this section and § 28-2-110 by virtue of his having paid taxes on such lands for a period exceeding 20 years. United States v. 2923.23 Acres of Land, 379 F. Supp. 1040, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8798 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).

4. Payment of Taxes.

Finding against plaintiff in her action against defendants involving a boundary dispute to 32 acres of land was appropriate, pursuant to T.C.A. § 28-2-109 and T.C.A. § 28-2-110, where defendants and their predecessors paid property taxes on the disputed property for over 20 years and they also had recorded assurance of title. Defendants were entitled to a presumption of ownership under T.C.A. § 28-2-109 and plaintiff was barred from asserting a claim under T.C.A. 28-2-110. Jack v. Dillehay, 194 S.W.3d 441, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 672 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, Jack v. Dilehay, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 378 (Tenn. 2006).

5. Assurance of Title.

Statutory adverse possession was not established in a boundary dispute case because adequate assurance of title was not shown based upon a deed or a 1990 tax map. A second neighbor could not identify a deed or specific instrument of record that gave him title to to the property at issue; rather, he could only point to statements he had heard from relatives over the years. Summers v. Stubblefield, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2015).

28-2-110. Action barred by nonpayment of taxes.

  1. Any person having any claim to real estate or land of any kind, or to any legal or equitable interest therein, the same having been subject to assessment for state and county taxes, who and those through whom such person claims have failed to have the same assessed and to pay any state and county taxes thereon for a period of more than twenty (20) years, shall be forever barred from bringing any action in law or in equity to recover the same, or to recover any rents or profits therefrom in any of the courts of this state.
  2. This section does not apply to persons under eighteen (18) years of age or to persons adjudicated incompetent if suit shall be brought by them, or any one claiming through them, within three (3) years after legal rights are restored.
  3. Nothing in this section shall bar a person from bringing an action to contest the lapse of a mineral interest within the period provided by § 66-5-108(j).

Acts 1947, ch. 28, § 3; mod. C. Supp. 1950, § 8585.1 (Williams, § 9159.1); impl. am. Acts 1979, ch. 413, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-210; Acts 1987, ch. 282, § 6; 2011, ch. 47, § 18.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 107 provided that nothing in the legislation shall be construed to alter or otherwise affect the eligibility for services or the rights or responsibilities of individuals covered by the provision on the day before the date of enactment of this legislation, which was July 1, 2011.

Acts 2011, ch. 47, § 108 provided that the provisions of the act are declared to be remedial in nature and all provisions of the act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.

Cross-References. Preservation, or extinguishment and reversion of mineral interests, § 66-5-108.

Property taxes, classification and assessment, mineral interests, back assessments, location, § 67-5-809.

Property taxes, classification and assessment, records, identification and registration of mineral interests, § 67-5-804.

Property taxes, notice of sale of land, mineral interests, § 67-5-2502.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 1 Tenn. Juris., Adverse Possession, § 8, 39; 8 Tenn. Juris., Cotenancy, § 11; 11 Tenn. Juris., Equity § 99;  18 Tenn. Juris., Limitation of Actions, § 17; 20 Tenn. Juris., Partition, § 12.

Law Reviews.

An Exegesis of the Ejectment Statutes of Tennessee (R.D. Cox), 18 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 581 (1988).

Quiet Title Actions in Tennessee, 15 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 263 (1985).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Only persons who had a vested interest in land at the time of the enactment of the statute barring actions to recover property or rents or profits therefrom are in a position to question the validity of the statute and claimant, who took by quitclaim more than three years later, is entirely too late to step into shoes of the delinquent taxpayer who was his predecessor and make the defense of lack of due process. Lee v. Harrison, 196 Tenn. 603, 270 S.W.2d 173, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 427 (1954).

2. Applicability.

This section may be applied in a suit to remove cloud on title. Tidwell v. Van Deventer, 686 S.W.2d 899, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2990 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

Finding against plaintiff in her action against defendants involving a boundary dispute to 32 acres of land was appropriate, pursuant to T.C.A. § 28-2-109 and T.C.A. § 28-2-110, where defendants and their predecessors paid property taxes on the disputed property for over 20 years and they also had recorded assurance of title. Defendants were entitled to a presumption of ownership under T.C.A. § 28-2-109 and plaintiff was barred from asserting a claim under T.C.A. 28-2-110. Jack v. Dillehay, 194 S.W.3d 441, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 672 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, Jack v. Dilehay, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 378 (Tenn. 2006).

Trial court did not err in holding that the exception to the statute applied and that adjacent owners established their claim of adverse possession of the disputed property because the tracts were contiguous, a relatively small area was at issue, and the adjacent owners paid their respective real estate taxes. Holtsclaw v. Johnson, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 782 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2015), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 21 (Tenn. Jan. 13, 2016).

Trial court rightly denied a county's request for judgment on alternative bases because the county had already elected to obtain ownership of the subject property pursuant to the power of eminent domain, leaving only the issue of compensation to be decided. Therefore, the owners were barred from claiming title to the condemned property. Shelby Cnty. v. Crews, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 967 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2015).

3. Failure to Pay Taxes — Effect.

Where complainant and those through whom he claims have failed to have property assessed and to pay any state and county taxes thereon for a period of more than 20 years, he is barred from bringing any action to remove cloud on title. Lee v. Harrison, 196 Tenn. 603, 270 S.W.2d 173, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 427 (1954).

This section does not apply where it does not appear complainants failed to pay taxes for 20 years and where disputed property was alleged to be part of other property which they owned, even though the grantor of the defendants who dispute ownership paid some prior taxes on the disputed land. Winborn v. Alexander, 39 Tenn. App. 1, 279 S.W.2d 718, 1954 Tenn. App. LEXIS 155 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954).

Where claimants did not assert claim that deed was a mortgage for 34 years and did not pay taxes during such period, claim was barred. Van Dyke v. Inman, 50 Tenn. App. 493, 362 S.W.2d 795, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 158 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

The failure to pay taxes for 20 years does not automatically cause a nonpayor to be ejected. Layne v. Baggenstoss, 640 S.W.2d 1, 1982 Tenn. App. LEXIS 383 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982); Cooke v. Smith, 721 S.W.2d 251, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3583 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

This section does not bar a defense of title and since defendants filed a counteraction, plaintiffs' defense in the posture of a counter-defendant was not barred. The chancellor voided defendants' quit claim deeds on the basis that plaintiffs and their predecessors had adversely possessed the land more than 20 years at the time defendants received their deeds. Catlett v. Whaley, 731 S.W.2d 544, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2507 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

In a property ownership dispute, the trial court misapplied T.C.A. § 28-2-110(a) and erred in granting summary judgment to a broadcasting company declaring that it owned an access road to its tower through adverse possession because, despite open use of the road, the company had conceded that neither it nor its predecessors in title had paid taxes on the disputed property for 20 years. Cumulus Broad., Inc. v. Shim, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 790 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2005), rev'd, 226 S.W.3d 366, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Apr. 27, 2007), overruled, Sweeney v. Koehler, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 762 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2010).

Court of appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and dismissing an adverse possession claim based upon T.C.A. § 28-2-110 and holding that, because there was a failure on the part of the neighbor to pay real estate taxes on the land at issue owned by the property owner, the adverse possession claim failed. Cumulus Broadcasting, Inc. v. Shim, 226 S.W.3d 366, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Apr. 27, 2007).

As a matter of policy, possession of property for 20 or more years, accompanied by all other elements of the doctrine, is a basis for ownership. Cumulus Broadcasting, Inc. v. Shim, 226 S.W.3d 366, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Apr. 27, 2007).

Because tax maps do not identify precise boundaries and actual boundaries are established by intent, T.C.A. § 28-2-110 should not serve as a bar to a claim of adverse possession when the tracts are contiguous, a relatively small area is at issue, and the adjacent owners making claims of ownership have paid their respective real estate taxes. Cumulus Broadcasting, Inc. v. Shim, 226 S.W.3d 366, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Apr. 27, 2007).

Statutory bar to an adverse possession claim did not apply and that the two neighbors were mistaken as to the true boundary was of no consequence; the neighbor asserting the common law claim exercised exclusive, actual, adverse, continuous, and open and notorious possession, by the legal definitions of those terms, of the actual area making up the service road for more than 20 years and by all appearances, both parties paid taxes on their separate tracts throughout their intervals of ownership. Cumulus Broadcasting, Inc. v. Shim, 226 S.W.3d 366, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. Apr. 27, 2007).

T.C.A. § 28-2-110, whether properly pled or not, was not a bar to the property action because the property taxes were paid by the previous property owner, a bank. Due to an error, the bank continued to pay the taxes on the property for 34 years after the property was sold. Milledgeville United Methodist Church v. Melton, 388 S.W.3d 280, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 638 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2012).

Trial court properly held that this statute barred any affirmative action by plaintiffs to claim an interest in the disputed property and summarily dismissed the complaint because a rebuttable presumption of ownership arose as defendants had paid taxes on the property continuously for over 20 years; plaintiffs were not entitled to notice of the tax sale in 1994 as plaintiffs did not hold an ownership interest in the property at the time of the sale as there deed was not recorded until 1995; there was no proof in the record that the tax sale to defendants was invalid; and defendants'  predecessors in interest purchased the property at a tax sale in 1994, and their deed was duly recorded prior to plaintiffs'  deed. Kinder v. Bryant, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 286 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 22, 2018).

In an action between adjoining neighbors concerning the ownership of a strip of railroad property that was abandoned by the railroad in 1977, the court held that this section barred plaintiffs'  claim of adverse possession because it was undisputed that they did not pay taxes on the property for more than 20 years. No portion of the parties'  property overlapped the boundary of the other's tract, and the disputed property was separately assessed to the railroad for tax purposes at all times material to the issue and not to the parties. Butler v. Burrow, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2020).

Trial court properly held that this action was barred as the evidence did not preponderate against the determination that appellants had not paid taxes on the disputed land; they paid taxes only on the 95.15 acres as it was plotted on the 1974 survey, and the surveys in the record made clear that the 95.15 acre tract did not include the gravel lane in question, and the property at issue was not contiguous to appellants'  property. Lee v. Smith, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2020).

4. Cotenancies.

Evidence to affect that tenants in common occupied premises for more than 20 years, paid taxes, made repairs, collected rent and appropriated same to themselves but gave no actual notice of an adverse claim was not sufficient to preponderate against trial court's judgment to effect that ouster as to other tenants in common had not been established and that adverse claim of exclusive ownership by prescription had not been shown. Memphis Housing Authority v. Mahoney, 50 Tenn. App. 117, 359 S.W.2d 851, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

This section does not bar a suit by one tenant in common against another tenant in common who has paid such taxes. Phillips v. Pittsburgh Consol. Coal Co., 541 S.W.2d 411, 1976 Tenn. LEXIS 549 (Tenn. 1976).

5. School Lands.

Since school lands could be disposed of only according to the procedures established by the legislature under Tennessee Acts 1843-1844, ch. 104, § 2, pp. 122, 123 and Tennessee Acts 1845-1846, ch. 121, pp. 188-190, title to such lands could not have vested in a private individual under this section and § 28-2-109 by nature of his having paid taxes on such lands for a period exceeding 20 years. United States v. 2923.23 Acres of Land, 379 F. Supp. 1040, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8798 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).

6. Constructive Trusts.

Where the taxes have been assessed and paid by a person as trustee for the use and benefit of the beneficiaries, neither he nor his successors in interest may invoke the bar of this section to the detriment of the beneficiaries of the constructive trust. Tanner v. Tanner, 698 S.W.2d 342, 1985 Tenn. LEXIS 565 (Tenn. 1985).

7. Burden of Proof.

A party attempting to rely on this section as a bar must clearly show that the other party failed to pay the taxes. Bone v. Loggins, 652 S.W.2d 758, 1982 Tenn. App. LEXIS 454 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).

8. Failure to Assess Property.

Failure of tax assessor to assess property under § 67-5-504 did not remove bar imposed on plaintiffs where taxes had not been paid for more than 20 years prior to § 67-5-504 being enacted. Burress v. Woodward, 665 S.W.2d 707, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. 1984).

9. Payment of Back Taxes.

Payment of back taxes under § 67-1-1001 did not remove the bar imposed by this section on plaintiffs who had not paid taxes for over 20 years. Burress v. Woodward, 665 S.W.2d 707, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 743 (Tenn. 1984).

10. Action Not Barred.

In a dispute over the boundary of two tracts of land, a first neighbor was not barred by T.C.A. § 28-2-110 from defending his title to the property based on the fact that he had not paid property taxes on the property in dispute for 20 consecutive years; section 28-2-110 was a statute of limitations that did not affect title or destroy rights. Because a second neighbor asked the trial court to declare him the rightful owner of the disputed property, the first neighbor was entitled to defend his title against those claims. Summers v. Stubblefield, — S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 129 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2015).

28-2-111. Period of validity of liens — Extension.

  1. Liens on realty, equitable or retained in favor of vendor on the face of the deed, also liens of mortgages, deeds of trust, and assignments of realty executed to secure debts, shall be barred, and the liens discharged, unless suits to enforce the same be brought within ten (10) years from the maturity of the debt.
  2. Subsection (a) shall not apply to lands sold for school purposes, whereon liens have been retained for the payment of the purchase money, nor to persons under disability, until three (3) years after the removal of the same.
  3. Original liens on realty retained in favor of vendors on the face of a deed, also original liens of mortgages, deeds of trust, and assignments of realty executed to secure debts, may be extended without their priority or legal effectiveness being in any way impaired, for any period of time agreed upon and beyond the ten-year period from the maturity of the obligation or debt, as provided for in subsection (a); such extension shall be evidenced by a written instrument, which shall, prior to or within ten (10) years from the maturity of the obligation or debt, be duly executed and acknowledged and be filed for record with the register of the county in which the realty affected is located and be there recorded, all in accordance with the statutes of this state in that regard; and when so filed for record such instrument of extension shall be constructive notice to all persons, as provided by the registration laws of this state; and such instrument shall contain a brief recital of the facts with reference to the original lien and shall provide that the lien shall continue, for a definite period of time in the future, to secure the remaining obligation or debt due under and secured by the original lien, and it shall not be necessary that there be any increase or decrease in the terms of the original obligation either of principal or interest.

Acts 1885, ch. 9, §§ 1, 2; Shan., §§ 4464, 4465; mod. Code 1932, §§ 8590, 8591; Acts 1943, ch. 129, § 1; C. Supp. 1950, § 8590.1; T.C.A. (orig.ed.), §§ 28-212—28-214.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 1 Tenn. Juris., Adverse Possession, §§ 3, 25, 62; 12 Tenn. Juris., Executors and Administrators, § 40; 18 Tenn. Juris., Liens, §§ 10, 12; 18 Tenn. Juris., Limitations of Actions, § 17; 19 Tenn. Juris., Mortgages and Deeds of Trust, § 50; 24 Tenn. Juris., Vendor and Purchaser, § 68.

Law Reviews.

Power of Sale Foreclosure in Tennessee, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 871.

The Tennessee Recording System (Toxey H. Sewell), 50 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 (1982).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction and Interpretation.

2. —Statute Controls.

Since the legislature has specified one exception to the bar of the statute, it is beyond the power of the courts to create another. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Chumbley, 174 Tenn. 581, 129 S.W.2d 213, 1938 Tenn. LEXIS 126, 122 A.L.R. 936 (1939).

3. —Notice of Sale — Effect.

The posting of notices of a foreclosure sale is not a “suit brought” within the meaning of this section and does not fall within the saving clause of the statute. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Chumbley, 174 Tenn. 581, 129 S.W.2d 213, 1938 Tenn. LEXIS 126, 122 A.L.R. 936 (1939).

Where notices of trust sale by trustee were posted before the debt secured by the trust deed was barred but not in time to make the sale before the bar of limitation was complete, purchaser under such sale obtained no title to land so purchased. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Chumbley, 174 Tenn. 581, 129 S.W.2d 213, 1938 Tenn. LEXIS 126, 122 A.L.R. 936 (1939).

4. —Application to Realty Liens.

This section only has application to liens on realty. Montgomery v. Wolfe, 176 Tenn. 462, 143 S.W.2d 717, 1940 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (1940).

5. —Suit to Construe Deed.

Where a bill is for a declaratory judgment to construe language in a deed and pass upon the rights of the parties thereunder and not to reform the deed, the limitation of this section would not apply. Clarke v. Walker, 25 Tenn. App. 78, 150 S.W.2d 1082, 1941 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941).

6. —Cancelation of Lien Release.

This section has no application to the cancelation of an unauthorized entry of release of a lien. Needham v. Caldwell, 25 Tenn. App. 189, 154 S.W.2d 535, 1941 Tenn. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1941).

7. —Bar as to Debt.

It is the bar of the lien alone which is prescribed by this section while the bar to the personal obligation on the debt secured by such lien is prescribed by § 28-3-109. Lawman v. Barnett, 180 Tenn. 546, 177 S.W.2d 121, 1944 Tenn. LEXIS 321, 153 A.L.R. 772 (1944).

8. Accrual of Statute.

9. —Constructive Trust.

In case of a constructive trust, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date the wrongful and adverse holding begins and is or should be known to the complainant. Vick v. Vick, 60 Tenn. App. 600, 449 S.W.2d 717, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).

10. —Resulting Trust.

The statute of limitations generally does not begin to run in the case of a resulting trust until the trustee does some act hostile to the cestui que trust. Vick v. Vick, 60 Tenn. App. 600, 449 S.W.2d 717, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).

11. —Mortgage Lien Foreclosure.

Under this section, the limitation on the right to foreclose the mortgage lien does not begin to run until the maturity of all of the debt secured thereby, no optional right of acceleration having been exercised by the creditor. Lawman v. Barnett, 180 Tenn. 546, 177 S.W.2d 121, 1944 Tenn. LEXIS 321, 153 A.L.R. 772 (1944).

Right to foreclose mortgage lien did not mature, and 10 year limitation did not begin to run, until maturity date of third and last of serial notes given for purchase of land. Lawman v. Barnett, 180 Tenn. 546, 177 S.W.2d 121, 1944 Tenn. LEXIS 321, 153 A.L.R. 772 (1944).

12. —Deed Decreed Mortgage.

Where a deed absolute in form is at instance of the maker declared a mortgage, the limitation runs against right of vendee or mortgagee from date of such decree. Paris v. Webb, 104 Tenn. 122, 56 S.W. 835, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 20 (1899).

Where claimants did not assert claim that deed was a mortgage for 34 years and did not pay taxes during such period, claim was barred. Van Dyke v. Inman, 50 Tenn. App. 493, 362 S.W.2d 795, 1962 Tenn. App. LEXIS 158 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962).

13. —Instalment Provisions — Right to Assert.

A stipulation in the instrument securing two notes maturing at different dates that if either should not be paid at maturity, then both should become due and the premises should be sold, is solely for the benefit of the mortgagee, so that the mortgagor cannot take advantage of it in computing limitations. Batey v. Walter, 46 S.W. 1024, 1897 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 122 (1897).

Where the instrument provides for sale of land after six months' notice to debtor, the statute begins to run from date of notice. Brown v. Brown, 107 Tenn. 349, 65 S.W. 413, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1901).

Where the instrument fixed no specified time for the debt, it did not mature until demand. Brown v. Brown, 107 Tenn. 349, 65 S.W. 413, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 83 (1901).

14. —Instalment Payments.

Where a note was executed in 1918 and the last payment thereon was due in 1925, the statute of limitations on the deed of trust securing the payment of the note had not run in 1932. Anderson v. Howard, 18 Tenn. App. 169, 74 S.W.2d 387, 1934 Tenn. App. LEXIS 19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1934).

15. —Note Secured by Deed of Trust.

The date of maturity of a demand note securing a deed of trust was the date of its execution; a suit to enforce the lien securing the indebtedness evidenced by the note was required to be brought within 10 years from the maturity of the debt. Slaughter v. Slaughter, 922 S.W.2d 115, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 806 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995), appeal denied, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. May 13, 1996).

The principle that payment of payment of principle or interest may toll the statute of limitations relating to an indebtedness does not apply to the limitation placed on deeds of trust by this section. Slaughter v. Slaughter, 922 S.W.2d 115, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 806 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995), appeal denied, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 330 (Tenn. May 13, 1996).

16. Effect of Statute.

17. —Sale under Barred Deed of Trust.

A sale made by the trustee under and pursuant to a deed of trust, after its lien is barred by the statute of 10 years, is absolutely void, and imparts no title to the purchaser. Union & Planters' Bank v. Smith, 107 Tenn. 476, 64 S.W. 756, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 95 (1901).

A sale of land, made by the trustee, where both the secured debt and the deed of trust are barred, will be vacated and set aside at the suit of the maker of the deed, his heirs or devisees. Randolph v. Thomas, 107 Tenn. 132, 64 S.W. 5, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1901).

18. —Parties' Nonresidence.

The nonresidence of parties to the instrument does not operate to stop the running of the statute. Christian v. John, 111 Tenn. 92, 76 S.W. 906, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 6 (1903).

19. —Running of Statute as to Debt.

A foreclosure sale under a mortgage or deed of trust is not barred by the fact that the indebtedness secured thereby is barred, so that no personal judgment can be recovered for the indebtedness. Irvine v. Shrum, 97 Tenn. 259, 36 S.W. 1089, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (1896).

It is of course well settled that where the security for a debt is a lien on property, real or personal, the lien is not impaired in consequence of the running of the statute of limitations upon the debt. Montgomery v. Wolfe, 176 Tenn. 462, 143 S.W.2d 717, 1940 Tenn. LEXIS 87 (1940).

The right to foreclose a mortgage lien for the debt secured thereby and the right to enforce the personal liability for such debt are wholly independent rights and the limitation on the right to enforce one is not governed by the maturity of the other. Lawman v. Barnett, 180 Tenn. 546, 177 S.W.2d 121, 1944 Tenn. LEXIS 321, 153 A.L.R. 772 (1944).

20. —Notes in Custody of Law.

Limitation does not run against a note executed to a court official for property sold in progress of a suit while same is in the law's custody. Gold v. Bush, 63 Tenn. 579, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 308 (1874); Tyner v. Fenner, 72 Tenn. 469, 1880 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (1880).

21. —Mortgage Securing Several Debts.

Where a purchase money mortgage secured three serial notes, the right to foreclose did not mature fully until the date of the maturity of the third note, and the statute of limitations did not begin to run on the mortgage lien until that time. Lawman v. Barnett, 180 Tenn. 546, 177 S.W.2d 121, 1944 Tenn. LEXIS 321, 153 A.L.R. 772 (1944).

Where no optional right of acceleration has been exercised by the creditor the limitation under this section on the right to enforce the lien does not run until maturity of all the debt secured thereby. Lawman v. Barnett, 180 Tenn. 546, 177 S.W.2d 121, 1944 Tenn. LEXIS 321, 153 A.L.R. 772 (1944).

22. Waiver of Default.

In an action to enforce liens for the unpaid balances in serial obligations for tax assessments levied on abutting property for street improvement, after the first five instalments were delinquent, the property owner paid the five then due, so that acceptance of the payments waived the default and the statute of limitations did not run in favor of the debtor from the time of the original default. Morristown v. Davis, 172 Tenn. 159, 110 S.W.2d 337, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 65, 113 A.L.R. 1164 (1937).

23. New Promise — Effect.

Bank was not barred by statute of limitations from enforcing deed of trust because deed secured future advances up to 20 years after 1997 note, or after modified plan set new interest rate and established new maturity date. Payne v. First Cmty. Bank (In re Payne), 523 B.R. 560, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 5125 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Dec. 23, 2014).

24. —Renewal of Debt.

A vendor's express lien on land for the purchase money is barred at the expiration of 10 years from the maturity of the original debt secured, although the debt may have been kept alive, and the date of its payment postponed by renewal of the notes within 10 years next before the institution of the suit. McElwee v. McElwee, 97 Tenn. 649, 37 S.W. 560, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 192 (1896); Runnells v. Jacobs, 100 Tenn. 397, 45 S.W. 980, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 128 (1898); Johnston v. Grosvenor, 105 Tenn. 353, 59 S.W. 1028, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1900); Randolph v. Thomas, 107 Tenn. 132, 64 S.W. 5, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1901); Union & Planters' Bank v. Smith, 107 Tenn. 476, 64 S.W. 756, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 95 (1901); Christian v. John, 111 Tenn. 92, 76 S.W. 906, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 6 (1903); Alexander v. Muse, 112 Tenn. 233, 79 S.W. 117, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (1903).

Even though the debt in personam be kept alive by renewals, this section bars the remedy and extinguishes the right of the lien. Runnells v. Jacobs, 100 Tenn. 397, 45 S.W. 980, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 128 (1898); Alexander v. Muse, 112 Tenn. 233, 79 S.W. 117, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (1903); Johnson v. Robinson, 7 Tenn. App. 457, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 65 (1928).

Renewal note for purchase money of a house was held not to have the effect of a new mortgage or trust deed, nor to toll the running of the 10 year statute of limitations, on the ground that an extension could not be made for a longer time than the 10 year period provided by this section and to preserve the lien a new recorded instrument must be executed. Osborne v. McCormack, 180 Tenn. 526, 176 S.W.2d 824, 1944 Tenn. LEXIS 318 (1944).

25. —Renewal of Lien.

The acceptance of a deed reciting that the grantee assumes and agrees to pay a certain mortgage debt on the land conveyed, though already barred by this 10 year statute of limitations, and the grantee's insistence upon the enforcement of the beneficial provisions in such deed, are equivalent to renewal of the mortgage, which may be enforced any time within 10 years from the acceptance of such deed, though such grantee knew nothing of such recital at the time. Christian v. John, 111 Tenn. 92, 76 S.W. 906, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 6 (1903); Alexander v. Muse, 112 Tenn. 233, 79 S.W. 117, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 100 (1903).

The statute does not prevent a renewal of a lien by an agreement of the parties registered prior to the expiration of the 10 year period. Shanks v. Phillips, 165 Tenn. 401, 55 S.W.2d 258, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1932).

The bar of the statute prevents an effectual extension or renewal of the lien by unregistered instruments. Shanks v. Phillips, 165 Tenn. 401, 55 S.W.2d 258, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1932).

Where holder of a mortgage discharges it of record within the 10 year period and contemporaneously takes and registers a renewal mortgage securing his unpaid debt, the renewal mortgage has priority over a vendor's lien which was subordinate to the original mortgage. Shanks v. Phillips, 165 Tenn. 401, 55 S.W.2d 258, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 66 (1932).

Where the agreement to extend the time of payment bound the mortgagor maker to pay increased legal rate of interest on the debt secured for the new term, and contained the mortgagor's covenant that the mortgage should continue as security for the debt and remain in full force, this was a new and additional binding of the land and the lien, thus created and renewed, continued in force for 10 years from the new maturity date expressed therein. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wall, 167 Tenn. 207, 68 S.W.2d 108, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1934).

Renewal note for purchase money of house and lot reciting that a lien was retained on the property to secure payment of such note but which was not registered during the 10 year period from the date of the original indebtedness did not have the effect of a new mortgage or trust deed or toll the running of the statute of limitations on the vendor's lien as against a general creditor of the vendee's insolvent estate. Osborne v. McCormack, 180 Tenn. 526, 176 S.W.2d 824, 1944 Tenn. LEXIS 318 (1944).

26. —Provision in Note — Effect.

A provision in a note that it shall stand as secured by the same mortgage that the maker had given to the payee to secure another note does not constitute such new promise as will revive or keep alive the mortgage or the debt therein secured. Randolph v. Thomas, 107 Tenn. 132, 64 S.W. 5, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1901).

27. —Subsequent Encumbrances.

A mortgage or deed of trust cannot be saved from the bar of the statute of ten years, and its lien preserved as against subsequent intermediate encumbrances, by any sort of new promise or renewal contract between the maker and beneficiary, though entered into before the bar of the statute had attached. After the lapse of 10 years from the date of the maturity of the secured debt, the bar of the statute, if not prevented by appropriate proceedings for foreclosure, becomes complete and absolute. Union & Planters' Bank v. Smith, 107 Tenn. 476, 64 S.W. 756, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 95 (1901); Christian v. John, 111 Tenn. 92, 76 S.W. 906, 1903 Tenn. LEXIS 6 (1903); Johnson v. Robinson, 7 Tenn. App. 457, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 65 (1928).

28-2-112. Challenge of title of parcel conveyed pursuant to tax proceeding.

  1. A person, and those claiming through such person, who receives title to a parcel conveyed pursuant to a tax proceeding is vested with an absolute and indefeasible title in fee in the parcel, unless a judicial action challenging the title of the parcel is filed in an appropriate court within three (3) years of the recording of the tax deed or order confirming the sale of the parcel in the office of the register of deeds for the county in which the parcel lies.
  2. A person, and those claiming through such person, whether under disability or not, who fails or neglects to file a judicial action challenging the title of a parcel conveyed pursuant to a tax proceeding within three (3) years of the recording of the tax deed or order confirming the sale of the parcel in the office of the register of deeds for the county in which the parcel lies, is barred from challenging the title of the parcel.
  3. The right to possession of a parcel pursuant to § 67-5-2503(a) constitutes adverse possession as to all other claimants of an interest in the parcel without any other action on the part of the person with the right to possession or the person's successors.
  4. This section is applicable regardless of whether the instrument of conveyance in a tax proceeding is subsequently invalidated or declared void.
  5. The three-year periods established in subsections (a) and (b) begin on July 1, 2017, as to parcels conveyed by tax deed or order confirming the sale prior to July 1, 2017.
  6. Nothing in this section shall be construed to repeal or limit the application of § 67-5-2504.
  7. As used in this section:
    1. “Judicial action challenging the title of the parcel” includes actions to invalidate the title and actions to declare the instrument conveying the title void for any reason. “Judicial action challenging the title of the parcel” also includes motions, suits to quiet title or for declaratory judgment, and any other means or court proceeding by which the title to the parcel may be attacked; and
    2. “Proceeding” has the same meaning as defined in § 67-5-2502(c)(1).

Acts 2017, ch. 299, § 1.

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 299, § 20. July 1, 2017.

Chapter 3
Limitation of Actions Other than Real

Part 1
Miscellaneous Limitations

28-3-101. Scope of chapter.

All civil actions, other than those for causes embraced in chapter 2 of this title, shall be commenced after the cause of action has accrued, within the periods prescribed in this chapter, unless otherwise expressly provided.

Code 1858, § 2769; Shan., § 4466; Code 1932, § 8592; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-301.

Compiler's Note. For the Preamble to the act concerning domestic relations orders, see Acts 2020, ch. 596.

Cross-References. Limitation of product liability actions, § 29-28-103.

Not-for-profit board members, immunity from suit, § 48-58-601.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 669.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 12 Tenn. Juris., Executors and Administrators, § 98; 18 Tenn. Juris., Limitations of Actions, §§ 9, 11, 17.

Law Reviews.

An Exegesis of the Ejectment Statutes of Tennessee (R.D. Cox), 18 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 581 (1988).

Constitutional Law — Limitation of Actions — Application of the Products Liability Statute of Repose, 52 Tenn. L. Rev. 97 (1984).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

The suing out of a summons is the commencement of an action. Whitson v. Tennessee C. R. Co., 163 Tenn. 35, 40 S.W.2d 396, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 136 (1931).

Statutes of limitation are looked upon with favor as statutes of repose. Knoxville v. Gervin, 169 Tenn. 532, 89 S.W.2d 348, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 80, 103 A.L.R. 877 (1936).

Court discerns no language in T.C.A. § 28-3-109(a)(3) prohibiting courts from examining the validity of a contract or other document proffered as evidence but not specifically challenged in an action as defined by T.C.A. § 28-3-101. Haiser v. McClung, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 509 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2018).

2. Scope.

This statute applies to actions commenced under §§ 30-510 (now § 30-2-307), 30-512 (now § 30-2-309), 30-514 — 30-516 (now §§ 30-2-31130-2-313). Harrison v. Henderson, 54 Tenn. 315, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 53 (1872).

Sections 28-3-101, 28-3-109, 28-3-110 provide for statute of limitations against all causes of actions, contracts, and cases not otherwise expressly provided for. Keeble v. Tompkins, 61 Tenn. 473, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 211 (1873); Barnes v. Barnes, 157 Tenn. 332, 8 S.W.2d 481, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1928).

The bar of these statutes extends to equitable as well as legal actions. Alvis v. Oglesby's Ex'rs, 87 Tenn. 172, 10 S.W. 313, 1888 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1889).

Sections 28-3-101, 28-3-109, 28-3-110 indicate a legislative purpose to prescribe a bar for all suits, whether specifically mentioned or not. Alvis v. Oglesby's Ex'rs, 87 Tenn. 172, 10 S.W. 313, 1888 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1889); Hughes v. Brown, 88 Tenn. 578, 13 S.W. 286, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 79, 8 L.R.A. 480 (1889); Ballard v. Scruggs, 90 Tenn. 585, 18 S.W. 259, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 47, 25 Am. St. Rep. 703 (1891); Scott v. Wagstaff, 120 Tenn. 252, 107 S.W. 976, 1907 Tenn. LEXIS 46 (1908); Blackwell v. Memphis S. R. Co., 124 Tenn. 516, 137 S.W. 486, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 60 (1911); Morris Plan Bank v. Scott, 176 Tenn. 496, 144 S.W.2d 741, 1940 Tenn. LEXIS 93 (1940).

Company's reliance on the amended restrictive covenants in its answer did not constitute an action; the statute of limitations in T.C.A. § 28-3-109(a)(3) does not operate to bar the litigation of an issue introduced as a defense rather than a claim, and having determined that the statute of limitations applies only to actions, and no action challenging the amended restrictive covenants had been filed in this case, the statute was inapplicable. Haiser v. McClung, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 509 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2018).

3. Application.

It is the cause of action, and not the form, that determines what statute of limitations is applicable. Callaway v. McMillian, 58 Tenn. 557, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 299 (1872), superseded by statute as stated in, Pioneer Bank v. Kelley, — S.W.2d —, 1994 Tenn. App. LEXIS 599 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 1994); Alvis v. Oglesby's Ex'rs, 87 Tenn. 172, 10 S.W. 313, 1888 Tenn. LEXIS 49 (1889).

4. Pleading Statute of Limitation.

The only way in which the statute of limitation is available as a defense is when it is, at the proper time, specially pleaded. Carolina, C. & O. R. Co. v. Mumpower, 205 F. 872, 1913 U.S. App. LEXIS 1505 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1913).

Where defendant had knowledge of all facts, it is improper to allow him to amend his answer, after all proof is taken, so as to plead limitation. Towater v. Darby, 15 Tenn. App. 53, — S.W.2d —, 1932 Tenn. App. LEXIS 73 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1932).

5. Accrual of Cause of Action.

Where parties intended that deed should be to husband, but, by mistake of draftsman, the name of wife was inserted as joint vendee, husband's right of action to correct the deed is barred by 10 year statute of limitations, and the accrual of the cause of action cannot be postponed to the discovery of the mistake, there being no statute expressly providing for any such postponement. Barnes v. Barnes, 157 Tenn. 332, 8 S.W.2d 481, 1928 Tenn. LEXIS 194 (1928).

6. Exceptions.

The general rule is that courts cannot add exceptions to those made by the legislature. Phillips v. Memphis Furniture Mfg. Co., 168 Tenn. 481, 79 S.W.2d 576, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1935).

7. —Fraud.

Mere concealment by a purchaser of the value of land which the vendor has an opportunity to ascertain is not a fraudulent concealment preventing running of limitations, where no trust relationship exists between the parties. Woodfolk v. Marley, 39 S.W. 747, 1896 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 89 (1896), aff'd, 98 Tenn. 467, 40 S.W. 479, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 241 (1896).

Where there was no sufficient fraud established to stop the running of the statute of limitations, claim on implied contract to pay a reasonable value of commissary stock transferred at the time of signing a lease, was barred by the statute of limitations. Kimberly Coal Co. v. Douglas, 45 F.2d 25, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 3555 (6th Cir. Ky. 1930).

To prove fraudulent concealment for the purposes of tolling a statute of limitations, a party must show: (1) wrongful concealment of their actions by defendants; (2) failure of the plaintiff to discover the operative facts that are the basis of his cause of action within the limitations period; and (3) plaintiff's due diligence until discovery of the facts. Electric Power Bd. v. Monsanto Co., 879 F.2d 1368, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 10141 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1989), rehearing denied, — F.2d —, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 12611 (6th Cir. Aug. 17, 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S. Ct. 724, 107 L. Ed. 2d 743, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 72 (1990).

8. —Moratorium.

A moratorium, declared by a private corporation, even though it be a mutual benefit association, cannot be made effective to save bar of limitation. Stephens v. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., 18 Tenn. App. 476, 79 S.W.2d 591, 1934 Tenn. App. LEXIS 49 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1934).

9. —Pendency of Litigation.

Limitations are generally tolled by the pendency of litigation over the subject matter. Butterbaugh v. Loew's, Inc., 168 Tenn. 284, 77 S.W.2d 644, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 54, 96 A.L.R. 973 (1935).

28-3-102. Actions against personal representative.

  1. All actions against the personal representative of a decedent, for demands against such decedent, shall be brought within seven (7) years after the decedent's death, notwithstanding any disability existing; otherwise they will be forever barred.
  2. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to extend the time limited by §§ 30-2-310, 30-2-314 and 30-2-315.

Code 1858, § 2786 (deriv. Acts 1715, ch. 48, § 9); Shan., § 4483; Code 1932, § 8610; mod. C. Supp. 1950, § 8610; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-302; Acts 1990, ch. 970, § 1.

Cross-References. Time between death of person and grant of letters not exceeding six months not counted, § 28-1-110.

Textbooks. Gibson's Suits in Chancery (7th ed., Inman), § 437.

Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 763.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 1 Tenn. Juris., Adverse Possession, § 14; 5 Tenn. Juris., Children Born out of Wedlock, § 10; 12 Tenn. Juris., Executors and Administrators, §§ 97-99; 18 Tenn. Juris., Limitations of Actions, § 33; 25 Tenn. Juris., Wills, § 177.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

The provision in Acts 1715, ch. 48, § 9 providing that creditors of deceased must file their claims within seven years or be forever barred was not repealed by Acts 1789, ch. 23 as far as heirs of deceased are concerned. Smith v. Hickman's Heirs, 3 Tenn. 330, 1 Cooke 330, 1813 Tenn. LEXIS 25 (1813).

If administrative representative advertises for claims as provided for by provisions of Acts 1789, ch. 23, and none of the exceptions apply a claim will be barred in two years, but if there is no advertisement a claim will be barred in seven years as provided by Acts 1715, ch. 48, § 9. Lewis v. Hickman, 158 Tenn. (Appx.) 108, 2 Cooke (1814).

Acts 1715, ch. 48 and 1789, ch. 23 must be interpreted together, since latter act did not repeal former act in its entirety. Lewis v. Hickman, 158 Tenn. (Appx.) 108, 2 Cooke (1814).

Portion of Acts 1715, ch. 48, § 9 relating to disposition of surplus in estates after seven years is repealed by Acts 1784, ch. 23 and 1789, ch. 23. Lewis v. Hickman, 158 Tenn. (Appx.) 108, 2 Cooke (1814).

Right of representative to issue deed for land pursuant to agreement of deceased as authorized by Acts 1794, ch. 5 is restricted to seven year period, since representative cannot act on claims after seven-year period by virtue of Acts 1715, ch. 48, § 9. Lewis v. Hickman, 158 Tenn. (Appx.) 108, 2 Cooke (1814).

2. Basis of Statute.

This statute is founded upon considerations of public policy, which are strongly sustained in its discouragement of litigation under circumstances which, in many cases, preclude the attainment of truth and justice; in its suppression of frauds and perjuries in attempts to set up demands against the estates of deceased persons, when the means of exposing their falsity have perished; in the necessity that those who succeed to the rights and property of such deceased persons should be quieted in the enjoyment of their rights. State v. Crutcher's Adm'r, 32 Tenn. 504, 1852 Tenn. LEXIS 106 (1852).

3. Nature of Statute.

This statute is something more than a statute of limitations; it constitutes a rule of property. Cooper v. Lyons, 77 Tenn. 596, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 108 (1882).

This statute establishes a positive limitation in contradistinction to a negative prescription. Delaney v. Delaney, 190 Tenn. 632, 231 S.W.2d 328, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 530 (1950).

4. Protection of Statute.

This statute establishes a positive prescription or limitation, in contradistinction to a negative prescription. The distinction is that the statute of positive prescription acts upon and extinguishes the right, while that of a negative prescription affects only the remedy. A negative prescription may be answered by a new promise, or by something that will take the case out of the apparent bar of the statute. Marshall v. Hudson, 17 Tenn. 57, 1836 Tenn. LEXIS 16 (1836); State v. Crutcher's Adm'r, 32 Tenn. 504, 1852 Tenn. LEXIS 106 (1852); Rogers v. Etter, 67 Tenn. 13, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 317 (1874); Cooper v. Lyons, 77 Tenn. 596, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 108 (1882); Caldwell & Hays v. McFarland, 79 Tenn. 463, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1883); Sigler v. Vaughan, 84 Tenn. 346, 1886 Tenn. LEXIS 107 (1886); Henderson v. Tipton, 88 Tenn. 255, 14 S.W. 380, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Sep. 1889); Fitzsimmons v. Johnson, 90 Tenn. 416, 17 S.W. 100, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1891); Smith v. Goodlett, 92 Tenn. 230, 21 S.W. 106, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (1893); Jones v. Whitworth, 94 Tenn. 602, 30 S.W. 736, 1894 Tenn. LEXIS 73 (1895); Carrigan v. Rowell, 96 Tenn. 185, 34 S.W. 4, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1896); Bass v. Harkreader, 162 Tenn. 518, 39 S.W.2d 275, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 117 (1931); Sparks v. First Nat'l Bank, 164 Tenn. 64, 46 S.W.2d 43, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (1932).

This section protects the heirs at law and distributees, as well as the administrator, against the claims of all creditors after the lapse of seven years. Cox v. Kent, 68 Tenn. 492, 1876 Tenn. LEXIS 35 (1876).

This statute protects the estate whether it be in the hands of the personal representative, the heir, or distributee. Cooper v. Lyons, 77 Tenn. 596, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 108 (1882).

The protective period of six months allowed to personal representatives by § 28-1-111 is not applicable. Fitzsimmons v. Johnson, 90 Tenn. 416, 17 S.W. 100, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1891).

Where suit was brought to recover stock certificate 12 months after the death of the alleged donor, against those holding the certificate as trustees for the donor's estate, the action was barred either by 18 months statutory limitation on cause of action accruing during the decedent's lifetime, or by seven years limitation on actions against the personal representatives for demand against the decedent. Rose v. Parker, 36 Tenn. App. 46, 251 S.W.2d 320, 1952 Tenn. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1952).

5. Application.

6. —Persons Under Disability.

The ward in a guardian bond may be barred under it, though his disability continued. Foster v. Maxey's Ex'rs, 14 Tenn. 223, 14 Tenn. 224, 1834 Tenn. LEXIS 65 (1834).

There is no saving of the bar as to persons under disability in the seven year statute. It is an absolute and unconditional protection against the suits of all persons. The personal representative is protected against all suits after seven years from the time the right to sue accrues, notwithstanding the disabilities of the creditors; and the heir is protected against suits to subject the descended lands within such period; but after judgment against the personal representative, the judgment creditor may, within seven years, institute proceedings against the heir to subject the descended land to its satisfaction. Hobbs v. Ballard, 37 Tenn. 395, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1858); Rogers v. Etter, 67 Tenn. 13, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 317 (1874); Henry v. Mills, 69 Tenn. 144, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 65 (1878); Trafford v. Wilkinson, 3 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 701 (1878); Hull v. Jones, 78 Tenn. 100, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 149 (1882); Fitzsimmons v. Johnson, 90 Tenn. 416, 17 S.W. 100, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 28 (1891).

Persons under disability have not the grace provided by § 28-1-106, and must sue within seven years after the maturity or suability of their claims. Jones v. Reynolds, 64 Tenn. 644, 1875 Tenn. LEXIS 147 (1875).

This statute bars rights of one non compos mentis. Bass v. Harkreader, 162 Tenn. 518, 39 S.W.2d 275, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 117 (1931).

7. —Trust Estates.

Where owner of trust property bequeathed by trustee to another fails to assert his right within seven years, he will be barred notwithstanding his disability. Williams v. Conrad, 30 Tenn. 412, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 140 (1850); Henderson v. Tipton, 88 Tenn. 255, 14 S.W. 380, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Sep. 1889).

Owner of trust property bequeathed by trustee to another will not be barred pending an intermediate life estate if he is a remainderman. Williams v. Conrad, 30 Tenn. 412, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 140 (1850); Henderson v. Tipton, 88 Tenn. 255, 14 S.W. 380, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Sep. 1889).

The person seeking to set up a resulting trust in land to which the decedent held the legal title at the time of his death must bring suit against the heirs of such decedent within seven years after his death though there has been no adverse possession of the land by the heirs. Earles v. Earles, 40 Tenn. 366, 1859 Tenn. LEXIS 101 (1859); Lane v. Farmer, 79 Tenn. 568, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 109 (1883); Henderson v. Tipton, 88 Tenn. 255, 14 S.W. 380, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Sep. 1889); Henderson v. Tipton, 88 Tenn. 255, 14 S.W. 380, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Sep. 1889); Smith v. Goodlett, 92 Tenn. 230, 21 S.W. 106, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (1893); Lucas v. Malone, 106 Tenn. 380, 61 S.W. 82, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 171 (1901).

This section is applicable to trust estates. Killebrew v. Ray, 181 Tenn. 333, 181 S.W.2d 334, 1944 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (1944).

Where suit was brought to recover stock certificate 12 months after the death of the alleged donor, against those holding the certificate as trustees for the donor's estate, the action was barred either by 18 months statutory limitation on actions for cause of action accruing during the decedent's lifetime, or by seven years limitation on actions against the personal representatives for demand against the decedent. Rose v. Parker, 36 Tenn. App. 46, 251 S.W.2d 320, 1952 Tenn. App. LEXIS 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1952).

8. —Mortgages.

This seven year statute does not run against a mortgage or deed of trust so as to protect the deceased maker's heir from foreclosure of the same. Smith v. Goodlett, 92 Tenn. 230, 21 S.W. 106, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (1893); Irvine v. Shrum, 97 Tenn. 259, 36 S.W. 1089, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 137 (1896).

This section has no application to a mortgage foreclosure suit where the decedent is alleged not to have left personalty in this state, and no judgment is sought against his heirs or personal representative. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wall, 167 Tenn. 207, 68 S.W.2d 108, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 27 (1934).

9. —Ejectment.

This statute is inapplicable, and does not bar ejectment against the heirs of the decedent, where it does not appear that the defendants had held the actual possession of the land for more than seven years before the institution of the suit. Peterson v. Turney, 2 Tenn. Ch. App. 519 (1897).

10. —Sureties.

Action is barred if not brought within seven years from date of surety's payment. Harris v. Thomas, 52 S.W. 706, 1899 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 29 (1899).

Surety who paid judgment was entitled to sue estate of deceased cosurety for contribution where judgment was paid and suit for contribution filed within 10 year period of judgment though filed more than seven years after death of cosurety, since obligation to contribute did not accrue until judgment was paid. Sims v. Martin, 184 Tenn. 35, 195 S.W.2d 24, 1946 Tenn. LEXIS 257 (1946).

11. —Paternity Suits.

Statute of limitation in this section for claims of creditors against a decedent's estate does not apply to suits brought to establish paternity for the purpose of determining intestate succession. Thompson v. Coates, 627 S.W.2d 376, 1981 Tenn. App. LEXIS 570 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); McCluskey v. Weaver, 667 S.W.2d 747, 1982 Tenn. App. LEXIS 458 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982).

12. Pleading of Statute.

The heirs or devisees may plead this seven year statute of limitation, when it is sought to subject the land descended or devised to them to the payment of the debts of the decedent. Pea v. Waggoner, 6 Tenn. 1, 1818 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (1818); Peck v. Heirs of Wheaton, 8 Tenn. 353, 1828 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (1828); Hooper v. Bryant, 11 Tenn. 1, 1832 Tenn. LEXIS 10 (1832); Stone v. Sanders, 38 Tenn. 248, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 165 (1858); Miller v. Taylor, 2 Shan. 461 (1877); Henry v. Mills, 69 Tenn. 144, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 65 (1878); Smith v. Goodlett, 92 Tenn. 230, 21 S.W. 106, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (1893).

The bar of the seven year limitation after the rendition of the judgment against the personal representative is effective in favor of the heir, notwithstanding the statute is not pleaded or relied on. Bomar v. Hagler, 75 Tenn. 85, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 80 (1881).

This statute need not be specially relied on or formally pleaded in bar, but may be relied on in the trial, if the facts appear in the general pleadings and the proof, for it extinguishes the right or vests the title. The statute is conclusive. Cooper v. Lyons, 77 Tenn. 596, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 108 (1882); Caldwell & Hays v. McFarland, 79 Tenn. 463, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1883); Henderson v. Tipton, 88 Tenn. 255, 14 S.W. 380, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Sep. 1889); Carrigan v. Rowell, 96 Tenn. 185, 34 S.W. 4, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1896); McSpadden v. Parkenson, 10 Tenn. App. 11, — S.W.2d —, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928).

13. Running of Statute.

14. —Filing of Claims.

The deposit of a matured note with the personal representatives and its recognition by them as a “filed claim” is not equivalent to a suit commenced so as to prevent the bar when suit was not begun within the period prescribed after appointment of the personal representatives. Woods v. Woods, 99 Tenn. 50, 41 S.W. 345, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1897).

15. —Claims Against Insolvent Estates.

There is no exception in the seven year statute in favor of claims filed under the insolvency acts. Stone v. Sanders, 38 Tenn. 248, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 165 (1858).

Laches in enforcement of a claim duly filed against insolvent's estate may bar, diligence being incumbent on the creditor. Grimmett v. Midgett, 57 S.W. 399, 1899 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 158 (1899).

16. —Admitted Claims.

Claims admitted by personal representative to be valid in his bill to sell lands to pay debts, taken for confessed, stand as judgments. Henderson v. McGhee, 53 Tenn. 55, 1871 Tenn. LEXIS 317 (1871); Vance v. Sanders, 67 Tenn. 294, 1874 Tenn. LEXIS 376 (1874); Allen v. Shanks, 90 Tenn. 359, 16 S.W. 715, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 25 (1891).

Where claims are merely filed, without petition or answer, but reported upon and allowed, the party filing may be deemed a party to the suit. Caruthers v. Caruthers, 70 Tenn. 264, 1879 Tenn. LEXIS 173 (1879); Allen v. Shanks, 90 Tenn. 359, 16 S.W. 715, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 25 (1891).

A suit for the sale of a decedent's lands to pay his debts is not barred, though instituted 13 years after his death, if brought within seven years after the final adjudication of the claim against the estate, in a proceeding commenced in time, and prosecuted with due diligence. Carrigan v. Rowell, 96 Tenn. 185, 34 S.W. 4, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1896).

17. —Prevention of Bar.

The personal representative has no power to make a deed in pursuance of the title bond of the decedent after the lapse of seven years from the maker's death. Lewis's Ex'rs v. Hickman's Heirs & Adm'rs, 2 Tenn. 316, 2 Tenn. 317, 1814 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1814).

A suit to compel the specific performance of the contract or title bond of a decedent to convey certain land is barred after the lapse of seven years from his death. Smith v. Hickman's Heirs, 3 Tenn. 330, 1 Cooke 330, 1813 Tenn. LEXIS 25 (1813); Coulson v. Walton, 34 U.S. 62, 9 L. Ed. 51, 1835 U.S. LEXIS 334 (1835); Wooldridge v. Page, 68 Tenn. 325, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1878); Woolridge v. Page, 69 Tenn. 135, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1878); Henry v. Mills, 69 Tenn. 144, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 65 (1878); Henderson v. Tipton, 88 Tenn. 255, 14 S.W. 380, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Sep. 1889); Smith v. Goodlett, 92 Tenn. 230, 21 S.W. 106, 1892 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (1893).

A personal representative cannot, by a request for a delay or by the recognition of a claim, stop the running of this seven year statute, nor can he extend or prevent the limitation in favor of the heir, allowed under this section after the recovery of a judgment against the personal representative. Peck v. Heirs of Wheaton, 8 Tenn. 353, 1828 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (1828); Maloney v. Wilson, 68 Tenn. 403, 1877 Tenn. LEXIS 33 (1877); Loyd v. Loyd, 68 Tenn. 406, 1877 Tenn. LEXIS 34 (1877); Cooper v. Lyons, 77 Tenn. 596, 1882 Tenn. LEXIS 108 (1882); Bates v. Elrod, 81 Tenn. 156, 1884 Tenn. LEXIS 18 (1884); Henderson v. Tipton, 88 Tenn. 255, 14 S.W. 380, 1889 Tenn. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Sep. 1889).

The heirs cannot rely upon this statute as a bar after seven years to a bill filed to set up a lost deed by the person in possession of the land conveyed therein, for the statutes of limitation and the lapse of time have no application to a bill in chancery, in which the complainant is not seeking to recover anything, but only resisting the demand of the defendants which he (the complainant) has been constantly opposing, by some equity inherent in the right or covenant on which the demand is vested. Anderson v. Akard, 83 Tenn. 182, 1885 Tenn. LEXIS 40 (1885).

Bill by partner against widow of deceased partner to set aside a deed from third parties to deceased partner, and to enjoin widow from alienating property, was barred by seven and 10 year limitation periods where suit was filed more than 14 years after death of partner. Killebrew v. Ray, 181 Tenn. 333, 181 S.W.2d 334, 1944 Tenn. LEXIS 377 (1944).

18. —Suspension of Statute.

The statute is not a bar to award of relief to a distributee unequalized in a former collation of advancements, when there is an unexpected realization on assets afterward. Daniels v. Pickett, 59 S.W. 148, 1900 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 66 (1900).

The rule that fraudulent concealment of right of action suspends running of statute has application to a concealment of the cause of action, rather than of property or assets of the debtor. Sparks v. First Nat'l Bank, 164 Tenn. 64, 46 S.W.2d 43, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (1932).

19. —Running from Accrual of Right.

The original statute, substantially reenacted in this section, was given what was called an “equitable construction,” by which the statute did not begin to run until the right to sue accrued, a construction based upon the ground that the legislature could never be held to intend that a person should be barred of his action before the right to sue had accrued. Caplinger v. Vaden, 24 Tenn. 629 (1843); Jones v. Whitworth, 94 Tenn. 602, 30 S.W. 736, 1894 Tenn. LEXIS 73 (1895); Woods v. Woods, 99 Tenn. 50, 41 S.W. 345, 1897 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1897).

The purchaser of property under a warranty of title, executed by the deceased, does not become a creditor of the deceased warrantor till the property warranted has been recovered by title paramount; and, in such case, the purchaser is not barred, though seven years may have elapsed since the death of the warrantor. The warrantee has no cause of action till the property is recovered, and he is entitled to the time given by the statute from the period when his cause of action accrued. Caplinger v. Vaden, 24 Tenn. 629 (1843).

The general rule is that the statute begins to run from the date of discovery of a mistake made by a draftsman of a deed in a suit to correct, or from the time when it might have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence. The record of such a deed does not import notice of the mistake. McSpadden v. Parkenson, 10 Tenn. App. 11, — S.W.2d —, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928).

Where plaintiffs, heirs of decedent, sued to reform a deed so as to give them title to the land, the action was one, in effect, to recover title to the land and the seven year statute of limitations applied. McSpadden v. Parkenson, 10 Tenn. App. 11, — S.W.2d —, 1928 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1928).

Where the maker of a note paid a part of the note before it was due and the maker and payee agreed that interest would be charged on the payment so made and credited against the balance of the note, the statutes of limitation did not run even though there had been no credits entered on the note according to the contract. Boyd v. Maroney, 20 Tenn. App. 117, 95 S.W.2d 1272, 1935 Tenn. App. LEXIS 10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935).

20. —Running from Date of Death.

The bequest of trust property, as his own, by the trustee is a conversion, and the possession of the executor or legatee under the bequest would not be subservient to, but in opposition to, the trust, and in hostility to the right of the owner of the trust property, and the statute would begin to run against the person having an immediate possessory right to the beneficial interest and enjoyment of the property. Williams v. Conrad, 30 Tenn. 412, 1850 Tenn. LEXIS 140 (1850).

The statute runs at the death of the debtor whether a personal representative be appointed or not. The remedy of the creditor is to procure appointment of such. Sparks v. First Nat'l Bank, 164 Tenn. 64, 46 S.W.2d 43, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (1932).

21. —Running from Date of Judgment.

Proper institution of suit against personal representative within the time prescribed saves the bar as to realty and personalty, if prosecuted to judgment, and proceedings to subject realty are begun within seven years from rendition of judgment. Wooldridge v. Page, 68 Tenn. 325, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1878); Woolridge v. Page, 69 Tenn. 135, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 64 (1878); Henry v. Mills, 69 Tenn. 144, 1878 Tenn. LEXIS 65 (1878); Raht v. Meek, 89 Tenn. 274, 14 S.W. 777, 1890 Tenn. LEXIS 47 (1890); Carrigan v. Rowell, 96 Tenn. 185, 34 S.W. 4, 1895 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1896); PREWETT v. GOODLETT, 98 Tenn. 82, 38 S.W. 434, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 206 (1896); Harris v. Thomas, 52 S.W. 706, 1899 Tenn. Ch. App. LEXIS 29 (1899).

22. —Absence of Debtor.

The fact that decedent became a nonresident after the cause of action accrued, and so continued, does not take the case out of this seven years' statute. Sparks v. First Nat'l Bank, 164 Tenn. 64, 46 S.W.2d 43, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 12 (1932).

23. Waiver of Statute.

A written agreement entered into by the devisees, obligating each to pay to the executors his proportional part of any amount found to be necessary to satisfy the indebtedness of the estate, means that the devisees will hold the land subject to their respective proportions of the debts found to be due, by due course of administration, and does not waive any benefit of the statute of limitations. Caldwell & Hays v. McFarland, 79 Tenn. 463, 1883 Tenn. LEXIS 84 (1883).

28-3-103. Slander actions.

Actions for slanderous words spoken shall be commenced within six (6) months after the words are uttered.

Code 1858, § 2771 (deriv. Acts 1715, ch. 27, § 5); Shan., § 4468; Code 1932, § 8594; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-303.

Textbooks. Tennessee Jurisprudence, 17 Tenn. Juris., Libel and Slander, § 33; 18 Tenn. Juris., Limitations of Actions, § 25.

Law Reviews.

Conditional Privilege in Tennessee (Donald F. Paine), 30 Tenn. L. Rev. 569.

Torts — Quality Auto Parts Co. v. Bluff City Buick Co.: Refusing to Apply the Discovery Rule to Slander Actions (Paige A. Seals), 24 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 611 (1994).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Refusal of Bank to Pay Check.

This statute has no application to an action for injury resulting to plaintiff's credit from the wrongful act of a banker in refusing to pay the check of a customer who had an ample deposit to meet it. J. M. James Co. v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 105 Tenn. 1, 58 S.W. 261, 1900 Tenn. LEXIS 49, 80 Am. St. Rep. 857, 51 L.R.A. 255 (1900).

2. Pleading of Limitation Period.

If a bank president's conduct in the violent way in which he refused the plaintiff a loan and ordered him to remove his account, in the presence and hearing of others, be slanderous, it is in the manner of speaking the words, and not in the act of refusing the loan and closing the account; and such conduct, if actionable, is so because the words spoken are slanderous; but when such action is brought more than six months thereafter, as shown by the declaration, a demurrer upon the ground that more than six months elapsed before the bringing of the suit defeats such action. Farabee-Treadwell Co. v. Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 135 Tenn. 208, 186 S.W. 92, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 22, L.R.A. (n.s.) 1916F501 (1916).

Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment dismissing appellant's defamation lawsuit against appellee because, although appellant's general sessions'  warrant averred a claim for libel, in her general sessions court testimony, appellant's only claim was for slander as she testified that the offending statements were statements that appellee's personnel said to the police officers, and she provided no evidence of any written statement by appellee that would form the basis for a libelous defamation action; and appellant's lawsuit was time-barred by the six-month statute of limitations applicable to slander claims as the offending statements were made on July 17, 2013, and her lawsuit was filed on July 15, 2014. Vaughn v. Methodist Hosp. Staff & Admin., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 596 (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2017).

When a passenger on a transit authority bus brought claims for slander and libel, after being arrested as a result of an altercation with the driver, denial of the passenger's claims was appropriate because the passenger's claims against municipal employees and officials were barred by the statutes of limitations for slander actions and libel actions. Poe v. Gist, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 850 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2017).

Given the six-month statute of limitations that applies to slander claims, all alleged communications sought to be injected into the suit by way of an amended complaint were time-barred when plaintiff filed his motion to amend. The trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion to amend was therefore affirmed. Maize v. Friendship Cmty. Church, Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 463 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2020).

3. Accrual of Cause of Action.

Rule of Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 438, 93 A.L.R.3d 207 (Tenn. 1974), and McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. 1975), that in certain cases the cause of action does not accrue until plaintiff is aware that he has suffered injury, is restricted to cases arising under sections that specify the accrual of the cause of action as the starting point for the running of the limitations period; thus, slander-action plaintiff's argument that the running of the limitations period under this section did not commence until he discovered that he had been defamed was mistaken, since this section clearly provides that the period runs “after the words are uttered.” Heller v. Smither, 437 F. Supp. 1, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17145 (M.D. Tenn. 1977), aff'd without opinion, Heller v. Chance, 578 F.2d 1380 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1978), aff'd without opinion, v. Chance, 578 F.2d 1380 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1978).

In a personal injury and products liability case in which the injured party and his spouse sued the makers of a tree/deer stand, and the makers moved for summary judgment, the complaint was untimely under the one-year limitation period in T.C.A. §§ 28-3-104 and 29-28-103. The accrual period was when the injury was discovered, not when the injured party and his spouse discovered who the makers were, and they failed in their duty through the exercise of reasonable care and due diligence to discover who the makers were. Willis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d 700, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110292 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 2011).

4. False Light Invasion of Privacy.

False light invasion of privacy claim, if the publicity was in spoken form, is governed by T.C.A. § 28-3-103; if the publicity was in written form, the claim is governed by T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(1). West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 620 (Tenn. 2001).

28-3-104. Personal tort actions; actions against certain professionals.

    1. Except as provided in subdivision (a)(2), the following actions shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued:
      1. Actions for libel, injuries to the person, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, or breach of marriage promise;
      2. Civil actions for compensatory or punitive damages, or both, brought under the federal civil rights statutes; and
      3. Actions for statutory penalties.
    2. A cause of action listed in subdivision (a)(1) shall be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrued, if:
      1. Criminal charges are brought against any person alleged to have caused or contributed to the injury;
      2. The conduct, transaction, or occurrence that gives rise to the cause of action for civil damages is the subject of a criminal prosecution commenced within one (1) year by:
        1. A law enforcement officer;
        2. A district attorney general; or
        3. A grand jury; and
      3. The cause of action is brought by the person injured by the criminal conduct against the party prosecuted for such conduct.
    3. This subsection (a) shall be strictly construed.
  1. For the purpose of this section, in products liability cases:
    1. The cause of action for injury to the person shall accrue on the date of the personal injury, not the date of the negligence or the sale of a product;
    2. No person shall be deprived of the right to maintain a cause of action until one (1) year from the date of the injury; and
    3. Under no circumstances shall the cause of action be barred before the person sustains an injury.
    1. Actions and suits against licensed public accountants, certified public accountants, or attorneys for malpractice shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued, whether the action or suit is grounded or based in contract or tort.
    2. In no event shall any action or suit against a licensed public accountant, certified public accountant or attorney be brought more than five (5) years after the date on which the act or omission occurred, except where there is fraudulent concealment on the part of the defendant, in which case the action or suit shall be commenced within one (1) year after discovery that the cause of action exists.
  2. Any action to recover damages against a real estate appraiser arising out of the appraiser's real estate appraisal activity shall be brought within one (1) year from a person’s discovery of the act or omission giving rise to the action, but in no event shall an action to recover damages against a real estate appraiser be brought more than five (5) years after the date the appraisal was conducted.

Code 1858, § 2772 (deriv. Acts 1715, ch. 27, § 5); Shan., § 4469; mod. Code 1932, § 8595; Acts 1967, ch. 283, § 1; 1969, ch. 28, § 1; 1969, ch. 293, §§ 1, 2; 1972, ch. 669, § 1; T.C.A. (orig. ed.), § 28-304; Acts 1990, ch. 970, § 2; 1990, ch. 1056, § 2; 2014, ch. 618, §§ 1, 2; 2015, ch. 388, § 1; 2017, ch. 234, § 1.

Compiler's Notes. Acts 2014, ch. 618, § 3 provided that this act shall apply to causes of actions or suits for acts or omissions that occurred on or after July 1, 2014.

Acts 2015, ch. 388, § 2 provided that the act, which amended (a), shall apply to causes of action accruing on or after July 1, 2015.

Acts 2017, ch. 234, § 3 provided that the act, which added subsection (d), shall apply to actions accruing and appraisals conducted on or after July 1, 2017.

Amendments. The 2017 amendment added (d).

Effective Dates. Acts 2017, ch. 234, § 3. July 1, 2017.

Cross-References. Abolition of common law tort action of alienation of affections, § 36-3-701.

Abolition of common law torts of seduction and criminal conversation, § 39-13-508.

Limitation of actions, counterclaim or third party complaint, § 28-1-114.

Limitation of actions, Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, § 29-11-104.

Not-for-profit board members, immunity from suit, § 48-58-601.

Textbooks. Pritchard on Wills and Administration of Estates (4th ed., Phillips and Robinson), § 637.

Tennessee Jurisprudence, 3 Tenn. Juris., Attorney and Client, § 12; 4 Tenn. Juris., Automobiles, § 36; 6 Tenn. Juris., Constitutional Law, § 71; 10 Tenn. Juris., Employer and Employee, § 65; 17 Tenn. Juris., Libel and Slander, § 33; 18 Tenn. Juris., Limitations of Actions, §§ 5, 14, 17, 25, 34; 18 Tenn. Juris., Malicious Prosecution, § 7; 22 Tenn. Juris., Seduction, § 3.

Law Reviews.

A Pragmatic Approach to Improving Tort Law, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1447 (2001).

Accidental Torts, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1225 (2001).

Accrual of Cause of Action in Products Liability and Other Tort Actions, 42 Tenn. L. Rev. 593.

Age Discrimination: A Growth Industry (Charles H. Anderson), 25 No. 6 Tenn. B.J. 24 (1989).

As a Matter of Law: Summary Judgment in Medical Malpractice Litigation in Tennessee, 15 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 55 (1984).

Attorney and Client — Negligence — Limitation of Action, 34 Tenn. L. Rev. 507.

Attorney Malpractice — The Accrual of a Cause of Action, 42 Tenn. L. Rev. 784.

Civil Procedure and Evidence — Tennessee Survey 1970 (Jerry J. Phillips), 38 Tenn. L. Rev. 127.

Civil Procedure — Carr v. Borchers: Tennessee's Nonresident Motorist Statute Revisited, 22 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 357 (1992).

Civil Rights — Statutes of Limitations for Section 1983 Actions — A Definitive Answer in Wilson v. Garcia?, 17 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 127 (1986).

Conditional Privilege in Tennessee (Donald F. Paine), 30 Tenn. L. Rev. 569.

Conflict of Laws — Limitation of Actions — Lex Loci or Lex Fori, 23 Tenn. L. Rev. 1038.

Conflict of Laws — 1957 Tennessee Survey (John W. Wade), 10 Vand. L. Rev. 995.

Constitutional Challenge to Medical Malpractice Review Boards, 46 Tenn. L. Rev. 607.

Constitutional Law — Limitation of Actions — Application of the Vested Rights Doctrine (David A. King), 51 Tenn. L. Rev. 129 (1983).

Constitutional Law — Retroactive Application of a Statute Removing a Statute of Limitations Bar, 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 914.

Contract — Tort — Breach of Duty Resulting in Property Damage — Limitation of Action, 34 Tenn. L. Rev. 297.

Contracts and Sales Law in Tennessee: A Survey and Commentary: III Sales (John A. Sebert, Jr.), 45 Tenn. L. Rev. 391.

Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Negligence Standard, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 893 (2001).

Counterclaims and Statutes of Limitations — A Critical Commentary on Present Tennessee Law (John L. Sobieski, Jr.), 42 Tenn. L. Rev. 291.

Domestic Relations — Alienation of Affections — Statute of Limitations, 23 Tenn. L. Rev. 1046.

Domestic Relations — 1955 Tennessee Survey (William J. Harbison), 8 Vand. L. Rev. 1004.

Duty Rules, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 767 (2001).

Economic Loss in Strict Liability — Beyond the Realm of 402 A (Joe E. Manuel and Gregory B. Richards), 16 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 315 (1986).

Employment Law — Carr v. United Parcel Service: Individual Liability Under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, 29 U. Mem. L. Rev. 245 (1998).

Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far? The Status of the Discovery Rule in Medical Malpractice Cases in Tennessee, 30 U. Mem. L. Rev. 625 (2000).

Intent and Recklessness in Tort: The Practical Craft of Restating Law, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1133 (2001).

Interpretive Construction, Systematic Consistency, and Criterial Norms in Tort Law, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1157 (2001).

Legal Cause: Cause-In-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 941 (2001).

Legal Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty Little Secret (Manuel R. Ramos), 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1657 (1994).

Legal Profession — Attorney and Client, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 611.

Limitation of Actions — Accrual of Action in Malpractice Cases, 13 Tenn. L. Rev. 131.

Limitation of Actions — Statutory Construction — “Act or Omission Complained Of,” 6 Vand. L. Rev. 794.

Malpractice in Dealing with Medical Malpractice, 6 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 437.

Mass Tort Litigation in Tennessee (Paul Campbell, III and Hugh J. Moore, Jr.), 53 Tenn. L. Rev. 221 (1986).

Medical Malpractice (Ray L. Jenkins), 26 Tenn. L. Rev. 514.

Non-Utilitarian Negligence Norms and the Reasonable Person Standard, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 863 (2001).

On Determining Negligence Norms, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 813 (2001).

Once More Into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1071 (2001).

Pleadings, Motions and Pre-Trial Procedure, 4 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 219.

Please Pass the Biscuits and Gravamen (Donald F. Paine), 29 No. 6 Tenn. B.J. 20 (1993).

Procedure — Limitation of Actions — Tolling of Statute by Fraudulent Concealment, 25 Tenn. L. Rev. 284.

Procedure — 1963 Tennessee Survey (William J. Harbison), 17 Vand. L. Rev. 1108.

Products Liability of Retailers and Manufacturers in Tennessee (Dix W. Noel), 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 207.

Products Liability — Lessors as Warrantors of Fitness in Tennessee, 16 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 303 (1986).

Protecting Yourself from Statutes of Repose, 50 Tenn. B.J. 33 (2014).

Purpose, Belief, and Recklessness: Pruning the Restatement's (Third) Definition of Intent, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1165 (2001).

Recent Developments in Tennessee and Federal Procedure (Donald F. Paine), 36 Tenn. L. Rev. 276.

Recent Developments in the Law of Accrual and Limitations of Actions in Tennessee as Applied to Products Liability Cases (Michael E. Hewgley), 2 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 105.

Removing Emotional Harm from the Core of Tort Law, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 751 (2001).

Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles and the Prescription of Masculine Order, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1367 (2001).

Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: Descriptive Theory and the Rule of Law, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1039 (2001).

Savings Statutes v. Statutes of Repose: A Decision Is Reached with Cronin v. Howe (Philip E. Mischke), 32 No. 1 Tenn. B.J. 21 (1996).

Scientific Uncertainty and Causation in Tort Law, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1011 (2001).

Statute of Limitations — Personal Injury, Property Damage and Breach of Warranty, 8 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 803.

Statute of Limitations — Professional Negligence — Foreign Objects Left in Patient's Body, 17 Vand. L. Rev. 1577.

Statute of Limitations: Their Selection and Application in Products Liability Cases (Larry T. Thrailkill), 23 Vand. L. Rev. 775.

Stealing Love in Tennessee: The Thief Goes Free, 56 Tenn. L. Rev. 629 (1989).

Survey of Civil Procedure in Tennessee — 1977, IV. Pretrial Procedure (John L. Sobieski, Jr.), 46 Tenn. L. Rev. 308.

Tennessee Human Rights Act: Court of Appeals addresses limitations period of THRA (Timothy S. Bland and Licia M. Williams), 38 No. 2 Tenn. B.J. 20 (2002).

Tennessee Legislature Abolishes Privity Requirement and Clarifies Statute of Limitations in Product Liability Cases, 3 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 212.

Tennessee Survey of the Law — Indemnity in Tort, 7 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 307.

The Advent of Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Construction, 12 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 367 (1982).

The Duty Concept in Negligence Law, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 787 (2001).

The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: Encompassing Fairness as Well as Efficiency Values, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 901 (2001).

The John W. Wade Conference on the Third Restatement of Torts, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 639 (2001).

The Nonparty Tortfeasor (June F. Entman), 23 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 105 (1992).

The Passing of Palsgraf?, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 803 (2001).

The Restatement of Torts and the Courts, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1439 (2001).

The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 657 (2001).

The Tennessee Employer's Wrongful Discharge and the Union's Breach of the Duty of Fair Representation — Does Tennessee Need a Statute of Limitations? (Marsha H. Ashlock), 20 No. 2 Tenn. B.J. 15 (1984).

The Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978. (Irvin L. Tankersley), 14-4 Tenn. B.J. 11.

The Tennessee Saving Statute, 29 Tenn. L. Rev. 287.

The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1285 (2001).

The Theory of Tort Doctrine and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1413 (2001).

The Trouble with Negligence, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1187 (2001).

The Unexpected Persistence of Negligence, 1980 — 2000, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1337 (2001).

Torts — Attorney's Liability — No Liability to Disappointed Beneficiaries for Negligent Handling of Will, 4 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 188.

Torts — Libel — Single Publication Rule Adopted — Statute of Limitations Starts Running When Libel Is First Distributed in County in Which Suit Is Brought, 4 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 193.

Torts — Limitations of Actions — Application of the Four Year Statute in Breach of Warranty Actions, 38 Tenn. L. Rev. 293.

Torts — Medical Malpractice — Statute of Limitations and the Discovery Rule in Tennessee, 42 Tenn. L. Rev. 604.

Torts — 1956 Tennessee Survey (John W. Wade), 9 Vand. L. Rev. 1137.

Torts — Products Liability — Statute of Limitations, 36 Tenn. L. Rev. 416.

Torts — Statute of Limitations — Actions for Personal Injury Resulting from Faulty Construction of Building Does Not Accrue until Date of Injury, 2 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 231.

Torts — Statute of Limitations — Employee Injured Using Employer's Equipment, 38 Tenn. L. Rev. 608.

Torts — Statute of Limitations — Personal Injury — Defect in Real Estate Construction, 38 Tenn. L. Rev. 613.

Torts — Taylor v. Beard: The Tennessee Supreme Court Declines Adoption of a Cause of Action for Loss of Parental Consortium in Personal Injury Cases, 34 U. Mem. L. Rev. 737 (2004).

Torts — The Discovery Rule and the Statute of Limitations in Medical Malpractice Actions, 14 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 115 (1983).

Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Tennessee (Phillip A. Fleissner), 38 Tenn. L. Rev. 391.

Uninsured Motorist Insurance: Selected Tennessee Procedural Aspects, 10 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 746.

Wrongful Death Actions in Tennessee (T.A. Smedley), 27 Tenn. L. Rev. 447.

Wrongful Death in Tennessee — New Solutions to Recurring Problems, 9 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 85.

Attorney General Opinions. Applicability, OAG 84-121, 1982 Tenn. AG LEXIS 220 (4/10/84).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. General Principles.

The statute of limitations is looked upon with favor as a statute of repose, as it cannot be said that the result is harsh or inequitable, for there was a period of one year within which suit could have been started. West v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 108 F. Supp. 276, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2250 (D. Tenn. 1952).

In action by equal employment opportunity commission against employer where employer contended that action was barred by one year statute of limitations as provided by this section, court held that while general rule is that where no limitation is provided by federal law, the state law governs, an exception is made where the federal government or one of its agencies is plaintiff on the concept of sovereign immunity and federalism, particularly where practice complained of is contrary to public policy. EEOC v. Duff Bros., Inc., 364 F. Supp. 405, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11757 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).

This section being a procedural bar to legal remedies and not an extinguisher or qualifier of a statutory cause of action does not apply to a diversity action for wrongful death as the law of the forum state governs. Cummings v. Cowan, 390 F. Supp. 1251, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13512 (N.D. Miss. 1975).

An action for deprivation of constitutional rights in proceedings to attach plaintiff's automobiles was barred by this section where the alleged wrongful acts occurred more than one year prior to the filing of the suit. Boles v. Fox, 403 F. Supp. 253, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16044 (E.D. Tenn. 1975).

As a general rule this section is applicable to strict tort cases while § 47-2-725 is applicable to warranty actions. McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. 1975).

Section 29-28-103 is not a conventional statute of limitations. It imposes an outer limit or ceiling upon the existing statute of limitations relating to actions for personal injuries in this section. Buckner v. GAF Corp., 495 F. Supp. 351, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9742 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).

In determining whether the purpose of an action is to recover damages which are personal, to property, or on account of a breach of contract, the court must look to the complaint and ascertain the basis for which damages are sought. Harvest Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 610 S.W.2d 727, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 417 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980).

Section 29-28-103 was meant to supplement in part and supersede in part the statute of limitations for personal tort actions provided in this section. Milligan v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 622 F. Supp. 56, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16397 (W.D. Tenn. 1985).

There is no conflict between the provisions of § 50-6-112(d), regarding claims of workers covered by the workers' compensation provisions against third persons, and this section. Craig v. R.R. Street & Co., 794 S.W.2d 351, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

2. —Constitutionality.

The fact that the statute starts to run at the date of the wrongful act or sale of a defective product does not constitute a violation of the due process clause. Hargraves v. Brackett Stripping Machine Co., 317 F. Supp. 676, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10281 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).

Fact that suit by workers' compensation recipient against manufacturer and supplier of equipment for personal injuries sustained from explosion of equipment during course of employment was governed by limitation of § 50-914 (now § 50-6-112) of one year from date of injury rather than applicable general limitation of this section, prior to its amendment, of one year from date of wrongful act or omission did not constitute unlawful discrimination prohibited by Tenn. Const., art. XI, § 8 or equal protection clause of U.S. Const. amend. 14. Dobbins v. Terrazzo Machine & Supply Co., 479 S.W.2d 806, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 401 (Tenn. 1972).

Giving amended statute of limitations retroactive effect was unconstitutional where it revived a cause of action that had expired prior to the amendment. Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. 1974).

3. Application.

The one year time limitation of this section applies to an action based on racial discrimination in employment filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 95 S. Ct. 1716, 44 L. Ed. 2d 295, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 15 (1975), superseded by statute as stated in, Tahy v. United States, — F.3d —, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20250, 1999 Colo. J. C.A.R. 4937 (6th Cir. 1999).

This section does not affect the time period in which a civil action may be commenced after receipt of the right to sue letter pursuant to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 11487 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1975).

As a special statute of limitation, § 28-3-202 takes precedence over the general statute, this section, although reference must be made to both such statutes in determining whether a particular claim is barred. Harper v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 910, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20082 (E.D. Tenn. 1978), aff'd without opinion, Harper v. Grundy Motel Co., 633 F.2d 215, 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 14245 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1980).

Where automobile accident occurred in Tennessee and defendants were residents of Tennessee, action filed in Tennessee more than one year after accident was barred by this section although an action had been filed in state where plaintiffs resided within such one-year period and was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Elias v. A & C Distributing Co., 588 S.W.2d 768, 1979 Tenn. App. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1075, 100 S. Ct. 1022, 62 L. Ed. 2d 757, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 711 (1980).

A statute of limitations other than that contained in the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act (UCATA), has no effect on an action under the UCATA and the party seeking contribution will not be barred by it. Manning v. Ft. Deposit Bank, 619 F. Supp. 1327, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14962 (W.D. Tenn. 1985), appeal dismissed without opinion, vacated without op., Fort Deposit Bank v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar, & Allen, 798 F.2d 469, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 37384 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1986), rev'd and remanded, Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 7830 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1988).

This section does not apply to action by parents of an emotionally disturbed child under Federal Education of All Handicapped Children Law for repayment of education expenses, because there is no tortious injury. Janzen v. Knox County Bd. of Education, 790 F.2d 484, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 24930 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1986).

This section is applicable to discrimination claims under § 4-21-311. Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 16584 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1989).

Plaintiff's action alleging loss of a business relationship and financial backing which led to the closing of his business dealt with business and property losses, and were governed by the three-year statute of limitations of § 28-3-105, not this section. Collins v. Greene County Bank, 916 S.W.2d 941, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 704 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995), appeal denied, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 160 (Tenn. Feb. 26, 1996).

The one-year limitation of this section applied to an action alleging libel, invasion of privacy and a violation of the Personal Rights Protection Act. Gibbons v. Schwartz-Nobel, 928 S.W.2d 922, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 57 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

Tennessee's personal injury statute of limitations applies to plaintiff's federal civil rights claims. Craft v. Vanderbilt Univ., 18 F. Supp. 2d 786, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12952 (M.D. Tenn. 1998).

An employee's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was not subject to the one-year statute of limitations under T.C.A. § 28-3-104. Anthony v. BTR Auto. Sealing Sys., 339 F.3d 506, 2003 FED App. 278P, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 16264 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2003).

Where notice of a proposed zoning reclassification to allow a shooting range involved ten acres, but the adopted resolution stated ninety acres, the ordinance was void ab initio and the statute of limitations was no defense because: (1) The resolution qualified as a zoning amendment which required specific procedures; (2) The county legislative body had no jurisdiction to act on the proposed amendment since the alteration was so substantial that there should have been a resubmission of the proposed amendment to the planning commission; and (3) The record did not establish the requisite public or private reliance for an exception to the application of the void ab initio doctrine. Edwards v. Allen, 216 S.W.3d 278, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 144 (Tenn. 2007).

In an appeal arising from a family dispute over a life estate, respondents properly pled the statute of limitations an affirmative defense in their answer to the amended petition. The trial court committed no reversible error in soliciting argument and then ruling on an issue properly pled. Stokely v. Stokely, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 23 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 19, 2018).

Even though appellant's contract with appellee was the basis for its retainage claim, the contract was not the basis for its claim for $ 300-per-day damages under the statute, which described its relief as a penalty; the Prompt Payment Act was the basis for appellant's claim, and thus the one-year statute of limitations period applicable to statutory penalties governed this claim. Snake Steel, Inc. v. Holladay Constr. Grp., LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2020 Tenn. App. LEXIS 23 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2020).

4. —Miscellaneous Examples.

The statute of limitations barred action in the following case: Inmates, Washington County Jail v. England, 516 F. Supp. 132, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16683 (E.D. Tenn. 1980), aff'd without opinion, 659 F.2d 1081, 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 13381 (6th Cir. 1981).

Trial court erred in ruling that the statute of limitations had run in wrongful termination lawsuit filed on December 12, 1995 where defendant initially believed she was terminated November 23, 1994, but she was not actually terminated until December 13, 1994. Reed v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 677, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 207 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

On ex-husband's abuse of process claim against ex-wife arising out of contempt petition filed by ex-wife in state court, ex-husband's contention that initial issuance of process was parties'  divorce decree and contempt petition was subsequent improper use of process, claim was time-barred because abuse of process claim was filed more than one year after filing of contempt petition; although Tennessee's Code does not prescribe limitations period for abuse of process claims or prescribe a catch-all period for torts, the most nearly analogous statute is T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(1), which provides a one-year limitations period for personal torts, and the Sixth Circuit determined that a Tennessee court would apply § 28-3-104(a)(1) to abuse of process claims. Law v. Law, 279 Fed. Appx. 386, — F.3d —, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12038, 2008 FED App. 306N  (6th Cir. May 29, 2008).

T.C.A. § 28-3-104 barred tort claims including malicious prosecution because the conduct about which plaintiff complained, the taking of his deposition and the filing of a verified complaint against him, occurred well over a year prior to plaintiff's filing of the lawsuit. Lane v. Becker, 334 S.W.3d 756, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 1146 (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2010).

Court erred in dismissing a medical malpractice action where the original lawsuit was “commenced” for purposes of the savings statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-105, because, although it was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations in T.C.A. §§ 28-3-104 and 29-26-116, it was filed within one year of the order of voluntary nonsuit, and it was filed in the name of the proper party plaintiff under T.C.A. § 20-5-107. Howell v. Claiborne & Hughes Health Ctr., — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 24, 2010), overruled in part, Myers v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., 382 S.W.3d 300, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 735 (Tenn. Oct. 4, 2012).

Defendants were not entitled to dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) of a breach of contract claim on statute of limitations grounds because the face of the complaint did not show that the suit was filed in violation of former T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(2) [now § 28-3-104(c)], or that the Tennessee statute was applicable here instead of the statute of limitations under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5525(a). Estate of Thouron v. Cecil Smith & Assocs., PC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1129 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2013).

Arrestee's claims against a city and a group of its police officers for intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrageous conduct, false imprisonment, malicious harassment, and civil rights violations were barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations as the arrestee ‘s claims accrued more than one year prior to the filing of the arrestee's complaint. Olivier v. City of Clarksville, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 564 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2017).

5. —Constitutional Challenges.

This section did not apply to constitutional challenge of Homosexual Practices Act, because there is no statute of limitations on challenging an unconstitutional penal statute. Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

6. Jurisdiction.

A judgment of a court dismissing a suit for want of jurisdiction does not conclude the plaintiff's right of action. Davis v. Parks, 151 Tenn. 321, 270 S.W. 444, 1924 Tenn. LEXIS 67 (1924).

7. —Conflict of Laws.

Where automobile accident occurred in Tennessee, fact that defendant was a nonresident would not toll the statute of limitations and Tennessee statute of limitations was applicable in suit brought in Missouri. Young v. Hicks, 250 F.2d 80, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 4452 (8th Cir. Mo. 1957).

The commencement of a suit in North Carolina does not toll the running of the statute of limitations in this state. Sigler v. Youngblood Truck Lines, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 61, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3823 (D. Tenn. 1957).

The Tennessee statute of limitations was not applicable to actions brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Jackson v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 882, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9791 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); Kennerly v. Aro, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1083, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11604 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); Kennerly v. Aro, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1090, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13769 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).

By providing for a 30-day period in which an aggrieved party could have brought an action [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)], Congress intended to insert a limitation period for actions which should have been applied in lieu of a statute of limitations. Beckum v. Tennessee Hotel, 341 F. Supp. 991, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13422 (W.D. Tenn. 1971); Kennerly v. Aro, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1083, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11604 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); Kennerly v. Aro, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1090, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13769 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).

The Tennessee one year statute of limitations was not tolled as to actions under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). Harrison v. Wright, 457 F.2d 793, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 10327 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1972).

The Tennessee statute of limitations was applicable to actions filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, but not to actions filed under Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.Kaltenborn v. Excel Personnel, 339 F. Supp. 129, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15220 (W.D. Tenn. 1972); Kennerly v. Aro, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1083, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11604 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); Kennerly v. Aro, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1090, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13769 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).

Where, in a civil rights action, the court had the choice of applying this statute or the Georgia statute of limitations, it held that where a civil rights action arose in one state but was brought in another, a federal district court should apply statute of limitations of the state in which the action arose. Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12766 (D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 805, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 11519 (5th Cir. Ga. 1973).

Under Tennessee law a claim would be barred because Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations for personal injury cases, § 28-3-104, is not tolled under § 28-1-105 by the filing of the lawsuit in another state where there was no basis for personal jurisdiction. Graham v. Ferguson, 593 F.2d 764, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 16392 (6th Cir. Mich. 1979).

Rather than permitting application of the one year limitations period of subdivision (a)(3) of this section, 28 U.S.C. § 1658 mandated application of the four year federal statute of limitations to employee's racial discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Miller v. Federal Express Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 955, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9618 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).

8. —Declaration.

The declaration alleged the bringing of a former suit and its dismissal by nonsuit and the bringing of the present suit within 12 months thereafter, defendant's plea of one year statute of limitations was insufficient to put upon the plaintiff the burden of making proof to sustain his averments in the declaration. Holliston Mills of Tennessee v. McGuffin, 177 Tenn. 1, 145 S.W.2d 1, 1940 Tenn. LEXIS 4 (1940).

To determine whether suit is for tort or contract and therefore whether respective one or six year statute of limitations applies, court must look to plaintiff's declaration to see whether personal injuries are claimed regardless of how the action is styled and even though some contract damages are claimed. Bland v. Smith, 197 Tenn. 683, 277 S.W.2d 377, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 335, 49 A.L.R.2d 1212 (1955).

9. —Amendment.

Where receivers of a railroad company are not made parties until after the year, by amendment, the cause of action is barred as to them. Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Hoechner, 67 F. 456, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 2766 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1895).

A party cannot, by way of amendment, change his right of action from contract to tort and obviate with respect to the latter the running of the statute of limitations. Gruver v. Cordes, 3 Tenn. Civ. App. (3 Higgins) 591 (1913).

Where the original declaration did not state a common law right, it was an imperfect declaration subject to amendment to make it perfect. Kennard v. Illinois C. R. Co., 177 Tenn. 311, 148 S.W.2d 1017, 1940 Tenn. LEXIS 40, 134 A.L.R. 770 (1941).

An amendment merely changing designation of defendant, under Tennessee law, for limitation purposes related back to the date of the original filing of the action. Smith v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 33 F.R.D. 294, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10372 (D. Tenn. 1963).

Where the trial court did not have the benefit of the 1972 amendment at the time summary judgment was entered for defendant, the judgment was vacated and the case remanded for further consideration in light of this section as amended. Bradley v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 239, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 9477 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1972); Bradley v. General Motors Corp., 512 F.2d 602, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15801 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1975).

The contract which was entered into before the limitation in this section was amended from six years to one year was subject to the one year statute of limitations. Bradley v. La Penna, 490 S.W.2d 500, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 518 (Tenn. 1973).

A federal action is commenced as against additional party defendants named in an amended complaint as of the date of the filing of the amended complaint, rather than the date of the order granting leave to so amend. Cannon v. Metcalfe, 458 F. Supp. 843, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15065 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).

An amendment to a complaint in federal court which added a new party created a new cause of action and there was no relation back to the date of the filing of the original complaint for statute of limitation purposes. Jenkins v. Carruth, 583 F. Supp. 613, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17646 (E.D. Tenn. 1982), aff'd without opinion, 734 F.2d 14, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 14413 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1984).

A party to be brought in by amendment, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c), must receive notice within the statute of limitations period, Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 29, 106 S. Ct. 2379, 2384, 91 L. Ed. 2d 18, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 106 (1986); however, the notice required by Schiavone does not need to be formal. Smith v. TW Services, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 144, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20693 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).

Notice to a liability insurer provided the sole basis for Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) notice to a new defendant, alleged tortfeasor, so that the plaintiff's amendment related back to the date of the original complaint. Smith v. TW Services, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 144, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20693 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).

Where shortly after an accident, the liability insurer of a defendant brought in by amendment became aware of the claim, and it received an “information copy” of the complaint with letter from plaintiff's counsel, based on the prolonged correspondence between plaintiff's counsel and defendant's liability insurer, including settlement requests, injury/medical updates and finally a copy of the complaint, the defendant received sufficient notice of the action that it would not be prejudiced in the maintenance of its defense. Smith v. TW Services, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 144, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20693 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).

Plaintiff could not amend his complaint to identify John and Jane Doe officers because amendment would be futile, as his 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 excessive force and unreasonable seizure claims and his state law negligence, false imprisonment, and assault claims would not relate back to the date of the original complaint and thus, would be barred by Tennessee's one year period of limitations. Dunfee v. Finchum, — F. Supp. 2d —,  2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126052 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 21, 2015).

10. —Cause of Action.

In administrator's bill to renew a judgment formerly entered against respondent, the substitution of the distributees by naming them did not constitute a new cause of action. Delaney v. Delaney, 190 Tenn. 632, 231 S.W.2d 328, 1950 Tenn. LEXIS 530 (1950).

Where plaintiff knew of a causal relationship between products he worked with and his condition as far back as September of 1977, but chose in two earlier suits, and in present action, to pursue a remedy against only the makers of the finished products, and made no effort until 1980 or 1981 to locate the manufacturers and suppliers of any ingredient that went into the finished products, under these circumstances, plaintiff had sufficient knowledge, or should have had sufficient knowledge, that he could have had a cause of action against defendant suppliers long before he added them in 1981, and suit against such defendants was properly dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. Webber v. Union Carbide Corp., 653 S.W.2d 409, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 575 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

11. —Commencement of Action.

The suing out of a summons is the commencement of an action that interrupts the running of the statute. Whitson v. Tennessee C. R. Co., 163 Tenn. 35, 40 S.W.2d 396, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 136 (1931).

When the remedy of the suitor is complete and unaffected by the absence of the defendant, when his nonresidence does not affect the right to sue, the time of his residence out of the state shall not be taken as any part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. Arrowood v. McMinn County, 173 Tenn. 562, 121 S.W.2d 566, 1938 Tenn. LEXIS 43, 119 A.L.R. 855 (1938).

Where plaintiff filed his declaration and summons in the state court within the period of limitation, but the clerk of the court, through oversight, did not forward it to the secretary of state until after the limitation period had expired, the process and service were sufficient. Miller v. Baird, 239 F. Supp. 754, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7101 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).

The filing of a suit for personal injury and property damage arising out of an automobile collision does not toll the statutory limitations contained in this section as they apply to the defendant and a cross-declaration filed pursuant to § 20-1007 (repealed) must be filed within the statutory limitations contained herein. Lovejoy v. Ahearn, 223 Tenn. 562, 448 S.W.2d 420, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 442 (1969).

A suit for personal injuries may be brought more than one year after the injury occurs provided it is brought within one year after it is discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered. McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. 1975).

Attorneys whose only interest was that of an attorney representing a client did not become real parties in interest; the one-year statute of limitations was not tolled by the filing of the action against the client, and the action was commenced not by the proceedings against the client, but when the counsel was brought in as third-party defendants. Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Fabricating, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 860, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 757 (Tenn. 1983), cert. denied, Podrog v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 469 U.S. 1038, 105 S. Ct. 515, 83 L. Ed. 2d 405, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 4517 (1984).

The cause of action commences to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the cause of action and if events receive widespread publicity, a plaintiff may be charged with knowledge of its occurrence. Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 F.3d 543, 2000 FED App. 193P, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 12297 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2000).

Pursuant to T.C.A. § 47-18-110, for both private consumer protection act claims and negligence claims, the cause of action accrues when the action giving rise to the claim is discovered. Heatherly v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 43 S.W.3d 911, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 751 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Where an inmate had knowledge of the alleged violations of the Videotape Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710, and the Tennessee Video Consumer Privacy Act, T.C.A. §§ 47-18-220147-18-2205, on March 27, 2000, his suit filed on June 17, 2002, against the video service providers was time-barred pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c) and T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(1). Daniel v. Cantrell, 241 F. Supp. 2d 867, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1185 (E.D. Tenn. 2003), aff'd, 375 F.3d 377, 2004 FED App. 216P, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14078 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2004).

In clients'  legal malpractice action, trial court erred in denying their former attorney's motion to dismiss because clients'  intentional nine and one-half month delay in service of the summons after the filing of the complaint against their former attorney rendered the filing of the complaint ineffective pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.01(3). Jones v. Cox, 316 S.W.3d 616, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 697 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 282 (Tenn. June 1, 2009).

12. —Ignorance of Cause of Action.

Mere ignorance or failure of plaintiff to discover his cause of action or the subsequent resulting damage cannot prevent the running of the statute. Bodne v. Austin, 156 Tenn. 353, 2 S.W.2d 100, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 128, 62 A.L.R. 1410 (1928), superseded by statute as stated in, Stanbury v. Bacardi, 953 S.W.2d 671, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. 1997); Hudson v. Shoulders, 164 Tenn. 70, 45 S.W.2d 1072, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 13 (1931).

The mere failure of a plaintiff to discover the existence of a cause of action does not prevent the running of the statute. Clinard v. Pennington, 59 Tenn. App. 128, 438 S.W.2d 748, 1968 Tenn. App. LEXIS 336 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).

The relevant inquiry for determining the date of discovery is an objective one. Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 F.3d 543, 2000 FED App. 193P, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 12297 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2000).

13. —Lack of Means to Prosecute.

Where plaintiff was incarcerated by defendant and did not commence his action for one year and 34 days after the cause of action arose, he could not be heard to assert that he did not have the means within his power to prosecute his claim in a timely manner. Davis v. Wilson, 349 F. Supp. 905, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13750 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), aff'd without opinion, 471 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1972).

14. —Concealment of Cause of Action.

Fraudulent concealment of cause of action will prevent the running of the statute of limitations. Whaley v. Catlett, 103 Tenn. 347, 53 S.W. 131, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 115 (1899); Bodne v. Austin, 156 Tenn. 366, 2 S.W.2d 104, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 129 (1928), overruled in part, Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 438, 93 A.L.R.3d 207 (Tenn. 1974); Hudson v. Shoulders, 164 Tenn. 70, 45 S.W.2d 1072, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 13 (1931).

Where there is a bare averment that plaintiff was kept in ignorance of the cause of action without averment that the concealment was fraudulent on part of defendant or that the cause of action was known to the latter, the court may not presume fraud in order to prevent a bar. Bodne v. Austin, 156 Tenn. 366, 2 S.W.2d 104, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 129 (1928), overruled in part, Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 438, 93 A.L.R.3d 207 (Tenn. 1974).

There can be no fraudulent concealment where there is no dealing between the parties. Mere silence does not constitute it. Statute of limitations not postponed as to running on facts shown. Patten v. Standard Oil Co., 165 Tenn. 438, 55 S.W.2d 759, 1932 Tenn. LEXIS 70 (1933).

The fact that a dentist should have known that he, in extracting a tooth, had left its root in his patient's mouth, did not constitute fraudulent concealment. Albert v. Sherman, 167 Tenn. 133, 67 S.W.2d 140, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1934), overruled in part, Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 438, 93 A.L.R.3d 207 (Tenn. 1974), superseded by statute as stated in, Stanbury v. Bacardi, 953 S.W.2d 671, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. 1997).

Failure of officials, agents and representatives of railroad to disclose details of death of plaintiff's husband to plaintiff did not constitute fraudulent concealment of facts so as to prevent running of statute of limitations in action for damages against railroad for such death. Turner v. N. C. & S. L. Railway, 199 Tenn. 137, 285 S.W.2d 122, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 437, 54 A.L.R.2d 1225 (1955).

Mere silence where there is no duty to speak will not constitute fraudulent concealment of facts so as to prevent the running of the statute of limitations. Turner v. N. C. & S. L. Railway, 199 Tenn. 137, 285 S.W.2d 122, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 437, 54 A.L.R.2d 1225 (1955).

In action for personal injuries by employee against employer based on alleged negligence of employer to disclose fact that employee had active tuberculosis after physical examination in employer's medical department revealed such fact, the alleged neglect of the employer did not operate to toll the statute of limitations since there was no evidence to the effect that failure to make such disclosure was a deliberate or willful misrepresentation and since the failure to disclose was itself the gist of the suit. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton, 237 F.2d 229, 1956 U.S. App. LEXIS 4323, 69 A.L.R.2d 1206 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1956).

Fraudulent concealment will toll the statute of limitations, but ordinarily such fraudulent concealment must be proved by evidence of some affirmative misrepresentation. Redwood v. Raskind, 49 Tenn. App. 69, 350 S.W.2d 414, 1961 Tenn. App. LEXIS 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961).

Fraudulent concealment of a cause of action can operate to toll a statute of limitations. Ray v. Scheibert, 484 S.W.2d 63, 1972 Tenn. App. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).

Allegations that defendant physician knowingly concealed injuries to plaintiff's spinal cord occurring during spinal operation for arthritic spur by representing that disability and paralysis resulted from contractions of muscles in plaintiff's back and continued to so represent during period plaintiff continued under treatment by defendant were sufficient allegations of fraudulent concealment to toll running of statute of limitations if proved. Ray v. Scheibert, 224 Tenn. 99, 450 S.W.2d 578, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 380, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 381 (1969).

In order for the statute of limitations to be tolled by a fraudulent concealment, there must be an allegation that the cause of action was known to defendant and fraudulently concealed by him, since mere ignorance by plaintiff and his failure to discover the cause of action is not sufficient to prevent the running of the statute. Ray v. Scheibert, 224 Tenn. 99, 450 S.W.2d 578, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 380, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 381 (1969).

An honest mistake made by physician in diagnosing the cause of a patient's infirmity, standing alone, was not evidence of fraudulent concealment; therefore the statute of limitations was not tolled. Ray v. Scheibert, 484 S.W.2d 63, 1972 Tenn. App. LEXIS 345 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).

T.C.A. § 28-3-104 barred an alleged victim's negligent supervision claim against a diocese, based on the victim's alleged sexual abuse by a priest when the victim was a child, because the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, the discovery rule, and equitable estoppel did not toll the statute when the victim reached the age of majority, as, (1) when the victim reached the age of majority, the victim knew a priest of the diocese had abused the victim, that the victim had a claim against the priest, and that the diocese employed the priest, and (2) the abuse was the injury, not the diocese's alleged cover-up of the abuse. Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 358 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2010), rev'd, 363 S.W.3d 436, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. Feb. 27, 2012).

T.C.A. § 28-3-104 barred an alleged victim's negligent supervision claim against a diocese, based on the victim's alleged sexual abuse by a priest when the victim was a child, because the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, the discovery rule, and equitable estoppel did not toll the statute when the victim reached the age of majority, as, (1) when the victim reached the age of majority, the victim knew a priest of the diocese had abused the victim, that the victim had a claim against the priest, and that the diocese employed the priest, and (2) the abuse was the injury, not the diocese's alleged cover-up of the abuse. Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 358 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2010), rev'd, 363 S.W.3d 436, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 143 (Tenn. Feb. 27, 2012).

Constitutional claims in both the original action and the instant action were properly construed as Bivens claims and the claims against all of the deputized officers named in the original action were timely under T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(3) because the statute of limitations was tolled under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. Moreover, the Tennessee Savings Statute, T.C.A. 28-1-105(a) “saved” the Bivens claims where the court interpreted the term “commence a new action” to include reasserting the cause of action, whether through an independent lawsuit or through reasserting the claims in the context of an existing action premised on the same underlying facts. Pike v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 2d 667, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51243 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 11, 2012).

15. —Absence of Defendant from State.

The limitation fixed by this section was not tolled by the absence of the defendant from the state where the defendant was a nonresident subject to service of process by service on the secretary of state under § 20-235 (now § 20-2-214). Burris v. Alexander Mfg. Co., 51 Misc. 2d 543, 273 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1966).

16. —Pleading of Statute.

The plea of the statute of limitations is a special plea personal in its nature and which may be waived or asserted, and a party relying upon it affirmatively must set it up in his pleadings. Whittaker v. Monterey Spoke Co., 6 Tenn. Civ. App. (6 Higgins) 26 (1915).

When issue is joined on defendant's plea of the statute of limitations, the burden is on plaintiff to prove that the cause of action accrued within the period of limitation. Brown v. Tennessee Consol. Coal Co., 19 Tenn. App. 123, 83 S.W.2d 568, 1935 Tenn. App. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935).

17. —Miscellaneous Actions.

Action for damages for willful violation of plaintiff's right to the undisturbed possession and interment of the body of her deceased band is not barred by the one year statute. Hill v. Travelers Ins. Co., 154 Tenn. 295, 294 S.W. 1097, 1926 Tenn. LEXIS 127, 52 A.L.R. 1442 (1927).

One year statute of limitations did not apply to suit by bank receiver against stockholders of bank to recover loss to unsecured creditors and depositors. Robertson v. Davis, 169 Tenn. 659, 90 S.W.2d 746, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (1936).

In a suit by a receiver for compensation for his acts as receiver and for alleged damages suffered for failure of the complainant in the cause in which he was appointed to protect him at the time of the entry of the final decree the six year statute of limitations applicable to actions on contracts was controlling and not the one year statute governing actions in tort. Taylor v. Smith, 172 Tenn. 247, 111 S.W.2d 1020, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (1938).

Plaintiff's action suing attorney for mishandling of divorce case claiming “not only loss of properties but … pain and mental anguish” was controlled by one year statute of limitations for personal actions rather than six year contract statute. Bland v. Smith, 197 Tenn. 683, 277 S.W.2d 377, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 335, 49 A.L.R.2d 1212 (1955).

Action by insured and wife against insurance carrier to recover for injuries sustained in automobile accident when their vehicle was struck by hit and run driver which was brought under uninsured motorist clause of policy was governed by six year limitation for actions on contract rather than one year limitation for personal tort actions. Schleif v. Hardware Dealer's Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 218 Tenn. 489, 404 S.W.2d 490, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 582 (1966), superseded by statute as stated in, Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., — S.W.2d —, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 1989).

An action by a client against his attorney for damages for failure to file his personal injury action prior to the running of the statute of limitations is not an action for personal injuries within the meaning of this section, but an action for breach of contract. Sitton v. Clements, 385 F.2d 869, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 4454 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1967), overruled, Shoemake v. Ferrer, 143 Wn. App. 819, 182 P.3d 992, 2008 Wash. App. LEXIS 776 (2008).

Where parents satisfied proof of financial responsibility for their minor son under 18 years of age pursuant to former § 55-7-104(c), and where son was later found liable for damages for bodily injuries to other parties, the statute of limitations applying to parents' liability sounds in tort under this section, and was not a contractual liability under § 28-3-109. Bankers Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Sampley, 304 F. Supp. 523, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9919 (E.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd, 420 F.2d 300, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 11375 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1970).

In products liability case, where two minors were killed, although the cause of action accrued at date of sale of product, the one year statute of limitations would not bar the suit, as the injuries resulted to minors, and the minors had they lived, would have had a cause of action. Rives v. International Oil Burner Co., 298 F. Supp. 1146, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9034 (E.D. Tenn. 1969).

As the statute of limitations on a libel action does not begin to run on a published book until the first copy is sold in the county where the action is brought or where the defamed individual lives, it was error to dismiss an action when book had been published over a year before commencement of action, but the date on which book was first sold in the plaintiff's county was not ascertainable. Applewhite v. Memphis State University, 495 S.W.2d 190, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 487 (Tenn. 1973).

Where prisoner brought action for damages against judge who dismissed prisoner's post-conviction petition, the action was barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity and further by the one-year statute of limitations for injuries against the person. Harris v. Witt, 552 S.W.2d 85, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 512 (Tenn. 1977).

18. Immunity of State.

For case concerning the applicability of the statute of limitations to the claims of a metropolitan board of education for injunctive relief against the state of Tennessee where (1) the third party plaintiffs sue in their official governmental capacity seeking relief as an arm of the state for the general good of the population, and (2) the state is liable for a continuing violation of federal law. Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 836 F.2d 986, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 16899 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1987), cert. denied, Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ. v. Tennessee, 487 U.S. 1206, 108 S. Ct. 2848, 101 L. Ed. 2d 885, 1988 U.S. LEXIS 2848 (1988).

19. Suits Against the State.

Tennessee claims commission for the eastern grand properly held the inmate's claim against the state was barred by the statute of limitations because: (1) The inmate filed his claim against the state well beyond the one-year statute of limitations in T.C.A. §§ 9-8-402(b) and 28-3-104(a); and (2) The inmate had full knowledge of the facts relevant to his alleged injury when it occurred because he knew that he was being tried and sentenced in abstentia; thus, the commission did not err when it granted the state's motion to dismiss, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12. Williams v. State, 139 S.W.3d 308, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. LEXIS 530 (Tenn. June 1, 2004), appeal denied, Williams v. Parker, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 9 (Tenn. 2006).

Claims commission did not err in dismissing a family's claim against the state as time barred because the ninety day extension provided in T.C.A. § 20-1-119 was not triggered; the family originally only sued the county, which denied the allegations in the complaint and asserted that it could not have been liable for any of the injuries sustained by the family because that property was in control of the state, but the county failed to allege comparative fault in its answer, and the family had not asserted in its complaint against the county or before the commission that any comparative fault existed. Austin v. State, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 386 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 6, 2006), rev'd, 222 S.W.3d 354, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 434 (Tenn. 2007).

20. Action Against Court Clerk.

The one year statute of limitations this section began to run against landowner seeking interest from court clerk for money previously held by clerk as trustee when landowner received money from clerk without interest. Warren v. Scott, 845 S.W.2d 780, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 779 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

21. Personal Injuries.

Suit for damages upon allegation that defendants had conspired to deprive plaintiff from occupying her home with her children and from being supported by her husband by counseling certain persons to place plaintiff in state mental hospital and by advising her husband to divorce her was suit for injury of a personal nature and was barred by the one year limitation for injuries to the person where filed more than one year after last act complained of. Emerson v. Machamer, 221 Tenn. 739, 431 S.W.2d 283, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 500 (1968).

This section is applicable to injuries to the person. Ray v. Scheibert, 224 Tenn. 99, 450 S.W.2d 578, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 380, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 381 (1969).

Where state statute of limitations as to personal injuries had run before filing of counterclaim, counterclaim, as it related to personal injuries, failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Maxwell v. Roark, 337 F. Supp. 506, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10184 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).

A suit for personal injuries may be brought more than one year after the injury occurs, provided it is brought within one year after it is discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have been discovered. Sullivant v. Americana Homes, Inc., 605 S.W.2d 246, 1980 Tenn. App. LEXIS 381 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980); Beaman v. Schwartz, 738 S.W.2d 632, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3462 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

An action against a bank for refusal to make payment on a check, where the gravamen of the action was mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, and damage to reputation, was one for personal injuries, and therefore the one-year limitation in this section applied, rather than the six-year limitation in § 28-3-109(a)(3). Pera v. Kroger Co., 674 S.W.2d 715, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 828 (Tenn. 1984).

Not all contract actions are subject to the six-year statute of limitations; they may be subject to a one-year period for personal injuries or a three-year period for property damage. Pera v. Kroger Co., 674 S.W.2d 715, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 828 (Tenn. 1984).

The one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions contained in this section applied to union member's action, pursuant to § 101(a)(5) of the labor-management reporting and disclosure act (29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5), for discharge from the union without prior notice or hearing. Holmes v. Donovan, 984 F.2d 732, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 1030 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1993).

In a personal injury case, plaintiff's first amended complaint was devoid of any factual allegation which would estop defendants from asserting the statute of limitations defense or to support a claim of fraudulent concealment. Similarly, the allegations contained in plaintiff's second amended complaint were conclusory and inadequate to establish a basis upon which to prevent the raising of the statute of the limitations defense or to constitute fraudulent concealment of any cause of action against defendants. Bracey v. McDonald, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 25 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2016), review denied and ordered not published, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 370 (Tenn. May 9, 2016).

In a case arising from an automobile accident, damages should not have been awarded for personal injuries because an insurer's claim was not made until after the statute of limitations had run, and an appeal to the circuit court from the general sessions court did not extend the limitations period; in such an appeal, the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure did not expand the circuit court's jurisdiction. The savings statute did not permit the insurer to refile the previous action and rely upon the original filing of the lawsuit in order to add a claim for personal injuries. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Blondin, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 189 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2016).

22. —Definitions.

“For injuries” means on account of injuries to the person. Blackwell v. Memphis S. R. Co., 124 Tenn. 516, 137 S.W. 486, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 60 (1911).

Actions “for injuries to the person,” as used in one year statute of limitations means actions for “bodily injuries.” Rheudasil v. Clower, 197 Tenn. 27, 270 S.W.2d 345, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 447, 46 A.L.R.2d 1083 (1954), superseded by statute as stated in, Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. 1991).

This section did not apply to suit by divorced wife to recover from former husband her share of proceeds recovered by husband as administrator for minor child, since it was not a wrongful death suit, but an action to recover proceeds of settlement in a wrongful death suit. Shelton v. Shelton, 198 Tenn. 346, 280 S.W.2d 803, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 379 (1955).

Declaration which in substantial part sought recovery for damages to plaintiff's reputation as a business man, father and respected member of society and for humiliation and the like, alleged damages to rights which were personal in nature and limitation of this section was applicable. Brown v. Dunstan, 219 Tenn. 291, 409 S.W.2d 365, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 529 (1966).

The phrase “for injuries to the person” appearing in this section is not limited to bodily injuries resulting from trauma but includes injuries resulting from invasion of rights that inhere in man as a rational being, such rights, however, being distinguished from those which accrue to an individual by reason of some peculiar status or by virtue of an interest created by contract or property. Brown v. Dunstan, 219 Tenn. 291, 409 S.W.2d 365, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 529 (1966).

A suit for damages because of obliteration by land developer of burial plot in which plaintiff's ancestors were buried in which it was alleged that plaintiff suffered great mental pain and anguish and loss of property rights was a suit for injuries to the person within the meaning of this section. Carney v. Smith, 222 Tenn. 472, 437 S.W.2d 246, 1969 Tenn. LEXIS 454 (1969).

For the purpose of this section personal injury actions are defined as those brought for injuries resulting from invasion of rights, that is, rights to which one is entitled by reason of being a person in the eyes of the law and such rights are to be distinguished from those which accrue to an individual by reason of some peculiar status or by virtue of an interest created by contract or property. Swauger v. Haury & Smith Contractors, Inc., 512 S.W.2d 261, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. 1974).

The application of any particular statute of limitations is governed by the gravamen of the action as determined on the basis of the claimed damages; and a suit for inconvenience and loss of enjoyment of a home resulting from faulty construction of a septic system was basically a suit for injury to property and was not barred after one year by this section, the applicable statute being the three-year statute (§ 28-3-105). Swauger v. Haury & Smith Contractors, Inc., 512 S.W.2d 261, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 477 (Tenn. 1974).

23. —Declaration.

Where there is no averment that the wrong was within the period allowed for action, the declaration cannot be sustained upon the theory that it is based upon recurrent injuries within the period. Bodne v. Austin, 156 Tenn. 353, 2 S.W.2d 100, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 128, 62 A.L.R. 1410 (1928), superseded by statute as stated in, Stanbury v. Bacardi, 953 S.W.2d 671, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. 1997).

Statute governing form of notice to be given municipality requires only that the “general” nature of the injury be stated, thus indicating legislative intent not to require same exactitude in stating nature of injury as is required in stating time and place of injury. Maryville v. McConkey, 19 Tenn. App. 520, 90 S.W.2d 951, 1935 Tenn. App. LEXIS 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935).

24. —Amendment.

25. — —Cause of Action.

Amended declaration in death action based on law of foreign state did not change cause of action merely because amended complaint cited particular foreign statutes upon which plaintiff relied to sustain cause of action which original declaration did not cite. Parsons v. American Trust & Banking Co., 168 Tenn. 49, 73 S.W.2d 698, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (1934).

In action for wrongful death, an amendment to the declaration setting up doctor's bill and funeral expenses as items of damages, was not demurrable as barred by limitation, since they were but items incidental to the wrong already and seasonably pleaded. Caldwell v. Hodges, 18 Tenn. App. 355, 77 S.W.2d 817, 1934 Tenn. App. LEXIS 39 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1934).

Original complaint which alleged that plaintiff's injuries were due to the negligence of defendant's employees in the use of a scaffold, stated no different cause of action as respects limitation than amended complaint filed more than one year after date of injury which stated that her injuries were due to the negligent manner in which the scaffold was constructed, because the two acts alleged were but different invasions of plaintiff's primary right and different breaches of the same duty, thus amended complaint did not introduce a new cause of action so as to be barred by this section. Blair v. Durham, 134 F.2d 729, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 3672 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1943), rehearing denied, 139 F.2d 260, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 2257 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1943).

26. — —Parties.

Where the declaration in the widow's action for the wrongful death of her husband contains a count for common law negligence as against a railroad operating between two points in Tennessee, and another count for negligence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act as against a railroad engaged in interstate commerce, and amendment to the declaration allowing the widow to prosecute the suit in her capacity as the personal representative of her deceased husband, as well as in her individual capacity, does not introduce a new cause of action so as to be barred by the limitation of two years under the federal statute. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Wulf, 226 U.S. 570, 33 S. Ct. 135, 57 L. Ed. 355, 1913 U.S. LEXIS 2265 (1913); Gray v. Kent, 5 Tenn. Civ. App. (5 Higgins) 519 (1914).

In a personal injury action, the court properly refused to permit plaintiff to amend his declaration and summons so as to make the action and summons run against a corporation as defendant instead of against the president and general manager of the corporation, where two years had elapsed since bringing the action, and the one year statute of limitations had run against the action. Abdallah v. Weil, 168 Tenn. 382, 79 S.W.2d 284, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 69 (1935).

Where administrator brought suit for wrongful death of decedent in administrator's name for benefit of decedent's brothers and after the statutory period of one year had expired moved to amend the declaration by striking out the allegation that the suit was for the benefit of the brothers and inserting that it had been brought for the use and benefit of the living father and mother, deceased leaving no widow or children, this was not the commencement of a new suit so as to be barred by this section as the cause is that of the decedent and the suing out of the summons in the name of the administrator was the commencement of the action and the names of the beneficiaries may be set out by amendment. Townsend v. Nashville, C. & S. L. Ry., 170 Tenn. 239, 94 S.W.2d 384, 1936 Tenn. LEXIS 8 (1936).

Where suit by foreign administratrix against foreign power company and city to recover damages for death of deceased as result of defective insulated wire was dismissed when plaintiff took a nonsuit, a second suit filed within one year thereafter by domestic administratrix against power company was not barred by limitations even though city was not made a party defendant in second action. Privett v. West Tennessee Power & Light Co., 19 F. Supp. 812, 1937 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1738 (D. Tenn. 1937), aff'd, 103 F.2d 1021, 1939 U.S. App. LEXIS 3771 (6th Cir. 1939).

In action by father as next of kin for wrongful death of minor son father could amend complaint so as to include mother of deceased as party plaintiff and amendment would relate back to time of filing original action, since cause of action would not be changed by adding party plaintiff, and this was so even though suit by mother would have been barred by statute of limitations. Mosier v. Lucas, 30 Tenn. App. 498, 207 S.W.2d 1021, 1947 Tenn. App. LEXIS 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947).

One year statute of limitations in this section does not bar decedent's parents as next of kin from amending summons where action for wrongful death of decedent was originally brought by the father as an administrator, the amendment relates back to the date of the original summons because no new cause of action or new parties are set out. Gogan v. Jones, 197 Tenn. 436, 273 S.W.2d 700, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 505 (1954).

A party to be brought in by amendment, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c), must receive notice within the statute of limitations period, Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 29, 106 S. Ct. 2379, 2384, 91 L. Ed. 2d 18, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 106 (1986); however, the notice required by Schiavone does not need to be formal. Smith v. TW Services, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 144, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20693 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).

Notice to a liability insurer provided the sole basis for Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) notice to a new defendant, alleged tortfeasor, so that the plaintiff's amendment related back to the date of the original complaint. Smith v. TW Services, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 144, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20693 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).

Where shortly after the accident, the liability insurer of a defendant brought in by amendment became aware of the claim, and it received an “information copy” of the complaint with letter from plaintiff's counsel, based on the prolonged correspondence between plaintiff's counsel and defendant's liability insurer, including settlement requests, injury/medical updates and finally a copy of the complaint, the defendant received sufficient notice of the action that it would not be prejudiced in the maintenance of its defense. Smith v. TW Services, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 144, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20693 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).

Although defendants reasonably could be expected to have known of the instant suit, this alone is insufficient to impute to them knowledge of their future status as defendants. Others who were not named as defendants were aware of and even deposed in this case. Doe v. Sullivan County, 956 F.2d 545, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1685 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 864, 113 S. Ct. 187, 121 L. Ed. 2d 131, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 5302 (1992).

As defendant-A was named in an amended personal injury complaint filed within the applicable statute of limitations under T.C.A. § 28-3-104, and as defendant-B was thereafter named in a second amended complaint within 90 days from the identification of it for comparative fault purposes under T.C.A. § 20-1-119, the claim against defendant-B was not time-barred; accordingly, it was error to grant summary judgment to defendant-B on that basis. Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc., — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 793 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2010), rev'd, 360 S.W.3d 362, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 142 (Tenn. Feb. 24, 2012).

Court of appeals erred in affirming an order granting fraternity members'  motion to dismiss vehicle owners'  complaint on the ground that it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations, T.C.A. § 28-3-104, because “a person not a party to the suit,” for purposes of T.C.A. § 20-1-119, included any defendant previously dismissed pursuant to a written, non-final order under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02; a named defendant ceases to be a “party to the suit,” for purposes of § 20-1-119, when the trial court issues an order, whether final or interlocutory, dismissing that defendant. Mann v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 380 S.W.3d 42, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. July 3, 2012).

In a personal injury action filed by plaintiff injured party against a deceased driver, a trial court properly denied plaintiff's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 motion to amend to add the personal representative as a defendant and dismissed the action because plaintiff failed to name the personal representative as a defendant, as required by T.C.A. § 20-5-103, before the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations in T.C.A. § 28-3-104. Vaughn v. Morton, 371 S.W.3d 116, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 201 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 435 (Tenn. June 19, 2012).

Trial court erred in granting limited liability companies'  (LLCs) motion to dismiss because a customer was permitted to add the formerly dismissed LLCs back into her lawsuit to recover for injuries she sustained when she slipped and fell at a grocery store; pursuant to the one-year statute of limitations, the action against the LLCs was still viable when the grocery store identified them as comparative tortfeasors, and the customer filed her second amended complaint within 90 days. Scales v. H.G. Hill Realty Co., LLC, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2018).

27. —Conflicts of Law.

Wrongful death action filed in Tennessee though based on death in Florida was controlled by limitation period contained in this section as law of the forum applied. Cauley v. S. E. Massengill Co., 35 F. Supp. 371, 1940 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2540 (D. Tenn. 1940).

Wrongful death action filed in Tennessee against former resident of Mississippi to recover damages for death of decedent occurring in automobile accident in Mississippi was governed by one year limitation period of Tennessee instead of six year limitation period prevailing in Mississippi. McDaniel v. Mulvihill, 196 Tenn. 41, 263 S.W.2d 759, 1953 Tenn. LEXIS 404 (1953).

In action for violation of federally protected civil rights, since there is no applicable federal statute of limitations, state statute controls and requires dismissal of suit filed more than one year after plaintiff's alleged cause of action accrued. Phipps v. Armour, 335 F. Supp. 768, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10797 (E.D. Tenn. 1971).

28. —Running of Statute.

The cause of action for a personal injury accrues at the time of the injury, and is the same whether brought by the party injured or by his personal representative. The statute begins to run from the moment of the injury, and is not suspended by the death of the injured party, nor during the time that intervenes after his death and before the qualification of his personal representative. The statute applies alike to instant death or to instance where injured person survives for a time. Fowlkes v. Nashville & D. R. Co., 56 Tenn. 829, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 211 (1872); Whaley v. Catlett, 103 Tenn. 347, 53 S.W. 131, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 115 (1899).

Action in the name of the administrator for the wrongful death of his intestate is effectively commenced, so as to prevent the running of the statute of limitations, though it does not mention the beneficiaries of the recovery. Love v. Southern R. Co., 108 Tenn. 104, 65 S.W. 475, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 13, 55 L.R.A. 471 (1901).

Where plaintiff contracted tuberculosis from working in defendants poorly ventilated factory the tort was a continuous one and the statute of limitations did not begin to run until plaintiff had quit work. Goodall Co. v. Sartin, 141 F.2d 427, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3691 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 709, 65 S. Ct. 34, 89 L. Ed. 571, 1944 U.S. LEXIS 350 (1944).

Where action for personal injuries arising out of automobile accident was commenced against nonresident in federal court in Tennessee within the one year period provided by this section and summons was returned that the defendant was no longer in the Tennessee district but could be found at a designated address in another state but nothing further was done until the second term of court thereafter when plaintiff obtained an order for “plures summons” and service in Tennessee more than 22 months after date of the injury, plaintiff's claim was barred by the limitation of this section since plaintiff could have availed himself of the provisions of §§ 20-2-203, 20-2-205 providing means of service on nonresident motorists. Hixon v. Highsmith, 147 F. Supp. 801, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4282 (D. Tenn. 1957).

Suit for damages upon allegation that defendants had conspired to deprive plaintiff from occupying her home with her children and being supported by her husband by counseling certain persons to place her in a mental hospital and advising her husband to divorce her was of a personal nature and barred by this section where the last overt act alleged, the filing of the divorce suit, occurred more than a year prior to the filing of the suit for damages. Emerson v. Machamer, 221 Tenn. 739, 431 S.W.2d 283, 1968 Tenn. LEXIS 500 (1968).

The limitation in this statute begins to run from the date of the alleged wrongful act or from the date of sale of the equipment rather than from the date of damage or injury caused by such act or equipment. Hargraves v. Brackett Stripping Machine Co., 317 F. Supp. 676, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10281 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).

Where wife's claim for loss of consortium was filed one year from date of husband's injury instead of one year after husband's employer purchased the defective equipment which caused the injury, as this claim was derived from husband's personal injuries, the court held that to bar such suit would be against the public policy of Tennessee and the same limitation should apply to both claims. Manning v. Altec, Inc., 488 F.2d 127, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 6665 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1973).

Although the amendment shortening this limitation on actions from six years to one year was given prospective application only, a malpractice action against an attorney which had accrued two years prior to the enactment of the amendment was properly dismissed for failure to commence the action within one year of the effective date of the amendment. Redmon v. Le Fevre, 503 S.W.2d 97, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 432 (Tenn. 1973).

Where suit was not filed in a personal injury action until after the death of the defendant, at which time the period of limitation of action under this section had not expired, and subsequently, after the expiration of the period, the trial court ordered the personal representative as defendant, the court held that that order commenced the action within the meaning of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3, but that the first provision of § 28-1-110 tolled the running of the statute for the same period of time after the appointment of the personal representative as the unexpired period existing at the time of death, up to six months, and that, therefore, the action was not barred by this section. Carpenter v. Johnson, 514 S.W.2d 868, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 460 (Tenn. 1974).

Action by patient and husband against physician and drug manufacturer alleging high blood pressure and heart damage from taking contraceptive pills was not barred by one year period of limitation where action was commenced within one year of time patient was first advised by another physician of causal relationship between pill and such symptoms even though more than a year had lapsed since patient had last taken such medication. Gilbert v. Jones, 523 S.W.2d 211, 1974 Tenn. App. LEXIS 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974).

In action seeking to enforce oral agreement between automobile insurance carrier and person injured in automobile accident with respect to settlement for personal injuries and property damages where there was no allegation that plaintiff failed to file suit within period of limitation because of reliance of promise of insurance carrier to negotiate and no assertion of forbearance as consideration for failure to institute suit within statutory period, claim was barred by limitation of this section. Whitehead v. Davidson, 522 S.W.2d 865, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 725 (Tenn. 1975).

In tort actions including but not restricted to products liability actions predicated on negligence, strict liability or misrepresentation, the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations commences to run when the injury occurs or is discovered or when in the exercise of reasonable diligence it should have been discovered. McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. 1975).

A suit for personal injuries may be brought more than one year after the injury occurs, provided it is brought within one year after it is discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have been discovered. Gosnell v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 674 S.W.2d 737, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2617 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

The fact that the plaintiff wife was disabled mentally and physically from the date of the intentional tort by husband did not exclude her from the application of the pipeline approach in the application of Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 1983 Tenn. LEXIS 723 (1983). Lazarov v. Lazarov, 731 S.W.2d 928, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2561 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

An action for injuries allegedly caused by exposure to asbestos in the work place was not time barred where, even though plaintiffs had been notified by letter more than one year before the action was filed of the possibility that they had an asbestos — related disease, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until they received the results of follow-up testing which they had pursued diligently. Wyatt v. ACandS, Inc., 910 S.W.2d 851, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 717 (Tenn. 1995).

The one-year limitation applicable to employees' claims against an employer based on allegations of outrageous conduct/intentional infliction of emotional distress was not tolled by the employees' filing of administrative charges against the employer. Scarborough v. Brown Group, 972 F. Supp. 1112, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12700 (W.D. Tenn. 1997).

Under the discovery rule, the determination of when the statute of limitations begins to run requires a determination of when the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge that she had sustained an injury. The inquiry does not require that the plaintiff had knowledge that a breach of the appropriate legal standard had occurred. McIntosh v. Blanton, 164 S.W.3d 584, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 531 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (Tenn. Jan. 24, 2005).

Statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff is aware of the facts sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that he has suffered an injury as a result of wrongful conduct, and the plaintiff knows the identity of the person who engaged in the conduct. The statute does not begin to run until the plaintiff had “sufficient information” to put him on notice that he has suffered an injury and that the injury was caused by a wrongful act. McIntosh v. Blanton, 164 S.W.3d 584, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 531 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 74 (Tenn. Jan. 24, 2005).

While T.C.A. § 56-7-1206(d) allows a plaintiff to proceed directly against an uninsured motorist carrier under certain circumstances, even if the uninsured motorist is never successfully served with process, a plaintiff is still required to make a duly diligent effort to serve process on the uninsured motorist, and when that diligent effort is lacking and an unreasonable amount of time passes, a plaintiff can not use the uninsured motorist statute to avoid the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3. Thus, where the insured failed to exercise due diligence to serve the tortfeasor, he could not use T.C.A. § 56-7-1206(d) to avoid the one-year requirement of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 when he later sued his uninsured motorist insurance carrier. Webb v. Werner, 163 S.W.3d 716, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 703 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 240 (Tenn. Mar. 7, 2005).

Class action tolling doctrine was consistent with Tennessee law and the trial court erred in failing to invoke same as to the replacement workers'  individual claims of breach of contract and interference with contract; the doctrine of laches did not prevent the replacement workers from maintaining their claims, in part, because they were not sleeping on their rights when they trusted the former class action plaintiffs to adequately represent their interests. Tigg v. Pirelli Tire Corp., — S.W.3d —, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 812 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2005), rev'd, 232 S.W.3d 28, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 641 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2007).

Doctor's state law claims of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims were barred by T.C.A. § 28-3-104 and the medical malpractice claim was time-barred under T.C.A. § 29-26-116, because the doctor knew or should have known of defendant physician's allegedly actionable statements in a state court malpractice action against the doctor and the doctor failed to bring the current federal action against the physician and others within the applicable statute of limitations. Feild v. Graffagnino, 514 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71052 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 11, 2007).

In an action that arose from a fatal fire at an apartment complex, plaintiffs'  claims against defendants were barred by applicable statutes of limitations where plaintiffs'  counsel intentionally caused delay of prompt service of summons, which rendered the initial filing of the complaint ineffective. Estate of Butler v. Lamplighter Apts., 278 S.W.3d 321, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 488 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2008).

Trial court did not err in granting an uninsured motorist carrier summary judgment because an insured's claim against it was barred; because a driver, the alleged tortfeasor, died prior to the filing of the complaint, in order to comply with the Survival Statute, T.C.A. § 20-5-103(a), the insured was required to serve the driver's personal representative with process prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(1), but the insured failed to submit any evidence showing that an estate was ever established for the grinder. Liput v. Grinder, 405 S.W.3d 664, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 136 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. July 11, 2013).

Trial court did not err in granting an uninsured motorist carrier summary judgment because an insured's claim against it was barred since the insured failed to ever serve any personal representative for a driver's estate; pursuant to T.C.A. § 28-1-110, the one-year statute of limitations contained in T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(1) was tolled for the maximum allowance of six months from the date of the driver's death, but the insured did not obtain issuance of new process within one year of the original issuance as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 to maintain his claim. Liput v. Grinder, 405 S.W.3d 664, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 136 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2013), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 615 (Tenn. July 11, 2013).

Insureds did not comply with the rule because they failed to have any summons issued within one-year of filing the complaint; therefore, the insureds did not strictly comply with the rule and allowed their claim to lapse because the filing of their complaint was insufficient to toll the statute of limitations, and their claim against a driver was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Davis v. Grange Mut. Cas. Grp., — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 646 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2017).

Failure of a driver and her husband to comply with the survival statute by appropriately commencing their personal injury case until after the expiration of the statute of limitations barred their recovery because no new cause of action arose on the date they discovered the decedent's death that extended the statutory period for filing their claim simply on the ground that they failed to realize the decedent died until that date. Putnam v. Leach, 572 S.W.3d 605, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 22 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. May 17, 2018).

Trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss filed by an administrator ad litem because a driver and her husband did not commence their lawsuit within the time afforded by the one-year statute of limitations; the discovery rule was not applicable to delay the commencement of the statute of limitations until the date when the driver and husband determined the decedent passed away because they were aware of the nature and cause of the driver's injuries on the date of the accident. Putnam v. Leach, 572 S.W.3d 605, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 22 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. May 17, 2018).

When a decedent died the survival statute paused the statute of limitations, and because no personal representative was appointed during the six month period following his death, the statute of limitations recommenced; because the statute of limitations period ran before a driver and her husband filed their action against the administrator ad litem, the statute of limitations barred their personal injury claims. Putnam v. Leach, 572 S.W.3d 605, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 22 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2018), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 281 (Tenn. May 17, 2018).

Circuit court properly denied a motion filed by an injured driver and his wife (the plaintiffs) to enlarge the time frame for obtaining new service of process of the defendant driver, and dismissed their automobile negligence suit because they failed to timely serve the defendant with process, acknowledged that their counsel's failure to investigate the lack of personal service sooner was negligent, and failed to follow up with the process server or the trial court clerk to determine whether they needed to effectuate alias service despite having almost 10 months to do so. Webster v. Isaacs, — S.W.3d —, 2019 Tenn. App. LEXIS 404 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2019).

Trial court did not err by finding that this section was applicable to extend the statute of limitations for plaintiff?s personal injury action to two years due to defendant?s traffic citation for failure to exercise due care, and therefore the trial court did not err by denying defendant?s motion for summary judgment, because the traffic citation issued to defendant, which had been prepared, accepted, and the original citation filed with the court, was a criminal charge and a criminal prosecution by a law enforcement officer. Younger v. Okbahhanes, — S.W.3d —, 2021 Tenn. App. LEXIS 33 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2021).

29. — —Disabilities.

The statute of limitations does not run against married women during the disability of coverture, but this does not disqualify her from suing to recover damages for personal injury before the removal of the disqualification if she joins her husband as a nominal plaintiff. Rink v. Campbell, 70 F. 664, 1895 U.S. App. LEXIS 2539 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1895) (decision prior to enactment of Married Women's Act).

As the statutes saving the right of recovery for the personal injuries of a decedent to his widow, children, next of kin, and personal representatives, do not create a new and independent cause of action for them, but merely preserve the right that accrued to the decedent for their benefit, the statute of limitations that began to run against the decedent continues to run against those who succeed to his rights, notwithstanding their disabilities, and bars the action, unless it is brought within one year after the injury was done. Whaley v. Catlett, 103 Tenn. 347, 53 S.W. 131, 1899 Tenn. LEXIS 115 (1899); Love v. Southern R. Co., 108 Tenn. 104, 65 S.W. 475, 1901 Tenn. LEXIS 13, 55 L.R.A. 471 (1901); Davidson Benedict Co. v. Severson, 109 Tenn. 572, 72 S.W. 967, 1902 Tenn. LEXIS 95 (1903), overruled, Jordan v. Baptist Three Rivers Hosp., 984 S.W.2d 593, 1999 Tenn. LEXIS 43 (Tenn. 1999); Smith v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 136 Tenn. 282, 189 S.W. 367, 1916 Tenn. LEXIS 129 (1916).

Plaintiff-students were unable to take advantage of § 28-1-106 in a suit against a teacher for sexual abuse and resulting emotional harm where they did not repress the memory of the incidents and remained aware of their injuries and the wrongfulness of defendant's conduct. Rather than being incapable of protecting their rights, they consciously chose not to pursue the matter to avoid embarrassment; therefore, their reluctance to come forward could not postpone the commencement of the running of either subdivision (a)(1) or § 29-20-305(b). Jane Doe A v. Coffee County Bd. of Educ., 852 S.W.2d 899, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1019 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Where plaintiff's anxiety and depression were not shown to render her of unsound mind and she was aware of facts sufficient to put her on notice that she suffered an injury, her claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations and were not tolled. Jacobs v. Baylor Sch., 957 F. Supp. 1002, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20704 (E.D. Tenn. 1996).

Disability benefits claimant's negligence claim against an insurer and an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 plan administrator was barred by the one-year statute of limitations of T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(1) because even though the claimant should have discovered her injury on January 8, 2003, the date of the misstatement to a doctor's nurse and the same date the doctor refused to write her a prescription for pain medication, she did not file her complaint until more than one year after the alleged misstatement. Newman-Waters v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Tenn., Inc., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27394 (E.D. Tenn. May 27, 2005).

In answer to certified questions, the supreme court of Tennessee held that the tolling provision of Tennessee's legal disability statute remains in effect as to plaintiffs of unsound mind for so long as they remain of unsound mind regardless of the appointment of a legal guardian and/or the commencement of a lawsuit by a representative on behalf of the disabled plaintiff; the discovery rule is inapplicable to plaintiffs of unsound mind for so long as they remain of unsound mind. Abels v. Genie Indus., 202 S.W.3d 99, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 836 (Tenn. 2006).

Plain language of Tennessee's legal disability statute tolls the running of the statute of limitations while the claimant is either under the age of eighteen years, or of unsound mind; the disability of unsound mind is removed when the individual is no longer of unsound mind, due either to a change in the individual's condition or the individual's death and the statute contains no language which would lead the supreme court of Tennessee to conclude that the legislature intended for removal of either of these two disabilities upon appointment of a guardian. Abels v. Genie Indus., 202 S.W.3d 99, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 836 (Tenn. 2006).

The statute of limitations, T.C.A. § 28-3-104, is tolled for purposes of T.C.A. § 28-1-106, the tolling statute, for so long as the person to whom the claim belongs is under a disability because of age or unsound mind. Sullivan v. Chattanooga Med. Investors, 221 S.W.3d 506, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2007).

Court of appeals did not err in reversing the decision of the trial court that found that a deceased nursing home resident's negligence claims against the home were barred by the statute of limitations; the deceased was mentally incapacitated while being a resident at the home, and therefore T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(1), the statute of limitations on the negligence claims, remained tolled by T.C.A. § 28-1-106 until the resident's disability was removed by the resident's death, and the tolling was uninterrupted by the existence of a durable power of attorney in the resident's representative. Sullivan v. Chattanooga Med. Investors, 221 S.W.3d 506, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 361 (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2007).

Grant of summary judgment in favor of the physician in a medical-malpractice action was inappropriate because there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the patient was of unsound mind on the date the cause of action accrued, thus tolling the limitations period. Sherrill v. Souder, 325 S.W.3d 584, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 988 (Tenn. Oct. 28, 2010).

30. — —Accrual of Action.

This Tennessee statute of limitations does not in express terms apply to wrongful death actions instituted under § 20-5-106, but has been construed by the Tennessee Supreme Court to restrict them to one year from the date the decedent was injured. Fowlkes v. Nashville & D. R. Co., 56 Tenn. 829, 1872 Tenn. LEXIS 211 (1872); Wilson v. Massengill, 124 F.2d 666, 1942 U.S. App. LEXIS 4550 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1942), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 686, 62 S. Ct. 1274, 86 L. Ed. 1758, 1942 U.S. LEXIS 572 (1942).

Where the plaintiff's effort is to base his cause of action on alleged consequential damages, by an allegation that he suffered no damages until a year and nine months after the alleged negligent operation by the defendant dentist, the statute began to run from the time of the original injury. Albert v. Sherman, 167 Tenn. 133, 67 S.W.2d 140, 1933 Tenn. LEXIS 17 (1934), overruled in part, Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 438, 93 A.L.R.3d 207 (Tenn. 1974), superseded by statute as stated in, Stanbury v. Bacardi, 953 S.W.2d 671, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. 1997).

Filing of declaration more than one year after accrual of death action did not suspend limitation period where summons was issued within one year period even though Private Acts 1917, ch. 30 stated that in counties with population of more than 150,000 the declaration should be filed upon suing out of summons, since private act could not suspend the general law of the state. Parsons v. American Trust & Banking Co., 168 Tenn. 49, 73 S.W.2d 698, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 19 (1934).

As against an action for personal injuries, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the injury complained of. Brown v. Tennessee Consol. Coal Co., 19 Tenn. App. 123, 83 S.W.2d 568, 1935 Tenn. App. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935).

One year statute of limitations for personal actions began to run on action for alleged negligent handling of divorce suit by attorney when final decree was handed down rather than on final payment of fees. Bland v. Smith, 197 Tenn. 683, 277 S.W.2d 377, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 335, 49 A.L.R.2d 1212 (1955).

In action for personal injuries by employee against employer based on alleged negligence of employer to disclose fact that employee had active tuberculosis after physical examination in employer's medical department revealed such fact, the statute of limitation commenced to run from the date that employee left employment and not from the time of the physical examination since duty of employer to exercise ordinary care to inform employee of his condition continued throughout the period of employer-employee relationship. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Stapleton, 237 F.2d 229, 1956 U.S. App. LEXIS 4323, 69 A.L.R.2d 1206 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1956).

Notwithstanding the provisions of ch. 3, part 2 of this title that actions for injuries as a result of defective improvements of real estate shall be brought within four years after substantial completion of the improvement, one who suffers personal injuries as a result of such defective improvement may bring suit within one year after the date of injury. Leyen v. Dunn, 62 Tenn. App. 239, 461 S.W.2d 41, 1970 Tenn. App. LEXIS 264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970).

Where plaintiff had no previous contact with the building constructed by defendant three years prior to plaintiff's injury, plaintiff's claim was of a consequential nature and the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the time of plaintiff's injury. Vason v. Nickey, 438 F.2d 242, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 11851 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1971).

In action for tortious misrepresentation and negligence the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations commences to run when the injury occurs or is discovered or when in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, it should have been discovered. Curtis v. Murphy Elevator Co., 407 F. Supp. 940, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17216 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).

The accrual date is generally defined as the date when the injury occurs or the date when the injury should have been discovered by a reasonable person. Huggins v. Fulton, 505 F. Supp. 7, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15875 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).

Whereas a plaintiff who is fired cannot exercise control over the triggering act or accrual date but must instead count the injury from the date of the employer's action terminating him, the plaintiff who submits his resignation thereby defines his own accrual date, and an employer who accepts the terms of the resignation is estopped to assert an earlier date. Huggins v. Fulton, 505 F. Supp. 7, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15875 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).

The discovery rule applies only in cases where the plaintiff does not discover and reasonably could not be expected to discover that he has a right of action; it does not permit a plaintiff to wait until he knows all of the injurious effects or consequences of a tortious act. The statute is tolled only during the period when the plaintiff has no knowledge at all that a wrong has occurred, and, as a reasonable person, is not put on inquiry. Woods v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 666 S.W.2d 77, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 666 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

When allegations of discrimination involve a termination from employment, the critical date is the date of termination; the existence of a grievance procedure does not change the importance of this date. Kessler v. Board of Regents, 738 F.2d 751, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 20625 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1984).

In federal civil rights action applying the one year statute of limitation of subsection (a), the cause of action accrued when plaintiff knew of his injury and its connection to the defendants at the time of the alleged assault, despite plaintiff's lack of knowledge of the names of the individuals who allegedly assaulted him. Richmond v. McElyea, 130 F.R.D. 377, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7782 (E.D. Tenn. 1990).

Where dry-cleaning company employee who purchased chemicals for the company became ill from his exposure to chemicals in his work place, his knowledge of his illness and the causal connection between the illness and his exposure to the chemicals involved put him on inquiry as to the manufacturers and suppliers who were the source of the chemicals; and where wife of employee filed wrongful death action more than one year after employee had knowledge of the causal connection, suit was barred. Craig v. R.R. Street & Co., 794 S.W.2d 351, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

Where plaintiff's decedent was the victim of a continuing tort that resulted in a latent, “creeping” disease, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until such a condition was discovered, or until it reasonably could have been discovered, by the injured party. Potts v. Celotex Corp., 796 S.W.2d 678, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 318 (Tenn. 1990).

An earlier manifestation of an asbestos-related disease (asbestosis) did not trigger the running of Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations on a separate, distinct, and later-manifested disease (mesothelioma) that was also caused by exposure to asbestos. A cause of action for a separate and distinct asbestos-related disease does not accrue, under this section, until that disease becomes manifest. Potts v. Celotex Corp., 796 S.W.2d 678, 1990 Tenn. LEXIS 318 (Tenn. 1990).

Plaintiff cardholder knew or was put on notice that he had a claim against defendant bank relative to its handling of his credit card dispute on date when he was first denied credit due to the bank's credit report, and thus the one-year statute of limitations began to run on that date. Yater v. Wachovia Bank, 861 S.W.2d 369, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 359 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

The doctrine of continuing tort did not apply to claims for assault, battery, and false imprisonment. Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12566 (E.D. Tenn. 1997).

Personal tort claims brought by residents near an atomic weapons facility were barred by the one-year statute of limitations, T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(1), (3), since the residents should have known of their causes of action based upon newspaper publicity. Ball v. Union Carbide Corp., 212 F.R.D. 380, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25288 (E.D. Tenn. 2002), aff'd, 376 F.3d 554, 2004 FED App. 229P, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14572 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2004), aff'd, 385 F.3d 713, 2004 FED App. 334A, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 20540 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2004).

Client's legal malpractice action accrued at the latest in June 1997 when, upon signing the settlement statement on that date, the client knew or should have known that the client was not going to get any further payments out of the settlement with her former husband's estate; that realization contained two elements: (1) Knowledge that the client's attorney had not recovered all he allegedly said he would from the estate; and (2) Knowledge that the client had been harmed by the attorney's alleged failure. Swett v. Binkley, 104 S.W.3d 64, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 286 (Tenn. Mar. 17, 2003).

District court properly granted summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 in favor of the government and certain private contractors in an action by two groups of plaintiffs alleging personal injuries and civil rights claims arising from the operation of the nuclear weapons manufacturing and research facilities that the government established in the Oak Ridge Reservation, Tennessee, as part of the Manhattan Project in 1942; the one-year statute of limitations under T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(1) and (3) had run on plaintiffs' claims because extensive news coverage of a government study gave plaintiffs' constructive notice of potential claims; further, the equal protection and due process clauses of U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV did not afford the relief sought by plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because the contractors had no affirmative duty to eliminate the current effects of past discrimination by governmental entities and there was no allegation that the contractors initiated the segregation in the 1940's. Ball v. Union Carbide Corp., 376 F.3d 554, 2004 FED App. 229P, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14572 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2004).

District court properly granted defendants, the government and private contractors, summary judgment on the residents' personal injury claims, because they were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The public record was sufficient to alert the residents as to a possible connection between emissions from the nuclear weapons facilities and health risks; the residents should have been aware of a potential personal injury claim when a steering panel's preliminary reports on the emissions became available; the statute of limitations also applied to the residents' civil rights claims, because they did not seek to eliminate the vestige of past discrimination by asking for desegregation of part of the town surrounding the facilities because they were seeking remedies for potential personal injuries and property damage. Ball v. Union Carbide Corp., 385 F.3d 713, 2004 FED App. 334A, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 20540 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2004).

Husband and wife were placed on notice at the time of the accident that they could file an action against the company that improperly stacked the sheetrock at the time the incident occurred, because they knew that the injury was likely caused by the improper stacking of the sheetrock; thus, dismissal under T.C.A. § 28-3-104 was proper. Schultz v. Davis, 495 F.3d 289, 2007 FED App. 277P, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 17436 (6th Cir. July 23, 2007).

District court did not err in rejecting plaintiff's arguments that accrual of his due process cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on juvenile court proceedings in which he was falsely accused of child sexual abuse, was delayed or extended pursuant to the continuing violation doctrine or the rule of Heck v. Humphrey; therefore, his complaint was time barred under T.C.A. 28-3-104(a)(3). Eidson v. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 2007 FED App. 497P, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 29400 (6th Cir. Dec. 20, 2007).

Because a patient's deposition testimony regarding her March 20, 2002 conversation with a hospital patient advocate was unrefuted by the patient's later affidavit and showed that, by not later than March 20, 2002, the patient was aware of facts sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice of an injury resulting from another's wrongful conduct, the medical malpractice suit filed on April 14, 2003 was untimely and was barred by the statute of limitations. Sampson v. Wellmont Health Sys., 228 S.W.3d 124, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 62 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2007), appeal denied, Sampson v. Wellmont Health Ctr., — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 547 (Tenn. June 18, 2007).

Although knowledge of misconduct on the part of one defendant does not automatically result in a finding of inquiry notice of claims against a potential co-defendant, a plaintiff should be charged with inquiry notice of what an investigation of the potential co-defendant would have revealed where potential co-defendants are closely connected, as with an employer/employee relationship; therefore, a motion to dismiss should have been granted in a case based on sexual abuse perpetrated by a priest because the action was time-barred under T.C.A. § 28-3-104 since a congregant could have learned when he reached the age of majority that he had a right of action against a diocese for negligent supervision and retention, and equitable estoppel, fraudulent concealment, and discovery rule did not operate to toll the limitations period. Doe v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis, 306 S.W.3d 712, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2008), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 144 (Tenn. Mar. 16, 2009).

Dismissal of the passenger's action against the vehicle owner's son after she was injured while riding in a vehicle being driven by the driver was proper because the passenger's claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations under T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(1). The passenger knew, or reasonably should have known, no later than April 7, 2006, that it was the son, and not the father, who loaned the driver the vehicle; the passenger did not amend her complaint to add the son as a defendant until June 9, 2008, over two years later. Strine v. Walton, 323 S.W.3d 480, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 268 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2010), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Tenn. LEXIS 768 (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010).

In a personal injury and products liability case in which the injured party and his spouse sued the makers of a tree/deer stand, and the makers moved for summary judgment, the complaint was untimely under the one-year limitation period in T.C.A. §§ 28-3-104 and 29-28-103. The accrual period was when the injury was discovered, not when the injured party and his spouse discovered who the makers were, and they failed in their duty through the exercise of reasonable care and due diligence to discover who the makers were. Willis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d 700, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110292 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 2011).

31. — —Third Party Defendants.

The statute does not begin to run as to third party defendants until the effective filing of the principal action against the third party plaintiffs. Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 243 F. Supp. 694, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7400 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).

Where plaintiff filed a negligence action against a restaurant for injuries sustained when a stool collapsed, his actions for strict liability and negligence against the manufacturer and the seller of the stool which were brought more than six years from the date of the injury were barred by the statute of limitations, and the enactment of § 20-1-119 after the date of plaintiff's original complaint did not revive the plaintiff's right to assert such claims. Owens v. Truckstops of Am., 915 S.W.2d 420, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 62 (Tenn. 1996).

Trial court properly granted defendants'  motions for summary judgment and to dismiss because the original statute of limitations, T.C.A. § 28-3-104, had expired, and T.C.A. § 20-1-119 could not be utilized to extend the limitations period against defendants; because the trial court failed to direct the entry of a final judgment when it granted defendants'  motions as to plaintiffs'  first amended complaint, the action did not terminate as to defendants, and since no final order was entered against defendants, they remained parties to when plaintiffs sought to assert claims against them in their second amended complaint. Mann v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Tenn. App. LEXIS 422 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2011), rev'd, 380 S.W.3d 42, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 468 (Tenn. July 3, 2012).

32. — —Emotional Harm.

The fact that plaintiffs insisted that they did not become fully aware that they had been “emotionally harmed” until some later date was not enough to toll the statute of limitations. Where they had known for quite some time that defendant had injured them, they were not allowed to delay filing suit until they became fully aware of all the injurious effects of defendant's conduct. Jane Doe A v. Coffee County Bd. of Educ., 852 S.W.2d 899, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1019 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

33. —Form of Action — Statute Applicable.

In an action of trespass for injuries to realty, the plaintiff may recover special damages for personal injuries by way of aggravation of damages to the realty, when specially alleged and proved, though the action for personal injuries is barred, and in this way, this one year statute is evaded. Burson v. Cox, 65 Tenn. 360, 1873 Tenn. LEXIS 365 (1873).

Where the real purpose is to recover for an injury to the person, whether the action be on contract or for tort, one year statute applies. Bodne v. Austin, 156 Tenn. 353, 2 S.W.2d 100, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 128, 62 A.L.R. 1410 (1928), superseded by statute as stated in, Stanbury v. Bacardi, 953 S.W.2d 671, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. 1997).

In malpractice suit, though declaration alleged breach of contract, if it sought compensation for personal injury, the one year statute of limitations is applicable. Bodne v. Austin, 156 Tenn. 353, 2 S.W.2d 100, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 128, 62 A.L.R. 1410 (1928), superseded by statute as stated in, Stanbury v. Bacardi, 953 S.W.2d 671, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. 1997).

The one year statute does not apply to actions for trespass or on contract where there is no element of injury to the person. Bodne v. Austin, 156 Tenn. 353, 2 S.W.2d 100, 1927 Tenn. LEXIS 128, 62 A.L.R. 1410 (1928), superseded by statute as stated in, Stanbury v. Bacardi, 953 S.W.2d 671, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 498 (Tenn. 1997).

Suit against sheriff and sureties to recover for personal injuries inflicted on plaintiff was governed by one year limitation period for personal injury, instead of six year period in § 28-3-109 governing suits against sureties, and 10 year period in § 28-3-110 governing suits against sheriff on bond. State v. Head, 194 Tenn. 576, 253 S.W.2d 756, 1952 Tenn. LEXIS 423 (1952).

Where former sheriff brings action against surety company on indemnity bonds given by former deputy sheriffs who, while still in office, were involved in automobile accident which resulted in a judgment against such sheriff, the action is not only based on a contract, but is founded solely on the contract, and the six year contract statute, not the one year tort statute, applies. Jones v. Bozeman, 196 Tenn. 633, 270 S.W.2d 185, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 431 (1954).

Where plaintiff who was struck by automobile failed to file suit within the one year period provided by this section as a result of statement of claims adjuster that if plaintiff would not employ an attorney and would deal directly with the adjuster such adjuster would authorize direct payment of hospital and doctor bills, subsequent suit brought on theory of contract was not barred by the one year period provided by this section but was governed by the six year period relating to contracts. Jackson v. Kemp, 211 Tenn. 438, 365 S.W.2d 437, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 364 (1963).

Although plaintiffs undertook to rest their claims upon breaches of contract of warranty where the alleged defendants inflicted injuries to their person and sought recovery for such injuries they were governed by this section. Bowling v. Ford Motor Co., 296 F. Supp. 312, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9671 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).

Where an insurance company sues the parents of a minor child who assumed liability for the child's torts when the child applied for a driver's license according to the requirements of former § 55-7-104(c) and (d), such action is one in tort and is controlled by the one-year statute of limitations set out in this section. Bankers Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Sampley, 420 F.2d 300, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 11375 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1970).

The limitation of § 47-2-725 controls all actions wherein a breach of warranty of contract of sale of goods is alleged, irrespective of whether the damages sought are for personal injuries or injuries to property, while this section controls actions for personal injuries and § 28-3-105 controls actions for injuries to property where such actions are based on common law negligence or strict liability in the sale of goods. Layman v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 224 Tenn. 396, 455 S.W.2d 594, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 338 (1970); McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 668 (Tenn. 1975).

Where insured paid claim under uninsured motorist provision after negligent motorist's insurer denied coverage its suit was for indemnification with six-year statute of limitations rather than for subrogation which had one-year statute of limitations and under which suit would have been barred by statute's expiration. Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 511 S.W.2d 713, 1972 Tenn. App. LEXIS 283 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).

In action alleging employment discrimination by employee against employer and local unions, court stated action was analogous to tort rather than contract and was governed by this section. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 489 F.2d 525, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 6839 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1973), aff'd, 421 U.S. 454, 95 S. Ct. 1716, 44 L. Ed. 2d 295, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 15 (1975).

Suit against driver, owner, vendor, and component parts manufacturer of dump truck by administratrix of victim whose death was alleged to be the result of injuries sustained when gravel spilled upon him, was a transitory action, sounding either in contract or in tort, and subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Commercial Truck & Trailer Sales, Inc. v. McCampbell, 580 S.W.2d 765, 1979 Tenn. LEXIS 427 (Tenn. 1979).

Where the complaint and the record showed that the gravamen of the action was mental anguish, anxiety, humiliation, embarrassment and damage to reputation with regard to plaintiff's credit, and was not based on contract arising out of his credit agreement with defendant, the one-year limitation applicable to tort actions, and not the six-year period, applied. Yater v. Wachovia Bank, 861 S.W.2d 369, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 359 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

34. — —Inapplicable.

This section does not apply to a cause of action for breach of a union's duty of fair representation. Headrick v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 526 F. Supp. 604, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17692 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).

Action by union member against union for breach of duty of fair representation and against his employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement was an action in tort relating to an injury to property, plaintiff's interest in his job, governed by the statute of limitations in § 28-3-105. Nevils v. McDowell Contractors, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 502, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9829 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).

35. —Real Estate Improvement Defects.

An action for personal injury arising from defects in improvement of real estate must be commenced within one year after the date of the injury or the date the injury was discovered or should have been discovered with reasonable care and diligence, and within four years after substantial completion of the improvement unless the injury occurs in the fourth year after substantial completion in which case the action must be commenced within one year from the injury. Watts v. Putnam County, 525 S.W.2d 488, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 659 (Tenn. 1975).

Action for damages for sexual abuse against plaintiff's former foster father accrued when she was aware of the injury, which was, at the latest, on the date she had an abortion. Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W.2d 49, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 540 (Tenn. 1997).

36. —Renewal of Action.

This statute and the statute authorizing renewal of an action after dismissal on grounds not concluding the rights are applicable to the statutory right of widows and next of kin to sue for personal injuries to deceased. Rye v. Dupont Rayon Co., 163 Tenn. 95, 40 S.W.2d 1041, 1931 Tenn. LEXIS 92 (1931).

Wrongful death action instituted within one year after accident which was dismissed, and refiled on the same day in another county was not barred by one year limitation period on the ground that second suit was filed more than one year after accident, since new suit was filed within one year after dismissal of first suit. Denny v. Webb, 199 Tenn. 39, 281 S.W.2d 698, 1955 Tenn. LEXIS 426 (1955).

The statute of limitations could have been avoided by recommencement by the issuance of a new summons on the same cause of action within one year from the date of failure to execute the first. Reeves v. Thompson, 490 S.W.2d 525, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 525 (Tenn. 1973).

Where plaintiff took a voluntary dismissal without prejudice and refiled his action within one year after dismissal but more than one year after cause of action accrued, his suit was not barred by this section as he came within the saving provisions of § 28-106 (now § 28-1-105). Stewart v. University of Tennessee, 519 S.W.2d 591, 1974 Tenn. LEXIS 431 (Tenn. 1974).

In a personal injury action, where plaintiffs did not obtain the issuance of new process within six months of the issuance of previous process or recommence their action within one year of the issuance of the initial process pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3, they could not rely on the date of filing of their original complaint to toll the running of the statute of limitations pursuant to § 28-1-105. Gregory v. McCulley, 912 S.W.2d 175, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 524 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

37. —Waiver.

Failure of the widow to bring suit for wrongful death under § 20-5-107 for seven months after the decedent's death was not such delay as to constitute a waiver of the right of action. Koontz v. Fleming, 17 Tenn. App. 1, 65 S.W.2d 821, 1933 Tenn. App. LEXIS 44 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1933).

Agreement between the parties for suspension of statute of limitations in a tort action does not amount to a waiver of any defense which might otherwise have been permitted if the tort action had been brought. Jackson v. Kemp, 211 Tenn. 438, 365 S.W.2d 437, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 364 (1963).

A promise not to plead the statute of limitations made before the remedy is barred may be given in exchange for forbearance to bring suit. Jackson v. Kemp, 211 Tenn. 438, 365 S.W.2d 437, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 364 (1963).

The statute of limitations is for the benefit of individuals and not to secure general objects of policy and may be waived by express contract or by necessary implication or its benefits may be lost by conduct invoking the established principles of estoppel in pais. Jackson v. Kemp, 211 Tenn. 438, 365 S.W.2d 437, 1963 Tenn. LEXIS 364 (1963).

Decedent's children did not waive the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense to a partition action because, although they did not assert the defense before the start of the trial, they properly pleaded the statute of limitations in their answer to the amended petition. Stokely v. Stokely, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 17 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2018).

38. —Estoppel.

Where the insurance company ignored the claim until after the one-year statute of limitations expired it was estopped from relying on the statute. Price v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 486 S.W.2d 721, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 328 (Tenn. 1972).

Where defendant by fraud and deceit induced plaintiff to accept a personal injury settlement and delay legal action on her claim the doctrine of equitable estoppel barred defendant from pleading the statute of limitations. Jackson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 403 F. Supp. 986, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15309 (M.D. Tenn. 1975), modified, Edwards v. Travelers Ins. of Hartford, 563 F.2d 105, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 11251 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1977).

39. —Minors.

Where an infant has received a personal injury, he may, by next friend, sue during his infancy, or in his own name, within one year after coming of age. Whirley v. Whiteman, 38 Tenn. 610, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 236 (1858), overruled in part, McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 336 (Tenn. 1992); Cargle v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 75 Tenn. 717, 1881 Tenn. LEXIS 177 (1881).

The parent's right of action for loss of service resulting from an injury to a minor child is barred by the one year statute of limitations. Blackwell v. Memphis S. R. Co., 124 Tenn. 516, 137 S.W. 486, 1911 Tenn. LEXIS 60 (1911).

Where an action for personal injuries was brought by a minor by his next friend, and the minor died before the trial and nonsuit was taken and a new action brought, the first case was not res judicata because it was not tried on its merits, and the statute of limitations does not bar an infant. Read Phosphate Co. v. Vickers, 11 Tenn. App. 146, — S.W.2d —, 1930 Tenn. App. LEXIS 6 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1930).

A right of action for wrongful death of a minor child, prosecuted for benefit of the father as next of kin in the name of the personal representative, is subject to the statute of limitations of one year. Where such action was erroneously begun by the father, and the administrator was not substituted as plaintiff until after a year had elapsed, the running of the statute was arrested at the date of filing of the original pleading, the substitution of the administrator not being a change in the cause of action nor an addition of a new party with other than a formal interest. Whitson v. Tennessee C. R. Co., 163 Tenn. 35, 40 S.W.2d 396, 1930 Tenn. LEXIS 136 (1931).

Where a 19-year-old minor was injured in an auto accident on December 19, 1969, and attained his majority by virtue of the Legal Responsibility Act of 1971 (amending §§ 28-1-106, 29-31-101, 39-1003 (now § 39-17-310), 39-3706 (repealed), 57-3-210) on May 11, 1971, his action for damages commenced on December 7, 1972, was dismissed under this section and § 28-1-106. Arnold v. Davis, 503 S.W.2d 100, 1973 Tenn. LEXIS 433 (Tenn. 1973).

One-year statute of limitations had not begun to run against minor's guardian joined as defendant two years after original complaint was filed; under § 28-1-106 the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the minor attained the age of 18 years, and a statute which has not run as to the minor's claim has not run as to his guardian. State use of Brooks v. Gunn, 667 S.W.2d 499, 1984 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2621 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

40. —Injuries of Employees.

Third party action by employer of injured person is a suit to recover damages for personal injuries since based on statutory subrogation, hence one year statute of limitations for personal injury suits applies. J. F. Elkins Const. Co. v. Naill Bros., 168 Tenn. 165, 76 S.W.2d 326, 1934 Tenn. LEXIS 35, 95 A.L.R. 1429 (1934).

The limitation of an action for personal injuries, which resulted from the coal miner's breathing of dust produced by drilling, began to run from the time the injury was first inflicted, and not from the time the employee first obtained knowledge of the dangerous character of such dust. Brown v. Tennessee Consol. Coal Co., 19 Tenn. App. 123, 83 S.W.2d 568, 1935 Tenn. App. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935).

In an action for personal injury by a coal miner, for injury produced by inhaling dust, which produced the disease of silicosis, plaintiffs could recover damages sustained during the year prior to the institution of the suit. Brown v. Tennessee Consol. Coal Co., 19 Tenn. App. 123, 83 S.W.2d 568, 1935 Tenn. App. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935).

Where a coal miner seeks to recover damages resulting from silicosis contracted by inhaling dust produced by drilling, he cannot recover for negligent acts of the employer, which produced such disease, occurring more than a year prior to commencement of the action. Brown v. Tennessee Consol. Coal Co., 19 Tenn. App. 123, 83 S.W.2d 568, 1935 Tenn. App. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935).

One who had worked in a coal mine as a driver boss, mostly in the main entrance where the air currents were heavy, and was later removed to a sand house where he was engaged in drying river sand, and only occasionally was there dust in the process of sieving the sand, cannot recover damages resulting from silicosis, in the absence of a showing that the breathing of such dust produced by such work would cause such disease. Brown v. Tennessee Consol. Coal Co., 19 Tenn. App. 123, 83 S.W.2d 568, 1935 Tenn. App. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935).

In an action by a coal miner for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by inhalation of fine particles of dust caused by the drilling and blasting operations, the allegation in the complaint that defendant, employer, negligently failed to warn plaintiff of the danger, thereby concealing the fact from plaintiff and keeping him ignorant of his right of action, is not a sufficient allegation of fraudulent concealment by defendant of plaintiff's cause of action, so as to toll the statute of limitations. Brown v. Tennessee Consol. Coal Co., 19 Tenn. App. 123, 83 S.W.2d 568, 1935 Tenn. App. LEXIS 24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1935).

This section did not bar an action brought by an employee for personal injuries caused by working in a room insufficiently equipped to remove impure air containing starchy dust, in violation of Tennessee statutes, within one year from the time the employee ceased breathing the dust. Goodall Co. v. Sartin, 141 F.2d 427, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3691 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 709, 65 S. Ct. 34, 89 L. Ed. 571, 1944 U.S. LEXIS 350 (1944); Hercules Powder Co. v. Bannister, 171 F.2d 262, 1948 U.S. App. LEXIS 2820 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1948).

In an employee's action for damages sustained from an occupational disease, the trial court correctly applied the doctrine of continuing negligence as suspending the operation of the statute of limitations where it charged that if the jury believed that the negligence of the employer was the continuing cause of the injury, the statute of limitations did not begin to run as long as the negligence continued, or until the termination of the employment. Hercules Powder Co. v. Bannister, 171 F.2d 262, 1948 U.S. App. LEXIS 2820 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1948).

Suit by Texas employee to recover damages against manufacturer of defective ladder for injuries sustained in fall was not barred by one year limitation period though suit was filed more than one year after accident, if suit was filed within one year after payment of compensation where Texas Workers' Compensation Act required employee to first file claim for compensation and cause of action against third party did not accrue until after payment of compensation. Hutto v. Benson, 212 F.2d 349, 1954 U.S. App. LEXIS 3371 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 831, 75 S. Ct. 52, 99 L. Ed. 655, 1954 U.S. LEXIS 1756 (1954).

Worker's compensation recipient must bring action against nonresident third party tortfeasor in another state within one year after the injury or as a matter of law the cause of action is assigned to his employer since § 28-1-111 does not toll the running of the period specified in § 50-914 (now § 50-6-112). Willis v. Weil Pump Co., 130 F. Supp. 896, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2281 (D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 222 F.2d 261, 1955 U.S. App. LEXIS 3797 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1955).

Where involved injury provided benefits to an injured person under Workers' Compensation Law, the action against the third party wrongdoer was controlled by state statute providing that period of limitation ran from date of injury. Williams v. Singer Co., 457 F.2d 799, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 10675 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1972).

Suit by workers' compensation recipient against manufacturer and supplier of equipment for injuries sustained during the course of employment was governed by limitation of § 50-914 (now § 50-6-112) rather than that of this section. Dobbins v. Terrazzo Machine & Supply Co., 479 S.W.2d 806, 1972 Tenn. LEXIS 401 (Tenn. 1972).

Employee was at-will and therefore one-year statutory limit of T.C.A. § 28-3-104 applied because employment agreement he signed specifically stated that he understood that this employment was not for any definite term and could be terminated at any time without advance notice; employee acknowledged that the terms contained in the employment agreement constituted to the entirety of his agreement with his employer, and employee handbook did not change employee's status to that of a contract or definite time period employee because employer reserved the right to unilaterally amend the handbook and it stated that it was not intended as a contract. Sudberry v. Royal & Sun Alliance, 344 S.W.3d 904, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 607 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2008).

One-year statute of limitations that was borrowed from Tennessee law applied to an employee's retaliation claim under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729, because the FCA lacked a limitations period for retaliation claims when the action was filed, the employee was an employee at will, and claims of employees at will were deemed personal injury claims; the action was time-barred because it was filed more than a year after the employee was terminated. United States v. Medquest Assocs., 812 F. Supp. 2d 821,  2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94413 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 23, 2011), rev'd, United States ex rel Hobbs v. Medquest Assocs., 711 F.3d 707, 2013 FED App. 85P (6th Cir.), 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 6425 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2013).

Because an employee sought damages flowing from the termination of her employment and her employment relationship was terminable at will, the employee's misrepresentation claim against a former employer was subject to the one-year statute of limitations in T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(1) rather than the three-year period of T.C.A. § 28-3-105; the misrepresentation claim was time-barred because the employee knew or should have discovered that she sustained an injury as a result of the employer's allegedly tortious conduct more than one year before she filed her action. Evans v. Walgreen Co., 813 F. Supp. 2d 897,  2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95753 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 25, 2011).

41. —Products Liability.

The 1969 amendment to this section (Acts 1969, ch. 293) providing that with respect to personal injury actions arising out of products liability, cause of action accrues as of date of personal injury and not the date of the negligence or the sale of the product was inapplicable to suit commenced before the effective date of the amendment, and such suit was barred where commenced more than a year after alleged negligent sale of automobile. Bates v. Shapard, 224 Tenn. 672, 461 S.W.2d 946, 1970 Tenn. LEXIS 372 (1970).

Employee's cause of action accrued from the date of his injury rather than from the date of purchase of the defective product. Hodge v. Service Machine Co., 438 F.2d 347, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 11784 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1971).

In personal injury action in products liability case wherein the injury occurred prior to the 1969 amendment providing that statute of limitations commences to run from date of injury rather than date of negligence or sale of product, suit was barred where injury occurred more than one year after sale of product. Flynn v. Camp, 225 Tenn. 457, 470 S.W.2d 347, 1971 Tenn. LEXIS 314 (1971), superseded by statute as stated in, McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487, 1975 Tenn. LEXIS 728 (Tenn. 1975); Hargrove v. Newsome, 225 Tenn. 462, 470 S.W.2d 348, 1971 Tenn. LEXIS 315 (1971).

Products liability statute of limitations in § 29-28-103 does not repeal, alter or amend this section, but rather superimposes its 10 year ceiling upon existing limitations. Stutts v. Ford Motor Co., 574 F. Supp. 100, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12082 (M.D. Tenn. 1983).

Application of the ten-year statute of repose in § 29-28-103(a) does not conflict with subsection (b) of this section. Wyatt v. A-Best Prods. Co., 924 S.W.2d 98, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 770 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995), appeal denied, — S.W.2d —, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 371 (Tenn. May 28, 1996).

Statute of limitations, T.C.A. § 28-3-104, had expired as to a truck buyer's products liability negligence claim against the seller, because it was filed more than one year after a nonsuit, T.C.A. § 28-1-105. The buyer's strict liability claim under T.C.A. § 29-28-106(b) was timely, however, because this claim did not accrue until the manufacturer was insolvent. Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 889, 2011 Tenn. LEXIS 1151 (Tenn. Dec. 15, 2011).

42. —Latent Diseases.

Assuming § 68-32-102 applies, hemophiliac plaintiff's suit against defendant manufacturer of blood-clotting factor was time barred by § 29-28-103. The plaintiff's claims manifestly related to a product and this section governing the statute of limitations for injuries to the person did not apply. Therefore, plaintiff had one year from product distribution date to bring suit even though AIDS diagnosis followed three years later. Spence v. Miles Lab., 37 F.3d 1185, 1994 FED App. 352P, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 29071 (6th Cir. 1994).

43. Civil Conspiracy.

The statute of limitations for personal injury claims applies to personal injuries resulting from the tort of civil conspiracy. Braswell v. Carothers, 863 S.W.2d 722, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 294 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

44. Libel.

The statute runs from the publication of the libel. Brownlow v. Jones, 33 Tenn. 170, 1853 Tenn. LEXIS 24 (1853).

A showing of special damages in the loss of contracts due to the publication of libelous statements was barred by the statute of limitations where the loss occurred more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint. Riley v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 172 F.2d 303, 1949 U.S. App. LEXIS 2701 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1949).

This statute of limitations did not bar an action for libel where there was a republication of the more than year old libelous statements two months before the action was commenced. Riley v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 172 F.2d 303, 1949 U.S. App. LEXIS 2701 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1949).

A cause of action for libel in an “amended” complaint filed January 5, 1973, was barred by the statute of limitations since the original complaint was filed August 5, 1971, and was dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and where the record showed that the word “amended” had been stricken and a new civil action number assigned the second complaint was viewed as a new cause of action and the statute of limitations was not tolled since the libel action was not substantially the same cause of action as in the original complaint. Worthams v. Atlanta Life Ins. Co., 533 F.2d 994, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 11791 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1976).

Libel suit concerning two television broadcasts filed more than sixteen months after the second broadcast was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Ali v. Moore, 984 S.W.2d 224, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 1998).

Claims based on television broadcasts are generally treated as libel, rather than slander, particularly if they are based on written scripts. Ali v. Moore, 984 S.W.2d 224, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 398 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 489 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 1998).

Employee's defamation claim was time-barred because it was filed more than one year after a former employer made allegedly defamatory statements regarding the employee's alleged anger management problem and threatening demeanor. Evans v. Walgreen Co., 813 F. Supp. 2d 897,  2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95753 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 25, 2011).

45. Criminal Conversation.

Where complainant knew that his wife was affectionate toward defendant in 1941 shortly after they moved on to defendant's farm as tenants a suit for criminal conversation filed in 1945 was barred by this section. Broidioi v. Hall, 188 Tenn. 236, 218 S.W.2d 737, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 335 (1949).

Complaint for criminal conversation was governed by one year limitation period of this section though alienation of affections was also alleged in complaint where latter cause was not set forth in a second count. Broidioi v. Hall, 188 Tenn. 236, 218 S.W.2d 737, 1949 Tenn. LEXIS 335 (1949).

In suit for alienation of husband's affections based on criminal conversation of husband and defendant statute of limitations started to run when plaintiff knew about acts of criminal conversation even though a reconciliation was attempted by plaintiff with husband, and one year statute applied. Scates v. Nailling, 196 Tenn. 508, 268 S.W.2d 561, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 413 (1954).

“Criminal conversation” means adulterous relations as used in one year statute of limitations. Rheudasil v. Clower, 197 Tenn. 27, 270 S.W.2d 345, 1954 Tenn. LEXIS 447, 46 A.L.R.2d 1083 (1954), superseded by statute as stated in, Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. 1991).

Since the amendment to § 28-3-105 so as to specifically provide a three year limitation for suits for alienation of affection, suits of that nature are governed by that section rather than this section, even though such alienation is alleged to have been accomplished by acts constituting criminal conversation. Nabors v. Keaton, 216 Tenn. 637, 393 S.W.2d 382, 1965 Tenn. LEXIS 609 (1965).

The statutory exception (Acts 1990, ch. 1056, § 4) for previously-filed actions was merely a legislative recognition of the constitutionally-required separation of legislative and judicial powers, and did not deprive the supreme court of the power to abolish criminal conversation actions filed prior to the effective date of the 1990 amendment to this section by Acts 1990, ch. 1056 (January 1, 1991). Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 156 (Tenn. 1991), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 199 (Tenn. May 20, 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 942, 112 S. Ct. 381, 116 L. Ed. 2d 332, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 6263 (1991).

46. —Alienation of Affections.

For a decision discussing the statute of limitations concerning the now abolished common law action for alienation of affections, see Roberts v. Berry, 541 F.2d 607, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 7276 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1976).

47. Seduction.

The cause of action for seduction accrues when the first act of sexual intercourse is committed, but the statute of limitations does not begin to run against an action therefor, as long as the relations are continued, especially where the seduction was accomplished under promise of marriage, and the sexual intercourse was repeated and continued under a continuation and renewal of such promise. In such case, the statute begins to run from the last act of sexual intercourse, as seduction is, in such case, a continuous act. This is the rule, whether the action for the seduction is prosecuted by the female herself, or by her father. Thompson v. Clendening, 38 Tenn. 287, 1858 Tenn. LEXIS 177 (1858); Davis v. Young, 90 Tenn. 303, 16 S.W. 473, 1891 Tenn. LEXIS 23 (1891); Ferguson v. Moore, 98 Tenn. 342, 39 S.W. 341, 1896 Tenn. LEXIS 229 (Tenn. Dec. 1896); Heggie v. Hayes, 141 Tenn. 219, 208 S.W. 605, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 83, 3 A.L.R. 150 (1919).

Although the contract of marriage was not entered into prior to the first illicit act of sexual intercourse, if the contract existed thereafter concurrently with the illicit intercourse, such contract was sufficient to prevent the defendant from referring the statute of limitations to the first unlawful act. Heggie v. Hayes, 141 Tenn. 219, 208 S.W. 605, 1918 Tenn. LEXIS 83, 3 A.L.R. 150 (1919).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow defendant to plead statute of limitations in an action for seduction where defendant had previously been required to plead his defenses specially, and where amendment was not sought until after plaintiff had introduced her evidence and rested, the court had overruled a motion for a directed verdict and plaintiff had been required to elect between the count for seduction and one for breach of promise to marry. Caccamisi v. Thurmond, 39 Tenn. App. 245, 282 S.W.2d 633, 1954 Tenn. App. LEXIS 165 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954).

Where plea of statute of limitations was not made in seduction case the case presented for trial was in all respects as if the suit had been filed within one year after the first act of intercourse between plaintiff and defendant. Caccamisi v. Thurmond, 39 Tenn. App. 245, 282 S.W.2d 633, 1954 Tenn. App. LEXIS 165 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954).

48. Action by Client Against Attorney.

Prior to the 1967 amendment of this section, action by client against attorney for financial losses sustained when attorney failed to prosecute personal injury action within statute of limitations was governed by six-year period provided by § 28-3-109 for actions on contracts rather than one-year period provided by this section for personal injury actions. Hillhouse v. McDowell, 219 Tenn. 362, 410 S.W.2d 162, 1966 Tenn. LEXIS 631 (1966), superseded by statute as stated in, Swett v. Binkley, 104 S.W.3d 64, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

Relief from the one-year statute of limitations in legal malpractice actions is available only when matters of fact, as opposed to matters of law, are unknown or undisclosed to a prospective plaintiff. Banton v. Marks, 623 S.W.2d 113, 1981 Tenn. App. LEXIS 547 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).

A plaintiff cannot be permitted to wait until he knows all of the injurious effects or consequences of an actionable wrong to delay the accrual of a cause of action. Memphis Aero Corp. v. Swain, 732 S.W.2d 608, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3544 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

Statute of limitations could not begin to run until the attorney's negligence had resulted in injury to the plaintiff and where there was no proof of such injury at time plaintiff was notified of agreed order, summary judgment holding action barred was improper. National Mortg. Co. v. Washington, 744 S.W.2d 574, 1987 Tenn. App. LEXIS 3188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

This section applies to legal malpractice cases. Nobes v. Earhart, 769 S.W.2d 868, 1988 Tenn. App. LEXIS 858 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).

Where attorney, under contract with title company to transact its business, exercised little, if any, independence in carrying out his duties as an agent of the title company, relationship between the parties was that of principal and agent rather than client and attorney, making the one-year statute of limitations for professional negligence inapplicable to suit by title company against attorney. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Smith, 794 S.W.2d 734, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 218 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

Client's cause of action accrued as of the date the attorney's alleged negligence became irremediable; the statute of limitations would only be tolled during the period when the plaintiff had no knowledge that a wrong had occurred and, as a reasonable person, was not put upon inquiry. Price v. Becker, 812 S.W.2d 597, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 141 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), appeal denied, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 301 (Tenn. Aug. 5, 1991).

Plaintiffs' claims for legal malpractice held barred by statute of limitations. Batchelor v. Heiskell, Donelson, Bearman, Adams, Williams & Kirsch, P.C., 828 S.W.2d 388, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 562 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), rehearing denied, — S.W.3d —, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXIS 625 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).

The mere possibility or probability of injury is not enough for a cause of action for legal malpractice to accrue, such that limitations period began to run against plaintiff leasing company only when it was forced to defend the validity of deeds imperfectly secured by defendant attorneys, rendering trial court's summary judgment improper. Caledonia Leasing & Equip. Co. v. Armstrong, Allen, Braden, Goodman, McBride & Prewitt, 865 S.W.2d 10, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 926 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

One-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice began to run on the date the original action became subject to dismissal — not on the date it was actually dismissed. Dukes v. Noe, 856 S.W.2d 403, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 171 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

The “legal malpractice discovery rule” is composed of two distinct elements: plaintiff must suffer a legally cognizable or actual injury as a result of defendant's negligence, and plaintiff must have known or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that the injury was caused by plaintiff's negligence. Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. 1995).

Plaintiffs' cause of action for legal malpractice based on the negligence of defendant attorneys in the preparation of a warranty deed accrued at the time the plaintiffs were sued by the purchasers for breach of warranty, not after the entry of judgment against plaintiffs. Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 1995 Tenn. LEXIS 272 (Tenn. 1995).

In a malpractice action involving failure of a law firm to name a possible codefendant in a personal injury suit, knowledge of the facts and circumstances possessed by the client's attorney were imputed to the client at the time that attorney (a former member of the firm) was substituted as counsel of record for the firm, and the statute of limitations began to run on that date. Smith v. Petkoff, 919 S.W.2d 595, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 618 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); Spar Gas, Inc. v. McCune, 908 S.W.2d 400, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 384 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

Prisoner's legal malpractice action alleging negligence by his attorney regarding a motion in a habeas corpus proceeding for an order to require a comparison test of certain evidence accrued on the date the motion was denied or, at the latest, when the court denied the prisoner's pro se motion for reconsideration of the order denying the test. Rayford v. Leffler, 953 S.W.2d 204, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 249 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).

Plaintiffs' claims for legal malpractice were not barred by statute of limitations. Harriet & Henderson Yarns, Inc. v. Castle, 75 F. Supp. 2d 818, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20841 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).

A cause of action for legal malpractice accrues when: (1) The defendant's negligence causes the plaintiff to suffer a legally cognizable or actual injury; and (2) The plaintiff knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that this injury was caused by defendant's negligence. Wilson v. Mathes, 15 S.W.3d 865, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 726 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

Because negligence without injury is not actionable, the legal malpractice statute of limitations does not begin to run until an attorney's negligence has actually injured the client; furthermore, there is no injury until there is the loss of a right, remedy, or interest or the imposition of a liability. Cherry v. Williams, 36 S.W.3d 78, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 244 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

An appeal does not toll the running of the statute of limitations; therefore, the statute of limitations on plaintiff's legal malpractice claim began to run when the trial court entered its final order setting punitive damages. Cherry v. Williams, 36 S.W.3d 78, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 244 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Following divorce, the gravamen of the client's complaint was not client's attorney's breach of a promise, but was a complaint that the attorney failed to fulfill agreement to recover all the fees and expenses from the former husband or his estate after the former husband died; the complaint clearly came within the legal malpractice statute of limitations contained in former T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(2) [now § 28-3-104(c)]. Swett v. Binkley, 104 S.W.3d 64, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 819 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 286 (Tenn. Mar. 17, 2003).

In a legal malpractice suit, client's claim for malpractice arising from his criminal case which was not filed within one-year of the motion to vacate the judgment was barred by the statute of limitations. Hill v. Moncier, 122 S.W.3d 787, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 467 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), rehearing denied, 122 S.W.3d 787, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 973 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2003 Tenn. LEXIS 1146 (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2003).

Where the couple retained an attorney to draft the necessary documents to subdivide their lot in 1992, regardless of whether the attorney's alleged failure to advise them of the zoning requirements related to minimum lot size requirements was the proximate cause of their injury, the couple suffered no injury until April 1998 when they discovered, through the purchaser's lawyer that the subdivision had been illegal; thus, per the discovery rule, the limitations period for the couple's malpractice action did not begin until the latter date. Wilson v. Pickens, 196 S.W.3d 138, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 655 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 262 (Tenn. 2006) .

Trial court did not err in granting the attorney's second motion for summary judgment on the inmate's legal malpractice action where the trial court was not prohibited from reviewing the statute of limitations question on remand and inmate's complaint was filed well beyond one-year time limit imposed by former T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(2) [now § 28-3-104(c)]. Crafton v. Van Den Bosch, 196 S.W.3d 767, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 749 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 499 (Tenn. May 30, 2006).

In a legal malpractice case arising out of the 1986 sale of a family farm, plaintiff's claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. With the exercise of diligence, plaintiff could have known of any alleged wrongful conduct many years before the filing of his first suit in 2010. Irvin v. Bass, Berry & Sims, PLC— S.W.3d —, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2015), appeal denied, Irvin v. Bass, Berry & Sims, PLC, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. LEXIS 45 (Tenn. Jan. 13, 2016).

Denial of attorneys'  motion to dismiss clients'  legal malpractice claims was appropriate, when summary judgment was entered for a bank and an individual and the client's underlying case was voluntarily dismissed as to another bank, because the clients'  legal malpractice complaint failed to establish an actual injury prior to the date of the final judgment in the underlying case. The clients'  claims as to the voluntary dismissal and the interlocutory summary judgment in the underlying case were separate claims. Story v. Bunstine, 538 S.W.3d 455, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 747 (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2017).

Because a client alleged intentional misconduct, his claim for fraudulent billing was not barred by the one-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice. Vazeen v. Sir, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 709 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2018).

49. —Legal Malpractice Discovery Rule.

When a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues is determined by applying the discovery rule. Under this rule, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should know that an injury has been sustained as a result of wrongful or tortious conduct by the defendant. John Kohl & Co. P.C. v. Dearborn & Ewing, 977 S.W.2d 528, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. 1998); Bradson Mercantile, Inc. v. Crabtree, 1 S.W.3d 648, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

The knowledge component of the discovery rule may be established by evidence of actual or constructive knowledge of the injury. John Kohl & Co. P.C. v. Dearborn & Ewing, 977 S.W.2d 528, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. 1998); Bradson Mercantile, Inc. v. Crabtree, 1 S.W.3d 648, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

Under the theory of constructive knowledge, the statute of limitations may begin to run at an earlier date; that is, whenever the plaintiff becomes aware or reasonably should have become aware of facts sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that an injury has been sustained as a result of the defendant's negligent or wrongful conduct. John Kohl & Co. P.C. v. Dearborn & Ewing, 977 S.W.2d 528, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. 1998); Bradson Mercantile, Inc. v. Crabtree, 1 S.W.3d 648, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

There is no requirement under the theory of constructive knowledge that the plaintiff actually know the specific type of legal claim he or she has, or that the injury constituted a breach of the appropriate legal standard; rather, the plaintiff is deemed to have discovered the right of action if the person is aware of facts sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that the person has suffered an injury as a result of wrongful conduct. John Kohl & Co. P.C. v. Dearborn & Ewing, 977 S.W.2d 528, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. 1998); Bradson Mercantile, Inc. v. Crabtree, 1 S.W.3d 648, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

An actual injury occurs when there is the loss of a legal right, remedy or interest, or the imposition of a liability; and it may also take the form of the plaintiff being forced to take some action or otherwise suffer some actual inconvenience, such as incurring an expense, as a result of the defendant's negligent or wrongful act. John Kohl & Co. P.C. v. Dearborn & Ewing, 977 S.W.2d 528, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. 1998); Bradson Mercantile, Inc. v. Crabtree, 1 S.W.3d 648, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

The injury element of the legal malpractice discovery rule is not met if it is contingent upon a third party's actions or amounts to a mere possibility. John Kohl & Co. P.C. v. Dearborn & Ewing, 977 S.W.2d 528, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. 1998); Bradson Mercantile, Inc. v. Crabtree, 1 S.W.3d 648, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

Plaintiffs suffered an actual injury for purposes of the legal malpractice discovery rule when they began to incur expenses, or at least had to take some action, as a result of the defendant's negligent advice. John Kohl & Co. P.C. v. Dearborn & Ewing, 977 S.W.2d 528, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 546 (Tenn. 1998); Bradson Mercantile, Inc. v. Crabtree, 1 S.W.3d 648, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

Constructive knowledge of an injury in a legal malpractice action requires that the plaintiff know or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should know that he or she has sustained an injury as a result of the defendant's wrongful or tortious conduct. The plaintiff's knowledge need not rise to the level of an actual awareness that his or her injury constituted a breach of the appropriate legal standard. In this case, an issue of material fact remains as to whether divorce plaintiff knew or should have known of her attorney's allegedly wrongful trial conduct before she consulted another attorney. Tanaka v. Meares, 980 S.W.2d 210, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 319 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), review or rehearing denied, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 635 (Tenn. Oct. 19, 1998).

The cause of action accrued when the plaintiff first became aware that his initial case had been dismissed because of his first attorney's negligence, not when the judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the court of appeals. Wilkins v. Dodson, Parker, Shipley, Behm & Seaborg, 995 S.W.2d 575, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 751 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), aff'd, Brown v. Bruce Hardwood Floors, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 752 (Tenn. Dec. 31, 1998).

Client's cause of action for legal malpractice accrued when the client knew or should have known of his first attorney's alleged malpractice in suit against a bank following the client's attendance at a deposition in which the bank asserted a statute of limitations defense and pled the defense in its answer. Wilkins v. Dodson, Parker, Shipley, Behm & Seaborg, 995 S.W.2d 575, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 751 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), aff'd, Brown v. Bruce Hardwood Floors, — S.W.2d —, 1998 Tenn. LEXIS 752 (Tenn. Dec. 31, 1998).

A cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiffs have suffered actual injury. Harriet & Henderson Yarns, Inc. v. Castle, 75 F. Supp. 2d 818, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20841 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).

The plaintiff is deemed to have discovered the right of action if the person is aware of facts sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that the person has suffered an injury as a result of wrongful conduct. Wilson v. Mathes, 15 S.W.3d 865, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 726 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).

An attorney's purposeful concealment from a client of facts that prevents the client from learning of an injury can toll the statute of limitations on legal malpractice; reliance upon erroneous legal advice cannot operate to toll the statute of limitations on legal malpractice inasmuch as the discovery rule relating to injury only applies to matters of fact unknown to a prospective plaintiff, not to matters of law. Cherry v. Williams, 36 S.W.3d 78, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 244 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

A “continuing representation” argument is subsumed into the discovery rule; therefore, in the context of a legal malpractice claim, a litigant who learns that it has suffered a cognizable legal injury and that this injury was caused by the negligence of its lawyer but who continues to be represented by that lawyer will be forever barred from bringing suit against the lawyer unless it files suit within one year after the discovery of the injury and its cause. Cherry v. Williams, 36 S.W.3d 78, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 244 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Client's legal malpractice claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations of former T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(2) [now § 28-3-104(c)], and therefore the attorneys were properly granted summary judgment, because the client knew or should have known that it had suffered a legally cognizable injury no later than March 3, 1994, the date it was served with a creditor's complaint to revoke the order confirming the reorganization plan, and the client did not sue the attorneys until February 2001. A tolling agreement entered into between the parties that deemed the client's complaint to have been filed on August 3, 1995, five months after the statute of limitations, did not preclude the attorneys from asserting the statute of limitations offense. Tenn-Fla Partners v. Shelton, 233 S.W.3d 825, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2007), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 703 (Tenn. Aug. 13, 2007).

Client's legal malpractice complaint was filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations period, where the client was injured when it was hailed into court to defend the enforceability of a contract drawn up by the attorney and thus, the client knew of should have known of a “potential problem” with the contract at the time it was hailed into court, well over one year before filing the complaint. Cardiac Anesthesia Servs., PLLC v. Jones, 385 S.W.3d 530, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 217 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2012), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 598 (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2012).

Law firms and attorneys were entitled to summary judgment in a client's legal malpractice action, concerning one attorney's alleged failure to file three QDROs and another attorney's alleged failure to monitor preparation of the QDROs, because the one-year limitations period in former T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(2) [now § 28-3-104(c)] began to run in June 2008 when the client had actual notice the QDROs had not been filed, and, as such, the client's October 2009 complaint was untimely. Pier v. Jungkind, 427 S.W.3d 922, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 232 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2013).

Lender's action against an attorney was timely filed within the statute of limitations because the attorney made fraudulent misrepresentations when he drafted a deed of trust in favor of the lender, conveying title to land owned by the attorney's brother; nothing in the brother's bankruptcy filings would have caused the lender to discover the nature of its injury suffered by reason of the defective and improper drafting of the deed of trust. Credential Leasing Corp. of Tenn. v. White, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 336 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 2016).

Former clients'  legal malpractice complaint against attorneys who represented them in an underlying lawsuit was untimely filed because, although the clients contended that the statute of limitation on their suit did not begin to run until the last defendant in their underlying lawsuit was dismissed, the statute of limitation began to run when their claims against two of the three defendants in their underlying lawsuit were dismissed as the clients then had sufficient knowledge of an injury, which was likely based on some legal malpractice. Story v. Bunstein, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 9, 2016), rev'd, Story v. Bunstine, 538 S.W.3d 455, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 747 (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2017).

Trial court properly dismissed the malpractice claim against the attorney because the claim was time-barred; information about the fraudulent nature of the transaction in question was available to the clients in May and August of 2012, and if the disclosure of such information caused the agreed judgments to become worthless, then the clients knew or should have known of this injury in August 2012 at the latest, and the filing of the complaint was not timely. Athena of S.C., LLC v. Macri, — S.W.3d —, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 766 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2016).

The Tennessee formulation of the discovery rule articulated in Carvell and again in John Kohl & Co. was the appropriate analysis for determining when a claim of legal malpractice accrued. Accordingly, Tennessee courts have declined to adopt the continuing representation rule and the appeal-tolling doctrine and have declined to hold that a final judgment was required before there was an actual injury for purposes of accrual. Story v. Bunstine, 538 S.W.3d 455, 2017 Tenn. LEXIS 747 (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2017).

Trial court properly granted attorneys'  motion for summary judgment because a client's legal malpractice action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations; the client's injury stemming from the attorneys'  representation in a federal case, and the client's knowledge of that alleged injury, occurred on the day that the district court entered judgment on April 28, 2014, but the client did not file his legal malpractice case until October 21, 2015. Thomas v. Myers, — S.W.3d —, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 697 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2017), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 257 (Tenn. Apr. 23, 2018).

50. Statutory Penalties.

The action for threefold damages, authorized by one “injured in his business or property” by the Antitrust Act of Congress, where one was led, by reason of an illegal arrangement between the members of a trust or combination formed in violation of the Antitrust Act, to pay an excessive price for iron water pipe, is not for a statutory penalty and the limitation for such action is ten years under § 28-3-110. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 27 S. Ct. 65, 51 L. Ed. 241, 1906 U.S. LEXIS 1603 (1906), superseded by statute as stated in, Pinney Dock & Transp. Corp. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 1514 (6th Cir. Ohio 1988).

Action against a telephone company to recover a statutory penalty for discriminating against an applicant for telephone service is governed by the one year prescriptive period. Brown v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 181 F. 246, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5813 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1909).

One year statute of limitations did not apply to suit by bank receiver against stockholders of bank to recover loss to unsecured creditors and depositors. Robertson v. Davis, 169 Tenn. 659, 90 S.W.2d 746, 1935 Tenn. LEXIS 94 (1936).

A suit under the provision of § 35-508 (now § 35-5-107) authorizing damages for failure of an officer or other person to comply with § 35-509 (now § 35-5-108) in sale of lands at foreclosure is not an action to recover a statutory penalty so as to be governed by the one year statute of limitations but falls within the ten year limitation of § 28-3-110. Doty v. Federal Land Bank, 173 Tenn. 140, 114 S.W.2d 953, 1937 Tenn. LEXIS 20 (1938).

It is settled that there is no federal statute of limitations governing actions under the antitrust laws for threefold the damages sustained and the statute of limitations of the state in which the action is commenced are applicable. Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 747, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3718 (D.N.Y. 1953), overruled, Cinema Service Corp. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 477 F. Supp. 174, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9433, 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P62964 .

Beneficiary's bad faith claim against an insurer under Tennessee's bad faith statute, T.C.A. § 56-7-105, was time-barred because it was filed almost six years after the denial of benefits claim, and the statute was governed by the one-year limitations period of T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(4) for actions for statutory penalties. Wynne v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co., 694 F. Supp. 2d 871, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23941 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 22, 2010).

51. Employer's Promise to Pay Tort Judgment Against Employee.

Suit by employee to recover on promise of employer to pay any judgment recovered by employee in action for personal injuries against another employee was a suit on a contract rather than in tort and was governed by the provisions of § 28-3-109 rather than by this section. Williams v. McElhaney, 203 Tenn. 602, 315 S.W.2d 106, 1958 Tenn. LEXIS 225 (1958).

52. Malicious Prosecution.

This section applied to an action for conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights consummated by securing plaintiff's conviction and imprisonment for robbery and was not tolled during the time plaintiff was imprisoned, there being no statutory provision for such tolling. Williams v. Hollins, 428 F.2d 1221, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 11330 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1970).

A cause of action for malicious prosecution accrues when a malicious suit is finally terminated in the defendant's favor. Christian v. Lapidus, 833 S.W.2d 71, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 414 (Tenn. 1992).

Abandonment of a civil action constitutes a final, favorable termination so as to commence the running of the statute of limitations for malicious prosecution. Christian v. Lapidus, 833 S.W.2d 71, 1992 Tenn. LEXIS 414 (Tenn. 1992).

In order to establish the essential elements of a malicious prosecution claim in Tennessee, a plaintiff must show that: (1) prior suit or judicial proceeding was brought against the plaintiff without probable cause, (2) the defendant brought the prior action with malice, and (3) the prior action was finally terminated in favor of the plaintiff. Hill v. White, 167 F.R.D. 47, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7425 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).

Court's dismissal of the malpractice suit against an attorney was a “favorable termination” for purposes of a malicious prosecution, because the malpractice plaintiff did not have standing to sue and the applicable statute of limitations was not complied with. Parrish v. Marquis, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 354 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 8, 2004), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 172 S.W.3d 526, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 698 (Tenn. 2005).

53. Wrongful Death.

Where a wrongful death action was filed in the Tennessee court within the one year limitation period, and later was dismissed other than on the merits, a subsequent action based on substantially the same facts filed in federal court under the Federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983 et seq.) was not barred by this section since the limitation was tolled by the operation of § 28-1-105. Bailey v. Harris, 377 F. Supp. 401, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8019 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).

A state court's dismissal of a wrongful death action with prejudice for failure to comply with the statute of limitations did not constitute a res judicata on the merits to a wrongful death action brought in another state. Cummings v. Cowan, 390 F. Supp. 1251, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13512 (N.D. Miss. 1975).

One year statute of limitations governing personal injury actions is applicable to actions for wrongful death, regardless of beneficiary's minority or disability. Jones v. Black, 539 S.W.2d 123, 1976 Tenn. LEXIS 572 (Tenn. 1976).

Where wrongful death action was commenced initially within one year after the cause of action arose, was dismissed without prejudice and then was refiled within one year after such dismissal and where subsequently the present plaintiff was substituted with the same effect as if the refiled action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest, the action was not barred by the statute of limitations. Caldwell v. Metcalfe, 458 F. Supp. 847, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12616 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).

The fraudulent concealment of the true cause of death would toll the statute of limitations in a wrongful death action. Woody v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 491 F. Supp. 1073, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12021 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).

An action for wrongful death of a minor must be brought within one year of the accrual of the cause of action. Collier v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 657 S.W.2d 771, 1983 Tenn. App. LEXIS 606 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

A cause of action for wrongful death accrues as of the date a cause of action accrues for the injury which resulted in the death, and the difficulty facing the courts is the determination of when the cause of action accrues. Craig v. R.R. Street & Co., 794 S.W.2d 351, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

Where injury, resulting in wrongful death, for which suit was brought, occurred more than one year prior to the institution of the suit, it was barred by § 50-6-112(d), as well as this section. Craig v. R.R. Street & Co., 794 S.W.2d 351, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).

Wife's wrongful death claim under T.C.A. § 20-5-113 was barred by the one-year statute of limitations in T.C.A. § 28-3-104 because the date of her husband's injury, rather than the date of his death, was dispositive for determining when the statute of limitations began to run. Ford v. Evans Delivery, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 995 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 4, 2006).

Where plaintiff parents brought their wrongful death claims more than three years after the death of their minor children, Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations barred these claims. T.C.A. § 28-1-106 did not have the effect of tolling the limitations period. Lemons v. Cloer, 206 S.W.3d 60, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 285 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 795 (Tenn. 2006).

Although the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment to a nursing home because a family untimely filed their wrongful death case, given the recent decision in Abels v. Genie Industries, Inc. , the judgment was vacated and the case was remanded for the parties to present proof of the decedent's mental state in light of Abels  and the legal disability statute, T.C.A. § 28-1-106. Burk v. RHA/Sullivan, Inc., 220 S.W.3d 896, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (Tenn. Jan. 29, 2007).

Trial court was correct in granting summary judgment to a nursing home because a family untimely filed their wrongful death case on September 30, 2004 because by September 9, 2003, the family was aware that the decedent's scrotal gangrene, for which he underwent surgery the following day, might have been caused by the neglect of the nursing home; the family then had a duty to investigate and discover whether the nursing home was in fact responsible for the decedent's injury. Burk v. RHA/Sullivan, Inc., 220 S.W.3d 896, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXIS 637 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006), appeal denied, — S.W.3d —, 2007 Tenn. LEXIS 82 (Tenn. Jan. 29, 2007).

54. Employment Discrimination.

A suit for employment discrimination was subject to this section. Mungen v. Choctaw, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1349, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11849 (W.D. Tenn. 1975).

Plaintiff's civil rights claim was barred by this statute where the claim arose more than one year prior to the filing of the suit. Webster v. Liberty Cash Grocers, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1002, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11748 (W.D. Tenn. 1975).

Plaintiff's state law claims for age discrimination were barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in this section. Easter v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc., 823 F. Supp. 489, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21029 (E.D. Tenn. 1991).

The limitations period applicable to a face discrimination action by plaintiff university administrator began to run on the date plaintiff received notice of his termination, not on the date on which his contract for services ended. Webster v. Tennessee Bd. of Regents, 902 S.W.2d 412, 1995 Tenn. App. LEXIS 134 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

Plaintiff's claim for relief arising from gas company's failure to enter into franchise agreement was not time barred under this section. Harper v. BP Exploration & Oil Co., 896 F. Supp. 743, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12350 (M.D. Tenn. 1995), modified, Harper v. BP Exploration & Oil, — F.3d —, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1324 (6th Cir. Tenn. Jan. 27, 1998), aff'd, Harper v. BP Exploration & Oil, 134 F.3d 371, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4529 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1998).

In an action for sexual harassment, the continuing violation doctrine, which allows a plaintiff to challenge an ongoing series of discriminatory acts in their entirety, would have applied if one of the discriminatory acts fell within the limitations period of this section. Spicer v. Beaman Bottling Co., 937 S.W.2d 884, 1996 Tenn. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. 1996), overruled in part, Booker v. Boeing Co., 188 S.W.3d 639, 2006 Tenn. LEXIS 311 (Tenn. 2006).

Plaintiff's race discrimination claim under Title VI was governed by the one-year limitations period set forth in T.C.A. § 28-3-104. Wade v. Knoxville Utils. Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 2001 FED App. 246P, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16932 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2001).

Since plaintiff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a Title VI claim, the limitations period was not tolled during the pendency of the administrative proceedings. Wade v. Knoxville Utils. Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 2001 FED App. 246P, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16932 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2001).

Employee's discrimination suit against a university and certain administrators, brought as a personal tort action and/or an employment discrimination suit, was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the employee sought (1) the disqualification (and presumably removal) of certain individuals at the university, such as the president, (2) disqualification of the appointments of various officials, and (3) dismissal of decisions made by an allegedly illegal committee, all of which exceeded the court's authority under the applicable statutes. Nagarajan v. Sharpe, — S.W.3d —, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 106 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018).

55. Loss of Consortium.

This statute begins to run at the time of loss of consortium even though the tortious conduct was discovered thereafter. Roberts v. Berry, 541 F.2d 607, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 7276 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1976).

56. Counterclaim.

Where plaintiff filed his tort claim within the limitation period, but defendant filed his tort counterclaim after the limitation period had expired, the timely filing of the original claim did not toll the statute of limitations with respect to the untimely counterclaim which was therefore dismissed. Brown v. Hipshire, 553 S.W.2d 570, 1977 Tenn. LEXIS 582 (Tenn. 1977).

57. Medical Malpractice.

In cases where medical malpractice is alleged to have o